

BRAZIL
AND THE
UNITED STATES
DURING
WORLD WAR II
AND ITS AFTERMATH

*Negotiating Alliance and
Balancing Giants*

FRANK D. McCANN



Brazil and the United States during World War II and Its Aftermath

Frank D. McCann

Brazil and the United States during World War II and Its Aftermath

Negotiating Alliance and Balancing Giants

palgrave
macmillan

Frank D. McCann
University of New Hampshire
Durham, NH, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-92909-5 ISBN 978-3-319-92910-1 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018949628

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover credit: Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-102791 (b&w film copy neg.)

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG

The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to Diane Marie who made it possible.

PREFACE

This book grew from conference papers and lectures that I gave over a number of years. My interest in the subject began in Professor Robert H. Ferrell's diplomatic history seminar at Indiana University. In this project, originally I wanted to do a brief study of the negotiations that led to the alliance between Brazil and the United States. But the deeper I went, the more it became clear that it was the very nature of those relations to be continually negotiating their contents, goals, and mutual responsibilities. As in my other studies, I have tried to keep a certain distance from the two sides and to tell the story from both Brazilian and American perspectives. To do so was, of course, dependent on having documentation from both that shed light on the same events. That was not always possible, but it was my goal. This project studying negotiations and the gradual building of trust was inspired by my continuing studies of the history of the Brazilian army.

As the notes on sources show, government records for military and diplomatic interactions were impressively rich and detailed. The difficulty was that the two countries did not release all the documentation at the same time; it came available in dribs and drabs over many years. Some American documents from the war era were declassified in the 1970s, while Brazilian materials were often opened much later. One of the most important documents, President Getúlio Vargas's diaries, were kept secret by the family until their publication in 1995. Their existence changed the level of analysis.

Throughout my emphasis is on military relations because they were central to the bond between the countries. In the 1930s the Brazilian army was the principal national institution. From 1939 the danger that the Axis would strike across the South Atlantic was very real to American military planners. They wanted to get American forces into Brazil to fend off such a threat. For the Brazilians allowing foreign troops on their soil was unacceptable. They wanted arms so that they could defend their country themselves. The story here is how the Americans eventually negotiated acceptance of air and naval bases in Brazil. Ultimately the largest American air base outside of the United States was at Natal in Northeast Brazil. Before long there would be 16 US bases, including the headquarters of the Navy's Fourth Fleet at Recife. The 16,000 American military personnel stationed in Brazil during the war had noticeable effects on Brazilian culture. German torpedoes sank Brazilian ships in their coastal waters until Brazil recognized that a state of war existed. With an eye to getting weaponry, increased international status, and revenge, Brazil sent an infantry division and a fighter squadron to fight in Italy under American command. This is the only case in the war of a foreign infantry division of an independent sovereign nation submitting itself entirely to American command and control.

Today in the United States World War II is ancient history, in Brazil it is almost yesterday. It is a focal point much more so than in the United States. But that does not mean to say that younger Brazilians know more than their American counterparts. I carry the story through the post-war years, the deep disappointment with unfulfilled American commitments and the turmoil of the 1950s and 1960s which saw Brazil refusing to get involved in the Korean conflict and the war in Vietnam. The post-war Cold War with the communist powers contributed to the Brazilian military taking control of the government from 1964 to 1985. The World War impacted greatly Brazil's process of industrialization, gradually turning it into the eighth-ranked economy in the world in 2018. Today the military aspects of the relationship are less salient, but still important. It should mean something that today there are more Brazilians in South America than the total population of the entire continent's other republics and that Portuguese is now the language of the majority of South Americans.

Brazil has consumed my academic career since 1962 when my fellow graduate students—George Fodor, Teresinha Souto Ward, and Iêda Dias da Silva—convinced me to specialize on their country. I continue to be grateful for their timely intervention.

The American Philosophical Society and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars made research in the National Archives

possible. The extensive Xerox copies of military intelligence and State Department files that I collected were organized and made accessible by student research assistants Candace Kattar and Gus Lawlor at the University of New Hampshire, who also collected very useful biographical data on 254 Brazilian general officers. They have my lasting gratitude. And I am thankful to the University for numerous research grants that frequently allowed me travel to Brazil.

Special thanks to David Mares for including me in the Minerva Grant Research Group at the University of California—San Diego (2011–2014) which studied “Brazil as an Emerging Power.” The Minerva Grant underwrote a month’s research in Brazil in 2013 that included a return to Natal and an intensive tour of the Parnamirim air base arranged by my colleague Rostand Medeiros. And my gratitude to Jose Henrique de Almeida Braga for sending me his new book: *Salto Sobre o Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceara* which provided insights into the effects that the presence of so many Americans had on local culture.

I must acknowledge that the seminar I had the privilege of giving at the *Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos* of the Universidade Federal Fluminense in October 2014 gave me the chance to try out ideas on a remarkable group of graduate students. I am grateful to Professor Vagner Camilo Alves for his invitation and making sometimes complicated arrangements. And my thanks to Nicolette Amstutz of *Lexington Books* for mining the conference proceedings of the Brazilian Studies Association.

The help I received from librarians and archivists allowed acquiring documents and books beyond number. The staffs of the Diplomatic and Modern Military Branches of the National Archives stand out in my memory. My daughter Katherine’s invitation to be a contributing editor to the *Handbook of Latin American Studies* (Hispanic Division, Library of Congress) has kept me abreast of the latest historical research in Brazil. *The Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty*, the *Arquivo Histórico do Exército*, the *Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil*, and the *Arquivo Nacional* contributed to my research more than I can possibly detail. My dear deceased friend Colonel Luiz Paulo Macedo de Carvalho and his wife Lucia Maria were my teachers, translators, guides, and frequently congenial hosts. Over the years Macedo said that we should write a book together about the full range of the military relations of our two countries. I hope that this one is a step in fulfilling his idea. Colonel Durval Lourenço Pereira arranged a visit to the preparatory school of the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras* and graciously shared his research on the 1942 German submarine attacks. His research changes how those attacks should be interpreted.

André Gustavo Stumpf has been my sure guide in understanding Brazilian politics and much more about his country. David Fleischer's incomparable weekly reports on Brazil keep it real and immediate. Colonel Sérgio Paulo Muniz Costa has long been helpful in shaping my understanding of the Brazilian army. Also I was aided and encouraged by my editor at Palgrave Macmillan Christine Pardue, whose gentle prods kept me going. And thanks to Danna Messer for the fine index.

Selecting photos proved complicated due to copyrights, proper resolution, and bureaucracy. Three individuals and their organizations were especially gracious in their assistance: Alexis Quinn of the George C. Marshall Foundation Research Library, Lexington, Virginia; Matthew Hanson of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York; and Major Alcemar Ferreira Jr. of the Brazilian Army's *Arquivo Histórico*, Rio de Janeiro. Mr. Hanson not only provided photos, he identified individuals whose names I did not know, and sent along a very helpful document related to FDR's Natal meeting with Vargas.

Some of the text, expanded and in different form, was drawn from previous publications. Chapter 6 draws on "Brazil and World War II: The Forgotten Ally, What did you do in the war, Ze Carioca?" *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America Latina y El Caribe* (University of Tel Aviv), Vol. 6, No.2 (1995), pp. 35–70. And Chap. 8 utilized "The Rise and Fall of the Brazilian-American Military Alliance, 1942–1977," *Revista Esboços* (Florianópolis), Vol. 22, No. 34 (July 2016), pp. 13–60.

Among the most valuable things an author can have are friends, colleagues, and relatives who read and critique with pencil in hand. My compadre Michael Conniff started with the proposal and gave me insightful commentary throughout the writing of the book. Sonny Davis, and my brother Bernard McCann, attacked my punctuation with impressive zeal and made wise comments on the text. Darlene Sadlier saved me from making some factual errors. Francisco Ferraz and Sidney Munhoz bought a Brazilian perspective with their useful critiques. But above all, I thank my dear wife Diane Marie, who read and re-read draft after draft making the text more understandable. And she read the entire text aloud as we checked the proofs. She gave up our usual canoe excursions on the Lamprey throughout many fair weather days, as well as ski trips in New Hampshire's White Mountains, so I could disappear into my study. Her constant encouragement, good nature, tolerance, patience, and love made this book a reality.

A thousand thanks to all.



Fig. 1 Map of Brazil, circa 1940s. From *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945* by Frank D. McCann, Jr. (Copyright © 1973, renewed 2001 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission)

CONTENTS

1	A Relationship of Unbalanced Giants	1
2	Pre-war Fears and Explorations	19
3	Search for Mutual Benefits	59
4	Brazil's Options Narrow	99
5	Decision to Fight	143
6	The Brazilian Expeditionary Force: The Smoking Cobras	183
7	Post-World War Disappointment	225
8	Cold Wind from the East	249
	Index	293

ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Airport Development Program
AG	Adjutant General
AGV	Archive of Getúlio Vargas CPDOC, FGV (Rio)
AHE	Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio)
AHMRE	Arquivo Histórico de MRE (Itamaraty Palace, Rio)
AMAN	Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras
AOA	Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC, FGV (Rio)
BEF	Brazilian Expeditionary Force
CIEX	Centro de Informação do Exército (Army Intelligence)
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CPDOC	Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil
DA	Department of the Army
DAR	Division of American Republics (State Department)
ECEME	Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior (Command and General Staff School)
ESAO	Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais (Officers Advanced Training School)
EW	European War
EXP	<i>Expedido</i> (outgoing MRE dispatch)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDRL	Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park, New York)
FEB	Força Expedicionária Brasileira
FGV	Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Rio)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers (State Department)
G2	Army Intelligence

GS	General Staff
JBUSDC	Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission
MATS	Military Air Transport System
MID	Military Intelligence Division (General Staff, War Department)
MMB	Modern Military Branch (NARA)
MRE	Ministério das Relações Exteriores
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (Washington DC)
NPR	National Public Radio
OCIAA	Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
OCMH	Office of the Chief of Military History
OF	Official File (FDRL, Hyde Park)
OPD	Operations Plans Division (General Staff, War Department)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PAA	Pan American Airways
PPF	President's Personal File (FDRL, Hyde Park)
PSD	Partido Social Democrático
PTB	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
RG	Record Group (NARA)
SADATC	South Atlantic Division Air Transport Command
SLC	Standing Liaison Committee (State, War, Navy Departments)
SNI	Serviço Nacional de Informações (National Intelligence Service)
USN	United States Navy
WD	War Department
WPD	War Plans Division (General Staff, War Department)
WWII	World War II

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 2.1	Roosevelt and Vargas on FDR's arrival in Rio de Janeiro, 1936. The president's oldest son James is the naval officer in the front looking at his father. (Courtesy of the FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY, NARA)	23
Fig. 2.2	Marshall's arrival in Brazil. (Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation Research Library, Lexington, Virginia)	28
Fig. 4.1	Guanabara Palace: President's residence. (Photo courtesy of author)	103
Fig. 4.2	Itamaraty Palace: Brazil's foreign ministry. (Photo courtesy of author)	108
Fig. 4.3	Catete Palace President's Offices, where the cabinet met. In the second Vargas government in the 1950s, the president lived here. (Photo courtesy of the author)	111
Fig. 4.4	The Springboard to Victory: Miami to Natal to Africa and points east. (Source: Charles Hendricks, "Building the Atlantic Bases" in Barry W. Fowle, ed. <i>Builders and Fighters: U.S. Army Engineers in World War II</i> (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Office of History, US Army Corps of Engineers, 1992), p. 36)	121
Fig. 5.1	General Gustavo Cordeiro de Faria explaining Natal's harbor defenses to Roosevelt, Vargas, and Admiral Ingram. (Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, NARA)	146

- Fig. 5.2 This grid map was the type the German navy used to track the location of its vessels. The dark box shows the area assigned to U-507 and the light gray to U-130. The dark lines show U-507's route to and along the Brazilian coast. (Map was prepared by Col. Durval Lourenço Pereira for his *Operação Brasil: O ataque alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015), p. 198. Reproduced by permission of Col. Durval.) 152
- Fig. 5.3 Vargas and his American allies aboard the *USS Humboldt*. (Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. NARA. Bottom from left: Harry Hopkins, Vargas, FDR, Jefferson Caffery. Standing from left: Rear Admiral Ross McIntire, Major General Robert L. Walsh, Admiral Jonas Ingram, Rear Admiral Augustin T. Beauregard) 165
- Fig. 5.4 Vargas, Roosevelt, and Caffery Natal conversations on the *USS Humboldt*. (Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. NARA) 166
- Fig. 6.1 Lt. General Mark Clark, commander of US Fifth Army, in front seat. In the rear, Captain Vernon Walters, interpreter with FEB commander João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes. (Courtesy of the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro) 199
- Fig. 6.2 Map of Italy showing area north of Firenze where FEB fought. From *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945* by Frank D. McCann, Jr. (Copyright © 1973, renewed 2001 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission) 200
- Fig. 6.3 Generals Willis Crittenberger, C.O. of Fourth Corps, and Zenobio da Costa, C.O. of FEB Artillery. (Courtesy of the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro) 201
- Fig. 6.4 Map of FEB's principal area of engagement. From *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945* by Frank D. McCann, Jr. (Copyright © 1973, renewed 2001 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission) 202
- Fig. 6.5 Italians cheering victorious FEB troops. (Courtesy of Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro) 205
- Fig. 6.6 FEB patch with combined colors of Brazil and the United States 207
- Fig. 6.7 German prisoners captured by the FEB. (Photo courtesy of the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro) 209



CHAPTER 1

A Relationship of Unbalanced Giants

Brazil and the United States are the two giants of the Western Hemisphere in territory, population, natural resources, and industrial plant. They have never engaged each other in war, their governments have had relatively few disputes of the sort that fill the pages of diplomatic and military histories, and they have adjusted their relations to new regional and world conditions many times since José Silvestre Rebello presented his credentials to President James Monroe in May 1824 as the first representative of the independent Empire of Brazil. Though their relations have been peaceful for 194 years, and give every sign of remaining so, there has been a thread of tension running throughout the fabric of their relations.¹

The sources of this tension have been political, economic, and cultural, and they are also related to the differences between the identities and systems of the two countries. Though Brazil and the United States have many similarities, they are profoundly different from one another.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

First let us look at the similarities. They are both huge political entities, with their land borders measured in thousands of kilometers (miles), their long seacoasts supporting old seafaring traditions, and they both experienced a long struggle to occupy, control, and develop vast interior spaces. They both have deep traces of their colonial experiences in their national

characters. Both reflect predominately European traditions that overran native cultures and land claims, but both display cultural traits influenced by native values and practices. Both used extensive slave labor and had their cultures significantly marked by African influences from their large African-descended populations. Both absorbed European and Asian immigrants. And their respective military institutions have played major roles in their own systems, though in very different ways. The Brazilian military stance is constitutionally defensive, although its military has intervened in politics to the extreme of taking control of the national government. The Americans have used their military to intervene in neighboring countries and international wars while avoiding direct interference in US national politics. Both countries share the common feature of having superficial knowledge and understanding of the other's society. Brazil is seen from the United States through a Caribbean and Spanish-American haze, while for Brazilians the United States has a mythical Hollywood and TV image. Both see themselves as unique expressions of humanity. To make matters more complicated for American understanding, Brazilian governments and intellectuals, aside from some on the left, have not thought of their country as part of Latin America (which was a French cultural construct) until recently, but rather as a continental-size chunk of South America.²

Their differences are perhaps more salient. Brazil was born at the end of the medieval era and the beginning of the Renaissance in the Catholic heritage, while the United States grew from a colonial experience on the East Coast of North America related to the Protestant Reformation. The Portuguese monarchy kept Brazil closed to foreigners and foreign trade from 1580 to 1808, while the Americans had a lively international maritime trade from early on. Their intellectual ancestry produced different attitudes toward law; in the United States, whatever is not outlawed is legal, while in Brazil to be legal, a thing must be specified in law. This in turn has produced different attitudes toward government, Americans assume that they are free to act and so tend to ignore government and to resent its interference in their daily lives, while Brazilians seek permission, recognition, and support from the government. Or perhaps better put from the ever-present bureaucracy. Americans created impersonal, impartial mechanisms, such as the graduated court system, before which they seek to resolve their differences; Brazil has a similar appearing system of courts, but on a more personal level, Brazilians seek to settle problems via the intercession of friends, relatives, and patrons. The *panelinha*, an informal grouping of individuals who share common interests and personal

ties, has “a significantly pervasive role in the brokering, clientelistic nature of the Brazilian political-governmental system.” Such groups are difficult to identify and study, but they are one of the unseen linkages “between various interests, organizations, and agencies” that maintain networks of influence throughout Brazil. Access to such networks is obtained by what the Brazilians call *pistolão* or the exercise of influence. The networks can be positive or negative, but their functioning can undermine the rule of law. Regulations and laws may or may not catch hold and endure (*pegam ou não pegam*), but they will likely be struggled against via what is known as the *jeito* or *jeitinho*, the overcoming or getting around annoying or inconvenient obstacles. *Panelinha* and *jeito* “serve as means for reconciling the modern and the traditional – certainly a continuing need for citizens of changing but not yet transformed Brazil.”³ Via the *jeitinho*, as Roberto DaMatta observed, “we do what we want and avoid open conflict with the law.”⁴

An extreme example of a *jeito* could be Brazilian Chief of Staff Pedro Aurélio Góes Monteiro’s reaction to US Navy Secretary Frank Knox’s request in 1943 to discuss cooperation and to be briefed on Brazil’s war plans. In fact there were no war plans on which to brief the Americans, so Góes did a *jeito* by quickly gathering his staff officers for an all-night session in which they created ostensible war plans. The next day the general was able to expound on Brazilian plans as if they had existed for months or years.

The landholding patterns and their attendant social-economic and labor systems that grew out of these respective histories were also dissimilar. The Brazilian Land Law of 1850 reinforced the tendency toward large landholdings with slave or peon labor, while the American Homestead Act of 1862 increased the number of small family farms. Witness too the importance that the American Congress gave to education with the passage in 1862 of the Morrill Act that set aside public lands in each state for the support of public universities. That Act gave rise to the great state universities that have contributed so much to the development of the American economy and society. In Brazil the public universities were not established until the 1930s; the lack of public education for the masses acted as a drag on development. In 1940 Brazil’s white people were 47% illiterate, Negroes were 79%, and Pardos (mixed) were 71%,⁵ while the American white population was 4% illiterate and the black 20%. The United States, in the decades after the Civil War, adopted racial segregation as a lamentable response to the abolition of slavery, while Brazil hid

its racial prejudice behind a seemingly more tolerant miscegenation. After slavery was outlawed in 1888, the Brazilian elite gradually embraced the convenient idea that the country enjoyed a racial democracy, which made good press copy but was far from the truth. The two countries had been intimately joined by the African slave trade. Though it was illegal for US citizens and vessels to participate in the slave trade, they and American capital engaged enthusiastically in the dastardly traffic between Africa and Brazil.⁶

The two countries are continental in size, in 1940 Brazil had a population of about 41,114,000, while the United States had 132,164,569, but then much of Brazil's territory was beyond the reach of the central government. In 1940, Brazil was still the land of coffee, it dominated world production. The American economy was heavily industrialized and moved by extensive coast-to-coast and regional railway networks which also linked population centers all across the land. With the exception of Minas Gerais, Brazil's population was concentrated along its long coast just as it had been in the colonial era. And with the exception of the rail line from Rio and São Paulo to Rio Grande do Sul, the republic's railroads ran from ports a relatively few miles into the hinterland to carry out regional products for export. The interior areas were tied together by mule train trails, rather than roads, which were few and far between. Even the "highway" from Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo was gravel in 1940. As historian Joel Wolfe observed, "It was not until Brazilians began to manufacture automobiles in the 1950s that they built the first major roads into the interior."⁷

Another major difference between Brazil and the United States as the world skidded toward war was that the former was a dictatorship, while the latter was an elected representative democracy. Getúlio Vargas had come to power via a revolution in 1930 that toppled an oligarchy led by the elite of the state of São Paulo. He was the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul bordering Uruguay and Argentina. His military allies were reformist officers committed to making the army a force for change and bringing Brazil into the modern world.⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the presidency in early 1933 in a type of electoral revolution that brought Democrats to power after a decade of Republican rule had plunged the country into the greatest Depression in history. In attempting to reconstruct their economies, the two chief executives felt a unity of purpose and a spirit of comradeship. In 1934 Vargas had been elected president by the constituent assembly turned national congress after writing a new

constitution. Economic difficulties and political disagreements stymied plans for rearmament and industrialization. By 1937 it was clear that Brazil could not pay on its national debt or on bonds sold abroad and also arm itself. The army was alarmed by its evident weakness in being unable to defend against persistent corrosive regionalism and rising international tensions. Brazilian politics entered into crisis as the 1938 presidential elections neared. Minister of War General Eurico Dutra was convinced that an explosion was about to occur. Laws were not working, he declared, and that only the armed forces were “capable of saving Brazil from the catastrophe ready to erupt.” It was necessary to act, “even outside the law,” he asserted, “in defense of the corrupted law and institutions.” The Chamber of Deputies would be purged of its reactionary, weak, and incapable members; in fact it would be closed. Dutra insisted that “the constituted authorities should be maintained. The movement will carry with it the President of the Republic, whose authority will be reinforced.”⁹ To end the stalemate, Vargas with General Dutra and Army Chief of Staff Pedro de Góes Monteiro toppled the constitutional government in the name of the higher good of the security of the *Pátria*. Vargas made a pledge, or *compromisso*, that he would equip and arm the armed forces so that they could carry out their assigned duty, in return they would provide the muscle for a regime of force and national development. The regime was styled the *Estado Novo* (New State) to mark its break with the past. This would be the government that the United States would have to work with in creating a framework for hemisphere defense.¹⁰ Roosevelt viewed the Brazilian situation with a certain tolerant benevolence. He had long had a fascination with Brazil. As a youth, during a trip to Paris, he had seen the exiled Emperor Pedro II in a park. And, of course, he was stirred by the adventure of his cousin, Theodore, journeying the River of Doubt with Brazilian Colonel Cândido Rondon in 1914. That venture had emblazoned the Roosevelt name on the river in the Western Amazon. He would have known that his cousin considered the “last frontier” to be in Brazil.¹¹ He visited Rio de Janeiro briefly in 1936.

The dissimilar national psychologies of the two countries affected what they expected from their relationship. The Brazilians frequently envisaged more from the United States than its political system allowed the government to give. In the twentieth century, Brazilian leaders thought that the bonds of “friendship” between the two governments gave them claims on the United States. They did not appreciate that friendships between leaders, while extremely useful in furthering relations, did not transfer to

friendship at the societal level; that personal friendship did not convert into national favors. As a result, at times Brazilian leaders were disappointed when their expectations were not fulfilled by their American counterparts. For their part the Americans, caught up in their fears of the Axis, minimized Brazilian national pride and worries about foreign encroachment on their territory. They expected Brazilians to trust them, ignoring that US history in Latin America recommended that the Brazilians should be wary.

It is not surprising that tension arises between two huge dynamic countries linked by many different kinds of interactions. Some of the sources of tension are cultural, while others are related to the imbalance between the two economies. The form of Brazil's government—which has ranged from monarchy to oligarchic presidency to dictatorship to elected congress and presidency—has been less important than other factors as a source of tension. Certainly in the post-World War II period, there has been tension regardless of the type of national leadership. Developmentalist, left-leaning administrations, right-wing military regimes, and civilian-centrist governments have all had their share of problems with the United States and vice versa.

Some problems could have been avoided if Brazilian and American leaders had better understanding of the other's society, language, culture, and political system. But, given the lack of such understanding, it is not surprising that Brazilians would feel uneasy facing the highly organized, economically and militarily strong United States. American impatience, ethnocentrism, and self-righteousness make Washington take positions on such matters as basing troops, atomic energy, and Amazonian development that strike Brazilians as potential threats to their national sovereignty.

Brazilian and American expectations of each other came into play at such moments. In the post-war era, Brazilians quite rightly recalled their role in World War II, which at certain points in that conflict was very important. Indeed, Brazil was a factor in the pre-war tension between the United States and Nazi Germany, because one of the elements of contention in the 1930s was over the Brazilian market and access to Brazil's raw materials. During the war the American air and naval bases in the Northeast of Brazil played major roles in destroying Axis submarines in the South Atlantic and in the Allied victories in Egypt and North Africa. The supply of natural resources and foodstuffs was of basic importance, as was the denial of those things to the Axis. The Brazilian Expeditionary Force

[*Força Expedicionária Brasileira*, commonly referred to as *FEB*] in the Italian campaign was important to both countries, but for different reasons; to the Americans it embodied a guarantee of Brazilian commitment to the Allied cause; to the Brazilians it was a blood sacrifice that would bind them to their American allies in a special, deep friendship that would bring future benefits.

Brazilians and Americans viewed American wartime assistance differently as well. The building of the steel mill at Volta Redonda in the state of Rio de Janeiro was for the Americans a short-term, immediate measure, a bargaining chip that helped keep Brazil out of the German camp, but Brazilians viewed it and the later economic advisory mission led by Morris Cooke, that recommended long-term support of Brazilian development, as the beginning of continued American assistance. Such aid would not be given to Brazil's rival, Argentina. Oswaldo Aranha, who as foreign minister kept Brazil on a steady pro-American course, expressed the relationship as one in which Brazil would support the United States on the world scene in return for United States' support of Brazilian hegemony in South America. Stated so neatly, it seemed, from the perspective of Rio de Janeiro, to be a *fait accompli*, but in the Department of State, such thinking was met with caution and the desire to avoid becoming "entangled in the subtle web of Mr. Aranha's balance of power politics."¹²

Brazilian leaders were understandably drawn to the point of view of Americans such as Morris Cooke, who believed that the colonial-era economy was coming to an end and that Brazil would attain industrial maturity through hydro-electric energy, air transport, and light metals. Cooke was committed to the idea that great things could be "accomplished for Brazil and ultimately for the United States in the free passage of our technology as an essential element in the industrialization of Brazil."¹³ At the time Brazilian leaders were not aware that Cooke's report was received with skepticism in the State Department, where one official commented that it contained "captivating excursions into fantasy," and that Cooke seemed to be infected with the enthusiasm about Brazil's natural resources and future that prompted "so many otherwise normal American visitors to Imaginative thinking."¹⁴ Those Americans with direct experience, who had actually been in Brazil, especially those who spoke Portuguese, often saw things differently than those who lacked such experience.

Brazilians and Americans came out of the war with different expectations of each other. 1945–1946 was a time of great historical change for the world and for the two republics. The American leadership was no

longer the same one that took the United States into the war; it had a vague or no memory of a special Brazilian role. The events of the war had eliminated recollection of the difficult days of 1939–1942. In contrast, the Brazilian post-war leadership was composed of many of the same men who had led Brazil during the conflict, with the notable exceptions of Getúlio Vargas and Oswaldo Aranha. The replacement of elites in the United States was more rapid and continuous in the two decades after the war than it was in Brazil.

When you look at what was available to read about the war, you notice that the Brazilian role fades from view. Secretary of State Cordell Hull's and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles's memoirs and historians William Langer and Everett Gleason's 1952 and 1953 books on the start of the war gave Brazil its due, but there was no comprehensive study of the Brazilian involvement until Princeton University Press published *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945* in 1973. And that book did not appear in Portuguese until 1995. Even major studies of the war make no reference to Brazil. The vast majority of Americans today know nothing of Brazil's contributions to Allied victory. Indeed, Americans still confuse Brazil and Argentina and think that Brazil tended to support the Axis and after the war offered sanctuary to fleeing Nazis. Witness the book and film *The Boys from Brazil*, which dealt with a plot to recreate the German Reich, which was actually set in Paraguay!¹⁵ Americans are still surprised to learn that Brazil fought alongside the Allies. As a result the constant post-war Brazilian references to the wartime alliance had no popular reverberations in the United States.

Brazil and the United States were military allies from 1942 to 1977. The alliance was an important element in Brazil's modernization and the development of its armed forces. As an historical note, when Brazil gained independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazilian Emperor Pedro I sent an envoy to Washington with instructions to negotiate an alliance with the northern republic. The Americans believed that "a Treaty of alliance offensive and defensive to repel any invasion of the Brazilian Territories by the forces of Portugal" was not likely to be necessary and so declined, but concurred in the "expediency of permanently uniting our two Nations in the ties of Friendship, Peace and Commerce" and that the United States was disposed to conclude a treaty to that effect.¹⁶ So business was to be the basis of the relationship. However, there were crucial exceptions to the tendency of the American government to hold the Brazilians at arm's length. For example, in 1893, President Grover Cleveland violated

neutrality laws by allowing a private businessman, with Brazilian interests, to raise a 12-ship flotilla, armed with the era's most feared naval gun and electrical torpedoes, crewed and commanded by Americans, and steamed for Rio to suppress rebels against the then new Brazilian republic.¹⁷ The Brazilian government was so pleased that it commemorated July 4 as a holiday. The relationship over the next decades has been labeled "an unwritten alliance."¹⁸ In 1917 the Brazilian army sent a group of officers to train at the US coast artillery school, as well as a mission to study the organization of American war plants and arsenals, Brazilian officers served on American warships in World War I, and Brazil welcomed a large American Naval Mission in 1922.¹⁹ During the Great War, Brazil was largely distracted by its own problems. The army was concluding its suppression of a serious peasant rebellion in the Contestado region of Santa Catarina and Paraná and attempting to modernize itself and its relationship to society. The war in Europe seemed far away, even though Brazil became a rather inactive belligerent. Some of the army's younger officers were frustrated with missing a chance to fight, which provoked a few of them to volunteer for service in the French army.²⁰ The gap between the United States and Brazil perhaps was symbolized by the flag that the organizers of the victory parade in New York gave to the Brazilian delegation. It was the flag of the Brazilian Empire that had been overthrown in 1889.

BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

After World War I, seeking to modernize their army, the Brazilians turned to France for an advisory mission. They considered inviting the Americans to learn from the United States' massive mobilization, but thought that they were culturally closer to the French and political and banking interests in São Paulo backed the choice of France.²¹ By the 1930s the Brazilian General Staff was somewhat disenchanted with the French and piecemeal began seeking American assistance for specialized training in coastal artillery, medical care, and aviation. American aircraft and weapons producers were more interested in accommodating Brazilians at their plants than were American military officials in training them in their schools and bases.²² The idea of a military alliance was not on the official agenda of either country. Indeed in 1933–1938, Brazil, which could not afford to buy arms in the United States (also made difficult by neutrality laws), turned to Germany, where it could use "compensation trade" to acquire weapons. This was not an ideologically based decision, but a practical

economic one. The Brazilian army chief of staff warned "...we are disarmed, even our rifles are in a sad state."²³ This interlude of doing business with the Nazi regime caused undue suspicion in the United States and resulted in the labeling of some Brazilian leaders involved as Germanophiles.

At the very time these purchases were being negotiated, Brazilian army intelligence officers were saying that the "ambitions and demands of Germany, Italy, and Japan" were a "latent danger for Brazil." They also recommended "greater closeness with the United States of America, our principal support in case of war." These officers saw the United States as Brazil's best customer, but noted that "we buy relatively little from them." They understood that unless Brazil developed its military power, it could not liberate itself from "North American dependence," which they thought it could do "without prejudicing an even greater closeness with the great confederation of the north."²⁴

As the world slid toward another great war, Brazilian army leaders believed that they had to depend on their own wits and resources and that they should use the crises that lay ahead to obtain the greatest advantage for Brazil. When considering the looming war clouds, Brazilian military and presidential papers continually pointed to the United States as the logical partner.

WORLD WAR II ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES

In January 1937, such thinking naturally led President Getúlio Vargas to offer discussion of all forms of military and naval cooperation, including an American naval base in a Brazilian port to be used in case of aggression against the United States. At the time Washington was not prepared to act. Less than two years later, it would be the Roosevelt administration that would be desperate to obtain bases in Brazil.

The popular perception of World War II in Brazil has a curious poisonous undercurrent suggesting that the United States had somehow drawn Brazil into the conflict against the better judgment of Brazilian leaders. At its extreme this undercurrent alleges unbelievably that US Navy submarines sank Brazilian ships to provoke the country to enter the war.²⁵ This tale had its origins in the efforts of Nazi agents to undermine the credibility of Brazil's war effort. It was believed by some at the time and has been passed on down to the present. Some of the literature on the Brazilian Expeditionary Force carries a warily suspicious tone that Brazilians, especially the FEB troops, had been exploited by the United States. Some

commentary suggests that the United States pressured Brazil to enter the war. The documentary evidence leaves little doubt as to what actually happened. However, some of these false undercurrents are fixed in a portion of the popular Brazilian imagination.²⁶

Even some noted Brazilian historians have carelessly misread events. For example, Boris Fausto, historian at the Universidade de São Paulo, asserted: “By the end of 1941, without waiting for authorization from the Brazilian government, American troops had set up bases in the Northeast”²⁷ [emphasis added]. This book shows the absolute falsehood of that statement. Alternate facts and unresolved doubts must not be allowed to infect history. Keeping analyses firmly based on archival records lessens the space available for fake stories.

The *FEB* in the Italian campaign was the culmination of a long and complex process of negotiations and confidence building from 1938 to 1944 that created the alliance between Brazil and the United States. My intent is to study the nature of Brazilian-American military relations, the negotiations that created the alliance, and the often divergent objectives of the two nations. From 1938 onward, American leaders had been worried about Brazil’s vulnerability to German attack, especially against its north-eastern bulge. They feared that if the Axis could secure part of the north-east its forces could launch an air attack on the crucial Panama Canal. Moreover, the United States needed air and naval bases to confront the Axis submarines that were threatening the passage of Allied shipping through the South Atlantic and to fly aircraft, equipment, and supplies across to Africa and then onto the Middle East, Russia, South Asia, and the Far East. Their solution was to obtain permission to build air and naval bases in Brazil’s northeast, eliminate Axis-owned airlines from Brazilian skies, build up Brazilian military capabilities, and station American troops in the region to assure its safety. In 1940, to prepare the critical airfields before an actual emergency occurred, the US Army made an agreement with Pan American Airways to make arrangements with Brazilian authorities and to do the construction via its subsidiary *Panair do Brasil*. As a result when the need arose in 1942, the necessary airfields were available to handle the increasingly heavier military traffic from Miami through Brazil to Africa and beyond. In retrospect the army was pleased with its wisdom because without “the foresighted planning that preceded the 1940 contract with Pan American, the entire course of the war might have been changed.”²⁸

The history of World War II has tended to focus on the battlefields, but victories could not be won without munitions, equipment, food, and all manner of other supplies. And without transport by air and sea, such crucial things could not reach their destinations. In the vast logistical network created by the United States, the Northeast of Brazil was the “indispensable link.”²⁹ When the North Atlantic air route closed down in the winter months, “the Brazilian route handled virtually all air traffic to Europe and Africa, a large part of the planes and emergency supplies for India and China, and some of the lend-lease materials for the Soviet Union.” This traffic included thousands of supply planes and some 2500 combat planes flying to overseas stations. In 1943, the vitally significant Brazilian airway would be “the air funnel to the battlefields of the world.”³⁰

Until the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Brazilians did not share American strategic worries about the Axis. For them the struggles in Europe and Asia were far away and they believed that the more likely immediate threat to Brazil was from Argentina in the south. Some Brazilian leaders thought that as in World War I they could avoid large-scale involvement. But above all they wanted to control defense of their own national territory. Moreover, they were uncertain that the United States could or would come to their aid if Brazil were attacked. In reality their armed forces were weak, and they had insufficient industrial capability to produce their own weapons. Where the two national perspectives and objectives deviated, there were tensions, suspicions, and misunderstandings ruling the day. American military and naval intelligence reports and analyses richly documented the issues involved, but, as would be expected, they were colored by an American perspective that was impatient with Brazilian worries about sovereignty. The documents were classified secret and unavailable to historians for decades after the war. They and the Brazilian archives for the period have been gradually opened to researchers, and some documents have even found their way into print. Thus, it is now possible to have a more balanced account of what took place.

NOTES

1. For relations in the decades prior to the 1930s, see Frank D. McCann, “Brazil and the United States: Two Centuries of Relations,” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. *Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries* (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 23–51.

2. Leslie Bethell, "Brazil and Latin America" *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (August 2010), pp. 457–485. Darcy Ribeiro in his study of the meaning of Brazil projects its destiny as joining "with all Latin Americans in our common opposition to ... Anglo-Saxon America" See his *Brazilian People: The Formation and Meaning of Brazil* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), pp. 321–322.
3. Ronald M. Schneider, "*Order and Progress*": *A Political History of Brazil* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 20–21; Belmiro Valverde Jobim Castor, *O Brasil Não É Para Amadores: Estado, Governo e Burocracia na Terra do Jeitinho* (Curitiba: IBOP-Pr, 2000), pp. 46–50; and not to be missed is Roberto Da Matta, *O que faz o brasil, Brasil?* (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1989), pp. 29, 41, 66–69.
4. Livia Barbosa, *O Jeitinho Brasileiro: A Arte de ser mais igual que os outros* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campos, 1992), Roberto DaMatta, Prefácio, no page number, pp. 125–137.
5. T. Lynn Smith, *Brazil: People and Institutions* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 490.
6. Gerald Horne, *The Deep South: the United States, Brazil, and the African Slave Trade* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), pp. 3–4. For race in the two countries see Thomas E. Skidmore, *O Brasil Visto de Fora* (São Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra, 2001), pp. 101–125. For a study that analysed participation by US-built ships, the financing and organizing of their voyages see Leonardo Marques, "The Contraband Slave Trade to Brasil and the Dynamics of US Participation, 1831–1856", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 47: part 4 (November 2015), pp. 659–684.
7. Joel Wolfe, *Autos and Progress, The Brazilian Search for Modernity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 5.
8. I have described and analyzed the 1930 movement in *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 259–300.
9. Dutra told Hélio Silva this version in 1959; Silva, 1937: *Todos os golpes se parecem*, pp. 390–391; Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Junior and Mauro Renault Leite eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), pp. 228–229.
10. I have detailed the alliance among Vargas, Dutra, and Góes Monteiro in "The Military and the Dictatorship: Getúlio, Góes, and Dutra" in Jens R. Hentschke, ed. *Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 109–141 and "Compromisso Among Vargas, Góis Monteiro, Dutra and the Establishment of the Estado Novo," *ACERVO, Revista do Arquivo Nacional*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jul.–Dez. 2017), pp. 19–35. <http://revista.arquivonacional.gov.br/index.php/revistaacervo/article/view/814/867>.

11. Theodore Roosevelt, *Through the Brazilian Wilderness* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), p. 333.
12. Eric. C. Wendelin, Memo, Division of American Republics, June 10, 1944, 832.00/5-3144, RG 59, NARA. For discussion see McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945* (Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 327–328.
13. Morris Cooke to Miguel Alvaro Ozorio de Almeida and Samuel Wainer, June 30, 1943, Cooke Papers, 0283, FDRL; for more on Cooke Mission see Cooke, *Brazil on the March – A Study in International Cooperation* (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1944).
14. Walter N. Walmsley, DAR, December 8, 1942, 832.20/480, RG 59, NARA.
15. The book came out in 1976 and the film followed in 1978.
16. José Silvestre Rebello presented his credentials on May 26, 1824, and stayed in the United States until September 1, 1829. In response to Rebello's notes of January 28 and April 6, 1825, there was Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to José Silvestre Rebello (Brazilian Charge d' Affaires in the United States), Washington, April 13, 1825, Document 136, William R. Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations*, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), pp. 233–234. Emperor Pedro I's instruction to Rebello to seek an alliance was in Luis José Carvalho e Mello to Rebello, Rio de Janeiro, 15 de Setembro 1824, Despachos Ostensivos, 1823–1827 (444/2/28), Arquivo Histórico Itamaraty (Rio). The best study of those early years is Stanley E. Hilton, "The United States and Brazilian Independence," in A. J. R. Russell-Wood, ed. *From Colony to Nation: Essays on the Independence of Brazil* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 109–129.
17. Steven C. Topik, *Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire* (Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 135–177. The Empire of Brazil was overthrown by a military coup on November 15, 1889.
18. E. Bradford Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1966).
19. R. D. Layman, "The Brazilian Navy in the Great War," *Relevance: The Quarterly Journal of the Great War Society* (Spring 1996), Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 31–33.
20. For the Contestado affair and Brazil during the war, see McCann, *Soldiers of the Patria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937*, pp. 121–190. For Brazil in the war, see Francisco Luiz Teixeira Vinhosa, *O Brasil e a Primeira Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1990), pp. 99–183.

21. The commander of the French army, Marshal Joffre, recommended his former chief of staff, BG Maurice Gustave Gamelin, as chief of mission. He would be best known as commander of the French army in the disastrous defeat by the German invaders in 1940.
22. McCann, *Soldiers of the Patria*: pp. 250–251, on private and official military interests in Brazilian ties pp. 360–361.
23. Estado-Maior do Exército, *Relatório ... 1936 ... G[eneral] D[ivisão] Arnaldo de Souza Paes de Andrade* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado-Maior do Exército, 1937), Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio), pp. 4–5.
24. General de Divisão Francisco Ramos de Andrade Neves (Chief of Staff), Rio de Janeiro, Aug. 3, 1934: Estado-Maior do Exército, *Exame da Situação Militar do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado-Maior do Exército, 1934), Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio). Quotes are from pp. 5–9.
25. Hélio Silva said that this tale was spread by Axis agents to cast doubt on Brazil's reasons for joining the conflict. The rumor's longevity and spread is remarkable, I have been asked about it by students in various parts of Brazil. See Hélio Silva, *1942, Guerra no Continente* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1972), p. 394. It is discussed on the internet, usually trying to discredit its validity; see Túlio Vilela, <http://educacao.uol.com.br/historia-brasil/brasil-na-segunda-guerra-terror-no-atlantico.jhtm>.

A popular magazine, *Super*, published a piece on Brazil and World War II “Pearl Harbor no Brasil”; some readers’ comments asserted that the United States sank the ships [“*na verdade foi os EUA que atacaram o Brasil, e botaram a culpa nos nazistas*” (in truth it was the United States that attacked Brazil and put the blame on the Nazis)]; see: <http://super.abril.com.br/forum/Revista/Edicao-setembro2010-A-genetica-fracassou/Pearl-Harbor-no-Brasil>.

However, the sinking of Brazilian ships was closely documented by the recorded testimony of survivors that the submarines were German. See detailed reports on 14 vessels in Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *O Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944), Vol. II, pp. 61–148. Moreover, captured German naval records regarding the attacks on the Brazilian ships are very clear: US Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, *Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939–1945* (Washington, 1947), pp. 86, 89–90. See the “Report on a Conference between the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Fuehrer at the Berghof the afternoon of 15 June 1942” in which Hitler approved executing the submarine attacks on Brazilian shipping and ports. German sub attacks had started in February and on June 15, 1942; Hitler approved the continuation and increase of submarine attacks on Brazil to begin at the start of August. Considerable correct information is readily available in Brazil; for

those who care to search the internet, see, for example, <http://www.naufra-giosdobrasil.com.br/2guerrasubmarinos.htm>. There is an excellent analysis in the well-researched book: Vágner Camilo Alves, *O Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial: História de um Envolvimento Forçado* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora PUC-Rio, 2002), 164–184. For the rumor, which he called “absurd historical doubt,” see pp. 180–181. The definitive study of the German submarine attacks is Durval Lourenço Pereira, *Operação Brasil: O ataque alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015).

26. Sometimes this undercurrent bubbles up in publications, for example, a book published by the state of Paraná press: Alfredo Bertoldo Klas, *Verdade sobre Abetaio: drama de sangue e dor no 4o ataque da F.E.B. ao Monte Castello* (Curitiba: Imprensa Oficial, 2005). *The author was a lieutenant in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force’s 11th Infantry Regiment that fought in Italy. He believed that the Brazilian government provoked the German submarine attacks on Brazilian ships by allowing American air and naval bases in Northeast Brazil. He equated the Vargas dictatorial regime with “Nazism.” Throughout there is an undertone that the United States dragged Brazil into the war. In sending the FEB without sufficient training, including with little explanation of what the war was about, against “an alert and brave enemy... they [the Brazilian government] committed a crime in the name of Brazil.” [p. 237]. The importance of books such as Klas’s is that they feed rumor and myth-making in the streets. Such rumors were nourished by reputable writers such as Nelson Werneck Sodré, who in his *Memórias de um Soldado* (Rio: Editora Civilização Brasileiro, 1967), p. 207, incorrectly asserted that there was no proof in German archives regarding the sinkings. It is unlikely that he bothered to check those archives, which were then held in the National Archives in Washington and the Public Records Office in London. I first heard the mythical tale that the American navy had sunk the Brazilian ships from students at the Universidade Federal de Roraima in August 1998. A study of how the story was maintained for so many years would be useful.*
27. Partly because of the paucity of extensive research on Brazil in World War II, inaccuracies have crept into the historical literature. See Boris Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 228.
28. I added the emphasis. Julius H. Amberg (Special Asst. to the Secretary of War) to Hugh Fulton (Chief Counsel, Truman Committee, US Senate), August 13, 1943, OPD 580.82 Brazil (3-30-42), RG165, NARA. There was a congressional investigation into the army’s dealings with Pan American Airways. On the air line’s “Airport Development Program,” see

- Therese L. Kraus, "The Establishment of United States Army Air Corps Bases in Brazil, 1938–1945" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1986) and my "Aviation Diplomacy: The United States and Brazil, 1939–1941," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1968), pp. 35–50.
29. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940–1941* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 600.
 30. Stetson Conn and Bryon Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960), pp. 325–326.



CHAPTER 2

Pre-war Fears and Explorations

BRAZILIAN MILITARY PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF WAR

The 1920s had seen the Brazilian army torn by the rebellion of hundreds of junior officers that fed political unrest. Then the disputed 1930 presidential election ended in a well-organized uprising that has been called a “revolution.”¹ The army generals lost control of key commands and all of the states save the capital of Rio de Janeiro. The new government styled itself revolutionary and launched an extensive political reform. This provoked a three-month civil war between the state of São Paulo (1932) and the federal government, which the state lost. As a result the national military was split in a variety of ways and was badly in need of restructuring and reform.² By 1934–1935 the Brazilian army was in the midst of reorganizing itself. Admittedly much of the reorganization never got beyond the planning stage. However, the army did create an intelligence service and made a careful study of Brazil’s military situation, including possible threats to national security. That threat analysis indicated that Brazilian authorities were measuring the dangers that were accumulating on the world scene and were carefully considering how best to protect their country. Brazilian leaders believed that they could only depend on their own wits and resources and that they should try to obtain the greatest advantage for Brazil from whatever crises that might appear. But, when considering a possible world war and the problem of equipping and preparing its armed forces, the Brazilian military and presidential papers

repeatedly pointed to the United States as the logical source of military supply.³ However, in the 1930s the political realities of international finance and trade, and restrictive American laws on arms sales, made it impossible to buy weapons from the United States and facilitated Brazilian purchases from Germany.⁴

While historians have been aware of the problem of military supplies through the focus of the American-German competition over Brazil, a less known aspect was related to the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia's (1932–1935) and Peru and Colombia's struggle for control of Leticia in the Western Amazon (1932–1933). Indeed those wars on Brazil's borders contributed to the decision to reorganize the army in 1934. President Getúlio Vargas was particularly troubled about Paraguay and how the Chaco conflict could affect relations with Argentina. Likewise the army general staff was "very alarmed." The war appeared to be growing more complicated. Vargas wrote to his new ambassador in Washington, his old friend, Oswaldo Aranha, that Paraguay would not know what to do with its 70,000 strong, victorious army after the war. It would not have jobs for the returning soldiers and so Vargas foresaw that the general commanding "a discontented army" would likely overthrow the civilian government. He was afraid that Paraguay could "create problems on our frontier in Mato Grosso, provoking an incident that would bring Argentina into the conflict." Argentina had been "openly supporting Paraguay, providing all manner of supplies, concentrating troops on the border of Bolivia" even seizing some Bolivian border posts and "advocating the reabsorption of Bolivia, [which had been] part of the [colonial] viceroyalty of the Prata." The Argentine minister of war, General Manuel A. Rodríguez, was notably loud in calling for such action. Argentina had made loans to keep Paraguay fighting. Brazilian military attachés were not allowed to visit the war zone and were treated with "visible suspicion." "Our policy," Vargas wrote, "has been cordial friendship with Argentina and abstention of interference in the Chaco question." Maintaining that policy, "we must take military precautions," in order to avoid future problems.

However, he lamented, "We lack almost everything." He wanted to know what the Americans thought about all this "and to what point will they accompany us?" Brazil did not have funds and "two things we need at the moment: some units for coastal defense; one or two cruisers, submarines and one or two gunboats on the Paraguay River." Ambassador Aranha replied that President Franklin Roosevelt asked that they do nothing about the Brazilian fleet without consulting him because he had "decided to do

everything he could so that everything could be built [in the United States] on the best and cheapest terms.” Aranha cautioned that they had to keep this secret between them, that the slightest leak could compromise their efforts to secure American arms. “The truth ... Getúlio, is that these people are convinced that in case of war we will be with them.” However, they were “alarmed with our lack of interest in this post since the time of Domicio da Gama (1911–18), and the Americans did not understand how Brazil could twice renew the French military mission’s contract and not keep the American naval mission (which was then in doubt).” He feared they would turn to Argentina. “I tell you,” Aranha affirmed, “that everything is possible to obtain, but it will all have to be done with discretion, with secrecy.”⁵ Aranha warned that Argentina was trying to undermine Brazil’s friendly relations with the United States and that “we must preserve our position so that in any eventuality we can count on this country.”⁶

At that time Brazil lacked gold reserves and hard currencies to finance its international trade, so in June 1935, the government signed an informal compensation trade agreement with Germany that using complicated exchange mechanisms allowed Brazil to swap its natural or agricultural products for German manufactures. Washington protested vigorously to this closed arrangement that detached Brazilian-German trade from the wider international system based upon gold and convertible currencies. Because of the close linkage between obtaining arms and Brazil’s foreign trade, the army’s general staff paid close attention to trade policies.

Vargas committed himself to arming and equipping the military and building a national steel factory in return for military backing for extending his presidency with dictatorial powers that would eliminate politics. The execution of this arrangement proceeded in the hesitant, indirect way in which Getúlio usually maneuvered. He flashed mixed, even contradictory signals. But rather than being devious, his lack of clarity likely reflected his indecision and caution. He had made an agreement, or *compromisso*, with Generals Dutra and Góes Monteiro to establish a dictatorship that would arm Brazil.⁷ In his diary Vargas commented on June 15, 1936, that the only way to make the necessary arms purchases would be “a great reduction in payment of the foreign debt” which could not be done under “the political regime that we are following.” So defense policy produced the dictatorship called the *Estado Novo*.⁸

The debates within the army regarding trade and arms policies gave the officer corps the appearance of grouping into pro-American (later Allied) and pro-German (later Axis) camps. The European crisis produced deeply

conflicted and complicated responses in the Brazilian officer corps. Certainly, there was admiration for Germany's post-World War I reconstruction of its armed forces and its military industries. Furthermore there was growing acceptance of the idea that in facing the uncertainties ahead, Brazilian national security demanded a strong, efficient, centralized government committed to defense. It was easy for contemporary American observers to see nefarious Axis influences in the statements and attitudes of Generals Eurico Dutra (minister of war) and Pedro A. de Góes Monteiro (army chief of staff), but historians should look more deeply and not merely accept what seems obvious.⁹ It has been common for historians to present the government of Getúlio Vargas as wavering between Nazi Germany and the United States. It often looked that way to newspaper reporters and hence later historians who saw Dutra and Góes Monteiro having "sympathy for Germany."¹⁰ However when Dutra was asked directly by a *New York Times* reporter "Can it be said that the sentiment of the Army is pro-German and anti-American?", he replied: "Not at all. The Army is intent on perfecting its professional efficiency, and is solely pro-Brazilian. [And] for help along this line it has looked to the United States rather than to Germany."¹¹ The idea of being pro-Brazilian was often difficult for Americans to understand.

In 1938, listening to the advice of its generals, the government of Getúlio Vargas contracted with Germany's Krupp and Zeiss companies for a massive purchase of artillery pieces and appropriate sights and other optics.¹² That \$ (US) 55,000,000 package raised suspicions in Washington, but should have been balanced against President Vargas's friendly relationship with Franklin Roosevelt and the Brazilian leader's unsolicited offer after their cordial meeting in Rio de Janeiro in late 1936 to discuss full military and naval cooperation, including building a naval base in Brazil for American use in the event of a war of aggression against the United States. Vargas observed that such an attack on the United States "would necessarily" involve "the vital interests of Brazil."¹³ The American army's intelligence files oozed doubts and distrust; staff officers knew nothing of Vargas's offer of a naval base and tended to view many Brazilian officers as Nazi sympathizers. Some were, but most merely had a professional admiration for the discipline and efficiency of the German army.¹⁴ Unfortunately, Roosevelt's government did not take up the offer, and the Brazilian leadership turned to their own problems and solutions. Less than two years after Getúlio's remarkable offer, the Americans would be urgently pursuing that very cooperation (Fig. 2.1).



Fig. 2.1 Roosevelt and Vargas on FDR's arrival in Rio de Janeiro, 1936. The president's oldest son James is the naval officer in the front looking at his father. (Courtesy of the FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY. NARA)

AMERICAN FEARS AND BRAZILIAN NEUTRALITY

It is important to recall that the war began suddenly in September 1939 with the German invasion of Poland and that the conquest of the Netherlands and Belgium and shocking retreat of the British across the Channel from Dunkirk in early June and the defeat of France in mid-June 1940 caused panic in Washington. It was not at all evident that Britain could hold off the Germans, who launched massive air attacks on the island kingdom. Eventually, the Germans gave up their invasion plans, but that was not immediately clear. Meanwhile, Italy attacked British colonies in East Africa and Japan took over French Indo-China. On September 27, the three aggressors signed a ten-year military and economic pact, forming the Axis alliance. Their forces swept into Romania and the Balkans and plunged into Greece. Uncertainty was the order of the day. On December 29, 1940, President Roosevelt held a radio "fireside chat" with his countrymen stressing the Axis threat and calling for an immense production

effort that would make the United States “the great arsenal of democracy.” Brave inspiring words, but everything remained to be done. What if the French surrendered their fleet to the Germans and they mounted an attack from Dakar, in West Africa, on Northeast Brazil? The distance was a mere 1400 miles and only 8 hours by air. American planners worried that if the Germans could get control of Northeast Brazil, they would separate the United States from South America’s natural resources.¹⁵ An even worse fear was that if they got a toehold on the “hump” of Brazil they could step by step move on the Panama Canal cutting that lifeline.

Today, understanding German weaknesses, that scenario of a German attack on the Panama Canal appears like a fantasy, but at the time it looked all too possible. Military planners in Washington were unsure of Axis capabilities and so had to think in worst case scenarios. In fact at the White House conference of American and British staff officers with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on December 23, 1941, the two leaders “thought it was important to keep a flying route open across Africa, referring to the Brazilian situation and the threat from Dakar.” FDR emphasized “the dangers of Brazil”; while Churchill worried about a German move into North Africa and a seizure of Dakar, he imagined the possibility of “an expedition against Dakar” to head off such an event.¹⁶

The nightmare of a German seizure of either Dakar or Natal disturbed the sleep of American military leaders for several years. From the early 1930s, Germany and the United States had competed for Brazilian trade and the American military had courted the Brazilian army energetically. Military planners hoped that the United States would trade arms to Brazil for permission to station a defense force in the northeast. From 1939 through 1942, American military planning emphasized the exposed nature of the Brazilian bulge and the War Department’s desire to garrison it with American troops. In January 1939, according to War Department analysts, Brazil’s coastal cities were

“almost completely defenseless ...against even small naval raiding expeditions. Brazil is helpless in the face of any kind of powerful enemy. ... If we are ever embroiled over the Monroe Doctrine the chance is about 95 per cent it will be on account of undefended Brazil. ... Twenty-five hundred miles of undefended coast line ... which means all a hostile force would have to do would be to enter, drop anchor and take charge.”

There was no anti-aircraft defense in Brazil, even for Rio and São Paulo. Clearly amazed, the analyst lamented “No equipment whatever. With planes on a regular schedule to Europe, need I say more?”¹⁷

That comment might be a bit overdramatic, but Brazil was militarily weak. In February 1939, officers at the Army War College, responded to an unusual secret request for a “Special Strategic Study of Brazil” setting out necessary American actions to assist “in the maintenance of its independence and integrity in the face of internal or external operations, undertaken, fostered or assisted by non-American countries.” The officers involved were sensitive to Brazilian sovereignty concerns, insisting on “the immediate evacuation of Brazilian territory as soon as the desired results have been obtained.”¹⁸ Immediately upon the outbreak of war, the Brazilian government proclaimed its neutrality. Minister of War Dutra warned Brazilian officers to avoid any sign of partiality in their public actions and statements.¹⁹

The American army and navy had different interpretations of the situation in the South Atlantic. The army saw the situation as perilous, while the US Navy was content with its relationship with the Brazilians and was not anxious to help the army establish itself in Brazil. Clearly, any transatlantic invasion would be by sea and air. When the army’s War Plans Division proposed broadening the quest of bases for joint army and navy use, the navy objected. It already had secured Brazilian permission to use the northeastern harbors and did not see the urgency that the army did. During World War I, some Brazilian officers had served aboard American warships, and American officers were teaching at Brazilian naval institutions by the end of that war. And beginning in 1922, the American navy had a sizeable and well-regarded mission in Brazil. Its officers had good rapport with Brazilian naval leaders, and overall the navy had better relations with the Brazilians than did the American army.²⁰

Brazil worried American officialdom because the threat of German and Italian commercial, political, and military penetration was very real. Brazil had a German and Italian immigrant and descendant population estimated at 1,519,000 located mostly in the southern states of São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. The long history of friendly Brazilian-American relations and trade dating from the late eighteenth century was positive and reassuring, but the German and Italian emphasis on preserving contact with and the loyalty of the immigrant communities was troubling. Army planners feared that German and Italian communities might rebel against the government. The Americans naturally wanted to counter German

and Italian propaganda and influence.²¹ And, of course, the Vargas government was very worried about the many unassimilated German communities in the southern states. In 1940 there were 581,807 German speakers in Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná according to the census.²² The Nazi Party in Brazil was the largest in the world outside Germany with 2900 members in 17 states. The government was less concerned with the Italians who were more Brazilianized. The government moved army units to key locations in the south, closed German language newspapers and schools and made clear to the German ambassador that the Nazi Party was not allowed to establish itself in German-speaking communities. Vargas had outlawed all political parties, and when the German ambassador aggressively argued that the Nazi Party should be allowed, he was declared *persona non grata*.²³ Minister of War Dutra commented that the foreign immigrants had made it possible to fill vast uncultivated and undeveloped spaces with viable communities, but government neglect had allowed them to become “true enclaves focused internally, socially organized with habits, customs, and traditions of their distant motherlands.” The army saw such communities as “worse than a foreign military occupation.” It would not be possible, Dutra said, to rapidly nationalize them, but with patience and persistence this “*problema serissimo*” would be eliminated.²⁴

The government was also convinced that the Germans had a large number of secret agents operating “a well-organized espionage system” in the country.²⁵ German propaganda aimed at keeping Germans resident in Brazil “as an alien bloc owing allegiance to the mother country.” Moreover the government feared that Germany, and maybe Japan, had “long-range designs on Brazil” and such fears had been “considerably accentuated since the Munich Conference” (Sept. 29, 1938). The American army War Plans Division’s (WPD) intelligence chief reported that officials of the German embassy in Rio and consuls in various cities “have become extremely arrogant since the recent events in Czechoslovakia.” The Germans were conducting “an active program of inviting prominent Brazilian professional men to visit Germany, accompanied by their wives, all expenses paid. These invitations are being more frequently accepted.” German short-wave broadcasting stations were “extremely active in transmitting to Brazil in Portuguese. The musical programs are exceptionally fine and the reception superior to that of any other broadcasting country.” The news programs gave “pro-Fascist and anti-American interpretations to all possible news.” The intelligence chief worried that the result of these activities would eventually be “an effective nucleus of pro-fascist Brazilians.”²⁶

Instead of seeing the failed May 1938 coup attempt by the fascistic *Integralista* party as a positive sign of government strength, American analysts aware of German and Italian backing of the *Integralistas* worried that it could happen again.²⁷ The Vargas regime was after all a dictatorship held in place by the military. Pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi forces might stir up enough internal dissent to topple the government, or if they could secure control of part of the country, Germany and Italy could send reinforcements as they had been doing in Spain since 1936. In fact as early as June 1938, the *Integralistas* had a plan for another revolt in the southern states according to a report by German ambassador Ritter.²⁸ If a Fascist regime could be established in Brazil, the vital interests of the United States would be shaken “and the Panama Canal menaced.” Such events would affect the stability of neighboring Uruguay and Argentina that also had large German and Italian populations and endanger the security of the hemisphere.²⁹

CHIEFS OF STAFF GEORGE MARSHALL AND GÓES MONTEIRO EXCHANGE VISITS

In 1939, the Roosevelt government was so preoccupied with Brazil that it sent its newly designated army chief of staff, General George C. Marshall, to Rio de Janeiro on the *USS Nashville* to assess the Brazilian army firsthand and to begin negotiations. It was the first time in history that an American chief of staff or designate had made a foreign journey in that capacity. To be exact Marshall had been selected but did not succeed General Malin Craig as chief until September 1, 1939.³⁰ The idea of an exchange of visits between the chiefs of staff of the armies of Brazil and the United States came from Oswaldo Aranha, who after serving as ambassador in Washington from 1934 to 1938 had become foreign minister. In February 1939 during a visit to Washington, he met with army generals. He was the constant driving force behind close relations with the United States. Germany had invited Brazil's chief of staff to visit and to participate in Wehrmacht maneuvers, and he had made worrisomely favorable comments about the German army. Aranha correctly thought that the exchange of visits would forestall a Góes Monteiro trip to Europe. Years later Marshall recalled that “in order to suppress these intimacies, I was sent to Brazil on a goodwill tour.”³¹ Marshall would have been well prepared by his attendance from mid-1938 at meetings of the Standing

Liaison Committee, under the chairmanship of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, which dealt mainly with Latin American military matters, specifically the defense of Brazil.³² Beyond assuming that he had learned something about Brazil, it is not clear how meticulous his preparation had been. The American military attaché had sent a detailed explanation about the relative balance of power within the Brazilian army. One would suppose that the minister of war was more powerful than the chief of staff, but the reality was, according to the attaché, that “the Chief of Staff controls more important elements of the Army leaving to the Minister of War control of administrative matters.... As matters now stand, the Minister of War is decidedly overshadowed by the Chief of Staff in actual power and political influence”³³ (Fig. 2.2).

Considering that it took at least 14 days each way by ship, such a trip was a major commitment of time and effort. Marshall’s reception on the




Fig. 2.2 Marshall’s arrival in Brazil. (Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation Research Library, Lexington, Virginia)

streets of Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, and Belo Horizonte was startlingly effusive. The popular reception at the dock in Rio and along Avenida Rio Branco was “extremely warm and the spontaneous applause from the crowds surprised even the Brazilian officers” assigned to meet the general and his party. In Belo Horizonte some 12,000 school children and thousands of adults lined Avenida Afonso Pena, clapping and cheering as Marshall thrilled them by getting out of the car and walking a mile or so waving to the crowds. Even Brazilian officials were surprised at the emotionally demonstrative reception. General Francisco Pinto, Vargas’s aide, remarked “Our people are generally... somewhat indifferent to foreign State visits, and I was surprised and delighted with the size of the crowds and their applause as the procession drove down the Avenida Rio Branco.”³⁴ And Marshall observed that it was carrying hospitality too far to have a Brazilian colonel and a major assigned to him as “aides.” He thought that the calls on officials and receptions were “pretentiously arranged,” perhaps especially Chief of Staff General Góes Monteiro’s serving champagne to those welcoming Marshall at the war ministry. Even so he carefully noted Brazilian procedures so that his army could reciprocate similarly when General Góes arrived in the United States. He wrote to General Malin Craig that “they are doing this in great style.”³⁵

On June 7 Marshall conferred with Generals Dutra and Góes Monteiro giving a “long and clear exposition of the matters that brought him to Brazil and asking for their cooperation in case of war.” He assured them that if Brazil were attacked, the United States Navy and Army Air Force would come to its assistance. To prepare a joint defense, Washington wanted to have access to a port, where it could concentrate its ships, and bases in the northeast where it would set up deposits of munitions, arms, oil, and gas to facilitate operations. General Góes countered that in the event of war Brazil’s principal worry would be to defend the south against invasion from Argentina and against subversion among the numerous German, Italian, and Japanese immigrant communities in the southern states.³⁶

One of the difficulties that American officers had in discussing defense matters with their Brazilian counterparts was knowing the exact size of the Brazilian army. It was not necessarily that the numbers were secret, but because for years the authorized strength had been set for one year at a time and the authorized strength was usually higher than the actual strength. In 1936, for the first time the authorized numbers were set for three years (1936, 1937, and 1938) at 4800 regular officers, 1100 tempo-

rary officers, and 74,000 soldiers. The problem was that while the actual officer number was correct, the enlisted strength was estimated to be at 20% lower than that authorized. The actual number of soldiers was about 60,000.³⁷ The question of army strength was made more difficult because funds to carry out the army Reorganization Plan of 1934 were nearly nonexistent. The army command dealt with the lack of funds by reducing the numbers recruited. Officers protested and held mysterious secret meetings, while the minister of war responded with public statements that the reductions were merely rumors and that the “efficiency of our land forces” was being maintained.³⁸ The resulting discontent in the officer corps was one of the causes of the rise of *Integralista* and Communist agitation among officers and sergeants and a factor in the Moscow-sponsored uprising in November 1935.³⁹

Another difficulty that foreign observers had was evaluating the quality of the troops. However, the reality for Brazilian officers was all too clear and was reason for embarrassment, because most recruits were painfully uneducated. They were, a Brazilian officer admitted, “ignorant of our past, unaware of our present ... indifferent to the future” lacking elementary “civil and moral education,” and with only a vague understanding of good and bad.⁴⁰ General Dutra complained that 60% of potential recruits were illiterate and nearly 50% were physically unqualified.⁴¹ Because illiteracy was so common, basic training necessarily included instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic, and troops who were deficient at the end of their service period were kept another six months. The “cancer of illiteracy,” as officers called it, was a serious limitation on military capability.

Marshall’s tour of southeastern and southern Brazil was a public relations success and gave him the opportunity to visit army units. Aside from “a devilish number of speeches a day,” he thought the reception “remarkable, with a steadily increasing enthusiasm.” The elaborateness of the receptions made a deep impression on him. In Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, en route from the airport, there was a “Guard of Honor, Cavalry escort surrounding my car, motorcycle police. Main street bordered by thousands of school children in uniform, 50 or 75,000 people crowded in the rear of children, confetti and paper, like Broadway, for a half mile of blocks, four or five bands.” Dinners with state officials, balls, “guards in plume, jackboots ... guests grouped to receive me, Governor as escort, national anthems, a dais at which to sit. It sounds like a joke or a bit of stage business, but it was all in deadly earnest in their desire to do the gracious thing.” His own warmth appealed to Brazilians; in Porto Alegre he

delighted them by sending a considerable amount of candy to an orphanage and in Belo Horizonte, as mentioned, walking the line of march to better greet the crowds charmed the *mineiros*. Thinking ahead to Góes's return visit, he was worried because "what they have done personally we cannot duplicate."⁴² It is notable that Marshall was not favorably impressed by the officers of the small US Army Military Mission that had been advising on Brazil's coastal defenses, they did not present a sufficiently alert and smart appearance to suit him. The general asserted that he wanted "to have only the highest type of officer in Brazil."⁴³ Marshall himself had selected Major Matthew B. Ridgway for this assignment because of his previous experience in Latin America; he was then assigned to the Fourth Army staff in San Francisco. The Head of the Army Air Corps General Henry H. Arnold had recommended his former Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel James E. Chaney. Marshall sent Ridgway and Chaney north on a Pan American plane to have a look at the area from Belém to Recife. Góes returned with Marshall to the United States on the *USS Nashville* to continue their talks.⁴⁴ While en route, Ridgway wrote a memo for Marshall declaring that the objective of US policy "should be the maintenance in Brazil of a government determined and able to both preserve its territorial integrity and to cooperate fully with the United States in Hemisphere Defense." He commented further that "The supply of arms and munitions is the critical first step. If, withheld, Brazil will inevitably turn to Europe. If furnished, the remaining steps will be relatively easy of accomplishment."⁴⁵

Góes wrote to President Vargas that he feared that Marshall suffered "a real deception" on seeing Brazil's military weakness, because he had thought the Brazilian forces were stronger, and so now had a low opinion of "our military potential." Góes Monteiro showed a lack of understanding of American military thinking when he told Vargas that he feared that if Brazil did not agree to an alliance, the Americans would turn to Argentina, where it had a military aviation mission. Of course, Argentina could not defend Northeast Brazil. But, even so, Góes Monteiro was hopeful that they could find solutions beneficial to Brazil and that "approximation" with the United States would solve "our capital problems."⁴⁶

Marshall did not leave any comment indicating the low opinion that Góes feared. At the time the American army itself was not in prime condition. By the mid-1930s, the army "had reached a low point in both numbers and readiness for combat ... [because of] congressional thrift and anti-war sentiment." Back in 1932 it had somewhat less than 120,000

active-duty enlisted men and was 17th in size in the world. By the time Marshall went to Brazil, the US Army had about 175,000 soldiers, still considerably under the 280,000 authorized in the National Defense Act of 1920. Army appropriations were “grossly inadequate even to halt the normal deterioration of attrition and obsolescence, much less to develop and buy modern weapons to match those being acquired by America’s potential enemies.” The needs of the “absurdly small and ill-equipped” air force were especially cause for deep worry.⁴⁷

Góes and Dutra likewise knew that their army was not in proper condition. They had committed themselves to overthrow the government based on the Constitution of 1934 in November 1937, because it did not satisfy defense needs.⁴⁸ In his general staff report for 1937, Góes Monteiro had charged that the 1934 law specifying that army reorganization was to be completed within three years had not been fulfilled. Simply put, the army was “useless for the field of battle.” The images that he sketched were extremely discouraging. The army was, he said, “fragile, more fictitious than real,” its big units were “dismantled ... incapable of being mobilized in reasonable time and employed in any situation.” The general staff’s worries about Brazil’s military weaknesses, he wrote, had intensified with the news that Chile was renewing its army’s equipment and that Argentina was improving its armament, expanding its weapons industry, and generally developing its military capabilities. In the United States, President Roosevelt was calling for the “prompt and intensive equipping of its armed forces.” The nations of the globe were preparing for war. “The violence in Abyssinia, China, and Spain were,” the general declared, “true practice wars to test the means of destruction and protection” in rehearsal for a great and decisive struggle. Neither pacifist illusions nor Brazil’s turn-of-the-century Krupp artillery would be able to protect the country. On Brazil’s very borders, the “ex-belligerents of the Chaco, despite the interminable peace conference in Buenos Aires, had returned to the path of complete rearmament, in expectation of another appeal to arms.” Góes warned that “the moment, in which we are living, imposes a radical transformation of [our] military organism ... [because] we remain paralyzed, about a decade behind.” They had the responsibility to restore Brazil’s armed forces in order to “redeem us from the previous inertia and to free us from the depressing situation in which we are entombed.” These circumstances motivated Góes and Dutra “to solicit insistently from the President of the Republic all the measures required for the reform of our [army’s] structure.” And most basically the army needed arms to carry

out its defense mission.⁴⁹ So knowing how weak they were; they were ready to listen to Marshall's proposals.

The army units that Marshall saw looked respectable. In the 1920s, in a massive construction program, the army had established 61 new posts or barracks (*quartéis*), many in the southern states. They were attractive and so well built that many are still in use. They made a good impression as did the parading troops that were likely carefully selected.

Arriving in the United States, Góes was fascinated by the country's power and organization. Marshall pulled out all the stops to insure that the Brazilian general really saw the United States. Marshall commented that "no officer in our Army has ever had the same opportunity to see our country as did [Góes] Monteiro..." And Marshall made sure that Góes understood that even though the American army was small, it was disciplined, skilled, and preparing itself for war. The Brazilian general was impressed with the physique, intelligence, technical skill, and high state of discipline of the American army and was so taken with the country's potential power that he remarked to Marshall that the United States "could lick the world." At San Francisco, Góes could not avoid being excited when he had an aerial view of "the Fleet with its 100 or more vessels steaming into the Golden Gate."⁵⁰ And at West Point watching the Corps of Cadets on parade, Góes was "reduced to tears." And he enjoyed playing history buff touring the battlefield of Gettysburg and observing an air show at Langley Field with Marshall. Of course, he had the opportunity to see the Brazilian Pavilion at the World's Fair in New York. Perhaps the highpoint was having Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of the Army George Woodring, and Marshall take him to the White House to meet President Roosevelt. Throughout the tour he was hosted by the leading generals of the US Army.⁵¹

Marshall evaluated the tour saying "General Monteiro carried himself very well, considering the limitations on language and the lack of a dashing appearance. He really made a splendid impression, however, better than I anticipated ... he was given a really remarkable reception." He correctly thought that the general had been impressed with the American army. Marshall mused that "I think he had in mind that we were rather careless people in a military way, and he found in these concentrated garrisons that quite the opposite was the case."⁵²

During their voyage on the *USS Nashville*, Marshall "grew worried about his [Góes's] condition, with relation to a strenuous trip, travel and altitude." He "inveigled Monteiro into a physical exam, by first having the

doctor come up and examine me.” It turned out that that his heart was “a little flabby, and a cardiogram had indicated a bad valve.” Góes had assured him that he was up to the journey, but Marshall had his doubts and arranged things so he could have adequate rest and added a doctor to the party. Marshall appeared to have developed a fondness for Góes beyond what was necessary for military protocol.⁵³

In their conversations Góes Monteiro stressed that Brazil needed help from the United States in protecting its maritime communications along its exposed 4650-mile coastline, especially in keeping the sea lanes open to the northeastern region. In exchange Brazil would offer use of air bases at Natal and on Fernando de Noronha Island.⁵⁴ As early as 1936, Góes Monteiro had stated that, in the event of a world conflict, Brazil would not be able to stay neutral and that its only source of arms would be the United States.⁵⁵ On his return to Brazil, Góes was exuberant about the “liberty, order and discipline” in the northern republic.⁵⁶ Even so American military intelligence maintained a highly guarded attitude toward General Góes. Late in life, he declared that “I was never a *Nazista* or a *Fascista*, as many people thought. I was only an admirer, as a soldier, of the German army.... I never admired Hitler; I admired, yes, the German Generals.”⁵⁷

Marshall did not speak Portuguese so all of his conversations and speeches had to be interpreted. There were few American officers who spoke Portuguese, but one, Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller, had served in the US Military Mission to Brazil and had developed considerable fluency. He was at Marshall’s side throughout the time in Brazil and later was with Góes Monteiro in the States. Marshall thought that Miller’s role had been of “the highest importance to the success of the mission” and his advice and guidance during Góes Monteiro’s “tour of the United States was directly responsible for a large measure of the success of the visit.” He was the exception to Marshall’s low opinion of the military mission in Brazil. Marshall was not one to give out unmerited praise, and he emphasized his regard in a letter to Ambassador Caffery observing that Miller, “while self-effacing and modest to a remarkable degree, played a leading role in this affair. He made a profound impression everywhere he went... I mention this because he is a man of great value to us in connection with Brazil. ... He seems to have Monteiro’s confidence to a remarkable degree.” He was so impressed that he rearranged Miller’s posting and sent him to the War College in September 1939 with the idea that his next assignment would be Brazil.⁵⁸

Góes promised Marshall that his army would create new coast artillery and anti-aircraft units and would station an army division in the northeast, but he repeated again and again that everything would depend on arms from the United States. He provided a list of military equipment that his army considered urgent and indispensable. He stressed that the prices and terms of payment had to match those offered by Germany and other countries. The Vargas government wanted to exchange raw materials, such as manganese, for the desired items. The Brazilian government wanted to know, "with absolute certainty," that the American Congress would revoke the neutrality law and that there would be no "future obstacles to our possible acquisitions in the United States."⁵⁹ Fearful of war and increasingly isolationist, the Congress had passed Neutrality Acts in 1935, 1936, and 1937. These laws were intended to deal with the unsettled world scene produced by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil War, and the Japanese invasion of China, but they made difficult any agreements to arm Brazil.

Marshall wrote to him on October 5 explaining the supply constraints and legal limitations that they were working within. The army could sell "to a friendly government any materiel which is surplus and no longer needed for military purposes." Such sale to Brazil would be at nominal prices. However such materiel was "limited in quantity and quality, because of our deficiencies in war materiel." He referred to a list of available surplus that Colonel Miller had sent to Góes, which included 6-inch mobile guns that could be used in coastal defense. They would require some modernization with new carriages that could be made in commercial factories. The "principal deficiency" Marshall lamented was ammunition, "of which we have a shortage." If munitions could not be made in Brazil, he suggested that Brazil procure them from "private manufacturers in the United States."

At that time the law did not allow the sale of "new equipment manufactured in our government arsenals." He was hopeful that a bill to authorize such sales would pass when the Congress re-convened in January, but realistically that might not solve the problem "because our government arsenals have insufficient capacity to meet our requirements in the present emergency." As a result the American government was giving priority to purchasing equipment and arms from commercial firms. He suggested that they do the same in Brazil. This must have pained Góes because Brazil did not have sufficient industrial capability. Marshall reinforced Colonel Miller's suggestion that Góes send a qualified officer to the States to select

surplus equipment when it came available and to “place orders with commercial firms after obtaining plans from our War Department.” Marshall was pleased “that your government has tentatively approved certain measures for the increased effectiveness of our military cooperation” and that the Brazilian army was considering “establishment of air bases in north-eastern Brazil” and offered to provide information on technical requirements. To improve cooperation, the US Military Mission was to be strengthened, some Brazilian officers were to be sent for training, and Washington was to send technicians to orient Brazilian war industries. Regarding Góes’s worry about the neutrality laws, Marshall was reassuring that whatever the Congress did, “it should not create obstacles to your procurements in the United States, as the neutrality legislation is directed toward belligerent nations.” He promised Góes that he would return to the idea of exchanging manganese for arms as soon as “our requirements and funds” have been determined.

He concluded saying that his army was going to send a flight of seven “Flying Fortress” B-17s, under the command of Major General Delos C. Emmons, to participate in the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Republic (November 15). He assured his “good friend, of my desire to cooperate to the full extent of my authority in all measures which will better prepare your country for its own defense, and that of the American continent.”⁶⁰

Góes had returned to Brazil with the basis of an agreement for military cooperation, but nearly three years passed before it was signed, mostly because the Americans were unable to provide arms. The exchange of chief of staff visits showed American concern for Brazilian security and helped focus the American public on hemispheric defense.⁶¹ One point of divergence was that the Americans wanted to include the defense of Brazil within a broader framework of hemispheric defense, which the Brazilians thought would diminish their role by mixing it with their neighbors, especially Argentina. The Brazilian military would “go all the way” with the United States, Minister Aranha told Ambassador Caffery, “but does not want to get tied up with any other country or countries.” The army “would not approve a scheme for continental defense.”⁶² Brazil did not want the bilateral relationship situated within the continental and multilateral context. Brazilian military leaders judged that their country’s size and location gave it a “privileged position that ought to rate it special help by Washington.”⁶³ Yet it seemed that the United States authorities were conditioning the furnishing of military equipment on the possibility

of Brazil participating in the collective defense of the hemisphere. The clash of viewpoints contributed an unnecessary roadblock to the defense of Northeast Brazil.

An odd result of Góes's journey is that a serious misunderstanding crept into Brazilian historiography. Various authors claim that he went to Germany before the war. It had been publicized that he had been invited to visit Italy, Germany, England, France, and Portugal. In later years many scholars assumed that he had gone.⁶⁴ The reality was that he had decided against the European trip before going to the United States. The very day Marshall arrived in Brazil on May 25; Ambassador Caffery reported that there were renewed efforts being made to have Góes travel to Europe after the visit to the United States. However, on June 6, Caffery reported that Góes told him that afternoon that he had decided not to visit Germany and the others and that he would return to Brazil in the Flying Fortress as Washington had offered.⁶⁵ The documents concerning his plans have been available since the early 1960s, so there is no reason to perpetuate the myth. Moreover it should have been obvious to all that he stayed so long in the United States that the outbreak of war made such a trip impossible. But even more oddly, Foreign Minister Aranha did not seem to know of Góes's decision not to go to Europe. On August 18 he wrote to Vargas that turning down the invitations was difficult and could provoke "resentments, doubts or reserves." The government had to accept them, but they required the "maximum prudence ... [so as not to give] the smallest signal of [Brazil's] sympathies...." Within the "restricted liberty that we have and must preserve," decisions must be made according to Brazilian interests and sovereignty.⁶⁶ No matter, within two weeks Germany invaded Poland.

NEUTRALITY AND COOPERATION

Prior to the exchange of visits, the Brazilian General Staff had discussed how to facilitate negotiations so that they supported national interests. They had already ordered and paid for extensive armaments from Germany, which had yet to be shipped, and they wanted to insure that arrangements with the United States would not interfere with receiving those weapons and would not violate Brazil's declared neutrality.⁶⁷ Minister of War Dutra advised Vargas that they should seek economic advantage from "a mutual and intensified commercial cooperation with the United States, but without military commitments." They should follow a policy of solidarity and

peace with their South American neighbors while preserving “the most formal neutrality” regarding the European war. However, if Vargas decided to approve military cooperation with the United States as suggested by Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro, Dutra recommended that discussions with the Americans be based on three “essential conditions”:

- (1) “Complete maintenance of our territorial and military sovereignty in any armed forces actions or cooperation;”
- (2) “Complete freedom of action in our diplomatic relations and commercial and cultural exchange with all the world’s powers, permitting us, without subterfuges or allegations, the most cordial relations with the European countries;” [i.e., Germany and Italy]
- (3) “Maximum discretion in the negotiations, so as not to provoke distrust and animosity among the other South American nations.” [i.e., Argentina]⁶⁸

Vargas responded that Brazil should keep out of any conflict in Europe or Asia that did not affect national interests. But that they should examine the cooperation that the United States was offering as it pertained to military preparation and defense against Brazil being attacked or threatened. As this cooperation was defensive, it was necessary, Vargas thought, to carry it so as not to affect relations with other countries.⁶⁹

Dutra passed Vargas’s decision on to Góes Monteiro emphasizing that “Brazil should remain permanently out of any extra-continental conflict....” And he thought that they should not share their defense studies and operations plans with the Americans, as the US military attaché had requested. Considering that Brazil’s traditional policy was non-aggression and that their plans were “exclusively” defensive, Dutra did not think that their planning had anything to do with cooperation with the United States.⁷⁰

Military relations got off to a shaky start because American neutrality laws prevented the United States from selling weapons prior to the outbreak of the war and because its own forces were so badly armed that Washington had little extra to give Brazil.⁷¹ The Brazilians did not yet feel threatened, and they were unwilling to allow American forces into their country. The two sides did agree to set up a binational military commission to continue negotiations.

Marshall was able to offer training and had invited Dutra to send some officers to US army schools. However, it took a year before 14 officers departed for the United States. It was clear to the chief of the small US

Military Mission that experience in the United States would be an effective way to combat the antipathy toward Americans exhibited by some officers who had trained in Europe. He went so far as to urge that selected Brazilian officers serve a year or more in the American army.⁷² Instruction for such Brazilians at Forts Benning, Sill, and Monroe was offered in Portuguese.⁷³

May 1940 was a crucial month. On May 13, during a visit to Belo Horizonte, Vargas gave a speech strongly reaffirming Brazilian neutrality, while warning that extremist elements of any sort would not be allowed to flourish, and asserting that “if we should have to take any initiative, we shall not do so alone but in accord with the rest of the American nations. ‘Like cautious Ulysses’ they should avoid the ‘lure of the Sirens which roam our seas so that our thoughts may be free to concentrate not only on Brazilian interests, but on the destinies of Brazil...’”⁷⁴ That same day Góes Monteiro had a conversation with US Chargé d’Affaires William C. Burdett, in which he reported that 8 of the 28 anti-aircraft batteries that they had ordered from Germany had arrived. Góes described the deliveries as a challenge to the Allies that showed the Germans were confident in their ability to supply arms. He affirmed that when the time came Brazil would cooperate fully with the United States and the other American Republics, but that Brazil was unarmed and had no weapons industries, it only had plenty of manpower. He was worried about the advances in aviation and uneasy about the course of the war seemingly believing that the Germans had a good chance of defeating the Allies. He believed that there was a real need for the closest cooperation between Brazil and the United States because both were confronted by a real and imminent danger.⁷⁵

In that bleak month of May with German forces storming toward Paris and defeated British troops desperately fleeing across the Channel to home, the nightmare of Germany gaining control of, or destroying the French and British fleets, sent Washington into a planning frenzy.⁷⁶ Army planners were studying situations that would be addressed in the various Rainbow Plans. In April and early May, one of the student officer groups of the Army War College class of 1939–1940 was laboring over “War Plan Purple” that addressed a supposed combined rebellion and Axis invasion of Brazil. The Army War College in Washington, D.C., was a rung on the ladder to higher command in World War II. The student officers at the War College learned how to conduct war operations by planning theoretical maneuvers and carefully studying historical campaigns. The War College stressed grooming officers for general war staff service and higher command. There were no class rankings, and work was done in committees.⁷⁷

The Brazilian study assumed a civil war in which Brazilian federal and rebel forces were fighting along an east-west line through São Paulo. It posited that Germany and Italy had created bases in the Cape Verde and Canary Islands off Africa and were reinforcing the rebels with men and munitions. Argentina had aligned itself with the rebels. The planning aimed at keeping the friendly government of “Loyalist Brazil” functioning and defeating the combined German, rebel, and Argentine forces. The dual focus was to secure Rio de Janeiro and Natal. They gave a lot of attention to estimating how rapidly the United States and the Axis could move troops into Brazil and the respective efficiency of the opposing fleets. Of four committees studying the Brazilian problem, only one had decided to send an American expeditionary force. Perhaps this reflected a tendency to avoid a direct South American involvement? Quite reasonably the officers were troubled by the difficulties caused by Brazil’s rough terrain, lack of roads and railroads, and the organization of the crucial American fleet. One critic wondered what would be the American public’s reaction to displacing so much army and naval power to the South Atlantic.⁷⁸ Worse, on May 24, the British Admiralty passed on reports that Germany had loaded 6,000 troops on merchant ships that might be en route to attack Brazil. As a precaution President Roosevelt ordered the army and navy to work up a plan over the weekend of May 25–27 to send 100,000 troops to defend Brazil. Labeled “Pot of Gold,” the operation could not be carried out because the army had no units ready, the Army Air Corps did not have sufficient air transports, the airfields in Brazil were inadequate, and the necessary naval support would have to be detached from the Pacific fleet, which the navy opposed. And, of course, the Brazilians would not welcome thousands of American troops. What happened to the German troop ships, that the British warned about, is unknown.⁷⁹

On June 4, 1940, Vargas met with his ministers of foreign affairs, justice, army, and navy and the two services’ chiefs of staff to discuss the international situation and what Brazil should do in the likelihood that the United States entered the war on the Allied side. They decided that Brazil should continue to arm itself and to maintain its neutrality, although in favor of the United States. They would keep their commitment to enter the war only in case of aggression against an American country.⁸⁰ Dutra’s notes on that meeting indicated that they would cooperate with the United States militarily, but they did not decide what to do if the Americans entered the war without first being attacked.⁸¹ Dutra assured the new

American military attaché, Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller, who had just completed the War College course mentioned above, that Brazil would collaborate with the United States, but emphasized that Brazil needed arms, and thereafter he sent Ambassador Jefferson Caffery a listing of their needs. In reality there was continuing doubt and perhaps fear, among Brazil's military, that the United States could not actually deliver the necessary arms. A deeply troubled Foreign Minister Aranha commented to Caffery that "You hold conversations with us and the Germans give us arms."⁸² Well, not exactly. The Germans were, according to the Brazilian ambassador in Berlin, anxious "to end the war quickly," and they were encouraging Brazilian neutrality by offering to increase their purchases of commodities in Brazil when the war ended. German companies were accepting orders at discount prices for goods to be delivered in September. At that point the Germans were optimistic that they would win.⁸³

On June 11, Vargas, perhaps unintentionally, raised worries in Washington by giving a speech that contained language that was interpreted ambiguously. Newspapers in the United States regarded his remarks as Fascist, while those in Germany praised them as courageous.⁸⁴ The speech, which he entitled "On the Threshold of a New Era," was given on Navy Day on the fleet's flagship *Minas Gerais* at a luncheon for admirals and generals. On board ship Vargas had shown General Góes Monteiro a copy of the speech, and Góes had cautioned that some of the terms and phrases might be interpreted as approving the German invasion of France, which was then underway. But Getúlio read the text without changes.⁸⁵ He did not yet know that FDR had the night before condemned Mussolini's declaration of war on crumbling France and retreating Great Britain as a dagger plunged into the back of a neighbor.⁸⁶ Vargas's focus was Brazil, but it certainly referred generally to the world situation; the speech caused considerable consternation. Recalling that the day commemorated the 1865 naval victory of Riachuelo in the Paraguayan war, he was certain that all Brazilians would do their duty in this historic moment when all of humanity was confronting "grave repercussions" resulting from the "rapid and violent change of values."

We march toward a future unlike that which we knew in economic, social, or political organization, and we sense that the old systems and outdated formulas are entering into decline. It is not the end of civilization, but the tumultuous and fruitful beginning of a new era. The vigorous peoples ... need to follow the course of their aspirations, instead of contemplating that

which collapses and falls into ruin. We must therefore understand our time and remove the debris of dead ideas and ideals. ... The State ought to assume the obligation of organizing the productive forces to give to the people all that is necessary for their aggrandizement as a collective. ...

We are creating industries, enabling the exploitation of raw materials, in order to export them transformed into industrial products. To accelerate the pace of these achievements, some sacrifice of commodities is necessary, [as is] the manly disposition to save in order to build a strong nation. In the period we are going through, only peoples hardened in the struggle and strengthened by sacrifice will be able to face storms and overcome them.

Political order now cannot be made in the shadow of vague humanitarian rhetoric intended to annul borders and create a fraternal and united international society without peculiarities or friction, enjoying peace as a natural good and not as a conquest of every day. Instead of a panorama of balanced and fair distribution of the goods of the Earth, we witnessed the exacerbation of nationalism, the strong Nations imposing themselves by organizing based on sentiments of the Fatherland and sustaining themselves convinced of their own superiority. The epoch of improvident liberalisms, of sterile demagogies, useless individualism and sowers of disorder is past. Political democracy replaces economic democracy, in which power, emanates directly from the people and instituted to defend their interest, [and it] organizes work, source of national aggrandizement and not means and roadway to private fortunes. There is no more room for regimes founded on privileges and distinctions; there are, only, those incorporating the entire nation [based] on duty and offering, equally, social justice and opportunities in the struggle for life.

Happily in Brazil we have established a regime which is adequate for our necessities without imitating or affiliating ourselves with any of the current doctrines and existing ideologies. It is a regime of Brazilian order and peace, in accord with the nature and tradition of our people, capable of rapidly boosting the general progress and guaranteeing the security of all.⁸⁷

Reading the speech today, one wonders what the fuss was all about. Likely it was the timing of it. The British had just retreated across the Channel, the Netherlands and Belgium were conquered, and France was on the edge of falling under the Nazi boot. It was a very nervous time. Phrases like “vigorous peoples,” “dead ideas and sterile ideals,” “old systems” caught attention and maybe paralyzed thought.

Vargas noted in his diary that “the Germans praised it, the English attacked, the Americans were alarmed. Internally they accuse me of being a Germanophile.” He ended his diary entry for June 12 saying that the

conversations “between the chief of the American Military Mission and our military and the foreign minister about our war materiel [have] started.”⁸⁸ The next day the Brazilian newspapers carried a note that Vargas had written to clarify his meaning. He emphasized the maintenance of a foreign policy of solidarity in the defense of the American continent and neutrality in regard to European conflicts while declaring that his speech of June 11 was intended to alert the nation that the changes in the world required strengthening the Brazilian state economically and militarily.⁸⁹ It is possible, as historian Gerson Moura argued, that Vargas intended his remarks to put more pressure on Washington to support Brazilian industrialization and to speed up arms delivery, but the president’s scant comments left room for doubt.⁹⁰

VARGAS SOUGHT NOT TO ALIENATE GERMANY

Behind the scenes a perplexing drama unfolded. On June 20 Vargas met with German Ambassador Kurt M. Prüfer, who brought cables from Berlin proposing that Germany immediately order a “great quantity of cotton and coffee for delivery after the war,” which he hoped would end soon. Prüfer reported that Vargas suggested that they should arrange a trade agreement before the war ended. Likely he thought that his bargaining position would be weaker once the fighting ended. Moreover, the ambassador said that Vargas had “emphasized of his own accord his full intention to maintain neutrality and his personal sympathy for the authoritarian states, referring at the same time to the speech he made on June 11. He openly expressed his aversion to England and the democratic system.” It is strange that Prüfer’s comments were at odds with what Vargas wrote in his diary about their meeting. Prüfer said Vargas had requested the meeting, while Vargas twice wrote that Prüfer had asked for it. The reference to the June 11 speech matched German interpretations of it but disagreed with Vargas’s diary comments. And their dating of the meeting differed by a day. Was Prüfer accurate in his account or was he telling Berlin what he knew would be pleasing?⁹¹

Vargas’s conversations with the German ambassador have been interpreted frequently to show that he was playing both sides, and, as a noted Brazilian historian expressed it, “the expectation, at the time, was that Brazil would be on the side of the Axis countries.”⁹² The official German view in June 1940 was that Vargas, “despite protestations of friendship,” was rejecting “North American policy... in anticipation of England’s

defeat and the resulting weakening of Roosevelt, and the orientation of Brazilian policy toward trade with Germany and Europe.”⁹³ Germany held out a promise to buy large amounts of Brazilian products “immediately after the war ends” and to deliver on the steel works, as long as there was “no substantial change ... in the present state of Brazil’s neutrality.”⁹⁴ Certainly, Vargas’s public position was that, for Brazil and the Americas, the European war was “something very distant and beyond the interests of the continent.”⁹⁵

However, Getúlio’s long time “*homem de confiança*,” [confidant] Paulo Germano Hasslocher, wrote from his diplomatic post in Washington that the speech had the advantage of focusing world attention on Brazil in this moment of great crisis. He thought that the two men who would decide the outcome of the war were FDR and Hitler; all others would play secondary roles. He recalled a saying of Talleyrand that in “international politics, when you are not the strongest, you ought to be with the strongest.” The United States, he asserted, was stronger than Germany. “This country can do all that Germany has done and is doing, and much more.” Modern war would be decided in favor of the country with the greater industrial capacity to give its armies the greatest and most efficient armament. “I am absolutely certain that it [the United States] is the most powerful in the world and invincible on the day that it steps into the arena of battle. ... I think that from the wisdom and knowledge of things we ought to place ourselves at the side of the United States. Not as humble vassals, but as cooperators and collaborators in a task of common interest ... that is more in line with our character and development.”⁹⁶

The day after Hasslocher wrote that advice, FDR signed a joint resolution of Congress authorizing the Secretaries of War and Navy to assist the governments of the American Republics to enlarge and enhance their military and naval establishments.⁹⁷

Curiously, on June 22, Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro gave a decidedly “*Pan-Americanista*” speech that seemingly was intended “to correct the unfortunate impression caused by Vargas’s speech of June 11.” The occasion was the farewell luncheon at Rio’s Jockey Club in honor of General Allen Kimberley, chief of the American Military Mission, returning home after two years in Brazil. Commentators and most historians seemed to have ignored that Góes asked that Kimberley carry the message to the American government and people of “our sentiments of brotherly continental confidence ... which are permanent factors in the foreign policy of Brazil.” He pleaded that the United States immediately implement a secu-

rity program, assisting the Latin American peoples to cooperate in collective defense. He observed that it was “the duty, now, of the members of this [Pan American] brotherhood ... to contribute ... [to] making it effective and efficient.”⁹⁸ Hardly the sentiments one would expect from an officer American intelligence continued to regard as dubious. However, Góes was extremely worried, somber, pacing back and forth in his office. He commented to General Leitão de Carvalho that he feared that it would be all over by September “with a complete victory by the Axis forces.”⁹⁹ Góes talked too much and revealed his thoughts too openly, making him hard to evaluate. Appearances and realities mixed in curious fashion in Brazil in the first half of 1940. In his annual report to Vargas, Minister Dutra commented that after the exchange of visits of the chiefs of staff, “a tacit alliance is on the way of being established objectively for the armed cooperation of the two countries, in case of war with a European power or in the south of the continent.”¹⁰⁰ Whatever motivation Vargas may have had in giving the puzzling June 11 speech, it contributed to the Roosevelt’s decision to act.

NOTES

1. The uprising wiped away the political arrangements of what is called in Brazil the Old Republic and brought to power a group of political leaders with a different set of ideas about what was needed in the country. There has been a continuous debate among historians over the nature of the political-military events of October 1930. A useful starting point for the debate is Lúcia Lippi Oliveira (Coordenadora) et al., *Elite intelectual e debate político nos anos 30: uma bibliografia comentada da Revolução de 1930* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1980), pp. 35–51.
2. See McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937* (Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 191–371.
3. General de Divisão Francisco Ramos de Andrade Neves (Chief of Staff), Rio de Janeiro, 3 de Agosto de 1934: Estado-Maior do Exército, *Exame da Situação Militar do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado-Maior do Exército, 1934), 6–8. For a very explicit statement, see Estado-Maior do Exército, 2a Grande Região Militar, Rio de Janeiro, Dec. 1936, Memo #1 (Situação do Paiz), Correspondência Pessoal, Acervo Pessoal Gen. Pedro de Góes Monteiro, Caixa 1, Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio). It noted (in section “*Neutrality and Cooperation*”) that Brazil would not be able to maintain neutrality in the event of a world conflict, that it would have to associate itself with one of the sides, and that, because it

- lacked war materials, its mobilization would provide soldiers that would have to be equipped by another power, “which could not be other than the United States of America.”
4. For an analysis of the trade situation and Brazilian purchase of German arms, see Stanley E. Hilton’s close study of Brazil’s arms negotiations with Germany in his *Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930–1939: The Politics of Trade Rivalry* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), 118–129, 186–190; and my *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945* (Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 149–175.
 5. G. Vargas to Oswaldo Aranha, n.p., Dec. 24, 1934, GV 1934.12.14/1, AGV, CPDOC; and O. Aranha to G. Vargas, Washington, D.C., Jan. 18, 1935, GV 1935.01.18/2, AGV, CPDOC.
 6. Oswaldo Aranha to G. Vargas, Washington, D.C., Mar. 6, 1935, GV 1935.03.06/1, AGV, CPDOC.
 7. A *compromisso* can be thought of as a pact. For fuller treatment, see McCann, “The Military and the Dictatorship: Getúlio, Góes, and Dutra,” in Jens R. Hentschke, *Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 109–141.
 8. Vargas, *Diário*, Vol. 1, pp. 523–524.
 9. On Brazil’s strategic situation and the military’s concerns about arms, foreign trade, and international relations: McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937* (Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 349–363.
 10. Boris Fausto, *A Concise History of Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 227; typical of books that argue that Vargas was vacillating is Roberto Gambini, *O Duplo Jogo de Getúlio Vargas* (São Paulo: Edições Símbolo, 1977).
 11. Maj. Lawrence C. Mitchell (Military Attaché), Rio, March 13, 1939: “Interview with Minister of War, Army’s attitude toward Germany and the United States,” No. 2202, 2257 K-33, RG165, National Archives [NARA].
 12. The Friedrich Krupp Company and the Carl Zeiss Company were key elements of Germany’s war industries. The contract called for the delivery of 1,180 artillery pieces of various calibers. For a listing by type, see Ministério da Guerra, *Relatório apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo General de Divisão Eurico Dutra, Ministro de Estado da Guerra em Maio de 1940* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1941), pp. 5–7 [hereafter MG, *Relatório...Dutra...1940*]; Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da verdade* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), p. 335. The negotiations took place over two years starting in 1936. The Krupp contract was signed on March 9, 1938.

13. Sumner Welles to F. D. Roosevelt, Washington, DC, January 26, 1937, President's Personal File 4473 (Vargas), FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY. Roosevelt and Vargas met in Rio de Janeiro in November 1936. In addition to saying that Brazil's "vital interests" would be involved if the United States were attacked, he suggested the possibility of the United States "utilizing some other portion of Brazilian territory as a means of safeguarding the eastern approach to the Panama Canal." For Welles biography, see Michael J. Devine, "Welles, Sumner"; <http://www.anb.org/articles/06/06-00696.html>; American National Biography Online Feb. 2000.
14. Prior to World War I, Brazil had planned to contract a German mission to instruct the army and had sent 34 officers in three contingents to train with the Imperial German Army (1905–1912) for two-year periods. Members of this group founded the army journal *A Defesa Nacional* in 1913 and shaped the modern Brazilian army. A number of them were senior generals in the late 1930s. For a listing of names, see McCann, *Soldiers of the Patria*, p. 486. Some of the admiration of the reconstructed army of the Third Reich was actually nostalgia related to the pre-World War I experience.
15. Sixty-five percent of US bauxite supply for the aluminum industry came from neighboring Dutch Guiana (Surinam); as in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940–1941* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 603.
16. Memorandum, Washington, December 23, 1941: Notes of meeting at the White House with the President and the British Prime Minister presiding. <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/memorandum-10/>.
17. "Notes on Coast Artillery Defenses of the coast of Brazil," January 16, 1939, 2006-164, War Department, Military Intelligence Division, RG165, NARA.
18. "Special Study, Brazil," March 29, 1939, Army War College, War Plans Division (WPD) 4115-7, WWII RS, NARA. In asking the War College to do this study, General Marshall was breaking a long-standing policy of not using the college for such studies. See Brig. Gen. G. C. Marshall (Deputy Chief of Staff) to Maj. Gen. John L. DeWitt (Commandant Army War College), February 6, 1939, 14281-22, WPD, RG165, NARA. The officers involved worked in secret under the leadership of Major Francis G. Bonham between February 17 and March 29, 1939 to produce the study on Brazil and another on Venezuela. The War College was then at Fort Humphreys in Washington D. C. Larry I. Brand, ed. *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 194–195.

19. Maj. Lawrence C. Mitchell (attaché), Rio, Sept 22, 1939, Report 2300: "Comments on Current Events, No. 4," 2050-120, War Dept., General Staff, Military Intelligence Div., RG165, NARA. Dutra urged Brazilian officers to follow combatant operations to glean lessons and enlightenment.
20. The US Navy mission had 16 officers, headed by a rear admiral; see <http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F50716F8355B11728DDDAE0894DA415B828EF1D3>. The mission endured until 1977. From its origins into the 1930s, see Eugénio Vargas Garcia, "Anglo-American Rivalry in Brazil: the Case of the 1920s," Working Paper CBS-14-00 (P), July 15, 2000, Center for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, pp. 19–24.
21. Col. E.R. W. McCabe (Asst. Chief of Staff G2), Memo for Asst. Chief of Staff WPD, January 25, 1939, WPD 4115, RG 165, NARA.
22. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), *Recenseamento, 1940* (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1940), as in Ricardo A. Silva Seitenfus, "O Brasil e o III Reich (1933–1939)," pp. 275–276. <https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/jbla.1988.25.issue-/jbla.1988.25.1.273/jbla.1988.25.1.273.pdf>. There were then about 900,000 Germans in Brazil.
23. McCann, "Vargas and the Destruction of the Brazilian Integralista and Nazi Parties," *The Americas*, Vol. XXVI (July 1969), No. 1, pp. 15–34. German language even disappeared from head stones in cemeteries in southern towns, such as Canela, Rio Grande do Sul. I saw that firsthand during a visit to Canela.
24. Eurico Dutra, Ministro de Guerra, *Relatório dos Principais Atividades do Ministerio de Guerra durante o ano de 1939* (Rio de Janeiro; Imprensa Militar, 1940) dated July 1940, pp. 45–46. For a study of Nazi activities, see Ana Maria Dietrich, "Nazismo Tropical? O Partido Nazista no Brasil" (Tese de doutorado em História, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007). <http://docshare01.docshare.tips/files/20852/208520682.pdf>.
25. For German spies, see Stanley E. Hilton, *Hitler's Secret War in South America, 1939–1945: German Military Espionage and Allied Counterespionage in Brazil* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981).
26. Col. E.R. W. McCabe (Asst. Chief of Staff G2), Washington, January 27, 1939: "Attitude of Brazil toward the United States and Intrusion of the Axis States in Brazil." 2006-164, RG165, NARA.
27. McCabe Memo January 25, 1939. On *Integralismo*, see Stanley E. Hilton, "Ação Integralista Brasileira, Fascism in Brazil, 1932–1938," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 9, No.2 (Dec. 1972), pp. 3–29; McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army*, pp. 372–375; Marcus Klein, *Our Brazil Will Awake! The Acção Integralista Brasileira and the Failed Quest*

- for Fascist Order in the 1930s*, (Amsterdam: Cuadernos del CEDLA, 2004), pp. 71–74.
28. Karl Ritter, Rio, June 29, 1938, # 993, mentioned the Integralista plan that had fallen into police hands, see *O III Reich e o Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Laudes, 1968), pp. 97–101.
 29. Col. E. R. W. McCabe (Asst. Chief of Staff G2), Memo for Asst. Chief of Staff War Plans Division, January 25, 1939: “Defense Policy of Brazil,” G-2/2006-164, RG 165, NARA.
 30. Marshall arrived at Rio on May 25 and departed on June 6, reaching Annapolis, Md., on June 20. General Góes Monteiro returned with him for an extensive visit to the United States. They were entertained at the US Naval Academy, whose commander had been a member of the naval mission in Brazil. In May 1939, Marshall was deputy chief of staff, but President Roosevelt already had named him to succeed General Malin Craig (Oct. 2, 1935–Aug. 31, 1939), and he was to take over the chief’s post on September 1. There is a chronology of his career in Larry I. Bland, Editor, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. xxix–xxx.
 31. Larry I. Bland, Editor, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 1, p. 716. Quote from interview Bland had with Marshall on December 7, 1956.
 32. The Standing Liaison Committee, formed in early 1938, had representatives from State, War, and Navy Departments. As deputy chief of staff from mid-1938, Marshall was an active participant. The SLC was the forerunner of the post-war National Security Council (1947).
 33. Major Lawrence C. Mitchell, Rio, March 2, 1938, Report 2057 “Law of 1938 for Organization of the Brazilian Ministry of War” 2006-86, War Department, General Staff, RG 165, NARA.
 34. On Marshall’s reception there is Caffery, Rio, May 26, 1939, 832.20111/29, #1317, RG 59, NARA. This lengthy dispatch included the full program of the tour, including arrival times and methods of travel. Attached to it are clippings, editorials, and front-page photos. There is a detailed 11 page program of Marshall’s visit in “Programa das homenagens do Brasil a missão militar chefiada por S.Exa. o General George C. Marshall, Chefe do Estado Maior do Exército Americano e sua ilustre comitiva” (Rio de Janeiro, 1939) HB203f, Arquivo Horta Barbosa, CPDOC. Góes Monteiro was the general’s family name. Many Americans referred to him incorrectly as “Monteiro.” Familiarly friends and even the press called him Góes for short. For his biography, see “Góes Monteiro,” Israel Beloch and Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds. *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983*. Vol. 3 (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1984.), pp. 2246–2259; for Dutra, see “Eurico Gaspar Dutra,” *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 1126–1154. Because of a spelling reform, some publications now spell his name Góis. I am using the spelling he used himself.

35. General George C. Marshall to General Malin Craig, Rio de Janeiro, May 26, 1939, <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/to-general-malin-craig-6/> and Marshall to Craig, Belo Horizonte, June 1, 1939. <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/1-577-to-general-malin-craig-june-1-1939/>. The originals are in Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1917–, 210.482 Brazil [4-29-39], RG 407, NARA.
36. Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe...* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Coelho Branco, 1956), pp. 357–360. Góes provided background on the invitation, noting that Dutra was not favorable to the idea. Marshall's presentation and Góes's response are from Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, *A Serviço do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora A Noite, 1952), pp. 58–59. Leitão was the commanding general in Rio Grande do Sul during Marshall's visit. There is a detailed summary of the trip in General Paulo Q. Duarte, *O Nordeste na II Guerra Mundial: Antecedentes e Ocupação* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1971), pp. 45–62.
37. Major William Sackville (Military Attaché), Rio, March 4, 1936: "Brazil's Authorized Army, 1936-7-8" 2006-105, RG 165, NARA.
38. Major William Sackville, "Agitation within Army to prevent reduction of effectives," Rio, Nov. 1, 1935, 1552, 2006-102, G-2 Regional, Brazil 6300-c, MID, G2, WD, RG 165, NARA. Sackville could not have been more wrong when he concluded his report saying, "There is not much probability of further agitation by officers."
39. McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army*, pp. 375–388.
40. Major Emmanuel Kant Torres Homem to Lt. Col. José Agostinho dos Santos, n.d. Forte de São João (Niterói, RJ) included in Relatório, Segundo Período de Instrução, 2 GAC, 1936, III–IV, Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio).
41. MG, *Relatório ... Dutra ... 1940*, p. 132.
42. George C. Marshall to General Malin Craig, Rio, May 26, 1939, and Belo Horizonte, June 1, 1939, in Larry I. Bland, Editor, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 1, pp. 716–717, 717–720. He outlined ideas for Góes's tour of the United States.
43. Comment in memo of Orme Wilson to Sumner Welles, Rio, Nov. 15, 1940, 832.20/261, RG59, NA. The military mission had been there since 1934, its four officers provided training and advice in coastal defense and other technical matters.
44. Throughout Marshall was careful with costs noting that Pan American had offered a free flight to the north. General George C. Marshall to General Malin Craig, Rio de Janeiro, May 26, 1939, <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/to-general-malin-craig-6/>. Ridgway and Chaney had distinguished careers. Marshall assigned Ridgway to the War Plans Division in September 1939; in 1942 he took command of the

- 82nd Airborne Division, had distinguished roles in the Sicily and Normandy invasions, commanded the Eighth Army in Korea, and in 1952 succeeded Eisenhower as NATO commander. In 1942 Chaney was the first commander of US Army forces in Britain, being succeeded in that post by Eisenhower. One wonders how long the impressions they formed of Brazil in 1938 continued to influence their thinking.
45. Matthew B. Ridgway to G. C. Marshall, *USS Nashville*, June 17, 1939, Memo: "Brazil in Hemisphere Defense," WPD 4224-11, World War II Records Section, RG 165, NARA.
 46. Góes Monteiro to Getúlio Vargas, Washington, July 7, 1939 and July 10, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC. Curiously in the mid-1930s, Argentine war plans assumed that Brazil and the United States were allied against that republic; see Capt. Vernon A. Walters, Rio, Jan. 27, 1944, "The Plano Maximo," G-2 Regional Files 5995, RG 165, NARA. This document was the Argentine plan for war with Brazil. Góes's planned trip to Europe was not just to Germany, first he was to go to England, France, and Italy. In fact the American invitation had been received after the other four, but Vargas had decided it should be acted on first. In the end Góes never made the trip to Europe. On trip plans and Vargas's interest, see Jefferson Caffery (Ambassador to Brazil), Rio, May 8, 1939, 832.20111/8, RG59, NARA.
 47. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General* (New York: MacGibbon & Kee, 1964), pp. 332–333.
 48. For Góes Monteiro and Dutra's role in establishing the Estado Novo dictatorship see McCann, "The Military and the Dictatorship: Getúlio, Góes, and Dutra," in Jens R. Hentschke, Ed. *Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 109–141.
 49. Estado-Maior do Exército, *Relatório dos Trabalhos do Estado-Maior ... 1937 ... pelo GD Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado-Maior do Exército, 1938), 4–5, 8–9. "We inherited ... a quasi-Army only nominal, devoid of what is essential and, therefore, worthless on the battlefield" p. 5.
 50. G. C. Marshall to Jefferson Caffery, Washington, July 24, 1939, #2-018, Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, General Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.
 51. Góes at West Point was from G. C. Marshall to Lt. Col. Harold R. Bull, Washington DC, July 15, 1939 #2012, Larry I. Brand, Sharon Ritenour Stevens, and Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr. Eds., *George Catlett Marshall Papers*. Vol. 2, "We Cannot Delay," July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),

- p. 13. Col. Bull had just ended his tour as secretary of the general staff. See Getty Images for photo at White House. Brazilian Ambassador Carlos Martins also was with Góes at the White House. There is a one minute video of Marshall and Góes at the air force display at Langley Field on June 22, 1939 <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/video/langley-field-virginia-air-show/>.
52. G.C. Marshall to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Washington DC, July 24, 1939, #2-018 <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-jefferson-caffery/>.
 53. Marshall to Gen. Malin Craig, on USS Nashville “Off Recife,” June 10, 1939 [Handwritten Aerogramma via Panair] 2257 K32, RG165, NARA.
 54. Under Secretary Sumner Welles to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Washington, May 8, 1940, 810.20 Defense/58 ½, *United States Foreign Relations 1940*, Vol. 5, pp. 40–42; Hélio Silva, 1939: *Véspera de Guerra* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1972), pp. 194–195. The Brazilian coastline would be equal to the distance from San Diego in California to the Arctic Circle in Alaska.
 55. Estado-Maior do Exército, 2a Grande Região Militar, Rio de Janeiro, Dec. 1936, Memo no. 1 (Situação do Paiz), (Sec. 4) Correspondência Pessoal, Acervo Pessoal Gen. Pedro de Góes Monteiro, Caixa 1, Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio).
 56. Jefferson Caffery to Marshall, Rio, August 10, 1939, Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office, General (Brazil-American Military Mission), George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.
 57. Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe...* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Editora Coelho Branco, 1956), p. 40. This book was based on a series of interviews with the general.
 58. G.C. Marshall to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Washington DC, July 24, 1939, #2-018 <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-jefferson-caffery/>. Miller was from New Hampshire and graduated from West Point in the fabled class of 1915 ranking ninth.
 59. Góes Monteiro to Marshall, Rio, August 8, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC. For the Góes-Marshall letters and lists of the arms requested, see WPD 4224-7 to 13, WWII Records Section, NARA.
 60. G.C. Marshall to P. de Góes Monteiro, Washington DC, October 5, 1939, #2-061 <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-general-pedro-goes-monteiro/> Marshall was replying to a letter from Góes dated September 8, 1939, WPD4224, RG165, NARA. He thought that the orders for materiel from Germany were “virtually cancelled and arrested” by the outbreak of war. He wanted to know if the United States could “supply us with identical materiel with extreme urgency.”

61. Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe...* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Editora Coelho Branco, 1956), 365; Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General* (New York: Viking, 1963), p. 342.
62. Jefferson Caffery to Sumner Welles, Rio de Janeiro, May 24, 1940, 810.20 Defense/58 ½, telegram, *United States Foreign Relations 1940*, Vol. 5, pp. 42–43. Caffery reported that Aranha told him that morning that Brazil was ready to “cooperate 100% with the United States in plans for military and naval defense or to repel aggression, and even to cooperate with the United States in war.”
63. Ricardo Antônio Silva Seitenfus, *O Brasil de Getúlio Vargas e a Formação dos Blocos, 1930–1942: O processo do envolvimento brasileiro na II Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1985), p. 348 ff.
64. While having been invited to German maneuvers has been emphasized in a number of books, he was also to observe British maneuvers. The Itamaraty, Brazil’s foreign ministry, laid out the order of visits as Italy, England, Germany, and France. See Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, August 18, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC. Frank D. McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945* (Princeton University Press, 1973), 146, note 46. For the persistent myth circulating in Brazil that Góes Monteiro went to Germany, see, for example, Luis Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1973), p. 263. The myth has so penetrated Brazilian historiography that it is even found in cultural studies such as Ruy Castro’s biography of Carmen Miranda; see *Carmen: Uma Biografia* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2005), p. 243. On the cancelled trip to Europe, see Hélio Silva, *1939, Véspera de Guerra* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1972), pp. 158–160.
65. Caffery, Rio, May 25, 1939, Telegram 174 (4 pm), 832.20111/18, RG 59, NARA and Caffery, Rio, June 6, 1939, Telegram 184, RG 59, NARA.
66. Oswaldo Aranha to G. Vargas, Rio, August 18, 1939, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC. Having access to documents on both sides does not always clarify matters.
67. Eurico Dutra to G. Vargas, Rio, May 5, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC. Surprisingly Dutra thought that a war in Europe would attract Russia into an anti-German alliance, and he feared that would cause the spread of communism in Brazil. He said that any alliance or commercial arrangement with Russia could have “the most serious consequences for Brazil.” In 1935 Brazil had suffered a communist revolt in its army that had been supported by agents and money from Moscow. Though quickly suppressed, it deeply disturbed the Brazilian officer corps for years thereafter. McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937*, pp. 375–388.

68. Eurico Dutra to G. Vargas, Rio, May 5, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
69. Vargas to Dutra, Rio, May 9, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
70. Eurico Dutra to Góes Monteiro, Rio de Janeiro, May 11, 1939, Aviso Secreto No. 9, Arquivo Marechal Dutra as in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da verdade* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), pp. 400–401.
71. The Neutrality Act of 1939 repealed the arms embargo and permitted “cash and carry” exports of arms and munitions to belligerents. The final vote in the House of Representatives was on Nov 2.
72. Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller, Memo for American Ambassador, Rio, Sept. 24, 1940 “Sending of Brazilian Army Officers to the US for Instructional Purposes” 2257-K-18/181; see also Eurico Dutra to Maj. Edwin L. Sibert (Military Attaché), Rio, January 8, 1941, 2257-K-18/247, WD, GS, MID, RG 165, NARA.
73. BG Sherman Miles (Chief G2) to Military Attaché (Brazil), Washington, Jan 16, 1940, Telegram 217, 2257-K-18; and Maj. Edwin L. Sibert to Asst. Chief of Staff, G2, Rio, Jan. 3, 1941, No. 2565: “Brazilian Officers to US Service Schools,” 2257-k-18/232, WD, GS, MID, RG 165, NARA.
74. Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil*, Vol. VII (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1940), pp. 317–320. Speech was on May 13, 1940. The speech was reported to Washington in Randolph Harrison, Rio, May 16, 1940, Dispatch 3014, 832.00/1289, RG 59, NA. Getúlio’s imagery of “Ulysses” avoiding the lure of sirens may have been a reference to the 29 foreign naval vessels that had visited Brazil in the previous 17 months. See Duarte, *O Nordeste na II Guerra Mundial*, p. 67.
75. Robert C. Burdett to George C. Marshall, Salvador da Bahia, May 17, 1940, 832.00/1289 ½, RG59, NARA. He met with Góes in Rio on May 13. The *chargé d’affaires* was in charge of an embassy when the ambassador was absent.
76. On May 23, 1940, Roosevelt told a group of businessmen that the defeat of Britain and France would remove the protective buffer of the British fleet and the French army. “And so ... we have to think in terms of [protecting] the Americas more and more and infinitely faster.” The Belgian army surrendered on May 28, and the British evacuation from Dunkirk began. Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), p. 34.
77. Harry P. Ball, *Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Alumni Association of the United States Army War College, 1983), pp. 212–219.

78. Of course, such “planning” is based on assumptions about enemy capabilities that are only as good as the intelligence available and the quality of the familiarity of the planners with the terrain they will be operating in. The documents do not show adequate familiarity with the terrain or awareness of the difficulty of movement in a country without roads. “Course at the Army War College, 1939–1940. War Plans. Formulation of War Plans Period.” Report of Staff Group No. 3. Subject: War Plan Purple. Date of Conference – 20 May 1940, AWC WPDC4081. Copy in US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa. Lt. Colonel L. W. Miller participated in this exercise.
79. For “Pot of Gold,” see Conn and Fairchild, *Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, pp. 273–274. Conn and Fairchild took pains to show American and British concerns about German interest in establishing a base at Dakar in French West Africa and what this could mean for Brazilian security. See p. 120. The origin of the British report of a possible German expeditionary force is not clear. The 6,000 German troops came from “Foreign Policy and Armed Forces,” <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/csppp/ch04.htm>, p. 95.
80. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II (São Paulo: Siciliano & Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1995), p. 317 (4 June 1940). Others have said this meeting was on June 5. I am following the date of the Vargas diary entry. The existence of the Vargas diary was a closely guarded family secret until its publication in 1995.
81. Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade*, p. 401. The editors said that the meeting was on June 5, but they did not cite a particular document.
82. Hélio Silva, *1939, Véspera de Guerra*, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1972), p. 201. Lehman Miller, an engineer officer, West Point class of 1915, had been in Brazil with the small US Military Mission (1934–38), went to Rio as military attaché, then was made chief of military mission and promoted to brigadier general.
83. Cyro Freitas Valle, Berlin, June 17, 1940, #193, Arquivo Histórico de Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE), Palácio de Itamaraty, Rio de Janeiro (hereafter AHMRE). The foreign ministry encouraged the Americans to be more active in strengthening trade; see MRE to Embaixada/ Washington, Rio, August 5, 1940, #155, Expidido 3801, AHMRE.
84. *The New York Times*, June 12, 1940; Cyro de Freitas Valle, Berlin, June 12, 1940, #183; June 15, 1940, #189; July 2, 1940, #233, *Arquivo Histórico de Ministério das Relações Exteriores* (Itamaraty Palace, Rio de Janeiro). AHMRE.

85. Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe...* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Coelho Branco, 1956), pp. 365–367.
86. <http://www.history.com/speeches/franklin-d-roosevelts-stab-in-the-back-speech> FDR also attacked the isolationists who were endangering the country's security. The speech was at the University of Virginia, where his son was graduating from law school.
87. For the text, see Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil*, Vol. VII (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1940), pp. 331–335. There is an English translation of some dubious sections of the speech in Caffery, Rio, June 11, 1940, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, V, pp. 616–617.
88. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 319–320 [June 11 and June 12, 1940]. He labeled the Germanophile charge as irrational or absurd. For the various interpretations and concerns, see McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945*, pp. 185–190.
89. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 320, and note 29 [June 13].
90. Gerson Moura, “Brazilian Foreign Relations, 1939–1950: The Changing Nature of Brazil-United States Relations during and after the Second World War” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University College London, 1982), pp. 55–57. He saw the US commitment to support construction of a steel mill and strengthening the armed forces as the price for Brazil ending its neutrality (p. 56). Moura based his study on British, American, and Brazilian archives. His interpretations were often influenced by British perspectives. He summarized his dissertation research in his *Sucessos e Ilusões: Relações Internacionais do Brasil Durante e Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1991). Unhappily it does not include the ample documentation of the dissertation.
91. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 321 [June 17 and June 20, 1940]; Kurt M. Prüfer, Rio, June 21, 1940, 235/157133, telegram as in Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, Vol. IX, p. 659. According to Prüfer the meeting was on June 21, but Vargas's diary has it on June 20. Some historians have accepted the June 11 speech as an indication that Vargas was, at worse, playing both sides. Others have him seeking to unlock the Brazilian-American negotiations on military and economic cooperation; Ricardo A. Silva Seitenfus, *O Brasil de Getúlio Vargas e a Formação dos Blocos, 1930–1942* (São Paulo, 1985), pp. 324–330; Amado Luiz Cervo & Clodoaldo Bueno, *A Política Externa Brasileira, 1822–1985* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1986), pp. 72–73; and Gerson Moura cited in note 90.

92. Edgard Carone, *A Terceira República (1937–1945)* (São Paulo: Difel/Difusão, 1976), p. 55. Carone did not clarify exactly to whose expectation he referred.
93. Kurt M. Prüfer, Rio, July 2, 1940, 235/157134, telegram as in Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, Vol. X, pp. 100–101.
94. Emil Wiehl (Director, Economy Policy) to Prüfer, Berlin, June 19, 1940, 8719/E609576-77, telegram as in Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, Vol. IX, pp. 630–631.
95. Vargas statement in *Nación* (Buenos Aires) June, 1940, as quoted in Demócrito Cavalcanti de Arruda, “Nossa Participação na Primeira e Segunda Guerras Mundiais” in *Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva sobre a F.E.B* (Porto Alegre: Cobraci Publicações, 1949), p. 36.
96. Paulo Germano Hasslocher to Getúlio Vargas, Washington, June 14, 1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC. Hasslocher was from Rio Grande do Sul and had been a close associate since Vargas’s governorship (1927–1930). In Washington he was commercial consul since 1931. For biography, see “Paulo Germano Hasslocher,” in Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, Eds, *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitária, 1984), Vol. 2, p. 1582.
97. Public Resolution 83, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, Joint Resolution 367. Signed by FDR on June 15, 1940.
98. Randolph Harrison Jr. (Second Secretary), Rio, June 24, 1940, 3186, 832.20/209, RG 59, NARA. McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 189–190.
99. General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, *A Serviço do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora A Noite, 1952), p. 25. The general was then regional commander in Porto Alegre. Later on he would be chief of the Brazilian delegation in the Mixed Brazilian-American Defense Commission in Washington.
100. Eurico Dutra, Ministro de Guerra, *Relatório dos Principais Actividades do Ministerio de Guerra durante o ano de 1939* (Rio de Janeiro; Imprensa Militar, 1940) dated July 1940, p. 31.
Of course the reference to the south of the continent meant Argentina, which the Brazilians continued to regard as their likely opponent.



CHAPTER 3

Search for Mutual Benefits

ARMAMENTS KEY TO BRAZILIAN COOPERATION

In 1940, American officers did not have a high regard for the Brazilian military, indeed, for any Latin American military. They vastly preferred to send their own forces to defend Brazil, but in truth did not have troops trained and armed for such a mission, nor did they have the transports to get them to Brazil. The Brazilians regarded the idea of accepting American defenders as a threat to national sovereignty, something their self-esteem would not allow. American intelligence estimates misread the caution of Brazilian generals as a pro-German attitude. In early June 1940, Góes Monteiro reminded Military Mission Chief Colonel Miller that they had been talking for a year about military cooperation and after all that conversation, not a gun, not a round of ammunition had reached Brazil.¹ As crisis-laden 1940 dragged on into August, the two sides stumbled about looking for a mutually satisfactory solution to their defense dilemma.

The War Department announced that a meeting in Washington of the chiefs of staff of the armies of the American Republics would be held in October, and to prepare for that meeting, Dutra wrote a memo for Vargas outlining his thoughts on the position Brazil should assume. He first suggested that someone other than General Góes be sent so that the decision-making process could be slowed down, but, failing that, the government's instructions should be carefully defined to maintain Brazil's neutrality. He referred to Col. Miller's promise that Brazil would receive its desired

armaments during a projected period of six months to three years. Such timing was too vague for the Brazilians. And Dutra wanted to be sure that they would not give up their rights to the arms purchased from the *Reich*. He told Vargas that it seemed as if the United States could only provide old armament unsuitable for their defense plans.²

In July, Ambassador Caffery had stated the case bluntly, Washington had to provide credits to allow the Brazilians to buy arms or they would negotiate with the Germans. Brazil simply had to have arms. Moreover, Caffery told Secretary of State Cordell Hull that Krupp was ready to commit to building a steel mill in Brazil after the war, and to avoid that possibility, Vargas wanted to obtain financing from the Export-Import Bank to purchase steel mill equipment and technical assistance in the United States. So Brazilian defense and industrial development were intimately linked to the danger of “Brazil’s falling altogether into the German orbit.” It was time, the ambassador wrote, for Washington to decide.³

General Góes Monteiro commented to an American diplomat that he was “sorry that the United States did not realize that it had failed to convince Brazil that it had a definite program and contrasted ‘vague’ American policy with German ‘action’.” Góes was “realistic,” and the diplomat concluded that if Washington offered “something concrete and [could] convince him that we are ready for action, he would be willing to play on our side. I think we may take it for certain that unless we do so convince him, he will play on the German team.”⁴

It was probably not that simple. Góes understood the dangers his country faced. He also understood that, of necessity, the southern end of the defense zone of the United States in the Atlantic was anchored on Cape São Roque (the closest point in Brazil to Africa) and the island of Fernando de Noronha (223 miles offshore). The United States would need air and naval bases on the Brazilian coast. And Góes supposed that there would be three ways that the United States could obtain such bases: (1) by agreement; (2) by fomenting a civil war as it had done in Panama in 1903; or (3) by open military conquest. Obviously, he preferred the first option. The Brazilian General Staff believed that making an agreement was “the only way, in the current circumstances ... [for Brazil] without abdicating its sovereignty, to exploit prudently the contradictions and oscillations between the opposing blocks to become sufficiently strong without broader commitments.”⁵ Besides as early as July 1940, the Brazilian General Staff thought that it would be “singularly difficult [for Brazil] to guarantee the inviolability of its territory.”⁶

Fortunately, President Roosevelt decided to provide the wherewithal for the steel mill thereby setting Brazil on the long path to becoming an industrial giant and rising power by the end of the twentieth century. The Brazilian ambassador requested permission to sign the agreement on the steel mill before the presidential elections for fear that they could upset their plans.⁷ Meanwhile, in July 1940 the foreign ministers of the American Republics met in Havana to assess what their countries should do regarding the deepening European crisis. The Vargas government was somewhat miffed that its request to host the meeting had been overridden, but it emphasized that “our Pan-Americanism has not changed [just] because things in Europe have changed.” The conference authorized the temporary Pan American administration of European colonies in the Caribbean and northern South America to prevent their falling to the Germans, and it asserted in a Reciprocal Assistance Declaration that any attempt against the sovereignty or political independence of any American Republic would be considered aggression against all. The declaration contained provisions for the signatory countries to enter into mutual defense agreements, which became an objective in United States relations with Brazil.⁸ On June 1 the importance of preventing European colonies from falling into German hands was illustrated by the arrival of the French aircraft carrier *Bearn* seeking safety at Martinique when France gave up the fight against the Nazi invasion. It was carrying 106 American-made pursuit planes, while an accompanying ship had on board a quarter billion of France’s gold reserve which was being rushed to the United States for safe-keeping. In this case the American and British navies threw a protective blockade around Martinique.⁹

In mid-August 1940, the War Department was revising its color-coded war plans (known as the Rainbow Plans) and requested “strategic” surveys of the major cities of Brazil to prepare, among other things, the military government aspects of *LILAC*, the plan for Brazil. During the coming months, the military attaché’s office in Rio de Janeiro and the War Plans Division in Washington wrote detailed surveys of Natal, Pará (Belém), Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Southern Brazil, and Mato Grosso/Amazon.¹⁰ Such preparations were extremely sensitive because if implemented, the United States would be occupying key parts of Brazilian territory. And perhaps out of frustration at the slowness and back and forth of decision-making, then Lt. Colonel Lehman W. Miller, who had recently been appointed head of the American military mission, confessed to General

Góes Monteiro that until the day of his writing nothing had been resolved in the United States to insure that attacks against Brazil could be repelled.¹¹

Miller's openness seemingly enhanced Brazilian confidence in him. Reportedly army leaders were "delighted" with him and confident that he would develop a more satisfactory mission. Apparently, they had grown resentful of his predecessor General Kimberley's attitudes. They resented that two years before some members of the mission had been appointed despite Brazilian opposition and, in fact, in the face of warnings from the embassy. They had confidence in Colonel Miller and convinced that he would "restore and increase the prestige of the Mission." They were also favorably impressed by Major Thomas D. White and his men in the air mission.¹² The War Department now realized that it had been a mistake to send unwanted personnel to Brazil and was "more than anxious to correct it."¹³ On September 23, Ambassador Caffery notified the State Department that, in the event of aggression, the Rio government had decided to place all Brazilian resources on the side of the United States. But he regretted that a collection of American press commentaries attacking Vargas and military authorities had exasperated them. Vargas commented that he was not allowing his press to attack FDR or the United States.¹⁴

The Brazilian ambassador to Berlin gave Vargas his view of what was taking place. Calling the then six-week old war between Germany and Britain one of extermination, he thought it was becoming a stalemate because the British could bomb Germany only at night and therefore its attacks were imprecise, and although Germany could strike from the air day and night, it could not dream of landing on the island. "To prevent the United States from entering the war, something always feared, Germany had signed with Italy and Japan the Treaty of Triple Alliance." That treaty, he said, could only irritate the "*norteamericanos*." It wasn't so much "a treaty of alliance as it was a threat." The German press was "carrying on a daily campaign," he reported, "seeking to show (to whom it was not clear) that South America needed Europe more than the United States and emphasized besides that the States and Great Britain only wanted to make us vassals, while Germany only aspired to carry on pacific commerce with us." The press was saying that the hoped for entry of Spain into the war would decisively influence the opinion of the Spanish-speaking countries.¹⁵

Behind the scenes in Washington and New York, the army was taking secret steps that would affect the course of the war and the nature of Brazil's involvement in the conflict. In June 1940 the Military Appropriation Act allowed the president to approve secret projects without providing a

public accounting of expenditures. Thereupon the War Department negotiated a contract with the Pan American Airports Corporation, a subsidiary of Pan American Airways (PAA), to carry out the Airport Development Program (ADP) to develop air bases and routes from the United States, through Latin America over to Africa and on farther east.¹⁶ And, of course, the Brazilian bases would be central to the whole structure. Chief of Staff Marshall stressed the importance of this agreement in a memo to Secretary of War Henry Stimson saying that “the immediate conclusion of the PAA contract is now more essential to our national defense than any other single matter.”¹⁷ President Roosevelt approved the allocation of \$12,000,000 from the Emergency Fund that the Congress had voted back in June.

Getting permission to have bases was only the beginning. They had to be built before they could be used. And the Brazilians would not permit the American military to build bases while Brazil was neutral. But Pan Am could improve its landing facilities ostensibly for its own use. The airline was then shifting from flying seaplanes to land-based craft. To minimize Brazilian objections, PAA decided to have its Brazilian subsidiary *Panair do Brasil* carry out the project. The head of *Panair*, Cauby C. Araújo, who was to carry on the negotiations with the Brazilian government and organize the work, was instructed to say that the airfields and associated facilities were solely for the use of *Panair do Brasil* and PAA. He was given latitude in how much detail he would reveal to Brazilian leaders. He and airline officials were cautious lest the project’s close connection with the United States government be seen as disguised imperialism and harm PAA. The war would not last forever, and the company had to protect its future.¹⁸

On January 18, 1941, Araújo met with Vargas at the president’s summer residence in Petrópolis and explained the program, including the role of the United States government. After giving it some thought, he gave his approval but commented that he would have to wait on issuing a decree authorizing construction because of some difficulties in the army. General Francisco José Pinto, the president’s military aide who was present throughout the conversation, noted that “nazista” sentiment was then strong in the army and so they had to proceed slowly. Curiously Getúlio made no mention of any of this in his diary. At that time he was maneuvering to check the army’s influence somewhat by creating a ministry of aeronautics, under a civilian, rather than an aviation officer. The new ministry would oversee both civilian and military aviation. Work on the airfields could begin, but Araújo would have to submit a formal application to obtain a decree.¹⁹

The Vargas government was dictatorial, but it used bureaucratic procedures. Pressure groups inside and outside the government influenced its decree-laws. If no opposition appeared and if the desired law did not conflict with the regime's definition of national interest, the parties involved literally could write their own decree, but when, as in this instance, formidable groups such as nationalistic military officers, rival airlines, and foreign governments were involved, progress was slow and cautious, with commissions and bureaus submitting studies and position papers.

The new aviation ministry was a problem for Cauby Araújo because the men who staffed it were under the influence of *Lufthansa*, the German airline. He backdated the Airport Development Project (ADP) application to January 20, the day Getúlio signed the decree creating the ministry.²⁰ Doing so allowed him to send it to the National Security Council by way of the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, which supervised aviation until the new air ministry was running. General Pinto, secretary-general of the Security Council, protectively oversaw the process. This tactic successfully prevented successful opposition. Araújo took on the task of getting the land for the airfields. The Department of Civil Aviation (DAC) or the army owned the sites at Belém, Camoçim, Fortaleza, and Recife; the subsidiary of Air France *Cia. Aéropostal Brasileira* owned the airfields at Natal, Maceió, and Salvador. Araújo purchased *Aéropostal* outright and negotiated agreements with the DAC and the army. In a few cases, he purchased other properties, or the government confiscated them and gave them over to *Panair*. This was being done without the formal authorizing decree, six months slipped by, and then Araújo himself wrote up the draft document. Even getting the full ministry to approve the decree was tense and required Foreign Minister Aranha to make a firm stand in favor of it. The decree was published in the *Diário Oficial* on July 26, 1941 giving it the force of law.²¹ Likely the cabinet did not know that if its decision had been negative, the United States would have had "to occupy Northeast Brazil by force of arms" to protect the airfields in construction.²² And it may well be that the decision was made easier by the arrival on July 23 of the first shipment of war materiel from the United States.²³

The decree required that *Panair* present plans and cost estimates for the Brazilian government's approval, and upon completion it was to turn the fields over to the ownership of the government, which in turn would lease them to *Panair* for 20 years. This, of course, hid the role of the

American army, but it was also practical because the Brazilian government did not have experience in managing modern airfields. In the first half of 1941, the War Department was pressuring Pan American to speed the ADP. German forces were hurtling through North Africa, and Natal was the key link in the supply route from the United States to the endangered British forces. Because of Brazil's neutrality, the ADP had to appear to be a strictly civilian commercial endeavor. Delay, however, was the hallmark of the project. The lack of qualified field engineers, poor communications in the northeast, differences in Brazilian and American notions of speed and scale of construction added to the language problem, slowed the program. It took five months from the initial survey simply to clear the ground for one of the runways at the Natal-Parnamirim (Little River) field. It was September before the first heavy equipment—bulldozers, graders, trucks—arrived with their operators from the United States. There was considerable local graft and profiteering in the sale of land and supplying services and building materials. There were some incidents of agitation and sabotage and constant fear of a surprise German commando or air attack. Army intelligence warned that German “landings are possible throughout practically the whole coast line of the Natal region.”²⁴ Throughout 1941 the American authorities worked to convince the Brazilians to allow stationing Marine guards at Natal and the other base sites. Brazilian military commanders in the northeast were steadfastly opposed to any American troops being allowed in. However, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, Vargas consented to Roosevelt's request to allow uniformed Marines to be located at Belém, Natal, and Recife. The first three Marine companies arrived with their arms crated and secured in storage. They were the opening wedge, and in the following months, air corps and navy personnel increased in number. Even so sabotage was a reality. In February 1942, sugar in the gas tanks of a B-17 caused it to crash on takeoff killing its crew of nine. Despite such dangers Brazilian cooperation with the ADP was, according to General Marshall, “of inestimable value for the increase of our air forces in Europe and the North of Africa.”²⁵

By September 15, 1941, Britain had survived the German air offensive, in the process shooting down 1,733 German aircraft, thereby insuring that there would be no invasion of the island kingdom. It was a fitting moment for Vargas to clarify further the Brazilian government's position. On September 21, he met with the armed services ministers, the foreign minister, and Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro to discuss the situation and to consider what Góes should say while in the United States. It was clear that

Brazil could not remain on the margin of world events and that its national security was of “supreme importance.” The war had caught the Brazilians unprepared, and they had to overcome the “tyranny of [war] materiel” by freeing themselves from dependence on foreign suppliers and produce “in our own country the arms that one day we will need to defend our sovereignty.” They had to industrialize, because they believed that industrial states would win out over agrarian ones.²⁶ Truly, Brazil did not have enough arms to defend itself. In November 1940 it had 114,336 Mauser rifles (1908 vintage) and 464 artillery pieces of various calibers, 300 81 mm mortars, and 24 light tanks.²⁷ So Brazil’s military collaboration with the United States assumed the greater objective of industrialization beyond the immediate defense against the Axis.

But the “collaboration” was moving too slowly for both sides. Military Mission Chief Colonel Miller wrote to Góes, on September 19, complaining that until that day “nothing concrete had been resolved.” His government, he declared, “was favorable” to providing arms to Brazil, but that Brazil had not taken steps necessary to mount a defense. Góes replied heatedly that “the blame was neither ours, nor [that of] the Brazilian government,” that they had done all that the Americans had asked. They were dependent on the United States for arms as Góes had been repeatedly saying. Vargas regarded Miller’s statements as “rather impertinent” and discussed with his army and navy ministers and General Góes how to respond. This Miller-Góes exchange set a tone of recrimination and misunderstanding that put the efforts toward collaboration and cooperation at risk.²⁸

Roosevelt apparently cautioned American generals that Vargas needed to be sure of his ground before agreeing to their plans. And the Brazilian generals had to be convinced that they were not ceding national territory to foreign occupation. Without modern arms the Brazilian army was just too weak to risk cohabitation with American forces. For the Brazilian generals, the negotiations with the Americans were full of “inferences, possibilities, and digressions” from which they could not measure the consequences of an agreement with the United States. Dutra warned Vargas that “Brazil’s fundamental problem” was that it had to arm itself so that it did not become an “American Mongolia” subject to a bold assault by a stronger nation.²⁹ They could not accept a “pseudo-solution of vague promises, put off in time, imprecise in quantity and quality and subordinated to priorities that, for certain, are to our disadvantage.” Dutra thought that they had to do what they could to secure the arms purchased

from the *Reich*, perhaps getting the Americans to help free the arms shipments from the grips of the British blockade. "Either the Americans should provide the promised arms or they should help us get them from Germany."³⁰ If neither of these things could be done, Dutra did not see how an agreement would be possible, despite recognizing that General Marshall was "our sincere friend" and that the two countries had enjoyed "a long existence of uninterrupted harmony."³¹

While the negotiations were proceeding with Brazil, Roosevelt's team was building its defensive system in the North Atlantic. In September 1940, the Americans negotiated a "destroyers-for-bases" deal with the United Kingdom that transferred 50 old destroyers to the British navy in exchange for bases leased for 99 years in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Trinidad, British Guiana, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, and the Bahamas. The agreement not only tied the United States and Great Britain in the crucial alliance against the Axis but also marked the beginning of the end of the British Empire in the Western Hemisphere.³² In late December Roosevelt set up the Office of Production Management to coordinate defense industries and to speed aid "short of war" to Britain and other endangered nations. In a "fireside" radio chat, he emphasized the Axis threat to the United States and called for a national effort to make the country "the great arsenal of democracy." By mid-March 1941, German and Italian submarines had sunk more than two million tons of Allied shipping. The Lend-Lease Act passed that month was emblematic of American anxiety. It allowed any country whose defense the president deemed vital to defense of the United States to obtain arms, equipment, and supplies by sale, transfer, exchange, or lease. It also squarely placed the United States on the allied side for total victory over the Axis.³³ In April, agreement with Denmark permitted the United States to extend its defensive shield in the North Atlantic to Greenland, followed in July by the stationing of troops in Iceland to prevent its occupation by Germany. But those moves did not ease Washington's fears about Axis threats to South America. In fact, as two noted scholars of the era observed: "Washington military authorities rated defense of the Western Hemisphere second in importance only to defense of the United States itself."³⁴

The American strategy was to build a defensive system of bases with three key points in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland in the north, in Trinidad off Venezuela, and in Northeast Brazil in the South Atlantic. The objective was to have forces in place to fend off a sudden German thrust, which planners conceived might come as a coordinated north and south

pincer attack. American military planners believed that it was “within the capabilities of the Axis powers to establish small forces in Northeast Brazil before effective armed resistance could be interposed by United States forces.” The problem was that in early June 1941 the American “Government had no naval craft, surface, sub-surface or air, within 1,000 miles of the tip of Brazil and the nearest Army force was nearly twice that distance.” And the line of communications to that area was “almost wholly sea-borne.” A realistic military analysis showed that “a small force in initial occupation will compel a major effort to expel it.” To be obliged to redirect American forces to expel an even small force from the northeast was “highly undesirable,” and such a risk “should not be accepted.” Chief of Staff Marshall and his navy counterpart, Admiral Harold R. Stack, believed “That risk exists today. It will continue so long as we fail to provide the security forces essential for that area.” There was in their view “the distinct possibility of a lodgment by

small German forces in Northeast Brazil which would require a very strong effort on our part to dislodge. Once our security forces are there, that possibility will be eliminated. It will then require a strong German effort to dislodge us, and the probability of such an effort being made will be relatively small.”

Marshall envisioned a protective army force of all combat arms totaling about 9,300 troops and 43 aircraft. The army and navy had the forces available with sufficient shipping to move them from the Atlantic seaboard on 20 days’ notice. He favored having President Roosevelt directly ask President Vargas to allow entry of American forces.

The real hazard, however, which probably should not be mentioned to President Vargas, lies not in the danger of an unsupported attack by German forces. The greatest peril in this situation lies in the possibility of a sudden seizure of airfields and ports in Northeast Brazil by forces already in the country and acting in collusion with small German forces. The latter, arriving by air and perhaps by sea, would so time their movement as to arrive at these points immediately after their seizure. They would at once take over and organize these points for defense.³⁵

“ONE MORE GOOD-WILL MISSION AND BRAZIL WILL
DECLARE WAR ON THE U.S.A.”³⁶

While the military negotiations went forward, the United States conducted a grand-scale campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Brazilian people. The war period, as Darlene Sadlier observed, “was one of the few times in U.S. history when culture’s importance in domestic and world affairs was recognized and discussed alongside issues of finance and commerce.”³⁷ In August 1940 President Roosevelt appointed Nelson A. Rockefeller as coordinator in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA). The new agency’s mission was to use modern public relations techniques and mass communications to polish the image of the United States throughout Latin America, but particularly in Brazil. It also worked to expand the Latin image among North Americans via programs in schools and universities. It emphasized the idea that the peoples of the Western Hemisphere were all Americans. As one OCIAA-sponsored high school text expressed it: “A citizen of Brazil is just as much an American as is a citizen of the United States.”³⁸

The OCIAA used multiple approaches. It had important Brazilian books, such as Euclides da Cunha’s *Os Sertões*, Gilberto Freyre’s *Casa-Grande e Senzala*, and Jorge Amado’s *Terras do Sem Fim* translated into English and published in the United States.³⁹ It commissioned movies in Hollywood and elsewhere that depicted friendly relations among the American Republics. Singer Carmen Miranda, imported by Broadway, became the “Brazilian bombshell” whose comedic film roles dazzled Americans but earned her ridicule by Brazilians. Rockefeller used his partial ownership of RKO studios to send Orson Welles to make a film about Brazil, which turned out to be too genuine for the studio chiefs and for President Vargas, who “disliked the image of a poor and black Brazil that Welles was creating in *It’s All True*.”⁴⁰ Welles’s graphic scenes of Brazil’s poor black and mulatto people resulted in his funding being cut.⁴¹ Walt Disney headed down to Rio too and created a symbol for Brazil in the cartoon parrot, *Zé Carioca*, who introduced Donald Duck to his homeland and to samba. Unfortunately the film *Saludos Amigos* (1942) presented a whitewashed image, even the highly Africanized city of Salvador da Bahia appeared to have no dark-skinned inhabitants. He was immediately captivated by the rhythm of Ari Barroso’s *Aquarela do Brasil*, which was fast becoming an unofficial national anthem, and incorporated it into later film scores.⁴²

Rockefeller cleverly arranged to have American corporations freed from taxes on the cost of advertising in Latin America as long as they were cooperating with the OCIAA. During the war tax-exempt American corporate advertising became an effective tool. “By selectively directing this advertising toward newspapers and radio stations that accepted “guidance” from his office, [Rockefeller] was effectively able to control the images ...projected about America during World War II.” By the war’s end, more than 75% of world news reaching Latin America passed through the OCIAA.⁴³ More broadly, the American military “relied far more heavily on Disney for their military training-film program than on any other Hollywood studio....”⁴⁴ Brazilian security officials regarded some of the Hollywood people, such as Douglas Fairbanks Jr., as agents propagating a message of eventual German defeat, which of course they were.⁴⁵

In October 1941, FDR removed Latin America from the purview of William Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and entrusted the tasks related to conquering the hearts of Latin America to Nelson Rockefeller’s program.⁴⁶ James Reston observed in *The New York Times* in 1941 that the purpose of the OCIAA was to convince Latin America to close ranks against the German threat and that the Good Neighbor Policy was not a temporary expedient but a sincere and permanent change of attitude.⁴⁷

The sudden and breathtaking courtship was not entirely flattering—Brazilians were aware that the Americans were also pursuing their Spanish-speaking neighbors. They believed that they should receive special attention because of Brazil’s size and importance and the old friendship with the United States. However, aside from knowledgeable diplomats, the two peoples hardly knew each other. Until 1940 there was no history of the United States available in Portuguese. The common conception of the United States among Brazilians came from the very popular Hollywood films, while Americans were not sure if the capital of Brazil was Buenos Aires or Rio de Janeiro. Portuguese was rarely taught in American schools, and educated Brazilians were more likely to speak French than English. The results would have been more profound if more Brazilians had been sent north to experience the land of Uncle Sam. The State Department was unenthusiastic about proposals to organize a program to promote Brazil in the United States. The coordinator’s office was more successful countering Axis propaganda and explaining shortages caused by restricted shipping. But some Axis propaganda had a persistent life as the rumors about American responsibility for the submarine attacks in 1942 showed

[see Chap. 1, Note 25]. The OCIAA propaganda did contribute to preparing the Brazilian public for coming events. Public opinion in Brazil often raced ahead of Vargas government policy. In August 1942 it would be the Brazilian people who would demand war against the Axis.⁴⁸

INACTION AND DISTRUST

The militaries of the two countries were slow to reach a common view of the war and its dangers. The initial American posture was defensive seeking to protect the hemisphere from feared German attacks. American military planners saw the Northeast of Brazil as a likely potential target for a German thrust from Africa. Because the Brazilian armed forces did not have the strength to fend off such an attack, the Americans thought that they should send their own troops to the northeast. It did not help matters that the American press portrayed Generals Dutra and Góes Monteiro as leading the hypothetical Nazi faction in the Brazilian army. General Amaro Soares Bittencourt, who had been sent to Washington to negotiate arms purchases, observed that such press commentary made a “profound impression” on Washington officials, particularly because Dutra and Góes publicly did not challenge or deny such rumors. The wide lack of confidence in official circles, he suspected, was contributing to the delay in shipping arms.⁴⁹ Once the arms question had been resolved, General Amaro was to become the head of the Brazilian military commission in the United States and the main channel for military communications between the two countries. General Marshall was very clear that the army would help Brazil get modern arms, but that there was little that could be done in the immediate future. He did promise General Amaro that Brazil’s requests would be given preference over those of the other Latin American Republics. The United States was not yet on a war footing and did not then have sufficient arms and equipment for its own forces.

Indeed, some of the Brazilian requests were greater than the amounts available to American forces, and some were larger than the combined total of American and British requirements. American staff officers reshaped the Brazilian lists to more realistic quantities. At least now the Americans knew what the Brazilians thought that they wanted, and the Brazilians knew what the United States could provide. How it was to be paid for was another matter of concern. In March 1941 the State Department arranged with the Export-Import Bank for a \$12,000,000 credit for Brazil, even while it hoped to delay a decision until the Lend-Lease Act, which would cover the Brazilian arms, was passed and signed on March 11.⁵⁰

Dutra privately lamented the American lack of confidence and the unspoken fear in Washington that the Brazilians might use resources obtained from the United States “in a direction opposed to American objectives.” The war minister offered to resign if Vargas thought it would elevate American confidence. He defended himself by saying that his opinions had nothing to do with “*nazistas* or *fascistas*, or any other similar doctrines,” that his only objective was “to raise the level of the army’s efficiency and give it the means to carry out its mission,” and that he did not favor either side in the current war, that he was fully absorbed in solving Brazilian problems. He was concerned, as he knew Vargas was, to prevent “any foreign country trying, under any circumstances to occupy, even briefly, points or zones of the National Territory, whose security is always ours to maintain.”⁵¹ Vargas declined to remove Dutra. The more problems that the Americans faced in providing the necessary arms, the more Brazilian faith in American intentions diminished.

The Americans were organizing their industries for war production and arms that were available either went to struggling Britain or to their own expanding forces. Brazil was, however, a continuing concern as demonstrated at the Army War College in early 1940 where one of the four staff groups in the class of 1940 “developed War Plan PURPLE that envisioned operations in Brazil against a coalition of Germany and Italy.” Col. Lehman W. Miller was one of that group and was soon assigned as military attaché in Rio de Janeiro. That select class of 99 officers was the last before the college closed before the war and two-thirds of the officers made general by 1946 and 13 of them commanded divisions during the war. They were the “cream of the crop” of the army’s officer corps.⁵² The war in Europe, which started as the war college session began, captivated the officers’ attentions, and as the classes ended in May 1940, President Roosevelt federalized the National Guard signaling that the crisis had deepened.

Newly named military attaché, Colonel Lehman W. Miller, had been in Washington during the conversations with General Amaro, working closely with Colonel Matthew Ridgway. Amaro had given them a good sense of the Brazilian hesitancy regarding stationing American troops in Northeast Brazil. Before returning to Rio, Miller wrote a sensible analysis of the Brazilian situation. The majority of Brazilians were, he said, “pro-American, pro-British, and anti-Axis,” but they were also very nationalistic, protective of their sovereignty, and resistant to any infringement of it. The Brazilians wished to contribute actively to hemisphere defense, not merely to be bystanders. He advised that the United States should supply

what arms it could and should assist in the development of a Brazilian arms industry. The preparation of air and naval bases in the northeast should go forward “with the understanding that such bases are Brazilian and will be defended by Brazilian forces...” He warned against attempting to lease bases or sending American forces to Brazil prior to the Brazilians realizing that an attack was imminent.⁵³ This was good advice, but it did not resolve the American army’s paramount worry, namely, that the Brazilians might not call for help in time to resist an Axis attack.

In May 1941, Miller returned in Rio as chief of the American Military Mission and had been promoted to brigadier general to facilitate his relations with senior Brazilian officers and to give more prestige to his work. An indication of Brazil’s importance to the American army at that time was that the only other countries that had such military missions were the Soviet Union and Iran. In 1939, Colonel Miller had traveled with Generals Marshall and Góes Monteiro and had impressed Marshall with the skillful way he dealt with the Brazilians. Góes apparently liked him and had requested that he be made chief. Miller was then a distinguished officer. He graduated from West Point in the famous 1915 class that the stars fell upon ranking ninth well ahead of Eisenhower and Bradley. He went to Brazil in 1934 as a member of the four-man mission on coastal defense. He returned to the States in 1938, only to be selected to accompany Marshall back to Brazil, where he acted as interpreter for Marshall’s tour. In September 1939 he was one of the 99 officers to attend the Army War College in the last class prior to American entry into the war.⁵⁴

The successes of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s panzers in North Africa kept American eyes on the vulnerable South Atlantic and, what they called, “the Brazilian bulge.” The Brazilians had announced their intention to hold combined arms training maneuvers in the northeast in August and September. The thinking in Washington was that even a token American presence in the northeast would discourage a German attack. From that line of thought, there developed the idea of participating in the Brazilian maneuvers. Marshall suggested to General Miller that if the Brazilians could be persuaded to agree, he could send “three or four squadrons” of the air force and some ground units that the Brazilian army lacked—anti-aircraft, signal, combat engineers, and medical troops—to participate under Brazilian command. “We would have no combatant ground troops,” he cautioned, “other than antiaircraft.” He noted that the principal difficulty would be to find shipping to carry troops to and from Brazil. He directed General Miller to sound out Brazilian army offi-

cials, but cautioned him that the idea might not be practical, that FDR had not approved it, and that he was being “purely tentative.”⁵⁵ But Miller was anything but tentative.

The situation again seemed dire. German officials and Vichy French Admiral Jean-Francois Darlan negotiated an agreement that appeared to give the Nazi regime a free hand in North Africa.⁵⁶ The German occupation of Dakar seemed to be about to happen. Hurried staff meetings in Washington resulted in Colonel Ridgway being sent to Rio to arrange immediate Brazilian-American staff planning and agreement to the dispatch of American forces at the soonest possible moment.⁵⁷ He and Ambassador Caffery met with Foreign Minister Aranha, who told them that President Vargas would not likely agree to receive American troops in Brazil, unless Roosevelt directly requested that he do so. Why FDR did not make that request is still unknown. Roosevelt was then thinking of occupying the Azores, even though army planners favored sending troops to Brazil.

On May 22, Sumner Welles made a remarkable statement about the relations between the two countries, namely, “that there is no government anywhere with which this Government

regards itself as being on more intimate terms of trust and confidence than with the Government of Brazil. As Aranha knows, I have made it a practice ever since I have occupied this office to communicate to the Government of Brazil all information which this Government received which I have believed would be of value to the Brazilian Government. ... you should state to Aranha that in our considered judgment the German Government and its allies can never achieve victory so long as they do not obtain mastery of the seas, and particularly of the Atlantic. The United States will never permit the passage of the control of the seas, and particularly the Atlantic, into the hands of powers which are clearly bent solely on world conquest and world domination That is a fundamental principle in our present policy.”

He then gave substance to this declaration of “trust and confidence” by sharing a piece of extremely sensitive secret information. Roosevelt had “personally authorized” him to inform President Vargas that “a very considerable portion of the United States fleet is now travelling under secret orders from the Pacific to the Atlantic and that this portion of the fleet will be in the Atlantic by June 8.” The developments of the past weeks affecting the Atlantic had provoked this movement, and those vessels would be

used to “safeguard the interests of the United States and its American neighbors.” Ambassador Caffery met with Vargas on May 28 and told him to tell Roosevelt that “Brazil will honor its obligations contracted at Panama and Habana. In other words you can count on us.”⁵⁸

In Rio de Janeiro another exchange moved the military relationship in a less intimate direction. General Miller met with Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro on May 30, 1941. At first, the meeting seemed to go well, but then Miller undiplomatically said things that upset Góes, who afterward wrote a detailed memo for Dutra about their discussion. Maybe once it was on paper it seemed worse? Certainly by the time Vargas read it, bad feelings were bubbling. Brazilian army historians have described it as a “grave incident” caused by Miller’s “unfriendliness.”⁵⁹ Góes noted that Miller was clearly “uncomfortable” reminding the chief of staff that he was “a personal friend and very particularly a sincere friend of Brazil....” He said he was disturbed by unspecified “grave worries” and mentioned that General Marshall and the American government had doubts about Brazil’s willingness to cooperate effectively with the United States and were especially troubled by recent “indications and rumors.” Góes pressed him to explain, and Miller said that “certain statements by Brazilian General Staff officers regarding the need for immediate delivery of war materiel were interpreted in Washington as a sign that cooperation between the two in case the war reached their shores was no longer workable.” Góes affirmed that their cooperation necessarily would be proportional to the arms that they had for their troops. Miller pointed to the “reserve – and even a certain coldness and indifference – noted in the Brazilian military toward a greater tightening of the links needed for eventual cooperation” which he attributed to the Brazilian army not wanting to upset the German army. Góes replied that his government and the armed forces were oriented by the “real interests” and “preponderant sentiments of the country” and that they were never concerned about the feelings of any other army. Brazil would not flee its duties of solidarity and giving aid to its Sister Nations, but that “it had no reason to offend other peoples aggressively.” Miller continued by referring to persistent intelligence reports that “a great part of the officers of the Brazilian army sympathized with the German army and with Nazism,” and he alluded to the influence of German agents and seeming tolerance for Nazi organizations active in the country.⁶⁰ Góes, at least in this memo, seemed to keep cool, rejoicing that Brazilians were much more against the *Reich* than for it. Convictions of members of the armed forces, he insisted, “were solely

those of deep-rooted patriotism, with a clear national consciousness against the imperialist intentions of any foreign elements that come to threaten us.” He regarded such negative propaganda as “ridiculous and vile” attempts to cause confusion and to cast the regime set up in 1937 in a bad light abroad and to make the Brazilian army appear different than it actually was. He denied that there were adherents of Nazism or any other ideology in the army. He admitted that his fellow officers “greatly admired the strategy, tactics, operations, organization and efficiency of the German army,” but he was certain that American military leaders shared such professional admiration. Brazil lamented “the catastrophe that was bloodying Europe, [and] did not have a special predilection for any of the belligerents”; it intended to remain “impeccably neutral” but at the same time committed to guaranteeing the common security of the Americas. The Brazilian army would fulfill its duty, and “the dominant and stubborn sentiment among us is to react against any type of domination or slavery.” Changing the subject, Miller, who Góes described as “visibly embarrassed,” turned to less exasperating topics. Why Miller had risked alienating an officer who he had cultivated for a number of years is not clear. The immediate consequence was that Góes imposed some distance on their relationship by telling Miller that, henceforth, he should transmit in writing any future requests or suggestions from the American General Staff.⁶¹

Finally, turning to American participation in the projected maneuvers in the northeast, Miller again pushed his luck by asserting that some of the officers slated to lead the maneuvers were notoriously against cooperation and approximation with the United States and were sympathetic toward Nazism. Góes responded that the mere fact that Miller, a foreign officer, could say something so “unacceptable” to the Brazilian army’s chief of staff proved that “the members of the North American army were treated as if they belonged to our own ranks, with all consideration, esteem and confidence.”⁶² Góes likely thought that it would be helpful to have other American officers involved in the discussions because he suggested that the American General Staff secretly send some staff officers to Brazil to work on implementing their agreement. He expressed surprise that Washington had not done so yet.

Miller was uneasy about the overall situation and expressed his worry about the apparent calm with which Brazilian officials were appraising the frightening world scene. He believed that the entrance of the United States into the conflict was inevitable and that there would be a lengthy war. Góes assured him that for a long time the Brazilian General Staff had

considered the situation as extremely dangerous (*perigosíssima*) with increasing and enduring complications. He assured Miller that he would discuss American participation in the maneuvers with Dutra and the new minister of aeronautics and that they would respond. He observed that the idea behind the northeastern maneuvers in part had been to ease American worries about the “density of our forces in that region.”⁶³

At that point the Brazilian Armed Forces numerically appeared respectable if compared to other non-Axis forces around the world. The army had 92,000 organized in five divisions commanded by 6500 officers. US Army intelligence rated the training to be “fair,” and it regarded the training of the 192,000 unorganized reserves to be “poor.” The latter was composed of those who had completed their obligatory year of military service and on paper appeared as a reserve. But there was no system of active reserve units and so the military value of such reservists was doubtful. The Navy had 17,000 personnel on its vessels which were put to sea infrequently. The small air force had been created in 1941 by a forced marriage between Army and Navy pilots and crews and had 4722 members in 8 squadrons. All together they lacked modern arms and equipment, a secure supply of gasoline, and ammunition.⁶⁴

Góes regarded his exchange with Miller as a troubling and “important conversation” and reminded Dutra that both the British and German military attachés had visited him recently asking pointed questions about the projected maneuvers. The German Attaché General Gunther Niedenfuhr had told him that Berlin had informed him that the United States was planning to send 40,000 soldiers and 1,200 aircraft to participate. Góes told both officers that such reports were exaggerated and that the maneuvers were simply routine annual affairs.⁶⁵

Minister Dutra sent Góes Monteiro’s extensive memo to President Vargas. In his cover letter, Dutra wrote that before the president took any action, he wanted to give his views on the “complex and interconnected problems” related to this grave and important conversation. Dutra wanted Vargas to know that he fully agreed with Góes’s firmness in rebutting General Miller’s “objections, doubts, suspicions... about the attitude of Brazil and our effective cooperation with the USA in defense of the Hemisphere.” Miller’s alluding to high-ranking Americans expressing doubts because of imprecise rumors of unknown origin struck Dutra as “imprudent, discourteous and capable of causing us to have misgivings about the sincerity of the proposals of those who distrust us without reason.” It was not reasonable, he said, to have to take time

from important tasks to address repeated suspicions and fantasies. Dutra believed that confidence could not be forced; it had to be earned by mutual understanding.

He made a series of observations on the topics that Miller had raised. The first comment was on a joint aerial survey of the northeast. There were neither detailed maps nor aerial photos of the region because the Brazilian army's geographic service had been concentrating on mapping the south, which it saw as the likely battlefield in the event of an Argentine attack.⁶⁶ The Brazilians had appropriate technicians but needed aircraft and up-to-date cameras; however, the Americans wanted to do the work themselves, which was unacceptable.⁶⁷ The second topic was American participation in the projected maneuvers, an idea that Dutra saw as breaking Brazil's careful neutrality. He did not see sufficient reason for such a demonstration of force, "which he thought would have negative effects at home and abroad." However, thirdly, he thought it is fully acceptable and useful to have US staff officers come secretly to Brazil. Being there they would see the Brazilian army's problems and necessities and could result in the "true and desired climate of mutual confidence." As for the fourth topic of the supposed Brazilian "calm and indifference" to the powers' war preparations, he said that such an interpretation of the attitude of their armed forces was "positively mistaken." Rather the Brazilian military was closely following the "shocking events" and analyzing what they meant for Brazil. But officers avoided discussion outside their professional military circle so as not to stir up useless agitation in the press. "There is no lack of interest, no indifference. On the contrary there is a very sensible collective anxiety to obtain the arms and equipment of every type that we lack." Then expressing his deep frustration with the Americans, he told Vargas that they seemed merely "to want to secure positions and bases leaving us standing by watching foreigners defend our land. ... They want, under the appearance of alliance, domination. We ask for arms for our troops and they offer [their] troops to substitute ours. ... They propose to defend our land [instead of providing arms to us]." Then he said what he really felt: "Such alliances and accords are more appropriate for the African colonies or Asiatic possessions, intolerant and intolerable for agreements negotiated between free countries, which mutually join in a common struggle." He was feeling that it would only be by their own efforts, with their own people and their own materials, that they would resolve the "fundamental problems of our sovereignty and hold off any threats to our national integrity." They could not count on foreign help. They had a professionally

prepared officer corps and large numbers of reserves. Unfortunately, their arms were minimal. "We are united: we have discipline and much love for our country.... On these bases we can, we should and we want to realize our defense and cooperate with our brothers of all of America in the collective security of the Hemisphere."

He asked that Vargas raise the army's troop levels, approve acquisition of 100 million bullets for the infantry and have all artillery rounds be fabricated in Brazil, and authorize the call-up of reserve officers and the purchase of Brazilian-made steel helmets, equipment, and uniforms. Dutra closed by saying that to reach their objective they had "to convince the men of the government and the American people that Brazil wants and can cooperate in the defense of the Hemisphere," but that "great and strong Republic" should facilitate acquisition of armament. "With equal sincerity we have to convince them that Brazil cannot and does not want to be relegated in hemispheric questions to the level of a mere geographic expression where only foreign, though friendly, flags come to secure possession of the land and the defense and sovereignty of our country and of our people." Their watchwords, Dutra concluded, should be "comprehension and confidence." The next day Vargas replied that he agreed. "The Brazilian government," he wrote, "intends to cooperate with the Government of the United States in case the circumstances require it in conformity with the agreements already discussed and accepted." It must be clear, he said, that adopting such a position, "the Brazilian Government does not ever abdicate its free determination and autonomy, principally regarding the problems and activities, directly or indirectly related to our sovereignty, the guarding of our territory and the defense of national interests."⁶⁸

The same day that he discussed the memo with Dutra, Vargas met with German Ambassador Kurt Prüfer and asked if he were to accept Roosevelt's oft repeated invitation to visit Washington would the Reich consider it opportune for him to offer to act as a mediator between the two governments. He emphasized that this was only a vague idea that he wanted to explore before taking any action. Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop replied asking Vargas not to take such a step, because "Germany did not have the slightest reason to request any initiative whatever with respect to proposals for mediation." Ribbentrop was content to leave such moves "to the other side, which would doubtless become convinced quite independently, sooner or later, of the hopelessness of continuing the war against Germany which it had provoked."⁶⁹ Because Vargas left no com-

ments about any of this, it is not known if the mediation idea was related to his exchange with Dutra. It is interesting that the day before he had noted in his diary that the first delivery of arms under the US Lend-Lease program had arrived. "Our expenditures will go up. It is becoming necessary to speed up [obtaining] war materiel and increasing military effectiveness." And before that, on May 29, he had explained to the Japanese ambassador that if any American country were attacked, Brazil would stand with it.⁷⁰

But obviously, General Marshall's inquiry about possible American participation in the projected Brazilian maneuvers had stirred deep anxieties. Brazilian officers knew that their army was weak and practically disarmed, and they did not know whether or not they could trust the Americans. It is possible that they were concerned that putting Brazilian and American troops side by side would result in embarrassing comparisons. It was good that they were unaware of how extreme were some of the ideas floating about in the American General Staff. When a chief of staff is mulling over ideas, his staff can let their imaginations take flight. In mid-June 1941, in a memo for General Marshall, one of his intelligence officers warned that "Brazil is utterly incapable of defending this area and may even shift its support to Germany should England fall. It is already wavering.... It is therefore imperative that U.S. Forces become firmly established in the vital area before we are too deeply involved in war." He laid out three possible lines of action for gaining access: (1) by diplomacy, including "consideration ... [of] outright purchase of vital concessions"; (2) by subsidizing the existing regime including paying the Brazilian armed forces for concessions; and finally (3) by "Political pressure accompanied by force." If the second course succeeded, "we should quietly proceed to organize Brazil in such a way that it would serve our military and economic interests for years to come." And more bluntly, he recommended that "If the existing regime will not agree to these arrangements a coup might be arranged which could be synchronized with direct political pressure and the intervention of armed forces." If the situation reached such an extremity, he advised arranging "matters so that a part of the Brazilian people will welcome our arrival." Carefully prepared and convincing propaganda should present such action as being "in the interest of the self-preservation of the United States and the other American Republics."⁷¹

In June 1941 anxiety in the War Plans Division over getting troops into Brazil continued to boil up. On the 19th Secretary of War Stimson drafted a letter to Roosevelt saying that "recent news from North Africa makes it

very clear that we must act immediately to save the situation in Brazil.” Instead of sending it, he talked it over with General Marshall, and they decided to go immediately to the White House to see the president. The conversation was at the president’s bedside. Given the urgency, Roosevelt said he would direct the State Department to find a way to get troops into Brazil as soon as possible. He thought that the best way would be to persuade Brazil to agree to a limited lease of an air base near Natal. Marshall was not optimistic because he knew that State was deeply opposed to the idea of leasing bases in Latin America. Moreover at that moment the American army did not have the equipment or ammunition to supply an expeditionary force and at the same time leave anything to defend the United States proper.⁷² American military planners must have been very gloomy indeed.

Sumner Welles telegraphed Ambassador Caffery that the situation was changing rapidly and a German attack on the Western Hemisphere was becoming “more imminent.” The president and the service chiefs judged “the most vulnerable points ... are Iceland and Natal.” If Vichy gave over control of Dakar to Germany, it was “probable that Germany would then undertake its classic pincer strategy by attempting to occupy Iceland and Natal, the objective being, of course through the use of air forces based upon those regions to cut off Great Britain from the supplies now reaching her across the North Atlantic and from the South Atlantic.” He wanted Caffery’s advice on how best to approach President Vargas about using the “pretext of maneuvers” to get troops into the northeast.⁷³

Caffery replied the next afternoon saying that he had talked with Foreign Minister Aranha, who said it “would be a mistake to ask President Vargas to permit the sending of United States troops to northern Brazil, especially in view of the failure of the United States to supply arms for the Brazilian army.” The ambassador agreed with Aranha and observed that “Vargas has been leaning more and more in our direction during the past few months. He is definitely on our side but certainly the moment has not yet arrived when he could agree to this proposal and get away with it.” Caffery asked Aranha if it would help if Washington invited Brazilian forces to join in the defense of some American possessions, but that suggestion seemed to go nowhere.⁷⁴

While these discussions were going on, the unforeseen had happened; the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22. Even so the Americans continued focusing on securing the North and South Atlantic. Gradually army planners estimated that for the next one to three months, the

Germans would be so involved in the Soviet Union that they could not invade Great Britain, prevent American troops from landing in Iceland, or maintain their “pressure on West Africa, Dakar and South America.” This seemingly providential occurrence provided time to substitute the British forces in Iceland, strengthen the navy in the Atlantic, and get American forces into Brazil.⁷⁵ The German campaign in Russia provided breathing space that gradually eliminated the danger of Axis aggression across the South Atlantic. Even so the army still wanted to dispatch a security force to Northeast Brazil as quickly as possible.⁷⁶ Sending troops to secure Iceland was then in the works. War Plans Division head General Leonard Gerow was sufficiently concerned about Brazil that he hoped to get the army’s units preparing for transport to Iceland redirected as expeditionary forces to Brazil instead.⁷⁷

JOINT PLANNING AMIDST UNCERTAINTY

While the foregoing had been happening, a joint planning group of Brazilian and American officers had spent a month in the northeast developing a defense plan that included locating major air bases and supply centers at Natal, Recife, and Belém. In the plan, the Brazilians were to provide ground troops to garrison those cities, and it recommended creation of a permanent joint board to study and implement the construction of the bases and other aspects of the plan.⁷⁸ This exercise in joint planning convinced the American officers that their Brazilian colleagues did not have a realistic notion of how much time it would take to build, staff, and organize such bases. They assumed that Brazil would encounter difficulties similar to those the United States faced in mobilizing and expanding its forces. They believed that “the period from now until the end of 1942 may well be the critical stage” and that though the proposed plan was excellent, it did “not provide adequate protection during this critical period.” And although Góes Monteiro implied that instead of creating new units, as the plan recommended, it would be more efficient to transfer existing units to the northeast, in which case “the shortages of materiel” would have to be filled by purchases in the armament market or by loans of equipment from the United States Army.⁷⁹

The seemingly satisfactory trend toward greater cooperation was balanced by a dose of reality from Ambassador Caffery who reminded Washington “that the Brazilians had very little interest in hemisphere defense as such: for the most part, they are doing what we ask them to do

because we ask them to do it. I would like to make that clear. At the same time, they are very apprehensive over what looks to them like penetration; they are apprehensive of our sending troops to Natal before they are actually needed there.”

He was hearing that some Brazilian officers were calling the American emphasis on the air defense of the Natal region an “aviation scam.” He repeated that “they are sorely disappointed that after so many years of so much talk and so many promises we have done nothing for them in the way of air materiel and only what our War Department calls a ‘token shipment’ for the Brazilian military. Their lack of confidence in us is growing daily.”⁸⁰

In August 1941 the two armies were still discussing joint training maneuvers in the northeast that the planners in the War Department hoped could be used as a pretext to establish the presence of American troops. As the documents discussed above indicate forcefully, General Góes Monteiro and Minister of War Dutra saw the proposal as a ruse, and they told Vargas that if he agreed to it they would resign, but the president would have none of it. Keep negotiating, he told the generals, “we need to have the Americans furnish the promised materiel, so we can defend ourselves, but we cannot agree to foreign occupation.”⁸¹ From the meetings of the mixed military commission and his conversations in the United States, it was clear to Góes Monteiro that the Americans wanted to build navy and air bases and garrison them with their own troops. Vargas commented in his diary that “In summary: the Americans want to drag us into war in Europe under the pretext of defense of America.”⁸²

The Brazilians would not go to war until it was clear that their national interests were at stake. They understood that the Americans wanted to station troops in north and Northeast Brazil, but they were not willing to let foreign troops, even friendly ones, into national territory. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, the American army headquarters was in the final stages of completing an operations plan for a Northeast Brazil theater and had designated two divisions to prepare for a Brazilian expedition. Some officers had visited Brazil in the summer of 1941 to see the region firsthand.⁸³ Likely it startles Brazilians today to learn that long before Pearl Harbor their country was the object of American war planning. Rainbow war plan *LILAC (Purple)*, which had Northeast Brazil as its focus, proposed an initial ground force of 19,000 to be concentrated at the Belém, Natal, and Recife air bases. However, given the shortage of shipping and the more urgent needs in other theaters, it is unlikely that troops could have been

sent until late in 1942. But the foregoing pages should make clear that Brazil had been cooperating with the United States since January of 1941.

It is not surprising that officers on both sides had some difficulty understanding the thinking of the other. Vargas kept the two sides talking while trying to explain Góes's and Dutra's attitudes to General Lehman Miller.⁸⁴ General Miller's "negotiating" became so insistent that Góes had him declared *persona non grata* in November. What exactly happened to force Miller's recall is not clear, but it certainly sidelined an upwardly mobile officer, he would eventually be assigned to training combat engineers. The Brazilian situation was mostly static until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on December 7. The next day, after conferring with his ministry, Vargas telegraphed FDR assuring him of Brazil's solidarity, but still he wanted to keep Brazil out of the war. Germany and Italy's declarations of war on the United States on December 11 did not change his mind. General Dutra sought to resign because of the persistent negative rumors that he was pro-German, but Vargas refused, reaffirming his confidence in him.⁸⁵ A few days later, on December 21, Foreign Minister Aranha told Vargas that the American government would not provide military equipment because it did not have confidence in various people in the government. The president replied that he had no reason to distrust his aides and that the "facilities that we have given the Americans do not allow such lack of confidence"; moreover he would not replace his generals because of "foreign demands." Aranha said that he agreed with his attitude, "but the truth is that they don't trust them."⁸⁶

THE NORTHEAST BECAME EVEN MORE STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT

The Americans were soon fighting a war on a world scale, and the Brazilians were focused on keeping foreign troops from entering their country. However Japanese victories in the Pacific cut the air routes from North America to the South Pacific, and as winter weather effectively ended air travel in the North Atlantic, the only air route from the United States to Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia was via the South Atlantic. The importance of Northeast Brazil grew by the day. The situation in the Far East was deteriorating rapidly, and in the week before Christmas 1941, the Army Air Corps was ordered to move 80 heavy bombers to the Philippines in an operation called "Project X."⁸⁷ From October to early December

1941, the army's War Plans Division had revised its operational plans for Brazil based on the assumption that the Germans would soon make a thrust in the South Atlantic. This planning under Rainbow 5 called for the deployment of more than 64,000 air and ground troops who would be concentrated around Belém, Natal, and Recife.⁸⁸ WPD planners concluded that the "occupation of Natal by American forces in considerable strength affords the only reasonable assurance that we can maintain communications in the South Atlantic and a base from which long-range airplanes can fly to Africa and thence to the Middle East and the Far East."⁸⁹ General Marshall thought that the three main air bases in Brazil should each be protected by a 1,200-man infantry battalion, supported by seven or eight combat aircraft.⁹⁰ The general staff feared that "Germany's failure to achieve full success in Russia may strongly influence her to invade Spain, Portugal and French North and West Africa for the purpose of restoring the balance."⁹¹

With this perspective in mind, it is understandable why the US Army was so worried about the security of Northeast Brazil. Even so Marshall and the general staff did not want to make any move into the Brazilian bulge without the Vargas government's consent and cooperation. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles over optimistically assured Marshall that he thought that within the next ten days the Brazilians would agree. The War Plans Division conceded that they could afford to wait the ten days, "...but no longer. Every week adds to the

peril and difficulty of sea-borne troop movements in that area. Axis submarines in numbers are now reported between Natal and the African coast. Known Axis capabilities, possible Brazilian internal reactions, and unpredictable surprise moves, combine to create a growing peril. We now fight facing westward. The southeast lies open."⁹²

It is interesting that all this planning and discussion was running far ahead of American capabilities. By the end of June 1941, the army had 1,455,565 personnel, but as of October 1, the general staff rated only one division, five anti-aircraft regiments, and two artillery brigades as combat ready. The Army Air Corps then had only two bomber squadrons and three pursuit groups ready. Moreover, congressional restrictions on the use of draftees and reserve personnel and the shortage of shipping prevented large-scale overseas deployments. Interest in Brazil likely had been intensified by the Selective Service Act's ban on sending draftees outside

the Western Hemisphere. And it should be remembered that before the Pearl Harbor attack the American public was full of doubts about the war. When the Selective Service Act was extended for 18 months on August 12, 1941, it passed the House of Representatives by the extremely slim majority of one vote (203 to 202)!⁹³ The army's strategic October estimate admitted that "our present forces are barely sufficient to defend our military bases and outlying possessions. If the Axis Powers were in a position to attempt a major military operation against the Western Hemisphere, our current military forces would be wholly inadequate."⁹⁴ Until its armed forces were ready for a transatlantic offensive, the United States could only conduct "preliminary operations" that would strengthen the defense of the Western Hemisphere, and important among such operations was safeguarding the bases in Northeastern Brazil.⁹⁵

One of the positive effects of the Japanese attack was the seemingly increased willingness of the Brazilians to cooperate. The two governments agreed to form a Joint Military Board for the Northeast on December 17, 1941.⁹⁶ The US Army selected Colonel Lucius D. Clay of the engineers and Colonel Robert C. Candee of the Air Corps to be its representatives. Clay had a lot of recent experience upgrading hundreds of civilian airports in the United States. The two were to be the General Headquarters' "advance agents in Brazil" with the idea that they would eventually serve there. After meeting with their Brazilian counterparts, Clay and Candee recommended spending \$2,700,000 to improve the airway that the Air Corps Ferrying Command was to use. Urgently, they called for small groups of US Army mechanics and communications specialists to be stationed at each airfield and that emergency shipments of machine guns and ammunition be sent to allow transient air crews and Brazilian troops to defend the fields and planes from any locally organized fifth-column attacks.⁹⁷ The army's foresight in enlisting PAA/*Panair* to construct and improve the airfields in Brazil was indeed wise.

On December 31, 1941, Vargas gave an address to the leaders of the armed forces in which he recalled a century of esteem and collaboration with the "noble American nation" and declared that when it was attacked there was no doubt as to Brazil's attitude of solidarity with the United States. Until that moment, he said, "we could have discordant opinions about the reasons for the conflict, [and] make personal forecasts as to its consequences." Brazil was not in the war, even indirectly, and the nation would maintain exemplar neutrality, but Vargas observed that "nations like individuals must face [their] Destiny.... We made the decision that

corresponds to our historical determinism.” He assured the officers that he was convinced that the “materiel elements which we still lack will be delivered in opportune time” for Brazil to fulfill its responsibilities guarding the hemisphere.⁹⁸

NOTES

1. Ambassador Caffery to Sumner Welles, Rio, June 10, 1940, 832.20/203-1/3, RG 59, NARA. Caffery reported that afternoon Góes and Miller had talked.
2. Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, August 29, 1940, Mensagem No. 40-12, in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade*, pp. 402–404.

The Brazilian generals were putting constant pressure on the British military attaché, Col. Parry-Jones, and his American counterpart Col. Edwin L. Sibert to get the arms on order or stopped by the British allowed through the blockade. Col. Sibert reported that the generals may have had financial as well as patriotic reasons behind their insistence. Supposedly 10% of the total purchase price, or about \$4 million dollars, was to go to a select group of officers. Naturally, that made “these officers interested in the continuance of the contract even above any patriotic consideration.” Whether this was true or merely rumor is unknown, but it is an interesting sidelight. Col. Edwin L. Sibert, Rio de Janeiro, Military Attaché, Report: comments on Current Events, Jan. 31, 1941, MID, War Dept. General Staff, 2052-120, RG165, NARA. I am using the rank that Sibert held when he wrote the dispatch.

3. Caffery, Rio, July 8, 1940, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, p. 608; Caffery, Rio, July 16, 1940, *ibid.*, pp. 49–50.
4. Division of American Republics, Department of State, July 1, 1940: “Attitude of Brazilian Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro and Federal Interventor Cordeiro de Farias towards Nazis,” G-2 Regional File Brazil, 5900–5935, RG 165, NARA. American government officials made statements like this without offering proof that such interpretations had validity.
5. Góes Monteiro to Dutra, *Bases de Convenção com os EUA* (Basis of Agreement w/ USA), Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 11, 1941, Ofício Secreto 284 e Anexo, p. 1, 2, & 4. Góes Monteiro Archive (or *Acervo*), Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro as in Giovanni Latfalla, “O Estado-Maior do Exército e as Negociações Militares Brasil-Estados Unidos Entre os Anos de 1938 e 1942.” *Caminhos da História* (Vassouras), (Jul.–Dez. 2010), Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 65–66. This document was written in preparation for Góes’s trip to Washington in October 1941.

6. Góes Monteiro to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, July 26, 1940, Relatório do Estado-Maior do Exército, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
7. Carlos Martins Pereira e Sousa (Brazilian ambassador to the US) to Getúlio Vargas, Washington, September 24, 1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
8. Frederick B. Pike, *FDR's Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), pp. 247–250. Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), pp. 48–56 (hereafter cited as Conn & Fairchild, *Framework*).
9. Conn & Fairchild, *Framework*, pp. 49–50.
10. These studies give a vivid portrait of life and organization of those cities in 1940–1941. The ones on Rio de Janeiro and Belém, Pará, were typical: War Department, “Survey of Rio de Janeiro Region of Brazil,” Vol. 1 – Text, Military Intelligence Division (MID), August 6, 1942, S30-772, and “Survey of the Pará Region of Brazil,” Vol. 1 – Text, MID, June 6, 1941, S30-770, RG 165, NARA. Lt. Col. Archibald King (WPD, Judge Advocate General) to Asst. Ch. of Staff –G2, Washington, August 15, 1940, 2052-121, MID, General Staff (GS), War Dept. RG165, NARA. Lt. A. R. Harris (Liaison Branch) to Military Attaché (Rio), Washington, March 25, 1941: “Priority for Strategic Surveys” 2052-121, MID, GS, War Dept., RG165, NARA. For example, Col. Edwin L. Sibert (Military Attaché), Rio, May 3, 1941 Rpt.2704: “Narrative of a Trip by the MA Across Bahia and Piauhy [sic] during early March, 1941” 2052-121, MID, GS, War Dept. RG 165, NARA. That American officers were allowed to make such trips was an indication of Brazilian cooperation.
11. Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller to Chief of General Staff, Brazilian Army, Rio, September 19, 1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
12. Thomas D. White went to Brazil in April 1940 as the air attaché and then became chief of the military air mission. After Brazil he served on the general staff as one of its Brazil specialists. He was promoted to four-star general in 1953 and chief of Air Force Staff from 1957 to 1961.
13. Caffery, Rio, September 6, 1940 #3538, 832.20/224 ½, RG 59, NARA.
14. Caffery, Rio, September 23, 1940, Telegram 476, 711.32/91, RG59, NARA.
15. Ciro de Freitas Vale to Getúlio Vargas, Berlin, October 23, 1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC. The ambassador’s choice of words showed the typical attitude of Brazilians toward Spanish speakers by referring to them as “*Castelhanos*,” Castilians, as in people of Castile, Portugal’s ancient enemy.
16. “War Department – Pan American Aviation Contract for Latin American Aviation Facilities,” November 2, 1940, WPD 4113-3, World War II RS,

- NARA. For an interesting discussion of the development of Pan American, see Rosalie Schwartz, *Flying Down to Rio: Hollywood, Tourists, and Yankee Clippers* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2004), pp. 221–257.
17. Memo, Chief of Staff for Secretary of War, Washington, September 7, 1940, as quoted in Conn & Fairchild, *Framework*, p. 252.
 18. F.P. Powers (*Panair* business manager) to Evan Young (responsible for PAA's foreign relations), Rio de Janeiro, December 18, 1940, "ADP," Cauby C. Araújo Papers; author's interview with Cauby C. Araújo, Rio de Janeiro, October 4, 1965. Presumably a copy should be in the PAA archives at the University of Miami.
 19. The foregoing came from my interview with Cauby C. Araújo, October 4, 1965. Vargas appointed Joaquim Pedro Salgado Filho as the Minister of Aeronautics in late January 1941. Góes Monteiro regarded this appointment as Getúlio's way to weakening the influence of the armed forces. There is a fascinating collection of news clippings attached to A.W. Childs, "New Air Ministry," January 22, 1941, 832.00/1332, RG 59, NARA.
 20. Petition to Minister of Transportation and Public Works, January 20, 1941, "Requerimento 30/31" and "Requerimento 28/41 ao Presidente, Conselho Superior de Segurança Nacional," January 20, 1941, both in "ADP," Araújo Papers. Unfortunately this private collection is now apparently missing.
 21. Prior to the cabinet meeting, Vargas had asked Aranha to sign the decree below his own signature, but at the meeting Aranha saw that the president's name had disappeared. Aranha took out a photostat of the original showing his signature and forcefully told him that he would not stand alone before the army as the supporter of the United States. Vargas signed the document again and the cabinet approved it as Decree-Law 3462 (July 25, 1941). It appeared in the *Diário Oficial* on July 26, 1941. The story about the signatures was told to me by the foreign minister's son Euclides Aranha in Rio de Janeiro on November 15, 1965. Oddly the only reference in Vargas diary to a cabinet meeting at that time in July was on July 26. Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942* Vol. II, p. 410.
 22. "Official History South Atlantic Division Air Transport Command," Part I, II, p. 71, US Army Center for Military History.
 23. Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942* Vol. II, entry July 23, p. 409.
 24. War Department, "A Survey of the Natal Region of Brazil," May 14, 1941, I, p. 35 as in History SADATC, Part I, II, p. 72.
 25. As quoted in General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, *A Serviço do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra A Noite, 1952), p. 63. The author was chief of the Brazilian delegation on the Brazil-United States Defense Commission during the war.

26. MG, *Relatório...Dutra...1940*, pp. 4–6. For a deeper analysis of Brazil's arms situation, see my "The Brazilian Army and the Pursuit of Arms Independence, 1899–1979," in Benjamin F. Cooling (Ed.), *War, Business and World Military-Industrial Complexes* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1981), pp. 171–193.
27. The army did have 129,085 carbines, 8732 automatic rifles, 5738 Madison and Hotchkiss machine guns, 20 anti-aircraft machine guns, 13,986 swords, and 7797 lances. Col. Ralph C. Smith (Executive Officer, G-2, General Staff), Memo for Army War College: "Brazilian Army: Armament and Munitions on hand, Status of Training," Nov. 3, 1941, G2 Regional Files, Brazil 6000, RG 165, NARA.
28. On September 20, Dutra bought Miller's documents to Vargas, who found the questions "um tanto impertiente" (rather impertinent, insolent, or rude). The next day Vargas discussed the matter further with the ministers of war, navy, foreign affairs, and Góes; see Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 339 (entries Sept 20 & 21, 1940). Memorando, Col. L. Miller to Góes Monteiro, Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 19, 1940 and Report of General Staff of US Army on Military Cooperation with Brazil, Rio, Sept. 19, 1940 (translation in Portuguese of report done in Washington) in Góes Monteiro archive (or *Acervo*), Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro as in Giovanni Latfalla, "O Estado-Maior do Exército e as Negociações Militares Brasil-Estados Unidos Entre os Anos de 1938 e 1942." *Caminhos da História* (Vassouras), vol. 6, no. 2 (Jul./Dez. 2010), pp. 61–78.
29. Likely Dutra was confusing Mongolia with Manchuria, which Japan had invaded in 1932 and had set up the puppet state of Manchukuo.
30. There is a detailed review of the arms contract with Germany and the processes of the British blockade that entrapped the arms en route to Brazil in Major Edwin L. Sibert, Rio de Janeiro, Jan. 21, 1941 Military Attaché Report: Comments on Current Events, MID, War Dept. General Staff, 2052-120, RG165, NARA.
31. Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, November 20, 1940, No. 58/19, in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade*, pp. 404–407.
32. For a careful study of those bases from South America to Newfoundland, see Steven High, *Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940–1967* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
33. On the complicated politics leading to the passage of the Lend-Lease legislation, William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940–1941* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 252–289.
34. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937–1940 and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1952), Vol. II, p. 614.

35. General George C. Marshall, Memoranda by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Under Secretary of State (Welles): Military Cooperation of Brazil, Washington, June 17, 1941, as in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1941, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 498–501. This assessment ignored the fact that the sufficient German immigrant population that could possibly provide such a fifth-column force lay thousands of miles south in Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. How they could be assembled, trained, and transported to the Northeast does not seem to have been considered.
36. This was Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha's weary comment on the number of goodwill ambassadors he had to receive. "The Wooing of Brazil," *Fortune*, XXIV, No. 4 (October 1941), p. 100.
37. Darlene J. Sadlier, *Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), p. xii. This is the best study of the OCIAA.
38. Harriet M. Brown & Helen Bailey, *Our Latin American Neighbors* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1944), p. 1. Before saying that citizens of Brazil and the United States are both Americans, the authors said that the term "America" should be applied "to both the continents in the Western Hemisphere." And so the peoples of all the hemisphere's nations are Americans. For an excellent analysis of the Rockefeller office and its archival records, see Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch, "Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940–1946) and Record Group 229," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 84, No. 4 (November 2006), pp. 785–806.
39. For a recent study of the translation program, see Eliza Mitiyo Morinaka, "Ficción y política en tiempos de guerra: el proyecto de traducción estadounidense para la literatura brasileña (1943–1947)," *Estudos Históricos* (Rio de Janeiro, setembro-dezembro 2017), Vol. 30, No 62, pp. 661–680. For an excellent study of the Rockefeller Office's Brazilian programs see Alexandre Busko Valim, *O Triunfo da Persuasão: Brasil, Estados Unidos e o Cinema da Política de Boa Vizinhaça durante a II Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Alameda Casa Editorial, 2017).
40. Darlene J. Sadlier, *Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), p. 75.
41. Darlene J. Sadlier, *Brazil Imagined 1500 to the Present* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008), pp. 215–233. The unfinished Welles film was "It's All True"; see Catherine Benamou, *It's All True: Orson Welles Pan-American Odyssey* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). For the part of the film about the Cearense *Jangadeiros*, see José Henrique de Almeida Braga, *Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará* (Fortaleza: Premium Editora, 2017), pp. 147–152. For Carmen Miranda's adventures and misadventures as a cultural go-between: Bryan McCann, *Hello, Hello Brazil: Popular Music in the Making of Modern Brazil* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 129–150; and the excellent biography

- by Ruy Castro, *Carmen: Uma Biografia* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2005), especially pp. 258–349. The Brazilian elite criticized her for becoming too Americanized; see Castro, pp. 244–251.
42. *Saludos Amigos* premiered in Rio de Janeiro on August 24, 1942. For an in-depth study of Disney activities, see J. B. Kaufman, *South of the Border with Disney: Walt Disney and the Good Neighbor Program, 1941–1948* (New York: Disney Editions, 2009). “What Walt Disney Learned from South America” Walt & El Grupo; Documents Disney Diplomacy” NPR, September 17, 2009. <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112916523>. Disney and his artists visited Brazil, Argentina, and Chile in August–October 1941. The Disney party was swept up in admiration for Brazil’s infectious samba; see Kaufman’s *South of the Border*. Barroso’s 1939 *Aquarela* was Americanized as simply *Brazil* and entered the playlists of the big bands.
 43. David J. Epstein, *Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977), p. 36. The author did not provide his source, but his statement appears credible.
 44. John Baxter, *Disney During World War II: How the Walt Disney Studio Contributed to Victory in the War* (New York: Disney Editions, 2014), pp. 173–174.
 45. See, for example, Police Chief Filinto Müller to Benjamin Vargas, Caxambú, April 30, 1941, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, Rio. He warned that Fairbanks was coming as a propaganda agent for both the United States and Britain. He met with Getúlio. For more on Fairbanks and other Hollywood people sent on missions, see Darlene J. Sadlier, *Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), pp. 34–36.
 46. Antonio Pedro Tota, *O Imperialismo Sedutor, A Americanização do Brasil na Época da Segunda Guerra* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000), p. 90.
 47. James Reston, “Our Second Line of Defense,” *The New York Times Magazine*, June 29, 1941, p. 7.
 48. McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 246–249. OCIAA efforts were not aimed at getting Brazil into the war, but they increased Brazilian concerns about Nazi Germany. There has been little effort to see how its programs affected local attitudes. There is useful local emphasis on Fortaleza in José Henrique de Almeida Braga, *Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará* (Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), pp. 153–169. For more documentation and interpretation, see <http://cpdoc.fgy.br/producao/dossies/AEraVargas1/anos37-45/AGuerraNoBrasil/TioSam>.
 49. General Amaro Soares Bittencourt to Eurico Dutra, Washington, March 2, 1941, in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade*, pp. 407–409. General Amaro

- had been sent to handle the day-to-day details of the arms purchases. He mentioned a story in the *Washington Times-Herald* of Feb. 28, 1941.
50. The Lend-Lease Act permitted any country whose defense that the president considered vital to that of the United States to receive arms, equipment, and supplies by sale, transfer, exchange, or lease.
 51. Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas Rio, March 8, 1941 in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade*, pp. 410–411.
 52. Col. Trent N. Thomas & Lt. Col. Charles F. Moler, “A Historical Perspective of the USAWC Class of 1940” (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 15, 1987), ADA183148.pdf. p. 47. Miller’s classmates included Maxwell Taylor, Lyman Lemnitzer, Anthony C. McAuliffe, and Charles Bolte. Miller graduated from West Point in 1915, the class the stars fell upon. He ranked ninth in that class of 164 cadets. His classmates, Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Joseph T. McNarney, and James Van Fleet were ranked 61st, 44th, 41st, and 92nd. Order of class ranking clearly did not determine success in their military careers. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_class_the_stars_fell_on.
 53. Colonel L. Miller to Colonel M. B. Ridgway, Washington, February 13, 1941, WPD 4224-122, RG165, NARA.
 54. Col. Trent N. Thomas & Lt. Col. Charles F. Moler “A Historical Perspective of the USAWC Class of 1940” (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa, 15 April 1987), ADA183148.pdf. p. 81.
 55. George C. Marshall to BG Lehman W. Miller, Washington, May 6, 1941, 2–441, Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, General Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.
 56. The German-Vichy agreement was announced on May 15, 1941.
 57. Improvement in air travel made the Washington-Rio de Janeiro journey faster than Marshall’s ten days by boat in 1939. Until 1940 the air trip had been five days via the coastal route, because night flying was not possible. In 1940 Pan American opened a land route from Belém to Rio, using the new DC-3 that cut the time in half.
 58. Welles to Caffery, Washington, May 22, 1941, 868.20232/206:Telegram and Caffery to Welles, Rio de Janeiro, May 28, 1941, 862.20232/2061: Telegram as in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1941, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 494–496.
 59. Milton Freixinho, *Instituições Em Crises: Dutra e Góis Monteiro, Duas Vidas Paralelas* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1997), p. 382. Colonel Milton wrote “grave incidente pela visita inamistosa [unfriendly visit] do chefe da Missão Militar Americana no Brasil....”
 60. For a detailed study of German activities in Brazil, see Leslie B. Rout and John F. Bratzel, *The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States*

Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick, Md.: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 106–172; and a contemporary report Aurélio da Silva Py, *A 5a Coluna no Brasil: A Conspiração Nazi no Rio Grande do Sul* (Porto Alegre: Edição da Livraria do Globo, 1942). The author was chief of police in Rio Grande do Sul and led the anti-Nazi efforts.

61. Góis Monteiro to Eurico Dutra, Rio, June 2, 1941, Ofício No. 82 “Entendimento com o Chefe da Missão Militar Americano” in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade*, pp. 425–431. It may be noteworthy that before Miller had this conversation with the chief of staff, Ambassador Caffery had asked President Vargas if he would authorize it. Why the president would need to authorize a meeting between the head of the military mission and the chief of staff remains unclear.
62. *Ibid.* p. 429.
63. *Ibid.* p. 431.
64. “Sizes of the Brazilian Armed Forces in July 1941,” Intelligence Branch, MID, Combat Factor, Brazil, July 1, 1941, 6010, G2 Regional, RG 165, NARA.
65. Leite and Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade*, p. 430. The British attaché was Lt. Colonel Parry-Jones. The reality was that the Brazilian army had never conducted such large-scale training maneuvers in the northeast.
66. For military competition between Brazil and Argentina, see Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: Conflito e Integração na América do Sul (Da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul 1870–2003)* (Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 2003), pp. 197–217.
67. By the spring of 1942, the Brazilian government agreed to an extensive photomapping program from French Cayenne to Uruguay of a stretch 100 km inland and along the Amazon up to Iquitos, Peru. War Dept., Special Staff, Historical Division, “History of United States Army Forces South Atlantic,” (1945), p. 30.
68. Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, June 5, 1941, No. 35-25 (Pessoal e Secreta), and Getúlio Vargas to Eurico Dutra, Rio, June 6, 1941 in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade.*, pp. 418–425.
69. Joachim von Ribbentrop to Prüfer, Berlin, June 11, 1941, 235/157214, telegram as in *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, Vol. XII, p. 41. He is replying to Prüfer’s telegram of June 6. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 398 (5 June 1941). The president gave no hint as to what he discussed with the German ambassador.

70. The Lend-Lease comment was in Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II p. 399 (10 June 1941) and the conversation with the Japanese ambassador in *ibid.* pp. 396–397 (29 May 1941).
71. Col. Paul M. Robinett, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Washington, June 14, 1941, BCD 5400, RG218 (Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff), NARA. This set of records of the joint chiefs was declassified August 20, 1973. Colonel Robinett was closely associated with General Marshall, was involved in the Arcadia Conference (1941), later fought and was wounded in North Africa. It is noteworthy that the Brazilian Army awarded him its Order of Military Merit. See Biographical Sketch, Paul M. Robinett Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.
72. Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), pp. 286–287.
73. Sumner Welles to Jefferson Caffery, Washington, June 26, 1941, 810.20 Defense/892a:Telegram as in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 501–502.
74. Caffery to Welles, Rio de Janeiro, June 27, 1941 (3 p.m.), 810.20 Defense/892 1//2:Telegram as in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 502.
75. Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 303–304.
76. Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), pp. 286–287.
77. *Ibid.* p. 287.
78. *Ibid.* p. 291. The American members returned to the United States on October 5, 1941.
79. Commission of Officers of the North American General Staff to Commission of Officers of the Brazilian General Staff, Rio de Janeiro, September 25, 1941, with attached memo by Góes Monteiro, same place and date, BDC5700, 5740 Reports The Defense of Northeastern Brazil, Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG218, NARA.
80. Jefferson Caffery, Rio, September 24, 1941, No. 5437, Brazil 5900, G2 Regional, RG 165, NARA. The phrase the ambassador reported was “*tapeação de aviação*,” which I translated as “aviation scam.”
81. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, pp. 415–416 (August 19, 1941), pp. 424–425 (August 22–26, 1941).
82. *Ibid.*, 424, entry for August 22, 1941. “Em resumo: os americanos querem nos arrastar à Guerra na Europa sob o pretexto de defesa da América.”

83. Memo, WPD for GHQ, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4516-38; Report of G-3 GHQ, 18 Dec 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conferences Binder 2, MMB, RG 165, NARA.
84. *Ibid.* 425, August 25, 1941. Góes had Miller recalled; see Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, pp. 301–302.
85. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, pp. 440–442 (entries December 7–12, 1941).
86. *Ibid.* p. 443 (December 21, 1941). American distrust of Dutra and Góes was persistent.
87. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), Vol. I, 332. At the end of December 1941, the British-American Arcadia Conference that set the strategy for the war designated the route through Brazil as the most important one between the hemispheres; Conn and Fairchild, *Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, p. 304.
88. Conn & Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, pp. 292–293. The previous Rainbow 4 series was based on the assumption that Great Britain would collapse. The shift of focus to the South Atlantic necessarily increased the importance of Brazil's security in US Army thinking.
89. WPD study, Dec 21, 1941, subject: "Immediate Military Measures," OPD Exec 4, Book 2, MMB, RG 165, NARA.
90. Remarks of Gen Marshall at Standing Liaison Committee meeting, January 3, 1942, SLC Minutes, Vol. II, Item 42, MMB, RG165, NARA.
91. Brief Joint Estimate (General Marshall and Admiral Stark), December 20, 1941, WPD 4402-136, MMB, RG 165, NARA. This was presented at the Arcadia Conference, where Roosevelt met with Churchill. They agreed that the Iberian Peninsula and Africa were likely targets.
92. Memo from WPD for Chief of Staff, December 21, 1941, WPD 4224-208, MMB, RG 165, NARA.
93. The Selective Training and Service Act was approved on Sept. 16, 1940, providing one year of training for 1,200,000 men between 21 and 35 years of age. This was the first time in history that the United States enacted a peacetime draft.
94. Conn & Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, pp. 146–148.
95. *Ibid.* p. 149. The other preliminary operations were completion of the occupation of Iceland, occupation of Dakar, and protective occupation of the Portuguese Azores and Cape Verdes, as well as the Spanish Canaries. Obviously to move anywhere in the South Atlantic, Northeast Brazil had to be secure as a base of operations.
96. The US embassy delivered the proposal for this to President Vargas on Nov. 13 and he discussed it with Dutra that day; see Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 435 (13 November 1941).

97. On Clay and Candee's trip to Brazil, see Oral History Interview, Major General Kenner F. Hertford by Richard D. McKinzie, June 17, 1974, Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Mo. For the building of American air bases, see McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, 221–239.
98. Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1943), Vol. 9, pp. 187–190. He presented an optimistic face to his military and reminded the United States that he was still waiting for arms. Simmons, Rio, January 2, 1942, #6172, 832.00/1454, RG59, NARA. Dramatically Vargas told the officers “I shall be with you, ready to fight, to win, to die.”



Brazil's Options Narrow

INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE AT RIO DE JANEIRO (JANUARY 1942)

A month after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the American people were deeply distressed and fearful, and Washington was anxious to expand the number of its allies against the Axis and to have the American Republics present a unified front. The previous Inter-American conferences in Lima (December 1938), Panama (October 1939), and Havana (July 1940) had set a tone of cooperation in the unfolding world crisis. The deep suspicions with which Latin Americans viewed the United States, because of American interventions in previous decades, had been ameliorated, but not fully eliminated, by Roosevelt's 1933 renunciation of intervention and the launching of the Good Neighbor Policy. Truly, Latin American leaders tended to have private reservations and doubts about the reality of Roosevelt's pledge, but it was convenient to act publicly as if it were true.¹ Moreover Americans, despite Good Neighbor rhetoric, tended "to regard the portion of the New World that lay to their south as their sphere of influence, a sphere whose economic potential to the degree that it benefited foreigners must benefit primarily the citizens of the United States."²

With the Axis threat now looming, the American Republics gathered in Rio de Janeiro to find a common response to the Japanese attack and German-Italian declarations of war. Nine republics in Central America and the Caribbean had declared war on Japan already. It could be argued that

the Good Neighbor Policy was paying dividends. However that may be, President Vargas was probably realistic when he commented in his diary that such declarations were likely more due to American pressure than to spontaneous decisions.³ Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela called for a resolution that would make the breaking of relations with the Axis mandatory, but Argentina and Chile were opposed. Chile was understandably fearful that its long, undefended coastline would be open to Japanese assault, especially because the American navy had been seriously mutilated by the Pearl Harbor attack. When Washington promised that its fleet would protect the Chilean coast, Foreign Minister Gabriel Rossetti insensitively retorted, "What fleet? The one sunk in Pearl Harbor?" Meanwhile, the Japanese embassy in Santiago was promising that there would be no attack if Chile stayed neutral.⁴

Chile's relationship with Germany was complicated. German officers had worked to modernize the Chilean army since 1884, for several years a German officer served as chief of the general staff, and Chilean units on parade looked very much like the German army. However, the Prussianization was less substantive than "a matter of style." But it was so persistent that honor guard units were still wearing spiked Prussian-style helmets in 2017! Moreover, strong German influence played an important role in upgrading and modernizing Chilean education.⁵

Being contrary the Argentines reinforced the negative image that Secretary of State Hull had of them. The Brazilians and Americans expended much effort during the conference to bring the Argentines into the Allied fold. If Germany won the war, Argentine leaders believed that they would gain "the Golden Market for Argentina's traditional exports ... [as well as] capital, manufacturers, and branch-plant technology." That "if" would not materialize, but for a time American planners even considered invading Argentina to remove the supposed "Nazi Menace."⁶ Many Argentines thought of the war as a distant European conflict and did not want to embrace American-led Western Hemisphere solidarity. Reportedly, their delegates at Rio showered Peruvian and Paraguayan delegates with attention and money, trying to convince them to assume an extreme neutralist stance. Germany, according to the FBI, had spread money around in Buenos Aires.⁷ And, like Chile, Argentina's military connections with Germany had age and depth.⁸ It is possible, as some have argued, that Argentina acted as it did to resist US dominance of the Western Hemisphere; local [Nazi] Party pressure was insignificant.⁹ Whatever the reasons, Argentine refusal strained relations with Washington for many years.

Throughout the conference, Foreign Minister Aranha and President Vargas acted as mediators to bring the Argentines around and to restrain the Americans from alienating them completely. They did not want Argentina to become so isolated that it might react militarily against Brazil. The Brazilians were not only in the American camp, they were leading the other republics toward a complete break with the Axis. Days before, on New Year's Eve, Vargas had addressed a dinner of military leaders in which he said that the decision to stand with the United States had been clear from the moment of the Japanese attack. Brazil did not need international congresses to show it where its responsibilities lay. He called for unity against rumor mongers and against propaganda from suspicious and self-interested sources. He added a reminder to the Americans that he trusted that the arms they needed "will be delivered in opportune time." He affirmed that if attacked, a united, cohesive Brazil would fight and the *Pátria* would not succumb.¹⁰

RIO CONFERENCE, JANUARY 1942

In the heat and humidity of the Brazilian summer, the Vargas government was pleased to be hosting the Third Consultative Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics to decide on a common course of action. The conference would set Brazil firmly on the path against the Axis, although at times Washington was uncertain of the Brazilian commitment. Sumner Welles and Aranha had become good friends during the latter's years as ambassador in Washington, and holding the conference in Rio meant that Aranha would be chairman.¹¹

The Americans had some difficulty understanding what was happening in Brazil. It is now possible to see a bit behind the scenes. On Friday, January 9, Vargas worked on his speech for the conference and showed the draft to Oswaldo Aranha who wanted to make sure that his own address reflected that of the president.¹² Negotiations to secure Northeast Brazil and to provide arms for the Brazilian forces were stalled, but beyond the foreign ministers' speechmaking, Vargas and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles held historic conversations. Secretary Hull did not think he himself should be away from Washington, and Roosevelt probably was more comfortable with Sumner Welles leading the American delegation.¹³ Two days before Welles disembarked from his Pan American seaplane at Rio's Santos Dumont Airport, Vargas met with the National Security Council in a very unusual session on Saturday afternoon, to discuss the

international situation, defense needs, and the coming conference. He could not have been clearer when he told its members that “Brazil must stand or fall with the United States” and that anyone in the government who disagreed was “at liberty to resign his position.” They agreed unanimously. Generals Dutra and Góes Monteiro, who reportedly had believed in the early months of the war that Germany would prevail, commented that Vargas’s stance was “the only correct policy for Brazil to follow.” However, they lamented that the country had little ability to defend itself. Unfortunately, the Army’s repeated attempts to obtain weaponry from the United States had thus far resulted in “nothing but token shipments despite the promises of the American government.” They mentioned as an example that the few small tanks that had been sent had arrived “without armament” and so were “practically useless.” Both men had recently told Axis representatives, as well as those of Argentina and Chile, that Brazil would be standing with the United States. Vargas assured the National Security Council members that the armed forces would not have to worry about subversive activities, even of the uprisings of German or Italian sympathizers, because “the Brazilian people were 100% in agreement with his policy” and they would take care of any Axis-instigated uprisings (Fig. 4.1).¹⁴

Under Secretary Welles arrived in Rio on Monday, January 12, and that very night, he and Ambassador Caffery met with Vargas in Guanabara Palace. Welles gave him a letter from FDR repeating his invitation to visit Washington so he could repay “the warm welcome that you and the Brazilian people gave me when I visited your beautiful capital in 1936.” He observed that “no country has done more to bring ... [a growing inter-American solidarity] about than Brazil, and no person has given it wiser leadership than yourself.”

Praising Getúlio’s “magnificent cooperation ... generous attitude and assistance with regard to ... the ferry service to Africa and the naval and air patrols from your ports and airfields ...,” he offered his appreciation “from the bottom of my heart...” Then he turned to what Getúlio wanted to know most of all, saying that

I did not fail to catch the import of the reference in your speech of December 31 to the delivery of ‘the material elements which we still lack.’ Despite new demands for equipment of an urgent character necessitated by the aggression of the Japanese, I assure you that before long we shall be able to supply you with the equipment for which you have been waiting. ... existing productive capacity is being doubled in order that this country can fulfill its role as the ‘arsenal of democracy’.



Fig. 4.1 Guanabara Palace: President's residence. (Photo courtesy of author)

The meeting of Foreign Ministers shortly to convene in Rio under your friendly auspices is the most important inter-American meeting that has ever convened in the New World. The security of the Western Hemisphere, the future welfare of all of us, may well depend upon its outcome.¹⁵

Vargas, however, remained “apprehensive.” It seemed to him that “the Americans want to pull us into the war, without this being useful, neither for us, nor for them.” After Welles and Caffery left, he worked on his speech for the conference.¹⁶

On Tuesday, January 14, Argentine Foreign Minister Enrique Ruiz Guiñazú appealed to Vargas not to break relations with the Axis. He replied that as conference host, Brazil’s “attitude had to be conciliatory and could not put itself in such an extreme position of opposition,” and urged him to talk with Welles.¹⁷ The American undersecretary wrote a fuller report that had Vargas telling Guiñazú that Brazil completely sup-

ported the United States and “considers it indispensable that a joint declaration by all the American Republics for an immediate severance of relations with the Axis powers be adopted by the Conference.” Further, he had sent a courier to Buenos Aires with a message saying the same to the acting president of Argentina, Ramón Castillo, and that he was using Brazil’s considerable influence with Chile to obtain its adherence. Welles likely got those details from Aranha. Clearly Vargas’s diary entry was more restrained. He could have been affected by his conversations the day before regarding the once again requests from Dutra and Góes to resign.¹⁸ The army leaders were opposed to breaking relations because they lacked armament and were losing faith in American promises to provide it.

Welles was convinced that if it had not been for the “strong and helpful position taken by President Vargas and by Aranha four of the other South American Republics would probably have drifted in the direction of Argentina.”¹⁹ Welles had a very low opinion of Foreign Minister Guñazú, who the year before he had heard praise Mussolini and Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, and so it is not surprising that he regarded him as “one of the stupidest men ever to hold office in Argentina’s proud history.”²⁰

In the long telegram to Roosevelt, Welles reported that the ambassadors of Germany, Italy, and Japan had sent threatening letters to Vargas warning that if Brazil broke diplomatic relations, it would mean war with the Axis. Vargas and Aranha were anxious that this threat be kept quiet for the present. Vargas told Welles that his responsibility for taking Brazil into war was very great and that his efforts during the past 18 months to obtain arms from the United States had not been successful, but that he depended on FDR to understand his “crucial difficulties.” Brazil, the president said, unlike a small Central American country, could not be satisfied and feel protected by the stationing of American soldiers on its territory. Rather it had “the right to be regarded by the United States as a friend and ally and as entitled to be furnished under the Lend-Lease Act with planes, tanks, and coast artillery sufficient to enable the Brazilian Army to defend at least in part those regions of northeastern Brazil whose defense was as vitally necessary for the United States as for Brazil” Welles and General Marshall had agreed not to raise the possibility of stationing American troops in the northeast, which was a dead letter until the Brazilian army received at least “a minimum of materiel requested by President Vargas.”²¹

The problem was not so much a question of American will, but of shortages and building the manufacturing infrastructure to produce the massive quantities of arms, equipment, and ammunition. That took time. General

Marshall admitted that “shortages make it practically impossible to find anything for immediate or even reasonably prompt delivery.”²² While watching a horse-jumping exhibition, Welles asked Vargas for a private meeting, which they set for the next Monday evening during the festive reception for the conference delegates at Guanabara Palace, the president’s residence.²³

There was a cultural difference in the way Americans and Brazilians viewed the proper style for holding an international conference. The Americans wanted to keep focused on the tasks at hand, while the Brazilians wanted to mix in some levity. The Brazilians knew that some quiet business could be done in social settings, so they wanted to have some receptions complete with formal dress. Caffery telegraphed the State Department that “he was doing his best, but that, it was next to impossible to keep the Brazilians and especially Aranha from entertaining.” When the Chilean ambassador announced that he wanted to hold a reception in honor of his foreign minister, Caffery envisioned the possibility of 20 such affairs. He invited his Latin American colleagues to a meeting at his residence and persuaded them to agree that they would not give any “conference parties.” Wistfully, he told State that, “it is extremely difficult to prevent the Brazilians from adding more parties to their list.”²⁴

Meanwhile, the day after the conversation with Welles in Petrópolis, Vargas returned to Rio for a round of golf at the Itanhangá Club in the Barra da Tijuca. After the round Argentine Minister Guñazú came by to propose a conciliatory formula to support the United States. Aranha, who was there, argued against the idea, but Vargas thought it worth examining and pressed the Argentine to speak with Welles.²⁵

The next morning Vargas and Aranha discussed the probable consequences of breaking relations with the Axis. The president also learned that Góes Monteiro and Dutra were still talking about resigning. On January 15, as the Inter-American Conference was opening in the Tiradentes Palace in downtown Rio, Vargas and Dutra were in Guanabara Palace discussing the generals’ wish to resign. A decision to break relations, as the Americans wanted, would take them to war, which, Dutra insisted, the army opposed because it was not ready. He emphasized that without the arms that the Americans had been promising, but not delivering, the armed forces could not adequately defend Brazilian territory, especially if Argentina maintained relations with the Axis. That night General Góes came by the palace, and after outlining the recent developments, Vargas convinced him that his and Dutra’s resignations would be most inconvenient. Góes agreed and said he would persuade Dutra to stay.²⁶

On the early evening of January 19, the crucial “long and frank” conversation between Vargas and Welles took place in the president’s favorite escape on top of the hill (*morro*) at the far end of the palace grounds, which was cool and very private. Vargas must have regarded this meeting as very important because he wrote one of the longest entries in his diaries about it. He said that circumstances had given Brazil the role of arbitrator between the United States and Argentina and Chile who did not want to break relations with the Axis. He did not want to take advantage of that role, observing that he could not risk his country without some security guarantees, principally the delivery of war materiel. The day before, Welles had telegraphed FDR asking permission to promise in his name that if Vargas gave him a list of the minimum war materiel needed, Roosevelt would guarantee that it would be made available at “the first possible moment.” Welles had gently reminded Roosevelt that “like all armies, the Brazilian High Command is not inclined to be enthusiastic about getting into war if they have none of the basic elements for defense.”²⁷ He admitted that General Marshall had expressed doubt about Brazil and that the chief of staff worried it was “not safe to give Brazil arms that they may use against us.” But Welles rejected that idea and warned that “[an Axis-inspired] revolution in Brazil might have fatal repercussions ... If we felt it necessary to move by force into Northeast Brazil, the effort might be far greater than we care to envisage.”²⁸

Roosevelt wrote his response by hand and sent it to Lawrence Duggan, a key Department of State adviser on political relations. He could not reach Welles or any of his staff by telephone, so he called Ambassador Caffery in Rio, who was to meet with Welles and Vargas shortly. FDR said “Tell President Vargas I wholly understand and appreciate the needs and can assure him flow of material will start at once. ...there are shortages in a few items which I do not trust to putting on the wire ... I want to get away as soon as possible from token shipments and increase them to a minimum of Brazilian requirements very quickly. Tell him I am made very happy by his splendid policy and give him my very warm regards.” A list of immediate shipments was to follow in a separate coded message.²⁹

Vargas and Welles talked more about the necessity of attracting Argentina. Welles expressed his dismay with and distrust of Argentina. He said that Japan had given money to certain Chilean political figures, including Foreign Minister Juan Bautista Rossetti. Vargas kept emphasizing that “he needed the delivery of the armaments that the American government was delaying.” Welles gave him absolute guarantees and told

him that he had sent Roosevelt an urgent cable and expected a rapid response. The under secretary, likely feeling the importance of the moment, then went a step further by placing a telephone call to the White House. Roosevelt assured Welles that 65 light tanks and 2000 other military vehicles would be sent immediately. Vargas was worried about Argentina's attitude and the need to attract it to their side. Welles was irritated with Buenos Aires and said that if the Argentines did not join in breaking with the Axis, the United States would cut them off. He confided that he was betting his position as under secretary on achieving the break in relations. Vargas rejoined that Welles could "count on Brazil, but that with this decision, I was staking my life, because I would not survive if it turned out to be a disaster for my *pátria*."³⁰

After that conversation they attended a lively reception in the Guanabara Palace, complete with music. In the midst of the festivity, Argentine Foreign Minister Guiñazú drew Vargas into a conversation, in which the president told him that Argentine-Brazilian friendship was an integral part of his government's program, and reminded him that he had grown up on the frontier and believed that it was natural for the two peoples to understand and respect each other. "When there had been distrust or touchiness, it was the fault of the governments not the people." The reception was still on when Vargas ducked out to make these comments in his diary; he wrote that he could hear the lively music drifting up from downstairs.³¹

Setting aside any distrust he may have had about Chilean Minister Juan Bautista Rossetti, Welles did his best to win him over. In a four-hour conversation, Rossetti swore that he expected to receive instructions from Santiago at any moment to vote in favor of breaking relations. As an inducement to his government, Welles recommended that Chile receive Lend-Lease arms.³² In reality, Rossetti probably was determined not to break with the Axis. His Radical Party could not afford to antagonize the German-Chilean community for fear of losing its support in the 1942 presidential election. And he had more personal reasons. He commented that "if I return to Chile... after having broken relations with the Axis, they may hang me in the Plaza de Armas"³³ (Fig. 4.2).

In his office at the Itamaraty, on January 21, Aranha came up with a new formula to gain the Argentine and Chilean votes favoring a break in relations. The motion would be *to recommend* breaking relations, thus leaving it to each republic to put the recommendation into effect. Argentina and Chile could vote for it knowing that they would not actu-

Fig. 4.2 Itamaraty Palace: Brazil's foreign ministry. (Photo courtesy of author)



ally break relations. Vargas approved the idea as a way to appear to maintain unity, and that very day Welles and Guiñazú agreed to the maneuver. However, the next day a word came that President Ramon Castillo had forbidden Guiñazú to vote in favor of any formula that involved breaking with the Axis. The unity that the Americans and Brazilians wanted seemed to be slipping beyond reach. To create time for more negotiations, the vote was delayed and the conference focused on bringing peace to the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border conflict in Amazonia. The fighting had lasted from July 5 to 31, 1941, and an armistice had been signed in October; what was negotiated at Rio was a protocol setting forth the procedure by which a diplomatic settlement would be reached.³⁴

The Americans also had their own problem with the formula. Secretary Hull was livid when he learned of it, which was heightened by late-night radio news that spoke of an Argentine victory at the Rio Conference. According to Adolf Berle, who was with the Secretary of State on January 24, Hull called Welles at the Copacabana Palace Hotel and had a half-hour “violent” conversation. It was midnight in Washington and 2:00 a.m. in Rio, and Welles was just getting into bed after a very long day. The secretary furiously accused Welles of getting “us into a fine mess ... I never gave you ‘carty blanchy’ (sic) to act for us!” He told Welles to tell the conference the next day that he had not been authorized to vote for the compromise and to switch his vote against it. Hull thought that Argentina should be regarded as an “outlaw.” Furthermore, he thought Welles was being “ingenuous – not a single government would carry out its commitments.”

Welles reminded him that he had Roosevelt’s specific approval to act as he did. Hull denied it, so Welles insisted that they get the president on the line for a three-way exchange. Fortunately, the president was in the White House. Roosevelt listened to the raging diplomats then said, “I’m sorry Cordell, but in this case I am going to take the judgment of the man on the spot. Sumner, I approve what you have done. I authorize you to follow the lines you have recommended.” Hull supposedly never forgave either of them. Caffery weighed in with a telegram to Hull saying that “General feeling here is far better... to secure... adhesion of Argentina and Chile to this formula [i.e. to recommend a break] than to a more ideal formula [i.e. to insist on a break] without them.” They were so delighted at having FDR’s backing, that Welles and Caffery “really tied one on that night,” which left Welles with some difficulty functioning the next morning. Nevertheless, he was able to cable FDR his thanks assuring him that “We have achieved ... a result which is the safest for the interests of our own country.”³⁵ Hull felt humiliated and worn down and was, according to Adolf Berle, “nervously and spiritually torn to pieces”; he took to his bed for a week.³⁶ The breach between the two diplomats festered like a wound that refused to heal.

On Sunday, January 25, Dutra sent Vargas comments on the war materiel that Welles had said was being sent. It was not what they had requested and would be of little use (*pouco adianta*). He then went by the palace to give Vargas a letter and one from General Góes, both saying that the military had not been sufficiently heard regarding the consequences of breaking relations and that “Brazil is not prepared for war.” That night Aranha also sent a letter dealing with the American pressure on Brazil to break immediately and

Roosevelt's appeal to Vargas to do so. The president noted in his diary that "Oswaldo proposed ending the conference by declaring Brazil's relations with the Axis broken. I did not respond. I can't act precipitously. ... There is still the matter of Argentina's position, which will probably [cause it to become] a *foco* of reaction against the North Americans and a center of intrigues. I think that I am going to have an unpleasant night."³⁷

The next day, Aranha and Vargas had a long conversation about the international situation and the necessity of announcing the break with the Axis at the closing ceremony. Vargas, in a display of caution, called a cabinet meeting for that last day of the conference to make a final decision just before the closing at 5 p.m. He noted in his diary that "there are doubts about the attitude of the minister of war. Only there are no doubts that we are traversing a grave moment concerning the fate of Brazil." To head off an inopportune move by Dutra to resign before the cabinet meeting, Vargas had his son-in-law Amaral Peixoto arrange to have the war minister, Góes, and Aranha gather at his house. The two generals were feeling some resentment toward Aranha, and Vargas wanted to smooth things over before the cabinet met. They then went to the executive offices in the Catete Palace for the meeting at 3:30 p.m. (Fig. 4.3).

Vargas summarized the situation stressing the appeal that the American government had made, the advantages of responding and the disadvantages of any delay, and the consequences that could come from a negative attitude. He had each minister state his views. When it was Dutra's turn, he read a very long prepared statement that justified his hesitations by repeatedly emphasizing "our lack of military preparation for war." He also read a brief letter from Góes Monteiro saying that the armed forces were not adequately equipped "to defend our territory."³⁸ He blamed the Americans for not providing arms and feared that they would not do so but ended by expressing his "solidarity with me." Vargas praised the minister's "frankness and loyalty" and authorized Aranha to declare the rupture of relations at the closing session of the conference, asserting that he took the responsibility on his own shoulders. Concluding the foregoing in his diary, Vargas admitted feeling "a certain sadness" because "many of those who applaud this decision ... are adversaries of the regime that I founded, and I begin to doubt that I can consolidate it to pass the government tranquilly to my substitute."³⁹

Aranha's speech was full of allusions to Pan Americanism and how Brazil's solidarity with America was "historic and traditional." "The decisions of [all of] America always obligate Brazil and, even more, the aggres-

Fig. 4.3 Catete Palace President's Offices, where the cabinet met. In the second Vargas government in the 1950s, the president lived here. (Photo courtesy of the author)



sions against America.”⁴⁰ The passage of time had not just increased the self-confidence of Brazilians in themselves, but also their awareness of solidarity with their American brothers. “Today at 1800 hours, by order of the president of the republic, Brazil’s ambassadors in Berlin and Tokyo, and Chargé d’affaires in Rome communicated to those governments that in virtue of the recommendations [of this conference]... Brazil broke diplomatic and commercial relations...” “For the first time ... the structure of Pan-Americanism has been put to the test, a whole continent declares itself united for a common action, in defense of a common ideal, that is all of America. We fulfill our duty as Americans ... [and] assume the responsibilities that fulfill our universal destinies.”⁴¹

Getúlio listened to the conclusion of the conference on the radio and thought that the speeches were “well applauded” but in general were full of “the same wordy, obsolete, and phony liberal rhetoric.”⁴² At 8 p.m. Roosevelt cabled Vargas saying that the peoples of the Americas were in his debt for his clear-sighted leadership. “Continental solidarity ... has been greatly strengthened. [It was] a magnificent triumph over those who have endeavored to sow disunity among them That triumph has been sealed by the prompt and forthright decision of your Government and of the other American Governments Your personal friendship in these critical times is a source of constant inspiration to me.”⁴³

The next day Welles and Caffery had lunch with the president, when they talked frankly about the risks Brazil was running and the need for war materials and industrial products for its defense and security. Welles made the most formal promises that he would take care of that. He was very upset with Argentina and disposed to not only deny it any aid but to take economic and financial measures against it. Vargas kept a discrete silence to Welles’ threats. To add more drama to the day, when the Argentines’ plane took off from Santos Dumont airfield, it crashed into Guanabara Bay. Vargas observed that “happily everyone was saved.”⁴⁴

Welles returned to Washington with fresh lists of what the Brazilian military wanted. All the American Republics, save Argentina and Chile, followed the Rio conference’s recommendation to break relations with the Axis. Even so, tension and uncertainty continued between Rio de Janeiro and Washington.⁴⁵

While the diplomats had been meeting in Rio, American Colonels Lucius D. Clay and Robert C. Candee had surveyed the northeast to get a clearer idea of the region and in the process gained a sounder understanding of the complex Brazilian situation:

We left Washington with the impression that the War Department regarded Northeast Brazil as a highly strategic area where hostile military operations might develop at any moment and – where it was therefore imperative to have U.S. troops – air and ground – as soon as possible. We find in Rio much “solidarity,” Good Neighborliness, and a willingness to concede the importance of the defense of N.E. Brazil, but practically no inclination to do anything concrete in the matter. The Brazilians agree that the area should be defended and say that they will seek our air units, or even ground forces, when attack becomes imminent. In the meantime, they will gladly permit the conversion of commercial fields into military airports and the installation

of other facilities and improvements by us while they furnish the ground protection. The Ambassador agrees that we should have troops in NE Brazil but believes that these must be limited to air units for the present. Mr. Sumner Welles regards Brazilians as among our best friends but holds that the War Department has put a considerable strain on their friendship by blocking the delivery of certain military equipment which we have promised to furnish Brazil.⁴⁶

Returning from their journey, the colonels concluded that they could do no more until the two governments reached a broader understanding and returned to Washington with little to show for their efforts. The Joint Military Board could not do more, because the Brazilian members believed that the board's task was limited to "supervising a construction program that would not involve or imply participation of United States Army ground forces in the defense of the Brazilian bulge." Informally, the Brazilian chairman of the board advised Colonel Clay that joint defense was a dead issue until the two governments had a formal agreement setting out the responsibilities of each side.⁴⁷

Military Attaché Miller also recommended that the two governments reach an agreement "which will satisfactorily solve this question of participation of the armed forces in the defense of Northeast Brazil."⁴⁸ Miller was increasingly fearful about the Brazilian attitude regarding defense of the northeast. He had to make an effort not to show that he was losing his patience in conversations with officials, such as air chief Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes. In an exchange on January 28, Gomes insisted that "Brazilian forces must be allowed to provide the initial defense of Brazilian territory." They would call for American help only if they were unable to hold off an enemy attack. Miller lamented that "if the view of Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes prevails, our ground and air forces will arrive in Brazil too late for effective assistance, if they arrive at all." He had been forceful with Gomes, saying that with the break in relations, Brazil would eventually be in the war and "we will be Allies. ... I cannot understand why some of the Brazilian Military authorities are so opposed to permitting any American soldiers or aviators to come to Brazil to help defend your territory." Gomes replied, "It is because we wish to be the first to defend Brazilian territory. As long as we live we shall defend it and ask you to give us the necessary equipment." Miller: "Does that mean that you insist on defending alone Northeast Brazil when the attack comes and that only after discovering that you are unable to meet the attack alone you will call upon us

for help?" Gomes: "Yes, we wish to be the first to defend Brazil and if we find that we need help we will ask you for that assistance." Miller: "Then it will be too late. We are as far from Brazil as is Europe. Help cannot be sent in a few hours of time." Gomes: "All you need to do is to put in a few more landing fields between the United States and Brazil and that will permit help to be sent very quickly." Miller explained that "help consists of more than individual airplanes, and that ships cannot be held in waiting for the dispatch of the other means of assistance that are always necessary." Gomes said that he did not believe an attack against Brazil was imminent. Miller: "How do you know?" Gomes: "We will be glad to have you use your Navy, including Navy aviation to assist us at any time." Miller: "How many ships do we have in the South Atlantic at the present time? Our Navy does not yet have the means to act effectively both in the Atlantic and Pacific. The attack may come before you expect it. I lie awake nights worrying about the danger of an attack against Brazil, and I am not willing to assume the responsibility of military cooperation in the defense of Brazil under the conditions which now exist. It seems to me that you people are motivated either by distrust of the United States' intentions or by false pride." Gomes: "It isn't distrust of the United States. If it were we would not be willing to have your Navy operating from Northeast Brazil ports. Your navy could take Northeast Brazil if it desired." Miller opined that "Brazil should welcome the assistance of all possible Allies if she is really apprehensive of the danger confronting her." Gomes said that he thought that Northeast Brazil only needed the protection of three squadrons of pursuit planes against bombing raids and that "if the airplanes are furnished to the Brazilian Air Force it can provide the necessary personnel." A clearly frustrated Miller wrote to Ambassador Caffery that "All attempts at a favorable solution directly between the representatives of the armed forces have been of little avail." He concluded by urgently recommending that the two governments, by diplomatic channels, reach "some general agreement ... which will satisfactorily solve this question of participation of the armed forces in the defense of Northeast Brazil which is so vital for the defense of this hemisphere and the United States."⁴⁹

Miller's agitation to get American troops into Brazil deeply offended the great Brazilian ally of the United States, Oswaldo Aranha. Reportedly he was "sore as hell!" He was quoted as saying "That's always the way whenever you let the military do it. They have no understanding of the human factors that enter into any political situation." He remarked that "Brazil has graciously agreed to the construction of landing fields and

other military air preparations at Recife and Natal. However ... all this did not satisfy General Miller. He wants Brazil to agree to a further intensification of American military presence on Brazilian territory." Aranha fumed that this was something "he will resist even if he has to go and carry a gun himself." Dramatically, he threatened, "Much as I love the United States ... I would be the first to shoot an American soldier who dared to land on Brazilian territory against the wishes of this government."⁵⁰

The question of sending American military to Brazil hinged on Washington fulfilling the promises to supply arms and equipment made to Góes Monteiro during his visits to the states. The request to send marines to guard the new base at Natal was the "storm center" of a persistent clash of nationalisms. Miller's position, which they had to have the American army guarding Northeast Brazil, was based on distrust of the leaders of the Brazilian army. By early January 1942, Brazilian staff officers were thinking that they had made a mistake in the initial negotiations by going as far as they had, which had left them open for further demands. Letting the Americans send troops into Brazil would wound "national pride" and perhaps reveal that "even the President's unique grasp on the country would not be strong enough to withstand public indignation." Such a turn of events "would create an excellent opportunity for the Nazis and the *Integralistas* to exploit the situation, using as their motto the already existing slogan 'Brazil for the Brazilians.'" The Brazilian General Staff opined "that the arbitrary occupation of Brazilian soil by the United States land forces would have serious reaction in the other South American countries and would endanger the entire 'Good Neighbor' policy." General Góes Monteiro met with various generals to say that he was ready to step aside, if anyone of them was "willing to turn Natal over to the United States Marines." They all refused. Even General Ary Pires, assistant chief of staff, who was "an out-and-out anti-Nazi, has been particularly contrary to the United States Army demand."⁵¹ It was clear that while the Rio Conference had been successful, there was much to be done to pump life into the relationship of the two republics.

In early March alarming rumors were adding to the worries and frustrations. Supposedly Berlin had sent orders that the Vargas government should be overthrown. Who was to do that was unclear. Meanwhile Axis submarines had sunk four Brazilian ships and a fifth was several days overdue. Observers thought that the sinkings were meant to serve notice that if the other Latin American Republics followed Brazil's lead, they would receive similar punishment.⁵² Fifth column activities had grown bolder,

and intensified Axis propaganda was emphasizing the inability of the United States to provide military equipment or adequate shipping. There was a fantastic story that Japan had secretly organized a military force composed of Japanese immigrants in Brazil that was ready to attack São Paulo. Painting a dire picture of the situation in Brazil, the American army's intelligence chief, Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee, warned that the political stability of the Vargas regime depended to a large extent upon the support of the United States. "Without our strong support, the present government may fall."⁵³ Clearly fear was unsettling and spreading though both governments. The acting chief of the Latin American Section of US Army intelligence warned that there were an "excessive number" of Americans in Brazil "investigating or reporting or arranging for bases, factories, railroads, espionage, propaganda or motion pictures. There are too many Americans on official missions without knowledge of the language, custom, and character of the people."⁵⁴

Evidently General Miller had decided that there should be one less American on the scene. After returning from a trip to Washington at the end of the previous October, he told Góes Monteiro that he had tried to resign as attaché, but that Marshall had refused. He intended to keep seeking relief.⁵⁵ In the midst of the rumor-filled atmosphere after the Rio Conference, Marshall relented and ordered Miller back to Washington. Publicly it looked as if he was being relieved against his will. A defender wrote to General Marshall: "the only individuals ... in the Armed Forces of Brazil who have anything against General Miller are ultra-nationalists ... or well-known pro-totalitarian generals and high police officials as well as members of the Integralista movement" The writer, Paul Vanorden Shaw, had been born in Brazil to a missionary and academic family, had a PhD in political science from Columbia University, and taught at the Universidade de São Paulo (1934–1940). He followed developments in Brazilian foreign relations closely, and from his correspondence, it appears that he was quite knowledgeable. He observed that Americans who bucked "the appeasement policy of the State Department and of the American Embassy here in Rio" have been "pushed out." He asserted that "the policy which Washington has followed and is following with respect to Brazil is suicidal from the point of view of military cooperation which is the only thing that counts now." He noted that "General Miller speaks almost perfect Portuguese, a fact which is extremely rare among Americans who have lived here even a longer time than he.... His interpretation of Brazil is the only safe one on which to proceed at the moment

and that any other is dangerous if not suicidal.” Shaw was convinced that his departure was “a great loss,” and the circumstances surrounding his return were “symptomatic of an underlying situation which is fraught with grave dangers to the defense plans of the Americas....” He concluded affirming that Miller was “a symbol of a great Cause in real danger.”⁵⁶ There is no indication in the Army files that Marshall ever saw this letter. But it is useful as an indication of the great tension surrounding relations with Brazil at that time.

The difference between Brazilian and American attitudes can be ascribed to their relative proximity to the war itself. By the end of January 1942, Axis submarines in the North Atlantic had sunk 31 ships totaling nearly 200,000 tons. The great sea lanes along the coast of the United States had a constant procession of unarmed tankers carrying oil from Venezuela and Mexico that underpinned the war economy. If Germany had concentrated on submarine assaults, it could have potentially crippled the Allied war effort. The American Army Air Corps had no training in anti-submarine operations, and the Navy did not have the proper aircraft to carry them out. It looked as if the submarines were destroying the Allied supply lines. In February another 71 ships went to the bottom, showing, to Winston Churchill’s mind, that the Navy’s protection was “hopelessly inadequate.” Thankfully Hitler refused to accept the advice of his admirals that the Atlantic was crucial; instead he was fixated on defense of the North Atlantic, believing that “Norway is the zone of destiny in this war.”⁵⁷

In North Africa Rommel’s troops pushed the British back near Tobruk in Libya, while through January in the Philippines, MacArthur was isolated on Corregidor. To these discouraging losses was added the surrender of Singapore to the Japanese by British, Indian, and Australian forces on Sunday February 15. The Brazilians must have wondered about the wisdom of their decisions. Caffery commented that “our friends here are becoming increasingly critical of our side in the struggle: they criticize us for too much and too loud talking and for inefficiency in our efforts. I may add that a lot of them are becoming thoroughly frightened.”⁵⁸

Within days after the Rio Conference ended, Finance Minister Artur de Sousa Costa went to Washington to set the relationship on a more beneficial footing. His goal was to broaden the Lend-Lease agreement from military equipment to include construction costs of the Volta Redonda steel mill, rails, and rolling stock for the *Central do Brasil* rail line, financing for strategic materials production, and agreements for American pur-

chases. The delivery of arms and equipment was “very urgent,” Vargas emphasized, and would confirm “if it is worthwhile or not to be the friend of the United States.”⁵⁹ Getúlio’s concern at this point was shown by his minute attention to the details of the negotiations in the constant stream of communications with Sousa Costa. His telegrams listed the numbers of combat cars, artillery pieces, and munitions which he labeled as “urgent necessities.” He worried about the prices of coal and oil because Brazil was totally dependent on imports from the United States. The new Lend-Lease accord covered all purchases to the level of \$200 million. Of key importance for the future, the Volta Redonda steel mill was included in the Lend-Lease agreement. Along with the support for collection of natural rubber in the Amazon and for various industries, the United States committed itself to fund and to provide advice to Brazilian industry and to purchase its products. In effect, it was partnering in the economic development of Brazil.⁶⁰

In the midst of these negotiations, Vargas sent word about disquieting activities on the Argentine frontier. There were reports of police forces being substituted by Argentine army units apparently equipped for action, placement of new radio stations, the appearance on the Uruguay River of armed speed boats, and the hasty construction of roads and landing fields, with engineers making maps and building bridges and storage facilities in Posadas, Misiones. Disquieting too were reports of German agents disguised as Protestant missionaries in German colonies in Southern Brazil.⁶¹

WORRIES ABOUT ARGENTINA

Was Argentina preparing to attack? Such reports from the frontier were certainly disturbing, but it all looked different from Buenos Aires. The Brazilian Naval Attaché Augusto do Amaral Peixoto clarified the situation. The same kind of threatening rumor about a Brazilian buildup on the frontier was then current in Argentina. He attributed the coincidence of stories of military concentrations on both sides along their common border to those “most interested in a clash, the Nazis.” He went further saying that this was not a good time for Argentina to go to war. It was completely isolated, without supplies for a military campaign,

agitated internally by a policy that divided the nation in two big groups absorbed by economic problems, it was not believable that Argentine leaders could think of a struggle which in the ultimate analysis would be a war against

the continent! As extremely Nazi as the government pretends to be, it can do little more than stay neutral in the hope of a German victory so it can assume the classic attitude of stabbing us in the back.

He advised Ambassador José de Paula Rodrigues Alves that “our duty is to try, as much as possible, to unmask the Nazi intrigues, avoiding ‘misunderstandings’, but at the same time, staying alert as long as the present Executive Power is dragging the Argentine nation toward the sad situation of isolation on the South American continent. As for movements of the Argentine fleet, they are limited to an inefficient patrolling without an organized plan that seems aimed at satisfying public opinion.” He went on to say that the great majority of Argentines favored a policy of aiding the United States and that the Buenos Aires newspapers did not hide their displeasure with the “frank sympathies of the president for the Axis.” The government’s declaration of a “state of siege” silencing the press and ending the legislative session allowed it to resist the pressures produced by the Rio Conference.

President Castillo distorted the facts, Amaral Peixoto asserted, and made it appear as if he was defending national sovereignty by not “submitting to ‘North American impositions.’” He commented that FDR and Churchill had been cheered when they appeared in newsreels so that recently the censors were editing them out. He believed that Argentina’s neutral status would make Buenos Aires the center of Nazi espionage in South America. At the moment Argentines regarded Brazil’s attitude with admiration, but he feared that mood could evolve into “resentment and envy.” He warned that the “Fifth Column campaign, is not small, and enjoys, as we know, official support, [and] continues to develop its web of intrigues.”⁶² Brazilian alarm about Argentina continued as its military took control and allowed Colonel Juan Perón to rise to power.

AXIS SUBMARINE ATTACKS BROUGHT THE WAR TO BRAZIL

In the days after the Rio Conference, the Axis threats became very real as German submarines began sinking Brazilian ships. On February 16, the first victim was the *Buarque* out of Belém do Pará with a cargo of Amazonian products. In February and March 1942, submarine attacks sent three more Brazilian steamers to the bottom. On March 9, the last of these, the *Cairú*, which was camouflaged and without lights, was torpedoed at night without warning by a submarine later identified as U-94. In

the first two instances, the crews and passengers were allowed to disembark in lifeboats before their vessels were sunk. But the *Cairú* was taken by surprise, which would become the usual German practice.⁶³

Events unfolded rapidly, and on Saturday, February 28, Roosevelt, for the first time, “with great earnestness” asked Vargas to allow into Brazil about 1000 unarmed officers and soldiers to supervise the American aircraft that would be en route to Africa. Vargas had lunch at Dutra’s house with the minister and Góes and afterward that afternoon back at Catete Palace signed the decree legalizing the Air Base of Natal.⁶⁴ Thus, the Americans finally had the official approval, at least to conduct their ferrying operations through Brazil. It was also necessary to engage in some direct military diplomacy. Brigadier General Robert Olds, chief of the ferrying command, flew to Brazil to cultivate Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes, air commander of the northeast. He invited Gomes to the United States and promised 30 bombers and 30 fighters. Before his return to Brazil, Gomes inspected six B-25s and six P-40s at Bolling Field in Southeast Washington that were preparing to fly to Natal. In effect the way was clear to create the South Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command later in May (Fig. 4.4).⁶⁵

Washington confronted Brazilian anxiety about the lack of arms by signing a Lend-Lease agreement, on March 3, 1942, for the eventual delivery of \$200,000,000 worth of military equipment, which doubled the amount agreed to in 1941. At the same time, the army arranged to ship to Brazil before the year’s end 100 medium tanks, over 200 light tanks, 50 combat aircraft, and a large number of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. Washington hoped that this would alleviate Brazilian concerns.⁶⁶ Four days later, Vargas triumphantly informed Ambassador Caffery that he could tell FDR that he approved his request for “the coming of technicians to care for the aircraft en route to Africa.” Note that his use of *technicians* rather than soldiers was deliberate because the Brazilian Army still did not want to see American troops on Brazilian soil. The next day the German U-boat 155 sank the Brazilian-flagged SS *Arabutan* off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina.⁶⁷

Despite ever closer ties, officers of the two armies continued to be suspicious of each other’s motives. The new Lend-Lease agreement cleared some of the distrust. Shortly after Brazil decided to permit arrival of American “technicians,” Vargas agreed to “a wide-reaching program for Northeast Brazil” that involved sending 800 more maintenance personnel, new construction, and, most importantly, unrestricted flight privileges for army aircraft. The Brazilian chiefs of staff and Foreign Minister Aranha




Fig. 4.4 The Springboard to Victory: Miami to Natal to Africa and points east. (Source: Charles Hendricks, "Building the Atlantic Bases" in Barry W. Fowle, ed. *Builders and Fighters: U.S. Army Engineers in World War II* (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Office of History, US Army Corps of Engineers, 1992), p. 36)

drafted a defense agreement to be proposed to Washington.⁶⁸ While this was a positive development, Aranha was so bothered by the questionable activities of the federal district's (Rio) chief of police, Army Captain Filinto Müller, a notorious pro-German, that he was again threatening to resign.⁶⁹ Throughout February and March, Rio was alive with rumors of conspiracies. It was in this tense ambience that Vargas received word that the Brazilian steamer *Cairú* had been torpedoed. He immediately closed down all shipping to the United States until Brazilian vessels could be armed and protected by convoys. He directed Ambassador Carlos Martins, "in my name" to ask the American government to guarantee the safety of "our merchant ships traveling between Brazil and the USA." It was necessary, he thought, that steamers be immediately convoyed and armed with artillery and provided with armed guards by the Americans. He wanted the ambassador to keep him meticulously informed about the government's response.⁷⁰

The embargo kept in port cargoes that were vital to the American war effort while depriving Brazil of American petroleum and coal. The problem was resolved in a most unorthodox manner by a private agreement between Vargas and Admiral Jonas Ingram, commander of US naval operations in the South Atlantic. In return for Ingram's promise to assume responsibility for the protection of Brazilian shipping, the president agreed to lift the embargo. Calling Ingram his "Sea Lord," he asked him to be his secret naval adviser. Vargas went even further by opening Brazil's ports, repair facilities, and airfields to the American navy and ordered Brazilian naval and air forces to operate according to Ingram's advice. For his part, Ingram promised to hasten delivery of naval equipment and to train Brazilian personnel.⁷¹ The US Navy did not evoke the concerns about sovereignty that the American army did, and, thanks to Ingram, it now had direct access to Vargas. Ingram's experience with Latin Americans dated from his participation in the 1914 capture of Vera Cruz for which he had received the Congressional Medal of Honor.⁷²

In early April 1942, Minister Aranha told Ambassador Caffery that after the recent Japanese successes in the Pacific, some younger Brazilian army officers were talking against the policy of close military relations with the Americans. Specifically, a dozen army captains recently had engaged in "ugly talk about our alleged intentions of occupying the Natal Region."⁷³ Such reports were worrisomely plentiful.

Vargas had been unsuccessful in convincing General Miller of the sincerity of his two top generals. Miller had so irritated General Góes that Vargas had little choice but to request his replacement. As mentioned above, Miller had grown so disenchanted that he too had asked to be relieved. Returning to Washington, Miller served on the general staff's Operation Plans Division for a few months, where his years of experience with Brazilians gave him credibility. When Góes wrote to Marshall on April 22, 1942, the chief of staff's aide requested that Miller comment on the letter. Indeed, he wrote a brutally frank analysis saying that he had known Góes for eight years and that he "cannot be trusted by us." He said that Góes was "only pretending a sincere desire to cooperate with the United States, because Brazil at the present time, is almost entirely dependent economically upon the United States, and because General Góes still hopes to get as much equipment as possible from us for his army."⁷⁴

Another general staff officer and former air attaché in Brazil, Thomas White, commented that *if* Góes's letter was "sincere," it was "based on a great lack of understanding of [the] problems at stake." White did not know if

General Góes is himself is pro-Axis. He is surrounded by pro-Axis officers and is controlled by the ruling military clique. He reflects the opinion of one of the most selfish classes in the world – the Brazilian armed forces. He does not reflect the opinion of the average Brazilian who is wholeheartedly in support of the United States and is willing to do what is needed.... Unquestionably, even if given material the armed forces of Brazil would not use it effectively. This is particularly true of aviation material. Brazil could do a great deal now without further equipment. Pro-Axis or anti-American elements still hold many key positions in both Army and Air Force. The Chief of Police (Filinto Müller) is an excellent example.⁷⁵

These American officers had little patience for the apparently cautious ways of the Brazilian authorities in dealing with Axis espionage and sympathizers. General Miller was bothered, perhaps puzzled, by Góes's view that "Brazil's possibilities are limited and of small account in the present war." Miller believed that Brazil "could be of considerable account, if Brazilian army leaders desired." Deeply troubled, Miller asked whether the war material that was to be provided would be "used for or against us by an army under General Góes?"⁷⁶

Such suspicion and distrust was slow to dissipate, and the atmosphere of frustration continued on both sides. In Washington the mix of irritation and fear produced some fanciful talk of forming a secret "jungle" force made up of Portuguese-speaking "American woodsmen" to take control of Northeast Brazil. Apparently to quash such ideas, the then assistant chief of staff, Major General Dwight Eisenhower, wrote to Sumner Welles saying that "every practical step is being taken to safeguard our interests. The policy has been established that all security and defensive measures affecting Brazilian territory must be taken in harmony with the Brazilian government. Any clandestine approach involving so many people would soon be detected and would be fatal to our objectives in this important area."⁷⁷

ARMY DISSATISFACTION WITH AMBASSADOR CAFFERY

At the same time, the American army general staff was frustrated with Ambassador Caffery, who is accused of being uncooperative, particularly in intelligence matters. Caffery held to the tradition that the ambassador was in charge of all United States affairs in Brazil and that all embassy personnel, including the military attachés, were subordinate to him. The

FBI was running a counter-espionage operation in Brazil that was reporting to the ambassador and not sharing information with the military attaché. Caffery had been unhappy with the former attachés, Colonel Edwin L. Sibert and General Miller, because he regarded them as “exceedingly uncooperative and had done nothing but spoil relations between himself and the Brazilian Government.” Caffery opposed a War Department proposal to establish a “U.S. Military Observation System throughout Brazil.”⁷⁸

Army officials had been complaining about Caffery since at least November 1941. One of Marshall’s staff thought that the situation was “dangerous” and that there should be “a show down understanding with the State Dept. otherwise further rapid decline in our Military Intelligence in all Brazil will occur and doubtless [in] our whole relations in this critical area.” He noted at the bottom of a handwritten letter that [Colonel Henry A.] “Barton and I feel that the situation requires the Chief’s direct intervention soon.”⁷⁹

General Miller, who was no fan of Caffery, wrote to Marshall that “the best solution for our present unsatisfactory military problem in Brazil would be the replacement of the American Ambassador there. As a wartime ambassador, Mr. Caffery is a failure.” However, admitting that such a solution was “impracticable of accomplishment at the present moment,” he recommended that a well-qualified general officer be made “coordinator of all United States military, air, and naval (land) activities in north and northeast Brazil.” He recognized that Caffery, the State Department, and the Brazilian government would have to give their consent. Perhaps accepting that Caffery had too much support from both presidents to be further contested, Miller admitted that “it is a mistake to expect, however, that any officer could perform these duties entirely independently of our ambassador in Brazil.” He recommended that “the problem of collection of military information in Brazil be discussed by our G-2 Division [intelligence] with the State Department in an attempt to obtain a satisfactory solution.”⁸⁰

Miller likely had crossed one of Marshall’s invisible lines. The chief kept a black book in which he recorded positive and negative comments on the many officers he met over the years. He was responsible for Miller’s assignment to Rio and for his brigadier star. It is not clear what caused Miller’s next assignment away from the general staff, but a good guess is that his negative attitude regarding Góes Monteiro and Ambassador Caffery did not get high marks in Marshall’s black book. On July 2, 1942, Miller took

command of the army's Engineer Replacement Training Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.⁸¹ He had ranked ninth in his West Point class of 1915. While his classmates, such as Eisenhower and Bradley, took on considerably more prestigious assignments, Miller was relegated to training missions. The need for engineer officers and men was extremely critical, but the Belvoir assignment was the start of a downward trend. After a year and a half at Belvoir, he was sent to command Camp Sutton, North Carolina, where he oversaw training of engineers and POWs from Rommel's African Corps; then in November 1944, he was deputy commander of Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, a major basic training facility, where the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions had been organized, and at war's end he was attached to the office of the chief of engineers. It was a sad fall from grace.⁸²

The State Department position, as expressed by Under Secretary Welles, was that Caffery was "a singularly successful ambassador." Welles passed along to FDR Vargas's comment that he had complete confidence in Caffery and that "the United States had never had an ambassador in Brazil who had shown greater tact or more knowledge of how to deal with Brazilian officials and with the Brazilian people." Vargas added his praise in a letter to Roosevelt saying "this illustrious diplomat practices diplomacy as it ought to be practiced: with the sole preoccupation of uniting, deepening, increasing the friendship of the people in whose midst he lives for the people whose government he represents."⁸³ The foregoing controversies highlight that armies and governments are never wholly cohesive or without guile and that disagreements and clashes of viewpoints are part of any policy-making process, particularly in wartime.

LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN BRAZILIAN ARMS

The tensions and fears of the spring of 1942 have today [2018] largely receded from collective memory. But, in April and May 1942, the harsh reality, according to US Army analysts, was that

Germany and Italy have conducted extensive counter blockade measures by surface raiders, submarines and aviation. The surprise attack of the Japanese and their early successes, have to a certain extent nullified the superior American fleet. If the French surrender their fleet or if England should fall and the British fleet should be eliminated, the situation would become grave. The Axis would secure the means for aggressive action to the west, particularly against South America, in a movement by water.⁸⁴

American Army planners did not believe that the Brazilian or other Latin American armies could hold off an Axis attack, because those armies were “neither organized, trained nor equipped to meet first-class troops in battle.” They firmly believed that only United States troops were “capable of defending the Western Hemisphere....” They admitted that the ability of the Axis to launch such feared operations beyond Eurasia and Africa would depend upon their construction of a merchant marine and navy. However, if their nightmare of an Axis advance into West Africa occurred, they were convinced that “control of the Natal area would become vital to the U.S. if it is to remain a first-class power.”⁸⁵

The Brazilian attitude at that point was captured by Admiral Jonas H. Ingram, commanding US naval forces in the South Atlantic from his base in Recife, when he wrote that “They are afraid of our army. They are definitely not ready to receive a U.S. Army garrison.” He concluded his report by emphasizing

that Brazil is now the greatest Latin Nation in the World, with unlimited resources and that the future of this great country, in a measure, lies with us. [He urged that] it is the personal touch down here that will attain results.... For the United States to reap the benefits of her [Brazil's] expansion and development, a staunch friendship, based on mutual confidence, must be cultivated and maintained.... It's a great mistake to try and sell the United States in South America. More progress will be made by cultivating friendship and developing mutual respect and confidence.

And he cautioned that the Brazilians' “inferiority complex” should not be “spot-lighted.” He also pointed out that their attitude toward Britain had nothing to do with dislike of democracy but was caused by “the arrogant attitude of British officials toward Brazil and the stoppage of war materials purchased from Germany.”⁸⁶ It is noteworthy that Ingram's approach had been successful in securing the trust of the Brazilian government for the US Navy, while the army's style had produced a stalemate. Washington's confidence in the stability of the Brazilian situation was not improved by reported whisperings in Rio de Janeiro that new German victories on the Russian front might lead the army to overthrow Vargas and set up a military government.⁸⁷

POLITICAL-MILITARY ACCORD, MAY 1942

After his conversations with Sumner Welles during the Rio Conference, Vargas had sent his finance minister Sousa Costa to Washington to give substance to the American promises. He had found that there was a lot of goodwill, but the Americans were struggling to arm the British and Russians, as well as their own expanding forces, and had little to give at the moment. Indeed, four anti-aircraft guns that were shipped south had been taken from the defenses of New York City. As mentioned above, the Lend-Lease funding for Brazil had been doubled, and the US Army pledged to provide by the end of the year medium tanks and light tanks, combat planes, as well as numerous anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery. The demand for ammunition, supplies, and aircraft from the fighting fronts required steadily more air traffic via Natal. Brigadier General Robert Olds, commander of the ferrying operations, told Roosevelt that he needed some 750 additional men for the bases at Belém, Natal, and Recife, plus housing for them, more gasoline storage, and, most importantly, blanket clearance for flights through Brazil. Secretary of War Stimson asked FDR to send a personal request to Vargas, commenting: "I cannot tell you how important I think this Natal danger is. With the redoubled necessity of planes in Burma and China; with the French fleet moving in the Mediterranean; with subs in the Caribbean, we can't allow Brazil, who is not at war, to hold up our life line across Africa." Welles pressed Ambassador Caffery to impress on President Vargas that "we must cooperate, one with another, to the fullest extent possible in order to attain the defeat of the totalitarian nations. It has not been easy to convince our Army that tanks should be taken from our own troops which are still insufficiently supplied to send to Brazil." He noted that Roosevelt had decided to increase the arms going to Brazil "because of considerations broader than the purely military which demand today the closest working relationship between the two Governments."

After representatives of the two countries signed the new Lend-Lease agreement on March 3, Vargas readily agreed to unrestricted flights and to the other American requests. Meanwhile, in Rio de Janeiro, Góes Monteiro brushed off the draft of an agreement on joint operations that he had brought back from his 1939 trip to the United States and an agreement from October 1941 on the northeast and met with the naval and air chiefs of staff to formulate a proposal for a broad joint political-military accord.

Foreign Minister Aranha handed the draft proposal to Caffery who forwarded it to the State Department. The objective was to have agreement on how to “regulate their cooperation in military and economic matters for common defense.” It consisted of 22 articles covering details of the new relationship. The first article called for the creation of two mixed commissions in Washington and Rio de Janeiro “to execute the agreement and to make recommendations to their governments.” The second importantly specified that Brazilian troops would be used on Brazilian territory, while the third said that US forces would be requested if there was “an attack on Brazil or imminent threat” of such an attack. If that threat came from the Axis, article 15 required that the Americans “immediately assist” Brazil. Overall the provisions indicated a shift in Brazilian strategic thinking because the north, northeast, and Rio de Janeiro were to be considered zones of “prime importance,” and Brazilian forces were to be concentrated in those zones. The Brazilians committed to the intensification and expansion of agriculture, manufacturing, and mining to furnish the United States with raw materials, but the United States would provide technical and financial assistance in organizing production. A bit of caution appeared in article nine that limited American garrisoning of air and naval bases “only at request of Brazil as reinforcements and under Brazilian Military authorities.” Upon request Brazil would permit stationing of “technicians and experts” to assist US forces in transit or engaging in operations. Other articles dealt with army and naval command arrangements and allowed the United States to build installations and to organize services for its personnel; also they dealt with convoy arrangements and pilot training and required the United States to “immediately facilitate” shipment of war material “already requested and other materials needed to expand its forces and develop military industries and improve transportation.” Finally, in an obvious nod to long-standing suspicions of Argentina, article 16 specified that “in case of other aggression vs. Brazil, the U.S. would guarantee sea lanes and aerial supremacy and would supply war material for land forces in new theaters of operations.”

Beyond these negotiations, throughout Brazil the next days were marked by an awkward nervous tension. According to British sources, there were food shortages in the Amazonian state of Pará, which were locally blamed on laborers being sent into the jungle to collect rubber.⁸⁸ The apparent indifference of authorities to the sudden increase in the cost of living aggravated the chronic sense of grievance in the Amazonian states against the Rio government. Integralistas exploited the local resentment

and stirred up grumbling among soldiers in the army garrison in Pará. Rumors were rife of an Axis attack and of a responding US occupation. The handful of US Marines and air transport staff were inadequate to protect the Belém airfield and fuel tanks. Islands at the mouth of the Amazon provided good hiding places for Axis submarines and raiders and were then “very inadequately patrolled.” The Brazilians lacked enough planes to carry on effective patrolling. From further south at Salvador da Bahia, the British consul reported that the situation was “peculiar.” He said that public opinion was pro-ally, but that the attitude of the authorities “was generally held to be sympathetic to enemy. The reason probably is that their first motive is their personal advantage.” Summarizing the reports of other consuls, the British Ambassador opined: “There was generally much evidence to show that men in important positions were under persuasion of enemy propaganda and were doubtful of chances of allied victory. German propaganda had been so thorough in the past in civil and military departments that officials were careful not to cause annoyance in certain circles so as to be able to readjust their positions rapidly with each turn of the tide.”

In the week after Caffery telegraphed the draft proposal to Washington, Aranha several times asked if he had received any reply. The War and Navy Departments had been urgently studying the Brazilian proposal. On March 20 Welles received their written assessments and had a meeting in his office with Army, Navy, and State officials. The Army offered an article-by-article critique, with which the Navy concurred, while offering only its own general comments. The Army staff thought that articles 3 and 15 conflicted; in the event of an attack, should the United States act or wait for a Brazilian request for aid? How much control the Brazilians would have appeared to be an underlying question. The articles regarding convoys were already covered by the Navy's agreement with Brazil. The assistant chief of staff of the Army, Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, thought that they should “strike while the iron is hot, even though the advantages to be gained for the present may be more political than military.” He thought that negotiating via written exchanges would likely cause difficulties and delays and so suggested a conference in Rio to facilitate matters.

The Navy thought that Brazil was asking a great deal and offering very little. “There was no acceptance of our forces in Brazil and the U.S. was asked among other things to guarantee lines of communication and aerial supremacy, even in an inter-continental campaign. Most important, the

U.S. was asked to furnish [the] war material then requested and all necessary to development of war industries and transportation in probable zones of operations.” This included supporting a possible campaign against neighboring Argentina. The Navy recommended that agreements for military and naval collaboration should be approached in three stages:

1. Discuss the proposed political-military agreement.
2. Elaborate a Brazilian-American combined basic war plan.
3. Develop military cooperation to make the plan effective.

The agreement should contain definite political commitments to guide the combined military commissions in their formulation of war plans. The commitments should not deal with the details of military operations, but should make definite and specific political agreements. Welles thought that Aranha and Caffery should guide the discussions in Rio. Two Army officers would be sent to Rio, while the chief of the naval mission could represent the Navy. He said that once the bases of cooperation were agreed upon, the “ultimate objective was the creation of a Brazilian-American military, naval and air commission to sit in Brazil to implement the agreement and for the functioning in Washington of a joint staff, similar to that then functioning between the United States and Great Britain.” The “satisfactory conclusion” of the discussions in Rio was, he said, “of basic importance.” The Navy and War Departments thought that because the agreements were to be “political-military,” the foreign minister and ambassador should conduct the negotiations with the officers acting as advisers. They thought that the officers should not discuss policies but only military matters. The chief of naval operations had sent Welles a letter to that effect. Welles thought it was a question of emphasis and that the ambassador and American officers should have sufficient latitude to decide how far the agreements would go on the purely technical side.

The Army sent Colonel Robert L. Walsh, chief of the air intelligence staff, and Colonel Henry A. Barber Jr., Ridgway’s successor as Marshall’s principal Latin American planner, to Rio de Janeiro. They were both West Point graduates and veterans of the First World War; Walsh had served on the Mexican border and been air attaché in Paris and Madrid, while Barber had been military attaché in Havana for two years before moving to the general staff. Their experiences with Latin cultures would be useful. Their instructions emphasized that the “primary result” of the discussions should be the creation of Joint Defense Commissions in Washington and

Rio for the purpose of preparing staff plans for the joint defense of Northeast Brazil. They were cautioned that final agreement should not in any way "jeopardize the operations and functions of present Air Corps ferrying activities" and, notably, the discussions "should not involve the question of the stationing at present of large forces of American troops in Northeast Brazil." This was a major change in the Army policy aimed at getting American forces into Brazil and shows that all along its intent had been defensive and not nefarious as some Brazilians feared.

At a meeting on April 15 of Aranha, Caffery, and the Brazilian chiefs of staff, the latter agreed to accept, with only minor word changes, much to the surprise of the Americans, the text that the two colonels had brought from Washington. Colonel Barber confessed that he had been "entranced" when the Brazilian side accepted the draft. He had expected that the Brazilians would want to insure that they would command American troops in the northeast. His equanimity did not last.

Five days later, to the discomfort of the American side, the Navy Department telegraphed that they should not conclude negotiations until "specific understandings" were reached concerning several articles. They had been getting ready to sign, and Ambassador Caffery responded that to reopen discussions would have "a disastrous (repeat disastrous) effect" on the Brazilian government. Colonel Barber was puzzled; he told Caffery that the whole thing had been thrashed out before they left and that the Navy had agreed completely with the draft. Aranha expected that they would sign the agreement that very day at noon. Caffery was at a loss as to how he could explain things to Aranha. He was afraid that if he conveyed the Navy's objections officially, Aranha would not go ahead with any defense agreements. He thought that the Brazilians might agree orally to the Navy's changes, but if asked to alter the written agreement, they would accuse the Americans of having negotiated in "bad faith." At several points during the negotiations, the Brazilians had wanted the Americans to be more specific. Caffery had remarked that "all this depends on mutual good faith doesn't it?" And Aranha had replied "yes," and they had not insisted. He asserted that the Brazilians understood the overall situation and interpreted the various articles in the same way as the Navy and would not like rehashing them. Welles broke the stalemate by convincing the Navy that it was unnecessary to change wording because the Brazilians understood the matter in the same way as the Navy. What had happened was that the naval staff had used the "wrong draft" of the agreement to make its analysis. It seems almost comical, but it was very serious for those involved.

Caffery had several uncomfortable days, “resorting to expedients day by day,” avoiding Aranha so that he would not have to explain why the signing was being postponed. Aranha was puzzled as to why the Americans were delaying. Finally on May 4, Caffery summoned the courage to explain what had happened and assured the foreign minister that the Navy had dropped its objections. Even so getting the agreement signed was slow. Secretary Hull prodded Caffery to get moving with the message that the War and Navy Departments were anxious to get the two commissions set up and so “urgently desired” the signing to take place. Signatures were finally set down on May 27, and attention turned to organizing the two commissions.

THEN THE UNEXPECTED HAPPENED

Of course very likely the major reason for the delay in signing the document was that on May 1, Vargas suffered a serious automobile accident that left him with a fractured leg, dislocated hip, an injured hand, and a broken jaw. Confined to bed and unable to speak, his condition sparked a political crisis. Government business that required his attention halted. Pro-Axis agitators whispered that he could no longer govern the country. If his government collapsed, it would undo much that had been accomplished.⁸⁹ The defense agreement with the United States had been signed, but the Brazilian army was seemingly doing little to fulfill its commitments. In many ways Vargas was the government. Sadly for historians, after the accident he gave up keeping the diary that he had maintained since 1930.⁹⁰ He did not leave his official residence in Guanabara Palace again until September 1. After the accident the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS) surmised that Vargas was “no longer useful even to gamble with. The only thing that counts today is the Army, the majority of which has democratic sympathies.” The OSS assessment warned that there existed “a strong minority, profoundly Nazi and Fascist, which can from one moment to the next change the course of events” but that it was “difficult to localize this minority” because its members officially spoke in favor of the United States while secretly being “very fond of Hitler and Mussolini....” It was frustrating that “the ‘Fifth Column’ presently is working to convince the people of Brazil that an alliance with the United States has only hurt Brazil.”⁹¹

NOTES

1. Critic Carleton Beals advocated recalling military missions and cease selling arms to Latin American governments that were often unpopular arguing that “we are not supporting the forces of democracy and freedom.... We are merely playing a conventional game of power politics on the southern continent.” Carleton Beals, *The Coming Struggle for Latin America* (New York: Halcyon House, 1938), pp. 299–316.
2. The complexity of American and Latin American attitudes was carefully analyzed in Fredrick B. Pike, *FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995) see especially pp. 164–176. Quotation is from p. 174.
3. Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 452 entry for January 16. He wrote: “não o fez espontaneamente. Foram coagidos pela pressão americana.”
4. William F. Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), p. 114.
5. Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808–2002* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 179–180; Graeme Stewart Mount, *Chile and the Nazis: From Hitler to Pinochet* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2002), pp. 63–70. In June 2017, I saw army honor guard units wearing such helmets during ceremonies at the La Moneda Palace in Santiago.
6. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos; Conflito e Integração na América do Sul (Da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul) 1870–2001* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 2003), pp. 204–211. Vargas consistently opposed violent American policies against Argentina. As a man of the frontier he well understood that the two countries would be neighbors forever.
7. Ronald C. Newton, *The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931–1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 215–217. The “Golden Market” quotation is on 215–216.
8. Frederick M. Nunn, *Yesterday’s Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890–1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 122–131.
9. Max Paul Friedlman, *Nazis & Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against Germans of Latin America in World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 27. Joseph S. Tulchin observed that “The central objective of Argentine policy was to avoid domination by the United States.” See his *Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), p. 83. The Argentines also attempted to get arms from the United States to keep a balance with the Brazilians. Importantly, Tulchin commented that there was “evidence

- that Argentine leaders often made their wishes the basis for foreign policy” (p. 83).
10. Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1943), pp. 187–190. The title of the speech was “O Brasil em paz perante a guerra.” In Simmons, Rio, January 2, 1942, #6172, 832.00/1454, the embassy reported that the speech received “unusually favorable editorial comment in the Rio de Janeiro press.”
 11. Benjamin Welles, *Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 315.
 12. Vargas, *Diário*, Vol. II, 1937–1942, p. 450. He noted that he worked with three aides to prepare the speech.
 13. See his son Benjamin’s biography, particularly Chap. 13 “Growing Links with FDR,” pp. 134–143. The friendship between the Roosevelts and Welles families dated from well before Sumner’s birth. As a child he was a ring bearer in Franklin and Eleanor’s wedding. And Sumner studied at FDR’s schools: Groton and Harvard. The president had considerable confidence in Sumner. For a detailed biographical sketch, see *Pathfinder*, Washington, January 24, 1942, p. 16.
 14. The foregoing is from the very detailed telegram that Welles sent to President Roosevelt; Welles to FDR (via the State Department), Rio de Janeiro, January 18, 1942, 740.0011 European War 1939/18611: Telegram as in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942*, Vol. V, pp. 633–636. Aranha told Caffery about the meeting saying that Vargas had said that he was for complete cooperation with the United States; Caffery, Rio, January 2, 1942, 740.0011 European War 1939/18402, Telegram 115, RG 59, NA. Both Welles and Caffery referred to this as a cabinet meeting, but Vargas said it was the National Security Council, Vargas, *Diário*, II, p. 450.
 15. Roosevelt to G. Vargas, Washington, January 7, 1942, FDR, Papers as President, Official File 11 Brazil, 1942–1943, FDRL. Welles delivered this letter personally on January 12.
 16. Vargas, *Diário*, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 451. Vargas wrote: “...fico apreensivo. Parece-me que os americanos querem nos arrastar á guerra, sem que isso seja de utilidade, nem para nós, nem para eles.”
 17. Vargas, *Diário*, 1937–1942, Vol. II, pp. 451–452 entry for January 14.
 18. *Ibid*, *Diário*, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 451 entry for January 13. Getúlio’s brother Benjamin brought word from Police Chief Müller that Góes was going to ask to be relieved as chief of staff, and Dutra sent a letter of resignation. Apparently Góes was acting in solidarity with General Álvaro Mariante, under whom he had served in the attempt to suppress the lieutenants’ revolts of the 1920s. Getúlio told his brother to return Dutra’s letter, and the general said he would talk with Góes. Years later, Góes

- explained that he opposed breaking relations simply because Brazil was not yet militarily prepared. See Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe ...* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Coelho Branco, 1956) 3rd Edition, pp. 378–379.
19. Welles to FDR (via the State Department), Rio de Janeiro, January 18, 1942, *FRUS, 1942*, V, p. 634.
 20. Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions that Shaped History* (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 100.
 21. Welles to FDR (via the State Department), Rio de Janeiro, January 18, 1942, *FRUS, 1942*, V, pp. 634–635. This conversation took place on Saturday, January 17, at an exposition in Petrópolis, the so-called summer capital in the mountains.
 22. Quoted in Benjamin Welles, *Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), p. 315.
 23. Curiously they both said that the other had requested the private meeting.
 24. Caffery, Rio, January 3, 1942, 710.Consultation (3)/192, RG59, NARA.
 25. Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 453. Unfortunately Vargas did not explain Guñazú's idea.
 26. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, pp. 451–452 (January 12, 13, 15, 1942). He met with Welles on the 12th, Aranha on the 13th, and Dutra and Góes on the 15th.
 27. Welles to FDR (via the State Department), Rio de Janeiro, January 18, 1942, *FRUS, 1942*, V, p. 635. The importance of this cable was indicated by Welles marking it as “triple priority”; see B. Welles, *Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist*, p. 318.
 28. B. Welles, *Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist*, p. 318. General Marshall's view of Brazil as dubious does not appear in the January 18 telegram as printed in *FRUS*. Benjamin Welles cites a copy that is in the Sumner Welles Papers; see note 21, p. 412. The collection is in FDRL at Hyde Park, NY.
 29. Roosevelt to Welles, Washington, January 19, 1942, 832.24/634, *FRUS, 1942*, V, p. 636.
 30. *Ibid*, pp. 453–454 (January 19, 1942). This conversation took place at Vargas's favorite spot to relax and think—the pavilion on top of Morro Mundo Novo behind the presidential residence, Guanabara Palace.
 31. *Ibid*, p. 454 (January 19, 1942). For more on the conference and the Argentine and Chilean positions, see Michael J. Francis, “The United States at Rio, 1942: The Strains of Pan-Americanism,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (May, 1974), pp. 77–95.
 32. B. Welles, *Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist*, p. 318.

33. William F. Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), p. 115.
34. For a discussion of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border conflict, see Lawrence A. Clayton, *Peru and the United States: the Condor and the Eagle* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), pp. 149–150.
35. B. Welles, *Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist.*, pp. 320–321.
36. Christopher D. Sullivan, Sumner Welles, *Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937–1943* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2008), pp. 63–64.
37. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, pp. 455–456 (entries for January 21, 22, 25, 1942).
38. His language was complicated, discursive, complaining, and tedious, repeating in many ways that “we are not prepared.” Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), pp. 481–491. The Góes Monteiro letter is on p. 486.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 457 (entry for January 27, 1942).
40. Aranha meant “America” as the whole collective of the American Republics, not the United States, as its citizens usually use it. Caffery described the scene in his dispatch Rio, January 28, 1942, Telegram 270, 740.0011 European War 1939/19015, RG 59, NARA.
41. Eugênio Vargas Garcia (Editor), *Diplomacia Brasileira e Política Externa: Documentos Históricos, 1493–2008* (Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto Editora, 2008), pp. 440–443. For the text of the cables sent to the Brazilian embassies, see pp. 444–445.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 458 (entry for January 28, 1942). “Os discursos tiveram, no geral, o mesmo da retórica liberalóide, obsoleta e palavrosa.”
43. FDR’s message was in Hull to American delegation, Washington, January 28, 1942, Telegram 98, 740.0011 European War 1939/500, RG 59, NARA.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 458 (Entry for January 29, 1942).
45. For what was happening beyond public view, see McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, 250–258. Dutra repeatedly warned that the armed forces were unprepared for war. See Dutra to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, January 24, 1942, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC. For photos of the conference and documents, see <http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/AEraVargasI/anos37-45/AGuerraNoBrasil/ReuniaoChanceleres>.
46. Report, Military Attaché to Ambassador Caffery, Rio, January 30, 1942, War Plans Division, 4424-204, MMB, RG165, NARA.
47. Memo, Col Clay for WPD, February 24, 1942, GHQ 381, MMB, RG 165, NARA.

48. Report, MA Rio to American Ambassador, Rio, January 30, 1942, WPD 4424-204, RG 165, NARA.
49. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Lehman W. Miller (Military Attaché) to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Rio, January 29, 1942, "Report of a conversation with Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes held on January 28, 1940...." Office of Strategic Services, RG 228, NARA.
50. The source was Harold J. T. Horan of *Time*, *Life*, *Fortune* in Buenos Aires, who had just returned there from the Rio Conference. Sent by Lang, Buenos Aires, February 12, 1942, Brazil 5900, G-2 Regional, RG 165, NARA.
51. Unsigned, "Transmitted by the FBI," Memorandum, "Political Situation in Brazil," January 7, 1942, G-2 Regional Files, Brazil 5900-5935, RG 165, NARA.
52. On the submarine attacks after the break in relations, see Paulo de Q. Duarte, *Dias de Guerra no Atlântico Sul* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército – Editora, 1968), pp. 85–108.
53. Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee (Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2), Washington, March 12, 1942, "Situation in Brasil," 381 Brazil (8-28-42), Modern Military Branch, NARA. He noted that the Brazilians believed they had things in hand, but "qualified United States military authorities" thought that "Brazilians must have, without delay, strong United States support...."
54. Col. E.M. Benitez [Enrique Manuel Benitez], Washington, March 14, 1942, Memo for Col. [Henry A.] Barber, WPD, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 "Highlights of Dean Ackerman's Report." The report referred to was entitled "Volcanoes on our Southern Flank," OPD 381 Brazil (3-14-42), MMB, RG 165, NARA.
55. *Ofício secreto* de Góes Monteiro a Eurico Gaspar Dutra, Rio, 30/10/1941, CPDOC- FGV "relatando palestra com o Gal. Lehman Miller versando sobre suspeitas de War Department em relação à colaboração brasileira, proteção militar para o Nordeste, fornecimento de material para o Brasil e intenção de Miller de demitir-se das funções que exerce no Brasil" (underline added).
56. Paul Vanorden Shaw to General George Marshall, Rio, March 4, 1942, OPD 381, Brazil (3-12-42), RG 165(Records of War Department General and Special Staffs), MMB, NARA. There are several letters in CPDOC files that the Brazilian government censor intercepted, copied, and sent to Vargas's office, so Shaw was important enough to attract the censor's attention. For example, see Paul V. Shaw to A. Kayston, Rio, 16/06/1941 GV Confidential, 1941.06.16/3, CPDOC, FGV, Rio.

57. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 109–112. Hitler and Norway reference is on p. 112.
58. Jefferson Caffery, Rio, February 14, 1942, No 6528, “Brazilian Opinion Regard to the War,” Brazil 5900, G-2 Reg., RG 165, NARA.
59. G. Vargas to A. de Sousa Costa, Petrópolis, February 14, 1942, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, FGV-Rio. For detailed analysis of the Sousa Costa Mission see my *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945*, pp. 259–269.
60. Brazil was then thought to have no oil, whose discovery lay decades in the future. Its only coal was a soft variety unsuited for steel production. On president’s level of focus, see, for example, Vargas to Sousa Costa, Petrópolis, February 14, 1942 and undated but most likely February 26 or 27, 1942, and Sousa Costa to Vargas, February 25, 1942, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, FGV-Rio. Sousa Costa reported the inclusion of all war materiel along with Volta Redonda in his February 16 cable to Vargas. Brazil was made eligible for Lend-Lease aid on May 6, 1941; the agreement negotiated by Sousa Costa was dated March 3, 1942, and would be modified by Brazil signing the UN Declaration on February 6, 1943. On Lend-Lease, see Official File 4-193 (1941–), FDRL-Hyde Park.
61. Sousa Costa gave Sumner Welles a cable from Vargas dated February 16. He passed the information on to FDR in Welles to FDR, February 18, 1942, President’s Secretary File, Brazil 1942, Box 95, FDRL.
62. Attaché Augusto do Amaral Peixoto was the brother of Vargas’s son-in-law Ernani do Amaral Peixoto, interventor of the state of Rio de Janeiro; quoted material is from his report to Ambassador José de Paula Rodrigues Alves, Buenos Aires, February 26, 1942, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, FGV-Rio.
63. The crews of the other three ships—*Buarque*, *Olinda*, and *Arabutan*—identified the attacking submarines as German. The ships were well-lit and clearly marked with Brazilian flags. The *Cairú* was sailing darkened and camouflaged. The crew could not identify the attacker, but later it was found to be U-94. For survivors’ testimonies, see Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *O Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944), Vol. II, pp. 61–148. For Brazilian maritime losses in 1942–1943, see Ministério da Marinha, *Subsídios para a História Marítima do Brasil*, Vol. XII, (Rio de Janeiro, 1953), pp. 11–12 and Office of Naval Intelligence, “Post-Mortems on Enemy Submarines,” 250-G: Serial 8, US Naval Archives, NARA. There is a report on the *Buarque* in Jay Walker, Pará, February 24, 1942, 832.00/14531/2, RG59, NARA.
64. Vargas had great respect for FDR, and the fact that he personally asked was influential. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 466 (February

- 28 and March 1, 1942); the official authorization was in Decreto-lei no. 4.142, March 2, 1942.
65. Welles to Caffery, Washington, March 21, 1942, 832.20/359, RG 59, NARA; History of South Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command (SADATC), Part 1, III, pp. 133–137; Part II, IV, pp. 4–5, US Army Center for Military History, Washington. For a detailed study, see Theresa Louise Kraus, “The Establishment of the United States Army Air Corps Bases in Brazil, 1938–1945m” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1986). Bolling Field is located in Anacostia in the District of Columbia.
 66. “History of United States Army Forces South Atlantic,” Appendix IV (copy of 3 Mar 42 Lend-Lease Agreement); SADATC, Chap. III, 132–33, US Army’s Center for Military History, Washington.
 67. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 468 (March 7 and March 8, 1942).
 68. WPD Memo for Record, WPD 4224-233; Memo, OPD for Cols Robert L. Walsh and Henry A. Barber, April 1, 1942, OPD 336.6 Brazil-U.S. MMB, RG165, NARA.
 69. For Müller’s biography, see Israel Beloch and Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds. *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983*. Vol.3 (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1984.), pp. 2342–2346. On Aranha’s resignation threat, Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 469 (March 10, 1942).
 70. Getúlio Vargas to Ambassador Carlos Martins Pereira e Sousa, Rio, March 17, 1942, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC-Rio, FGV.
 71. War Diary, Commander of South Atlantic Force, April 28, 1942, A12/ Serial 0025 and Commander of Task Force 23, Report of Situation in Brazil, April 22–26, 1942, Serial 0018, US Navy, NARA.
 72. <https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/us-people/i/ingram-jonas-h.html>; on Vera Cruz, see Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Vera Cruz* (New York: University of Kentucky Press, 1962).
 73. Jefferson Caffery to Secretary Cordell Hull, Rio de Janeiro, April 7, 1942, #6952, G2 Regional Brazil 5900, RG165, NARA.
 74. BG Lehman W. Miller to Colonel Henry A. Barber, Washington, April 29, 1942, G2 Regional Brazil (4-22-42), RG165, NARA.
 75. Colonel Thomas D. White, Memo for chief of staff, Washington, May 8, 1942, 336.4 Monteiro, Gen. Goes (4-22-42), 381 Brazil, RG165, NARA. Upon the request of Vargas, Col. White, who arrived as attaché in April 1940 and became chief of the air mission in August 1941, had been replaced at the same time as Miller. In the post-war, White rose to be the US Air Force’s fourth chief of staff, 1957–1961. When Police Chief Müller

- was removed from his police assignment, he joined War Minister Dutra's personal staff.
76. Miller's marginal comments on pages 2 and 4 of Góes Monteiro to George Marshall, Rio de Janeiro, April 22, 1942, 336.4 Monteiro, Gen. Góes (4-22-42), 381 Brazil, RG 165, NARA. Góes asked for yet more munitions citing the situation in Argentina as particularly dangerous.
 77. MG David D. Eisenhower (Asst. Ch. of St.) Memo for Under Secretary of State Welles, Washington, May 15, 1942, OPD 381 Brazil, Box 1238, MMB, RG165, NARA.
 78. Such a "system" would involve stationing officers at various points to report their observations of military activities. Captain Lloyd H. Gomes (Assistant Military Attaché) to Col. Henry A. Barber, Rio de Janeiro, April 24, 1942, Army chief of staff, 381 Brazil, War Dept. General & Special Staffs, MMB, RG 165, NARA. By the end of the war, Col. Sibert would be the highest-ranking military intelligence officer in Europe.
 79. General Townsend Heard to General Strong, n.p. May 1, 1942, 381 Brazil (4-24-42) War Dept. General & Special Staffs, MMB, RG 165, NARA. The chief was, of course, George Marshall.
 80. General Lehman W. Miller to George Marshall, Washington, May 4, 1942, 381 Brazil (5-4-42) War Dept. General & Special Staffs, MMB, RG 165, NARA.
 81. Gustav Parson, "Fort Belvoir's Engineer Replacement Training Center," *Engineer* (September-December, 2011), pp. 36–40. <http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/PDFs%20for%20Sept-Dec%2011/Person.pdf>.
 82. For Miller's career: http://www.generals.dk/general/Miller/Lehman_Wellington/USA.html. For Camp Sutton: <http://monroenc.blogspot.com/2012/08/camp-sutton.html> and Camp Claiborne: <https://www.facebook.com/Camp.Claiborne>.
 83. Welles to Roosevelt, Washington, July 1, 1942, OF884 Jefferson Caffery, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Vargas to Roosevelt, Rio, July 30, 1942, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
 84. Rainbow Plan Lilac. General Headquarters, US Army, "Operations Plan of Northeast Brazil Theater," November 1, 1941 (updated April 23, 1942), Annex 1j, Boxes 38 & 39, MMB, RG 407, NARA. The quotation is from Box 38, Update, April 23, 1942, pp. 5, see also 13, 18, 19.
 85. *Ibid*, quotations from Box 38, Update, April 23, 1942, pp. 13, 18, 19.
 86. J. Ingram (CO of Task Force 23) to Chief of Naval Operations, USS Memphis, May 15, 1942, OPD381 Brazil, Box 1238, MMB, RG165, NARA. The quotations are from pp. 5–7 and 12. He also noted Brazilian fear of aggression from Argentina and observed that "they will freely trade any guarantee from us for support against an Argentine attack" [p. 7]. His command eventually was raised to be the US Navy's Fourth Fleet. For

- more on Ingram, see McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, 276–277, 293–296, 307–309.
87. J. Edgar Hoover (Dir. of FBI) to Col. William J. Donovan (Coordinator of Information) Washington, June 13, 1942, OSS Files, 17662, MMB, RG226, NARA. Hoover did not identify the “reliable source,” but said it was based on an “overheard conversation” between two high-ranking Brazilian officers. FDR on June 13, 1942, ordered the creation of the OSS headed by Donovan. Hoover disliked Donovan and reportedly kept a derogatory file on him, which mysteriously disappeared. See Curt Gentry, *J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), on the creation of OSS, pp. 266–267, on Hoover’s attitude and files, pp. 734–735.
 88. The Brazilian-American campaign to increase the collection of wild rubber in Amazonia is beyond the scope of this book. It has been studied by Seth Garfield, *In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States and the nature of a region* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2013), especially Chap. 3 “Rubber Soldiers.”
 89. Caffery, Rio, May 1, 1942, Teleg. 1485, 832.001: Vargas, Getúlio 10/99, and series following, such as Caffery’s reports on May 6, 9, July 10, July 18, and September 1, 1942, RG 59, NARA.
 90. Getúlio Vargas, *Diário, 1937–1942*, Vol. II, p. 477 (last dated entry was April 30, 1942). He did not date his final entry saying he was giving up the diary. His convalescence lasted three months.
 91. “OSS, “Highlights on the General Political Situation in Brazil,” copy in 19354, MMB, RG226, NARA. The document carried no agent’s name and no date, but from content it appears to have been written in July 1942. The unnamed author called for “very careful attention [to] be focused on the Brazilian army...” The German embassy fed some newspapers with funds and propaganda: see José Carlos Peixoto Júnior, “A ascensão do nazismo pela ótica do Diário de Notícias da Bahia (1935–1941): um estudo de caso” (Tese de Mestre em História Social – Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, UFBA, Salvador, 2003) and Igor Silva Gak, “Os fins e seus meios: diplomacia e propaganda nazista no Brasil (1938–1942)” (Tese de Mestrado em História, Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia, UFF, Niterói, 2006). A useful study of the Nazi-influenced newspaper *Meio-Dia* (Rio de Janeiro) is João Arthur Ciciliato Franzolin, “Joaquim Inojosa e o jornal Meio-Dia (1939–1942)” *Anais do XXVI, Simpósio Nacional de História*, ANPUH, São Paulo, Julho 2011, [http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/anais/14/1299918891_ARQUIVO_Textocompleto-JoaquimInojosaeojornalMeio-Dia\(1939-1942\).pdf](http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/anais/14/1299918891_ARQUIVO_Textocompleto-JoaquimInojosaeojornalMeio-Dia(1939-1942).pdf).



Decision to Fight

BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES BECAME ALLIES

It is rather surprising that in spite of the atmosphere of suspicion the two armies and their governments had been able to craft a political-military agreement that would in effect create an alliance between the United States and Brazil. The agreement produced joint military commissions, one in Washington and the other in Rio de Janeiro, and outlined the policies that would govern their work. The Washington commission was to prepare a defense plan for Northeast Brazil and make recommendations appropriate to the changing situation of the war. The Rio commission was to work with the American army and naval missions to improve the combat readiness of the Brazilian forces.¹

On the American side, this outcome was the result of General Marshall's calm and patience in dealing with the Brazilians and his willingness to listen to the advice of the State Department. He believed that the War Department had "made real sacrifices in many directions to satisfy Brazilian requirements in military equipment..." He reminded Sumner Welles that he had "relieved officers at the request of our Ambassador – officers of superior qualifications" (likely he had Miller and White in mind). And that he had "changed the assignments of officers in the War Department concerned with the Brazilian situation because they had become so convinced that our failure to secure the necessary precautionary measures would result in a disaster in that region [and] that their feelings were too intense

to facilitate negotiations.” He deplored that it was “increasingly apparent that the Brazilians are not seriously cooperating with us to secure that vital area, sea and land, against Axis aggression.” He asked Welles to instruct Caffery to press the Brazilian Air Ministry again on the “urgent necessity” of carrying out “the immediate detailed and effective reconnaissance of the Amazon area” and on extending air patrols off the Brazilian coast.² Marshall then wrote to Góes Monteiro praising the negotiations that had given rise to the “political-military agreement.” Even though he lamented “the lost opportunities for close cooperation in the past,” he observed that it was “futile to dwell on such incidents.” He was certain that Góes agreed “that this is a time for action with all eyes on the future,” and he was hopeful “that the continuation of present measures by Brazil will result in the speedy elimination” of the Axis threat to ships and aircraft and to the Panama Canal. He assured Góes that “I have clearly in mind your needs and shall see that, in return for the cooperation which you have offered on your part, that we on our part give you the material assistance you request as far as our capacities will permit” [*emphasis added*]. He included the caveat that he was sure that Góes understood that he had to meet “the minimum requirements of our own forces as well as of other forces in actual combat with Germany and Japan, and of course Italy.”³

Brazil’s significance in Marshall’s mind was indicated by his replacement for General Miller. The new attaché would be his aide and long-time friend, Claude M. Adams, whom he called “Flap.”⁴ Adams had been his executive officer when Marshall commanded the fifth Brigade of the third Division at historic Vancouver Barracks in Washington state in 1938; they became great friends and fishing buddies.⁵ They were close enough to play practical jokes on one another. Marshall’s wife Katherine was close to Adams’s wife Ruth so it was a friendship between the two couples. While going through the Command and General Staff course at Ft. Leavenworth (1939–1940), Adams suffered a heart attack but was able to complete the course. Marshall brought him to the general staff as an all-purpose sort of aide. So now he had his man in Rio whom he trusted implicitly.

Axis agents were actively broadcasting with clandestine radio transmitters the movements of ships in and out of Guanabara Bay, and the Federal District Chief of Police Filinto Müller did nothing to stop them. It was mid-July before Vargas had recuperated enough to replace him with a trustworthy officer. It was worrisome that Müller then joined the immediate staff of Minister of War Dutra. After German submarines sank three more Brazilian ships off Trinidad on July 26 and 28, 1942, Dutra told

Ambassador Caffery that he was as pro-American as Aranha, but complained that the foreign minister wanted to go to war even though Brazil was absolutely unready. Dutra did not think that the United States could prepare Brazil for a combat role; therefore Brazil should limit its cooperation to measures short of war.⁶ The documents did not reveal why Dutra thought that way, he certainly was not displaying great confidence in his army.

Brazil's air force had become active in hunting and attacking German submarines so it was already in the fight though the nation was officially neutral, but between August 15 and 19, the sinking of six ships off the Brazilian coast took the republic into the war. Notably the army wanted to revenge the deaths of the 16 officers and 125 men of its Seventh Artillery Group on the passenger ship *Baependy* (sunk on August 15). The sinking of the *Baependy* raised questions that went unaddressed, about the competence of army leaders who did not take adequate precautions against the known submarine threat. They may have thought that peaceful coastal traffic would not be attacked. It may puzzle readers that the Brazilian Navy did not provide an armed escort. The two services were not accustomed to cooperating, and the navy did not yet have an anti-submarine capability. A Brazilian officer of that era, Nelson Werneck Sodré, in his memoir, condemned the ineptitude of Dutra and Góes for allowing such an obviously dangerous troop movement and the insensitivity of the army bureaucracy in indemnifying the survivors with a mere month's pay, whose payment was delayed. Unfortunately Sodré fertilized the Nazi-created rumors of American responsibility for the sinkings by saying that there was no proof that the submarines were German.⁷

OPERATION BRAZIL AND LONE WOLF U-507 1942

Of course there was proof, Sodré was either ignoring it or perhaps he did not want to believe it. Both Germany and Italy had submarines operating in the South Atlantic. On June 2, 1942, the Brazilian press reported that Brazilian air crews flying B-25s had sunk two Italian subs. Radio Berlin warned that retaliation would be swift. Authorities in Natal ordered a blackout to make night attacks more difficult. Marines at the Natal Air Base dug trenches and set up machine guns. Fear gripped the people of Natal because of the radio threats. The German government saw Brazilian cooperation with the American forces as the end of Brazilian neutrality and believed that when Brazil was ready it would formally enter the war.

Likewise German officials seemed offended that a military nonentity of mixed race would dare take defensive measures against Axis vessels. The commander of the German Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, on June 15, 1942, met with Hitler, who approved a massive submarine attack on Brazilian ports and coastal shipping, called “Operation Brazil.” Thereafter a number of subs, variously reported as eight to ten, left French ports for the South Atlantic (Fig. 5.1).⁸

The Brazilian fleet was all but obsolete and had no experience or appropriate vessels to combat submarines. The great 305 mm guns on its two 1910 battleships were useless against subs. The ports without anti-submarine nets were defenseless. Submarines could stealthily enter the great bays at Rio de Janeiro and Salvador da Bahia to sink vessels anchored there, and at Recife the area protected by the seawall was so



Fig. 5.1 General Gustavo Cordeiro de Faria explaining Natal's harbor defenses to Roosevelt, Vargas, and Admiral Ingram. (Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, NARA)

small that many ships were anchored outside it. They made easy prey. The German submarines would encounter a Brazilian fleet “incapable of efficiently reacting to a surprise attack.” The hard truth was that “the extreme fragility of Brazilian naval defense was similar to that in the Army and in the recently created Air Force.” Brazil was paying the price for successive governments’ inability to pull the country out of its deep underdevelopment.⁹

The reader should recall that Brazil of 1942 was totally dependent on the sea for transport among its coastal cities north of Rio de Janeiro. Vitória, Salvador, Maceió, Recife, Natal, Fortaleza, São Luis, and Belém were basically islands separated one from the others by vast stretches of land. Brazilians, at the time, described the country as an archipelago. There were no long-distance connecting railroads or all-weather highways. Indeed in 1942–1943, “there were eighty miles of paved road in that vast country outside of the cities.”¹⁰ Rudimentary aviation was available only to a small portion of the elite. The first regular flight between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo began in August 1936 with two 17-passenger German-made *Junkers*. That same year construction began on Brazil’s first civilian airport, Rio’s Santos Dumont, which would be completed only in 1947!¹¹ Significantly it was built on landfill in Guanabara Bay partly to accommodate the seaplanes of international airlines. Everything moved by water, which meant that the Brazilian economy could be shattered by submarines.¹² The consequences of such an attack for the political situation could only be bad. Vargas was slowly recovering from his May automobile accident and would be in no condition to hold things together. Moreover, despite the political-military accord signed with the United States in May, the Brazilian high command was not hurrying to implement it.

Providentially, Hitler had approved “Operation Brazil” with the stipulation that before it was launched there should be a review of the diplomatic situation. That brought the plan to the foreign ministry and the desk of former ambassador to Brazil, Karl Ritter, the same who had been declared “*persona non grata*” and expelled by Oswaldo Aranha. Ritter was responsible for liaison between the foreign ministry and the military. Such a submarine offensive against still officially neutral Brazil would mean expanding the war. Ritter argued that pushing Brazil into the conflict could have negative consequences for interactions with Chile and Argentina, who still had diplomatic and commercial relations with the Axis. Besides he thought that Italy and Japan ought to be consulted before such an attack. From an operational point of view, an attack was complicated

by the great distance from Europe and the submarine's vulnerability during the 26 days en route. The submarines would have to surface regularly to recharge their batteries and so would be vulnerable to attack. It was true that because Brazil was neutral, its cities would be lit up at night making it easier to see targets in silhouette, and Brazilian coastal shipping would likely still be brightly lit. It should be noted that submarine attacks on ports had some recent precedence. In February 1942, a German submarine attacked a refinery on Aruba and a Japanese sub fired on a refinery at Santa Barbara, California.¹³

There is some confusion regarding when "Operation Brazil" was cancelled and when and who ordered the attacks in August. Colonel Durval Lourenço Pereira carefully reconstructed the dating and origins of the various orders and contra-orders showing that Admirals Donitz and Raeder in their defense testimonies during the Nuremberg trials and American historians were inaccurate about timing and responsibility.¹⁴ The startling reality is that, instead of a wolf pack of submarines, there was only one submarine, U-507, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Harro Schacht, whose attack procedures were strikingly inhuman.¹⁵

U-507 was one of the original vessels designated for the campaign against Brazil. When the foreign ministry, that is, Karl Ritter, objected to "Operation Brazil," it was cancelled and the submarine commanders were told to destroy their orders. They were given other missions in the Atlantic. On August 7 Lieutenant Commander Schacht requested by radio to "freely maneuver" along the Brazilian coast. Jürgen Rower, a distinguished German historian, was puzzled by U-507's mission, but suspected that it might have been motivated by the naval command's desire for retaliation for Brazil's participation in allied anti-submarine operations. He thought that it contradicted Hitler's cancellation of "Operation Brazil" and that it was a "foolish mistake."¹⁶ It was a mistake that had frightful consequences for the passengers and crews of defenseless Brazilian coastal transports.

On the afternoon of July 4, 1942, Schacht's U-507 and a companion vessel U-130 headed into the open ocean from the port of Lorient on the coast of Brittany. Their destination was a stretch of ocean between the tiny Brazilian islets of São Pedro and São Paulo and the islands of Fernando de Noronha. The islets are 590 miles from Brazil's northeastern shore. Their mission was to patrol one of the quadrants by which the German navy divided the vast ocean.¹⁷ The outward voyage was uneventful except for an encounter with a sonar-equipped destroyer, which detected the U-507 and launched four depth charges. The charges missed the submarine but

caused some slight damage that produced a constant loud pinging sound that Schacht feared could be detected at a distance.

After passing the Azores, Schacht was ordered by radio to operate jointly with U-130 commanded by Captain Ernst Kals and the Italian sub *Pietro Calvi*, but that very day a British destroyer sank the *Calvi*. On the afternoon of July 23, the two German subs were given their patrol quadrants being told that traffic crossed those quadrants in scattered fashion in a northeasterly direction and vice versa. They were patrolling a stretch of the Atlantic narrows between Dakar and Brazil, focused on convoys and single vessels coming from Trinidad and Georgetown. Their orders took the two subs in autonomous directions. Brazil itself was beyond their area. So how did U-507 end up in Brazilian waters?

Schacht's U-507 was now on its own and seeing no targets, the crew practiced submerging and firing the deck gun. Isolated from his colleagues deployed across the South Atlantic, Schacht was the only commander who did not have any "victories." His earlier companion Kals had sunk two ships, but in more than a month since leaving Lorient, U-507 had not fired a single torpedo. For ten days he did not see any ships at all, which led him to think that maritime traffic had been diverted westward toward the Brazilian coast.¹⁸ The boredom and tedium must have been corrosive on the crew's morale. On the surface the heat of the equatorial zone, the glare of the sunlight reflecting off the sea would have been physically draining, and while submerged the stink of the diesel engines and the sulfuric acid smell from the electric batteries mixed with the odors of the unwashed crew wearing the same uniforms for weeks must have been extremely distasteful. There was only one toilet available for the 56 crew men. On August 3 the sub was 90 nautical miles from the coast of Ceará when it turned back toward the open ocean. Reaching a point northeast of the islets São Pedro and São Paulo, Schacht made a decision that "would bring unexpected consequences for the Axis war effort."¹⁹

Late on the night of August 7, he asked permission from the Submarine Command to operate freely on the Brazilian coast. Some 15 hours later, he received the go-ahead from Submarine Command: "Change course and head for Pernambuco." This exchange of radio messages shows that historians have been wrong for decades attributing the attacks on Brazilian coastal shipping to the considered planning of the German navy or to orders from Hitler. In reality, it was the decision of a lone sub commander seeking victims. It coincided with the presence of a convoy (AS-4) at Recife ready to head to Africa carrying critically important Sherman tanks

for British forces,²⁰ and German naval leaders hoped that U-507 could do some damage to it and subsequent convoys. In an analysis related to "Operation Brazil," German naval planners had given Pernambuco considerable importance for the security of Allied convoys. On August 14, a radio message to Schacht emphasized Recife as a resupply and gathering point for convoys and ships from Florida via Georgetown to Natal, St. Helena Island, and Cape Town.²¹ Schacht had other ideas. He considered heading toward Rio de Janeiro, however, was dissuaded by his declining fuel supply. The meaning of Submarine Command's repeated instructions to Schacht was that he was to attack the allied convoys heading toward Cape Town and *not* Brazilian coastal shipping. On his own he did the opposite. Did Schacht's disobedience allow Convoy AS-4 to escape unscathed? If so perhaps he contributed to the German defeat at El Alamein? He apparently believed that the reason he had not encountered ships during the previous days was that the Allies had shifted their routes further to the west along the Brazilian coast. He had the idea that oil tankers were coming into the Atlantic through the Strait of Magellan and up the South American coast to a crossing point to Freetown in Africa. He shied away from Pernambuco, which perhaps he thought was too heavily protected. Admiral Ingram had chosen Recife for his headquarters because he believed that Recife's closeness to Cape São Roque, the nearest location to Africa and thus "most strategic point in South America," made it the best port for his operations.²²

AUGUST 1942 DISASTER ON THE COAST OF SERGIPE AND BAHIA

Schacht took up station off the coast of Bahia and its great port of São Salvador.²³ There he ran less chance of discovery before he could strike. If U-507 was detected, it could plunge into the deep waters off Bahia. The captain was not a coward, but he was cautious. He was one of the German Navy's 2% of submarine commanders responsible for 30% of sinkings during the war. It is notable that of the 870 U-boats sent after Allied shipping, fully 550 did not sink or damage a single ship. Of a total of 2450 Allied merchantmen sent to the bottom, 800 were sunk by only 30 commanders. Harro Schacht was among that number and was one of Germany's most intrepid and daring submariners.²⁴ It is not clear whether he thought he was disobeying orders, perhaps he considered a radio message of July 5 authorizing attack without warning "against all Brazilian merchant ships,

including disarmed and recognized as Brazilian” as sufficient sanction. Of course, the July 5 message did not give permission to attack vessels in Brazilian waters. The German Submarine Command never gave an order to attack Brazilian coastal shipping. Recall that Hitler had expressly vetoed “Operation Brazil.” At the Nuremberg trials, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, commander of the German Navy, testified that his submarines had attacked Brazilian ships because they lacked clear identification as neutral and that Germany had advised all South American countries to illuminate their vessels so that they could be recognized at night. However, Brazil had not been so advised, even though Raeder’s testimony implied that it had.²⁵ Schacht did not long survive these events and left no explanations of his conduct, but all the evidence points to his action as violating orders by sinking seven ships in Brazilian coastal waters. The leading scholar of the submarine attacks, Durval Lourenço Pereira, reached the firm condemning conclusion: “The massacre in the waters of the northeastern litoral happened thanks to the initiative and the personal decision of Lieutenant Commander Harro Schacht” (Fig. 5.2).²⁶

Since February 1942 Brazil had lost 12 ships to Axis submarines, but they had all been off the East Coast of the United States or in the Caribbean and adjacent waters.²⁷ Somehow such losses could be accepted as costs of doing business traversing known war zones. Being attacked while traveling from one state to another via “our territorial waters” would elicit very different emotions. Meanwhile the South Atlantic took on increasing importance in the summer of 1942 because the Germans successfully shut down British convoys using the Arctic above Scandinavia to reach the Russian port of Archangel. The losses were so heavy that the Arctic route had to be discontinued. FDR and Churchill were determined to keep the Soviet Union fighting. The best alternative route was to convoy from the United States via the South Atlantic, around Africa through the Indian Ocean to Iran and thence overland to Soviet territory. An idea of the importance of the route can be seen in the 47,874 aircraft that were shipped disassembled to Russia via the “Persian Corridor.” The route was some 10,000 nautical miles longer than the Arctic one, but there was no other choice. This meant that Brazil and the bases there increased in significance. Brazil was literally the keystone in the edifice of the logistical war. And the war was not going well for the Allies. On January 2, 1942, Manila fell to the Japanese, who also swept over the Netherlands East Indies, then in the next month, the British surrendered Singapore, losing 130,000 troops taken captive. The Doolittle Raid on Tokyo on April 18 was predictive of




Fig. 5.2 This grid map was the type the German navy used to track the location of its vessels. The dark box shows the area assigned to U-507 and the light gray to U-130. The dark lines show U-507's route to and along the Brazilian coast. (Map was prepared by Col. Durval Lourenço Pereira for his *Operação Brasil: O ataque alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015), p. 198. Reproduced by permission of Col. Durval.)

the future and boosted Allied morale, but did little to change the immediate dark trend. In Egypt, on June 21, Rommel's supposedly weakened Africa corps surprised the British by seizing Tobruk in a relatively brief combat, losing another 6,000 soldiers to the Nazi forces, along with all their armament. Loss of the Suez Canal loomed as an alarming possibility. The Germans would get to 70 miles from Alexandria before being stopped at El Alamein on June 29. Without doubt the war could be won or lost in the South Atlantic. Armies cannot fight without weapons and all sorts of supplies and so safe routes for shipping were crucial to obtain victory. That is why the Axis was sending submarines into the South Atlantic and why the Allies had to destroy them.

Ironically Schacht's impatience and decision to head to Brazil caused him to miss the S.S. *Seatrains Texas* which was carrying 250 Sherman tanks steaming for Cape Town and, via the Red Sea, for Port Suez. At Cape

Town the British gave it the code name “Treasure Ship.” The US Merchant Marine history concluded that “These Sherman tanks, the first Allied tanks which matched the German Mark IV Panzer in firepower, were a decisive factor at the battle of El Alamein which began on October 23, 1942, and resulted in an Allied victory.”²⁸ Of course, the intense air cover that Army Air Corps planes gave to the British Eighth Army played an extremely important role, and they would not have been there without Brazilian cooperation and the Parnamirim base at Natal.²⁹

Leaving his assigned quadrant caused U-507 to miss the important cargo targets. Schacht’s next action would cause war between Brazil and Germany. He was heading south away from Recife and toward Salvador da Bahia. Submarine Command’s instructions allowed attacking without warning all merchant vessels cruising with their lights out. He was aware that Brazilian coastal ships carried both cargo and passengers. Strictly speaking passenger vessels were not on the list of approved targets, but he could have been frustrated after 40 days at sea and still carrying his compliment of 22 torpedoes. He was moving southeast and would encounter the passenger steamer *Baependy* on a north-northeast heading. The confrontation of these two vessels had a certain irony to it. They had the same birthplace, at the Blohm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg. The *Baependy* had been launched 40 years before and had fallen into Brazilian hands during World War I. U-507 was laid down in 1939. The Brazilian vessel had its running lights on, but its flag and name were in the dark. As Schacht maneuvered into attack position, he saw a light on the horizon, likely another ship. If he acted quickly, he could get two victims. He launched two torpedoes each with an explosive mixture equal to 280 kilos of TNT.

It was 1825 hours and the unwary *Baependy* was 1500 meters away [1600.4 yards]. On board the Brazilians had just finished dinner and were gathering to celebrate a crew member’s birthday. Soldiers, most of whom were Cariocas, were on the rear deck playing their *pandeiros*, drumming on cans, and singing sambas. This happy scene was undisturbed as both torpedoes missed their mark and continued on in the darkness. Schacht had miscalculated the speed of the *Baependy*. He raced ahead and came back at a better angle before launching two more torpedoes at 1912 hours. In his diary he noted “two shots to prevent any possibility of radio transmission by the steamer.”³⁰ An SOS from the ship could reveal the submarine’s presence. Even if the captain of the *Baependy* could have seen the torpedoes, at their 40 knot speed, he could not have avoided them. The two torpedoes hit the *Baependy* about 30 seconds apart.

The 320 passengers were stunned, some frozen in absolute fear, others screaming and trying to reach the deck. Captain Lauro Mourinho dos Reis of the Seventh Artillery Group recalled that glass and wood fragments flew in every direction cutting and killing indiscriminately. The second torpedo had hit the engine room; the lights went out, leaving everyone to struggle for a way out in the dark. Up on deck flames shot into the night. It had happened so rapidly that, despite frenzied efforts, only one of the lifeboats could be let down. Finally on deck Captain Lauro understood that he had to jump overboard to avoid getting sucked under by the sinking ship. A machinist saw the ship's captain covered in blood on the bridge sounding the ship's whistle repeatedly as it went under. Those who could not swim thrashed about uselessly, while others held on to floating pieces of wreckage. It had been four minutes from impact to the ship going down prow first. For the 28 survivors in the lone lifeboat, it would be a long dramatic night of terror before they reached land.³¹

Schacht knew he had hit a passenger vessel but did nothing to help the survivors. Instead he attacked the second ship, the *Araraquara*, a relatively new, luxury vessel. He noted that it had its running lights on and was "brilliantly illuminated" but it lacked any mark of neutrality. Two hours after sinking the *Baependy*, the U-507's torpedo exploded amidship plunging the *Araraquara* into darkness. It listed and broke in half and within five minutes it and its 131 passengers were gone. Four crewmen clung to wreckage, one hallucinated and threw himself into the sea, and the others lived to tell the tale.³²

On August 16 at 0210 in the morning, on the north coast of Bahia, the third victim was the *Anibal Benevolo*, with 154 passengers and crew on board. Asleep, they had no time to panic; the vessel went down in 45 seconds. Only four crewmen managed to save themselves. U-507 continued toward Salvador. So far it was very successful from a coldly martial point of view. The three ships had not been able to sound an SOS; the German submarine was advancing on Salvador undetected. One of the reasons Schacht chose this region is that the depth of the sea plunges from 40 meters north of the city to 1000 meters at the bay's mouth. If discovered, he could easily dive to the sub's maximum depth of 230 meters. Unhappily for Schacht nothing seemed to be afloat in the great bay, except a small sailboat that he did not regard as worth his bother.³³ Before dawn on the 17th, he went back to deep water, where at 0841 he spied a steamer going north. It was the *Itagiba*, carrying the rest of the army's Seventh Artillery Group among other passengers. At a distance of 1000 meters, the torpedo

hit the ship in the middle. Its passengers managed to get off in lifeboats, although two of the boats were hit or dragged under by the sinking ship. Ten minutes had elapsed.³⁴

In an act of temporary mercy, Schacht chose not to sink the yacht *Aragipe* which came to rescue the people in the crowded lifeboats. Likely he simply did not want to surface to use his deck gun, so as not to reveal his position. The *Aragipe* was able to crowd on 150 terrified survivors; the remainders were picked up by two of the lifeboats. Meanwhile in Salvador an alarm had been sounded and vessels were held in port. One ship, the *Arará*, unaware of the warning, had gone amidst the floating wreckage to pick up 18 survivors. Observing through his periscope from 200 meters away, he waited until all were onboard before firing the torpedo. Raising the periscope again to survey the scene, he could only see one lifeboat with five “non-whites” in it.³⁵

Later in the afternoon, Schacht saw a passenger ship coming his way. It was painted gray and did not have a flag or other marks of neutrality. He fired and the torpedo hit its mark but it did not explode. The unnamed vessel was moving too fast for U-507 to catch it before it reached safety in the port. He noted in his log: “It is not possible to stop it with artillery during the day, considering the nearness of the port and the aerial danger.”³⁶

It was now clear to the Brazilian and American authorities that submarines were operating in Bahian waters. From Recife the destroyer *USS Somers* and cruiser *USS Humboldt* steamed south, and seaplanes from VP-83 squadron flew out on patrol. Meanwhile Schacht, on August 18, had taken U-507 out to sea to make repairs on a mechanical problem in a launch tube. The seaplane PBY Catalina 83P6 found it exposed on the surface and attacked with machine guns and depth charges. U-507 dived rapidly. The pilot, Lt. John M. Lacey, USN, thought he had sunk it because an oil slick and air bubbles appeared on the surface. But all the attack had done was cause a leak in an oil tank. Schacht steered his boat south toward Ilhéus in search for more targets.³⁷ But the only vessel encountered was a small coastal sailing boat, on August 19, that his crew boarded but not understanding Portuguese learned nothing useful. The *Jacyra* was carrying a disassembled truck, cases of empty bottles, and cacao. The *mestiço* crew were sent toward shore and the Germans blew up the vessel. Why they took the trouble to destroy such a harmless craft is a mystery. The smell of fuel oil alerted them to the leak in the tank and the need for repairs. The next day U-507 returned to the entrance to the Bay of All Saints where he found the lighthouses were shut down, but oddly

Salvador was still lit up brightly. On the 22nd Schacht encountered the Swedish ship *Hammarem* without lights and launched a torpedo, but missed. A second one hit its mark but did not explode. As dawn broke he surfaced and fired the 105 mm gun on the rear deck hitting the bridge. The crew abandoned the burning ship, while Schacht maneuvered to fire his last torpedo from the stern tube. Turning north he set course for France.³⁸ He left behind a Brazil lusting for revenge.

Businesses with German names were sacked. Police rounded up Germans. What some called Brazil's "Pearl Harbor" provoked clamorous street demonstrations throughout the country. The streets of Fortaleza, Ceará, filled with people breaking into stores owned by real or supposed Germans and Italians and setting them afire. The police could not control the mob.³⁹ In Vitória, Espírito Santo, on the 17th the authorities could not quell the rioters, who wrecked some 25 buildings, but took all Axis nationals into custody, while in Belém do Pará, news of the sinkings resulted in mobs destroying some 20 stores, offices, and houses of alleged Axis nationals and sympathizers. In Manaus there were loud anti-Axis demonstrations that saw numerous Axis nationals being beaten and injured. In Natal there was destruction of Axis property and "genuine enthusiasm against enemy for the first time...." São Paulo saw large groups of students shouting for war and a huge number in the plaza in front of the Cathedral clamoring for action. The US Consulate in Porto Alegre reported that there was a systematic smashing of shops belonging to supposed Axis sympathizers. "All around the Consulate at this minute stores are being demolished." The material damage was already great.⁴⁰ The outraged Brazilian people demanded a response.

Inadvertently, U-507 would contribute to the eventual Allied victory by its unauthorized attack on Brazilian shipping. After pulling Brazil into the war, Schacht returned to his home base at Lorient in France. Unlike a previous voyage this time there were no medals and the reception was not warm. U-507 returned to sea in late November and cruised back to Brazil, where it patrolled off of Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte. In conducting attacks Schacht changed his procedure to take prisoner the fated ship's captain to obtain precise information about cargoes and navigation routes. By New Year's 1943, he had three British merchant marine captains on board the U-507. In a twist of fortune, on January 13, 1943, a USN Catalina PBY, flying out of the base at Fortaleza, spotted the submarine and dropped four depth charges totaling 884 kilos of TNT making direct hits.

U-507's voyages of death were ended thanks to the Brazilian-American alliance.⁴¹

BRAZIL GOES TO WAR, AUGUST 1942

The government in Rio was stunned. For a couple of days, Vargas, who was “far from well: he attempted to walk too soon and developed water on the knee; was in severe pain during the cabinet meetings ...,”⁴² seemed uncertain of what to do. Foreign Minister Aranha recalled that time as “the worst days” as he drafted a note of protest to be sent via Portugal to Berlin, basically saying that the German attacks created a state of war and that Brazil was accepting the challenge. He seemed ready to declare war, according to General Dutra and Ambassador Caffery. Góes proposed that instead of declaring war they should make use of reprisals. Vargas initially was inclined to agree, thinking that reprisals could include confiscating German businesses and interned German ships. At least on August 16, he was not thinking of declaring war on Germany. Góes and Dutra suggested decreeing a “state of war” (akin to martial law) in the 6th and 7th Military Regions, which would legally increase government control of the threatened coast. They thought to follow that with a partial mobilization without making any communication with the Reich.⁴³ The cabinet held inconclusive meetings arguing about the wording of a note to be sent to Berlin.

While this internal debate went on, Aranha showed Consul General John F. Simmons parts of alternative drafts of the war note and explained the cabinet’s discussions. This was an example of the closeness between the foreign minister and the embassy. Vargas ultimately opted for Aranha’s formula, recognizing “the state of war which, in an inhuman and brutal manner, has been forced upon us by the German Reich.” Aranha explained to Caffery that “recognition of the existence of a state of war ... was more in line with Brazilian tradition.” That is what had been done the last time Brazil had gone into a foreign war—against Paraguay in May 1865! Aranha had built his arguments slowly until he had 12 of them. Dutra reminded the cabinet that Brazil was practically defenseless. He conceded that they had received some very good material from the United States; “but, so very little of it” Aranha admitted to Caffery that “I don’t like Dutra personally, but I cannot criticize his attitude.”⁴⁴ The other ministers worried about shortages of coal, gasoline, and other fuels. Brazil was certainly not prepared for war. Even so, meeting at 3 p.m. on August 22, the cabinet voted unanimously for war.⁴⁵

Three days later Admiral Jonas Ingram advised the Navy Department that Brazil’s naval minister had directed the senior officer in the northeast to report to him for duty.

The Brazilian navy was to be under the command of the American admiral. Joined by the Brazilian army's senior officer in the northeast, they agreed tentatively that naval forces had the paramount responsibility for defending the region. They agreed that Ingram would take full responsibility for offshore and coastal operations and that the Brazilian army would assume security measures ashore. In any contingency Brazilian and American forces would cooperate fully. The air forces would also operate under the admiral's joint operations plans. The Americans were much encouraged by the Brazilian attitude, which exceeded their most optimistic expectations.⁴⁶

The Brazilian armed forces were willing to operate under American control, but curiously, not under Brazilian joint command. At a cabinet meeting in Guanabara Palace on August 29, Dutra proposed that the three services place themselves under a single commander to improve coordination. The ministers agreed except for the naval and air force ministers, who energetically opposed the idea. To end the argument, Vargas said he would gather the chiefs of staff of the services "to study the question." At that point the ministers had yet to authorize the mobilization of the army.⁴⁷ They did manage to approve a decree, issued on August 31, putting Brazil on a war footing internally by establishing a "state of war" in all of Brazil. That step limited rights and increased executive power by suspending several articles of the Estado Novo constitution. It might strike the reader as a mere formality, after all this was a dictatorship, but showed Brazilian respect for the idea of law.⁴⁸ Brazilian ships heading for the United States now steamed in well-guarded convoys, even so sinkings continued. In a few months, Brazil had lost 75% of its commercial fleet. Looking back years later, Dutra stubbornly commented "that nothing justified the haste with which we broke relations with the Axis countries."⁴⁹

As Brazil's Independence Day, September 7, drew closer, Rio took on the cautious appearance of a city under threat of attack. The spotlights illuminating the Statue of Christ on Corcovado Mountain were darkened, as were the lights on Urca and Sugar Loaf at the entrance to the great bay. The light of the clock tower of Mesbla department store went off as did all advertising signs on mountains and upper floors of tall buildings. On September 6 the beaches of Leme, Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leblon had their first total blackout.⁵⁰

THE IDEA OF A BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Given the indecision and uncertainty of the previous years, it is notable that now opinion in the Brazilian military shifted toward an active combat role abroad. The idea first took shape in informal discussions among Brazilian officers, who were infuriated and deeply frustrated by the sinking of the *Baependy*, which had killed 250 soldiers and 7 officers.⁵¹ Their helplessness in the face of the German submarine onslaught clearly illustrated Brazil's military and naval weakness. Although in August the cabinet had recognized that there existed a state of war with Germany and Italy, it was not immediately clear what role in the war Brazil would claim for itself. Minister of War Dutra's proclamation to the army declared that Brazil was experiencing "moments of intense gravity" and condemned the sinking as "a monstrous and criminal act" asserting that the army stood unified to defend the country, but oddly it never mentioned Germany or the Axis.⁵²

The situation was becoming clearer, but American officials continued to worry about pro-Axis Brazilian officers. A few of the officers on Dutra's ministerial staff were vocally pro-German. In the army itself, there may well have been a difference of opinion between junior and field-grade officers. US Army intelligence reported that lieutenants and captains in civilian dress were seen leading marchers in anti-Axis street demonstrations. Supposedly such junior officers were dissatisfied with "the regime of the two generals" (Dutra and Góes) who reportedly had stronger backing among majors and lieutenant colonels.⁵³ One wonders if such junior officers had been among the cadets at the Realengo Military School in October 1940, who booed and jeered when Hitler appeared on screen during a showing of German army war films depicting the Spanish Civil War and the invasions of Poland and Czechoslovakia. One of the cadets later recalled that while the films were well made and that the cadets were at first curious and a bit perplexed, when they realized that the films were war propaganda, a "deafening booing, and vigorous foot stamping" broke out.⁵⁴ The US military attaché emphasized that there was "only a small proportion of officers in the Brazilian Army who are pro-Nazi, but they are in key positions where their influence is great." Furthermore they appeared to be protected by Dutra and Góes.⁵⁵

Recent graduates of the army's Command and General Staff School in Rio were enthusiastic about getting into the fight. The majority of officers in the class of 1942 had been part of the *Tenente* movement of the 1920s.⁵⁶ On October 31, at the Staff School's graduation ceremonies, in the pres-

ence of Dutra and Góes, the class spokesman, Colonel Newton Estillac Leal, gave an energetic speech in which he called Hitler a pig and a swine and demanded adherence to the Atlantic Charter⁵⁷ and full cooperation with the United Nations. He labeled Nazism-Fascism-Integralism a “sinister trinity.”⁵⁸ Furthermore, he asserted that Brazil should take an active part in the war and form an expeditionary force. Leal was one of the *Tenentes* and apparently had convinced a number of them to support the Allied cause. Military Attaché Claude Adams noted happily that the speech was the first time that “any Army group [had] defied the *Políticos* by openly declaring solidarity and friendship with the United States....” The newspapers responded favorably, which meant that the censors (*DIP*) had given approval.⁵⁹ Dutra appeared friendlier to the American embassy, but the military attaché noted that the minister had not yet mentioned the army taking an active part in the fighting. Correct or not, the military attaché believed that Góes was “an obstructionist to active measures against the Axis.” The pro-Allied officers had three objectives: (1) the formation of an expeditionary force to fight alongside the allies; (2) the removal of Axis sympathizers and those who were lukewarm toward the Allied cause from responsible positions in the government, particularly Dutra and Góes; (3) they would accomplish the foregoing by “quiet pressure on President Vargas, in whom they have confidence....”⁶⁰

Meanwhile, army officers talked about attacking Vichy France’s colony Guiana, on Brazil’s northern border, or even Dakar in French West Africa. Brazil had neither the shipping nor the armament, or, indeed, trained troops to mount such independent operations so such actions would be dependent on American approval and support. Washington feared that an assault on French Guiana would upset its delicate negotiations seeking to separate the French forces in North Africa from Axis-tolerant Vichy. In December 1942, with the Allied invasion of North Africa underway, the Brazilian General Staff discussed sending troops there. To test public reaction, Minister of War Dutra inspired newspaper articles favoring an expeditionary force to Africa. The *Correio da Manhã* (Rio de Janeiro) declared that street demonstrations were not enough, Brazil should be doing “what our North American allies are doing.” Góes Monteiro wrote a letter to Dutra recommending the preparation of a fighting force to go overseas and went so far as to offer to be its commander. Somewhat dismissively US Attaché Adams commented that “Góes realizes that something of this nature is in the wind and as usual [he] wants to claim credit for the idea.”⁶¹

Foreign Minister Aranha gave a speech arguing that Brazil should take a more active role in the war.⁶² Aranha reportedly had allied himself with the *tenente* group, which spoke ever more loudly for committing troops. It is interesting that the *tenente* officers were saying openly that following the war Brazil would return to a democratic form of government.⁶³ In his *Diário Carioca* (Rio de Janeiro) column, José Eduardo de Macedo Soares highlighted the dissatisfaction with Brazil's seemingly passive stance; he asserted that the armed forces were able and willing to fight and were only awaiting orders. Then, on December 31, President Vargas spoke at a luncheon of officers saying that it was impossible to tell how the war would develop but that the nation should not limit itself to supplying raw materials or to being a way station for foreign troops en route to the battlefields of Africa. Instead, Vargas declared, Brazil should prepare to intervene outside the hemisphere with large numbers of well-trained and well-equipped troops. He cautioned the officers to stay united and reminded them that they embodied "national honor and the very future of the *Pátria*."⁶⁴

On Christmas Eve, Franklin Roosevelt had sent Vargas a message saying that during the coming year "the statesmen of our two countries, continuing their traditional collaboration, will draw the blueprint for the new and lasting peace."⁶⁵

Minister Dutra was often accused of being dubious of alliance with the Americans and of being slow to prepare his army for combat, yet in the first week of January 1943, he advised Vargas that the American necessity of confronting the Japanese would likely compel the United States to send more forces to the Pacific. Because the need for troops in Africa and Europe would continue to be great, he thought that Washington would want Brazilian troops. They had to prepare. He thought that their combat force should be an expeditionary army of two corps, one of which should be motorized, plus a supporting armored division. Such a force would require 4,700 officers and 140,450 soldiers. They would need an additional number to keep order in Brazil. He lamented that they did not have the equipment for such a force. Mobilization would be difficult, he noted, because many would flee from being drafted. "Unhappily, we will have to admonish harshly the educated part of the population, whose sons – the most capable and competent – are the desired element to sustain armies in this ultra-civilized century so steeped in science and mechanics." He complained that the army was handicapped by so many officers being assigned to non-military functions. And he reminded Vargas that "not every theater of operations would be appropriate for our congenitally

weak and physically debilitated soldiers.” He suggested that they send officers to Europe to observe how their forces would be used.⁶⁶ Not exactly the most confident endorsement of the abilities of Brazil’s soldiers. It is puzzling why Dutra did not use his considerable power to launch a vigorous training program and to persuade Vargas to mobilize more troops.

NATAL CONFERENCE: ROOSEVELT AND VARGAS, JANUARY 1943

Vargas would soon be preparing for a “secret” conference at Natal with Roosevelt who would be flying back from the Casablanca Conference.⁶⁷ Initially Roosevelt was thinking of meeting Vargas “in some central location like Trinidad.”⁶⁸ Roosevelt likely realized that because he would have to pass through Brazil, it would be more diplomatic to meet at Natal.

Foreign Minister Aranha wrote a long letter to Vargas analyzing Brazilian foreign policy and making a careful examination of the Brazilian-American alliance. His basic point was that the United States would be the leader of the post-war world and Brazil should be at its side; not to do so would be a fateful error. Pan Americanism could not succeed without Brazil. Aranha believed that Brazil and the United States were “cosmic and universal” nations, whose futures could only be continental and worldwide. He knew that Brazil was still “a weak country economically and militarily,” but he was confident that natural growth and a flood of immigration and investments after the war would give it the population and capital to be “inevitably one of the great economic and political powers of the world”—as it was already second in the Western Hemisphere. He believed that Brazilians would gain economically by subjecting themselves to the war economy.⁶⁹ Aranha was aware, as he told Dutra, that complete cooperation with the United States could be risky, but weak Brazil was at the mercy of stronger nations and that without a powerful ally “the future of Brazil will be everyone’s, except the Brazilians.”⁷⁰

Aranha said that he did not think it was necessary at that moment to send Brazilian forces to Africa or Europe, even as he encouraged army leaders to think that they should, but he conceded that the course of the war might make it in Brazil’s interest to do so later. He urged Vargas to ask Roosevelt about future allied operations and plans for European occupation and reconstruction so that they could plan better. The bi-national

military commissions in Rio de Janeiro and Washington already managed their military relations; however, Aranha thought that the two governments should have intimate contact and a continuous flow of ideas at the ministerial level. Brazil, he said, should not await events, but prepare militarily as if it were to enter combat immediately. Such preparation, he argued, whether Brazil fought or not, would give it more weight at the peace table. In addition to participating in planning for the United Nations, he wanted Brazil to secure a seat on the supreme military councils. Aranha's memoranda for Vargas prior to the presidential conference at Natal, complete with its 11 war objectives, in effect laid out what became goals of Brazilian foreign policy for the next decades.⁷¹

Aranha's objectives for Brazil's participation in the war were as follows:

1. An improved position in world politics;
2. Consolidation of its preeminence in South America;
3. A more confident and intimate solidarity with the United States;
4. Greater influence over Portugal and its possessions;
5. Development of maritime power;
6. Development of air power;
7. Development of heavy industries;
8. Creation of war industries;
9. Creation of industries—agricultural, extractive, and light mineral—which would be complementary to those of the United States and necessary for world reconstruction;
10. Extension of Brazil's railways and highways for economic and strategic purposes;
11. Exploration for essential combustible fuels.

He hoped that these "hurried and general lines" would better prepare Vargas to deal with Roosevelt.

Vargas and Roosevelt had met in Rio de Janeiro in 1936 when Roosevelt was en route to Buenos Aires for an Inter-American Conference; they got on well and spoke in French with each other. In the intervening years, Vargas had enriched FDR's stamp collection with numerous examples from Brazil. The fact that Getúlio's son had returned from his studies at Johns Hopkins, and almost immediately had contracted polio and was then slowly dying in São Paulo, must have deepened their bond. Because Getúlio was still limping slightly from his injuries in the auto crash the

previous May, Roosevelt gave him his cane. In their Natal conversations, Roosevelt told him that he would like to have him at his side during the peace conference. He described the progress of the war, some hopes and plans for the post-war, and some of his ideas for the future of French African colonies. He was especially concerned about Dakar, which he thought should be made a trusteeship under three commissioners, an American, a Brazilian, and a third from another American Republic. In a general way, they talked about “the future of Brazil’s industrial development.” FDR was intent that Brazil formally join the United Nations, which Vargas readily agreed to arrange. That gave Vargas the opportunity “to say again that we need equipment from you for our military, naval and air force.” Vargas emphasized that the Americans could depend upon the Brazilian military’s “integral cooperation with no restrictions.” He added “everything the United States judges necessary and useful as cooperation from Brazil we shall continue to give” (Fig. 5.3).⁷²

They talked and joked throughout their inspections of the huge Parnamirim Air Base that was the keystone of the allied transatlantic supply line and was then “one of the finest [airfields] in the world.”⁷³ Indeed, an officer with wide experience throughout the Air Transport Command observed that “Natal, Brazil, was a comfortable, almost luxurious post. I enjoyed my quarters, found the officers’ mess splendid, and the officers’ club delightful.”⁷⁴ Their joint press statement asserted that “Brazil and the United States seek to make the Atlantic Ocean safe for all.”⁷⁵

A negative aspect of the conference was that the American officials at Natal knew what was happening but the local Brazilians did not. One can only imagine what people in Natal thought when they saw a car bearing the two presidents followed by one with American guards, but no Brazilians. The Brazilian regional army commander resented not being forewarned and was alarmed that American troops were “blockading our President.” After all, he complained, “Natal is a city garrisoned and policed by troops of the Army, Navy, and Air Force of Brazil, and is not yet an occupied city.” Despite the considerable American presence, Vargas appeared comfortable; he commented to Ambassador Caffery that he had arrived the night before Roosevelt’s arrival because “The host should await the visitor” (Fig. 5.4).⁷⁶

The Natal Conference was a key, perhaps the emblematic, event in the wartime relations between the two countries. It was kept secret until it happened. The Rio de Janeiro newspaper *A Manhã* captured the general press reaction saying that Natal was the “high point of our alliance with



Fig. 5.3 Vargas and his American allies aboard the *USS Humboldt*. (Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. NARA. Bottom from left: Harry Hopkins, Vargas, FDR, Jefferson Caffery. Standing from left: Rear Admiral Ross McIntire, Major General Robert L. Walsh, Admiral Jonas Ingram, Rear Admiral Augustin T. Beauregard)

the United States and shows the absolute solidarity which unites us.” A columnist in another Rio paper, *A Noite*, prodded the military and the government with the comment that if Brazil already had its forces in combat there would have been a Brazilian delegate at Casablanca.⁷⁷

At Natal, the two presidents discussed possible military roles for Brazil. FDR said that the American military preferred that instead of sending troops to North Africa, Vargas should arrange with Salazar to replace Portuguese forces on the islands of the Azores and Madeira. Vargas said he was willing to send troops to the Portuguese islands, but stressed that he would not be able to do so “unless you furnish adequate equipment for them... we need equipment from you for our military, naval, and air



Fig. 5.4 Vargas, Roosevelt, and Caffery Natal conversations on the USS Humboldt. (Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. NARA)

force.”⁷⁸ Apparently Roosevelt agreed because when he returned to Washington, the War Department dropped its opposition to a Brazilian combat role and “supported the employment of Brazilian troops aboard.”⁷⁹ The American generals, particularly Eisenhower, had been reluctant to crowd the battlefields with allies of dubious preparation. Also the United States was then struggling to produce enough arms for itself, the United Kingdom, and for Russia. Brazil was not the only one waiting for arms.

It should be recalled that when the war began in 1939 the United States Army was the 17th in size among the world’s armies. It had 174,000 men in the regular army and a like number in the reserves. Its regiments and battalions were understrength and undertrained. Its weaponry was left over from the first great war. Its officer corps was old, the average captains were in their late 30s and early 40s, and they were unprepared to command troops in combat. The general officers who would lead armies in Africa, Europe, and the Far East were still majors and lieutenant colonels. The country’s war-related industries were few. The extensive training

maneuvers held in Louisiana and East Texas in 1940 and 1941 reshaped the officer corps, the army's tactics, and weapons. Brazil faced many of the same problems, but, though it increased its army from 60,000 to 90,000, it held no mammoth training exercises to test the command abilities of its officers and had no industrial base to manufacture the required weapons. It did, however, hold limited exercises at its Saican training grounds in Rio Grande do Sul that organized the troops into an infantry division, which was a step away from the French pattern it had followed through the 1920s and 1930s.⁸⁰

By early December, Góes had become seriously ill and had taken leave of his duties. A strange set of events showed the impatience of some members of the Brazilian elite about Brazil's war role. There were reports that Foreign Minister Aranha and Francisco Assis Chateaubriand, owner of the *Diários Associados* newspapers, were promoting the creation of a "Latin American Volunteer Legion" for overseas service. Chateaubriand, if not Aranha, was convinced that the Estado Novo government would avoid direct involvement in the fighting. "We [have been] transformed into a pile of cowardly frogs," he complained. He was convinced that he could raise 6000 volunteers from Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay to fight on the Allied side. He told the new military attaché, General Claude Adams, that he had a million dollars for initial financing, but needed a guarantee from the United States that it would arm and maintain such troops. He had gone so far as to sound out Colonel Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias about his interest in commanding such a force. Taking the idea to Dutra, for whom he had little regard, the minister threw cold water on the plan, saying that he would order the arrest of any army officer who joined "this Falange that the *Diários Associados* wants to create." He told him to talk to Getúlio.

Chateaubriand met Vargas, at the end of February 1943, at the Palácio Rio Negro, the summer residence in Petrópolis. Vargas showed him copies of telegrams and American documents indicating that he had been following his conversations about a volunteer legion. Without telling him about his discussions with Roosevelt at Natal regarding Brazil's war role, he let him read a Dutra memo proposing an expeditionary force. *Chatô*, as he was nicknamed, must have realized that, although he was king of the Brazilian press, his sources within the secretive military were limited.

The Natal Conference marked a shift in United States policy toward Brazil. Officials in Washington began considering the post-war situation. If another American Republic joined the fighting, it would, they thought,

strengthen the United States position as leader and spokesman for the Western Hemisphere after the war.

Seemingly on cue, the Brazilian army shuffled its regional commanders in what American intelligence observers labeled “the most widespread shake-up in the Brazilian High Command since the outbreak of the war.” General João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes, who had been commanding the 7th Military Region at Recife, was transferred to the more prestigious post of the 2nd Military Region in São Paulo. The Americans had rated him as “an average officer” but pro-democratic.⁸¹ It is worth noting that there was no unity of command among Brazilian forces in the northeast. The army, navy, and air force headquarters operated independently of each other, and there was never a joint regional or theater commander. Combined operations training was not held. Instead a lot of energy was expended on inter-service negotiations.⁸²

An incident shows the looseness of the army’s command structure. Mascarenhas expressed his interest in taking a group of his officers to visit the North African front, an idea General Robert L. Walsh, commander of the newly established US Army Forces South Atlantic (USAFSA), endorsed. Significantly, Mascarenhas had not requested approval from his superiors in Rio de Janeiro. Walsh commented that since Brazil’s entry into the war, “there has been a constantly increasing interest by Brazilian commanders” regarding the part Brazil would play. They “are reacting very definitely and favorably toward our war effort and it is becoming more and more apparent to them that they must participate directly in combat operations across the seas, in conjunction with Allied combat units.” In order to give Brazilian officers an “unvarnished” idea of the realities of combat operations, “the time is ripe,” Walsh recommended, for sending a small number of their officers to North Africa.⁸³ At that time, the thinking in the Brazilian army was that troops from the northeast would be sent to Africa.

Dutra himself was angling for a visit to Eisenhower’s headquarters in North Africa, and Marshall was responding with delay. He was alarmed that too many foreign delegations wanted to engage in war tourism draining Eisenhower’s valuable time. He radioed Adams in Rio, “Delay is due to necessity of making arrangements convenient to Eisenhower. He is swamped with a fierce battle, with other preparations, with visitors from China, England, the United States, and elsewhere. We have to protect him and you must do your part. General Gomez, [sic] representing Brazil, has just been in Africa, so your references to loss of goodwill do not impress

me. A similar Mexican party is just leaving for Africa and every official in Africa is head over heels in work, accommodations limited, planes over-taxed, etc.”⁸⁴

Leaving Rio out of “the picture,” as General Mascarenhas asked General Walsh to do, could have created problems. A serious weakness in the Brazilian army was the strong tendency toward top-down control, with a countervailing tendency for local commanders to act independently whenever possible. And with Góes Monteiro’s illness, Minister of War Dutra was firmly in charge. So much so that American intelligence officers now called the army a “one man show.” Dutra would “not allow any subordinate to make any important decision without his approval.” For Brazil-US military cooperation to work, everything had to be handled directly with him. He enjoyed Vargas’s full confidence so that it was foolhardy to try to go around him. This centralization not only slowed decision-making, it was troubling because Dutra was “surrounded by some staff officers who are unfriendly to the United States and who act as obstructionists.” Dutra himself did not excite American enthusiasm, but he had to be treated with caution. “Although he is retiring” [that is reserved], the intelligence report stated, “and not brilliant, he is very determined.”⁸⁵

It is ironic that Americans tended to distrust Dutra as being pro-German, because he had since becoming minister worked to keep non-Brazilian influences out of the army. He certainly admired the German army, but he was a Brazilian patriot. He and likely many other high-ranking officers were deeply concerned that Brazil could break apart, and to preserve national unity, it was necessary to keep out foreign influences. Such officers believed that ultimately it was only the army that held Brazil together. And so the army’s ranks, especially the officer corps, could not tolerate, even minimally, any “exotic tendency.” Since December 1937 the Vargas government had suppressed German language schools, clubs, and Nazi Party activities in German immigrant communities.⁸⁶ True, Dutra did not focus on Nazism or Germany as threats, but he imposed a kind of racial, religious, and intellectual purity on the officer ranks that appeared uncompromising. He wanted the army to be as completely Brazilian as possible. Immigrants, even Brazilian-born sons of immigrants, were not accepted into the military school, neither were Negroes, Jews, nor Muslims. While this discrimination reflected broader attitudes in society and certainly in the Estado Novo regime, Dutra played a key and personal role in imposing the exclusions. Showing his penchant for control, he went so far as to have doubtful cases in military school admissions sent to his office for decision.⁸⁷

After the successful landings in North Africa in November 1942, the War Department had considered using Brazilian troops in that theater. The State Department wanted to send a Brazilian battalion to the region, but, after studying the matter, the army was reluctant because it feared that if the Brazilians went, other Latin American countries would want to go too; moreover “none could be sent before they [were] ... supplied, reequipped, and properly trained.”⁸⁸ Which other Latin American Republics the army planners had in mind is not clear, nor explained in the archival files. As a result of the Natal Conference, the American Army reconsidered and thereafter supported employing Brazilian troops in combat.

At Natal, Roosevelt had encouraged the idea of Brazil committing troops, telling Vargas that he wanted him with him at the peace table. If Brazil sent its soldiers to fight, it could legitimately claim a larger role in post-war restructuring of the world. After the first war, in which it was an ally but without a combat role, it played a minor part at the peace conference, and although active in the League of Nations, it had resigned in frustration at not obtaining a permanent council seat in 1926. In addition to international reasons, Vargas likely thought that distracting the military with a foreign campaign would give him some political space in which to develop a populist base with which to preserve the gains of the freshly labeled *Estado Nacional*. The dictatorship’s opponents quickly regarded a combat role as guarantee that the regime would not outlast the war. They asserted that Brazilians could not fight against tyranny overseas and return to live under it at home. Although tyranny was likely too strong a term to describe the *Estado Novo*, it certainly was not a democratic government.

Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha saw the war and an expeditionary force as a way to expand Brazil’s historic cooperation with the United States into “a true alliance of destinies.” That policy of cooperation had been, Aranha noted, “a source of security” for Brazil, that by giving the United States assurance of Brazil’s support in international questions, Brazil could “count on them in [South] American ones.” The FEB would, in his view, convince the Americans that Brazil was committed to an alliance “materially, morally, and militarily.” The alliance was his strategy for gaining United States assistance in Brazilian industrialization, which he saw as “the first defense against external and internal danger.” He argued that the FEB was the start of a wider collaboration, involving Brazil’s total military reorganization. Moreover, he did not believe that they could restrict themselves solely to an expeditionary force if they wanted to insure

American involvement in other Brazilian military matters, such as development of the navy and air force, and defense of Southern Brazil. Looking ahead, he believed that Brazil would have to keep its forces mobilized for some time after the peace to help maintain the post-war order. In a cabinet meeting, he asserted that they should work to convince the Americans that “having chosen the road to follow and our companions for the journey we will not change our course or hesitate in our steps.”⁸⁹

For some Brazilian officers, especially the military school graduates of the class of 1917, committing troops would vindicate their not having fought in World War I; it would also revenge the deaths of friends and colleagues killed in German submarine attacks, and, perhaps more importantly, it would increase the military’s effective strength and ability to deal with various contingencies. Among the latter were the strong United States military and naval bases in Northeast Brazil, which the Brazilians wanted to insure that the Americans would vacate after the war; the German immigrant populations in Southern Brazil, which they wanted to be able to control; and, the ever-present fear of Argentina, which was then under a military regime. But the army was not about to ship overseas and trust that all would be well at home or on the frontiers. Its leaders were particularly concerned about Argentina. In July 1943, Minister of War Dutra declared that whatever number of troops went abroad, he wanted an equivalent force left in Brazil “to guarantee sovereignty and the maintenance of order and tranquility here.” Clearly, the home front had to be secure, but to achieve that objective, Brazilian leaders would have to pry sufficient weapons from the Americans, who then were struggling to arm their own troops and those of their Allies already fighting. The Brazilian government decided that it would have to send troops to the battlefields.

Washington favored the idea because if the largest Latin American country fought with the Allies, it would enhance the image of the United States as leader of the hemisphere. The Roosevelt administration also hoped that it would make Brazil a pro-American bulwark in South America. Secretary of State Cordell Hull saw Brazil as a counterweight to Argentina. Both the Brazilians and the Americans adroitly played on the other’s worries about Argentina to bolster their policy goals. But, of course, the closer Brazil and the United States became, the more nervous the Argentines grew.

Some American army leaders were reluctant to accept the Brazilian offer of troops. Their willingness to accommodate the Brazilians was in direct proportion to what they wanted from them. By the end of 1942,

the United States Army had its Brazilian air bases and related supply lines through them to North Africa, so why worry about the Brazilians? A debate took place in American military and diplomatic circles over the merits of accepting or deflecting Brazilian desires. Earlier in 1942, the two governments had considered a Brazilian occupation of French and Dutch Guiana, and, at Natal (Jan. 1943), Roosevelt suggested to Vargas that Brazil replace Portugal's troops in the Azores and Madeira, so that the Portuguese could reinforce their home defenses. Nothing came of that idea, but after the Natal Conference, it was not if Brazil would fight, but where? In mid-April 1943, the Brazilian military representative in Washington, General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, told Chief of Staff George Marshall that Brazil wanted to form a three or four division expeditionary Corps, and, in May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the idea.

It is important to emphasize that the expeditionary force was a Brazilian idea, that it resulted from a calculated policy of the Vargas government and not from an American policy to draw Brazil directly into the fighting.

NOTES

1. Conn and Fairchild, *Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, pp. 318–319; and two unpublished manuscripts “History of US Army Forces South Atlantic,” 34–36, and “History of South Atlantic Division Air Transport Command,” Part I, III, pp. 137–140. These two manuscripts were written by staff historians at the bases in Brazil. There are copies in the US Army, Center for Military History, Washington. The military alliance would endure until 1977.
2. Memo, Marshall to Welles, Washington, May 10, 1942 “Situation in Northeastern Brazil” in Larry I. Bland, Editor, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 3, pp. 193–195; also appears in *Foreign Relations*, 1942, Vol. 5, pp. 659–661.
3. Marshall to Góes Monteiro, Washington, May 12, 1942 in Larry I. Bland, Editor, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 3, p. 196.
4. On the nickname, see Larry L. Bland, Ed, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, vol. 2, “We Cannot Delay,” July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 502–503. <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-lieutenant-colonel-claude-m-adams/> Adams had a heart attack while completing the command course at Ft. Leavenworth. Marshall's correspondence with him shows a close friendship. Adams was from Tennessee and had

- served in the National Guard in World War I and obtained a commission in the Regular Army in 1920. Marshall had requested his transfer from an ROTC assignment at the University of Florida to Vancouver Barracks to be his executive officer. Larry L. Bland, Ed. *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 1, “The Soldierly Spirit” December 1880–June 1939 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 551, note 2. Also Marshall to Mrs. Claude M. Adams, August 24, 1939, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, #2-036 [2: 39–40.] and Marshall to Claude M. Adams, December 28, 1939, #2-093. <http://marshallfoundation.org/library/to-major-claude-m-adams-2/>.
5. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 311–312. As commander Marshall oversaw the area’s CCC activities.
 6. McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, p. 281. For Müller’s biography see “Filinto Müller” in Israel Beloch and Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds. *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983*. Vol. 3 (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1984.), pp. 2342–2346. He retired from the army as a Lt. Colonel in 1947. Later he was elected to the Brazilian senate.
 7. Nelson Werneck Sodré, *Memórias de um Soldado* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1967), p. 207. He labeled the two generals *Nazista*. By the time he wrote he was disenchanted with American Cold War policies and likely let his criticism of the United States affect his historical judgment.
 8. Stanley Hilton, *Oswaldo Aranha, uma biografia* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Objetiva, 1994), p. 398; McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, p. 278; USN, *Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy*, pp. 89–90.
 9. Durval Lourenço Pereira, *Operação Brasil: O Ataque alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015), pp. 133–134. For analysis of Brazilian economic history see Warren Dean, “The Brazilian Economy, 1870–1930” in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Vol. 5, Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 685–724; and the classic Werner Baer, *The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development*, 5th edition (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press/Praeger, 2001).
 10. General Vernon Walters, *The Mighty and the Meek: Dispatches from the Front Line of Diplomacy* (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 2001), p. 172.
 11. In 1936 it was a seven-day trip from New York to Rio on Pan American Airways’ seaplanes. This whole section is based on Durval Lourenço Pereira, *Operação Brasil: O Ataque alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015), pp. 111–149.

12. Two-thirds of Brazil's salt came from Rio Grande do Norte and was shipped by sea to other regions. See *ibid*, p. 136.
13. *Ibid*, p. 138.
14. Colonel Durval is retired from the Brazilian army and has had interest in World War II since his cadet days. His account will likely be definitive. Durval Lourenço Pereira, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 183–191. The American historians were Conn and Fairchild, *Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, pp. 323–324. They had a “pack of ten submarines” attacking coastal shipping. Previously I had assumed that they were correct about ten submarines. Stanley Hilton, *Oswaldo Aranha, uma biografia*, p. 398, said there were eight subs.
15. Elísio Gomes Filho, “u-507: um estudo interpretativo das ações de um submarino alemão nas águas do Brasil,” *Revista Navigator:subsídios para a história marítima do Brasil* Rio de Janeiro, V. 2—No. 3 (Junho de 2006), pp. 56–71.
16. Jürgen Rower, “Operações navais da Alemanha no litoral do Brasil durante A Segunda Guerra Mundial,” *Revista Navigator:subsídios para a história marítima do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, n. 18 (Jan/Dez. 1982), p. 15.
17. See Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 192–193 for a detailed description of the German Navy's Quadrant map system.
18. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 194–197.
19. *Ibid*, p. 199.
20. Samuel E. Morison, *The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943* Vol. 1 of *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 381. The tanks later contributed to the British victory at El Alamein. Convoy AS-4 stopped off at Recife for 40 hours. The Germans knew it was there, but no submarines reached an attack position.
21. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 200–202. Durval used the Submarine Command's operations diary to study the radio messages.
22. Morison, *The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943*, p. 378. The Ingram statement was from September 1941. He went on to say that as a port, Salvador da Bahia was far superior to Recife in every way except for location. It was 400 miles further south from the United States.
23. For the atmosphere and occurrences in Bahia during this time, see Consuelo Novais Sampaio, “A Bahia na Segunda Guerra Mundial,” *Olho da História: Revista da Teoria, Cultura, Cinema e Sociedades*, UFBA. <http://www.ufba.br/search/node/Bahia%20na%20Segunda%20Guerra%20Mundial>.
24. The data on numbers of sinkings by so few captains is from Durval, *Operação Brasil*, p. 210. *U-boat net* listed Schacht as a “top U-boat Ace.” Site lists U-507 movements. In four patrols the vessels it had sunk were

- seven American, one Norwegian, one Swedish, two Ho, three British, and six Brazilian. <http://uboat.net/men/schacht.htm>.
25. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 208–213.
 26. Ibid, p. 217. The question of responsibility is mixed up in orders and counterorders. The effect of the sinkings on the coastal population was deep and striking. The rumor that the submarine was American apparently had one root in Northeast Brazil. See Luiz Antônio Pinto Cruz and Lina Maria Brandão de Aras, “Submarinos alemães ou nort-americanos nos malafogados de Sergipe (1942–1945):” *Navigator* 17, pp. 69–81; and by same authors “A guerra submarina na costa sergipana” *Revista Navigator* 15, pp. http://www.revistanavigator.com.br/navig15/art/N15_art1.pdf.
 27. In February and March, the following were sunk in the Atlantic off the United States: *Cabedelo*, *Buarque*, *Olinda*, *Aratutã*, and *Cairu*. From May to July, they were followed by seven more in the Caribbean: *Parnaíba*, *Gonçalves Dias*, *Alegrete*, *Pedrinhas*, *Tamandaré*, *Piave*, and *Barbacena*. Many of these were attacked near the islands of Trinidad, Tobago, and Barbados. Each incident was carefully reported on by Brazilian diplomats, who also interviewed survivors. The reports and interviews are in Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *O Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, Vol. II (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944), pp. 61–148. For overall context, see Victor Tempone, “A Batalha do Atlântico e o Brasil na II Guerra Mundial,” http://www.revistanavigator.com.br/navig18/art/N18_art3.pdf.
 28. The *SS Seatrain Texas* left New York on July 29, without escort or convoy for the 18-day voyage to Cape Town. It had air cover for a few days. Orders for the risky solo voyage came from FDR himself. At that point the beleaguered British had only 70 tanks to face Rommel’s Panzers. See “American Merchant Marine at War” www.usmm.org. 1998–2001. <http://www.usmm.org/images/seatrainroute.gif>. See also Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 269–273.
 29. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 1423.
 30. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, p. 158. “Dois disparos para prevenir qualquer possibilidade de transmissão de rádio pelo vapor.”
 31. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 152–161. Jürgen Rohwer, *Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two: German, Italian and Japanese Submarine Successes, 1939–1945* (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), p. 116. This is the definitive listing of all sinkings. For various details of the Baependy sinking, see Elísio Gomes Filho, “u-507: um estudo interpretativo das ações de um sumbarino alemão nas águas do Brasil,” *Navigator*, Rio de Janeiro, V. 2 – No. 3, (Junho de 2006), p. 61.
 32. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 162–163.

33. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 165–166.
34. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, p. 167.
35. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, p. 168.
36. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, p. 169.
37. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 170–171.
38. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 173–176. For photos of U-Boats see http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/ra/mega/Pub/GP/p3/2012/08/25/VidaCidadania/Imagens/submarino_alemao_240812.jpg.
39. For a close-up of what happened in Fortaleza and elsewhere, see José Henrique de Almeida Braga, *Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará* (Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), pp. 129–136.
40. John F. Simmons, Counselor of Embassy and Consul General, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3121, (forwards cable from Fortaleza); 832.00/4242, Simmons, Rio, August 18, 1942, Telegram 3091 (forwards cable from Vitória), 832.00/4238; Walker, Pará, August 18, 1942, 832.00/4244; Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942 m, Telegram 3118 (forwards cable from Manaus), 832.00/4245; Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3126 (forwards cable from Porto Alegre) 832.00/4247; Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3124 (forwards cable from Natal), 832.00/4248; Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3127 (forwards cable from São Paulo), 832.00/4249 all RG 59, NARA.
41. Durval, *Operação Brasil*, pp. 295–299. The captured British captains on board U-507 and their ships were James Stewart (SS *Oakbank*), Donald MacCallum (SS *Baron Dechmont*), and Frank H. Fenn (SS *Yorkwood*). See also José Henrique de Almeida Braga, *Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará* (Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), p. 425.
42. Caffery, Rio, August 28, 1942, Telegram 3296, 832.00/4268, RG 59, NARA.
43. Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), pp. 502–504.
44. Caffery, Rio, August 28, 1942, Telegram 3296, 832.00/4268, RG 59, NARA.
45. Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3122, 832.00/4346, RG 59, NARA. Aranha asked that Caffery, then in Washington, be informed that “Brazil will declare war on Germany tomorrow.” Simmons, Rio, August 21, 1942, Telegram 3182, 832.00/4254, RG59, NARA. See also *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, American Republics*, V, pp. 666 ff.
46. A.D. Struble, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Memo for State Department, August 25, 1942, 832.20/434, RG 59, NARA.
47. Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), p. 507.

48. Caffery, Rio, September 1, 1942, Airgram 203, 740.0011 European War 1939/24081, RG 59, NARA. The decree suspended Constitutional articles 122, 136, 137, 138, 156, and 175. For a discussion of *Estado de Guerra* see Patricia Aparecida Ferreira & Rodrigo Borges de Barros, “O Papel das Forças Armadas na Defesa Nacional” (Universidade de Uberaba, MG, 2016), pp. 6–9. http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/cadn/artigos/xiii_cadn/o_papel_das_forças_armadas_na_defesa_nacional.pdf.
49. Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), p. 509.
50. Simmons, Rio September 4, 1942, #8367, 832.20/437 and Caffery, Rio, September 7, 1942, Airgram 249,832.20/440, RG59, NARA.
51. The 7th Pack Artillery was on board with all its equipment. Among the passengers were the wives and children of the unit’s officers and soldiers. There is a report on the Seventh Group of the army’s pack artillery located outside Recife: Major Charles H. Dayhuff, Recife, July 21, 1943, 6010, G2 Regional Brazil, MMB, RG165, NARA. There is a survivor’s account of the terrifying event: <http://www.brasilmergulho.com.br/port/naufragios/artigos/2005/019.shtml>.
52. Military Intelligence Division, War Dept. General Staff, MID 6300, 745,009, Aug. 26, 1942, G2 Regional, WFRC, RG165, NARA. An OSS report, Sept 18, 1942, #22875, RG226 (Office of Strategic Services), NA, said that though Dutra has signed it, the proclamation had been written by Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro. Dutra had reportedly opposed the recognition of the state of war. The text of his proclamation is in Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, *Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), pp. 504–505.
53. “Area Controller, MID 350-05 9-11-42 (7-23-41)” Extract, September 11, 1942, 6300, G2 Files, Box 273, RG165, NARA.
54. Randolph Harrison Jr. (2nd Secretary), Rio, October 4, 1940, 3697 “Anti-Nazi Demonstration at Brazilian Military Academy” 6300, G-2 Regional Brazil, Box 273, RG165, NARA. The German military attaché, General Gunther Niedenfuhr, had offered the films and was present at the showing. Hitler’s appearance caused “pandemonium” to break loose and caused the session to be ended. The school’s commander reprimanded the cadets and suspended leave for a week. The cadet who participated was Octavio Pereira da Costa, who said that the incident showed that “the great majority of the cadets positioned themselves in a irrefutable manner in favor of liberty and democracy.” *História Oral do Exército na Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2001), Vol. 5, p. 23.
55. Extract, Military Attaché Weekly Estimate of Stability, No. 4548, September 30, 1942, 6300, G2 Regional, Box 273, RG165, NARA. He

- gave the names of the officers and their positions. A study comparing such officers with their personnel files would be interesting. Oddly, he said that pro-German feelings were strong in the Coast Artillery, which had been advised by American officers since 1934.
56. The comment about the *Tenentes* in the class of 1942 is from Captain Richard T. Cassidy (Asst. Mil. Attaché), Rio de Janeiro, October 22, 1942: "Brazilian Army Officers to Visit the U.S. [for training]" Report 6979, 6770, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA. He indicated which ones were "*tenentes*". For the so-called *tenente* movement, see McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 209–211, 260–277.
 57. The Atlantic Charter was a statement of post-war aims drawn up by FDR and Churchill at their shipboard meeting off of Newfoundland in August 1941 that asserted the right of all peoples to choose their form of government, freedom of the seas, freedom from want and fear, disarmament of aggressor nations, and renounced territorial aggrandizement.
 58. Integralism was a Fascist-like movement in Brazil in the 1930s. See Marcus Klein, *Our Brazil Will Awake! The Ação Integralista Brasileira and the Failed Quest for Fascist Order in the 1930s* (Amsterdam: Cuadernos del CEDLA, 2004). The classic study is Hêlgio Trindade, *Integralismo: o fascismo brasileiro na década de 30* (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1974).
 59. "Estillac Leal," Beloch, Israel, & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds. *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983* (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1984), Vol. 2, 1753; Claude M. Adams, military attaché, Rio, Nov. 6, 1942, G2 Regional Brazil 5900, RG165, NARA. This report was important enough to be forwarded to Chief of Staff Marshall immediately; see W. Sexton, Memo for Chief of Staff, Nov. 6, 1942, OPD 336 Brazil (11-5-42) (Sec I), MMB, RG 165, NARA. For an idea of the general staff school's program, see translation of a Brazilian army document, "Program of Instruction for the School Year 1943–1944," General Staff, Directorate of Instruction, 6740, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA. The censorship agency, DIP, also doubled as the government propaganda arm: see "Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda" Israel & Abreu, eds. *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro*, Vol. 2, 1076–1079. Leal rose to be a prominent general commanding at Natal in 1943. In the second Vargas government in 1951, he was minister of war.
 60. Col. Claude M. Adams, Rio, December 3, 1942, Report # 4683, MID: "Movement of Group of Military Officers," 6210, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
 61. Col. Claude M. Adams, Rio, December 12, 1942, #4716, 6905, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.

62. *Correio da Manhã*, Rio, December 23, 1942.
63. Col. Claude M. Adams, Rio, December 21, 1942, #4738: "Pro-Allied Political Faction in the Army," 6110, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
64. *Diário Carioca*, Rio, December 24, 1942; text of Dec 31 speech is in Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1938–1947), IX, pp. 323–327.
65. Roosevelt to Vargas, n.p., December 24, 1942, President's Personal File 4473 (Vargas), Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, NY. For the American Ambassador's review of the political-military situation at the start of 1943, see Jefferson Caffery, Rio, February 6, 1943, 832.00/4349, NARA.
66. Eurico Dutra to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, January 6, 1943, APG, Caixa II, Pasta 4, Doc 2, Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro.
67. Probably the best account of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at Casablanca is Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 674–693.
68. Caffery, Rio, January 6, 1943, 832.001 Vargas, Getúlio/134 ½: telegram, and Memorandum, FDR to S. Welles, Washington, January 8, 1943 832.001 Vargas, Getúlio/134 2/3 in *FRUS, 1943*, Vol. V, pp. 653–654.
69. Aranha to Vargas, Rio, January 25, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC-Rio.
70. Aranha to Eurico Dutra, Rio, August 11, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC-Rio.
71. Aranha to Vargas, Rio, January 25, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC-Rio. This document is one of the most important in the history of Brazilian foreign relations. Aranha had let Ambassador Caffery read it, so he was able to brief Roosevelt exactly as to Brazilian thinking before he sat down with Vargas. For more detailed analysis and listing of the 11 objectives, see McCann, *Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 304–309. For the Brazilian edition: *Aliança Brasil-Estados Unidos, 1937–1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1995), 242–246.
72. Caffery to Roosevelt, Rio, Feb. 9, 1943, President's Secretary File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, NY; on Brazil's cooperation see Caffery to Sec. of State, Rio de Janeiro, January 30, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/27590; Telegram in *Foreign Relations 1943*, Vol. V, 655–656. Caffery was present during the conversations.
73. Caffery, Rio, January 30, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/27588: Telegram in *FRUS, 1943*, Vol. V, p. 656.
74. Oliver La Farge, *The Eagle in the Egg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1949), p. 150. As a Reserve Lt. Colonel, La Farge was the Air Transport Command's chief historian. He was a noted anthropologist and Pulitzer Prize (1929) novelist. For a pictorial history, mixed with memories of a navy man, regarding US military in northeast, see John R. Harrison,

- Fairwing Brazil: Tales of South Atlantic in World War II* (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Publishing, 2014), pp. 24–73, 182–224.
75. Press release, Natal, Jan. 30, 1943, in “Política Exterior do Brasil, 1938–1944,” Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC-Rio. For analysis of the Natal Conference and its relationship to Casablanca, see Hélio Silva, *1944: O Brasil na Guerra* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1974), pp. 45–61. For images of Natal and FDR with Getúlio, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-fkffohEIEc> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MdGxLvxG4wA>.
 76. BG Gustavo Cordeiro de Farias (Commander of Inf. Div. 14 & Natal Garrison), Natal, February 1, 1943: “Conferencia dos 2 Presidentes em Natal,” *Relatório*, Acervo Pessoal General Góes, Caixa II, Pasta 4, Doc 7, Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro. The Vargas “host” comment is from Caffery to Sec. of State, Rio de Janeiro, January 30, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/27588; Telegram in *Foreign Relations 1943*, Vol. V, 655–656. It is noteworthy that Vargas flew to Natal in an American aircraft, in the company of Admiral Ingram. He did have two Brazilian aides with him.
 77. The Rio embassy created a clipping file of newspaper stories and editorials: “News Summary for week ending February 4, 1943,” 832.9111/34, National Archives. See also “Natal,” *Brazil*, 17, No. 172 (March 1943), 19.
 78. Caffery to Roosevelt, Rio, Feb. 9, 1943, President’s Secretary File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, NY. As it turned out, the British were not pleased with the idea and arranged with Salazar for their forces to go to the islands. On Portugal, see Hugh Kay, *Salazar and Modern Portugal* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1970).
 79. Caffery, Rio, Jan. 30, 1943, 740.0011 EW 1939/27588, NA. The summary of the Vargas-FDR conversations is about as detailed as the record allows. The fullest documentary record is in “Conference between President Roosevelt and President Vargas of Brazil at Natal” in *Foreign Relations 1943*, Vol. V, 653–658.
 80. For Brazil’s mobilization, see Manoel Thomaz Castello Branco, *O Brasil na II Grande Guerra* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1960), pp. 77–79. On army training, officer education, and the influence of the French Military Mission, see McCann, *The Soldiers of the Pátria*, pp. 241–253.
 81. Captain T. L. Ridge (USMC, Asst. Naval Attaché), Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1942, OSS Files 20,128, MMB, RG226, NARA. Mascarenhas described the problems he faced as regional commander at Recife in his *Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes: Memórias* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1969), Vol. 1, pp. 110–116. He had about 50,000 under his command, all in fixed and small-scale urban military posts. Such facilities lacked space for combat training.

82. Mascarenhas complained to his staff about the lack of unity of command; see Carlos Meira Mattos, *O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua Época* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1983), Vol. 1, pp. 82–83. The author was the general's aide de camp.
83. Lt. Colonel John M. Raymond (MIS) to Ch. of Staff USAFSA, Recife, January 13, 1943, "Changes in Brazilian High Command" OPD 319.1 Brazil, MMB, RG 165 and BG R.L. Walsh to Colonel Kenner F. Hartford (Operations Division, Gen. Staff), Recife, January 14, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (Sec I) MMB, RG165, NARA. Walsh commented that Mascarenhas "desires to not bring Rio into the picture." Walsh had also spoken to Gen. Marshall about arranging a visit to North Africa for General Eduardo Gomes, air force commander in the northeast, whom Walsh considered an important ally. He thought that such a trip would strengthen Gomes's position in the prestige jockeying going on in Brazil. Not long after that, Gomes did in fact go to Africa at the invitation of General Eisenhower. See Military Attaché (Rio), "Weekly Estimate of Stability," Report No.5094, March 23, 1943, 6300, G2 Regional Brazil, RG 165, NARA.
84. Marshall to Brigadier General Claude M. Adams, Washington, April 16, 1943 Radio No. 872 Secret, "From Marshall to Adams for his eyes only. Reference your 1028 regarding Dutra." OPD 336 Brazil, RG165, NARA.
85. Military Attaché (Rio), "Weekly Estimate of Stability," Report No. 4968, February 23, 1943, 6300 G2 Regional Brazil, RG 165, NARA.
86. The anti-Nazi campaign was publicized at the time, see Aurélio da Silva Py, *A 5a Coluna no Brasil: A Conspiração Nazi no Rio Grande do Sul* (Porto Alegre: 1942). The government had expelled the German Ambassador Karl Ritter for his protests against the anti-Nazi policies. The campaign was studied in William N. Simonson's "Nazi Infiltration in South America, 1933–1945" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School, Tufts University, 1964) and in Priscila Ferreira Perazzo, "O perigo alemão e a repressão policial no Estado Novo." *Revista Histórica*, Vol. 3, no. 4 (jul/2001), pp. 69–73.
87. Fernando da Silva Rodrigues, "Discriminação e intolerância: os indesejáveis na seleção dos oficiais do Exército Brasileiro (1937–1946)." *Antíteses*, vol. 1, no. 2, (jul.-dez. de 2008), pp. 464–465 <http://www.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/antiteses> The full article is on pp. 455–474.
88. Minutes, War Council meeting, December 16, 1942, Secretary of War Conference Binder 2, Office of Chief of Staff Records, RG 165, NARA.
89. Oswaldo Aranha to Eurico Dutra, Rio, August 11, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC. He wrote this to Dutra who was then visiting the United States to negotiate details of the FEB. He admitted that such a close alliance carried dangers potentially incompatible with Brazilian sovereignty and interests, but that it was the course with the fewest risks and greatest security. It was a lesser evil and they would have to be constantly vigilant to avoid pitfalls.



The Brazilian Expeditionary Force: The Smoking Cobras

As 1942 ended the American forces in North Africa, under General Marshall's deputy, Dwight Eisenhower, had taken Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers and were advancing on Tunisia. The French fleet at Toulon had been scuttled by its crews to keep the ships out of German hands. The British Eighth Army took Tripoli and in the first week of February Eisenhower was made commander of all Allied forces in North Africa. In a fluctuating struggle, the Americans were first pushed back at the Kasserine Pass, but then days later they stopped Rommel's Afrika Korps. In April and early May, American and British armies encircled the 250,000 Axis troops in Tunisia and took their surrender. They went on to invade Sicily, and by August 17 they controlled the island which provided the springboard for assaults on the Italian peninsula and Sardinia making the Mediterranean safer for Allied shipping. The Brazilians would have to move more quickly to get into the fighting.

In mid-April 1943, President Vargas wrote to General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, the army representative on the mixed defense commission in Washington, authorizing him to discuss with the War Department the formation of a Brazilian Expeditionary Force. Vargas said that such a force would consist of a maximum of three infantry divisions, one armored and motorized division, plus suitable supporting troops and a fighter squadron. The president estimated that it would take nine to twelve months to train these expeditionary troops "if equipment is made available." Leitão

de Carvalho formally presented the letter to General Marshall on April 19. Major General James G. Ord, who chaired the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission, analyzed the situation for the chief of staff. He took care to say that he did not believe that the proposal was “motivated by a desire to obtain larger quantities of Lend-Lease materiel from the United States.” He pointed out that “our own supply and shipping problems preclude the immediate formation of any sizeable Brazilian Expeditionary Force.” However, the fact that Vargas recognized that at least a year of training would be required made “it difficult to refuse at this time to discuss plans for possible future use of Brazilian troops in extra-continental theaters of operations.”¹ Marshall was suitably grateful and promised that the proposal “would receive careful and prompt consideration.” Leitão de Carvalho for his part pressed Ord to begin planning immediately.

General Ord stressed the importance of the Brazilian proposal:

This is a major decision by Brazil to take an active part in the war [and] has the appearance of being both realistic and sincere. The significance of this step, both from a military as well as a political viewpoint, cannot fail to affect profoundly Brazil-United States relations, not only during the war but also during the post-war period. Brazil's position as the dominant South American nation and definite stand on the side of the United States cannot be overlooked in the consideration of plans for both the conduct of the war and the negotiations at the peace table.² (emphasis added)

By April 1943, the idea of a Brazilian expeditionary corps had the backing of key policy makers of the two countries. At that time North Africa was the favored projected zone of employment, but in truth the actual zone was secondary in most discussions. The idea was to get the Brazilians into combat. Marshall agreed with the proposal and sent it on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who approved it in principle in the first week of May.³ The Americans nodded positively, but were worried that equipping such a force would be difficult.

REORGANIZING THE BRAZILIAN ARMY FOR WAR

In 1943, the Brazilian army did not have standing divisions ready for intensified training and transportation, but rather it was organized in static geographic regional commands which presided over dispersed regimental-sized units. These in turn were quartered in barracks that often had scant

room to receive additional mobilized troops, and the surrounding grounds had little space for training of the sort the American army was then receiving. Moreover, most of the barracks were in urban areas. And because the troops were mainly drafted from the locality, to form a division from one region would place a politically unacceptable sacrifice on that region. Considerable reorganization was necessary to create division-sized units ready to fight abroad.

On May 8, Minister of War Dutra gave the inaugural address on the Mutual Broadcasting System's new hook-up from Brazil to some 227 radio stations in the United States. In appropriately flowery language, he gave a deep historical context to the Brazilian-American alliance saying: "We are the allies of the country of Washington, and we wish to contribute our small but resistant grain of sand to the magnificent monument which you are erecting at this moment of the world's history." Then he quoted the words that José Joaquim de Maia wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1786: "In the present state of affairs, we look, and with reason, only to the United States, and we shall follow its example, for nature, making us inhabitants of the same continent has bound us together as though we were all of one common country."⁴

While Dutra was reassuring Americans of Brazil's sincerity in wishing to send troops into combat, General Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, interventor in the important frontier state of Rio Grande do Sul, gave a speech on May 1 exhorting the *Gaúcho* state with its many army posts to make ready for active participation in the war. A few days later, he told the American consul in Porto Alegre that it would strengthen the power of the United States to speak for the Americas in the post-war conferences if Brazil "shed its blood in the struggle." He confided to the consul that he hoped to be relieved of his political duties so he could return to active military service, which, of course, is what happened.⁵

The generals seemed to be accepting the American alliance and the possibility of combat operations, but at the key army base, Vila Militar in Rio de Janeiro, fascist *Integralista* propagandists were at work. The reservists who had been called to duty included "a fairly large proportion of Green Shirts." A large number of Brazilian officers were "not openly pro-German [but] were great admirers of the German Military Organization." The *Integralistas* cautioned their adherents to keep strict discipline so as to gain the confidence of unit officers. They did not use any printed propaganda, everything was oral. They were particularly friendly to reservists. They whispered complaints about the very bad food and inadequate

accommodations and spread the story that the generals who drew Brazil into the war had been “bought by the Americans”; and that money that should have been used to feed and house them was going to buy more and more officers. Unfortunately regular officers, especially junior and non-commissioned officers, showed “marked ill-will” toward middle-class reservists. These fellows did not help their cause by acting uppity “trying to impose their ‘doctoral’ status upon the corporals, the sergeants and sometimes even other officers.” In that era, educated men in Brazil were often addressed as “doctor” even when they did not hold such a degree.

Integralista officers had instructions “to show every possible sympathy towards the reservists in the way of granting leaves easily, conferring exemptions and other small ‘acts of comradeship’, which, little by little, win over the unmilitary reservists.” Discontent was “specially felt in the units of the Villa Militar where the propaganda [had] been more active.” As a result a noticeable number of military personnel in Rio de Janeiro, according to a well-informed source, made little effort and “still are not convinced that we are in this to the finish, wherever that may be, probably on the other side of the Atlantic.” The situation was made worse by the fact that many “real soldiers” had been sent to units in north and Northeast Brazil. This discouraging report ended by listing four *Integralista* ring-leaders at Vila Militar.⁶

General Ord flew down from Washington to make an extensive inspection of Brazilian units in Rio de Janeiro, Recife, and Natal in June 1943. He noted the depth of French influence in the planning and execution of tactical operations.⁷ From his observations he commented that “French ideas of defense and counter-stroke, rather than seizing the initiative have been impressed on the Brazilian Army.” After observing a number of infantry and artillery training operations, he noted that infantry training was similar to that used by the French before the war. There were some notable problems: the differences between defensive and offensive machine gun fire was not always well understood; riflemen were not trained to fire at every opportunity; local maneuver by small units was seldom used; in the northeast many soldiers dressed in badly worn or torn uniforms; the lack of an infantry school was apparent; “they need a more realistic type of training”; and the offensive use of tanks and defense against tanks was not well understood. At the Belém Air Base, the anti-aircraft units had been “trained in the theory [of] firing at airplanes, but have had no training [firing at actual] ... towed targets.” The mix of artillery pieces was extreme. “The artillery weapons are French, German, English, and now United

States. Standardization is badly needed.” He concluded with three points: “The Air and Ground Forces are so completely separate and independent that there is practically no cooperation outside the Belém garrison”; “Brazil has a real army, and it should be able to fight well, if given four to eight months of modernized training per division”; “the question of the durability of the Brazilian soldier under modern air and artillery pounding can only be settled by the test of war.”⁸ Three days after Ord wrote the foregoing comments, arrangements were completed to send the first group of 57 officers by air to army schools in the United States.⁹

That there had been a sea change in the opinions of key Brazilian generals can be exemplified by General Gustavo Cordeiro de Farias, commandant of the Natal garrison. The American consul at Natal, Harold Sims, analyzed the change in General Gustavo in the two years that he had known him. The general had spent 1939–1940 in Germany as head of the Brazilian purchasing commission. He had been responsible for assembling the largest arms purchase Brazil had ever made. The Nazis had showered him and his family with “meticulous care and attention.” He was profoundly angry with the British as the result of its navy seizing the purchased arms on the Brazilian ship *Siqueira Campos* in 1940. That seizure nearly caused a break in relations with the British. When he arrived at Natal in November 1941, “he was notoriously famous among his own countrymen as a rabid pro-Nazi, and he himself left no doubt in the mind of anyone as to his admiration for Germany.” Some in Natal considered him “more German than Brazilian.” After the arrival of the US Naval Patrol Squadron in December 1941 and definitely after Brazil broke relations with Germany at the Rio Conference in January, “the General turned off his Nazi enthusiasm and turned on his American enthusiasm.” He began referring to Harold Sims as “Nosso [our] Consul” and sharing his prized private stock of Scotch with him. Sims thought him to be “a first rate soldier” much respected by his troops, but noted that he was “an opportunist, intelligent, astute, and possesses an uncanny knowledge of the political and economic factors of the present war.” He was “fervently anxious that the Brazilian Army participate” in the war. Sims thought that he had been most helpful to US military and naval activities at Natal, but he cautioned “that his cooperative attitude developed only after the Vargas government joined the ranks of the allied nations.” It would be foolhardy to think that he was the only Brazilian officer who changed his views in such fashion.¹⁰

As the Brazilians began to assemble and send to the United States the officers who would command expeditionary force units, the American army collected information on exactly who they were, especially what their ideological leanings were. Among a list of 22 officers then in American service schools, some like Lt. Colonels Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco and Aurelio de Lyra Tavares were unquestionably pro-ally, while others such as Colonel Aguinaldo Caiado de Castro and Lt. Colonel Ivano Gomes were considered pro-German. Altogether 13 were rated as pro-American or pro-ally, while the rest were pro-German or dubious. Of course, Lt. Col. Castello Branco became the force's operations officer, and Col. Caiado de Castro commanded the 1st Infantry Regiment, so what did the Americans intend to do with such evaluations?¹¹

By July 1943, Brazilian officers anxious to get into the fight were concerned that the process was moving too slowly. Some disparaged the Vargas government's attitude as lackadaisical. Realizing that they could not take untrained troops into combat, they were frustrated that each day the army lost in organizing an intensive training schedule could not be recovered. They feared that their war would be over before they could get into battle against Germany and Italy. Other officers complained that they had accepted assignment to the northeast thinking that those units would be the first sent to a combat zone, but the decision to keep those divisions in Brazil meant that what they laughingly called the "Battle of Recife" would be all the action they would see. They predicted that when the war ended the Vargas regime would be overthrown. As one officer expressed their attitude: "we want democracy in Brazil and we are going to get it."¹²

It was very odd, with all this activity, that there was no official public announcement that the expeditionary force was being organized until August 1943. And that seems to have been provoked when a group of university students in Rio de Janeiro wrote President Vargas offering to join such a force and the newspapers reported it.¹³

It is equally odd that with so much to do to prepare his forces, in August Minister of War Dutra took time to go to the United States for an extensive tour of army facilities. This was the first time he had ever left Brazil, so it was probably an expansive experience and it certainly convinced him that his government had been correct to follow Aranha's advice and not his. Perhaps that change of heart was symbolized by his decision to take Aranha's son Oswaldo, a volunteer soldier, along as interpreter.¹⁴ As Dutra flew north, the one-half of an infantry division's equipment to be used to train the three divisions of the expeditionary

corps was en route to Brazil. The 53 officers who would serve as unit commanders, division staff, and various support services were then undergoing courses at US Army schools and training centers and would return to Brazil around October 1. Because many of the American interpreters spoke Spanish rather than Portuguese, one wonders how efficient the learning was. The mixed commission and the Brazilian General Staff had reached an informal agreement that the expeditionary force would be under the strategic direction and command of the United States Army. The Brazilians made clear that they did not wish to serve under British command. The War Department also decided that "if and when Brazilian troops are sent overseas," they would be employed in the European-African theaters. Most likely that would mean in the Mediterranean area.¹⁵ It is interesting that at the highest levels of the American military, the expression "if and when" was being used.

Meeting with Marshall on September 2, 1943, Dutra raised the question of when and where the force would be sent. They discussed whether the first division should go as soon as it was trained, or should they wait until all three could go as a full corps? From Marshall's point of view, it would depend on available equipment and shipping. He wanted to see the leading division start overseas in February or March. Dutra thought that two other factors had to be considered, namely, "Brazil's desire that the force should be more than symbolic; and the psychological effect of the sending of a large force so that people would not say, 'One echelon has gone, and that's the only one.'" He added that his government "would prefer to wait until the Second and Third Divisions were well along with their training." Holding off until the entire corps could be sent would simplify the War Department's shipping problem. Dutra agreed that such a delay was reasonable. Where the force would go, of course, would depend on the strategic situation some months hence, but it appeared that the Mediterranean would be likely. Marshall assured Dutra that "the place where they would be used would be carefully chosen because of the importance of the event." Marshall observed that he had 60 divisions in the United States, "some of which had been in training for more than three years." The American army now totaled about 8,000,000. Was he subtly telling Dutra that training was a slow process? They also discussed Dutra's desire to get some modern tanks and anti-tank weapons. Marshall commented that some of the divisions in the States were being held to 50% of basic equipment and that they were rearming French divisions in Africa, Polish ones in the Near East, and large shipments were going to

Russia. He did not say no, but he did not say yes. He ended by telling Dutra that “the war must be fought to the bitter end of unconditional surrender.”¹⁶

In mid-October, there was a key discussion in the American General Staff regarding the timing of shipping the Brazilians overseas. Colonel Kenner Hertford, who had been following Brazilian matters, closely as chief of the Western Hemisphere section of the General Staff’s Operations Division (OPD),¹⁷ argued that the first Brazilian division would be ready for movement in late December 1943 and that the Brazilian government would prefer an early date. Brigadier General John E. Hull of the War Department’s Operations Division admitted that “the advantage from a political standpoint of sending Brazilian troops overseas is self-evident.” But General Hull doubted that “the equipment situation will ever permit the training of three divisions at one time in Brazil,” and although Dutra and Marshall had agreed that the corps should be sent as a unit, “I personally don’t think that it is practicable... furnishing of enough equipment to train three divisions in Brazil is, in my opinion, out of the question.” The divisions would have to be sent with some interval between them. Staging for the Normandy invasion (Operation *Overlord*) would be consuming all available shipping for months ahead. Hull suggested that “unless the Brazilians themselves request one of their divisions be sent overseas earlier than next May, June, or July we should take no further action at this time....” He recommended the “target date of May 15, 1944 for moving the first Brazilian division overseas.”¹⁸

The question of departure date bedeviled relations between the two countries for months. Colonel Hertford asked Military Attaché Adams for his opinion concerning the possible Brazilian reaction to the idea of sending a Brazilian division to North Africa for training, to be followed by a second one shortly thereafter. The seemingly straightforward question produced some confusion and consternation, and maybe a heart attack, in the US Embassy. The attaché asked Ambassador Caffery, who took the question to Vargas, who liked the idea and accepted it “in principle.” The president then wondered if they should not reconsider sending several generals to the United States for general staff training. Their departure date was approaching. The Operations Division (OPD) in Washington had only wanted advice, not action; it wanted “information concerning Brazil’s sincerity [regarding] active participation in the war before any action was initiated in Washington to obtain specific approval for the employment of Brazilian troops.” The question was being asked because

the Brazilian Aviation Minister Joaquim P. Salgado Filho had refused “the specific proposal to equip and train a fighter squadron of the Brazilian Air Force for service overseas.” The tension on the American side likely contributed to Attaché Adams falling ill with “coronary occlusions” which required his return to the States.¹⁹ The Operations Division hoped there would be no change in sending the generals because the training was “an essential preliminary to possible joint operations.” OPD’s General Hull cautioned that “it should be thoroughly understood that plans for sending Brazilian troops overseas will have to be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that problems of shipping and the like are not yet resolved.”²⁰ The War Department was “unwilling to put the proposition before the Chiefs of Staff ... until it knows that Brazil actually does want to send troops into combat areas and finds acceptable the pattern of operation suggested.” Colonel Hertford commented that Generals Eisenhower and Clark had said that “they would be glad to have them and could use them.” But he worried that the “good atmosphere in the War Department ... may change, depending upon the progress of the war. For one or another reason General Marshall and General Eisenhower may lose interest.” He believed that the Brazilians should make their interest clear. This did not mean “that we think Brazil should be persuaded that it should send troops” only that it would be well for them to proceed.²¹ This dialogue shows that the Americans were avoiding saying anything that would put pressure on the Brazilians. The decision to send troops into combat had to be theirs.

Dutra told Ambassador Caffery that he understood that “no definite plans can be made without the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff” but that the Brazilian army was “making all preparations and will be ready to send the first division in December.”²² What is strange here is that Dutra knew in October that the First Expeditionary Division could not be transported in December, and most likely not until May or June 1944. He mounted a charade, asking that the Americans not tell “anybody else because he did not want the Brazilian Army to know of this change in plans.” Assistant Military Attaché Richard Cassidy thought that Dutra wanted to wait until December to tell the army that the division was not ready to embark.²³

There was still the problem of the Brazilian public’s perception of the idea of the expeditionary force. The *Time* magazine reporter in Rio de Janeiro, Jane Gray Braga, told the military attaché that American army personnel were “more enthusiastic about the Brazilian Expeditionary

Force than the Brazilians themselves. Many Brazilians laugh at the idea and consider the whole plan as typical Latin American optimism and wishful thinking.” A sarcastic remark making the rounds in Rio de Janeiro quipped that if such a force actually reached a war zone, the Brazilians would be “used to police occupied territories.” Mrs. Braga observed that if that happened, it “would be fatal and offending to their national pride. They expect to fight...”²⁴

Rumors were also flying regarding who would command the expeditionaries. Dutra wanted to be corps commander, although “the general opinion in Brazil” was that the logical man was General Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, who was “young, energetic, capable and, unlike his brother Gustavo, very pro-American.”²⁵ The army’s intelligence office in Miami detailed a colonel to assist and entertain Brazilian officers passing through that city. He reported a conversation with General Dutra in which the minister had mentioned as possible commanders Generals João B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, José Pessoa Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, and Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias. Ambassador Carlos Martins in Washington opined that “Vargas would select the Commander as late as possible ... when the force was ready to leave the country.” He thought it unwise “to place anyone in command of the largest South American army, on South American soil.”²⁶ It is strange that Dutra did not admit that in August 1943 he had invited Mascarenhas, who was then commanding the 2nd Military Region (São Paulo), to command one of the corps’ divisions and that he had immediately accepted.²⁷

After all of the bureaucratic and diplomatic infighting, it was disturbing that the massing and training of the expeditionary force had not yet begun! Indeed, only in late October 1943 was the site of the training grounds selected. For a time Resende in the state of Rio de Janeiro, which would soon be the site of the new military school, had been under consideration, then rejected because its hilly, even mountainous terrain was not considered suitable for training. Considering that the *FEB* eventually fought in the mountains of Italy, the Resende site, braced by the Mantiqueira mountain peaks of Agulhas Negras, would have been excellent. Another site was chosen, also in the state of Rio de Janeiro between the towns of Guaratinguetá and Cachoeira, where a US\$3,000,000 camp was “to be located.” The plans at that moment called for the First Expeditionary Division to begin its training on January 1, 1944, devoting 11 weeks to basic training, 8 weeks to unit training, and 8 weeks to combined arms training. The startled assistant military attaché, who reported on these

moves, concluded with the comment: "Because of the highly theoretical nature of the Brazilian army's preparations ... There is no certainty that there will be no change of minds..."²⁸ In fact, he was correct, shortly before December 8, the Guaratinguetá/Cachoeira site was cancelled in favor of Vila Militar on the outskirts of Rio as the training ground.²⁹

In mid-November Góes Monteiro, who had returned from sick leave, had a significant falling out with Dutra over the expeditionary force. The animosity was so bad that Vargas had to decide between his two generals. Dutra apparently won because Góes was packed off to a decorative posting in Montevideo. His successor as chief of staff was an odd choice, General Maurício José Cardoso, who when he commanded the 2nd Military Region (São Paulo) had been evaluated by American observers as "pro-democratic but not an able soldier" and rather "inept," allowing himself to get manipulated into situations "which were not helpful to the Allied cause." Cardoso was near retirement age and so socially active that he was called "General Banquete." He may have gotten the post because "he would do what Dutra wanted him to do."³⁰

Renewed doubts were building in the minds of the military attaché's staff. The office reported that the names of the first division staff had been announced, even though the commander's name had not. The usual Brazilian practice was for a unit commander to be appointed first and for him to select his staff. The Americans were also bothered by the choice of Colonel Aguinaldo Caiado de Castro to be commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment at Vila Militar, which would be part of the expeditionary force. Recently high-ranking officers had been referring to the force as the Brazilian Expeditionary Corps or simply as the Corps and had taken to calling Dutra "Corps Commander." To avoid prophesying "the eventual size of the proposed force," the military attaché continued to refer to it as the Brazilian Expeditionary Force.³¹ The more familiar with the Brazilian army that the American observers became the more skepticism crept into their reports. In selecting officers for the force, little attention was being paid to replacing them quickly in the units that were losing them. For example, 14 officers were suddenly transferred from the 10th Infantry Regiment "completely disorganizing" it. As a result one reserve lieutenant was commanding two companies and the work of the regiment's executive officer had been added to his duties as a battalion commander. The military observer in Belo Horizonte commented that "the Brazilian army is not based on sound organizational principles, judged by U.S. standards. The command and staff of a Brazilian battalion consisted of but two officers." Perhaps

worse, the field-grade officers “do too much direct commanding, and so do not leave enough function of command to the initiative of their junior officers.” As a result “team spirit and initiative [was] lacking among the junior officers, who for the most part are officers of the Reserve, some of whom are serving in the Army with little enthusiasm.”³²

In mid-December Secretary of War Henry Stimson announced to the press that the United States and Brazil were preparing a Brazilian Expeditionary Force for overseas duty. The same press report mentioned that Generals Mascarenhas de Moraes and Ord were then in North Africa and southern Italy touring the battlefields.³³ It seems that back in August after accepting the offer of a division command, Mascarenhas learned from Dutra that Vargas had chosen him to lead the first division. He was 60 years old and would be faced with terrible tensions and stress in Italy. He had taken advantage of Dutra’s trip to the United States to have surgery for an unexplained ailment. The units assigned to the division had never worked or trained together and were under strength. The hurried call-up of raw recruits to fill the ranks was rather sloppy. Mascarenhas admitted in his memoirs that the selection process was not rigorous. The ill health of a large percentage of the rural poor who bore the weight of the recruitment resulted in numerous rejections.³⁴ Reportedly the army wanted men who were 5 foot, 9 inches or taller, which the assistant American military attaché unkindly observed was “to show the world what big husky people the Brazilians are.”³⁵ The army’s medical examinations of recruits and army personnel assigned to the expeditionary units left much to be desired and showed that Brazil’s health standards and quality of care were low. The second set of examinations in Rio de Janeiro discovered that a large number of regular soldiers in such units were medically unfit. Poor teeth were a particular problem.³⁶ In fact, there is reason to suspect that some medical reports were not scrutinized.³⁷ By February 1945 it was clear to American officers that Brazil could not supply any more healthy replacements. The medical examinations had eliminated 12,000 men out of a pool of 18,000. Equally troubling was the discovery that some of the replacements “had had very little training prior to their movement to Rio de Janeiro for shipment overseas.” This failure had been discovered too late to postpone their departure.³⁸

From his tour of the Italian battlefields in December 1943, Mascarenhas realized that the typical Brazilian uniforms and boots would never do for the cold and rugged conditions in Italy, but he could not get Dutra’s team to secure proper gear. Eventually the troops would be clothed from

American stocks in Italy. The reality of what they were about to face must have been made clear by the horrific American losses at Anzio which were nearly equal to the total that the Brazilians were assembling. The appointment of Mascarenhas as division commander was only made official on December 28, 1943, shortly before his return from Italy.³⁹ His headquarters was set up in the Tijuca district of Rio de Janeiro, miles from Vila Militar and even further from where the division units gathered near Valença and Tres Rios a couple of hours drive from the capital. Mascarenhas decided that he and his staff would remain in Rio de Janeiro. Reportedly he quipped that he preferred “the ‘softie’ life of Rio to the hard life of the training camp.” However, Generals Zenobio da Costa, commander of the division’s infantry, and Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, the artillery commander, moved to the training camp.⁴⁰

In reality under such conditions it was an “impossibility to instruct and train” an infantry division. It was a victory of sorts just to gather all of the division’s units in the Rio area. Emphasis was placed on physical conditioning so that the troops would be fit enough to march the 30 kilometers from the center of Rio de Janeiro to Vila Militar at the end of March 1944. That display and a second parade through the city in May were partly to show the public that the expeditionary force really existed. The fifth column spread insistent rumors that the division would never embark.⁴¹

What the Brazilians did not know was that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was refusing his approval. He thought it “would be a serious error to permit more than a token force or a brigade to be sent overseas from Brazil....” Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius made an extended trip to London to confer with the British. On April 15, he “impressed on Churchill” that the embarkation of the expeditionary force was important for Brazil’s domestic politics and for projecting the republic’s prestige as an ally. Perhaps grudgingly Churchill withdrew his objections. From the documentation it is not clear why he had opposed the Brazilian role.⁴²

ORGANIZATION AND COMMITMENT OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

There was some difference of opinion between the Brazilians and Americans over which troops should be used to form the expeditionary force. The American military, and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission, which had been set up to coordinate military relations, thought it logical to use the units in the northeast, but the Brazilians

looked at the 15,000 American personnel at bases in that region and thought differently. Minister Dutra wanted to build three regional training camps to prepare three divisions simultaneously, thereby creating valuable facilities for the post-war era. But the United States could not provide the weapons and equipment necessary to outfit three camps, that is to say, 50% of the equipment for three divisions. Moreover, because neither Brazil nor the United States had enough ships to carry even one full division all at once, the Pentagon came up with the idea of providing 50% of a division's equipment for training, which would be left behind for the training of each successive division. They would all be armed and equipped in the theater of operations.

Just before he visited the United States in August 1943, Minister of War Dutra, who wanted to command the planned corps, sounded out various generals as to their interest in leading one of the divisions. General João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes, who had commanded the northeastern military region (the 7th) from June 1940 to January 1943, responded immediately, while the others hesitated. Eventually two other division commanders were designated and preparations begun, but the plans were not carried out, and the force was fixed at one division.⁴³

Without already formed divisions and without barracks to receive mobilized troops and a recruitment system that largely kept recruits near their home areas to form a division from one region would place a politically undesirable cost on that region. So the unwillingness to use northeastern units was related to more than worry about the American presence.

To form the expeditionary division, units were called in from across the map of Brazil. On the negative side, this meant that these units were not accustomed to working together. On the positive side, planners argued that since the army had been trained and organized on a French model since 1919, it would be easier to shift to an American model if the division was composed of units which had no previous joint experience. Adaptation would be faster.

Oddly, instead of using the coming combat experience to enhance the professionalization of a maximum number of regular junior officers, the army called up a considerable number of reserve officers, many of whom were professional men in civilian life. Of the 870 infantry line officers in the force, at least 302 were reservists. Fortunately for historians, a group of them produced one of the most useful books on the expeditionary force.⁴⁴ It is not clear whether the call-up of reserve officers was a political

decision or a purely administrative one. But it does seem that there were not enough junior officers to staff the expeditionary force. Later, in Italy, referring to the shortage of military school graduates and to the professional deficiencies of the reserve officers, Mascarenhas requested, as late as April 1945, to commission 60 infantry sergeants to serve as platoon leaders.⁴⁵

There was also considerable difficulty filling the ranks of the designated units. Lacking military police units, the army took in policemen from São Paulo's *Força Pública*, it created signal units with men from electric and telephone companies, and it organized a nursing detachment by public recruitment of interested women.⁴⁶ The fact that draftees were being sent overseas persuaded many to escape service, but, since the draft was imposed in 1916, the army always had large numbers who evaded duty. For example, in the 7th Military Region in Northeast Brazil, while Mascarenhas was commander, the 1941 call-up of 7898 men had an evasion rate of 48.9%, and of those who did present themselves, fully 41% were medically unfit. Indeed, this was an improvement, the previous year the evasion rate had been 68%! Among the 3434 volunteers in that region, 2201 or 64% were found fit for service. These figures were fairly typical of the national experience. The rejection rate for medical and health reasons was high for both draftees and active-duty troops. In forming one of the later echelons, 18,000 soldiers in regular units were examined to obtain 6000 men. In the case of the fourth echelon, the 10,000 active-duty soldiers examined netted only 4500 physically fit for embarkation. I have discussed elsewhere in more detail the recruitment and medical examinations; suffice to say here that it was the nation's poor health that stalled the mobilization. Medical officers complained that unit commanders were not cooperative about treatment of venereal diseases. Two days before the fourth echelon embarked, a final physical examination discovered 150 with acute stage venereal disease. On the eve of embarkation, the fourth echelon was short 500 men because of prior failed health examinations. A majority of the last minute rejections were mostly due to defective dental conditions. In January 1945, General Ralph Wooten observed that the Brazilian army was "near the bottom of the barrel" in finding combat personnel and that it was "a mistake to expect any additional assistance from Brazil in this respect."⁴⁷ It should be noted that sons of President Vargas and Foreign Minister Aranha served in the expeditionary force. Lutero Vargas went as a medical doctor and Oswaldo Gudolle Aranha as an interpreter and driver with the division's artillery.

The training of the force functioned on multiple levels. Brazilian officers had been sent to the United States for courses since 1938, mostly in coast artillery and aviation. Indeed, in early 1941, well before Pearl Harbor, Brazil was sending groups of officers for training in a variety of specialties. The pace continued to accelerate to the point where, by the end of 1944, somewhat over 1000 Brazilian military personnel had gone to the United States. The American army created a special Brazilian course at its Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that enrolled 259 officers, the largest contingent of any one foreign nation to pass through its classrooms. The school commandant said that the Brazilians, who had already completed their own three-year general staff course, “knew more than most of his instructors.”⁴⁸ Leavenworth’s program provided a common basis for officers’ approach to conducting war. Instruction focused on tactics and operations employing practical exercises and problem solving as the instructional methodology. In the late 1930s, it had added instruction on corps and army-level operations to prepare officers for command and staff duties at the level of division and corps. Thirty-three of the thirty-four US Army combat corps commanders in World War II were Leavenworth graduates.⁴⁹ The Brazilians were being given what the Americans considered their premier combat command instruction.

Finally, in late June 1944, the long awaited American transport ship *USS General W. A. Mann* arrived to transport the first echelon of the division abroad. Mascarenhas was enough of a leader to know that he should embark with his troops, even though Dutra wanted him to fly. On the night of June 30, 1944, in what passed for secrecy in Rio de Janeiro, 5000 Brazilians soldiers filed on board the huge ship. Vargas and Dutra came to wish them well. As the *General Mann* steamed out of Guanabara Bay under Sugar Loaf, only Mascarenhas knew that their destination was Naples.⁵⁰ Now, all they had to do was to fight the German Army (Fig. 6.1).

PERFORMANCE OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The troops sent to Italy in five echelons eventually totaled 25,334. In July 1944, the first echelon arrived in Naples. After some delays with equipment and training, on September 15, the 6th Infantry Regiment and support troops, under Brigadier General Euclides Zenobio da Costa, went into the line of the Fourth Corps of the US Fifth Army. Army commander,



Fig. 6.1 Lt. General Mark Clark, commander of US Fifth Army, in front seat. In the rear, Captain Vernon Walters, interpreter with FEB commander João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes. (Courtesy of the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro)

Mark Clark, decided on this partial commitment because he needed to beef up the Fourth Corps, which had dwindled to barely the level of a reinforced division because of units being detached for the Seventh Army's invasion of southern France in July. The Fifth Army had lost fully seven divisions to the French operation, so the Brazilians' arrival at that moment was opportune. The American Fifth and British Eighth Armies were readying a drive on the German's Gothic Line, in an attempt to reach the Po Valley and Bologna before Christmas. The Fifth Army's three corps (from west to east: US Fourth, US Second, and British Twelfth) were to attack with the Second Corps as spearhead and the Fourth immobilizing and harassing the Germans before it. Clark thought that this would give the Brazilians a relatively smooth introduction to combat (Figs. 6.2 and 6.3).




Fig. 6.2 Map of Italy showing area north of Firenze where FEB fought. From *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945* by Frank D. McCann, Jr. (Copyright © 1973, renewed 2001 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission)

It is interesting to note the different reactions of the Brazilians and the Americans to the subsequent action. The Brazilians moved along nicely pursuing retreating German units from September 16 to October 30, when they suffered a sudden counterattack that they held back for about ten hours, until they ran short of ammunition and were forced to fall back.



Fig. 6.3 Generals Willis Crittenger, C.O. of Fourth Corps, and Zenobio da Costa, C.O. of FEB Artillery. (Courtesy of the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro)

A steady cold rain had turned into snow, which by itself was an event for these tropical men. The German attackers were fresh elite S.S. troopers who got between two of the Brazilian companies attempting to encircle them. From the American records, we can see that this was perceived as a normal combat occurrence, but the accounts published by Brazilian officers are full of finger-pointing and acrimony. On the scene, Mascarenhas blamed and reprimanded the troops for their imagined cowardice, lack of caution, and fleeing before “a patrol of demoralized enemy.” Of course, he was anxious that they do well, and he was still a bit inexperienced himself in the nature of this war. It would have been General Zenobio’s responsibility to make sure that there were reserves in position to back up the frontline units being attacked. They had done about as well as anyone could have under the difficult circumstances. The US 92nd Division which replaced them, when they moved over to the Reno Valley, was likewise unable to drive the Germans from the ridge line that they held for the next five months (Fig. 6.4).⁵¹




Fig. 6.4 Map of FEB's principal area of engagement. From *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945* by Frank D. McCann, Jr. (Copyright © 1973, renewed 2001 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission)

The role of the expeditionary force (FEB from here on) was a tactical one; the bulk of its combat experience was at the platoon level. The division's combat diary is largely a summary of patrol actions, as was the case for the Fifth Army generally in the autumn and winter of 1944–1945. The Brazilians recognized this; they did not claim that their role or its impact was strategic, although, with age, a few veterans have made that assertion. In his memoirs, the division's chief of staff, Floriano de Lima Brayner, observed that at “no time did the FEB engage in strategic level operations.”⁵² And after the war, to symbolize the level of the role they had played, the army erected a monument to the FEB lieutenants at the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras*. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how one division could have played anything but a tactical role in the campaign in northern Italy.

This point has been lost sight of by some observers, such as journalist William Waack, whose *As duas faces da glória: A FEB vista pelos seus aliados e inimigos*⁵³ seems based on the premise that the Brazilians claimed a

greater importance for the FEB than they actually did. He contrasted some German veterans' lack of knowledge and remembrance of the Brazilian force and the criticism of American liaison and inspection reports with the "grandiloquence" of Brazilian narratives on the FEB.

The principal German division facing the Brazilians had a large number of very young and rather old soldiers and was commanded by officers who had served long years and had survived the rigors of the Russian front. Some of these men may have been worn out, but most were veterans who had immeasurably more combat experience than the Brazilians. Indeed, the FEB sailed from Brazil with most of its troops insufficiently trained. The officers were startled by the intense training program that the Americans insisted upon.

The literature on the FEB makes much of its struggle to take an elevation called *Monte Castello* during the winter of 1944–1945. In combat, everything is a matter of perspective and scale. The front for an army commander is measured in miles, for a corps commander it is narrowed to a mountain ridge, for a division commander the focus is a hill, for a company commander the objective is part of the slope, for platoon leaders it is a matter of certain pillboxes and gun positions, and for the soldier it is the few feet and inches ahead of him. Each one experiences a different battle. The Italian campaign was brutal because the Allies had to fight continuously uphill to dislodge the Germans from commanding elevations. When the FEB reached division strength in November, it took its place with the US Fourth Corps in the mountains north of Florence and west of Bologna. The Fifth Army's objective was to break through the German's so-called Gothic Line and descend into the Po Valley to take Bologna. The Fourth Corps confronted an imposing mountain ridge known as Mt. Belvedere—Mt. Torraccia, from which German artillery and mortars could harass traffic on the west-to-east highway #64 that cuts its narrow way through the mountains from Pistoia to Bologna. It is difficult to imagine driving defenders from such a place. Just beyond the spa town of Poretti Terme, the mountains open into a huge basin flanked by low elevations on its right and left and blocked by the suddenly rising Belvedere-Torraccia to the front. On its left, the ridge is a sheer rock wall that appears smooth from a distance, to the right the ridge becomes jagged and broken, with a road winding upward around it off in the direction of Montese, a key point before descent into the Po Valley. The American 92nd "Black Buffalo" Division and later the 10th Mountain Division faced Belvedere. The Brazilians were on their eastern flank. The FEB confronted a hill that

juts out below Torraccia. From that hill, the Germans could rake the lower slopes to the west (left) from well-prepared positions. That hill, which German maps labeled simply “101/19,” was what local people called Monte Castello. Walking up it today is hardly even tiring, but going up it under artillery, machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire would have been miserable, very nearly suicidal. Monte Castello held the Brazilians at bay in four assaults—November 24, 25, 29, December 12—before falling to them on February 21. They spent four out of their nine months of combat under its guns. The German defenders admired their stubbornness. After the failed December 12 assault in which the Brazilians suffered 145 casualties, compared with a German loss of 5 killed and 13 wounded, a German captain told a captured FEB lieutenant: “Frankly, you Brazilians are either crazy or very brave. I never saw anyone advance against machine-guns and well-defended positions with such disregard for life You are devils.”⁵⁴ Though the elevation itself pales beside its neighbors, it became symbolic of the FEB’s combat ability and, in a larger sense, of Brazil’s coming of age as a country to be taken seriously. The Rio newspaper, *A Manhã*, editorialized that “The young Brazilians who implanted the Brazilian banner on its summit will conquer for Brazil the place that it merits in the world of tomorrow” (Fig. 6.5).⁵⁵

Monte Castello was and is a minor elevation lost amidst some of the most rugged terrain in Italy. It does not show up on large-scale maps of Italy and one has to search out local hiking maps to find it. It was not labeled clearly on American battle maps, and likely the German defenders did not even know its name. In fact, in the FEB war diary, the first mention of that name was the day of its capture, February 21. It would be surprising if anyone besides the Brazilians remembered the name. Naturally they gave more importance to the names of the terrain that they captured than did either the defending Germans or the Americans concerned with the broader front. The American liaison detachment diarist commented that “this feature had been the objective of two previous Brazilian attacks, in which they suffered considerable casualties, its capture was a distinct loss to the enemy, since it deprived him of his last good observation” point. From Monte Castello the Germans had an open field of fire along the sheer face of Belvedere that the 10th Mountain Division would be climbing to surprise the defenders on top. The FEB’s mission was to destroy the German’s ability to fire on the exposed Americans.⁵⁶

After the war, the Brazilian veterans and the Brazilian army made much of Monte Castello. For them the battle had great symbolic importance.



Fig. 6.5 Italians cheering victorious FEB troops. (Courtesy of Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro)

Their part in the capture of Belvedere-Castello convinced the Brazilians that they were up to the task that they had taken on. The fact is that the FEB and the US 10th Mountain Division were effective in the joint operation which drove the Germans off important elevations that allowed the Allied spring offensive to move forward. If either of the two divisions had failed, that offensive would have been delayed.⁵⁷

Relations between the Brazilian troops and the Americans were sometimes tense. It was awkward for the Brazilians to be totally dependent on the American forces for training, clothing, arms, equipment, and food. The American stress on training, training, and more training, even of frontline personnel, bemused the Brazilians. It was a clash between two cultures, one that so believed in education that its army's terminology was drawn from the language of the school house⁵⁸ and the other that left most of its people unschooled. The outcome was a successful example of

coalition warfare, which always requires determined effort and understanding to blend national styles into a winning combination. But the FEB went beyond the standard idea of coalition warfare because of its total integration into the American army. It was not a colonial unit, as were the British Indian ones, or a Commonwealth military, such as the Canadian, New Zealander, or South African, nor a Free “this or that,” such as the Polish or French contingents. It was a division from an army of an independent, sovereign state that voluntarily placed its men and women under United States command. The connection could not have been tighter and still have preserved the FEB’s integrity of command and its Brazilian identity. It never lost either.

The FEB completed all the missions confided to it and compared favorably with the American divisions of the Fourth Corps. Unfortunately, the heavy symbolism of Monte Castello has obscured the FEB’s victory at Montese on April 16, in which it took the town after a four-day grueling battle, suffering 426 casualties.⁵⁹ In the next days, it fought to a standstill the German 148th Division and Fascist Italian Monte Rosa, San Marco, and Italia Divisions, which surrendered to General Mascarenhas on April 29–30. In a matter of days, the Brazilians trapped and took the surrender of 2 generals, 800 officers, and 14,700 troops. The 148th was the only intact German division to surrender on that front. The Brazilians completed this feat on their own and with considerable pride waited until the surrender was complete and the prisoners under guard before calling the American headquarters.⁶⁰ Although they had little preparation and served under foreign command, against a combat-experienced enemy, the “Smoking Cobras,” as the FEB was nicknamed, had shown, as one of their songs put it, the “fiber of the Brazilian army” and the “*grandeza de nossa gente*” [greatness of our people].⁶¹

The origin of the term “Smoking Cobras” is a bit obscure. At the time some sources attributed a supposed statement by Hitler to the effect that Brazil would send troops when Brazilian snakes started smoking.⁶² Probably more accurate was the story that related the old train called “*Maria fumaça*” (Smoky Mary) in Minas Gerais to the image of a slithering snake. That train carried the 11th Regiment from its barracks in the quaint colonial town of São João del Rei on its way to Rio de Janeiro. With smoke pouring from the engine stack as the train ran on the twisting railbed through the mountains, it looked like a gigantic Smoking Cobra. Reportedly as the regiment’s departure approached, the soldiers began saying “*a cobra vai fumar*” (the cobra is going to smoke).⁶³ Certainly by

the time they arrived in Italy in 1944, the expression had become commonplace. And at the request of Rio de Janeiro's *O Globo* newspaper, Disney made a design of a helmeted pipe Smoking Cobra firing two six-shooters which the army used in morale-building posters. The final version eliminated the helmet and six-shooters (Fig. 6.6).

When the first FEB troops shipped off to Italy, their unit patch was simply a green shield embossed with *Brasil* in white. At some point, Liaison Officer Vernon Walters may have made a suggestion to Fifth Army commander, Mark Clark, who spoke with Mascarenhas about the need for a more distinctive insignia. For his part Mascarenhas said that when Minister Dutra visited Italy in September–October, 1944, he saw the various American division patches and suggested to Mascarenhas that the FEB should have its own. It is not certain if the Disney design was the model, but that seems reasonable even though the date of April 3, 1945, does not correspond. During the war the Disney studios drew 1,272 such insignias for American and allied units.⁶⁴ Mascarenhas said that Lt. Col. Aguinaldo José Senna Campos designed the patch, but historian Cesar Campiani attributed it to 3rd Sergeant Ewaldo Meyer, who worked under the colonel on the division's general staff. Brazilian officers were not accustomed to giving credit to enlisted men. In a YouTube interview, Sergeant Meyer asserted that Vernon Walters asked him to make the design, which he would then show to Mascarenhas. It is possible that Senna Campos made improvements on Sgt. Ewaldo's sketch. Ewaldo said that he drew a helmet

Fig. 6.6 FEB patch with combined colors of Brazil and the United States



on the cobra, which, of course, does not appear in the final product. Though there were those that thought that a snake was not refined enough to symbolize the FEB, it became popular with the troops and remained so with the veterans. If Walters played any role, he kept silent about it.⁶⁵

The Americans sounded out the Brazilians about participating in the occupation of Europe, but the Brazilians were not interested.⁶⁶ On March 21, Dutra told General Kroner that he did not want expeditionary troops to stay for a long period as part of the allied occupation.⁶⁷ Unhappily, over American objections, the Brazilian government also decided to disband the FEB upon return to Brazil. The American military had hoped that the division would be kept together to form the nucleus for a complete reformation of the Brazilian army. FEB veterans would slowly introduce the lessons of the war into the General Staff School and military school curricula. But the chance to use the FEB experience to project Brazilian influence on the post-war world order was lost. Those making the rapid decisions in 1945 that led to the FEB's demise could not know how quickly the United States would demobilize or how swiftly the alliance with the Soviet Union would collapse. Perhaps if Brazil had maintained occupation troops in Europe and a standing cadre of combat-hardened troops at home, it would have had a different post-war international position.

The *FEB* was incorporated into the American army for 229 days of continuous combat, achieving the distinction of trapping and taking the surrender of the German 148th Division and remnants of three Italian Fascist divisions. This was the only intact German division captured on that front. The Brazilians lost 443 dead, 1577 wounded, 9625 sick and injured in accidents (Fig. 6.7).⁶⁸

Of the sick and wounded, 600 were evacuated to Brazil, of these 234 first went by sea to the United States, where some were hospitalized and received intensive care. The most severe periods of combat in December 1944 and February and April 1945, not surprisingly, generated the most casualties that were sent Stateside (84 in December, 75 in February, and 50 in April). Another 307 were flown back home via the Air Transport Command by way of Natal. The heaviest evacuation by air was in April 1945 when 131 wounded made the journey.⁶⁹

Many soldiers likely nursed unseen mental wounds from the grueling experience. The American surgeon general commenting about his own forces said that "practically all men in rifle battalions who were not other-



Fig. 6.7 German prisoners captured by the FEB. (Photo courtesy of the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro)

wise disabled ultimately became psychiatric casualties,” often this occurred following 200 to 240 days in combat.⁷⁰ Psychologists cautioned that “combat skills began to decline after a month of fighting” with many “close to a vegetative state” after 45 days. Eisenhower was told by medical personnel that “each moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to the intensity and duration of their exposure.” Indeed, “psychiatric casualties are as inevitable as gunshot and shrapnel wounds in warfare.” The American public would not be told that the US Army had “hospitalized 929,000 men for ‘neuropsychiatric’ reasons in World War II, including as many as one in four admissions during the bitter fall of 1944.”⁷¹ US Army authorities showed particular concern for the mental state of the Brazilian troops. Some were sent to the States for treatment, with accompanying Brazilian medical personnel to care for them “but also to protect the position of the U.S. Army.” In December 1944, “forty-nine Brazilian mental cases” arrived at New York.⁷²

Oddly, after all the concern about having a weak military, the government sought the immediate return of its troops who were quickly disbanded. Despite Minister Dutra's declaration that his ministry was "resolved to use to the maximum the experience of the FEB units," American officers feared that the lessons of combat would be largely lost to the post-war army.⁷³ Although the army did not organize combat teams of veterans to train large units, as the Americans had hoped, it did send veteran captains and lieutenants to staff the new *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras* and the advanced officer course (*ESAO*) at Vila Militar to give cadets and junior officers the benefit of their war experience.⁷⁴

What was unexpected was that by the end of March 1944 the Brazilian government had already decided to demobilize the force immediately upon its return. Dutra said that once the war in Europe ended, he planned to discharge or transfer the *FEB* soldiers to the reserve while keeping a number of officers and sergeants on active duty for training purposes. He justified the discharge by saying that his army lacked suitable housing for such troops. The US Army's Operations Division expressed dismay at this "most unfortunate" idea and protested saying that it believed that demobilization would vitiate much of the benefit to Brazil from the experience of the expeditionary force. The American military had hoped that the division would be kept together to form the nucleus for a complete reformation of the Brazilian army. General Ord warned that "This means in effect the destruction of the one United States trained major unit in the Brazilian Army. ... [Such action would] seriously reduce the effectiveness of the Brazilian Army and every effort should be made to persuade the Brazilian Government to retain this unit as it is a major contribution to the security of the hemisphere."⁷⁵ Apparently the real reason for the demobilization was that the government feared having a cohesive body of combat veterans in the country as it worked its way through ending the Vargas dictatorship. But exactly who made this decision is unknown and the documents for appropriate research have disappeared.

Brazil's entry into an intense electoral campaign to replace the Vargas government did not help the decision-making process. Anything involving American policy took on a heavy emotional character. The question of Brazil's role in the new United Nations was not developing as the government expected and since mid-April relations had deteriorated somewhat. The end of war decisions by the Brazilian government require further research, which is hampered by missing documents, such as the minister of war's annual reports for 1945 and 1946.⁷⁶

The First Brazilian Fighter Squadron of 41 pilots was part of the US 350th Fighter Group based at Pisa. Between October 1944 and mid-January 1945, they had flown 167 missions and 999 sorties, having lost one pilot killed and two missing in action. By the German surrender in May, the squadron saw seven more pilots killed and eight taken prisoner. Their American commander thought that their results were “just about the same as those of an US squadron.”⁷⁷ A successor commander of the fighter group, Colonel Ariel W. Nielson, was even more emphatic, he said that the squadron was “the best unit I have under my command!” He recommended that it receive a Presidential Unit Citation, but was denied because the squadron was not American. Decades later President Ronald Reagan approved a renewed request for the citation, making the Brazilian unit the second in the world to receive the prestigious award, the other one was English.⁷⁸

The string of air bases that the United States had in Brazil was extremely valuable to the allied war effort. Among the Air Transport Command's routes throughout the world, the Brazilian route was the busiest. Parnamirim airfield at Natal expanded from a single runway to the largest Air Transport Command base in the world. Indeed, by 1943 the Brazil route was “the air funnel to the battlefields of the world.”⁷⁹ All together there were 17 bases of various sizes and purposes north of Rio de Janeiro and several more in the south. President Roosevelt passed through the Natal base twice, going to and from the Casablanca and Teheran conferences in January and November 1943. The South Atlantic ferrying traffic was always heaviest in winter, when the North Atlantic route was closed. It reached its peak in March 1944, when 1,675 tactical fighters flew east via Natal with planes taking off every three minutes.⁸⁰ In the sea war, according to naval historian Samuel E. Morison, Brazil's entry into the war was “an event of great importance in naval history.” Without Brazilian participation, it would have been impossible to shut the “Atlantic narrows” to Axis blockade runners and submarines.⁸¹ In April 1944, Roosevelt wrote Vargas saying that “History will surely note that the turning point of the war in the European theater was coincident with the action of your government in providing bases and facilities which contributed so materially to the African campaign.” He expressed the appreciation of the American people and government for this “very vital aid ... to our common fight against the Axis powers.”⁸² American observers believed that the Brazilian military and the people in general were “fully aware” of the opportunities that the war had provided. “They are taking every advantage to make their

nation self-sufficient and independent of raw materials and supplies from other countries. ... [with American assistance and training] they will emerge from the present war as the leading nation of South America.” Brazilians, the Americans were convinced, “are determined to achieve a place of potent economic force in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere and of the World.”⁸³ On June 13, 1945, FDR’s successor Harry S. Truman told his new ambassador to Rio de Janeiro, Adolf Berle, that he wanted “to maintain good relations with Brazil even above any other country in Latin America.”⁸⁴

In 1944, the Americans had tried unsuccessfully to negotiate an agreement to keep the chain of bases for ten years after the war’s conclusion. President Vargas favored extending the arrangement, but toward the war’s end, he had less control of the situation and he was forced from office in October 1945 in a *coup d’état* led by the Góes Monteiro-Dutra duo.⁸⁵ The latter was elected president to succeed him. Then escalating objections “to the continued occupation of Brazilian soil by foreign troops” insured that the bases would be turned over to Brazilian control by October 1946.⁸⁶

Brazil took an active part in World War II as a supplier of strategic raw materials, as the site of important air and naval bases, as a skillful supporter of the United States in Pan American conferences, as a contributor of naval units, a combat fighter squadron, and a 25,000 strong infantry division. It lost 1,889 soldiers and sailors, 31 merchant vessels, 3 warships, and 22 fighter aircraft. It came out of the war with modernized armed forces, thanks to its receipt of 70% of all United States Lend-Lease equipment sent to Latin America.

Zé Carioca, Walt Disney’s dapper parrot, who was Hollywood’s cartoon characterization of Joe Brazilian, taught Donald Duck how to samba in the film *Saludos Amigos*, but the Americans, like Donald, could not quite catch the beat. So with the restoration of peace, instead of the wartime alliance heralding an era of two national destinies bound together for mutual benefit, as Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha had dreamed, the Cold War turned Americans in other directions and left Brazilians with a vague sense of having been exploited. Brazil’s rejection of further overseas military operations in the Korean and Vietnam wars is partly related to a national perception that the United States did not adequately appreciate its contribution in World War II.

Even so, the war changed Brazil. The wartime air and naval bases were turned into civilian airfields and port facilities, the joint operations set new standards for military education and training, and the experiences abroad

that the thousands of veterans brought back began a process of modernizing the nation's mentality. The industrialization spurred by the building of the Volta Redonda steel mill propelled Brazil during a single generation from the age of the bull-cart to that of the internal combustion engine. Without the infrastructure, experiences, import-substitution processes, and transfer of know-how acquired during the war, it is difficult to imagine how Brazil would be today.⁸⁷ Its role in World War II has grown in importance in the minds of Brazilians, and they resent that American and European historians are not as enthusiastic as they are about Brazil's multiple contributions to Allied victory. The more extreme see a deliberate downplaying of Brazil's role "to deprive Brazil of the credit it deserves for helping to win the war."⁸⁸

NOTES

1. MG J. G. Ord to George C. Marshall, Washington, April 16, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (Sec I), MMB, RG165, NARA.
2. MG J. G. Ord to George C. Marshall, Washington, April 21, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (Sec I), MMB, RG165, NARA. Brazilian readers might notice that this letter was written on Tiradentes Day.
3. In a marginal note, Colonel Kenner F. Hartford (Operations Division, Gen. Staff) said that the Joint Chiefs received Marshall's endorsement on May 4 and the next day gave their approval in JCS 284. Hartford stated that equipment for training one division could be shipped within about three months; see BG John E. Hull (Acting Asst. Ch. of Staff) to Gen. Marshall, Washington, April 28, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (4-21-43) (Sec I), MMB, RG165, NARA; Memo from Marshall to Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Armament of Brazilian Expeditionary Force," May 4, 1943, 314-1 (JCS 284) (apparently prepared on May 3) attached to BG J.E. Hull to MG J. G. Ord: "Proposal of Brazil that an Expeditionary Force be formed in Brazil," May 5, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (4-21-43) MMB, RG 165, NARA.
4. Major Lloyd H. Gomes, Military Attaché, Rio de Janeiro, IG 5990, Report 5508, May 8, 1943, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA. José Joaquim de Maia was a student in France who in the name of a pro-independence movement made secret contact with Jefferson seeking US help.
5. US Naval Observer, Porto Alegre, May 13, 1943, G2 Regional Brazil, 6900 BEF Part II, RG165, NARA. The consul was Daniel M. Braddock who met with Cordeiro on May 4, 1943. Cordeiro commanded the artillery of the FEB in Italy. An interventor was the appointed governor of the state, which had about a third of the army's units. For Cordeiro's experience with the FEB, see his oral history testimony in Aspásia Camargo &

- Walder de Góes (Eds), *Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de Farias* (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1981), pp. 293–380.
6. This “secret” report was unsigned, but was sent to G2 and Naval Intelligence. Rio de Janeiro, May 25, 1943: “Integralism in the Army” 6300, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
 7. The French had an extensive mission in Brazil in the inter-war period. For background on the French Military Mission, see McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria, A History of the Brazilian Army*, pp. 202–219, 245–251.
 8. MG J. G. Ord, memo for Asst. Chief of Staff: “Observations of Certain Brazilian Forces,” June 16, 1943, OPD 336.2 Brazil (Sec I), MMB, RG165, NARA.
 9. Note for the Record, June 19, 1943: “Instruction in the U.S. of Brazilian Officers for Expeditionary Force,” OPD 350.2 (Sec I), MMB, RG 165, NARA.
 10. Harold Sims, US Consul, Natal, June 19, 1943: “Example of Friendly Relations between American and Brazilian Military Authorities,” 711.32/178 and 6210, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
 11. BG Claude M. Adams (Mil. Attaché) to Col. W.W. Cox (AIS Miami), Rio de Janeiro, July 30, 1943 6900 BEF Part II, G2 Regional Brazil, RG 165, NARA. Castello Branco would rise to be army chief of staff and then president via the “revolution” of 1964. Caiado de Castro would be a federal senator from 1954 to 1963.
 12. BG Claude M. Adams, Recife, July 31, 1943, 5900, G2 Regional Brazil, RG 165, NARA. Likely the army administration was responsible for the slowness of organizing the force.
 13. Clark D. Burton (Asst. Military Attaché), August 2, 1943, 6905, G2 Regional Brazil, MMB, RG165, NARA.
 14. Oswaldo Gudolle Aranha had become fluent in English, while his father was ambassador in Washington 1934–1938. He accompanied Dutra throughout his 1943 visit to the United States. Later he would serve in the FEB as a soldier interpreter and motorist in the artillery. “Economista Oswaldo Gudolle Aranha,” Aricildes de Moraes Motta (Coordenador), *História Oral do Exército na Segunda Guerra Mundial*, Tomo 6 (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2001), pp. 199–215.
 15. MG J. G. Ord, memo for Ch. of Staff, Washington, August 12, 1943, OPD336 Brazil (Sec II), Records of General and Special Staffs, RG165, NARA. Dutra was to meet with Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall on August 18.
 16. Conversation between Chief of Staff & Gen. Dutra, September 2, 1943, OPD336 Brazil (Sec II), Records of General and Special Staffs, RG165, NARA.

17. <http://apps.westpointaog.org/Memorials/Article/6964/>. Hertford was graduated from West Point (USMA) in 1923. He had a civil engineering degree from Cornell, had seen service in Nicaragua and in France, and had ability with languages.
18. BG John E. Hull (Chief, Theater Group, OPD) to General Handy, Washington, October 15, 1943, OPD336 Brazil (Sec II), Records of General and Special Staffs, RG165, NA. “Overlord” was the code name for the invasion of Normandy (June 6, 1944). For Hull’s career, see <https://www.redirectify.com/people/john-e-hull.html>. He was one of the top planners. In the next decade, he would be commander in chief of the Far East Command.
19. Claude Adams had had a heart attack while an officer student at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1939.
20. Telegrams, Col. Kenner F. Hertford to Selser and Adams, October 1, 1943 & October 4, 1943 [“Only investigation and report are desired and no specific proposal should be submitted for Brazilian approval or disapproval.”]; Caffery to Secretary of State, Rio de Janeiro October 4, 1943, #4695; Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, October 4, 1943, #4707; Col. K. F. Hertford to General Hull, OPD, October 7, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (Sec I), MMB, RG165; Hull to Caffery via State Dept. Washington, October 6, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/31419 in *Foreign Relations 1943*, Vol. V, p. 642.
21. Laurence Duggan (Head of State’s Latin American Division) to Caffery, Washington, October 8, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/31617a in *Foreign Relations 1943*, Vol. V, pp. 642–643.
22. Caffery to Sec. of State, Rio de Janeiro, October 13, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/31644, Airgram in *Foreign Relations 1943*, Vol. V, p. 644.
23. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, December 21, 1943, Report 6406, G2 Regional Brazil, 6110, RG165, NARA. Cassidy was Class of 1940, US Military Academy.
24. Colonel Charles G. Mettler (Mil. Intelligence, BOMIS Miami) October 26, 1943, Report 354, G2 Regional Brazil 6900, BEF, RG 165, NARA.
25. Ibid.
26. Colonel Charles G. Mettler (Mil. Intelligence, BOMIS Miami) October 31, 1943, Report 364, G2 Regional Brazil 6900, BEF, RG 165, NARA. The officer gleaned information was Lt. Col. E. J. Hall.
27. João B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, *Memórias* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1969) Vol. I, pp. 117–126. The telegram from Dutra was dated August 10, 1943. On August 17 Mascarenhas left the regional command and went to Rio “a fim de tratar do apresto da tropa Expedicionária”[to deal with preparing the Expeditionary troops] (p. 118).

28. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, November 4, 1943, Report 376, G2 Regional Brazil, 6900 BEF Part II, RG165, NARA.
29. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, December 8, 1943, Report 6323, G2 Regional Brazil, 6115, RG165, NARA.
30. "General Banquete" (General Banquet), see Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, December 21, 1943, Report 6406, G2 Regional Brazil, 6110 RG165, NARA; Captain T. L. Ridge (USMC, Asst. Naval Attaché), Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1942, OSS Files 20128, MMB, RG226, NARA. This report evaluated the regional commanders. Cardoso headed the 2nd Military Region 1939–1942 and was commander of the 1st Military Region in Rio when named chief of staff. He retired from that position in December 1944.
31. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, November 8, 1943, Report 6153, G2 Regional Brazil, 6900, BEF Part II, RG165, NA. The staff officers were Col. Floriano Lima Brayner (C of S), Col. Henrique Baptista Duffles Teixeira Lott (Asst C of S), Lt. Col. Thales Montinho Ribeiro da Costa (G1), Lt. Col. Amaury Kruehl (G2), Lt. Col. Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (G3), and Major Aguinaldo Sena Campos (G4). Even at this late date, the Brazilian War Ministry was saying that it preferred the US War Department's proposal to train the FEB divisions in the European theater because it would leave the equipment and camps free to train the home divisions sooner. The new *Centro de Instrução Especializada* that was supposed to train 2,600 specialists had not opened on schedule.
32. Major Frank G. Burns (Military Liaison Officer), Belo Horizonte, November 26, 1943, 6210, G2 Brazil 6900 BEF, RG165, NARA.
33. *Diário Carioca* (Rio), December 17, 1943; Mascarenhas de Moraes, *Memórias* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1969) Vol. I, 131–136; he detailed the events of his North African trip. General Carlos de Meira Mattos, *O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua época* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1983), Vol. I, 99–106.
34. Mascarenhas, *Memórias*, 130–131.
35. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, December 8, 1943, Report 6328, MID 6115, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
36. Carlos Paiva Gonçalves, *Seleção Médica do Pessoal da F.E.B.: Histórico, Funcionamento e Dados Estatísticos* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1951), pp. 67–142. The author was an army doctor involved in the process. He praised the quality of the exams for discovering cases of tuberculosis, imbecility, hernia, color blindness, parasites, circulatory and respiratory ailments, and two cases of leprosy. See p. 82.
37. Alfredo Oscar Salun, "*Zé Carioca*" *vai à guerra: Histórias e memórias sobre a FEB* (São Paulo: Edições Pulsar, 2004), pp. 39–41.

38. Memo: Colonel D. R. Patrick (Hdqs. US Army Forces South Atlantic) to Asst. Chief of Staff, OPD, "Brazilian Replacements," Recife, February 23, 1945, OPD336.2 Brazil (Sec IV), RG165, NARA. The colonel commented "Obviously, this situation makes it inadvisable to call upon Brazil for any further shipments of personnel overseas if it can be avoided."
39. There is a detailed account of Mascarenhas's trip to Italy in General Aguinaldo José Senna Campos, *Com a FEB na Itália: Páginas do meu diário* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Exército, 1970), pp. 30–57. The Americans lost 25,000 in the hard fighting at the Anzio beachhead from January 22 to June 5, 1944; among the dead was General Marshall's stepson.
40. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, March 10, 1944, Report 6706, G2 Regional Brazil, 6900, BEF, MMB, RG165, NARA. Likely Mascarenhas wanted to be close to the army ministry to prevent bureaucratic problems.
41. The headquarters was a building at Rua São Francisco Xavier 409, and he had "a command post" in borrowed space in the Diretório do Material Bélico in the Palácio da Guerra. Mascarenhas, *Memórias*, 136–137; Meira Mattos, *O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua época* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1983), Vol. I, 112–113. Mascarenhas apparently commented to his staff: "Agora que vencemos o inimigo interno, vamos ver de perto o Exército alemão" (113).
42. E. R. Stettinius, Washington, May 12, 1944, 740.0011 European War Stettinius Mission/112 1/2, RG 59, NARA. This is a report on his trip of April 7–29, 1944.
43. Carlos de Meira Mattos, *O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua época* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1983), pp. 89–90; Meira Mattos comments to author, Rio, December 1991. He was aide de camp to Mascarenhas. The other two divisions were to be led by Generals Newton Cavalcanti and Heitor Borges.
44. The book was Democrito Cavalcanti de Anuda, et al., *Depoimento de Oficiais de Reserva Sobre a F.E.B.* (Rio de Janeiro: Cobraci Publicações, 1949). On the number of reservists, see McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, p. 368, n. 40.
45. J.B. Mascarenhas to E. Dutra, Cifrado #33-G.1, 7 Apr. 1945, Cifrados FEB, de 15/9/44 a 5/ 7/45, 433.40, "1944/1945," MG665c, CDOC-EX, Brasília. He saw the FEB's prestige at stake. The Americans, too, were concerned about junior officers. Mascarenhas report when he commanded the 7th Military Region indicated a shortage of lieutenants (165 authorized, but 123 on duty = 46 shortfall), Mascarenhas, "Relatório.0.7 RM, 1941" (Recife, 12 Feb. 1942), p. 25 in CDOC-EX, Brasília. Unfortunately the army's documentation center (CDOC-EX) has

been disbanded since I made these notes. I cite them here to aid others who might want to chase them down. Likely they are now in the *Arquivo Histórico do Exército* in Rio. General Ralph Wooten, who played a large role in relations with the Brazilians, called General Dutra's attention "to the lack of leadership in the lower officer and non-commissioned officer grades," suggesting various remedies. MG Ralph H. Wooten to Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, Recife, 23 Jan. 1945, "Resume of Situation in this Theater," OPD 336 Latin American Section IV, Cases 80–93, RG 165, Modern Military Branch, NARA.

46. Virginia Maria de Niemeyer Portocarrero, "A Mulher Brasileira Apresentou-se Voluntariamente," *Revista do Exército Brasileiro*, Vol. 131, No. 3 (Jul./Set. 1994), pp. 59–63.
47. For the recruitment data on the 7th Military Region, see João B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, "Relatório apresentado ao Exmo. Sr. General de Divisão [Eurico Dutra] Ministro de Guerra pelo General de Brigada João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes Comandante da 7a. Região Militar, Ano de 1941" (Recife, 12 Fevereiro de 1942), CDEX- Brasília, pp. 32–34. On FEB selection, see Lt. Col. Carlos Paiva Gonçalves, *Seleção Médica do Pessoal da F.E.B., Histórico, Funcionamento e Dados Estatísticos* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1951), pp. 67–142. For American reports, see MG Ralph H. Wooten to ACS OPD, Recife, Jan. 23, 1945, "Resume of Situation in this Theater," OPD 336 Latin American (Sec. IV) Cases 80–93; and Col. Charles B.B. Bubb to Commanding General MTOUSA (Mediterranean Theater), Rio, 6 Dec. 1944, "Medical Report on the Fourth Echelon of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force," OPD336.2 Brazil (Sec. IV), RG165, MMB, NARA. That report is a distressing and depressing account of Brazil's low state of public health. McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 369–372.
48. Gen. Eurico Dutra to Col. Edwin L. Sibert, Rio, 8 Jan. 1941, 2257 K18/247; and Col. Edwin L. Sibert to ACS G2, Rio, 18 Mar. 1941, No. 2650, "Student Officers from Brazil to US Service Schools," 2257 K18/306, RG165, WD, GS, MID, NARA.

McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 353–354, n. 18. By comparison, the Chinese sent 249 officers to Ft. Leavenworth, the British 208, the Venezuelans 73, the Mexicans 60, and the Argentines 31. Command and General Staff School Commander General Karl Truesdell's comment about quality of Brazilian officers was reported by Major General J.G. Ord in a speech to the staff of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, August 11, 1944, BDC 5400, RG218 (Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff), NARA.

49. Robert H. Berlin, "United States Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography," *The Journal of Military History* 53 (April 1989): pp. 9–10, 147–167.
50. *Ibid.*, 137–140. Meira Mattos, *O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua época* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1983), Vol. I, p. 113. For the best study of the front the Brazilians were about to join, see Rick Atkinson, *The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007). Unfortunately he ended the book with the capture of Rome and thus ignored the last difficult months of the Italian campaign. He does not even mention the Brazilians. The *USS General Mann* sailed with the second echelon on September 22, 1944. The *USS General Meigs* left Rio with the third, fourth, and fifth echelons on September 22 and November 23 and with the fifth on February 8, 1945.
51. Entries for October 30–31, 1944, Combat Diary, Report I/Inf. Div. BEF, US Army Center of Military History, Washington; José Alíó Piason, "Alguns Erros Fundamentais Observados na FEB," Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva, pp. 103–107. Piason was a sub commander of one of the companies involved (3d Co. 1/6 IR). Mascarenhas, *Memórias*, I, pp. 183–188. On an aerial observer's report of German buildup prior to the action, see Elber de Mello Henriques, *A FEB Doze Anos Depois* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Biblioteca do Exército, 1959), pp. 72–74. The most balanced account is Manoel Thomaz Castello Branco, *O Brasil na II Grande Guerra* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1960), pp. 206–214.
52. Floriano de Lima Brayner, *A Verdade Sobre a FEB: Memórias de um Chiefo de Estado-Maior, na Campanha da Itália, 1943–1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1968), p. 234.
53. William Waack, *As duas faces da glória: A FEB vista pelos seus aliados e inimigos* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1985). The underlying tone of the book questions the importance of the FEB. It is interesting that the Germans took it seriously enough to broadcast a daily radio program called "Ouro e Verde" over Radio Victoria from near Como, Italy, that used two Brazilian nationals as commentators—Margarida Hirschman and Emilio Baldino, who were tried and given jail sentences after the war. Daniels to Secretary of State, Rio, Dec. 9, 1946, 832.203/12-946, RG 59, NARA.
54. Emilio Varoli, "Aventuras de um prisionero na Alemanha Nazista," in *Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva Sobre a F.E.B.*, p. 447. This contemporary participant account is at variance with Waack's report that German veterans in the 1980s did not recall fighting Brazilians. Unhappily, the pertinent German army records reportedly were destroyed in a post-war fire.

55. *A Manha* (Rio de Janeiro), February 27, 1945. I visited the battle site in late February 1994.
56. Waack assumed that because the German veterans he interviewed decades after the war did not remember a Monte Castello, it must have been insignificant; see *As Duas Faces*, pp. 90–93. FEB Combat Diary, 35, Entry for February 21, 1945, in “Report on the 1st Infantry Division, Brazilian Expeditionary Forces in the Italian Campaign from 16 July 1944 to the Cessation of Hostilities in May 1945,” 301 (BEF)-033, NARA.
57. It is worth noting that this was the 10th Mountain Division’s “first major engagement with the enemy.” “Fourth Corps History,” p. 512. In May 1994, Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, Chief of Military History, US Army, and General de Divisão Sérgio Ruschel Bergamaschi, Director of Cultural Matters, Brazilian Army, led a joint American-Brazilian “Staff Ride” to retrace the side-by-side campaigning of the 10th Mountain and the FEB; see Sérgio Gomes Pereira, “Ação conjunta 1 DIE (BR) / 10 a Div. MTH (EUA), *Revista do Exército Brasileiro*, Vol. 131, No. 3 (Jul./Set. 1994), pp. 54–56.
58. For a valuable discussion of the “school of the soldier,” see Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 52–65.
59. Col. Newton C. de Andrade Mello, *A Epopéia de Montese* (Curitiba: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 1954).
60. Gen. Mascarenhas ordered his men: “Only after the Germans are here we will inform the Americans.” Aspásia Camargo & Walder de Góes, *Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de Farias* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1981), p. 368. Gen. Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias commanded the FEB artillery.
61. On the songs of the *Febianos*, see McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 432, 435; and the recording “20 Anos Depois: Expeditionaries em Ritmos” (Chantecler Records, São Paulo, release CMG 2397, 1965). For a more recent commentary on the FEB’s sambas, see Cesar Campiani Maximiano, “Neve, fogo e montanhas: a experiência brasileira de combate na Itália (1944/45),” in Celso Castro, et al., *Nova História Militar Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2004), pp. 352–354. And there is Maria Elisa Pereira, “Você sabe de onde eu venho? O Brasil dos cantos de Guerra (1942–1945)” Doutora em História, Universidade de São Paulo, 2009.
62. *The New York Times*, September 2, 1945.
63. Octavio Costa, *Trinta Anos Depois da Volta: O Brasil na II Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1976), p. 61. “Em meados de março de 1944, o Onze estava pronto para seguir rumo ao Rio. Foi aí que ouvi, pela primeira vez, a expressão “a cobra vai fumar,”

- que os soldados usavam para indicar a proximidade da partida, assemelhando o trem à cobra.” Cobra is snake in Portuguese. How the expression turned into the FEB shoulder patch has been rather vague. See Costa, pp. 32–33.
64. John Baxter, *Disney During World War II: How the Walt Disney Studio Contributed to Victory in the War* (New York: Disney Editions, 2014), p. 123.
 65. João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes., *Memórias*, Vol. 1, p. 189. Senna Campos said that Clark had urged Mascarenhas to create a division patch and that he adopted the “*Cobra Fumando*” which was already a popular expression among the troops. There is a photo in his book of Senna Campos and Mascarenhas purportedly showing Dutra the design. General Aguinaldo José Senna Campos, *Com a FEB na Itália: Páginas do meu Diário* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Exército, 1970), pp. 95–98. Cesar Campiani Maximiano, *Barbudos, Sujos e Fatigados: Soldados brasileiros na Segunda Guerra Mundial* (São Paulo: Grua Livros, 2010), pp. 303–306. The YouTube statement of *Sargento Ewaldo [Meyer]: criador do desenho da cobra fumando Força Expedicionária Brasileira*) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uug5DvQ0UHU>. Filmed by Nahor L. de Souza Jr. Antonio Pedro Tota has a slightly different version in *O Imperialismo Sedutor: A Americanização do Brasil na Época da Segunda Guerra* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000), pp. 138–139. Sgt. Ewaldo stated that Walters said he would send it to Disney for polishing. Walters made no mention of any role in creating the Smoking Cobra patch in his autobiography *Silent Missions* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1978).
 66. John W. F. Dulles, *Castello Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1978), p. 167–168. Castello thought that if the Allies abandoned Italy, “it will catch fire and, moreover, nazi-fascism will resurge a little from the ashes....” But he admitted to his wife that “*I am saturated* with all this and it is high time to return.” Ambassador Vasco commented that “A razão de ser da FEB foi mais política que militar. Foi uma confirmação com sangue da nossa aliança com os Estados Unidos. E foi uma confirmação para os Aliados da nossa posição antinazista e antifascista. ... E nós não soubemos aproveitar essa vantagem, ficamos com fofoquinhas, coisas de somenos, quando tínhamos um aliado natural. Ficamos de pé atrás com os Estados Unidos.” Vasco Leitão da Cunha, *Diplomacia em Alto-mar: Depoimento ao CPDOC* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003), pp. 104–106.
 67. BG Hayes Kroner to Ord, Rio, March 21, 1945, OPD 336.2 Brazil Sec IV, Cases 56–84, MMB, RG165, NARA.
 68. João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes, *A FEB pelo Seu Comandante* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2005), pp. 312–314.

69. Charles M. Wiltse, *United States Army in World War II: The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters* (Washington, DC, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965) p. 506; see Table 35.
70. Rick Atkinson, *The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), pp. 508–509. Prior to the taking of Rome, a study of the divisions in Italy found that an infantryman did not question “*whether* he will be hit, but *when* and how bad.”
71. Rick Atkinson, *The Guns at Last Light: the War in Western Europe, 1944–1945* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2013), pp. 340–341.
72. Major General J. G. Ord, Memo for Asst. Chief of Staff, OPD, Subject: “Brazilian sick and wounded from Italy” Dec. 6, 1944, OPD 336.2 Brazil, Sec. III, Cases 38–55, RG 165, Box 967, MMB, NARA.
73. Eurico Dutra to General Hayes Kroner, Rio, May 15, 1945, OPD 336 Brazil, RG 165, NA. Dutra had conversations with Kroner on March 21, April 30, and May 11 about the FEB’s return, and he was anxious to have it carrying the arms it used in Italy and bringing the material captured from the enemy. He wanted the first shipload to arrive at Rio de Janeiro by the end of June. Because the government planned a big celebration, “it would be very desirable that the troops arrive here well-equipped and armed.”
74. My thanks to Colonel Sergio Paulo Muniz Costa, Brazilian Army Retired, for pointing this out to me.
75. Memo for Record: “Demobilization of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force,” April 6, 1945, OPD336.2, Brazil, Sec V, Cases 85-, Box 967, RG165, MMB, NA; see also Memo by Col. P.W. Edwards (Deputy Chief, Pan American Group, OPD.
76. These valuable reports were not transferred to the Brazilian army’s archives but were kept in the minister’s office. A thorough search by archive staff and, at my request, by officers in the commander’s office in Brasília in June 2011 could not find them. Hopefully they are safely gathering dust on some shelf and will eventually be discovered.
77. Notes taken by Col. C.H. Calais during visit to base and conversations with the 350th commander, Lt. Col. John C. Robertson, Pisa, January 17, 1945, OPD 336.2 Brazil (Sec. IV), RG 165, NARA. On killed and POWs see Major John W. Buyers, US Liaison Officer, June 16, 2001, in Aricildes de Moraes Motta, Coordinator, *História Oral do Exército na Segunda Guerra Mundial*, Tomo 8 (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2001), p. 228. Many pilots had completed their required 35 missions, but could not be sent home because of a lack of replacements. For 350 Fighter Group, 8th US Army Air Corps <https://www.8thafhs.org/fighter/350fg.htm>.

78. Quotation in “Major John W. Buyers,” US Liaison Officer, June 16, 2001, in Aricildes de Moraes Motta, Coordinator, *História Oral do Exército na Segunda Guerra Mundial*, Tomo 8 (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2001), p. 226.
79. The quotation is from Conn and Fairchild, *Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, p. 326. For a study of the airbases, see Therese L. Kraus, “The Establishment of United States Army Air Corps Bases in Brazil, 1938–1945” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1986), p. 185.
- The senior American officer in Rio de Janeiro summarized “Brazil’s contribution, in the present conflict, to Hemisphere Defense (sic), in order of importance: Air Bases in Northeast Brazil; strategic materials; troops for overseas combat; naval and air assistance in anti-submarine warfare; and neutralization of Axis activities. To these should be added the moral value of having one South American country actively participating in the war against the Axis powers.” BG Hayes Kroner, Rio de Janeiro, May 18, 1945, “Notes on “THE PRESENT AND FUTURE POSITION OF BRAZIL (Sic),” OPD 336 Brazil, RG165, MMB, NARA.
80. Charles Hendricks, “Building the Atlantic Bases,” p. 43 in www.SACE.army.mil/publications/eng_pamphelts/ep870-42/c-1.3.pdf. There is a list of bases and discussion of negotiations for continued use in Maj. Gen. Ralph H. Wooten (Commander, US Army Forces South Atlantic) Memo: “Implementation of Airbase Agreement between Brazil – U.S. Governments,” April 15, 1945, OPD 580.82 Brazil (3-30-42), RG 165, NARA.
81. Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943* (Boston, 1964), p. 376. For the Brazilian navy’s view of the war, see Dino Willy Cozza, “A Marinha do Brasil na II Grande Guerra,” *Revista do Exército Brasileiro*, Vol. 131, No. 3 (Jul./Set. 1994), pp. 64–66.
82. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Getúlio Vargas, Washington, April nd, 1944, GV 44.01.08, XLIV.8, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC-Rio. In the microfilm copy, it appears as frame 0014.
83. Lt. General George H. Brett to Chief of Staff, HDQ, Caribbean Defense Command, Dec. 6, 1944, OPD 336 Brazil, FW78/2, General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NARA.
84. Joseph C. Grew (Acting Secretary of State), Memo of Conversation (Truman, Grew, Berle), June 13, 1945, 711.32/6 -1345, RG59, NA. Also J.C. Grew, Secret “Circular Air gram to Certain American Missions,” Washington, June 27, 1945, 711.32/6 –2745, CS/D, RG 59, NARA. This dealt with deterioration in relations with Brazil. It spoke of Brazil being “disgruntled” by its treatment at the San Francisco Conference (April 25 to June 26, 1945).

85. There is extensive documentation that still has not been studied sufficiently, for example, the minutes of the 11 meetings of generals at army headquarters in Rio in August to October 1945. “Resumo das Reuniões de Generais realizadas no edifício do Ministério da Guerra, em Agosto, Setembro e Outubro de 1945”; Acervo Pessoal General Góes, Caixa 11, Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro.
86. Maj. Gen. Ralph H. Wooten (Commander, US Army Forces South Atlantic) Memo: “Implementation of Airbase Agreement between Brazil – U.S. Governments,” April 15, 1945, OPD 580.82 Brazil (3-30-42), RG 165, NARA.
87. The changes included such common things as ice cream. The popular Kibon ice cream products appeared on the market in 1942. An American company (US Harkson do Brasil) fled Japanese-occupied China and set itself up in Brazil. Kibon comes from “que bom,” how good! “Ice Cream in Brazil,” *Business Week* (November 21, 1942), p. 24.
88. Larry Rohter, *Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2012), p. 248. For a summary of Brazil and United States in World War II, there is Frank D. McCann and Francisco César Alves Ferraz, “Brazilian-American Joint Operations in World War II” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. *Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries* (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 83–128.



Post-World War Disappointment

At the end of the war, relations between the two countries, and especially their two military establishments, could not have been closer. Unfortunately, American demobilization was so deep and rapid that succeeding American governments lost sight of the importance of the relationship. Changes in presidents, cabinet officials, and department-level staffs resulted in a loss of institutional memory. The documents on the relationship lay undigested in the archives for decades. Brazil's war role faded under archival dust. It is worth noting that the voluminous documents in the American archives about the construction of the air bases, the intense military negotiations, improvement of ports, and diplomatic relations generally, and particularly about the *FEB*, were still classified "Secret" as late as 1964, others until 1976.¹ The histories of World War II gave priority to relations among the Big Three—United States, Britain, and Soviet Union—and only slowly turned to the secondary powers. Historians emphasized United States combat operations, not how the supply and support networks had been created and functioned. Brazil rarely entered the American worldview.

American officials had implied that Brazil would have a privileged position after the war. Even before the Brazilian troops reached Italy, the two governments signed an agreement that would have allowed the American military to have use of air bases at Natal, Recife, and Belém for ten years after the war ended. It appeared as if the two countries would remain close allies in the post-war period.

MILITARY STAFF NEGOTIATIONS

On August 1, 1944, the Department of State alerted diplomatic missions in Latin America that they were to propose that bilateral staff conversations lay “the foundations for continued military collaboration between [sic] the American Republics in the post-war period.”² A little later in August, Cordell Hull wrote to the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, saying that the conversations with Brazil and Mexico should be held before they were initiated with any other republic.³ The objective was to standardize the weaponry, training, and organization of the Latin American armed forces so that if there was another attack on the hemisphere, there would be a massive defense force ready. Also the idea was to prevent European countries from selling arms or placing military missions in the region. The difficulty was that the Brazilians were not interested in standardization, but in establishing their predominance in South America. They wanted to insure that Argentina would never be able to attack Brazil successfully so that Brazil and the United States entered into these discussions with different objectives. A further problem was that Americans were not united in their own estimate of the situation.

On October 10, 1944, the staff conversations were officially begun with fanfare presided over by Getúlio Vargas in Rio’s Catete Palace. The president commented that what they were doing “for all practical purposes amounted to a military alliance” and recalled that their “highly satisfactory military collaboration” had begun “even before Pearl Harbor.”⁴ With this auspicious beginning, the two militaries held detailed staff discussions about the structures, armaments and equipping, stationing, missions, and cooperative arrangements with the Brazilian armed forces after the war. Similar conversations were to be held with other Latin American countries.⁵ The discussions were conducted between Brazilian and American officers without any involvement of civilian diplomats. The resulting “papers” or studies were the official views of the Brazilian armed forces and had been approved by President Vargas. The American officers assumed that the United States wished Brazil to have “a strong and cooperative role in the maintenance of hemispherical defense as a component of post-war world order, thereby relieving the United States of the military burden and political embarrassment of playing this role directly in South America.”⁶ The Americans believed that “Brazil was willing and anxious to become a southern partner of the United States in a military sense,” that they wanted assistance to become self-sufficient, rather than

having “continued help.” The army “program was scaled to cover defense of Brazil from attack within or from without South America, in conjunction with possible United States help.”⁷

The Brazilian navy hoped for the transfer of some 32 warships that included two battleships, two light aircraft carriers, four cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and nine submarines, which would “make the Brazilian Navy incontestably the strongest naval force in South America....” However, Adolf A. Berle, who had succeeded Jefferson Caffery as US ambassador in January, doubted that the Brazilian navy could maintain such “complicated and formidable” machinery.⁸ He argued that “The money and effort used in organizing a naval force at this point in Brazilian history would be infinitely better spent on putting in an internal transport system, and building and maintaining public schools.”⁹ He may have been correct, but apparently he forgot that such policy decisions were for Brazilian leaders to make and were not the purview of the American ambassador. The staff conversations raised the expectations of the Brazilian navy, which were stimulated even higher due to comments that Admiral Jonas Ingram, commander of the 4th US Fleet based at Recife, made to reporters in early July 1945 in which he said that a number of American ships would be ceded to Brazil.¹⁰ Ingram’s comments and the promise of ships were “unauthorized” but that did not reduce their impact.¹¹ Somewhat frustrated, Berle observed that “we have to cope with the results. To throw overboard the Naval Conversations now would undoubtedly create a very considerable crisis.” He recommended keeping “the program as *an ideal*, propose measures designed to make progress toward realizing it *without commitments as to time*.”¹² [Italics added]

The proposal for the army, at least in the American view, emphasized instruction and training. It called for the insertion of American instructors at every level of training of officers and enlisted specialists. American officers would be assigned to the “tactical schools, the military academy, and officers pre-military schools.” Although the document did not mention the French Military Mission’s long attempt to reshape the Brazilian army, the considerable American insertion into Brazilian army institutions would be more profound than what the French had done. Within two years of the proposal’s approval, the Brazilians wanted to receive “sufficient war materiel with which to equip ... [a] peace-time Army of 180,000 and ... a reserve sufficient to equip the 26 divisions contemplated in ... initial mobilization plan.” Ambassador Berle doubted that within the specified two years, the army would be ready to receive so much equipment and

arms. He thought it would involve “an extremely large factor of waste.” He asserted that “the Brazilian record for maintenance is not good; and there is always a tendency to ask for new equipment as a solution.” However, he observed that “the capacity for maintenance is there if it can be developed.”¹³

The staff conversations also proposed the expansion of the Brazilian air force from 14,000 officers and men to 25,654 by 1948, with a like increase in aircraft from the current 60 fighter bombers to 200 by 1949.¹⁴ If adopted, Berle believed that “Brazil would have unquestioned air supremacy so that no nation or group of nations in South America could oppose her. Technically she would have the continent at her mercy. Given her pacific tendencies, this is not of itself a danger.” Indeed, underlying the three sets of staff talks was the belief that “Brazil if armed would be a force for peace and defense, and not for war and expansion; and on the historical and psychological record of Brazil,” Berle concurred that “this assumption seems warranted.”¹⁵

The reports resulting from the staff conversations, which had been approved at the highest levels of the Brazilian government, were sent to Washington with Brazilian expectations soaring, but then nothing happened. Rio was not even notified of their receipt. Some nine months later at the end of December, Colonel José Bina Machado, who had been Brazil’s first military attaché in Washington from 1938 to November 1941 and was considered a friend of the United States, paid an unsettling visit to the American embassy. During the previous months, he had been chief of Minister of War Dutra’s office and was close to Generals Dutra, Góes Monteiro, and other high officers.¹⁶ He said he was alarmed at the “recent growth of anti-American sentiment in high Brazilian army circles, gravely threatening the future of Brazilian–American military cooperation.” He declared that Brazilian officers were thinking that the United States “was inclined to treat Brazil as a small brother rather than an important nation” and doubted American sincerity about “a wholehearted policy of cooperation with Brazil.” The chargé d’affaires quickly reported Bina Machado’s comments warning that it was “obvious that immediate action must be taken ... to produce concrete results pursuant to the staff conversations.” If action was not taken, he predicted that it would “prejudice the standing of our military personnel in Brazil, and gravely threaten the whole future of American-Brazilian military cooperation.”¹⁷ In addition it would, he emphasized, have “effects far transcending the immediate military necessity.” Secretary of State James F. Byrnes replied that there had been no

change in Washington's policy of "full cooperation with Brazil" and that it was "our most earnest desire to keep our relations with Brazil on the same intimately friendly basis that has existed traditionally...." He was concerned that "certain elements" might be trying to stir up trouble.¹⁸

Also of concern was the appearance in Rio of an agent of the British company Vickers-Armstrongs with offers to sell to the Brazilian navy at scrap prices a large number of fully equipped combat vessels. The agent was making the rounds of South American capitals seeking prospective buyers. Minister of Navy Jorge Dodsworth Martins told the American naval attaché that he was worried that such sales could be the start of an arms race. He questioned the status of the staff conversations' recommendations. Ambassador Berle urged the State Department to act, but he seems to have immediately tried to restrain the British, rather than to pressure Washington for the implementation of the staff proposals.

The Brazilians could not understand the American attitude, Truman and his team said the right things, but failed to act on the recommendations.¹⁹ What was going on? In 1945 there were two sets of opposing attitudes in Washington regarding Brazil's military status and relationship with the United States. From 1938 onward the War and Navy Departments had gradually eclipsed the State Department in the realm of foreign policy making, particularly in the Americas. Secretary of State Cordell Hull had not favored the idea of a special relationship with Brazil, and after President Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, Truman's team had little familiarity with Brazilian-American relations and even less sympathy for Brazilian ambitions. And that view eventually spread to the army staff. Perhaps because so much of what had happened in Brazil was in the shadows, Brazilian contributions were not well known, even in the War Department.²⁰

FDR's death marked the end of a remarkable relationship between the American president and Brazil. His passing was mourned publicly by ordinary citizens. From Manaus in the north to Porto Alegre in the south, the newspapers reported the shock and profound pain of loss that people on the streets expressed. The interventor in Recife commented that Roosevelt's name would be "indelibly linked to Brazil in the fight for freedom and justice." Recife businesses closed and the government shut down. The interventor Rui Carneiro in Paraíba observed that Roosevelt was gone but that "'rooseveltismo' is the eternal unperishable dogma of good will among men and nations."²¹ President Vargas, at a memorial held at the foreign ministry on May 12, declared that it was not a protocol ceremony, rather "the demonstration of friendship of the Brazilian nation

for a foreign statesman, who was so much a friend as to be considered by all of us as a quasi-national name.”²² The impression that he made on Brazilians as a reformer was so long lasting that President Fernando Cardoso (1995–2003) liked to compare his program to FDR’s, and some commentators tagged President Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) as a “Roosevelt Brasileiro” in 2010.

AMERICAN MILITARY VIEWS

The Army General Staff was divided between those with direct experience with the Brazilians and those who had more theoretical views on how to deal with the American Republics. The two groups of officers saw things very differently. Those in Brazil recommended recognizing Brazil’s emergence “as the dominant military power in South America.” Referring to “Brazil’s contribution, in the present conflict, to Hemispheric Defense,” they advised building “Brazil into a power in the South American continent comparable to that of the United States in the North American continent....”²³ The problem was that such a policy collided with the fault line between the Spanish-American Republics and Portuguese-speaking Brazil, and the desire of Washington’s bureaucracies to craft policies that engaged all of Latin America. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved a statement (JSC 629) that provided “for an integration of all Latin American armed forces into a hemisphere defense force equipped with United States material and organized and trained in accordance with United States standards.” The War Department’s intelligence section candidly admitted that “one of the main purposes” of the integration policy was “to prevent European powers from providing arms and military missions to Latin American republics.” If Brazil alone were provided with substantial American arms and equipment it would be “inevitable that European powers” would move into the breach with arms and military missions, particularly in Argentina, Chile, and Peru. The G-2 critics asserted that “a reversal of the policy would have a disastrous effect upon United States relations with Latin America ... [and] would lead to a Spanish-speaking bloc which would be hostile to both the United States and Brazil.” Pan American unity “would be destroyed and Inter-American military cooperation disrupted.” The negative evaluation concluded acidly: “The friendship of Brazil for the United States ... is a recent development and there is no assurance of its permanence.”²⁴ On June 9, 1945, the Army staff’s Operations Division (OPD) agreed with the foregoing assessment

and recommendation against a pro-Brazil policy. OPD, showing lamentable ignorance of reality, reduced Brazil's wartime contributions to allowing American personnel in Northeast Brazil to construct strategic air bases and to participate in the defense of the region. The author's final line caught the mood in Washington by saying: "Assurance of Brazil's friendship for the United States is no less than that of other Latin American countries."²⁵

How different in tone was OPD's assessment from that of officials more aware of the importance of those very same air bases. In an August 1943 report to the Senate investigation of the airfield projects, a special assistant to the Secretary of War declared that without the Brazilian route to Africa, "the entire course of the war might have been changed." For Brazilian aspirations it was most unfortunate that "the entire project has from the beginning been treated as a secret one."²⁶ Obviously, secret projects are not widely known and can be easily forgotten.

Brazilian leaders in the second half of 1945 were slow to realize that their "blood sacrifice" was lost from view in the rivers of blood shed on the world's battlefields. Historians have not been inquisitive as to Brazil's immediate post-war role in world affairs. They have concentrated on the fall of Vargas, the successor Eurico Dutra government, and Brazilian activity in the new United Nations.²⁷ For example, no one has asked why Brazil did not participate in the occupation of the defeated Axis countries.

NO OCCUPATION ROLE

While the above was going on in Rio de Janeiro and Washington, a different dialogue had taken place in Italy. At some point in February 1945, likely after the victory at Monte Castello, General Mark Clark, former commander of US Fifth Army, asked General João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes about contributing troops to the occupation. Clark would eventually head the occupation of Austria and apparently had the idea of transferring the *FEB* there. It is significant that little is known about this inquiry, sources such as the *Foreign Relations* papers are silent and I have not found anything in the military files in the National Archives.

The Brazilian sources tell us more but in shadowy fashion. Without any prompting Mascarenhas wrote Minister of War Dutra that he did not favor an occupation role because it would necessarily involve Brazilian troops in an uncomfortable disciplinary function that could easily turn violent. As the least powerful force in that theater of operations under the control of

one of the strongest nations, he did not think his troops cut a figure of sufficient authority for such a role. He noted that the poor quality of their uniforms compared unfavorably with those of the Americans and English, and worse, he regarded their discipline and military instruction as deficient. He concluded by writing that “It seems to me [to be] contra-indicated to employ the *Força Expedicionária Brasileira* as occupation troops in any country of this continent.”²⁸

The *FEB*'s chief of staff Colonel Floriano de Lima Brayner argued against participating in the post-war occupation. He apparently thought that Brazil was paying the full cost of the *FEB*, and so “staying in Italy,” he observed bitterly, “would cost incalculable and onerous fortunes of our public moneys.” He complained that “The only thing the Americans did not charge for was the air we breathed because the banks could not measure it.”²⁹ Sadly, he was unaware that in early April 1945 the Lend-Lease agreement between the two governments was modified to include the cost of *FEB* operations. Decades later he still believed that the Americans did not appreciate them.³⁰ General Willis D. Crittenberger, commander of the Fourth Corps of the US Fifth Army, met with *FEB* staff officer (G-3) Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco in Milan on May 10, 1945. He asked Castello why the Brazilians were in such a hurry to go home. Castello replied that Brazil was not represented on the allied council for governing Italy and so it should not contribute troops. He said that Brazil had no political interest in Europe. Castello and Brayner believed that the *FEB* had completed its mission and there was no reason for it to be part of the occupation of Italy or anywhere else.³¹ But, of course, this was not a decision for field officers to make. Exactly who made the decision and why is not known. It is possible that the missing 1945 and 1946 *Relatórios* of the Minister of War might shed some light on why Brazil did not participate in the occupation.³²

If the Brazilian army had taken part in the occupation, it likely would have given Brazil a louder voice in post-war diplomacy and likely would have strengthened its relationship with the United States. Ambassador Vasco Leitão da Cunha in his oral history testimony observed that British General Harold R. L. G. Alexander, commander of the 15th Group of Armies, had said to him: “The Brazilian is a fine soldier. I’m sorry to hear they want to go home and not go to Austria.” Leitão da Cunha was in Rome at the time and immediately telegraphed the Brazilian foreign ministry saying “that the *FEB* ought to stay.” He argued that the reason for the *FEB* was more political than military, it was a confirmation of our

alliance with the United States, “written in blood.” It was to show the Allies that Brazil was “anti-Nazi and antifascist.” Apparently in the Itamaraty, the diplomats were not looking to expand Brazilian influence and prestige; one of them responded: “This is an easy way for them to earn gold.” [*Isso é cavação deles para ganhar ouro.*] As if the war-weary veterans were thinking only of lining their pockets! The Ambassador summarized his reaction by saying: “we give up conquered gains.” [*Nós abdicamos das vantagens conquistadas.*] “And we did not know how to take advantage of what we had done; we got stuck in intrigues, lesser things, when we had a natural ally. We strayed out of step with the United States.” He concluded by saying that “the Germanophiles [in the War Ministry] did not lose their Germanophilia. They fought without enthusiasm.” Because of its role in the war, “Brazil stopped being an adolescent country and became a serious country.” “We do not know how to take advantage of the things that we do well. We ought to celebrate [them], but Brazilians don’t know what the *pracinhas* did.”³³ If Brazil had participated in the occupation, its visibility and, perhaps, status in the post-war world would have been different.

Even before World War II ended, the United States negotiated a ten-year extension of its access to air bases at Belém, Natal, and Recife. American policy aimed at excluding all other foreign military influences from the Western Hemisphere and to solidify American leadership in military matters. Brazil was to be the model for the other American Republics of the value of such an arrangement of hemispheric defense. The United States which before the war had not been interested in training and supplying Latin American forces now made this the core of its relations with the region.³⁴

THE PACIFIC WAR

When Brazil entered the war in August 1942, it recognized that a state of war existed with Germany and Italy, but it did not include Japan. The other two Axis powers had sunk Brazilian ships, in effect attacking Brazil. Japan had attacked another American Republic, so Brazil broke relations with the three, but did not recognize war with Japan because the Empire had not attacked it. Brazil’s tradition was to go to war only if attacked. There was a large Japanese immigrant population in the country dating from 1906, with communities in the southern states and in Pará in the Amazon. The government imposed harsh repressive controls on the

Japanese. With the end of the war in Europe in early May 1945, all eyes turned toward the Pacific. Peace in Europe also meant the end of Brazilian participation in the Lend-Lease program. The exact thinking of the Vargas government is not clear, but it must have seen advantages to joining the fight in the Pacific, especially because Argentina still maintained its neutrality.

The Vargas government let it be known that it would respond favorably to an American request that it enter the war with Japan. Washington demurred saying it would welcome a Brazilian declaration, but it would be up to Brazil to act without an invitation. On May 8, Vargas, rejoicing in the victory in Europe, told journalists that Brazil was standing with the United Nations and that the bases in the north would continue to serve the war effort until Japan was defeated. He emphasized that if the United Nations needed Brazilian troops in the Pacific, "the country was ready to supply them."³⁵ So he was ready to set aside the tradition of declaring war only if attacked. Meanwhile some American troops in Italy were being shipped to the Pacific theater.³⁶ And Brazil's troops would soon be heading home.

At that time the United Nations was being organized in San Francisco. Brazil was angling for a seat on the Security Council, but faced resistance from the British and the Russians and lack of enthusiasm from the Americans.³⁷ The chief Brazilian representative at the conference Pedro Leão Veloso met with President Truman to discuss Lend-Lease issues and possible Brazilian entry into the war with Japan.³⁸ The Department of State opined that "it would be politically advantageous to have Brazil declare war on Japan." The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved "a token participation of the Brazilian Air Force in the Pacific," but because of transportation and retraining difficulties, they could not make use of Brazilian ground troops. On June 6, 1945, Brazil announced that "having for some time considered the aggression of Japan against the United States of America as though it were directed against Brazil itself and desiring to cooperate for the final victory of the United Nations...", it declared that a state of war existed with the Empire of Japan.³⁹ President Truman telegraphed to Vargas his "deep satisfaction" that Brazil "will be solidly at our side until the total defeat of the one remaining Axis aggressor." He noted that the action was "an additional bond in the historic friendship" that had its "roots in the beginnings of our respective histories as independent nations."⁴⁰ However, it may be that the Brazilian declaration and offer of

troops were more related to a desire to keep Lend-Lease arms and equipment flowing than to a real desire to see action in the Pacific.

It is worth noting that historians have paid little attention to Brazil's entry into the war against Japan. The many thousands of Japanese immigrants in Brazil suffered discrimination and severe repression in the late 1930s nationalist campaigns and even worse after the 1942 break in relations. Because of their extreme cultural and physical isolation, most of them did not believe that Japan had lost the war.⁴¹ Recently, one team of Brazilian historians has questioned why Brazil delayed including Japan in the recognition of a state of war from 1942 to 1945. Their continuing research may provide answers. They noted that even without such action, Brazilian authorities treated the resident Japanese as harshly as they did the Germans and Italians.⁴² The intense political agitation that led to the ousting of President Vargas at the end of October 1945 likely distracted and deflected historians' attention to other questions such as the formation of the United Nations.

By the end of December 1945, a significant number of Brazilian officers had doubts about American sincerity regarding their relationship. Such officers thought that the Americans were "inclined to treat Brazil as a small brother rather than an important nation pledged to full military cooperation." Secretary of State James F. Byrnes tried to counter such feelings by saying that it was the Truman administration's "most earnest desire to keep our relations with Brazil on the same intimately friendly basis that has existed traditionally and particularly throughout the war...."⁴³

VARGAS OVERTHROW

That goal would be affected by a regime change in Brazil as 1945 progressed. The military and right-wing civilian opposition became concerned about Getúlio's attempt to mobilize the working class as a political actor. As the wartime development projects became a reality, the labor and social decrees of the Estado Novo gave Vargas increasing influence over unions and the working class. His image as "father of the poor" and friend of workers took on more substance. The end of dictatorship and the return of elected government meant that the working class would have an unprecedented role in Brazilian politics. Getúlio's apparent acceptance of the idea of holding a constitutional convention while he was still in office was seen by his opponents as a step toward keeping power. Moreover, support

for the idea by the Communist Party of Brazil and the similarity of the situation to the Peronist phenomenon in Argentina were enough to drive a wedge between Vargas and the military. The army was then searching out and watching Communist cells in its ranks. Vargas maneuvered to secure the backing of the recently freed left-wing political prisoners and their related worker allies. At a meeting of generals on September 28, 1945, Góes, speaking now as Minister of War, said that Vargas's re-election could not happen, that it would be "inadmissible."⁴⁴ The mood in the country, at least among the middle and upper classes, as expressed in newspaper editorials, was that, as the *Diário Carioca* (Rio) stated it, "the decisive role in this hour of transition falls to the armed forces. ... We appeal to the armed forces...." Vargas had to go.⁴⁵

But why did he have to go before the elections scheduled for December 2? Coups are often related to political instability, yet in 1945 Brazil was remarkably stable. It is true that in 123 years of independence, it had had 4 constitutional regimes that were barely representative and tended toward increasing authoritarianism. In the eight previous years under the Estado Novo appointed leadership, changes were at the ministerial and state levels without social violence. There were few manifestations against the Vargas regime in the early 1940s and in the first ten months of 1945. Vargas's economic programs had strong public support. Various features of the state direction of the economy appealed to business and consumers alike. "Most obviously, anti-foreign measures that placed foreign capital at a relative disadvantage were attractive to domestic entrepreneurs hard-pressed to compete with the superior resources of outside investors." Vargas had shifted politically during the war. Clearly democracy was the trend of the moment. He cultivated the emergent working class and soothed the conservative landowners of the interior. He created the Labor Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB*) and the Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Democrata, PSD*) imagining a return to elective democratic politics in which he would persist as a key figure. "The combination of economic nationalism, with the state greatly contributing to industrialization, and the political maneuvers by Vargas helped sustain his popularity among most of the Brazilian population. 1945 witnessed the polarization of politics with the working class and Vargas's side (for him to remain in office) and the forces rallying against the dictator."⁴⁶

There were no strikes against the government. The cost of living in the center south hovered a bit above 1 percent during the Estado Novo. There were more rallies in his favor than against him. Growth was steadily upward

throughout the dictatorship, even though productive capacity lagged, and the industrial plant was deteriorating and tending toward obsolescence.⁴⁷ Likely poor maintenance contributed to both. However, public support was consistent up to the coup.

What did Vargas have to say about his intentions? He had given up on his diary after the accident in 1942, so the only entries into his thinking are what he said to others during what became the 1945 crisis. On the evening of Friday, September 28, at Getúlio's request, Ambassador Adolf Berle went to Guanabara Palace. The president said he wanted to know the thinking of the Truman government "without going through the bureaucracy of Foreign Offices." They talked about the status of the negotiations over the air bases that seemed to be progressing satisfactorily. They discussed the multilateral civil air agreements resulting from the international civil aviation conference in Chicago in 1944, Brazil's preference for a bilateral accord, and the next aviation conference to be held in Montreal.⁴⁸ As head of the American delegation at Chicago, Berle was an expert. They went on to talk about the exchange of Argentine wheat for Brazilian-made tires, which Vargas felt placed Brazil at an uncomfortable disadvantage. Berle indicated that he would explore the possibility of the United States shipping wheat to Brazil. With the question of Argentina in the air, they turned to the wisdom of Vargas attending the dedication of the international bridge at Uruguaiana, Rio Grande do Sul, on October 12, now that Perón had ordered the arrest of thousands of Argentines and the level of public anger in Argentina was rising. The American press had been linking Vargas with Perón in a supposed "league of dictators," and Berle was worried that a meeting at the bridge would give impetus to such speculations and might even alienate popular opinion in Brazil, which "would probably be misinterpreted in the press of the United States." Berle suggested putting off the visit until after the Rio Conference on Continental Peace and Security (held August 15–September 2, 1947). Of course, by then Vargas would be out of office.

Then the president asked what Berle thought of the situation in Brazil. The ambassador replied that it "would be very closely watched in the United States. We had admired as acts of great statesmanship his putting Brazil back on the democratic rails..." Referring to Vargas's speech of September 7, 1945 declining to run again, Berle characterized it as "forthright, direct and honest," noting that "we had not taken any stock in his enemies who had tortured this speech into the exact opposite of what it said." Talk of coup d'état by Vargas or against him was then being reported.

They chatted a bit about Communist activity. “The President said rather grimly that the Communists knew very well that the masses were with him and not with them; that all they wanted was a chance to organize and that their real goal was 20 or 30 years ahead.” Vargas asserted that he did not intend to be a candidate for two reasons: he had said he would not and that he intended to keep his word; the second was that he was tired and that he “proposed to leave while he had the affection and applause of his people.” He did not want to go out with either their hatred or their indifference. “For this reason he was going through with elections and he had made that plain.” He said that he would resolve the agitation for a *Constituinte* and that “this was the end of a government and he was putting things in order.”

Berle took that as an opening to ask Vargas to look at a draft of a speech he planned to give about the situation. After reading it, Vargas asked one question: “whether this meant we were opposed to a *Constituinte*.” “I told him certainly not ... Our fear was lest the hotheads would defeat the policy he had so wisely and brilliantly worked out during the last year.”

They parted pleasantly. Berle summarized his reaction saying: “I got the sense of a tired, sincere man struggling with many forces, no longer anxious for great power, caught to some extent in the shackles of his past.”⁴⁹

Berle had grasped the nature of the crisis. Vargas had set the date of the presidential election for December 2. The opposition party, the *União Democrática Nacional* (UDN), had nominated Air Force Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, and the government’s PSD had selected Army Minister Eurico Dutra, which many saw as Vargas’s attempt to split the armed forces. His good intentions aside, Ambassador Berle precipitated a crisis by giving the speech the next day before the *Sindicato de Jornalistas* (Journalists Union). Berle emphasized the interest of the United States in Brazil’s re-democratization and confidence in Vargas to see the process through. Getúlio had made a solemn promise to hold free elections and the United States considered his word as “inviolable.” Raising the *Constituinte* Berle declared that there was no conflict in holding elections while taking measures to organize a constituent assembly “in the form the people indicate.” The opposition press emphasized selected words to give the impression that the ambassador meant the opposite of what he said. As a result Vargas was livid and Góes suggested that he have him recalled, indeed the foreign ministry protested strongly. British Ambassador Gainer called the speech an explicit and flagrant intervention in internal Brazilian affairs.⁵⁰ But there are some peculiar inconsistencies in all this. Some his-

torians have written—for example, Hilton and Neto—that Vargas read the text, while the CPDOC account has Berle reading it to Vargas. Góes Monteiro's comments have Berle reading the text aloud, which Góes said Vargas had difficulty understanding. Moreover, Berle and Vargas each said the other had requested the meeting.⁵¹

On October 10, when Vargas moved the state-level elections, which had been scheduled for May, to occur simultaneously with the presidential one, the opposition cried foul. They suspected Getúlio's every move as related to a plot to stay in power. The ghost of the coup of 1937 hung over everything Vargas said or did not say, everything he did or did not do. It is not known if he wanted to keep power or not, nor if his actions were geared to staying in office, as he said, only until elections allowed him to pass the presidential sash to his successor. There was too much distrust, misunderstanding, and suspicion for unemotional rational thought. His opponents simply wanted him gone, his allies Góes Monteiro and Dutra now had their own reputations to save and goals to achieve. Vargas's seemingly straightforward gesture in replacing the federal district's chief of police set off the explosion of coup d'état. What Stanley Hilton labeled "The Unnecessary Golpe" of October 29 set the tone for the post-war era and eventually contributed to the military regime of 1964–1985.⁵² Its perpetrators envisioned deposing Vargas as "restoring" democracy and redeeming the military for supporting the *Estado Novo*.

Dutra would win the elections and become a rather lackluster president who gained little popularity. Worse his years in office were "a return to the *Estado Novo*'s style of industrial relations." The 1946 Constitution was not the guidebook for a democratic society but rather a continuation of the *Estado Novo*'s "corporatist control over labor."⁵³

The difficulty was that the role of the Communist Party in Brazilian unions was significant enough to allow the government to mask labor repression behind a façade of combatting communism. The repression was not limited to workers, but was also aimed at the military, the diplomatic corps, and government employees.⁵⁴ Such repression was not seen from abroad as limiting citizens' rights but as protecting Brazil from the Russian bear. As long as Dutra was cooperative about allowing American investors free rein, Washington did not concern itself with the realities of his government.⁵⁵

Somewhere in Góes's mind, he may have felt that his long-time ambition of achieving the presidency himself was slipping beyond reach. He had turned aside Getúlio's suggestion that he should succeed him. He

truly wanted to reform and strengthen the army, which desire constantly conflicted with his recurrent presidential fantasies. His tendency of talking too much and drinking too much diminished his ability to accomplish his own ideas. Throughout the 1930s each time those fantasies took hold, they faded quickly and he contritely renewed his partnership with Getúlio. 1945 proved different because the very idea of dictatorship was in decline, and, moreover, the power balance had tipped toward the now better armed, equipped, and organized army. The Lend-Lease tanks were used in the coup to control the streets and to directly threaten Vargas. Seemingly Góes and the other generals no longer needed Vargas.⁵⁶ But considering that the deposition of Vargas took place in a matter of hours and was ostensibly caused by the president's appointment of his brother Benjamin as the capital's police chief, it should have raised deeper doubts in the minds of historians. It was Benjamin who had called his brother's attention to Eurico Dutra's command abilities during the suppression of the 1932 Paulista uprising. Certainly the younger Vargas had a streak of unpredictable behavior, but would he have been able to keep his brother in power? Vargas did not create the dictatorship alone, it would not have happened without Dutra and Góes. Brazilian historiography has often portrayed Vargas as the scheming dictator who fell before the winds of democracy. That portrayal transforms General Dutra, who had been the mainstay of the *Estado Novo*, into the bearer of democratic, constitutional government. Yet the Dutra years were not an experiment in democracy, but more accurately a political closing or perhaps a veiled continuation of the *Estado Novo* in more acceptable dress.

It was not a surprise that the formal *Estado Novo* was at an end in 1945. In retrospect it is doubtful that Getúlio intended the regime to continue. He never held the plebiscite that would have ratified the constitution of 1937, he refused to create a party or a youth movement to support the regime, and he knew, as the country did not, that the regime has its origins in the agreement that he, Dutra, and Góes Monteiro [these two speaking for the army's generals] had made in 1937 to close down the existing political system so that they could arm and industrialize Brazil. The decision to close the system based on the 1934 constitution had been, in the first instance, a military one, made by the senior generals, who preferred to act with Vargas at their head than risk possible rivalries among themselves. But they were determined to act with or without Vargas. Given Getúlio's political style as far back to his governorship in Rio Grande do Sul, it is unlikely that he would have tried to create the

Estado Novo on his own. In effect, however, by the war's end, he was left as the sole parent of the dictatorship, while the generals minimized the importance of their roles.

Vargas had committed himself to arming and equipping the military and building a national steel complex in return for military support in prolonging his presidency with dictatorial powers that would eliminate politics and regionalism. The public implementation of this arrangement proceeded in the hesitant, indirect way in which Getúlio usually maneuvered.

The signals that he flashed were certainly mixed. It is most common for historians to see his contradictory moves as deliberate diversions intended to confuse. It is more likely, however, recalling his hesitant behavior in 1930, that such moves really indicated his indecision and caution. Set against the creation of the *Estado Novo* in 1937, the events of October 1945 suggest that Getúlio was left holding the bag of responsibility.

The Dutra government's continuance of the wartime alignment with the United States did not bring any more benefits than the wartime alliance had already secured. Because Brazil's status during the war was different from that of its neighbors, Brazilian leaders then and since have expected the great powers to accept the country into their councils. They have often been disappointed when the powers, especially the United States, did not accord proper recognition of Brazil's status. Policy makers in foreign capitals, in particular Washington, have frequently been puzzled by, what they considered to be, the Brazilians' pretensions. Their perplexity was perhaps feigned at times, because such recognition was not in harmony with their own policy objectives, but it is likely that many of them were, like the world at large, ignorant of the history of Brazil's wartime roles. Those roles had been often secret or were lost.

NOTES

1. I applied for access to the military records in 1963; it took a year for the army to give me a "top secret" clearance to do research, and it took another year for the army to return my "censored" notes.
2. Edward R. Stettinius to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, Washington, August 1, 1944, 810.20 Defense/8-144, as in *FRUS, 1944*, Vol. VII, pp. 105-106.
3. Cordell Hull to William D. Leahy, Washington, August 24, 1944, 810.24/5-3044, as in *FRUS, 1944*, Vol. VII, p. 115.

4. The three Brazilian armed forces ministers, the chiefs of staff, the foreign minister, Admiral Jonas Ingram of the 4th Fleet, the commander of the 6th Air Force in the Canal Zone, and other officers were present. Chargé Donnelly, Rio de Janeiro, October 10, 1944, 810.20 Defense/10-1044: Telegram as in *FRUS, 1944*, Vol. VII, pp. 123-125. The possibility of staff conversations was raised with President Vargas on July 10, 1944; see Caffery's memo of that date in *ibid.* p. 125. It spoke of an agreement to guarantee collaboration in case of aggression against either country and that the United States would "obligate itself to furnish war material to Brazil" under an agreement that would "be substituted for the present Lend-Lease agreement." Similar conversations had taken place in the much tenser time near the end of 1940.
5. Interestingly the instructions for the American officers who participated were sent out in January 1945 and involved some 16 countries. See notes to "Discussions Regarding Military and Naval Cooperation between the United States and Brazil," *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 600. The army paper was signed on March 31, 1945, the air force one on April 12, 1945, and the naval one on April 15, 1945.
6. Adolf A. Berle to Secretary of State, Rio, July 26, 1945, No. 2186, 810.20 Defense/7-2645 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, pp. 600-606 ff. Here Berle analyzed the naval staff conversations document in considerable detail; the same day he did the same with the army document (pp. 606-614) and the next day discussed the air force one (pp. 614-620).
7. Adolf A. Berle to Secretary of State, Rio, July 26, 1945, No. 2187, 810.20 Defense/7-2645 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 607. Argentina was then a concern. Thanks to the proposed program, Berle said that "Brazil will be able, granted the power of organization, to put an Army into the field larger than any South American state, and possibly larger than any combination of them."
8. See Berle's comment in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, pp. 602-603. Poor Brazilian maintenance of war materials transferred by the United States was frequently commented upon by Americans. Often this was done to criticize future transfers. Oddly, World War II vehicles and ships were in service in Brazil for decades indicating a high level of maintenance. In May 1965 I visited the navy base at Recife and found the machine shops using equipment left behind when the Americans withdrew.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 603.
10. "U.S. Navy to Give Vessels to Brazil," *The New York Times*, July 5, 1945, p. 3; and "Brazil Takes Over Bases Tomorrow," *The New York Times*, July 7, 1945, p. 6.
11. Berle called it "unauthorized" and "very unfortunate" *FRUS 1945*, IX, p. 606. He noted that Ingram was then "a Brazilian hero for having promised the Brazilians a Navy free of charge." Oddly Berle inflated Ingram's actual comments.

12. Berle as in note 20 above, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 606.
13. *Ibid*, pp. 610–611.
14. The increase in aircraft would include as well 57 light bombers to 60, 41 medium bombers to 120, 12 heavy bombers from none to 12 (1948), 9 transports to 150, and 21 patrol planes to 60. Adolf A. Berle to Secretary of State, Rio, July 27, 1945, No. 2196, 810.20 Defense/7–2745 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 615.
The memorandum produced by the staff conversations was entitled “Missions and Plans of the Brazilian Air Force,” Rio de Janeiro, April 12, 1945.
15. *Ibid*, 615.
16. “José Bina Machado,” biographical sketch in Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds., *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro*, 1930–1983, Vol. 3, p. 1981. To make things slightly confusing, his brother João Bina Machado was an army officer at the same time; see *ibid*. p. 1980.
17. Daniels (Chargé), Rio de Janeiro, December 28, 1945, 711.32/12–2845: Telegram, as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, pp. 620–622.
18. Byrnes to Chargé Daniels, Washington, December 31, 1945, 711.32/12–2925: Telegram, as in *ibid.*, pp. 622–623. He did not identify the “certain elements.”
19. Back on June 12, 1945, President Truman, in a meeting with Ambassador Berle and Acting Secretary Grew, told Berle that “he was more anxious to have good relations with Brazil than any other country in Latin America.” Joseph C. Grew, Memorandum of Conversation, June 13, 1945, 711.32/6–1345, RG 59, NARA. It is noteworthy that Grew shared Truman’s statement with 26 American missions in Europe, the Middle East, and Canada, but none in Latin America; see Grew, Circular Air gram, June 27, 1945, 711.32/6–2745, RG 59, NARA.
20. The senior American officer in Rio de Janeiro summarized “Brazil’s contribution, in the present conflict, to Hemisphere Defense (sic), in order of importance: Air Bases in Northeast Brazil; strategic materials; troops for overseas combat; naval and air assistance in anti-submarine warfare; and neutralization of Axis activities. To these should be added the moral value of having one South American country actively participating in the war against the Axis powers.” BG Hayes Kroner, Rio de Janeiro, May 18, 1945, “Notes on ‘THE PRESENT AND FUTURE POSITION OF BRAZIL (Sic),’” OPD 336 Brazil, RG165, Modern Military Branch, NARA.
21. For a summary of newspaper reactions, *A Noite* (João Pessoa, Paraíba), Domingo, April 15, 1945, p. 12. http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/Hotpage/HotpageBN.aspx?bib=348970_04&pagfis=33235&curl=http://memoria.bn.br/docreader#.

22. Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil: O Brasil na Guerra* Vol. XI (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1947), p. 163. The expression in Portuguese was very warm: “tão amigo que chegou a ser considerado por todos nós um nome quase nacional.”
23. *Ibid.* Kroner admitted frankly that the pro-Brazil policy he recommended would reduce Argentina “to the relative power of Mexico or Canada.” But by way of justifying his view observed that “the attitude of Argentina during this war has demonstrated clearly that what the United States needs and must have, is, definitely, one strong friend in South America.” (Emphasis was in original.)
24. MG Clayton Bissell, Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, June 1, 1945 and BG John Weckerling, Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, June 6, 1945, OPD 336 Brazil, Section IV, RG 165, Records WD General and Special Staffs, MMB, NARA.
25. MG J.E. Hull, Asst. Chief of Staff, OPD, Washington, June 9, 1945, OPD 336 Brazil, Section IV, RG 165, Records WD General and Special Staffs, MMB, NARA. This document was initialed as “Noted” by the army chief of staff on June 12, 1945. For a study of the broader debates then in progress, see Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms: Brazil-United States Military Relations, 1945-1977* (Niwot, Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 1996), pp. 43-54. Davis commented (p. 51) that “The JCS members suffered from myopia” and that “U.S. leaders saw Brazil- U.S. ties as episodic.”
26. Julius H. Amberg (Special Asst. to Secretary of War) to Hugh Fulton (Chief Counsel, Truman Committee), Washington, August 13, 1943, Tab A, OPD 580.82 Brazil (3-30-42), MMB, NARA.
27. For example, Leslie Bethell’s well-done study of the post war stressed internal politics: “Brazil,” in Leslie Bethell & Ian Roxborough, eds. *Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 33-65.
28. J.B. Mascarenhas de Moraes to General Eurico Dutra, Italia, 27 Feb 1945, Ofício No. 90: Tropa de ocupação (ponderação), Pasta FEB 1945, Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio). He said that no one had asked his opinion; he just wanted to give Dutra his “personal and frank opinion.” He was “trying to look ahead at the consequences and political advantages for Brazil that could result from a measure that would have a purely policing character.” What had provoked Mascarenhas to send his views to Dutra is not clear, but it indicates that the future occupation was being discussed. It is notable that this letter was written after the Brazilian victory at Monte Castello, when his confidence would likely have been very high.
29. He did not understand that the American army had to account for all its expenditures, but all the accounting did not mean that Brazil would be

- handed a bill at the end of the war. It is a shame that he did not understand how the Lend-Lease system worked. Floriano de Lima Brayner, *A Verdade Sobre a FEB: Memórias de um chefe de estado-maior na campanha da Itália, 1943–1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1968), pp. 511–513. He described the American attitude as one of “ingratitude” [*ingratidão*].
30. There are many documents on adjusting the Lend-Lease agreement; see, for example, MG J. E. Hull (ACS, OPD) Memo for Commanding General, Army Services Forces, Washington, April 5, 1945, OPD 336.2 Brazil, Section IV, Cases 56–84, MMB, NARA.
 31. John W. F. Dulles, *Castello Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1978), pp. 167–168. Castello thought that if the Allies abandoned Italy, “it will catch fire and, moreover, Nazi-fascism will resurge a little from the ashes....” But he admitted to his wife that “*I am saturated* with all this and it is high time to return.”
 32. The 1945 and 1946 *Relatórios* (annual reports) of the Minister of War are missing from the Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio de Janeiro). Dutra considered them to be so secret that he ordered them held in a special archive in his office. Even though, in 2010, the army commander ordered a search for the *Relatórios*, they continue to be missing.
 33. *Pracinhas* was what the FEB soldiers were called. Ambassador Vasco commented that “A razão de ser da FEB foi mais política que militar. Foi uma confirmação com sangue da nossa aliança com os Estados Unidos. E foi uma confirmação para os Aliados da nossa posição antinazista e antifascista.” ... E nós não soubemos aproveitar essa vantagem, ficamos com fofquinhas, coisas de somenos, quando tínhamos um aliado natural. Ficamos de pé atrás com os Estados Unidos. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, *Diplomacia em Alto-mar: Depoimento ao CPDOC* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003), pp. 104–106. CPDOC (*Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil*) holds a large number of personal archives, carries on historical research, and has an academic program, located in the Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro.
 34. See Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, pp. 44–45.
 35. “Brazil Pledges Aid for War in Pacific,” *The New York Times*, May 9, 1945, p. 16.
 36. “GI’s on Italian Front Go Direct to Pacific,” *The New York Times*, May 10, 1945, p. 17.
 37. Eugênio V. Garcia, “De como o Brasil quase se tornou membro permanente do Conselho de Segurança de ONU em 1945,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Vol. 54 No. 1 (Brasília 2011) http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-73292011000100010&script=sci_arttext.

38. Correspondence relative to San Francisco Conference, GV 45.04.30, *Arquivo Getúlio Vargas*, CPDOC, *Fundação Getúlio Vargas*, Rio.
39. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew to Chargé Daniels (Rio), Washington, June 6, 1945, 740.0011 P.W. /6-145: Telegram; and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Macedo Soares to Secretary of State, Rio de Janeiro, June 6, 1945, 740.0011 P.W. /6-645 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, pp. 627–627.
40. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew to Ambassador Berle, Washington, June 6, 1945, 740.0011 Pacific War/6-645 as in *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. IX, p. 628. This contains text of Truman's telegram to Vargas.
41. For excellent studies of Japanese immigration, see Kozy K. Amemiya, "Being Japanese in Brazil and Okinawa," Japan Policy Research Institute Occasional Paper No. 13, May 1998: <http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op13.htm>; and Marcia Yumi Takeuchi, *O Perigo Amarelo: imagens do mito, realidade do preconceito, 1920-1945* (São Paulo: Associação Editorial Humanista, 2005).
42. See Fábio Koifman and Humberto Manabu Oda, "A declaração brasileira de guerra ao Japão," XXVII Simposio Nacional de História, Associação Nacional de História, Natal, RN, (22–26 Julho 2013), pp. 6–8.
43. Byrnes to Chargé Daniels, Washington, December 31, 1945, 711.32/12-2925: Telegram, as in *FRUS, 1945*, IX, pp. 622–623.
44. See meeting of September 28. "Resumo das Reuniões de Gerais realizadas no edifício do Ministério da Guerra, em Agosto, Setembro e Outubro de 1945; Acervo Pessoal General Góes, Caixa 11, Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro. The placards calling for a constitutional convention (*Constituinte*) held aloft during the Independence Day (September 7) celebration in Rio's Vasco da Gama stadium troubled Góes Monteiro.
45. Quoted in Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 102–103.
46. Mariano Magalhães, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil and the Coup of 1945: The Application of a New Model to Explain Military Behavior," *Delaware Review of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (August 15, 2002), pp. 16–17. <http://www.udel.edu/LASP/Vol3-2Magalhaes.html>.
47. Werner Baer, *The Brazilian Economy: Its Growth and Development* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Publishing, 1979), pp. 38–45.
48. Referred to as the Chicago Convention, the multilateral agreement's official name was the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
49. Adolf A. Berle, Memorandum of Conversation (with President Vargas), Rio de Janeiro, October 1, 1945, President's Secretary's File, Foreign Affairs – Brazil, Box 171, Harry S Truman Library. This memo was declassified in 1976.

50. Stanley E. Hilton, *Ditador & O Embaixador: Getúlio Vargas, Adolf Berle, Jr. E a Queda do Estado Novo* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1987), pp. 90–95. Lira Neto, *Getúlio: Do governo provisório à ditadura do Estado Novo (1930–1945)* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2013), pp. 476–477. CPDOC biographical sketch of Adolf A. Berle <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/adolf-augustus-berle-junior>.
51. Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe...* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Editora Coelho Branco, 1956), pp. 430–432. The general asserted that there was no American involvement in Getúlio's deposition.
52. Stanley E. Hilton, "The Overthrow of Getúlio Vargas in 1945: Diplomatic Intervention, Defense of Democracy, or Political Retribution?" *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 67, No.1 (Feb. 1987), pp. 1–37. Hilton's study is best documented.
53. Joel Wolfe, *Working Women, Working Men: São Paulo and the Rise of Brazil's Industrial Working Class, 1900–1955* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 158.
54. For a study of repression in the military, see Shawn C. Smallman, *Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society, 1889–1954* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
55. Frank D. McCann, "Commentary for Dialogos," *Diálogos*, Vol. 6 (2002) pp. 61–66. www.dialogos.uem.br (241-707-1-PDF).
56. On the evolution of the relations between Vargas and the military, see José Murilo de Carvalho, *Forças Armadas e Política no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2005), pp. 102–117. The complicated story of the deposition of Vargas is documented in Hélio Silva, *1945: Porque depuseram Vargas* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1976).



CHAPTER 8

Cold Wind from the East

When peace turned into tension and then into harsh relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Brazilian military easily adhered to the Cold War; after all, they had confronted the Communist menace head on in 1935¹ and thus were willing to back the Americans against the Russians. That willingness would have negative long-term results in the extreme military intervention from 1964 to 1985. More immediately, at the world war's end, the US Army's plans for Latin America aimed at standardizing arms, equipment, and training. Military planners envisioned a multimillion-dollar aid program that would integrate the region's armies and would stimulate broad development of its societies. Such thinking relied on the continuation of the wartime levels of funding. The US Congress wanted to reduce spending and had little interest in Latin American economic and military development. The perception of American civilian leaders was that Brazil, indeed, Latin America, was safe from the communist threat and that Washington should focus on the hot spots. It soon became clear to Brazilian leaders that Brazil would not receive the extensive economic development assistance that they had been led to expect for wartime support.

American policies and Brazilian expectations proceeded at odds. The Americans wanted to continue using their wartime bases. The commander of the US Army Air Forces in the South Atlantic, Major General Robert L. Walsh, thought that "the problem of post-war use ... can no longer be

avoided” to insure that “a fair return is achieved by both Brazil and our own government.” After the war, he believed that the bases would become “without doubt vital links in the transoceanic airline operation[s]. They are a part of the only all-weather year-round important transoceanic route from the Western Hemisphere to Europe and Africa. It is also part of the East Coast route between North and South America.” He pointed out that “relations between the two nations have never been at a more friendly stage than right now.”² Commenting on Walsh’s ideas, Robert A. Lovett, assistant secretary of war for air, warned: “Frankly we better take advantage of every favorable situation to now arrange things for the post-war period. This is our last chance before the others start to work.” He advised that joint control “might be more acceptable if the US committed itself to train Brazilian personnel with a view to putting them in a position at as early a date as possible to maintain and operate their own fields and the technical services that are of such particular importance in connection with the transoceanic flights.”³ The War Department considered it a “very high priority” to obtain continued use of bases at Amapá, Belém, São Luiz, Fortaleza, Natal, and Recife. In January 1944 Roosevelt had asked the State Department “as a matter of high priority” to initiate negotiations regarding future usage. If it was not possible to obtain ownership or long-term lease of such bases, the president suggested exploring whether Brazil would be willing to allow US military aircraft use of the bases and that the two air forces “for a stated period of time” jointly control, operate, and maintain them. “Such an arrangement,” he stated, “would be of great value to our post-war defenses.”⁴

Despite the millions of dollars that the United States spent in building the air bases, it never challenged Brazilian ownership of the facilities. Brazilian air force officers were not interested in the sort of joint control that the Americans proposed, “they wanted to gain control of [the] bases without it.”⁵ Those officers led by Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes wanted to prevent Pan American Airways and its subsidiary Panair do Brasil from getting sway over the airfields that they had been so instrumental in establishing. Gomes especially long harbored a dislike of PAA and *Panair*. He would be the key man in destroying *Panair* in 1964 when he became aeronautics minister. For decades after the war, the Brazilian air force would control Brazil’s airfields and its civil aviation.

Although the two governments negotiated an agreement to allow a ten-year period of use by American forces, the growing opposition to the Vargas government also objected to the “continued occupation of Brazilian

soil by foreign troops.” In mid-April 1945, the senior US commander in Brazil, Major General Ralph H. Wooten, advised the War Department that it was “not deemed advisable to proceed with preparation of plans for putting this joint agreement into effect” The end of American bases in Brazil was in sight.⁶

The prospects had been bright back in February 1944 when President Roosevelt suggested a joint Brazilian-American air base in either West Africa or in the Cape Verde Islands and Vargas had said that “he would gladly participate” in such a venture. It should be said that the United States did not have any rights to such bases, and so the offer to Vargas was being made on a “if and when” basis.⁷ It is likely that this joint base idea provoked him to say to Ambassador Caffery: “Well, you may tell President Roosevelt that I am willing to make an agreement with you permitting some sort of continuing military use of those fields [in the northeast].”⁸ In conversations with Caffery, Vargas repeatedly sought assurances of support in case Argentina attacked, and the Americans understood that they had to “at least go through motions sympathetic to Vargas’ desires” if they wanted to conclude an agreement on the use of the bases. Throughout the resulting secret negotiations, there was concern by those involved about opposition from Brazilian air force officers, who were suspicious of American intentions.⁹ All of the foregoing unraveled when Aranha, Roosevelt, and then Vargas were no longer managing the relationship. Before Aranha was forced to resign in August 1944, Secretary Hull had written asking if he could come to Washington in mid-August to discuss the future of relations and Brazil’s role in the security organization of the post-war world. Perhaps his inability to make the trip negatively affected Brazil’s role in that world?¹⁰

At the same time, Washington’s policy, as expressed in the 1945 Chapultepec resolution, called for equal treatment for all Latin American countries.¹¹ Washington seemed to want both a strong bilateral relationship with Brazil *and* a multilateral relationship with all of Latin America. This contradiction resulted from a deep divide in the American government between the State Department, which favored multilateralism, and the War Department that was more, if not completely, inclined toward a bilateral relationship with Brazil. As a result, the messages the Brazilians received from Americans were often confusing. The negative position in the army was succinctly expressed by Brigadier General John Weckerling of the general staff’s intelligence section, rejecting a more favorable status for Brazil in arms supply to Latin America; he declared:

One of the main purposes of [the arms supply policy] is to prevent European powers from providing arms and military missions to Latin American republics. Should Brazil alone receive large amounts of arms it is likely that the others would turn to Europe, especially Argentina, Chile and Peru.¹²

Although Brazil, particularly its military, wanted close friendship with the United States, the Brazilian attitude was not subservient, the Brazilians wanted a relationship of equals that enhanced rather than diminished their nationalism. In 1948 the new CIA correctly warned that in any choice between cooperation and national sovereignty, the Brazilian leadership would follow an independent course. Washington “should not assume Brazil would make concessions incompatible with its national goals.”¹³

After the war the United States did not provide the arms the Brazilians expected, and, more worrisome from the perspective of Rio de Janeiro, it sought a rapprochement with Argentina. This aspect of American multilateralism deeply disturbed the Brazilians who still had a third of their military forces permanently arrayed in defensive positions in the south against a long-expected Argentine invasion. Brazilian strategic planning was based on the premise of war with Argentina.¹⁴ In 1947 they were somewhat mollified by the arrival of enough “surplus” American equipment to outfit a division of infantry and an airborne combat team. But surplus items were not new and recalled the used French equipment they had obtained after World War I. The Brazilians felt inferior and had a sense that somehow they were being cheated. This was especially so because the Truman administration was working hard to prevent the Brazilian Congress from passing laws that would shut out foreign participation in Brazilian petroleum development. Most of the American pressure came from the State Department, but that did not prevent Brazilian officers from feeling distrustful.

The Pentagon regarded Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela as the Latin American countries whose interests appeared “to be most closely allied to the U.S. national interest or which for other reasons should be granted the highest priority of training assistance.” The basic idea was that “training and education were tools for maintaining influence.”¹⁵ Not surprisingly, the Pentagon was enthusiastic about helping the Brazilians create their new *Escola Superior de Guerra*, loosely modeled on the American “National War College,” to prepare their military and civilian elites in finding solutions for Brazil’s development problems.¹⁶

While the American government, at the level of the presidency, always said soothing words of friendship, beyond the White House its actions gave the impression of hardness vis-à-vis Brazilian development, indeed American officials had little interest in or knowledge of Latin America, let alone Brazil. George F. Kennan, then in the State Department, who would be influential in shaping the policy of containment of the Soviet Union, saw the region's racially mixed populations as "unhappy and hopeless," and he judged Brazil by the "noisy, wildly competitive traffic" in Rio de Janeiro and was repulsed by the "unbelievable contrasts between luxury and poverty."¹⁷ He viewed the region as insignificant: "we have really no vital interests in that part of the world" and should "not be greatly concerned for their opinion of us."¹⁸ Of course, he had spent all of a month in the region and was ignorant of its languages and histories.

Kennan's 1950 report on the region was shelved and did not influence Washington's policies toward Latin America.¹⁹ But his attitudes were not far removed from those of other officials who used more diplomatic language.

PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND KOREAN WAR

Oil was a central issue that was viewed differently in the two countries. The United States' position was that Brazil should allow American companies to search for, develop, and basically to own the resulting oil. Free trade and free investment were the American mantras of the era. The Brazilian military was divided as to the best way to develop the crucial resource. Some absolutely opposed foreign corporate involvement, while others thought that foreign money and know-how were necessary. The resulting argument within the armed forces weakened and delayed the development of a concerted national policy.

Most senior Brazilian officers had come out of the 1930s with broad and ill-formed ideas about Brazilian politics. The lack of organized parties during the Estado Novo had left opinion-makers thrashing about for ideas on how the now strengthened Brazilian state should best function. After the Estado Novo collapsed, some hoped to undo the Vargas legacy, others wanted to build upon it, some wanted to follow a strictly nationalist development line, others wanted an economy and society open to foreign investment, ideas, and participation, but openness was hotly debated. The uncertainty was not eliminated by the post-war parties, but heightened by their overly partisan approaches. Moderation and compromise were often

the victims in the political arguments and debates of those years. Often debates on, for example, investment in petroleum development were covered for desires for revenge over some aspect or injury of the Vargas years.²⁰

The division of military opinion regarding oil development was embroiled further by the outbreak of war in Korea. Those officers who opposed American involvement in petroleum tended to blame the United States for the Korean crisis and, hence, opposed any suggestion that Brazil should send troops. The lack of American economic assistance since World War II and a sense of unfulfilled wartime promises were the backdrop for a heated debate over Korea. Anti-American sentiment was notable and growing. Ardent pro-American Foreign Minister João Neves da Fontoura believed that Brazil should not make the mistake it had in 1942 by going to war without guarantees that it would benefit. Naturally Brazil would cooperate with the United States, but the cooperation should be reciprocal; after all a modern, functional Brazil would be a bulwark for the defense of the United States. During the world war, American analysts, such as the Cooke Mission, had recommended massive investments in infrastructure to allow more exports and expansion of the Brazilian internal market. The mission reasoned that trade increased between rich nations, not between rich and poor ones, and so creation of a prosperous Brazil was in the national interest of the United States. The objective should be to build up the purchasing power of Brazilians.²¹ The Brazilian press heralded such views as prelude to the dawning of a new era for the country hand in hand with their American allies. It was a euphoric rising of expectations.²² Encouraging belief that industrialization, education, housing, electrification, and trade would be the results of allied victory appeared to have been a ploy to hold Brazil at the side of the United States. Post-war requests for assistance were sidelined; for example, in 1946 when Brazil requested \$200 million in loans or grants to build and modernize its railways, Washington's bureaucracies could not agree, and the cold response confused and disillusioned Brazilian officials.²³ Americans were more interested in rebuilding their defeated enemies than in helping their friends, which may have been economically logical but it cut deeply. Even worse, the Americans were too willing to treat Argentina as equal to Brazil in distributing war surplus arms and equipment. Juan Perón's unrepentant German partisanship was seemingly unimportant.²⁴

Since 1945 Washington had not cooperated with Brazil, during the Dutra government it had not given (loaned) a cent to Brazil nor to the rest of Latin America. However, on the surface relations appeared quite

friendly and positive, Truman went to Rio for the closing of the Inter-American Conference that produced the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty (commonly called the Rio Treaty) in 1947, and Dutra repaid the honor with a 12-day visit to the United States in September 1949. Because Dutra was the first Brazilian head of state to visit the United States since Emperor Pedro II in 1876, this should have been a remarkably important event. It seemed that the Americans would support Brazilian economic development. The so-called Abbink Mission (1947–1948) updated the wartime Cooke Mission's recommendations with yet another diagnosis of Brazilian necessities.²⁵ Dutra told the Brazilian Congress that Truman had emphasized that the United States was interested in collaborating in Brazil's economic development and social progress. And he noted that the two governments would soon be negotiating a treaty to stimulate American investment in Brazil.²⁶ But it did not turn out that way.

The elections of October 3, 1950, returned former dictator Getúlio Vargas to the presidency. Vargas was not the same as he had been when overthrown in 1945. He was the wartime ally and understood the benefits of close ties with the United States. But he also understood that American promises, real and implied, were not always fulfilled. And he nursed a gnawing wound from Ambassador Berle's misconstrued interventionist role in his unseating in 1945. Also, he had less mental and physical energy to deal with a hugely complicated political scene with many more turbulent actors and issues than had been the case earlier. The task of creating a supportive legislative coalition was not in his skillset. He wanted to continue Brazil on the road to national development. He was particularly desirous of creating a program of planned industrialization by means of government intervention exercised in such fashion so as not to alarm private initiative but to attract it and foreign investment as partners in the economic development of the country.²⁷ Truman gave the impression of favoring support of such development efforts by sending as his representative to Getúlio's inauguration, Nelson Rockefeller, head of the American government's International Development Advisory Board, charged with implementing a program of technical assistance for Latin America. A year earlier, while Dutra was president, the two countries had agreed to form a bi-national commission to organize establishment of basic industries and to end Brazil's status as a dependent nation simply exporting natural resources. Rockefeller and Vargas discussed how to make the commission a reality.²⁸

Now, with the crisis in the Far East, the United States wanted Latin America to send troops to fight in Korea. The signing of an alliance between China and the Soviet Union in February 1950 had caused Washington to fear the spread of communism in Asia and to embrace the idea that the world was again under threat. In June 1950, the North Korean invasion of the south had made the threat all too real. Before Washington spoke the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) waged a hotly worded press campaign along with marches and demonstrations against any Brazilian military participation. The armed forces could see advantages and disadvantages and struggled to maintain unity in the face of deeply felt emotional division.²⁹ The unfulfilled American promises weighed heavily on the side of staying out of it. Washington made repeated overtures to Brazil to send an infantry division. In the first half of 1951, the Brazilians did not quite say no, but they never said yes. In April Truman made a direct appeal to Vargas for troops, saying that after nine months of combat, the American forces needed relief and could only get it if capable troops such as Brazil's took their place.³⁰ In June 1951, when the secretary-general of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, requested Brazilian troops, the Brazilian National Security Council discussed the matter and decided the country could not afford the costs of organizing and maintaining an expeditionary force in Asia, but it could furnish, in return for military and financial aid, strategic materials for war industry, including minerals related to producing atomic energy. The Americans had offered to train Brazilian forces in Brazil and to pay for arms, equipment, and transportation. Truman had written Vargas pleading that it would be a "great help to the United Nations effort in Korea if Brazil could send an Infantry Division...."³¹ The Truman administration sought the Organization of American States (OAS) approval to invoke the recent Rio Treaty, which would oblige the Latin Americans to enter the conflict. But the Latin Americans pointed out that the treaty related to hemispheric security and Korea was far away. Washington was beset by fear that the fighting in Korea was preparation for a Soviet attack in Europe, but could not convince the Latin Americans to adopt its worldview.³²

It is worth noting that it was the Korean crisis that led the United States to expand its facilities to train Latin American officers in hopes that their countries might "respond increasingly to United Nations requests for assistance in Korea." Several Latin American countries had requested training in joint staff planning and operations for their senior officers, and because security restrictions, limited capacity, and language difficulties

made such training in existing installations impractical, the Joint Chiefs took steps to create an appropriate school in the Canal Zone.³³ That institution eventually became the infamous School of the Americas.

For Brazil the question of sending troops to Korea was intimately linked to economic assistance. Even Oswaldo Aranha, who had been chiefly responsible for the World War II alliance and who continued to be a major proponent of “supporting the United States in the world in return for its support of our political, economic and military preeminence in South America,” was opposed to committing troops. To show solidarity with the Americans, he suggested sending a division to Germany to free United States troops for Korea.³⁴ An important army general and commander of the *FEB* artillery in Italy, Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, thought that the United States was in the Korean War to “maintain its authority in the [Far East] region.”³⁵

The Brazilians wanted assistance signed and delivered *before* they made a decision about sending troops. General Pedro de Góes Monteiro³⁶ was sent to Washington with the goal of obtaining that type of agreement. But his instructions specified delaying matters until the fighting ended or until World War III broke out. The Brazilian government did not have domestic political support for a war role; indeed, Vargas’s own party, the *PTB*, opposed such a role, yet Vargas did not want to say no to the American request and so delayed a response. Góes found that Brazilian prestige in Washington had declined conspicuously and that there was uneasiness about the Vargas government. As a result he and the Americans talked past each other; even so the Americans drafted the text of an agreement aimed at refurbishing the war-time alliance. That draft was what Góes brought back to Rio de Janeiro.³⁷

1952 POLITICAL-MILITARY ACCORD

In the United States, the McCarthy anti-communist campaign was on, and in Brazil’s suspicion of American “imperialism” infected politics and discussions of foreign affairs. Calm and reason were often absent. Brazil was still adjusting to electoral democracy after the many years of dictatorship and censorship. Remarkably, it was in this tense climate that the two governments successfully negotiated a military accord along the lines of their 1942 agreement. Its purpose was to keep the military alliance alive by promising the supply of arms and training, but it muddied that intent by committing Brazil to export monazite and radio-active sands to the United States for its atomic program. Brazil was rich in uranium deposits and very interested in developing atomic technology, which the Americans

blocked at every turn. It appeared that Washington wanted to obtain Brazil's minerals while keeping it underdeveloped. The heated debates in the press agitated public opinion for and against the military accord and contributed to a rising wave of anti-American sentiment. And many feared that the war in Korea was a prelude to World War III.³⁸ It took the Brazilian Congress a year of fierce debates to approve the accord. The fallout from obtaining approval was such that it forced the resignations of Foreign Minister João Neves da Fontoura, who had favored its passage, and the ousting of War Minister Newton Estillac Leal, who had opposed it. The accord appeared to contradict Vargas's efforts to protectively nationalize key natural resources.³⁹

Within the Brazilian army, this turmoil caused a wave of dismissals and punishments of officers regarded as ultranationalists, who questioned continued close ties with the United States. This purge had the effect of making Brazilian military opinion more homogenous and less questioning of American motives. Petroleum continued as an irritant in relations because Brazil's requests for funds to develop it were met by the Eisenhower administration's insistence that the Brazilian government open its development to private American investment. Potential American investors attacked the *Petrobras* law as Communist-inspired. President Vargas responded by denouncing investors' intent to sabotage Brazilian development. Political Scientist Ronald Schneider commented on those turbulent years saying that "Polemics largely replaced dialogue as radicalizers on both extremes played upon class interests and the tensions and insecurity engendered by the process of modernization."⁴⁰

Brazilian politics, with the military actively participating, descended into a struggle between nationalists and internationalists that was poorly understood in a Washington infected with McCarthyism. Opposition to American views was easily labeled as Communist. From the perspective of the Brazilian government, Eisenhower was the creature of Wall Street. Pro-American Oswaldo Aranha wrote Vargas that the Eisenhower administration would be a Republican and military government, with Wall Street serving as the general staff. He predicted that "capitalism in power will not respect limitations, especially those of international order."⁴¹ With the Americans insisting on private investment, which the Brazilian government did not want to accept, Brazil would have to develop itself. On October 3, 1953, the Brazilian Congress approved the *Petrobras* law placing petroleum development under state control. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles responded by reducing drastically the amount of an

already agreed upon loan from the Export-Import Bank. Considering that 55% of Brazilian trade was then with the United States, Dulles's action was as hurtful as it was ill-considered. Brazil responded with a decree limiting the repatriation of profits of American firms operating in Brazil.

It should have been clear that "military" relations cannot be isolated from the overall relations between countries. And in the Brazilian case, military relations with the United States contributed negatively to the political climate. In February 1954 Brazilian officers issued a manifesto protesting low salaries and lack of proper arms and equipment and asserted that there was a "crisis of authority" in the army. Vargas became even more defensive against American trade controls and lack of development assistance. In April he sent Congress the bill that created *Electrobrás* nationalizing the electric power grid, at the expense of Canadian and American companies.⁴² Former Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura turned up the political heat with a press interview charging that Vargas had been negotiating with Juan Perón to create an Argentine-Brazilian-Chilean alliance against the United States. The reality of what Vargas had in mind was complicated, but seemed to hold the possibility of increasing bargaining power with Washington; even so it infuriated his enemies, who used it to argue that he wanted to stay in power.⁴³ Anti-Vargas plotting commenced in the officer corps, especially in the air force. These political tensions mixed with economic ones as wages could not keep pace with inflation, credit demands outpaced availability, and currency exchange was unfavorable. At the time Brazil, heavily dependent on coffee exports, watched demand in the American market fall as the Brazilian government tried to keep the price above market levels.

Events in Brazil reached such a pass that a State Department official could speculate about a possible coup d'état. Worse, he thought that a coup "would not seriously affect our interests. The Army is conservative, anti-Communist by a large majority, and would respect existing agreements. ...It would be unfortunate in principle... [though] our practical security objectives might even be enhanced."⁴⁴

In a misguided attempt to help the beleaguered president, his bodyguard organized a murder attempt of his most vociferous enemy, Carlos Lacerda, but the shots missed their target and killed an accompanying air force officer. The resulting indignant reaction led to the military demanding Vargas's resignation, but ended in his dramatic suicide on August 24, 1954.⁴⁵

POST-VARGAS ERA RELATIONS

Vargas's tragic death ushered in a decade that began with a political-military crisis over the outcome of the 1955 elections and then happily entered a period of relative peace and achievement during the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1960). Those years were marked by the building of Brasília, massive road construction, the establishment of the automotive industry, and the beginning of Brazil as an industrial power. Throughout, Kubitschek was a major voice calling for serious American investment in Latin American development that would eventually lead to the Alliance for Progress in 1961. But Washington did not support Brazilian industrialization, and American private enterprise gave it a cold shoulder. Ford and General Motors refused to set up factories, and so Volkswagen became the leading Brazilian automotive producer. The United States actively undermined Brazilian efforts to create capability in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.⁴⁶ Brazilian leaders felt that they had little choice but to turn to Germany for assistance in developing an atomic capacity.

More positively, in 1956 the United States had negotiated placement of a missile tracking station on Brazil's Fernando de Noronha Island and military radio stations in the northeast and expanded facilities for its Military Air Transport System (MATS).⁴⁷ Unfortunately, American officers injured Brazilian pride by asserting that Brazilians would have limited and guarded access to such American stations. Equally irritating, as historian Sonny Davis observed, was the American failure "to acknowledge and treat Brazil as more important than its Spanish-speaking neighbors."⁴⁸ United States Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs argued that Brazil should be treated as the "first friend and ally" in Latin America. He asserted that "we should recognize [the] reality of Brazil's emergence as [the] dominant Latin American power" and should treat it as such.⁴⁹ Briggs warned of military dissatisfaction with the small size and slowness of arms transfers and the tendency to give Brazil and its smaller South American neighbors identical treatment. Brazil did not want to be treated the same as Uruguay or Paraguay.

Kubitschek was dependent on the military for his government's security and so he was concerned that their needs be met. He was committed to continuing Brazil's traditional pro-United States foreign policy, but in economic and military matters, he had to defer to the Congress and to the armed forces, both of which were "highly sensitive to any development which appears to infringe upon Brazilian sovereignty."⁵⁰

The Soviet Union's success in launching *Sputnik* (October 4, 1957) caused Brazilians to doubt the long-heralded technological preeminence of the United States, and the space launch gave a certain prestige to communism. Military critics of the traditional relationship asked what value it had in a world where Soviet science was outpacing American science and technology.

The White House woke up a bit when Vice President Richard Nixon was received with hostility in Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela in May 1958. The Eisenhower administration increased its military assistance to Latin America but basically was opposed to development aid. Kubitschek took advantage of Washington's renewed focus on the region by asking that the United States pledge \$40 billion over the next 20 years to support what he called "Operation Pan America," which was to be a Marshall Plan for Latin America.⁵¹ The American government received the idea coldly. The Eisenhower years saw relations with Brazil in evident decline, along with American prestige in all of Latin America.

Despite the foregoings, Eisenhower personally wanted to improve relations with Brazil and the rest of Latin America. He was fascinated by the construction of Brasília as Brazil's new capital. In February 1960 he flew to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and then Uruguay receiving great public displays of welcome.⁵² Kubitschek was charmed and honored to be in the presence of the distinguished war hero, but Eisenhower, although appalled by the evident poverty in Brazil, was not moved to support JK's position that economic growth was the best way to combat communism. Eisenhower could see that "the private and public capital which had flown *bounteously* [emphasis added] into Latin America had failed to benefit the masses...." Kubitschek argued that poverty and frustration had "far greater capacity for stirring discontent" than did communists.⁵³

The visit was marred by the collision over Rio's bay of a Brazilian airliner with an American plane carrying members of the US Navy band. The accident seemingly heightened empathy between the two presidents but nothing more. A behind-the-scenes incident revealed American ignorance of Brazilian history and culture. When embassy staff unwrapped Eisenhower's official gift to Kubitschek, they were aghast to see a Steuben Glass model of the Wright Brothers' *Kitty Hawk*. The Brazilians regarded their countryman, Alberto Santos-Dumont, as the first to fly a heavier-than-air machine, and so the Steuben Glass model would have been an affront.⁵⁴ A replacement gift was quickly sought.

CASTRO ERA

Fidel Castro's victory over Fulgencio Batista in Cuba in January of 1959 changed the relative importance of Latin America to Washington. The ineptness of the Eisenhower administration helped radicalize the Castro government and pushed it into the willing arms of Moscow. The *Military Review* at the US Army's Command and General Staff School began publishing articles on "unconventional warfare." And to deal with the perceived threat so close to the United States, the Eisenhower team embarked on intense intervention. His 1960 trip to South America did not deter him from authorizing the CIA to overthrow Castro. Washington's nervous attention to communists in Brazil soared to a whole new level. The government perceived Latin America as an undifferentiated mass. If it could happen in Cuba, it could happen in Brazil.

The successor government of John F. Kennedy had better instincts but succumbed to the anti-communist, anti-Castro wave. The new president was fascinated by "unconventional warfare" and gave approval for the creation of the army's green beret-adorned Special Forces. The official vision of Latin America was distorted even more as the Kennedy administration became convinced in 1961 that the Northeast of Brazil was about to erupt into a vast Cuban-style revolution. In 1962 this "fear" was such in Washington that the government gave funds to the enemies of Brazilian President João Goulart to weaken his position.⁵⁵

In 1962 understanding in Brazil of how American military assistance functioned was so confused that officers on the president's military staff (*Casa Militar*) thought that Americans officials decided which Brazilian units received American arms and equipment. Obviously that would be an "interference of a foreign country in matters of our exclusive competence." It is noteworthy that the chief of Brazil's General Staff of the Armed Forces (*EMEA*) felt compelled to write a long memo denying any American involvement in the distribution of material.⁵⁶ Clearly alliances require considerable explanation to all involved.

1964 COUP AND AFTER: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND VIETNAM

The Brazilian political situation deteriorated steadily, and the military was drawn intimately into plotting against President João Goulart. Suffice to say that he and his government were tarnished with a communist and fellow traveler label. From the day he took over, after President Jânio

Quadros resigned in 1961, the American government paid close attention and tried to foretell his views and actions. He made an extensive visit to the United States in 1962, met twice with President Kennedy, and addressed the Congress. He admired Kennedy and they got on well. But he faced a difficult political situation in Brazil, where the opposition had imposed a parliamentary system to weaken his power. On July 30, 1962, Kennedy and his ambassador to Brazil, Professor Lincoln Gordon, worried that Goulart was being too tolerant of the left and feared the rise of communism.⁵⁷ In 1963 a plebiscite returned Brazil to a presidential system with Goulart holding full executive powers. The US Embassy, especially the new Military Attaché Colonel Vernon Walters, followed currents and plans within the officer corps. Walters had been liaison officer and interpreter for FEB commander Mascarenhas and had been assistant attaché (1945–1948) in Rio. He had easy access throughout the Brazilian officer corps. The atmosphere of crisis recalled the memory of Vargas who had been Goulart’s neighbor in Rio Grande do Sul and his political mentor; it also called up the 1945 solution, namely, another coup. As events moved toward a breaking point, United States officials reportedly advised Brazilian captains and majors that if the coup failed, they should get out of Brazil and reassured them that the American government would support, train, arm, and reinsert them to carry out a guerrilla war against the winners. More directly Washington assembled a naval task force called “Operation Brother Sam” with petroleum and arms in case the anti-Goulart forces needed them. As it turned out, Goulart’s people folded immediately and *Brother Sam* steamed back north. Unhappily, President Lyndon Johnson had the bad taste to recognize the new government while Goulart was technically still president.⁵⁸

A purely military coup d’état was not part of Brazilian political culture; previous coups had been civilian-military mixes. This one was no different, but the military had the guns. Army Chief of Staff Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco had been a major player in the plotting and organizing elite opinion. The various “revolutionary” factions could not agree on a civilian politician to take the presidency, but a majority backed Castello Branco.⁵⁹ He had been the operations officer of the FEB in Italy and was well regarded by the American military. He agreed to serve as president only until the end of Goulart’s term of office, and he refused to institutionalize the military’s hold on power. He wanted to reform the political-economic system by restructuring the political parties and launching a land reform program that was similar to Goulart’s. The situation was radicalized

by military hardliners seeking a complete cleansing of leftist and populist influences and by civilian politicians delaying and obstructing Castello's reforms. The former pressed him to recess and purge the Congress, to remove questionable state governors, and to decree the expansion of presidential powers at the expense of the Congress and the courts. He restrained the populist left, but in doing so created the basis for authoritarian rule by his successors.⁶⁰ Castello tried to maintain a degree of democracy but in the end was forced to accept continued army control by agreeing to the succession of Minister of Army Artur Costa e Silva. On the positive side, he maintained the tradition of presidential supremacy over the military and kept potential coup-makers in check. He also limited the time an officer could serve in general's rank to 12 years. There would be no more multi-decade generals, such as Góes Monteiro, whose time as a general stretched from the early 1930s to the mid-1950s.

It was now apparent that the armed forces officer corps was divided between those who believed that they should confine themselves to their professional duties and those who regarded politicians as scoundrels ready to betray Brazil to communism or some other menace. Many officers believed that they were upholding democracy, even as they were distorting and limiting it. The regime did not attempt to eliminate the trappings of liberal constitutionalism because it feared disapproval of international opinion and damage to the alliance with the United States. As the citadel of anticommunism, the United States provided the ideology that the Brazilian military used to justify their hold on power. But Washington also preached liberal democracy, which forced the authoritarians to assume the contradictory position of defending democracy by effectively destroying it. Their concern for appearances caused them to abstain from creating a personalist dictatorship as in Spanish-American countries by requiring each successive general-president to pass power to his replacement.⁶¹

The role of the United States in these events was complex and at times contradictory. Throughout 1963 in the United States, there had been an anti-Goulart press campaign, and in 1964 the Johnson administration gave moral support to the conspiracy. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon later admitted that the embassy had given money to anti-Goulart candidates in the 1962 elections and had encouraged the plotters; that there were many extra CIA and American military personnel operating in Brazil; and that four US Navy oil tankers and the carrier *Forrestal*, in "Operation Brother Sam," had stood off the coast. Washington immediately had recognized the new government and joined the chorus chanting that the coup d'état

of the “democratic forces” had restrained the hand of international communism. In retrospect it appears that the only foreign hand involved was the American one. But it would be going too far to say that Brazilian puppets were dancing to Washington’s tune, the United States was not the principal actor in this play.⁶²

With the military in power, one might think that military relations with the United States would greatly improve, but that would be a mistake. On the surface they certainly were friendly, but out of public view, it was another matter. The American intervention in the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic under the guise of preventing another Cuba obtained the blessing of the Organization of American States (OAS), but the American request for Latin American troops was approved with the proviso that the commander be Latin American. The Latin Americans were upset that Washington sought OAS approval only after it sent troops.⁶³

President-General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco agreed to send a Brazilian contingent partly because he opposed such unilateral intervention by any American Republic, especially the United States.⁶⁴ Effectively, the Dominican intervention became a multilateral operation. The symbolism of having a Brazilian general command American troops was profound for the Brazilian military. Lt. General Bruce Palmer was not pleased being told by General Hugo Panasco Alvim that the language of his headquarters would be Portuguese and that Palmer had better find himself an interpreter. Not surprisingly Palmer and Alvim did not get along, and eventually they were both relieved under guise of rotation of commanders. An important grouping of Brazilian intellectuals expressed their “vehement repulsion at the Brazilian government’s complicity in the hateful armed intervention of the United States.” Likewise, there were protests within the armed forces, particularly, from hardline officers. As a result Castello Branco lost so much prestige that he was unable to fulfill his promise of turning the presidency over to an elected civilian.⁶⁵ Brazilian participation in the Dominican affair was a factor in prolonging military control of the government.

Hard on the Dominican crisis was the Vietnam situation. This time the United States was acting without the cover of the United Nations or any other international body. In repeated letters between 1965 and 1967, President Lyndon Johnson asked Castello Branco for Brazilian troops. The request was somewhat sweetened by Johnson’s approval of a \$150 million loan to Brazil. Castello Branco told Ambassador Lincoln Gordon that the military would have objections. Given the intense popular opposition to the war, and the likelihood of high casualty levels without clear

recompense, Castello Branco said no.⁶⁶ Close on that decision, in an effort to control spending, the Johnson administration cut back on the military assistance that Brazil had been receiving. This had the consequence of Brazil turning to Europe for weaponry. French Mirage jets replaced American F-5s, and from 1968 to 1972, Brazil spent some \$500 million on European arms.

At the end of the 1960s, President Richard Nixon called for a careful reassessment of relations with the considerably more authoritarian Brazilian regime. The reassessment recognized the need for “a mature, friendly, and mutually beneficial relationship ... because of Brazil’s long-run potential” and because it had half the land and half the population of South America. Trade and investment were judged to be of prime importance, while diplomatic and military interests were secondary.⁶⁷ The Congress had declared that “military sales should not be made if they would arm military dictators who are denying the growth of fundamental rights or social progress to their own people unless the President determines it to be in the security interests of the U. S.”⁶⁸ The administration decided to sidestep that “sense of Congress” because of Brazil’s “importance to the interests of the U.S.” and allow cash sales to go forward and to release \$30 million in credits for helicopters and transport aircraft. To do otherwise would “be a very serious irritant causing damage to our relations out of proportion to the requests themselves.”⁶⁹ Concurrent with these actions, President Richard Nixon told Henry Kissinger that “I want a stepped up effort for closer relations with Brazil’s government...”⁷⁰ He said that he preferred democratically elected governments but believed they had to be pragmatic. He strove to assure the Brazilian government and the military that “we are [not] looking down our noses at them because of their form of government.” He thought it was possible to have close relations without “embracing their form of government or condoning their internal actions.”⁷¹

In theory such relations might be possible, but from a Brazilian perspective, close relations were regarded as support and approval. Meanwhile 1968 saw increasing protests and street demonstrations against the military-controlled government. In March 1968 some 60,000 gathered for the burial of a high school student shot by the police during a protest against the closing of a student restaurant in Rio, then after the Seventh-Day Mass at the *Candelária* Church in the city center, crowds outside the church were dispersed with considerable violence. Protests and marches took place, throughout Brazil. More repression and arrests of students led

to a massive march of some 100,000 through Rio's streets. In April 72 university professors, some with international reputations, were summarily dismissed and forbidden to teach. Hundreds of people had been arrested, frustration and anger were widespread. One general warned that "excessive repression brings a rising radicalization of demands." Instead of easing the tension, police and military repression intensified in August, Brazil's darkest and tragedy-laden month, with hundreds of students arrested in São Paulo and Rio and 14,000 soldiers on the streets of the latter. The Supreme Federal Tribunal denied habeas corpus for an arrested student leader, and the Chamber of Deputies rejected a bill of amnesty for the student demonstrators. The *Universidade de Brasília* was invaded by military police, and the *Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais* was closed after a similar invasion.⁷² Throughout the country university professors and labor leaders were arrested. Overstating the reality, radical military officers saw the student unrest as sign that a "revolutionary war" was under way.

At the end of 1968, the government of Costa e Silva issued the draconian Institutional Act No. 5 taking Brazil into a dark dictatorship. Hundreds more were arrested; disappearances and "the widespread use of severe torture" became commonplace. The US military was very reluctant to accept the truth of the reports because, according to Ambassador John Crimmins, "they did not believe that the Brazilian Army was capable of doing this." Crimmins noted that the torture "wasn't just electrical shocks; this was the real medieval stuff."⁷³ The years 1968 and 1969 were the worst years of the military era.

In August 1969, when President Costa e Silva was incapacitated by a cardiovascular problem, the three armed forces ministers declared themselves a ruling junta until a new president could be chosen. And the military did the choosing. The senior generals and admirals gleaned the favorite candidates by polling their subordinate flag officers, and a seven-member armed forces high command ratified the choice of General Emílio Garrastazú Médici, who had headed the National Intelligence Service (*SNI*). The National Congress, which had been forcibly recessed for ten months and thoroughly purged, was called into session to endorse the military's decision.⁷⁴

Who was Médici? When Goulart was deposed in 1964, Médici was commander of the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras* and supported the coup more from a commitment to hierarchy and discipline and army cohesion than from a political position. Costa e Silva sent him to

Washington as military attaché for just short of two years. Promoted to major general, Costa made him head of the National Intelligence Service (*SNI*) saying he wanted someone nearby who was capable of telling him when he was wrong. Within the regime Médici argued that exceptional measures were not necessary to guarantee stability and national security. Even so the climate became steadily more repressive. In March 1969, Médici was promoted to four-star general and sent to command the Third Army in Rio Grande do Sul. So when Costa e Silva became ill, Médici was one of the small cluster of generals considered eligible to succeed him.⁷⁵

As Elio Gaspari observed: “To Castello Branco the dictatorship appeared an evil. For Costa e Silva it was a convenience. For Médici it was a neutral factor, an instrument of bureaucratic action, a source of power and strength.” As he said to one of his ministers: “I have the AI-5, everything is possible.”⁷⁶

Médici professed dismay at the reports of mistreatment and torture of prisoners. According to his head of *SNI*, General Carlos Alberto Fontoura, in two or three meetings of the armed forces chiefs and cabinet ministers, Médici said that he did not “accept torture, or the mistreatment or killing of captives. There is no way that I accept this.”⁷⁷

But the mistreatment, torture, and murder continued beyond the control of the military president of the republic.

In November 1969 a group of European clergymen and intellectuals delivered a dossier to the Pope documenting torture in Brazil, and in the next month Amnesty International issued a report on Brazilian torture that gave the topic worldwide attention. On March 8, 1970, the Sunday *New York Times* carried a letter from 102 professors, most of whom had done research in Brazil, protesting against “torture, imprisonment without cause, and suppression of civil rights.” “We doubt,” they declared, “that ever in the history of Brazil has there occurred more systematic, more wide spread, and more inhuman treatment of political dissidents.” In April 1970 there was a flood of exposés: *The Washington Post* published Brady Tyson’s “Brazil Twists Thumbscrews . . .”; noted American academics launched a dossier entitled “Terror in Brazil”; the Catholic *Commonweal* magazine carried Ralph Della Cava’s article “Torture in Brazil.”⁷⁸ After months of denials, in December the Minister of Education, Jarbas Passarinho, admitted that “isolated” cases of torture had occurred.⁷⁹

The reality was that state-managed violence had become part of the daily political culture. Brazil was locked in a culture of fear that immobilized the population. The deep involvement of the armed forces in repres-

sion and the use of torture was something new. Mistreatment of prisoners could be traced back in Brazilian history, but earlier cases were poor, marginal people, this time the victims were middle class, even women and clerics were not immune. The personal actions of military officers in the repression implicated them in crimes that could have no legal justification and thereby assured their support for the whole terrible system. Fear of the reach of justice insured their loyalty to the regime and their fierce opposition to dismantling the system. Of course, it damaged the reputation of Brazil's military.⁸⁰ Besides it hurt its effective readiness, despite having increased the number of generals from 124 in 1964 to 155 in 1974. Reportedly some 7000 trucks had been added to the various barracks motor pools, but not a single mechanic. The army bought old American tanks for which ammunition was no longer made, and every other one did not run.⁸¹

The foregoing was the situation when President-General Médici visited the United States in December 1971. Nixon famously toasted him: "we know that as Brazil goes, so will go the rest of that Latin American Continent" Médici's response included the line "United States always knows that it will find in Brazil a loyal and independent ally."⁸² An attuned ear would have caught the importance of the word *independent*. Nixon's toast would take on dark meaning in the next years as Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina fell under military dictatorships.⁸³ In a meeting in the White House, Médici emphasized that continued American military assistance was "essential" and that contact between the two nation's militaries was "indispensable." He opposed "any reduction of either."⁸⁴ But the nature of the military regime would ultimately produce that effect.

Médici enjoyed noticeable popular support; after all Brazil was in an impressive economic boom that seemed to be making life better, at least for the middle and upper classes. In addition, of course, Brazil's team won the World Cup in 1970. Authoritarianism seemingly provided benefits. Médici repeatedly said that he wanted to be followed by a civilian president. He was thinking of his chief of staff (*Casa Civil*) João Leitão de Abreu, who would have been appointed as he himself had been, not elected. But because there was still guerrilla activity in the Araguaia region of the Amazon, he believed that another general was necessary. Médici was linked with his predecessor Costa e Silva, yet he and his closest advisers settled on General Ernesto Geisel to succeed him.⁸⁵

Geisel was retired from the army and was president of *Petrobrás*, but more importantly, he had been the principal military aide to Castello

Branco. In the Brazilian army, there was a division between those officers who adhered to Costa e Silva's attitudes and those who were more attuned to the ideas of Castello Branco. The major difference between the two related to the nature of government, the *Costistas* favored long-term authoritarian military control, while the *Castellistas* leaned toward reform and preservation of constitutional structures. The latter tended to be more sophisticated and better educated, the former were found in the ranks of the hardliners. Likely Médici was somewhat deluded about Geisel. But he thought that because Geisel had been away from the army for a time and was sort of a businessman in his *Petrobrás* role, choosing him would show that the situation had evolved positively.

It should be said that Geisel's older brother Orlando was Médici's army minister. There were whispers that Orlando was behind his brother's rise to the presidency, but they were not accurate. There was some hope among the *Costistas* that Médici would stay in office, but he would not hear of any continuation. He voted for Ernesto Geisel and his was the vote that counted. A recently fashioned electoral college gave its assent, but it was Médici's decision that mattered. Geisel took office in mid-March 1974.⁸⁶

General João Batista Figueiredo, while briefing Geisel on the poor readiness status of the army, concluded "God help us ... they are throwing money away." Geisel had reason to observe that "the army, from a moral point of view, had fallen considerably." Besides, his choice for minister of the army, General Dale Coutinho lamented that in fighting subversion, they had no legal cover; there were laws for foreign war, but not for their specific type of war.⁸⁷

Geisel told his cabinet that the goal was "gradual, but sure democratic refinement" with increased participation of "responsible elites" aiming at the complete institutionalization of "the principles of the Revolution of 1964." The exceptional powers would be kept, but used only as a last resort. Clearly there would be no quick return to democratic rule; instead, Brazil entered a period of slow "decompression" (*distensão*). Geisel intended to set the pace for political change. He and his immediate adviser General Golbery do Couto e Silva "envisioned a gradual and highly controlled opening." Brazil could not continue as it was, even if change took a long time.⁸⁸ Médici had urged him to keep his brother Orlando as minister of the army, but Geisel knew that he and his brother thought differently. Instead he appointed General Coutinho, with whom, despite his hardline reputation, he shared a sense of common purpose regarding the

army; they agreed that the hardline officers had to be controlled; unfortunately after two months in office, he took ill and died suddenly. Geisel named the chief of staff General Sylvio Coelho da Frota to replace him.

Frota was also a hardliner and did not share Geisel's vision. Geisel had to gain control of the armed forces, and to do that he had to have the army behind him. The key was to limit the autonomy of the *Centro de Informações do Exército* (CIEEx), which had been operating throughout the country, often without the knowledge of local regional commanders. New orders specified that the CIEEx would continue its intelligence work, but that it had to obtain the approval of regional commanders to operate in their areas. In effect this stopped clandestine operations in Rio and São Paulo, and the number of cases of reported torture declined sharply.⁸⁹ He also moved its headquarters from Rio to Brasília, thereby tightening control. The hardliners fought back, according to an admitted killer, by "resolving to act on their own account outside the chain of command."⁹⁰ Repeated appeals for military unity had much to do with Geisel's struggle to suppress the rogue hardliners. But Geisel on April 1, 1974, approved continuation of the CIEEx policy of executing certain captured subversives, with the proviso that future cases be submitted to SNI director General Figueiredo for approval.⁹¹

In the meantime he was reshaping Brazilian foreign relations. He described his foreign policy as pragmatic. There would be no more automatic alignment with the United States, Brazilian foreign policy would be ecumenical. Brazil was "of the west, but not an ally of the United States."⁹² It would act primarily in its own best interests. Partly this attitude built on evident trends in the Quadros and Goulart foreign policies and partly was stimulated by Brazil's dependence on imported oil. Geisel aimed at insuring good relations with the oil-rich Arab countries and opened new embassies in the Gulf States and Iraq. Saudi Arabia provided money for a Middle Eastern study program at the Universidade de Brasília. Brazil had been a major supporter of the creation of Israel, and so it was symbolic of its shift toward the Arab states when it voted for the anti-Zionist resolution in the UN General Assembly in November 1975. The decision on the vote resulted from some sloppiness in the foreign ministry and American quickness to criticize. Asked for his approval of a vote in favor, Geisel concurred, but then the next day thought better of it and ordered the ministry to vote no, but in the meantime the State Department criticized their position wounding the Brazilians' sense of dignity, making it impossible to back down.⁹³ Brazil sought new markets in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, not because it had changed its view of communism, rather it

wanted to diversify its markets and trade partners. Recognizing that the Portuguese revolution of 1974 had cut loose the mother country's African colonies, Brazil recognized the independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Echoing Oswaldo Aranha on seeking greater influence over Portugal and its colonial possessions, historian Jerry Dávila commented that "Africa was its natural sphere of influence ... [and] Africa would help propel Brazil industrially and bring autonomy from the cold war powers."⁹⁴ Also in 1974 Brazil exchanged ambassadors with the People's Republic of China and warmed up to Cuba. It was notable that Geisel made state visits to England, France, and Japan while avoiding the United States.

The low point in Brazilian-American military relations came in 1977. Having been blocked by the United States (1951) in obtaining centrifuges for an atomic program, Brazil had joined the American Atoms for Peace program (1955) that gave it an atomic plant powered by American-supplied reactor fuel. In 1974 India's explosion of a nuclear device so startled the United States that it told the Brazilians that it would not fulfill its agreement to provide the contracted enriched fuel. Coming on the heels of the OPEC oil embargo, this put Brazil in a difficult spot. Worse, that same year, Argentina's *Atucha* reactor came on line. With some evident desperation, the Brazilians negotiated a vast contract with West Germany for the construction of enriched uranium heavy-water reactors, for extensive transfer of technology for full fabrication and processing from uranium ores to transmission of electricity via an extensive electrical grid.⁹⁵

It was rather startling to see atomic enrichment mix with human rights violations to create a volatile situation that ended the military alliance. But first in 1976, there was a brief interlude when it looked as if Brazil and the United States would deepen their traditional cooperation. Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, who had a friendly relationship with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, arranged a joint memorandum that provided for regular consultation on issues of interest.⁹⁶ The sound idea behind the consultative mechanism was that it would reduce the possibility of misunderstandings reaching the level of crisis. The Brazilians interpreted the memorandum as meaning that the United States recognized Brazil's status as the region's paramount economic power. Kissinger asserted that the United States welcomed "Brazil's new role in world affairs" and that their "institution of consultation" would give "meaning and strength and permanence to our cooperation."⁹⁷

In June 1976, the foreign aid bill passed the American Congress with the requirement (Harkin Amendment) that the State Department make an annual report on human rights in all the countries receiving military assistance. The first report prepared before the presidential elections of that November criticized Brazil. Throughout the campaign the Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter had condemned the human rights situation in Brazil, as well as the Brazilian-German atomic agreement. In October, the Ford White House issued a strong statement on non-proliferation, which the Brazilians appeared to shrug off. The Geisel team was betting that Gerald Ford would win the election and that the “close friendship” between Kissinger and Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira would protect them. “The Brazilians were shocked that Carter won,” and they dug in their heels on the nuclear problem. The situation was “aggravated severely” by Vice President Walter Mondale’s going to Bonn to try to convince the Germans to withdraw from the agreement. The Americans decided to work on the West Germans, as Ambassador Crimmins put it, “based on the belief that we couldn’t do anything with Brazil.”⁹⁸

The Brazilians felt depreciated by the American maneuver to pressure the Germans. Shortly after taking office, Carter sent Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Brasília for a broad examination of the situation. There were no threats, contrary to what the Brazilian press reported. The Americans explained why they hoped that “the Brazilians would adopt comprehensive safeguards for all their nuclear activities.” And they explained the “legislative prohibitions” in the foreign assistance laws, which could be regarded as a subtle warning. The Brazilians put out the story that they had resisted strong American pressures. They believed that their national prestige required that they have nuclear technology and were determined to obtain it. The Americans were concerned that Brazil would one day develop a bomb, which the Brazilians claimed not to want. Ambassador Crimmins observed that “the Brazilian nerves were very raw about the nuclear thing. They were worked up about it. A lot of phony stuff issued, planted by the government about this. Then the human rights question intervened.”⁹⁹

President Jimmy Carter emphasized dual policies of respect for human rights and non-proliferation of nuclear technology.¹⁰⁰ He first tried to convince Germany to withdraw from the agreement and failing that pressured Brazil to halt its program. The stubborn, hostile reaction in Brazil was remarkable for it succeeded in unifying all sectors of society against the American intrusion into what was commonly thought to be an important

element of Brazilian development.¹⁰¹ Besides, as President Geisel later noted, the program with Germany had nothing to do with the military or military objectives. “The United States, England, France, Russia, and China could have nuclear technology, but not Brazil? Are we inferior to the others?”, Geisel asked.¹⁰² The obvious lack of American trust in Brazilian intentions caused an intense rallying around the flag.

Ambassador John Crimmins took pains to deliver a copy of the report on Brazil’s human rights before it became public in Washington. The very next morning, Crimmins was called to the foreign ministry to be told that they were renouncing the [1952] military accord. The human rights report was very positive about Geisel’s efforts to reign in the security apparatus, but by then Geisel had already decided to end American military assistance as a sign of independence. Both sides believed that the accord no longer served the relationship, but the hardline officers especially felt that it kept the military subservient to the United States. Geisel’s act of bravado increased his prestige among those officers. Indeed, it may have helped his relations with the opposition as well. It contributed to his ability to remove hardline Minister of the Army Frota in October, strengthen his hold over the armed forces, and allowed him to continue the policy of decompression and, eventually to impose, his chosen successor General João Batista Figueiredo.¹⁰³

While the anti-atomic energy policy of the Carter government angered Brazilians as a whole, the human rights campaign seemed two-faced to the Brazilian military.¹⁰⁴ There was an intense debate going on within the armed forces regarding torture and mistreatment of political prisoners. President Ernesto Geisel had long opposed such behavior and was then engaged in an internal struggle to eliminate it from the military’s “suppressive apparatus,” as it was called. By doing so Geisel would effectively weaken the influence of the hardline officers. Jimmy Carter’s moralizing confused officers involved in repression because they had learned harsh interrogation techniques from Americans. Between 1965 and 1970, 70 Brazilian officers trained at the School of the Americas in Panama, of whom 38 (63%) were in intelligence. Comparing the names of those who went to the school with those who were later accused of torture or the death of prisoners, there was a ratio of one in every ten.¹⁰⁵

The effect of Carter’s dual policy of human rights and anti-nuclear development was more than the Geisel government could tolerate. Geisel said that “our foreign policy had to be realistic and, as much as possible, independent. We had walked too much in tow (subordinate) of the United

States. We had to live and treat with the United States, as much as possible, as equal to equal, even though they are much stronger, much more powerful than us.” He believed that Brazilian development was tied to the Northern Hemisphere, and so he intensified relations with England, France, Germany, and Japan. “We could not do more with the United States because the demands that they were making seemed to me to be improper.”¹⁰⁶

NO LONGER ALLIES BUT STILL FRIENDS?

The cancelling of the 1952 military accord and the elimination of the mixed military commission that had existed since 1942 altered the nature of Brazilian-American relations. The old intimate alliance was gone. Some might call it a more mature relationship. However, relations between the two armed forces remained cordial with officer and military school exchanges continuing, but the close cooperation could no longer be assumed. The fading controversy over atomic energy continued until 1990, but suspicions lingered.¹⁰⁷ Brazil turned toward space research partly to enhance its continuing bid to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and partly to give itself greater autonomy from United States’ influence which had been irritating it since the end of World War II and, of course, to exhibit that it has a higher level of development than its neighbors.¹⁰⁸ The two countries signed an agreement in 1997 relative to Brazilian participation in the International Space Station. It was to stimulate Brazil’s technology industry by having it manufacture components for the station.¹⁰⁹ A Brazilian was designated for astronaut training, and it looked as if a promising new area of cooperation had been opened, but it turned out that Brazilian industry could not meet the specifications and the effort withered.

In the meantime the Brazilians had been actively engaged in rocketry research with 381 low-altitude launches between 1965 and 1972 from its *Barreira do Inferno* facility in Rio Grande do Norte and had built a more advanced space launch site at Alcântara in Maranhão. The Brazilian objective was to develop capability to place their own satellites in orbit with their own rockets.¹¹⁰ The Alcântara facility was Brazil’s answer to the European space station in French Guyana. That station is a little above the equator and the Brazilian site is slightly below the equator. Launches from both sites are more economically efficient in reaching orbit than from the American site in Florida. Because of international control agreements on space rocketry, the Brazilians could not obtain necessary components

from signatory countries. Because the space program was controlled by the Brazilian air force until 1994, it was viewed with suspicion by American authorities still wary of possible Brazilian nuclear ambitions. Washington sought to dissuade them from pursuing advanced rockets. For a time it seemed that some collaboration might result, but that was not to be.

In 2000–2002, the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Bill Clinton completed an agreement that would have given a section of the Alcântara facility over to the Americans.¹¹¹ Supposedly Brazilians would not have had access to that portion of the base. The American negotiators could not have known much about the history of the two countries' relations or of Brazilian attitudes. Would they have agreed to a similar arrangement with foreigners on American soil? The Brazilian military was aghast to put it mildly.¹¹² They saw it as the creation of an American military base in Brazil that might give the Americans a way to control the vast Amazon region. Vociferous Brazilians regarded it as ceding sovereignty. Worse they feared it was linked not so much to space but to the bases that the Americans were acquiring in Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The Americans touched a sensitive nerve and made it considerably worse by proposing to limit Brazilian access. When more independent-minded Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became president, he vetoed the Congressional enabling bill in May 2003.¹¹³

That year was not a good one for space exploration or for cooperation. The American Space Shuttle *Columbia* had disintegrated upon re-entry, killing its crew of seven in February 2003, and later in August disaster struck the Brazilian space program when in a pre-launch test its VLS rocket exploded, destroying the launch pad and killing 21 scientists, technicians, and workers.¹¹⁴ Potentially the two countries could have united in grief, but instead imaginative Brazilian rumors blamed the tragedy at Alcântara on the Americans! Like the rumors that the Americans sank the ships in 1942, they are hard to combat.¹¹⁵ This is especially so when retired military officers cast doubt on the results of official investigations.¹¹⁶

In 2006 Brazil paid the Russian government \$10.5 million to carry astronaut and air force Lt. Colonel Marcos Pontes on its Soyuz spacecraft for an 11-day mission on the International Space Station. The mission was criticized by Ennio Candotti, president of the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science, as merely “space tourism.” The Brazilian Space Agency thought it would bring publicity to its work and help increase its budget. That negative view aside, it is certainly significant that Brazil's first astronaut went into space from a Russian base in Kazakhstan than from

Florida or Maranhão.¹¹⁷ Worthy of note too is that Lt. Col. Pontes had his year of fighter pilot training at Parnamirim Air Base at Natal, which continues to be Brazil's principal pilot training facility.

It does not help relations that ill-informed Brazilians believe that the United States has military installations at Alcântara and that it wants to control the space station to “undermine Brazilian sovereignty in the Amazon.”¹¹⁸

It should be clear that to maintain easy, friendly, cooperative relations constant, open communication is necessary. While it may puzzle Americans that some Brazilians actively see the United States as a threat, the two giants of the Western Hemisphere cannot change the reality of their geography. They have grown ever more interdependent economically, even as Brazil continued to lag behind in education and research. The collapse of the Soviet Union had created new dynamics and possibilities, while the recast Russia proved a competitor in supplying Brazil with modern armaments and seeking entry into its space program. Partly to prevent Russian sales, the United States revamped its military relations with Brazil, at a moment when the Brazilian military was concerned to enhance its research and development, logistics systems, education and training, and the acquisition of weapons and services.¹¹⁹ And so in 2010, when, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed, their “common interests” made “Brazil’s growing involvement and significance in global affairs a welcome development for the United States,” and the two signed a new military agreement.¹²⁰ In 2012 a study done at the Army War College urged re-establishment of the “Unwritten Alliance” with Brazil. Lt. Colonel Lawrence T. Brown argued that “Failure to substantially improve U.S. relations with Brazil will cause its leaders to seek more advantageous relationships elsewhere—to the detriment of the United States.” He proposed energizing the relationship by building a strategic partnership based on common interests throughout the world. Treating relations as a partnership would appeal to the self-image of Brazilians.¹²¹ In 2015 during President Dilma Rousseff’s visit to Washington, she and Barack Obama signed a number of cooperative agreements including some related to military relations. These allowed for greater cooperation in defense matters, especially in research and development of arms and equipment, logistical support, and technology security. The agreement promoted joint exercises, exchange of information and equipment, particularly to improve international peacekeeping operations. The White House press release described “a Mature and Multifaceted Partnership.”¹²²

The political turmoil engendered by the enormous corruption scandal involving important corporations and vote buying in the Brazilian Congress in 2015–2017 has cast a deep pale over Brazil. With President Dilma Rousseff being impeached in August 2016 and ex-President Lula da Silva being charged with crimes of corruption, and numerous business and political figures being jailed, Brazil's future is less certain than it was a decade ago.¹²³

Relations between the two militaries have been sufficiently friendly for Brazil to invite the American military to participate in a training exercise in humanitarian and disaster relief in Amazonia with Brazilian, Colombian, and Peruvian troops in November 2017. This was called the largest such military exercise in Amazonia in history. A decade or so earlier, such American involvement would have been most unlikely. The defense minister, Raul Jungmann, observed the exercise and then went to Washington for talks with American officials. The relationship continues to be based on negotiating its form, substance, and practice.¹²⁴

THE LAST AMERICAN¹²⁵

Natal's Alecrim cemetery held the graves of 146 US servicemen who died at Natal. Some died from illness or accidents, others with battle wounds died while being transported home. One soldier's body, by his own wish or family decision, remained when a US Navy ship collected the remains in April 1947.

Twenty-two-year old Sergeant Thomas N. Browning of Cincinnati, Ohio, of the 22 AAF Weather Squadron of the Air Transport Command, died suddenly from infectious spinal meningitis on July 18, 1943. Apparently enchanted by Brazil, he studied Portuguese, made friends with Brazilians, and loved the beaches. He had been stationed in Bahia for two months prior to assignment to Natal. His grave is an enduring reminder of the American wartime presence.

NOTES

1. For the Moscow-sponsored and financed revolts of 1935, see McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 375–388; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da Ilusão: A Revolução Mundial e o Brasil, 1922–1935* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991), pp. 287–326; and Hélio

- Silva, *1935 – A Revolta Vermelha* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1969). For a study that shows how the Cold War mixed with relations, see Sidnei J. Munhoz, “At the Onset of the Cold War: the USA and the repression of communism in Brazil” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. *Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries* (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 128–164.
2. MG Robert. L. Walsh (USAFSA) to Jefferson Caffery, November 28, 1943, Aviation Agreement between US and Brazil, OPD, 580.82 Brazil, NARA. This was a draft letter that Walsh sent to War Department for approval. State Department was to take the first step. It seems that all later discussions resulted from Walsh’s suggestions.
 3. Robert A. Lovett [letter] to Adolf A. Berle, Asst. Secretary of State, Washington, December 7, 1943, OPD, 580.82, NARA.
 4. On January 8, 1944, Roosevelt had written to the Secretary of State, and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson commented on and quoted from a copy of the letter in Stimson to Secretary of State, January 14, 1944, OPD 580.82 Brazil, NARA.
 5. Lt. Colonel Eiseman, Memo for OPD Record, December 19, 1945, “Use of US Controlled Brazil owned real estate and buildings for Brazilian Air Force program,” OPD 336 Brazil, NARA. For a discussion of Brazilian ownership, the role of Pan American and Panair, and future maintenance, see Col. George A. Brownell to Asst. Chief of Staff, Plans, August 13, 1945, “Implementation of Air Base Agreement,” OPD 580.82 Brazil, NARA.
 6. MG Ralph H. Wooten to Adjutant General War Dept., Recife, April 15, 1945, OPD580.82 Brazil, NARA.
 7. Walter N. Walmsley, Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Brazilian Affairs, Washington, Feb. 24, 1944, 711.3227/47 as in *FRUS 1944*, Vol. VII, pp. 554–556.
 8. Jefferson Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, Feb. 1, 1944, 711.32/206: Telegram, as in *FRUS 1944*, Vol. VII, p. 551. In June 1944 the Rio Embassy and the foreign ministry exchanged texts in their respective languages of a Military Aviation Agreement that would have allowed use and maintenance of the bases for ten years by civilian clothed, unarmed American personnel. See *FRUS1944*, Vol. VII, pp. 561–565. Caffery had been directed by President Roosevelt to pursue continued access to the bases.
 9. Caffery reported that Vargas wanted a strong tie to the United States, unconnected directly to the continued use of the bases, and going through sympathetic motions was necessary. Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, April 25, 1944, 711.3227/79: Telegram as in *FRUS 1944*, Vol. VII, pp. 559–560. On air officers opposition see p. 559.

10. Cordell Hull to Oswaldo Aranha, Washington, July 17, 1944, AGV c 1944.07.17, CPDOC- FGV-Rio. It would be interesting to know why this personal letter ended up in Vargas's archive rather than Aranha's.
11. Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held at Chapultepec, Mexico City, March 1945: <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/chapultepec.htm>.
12. BG John Weckerling, Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff G2 to Major General Clayton Bissell, Asst. Chief of Staff G2, Washington, "Comments on ... Memo on Brazil of 18 May 45," June 6, 1945, OPD 336 Brazil, NARA.
13. Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, p. 63. The CIA report was dated Nov. 30, 1948, and is in the Truman Library.
14. Frank D. McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria*, pp. 251–258; and "The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil's Military Situation, 1900–1945," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 1983), pp. 299–324. The premise of war with Argentina persisted at least until 1977, after which both republics pursued cooperation as the basis of their relations.
15. Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, pp. 86–87. For an excellent analysis of military relations in the post-war era, see Davis, "Brazil-United States Military Relations in the Twentieth Century," in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. *Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries* (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 291–324.
16. The ESG is most famous for organizing a doctrine of national security that would encourage economic development while keeping society orderly. There is a big literature on the ESG. A good starting place is Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 178–183; Wayne A. Selcher, "National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government," Military Issues Research Memorandum, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (16 July 1977); Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, pp. 93–115; Antônio de Arruda, *A Escola Superior de Guerra: História de Sua Doutrina* (São Paulo: Edições GRD, 1983); Francisco César Alves Ferraz, *Á Sombra dos Carvalhos: Escola Superior de Guerra e política no Brasil (1948–1955)* (Londrina: Editora UEL, 1997), pp. 108–120; ESG, Departamento de Estudos, *Manual Básico* (Rio de Janeiro: ESG, 1975).
17. Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 315.
18. Quoted in Mark Gilderhus, "An Emerging Synthesis? U.S. – Latin American Relations Since the Second World War" in Michael J. Hogan,

- ed. *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941* (University of Cambridge Press, 1995), p. 442.
19. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan*, pp. 317–318.
 20. The petroleum question was at the heart of the turmoil that led to Getúlio's suicide. For an excellent account of those turbulent days, see W. Michael Weis, *Cold Warriors & Coups d'état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945–1964* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993) especially pp. 48–50, 71–79. And also the fine analysis in Peter S. Smith, *Oil and Politics in Modern Brazil* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976).
 21. Morris L. Cooke, *Brazil on the March: A Study in International Cooperation* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1944).
 22. See the many newspaper clippings on the Cooke Mission in the State Department files, 832.60/52, RG59, NARA.
 23. C. Michael Weis, *Cold Warriors and Coups d'état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945–1964* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), pp. 19–21. One of the problems in Washington was uncertainty over the respective jurisdictions of the Export-Import Bank and the “International Bank” (later World Bank). Adding to the confusion was the Brazil-United States Joint Economic Development Commission, created under the authority of the International Development Act (Section 410) and the Point Four Program, could not really get underway until the banks sorted themselves out. See Dean Acheson, Memo of Conversation: “Financial Aid for Development Projects in Brazil,” October 19, 1950, Papers of Dean Acheson, Box 65, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
 24. Vágner Camilo Alves, “Ilusão desfeita: a ‘aliança especial’ Brazil-Estados Unidos e o poder naval brasileiro durante e após a Segunda Guerra Mundial,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Vol. 48, No. 1, Brasília, Jan – Junho 2005, pp. 151–177. The Brazilians could not understand Washington's equal treatment policy. Juan Perón, who had “sympathy for Germany and everything German,” denounced the Nuremberg trials; see Ronald C. Newton, *The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931–1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 381.
 25. The instructions to the mission leader, John Abbink, from Paulo H. Nitze (Deputy to Asst. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs), set out the American view of such economic assistance. See Joint Brazil-United States Technical Commission, *FRUS, 1948*, Vol. IX, pp. 364–366.
 26. *Mensagem apresentada ao Congresso Nacional por ocasião da abertura da Sessão Legislativa de 1950 pelo General Eurico G. Dutra, Presidente da República*, (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), pp. 101–102. Paulo Fagundes Visentini, “Populism and Brazil-USA Relations (1945–64): the dialectic of alignment and autonomy” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. *Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries*

- (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 165–193.
27. Berle gave a speech seemingly praising the scheduled elections, but it was seen in Brazil as placing the United States behind the opposition to Vargas. The ambassador did not have State Department approval and wounded Vargas and his supporters. In some versions of the event he read the speech to Vargas in a private meeting, but later the president said he could not understand Berle's garbled Portuguese. As my text shows Berle said that he handed Vargas the speech to read. For the Berle affair, see Stanley Hilton, *O Ditador & O Embaixador: Getúlio Vargas, Adolf Berle Jr. e a Queda do Estado Novo* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1987), pp. 75–99; and Bryce Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp. 122–131. On his development ideas: Lira Neto, *Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio (1945–1954)* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014), p. 208.
 28. Neto, *Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio*, p. 208.
 29. Alex Semm, “O Capitão X, Herói ou Vilão? Considerações sobre os efeitos político-militares da guerra da coreia no Brasil (1950–1953),” in Thiago Mourelle and André Fraga (Organizers), *Olhares sobre o governo Vargas* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Autografia, 2017), pp. 174–206.
 30. Neto, *Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio*, p. 211.
 31. Truman to Vargas, Washington, Sept. 4, 1951, Arquivo de Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC- Rio.
 32. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, p. 121; for a summary of the Rio treaty see Robert H. Holden & Eric Zolov, eds, *Latin American and the United States: A Documentary History* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 187–189. They did convince Colombia to send an infantry battalion and a warship.
 33. Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Army for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Establishment of Joint School for Senior Latin American Officers,” 28 May 1951, JCS 1976/53, CCS 352 (5-25-51), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NARA.
 34. Stanley Hilton, *Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia*, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Objetiva, 1994), p. 463, p. 467; Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1973), pp. 327–332.
 35. Aspásia Camargo & Walder de Góes, eds. *Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de Farias* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1981), note 6, p. 440.
 36. Góes Monteiro was then chief of the new Brazilian joint staff. He had heart problems and had slowed down noticeably.
 37. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, pp. 128–129; Memo of Conversation, “Farewell Visit by General Goes Monteiro – Brazil- U.S. Military

- Cooperation,” October 15, 1951, 452 S/S, Papers of Dean Acheson, Box 66, Harry S Truman Library.
38. Alex Semm. “Carne pra canhão!” A imprensa e o Acordo Militar Brasil-Estados Unidos (1950–1953),” Dissertação (mestrado), Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2016, p. 49.
 39. Interesting analysis of the accord and its passage in Vasco Leitão da Cunha, *Diplomacia em Alto-mar. Depoimento ao CPDOC* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003), pp. 186–187, 214–215; for a discussion of the impact of the accord on the ideological debates, especially in officer ranks, see Maria Celina Soares D’Araújo, *O Segunda Governo Vargas, 1951–54* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982), pp. 148–159; for text and memos commenting on the “Mutual Defense Assistance” agreement which entered into force May 19, 1953: Joint Chiefs of Staff File, 092.2 Brazil, Modern Military Branch, NARA.
 40. Ronald M. Schneider, “*Order and Progress*”: *A Political History of Brazil* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 178.
 41. Aranha to Vargas, Washington, Feb. 2, 1952, Aranha Archive, CPDOC-Rio.
 42. Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 132.
 43. The best documented study of Vargas and Perón is Moniz Bandeira, *Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: Conflito e Integração na América do Sul* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 2003), pp. 251–259.
 44. W. Michael Weis, *Cold Warriors & Coups d’état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945–1964* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), p. 77.
 45. The crisis leading to the president’s suicide is carefully documented in Hélio Silva, *1954: Um Tiro no Coração* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1978). Ronaldo Conde Aguiar raised serious questions about the reality of the attack on Carlos Lacerda in his *Vitória na Derrota: A Morte de Getúlio Vargas* (Rio de Janeiro: Casa da Palavra, 2004).
 46. Dense documentation on the topic can be found in Moniz Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil*, pp. 354–376.
 47. The tracking station agreement text is in J. F. Dulles, Washington, December 22, 1956, Telegram 512, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, pp. 732–734.
 48. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, p. 150.
 49. Briggs, Rio de Janeiro, December 18, 1956, Telegram 619, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, Vol. VII, pp. 731–732.
 50. National Intelligence Estimate 93–57, Washington, January 8, 1957: “Probable Developments in Brazil,” as in *FRUS, 1955–1957*, Vol. VII, pp. 737–746. Quotation is from p. 738.

51. Stephan G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 100–110.
52. *FRUS 1958–1960*, Vol. V, 267–286. For analysis of Eisenhower’s Latin American policies, see Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp. 64–69, 94–99, 135–137.
53. *Ibid.* pp. 136–137.
54. Ambassador John Crimmins as a junior foreign service officer in the Rio Embassy had witnessed the scene. He told me about this in 1976, when he was chief of mission in Brasília. On Santos-Dumont, see <http://www.smithsonianeducation.org/scitech/impacto/graphic/aviation/alberto.html>.
55. W. Michael Weis, *Cold Warriors & Coups d’état: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945–1964* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), pp. 161–166.
56. BG Albino Silva (Chief of Casa Militar) to Chefe do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, Ofício # 76–2 s, Rio, 22 Outubro 1962, HL62.10.22, CPDOC -Rio and response E.M. No.337-c/57. Rio, 30 Novembro 1962, HL62.10.22, CPDOC- Rio. Both documents were stamped SECRET.
57. “Meeting on Brazil on 30 July 1962,” Tape 1, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [The Great Crises, vol. 1, ed. Timothy Naftali] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: <http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/8010002>.
58. My principal source for American promises to the younger officers was Col. Luiz Paulo Macedo de Carvalho; for the coup see Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, pp. 179–183; Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 3–17; Moniz Bandeira, *Brasil-Estados Unidos: A Rivalidade Emergente, 1950–1988* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileiro, 1989), pp. 103–138.
59. The best studies of Castello’s role are Lira Neto, *Castello, A Marcha para a ditadura* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2004), especially pp. 218–245; and Elio Gaspari, *A ditadura envergonhada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 45–125.
60. The Institutional Act #2 of October 1965 expanded arbitrary powers of the executive, and Castello had no choice but to accept the succession of Minister of the Army, General Arturo Costa e Silva (1967–1969).
61. This did not happen according to a prior plan but from a process of evolution. Symbolic of this attitude was that president-generals wore civilian clothes rather than military uniforms. Costa e Silva had a heart attack and died in 1969. He was succeeded by General Emilio Garrastazú Médici

- (1969–1974), General Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979), and General João Batista Figueiredo (1979–1985).
62. See the Editorial Note (summarizing actions), *FRUS, 1964–1968*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 431–432; John W.F. Dulles, *President Castello Branco: Brazilian Reformer* (Texas A & M University Press, 1981); Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); Phyllis R. Parker, *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). Hélio Silva, *1964: Golpe ou Contragolpe?* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1975); René A. Dreifuss, *1964: A Conquista do Estado: Ação Política, Poder e Golpe de Classe* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1981); Edgard Carone, *A Quarta República (1945–1964): Documentos* (São Paulo: Difel/Difusão, 1980); Daniel Drosdoff, *Linha dura no Brasil: O governo Médici, 1969–1974* (São Paulo: Global, 1986); Ruth Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961–1969* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1990).
 63. Ambassador John Hugh Crimmins, Interview, May 10, 1989, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Library of Congress, pp. 27–28. <http://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mssmisc/mfdip/2004/2004cri01/2004cri01.pdf> Lingering irritation undid American efforts to organize a similar intervention in Nicaragua years later.
 64. Luís Vianna Filho, *O Governo Castelo Branco* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca do Exército & Editora José Olympio, 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 433–435.
 65. Lira Neto, *Castello: A marcha para a ditadura* (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2004), pp. 330–331.
 66. The Americans apparently used several routes to request Brazilian participation. A news story had General Maxwell Taylor asking for Brazilian paratroopers. “Taylor Pede Tropas do Brasil para o Vietnã,” *Folha de São Paulo*, 12 de Março de 1965. Ambassador Gordon made an official plea: Geneton Moraes Neto, Entrevista: “O Dia em Lincoln Falou...,” *O Globo*, Rio, 21/12/09: <http://g1.globo.com/platb/geneton/2009/12/21/o-dia-em-lincoln-gordon-falou-sobre-dois-temas-explosivos-primeiro-os-estados-unidos-queriam-que-o-brasil-participasse-da-guerra-do-vietnam-segundo-a-cia-financiou-a-campanha-de-candidatos-simpatiz/>. The Navy minister was ready to send his marines, but Army Minister Costa e Silva opposed sending any troops. See Orivaldo Leme Biagi, “O (Quasi) Envolvimento Militar do Brasil na Guerra do Vietnã,” <http://www.historica.arquivoestado.sp.gov.br/materias/anteriores/edicao05/materia03/militar.pdf>. On the Johnson-Castello correspondence, see Luís

- Vianna Filho, *O Governo Castelo Branco* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca do Exército & Editora José Olympio, 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 442–443.
67. Brazil Program Analysis, Washington, November 1, 1969, National Security Council, Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-49, Senior Review Group, NSC Files 12-1-70, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. The study set out three policy objectives regarding Brazil: “a pro-United States Government, economic growth, and helping to promote a more modern social structure.”
 68. This was done in the so-called Reuss amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act as an expression of the sense of Congress.
 69. Viron P. Vaky, Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, National Security Council, May 19, 1970, Subject: Brazil and Reuss Amendment to Foreign Military Sales Act; NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 1, Through August 1970, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.
 70. He wrote that instruction on a memo from Kissinger: NSC Files., Box 29, Country Files, Brazil, President’s Daily Briefing, Chronological File, December 1–15, 1970, NARA.
 71. Memorandum of Meeting, White House, Washington, Dec 14, 1970, Nixon, Ambassador William Rountree and Arnold Nachmanoff (NSC), Subject: Brazil; NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Brazil, Volume 2, September 1970–31 July 31 1971, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.
 72. “Passeata dos Cem Mil,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 2616–2619. The cautioning general was Carlos de Meira Mattos, who did a report noting numerous problems in the universities. Meira Mattos had been Mascarenhas’s aide-de-camp during the FEB.
 73. Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, p. 37. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247>.
 74. Ronald M. Schneider, “Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 261–262.
 75. “Emílio Garrastazu Médici,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 2159–2172.
 76. Elio Gaspari, *As Ilusões Armadas: A Ditadura Escancarada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 129–130.
 77. “Mas não aceito tortura, nem que se maltrate o preso, nem que se mate preso. Não aceito de jeito nenhum isso.” Oral History Interview, FONTOURA, Carlos Alberto da. *Carlos Alberto da Fontoura (depoi-*

- mento, 1993), (Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2005), p. 128.
78. Richard Morse, Thomas Skidmore, Stanley Stein, Charles Wagley, and 97 others, "A Protest to the Brazilian Government," *The New York Times*, March 8, 1970 (I was one of the 97); William L. Wipfler, "Repression and Terror, The Price of "Progress" in Brazil, *Christianity and Crisis* (NY), March 16, 1970, pp. 44–48; Brady Tyson, "Brazil Twists Thumbscrews..." *The Washington Post*, April 5, 1970; American Committee for Information on Brazil, "Terror in Brazil: A Dossier," April 1970: reported that there were nearly 12,000 political prisoners; Ralph Della Cava, "Torture in Brazil," *Commonweal*, Vol. XCII, No. 6, April 24, 1970, pp. 135–141; James N. Green, "Opposing the Dictatorship in the United States: Human Rights and the Organization of American States," in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. *Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries* (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 391–413.
 79. Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 154.
 80. Many officers opposed such behavior and made attempts within the armed forces to resist it. Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *Estado e Oposição no Brasil (1964–1984)*, (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1984), pp. 166–181. In later years those opposed would publicly defend their colleagues' behavior as lamentable but necessary. While doing research in the army headquarters in Brasília in 1976–1977, a number of field-grade officers without prompting told me they opposed the repression.
 81. Elio Gaspari, *O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 287–288.
 82. Richard Nixon: "Toasts of the President and President Medici of Brazil," December 7, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3247>.
 83. The Brazilian Truth Commission uncovered considerable evidence of Brazilian support for the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende's government to the extent of providing training in torture and military equipment. The Brazilian embassy was fully behind the Chilean coup. See the report: "Memória das trevas: Arquivos revelam como o Brasil ajudou a ditadura chilena," *Diário do Poder*, 27 de abril de 2014. <http://www.diariodopoder.com.br/noticias/arquivos-revelam-como-o-brasil-ajudou-a-ditadura-chilena/>.
 84. Nixon- Médici meeting in White House, Dec 7, 1971 *FRUS, 1969–1976*, Vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972,

Document 141 <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d141>.

85. “Ernesto Geisel,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 1450–1459.
 General João Batista Figueiredo was Médici’s close aide, but he also had long ties to Geisel and his close advisers. He played a role in Médici’s decision for Geisel and he would succeed Geisel as the last general-president of the military regime.
86. Because of intense press censorship, the selection process was hidden from the Brazilian public. There are excellent reconstructions in Ronald M. Schneider, *“Order and Progress” A Political History of Brazil* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 262–266; Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 149–154; Elio Gaspari, *O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 215–228.
87. Elio Gaspari, *O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 287–288. On page 322: “Os comandantes do exército estão sem um respaldo legal para esse problema. A verdade é essa. ... Para a guerra externa a gente tem legislação, mas para a nossa guerra específica, não temos.”
88. Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 167 and 364, note 18. In an interview in 1974, Geisel told Alfred Stepan that “not only did he not have a mandate for *distensão* but significant military opinion ... opposed *distensão*.” Namely, the “security apparatus” was opposed. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 35–39.
89. Between 1965 and 1968, reported cases averaged 71 per year. In Médici’s last year there had been 736; in 1974 there were 67 reported cases of torture or death. See Elio Gaspari, *O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), p. 403. It seems that the hard-liners tried to avoid detection and record keeping by simply eliminating suspects instead of arresting them; *Brazil: Nunca Mais* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1985), p. 64. According to this report, at the time Geisel took office, some 20 individuals simply disappeared after being detained.
90. Cláudio Guerra, *Memórias de um guerra suja* (Rio de Janeiro: Top books Editora, 2012), pp. 151–152. Some former torturers testified about their crimes before the National Truth Commission.
91. CIA, office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80 M01048A: Subject Files Box 1, Folder 29:B-10 Brazil. Secret memorandum from

- Director of Central Intelligence William Colby to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, April 11, 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E-11, Part 2 Documents on South America, 1973–1976, document 99.
92. Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, p. 49. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247>.
 93. Walder de Góes, *O Brasil do General Geisel* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1978), p. 30.
 94. Jerry Dávila, *Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 51 and James G. Hershberg, “‘No Longer Anyone’s Sacristan’: New Evidence on Brazil’s Surprise Recognition of the MPLA Government in Angola” (Paper at the “Southern Africa in the Cold War Era Conference” in Lisbon, Portugal, May 2009).
 95. Dani K. Nedal & Tatiana Coutto, “Brazil’s 1975 Nuclear Agreement with West Germany,” Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Wilson Center: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/brazils-1975-nuclear-agreement-west-germany>. “Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira to President Geisel, US Threats and Promises and Brazilian Responses,” February 25, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC), Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), Azeredo da Silveira Archive, 1974.08.15 pp. 544–549.
 96. They signed the memo in Brasilia on February 21, 1976. Frank D. McCann, “The Value of U.S.-Brazilian Consultation,” Op-Ed Page, *The New York Times*, March 6, 1976.
 97. Quotes from *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1916, March 15, 1976, text of agreement, pp. 337–338. Brazil negotiated similar consultative agreements with France, Britain, and Germany. Hopeful observers saw it as reinforcing the traditional alliance. For more analysis, see Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 95–196.
 98. The whole paragraph is based upon Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, pp. 44–45. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247>.
 99. Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, pp. 45–46. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247>.
 100. For an internal State Department analysis of US human rights policy, there is Human Rights S/P Study—Policy Planning Vol. II, L/HR Files: Lot 80

- D 275, RG 59, NARA. <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve03/d264>.
101. Robert Wesson, *The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence* (NY: Praeger, 1981), pp. 75–89. I was then resident in Brasília and observed these events closely.
 102. Maria Celina D’Araujo & Celso Castro, eds. *Ernesto Geisel* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1997), pp. 305; 340–341; Dani K. Nedal, “U.S. Diplomatic Efforts Stalled Brazil’s Nuclear Program in 1970s,” <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-diplomatic-efforts-stalled-brazils-nuclear-program-1970s>.
 103. See Andre Gustavo Stumpf & Merval Pereira Filho, *A Segunda Guerra: Sucessão de Geisel* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1979). For Frota’s views see Sylvio Frota, *Ideais Traídos: A Mais Grave Crise dos Governos Militares* (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2006), especially pp. 499–536.
 104. Brazilian reaction was discussed in “Impact of the US Stand on Human Rights,” Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, May 11, 1977, *FRUS, 1977–1980*, Vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 42 <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v02/d42>.
 105. Elio Gaspari, *As Ilusões Armadas: A Ditadura Escancarada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 305–306; for an extensive study, see Martha K. Huggins, *Political Policing: the United States and Latin America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998). Of course police mistreatment of prisoners had been commonplace, what was unusual was its institutionalization by the armed forces.
 106. Maria Celina D’Araujo & Celso Castro, eds. *Ernesto Geisel* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1997), pp. 336–337; Paulo Fagundes Visentini, “Brazil-USA relations during the Military Dictatorship (1964–1985)” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. *Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries* (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 195–216.
 107. “O programa nuclear secreto brasileiro (Programa nuclear paralelo)” *Gamevicio*, 17 Dez 2011. <http://www.gamevicio.com/i/noticias/106/106426-o-programa-nuclear-secreto-brasileiro-programa-nuclear-paralelo/>.
 108. Robert C. Harding, “Ergue-se Marte! A Evolução do Programa Espacial Brasileiro em Apoio à Segurança Nacional,” *Air & Space Power Journal* [U.S. Air Force] Vol. XXI, No. 4, December 2009; <http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/apj-p/2009/4tri09/harding.html>.
 109. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/106612.pdf>. It was signed in Brasília on October 14, 1997.

110. Décio Castilho Ceballos, “The Brazilian space program: a selective strategy for space development and business” (November 16, 1999). <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596469592254B>.
111. Cardoso overlapped with Clinton and Bush. His goal was to make good relations the norm; see Paulo Roberto Almeida, “Brazil-USA relations during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments,” Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. *Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries* (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 217–238.
112. Even officers who had long personal history of being unequivocally pro-American were deeply angry at the American insensitivity to the point of talking about returning their coveted American medals.
113. Ricardo Pereira Cabral, “The Foreign Policy of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva’s Government and its relations with the USA” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. *Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries* (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 247–287. “Brazil to Say ‘No, Thanks’ to US,” *Brazzil*, Brazil/US, May 2003; <http://www.brazzil.com/p128may03.htm>.
114. Stephan Clark, “Brazilian rocket explodes on launch pad,” *Spaceflight Now*, August 22, 2003. VLS stands for *Veículo Lançador de Satélites*.
115. Though investigations dismissed rumors of sabotage, they continue to circulate. Sean T. Mitchell, *Constellations of Inequality: Space, Race & Utopia in Brazil* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), pp. 80–90, 159–164. Statements in the press hinted at “gradual sabotage” of the project, Eduardo Hollanda & Hélio Contreiros, “Jóia da coroa: Interesse estrangeiros pela base de Alcântara põe o Brasil mais perto do sonho de lançar seu próprio satélite,” *Isto É* (São Paulo) 2/25/2004, https://istoe.com.br/27183_JOIA+DA+COROA/.
116. Likely the best example of implying sabotage is the “study” by Ronaldo Schlichting and Colonel Roberto Monteiro de Oliveira, “A sistemática sabotagem contra a Missão Espacial Completa Brasileira (MECB) e contra o projeto VLS-1,” Curitiba, December 8, 2004, *Análises Estratégicas: Política Nacional e Global*. [http://www.suaaltezaogato.com.br/arq/Gavetao/Ronaldo_Schlichting_\(Sabotagem_Programa_Espacial_Brasileiro\).pdf](http://www.suaaltezaogato.com.br/arq/Gavetao/Ronaldo_Schlichting_(Sabotagem_Programa_Espacial_Brasileiro).pdf).
117. After the 2003 disintegration of the *Columbia* spacecraft, the Americans were dependent on Russian vehicles to reach the space station at the cost of \$60 million per astronaut. The fee charged by Brazil was a bargain by comparison. The life and career of Colonel Pontes are laid out in [http://www.marcospontes.com/\\$SETOR/MCP/VIDA/biografia.html](http://www.marcospontes.com/$SETOR/MCP/VIDA/biografia.html). “First Brazilian astronaut returns to Earth,” *New Scientist*, Daily News, April 10, 2006, <https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn8972-first-brazilian-astronaut-returns-to-earth/>; Marcos C. Pontes (Lieutenant

- Colonel, Brazil Air Force Astronaut, Brazilian Space Agency), <https://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/pontes.html>.
118. Sean T. Mitchell, *Constellations of Inequality: Space, Race & Utopia in Brazil* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), p. 160.
 119. Frank D. McCann, “Brasil: Acima de Tudo!! The Brazilian Armed Forces: Remodeling for a New Era,” *Diálogos* vol. 21 no. 1 (2017), pp. 57–95. <https://doi.org/10.4025/dialogos.v21i1>.
 120. “Why Brazil signed a military agreement with the US,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 13, 2010.
 121. Lt. Colonel Lawrence T. Brown, “Restoring the ‘Unwritten Alliance’ in Brazil—United States Relations, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA) March 12, 2012, ADA 560773.pdf.
 122. The White House, “Fact Sheet: The United States and Brazil – A Mature and Multifaceted Partnership,” June 30, 2015. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/30/fact-sheet-united-states-and-brazil-mature-and-multi-faceted-partnership>.
 123. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html> and https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-lula-corruption-workers-party.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FDa%20Silva%2C%20Luiz%20In%C3%A1cio%20Lula&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection.
 124. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-usa-military/u-s-military-joins-brazil-army-exercises-in-amazon-idUSKBN1D8347>.
 125. Rostand Medeiros, “Segunda Guerra Mundial: O ultimo militar Americano em Natal,” *Tok de História*, 17/12/2012. <https://tokdehistoria.com.br/2012/11/17/4341/> Medeiros specializes in the history of Natal. He was my guide and host in a visit to the city and the air force base at Parnamirim in June 2013. For the affect of the war and American troops on Natal see João Wilson Melo, *A Cidade e o trampolim* (Natal: Sebo Vermelho, 2003); Clyde Smith Junior, *Trampolim para a Vitória: os americanos em Natal - RN: Brasil durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Natal: Editora do UFRN, 1992); Giovana Paiva de Oliveira, *Natal em guerra: as transformações da cidade na Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Natal: Editora do UFRN, 2014).

INDEX

A

- Abbink Mission, 255
Abreu, João Leitão de, 269
Abyssinia, 32
Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras,
202, 210, 267
Academics, 116, 268
Adams, Claude M., 144, 160, 167,
168, 190, 191
Adams, Ruth, 144
Aeronautics minister, *see* Gomes,
Eduardo
Africa, 85, 149, 161, 162, 166, 250
Africa corps, *see* Rommel, Erwin
African colonies, 78, 272
Agriculture, 128, 163
Agulhas Negras, 192
Air bases, 211–212
 Amapá, 250
 Belém, 64, 127, 129, 186,
 225, 250
 Camoçim, 64
 Cape Verde Islands, 251
 Fernando de Noronha Island, 34
 Fortaleza, 64, 250
 in Latin America, 81
 Maceió, 64
 Natal, 64, 65, 81, 115, 127, 145,
 211, 225, 250, 277
 post-war, 249–251
 Recife, 64, 115, 127, 225, 250
 Salvador, 64
 São Luiz, 250
 Vila Militar, 185, 193
 West Africa, 251
Air Corps Ferrying Command, 86
Aircraft, 9, 11, 68, 77, 78, 117, 120,
127, 151, 228
 American, 120, 250
 Axis threat to, 144
 carriers, 227, 266
 combat, 85
 fighter, 212
 French carrier *Bearn*, 61
 German, 65
Airfields, 11, 40, 63–64, 68, 86, 102,
122, 164, 212, 250
See also Air bases

- Air force
 Brazil, 145, 191, 228, 234, 250, 251
 Brazilian and space program, 276
- Airlines
 Air France, 64
Cia. Aéropostal Brasileira, 64
 Lufthansa, 64
 Pan American Airways (PAA), 63, 65, 86, 250
Panair do Brasil, 63, 64, 86, 250
- Air Intelligence Staff, 130
- Airplanes, 85, 114, 186
- Airport Development Program (ADP), 62–66
See also Military Appropriation Act;
 Pan American Airports Corporation
- Air Transport Command, 120, 164, 211, 278
- Alcântara, 275–277
- Alecrim cemetery, 278
- Alexander, Harold R. L. G., 232
- Alexandria, 152
- Algiers, 183
- Alliance, 8, 185, 208, 212, 241, 256, 257, 264, 272
- Alliance for Progress, 260
- Allied merchantmen, 150
- Allies, 39, 114, 150, 152, 171, 203, 233
- Alvim, Hugo Panasco, 265
- Amazon, 61, 118, 119, 129, 233, 269, 276, 277
 reconnaissance of, 144
- Amazonia, 108, 278
- Amazonian states, 128
- American Atoms for Peace program, 272
- American embassy, 116, 160, 228
- American F-5s, 266
- American General Staff, 76, 123, 230
- American military
 Brazilian views of, 31, 33
 views, 230–231
- American Mongolia, 66
- Ammunition, 35, 81, 86, 104, 127, 200, 269
- Amnesty International, 268
- Amnesty, student, 267
- Angola, 272
- Anibal Beneyolo* (passenger ship), 154
See also Operation Brazil
- Anti-aircraft, 73
 artillery, 127
 batteries, 39
 defense, 25
 guns, 120, 127
 regiments, 85
 units, 186
- Anti-Americanism, 22, 26, 123, 228, 254, 258
- Anti-Axis, 72, 156, 159
- Anti-Castro, 262
- Anti-communism, 257, 264
- Anti-communist, 262
- Anti-Goulart, 264
See also Gordon, Lincoln; Johnson administration
- Anti-Goulart forces, 263
- Antigua, 67
- Anti-submarine, 145, 146
- Anti-tank artillery, 127
- Anti-tank guns, 120
- Anti-Vargas, 259
- Anti-Zionist resolution, 271
- Anzio, 195
- Aquarela do Brasil* (song), 69
- Aragipe* (yacht), 155
See also Operation Brazil
- Araguaia region, 269
- Aranha, Oswaldo, 7, 21, 41, 64, 74, 81, 84, 101–105, 107–111, 114, 115, 122, 128, 130–132, 147, 167, 188, 197, 212, 257, 258, 272
- Brazilian-American alliance, 170

- Northeastern Brazil defense
 agreement, 120
 and political accord, 132
 and relations with United States, 27
 and state of war, 157–158
 war objectives, 162–163
- Aranha, Oswaldo Gudolle, 188, 197
- Arará*, *see* Operation Brazil
- Araraquara* (luxury vessel), 154
See also Operation Brazil
- Araújo, Cauby C., 63, 64
- Archangel, Russia, 151
- Archives, 12, 225, 231
- Argentina, 7, 21, 38, 102, 106, 112, 147, 167, 230, 269
 aligned with rebels, 40
 arms, 252
 as Brazil's rival, 21
 campaign against, 130
 and Chaco War, 20–21
 distrust of, 106
 German and Italian populations
 in, 27
 Inter-American Conference, 100
 “Nazi Menace” in, 100
 negative image of, 100
 neutrality, 119
 and Peronist phenomenon, 236
 relationship with Germany, 100
 relations with axis, 105
 and Richard Nixon, 261
 threat of, 171, 226, 252
 as threat to Brazil, 12
 worries about, 118–119
- Argentine-Brazilian relations, 107
- Argentine-Brazilian-Chilean
 alliance, 259
- Armaments, 37, 60, 71, 104, 106, 226, 277
- Arms
 American, 21, 262
 appeal to, 32
 and army, 32
- Brazilian, 66, 71, 125–126
 delivery, 43, 80, 101, 118
 development of, 73, 277
 force of, 64
 German supply of, 39, 41, 60, 66
 need for, 66, 71, 78, 105, 120, 259
 in Northeast Brazil, 29
 policies, 21
 post-war supply of, 229, 230, 252
 production of, 104, 166
 purchase of, 9, 21, 35, 60, 67, 71, 187, 256, 266
 race, 229
 Russian sales of, 277
 sales, 20, 35–36, 226
 shipments, 67, 71
 standardization of, 249
 supply, 31, 35, 251, 257
 surplus, 254
 trade, 24
 training, 73–74, 192, 205
 transfers, 260
 US supply of, 34–36, 41, 65–67, 71–73, 78, 81, 101, 104, 110, 115, 127, 228
See also Lend-Lease arms
- Army
 Argentina, 118
 Brazil, 4, 9, 10, 28, 126, 168–170;
 alliance with US, 27–37; prior
 to war, 19–23; reorganization
 before war, 184–195
 Chile, 100
 France, 9
 Germany, 100
 Latin America, 126
 Latin American Section of US, 116
 South America, 192
 US, 25, 65, 73, 76, 113, 126, 127, 166–167, 170, 171, 189, 191, 208; alliance with Brazil, 27–37; Operations Division (OPD), 190, 210, 230

Army Air Corps (US), 31, 40, 84, 85,
 117, 153
 Army bases, Vila Militar, 186, 193,
 195, 210
 Army Chief of Staff, *see* Góes
 Monteiro, Aurélio Pedro de
 Army War College (US), 25, 39, 41,
 72, 73, 252, 277
 Arnold, Henry H., 31
 Artic route, 151
 Artillery school, 9
 Aruba, 148
 AS-4 convoy, 149, 150
 Asia, 84, 256
 Astronaut, 275, 276
 See also Industry, space
 Atlantic Charter, 160
 Atlantic narrows, 211
 Atomic agreement, 273
 Atomic energy, 6, 256, 260, 275
 Atomic program, 257, 260, 272
 Atomic technology, 257
Atucha (reactor), 272
 Austria, 231
 Authoritarianism, 43, 236, 264, 266,
 269, 270
 Automobiles, 4
 Aviation, 9, 125, 147, 198
 advances in, 39
 civil, 63, 250
 civil conference, 237
 material, 123
 military, 31, 63
 ministry, 64
 ministry of aeronautics, 63
 naval, 114
 Axis, 8, 66–68, 82, 85, 86,
 99, 101–103, 107, 108,
 110, 112, 119, 123, 125,
 128, 129, 149, 159, 231,
 233, 234
 advance in West Africa, 126
 agents, 144

 break with, 110
 breaking relations with, 105
 influence, 22
 and Inter-American Conference, 104
 invasion of Brazil, 39
 propaganda, 70, 116
 relations with, 158
 relations with Argentina
 and Chile, 147
 submarines, 119–120
 sympathizers, 123, 156, 160
 threat, 11, 23, 45, 67, 73, 119,
 126, 144
 troops in Tunisia, 183
 vessels, 146
 war with Brazil, 104
 Axis alliance, 23
 Axis nationals, 156
 Azores, 74, 149, 165, 172

B

B-17, 36, 65
 B-25, 120
Baependy (passenger steamer),
 145, 153, 159
 See also Operation Brazil
 Bahamas, 67
 Bahia, 69, 129, 146–156, 278
 Balkans, the, 23
 Barber, Henry A., Jr., 130, 131
 Barra da Tijuca, 105
Barreira do Inferno, 275
 Barroso, Ari, 69
 Barton, Henry A., 124
 Batista, Fulgencio, 262
 Battle of Recife, 188
 Battleships, 146, 227
 Bay of All Saints, 155
 See also Operation Brazil
 Belém do Pará, 31, 65, 82, 83, 85,
 119, 147, 156, 187
 See also Air bases

- Belgium, 23, 42
 Belo Horizonte, 29, 31, 39, 193
 Belvedere, 204
 Belvedere-Torraccia, 203
 Berle, Adolf, 109, 212, 227–229, 237–239, 255
See also Constituinte; Vargas, Getúlio
 Berlin, 41, 43, 62, 111
See also Government, German
 Bermuda, 67
 Bilateralism, 36, 237, 251
 Bittencourt, Amaro Soares, 71
 Black people, 69
 Blockade
 American, 61
 Axis, 211
 British, 61, 67
 German, 125
 Italian, 125
 Blohm & Voss (shipyard), 153
 Bolivia, 20, 269, 276
 Bolling Field, 120
 Bologna, 199, 203
 Bombers, 84, 120, 228
 Bonds, 5
 Bonn, 273
 Books
 The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945, 8
 Casa Grande e Senzala, 69
 Os Sertões, 69
 Bradley, Omar, 73, 125
 Braga, Jane Gray, 191
 Brasília, 260, 261, 273
 Brazil, 8, 147
 army, 29
 attitude to US help, 59
 and Chaco War, 20–21
 Chamber of Deputies, 5, 267
 Constitution of 1934, 5, 32
 Constitution of 1937, 240
 Constitution of 1946, 239
 defense of, 37, 40
 General Staff of the Armed Forces (*EMFA*), 262
 government forms of, 6
 Northeast, 67
 Northeast as German target, 71
 perception of, 10–11
 public opinion of World War II, 71
 relations with axis, 106
 Brazilian Air Force, 114
 Brazilian Air Ministry, 144
 Brazilian-American alliance, 45, 66–67, 74–75, 79, 86–87, 132, 143–145, 156, 158, 162, 185
 post-war negotiations, 226–230
 post-war relationship, 252–253
 Brazilian-American military relations, 11, 130, 272
 contemporary, 275–278
 Brazilian-American relations, 25, 78–80, 102, 104, 115, 117, 229, 275
 Brazilian-Argentine relations, 100–101
 Brazilian bulge, 24, 73, 85, 113
 Brazilian Empire, 9
 Brazilian Expeditionary Corps, *see Divisions, 1st Infantry Regiment, Brazil*
 Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 6, 10, 172, 183–184, 188, 189, 191–193, 195
 organization of, 195–198
 performance of, 198–213
 See also Força Expedicionária Brasileira (FEB)
 Brazilian fleet, 20, 146
 Brazilian general staff, 37, 60, 75, 76, 115, 160, 189
 Brazilian High Command, 106, 168
 Brazilian military
 attitude towards entering war, 75, 78, 172
 cooperation with United States, 38, 59, 114, 116, 169, 228

- Brazilian military (*cont.*)
 German supplies to, 20, 22, 41
 justification of power, 264
 marches and demonstrations
 against, 256
 and national security, 19, 22
 nature of, 2
 opposition to American troops in
 northeast, 65
 position of, in Cold War, 249
 post-Cold War relations with United
 States, 277
 post-war occupation, 231–233
 reform of, 19
 training in United States, 39
 United States military supplies of, 19
 use of United States for military
 supply, 128, 198
 view of partnership with United
 States, 10, 36, 113, 228
 weakness, 25, 30, 32
 Brazilian neutrality, 23–27, 34,
 37, 39–41, 59, 63, 65, 78,
 86, 145, 147
 Brazilian Pavili, 33
 Brazilian proposal, 129
 Brazilian Society for the Progress
 of Science, 276
 Brazilian Space Agency, 276
 Bridges, 33, 118, 237
 See also Golden Gate Bridge
 Briggs, Ellis O., 260
 British Admiralty, 40
 British colonies, 23
 British consul, 129
 British Empire, 67
 British forces, 65, 82, 150
 British Guiana, 67
 Brittany, 148
 Broadcasting, 26, 144
 Broadway, 69
 Brown, Lawrence T., 277
 Browning, Thomas N., 278
Buarque (ship), 119
 Buenos Aires, 100, 118, 163
 See also Inter-American Conference
 Burdett, William C., 39
 Bureaucracy, 2, 145, 237
 Burma, 127
 Byrnes, James F., 228, 235
- C**
 Cacao, 155
 Cachoeira, 192
 Caffery, Jefferson, 37, 41, 62, 74, 75,
 81, 82, 117, 122, 127, 130–132,
 191, 227, 251
 amd, 158
 and Brazilian arms, 125–126
 correspondence to, 114
 dissatisfaction with, 123–125
 and Inter-American Conference,
 101–112
 and political accord, 127–132
 Caiado de Castro, Aguinaldo, 188, 193
Cairú (steamer), 119–121
 Calibers, 66
 California, 148
 Camp Claiborne, 125
 Camp Sutton, 125
 Campiani, Cesar, 207
 Canal Zone, 257
 Canary Islands, 40
 Candee, Robert C., 86, 112
Candelária (church), 266
 Candotti, Ennio, 276
 Cape Hatteras, 120
 Cape São Roque, 60, 150
 Cape Town, 150, 152
 Cape Verde, 40
 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 230, 276
 Cardoso, Maurício José, 193
 See also Divisions, 2nd Military
 Region, Brazil
 Caribbean, 61, 99, 127, 151

- Cariocas, 153
 Carl Zeiss Company, 22
 Carneiro, Rui, 229
 Carter, Jimmy, 273, 274
 Casablanca, 183
 Casablanca Conference, 162, 165, 211
Casa Civil, 269
 See also Abreu, João Leitão de
Casa Militar, 262
 Cassidy, Richard, 191
Castellistas, 270
 Castello Branco, Humberto de
 Alencar, 188, 232, 263, 265,
 268, 270
 Castillo, Ramón, 104, 108, 119
 Castro, Fidel, 262
 Catalina 83P6, 155
 See also Operation Brazil
 Catete Palace, 110, 120, 226
 Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, José
 Pessoa, 192
 Ceará, 149, 156
 Censors, 119, 160
 Central America, 99
Central do Brazil, 117
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
 252, 262, 264
Centro de Informação do Exército
 (CIEEx), 271
 Chaco, 32
 Chaco War, 20
 Chaney, James E., 31
 Chapultepec resolution, 251
 Chargé d'affaires, 39, 111, 228
 See also Burdett, William C.
 Chateaubriand, Francisco Assis, 167
 See also Newspapers and magazines
Chatô, *see* Chateaubriand,
 Francisco Assis
 Chicago, 237
 Chief of Staff, *see* Marshall, George C.
 Chile, 32, 102, 106, 147, 230, 252, 269
 Inter-American Conference, 100
 Chilean-Brazilian relations, 107
 Chilean-German relations, 100
 China, 32, 35, 127, 168, 256
 Christopher, Warren, 273
 Churchill, Winston, 24, 117, 119,
 151, 195
 Cincinnati, 278
 Civilian-centrist governments, 6
 Civil war, 3, 19, 35, 40, 60
 Clark, Mark, 199, 207, 231
 See also Crittenberger, Willis D;
 Divisions, 5th Army, US
 Clay, Lucius D., 86, 112, 113
 Clergy (clerics), 268, 269
 Cleveland, Grover, 8
 Clinton, Bill, 276
 Coalition, 72, 206, 255
 Coffee, 4, 43, 259
 Cold War, 212, 249
 Colombia, 20, 100, 276
 Columbia University, 116
 Combat, 31, 152, 163, 166,
 170, 184, 185, 188, 191,
 196, 198, 199, 203, 204,
 208, 210, 252, 256
 aircraft, 120, 127
 arms, 68
 cars, 118
 engineers, 73, 84
 experience, 202, 206
 operations, 168, 185, 204, 225
 personnel, 197
 planes, 12
 role, 166, 170
 skills, 209
 teams, 210
 troops, 68, 208, 212
 units, 168, 198
 vessels, 229
 veterans, 210
 zone, 188, 191
 Command and General Staff School,
 144, 159, 198, 262

- Communism, 30, 239, 249, 256, 258, 261, 263–265
- Communist, 236, 238, 249, 258, 262
- Communist Party of Brazil (PCB), 236, 239, 256
- Compensation trade, *see* Trade
- Congress
- Brazil, 252, 255, 258–260, 264, 267, 278
 - US, 35, 63, 249, 263, 266, 273
- Congressional Medal of Honor, *see* Ingram, Jonas H.
- Conspiracy, 121, 264
- Constituinte*, 238
- See also* Berle, Adolf
- Constitutional government, 5
- Convoys, 121, 129, 149–151
- Cooke Mission, the, 254, 255
- Cooke, Morris, 7
- Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), US, 69
- See also* Rockefeller, Nelson A.
- Copacabana, 158
- Copacabana Palace Hotel, 109
- Corcovado Mountain, 158
- Cordeiro de Farias, Osvaldo, 167, 185, 192, 195, 257
- Corps of Cadets, 33
- Corregidor, 117
- Costa e Silva, Artur, 264, 267–270
- Cost of living, 128, 236
- Costistas*, 270
- Cotton, 43
- Counter-espionage, 124
- Coup, 27, 80, 236, 237, 239, 240, 263, 264, 267
- Coup d'état*, 212, 237, 239, 263, 264
- Coutinho, Dale, 270
- Couto e Silva, Golbery, 270
- CPDOC, 239
- Craig, Malin, 27, 29
- Crimmins, John, 267, 273, 274
- Crittenberger, Willis D., 232
- See also* Castello Branco, Humberto de Alencar; Divisions, 4th Corps, US; Divisions, 5th Army, US
- Cuba, 262, 265, 272
- Czechoslovakia, 26, 159
- D**
- da Gama, Domicio, 21
- da Silva, Ignacio Lula, 230
- Dakar, 24, 74, 81, 82, 149, 160, 164
- DaMatta, Roberto, 3
- Darlan, Jean-Francois, 74
- Dávila, Jerry, 272
- Davis, Sonny, 260
- de Lima Brayner, Floriano, 202, 232
- de Lyra Tavares, Aurelio, 188
- De Macedo Soares, José Eduardo, 161
- See also* Newspapers and magazines
- de Maia, José Joaquim, 185
- de Paula Rodrigues Alves, José, 119
- de Sousa Costa, Artur, 117, 118, 127
- Decree, 63, 64, 158, 259, 264
- Aiport Development Program (ADP), 63–65
 - Estado Novo*, 235
 - legalizing Natal Air Base, 120
 - state of war, 157–158
- Decree-laws, 64
- Defense, 28, 30, 33, 43, 60
- against Argentina, 29
 - Brazilian coast, 34
 - Brazilian naval, 147
 - Brazil's coast, 24
 - hemispheric, 37
 - joint, 29
 - New York City, 127
 - North Atlantic, 67–68
 - Northeast Brazil, 24, 120, 128
- Defense agreement, 121, 132

- Della Cava, Ralph, 268
 Demobilization, 210, 225
 Democracy, 4, 24, 42, 67, 102, 126,
 188, 236, 239, 240, 257, 264
 Demonstrations, 156, 159, 160, 256,
 266–268
 Denmark, 67
 Department of Civil Aviation (DAC), 64
 Destroyers, 67, 227
 Development, 3, 5, 8, 126, 253,
 258–261, 274, 275, 277
 air power, 163
 Amazonian, 6
 anti-nuclear, 274
 Brazilian, 7
 economic, 118, 249, 255
 forces, 171
 industries, 60, 130, 163, 164
 investment, 258
 maritime power, 163
 military, 249
 oil, 254
 petroleum, 252, 254, 258
 wartime, 235
See also Arms; Industry
Diário Oficial, 64
Diários Associados, *see* Newspapers and
 magazines
 Dictatorship, 4, 6, 21, 27, 158, 170,
 210, 235, 237, 240, 241, 257,
 264, 267–269
See also Argentina; Bolivia; Chile;
 Uruguay
 Diplomacy, 120, 125, 232
 political, 80
 Disaster relief, 278
 Discrimination, 169, 235
 Disney Studios, 70, 207
 Disney, Walt, 69, 212
 Dissidents, 268
 Divisions, 154, 193
 1st Division, Brazil, 189–191, 194
 1st Expeditionary, Brazil, 191, 192
 1st Infantry Regiment, Brazil,
 188, 193
 2nd Division, Brazil, 189
 2nd Military Region, Brazil,
 168, 192, 193 (*see also*
 Cardoso, Maurício José)
 3rd Army, Brazil, 268
 3rd Division, Brazil, 189
 4th Army, US, 31
 4th Corps, US, 198, 203, 206, 232
 4th Fleet, US, 227
 5th Army, US, 198, 199, 207,
 231, 232
 5th Brigade of the 3d Division,
 US, 144
 6th Military Regions, Brazil, 157
 7th Army, US, 199
 7th Artillery Group, Brazil, 145, 154
 (*see also* Operation Brazil)
 7th Military Region, Brazil, 157,
 168, 196, 197
 8th Army, British, 183, 199
 10th Mountain, US, 205
 15th Group of Armies, British, 232
 22 AAF Weather Squadron, US, 278
 82nd Airborne, US, 125
 92d “Black Buffalo,” US, 201, 203
 101st Airborne, US, 125
 148th Division, German, 206, 208
 350th Fighter Group, US, 211
 British 8th Army, 153
 Fascist Italia, 206
 Fascist Monte Rosa, Italian, 206
 Fascist San Marco, Italian, 206
 French, 189
 Italian Fascist divisions, 208
 Polish, 189
 Tenth Mountain, US, 203, 204
 Dominican affair, 265
 Dominican Republic, 265
 Donald Duck, 212

- Donitz, Admiral, 148
 Donovan, William, 70
 Doolittle raid, 151
 Dos Reis, Lauro Mourinho, 154
 See also Divisions, 7th Artillery
 Group, Brazil; Operation Brazil
 Duggan, Lawrence, 106
 Dulles, John Foster, 258, 259
 Dunkirk, 23
 Dutch Guiana, 172
 Dutra, Enrico Gaspar, 26, 29, 37, 45,
 59, 66, 72, 77, 83, 84, 109, 144,
 145, 157–162, 167–169, 171,
 190, 193, 196, 207, 208, 210,
 212, 228, 231, 238–240, 255
 American distrust of, 169
 and Brazilian-American alliance, 185
 conditions for US alliance, 38
 and discrimination, 169
 elected president, 239
 and *Estado Novo*, 21
 forces in Pacific, 161–162
 and the Mutual Broadcasting
 System, 185
 meeting with Marshall, 189
 and state of war, 157–158
 talk of resignation, 104, 105, 110
 tour of US army facilities, 188
 visit to Eisenhower, 168–169
- E**
- East Africa, 23
 Eastern Europe, 271
 East Indies, 151
 Economic power, 272
 Economy
 American, 3, 4
 Brazilian, 147, 236, 253
 colonial-era, 7
 war, 117, 162
 Ecuador, 108, 276
- Education, 227, 254, 277
 American, 205
 Chilean, 100
 civil and moral, 30
 military, 212, 252, 277
 public, 3
 Egypt, 152
 Eisenhower administration,
 258, 261, 262
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 73, 123,
 125, 129, 166, 168, 183, 191,
 258, 261
 El Alamein, 150, 152, 153
 Elections, 5, 236, 238, 239, 255, 260,
 264
 Electric power grid, 259
Electrobrás, 259
 Eleventh Regiment, Brazilian, 206
 Embargo, 122
 Emergency Fund, US, 63
 Emmons, Delos C., 36
 Empire of Brazil, 1
 Empire of Japan, 234
 Engineer Replacement Training
 Center, 125
 England, *see* Great Britain
 English Channel, 23, 42
 Equipment, 11, 12, 25, 32, 60, 65,
 67, 71, 78, 79, 81, 82, 102, 104,
 113, 115, 118, 122, 123, 161,
 164, 165, 183, 188–190, 196,
 198, 205, 212, 227, 230, 235,
 249, 252, 254, 256, 259, 262,
 277
Escola Superior de Guerra, 252
 Espionage, 26, 116, 119, 123
 Espirito Santo, *see* Vitória
Estado Nacional, 170
Estado Novo, 5, 21, 158, 169, 170,
 235, 236, 239–241, 253
 Ethiopia, 35
 Eurasia, 126

- Europe, 39, 44, 62, 65, 84, 161, 162, 166, 208, 232, 234, 250, 252, 256, 266
- European-African theaters, 189
- European colonies, 61
- European conflicts, 43
- European countries, 226
- European occupation, 162, 208
- European powers, 230, 252
- European space station, 275
- European theater, 211
- European war, *see* World War II
- Export and Import Bank, 60, 71, 259
- Exports, 4, 42, 100, 254, 255, 259
- F**
- Factories, 35, 116, 260
- Fairbanks, Douglas Jr., 70
- Far East, 84, 166, 256, 257
- Fascism, 26–27, 41, 132, 160
- Fascista*, 34, 72
- Fausto, Boris, 11
- FDR, *see* Roosevelt, Franklin D.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 100, 124
- Federal District of Rio, 121
- Federal Forces, Brazil, 40
- Fernando de Noronha islands, 60, 148, 260
- Ferrying operations, 120, 127
- Fifth Army, Brazil, 202
- Fifth Column campaign, 115, 119, 132
- Figueiredo, João Batista, 270, 274
- Films, 8, 70, 116
- The Boys from Brazil*, 8
- Donald Duck, 69
- It's All True*, 69
- military training, 70
- Saludos Amigos*, 69, 212
- war, 159
- Zé Carioca*, 69
- Florence, 203
- Florida, 150, 275, 277
- Fontoura, Carlos Alberto, 268
- Food, 12, 185, 205
- Food shortages, 128
- Força Expedicionária Brasileira (FEB)*, 7, 192, 202–204, 206–208, 210, 225, 263
- Brazilian-American alliance, 170
- in Italian campaign, 11
- role in Occupation, 231–233
- role of, 202–210
- Força Pública*, 197
- Ford, Gerald, 273
- Ford Motors, 260
- Foreign debt, 21
- Foreign Minister, *see* Aranha, Oswaldo
- Foreign Minister, Brazil, *see* Ruiz-Guiñazú, Enrique
- Foreign Ministry, Brazil, 147, 148, 229, 238, 274
- Foreign Relations* papers, 231
- Forrestal* (carrier), 264
- See also Operation Brother Sam*
- Fort Belvoir, 125
- Fort Benning, 39
- Fort Leavenworth, 198
- Fort Monroe, 39
- Fort Sill, 39
- Fortaleza, 147, 156
- France, 9, 23, 41, 42, 61, 156, 199, 272, 275
- Franco, Francisco, 104
- Freetown, 150
- French African colonies, 164
- French Guiana, 160, 172
- French Indo-China, 23
- French Mirage jets, 266
- Friedrich Krupp Company, 22, 32, 60
- Frota, Sylvio Coelho da, 271, 274
- Ft. Leavenworth, 144

Fuels

- coal, 118, 122, 157
- gas, 29
- gasoline, 127, 157
- imported oil, 271
- oil, 29, 117, 118, 253
- petroleum, 122, 254, 258, 263
- petroleum development and Korean War, 253–257

G

- G-2, 230
- G-2 Division, 124
- Gaspari, Elio, 268
- Gates, Robert, 277
- Gaúcho* state, 185
- Geisel, Ernesto, 269–271, 273, 274
- Geisel, Orlando, 270
- General Banquete, *see* Cardoso, Maurício José
- General Motors, 260
- Georgetown, 149, 150
- German agents, 75, 118
- German businesses, 156, 157
 - See also* Friedrich Krupp Company; Carl Zeiss Company
- German-Chilean community, 107
- German communities, 26
- German embassy, 26
- German Mark IV Panzer, 153
- German Military Organization, 185
- Germanophiles, 10, 42, 233
- German Submarine Command, 151
- German weaknesses, 24
- Germany, 20, 26, 27, 44, 62, 80, 275
 - armed forces, 22
 - declaration of war on
 - United States, 84
 - state of war with, 159
- Gerow, Leonard, 82
 - See also* War Plans Division (WPD), US
- Gettysburg, 33

- Gleason, Everett, 8
- Góes Monteiro, Pedro Aurélio de, 3, 5, 31, 34, 39, 41, 44, 65, 77, 82, 83, 110, 115, 116, 124, 127, 144, 160, 212, 228, 239, 240, 257, 264
 - and *Estado Novo*, 21
 - illness, 167, 169, 193
 - meeting with Miller, 75, 77
 - talk of resignation, 105
 - visit to Europe, 37
 - visit to United States, 33
- Gold, 21, 61, 233
- Golden Gate Bridge, 33
 - See also* Bridges
- Gomes, Eduardo, 113, 120, 168, 238, 250
- Gomes, Ivano, 188
- Good Neighbor Policy, 70, 99, 100, 115
 - See also* Inter-American Conference; Rio Conference on Continental Peace and Security
- Gordon, Lincoln, 263–265
- Gothic Line, 199, 203
- Goulart, João, 262, 263, 267, 271
- Government, 2, 5–6, 74, 235
 - American Republics, 44
 - Brazil, 2, 9, 19, 27, 32, 63, 64, 116, 157, 161, 208
 - Carter, 274
 - Castro, 262
 - Dutra, 231, 240, 241, 254
 - Eisenhower, 258
 - Estado Novo*, 167, 170
 - Ford administration, 273
 - German, 43, 77, 115, 119, 145, 157
 - Goulart, 262
 - Kennedy, 262
 - Portugal, 157
 - US, 8, 27, 35, 44, 63, 75, 84, 102, 106, 110, 116, 121, 251, 253, 255, 261, 263

Vargas, 26, 64, 115, 169, 172, 187, 188, 234, 250, 257
 Vichy, 74, 81, 160
See also Brazilian-American alliance
 Great Britain, 23, 41, 62, 65, 67, 72, 81, 82, 126, 130, 166, 168, 225, 272, 275
 Great Depression, the, 4
 Great War, The, *see* World War I
 Greece, 23
 Greenland, 67
 Green Shirts, 185
 Guanabara Bay, 112, 144, 147, 198
 Guanabara Palace, 102, 105, 107, 132, 158, 237
See also Berle, Adolf; Vargas, Getúlio
 Guaratinguetá, 192
 Guerrilla war, 263
 Guinea-Bissau, 272
 Gulf States, 271

H

Hamburg, 153
Hammarum (ship), 156
See also Operation Brazil
 Harbors, 25
 Harkin Amendment, 273
 Hasslocher, Paulo Germano, 44
 Havana, 61, 75, 99, 130
 Health, 194, 197
 Hegemony, 7
 Hemispheric defense, 31, 36, 79, 81, 82, 87, 126, 226, 230, 233
 Hertford, Kenner, 190
 Highways, 147, 163
 Hilton, Stanley, 239
 Hitler, Adolf, 34, 44, 117, 132, 146, 151, 160, 206
 Operation Brazil, 149
See also Operation Brazil
 Hollywood, 2, 69, 70, 212

Homestead Act, 3
 House of Representatives, US, 86
 Housing, 254
 Hull, Cordell, 8, 33, 60, 100, 101, 109, 132, 171, 226, 229
 Hull, John E., 190
 Human rights, 272–274
 Humanitarian relief, 278

I

Iceland, 67, 81, 82
 Ilhéus, 155
 Illiteracy, 3, 30
 Immigrants, 2, 25–26, 29, 116, 169, 171, 233, 235
 Imperialism, 63, 257
 Independence Day, Brazil, 158
 India, 272
 Indian Ocean, 151
 Industrialization, 5, 7, 43, 66, 170, 213, 236, 254, 255, 260
 Industrial power, 260
 Industry, 166
 arms, 73
 space, 275–277
 technology, 275
 war, 163, 256
 weapons, 32, 39
 Influence, 3, 62, 85, 104, 163, 169, 233, 235, 272, 274
 African, 2
 American, 99, 275
 Axis, 22
 foreign, 233
 French, 186, 196
 German, 26, 64, 75
 Italian, 26
 political, 28, 64
 populist, 264
 pro-Nazi, 159
 Ingram, Jonas H., 122, 126, 157, 227

- Institutional Act No. 5, 267
 Integralism, 160
Integralistas, 27, 30, 115, 116, 128, 185, 186
 Intellectuals, 2, 265, 268
 Intelligence
 American, 59, 168, 169
 American army, 22, 26, 65, 116, 124, 159
 American military and naval, 12, 34
 Brazilian army, 10, 19
 and Caffery, 123
 Centro de Informação do Exército (CIEEx), 271
 military, 124
 United States War Department, 230
 Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), 69–71
 Inter-American Conference, 99, 105, 163, 255
 See also Buenos Aires
 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, 255, 256
 International Development Advisory Board, US, *see* Rockefeller, Nelson A.
 Internationalists, 258
 International Space Station, 275, 276
 International trade, *see* Trade
 Interventor, 185, 229
 Investment, 253, 255, 258, 260, 266
 Ipanema, 158
 Iran, 73
 Iraq, 271
Itagiba (steamer), 154
 See also Operation Brazil
 Italian campaign, 11, 203
 Italian peninsula, 183
 Italy, 27, 37, 62, 72, 84, 147, 188, 192, 194, 197, 198, 202, 204, 207, 231, 232, 234, 257
 Brazilian troops in, 225
 declaration of war on United States, 84
 and East Africa, 23
 state of war with, 159
 Itamaraty, 233
 Itanhangá Club, 105
- J**
Jacyra (carrier), 155
 See also Operation Brazil
 Jamaica, 67
 Japan, 26, 99, 106, 116, 147, 233, 235, 272, 275
 See also Treaty of Triple Alliance, the
 Japanese embassy, 100
 Jefferson, Thomas, 185
Jeitinbo, *see* *Jeito*
Jeito, 3
 Jews, 169
 Jockey Club, 44
 Joe Brazilian, 212
 John's Hopkins University, 163
 Johnson administration, 264, 266
 See also Anit-Goulart; Gordon, Lincoln
 Johnson, Lyndon, 263, 265
 Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission, 184, 195
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 172, 184, 230, 234
 Joint Defense Commissions, 130
 Joint Military Board, 113
 Joint military commissions, 143, 163
 Jungmann, Rual, 278
Junkers, 147
- K**
 Kals, Ernst, 149
 Kansas, 198
 Kasserine Pass, 183
 Kazakhstan, 276
 Kennan, George F., 253

Kennedy administration, 262
 Kennedy, John F., 262, 263
 Kimberley, Allen, 44, 62
 Kissinger, Henry, 266, 272
Kitty Hawk, 261
 Knox, Frank, 3
 Korea, 256
 Korean War, 212, 256–258
 Kubitschek, Juscelino, 260, 261

L

Laborers, 128, 239
 Labor leaders, 267
 Labor Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro-PTB*), 236
 Labor systems, 3
 Lacerda, Carlos, 259
 Lacey, John M., 155
 See also Operation Brazil
 Land forces, 30, 115, 128
 Langer, William, 8
 Langley Field, 33
 Latin America, 2, 63, 69, 70, 212,
 226, 230, 249, 251, 253–256,
 260–262
 view of United States, 99
 Latin American Volunteer Legion, 167
 Leadership, 6, 7, 22, 102, 112, 233,
 236, 252
 League of Nations, 170
 Leahy, William D., 226
 Leal, Newton Estillac, 160
 Leão Veloso, Pedro, 234
 Leavenworth, 198
 Leblon, 158
 Lee, Raymond E., 116
 Leitão da Cunha, Vasco, 232
 Leitão de Carvalho, Estevão, 45, 172,
 183, 184
 See also Brazilian Expeditionary
 Force

Leme, 158
 Lend-Lease Act, 67, 71, 80, 104
 Lend-Lease agreement, 117, 118,
 120, 127, 184, 212, 232, 234
 Lend-Lease arms, 107, 235
 Lend-Lease funding, 127
 Lend-Lease materials, 12
 Leticia, western Amazon, 20
 Liberal constitutionalism, 264
 Lie, Trygve, 256
LILAC, 61, 83
 See also Rainbow war plan
 Lima, 99
 London, 195
 Lone Wolf, 145–156
 Lorient, 148, 149, 156
 Louisiana, 125, 167
 Lovett, Robert A., 250
 Low salaries, 259

M

MacArthur, Douglas, 117
 Maceió, 147
 Machado, José Bina, 228
 Machine guns, 86, 145, 155
 Madeira, 165, 172
 Madrid, 130
 Manaus, 156, 229
 Manganese, 35, 36
 Manila, 151
 Mantiqueira mountains, 192
 Manufacturing, 35, 104, 128
 Maranhão, 275, 277
 Maria fumaça (Smoky Mary), 206
 See also Smoking Cobras
 Marines, US, 115
 Maritime traffic, 149
 Market, 6, 82, 254, 259
 Market levels, 259
 Marshall Plan for Latin America, 261
 See also Operation Pan America

- Marshall, George C., 38, 63, 65, 67, 68, 71, 73–75, 80–81, 85, 104–106, 116–117, 122, 124–125, 143–144, 172, 191
and Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 184
meeting with Dutra, 189
tour of Southern Brazil, 30
visit exchange with Goes Monteiro, 27–37
visit to Eisenhower, 168
- Marshall, Katherine, 144
- Martial law, *see* Decree, state of war
- Martinique, 61
- Martins, Carlos, 121, 192
- Martins, Jorge Dodsworth, 229
- Mascarenhas de Moraes, João Batista, 168, 196, 197, 201, 206, 207, 263
post-war occupation, 231
- Mato Grosso, 20, 61
- McCarthyism, 257, 258
- Médici, Emílio Garrastazú, 267–270
- Medieval era, 2
- Mediterranean, 127, 183, 189
- Mental health, *see* Health
- Mesbla, 158
- Mestiço* crew, 155
- Mexico, 100, 117, 130, 169, 226, 252
- Meyer, Ewaldo, 207
- Miami, 11, 192
- Middle class, 186, 269
- Middle East, 84, 85
- Milan, 232
- Military, 124
collaboration between Brazil and United States, 66
Commonwealth, 206
equipment, 35, 36, 84, 113, 116, 117, 120, 122, 143
Latin American, 28, 59
negotiations between Brazil and United States, 69
regimes, 6, 171, 239
reorganization of, 35
reorganization, 32
schools, 38, 159, 169, 171, 187, 189, 192, 197, 208, 275
training, post-war, 227–228
- Military accord, 127–132, 147, 257, 258, 274, 275
- Military Air Transport System (MATS), 260
- Military Appropriation Act, 62
- Military cooperation, 72–76, 120
Brazil and US, 36
See also Policy, arms supply; Army, Brazil; Army, US
- Military mission
France, 227
US, 31, 34, 36, 39, 43, 44, 61, 66, 73
- Military Observation System, US, 124
- Miller, Lehman W., 35, 41, 59–60, 62, 66, 72–74, 113–117, 122–125, 143–144
meeting with Góes Monteiro, 75–79
- Minas Gerais (flagship), 4, 41, 206
- Minister of Education, *see* Passarinho, Jarbas
- Minister of War, *see* Dutra, Eurico Gaspar
- Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, 64
- Miranda, Carmen, 69
- Miscegenation, 4
- Missile tracking station, 260
- Monazite, 257
- Mondale, Walter, 273
- Monroe Doctrine, 24
- Monroe, James, 1
- Monte Castello*, 203, 204, 206, 231
- Montese, 203, 206
- Montevideo, 193
- Morison, Samuel E., 211

- Morrill Act, 3
 Mortars, 66, 203
 Mt. Belvedere, 203
 Mt. Torracchia, 203
 Moura, Gerson, 43
 Movies, *see* Films
 Mozambique, 272
 Mulatto people, 69
 Müller, Filinto, 121, 123, 144
 Multilateralism, 251, 252
 Munich Conference, 26
 Munitions, 12, 29, 31, 35, 40, 118
 Murder, 259, 268
 Muslims, 169
 Mussolini, Benito, 41, 104, 132
 Mutual Broadcasting System, 185
 See also Dutra, Enrico Gaspar
- N**
- Naples, 198
 Natal, 40, 65, 147, 150, 153, 156,
 164, 186, 187, 233, 278
 air bases and supply centers in, 82
 air defense of, 83
 American occupation of, 122
 American troops in, 85
 American troops sent to, 83
 Americans in, 126
 Axis submarines in, 85
 decree legalizing air base at, 120
 German seizure of, 24
 possible German attack on, 81
 proposed American ground
 force at, 83
 survey of, 61
 US marine guards stationed at, 65
 Natal Conference, 162–172
 National debt, 5
 National Defense Act, 32
 National Guard, 72
 National Intelligence Service (SNI),
 267, 268
 Nationalism, 42, 235, 236, 252,
 253, 255
 Nationalists, 116, 258
 National security, 66, 102, 268
 National Security Council, Brazil,
 64, 101, 256
 National Territory, 72
 Natural resources, 1, 6, 7, 24, 258
 Naval forces, 126, 158
 Naval Mission, US, 9
 Naval Patrol Squadron, US, 187
 Navy
 American, 61, 114, 117
 Brazilian, 145
 British, 61, 187
 German, 146, 149, 151
 United States, 122
 United States, cooperation with
 Brazil, 129–130
 Navy Department
 Brazil, 129
 US, 130–132, 157, 229
 Nazi Germany, 22
 Nazi Party, 26, 169
 Nazi sympathizers, 22
 Nazism, 75, 76, 132, 160, 169
Nazista, 34, 63, 72
 Near East, 189
 Negotiations, 11, 27, 37, 38, 66, 67,
 108, 115, 118, 128, 130, 131,
 144, 160, 168, 184, 225, 237,
 250, 251
 Negroes, 3, 169
 Netherlands, 23, 42, 151
 Neutrality Act, 35
 Neutrality law, US, 9, 35, 36, 38
 Neves da Fontoura, João,
 254, 258, 259
 Newfoundland, 67
 Newspapers and magazines
 American, 41, 70
 Brazilian, 43, 160, 188
 Brazil Twists Thumbscrews..., 268

- Newspapers and magazines (*cont.*)
- Buenos Aires, 119
 - Commonweal*, 268
 - Correio da Manhã, 160
 - Diário Carioca, 161, 236
 - Diários Associados*, 167
 - German language, 26
 - A Manhã*, 164, 204
 - Military Review*, 262
 - New York Times, The*, 22, 70, 268
 - A Noite*, 165
 - O Globo*, 207
 - Terror in Brazil*, 268
 - Time*, 191
 - Torture in Brazil*, 268
 - Washington Post, The*, 268
 - See also* Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA)
- New State, *see* Estado Novo
- New World, 99, 103
- New York Times, The*, *see* Newspapers and magazines
- Niedenfuhr, Gunther, 77
- Nielson, Ariel W., 211
- Nixon, Richard, 261, 266, 269
- Non-proliferation, 273
- Normandy invasion, *see* Operation *Overlord*
- North Africa, 73, 80, 85, 117
- Allied invasion of, 160, 170, 183
 - Brazilian troops in, 190
 - Brazilian visit to, 165, 168, 184
 - German forces in, 24, 65, 74
 - US supply lines in, 172
- North American route, 250
- North Atlantic
- air route, 12, 84
 - Axis submarines in, 117
 - defense of, 67, 81, 117
 - route, 81, 211
- North Carolina, 120, 125
- Northeast Brazil
- American participation in, 76–81
 - American troops in, 81–84, 123, 131
 - Axis-inspired revolution in, 106
 - defense of, 104, 113–114, 131
 - defense plan for, 143
 - joint Military Board for, 86
 - surveys of, 78, 112–113
 - See also* Air bases
- Northeastern, bulge, 11
- Northern Hemisphere, 275
- Norway, 117
- Nova Scotia, 67
- Nuclear ambitions, 276
- Nuclear technology, 273
- Nuremberg trials, 148, 151
- O**
- Obama, Barack, 277
- Office of Production Management, US, 67
- Office of Strategic Services, *see* Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA)
- Office of Strategic Services (OSS), US, 70, 132
- Officers Advanced Training School (Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais, ESAO), 210
- Ohio, 278
- Olds, Robert, 120, 127
- Oligarchy, 4
- OPEC oil embargo, 272
- Operation Brazil, 145–150
- Operation Brother Sam*, 263, 264
- See also* *Forrestal* (carrier)
- Operation *Overlord*, 190
- Operation Pan America*, 261
- Operation Plans Division, US, 122
- Oran, 183
- Ord, James G., 184, 186, 187, 210
- Organization of American States (OAS), 256, 265

P

- P-40, 120
 Pacific, 122
 Pacific War, 233–235
 Palácio Rio Negro, 167
 Palmer, Bruce, 265
 Panama, 60, 75, 99
 Panama Canal, 11, 24, 27, 144
 Pan American Airports Corporation, 63
 See also Airport Development Program; Military Appropriation Act
 Pan American Airways, *see* Airlines
 Pan American unity, 230
 Pan American conference, 212
 Pan Americanism, 44, 61, 110, 111, 162
Panelinha, 2, 3
 Pará, 61, 128, 233
 Paraguay, 20, 100, 157, 167, 260
 Paraguayan war, 41
 Paraguay River, 20
 Paraíba, 229
 Paraná, 9, 25
 See also Immigrants
 Pardos, 3
 Paris, 39, 130
 Parnamirim, 153
 See also Air bases, Natal
 Passarinho, Jarbas, 268
 See also Demonstrations; Torture
Pátria, 5, 101, 107, 161
 Paulista uprising, 240
 Peace conference, Buenos Aires, 32
 Pearl Harbor, 12, 65, 83, 84, 86, 99, 100, 156, 198, 226
 Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil, 8
 Pedro II, Emperor, 5, 255
 Peixoto, Amaral, 110, 118, 119
 Pentagon, US, 196, 252
 People's Republic of China, 272
 Pereira, Durval Lourenço, 148, 151
 Pernambuco, 149, 150
 Perón, Juan, 119, 237, 254, 259
 Persian Corridor, 151
 Peru, 20, 108, 230, 252
Petrobrás, 258, 269, 270
 Petrópolis, 63, 105, 167
 Philippines, 84, 117
 Pilot training, 128, 277
 Pinto, Francisco José, 29, 63, 64
 Pires, Ary, 115
 Pisa, 211
 Pistoia, 203
Pistolão, 3
 Plaza de Armas, 107
 Plebiscite, 240, 263
 Poland, 23, 37, 159
 Police, 30, 116, 118, 121, 144, 156, 192, 197, 239, 240, 266, 267
 Policy, 167
 American foreign, 60
 anti-atomic energy, 274
 anti-nuclear development, 274
 Argentinian foreign, 119
 arms supply, 252
 Brazilian foreign, 20, 37, 38, 43, 44, 71, 102, 122, 162, 163, 170, 172, 260, 271
 Brazilian national, 253
 Brazil's foreign, 274
 defense, 21
 human rights, 274
 United States Brazilian, 31, 74, 116, 123, 131, 167, 210, 228, 229
 (*see also* Natal Conference)
 United States Cold War, 249
 United States foreign, 229, 233, 253
 United States Latin American, 230, 251, 253
 United States pro-Brazilian, 231
 Polio, 163
 Political-military agreement, 130, 143, 144, 277

Políticos, 160

Politics

Brazilian domestic, 2, 5, 195, 235,
253, 258

international, 44, 163

polarization of, 236

power, 7

US national, 2

Pontes, Marcos, 276

Pope, 268

Populism, 170, 264

Poretti Terme, 203

Port Suez, 152

Porto Alegre, 29, 30, 156, 185, 229

See also Demonstrations

Ports, 4, 29, 68, 102, 114, 122, 146,
148, 151

Portugal, 8, 37, 85, 163, 172, 272

Portuguese

Americans speaking, 34, 70, 116,
123, 155, 189

home defenses, 172

islands, 165

language, 7, 26, 39, 70, 265

Posadas, Misiones, 118

“Pot of Gold,” 40

Po Valley, 199, 203

POWs, 125

Pracinhas, 233

Prata, vicerealty of the, 20

Presidential elections, 61, 273

Presidential papers, 19

Presidential Unit Citation, 211

Press

American, 71, 237

attacks on Vargas, 62

Brazilian, 62, 145, 273

Brazilian entrance in war, 78

and Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 194

Communist Party of Brazil (PCB)

campaign, 256

entry of Spain into war, 62

German, 62

Góes Monteiro and Dutra as leading

Nazi faction, 71

and Natal Conference, 164

and Vargas, 238, 259

Prisoners, 206, 236, 269, 274

Pro-ally, 129, 188

Pro-American, 7, 21, 72, 145, 171,

188, 192, 254, 258

Pro-Axis, 132, 159

Pro-British, 72

Pro-democratic, 168, 193

Pro-Fascist, 26

Professors, 267, 268

Pro-German, 21, 59, 84, 121, 159,

169, 185, 188

Project X, 84

Pro-Nazism, 27, 159, 187

Propaganda, 26, 76, 101, 116, 129,

159, 186

See also Inter-American Affairs

(OCIAA)

Protestant missionaries, 118

Protestant Reformation, 2

Protests, *see* Demonstrations

Prüfer, Kurt M., 43, 79

Prussianization, 100

Q

Quardos, Janio, 263

R

Racial prejudice, 4

Racial segregation, 3

Radical Party, 107

Radio Berlin, 145

Radio stations and communications,

70, 109, 112, 118, 144, 145,

148–150, 153

See also Inter-American Affairs

(OCIAA)

Raeder, Erich, 146, 148, 151

- Railroads, 4, 40, 116, 117, 147, 254
 Rainbow war plan, 39, 61, 72, 83, 85
See also LILAC
 Raw materials, 6, 35, 42, 128, 161, 212
 Reagan, Ronald, 211
 Realengo, *see* Military, schools
 Rearmament, 5, 32
 Rebel Forces, Brazil, 40
 Rebellion, 9, 19
 Rebello, José Sylvestre, 1
 Recife, 31, 61, 65, 82, 83, 85, 146,
 147, 149, 150, 153, 168, 186,
 227, 229
 Reciprocal Assistance Declaration, 61
 Reconstruction of its armed forces,
 REORG OF MILITARY, 22
 Red Sea, 152
 Refinery, 148
 Reform
 constitutional, 270
 of land program, 263
 military, 19, 32, 208, 210, 240
 political, 19, 263
 Reich, German, 8, 60, 67, 75, 79, 157
 Relatórios, 232
 Renaissance, 2
 Reno Valley, 201
 Reorganization Plan, 30
 Reprisals, 157
 Republic
 American, 44, 59, 61, 80, 99,
 104, 112, 164, 167, 226,
 230, 233, 265
 Argentina, 112
 Brazil, 7, 79, 268
 Caribbean, 99
 Central American, 99
 Chile, 112
 Latin American, 39, 71, 115,
 170, 252
 South American, 104
 Spanish-American, 230
 United States, 7, 39, 80, 265
 Republican, 4, 258
 Resende, 192
 Reserves, 79, 166, 194, 210
 Reservists, 185, 186, 196
 Reston, James, 70
 Revolution, 4, 19, 106, 262, 267, 272
 Revolution of 1964, 270
 Riachuelo, 41
 Ridgway, Matthew B., 31, 72, 74
 Rifles, 10, 66
 Rio Conference, 187, 237
 Rio Conference on Continental Peace
 and Security, 109, 115–117, 119,
 127, 237
 Rio de Janeiro, 40, 99, 146, 147,
 186, 195
 Rio de Janeiro commission, *see* Joint
 military commissions
 Rio Grande do Norte, 156, 275
 Rio Grande do Sul, 25, 26, 30, 167,
 185, 240, 263, 268
See also Immigrants
 Rio Treaty, *see* Inter-American
 Reciprocal Assistance Treaty
 Ritter, Karl, 147, 148
 River of Doubt, 5
 RKO (movie studio), 69
 Rockefeller, Nelson A., 69, 70, 255
See also Inter-American Affairs
 (OCIAA); International
 Development Advisory
 Board, US
 Rocketry research, 275
See also Space research
 Rockets, 275, 276
 Rodríguez, Manuel A., 20
 Romania, 23
 Rome, 111, 232
 Rommel, Erwin, 73, 117, 125, 152, 183
 Rondon, Cândido, 5
 Roosevelt administration, 10

- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 5, 33, 44, 45, 61, 66, 68, 74, 125, 127, 211, 229, 250, 251
 American fears and Brazilian neutrality, 23–27
 Brazilian neutrality and cooperation, 40–44
 Inter-American Conference, 99–118 and Natal Conference, 172
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 5
 Rossetti, Gabriel, 100
 Rossetti, Juan Bautista, 106, 107
 Rousseff, Dilma, 277, 278
 Rower, Jürgen, 148
 Rubber, 118, 128
 Ruiz-Guiñazú, Enrique, 103–105, 107, 108
 Russia, 82, 85, 127, 151, 166, 190, 234, 249, 277
 Russian base, 276
 Russian front, 126, 203
 Russian government, 276
- S**
- Sabotage, 65, 258
 Sadlier, Darlene, 69
 Saican training grounds, 167
 St. Helena Island, 150
 St. Lucia, 67
 St. Peter and St. Paul, islets, *see* São Pedro and São Paulo, islets
 Salgado Filho, Joaquim P., 191
 Salvador da Bahia, *see* Bahia; Operation Brazil
 San Francisco, 31, 33, 234
 Santa Barbara, 148
 Santa Catarina, 9, 25, 26
See also Immigrants
 Santiago, 100, 107
 Santos Dumont airport, 101, 112, 147
 Santos-Dumont, Alberto, 261
 São João del Rei, 206
 São Luis, 147
 São Paulo, 40, 116, 147, 168, 192, 193, 197
See also Civil war; Demonstrations; *Força Pública*; Immigrants; Revolution
 São Pedro and São Paulo, islets, 149
 São Salvador, 150
 Sardinia, 183
 Satellites, 275
See also Industry, space; Rocketry research; Space research
 Saudi Arabia, 271
 Scandinavia, 151
 Schacht, Harro, 152–156
 Schneider, Ronald, 258
 School of the Americas, 257, 274
 Secret agents, 26
 Secretary of State, *see* Hull, Cordell; Kissinger, Henry; Christopher, Warren
 Selective Service Act, 85
 Senna Campos, Aguinaldo José, 207
 Sergipe, 148–156
 Shaw, Paul Vanorden, 116, 117
 Sherman tanks, 149, 152
 Shipping
 allied, 11, 67, 150, 183
 Atlantic, 68
 Brazilian, 122, 148, 149, 151, 156, 190, 191
 to carry troops, 73
 restricted, 70
 shortage of, 83
 United States, 116, 189, 237
 Sibert, Edwin L., 124
 Sicily, 183
 Silva, Ignacio Lula da, 276, 278
 Silveira, Azeredo da, 272, 273
 Simmons, John F., 157
 Sims, Harold, 187

- Sindicato de Jornalistas (Journalists Union)*, 238
 See also Berle, Adolf
- Singapore, 117, 151
- Siqueira Campos* (ship), 187
- Slave labor, 2, 3
- Slave trade, 4
- Slavery, 3, 4, 76
- Smoking Cobras, 183–184
 See also Brazilian Expeditionary Force
- Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Democrata, PSD*), 236
- Sodré, Nelson Werneck, 145
- South America, 61, 62, 67, 82, 119, 125, 150, 163, 171, 212, 230, 257, 262
 Brazilian naval force in, 227, 228
 Brazilian post-war predominance in, 226
 route, 250
- South Atlantic, 40, 73, 126, 149, 152
 Axis in, 82, 85
 defense of, 67, 81, 114
 importance of, 151, 152
 route, 11, 81, 211
- Southern Brazil, 61, 118, 171
- Sovereignty, 12, 25, 60, 122, 171, 260, 277
 defense of, 61, 66, 72, 276
 national, 6, 37, 59, 78, 79, 119, 252
- Soviet Union, 73, 81, 82, 151, 208, 225, 249, 253, 256, 261, 271, 277
- Soyuz spacecraft, 276
- Space exploration, 276
- Space launch, 261
- Space program, 276
- Space research, 275
 See also Rocketry research
- Space Shuttle *Columbia*, 276
- Space tourism, 276
- Spain, 27, 32, 62, 85
- Spanish Civil War, 159
 See also Films
- Spanish language, 189
- Spanish-speaking countries, 62, 70, 230, 260
- Special Forces, US, 262
- Special Strategic Study of Brazil, 25
- Sputnik*, 261
- SS Arabutan*, 120
- S.S. *Seatrain Texas*, 152
- Stack, Harold R., 68
- Standing Liaison Committee, 27–28
- State Department, US, 7, 62, 70, 71, 81, 105, 116, 124, 125, 128, 143, 170, 226, 229, 234, 250–253, 271, 273
- Statue of Christ, 158
- Steel, 7, 21, 44, 60, 61, 79, 213, 241
 See also Volta Redonda (steel mill)
- Stettinius, Edward R., 195
- Steuben Glass model, 261
- Stimson, Henry L., 63, 80, 127, 194
- Stocks, 117, 195
- Strait of Magellan, 150
- Students, 156, 188, 266, 267
- Submarine Command, 149, 150
 See also Operation Brazil
- Submarines, 6, 10, 20, 117, 125, 146, 147, 227
 Axis, 6, 11, 85, 115, 117, 129, 151, 152, 211
 German, 119, 144, 145, 147, 148, 151, 155
 Italian, 145
 Japanese, 148
Pietro Calvi, 149
 See also Operation Brazil; Schacht, Harro
- Suez Canal, 152
- Sugar Loaf, 158, 198
- Supreme Federal Tribunal, 267

T

Talleyrand, 44
 Tankers, 117, 150, 264
 Tanks, 65, 66, 102, 104, 107,
 120, 127, 129, 153, 186,
 189, 240, 269
 Technicians, 36, 78, 120, 128, 276
 Teheran conferences, 211
Tenente, 161
Tenente movement, 159
 Tenth Infantry Regiment, Brazil, 193
 Texas, 167
 Theater of Operations, 196
 Third Consultative Conference of the
 Foreign Ministers of the American
 Republics, 101
 Tiradentes Palace, 105
 TNT, 153, 156
 Tobruk, 117, 152
 Tokyo, 111, 151
 Torture, 267, 268, 271, 274
 Toulon, 183
 Trade, 2, 22, 25, 43, 253, 254, 259,
 266, 272
 arms, 24
 competition for Brazilian, 24
See also Arms, trade
 Treasure Ship, *see* S.S. *Seatrain Texas*
 Treaty of Triple Alliance, the, 62
 Tres Rios, 195
 Trinidad, 67, 144, 162
 Tripoli, 183
 Truman, Harry S., 212, 229, 234,
 235, 237, 255, 256
 Tunisia, 183
 Tyson, Brady, 268

U

U-507, *see* Lone Wolf
 U-boat, 120, 150
 Unconventional warfare, 262

Under-Secretary of State, *see* Welles,
 Sumner
União Democrática Nacional
 (UDN), 238
 United Kingdom, *see* Great Britain
 United Nations, 160, 163, 164, 210,
 231, 234, 256, 265, 271, 275
Universidade de Brasília, 267, 271
Universidade de São Paulo, 11, 116
Universidade Federal de Minas
Gerais, 267
 The Unnecessary Golpe, 239
 Unwritten, 277
 Uranium, 257, 272
 Urca, 158
 Uruguiana, Rio Grande do Sul, 237
 Uruguay, 27, 118, 167, 260,
 261, 269
 US Army Forces South Atlantic
 (USAFSA), 168
 US Consulate, 156
 US Embassy, 190, 263
 US Navy Secretary, *see* Knox, Frank
 USN Catalina PBY, 156
USS General W. A. Mann, 198
USS Humboldt (cruiser), 155
See also Operation Brazil
USS Nashville, 27, 31, 33
USS Sommers (destroyer), 155
See also Operation Brazil

V

Valença, 195
 Vancouver Barracks, 144
 Vargas government, 35, 71, 85, 101
 Vargas, Benjamin, 240
 Vargas, Getúlio, 5, 38, 40, 60, 63, 65,
 68, 72, 74, 75, 81, 83, 100, 118,
 122, 125, 127, 161, 183, 188,
 212, 226
 1952 political accord, 257–259

- automobile accident, 132, 147, 163
 Brazilian military before war,
 19–22
 Brazilian neutrality and American
 concerns, 26–27
Estado Novo, 22
 and Germany, 43–45
 Inter-American Conference,
 101–110
 and Natal Conference, 162–172
 “On The Threshold of a New Era”
 (speech), 41–43
 overthrow of, 235–241
 return to presidency, 255–257
 speeches, “On the Threshold of a
 New Era,” 41
 and state of war, 157
 Vargas, Luterio, 197
 Venezuela, 67, 100, 117, 252, 261
 Vera Cruz, 122
 Vickers Armstrong, 229
 Victims, 269
 Vietnam, 265
 Vietnam War, 212
 Violence, 32, 236, 266, 268
 Virginia, 125
 Vitória, 147, 156
 Volkswagen, 260
 Volta Redonda (steel mill), 7, 117,
 118, 213
 See also Steel
 von Ribbentrop, Joachim, 79
 VP-83, *see* Operation Brazil
 VP-83 squadron, 155
- W**
 Waack, William, 202
 Wall Street, 258
 Walsh, Robert L., 130, 168,
 169, 249
 Walters, Vernon, 207, 263
 War Department Operations Division,
 US, 191
 War Department, US, 24, 59, 61–63,
 65, 83, 112, 124, 130, 132, 143,
 166, 170, 183, 189–191, 229,
 230, 250, 251
 War materiel, 43, 64, 66, 75, 80,
 106, 109, 112, 123, 126, 128,
 130, 227
 War Plans Division (WPD), US, 25,
 26, 61, 80, 82, 85
 See also Gerow, Leonard
 War tourism, 168
 Washington commission, *see* Joint
 military commissions
 Washington, D.C., 67, 261, 277
Washington Post, The, *see* Newspapers
 and magazines
 Weaponry, 102, 166, 226, 266
 Weckerling, John, 251
 Wehrmacht maneuvers, 27
 Welles, Orson, 69
 Welles, Sumner, 8, 28, 74, 81, 85,
 101–110, 112, 113, 125, 127,
 129–131, 143
 West Africa, 24, 82, 85, 160
 West Germans, 273
 West Point, 73, 125, 130
 Western Hemisphere, 67, 69,
 86, 100, 103, 162, 190,
 212, 233, 277
 route, 250
 Wheat, 237
 White House, 33, 81, 107, 109,
 269, 277
 White House conference, 24
 White people, 3
 White, Thomas D., 62, 122
 Wolfe, Joel, 4
 Women, 197, 206, 269
 Woodring, George, 33
 Wooten, Ralph H., 197, 251

Working class, 235, 236
World Cup, 269
World Fair, 33
World War I, 9, 12, 22, 25,
130, 153, 166, 170,
171, 252
World War II, 62, 70, 198,
209, 212, 213, 225,
233, 254
World War II alliance, 257
World War III, 257, 258

Y

Youth movement, 240
YouTube, 207

Z

Zé Carioca, 212
Zenobio da Costa, Euclides, 195,
198, 201
See also Clark, Mark; Divisions, 4th
Corps, US