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The Local Class Politics of National Mobilization

Adam J. Hodges



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

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To the Memory of My Father
Dr. Michael R. Hodges

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PREFACE

We still have a limited understanding of the ambition of federal intervention in urban life toward carrying out a coast-to-coast mobilization of unprecedented scale in the World War I era. This campaign presented an opportunity to a burgeoning array of federal agencies and their local allies to bring increased order to the nation's rapidly transforming cities even as the war effort accelerated the pace of change. It was a mission of daunting complexity. Diverse regional conditions combined with competition both among state agencies and among their potential allies and certain enemies. Were we to examine one program, or even just several interlocking efforts, our conclusions would be misleading. Local labor adjusters for the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) might often support union complaints because of a luckily sympathetic member of the agency field staff active at the moment or because shipyard owners just then held a more intractable position. At the same time, staff at other agencies could work toward weakening organized labor even as the EFC office in the same city needed its strength to minimize the production impact of shop floor disputes and to contain militancy. Single local constituencies could be at least as complex. Some doctors committed to "social hygiene" reform in Portland, Oregon, allied with the state to push the criminalization of venereal disease while others resisted interference with patient relationships and treatment.

It is important to examine the evolution of the state apparatus in Washington, DC, but for those who seek to write a social history of federalism we must move outward. How does an expansion of state prerogatives impact everyday life and ongoing contests over power in cities? The sheer diversity of the nation's locales necessitated flexibility and encouraged opportunism in the federal field service in the war era and often rendered drives toward uniform policy emanating from Washington, DC, pointless, when agencies even attempted it. Once we understand how a diverse and experimental array of government programs interacted within a number of inevitably different cities, shaped by the conditions of their own locations and pasts, then we will be moving toward a social history of the evolution of

federalism, a history from the bottom-up of how interaction with a broad swathe of local people changes US government.

The records of federal agencies reveal an extraordinary amount about the localities they enter seeking alliances in the pursuit of their goals and the containment, or elimination, of opposition. There are rich resources for studying the history of Portland, Oregon, beyond government documents. However, a great deal of what I learned came from federal sources. The lives and struggles of so many people with no official position and little power are buried in the intimidating volume of paper the functionaries of the state produced, which escalated in keeping with their ambition for urban order and optimism in its pursuit. Many of these individuals never got their name in the local newspapers and nobody bothered to keep what they wrote, if anything. However, if a person so much as disputed their rent in a shipbuilding city with scarce housing, the National Archives will remember them. The more agencies we examine per locale, the more we will piece together the fabric of everyday life. The possibilities toward recovering a fuller picture of urban life through federal records are enormous and still largely unfulfilled. It is not just a project that should be limited to moments of crisis, such as war mobilization. The federal field service contracted in some areas, persisted in others, and continued to expand in new ways after World War I. The New Deal was another stage in this evolution, not a departure from the past.

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I have incurred many debts while unearthing local life through federal documents and other critical supporting material. The work of archivists and librarians makes the work of historians possible. The staff at the National Archives in College Park, Seattle, and Washington, DC, deserve more than mere thanks from me. As a nation, we should make supporting their endeavors a much higher priority. A more expansive social history of federalism across time and locale demands this commitment. I owe a great deal to the dedicated people who work in the library and archives of the Oregon Historical Society in Portland. Their farsighted predecessors also deserve thanks for building up the wonderful collections we may now explore. The efforts of the small Portland Police Historical Society to preserve this crucial aspect of the city's past have been quietly heroic. It is easy to dwell on how much is lost, so I am grateful for such reminders of how hard a few people are working to preserve. The staff of the Library of Congress and the Department of Labor library in Washington and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) Archives in Silver Spring, Maryland, were very helpful and my time in each was all too brief. The amazing work of University of Oregon librarians to

preserve and now gradually digitize the state's newspapers for the public deserves thanks and encouragement. Librarians at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign and later the University of Houston—Clear Lake helped me find important materials. I am grateful for their professionalism and patience. Grants from both of these universities and the Museum of the Great War in France helped develop this project.

I have benefited from the critiques and insight of a number of scholars and their involvement was critical in innumerable ways as the project developed. Alan Lessoff, Kathryn J. Oberdeck, and David R. Roediger all offered great advice. Mark H. Leff worked with me in the early stages, insistent that I must—and could—further develop and clarify the argument. His death is a blow to the many who learned from him and I so wish I had better thanked him for his crucial help toward this project taking coherent form. I still consider myself incredibly lucky to have been one of James R. Barrett's students at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. Jim was both a tough critic and a good friend while this project was taking shape. He has continued to be a source of indispensable advice and friendship. Nobody has been more instrumental in my development as a historian. The dean of Portland historians, Carl Abbott, has been helpful to me since I was a graduate student. I am thankful not only for his advice but also for his necessary scholarship on both the city of our mutual interest and the urban West more broadly. Robert D. Johnston has done more to illuminate and complicate the class politics of Portland in the Progressive Era than any other scholar. His book on the city has important national implications and is a powerful argument for the pursuit of local studies. He has read my work on Portland in more incarnations and through more stages than anyone else and has been a superb critic. I am grateful for his insight and generosity.

The editorial staff at two journals, and the peer reviewers they consulted, helped chapters 6 and 7 greatly improve and that process valuably informed my work on the rest of the manuscript. Chapter 6 previously appeared as "'Enemy Aliens' and 'Silk Stocking Girls': The Class Politics of Internment in the Drive for Urban Order during World War I," *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 6 (Oct. 2007): 431–458. The version in this book appears with the permission of Cambridge University Press. Chapter 7 previously appeared as "Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: The Portland Soviet and the Emergence of American Communism, 1918–1920," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 98 (Summer 2007): 115–129. I would also like to acknowledge a minor overlap in text between the section of chapter 5 on Dr. Marie Equi and Kathleen O'Brennan and an introduction I wrote to a piece featuring several edited documents. The introduction was part of "At War over the Espionage Act in Portland: Dueling Perspectives from Agent William Bryon and Kathleen O'Brennan," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 108 (Fall 2007): 474–486.

My editor at Palgrave Macmillan, Kristin Purdy, has been very supportive and I am thankful for her friendly efficiency. I am grateful that she and her colleagues are enthusiastic about this book and have done so much to make it a reality. My mother and stepfather, Marilyn and Marshall Mazer, have always been generous hosts while I conduct research in the Washington area and are always eager to talk when I come home excited about the day's find. My wife, Elizabeth, and daughter, Miranda, are together the very best part of my life. They sustain me every day and that is the most important acknowledgment of all.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: WORLD WAR I AND THE CITY

World War I wrought truly staggering change in the US government. Prior to the conflict, annual federal budgets never reached $800 million. After the smoke had cleared, the government had spent an average of about $43 million per day during wartime. Some recent historical work has connected this dramatic change in the scope of governance to everyday living. Historian Robert H. Zieger has noted that the federal government "created a host of new agencies and bureaus, employed an army of clerks and secretaries, and intruded into virtually every area of private life." Historian Christopher Capozzola has rightly asserted that the government had help:

> During the war, Americans policed their fellow citizens as part of a culture of obligation that pervaded nearly every facet of national life. At the factory and at school, in churches and in dance halls, on the streets and on the telephone, ordinary Americans were watched and governed by their fellow citizens.

However, historians of the war home front usually have a national focus and have failed to really explain how the many people who encountered the federal government as a prominent force in their own daily lives for the first time dealt with the experience. Wartime mobilization was particularly transformative for cities, though we still know little of what this enormous and unprecedented nationwide process meant to urbanites in the United States, and even the fascinating work that has emerged on Europe is largely restricted to the capital cities of the major powers.[1]

When the United States entered the war in 1917, there was no more-pressing question in American cities than how to create industrial peace. Over 9 percent of all workers had been involved in strikes during 1916, over double the percentage for 1915. Because the federal government required peace to accomplish its war production aims, it had to solve the

problem of increased militancy. However, the state exacerbated conflict by accelerating industrial growth, thus raising the stakes and even further removing a solution. To create détente, the government established a heavy local presence. During the crisis, the state expanded its own capacity to at least partially fulfill the needs of the groups whose immediate cooperation was essential—and it had to do so in each production center. Although the industrial workforce expanded during the war, dramatically in some locales, the number of strikers decreased significantly from prewar levels. To understand how the war production effort increased the stability of labor relations, we have to examine the local level because industrial peace was built there—one city at a time.[2]

I argue in this book that this program represented a novel form of and scope for federal policing. The new approach relied upon executive branch agencies working in tandem with local authorities and cooperative interest groups—a more regularized and persistent strategy than the sporadic use of the military and court injunctions that preceded the war. I consider the intersection of interest groups, both cooperative and oppositional, with the needs of the government and I keep the arenas of industrial relations and civil liberties, critical to the organizations of workers, at the center of inquiry. We need to analyze a wide variety of interest groups in order to make conclusions about how working people in Portland experienced the war crisis, including the local political establishment, shipyard owners, unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL), doctors and social hygiene activists, anticapitalist organizations, and the various and mushrooming agencies of government at every level. There were also individuals, notably Marie Equi and Kathleen O'Brennan, who intersected with key local interest groups though they held no office or formally belonged to any key organization, yet loomed large in the struggle to define and impose order in wartime Portland. Beyond interest-group clashes with the state, I also investigate how Portlanders experienced this new federal presence in their daily lives through the impact of the registration of enemy aliens, housing and social hygiene reform, pressure to buy war bonds, and conflict over food rationing. The war reached many urbanites, not just those connected to the fighting in France or the diverse array of activists engaged in other wars at home.

The war dramatically transformed Portland, Oregon; even prior to mobilization, it was one of the most dynamic urban centers in the nation. In the first decade of the twentieth century, it had the second highest growth rate among US cities with over 50,000 residents. Between 1885 and 1915, Portland's population increased from 32,000 to 232,000 and its land area grew from 6 square miles to 66. Although it was a booming commercial city, its industrial sector was stagnant. Prior to the war,

an economic monoculture based on timber processing had hampered the ability of Portland's labor movement to achieve recognition from employers. The closed shop was already common in more economically diverse San Francisco and Seattle. Portland's location and dock facilities made it ideal for shipbuilding, and federal money and hired expertise created the industry from virtually nothing in a matter of months. By the end of the war, Portland had 28,000 shipyard workers and at least 5,000 more laborers producing materials for the yards. This boom more than doubled the population of industrial workers present in the city in 1910. By early 1920, the shipyards were comparatively dormant—and would remain so for 20 years until the next global war. However, the federal presence in Portland did not disappear and it transformed as it persisted, setting patterns of expectation in Portland for future crisis intervention.[3]

Political scientist Marc Allen Eisner has argued that the federal government engaged in "compensatory state building" during World War I to make up for its lack of ability to administer a national war effort. In his model, "state capacity was expanded by appending the capacities of private-sector associations on to the state." Private organizations such as unions and industrial firms proved vital to maintaining industrial peace on the local level. However, my research on Portland shows that in this arena the federal state expanded its own powers and appended those of local and state governments more than it relied on the national industrial associations emphasized by Eisner. National associations could not create local order.[4]

The operation of federalism during the war has been largely ignored. Historians have tended to examine the national implementation of programs or internal wrangling in Washington, DC, despite limited federal capacity and heavy reliance on state and local administrative resources. Two fine books by historian William J. Breen on the Council of National Defense and the US Employment Service are notable exceptions, but they are also overly ambitious attempts to describe federal interaction with every region in the country. Historian Gerald E. Shenk's book on the Selective Service System during the war highlights four states in different regions but this laudable attention to locality gives us just a chapter exploring each before moving on. All three of these works focus on just a single program administered in a range of places, while I take the opposite approach. Because the literature is situated at an overly broad level in an underdeveloped area of inquiry, scholars have missed the most transformative element of the World War I home front: the complexity of newly forged federal-local relationships. The state has tended to appear monolithic in scholarship, as have the regions of the nation. According to Breen, regional leaders hoped that active local and state coordination of the federal war effort "would avert or contain any drive toward the aggrandizement of power in Washington."

This generalization does not work well for Oregon, whose elites saw the coordinated effort as an opportunity to consolidate their own power by encouraging the federal government to *expand* its own local prerogatives.[5]

The regional elite fears of encroaching federalism that Breen has found do not seem at all likely in West Coast cities, which for years had been requesting federal help to crush radical organizations and contain unions. The Pacific Northwest economy was dominated by seasonal work and plagued by a cycle of labor shortages and surpluses. The region's elites wanted federally subsidized industry and law enforcement. There is not much evidence that Oregon's political leadership was worried about ceding power to the capital. Political elites wanted to impress, not contain, Washington, DC, because the potential spoils of war were immense. In shipbuilding alone, a US workforce of 45,000 in April 1917 expanded to 375,000 by October 1918 solely because of government contracts.[6]

It is impossible to make broad conclusions about the national war mobilization before coming to terms with regional divergences, which complicated, and could even preclude, uniform policy. Focused investigation of the implementation of a range of intersecting federal programs in one place over the course of the war also reveals divisions within the state itself, where local reality conflicts with national policy. Historian James Weinstein argued in 1968 that the federal government had fallen fully under corporate sway by the end of World War I and his thesis still influences interpretations of the state among labor historians. But historian Melvyn Dubofsky's superb survey of the relationship between organized workers and the state has since suggested that the federal government has helped labor at critical moments. I believe that specific cases, limited in time and geographic area, can show us a divided state that could work both for and against workers simultaneously. I have sought to understand the federal state's role in urban life during the war through its local agents. Sociologist Theda Skocpol's notion of a "structured polity" approach designed to explain changes in the welfare state can be applied to industrial relations and civil liberties battles in Portland. These conflicts were transformed by the insertion of the federal government, an agent with independent goals and a rapidly expanding capacity to achieve them. Skocpol is interested in how policymakers transform the state in order to pursue their goals, as well as the identities of social groups that become involved in this process. Her concept of a "fit" between certain organized groups and the mechanisms of the state at a particular time has helped to shape my thinking about industrial relations in Portland during the war.[7]

During the 1970s, labor history—the study of unions and the industrial relations process—became working-class history, which focuses more on social movements and communities. The new scholarship tends to exclude

deep analysis of the impact of other social classes on working-class social movements and often also leaves out the enormous impact of a complex and changing federal state. Historian and political scientist Ira Katznelson has already pushed for state-oriented innovations in the study of class with his call for the inclusion of "political, institutional, and state-focused themes…to join issues of class and identity to provide the third main pillar for labor history." I argue that the state is indeed crucial but its local impact is so varied that an understanding of major patterns can only emerge through a collective process of examining cases. Historian Joseph A. McCartin's *Labor's Great War*, the reigning interpretation of the subject, attempted to move labor historians away from an emphasis on workers' struggles for shop floor control, which varied by region and industry, and toward a national synthesis based on a fight for "industrial democracy." This innovation tends to essentialize the aspirations of a massive group of workers and ignores the preeminence of localism and the problems of regional exceptionalism in this period.[8]

The notion of regional difference during World War I is still in its infancy. Historians Jeanette Keith and Christopher C. Gibbs have written insightful books recovering grassroots resistance to the war in the rural Southeast and the state of Missouri, respectively. Keith has demonstrated that local and state authorities tended to subvert federal goals to their own ends and resisted the encroachment of federal power. While the former was inevitable in any region, the latter was clearly untrue for the West Coast. Oregon was particularly far removed from this pattern: a large and underdeveloped state with one city—but a city that was actively competing with Seattle to become the "second city" (after San Francisco) west of the Rockies. Portland boosters were desperate to attract industry while barring unions and imposing greater order, so they embraced federal paternalism.[9]

Grassroots resistance to the war does not work well as a narrative for Portland either. Like elites, workers (even radicals) also saw the war crisis as an opportunity for gain if properly manipulated. Portland's AFL craft unions sought the same power their counterparts in Seattle and San Francisco had, and after a brief struggle to go it alone, accepted the paternal protection of the state. The federal government determined whether or not Portland would sprout industrial firms and whether those shops would have unions. It is important that Portland was a city on the make and not one in decline. Historian Marc Scott Miller, in his study of Lowell, Massachusetts, during World War II, argued that the city's terminal decline strongly affected its reaction to the war boom. It "had all the makings of a dying city" and "only a major event could have saved Lowell or even delayed its death." It was once one of the great centers of capitalist innovation in the nation but the time of this textile mill town had passed. Portland, in contrast, was a new

and growing city with every hope, held by a broad swathe of its residents, that future prosperity might emerge from the war boom.[10]

It also mattered that Portland was in a region where cities are still particularly important. As the twentieth century began, the West was more urban than any region of the country except the North Atlantic. And as historian Carey McWilliams argued just after the explosive urban growth of World War II,

> The cities of the West, paradoxical as the statement may sound, are socially more important than their counterparts in the other major regions. Where people are so thinly distributed over such vast areas the concentration of population, no matter how small they may be…come to possess a unique importance.

Urban studies scholar Carl Abbott's definitive synthesis of western urban history argued for "the ubiquity of the city-building imagination and city-building impulse in shaping western North America" and historian Richard White has asserted that "while the federal government shaped the West…the West itself served as the kindergarten of the American state," but the connections between the two remain underexplored and we must approach the notion of a vast yet coherent West with skepticism.[11]

Historian Robert D. Johnston has argued that although White's landmark synthesis of western history "offers a great deal of evidence and analysis for its argument about a strong federal presence in the West, the book's argument for the link to national state development is simply *asserted*." Johnston also doubted that the federal role in the West has consistently been greater than in other regions. Federal intervention, he pointed out, repeatedly transformed the Southeast in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The key to implementing Johnston's important critique of common assumptions in western history without abandoning regionalism as a useful analytical tool is to examine more precisely and intentionally constructed areas that correspond carefully to both historical aspect and period. This book will, based upon the issue under examination, view Portland during the World War I era in the alternating specific contexts of Oregon, the Pacific Northwest, or the urban West Coast.[12]

The relationship between West Coast cities and the government prior to the New Deal of the 1930s is still little understood. Historian Roger W. Lotchin has touched upon the urban-military nexus in California in this early period, yet he noted that scholars have largely ignored the impact of World War I throughout the West. Historian Karen R. Merrill has called for examination of "the institutional structures, histories, cultures, and organizational ideologies of the [federal] agencies involved in the region." Historical

work, she argued, lacked specificity and also failed to address "the larger context of American state formation." This book investigates the local branches of the government agencies that transformed both urban life and space in Portland during the war. I highlight their impact on a particular place in the context of their role in a national crisis and as part of a changing state.[13]

The precedent of bureaucratic federal mediation in local labor disputes established during the war remained a continuous feature of government even during the supposed lull of the 1920s. Dubofsky has argued that "the 1920s saw no sudden shrinkage in federal power to intervene in the domestic economy" even though "the most expansive of the wartime federal powers, agencies, and policies had been eroded in the reaction of 1919–20." He credited an active Department of Labor mediation service and the Railway Labor Board created in 1920. There were serious proposals for a broader system but it had many opponents on the Left and Right according to historian Morton Keller:

> Both the Socialist party and the AFL opposed a scheme to establish a national industrial tribunal with full judicial powers. And conservatives rejected a proposal to establish regional boards of industry and adjustment modeled on the Federal Reserve system: these, they held, too closely resembled the dreaded Soviets of the Bolsheviks.

There were also internal changes in the labor movement that caused federal activism in this sphere to temporarily diminish. Dubofsky has noted that "those unions that had been in the forefront of labor militancy from 1916 through 1922 suffered the severest losses" until the New Deal and "by contrast, the less militant and more conservative sectors of the labor movement…either maintained their strength or grew slightly."[14]

Eisner has found continuity in federal economic intervention between World War I and the New Deal: "The Roosevelt administration constructed a recovery program and the welfare state from policies, agencies, and patterns of state-economy relations that originated in World War I mobilization and evolved throughout the 1920s." To evoke just one facet of that evolution, historian Daniel Amsterdam has analyzed an unprecedented federal push toward local efforts to ameliorate unemployment in the early 1920s. Historian Ronald Schaffer, in his survey of the "war welfare state" during World War I, has given state expansion during the conflict even broader long-term implications:

> The centrally managed society of World War I both presaged and contributed to the rise of federal power in the 1930s. And it also foreshadowed much of what happened in the decades that followed as the United States entered a long era, as Wilson had foreseen, of warfare and continuous preparation for war.

That long era, I suggest in the epilogue, is still not over. The state clearly did not, and never would again, entirely leave the realm of labor arbitration and the attendant project of tracking internal anticapitalist enemies.[15]

Federal field agents were largely successful at balancing local interest groups but those that were both nonessential and had the potential to upset détente were relentlessly persecuted. Radicals who rejected industrial peace under capitalism were the state's primary targets. After the war, the government still sought to crush these groups and harassed leftist unions within the AFL, which were no longer essential adjuncts of a war production program. Anticapitalist activists, closely watched and short on resources, operated in local cells. The Department of Justice (DOJ) reacted on a local basis to prevent radicals obtaining the capacity to act on a national level. The notion that the local level provides the critical view toward understanding anticommunism has gained traction among scholars for the early Cold War period but the more important evolutionary stage of the World War I era remains underexplored.[16]

Revolution was sweeping Europe in the war's destructive wake and this threat seemed very real to the intelligence community that had formed during the conflict. Civil liberties lawyer and scholar Frank Donner has argued that "if labor strife and political anarchism were the parents of nonfederal intelligence, World War I and the Russian Revolution played the same role in the federalization of intelligence." And the local component of the anticapitalist alliance remained continuous and vital:

> The hysterical antiradicalism of World War I and the postwar red scare fostered the further growth and development of urban police red squads and provided them with the momentum that carried them through the 1920s until the next major burst of radical activity in response to the Great Depression.

Locally based surveillance and attack systems were already in place from the war but with postwar budget cuts and the expiration of emergency wartime laws, DOJ needed to rely heavily on the ability of individual cities to respond to their own problems. Still, the federal antiradical program continued overtly until at least 1924 and informally afterward until a revival in 1936 when labor militancy flourished once again. That there was continuity even during the lull is not in doubt. Historian Robert Justin Goldstein, introducing a volume of over a dozen essays on the subject, argued that "the red scare never really ended" and, in fact, "the 1921–46 period witnessed a whole series of 'little red scares.'" Historian Regin Schmidt has concluded that "the open shop campaign, which began in 1920–21 and continued well into the thirties ... used red-baiting to discredit organized labor and reform movements and cooperated closely with the Bureau." He has also asserted

that "during the inter-war period, the motives…of federal officials had…to do with the emerging state's search for order and stability," and I trace the origins of this process to the World War I crisis.[17]

It is important to see the federal response to Prohibition enforcement following the war as part of this policing project toward urban order as well. With limited funds, by 1929 the Prohibition Bureau of the Department of the Treasury had just 4,129 employees. Despite testimony from the commissioner the previous year that effective enforcement would cost $300 million per year, the bureau had a budget of about 5 percent of that lofty sum. Yet the attorney general was still able to report in 1929 that his department had initiated 56,786 prosecutions over the last year. Very few cases went to trial because "those which were settled had been settled principally by pleas of guilty," according to journalist Charles Merz's summation of government data. The burden of generating the required evidence for so many settled cases relied upon local and state authorities. Deputy Attorney General Mabel Walker Willebrandt wrote at the end of the 1920s that the up to 3,000 state and over 16,000 city police of New York "are now and have been inactive as to prohibition since New York State repealed its own enforcement act." Kansas took enforcement so seriously that the federal government had as few as a dozen cases there per year, in contrast to up to a thousand per month in New York. Most states did cooperate, though less independently than Kansas, as the prosecution numbers indicate, and used federal law and prestige in an enduring form of partnership that had continuously bound local and federal policing since its wartime evolution.[18]

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The process of developing cooperation and navigating conflict was intensely local and it is there we must begin. Before explaining the federal regime that brought stability to Portland's shipyards, and the attendant antiradical campaign, I establish the local context and then explore the wider frame of government and citizen policing during the war. Chapter 2 traces the recent history of Portland leading up to the war. I explicate the city's political culture, economy, and labor movement. Chapter 3 then explains how federal policing in wartime Portland beyond industrial relations connects to the effort to enforce industrial peace. I discuss Oregon's elite-run Council of National Defense, housing reform, and the enforcement of food rationing and war bond purchasing.

I then focus on the central process of stabilizing the shipyards before investigating the harassment of potentially obstructionist groups. Chapter 4 examines the city's wartime power struggle in shipbuilding between the yard owners, AFL unions, and the regional representatives of the government's

Emergency Fleet Corporation. Chapter 5 then looks at the process of organizing workers under the new industrial relations regime, first from the perspective of AFL unions in the shipyards and then that of the radical Industrial Workers of the World. I also discuss federal anxiety over both radical women and the potential for a broad labor alliance.

Chapter 6 examines the apex of policing power during World War I through the containment of both male enemy alien laborers and female working-class sexuality via internment programs. Internment, or the threat of internment, was the most powerful policing tool during the war because it circumvented formal legal proceedings. It has received little attention, particularly on the local level, where decision making on the fates of individuals took place in response to regional conditions.

I then analyze postwar continuity and the legacy of the wartime campaign to create and enforce urban industrial order. Chapter 7 examines anticapitalist radicalism in Portland during the immediate postwar period through the lens of the city's soviet movement, focusing also on government fears of a radical resurgence and the potential for growing unity. The epilogue suggests that during later, even recent, crises, the formative World War I period still has resonance for the latter-day counterparts of the interest groups I analyze here.

We need to know more about differences within and between regions before making assumptions about the implementation and outcomes of national wartime policing programs, which relied so heavily on prewar local conditions and capacity. Scholars can then form a more nuanced understanding of the impact of the war upon policing capacity and political culture during the decades that followed. Federal-local partnerships that persisted to contain radicalism and immorality through the Red Scare and Prohibition were rooted in the war, which has much to teach us about the evolution of federalism in the twentieth century.

CHAPTER 2

PORTLAND: MIDDLE-CLASS PARADISE OR CITY OF STRUGGLE?

The only US citizen to be buried in the wall of the Kremlin was born and raised in Portland, Oregon. He began life as part of the city's privileged elite, went east to attend Harvard in the 1900s, and then became one of the most famous socialists in the world during an extraordinary career that spanned the 1910s and ended with his premature death. This man, on a return trip to Portland, convinced a University of Oregon graduate and dentist's wife with ambitions to write and travel to leave her provincial home and move to Greenwich Village with him and build the revolution. John Reed and Louise Bryant, Portland's most famous radical couple, will always be remembered as New Yorkers.[1]

Portland has been relentlessly described as "middle class" by observers of all social classes from the city's earliest years. Lacking massive factories and large numbers of southern and eastern European immigrants, the city was supposedly spared the political upheaval and epic workplace confrontations of the Progressive Era. This chapter deconstructs the myth and creates in its place a more accurate portrait of a hotbed of reform politics that had a strongly oppositional, and at times radical, labor movement. When the United States entered the war, Portland was already at a fever pitch of class antagonism, necessitating an extensive federal policing project to ensure the stability of essential war production. I turn first, briefly, to the city's origins before sketching Portland's politics, working class, and labor movement leading up to the war era.

Origins

The uneasy joint occupancy of the Oregon Country by the United States and Britain finally ended in favor of the younger nation in 1846, opening

the way for substantial white settlement of the region. As early as 1843, the provisional legislature proclaimed that the head of a white family could claim 640 acres of free land. Along with hopeful farmers came land speculators who exploited the legal chaos of the 1840s. A federal act of 1850 transferred land claim authority to the representatives of the national government in Oregon and set off a torrent of lawsuits that did not subside until well into the 1870s. Oregonians dealt with an outpost of the capital, the federal land office, to secure final ownership of holdings thrown into jeopardy by the crisis of transition from disputed territory to eventual statehood in 1859. While some stakeholders benefited from federal intervention, others lost their lands. The government left a mix of winners and losers in its wake as it gradually solved the land legitimacy crisis and then kept a watchful eye on fraud over the years. When the United States entered World War I in 1917, the US attorney's office in Portland was still mainly concerned with land fraud.[2]

The two men who founded the metropolis at the confluence of the Willamette and Columbia rivers in the mid-1840s decided which of their native cities, Boston or Portland, would lend its name to the new town with a coin toss. The earliest migrants were mainly white, educated, and had some financial means. The 1850 census revealed that of the 821 Portland residents: half had arrived in 1850, three-quarters were native born, and most were under 30 years of age. The earliest Portlanders lived in an environment where the federal government's stakeholder patent decisions had changed the course of lives and the fabric of their new community. As Portland grew during the late nineteenth century, newcomers entered a state with settled means for buying land and conflict in this arena receded. However, the growth of the city was by no means orderly.[3]

Historian E. Kimbark MacColl has called Portland "a cumulative growth city." He observed, "Portland grew by means of the gradual accretion of individual entrepreneurs and by the rapid and often disorderly accumulations of speculators." Although growth was haphazard and sprawling, the editor of the *Portland Oregonian* newspaper claimed in 1891 that Portland had "few of the problems faced by the large Eastern cities: minimum geographic social segregation, no dirty industry, little permanent unemployment, and few unassimilated immigrants except for the Chinese colony." Oregon's Chinese population was second only to that of California. The editor's observations coincided with the merger of the older city on the western bank of the river with newer developments on the eastern side. Portland, now spanning the Willamette River, had 62,000 residents and an enviably low population density spread over its 26 square miles. Just before the merger, Portland was already such a commercial success that an 1888 national study declared "it to be the third richest in the world in proportion to population."[4]

Politics

A nineteenth-century city that grew as quickly as Portland, whatever its promise, was bound to have its share of problems. The *Oregonian* claimed in 1889 that Portland was "the most filthy city in the Northern States" because of a totally inadequate gutter and sewer system, essential areas of public investment in a region pelted with rain for up to two-thirds of the year. The enormous quantities of mud produced by the climate did not drain through sewers and clogged the streets, which the city covered over at the edges with wooden planks to make primitive sidewalks. Portland was covered with mud and its politics were as well. Vice quickly spread in this booming commercial city and license fees from the more than five hundred saloons created half of the city government's revenue in 1900. MacColl has rightly pointed out that much of this vice was carried on in properties owned by the city's pioneer elite but rented to others. He saw the lack of distinction between public and private interest in municipal government as the primary source of Portland's extensive corruption. If city leaders personally profited from vice, why would they object to Portland, as its ordinary residents did, being a "wide open town"? The eminent Rabbi Stephen Wise of New York began his career in Portland and looked back on a city morally polluted by its own elites:

> It was the union of gambling and liquor interests plus organized prostitution, which, in collusion with city officials and above all with the police department, poisoned and corroded the life of the city. The hold of these forces upon the city's life was fully known to the acquiescent and rather cynical population, which seemed to take it for granted that organized vice was entitled to no small part in managing the city and its affairs.

There was really no substantial challenge to this regime until 1913, and the factors leading to a dramatic change in the city's political life just prior to World War I are varied and complex.[5]

Over the first decade of the new century, the city more than doubled in population to over 200,000 residents. Portland's percentage of foreign-born residents peaked in 1890, totally counter to the national trend that saw enormous numbers of eastern and southern European immigrants settle in American cities between the 1890 and 1910 censes. The foreign-born percentage of residents in 1910 was the same as it had been in 1850, just one-quarter. Thus, Portland never developed the intricate ethnic political balance that made it difficult to reform ward systems in other cities. Historian and political scientist Ira Katznelson has argued that "the working class thought of themselves as workers at work, but as ethnics…at home." Historian Richard Oestreicher's theory of urban working-class politics

from the 1870s until the 1930s differentiated "class sentiment" from "political consciousness" and posited that

> the majority of American workers in those years, especially in the cities of the Northeast and Midwest, were immigrants, children of immigrants, or recent rural-to-urban migrants with limited organizational resources and the desire to adapt to existing power in ways that would facilitate, rather than threaten, their priorities of family integrity, economic well-being and cultural defense.

In a city that was three-quarters native born in 1910, however, theories of ethnic and neighborhood identity trumping wider loyalties like municipal pride, class consciousness, and patriotism do not work well.[6]

There was also little racial division in local politics. Small Chinese, Japanese, and African American communities were almost entirely excluded from public life. The Chinese immigrant population reached a peak of nearly 7,000 in 1900 and then declined steadily. The Japanese community was on the rise but still less than 1,500 by 1910. While the Chinese population of Portland had mainly been male and thus could not be sustained, 39 percent of Japanese immigrants to the United States from 1908–19 were women. Historian William Toll has argued that "with more diverse businesses (many of which catered to a white clientele), a more even sex ratio, many young families, and a dispersed population," the Japanese of Portland were in a much better position to thrive than an earlier generation of Chinese immigrants that had suffered even more stringent, racist entry restrictions. Still, there is no evidence that the comparatively advantaged group was able to get into the shipyards and a majority of adult Japanese males in Portland in 1920 worked in services or as farm laborers on the city's periphery. Historian Dana Frank has found that the shipyards of this era remained the province of white men in Seattle as well. Perhaps less ghettoized than the Chinese, the Japanese were still largely excluded from the economic boom of the war era and were just as marginalized in civic discourse and activity.[7]

There were only about 1,500 African Americans in Portland in 1920 and a majority of men (55%) and most women (80%) engaged in paid work had menial service jobs. From its earliest days, the provisional government of the territory made sure that only whites could buy land and then enshrined their racism in the state's constitution. Article I, Section 31, stated, "White foreigners who are, or may hereafter become residents of this State shall enjoy the same rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment, and descent of property as native born citizens." Section 35 of the same article negated the most basic constitutional rights of African Americans: "No free

Negro, or mulatto, not residing in this State at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall come, reside, or be within this State, or hold any real estate, or make any contracts, or maintain any suit therein." Article XV, Section 8, extended the property ban to Chinese and Article II, Section 6, asserted, "No Negro, Chinaman, or Mulatto shall have the right of suffrage." Amendments to the US Constitution following the Civil War invalidated these sections but they still proved quite difficult to repeal.[8]

Legislative attempts to strike the unenforceable exclusion clauses, particularly embarrassing in a Republican state, began in 1891 but did not succeed until 1926. African Americans began to challenge the similarly inoperative voting ban in 1893 and a referendum nearly lifted it in 1916 when a deadlocked public decided to keep the clause by just hundreds of votes. An amendment to strike the voting ban finally gained popular approval in 1927, although about 38 percent voted against—the same percentage that opposed eliminating exclusion the year before. Women secured the franchise in Oregon in 1912, but African and Asian Americans of both sexes knew in the World War I era that the voters of Oregon were unwilling to guarantee their full citizenship. The rapid decline of the Chinese population left the city only 2 percent nonwhite by 1920. During World War I, white men and women shaped public discourse about patriotism and claimed the economic largesse that came with federal contracts.[9]

An unusually high degree of ethnic and racial homogeneity limited the cultural fragmentation of Portland politics and enabled a grassroots democracy for white male Oregonians that many reformers viewed as a model for the nation. Populists founded the "Oregon System" upon the grassroots lawmaking tools Initiative and Referendum. The former allows citizens to initiate state legislation, while the latter refers laws passed by the legislature to the people for approval. Popular recall of elected officials was also part of the Oregon System. Direct democracy had become a major goal of the Populist movement in the 1890s, a tool to counter corrupt influences in politics. In 1894, William S. U'Ren became chair of the Oregon convention of the People's Party. He used his party to create the Oregon Direct Legislation League, widening that coalition until his plan passed the state legislature in 1901. Voters approved it by an 11 to 1 margin the next year.[10]

The results were extraordinary. In 1908, U'Ren proposed an initiative that made Oregon the first state in the nation to popularly elect US senators. In 1910, another initiative in Oregon created the nation's first presidential primary. Then in 1912, Oregon women won the right to vote by initiative thanks to hardworking suffragists led by Abigail Scott Duniway. In 1914, initiatives established the prohibition of alcohol and banished the death penalty in Oregon. Most of the states to establish the Oregon System did so by the end of the 1910s and the movement did not spread much

beyond the West, which had 17 of 23 direct democracy states. The lasting influence of Populist politics in many western states may have played a determinative role.[11]

The campaign to rationalize municipal governance and services in order to eradicate vice and plutocratic corruption had powerful tools in the Initiative and Referendum but one party control of Oregon's major city stymied it for another decade. A small group of Republican politicians with strong business ties controlled local politics because over 80 percent of Portland voters were registered with that party. They set zoning and land use regulations, awarded franchises, and overlooked the legal transgressions of industry and wealthy property holders. Portland was hardly unique in this regard. Journalist Lincoln Steffens found the urban businessman, in his turn of the century investigation of politics in seven major cities, to be a "self-righteous fraud" and "the chief source of corruption" who "has failed in politics as he has failed in citizenship." Over the decade preceding reformist victory in 1913, the Oregon System diminished party loyalty and paved the way for Progressives to enter office and fundamentally change governance.[12]

Oswald West, elected governor on the Democratic ticket in 1910 with little money or establishment support, in a thoroughly Republican state, exemplified the decline in party loyalty and surge of reformist passion that emerged in this period. West proclaimed in his "Declaration of Principles," "The people must rule the corporations or the corporations will rule the State." As land agent and railroad agent in Oregon, he had established a reputation for exposing corruption and eliminating preferential practices. Yet, the last 15-member city council Portland voters elected before Progressives swept the institution away in 1913 failed to reflect the success of West's reformist candidacy. MacColl has described the council as "an average chamber of commerce or commercial club group which varied little in character from those of the previous decade except that realtor representation was doubled."[13]

The vice issue loomed large in Portland politics, and Governor West, whose own father had been an alcoholic, distinguished himself as a tireless crusader. However, the city council and the "colorless" A. G. Rushlight, the new Republican mayor of Portland and long-serving city councilman, wavered between recalcitrance and ineffectiveness. The startling contrast between the two men helped elicit support for a more professional and nonpartisan method of municipal governance. Rushlight immediately created a 15-member Vice Commission in response to popular demand but had no idea what to do with its findings. The report, although startling, was filed away and forgotten by municipal authorities. In August 1912, one year after the commission began its investigation, West declared he would clean

up Portland himself. He promised to quit his job if he failed. His campaign revealed that the owners of property hosting vice "came from the highest social and business levels in the city." The city had also tied its financial fortunes to vice, gathering a substantial portion of its budget from granting liquor licenses. Despite public outrage, the Vice Commission seemed divided and powerless. It had become "bogged down in the old dispute over whether the profession [of prostitution] should be banned or limited to a restricted district." Rushlight favored the latter option as "better than present conditions" but felt that the commission did not have the power to implement such a scheme.[14]

Public anger brought about extensive political reform in 1913, stoked for years by vice corruption and the complicity of the city council in placing corporate interests above those of citizens in zoning and granting franchises. It is no coincidence that a municipal revolution immediately followed both an ineffective Vice Commission and the victory of women suffragists. The Portland Woman's Club was at the forefront of the Oregon suffrage battle and had a history of fighting for protective legislation for working women and the elimination of vice. After obtaining the vote for white women in 1912, suffragists successfully mobilized women voters to push through urban reform the following year. Voters almost recalled Portland's first Progressive mayor in 1914 and he later claimed privately that his career had survived "due to the women of Portland, who supported this administration well." In considering the class basis for reform, it is important to remember its gendered origins as well.[15]

Voters approved a new city charter in May 1913, replacing the part-time, ward-based 15-member city council with 4 full-time commissioners. The mayor controlled the police department and assigned a major department to each of the other commissioners. All five individuals held equal voting power, without veto, and each was elected by the entire city through a nonpartisan voting system. The new system abolished "citizen boards" in an effort to keep business out of municipal administration. By a margin of just 722 votes, the city had chosen a system that dramatically reduced cronyism and partisan brokering. Low voter turnout may well have been a decisive factor in the victory, perhaps caused by the decline of local party organization. Stephen T. Janik studied the charter voting records by precinct and concluded that the most substantial support came from the middle and skilled working classes, with elites and laborers alike registering less support. This runs entirely counter to the dominant paradigm framed by historian Samuel P. Hays: "Lower and middle class groups not only dominated the pre-reform governments, but vigorously opposed reform." Hays believed that businessmen schemed to end the ward system, which was responsive to grassroots constituencies, in order to take control of municipal machinery.

In Portland, which had comparatively few ethnic neighborhoods and lacked large factory districts, this was just not the case. Only Portland's poorest residents clung to neighborhood representation, along with elites, who maintained rather tight control of the city under the old system.[16]

Reformers continued their electoral success in 1913 with the election of Progressive H. Russell Albee, advocate of city ownership of public utilities, as mayor in a repudiation of both major parties. But the old Republican system proved resilient, and although the mayor's office remained nonpartisan, George Baker won in 1917 with very strong Republican backing. His opponent Will Daly, who had strong labor ties and the backing of former governor Oswald West, lost a close election after a smear campaign cast doubts about his patriotism. This contest in June 1917 tells us much about the politics of the city during the war. George Baker remained in office until 1933, establishing a city record for mayoral longevity.[17]

Will Daly was a printer by trade and fellow workers elected him as head of both the city's printers' union and the Oregon State Federation of Labor (OSFL) in 1908 and then he also became head of Portland's Central Labor Council (CLC) in 1910. This extraordinary combination of responsibilities made him by far the most powerful trade unionist in the state even before the Workingmen's Political Club urged him on to a successful Portland City Council run in 1911, the same year he founded his own printing business. He was the first American Federation of Labor (AFL) officer to win a council seat and his transition from wage earner to middle-class entrepreneur did not uproot his working-class politics. Historian Lawrence M. Lipin has traced a strong strain of prewar "producerism" in the Oregon labor movement that could keep Daly in the fold even after he became a business owner. That he was able to achieve such eminence while openly expressing radical sympathies says a great deal about both the Portland affiliate of the AFL that Daly led and about the strength of radical sentiment and solidarity with workers among the city's petit bourgeoisie uncovered by historian Robert D. Johnston. When the leader of the radical Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), "Big Bill" Haywood, came to the city in 1909, Daly introduced him to an audience of three thousand as "the man who has suffered more in the cause of organized labor than any other in the United States." Daly praised the large Socialist turnout and claimed that the movement's mounting strength was proof that "there was a growing conviction among people that the old parties should be abandoned and that all should unite in a movement for real freedom in the United States."[18]

As a small businessman and AFL stalwart, Daly was able to bring together the coalition that Janik has found responsible for the passage of the new city charter in 1913: small businessmen and skilled workers. In the citywide election for the first group of four commissioners to replace the council,

Daly won more votes than any other candidate and became commissioner of public utilities. The Portland AFL could boast that their most prominent member was now the most powerful man in city government. In 1914, the Portland Employers' Association tried to get the city to adopt an ordinance limiting union picketing and Daly had the proposal quashed. This plan rose from its ashes during the 1917 election and it passed by just hundreds of votes, revealing support for union rights far greater than the numbers on union rolls. It had a substantial impact on wartime industrial relations.[19]

Daly lost this very close mayoral election in 1917, so crucial for organized labor, because of his radical ties and the enormous publicity given to them by the *Oregonian*. When elected to the city council in 1911, Daly was a member of the Socialist Party (SP), which had a significant presence in Portland. When national SP leader Eugene V. Debs visited the city during his 1912 presidential campaign, his speech drew a crowd that may have been as large as seven thousand. Fred D. Warren, editor of the party newspaper *Appeal to Reason*, attracted a crowd of similar size during the election season. There were Debs majorities in 3 Portland precincts during the 1912 election and the city's Socialist vote had doubled since the 1908 election to just under 15,000. The SP fostered a successful culture in the city, to the point where in April 1915 "the Saturday and Wednesday night dances at Arion Hall have grown to such popularity that the question of accommodating the crowds is becoming a serious problem." Over a thousand turned out for a Portland SP picnic at Crystal Lake Park the following month.[20]

Daly became a registered Republican in 1912 but never received strong backing from the party or its sympathetic newspapers and donors. The *Oregonian* printed his 1910 application for Socialist membership just days before what looked to be a landslide victory. The revelation swayed enough voters to erase Daly's lead because the SP's strong opposition to World War I made it poisonous to the many voters who favored US participation in the conflict. In April 1917, just after the United States entered the war, the SP met in emergency convention to determine how to react. Dominated by the party's Left, the gathering committed the organization to a "continuous, active, and public opposition to the war." Daly had the misfortune of standing for election just weeks later. His expedient switch to the Republicans in 1912 did not aid him in a hyperpatriotic wartime political climate.[21]

The election ended Daly's extraordinary decade-long career as a union and political leader. The *Oregonian* had warned that "there will be encouragement for strikes and countenance of industrial agitation" if the voters went for Daly. "The radicals will have a friend in the City Hall, and the investor, just now looking again to Portland, will be discouraged." Certainly, this prophecy was averted. An enormous amount of investment poured into wartime Portland and municipal government worked to suppress any

interference from both mainstream unions and radical groups. Progressive Portland had enjoyed a short lifespan. Johnston's precinct analysis of the election indicated that "Baker's strength was on the West Side, the home of the city's richest and poorest residents," the same groups that had voted against the 1913 charter. Daly remained dominant in residential eastern Portland, new and growing haven of the middling classes, who had supported Progressive reform through the 1910s. The SP in Portland established its second branch on the east side in early 1913, the year that this area helped pass the new city charter. Although the preelection revelation had weakened Daly's support, it was still a close contest. That he could *nearly win* was a testament to the strength of class consciousness and socialist politics in Portland.[22]

Work and Workers

Close study of local politics in the 1910s dispatches any notion that Portland was not divided by fault lines of class. The city had a highly visible elite, a handful of pioneer families who made fortunes through real estate speculation in the late nineteenth century when Portland first connected to national railroads. In 1918, less than 1 percent of Multnomah County's population commanded 63 percent of the taxable income. This elite translated its grip on real estate into banking and insurance fortunes, as well as control of the highly lucrative port of Portland. The third fastest growing city in the country from 1890–1910, Portland was the fourth leading exporter of goods by 1912. A commercial city with an entrenched elite, in which the largest employer was Portland Railway, Light & Power Company with four thousand employees, Portland seemed to offer an alternative path to growth through commerce rather than manufacturing.[23]

Portland offered opportunity to skilled workers who operated the railroads, built the rapidly growing city, and toiled in sawmills and furniture shops. The city was the most important center of furniture making in the West by World War I. The immigrants who settled in Portland tended to be skilled, literate in English, and northern European. They built homes on the city's rapidly growing residential east side across the Willamette River from the bustling downtown and its crowded nearby docks. The city's working class also had another side. Making flour, canning salmon and fruit, and processing timber were all critical to the local economy. These products also needed to be packed and loaded onto ships, ensuring an abundance of longshoremen looking daily for work. By 1920, Portland was the largest exporter of grain and second largest of woolens in the country. Because the city was so dependent on processing and exporting regional raw materials, it was unusually subject to swings in demand (domestic and international)

and seasonal fluctuations. Western Oregon's rainy winters marked the logging off-season and the trade in wheat and fruit dried up. Regional rural workers flooded Portland between work seasons and many of the city's laborers who processed the harvests of lumber, grain, and fruit lived a similarly precarious existence.[24]

Portland went through dramatic change during the 1910s, from boom town to stagnant in mid-decade to boomtown again. Urban studies scholar Carl Abbott asserted in the early 1980s, "Times in Portland have never again been so prosperous as during the years from 1905 to 1912." The city did have the third highest urban growth rate in the nation during the first decade of the century, in which it increased populace by 129 percent. Harold Farrow, a British immigrant and sawmill worker, arrived in the city during 1910 and wrote a very enthusiastic descriptive letter to his brother that illuminated the general prosperity of the time. He described his work as that of a "millwright," but it seems he was more of a foreman. He was in charge of "one mill shed out of seven" and described the job as "easy work; in fact, it is no work. All I do is simply to walk round and round until anything gives out." Although he feared that timber overproduction would lead to mill cutbacks and he might lose his job, he was not at all worried. "The Western States are marvelous places to get work. I have never seen anything like it. A fellow can quit his job and get one just as good any time he likes." He claimed that someone could arrive in Portland and "get a job within ten minutes of leaving the railway depot." Plenty were to be had through the many employment agencies that charged $1, and there was also a "free employment agency," publicly operated, but it was "looked upon as going a bit low down."[25]

Farrow also gives us insight into the ethnic hierarchy of the time. "The lowest wage for whites (American and British) is 9s. a day for any kind of work; dagoes (Italians, Norwegians, Dutch, etc.), 8s., so you see everyone is fairly well off." The 1910 census does indicate that only one-quarter of Portland was foreign born, well in line with other far-western cities apart from San Francisco. Of that quarter (50,312), the dominant European groups were Germans (7,489), British (5,362), and Canadians (5,195). No other group reached a 10 percent share of the foreign-born population, although the Swedes (4,801) were close. The Chinese population (5,699) was significant but rapidly in decline. All the European groups mentioned had increased, often dramatically, from the 1900 census. Farrow may have equated Italians and Norwegians as "dagoes" because they did not speak English, which was locally unusual. Approximately 80 percent of the city's residents were born in English-speaking nations, most of them in the United States. Those who were part of foreign-language communities may well have been "dagoes" to most Portlanders, and certainly Farrow found

that they earned the equivalent of a shilling less per day regardless of skill. Portland's ethnic homogeneity erased two of the most common destructive elements of labor struggle during this period: workers' movements divided by ethnic loyalties and employers separated from their workers by culture as well as class.[26]

Portland did not have big factories and tended to draw migrants who were at least semiskilled and used to workshop environments. Farrow claimed, "The British workman type does not exist here. All are about as well educated as our middle-class. It is strange at first to notice (say) a fellow making roads, daytime, in overalls and dirty ...[Then] evening sees him dressed in a good suit, white or fancy shirt, linen collar, dressed as our well-to-do City fellows." At the moment when Farrow arrived in Portland, his experience may have painted a fairly reasonable portrait but the good times soon ended and Farrow appeared listed as "janitor" in the 1914 Portland city directory. The economy of the Pacific Northwest collapsed into depression in 1913 after demand for wheat and lumber fell dramatically. The timber overproduction that Farrow predicted did happen but his janitorial job indicates he was wrong that it would still be an easy matter for him to get millwork. Portland felt like a city on the rise, its residents repeat this sentiment again and again during the war boom that ended the mid-decade depression. It is important that we are examining the war boom in a place that had widespread high expectations for the future of the city and for working-class quality of life. Labor history has revealed time and again that workers strive hardest to build social movements for positive change when they perceive that conditions are improving.[27]

Unfortunately, Farrow's description of a bourgeois city adds his voice to a chorus of observers who, over the years, have falsely labeled Portland a "middle-class paradise." Historians who investigate Portland have not really questioned this reputation and have in fact reinforced it. Johnston has addressed the problem but working-class activism is not at the center of his work. He noted,

> Citizens have long accepted a kind of paradise mythology, seeing Portland—set amidst tremendous natural beauty—as a haven from violence, radicalism, and the extremes of wealth and poverty. Journalists have for many years noted how much the supposedly middle-class characteristics of stability, complacency, and moderation tending toward conservatism have dominated the city's culture.

Johnston goes on to assert, "What is not surprising about this myth is that it exists; all viable communities live in part off similar types of fictions. What is surprising about the myth is that so many scholars have readily accepted it."

His concern was with breaking up the middle class as a monolithic entity, mainly by defining the politics of an anticorporate lower-middle class, which had much in common with that of skilled workers. My concern is to have Portland's working-class activists understood as similarly varied and complex while taking the rightful place they have earned when we frame their city's history. Johnston noted,

> As has the city as a whole the Portland working-class, and its most important institution the labor movement, have suffered from neglect and mischaracterization at the hands of historians. Again, Portland is supposedly a deviation from the dominant trends of industrialization, conflict, and radicalization during the period.

Portland was certainly more commercial than industrial but it had a history of class conflict. It also had a substantial radical movement, particularly among too often historically invisible unskilled and transient workers.[28]

Despite the city's many transients, it is important to note that there was also quite a high rate of home ownership, which has been a major factor in the perpetuation of the city's middle-class reputation. Portland's rate of home ownership in 1910 was 46 percent, much higher than the 32 percent national average for major cities. Portland was really two cities: on the old west side (which included downtown) 70 percent of residents rented, while on the new east side across the river 58 percent of residents owned. The west side was home not only to the city's elite but also to transient workers and unskilled immigrants. Also, the east side was very white—African and Asian Americans lived on the west side and the state constitution forced them to rent. Portland's west side was considerably more multicultural than the city as a whole and had a stark class divide. But this side of the city was becoming less significant. It declined after a 1910 peak of 86,000 residents while east Portland reached 185,000 by 1920. Support for the 1913 city charter and Will Daly's 1917 mayoral candidacy indicated that east Portlanders were the bedrock of the local labor movement and the fight against business influence in politics. Many of Portland's organized workers were prospering, but labor history has shown us that increased expectations do not decrease workplace activism. Historian James R. Barrett has found that the militant workers of Chicago's Packingtown also had an unusually high rate of home ownership. In 1920, 58 percent of occupants owned their homes. Perhaps workers who owned homes in Portland felt less willing to move elsewhere to find just conditions, so they formed unions where they were in order to obtain fair treatment. The city's large transient population was also hardly passive, and belied the image of urban stability projected by the home ownership numbers.[29]

The winter of 1913–14 was a particularly bad one for seasonal workers in the region. With jobs scarce in Portland, a number of men formed an Unemployed League and lobbied the city for use of the abandoned Gipsy Smith Tabernacle as a hostel. The city council provided $500 for food and blankets and the Oregon Civic League also made donations. During the period from January to March 1914, it housed an average of 900 men each night and 1,200–1,500 men each day. Nearly one-third slept on the floor without blankets. Two-thirds were there because they had lost their jobs. The 1910 census, taken during the 1905–12 boom, shows a very volatile state economy. Over 30,000 workers found employment in Oregon industries from May through October. This number declined dramatically during January through March, by close to 8,000. The closure of smaller lumber mills during the winter accounted for about 5,000 of the seasonally unemployed, cannery shut downs for about 1,500. Many of these workers, as well as agricultural laborers, drifted to Portland in the off-season. Carl Abbott has noted that local boosters claimed in 1913 "that a transient wintertime population of 20,000 loggers, railroad workers, and ranch hands had been omitted from the census because of the jealousy of eastern cities." When the local economy was strong, these men could make it through the winter in another job. During the 1905–12 boom, "the rate of employment growth outpaced population, which itself leaped by nearly twenty thousand a year." But during depression winters such as 1913–14, jobs were scarce in Portland. The Municipal Free Employment Bureau placed nearly 3,000 men in jobs during January through March, but one-third of them went directly to work for the city.[30]

During 1910, Oregon had an average of 28,750 manufacturing workers and just over 15,000 of them relied on the lumber processing industry. The next largest industry, printing, on average, had only 10 percent as many employees. Less than 5 percent of Oregon's total population worked in manufacturing in 1910. Only 2 towns exceeded 10,000 residents: the state capital, Salem (14,094), and Oregon's single major city, Portland (207,214). The state needed to diversify if it was going to compete for a larger share of the national economy in this era of extraordinary industrial growth and if Portland boosters were going to put their city on the map and solve the problem of seasonal unemployment. The answer to this problem seemed to appear in the form of shipbuilding. In July 1916, only 4,200 Oregonians worked in this industry and built just 22 wooden ships and 1 of steel over the following year. This small industry took advantage of the state's relatively mild winter temperatures and abundant timber. Government wartime investment exploded these numbers to 43,000 workers by July 1918, with 95 wood and 29 steel ships built the previous year. During July 1918, 82 wood and 45 steel ships were currently in production. By the peak in

October 1918, Portland alone had well over 30,000 shipbuilding workers and there were thousands more in towns along the Columbia River. Just over one year later, Portland's shipyards employed less than 3,000. However, Portland's traditional economy expanded enormously. Exports from the city's port increased from $4 million in 1917 to $69 million in 1921. There was far more processing and shipping of regional raw materials (dominated by wheat with significant flour and lumber) after the war era than before. The wartime boom failed to bring permanent industrial diversity to the city's economy, but the extraordinary 1917–19 period left an expanded economy in its wake and gave local workers far more power than they had ever had before.[31]

However, women were entirely cut out of the boom in industrial employment. Only 33 percent of Portland men worked in "manufacturing and mechanical industries" in 1910, but 42 percent did so in 1920. Despite the near demise of wartime shipbuilding, men's occupational structure did become more geared toward industrial work. Conversely, the 1910 census indicates that "domestic and personal service" dominated 37 percent of women's employment in the city and only 16 percent toiled in "manufacturing and mechanical industries." In 1920, the number of men working was about the same but there was nearly a 60 percent jump in the number of employed women. Still, only 15 percent of women worked in manufacturing, indicating that the gendered occupational structure in that sector had not changed. The manufacturing category for women in 1910 was composed solely of textile and garment workers, while in 1920 the only addition was about four hundred candy and baking laborers.[32]

On a national level, the industries essential to the shipbuilding process almost completely excluded women. The Women's Bureau of the US Department of Labor conducted a national survey of women's industrial employment after the war to measure change wrought by the conflict. They found that the proportion of women in shipbuilding varied during the war from 0.6 to 1.1 percent. "Only about one-third of the firms employed women at all, and the majority of women in the industry were employed in those few plants which attempted substitutions." If only a few plants in the industry placed women in jobs reserved in the past just for men, then the minority of plants that had any women at all must have kept them in positions away from production work. In the iron and steel industry, even late in the war, the proportion of women workers was only just over 10 percent. Women workers were almost nonexistent in key areas like "crude iron and steel and rolled products" (2%) and "structural iron work" (under 1%). Women only achieved representation above a single digit percentage in "cutlery and tools," "small machines for office and home use," and "firearms and ammunition." The latter is the best-known case of substantial numbers

of women gaining entry to a key wartime industry but it is one that Oregon lacked. Overall, Oregon was well below the national average of 110 women per 1,000 iron and steel wage earners during the war at just 32. Even in the state's famous lumber industry, Oregon women were just 52 per 1,000 wage earners while the national average was 94.[33]

Unfortunately, there was no comprehensive study of temporary changes in women's occupational structure on the West Coast during the war. The chief examiner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of California affirmed this in January 1919 in response to a survey of women's war work undertaken by the San Francisco Labor Council. The first question was, "What part has woman taken in labor due to the war?" To which he answered, "So far as I can ascertain there have been no statistics gathered on this question." He summed up his impression of the changes by stating "that women have displaced men in clerical positions, as sales people in department stores, in the elevator and hotel messenger service." He was led "to conclude that the war will not affect, to any great degree, the status of women in industry due to the many occupations prohibitive to women." The male-dominated AFL, an affiliate of which conducted the survey, had to bear a great deal of responsibility for constructing that notion. Some unions key to the war effort in Oregon admitted women only as second-class members, including the leather, sheet metal, and electrical workers, as well as the machinists. Others banned women explicitly, including the carpenters and iron molders. Many other unions did not make their bans or limitations so clear but actively worked to prevent women gaining access to training and employment in trades traditionally controlled by male workers.[34]

The Labor Movement

Samuel Gompers himself came to Portland to spread the union gospel as soon as the city joined the national railroad network in 1883. He created the city's first central labor body, the Federated Trades Assembly (FTA), which had three hundred members in nine unions. The FTA collapsed in 1885, torn asunder by infighting over electoral politics. Gompers returned in 1887, now leading the AFL, and revived the FTA. Researchers have disputed the new membership numbers, but it seems clear that there were now 15 unions, quite a dramatic increase in just several years. Gompers urged the new central body to avoid electoral politics, which had destroyed the previous organization, and focus on building membership. Each union had equal weight within the FTA and there was a flat annual affiliation fee. The FTA formally affiliated with the AFL in 1889, although there is a second application dated 1899. I believe the latter application may have been unnecessary paperwork: the Portland FTA was trying to convince the AFL

to remove the unpopular organizer foisted upon them and replace him with one of their own, a member of the cigar makers local union. This conflict shows us that Portland unions fought for local independence early on but still operated within the parameters of their national organization, even applying to rejoin just to change organizer.[35]

The FTA quickly grew into several thousands, but specifics are again elusive. Yet while Portland and its unions were both expanding, organized labor in the rest of the state developed little. There were dispersed railroad unions, some miners in the east, and fishermen in the west. Salmon canning along the Columbia River was growing rapidly, but Chinese immigrants dominated the industry and the AFL refused to organize them. Portland was the center of construction, shipping, and timber processing work in the region. As the only center of labor politics in Oregon, Portland unions had an important place in the state's direct legislation movement and made this goal a high priority in 1898. The weekly *Portland Labor Press* appeared in 1900 and thereafter evidence of the number of local unions and members at any given time becomes more frequent and reliable. It listed 30 unions in Portland in the second issue and by the middle of 1902, there were 41. The FTA created a Non-Partisan Advisory Association in early 1902 to push along the state's direct democracy campaign but it seems that the organization had little effect. One of its leaders, George Harry, a sheet metal worker recently arrived from California, lamented the antipolitical culture of the FTA. He pushed for the formation of a statewide organization, which may have made sense for California but Portland *was* the statewide movement in Oregon. He also wanted the FTA to engage in electoral politics beyond support for direct democracy but memories of infighting and collapse in the 1880s were still too fresh.[36]

Harry kept pushing for a statewide organization and eventually his colleagues challenged him to do it with $100 in 30 days. Set up to fail, he somehow managed to get 175 delegates from 101 unions, "many of which were so new they had not yet received their charters," to come to Portland to organize the OSFL in May 1902. We know Portland had 41 unions that May, so a majority of organized workers in the state (an estimate of 10,000) now came from outside Oregon's only major city. But this picture was deceptive, for the union boom of 1900–1902 was not sustainable. A state lacking economic diversity was particularly vulnerable in this period of highly volatile business cycles. Portland's movement was able to survive the rest of the 1900s largely intact. In 1909, 51 unions established during 1902 or earlier were still alive but only 17 more of them founded from 1903–8 made it to the end of the decade. The movement was consolidating past gains and even growing, but slowly. The picture was grimmer for the rest of the state. Those who hoped that the AFL would blanket the state

were disappointed at the close of the 1900s. By 1909, only 43 local unions outside Portland were left standing, far fewer than the probable 60 that had helped build the OSFL in 1902. Portland, as Harry's opponents had always believed, would continue to define organized labor in Oregon.[37]

The newly powerful Portland unions had their first major conflict with the city's employers in 1902. The issues raised would prove insoluble and provided the basis for conflict over the next 15 years. The Lumber Mill Workers' Union struck for recognition and increased wages; they got neither in a settlement brokered by the mayor. The only employer concession was a promise not to discriminate against union members. At about the same time, the Amalgamated Woodworkers struck for a nine-hour day and employers replaced them with strikebreakers. The Building Trades Council called out their 13 local unions with about 2,500 total members. Although the OSFL leadership threatened to have the whole state strike, the organization was not strong enough to sustain such an action. The Amalgamated Woodworkers returned to work with a promise that their fellow unions would boycott the unfair materials from their mills until they achieved a shorter day. There was a great deal of internal dissension over this strike, with several older unions (printers and carpenters) claiming it had gone too far and at least one younger one (painters) that it had not gone far enough. Mill owners, building materials dealers, and employing contractors struck back with a boycott of their own: any firm refusing unfair materials from even one source would not get anything from anyone. This effort expanded and united the fledgling Master Builders' Association and when carpenters began regularly using unfair materials, the Building Trades Council had to recant the boycott in humiliation. Labor solidarity in the young local movement had been dealt a terrible blow, and although it would recover, the unions were unable to enforce general boycotts on unfair materials even during World War I. By the middle of 1903, 6 of the 13 unions in the Building Trades Council had left. The body then completely collapsed, while the newly formed Allied Employers' Industrial Association of Portland, which referred to itself often as the Citizens' Alliance, united antiunion employers across industry.[38]

Despite the fact that through direct democracy Oregon was becoming a hotbed of workplace reform, the AFL failed to become part of the fabric of civic culture in Portland. Local unions bitterly disputed the construction of the city's highly successful 1905 fair, the Lewis and Clark Centennial, claiming they had been promised all the building work in return for buying stock in the project. Soon after the deal, a large state appropriation made their contribution less crucial. Fair backers argued that lumber suppliers would boycott if they ran a strictly union shop. Feeling betrayed, some Portland unions began pushing for a referendum on the fair. They hoped to

use the new tools of direct democracy to defeat what looked to be a boon for boosters and speculators but another costly defeat for organized labor. This campaign not only failed but also precipitated storms of indignation from local newspapers and alienated many of the Oregonians who eventually flocked to the fair in droves. Over the course of the summer, more than 2.5 million visitors enjoyed the fairgrounds. The only legacy of this debacle was a split in the labor movement. Some home-owning skilled workers outside the building trades anticipated that the fair boom would increase property values, while lower-paid service laborers hoped that a swarm of tourists would stabilize their own working lives. Other workers objected to the fair, fearing increased cost of living and a further decline in union power. The local press was claiming that socialists had been behind the referendum drive, and there is some truth to the claim that a wide split had been developing between Left and Right over the previous few disastrous years.[39]

In 1907, the downward slide accelerated. Finally convinced of the importance of having a presence in politics, Portland unions formed a party early in 1906 to contest municipal elections in the spring of 1907. All its candidates met defeat. Once again, electoral politics burned the Federated Trades Council (FTC). A strike of streetcar workers in January revealed an increasingly desperate environment for unionization. The conflict was quite violent, and although five thousand supporters marched in solidarity, the strike destroyed the local union and management replaced it with one of Oregon's first company unions. A sawmill conflict in March saw a new organization, one that insisted it would refuse to compromise with employers, win the support of strikers and condemnation of the FTC. Unlike the AFL, the IWW did not accept the framework of corporate capitalism and sought to replace it with a syndicalist state. The government went to extraordinary lengths to suppress the IWW during the war and it was particularly strong in the Pacific Northwest. Why was the IWW so threatening?[40]

Syndicalists intended that after mass organization workers would elect councils by industry to coordinate the government and economy. The idea was not native to the United States; its roots were in radical western European socialist philosophy. It was also at odds with the approach of the pragmatic AFL, for syndicalism was openly antagonistic to compromise approaches with capitalism and rejected the validity of contracts made within the wage system. Syndicalists espoused the active ruination of the economy through sabotage on the job, civil disobedience, and eventually, when the bodies to take over the state and economy were in place, a general strike of all workers to topple the current regime. The IWW, founded in Chicago in 1905, was the first substantial attempt at a mass, national expression of this philosophy in the United States. Strong tensions between

proponents of political campaigning and union organizing during the creation of the IWW resulted in the repudiation of socialist political activity as a means to achieving a syndicalist state. After this split, the remaining leadership insisted on the plausibility of supplanting the state with an industrial democracy in which workers were the source of all power and expressed their will through delegates. Unions, organized broadly by industry rather than exclusively by craft, would be the means to achieve a new working-class regime in the form of a syndicalist state.[41]

It is virtually impossible to establish membership strength for the IWW but it did become particularly important for itinerant male workers in the West, providing a local advocate as well as a headquarters that functioned in part as a clubhouse. The IWW provided a culture and community in the unstable lives of transient workers and usually functioned more as a sporadic force rather than a network of stable local unions, to solve local problems such as corrupt hiring practices, squalid work conditions, and appallingly low pay that affected many workers—but transient and seasonal ones most of all. Some of these workers gathered in cities like Portland in winter, when agricultural and logging work dried up, hoping to find something going. A lot of these men did not stay in one place long, which mitigated against stable local unions (which the organization could not have funded anyway) but contributed to a massive and mobile support network for IWW struggles. Because IWW members were already at the margins of society, many did not fear the stigma of a short jail term in support of a cause—such dedication was a badge of honor and sign of toughness in this masculine subculture. Because the IWW used city streets to organize and make its grievances heard, local contests could explode into free speech fights. Local authorities soon came to fear the IWW out of all proportion to its resources or membership strength. Repeatedly, they asked the federal government for assistance and were ignored. By the time the United States entered World War I, a siege mentality had set in for West Coast towns. If the IWW called a strike or rally, detectives would wait at train depots, arrest anyone without substantial means, and sweep the streets doing the same. This practice, "vagging," would not be enough.[42]

Just several weeks before the March 1907 sawmill strike, the IWW paraded in the streets of Portland in support of the organization's national leader, "Big Bill" Haywood, who was on trial for murdering the governor of Idaho, a crime of which he was innocent. Two-thirds of the city's union locals marched with the IWW, as well as five SP locals. Although the city had only two fledgling IWW affiliates, over three thousand organized workers took part in the parade. William Z. Foster, who would go on to become a key leader of the Communist Party in the United States for 40 years, was an SP activist in Portland at the time. He recalled that "the

arrest and kidnapping of…Haywood…in 1906 shook the labor movement and stimulated great defense activity among us Socialists. His acquittal in 1907, directly forced by the mass pressure of…aroused workers, we hailed as a tremendous victory." By 1907, many FTC unions were so far outside the mainstream of civic life that alliance with the IWW and SP must have seemed wholly reasonable. After failing to make an impact in politics, witnessing increased employer persecution, and arousing public indignation by fighting the Lewis and Clark Centennial, perhaps it appeared to some AFL locals that only radical change would bring about justice. Already alienated, what had they to lose?[43]

Any hopes of maintaining the leftist unity on display in February 1907 were quickly dashed. Once the IWW began competing with the FTC for the allegiance of lumber mill workers in March, cooperation ended. The IWW won over an entire local union after it rejected an AFL charter and FTC leadership during the strike. Still, the FTC advised its membership and the public to respect the IWW picket. The IWW held a rival Labor Day celebration that year, embarrassing the FTC and further ensuring that the organizations would remain rivals in Portland. Over the next decade, the IWW and FTC developed separate constituencies and their rivalry was somewhat muted. The IWW proved unable to build stable local unions and catered more to seasonal and transient workers—groups largely ignored by the AFL. The IWW organized lumber camps, farms, and canneries—never really taking hold with the mill workers temporarily won over in 1907. The *Portland Labor Press* often chided the IWW for its "schoolboy pyrotechnics" but further alienated the public by supporting their right to use public space for organizing and protest. The FTC had been fighting attempts to restrain its own picketing for years and could not afford to see the rights of any labor organization abridged. There must have also been some real sympathy. The February 1907 parade does indicate that two-thirds of the city's AFL locals felt enough kinship with revolutionaries to march in support of another organization's radical leader who had been much vilified in the region. Although the FTC and IWW would become organizational rivals, there may not have been that much ideological distance between the battered rank and file of either group.[44]

Oregon was never one of the strongest Socialist states but support there was significant and electoral evidence indicated that it was increasing over the 1910s even as voting for the party waned nationally. Although SP leader Eugene V. Debs opposed the IWW after 1908 over its repudiation of socialist politics in favor of union organizing, "Big Bill" Haywood sat on the SP's National Executive Committee until early 1913. The SP also had broad support within segments of the AFL. Strong AFL and Progressive support for Woodrow Wilson, along with the charismatic Debs sitting out the 1916

presidential election, contributed to a decline in Socialist voting. A national study concluded that during 1910, near the peak of SP power, Oregon ranked thirty-second in its election of Socialist officials. However, in 1916, nearly 4 percent of Oregon voters went with the SP, ranking the state fifteenth in the nation in Socialist electoral support. Even when Oregon was in the bottom half of states in SP voting, William Z. Foster reported a vibrant movement in Portland led by the sort of prosperous workers and middle-class reformers who owned homes on the east side and voted for Will Daly. Foster believed that leftist Populist supporters in predominantly agricultural states, including Oregon, had become SP supporters. "The Socialist Party also attracted many radical elements of the city petty bourgeoisie who were feeling acutely the pressure of the trusts upon the middle class and who had no faith in the two old parties." Socialist strength in Portland still grew even when the Progressives ousted the old Republican politicos but Foster would not be around to see it happen. He left Portland in 1907 during a temporary economic crisis that boosted unemployment and weakened the labor movement even further.[45]

By 1908, the FTC was in dire straits. The collapse of the Building Trades Council and the terrible publicity generated by opposition to the Lewis and Clark Centennial had both badly hurt the credibility of the central body with local unions. The national AFL sent an organizer to the city in the spring to demolish what was left of the failed central organization and rebuild entirely. C. O. Young convinced each AFL local to affiliate with a "trade sectional," such as the Building Trades or Metal Trades as well as with the new central body, the CLC. The new CLC moved quickly to expand the *Portland Labor Press* and remove the radical editor, R. A. Harris, replacing him with his supposedly more conservative assistant. Harris was openly critical of capitalism, and in response to those who objected, he stood pat: "This paper will be as radical as the combined ingenuity of its management can make it" because "radical men and radical ideas get us something. Conservatives suffer in humility and die in slavery." His replacement distinguished himself by dressing as a hobo and intentionally getting arrested to examine treatment of the unemployed. The article that followed this experience condemned both local government and the larger system that persecuted the poor. During the winter of 1914–15, the CLC spent nearly $1,500 to provide over 8,000 meal tickets to the unemployed. Portland's AFL labor movement and its newspaper have often been branded as conservative not because that has been consistently true but because the city never consistently had the scale of protest of some of its more industrialized peers.[46]

In 1909, the CLC renewed battle with the supposed Citizens' Alliance, which reformed in response as the more honestly titled Employers' Association, a name it would retain through the war years. A pickup in

the local economy coincided with the successful reorganization of labor and by late 1911 the CLC had 74 local unions with a combined membership estimated at 7,500. In response to Employers' Association attempts to restrain union pickets through local ordinances, which began in 1910 and never really subsided, the CLC, despite a consistent record of failure, had to enter the political arena. It actively backed the candidacy of three union members for municipal office in 1911 and all of them won. Among them was union printer and SP member Will Daly, by then a city councilman. He was a powerful voice for Portland unions until the war began, often fending off the anti-picketing restrictions proposed by the Employers' Association. It is important that, entering the war, Portland unions felt their political influence growing. They would have the confidence to be quite demanding of all levels of government. However, a history of civic marginality and a public image as a contentious outsider would make the movement's political power quite precarious and encourage an increased radicalism.[47]

During the several years preceding the war, the CLC and *Portland Labor Press* opposed militarism and fought a losing battle to win the city's respect and relieve the plague of cyclical unemployment during the mid-decade slump. In 1915, the newspaper mounted a campaign of personal attacks against members of the city school board after they voted to keep the schools open on Labor Day. The Central Committee of the Portland SP passed a resolution against the introduction of military training in the city's public schools that November, noting that "we in common with the organized workers of this City…are opposed to militarism." The *Labor Press* also suggested that city funds appropriated to celebrate a local stop of the Liberty Bell on its national tour should instead be spent on unemployment relief. Civic alienation would become even more pronounced, despite the prominence of Will Daly, as the war "preparedness campaign" gained ground in 1916. The *Labor Press* printed and attacked a proposal by the Pacific Coast Business Men's Preparedness League to militarize the workforce:

> Businessmen should be sensible to the advantages to be had from military training in point of greater discipline and efficiency of the work people for their ordinary civil employment. Every employee returning from training camp or militia drill will forthwith show himself more obedient and faithful and the trouble maker will disappear.

If unions were worried about what war would bring, they apparently had very good reason, though their hesitancy was yet another factor that distanced union members from much of the city's populace. An estimated 20,000 turned out to a local Preparedness Day celebration in June 1916, the month before the *Labor Press* launched its attack on the workforce militarization proposal.[48]

During the 1910s, Portland unions began to build a potential organizational advantage over employers by expanding their reach beyond the city itself. Crafts formed district and statewide organizations to connect their various local unions, and allied crafts began to federate in the same fashion. This trend would grow beyond limits of state and even nation. During and immediately following the war, for example, the specter of a militant Pacific Coast Metal Trades Council that stretched from California to British Columbia frightened shipyard and foundry owners who were reaping immense profits from government contracts. This sort of solidarity became a reality as early as September 1917, when all the shipbuilding workers of San Francisco Bay, the Columbia River, and Puget Sound walked out together. This action prompted the federal government to take on the role of peacemaker in this critical wartime industry.[49]

As the number and size of local unions expanded during the war, and as they dramatically expanded their reach through regional allied craft networks, women remained largely excluded from the increasing power and scope of the AFL. A decade after the war, in 1929, only 1,667 women belonged to unions throughout the state. Only one-third of Oregon's local unions had any women members at all. A Portland local of waitresses and cafeteria workers had 402 women members and no other had nearly as many. The other significant statewide totals were as follows: 235 in food services, 210 in garment manufacture, 153 in service on trains and steamships, 110 musicians, and 100 retail clerks. Although two women laundry workers served as delegates at the first OSFL convention in 1902, their union was long gone by 1929. Employers and unions excluded women from the crafts that thrived during the war and the labor movement in Oregon did not commit itself to organizing the trades in which women toiled. There is evidence of telephone operator militancy in the war period, but women, as workers, were largely cut out of wartime unionization and prosperity.[50]

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In the spring of 1917, the CLC was in crisis. The Portland union movement had a history of political failure and had just lost its strongest elected ally, Will Daly, who had protected labor since 1911. George Baker's mayoral victory and a strong Employers' Association portended more confrontations over the union shop and unfair materials, in which organized labor had suffered defeat after defeat—but there was hope on the horizon.

During the course of US involvement in the war, the OSFL mushroomed from 12,000 to 35,000 members. The federal government also became a new force in the industrial relations balance and AFL craft unions were a critical component of its program to police war production.

Portland unions had a unique opportunity to build their power base and responded militantly. Although they had largely failed in politics and were alienated from mainstream civic culture, the city's unionized working class was unusually homogeneous and prosperous. AFL unionists consolidated power by exiling workers with less bargaining strength, such as nonwhites, women, transients, and the unskilled from the promise of wartime gain. These factors would lend solidarity and confidence to a movement that had suffered resounding defeats in political and economic struggle. The AFL had a home-owning constituency east of the river, while radical movements drew more from west Portland transients and the unskilled. A wartime labor shortage emboldened radicals also. Although there were two different movements divided by the Willamette River, they were united in their desire to topple the Employers' Association from its position of dominance. They were also bridged by the deep roots of Progressive and, to a lesser but still significant extent, Socialist politics on the east side. Federal agencies, in cooperation with an antilabor municipal government, would have to build a new interventionist bureaucratic regime to maintain peace.[51]

CHAPTER 3

POLICING EVERYDAY LIFE: FEDERAL POWER, LOCAL ELITES, AND CITIZEN SPIES

Just after World War I ended, Mrs. W. Humphrey wrote to the US Food Office in Portland, indignant and humiliated that her home had been searched by federal agents acting on a tip that she was hoarding sugar. She listed her many activities in support of the war effort, including volunteer gardening and nursing work. She was sure that a woman on her street, who was "foreign," unlike the native-born Mrs. Humphrey, had reported her unfairly. To make matters worse, the foreign woman "would abuse the Red Cross and its methods of collecting money." There is suffering evident in her letter. She and her husband were of modest means, not young or in good health, and she was "today bare for things I need to help my dear homeland." The government had humiliated her before her neighbors and she responded in the only way many individuals during the war felt able to: with proof of her active loyalty and intrinsic Americanism. She discredited her accuser by taking these characteristics away from the foreign woman who would remain anonymous.[1]

Mrs. Humphrey was not alone. During the war era, the federal government burst into the lives of millions who lived in war production centers. Because local elites in Portland welcomed federal policing, the reach of the state there was long. A culture of fear and hyper-patriotism convinced Portlanders to spy on each other, making them adjuncts to the police power of the state. Some individuals who were suspect had more power than others to resist, and examining the ability to respond to the state is just as important as understanding the power of the government to police.

There were two layers to the construction of urban order through the basic mechanics of everyday life. The first occurred at the elite level through the mutual goal of the local establishment and the federal government to grow the industrial base of Portland and to do so rationally and under tight

control. The Oregon branch of the Council of National Defense (CND) was the primary vehicle steering the city toward this carefully managed outcome. The group wanted peaceful shipyards and the suppression of radicals but these goals required more than industrial relations and intelligence systems. As war workers streamed into Portland, urban order also relied upon rationalizing the allocation of human resources and solving a housing crisis. Success hinged upon the cooperation of business elites with their peers on the Oregon CND. Local elite interests could fracture and did so in a conflict over zoning and housing reform. The federal-local partnership confronting the war emergency failed to overcome entrenched real estate interests. In the second layer were the citizen spies who permeated everyday life. Portlanders fought skirmishes over ethnicity and class through war bond drives and food hoarding regulations. As they served their own goals, they also furthered those of the government.

The Oregon CND

Mobilization through wartime federalism would prove broadly transformative but it began at the top. Secretary of War Newton Baker chaired the CND and opened the May 1917 conference that founded the body by discussing the "indispensable relations which exist between the States and the Federal Government." Baker believed from the outset that action at the state and local levels would determine the success of the effort and that building morale would prove as important as gathering resources. Although the CND State Councils Section coordinated from Washington, DC, each state organized its own branch and even federated by county in order to mobilize both people and materials for the war effort. The CND encouraged this highly dispersed structure to take advantage of administrative capacity where it already existed and to push forward local initiatives and publicity campaigns. The Oregon branch used this combination of local autonomy and federal authority to boost the growth of Portland and ameliorate what its leaders believed to be the city's entrenched problems.[2]

There was a good deal of civilian chain-of-command confusion in Oregon just after the declaration of war in April 1917 due to the dominance of private-sector voluntarism established during the preparedness campaign. As the CND formed in the national capital, the Oregon Patriotic Service League (OPSL) emerged. The OPSL had its first meeting eight weeks before the Oregon branch of the CND and had an impressive and large board of directors, who structured it to operate through a smaller and more easily assembled executive committee. The OPSL constitution put forth an ambitious plan to serve as a voluntarism clearing house in Oregon to avoid duplication of work by separate agencies. The organization wanted

to assist "the government in its intelligence efforts" and propaganda campaigns in addition to coordinating the local people and materiel that the national mobilization required. After the formation of the Oregon CND, the OPSL offered in May to increase the new body's membership to a hundred by merging its own quite prominent volunteers. The national CND affirmed the decision and called for a small executive committee, similar to the OPSL model. In September, the director of work of the Oregon CND, Bruce Dennis, claimed that the organization was already federated by county and that it was taking an active part in fire prevention and food conservation, as well as the expansion of wooden shipbuilding.[3]

Having Bruce Dennis, a newspaperman, in charge of operations made sense given the Washington directive that state-based CND publicity activity for the war effort was "fundamental to all work and of first importance." He was a newspaper publisher who had been active in Progressive politics before the war and became a Republican state senator in 1921. Under his guidance the *La Grande Daily Observer* "established its influence second to no publication in Oregon east of Portland." The *Oregon Voter* described the new senator as not only having done "very effective work" while "demonstrating administrative ability of a high order" during his leadership of a bond campaign for better roads in 1917 but that he "also holds grudges and works at them; a nasty enemy." By the time the United States entered World War I, he may well have been feared by many business elites, whether friends or enemies. Before he had even taken his seat, the *Oregon Voter* predicted that he was "practically certain to introduce or work for legislation aimed at businesses or business interests that he dislikes and is certain to prove very effective in moves of this kind." During the war he brought his full enmity to bear against labor activism as an impediment to the expansion of shipbuilding. He was effective at promoting the reputation of his council and in using language in correspondence with Washington, DC, that emphasized federal goals while working toward those of his regional colleagues. For example, Dennis justified the local Progressive effort to contain sexuality, and thus moral order, in a city in great flux squarely in the context of the war effort. The Oregon CND received $25,000 of state funds in October 1917 and $10,000 of it went directly to the Oregon Social Hygiene Society "for moral uplift and sanitation in the different army camps where Oregon men are stationed."[4]

The Oregon CND intended to direct federal power toward the suppression of radicals and stabilization of industrial relations. Bruce Dennis boasted after coordinated September 1917 federal raids on halls of the radical Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) organization across the nation,

> During the labor troubles, this Council assisted materially in getting the United States Government to see its error in not dealing stealthily and

> quickly with the I.W.W. element, which later on the Government did do, and thereby removed the peril to industries on the Pacific slope.

Dennis firmly believed that the Oregon CND had also helped the fight against the IWW in the region by conspiring to deny them newspaper coverage, because "without publicity such an organization would soon perish." He took credit that lately, "The I.W.W. headquarters were abandoned and street speakers ceased to appear." The national CND office gave thanks for this suggestion and concurred with the wisdom of "inducing the federal government to interest itself in this labor difficulty before any crime had been committed [, which] ought to be valuable…for other States."[5]

During the West Coast shipbuilding strike of September 1917, Bruce Dennis informed Washington, DC, "The State Council of Defense has exerted every effort not only to encourage wooden shipbuilding in Oregon, but also to protect it as much as possible." But the national capital would have to take the lead in creating industrial peace: "The Federal Government has agreed to take a hand in the matter at once and we hope for good results soon." The government did indeed settle the strike, and the Oregon CND wanted it to maintain industrial harmony in the shipyards, at least in part, through propaganda. The CND was not asking for anything it could not have done on its own but the strike settlement had shown local elites the power of federal prestige. War production agencies headquartered in the capital had an even greater interest in avoiding strikes and were desperate for advice from observers who knew local conditions. Effective federal propaganda *might* help local elites use an expanding shipbuilding industry to boost Portland but it would *definitely* help federal officials accomplish the war aims of the state.[6]

Just after the strike settlement, in late November 1917, Oregon CND chairman Henry L. Corbett, also head of the Portland Chamber of Commerce and state Red Cross, asked Bruce Dennis to communicate his plan for peace in shipbuilding to the national CND office. He was the Harvard-educated scion of an Oregon dynasty. The Corbetts were one of the ruling families of Portland banking and real estate and had extensive ranching interests beyond the city. Dennis pushed the agenda of the CND, but its purpose and legitimacy emanated from Corbett and his elite allies: "He contends that men working in that industry should be made to feel and understand that their part in the great scheme of production is vitally essential." Toward this end, the government should make films that show ships at work in the war effort. Corbett was concerned that the conflict had not been solved; rather it had "only lapsed into a state of coma, subject to revival at any moment." Dennis also suggested that because the president had already made a practice of calling prominent labor leaders and yard

owners to Washington, DC, for conferences, he should "select a few of the prominent men who labor in the shipbuilding industry, inviting them to the National Capitol to talk with him personally regarding the future." This was clearly a program to maintain local industrial peace using federal prestige. In Portland, federal arbitration had not established the union shop even though it had been the main cause of the recent strike. The city was alone in this regard among the major West Coast shipbuilding centers. Corbett and Dennis wanted workers to identify with the mission of their national government over that of their union in order to maintain local industrial peace. Corbett felt that "there is a mental and physical sluggishness in all work being done in the shipyards in this district," not surprising following a long and unsuccessful strike for union recognition. He wanted to

> popularize industrial work by allowing the men to organize among themselves labor battalions and giving them some insignia to show that they are part of the war machinery. This cannot come from local communities or employers but might properly come through the National Council of Defense, or better still, through the President.

The national CND agreed with Corbett on shipbuilding insignia, and the Department of Labor (DOL) instituted a system along these lines in 1918. But if the government had tried to force union shipbuilding workers into "labor battalions," it would surely have created, not resolved, conflict.[7]

However, there were less confrontational ways to draw war production laborers into a militarized federal system. In the summer of 1917, federal officials hatched a plan to have all existing state and municipal employment agencies partner with the labor committee of each state CND and form war production labor exchanges in all population centers with significant federal contracts. Federal officials wanted the CND committee in charge to be carefully balanced: it should have a woman member to deal with the recruitment of women workers, the chairman should be acceptable to both capital and labor, and both employers and unions should have representation. The DOL spearheaded the effort to build an employment exchange system in late 1917 with a $250,000 budget. Although DOL then served as an information clearinghouse for employers on federal contracts, the states—through the CND—had to expand their already existing public employment networks to recruit the specific laborers that DOL told them to find. In addition to forming a CND labor committee, each state had to find the money to open and staff offices in the places where DOL requested them.[8]

The federal hiring agency that emerged in early 1918 was the Public Service Reserve of the DOL. The associate director of the program visited Portland and selected Franklin Griffith, president of the Portland Railway,

Light & Power Company, as head of the Public Service Reserve for Oregon. Griffith and his committee oversaw a federated operation with "county directors" and even "enrolling agents" in every community. When the drive for "shipyard volunteers" began in early February 1918, Oregon's quota share of the national goal of 250,000 recruits was only 3,204. The Portland registration locations were familiar: the offices of the building trades unions as well as the city and county employment agencies. The federal-local government effort to coordinate hiring had drawn in Portland's Central Labor Council. The national program was a total success, with the goal reached in little more than a month. All the registration postcards went to the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) national office. This federal agency was responsible for expanding national shipbuilding capacity and maintaining peace in the yards, thus it had a substantial field presence in Portland. The Department of Shipyard Volunteers of the EFC indexed registration cards and then sent each worker a badge and certificate. The suggestions regarding insignia from Oregon in late 1917, to some degree instituted through the shipyard volunteers program, finally came to fruition when the DOL Employment Service reorganized in August 1918 to meet the mounting crisis in war production labor. DOL formed a new Civilian Insignia Service to design and issue badges to war production workers.[9]

Despite great efforts, the US Employment Service and its local partners never developed the capacity to manage employment so thoroughly that shipyards abandoned their own employment offices. Also, given the heavy involvement of the labor movement, it is unsurprising that shipyard owners wanted to develop their own capacity to become autonomous—even at significant expense. Through 1918, the shipyards continued to expand their own employment offices and the EFC encouraged this process by holding training seminars for employment managers and soliciting the yards for nominations to these courses. The boilermakers union complained in August 1918 that both Columbia River Shipbuilding and Northwest Steel were using employment offices to hire their members at laborers' rates, regardless of qualifications, and then granted or refused promotions arbitrarily.[10]

For reasons both practical and political, federal agencies worked in tandem with the shipyards' own employment departments. The employment crisis was critical in specific crucial sectors of production but there was clearly a lack of real desperation throughout the economy as a whole that prevented novel public systems driven by voluntarism from becoming all encompassing. Ambitious plans to register women and boys, as a contingency in preparation for a long war that would ultimately make impossible demands on the adult male workforce, moved forward early and demonstrate a broad vision of labor allocation that might have come to fruition

had it become necessary. Like the efforts to recruit "shipyard volunteers" energetically from early 1918, the registration of women and boys awaited only sufficient funding driven by necessity. That this necessity never developed does not render these drives unimportant. Rather, they provide a window into a much broader vision for society-wide mobilization that the end of the war cut short.

The primary goal of the head of the Oregon CND Woman's Committee, Therese Castner, was to hold a massive registration of Oregon women in order to find them appropriate work, or training for such, to further the war effort. Her committee issued 125,000 registration cards and distributed pamphlets describing the types of work women could do and where training could be had. While some types of volunteer work were rather in keeping with bourgeois gender norms, such as "home nursing," "knitting," and "welfare work for families"—others, such as "automobile repair and driving," did break boundaries. Most unusual was the extensive listing of "professional or paid work" that included highly desirable, traditionally male jobs: architecture, chemistry, dentistry, law, medicine, and pharmacy. The pamphlet did not relegate women to assistant positions either. Every subheading hinted at full entry into the profession, including "general practice" for dentistry and medicine and laboratory work in chemistry and pharmacy.[11]

On the day of registration in September 1917, the *Portland Oregonian* newspaper reported that women volunteers had distributed 70,000 cards to homes, though the Woman's Committee later claimed just 5,400 returned. While the low rate of return could be attributed to ambivalence over the war or the resilience of gender norms, it is just as likely that the whole scheme was a class-based misunderstanding. The bourgeois organizers of the registration plan had leisure time to volunteer but it is unlikely that the bulk of Oregon women, who lived in a state not very urban or affluent, had the money and freedom to pursue volunteer work or professional training. The response would likely have been considerably lower still without ambiguity raising the possibility of federal subsidy. A national official of the CND Woman's Committee indicated that "there has been a misinterpretation of the registration cards by many people who have thought that training would be offered by the Government and would be free." But the national office hoped "that if there should be a large demand for free tuition in any one course of study and those persons seeking that training were quite unable to pay a tuition fee, the Woman's Committee in the locality could…organize classes."[12]

The committee's efforts were in vain. In March 1918, months after the registration, the cards "have not been filed according to occupation, because of lack of funds. It would require the services of a stenographer for at least a month." The committee voted to ask the Oregon CND for the necessary

funds but there is no evidence that this project went any further. The CND also participated in the registration campaign of the US Boys' Working Reserve during April 1918. The Oregon committee consisted mainly of YMCA administrators but also included several high-ranking CND officials and the superintendent of Portland schools. The Oregon CND hoped that the county-level organizations would carry out the registration in conjunction with the Woman's Committee, which had already gone through the process. The registration of boys and deployment of their labor was a greater success than the campaign for women though it is unclear whether administration had improved or issues of age and gender made this task more feasible. Over nine thousand registered and the Boys' Working Reserve utilized nearly half this number during the summer of 1918. Boys mainly helped in agriculture, particularly toward bringing in Oregon's berry crop but several hundred also worked in Portland shipyards. However, because it was a summer program, the Reserve would likely have remained focused on agriculture had the war lasted longer. Still, such schemes reveal how far the registration of the nation's population may well have gone had the war stretched labor resources over several more years. The federal government might well have had to shift registration of women and boys from the realm of voluntarism to that of an expanded official administrative capacity with centralized record keeping—a major shift in the relationship of individuals and communities to the national government.[13]

Boosters of Oregon industry believed that the state's education system would have to construct a major vocational component to sustain the growth of shipbuilding. The new State Board for Vocational Education included both Therese Castner, head of the Oregon CND Woman's Committee, and E. J. Stack, secretary of both the Oregon State Federation of Labor and Portland Central Labor Council, among its five members. Under the leadership of J. A. Churchill, state superintendent of public instruction, the board submitted an ambitious plan to develop institutions focused on agricultural, industrial, and home economics education to Washington, DC, in December 1917 to gain federal funds promised by the recent Smith-Hughes Act. This was the beginning of a national push toward vocational education and marked a turning point in both federal involvement in local schools and the basic mission of school districts. A field inspector approved reimbursement money for six courses underway in Oregon in June 1918, including two in Portland for machinists and shipbuilders. The former was taught at the new Benson Polytechnic School for boys (there was also a counterpart for girls focused on home economics), though the latter course was geared toward adults and had over two hundred registrants. It seems the expectation on the local and federal sides of the partnership was that this was just a beginning for the vocational training of children and adults in the state.[14]

Housing Reform and the Rise of Planning

As the Oregon CND and its partners developed human resources in the state to secure its economic future, workers flocked to Portland seeking war production jobs. The federal-local partnership faced a major challenge to urban order as the city swelled with war workers, never enough to exceed demand yet making housing difficult to find and dramatically increasing rents. As with scarce labor resources, federal agencies and local authorities responded with a registration program to ascertain and allocate resources, as well as an arbitration system, in this case to settle rent disputes. The Oregon CND conducted a massive survey of all the housing resources in Portland during October 1918. Had the war not ended just after the survey, it is quite possible that a federal housing program would have come to Portland rather quickly. In March 1918, Congress allowed the EFC to provide loans to shipbuilding firms to construct housing for their workers. Portland was not in desperate straits at this point, and would not be until after the summer, so the city was not on the initial slate of EFC housing projects. The DOL was also taking an active role through its new US Housing Corporation (USHC) but suffered from lack of funds, making it reliant on local initiative.[15]

Fortunately for the USHC, the war coincided with a local push for comprehensive zoning in Portland. The Portland Housing Association (PHA), a private group of Progressive reformers, claimed in 1918, "The housing problem is largely a matter of unguided city growth. Each of our American cities must learn the art of growing." There are two ways to understand the impulse toward and conflict over an "art of growing." On one hand, it engendered a largely local and materialist contest over whether zoning in Portland would protect or decrease land values, and for whom. This aspect of the struggle centered on Portland's Planning Commission, which began meeting in January 1919, and its failed attempt to zone the city. A coalition of municipal officials and major real estate interests did not hold together long enough to work out a compromise to make the city's physical space more rational and more profitable simultaneously. The hopes of planning consultant Charles Cheney, who had come to Portland in 1918 and advocated an eight zone system that regulated broad types of land use as well as limiting building height and lot coverage, faded away over 1919–20. Just enough small businesses and homeowners disagreed with specifics in the plan to help zoning meet defeat in a close referendum with just 40 percent turnout in November 1920.[16]

Although the business establishment had by then backed away from zoning and it had not captured the public imagination, the referendum was a real defeat for city government and also for another group that had provided significant impetus for planning in Portland and in cities nationwide: social

reformers. This is the other side of the contest over the "art of growing." Some urban elites were drawn to the issue of housing not by a material contest over the rational or profitable use of the city's land but from concerns over moral decay. These reformers were very active both inside and in partnership with the Wilson administration during World War I, hoping that unprecedented government efforts to manage the massive social dislocation brought on by the war would last beyond the crisis, creating a new moral order out of the turbulent cities that grew rapidly owing to industrialization and immigration. Reformers and their organizations took hope from not only a sympathetic administration but also the dramatic expansion of both the federal field service and the prerogatives of the state in local life during the war. Symbiosis between dynamic state agencies during the war and local reformers who were often connected to national networks suggests that the rise of demand for planning in Portland was not a local process for everyone involved. For reformers, a new national moral order would have to proceed city by city. In Portland, their vehicles were first the private PHA and then the USHC of the DOL.

The private PHA had been agitating for housing reform since at least 1913, initially as a housing committee of the Consumers League, but had little real impact until planned growth gathered considerable momentum in Portland during a worsening wartime housing crunch brought on mainly by massive federally funded expansion of local shipbuilding. The PHA inspected over seven hundred buildings in poor areas of the city in spring 1918 at the request of Commissioner of Public Works A. L. Barbur, and with the formal approval of the city council. It was the first of two major housing surveys in Portland during 1918, both brought about by the war and pushed by social reformers. The first provided systematic evidence of the nature of the housing standards crisis and the second established a comprehensive housing map. Both provided impetus to zoning advocates in city government.[17]

The PHA and city government did not have entirely congruent goals. The PHA was campaigning to save the poor from the slums, and their final report reveals the complexity and contradictions of the group's motivations: fear, disgust, and paternalistic duty combined with real beneficence. Although local reformers were often tied to larger national networks striving for broad social control of, in their perception, morally chaotic cities, it is also clear that these housing advocates were the only substantial voice for the poor, who were too often invisible in the zoning debate. The PHA report to Commissioner Barbur explicitly makes the connection between local conditions and the nation's future:

> There are many districts where life can not be maintained properly and where children, if they survive in spite of the unhealthful conditions, will be

> physically and morally subnormal, being handicapped as individuals in the race of life and jeapordising, in the mass, the maintenance of the democracy of the United States.

Fear of and disdain for the poor is as evident as pity in the report: "The shiftless gather where their shiftlessness is unnoticed and always there are those either foreign born or from our own rural districts where sanitation is unknown, who come to the city, bringing with them the unsanitary habits of primitive life." The report's two primary stated rationales for housing reform make clear a split between beneficent, if paternal, uplift and social control. First, "to give to every one their reasonable share of the essentials of life—light, air[,] water, protection from the elements and from unsanitary surroundings." The second, however, revealed an intention "to secure the environment that will protect the community socially and morally." The group's specific recommendations to accomplish these two principles included not only protecting undeveloped space and demanding more windows, plumbing, and fire protection but also active "supervision…to prevent dilapidation and deterioration and wanton destruction of buildings through neglect of tenants," not just owners. The report inspired a new housing code, at first unanimously adopted by the city council in early 1919 and then eviscerated by building and realty interests later that year.[18]

The end of the war in late 1918 and the subsequent decline of energy and funding for Wilson administration Progressives and their allies meant that the findings of the PHA, which Cheney endorsed, helped bring about, but did not ultimately frame, the local zoning debate of 1919–20. The DOL's wartime USHC similarly spurred housing reform but then weakened too much to guide the postwar planning conflict. The USHC also displayed the impulse of the PHA toward both beneficence and social control. This agency was composed of reformers who believed in the stabilizing effects of home ownership on society and the moral benefits for the individual workman and his family. The USHC wanted to use the war as a launching pad for a permanent role for the federal state in this area of the private sector, and there were plenty of local businessmen in real estate, construction, and banking who were eager for the partnership. Local political leaders and industrialists also saw expansion of housing as intrinsically connected to expanding their city and its economy. The USHC focus on growth rather than standards lent it broader potential appeal than the PHA. However, its defense of both single-family dwellings and affordable rents would have placed the agency on the opposite side of the zoning debate from real estate interests, which came to oppose single-family dwelling zones as a drag on potential profits from commercial or apartment development. There is also evidence that the USHC field service on the West Coast wanted to shift

focus to a standards approach similar to the PHA after the war production emergency was over. The Pacific Coast manager endorsed the postwar statement of Portland agent Mark Cohn that

> our recommendations have been made with the thought in mind of conserving energy and expense, and we have viewed the matter merely from the standpoint of the work we have been performing in connection with the war program…our recommendations might differ quite materially if the Government is considering taking up housing in its broader aspects, i.e., housing from a social and public welfare standpoint in normal peace times.

However, although the USHC diminished after the war and Cohn's hopes never came to fruition, the agency had already successfully pushed for a survey that ultimately provided the first really comprehensive housing map of Portland just several months before the Planning Commission formed and pursued zoning.[19]

The USHC, however, was not initially interested in Portland. A September 1917 report claimed that the housing situation in that city was "as nearly ideal…as you will find at any place in the United States." But in the expansion of federally subsidized industry lay the seed for future problems, should the war last quite a while:

> On account of the slump in business in the last few years many residences were vacant; these are now being filled up with people coming in that are working in the shipyards and other places that have secured government contracts. However, the city is not yet full and it is possible for labor of all kinds to secure good and comfortable homes and rooms, at reasonable rates. There is no situation here at this time that demands any particular attention.

Nearly a year later, in late August 1918, the city that had been "not yet full" was facing a crisis: build more housing or turn away federal war production contracts. Mayor Baker, also head of the Multnomah County branch of the Oregon CND, named members of an "emergency housing survey committee." The *Oregon Journal*, a Portland newspaper, reported,

> Never in the history of the city have unoccupied dwelling houses been so scarce as they are at present…With a shipbuilding population estimated at over 30,000, the most of whom have been drawn to Portland from outside points, the problem of finding living accommodations has reached a serious point. Contemplated expansion of plants has aggravated the conditions.

Baker's committee included federal and local officials as well as representatives of the carpenters union and real estate interests. Their work was not

initiated locally but from a USHC directive "that a complete survey be made immediately of all housing facilities in the city." Baker was now the chair of the US Registration Service of the USHC in Portland and there was an associated Placement Bureau Committee as well. After the survey, workers on government contracts in need of housing were to be matched with available space by this local extension of the USHC. This government survey operation was nationwide and followed a plan based on election precincts, similar to the military draft. Mayor Baker asked all election precinct officers to enlist in the effort and to use their board members as canvassers and their polling place as headquarters. The publicity campaign was enormous, including 400 large posters on streetcars and 125,000 circulars enclosed with shop purchases. "Picture houses" showed informative slides, newspapers trumpeted the survey, and teachers instructed students to inform their parents. In all, nearly 3,000 volunteers worked Portland's 380 election precincts and visited 45,886 "habitations," which the county assessor declared to be virtually all of the residences in the city. This survey provided the first comprehensive understanding of housing resources in the city, an essential precursor to the zoning campaign.[20]

The results showed that new construction would have to begin soon. Although there were single rooms for more workers, lodging for families was sorely lacking. The city was completely saturated in this area, although over a thousand "private homes…are apparently patriotically trying to assist in this shortage." Still, "in a large percentage of cases, [the flats] are rather meager and in many instances would not afford the facilities which the families of our workers might require." The survey report made clear that these emergency "house keeping accommodations" would only do "for our war workers for the few weeks or months required for the building…of at least one thousand new houses." Local elites certainly wanted to avoid a situation in which large numbers of male workers were unable to bring their families to Portland. City officials had long believed that working-class men were more susceptible to vice and radicalism without the stabilizing influence of family. Such thinking meshed quite well with the belief of USHC reformers that home ownership would give the working class a greater stake in urban order.[21]

Mayor Baker's More Homes Committee quickly issued permits to 65 builders and began considering 200 more applications. He hoped to have one thousand new homes built within three months but the cessation of hostilities just as the program was gearing up dashed the hopes of those who wanted to keep building Portland. As the government cancelled contracts and the promise of new ones evaporated, the vision of a shipbuilding metropolis on the confluence of the Willamette and Columbia rivers faded. The Portland placement bureau headed by Mayor Baker, district supervisor

of the EFC Lloyd Wentworth, and USHC field agent Mark Cohn never really got started. The survey, however, clearly shows the growing depth of federal involvement in the use and expansion of local housing resources. The Own Your Own Home section of the USHC tried to keep the government involved in housing well into 1919. This project met with the hearty approval of local elites, who saw its potential for giving workers a firmer interest in the status quo. George Tazwell, Multnomah County judge, wrote to the DOL that "a Democratic form of Government cannot safely exist under a system where tenantry predominates. The people are restless, are not satisfied and it brings on dissatisfaction with the majority, Why? Because there is no permanency or stability to rest upon." Tazwell went on to insist that "a Government of 'HOME OWNERSHIP,' means a government of stability, no[t] only to the few but the people as a whole." Bereft of financial clout, the DOL was unable to follow through on the promises of its posters: "I WANT TO SEE EVERY WAGEWORKER OWN HIS OWN HOME." Although the USHC offered to serve as "a clearing house for 'Own Your Home' ideas" and to send out "posters and publicity matter," money and administrative capacity were the crucial missing resources.[22]

Portland tenants were afflicted with rocketing rents during the war and wrote to federal officials, both in Portland and Washington, DC, with complaints. When one such complaint found its way to the desk of James Ford, manager of the Homes Registration and Information Division of the USHC, he pressured Mayor Baker to form a Rent Profiteering Committee in his capacity as chairman of the CND for Multnomah County. Ford noted that other state CND networks had established local committees of this sort, with a subcommittee on "rent adjustment" composed of three members: one labor, one real estate, and one "leading citizen of the community." The subcommittee would meet once per week and order both landlord and tenant to appear and give evidence in a dispute. If the subcommittee ruled against the landlord then "he is told what will constitute a fair rent and is asked to hold to it. If he refuses the facts are published without comment in the local papers." Ford offered to send a representative to Portland to help organize the operation and it began work in late September 1918. The committee ceased taking complaints after November, but in just two months it settled 318 cases. It sustained the landlord in 125 cases and the tenant in only 25, while it brokered a compromise in 168.[23]

During the summer of 1918, one shipbuilding worker wrote to the EFC labor examiner in Portland complaining about his rent and was told that it was "our impression that the government is preparing to take action in cases where the rental to ship workers is raised above figures warranted by conditions." Had the EFC established this prerogative, the effects would have been far more revolutionary for tenants' rights than the shaming of

landlords in the newspapers carried on by local rent committees attached to the CND and USHC. The USHC knew that postwar funding cuts and the disbanding of state CND networks would devastate programs such as home registration, placement bureaus, and fair rental committees—although DOL wanted the committees to continue work during Reconstruction to promote stability in industrial relations. To avert a total shutdown, a Portland field agent drafted local ordinances that would have incorporated a salaried USHC official into city government and funded a US Homes Registration Committee. This tactic proved a failure but the effort shows how close federal-local government relationships became during the war in their mutual effort to create and maintain urban order.[24]

The repercussions of the failure of housing reformers to maintain momentum after the war and play a determining role in the zoning debate of 1919–20 that they had done much to inspire during the war had long-term consequences. Historian E. Kimbark MacColl has noted that the eventual 1924 zoning code did not "deal adequately with housing conditions" and that "housing facilities for the poor became worse through ineffective provisions for code enforcement," ignoring the supervision that the PHA had demanded. MacColl claimed that the Advisory Board of the Housing Code "was nothing more than a front for realtors and homebuilders." From the vantage point of the late 1970s, he observed that in the Buckman neighborhood of near southeast Portland, since 1960, "over 200 houses have been demolished and 100 apartment complexes erected, many of which have the appearance of motels." The neighborhood had also attained the city's highest rate of juvenile delinquency during that period. Housing reform failed as an experiment in either social justice or social control, making clear the indispensable nature of business support, or at least lack of opposition, to lasting federal-local partnerships.[25]

Liberty Bonds, Food Hoarding, and Citizen Spies

Many people living in war production centers could reasonably have held hopes that the federal government would improve their lives through housing programs, rent arbitration, and public transit expansion. However, for many communities, the war did not last quite long enough for these boons to become reality. Although some Portland residents benefited from rent arbitration, it did not have enough time to become ingrained in local culture to survive the war. Had the war lasted longer, the massive housing survey undertaken in late 1918 would have led initially to government-sponsored construction projects to house shipbuilding workers and expansion of transit networks to connect them to the yards, and perhaps even more ambitious schemes later. Other powers of the state to manage the lives

of urbanites did have enough time to successfully take root. The government did form strong local alliances to combat sex and alcohol in proximity to troop encampments—and the federal-local battle against alcohol continued to widen until it collapsed in disgrace in 1933. However, such efforts were particularly successful in realms in which authorities could encourage the public to spy on one another. In order to finance the war and limit private consumption of essential materials, federal and local authorities could not rely on their own capacity to hunt out the uncooperative. Because they were not targeting particular organizations or minorities, for here the whole nation was suspect, authorities had to hope that neighbors and workmates would betray each other—and they did.

Public pressure to purchase war bonds was intense and because people often encountered this campaign while at work, noncooperation could threaten their livelihood. Eager to trumpet their patriotism, firms would pressure their foremen to in turn pressure workers into subscribing to Liberty Bonds. A machinist fired after refusing to buy bonds complained to the EFC's assistant examiner in Portland, who then leaned on the Foundation Company to reinstate him. J. K. Smith had insisted to his foreman that he would buy bonds through a bank when he could and was unable to do so immediately through the company. After some investigation, it turned out that Smith had a family in the East and was saving to bring them out to Portland and that "every week he sends them the full amount of his pay, less his bare living expenses." There was also "considerable illness in the family." While defending Smith, the assistant examiner also made clear that it was reasonable to fire someone for refusing to buy bonds if they could afford to do so and that such people were not entitled to any privacy: "While not attempting to defend any bond slacker, this office is of the opinion that before men are discharged for refusing to purchase bonds, their cases should be carefully investigated so that injustice may not be done." Although bond purchasing was officially a voluntary display of patriotism, it really became part of an informal framework of wartime compliance administered by the public.[26]

During a Liberty Loan drive, the capital gave each state a quota based upon population and there was a great deal of competitiveness to surpass these figures greatly and quickly. In Oregon, this sort of enthusiasm was often a combination of sincere patriotism and the desire of political elites to further develop the region through federal investment. The third drive took place in spring 1918, and after just six days Oregon became the first state to reach its quota. The day that the triumphant news broke, city newspaper readers also learned that Louise Hunt, an assistant to Portland's public librarian, had refused to subscribe for war bonds. The case became the greatest local scandal since Senator Harry Lane voted against war the

previous spring. As pressure mounted from the bond campaign committee and newspapers whipped up public ire, library board head Winslow Ayer called a meeting of the body to interrogate Hunt. She responded that she was a loyal citizen but disagreed with President Wilson and that "at no time have I desired to be an 'obstructionist,' I merely wish to claim the constitutional American right privately to hold a minority opinion." The directors then voted not to terminate her employment. Ayer argued, "She is a pacifist and is conscientiously opposed to war." There was a tremendous backlash, which successfully pressured the board to convene a second time to dismiss Hunt. However, she resigned at the beginning of the meeting before such action could take place. Henry Corbett, head of the Oregon CND and Portland Chamber of Commerce, aptly summed up the local political climate when he stated that "now was not the time for individual opinion."[27]

Bond buying could serve as a litmus test if an individual's patriotism was called into question on other grounds. Stanley Socha, born in Prussia and with only first papers, was caught working in a shipyard well after all enemy aliens had been banned from the waterfront. The penalty was suspiciously light, just parole without bond required, because the US attorney felt that Socha had been lied to by his employer about his right to work in the yard and the man had both a family and a Liberty Bond to his credit. For radicals without families, failure to help finance the war was final proof for the city's judge George Rossman that such men were utter failures, which he made clear during a February 1918 sentencing of over two dozen IWW members caught in a raid on their hall:

> There is no excuse for any of you. You should be ashamed of yourselves for having made the failures of your lives that you evidently have. Only three of you have taken a sufficiently serious view of life to get married and take the responsibility of raising a family; not one has contributed to the Red Cross more than a few cents; not one of you has bought a liberty bond, and not one has purchased any of the other war emergency fund propositions.

Many IWW members lived hand to mouth and it is difficult to see how seasonal migrant workers would have been able to build home and family, let alone help the government pay for the war. But the new locally enforced regime of national patriotism demanded that "bond slackers" either plead for mercy, as machinist J. K. Smith had, or be condemned.[28]

Convincing the public to adhere to strict limits of staple foodstuffs was a much more difficult task and required even more invasion of privacy. Because it would have been utterly impossible for Department of the Treasury Secret Service agents, assigned to the new US Food Administration (USFA), to

regularly search every home in the land, informally deputizing everyone in the nation was the logical solution. The many letters irate Portland residents wrote to the government identifying their fellows as hoarders are a lasting testament to the efficacy of that solution. The official history of the USFA admitted that the "enforcement division" created in October 1917 to investigate violations of the Food Control Act "was concerned almost exclusively with the administrative or quasi-judicial action rather than with the legal proceedings possible under the Act." In this somewhat informal manner, the agents of the USFA, usually independently of Washington, DC, dispensed penalties in nearly nine thousand cases. Because investigation and then a hearing followed complaints, the already overstretched US attorney's office tried to focus on violations by wholesalers and sometimes retailers. However, the Secret Service was obliged to follow up on complaints. The Oregon head of the USFA responded to the humiliated Mrs. Humphrey, who claimed that her neighborhood reputation had been besmirched by a search of her house, that "this was undoubtedly one of hundreds of other similar cases that were reported to us and where we simply sent an inspector to investigate and where everything was found all right, as in your case, the matter was simply dismissed without record." If there were hundreds of unrecorded investigations and evidence of hundreds more that involved guilt and official reports just for sparsely populated Oregon over 1918, then the national extent of this sort of neighbor upon neighbor spying must have been rather substantial.[29]

The penalties from food profiteering and hoarding certainly added up. Penalties imposed after hearings, almost always informal, garnered over $500,000 for the Red Cross and other war charities and over $1 million of confiscated foodstuffs for the war effort. Some aggrieved individuals claimed that these sums could have been much higher if the government had gone after more of the big violators instead of bothering households. One anonymous complainant wrote that he was only allowed six pounds of sugar to jar his fruit, which would not nearly serve his needs. Even urbanites in Oregon sometimes had fruit trees or bushes at this time and there were an extraordinary number of complaints on this issue. This particular complainant launched an amateur investigation and "found out that some of the large users of sugar was getting it by the dray load of 81 to 100 sacks[.] what is bothering the writer is to know how these favored ones can get it in large quantities and us little cusses get starvation lots." The aggrieved then suggested that the Oregon head of the USFA, the same Winslow Ayer who initially showed tolerance as head of the library board, was having "something shoved in [his] way that makes them look good to him."[30]

The notion of official corruption and everyday citizens taking it on the chin while the fat cats live in splendor comes up repeatedly in these letters,

reflecting a widespread and accurate understanding that the rich were getting much richer because of the war and that this elite, including Corbett and Ayer, distributed among itself the top local war-mobilization positions as well. An incident involving the US attorney and one of the city's most prominent businessmen indicates that powerful federal connections could create a different set of rules for the local privileged class. When a Secret Service agent and a deputy sheriff investigated the German-speaking Wahl household, they found enormous amounts of hoarded food staples, some of which Mrs. Wahl attempted to hide or dispose of while the investigators were in her house. She also had homemade wine, which was in violation of Oregon's prohibition law. These violations "and general lax attitude toward the law" precipitated a punitive hearing. At that hearing, the attorney for the defendant quietly remarked to someone that US Attorney Haney "was in the habit of prosecuting these poor persons, while he let rich and influential individuals, for example Julius Meier, a wealthy and prominent merchant here, hoard all the foodstuffs they liked, with absolute impunity." Haney overheard and protested that this comment "touched his professional honor" because he had been Meier's lawyer for ten years before entering government employ. Still in the courtroom, he publicly ordered the Secret Service agent, who was present to serve witness against the Wahl household, to obtain a warrant and search the Meier residence. The agent and deputy sheriff went out to make the search and were greeted "at the door by Meier's daughter, aged 16, and her first question was, 'Have you come to see about the flour?'" The agent insisted in his report that "evidently Meier was 'tipped off.'" The subsequent search revealed nothing illegal. Such cases could raise class-based indignity not only among the working class but also among the lower ranks of federal employees, such as Agent Smith.[31]

Some Portlanders, who felt that their native-born heritage entitled them to special status, bitterly complained that foreigners, such as the Wahl family, were taking advantage of the nation's hospitality by hoarding. A search of the Theberge home revealed nearly 300 pounds of flour hidden in a back room after the family insisted that the one pound in a pantry bin displayed to investigators was all they had. Despite the deception and gross quantity violation, which had earned the German Wahls the comment, "It seems that this case might well merit severe action" at the end of their report, the Theberge report recommended no course of action at all. It did note, however, that "these people are natives of this country, of French descent" and that both father and son worked in a shipyard. Hyped fear of foreign subversion in a nation of immigrants had led to a contest of Americanism. Mrs. Humphrey, who complained about her house being searched, began her letter with the words "As an American citizen born here" in order to emphasize the outrageousness of what had become a routine event.[32]

The privileges of Americanism could be granted, as in the case of the Theberges, or just claimed by those like the Humphreys. Either way, in Portland, being native born became a form of power, like the wealth of the Meier family, used to demand special treatment. Wartime networks of informal policing were quite complex. Many factors could entitle individuals to more or fewer rights: having a family, being *very* American, working in shipbuilding, being apolitically patriotic, having served in prior wars or having sons in the current one, and contributing financially to the war effort. The public actively used the legal apparatus of the government and thereby served as agents of the state. Every citizen was a potential spy.

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The war period saw many innovations in the federal management and policing of everyday urban life that took root for sometimes little more than a year or were even just gearing up as the conflict was drawing toward a close. That these initiatives were short-lived or incomplete does not render them unimportant. Portland elites understood the power of federal prestige and of national patriotism. They also knew that contributing to the reach of state bureaucracy by suppressing labor militancy and anticapitalist radicalism, tracking human resources, and sharing control of resource allocation from housing to food could bring them more power and more money to grow the city and, in turn, their own dynasties. Portland's working and middle classes also knew that there were rewards for being more loyal or more American than other city residents. However, not all decisions to collaborate with, enforce, or evade federal management and policing were rational calculations to procure gain. Mrs. Humphrey, who began this chapter, wanted nothing more than to have her genuine patriotism, and the deprivations she endured for it, acknowledged by those who acted on behalf of the nation she loved. But she and everyone else in the city were swept up in a larger project to exert order in this shipbuilding center. Individual lives and their power were limited for some and expanded for others, for the first time, by a rapidly evolving and expanding bureaucratic federal system that permeated war production communities.

CHAPTER 4

POLICING THE SHIPYARDS: THE EFC AND THE FEDERAL STRUGGLE FOR URBAN INDUSTRIAL ORDER

In September 1917, West Coast shipbuilding was shut down by an epic strike of at least 40,000 workers. In Portland, responding to picketing arrests, five thousand members of local American Federation of Labor (AFL) unions filled the city auditorium to capacity and with unanimous votes and thunderous applause sent a very radical resolution to the capital, totally at odds with efforts of the national AFL leadership to compromise with employers during the war crisis. The resolution pledged that Portland shipbuilding workers would help save the federal government time and money if it claimed ownership of the yards. The statement also called for the "elimination of unskilled, high-salaried, inexperienced management." Instead, unionists offered a "guarantee to place competent shipbuilders in the management of these several yards to superintend and direct" ship construction. As an incentive, strikers offered to run the yards "free of all profits and cost, except the necessary wages of the men and the cost of material."[1]

The government, of course, did not accept this offer to dispense with capitalism in shipbuilding. Because these workers were on the brink of revolt against capital, yet still pledging loyalty to the state, federal intervention was both necessary and possible. The West Coast strike brought about federal oversight of shipbuilding and an ongoing bureaucratic effort to police the industry on the local level to prevent further interruptions in production. The program that emerged was at the very center of government efforts to maintain industrial peace in Portland but the state was often unable to keep its promises and only barely maintained order. Although unions remained within the system once they accepted it, they used it to fight for longer-term gains and made constant threats of rebellion.

The United States entered the war with a desperate lack of ships and that made fears of worker unrest particularly acute for those coordinating war production. The strike crisis and a developing program to prevent its recurrence unfolded in three stages. First, Portland's union workers failed to win the closed shop through direct action. An anti-picketing ordinance alienated the labor movement even further from local civic life and made it yet more clear that unions would have to cast their lot with the national government. The state then established a framework to keep peace in Portland shipyards. Unions used government hearings to continue their fight for the closed shop but failed again. Finally, a federal struggle to balance all the parties in shipbuilding within the new system ensued. While unions were an explicit part of this process in San Francisco and Seattle, in Portland their role was more covert and contested. Employers attempted to push them off the shop floor but because unions proved more cooperative, the government co-opted them to subdue the yard owners. Unions were both a threat to stability and an invaluable tool toward its maintenance.

The Shipbuilding Emergency

When the United States entered the war in spring 1917, its shipping capacity was woefully inadequate to transport troops and materiel to France. There were two primary problems: submarine warfare and a comparatively underdeveloped shipbuilding industry. By December 1917, the net Allied shipping loss (subtracting new construction) from German submarine attacks was 7.5 million tons. The situation was desperate but Herculean efforts of state investment and coordination paid off and a stalemate between construction and destruction held for all of 1918. From December 1917 to October 1918, 5.5 million tons were both built and sunk. To understand the panic felt by government officials during serious wartime labor disputes in this industry, it is critical to remember that US shipyards were part of a larger Allied network that was struggling not to accumulate a newly powerful merchant marine but to replace one that was rapidly being destroyed. The United States was in a particularly difficult situation because the nation had to mobilize so rapidly mid-war and had a minimal shipbuilding capacity. US mobilization was very dependant on ships because the Atlantic Ocean separated it from the fields of battle. The challenge seemed overwhelming to the government of this farthest removed and least prepared major belligerent.[2]

At the outbreak of war in Europe, US shipbuilding had long been in decline. In 1856, when the industry was at its peak, 90 percent of US foreign trade was carried by domestically built ships. By 1913, this figure had dropped to 11 percent. The half-century slump from the 1860s to the 1910s

had left only 61 shipyards with 215 ways capable of holding heavy (over 3,000 tons) vessels by April 1917. The state intervened immediately through the US Shipping Board (USSB), created by Congress in 1916 to regulate shipping and boost expansion of the merchant marine as part of the nation's preparedness campaign. Its first action, in February 1917, was to stop foreign vessels hemorrhaging out of the US merchant marine, a move backed by presidential decree. Germany reacted with a promise to sink US vessels indiscriminately, a policy that would bring the nation into war shortly. In mid-April, within several weeks of the declaration of war, the USSB formed the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) to invest in shipbuilding. Like the USSB itself, the EFC was initially conceived as a device to prime the pump, not direct the industry. It began life with $50 million in capital, but as the chairman of the USSB noted in his memoir, "The corporation was destined to spend far more on a single shipyard."[3]

Direct federal investment in industry was new territory and historian Paul A. C. Koistinen has observed that "mobilizing the economy for World War I was an experiment that was still evolving at the time of the armistice." Commitment to funding the EFC beyond anything anyone had previously imagined came with the Emergency Shipping Fund in June 1917, which gave the president a budget of over $400 million and the authority to requisition and operate any plant capable of producing ship components. Wilson delegated these powers to the EFC in early August and spending continued to escalate without direct administration of facilities; even newly created yards were privately owned. The EFC, which became the Merchant Fleet Corporation after the war, received $470 million in 1917, $639 million in 1918, $1.8 billion in 1919, and $356 million in 1920. This infusion of over $3 billion into the industry over 1917–20 revolutionized US shipbuilding and the government struggled to control the new power it had given itself. By October 1918, as the war drew to a close, there were 210 shipyards with 963 ways engaged in EFC work. Although the number of shipyards more than tripled, the workforce far outstripped this figure as the scale as well as the number of shipyards increased. A workforce of 45,000 in April 1917 expanded to 375,000 by October 1918.[4]

A large part of this industrial expansion happened on the Pacific Coast. In 1914, California was home to only 6,000 shipbuilding workers. By 1919, the San Francisco Bay area alone had 55,000. It had risen from obscurity in the industry to become the largest shipbuilding center in the nation. Southern California never became a major factor in EFC plans or a locale of serious labor disputes. The Puget Sound area of Washington State and the Columbia River (which forms the border between Oregon and Washington) made the Pacific Northwest, overall, even more important to the shipbuilding effort than California and much more prone to labor strife

during the war era. While San Francisco unions had virtually controlled the city's labor market since the 1906 earthquake and subsequent rebuilding program, unions in Portland and Seattle (as well as satellite shipbuilding towns) had been waiting for a showdown with employers over the open shop for a long time.[5]

Portland unions were in an unprecedented situation during the shipbuilding boom, which more than doubled the number of industrial workers in the city by the end of the war. In 1917, Portland shipbuilding workers led the industry in militancy. They not only participated in a walkout that was at least 40,000 strong with unions in Seattle and San Francisco, they held out the longest. This conflict brought about a federal commitment to control labor relations across the nation's shipyards. As the strike was brewing, the government hurriedly created labor dispute resolution mechanisms. Like the scope of the EFC itself, they would soon evolve beyond anyone's expectations and before those in other industries. Although the state had already formed a wage board to assure the rapid construction of troop cantonments several months earlier, it hardly encompassed the construction industry. An arbitration commission for longshoremen emerged about the same time as the one for shipbuilders, but the former was limited to the Atlantic and Gulf coasts while the latter was truly national. By the time shipbuilding workers in the Pacific Northwest went back to the yards after a bitter monthlong strike, the federal government had taken on—for the first time—complete responsibility for arbitration within a major national industry.[6]

The Pacific Coast Shipbuilding Strike

In early June 1917, E. B. Ingram, the secretary of the Portland Metal Trades Council (MTC), complained to A. J. Berres, secretary of the Metal Trades Division of the AFL, that "the employers have refused repeatedly to meet us in conference." Because the EFC had not yet invented an arbitration mechanism, there was a good deal of confusion as to who would keep peace in the shipyards. Although the national AFL leadership had advised Portland unions to consult with the Department of Labor (DOL) before striking, Ingram was not at all sure how to even contact this agency and asked Berres to do it on his behalf. He asked to "have some Conciliator sent here to assist us in getting some understanding with the employers." "We have made up our minds to call a general strike in all the yards but before we do we would welcome someone to mediate." Ingram believed that conditions were far superior in Seattle and San Francisco, presaging the elusiveness of local parity that would plague government arbitration efforts throughout the war era. The timing of this arbitration crisis in early June was no accident. About the same time, the Portland City Council passed a Trade Conspiracy

Ordinance designed to criminalize picketing. Opposed by city government and employers, the MTC needed an ally quickly.[7]

Secretary Wilson of the DOL sent a Seattle-based representative immediately, but quietly, to visit the leaders of the Portland MTC. The MTC was already preparing wage demands and expected to transmit them to employers within a few days. Worried that his presence might be linked to the timing or content of the demands, the supposed arbiter left immediately and returned to Seattle "with the understanding that Committee would call me if they needed any assistance further." Yet no assistance had actually been rendered and it is unlikely that unions were reassured by this brief and overly discreet visit. It was clear that the government was not yet willing to take responsibility for preserving an industrial peace that had not yet broken down.[8]

The conflict simmering in the Portland shipyards was not isolated; deep unrest in the Pacific Northwest lumber industry and San Francisco Bay metal trades also contributed to the destruction of a fragile peace on the West Coast and precipitated a coordinated walkout. Scarcity of skilled workers in the region during wartime put unions in an excellent position to cooperate. They formed an understanding that "unfair materials," those produced in antiunion shops, would be left untouched. Portland unions had met nothing but failure with such boycotts in the past but hoped that wartime conditions and wider regional cooperation could bring success at last. The first such war era confrontation was the push for "eight-hour lumber." Over the course of June 1917, workers began to spontaneously walk out in lumber camps across the Pacific Northwest. The industry virtually ground to a halt east of the Cascade Mountains by July and spread through western Washington State over that month. Grays Harbor shipyard workers went out in sympathy and were followed by others. The logging industry and its unions were less developed in Oregon but over the first half of August, the strike did spread to Columbia River lumber camps as well as Portland and Astoria sawmills. As August ground on, however, the now massive, sprawling walkout began to collapse. Although, formally, it continued throughout September, it was clear during that month that the timber workers had lost. The strike was a formative experience for government officials, who now made it clear that the military and Department of Justice would work closely with local law enforcement agencies during the war to jail radicals by any means necessary. The strike had been a disaster for informal federal mediation, with much of prime logging season lost in this timber-rich region at such a critical early point in US involvement in the war. The lumber strike convinced federal officials that they would have to develop a formal mediation capacity, suppress radicals, and make AFL unions part of the framework of industrial peace. When shipyard carpenters

and sawmill workers refused to handle "ten-hour lumber" that summer, nobody could ignore the implications of growing regional solidarity across industrial lines.[9]

At the peak of the lumber strike, in mid-August 1917, Portland's shipbuilding workers became emboldened. With sawmills in the city shut down and nearby logging camps on the Columbia abandoned, the moment had arrived for a showdown to defeat the open shop. Portland carpenters issued a decree flatly stating the conditions under which they would be employed: hours, wages, holidays, and so on. Employers in the city could take the offer or do without the labor. The Pacific Coast Maritime Council (representing workers in wooden shipyards) followed with a similar statement. Secretary Wilson of the DOL immediately chose George Harry, the metalworker who had been the driving force behind the creation of the Oregon State Federation of Labor in 1902, to negotiate a settlement between the yard owners and AFL unions in Portland. Harry found the MTC ready to call a strike but was able to convince them to postpone action until their next meeting at the end of August. Although he now had some time to work, the situation looked grim. Union officers told Harry "that the managers of the shipbuilding plants have insisted to them that the scale of wages and conditions at present in vogue cannot be changed excepting through the Government's Shipping Board…and that the Government was practically in control of the yards." Harry convinced them that the DOL would attempt to adjust the situation.[10]

Even as Harry was making assurances on behalf of Secretary Wilson, the EFC devised a scheme to adjust labor disputes in the yards. The agency announced its new framework the day before Harry's arrival in Portland. The memorandum creating the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board (SLAB) carried the signatures of the assistant secretary of the Navy, the heads of the USSB and EFC, and the presidents of all the unions involved in shipbuilding work. Only W. L. Hutcheson, head of the carpenters union, held out. He insisted that without the closed shop, "union officials would have no power of compelling the workmen to obey the rulings of the Board since they would have no control over the nonunion men. Union leaders would consequently be bound before the public to keep labor in line and yet would not be furnished with the authority to do this effectively." Hutcheson's stand would be to no avail, for employers were united behind maintaining the open shop.[11]

As soon as EFC authority in labor disputes became clear, Fred Ballin of Portland's Supple-Ballin Shipbuilding Corporation tried to convince Admiral W. L. Capps, general manager of the EFC, that the new arbitration board should be part of a larger project to put a lid on employee militancy by using federal prestige. Ballin complained about the unions' wage

demands but was even more concerned that the EFC might acquiesce to the closed shop if it came under enough pressure—just to keep the yards going. He asserted that the closed shop "would be the death knell to the shipbuilding industry" because "the present members of the Union, if recognized and successful, will close the doors to any new members and prevent shipbuilders from hiring new men to fill their places in case of strike, or to work with them in the same yard and be taught the business." Ballin estimated that his workforce would have to expand by a factor of ten just to fulfill present contracts with the EFC, and the closed shop would make this impossible. He admitted that most of his workers, many of whom were new to the industry, had joined AFL unions because they offered to fight for strike protection and increased wages. The AFL was organizing the flood of new shipbuilding workers as fast as possible, and most were joining. Harry claimed that "the two large shipbuilding corporations, the Northwest and the Columbia ... are probably 98 percent union. A large proportion of this membership have only very recently become union men." Ballin's concerns over union power in hiring and training make it clear that shop floor control, particularly command of craft knowledge and the work process, would shift to workers under the closed shop.[12]

Secretary Wilson tried to assure Harry that the new SLAB would soon come to the West Coast to broker an agreement, replacing the DOL in shipbuilding. In the meantime, however, it rested with him to broker a temporary truce to keep the men in the yards. Harry felt that SLAB intervention could not wait: "Unless the Shipping Board can make satisfactory progress within the next week or ten days, we are liable to have a strike in every shipbuilding plant in Portland and vicinity. The other Pacific Coast points may precede us in that action." In the first test of the new AFL-EFC alliance codified in the SLAB memorandum, union presidents bombarded Portland locals with telegrams urging them to stay in the yards until the board was able to travel to Seattle and then Portland to hold hearings. Although the national union heads were willing to sacrifice the closed shop, C. M. Bottomley of the Portland MTC was not. The SLAB offered to have several delegates from Portland come to the capital for consultation the day before workers planned to shut down the steel shipyards in early September 1917. Bottomley asked, "Wire definitely whether closed shop in Portland is to be considered[.] state definitely what prospects are for accomplishing same to avert strike[.] answer immediately or strike cannot be avoided sept seventh." However, heavy pressure from AFL officials did get Portland delegates from the unions and yard owners to Washington, DC, and delayed the strike.[13]

Four thousand carpenters and wooden ship workers walked out in Seattle on September 14, 1917, in support of the eight-hour lumber campaign

and 2,500 Portland shipyard woodworkers went out the next day. A metal trades walkout became inevitable because wooden and steel shipyards had the same grievances over wages and union recognition and because metalworker layoffs in the yards would spiral as construction ground to a halt without wooden scaffolding. House carpenters, who had long dealt with the Master Builders' Association in Seattle, caved on September 22 without any resolution of the ten-hour lumber issue. But the composition and size of the woodworking craft in Seattle had changed rapidly in recent months because of the demand for wooden ships and for scaffolding in both wooden and steel yards. Only one thousand house carpenters were involved in the walkout but three thousand shipyard woodworkers stayed out. Many shipyard workers were new to their craft and the local union movement and thus more likely to risk sacrificing amicable relationships with employers' associations with whom they had no history. This was also the case for Portland shipbuilders. Workers who entered the labor movement on the Pacific Coast during the war could afford to be militant. A labor shortage and desperate production timetable gave strikers enormous power.[14]

The full-blown shipyard conflict that had been percolating all summer finally boiled over, but the timing was no accident. San Francisco Bay's powerful Iron Trades Council (ITC) had a contract with the employers' California Metal Trades Association that expired on September 15, 1917. All unions on the Pacific Coast knew that negotiations for a new agreement had been rocky all through August and that ITC unions would walk out if they did not achieve a settlement before the expiration date. What the employers in California had already conceded inspired Portland MTC militants: the closed shop, an eight-hour day, and the right of union business agents to represent employees and have free access to workplaces. There were two obstacles to signing a new contract, and one appeared to be intractable. Disputes over EFC compensation for dramatic wage increases were an important question in San Francisco as elsewhere but both unions and employers seemed confident that this issue could be adjusted through hearings. Everyone knew that the spiraling cost of living and scarcity of labor on the Pacific Coast during the war demanded high wages; the only question was distributing their cost. But the second sticking point of the San Francisco contract was clearly linked to the summerlong battle over ten-hour lumber in the Pacific Northwest and would set a precedent that an employers' association could never concede: the right to boycott nonunion materials.[15]

The ITC ordered a strike for September 17, 1917, but it was much shorter than the one called by the Portland MTC a week later. On the third day of the San Francisco strike, the EFC pledged to pick up half the cost of wage increases handed down by the SLAB. This satisfied the Bay Area yard owners, who in the end benefited tremendously from the strike and

may well have precipitated it to put the government in a desperate position. Although the unions and employers were certainly not conspiring together, this sort of unwitting alliance to elicit funds from the government recurred throughout the war. Employers surely realized that fanning the flames of their workers' discontent while asserting that the government controlled the yards turned unions toward making their demands to the EFC, and thereby supported yard owners' requests for more subsidization. But on the issue of unfair materials, employers would not budge. Union members at Oakland's Moore & Scott shipyard refused to handle nine boilers from Willamette Iron & Steel in Portland because that firm actively persecuted union members and was the only major firm in the city to continue operating during the strike. The situation was never really resolved. The yard owners refused to ship the boilers back, and the national head of the union, J. A. Franklin, ordered his membership in the Bay Area to go back to work under protest. The vote to return on these grounds was unanimous, and the strike turned lockout ended on October 1. Although West Coast unions continued to fight unfair materials skirmishes throughout the war, this concession in San Francisco essentially abdicated the principle of totally unionized war production and badly hurt the struggle of Portland's workers for the closed shop.[16]

In Portland, the movement's leadership had been waiting a long time for a showdown on the open shop and were determined to hold out as long as possible, for theirs was the only major city on the Coast where this condition was universal. Although both Portland and Seattle stayed out through most of October, over three weeks longer than the Bay Area, Portland's militancy kept the strike going. The city's Trade Conspiracy Ordinance received its first test, and although it proved unviable, the law created a powerful sense of solidarity among AFL members in the city. The ordinance was designed to make striking impossible. Two or more people who agreed to boycott any business, or induced others to do so, were guilty and could be jailed up to 6 months and fined $500. However, they were only guilty if their motive was to in any way influence terms of employment at a Portland business. Individuals could, of course, decide not to patronize a firm but the decision and action had to be private. The law banned any form of written communication that inspired others to boycott, specifically naming almost everything that could convey such information: "banner, sign, transparency, writing, printing, dodger, card, notice, sticker, button, or sash." Even the physical presence of boycotters not conveying any information was banned, denying them the right to "loiter or parade back and forth" in front of a targeted business or the homes of anyone connected with that business.[17]

By September 24, 1917, the wooden and steel yards in Portland had emptied out leaving 7,500 shipbuilders idle. Three thousand strikers came

from the large Northwest Steel plant and 1,600 from the Columbia River Shipbuilding Company. However, the Willamette Iron & Steel plant that had outraged Oakland boilermakers, and had been responsible indirectly for extending the San Francisco Bay strike, was working normally. It would have been unthinkable in Seattle or San Francisco to keep a plant that large operating at capacity during a strike but the Portland anti-picket law made protesting impossible. The firm was notorious for its policy of harassing and firing union members, an attitude maintained throughout the war even as membership increased dramatically. The sympathetic *Portland News* claimed that "nearly 200 police, motorcycle men, deputy sheriffs and special agents" were sent to protect the Willamette Iron & Steel plant on the afternoon of September 26 when picketers assembled around quitting time to convince the workers to join the walkout. Although it seems that strikers here and at other plants dispersed when asked by police, 23 provoked their own arrests over the first several days to test the constitutionality of the new city ordinance. The establishment *Portland Oregonian* newspaper accused strikers of riot-like behavior but the *Portland News* dismantled this charge and it seems unlikely that police would have made so few arrests if picketers were disorderly or had refused to disperse.[18]

On September 27, 1917, the police attempted to break up a group of men gathering in front of the boilermakers union office. The *Portland News* laid the blame entirely on the shoulders of Mayor Baker, anonymously quoting policemen who felt their orders to be "a shame." On the evening of September 28, union members demonstrated the extent of their civic alienation and the resulting desperation to ally themselves with the federal government against the city's political and economic leaders with their unanimously supported resolution to oust the owners and run the yards at cost for the government.[19]

These demands to nationalize shipbuilding on a nonprofit basis and have workers manage the yards might seem like a dramatic departure for AFL-organized workers, whose national leaders were committed to operating within a capitalist framework and compromising with employers during the war crisis. However, we must consider the precise timing of the resolution. At the end of September 1917, the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets had been passing Bolshevik resolutions for a month and many other Russian soviets had followed suit. This news provided organized workers in Portland with a vision of their potential power. A speaker at the meeting told of violent repression against union members in other states that had passed anti-picket laws and went on to say, "That's the way to promote harmony. That's what the employers said they wanted to promote when they offered the anti-picketing law for passage. That's the way they promoted harmony in Russia—and that's why they've got real harmony in Russia now!" This

statement was followed by "long applause and cheers" according to the *Portland News*. The next speaker made a call to arms reminiscent of radical Industrial Workers of the World struggles: "It is an honor to go to jail for something you are proud of and to fight the fight to a finish!" Again, "wild applause and cheers" rang out. "I believe the only way we men and women are going to win our freedom is to be willing to go on the picket line—and go to jail!" The audience responded with "thunderous applause for three or four minutes." Union members were urged to go to the MTC office the next day to sign up for picket duty, which would mean prison, and over six hundred did. The *Portland News* then reported rumors of a plan to make mass arrests and put strikers in hastily constructed "bull pens." Whether the story was true or not, tensions were now at fever pitch.[20]

With trials for 37 picketers pending and no end to the strike in sight, DOL mediator George Harry began a series of unsuccessful meetings with employer and union representatives to broker a temporary truce in advance of a more thorough hearings process when the SLAB arrived. The anti-picket law was disarmed even before those hearings began. W. S. U'Ren, the founder of the direct democracy movement in Oregon, represented the accused and insisted that each picketer receive a separate trial. This tactic put a tremendous burden on the city court. On October 2, 1917, a hung jury caused the first—and as it turned out, the last—defendant to be released.[21]

The strike dragged on for another three weeks until Portland workers went back in late October 1917 under the temporary terms laid down by the SLAB, which had by then concluded its hearings in both Seattle and Portland. Although there were no final rulings until after the San Francisco hearings, Portland unions had already linked their fate to government arbitration rather than direct action, and would do so until the framework was dismantled after the war era. Although unions defeated the anti-picketing ordinance in the end, it had already served its immediate purpose. The AFL, which was already marginal in local civic culture, had their greatest confrontation rendered invisible. Although solidarity across craft and locale had shut down the shipbuilding industry on the West Coast, Portland saw little public protest. The right of union visibility, particularly on the shop floor, became the locus of struggle in the months ahead. Unions had not yet given up hope of gaining the closed shop and this hope lay with federal hearings.

Establishing Federal Authority in Shipbuilding

Portland's workers had seen investigative hearings in their city before the SLAB arrived in October 1917 but had never before gained much from this sort of public exposure of their laboring conditions. Just prior to the war, Portland unions had two formative experiences with hearings: the US

Commission on Industrial Relations (USCIR) and the Industrial Welfare Commission of Oregon. The former sent unions the message that the federal government was unable to improve their working lives, although it was perhaps sympathetic. The latter proclaimed that the state of Oregon would negotiate conditions for women and minors while union men would have to take care of themselves.

Oregon's 1903 child labor law and ten-hour law for women were filled with loopholes and proved to be largely ineffectual. The latter law was challenged in the US Supreme Court, resulting in the landmark *Muller v. Oregon* decision of 1908 that upheld the constitutionality of protective legislation aimed solely at women. An Oregon movement for more comprehensive and rigorous safeguards for women and child workers achieved a minimum wage law in 1913. It was amended in 1915 to create the Industrial Welfare Commission to hold hearings and set standards for employment beyond wages. The commission would determine hours as well as moral and sanitary requirements for workplaces. Rev. E.V. O'Hara chaired the commission on behalf of the people of Oregon over 1915–16 and the other two members represented the employers and employees. After exhaustive hearings and visits to workplaces, O'Hara's board passed down a number of highly specific orders that varied by industry. The notion that the protection of women and children was a moral imperative necessitating state intervention sent Oregon unions a rather clear message: adult men were on their own. In fact, turning to the state would be a sign of weakness.[22]

When the federal government, in the guise of pro-labor lawyer Frank P. Walsh's USCIR, visited Portland in August 1914, union members saw a sympathetic body grill their opponents—but to no avail. Walsh and his panel moved on and Portland remained unchanged. By the time the USCIR reached Portland, representatives of the employers had given up on it. Professor John R. Commons, one of the members representing the public, firmly believed in a widespread rationalizing federal presence in industrial relations. He was isolated by the other members, however, who supported the freedom to organize as the ultimate solution. Joining Walsh in Portland were Austin B. Garretson of the Order of Railway Conductors, head of the AFL Metal Trades Department James O'Connell, and AFL treasurer John Brown Lennon. Although Commons and Walsh differed bitterly over the final recommendations of the commission, there was no dissent about unions; every man on the panel supported them and three of five were powerful AFL officials. Historian Joseph A. McCartin has asserted that the USCIR was critical in integrating the AFL into the Wilson administration. I would add that its 154 days of on-site hearings over 1913–15 brought a pro-labor Wilson administration voice to communities around the country and offered a new vision to union members of the potential of an alliance with

the federal government. Portland union leaders witnessed Chairman Walsh mercilessly hound M. C. Banfield, a Portland businessman active in organizing employers locally and coast-wide, while treating laborers with respect.[23]

As the United States entered the war in spring 1917, Portland unions faced entrenched employers who had the backing of local government. Rapid expansion of membership and a massive sustained strike had failed to gain closed shop guarantees. Portland's union officials knew that the SLAB, unlike the USCIR, would have the power to force an agreement on all sides after hearings. Like the USCIR, the SLAB had AFL representation. Portland's unionists needed an ally badly and from October 1917, they relied on the government for both the freedom to organize that Walsh wanted for them and the federal arbitration apparatus favored by Commons. Now, both seemed possible. However, dependence on the government came at a price. To finally confront organized employers as equals, trade unionists would have to cede independence to a paternal intermediary that would police industrial relations.

Although the chairman of the USSB opposed bringing the AFL into a labor arbitration framework, creation of the SLAB was beyond his reach. To obtain the active participation of national AFL officials, the Wilson administration made the August 20, 1917, memorandum that formed the SLAB a pact between government and labor. Edward N. Hurley, who would later serve as a representative of business on the International Labor Board at the Versailles negotiations, never liked the SLAB and blamed it for the high cost of shipbuilding. But to workers, it looked like a continuation of the USCIR—only with the power to craft and enforce working conditions. The SLAB hearings in Portland opened with the unions presenting a written history of the abuse they had suffered at the hands of employers. V. E. Macy, representative of the public, chaired the board. President Wilson appointed him from the leadership of the National Civic Federation (NCF), an initiative begun at the turn of the century to bring employers and unions into peaceful patterns of negotiation. The NCF struggled in vain to convince employers that they could recognize unions and limit the leverage that formal agreements gave them toward shop floor control. It intended to shift power away from the rank and file and toward union officers as much as possible in order to reassure employers but the open shop consensus was too strong to overcome. Historian David Montgomery has observed that, after 1903, "the important manufacturers who were active in the NCF participated in the organization's welfare and safety work but not in its promotion of conciliation and trade agreements." Montgomery has asserted that this opposition did much to ignite rank-and-file union democracy and political action, despite the wishes of the national AFL leadership. The new Macy Board now faced that legacy: local unions that were militant and difficult to control on one side and fervently open shop employers on the other.[24]

Macy was the balance on the three-member board between USSB chairman Hurley's representative, Louis A. Coolidge, and the head of the AFL Metal Trades Division, A. J. Berres. Although Coolidge was fairly close in sympathies to the yard owners, the employers had no permanent representation on the board. Portland's union members could not help but be encouraged by this fact as well as by Wilson's selection of Macy and the presence of Berres. However, to make the board more legitimate in each locale where it met, local unions and employers received a representative each. Portland unions selected an official from the militant MTC while the employers chose a lawyer who was also a major investor in several yards. The board first considered the workers' case and then that of the employers. Each side had an advocate who called and questioned witnesses; the board also asked questions and even requested additional evidence and witnesses. Macy was often emphatic that the meetings were hearings and not arbitration sessions. The board intended to head to San Francisco next and then make a ruling applying to the whole Pacific Coast. Portland unions were very much in favor of this plan because they believed it would bring their city up to the standards achieved by their fellows in Seattle and San Francisco. Employers, for the same reason, seemed fairly nervous.[25]

The historical brief submitted by the Portland MTC early in the proceedings drew direct comparisons between the USCIR and the Macy Board: "As to the effect upon production, quality of workmanship, and general effect upon the condition of the workers by this refusal to permit of organization, we most respectfully cite your Honorable Board to the conclusions of the Industrial Relations Commission." The brief also made it clear that the partnership between the Wilson administration and the AFL made employer abuse of unions—by extension—abuse of the government. President Wilson was quoted at length, including, "If there is not a right on the part of the working man to organize then there ought not to be a right on the part of capital to organize." The MTC went on to stress that because AFL president Samuel Gompers appointed one member of the board, "it is therefore self-evident that organized labor is a recognized factor in the industry of America, and is a proven part of the structure of the United States government." The offer made during the strike to kick out the yard owners and managers, and then have the unions run everything profit-free for the government, came up again during the hearing. The workers' advocate asked a testifying machine press operator, "Do you believe that the organized labor movement and the government are co-partners, do you believe that the unions are loyal to the government?" He responded that the resolution offering to run the yards was "sufficient proof that we are loyal to the government."[26]

The testimony about patriotism during the hearings often became rather emotional and some workers who testified felt that their love of

country had been ignored, or even subverted, by employers. Fred Bourne, head of the electricians' local in Portland, submitted as evidence a number of letters of thanks he received after writing to various government agencies offering the assistance of his union. He then testified at length how he assisted military recruitment among union members and displayed a picture of a detachment of 32 of his own members. His members paid 10 percent of their wages every month to support the "mess fund" of these soldiers. Bourne exclaimed, "We don't have to hang out our card on the Fourth of July, we have got it hung out all the time." He made an impassioned plea:

> Forty cents an hour don't make good patriotic citizens, when you have got men like that to look after out on the firing line…I can't figure out that reasoning. If you are going to buy Liberty Bonds you can't buy them on forty cents an hour, and you can't do it standing out in the rain in the slave markets, with hundreds of men sparring for place…You can't preach this patriotism to me because I am chuck full of it.

Just as the unions attacked the patriotism of employers throughout the war when communicating with government officials, employers similarly attacked the unions. Managers and foremen also assailed the patriotism of individual workers to discredit them on the shop floor and this hearing was a rare opportunity to air such grievances. The most impassioned testimony in this regard came from Thomas Geks, a Greek drill operator who lost his job at Northwest Steel after an altercation with a foreman:

> "Oh, go on, you German spy," he says, "I got nothing to do with you, you go out of this shop." Of course the reason was he saw my button. I joined the union, I never belonged to the union before, and when he see it he says, "Here you got a button on." "Yes," I says, "I feel like it, I get a button." I says, "My button don't hurt you any." "All right," he says, "I will fix you."

After recounting the story, he brandished his naturalization papers and emotionally declared, "I love this country, and I come over to this country and raised my family, and I love this country just as good as any other man who is an American."[27]

Demonstrations of patriotism were essential, for everyone knew that the lengthy strike was primarily over the closed shop and not wages. Unions had to prove that the open shop was both unpatriotic in principle and counterproductive to the goals of the state. Arthur Burns, an official for the iron molders union, stated that adjusted wages were not the main point:

> The Metal Trades Council here realizes that the question of wages—that after this Board makes its investigations in Seattle and San Francisco and

> Portland, that they are going to adjust the wages…and we realize that if you had gone around Portland and never even sat here for a hearing at all on the wage question that we would get the wages here—we realize that; but we also realize that we are not going to be able to maintain that wage unless we get some settlement on this open and union shop contention that is on here at the present time.

The strike would not end, Burns argued, until "there is something worked out on that proposition." And if the employers would not settle, then perhaps the government could remove them from the process. Unions were testing how far the state would go to achieve its war production aims. Who was more expendable: owners or builders? E. J. Stack, secretary of both the Oregon State Federation of Labor and Portland Central Labor Council, stated flatly, "I have heard a great many men say they prefer industrial conscription to that of having their fundamental rights abrogated by private employers."[28]

Enforcing the "Macy Agreement"

During the hearings, union members and officials repeatedly voiced concern over enforcing a settlement. They wanted to deal with employers directly and with government protection. Macy intended to leave an "adjuster" behind in Portland, a local who had the trust of both sides, to interpret and enforce the board's decisions. But none of the parties to the agreement was sure how the adjuster would handle problems. While the employers seemed very much in favor of dealing with this adjuster in all matters, rather than recognizing the unions, the unions saw this intermediary as an attempt to maintain the open shop status quo in Portland. The Portland employers' representative on the board asked Arthur Burns of the iron molders if rather than sign a contract with the unions "it would be a more satisfactory plan to have the question of whether a man is a competent employee or good mechanic determined by a competent adjuster, rather than to have it determined either by the union organization or the employer?" Burns replied, "How is he going to do it, when he don't know anything about the mechanical ability…If he doesn't know anything about the molding trade how is he going to judge whether I am a competent mechanic or not?" Macy eventually stepped in and asked if it would be preferable to have a representative of the workers and one of the employers on hand in every shop to determine issues of craft status and competency. Unions wanted direct involvement in this critical aspect of the new wage scale, for if employers were allowed, they would downgrade the status of as many mechanics as possible to save money. During the war, unions could rely upon price competition between shipyards for scarce skilled labor, but

how long would the war last? While E. J. Stack was testifying, A. J. Berres proposed explicitly connecting the "examiner" with union officials in the adjustment process, "Suppose it was understood the examiner would at all times confer with the business representatives here, with a committee of the employees so as to become enlightened where there were things he did not understand." Stack supported the idea that "if the men who are employed in any shipbuilding plant who are union men are permitted to choose their own representative, or if a representative of their union is permitted to choose them." Macy began to despair that "it may be impossible to work out such a scheme as will meet with the approval of both sides in this controversy."[29]

On the last day of testimony, Macy announced that four delegates, one each from the employees and employers representing wooden and steel shipyards, would have to come up with an adjuster they could all agree upon. If they failed to reach consensus, the SLAB would appoint someone. Macy stressed that "so far as possible we want each community to take care of their own affairs and settle them in their own way." The adjuster would have to stay in touch with the EFC to report on conditions in Portland but could only appeal to Washington, DC, as a last resort. The compromise that ended the strike in Portland just after the hearings, before the board had concluded its work in San Francisco and announced final Pacific Coast decisions, guaranteed that strikers would all regain their jobs before any new hires were made, union members would not be discriminated against in their workplaces, and each craft would have a grievance committee in every shop elected from its ranks. While the SLAB intended that grievances be settled within shops whenever possible, if that proved impossible in a particular case then the local adjuster would take it up. If he could not broker a compromise, only then would Washington, DC, get involved. The local lawyer who landed the job, Richard Montague, found it a thankless and overwhelming task. The grievances that Portland unions brought to the hearings persisted—union officials were quick to rely on Montague because employers would not meet independently with them. Antiunion discrimination persisted, so the quick and internal solutions that Macy had hoped for in most disagreements never materialized.[30]

The board's November 4, 1917, decision established basic principles of agreement as well as minimum wage rates for specific categories of work and levels of seniority. In a blow to the unfair materials campaign waged over both lumber and boilers on the Pacific Coast, the SLAB decided that "to permit such discrimination to interfere with the defense of the Nation in time of war would be intolerable." There were separate agreements for the San Francisco Bay, Columbia River, and Puget Sound districts to reflect the varying degrees of union recognition in those three locales. Although

wage rate minimums and job classifications became uniform for the Pacific Coast, Portland yard owners had successfully defended the open shop. For San Francisco and Seattle, a no-strike or lockout pledge was in effect for workers and employers. Unions would be part of the grievance process and parties to the agreement. Their representatives were guaranteed access to the yards, but "at the discretion of the management." Still, the ITC maintained its position in San Francisco, and in Seattle, the closed shop was virtually written into the SLAB agreement: "The working conditions in the shipyards of the Puget Sound district shall be determined by collective agreement of the employers and employees in the shipyards of said district subject to the approval of the board." Of the three major coastal shipbuilding centers, only Portland had no real resolution of the bitter strike. Although the unfair materials campaign among Bay Area boilermakers continued sporadically, Portland unions were essentially out in the cold until the framework was dismantled in 1919 and coordinated coast-wide solidarity emerged again. Until then, Montague would bear the impossible task of getting Portland yard owners to obey the agreement and keeping union members on the job when management refused.[31]

Although the process behind Montague's appointment is unclear, it seems he was picked for his connections to the Democratic Party. He was the party chairman for Oregon when Wilson was first elected and had been a close friend of Democratic senator Harry Lane, who was one of five to vote against the declaration of war on Germany in the spring of 1917. The following month, Lane died in disgrace after a storm of Oregon protest against his vote. Montague was also the second of four partners in a law firm headed by Portland's most notable eccentric, Colonel C. E. S. Wood. The US attorney's office reported to Washington, DC, in January 1918 that Wood was both involved in the defense of "the very worst agitator we have in town," Dr. Marie Equi, and also maintained a friendship with the notorious anarchist Emma Goldman. The Bureau of Investigation later linked him to the Communist Labor Party. However, US Attorney Reames felt "that he is rather insincere in his past protestations of anarchy because he is the attorney for and a heavy stockholder in some of the biggest land grabbing corporations in the West." How could Wood passionately support labor as a witness in the USCIR hearings, defend local radicals, and also represent and invest in the same corporations they fought? Reames concluded that Wood "rather likes to pose as being erratic, unusual, and obstreperous" but a more dispassionate analysis would have to focus on his suspicion of the state emerging from a clear commitment to individualism, not opposition to capital. Portland historian E. Kimbark MacColl has asserted that "one of his most strongly held principles was opposition to the granting of special privileges to any person, group or corporation." Wood wrote to Lane in 1913 "that a

man may help both sides, labor and capital, to see the good there is in the other side, and the errors in their own, and maintain the respect of each."[32]

That Montague shared his senior law partner's evenhanded tolerance is clear. He was on the board of directors of the Portland Public Library when the United States declared war, and within days, drew public criticism for his defiant stand in defense of Louise Hunt, an assistant librarian who refused to buy Liberty Bonds because of pacifist convictions. While Mayor Baker railed against Hunt to shore up his own public support, Montague wanted to know "whether the people of Portland…were willing to yield to the rising tide of hate against all who disagreed with them." Soon after the library scandal and the ignominious death of his friend Senator Lane, Richard Montague became the peacekeeper of industrial Portland.[33]

He attempted to balance the interests of workers and employers, as his elder law partner did, but Portland unions wanted an advocate more than they wanted an adjuster and they grew to detest him. The position itself was deeply flawed. Montague lacked a network of plant investigators and also often needed to bring the weight of Washington, DC, down on employers to force them to honor the agreement. Even then, many issues related to the wage scale and antiunion discrimination were never resolved. He had earned this important job through party loyalty and seniority, and must have known that he would be paid little and that his law practice would suffer. The job turned out to be anything but a reward, and whatever his motivations for accepting it—greater prominence, heartfelt patriotism, or both—he was alternately battered and ignored over the next year.

Less than two months after the board's decision, the Portland MTC complained directly to Macy about "the services" of Montague. Although "he is a gentleman and very courteous in his treatment toward us" he was, the MTC alleged, unable to convince employers to live up to the agreement. They threatened that if problems continued, "the men are liable to take the situation into their own hands." The MTC also complained to Republican senator Charles McNary, cleverly handing him an irresistible opportunity to assail the Oregon Democrats. McNary made sure that Montague was forced to explain himself to the director of labor for the USSB, William Blackman. He insisted, "I have given without limit or stint, to every person or every matter brought before me by workmen, shipbuilders, or the representatives of either, all the time required or sought, subjecting entirely the demands of either business or leisure to this work." The quick and unequivocal endorsement of the employers may have made officials in Washington, DC, even more skeptical of Montague's ability to prevent walkouts in the most tense shipbuilding district on the Pacific Coast. James Kerr, who had represented local employers during the Portland SLAB hearings, told Macy in January 1918 that Montague was "indefatigable in performance of work,"

gave "immediate consideration to every matter brought to him," and that "any change would be highly undesirable." By late March, Senator McNary had gone to Charles Piez, vice president and general manager of the USSB, and convinced him that Montague had to go because he "is too close to big business and not quite fearless enough to properly handle this job." Macy reassured Piez that Montague could handle the job but needed an assistant, suggesting Arthur Jones, a man with a strong labor allegiance.[34]

In April 1918, tensions in Portland eased as Jones added an investigative capacity to the SLAB examiner's office in Portland and the EFC invited union delegates to meet with officials in Washington, DC, a peace gesture also made during the strike, although without concrete results. Of the two initiatives, Arthur Jones had the most significant impact and Macy had always intended that local conditions and solutions should prevail wherever possible. Montague had been set up for failure because the SLAB viewed his job function as last-resort mediation. By April, however, it became clear to Macy that the EFC needed a full-time, pro-labor investigative presence in the yards to find grievances and settle them on site. The November 1917 agreement quickly raised as many problems as it solved because the pay scale was ambiguous about grades of craft expertise and also failed to cover every position in the yards. The scale and methods of shipbuilding were transformed by the war and jobs were constantly being transformed, even invented. Craft unions had carefully defined apprenticeship requirements and journeyman standards more in keeping with workshop environments than with the new epic scale of US shipbuilding. Beyond constant complaints of discrimination against unionists or blatant failure to pay the scale, the examiner's office was most often called upon to arbitrate complaints that men with little or no training had been inappropriately elevated—and conversely—that proven craftsmen were being paid as "learners." In the closed shops of Seattle and San Francisco, these issues would have been easily avoided by the enforcement of union standards. But in open shop Portland, issues of rank were a powder keg and it was largely left to Jones to prevent an explosion.[35]

Montague was primarily concerned that his assistant should "have the confidence of the laborers" while "able to resist the temptation (which is at times very strong) of becoming a mere partisan for them." While this sentiment shows that he was an excellent choice for passive arbiter, his inexperience in industrial relations matters left him unable to see the need for a proactive office. Because government arbitration was so new, particularly on this scale, there was no substantial pool of experts who had gained their knowledge outside the ranks of either unions or management. An investigator who had labor sympathies and expertise clearly made sense, as long as he was still subordinate to Montague, whose evenhandedness pleased the yard

owners. Jones had been a union member for 23 years and claimed still to be one but his specific affiliation was unclear. He had also served as director of Portland's Public Employment Bureau. Although pro-union, he was clearly part of the middle class that the government needed to build a bureaucracy capable of policing industrial relations.[36]

In late April 1918, there was an anonymous accusation that Jones was using his new position to further the political candidacy of a friend and the unions firmly defended him. R. A. McInnis, secretary of the Columbia River District Maritime Council (representing wooden shipbuilding workers), claimed that the charges were unfounded and "since Mr. Jones has been on the job things seem to be shaping themselves into form." Encouraged, Macy decided it was time for Jones to launch an on-site investigation of conditions. He was most concerned about four particular operations, including the giant Northwest Steel and Willamette Iron & Steel plants, which were "introducing entirely unauthorized intermediate classifications and paying skilled journeymen less than the rates fixed, by assigning them to these intermediate classes." Macy admitted that the board's work "left many occupations unprovided for and also that provision should have been made for learners and improvers." It was up to Jones alone to make sure that these yards "pay the scale to all skilled journeymen." With rapidly expanding employment and no union contracts, training periods and skill standards were evaporating. Jones could not possibly interview the thousands of employees in these yards and did not have the knowledge to determine what constituted appropriate skill rank in the myriad crafts. Just as Macy had set Montague an impossible job description, so was the one passed to Jones. Miraculously, he seems to have been able to please the unions.[37]

From July to September 1918, Jones sent weekly reports to Washington, DC, that outlined his daily activities. His energy was extraordinary, visiting a number of plants each day—sometimes in different cities—six days per week. He held conferences with committees of union officials or members as often as he did with shop committees and would redress grievances by visiting management immediately whenever a violation of the agreement was clear. He sometimes made plant visits just to address the concerns of a single worker or searched an entire department for anyone being paid under scale. Conferences in the examiner's office, the practice before Jones joined Montague, continued—but Jones would also investigate written complaints and inspect yards randomly to search for violations. If Jones had a substantial investigative staff of his own, and perhaps he would have if the war had dragged on and pressure for union shops had become more threatening, the Macy Agreement might have been as effective in the Columbia River district as it was under the union contracts of San Francisco Bay and Puget Sound. If the government refused unions along the Columbia

River the right to determine and enforce job classifications, skill grades, and appropriate pay, then it would have to develop its own capacity to do so. Macy became grudgingly aware of this necessity after the storm of union protest over Montague's passivity, often mistaken for bias toward employers. Jones's efforts were garnering results but more capacity in that direction was required because grievances did not cease.[38]

The ever-rising cost of living further complicated and deepened government involvement in shipbuilding. The war effort drew manufacturing away from domestic consumption and made some materials and products quite scarce, rendering the Macy wage scale quickly obsolete. The careful research conducted by the board in its first Pacific Coast hearings, in Seattle, became the basis for their regional decision. After the Seattle MTC unsuccessfully demanded a revision after just a few months, unions there formulated new wage demands to coincide with the expiration of the San Francisco agreement on July 1, 1918. There was pressure within the EFC to revisit wage levels as well. During the summer of 1918, some EFC officials on the Pacific Coast called for an expansion of the agreement to all shops making parts for ships as well as a thorough revision of the scale. This push was primarily a reaction to increasing competition for scarce skilled labor in the far West. The examiners of the Pacific Coast met in San Francisco during the first week of July to work out a set of principles upon which to revise the scale and thereby head off another disastrous strike. Though this meeting did not solve the problem of wage competition with parts firms outside the agreement, the examiners recommended its expansion to "allied industries" and called for a "Federal Employment Agency" to control all hiring in shipbuilding. They also wanted an "improvers' scale for mechanics" and a 90-day probationary period for these apprentices. The control of both hiring and apprenticeship were clear steps toward having the government take on traditional trade union functions, even in districts where unions currently controlled such facets of working life.[39]

The new agreement—now national in scope—arrived in late October 1918, just several weeks before the war ended. But the text of the agreement implied that government regulation of shipbuilding would continue, although the board ultimately handed down its last amendment just several days before the SLAB was dissolved at the end of March 1919. Craft unions had requested national rates for skilled workers, and got them, while laborers' wages were still determined by region. The government linked wage rates to cost-of-living research from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and set nationwide rates accordingly. Unions gained the power to bargain with an entire national industry through the government. The plan also contained an explicit ban on antiunion discrimination as well as plans for a government takeover of both hiring and training.[40]

The system was evolving toward elision of regional difference through national standards and expanding the scope of federal control. It became clear in early October 1918 that the EFC intended to consolidate the Columbia River and Puget Sound districts and place the new unit under the examiner at Seattle. Montague strongly objected, "believing that conditions are so different that it would be difficult for one examiner to deal satisfactorily with both." He was right, and primarily at issue was the open shop. Predictably, Portland employers feared consolidation while the unions welcomed it. The latter had long argued that the Columbia River district should not be isolated from closed shop districts to the north and south. Jones became the new examiner's assistant for wooden shipbuilding in the Columbia River area and, incredibly, Joseph Reed—who had led a committee of strikers against Northwest Steel in January 1917 and had served as an officer of the boilermakers union—became the assistant for steel shipbuilding. James Kerr complained on behalf of employers, arguing that Portland yard owners would never have signed an agreement had they known it would eventually bind them to Puget Sound. Macy claimed that the change was "designed to promote administrative efficiency merely" but clearly the program to nationalize standards was favoring the unions and the appointment of Reed seemed ominous for Portland capitalists. Yet in the end, with less than five months until the dissolution of the SLAB and a rather unsympathetic examiner in Seattle (which would see a general strike spurred on by resistance to wage rates in the new agreement), Reed did not have enough time or power to batter down the tower of the open shop in Portland. Employers had survived the union siege through the war.[41]

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In attempting to balance the competing interests of AFL unions and yard owners, the EFC faced a difficult task. While the national AFL embraced the federal peacekeeping regime, local unions often rebelled because the system often faltered. However, these protests tended to work within the established system and did not greatly disrupt war production. The yard owners fought a complex struggle to reject federal authority while extracting profitable contracts. We can also see that state agencies in Portland, such as the EFC and the DOL, had different visions of the government home front mission and the postwar future of its authority. While the former tended to view its own expansion, even existence, as inseparable from the first word of its name—"emergency"—the latter hoped for an expanded role that would bring it into realms, such as housing, that impacted laborers beyond the workplace. However, overall, the various components of the wartime state were bound to further the war effort beyond all else and that

meant promoting industrial peace. Although the culture of the EFC was formed by businessmen who included the AFL out of necessity, by the end of the war, union veterans were running the Portland adjuster's office. They were in such a position, however, only because the AFL had thoroughly accepted federal authority and thus became useful as an ally to bring unruly employers to heel.

CHAPTER 5

WARTIME CLASS STRUGGLE: THE PORTLAND LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE INDUSTRIAL PEACE REGIME

Just several days before the war ended, F. B. Stansbury, the head of the Plant Protection Section of Military Intelligence for the West responded to a warning from his agent in Portland, L. F. Russell, that an American Federation of Labor (AFL) organizer was attempting to organize sawmills working on airplane components and that agitation might precipitate a walkout. Stansbury told Russell that "any time he goes beyond his rights, take the necessary action against him." But he was also careful to point out that "we cannot take any action against him if he is legitimately trying to organize workmen…We cannot afford, as you know, to have any trouble with organized labor in a matter of this kind. Just be diplomatic in handling him." The targeted mills were ready to suppress the organizing drive but for the first time, they had to put up with AFL activists. The unions, for a few more days, had federal protection.[1]

The AFL was a critical component of wartime industrial peace in Portland and these unions pushed the Macy Agreement as far as they could to expand in size and power. But radicals, because they opposed the war, had no such organizing protection and were exiled from the wartime industrial relations system that the AFL maneuvered within. While the AFL grew and fought for greater shop floor visibility and power, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), as well as radicals on its periphery, fought to stay out of jail or avoid deportation and responded creatively to a system of repression that was novel and imperfect.

Local AFL activists worked doggedly to exploit the Macy Agreement for long-term gain while their unions enjoyed insider status. We can see the resulting struggle for shop floor power, and its ambiguous outcomes, most clearly through conflicts over wearing union buttons and electing shop

committees. The fate of the IWW was less nuanced. The open and flexible nature of the group made it both easy to infiltrate and difficult to crush initially but it did eventually fade away under relentless assault. It is still important, however, to examine IWW responses to the federal campaign against them. Antiradical intelligence and suppression efforts evolved in reaction to methods of resistance and achieved their aims only gradually.

Beyond the IWW, wartime Portland was also home to a subculture of unaffiliated and eclectic radical activists whom authorities had to confront as individuals. It is difficult to see, at first glance, how it could be worth pursuing a few iconoclasts. Yet the attempts of federal-local policing partnerships to contain such targets were extensive and provided those persecuted with great cachet and publicity. Though these efforts then appear inexplicably counterproductive, this strand of the pursuit of urban order was rooted in fears that such individuals could help form and lead a broad local labor coalition. Two of these radicals, Dr. Marie Equi and Kathleen O'Brennan, together provide a particularly illuminating case. Individuals who could bridge the gap between groups inside (AFL) and outside (IWW) the wartime industrial relations system raised the possibility of a movement that the new regime would be unable to contain.

Containing the Struggle for Shop Floor Control in Shipbuilding

Although unions had high hopes for the Macy Agreement, overcoming the open shop tradition in Portland proved an impossible task. Employers did everything in their power to avoid recognizing unions and to make them invisible on the shop floor. Conflicts at Northwest Steel and Willamette Iron & Steel over shop committee elections and the right to wear union buttons demonstrated that although the government recognized AFL unions, its support was equivocal and lacked persuasive authority. Although employers had to tolerate unions more than ever before, the federal government failed in the end to provide workers with the paternal protection it promised in return for their cooperation. Yet, it is difficult to blame the government because employer intransigence even in the face of federal commands made clear that the open shop was of higher priority than even profit or patriotism.

Although both sides used the rhetoric of democracy, this language really served to legitimize maneuvering for shop floor power, cautioning us against Joseph A. McCartin's valuable industrial democracy synthesis as a truly nationwide tool for understanding wartime AFL activism. He has argued that "the labor conflicts of this period were primarily significant for giving voice to a widely expressed demand for industrial democracy, which

was linked both to new union efforts to organize mass industries and to the emerging regulatory potential of the federal government." McCartin dismissed the contest for shop floor power as "illusory in most industries and among the vast majority of workers." Portland's shipyard workers, who dominated the local wartime labor movement, fought a grinding battle to entrench unions on the shop floor while invoking government protection after settlement of the September 1917 strike. The ideal of democracy was more illusory than the realities of power. Unions in locales similar to Portland could not realistically begin to hope for a grand industrial democracy if their own local employers, amidst federal intervention, continued a refusal to even acknowledge them.[2]

During an earlier shipbuilding strike, in January 1917, the president of Northwest Steel told the strike committee, "In order to avoid any erroneous inference being drawn that our negotiations are with the representatives of Unions…we will expect there to be present at such conferences your full committee and [leader] Mr. Reed only." J. R. Bowles recognized Joseph Reed as the leader of the committee "without reference to his Union affiliation" and asserted, "We entered into these negotiations in good faith as an Open Shop proposition." This sums up the semantic dance that Portland employers engaged in: relying on union leaders to settle problems with their membership but pretending the unions did not exist. Bowles feared to *formally* share power—although *informally*, the situation was obvious.[3]

The most instructive dispute in this regard is the election of shop committees. President Bowles of Northwest Steel continually insisted during the war, and eventually convinced the government, that fair shop committee elections could only occur on company property—not in union halls. This struggle took on a lot of symbolism for both sides. In January 1918, H. W. Shaw, the business agent for the machinists local and secretary of the Metal Trades Council in Portland, complained to the national head of the union and member of the National War Labor Board, William Johnston, that Northwest Steel would not meet the ship fitters committee because "the union men decided to elect their committee in their hall, which was done." The local examiner, lawyer Richard Montague, upheld Northwest Steel's position. He decided that although the new election would be held on company grounds and the ballot box kept in their offices, Montague would keep the key to the box in order to reassure the unions that the company would not tamper with the votes. Shaw and the union men strongly objected, asserting that this decision misinterpreted a key clause of the Macy Agreement and that the best chance to establish union shops in the city's history was slipping away. J. A. Franklin, national head of the boilermakers union, complained to V. E. Macy that Bowles had violated the agreement by tossing aside the union hall elections. The clause at issue was

as follows: "The members in each craft or calling in a shop or yard shall have the right to select three of their number to represent them as members of a shop committee. However, members of this committee shall be chosen by a majority vote through a secret ballot *in such manner as the employees shall direct* [italics mine]." Franklin assured local boilermakers, "If you will recall my statement during the conference in Portland that we never would permit the employer to dictate to us the manner in which committees representing the men should be elected, and we will not stand for it now, even if we have to suspend work in every yard in Portland."[4]

Macy tried to reassure Franklin that workers "are guaranteed the right to vote for their shop committees without pressure of undue influence from any source." He also pointed out that the Macy Agreement established "that if the men could not agree upon the place and method of holding elections, the matter should be referred to the Examiner." It was critical, he argued, that *all workers* in a craft got the chance to vote—even if they did not belong to the union. If Macy could position Montague's decision as a defense of the voting rights of any nonunion minority, then the democratic rhetoric of wartime industrial relations used by all three sides mitigated against undermining this notion. The unions had been handed a critical defeat. Although Franklin was careful to evoke phraseology such as "the principles of democracy, which we are all fighting for" in his complaint to Macy, the matter at hand was clearly one of shop floor control, one plant at a time. If precedent could be set in Portland that workers had to join the union in order to participate in shop committee elections, then the closed shop would emerge in every plant in the nation working under the Macy Agreement. The issue dragged on until late April 1918, when Montague finally brokered a compromise that allowed management to provide an election location outside the yard. When the election took place in mid-May, only 450 workers out of about 2,500 at the plant cast votes. Montague blamed the rainy weather, but for Portland that seems a particularly weak excuse. More likely, union members were despairing of the whole process. Montague actually requested that a Northwest Steel committeeman be replaced after he refused to handle the grievances of nonunion workers, which suggests that the unions never really gave up this struggle for the remainder of the war. Northwest Steel minimized the number of grievances committeemen were allowed to collect by forcing them to do it over their half-hour lunch break. When Montague requested that these workers be allowed an additional half an hour, the company wryly asked if they could bill the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) for time lost.[5]

The right to display union membership and organize openly was another critical wartime battle over shop floor control. Union membership had been covert in Portland's workplaces for a long time, known but not

acknowledged. A shortage of skilled labor and promises of federal protection launched a campaign to reverse this shop floor invisibility. During the war, the union button became the most important recruitment technique in Portland. Contemporary pictures of gathered workers, even in official company photos, reveal a button on almost every man. This was an important symbol, one that surely made the minority who refused to join their craft union very uncomfortable. While some employers postponed a challenge to this practice until the postwar open shop drive, a few toughed it out during the war and met strong resistance from both the unions and the Macy Board. The fiercest battle over this issue, and organizing rights generally, was waged with Willamette Iron & Steel, the most antiunion industrial employer in Portland.[6]

In February 1918, national head of the boilermakers union J. A. Franklin again pressed Macy on a Portland issue, and this time the two agreed. Willamette Iron & Steel was allegedly discharging boilermakers for wearing union buttons at work, and Macy immediately took a stand against this practice. Macy told Montague that the "company has no more right to dictate whether or not men should wear buttons than clothes they should wear." But he cautiously stopped short of *endorsing* union buttons: "In the interest of harmony [I] think it unwise men should wear buttons. This however should be left to their own discretion." In early March, President Bert Ball of Willamette Iron & Steel told Macy that union buttons "would be a serious cause for controversy" both between management and workers and between union and nonunion workers. But the proportion of nonunion workers in the industry locally was insubstantial. Department of Labor arbitrator George Harry claimed as early as August 1917 that "the two large shipbuilding corporations, the Northwest and the Columbia…are probably 98 percent union. A large proportion of this membership have only very recently become union men." But Ball cited that "it was agreed by all parties that during the period of the war neither employer nor employee should take advantage of the conditions to secure conditions which were not in force prior to the war." However, the boilermakers union was over six thousand strong in Portland at this point and absolutely critical to the progress of federal ship contracts, so the problem could not be ignored.[7]

Although it began with the boilermakers, the electrical workers' shop committee at Willamette Iron & Steel sent a union button complaint to Montague later in March 1918. The letter was on International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) stationary, which indicated that this union local was administering the business of the committee. The IBEW complained that the company "refuses to allow the Men to wear the emblem of their Organisation which we claim is Un American." They detailed a program of antiunion harassment: "Whenever a workman joins our Union

he is put through a Question ordeal and discrimination starts right away." Management demoted five electricians, including the chair of the committee, together in status and pay to "fuse installers" and "lamp inserters." They all quit, fuming, "Men refuse to work in this Plant. Impossible to get a Committee to serve in this plant."[8]

When Willamette Iron & Steel discharged two members of the boilermakers union in February 1918 for refusing to remove their union buttons, Montague referred the problem back to the shop committee. This had become the standard method of dealing with such disputes and clearly tilted toward the unions. But the boilermakers (like the electrical workers) had not been able to maintain a committee due to harassment. The union was still complaining about the incident in April, and matters grew worse over the summer as Willamette Iron & Steel became emboldened by a weak reaction from the EFC, even though Macy had clearly sided with the unions on this issue. The boilermakers local complained directly to the secretary of labor, William Wilson, in mid-July and informed him that "almost daily at the Willamette Iron & Steel Works…they discharge our members for wearing the union button." The local argued that the union required members to wear the button and made a direct comparison between a man who "wears any emblem to show which branch of the service he belongs to" and a shipbuilder furthering the war effort and wearing the badge of his union.[9]

The one-year term of the general committee in the yard (to which the craft committees reported) was about to expire in August 1918, much to the relief of both the unions and the EFC officials who had entertained constant complaints of antiunion discrimination. Assistant Examiner Jones told the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board office in Washington, DC, "The majority of the committee members are non-union men and of the Apostolic Faith, and as such are opposed to unions." This committee had supported the company in its crusade to ban union buttons and was apparently able to convince the EFC that it was the *workers* and not *management* who were taking the lead on this issue. Jones warned, "It may be that the character of the committee will be changed with the new election as there is a vastly greater proportion of union men there now than at the time of the previous election." It was also crucial that this time the government would scrutinize the election process.[10]

Shop committees in plants doing government work had been an EFC innovation, the personal project of Vice President Charles Piez. He was a corporate executive and disciple of Frederick W. Taylor, the efficiency guru, who had formed shop committees before the war as a rationalization experiment. Piez had insisted that shop committees be part of the EFC war production plan from the beginning, and other agencies soon adopted

them. As union button dismissals continued, the boilermakers appealed directly to Piez during early September 1918 with a sworn affidavit from a member who was asked to remove his button and was fired after he refused even though he was told that his services had been otherwise satisfactory. Piez waited out the election and subsequent committee vote on the button issue before acting and then intervened in the Willamette Iron & Steel union button case to save the integrity of the shop committee system in this critical shipbuilding district.[11]

Jones visited the new committee in October 1918 and made sure that its members understood that a grievance should first go from the craft committee to the foreman. If still unresolved, it should then go to the general shop committee and then the plant superintendent. Only if there was still no way to settle the problem should the company president and the examiner's office become involved. The local office was trying to have matters settled internally and not remain the resource of first resort for both sides. As the war drew to a close, it was clear that shop committees would have to stand on their own in the future. However, they did have the weight of the EFC behind them for now, and with Jones present voted unanimously to allow union buttons in the plant. The committee also unanimously ordered that two blacksmiths who had recently been fired for wearing union buttons be reinstated with back pay for time lost.[12]

One week later, Piez laid down the law. The vice president of the EFC, who was one of the most important officials in the entire war production effort, commanded Willamette Iron & Steel not to dismiss workers for wearing union buttons. The company responded the next day, pleading that Piez had been given incorrect information and that management had already planned a meeting with the general shop committee. They planned to abide by the committee's majority decision and would not appeal. It seems doubtful that management happened to have such a meeting scheduled for the day after Piez's telegram. Much more likely, they sought to pacify the man well known for bringing the shop committee system to the EFC and who could also cut them out of future federal contracts with the stroke of a pen. The shop committee vote had already taken place one week earlier, so management's plea of ignorance was also likely part of the show for Piez. Ironically, a disciple of Frederick W. Taylor empowered the employees of Willamette Iron & Steel to wear union buttons on the shop floor of one of the largest industrial employers in the Pacific Northwest. The war worked in mysterious ways. For all the frustration with employer intransigence and examiner impotence there were enough historic union victories like this one to suggest that federal intervention could empower organized workers on the shop floor.[13]

Repression and Resistance: The IWW

The contestants in Portland's war production peacekeeping regime were fixed. AFL unions were institutionalized in the process here as elsewhere, from the Macy Board itself down to everyday negotiations with local examiners. But the anticapitalist IWW suffered not just by exclusion from wartime negotiations but by active federal harassment. State and local governments in the West had asked for federal assistance in crushing this organization for a decade but their requests fell on deaf ears. Until World War I, radicals were a local problem. The imperatives of war production and the specter of Bolshevism finally shifted the government on this issue. Federal persecution of anticapitalist labor organizers lasted beyond the war, carried on by wartime enforcers bereft of supporting federal law but reinforced by new state laws and local police "red squads."[14]

The Espionage Act, approved by Congress on June 15, 1917, was the primary enabler of the wartime antiradical campaign. The government could prosecute individuals under the act not only for spreading misinformation to the detriment of military efforts but more importantly, for attempting "to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military" or obstructing "the recruitment or enlistment service." The maximum sentence was 20 years and/or a fine of up to $10,000.[15]

From the first day the United States entered the war, the US attorney in Portland, Clarence Reames, pushed the attorney general to punish sedition more broadly. While President Wilson was waiting to make his momentous address to Congress that evening, Reames sent an urgent telegram to the chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. It opened as follows: "A law should be passed immediately against desecration or misuse of the flag." "We have no law to meet this situation and it is causing riots." When he forwarded the text of the telegram to the attorney general that same day, Reames pleaded further for power to act: "So far the police have been able to keep down rioting on account of this, but there is great danger of rioting on a large scale if the practice is not condemned and stopped." Not satisfied with the extent of the Espionage Act, his dutiful pressure on the attorney general continued into 1918. "Daily we have reports from sheriffs, state district attorneys, police and citizens" of unpatriotic public remarks. Reames listed ten such seditious statements commonly heard, including "the United States army is afflicted with loathsome diseases" and that "this is not a war for the people it is a war for the capitalists." Reames complained, "About all we can do is to make an investigation of the occurrence and list the man's name for future reference in the event he should subsequently violate the law." The key, of course, was to make such utterances themselves violations of the law in order to "call these disloyal men and women to account."[16]

This sort of pressure continued and before the act was a year old it was dramatically expanded in May 1918 to suppress sedition. Congress carefully constructed the amendment to target anticapitalist radicals and break their organizations through prosecution under the Espionage Act. The original text of the act protected conscription and guarded against mutiny, while ignoring war production and the prospect of revolution. It now became a crime to "willfully utter, print, write or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States" or to use any such language to bring the government, Constitution, military, official uniforms, or national flag "into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute." The new act contained the key to postwar federal involvement in suppressing local radicals, ensuring the new industrial relations regime and safeguarding the state against revolution. Although victory was not in sight in May 1918, federal authorities were already looking toward Reconstruction. Perhaps the prospect of German troops just 40 miles from Paris on June 1, over a year after the United States declared war, had a sobering effect. The Portland US attorney's office had finally gotten the latitude that Reames had been asking for since before the war had even started, but he had already moved up.[17]

Reames was rewarded for his diligence in February 1918 with a promotion to special deputy of the US attorney general in charge of all government intelligence work in an increasingly radical key shipbuilding and naval city, Seattle. By February, not yet even enabled by the amended Espionage Act, the federal government had already spawned competing intelligence services, which in turn worked haphazardly with local and state police forces and prosecuting attorneys. Agents and administrators from the US attorneys, Bureau of Investigation, Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and Secret Service were working separately but toward similar goals. Foremost of their goals, until the end of the war, was the elimination of the IWW. Unlike the AFL, the IWW did not accept the framework of corporate capitalism and sought to replace it with a syndicalist state run by industrial unions. It was the most substantial union organization to deny the legitimacy of the US government during the war.[18]

Before the United States entered the war, the IWW was thriving in Portland. The *Industrial Worker*, the IWW newspaper published in Seattle, promoted a Portland fundraiser for a new hall in February 1917. The new building would be "right in the heart of the slave market" and could "accommodate over seven hundred" with a rent of over $100 per month. In late May, 50 members joined in a single week and the organization was getting ready to move into its new hall, "which will be one of the finest on the coast." The Portland IWW had also just held a rally on the Plaza Block (a downtown public meeting area) with over one thousand present

to scatter some of the ashes of IWW bard Joe Hill, sing his songs, and listen to speakers in both Swedish, Hill's native language, and English. In June, all branches on the Pacific Coast combined efforts to start a Ship Builders Industrial Union to cover all workers in the yards regardless of craft, skill level, or locale. The organization had only a $2 initiation fee and membership cards were transferable between any yard or town because one local covered the entire coast. The union rejected the wartime industrial relations regime, refusing "to sign or abide by any contracts or agreements that in any way bind its members to work any stated hours at any stated wages for any given period of time." The IWW as a whole also continued to gain ground. In late July, with rebellion brewing in the logging camps, Portland was reporting "from twelve to fifteen new members are joining every day…and it looks now as if there will be even busier times in a day or two. The whole Columbia River valley is talking about strike." The summer 1917 logging strike that spread to sawmills and shipyards in the Pacific Northwest, boosting an already growing IWW movement in the region, precipitated the massive federal antiradical campaign that Oregon's politicians and employers had wanted for years.[19]

In September 1917, a Department of Justice coordinated nationwide raid of IWW halls represented a major step toward a more systematic attack. Six search warrants in Portland and Astoria yielded over 3,000 pounds of evidence impounded at the federal building. The raids and the notorious Chicago trial that followed are most often noted by scholars for both a disregard of the law and for ruthless efficiency. Federal agents and their local allies rounded up over two hundred leaders across the nation and nearly half were eventually convicted and given stiff sentences. Although this trial virtually destroyed the national leadership and its Chicago office, the IWW was not really a centralized organization. This supposedly devastating national net failed to snare key radicals in Portland, and the IWW maintained enough structural integrity locally to cause great anxiety for federal and local law enforcement officials in the city.[20]

Although the sweep of arrests appears to indicate that federal law enforcement coordination was fully developed and almost impossible to oppose, the reality was rather more disorganized. Historians of the IWW have not analyzed the local process of rounding up organizers in cities far from Chicago, a messy affair that clearly intensified the need for local officials to act locally.[21] On September 28, 1917, Agent Clabaugh in Chicago sent a telegram to Agent Bryon, head of the Bureau of Investigation office in Portland, with the entire list of defendants and instructed him to help execute the bench warrant by taking into custody all those on the list within his district and then ship them to Chicago for trial. Agent Bryon received the telegram at 4:15 p.m., although it ordered him to make arrests

over two hours before that at 4 p.m. Chicago time. He grumbled in his report that "newsboys had been crying facts concerning these indictments on the streets of Portland for more than two hours previous to the receipt of the above stated telegram." Almost a year later, Bryon was still angry enough to begin a report with a tirade about that fateful telegram. Because it arrived after the local press had revealed the indictments to the public, he thought it would be a mistake to further delay arrests by deciphering the coded message. He arrested all those mentioned as *possible* indictments from previous correspondence. Of the seven men he rounded up, the Chicago office wanted only four. Somewhat embarrassed, Bryon held Harris Allman, who he had already reported as a key local IWW leader, and two others as "detained witnesses" at $5,000 bail and later released all but Allman.[22]

The government built the Chicago trial on masses of evidence seized from IWW halls around the country. The September 1917 raid and the trial forced much of the organization underground—both leadership and rank and file. While it proved difficult to break the leadership entirely, the organization could not long withstand the nationwide assault enabled by wartime legislation. Radical activists suddenly had much more to worry about than 30 days on the rock pile for vagrancy, their traditional punishment from local judges. Constant harassment made the IWW hall, an important social institution for male working-class radicals in Portland, an unsafe place. In November, just two months after the first major raid, a Military Intelligence agent learned that the IWW was hosting a "smoker" at its hall on a Saturday evening. He raided the gathering with a team of agents and asked each man of conscription age to produce a draft registration card. Military Intelligence detained 12 men who could not produce a card, either for failure to register or simply because they did not carry it with them. As employment continued to pick up in the shipyards and the AFL unions expanded their base, many IWW sympathizers or covert (non-dues paying) members became invisible. They were also (unlike the AFL unions) unable to organize in or near the shipyards. In December, the Northwest Steel Company "was having trouble with agitators of the IWW type" and wanted the Bureau of Investigation office in Portland "to visit its plant so that some scheme could be developed whereby no trouble would be encountered in the future by this company, which is now building ships for the Government." The bureau was always happy to oblige.[23]

The next major raid to hit the Portland IWW hall, in February 1918, took 51 prisoners and "a truckload of literature." A special agent of the Department of Justice led the effort, assisted by Portland police, who charged 20 with vagrancy and released the rest. Although it was a federal raid, Municipal Judge George Rossman dealt with the prisoners. He released 12, gave suspended sentences to another 3, and held 5 for federal

authorities. Only 6 served time—all 30 days or less. Rossman found that the local laws at his disposal were totally inadequate and began a campaign for new ones to prosecute the IWW.[24]

Vagrancy had proven a tactic insufficient for wiping out "IWWism," a thorn in the side of Portland's authorities for a decade. Encouraged by the expansion of an investigative federal apparatus determined to work for local and state prosecutors, there was growing momentum in early 1918—made clear in the press—toward an ordinance banning the IWW explicitly:

> Municipal Judge Rossman yesterday directed an appeal to Mayor Baker for an ordinance definitely defining the particular offenses usually committed by members of the Industrial Workers of the World, which, he says, should be provided in order that they may readily be found guilty of that specific offense. Heretofore, they have been charged with vagrancy, but, as a matter of fact, many of them are not, in the strict legal sense, guilty of that, it is pointed out by the judge.

Judge Rossman suggested that "sabotage," rather than "vagrancy," should serve as the legal basis for punishing IWW members. He announced that he had found many "vagged" IWWs, whether vagrants or not, carried pamphlets and stickers advocating sabotage. "I believe," the judge concluded, "it would be appropriate to pass an ordinance making it unlawful for any person to advocate the destruction of property and to find in one's possession literature advocating such destruction be made prima facie evidence of the violation of the ordinance." Judge Rossman felt that the average "idle and dissolute [IWW member] is generally not a very destructive individual" and that the proposed sabotage ordinance should deliberately target organizers.[25]

The raid yielded membership records proving that there were still plenty of IWW organizers to harass. The summary report listed 236 "agitators" in the Portland district as well as the membership of 4 thriving locals. These locals had the arduous task of rebuilding their records and membership base after the September 1917 raid, and in less than six months, the results were impressive. The Lumber Workers' local 500 had 704 members and 55 "delegates," or organizers. The Marine Transport Workers' local 700 had 84 members. The Agricultural Workers' local 400 had 176 members. The Construction Workers' local 573 had 518 members. The records indicate a total of 1,773 members in the Portland district but in all likelihood the number was far greater. The seized membership lists included only those who had paid dues to their Portland local since the last raid. However, many IWW members moved from place to place quite often and dropped in and out of the union. Dues were quite low and cards were also transferable from one local to another. The IWW eschewed the high initiation fees they associated with the "labor-aristocratic" AFL.[26]

About the same time, several months before passage of the expanded Espionage Act, federal authorities stepped up pressure on IWW organizers by deporting aliens with radical Left beliefs.[27] The case of Harris Allman, identified by the government as one of three key leaders of the Portland IWW, demonstrates the precarious situation of immigrant organizers. His parents, immigrant British Jews, raised him in Ontario, Canada, and Allman then emigrated to the United States probably in 1910. It appears that he may have been born in Portland but Allman never sought to establish his citizenship and his alien status left him vulnerable. He owned a cigar and fruit stand in Portland as well as a restaurant in the west Portland "skid row" district where radicals congregated. In fact, his restaurant was "adjoining and opening into the I.W.W. hall." His dossier quotes him openly stating at length his support for the overthrow of the US government, his opposition to the war and conscription, and his refusal to take out naturalization papers. Allman's only leverage against the US attorney, city attorney, and immigration officials was property ownership; after the spring of 1918, even that did not matter much. Fueling already intense paranoia, a spy claimed that Allman revealed that inner and outer circles had developed in the IWW as a precaution after vigilante violence and systematic arrests. A core group at a secret rented house supposedly made the real decisions, not the membership at the IWW hall.

The Bureau of Investigation assigned this spy to Allman during the summer of 1917 in hopes of getting enough evidence to have him deported. In fact, all the incriminating quotes from his dossier compiled after the February 1918 raid appear to have been lifted from the spy reports of "Employee 100" generated in early August 1917. However, much of the information from this spy about Allman's background conflicts with what later appears in the dossier, such as birthplace (Russia, not Portland) and the location of his parents (Montreal, not Ontario). The number and length of the direct quotes from Allman reproduced by Employee 100 in his reports stretches the limits of credulity. The reported secret meeting place of the inner circle and associated conspiracy was rather easy to come by for Employee 100 as Allman revealed it all four days after striking up an acquaintance. This spy also complained that it took five hours of loitering around the IWW hall until Allman began talking to him in earnest about violent revolution. Almost immediately, the operative claimed, Allman was raving about obtaining guns and dynamite under false pretenses and wreaking havoc. Though the evidence seems clearly unreliable, the bureau used it to imprison Allman indefinitely while patiently pursuing deportation.[28]

Bryon noted in August 1918 that Allman had been in jail since his accidental arrest a year earlier during the national IWW sweep and Assistant US Attorney Robert Rankin was preparing a deportation case against him.

Just after his arrest, Immigration Inspector Robinson assured Bryon that he could obtain a deportation warrant but the final order did not come for a year. His case required attention through almost the entire period of US involvement in the war, although he was taken out of action through detainment. Not until spring 1918 had the legal climate changed to the point where Portland newspapers could trumpet, "I.W.W. VANDALS FACE DEPORTATION." "The patience of the government is exhausted and any alien who advocates sabotage will be arrested and deported as quickly as possible."[29]

Surveillance efforts increased that spring and Military Intelligence operatives hung around the IWW hall even when nothing was happening. One agent reported in May 1918 that "very few men were in the hall but a good many on the street. Hundreds of jobs were posted on the boards but the men are not taking them" because the wages were too low. Military Intelligence intercepted a June 1918 letter from a Portland IWW activist to one in Spokane, and he dejectedly recounted the following:

> Things are sure dead around here, and it would make a fellow sick to see the Spineless element sit around and Brass Band…I shamed a couple of them into taking out Credentials, just before I went away, and they still have them and never left the hall to try and do one damn thing for the O.B.U. [One Big Union, an internal IWW nickname] and I said to one of them, why dont you get out and try and do something for the cause…but he told me that he had the Bull Horrors, but that if things quieted down so that it was easy sailing he would get out on the job.

"The 'Bull Horrors' is becoming a general disease among the local 'Wobblies,'" the writer admitted, "due to the vigorous manner in which they are caught up upon the least evidence of law-breaking."[30]

Yet until the expansion of the Espionage Act in spring 1918, those IWW members with the means to evade vagrancy charges or have them overturned were in a strong position to exercise their political rights. William Ford, an organizer much detested by local and federal authorities in Portland, is a demonstrative case. Chief of Police Nelson Johnson ordered Ford jailed in early December 1917 because "first and most important of all" the IWW have a secret meeting place (although the report names C. H. Rice as the "man in charge" there) and "the further claim is made by these IWW that Portland is now the only place where an IWW is free from police interference." Chief Johnson then asked Agent Bryon to interview Ford, which he did but was unable to take action against him: "Ford denied that he was agitating." Had he admitted to being an organizer—he was publicly acting as one—a vagrancy charge would still be the harshest possible. If Ford had violated the Espionage Act, Bryon would have eagerly brought the US

attorney's office into the case. The next day, Ford pled guilty to vagrancy and was given six months suspended sentence by Judge Rossman on the condition that he stay out of Oregon for a year. If Ford had really been vagrant within the letter of the law, Rossman would have put him in jail and done so again as soon as he was released. In early February 1918, several weeks before the second major raid on the IWW hall and the first mass capture of local IWW members, Portland police spotted Ford and jailed him for violating the terms of his suspended sentence. To make matters worse, "Ford when arrested had certain literature in his possession, which same is attached and sent to the Bureau for their consideration and disposition." Still, nothing could be done. Ford appealed his case to the circuit court, which released him because the vagrancy charge was unfounded.[31]

Although the IWW was often accused of shadowy conspiracy, the ease with which government agents infiltrated meetings and even learned of strategy indicates that it was a fairly open organizational culture—a fact lost on those who were themselves engaged in a conspiracy to crush the IWW. But during the war, it committed the irredeemable act of thoroughly rejecting federal legitimacy. In May 1918, the *Industrial Worker* published an editorial titled "Paternalism and the I.W.W." that began as follows: "Paternalism is an insidious government snake that crawls into every single phase of the workers life. It is state interference carried to intolerable limits." After much more invective in the same vein, the piece concluded, "Placing the control of all the economic forces of the country into the hands of a group of professional politicians would be a very effective way of manufacturing a group of tyrants with power that has never before been equaled. In other words, it would create paternalism." Less than two weeks later, Congress passed the Sedition Act to enable a more robust antiradical campaign. After the summer of relentless harassment that followed, the ailing Portland IWW went even further underground.[32]

This organization then threw itself on the mercy of the paternal state it loathed. An official IWW letter to Attorney General Thomas Gregory in August 1918, signed by five local union secretaries and the members of the legal defense fundraising committee, indicted Portland authorities and requested federal shelter. The authors "object to the usurpation by city authorities of the duties of the Federal authorities" and added, "We believe that a warning or suggestion from you and your department to the local authorities here would insure us the protection to which we are entitled." The letter concluded quite politely, and implausibly, with a claim that the authors "have only the best interests of the government…at heart." The letter detailed specific police abuses and emphasized the important role of IWW members in regional war production enterprises. While mainstream unions had long since learned that direct appeal to federal authority could

produce local pressure and even precipitate hearings, the IWW stood outside this framework of negotiation. Local police had finally become a terminal threat because they had extensive federal assistance. Although Portland police and the city's attorney and judge had been harassing IWW members for years, it was really the Department of Justice that nearly destroyed the organization and established the legal climate for a rash of state "criminal syndicalism" laws in 1919–20 to both prevent a postwar IWW resurgence and fight new forms of radicalism.[33]

Dr. Marie Equi, Kathleen O'Brennan, and the Labor Movement

Though the Portland IWW was now a shadow of its former self, the threat of its revival, particularly through charismatic leadership, continued to occupy the imagination of federal authorities. In late September 1918, US Attorney Bert Haney responded to a request from the attorney general for more information on an Irish nationalist in Portland, Kathleen O'Brennan. He noted that she was "engaged in spreading Irish propaganda" and was "the daily consort of I.W.W. leaders and speakers in this city." She was a compelling speaker and had immediately been in high demand since arriving in Portland during the summer of 1918. O'Brennan was living and having an affair with Dr. Marie Equi, lesbian and anticapitalist radical, who Haney referred to as "the most dangerous person at large in Oregon." His office was busily preparing a case against Equi under the Espionage Act, which would eventually send her to prison. O'Brennan managed the public campaign for her appeal and Portland workers participated actively. O'Brennan and Equi, neither of whom held any official leadership positions in radical organizations, were widely respected by both AFL unionists and IWW radicals. These two women challenged gender boundaries, capitalism, and the war but were still able to win the support of individuals and organizations that stretched to both poles of social class and opinion on the war. The specter of this coalition made these two women dangerous to federal and local officials alike.

O'Brennan and Equi had no problem complaining to federal authorities if they felt they were being mistreated. Although I have no evidence of any male radicals actually visiting the US attorney to register grievances, Haney noted that Military Intelligence had been so persistent in tailing O'Brennan that "she has complained to me bitterly thereof." He responded by assuring "her that innocent, peaceable and law abiding people would receive protection in this district"—which reads very much like a warning. Both Equi and O'Brennan had powerful bourgeois connections, a resource unavailable to most radicals. The former was a medical doctor and had been

a Progressive activist, while the latter was part of an Irish nationalist movement that had powerful supporters. Haney warned the attorney general that O'Brennan had already complained to members of Congress and "claims to have the personal acquaintance and the cordial support of Senator Phelan of California." In closing, Haney stated that O'Brennan's activities in Portland were not "at all to her credit, either as a citizen *or as a woman* [italics mine]." In order to treat radical women as they treated men, federal authorities would have to challenge the legitimacy of their womanhood to circumvent the demands of chivalry. Equi's case is classic in this regard.[34]

She first came to the notice of Portland authorities while serving on the strike committee of cannery women who walked out during the summer of 1913. It was a radicalizing event for Equi. She went from Progressive to revolutionary socialist over the course of the conflict and served her first stretches of jail time. Equi embraced the cause of the IWW, speaking in public for the organization and providing free medical service to its members. Federal authorities associated her rather quickly with Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the famous "rebel girl" of the IWW. Haney claimed that Equi was involved in riots in Paterson, New Jersey, during 1915, and traced her relationship with Flynn to this point. In fact, the famous Paterson strike pageant occurred during the summer of 1913 when Equi was undergoing political conversion in Portland. She did travel to the East Coast to meet radicals there during 1914 but then returned to Portland. As both a lesbian and an abortion provider, Equi was already well outside the mainstream and also could have faced serious legal trouble before her association with the IWW. She also had a history of making violent threats, physically intimidating policemen, and launching into public harangues against anyone who challenged her.

In June 1916, Equi's life took a dramatic turn. On Preparedness Day, a nationwide rally that saw massive turnouts (including perhaps 20,000 in Portland), she carried a banner reading, "Prepare to Die, Workingmen, J. P. Morgan & Co. Want Preparedness for Profit. 'Thou Shalt Not Kill.'" The crowd mobbed Equi and tore down the banner before police arrested her. After her release that same day, Equi borrowed linesmen's spurs and climbed to the top of a telephone pole. She began an antiwar speech and displayed another banner, this one reading, "Down With the Imperialist War." During the latter half of 1916, Equi gave local authorities even more cause for concern. When Margaret Sanger visited Portland on a speaking tour, the two quickly became friends and Equi helped her distribute and even revise her birth control literature. Police arrested the two together at a Portland rally, the beginning of a deep bond and frequent correspondence that lasted many years. Also in late 1916, Equi provided free medical care to IWW members wounded in the "Everett Massacre" in Washington State and

served as the Oregon delegate to a ceremony scattering some of IWW bard and martyr Joe Hill's ashes. As the United States entered the war in 1917, Equi's deep involvement in anticapitalist and antiwar movements, as well as her now very public association with Sanger, made her threatening. It was the broad support she enjoyed within Portland's labor community, as well as her bourgeois connections, that made this threat a top law enforcement priority. This was no radical to be dispatched to the rock pile for vagrancy.

The police and federal agents were unable to touch Equi over the first year of US involvement in the war, but when Congress dramatically broadened the Espionage Act in May 1918, the means to silence her was finally at hand. Haney indicted Equi in late June, following an arrest while she made an antiwar speech at the IWW hall, and he set about the lengthy process of finding enough evidence to ensure avoidance of an embarrassing acquittal in a high-profile case. He was surprised, and clearly disappointed, when she paid the $10,000 bond to avoid imprisonment while awaiting trial. Ironically, the trial did not begin until November 12, the day after the war ended. Protecting the war effort, of course, was just the facade for removing her influence from Portland for as long as possible.[35]

Not leaving anything to chance, Agent Bryon hired a woman, who reported as "Informant 53," to become close friends with Equi and report her activities and utterances to him in detail during the months leading up to the trial. He later claimed after the war that she was "an educated woman, a believer in the freedom of Ireland and an intensely loyal and patriotic citizen of the United States." Thomas Mannix, an Irish nationalist lawyer in Portland, introduced Informant 53 to O'Brennan. "This introduction, of course, was arranged by subterfuge," Bryon reported and Informant 53 was under instructions to initially discuss only Ireland with O'Brennan. Informant 53 quickly met Equi through O'Brennan, succeeded in becoming close friends with both women, and soon accompanied them everywhere. Her extensive reports are significant for two reasons: they make clear the chaos and competition under which the government's nascent intelligence gathering services were operating and they also illuminate the extent and specifics of Equi and O'Brennan's support in Portland.[36]

Informant 53 made it clear that Military Intelligence was inept. O'Brennan told her that "she resented the clumsiness of these agents, who even fell over her feet in the elevator." They had planted an easily discovered dictaphone in her room. Equi and O'Brennan cut the wire and threw it back over the transom of the door with a note pinned to it: "Here you poor fish you might need this again." Both women constantly confronted the agents tailing them, embarrassing them publicly as much as they could. Informant 53 began reporting in August 1918, and by the end of the month she was sure that Military Intelligence was watching her also: "When I got

to my room I noticed there was a hole in the adjoining door." She "poked it through into the other room with a hairpin and left the hairpin in the door." In an odd twist, O'Brennan encouraged Informant 53 to complain about this spying to the US attorney, for she was sure British agents were to blame because of Informant 53's Irish nationalism. "I have convinced Miss O'Brennan that I am constantly watched (which I am certain is true)." Agent Bryon even received a complaint from the manager of the hotel where O'Brennan was staying about the ludicrous Military Intelligence operation in his establishment. He asserted that there were five agents and a member of the American Protective League, a volunteer group of pro-government spies and vigilantes, following O'Brennan. The bureau was equally interested, having been asked by British authorities to monitor her. A letter from the national head of the bureau in June 1918, shortly before O'Brennan's arrival in Portland, expressed his belief that her lecture tour was violating the Espionage Act. He wanted all local agents to monitor her speeches and promptly contact their US attorney if she crossed the line.[37]

Before even meeting Equi, O'Brennan was already speaking to labor groups. An agent in Tacoma reported that she spoke to the labor council in that city. However, her relationship with Equi was a politically transformative experience. In August 1918, an agent reported, "The writer heard nothing, either from the platform or the audience, which could be construed as seditious." Indeed, O'Brennan was criticized by some for not being strongly anticapitalist, for supporting the Catholic Church, and lauding Irish soldiers fighting in the war. By October, Informant 53's spy reports revealed a rather different attitude: "Miss O'Brennan further told me the thing that had first ardently interested her in the labor question was the great abuse that Dr. Equi had been subject to at the time of her imprisonment [during the 1913 cannery strike]." Equi claimed that she "had been so brutally injured by beatings, that her spinal cord had been permanently hurt." O'Brennan's affair with Equi was shifting her from nationalism to revolutionary socialism. She told Informant 53 that the war was precipitating revolution in the United States and Britain and discoursed on the matter at length. According to historian Julia L. Mickenberg, "A belief that Russian revolutionaries were taking practical measures to transform women's place in society opened space for American feminists to conceive a new model of citizenship," even "a new kind of subjectivity." This context is important toward understanding the link for bourgeois anticapitalist women in this revolutionary era between the emancipation of workers and the self. Equi and O'Brennan engaged in an increasingly bold and combative public politics.[38]

In October 1918, there was a mass meeting on the Plaza Block in downtown Portland to "arouse interest in Dr. Equi's cause." In a clear display of the powerful conjunction of her bourgeois and labor connections, local

AFL unions organized the rally and included a number of speakers from the faculty of Reed College. In fact, Informant 53 claimed, "It was the policy, not for Dr. Equi or her friends [to] go to these people to get aid, but to have the Labor Unions go." At this point, according to Informant 53, supporters had raised $1,200 for Equi in Portland alone and $200 of that just from the shoe fasteners union. Equi was speaking in public often, and sometimes to large crowds: nearly eight hundred at an IWW meeting attended by soldiers in uniform. While there was clearly strong support for Equi within the labor movement, there was also divided opinion. O'Brennan confessed in October that there was "some opposition that she was meeting in regard to speaking at the Labor Unions for Dr. Equi." Nevertheless, "she intended to keep on speaking even if she almost had to force her way in." That same month she spoke to two of the most important and militant organizations in wartime Portland: the Metal Trades Council and boilermakers union. A doctor she knew was also arranging for her to give lectures about the art and literature of Ireland at the Portland Public Library—a cover for nationalist agitation. O'Brennan also claimed that the Irish Women's Council of New York and Oregon's Senator George Chamberlain had interceded with Military Intelligence on her behalf. Most astonishingly, Informant 53 reported that Equi was "offered $1000 to campaign for the Democratic party and [was] told that her case would be dropped if she agreed." The Central Labor Council (CLC) in Portland passed a resolution of support for Marie Equi and Secretary E. J. Stack seems to have been a personal ally. The US attorney felt that "she has brought a considerable amount of pressure upon the local labor unions" and that "a considerable amount of agitation" had created "the impression that the trial of her cause" was some sort of trial of the labor movement itself.[39]

The prosecuting deputy US attorney, who told the jury that Equi was an "unsexed woman" during his arguments in the November 1918 trial, got the conviction that his office and the intelligence services had labored toward in both concert and competition for months. The government issued a deportation warrant for O'Brennan that same month and after some delay the arrest took place while the two were sleeping at their hotel. According to Agent Bryon's report, although Equi was "disrobed," she "drove the officers out of the room." Despite O'Brennan's substantial connections, her association with the now convicted Equi left her on shaky ground. To make matters worse, the bureau claimed that both women had become members of the IWW's "Recruiting Union Branch" in Portland on Christmas day 1918.[40]

Equi left the courtroom after her December sentencing, still on $10,000 bond, to pursue an appeal while facing three years in prison. As she walked out, according to the conservative *Portland Oregonian*, Agent Bryon struck

and knocked her down. When Harriet Speckart (Equi's partner from 1906 until her affair with O'Brennan) got between them, he did the same to her. Bryon argued to the press that he had been provoked, which Equi denied, but it was clear that he had assaulted both women. Despite Equi's status as a convicted federal criminal sentenced to prison, the mainstream labor movement came to her defense.[41]

The Oregon State Federation of Labor (OSFL), at its January 1919 annual convention, unanimously passed a resolution demanding the removal of Agent Bryon from his post and requesting a reassessment of Equi's case. O'Brennan was present at the meeting and also pushed successfully for a resolution supporting US recognition of a united and independent Ireland. Also in early 1919, the unions representing boilermakers and shipwrights passed resolutions opposing O'Brennan's potential deportation and decrying government "attempts to defame" her. This show of support for both Equi and O'Brennan within the OSFL showed the real strength of progressive unions and leaders in the organization at the time, emboldened by wartime strength and expansion.[42]

The government postponed its case against O'Brennan to observe her and strengthen their evidence. In April 1919, she won a six-month delay during which immigration authorities had her watched closely by the Bureau. In June 1919, Agent Kelly in San Francisco reported that she was agitating prior to Equi's appeal, and forwarded a copy of the passionate pamphlet she had created and was distributing titled: "WORKERS UNITE," with a picture of Equi on the cover and a call to arms to free her and other "class war prisoners." O'Brennan's political shift was taking its toll. The *Portland Telegram* reported in September that the Affiliated Irish Societies of Oregon had refused to support any more of her talks and the city council then unanimously denied her access to the city auditorium, a key tactic to limit the audience size radicals could address.[43]

However, at about the same point in 1919, she continued to be well received at meetings of the CLC and led a group of one thousand ironworkers in the city Labor Day parade. The group marched with sashes and a banner proclaiming the militant Irish nationalist organization Sinn Fein. Also, the Portland reception committee for Eamon DeValera, leader of Sinn Fein, asked O'Brennan to act as secretary. Her radical Irish and anticapitalist allies remained steadfast as her more mainstream connections unraveled. She left for the East Coast and was one of the speakers at a June 1920 rally in Boston for James Larkin, an Irish socialist recently imprisoned in New York. The meeting had an attendance of 1,500, "most of them being Irish." She called Larkin "a victim of English propaganda" and praised his efforts toward "the emancipation of the Working Class in Europe and in America" as well as his preaching national independence "to the lowest class of the

Irish." Interest in O'Brennan waned as the government came to focus more on Communists rather than the IWW and retained no obligation to assist British intelligence after the war. The Bureau of Immigration cancelled her November 1918 deportation warrant in July 1920. After nearly two years of appeal and delay, in October 1920 Equi reported to a US marshal in Portland for transport to San Quentin. She said a wistful goodbye to a small crowd of "two-score friends and sympathizers."[44]

Equi and O'Brennan both had substantial bourgeois, as well as labor and radical, connections—a highly unusual combination. Equi could draw upon her status as a medical doctor and former Progressive activist, while O'Brennan was a speaker of growing prominence in a nationalist movement that crossed class lines. But the experience of these two clearly demonstrates that too close an association with the IWW removed the veil of chivalry and exposed bourgeois women to the harassment of law enforcement officials on an extralegal crusade. Still, for a time, these women were able to connect the mainstream and the radical. Informant 53's spy reports did claim that both the Democratic and Republican parties were courting Equi. A former Oregon governor testified on her behalf and she had the support of a number of fellow physicians. President Otto Hartwig of the OSFL and secretary stack of the CLC visited the US attorney's office to ask that Equi's case be dropped. Despite her wildly nontraditional identity and public behavior—lesbian, abortionist, outspoken pacifist and anticapitalist, physically intimidating—Equi had a great deal of support from people of influence as well as the grass roots. I think the answer lies in the strength of progressive factions within the AFL, the professions, and politics prior to the postwar Red Scare. Equi and O'Brennan were able to move between these worlds and that of radicals until the latter became poison during 1919—something that did not happen until *after* the war. When Equi finished her year in San Quentin in late 1921, revolution no longer seemed imminent. The radical Left had been decimated and Progressivism seemed spent. Shorn of her unique mix of connections, Equi's political moment had passed.[45]

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The federal peacekeeping regime was unable to entirely contain protest from those who cooperated or resistance from those who did not. By the end of the war, the government arbitration apparatus relied heavily on the unions and they used the Macy Agreement creatively to further their power on the shop floor. Because their success was limited, it would be short lived. The IWW was thriving before the government intervened in Portland industrial relations just after the summer of 1917, but it was an obstacle to

the new regime and could only be effectively swept away through combining federal and local resources. The expansion of federal prerogatives in the surveillance and suppression of speech and action that accompanied policing efforts from food consumption to enemy alien registration aided efforts to crush the IWW. Still, the organization was able to survive in Portland through most of the war by exploiting weaknesses in the evolving federal-local law enforcement nexus. The postwar period and attendant diminishment of federal capacity would see a partial IWW revival in the region. Although national and local authorities continued the fight, it was a shift of radical enthusiasm toward the communism of the triumphant Bolsheviks that was the syndicalist group's most insurmountable challenge.

In Portland, the AFL had consistently defended the rights of the IWW before the war and had on occasion acted in solidarity. The war then drew these two groups too far apart for concerted action. The government recognized the AFL as an integral part of its industrial relations framework while marking the IWW as the greatest outside threat to that new and fragile system. However, Equi and O'Brennan were able to draw support from both groups, revealing that perhaps the split was not so deep in an era of rapid AFL growth and escalating militancy. The government's long and steadfast campaign against Equi, which saw her trial begin in November 1918 the day after the war ended and then continue through several years of delays and failed appeals, shows that the state interpreted this sort of potential alliance as a serious threat. Once Equi's trial began, the credibility of the postwar federal campaign against those that most strongly rejected its authority would be on the line. For the IWW, the stake in Equi's trial was enormous and she never lost their support. For the local AFL, whose wartime protection had expired, the outcome would also be a measure of their own freedom in the Reconstruction era.

CHAPTER 6

INTERNMENT AND URBAN MORAL ORDER: ENEMY ALIENS AND "SILK STOCKING GIRLS"*

Albert Hilker, a Prussian coppersmith and recent immigrant who had served in the German infantry, would certainly have been banned from working in the war production plants on the Willamette River in Portland if not for his trade. He made copper elbow joints for the Northwest Process Company and stubbornly refused, out of craft pride, to allow others to do the finishing on his joints. The company could not do without his skills but badly wanted to maximize production by speeding up and dividing the elbow joint work. After being leaned on by management, Hilker quit. Desperate to regain his services with full cooperation, the firm had him taken into federal custody as an enemy alien who deliberately sabotaged essential war production by slowing down the pace of work. US Attorney Bert Haney interviewed him and afterward felt "confident that he will cooperate hereafter in getting out material." Hilker was in a strong position due to current high demand for his skills and could easily have left for another firm in Portland or any other war production center in the nation. However, as an enemy alien, he needed a permit to leave the city and most metalworkers in Portland labored on or near the waterfront, which also required a pass.[1]

If Hilker had proved stubborn to Department of Justice (DOJ) officials, they would have had every right to intern him as a Prussian saboteur. During the war, federal-local partnerships used internment, or the threat of internment, on the local level and in response to regional conditions to eliminate threats to war production and troop recruitment and deployment. This chapter focuses on the two internment programs developed in the United States during the war. These national drives unfolded as local programs, focusing on fears of an itinerant working class in the Pacific Northwest that were crucial in creating shared ground upon which local

and federal interests could coalesce. Class position, even within the working class, and potential contribution to the war effort were often determinant of whether local and federal authorities labeled an individual as undesirable. Both the male enemy aliens at risk of internment and the girls and women who experienced confinement due to sexual activity tended to be poor. The authorities they encountered deemed that they were, or were likely to become, radicals or prostitutes—but they were not to be prosecuted as such. Officials could banish or track them more easily as threats to the war effort rather than as threats to urban social stability and economic development. Scholars of the World War I home front in the United States have ignored the evolving local-federal system to track or intern these two groups. While the limited work on female venereal disease internment does acknowledge the importance of class, though scholarship on enemy aliens does not, scholars have so far failed to establish how local perceptions of the dangerous poor shaped cooperation with federal authority.[2]

Internment and the Drive for Urban Order

In November 1917, the government ordered all nonnaturalized German males over age 13 to report during the week of February 4, 1918, to their local US attorney's office if there was one, or to the postmaster if not, and submit to an interview. Field agents attached photographs and fingerprints to each file and gave an identification card to enemy aliens they deemed politically safe. Each individual had to carry this card at all times and could not travel, or even switch residences locally, without approval. In April 1918, President Woodrow Wilson, finally conceding to the DOJ, extended the program to define enemy alien women as well, and they registered the week of June 17. Women were particularly vulnerable because federal officials assumed that their politics and loyalties mirrored those of their husbands. This policy spared those married to men who were US citizens but rendered all female citizens who had married enemy aliens as enemies themselves. These women, now effectively bereft of citizenship, were vulnerable to asset forfeiture and the Alien Property Custodian took over $25 million worth from them during the war.[3]

In all, the DOJ reported that it registered 480,000 enemy aliens in 1918 and interned 6,000 over the course of the war after they refused, or failed, to establish their loyalty. Enemy alien regulations also became an expedient adjunct to the Espionage and Sedition Acts, granting the DOJ more power to track and contain individuals with radical politics if they happened to be part of this enormous group of immigrants. Austro-Hungarians and other nationals of Central Powers belligerents were never really incorporated into these new systems, however, revealing the limitations of federal capacity to

manage such a massive project and also the primacy of war production. The DOJ estimated that there might be as many as 4 million Austro-Hungarian enemy aliens in the United States and that perhaps 1.6 million were industrial workers. The government could not hope to register and track so many people, and certainly, it would have been both foolish and impossible to fire so many badly needed war production workers. The state also had no national administrative precedent to draw upon. Historian Mark E. Neely has found that during the Civil War, by far the largest prior mobilization, most federal military arrests of civilians occurred in the precarious border states and that a majority of these targeted Confederates after 1862. He established that such arrests were much more unusual in the North and that it was rare for political speech or organization to be at issue.[4]

A confluence of federal-local interests and mutual dependence also helped precipitate the other wartime internment program, the protection of soldiers and potential recruits from girls and women with venereal disease, which also went beyond the scope of its official purpose and dwelt on fears of the working class. In the context of war mobilization, both the rising tide of radicalism and the spread of venereal disease clearly struck federal officials as dangerous contagions that could hinder an already daunting project. In early 1917, the US Army had just 128,000 regular and 180,000 reserve soldiers. Less than two years later the military had expanded to four million, half of whom went to Europe with the American Expeditionary Forces. Thirteen percent of these recruits contracted venereal disease *before* arriving at training camps. Because the army quantified the number from each state who were infected and released the data, locales competed to prove their purity in hopes of boosting development and obtaining war production contracts.[5]

The government tried to foster a nationwide campaign to protect potential recruits. The US Public Health Service (PHS) became active in "extra-cantonment areas" as early as January 1918 under its Division of Domestic Quarantine with a coordinating officer appointed in each state. The states, however, carried most of the burden. The PHS pushed them "for the extension of facilities for early diagnosis and treatment," to pass "repressive measures, looking to isolation and treatment of dangerously infected individuals," and for "educational measures." In July 1918, the Chamberlain-Kahn Act set aside over several million dollars to treat, contain, and research those infected with venereal disease and created an Interdepartmental Social Hygiene Board (ISHB) to coordinate all efforts. Although the ISHB only spent a fraction of its appropriation before the war ended and was thereafter banned from contributing to nonfederal facilities, the restoration of the original mission of Chamberlain-Kahn became a unifying postwar campaign for the PHS and sympathetic local advocates.[6]

Historian Nancy K. Bristow has estimated that 30,000 women were detained during the war. Federally aided institutions alone held 15,520 females over 27 months during the 1918–20 period. They served an average of 70 days in detention houses and 1 year in reformatories. Bristow's overall estimate accounts for the thousands held by local and state facilities not directly aided by the government, including traditional jails.[7]

Enemy Aliens

The resources and willing assistance of city government proved indispensable in both internment programs in Portland. The other major establishment partner in enemy alien policing, the shipyards, proved less reliable. However, even in the failings of the shipyards, one sees a mutual focus on war production that superseded enemy alien control unless the two goals coincided. Local conditions forced federal officials in the field to evolve practices in order to implement national policy and form alliances that would increase their capacity to manage this ambitious program. On June 1, 1917, a federal ban on enemy aliens passing within a half mile of military or war production facilities went into effect and the resultant dislocation was massive. The US attorney in Portland, Clarence Reames, spoke with over eight hundred petitioners in ten days. The number would have been much larger but the only banned zone was within a half mile of the local armory until November 1917 when all waterfront workers, whether citizens or not, had to apply for a pass. The government tried to prevent enemy aliens from approaching within one hundred yards of a waterfront area and ordered a ban on passes for the nationals of any Central Powers belligerent. For a city that was divided by a river and had a significant German-speaking population, the complications seemed overwhelming. There were 23,198 German-born Oregon residents in 1910. The next largest foreign-born group, Canadians, was only half as large. Nearly one-third of the state's German nationals (7,489) lived in Portland, the largest immigrant group in the city. Because the DOJ had a small number of field agents in Portland, the city police split off over one-quarter of its active duty officers, 80 men, to work under Leon Jenkins, who later served as chief of police from 1919 until Mayor Baker left office in 1933. Jenkins's force policed areas dedicated to war production, coordinated and enforced enemy alien registration, raided "radical headquarters," and worked with military intelligence services as well as the DOJ.[8]

The job was still too much for federal field agents and their local law enforcement allies to handle, so the web of cooperation widened to include private industry. The government allowed some employers to devise and enforce their own pass systems if they earned approval. In all, the DOJ

issued 900,000 waterfront passes and permitted 50 independent pass systems. For Portland, whose economy revolved around waterfront activity during the war, the new regulations were particularly onerous. Enforcement was porous and mainly relied on voluntary cooperation. Northwest Steel, one of the region's largest employers during the war, often printed articles in its employee magazine exhorting all its workers to wear the company's "war service badges." To appear democratic, the magazine noted, "The offenders are not all 'privates.' Several men in relatively high positions…have been noticed without their badges or wearing them concealed." Operating under a worsening labor shortage, appeals to patriotism were the only recourse the company really had: "Failure to comply with this rule implies…disrespect for our Government and our boys in France." Regardless, the violations must have continued because the admonitions did also.[9]

The Northwest Process Company (Albert Hilker's employer), located near the waterfront, made copper piping for local shipyards. Coppersmiths were in high demand by early 1918 and at this firm the workers were "ninety-five percent of German or Austrian extraction." The company was barely inside the restricted area and its attorneys begged Oregon senator George Chamberlain to intervene. Failure to secure exemptions, management argued, would destroy the company and delay shipbuilding. Northwest Process estimated that moving the plant might take 2 months and cost a prohibitive $20,000. US Attorney General Thomas Gregory relented, pending a local investigation that quickly put the matter to rest. The company continued to operate unchanged, although the DOJ did not actually have the authority to grant exceptions to the president's ban on alien access to waterfront areas. Regardless, federal field agents continued to examine individual cases.[10]

With such a substantial number of German-born residents in Portland, the problem of enemy alien workers on the waterfront refused to recede. Local yard owners went out of their way to hide enemy alien workers from discovery. An informant told DOJ officials that an Albina Engine & Machine Works employee claimed that there were 20 to 25 enemy aliens working there and "that the foreman is shielding them because they are high-grade mechanics." After the enemy alien waterfront ban, these workers "consulted the foreman and he told them to keep still until they were found out." There was no recorded follow-up in the Albina case, perhaps because such incidents badly embarrassed the DOJ when they appeared in the newspapers. In July 1918, the press announced, "Federal officials report considerable trouble with the Grant Smith Porter Ship Company over the employment of alien enemies." Since the waterfront proclamation less than a year before, the government had taken four Germans into custody from that yard. The arrest of a carpenter who had served in the German navy and claimed to be a Dane when applying for work had prompted the newspaper

attention. DOJ officials were angry that the yard neglected to request proof of nationality. Assistant US Attorney Robert Rankin claimed, "Without the closest cooperation of the management of the different shipyards in employing help, it is virtually impossible for the Federal officials to prevent alien enemies obtaining employment." However, there is no evidence that Washington, DC, punished offending yards by denying or withdrawing ship orders or even setting fines. Both the yards and the government were interested primarily in maximizing productivity and the enemy alien program needed to be subordinated to that goal.[11]

Undesirables

The priority given to war production and the usefulness of the enemy alien program in protecting production become clear in the highly structured way that the Portland US attorney's office judged an individual's reliability by class position, even within the working class. Parole and internment criteria, though applied by federal officials, were deeply embedded in region-specific fears of the dangerous poor. City government's old campaigns to suppress radicalism and vice, along with new hopes for a future of industrial growth, also shaped the wartime climate and Portland's policing resources were indispensable to federal goals. The US attorney personally interviewed every enemy alien that police caught in a restricted zone without a permit. Clarence Reames held the position through the war period until he was promoted to special deputy US attorney general in charge of coordinating government antiradical intelligence in Seattle in early February 1918. Rankin, the assistant US attorney, served as interim head of the Portland office until Bert Haney's confirmation as US attorney in mid-March for the remainder of the war. Each of the three followed a similar procedure, first recording the arrested individual's history and then determining the detainee's political and national loyalties. If the US attorney determined that the arrestee was a recent arrival in the city, had a migratory history, and was without family, then it was typical to place this person on federal parole. The political establishment was convinced that such men were an unstable force contributing to the ranks of the unemployed, the criminal, and the radical, even though they were essential to the regional economy. Historian Frank Tobias Higbie has described such migrants as "indispensable outcasts."[12]

Itinerant laborers usually found their way to the North End, a vice district near downtown that was also home to a great many cheap lodging houses. Most of this neighborhood fell within the Third Ward, which had 14.8 inhabitants per dwelling by 1898 and was 79 percent male in 1910. Many of the city's saloons were concentrated in the North End, and the neighborhood was also host to the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW),

which sought out "indispensable outcasts" where they lived. Prostitution, drunkenness, and revolution seemed to characterize the area, and by extension the mores of its itinerant male residents, for the city's middle class after years of sensational press coverage. The North End was well known as the city's most dangerous lure, with over one thousand minors taken into police custody there in 1903 alone. Elimination of brothels in 1913 and then saloons in 1916 diminished the attraction but the neighborhood remained the center of the city's working-class radicalism and maintained its popular association with raucous immorality. US attorney reports reflected this ongoing concern by emphasizing whether or not someone had moved around often and whether this person had family or property. IWW culture in the Pacific Northwest was built by and for the "indispensable outcasts" of the North End, so law enforcement officials extended their battle against the organization to its potential constituency. Although a person's level of intention to violate enemy alien regulations was important to the outcome of a case, Reames, and later Rankin and Haney, ultimately drew their judgments of intentions from whether the enemy alien had the characteristics adding up to reliability: strong rejection of their birth country and equally strong love of the United States; a lack of interest in politics or workplace activism; and a substantial local history that included steady employment and a family. However, if an individual had a scarce skill that was essential to the local war production effort then he would only need to prove that he was not radical and also at least indifferent to the war.[13]

One enemy alien served only a brief term of detention because a "firm engaged…with the production of ships was very anxious to employ him…as he is a skilled draftsman and engineer." The US attorney "thought that it would be better to have him engaged in essential war work than to be idling away his time in jail." Julius Meyer and John Heilman both avoided registering as enemy aliens to keep their jobs as coppersmiths. In both cases, the US attorney judged their excuses to be fabrications but still recommended parole under their firm's supervision after deciding that the men were "law-abiding, industrious, and orderly." The report to the attorney general noted that Meyer was married and that Heilman was a widower with four US-born children, and his employer claimed that "he [would] have great difficulty to replace [Heilman]." Stanley Socha had three brothers in the German army and had served two years himself before emigrating. He was arrested working in a shipyard but the US attorney blamed the yard for misleading him about the necessity to register and recommended parole. The report noted, "He has a wife and two children aged 4 and 2 dependent upon him for support. He has purchased a Liberty Bond."[14]

William Prandle had worked as a farm laborer in Montana before making his way to Portland when the war began and found employment on

a waterfront grain elevator. He avoided registration, like Meyer, Heilman, and Socha, but did not have their skills and was also unmarried, earning him internment for the remainder of the war for the same violation that had earned the other three men parole under employer supervision. Victor Trenczek, an iron molder who had spent two years in the German army, was "single, and with no permanent home." He knowingly violated the waterfront rule until arrested and had a profile even more suspicious than Prandle, but Trenczek had an important shipyard skill and got a recommendation for just 30 days detainment followed by parole.[15]

Bourgeois enemy aliens had substantially more leverage than even skilled shipbuilding workers. William Mau, owner of Oregon Sheet Metal Works on the waterfront, received the personal endorsement of US Attorney Haney and a prominent Portland businessman for his enterprise to continue. He initially complied with the president's waterfront proclamation "but the result thereof has been serious injury to his business." Haney insisted "that his status as an alien enemy, which is a technical one, is the result of an oversight rather than any feeling of friendliness toward the Imperial German government." Even when deemed disloyal, such individuals could receive unusually circumspect treatment. Maximilian Lucke was at the center of a months-long dispute between Portland officials of the DOJ and the *Oregon Deutsche Zeitung* newspaper. US Attorney Reames reported in August 1917 that "up to the day war was declared this paper was rabidly and violently pro-German, making statements that now would be clearly unlawful" and during the war became "no more loyal than is necessary." The report claimed that Lucke was acquainted with known German saboteurs "and would aid that country in any way possible." Lucke was assistant editor and wrote a daily column in the paper "with studied intent to create and nurture a feeling of contempt and disgust for American methods, institutions and endeavors." The attorney general agreed that the newspaper "column was clearly disloyal" but that the writer should receive a warning first and declined to approve internment. Reames replied that he had already called Lucke into his office three times threatening internment with no impact. The column even went on to skewer the DOJ specifically, engaging in "satire at the efforts of the United States secret service in attempting to stop the pro-German propaganda."[16]

After Reames made it clear that the attorney general would approve Lucke's internment if the antigovernment articles continued, the *Oregon Deutsche Zeitung* reacted immediately by suspending publication in German and becoming the English-language *Portland American*. Lucke, however, continued to write articles critical of the government, but now in English, and the US attorney continued to try to tie him to espionage in order to obtain final permission to intern. Within several weeks, the *Portland American* added

"an eight page supplement printed entirely in German and dealing exclusively with war news." The US attorney, exasperated, wrote to Washington, DC, that he realized "that we must proceed carefully so that no one can accuse us of dealing unfairly with persons or institutions simply because they are German," but the paper was clearly disloyal, and he had hired an interpreter for the sole task of translating it every day, unwilling to accept the translations furnished by the publisher. A. E. Kern, head of the German Publishing Company, which owned the *Portland American*, then informed the US attorney that he intended to begin publishing a new weekly newspaper in German and dedicated to war news. Kern had approached the US attorney with the postmaster of Portland, Frank Myers, to back his demand that the company be excepted from the federal wartime law requiring German newspapers to produce English translations for federal officials. Furious, Reames stated that he would "stop the issue of the paper even if I had to put a secret service operative in the plant to take the papers as they come off the press." Kern reacted by sending telegrams to Senator Chamberlain, the postmaster general, and President Wilson. Reames concluded, "The German Publishing Company in this city is politically powerful and there is little, if any, reason to doubt that we are facing trouble with them." Reames succeeded at last in interning Lucke after months of struggle but problems with German-language newspapers in Portland were still evident in correspondence between his successor and the attorney general as late as the spring of 1918, with no evidence that the issue was ever resolved.[17]

Avowed anticapitalist radicals were the most vulnerable enemy aliens, particularly those who admitted membership in the IWW. US Attorney Reames, while reporting the case of a German IWW member who had ignored the expiration of his two-week pass to go within the restricted zone around the armory until arrested by local police, stated that "every member of the I.W.W. who is an alien enemy as defined by the proclamation of the President should be interned until the close of the war." Reames justified this position by arguing that a German did "not have any right to preach the principles of any organization in the United States in time of war when that organization is against the United States in the prosecution of the war." While Reames and his superiors seemed divided on this policy when it came to the politically well-connected German Publishing Company, they were of one mind on the IWW. Historian Jörg Nagler has noted, "Although the Attorney General maintained officially throughout the war that mere membership of an organization was not grounds for internment, he supported the view that the IWWs were an auxiliary of the German espionage system."[18]

The two-week pass violation case in mid-August 1917, which coincided with a summer of unrest in the logging camps driven by IWW organizing,

seems to have been a turning point in policy. Thereafter, whenever the government could establish the IWW membership of an enemy alien, the US attorney's office in Portland recommended internment for the duration of the war. Paul Seidler was Hungarian, had both shipbuilding experience and machinist skills, and denied "any friendliness to Germany or his native country and [while] expressing his opinion that our war is just,…he maintained…his belief in all the principles of the Industrial Workers of the World." The attorney general authorized his detainment. Portland US attorneys requested approval to intern all enemy aliens during the war identified as current IWW members with their affiliation as the foremost basis for detention in each instance. As in Seidler's case, a lack of sympathy for the Central Powers failed to redeem any of them. This internment rule was already well established in the Portland office by the time Reames left for Seattle in February 1918. His interim replacement noted in one request that "if it is the policy of the Department to intern these men who are alien enemies and also I.W.W. solicitors, I recommend the internment of this man."[19]

The DOJ used internment to remove IWW members from Portland and also to reduce their potential constituency in the North End. After police arrested Christopher Meyer in a raid on the Portland IWW headquarters, DOJ officials failed to definitely establish his membership in the organization. IWW halls tended to function as social spaces for itinerant male workers as well as sites of organizational activity, so it was quite possible that he was not an active member. Haney noted that "he is unmarried, has no permanent home at the present time," and seemed to have a penchant for dishonesty about his background. The US attorney requested permission to intern him because "he is a wandering alien enemy and I am satisfied that he is either a member of the I.W.W. or is in sympathy with that organization."[20]

Radicalism could receive even more stress than German nationalism if both applied. Herman Schreiber "mailed a letter that was filthy and of an indecent character" to a bank that had served him notice of money owed. He had been in the city for over a decade and had his own landscape gardening business but "is unmarried and is somewhat of a recluse." Although he had authored and paid to publish a pamphlet in 1916 titled "Germania's Awakening," Reames neglected to discuss it in any detail and recommended Schreiber's internment because "he is of that class of individuals who could prove dangerous because of socialistic tendencies and it appears to me that his detention is warranted as a precautionary measure." Reames claimed that Schreiber was acquainted "with Germans who are known to be radically socialistic and inimical to society" who could possibly exercise dangerous influence over him. The US attorney placed no stress at all on

the threat of his German nationalism and did not ascribe such views to his dangerous friends.[21]

The threat of socialism, not "Kaiserism," led to the first requests for internment from the Portland district. Carl Horn and Julius Knispel, the first two internees, could not be removed from Portland fast enough in mid-July 1917. Reames wrote to Attorney General Gregory, "We are anxious to dispose of these parties in some detention camp and have since heard nothing from you with respect to the location." Knispel's wife had sued him for divorce "on the grounds of personal abuse and that the defendant was a man of bad moral character" and he was also a "user of drugs." Setting a pattern for the radical interviewees who followed, Reames judged Knispel on his character more than opposition to the war. Good character required a stable family life, valuable skills, and mainstream politics. Any man who had failed to attain all three was more potential rabble for the North End and a possible threat to war production. Local authorities held this view before the DOJ adopted it upon becoming involved in the struggle for urban order during the war. Portland Municipal Judge George Rossman had long been a foe of the IWW and North End itinerants. During a February 1918 vagrancy sentencing of two dozen IWW members, a Portland ritual, he stated,

> There is no excuse for any of you. You should be ashamed of yourselves for having made the failures of your lives that you evidently have. Only three of you have taken a sufficiently serious view of life to get married and take the responsibility of raising a family; not one has contributed to the Red Cross more than a few cents; not one of you has bought a liberty bond, and not one has purchased any of the other war emergency fund propositions.[22]

Portland had lost any financial stake in perpetuating the culture of the North End when saloons became illegal at the state level in 1916, ending the city's very lucrative sale of required licenses, and had much to gain by enticing industrial investment. The added urgency of a rising tide of radical organizing and union militancy amidst war mobilization in the summer of 1917 inspired a confluence of interests between the city, which had the policing capacity to find and arrest itinerant radical enemy aliens, and local federal officials, who had the authority to parole or intern but lacked the manpower to sweep the North End.

"Silk Stocking Girls"

In both wartime internment programs, the prestige emanated from the federal mobilization effort, while locals provided the police. The basic motivation to police the poor toward urban order was also consistent. However,

the federal government was not the senior partner in both programs. It had the primary role in the enemy alien campaign but not the one to intern girls and women infected with venereal disease. The primary power to intern was local in this latter case and the federal government played the secondary role, providing coordination and expertise to promote its local allies and spread their success. Portland created a model program, and the PHS eagerly maintained a close relationship to support and export their efforts, at the center of which was the Cedars. In the spring of 1920, the *Portland Oregonian* ran a front-page feature in its Sunday magazine section titled "Work and Fun on City's Farm is Health Restorer." Five photos showed smiling young women who lived on this "city farm" working at pitching hay, guiding a plow, feeding chickens, milking cows, and sewing. One could easily assume from the article that this municipal institution, the Cedars, was something other than a prison for women diagnosed with venereal disease after forced examination: "Smiling and happy as the children most of them are, these girls forget their worries and cares as they scamper over five acres of land." Locally authorized in late 1917, the Cedars was the first prison of its kind in the United States. This internment facility was, in part, the product of a national wartime climate hostile to threats to the moral and physical purity of the nation's soldiers and potential recruits. However, it was also a long-awaited opportunity for local morals reformers and sympathetic municipal authorities to bring moral order to environments made chaotic by rapid growth while still promoting expansion.[23]

Eugenics advocates had created momentum toward the further wartime containment of sexuality in February 1917 when Oregon enacted a law enabling "the sterilization of all feebleminded residents of state hospitals and prisons." Historian Mark A. Largent has found that the law targeted three categories of inmate: "insane," "habitual criminal," and "moral pervert" or "sexual deviant." The latter group included men who had been convicted of rape, child molestation, or committing homosexual acts. Men discovered engaging in homosexual acts while in prison also fell prey to the law and, overall, male "sexual or moral degenerates" were the most common early targets. Over two-thirds of the men sterilized at the Oregon State Hospital in Salem between 1918 and 1941 were castrated, though the much less brutal vasectomy was more common in other states. There were a dozen castrations at the institution in 1918 alone and 141 in total by 1941. Most of the women underwent salpingectomies and ultimately comprised a majority (59%) of those sterilized at the state hospital during the same period. Oregon morals reformers and allied officials would show similar zeal in their containment of venereal disease.[24]

At the end of the war, the Division of Venereal Diseases of the PHS declared that of any state, Oregon had the lowest rate of infected men

arriving at training facilities. When the PHS prepared a book on suppression of vice and venereal disease in late 1920, the agency asked Portland's Mayor Baker to contribute an essay. Because of the city's unparalleled success in their view, he was the only mayor that the agency approached. Also, the Chamberlain-Kahn Act, which attempted to dramatically expand federal spending on and coordination of venereal disease control, had been cosponsored by Oregon's own Senator Chamberlain, whose state had already set national standards according to the surgeon general: "Practically all of the states and most of the cities have now on their statute and ordinance books measures for the control of venereal diseases which were first instituted in Portland and in Oregon." This vaunted reputation and national-level engagement began with an early local commitment that pushed the federal campaign forward, much like the city's longstanding war against the IWW had for enemy alien internment.[25]

Portland's venereal disease detainment initiative predated the first small federal fund for internment facilities, just $250,000 earmarked for cantonment areas, created in February 1918. The city council appropriated $25,000 in November 1917 to build the Cedars independently on a 43-acre tract that Portland already owned, but had to come up with an immediate detention facility because it passed an "Ordinance for the Control of Venereal Diseases" the following week that included a quarantine mandate. Women were initially imprisoned temporarily at the Kelly Butte rock pile, a penal institution well known to Portland's radicals, until the Cedars was ready. The ordinance was quite sweeping. It forced physicians to violate confidentiality by reporting infected patients to the Bureau of Health, but the municipal government did not even need proof of infection to detain individuals. The new law ordered the city health officer to "immediately use every available means" to confirm infection and the source of the infection, "in all *suspected* [italics mine] cases of venereal disease in the infectious stages." The ordinance did not create any specific standards by which to judge sources of suspicion, thus creating potentially sweeping police powers for local government.[26]

The law enabled the city health officer to conduct "examinations of persons *reasonably suspected* [italics mine]" of being infectious. No standard of reasonableness appeared but "owing to the prevalence of such diseases among prostitutes, all such persons may be considered within the above class." The officer had the duty to isolate potentially infectious individuals in order to protect public health and had the power to "define the limits of the area in which the persons reasonably suspected or known" to be infectious "are to be isolated, and no persons other than the attending physicians, shall enter or leave the area of isolation without the permission of the City Health Officer." However, an infected individual wealthy enough to pay

$1,000 bond could go free after signing an agreement not to infect anyone and to continue treatment. The city promised to refund bond money once the health officer pronounced the individual cured.[27]

Federal and local officials hoped that Portland's doctors and druggists would report venereal cases, but both groups saw the ordinance as an infringement, which confirmed that the police would have to aggressively identify suspect individuals in public in order to enforce the new ordinance. Just after the law went into effect, one local morals reformer noted, "We are being quite severely criticized by some well-known physicians for our part in this, but I feel confident that when the matter is explained thoroughly to them their objections will be met." In fact, physicians maintained their opposition. The senior surgeon of the PHS believed that the problem could "only be overcome by ... appointing an officer for this special work alone in each state, who, by repeated visits and personal contact with the physicians, will be able in time to secure in greater measure their cooperation." The patience of PHS officials became exhausted toward the end of the war: "There seems to be active opposition on the part of the physicians of Portland to this work ... and if we cannot change their attitude by reasoning with them, the Social Hygienic Association promises to arrest and prosecute every doctor in Portland, who fails to report Venereal diseases." Of course, professional associations did not risk openly flouting the law. At the end of the war, a regional military official lamented, "The local physicians, while passing appropriate resolutions with regard to the reporting of venereal diseases, have not, as individuals, performed their duty in this regard." Lacking significant access to private medical records, city officials had to rely mainly on profiling and forced inspections through policing, placing law enforcement, rather than medicine, at the center of the campaign.[28]

This campaign should not be confused with an attempt to end a thriving commercial sex trade. Having already closed its brothels and saloons, Portland passed an ordinance in late 1917 "for the regulation of hotels, rooming houses, and lodging houses" that codified strict licensing rules for such businesses. Overall, there was an intolerant legal environment in the city and active enforcement. A military official stated in early 1918, "There is not commercialized prostitution in Vancouver and conditions in Portland are very good." So why such an extensive effort to combat venereal disease?[29]

Protective Supervision

The internment program inaugurated during the war era was an escalation of an already institutionalized campaign to contain the sexuality of working-class girls and young women in Portland, and the local establishment

continued to play the dominant role. During the Lewis and Clark Centennial Exposition in the city, the Young Women's Christian Association set up a Travelers' Aid Department to ameliorate the inevitable increase in sexual opportunities created by an event that drew over 2.5 million visitors in the summer of 1905. The department "cared for" 1,640 young women that year, 2,555 in 1906, and 6,630 in 1907 before becoming the Women's Protective Division (WPD) under the auspices of city government in 1908, the first of its kind in the nation. A group of physicians with powerful political contacts established the Oregon Social Hygiene Society (OSHS) that same year, allying morals reformers with the new division. The WPD focused on preventing girls and young women from falling victim to predators and assumed that those within the working class posed the most significant problem. A 1912 *Portland Oregonian* article noted the important role of the WPD "in looking after unsophisticated country girls in a large city and subject to the temptations and pitfalls of a metropolis, to the foreign girl alone in a strange land, to the shopgirl, the factory girl." Immigrant young women were supposedly especially vulnerable: "There is always urgent need of help among the foreign working girls. As a rule they are gullible and easily misled." The article described five anonymous cases furnished by the WPD to explain their work. In each example, the young women were victims of scheming older men and usually also of neglectful parenting. All were working class. Debt and poverty played crucial roles in their seeking irresponsible amusement or becoming abandoned or ensnared. The WPD worked to expose male predators and shut down environments that assisted them, such as the public dance hall. "After the case has been handled in the courts and when the cause of trouble has been removed…it is a matter of mothering, not policing." The WPD helped to place these young women in reliable homes and jobs and would keep "a record of their life from that time on"; unfortunately, these records no longer exist. The WPD's prewar activities proved a precursor to the more ambitious wartime program.[30]

In February 1918, the War Work Council of the OSHS, which had been inveighing against venereal disease for years and controlled appointments to the governing board of the Cedars, proposed creating a full-time position for a woman to track internees after their release from Kelly Butte. The War Work Council proclaimed, "We feel it is only fair to the girl that someone have her welfare at heart and be ready to assist her in finding an honorable living. This would involve getting the girl's history, learning of the work she is best equipped for; finding employers willing to do their part in this absorbing process, keeping in touch with the girl." This proposed long-term parole officer would also conduct "educational work among employed women and girls. Arranging lectures in department stores, laundries, candy factories, overall factories, railroad shops, shipbuilding plants and all industries

where women and girls are employed." An OSHS memo on "the war and juvenile misconduct" sent to local ministers, in hopes that they would use the document as a basis for sermons, clarifies both the intrinsic connection for morals reformers between immorality and working-class youths and the way the war seemed an unprecedented crisis in this regard. "In the midst of a cataclysm like the present world war [juvenile delinquency] assumes grave proportions and calls for concerted action on the part of all who wish to prevent the war from destroying our civilization." The memo claimed that youths working in industry and those abandoned by mothers working in industry were the two broad categories most at risk. War work could give the young an economic independence granting "special opportunity of indulging their caprices" and "that the hours of monotonous labor provoke a desire for unusual relaxation and recreation which is not provided for by the better forces in society." After the war, the OSHS continued this campaign by pushing for strict police enforcement of the city's juvenile curfew ordinance as a curb on sexual delinquency.[31]

The addition of an OSHS parole and education officer for Kelly Butte internees, and later for the Cedars as well, made the organization an official adjunct to the government's work in suppressing sexual immorality. The new officer, Anna Murphy, left records preserved by the OSHS describing the parole of over two hundred former internees in Portland released between April 1918 and April 1920. Each one had to report to Murphy as often and for as long as she requested or risk referral to the courts. Murphy found homes and jobs for paroled women and removed parolees from placements as she deemed appropriate. She regularly intervened in romantic relationships and social life more generally. It was common for Murphy to threaten young women over inappropriate relationships: "Worker called [boyfriend] in office, asked him to bring her home earlier or discontinue going with her." The threats were not idle, as another representative case reveals: "Worker had her arrested because she remained out nights and deceived her in numerous ways." Although internment ended once risk of communicable disease subsided, the OSHS monitored and circumscribed a prisoner's life for as long as deemed necessary after release. Murphy recorded brief mentions of women she encountered each week and tracked them with numbers to protect their identities. Despite the lack of a unified file on each individual and the brevity of the entries, certain patterns are clear from examining the fates of the 104 women paroled during the first year when tracked over the entire recorded 2-year period. Less than one-quarter found housing and adequate financial support on their own. The rest needed a place to live, employment, OSHS relief funds, or all three. Less than one-quarter were married or had children. More than half had what Murphy considered to be serious behavioral problems following

release, and one-third required emergency relief money to cover housing bills, continue medical treatments, and purchase basic clothing. The overwhelming impression left by the parole record is that these women were young, single, poor, and considered incorrigible.[32]

Of the 24 women paroled during the first year (less than one-quarter of the total) who did not receive employment, housing, or emergency relief support, one-third returned to parents or relatives who lived outside of Portland. The OSHS thus usually lost touch with them because there was no comprehensive national tracking program in place similar to that for enemy aliens. Murphy was vexed by "the out-of-town girl…inasmuch as there is no legal hold upon her which means that she returns to her home town and inevitably drifts back to her former plan of living." If a Portland parolee attempted escape, however, Murphy would try to track her down: "Suddenly disappeared. Letters written [to] Women's Protective Divisions of Seattle and Tacoma, hoping to apprehend her." Most of the small minority of parolees who stayed in Portland and did not receive any aid may well have refused supervision entirely because they ended up in the formal legal system, often the juvenile courts, or back in the Cedars. Only 5 women out of 104 paroled during the first year had both consistently positive parole reports from Murphy and did not receive any aid.[33]

In many cases, the parole officer found a solution to the simultaneous problem of a lack of housing, employment, and supervision through placement in domestic service. Women were increasingly leaving such employment during the war for higher paid work that also provided greater autonomy off the clock, so there seemed to be no shortage of positions. Murphy noted that newspaper publicity of the program "attracted a great many women wishing domestics." She was tenacious in placing young women in new positions again and again if they rebelled and were ejected, "This girl was placed for the 6th time. She is progressing wonderfully under the care of the woman with whom she is living," and in another case, "Placed for the third time in housework with a woman who understands." Bourgeois households had become more desperate in their search for help as the number of women willing to work as domestics dropped off dramatically in this era. In the decade before 1920, the number of women working as servants declined by over 250,000 while office clerks, semiskilled manufacturing operatives, and stenographers/typists each increased well in excess of that figure. Internees in Portland had held the jobs nobody else wanted, if they could find work at all, and then returned to similarly undesirable positions while on parole.[34]

The *Portland Oregonian* piece on the Cedars written a year and a half after the war created a very specific image of the girls and women who ended up there: young and poor. The inmates made gingham dresses for issue to new

arrivals, who had their own clothing taken away to be "revamped." Also, "the girls enter the Cedars literally starved because of the absence of nourishing food for perhaps months." Those who were interned were invariably young: "The majority…are young in years, some of them scarcely out of their teens." The munificence of the city gave its wards "a new lease on life and enable[d] them to secure employment and forget the follies of youth." The *Portland Oregonian* article's fantasy of benevolent paternalism and the Cedars healing the wayward among the city's female working class is quickly dismantled by the report of a PHS official just after the war: "Present buildings badly planned and lacking in capacity, grounds rather faulty and unfinished. Water supply condemned. Inmates crowded far beyond capacity. The dress, toilet and adornment, both personal and of rooms of inmates, differs but little from the usual 'red light.' Inmates have no useful employment." When the Portland City Council appropriated more money to expand capacity at the end of 1918, it was merely "some temporary barracks." The PHS, OSHS, city health officer, and chief of police pleaded with the city council to appropriate $150,000 for the construction of additional buildings and were turned down flat, though the space was badly needed. Although the capacity of the Cedars was just 50 until the new construction, there were 104 cases under care listed for November 1918. The monthly average for the second half of the year was just over 80.[35]

The Cedars was not the only institution involved in the detainment campaign, which relieved potentially worse overcrowding. In early 1920, the state health officer listed four others. Among them was the Louise Home, which received 138 girls and young women over the course of 1919. Only 22 of them were over 18 years, some as young as 12, and only 20 of them came voluntarily. About half were venereal cases, but the other half were not infected at all. These women were either pregnant or listed as "way-ward." The scope of the city's project to contain the sexuality of working-class young women defied its resources, though that did not daunt its efforts. To federal and local authorities and reformers, it was containment that mattered more than reform. Historian Estelle B. Freedman has estimated that of the 43 detainment institutions aided by the federal government during the war, at least 16 survived demobilization, in addition to locally funded facilities like the Cedars that also outlasted the war era. Even if reformation appeared to be the focus of an institution like the Cedars, the war had changed the overall Progressive approach to women's penology. Freedman asserted, "Sympathy for the fallen woman as victim declined as even some women reformers…justified their work as a way to 'protect our men against prostitutes.'" The "new institutions abandoned most of the benevolent features of earlier women's reform," Freedman continued, noting that "incarceration was [now] used to control rather than restore."[36]

Historian Mary E. Odem has further argued that this important shift had actually been gathering momentum gradually during the Progressive Era as a new generation of women reformers increasingly "disagreed with the Victorian assumption of girlhood passivity and victimization. Instead, they acknowledged female sexual agency and thought of young women who engaged in illicit encounters as 'delinquents' in need of guidance and control." This set of beliefs emerges from Anna Murphy's parole records for Portland in illustrative detail. During the war, the focus of social hygiene propaganda completed a shift from ruination of the family by infected men to the corruption of soldiers by infected women whom social hygiene reformers now portrayed as aggressors much more often than victims. However, the trends in reform ideology identified by scholars need to be studied through a local lens because that is where the programs developed that acted upon them. What began as a local protective campaign in Portland in 1905 helped shape a national containment drive during the war.[37]

Aftermath

After the war, those who had commanded the power of internment were loathe to give it up. US Attorney Haney was still recommending "internment for the remainder of the war" as late as February 1919, months after it had ended, still conflating the now finished battle against the Central Powers with the ongoing struggle against domestic radicalism. In late April 1919, he begged Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer to prevent Portland's first internee, radical Julius Knispel, from returning to the city. Internment camps remained operational until the spring of 1920, but by then the government had deported or paroled most of the enemy alien inmates. By late 1919, only 250 of the thousands remained, and these were all anticapitalist radicals that the DOJ feared would contribute to the strike unrest of that turbulent postwar year. The DOJ had to respond to War Department budget cuts that made the long-term maintenance of internment camps impossible. Attorney General Gregory and his successor, Palmer, according to historian William Preston Jr., "reluctantly paroled and freed the less obnoxious prisoners, namely, 'those who are merely pro-German.'" National funding for internment was also short-lived in the campaign against women with venereal disease, but because the federal government had the supporting role there, the opposite of enemy alien containment, local authorities were able to continue the practice following the war.[38]

Portland further refined and institutionalized its detainment process after 1918. Martha Randall, who had served with the morals squad before the war, worked along with an assistant as a deputy to the state health officer to investigate every woman who came to court in Portland to determine

whether she received an examination. Randall had the full cooperation of the office of the city attorney. Examinations could still occur, according to Mayor Baker, "regardless of the criminal charges in the case. The method of holding all women indiscriminately for examination has been discontinued because the plan was abused. When policemen had no other grounds for holding a woman in jail they did so by holding her for the Health Department." Despite Baker's frank admission of official abuse, made privately to the surgeon general, the new method was not much different. Police could arrest a woman on any sort of charge, leading to examination and detainment. During 1921, the WPD had "988 persons held for the health department" and failed to test a majority positive for venereal disease. The mayor, in the context of describing the basis of Portland's venereal disease control system, stated that "where a man and a woman, unmarried, were found together, both were held for a medical exam."[39]

Portland officials also sought a continuation of the Chamberlain-Kahn fund beyond the war era, and in April 1920, to assist their comrades in the PHS, sent a resolution to Congress that "heartily endorse[d] the campaign of the United States government against venereal disease." According to historian David J. Pivar, "Despite significant curtailment of funds…in 1921, the service continued its aggressive stance" and relied even further on state laws. The PHS had already published a volume titled *Venereal Disease Ordinances* containing laws "recommended for municipal enactment." The broad collection of prefabricated regulations covered venereal disease and treatment controls as well as legal means to regulate urban spaces such as hotels and rooming houses, public vehicles, dance halls, restaurants, grills, and massage parlors.[40]

The wartime campaign had swept in a new era of government-mandated incursions against bodily privacy, and workers became even more vulnerable than during the war. Many cities and states enacted laws requiring the physical examination of all food handlers for communicable diseases. A very distraught Miss Harvey of Portland, who protested both compulsory vaccination and venereal disease examination in 1920, wrote to the PHS decrying the Portland ordinance,

> The radicals are ravaging the pride of our womanhood by compelling them to take their turn with red-light women in exposure and submission to instruments telling us it is ordered by our Government. Will you hear the prayers of 8000 innocent victims who must submit regularly and inform us? Have political doctors the constitutional right to compel innocent mothers to submit to a limitless exposure or insertions or any request they may make because they handle food products?

According to Oregon law, it was illegal for anyone with venereal disease to work in the preparation, manufacture, or handling of foodstuffs, or to

work with children or the sick. The legislature left open the possibility, also, of examining workers who labored in any environment other than total isolation with the statement, "Nor shall any such person be engaged in any occupation, the nature of which is such that his or her infection may be transmitted to others." Miss Harvey received little comfort from the PHS in their reply, which assured her that such regulations were both commonplace and necessary.[41]

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The momentum of enemy alien and venereal disease internment outlasted the war because the problems they were applied to did as well. Even as fear of the "Hun" receded and the military demobilized, those on the local and federal levels who built systems of containment in Portland perpetuated them because itinerant male workers, immigrant radicals, and working-class girls and young women remained destabilizing threats to an urban moral order. While the war had successfully served as justification for programs to track and intern undesirables, social dislocation brought on by the sheer scale of national mobilization had also exacerbated prewar problems, making containment perhaps more urgent than ever. Policewoman Lola Baldwin lamented in 1922, "All social agencies which deal with public welfare and delinquency are forced to admit that moral conditions are below the normal since the War." For Portland, wartime shipbuilding produced a mirage. A reliable industrial economic base and attendant hopes for social stability and stricter morality continued to elude city boosters, who were left with spiking unemployment and radicalism as workers became idle and soldiers returned to the city.[42]

CHAPTER 7

POSTWAR CLASH: THE PORTLAND SOVIET AND THE LOCALIZED STRUGGLE OVER THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNISM

Just before Christmas 1918, the president of the Oregon State Federation of Labor (OSFL), Otto Hartwig, traveled to Washington, DC, to convince the US Shipping Board to invest in the future of wooden shipbuilding in his state. "I find that already ten thousand shipwrights and carpenters have been discharged by the yards…and…by the first of the year that number will be increased by at least four thousand." He added, "Several thousand men following metal trades work in wooden yards have also been discharged." With the soldiers soon to return from the war and laborers arriving from remote work sites for the winter, the employment situation in Portland seemed dire. "These workers are rapidly developing a spirit of unrest and bitterness that bodes ill for the peace of this country," Hartwig warned. "The elements favoring violence and other extreme revolutionary tactics have not disappeared"; in fact, he added, they have never been "so active as they are right now."[1]

This unrest was particularly ominous because of the wave of radicalism concurrently sweeping across Europe amid the economic ruin and crisis of faith in traditional political institutions wrought by World War I. The soviet idea—that workers might democratically govern themselves by forming councils—had sparked the leftist imagination. The idea had emerged during the 1905 general strike in Russia when the new St. Petersburg Soviet coordinated strikes and relief supplies. The soviet also started a newspaper and organized a militia. Workers in 50 other Russian cities followed suit and established soviets (meaning *councils* in Russian). The tsar eventually crushed the movement but the idea proved irrepressible and the soviet returned as a major political force in Europe during and after World War I, spreading

from Russia to Germany and beyond to other nations disillusioned and crippled by the conflict. The soviets, which frequently consisted of sailors and soldiers as well as workers, maintained order in a city or region, supplanting traditional authority. In Russia, the Bolshevik Party took over the major soviets. However, because the party was built upon military discipline, it was uncomfortable with the dispersed and democratic governance of the soviets and working-class democracy soon gave way to party authority.[2]

After the Bolsheviks' stunning successes of 1917 in Russia, revolutionaries around the world scrambled to emulate the first group of Marxian socialists to gain control of a Great Power. The Council of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors of Portland and Vicinity, a soviet established in January 1919, was a reflection of the excitement caused by both the Bolshevik success in Russia and the spread of European workers councils. The leader of the Portland council was a charismatic journalist who poured invective upon his enemies, both socialist and capitalist. Béla Kun, who led a briefly successful revolution in Hungary in 1919, could be similarly described. His name was Harry M. Wicks and he appeared to be both the Kun and the Vladimir Lenin of Portland, intolerant and dictatorial, but conversely also the individual doing the most to unite the city's working-class factions in a democratic assembly.[3]

Toward a Local Focus

Most of the scholarship on the revolutionary fervor in the United States during and after World War I has focused on the struggle to form a unified national communist party. The prime revolutionary political group in the United States, the Socialist Party of America, had crumbled in the wake of government persecution during a war it opposed. Consequently, a movement that had always relied heavily upon local initiative became even more decentralized. The now ascendant left wing of the party broke into two competing splinter groups, the Communist Party of America (CP) and the Communist Labor Party (CLP). Both competed for recognition from the Comintern in Moscow, which aspired to coordinate the organization of world revolution. The differences between them were not very significant and they unified after three years at Moscow's demand. We know much about the dramatic maneuvering of the national leadership of these competitors but little about the impact of the revolutionary fervor of the era upon local radical organizing.[4]

This national focus has resulted in two related problems. First, it leaves unexplored the initiative taken by activists at the local level. National anticapitalist organizations were of dubious help to local movements. They were typically unstable, unpopular, and easy targets of repression; they were also

usually strapped for resources. Successes abroad fueled hopes for an imminent world revolution of the proletariat and stirred radicals to act where they were. Local action seemed even more essential than usual because national leadership broke down at this seemingly crucial moment. The formation of the Portland soviet is a compelling example of the importance of local activism. The council formed at the beginning of 1919, a record strike year and a historic high point of radical activity. The national communist parties, however, did not emerge until later in the year. Where, in the absence of effective national coordination, did the energy to form the soviet come from? It was international inspiration spurring local initiative.

Second, the national focus of the historical literature has also obscured the innovative ways that state and municipal governments and local anticommunists found to repress those who emulated revolutionary language and organizational forms imported from Europe. Much of the innovation and escalation after World War I was driven locally on both sides of the conflict. Differing regional conditions, such as the culture and relative success of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in particular parts of the West or the collapse of shipbuilding in Oregon, were crucial in shaping the tactics of revolutionaries and their opponents as well as their responses to one another. The partnerships built between field agents from the justice and war departments and their local allies during the war to effect mobilization and suppress dissent were similarly indispensable after the war to beat back the tide of revolution. Anticommunists were driven by the same radical energy from abroad that inspired their opponents and similarly, they carried out their campaigns locally.

Infighting and Innovation

The IWW ceased to be a vibrant outlet for working-class discontent in Portland just when it seemed to be at its peak. The city had had a significant IWW movement since 1907, and the organization had gained substantial momentum during the 1917 timber and sawmill strikes in the region. However, the IWW was in tatters by 1919, with both its organizers and rank and file organizationally adrift after wartime repression. The Seattle shipyard walkout of late January 1919, which became a citywide general strike in early February, coincided with the emergence of the Portland soviet. This confluence of events immediately inspired a criminal syndicalism law in Oregon, which essentially outlawed radical organizing.[5]

The local IWW leadership was divided between moderate and radical factions at this point, further weakening an already beleaguered organization. A government spy reported that the comparatively moderate C. A. Rogers controlled the IWW when the law went into effect, though the more radical

Earl Osborne (later a leader of the CLP in Portland) had already "made several attempts to gain the ascendancy, at various meetings." This same spy asserted, "Osborne and his crowd believe in sabotage and direct action, while the conservatives are eliminating these two features." As soon as the governor signed the criminal syndicalism bill in early February 1919, the Portland police started using it to arrest any radical organizers distributing literature. The IWW lost its hall because the owner would have been guilty of violating the new law if he let the organization stay. A week after the IWW announced that it would have to abandon the hall, a February 26 raid by both local policemen and Bureau of Investigation agents resulted in the detainment of 20 radicals.[6]

Federal and local authorities soon shifted their focus when the Bolshevik threat began to take shape in the city. The potential of the soviet captured the imagination of both radicals and their opponents, pushing the IWW toward the margins and irreversible decline. The tensions between radical and moderate IWW factions in the wake of criminal syndicalism harassment resulted in schisms after early 1919, which compounded the group's problems but forced local organizers to both cooperate and innovate in order to move beyond the institution that had dominated radical union activity in the region for over a decade.[7]

The One Big Union (OBU), long an internal nickname for the IWW, was the old movement's most enduring new form. Militant organizers formed the OBU in Calgary, Canada, in March 1919 to capitalize on the rapid expansion of unions during wartime. It launched a campaign to amalgamate craft unions along industrial lines, an initiative that the American Federation of Labor (AFL) hierarchy opposed. Amalgamation would have brought all shipyard workers, for example, into the same union rather than dividing them by craft, like carpentry or caulking. Unlike the old IWW, but like the new Portland soviet, the OBU allowed multiple allegiances and tried to work within AFL unions. The OBU also ignored radical political organizations but did not dissuade its adherents from taking political action, which encouraged the sort of coalition building upon which the soviet was premised. In addition, the OBU emphasized grassroots democracy within unions over centralized leadership, in hopes that locals could take control of their own organizations.

The Pacific Northwest was a critical battleground for the new movement. James Robertson, a member of the boilermakers union in Portland, outlined the OBU program to the Seattle Metal Trades Council after the February 1919 general strike. Robinson's local in Portland had already endorsed the new soviet. He stressed that the AFL would not be transformed from the top but from the bottom. Shop stewards would radicalize the rank and file on the shop floor, and they in turn would force amalgamation and

grassroots industrial unionism upon the AFL. The metal trades, which had been dramatically boosted by wartime contracts and badly hurt by their postwar cancellation, were in the vanguard of revolutionizing the AFL and building ties to radical movements. The Pacific Coast Metal Trades District Council had already endorsed a resolution to create a regional soldiers, sailors, and workers council during its meeting in Portland in January 1919, just as the Portland soviet was forming.[8]

Historian David Jay Bercuson has asserted that the OBU movement in Canada peaked in early 1920 but had largely collapsed just a year later. Its success earlier on in western Canada had brought the movement out into the open, where it was a target of government repression. The OBU in the United States may have survived the Red Scare that withered much of the revolutionary movement, avoiding destruction by using AFL locals as camouflage. Government spy reports indicate that the union was alive and well in Portland in late 1920.[9]

The threat of criminal syndicalism harassment certainly played a role in keeping Portland OBU adherents underground. However, of the many criminal syndicalism arrests, few resulted in lengthy and expensive state trials. It was easier to harass radicals by arresting and detaining them for as long as possible without trial and then to bring them to municipal court for vagrancy, curfew violations, distributing handbills without a license, littering, and so on. The Portland soviet's newspaper, the *Western Socialist*, complained bitterly about the proliferation of local ordinances of this sort. Constant arrests—and fear of them—disrupted the leadership and organizing and drained the limited financial resources of Portland's radicals, helping to explain the impulse toward coalition building upon which the soviet relied.[10]

The Bolshevik Turn

The soviet had begun taking shape in April 1918, when the Socialist Party in Portland launched a drive to unite radicals in the region under the banner of revolutionary socialism. Harry Wicks, the party's "organizer-secretary" in Portland, told colleagues that he was "writing…letters to a few of the street car men, who are known to be socialists." He was attempting to put together a meeting of these sympathetic workers to devise means to further organize streetcar men into the Socialist Party. After intercepting part of this correspondence, the local branch of the Bureau of Investigation delved into Wicks's private life. He was a 29-year-old printer turned Socialist Party activist who had begun organizing in Michigan in 1915 before moving to Portland during the war.[11]

Not long after the government began monitoring Wicks in the spring of 1918, a man visited the US attorney's office in Portland with a grievance

against the activist. The complainant painted Wicks as a sexual degenerate, an anticapitalist radical, and a cowardly deserter. The man's married daughter, Erma Lamb, was a student of social science who had become acquainted with Wicks at local leftist lectures. When Wicks became editor of the radical *Seattle Call*, he convinced Lamb to leave her husband and come north with him. Her father approached the US attorney's office hoping that it could have Wicks drafted into the military. Apparently, his son-in-law intended to hunt the pair down in Seattle and was well armed. Lamb's father claimed that Wicks also carried a gun and was a serious menace: "Wicks is a no good I.W.W. of the worst sort[;] he works at all times upon the shop and industrial girl workers, he persuades many of them to become anarchists." He alleged that Wicks had made statements about the inevitable military success of Germany and imminent revolution in England. Wicks had been cautious, however. He always carried his draft registration certificate issued in the Midwest and had checked in with the draft board in Portland when he arrived in the city. Neither her father nor her husband heard from Erma Lamb after she and Wicks left for Seattle.[12]

In late November 1918, as the United States abruptly demobilized, the War Department's Military Intelligence office in Portland sent an urgent telegram to headquarters: "I.W.W. leaders this district planning strike early part of December. Are now organizing soldiers and working men's committees shipyards and mills with probable view of uniting them into Soviet Council. Organized labor also contemplating action in December. Situation looks serious." Apparently, the Socialist Party's movement to form a broad-based radical organization had picked up steam by late 1918, and by January 7, 1919, Wicks was back in Portland and publishing the *Western Socialist*, which had the US attorney in Portland, Bert Haney, in fits. Wicks was being somewhat careful to avoid overtly violent rhetoric because the wartime Sedition Act was still in effect; his paper was otherwise as inflammatory as possible.[13]

Haney was frustrated at his inability after the war to suppress the *Western Socialist*. He took the tactic, used quite often during the war, of trying to scare the US attorney general into encouraging suppression while proving the worthiness of his own diligence: Wicks, he told the attorney general, "openly advocates the breaking of jail and the forcible liberation of Mooney—another example illustrating the necessity for drastic action against this type of Bolshevism." Thomas Mooney had been jailed for allegedly dynamiting a Preparedness Day parade in San Francisco in 1916. Winning Mooney's freedom had become a major cause for radicals. After making clear the supposed enormity of the emerging communist threat, Haney asked the attorney general for his "opinion as to the course of action I should pursue with this paper and its publisher." This duty was not one

that Haney, or his predecessor during the war, approached with any ambivalence, although it was a substantial departure from prewar practice and had little to do with upholding federal law after the war had ended.[14]

On January 9, 1919, about four weeks before the general strike in neighboring Seattle, one thousand people crowded into Arion Hall, the Socialist Party headquarters in Portland, to form a council of workers and discharged soldiers and sailors. The soviet targeted only those military men who had been discharged to avoid federal harassment. The *Portland Oregonian* pointed out that Wicks, who had been elected to lead the group, could be cautious when necessary: "The organizers said their society was to include only discharged soldiers, making no effort to spread propaganda in the Army." This would also keep the soviet out of Haney's jurisdiction, making it a local or state, but surely not a federal, problem. However, the *Western Socialist* declared that delegations of soldiers from Fort Vancouver and Camp Lewis had approached the council on their own and that "one soldier stated that his entire company was anxious to join."[15]

Haney was determined to stay involved and sent another letter to the attorney general a week after his first to express his horror at the second issue of the *Western Socialist*. "As I anticipated," he claimed, "the publisher has become bolder in the viciousness of his attacks against the Government and more scurrilous, if possible, in his vituperation directed against the officers of the Department of Justice." This was a personal affront, he felt, and bad for public morale. The newspaper was likely "to create in the minds of the discontented and ignorant a spirit of rebellion against the constituted authorities, thereby hoping to hasten the day of anarchy and revolution in this country."[16]

The organizational meeting of the soviet elected a leadership committee, the Central Executive Committee, which in turn wrote a constitution. The constitution had ten points, the first two of which were the most important. First, the council was open to "all men and women employed in industry or who in any manner whatsoever contribute to the social welfare, except those who employ the labor of others." This first point mentioned specifically wageworkers, women in housekeeping, and discharged soldiers and sailors. It then extended the invitation to "in fact all the working class, employed or unemployed." This was a radical departure from the masculine code of the IWW, which had sometimes waged campaigns that included women workers in the West but had never integrated them into the culture of the organization. However, no women were on the leadership committee elected at the meeting, which was composed of "nineteen workmen and eight discharged soldiers."[17]

The second point of the constitution began, "No craft or industrial divisions shall be recognized by the Council." The Socialist Party conceived the

council as a means of uniting existing organizations, which was precisely what made it so threatening to local and state authorities and their federal allies. The organization that Wicks had envisioned in April 1918, one uniting "rebels" irrespective of affiliation, was coming into being. This point also noted that existing organizations were welcome to send delegates to the council, one for every hundred of their members, though any worker could join independently.[18]

When the soviet took form, conditions in Portland were dire, which only exacerbated the fears of its opponents. There were ten thousand unemployed, according to federal employment agency figures, as demobilized troops returned to the city. The *Portland News* accused the chief of police of maintaining a policy of bringing "men before Muny Judge Rossman to show cause why they are not employed." The heads of the federal employment agency in Portland claimed that they could find work for only a very small number of the jobless, and the *News* asserted, "The majority of men hanging around the North End employment agencies say they are willing to take any kind of a job they can get." These private agencies were running a scam that the IWW had fought for years. Laborers paid a fee to be transported to a job site, usually to do agricultural or timberwork but sometimes to work temporarily at a factory or in construction. After arriving, they often found conditions and pay inferior to what agents had promised or even that there were too many men for the work, yet they were stranded, with no way back to Portland. During the postwar slump, even these awful jobs were unobtainable. Applicants required money for both the agency fee and their transportation to the job site, and most had neither.[19]

To make matters worse, the droves of patriotic wartime volunteers dried up when it came time to deal with rebuilding the local economy after the war. Portland's mayor, George Baker, hosted a meeting that began on January 9, 1919, to set policy and build networks to help solve problems related to the city's postwar economic collapse. Although Baker invited hundreds to the first session of the Oregon reconstruction convention, the *Portland News* revealed that only "a pitiful handful of delegates showed up." The gathering was in stark contrast to the packed first soviet meeting, held that same day. Portland's elite, eager to draw war production contracts to the city, were not so eager to confront the mess left behind by the sudden withdrawal of those contracts. Those present, in a pathetic attempt to bolster their numbers, voted to invite delegates from the Oregon Irrigation and Oregon Drainage conferences—coincidentally in town that week—to join them. The *Western Socialist* reveled in the ineptitude of the conference organizers in a front-page story. The *Portland News* reported that Baker was furious, shouting at the few delegates in attendance, "If the soldiers in the days just ahead walk the streets, penniless, workless, begging, it will be your

fault." He continued, "If the I.W.W. say to them: 'This is a hell of a country that you fought for,' it will be your fault."[20]

Nevertheless, the meeting went ahead. There was a speech on unemployment by the director of the US Employment Service in Oregon and other talks on the lumber industry, wooden shipbuilding, and "substitute industries" that could replace war production. Delegates also listened to lectures on such topics as "the returning soldier and sailor" and "the attitude of the soldier." Although the city administration was clearly worried about the prospect of unemployed veterans, along with the thousands of jobless already stranded in Portland, becoming radicalized, the mayor could not rebuild the local economy alone, and nobody seemed willing to help, except, perhaps, the OSFL.[21]

On the second day of the convention, C. M. Rynerson, the editor of the *Oregon Labor Press* and secretary of the OSFL's own reconstruction committee, told the audience, "We pledge you our aid in bringing new industries to Oregon." But there was a price. "We insist that every returned soldier and every citizen who wishes employment shall have it and that they shall receive wages sufficient to maintain them in decent comfort." Although Rynerson offered no method to guarantee a boost in economic growth, he proposed a radical measure to guarantee full employment: "An amendment to the state constitution giving everyone the right to work on application." He followed with an appeal to the audience's fear of revolution, a force sweeping Europe as this Portland convention met: "You will either deal with workers in an orderly organization or you will deal with workers in a disorderly mob." After making the case that the OSFL had fought the IWW harder than anyone in Oregon, he stated the threat plainly, "You've got to choose between organized labor and the Bolshevik."[22]

The establishment in Portland began to fear that revolution would come not from its old adversary, the IWW, but from the Bolsheviks, who seemed to be gaining an alarming number of adherents abroad and at home. Even as the reconstruction convention met, the Portland soviet was forming and it looked frighteningly like the revolutionary bodies of Germany and Russia. The *Portland News* painted its leader as a different sort of radical from the IWW organizers that Portland was accustomed to: "Wicks doesn't look at all like the blood-and-thunder sort of 'red.' He is 30, but doesn't look more than 25. He hasn't got the stubbly beard which distinguishes the real Bolshevik. He is clean shaven, wears a regular collar, his English is perfect and his conversation not at all violent." Clearly Wicks was a new sort of threat and federal officials were worried that the smooth-talking socialist who had convinced Erma Lamb to run away to Seattle would sway Portland's workers, some of whom were increasingly desperate and might be feeling betrayed by both employers and the government. There was a

good deal of confusion in the media over the relationship of this new threat to the old, the IWW. The *Western Socialist* mocked the local papers for their miscomprehension: "The Portland Telegram declared the organization was composed of violent I.W.W.'s and the Journal declared it was opposed to the I.W.W., both of them failing to understand the principle of the organization; which aims to get all the workers into a mass movement."[23]

Mayor Baker quickly raised the alarm about this new threat in a speech to the members-elect of the state legislature at a Portland Press Club dinner: "In the organization of this council you have as fine a Bolsheviki body as ever existed either in Russia or in Germany. These revolutionists captured the convention of the State Federation of Labor in this city this week, notwithstanding 60 percent of the membership of organized labor is loyal and patriotic. With soldiers being discharged in this vicinity at the rate of 600 a day with no employment for them, the agitators and organizers are finding a fertile field in which to spread their dangerous propaganda. We must meet and solve this situation immediately. We must put down the Bolsheviki movement, and do it now, or they will put us down."[24]

The Multnomah Guard held a training session at the Portland Armory on January 11, 1919, the day before the council's second meeting at Arion Hall, because reports had come in "that there might be trouble" at the gathering. The Multnomah Guard was the result of state and local authorities taking advantage of the militarization of society during the war. The authorities had expanded on the concept of the National Guard to build a supplementary force, a sort of home guard, that was really intended to combat anticapitalist radicalism. Back in December 1917, the *Portland Telegram* had reported that a force of about 2,000 "trained men" had been divided among the state's 15 counties and was "ready to quell any local disturbances that may arise from the activities of I.W.W. organizations or Teutonic spies." The quotation is revelatory—radicals are mentioned before spies. The adjutant general of Oregon, also in charge of the state's National Guard, whose 3 companies numbered only 232 men, controlled this new "semi-military" force, as he called it, though its members were trained by county sheriffs. The militia in Multnomah County, where Portland is located, was of course the largest of these forces at 600. The group trained at the Portland Armory, headquarters of the Oregon National Guard. The adjutant general was confident "that more than 2000 men could be mobilized for defense of property interests within a very short time." This home guard movement quickly obtained federal sanction: the *Portland Telegram* noted that one company had already volunteered to become part of a 25,000-strong US guard called for by the militia division of the War Department.[25]

Although the new council had not actually planned any action, the "Multnomah guardsmen were ordered held in readiness for emergency

call" on the night of its second meeting. The guard established communications with the local police, whom it had alerted to the possibility of unrest caused by the council meeting. No confrontations occurred but the day after the meeting, with the Multnomah Guard—including a machine gun battalion—just dismissed from alert duty, the commanding officers of the Multnomah and Oregon guards met with the adjutant general of Oregon and the Multnomah County sheriff in the office of Mayor Baker, revealing the extensive nature of the elite alliance supporting the militia movement in Oregon and the militarization of postwar Portland. The commander of the Multnomah Guard, Colonel Campbell, claimed he had received word that the council planned to "get Mayor Baker, Sheriff Hurlburt, Chief of Police Johnson, United States Attorney Haney and Bill B[ry]on, special agent of the department of justice, within 10 days." The colonel also believed that 15 members of the council were ready to storm the armory and take enough guns and ammunition to hold the municipal auditorium.[26]

The conference in Mayor Baker's office had accomplished what the reconstruction convention had not: it had resulted in a comprehensive plan to minimize upheaval as soldiers returned to Portland. First, the American Red Cross would pour its efforts into providing for returning soldiers and sailors. Second, the US Army would attempt to perpetuate the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen, a paramilitary organization of logging workers it had fashioned as a union. The legion already had 13,000 members in the Pacific Northwest. Although the legion was supposedly an emergency wartime measure, the participants in Mayor Baker's meeting hoped they could help it survive. Third, city police and state militia forces would stand ready. Most importantly, the state legislature would outlaw anticapitalist radicalism in Oregon. Legislators quickly pushed through a bill declaring radical organizing a felony, the criminal syndicalism law.[27]

Federal investigators in Portland were well informed of the plans of the civilian-military alliance and did not need to be convinced to use their resources in the antiradical effort. Even the Plant Protection Section of the Military Intelligence Division in Portland, which had no legitimate reason for initiating new operations after the war production emergency ended, was quite intent on artificially extending its own life span to combat the expansion of Portland's soviet. In late November 1918, the director of the Military Intelligence Division had mandated that all field offices "upon receipt of these instructions, undertake no new investigations in the civil population except those connected with Plant Protection and alleged graft and fraud in War Department contracts." However, the director wanted to ensure that US attorneys and Bureau of Investigation agents could continue where Military Intelligence left off. The director ordered those in the field to "consult nearest Department of Justice agent as to practicability of turning

over all unfinished disloyalty and enemy activity cases in the civil population to the Department of Justice." He also told field offices to "dispense with all civilian investigators except those indispensable to unfinished cases, and with the latter upon completion of these cases or entire assumption of their direction by the Department of Justice." However, agents were not to dispense with "civilian investigators" (spies) on plant protection cases.[28]

Plant protection cases were a convenient pretext for investigating radical movements. F. B. Stansbury, who was in charge of the western operations of the Plant Protection Section, was greatly concerned about Wicks, his newspaper, and the newly formed soviet. Writing to his Portland agent, L. F. Russell, one week after the meeting in Mayor Baker's office, Stansbury expressed his hope that the November 1918 directive would not prevent Russell from contributing to the array of forces now aligned against the fledgling council. Although he did not know how long funding for an office in Portland would last, Stansbury did know that as long as work on government contracts continued there he had a legitimate reason to continue operations in the city. He wanted Russell to gather reports on lumber camp radicals from regional employers—and more importantly—to keep tabs on the soviet movement in Portland. Despite orders not to begin any new investigations unrelated to plant protection, Stansbury told Russell to "furnish the names of the radicals as you receive information concerning them and if possible give me specific instances of their activities" in regular reports.[29]

In fact, even the national head of Plant Protection, Edmund Leigh, seemed to permit his section of Military Intelligence to depart from the November 1918 directive. Leigh sent a memo to all agents on February 20, 1919, repeating the same warning about conducting "espionage among the civilian population" but then adding that although not permitted "to attend meetings or conduct espionage," agents should report information uncovered to the Department of Justice (likely the local US attorney) "in case of need." If the Department of Justice did nothing, the agents should "report fully to this office." Stansbury had already instructed Russell to proactively gather information and make regular reports about a matter totally unrelated to government war contracts a month earlier. Regional innovation was outstripping national direction.[30]

Russell dutifully spied on council meetings but had a hard time understanding this new sort of radicalism: "Wicks is a smart agitator but I do not think he will accomplish much because he talks over the audience's head. I do not think that there is a half dozen men in the audience who know what he is talking about." To agents accustomed to listening to IWW organizers, who tended to speak plainly and ignore political theory, Wicks must have seemed a very odd sort of agitator. But the similarity of his rhetoric to that employed by the leaders of the rapidly spreading socialist movement

in Europe must have made Wicks, and the soviet, seem a greater threat than the beleaguered, fracturing IWW. The US Attorney Bert Haney believed that the soviet was "patterned after the Soldiers' and Workers' Councils now alleged to be in control of the situation in Russia." The agent William Bryon, head of the Bureau of Investigation's Portland office, reiterated the parallel, claiming the group was "patterned after a similar organization in Russia and Germany." Bryon also considered Wicks "more radical than any IWW orator that has spoken in this city for some time" because he "advocates the fusion of Japanese labor leaders with American labor; stating that while the Japanese color is not white, his blood is red." Wicks might just have been endorsing labor internationalism but perhaps he meant to incorporate Japanese Portlanders into the labor movement—a feat even the IWW never attempted. In August 1919, the *Portland Labor News*, which succeeded the *Western Socialist*, printed a letter from a socialist outlining the Japanese threat to the "white race" along with its own admonishment, "When we learn to really respect ourselves and to respect other peoples, we will not be the playthings of our rulers."[31]

Building a broad-based and undivided working-class movement would involve more than overcoming racial divisions. Craft divisions were also deeply ingrained; however, there was pressure from within the AFL to overcome them. Wicks was actively building ties to influence the direction of Portland's AFL unions, and many members were responding. Bryon claimed that a "large number" of the four hundred delegates who had attended the January 16, 1919, meeting were AFL members. He also noted that these AFL members were most attracted to the idea of "one big organization." "A number of the A.F. of L. leaders have already advocated complete reorganization in the near future, if they expect to get results for the workingman." There was indeed a lot of internal pressure for amalgamating craft unions into industrial unions in the aftermath of the war. Activists who sought to move the AFL away from craft unions, which often excluded the unskilled, and toward industrial unions, which would engage in mass organizing, were part of the left wing of the labor movement in this era. Like Wicks and the soviet's organizers, these activists were seeking to create the widest possible solidarity among workers. The growing amalgamation movement, along with the abrupt termination of government war production contracts, seemed to be pushing the OSFL leftward. The OSFL annual convention in January had passed a resolution condemning US intervention in the Russian Revolution, claiming that "the Soviets of Russia represent 80 per cent of the people—a larger majority than the government of the United States represents." A similar resolution had also passed nearly simultaneously at the first meeting of the Portland soviet. AFL unions were divided over support for the council, however. While the boilermakers union, the largest

and most powerful in wartime Portland, endorsed the council, the OSFL assembly voted to refer a motion for affiliation to the executive board for further investigation.[32]

Federal and local authorities were panicked. In addition to the OSFL possibly affiliating with the council, the Pacific Coast Metal Trades District Council was calling for a regional soviet. Furthermore, Haney believed that the council was "devoting itself assiduously to an effort to bring about a strike in this city in support of the general strike in the shipbuilding plants in Seattle." He complained, "Constant pressure is put upon me by the city and county authorities, urging that I interfere and attempt to take charge of the situation upon various grounds." Bryon worried not only that the council might spread the Seattle strike to Portland but also that the group would try to seize the municipal auditorium. He and the police chief confronted Wicks personally in late January 1919. They said later that the radical would not "answer the Chief yes or no when asked whether or not he would lead a mob." Bryon warned, "Unless some law or method is devised to stop this fellow's tongue in the city of Portland, that a small bunch of citizens will find a method some evening and find it quick and there will not be much activity and it will be regarded as very impolite to undertake to investigate their conduct." Bryon, unable to hold Wicks for deportation, a common tactic used against immigrant radicals at that time, had been reduced to begging Washington, DC, for some new method to contain him before the government lost control of the situation. Oregon officials would have to take the initiative, and the criminal syndicalism law would be the means.[33]

The soviet continued meeting into February 1919, and Haney worried that "the discharge of a large number of men" from the military "without proper allowances" was giving radical organizers "some degree of success." Arion Hall had another gathering of one thousand on February 2. Along with soldiers in uniform, "some families appeared to have turned out in force, taking half-grown boys and girls along." Clearly, Wicks was going to continue to draw crowds and fill Arion Hall to capacity. At the meeting, he and an editorial writer for the *Oregon Journal* newspaper praised the constitution of the Soviet Union. Wicks also demanded the use of Portland's public auditorium and declared that he would use Oregon's recall law to remove Mayor Baker from office if he continued to block the council from using the larger facility. The *Portland News* article on the meeting referred to "Wicks and his 3000 sovieteers" and quoted him as saying, "When I told the people who filled Arion Hall at our last meeting that we must get control of the city they stood on their two feet and cheered."[34]

The efforts of the soviet to use the city auditorium quickly gained the support of the *Oregon Labor Press*, the newspaper of the AFL Central Labor Council (CLC), perhaps in part because a member of the soviet's

Central Executive Committee, C. A. Strickland, was business agent of the powerful shipwrights union. The *Labor Press* cautiously recommended that Portlanders attend the meetings of the soviet before passing judgment on the group but that the soviet needed a larger space than Arion Hall to make this possible. A larger forum also seemed necessary because of a projected rapid growth in membership. Joe Thornton, another member of the Central Executive Committee, told the *Labor Press* that "about thirty thousand men have signified their intention of becoming members and that a number of labor unions have endorsed the council." The Portland Metal Trades Council asked Mayor Baker to allow Wicks and the soviet to use the auditorium and sent a letter of protest that the *Labor Press* published when he refused.[35]

Fracture and Repression

Though the CLC seemed to tentatively lend its support to the soviet in January 1919, by early February the *Oregon Labor Press* was framing the group as a competitor to the AFL and editorializing against what it saw as "autocratic" features of the soviet's constitution (such as the requirement that members adhere to the ten principles or face expulsion) and Wicks's tirades against conservatism in the AFL. While the paper admitted that "there is no denying the affiliation of some unionists with the local Workers' and Soldiers' Council," it insisted that Wicks's "attempt to make the unions eat from his hand while striking them with the other is a further insult to their intelligence" and that "the labor unions of Portland need no Moses to lead them from the wilderness." The CLC may have feared a struggle for its own unions in the wake of the Seattle general strike. The rising tide of radicalism in the region was moving union moderates into an increasingly defensive position. By March, conservatives within the CLC were clearly digging in for a fight, as the *Labor Press* titled an editorial "Industrial Democracy, Not Bolshevism." CLC leaders were right to be concerned. In July, the soviet ran a slate of candidates, led by Thornton and Strickland, against CLC incumbents and had the *Labor Press* worried enough to print an extended denunciation on page one based upon the claim that "the plan of the revolutionists is to get control of the Central Labor Council and thereby gain control of the *Oregon Labor Press*." Historian Jennifer Luff has argued that AFL officials "were leading proponents of popular anticommunism" while also opposing restrictions on the civil liberties of radicals because they doubted "the capacity of the law to distinguish between legitimate militancy and subversive radicalism." It was a delicate balance. Concerned about leftist competition from without and within, AFL conservatives also had to fear the most effective mechanisms of crushing those disruptive forces.[36]

At the same time that the CLC began to turn on the soviet, early February 1919, the new syndicalism law went into effect, giving law enforcement a new tool to use on the radical group. Greatly concerned about the soviet after a visit with his counterpart in Seattle, which was in the midst of the general strike, Portland's chief of police authorized a raid on the group's headquarters while simultaneously exploding a gas bomb at an Arion Hall meeting on February 9. The *Portland News*, finding humor in the attack, subtitled an article "Radicals Are in 'Bad Odor' Sunday Night." A report noted that one thousand people were in attendance, which was the typical capacity crowd for Wicks at Arion Hall, making it unlikely that the panicked evacuation was humorous. Before the explosion, Wicks had denounced the criminal syndicalism law and asserted that the soviet would campaign to repeal it by referendum during the next election. He also took up a collection for the men jailed in Portland for violating the law and held at $2,500 bail each. An agent noted that the crowd "seemed to contribute very liberally."[37]

Neither the repeal of the syndicalism law nor the recall of Mayor Baker made it to the ballot. In February 1919, Baker informed the owner of Arion Hall that he was liable for criminal syndicalism infractions committed on his property. Wicks continued to use Arion Hall for another month, until Baker finally closed it on March 15. Wicks missed most of the later evolution of the movement he had led in early 1919. After losing the platform of Arion Hall, he left for Spokane. Bryon reported Wicks back in Portland and speaking on the Plaza Block, a public meeting space downtown, in early July. He noted that Wicks "is under indictment at Spokane for white slavery (Sanger free love)." This statement is clarified by a report Bryon made in late August, likely his final mention of Wicks, though the events detailed certainly date from the period when Wicks spoke regularly at Arion Hall. "The Chief of Police of this city and this agent agitated Wicks' private affairs with Erma Lamb and their following of the Margaret Sanger teaching till Wicks confidentially advised this agent that he, Wicks, had had a revelation; that he no longer entertained any interest in the welfare of the other fellow but from now on proposed to look after himself." Was this a fabrication by Bryon, or Wicks, or the beginning of a career as paid informant? The preponderance of evidence indicates that Wicks remained a committed radical and Bryon's July report demonstrates that he continued to participate in local labor rallies that summer. In addition, while in Spokane, he served the 30-day maximum sentence for criminal syndicalism under the city's ordinance, and then both he and Erma Lamb went to jail for "illegal co-habitation." After acquittal, the couple returned to jail for "lewdness" under the same evidence. The editors of the *Western Socialist* feared that the authorities had hatched a strategy to bankrupt the allies of Wicks in the region by charging him with petty local offenses before charging him with a federal

crime, which would require a lengthy, and expensive, trial. However, by late 1919, Wicks had left the Pacific Northwest—and the debts accumulated by comrades there on his behalf—behind.[38]

After leaving Portland, Wicks became a nationally prominent Communist. In 1919, he joined the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party and then attended the first CP convention, later joining the executive committee of the Proletarian Party after a factional split. After rejoining the CP briefly in 1922, he quit to form the United Toilers but was back in the party again by the end of the year. He then remained active in the party until the mid to late 1930s, having edited the *Daily Worker*, served as representative to the Profintern (the Communist trade union international), and done Comintern work abroad. The *Daily Worker* denounced him as a government informant in 1939, one of only two CP Central Committee members ever expelled for this transgression. However, there is no conclusive evidence that he collaborated with the government while still in the CP. He then turned against Stalin and the party but remained a labor activist and committed communist until his death in 1957.[39]

The soviet survived both the loss of Arion Hall and Wicks, though the publicity it received declined in the absence of a large meeting venue and a charismatic leader. In April 1919, the soviet passed a per capita tax of one cent, which the members of four union locals, three branches of the Socialist Party, and the Union of Russian Citizens agreed to pay. The council must have formed an enduring community beyond its meetings and lectures because it held a series of successful fundraising dances, one of which earned $90. The soviet could also still strike fear into the heart of Mayor Baker. On May Day, for example, the group's celebration on the Plaza Block saw the Multnomah Guard in readiness at the nearby courthouse and county building. Baker himself was on hand, and the *Western Socialist* claimed that the troops had two Gatling guns trained on the crowd from the second floor of the county building.[40]

The soviet movement had spread throughout the region and beyond that spring. The *Western Socialist* reported in April 1919 that a delegate to the Tacoma soviet had been as far east as Minneapolis to confer with other such bodies and that Seattle's Central Labor and Metal Trades councils had both seated representatives from that city's own Council of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors. The movement continued to push for expansion throughout the year, most notably with a convention of northwest councils in September 1919 in Tacoma featuring delegates from that city as well as Seattle and Portland. The delegates wrote a declaration of principles that they hoped would eventually be approved by a greater body of western councils. The *Portland Labor News* published the principles alongside those of the CLP and promoted a close alliance between the two groups. The Portland CLP seemingly also saw

the importance of such an alliance, for its Organization Committee recommended the election of delegates to the council in October 1919. Leaders of the party also approached the council with the idea of cosponsoring a series of open forums, and the two groups partnered to hold public debates, the first of which took place in what were described by Earl Oster, a prominent member of both groups, as the council's "new headquarters."[41]

Of the two rivals that had splintered off from the Socialist Party, only the CLP had taken hold in Portland. J. Edgar Hoover, at the time the head of the General Intelligence Division of the Bureau of Investigation, repeatedly badgered Bryon to investigate the CP in Portland, and Bryon always exasperatedly responded that one did not exist. "A reference to telegrams sent by this office will disclose this agent's inability to convince the Bureau that there was no Communist Party in the state of Oregon." The CLP was likely a better fit for Portland's radical culture; at its founding convention, the party had endorsed the IWW as the trade union counterpart to its own political activity. The CLP's national policy of cooperation with other groups served to further build upon the local soviet movement. The CP, conversely, rejected cooperation with other organizations. The coalition impulse evident in the Portland soviet and the open-forum initiative of the Portland CLP ran directly counter to the CP position.[42]

The authorities saw the CLP as just another front for the same people who had organized the IWW and the council. Bryon noted on a copy of seized minutes from a late September 1919 soviet meeting that "attention is respectfully invited to the various names appearing as members of Council of Workers Soldiers and Sailors together with the pertinent fact that they interlock as officers with the I.W.W., Socialist Party, Communist Labor Party and American Federation of Labor." The CLP's endorsement of the IWW had not escaped Bryon either; he wrote to Hoover for confirmation of "the theory that the Communist Labor Party and the IWW are one and the same in so far as the alien deportation laws are concerned." The March 1920 trial of three Portland CLP leaders under the state's criminal syndicalism law relied heavily upon evidence against the IWW. Bryon reported, "There were some 16 of the principal publications of the IWW introduced as exhibits. They…particularly refer to sabotage as practiced by the IWW." Though the CLP's relationship with the IWW contributed to the transition to communism for radical organizers in Portland, it was also the party's undoing in Oregon. The convictions of the three CLP leaders, based largely on evidence against the IWW, established the illegality of the party under state law.[43]

Wicks's eventual successor, Joseph Laundy, also went to prison in the spring of 1920 after a sensational trial. In addition to leading the soviet, Laundy was a member of the AFL, IWW, and CLP. He personified the

Bureau of Investigation's suspicion that all labor and radical groups were fronts for the same conspiracy. In a sense, the bureau operatives were right. Portland's radical organizers did move from one group to another. The Portland Left exhibited much more cohesion within and across organizations than we have come to expect in an era of intense radical factionalism, which helps explain the momentum for an umbrella group like the council. It was Laundy's involvement in the defense of Mooney and his support of the Soviet Union that sealed his fate. He had distributed information on Mooney in public, and later, after seizure of the papers of the CLP, Bryon discovered a letter written by Laundy as head of the council to the secretary of the longshoremen's union in Seattle supporting its decision not to load supply ships bound for US troops intervening in the civil war in Russia. Authorities postponed Laundy's trial for several months after his early January 1920 arrest so that the convictions of the three CLP leaders could strengthen the criminal syndicalism case against him. It is unlikely that the council continued to exist in any significant form after the spring 1920 trials. Though the IWW outlasted the council—and it may have adherents in the region still—the dwindling group was in irreversible decline, as most revolutionaries had embraced communism, never to return.[44]

The forces arrayed against the council had eventually proved overwhelming. The council faced not just determined opposition from all levels of government, panicked by the region's postwar economic collapse and the momentum of revolutionaries in Europe but also obstruction from an increasingly defensive AFL CLC in Portland. The soviet's inability to use the municipal auditorium in order to address crowds of larger than one thousand at a time, the capacity of Arion Hall, had also been a significant setback. However, the damage that Wicks himself had inflicted on the council should not be underestimated. One of the most important aspects of the transition from the IWW to Bolshevik-inspired organizations in Portland was the emergence of a cult of leadership. Authorities and newspapers alike were almost entirely focused on Wicks during the formative period of the council and paid little attention to others on the Central Executive Committee or to the membership. While the IWW, driven by an almost undifferentiated rabble in the view of its enemies, had seemed more like a plague than an organization, Wicks came off like the Lenin of the Pacific Northwest: a charismatic, intelligent orator and a fanatic of fearsome potential. The CLC had increasingly judged the council by Wicks himself once the relatively conservative faction that controlled the *Oregon Labor Press* turned against the organization: "The labor unions of Portland need no Moses to lead them from the wilderness."[45]

Given the focus on Wicks, it did not help that he had a passion for bitter, acidic invective directed as much against his rivals on the Left as on

the Right. When the *Oregon Labor Press* noted, "Members of the Socialist Party are not unanimously enthusiastic in support of Wicks," he responded in the *Western Socialist*, "There are members of the Socialist Party in the city of Portland who would burn me at the stake if they had the power because I have annihilated some of their bourgeois superstitions." He castigated "reformers" as "so fearful of being called 'radical' that they take refuge in the fat folds of some magnate's belly." In doing so, Wicks also insulted "working class slaves" broadly as "too foolish to see through the farce." Continuing to cast a wide net, Wicks attacked Thanksgiving in the same issue. "The barbarian gorging himself at the sacrificial feast; the Roman patrician debauching at the Festival of Saturnalia; the Feudal Baron and the braying priest at 'The Feast of Fools'; and the modern American groaning from indigestion after his Thanksgiving Day of feasting and worshipping all belong to the same category." His newspaper also constantly railed against religion in articles with such titles as "The Lie on the Lips of the Priest." The internationalism of communism and its coherence as a belief system could provide the inspiration and solidarity to help build a mass following but Wicks used communist ideology to repeatedly stress that predominant national values and traditions survived only through ignorance and had no place in an enlightened communist future. This doctrinal attitude undermined the potential of the soviet he did so much to form in response to local postwar conditions.[46]

In late 1922, fellow party members accused Wicks of being a spy just as he was up for election to the 11-member executive council of the new Workers Party of America, which the two competing communist parties had finally united to form. There was no shortage of enemies to denounce him and former comrades from the Pacific Northwest were in the vanguard of his accusers. Kate Greenhalgh claimed that Wicks's "escapades" had cost communist organizations in Spokane and Portland "hundreds of dollars." Alma Kriger asserted that Wicks was a drug addict, had falsely accused several fellow radicals of spying, and had become "an informer to the enemy." She also produced an ex-wife who claimed that Wicks had married her under a false name when she was 16 years old and that he had received money to speak to the enemies of socialism in Detroit. Kriger blamed the poor current state of communism in Portland on Wicks as well: "So long as we retain such men as Wicks, egotistical, jealous of party prominence, weak, a physical and moral coward, a traitor over and over again, so long as we retain such as he,… poison…filter[s] through the organization until the vital activities are clogged and slowed almost to the point of stagnation, as they are right now here in Portland." Wicks rebutted the accusations of the disgruntled Portlanders at great length, noting that they "began to raise hell in the organization and started a strong fight against my methods, claiming I was a dictator."

Wicks claimed that after the soviet became successful in early 1919, with a membership of 24,000, his internal enemies were responsible for negative press about him and that they backed his first successor, an alleged moderate named Cecil Townsend, whom he accused of being a government spy. In his view, traitors had undermined him. "As to the assertion that I called [the Portland communist Constance] Svensen a 'dirty bitch,'" he continued, "I emphatically declare that I do not indulge in such unmerited flattery." He was eventually cleared of the charges by fellow party leaders George Ashkenudzie, Earl Browder, and Max Bedacht.[47]

This sort of petty infighting did not begin with Bolshevism, but in the IWW, previously dominant in the Pacific Northwest, individual leaders and revolutionary theory were generally subordinate to a democratic culture focused on immediate concerns. Even when riven by factionalism, as the Portland IWW certainly was by 1919, debate often remained grounded in practicalities: Will moderation ensure survival or not? However, the council did have democratic aspects. The organization elected a large leadership of 19 workers and 8 soldiers, in addition to framing a very inclusive constitution. The Council of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors was an amalgam of the European councils movement, Bolshevik inspiration, and regional radical tradition. Harry Wicks certainly bears some responsibility for posturing himself as a Vladimir Lenin or a Béla Kun but the opponents of the soviet and the newspapers reporting on the conflict did not want to see the council as a democratic experiment responding to a crisis. In the essential conflict between soviet democracy and Bolshevik autocracy, the latter story eclipsed the former. The attempt by Joe Thornton and C. A. Strickland of the council's Central Executive Committee to lead a slate of candidates to unseat the AFL CLC in July 1919 probably represented a much more serious threat to the status quo in Portland than Wicks's dramatic speeches at Arion Hall and his campaign against the mayor for access to the municipal auditorium, which received all the attention and inspired much more panic.

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US anticommunists understood, as the Bolsheviks had in Russia, that control of the cities must come first in modern revolution. Fear over losing control of urban space to immigrants, industrial unrest, and moral laxity was already a potent political force, strengthened by the dislocation brought on by war mobilization. The highly militarized response to the Portland soviet suggests that the strains of abrupt demobilization in war production centers seemed to those who fought radicalism like the beginning of a potentially irreversible collapse in urban order. That cities might, at long last, spin entirely out of control as soldiers returned to conditions of high

unemployment must have seemed likely given concurrent events in Europe, which anticommunists in Portland constantly evoked.

Experimentation to capitalize upon, or conversely, contain, the instability caused by early demobilization was rapid in Portland. Forms of communism and anticommunism emerged earlier in the city than they did nationally. The two national communist parties did not form until September 1919, and the Palmer Raids on radical headquarters in 33 cities, resulting in the arrest of thousands of organizers, did not occur until January 1920, one year after the Portland soviet first met. We do not yet know much about how the urban networks that created the threat and the urban networks that helped to eliminate it had been built. Learning more about variances in regional conditions and early experiments in urban communism and anticommunism is prerequisite to understanding how the Palmer Raids were possible to prepare for and carry out and why there was such a dispersed threat to attack.[48]

CHAPTER 8

EPILOGUE

In April 2001, Jerry Auvil, an organizer with the carpenters' union, received a phone call from a man who claimed to be with the Portland Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), a team that formally combines the efforts of city police and FBI field agents. The organizer was planning a rally at a construction site in suburban Portland to recruit nonunion Latino immigrant workers there and answered all of the questions that the caller asked. After all, Auvil figured, he usually called the police beforehand anyway. When 60 union activists showed up at the site, they found it temporarily shut down.[1]

Although Jerry Auvil cannot prove that the man who called him was with the JTTF or that his disclosure of the rally resulted in the site being closed that day, there was a strong reaction from Portland unions. Twenty-one locals passed resolutions that summer demanding that the city withdraw from the JTTF. Local progressive activists repeatedly cited the historical union busting role of the FBI in their community in order to legitimize and spread the outrage sparked by the assumed sabotage of the carpenters' rally. The organizing director of the health professionals' union in Portland told Detroit-based *Labor Notes*, "They did it in the '30s, they did it in the '60s, and they're doing it now." The *Portland Alliance* fumed, "The FBI hounded ILWU leader Harry Bridges for over 30 years without making a legitimate case against him," and claimed that International Longshore and Warehouse Union activists who had just recently won a contract at Powell's Books in the city were under surveillance.[2]

The city initially joined the JTTF in 1997 to protect the Nike World Masters Games, though Portland City Council did not vote to approve the relationship until 2000. Civil rights activists had concerns and protested the decision but there was no major local controversy until growing trade union anger in spring and summer 2001 was immediately followed by the September 11 attacks. As the federal war on terror escalated and drew in

local policing resources, worries increased in Portland. There was no local oversight of JTTF activity; even the mayor and city attorney could not access its files. Although a few city council members voiced deep concerns, the political climate in the wake of the September 11 and subsequent anthrax attacks made dissent difficult. These partnerships were substantial and Portland's cost the city nearly $500,000 per year.[3]

Portland withdrew from the JTTF after a city council vote in 2005 in reaction to the FBI wrongly connecting a local lawyer to a terrorist train bombing in Spain. Portland had a very tentative relationship with the FBI after that decision, not quite in or out of the JTTF entirely. In early 2015, Mayor Charlie Hales, who as commissioner cast the lone vote against the JTTF just weeks after the September 11 attacks, struggled toward clarity in the relationship. The FBI reported that it had JTTF relationships in 104 cities by then, over two-thirds of them emerging after the September 11 attacks, including the locales of all 56 field offices. Hales seemed amenable to full participation in the JTTF if the FBI was willing to brief him on its activity, though it had previously refused him clearance. The Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 and more recent terrorist murders in Paris and Copenhagen proved decisive for him. "I do think the world has changed," he said to the press after voting to break a city council deadlock in order to end Portland's status as the only major US city without a formal JTTF partnership. The salience of civil liberties protection in Portland's political culture had transformed in the century since World War I but the complexity of local-federal policing, and the drive toward it on both sides, remained.[4]

The federal presence in local industrial relations arbitration persisted also. The historical consensus has the federal framework withering after World War I, the myriad ad hoc boards then replaced—after a decade and a half hiatus—by a permanent system through the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. The war has served as precedent for large-scale federal intervention in local labor disputes but scholars have not drawn any continuity from this watershed era. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor (DOL) first entered Portland industrial relations during the shipbuilding crisis of 1917 but it did not disappear from the city after being supplanted by the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board. It resolved ten more disputes during the next four years and became even more active over the course of the 1920s. Between September 1921 and May 1930, DOL intervened in 27 labor crises in Portland. These situations were not all strikes that threatened to bring local economic activity to a halt, although some were quite serious, such as militancy among longshoremen, streetcar workers, the building trades, and teamsters. The government also intervened to get bakers, launderers, painters, theatre engineers, and moving picture operators back to work.[5]

The state had moved beyond crisis response to everyday urban industrial relations management. The government still strived after the war to cut down militancy when it arose and prevent strikes from broadening into wider struggles that could provoke significant urban unrest. However, the open shop drive of the 1920s, along with the cessation of dramatic levels of immigration and industrial growth, meant that federal efforts did not have to match the scale seen during the war. When a national wave of worker militancy reemerged in the 1930s, the government created a more elaborate framework to manage labor disputes that had grown beyond the DOL system that continued after the war. It also expanded an antiradical intelligence operation that had become more quiet and informal in the years following the war era in response to a temporary decline in anticapitalist activism.

The federal law enforcement component of the World War I effort to maintain urban order was continuous, although as in labor arbitration, there was a brief period when its scale diminished because the threat to which it responded also diminished. Bureau of Investigation field agents and US attorneys of the Department of Justice learned that partnerships with local police were key to fulfilling government objectives. For the first time, those goals included ongoing investigation and suppression of labor activism. Legal scholar David Williams has argued,

> [Although a] 1924 order forced the bureau to abandon, at least temporarily, aggressive intelligence tactics, the directive did not terminate FBI surveillance of lawful political activities. Documents recently acquired through a Freedom of Information Act request show that between 1924 and 1936, when Franklin D. Roosevelt secretly rescinded Stone's directive, the FBI hired paid informers to collect information on the activities of liberal and radical political and labor organizations.

Williams concluded, "By 1924 the foundation of a permanent surveillance apparatus was firmly in place."[6]

Bereft of federal laws to enforce after the war, the partnership with local authorities continued. Because local ordinances and state laws replaced the Espionage and Sedition Acts, agents of the national government were relegated to intelligence gathering except where empowered by the Immigration Act of 1920, which made immigrants punishable for radical sympathies. Even so, the 1920 law, like the statutes of 1917–18 targeting radicals, was used primarily as a pretext to assist local authorities. Just as the JTTF was not about to bring Jerry Auvil to trial for violating the Hobbs Act, targeted at criminal conspiracy to obstruct commerce, trials under the wartime federal acts and the slew of state-passed criminal syndicalism laws that followed were uncommon. Historian Harry W. Stone Jr. has estimated

that although authorities made over 200 arrests under the Oregon criminal syndicalism law, they only indicted 80 organizers and actually tried just 21, a mere one-tenth of those they arrested. Federal intelligence was invaluable in securing 15 criminal syndicalism convictions and 18 deportations. The fear of government harassment that motivated 21 Portland unions to object to the JTTF was well grounded in local historical experience.[7]

The federal government began a remarkable expansion during World War I that made two key allies—mainstream unions and local elites—less essential in future crises. It became less necessary to append the capacities of those groups, because the reach of the state had expanded. The field service of the federal government grew from 476,000 to 800,000 between June 1917 and November 1918. The Employment Service of the DOL had 800 local offices by the end of the war. While "compensatory state building" through the private sector had been critical in expanding federal capacity, as political scientist Marc Allen Eisner has asserted, the government had also established precedent for massive nonmilitary expansion of the public sector to overcome national crisis.[8]

The Works Progress Administration (WPA) provided 25,000 Portlanders with jobs from 1935–42. As working-class militancy threatened urban order all over the nation, the government once again expended massive resources to construct peace. During World War I, it would have been impossible to placate Portland's workers without cooperating with the local American Federation of Labor (AFL). However, during the WPA era, the local central bodies of the AFL and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) passed resolutions condemning the project and held public rallies to raise indignation and apply pressure. Unions complained that the WPA intentionally paid less than prevailing wages. WPA administrators hoped this practice would encourage workers to rely upon the government only as a last resort but labor feared that its membership would lose jobs to lower-paid federal employees. As the protests continued, so did the program. During World War II, the AFL and CIO made "no strike" pledges to the government. A stronger labor movement made a concession that its World War I era counterpart had not.[9]

Portland's elites had also been indispensable during World War I, though less so by the New Deal years when the capacity of the federal government expanded so dramatically. Governor Charles Henry Martin, who had married into Portland's powerful Hughes family and their real estate empire, spent the latter half of the 1930s expanding and coordinating the anticommunist capacities of state and local law enforcement. This might have been welcome in the capital but when Martin's tireless persecution of radicals cast too wide a net and included mainstream unions, President Franklin Roosevelt sacrificed the governor, and ultimately a brief Democratic rule

of Oregon, to his primary challenger with a public endorsement through several key advisers.[10]

City government had provided an invaluable administrative network to marshal local resources toward the national World War I mobilization effort. Municipal officers and DOL field agents worked diligently to quickly expand housing in Portland, although the conflict ended just as their building program was beginning. During the next war, both the shipyard owners and the federal government became frustrated with the slow pace of Portland officials in building housing for workers. The problem became acute in the summer of 1942 and Edgar Kaiser, owner of Kaiser Shipyard, met with representatives of the federal Maritime Commission to form a plan without Portland's City Council or Planning Commission. They agreed on six thousand new units and soon raised the number to ten thousand. To circumvent Portland authorities and build a new community with Kaiser Shipyard access solely in mind, this alliance constructed Vanport one mile north of the city limits. The preliminary plans were set in August and the first tenants had already moved in by December. The stronger the government became, the less it needed some old allies.[11]

From the 1930s on, the federal government has been able to pursue urban order more independently and reduce the number and scale of old alliances. However, some groups, such as local police forces, still remained critical. The state has formed local alliances more selectively than it did during the World War I era, while remaining continuously active in labor arbitration and the suppression of working-class economic and political activism on the city level. The historical record set since 1917 convinced a substantial number of Portland unions and civil rights groups that the JTTF had indeed called Jerry Auvil of the carpenters' union in April 2001 and then sabotaged his organizing rally. In the words of the *Portland Alliance*, "The FBI and the Portland Police have a long record of violating civil rights in the pursuit of so-called terrorists."[12]

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29. William Clinton Mullendore, *History of the United States Food Administration, 1917–1919* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1941), 333–337; Mrs. W. Humphrey to US Food Office (Dec. 12, 1918), Sept. 1918 to End [Part II] folder, Box 60, RG 4; Acting Federal Food Administrator for Oregon to Humphrey (Dec. 14, 1918).
30. Maxcy Robson Dickson, *The Food Front in World War I* (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944), 151–152; Anonymous to District Attorney, Portland (Oct. 29, 1918), Haney folder, Box 60, RG 4.
31. S. Stephenson Smith to W. H. Moran (Aug. 10, 1918), Secret Service Reports folder, Box 63, RG 4; Smith to Moran (Sept. 14, 1918).
32. Secret Service Agent to Moran (Sept. 27, 1918), Haney folder, Box 60, RG 4; Smith to Moran (Aug. 10, 1918); Humphrey to US Food Office (Dec. 12, 1918).

4 Policing the Shipyards: The EFC and the Federal Struggle for Urban Industrial Order

1. Strike figures are from Jeffrey Haydu, *Making American Industry Safe for Democracy: Comparative Perspectives on the State and Employee Representation in the Era of World War I* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 131; *Portland News*, Sept. 29, 1917, pp. 1, 8.
2. Tonnage figures are from P. H. Douglas and F. E. Wolfe, "Labor Administration in the Shipbuilding Industry during War Time," *Journal of Political Economy* 27 (Mar. 1919): 145.
3. Trade percentages are from Roy W. Kelly and Frederick J. Allen, *The Shipbuilding Industry* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1918), 28; all shipyard and ways numbers are from Douglas and Wolfe, "Labor Administration in

the Shipbuilding Industry during War Time," 147; origins of the USSB and EFC are from Edward N. Hurley, *The Bridge to France* (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1927), 21–26.

4. Paul A. C. Koistinen, *Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865–1919* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 105; Emergency Shipping Fund from Darrell Hevenor Smith and Paul V. Betters, *The Unites States Shipping Board: Its History, Activities and Organization* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1931), 11–12 and budgets from 282–283; April 1917 workforce figure from Colin V. Dyment, "West Coast Shipbuilding," *American Review of Reviews* (June 1918): 626; October 1918 figure from Douglas and Wolfe, "Labor Administration in the Shipbuilding Industry during War Time," 147.
5. San Francisco figures are from Haydu, *Making American Industry Safe for Democracy*, 129–130; on union power in San Francisco, see Michael Kazin, *Barons of Labor: The San Francisco Building Trades and Union Power in the Progressive Era* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987).
6. Portland figures are from Carl Abbott, *Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 74–75; strike figure is from Haydu, *Making American Industry Safe for Democracy*, 131; Alexander M. Bing, *War-Time Strikes and Their Adjustment* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1921) on Emergency Construction Wage Commission [14–19] and National Adjustment Commission [39–45].
7. E. B. Ingram to A. J. Berres (June 5, 1917), File 33–479, Box 24, Entry 14, RG 280 [Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service], National Archives, College Park, MD; Jack E. Triplett Jr., "History of the Oregon Labor Movement Prior to the New Deal" (MA thesis, University of California, 1961), 102–103; "Initiative Petition for Trade Conspiracy Ordinance," Misc. Pacific Coast Exhibits folder, Box 2, Entry 378, RG 32 [US Shipping Board], National Archives, Washington, DC.
8. [?] White to William Wilson (June 19, 1917), File 33–479, Box 24, Entry 14, RG 280.
9. Robert L. Tyler, *Rebels of the Woods: The I.W.W. in the Pacific Northwest* (Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1967), Chapter 4.
10. District Council of Carpenters of Portland & Vicinity (Aug. 18, 1917), Supple & Ballin folder, Box 21, Entry 371, RG 32; Maritime District Council of Columbia River & Vicinity (Aug. 21, 1917); George Harry to William Wilson (Aug. 25, 1917), File 33–479, Box 24, Entry 14, RG 280.
11. Douglas and Wolfe, "Labor Administration in the Shipbuilding Industry during War Time," 150.
12. Fred Ballin to Admiral W. L. Capps (Aug. 25, 1917), Supple & Ballin folder, Box 21, Entry 371, RG 32; Harry to William Wilson (Aug. 25, 1917), File 33–479, Box 24, Entry 14, RG 280.
13. Harry to William Wilson (Aug. 25, 1917), File 33–479, Box 24, Entry 14, RG 280; SLAB to Charles Bottomley (Sept. 6, 1917), File 18255–1, Box 19, Entry 350, RG 32; Bottomley to Berres (Sept. 6, 1917); Blain to EFC (Sept. 12, 1917).

14. *Seattle Daily Times*, Sept. 14, 1917, p. 1; *Portland News*, Sept. 15, 1917, p. 1; *Seattle Daily Times*, Sept. 23, 1917, p. 1.
15. Haydu, *Making American Industry Safe for Democracy*, 131–132.
16. *San Francisco Chronicle*, Sept. 17, 1917, p. 1; Sept. 20, 1917, pp. 1–2; Haydu, *Making American Industry Safe for Democracy*, 132; *San Francisco Chronicle*, Oct. 1, 1917, pp. 1–2.
17. "Initiative Petition for Trade Conspiracy Ordinance," Misc. Pacific Coast Exhibits folder, Box 2, Entry 378, RG 32.
18. *Portland News*, Sept. 24, 1917, p. 1; Sept. 25, 1917, p. 1; Sept. 27, 1917, p. 1.
19. *Portland News*, Sept. 28, 1917, p. 1; Sept. 29, 1917, pp. 1, 8.
20. Robert Service, *A History of Twentieth-Century Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 58; *Portland News*, Sept. 29, 1917, pp. 1, 8.
21. *Portland News*, Oct. 1, 1917, p. 1; for transcripts of the Harry meetings, see Columbia River Shipbuilders Report of Committee folder, Box 1, Entry 378, RG 32; *Portland News*, Oct. 3, 1917, p. 5; Blain to EFC (Oct. 22, 1917), Wentworth folder, Box 20, Entry 371, RG 32; newspaper clipping, File 18255–1, Box 19, Entry 350.
22. Caroline J. Gleason, *Oregon Legislation for Women in Industry* (Washington, DC: Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 90, 1931), 14–25; on the investigations and decisions of the commission, see Edwin V. O'Hara, *A Living Wage by Legislation: The Oregon Experience* (Salem, OR: Oregon Industrial Welfare Commission, 1916).
23. *Final Report and Testimony Submitted to Congress by the Commission on Industrial Relations*, Vol. 5 (Washington, DC, 1916), 4573–4770; all background on USCIR from Joseph A. McCartin, *Labor's Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern American Industrial Relations, 1912–1921* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), Chapter 1; Banfield testimony in *Final Report and Testimony*, 4643–4654.
24. Hurley, *Bridge to France*, 186–195; Haydu, *Making American Industry Safe for Democracy*, 123, quotes Chairman Hurley wanting to use "the stiff arm for dealing with organized labor" but his memoirs are much more guarded—although still quite critical; Macy's connection to the NCF from Haydu, *Making American Industry Safe for Democracy*, 215, fn 7; NCF background from David Montgomery, *The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865–1925* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 269–281 and David Montgomery, "Industrial Democracy or Democracy in Industry?: The Theory and Practice of the Labor Movement, 1870–1925," in *Industrial Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise*, ed. Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell John Harris (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 30–34.
25. Macy explains the composition of the board and the purpose of the hearings at length, see "Proceedings before the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board" (Portland, OR, Oct. 15, 1917), 1–8, Box 1, Entry 378, RG 32. This transcript hereafter cited as "Portland SLAB Proceedings."
26. Portland MTC Brief, Portland SLAB Proceedings (Oct. 16, 1917), 16; Portland SLAB Proceedings (Oct. 16 [Part IV], 1917), 17–18.

27. Portland SLAB Proceedings (Oct. 16 [Part II], 1917), 12–15; (Oct. 16 [Part IV], 1917), 67–69.
28. Portland SLAB Proceedings (Oct. 16 [Part III], 1917), 43–44; (Oct. 16 [Part IV], 1917), 81.
29. Portland SLAB Proceedings (Oct. 16 [Part III], 1917), 48–49; (Oct. 16 [Part IV], 1917), 94.
30. Portland SLAB Proceedings (Oct. 18 [Part I], 1917), 187–188; newspaper clipping, File 18255–1, Box 19, Entry 350, RG 32.
31. J. Caldwell Jenkins, *Codification of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board Awards, Decisions, and Authorizations* (Washington, DC: US Shipping Board, 1921), 165–173.
32. E. Kimbark MacColl, *The Growth of a City: Power and Politics in Portland, Oregon, 1915–1950* (Portland, OR: The Georgian Press, 1979), 137–138; Clarence Reames to Thomas Gregory (Jan. 8, 1918), Vol. 31, Box 7, Mss. 1704 [Portland US Attorney], Oregon Historical Society, Portland; William Bryon to Lewis Bailey (Nov. 24, 1920), File 202600–389–1, Reel 928, "Bureau Section Files, 1920–21," RG 65 [Bureau of Investigation], National Archives, College Park, MD; for Wood's USCIR testimony, see *Final Report and Testimony*, 4676–4681; MacColl, *Growth of a City*, 11–12.
33. MacColl, *Growth of a City*, 149–154.
34. Portland MTC to V. Everett Macy (Dec. 29, 1917), Portland Metal Trades folder, Box 2, Entry 378, RG 32; Richard Montague to William Blackman (Jan. 20, 1918), File 18710–1, Box 23, Entry 350; James Kerr to Macy (Jan. 22, 1918), Carey & Kerr folder, Box 21, Entry 371; R. W. Leatherbee to Blackman (Mar. 30, 1918), File 18710–1, Box 23, Entry 350; Macy to Charles Piez (Apr. 10, 1918), File 18235–1, Box 18.
35. Macy to Montague (Apr. 12, 1918), Montague folder, Box 20, Entry 371, RG 32; Macy to Montague (Jan. 26, 1918), File 18710–1, Box 23, Entry 350; Macy to Arthur Jones (Apr. 25, 1918), Montague folder, Box 20, Entry 371.
36. Montague to Macy (Mar. 23, 1918), Montague folder, Box 20, Entry 371, RG 32; Arthur Jones to Henry Seager (Aug. 7, 1918).
37. Jones to Macy (Apr. 18, 1918), Montague folder, Box 20, Entry 371, RG 32; R. A. McInnis to Macy (Apr. 24, 1918), Columbia River Maritime District Council folder, Box 21; Macy to Jones (Apr. 25, 1918), Montague folder, Box 20.
38. All weekly reports in Montague folder, Box 20, Entry 371, RG 32.
39. Macy to Montague (May 29, 1918), Montague folder, Box 20, Entry 371, RG 32; William Piggott to Macy (June 27, 1918), Wentworth folder; Montague to SLAB (July 10, 1918), Montague folder.
40. Jenkins, *Codification of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board Awards*, 309–323, 337–338.
41. Montague to Macy (Oct. 2, 1918), Montague folder, Box 20, Entry 371, RG 32; Macy to McBride (Oct. 2, 1918), McBride folder, Box 19; Kerr to Macy (Oct. 10, 1918), Carey & Kerr folder, Box 21; Macy to Kerr (Oct. 15, 1918).

5 Wartime Class Struggle: The Portland Labor Movement and the Industrial Peace Regime

1. F. B. Stansbury to L. F. Russell (Nov. 9, 1918), Folder 738, Box 4, RG 165 [War Department General and Special Staffs], National Archives, Seattle, WA; the army developed a large domestic surveillance capacity rapidly and "labor unrest" was the top priority of the Western Department according to historian James L. Gilbert, *World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence* (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2012), 43–44.
2. Joseph A. McCartin, *Labor's Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern American Labor Relations, 1912–1921* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 6–9; on the long history of "industrial democracy" rhetoric, see Milton Derber, *The American Idea of Industrial Democracy, 1865–1965* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970) and "Some Further Thoughts on the Historical Study of Industrial Democracy," *Labor History* 14 (Fall 1973): 599–611; on the primacy of shop floor control in AFL disputes during this era, see David Montgomery, *The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865–1925* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Chapter 8; on the role of shipbuilding shop committees in this struggle, see Jeffrey Haydu, *Making American Industry Safe for Democracy: Comparative Perspectives on the State and Employee Representation in the Era of World War I* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), Chapter 5.
3. The January 1917 strike of metal trades unions at both Willamette Iron & Steel and Northwest Steel foreshadowed the shape of wartime conflict. See *Oregon Labor Press*, Jan. 6, 1917, p. 1; Jan. 13, 1917, p. 1; Jan. 20, 1917, p. 1; J. R. Bowles to Strike Committee (Jan. 14, 1917), Northwest Steel folder, Box 2, Entry 378, RG 32 [US Shipping Board], National Archives, Washington, DC.
4. H. W. Shaw to William Johnston (Jan. 5, 1918), Machinists folder, Box 21, Entry 371, RG 32; J. A. Reed to J. A. Franklin (Jan. 5, 1918), BBM&ISB folder; Franklin to V. Everett Macy (Jan. 12, 1918); Franklin to Reed (Jan. 12, 1918).
5. Macy to Franklin (Jan. 22, 1918), BBM&ISB folder, Box 21, Entry 371, RG 32; Franklin to Macy (Jan. 12, 1918); Richard Montague to Macy (Apr. 30, 1918), Montague Folder, Box 20; Montague to Macy (May 15, 1918); Montague to SLAB (July 23, 1918).
6. For photos of workers wearing union buttons in shipbuilding plants and yards, see the EFC magazine *Emergency Fleet News*; for Portland specifically, see *Heave Together: Official Organ of the Northwest Steel Company's Employees*, Feb. 1, 1918, p. 3.
7. Macy to Montague (Feb. 18, 1918), File 18110–1, Box 13, Entry 350, RG 32; Bert Ball to Macy (Mar. 4, 1918), Northwest Steel folder, Box 21, Entry 371; Harry to William Wilson (Aug. 25, 1917), File 33–479, Box 24, Entry 14, RG 280 [Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service], National Archives, College Park, MD; John McNary, Henry Hansen, and T. B. Neuhausen to Senator Charles McNary (Mar. 27, 1918), File 18710–1, Box 23, Entry 350, RG 32.

8. George Edwards and M. A. Beagle to Montague (Mar. 13, 1918), Portland Metal Trades folder, Box 2, Entry 378, RG 32.
9. BBM&ISB Lodge 72 to [?] (Apr. 15, 1918), BBM&ISB folder, Box 21, Entry 371, RG 32; P. Morgan to William Wilson (July 18, 1918), File 33–479, Box 24, Entry 14, RG 280.
10. Arthur Jones to [?] Seager (Aug. 7, 1918), Montague folder, Box 20, Entry 371, RG 32.
11. McCartin, *Labor's Great War*, 76–80; Morgan to Charles Piez (Sept. 9, 1918), BBM&ISB folder, Box 21, Entry 371, RG 32.
12. Jones to Willamette Iron & Steel (Oct. 26, 1918), McBride folder, Box 19, Entry 371, RG 32.
13. Piez to Willamette Iron & Steel (Oct. 29, 1918), File 18110–1, Box 13, Entry 350, RG 32; Willamette Iron & Steel to Piez (Oct. 30, 1918).
14. On local authorities pleading for federal support against radicals before the war, see Melvyn Dubofsky, *We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), Chapter 8; for more on Portland, see Robert L. Tyler, *Rebels of the Woods: The I.W.W. in the Pacific Northwest* (Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1967), Chapter 2, and Dennis E. Hoffman and Vincent J. Webb, "Police Response to Labor Radicalism in Portland and Seattle, 1913–19," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 87 (Winter 1986): 341–366; for the federal perspective, see William Preston Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), Chapter 2.
15. Federal wartime laws pamphlet for law enforcement officials (Oct. 10, 1918), Folder 746, Box 4, RG 165.
16. Clarence Reames to Thomas Gregory (Apr. 2, 1917), Vol. 29, Box 6, Mss. 1704 [Portland US Attorney], Oregon Historical Society, Portland; Reames to Gregory (Jan. 11, 1918), Vol. 31, Box 7.
17. Federal wartime laws pamphlet, Folder 746, Box 4, RG 165; for more on the legislative angle, see Paul L. Murphy, *World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States* (New York: Norton, 1979), Chapter 4; Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History* (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), 427.
18. Newspaper clippings (Feb. 9–10, 1918), Folder 2154, Box 14, RG 165.
19. *Industrial Worker*, Feb. 24, 1917, p. 1; May 26, 1917, p. 4; June 30, 1917, p. 1; July 30, 1917, p. 1.
20. Report of Agent Bryon (Sept. 5, 1917), Frame 446, Reel 3, *U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Surveillance of Radicals in the United States, 1917–1941* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984).
21. The historiography of the Chicago trial took form in the 1960s through Philip Taft, "The Federal Trials of the IWW," *Labor History* 3 (Winter 1962): 57–91; Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters*, Chapter 5; Richard Brazier, "The Mass IWW Trial of 1918: A Retrospect," *Labor History* 7 (Spring 1966): 178–192; Dubofsky, *We Shall Be All*, Chapters 16–17.
22. Report of Agent Bryon (Oct. 3, 1917), File 36190, Reel 573, "Old German Files, 1915–20," RG 65 [Bureau of Investigation], National Archives, College

Park, MD; Bryon (Aug. 30, 1918), File 45803, Reel 397; Bryon (Oct. 11, 1917), File 36190, Reel 573; Harris Allman reported by Bryon in Report of "Employee 100" (Aug. 3, 1917), File 45803, Reel 397.

23. On suppression of the IWW regionally, see Tyler, *Rebels of the Woods*, Chapter 5, and nationally, see Dubofsky, *We Shall Be All*, Chapters 16–17; Report of 39580 A. P. L. (Nov. 5, 1917), Frame 450, Reel 3, USMIR; Report of Elton Watkins (Dec. 1, 1917), File 104981, Reel 483, OGF, RG 65.
24. Newspaper clippings (Feb. 22 & 27, 1918), Folder 2112, RG 165.
25. Newspaper clipping (Feb. [?], 1918), Folder 540, Box 2, RG 165.
26. "A Report of the Activities of the I.W.W. in the District of Portland, Oregon," File 1494, Box 133, Entry 145, RG 32.
27. Newspaper clipping (Mar. 4, 1918), Folder 2115, Box 11, RG 165.
28. "A Report of the Activities of the I.W.W. in the District of Portland, Oregon"; Report of "Employee 100" (Aug. 3, 1917), File 45803, Reel 397, OGF, RG 65.
29. Report of Agent Bryon (Aug. 30, 1918) File 45803, Reel 397, OGF, RG 65; Bryon (Oct. 13, 1917); newspaper clipping (Mar. 4, 1918), Folder 2115, Box 11, RG 165.
30. Report of Captain George Gund (May 20, 1918), Frame 431, Reel 3, USMIR; Gund (June 22, 1918), Frame 428.
31. Report of Agent Bryon (Dec. 7, 1917), File 119779, Reel 502, OGF, RG 65; Report of Agent C. W. Robison (Feb. 11, 1918); newspaper clipping (Feb. [?], 1918), Folder 540, Box 2, RG 165.
32. *Industrial Worker*, May 4, 1918, p. 4.
33. Portland IWW Defense Committee to Gregory (Aug. 7, 1918), Folder 591, Box 2, RG 165.
34. Bert Haney to Thomas Gregory (Sept. 26, 1918), Vol. 33, Box 7, Mss. 1704; on the Irish nationalist movement in this region and era, see Timothy J. Sarbaugh, "Eamon de Valera and the Northwest: Irish Nationalism Confronts the Red Scare," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 81 (Oct. 1990): 145–151; federal documents never mention their homosexual relationship explicitly but it is confirmed in Nancy Krieger, "Queen of the Bolsheviks: The Hidden History of Dr. Marie Equi," *Radical America* 17, no. 5 (1983): 66, and Helen C. Camp, *Iron in Her Soul: Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and the American Left* (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1995), 129; on the gendered complexities of interaction between women radicals and men engaged in wartime and Red Scare policing, see Kathleen Kennedy, *Disloyal Mothers and Scurrilous Citizens: Women and Subversion during World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999) and Kim E. Nielsen, *Un-American Womanhood: Antiradicalism, Antifeminism, and the First Red Scare* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001).
35. Background from Krieger, "Queen of the Bolsheviks," 58–65; federal perspective from Haney to Gregory (Nov. 22, 1918), Vol. 33, Box 7, Mss. 1704; Haney's reaction to Equi paying the bond is stated in Haney to Gregory (Sept. 26, 1918).
36. Report of Agent Bryon (Sept. 6, 1919), File 209551, Reel 619, OGF, RG 65; Informant 53's name is revealed as Margaret Lowell Paul after Equi's conviction in Haney to Gregory (Nov. 26, 1918), Vol. 33, Box 7, Mss. 1704.

37. Report of Informant 53 (Aug. 28, 1918), File 209551, Reel 619, OGF, RG 65; Report of Agent Bryon (Aug. 30, 1918); Report of Special Employee Fitzgerald (June 22, 1918); on the American Protective League, which may have had a membership into the hundreds of thousands nationwide during the war, see Joan M. Jensen, *The Price of Vigilance* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969).
38. Report of Special Employee Fitzgerald (June 22, 1918), File 209551, Reel 619, OGF, RG 65; Report of 144005 A. P. L. (Aug. 19, 1918); Report of Informant 53 (Oct. 11, 1918); Julia L. Mickenberg, "Suffragettes and Soviets: American Feminists and the Specter of Revolutionary Russia," *Journal of American History* 100 (Mar. 2014): 1023.
39. Report of Informant 53 (Oct. 11 & 15, 1918), File 209551, Reel 619, OGF, RG 65; Haney to Gregory (Oct. 31, 1918), Vol. 33, Box 7, Mss. 1704.
40. *Portland Oregonian*, Nov. 22, 1918, p. 12; Report of Agent Bryon (Sept. 6, 1919), File 209551, Reel 619, OGF, RG 65.
41. *Portland Oregonian*, Jan. 1, 1919, p. 14; Speckart's relationship with Equi, vague in the newspaper report, is confirmed by Kennedy, *Disloyal Mothers and Scurrilous Citizens*, 99, and Krieger, "Queen of the Bolsheviks," 57.
42. Newspaper clipping (Jan. 9, 1919), Folder 2140, Box 12, RG 165; Kathleen O'Brennan to Editor of *Irish Independent* (Feb. 17, 1919), File 209551, Reel 619, OGF, RG 65.
43. Acting Chief to E. M. Blanford (May 27, 1919), File 209551, Reel 619, OGF, RG 65; Report of F. W. Kelly (June 19, 1919); *Telegram* report from Agent Bryon (Sept. 6, 1919).
44. Report of N. H. Castle (Aug. 29, 1919), File 209551, Reel 619, OGF, RG 65; N. H. Castle (Oct. 2, 1919); Report of Informant Z.212 (June 22, 1920); Assistant Commissioner-General [Bureau of Immigration] to Chief [Bureau of Investigation] (July 20, 1920); *Portland Oregonian*, Oct. 16, 1920, p. 6.
45. Report of Informant 53 (Oct. 15, 1918), File 209551, Reel 619, OGF, RG 65; Report of Agent Bryon (Sept. 6, 1919); on Equi's life after prison, see Krieger, "Queen of the Bolsheviks," 68–71.

6 Internment and Urban Moral Order: Enemy Aliens and "Silk Stocking Girls"

⋆ This chapter has previously appeared as "'Enemy Aliens' and 'Silk Stocking Girls': The Class Politics of Internment in the Drive for Urban Order during World War I," *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 6 (Oct. 2007): 431–458. The version in this book appears with the permission of Cambridge University Press.

1. Bert Haney to Thomas Gregory (July 15, 1918), Vol. 32, Box 7, Mss. 1704 [Portland US Attorney], Oregon Historical Society, Portland.
2. The only study of enemy alien regulations is article length with a nationwide scope: Jörg Nagler, "Victims of the Home Front: Enemy Aliens in the United States during the First World War," in *Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars*, ed. Panikos Panayi (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1993), 191–215.

The most comprehensive survey of the war barely mentions German immigrants at all: David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). The classic survey of civil liberties struggles during the war largely ignores enemy aliens: Paul L. Murphy, *World War I and the Origins of Civil Liberties in the United States* (New York: Norton, 1979). Even a study of contemporary enemy aliens does not examine German Americans during World War I, although nearly half the volume is devoted to historical context: David Cole, *Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism* (New York: New Press, 2003). A focus on popular rather than systematic federal persecution in the ethnicity literature is evident in the classic John Higham volume, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1955), and also still in Frank Van Nuys's more recent *Americanizing the West: Race, Immigrants, and Citizenship, 1890–1930* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002). Two books focusing on German Americans are valuable resources but make crucial omissions: Frederick C. Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974) did not explore federal manuscripts or delve much into registration, tracking, or internment; Russell A. Kazal, *Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), ignores the centrality of class position in determining the fate of enemy aliens. Most of the limited work on venereal disease internment that does acknowledge class has privileged the role of the federal Commission on Training Camp Activities and ignored the primacy of local initiative: Allan M. Brandt, *No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), Chapter 2; Barbara Meil Hobson, *Uneasy Virtue: The Politics of Prostitution and the American Reform Tradition* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), Chapter 7; and Nancy K. Bristow, *Making Men Moral: Social Engineering during the Great War* (New York: NYU Press, 1996).

3. *Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States* (Washington, DC, 1918), 29–30; Candice Lewis Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 72.
4. *Annual Report of the Attorney General* [1918], 26–27; on the US anti-German focus, see Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty*; Mark E. Neely Jr., *The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 137–138.
5. Mark Thomas Connelly, *The Response to Prostitution in the Progressive Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 136; Brandt, *No Magic Bullet*, 77; Division of Venereal Diseases to Oregon Social Hygiene Society (Nov. 25, 1918), 1918–19 folder, File 235.4, Box 90, Entry 42, RG 90 [US Public Health Service], National Archives, College Park, MD.
6. Laurence F. Schmeckebier, *The Public Health Service: Its History, Activities, and Organization* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1923), 48, 232–234; Brandt, *No Magic Bullet*, 88.

7. Bristow, *Making Men Moral*, 129.
8. On the dislocation caused by the ban on a national scale, see Nagler, "Victims of the Home Front," 198–201; Clarence Reames to Thomas Gregory (June 9, 1917), Vol. 30, Box 6, Mss. 1704; Paul G. Merriam, "The 'Other Portland': A Statistical Note on Foreign-Born, 1860–1910," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 80 (Fall 1979): 266–267; E. Kimbark MacColl, *The Growth of a City: Power and Politics in Portland, Oregon, 1915–1950* (Portland, OR: Georgian Press, 1979), 143.
9. *Annual Report of the Attorney General* [1918], 32–33; "Where's Your Badge?," *Heave Together: Official Organ of the Northwest Steel Company's Employees*, Feb. 1, 1918, p. 3.
10. Elmon Geneste to Senator George Chamberlain (Jan. 7, 1918), File 124678, Reel 510, "Old German Files, 1915–20," RG 65 [Bureau of Investigation], National Archives, College Park, MD; Report of Elton Watkins (Jan. 18, 1918), File 43436, Reel 394.
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