Mental Maps in the Era of Détente and the End of the Cold War 1968–91

Edited by
Steven Casey *and*
Jonathan Wright

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

Introduction, conclusion, editorial matter and selection © Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright 2015
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2015

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-50095-3

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First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978-1-349-56657-0 ISBN 978-1-137-50096-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-50096-0

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Mental maps in the era of détente and the end of the Cold War, 1968–91 / [edited by] Steven Casey (London School of Economics and Political Science, UK), Jonathan Wright (Christ Church College, Oxford, UK).
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references.

1. Political leadership—Psychological aspects—Case studies. 2. Heads of state—Psychology—Case studies. 3. Political culture—Case studies. 4. Heads of state—Biography. 5. Cold War. 6. World politics—1945–1989. 7. World politics—1985–1995. 8. International relations—History—20th century. 9. Balance of power—History—20th century. 10. Social change—History—20th century. I. Casey, Steven. II. Wright, Jonathan, 1941–
JC330.3.M457 2015
321.0092′2—dc23 2015019261

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Acknowledgements

We would like to take this opportunity to thank successive editors at Palgrave, and for this volume Clare Mence, Emily Russell and Angharad Bishop, and all our contributors – in this volume as in the previous ones, writing from a wide variety of vantage points – for making these three studies of the 'mental maps' of some 42 outstanding political leaders of the twentieth century possible.

S.C. and J.W.

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Introduction

Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright

The final two decades of the Cold War were marked by profound, and ultimately dramatic, change. The simple bipolarity of the late 1940s had long since been superseded by a complex configuration of power, especially as the process of decolonization created new states which either tried to remain neutral or exerted significant influence over their superpower allies. But from the late 1960s, the underlying tectonic plates of international relations underwent an even greater transformation. The two superpowers were both struggling: the United States smarting from the economic and political disruption caused by its failing war in Vietnam; the Soviet Union suffering from poor grain harvests, which were a harbinger of the more general economic problems to come. Meanwhile, the alliance blocs they had created during the first phase of the Cold War began to fray. The Americans faced an economically resurgent West Germany, ready to develop a more independent foreign policy. The Soviets clamped down hard on a Czechoslovakian bid for greater independence in 1968; a year later, they fought a major border clash with their erstwhile Chinese ally, turning the long-brewing Sino–Soviet split into something more ominous.

As the 1970s progressed, growing signs emerged that suggested that the Cold War might not be the only game in town. The 1973 Middle East war encouraged the oil-producing Arab states to join together to quadruple the price of this key staple. Soon analysts were starting to wonder whether security needed to be redefined, shifting the emphasis from military to economic power. Indeed, if the once-mighty American economy could be harmed by a group of hitherto small powers, perhaps the whole nature of international relations needed to be rethought. Some writers wanted to shift the focus away from East–West relations to the North–South divide. Others placed the accent on 'complex interdependence': the idea that state actors were no longer so dominant and that the 'low politics' of economics and social affairs were becoming as important as the 'high politics' of security and survival. That raised yet another prospect: perhaps the process of change was better described as 'globalization', the world being drawn ever more tightly together by technological advancements, from colour TV images to the growing use of computers.

How did the leaders in various key states respond to this new world? Our earlier two volumes explored the 'mental maps'—the geographic vision—of a range of pivotal figures in both the 1914–45 and 1945–68 periods. This book examines how political leaders dealt with the issue of détente and competition during the 1970s and early 1980s, followed by the era when the Cold War suddenly came to an end. Four chapters concentrate on the American and Soviet leaders who first sought to ease Cold War tensions through the process of détente and ultimately managed to bring the Cold War to a surprisingly peaceful conclusion. Other chapters assess not only leaders in Europe and the Middle East who worked to grasp the growing opportunities provided by a combination of their own strengths and superpower vulnerabilities, but also key figures from Africa, Asia and Latin America, who faced the tricky task of gaining independence, forging a new national identity and working out which ideological model presented the best chance of achieving their goals.

Between the late 1960s and early 1990s, some leaders embraced—and sought to channel, or perhaps even accelerate—the process of tumultuous change which drove international relations. Deng Xiaoping, for example, rejected Mao Zedong's notion that the outside world was an inherently hostile place and sought instead to integrate China more fully into it, eschewing as he did the notion that another world war was inevitable or even likely. Helmut Kohl, in a more limited fashion, was one of the many Western European leaders who recognized the importance of interdependence, and so placed deepening European integration at the heart of his mental map, including steps towards a monetary union. And then there was Mikhail Gorbachev, whose 'new thinking' ultimately helped to transform international politics, albeit at the expense of the Soviet Union's continued existence. As Archie Brown shows, in Gorbachev's rapidly evolving mental map, a strong emphasis was placed on 'equal rights and non-interference', while he also insisted that 'a policy of force in all its forms has historically outlived itself '.

Yet, perhaps an equally striking theme of the chapters that follow is the extent to which leaders during this era either ignored or failed to recognize the major changes taking place. This was certainly the case in Moscow and Washington until the mid-1980s. Take Leonid Brezhnev. According to Vladislav Zubok, the Soviet leader focused first and foremost on establishing and maintaining his country's position as a great power. He gave little thought to notions like interdependence, seeing the world in bipolar terms as a zero-sum game. He was willing to sit down and talk with the Americans, but largely because the Soviet Union now possessed a rough parity of nuclear weapons and so could negotiate from a position of equality, if not strength. On the other side, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger fretted that the Vietnam War had weakened American power. They also viewed the world as more of a tripolar game, hoping that an opening to China would pressure the Soviets into making concessions as the détente talks progressed. Yet, as Jussi

M. Hanhimäki shows, both men retained a very traditional view of international politics. Nixon possessed 'a mind that viewed international politics as a top-down game that leaders played; when Kissinger wrote about countries and their diplomacy he associated with those in power: the statesmen and diplomats... The overall emphasis on the "great powers" ', Hanhimäki argues, 'blinded Nixon and Kissinger to the specific local circumstances that determined the course of the numerous regional conflicts the administration encountered.'

That these leaders neglected the underlying processes of change is hardly surprising, for their mental maps had been forged largely during the era of the Second World War and then the most frigid phase of the Cold War. Brezhnev's belief that the Soviet Union needed, at all costs, to remain a great power flowed naturally from his first-hand experiences during the searing Nazi invasion. Nixon's view of the world was forged during the 1940s and 1950s, when he travelled extensively first as a congressman and later as vice president, witnessing problems that, he believed, US power could rectify. Reagan likewise, as Luis da Vinha emphasizes, had a mental map that, while forged partly by his Midwestern upbringing, leaned heavily on a deeply hostile image of the Soviet Union developed during the first phase of the Cold War, when he had come of age politically.

At the same time, all these leaders also gleaned from their earlier experiences a sense that negotiation was possible, and, in the right context, desirable. During his time as general secretary, Brezhnev constantly referred back to his detestation of wars of conquest, such as that unleashed by Hitler, emphasizing that he wished to be remembered as a peacemaker. Nixon, from a somewhat different experience, recalled the many times when, as vice president during the 1950s, his extensive globetrotting had afforded him the chance to sit down and discuss sensitive issues with other world leaders. Reagan, meanwhile, was preoccupied with the horror of the nuclear age unleashed at the start of the Cold War, from which sprang his determination to work for a post-nuclear world, even if that meant negotiating with the 'evil' Soviet empire.

The early Cold War also proved a significant learning experience for leaders of smaller powers, although for them the lessons tended to be different from those operating in Moscow or Washington. Even during the first 20 years of the Cold War, bipolarity was not the only characteristic of the international system. Decolonization was vitally important, too. And as new states gained their independence, many sought to exert a measure of neutrality, even freedom, from the two main superpowers. This process was particularly important for budding African leaders. As Emma Hunter points out in her chapter on Julius Nyerere, the Tanzanian president 'came of age in the era of decolonization and the early days of the Cold War'. Central to his mental map was not only 'the cause of liberation from colonial rule', but also the need for 'new forms of Afro–Asian solidarity encapsulated in the 1955 Bandung conference, when newly independent nations gathered in

Indonesia to attempt to defend their newly won freedom through creating a third force in international affairs'. Although he did not come to power until after the end of the Cold War, Nelson Mandela was from a similar generation. According to Rita Barnard and Monica Popescu, 'the years of his most serious study of world politics took place in the post-Bandung moment, in which revolutionary change still seemed a possibility'. As a result, Mandela's mental map

> cannot be grasped without bearing in mind the geopolitical configuration that held sway at the time of his most extensive journey before his imprisonment: his 1962 trip to various newly independent African states, only a few years after Bandung, with the Cuban and Algerian revolutions and Nasser's takeover in Egypt still in the very recent past.

Other leaders, meanwhile, were exposed to a particularly transformative moment in their early political careers, which thereafter overshadowed their mental map. For Willy Brandt, as Jonathan Wright describes, one such moment was the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which prodded him towards finding 'a new policy to soften the division of Europe'. For King Hussein of Jordan, it was the 1967 Six Days' War, which for the next three decades made him determined to 'prevent Israel from using the outcome of the war permanently to redraw the map of the region'. For Václav Havel, it was the 1968 Prague spring, which was the event 'that made him a man of politics' and shaped his attitude towards the Soviet Union.

Many of the leaders covered in the pages that follow also drew on their very earliest experiences. Only one was born to rule: King Hussein of Jordan, who, as Nigel Ashton explains, had inherited a 'dynastic mission' that underpinned his mental map. Many others worked their way up from humble, often agrarian, beginnings. In fact, a surprising number of the leaders covered in this volume shared a similar formative experience. Raised in rural backwaters, they sought at an early age to broaden their horizons. Thus Ceaușescu, as Eliza Gheorghe emphasizes, was born to a poor peasant family in southern Romania, headed to Bucharest, where he became a shoemaker's apprentice and convert to communism; Mandela, who grew up knowing 'a rural life of stick-fighting, herding cattle, listening to the stories and ruminations of elders', trekked to Johannesburg, where 'a poor peasant could transform himself into a wealthy sophisticate'; Soeharto similarly, as David Jenkins shows, hailed from a poor village in Central Java, where rapid population expansion had left the population close to the poverty line but suddenly moved to a court city 50 miles away, where he received a better, if still limited, education compared to that which his rural village had to offer.

For a number of leaders, this move to a local town or city was only the first step in a series of travels that would further their geographical education. Deng Xiaoping was a good example. Unlike those leaders born in

rural poverty, he enjoyed the privileges of a landlord upbringing, before he too branched out, first to the nearest major city and then to Europe, to Paris and Moscow during the interwar period. As Yafeng Xia shows, Deng subsequently became an inveterate traveller—especially compared to Mao Zedong, who made only two trips outside China. Significantly, it was a trait he shared with Gorbachev. As Archie Brown points out, Gorbachev not only travelled widely during the 1970s as part of official Soviet delegations, but also—and much more unusually—as a tourist. Perhaps these extensive travels sparked or at least reinforced their natural curiosity and appetite for new ideas. While Deng embraced, rather than spurned, external influences on Chinese development, Gorbachev was struck by how well the civil societies and polities of Western Europe functioned, compared to his own system.

Mental maps, though, did not just derive from personal experience. Although the early period of détente saw leaders like Brezhnev and Nixon try to de-emphasize the role of ideology in the Cold War, they were never entirely successful. In both Moscow and Washington suspicion of the other's ideology, combined with a firm belief in their own cause, continued to underpin the thinking. Elsewhere, leaders of smaller powers used ideology both to explain their position in the international system and as a map to chart a new, and hopefully better, future. Hence, while someone like Soeharto was driven partly by an instinctive anticommunism, Salvador Allende in Chile, as Victor Figueroa-Clark explains, used a non-doctrinaire socialism to understand 'the role of foreign capital in Chile, in particular the imperialistic role of the region's hegemonic power, the United States'. Havel is also an interesting case, an intellectual with a central European vision from the city of Prague, whose writings on morality, meaning and truth were directed, as Kieran Williams explains, not simply against the Soviet oppression from which he suffered directly but also to deficiencies in Western societies.

While this volume ends with end of the Cold War itself, the legacy of that era continues to linger. Sometimes, this is because the contested records of leaders like Brezhnev, Reagan, Mandela and even Ceaușescu continue to remain at the heart of their country's political discourse. Yet because, as we have seen, mental maps often derive from a leader's formative experience, there tends to be a time lag in adjusting to a new context. Just as those in power during the 1970s and 1980s had their views moulded in part by an earlier period, so many current leaders have been shaped by what happened in the latter phase of the Cold War. This book sheds light on that pivotal time.

1
'Do not think I am soft . . .': Leonid Brezhnev

Vladislav Zubok

Leonid Brezhnev stood at the helm of the Soviet Union when that country was at the peak of its power. The summits where Brezhnev negotiated with US presidents and other Western leaders were milestones of world diplomacy. Yet when Brezhnev died in November 1982 at the age of 75, there was not a comprehensive biography of the man. And so it has remained since. Simply put, Brezhnev's personality has failed to attract historians. Russian historian Dmitry Volkogonov in his essay on Brezhnev portrayed him as the blandest and most one-dimensional of all Soviet leaders, to whom he attributed 'the psychology of a middle-rank party bureaucrat – vainglorious, cautious, conservative personality'. A few ripples of revisionism have perturbed the quiet pond of historiography about his years: historians began to argue that 'early' Brezhnev was an energetic and effective leader, promoted a set of strategic policies in domestic and foreign affairs, and deserves more than a footnote in the study of Soviet leadership. Still, even though the Brezhnev years are better researched, the personality is not.[1]

In 2011 the news came that the Russian archives had declassified the 'working notes' that Brezhnev regularly took from 1937 until his death. This generated some excitement among researchers, yet the notes turned out to be much less than a personal diary. Only a few determined scholars surmised that those notes could offer a good insight into Brezhnev's personality, inner thoughts and beliefs. Overall, historians of all stripes – from Russian nationalists to Western liberals – continue to treat Brezhnev as a disappointing figure.

Meanwhile, 20 years after his death Leonid Brezhnev became surprisingly popular among common Russians. Political sociologists explain this phenomenon by the contrast between the 1970s, marked by stability and modest but predictable living standards, and the 1990s – with the disappearance of old social certainties and disastrous collapse of median incomes. Brezhnev's conservative and paternalistic style, his governing principles – disparaged by historians – remained much closer to the masses in Russia than Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's political liberalization and reformism. Russian

sociologist Yuri Levada attributed Brezhnev's popularity to the widespread phenomenon of 'Soviet person' or *Homo Sovieticus* – the persistent mindset typical of millions of Soviet citizens. This 'Soviet person' above all is not a liberal subject. He or she denies individual responsibility in favour of state paternalism, order and predictability. He or she not only accepts all benefits that trickle down from above as given, but also obeys and adapts to coercive mechanisms, while remaining indifferent to the concept of civic and political freedoms. This mindset, Levada discovered, remained remarkably persistent and even resurgent in the post-Soviet years, despite radical changes in economic and social conditions, freedom of emigration and access to information.[2]

In my earlier writings, I argued that Brezhnev's personal beliefs and commitments contributed much more to the formation of Soviet foreign policy than contemporaries and political scientists previously surmised. In this chapter I want to approach Brezhnev's personal beliefs more conceptually. Levada's concept of 'Soviet person' appears to be a good starting point for exploration of Brezhnev's mental map.

'Soviet Person' Analysed

Brezhnev was born in 1906 in the Russian empire. He came from a family of industrial workers, former peasants from the Kursk region who moved in search of jobs to the southern region of the Russian empire, so-called 'New Russia' (now Ukraine). In his early documents Brezhnev put himself down as 'Ukrainian', but later, after he moved to Moscow he changed his identity to 'Russian'. This was natural for people with a loose 'Russian' identity, but it was also a prudent choice: in the 1920s 'Ukrainians' enjoyed preferences in the Bolshevik national taxonomy, while after the 1930s the balance became reversed in favour of 'Russians'. The territory of 'New Russia' (*Novorossiia*) that became part of Soviet Ukraine was Brezhnev's small homeland; his contemporaries viewed his character as stereotypically 'southern Russian' – cheerful and gregarious. Also culturally, Brezhnev never fully separated himself from Russian peasantry. He cared about peasants and preserved peasant family values.

His education was grossly insufficient: a few classes of high school, a few years at the land–water technical school and night classes at the agricultural machine-building college. Yet every time he dropped his studies. As a result, his transformation into 'Soviet person' happened through the Komsomol, the communist youth association he joined at the age of 17. In the 1920s the Komsomol activists participated in all Soviet experiments. Young Brezhnev went to endless political meetings, read revolutionary poetry in an amateur theatre studio ('Blue Blouse') and probably helped to disrupt religious services and denounce 'class enemies'. He was vivacious and artistic, and probably a party career prevented him from making a career on 'the cultural front'.

Instead, the party chose him, along with other *vydivizhentsy* (affirmative-action cadres) with a proletarian background, for political propaganda work. A party member since 1931, he was lucky during the Great Terror and soon rose to prominent positions in the Dnepropetrovsk Region of the Ukrainian SSR.

The Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System interviewed in the early 1950s thousands of Soviet refugees who ended up in the West. When asked about the party members, people spoke about two types: the minority of 'believers' and the majority of 'non-believers'. The latter viewed the communist party not through ideological lenses, but rather as the career escalator, bringing economic opportunities and privileges.[3] Brezhnev definitely belonged to the latter category. Before the abolition of serfdom, Russian peasants knew that their landlords could do anything to them, yet at the same time they also had to take care of them. Brezhnev, grandson of peasants, transferred this psychology from the landlord to the party-state. He remembered that the party career lifted him from poverty and liberated from harsh physical labour. He always viewed the party apparatus as a supreme trade union that should ensure a better life for its members. When he hired foreign policy assistant Alexandrov-Agentov, he carefully inquired as to his salary and living conditions. Even when he forced people out, Brezhnev made sure they would have an adequate pension, good housing, privileged food supplies and other perks.[4]

The war with Germany in 1941–45 completed his transformation into a 'Soviet man'. This war became know as Great Patriotic War, and British historian Geoffrey Hosking aptly wrote that in those years '"Russianness" crystallized...as an amalgam of ethnic and imperial, *russkii*, *rossiiskii* and *sovetskii* elements.' Hosking also wrote that the intensity of this constellation was 'as never before – and indeed never subsequently'.[5] In other words, 'Soviet person' for the first time acquired strong national identity. Brezhnev went to war in June 1941, when he experienced some of the worst calamities of retreat, defeat and suicidal defence. Then he marched westward with the Soviet army from Northern Caucasus to the Carpathian mountain range in Slovakia. From now on, the idea of the USSR as a great power became the focus of Brezhnev's patriotic identity. The 39-year-old Colonel Brezhnev proudly represented the 'Second Ukrainian Front' (group of armies) in the victory parade in Moscow in June 1945. Even after revelations of Stalin's crimes, Brezhnev could never suppress his respect and admiration for the Generalissimo, the leader and 'organizer' of Soviet war victory, as well as a world statesman who determined the future of Europe and Asia together with Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. The idea of great power justified his support of Soviet militarism. For the rest of his life, Brezhnev remained convinced, with peasant tenacity, that one cannot prepare enough for the Homeland's defence.[6]

A flipside of this pride in the Soviet Union's great power was vulnerability, the search for respect and recognition. Henry Kissinger noticed this in his

memoirs, and ascribed Brezhnev's behaviour to historic Russian insecurity.[7] With even greater reason this behaviour can be attributed to Soviet national identity, with its contradictions. Indeed, Brezhnev felt at first insecure in the international arena. But, in contrast to Khrushchev, whose lack of assurance and search for recognition translated into bouts of revolutionary diplomacy and crisis-mongering, Brezhnev would transform the urges of his national identity into a quest for détente.

Communist ideology played an important role in his mental map, yet indirectly, not as a set of ideas and ideological beliefs. Brezhnev was not a man of ideas. Brezhnev did not like reading, and probably never finished or understood any of Marxist-Leninist 'classical' texts. In his narrow circle he confessed that he 'hated' Soviet 'ideological chattering' and called propaganda work – that took up a considerable part of his early party career – 'gibberish'.[8] With some degree of imagination, one can suggest that Brezhnev treated ideology as a force of nature, something beyond his comprehension yet that should be treated with extreme caution. He venerated Lenin as the source of supreme ideological wisdom, and asked Secretary for Ideology Mikhail Suslov and personal speechwriters to supply appropriate Lenin quotations for all his speeches. His use of ideological language increased in the spheres of policy-making about which Brezhnev knew less when he came to power, and this included foreign policy.

He knew how to use the immense power at his disposal. 'Do not think that I am soft', he said to his foreign policy assistant, even before he became the General Secretary. 'If necessary, I can strike so hard that, whatever happens to the person I would strike, I would remain sick myself for three days.' Brezhnev removed his potential rivals 'gently', and even found jobs for them in provincial bureaucracy or embassies in Africa. He was also a leader by consensus: he led from behind, by talking, cajoling and convincing – never by intimidation and threats. Indeed, he preferred to use his charm and actors' skill to get what he wanted. And he did not spend his political capital on the issues that did not concern him personally or the problems that could only hurt his reputation and cause trouble. In contrast to Khrushchev who moved forward like a tank, crushing any obstacles before him, Brezhnev could wait patiently and deal with peripheral issues – like the river that flows around obstacles. On issues of personal priority, however, he was capable of impressive political energy and skill.[9]

Levada wrote that for the 'Soviet person' the most important value was stability. The yearning for stability was shared by all segments of Soviet society. Amir Weiner astutely called this phenomenon 'Retiring Revolution',[10] and Brezhnev was an ideal leader embodying this value. Revolutionary phraseology and promises, associated with the national celebration of Lenin's and October's centennials, no longer entailed practices of revolutionary modernization and brutal social engineering – they just masked the conservative preferences of Brezhnev, Soviet nomenklatura and society at large. Experienced apparatchiks detected already in 1967 that Brezhnev had a 'fear

of reforms' and 'fear of the past'. He did not have new ideas and wanted to avoid new shocks. Stability reigned in Brezhnev's selection of cadres: he surrounded himself with his buddies. Soon people began to joke that Russian history should be divided into three periods: the pre-Petrine, the Petrine and the Dnepropetrine – after Brezhnev's Dnepropetrovsk 'gang'. This led to greater corruption, social cynicism and mafia-like patrimonialism.[11]

When Brezhnev was a middle-ranking official, his mental map of the 'Soviet person' was coherent, impervious to external influences and probably very comforting psychologically.[12] He was convinced that the Soviet system was the best possible system and that the Soviet Union was entitled to be a world power. This coherence, however, began to show strains when Brezhnev rose to the leadership and began to confront the numerous contradictions harbouring in the Soviet system. His beliefs and experience could not provide him systemic or even acceptable solutions. Ultimately, the stress of contradictory realities overwhelmed him and contributed to his stress, illness and political degradation.

Missiles versus Bread

The mid-career of Brezhnev in the late 1950s to early 1960s proceeded, thanks to Nikita Khrushchev's patronage, in two different sectors of Soviet economy: the military-industrial complex and agriculture. In the former sector, Khrushchev entrusted Brezhnev to supervise the most sensitive programmes: the development and construction of intercontinental missiles and nuclear weapons, and the space industry. Khrushchev also made him a top emissary to direct the epic 'Virgin Lands', an agricultural development programme in Kazakhstan. Both national problems – defence and food – preoccupied him with equal intensity. For years he would seek a difficult balance between them.

Brezhnev, in contrast to Stalin, felt empathy with the plight of Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian peasants, devastated by the collectivization, war and ruinous state taxes. He carried out the 'second emancipation' of the peasantry: in 1974 the collective farmers got the right to receive internal passports and therefore freedom to move around the country and to the cities. Also under Brezhnev, collectivized peasants began to receive benefits from the Soviet welfare system, previously accorded only to urbanites, which included the universal pension system. Although he quietly abandoned Khrushchev's utopian slogans of 'construction of communism in twenty years', he remained determined to give the Soviet people 'a good life' as he understood it. He devoted great energy to this goal: more state-paid housing was constructed and distributed during Brezhnev's rule than during the rest of Soviet history. Brezhnev's 'good life' meant above all guaranteed jobs, fixed minimal prices on basic goods and a sharp decline in practices of punishment and coercion.[13]

Economist James Millar called Brezhnev's social-economic policy a 'Little Deal'.[14] In reality, tens of millions of Soviet people became beneficiaries of the welfare state. And Brezhnev was proud of this achievement. He wrote repeatedly in his diary: 'People's mood is good' (*настроение у народа хорошее*). Indeed, between 1965 and 1975 the majority of Soviet citizens bought refrigerators, television sets and other durable goods, became consumers of commodified culture and greatly improved their diet.[15] The problem of food concerned Brezhnev constantly. While Stalin's taboo on importing wheat had already been broken in 1963, under Brezhnev's tenure the Soviet economy became heavily dependent on the import of wheat. In 1972 a major crisis struck: because of a terrible drought the Soviet Union suddenly lacked tens of thousands of tons of wheat.[16] In response Brezhnev used state reserves of grain and also considerable amounts of currency and gold reserves to buy a record amount of wheat from the United States, Argentina and Canada. Some 90,000 military trucks were mobilized to collect and distribute grain. Brezhnev later said, 'How we managed to do it, I do not know!'[17]

Typically, Brezhnev did not see any systemic solution for constant problems that hobbled the Soviet economy. He expected people to respond to the 'Little Deal' with a better work ethic and greater public activity. In this, he was sorely disappointed. Millions of people in the 1970s acted as 'Soviet persons' – they staunchly refused to see any connection between state munificence and their labour results, duties and responsibilities. And they increasingly accepted the Soviet economy as an 'economy of gifts' distributed from above or taken in the form of petty thefts and bribes. In 1969 Brezhnev already lamented that the growth of state social programmes did not correspond with the growth of productivity and the efficiency of economic performance. All this generated hidden inflation, and consumer goods began to disappear from the shelves of Soviet stores, creating long lines, discontent and more corruption. As the real value of the ruble dropped, the 'Soviet person' in the lower ranks of the societal pyramid stopped responding to economic incentives from above. Brezhnev also began to distribute symbolic awards – decorations and medals. This practice led quickly to devaluation of these awards as well. The General Secretary himself became the prime example of this devaluation: he received more medals than all other Soviet leaders combined. People laughed at Brezhnev's passion for decorating his chest and joked, 'They pretend they pay us, we pretend we work.'[18]

Brezhnev and Détente

At the start of his tenure Brezhnev confessed to his foreign policy assistant, Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, that he had never dealt with foreign policy and knew nothing of it. In the early 1960s Brezhnev performed largely ritual

diplomatic functions as the head of the Supreme Soviet, including leading Soviet delegations to various countries of Africa and Asia; he also participated in Khrushchev's negotiations with foreign leaders.[19] His mental map of the world was rigid. At its core was the belief in the Soviet Union as a great power. Brezhnev always recognized that the Soviet Union was the heir to 'great Russia', an enormous country spanning across Europe and Asia. As a great power, he believed, the Soviet Union should never make any territorial concessions under pressure – it was inadmissible sign of weakness. After the Sino–Soviet armed conflict around the islands on the Ussuri river in 1969 Brezhnev wrote in his diary, 'Our line – not to concede our territories.'[20] This guided him in his talks with Japan whose Foreign Ministry demanded the return of four disputed islands as a precondition for economic cooperation. Brezhnev was interested in settling this issue through negotiations, yet the idea of returning the islands to Japan was against his principles.[21]

The Soviet Union, Brezhnev believed, had to remain a military superpower at any cost. During the first five years of Brezhnev's leadership the Soviet Union undertook a colossal programme that allowed it to reach strategic parity with the United States – the goal that eluded Khrushchev. Brezhnev knew first hand about Soviet thermonuclear and missile capabilities: he looked into their technical details and was present at many tests. Yet recent evidence also corroborates that Brezhnev, like his other militarist friends, was highly insecure about Soviet strategic power – he knew that the technological and scientific potential of the United States was superior. This insecurity fed unconstrained militarism. Brezhnev's trusted entourage included Dmitry Ustinov and Andrei Grechko, who constantly pushed for more nuclear warheads, missiles, nuclear submarines, bombers and tanks. As the commander-in-chief and the head of the Defence Council, Brezhnev never said no to any military production and deployment proposal.[22]

Brezhnev's idea of peace was universal, but also very territorial. He believed that the Soviet Union was entitled to a buffer of 'fraternal states' along its frontiers. Every summer all leaders of the communist bloc, as well as the leaders of foreign communist parties, came to the party resorts in Crimea and shared their vacation with Brezhnev. This was the tradition established by Stalin and Khrushchev, but it was more than just a tradition. Just as Brezhnev called every republican and regional party secretary to inquire about his health and harvest, he called on the leaders of the 'fraternal' states, from East Germany to Bulgaria, to check on stability in every part of the socialist camp. For Brezhnev the socialist camp was an extension of the Soviet Union, synonymous with 'the zone of peace'. The frontiers of this zone could not be rolled back: a crucial moment for Brezhnev in this respect was the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968. After months of agonizing over it, the General Secretary sanctioned the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia – backed by some other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization – to prevent 'the loss' of the crucial part of

the socialist camp. The West began to speak about the 'Brezhnev Doctrine'. Trade, economic interdependence, tourism and other forms of transnational consolidation of the camp were subordinate to Brezhnev's preoccupation with borders and frontiers. This preoccupation about territorial integrity and the 'unshakable frontiers' of the Soviet camp – as a factor of international stability and peace – was a major reason behind Brezhnev's support of the Helsinki process in 1973–75.[23]

Brezhnev believed in the principle of 'revolutionary internationalist duty' with regard to 'progressive regimes' in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was not just a rhetorical ritual performed during his meetings with pro-Soviet leaders of the Third World.[24] Many sources demonstrate that Brezhnev regarded 'internationalist duty' through the prism of a revolutionary-imperial paradigm that had emerged in Lenin's time.[25] For all his conservative domestic orientation, he was not ready to repudiate the revolutionary aspect of Soviet foreign policy.[26] One of his advisers recalled he could not afford 'to do something "un-Marxist" such as ignoring the Leninist legacy of assistance to the movements of national liberation. The whole world was watching him' – including the leaders of other communist parties and hostile critics in communist China.[27] After the Six Day War of 1967 he wrote in his diary that the Arab defeat had big consequences, because it 'may lead to the loss of the revolutionary impact of the USSR in the countries of the Third World for a long time'.[28] Many ties with Egypt and Syria, as well as other 'progressive' Arab regimes, largely determined Brezhnev's outlook on the issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

The imperial component of the Soviet foreign policy paradigm, pregnant with geopolitics, was no less important. Brezhnev viewed Soviet assistance to North Vietnam or Egypt as a forward-based defence of 'unshakeable frontiers'. At the communist plenary meeting in Moscow in December 1969 he acknowledged that this assistance cost the Soviet economy dearly, yet confirmed that it was not only about 'revolutionary international duty': it

> concerned the state interests of our country, and the national interests of the Soviet people. If we had not helped [the Democratic Republic of Vietnam] to rebuff the imperialist encroachments in South-East Asia and the Middle East, this would have inspired the Americans and their allies to other aggressive actions somewhere closer to our borders . . . If we had not disrupted the plans of counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia, NATO troops would soon end up immediately at our Western borders.[29]

Brezhnev's considerations sounded similar to Eisenhower's 'falling domino' doctrine – they linked the projected 'loss' of allies to security. This testifies to how much Brezhnev's mental map, like those of many other senior political and military leaders, was shaped by the bipolar structure of the Cold War and its zero-sum-game psychology. As the leader of the 'socialist world', Brezhnev

felt it was his duty to prevent a defeat for the 'progressive forces' around the world. This assistance under Brezhnev acquired a predominantly militarized character – supplies of arms and military training. Still, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was an exception that proved the rule: he strongly preferred to avoid any bloodshed, to use 'cautious, skilful tactical moves' rather than naked force.[30]

Had Brezhnev followed only these guidelines in his foreign policy, he would have been a typical representative of the Soviet nomenklatura, where hard-liners remained predominant. Yet instead he chose to pursue détente with Western countries. He said to his speechwriters in October 1971, 'Today in our talks with the largest states of the West we aim at agreement, not at confrontation.' One senior functionary recalled him saying in 1974, 'We need to live thirty more years without war.'[31] His desire to be a peacemaker came from the peasant wisdom of his father. Brezhnev liked to tell everyone, from Andrei Sakharov to Henry Kissinger, about one particular conversation he had with his father at the beginning of the Second World War. When the war was engulfing Europe, his father told him that Hitler and his cronies should be hanged on the highest mountain in the world, for everyone to see – so that nobody in the future would be tempted to trigger wars. When the Nuremberg Trials subsequently condemned the captured Nazi leaders and hanged some of them, Brezhnev was struck by his father's prophetic vision. Brezhnev's assistants and interpreters knew this story by heart and began to call it 'the Sermon on the Mount'. At the Soviet–American summit of May 1972 Brezhnev suggested that Nixon and himself should conclude an agreement, directed against any third country that would act aggressively. The Americans interpreted it as a crude attempt to undermine NATO. In fact, it was a personal dream of the General Secretary inspired by his father's advice.[32]

Another source of Brezhnev's peace-making came from his pragmatic need to combine missiles and bread. In Brezhnev's mind, 'The Sermon on the Mount' was in harmony with his conviction that the Soviet Union had to have strategic parity with the United States. He wanted – like Ronald Reagan would do in the 1980s – to build up military strength in order to sit down and negotiate with the adversary. Brezhnev did not fear nuclear Armageddon: he believed that Soviet retaliatory capabilities would prevent a nuclear attack. At the same time he was concerned by the rising costs of the arms race, and he realized that the Soviet Union had no capacity to win this race. The Soviet budget and economy could not afford a further rise of allocations to the Soviet military and the military-industrial complex. Brezhnev said to Minister of Defence Andrei Grechko at the crucial meeting in May 1972 before the summit with Nixon, 'If we make no concessions, the nuclear arms race will go further. Can you give me, the Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces, a firm guarantee that in such a situation we will get superiority over the United States and the correlation of forces will become more

advantageous to us?' Grechko, who staunchly resisted any arms limitation agreements with 'imperialists', could not give such a guarantee. Brezhnev concluded, 'Then what is wrong? Why should we continue to exhaust our economy, increase military expenses?'[33] This was a strong argument that the Soviet military could not ignore.

Brezhnev's constant concern about the Soviet economy and the 'social contract' with the Soviet people made him acutely aware of painful choices between missiles and bread. Brezhnev could not resolve this dilemma domestically: he did not want to roll back the 'social contract'– and he shared fears that the military would be outraced. This increased in his eyes the attraction of reaching an agreement with the United States. His anguish about insufficient progress in stopping the arms race came through in Brezhnev's first meetings with Kissinger and Nixon in 1972 in Moscow. And Brezhnev expressed it most powerfully during his last 'healthy' summit – in Vladivostok in 1974 with President Gerald Ford. The Soviet leader complained that the Soviet Union and the United States haggled too much over details and could not impose a real limitation on the development of new armaments. 'In fact we have been spurring the arms race further and further', he explained.

> Tomorrow science can present us with inventions we cannot even imagine today, and I just don't know how much farther we can go in building up so-called security . . . The people don't know all this, otherwise they would really have given us hell. We are spending billions on all these things, billions that would be much better spent for the benefit of the people.[34]

Yet another powerful impulse to détente came from Brezhnev's idea of the 'Soviet person'. Stability and relaxation became the unspoken motto of his foreign policy as well as his domestic course. The Soviet word for *détente* connotes 'a relaxation of tension', and this is what Brezhnev sought to pursue in all his policies. One should note that, personally, Brezhnev loathed confrontation and tension. He made his career by trying to please people, to use his charm and artistic talents. His reaction to Khrushchev's brinkmanship experiments was highly negative. 'We almost slipped into a nuclear war! And what effort did it cost us to pull ourselves out of this, to make the world believe that we really want peace!'[35] In Brezhnev's mind 'relaxation of tension' meant above all building up a network of trust with top foreign leaders, especially the leaders of major Western countries. He was a tireless networker in domestic politics, spending hours bantering with the party chiefs of Soviet republics and regions. He did the same with the leaders of Soviet satellite countries – hosting them in Crimean resorts. And he tried to do the same in his 'backchannel' correspondence with foreign leaders and during summits with them. Brezhnev's summitry was remarkably similar to

his sessions with communist 'comrades': when hard work ended, 'relaxation' began. The host used his charm and endless stream of jokes, vodka flowed freely and Western leaders, including Willy Brandt and Richard Nixon, had to endure the consequences of Brezhnev's hospitality.

When healthy, Brezhnev was a very effective summiteer, in contrast to his predecessor. Khrushchev never respected diplomacy, publicly mocked Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko for his dogged patience in negotiations, and disrupted summits with eccentric and quixotic behaviour. Brezhnev had great respect of Gromyko's diplomatic talents. When Soviet diplomats and arms-control experts prepared agreements for a summit, Brezhnev threw his political weight behind these agreements in the Politburo and negotiated with powerful domestic lobbies, above all with the military. He read lengthy briefing papers. And he stayed surprisingly focused, prepared and articulate in front of his foreign interlocutors. In November 1974, reeling from Nixon's resignation, Brezhnev immediately sought to engage his successor Gerald Ford. During the summit with Ford, he did something extraordinary for his style of leadership. In order to achieve an agreement on the limitation of strategic missiles (SALT-2), he went outside the Soviet position for negotiations agreed by the Politburo. He made a phone call to Minister of Defence Grechko, waking him during the night, and after a very heated conversation overcame his resistance. Brezhnev paid dearly for this agreement: at the end of the summit he collapsed, and his health never fully recovered. In October 1975, an international adviser at the Central Committee remarked, 'Brezhnev took upon himself the whole business of peace and exhausted himself.'[36]

More Luck Than Brains?

In Brezhnev's mental map the United States and West Germany occupied a place of absolute privilege: relationships with both were pivotal for Soviet security and for Soviet relationship with the world. Brezhnev associated West Germany with the trauma of the Great Patriotic War and the unsolved issue of European borders, while the United States had a strategic capacity to destroy the USSR. Brezhnev was initially very lucky in dealing with the leadership of both countries. In West Germany, Social Democrat Willy Brandt reversed his country's foreign policy, choosing détente, accepting de facto the division of the country, and giving up on the eastern German territories lost to Poland and the Soviet Union. Brandt's courageous and visionary *Ostpolitik* helped Brezhnev to overcome political and psychological hurdles in promoting the course of détente. With Brandt's help, he could do so without jeopardizing the frontiers of the Soviet camp and the interests of the GDR and Poland. He could also present to the Soviet people the image of a 'new' West Germany – not militarist and chauvinist as it appeared to Soviet citizens during the previous decades.

In human terms, Brezhnev was fortunate to deal with Brandt as his first real partner in the West. The Soviet leader, the man with a terrible experience of the Great Patriotic War, grew to like Brandt as 'a man of crystal integrity, sincerely peace-loving and with firm antifascist convictions who not only hated Nazism, but fought against it during the war'. Summits with Brandt helped Brezhnev to build up his personal confidence in international summitry. His national pride and sense of inferiority – always lurking in the 'Soviet person' – retreated in 'the light and joyous spirit of mutual affection and trust' that developed between him and the German chancellor. The Crimean summit in September 1971 between Brandt and Brezhnev was a breakthrough and a novel experience for Brezhnev. For the first time since the Grand Alliance, a leader of a major capitalist country, above all Germany, became a partner of the Soviet leader. Moreover, he became Brezhnev's 'friend'.[37] The Soviet–German rapprochement was a spectacular success of Brezhnev's foreign policy, and this success boosted his personal motivation to engage in another détente enterprise – personal diplomacy with Nixon and Kissinger.

In the United States, the White House faced severe domestic pressures and wanted Soviet assistance to disengage from Indo-China. This made Nixon and his national security adviser Kissinger keenly interested in reaching agreements with the Kremlin. Moreover, the Nixon–Kissinger diplomacy broke with moralist, value-based Wilsonian tradition; the American leadership adopted a 'realist' approach to the USSR – acknowledged 'parity' between the two superpowers, overlooked Soviet problems with human rights and stopped questioning Soviet presence in Eastern Europe.[38] This was of enormous significance for Brezhnev. The General Secretary firmly believed that the two superpowers could reach a truce in the Cold War only on the basis of equality, equal power and respect for mutual spheres of interests. Even more than Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, the new course of détente by Nixon and Kissinger meant that Brezhnev could achieve full international legitimacy and stability of the Soviet camp, a triumph of the policy of 'peaceful coexistence'.

Brezhnev was pleased and flattered when Nixon, on the advice of the Soviet ambassador in Washington, addressed the General Secretary personally in his 'backchannel' message, sent behind the back of the State Department. The Soviet leader made preparations for the US–Soviet summit his personal priority. He had to overcome considerable political obstacles: highly negative reaction in the Soviet Union to the US savage bombing of North Vietnam and Kampuchea, the US–China rapprochement with its obvious anti-Soviet goals, the US-inspired coup against Salvador Allende in Chile, the military demarches of Washington during the Indo–Pakistani war, to mention just the most obvious. What helped him step over those issues was Nixon's willingness to recognize 'equal security' as the basis of the superpowers' relations. This, and not fear of a possible US–Chinese partnership

(as Kissinger assumed) was the main reason why Brezhnev did not cancel the summit with Nixon, despite the demands of his hardline colleagues. For Nixon and Kissinger the 'equal security' principle was a tactical and rhetorical concession. In Brezhnev's eyes, it was a huge gain that overshadowed all negative factors in Soviet–US relations. The 'Soviet person' in Brezhnev, who earned respect and recognition, responded enthusiastically. He, who had been rather cautious about Nixon as an ardent anti-communist, began to demonstrate euphoric expectations and emotional openness that startled Americans.

Also the Soviet Union, despite its official designation of the United States as 'the main enemy', did not have a strong political culture of anti-Americanism, a well-defined enemy image of the United States. American society evoked in Brezhnev, as well as other 'Soviet persons', contradictory push-and-pull feelings. Brezhnev was convinced that 'American imperialism' was powerful, sly and responding only to power and money. He was indignant and emotional when discussing US military activities in Vietnam, the US blockade of Cuba, American 'shenanigans' against Soviet interests in the Middle East and particularly US attempts to involve China in the anti-Soviet alliance. At the same time he remembered Americans as allies in the Great Patriotic War, and he was fascinated by US material civilization, especially cars and Hollywood. Brezhnev hugging celebrity actor Chuck Connors and playing with a toy six-shooter and a cowboy belt, a gift from Nixon, was what many other 'Soviet persons' would do. He envied, respected and idealized America, sought to find flaws with it, and ultimately never could understand how the US economy and society worked.[39]

Above all, Brezhnev firmly believed that the two leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, if they agreed, could alone solve major issues of war and peace. And he acted on this comforting and satisfying belief. When the Watergate scandal began to erode Nixon's power, Brezhnev gave a special order to Soviet propaganda and media apparatus, with the ban to print and show any materials directed against Nixon. In June 1974, when Nixon was on the brink of his inglorious resignation, Brezhnev invited him after the Moscow summit to Crimea, where they stayed practically one-on-one. At some point Nixon, already slightly tipsy and emotionally moved by his host's attention, said, 'I would like to raise toast to the exceptionally important political doctrine . . . – the doctrine of lasting and universal peace, the Nixon–Brezhnev doctrine.'[40] Brezhnev and his entourage were impressed. Unfortunately for them, this 'doctrine' remained a pipedream.

Some Soviet international experts, who observed Brezhnev during the peak of détente, praised him for what they perceived as glimpses of 'realism'. When the Yom Kippur War (1973) threatened Soviet–US relations, Brezhnev treated Washington and Egypt with remarkable balance and coolness. He was suspicious of Kissinger's motives in the crisis, yet did not respond to the US nuclear alert in kind. And in response to Sadat's appeal, he staunchly

refused to send the Soviet military to Egypt to 'save' the situation. He said to Gromyko that the Arabs would not make the Soviets 'fight for them'. He even thought about establishing diplomatic relations with victorious Israel. Anatoly Chernyaev was impressed enough to interpret it as an evidence of Brezhnev's 'realpolitik'.[41]

Yet Brezhnev's mental map cannot be described as 'realist' – despite his strong belief in the balance of powers. His refusal to be drawn into a Middle Eastern war stemmed from 'the Sermon on the Mount' rather than a logical and calculating approach to foreign policy. Besides, on 24 October, when Sadat urged him to dispatch Soviet troops, Brezhnev was scheduled to open the World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow. An experienced Soviet diplomat observed that 'the Congress was meant to confirm Brezhnev's role and authority'. It was 'also important in his struggle for absolute power in the Politburo'. Sadat's impertinent demands simply got in the way.[42] In contrast to classical realpolitik leaders, Brezhnev counted too much on personal relations with foreign leaders, such as Brandt, Nixon and Kissinger, but also French Presidents Georges Pompidou and Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, and Finnish leader Urho Kekkonen. His unwillingness to exploit Nixon's problems during the Watergate scandal shows that Brezhnev could be a romantic in international affairs, rather than hard-nosed realist. The departures of Brandt and Nixon from the political scene were a personal blow to Brezhnev, and contributed later to his declining interest in 'fighting for détente'.[43]

He was too much of a 'Soviet person' and had no intellectual resources to overcome the influence of communist ideology on Soviet foreign policy. Although he made an exception for Brandt, he treated other European Social Democrats with condescension or mistrust – looking at them through Leninist and Stalinist lenses. He wrote in his diary after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 'We must destroy the theory of humane socialism of the Social Democratic kind.' When 'enlightened' speechwriters with the help of linguistic virtuosity sought to dilute the ideological discourse in Brezhnev's speeches, omitting such words as 'class struggle', Brezhnev brought it back: he, who never studied Marxist-Leninist 'theory', viewed those words as seriously as his military decorations.[44] Still, Brezhnev's attitudes towards communist China pointed to his fear of revolutionary irrationality and unpredictability. He had never been to China, but shared with many Soviet officials and common people the sense of enthusiasm about the Sino–Soviet relationship in the period of 'friendship' of 1950 to 1960. His junior brother Yakov worked in China as a Soviet specialist, helping to build a metallurgical plant in Anshan. The Sino–Soviet split shook Brezhnev profoundly; he could not understand its causes. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the destruction of the old Chinese communists, left a strong emotional impact on him: among the victims of Mao's revolution was Liu Shaoqi, whom Brezhnev met and grew to like. But the greatest shock for him was the Sino–Soviet military conflict on the Ussuri islands in March 1969. He began to fear

China's irrational aggressiveness; Chinese territorial demands clashed with his deep-held beliefs in the 'unshakable borders' of the Soviet homeland. As Russian diplomats in the past, Brezhnev found himself being 'European' in talking with the seemingly inscrutable and unpredictable Chinese. They, he said to Kissinger in 1972, 'are certainly beyond the capacity of a European mind to fathom'.[45]

This was one of the cases when Brezhnev dropped the discourse of 'revolutionary internationalism' and aligned himself with 'Europe' in cultural and civilizational terms. Several times Brezhnev evoked China in his conversations with Kissinger and Nixon as a potential threat to world peace – a potential object for the 'Nixon–Brezhnev doctrine' of enforcing 'universal peace'. Americans spread a version that the Soviet leader allegedly proposed a pre-emptive strike against China's nuclear facilities. This 'version' was never corroborated by evidence and ran counter to Brezhnev's mental map, his psychology and intentions. His goal was to deter future provocations against Soviet borders – not to start a pre-emptive war.[46]

Brezhnev's lucky streak in foreign policy ended in 1975, just as his health began to ebb. On 1 August, he signed the Helsinki Final Act in the culmination of his monumental diplomatic activity to create a stable structure of European security – yet he was already a different, sick man. This was also the time when problems with Brezhnev's détente policy also became visible. First, the 'realism' of Nixon-Kissinger fell as rapidly as it arose, and the resurgent Wilsonianism in American foreign policy coincided with what could be called the international 'human rights revolution'. Brezhnev, just like Nixon and Kissinger, did not know what to do with the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union – triggered above all by the uproar around Jewish immigration. For all Brezhnev's relative tolerance and aversion to violence, his mental map had no soft spot for 'dissidents'; he left his lieutenant Yuri Andropov, the KGB head, to neutralize them by harassments, arrests and mental asylums. Another major contradiction was renewed Soviet–US tension in the Third World, above all in Angola, after the US defeat in Indo-China. Brezhnev knew that Soviet military assistance to 'progressive forces' such as MPLA in Angola would damage détente with the United States, yet this required him to veto a policy supported by many communist leaders and in line with 'revolutionary duty'. The General Secretary was not prepared to do it. Finally, Brezhnev's inability to say no to any new military programmes led to the deployment of new Soviet systems, such as SS-20 missiles, complicated the German–Soviet partnership and contributed to the new round of nuclear arms' escalation in the heart of Europe.

By the end of the 1970s Brezhnev was no longer the person analysed in these pages. His personality profoundly degraded, transformed by his disease. People who dealt with him, including his doctor and his bodyguard, testified that the General Secretary could no longer act as a rational decision-maker, and was on heavy medicine most of the time. His caution

transformed into suspicion, his vanity became grotesque and his tendency to treat policy issues through the prism of relations with foreign leaders led him to grave misjudgements. The most consequential of the latter was his nod to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Brezhnev at first resisted the idea of another military intervention (he always remembered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), yet was emotionally swayed by the brutal murder of the Afghan revolutionary leader Nur-Mohammad Taraki by his political ally Hafizullah Amin. Brezhnev liked the deceptively debonair leader of Afghanistan and was appalled at the news of his death: 'What kind of scum is this Amin – to strangle the man with whom he participated in the revolution? Who is now at the helm of the Afghan revolution? What will people say in other countries? Can one trust Brezhnev's words.' Yuri Andropov, the main proponent of intervention, convinced Brezhnev that his people would remove Amin without pain and, with the 'temporary assistance' of Soviet troops would save the Afghan revolution.[47]

Brezhnev's mental map, so common to two to three generations of 'Soviet persons', so orthodox in many ways, curiously fitted the period of détente. Without Brezhnev and his 'Sermon on the Mount', the détente of 1970–72 either might not have happened at all or might have been much less of an event than it was. He was the first Soviet leader who consciously and with pleasure donned the mantle of a peacemaker and a common-sense statesman, and not of a blustering revolutionary or of a domineering emperor. At the same time Brezhnev's mental map had no room for a strategic vision. His simplistic opportunism could not replace or reform the Soviet revolutionary-imperial paradigm. And his policies of balancing between missiles and bread, between 'relaxation of tension' and 'revolutionary internationalist duty', left his successors with a deplorable international, economic and financial legacy.

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2
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger: The Outsiders?

Jussi M. Hanhimäki

Introduction

The much overused quote from Nixon's memoirs captures the popular perception of the two men from different backgrounds – the 'Odd Couple' – who jointly engineered some of the most spectacular breakthroughs in US foreign policy during the Cold War era: 'The combination was unlikely – the grocer's son from Whittier and the refugee from Hitler's Germany, the politician and the academic. But our differences helped make the partnership work.'[1] Nixon's point was, it seems, twofold. First, it was to underline that the two men were products of the American dream; neither inherited wealth or position, each worked hard to achieve what they did. This, of course, was the sometimes forgotten but indisputable case. Unlike his 1960 rival, John F. Kennedy, Nixon came from nothing and took immense pride in this fact. Unlike most of his predecessors, Kissinger was not part of the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) elite that had dominated America's foreign policy-makers in the early part of the Cold War. Second and related, Nixon affirmed that they were both outsiders. Nixon's was a personality that did not easily fit one's image of an American politician. He was neither particularly charming up close nor did he have many real friends among America's political elite. 'I'm an introvert in an extrovert profession', Nixon once said of himself.[2] Meanwhile, Kissinger's Jewish background made him an outsider in the higher circles of the US government of the late 1960s. Being a naturalized American helped little; speaking with a German accent was not necessarily an asset. Perhaps because they were outsiders (or at least perceived themselves as such) both were, by most accounts, chronically insecure no matter how much they achieved.

Such personality traits explain, in part, why historians' assessments of the two men are steeped in controversy. Nixon is invariably described either as a brilliant statesman who oversaw the transformation of US foreign policy from the excesses of the 1960s towards the much-needed realism of the early

1970s or as the villain of Watergate who trampled on the US constitution at will. Kissinger is either perceived as the globetrotting and brilliant diplomat who executed the necessary changes in America's role in the world or as the war criminal who is responsible for the destruction of countries like Cambodia and the overthrow of democratically elected leaders like Chile's Salvador Allende. Very few observers are able to examine such controversial figures with detachment.

What most observers do agree on is that Nixon and Kissinger developed an extraordinarily close working relationship once installed in power in January 1969. Their method of working – in secrecy, bypassing large bureaucracies if possible – isolated the duo to an extraordinary extent from the pressures of public opinion and bureaucratic intransigence. As Robert Dallek puts it, Kissinger's unprecedented influence on the president 'made him a kind of co-president' on matters related to foreign policy.[3] While they failed to develop a close personal relationship, Kissinger and Nixon seem to have perceived themselves as two outsiders, who, by the force of their own hard work were in a position to influence the foreign policy of the most powerful nation on earth.

Thus, it makes sense that in a book devoted to mental maps of makers of foreign policy one would treat the two men together. This is not to argue that their thinking was identical on any of the major issues of the day – Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the Middle East, China – but because during a period of roughly five and a half years, they discussed, planned and acted to forge policies essentially in tandem. For better or worse, the late 1960s and early 1970s were the Nixon–Kissinger era in US foreign policy. To understand their mental maps and how these related to some of the policies they forged is the basic goal of this essay.

In the first half of this chapter I will focus on the backgrounds – or 'baggage' – that Nixon and Kissinger carried with them upon taking office. I will then discuss the two men's approach to the Soviet Union and China, two of the major foreign policy challenges they faced, before offering some tentative conclusions about the interrelationship between their mental maps and actual policies.

The Wonder Boy of American Politics

The post-Second World War era has been called the 'age of Nixon'.[4] Be that as it may, there is no doubt that Richard Nixon was probably the most enduring figure in American politics over three decades. Born and raised in small-town California, Nixon trained as a lawyer in North Carolina (Duke University), served in the Navy during the Second World War and then started building his political career. His rise was meteoric. Elected to the House of Representatives in 1946 and the Senate in 1950, he was one of the most prominent young men in a hurry in Washington. When Dwight D. Eisenhower selected

Nixon as his running mate in 1952, the future president was not yet 40 (he was born in January 1913). Having spent two terms as Ike's vice president, Nixon was the obvious candidate to lead the Republican Party in the 1960 elections; Nixon thus became the first sitting vice president since Charles Breckinridge in 1860 (!) to run for the presidency. But then, like Breckinridge, he was defeated as John F. Kennedy won a narrow victory in November 1960. Two years later another humiliation followed: in 1962 Nixon lost the California gubernatorial election to the Democratic incumbent, Edmund G. Brown. After 16 years in the political arena, Nixon announced the day after his defeat that he had had it. 'This is my last press conference', Nixon told the startled reporters who had come to hear him out. Everyone thought he was finished.[5]

Of course, Nixon had not retired from politics. Over the next few years he did, however, take some time off and worked in a law firm in New York City alongside his future secretary of state William Rogers. Political animal that he was, Nixon retained his links to the Republican Party's leadership but sat out the 1964 presidential campaign, where the Republican Barry Goldwater was soundly defeated by Lyndon Johnson. Soon thereafter, Nixon started positioning himself for a run in the 1968 elections. He built links to the moderate wing of his party dominated by Kissinger's mentor Nelson Rockefeller. By late 1967 Nixon was emerging as the most electable of those senior Republicans in contention for the nomination (in addition to Rockefeller, these included California Governor Ronald Reagan). And, as an experienced campaigner, Nixon had the best political machinery within his own party. By the summer of 1968 his nomination was a virtual certainty, confirmed at the Miami Beach Republican convention in August. Three months later Nixon finally won the ultimate prize of his political career as voters narrowly chose him, rather than Vice President Hubert Humphrey.[6]

Along the way to the White House Nixon had made a reputation for playing it dirty. Adlai Stevenson, twice the Democratic candidate for presidency against Eisenhower, summed up 'Nixonland' as 'a land of slander and scare, of sly innuendo, of a poison pen, the anonymous phone call, and hustling, pushing, shoving – the land of smash and grab and anything to win'.[7] From his first campaign – in 1946 for the House – to his last – in 1972 for second term as president – Nixon mixed positive rhetoric with below-the-belt attacks against his opponents. Yet, there was more to Nixon's success than dirty tricks. In all of his winning election campaigns Nixon correctly identified the 'mood' of his electorate, be it one district (1946), one state (1950) or the nation at large (1952, 1956, 1968 and 1972). Thus, in 1946 and 1950 he tapped, successfully, into a mix of anti-establishment and, in particular, anti-communist sentiments. By the time he successfully ran for president in 1968, however, there was a new Nixon, a man whose major promise was to restore 'law and order' to a country that appeared torn apart by the effects of the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement. Albeit narrowly, Nixon

triumphed. And that, many critics have argued, was what really motivated Nixon. He was pragmatic and driven to win; he was not deeply idealistic, his principles were malleable.

Nixon may have been the consummate American politician but he also had something that his predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, and his successor, Gerald R. Ford, lacked. Nixon was experienced and knowledgeable in foreign affairs and, once elected, intended to become a foreign policy president. Over his years as Eisenhower's vice president Nixon had spent more time on foreign policy than any previous holder of that post. He had literally travelled the world (with major trips to Asia, Africa and Latin America in the 1950s), and had met most of the prominent world leaders in office. He had shown an ability to hold his ground in debates with powerful adversaries (most famously with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the famous 'kitchen debate' of 1959). Nixon's anti-communism was evident but it was not unusual for his times. During the 1960 election against John F. Kennedy, Nixon's rhetoric had actually been less ideologically driven than that of his rival. Nixon was, in short, a pragmatist, someone who used rhetoric when it fit his needs. He believed, of course, that Soviet communism was the chief nemesis of the United States and that US democracy was superior to Soviet communism. But he was not dogmatic about the East–West rivalry.

Nixon's personality was, as almost every observer has noted, full of contradictions. He was the consummate American politician but he was also shy in personal contact with people. He could deliver a good speech but found it difficult to make chit-chat. He had few friends and could apparently relax only in the company of men that had no obvious connection to politics, such as the Miami businessman Bebe Rebozo. Even as the president of the United States, Nixon appeared insecure, unable to confront people face-to-face, yet craving public approval. He claimed to hate the press, but was seriously concerned about what they wrote. He was, in short, a complex man. As one of his biographers puts it, Nixon

> was devious, manipulative, driven by unseen and unknowable forces, quick as a summer storm to blame and slow as a glacier melt to forgive, passionate in his hatreds, self-centered, untruthful, untrusting, and at times so despicable that one wants to avert one's eyes in shame and embarrassment.... [Yet, the same Nixon] could be considerate, straightforward, sympathetic, and helpful [and] was blessed with great talent, superb intellect, an awesome memory, and a remarkable ability to see things whole, especially on a global scale and with regard to the world balance of power.[8]

Or as Elliott Richardson, who resigned rather than follow Nixon's order to fire one of the Watergate prosecutors, put it, Nixon 'wanted to be the Architect of his Time'.[9]

Jewish Refugee to Harvard High-flier

Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born on 27 May 1923 in Fürth, a small town in Bavaria, Germany. The time and place were unfortunate for a middle-class Jewish family. This was the year when Adolf Hitler launched an unsuccessful putsch in nearby Munich – the so-called Beer Hall Putsch – and began writing *Mein Kampf* (to be published in 1925). By the time young Heinz turned ten years old, Hitler was in power. By his twelfth birthday the Nazis passed their virulently anti-Semitic Nüremberg Laws, effectively denying Jews citizenship. After a few years of agonizing, in August 1938 the Kissingers left Germany for the United States. During this move Heinz became Henry.[10]

The move from Germany to the United States not only, in all likelihood, saved Kissinger's life, but it also freed him from the oppressive surroundings of 1930s Nazi Germany. In Manhattan, where the family settled in 1938, Kissinger found a society he wanted to become a part of and thrive in, a society that was not free of prejudices or discrimination, but at least in theory espoused the ideal of equal opportunity. Most importantly, the opportunities matched Kissinger's ambition and intellectual talent. Despite his linguistic handicap, Kissinger quickly established himself as a straight-A student even though, after his first year at high school, he worked by day at a shaving-brush manufacturer and attended school by night. After graduating from New York's George Washington High School, he completed a year of undergraduate studies in accounting at the City College of New York.

Kissinger's life took yet another turn in February 1943, when, along with numerous other young Americans, he enlisted in the army and was sent to a military training camp in South Carolina. The following month, he was naturalized. The four-year stint in the army that included a trip back to Germany, where he stayed as part of the occupation forces until 1947, transformed the young German immigrant into an assimilated (and hyphenated) American. Yet, upon his return to the United States at the age of 24, Kissinger, despite his obvious academic talent, did not even have an undergraduate degree. But the army experience had changed him. The shy boy who had grown up in a climate of fear returned to his adopted land a conqueror, whose innate intellectual abilities had begun to awaken. 'Living as a Jew under the Nazis, then as a refugee in America, and then as a private in the army isn't exactly an experience that builds confidence', he would later comment.[11] But it seems that as he returned to the United States from Germany, Kissinger no longer felt like an outsider. Henry Kissinger had become Americanized. And, in the fall of 1947, Kissinger became a 'mature' undergraduate student at Harvard.

A decade later Kissinger had established himself as one of the brightest young stars among a generation of Americanized European immigrant intellectuals that included the likes of Zbigniew Brzezinski. He published, in 1957, two books that provided the intellectual basis for his growing

reputation: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* and *A World Restored*.[12] The former was an outgrowth of a study group that Kissinger had coordinated at the Council of Foreign Relations and cemented the now 34-year-old man's image as a rising 'defense intellectual'. The latter, his revised PhD thesis, outlined Kissinger's essential preference for realpolitik as practised by leaders of great powers. Together, they earned him a position – and ultimately a tenured professorship – in Harvard's faculty. But they also provided the springboard for a career that, during the next decade, would gradually make Kissinger into the foremost foreign policy analyst affiliated with the Republican party.

Between 1957 and his eventual appointment as Nixon's National Security Advisor in December 1968, Kissinger pursued a two-track career. He published extensively, on issues ranging from nuclear weapons to transatlantic relations as well as general challenges facing US foreign policy.[13] But Kissinger was never confined to academia. Starting in the 1950s, he acted as an occasional consultant to successive administrations, emerging as part of a small group of high-profile 'defense/foreign policy intellectuals'. Although Kissinger was always closer to the Republican Party, particularly as the chief foreign policy advisor to New York Governor and presidential hopeful Nelson Rockefeller, he worked briefly as a consultant for both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. In 1966–67, for example, he made several trips to Paris in order to sound out the possibilities for peace in Vietnam. All these activities meant that by the time of the 1968 presidential elections Kissinger was one of the few outstanding defence and foreign policy intellectuals associated with the Republican Party. Following his victory in November, Nixon quickly tapped Kissinger as his national security advisor.[14]

When they arrived at the White House in January 1969 both men had thus observed the transformation of the world but from different vantage points. Nixon had, from his time as vice president, developed a sense of the high game of international politics. All this experience meant that he was accustomed to dealing with international affairs at the highest levels. Kissinger had no such practical experience. Yet, his writings revealed a mind that viewed international politics as a top-down game that leaders played. When Kissinger wrote about countries and their diplomacy he associated with those in power: the statesmen and diplomats. And, perhaps because of his personal experience, he was averse to ideological excesses and prone to emphasize the need for 'order' and 'stability'.[15] He had rarely commented upon such profound global changes as decolonization or the role of the People's Republic of China in international affairs.

If Nixon had the practical experience in high diplomacy that Kissinger lacked, the Harvard professor had the knowledge – of history and theory – that the new president craved. Both were extremely ambitious, and both wanted broad recognition of their abilities and intellect. Installed in the

White House in early 1969 – one in the Oval Office, the other nearby in the West Wing basement – they had an opportunity to make a major difference in US foreign policy and, in turn, in shaping the course of international relations writ large.

American Decline in a Turbulent World

Much like his campaign strategies, Nixon's foreign policy views were, in fact, malleable when he entered the White House in January 1969. They certainly lacked in specificity regarding the major challenges that would preoccupy the new administration. Nixon had, by and large, supported the escalation of the Vietnam War and offered, in 1968, only a non-specified 'secret plan' on how to end the war. He had published, in 1967, what many would later consider a remarkably prophetic essay on China, arguing, in essence, that in the long run the United States would have to come to terms with the world's most populous nation. But in the same essay Nixon also wrote that 'the world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change.'[16] This, of course, was not exactly how US policy would unfold during the Nixon presidency. In various speeches during the presidential campaign Nixon had also referred to 'a new era of negotiation' with the Soviet Union. There was a hint of change, but hardly anything approaching a strong commitment to détente. As for the so-called Third World, Nixon was loathe to promote American ideas and liberal democracy as something to be emulated. As he put it in a speech in 1967, 'It is time for us to recognize that much as we like our own political system, American style democracy is not necessarily the best form of government for people in Asia, Africa and Latin America with entirely different backgrounds.'[17]

Kissinger's views, as far as they were known, were equally open to interpretation. He had, by and large, supported the Johnson administration's Vietnam policies. His knowledge – and interest – in China was spotty at best. And while he had written about nuclear weapons, Kissinger's major area of interest in the 1960s had, in fact, been transatlantic relations. One searches in vain for a practical blueprint for policy-making in Kissinger's writings. What one finds is some characteristically opaque statements about the state of the world in the late 1960s, including the following: 'The greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order. In its absence, the awesome available power is unrestrained by any consensus as to legitimacy; ideology and nationalism, in their different ways, deepen international schisms.'[18] The world was, if this 1969 pronouncement is to be taken literally, facing turbulence as never before.[19]

Although their outlook was not identical, Kissinger and Nixon in fact shared a broad, and essentially pessimistic, view of the United States as a power faced with serious challenges. The world had changed from the time

Nixon was vice president or Kissinger a newly tenured Harvard professor. The Soviet Union had caught up in military terms with the United States to rough parity and the military bipolarity of the Cold War was particularly clearly on display in the field of nuclear weapons. But bipolarity was giving way to an increasingly multipolar – and global – international system. America's major allies – Western Europe and Japan – had emerged from the economically subservient positions of the early post-war era. China was the great unknown. Decolonization had transformed the world creating multiple regions of instability of which Vietnam was but one example. Kissinger summed it all up in his Delphic manner: 'Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.'[20]

The basic task facing Nixon and Kissinger in 1969 was, ultimately, clear enough: to sustain American global power in an era of rapid change. The challenge – to do this without the overt use of military force – defined a set of new tactics that, depending on one's perspective, may or may not have amounted to a grand design. Yet, it was clear that, if only for political purposes, Nixon would certainly bill himself as the antithesis of his predecessor. From a twenty-first-century perspective this appears like the 2008 US presidential campaign, with different names and partisan affiliations reversed: the Democrat Lyndon Johnson had made war and intervened (in Vietnam, in the Dominican Republic); the Republican Nixon was going to make peace. But, if his speeches were to be believed, Nixon would go further than simply put out fires. The new president promised to build a new structure that would, in effect, make peace a durable condition. He understood, it seems, the great challenges facing his country. In 1967, for example, Nixon had implored,

> We live in a new world. Never in human history have more changes taken place in the world in one generation . . . It is a world of new leaders . . . It is a world of new people. One-half of the people now living in the world were born since World War II. It is a world of new ideas. Communism, Marxism, Socialism, anti-colonialism – the great ideas which stirred men to revolution after World War II have lost their pulling power . . . Because we live in a new world, many of the old institutions are obsolete and inadequate. The UN, NATO, foreign aid, USIA were set up to deal with the world of twenty years ago. A quick trip around the world will show how different the problems are today.[21]

In this speech – given at the Bohemian club in San Francisco – Nixon went on to underline, if necessarily in a rather vague form, the basic principle that was to characterize his public foreign policy addresses. The United States needed to reassess the way it dealt with its adversaries and friends. In this

and other addresses or articles before taking up office, Nixon thus essentially laid down the trademark of his foreign policy: flexibility of means coupled by an adoption of, in essence, the very same assumptions and goals that had guided his predecessors. For example, there could be détente with the USSR but only if policy-makers remembered what Nixon argued was a fundamental difference between the United States and the Soviet Union. As he put it,

> We seek peace as an end in itself. They seek victory with peace being at this time a means toward that end ... we can live in peace with the Soviet Union but until they give up their goal for world conquest it will be for them a peace of necessity and not of choice.[22]

In addition to détente with the USSR, Nixon – before taking office – repeatedly wrote or hinted at the possibility that he might change US policy towards China, understood that the United States needed to rethink the structure of the transatlantic relationship, and, first and foremost, had to exit Vietnam 'with honor'. Through such speeches and articles, during, before and after the November 1968 elections, Nixon outlined a relatively straightforward and necessarily vague grand design for US foreign policy. He would outline it in his inaugural address on 20 January 1969 that emphasized the new administration's interest in talking to anyone – the Soviets, the Chinese, the Vietnamese apparently included – who wished to do so. As Nixon put it, 'Where peace is unknown, make it welcome; where peace is fragile, make it strong; where peace is temporary, make it permanent ... After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.'[23]

Kissinger, who may have winced a bit at the somewhat corny rhetoric, roughly agreed: the United States needed to negotiate its way out of trouble. Like Nixon, he recognized the need for new approaches. Moreover, perhaps more than the President, Kissinger saw the world as a whole, as a structure in which different pieces were interrelated. This made the national security advisor ruminate as follows in a book published virtually at the same time as he moved into the West Wing basement of the White House:

> The temptation is great to treat each issue as an immediate and isolated problem which once surmounted will permit the fundamental stability of the international order to reassert itself. But the crises which form the headlines of the day are symptoms of deep-seated structural problems ... The current international environment is in turmoil because its essential elements are all in flux simultaneously.[24]

Ultimately, Kissinger concluded, the 'new administration ... must recognize that, in the field of foreign policy, we will never be able to contribute to building a stable and creative world order unless we first form some conception of it'.[25]

In short, both Nixon and Kissinger talked about – or at least strongly hinted that they had a conception of – a grand design. Nixon called it a structure of peace; Kissinger wrote about it indirectly yet authoritatively, emphasizing broad concepts like 'order'. The probable reason why neither Nixon nor Kissinger offered too many specifics was simple enough: all such designs were, almost by some natural law, hostage to fortune and contingency. A year into the administration's tenure Winston Lord, Kissinger's young aide (and future ambassador to China), summed up this basic fact in a memo: 'even if we could construct a master plan, we would not adhere rigidly to it for the sake of consistency if events dictated tactical aberrations'.[26] Although Lord was talking mainly about the so-called Nixon Doctrine (see below) and its practical application in Asia, the same could easily have been said about the entire foreign policy of the Nixon (or any other) administration. As Kissinger put it in his memoirs, 'once the oath of office has been taken there is no longer time for calm reflection. The policymaker is then like a man on a tightrope; he can avoid a precipitous drop only by moving forward.'[27] There were, in short, strict limits – imposed by unexpected events, pressure from bureaucracies, demands of domestic politics – to how any grand design, however carefully conceived, could be put into practice. Put another way, mental maps informed the planning for the future but they were bound to be challenged by new events and new realities.

'Subject A': Détente and Linkage

There is little doubt that the country that most concerned Nixon and Kissinger was the Soviet Union – 'Subject A', as Nixon dubbed the USSR in 1967.[28] Similarly, it is undoubtedly true that the efforts to manage the competitive relationship with Moscow shaped every other aspect of US foreign policy in the early 1970s. The Kremlin's policies and likely reactions affected the settlement in Vietnam, the opening to China, and the relationship with the USA's allies in Europe. The USSR was part of the context when Nixon and Kissinger approached regional conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. Or to put it in another way, the Soviet Union loomed large on Kissinger and Nixon's mental maps; even as they acknowledged that the world was changing, even though they may have alluded to emerging new centres of power and multipolarity, Kissinger and Nixon were, at heart, cold warriors conditioned to act within the context of a bipolar world view.

Given their understanding of the changed and fluctuating power relationships, however, Nixon and Kissinger set out to pursue détente. They did not invent the policy. The origins of détente may be traced back to the early and mid-1960s; both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations sought to build bridges and engage with the Soviet bloc.[29] Nevertheless, there is no question that détente blossomed on Nixon's watch. The various agreements on Germany and Berlin, the signing of the SALT I and ABM agreements at the Moscow Summit of 1972, the summit of 1973 that produced the

Prevention of Nuclear War (PNW) agreement, and the 1974 tentative SALT II agreements of Vladivostok (an agreement that Nixon – having bowed out of office in August 1974 – could only watch from the sidelines) were examples of this almost feverish recalibration of Soviet–US relations. After 1974 détente began to falter. Under severe domestic attack from both left and right, Gerald Ford eventually banned the use of the word in his 1976 presidential campaign.[30]

It would be incorrect to argue that the idea of détente was a revolutionary concept as such: relaxing tensions between adversarial powers was and is, after all, the regular fare of the long-term development of any bilateral relationship. Indeed, the question one should probably be asking regarding the pursuit of détente is not so much why the relaxation of Soviet–US tensions emerged during the Nixon presidency but what its principal US practitioners thought could be gained by engaging the Kremlin. Was détente meant to launch a structural revolution that would ultimately lead to the end of the Cold War? Or was détente simply a way of gaining a 'breather'; of making the competition more manageable, perhaps even giving the United States an edge that it seemed to be losing? Did Nixon and Kissinger see détente simply as containment by other means? After all, in a domestic context where the use of US military power was an extremely risky proposal, diplomacy gained new currency as a policy-making tool.

Kissinger insisted that the real goal of détente was to manage the USSR. As he wrote to Nixon early on in the presidency,

> Moscow wants to engage us . . . we should seek to utilize this Soviet interest, stemming as I think it does from anxiety, to induce them to come to grips with the real sources of tension, notably in the Middle East, but also in Vietnam. This approach also would require continued firmness on our part in Berlin.[31]

Indeed, while the sources of détente lay much deeper than the specific interests and tactical goals of a few policy-makers, the actual practice of détente was, as is well known, a highly centralized matter in the Nixon administration.[32]

At the basis of it lay the strategy of linkage; the idea that one could create a web of relationships with the USSR and exchange, in effect, favours in one area (e.g. the SALT negotiations) to those made in another (say, the Vietnam peace talks). Thus, Kissinger and Nixon established the Backchannel to the Kremlin via Ambassador Dobrynin. Although much has been made about the foot-dragging that either side was guilty of, the real problem at the very beginning was not over the general principle of linkage. Rather, the Soviet ambassador objected to the type of linkage that Kissinger and Nixon aimed to pursue. During the meeting in the White House on 17 February 1969 that effectively established the Backchannel, the Soviet ambassador called for

serious negotiations 'on various subjects and at various levels'. When prodded by Nixon, Dobrynin mentioned SALT and the Middle East as the key issues. Nixon responded by stressing that one should separate SALT from 'the settlement of larger political issues' but did not foreclose the possibility of holding 'parallel' talks. Dobrynin was curious and pressed for clarification on 'the linkage between arms talks and negotiations on political issues'; Nixon asserted that 'progress in one area is bound to have an influence on progress in all other areas'. Further clarifying his central point, Nixon explained that it was his hope that the Soviets would 'do what they can to get the Paris talks [on Vietnam] off dead-center'. Dobrynin was evasive, maintaining that if a true era of negotiation were to be launched, 'it would be wise not to begin with the most difficult issues'.[33]

Aside from establishing the Kissinger–Dobrynin Backchannel, the February 1969 meeting had thus set the tone for Soviet–US negotiations for the next few years. Linkage was real, but it was tempered – at times pre-empted – by deep-seated mutual suspicion. The bilateral relationship was to be pursued over a number of issues ranging from SALT to Vietnam. But linkage often produced deadlock. There would be limited progress because both the Americans and the Soviets were, in the end, concerned about the other side gaining some kind of a unilateral advantage. During the months and years to come while Kissinger, at Nixon's behest, pressed Dobrynin for help in reaching a settlement on Vietnam, the Soviet ambassador replied by demanding that the Americans work for progress on the Middle East. The end result was that the early talks inevitably focused on areas where both sides did see progress in the offing or the pressure from other countries was insurmountable: for example arms control and the Berlin/German question. No wonder that the early détente process yielded few tangible results until the summer of 1971.

The Backchannel may not have been a great success but it exemplified traits of where US foreign policy was heading. It certainly indicated that to both Kissinger and Nixon foreign policy was essentially to be ironed out in small groups of influential men representing the national interests of their respective states. Indeed, communism, socialism or any other '-ism' is almost totally excluded from the discussions. At the same time, it is clear that while détente was central to the Nixon–Kissinger grand design, a bilateral approach within the context of US intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet nuclear build-up was producing very limited results. Something was needed to change the context in which Dobrynin and the Soviets would respond more positively to US overtures. Enter China.

Triangular Diplomacy

The generally accepted view is that, after two years of difficult negotiations with the Soviets, Kissinger's secret trip to China in July 1971 suddenly

transformed the nature of the Soviet–US relationship. As Kissinger later argued,

> [t]he triangular relationship among the United States, the USSR, and China unlocked the door to a series of major breakthroughs: the end of the Vietnam War; an agreement that guaranteed access to a divided Berlin; a dramatic reduction of Soviet influence in the Middle East, and the beginning of the Arab–Israeli peace process; and the European Security Conference (completed during the Ford Administration). Each of these events contributed to the others. Linkage was operating with a vengeance.

In other words, the goals that had not been possible to reach via 'mere' bilateral wrangling with the Soviets were transformed into reality as the Soviets, caught unprepared by the Sino–US rapprochement, adjusted their policies in order to stay on America's good side. Dobrynin seems to confirm this view in his memoirs. 'No one was more surprised and confused', he writes, 'than the Kremlin when it received the news of Nixon's plan to go to China even before he would meet Brezhnev at the summit in Moscow.'[34] In short: a masterstroke that prompted everything that happened afterwards.

While we do not have a full account of the Soviet response to the opening to China nor of the actual shock that it produced, the dramatic reversal implied above calls for some consideration. In particular, one needs to ask whether the shock that the sudden announcement of the 'opening' undoubtedly produced could possibly have been matched by a Soviet need suddenly to reverse, or at least review, all its policies (as implied by Kissinger). Were the Soviets caught completely off-guard? Even if the preparations for Kissinger's trip remained secret, could the Soviets have missed such obvious signals of an impending rapprochement as Nixon's announcement of relaxation in trade restrictions and the fabled ping-pong diplomacy of the spring of 1971? If so, why did Dobrynin, who should have been in a position to at least anticipate a Sino–US rapprochement, not lose his clout inside the Kremlin? If anything, it seems that he had failed in his job. Either that, or Kissinger (and Nixon's) gloating about the great breakthrough and its impact on the USSR does not accurately reflect the Soviet side of the story.

While we can speculate on such questions, the key point to be made in the context of grand strategy is, simply, that the use of the 'China card' did not suddenly surface on 15 July 1971 (the day when Nixon made a public announcement about Kissinger's secret trip and the president's upcoming visit to China). In fact, Kissinger had started hinting at a possible rapprochement with China in 1969; Nixon as early as 1967. The Johnson administration had toyed with the idea of an opening but the Vietnam War and China's cultural revolution had been effective deterrents.[35] While the Soviets may have become more interested in setting a firm date for the

Soviet–US summit after 15 July, they did not suddenly turn from stubborn stalling to meek accommodation. The Berlin agreement – a result of another series of Backchannel negotiations – had already been concluded by the time Kissinger travelled to China; that Kissinger had ordered the negotiations to be stalled just prior to his trip did not result in any substantial modifications of the four-power deal announced later in the fall. Nor did the China trip unlock any major problems in the way of the general agreement on SALT. The so-called conceptual agreement of May 1971 – the trade-off between limits on offensive and defensive weapons that formed the basis for the SALT I Agreements – had already been reached and announced by the time Kissinger feigned a stomach ache and disappeared in Pakistan. Perhaps most significantly, the opening to China did not yield positive results on Vietnam: Soviet (as well as Chinese) aid actually increased in the second half of 1971.[36] If anything, the Opening to China made it that much easier for the Soviets to manoeuvre themselves into a closer relationship with Hanoi's leaders (at Beijing's expense).[37]

That is not to argue that the Opening to China was an insignificant event. Far from it. If Kissinger and Nixon had a durable impact on the global arena then surely it is their role as part of the long process that, over subsequent decades, led to China's transformation from a backward and inward-looking virtual prison for 800 million of its citizens to the economic powerhouse of the early twenty-first century. Indeed, explaining the opening to China to a stunned White House staff in July 1971, Nixon put his motivations in simple terms:

> The reason why it was done is that they are one-fourth of the world's population . . . They are not a military power now but 25 years from now they will be decisive . . . *Where vital interests are involved, great powers consult their vital interests – or else they're played for suckers by those powers that do*.[38]

From the perspective of the twenty-first century such ruminations may well appear prophetic.[39] Kissinger, certainly, has reminded his audiences about the significance of the China opening in a number of publications and interviews over the past three decades.[40] In the near and medium term, however, the Opening to China hardly yielded as dramatic an end result as is often claimed. Most specifically, the new Sino–US relationship did not translate into a major diplomatic tool (its domestic significance as a key element in guaranteeing Nixon's re-election is quite another matter but virtually impossible to measure). After 1971 there were very few instances when the USSR practised restraint that could be directly attributed to its concern over a 'Washington–Beijing axis'. Although the China factor was not inconsequential in determining *US* policy (usually in favour of the Chinese), it seems to have given little incentive for the USSR to act according to US desires. In some ways, it was almost the diplomatic equivalent of America's

short-lived nuclear monopoly in the aftermath of the Second World War: the fact that the opening had taken place was important but its practical application to other contexts was extremely difficult.

The broader point about the opening to China therefore is not so much that it confirms a broad strategic vision at play; a Nixon–Kissinger grand design being implemented via heroic, if secretive, diplomatic efforts. Rather, the opening to China was an example of the elasticity between short-term goals and long-term interests, between vision and tactics. China as such was not, at the time, the motivating factor. Containing or managing what in retrospect may appear as the inevitable rise of China to the position it holds in the second decade of the twenty-first century was not what drove policy-makers like Nixon and Kissinger. Theirs was a more short-term goal: to use diplomatic innovation in order to gain advantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. At the time, China was ultimately a useful tool, a means to a specific end.

Conclusions

There is much that happened on Kissinger and Nixon's watch that is excluded from this essay: Vietnam, Chile, the October 1973 War in the Middle East, to name but a few controversial and much-discussed issues. There is the Nixon Doctrine that was initially announced as a justification for winding down America's involvement in Vietnam but rapidly transformed to an overall approach that aimed to 'outsource' the safeguarding of US interests to strong regional allies like Iran. Indeed, it would be difficult and probably inappropriate to try and address the actual mechanics and unfolding of foreign policy in this essay. Instead, it might be useful, by way of conclusion, to focus on a few central themes in Nixon's and Kissinger's respective outlooks.

For one, despite their different backgrounds and personalities the two men had a broadly similar understanding of the international situation. Most importantly, both seemed to consider themselves experts in the state of the world, the reasons for America's apparent decline, and the recipe for managing, if not necessarily reversing it. From different vantage points they had witnessed the relative decline of US influence, its debacles in Vietnam, its divisions at home. They had come to appreciate – Nixon as a politician and aspiring statesman, Kissinger as an observant scholar and wannabe policy-maker – that history was not necessarily on America's side in the late 1960s. Hence they set out to practise realpolitik with the Soviets and Chinese, while searching for strong regional allies in many parts of the world.

At the same time, their 'mental maps' limited their ability to innovate and to see the world and international relations as something other than a game played by nation-states. Both men had spent much time – Kissinger obviously more – in the study of international relations. They concluded, in essence, that realpolitik was the leitmotif of international politics; the

movers and shakers were the heads of states. They showed little concern, it seems, for the fate of 'little people' as evidenced, for example, in a recent book about the 1971 Indo–Pakistani War.[41] This, one could easily argue, produced a consistent – if not necessarily laudable – approach to US foreign policy.

Consistent as the conceptual approach may have been, if one is to consider the mental maps of Kissinger and Nixon a paradox emerges. Most significantly, each of them had appeared to acknowledge the emergence of a set of new forces in international relations, forces and non-state actors that were challenging the very nature of the existing order. But in their actual policies Nixon and Kissinger showed little consideration – or understanding – for these new forces of instability. The overall emphasis on the 'great powers' blinded Nixon and Kissinger to the specific local circumstances that determined the course of the numerous regional conflicts the administration encountered. More specifically, Kissinger's efforts in China, Vietnam, Angola, the Middle East, South Asia and Europe were all calculated within the context of the US relationship and rivalry with the Soviet Union. While the means for pursuing the long twilight struggle were less militaristic and more diplomatic, the end goals of the struggle had hardly changed. In 1969 and the years that followed many in the United States spoke about a new grand strategy, overseen by Nixon and implemented by Kissinger. In reality what the two men had provided was an elaborate set of new tactics based on well-worn goals and assumptions.

This leads one to a somewhat disappointing conclusion: while they may have considered themselves outsiders, the grocer's son from California and the refugee from Nazi Germany showed a remarkable inability to think 'outside the box'. Their mental maps were not particularly special for the time and place: one was a Cold War politician, the other an establishment-friendly product of the Cold War university. Their realism hardly represented a major intellectual breakthrough. Their policies, for better or worse, ultimately reflected this lack of imagination.

Notes

1. Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York, 1978), p. 341.
2. Cited in Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York, 2007), p. 8.
3. Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, p. ix.
4. Carl Freedman, *The Age of Nixon: A Study in Cultural Power* (Washington, D.C., 2012). Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) also used this phrase at Nixon's funeral oration in 1994.
5. For the election of 1960 see W.J. Rorabaugh, 'The Election of 1960', in Melvin Small (ed.), *A Companion to Richard Nixon* (Malden, MA, 2011), pp. 122–40.
6. See, among others, Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, pp. 29–32, 60–86.
7. Cited in Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, p. 7.

8. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician* (New York, 1992), p. 10. For an overview of Nixon's career prior to the 1968 election victory, see ibid., and idem, *Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913–1962* (New York, 1987).
9. Cited in Richard Reeves, *President Nixon: Alone in the White House* (New York, 2001), p. 14.
10. The summary here is based on Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2004), chapter 1.
11. Cited in Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger* (New York, 1992), p. 56.
12. Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957); Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822* (Boston, 1957).
13. For example: *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA, 1960); *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York, 1965); *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (New York, 1969).
14. Much has been written about the details behind Kissinger's appointment, including his role in (possibly) passing confidential information about the Humphrey campaign and the ongoing Vietnam peace talks to the Nixon campaign. See, for example, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2004), pp. 20–3; Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, pp. 71–6.
15. Further on this theme see Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), pp. 16–51.
16. Richard M. Nixon, 'Asia After Vietnam', *Foreign Affairs*, 46.1, 1967, pp. 113–25.
17. 'Address by Richard M. Nixon to the Bohemian Club', 29 July 1967. In *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d2 (accessed 26 March 2015).
18. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, p. 57.
19. But so, it seems, is the world of today: see Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History* (New York, 2014).
20. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, p. 58.
21. Nixon to the Bohemian Club.
22. Ibid.
23. Richard Nixon: 'Inaugural Address', 20 January 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941 (accessed 22 March 2015).
24. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, p. 52.
25. Ibid.
26. Document prepared in the NSC Staff (undated), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d54 (accessed 19 March 2015).
27. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), p. 70.
28. Nixon's address to the Bohemian Club.
29. See Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Detente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington, D.C., 2013), pp. 1–25, and Thomas A. Schwartz, 'Moving beyond the Cold War: The Johnson Administration, Bridge-Building, and Detente', in Francis J. Gavin and Mark Atwood Lawrence (eds), *Beyond the Cold War: Lyndon Johnson and the New Global Challenges of the 1960s* (New York, 2014), pp. 76–95.
30. The most exhaustive study dealing with Soviet–US détente remains Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*

(Washington, D.C., 1994). For more recent accounts focusing on, in particular, US policies see Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Detente*; Barbara Zanchetta, *The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s* (New York, 2014); and Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (New York, 2015).

31. Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 143–4.
32. There is no need here to recount the '*coup d'état*' that placed much of foreign policy decision-making in Kissinger's (and Nixon's) hands. Readers could consult, for example, Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, pp. 17–32, or Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, pp. 89–103.
33. Memorandum of conversation: Nixon, Kissinger, Malcolm Toon (State Department), Dobrynin, 17 February 1969. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. XII: Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970*, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v12/d14 (accessed 22 March 2015).
34. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, 1994), pp. 733, 761; Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York, 1995), p. 225.
35. See Michael Lumbers, *Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China during the Johnson Years* (Manchester, 2008); Yafeng Xia, 'Negotiating at Cross-Purposes: Sino–American Ambassadorial Talks, 1961–1968', *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 16.2, 2005, pp. 297–329.
36. On this see Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, esp. chs 10 and 11.
37. It is worth noting that in July 1971 the Chinese were in no particular rush to have Nixon visit Beijing prior to his trip to Moscow and, in fact, preferred the reverse order. See Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, p. 140.
38. Memorandum for the President's Files, 'Briefing of the White House Staff on the July 15 Announcement of the President's Trip to Peking', 19 July 1971, http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-41.pdf (accessed 22 February 2015).
39. On Nixon's visit the best available account is Margaret MacMillan, *Seize the Hour: When Nixon Met Mao* (London, 2006).
40. For example, Kissinger, *On China* (New York, 2012); Kissinger, *World Order* (New York, 2014).
41. Gary J. Bass, *The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide* (New York, 2013).

3
Salvador Allende

Victor Figueroa-Clark

Salvador Allende, Chile's president between November 1970 and September 1973, was a worldly man of long political experience, and as a senior Chilean politician, a well-travelled and well-connected statesman. Like many leaders emerging from the Third World during the latter half of the twentieth century, Allende was acutely aware of Chile's subordinate place in the global system. When Allende became president in 1970 Chile was not a country with global or even much regional reach, and Allende was not interested in territorial expansion. As a result Allende did not pore over maps in the way of world-shapers, expansionists and the militarily threatened. Yet Allende did have a less topographical idea of the geography of the world system that he and Chile existed within – a map of ideas, of concepts, of power structures and also a map of friends, enemies and potential adversaries. Allende did not survive to write his memoirs, and much of his administration's documentation was either destroyed or stolen during or after his overthrow in September 1973, but from what remains we can still outline the constant features, the areas of permanent focus, the well-trodden paths and the under-explored boundaries and the terra incognita of his view of the world.

Allende knew Chile well, having been born in its busiest and most cosmopolitan port – Valparaiso – and partially brought up in Tacna (today in Southern Peru), Valdivia (in Southern Chile) and Santiago. As a political activist Allende was exiled to Caldera, near Chile's historic mining heartland, and as a political candidate Allende represented Northern Antofagasta and later Magallanes, the region encompassing the far south of this long and narrow country. As presidential candidate he four times travelled across the nation, as none had before him, speaking in copper and nitrate mines, fishing villages, farmsteads and indigenous reservations. He travelled by car, by horse, by bus, by rickety plane and most famously, by steam train. Allende, by dint of his social origins in the wealthy bourgeoisie, and his position as champion of the '*pueblo*', was uniquely well equipped to mix with people from all social classes. Allende thus knew Chile and its geography better than most, but he also knew it as a society at all levels.[1] It is probably

no exaggeration to state that Allende knew Chile better than any other politician of his time.

It is therefore unsurprising that Chile was the lens through which Allende's mind perceived the world; it loomed largest in geographic and political terms. Beyond Chile lay Latin America, the future *Patria Grande* within which Chile would find its destiny. Allende knew Latin America through access to its common culture, through his relationships with Latin Americans exiled in Chile during the 1940s and 1950s in particular, and through travel. His travels in Latin America began in early 1959 when he visited Venezuela, Panama and Cuba. Later trips took him repeatedly to Cuba (often via Mexico), and to Uruguay and Argentina. As president he then visited Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Mexico. For Allende the clarion call of the independence struggle still echoed, complete with calls for continental unity. Allende's experiences helped him visualize Latin America as a shared past as well as a divided, subjugated and often repressive present; but also a bright future of integration and socialist unity.[2]

Beyond Latin America lay the rest of the world, within which could be found allies, friends and dangerous enemies. Coming to maturity at the time of the Russian revolution, Allende's political map included the Soviet Union from an early age, but it was not until he was an elected politician that he began gradually to build a vision of the world through direct experience, beginning with a visit to the United States as Health Minister in 1941, visits to the USSR and China in 1954, participation in international conferences such as the Tricontinental (1964) and OLAS (1966), both held in Cuba but with the participation of delegations from across the socialist and Third World. In the late 1960s Allende notably flew to Tahiti with the Cuban survivors of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara's Bolivian guerrilla column, and also visited Spain, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, North Korea and Vietnam. As president Allende again visited the USSR, and also travelled to New York to address the United Nations General Assembly. On many of these trips he passed briefly through other countries, although we have little evidence of what, if any, impression they left upon him.

The chronology of Allende's travels offers a rough reflection of his political view of the world. The visit to the United States left little mark upon him as far as his own words, and the testimonies of his closest collaborators, attest. The focal points of Allende's world were first Chile, then Latin America, then the socialist world, particularly those nations striving to achieve socialism in Third World conditions.

But of course Allende's mental map of the world was not simply shaped by his travels. It was built upon and subsumed within a multifaceted worldview that created a much more nuanced picture. As a Marxist Allende believed in the universality of class struggle, and in capitalism's role in creating poverty, underlined in a speech to Colombia's Congress in August 1971: 'Underdevelopment exists because imperialism exists, imperialism exists

because underdevelopment exists.'[3] Marxism also helped shape Allende's understanding of the role of foreign capital in Chile, in particular the imperialistic role of the region's hegemonic power, the United States. However, Allende was no doctrinaire Marxist. He did not believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat and his world was not divided into two opposing blocs between whom the rest of the world had to choose, although he was undoubtedly much closer and more sympathetic to the USSR than to the United States. Allende believed in the possibility of different forms of revolution, articulating the possibility of a 'parliamentary road' before the CPSU's XX Congress in 1956.[4] Allende's belief in a rather unorthodox set of ideas within the Marxist framework was reflected in the way that he did not hold up any particular foreign revolution as an example to follow, except in the sense of a rather general call to action. The Soviet Union, while respected, was at times criticized – as after the interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Allende sought to build a pluralist, democratic socialism, but he did acknowledge the Soviet Union's leading role in helping to build a socialist future in general, referring to it as 'the cradle of socialism' and the 'elder brother of the socialist countries'.[5] Allende also admired China and Yugoslavia, but there is no doubt that by far the greatest influence on him was the Cuban revolution of 1959. This was a Latin American revolution, and one that, as he also hoped to put into effect, did not limit itself to a 'nationalist' framework of reforms. Yet even here Allende did not think that Cuba was a model to be followed. Cuba was admired, respected and even loved, but it was not Chile and its methods were not valid for Chile.

For Allende, Marxism provided a 'scientific' framework for understanding reality. But it was not a dogma. Instead, it had to be 'constantly enriched' by the latest scientific developments and political experiences.[6] Furthermore, for Chilean Socialists the revolution had to be 'Latin American, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, and antifascist', and its 'essential objective' had to be the economic and political union of Latin America.[7] These ideas, rather unorthodox in world Marxism during the mid-twentieth century, but the basis of the Chilean Socialist Party's ideology, then fed into Allende's views on Chile's place in the world. Chile should oppose imperialism because imperialism shackled Chile to unjust economic forms of distribution, and distorted its society, its institutions and blocked its economic and human development.[8] By extension Chile should oppose all forms of imperialism throughout the world both for ethical reasons and because the more other Third World countries were shackled by imperialism, the fewer allies Chile would have. Chile should also seek close ties to the rest of Latin America, and to the growing Non-aligned Movement in Africa and Asia. Allende's world map, influenced by his worldview, had a decidedly 'North–South' character within which Latin America loomed largest.

However, Marxism was not the only important influence on Allende's worldview. Allende came from an illustrious family, with ancestors who

had helped liberate Chile from Spain, and others who had helped shape the nineteenth-century republic in important ways. From these ancestors he inherited a sense of destiny, a nationalistic Chilean patriotism, a sense of the importance of the individual, and a deep commitment to democracy as 'sublime competition'. This commitment was enhanced by his own brief experiences of imprisonment under the short-lived Ibañez dictatorship (1927–31), and by the brutality of this government's repression of the Communist Party, in particular, and of working-class mobilizations in general. Allende's commitment to democracy was linked to a deeply humanist political attitude. As a young doctor Allende was profoundly affected by his direct experiences of poverty and suffering while working in an insane asylum, and later as an autopsy assistant. In both jobs he was witness to the deep psychological and physical traumas that Chilean capitalism inflicted upon its most vulnerable subjects. This familial and physical legacy combined with the humanism of Marx and Engels' early writings and the lofty aims of the Masonic mission to enlighten the people of the world, to create a rather tolerant, people-centric, and one might say 'enlightened' view of the world. As can be seen in his political methods, and in the vision of the future he outlined in his speeches as president, unlike some Marxists, Allende sought to liberate the oppressors from what he saw as their 'sentence to despotism'.[9] This combination of political ideas and personal experiences created a democratic perspective, one located among a concrete '*pueblo*', rather than above it. Allende was not an architect who built *upon* 'his' people, but one who sought to liberate '*the people*' to build for themselves. This perspective meant that when he became president he was apt to seek consensus and to defer to the views of the majority rather than impose his own – a perspective that may have been fatal to his political project.

Nationalism also played an important role in Allende's worldview. For Allende nationalism had a narrow Chilean and a broader Latin American sense. The subject of that nationalism was a people that shared a similar historical experience of economic and political subordination to foreign power both in the colonial and postcolonial period. The only system that could overcome this unjust legacy was a socialist one, and therefore socialism was, for Allende, the only possible way of realizing nationalist goals. This was a perspective reinforced by his observation of the failures of 'nationalist' revolutions and political processes in Bolivia and Venezuela, for example.[10] Furthermore, imperialism prevented the untrammelled development of national culture and distorted how the 'nation's' history was understood, and therefore for Chile to be truly Chilean it needed to break the chains of cultural dependence on foreign (European and North American) examples. Therefore, the enemies of socialism were at the same time enemies of nationalism, and of the nation as '*pueblo*' and of the 'true' culture of the Chilean people.

This set of beliefs was strongly reflected in Allende's politics. His belief in pluralism and his tolerance of political and religious difference, alongside his hope to liberate his opponents from their oppressive role, meant that Allende rejected violence as a political tool in Chile. Allende might lambast his adversaries in the Senate, but he did not want them shot. Even when his adversaries did break institutional rules Allende did not seek to deal with them with violence or coercion. Allende hated abstracts: 'things', institutions and social structures – not people. As a result the only enemy Allende really visualized was 'imperialism', which as a system was embodied by the US government and those of other developed capitalist powers acting on behalf of their big-business corporations.[11] Yet this must be qualified, because for Allende even imperialism was not a monolithic structure. Instead it was a set of unjust relationships, which were often defended with violence and repression, and which then set off a long chain of distorting effects in Chile and the other nations of Latin America.[12] Imperialism had to be combatted in Chile so as to enable these disabling manifestations of the unjust relations to be dismantled, and for a fairer international system to develop

Two main related areas demonstrate this set of assumptions in practice. Allende's people-centred programme sought the material and spiritual emancipation of the people of Chile and in order to achieve this, education, healthcare and democracy had to be made available and put under the control of the people. But the concrete projects this involved would require financing, and it was here that Allende's ideas openly clashed with the structures of imperialism. Chile's only source of income was exports, and these were overwhelmingly exports of copper and other minerals. Yet US companies controlled these industries, and their associated international markets. Profits from these activities were unregulated, uncounted and exported – mainly to the United States. The mines themselves operated with open disregard for Chilean law, a blatant violation of sovereignty.[13] Therefore, to finance the social projects that would push Chile forward, and to end these violations of sovereignty, Allende argued that Chile needed to bring its mineral resources under domestic control. The struggle to achieve this was hampered by the combined efforts of the Chilean oligarchy, the copper companies and the US government over a sustained period of time. Similar struggles in other parts of Latin America during Allende's lifetime also had to deal with the hostility of the US government and of US companies – as in Guatemala in 1954. As a result, in Allende's worldview, imperialism, emanating largely from the United States, was one of the main brakes on Chilean and Latin American development and therefore the United States, both its government and its elite, were Chile's main international adversaries.

Unlike leaders who had more familiarity with the United States, men like Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela, or José Figueres in Costa Rica, Allende did not come to the conclusion that an accommodation with its overwhelming

economic power was the only option. Instead, Allende was stimulated by the success of the Cuban revolution, and heartened by successful national liberation struggles elsewhere in the Third World. Along with the rise of the non-aligned movement, and what he perceived as the growing strength of socialism, there was increasing room for manoeuvre for a socialist process in Chile, as long as it did not actively seek to take sides in the Cold War conflict.[14] This perception, alongside the growing strength of the popular movement within Chile, gave Allende and his allies confidence in the chances of success for their unique road to a democratic and anti-imperialist socialism.

Allende's worldview was obviously not the only source of Chilean foreign policy during his presidency. Allende's coalition contained two main parties with their own international connections, particularly in Cuba and other socialist countries, but also with political movements around Latin America, and he led a government with an established professional foreign policy bureaucracy. Each of these sometimes pursued their own policies, usually, but not always, within the broad framework of policy of the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular, UP), and therefore it can be said that at any one time there were several 'strands' to Chile's international relations.[15] The basis of this difference was one that also affected the government's domestic situation, which then rebounded upon its foreign policy – Allende's coalition contained two contradictory perspectives on the nature of the Chilean revolution. An important sector, mainly in the Socialist Party and in the smaller and newer parties of the UP – groups like the MAPU and the youth sector of the Radical Party – emphasized the need for a complete seizure of power and rather fetishized 'armed struggle' and revolutionary violence. The other main sector consisted of the 'Allendista' elements in the Socialist Party and among the Communists, who largely believed in a gradual transformation of Chilean society that would avoid the need for an armed seizure of power. This sector was initially dominant because it had designed the government's programme and achieved electoral victory, but as Allende's government began to stumble, the initiative passed to the more confrontational sectors. The incorporation of representatives of both sectors in official delegations sometimes caused confusion, but most importantly, disagreement within the UP over what to do in Chile was increasingly reflected in confusion over the goals of its foreign policy.

However, while on occasion what were known as the 'ultraleft' sectors of the UP prevented Allende from appointing more centrist candidates to diplomatic or government posts, and while different factions in the foreign ministry, the government and in the coalition parties might sometimes pursue their own agendas, this did not mean that the government was unable to carry out a generally coherent foreign policy.[16] Overall, the UP's foreign policy was the external mirror of its process of gradual and institutional reforms at home, both in its methods and in its development over time. Like the

domestic process it began with one set of goals that began to change in some areas once the initiative began to shift away from the government. This altered the emphasis of Chile's foreign policy from the energetic construction of relationships and projection of Chile onto the regional and world stage, towards a more overtly 'Cold War' position that sought out ways of resolving Chile's domestic troubles before the government became almost completely focused on domestic affairs. This was particularly true of Allende's own role in Chile's foreign policy, which is where we can also measure most closely what Allende's mental map of the world looked like, and how closely it matched reality.

The UP 1969 manifesto was the product of consensus building among the left, but it was also the latest in a series of manifestos to which Allende contributed. The manifesto underlined the role of imperialism in Chile's socio-economic and political problems, and listed a series of foreign policy goals and initiatives. The purpose of the UP's foreign policy would be to 'strengthen Chile's political and economic autonomy', but it was also to promote anti-imperialism and Latin Americanism among the peoples of the region, and express solidarity with the peoples of the Third World, particularly those engaged in building socialism. The programme called for self-determination and non-intervention to become the basis of international coexistence, and pledged to promote a Latin American 'figure' on the world stage and strengthen Chile's relations with the socialist countries. The programme also promised to revise all of Chile's treaties with the United States, and push to create a new organization for Latin American states, open diplomatic relations with all countries 'regardless of ideology' and to resolve border issues with neighbours so as to prevent 'imperialist and reactionary intrigues'.[17]

However, the UP's foreign policy was by no means overtly 'revolutionary' in the sense of breaking with established mechanisms or ignoring the realities of Chile's international environment. The UP promised to abide by Chile's existing international commitments – and, as Allende said in his first message to Congress on 21 May 1971, 'the same principles that inform our domestic policy are present in the foreign policy of the country' – the UP would seek to transform the way Chile operated in the international arena, making its policy truly sovereign. Chile would seek to extend cooperation with other Third World countries, and help transform an inter-american system that was, according to its analysis, in crisis and based upon the 'fiction of equality' of all its members while the reality was of a 'marked inequality in favour of the United States'.[18] However, although these broad outlines of policy existed, once confirmed in power Allende and his government needed quickly to establish more exactly how they would seek to achieve the outlined goals.[19]

Chile's immediate international environment initially looked positive. Bolivia was governed by an unstable leftist military regime, Peru by the

anti-imperialist Velasco government – only Argentina was ruled by a right-wing military dictatorship. Argentina was therefore the focus of Chile's most important foreign policy push under Allende. However, how could an overtly ideological and Marxist government achieve understanding and disarm the fears of a right-wing dictatorship? To achieve this goal the UP pursued a policy of 'ideological pluralism', which was as much a foreign policy extension of Allende's belief in democracy as it was a tool of foreign relations, and which emphasized a deep commitment to non-intervention and absolute respect for self-determination.[20] This was both eminently practical and totally coherent with the ideology of the new government.

Allende's government expected some US hostility towards its proposed nationalization of Chile's natural resources and to its political project for Chile, but it had no way of knowing exactly what forms this would take, nor how aggressive this hostility would be. The UP's representatives in Washington were soon led to believe that US policy would be reasonable and mainly concerned with the terms of the copper nationalization.[21] Nixon and Kissinger directed that US policy would outwardly be 'cool and correct' but would vigorously pursue the overthrow of the Allende government.[22] In international politics the Nixon administration soon began to implement a policy that sought to isolate Chile from the rest of Latin America. This Machiavellian posturing by the Nixon administration made it exceedingly difficult for the Chilean government to design and implement an adequate policy towards the United States during its first year.

To an extent though US policy would depend upon how the Chileans decided to take forward their nationalization project, an issue that was not decided until a month into Allende's government. In October 1970, before his inauguration, Allende had asked advisers to draw up a plan by which to neutralize the likely parliamentary opposition to his key reforms, including nationalizations. These advisers came up with a four-point plan, which was presented to Allende on 25 October. Their plan was to link the highly popular copper nationalization to a set of important political reforms. They thought that this would force a split between the centrist Christian Democrats and the right-wing National Party, and create some room for manoeuvre for the UP.[23] If it had been victorious, it would have avoided the subsequent institutional stalemate; it would have created a democratic fact that would have complicated a hostile US posture, even more than that achieved by the unanimous vote for nationalization in Congress. It was classic Allende politics, combining daring with utmost confidence. However, the leaders of the UP did not agree to the plan, when it was put to them at the end of November. They feared crippling the government before it had even begun, assuming that the nationalization process would in itself create support for any political reforms.[24] Although Allende returned to similar plans several times, he did not force the issue. The result was to tie the government's potential to economic results in the short term, and to ensure that

future developments would occur within the existing, stalemated institutional context. This had serious ramifications for the UP at home and abroad towards the end of Allende's government.

In the interim the Nixon administration began efforts to isolate Chile internationally, spreading negative and often invented propaganda about events in Chile through the CIA and US representatives in Latin America. US officials also expressed a renewed interest in working with Latin American countries in the context of Latin America's 'new political configuration'.[25] This new 'configuration' was greeted with alarm in Brasilia as well as Washington. It was soon clear to Chilean officials that Brazil was aiming to undermine the Allende government internally and isolate it within 'ideological borders' externally as part of an effort to boost Brazilian standing in the region.[26] Therefore the UP faced two main foes in the international arena – Brazil and the United States, and both of these were seeking out and supporting the UP's domestic foes inside Chile and trying to isolate it internationally.

These efforts were hampered, however, by the difficulty of portraying an elected government as a threat, and by the UP's active foreign policy. In early 1971 Chile began energetically working on its Latin American and 'Third Worldist' foreign policy. Within four months Chile had established diplomatic relations with Cuba and China, and Santiago had been designated the site of the third UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) despite Washington and Brasilia's opposition. Three months after this Chile had reached out to Argentina and Allende was about to meet Argentina's president General Lanusse. Chilean efforts were facilitated by Argentinean fears of the increasingly cosy relationship between the Nixon administration and Brazil's authoritarian regime, but nevertheless the meeting's results were not a foregone conclusion.[27] Salvador Allende was at the forefront of this crucial test for both the UP's foreign policy and the accuracy of Allende's mental map of the region.

At the time of Allende's election in Chile, Argentina was governed by the second dictator of its 'Argentinean Revolution', General Roberto Levingston. The Argentine regime faced economic crisis, a serious left-wing insurgency, nationalist and left-wing political opposition and geopolitical pressure from the military regime in Brazil. Confronted with these problems, by 1970 the regime had begun to follow a policy of its own 'ideological pluralism' characterized as 'heterodox occidentalism', which maintained that while Argentina remained within the 'western world', it should seek to reach out to the global 'middle class' of similar nations regardless of their ideology. As a result the military regime opened relations with some socialist countries, and also began reaching out towards the Non-aligned Movement in 1969, marking some distance from the United States. Argentina also made efforts to improve relations with Eduardo Frei's government in Chile, leading to the signing of the Santiago Declaration in early 1970, which promised

both sides would resolve differences peacefully and by legal means. The UP manifesto which declared that, under the UP, Chile would be committed to a negotiated resolution of border issues in order to forestall 'imperialist intrigues' signalled that Allende's government would seek to build upon this legacy. This commitment was well received by the Argentineans, and they backed Chile's application to host the third UNCTAD conference.[28] Levingston's government fell soon after Chile was confirmed as the hosts of UNCTAD in March 1971, to be replaced by that of General Alejandro Lanusse. Lanusse continued the previous policy of engagement and 'ideological pluralism' (which was also maintained in Argentinean relations with Peru) so as to counter Brazilian influence, prevent Chile becoming a haven for Argentinean insurgents, and so as to ease domestic political pressures and promote economic links. This set of concerns helps explain why General Lanusse had rejected the CIA's invitation to help overthrow Allende on 15 September 1970.[29]

Meanwhile President Allende expressed his hopes for the relationship with Argentina in his 21 May address to Congress, when he said 'it is a fundamental proposal of this government to reinforce, strengthen and develop all those links and relations that allow us to grow our traditional friendship'. Allende also highlighted Argentina's economic importance to Chile, and extolled the work being planned to develop infrastructure along their shared border.[30] In June 1971 the Argentinean foreign minister visited Chile to discuss the problem of the Beagle Channel, and various other issues, laying the groundwork for Allende's visit to Salta in Argentina a month later.

In Salta, Allende and Lanusse found common ground and mutual sympathy despite their political differences.[31] It was an important event for both sides, with Lanusse attending despite suffering from painful renal colic. Undeterred by the pain, Lanusse found energy for humour, murmuring to Allende as they waited for their hymns to be played out, 'I see we have a lapse in protocol.' Allende glanced to his sides and said, 'I can't see any lapse, General.' Lanusse responded, 'Well, they've put me on the left and you on the right.' Allende burst into laughter. The two men rapidly developed a good rapport. The agreements signed at Salta secured both sides' most important border, and prevented the isolation of Allende's government. It was a notable victory for Allende, one that reflected the accuracy of his, and the UP's assumptions about the situation in Latin America, whereby Chile's own 'ideological pluralism' would not be out of kilter with the needs of the region's other governments, nor out of step with the prevailing mood.

Allende's next move was to build upon this success by going on a tour of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, Chile's partners in the Andean Pact. As with Argentina, this trip was a notable success. In Ecuador thousands turned out to greet the Chilean delegation, Allende twisting his ankle in the tumult in Guayaquil. In Colombia Allende addressed Congress with a Bolivarian message of regional solidarity and a vision of an integrated Latin America. From

Bogota, Allende flew to Lima to meet President Velasco Alvarado of Peru, a general risen from the ranks who was leading a process that in its nationalizations, agrarian reform and international reorientation, mirrored Allende's. Peru faced some of the same international problems as Chile, and the two leaders, 'El Chino' Velasco, and 'El Chicho' Allende, as they came to know one another, rapidly built a rapport that overcame the traditional reserve between the two countries, as the Chilean ambassador to Peru recalled.[32] In all three countries Allende was greeted with popular acclaim and political success, with joint declarations that demonstrated that the UP's Latin Americanist policy reflected the political and economic priorities of these countries. Allende returned to Chile triumphant.

Allende's personal efforts were complemented by the feverish activity of his Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, who accompanied him on his Latin American tour, and also took Chile's message to the OAS, Eastern Europe, Cuba, the UN and the G77. During 1972 the world came to Chile during the UN Conference on Trade and Development, allowing Allende to present his ideas on what the Third World ought to do to confront an unjust global system. These boiled down to a united front against the world's developed capitalist nations, making UNCTAD a permanent UN institution, and ensuring that the Third World participate actively in the creation of the new global economic system, for which the moment was favourable, although Allende admitted this judgement was 'perhaps too optimistic'. A key feature of this new system could be an international 'Fund for Homogeneous Human Development' that would use monies previously assigned to military expenditure to finance infrastructure projects and other programmes.[33] However, even if adopted none of these measures would have immediate effects. Allende was appealing to the future, which was fine while things were seemingly going smoothly in Chile, with Allende's coalition winning just over 50 per cent of the vote in April's municipal elections and a growing economy. The problem would come when Chile's process began to hit rough seas. Then, the disunity and the economic weakness of the Third World would make it unable to help Allende's Chile.

In the meantime Allende's government continued to notch up international successes, most notably in Chile's relations with Western Europe. Here the UP built upon already established good relations, which, combined with the strength of social democracy in Western Europe, and the obvious similarities between it and the Chilean process, helped to create a positive environment. The UP even found a willing partner in Franco's Spain, testament to the validity of the concept of 'ideological pluralism'.[34] In Europe the Chileans were able to renegotiate their debts to the Paris Club despite US hostility, and were able to prevent West Germany from breaking off relations when Chile recognized the German Democratic Republic. Here again everything seemed to point to the correctness of Chile's non-aligned position and the strengths of its democratic road to socialism.

However, it was also during 1972 that Allende's government began to hit problems. Economic growth and other positive indicators achieved during the government's first year began to decline. The reasons were various: a US-imposed credit squeeze, falling prices for copper – Chile's main export – the dislocating effects of the agrarian reform and nationalizations, and the inflationary effects of increased consumer spending power. The political situation began to deteriorate too, amid growing polarization – the centrist Christian Democrats increasingly allied with the right, both inside and outside Congress – and the opposition as a whole started to act with increasing boldness, both legally and illegally. While the right counted on the backing of US transnationals, agencies and the US government, the 'dogmatic' left kept pressing for the process to become more traditionally 'revolutionary', creating alternative organizations and stoking social conflict.[35] Towards the end of the year the middle and upper class were engaging in the mass stockpiling of consumer goods leading to shortages for the majority of the population. Terrorist groups linked to the opposition carried out bombings, shootings and other armed actions. Then in October 1972 the transport owners went on strike, paralysing the domestic economy at harvest time, exacerbating shortages and creating economic chaos, and meanwhile, Chile still needed to pay its debts, much of them accrued by the previous administration. The situation seemed to point towards a catastrophic default.

This situation formed the context for Allende's next round of foreign visits, this time to Mexico, New York (to address the United Nations), Algeria, the Soviet Union, Cuba and Venezuela. These trips reflected Allende's efforts to maintain the impetus of his first year's diplomacy and put pressure on the United States, and also the urgent need to get credits from the USSR to allow Chile to pay off an $80 million dollar short-term loan from Latin American countries.[36] At the UN Allende gave a powerful and heartfelt speech, in which he illustrated the 'universal and transcendental' problems Chile was facing – the struggle for social liberation, for welfare and intellectual progress, the defence of Chile's national dignity. It was a speech that in its North–South orientation echoed the one he had made at UNCTAD several months earlier, and which underlined the role of transnationals in Chile's underdevelopment. Allende denounced the 'grave aggression' Chile was being subjected to, the great pressures from outside, the efforts to isolate Chile, to strangulate its economy, to paralyse the copper trade, and starve it of credit – it was, he said, an 'oblique, underground, devious' attack. It was also one that was a local expression of a regional, and a global, reality for the Third World. Allende welcomed the 'almost complete overcoming of the Cold War' in relations between the socialist countries and the West, but underlined the steps that still needed to be taken to create real peace.[37] It was a speech that contained several messages for different audiences – it was a rallying call for Latin America and the Third World, a warning to the United

States as Allende quoted John F. Kennedy, saying, 'those who make peaceful revolution impossible, will make violent revolution inevitable'; and an appeal for solidarity. 'I am sure that you, representatives of the nations of the earth will know how to understand my words', he said, but it was not clear exactly what he expected them to do. The speech got a standing ovation from the General Assembly, but the reality was that the majority of the countries there were not in a strong position either to provide economic assistance or apply pressure on the United States.

Allende's next stop was Algeria, which was to host the Non-aligned Movement's fourth Summit in September 1973. After listening to Allende describe the situation in Chile, President Boumedienne simply asked about the Chilean armed forces. Then, apologizing for his frankness, Boumedienne explained that in his experience it was necessary to purge the armed forces of all potential counter-revolutionaries, and that without doing this, the Chilean process was built on quicksand.[38] His opinion was not welcome, and perhaps it illustrates one of the reasons why few countries would take concrete action to defend Chile – they simply had no confidence in its chances of survival.

From Algeria the Chilean delegation headed to Moscow, where they met an advance party led by the Chilean Communist Party's leader, Luis Corvalán. An ill Brezhnev discharged himself from hospital to meet the Chileans at Vnukovo airport, and the huge crowds that lined the streets into the city impressed the delegation. Yet such popular support would prove difficult to translate into effective action. The Chileans were looking for hard currency, of which the Soviets had a shortage. Furthermore, the Soviets had already allocated significant sums to the Chileans during 1971 ($115 million) and 1972, and had also already agreed substantial long-term investments that amounted to over $500 million dollars.[39] Chile had used almost none of these loans. The Soviets were also concerned about UP's political problems, in particular the increasingly sharp division between what they called 'ultraleftists' and the 'Allendistas' in the coalition.[40] Nor was Allende's case helped by the overt anti-Sovietism of some of the Chilean delegates. The Soviets delayed their response. The mood among the Chileans was somewhat sombre when Allende spoke at the banquet in his honour. Allende underlined both Chile's great economic potential and its 'current poverty'. He eulogized the importance of Vietnam, and he put Chile on a similar level, emphasizing the importance of Soviet solidarity to Chile.[41] It was a subdued speech in comparison to much of his public oratory. The Chileans redoubled their efforts, but came away with a $45 million dollar credit instead of the $80 million they needed. Allende was, by some accounts, dejected.[42] However, the Chileans were eventually able to avoid a default – with the Soviets providing a total of $106 million at the end of 1972 and in early 1973 – and with loans from other socialist countries. The Chinese provided £20 million sterling, and other socialist countries provided

smaller sums. The assistance was enough, according to Chile's then-Foreign Minister, for Chile to avoid a default.[43] However, the difficulties in negotiating the loans pointed to an overestimation of Soviet economic capabilities, and an underestimation of the way that Chile's domestic problems reflected upon its quest for assistance. On the political level the Soviets reiterated their support for the UP, and condemned imperialist interference, but they would not risk détente for an unstable process in Chile.

From Moscow Allende flew to Cuba, where he no doubt felt much more at home. This was partly a reflection of a shared language and his long-standing relationship with Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution in general, and because of the burgeoning relationship between the two countries during the 1970–73 period. In Cuba Allende found wholehearted backing for the Chilean revolution, but an inability to assist economically in a meaningful way – in this it was less productive than the visit to Moscow. In political terms the periodic 'revolutionary' legitimization of the Chilean Road to Socialism by the Cubans was valuable, both in the Third World, and among the UP's supporters in Chile. Still, even the Cubans were worried about the direction of events in Chile, and although they provided some weaponry and training for pro-government groups, without a clear decision on military preparations from Allende this would make little difference.

Following the end of the October truckers' strike the situation in Chile became calmer, both sides anticipating a political victory, and a denouement in the March 1973 elections. It was only with the UP increasing its share of parliament in these elections that the stage was set for a violent overthrow. The opposition had been unable to mobilize sufficient popular support, and was now forced to turn towards the military, which soon became the focus of incredible pressure. The UP and its supporters appeared increasingly paralysed, despite successfully overcoming a coup attempt in late June. The 'ultraleft' bayed for the people to be armed while the Communists proclaimed 'no to civil war', and Allende continued to hold out for an institutional solution. Meanwhile, apart from the United States, Brazil and Cuba, the rest of the world stood by and watched as Chile stumbled, with seeming inevitability, towards the violent overthrow of the UP, the death of Salvador Allende and the destruction of Chile's transformational process.

Allende's mental map, then, reveals a man whose worldview enabled him to come to broadly accurate conclusions about the dynamics of the international system, but whose distance from the epicentres of global politics blinded him from seeing some of its important features. Allende's mental map was accurate closer to home, or when dealing with the considerations of Third World countries like Chile. It was less accurate when considering the positions of the superpowers and the calculations that they were obliged to make.

Allende was correct not only in his broad understanding of the times in Latin America, but also in his appreciation that the correlation of forces

was shifting away from local oligarchies and the United States, and towards nationalist, and 'progressive' regimes – as occurred in Peru, Panama and Bolivia. Allende was right, too, that this would create political space for a non-aligned but Latin Americanist international project and would facilitate integration processes that would have immediate political effects, and longer-term economic benefits for the Chilean process. Allende was also right that the same pressures would create positive conditions for 'ideological pluralism' between Latin American nations of differing political types, such as those he was able to build with Argentina, and that this would help shield the UP from US hostility.

The generally positive results of Chile's diplomatic activity in Western Europe also point towards a broadly correct appreciation of increasing multipolarity in world affairs, and of a European willingness to lead an independent foreign policy towards Chile. The Third World's reaction to Chilean activism shows that Allende and the UP were largely correct in identifying an increasingly anti-imperialist mood, but that they underestimated how disunited it was, and how slowly it would move to create alternative institutions.

Nevertheless, it is with regard to the superpowers and the nature of the Cold War that Allende's mental map proved most inaccurate. Allende clearly overestimated Soviet strength, and more particularly the way that its military power would translate into economic and political influence far from home. While the Soviets may have achieved security for themselves and the socialist world in Eurasia, the lesson Allende ought to have drawn from Vietnam, Korea and Cuba was that this power had severe limits further afield, that détente held little sway outside the European theatre and bilateral superpower relations. Allende miscalculated the extent to which the Soviets would be willing to make a stand over Chile, and in this Allende also misunderstood the way that the Soviets and other more 'traditional' socialists viewed the pluralism of the Chilean process. Where Allende saw strength in diversity they saw dangerous disunity. Where Allende sought to uphold the democratic 'conquests' of the Chilean people they tended to see him failing to deal with hostile bourgeois institutions. None of which encouraged them to invest their precious economic and political resources in Chile.

Nor did Allende prove to have an accurate idea of the capacity of the United States to influence events in Chile, despite détente, increasing multipolarity and being embroiled in Vietnam. While he clearly understood that US opposition would be forthcoming, he failed to predict the depth of Nixon and Kissinger's hostility to the Chilean process, nor how the very nature of 'the Chilean Road to Socialism', in combination with the lack of theoretical clarity over its destination, made it more, not less, susceptible to disruption. Ever the democrat Allende did not override opponents within the UP to push through political reforms that would have altered the institutional framework, and once the depth of US hostility became crystal clear during

1973, Allende still shied away from taking the kind of measures that might have ensuring the survival of the socialist project, if not of the 'peaceful road'. In this Allende also exaggerated the 'Chilean singularity' which had brought him to power, and which had resisted three years of heavy pressure but which failed catastrophically in the end. In an interview in early 1971, Allende said he thought US domestic troubles and 'worldwide repulsion' at US actions in Vietnam made it more difficult for the United States to operate in Latin America, and that in addition, the methods of the Chilean Road to Socialism meant that 'their hands are tied'. This was clearly not true and it betrays a certain propensity to exaggerate the importance of legal niceties.

Allende's mental map of Chile was initially fairly accurate, but he failed to adjust it to changing circumstances. Chile's institutions were flexible enough to allow his government to take power, and they were strong enough to withstand three years of increasing pressure and polarization. However, the combined effects of the profound systemic transformations his government began, with increasing political polarization and external intervention, changed the political environment and the rules of the game. The locus of power within the state shifted towards the military, and that of opposition activity from the formulation and communication of their opposition towards organization and physical action. Problems at home then reflected upon Allende's ability to achieve his international goals. Allende's mental map was most accurate when Chile's domestic situation was under control. When the parameters began to shift, the inaccuracies in his mental map of the Cold War proved to be fatal to the UP, and in the end, to Salvador Allende himself.

Notes

1. For a more detailed biography and exposition of the development of Allende's thought, see my book *Salvador Allende: Revolutionary Democrat* (London, 2013). This is the most detailed modern biography of Allende in English. For further reading in Spanish see Eduardo Labarca, *Salvador Allende: biografía sentimental* (Santiago, 2007); Jesus Manuel Martínez, *Salvador Allende: El hombre que abría las alamedas* (Santiago, 2009); Mario Amorós*, Allende, la biografía* (Santiago, 2013); Diana Veneros, *Allende: Un ensayo psicobiográfico* (Santiago, 2003); Iosef Lavretsky, *Salvador Allende* (Moscow, 1974).
2. For more on this, see Allende's speeches during his 1971 tour of Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. These can be found in *Salvador Allende y America Latina* (Mexico, undated).
3. Speech to Colombian Congress, Bogota, 31 August 1971, in *Discursos Salvador Allende* (Havana, 1975), 172.
4. See speech on 'Permanent Defence of Democracy', 18 June 1948. Chilean Senate Records, Sessions 14 and 15, Available online at Archivo Chile, http://www.archivochile.com/S_Allende_UP/doc_de_sallende/SAde0064.pdf.

5. Speech to the People on Bernardo O'Higgins Avenue, 28 November 1972, available online at the Salvador Allende archive, http://www.salvador-allende.cl/Discursos/1972/28_11_1972.pdf.
6. Julio César Jobet, *Historia Del Partido Socialista De Chile* (Santiago, 1987), pp. 79–80.
7. Salvador Allende, Speech at the Caupolicán Theatre in early 1944. Available online at the Salvador Allende archive, http://www.salvador-allende.cl/Documentos/1939-49/TEATRO%20CAUPOLICAN.pdf.
8. See the introduction to the 'Basic Programme of the Popular Unity Government' of 1969 for a description of the ways that imperialism was understood to distort Chilean reality. The programme is available online at the Memoria Chilena archive, http://www.memoriachilena.cl/archivos2/pdfs/MC0000544.pdf.
9. First Annual Message to Congress, 21 May 1971, in James Cockcroft and Jane Canning (eds), *Salvador Allende Reader: Chile's Voice of Democracy* (Melbourne, 2000), p. 94.
10. Regis Debray, *Conversations with Allende* (London, 1971), pp. 68–71.
11. See point 4 of the Popular Unity's Basic Programme; or Allende speaking on Guatemala in the Senate. Chilean Senate Records, Session 4a, 2 June 1954, Salvador Allende Foundation Archive (Hereafter SAFA), Santiago, Chile.
12. See Speech at Inauguration of Third UNCTAD Conference, 13 April 1972; Speech to the UN General Assembly, 4 December 1972 both in Cockcroft and Canning (eds), *Salvador Allende Reader*, pp. 156, 200.
13. Debate on Copper in Senate. Chilean Senate Records, Session 30a, 20 January 1955, SAFA.
14. Clodomiro Almeyda, *Reencuentro con mi vida* (Santiago, 1987), pp. 214–15.
15. Walter Sanchez Gonzalez, 'Chile en sus relaciones con los países vecinos y los países andinos en los anos 1970–1973', in Jorge Vera Castillo (ed.), *La política exterior chilena durante el gobierno del presidente Allende 1970–1973* (Santiago, 1987), p. 222. The debate on how far the foreign policy of the UP was ideological or pragmatic is presented in this book, with Chilean historian Joaquín Fermandois the chief proponent of the view that the UP carried out an ideological foreign policy. For a more complete exposition of this view see idem, *Chile y el Mundo 1970–1973. La Política Exterior del Gobierno de la Unidad Popular y el Sistema Internacional* (Santiago, 1985).
16. Ibid., p. 222.
17. *Política Internacional del Gobierno Popular*, in the Basic Programme of the Popular Unity Government, 1969.
18. First Annual Message to Congress, 21 May 1971, in Cockcroft and Canning (eds), *Salvador Allende Reader*, p. 111.
19. Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 2011), p. 75.
20. 'Salta Declaration' signed by President Lanusse of Argentina and President Allende of Chile, 24 July 1971, available in Vera Castillo, *La política exterior chilena*, p. 465.
21. Harmer, *Allende's Chile*, pp. 86–7.
22. NSC Memorandum 93, 'Policy towards Chile', 9 November 1970, National Security Archive.
23. Joan Garcés, *Allende y la experiencia chilena: las armas de la política* (Santiago, 1991), pp. 220–1.
24. Ibid., pp. 224–5.
25. Nixon cited in Harmer, *Allende's Chile*, p. 93.

26. Ibid., pp. 92, 95.
27. Ibid., p. 102.
28. For a more detailed description of Argentinean foreign policy during the period see Andrés Cisneros and Carlos Escudé (eds), *Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores Argentinas* (Buenos Aires, 2000), available online, http://www.argentina-rree.com/14/14-014.htm.
29. Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (London, 2007), p. 309.
30. First Annual Message to Congress, 21 May 1971, in Cockcroft and Canning (eds), *Salvador Allende Reader*.
31. Gabriel Salazar, *Conversaciones con Carlos Altamirano* (Santiago, 2011), p. 258.
32. Luis Jerez, *Ilusiones y Quebrantos* (Santiago, 2007), pp. 73–5.
33. Speech at Inauguration of Third UNCTAD Conference, in Cockcroft and Canning (eds), *Salvador Allende Reader*, p. 174.
34. María José Henríquez Uzal, *¡Viva la verdadera amistad! Franco y Allende, 1970–1973* (Santiago, 2014).
35. For more on this deterioration see Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File* (New York, 2003); and Francisco Herreros, *Del gobierno del pueblo a la rebelión popular* (Santiago, 2003).
36. Luis Corvalán, *De lo vivido y lo peleado* (Santiago, 1997), p. 144.
37. Speech to the UN General Assembly, 4 December 1972, in Cockcroft and Canning (eds), *Salvador Allende Reader*, p. 200.
38. Clodomiro Almeyda, *Reencuentro con mi vida* (Santiago, 1987), p. 183.
39. Figures from Corvalán, *De lo vivido y lo peleado*, pp. 144–7; Almeyda, *Reencuentro con mi vida*, p. 232; Vera Castillo, *La política exterior chilena*, pp. 251–72.
40. Harmer, *Allende's Chile*, p. 197.
41. Speech in the Kremlin, 6 December 1972, in Vera Castillo, *La política exterior chilena*, p. 527.
42. Harmer, *Allende's Chile*, p. 199; Corvalán, *De lo vivido y lo peleado*, p. 146.
43. Almeyda, *Reencuentro con mi vida*, p. 232.

4
Nicolae Ceaușescu

Eliza Gheorghe

In the traditional narrative of the Cold War, Nicolae Ceaușescu, the leader of the Socialist Republic of Romania and General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) from 1965 until 1989, remains the *enfant terrible* of the Eastern Bloc. By this term, historians underline that he was an adamantly anti-Soviet, nationalist, pro-Western leader, pursuing an independent foreign policy.[1] However, recent scholarship and newly declassified archival documents cast a very different light on Ceaușescu. He was not only eager to cooperate with the USSR, but also bent on undermining the capitalist bloc.[2] The sources of Ceaușescu's behaviour can be traced to his upbringing and family environment; his education, involvement in the communist movement and international experience; his personal values and role models; and finally his approach towards the structural forces (ideological, political, strategic, economic and geographic) that shaped international affairs during this time. It was interdependence not independence that anchored Ceaușescu's policies in the global Cold War.

Early Life

Poverty and family violence pushed the 11-year-old Ceaușescu from his small village in the south of Romania into the capital city, Bucharest.[3] He was born in 1918, into a large peasant family, which left him with very few choices but to become a ploughman, like his father.[4] Agriculture dominated the Romanian economy: as late as 1950, 75 per cent of the population lived off cultivating land and raising livestock.[5] But the young Ceaușescu tried his fortune in the city, following one of his older sisters. In Bucharest, he became the apprentice of a shoemaker, who introduced him to the then-illegal communist movement.[6] Trade unions and the industrial proletariat were weak at the time, which is why during the inter-war period, Ceaușescu got into trouble with the law repeatedly. He became well known at the age of 18, when he was tried for his involvement in the Anti-Fascist movement. Ceaușescu caused a great commotion in the trial with his continuing protests, leading

the judge to exclude him from court. The fracas around the trial piqued the interest of a journalist, Eugen Jebeleanu. In an interview, he described Ceaușescu as a small and dark fellow, with sparkling eyes, 'like two peppercorns'.[7] Ceaușescu spoke clearly yet a bit too fast, exuding what must have struck the journalist as youth, boldness and eagerness.[8] Ceaușescu's revolutionary fervour put him behind bars on several occasions, in Doftana, Brașov, Jilava, Caransebeș and Târgu Jiu. Yet, he also had more mundane preoccupations, such as the pursuit of his sweetheart, Elena (Lenuța) Petrescu, a textile worker. While behind bars in Jilava, Ceaușescu got permission to see a dentist outside the prison. He persuaded one of the guards to let him visit Elena; under escort, he met her in a safe house used by other communists, compromising their security. This amorous escapade earned him and Elena a sanction and a reprimand, respectively, from their comrades.[9] This experience taught Ceaușescu a lesson about the importance of secrecy, deceit and dissimulation, skills which he would later find useful in his foreign policy.

Ceaușescu's repeated incarcerations played a crucial role in shaping his mental map. While his time in jail deprived him of the first-hand experience in key events such as the Second World War, he had the tremendous luck to share his prison cell with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the leader of the communist movement, who took him under his wing.[10] Ceaușescu regarded the Doftana jail as an 'academy of revolutionary thought'.[11] Here the convicts, grouped together to make it easier for the guards to watch them, taught each other about Marxism-Leninism, Soviet history or the socio-economic order envisaged by communism.[12] This *esprit de corps* did not prevent the emergence of personal rivalries and tensions. While at Doftana, Ceaușescu took charge of several key roles in managing prison life, including distributing food for the inmates.[13] His larger responsibilities brought about the resentment of other imprisoned communists, such as Gheorghe Apostol, who served as General Secretary of the Romanian Workers' Party (RWP) between 1954 and 1955. They mocked his stammer and heavy Southern accent, and accused him of collaborating with the prison guards in exchange for lighter punishments.[14] These experiences instilled a deep sense of distrust in Ceaușescu, making him rely heavily on family ties and surround himself with sycophants. Elena Petrescu, who became Ceaușescu's wife in 1947, occupied prominent positions in the political and scientific environment.[15] She did not have a BSc, but managed to get a PhD in chemistry under the supervision of Professor Ioan Ursu, who led the Romanian nuclear programme from 1969 until 1976.[16] Her ascent to power gave her enormous influence over Romania's domestic and foreign policies. With her election to the Central Committee of the RCP in 1972, she became the second most powerful person after her husband. Their youngest son, Nicu, also benefitted from the nepotistic system fostered by the Ceaușescus. He took an early interest in politics, rising all the way to the Executive Committee of the RCP. His appointment as Ceaușescu's successor in the 1980s earned

the regime in Romania the reputation of 'dynastic communism' à la North Korea.[17]

Rise to Power

Freed from prison in August 1944, Ceauşescu was assigned to work for the Union of Communist Youth.[18] He later remembered how weak the RCP had been in the inter-war period and how much it depended on the Soviet Army's presence after the Second World War.[19] These years when the RCP lacked popular support and legitimacy left an indelible mark on Ceauşescu's mental map. He not only advocated collaborating with enemy forces, until the conditions for revolution ripened, but also blamed foreigners for the RCP's problems.[20] But this attitude brought about harsh criticism from Moscow, leading to accusations that the Romanians came close to betraying the revolution. Instead of obliterating the bourgeoisie, whose epitome was the monarchy, the RCP collaborated with King Michael I and formed a national-unity government from 1945 until 1947. To dodge charges of collusion with the Fascists, the RCP leadership invoked the inter-war negotiations for a non-aggression pact, which had resulted in the 1936 Gentlemen's Agreement between Nicolae Titulescu and Maxim Litvinov. This mutual assistance convention, Ceauşescu claimed, provided the groundwork for the anti-Fascist insurrection and showed that Bucharest had never been Moscow's enemy. The Soviets remained sceptical about Ceauşescu's arguments and reminded the RCP leadership that Romania fought alongside Hitler.[21]

The future General Secretary had developed something of an inferiority complex because the RCP had been put into power by the Red Army. The Romanian leadership was also aware of its inferior ideological credentials, which lagged behind those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for the simple fact that the RCP emerged much later.[22] Once, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, reminded the Romanians that without the Red Army, the leadership in Bucharest would not be able to hold on to power.[23] The Romanian Communist Party not only lacked popular support, but also did not follow the Marxist-Leninist recipe for class struggle and the victory of the proletariat, as there was no country-wide popular revolution against the fascists.

The Romanians themselves feared having former collaborators of the *ancien régime* among them, which resulted in widespread distrust in the late 1940s and early 1950s.[24] Repeated purges, meant to uproot reactionaries, had replaced experienced bureaucrats with unskilled workers and peasants. Having a sound, acceptable social origin helped Ceauşescu climb the power ladder. With the communists' ascent to power in 1947, he began his prodigious political career, first as the minister of agriculture, then the deputy minister of the armed forces.[25] Despite his modest background, Ceauşescu

saw himself as particularly well suited to play a dominant part in domestic and international matters. His foreign affairs education amounted to special training courses at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow at the end of the 1940s, where he had learned some Russian. That experience familiarized the young Ceaușescu with Soviet thinking and the power dynamics inside the CPSU.[26]

After joining the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party thanks to Gheorghiu-Dej's personal intervention, Ceaușescu became deeply involved in foreign policy issues, focusing on Bucharest's ties to Moscow, taking part in Romania's mediation efforts in the Sino–Soviet split, and visiting Pyongyang and Belgrade.[27] At that time, however, Bucharest rarely established relations with countries outside the international communist movement, which precluded Ceaușescu from acquiring the global statesman status he craved. In a stroke of fortune for him, Gheorghiu-Dej, the General Secretary of the RWP, issued the 'Declaration of Independence' of April 1964. This asserted that Romania's foreign policy would be based on the principle of respect for national sovereignty, mutually advantageous relations, non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful coexistence.[28] Ceaușescu extracted a great deal of domestic and international political capital by repeating this mantra, making Romanians and foreigners alike think he was a reform-minded leader and a maverick vis-à-vis Moscow.[29]

When Gheorghiu-Dej died in March 1965 from cancer, Ceaușescu managed to assume the leadership of the party.[30] The conventional narrative holds that because Gheorghiu-Dej's death took everyone by surprise, the succession was much more the result of improvisation than the product of a deliberate appointment.[31] According to this interpretation, Ceaușescu emerged as the compromise candidate, pushing aside Gheorghe Apostol.[32] Recent scholarship casts a different light, arguing that Ceaușescu's ascent to power was not accidental. In fact, he had been groomed to become General Secretary.[33] Gheorghiu-Dej progressively increased his responsibilities, making him a member of the Politburo at the age of 37. Moreover, Ceaușescu owed his anointment to Gheorghiu-Dej's 'old guard': Stoica Chivu, Emil Bodnăraș and Ion Gheorghe Maurer.[34] Stoica Chivu, a worker for the Romanian Railways, was prime minister between 1955 and 1961 and later became the President of the State Council and Secretary of the Central Committee from 1967. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, an attorney by training, was the ultimate operator. Even Nikita Khrushchev, who rarely saw eye to eye with the Romanian leadership, praised him for his politeness and good manners, mentioning that 'it was always a pleasure to do business with him.'[35] As the second-in-command, he travelled extensively and represented Romania at many high-level international meetings, and occasionally served as Ceaușescu's special envoy to Beijing, Hanoi and Washington.[36]

Bodnăraș remains one of the most enigmatic figures of the Romanian communist regime. After graduating as valedictorian from the Military

Academy in Timișoara and later from the Special Artillery Officer Academy in Bucharest, in 1932 he clandestinely crossed the border into the Soviet Union and joined the Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie (State Political Directorate – GPU), the forerunner of the KGB.[37] He returned to Romania in 1935 to gather intelligence for the Soviets, but he was exposed and ended up in prison until November 1942.[38] After the communist regime was installed in Bucharest, he headed the Party Secret Police and the Intelligence Services (1945–47), the Ministry of Defence (1947–55) and the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications (1956–59).[39] As Minister of Defence, he regularly sent promising Romanian communists to Moscow, including Nicolae Ceaușescu, to attend courses at various Soviet military schools. As Minister of Transportation, he allowed Soviet tanks to pass through Romanian territory on their way to Budapest, where they put an end to the Hungarian Revolution of October–November 1956.[40] As Ceaușescu was consolidating his grip on power, he relied heavily on Bodnăraș, especially for various diplomatic initiatives, such as the Romanian mediation between the US and North Vietnam. In 1965, Ceaușescu appointed Bodnăraș as Vice President of the State Council and kept him as a close confidant until Bodnăraș's death in 1976. His various roles have intrigued many historians particularly because of his close association with the Soviet intelligence services.

It was thanks to the protection provided by these three veterans – Chivu, Bodnăraș and Maurer, that Ceaușescu decided to denounce Gheorghiu-Dej in April 1968. As the spectre of Gheorghiu-Dej obstructed Ceaușescu's dominance of Romanian politics, the young General Secretary decided to move against his deceased mentor. Ceaușescu used an investigation into the assassination of Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu to condemn the power abuses of his predecessor. As Gheorghiu-Dej could no longer be held accountable for this crime, the blame fell on Alexandru Drăghici, the head of the Security Services and Ceaușescu's main rival.[41] The newly anointed General Secretary had no qualms about condemning his mentor and purging his rival, as both actions reinforced his position as leader.

Ceaușescu had learned early on how to blame others for his regime's shortcomings. In 1956, the attack launched by Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the CPSU, on Joseph Stalin, to whom the leadership in Bucharest owed its position, spelled trouble for Gheorghiu-Dej. He managed to stay in power by putting the blame for past mistakes on the Muscovite faction of the party, which consisted of Ana Pauker, Teohari Georgescu and Vasile Luca.[42] His deep commitment to Stalinism was to put him on a collision course with Khrushchev.[43] The resulting dispute with Moscow temporarily isolated Romania, and posed the grave risk of a leadership change.[44] However, Gheorghiu-Dej turned the brawl with Khrushchev into an advantage: he bolstered his domestic popularity by portraying his attacks on the Soviet First Secretary as a defence of Romanian independence and sovereignty.[45] This manoeuvre put Romania on the path to national communism, to which the

CPSU privately acquiesced.[46] Soon after the Romanian leadership released its 'Declaration of Independence', the Soviets concluded that 'all countries may have to go the way of communist nationalism', mentioning in brackets that this was the course on which Romania and China had embarked.[47] Playing the anti-Soviet card paid off: it buoyed the Romanian population, diverting its attention from the illegitimacy of the regime to the external enemy – Moscow.[48]

The Power Pyramid

Ceaușescu successfully carried out his duplicitous strategy thanks to the bureaucracy he had cultivated since his days at the helm of the Union of Communist Youth. He created the possibility of popular support for his regime by pursuing three basic national goals: unity, independence and industrial growth.[49] This combination of Romanian political culture and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary fervour counteracted popular feelings of anti-communism and earned Ceaușescu the support of the masses.[50] He presented himself as a reformer compared to his predecessor. Gheorghiu-Dej's mass terror had alienated the population, spurred internal opposition and attracted international condemnation. Ceaușescu denounced Gheorghiu-Dej's abuses, although he never embarked on a democratizing path.[51] Instead of terror and torture, Ceaușescu's regime relied on fear-instilling mass surveillance.[52] The task of spying on both Romanians and foreign citizens was performed simultaneously by various departments in the national intelligence apparatus, such as the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, border troops, police forces, passport regional bureaus, the national press agency and the national tourism bureau.[53] The security services seeped into every nook and cranny of Romanian government.

Concentrating power into his and his family's hands became Ceaușescu's top priority. He first brought the national security apparatus under his control. He focused on subduing the Ministry of National Defence (MAN), whose ranks, according to the RCP, were seething with reactionary forces.[54] Ceaușescu got to know the MAN inside out as he was Deputy Minister between 1950 and 1954, and the head of the Superior Political Direction of the Romanian Army.[55] Nationalism, once again, dealt with counter-revolutionary elements. The anti-Soviet sentiment Ceaușescu cultivated among the Romanian masses after the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia greased the wheels for the shift in Romania's military doctrine to 'the struggle of the entire people'.[56] In this connection, he ordered the creation of the Patriotic Guards. Portrayed as the ultimate proof of Romania's resilience and willingness to fight until the last breath against a foreign invasion, the Patriotic Guards remained in place until the demise of the communist regime, functioning as an environment for the indoctrination of workers, peasants and intellectuals.[57]

In 1967 Ceaușescu restructured the Ministry of Interior, removing the state security agencies from within its command.[58] He then placed the newly created State Security Department (Securitate) under the control of a Council comprising nine members and held accountable to the Central Committee of the RCP and the Council of Ministers, so that he could order the Securitate to compile compromising dossiers about his Central Committee colleagues' past activities if required, and to allow them to carry out his orders on foreign policy issues.[59] However, this reshuffling did not go as planned as the security services started to gather intelligence on Ceaușescu himself. Outraged at the discovery of reports on his own health and anxieties, such as his fear of needles, Ceaușescu unleashed yet another purge. In 1973, he fused the Security Services back into the Ministry of Interior and placed it under the sole tutelage of the Central Committee. He expelled Ion Stănescu from the leadership of the Ministry of Interior and from the RCP and replaced him with Emil Bobu, one of his most faithful aides.[60]

Next, Ceaușescu monopolized political power. On 28 March 1974, Romania reinstated the office of the president at the top of the political hierarchy, although it had little in common with the presidential republics of the time.[61] The symbols and pomp of the presidency, embodied in grandiose ceremonies and the use of a presidential sceptre, resembled the practices of monarchies.[62] The merger of the General Secretary with that of head of state allowed Ceaușescu to exert unrivalled influence in Romanian politics. With the erosion of the collective leadership, the cult of personality took hold. This personalization of power quenched not only Ceaușescu's thirst for power, but also that of his acolytes. Party membership enabled the top echelons to pursue their interests with little oversight from other organizations, under the pretext of acting in Romania's interest. Ruxandra Ivan shows that the Romanian foreign policy elite did not respond to the needs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), but rather to the demands of the Central Committee, and more specifically the Cadres Section and the Foreign Relations Section. It was through parallel and private channels of communication that Ceaușescu managed to carry out his secret negotiations with the Soviets, which, if made public, would have damaged his reputation as a nationalist.[63]

The Central Committee appointed only those whom it considered to be 'trustworthy people', coming from peasant or working-class backgrounds. Ivan points out that during the early communist period, the Romanian diplomatic corps suffered from a high degree of deprofessionalization.[64] This shortcoming was the result of the party's political control over the diplomatic corps, a feature which the Romanian authorities had imported from the Soviet Union.[65] The other important lesson the MFA learned from its Soviet counterpart referred to the intelligence functions of diplomats. In 1974, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate (DIE), General Nicolae Doicaru, ordered that the most sensitive positions in Romania's

diplomatic missions, that is, ambassadors, heads of mission and consuls, be occupied by undercover intelligence officers. The task of the MFA was to provide the leadership in Bucharest with a competitive advantage in its negotiations with other countries by offering spies official cover.[66]

The Mythology of Ceaușescu's Foreign Policy

From the very beginning of his time at the helm of power, Ceaușescu displayed an idiosyncratic combination of strong ideological commitment to communism, and pragmatism.[67] The bedrock of his foreign policy, however, remains his relationship with the Kremlin. The Romanian leadership repeatedly reaffirmed its strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles, and recognized the *primus inter pares* role of the USSR.[68] Nonetheless, the Romanians occasionally lashed out at Moscow, primarily because Bucharest was jealous of the attention other East European countries received from Moscow (mainly the German Democratic Republic and Poland), and also because Ceaușescu knew he could boost his popularity at home for his apparent anti-Russian stance.[69]

The conventional narrative holds that Ceaușescu continued the nationalist line pursued by Gheorghiu-Dej.[70] Yet recently declassified archival materials and memoirs in Russian and Romanian suggest a different story, in which the leadership in Bucharest tried to strengthen its ties to the USSR, but the Soviets were generally reluctant or unable to reciprocate. The Romanians' insistence exasperated the Kremlin. On the occasion of a visit by a high-level Romanian delegation to Moscow in June 1964, Nikita Khrushchev complained about the many responsibilities incumbent on the USSR. Everybody wanted something from Moscow, Khrushchev protested:

> The Vietnamese are grabbing us by the short and curlies, and ask us to help them. They say: you are the big brother and you must give us what we are asking for, as the Albanians used to say, and then they spit at us in the face . . . And now, you [the Romanians] want to break my jaw.[71]

This episode supports Valerie Bunce's argument that the increasing demands of the Eastern Europeans were putting a serious burden on Moscow and had become more of a liability than an asset.[72] It also suggests that it was Khrushchev who rejected the Romanians, and not vice versa.

With Ceaușescu's rise to power the situation worsened, as he was even more persistent than his predecessor. Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, the foreign policy adviser of Leonid Brezhnev, recounts how Ceaușescu irritated the General Secretary of the CPSU with his extravagant demands, ambition, arrogance and insolence.[73] Displaying a mixture of anti-Romanyism and anti-Semitism, Arvīds Pelše, the Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU, said about the Romanian leader's

haggling tactics, 'Ceaușescu reminds me of a Shtetl Jew. But he is not a Jew, he is a typical Gypsy.'[74] Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders, however, did not let their emotions get the better of them to maintain relations inside the Warsaw Pact.

Ceaușescu's pestering gave him privileged access to the top Soviet leadership. Aleksandrov-Agentov remembers how at meetings between the leaders of the Warsaw Pact, Ceaușescu would always strike a dissonant note. Whenever the other participants agreed unanimously, Ceaușescu would object, requesting a private meeting with Brezhnev. 'Under the Allies' dirty looks, Brezhnev usually agreed to such a procedure', and 'generally conceded' to a tête-à-tête with Ceaușescu.[75] The Romanian leader easily lost his temper and lacked the sense of humour of the more subtle and better educated Maurer.[76] Occasional shouting matches disturbed these private meetings, although in general, the two leaderships got along. Bilateralism and coordination behind closed doors allowed Ceaușescu to wield more influence on the Soviet leadership than multilateral settings, such as the Warsaw Pact or Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). It was in these private meetings that Ceaușescu consulted with the Soviet leadership on key foreign policy matters and reached mutually advantageous agreements.

These secret agreements between Bucharest and Moscow cast doubt on Ceaușescu's image as a pro-Western pragmatist. The covert Romanian–Soviet collaboration came at the expense of the same Westerners who provided Bucharest with much-needed advanced technology, loans and diplomatic capital.[77] This practice started during Stalin's rule, and continued under Khrushchev and Brezhnev.[78] The Kremlin gave its blessing to the Romanians buying advanced technology from the West, especially if it was not available in the socialist camp.[79] Trading with the capitalist bloc was not a policy of choice but one of necessity, as Gheorghiu-Dej had repeatedly complained. 'What the hell are we going to do?' he erupted in a meeting with his aides. 'Are we going to keep buying from the capitalists?'[80] His dissatisfaction stemmed from both pragmatic and ideological considerations: buying Western products diminished Romania's hard currency reserves and also attracted criticism from other members of the Eastern bloc. Poland and the German Democratic Republic accused Romania of selling its soul to the devil. To repair its image and demonstrate socialist solidarity, Romania re-transferred the equipment and know-how it received to its partners in the Eastern bloc.[81] For instance, in 1966 Ceaușescu offered Leonid Brezhnev an exchange of automotive technologies bought from Western suppliers.[82] Ceaușescu also admitted to stealing military technology from the West and then sharing it with the Soviet Union.[83] Thanks to the use of selective secrecy, Ceaușescu could maintain his reputation as the 'de Gaulle of the East' and, by doing so, boost his domestic legitimacy and eliminate his rivals in the Romanian Communist Party.

The Soviets and the Romanians coordinated their policies not only on economic issues, but also on larger security matters. Ironically, just as the

United States attempted to drive a wedge through the Eastern bloc by luring Romania closer to the West, the Soviets saw France as a tool to undermine NATO and so to drive the Americans out of Europe.[84] Leonid Brezhnev told Ceaușescu that 'we [the Soviets] cannot count on the fact that we will have such friendship with France as we have with you [the Romanians] but we could split France from the US and create conditions for other reciprocal relations with West Germany. This process is beneficial to us.'[85] Ceaușescu concurred. He welcomed De Gaulle's announcement that France would withdraw from NATO's integrated military command structure, regarding it as a positive development that the socialist bloc could exploit.[86]

Since the late 1950s, Romania had taken active steps to destabilize the Western military alliance. Its close connections to France helped it infiltrate various international organizations, including NATO. The main character in this cloak-and-dagger story is Mihai Caraman, who worked undercover in the Romanian Embassy in Paris. Caraman ran a spy ring through which he stole approximately 12,000 pages of secret and top-secret documents, which he 'carried home in sacks'.[87] His strategically located agents within NATO included Robert van der Vielle, in charge of the top-secret documents department; Francis Rousilhe, the head of the translations department; and Imre Nahit, the head of the financial department.[88] The intelligence Caraman gathered from Nahit included reports on NATO budgets and infrastructure, from which the KGB and DIE could have inferred NATO's military plans.[89] The Caraman network produced such spectacular results that in 1965, after Ceaușescu came to power, the KGB sent one of its own officers, Vladimir Arkhipov, to join the Romanian operation.[90] Contrary to the widely held belief that the Romanian and Soviet intelligence services stopped cooperating in 1964, the archival record indicates that the KGB–DIE collaboration continued at least until the 1980s.[91] In 1978, for example, Ceaușescu gave permission to the KGB to carry out intelligence collection operations against capitalist states over Romanian territory.[92] Soviet military planes flew four sorties per month over Romanian territory, deploying signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT). To maintain plausible deniability, the Romanians proposed that Soviet aircraft did not come closer than 60–70 km from the Romanian–Yugoslav border.[93] Shrouding the cooperation with the Soviets in a thick veil of secrecy helped Ceaușescu maintain appearances.

The Kremlin stood to gain from Ceaușescu's actions even when he did not consult with Moscow first. At the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in December 1966, Brezhnev reported that Romania had embarked on its own path.[94] Instead of quarrelling with Bucharest, however, the Soviets chose to work with it, anticipating that Romania's defiance could become useful. Shortly after the December meeting, the Soviets were proved right when the Romanian leadership facilitated a rapprochement between West Germany and the USSR. Until Bonn's March 1966 'peace note', the Eastern bloc followed the line desired by the Poles and East Germans on the German

Question insisting on the recognition of the Oder–Neisse border and the GDR. Any move undertaken by the Soviets to deal directly with the FRG was denounced by Warsaw and East Berlin as an act of betrayal.[95] Their worst nightmares appeared close to materializing in 1963. Then Nikita Khrushchev indicated that he was willing to accept mere reassurances from the USA that nuclear weapons would not end up in West German hands, in exchange for having a non-proliferation treaty signed swiftly.[96] This emphasis on expediency meant that the USSR would be accommodating over West Germany to gain leverage against China. Such plans put Poland and the GDR at risk, since they offered no verifiable controls on what Warsaw and East Berlin saw as Bonn's drive for the bomb.

But the Soviets started to feel trapped in the Polish–East German geopolitical straightjacket, which prevented the USSR developing advantageous commercial relations with West Germany.[97] At the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact held in Bucharest in July 1966, Romania claimed that giving the FRG a chance meant improving the security climate in Europe. The Romanian leadership made sure that the final declaration would 'not primarily be directed against West Germany, but in favour of more diplomatic contacts between all European countries, including the FRG'.[98] The document, which became known as the Bucharest Declaration, paved the way for the normalization of relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe, and allowed the Romanian leadership to justify one of its boldest foreign policy moves – its recognition of the FRG on 31 January 1967.[99] Romania's initiative prompted other countries, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to moderate their bellicose rhetoric toward Bonn, and to normalize relations with the FRG.[100] Developments in the Western camp vindicated Bucharest's geopolitical predictions about the advent of détente in Europe. The Harmel Report adopted at NATO's ministerial meeting in December 1967 was a direct response to the Bucharest Declaration, marking an important shift in East–West relations. NATO's new posture of 'defence cum détente' signalled that the prospects of a war in Europe had diminished significantly.[101] The more relaxed context of the 1960s facilitated Romania's subversive intelligence operations. In 1969, DIE had deployed 1140 spies abroad, most of them working undercover in embassies, consulates, economic delegations in Western Europe, Israel, Canada and the USA.[102] Later on, in the mid-1970s, the Foreign Intelligence Directorate escalated its counterintelligence operations against the capitalist bloc even further.[103] While the West was rolling out the red carpet for Ceaușescu in Washington, London or Paris, the Romanian leader carried on with his double-game, conspiring with the Kremlin against 'the common enemy'.[104]

Romania's secret cooperation with the USSR did not prevent occasional tensions between Bucharest and Moscow. Starting in the late 1950s, the Romanians and Soviets found themselves poles apart on issues related to Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. Plans for increasing the economic

efficiency of the bloc through specialization affected the overall balance of power within the alliance, since it reinforced the privileged position of the more developed countries in Central Europe (Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia) to the detriment of their poorer brethren to the South (Romania and Bulgaria). The proposals for a socialist division of labour envisaged Romania and Bulgaria as the suppliers of raw materials and foodstuffs, and Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia as the industrial powerhouse.[105] The Romanian leadership resisted these calls for closer integration. 'We shouldn't swallow any dumpling, just because it's smothered in a certain sauce', Gheorghiu-Dej protested in a party meeting in 1962.[106] In return, the Soviets and the other Eastern European states isolated the leadership in Bucharest and reduced their trade with Romania.

These quarrels did not pass unnoticed. The tensions created the impression that Moscow could not keep its junior partners in check. Ceaușescu's reaction to the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 angered the Soviets, especially because it gave ammunition to the Chinese at the peak of the Sino–Soviet split. Leonid Brezhnev invited Ceaușescu and Maurer to Moscow for talks in mid-May 1969. Brezhnev took Ceaușescu to task about his position on Czechoslovakia in August 1968:

> You blew the Czechoslovak matter out of proportion. You created guards, you armed the workers, you created the impression that the USSR would attack you ... Your trip to Czechoslovakia poured gasoline on fire ... You [Ceaușescu] gave many speeches in [August], your newspapers portrayed us as aggressors, and then you went to Czechoslovakia. I know what you said. But of course [your speeches] were interpreted by right-wing forces as a form of support. You didn't actually have to say anything, the very fact that you went there, when the atmosphere was so loaded, was perceived as a form of support.[107]

Ceaușescu tried to defend himself by pointing out Moscow's discriminatory behaviour towards Bucharest. The USSR did not deliver its weapons supplies to Romania on time, it ignored the RCP's requests for economic and technological assistance and it failed to consult with the Romanian leadership.[108] His pleas for closer economic ties and tighter political relations contradict the conventional narrative about his desire to move away from Moscow. Instead of seeking autonomy, he wanted to weave Romania's interests in the fine web of Eastern European politics.

The Soviets rebuffed Ceaușescu's pleas. The harder the Romanians tried to make their case, the more intensely the Soviets attacked them. At the core of the problem lay ideological differences. Brezhnev emphasized how the USSR wanted to have good relations with Romania: 'we have communist parties that share a Marxist-Leninist ideology. But lately Romania is drifting away from a series of political positions which we think should be shared by us

all because of our common ideology'.[109] The Romanian General Secretary realized he had painted himself into a corner: the Soviets already regarded his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism as a brand of its own, which they called Ceauşism, akin to Maoism and Castrism.

Only a bold move could help him mend fences with Moscow. Reneging on China appeared to be the best solution at hand: not only would Mao Zedong not know about it, but such a statement was also not binding. So Ceaușescu took the plunge: 'We disagree with the Chinese on the construction of socialism. We can't apply those things.' A sceptical Kosygin exclaimed, 'You're trying to apply them!' Left with no counter-argument, Ceaușescu barked back, 'Maybe you're trying to apply them!' After taking a moment to calm down, Ceaușescu continued: 'We told the Chinese we don't agree with their approach to the USSR... We do not support Mao's ideas.' Kosygin asked for concrete evidence, in the form of public statements. Backed by Maurer, Ceaușescu thought he had a solid excuse: 'we talked to the Chinese. We didn't go public because we didn't think it was the right moment to do so.' 'Taking sides would only worsen the situation', Maurer chimed in. Brezhnev hammered away: 'Your position on China is strange. You don't want to upset either side.' Luckily Maurer managed to diffuse the tension by making a joke: 'We can upset you both!... You should appreciate our position of non-interference, if nothing else.'[110] After having a good laugh, the two sides agreed to disagree, and it seemed that the Romanians' reassurances sufficed for the moment. Later on, Konstantin Katushev, a secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, presented the essence of Soviet–Romanian relations as follows: the USSR and Romania do not experience any differences in strategy, but there are some discrepancies in terms of tactics.[111] Moscow knew Ceaușescu sought to use his public criticism of the USSR to extract more assistance and additional benefits from the West, as well as to bolster his rule.

Conclusion

After reaping the benefits of double-dealing for a decade and a half, Ceaușescu suffered a major blow with the 1978 defection to the USA of his national security adviser, Ion Mihai Pacepa, who revealed the scope of Romania's secret deals with the USSR. One year after his defection, relations between the two superpowers entered a phase of renewed tensions. As this Manichaean rivalry sharpened, the space for other countries to manoeuvre decreased. As Ceaușescu's dealings with the West waned, Romania lost access to much-needed loans, markets and technology.

With internal repression worsening, a financial crisis looming ahead and compromising information about his foreign policy made public, the General Secretary of the RCP found himself marginalized in international affairs. By the 1980s, Romanian foreign policy had lost its lustre and Ceaușescu

could no longer punch above his weight. As a result of his opposition to any social, political and economic reform, the Romanian leader was toppled in what was the bloodiest revolution in Eastern Europe. On Christmas day in 1989, before a firing squad, Nicolae Ceaușescu displayed his hubris for the last time. He was executed while singing *L'Internationale*, which suggests that he was a true believer, with a fixed mental map. He warned the jury that sentenced him to death that history would judge him well. Indeed, the wave of nostalgia for the 'golden era' of communism in contemporary Romania is unparalleled in the former Soviet bloc.

Ceaușescu's trajectory offers an excellent example of how autocrats capitalize on foreign policy to build support at home. But most importantly, by playing the independence card in a loose bipolar order, Romania gained a foothold in international forums that would otherwise have been out of reach. Ceaușescu's all-azimuth foreign policy played on Western optimism that the cracks in the Eastern bloc could be widened and exploited to weaken the USSR. Little did the West know that the Romanians and Soviets had comparable plans to sow discord within the capitalist bloc. To keep the leadership in the Kremlin happy and to boost his reputation at home and abroad, Ceaușescu struck secret deals with the USSR to re-transfer the benefits that Romania obtained from the West.

This covert cooperation did not prevent the relationship between Moscow and Bucharest being peppered with occasional squabbling and backbiting. These tensions have long been interpreted as a manifestation of Romania's defiance and independence. The newly declassified sources used in this analysis confirm Mary Ellen Fischer's insight that the arguments between Ceaușescu and the CPSU leadership were not the result of a 'nationalist controversy between Soviets and Romanians', but 'a quarrel among Marxist-Leninists over the correct path of socialist development for Romania'.[112] The damage done during these arguments was not irreparable. As the Soviets put it, disputes are normal within families. Unlike Yugoslavia or Albania, Romania remained a member of the Soviet bloc until Ceaușescu's collapse. Romania's international achievements during his time in office stemmed much more from Moscow's acquiescence than from his wits and courage. Despite Ceaușescu's illusions of grandeur, his mental map reveals the evolution of a middle-power leader, caught between a rock and a hard place.

Notes

1. For the conventional narrative on Ceaușescu's foreign policy, see: Joseph Harrington and Bruce J. Courtney, *Tweaking the Nose of the Russians: Fifty Years of American–Romanian Relations, 1940–1990* (New York, 1991); Mircea Munteanu, 'Communication Breakdown? Romania and the Sino–American Rapprochement', *Diplomatic History* 33.4, 2009, pp. 615–31; idem, 'When the Levee Breaks: The Impact of the Sino–Soviet Split and the Invasion of

Czechoslovakia on Romanian–Soviet Relations, 1967–1970', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12.1, 2010, pp. 43–61; idem, 'Over the Hills and Far Away. Romania's Attempts to Mediate the Start of U. S.–North Vietnamese Negotiations, 1967–1968', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14.3, 2012, pp. 64–96; Larry L. Watts, *With Friends Like These . . . The Soviet Bloc's Clandestine War against Romania* (Bucharest, 2010); Elena Dragomir, 'The Perceived Threat of Hegemonism in Romania during the Second Détente', *Cold War History* 12.1, 2012, pp. 3–5.

2. Vladimir Tismăneanu is among the first scholars to show that 'although there were crises in Romanian–Soviet relations, they never reached the point of an open clash'. Dennis Deletant, exploring the extent of Soviet pressures on Bucharest, proposes the concept of limited autonomy to analyse Romania's position in the Warsaw Pact. Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons. The History of the Romanian Communist Party* (Berkeley, 2003), p. 48; Dennis Deletant, ' "Taunting the Bear": Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1963–1989', *Cold War History* 7.4, 2007, pp. 495–507.
3. Mark Almond, *The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu* (London, 1992), p. 19.
4. Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale [ANIC], Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Român [CC PCR], Secția Cadre, C/2050, File of Nicolae Ceaușescu, pp. 2, 13–14.
5. Mary Ellen Fischer, *Nicolae Ceaușescu. A Study in Political Leadership* (Boulder and London, 1989), p. 11.
6. ANIC, CC PCR, Secția Cadre, C/2050, File of Nicolae Ceaușescu, p. 13.
7. Eugen Jebeleanu, 'Impresii de la proces', *Cuvântul liber* 3.31, 6 June 1936, p. 2.
8. Fischer, *Nicolae Ceaușescu*, p. 28.
9. ANIC, CC PCR, Secția Cadre, C/2050, File of Nicolae Ceaușescu, p. 13.
10. Ibid., pp. 4–5; Edward Behr, *Kiss the Hand That You Cannot Bite. The Rise and Fall of the Ceaușescus* (New York, 1991), p. 81.
11. Nicolae Ceaușescu quoted in Tismăneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons*, p. 78.
12. Fischer, *Nicolae Ceaușescu*, p. 24; Behr, *Kiss the Hand*, p. 81.
13. ANIC, CC PCR, Secția Cadre, C/2050, File of Nicolae Ceaușescu, p. 18; Manuela Marin, *Originea și evoluția cultului personalității lui Nicolae Ceaușescu, 1965–1989* (Alba Iulia, 2008), p. 238.
14. Marin, *Originea și evoluția*, p. 238.
15. Alla Alekseevna Yaz'kova, 'Krakh zolotoy epokhi Chaushesku', *Voprosy Istorii* 9–10, 1991, p. 19; 'Repeat after me', *Nature* 488, 15 August 2012, p. 253, available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v488/n7411/full/488253a.html.
16. Open Society Archives, 53-6-20, Rene de Flers, Biographical Sketches of the Ceaușescu Clan, RAD Background Report/135, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20090603045842/http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/53-6-20.shtml.
17. Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, *Raport Final* (Bucharest, 2006), p. 113.
18. ANIC, CC PCR, Secția Cadre, C/2050, File of Nicolae Ceaușescu, p. 13.
19. ANIC, CC PCR, Relații Externe, 70/1966, Minutes of conversation between Emil Bodnăraș and Pham Van Dong, 7 May 1966, p. 68; Yaz'kova, 'Krakh zolotoy epokhi Chaushesku', p. 15.
20. ANIC, CC PCR, Relații Externe, 29/1964, Minutes of conversation between the delegation of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 3 March 1964.

21. ANIC, CC PCR, Relaţii Externe, 72/1966, Minutes of conversation between Nicolae Ceauşescu and Leonid Brezhnev, 10 May 1966, pp. 11, 52; ANIC, CC PCR, Cancelarie, 39/1963, Protocol No. 15 of the CC RWP Politburo Meeting, 18 July 1963, pp. 21–52; Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, *Vremya, lyudi, vlast' – Vospominaniya* (Moscow, 1999), Vol. III, pp. 297–300.
22. ANIC, CC PCR, Relaţii Externe, 9/1965, Minutes of conversation between Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Anastas Mikoyan, 25 March 1965, p. 27.
23. Khrushchev, *Vremya, lyudi, vlast'*, Vol. III, pp. 304–5.
24. Dennis Deletant, *Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948–1965* (London, 1999), p. 84; idem, *Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania 1965–1989* (Armonk, NY, 1995), p. 21.
25. Yaz'kova, 'Krakh zolotoy epokhi Chaushesku', p. 18.
26. Presidential Commission, *Raport Final*, p. 31.
27. Ibid.
28. This independence-infused rhetoric borrowed heavily from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, enshrined in the Panchsheel Treaty signed between China and India in 1954. In an interview with Liviu Ţârău, Vladimir Bukovsky, the famous Russian dissident, declared that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he saw the document in the Soviet Archives which summarizes the discussions between the leadership of the Romanian Workers' Party and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Quoted in Liviu C. Ţârău, *Între Washington şi Moscova: politicile de securitate naţională ale SUA şi URSS şi impactul lor asupra României, 1945–1965* (Cluj-Napoca, 2005), p. 490 n. 671.
29. *Foreign Relations of the United States* [FRUS] *1964–1968*, Vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Minutes of the Meeting of the Export Control Review Board, 1 April 1965, pp. 405–13; CIA Records Search Tool [CREST], Rumania: The Maverick Satellite, October 1968, CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030017-8, p. 10; Yaz'kova, 'Krakh zolotoy epokhi Chaushesku', p. 20.
30. Elis Neagoe-Pleşa and Liviu Pleşa, 'Introductory Study', in Florica Dobre (ed.), *Securitatea. Structuri-cadre, Obiective şi Metode* (CNSAS, Bucharest, 2006), Vol. II, pp. v–vii.
31. For a review of the orthodox narrative, see Alina Tudor-Pavelescu, 'Ceauşescu et la succession de Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: techniques du transfert du pouvoir (1965–1969)', in Le communisme et les élites en Europe centrale. Destructions, mutations, conversions. Colloque à l'École normale superieure, 2004; Pavel Câmpeanu, *Ceauşescu: The Countdown* (Boulder, CO, 2003), p. 396.
32. Vasile Buga, 'Din culisele preluării puterii de către Nicolae Ceauşescu', *Arhivele Totalitarismului* 3–4, 2008, p. 204.
33. Marin, *Originea şi evoluţia*, p. 58; Cezar Stanciu, 'Moştenirea Cominternului. Comuniştii români şi unitatea mişcării comuniste internaţionale, 1967–1969, Partea I', *Ahivele Totalitarismului* 1–2, 2012, p. 122.
34. Yaz'kova, 'Krakh zolotoy epokhi Chaushesku', p. 19.
35. Khrushchev, *Vremya, lyudi, vlast'*, Vol. III, p. 313.
36. ANIC, CC PCR, Secţia Cadre, M/1735, File of Ion Gheorghe Maurer, 27 March 1965, p. 5; Presidential Commission, *Raport Final*, pp. 655–6.
37. Yaz'kova claims that Ceauşescu tried to blackmail Bodnăraş with reports about his links to Chief of the Soviet security and secret police apparatus (NKVD), Lavrentiy Beria. Yaz'kova, 'Krakh zolotoy epokhi Chaushesku', p. 15; ANIC, CC PCR, Secţia Cadre, B/1930, File of Emil Bodnăraş, 12 June 1961, 2; ANIC, CC PCR, Relaţii Externe, 36/1964, Discussions between the two delegations after

the official talks ended on 7 July 1964, p. 208; Presidential Commission, *Raport Final*, p. 647.
38. ANIC, CC PCR, Secția Cadre, B/1930, File of Emil Bodnăraș, 12 June 1961, p. 2.
39. Ibid.
40. Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyy arhiv noveyshey istorii [RGANI], fond 89, opis 45, delo 18, Extract from the diary of V. Zorin, 2 November 1956; RGANI, fond 89, opis 45, delo 38, Message from Yepishev, 8 November 1956; RGANI, fond 89, opis 45, delo 50, Memorandum to Nikita Khrushchev from Georgi Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov, and Averkii Aristov, 24 November 1956.
41. ANIC, CC PCR, Relații Externe, 62/1968, Minutes of conversation between Ion Murg, Vasile Păcureț at the Romanian Embassy in Moscow and I. Petrov, Soviet State Security Committee, 7 May 1968, pp. 1–2; Neagoe-Pleșa and Pleșa, 'Introductory Study', in Dobre, *Securitatea*, Vol. II, pp. v–vii; Deletant, *Ceaușescu and the Securitate*, p. 79.
42. Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Fantoma lui Gheorghiu-Dej* (Bucharest, 1995), pp. 43–6, 110–16; idem, *Arheologia terorii* (Bucharest, 1996), pp. 41–51, 176–81; Yaz'kova, 'Krakh zolotoy epokhi Chaushesku', p. 19; Khrushchev, *Vremya, lyudi, vlast'*, Vol. III, pp. 301–3.
43. Khrushchev, *Vremya, lyudi, vlast'*, Vol. III, pp. 303, 309.
44. ANIC, CC PCR, Cancelarie, 19/1963, Protocol of the Romanian Workers' Party Meeting Politburo, 8 May 1963, pp. 5–10; ANIC, CC PCR, Relații Externe, 71/1966, Minutes of conversation between Emil Bodnăraș and Zhou Enlai, 12 May 1966, p. 22.
45. ANIC, CC PCR, Cancelarie, 39/1963, Protocol No. 15 of the CC RWP Politburo Meeting, 18 July 1963, pp. 21–52.
46. ANIC, CC PCR, Relații Externe, 36/1964, Discussions between the two delegations after the official talks ended on 7 July 1964, p. 202.
47. RGANI, fond 3, opis 16, delo 948, listy 32–34, Protocol no. 145. 26 May 1964 Meeting, published in Aleksandr Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964. Chernovye protokol'nye zapisi zasedanii. Stenogrammy* (Moscow, 2003), Vol I, p. 825.
48. Khrushchev notes in his memoirs, 'it was only natural that there should have been some resentment on their part left over from the war and the first years after the war. The Romanians and Hungarians had been dragged into the war against us by Hitler. Therefore, our army, as it pursued the retreating Hitlerite invaders back into Germany, had attacked and defeated these other countries as well.' Khrushchev, *Vremya, lyudi, vlast'*, Vol. II, pp. 345–6.
49. Fischer, *Nicolae Ceaușescu*, p. 31.
50. Lavinia Stan and Rodica Milena Zaharia, 'Romania's Intelligence Service: Bridge between East and West?', *Problems of Post-Communism* 54, January/February 2007, p. 4.
51. Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniia diplomata, sovetnika A.A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L.I. Brezhneva, Iu. V.A. Andropova, K.U. Chernenko i M.S. Gorbacheva* (Moscow, 1994), p. 159.
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5 Julius Nyerere

Emma Hunter

In June 1978, Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's president since 1962 and leader of its nationalist movement since 1954, called the foreign envoys stationed in Dar es Salaam to State House. 'I have been very concerned indeed', he told them, 'about world reactions to recent events in Africa, and it seems to me to be necessary that I should make Tanzania's position clear'. 'For', he continued,

> the events of the past few weeks have once again demonstrated that although our legal independence is officially recognized, our need and our right to develop our countries and our continent in our own interests has not yet been conceded in practice. The habit of regarding Africa as an appendage of Western Europe has not yet been broken.[1]

While the global 1970s may have been characterized by détente, in Africa the decade marked the arrival of the Cold War. When Nyerere surveyed the continent, he saw the independence of African countries threatened by the activities of global powers, from both East and West. While Western powers claimed to wish to support African independence from communist intervention, for Nyerere the danger came as much from those very Western powers. 'The danger to Africa does not come just from nations in the Eastern Block', he told his audience in State House. The problem for Africa was that the 'West still considers Africa to be within its Sphere of Influence and acts accordingly. Current developments show that the greater immediate danger to Africa's freedom comes from nations in that Western Block.'[2]

The strength of feeling exhibited by Nyerere on this occasion was typical of his attitude to foreign affairs and helps explain the very mixed responses he elicited in others. For some, his commitment to African freedom marked him out as a moral force in Africa. Others were far more critical, believing his idealistic principles to be contradicted by his actions. How, then, might an exploration of Nyerere's mental map help make sense of his approach to foreign affairs in the era of détente and the end of the Cold War?

Exploring Nyerere's mental map offers a perspective on why he evoked such contradictory responses in Western diplomats and politicians, and provides an explanation for the often strained relations he had with foreign powers. Unlike the leaders discussed in earlier volumes, Nyerere came of age in the era of decolonization and the early days of the Cold War. Born in 1922, he reached maturity during the Second World War, as African and Asian nationalists were insisting that participation in a war fought for freedom should mean freedom and self-determination for their countries as well. As a result, the cause of liberation from colonial rule was central to Nyerere's priorities. But he also knew that freedom was fragile and had to be defended, and that one way of doing so was by building connections between states with a shared antipathy to imperialism in all its forms. Again, this commitment was shaped by the world of the 1940s and 1950s, which was the era not only of decolonization, but also of the creation of new forms of Afro–Asian solidarity encapsulated in the 1955 Bandung conference, when newly independent nations gathered in Indonesia to attempt to defend their newly won freedom by creating a third force in international affairs. For some, including Nyerere, this meant the pursuit of non-alignment, and this principle, though often tested, oriented Nyerere's policies throughout his time in government in Tanzania.

When Nyerere looked at the world, it was therefore those areas which were still under colonial rule or white domination that loomed largest in his priorities, particularly the countries of southern Africa. And when he looked around the world for friends and allies, his mental map drew him to the anti-colonial networks across the global south established in the years after 1945, including, crucially, China. His was a mental map framed by anti-imperialism and the imperative of liberation, not by the Cold War. But this repeatedly put him at odds with Western policy-makers and diplomats, for whom close relations with China were an impossibility in a Cold War setting.

In this chapter, I explore Nyerere's mental map by first setting out the geopolitical and intellectual context in which his political ideas developed. I then consider Nyerere's time in office in Tanzania after 1961, and show how his approach to foreign affairs was challenged by a series of foreign policy crises. While Western politicians and diplomats at times perceived Nyerere as naïve and idealistic and at other times as cynically using high principles to disguise low political ends, these conflicts can be best understood in terms of Nyerere's distinctive vision of the world, in which solidarity against colonialism always trumped Cold War divisions. In the final part of the chapter, I examine the ways in which he sought to transform his vision of the world into practice in the 1970s and 1980s, in particular through the non-aligned movement and his support for southern African liberation movements, and later through institutions such as the South Commission.

Nyerere, Decolonization and the Bandung Moment

Nyerere was born in 1922 in rural north-western Tanganyika. In 1943 he went to Makerere in Uganda, graduating three years later and taking up a post as a teacher at Tabora Boys School.[3] In April 1949 he arrived at the University of Edinburgh to study history. He graduated in 1952 and returned to Tanganyika, initially to his teaching career.[4] He became leader of the newly formed Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954, and led TANU to power as the first government of independent Tanganyika in December 1961. A month after independence he stood down from his position as prime minister to return to the grassroots, but was back at the helm when Tanganyika became a Republic in December 1962, this time as president, a post he held until his resignation in 1985.

This potted biography already demonstrates that Nyerere's formative years were spent in a very different environment from that of the nationalists who came to power in Asia in the 1940s. Men like Jawaharlal Nehru, born in 1889, Ho Chi Minh, born in 1890 and Mao Zedong, born in 1893, were formed in a world still dominated by the European empires and an imperial system which was shaken but not transformed by the First World War. In contrast, Nyerere began reflecting seriously on politics in the era of the Second World War and its aftermath, a time of dramatic change in global thinking about empire, race and nation that was reflected after 1945 in a transformed geopolitics.

The contrast between the two eras is perhaps best seen in the very different foundational moments of the League of Nations and the United Nations. In the aftermath of the First World War, Japan's attempts to write the principle of racial equality into the founding documents of the League of Nations were rebuffed.[5] The League of Nations remained dominated by the European empires and a Western model of civilization. In contrast, by the time the United Nations was created after the Second World War, the principle of racial equality was firmly established and generally acknowledged in international affairs, as was the principle of freedom and self-determination for all peoples.

Already in the immediate post-war period, a postcolonial world order was emerging. Former League of Nations Mandates, like Tanganyika, were now Trust territories of the United Nations. Where the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations had been dominated by imperial powers, the Trusteeship Council, whose task it was to monitor the Trust territories, included countries such as India and Ecuador which had themselves experienced colonial rule and in some cases had only recently achieved independence. Unlike the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, the Trusteeship Council provided a platform for nationalist leaders to visit New York and present their case, as Julius Nyerere did on two occasions.[6] And, again unlike the League of Nations, they also despatched

Visiting Missions to Trusteeship Territories, where Indian nationalists offered help and advice to their African colleagues, much to the frustration of Tanganyika's colonial government and particularly the governor for much of the 1950s, Sir Edward Twining.[7]

But it was not only at the United Nations that the 1940s and 1950s saw the birth of a postcolonial world. In April 1955, 29 states gathered in Bandung in Indonesia for a momentous event, the first major conference of Asian and African leaders to be held not in Europe but in Asia. They had in common a recent experience of imperialism, but rather than dwell on the past they sought to build a new postcolonial future.[8] They rejected the demands of the West and the USSR that they choose sides in the Cold War and instead sought to defend their freedom from imperialisms old and new. Many of those states which gathered at Bandung had in common a commitment to the developing doctrine of non-alignment. When India became independent in 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had outlined his foreign policy as being 'based on the United Nations Charter and cooperation of all nations for peace, freedom and liberation of all suppressed peoples. We propose to avoid entanglement in any blocs or groups of Powers realising that only thus we can serve not only [the] cause of India but of world peace.'[9] The Bandung conference provided an opportunity to begin to put these principles into practice, and the final communiqué emerging from the conference included a commitment to abstain 'from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers'.[10]

Very few African states were present at Bandung because most of Africa was still under colonial rule in 1955. Ghana, at that point still the Gold Coast, was self-governing but not yet independent. Under pressure from the British government, its leader Kwame Nkrumah elected not to attend the conference but instead to send a representative.[11] The organizers of the Bandung conference were uncertain as to whether Nigeria was or was not independent and so eligible to be invited; in fact it was not. One country in Africa was independent, but was not invited to the conference. That country was South Africa, where the victory of D.F. Malan's National Party in the election of 1948 and the establishment of the Apartheid regime saw the gradual withdrawal of rights from black South Africans over the ensuing decades. The organizers were clear that South Africa's apartheid policy meant that it could not be part of the postcolonial world they were creating.

It was in this ideological and geopolitical environment that Nyerere spent his formative years. At school at Tabora he encountered the writings of the American pan-Africanist, Booker T. Washington, while friends at Makerere in the early 1940s recalled him talking about the Indian nationalist leader Mahatma Gandhi and the Ghanaian pan-Africanist James Aggrey.[12] He arrived in Edinburgh in 1949 just at the time when, as John Iliffe remarked in his *Modern History of Tanganyika*, 'the great issues of race and liberation in Africa were first being defined'.[13] His thinking was shaped by the

debates these issues provoked, particularly the question of apartheid South Africa. In this context, it is not surprising that Nyerere's immediate cause was liberation and self-government, and only after that had been achieved, development and the defence of newfound freedom.

Nyerere was also a Catholic, baptized into the faith on 23 December 1943 following his father's death the previous year.[14] His Catholic faith was an important element in his political philosophy, and echoes of his reading of Catholic theologians such as Jacques Maritain are evident in his thinking about the purpose of politics as being that of enabling human flourishing.[15]

Nyerere's commitment to the causes of liberation, anti-colonialism and equality, including racial equality, and the belief that solidarity between the states of the postcolonial world was essential if those goals were to be achieved, defined his approach to world affairs throughout his long career. But it also brought him into conflict with those who had a very different mental map of the world.

Nyerere and Foreign Policy in Power: Turbulent Relations

After TANU swept the board in elections in 1958 and 1959, Tanganyika moved swiftly towards self-government and independence. A further set of elections, originally planned for 1962, were brought forward to 1960, after which Julius Nyerere became Chief Minister. Tanganyika achieved internal self-government with Nyerere as prime minister on 1 May 1961, and independence followed in December of the same year.

In his radio broadcast to the nation on becoming prime minister in May 1961, Nyerere argued against wasting

> time in fighting battles that are over, in belabouring enemies who are already dead. Neither Africa nor the world is going to judge us by the amount of venom we pour against the old or even the new form of colonialism. We will be judged by what we do to strengthen ourselves and thus be in a position not only to safeguard our own freedom, but to help our brethren in Africa to achieve theirs and to safeguard it too.[16]

Crucially, freedom meant the freedom for African nations to determine their own foreign policy. In a 1964 speech at the University of Dar es Salaam, Nyerere explained what this meant:

> We did not struggle for our independence in order to sell it to the highest bidder. Our internal affairs, and our international stand on world issues must both be determined by us. This is what independence means – not the right to fly a flag, or a seat at the United Nations, but the right to determine our own policies in the light of the interests of the United Republic, and of Africa, and of world peace.[17]

Nyerere publically committed himself to a policy of non-alignment in world affairs. Again, Nyerere's formative experiences and the timing of his assumption of power are important here. As Tanganyika was preparing for self-government in the spring of 1961, the Yugoslav leader Josef Broz Tito was touring independent African countries advocating non-alignment.[18] The Belgrade Conference which marked the formal inauguration of the non-aligned movement was held in the autumn of the same year.

Yet while Nyerere insisted that non-alignment was the only way for newly independent countries to preserve their independence, in a Cold War world Western observers doubted that true non-alignment was possible and looked nervously for signs that African countries were rejecting the West in favour of the communist East. And in the mid-1960s, a turbulent few years suggested that Tanzania had indeed turned away from the West.

In 1963, a Tanganyikan Minister, Nsilo Swai, visited China. He was followed the next year by Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa, and in 1965 by Nyerere himself.[19] In January 1964, revolution in Zanzibar led to fears that the island was becoming a 'Cuba' off the coast of East Africa.[20] When the army mutinied in Dar es Salaam a few days later, the British *Daily Telegraph* was quick to blame Tanganyika's Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona, whom they described as 'Moscow's boss in East Africa'.[21]

Tanganyika's union with Zanzibar in April 1964, creating the country of Tanzania, did little to calm Western fears.[22] A few months later, in November 1964, Oscar Kambona was again ruffling Western feathers with his very public allegations of the existence of a 'Western Plot' to overthrow Nyerere's government.[23] The episode culminated in January 1965 with Nyerere's expulsion of two senior American diplomats.[24] In March 1965, Tanzania's decision to allow East Germany to open a consulate in Dar es Salaam led to a breakdown in relations with West Germany.[25] By 1965 British newspapers were describing Tanzania as 'the main Communist Chinese stronghold in East Africa'.[26]

This era of diplomatic crises came to a head on 11 November 1965 with Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Southern Rhodesia. On 3 December 1965 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) passed a resolution calling on all African states to break relations with Britain if action were not taken against Smith by a deadline of 15 December. When that deadline was not met, Nyerere went ahead and broke off diplomatic relations with Britain. In doing so, he gave up access to a £7.5 million loan which Britain had previously promised.

While breaking diplomatic relations with Britain was clearly a hard decision for Nyerere to make, his commitment to both the OAU and to the cause of southern African liberation seemed to leave him with no choice. In a letter to Harold Wilson explaining his decision shortly before he announced it to the world, Nyerere appealed to Wilson to 'try to understand Africa, and Africa's intense and legitimate concern on this issue'.[27]

Nyerere's stance was supported by many of his friends and supporters in Britain, but their pleas to British officials to restore relations swiftly and even to continue with Britain's aid programme to Tanzania in spite of the break in relations fell on stony ground. When the Conservative MP Humphrey Berkeley visited the Commonwealth Relations Office in February 1966, he was told in no uncertain terms of the CRO's position on 'the undesirability of letting people get away with impunity with, after all, the normally pretty drastic step of breaking relations, and the lack of dignity to this country if we ran after a country which had so blatantly insulted us.'[28]

The outcome of these years of vexed foreign relations was a growing popular consensus that Tanzania had turned towards the East and was no friend to the West.[29] Writing in 1972, the journalist Richard West recalled travelling to Nairobi in 1964 and hearing 'wild stories of hundreds of Cubans and Red Chinese installed in Dar es Salaam, how immigration and health officials goose stepped over the airport, how Nyerere himself did not dare venture forth except in a bullet-proof car'.[30] Tanzania's orientation towards China seemed to be confirmed by Nyerere's decision in 1965 to accept a Chinese offer to assist with the building of the TAZARA railway linking landlocked Zambia to Dar es Salaam. The *Wall Street Journal* greeted news of the project with the conclusion that 'the prospect of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Red Guards descending upon an already troubled Africa is a chilling one for the West'.[31]

The impression that China was not only supporting Tanzania financially but that there was also a highly visible Chinese presence in Tanzania continued into the 1970s. When Mervyn Brown arrived in Dar es Salaam in 1975 to take up his post as Britain's new High Commissioner in the country, he wrote that he had arrived expecting a noticeable Chinese presence. On his arrival he found instead that 'the widespread impression of Chinese domination of Tanzania bears little relation to the facts as seen on the ground. One hardly ever sees any Chinese in Dar-es-Salaam except a few Embassy officers going round in groups for safety.'[32]

But such rumours reflected a broader sense that Nyerere could not be trusted in foreign affairs. While Mervyn Brown's 1975 despatch was positive about Nyerere and the potential for Britain to work closely with him, the response of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London was to say that while Nyerere 'may be as charming and intelligent and openly friendly as the High Commissioner makes him out to be', he was nevertheless 'no friend of Britain'. 'The evidence of his "high purposes" ', Norman Aspin argued, 'is to be found in his speeches but not in his actions'.[33] Aspin was particularly critical of Nyerere's support for the armed struggle in Southern Rhodesia and the money he was spending on supporting liberation movements in the continent.

Yet if we look more closely at the way Nyerere saw the world, what is striking is not the inconsistency between rhetoric and action, or the shifting

of position of which he was accused by outsiders, but rather the extent to which his approach to world affairs was determined by the same underlying principles from his assumption of office in 1961 until his retirement from the presidency in 1985, and indeed beyond. Nyerere's approach to foreign affairs was often misunderstood because outsiders failed to understand the imperative he attached to liberation from colonial rule and to securing Africa's independence by any means possible.

Securing Freedom

When Tanganyika became independent in 1961, its East African neighbours were still under colonial rule. Southern Africa would not be completely free of white rule for a further three decades. This had direct implications for Tanzania's security. As Nyerere said in a speech to the TANU Annual Conference in October 1967,

> we shall never be really free and secure while some parts of our continent are still enslaved. If anyone had doubts about this in the past they can have none now. We have only to look at the threats which have been made against the Republic of Zambia in recent weeks – to say nothing of the constant threat to her power supplies since November 1965. Or we can look at the mines which have been laid in Tanzanian territory by the Portuguese colonialists, and which have resulted in the death of some of our citizens.[34]

Tanzania's southern neighbours posed real and present threats to the country's security. But the problem, as Nyerere saw it, was more fundamental than mere physical threats: this was an existential danger. He continued,

> Co-existence is impossible; for if the African peoples of South Africa and Rhodesia have no human right to govern themselves, then what is the basis of Tanzania's existence, of Zambia's, of Kenya's, and so on? If the principle of white supremacy is accepted anywhere in Africa it will seek to spread, and there will be no peace for any of us.[35]

For Nyerere, this meant a set of underlying principles of foreign policy which he outlined to TANU delegates in the same speech: a policy of non-alignment, support for the UN, commitment to African unity and support for 'the movement for African liberation and freedom from racialist oppression'.[36]

As Nyerere also made clear, his foreign policy was inseparable from his domestic policy. His policy of *ujamaa na kujitegemea*, or socialism and self-reliance, set out in the Arusha Declaration of February 1967 and elaborated over the months which followed, was in part the product of the

foreign policy crises of the mid-1960s which had taught him the dangers involved in relying on foreign aid for economic development. These principles continued to guide Nyerere as he navigated the 1970s and 1980s.

Non-alignment, Liberation Movements and Economic Development in the Era of Détente

In the 1970s and 1980s, Nyerere sought to put his foreign policy principles into practice, becoming an increasingly important voice in the international arena. He played an important role in the cause of the liberation of southern Africa, and in the non-aligned movement, while continuing to argue for close ties between economic development, south–south cooperation and non-alignment. By exploring these three themes we can see very clearly the way his mental map of the world framed his foreign engagements, helping to make sense both of the huge importance he attached to the liberation of southern Africa and to the networks of connections he sought to forge, through international institutions, through the non-aligned movement and through south–south connections across the postcolonial world.

The issue of southern Africa had led Nyerere to break diplomatic relations with Britain in 1965, and even after relations were restored it continued as a constant theme in their relations. This reflected the important place which the liberation of southern Africa from colonial rule and opposition to apartheid in South Africa held in Nyerere's priorities. And while Tanganyika's own path to independence had been peaceful, Nyerere offered consistent support to the southern African liberation movements which had turned to armed struggle to achieve liberation.

In September 1958, Nyerere formed the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), which put the liberation of southern Africa at the centre of its political agenda. PAFMECA advocated 'positive action' through a boycott of South African goods as a way of opposing the Apartheid regime.[37] The establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 provided an opportunity to create a new organizational structure to coordinate African support for the liberation of those areas still under white rule, through the OAU Liberation Committee. With this development, the centre of Africa's liberation struggle quickly moved from Accra in Ghana to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.[38] Liberation movements from across the African continent established their headquarters in Dar es Salaam so that on his arrival in Dar es Salaam in 1963, the British Deputy High Commissioner Stephen Miles found that freedom fighters he 'had known two years ago in Ghana' were now based in the Tanganyikan capital.[39] Outside the capital, FRELIMO training camps on the Mozambican border were a signal of Nyerere's commitment to support the fight against Portuguese colonialism by all necessary means.[40] In 1975, when the Organisation of African Unity recognized the 'Frontline States' as an ad hoc committee of the OAU,

formally bringing together the group of independent countries bordering southern Africa and threatened by South African policies in the region, Nyerere became a very active Chairman of the Committee.[41]

There was material support too for liberation movements from across the continent. The journalist David Martin recalled being shown a file by Nyerere showing how much Tanzania was spending each year on supporting liberation movements in Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and the Comoro Islands. Martin remembered being 'astounded by just how much Tanzanians were paying; a sum well beyond the country's publicised contribution'.[42]

Nyerere also sought to use diplomatic channels to draw attention to the plight of southern Africa. In a letter to the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in February 1961, as controversy raged over the question of whether South Africa could be admitted to the Commonwealth after it became a Republic, Nyerere made clear that he would always put his moral opposition to South Africa first. He wrote of his intention 'that every action taken by an independent Tanganyika, in international as well as internal affairs, shall make quite clear our stand on these fundamental issues, and our refusal to be associated in any way with the present South African Government.'[43] The following month he joined other African leaders in speaking against South Africa's application to join the Commonwealth and making clear that Tanganyika could not remain in the organization if South Africa was also a member.[44] The united front presented by Africa's newly independent states had the desired effect, and South Africa withdrew its application.

On the wider international stage, the United Nations provided a key platform in which to highlight the cause of southern African liberation throughout Nyerere's time in office. In 1970 his speech at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly, in which he argued that the world community should take steps to isolate South Africa or risk a new world war, was said to have 'had the greatest impact of any statement made so far in the General and Commemorative debates and impressed many people by its moderation and its closely reasoned arguments'.[45]

Nyerere's commitment to the United Nations remained a feature of his outlook even as others began to despair of its ability to effect real change. Nyerere was very aware that Tanganyika's path to independence had been shaped by its status as a Trust Territory of the United Nations and he continued to believe that the United Nations could be a powerful force for good in the world. He also stressed its particular importance for smaller nations. As he said in his 1967 speech on foreign affairs, countries like Tanzania had a duty to support the United Nations. Against criticism that the UN was too weak to be effective he said, '[r]ather than abandon the United Nations we must work steadfastly and persistently towards strengthening it, and increasing its powers', for it was only through bodies such as the UN that smaller

powers could 'hope to make our voice heard on international issues, and only through the implementation of the principles upon which it is based can we hope to survive and grow in peace'.[46]

If Nyerere saw the United Nations as one means of achieving a voice for smaller countries in world affairs, the non-aligned movement was another. Again, this derived from his commitment to liberation from colonialism. For Nyerere, seeking to redefine the non-aligned movement for a new era in 1970, and aware that the world was no longer neatly split into two blocs, what united the countries which were members of the non-aligned movement was precisely their anti-colonialism. Speaking at the Preparatory Meeting for the 1970 meeting of the non-aligned movement, held in Tanzania, Nyerere insisted that they were not a 'bloc', but a group of countries united by their opposition to colonialism and racialism.[47] And while the task of non-alignment might be more difficult in 1970 than it had been in 1961, in a world of three rather than two powers, and in which those powers were themselves 'no longer so monolithic', the task was as important as ever, for it served as a way of 'saying to the big powers that we also belong to this planet' and of 'asserting the right of all peoples to freedom and self-determination; and therefore expressing an outright opposition to colonialism and international domination of one people by another'.[48]

As the 1960s gave way to the 1970s, Nyerere increasingly stressed the danger posed to the postcolonial world by its lack of economic power. In the same 1970s speech, he said that '[t]he real and urgent threat to the independence of almost all non-aligned states thus comes not from the military but from the economic power of the big states. It is poverty which constitutes our greatest danger, and to a greater or lesser extent we are all poor.'[49]

Nyerere recognized that members of the non-aligned movement had chosen different paths to economic development, but for him true independence depended on taking a socialist path and being concerned with equality rather than the maximization of growth. As he wrote in 1973,

> there is no real choice. In practice Third World Nations cannot become developed capitalist societies without surrendering the reality of their freedom and without accepting a degree of inequality between their citizens which would deny the moral validity of our independence struggle. I will argue that our present poverty and national weakness make socialism the only rational choice for us.

Against the argument that socialism merely perpetuated poverty, he wrote that 'a successful harlot, or favoured slave, may be better off materially than a woman who refuses to sell her body, or a man to sell his freedom', but that ultimately it was preferable to preserve freedom.[50]

The cause of economic development, and that of African liberation, meant taking help from wherever it might be offered, and that included China. For

Western observers, it was China's position as a belligerent in the Cold War that dominated their thinking. In their mental maps, China was firmly in the East, and on the other side in the Cold War conflict. Yet for Nyerere, China was linked to Africa by a shared commitment to anti-imperialism. That was the China that the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai had presented to the world at the Bandung Conference in 1955. As George Kahin wrote in his account of the Bandung Conference, 'At Bandung China moved closer to the rest of Asia', but we might add that at Bandung, China also demonstrated a desire to forge links with African countries emerging from colonial rule.[51] As Zhou Enlai told the Bandung Conference, '[w]e Asian and African countries, China included, are all backward economically and culturally. Inasmuch as our Asian–African Conference does not exclude anybody, why could we not ourselves understand each other and enter into friendly cooperation?'[52]

For Nyerere, China was a valuable source of help in Africa's liberation struggle and in its economic development. On his 1974 visit to China, he spoke of his appreciation for 'the practical assistance which China is giving to Tanzania, and to the freedom struggle in Africa'.[53] But he also saw China as a source of inspiration. As he said in the same speech, he was deeply impressed by the country's 'dedication' to 'the cause of national development' and by China's 'discipline, the selflessness of the people and the people's cadres' and the way China was, he believed, focused on 'the benefit of the masses rather than the enrichment of a few individuals'.[54]

But pursuit of economic development also meant seeking out new ways of building south–south cooperation. Again, this drew on the principles established at the Bandung Conference of 1955. One of the objectives of the Bandung Conference had been to 'consider social, economic, and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented', and economic development was an important element within these objectives. The first section of the final communiqué issued at the end of the Bandung Conference addressed the specific issue of economic cooperation, stressing the 'urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region'. Noting the desire expressed at the conference for 'economic cooperation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty', the communiqué outlined a series of ways in which economic cooperation might be pursued, such as through technical assistance and collective action to stabilize commodity prices.[55]

In 1987, as the Cold War approached its end, Nyerere took on the Chairmanship of the South Commission, a group which included representatives from 28 countries from across Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well as Yugoslavia. The Commission expressed the hope that the 'easing of East–West tensions may…contribute to reducing the incidence and scale of armed conflict in the South, and as a consequence allow the South to

economize on military expenditure and concentrate on development'. But while the context may have changed, the language of the South Commission continued to echo that of Bandung.

President Sukarno of Indonesia had opened the Bandung Conference in 1955 with a call to recognize that while the Afro-Asian world was characterized by diversity, there was 'unity in desire', more specifically, the desire to 'impress on the world that all men and all countries have their place under the sun'.[56] In a similar vein, the South Commission too recognized the diversity which characterized the global south, including 'economic and technological diversity' which had 'become more marked in recent years, making the South of today even less homogenous than the South of yesterday'. Yet, the commissioners continued, in this diversity there is a basic unity. What the countries of the South have in common transcends their differences; it gives them a shared identity and a reason to work together for common objectives.' And that unity came from a shared commitment to 'escape from poverty and underdevelopment and secure a better life for their citizens'.[57]

Conclusion

During his time in office, Nyerere was often misunderstood, and he infuriated as many outside observers as he inspired and charmed. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Dar es Salaam offered a space in which liberation movements could house their headquarters, and where visiting nationalists and all those concerned with the liberation and economic development of the global south could be assured of a warm welcome. For some, Nyerere was both a source of inspiration and of material and practical support. Yet for others, his decision to spend significant proportions of Tanzania's scarce resources in providing support to liberation movements across the African continent demonstrated a shocking disregard for his own citizens. At the end of the 1970s, it was even suggested by British officials at the High Commission in Dar es Salaam that his enthusiastic deployment of Tanzanian troops in the cause of liberation across the African continent was a means to keep the army busy and distracted from the temptation of mounting coups at home.[58]

But viewed through the lens of the distinctive map of the world which framed Nyerere's approach to foreign affairs, the priorities he attached to the liberation of southern Africa and the connections he forged across Cold War lines with all those who had pledged commitment to the struggle against imperialism begin to make more sense. And what is striking is the consistency with which he upheld his commitments, while also demonstrating an ability to adapt to a changing world over a long political life. To see why, we might turn finally to two speeches Nyerere gave towards the end of his life, as the Cold War was ending.

At a speech in Geneva in 1990, Nyerere welcomed the end of the Cold War, not only as the fulfilment of his long-standing hopes for peace in the world, but also for another reason. He expressed the hope that the ending of one division in the world, that between East and West, might 'bring into better focus a more fundamental and more truly world division. That is the economic division between North and South, and the near-monopoly of international, economic, and military power possessed by the North.'[59]

His focus remained south–south solidarity. As he explained in a speech to the non-aligned movement in Jakarta in 1992, '[n]ow that we are no longer faced by a divided North nor subjected to rival pressures from East or West, let us invite all the countries of the South to join us so that together we become really a Movement of the whole South'.[60] In both speeches, he showed both his awareness of the ways in which the world was changing, but also the consistency in outlook which had marked his political life from his earliest days. In 1992 Nyerere was still hoping that the countries of the postcolonial world, the global south, could work together to achieve true liberation.

For Nyerere, the Cold War always came second to the real priority, true freedom for the South. As these speeches show, he hoped and believed in the potential offered by the ending of a battle between superpowers, in which Africa had served as pawn and battleground in what was fundamentally somebody else's civil war. In this way, the end of the Cold War represented for Nyerere a new opportunity for the goals to which he had long been committed finally to be fulfilled.

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6
King Hussein of Jordan

Nigel Ashton

King Hussein of Jordan has been described as a prisoner of history and geography.[1] In fact, he saw both as presenting him with opportunities as well as constraints. In terms of geography, Jordan is a classic buffer state, sandwiched between more powerful neighbours: to the north is Syria; to the south Egypt and Saudi Arabia; to the east Iraq and, most importantly, to the west Israel. But throughout his long reign (1953–99) Hussein made playing off enemies and rivals into an art form to ensure both the survival of Jordan as an independent state and the survival of the Hashemite dynasty. In terms of history, Hussein inherited both the incorporation into Jordan of the West Bank acquired in the war of 1948–49 and hence of the Palestinian national question, and a sense of a broader dynastic mission from his grandfather, Abdullah. While his West Bank inheritance made political strife endemic to the Hashemite Kingdom, his sense of dynastic mission led Hussein to dream of a Hashemite purpose which was always larger than the boundaries imposed on Jordan. As Hussein described matters in private, Jordan had to have 'a larger future than a few thousand square miles of sand'.[2]

This sense of dynastic mission was founded on two pillars. The first was temporal: the raising of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War by his great-grandfather, the Sharif Hussein of Mecca. The Arab Revolt provided a constant point of ideological reference for Hussein throughout his reign. For him it signified Arab dignity, unity and independence and the rejection of external, imperialist domination. Its antithesis in Hussein's formulation was provided by the Anglo–French Sykes–Picot agreement of 1916, which had conditioned the post-First World War imperialist carve up of Arab lands. While the Hashemites might be seen as beneficiaries of British imperialism to the extent that the Sharif's sons Abdullah (Hussein's grandfather) and Faisal had been installed respectively as the kings of Transjordan and Iraq, for Hussein 'Sykes–Picot' remained the shorthand term for describing an externally imposed, imperialist territorial order which had denied the Arabs full independence. It was a formulation to which he returned at key junctures in his reign. So, on 6 February 1991,

as a US-led air bombardment rained down on the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait, Hussein warned in a highly controversial speech that 'the real purpose behind this destructive war . . . is to destroy Iraq and rearrange the area in a manner far more dangerous to our nation's present and future than the Sykes–Picot agreement'.[3] Hussein kept up this theme in a series of speeches after the war, proclaiming the hope that 'the turn of the twenty-first century heralds the resumption of the Great Arab Revolt, an interpretation of history in terms of freedom not oil'.[4] For Hussein, then, the territorial order in the Arab world was a transient imperialist construct. Geography in this sense did not permanently imprison him or his dynasty.

The second pillar of Hussein's dynastic mission was spiritual, provided by the Hashemites' descent from the Prophet Mohammad via his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali. This spiritual claim to dignity and leadership was reinforced by the Hashemites' status during the Ottoman era as the guardians of Mecca and Medina, the most holy Muslim sites. Again, this was a theme to which Hussein returned repeatedly, most controversially in the wake of the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Then, Hussein's request to be referred to by the title 'Sharif' soon after the crisis broke out was taken by both the Saudis and Egyptians to be evidence of Hashemite irredentism, the coveting of the lost lands of the Hejaz which had been conquered by the forces of Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in 1924, driving Hussein's great-grandfather the Sharif Hussein into exile.[5] Albeit Hussein protested bitterly that he had never once 'in word or in deed' broken his grandfather Abdullah's commitment through the 1925 Hadda agreement to settle the differences between the two royal houses and renounce the Hashemite claim on the Hejaz, still the suspicions of his intentions lingered in Jeddah throughout the final decade of his reign.[6]

If these were Hussein's claims to a broader temporal and spiritual dynastic mission, his brand of Hashemite Arab nationalism also led him to stake out a clear position in the Cold War contest in the region relatively early in his reign. 'In the great struggle between communism and freedom, there can be no neutrality', he told the United Nations General Assembly on 3 October 1960. Hussein went on to emphasize that he 'wanted to be sure that there was no mistake about where Jordan stands in the conflict of ideologies that is endangering the peace of the world'.[7] In his autobiography written the following year, Hussein developed a coherent ideological case as to why communism was incompatible with the Hashemite brand of Arab nationalism.[8] This encompassed both an opposition to communist atheism and the aspiration for Arab independence from any form of imperialist influence. From Hussein's own perspective, therefore, there was an ideological justification for his Cold War alliance with the United States. Of course, ideology in this sense dovetailed neatly with practical considerations. The US alliance served Jordan's security in two respects: through its deterrent effect on more powerful neighbouring states which might otherwise have

sought to overrun the kingdom; and through the provision of financial aid which provided budget security, helping to remedy the chronic insufficiency of Jordan's domestic tax base.

Hussein's ideology of Hashemite Arab nationalism provided the compass which guided his statecraft through the dramatically changing regional landscape during the final two decades of the Cold War era. The year 1967 proved in this respect to be the most significant watershed in the whole of Hussein's reign. The defeat of Jordan, which had fought Israel as part of the coalition of Arab countries in the June war, wrought a fundamental change in the king's mental map. The key goal of his statecraft for the remaining three decades of his reign was to reverse the effects of the war and to recover the Arab lands lost to Israel. In other words, his goal was to prevent Israel from using the outcome of the war permanently to redraw the map of the region. But, if Hussein was such a shrewd judge of the balance of power, perhaps the first and most crucial question that must be posed before considering the consequences of the war for Jordan is how did he come to find himself involved in the conflict in the first place? After all, at no stage before the war was he under any illusion about the extent of Israel's military superiority or the likelihood of an Arab victory.

The key to understanding Hussein's fateful decision to sign an alliance with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser on 30 May 1967 and to place Jordanian forces under Egyptian command lies in an event which took place the previous year: the Israeli raid on the West Bank village of Samu. The operation, which took place early on the morning of 13 November 1966, was a major Israeli incursion undertaken in retaliation for a previous raid by Palestinian Fatah guerrillas on Israeli territory which had cost the lives of three soldiers. The problem from Hussein's perspective was that the Fatah attacks were sponsored by the Syrian regime and beyond his ability to prevent. Despite this, it was Jordan which was the target of the Israeli retaliation which resulted in the demolition of a large part of the village of Samu and the deaths of 15 Jordanian soldiers and one pilot from the Royal Jordanian Air Force. The situation was made even worse from Hussein's point of view by the apparent duplicity of Israeli actions in the period leading up to the raid. As he subsequently revealed in a dramatic conversation with US ambassador Findley Burns and CIA Station Chief Jack O'Connell, he had met secretly over the previous three years with various Israeli leaders including Golda Meir and Abba Eban to explore the possibilities of resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict. During his exchanges with these Israeli representatives he had told them that 'I could not absorb or tolerate a serious retaliatory raid. They accepted the logic of this and promised that there would never be one.'[9] To make matters even worse, the king had received a personal message from the Israelis reassuring him that they had no intention of attacking Jordan on the very morning that the retaliatory raid on Samu took place. Hussein drew two conclusions from this extraordinary sequence of events.

The first was that the Israelis could not be trusted. The second was that they were intent on undermining Jordan and seizing the West Bank.

It was this sense of fatalism which conditioned Hussein's response as the region slid towards war in late May 1967. The likelihood that Nasser's brinkmanship, involving the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and the demand for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai, would lead to war left Hussein with what he saw as a clear choice. He could sign a pact with Nasser and face Israel as part of an Arab coalition or he could try to stand alone and face the probability that Jordan would be dragged into the war in any case. If he stood alone, he was convinced that Israel would try to manufacture the circumstances to seize the West Bank.[10] Viewed in this way Hussein's decision to fly to Cairo and sign a pact with Nasser becomes more comprehensible, even if it proved to be the most disastrous choice of his reign.

Jordan's defeat in the June war was crushing and comprehensive. The loss of the West Bank deprived the country of a quarter of its cultivatable land and nearly half of its industry, accounting for almost 40 per cent of its Gross National Product. In addition, the influx of 300,000 refugees to the East Bank posed significant social and political problems.[11] While the passing of United Nations Security Council resolution 242 on 22 November 1967 put on record the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through war and the need for the 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict', it coupled this requirement with the need for 'termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force'.[12] Hussein was willing to accept this 'land for peace' formula, but as the victorious power in possession of the conquered territory the Israeli government's strategy by contrast was one of prevarication. Opinion in Israel was divided between those who saw the acquisition of the West Bank as a providential opportunity to incorporate 'Judea' and 'Samaria' into a Greater Israel and those who believed that territorial compromises might be made provided Israel retained a sufficient portion of the West Bank to ensure its future security. But opinion across almost the entire political spectrum was united in the belief that Jerusalem must remain a united city under Israeli sovereignty, making a deal with Hussein over Arab East Jerusalem, which Israel had occupied during the war, impossible.[13]

Hussein's attempts to explore the possibility of peace through his covert dialogue with Israeli leaders which continued after the war thus met with no success. In the meantime the internal situation in Jordan deteriorated, with raids by Palestinian guerrillas known as the *fedayeen* triggering severe Israeli reprisals against Jordan, a spiral of violence which served only to undermine Hussein's authority within his kingdom. By September 1970 the point of no

return had been reached from Hussein's perspective and he unleashed the Jordanian army against the Palestinian guerrilla groups which by this time had become a state within a state. Much debate has surrounded the question of how far Hussein survived and triumphed in the September 1970 conflict as a result of Israeli support.[14] The contemporaneous invasion of northern Jordan by Syrian armed forces posing as those of the Palestine Liberation Army presented a direct and significant threat to the survival of his regime. However, while Israel did redeploy forces to its northern border along the Golan Heights, and carried out air reconnaissance over the invading Syrian forces, the victory on the battlefield was won by the Jordanian armed forces. Hussein himself remained wary of the possibility that Israel might take the opportunity presented by the crisis to seize additional territory in the north of his country. Hussein's fears were not unfounded. Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan argued in private that 'if we go to Irbid [in northern Jordan] it will be difficult for us just to return it'.[15] Opinion within the Israeli government was divided between those who saw the crisis as an opportunity to 'solve' the Palestinian problem by toppling the Hashemite regime and replacing it with a Palestinian state, and those who by contrast saw the survival of Hussein as being in Israel's interests since he constituted Israel's best potential peace partner in the longer run.[16] In the event, the latter view prevailed.

However, Hussein's continuing efforts to secure the return of the West Bank proved to be of no avail. Most significant of these attempts was his United Arab Kingdom plan proposed in March 1972 which would have involved the Israeli-occupied West Bank being joined to the East Bank in a quasi-federal structure. The two regions would each have their own elected parliaments which would deal with local government matters, while a national parliament, presided over by the king as head of state would deal with the economy, defence and foreign affairs. Hussein expressed the hope that other territories such as the Gaza Strip might also be brought under the authority of the Palestinian entity thus created on the West Bank. In private he was even more expansive, arguing that this 'United Kingdom' might be expanded to include other Arabs, an observation which the British ambassador in Amman described as 'shades of the Fertile Crescent and Hashemite rule in Damascus and Baghdad'.[17] Evidently even in the unpromising circumstances prevailing in the early 1970s, Hussein had not lost sight of his broader dynastic mission. His mental map remained a canvas on which Hashemite dynastic ambitions could be sketched, if not perfected.

In the event Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan was rejected both by the Israeli Government and by the leadership of the PLO. It was also overtaken by events in the shape of the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War. The outbreak of the war was a consequence both of the deadlock in the regional peace process, with the Israeli government evidently content to sit tight in the territories it had conquered in 1967, and of the changing

climate in superpower relations. Paradoxically, the effect of détente between Washington and Moscow had been to close off the diplomatic options available to President Sadat of Egypt in seeking to recover the Sinai Peninsula occupied by Israel in 1967. Neither superpower was willing to take risks in Middle East diplomacy which might disrupt their improved relationship so matters were allowed to drift with Israel consolidating the territorial status quo. Only through launching a war did Sadat believe he could persuade the Nixon administration to devote its energy to the regional peace process and exert the kind of diplomatic pressure on Israel which might force it to make territorial concessions.[18]

Hussein for his part was excluded from the preparations for war undertaken by Sadat in conjunction with Syrian President Hafez Asad. However, through the activities of his head of military intelligence, Abboud Salem, who had recruited a senior officer in the Syrian army as a source early in 1973, Hussein was able to learn detailed information about the Syrian plan of attack. The king was to a large degree incredulous, believing that any renewed war with Israel risked disaster. However, he did what he could to avert its outbreak by warning Western interlocutors that war could come soon if no action was taken to break the diplomatic deadlock.[19] He also flew covertly to Israel to meet Prime Minister Golda Meir on 25 September 1973, in what has been termed a 'fishing expedition' to see if the Israelis had any information which would corroborate what he had learnt from his Syrian source. The fact that the Israelis did not expect war only deepened the king's incredulity at the information Abboud Salem had received.[20]

The outbreak of war on 6 October 1973 posed a significant challenge for Hussein. On the one hand, given the experience of defeat in 1967, he was determined to avoid Jordan's engagement in the conflict. On the other, as the war progressed, he came under increasing pressure to intervene and relieve the predicament of the Syrian forces which, after initial advances, had been driven back by the Israelis on the Golan front. Hussein's solution to the problem was elegant. On 11 October he told the British ambassador Glen Balfour Paul that he had decided that 'to retain any Arab credibility at all, he must make the gesture . . . i.e. despatch (in as slow a time as possible) [of] an armoured brigade to relieve the Syrian left wing'.[21] The problem remained how to avoid a direct engagement with Israel as a result of the movement of Jordanian forces. Initially, the king communicated with the Israelis through British and American intermediaries, but as the Syrian front crumbled, he was left with no alternative but to call Prime Minister Golda Meir directly on 15 October informing her that 'Israel should consider the Jordanian expeditionary force of the 40th armoured brigade as hostile as of yesterday morning.'[22] In the event, the Israelis did not directly target the Jordanian brigade during the remaining week of fighting and Hussein for his part, in contrast to 1967, maintained his refusal to place his forces under foreign command. As the war drew to a close, the US ambassador in Amman,

Dean Brown, wrote to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in appreciation of Hussein's skilful navigation of the crisis: 'he has played the game beautifully', Brown observed.[23] Hussein had managed to achieve credit in inter-Arab politics, particularly with the Syrians, at the same time as avoiding the destruction of his armed forces through maintaining channels to the Israeli government. The October war was probably the best example throughout the whole of Hussein's reign of his shrewd grasp of crisis management.

For all Hussein's tactical skill during the crisis, what mattered to him most was whether the war would be followed by a reinvigorated peace process which might lead to the return of the Arab lands lost in 1967. Here, the results were disappointing. The focus of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the disengagement of forces in the aftermath of the war left Jordan out in the cold. Paradoxically, because of Hussein's restraint there had been no fighting on the Jordanian front, so there was no pressing need to focus on the separation of forces there. Added to that was the fact that the Israeli government remained divided over what peace terms might be offered to Hussein, which continued to mean that no formal terms were actually offered. In the absence of movement, the competition between Hussein and the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, over who represented the Palestinians and who had the right to negotiate over the West Bank, came once more to the fore. At the Rabat summit of October 1974, the Arab states resolved that the Palestinians had the right to 'establish an independent national authority under the command of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated'.[24] Whatever Hussein's own dynastic inheritance, from now on the resolution obliged him to defer to the PLO in any future negotiations over the West Bank.

Nevertheless, there remained other potential outlets for Hussein's sense of dynastic mission during this period. The close relations with the Syrian regime of Hafez Asad which he cultivated with the help of his Prime Minister Zeid Rifai during the mid-1970s were not without their dynastic dimension. Hussein's grandfather Abdullah had cherished the notion of a Hashemite-led 'Greater Syria' which might incorporate Syria, Palestine and Transjordan, and while this remained a largely unspoken assumption of Hussein's Syrian policy, he did on one occasion allow his guard to slip, telling US ambassador Dean Brown, as noted above, that Jordan had to have 'a larger future than a few thousand square miles of sand'.[25]

One clear element of community of interest between the Syrian leader Hafez Asad and King Hussein lay in their mutual suspicion of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The Syrian view was that Sadat had formed an alliance and fought the October War under false pretences, intending only to pursue his own territorial goals. With the post-war peace process seemingly stalled on the Egyptian front after two limited Sinai disengagement agreements, Sadat now took a dramatic initiative in the form of his decision to fly to Jerusalem and address the Israeli Knesset in person on 19 November

1977. His initiative cut across the negotiations which had been brokered by the administration of the new US President Jimmy Carter towards the resumption of the multilateral Geneva Conference, which had convened briefly after the October war in December 1973, then adjourned indefinitely. A return to Geneva was close, as evidenced by a private letter from Carter to Hussein on 30 October in which he wrote that 'I strongly believe that the time has come for us to move boldly to reconvene the Conference'.[26] Sadat was also aware that the resumption of the conference was a serious possibility, but did not want to run the risk that Egyptian interests might be subsumed in a joint Arab negotiating position. Hence his dramatic personal initiative.

From the outset, Hussein had serious doubts about Sadat's approach. It was not just the timing or the fact that the Sadat visit to Jerusalem had stopped the multilateral negotiating process in its tracks. The visit of an Arab leader to occupied Jerusalem had great symbolic significance, particularly for Hussein as a Hashemite. As he later told US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski,

> the visit to Jerusalem under occupation had great religious significance. My grandfather is buried there. He was involved in the Arab revolt against colonial rule and he died because he would not compromise. We lost Jerusalem in 1967 under Egyptian command . . . The Sadat visit was a very, very big shock.[27]

The king's words perfectly plotted the visit's significance within the parameters of his own mental map. First there was the spiritual dimension in terms of Jerusalem's religious importance. Then there was the temporal dimension in terms of the reference to the Arab revolt. Finally, there was the spatial dimension in terms of the loss of Jerusalem in 1967 under Egyptian command. In every respect the Sadat visit transgressed a crucial boundary from Hussein's perspective. It is doubtful, however, whether the king's US interlocutor, Brzezinski, understood the full significance of his words. He more likely saw them more as a piece of special pleading mustered for the purpose of explaining Hussein's refusal to accept the consequences of the Sadat visit in terms of the subsequent bilateral Egyptian–Israeli negotiating process.

The main consequence of the Sadat visit, after a protracted period of negotiation, was the convening of a summit, under the auspices of President Carter, at the presidential retreat of Camp David in September 1978, which brought together Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. The goals of the summit from the perspective of its US hosts were to provide a framework for a bilateral Egyptian–Israeli peace agreement but also a framework for broader peace in the Middle East. The latter goal required a solution to the problem of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Given that Begin was willing to offer no more than a form of limited local autonomy to the

Palestinians in the occupied territories, Hussein held a potentially pivotal position. It would only be with his cooperation that any transitional autonomy plan might be fully implemented. But even before the Camp David summit convened, Hussein had written to Carter on 27 August 1978 expressing his fear that Israel's intransigence on the Palestinian question 'might prompt the participants to issue a vague and uncommitting document of principles aimed at de-emphasizing the differences and inviting other participants'.[28] Hussein expressed the same fear in his final letter to Sadat before the summit convened.[29]

In the event this proved to be an accurate prediction of what transpired at Camp David.[30] Sadat showed little interest in the broader framework agreement and focused his efforts on the bilateral Egyptian–Israeli issues. It was left to the American hosts to try to persuade Begin to accept a more expansive autonomy agreement. In the event, their efforts met with little success in this regard. The 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East', which was the second of the two main documents agreed by Begin and Sadat, placed Hussein in an anomalous position.[31] It called on Jordan to join in negotiations regarding transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza and also stipulated that Jordan would participate in joint patrols with Israel in maintaining security. It also laid out a timetable which required Jordan to start negotiations with Israel over a peace treaty by the third year of a planned five-year transitional period. But Hussein had not been consulted about any of these requirements which, at the very least, made the agreement high-handed in respect of the assumptions it made about the Jordanian role. As King Hussein described the position,

> then came the agreement, a very limited agreement . . . The role provided for Jordan under the Camp David agreements was that of a policeman, to ensure the security of who, – the occupied? We tried to keep as quiet as possible. But that is not a role we could play. What we wanted to know was what was the final object?[32]

Hussein now came under strong pressure from President Carter to back the Camp David agreement despite its weaknesses. In a private, handwritten letter Carter urged, 'I need your strong personal support'.[33]

In a bid to pin down more precisely the meaning of the framework document, and also to play for time, the king submitted a list of 14 questions about the agreement to US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who agreed to provide him with written answers.[34] However, the American answers did little to assuage Hussein's fundamental doubts about the Camp David framework. As he made clear in a cold letter sent to Sadat on 14 October, he viewed the framework agreement on peace in the Middle East as vague and any transitional agreement without a stated end goal as 'useless' since Israel would continue to change facts on the ground in the occupied territories through

its settlement activities.[35] In a letter sent to President Carter on 31 October Hussein made it clear that he did not believe the Camp David framework was just or workable. Whereas the bilateral Egyptian–Israeli agreement acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai, the framework document left open to negotiation the future of the West Bank and Gaza. 'I believe there was no balance in this', Hussein wrote, 'particularly as the document dealing with the West Bank and Gaza was very explicit in its provisions regarding the transitional agreements and the Jordanian role and responsibilities in them.' In a damning conclusion Hussein argued that the agreements offered 'no definite answers to our fundamental concerns, namely the ultimate total Israeli withdrawal, self-determination for the Palestinians and the return of Arab Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty.'[36]

Hussein's stance resulted in a rupture in his relations with the United States which might have had very serious consequences for Jordan's defence and budget security were it not for a new tack taken by the king in his regional policy. The summit conference of Arab heads of state held in Baghdad in November 1978, which agreed to take steps to isolate Egypt in the Arab world, also witnessed the cementing of a new, closer relationship between Jordan and Iraq. This was founded on the close personal relationship between the king and the Iraqi vice president, soon to become president, Saddam Hussein. Throughout the remainder of the Cold War era, between 1979 and 1991, this Iraqi–Jordanian axis remained at the heart of Hussein's policy. While its initial *raison d'être* was the king's search for budget security, with Saddam playing the pivotal role in negotiating and funding a pledge to Jordan of $1.25 billion per annum in aid over the coming decade, the alliance was soon further cemented by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in 1980. These twin events had a very significant effect on each of the temporal, spiritual and spatial dimensions of Hussein's mental map. In terms of the temporal dimension, the king came to see Saddam as a champion of 'Arabism', defending Arab independence and dignity. A common theme of his speeches in the 1980s was that Iraq had picked up the banner of the Arab Revolt and was advancing in the vanguard of the Arab nation. According to Hussein, 'we Jordanians have always been heirs to the principles of the great Arab revolution . . . Our support for Iraq is an inevitable extension of our principled stands because Iraq is right and demands nothing but justice.'[37] In terms of the spiritual dimension, Hussein was highly critical of the Iranian Revolution, arguing that it represented a perversion of Islam. The Khomeini regime was 'an anachronism and an insult to human rights, dignity and the true teachings of Islam'.[38] Worse than that it threatened a Sunni–Shia split, which held 'incalculable dangers of instability, strife, bloodshed and disintegration'.[39] Finally, in terms of the spatial dimension, Hussein argued that revolutionary Iran threatened the eastern border of the Arab world. Albeit that it was Saddam Hussein who had taken the initiative in launching the Iran–Iraq war

through his invasion of Iran in September 1980, still the king argued that it was Iran which entertained designs on Arab lands. As he saw matters, it was 'the whole idea and attitude of Iran in this area that we are up against, that it can fragment the area, that it can dominate the area, that it can act as a strongman in the area, that it can threaten whenever it feels like others in the area'.[40]

Hussein also found a justification for his stance in terms of the Cold War context. According to his formulation, the Soviets had backed the Iranian Revolution from the beginning and were its 'most logical inheritors'.[41] This was because Moscow would benefit most from the instability in the Arab world which the Iranians were aiming to engender. Hussein supported his argument with evidence drawn from his own visit to Moscow in June 1982, during which he claimed that Soviet leaders had suggested they might remove their remaining armed forces from the border with Iran, thus freeing additional Iranian divisions to menace Iraq and the Gulf states.[42] Given that Hussein deployed this claim as part of a battery of arguments aimed at persuading the United States to abandon its neutrality and tilt towards support of Iraq at a critical juncture in the war during the spring and early summer of 1982, an element of special pleading was no doubt present in his approach. However, there was a kernel of truth in his argument that the Iran–Iraq war presented certain opportunities to the Soviet Union to enhance its position in the Gulf region. The Kuwaiti request for the reflagging of its tankers, which were threatened by Iranian attacks, delivered jointly to Moscow and Washington in late 1986 was one illustration of such opportunities.

One further aspect of Hussein's support for Iraq deserves consideration here: how far it dovetailed with his dynastic ambitions? While for the most part these continued to lie dormant during the 1980s, Hussein was always conscious of the Hashemite legacy in Iraq. Immediately after the revolution of July 1958, which had swept away the Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad, he had considered asserting his own right to the Iraqi throne as he was entitled to do under the terms of the recently concluded Iraqi–Jordanian Union.[43] While the swift consolidation of power by the Iraqi Free Officers who had toppled the monarchy, together with the diffidence of the Western powers, had thwarted his ambitions at that stage, his despatch of Wasfi al-Tall as Jordanian ambassador to Iraq between 1960 and 1962 illustrated his continuing interest in building Jordanian influence in Iraq with a view to capitalizing on any potential collapse of the regime of Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim.[44] Clearly, the king could not afford any hint of continuing dynastic interest in Iraq to cloud his relationship with Saddam Hussein during the 1980s. However, the Iraqi leader's honouring of the Hashemite heritage in Iraq through the renovation of the royal cemetery and the reading of prayers for the souls of King Feisal I and King Ghazi during one of King Hussein's visits to Baghdad showed that Saddam was aware of his

sensibilities.[45] Nevertheless, it was not until after the mid-1990s, with the isolation of Iraq in the wake of its expulsion from Kuwait, coupled with a significant distancing in his own relationship with Saddam Hussein, that King Hussein's dynastic ambitions in Iraq re-emerged more openly through his support for efforts to overthrow Saddam.[46]

From the summer of 1982 onwards, the Iran–Iraq war remained deadlocked, with neither side able to advance significantly on the ground. Six years of effective stalemate ensued. In that respect, the conflict had something in common with the stalled Arab–Israeli peace process which was Hussein's other main concern during the 1980s. Ironically, the first key initiative taken during this period to break the deadlock in the peace process was also military in character. The Likud government of Menachem Begin sought, through a full-scale invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, to redraw the map of the region again, eradicating the PLO as a political and military force and cowing the Arab states into submission. The Israeli invasion reawakened a perennial Hashemite nightmare: that Israel might seek to 'solve' the Palestinian problem by driving the Palestinians out of the occupied territories into Jordan, toppling the Hashemite regime in the process and creating a Palestinian state on the East Bank. This nightmare went by the shorthand euphemism of 'transfer', and was referred to under the slogan 'Jordan is Palestine' in the political argot of Likud politicians such as Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Minister of Defence who had orchestrated the invasion of Lebanon. As Hussein described the situation in a letter to President Reagan,

> Sharon's desire . . . is to drive them [the Palestinians] eventually into Jordan that they may be joined by others driven out of the West Bank and Gaza so that in time and with more Jewish settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories when the issue of self-determination is addressed the results would be guaranteed in Israel's favour.[47]

The result for Jordan according to Hussein would be the establishment of 'a docile Palestinian state' under Israeli tutelage on Jordanian soil.

In a bid to assuage its Arab allies, and atone in part for its supine reaction to the Israeli invasion, the US tried to break the deadlock in the peace process by launching the eponymous 'Reagan Plan' on 1 September 1982. This re-introduced the concept of a Jordanian role in the West Bank through formal Israeli withdrawal and the creation of a system of local self-government in association with Jordan. Hussein did what he could to coordinate a joint response to the Reagan Plan with the PLO, whose central role in any negotiations over the West Bank had been reaffirmed by the Arab summit at Fez between 8 and 10 September 1982. However, the pressures on Arafat both from within the PLO and from various Arab states, particularly Syria, alongside the Israeli rejection of the plan and the US refusal to deal with the PLO, made a compromise agreement between Hussein and the PLO

leader unattainable at this juncture. Nevertheless, Hussein continued his efforts at coordination over the next two years, eventually arriving at a deal with Arafat in February 1985, known as the 'Amman Accord'. This appeared to offer a way forward by bringing the PLO into negotiations within the framework of an international conference, and proposing Palestinian self-determination in a confederation with Jordan. Hussein made it clear in private communications with Washington that he interpreted the agreement as meaning PLO attendance at the conference could only take place within a joint delegation with Jordan and that Palestinian self-determination would have to be within a state 'confederally united with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan'.[48]

The agreement immediately met with criticism from all sides. Israel refused to negotiate with the PLO, while Syria once again took the lead in organizing Arab opposition, mustering Palestinian critics of the deal with a view to toppling Arafat. Under pressure, the PLO leader started back-pedalling, attaching conditions to his acceptance of UNSC resolution 242. Hussein persevered in trying to sell the agreement, conducting covert discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres twice in London during 1985, and lobbying hard in Washington for the Reagan administration's support. But it was not to be. By the beginning of 1986 Hussein's patience with Arafat had run out and on 19 February 1986 he announced the failure of the Amman Accord with a stinging rebuke to Arafat: 'we are unable to continue to coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such time as their word becomes their bond'.[49]

It was at this juncture that Hussein's own dynastic ambitions re-emerged more clearly through the attempt to build up the Hashemite role in the occupied territories between 1986 and 1988 in covert cooperation with Israel. All PLO offices in Jordan were closed during 1986 and a projected five-year Jordanian development plan for the West Bank and Gaza was announced. Meanwhile further covert discussions took place in London in April 1987 between the king and Shimon Peres, who by this time had taken up the role of Israeli Foreign Minister. But the so-called 'London Agreement' which the two men struck was undermined by internal politics in Israel, in the form of the opposition of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and by diffidence in Washington, with US Secretary of State George Shultz refusing to take on the role of advocating the agreement in the face of Shamir's opposition.[50] The outbreak of the Palestinian *Intifada* at the end of 1987 drove the final nail into the coffin of Jordanian attempts to play a role independent of the PLO in the occupied territories. By July 1988 King Hussein decided to cut his losses, announcing Jordan's unilateral administrative disengagement from the West Bank and putting the ball firmly in the PLO's court to develop a viable negotiating position.

As the Cold War in Europe drew to a close at the end of 1989, tensions in the Middle East were if anything rising. The era of *glasnost* in the Soviet

Union had direct, pernicious effects in the region from the point of view of King Hussein in the form of the influx of a wave of Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel. Hussein's concern was that these immigrants would predominantly be accommodated in settlements in the occupied territories raising tensions still further and making the negotiation of Israeli withdrawal even more difficult. The decline of the Soviet Union as a balancing power to the United States, coupled with the consequences of the end of the Iran–Iraq war for Saddam Hussein's policy made the period 1989–90 one of great uncertainty in the region. There was much talk at this juncture of a so-called 'New World Order' but in Hussein's formulation this was a largely negative concept. It stood for unchallenged American hegemony and the trampling of Arab independence and rights. Indeed, this was a repeated refrain of his public interventions during the crisis which followed in the wake of the 2 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

During the first phase of the crisis King Hussein attempted to play the role of mediator between Iraq and the United States. But his position was widely perceived in the West and in most Arab quarters as being sympathetic to that of Iraq. With the failure of his mediation efforts and the launching of the US-led air and subsequent ground campaign to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Hussein's frustration boiled over. In a remarkable speech on 6 February 1991, already quoted above, Hussein spoke with particular bitterness about the supposed 'New World Order' which would follow the end of the Cold War: 'the talk about a New World Order whose early feature is the destruction of Iraq, and the persistence of this talk as the war continues, lead us to wonder about the identity of this order and instil in us doubts regarding its nature'. He proceeded to lambast the role of the United Nations and the international coalition assembled against Iraq, particularly its Arab members, concluding that 'I say that any Arab or Muslim can realise the magnitude of this crime committed against his religion and his nation.'[51] Hussein's speech drew a swift response from US President George Bush who wrote to him on 9 February asserting that 'your words exculpate Saddam Hussein for the most serious and most brazen crime against the Arab nation by another Arab in modern times'.[52] But Hussein was steadfast in defence of his position: 'while I do not . . . question your right to express yourself in defence of your policies and objectives, I am not able to concede mine as a Hashemite Arab Muslim'.[53]

One further footnote is worth adding here regarding the changed contours of the international order as the Cold War ended. The Gulf crisis witnessed Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev staking out a position which was almost wholly supportive of the US approach. Indeed, as Iraq began to target Israel with Scud missiles after the launching of the coalition air campaign, Gorbachev wrote to King Hussein emphasizing how little sympathy he had for Iraq and urging the king to take a 'responsible and balanced position' in response to Saddam's attacks.[54] The attempt to distract Arab attention from the occupation of Kuwait through the instigation of conflict

with Israel must not be allowed to succeed, Gorbachev warned. There could be no clearer indication of the changed circumstances prevailing in the region at the end of the Cold War than a Soviet leader warning an Arab client of the United States not to rise to the bait offered by an Arab client of the Soviet Union in attacking Israel.

The conclusion of the Gulf crisis left King Hussein more isolated than at any point in his long reign. The pursuit of the revived regional peace process, which involved the convening at American instigation of a multilateral conference in Madrid on 30 October 1991, offered him his only potential outlet. But Hussein's pursuit of the peace process, which culminated in the signing of the Jordanian–Israeli Peace Treaty on 26 October 1994, was much more a question of long-standing conviction on his part, facilitated by the changed circumstances prevailing in the region after the end of the Cold War, than mere necessity. Looking back over the course he had charted through the final two decades of the Cold War era, it is clear that he had been guided throughout by the three key parameters of his mental map: spiritual in the form of the particular destiny of the Hashemites as descendants of the Prophet and custodians of the holy shrines of Islam to provide leadership; temporal in the form of the legacy of the Arab Revolt and its symbolism for Arab dignity and independence; and spatial in terms of the drive to retrieve the Arab lands lost in 1967. While his statecraft was characterized for the most part more by striving than achieving, that was perhaps ultimately more a measure of his ambitions than his accomplishments.

Notes

1. Judith Miller, 'Death of a King: Cautious King Took Risks in Straddling Two Worlds', *New York Times*, 8 February 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1114.html (accessed 5 February 2015).
2. Brown to Kissinger, 2 June 1976, Amman telegram no. 2954, NSA Country File Middle East/South Asia, Box 23, Folder – Jordan State Dept Telegrams to SecState Nodis (26), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Papers (hereafter GRFP).
3. Address to the Nation by His Majesty King Hussein, Amman, 6 February 1991, document XII, *White Paper: Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990–March 1991* (Amman, Government of Jordan, 1991), p. 62.
4. 'King Hussein Addresses Human Rights Center Committee', Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS)-NES-93-029, 16 February 1993, p. 47. See also M. Mufti, 'A King's Art: Dynastic Ambition and State Interest in Hussein's Jordan', *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 13.3, 2002, p. 18, for discussion of this theme.
5. P. Robins, *A History of Jordan* (Cambridge, 2004), p. 178; Khaled bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior* (London, 1995), pp. 181, 210.
6. King Hussein to Prime Minister John Major, 20 May 1992, British File, Royal Hashemite Archive, Basman Palace, Amman (hereafter RHA).
7. For the full text of Hussein's speech see his autobiography, Hussein bin Talal, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (London, 1962), pp. 200–7.
8. Hussein bin Talal, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (London, 1962).

9. Amman to State, telegram no. 1457, 11 December 1966, Folder Jordan Memos Vol. III 12/66–5/67, Box 146, NSF: Country File, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. For further discussion of the implications of the Samu raid see: C.L. Bunch, 'Strike at Samu: Jordan, Israel, the United States, and the Origins of the Six Day War', *Diplomatic History*, 32.1, 2008, pp. 55–76; M. Shemesh, 'The IDF Raid on Samu: The Turning Point in Jordan's Relations with Israel and the West Bank Palestinians', *Israel Studies*, 7.1, 2002, pp. 139–67.
10. S. Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 103.
11. Ibid, pp. 163–80.
12. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, quoted from A. Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (New York, 1968), pp. 308–9.
13. For further discussion of Israeli views in general at this juncture see A. Raz, *The Bride and the Dowry: Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War* (New Haven, CT, 2012).
14. For further discussion of this question see N. Ashton, 'Pulling the Strings King Hussein's Role in the Crisis of 1970 in Jordan', *The International History Review* 28.1, 2006; D. Little, 'A Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer? The United States, King Hussein and Jordan, 1953–1970', *International History Review*, 17.3, 1995; Z. Rubinovitz, 'Blue and White "Black September": Israel's Role in the Jordan Crisis of 1970', *International History Review*, 32.4, 2010.
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7
President Soeharto

David Jenkins

Introduction

Soeharto[1] ruled Indonesia for 32 years (1966–98), remaining in power longer than any other major Third World leader apart from Kim Il Sung, Fidel Castro, Muamar Gaddafi and Lee Kuan Yew: during this time, no fewer than seven US presidents occupied the White House. A man of resourcefulness and guile, an enigma even to his closest associates, addicted to farming and golf and deep-sea fishing, he was one of the most complex and important Third World leaders of the post-Second World War era. Soeharto was cut from very different cloth, emotionally and ideologically, from an earlier generation of charismatic postcolonial figures such as Sukarno, who had been Indonesia's president since the proclamation of independence in 1945, Ho Chi Minh, Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser, men who were in varying degrees on the left of the political spectrum. Yet he achieved far more for his nation in material terms that any of those men. His successful combination of authoritarian rule and firm economic management, backed fortuitously by a resources boom and a quadrupling in the price of oil, gave Indonesia, a mendicant among nations when he came to power, a foothold in the global economy. It was an approach followed by a number of other conservative – albeit highly dissimilar – Third World leaders, including Lee in Singapore, Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Park Chung Hee in South Korea. It was an approach followed by Deng Xiaoping, once the antithesis of a conservative, as he steered China towards a booming market economy.

Soeharto came to power while overseeing one of the worst bloodbaths of the twentieth century, an army-directed pogrom of alleged Communists which claimed the lives of half a million people, mainly on densely settled Java and on the largely Hindu island of Bali; at his direction a million other Indonesians were consigned to a vast, archipelago-wide gulag. Unlike some of his fellow officers, Soeharto uttered not one word of regret or remorse for this mass slaughter and mass detention.

An archipelago of more than 18,000 islands, Indonesia extends across more than one-eighth of the world's circumference at the Equator, a distance of 3400 miles from east to west and 1200 miles from north to south. It lies between two continents, Asia and Australia, and between two great oceans, the Indian and the Pacific. As such, it straddles the vital sea-lanes between Europe and the Middle East on the one hand and Northeast Asia on the other. Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world and the most populous in Southeast Asia, with three times as many people as Vietnam. Rich in resources (oil, natural gas, timber, tin, coal, copper, gold, coffee, rubber and palm oil), it supports 254 million people, more than 143 million of whom are shoehorned onto Java, the smallest of the five major islands, with only seven per cent of the nation's land area. Java is about the size of New York state and not much larger than England. Overpopulated and under-resourced, Java is suspended like a lead-weighted basket at the bottom centre of the Indonesian archipelago, kept aloft by four great barrage balloons in the resource-rich Outer Islands: Sumatra, Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), Sulawesi and West New Guinea; the course and speed of this great airship are always determined by those at the controls in Java. Indonesia is one of the most complex and diverse nations in the world, with more than a dozen major ethnic groups and several major religions: Islam, Christianity and Hinduism. It has more Muslims than any other nation, although it is neither an Islamic nor a secular state but something deliberately ill-defined in between; more than 87 per cent of Indonesians are Sunni Muslims. It once boasted the third largest Communist Party in the world, after China and the Soviet Union.

Because of its size and importance, Indonesia has been courted since independence by most of the major powers: by the United States, which trained so many of its economists and army officers in the 1950s and which invested heavily in its oil industry; by the Soviet Union, which, in the early 1960s, provided it with warships and modern, long-range bombers, and by China, which courted both President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), only to be locked out for more than two decades after the turmoil of 1965. A nation born amid violent upheaval in 1945–49, it has resorted to military force three times to advance its domestic and foreign policy goals – against the Dutch in West New Guinea (1959–62), against the Malaysians, British and Australians in Malaysia (1963–66) and against the left-leaning Fretilin independence movement in Portuguese East Timor (1975). Military force was also used during the massacres of 1965–66 and to put down various domestic rebellions.

The Making of a Soldier

The political leaders who came to dominate the Indonesian nationalist movement in the 1930s and 1940s – men such as Sukarno, Mohammad

Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin – came overwhelmingly from a privileged urban background. They had been born for the most part in the first decade of the twentieth century, when the extractive economy of the Netherlands East Indies was in high gear, generating enormous profits for the Dutch. They had attended first-class Dutch senior high schools in Java and Sumatra. They spoke excellent Dutch and generally had a good command of German and English; they knew some French and some Latin, not to mention Malay/Indonesian and usually one or two other local languages. They had studied science and mathematics, history and literature. A number of them had attended university in the Netherlands. They read books and newspapers. They were interested in history and politics. They were, in many cases, quite worldly and sophisticated.

Soeharto was not of the era and not of that world: he was 20 years younger than Sukarno; he was from a village, not a city or large town; he was from a poor, not a well-to-do, family; he had only the most rudimentary grasp of Dutch, the language of preferment in the Netherlands East Indies, and he had not even reached, let alone completed, junior high school. Soeharto was born in a hamlet on the fertile rice plains of Central Java, a region of such abundance that it had sustained a succession of powerful kingdoms, first Hindu-Buddhist, then Islamic, before the Dutch gained full control of Java in the early nineteenth century. By the time of his birth, however, rapid population growth had rendered much of rural Java a minus area. Many villagers were living close to, if not well below, the poverty line.

Soeharto's father – or rather the man he always insisted was his father, there being some unresolved controversy about this matter – was an official responsible for the equitable distribution of irrigation water in the hamlet. He owned no land himself but was allocated about one hectare of village land, which he worked with a hoe, not having enough money for a water buffalo. He was better off than most other villagers, but that did not mean much at that time, when virtually all Javanese in rural areas were miserably poor. And because his hectare was something he enjoyed by virtue of his office, not something he owned, he could not pass it on to his children: Soeharto and his siblings would have no inheritance.

Soeharto was born, the official histories record, on 8 June 1921. In later life, he used to make two observations about his early childhood. The first was that he was an authentic product of rural Java and that the nine years he spent in the hamlet of Kemusu, 12 miles west of the court city of Yogyakarta, had left him with an abiding interest in agriculture. The second was that his childhood had been a time of acute deprivation, both material and emotional, owing to the fact that his mother abandoned him when he was less than six weeks old and that he was shunted thereafter from one family to another, feeling for much of the time neglected and rejected. There has never been any reason to doubt the veracity of these two claims. Those years were to shape Soeharto in profound ways. They left an indelible imprint not just

on the man but also on his presidency. There was, however, one beacon of light amid all this gloom. When Soeharto was nine his father sent him to live with his aunt and her family: they were on the lower rungs of both the Javanese and the colonial social ladder and they welcomed Soeharto as one of their own: the move transformed the boy's life.

Religion – of a particular kind – also left an indelible imprint, as did Javanese culture. On Java, distinctions have been drawn between two main sociocultural groups or streams (*aliran*) – the pious or orthodox Muslims (*santri*) and the more numerous *abangan*, nominal Muslims who follow a system of Javanese mystical beliefs (*kejawen*) which has deep roots in animism, Buddhism and Hinduism but which has been influenced in various ways by Islam.[2] Soeharto came from a decidedly *abangan* and *kejawen* background. He was part of a community which distanced itself not only from the Islamic modernists of the cities and large towns but also from Java's conservative rural Muslims, even though the religious practices of the latter take account of many traditional Javanese beliefs widely accepted in the *abangan* community.[3]

What of culture more broadly? The Javanese, like their neighbours the Sundanese, who occupy the western third of the island of Java, are a sophisticated people, with rich cultural traditions and elaborate social codes. In any account of Soeharto's remarkable rise to power, it is important to place him within the cultural traditions of Java – while firmly rejecting the arguments of those who would say that his later behaviour as president can be explained simply by 'cultural' factors. It is also important to recognize that Javanese society was undergoing profound change in the twentieth century, especially in the years after 1945.

Soeharto's thinking was notable for its ready acceptance of Javanese culture, tradition, mores, religion and social structures. This is only to be expected. Soeharto had spent his first 18 years in a thoroughly Javanese world, or at least one variation of it, albeit during a time of Dutch colonialism. He was comfortable in that world. He had no desire to change it radically. In the early years of his New Order regime a number of observers were to argue that the system of government appeared to be strongly influenced by traditional Javanese political culture. They alleged that Soeharto had recreated the atmosphere of a Javanese *kraton* (royal palace), in which politics was frequently a matter of court intrigue and in which the ruler played one prince off against another. They claimed that Soeharto's political style had something in common with that of the sultans of Mataram, who dominated East and Central Java between 1582–1755. The idea took root that New Order Indonesia was influenced to a disproportionate degree by traditional political culture.

It cannot be denied that Java left a deep imprint on Soeharto, nor that he presided over a latter-day 'court', just like Sukarno. But assertions about the importance of culture need to be treated with great care, especially when

they impinge on politics. We should not place too much reliance on cultural analysis when looking at Soeharto, a leader who, for all his putative 'Javaneseness', does not fit comfortably into some of those traditions.[4] The skills that Soeharto brought to the presidency were not uniquely Javanese or Indonesian political skills but skills which are found in any number of other countries. In Soeharto's Indonesia, as Harold Crouch has aptly observed, aspects of traditional culture were applied in a modern setting.[5] The mixture is what counted. Culture reinforced and legitimated behaviour that was not derived exclusively from that particular environment.

Judging the former Indonesian leader solely by the standards of Mataram does him a great disservice. As a president seeking to bend others to his will, Soeharto had far more in common with a number of European and Latin American military officers who assumed high political office, not to mention any number of autocratic civilian leaders, than he did with some remote historical figure such as Sultan Agung, the great Mataram ruler of the early 1600s. Soeharto may have been a product of Java, but he was a man shaped also by his exposure to the modern world as he saw it through the prism of the Dutch colonial army and, to some extent, through the prism of a modern Japanese army and police force, to say nothing of the swirling revolutionary currents in which he was forced to swim after 1945.[6]

Formative Years

Towards the end of 1929, when he was eight, Soeharto was enrolled in a village school. Two years later his father took him, with no warning and without advising the boy's mother, to live with his relatively well-off aunt and uncle in Wuryantoro, a town south of Solo, a court city some fifty miles to the east. Here, after finishing standard primary school, Soeharto entered a *schakelschool* (link school), one of a small number designed to connect the village school system, where the vernacular language was used and education was rudimentary, to the parallel and infinitely more prestigious Dutch-language stream. He finished his education at Yogyakarta *schakelschool* run by Muhammadiyah ('Followers of Muhammad'), a modernist Islamic social and educational organization which was not averse to helping those from an *abangan* background. There were limits, however, to what a *schakelschool* could offer. It was part of the elementary school system for 'native' Indonesians, a poor cousin of the elite primary schools, which offered students seven years of instruction, all of it in Dutch. There was never much prospect that Soeharto would ever reach, let alone complete, junior high school.

Soeharto may have had a more favoured education than nine out of ten other Indonesians, but he was never going to catch up with the Dutch-speaking sons of the Javanese urban elite, young men who were about to make the transition from privileged primary school to privileged secondary

school. From this group would come virtually every senior officer with whom Soeharto would compete for promotion and overseas staff college courses in the 1950s and 1960s. Many of those at the peak of the army pyramid had, as well, attended either the pre-war Royal Military Academy at Breda in the Netherlands or its equivalent in Bandung, West Java. To most of these men, Soeharto would always be something of an outsider, someone from a very different, more humble background: a man who got things done, polite and pleasant enough but taciturn and self-contained, not a man one got close to. The deficiencies of Soeharto's education would nearly – but never quite – stymie his chances of preferment.

In June 1940, two weeks after the German invasion of Holland, Soeharto, unemployed and with very few prospects, enlisted in the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL). It was a decision that was to transform his life. Here he showed the two attributes that would sustain him throughout his career: application and aptitude. With the threat of war looming in the Pacific, he rose from unemployed civilian to sergeant 2nd class in just 21 months, achieving in less than two years what had taken many older and more seasoned KNIL sergeants seven or eight. When the Dutch surrendered to the Japanese in March 1942 Soeharto was 20 years old. He had never been stationed in the Outer Islands, or commanded more than 16 or 17 men, and then only for seven days, or fired a shot at an enemy soldier. He had, however, acquired a great deal of valuable military instruction, having spent 17 of his 21 months in the army at KNIL training centres and four months on attachment to field units. This was to serve him well in the years to come, compensating for his educational shortcomings. Soeharto prospered under the Japanese as well. In 1943, conscious that they had far too few troops on Java, the Japanese set up a 37,500-strong Indonesian volunteer self-defence force (Peta). Soeharto joined the first intake as an officer cadet, having by then had nearly a year in the Japanese-run police force. By the time the Japanese surrendered in 1945, he had still not fired a shot in anger. But his career had made rapid progress. If the Dutch had pushed him through their pre-war NCO-training programmes as they prepared to face a Japanese onslaught, the Japanese had pushed him through their wartime officer-training programmes as they prepared to face an Allied onslaught. On 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesia's independence, becoming president and vice president. Seven weeks later Indonesia established an army. By then, Soeharto had more military training by far, and more military experience, than perhaps 98 per cent of his fellow Peta officers, the men who would form the backbone of a new army.

For the moment, it is true, Soeharto was just another ex-Peta officer, one of about 2150 such men demobilized and disarmed by the Japanese. His prospects did not seem especially bright. In the small world of the Indonesian elite, Soeharto was very much an outsider, socially and

educationally. He was unknown outside the Peta, and not especially well known within it, given the Japanese practice of allowing minimal lateral contact among Indonesian volunteer units. Nor, as yet, did he have any connections with the nationalist movement. Indeed, he would have been regarded with scepticism by many of the nationalist leaders, on account of his service in the Dutch colonial army and on account of his uncritical support for what some of them saw as Japanese 'fascism'. Times were changing, however. The tantalizing prospect of independence had taken hold in the popular imagination, especially among the young. It swept all before it as the Japanese reeled from one defeat to another. The Japanese seem to have trusted Soeharto until the very end. But he was ready, in August 1945, to hitch his fortunes to those of the nationalist cart. In the fluid and dangerous world of post-surrender Java, Soeharto held some important cards. He had ability, training, experience, judgement, determination and a wide range of contacts among young men from Yogyakarta who had been trained to fight. These attributes were to serve him well during the 1945–49 struggle for independence, as the Dutch sought to reclaim their colony.

In October 1945 Soeharto formed and commanded a battalion. A few weeks later he was one of many officers who sent troops to fight against British Indian Army units which had, with Sukarno's approval, landed in Jakarta, Semarang and Surabaya and pushed deep into Central Java to rescue 25,000 emaciated Dutch and Eurasian civilian internees – men, women and children who had suffered great privation during the Japanese Occupation and who were now being held in their camps as negotiating pawns by some of the more radical Indonesian nationalists. What galled the radicals was that the British had brought with them a handful of Dutch liaison officers. Local military officers saw the British as a vanguard for the return of the Dutch colonial regime, as indeed they were.

Soeharto's Worldview in 1945

In a time of revolutionary upheaval, when members of the nationalist movement were coalescing around political parties supporting a wide range of programmes and ideologies – from Communism on the left to a faith-based Islamic state on the right – Soeharto had no political affiliations. Indeed, he was quite out of his depth when the discussion turned to politics. He was keen, however, to learn more about the social and political forces that were buffeting the newly proclaimed Republic, and he brought with him certain fixed ideas. First, a commitment, albeit newly found, to the nationalist cause, and a determination to fight for that cause. Second, an attachment to traditional Javanese values and social structures, an attachment not always shared by those on the left, some of whom were seeking a social, not just a national revolution, one which would see off the last of Indonesia's traditional rulers and put an end to 'feudal' practices, as was to happen in China under Mao

Zedong and in Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. Third, a certain *abangan* scepticism about Islam, especially political Islam. The vehicle of political Islam at that time was Masjumi, a political party which wanted Islam to form the basis of the new state.

These commitments co-existed in sometimes surprising ways. Committed to the cause of '100 per cent Merdeka (independence)', believing in the need for uncompromising armed struggle (*perjuangan*) against the Dutch, Soeharto found himself on the same side – on this issue, at least – as the radical national Tan Malaka, a West Sumatran Marxist who, after a short term as chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party in the early 1920s, had been exiled from the East Indies and gone on to become Moscow's chief agent of revolutionary change in Southeast Asia. Along with almost everyone else in the army and in the various militia groups, Soeharto respected Sukarno and saw him as Indonesia's rightful leader. But on this issue he and many of his colleagues were at odds with Sukarno and the other major nationalist leaders. These leaders recognized the limitations of Indonesian armed power and saw the importance of cultivating Western diplomatic support, especially that of the United States and Britain: they favoured the path of negotiation (*diplomasi*) with the Dutch, backed up, it is true, with whatever force the Republic could muster. But if, in 1945–46, Soeharto shared certain objectives with the radical nationalists, he had no discernible interest in a thoroughgoing social revolution, no great desire to sweep away the remaining feudal courts, least of all in Yogyakarta, where the young sultan had come out in favour of the Republic. Soeharto seems to have imagined, like his Dutch-educated contemporaries, that once the Dutch had been shown the door, educated Indonesians, many of them *priyayi* (members of the Javanese official class) or from an aristocratic background, would simply take their place in the great ministries of state.

The 1945–49 Revolution

As Soeharto and some of his friends set about creating a battalion in September 1945 there was a sense on Java that everything was up for grabs. This was a tumultuous and profoundly exciting time, a time of danger and possibility: an old world had turned upside down, a new one was yet to replace it. The likely political consequences of all this were well above Soeharto's head. But he seems to have been fascinated by what he heard and saw. Although he had a serious job to do – seeking additional members for his rudimentary force, supplies, money and above all weapons – Soeharto was also attempting to make sense of the situation. In the process he was to make some new and potentially useful contacts.

In Yogyakarta Soeharto found lodgings at the home of a relative who lived not far from the home of Dr Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, a modernist Muslim political leader with a degree in medicine. In September 1945 Soeharto spent

time at Sukiman's home, seeking to gain some understanding of the political situation. Sukiman, who was 47 in 1945, was a seasoned, Western-educated religious socialist, very Javanese and very adept at manoeuvring, a man who drew his support from a largely urban Muslim community. Sukiman, with his university training in Holland, his knowledge of modern medicine, his rational discourse and his friendship with Vice President Hatta, represented the modern world, and it may have been that which attracted Soeharto, who had of course already had his own encounters with modernity, albeit in a more rigid form and at a very different level, while serving in the KNIL. If nothing else, these visits suggest that Soeharto was a young man with an enquiring mind.

At about the same time Soeharto began calling regularly at a house in the densely settled Pathok district of central Yogyakarta, where young followers of the socialist leader Sutan Sjahrir had been meeting for two years to discuss politics and draw up plans to further the struggle for an independent Indonesia. Those who met at Pathok were members of an important *pemuda* (youth) group and they were to have a significant influence on Soeharto's political education. At the so-called Pathok House, even more than at Sukiman's house, Soeharto came into contact with the world of political ideas. He met a number of budding intellectuals and activists whose careers were to be loosely interwoven with his for the next 20 years. Some of them were to rise to prominence in the Indonesian Socialist Party. Some of them were to join the Indonesian Communist Party. One of them, Kamaruzaman, or Sjam, would go on to play a central but still insufficiently explained role in the dramatic events which brought Soeharto to power in 1965.

In September 1945, Sjahrir's political thinking, once quite radical, was tempered by pragmatism. As Sjahrir saw it, 'the major revolutionary task' at this time of growing lawlessness was the 'systematic prevention of disorder among people'. What is more, he was flexible enough to accept that Indonesia needed to work with the major Western nations, not least the British, whose troops were set to arrive in Java to hold the fort until the Dutch could return. Sjahrir saw an Indonesia that was weak and vulnerable, and he took the view that it would have to trim its revolutionary sails to the prevailing winds of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and imperialism. It needed to ensure that the British and Americans did not give their full support to the Dutch. 'This in turn', as Benedict Anderson has noted, 'logically demanded a liberal policy toward foreign capital; an end to *pemuda*-style violence, particularly against white-skinned people; the establishment of political institutions acceptable to the West; and a nationalist rhetoric without immediate radical connotations'.[7] In November 1945 Sjahrir became the first prime minister of independent Indonesia, a post he would hold until mid-1947.

Soeharto's exposure to Sjahrir's ideas may have had an important influence on his political education. While Soeharto had no particular reason to

like the United States or Britain (he had, after all, been subjected to intensive Japanese propaganda directed against these two nations) and no particular reason to favour democracy, Sjahrir's call for an end to revolutionary anarchy would have had a certain resonance for him. Soeharto had always had a deep-seated predilection for order, stability and constancy, reinforced by both his police and military training. This helps explain his growing aversion, in the years after 1945, to communism. Like many others in the army, Soeharto took exception to the tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which sought to harness and radicalize the *abangan* poor: this was not only a direct affront to traditional Javanese notions of hierarchy and order but a threat to the power of an established elite, an elite into which the army itself had been absorbed. At the same time, Sjahrir's suggestion that one needed to look at situations realistically and make a calculated decision about the sort of people one had to cooperate with in order to get ahead would have made sense to Soeharto, who had already shown that kind of flexibility.

At Pathok, Soeharto found an environment more congenial and to his taste than had been the case at Sukiman's house. There, he had sat on the periphery of meetings chaired by an older generation of political leaders, many of them highly educated and sophisticated. He had been quite unable to keep up. Nor had the modernist Muslim orientation of the Sukiman group been in keeping with his essentially *abangan* outlook. At Pathok, it is true, Soeharto found political discussions equally hard to follow, at least initially. But Pathok was different. Pathok was a *pemuda* group. It was a loose association of young men with an interest both in revolutionary ideas and in revolutionary action. Kusumo Sundjojo, the Pathok leader, was younger than Soeharto, better educated and a good deal more sophisticated. But he was to show none of the condescension that Soeharto was to experience at the hands of other better-educated people for much of his career. Sundjojo was engaging and sympathetic; he welcomed Soeharto at the Pathok House and helped him gain an understanding of the political goals of the Revolution. At Pathok, under the influence of Sundjojo, Soeharto got his first lessons in politics. Within a year or two Soeharto was to have little time for politicians, claiming that all they did was talk. But he and Sundjojo remained firm friends.

Soeharto continued to prosper amid the turmoil of Indonesia's often brutal post-war struggle for independence. In 1945–46 he took part in major operations in Central Java against British forces sent by Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in South-east Asia. Mountbatten despatched 40,000 British and Indian troops to the Netherlands East Indies to take the Japanese surrender, rescue Allied prisoners-of-war and civilian internees and pave the way for a resumption of Dutch colonialism. Six hundred British and Indian troops were killed during this 15-month operation and many thousands of Indonesians died.

The Dutch, who returned in force in 1946, launched two major 'police actions' to regain key territory in Java and Sumatra. During the first, in mid-1947, they concentrated on rich plantation regions. During the second, in late 1948, they captured the Republican capital of Yogyakarta, arresting Sukarno and Hatta, who chose not to join the maquis. Soeharto, the military commander in the Yogyakarta region, fought a successful guerrilla campaign against them. On 1 March 1949 he staged a well-planned attack on Yogyakarta, flooding the town with 2000 fighters and shooting up Dutch positions before withdrawing.

Like many other army officers, Soeharto had developed a deep aversion to Communism by the time of the 1948 Madiun Affair, a brutal, half-baked revolt triggered by mid-level Communist leaders during a time of growing internal division within a Republic besieged on all sides by the Dutch. The killing that occurred at Madiun took place along the *santri–abangan* fault line: *abangan* turned on *santri*, *santri* turned on *abangan*. But if this was *aliran* conflict, it was *aliran* conflict of a new kind, one magnified and intensified by modern concepts of class analysis and by modern forms of political organization. Class differences had long been present in Java: the petty traders and wealthier peasants tended to be more devout Muslims and often lived in separate neighbourhoods; the poorer, landless peasants tended to be *abangan*. But those differences had been sharpened to a dangerous degree by the post-war politicization of Indonesian life. The *abangan* (the word comes from the Javanese *abang*, red) poor were now red not simply in a cultural and religious sense but in a political sense as well. At Madiun, a politicized peasantry turned violently on its religious, social and economic opponent, the pious Javanese Muslims, or *santri*, who called themselves *putihan* (the "white ones"). The *putihan* struck back with equal violence. The army, provoked by the murder of a number of local officers and encouraged by Prime Minister Hatta, also struck hard against the Communists, recapturing Madiun and hunting down those who had supported the takeover. To the non-Communists, this was a time of Red Terror, twice over as it were. To the Communists, it was a time of White Terror, again twice over. Both claims were correct: this was kidnapping and killing to the colours of the national flag, a reciprocal slaughter which foreshadowed that of 1965–66, and one in which the Communists would, in the end, pay an infinitely higher price.

Communism was not the only challenge. In the early 1950s Soeharto was active, like many other army officers, in pursuing and eliminating members of a Central Java battalion who had thrown their weight behind the Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) movement, which sought to create an Islamic state. The intolerance and ferocity of this movement, which was active in West Java, Aceh, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi in the years to 1962, claiming an estimated 25,000 lives, left an abiding distaste for fundamentalism in Indonesia, whose leaders had rejected arguments for an Islamic State when the Constitution was drawn up in 1945. The spore of Islamic

radicalism can lie dormant in Indonesian soil for many years, however, and it was to reappear in later years, both during and after Soeharto's presidency.

By the late 1950s Soeharto was the military commander in Central Java, one of the most densely settled regions on earth, with a population at that time of twenty million people. For the first six years of independence the secular Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) had held sway over Central Java. The PNI was the party par excellence of the Javanese bureaucratic elite, even as it drew its mass support from the *abangan* peasantry. Although Soeharto had emerged from a decidedly non-elite village background and had never been associated with any political party, by 1958 he had come to share many of the PNI values. During his two years as regional commander in Semarang he established a good working relationship with the city's mayor, Hadisubeno Sosrowerdoyo, an ambitious, tough-minded *priyayi* who had taken over as the chairman of the Central Java PNI in March 1956, the month Soeharto was appointed Chief of Staff of the Central Java Diponegoro Division. The two men were linked by a shared preference for the status quo, a deep dislike of the Communist Party and, in due course, by common business interests. They were linked as well by increasingly close family ties. Like Soeharto, the PNI put great stress on harmony and order, virtues which were said to be highly valued by all Javanese, but which also suited their desire for control and a minimum of popular pressure and dissidence.

The problem for the PNI in 1958 was that the Communists had been actively courting the *abangan* peasant mass on which the Nationalists depended for their pre-eminence, but with whom they were failing to connect at all effectively. That tactic was paying handsome dividends. In the 1955 general elections the PKI won 16 per cent of the national vote, making it the fourth biggest political party, after the PNI and the two big Muslim parties. When regional elections were held in Central Java in mid-1957, the PKI won three million votes, or 38.5 per cent of the total, to the PNI's 2.4 million. Banned for a time after the Madiun Affair, the Communist Party now seemed unstoppable. That did not seem to trouble President Sukarno. On the contrary, he had always had some sympathy for the Left and by 1957 was giving the PKI increasing support. Communist electoral advances did alarm others, however: Muslims (both urban modernists and rural traditionalists), Christians, secular nationalists, most army officers, non-Communist intellectuals, socialists, newspaper editors, bureaucrats, businessmen, members of the small but influential middle class and Outer Islanders. In Central Java, Hadisubeno flatly refused to cooperate any longer with the Communist Party, to the extreme annoyance of Sukarno; and when Soeharto sought to express his own concerns about the PKI, Sukarno put Suharto in his place. He told Soeharto to leave the politics to him.

Soeharto's elevation to divisional commander came at a time of mounting political, social and economic crisis in Indonesia. In 1957, Sukarno, hitherto a constitutional head of state with limited political authority, began to

move to a more commanding position. A clever, charming and charismatic leader, a gifted orator, a 'necromancer of unity', Sukarno could hold audiences in thrall, cajoling them, entertaining them, giving them a sense of pride and purpose, sending them away uplifted. But he was also vain and self-indulgent, fond of smartly tailored military uniforms, complete with rows of unearned military decorations, surrounded by courtiers and highly susceptible to female charms. He had no grasp of economic issues, however serious, and no interest in day-to-day administration. The army also assumed greater powers, with Sukarno's acquiescence, as the authority of the civilian politicians and a newly elected government crumbled in 1956–57. That process was reinforced by the proclamation of Martial Law in 1957. In Central Java, Soeharto came to wield extensive power.

In the late 1950s, the army officer corps, and in particular General A.H. Nasution, played a central role in overthrowing Indonesia's system of parliamentary democracy (1950–57) and gained support for the fundamental principles of Guided Democracy (1959–65), a form of authoritarian rule in which the army shared extensive power with President Sukarno, while seeking to outflank a revived and increasingly powerful Communist Party. This strong combination, subject to few controls by social organizations, would provide the essential foundation for Soeharto's even more authoritarian New Order government (1966–98).

In November 1957 the Eisenhower Administration, alarmed by Communist gains in the regional elections on Java and haunted by the 1949 'loss' of China, approved a major clandestine effort in support of anti-Communist rebel colonels in the Outer Islands. In early 1958 the government moved to crush the rebellion. Soeharto, strongly pro-government and distrustful of any centrifugal tendencies which might threaten Indonesian unity, contributed two battalions to the expedition. The revolt collapsed. The following year Soeharto was dismissed as commander in Central Java following an investigation into smuggling. Humiliated and angry, he found himself at staff college in Bandung, West Java. As it happened, this cloud was to have a silver lining: he made new contacts and gained new insights. Most importantly, he attended lectures on a wide range of subjects. Among his lecturers were a number of young and able Indonesian economists dismayed by the steady decline in their nation's economy; they stayed for informal discussions, establishing a connection with a number of up-and-coming officers.

The 'Coup'

In October 1965, a group of pro-communist military officers staged an abortive 'coup' in Jakarta, seeking ostensibly to protect President Sukarno from an alleged plot by right-wing generals, six of whom they brutally murdered. Soeharto had been warned several hours in advance that something

was afoot and failed to report this to his superiors. That led to understandable questions about his motives. Some Indonesians suspect that he was aware that a number of superior officers would be 'detained' that night. However, unless some of the more extreme conspiracy theories are shown to have substance, Soeharto was as surprised as anyone else by the extent of what unfolded, when kidnapping gave way to the murder of the army commander/minister and many of his key subordinates. Acting in his capacity as head of the Army Strategic Reserve, Soeharto took charge when many others hesitated. With the army, or key elements of it, behind him, Soeharto crushed the coup, in the process sidelining Sukarno, who had been taken to the plotters' base for his own security.

Convinced that the coup had the backing of the PKI and determined to destroy the party once and for all, Soeharto went out of his way to inflame communal tensions in what was already a deeply polarized society, encouraging a conflict in which pious Muslims (and, in some places, Hindus and Christians) turned on their generally poorer, PKI-voting *abangan* neighbours. 'In terms of the numbers killed', the US Central Intelligence Agency noted in 1968, 'the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1930s [*sic*]'.[8]

Soeharto's Worldview in 1965

By 1965 Soeharto had some very firm – not to say rigid – views. These included a visceral opposition to Communism; a wariness of Islam, particularly political Islam; a belief in the need for harmony, order and stability; a preoccupation with national development; a conviction that the *rakyat* (common people), though deserving of a better life, were, as his aides – and a good many others – liked to put it, *masih bodoh* (still stupid); and a belief that the army was the only institution capable of unifying and developing Indonesia. He also believed, as did many of his fellow officers, that since a cash-strapped central government could not adequately fund its armed forces it was perfectly legitimate for army commanders to raise supplementary funds through various business ventures. Soeharto had always excelled at such fund-raising.

Soeharto had come to see Communism as a threat to the existing social, political and economic order. The mass killings that came during the late 1965 reign of terror quickly put paid to Communism, although the regime would go on issuing dire warnings about the danger of a Communist comeback. At the same time, he remained distinctly wary of Islam. At a meeting at army headquarters in February 1966, when he was consolidating his grip on power and when he had so recently sent youthful Muslim villagers out to slaughter their Communist neighbours, Soeharto indicated that he was

strongly opposed to any suggestion that Islamic law be applied in all its rigour to those who were only nominally Muslim. Lukman Harun, a young Muhammadiyah activist who attended the meeting, came away saying that Soeharto 'seems to have an allergy to things that smell of Islam'.[9] In the later years of his presidency, it is true, he would turn towards Islam, but he was probably motivated then by his need for political support as he lost confidence in the army.

On the positive side, Soeharto wanted to rebuild and develop Indonesia. That could only be done, he believed, if there was order and stability. In the years to 1965 Indonesia had oscillated between periods in which successive rulers sought either to sedate or stimulate indigenous society. The Dutch, committed to the efficient extraction of Indonesia's bountiful resources, had been tranquillizers, at least since the 1920s when nationalist unrest became increasingly apparent. They sought to put society to sleep politically while they went about the business of business: they played classic colonial divide-and-rule politics, infiltrated political and social organizations and arrested, jailed and exiled their domestic opponents. They prized, above all, *rust en orde* (peace and order). The Japanese, while no less intent on extracting Indonesia's resources, were stimulators. They harnessed Sukarno's rhetorical and histrionic skills in the belief that it was necessary to energize and motivate Indonesians behind the Japanese-led Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. These twin Japanese goals proved contradictory. Harsh rice procurement policies and appalling treatment of Indonesian forced labourers (*romusha*) generated mounting hostility to the Japanese, who were soon seen as far worse than the Dutch. Sukarno, on coming to power in 1945, remained, as he had always been, a stimulator. He sought to stir, inspire and motivate, first in support of the four-year armed struggle against the Dutch, and later, after a number of more conventional prime ministers had left the stage, in support of his increasingly radical domestic and foreign agenda. His dominance was cemented with the introduction of Guided Democracy.

In some respects Soeharto had more in common with the pre-war Dutch colonial bureaucrats and engineers, those tall, perspiring, practical men in their pith helmets and high-collared white jackets, and with the early Dutch-educated prime ministers, than he did with either the Japanese or Sukarno, under whom Indonesia's economy and infrastructure had been allowed to deteriorate. Soeharto put an end to political mobilization and agitational politics. Like the Dutch, he favoured the smack of firm government. Like them, he favoured – and was able to deliver – steady economic development. His slogan would be *pembangunan* (development), especially in agriculture. To justify his particular brand of authoritarian developmentalism, Soeharto would, in his later years, fall back on anti-democratic organicist (or integralistic) 'family state' doctrines – doctrines which conservative, upper-class Javanese legal scholars had picked up from their pre-war lecturers at Leiden University and which stemmed from anti-Enlightenment thinking in Europe

more generally; these ideas had been written into the 1945 Constitution, where they sat uncomfortably alongside the thoughts of Montesquieu and the French Enlightenment.[10] But if 'family state' ideas provided a convenient cloak for authoritarian rule, there was more to it than that. Soeharto was sympathetic to that kind of thinking because it was not uncommon in the world of conservative *priyayi* Java, and he operated in that world.

When it came to formulating policy Soeharto drew on his close observation of the various worlds in which he had lived, worlds which had often succeeded one another in quick succession, like sets on a revolving stage, as when the era of Dutch colonialism gave way suddenly to the period of Japanese occupation, and when that, in turn, was replaced by an independent Indonesian Republic, the creation of which had brought a whole series of quite separate, rapidly changing and often highly complex environments of its own. Unlike the Dutch-educated politicians, Soeharto did not read books: he did not roam far and wide intellectually, seeking ideas and precedents. Rather, his worldview was shaped by his Javanese roots and by his exposure to those modern forms of government and administration he had observed during the Dutch, Japanese and Republican times. His ideas on economic policy were obtained orally from the US-educated technocrats he appointed to his cabinet.

How Did Soeharto Rebuild Indonesia?

When Sukarno reluctantly gave Soeharto full executive authority in March 1966, Indonesia was a broken-back state, fractured along class, religious, political and ethnic lines. The economy was in disarray, wrecked by war, rebellion, political conflict and mismanagement. Inflation had spiralled out of control: in Jakarta the price index rose by 1500 per cent in the year to mid-1966.[11] The country had just come through a nation-wide bloodbath. Soeharto transformed this nation in chaos into one of the 'Asian miracle' economies.

Soeharto's political acumen was evident from the start, as was his patience. He not only established his hold over the armed forces; he also acted with great subtlety and circumspection when facing Sukarno's supporters, who were numerous, not least in the armed forces, and he handled the Muslims deftly and decisively. Having bloodied their hands, literally and figuratively, during the anti-Communist pogroms, the Muslims assumed they would go on to play an important role in his New Order government. That was not to be. Soeharto used the Muslims, as he was to use so many other individuals and groups during his presidency, and then kept them at arm's length, taking care, however, not to shut them out completely and always giving them enough money for new mosques to keep most of them onside.

There would, however, be no concessions to political Islam, at least in the early years. Fearing, with reason, that Muslim political parties might win

the 1971 elections, he had the army bend the rules to bring in the vote for Golkar, the political machine of the army-backed ruling group. Two years later he forced Indonesia's nine surviving political parties, against their will, into two new and uncomfortable clusters. One of his objectives was to hobble the four Islamic parties. They were corralled into a single grouping, the United Development Party (PPP), which included rival modernist and conservative elements. Even so, Islamic groups could never be taken for granted. When later, in 1973, the government introduced a draft Marriage Bill that would have outlawed polygamy, required state registration of marriage and allowed cross-religion marriages, it ran into intense opposition from Muslim groups. At one point a Muslim mob invaded Parliament. Soeharto judged it wise to retreat and abandoned the changes.

As noted earlier, the spore of Islamic radicalism can lie dormant in Indonesian soil for many years. As president, Soeharto was to use the army to deal with periodic incidents of Islamic terrorism, almost certainly aware that some of those actions had been secretly funded and encouraged by Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo, his free-wheeling intelligence aide, in an attempt to discredit mainstream Islam ahead of a general election in 1977. The problem of Islamic fundamentalism was to resurface with devastating effect in the years immediately after Soeharto's fall in the guise of Jemaah Islamiyah, an organization founded by two radical preachers who felt persecuted by Soeharto.

On coming to power Soeharto had sought to put politics and politicians to one side. (What happened, of course, was that the most difficult political decisions – and there were any number of them – were now made in Soeharto's office, often after much behind-the-scenes arm-twisting and negotiation.) That allowed him to put a greater emphasis on economic development. Reaching back to his staff college days, he brought in the economists of the so-called Berkeley Mafia and gave them the job of resuscitating the economy. This was one of his most astute moves. Dismayed by the failed dirigist policies of the late Sukarno period, the technocrats swung Indonesia towards more market-oriented economics, while stopping short of the sort of rigid reliance on markets envisaged in 'neo-liberalism'.[12] Why was Soeharto, a man accustomed to an army command structure, who always sought to control the agenda, prepared to hand over a critical part of his administration to Western-educated civilian technocrats whose perspectives and backgrounds were so far removed from his own? Why did he think some form of free-market forces was the answer when he was so much an interventionist? Why, in an environment of strong nationalism, did he sign up, more or less, to the 'Washington Consensus', a charter of free-market economic policy prescriptions that have been widely seen as essential for developing countries that have fallen on hard times? Soeharto was, above all, a pragmatist: he wanted to develop Indonesia and he believed, correctly as it turned out, that the technocrats could deliver. It helped, of course, that he saw eye

to eye with the leading technocrat, Dr Widjojo Nitisastro, a calm and apolitical Javanese professor who was properly deferential and who kept his fellow technocrats in line. The technocrats did not always get their way, but they got it most of the time on macro policy.

Under Soeharto, Indonesia achieved impressive economic advances, attracting investment from the United States, Japan and Western Europe. As well as being a gold mine (sometimes quite literally) for major US resource companies (Caltex, Exxon, Freeport), it caught the eye of AT&T and Nike, among many others. Despite corruption and inefficiency, the Indonesian economy grew at an average annual rate of 7.5 per cent in the 30 years to 1998, bringing huge social benefits. There were new roads, bridges, irrigation canals, factories, health centres, schools, universities (many of them decidedly mediocre), harbours, airports, mosques and jobs. By building a modern economy out of the shambles left by his predecessor, Soeharto greatly improved the lives of scores of millions of people. This was a boon to rich and poor alike. It was, however, an unequal boon: it reinforced the position of both a predatory ruling class and an expanding, and equally predatory, middle class. Nor was the 'economic miracle' immune to outside forces.

During the 1990s the nations of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, received too much in the way of volatile capital inflows (encouraged by the Washington Consensus). When, in 1997, the money left in a rush, disaster followed. In the words of Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, 'as so often happens in financial markets, euphoria turned to panic without missing a beat'.[13] Why did Indonesia suffer far more than its neighbours during the Asian economic meltdown? The answer lies in a combination of serious policy mistakes in Jakarta and incompetent advice from the IMF; the greed of the Soeharto family made things worse, but only when the crisis was already out of hand.[14] Whatever the explanation, the impact was devastating. As the World Bank noted soon after Soeharto's fall, 'A country that achieved decades of rapid growth, stability and poverty reduction, is now near economic collapse ... No country in recent history, let alone one the size of Indonesia, has ever suffered such a dramatic reversal of fortune.'[15]

As he nurtured the Indonesian economy after 1965, drawing in billions of dollars in foreign investment, spinning wealth out of oil and gas, timber and rubber, oil palm and manufacturing, Soeharto and his family saw their own fortunes rise with those of the nation. During the New Order, many foreign investors came to believe, with good reason, that it would be not only beneficial but essential to have one of Soeharto's six children on board if a big project was to get off the ground. This was rent-seeking on an unparalleled scale. Soeharto was a man who plundered the nation's riches for the benefit of his family and friends, surpassing the excesses of the kleptocratic President Ferdinand Marcos in his greed, and entrenching a climate of corruption that drained vital resources and corroded moral standards. No one

knows for sure how much wealth the Soeharto family accumulated over the years – and much of that wealth, it is true, was lost during the Great Crash of 1997–98 – but the estimates ranged from US$3–30 billion. When Soeharto died, the headline on an article in the *Economist*, a magazine which had for years been expressing reservations about him, read 'Farewell to a thief'.[16]

As the leader of a large and diverse nation Soeharto stressed the need for ethnic, religious and cultural harmony but not political freedom. He made it a crime, punishable by a heavy jail term, to foster antagonism between different races, religions or social groups. That made sense: in Indonesia ethnic and religious tensions can quickly spiral out of control, leading to rioting, looting and death, especially in the larger and more volatile cities; it also helped the army maintain order and, of course, helped preserve the regime. And if all this seemed more than a little cynical coming from a man who had earlier gone out of his way to fan the flames of religious and class hatred in the interests of pursuing an anti-Communist pogrom, no one seemed to dwell on the fact. In Soeharto's Indonesia the Communists were beyond the pale: few dared, or cared, to speak for them.

In 1998, as Indonesia reeled from the effects of the Asian economic crisis and as rioters rampaged through the streets of Jakarta, Soeharto stood down. There was a subdued but orderly succession to Vice President Jusuf Bachruddin Habibie, a German-trained aeronautical engineer and one-time Soeharto favourite who had by then fallen from his mentor's grace. Four years later Indonesia had recovered in real per capita GDP. It has recorded around 5–6 per cent growth for more than a decade now and is seen by many as one of the most important developing nations in the world, along with countries such as Brazil and India.

Soeharto's Foreign Policy

Although he had travelled overseas only once in the years before he came to power, as a supernumerary on a 1961 military delegation to Europe, Soeharto was soon demonstrating a sure hand in international relations. As president, he endorsed the 'active and independent' foreign policy he had inherited from Sukarno, while leaning more towards the West and Japan and drawing back from the Communist bloc, especially China, for which Sukarno had developed a certain affection, partly out of a romantic belief that Indonesia and China were 'new emergent forces' marching together down the same road to socialism, partly perhaps because of a quite mistaken belief that China had made great economic strides under Mao. On China, the coming superpower, Soeharto was rigid to a fault: Indonesia did not have diplomatic relations with Beijing for 23 years (1967–90).

Soeharto had a profound, and largely beneficial, impact in his immediate region. He reached out to three of Indonesia's neighbours, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia, putting an end to Sukarno's pointless and costly

military 'Confrontation' with Malaysia, which had seen Indonesian forces engaged in bloody low-level encounters with British Commonwealth troops. (Even before he came to power, Soeharto had, at the behest of General Yani, the army commander, put out secret feelers to the British and Malaysians, seeking an end to Confrontation.) In addition, he maintained good relations with all the other Southeast Asian nations, including the two – and subsequently one – Vietnams, which, to an even greater degree than Indonesia, had won independence by force of arms. He repaired the relationship with the United States (Sukarno had once told America to 'go to hell' with its aid), building on an established de facto alliance between Washington and the Indonesian Army. He reached out to Western Europe and Japan. He maintained correct relations with the Soviet bloc, though holding out for a renegotiation of Indonesia's US$2 billion debt to Moscow. Only China was kept, for decades, at arm's length, it being Soeharto's view that Beijing had irresponsibly encouraged the Indonesian Communists to make their 1965 bid for power. At home, however, Soeharto was quite prepared, for reasons of self-interest, to go into partnership with prominent Sino-Indonesian businessmen, men renowned for their commercial acumen and their willingness to cut corners. His favoured business partner, Fujian-born Liem Sioe Liong, would become, under Soeharto, the wealthiest man in Southeast Asia.

The major blot on Soeharto's foreign record was the botched and brutal 1975 invasion and annexation of East Timor, which a revolutionary Portugal had all but abandoned and which, Indonesia's right-wing generals feared, might all too easily come under Chinese or Soviet control, serving as a foreign base and centre of subversion in the eastern reaches of the archipelago. As many as 100,000 – some say 200,000 – East Timorese died as a result of Indonesia's 24-year (1975–99) occupation of East Timor. But Soeharto was criticized, too, for the way in which he carried out the heavily rigged 1969 'act of free choice' (as it was dubbed) in West New Guinea, while an obliging United Nations looked the other way.

Conclusion

What impact did détente and the end of the Cold War have on Soeharto and his view of the world? The answer is: almost none. Indonesia had been practising its own form of détente *avant la lettre*. Jakarta had its 'independent and active' foreign policy and Soeharto was quick to repair relations with Washington when he came to power – for economic as well as political reasons. But he did not give Moscow the cold shoulder: the Soviet Union had one of the largest embassies in Jakarta throughout the Soeharto era. It was only Beijing that was kept at bay – and Moscow was only too pleased about that. Nor, for that matter, did the Chinese make life especially difficult for Soeharto once they had moved on from their initial fulminations over

the destruction of the huge, pro-Beijing Indonesian Communist Party. They were, in any case, much focused on their own problems during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). The Chinese did, it is true, issue a shrill denunciation when Soeharto invaded East Timor in 1975. But as the Australian ambassador to China put it, the Chinese were simply firing off empty cannons: it was just words; they actually did very little.

What impact did power have on Soeharto? Indonesia's second president was a man of decidedly rigid views and his outlook changed very little during his three decades in power. Indonesian society did change, however, thanks largely to the reforms he introduced and the progress he oversaw. In the end, Indonesian society rejected him: he had stayed too long and adapted too little. Unlike Sukarno, he had never been loved by the people he ruled.

Soeharto gave Indonesia a second chance after years of political, social and economic drift under Sukarno. Indonesia's second president liked to see himself as a political centrist, neither of the left, like the Indonesian Communist Party, nor of the right, like the more extreme Muslims, some of whom were still clinging to the dream of an Islamic state. That was in some ways an artificial antithesis: Soeharto was a man of the right, unforgiving, unapologetic. To those who had looked on in dismay as Indonesia drifted towards the precipice in the late Sukarno years, there was something miraculous about the transformation wrought by Soeharto, something miraculous, too, about the man himself. It was not the technocrats, the army officers, the bureaucrats, businessmen, foreign donor nations or foreign investors who had been primarily responsible for the turn-around in Indonesia's fortunes, they argued, although all had, of course, played their part. It was Soeharto who, for both good and ill, had coordinated and organized everything, who had driven the diverse team of horses necessary to accomplish this great task and who had gone on doing it, unflaggingly, year after year until the economic collapse in 1997–98.

In purely economic and social welfare terms Soeharto had an immense – and overwhelmingly beneficial – impact on Indonesia, even if there was much corruption and the wealth was shared unevenly. Soeharto recognized the need to get the country working again. He did more to lift Indonesians out of poverty than the Dutch or the Japanese or Sukarno had ever done. He presided over a 'green revolution' in agriculture, which saw Indonesia become self-sufficient in rice, albeit briefly. He made a major contribution to population control. (Without his family planning achievements there would today be an additional seventy million Indonesians.) He ran, for the most part, a sensible foreign policy, though one brooking no outside interference when it came to national interests he held dear, in Irian Jaya (West New Guinea), in Aceh and in East Timor. And while he effectively retained and refined Sukarno's concept of Guided Democracy, he kept the trappings of democracy in place, with a parliament, political parties and regular elections: this was more than many other military dictators have done. When

the game was up, he went without much fuss. Indonesia was able to return to a form of genuine, albeit corrupt and imperfect, democracy.

Soeharto was not, however, simply another Southeast Asian military strongman in the tradition of those right-wing military dictators – Sarit Thanarat, Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapat Charusathian – who ruled Thailand between 1959–73, and like-minded strongmen in South Vietnam and South Korea. He was a ruler of a very different kind, one whose ruthlessness evoked comparisons with Hitler and Stalin, with Mao and Pol Pot, men who killed on an industrial scale. The mass killing that accompanied the birth of the New Order regime did not, it is true, persist for years, as was the case in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, China and Cambodia. But it cast a long shadow over the achievements of the next three decades. Soeharto came to power amid a pogrom of unimaginable savagery. He compounded that brutality by sending his army into East Timor, to which he had no legitimate claim. Like Franco on the right and Mao on the left, Soeharto was a master of exemplary terror, the kind of terror that kept people in line.[17]

Soeharto was also a usurper of civilian power, a militarist who distrusted the political maturity of the Indonesian people, a man who kidnapped, jailed, tortured and, even after 1965–66, sometimes killed his political opponents, even his non-Communist opponents; a man who rigged political party congresses; who stole six general elections in succession; who was not above sending hoodlums to break up political rallies and ransack the offices of political opponents; and was not above burning books and banning newspapers. Soeharto may have given his nation three decades of stability and development, but he gravely damaged the state by weakening every political, administrative and judicial institution in it, except for the one institution that relied essentially on power more than authority: the army.[18]

For Indonesians, it was both the best of times and the worst of times.[19]

Notes

1. During the colonial era Indonesian words and names were rendered in the roman script using Dutch spelling conventions, which, inter alia, use *oe* for *u*. Between 1940–73 *oe* was replaced by *u*. This reform was intended to apply to personal as well as place names, but many Indonesians had a sentimental attachment to the old spelling and did not change their names. This has led to confusion. President Soeharto stuck with the Dutch spelling of his name, rather than switch to 'Suharto'. Indonesia's first president took a different tack. While giving instructions that his name was to be written as 'Sukarno', he went on signing himself, by force of habit and sentiment, 'Soekarno'.
2. For an excellent account of the origins of *santri–abangan* tensions, see M.C. Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society, Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830–1930)* (Singapore, 2007).
3. The modernist community, which had its origins late in the nineteenth century when Javanese studying in Cairo came under the influence of the Islamic reform movement and the teachings of Mohammad Abduh (1849–1905), stands

for a return to what it calls the fundamental truths of the Qur'an, stripped of all medieval accretions, while at the same time making use of modern scientific advances. Modernists tend to be scriptural and puritanical. They largely bypass the medieval law schools which the traditionalists regard as essential. They tend to reject cultural practices not set out in the Qur'an; traditionalists will accept them as long as they are not prohibited in the Qur'an.

4. For an excellent critique of 'culture' and its 'compelling promise to explain nearly everything', see Daniel S. Lev, 'Conceptual Filters and Obfuscation in the Study of Indonesian Politics', revision of a lecture for the Herb Feith Foundation, November 2002.
5. Harold Crouch, personal communication.
6. I am indebted to Ruth McVey for her observations about the 'modern' influences Soeharto would have picked up during his time in the Dutch colonial army. Personal communication, 7 December 2006.
7. Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–46* (Ithaca, NY, 1972), p. 194.
8. This is presumably a typographical error. The reference is more likely to be to the early 1950s, when China went through the Great Terror. For details, see Frank Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution 1945–1957* (London, 2013).
9. Confidential communication.
10. For a compelling account of the place of organicism in Indonesian political thinking, see David Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State* (Abingdon, 2015).
11. Stephen Grenville, 'The Price of Rice and Inflation', *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia* 27.3, 1979, p. 317.
12. I am indebted to Stephen Grenville and Peter McCawley for their observations on this process and draw gratefully on some of their arguments in this section. It has often been claimed, incorrectly, that the technocrats pursued neo-classical economic policies.
13. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 'The Wrong Medicine for Asia', http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu (accessed 18 March 2015).
14. Stephen Grenville, personal communication, 4 February 2015.
15. Annual World Bank report on Indonesia, 1998, p. 1.
16. *The Economist*, 2 February 2008 (accessed 11 April 2015).
17. See Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London, 1993); Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, and Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962* (London, 2010).
18. I am indebted to Dan Lev for making this point. Personal communication, 3 August 2005.
19. I am indebted to Harold Crouch, Bob Elson, Stephen Grenville and Ken Ward for their helpful comments on an early draft of this chapter.

8
Deng Xiaoping

Yafeng Xia

Deng Xiaoping was born in 1904 when China was in the dying years of the Qing dynasty and about 60 years after China was forced to open to Western powers. He died in 1997 when China had been under Communist rule for nearly half a century and had undergone successful capitalistic economic reform for about 20 years. As General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1956 to 1966 and the paramount leader of China from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, Deng was one of the world's pre-eminent leaders of the late twentieth century.

Much has been written about Deng as a politician, economist, social reformer, soldier, and statesman,[1] including numerous biographies in English.[2] Yet we still know surprisingly little about Deng's mental map during his time as leader, his vision of economic reform and development, his conception of China's place in the world, and his view of China's national security interests and values. Shortly after Mao Zedong's death, Deng was the general manager who provided overall leadership during China's great transformation. He functioned not only as China's decision-maker, but also its chief negotiator. While improving China's relations with other major powers, Deng believed that China should concentrate on peaceful development.

Although Deng has been dubbed 'the un-Maoist giant of post-Mao China',[3] from the mid-1930s to 1960s he was Mao's protégé. As CCP General Secretary, Deng was Mao's henchman. At the Seventh Plenary of the Eighth CCP Congress in April 1959, Mao said, 'Power is centralized in the [Politburo] Standing Committee and Secretariat. My name is Mao Zedong. I am in control, that's to say I'm commander in chief. Deng Xiaoping is [my] deputy and is deputy commander in chief. One of us is the commander and the other is the deputy.'[4] As such, Deng's view of China's place in the world closely echoed Mao's thinking.[5] Whether he truly believed what he preached during this formative period is more difficult to fathom. As the China scholar Perry Link has observed, 'Deng Xiaoping is a black box . . . He did not talk, he did not give interviews, he did not write.'[6] His daughter

Deng Rong agreed, remarking that 'Father never talked a lot.'[7] He had no interest in, and no patience with, idle chat or flowery ideas. Unlike Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek), he did not keep a diary. In contrast to Mao, he left no extensive writings.

However, an understanding of Deng's mental map is essential if we are to comprehend the reasons behind both the success of his economic reform programme and his obstinate resistance to any meaningful political reform. Based on presently available Chinese- and English-language sources, this chapter first provides a biographical sketch of Deng's educational background and his political apprenticeship under Mao and Zhou Enlai up to 1976. It then explains the role of this background in forming Deng's domestic and foreign policies, which began the transformation of China from revolutionary state to a richer and stronger country. It also offers a preliminary comparison of Mao's and Deng's mental maps.

Educational Background

Deng Xiaoping was born on 22 August 1904 to a landlord family in Paifang, Guang'an County, Sichuan. He was raised in the most privileged manner that a rural landlord could afford. His education began with standard Confucian training at the home of an educated relative in Paifang when he was five before he was transferred to Xiexing Township Elementary School. On turning 11, Deng entered the High-level Primary School in Guang'an after passing an entrance exam. Three years later, he then passed the entrance examinations to Guang'an Middle School. During all this schooling, Deng acquired a good understanding of the Confucian classics as well as modern subjects such as mathematics, science, history and geography.[8] Although Guang'an was then a relatively isolated locale in Southwest China, the Qu River and the Jialing River connected it to Chongqing (among the first inland commerce ports open to foreigners), from there to the Yangtze River and to the cosmopolitan Shanghai. Deng was thus exposed to the outside world from an early age.

In 1919, Deng, enrolled in a Chongqing school in preparation for work and study in France. It was a revealing decision. As Deng later recalled, 'I grew interested in national affairs at the age of fifteen . . . I had at the time much curiosity but little knowledge of Western affairs and therefore entered the Chongqing preparation school before going abroad to study in France.'[9] According to the historian Benjiamin Yang, Deng remained as mediocre a student at the prep school as he had been in Xiexing and Guang'an. He did not earn outstanding marks in any subject, including French. After 18 months of study, Deng's scores were not good enough to receive full financial support to go to France.[10] Nonetheless, with his father paying, Deng was allowed to join the programme and head to France. It provided his first taste of the outside world.

After travelling for nearly two months, Deng and 82 other students from Sichuan arrived in Marseilles on 19 October 1920.[11] It proved to be a formative experience. Lacking the funds to complete his education, Deng worked as an unskilled labourer and experienced the exploitation of workers first-hand by capitalists.[12] He also joined the Communist movement, working with Zhou Enlai, future premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) at *Red Lights* – the organization journal of the Communist Youth League in Europe (European Branch of the Chinese Communist Party). Under Zhou's tutelage, Deng acquired a broad understanding of the Communist movement, and he became involved in devising strategies for their movement.[13] Zhou would be Deng's mentor and patron for many years to come.

With the arrangements made by the CCP Branch in Moscow, Deng left Paris for the Soviet Union in early 1926. Deng arrived in Moscow on 17 January 1926. He was first admitted to the Eastern University, and then transferred to the first class at Sun Yat-sen University a few months later.[14] University officials soon recognized Deng's abilities and he 'was assigned to the "theory group" ', which consisted of those students who were considered especially promising as future political leaders'.[15] His political experiences in Paris had given him an advantage over other students, and he soon became a member of the leadership of the CCP organization at the university.[16] After studying in Moscow, Deng not only acquired a basic knowledge of Communist doctrines and techniques, but was also exposed to Soviet society during the period that Joseph Stalin began to emerge as the main leader. Some of the ideas Deng developed in Moscow had a life-long effect on him, including his conception of how a polity worked. 'Centralized power flows from the top down', he wrote for a class composition in August 1926. 'It is absolutely necessary to obey direction from above. How much democracy can be permitted depends on the changes in the surrounding environment.'[17] Deng's experience in Moscow became another important component of his developing mental map.

Nor was it just this exposure to other countries that shaped his thinking. Deng lived entirely with older people from the time he travelled to France. As the political scientist Lucian Pye observes,

> Instead of learning how to deal with peers as a normal adolescent, Deng's socialization was almost entirely focused on gaining the respect of older people, and he tended to seek out the most senior figures in the group . . . He learned how to give the appearance of being hard and bold and of never showing any sign of softness or tender emotions.[18]

Political Rise

Following a Comintern order, Deng, along with some twenty young Communist political instructors, returned to China in early 1927 to participate

in revolutionary activities. From October 1927 to September 1929, Deng worked as a staff member or secretary for the CCP underground centre in Shanghai where Zhou Enlai was one of the top CCP leaders. Deng's duties were largely confined to basic office chores: preparing papers, drawing up conference minutes, conveying directives, communicating messages and so forth. But his new status acquainted him with the organizational functions and personal relations among central party leaders. In August 1927, at an emergency CCP meeting, he also met Mao Zedong for the first time.[19]

Four years later, Deng journeyed to Ruijin in Jiangxi province, where he became CCP secretary. It was the start of a turbulent period for him. Nine months later, he became CCP secretary of the Hui-Xun-An Central County in the southern part of the Central Soviet. While there, Deng got to know Mao Zetan, Mao Zedong's younger brother. Mao Zetan was Deng's age and worked as party secretary of a neighbouring central county. This personal acquaintance ought to have bolstered Deng's position, especially as he appeared to support Mao Zedong's view that the Communists had to build up a rural base until they were strong enough to challenge their opponents. Yet Mao was not yet the dominant figure in the party, and Deng soon faced his first major political crisis: 'Deng's first fall', as it was later called.[20]

CCP leaders at the time (principally Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian) accused Deng of following the defeatist policy of Luo Ming, acting CCP secretary of Fujian. They attacked Deng for being the leader of a 'Mao faction'. Deng, together with three other officials (Mao Zetan, Xie Weijun and Gu Bo) were removed from their positions and subjected to severe criticism.[21] At the time, this fall came as a deep shock. Within a matter of years, however, this punishment for being of a 'Mao faction' would prove a blessing, for it gave Mao lasting confidence in Deng's loyalty.

Indeed, after Mao Zedong achieved pre-eminence in the CCP in 1935, Deng's political star began to rise in earnest. At Mao's behest, he was promoted to the position of political commissar of the 129th Division of the CCP's Eighth Route Army in early January 1938. This appointment was significant, since it not only provided him with important military experience but also placed him – nominally at least – in charge of one-third of the CCP's military forces.[22] Deng was charged with carrying out Mao's political and military policies – a job that meant he remained personally connected and loyal to Mao during a crucial point in the CCP's struggle for ascendancy.

For the next 12 years, Deng forged a partnership with Liu Bocheng in the long and brutal fights against first the Japanese in the Second World War and then the Guomindang in the Civil War. The two men worked so closely together that the name 'Liu-Deng' was used to designate their troops – the Liu-Deng Army.[23] Zhou Enlai once contrasted the methods of Deng and Liu Bocheng. Liu, Zhou said, treated anything light as heavy, whereas Deng treated anything heavy as light.[24] Deng was politically astute and always saw the big picture. He proved himself capable not only of implementing Mao's policy line but also of maintaining his loyalty to Mao personally.

During the war years, maps became crucial to Deng. Like all military commanders, he used them to locate his position, familiarize himself with the surrounding terrain and define his next direction. He also liked to read books such as Sima Qian's *Shiji* (Records of the Grand Historian) and Sima Guang's *Zizhi tongjian* (A General Reflection for Political Administration).[25] As Benjamin Yang aptly puts it, 'Deng was regarded as a party man in the eyes of his troops, while simultaneously being regarded as a military man in the eyes of the Party Center leaders.'[26] Between 1937 and 1949, the troops under his command grew from six thousand soldiers active in a few counties in 1937 to the Second Field Army of almost one million covering a dozen provinces in 1949. As Deng's military achievements mounted, his political influence in the party and army became even more firmly established, in the eyes of Mao and his senior colleagues as well as the rank and file. When the war ended in 1949, Deng was ideally placed to play a leading role in the new regime.[27]

Apprenticeship under Mao

He began by serving as the top official in his native Southwest China, which consisted of five provinces – Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xikang and Tibet. As Mao's protégé, he then advanced rapidly, acquiring several important posts in the new government and the party, including General Secretary of the CCP in 1956. By the age of 52, Deng had become one of the chief leaders of the CCP and government of the People's Republic of China, alongside Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Chen Yun.[28] Mao was clearly grooming Deng as a candidate for the top position.

As General Secretary, Deng worked closely with Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai. He saw first-hand how Mao weighed the issues facing China. He also closely watched how Zhou dealt with foreign relations and managed overall governmental activities. According to Ezra Vogel, as a leading official in China's party and government, 'Deng had the chance to see the logic of major decisions and to consider the broader framework of fundamental changes, experiences that would serve him well as he endeavored to rebuild China's economic and political frameworks in the 1980s.'[29]

While Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi were in charge of state-to-state relations, Deng was responsible for CCP's relations with other Communist and Socialist parties from 1956 to 1966, During the 1950s, the Sino–Soviet relationship was the top diplomatic priority of the PRC. Contacts between the two governments and parties were frequent, and top party leaders often conducted bilateral negotiations. Mao himself made all the major decisions, but Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai frequently represented the Chinese side. After the CCP's Eighth Congress in September 1956, Deng, and Peng Zhen, deputy general secretary, joined this select team, focusing on overseeing CCP's international activities.

At this time, Mao began to regard himself as the potential leader of the Communist bloc and Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), as a transitional figure. Deng was one of the Chinese leaders who shared this vision. In November 1957, Deng accompanied Mao to Moscow to take part in a major conference to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia. Leaders in the West looked on anxiously, fretting that this conference symbolized Communist bloc unity and strength. In practice, though, the rivalry between the Soviet and Chinese leadership was already deepening. Deng was the Chinese representative on the 12-nation committee that drafted the conference's final manifesto. After much haggling with the Soviets, the Moscow Declaration of 1957 announced two possibilities for the transition from capitalism to socialism: the peaceful transition, which the Soviets had advocated since the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, and violent struggle, which the CCP had long treasured. Deng fought tirelessly for Mao's position.[30] While in Moscow, Mao talked with Khrushchev about the CCP's senior leaders. Khrushchev recalled, 'The only one of his comrades whom Mao seemed to approve of was Teng Hsiao-ping (Deng Xiaoping). I remember Mao pointing out Teng to me and saying, "See that little man there? He's highly intelligent and has a great future ahead of him." '[31]

The first open split between China and the Soviet Union occurred at the Bucharest Conference in June 1960; two months later, Khrushchev recalled all Soviet experts and advisers from China. After the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Congress of the CCP in September 1962, Deng became even more preoccupied with Sino–Soviet relations. In a letter of 21 February 1963, the CPSU proposed bilateral talks in Moscow. The CCP concurred, and a delegation led by Deng arrived in Moscow on 5 July. Deng, as chief spokesman for the Chinese side, engaged in impassioned debates with his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee and a well-known Marxist ideologue. While Suslov insisted that 'peaceful co-existence', 'peaceful competition' and 'peaceful transition' should be confirmed as the common programme of the International Communist Movement, Deng and the Chinese delegation focused on attacking Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization. After two weeks, the two sides failed to reach any agreement, and the Sino–Soviet split could no longer be hidden from the world. The CCP and the CPSU each viewed the other as a traitor to true Marxism-Leninism. Rather than allies, they were on the path to becoming deadly enemies – a situation that would last the next twenty-odd years. Significantly, Mao's leadership team greeted this failure to improve relations with the Soviets as a victory of true Marxism-Leninism over CPSU revisionism, and Deng's delegation received a warm greeting when it arrived at the airport. Over the next couple of years, Deng took charge of an anti-revisionist writing squad. This comprised a dozen Russian specialists and Marxist scholars who produced nine highly confrontational pieces between

September 1963 and July 1964. These polemical articles not only condemned Khrushchev, but also claimed that the Soviet Union had degenerated into a country of 'social imperialism'.[32]

Deng's performance during the years of the Sino–Soviet split would play a crucial role in determining his political fate and his relations with Mao. Vilified as the 'number-two person in authority pursuing the capitalist road', Deng was purged by Mao at the beginning of the Great Cultural Revolution (1966–76) because he supported Liu Shaoqi's moderate economic policy in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958. Mao complained in October 1966,

> From 1959 up to the present time, Deng has never come to see me about anything. Deng is a deaf man, but whenever he was at a conference, he always chose to sit in a spot far from mine. He respected me but kept away from me, treating me like a dead ancestor.[33]

But he was treated much more leniently than Liu, China's second most important leader from 1949 to 1966, who died in disgrace in 1969. Deng's rehabilitation in early 1973 had much to do with the fact that Deng was Mao's long-time protégé and 'anti-Soviet revisionist' hero. Mao placed him in charge of foreign affairs in 1974, especially the PRC's policy toward the United States. In April 1974, Deng, as the head of the Chinese delegation to the UN, elaborated on Mao's 'Theory of Three Worlds' and China's foreign policy in his speech at the 6th special conference of the UN in New York. During US President Gerald Ford's visit to China in December 1975, Deng was the chief Chinese official to receive the US party.[34] In early 1976, despite being expelled again from the party's Politburo and Central Committee, Deng retained his Party membership. Throughout all these twists and turns, he was only briefly exposed to 'revolutionary' humiliation at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.

Post-Mao Reform

After Mao's death in September 1976, Deng rose to the pinnacle of power. According to Gao Zhikai, who later served as Deng's English-language interpreter in the Foreign Ministry, in May 1977 Deng visited Ye Jianying at the latter's map room. At the time, Ye was China's defence minister and a senior vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee. On the walls of his room were pinned three over-sized military maps on the east, west and north walls of the room. According to these maps, China was encircled by the Soviet and Mongolian armies to the north and US forces on the Korean peninsula and in Taiwan. Despite this parlous strategic position, China still advocated class struggle at home, while fermenting revolution abroad.[35] Deng came

away worried. Even before he had reached the pinnacle of power, he recognized the need for new policies to make China rich and strong, its people affluent.

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Congress, held on 18–22 December 1978, marked the formal inauguration of Deng's 'reform and opening up' policy. As Ezra Vogel points out,

> In 1978, Deng did not have a clear blueprint about how to bring wealth to the people and power to the country; instead, as he confessed, repeating a widely used saying – he 'groped for the stepping stones as he crossed the river'. But he did have a framework for thinking about how to proceed.[36]

On Deng's recommendation, economic development was designated as the focus of the party and the state. A week before the Central Party Work Conference, Deng said, 'Initiative cannot be spurred without economic incentives. Some more advanced people might respond to further appeals, but these will only have a short-time effect.' Instead, Deng argued, 'China must create an internal structure that will reward those who advance science, technology, and productivity with promotions and a comfortable way of life.' In particular, Deng advocated giving more flexibility to local officials, who would then take more initiative.[37]

Deng's strategy for achieving economic development and modernization stood in stark contrast to Mao's reliance on spiritual appeals to advance the Great Leap Forward. Deng charted a course that resulted in China's rapid economic development, successful reform and openness to a capitalistic international economy – while remaining in the grip of one-party rule. First in 1978 and then in 1992, he led China towards a new economic system, a place where no communist party had ventured before: the end of the domination of command economy, private property, stock exchanges and private entrepreneurs in the party. At the same time, he insisted that reform and openness would not be successful without the bureaucratic and organizational resources of the CCP. He once told his younger son, Deng Zhifang, that 'Gorbachev is an idiot' because the Soviet leader 'set out to change the political system first'. In Deng's mental map, this was 'a misguided policy because "he won't have the power to fix the economic problems and the people would remove him" '.[38] Obviously, Deng was no liberal. He sought to make China strong, but not democratic.

In foreign policy, Deng was determined to improve China's relations with other countries so that they would be receptive to working with China. He endeavoured to create a favourable international environment for China's economic development. Although he shared Mao's vision of striving for equality and restoring the country's lost glory, Deng's mental map at least after the late 1970s was very different from Mao's. Mao had seen a hostile world and had viewed a world war as inevitable. As a result, Mao's foreign and defence policies had focused on safeguarding China's security. Deng, by

contrast, had a far better grasp of the intricacies of world affairs and was much more willing to tolerate a foreign presence in China. Mao had only made two foreign trips during his long life. Deng travelled to many countries and clearly enjoyed talking to the foreign press. Deng sought the West as an ally in the quest for a strong and dignified China, while Mao had been much more distrustful.[39] In June 1985, Deng argued that a world war was unlikely in the near future and stressed that it ought to be possible to sustain world peace. In 1989, he likewise declared that the 'international situation is relaxing and world war could be averted'.[40] Rather than respond to external threats, Deng's foreign and defence policy focused more on the development of China's national strength.

The Soviet menace to China's security had been Mao's prime motive for improving relations with the United States in the early 1970s.[41] While Deng had shared Mao's vision then, by 1977 he began to consider how China could modernize. He knew that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan had relied heavily on US science, technology and education to achieve modernization. He also found that US individuals and companies held many of the patents for goods produced in Europe. Even if China could secure technological help from Europe, it still needed to cooperate with the United States. He therefore saw normalizing relations with Washington as an important first step in building a relationship that would enable China to modernize.[42] For this reason, he guided US–China normalization negotiations in the late 1970s, and in January 1979 he became the first PRC senior official to visit the United States. As Henry Kissinger put it, 'Deng ended the ambivalence about the American relationship of Mao's last year. There was no longer any Chinese nostalgia for opportunities on behalf of world revolution.'[43]

During his Washington visit, Deng secured the Carter administration's tacit consent for striking at Vietnam. The attack was launched on 17 February, two weeks after Deng returned. The historian Zhang Xiaoming argues that Deng's decision to wage war on Vietnam stemmed partly 'from the PRC's endeavor to improve its strategic position in the world while also advancing a domestic agenda of economic reform'. He further contends that Deng's decision 'to launch a punitive war against Vietnam was intended to display Beijing's usefulness in countering Soviet expansionism'.[44] Deng, in other words, was continuing Mao's strategy of 'a horizontal line' and 'a big terrain' to counter Soviet attempts at colonization.[45] Yet Deng intended to go much further than this. As Henry Kissinger observes, he was changing Chinese tactics towards

> the Soviet Union from containment to explicit strategic hostility and, in effect, to roll-back. China would no longer confine itself to advising the United States on how to contain the Soviet Union; it would now play an active role in constructing an anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnam coalition, especially in Asia.[46]

In Kissinger's view, 'It can be considered a turning point of the Cold War' because the Chinese leaders were proposing a kind of cooperation with the United States against the Soviet Union in many ways more intimate and surely more willing to take risks than the Atlantic Alliance.[47] In a nut shell, Deng expected to develop a *de facto* alliance relationship with the United States without a formal alliance structure.

But China's putative anti-Soviet alliance with the USA did not last very long. By 1984, China was moving from a semi-alliance with the USA to an independent foreign policy. In Deng's words, 'China's foreign policy is independent and self-reliant. It is a truly non-aligned foreign policy.'[48] On 29 November 1983, Deng explained his change of mind to visiting Canadian Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau. Deng said that China had adopted an accommodating policy towards the United States and Europe in the 1970s because China believed the threat of war was from the Soviet Union. Since then, the United States' continued support of Taiwan, especially the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and President Ronald Reagan's enhanced arms sales to Taiwan in 1981, had seriously damaged China's trust in Washington.[49] Deng now saw no need for China to stand on the US side to struggle against the Soviet Union. Deng claimed, 'We will adopt an independent foreign policy and oppose whoever wants to establish hegemony. [China would] stand steadfastly on the side of peace.'[50]

Since China no longer counted on the USA against the Soviet Union, Deng made efforts to mend fences with the Soviet Union. He demanded that the Soviets remove three obstacles to a Sino–Soviet rapprochement: reduce and withdraw Soviet troops along Sino–Soviet and Sino–Mongolian borders, withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and end support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. By the end of the 1980s, these obstacles had duly disappeared, albeit gradually. The 1989 summit meeting in Beijing between Deng and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev inaugurated a new era in Sino–Soviet relations and Sino–Russian relations on the premises of five principles of peaceful coexistence. During the meeting, Deng acknowledged that he had been personally involved in the ideological debates with the Soviet Union, but described the arguments on both sides as 'all empty words'. He confessed that 'we do not believe that our views were always correct'. Deng proposed to 'end the past disputes and focus on the future' and he hoped that the two neighbours 'should strive to develop a friendly relationship'.[51]

Like Mao, Deng regarded regaining Taiwan and Hong Kong as among his most sacred responsibilities. He was prepared to use armed force if necessary, but preferred to use peaceful, non-belligerent means. To gain the cooperation of local people and avoid the use of force, he was willing to grant considerable autonomy. On 5 January 1979, in a meeting with Kim Yong-nam, North Korean politburo member and special envoy of Kim Il-sung, the North Korean leader, Deng, for the first time said, 'Taiwan's political system may remain unchanged and the Taiwan people's way of life may not be altered.'[52]

Two months later, in his meeting with Hong Kong governor Sir Murray MacLehose on 29 March, Deng, again for the first time, proposed to use the policy of 'one country, two systems' to resolve the Hong Kong issue. He said, 'We will respect Hong Kong's special status . . . In this century and early the next century, Hong Kong will still carry out capitalist policy while we will carry out socialist policy.'[53] On 24 September 1982, in his meeting with visiting British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Deng further elaborated the policy of 'one country, two systems' for China to resume sovereignty over Hong Kong. He said, 'To preserve Hong Kong's prosperity after 1997, the current political system and most of Hong Kong's laws would remain in effect.'[54] The 'one country, two systems' policy was designed for China's national unification, but it was also aimed at eliminating flashpoints in Sino–UK and Sino–US relations. It was conducive to maintaining peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region. Thus, Deng must be credited with having come up with this imaginative concept to resolve the dilemmas inherent in the problems of reuniting both Hong Kong and Taiwan.

As an extension to the 'one country, two systems' policy, Deng also proposed the policy of 'shelving disputes and seeking common development' in resolving territorial disputes with China's neighbours. In April 1984, in a meeting with a visiting delegation from Georgetown University, Deng said, 'There are too many disputes in the world, and we have got to find solutions . . . For some international territorial disputes, we should first set aside the issue of sovereignty and look for common development.' In June 1986, Deng similarly told visiting Filipino Vice President Salvador Laurel, 'We should leave aside the issue of the Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands) for a while. We should not let this issue stand in the way of China's friendship with the Philippines and with other countries.' Deng once again brought up this idea when he met visiting Filipino President Maria Corazon Aquino in April 1988. 'In view of the friendly relations between our two countries', Deng declared, 'we can set aside this issue for the time being and take the approach of pursuing joint development'. With both President Aquino and Vice President Laurel responding positively to Deng's initiative, the outcome was significant.[55] Adhering to Deng's policy of 'shelving disputes and seeking common development', China managed to resolve territorial and boundary issues with all but a few of its neighbours.[56]

Nor were these the only departures from Mao's policies. Deng also called for self-restraint in showing off China's capabilities and seeking leadership in international affairs. In May 1980, while discussing party-to-party relations in the International Communist Movement, Deng advanced the following position:

> We should respect the Communist Party and the people of each country to find solutions to their own problems and explore the developmental road. It is not proper for a foreign party to act as a father party and issue

> orders . . . We oppose others issuing orders to us. Neither should we issue orders to others.[57]

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the International Communist Movement reached its lowest point. Many in the Third World were perplexed and called for China to carry the banner of opposing US hegemonism and Western 'peaceful evolution' strategy against socialist countries. Western media crowned China the laurel of a 'new center of world communism' and 'leader of the Third World'. Deng, for his part, remained cold-minded and clear-headed. He proposed a pithy set of guiding principles for China's foreign policy: 'Observe carefully, handle challenges calmly, solidify our position, avoid the limelight, hide our capacities, desist from claiming leadership, seize the opportunity, and make some achievements' ('lengjing guancha, wenzhu zhenjiao, chenzhuo yingfu, taoguang yanghui, shanyu shouzhuo, juebu dangtou, zhuazhu jiyu, yousuo zuowei'). As an honourable retiree, on 24 December 1990, in a conversation with several Party Center leaders, Deng pointed out, 'Several Third World countries want us to be in the head. But we should never take the head. This is our fundamental statecraft . . . China will forever stand with the Third World. China would never pursue hegemony. China will never take the lead.'[58] The essence of this policy was to create a long-term peaceful and stable environment so that China could continue to develop its comprehensive national power (*zonghe guoli*). In Deng's mental map, China would need 50–70 years of peace before it would be likely to reach a position of strength in the world.[59] This policy would serve China's long-term priority.

As an old Communist, how did Deng react to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? What lesson did he learn from it? Sometime in late December 1989, Deng and his senior colleagues gathered to watch videotapes of the Romanian coup, when the Romanian President Nicolae Ceauşescu and his wife were tortured and executed. At the end of the session, Deng said, 'we'll be like this if we don't carry out reforms and bring about benefits to the people'.[60] Indeed, the sudden turn of events in Romania and Eastern Europe caused the Chinese leaders to wonder if they were immune to the fate of Ceauşescu. In April 1990, the CCP Central Committee circulated among its members Deng's 'very important comments' about the consequences for China of the collapse of Eastern European Communism and the 'betrayal' by Gorbachev: 'Everyone should be very clear that under the present international situation all enemy attention will be concentrated on China. They will use every pretext to cause trouble, to create difficulties and pressures for us.' These developments, combined with the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, meant that what China needed was 'stability, stability and more stability'. He went on: 'the next three to five years will be extremely difficult for our party and our country, extremely

important. If we stand fast and make it through, our enterprise will develop quickly. If we collapse, China's history will regress for several tens of years, even a hundred years.' But unlike some of his colleagues who reportedly sought to open polemics with Gorbachev, Deng argued in favour of avoiding ideological debates and urged that state relations be developed on a steady and cordial basis in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence.[61]

On one particularly sensitive occasion, 20 August 1991, the day after conservatives in the Soviet Union had engineered a coup and while they were still holding Gorbachev under house arrest, Deng called a meeting of Party Center leaders, including Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the CCP, Yang Shangkun, President of the PRC and Premier Li Peng. He urged them to work together and avoid a split. Deng emphasized the importance of continuous reform and opening up. He also warned that emphasizing economic growth did not mean forgetting Marx, Lenin and Mao.[62] On 5 October 1991, a few weeks after Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania broke with the Soviets, setting off the process that led to the final dissolution of the Soviet Union, Deng stressed the same theme to visiting Kim Il-sung. China, he told the North Korean leader, 'remains firmly committed to economic reform and openness but also steadfast in its commitment to the four cardinal principles'.[63]

How did Deng explain the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? Deng asserted that the Soviet Union had failed to institute economic reforms in a timely manner and that the top Soviet leaders had not firmly supported the Communist Party. Instead, Soviet leaders had become embroiled in an arms race with the United States, a contest that had led to wasteful spending that did not improve the lives of ordinary people. While Soviet leaders had enjoyed a higher standard of living, ordinary citizens suffered.[64] Crucially, during this extremely difficult period, Deng never expressed any doubts about the ability of the CCP to overcome the difficulty. As Ezra Vogel notes, 'In public, Deng displayed a quiet confidence that the Chinese Communist Party would survive and eventually prevail, and that the economy would continue to grow.'[65]

Continuities and Changes from Mao to Deng

In appearance, Mao and Deng could not have been more different. Mao was 11 years older than Deng and much taller, 5′11″ to Deng's 4′11″. While Mao was handsome, powerfully built and a charismatic and romantic revolutionary, few ever complimented the stocky Deng on his looks. Nor did the dissimilarities end there. Deng has been remembered as a pragmatic statesman. As he famously said, 'it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice'.[66] As Ezra Vogel put it aptly, 'If Mao were like an emperor above the clouds, reading history and novels and issuing edicts, Deng was more like a commanding general, checking carefully to see that

his battle plans were properly staffed and implemented.'[67] Throughout his entire political career, Deng neither read much nor wrote extensively, but once involved in actual work, he demonstrated extraordinary determination and enthusiasm.

In domestic policies, Mao guarded against capitalistic economic practice, advocating 'Continuous Revolution'. Deng believed that, as the party in power, the CCP's main task was to develop the economy by any means possible. Both Mao and Deng have been regarded as outstanding international strategists, but again there were significant differences. Mao was interested in exporting revolution and serving as the mentor of world revolution. Deng focused on improving China's relations with other countries in order to create a harmonious environment for China's economic development. Deng substantially reduced China's aid and support to its former allies and Third World countries. He warned his colleagues that China should never 'take the lead' in international affairs.

Mao knew very little about the workings of modern capitalist society. Throughout his years in command, Mao denigrated materialism and economic incentives, preferring economic development propelled by voluntarism – spontaneity of the masses. Deng had a better understanding of the role of economic incentives, wider capitalist economic principles and the utility of linking China to the global liberal economic order. His reforms aimed at integrating the Chinese economy with the Western capitalist economy. His purpose was to make China rich and powerful and Chinese people affluent. Nevertheless, Mao's decision in the late 1960s and early 1970s to improve relations with the United States and to gradually open China to the West provided Deng with the foundation to open up China more widely.

Mao had a higher regard for Deng than for Lin Biao. Lin had been Mao's anointed successor in 1969 until he died in a mysterious plane crash in September 1971. Lin had a dark side to his psyche and promoted himself by toadying to Mao, shamelessly repeating what he apparently thought Mao would like to hear. Deng was mentally brighter, and had a less complicated relationship with Mao. When he and Mao saw eye to eye, he wholeheartedly carried out Mao's policies. When he disagreed with Mao, he attempted to avoid Mao. Deng also sang Mao's praises, but only as one of the crowd. He never demeaned himself in dealing with Mao. When Mao brought Deng back to power in 1973, he praised Deng as a man of rare talent, saying that 'Deng is pretty resolute in tackling problems', and, 'Deng is a man of "softness melded with toughness", just like "a needle wrapped in cotton."'[68]

Deng's childhood years had bequeathed him a strong and positive sense about what he wanted out of family life. Mao had had to fight his father to get an education, because the elder Mao had intended his son to work in the fields. Deng's mother and nurses had taken care of his daily needs, while his father had pressed Deng to achieve something loftier than his own local business and activities.[69] Mao kept concubines and ceased living with

his third wife, Jiang Qing, in the 1950s. Deng, by contrast, truly enjoyed family life with his wife, children and his numerous grandchildren. During difficult times, these warm and close relations with his wife and family helped to sustain Deng. At work, Deng was also far more approachable than Mao, who could only be addressed as 'Chairman Mao'. Ordinary citizens could call Deng by his first name, 'Xiaoping'. Deng's favourite hobby was to play bridge, and he believed this helped his mental health. Deng played bridge and fraternized with his colleagues; Mao was a loner.[70] President Jimmy Carter commented that Deng, unlike the Soviet leaders, 'had an inner confidence that allowed one to get directly into substantive issues'.[71] Mao, moreover, could be rather emotional, while Deng was steady. As Ezra Vogel put it, 'Mao had mercurial changes of mood, but Deng, as paramount leader, maintained a steady demeanor and consistent approach to governance.'[72]

Still, it was politics, not personality that caused the rupture in their relations during the 1960s. Deng's personal role in the anti-rightist movement and the Great Leap Forward, together with his role in implementing the Sino–Soviet split, made him a liability to Mao. In a 1980 interview with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, Deng claimed, 'We will not do to Chairman Mao what Khrushchev had done to Stalin.' So despite all their differences, Deng shied away from any prospect of de-Maoization. This position was demonstrated when Mao's legacy was being reassessed in the early 1980s. Deng was at great pains to stress 'that Mao Zedong's policy in foreign affairs had been correct and highly successful.'[73] Although Deng moved in different policy directions than Mao after 1978, he did so without repudiating Mao.

Deng cared not just about personal power, but also about public policy, and this constituted another important part of his political philosophy. In Deng's mental map, there was no contradiction between upholding the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and economic openness. Deng cared a great deal, especially in his later years, about China's most urgent needs, and how best to accomplish them. While stressing economic growth as China's focal point, Deng insisted on the four cardinal principles and the policies of reform and openness as the two supporting bases or, as Deng vividly put it, 'one focus plus two basic points'.[74] In his mental map, there was no viable path for China's modernization other than that which led through the Chinese Communist Party. In June 1989, Deng believed that the student demonstrators were threatening CCP rule. He remained convinced that Western political principles would produce chaos and thwart development in China.[75] Although he anticipated Western economic sanction and China's economic recession in the aftermath of a crackdown, he did not hesitate to use lethal weapons against these challengers. When some of his senior colleagues expressed concern that foreigners would react negatively to any use of force, Deng replied that swift action was required and 'Westerners would forget'.[76] But in early 1992, when Deng felt that his chosen successor, Jiang Zemin, was not wholeheartedly implementing his

reform and openness line, he took his case directly to the people during his famous Southern Tour (*nan xun*). Pressured by Deng, Jiang publicly praised and endorsed Deng's reform and openness line.[77] As Henry Kissinger notes, 'Deng's "Southern Tour" would take on an almost mythical significance, and his speeches would serve as the blueprint for another two decades of Chinese political and economic policy.'[78] Deng retired from all official posts after March 1990, but still wielded immense power till the end of his life in 1997.

Deng shared Mao's vision of China's basic role in the world. Both men saw China as a great nation with a long history. Both believed that China should be restored to its rightful place in international affairs. And both thought that this could only be realized under the leadership of the CCP. Yet there were also key differences. In Deng's mental map, China could attain the prosperity and power enjoyed by France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and Japan only through reforms and openness, not 'Continuous Revolution' and class struggle. His greatest legacy was to elevate China's status in the world of nations. Henry Kissinger, who met and negotiated with Deng on many occasions, wrote that 'China as the present-day economic superpower is the legacy of Deng Xiaoping. It is not that he designed specific programs to accomplish his ends. Rather, he fulfilled the ultimate task of a leader – of taking his society from where it is to where it has never been.'[79]

Notes

1. See David Shambaugh (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman* (New York, 1995).
2. A short list of important ones: Deng Rong (Maomao), *My Father Deng Xiaoping* (New York, 1995); Richard Evans, *Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China*, rev. ed. (New York, 1997); Benjamin Yang, *Deng Xiaoping: A Political Biography* (New York, 1998); Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge and London, 2011); Michael Dillon, *Deng Xiaoping: The Man Who Made Modern China* (London, 2015); Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine, *Deng Xiaoping: A Revolutionary Life* (New York, 2015).
3. Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. ix.
4. See Li Rui, *Da yuejin qinliji* (Eye-witness account of the Great Leap Forward) (Haikou, 1999), pp. 465–66. For a study on Deng's career as the CCP General Secretary, see Yen-lin Chung, *Wenge qian de Deng Xiaoping: Mao Zedong de 'fu shuai', 1956–1966* (Deng Xiaoping before the Cultural Revolution: Mao's 'Vice Marshal', 1956–1966) (Hong Kong, 2013).
5. I disagree with Ezra Vogel, who writes, 'Throughout his career, Deng was responsible for implementation rather than for theory.' See Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 7. This may be true to the time of Mao's death in 1976. But Deng guided China's reform and opening-up since 1978. Although he was not strong in theory, Deng was China's chief policy-maker from 1978 to 1991. For a study of Mao's mental map, see Yafeng Xia, 'Mao Zedong', in Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright (eds), *Mental Maps in the Early Cold War* (New York, 2011), pp. 160–79.

6. Perry Link and Hanchao Lu, 'Standing up for Liberty: A Conversation with Perry Link', *The Chinese Historical Review* 21.2, 2014, p. 175.
7. Maomao, *Wode fuqin Deng Xiaoping* (My Father Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing, 1993), pp. 5–6.
8. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping nainpu, 1904–1974* (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping, 1904–1974) (Beijing, 2009), Vol. I, pp. 2–8.
9. For Deng's remarks on his motives for going abroad, see Deng Xiaoping, *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 1975–1982* (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975–1982) (Beijing, 1983), p. 124.
10. Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 27.
11. *Deng Xiaoping nainpu*, Vol. I, pp. 8–10.
12. Zhao Xiaoguang and Liu Jie, *Deng Xiaoping de sanluo sanqi* (Deng Xiaoping's Three Downs and Three Ups) (Shenyang, 2001), pp. 13–15.
13. *Deng Xiaoping nainpu*, Vol. I, pp. 18–19.
14. In June 1921, the Soviet government founded the 'Communist University of Toilers of the East', or simply the 'Eastern University', in Moscow – a party school for training officials and cadres to control its eastern minority regions. From 1922 onwards, the Eastern University was formally put under the supervision of the Communist International rather than the Soviet government. Its objective was henceforth to train party cadres, not only of the eastern minorities of Soviet Russia but also of the eastern countries of Asia, to make communist revolutions in their own motherlands. Sun Yat-sen University was founded in Moscow in September 1925 in memory of the recently deceased founder of the Republic of China and leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party. Both communists and nationalists were trained there as revolutionary cadres for the CCP-GMD united front against the warlords and imperialists. For details, see Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 49–50.
15. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 23.
16. Lee Ching-Hua, *Deng Xiaoping: The Marxist Road to the Forbidden City* (Princeton, NJ, 1985), pp. 38–40.
17. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 25.
18. Shambaugh (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 20–1.
19. *Deng Xiaoping nainpu*, Vol. I, pp. 34–7; Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 55; Zhao and Liu, *Deng Xiaoping de sanluo sanqi*, p. 30.
20. *Deng Xiaoping nainpu*, Vol. I, pp. 93–98.
21. Ibid., pp. 95–8. Also see Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 28–9; Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 72–5.
22. *Deng Xiaoping nainpu*, Vol. I, p. 167.
23. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 31–32; Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 86–96.
24. Yu Jundao and Zou Yang, *Deng Xiaoping jiaowanglu* (A Record of Deng Xiaoping's Companionship) (Chengdu, 1996), p. 19.
25. Chen Jin, *Shiji Xiaoping: Jiedu yige lingxiu de xingge mielie* (Deng Xiaoping's Centennial: Decoding a Leader's Charisma) (Beijing, 2004), pp. 123–4.
26. Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 88.
27. Ibid., p. 110.
28. For additional information, see Yafeng Xia, 'Deng Xiaoping', in *Encyclopedia of the Cold War* (New York, 2008), pp. 247–9.
29. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 38–9.
30. For details on the Moscow Conference of 1957, see Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, 'Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon – Mao Zedong, Khrushchev and the 1957 Moscow Conference', *The Journal of Cold War Studies* 11.4, 2009, pp. 74–117.

31. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston, 1974), p. 253; Liu Jintian, *Zouchu guomen de Deng Xiaoping* (Deng Xiaoping's Travels Abroad) (Shijiazhuang, 2001), p. 83.
32. For details, see Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, 'Jockeying for Leadership: Mao and the Sino–Soviet Split, October 1961–July 1964', *The Journal of Cold War Studies* 16.1, 2014, pp. 24–60.
33. Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought) (Beijing, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 655–61. Here Mao vented his rage upon Deng in utter indifference to the facts. Deng maintained close contact with Mao during the Sino–Soviet polemics up to late 1964.
34. For details, see Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, 'Vacillating between Revolution and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy toward the U.S., 1969–1976', *Diplomatic History* 34.2, 2010, pp. 416–18; Yafeng Xia, 'Myth or Reality: Factional Politics, U.S.–China Relations, and Mao Zedong's Psychology in His Sunset Years, 1972–1976', *The Journal of American–East Asian Relations* 15, 2008, pp. 123–7.
35. See Yin Jie, 'Interpreter Gao Zhikai Recalled Deng Xiaoping: Reform and Opening Up Due to a Sense of Urgency and Crisis', *Huanqiu renwu* (Global People), 23 January 2014.
36. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 2.
37. Yu Guangyuan, *Deng Xiaoping Shakes the World: An Eyewitness Account of China's Party Work Conference and the Third Plenum* (November–December 1978) (Norwalk, CT, 2004); also Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 243.
38. Deng Zhifang reported this to Timothy Stratford in late 1990. Stratford was commercial minister-counselor in the US embassy in Beijing from 1989 to 1992. Cited in Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 423, 802 n. 1.
39. Shambaugh (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 73.
40. *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing, 1995), Vol. III, pp. 126–7, 289.
41. See Yafeng Xia, *Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.–China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972* (Bloomington, IN, 2006), p. 137.
42. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 311–12.
43. Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York, 2011), p. 349.
44. See Xiaoming Zhang, 'Deng Xiaoping and China's Decision to Go to War with Vietnam', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12.3, 2010, pp. 3–4, 28–9; Xiaoming Zhang, *Deng Xiaoping's Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991* (Chapel Hill, 2015).
45. See Xia, 'Mao Zedong', pp. 171–2.
46. Kissinger, *On China*, p. 348.
47. Ibid., pp. 340, 354.
48. Wang Taiping (chief ed.), *Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang yanjiu lunwenji* (A Collection of Papers on the Study of Deng Xiaoping Diplomatic Thought) (Beijing, 1998), p. 119.
49. *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* (Beijing, 1995), Vol. II, pp. 376–8; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu, 1975–1997* (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping Thought) (Beijing, 1998), p. 274.
50. Li Yuan, *Mao Zedong yu Deng Xiaoping* (Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing, 2008), p. 439.
51. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 613–14; Ye Zicheng, *Xin Zhongguo waijiao sixiang: cong Mao Zedong dao Deng Xiaoping* (New China's Diplomatic Thought: From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing, 2004), pp. 232–6.

52. *Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu*, 1975–97, p. 106.
53. Ibid., pp. 114–15.
54. Ibid., pp. 234–5.
55. Wang (chief ed.), *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 351–2.
56. Nonetheless, China has yet to resolve its territorial disputes with India, with Japan over Diaoyu Island (Senkaku Shoto), and with Southeast Asian countries over the Nansha Islands.
57. *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan*, Vol. II, pp. 318–19.
58. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 363; Li, *Mao Zedong yu Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 440–1.
59. Wang (chief ed.), *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 143.
60. Cited from Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 256–7.
61. *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan*, Vol. III, p. 353; 'Deng Xiaoping sees the future for the CCP', *Zhengming*, Hong Kong, no. 151 (1 May 1990).
62. *Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu*, 1975–97, pp. 456–7.
63. Ibid., p. 457. The four cardinal principles were stated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and are the four issues for which debate was not allowed within the PRC. They are: (1) the principle of upholding the socialist path; (2) the principle of upholding the people's democratic dictatorship; (3) the principle of upholding the CCP leadership; and (4) the principle of upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
64. Wang (chief ed.), *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 270–5; Qian Qichen, *Waijiao shiji* (Ten Stories of A Diplomat) (Beijing, 2003), pp. 220–4.
65. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 658–9.
66. At the Seventh Plenum of the Third Communist Youth League on 7 July 1962, Deng Xiaoping first uttered the famous line, 'It doesn't matter if the cat is yellow or black as long as it catches the mouse.' When the phrase was published, the cat's colour was changed from yellow to white. See Ruan Ming, *Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire* (Boulder, CO, 1994), pp. 4–5.
67. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 377.
68. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.), *Mao Zedong nianpu, 1949–1976* (Chronology of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976) (Beijing, 2013), Vol. VI, p. 512.
69. Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 19–20.
70. Shambaugh (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 73; and Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 8–9.
71. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 4.
72. Ibid., p. 383.
73. *Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu*, 1975–97, pp. 147–50, 164–5; and Li, *Mao Zedong yu Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 141–7.
74. One focus is economic development. Two basic points are (1) upholding the four cardinal principles, and (2) upholding reform and openness. These were set as the CCP's basic line in the primary stage of socialism at the 13th Congress of the CCP in October/November 1987.
75. Kissinger, *On China*, p. 444.
76. James Lilly with Jeffrey Lilly, *China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia* (New York, 2004), p. 309.
77. Yang, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 261–3.
78. Kissinger, *On China*, pp. 441–2.
79. Ibid., p. 333.

9
Václav Havel

Kieran Williams

For Václav Havel, 1968 was the year that made him a man of politics. Until then, he had been a successful playwright and outspoken essayist, but was still operating in terms set by the events of a previous tumultuous year, 1956. During the stifled ferment of Czechoslovakia's reaction to that year's events in neighbouring countries, Havel at age 20 had attracted attention with a cultural critique of the Communist establishment. Irreverent towards the officially approved writers of the day, many of whom were only a few years older than himself, he also deplored the embourgeoisement of the masses under socialism, with life's meaning reduced to a pale imitation of Western, consumer, technological society. Exposing the hollowness of this existence through his hit plays *The Garden Party* (1963) and *The Memorandum* (1965) while campaigning for reform of the writers' union and the survival of unorthodox periodicals, he was certainly being drawn into what he called *političnost* – 'perceptiveness of the problems of a person as a member of a human polis'.[1] But it was only with changes in the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in January 1968 and the resulting 'Prague Spring' that Havel at age 32 began to reframe his cultural critique as a political programme, hone his political skills and work out a conception of responsible leadership.

Despite the interruption of Czechoslovakia's reforms by the Soviet-led invasion in August 1968, Havel was now on the path that would eventually make him one of the leading figures of the country's small community of opposition intellectuals and, in 1989, president of the republic. What follows is not a detailed retelling of that narrative, which has been done many times elsewhere.[2] Instead, this chapter will attempt to pin down the sources of Havel's mental map in terms of influences, often noted but rarely unpacked, that ensured that he would not be a dissident in the narrow sense of someone focused just on the wrongdoing of his country's government. In keeping with his youthful hostility to the Biedermeier quiet life wherever it was lived, Havel in middle age diagnosed a crisis of all forms of industrial society, a crisis outwardly manifested in impersonal, oversized bureaucratic

states, soulless consumerism, ecological ruin and the nuclear arms race, but at root a crisis of modern man's ability to vouch for a truth and be consistent in an identity in his relations with others.

Havel's Vantage Point: *Domov*

Being consistent in an identity meant not being split into multiple unconnected personae, public and private, past and present. Just as every element of one of his plays was intended as an integral component of the world on the stage, so a person should be fully integrated.[3] One way in which Havel imagined that integration was through the idea of *domov*, 'home', which he began to develop while in prison in 1980 and which he revived in his early presidency. The prison variant, heavily phenomenological, conceived of *domov* as three horizons: the immediate surroundings into which a person is thrown; the 'concrete existential horizon' beyond it (family, friends, community), which might be momentarily out of sight but vividly alive in one's imagination and thus more significant as the 'hidden set of parameters of life', inspiration for political courage and fount of sustaining solidarity; and the 'absolute horizon' that is the origin of a person's values (such as a notion of God).[4] The presidential variant reconfigured *domov* as a set of concentric rings encircling the individual, radiating outward from family, friends, residence and workplace to embrace the broader culture and language in which we feel most at ease, all the way to a continental, civilizational or planetary affinity.[5] Even if the imagery might imply an order of receding intensity, each layer of *domov* was considered essential to a robust identity.[6]

At the centre of Havel's *domov*, and of his mental map, was the city of Prague.[7] Born there in 1936, he regarded its fate and condition as emblematic of those of Central Europe and humanity writ large. He cited its crumbling masonry and rabbit-warren housing estates as evidence of a government indifferent to the common weal and of life organized on an inhuman scale, but it was far more than a morass of urban nightmares. In 1983, he boasted that it was the intersection of 'various secret and unseen powerlines of European (western and eastern) intellectual and social life' from which sparked a light that momentarily illuminated 'something of the future of the opposing ends of Europe and the world'.[8] A year later, he placed the city 'at the very centre of Central Europe' and on the front line of the renewed Cold War, a precarious site since Prague had been

> traditionally the first battlefield and first victim of European and, later, worldwide conflicts; the crossroads of European ideas and armies; the unavoidable target of geopolitical interests and modern weapons, on whose surface the nature of the imminent danger is always somehow more urgently and promptly felt.

In response to that condition, the city's residents had developed an infectious dark humour, healthy distrust of 'bloated speech', sense of pervasive threat and disgust with the world.[9]

Havel's identification with Prague was part of his inheritance from a family that had already left its mark on its skyline and its society. His paternal grandfather and father were property developers, his father's brother a film magnate and his maternal grandfather a diplomat, newspaper editor and briefly a government minister (for propaganda and intelligence) during the Munich crisis of 1938. Before that traumatic event, the Havel men had also been active freemasons, Rotarians, members of the conservative National Democratic Party (Havel's uncle Miloš briefly flirted with Italian-style fascism in the 1920s), proponents of alternative forms of spirituality (occult séances and the YMCA) and enthusiastic importers of American and west European styles, trends and products.[10] Havel's first ten years were thus spent in an affluent household that blended Czech patriotism with cosmopolitanism, and throughout his life Havel was a keen traveller and digester of foreign ideas but never at home in any language other than Czech. The unhappy lot of his uncle Miloš in exile in West Germany also taught him that the émigré's life was not an easy one, which strengthened his resolve in the 1980s to resist pressure to leave.

Before the Communist seizure of power in 1948, Havel's family was knitted into the country's intellectual and artistic élites, such that the young Havel grew up surrounded by a well-stocked private library reflecting the values of the interwar republic, and later was able to approach some of the authors in that library for mentoring and tutoring (Havel was barred on class grounds from attending the school and university of his choice). Two philosophers in particular would have a lifelong impact on his mental map: Josef Ludvík Fischer and Josef Šafařík.

Josef Ludvík Fischer (1894–1973)

A polymath equally at ease in philosophy, sociology and psychology and all major European languages, Fischer affected the adolescent Havel in two ways. First, he acted as informal teacher in the elements of philosophy, meeting him 'rather intensively' at the family flat in central Prague or the nearby Café Slavia.[11] (Fischer had known Havel's father since 1933 and contributed to the latter's political discussion group.) For an overview, he pushed Havel to read Wilhelm Windelband, a German neo-Kantian whose *History of Philosophy* (1893) had also been a primer for Samuel Beckett, a playwright Havel would soon come to admire.[12] Windelband had headed the faction of neo-Kantians primarily concerned with preserving a distinction between the natural sciences and philosophy as a 'science of values (logical, aesthetic and ethical)', so that the latter not be reduced to a branch of the materialist, empirical former.[13] Fischer, and Havel, followed Windelband in arguing that

science alone could not guide humanity, as its first principles were always subject to judgement against a transcendental system of values.

Fischer's second means of influence was his own writings, the major works of which Havel had read by early 1954.[14] Prolific and prolix, Fischer progressed through early attraction to Bergsonian vitalism, US pragmatism and Marxism to arrive by the 1930s at his own philosophy of a 'composite order' (*skladebný řád*), one that was primarily concerned with individuals but did not neglect their social integration.[15] He took as his starting point the fact that interwar democracy and capitalism were based not on laissez-faire competition but on increasing degrees of collusion and cartels. Along with them came a culture of quantification, standardization and division of labour rooted in a mechanistic view of the cosmos, which had a 'dehumanizing, automatizing and asocial character'.[16] Against this, Fischer wanted a qualitative, 'humanized world (*zlidštěný svět*)'[17] organized in highly decentralized functional units; in essence modern-day guilds responsible for tasks, firms and services, subject to locally accountable bodies of democratic oversight.

To avoid charges of utopianism or sympathy for Soviet 'state capitalism', Fischer sketched his composite state with only a minimum of practical detail, but with the enthusiasm of someone moved by a 'faith'[18] that it would result in workers' 'vibrant and joyous awareness of co-responsibility for their "own" social "home" (*domov*) and enable each person to create as many such "homes" for himself as possible'.[19] Always thinking globally as well as locally, Fischer offered his composite state as a way by which Europe, perhaps organized as the 'United European States', could regain the initiative it was losing to America and Asia.[20] Elements of Fischer's vision can be found in the 17-year-old Havel's outline of a philosophy of 'humanistic optimalism' in autumn 1953, which charted a path between market and command economies, between Marx and Masaryk (Czechoslovakia's first president, whom Fischer had criticized for excessive focus on individual moral improvement at the expense of functional attachments).[21] Echoes of Fischer could still be heard in Havel's post-1968 dissident essays and post-1989 presidential addresses.

Josef Šafařík (1907–92)

'In my early youth my personal philosophical Bible was *Seven Letters to Melin*', recalled Havel in the mid-1980s.[22] The book in question had appeared for two months in shops in 1948, sold around 5000 copies, and then been withdrawn in the aftermath of the Communist takeover.[23] Enough people obtained it for it to develop a cult following, with Havel's grandfather Hugo Vavrečka among the enthusiasts. Havel developed a friendship with its reclusive author, Josef Šafařík, who unlike Fischer was not an academic philosopher but an engineer by training, and unlike Fischer wrote sparingly and poignantly.[24] Such was the impact of *Seven Letters* that it can be

described as the biggest single influence on Havel in not just his youth, but his whole life.

Not a treatise but a fictionalized meditation on an artist's suicide, *Seven Letters* confronted humanity's enduring need for truth and salvation, which it will find in neither traditional religion nor theosophical spiritualism nor the sciences in which Šafařík had been trained and employed. The book was marked by the post-war waves of retribution, which caught up Havel's father, uncle and grandfather Hugo in accusations of having been too willing to work with occupying German forces. Šafařík viewed Aryan racialism and the Nazi crimes that were then on trial as the fanatical but logical climax of modern Europe's culture of depersonalized science and reliance on socially generated standards of right and wrong, resulting in a society of pliant spectators. When German officials pleaded in their defence that they were just following orders and seemed surprised to be held responsible, Šafařík took them at their word, because that was more disturbing than if they were disingenuously seeking to avoid judgement.[25] Since the 'scaffolding' and 'balustrades' that modern man constructed to give his life a false structure had clearly failed, Šafařík advocated a radical individualism following the voice of conscience, 'of one's own accord, at one's own risk, on one's own responsibility'.[26] The detached spectator would be replaced by the active participant, whom Šafařík likened to Nietzsche's tightrope walker – a person who had to keep moving above the abyss, living in the here and the now, relying on a balance and resolve that came entirely from within. The consummate high-wire participant was the artist, someone who, like nature itself, resisted the discipline of man-made laws of regularity and morality, and danced without a safety net.[27]

In keeping with the post-war climate of prosecution and testimony, Šafařík described the participant as being a *ručitel* – someone willing to avouch something (*zaručit*), as if under oath before witnesses, because conscience dictates it as true. What made the words of Socrates, Jesus, Giordano Bruno or Jan Hus convincing to Šafařík as expressions of truth was not so much their content as the willingness of the speakers to provide their personal guarantee (*záruka*) by dying rather than recanting.[28] This language of avouching by one's words and actions, including self-sacrifice, as a guarantee of truth and command of conscience recurred throughout Havel's writing.[29] It also fitted Havel's instinctive acceptance of a pluralism of avouched truths and reluctance to commit to a single understanding of the 'absolute horizon'.[30]

Other Influences before 1968

Pitirim Sorokin (1889–1968)

Another book that, like *Seven Letters to Melin*, briefly appeared in Czechoslovak bookstores in 1948 was a translation of *The Crisis of Our Age* by Pitirim

Sorokin, which Havel had read by autumn 1953.[31] A Russian émigré at Harvard and outspoken 'conservative, Christian anarchist',[32] Sorokin saw human history as working through cycles of phases, from ideational (religious) to idealistic (blending religion with an ennobled view of humanity) to sensate (empirical, utilitarian and permissive). Much of the book was a fiery denunciation of the sensate age that had prevailed since the sixteenth century and had forgotten that '[m]an is not only an organism but is also a bearer of absolute value'.[33] Given Havel's later interest in broadening his critique to reach capitalist as well as Soviet systems, he may have been struck by Sorokin's very dark picture of a West that was 'progressively becoming mentally deranged and morally unbalanced', owing to its 'penchant for money, wealth, profit, pleasures and sensory happiness'.[34] Scathing in his contempt for an American economy of large bureaucratic corporations (no better than 'a decentralized totalitarianism'), Sorokin was also dismissive of an American democracy of spoils, bribery and 'violent coercion'.[35]

Sorokin was confident that the misery of world war and economic depression was just the necessary transition to the next ideational phase. This prophecy appealed to the teenage Havel, who subscribed to a non-Marxist dialectic based on his reading of Hegel's lectures, and felt in the months after Stalin's death that the world was on the cusp of a 'spontaneous grandiose movement' towards a more spiritual age (Havel described himself at the time as pantheistic).[36] Sorokin may have had a lasting impact in preventing Havel from idealizing the West, helping him resist the utilitarian thinking of his adolescent peers, and fuelling a nostalgia for the lost integration of medieval Europe, of which many traces were visible in Prague.[37]

Ivan Sviták (1925–94)

Even if inclined to a spiritual view of the universe, Havel never conformed to a conventional religious identity. Considering himself a socialist of sorts into the 1970s, Havel was at one point so taken by the revisionist Marxism of Ivan Sviták that he tried in 1963–64 to stage a theatrical rendition of his works, and a public reading in 1967.[38] That Havel was not allowed to do this reflects Sviták's very controversial position in the post-Stalinist intelligentsia. Sviták had started out as a regime-approved philosopher, specializing in militant atheism, but in 1956 he was the first to denounce the subservience of his profession to ideology, which he knew could not be blamed narrowly on the 'personality cult'. Instead, fault lay with the entire bureaucratic class, which had to be put under 'democratic control by the people', not just to catch up to Western standards of accountability but to surpass them.[39] Sviták called for a philosophy that offered no pat answers but was 'a process of seeking truth, unfinished, uncompleted, endless'.[40]

Sviták combined Marxism with humanism, and it was his observations on alienation ('the most urgent problem facing the industrial societies of West and East alike'),[41] poetics and Franz Kafka that probably attracted Havel's

attention around 1963. In this regard Sviták acted as an amplifier of elements of Havel's aesthetic education from the fifties, which had already fixed on Viktor Shklovskii's theory of literature as *ostranenie* (estrangement or 'alienization') disrupting everyday 'automatism'.[42] Havel summarized this method as a 'perspective that rids phenomena of the accretions of conventional perception, dislodges them from customary and automatized (*zautomatizovaných*) interpretative contexts and tries to see them ... "without glasses" ... Expose them as absurd. And thus open up inquiry into their true meaning.'[43] Shklovskii had noted that for a social critic such as Leo Tolstoi, this device was especially powerful for sensitizing readers to practices he disliked.[44] For Havel, the distance from his surroundings that he had felt from earliest childhood could be positive, if it allowed him to aim, as all progressive writers should, at a more humane world (*svět lidštější*) inhabited by a 'whole, harmonious humanity, unfragmented, unalienated from itself and uncommercialized, of which Marx dreamed'.[45] As Sviták put it more pithily, 'The poet is an unalienated man, who bears the alienation of his era inside himself.'[46] This semi-detached gaze would later inform Havel's conception of the dissident as someone who looks upon the machinations of power with the bemusement of Natasha at her first opera in *War and Peace*.

As for Kafka, while Havel was an enthusiastic reader years before it was fashionable, he refrained from wholesale imitation. That he did so for philosophical rather than literary reasons is clear from his 1958 review of a Hungarian film, *Master Hannibal*, in which a mousy, Chaplinesque schoolteacher is destroyed by the inscrutable forces of a fascist society. While Havel saw obvious similarities to Kafka's *Trial* and *Castle*, there was a crucial difference: Kafka's stories were rooted in a timeless 'original ontology', the protagonists' fates reflecting the 'general tragedy of man in the world', whereas *Master Hannibal* indicted a specific regime, in which ideology falsified reality and debased human conduct, making everyone – even the teacher – co-responsible. The Hungarian film – and, by extension, Havel's own outlook – thus resisted Kafka's bleakness, because its estranging allegory reminded the viewer that, as he told a writers' conference in 1965, 'sooner or later everything good and positive asserts itself after all, as it is a historical necessity'.[47]

1968: Opposition and Resistance

Three years after those remarks, it seemed that something 'good and positive' was indeed asserting itself in Havel's country. With Alexander Dubček at the top of the Communist Party (KSČ) and censorship falling away, Czechoslovakia seemed to be moving towards institutions and practices better suited to its needs. But Havel, never a KSČ member, remained cautious, reluctant to trust one ruling organization to stay on the right path: 'Democracy is a matter not of faith, but of guarantees (*záruk*).'[48] This sentiment

dominated his first political essay, 'On the Theme of Opposition', published in April 1968, which systematically dismissed as inadequate all forms of check on the KSČ then being considered (such as by public opinion, media pressure or interest groups) short of competition for power with a new political party. The scope of competition Havel had in mind was limited by Western, especially Westminster, standards: there would be underlying consensus on a 'national programme' of a humane, socially just society, with the new party focusing on the 'spiritual starting point' and 'moral renewal' dimension. To bring the over-bureaucratized state down to a human scale, the new party would emphasize such values as conscience, compassion, trust, understanding and dignity.[49] The only other intellectual to offer so bold a vision of political pluralism in 1968 was Sviták, with whom Havel co-founded a Club of Engagé Non-Partisans (KAN).[50]

'On the Theme of Opposition' is drenched in Šafaříkian talk of guarantees and avouching, but also harkens back to Havel's father's efforts to provide the interwar republic with a stronger loyal opposition. In late 1932, V.M. Havel began to assemble around 40 associates (including Josef Ludvík Fischer) on the terraces of his Barrandov restaurant overlooking Prague.[51] They came together in dissatisfaction with the cartel of entrenched parties, which had generated widespread corruption and dangerous levels of disaffection.[52] As remedy, the Barrandov group proposed a 'quality' (*kvalitní*) democracy, in which the mainstream parties would be pushed to a new sense of responsibility (the word appeared in some form 12 times in their brief programme) under pressure from a new 'alliance of creative minds'.[53] The ideal of *quality* appeared frequently in the younger Havel's 1968 essay, especially as a verb (*kvalitňovat*, to raise to a higher quality), reflecting both Fischer's preference for qualitative over quantitative thinking, and the entrepreneurial mindset of the Barrandov group.

Just as the Barrandov group could not save interwar democracy from the Munich calamity of 1938, so 30 years later Havel's push to keep the KSČ on the reform path was no match for Soviet impatience. When the invasion began on 20 August 1968, Havel and his wife Olga were vacationing with an actor, Jan Tříska, in the northern town of Liberec. They joined the local civil resistance effort, for which Havel wrote fiery appeals that Tříska read over underground radio and television, directing the people to stymie occupying forces and prepare for a longer-run campaign of sabotage and clandestine communications.[54] The appeals displayed an instinct for conceiving of an operation that eschewed violence but sought to subvert illegitimate power by claiming moral superiority, a skill that would reappear with the formation of dissident groups such as Charter 77 in the 1970s and the revolutionary movement of 1989. The Liberec addresses were also conspicuously different from the defeatist radio speech his grandfather Hugo had given after Munich, a capitulation that Havel, like many in his father's National Democratic Party, felt could have been avoided.[55]

In the year that followed the invasion, Havel wrote three powerful essays on political leadership and responsibility.[56] Their immediate intent was to urge Dubček, who was allowed to remain KSČ first secretary until April 1969, to use his authority to defy Soviet pressure and preserve something of the reforms, or at least, in Šafaříkian terms, 'vouch (*ručit*) for his truth' by not renouncing what he had helped set in motion before the invasion.[57] The essays were also appeals to the people not to become passive, despondent or self-satisfied, dwelling on moments of past glory at the expense of present action.[58] Marrying his new political analysis to his earlier cultural critique, Havel was already warning that the abdication of courage by the country's leaders and intellectuals would have devastating social effects, resulting in at best a 'problematic calm' that postponed solution of festering conflicts and deepened moral decay.[59]

Redrawing the Mental Map for the Decades of Dissent

In April 1969 Dubček was replaced by Gustáv Husák, and Czechoslovakia slipped into exactly the 'problematic calm' that Havel anticipated. Blacklisted from publishing and the theatre, Havel retreated to a farmhouse at Hrádeček, 150 km east of Prague and an integral part of his 'existential *domov*'. It was largely there that, between 1972 and 1987, Havel produced five landmark analyses/indictments of the situation, which organized his thoughts on the nature of power and politics while refining the cultural critique he had developed in his youth. They were also Havel's contributions to the running debate on the nature and purpose of dissent in the Soviet bloc. To some, dissent was a fool's errand, or an opportunity to create independent, parallel institutions of 'civil society' (in effect, a shadow state) or the embryo of a mass movement; to Havel, the role of groups like Charter 77 was primarily documentary and diagnostic, saying what everyone knew but dared not utter. As he remarked when asked whether Czech dissidents should take the lead in organizing a charity to help East Germans camping in the West Germany embassy in Prague in 1989, 'The mission of the Charter is to observe the situation, give it a name, and then speak it out loud. But we do not have to cram ourselves into everything just to get publicity.'[60]

Havel's outlook of the early 1970s reflected the addition of ideas picked up from the American psychologist Erich Fromm (1900–80), who had lectured in Prague in 1966 and whose book *The Heart of Man* had been published in Czech translation in 1969. What had disturbed Havel in the years since the Soviet invasion was not the intimidating power of foreign armies so much as the ease with which many Czechs and Slovaks had convinced themselves of the need for 'order', 'normalization' and 'consolidation' rather than freedom (at the same time that many postcolonial states were also succumbing to strongmen). Fromm had studied this mindset in the context of fascism, from which he extrapolated a general type, the necrophile, 'a new type of man;

he can be described as the *organization man*, as the *automaton man*, and as *homo consumens*', a personality with an unhealthy attraction to mechanistic, quantified, bureaucratized order.[61] For the necrophile there exists a fundamental polarity, 'the powerful and the powerless', and the necrophile is attracted to the powerful because they can dominate, hurt and kill.[62] In contrast to this personality, Fromm advocated the biophile, thriving on life's natural uncertainty framed by love, security and justice.[63] Fromm also called for systemic change, 'from bureaucratic industrialism to humanist-socialist industrialism; from centralization to decentralization; from the organization man to a responsible and participating citizen; subordination of national sovereignties to the sovereignty of the human race and its chosen organs'.[64] The idea of the necrophile's flight from freedom informed Havel's 1971 play *The Conspirators*, in which five well-placed characters inadvertently undermine the democracy they helped bring about because, as Havel explained in his commentary – his first significant political essay after 1969 – none of the formulaic lines they deliver is 'existentially avouched (*zaručeny*)'.[65]

As Havel moved towards more organized dissident activity in the mid-1970s, he did so without the blessing of Šafařík, who believed that Havel should devote himself to his art (playwriting). While never losing the deep traces of *Seven Letters to Melin* and Šafařík's 1960s essays, Havel gravitated to other Czech philosophers. For the most part, they reinforced tendencies Havel had developed before 1968, but they supplied new terms and angles, as can be shown by teasing out the shifts in Havel's grand analyses from 1975 to 1978, and 1978 to 1984–87.

Consider the differences between Havel's open letter to KSČ First Secretary Husák, composed in spring 1975, and the long essay, 'Power of the Powerless', of October 1978. The former followed the line of a similar letter to Dubček in 1969, reminding the leader of his enormous moral responsibility. Havel advised Husák not to take comfort in the country's outward calm, as it was based on indifference, resignation, opportunism, surveillance and fear of the life chances valued in a modern society (access to university, meaningful work, promotion). Ideology and political events were surface formalities, masking the consumerist escapism that the regime quietly encouraged owing to its distracting, stabilizing effects. The language Havel used was vividly organic, likening the regime's impact to castration, impotence, ravishment, enfeeblement and anaesthesia, and the concomitant moral condition to ferment, pus, abscesses, carbon monoxide and lava. Staying in Frommian mode, an overall contrast was drawn between the deathward entropy of the mechanistic, homogenizing state and life's yearning for diversity, novelty, self-organization and 'the transcendent'.[66]

By the time of 'Power of the Powerless' three years later, Havel's focus had shifted from Husák and the plight of Czechoslovakia towards the condition of all 'post-totalitarian' states (the Soviet bloc after Stalin) and all developed countries, including Western democracies. The most striking difference

from the letter to Husák is the emphasis on ideology's autonomous effect, strapping even the seemingly most powerful officials into a straitjacket of expected, acceptable behaviours. Ideology acted as a code, through which everyone complies while retaining a semblance of self-respect. No one was absolved of co-responsibility for reproducing this system through seemingly trivial, token gestures of acquiescence. Oppression came not just from the Party and secret police, but from below, as decentred social norms – as Havel was depicting at the time in his trilogy of one-acts plays involving the character Vaněk.[67]

The change in tone and style can be attributed in part to the essay's origin in contact with Polish dissidents at a covert border gathering in August 1978, and its initial publication in a Polish *samizdat* journal.[68] Intended as the introduction to a symposium as well as a morale-booster for dissidents everywhere, it had to transcend the specifics of Havel's homeland. Another cause of the shift was Havel's sustained contact with the eminent phenomenologist, Jan Patočka (1907–77), through their involvement in Charter 77. The Charter had been drafted by Havel and a small, motley coalition of writers, philosophers and ex-Communists at the end of 1976, on the occasion of the entrance of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into effect in Czechoslovak law, both to push the regime to honour its commitment and to publicize its failure to do so. In the three months in which he served as a Charter spokesman before his death, Patočka produced two interpretations of its purpose, as a moral, non-political (or, at most, pre-political) undertaking, to which Havel subscribed for the next 12 years.[69] A seam of influence can also be traced back to Patočka's 1936 essay, 'The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem', which Havel read 'with feverish excitement' at age 16.[70] In addition to containing the idea of *domov* that Havel developed later in prison, that essay fortified the aversion to quantified, scientific reasoning unmoored from responsibility for the world it seeks to explain; the sense of a European civilizational crisis; and the idea of man alienated from nature and himself that the young Havel was simultaneously acquiring from Fischer, Šafařík and Sorokin.[71]

Patočka's influence, however, should not be exaggerated. It is not clear how many other works in the philosopher's enormous, difficult *oeuvre* Havel actually read; he may have relied more on conversation and seminars to glean the essentials.[72] Likewise, Havel read a few of Martin Heidegger's shorter works in 1977–78, in particular the *Spiegel* interview, but seems never to have tackled *Being and Time*.[73] The analytical tools of 'Power of the Powerless' can already be found in Havel's youthful writings, such as his borrowing from Shklovskii the idea of automatism and its disruption; one of the most famous moments in 'Power of the Powerless', the decoding of a greengrocer placing a sign saying 'Workers of the world, unite!' in his shop window, is a masterly application of the *ostranenie* technique. The reminder in 'Power of the Powerless' that the East is an uncanny convex mirror to the West's

civilizational crisis is simply the reversal of the perspective in his 1960 review of Friedrich Dürrenmatt's play, *The Visit of the Old Lady*, in which Havel warned that capitalism's baleful effect on the human personality had its equivalent in socialism.[74] The notion of co-responsibility for an oppressive regime was already in his 1958 review of *Master Hannibal* (see above). Finally, Havel's thoughts on 'post-totalitarianism' are similar to Sviták's observation in his 1966 essay on alienation, that elements of totalitarianism are present in all industrial societies, because they arise from 'mass society, mass production and consumption of industrial goods and . . . the permanent arms race'. Following German sociologist Hans Freyer, Sviták had warned of ever more sophisticated, diffuse manipulation seemingly in the general interest, against which any protest appears to the 'smiling and consuming robots as sheer quixotry'.[75]

An atmospheric change distinguished 'Power of the Powerless' from the last two major essays: 'Politics and Conscience' in 1984 and 'Storytelling and Totalitarianism' in 1987.[76] It stemmed from Havel's arduous 1351 days in prison (1979–83), during which the Cold War lurched from détente to renewed tension, and from the influence of the émigré philosopher Václav Bělohradský and of a set of Platonists and Catholics known as the Kampademy (which included Havel's brother, Ivan).[77] Bělohradský, a Patočka protégé also versed in Arendt, Foucault and Weber, provided a genealogy of impersonal power as discipline and technique, from which conscience had been stripped in the Western pursuit of morally neutral, bureaucratic rationality; the intention in the time of Machiavelli and the wars of religion had been to bring peace and plenty, but the result in the twentieth century was the Shoah and Gulag. Against this, Havel offered 'anti-political politics', in essence applied morality in the service of meaning and truth, from which the West stood to benefit no less than the East.[78]

From Bělohradský, the Kampademy, Charter 77's reports on the worsening ecological situation and the rise of West Germany's Greens, Havel developed an ever-stronger sensitivity to nature as part of industrial modernity's crisis. He also showed an ever-greater willingness to talk in terms of good, evil and 'diabolical temptation' – Havel had begun planning a Faust play while in prison, and there were traces of Solzhenitsyn, whose jeremiads were reminiscent of Sorokin's.[79] With regard to Soviet-type systems, Havel now spoke in terms of totalitarianism, jettisoning the 'post-totalitarian' terminology of 'Power of the Powerless', but the model was unchanged: the system operated not through terror so much as through a suspension of open-ended movement in time and space, making it impossible for a person to experience mysterious natural uncertainty and be a participant rather than a spectator.[80] This recourse to Šafaříkian language showed that Havel was making no radical departures from the line he had been developing for decades, with 'political (and economic) matters as phenomena secondary to cultural and moral questions',[81] but the form taken in the mid-1980s would

constitute his outlook for the rest of the Cold War and into his first years as president.

Havel on the Small Causes of Big Changes

Havel refused to see Czechoslovakia's history and location as grounds for either fatalistic submission to foreign armies or passive pining for foreign rescue, such as when Mikhail Gorbachev visited in 1987 and dashed hopes that he would force the conservative leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to reform or resign.[82] Two years later, Czechs similarly looked to Oslo for a Nobel Peace Prize for Havel in the belief it would precipitate regime change, only to see it go to the Dalai Lama; a relieved Havel remarked, 'People must not set their hopes so much on foreign interventions, they must understand that they have to do something themselves.'[83]

It is possible that Havel did not win the Peace Prize because in his belief that small nations should and could try to control their destinies, he never advocated first use of force but (like Fischer) was no pacifist either. It caused some consternation in the West when, after the placing of American Pershing II missiles in West Germany in 1983, Havel was ambivalent in his attitude to the resulting protest movements. Unlike some East European dissidents, who derided Western anti-nuclear activists as Moscow-funded dupes, Havel praised them for their idealism, especially the young who set aside careers to campaign for a cause. However, he saw no purpose in focusing narrowly on particular weapons; the only guarantee (*zárukou*) of peace would be a Europe no longer divided into camps, transformed into a community of friendly, sovereign states. That in turn would come about only if those states were internally democratic and respected the human rights of their residents.[84] Without absolving the West of doing its part, Havel clearly saw the East as needing to undergo the greater change.

To understand how Havel believed that big change could come about, we return to 1968, even before the Soviet-led invasion, as he reflected on how the 'Prague Spring' erupted in a society that only months before had been dourly inert. He began to make connections to seemingly inconsequential prior events, such as the fate three years earlier of the pioneering journal *Tvář*, on whose behalf he had battled with the censors. Even though it seemed he had failed – it had shut down at the end of 1965 – from the vantage point of April 1968 Havel concluded,

> Very often a small task successfully carried out can have far-reaching consequences, because it can serve as a model or catalyst for further action . . . The battle for [*Tvář*'s] survival seemed rather trivial to me, yet the very fact that such a battle was waged proved to have important ramifications. We demonstrated new ways of approaching problems of this sort, we held up a mirror to the customary ways of doing things,

> we influenced many people . . . For many intellectuals, the story of *Tvář* caused a severe inner trauma and catalyzed the development of a new awareness. Thus the struggle for relatively unimportant and 'nonpolitical' goals can, under certain circumstances, have a very great – and political – significance.[85]

Over the next two decades, Havel reiterated this theory of causation, at times focusing on the ripple effect of an individual's actions – sometimes openly political, such as the defiance that he urged Dubček to display in 1969 – but usually not, such as the unsettling insistence of the protagonist of 'Power of the Powerless', a master brewer, on doing his job well.[86] In other contexts, Havel assured disconsolate readers that Charter 77 (and lesser-known groups) were quietly effecting and articulating changes in society's collective subconscious, which eventually would find grand expression.[87] Using his keyword *ohnisko* (epicentre, focus, hotbed) for points from which momentous changes may originate, he explained in April 1986:

> It could be said that the Charter is a sort of small centre (*ohniskem*) of relative independence, a center (*ohniskem*) from which, of course, independence continually radiates well beyond its boundaries . . . The recent Polish developments are a classic example of this. For a long time it seemed that the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) and its activists could not in any way visibly budge the general social situation or influence it, and then suddenly, when there occurred another outbreak of societal dissatisfaction, the work of KOR was reevaluated virtually overnight in an entirely unexpected way. It is hard to imagine that the multimillion-strong Solidarity could have arisen without KOR's preparatory analytical and conceptual work.[88]

It was that conviction that compelled Havel to persist in the seemingly quixotic work of dissent, and positioned him in December 1989 to replace Gustáv Husák, 14 years after writing him an unanswered letter, as president of the republic.[89]

Notes

1. 'Zvláštnosti divadla', in Václav Havel, *Spisy 3: Eseje a jiné texty z let 1953–1969* (Prague, 1999), p. 820.
2. See the list of recommended further readings. Several excellent accounts have appeared in Czech: Daniel Kaiser, *Disident: Václav Havel 1936–1989* (Prague and Litomyšl, 2009) and *Prezident: Václav Havel 1990–2003* (Prague and Litomyšl, 2014); Jiří Suk, *Politika jako absurdní drama: Václav Havel v letech 1975–1989* (Prague and Litomyšl, 2013); and Martin C. Putna, *Václav Havel: Duchovní portrét v rámu české kultury 20. století* (Prague, 2011).

3. 'O Asanaci', in Václav Havel, *Spisy 4: Eseje a jiné texty z let 1970–1989. Dálkový výslech* (Prague, 1999), p. 1006, and 'Přemýšlení o Františkovi K.', *Spisy 4*, p. 997.
4. Prison letter 53 (1 November 1980), in Václav Havel, *Spisy 5: Dopisy Olze* (Prague, 1999), p. 189.
5. Václav Havel, *Letní přemítání* (Prague, 1991), pp. 18–21.
6. David S. Danaher, *Reading Václav Havel* (Toronto, 2015), pp. 118–19, 181–7. See also Aviezer Tucker, *The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel* (Pittsburgh, 2000), pp. 253–6.
7. 'Prague is and probably always will remain my true – mental or spiritual – home (*domovem*)', said Havel in April 1975 (Havel, *O lidskou identitu* (Prague, 1990), p. 248).
8. 'Odpovědnost jako osud', in Havel, *Spisy 4*, p. 416.
9. 'Hovězí porážka', in Havel, *Spisy 4*, pp. 447–8, and 'Testovací terén', p. 1126. On the long history of this motif in Czech writing, see Robert B. Pynsent, ' "The Heart of Europe": The Origins and Fate of a Czech Nationalist Cliché', *Central Europe* 11.1, 2013, pp. 1–23.
10. V.M. Havel, *Mé vzpomínky* (Prague, 1993); Putna, *Václav Havel*, pp. 27–65; Krystyna Wanatowicová, *Miloš Havel: Český filmový magnát* (Prague, 2013).
11. Havel, *Spisy 4*, p. 717.
12. Josef Ludvík Fischer, *Listy o druhých a o sobě* (Prague, 2005), pp. 128, 155, 608; David Addyman and Matthew Feldman, 'Samuel Beckett, Wilhelm Windelband, and the Interwar "Philosophy Notes" ', *Modernism/modernity* 18.4, 2011, pp. 755–70.
13. Josef Ludvík Fischer, *Výbor z díla I* (Prague, 2007), p. 155.
14. Pavel Kosatík, *'Ústně více': Šestatřicátníci* (Brno, 2006), p. 78.
15. Fischer, *Listy o druhých a o sobě*, p. 247.
16. Fischer, *Výbor z díla*, p. 411. See also his 1933 lecture, 'Řád kapitalistický a skladebný', in *Výbor z díla I*, pp. 679–86.
17. Fischer, *Výbor z díla*, p. 420.
18. Fischer, *Výbor z díla*, p. 699.
19. J.L. Fischer, *Krise demokracie* (Prague, 2005), p. 304.
20. Fischer, *Výbor z díla*, p. 669.
21. Václav Havel, 'Optimalismus a humanismus', in Martin C. Putna and Jan Hron (eds), *Rozhovory '36. Stříbrný vítr* (Prague, 2010), pp. 18–25.
22. Havel, *Spisy 4*, p. 717.
23. David Drozd, 'Dobové kontexty *Sedmi listů Melinovi* Josefa Šafaříka', *Estetika* 42.2–3, 2006, pp. 149–87 (149).
24. Kudrna, *Václav Havel*, pp. 123–8.
25. Josef Šafařík, *Sedm listů Melinovi* (Brno, 1993), pp. 190, 193, 230.
26. Šafařík, *Sedm listů Melinovi*, p. 175.
27. Šafařík, *Sedm listů Melinovi*, pp. 128–30, 154–65, 229–30. On Šafařík's debt to Nietzsche, see Drozd, 'Dobové kontexty *Sedmi listů*', p. 158.
28. Šafařík, *Sedm listů Melinovi*, pp. 124, 216–21.
29. On Havel's understanding of truth and conscience, see Danaher, *Reading Václav Havel*, pp. 96, 187–200.
30. Barbara Falk, *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe* (Budapest and New York, 2003), pp. 239–40.
31. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook* (New York, 1942). In Czech as *Krise našeho věku*, trans. František Dědek (Prague, 1948). Havel mentions Sorokin in one of his first essays, 'Hamletovská otázka', in *Spisy 3*, pp. 34–47 (44).

32. Lawrence T. Nichols, 'Sorokin as Lifelong Russian Intellectual: The Enactment of an Historically Rooted Sensibility', *The American Sociologist* 43.4, 2012, pp. 374–405 (397).
33. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*, p. 317.
34. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*, pp. 199, 225.
35. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*, pp. 186, 201.
36. Havel, 'Hamletovská otázka', p. 45. The Hegel collection was *Filosofie, umění a náboženství a jejich vztah k mravnosti a státu*, trans. František Fajfr (Prague, 1943). Danaher (*Reading Václav Havel*, p. 151) notes that Havel was still predicting a shift to a new age in such later essays as 'Thriller' (1984) and in some of his presidential addresses.
37. On the medievalism of Havel and other Czech thinkers in the 1970s and 1980s, see Tucker, *The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence*, pp. 65–6, 142–3.
38. Letter from Havel to Alfréd Radok, 4 August 1963, in the Archive of the Václav Havel Library, item 10848; Kosatík, *'Ústně více'*, p. 267.
39. Ivan Sviták, *Man and His World: A Marxian View*, trans. Jarmila Veltrusky (New York, 1970), pp. 5–57.
40. Sviták, *Man and His World*, p. 45.
41. Sviták, *Man and His World*, p. 131.
42. 'Spoonriverská antologie' (1957), in Havel, *Spisy 3*, pp. 187–8;'Anatomie gagu' (1963), *Spisy 3*, pp. 591–3; 'Komentář ke hře Spiklenci' (1972), in Havel, *Spisy 4*, pp. 25–6, 53. See also Danaher, *Reading Václav Havel*, p. 23.
43. Prison letter 52, from 27 October 1980, in Havel, *Spisy 5*, p. 184.
44. Viktor Shklovskii, *O teorii prozy* (Moscow, 1929), pp. 11–17. A Czech translation had been published in 1933 and reissued in 1948.
45. 'O Laterně magice', in Havel, *Spisy 3*, p. 264. See also his commentary on one of his first plays, *An Evening with the Family*, 'Poznámka ke hře Rodinný večer', in *Spisy 3*, p. 316.
46. Sviták, *Man and His World*, p. 120.
47. 'Projev na konferenci Svazu československých spisovatelů', in Havel, *Spisy 3*, p. 683.
48. 'Na téma opozice', in Havel, *Spisy 3*, p. 831.
49. 'Na téma opozice', pp. 838–40.
50. Ivan Sviták, *Kulatý čtverec: Dialektika demokratizace* (Prague, 1990).
51. V.M. Havel, *Mé vzpomínky*, p. 210.
52. On the First Republic's shortcomings, see Peter Bugge, 'Czech Democracy 1918–1938 – Paragon or Parody?', *Bohemia* 47.1, 2006–07, pp. 3–28, and Andrea Orzoff, *The Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914–1948* (Oxford, 2009).
53. V.M. Havel, *Mé vzpomínky*, p. 259.
54. Havel, *Spisy 3*, pp. 857–65.
55. Hugo Vavrečka's speech of 30 September 1938 can be heard on track 33 of the disc accompanying David Vaughan, *Battle for the Airwaves: Radio and the 1938 Munich Crisis* (Prague, 2008). For the National Democratic perspective of Munich, see Vlastimil Klíma, *1938: Měli jsme kapitulovat?* (Prague, 2012).
56. 'Falešné dilema', in Havel, *Spisy 3*, pp. 866–74; 'Český úděl?', in *Spisy 3*, pp. 888–96; and 'Dopis Alexandru Dubčekovi', in *Spisy 3*, pp. 911–29.
57. 'Dopis Alexandru Dubčekovi', p. 926.
58. This was the thrust of his polemical exchange in early 1969 with Milan Kundera; see Charles Sabatos, 'Criticism and Destiny: Kundera and Havel on the Legacy

of 1968', *Europe-Asia Studies* 60.10, 2008, pp. 1827–45, and Tim West, 'Destiny as Alibi: Milan Kundera, Václav Havel and the "Czech Question" after 1968', *Slavonic and East European Review* 87.3, 2009, pp. 401–28.

59. Jarmila Cysařová, ' "... stát tvrdošíjně na svém ...": Neznámý projev Václava Havla z listopadu 1968', *Soudobé dějiny* 8.1, 2001, pp. 166–82 (177). On calm (*klid*) in Havel's discourse, see Danaher, *Reading Václav Havel*, pp. 120, 179–81.
60. Irena Gerová, *Vyhrabávačky* (Prague and Litomyšl, 2009), p. 103.
61. Erich Fromm, *The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil* (New York, 1964), p. 57.
62. Fromm, *The Heart of Man*, p. 40.
63. Fromm, *The Heart of Man*, pp. 52–3.
64. Fromm, *The Heart of Man*, p. 94.
65. 'Komentář ke hře Spiklenci', in Havel, *Spisy 4*, pp. 8–60. In 1979, Havel was still praising Fromm's analysis in prison letter 76, in *Spisy 5*, p. 299.
66. 'Dopis Gustávu Husákovi', in Havel, *Spisy 4*, pp. 67–108. See also Falk, *Dilemmas of Dissidence*, pp. 210–15, and Delia Popescu, *Political Action in Václav Havel's Thought* (Lanham, 2012), pp. 40–55, 138–45.
67. 'Moc bezmocných', in Havel, *Spisy 4*, pp. 224–330; Danaher, *Reading Václav Havel*, pp. 33, 42; D. Christopher Brooks, 'The Art of the Political: Havel's Dramatic Literature as Political Theory', *East European Quarterly* 39.4, 2006, pp. 491–522.
68. Elzbieta Matynia, ed., *An Uncanny Era: Conversations between Václav Havel and Adam Michnik* (New Haven, 2014), pp. 4–11. See also Jonathan Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent* (Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. 220–5.
69. Jan Patočka, 'Čím je a čím není Charta 77' and 'Co můžeme očekávat od Charty 77', in Patočka, *Češi I* (Prague, 2006), pp. 428–30, 440–4.
70. 'Poslední rozhovor', in Havel *Spisy 4*, p. 171.
71. Jan Patočka, 'Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém', in *Fenomenologické spisy I. Přirozený svět. Texty z let 1931–1949* (Prague, 2008), pp. 127–261 (on *domov* at 194).
72. Putna, *Václav Havel*, pp. 150–3.
73. Havel had access to two works by Heidegger in 1965, both published in the journal *Tvář* (January and June issues, respectively): 'Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry', and excerpts from the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Heidegger is cited in Havel's July 1965 essay 'O umění (tak vůbec)', on the need for 'authenticity' in art (*Spisy 3*, pp. 685–7). In 1977–78, the underground publishing house Edice Expedice, of which Havel was a co-founder, issued translations of: 'What is Metaphysics?' (1929); 'On the Essence of Truth' (1930); 'The Thing' (a 1950 lecture); 'Poetically Man Dwells' (a 1951 lecture); 'Principles of Thinking' (a 1957 lecture); 'My Way to Phenomenology' (1963); 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' (1969); and the *Spiegel* interview of 1966 published ten years later. The first Czech translation of *Being and Time* (only paragraphs 1–57) was not undertaken until 1980, while Havel was in prison, where he received from his brother a translation of 'The Fieldpath' (1949) and the 1950 lecture, 'Language'. For competing views of Havel's Heideggerianism, see Tucker, *The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence*, pp. 133–84, and James F. Pontuso, *Václav Havel: Civic Responsibility in the Postmodern Age* (Lanham, 2004), pp. 20–49.
74. 'Etika a život', in Havel, *Spisy 3*, pp. 292–303. On the East–West comparison throughout Havel's work, see Danaher, *Reading Václav Havel*, pp. 138–73.
75. Sviták, *Man and His World*, pp. 138–41.

76. 'Politika a svědomí', in Havel, *Spisy 4*, pp. 418–45, and 'Příběh a totalita', in *Spisy 4*, pp. 931–59.
77. In summer 1983, Havel read Václav Bělohradský's 'Krize eschatologie neosobnosti', published in three instalments in the Rome-based *Studie* 66, 1979, pp. 448–73; 67, 1980, pp. 12–27; 68, 1980, pp. 122–44. The impact of Bělohradský (and its limits) are described in Suk, *Politika jako absurdní drama*, pp. 226–9. The Kampademy's history is told in Daniel Kroupa, *Dějiny Kampademie* (Prague, 2010), and Putna, *Václav Havel*, pp. 194–235. A prime example of Kampademic writing is Ivan M. Havel, Martin Palouš and Zdeněk Neubauer, *Svatojánský výlet* (Prague, 1999 [1984]).
78. Havel, 'Politika a svědomí', pp. 441–2; Dirk Mathias Dalberg, *Der 'Versuch, in der Wahrheit zu leben': Václav Havels Politikbegriff und politische Strategie in den Jahren 1969 bis 1989* (Stuttgart, 2014), pp. 109–16.
79. On Solzhenitsyn, see Tucker, *The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence*, pp. 147–8. On the German Greens, see 'Návštěva Milana Horáčka' (1986), in Havel, *Spisy 4*, pp. 609–11.
80. Havel, 'Příběh a totalita', p. 952.
81. Danaher, *Reading Václav Havel*, p. 40.
82. 'Setkání s Gorbačovem', in Havel, *Spisy 4*, p. 962.
83. Gerová, *Vyhrabávačky*, p. 100. See also Havel, 'Politika a svědomí', pp. 433–4.
84. 'Anatomie jedné zdrženlivosti', in Havel, *Spisy 4*, pp. 550–2.
85. A.J. Liehm, *The Politics of Culture* (New York, 1973), pp. 375–6.
86. Bolton, *Worlds of Dissent*, pp. 226–7.
87. 'O smyslu Charty 77' (July 1986), in Havel, *Spisy 4*, p. 680.
88. 'Odpověď' do ankety Harolda Gordona Skillinga', in Havel, *Spisy 4*, p. 648.
89. The author thanks David Danaher for his very helpful comments on this chapter.

10
Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl

Jonathan Wright

The two German leaders most obviously associated with détente and the end of the Cold War were Brandt (Foreign Minister 1966–69 and Chancellor 1969–74) and Kohl (Chancellor 1982–98), though Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Foreign Minister 1974–92) also played an important part. They were very different in their backgrounds and political loyalties. But each believed that Germany remained a single nation, though divided into two states, and each made a vital contribution to unification.

Brandt's career was the longest and most varied.[1] Born in 1913 as Herbert Frahm, an illegitimate child to a working-class mother in Lübeck, he found a second home in the Social Democratic Party (SPD). However, as the SPD seemed unable to resist the rise of Nazism, he joined a radical Socialist splinter group in 1931, the Socialist Workers' Party (SAP). When the Nazis took power two years later, he assumed the name Willy Brandt and went into exile in Norway. There he worked as a journalist and was impressed by the pragmatism and breadth of the Norwegian labour movement. He returned to Berlin for three months with forged papers in 1936 to report for the SAP on the chances of a resistance movement. His contacts there convinced him that there was no such chance. A year later he was sent as an observer to the Spanish civil war, and saw and deplored the internecine conflicts between the Communist and non-Communist left in Barcelona. He was deprived of German citizenship in 1938 but granted Norwegian citizenship in 1940 by the Norwegian government, by then itself in exile after the German occupation of Norway. Brandt escaped detection by disguising himself as a Norwegian soldier and then crossing the frontier on foot to Sweden. There he again worked as a journalist, this time on behalf of the Norwegian resistance. He was supported by Swedish socialist friends and became a central figure in a circle of left-wing exiles which included the future Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky. As in Norway, he was impressed by the moderation of the Swedish Social Democrats who formed a national coalition government to demonstrate Swedish unity in face of the German threat. His experience of the Scandinavian labour movement, following what he had seen of the left in Spain, helped to move him back from the left-wing splinter group into

the mainstream of Social Democracy. At the same time he admired the success of the Red Army and remained critical of the United States and Britain as capitalist and imperialist powers. He hoped for a post-war European federation supported by all the anti-Hitler allies. More realistically he accepted that Germany would lose territory, including at least East Prussia to Poland. In October 1944 Brandt's application to rejoin the SPD was approved by the party headquarters in exile in London. In September 1945 he was invited by the Norwegian labour movement to report on the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leadership. He returned to Germany from exile but in an RAF plane as an accredited war correspondent with a Norwegian passport and wearing a Norwegian uniform.

Still employed by the Norwegian government he came to Berlin as a press attaché in January 1947 but a year later he became the Berlin representative of the new organization of the SPD which had been set up in the western zones of Germany. This was a key decision. The western SPD had been founded by Kurt Schumacher in Hanover in 1946 in protest against the enforced union of the SPD in the Soviet zone with the Communist KPD to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Brandt was in fact critical of Schumacher, whom he found too extreme in his anti-Communist stance. Brandt still hoped for an agreement among the wartime allies – or at least a modus vivendi between them – which would allow German unity to be maintained and a united German labour movement to come into being. However, he had no sympathy with the methods used by the Soviet authorities to force through the SED. In his commitment to parliamentary democracy, he was at one with Schumacher. The onset of the Cold War with the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in March 1948, followed by the Berlin blockade, destroyed what remained of Brandt's hopes for a post-war world in which cooperation between the wartime allies would continue. He came under the influence of the charismatic mayor of the western zones of Berlin, Ernst Reuter. Reuter, unlike Schumacher, supported the policy of the Christian Democratic (CDU) leader in the western zones and first Chancellor of West Germany, Konrad Adenauer, of creating a West German state. In 1948 Brandt once again became a German citizen and in 1949 he was elected to the first Bundestag in Bonn as part of the delegation from West Berlin.

Although a member of the Bundestag, Brandt's main centre of activity in the 1950s was in West Berlin. Here he supported Reuter's policy against that of left-wing socialists. The SPD governed in coalition with the CDU. It automatically adopted the relevant legislation of the Bonn government – although that was under CDU leadership – to make clear its desire to be a full part of the German Federal Republic (FRG), even though formally Berlin came under the control of the wartime allies. Reuter and Brandt also distanced themselves from the aggressive opposition of the SPD leadership in Bonn against Adenauer's policy of integrating the FRG into the European

Community and NATO. When Reuter died in 1953, Brandt was already widely seen as his heir and in 1957 he was elected Mayor of West Berlin. In this position he was suddenly given international prominence by the Second Berlin Crisis. In November 1958 Khrushchev threatened to hand over control of the access routes to West Berlin to the East German (GDR) government unless the West agreed to its becoming a demilitarized free city within six months. This set off the train of events which led to the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. Brandt became, ironically in view of his left-wing past, the representative figure of West Berlin's resistance, a symbol of the free world in the Cold War. He was fêted internationally and chosen by the SPD to be its candidate for the Chancellorship in the 1961 West German elections. For the SPD Brandt represented a new generation of modern and pragmatic leaders with the glamour of John Kennedy, the newly elected President of the United States.

Yet his sudden elevation was rapidly followed by disillusionment. The building of the Berlin Wall 'threatened', he wrote later, 'a deep crisis of confidence' in the Western powers.[2] Their reaction was muted and one of relief rather than outrage. In effect the Western powers accepted that what the Soviet Union did – or allowed the East German government to do – in its own zone was its business, despite the fiction of four-power control of the whole city. If hardship resulted for East and West Berliners, that was a price that had to be paid. It was not worth the risk of war. The West German government under Chancellor Adenauer also sought to play down the crisis for fear that it would divide West Germany from its NATO partners. Brandt found himself at the sharp end between the anger and anxiety of the Berliners with whom he identified, and the Western powers and the West German government who turned a cold shoulder. His impotence in this crisis became a strong motive to find a new policy to soften the division of Europe, one which finally came to fruition in his hands as Ostpolitik. That policy also, however, drew on his long and troubled experience of different worlds. He understood different mentalities and he could see Germany with the perspective of an outsider. As a former anti-Nazi exile, he commanded respect in the Communist world.[3] His own experience with its many reverses had also taught him that there could be change in the international system. In a long career he had already crossed many boundaries, real and metaphorical, making him a natural exponent of détente.

Kohl's career was much less tumultuous.[4] He was born in 1930 to a modest Catholic family in the industrial town of Ludwigshafen in the Bavarian Palatinate in south-west Germany. His father had been a professional soldier but after the First World War became a tax official. Helmut Kohl was the youngest of his three children. He grew up and went to school in Ludwigshafen and the first 40 years of his life were closely connected with the city and the chemical works that dominated it. As soon as he was old enough, he threw his energies into a political career with the Christian

Democrats, becoming a full member when he turned 18 in 1948. He rose rapidly in the party's youth movement and then in the provincial party organization and in the parliamentary party of the newly created state (Land) of Rhineland-Palatinate. He represented a new generation with a liberal, modernizing image. It pushed aside the elderly leadership which had survived from the former Catholic Centre Party in the Weimar Republic, and then rose rapidly, filling the gaps left by the intermediate generation as a result of wartime casualties. In 1969, aged 39, he reached the first summit of his career becoming the Minister President of the Rhineland-Palatinate, governing hospitably from his spacious Chancellery in Mainz with its ample wine cellar. He was, however, already by then active in the federal party organization for West Germany as a whole, becoming a member of the party executive in 1964 and of its Presidium in 1969 before finally being elected chairman of the party in 1973, a position he held until 1998. In the 1976 Bundestag elections he was the CDU candidate for the Chancellorship. The CDU, together with its Bavarian sister party, Christian Social Union (CSU), won the highest percentage of the vote, but that was not enough to oust the existing coalition of the SPD with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). He then moved to Bonn, resigning as Minister-President in Mainz, and becoming chairman of the CDU parliamentary party in the Bundestag. He faced challenges to his leadership in that role, partly because he was seen as unequal to the then SPD Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, in debate. Kohl stood aside in the 1980 elections allowing his main rival on the right, the leader of the CSU Franz Josef Strauss, to run as Chancellor. After Strauss had been defeated, Kohl was re-elected chairman of the parliamentary party and in 1982 he finally became Chancellor as a result of a coalition switch by the FDP, a partnership he had long worked to recreate. With the FDP he went on to win elections in 1983, 1987, 1990 and 1994, making him by the time of his defeat and retirement in 1998 the longest-serving Chancellor since Bismarck.

Kohl was a dedicated and consummate politician, hugely ambitious and energetic, a vote-winner attuned to every electoral shift and skilled in the arts of political in-fighting. On the other hand he lacked charisma and the intellectual stature of some of his rivals. What was he in politics for, apart from power? He positioned himself on the progressive wing of his party, a consensual politician, liberal in educational and social policy but an opponent of forming a 'grand coalition' with the Social Democrats. In foreign policy he was a committed supporter of Adenauer's drive to integrate West Germany into Western Europe and NATO. He echoed the usual slogans about reunification or, in the coded form that became increasingly current, Germany's 'right to decide on its unity in free self-determination'.[5] But this did not prevent his adopting a flexible stance towards Brandt's Ostpolitik despite its recognition of the GDR as a separate state, although this policy provoked ferocious opposition from Strauss and the right wing of the

CDU–CSU alliance. In power after 1982 he continued on a centrist course in domestic politics but in defence and foreign policy he showed more independence and determination. Against the opposition of the SPD and massive popular demonstrations, he stuck to the NATO decision to deploy medium-range nuclear weapons in 1983 unless the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle theirs. He also embarked with the French president, François Mitterrand, on ambitious policies to further European integration, including the Single European Act in 1986 and preparatory steps towards European Monetary Union. Despite these achievements Kohl's reputation was still that of a second-rater and his leadership was still contested before the dramatic events of 1989–90. His occasional ham-handedness did not help: for instance the invitation to President Reagan to a ceremony of reconciliation in 1985 at a military cemetery which turned out to contain graves of soldiers from the Waffen-SS (the elite troops responsible for many war crimes), or worse his extraordinary comparison in 1986 of Gorbachev with Goebbels as both being expert in public relations. Had he been replaced by his party, as seemed quite possible, before the autumn of 1989, 'historians would have depicted him pretty much in unison as an exemplary party boss, but only a mediocre Chancellor'.[6]

Kohl did not foresee any more than anyone else the sudden turn of events in 1989–90 which led to German unification. Some choices were forced on him by the pace of change, notably the implosion of the GDR. Yet he also rose to the occasion, giving a clear lead where others hesitated. What enabled this essentially cautious politician who had frequently been criticized for ducking hard decisions to act boldly and, confounding his critics, seize the chance to become 'the Chancellor of German unity'?[7]

At least part of the answer lies in the mental map formed by his background and experience. He was 15 at the end of the war. Although buffered by a Catholic home, he had been exposed to Nazi values at school. He had been a member of the Jungvolk (the branch of the Hitler Youth for 10–14 year olds). He had experienced the mass bombing of Ludwigshafen and been part of a school fire-fighting team which was also required to dig out buried corpses after an air raid. His elder brother was killed in an air raid while returning to his unit. In February 1945 Kohl was sent to a camp near Berchtesgaden to help with what was expected to be the final battle for Hitler's alpine fortress. The day before the Third Reich capitulated he left and made his way back to Ludwigshafen, which he reached only after five weeks after being captured by the US military police and put to work on a farm. He later said of himself that he was one of those who experienced 'the mercy of a late birth', meaning that he was not personally responsible for the crimes of the Third Reich, but he had his own experience of it and of its collapse.

How did this affect him? The obvious answer is that he shared with the overwhelming majority of his generation a horror of war, a suspicion of nationalism and an aversion to authoritarian regimes of all kinds. The goal

of European union, and gratitude to the United States for the Marshall Plan and NATO, filled the gap left by the collapse of the world to which he had in part belonged during the Third Reich. But it has been suggested that at a deeper level something survived in him and his generation from that world – the idea of Germany, the concept exploited by the Nazis of 'the community of the nation', and the importance of national defence.[8] This may help to explain his instinctive identification in 1989–90 with the demand, particularly of many East Germans, for national unity, which some younger liberal and left elites found outdated.

His experiences since 1945 also guided him in how to shape that demand. National unity, in his view, should not come at the expense of European unity. Consistency in supporting Germany's integration into Europe was necessary to calm French and other European fears about German unification and also something he believed in. Coming from the Palatinate borderland, the goal of Franco–German reconciliation was as natural for him as it had been for Adenauer. Equally he understood that US support depended on a commitment from the FRG that it would remain within NATO. He was able to capitalize on the confidence he had earned in Washington, and particularly with President Bush, by the firmness he had shown over the deployment of medium-range missiles. There was also something about the nature of the crisis which suited his temperament. However complicated in practice, the choice was a simple one. Unification which had been proclaimed as a goal for 45 years was suddenly within reach. Doubts about whether it was desirable or practicable came mainly from intellectuals who had always looked down on Kohl.[9] He was not intimidated. He was at his best with what he believed to be right, including Germany's right to self-determination. At the same time, as a party tactician he sensed the danger that the SPD might become – especially with Willy Brandt as its honorary chairman – the party of unification. Some of the traditional strongholds of Social Democracy lay in East Germany. If unification was to become an electoral issue, Kohl was not going to allow others to take the credit. Lastly, the crisis played into his hands as Chancellor. His was the power to represent the FRG and to make decisions with much greater freedom than in the usual routine of everyday politics.

Genscher, although never as prominent as Brandt or Kohl, also exercised a significant influence on unification.[10] The FDP, which he led from 1974, was essential both to the formation and the break up of coalition governments, though as the minor party its leader could never become Chancellor. Genscher served as Minister of the Interior under Brandt, and Foreign Minister under Kohl, providing a link between them. He brought his own approach to the question of unification. He was the only one of the three to have been born in what later became East Germany, near Halle in Saxony in 1927. In 1943, aged 15, he was called up to serve in an anti-aircraft battery where he witnessed a mass bombing raid on Leipzig.

In January 1945 he was conscripted into the army and was fortunate to serve under General Wenck, who disobeyed Hitler's orders to liberate Berlin and surrendered to the Americans. Genscher became a prisoner of war first of the Americans and then the British. Saxony, however, belonged under a wartime agreement between the Allies to the Soviet Occupation Zone, and in July 1945 Western forces withdrew. German prisoners were given the option of going with them but Genscher chose to remain behind and returned home to his mother in Halle. He soon learned of the rough side of Soviet justice. An uncle in a nearby village had been part of a group which tried to protect German women from rape by Soviet soldiers. Some members of the group were shot in front of the villagers and his uncle was taken away and never returned. Genscher joined the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) as the party which appeared to be most opposed to authoritarian rule of any kind, but saw the way in which it was being manipulated by the ruling party, the Soviet-backed SED. He studied law at Halle and Leipzig universities, at that time still a subject taught in the same way as in West Germany, and qualified in October 1949, just days before the Soviet Occupation Zone became the German Democratic Republic. He started work in the district court of Halle, giving advice in civil and criminal cases, but became concerned at the increasing incidence of political trials. Disillusioned and conscious that he had come to the attention of the GDR authorities and might be arrested, he left for West Berlin in August 1952, and from there flew to West Germany where he resumed his legal career in Bremen.

This background is important for an understanding of his later political career. Genscher as Foreign Minister is often portrayed as a clever foil for Kohl's staunch pro-NATO and pro-USA stance. He is seen as supplying the understanding towards the Soviet Union and the diplomatic finesse which kept contacts open to the East as well as the West, thereby making unification possible. There is truth in this picture. Genscher was quicker than Kohl to see the potential in Gorbachev as a genuine reformer. But it is also important to recognize that Genscher had no illusions about the Soviet system. As Minister of the Interior under Brandt, he was careful to see that the wording of the Treaties Brandt signed did not infringe the commitment to German unification in the Basic Law. As Foreign Minister after 1974 he provided the West German impetus in the pan-European Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Helsinki agreements which resulted in 1975 kept open the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers (and therefore German unification) and included protection of human rights in its provisions. Again it was Genscher as Foreign Minister who led the FDP out of the coalition with the SPD in 1982, in part because the SPD weakened in its support for NATO's decision to deploy medium-range missiles. On this issue he saw eye to eye with Kohl. Genscher was also quicker than most to see the opportunity presented by the growing dissident movements

in Eastern Europe. He instinctively sympathized with them. He had after all been a dissident himself. But if they were to succeed, it was essential that Gorbachev and his supporters remained in control. If they were humiliated, there was the very real danger that they would be overthrown and Soviet policy reversed.[11] Genscher always thought of himself as a central European. As foreign minister of West Germany, he did his best to manage the international system so that central Europe could again be free as well as peaceful.

Each of these three political leaders shared common assumptions. They thought of Germany as one nation despite the different development of the political, social and economic systems in the FRG and the GDR. They had all known Germany before the division. Brandt identified with Berlin and Genscher with Halle. Kohl had less personal contact with the east – his *Heimat* was clearly the Rhineland-Palatinate. But his wife had been born in Berlin and grew up in Leipzig and together they paid lengthy visits to the GDR in 1976 and 1988. Each of the three also regarded the GDR as an artificially imposed state, backed ultimately by the Red Army. None of them believed it would survive free elections.

Yet each also knew that so long as the Cold War continued there was no chance of unification. The Soviet Union had no incentive to give up the GDR and allow it to join the FRG in NATO and the European Community. And there was never a serious prospect of a West German government leaving the Western alliance in the hope that it might make unification possible. The Soviet Union also showed by armed intervention in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 that it would not allow change to come about from within its bloc. Unification was therefore not possible. This situation also suited the Western powers. Although they paid lip service to the goal of a free and united Germany, in practice they were content with the division. In addition, support for unification in West Germany gradually declined. Though a substantial majority in the 1980s remained in favour, only a small minority thought it more than a long-term prospect.[12]

Each of these three leaders also left open what form a new German state might take. None wanted a return to the nation-state which had wreaked havoc in Europe in recent memory. Each was committed to European integration, a continued transfer of sovereignty from its West European member states to the European Community. This was seen as good in itself, a safeguard against a revival of nationalism and a guarantee of peace. Paradoxically, it would also make it easier for others to accept the FRG as a full partner and at least to acquiesce in its aim to achieve 'unity in freedom'.[13] That aim was left vague – Brandt defining it negatively as not a return to the Bismarck Reich, and all three emphasizing that the division of Germany could be overcome only along with the division of Cold War Europe.[14] The goal of German foreign policy was described in a rather

complicated, if logical, way as to achieve a European peace order in which the German people could decide on the form of their own unity in freedom.

The goals of peace, freedom, European integration and national unity in whatever form were widely shared by the West German public and hardly controversial. Much more difficult and divisive was the question of which policies should be followed to achieve those goals in particular contexts. Brandt, as we have seen, was disillusioned by the acquiescence of the Western allies in the building of the Berlin Wall. For him this exemplified the failure of the policy of 'reunification through strength' which Adenauer had proclaimed in the 1950s. The nuclear stalemate between the two blocs made that policy defunct. In practice, both superpowers moved to a policy of managing the threat of nuclear war by recognizing their respective spheres of interest in Europe. That meant that Germany too had to accept its territorial division. From that harsh lesson Brandt and his team in Berlin developed the idea that it might be possible to soften the division gradually by first recognizing it. What the GDR wanted was recognition as a sovereign state which the West German government and the NATO alliance had until that point denied it. Ostpolitik aimed to link a degree of recognition of the GDR to agreements to increase contacts across the border. This was initially a policy with very limited humanitarian aims – its first success was an agreement to allow West Berliners to visit their relatives in East Berlin in the Christmas holiday of 1963. But the idea of 'change through drawing closer', a phrase coined by Brandt's press secretary, Egon Bahr, in 1963, was open-ended.[15]

With Brandt as its candidate for the Chancellorship, the SPD improved its share of the vote in both the 1961 and 1965 elections but in neither case sufficiently to form the government. But in November 1966 the FDP withdrew its support from the government of Chancellor Erhard opening the way for a 'grand' coalition of the CDU with the SPD. Brandt became Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor under the CDU Chancellor Kiesinger. Brandt had not wanted the grand coalition and accepted it only for lack of a viable alternative. It required courage to join a government with a party, some of whose representatives, including Adenauer, had used Brandt's illegitimate birth and wartime exile against him in the election campaigns.[16] But he could understand the significance of the SPD occupying the Foreign Ministry for the first time since the 1920s, even if it required serving under a Chancellor who had been a member of the Nazi party and worked for a propaganda section of the Foreign Ministry in the war.[17] And he could now start to put the ideas developed in Berlin to the test on a larger stage.

As Foreign Minister, Brandt explained his policy as one to serve the absolute priority of peace.[18] Ostpolitik, he wrote, had a threefold aim: 'improved relations with the Soviet Union, normal relations with the Eastern European states, and a *modus vivendi* between the two parts of Germany'.[19] The distinctions are important. The FRG had already established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955 under Adenauer but refused to recognize the

other Warsaw Pact states on the principle that it would not recognize any state (except the Soviet Union) which recognized the GDR. That was now relaxed except towards the GDR itself because the FRG could not recognize that 'the other part of Germany is a foreign country'.[20] The main diplomatic instrument to further these ends was a proposal for mutual renunciation of force with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a proposal first made under the previous government and now extended to include the GDR. The intention was to show that the FRG's policy was purely peaceful and not, as it was regularly accused of being by the Soviet bloc, one of revenge and aggression. Ruling out the use of force was a way of tacitly accepting the post-war frontiers in Europe while holding open the theoretical possibility that they might be changed by agreement. The government also proposed practical measures to the East German authorities to improve contacts between the two Germanies: in easing travel restrictions especially for families divided by the frontier, in expanding trade links and improved road, rail and telephone communications, and in culture, education and sport. The reaction of the Soviet Union and its East European allies was disappointing. They closed ranks behind the GDR and insisted on specific and formal recognition of frontiers and of the GDR, accusing the FRG of covert militarism and neo-Nazism. On a visit to East Berlin, the Soviet leader Brezhnev said that the FRG 'had hidden a great stone in its outstretched hand'.[21] The policy of 'change through drawing closer' appeared to be having the opposite effect of that intended. Brandt allowed himself some gentle irony at the expense of Communists who believed they could 'perpetuate a status quo of division ... in a way that is both undialectical and contrary to history'.[22] But when, in August 1968, the Warsaw Pact states intervened to crush the reform movement in Czechoslovakia and accused the FRG of fomenting trouble there, the future of détente looked precarious. But, as Brandt had written before the crisis, improving relations with the Soviet Union required 'a great deal of patience', adding, 'big advances cannot be achieved swiftly'.[23]

Brandt's leadership was soon in evidence. He remained committed to détente, arguing that there was no realistic alternative. In the next elections, in 1969, the SPD again increased its vote, making it possible to form a coalition with the FDP. Brandt was strongly in favour of this switch, although the new government had only a narrow majority in the Bundestag. The FDP leadership shared the foreign policy views of the SPD, whereas the CDU/CSU had become increasingly critical of them. Brandt in turn had grown increasingly weary of the compromises necessary to keep the grand coalition in being. In his first government statement to the Bundestag as the new Chancellor, Brandt reaffirmed his commitment to building 'a European peace order' and also to preserving national unity. But he broke new ground by referring to the GDR by name and also by not mentioning the word 'reunification'. Rather, he argued, 'Twenty years after the foundation of the Federal Republic and the GDR we must prevent the German nation growing further

apart and try to come together via an orderly process of living side by side.' This was a typically Brandt formulation, vague, suggestive and exploratory but also more realistic at the time than the stale rhetoric of reunification. By breaking the taboo on accepting that 'two states exist in Germany' he was able to be more convincing that 'they are not foreign countries to each other'.[24]

Ostpolitik still faced formidable difficulties. It had to overcome the opposition of the Soviet Union and its allies to accepting anything less than full recognition of frontiers and of the GDR. It also had to overcome domestic opposition to giving binding guarantees which could be held to be unconstitutional – in conflict with the Basic Law's requirement to work for German unity. And it had to calm fears among its NATO allies that it might be weakened in its commitment to the West. Given that the coalition had a majority on paper of only 12 and one which was immediately eroded by defections from the FDP, this was a bold policy.

It was astonishingly successful. Over the next four years treaties were concluded with the Soviet Union and Poland, the status of West Berlin was regulated in an agreement of the four occupying powers and a treaty was concluded with the GDR.[25] The crucial breakthrough came in negotiations with the Soviet Union.[26] The West German delegation agreed to declare existing frontiers in Europe 'inviolable', including specifically the Oder–Neisse line as Poland's western frontier, and the frontier between the GDR and the FRG. However, they argued that they could not go further towards full recognition since the wartime Allies retained responsibility for Germany as a whole, dating from the Potsdam agreement of 1945. This was an elegant way of retaining the right of a prospective future all-German government to give formal recognition of the frontiers and thus also a way of satisfying objections to the treaty as inconsistent with the Basic Law. The last point was specifically addressed in a letter, accepted by the Soviet Government, declaring that the treaty was not in conflict with the 'political objective' of national unity. Similarly in relation to the GDR, the distinction was maintained between recognizing the GDR as a state and full recognition in international law. This was in formal terms mere sophistry, meaning only that the two states exchanged 'permanent representatives' rather than ambassadors. However, politically it was important as a way of asserting the West German view that both states continued to belong to one nation and therefore that the relations between them were of a special kind.

The success of Ostpolitik had many causes. The Soviet Union had its own reasons for wanting détente. At a time when the Sino–Soviet dispute had erupted into border clashes, a reduction of tension in Europe was desirable. Having already re-enforced its hold on Eastern Europe by the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it could also allow an increase of contacts between Eastern Europe and the FRG without fear for the cohesion of its bloc. The willingness of the West German government to go a long way

towards recognition of the post-war settlement in Europe was in itself a significant gain. It also opened the way to potential economic benefits in trade and imported technology. And the very weakness of the Brandt government suggested that this was a chance which might not recur.

Nevertheless, Brandt's personal authority made a critical difference. Brezhnev, among others, acknowledged his anti-Nazi past, and the propaganda against West Germany as a threat to peace, which had been the staple diet of the Warsaw Pact, faded. Brandt's inspired gesture in kneeling in December 1970 at the memorial to the victims of the Warsaw ghetto uprising of 1942 showed an instinctive grasp of what was required for reconciliation and one which was worth many words.[27] And his willingness to search for an agreement to ease contacts with the GDR was popular with East Germans. On a visit to Erfurt in March 1970 to discuss proposals with the East German premier, the warmth of his reception from a crowd at the station and outside his hotel was embarrassing to his hosts and Brandt himself gestured for restraint for fear that otherwise those involved might face reprisals. Brandt was moved. Unlike during his undercover stay in Berlin in 1936 when he had felt himself 'an enemy in his own country', this time he sensed 'a people with him'.[28] His popularity with East Germans long outlasted his Chancellorship, which came to an end prematurely in 1974 when an East German spy was uncovered on his personal staff.

Brandt was equally effective in managing opinion at home. The opposition parties, the CDU/CSU, found themselves out of power for the first time since 1949 although they had won the highest share of the vote. Naturally they resented this turn of events and sought every opportunity to attack the government. Brandt, however, was not deterred. Patriotism, he argued, required recognition of reality, not the encouragement of false hopes. He pressed the opposition to make clear what they would do differently and what they understood by national unity.[29] This strategy succeeded in bringing the divisions among them into the open. Having attempted and failed by a margin of two votes to bring the Brandt government down in April 1972, they finally sought to cover their differences by abstaining, to allow the treaties negotiated with the Soviet Union and Poland to pass. And in the 1972 elections, which were called to resolve the near impasse in the Bundestag, the SPD for the first time won the largest share of the vote and the Brandt government was returned with a majority of 46, thus ensuring the passage of the treaty with the GDR. The last hurdle, an appeal to the constitutional court by the Bavarian state, was overcome when the court ruled in 1973 that the treaty with the GDR was not in conflict with the Basic Law.

The situation in 1989–90 was very different from that faced by Brandt twenty years before. Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union and his encouragement to the East European ruling parties to follow them left the GDR leadership increasingly isolated. It lacked the strength to embark on economic reforms having allowed its foreign debt to grow since the 1970s

to a point where it would require a drop in living standards of at least 25 per cent simply to stabilize it.[30] It also lacked the strength to embark on political reforms, especially as – unlike other East European countries – it could not fall back on national unity as the basis of the state.[31] That left repression as its only means of survival and, without Soviet support, the regime proved ultimately unable to frighten or bludgeon the opposition into submission. In a critical turning point on 9 October in Leipzig, where the Monday night demonstrations had become a focus for opposition, some 70,000 to 80,000 demonstrators faced police and militia apparently preparing for a showdown. Violence was averted only by a plea for dialogue from local dignitaries and party officials and the peaceful behaviour of the demonstrators.[32] On 18 October the 77-year-old party and state leader, Erich Honecker, was forced to resign and on 9 November, in a bungled decision, the frontiers were suddenly opened and the Berlin Wall started to be dismantled.[33]

By the autumn of 1989 it was clear that the GDR was in crisis but no one expected German unification within a year. Unlike Brandt who as Foreign Minister and Chancellor had devised a strategy to maintain a sense of German nationhood in the long term, Kohl had to find a way of keeping up with events which threatened to run out of control. This was nowhere more obvious than in the rate of East Germans leaving for West Germany: 344,000 in 1989, 225,000 between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of January 1990.[34] Yet, when the Wall fell the West German government still had no plan for unification. The very idea aroused deep fears not only in the Soviet Union and Poland but also in Western Europe. It might destabilize Gorbachev. Unification would also be an immense challenge to the West German economy and perhaps even to its social and political stability. Yet rapid decisions were required. Kohl found himself with the responsibility of leadership in a situation which was no longer stable.

He wrote later that ‘On many days it was almost like a dream, so much happened so rapidly that many could hardly take it in any more – I was no exception.’[35] Nevertheless he had an instinctive grasp of the situation and also showed what his biographer calls an ‘astonishing agility’ as it developed.[36] In October and early November he demanded that the GDR undertake political and economic reform, in return for which West Germany would be prepared to offer financial support. At the same time he insisted to Gorbachev that he had no interest in destabilizing the GDR and that the failure to reform there was the cause of instability: ‘Our interest is rather that the GDR follows the Gorbachev course and that its people stay there.’[37] There is no reason to doubt his sincerity at that time in believing that a reformed GDR could be viable, but that soon changed. Speculation about the future intensified with the opening of the frontier on 9 November. On 17 November the new premier in the GDR, Hans Modrow, suggested that the two states should form a ‘community governed by treaty’. On 20 November the

demonstrators in Leipzig who had previously confronted the state authorities with the cry 'We are the people', now chanted, 'We are one people.' Kohl was persuaded by his advisers that to keep control of the political agenda, he had to take a dramatic step. In a speech to the Bundestag on 28 November he outlined a ten-point programme which held out the prospect of increasing contacts with a reformed East Germany to the point where, with a democratically elected government in East Germany, they could form a 'confederation' with the goal of a 'federation'. He went on: 'No one knows today what the final form of a reunited Germany will look like. But I am sure that unity will come if that is what the people of Germany want.'[38]

Kohl did not inform his cabinet, Foreign Minister Genscher or his coalition partners in advance of the speech. Nor did he inform Gorbachev or West European governments. The only exception was President Bush to whom he sent a message, including the gist of the speech, to arrive in Washington as he was speaking.[39] Giving the speech was his decision taken only with the advice of his own immediate circle. At the time he thought that unification would take five to ten years.[40] But, having set the goal, he did nothing to slow the process. Rather at each stage he acted to accelerate it. His motives were a mixture of excitement and calculation.[41] He was rapidly convinced that the GDR was no longer viable. On a visit to Dresden on 19 December, which he later described as his 'key experience', he saw the welcoming crowds and said to a colleague, 'It's all over.'[42] During the visit he addressed a crowd of a hundred thousand and was so moved by their enthusiasm that he had difficulty in finishing the speech.[43] For a politician who was not used to this kind of reception, it was a heady experience. On the practical side, he had to find an answer to the continuing migration of East Germans to the West, some 50,000 in January 1990 alone. And there were also electoral calculations to be made. The East German government, under pressure from the opposition parties, agreed to hold early elections in March and elections were also due in West Germany in December. The Social Democratic Party was refounded in East Germany and Brandt lent his prestige to the cause of German unity there.[44] But the SPD's candidate for the Chancellorship, Oskar Lafontaine, was critical of what he saw as Kohl's outmoded nationalism and warned against the economic consequences of unification.[45] There was also evidence that the rate of migration from East Germany was causing concern among West German voters.

Kohl again decided to up the ante. He adopted proposals of his Finance Minister to offer East Germany an economic and currency union. This was seen, despite the risks, as the only way to prevent the collapse of the East German economy and check the migration of East Germans to the West.[46] Optimistically, Kohl drew a parallel with the success of Ludwig Erhard's currency reform in the western zones of Germany in 1948.[47] The offer of the Deutschmark also gave Kohl a perfect springboard for the East German elections. He took a prominent part in the campaign on behalf of the East

CDU and its allies with astonishing success. Despite the initial advantage of the SPD, which had a long and proud history in the industrial areas of East Germany before the Third Reich, and despite the lack of a natural class base for the CDU after 45 years of Communist rule, the CDU and its allies won 48 per cent of the vote compared to the SPD's 22 per cent. So far as German domestic politics were concerned Kohl now had an unassailable position as the Chancellor who could successfully unite Germany, whereas the divided SPD was forced on to the defensive. On 1 July East and West Germany formed an economic, currency and social union and on 31 August the two governments signed a treaty for the GDR to join the FRG under Article 23 of the Basic Law on 3 October.

German domestic politics were, however, only part of the story. Kohl had the crucial support of President Bush on condition that Germany, once united, remained a member of NATO.[48] This was also what Kohl wanted, but it was far from clear that it would be acceptable to Gorbachev. For this reason Kohl deliberately omitted any mention of alliances from his ten-point plan.[49] In Western Europe, President Mitterrand was initially unsettled at the speed with which the process of unification developed, and Prime Minister Thatcher was determined to stop it. Gorbachev, Mitterrand and Thatcher were all angry at the ten-point plan and Kohl's failure to inform, let alone consult, them in advance. They exchanged confidences. Mitterrand spoke of the danger that Europe would return to the situation of 1913; Gorbachev likened Kohl to a bull in a china shop and warned that if unification occurred he would be overthrown by the military; Thatcher, who had already told Gorbachev in September to disregard NATO statements in favour of reunification, kept maps in her handbag showing the expansion of Germany during the Second World War and attacked Kohl directly at a European Union summit in December 1989 for refusing a communiqué which guaranteed existing frontiers.[50] Kohl was not deterred and no one was able to stop him. The rapid collapse of the GDR, which he had not planned but had done nothing to prevent, made him the master of the situation. No one had a realistic alternative to German unification.

At the same time, Kohl moved adroitly to pacify the opposition. He remained committed to European integration and agreed the preparatory steps towards European monetary union for which Mitterrand was pressing.[51] Kohl also agreed to meet most of Gorbachev's increasingly urgent appeals for various kinds of financial assistance, in total something of the order of 55 billion marks.[52] Gorbachev made the crucial concession that the united Germany would be free to choose its alliance, meaning in practice NATO. The only limitation, which the Soviet side succeeded in imposing, was that until Soviet troops (some 350,000 of them) withdrew from the former East Germany in four years' time, no NATO troops or nuclear weapons – and after that only German NATO troops – would be deployed there. This was the breakthrough enabling a treaty to be signed between the

two German states and the four occupying powers on 12 September 1990, under which Germany recovered its sovereignty on 3 October. In the first all-German elections to the Bundestag in December, Kohl's government was re-elected with a large majority.

Kohl saw his success as having been to exploit 'a unique historical opportunity' to achieve German unification.[53] He was referring to the military coup against Gorbachev in August 1991. In many ways he was right. Without Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union, his refusal to use force in Eastern Europe and his adaptability to the revolutionary changes which followed, Kohl's opportunity would not have existed. Equally without the courage of the East German reform movements and the groundswell of support for unification there, the East German government would not have been undermined. Further, Kohl enjoyed the consistent support of his most important ally, the United States, in the person of President Bush. And the strength of the German economy gave Kohl the confidence to respond to the challenges unification presented.[54] As he said to Bush in November 1989, 'History has given us good cards; my desire now is to play them skilfully.'[55]

Kohl certainly acted decisively. As he later wrote, 'I knew what I wanted.'[56] Once he sensed that the GDR was finished, he moved rapidly to bring it down. In doing this he took great risks, including the costs of unification, which were far larger than anticipated and for which the German (and European) economies had to pay in higher interest rates.[57] He also took the risk that Gorbachev would be overthrown, although that risk could equally be seen as an argument for acting swiftly. Having decided to act, he had a disarming habit of assuming that all the associated problems – the costs of currency union or the question of Germany's NATO membership – could be solved.[58] This was part of his mental map, the belief that he was doing the right thing and that the problems that resulted would be overcome, even when he did not have an immediate solution for them. He also believed that he could communicate with foreign leaders on a personal level. As a German who had experienced the horrors of war as a teenager, he was anxious to share his experience with others. One example was the joint ceremony in 1984 with President Mitterrand at the ossuary in Verdun, the scene of one of the most protracted battles of the First World War which cost the lives of some 230,000 soldiers. Mitterrand in a spontaneous gesture took his hand. How far this emotional, even sentimental, appeal was effective is hard to assess. It certainly did not work with Thatcher. But it may have helped to establish a rapport with Gorbachev who was almost the same age and who had experienced the German invasion and occupation. Certainly Kohl believed that it had.[59] He may have overestimated his ability to convince others but equally he was often underestimated. As Mitterrand's special adviser, Jacques Attali, put it in retrospect, perhaps with a degree of poetic licence, 'Nothing is more romantic than this superb disdain of the ephemeral masters of the world towards the one whom they took right to

the end to be a naive and provincial politician, but who in the final analysis outsmarted them all.'[60]

Given Kohl's dominance, Genscher's role in the unification process was inevitably a lesser or at least a less obvious one. As Foreign Minister he loyally supported most of Kohl's decisions, even when, as in the ten-point plan, he had not been consulted. He used his contacts abroad to explain and defend West German policy with skill and moderation. This was important because having been Foreign Minister since 1974 he had established a reputation for building consensus. He was particularly sensitive to Soviet security interests and promoted the idea of a pan-European security system building on the Helsinki agreements of 1975 in which he had been closely involved.[61] He had always believed in the importance of a process of negotiations as a way of overcoming the divisions of the Cold War. His vision of an alternative form of security to that of the two blocs was helpful to Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze, as they faced the prospect of a united Germany in NATO and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Genscher, as Foreign Minister, also managed the detailed and complex negotiations which led to the treaty between the two German states and the four occupying powers. These threatened to come unstuck even at the last moment on the question of whether non-German NATO troops could be involved in manoeuvres on former East German territory. This was resolved by Genscher's intervention and a Delphic protocol saying that the question would be decided by the future German government 'in a reasonable and responsible way'.[62]

On two issues Genscher had a more direct influence. The most important was in the negotiation of the INF treaty, signed in December 1987, eliminating Soviet and US nuclear weapons of intermediate range. Genscher, who had met the new Soviet leadership in 1986 and urged the West to 'take Gorbachev seriously', was determined to see the negotiations succeed. They represented the successful culmination of the policy which he and Kohl had come together to defend in 1982, namely deploying medium-range missiles to persuade the Soviet Union to joint disarmament. However, Strauss put pressure on Kohl to resist the inclusion of the West German Pershing IA missiles in the agreement. Genscher threatened to resign and Kohl gave way.[63] Genscher also succeeded in getting a decision on the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons systems postponed until 1992, by which time they were redundant.

The other issue was recognition of the Polish frontier. Kohl wanted to avoid going further than the formula used in the Ostpolitik, namely that the frontier was 'inviolable' and that full recognition by a German government could happen only after unification. That was not enough to satisfy the Polish government, which demanded recognition of the frontier in international law in advance. Kohl obstinately refused despite pressure from Mitterrand, Gorbachev, Thatcher and even Bush. His real motive was electoral, fear that the CDU would lose the support of the Germans expelled

from the Eastern provinces of Prussia at the end of the war, which had then been occupied by Poland.[64] Genscher took a different position. In a speech to the United Nations in September 1989, he had already declared that Poland's 'right to live in secure frontiers would not be called into question by us Germans either now or in the future by territorial claims'. Again in March 1990 when Kohl agreed to a joint resolution of the West and East German parliaments to resolve the issue, but wanted to link it to a Polish renunciation of reparations and guarantees for the remaining German minority in Poland, Genscher distanced himself from imposing any conditions. Kohl again gave way and the resolution was adopted on 21 June.[65] On 14 November, Genscher, now as the Foreign Minister of a united Germany, signed the long-awaited treaty with Poland confirming the frontier.

Genscher occasionally stepped into the limelight as when, at the end of September 1989, he went to Prague to assure East Germans who had taken up residence in the West German embassy that they could trust an agreement which had been reached for them to travel to the West in a sealed train through the GDR.[66] But his main influence was exerted behind the scenes. This suited his position as Foreign Minister to an increasingly dominant Chancellor, and as the leader of a minority party in the coalition. It also suited his mental map as one who was more inclined to feel his way towards resolving conflict by agreement than taking a strong stand. That also reflected an attitude common to his generation of German foreign policy makers, that they should act as Germans under constraint – sometimes called 'self-containment'. As he wrote in his memoirs, Germans could lead opinion in multilateral negotiations like the Helsinki conference but they should not aspire to a 'leadership role'. He went on, 'History throws shadows over our actions; these shadows are long, and they will remain. The more we are conscious of this, the better it will be for Europe and for ourselves.'[67]

Notes

1. This summary of Brandt's career is taken from the meticulous biography by Peter Merseburger, *Willy Brandt 1913–1992. Visionär und Realist* (Stuttgart, 2002).
2. Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 2003), p. 58.
3. Archie Brown, *The Myth of the Strong Leader. Political Leadership in the Modern Age* (London, 2014), pp. 134–5. See also Vladislav Zubok's chapter in this volume, pp. 16–17.
4. The best and most comprehensive biography is by Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie* (Munich, 2012).
5. This language echoed the wording of the preamble of the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of 1949, which was intended to serve in place of a Constitution until Germany regained its unity.
6. Schwarz, *Kohl*, p. 491. It has been suggested that he adopted the rhetoric of unification in the autumn of 1989 partly as a way of uniting his party when he and the party were both at a low ebb. Karl-Rudolf-Korte, *Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft. Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989* (Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 463–6.

7. CDU slogan for the first Bundestag elections after unification in December 1990.
8. Schwarz, *Kohl*, p. 41.
9. For example a diary entry for 5 June 1990 by Günter Grass reads, 'At night I often toss and turn, haunted by images of a Germany that can no longer be mine. This Kohlian abomination: egomaniacal, bombastic, jovial, tough, condescending, domineering, feigning harmlessness.' Günter Grass, *From Germany to Germany. Diary 1990* (Eng. edn, London, 2012), p. 99.
10. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 1995) contains much of interest. See also Hans-Dieter Heumann, *Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Die Biographie* (Paderborn, 2000), and on his role in the unification process, Gerhard A. Ritter, *Hans-Dietrich Genscher, das Auswärtige Amt und die deutsche Vereinigung* (Munich, 2013).
11. He said repeatedly to his officials, 'It is not at all stupid to imagine what might happen.' Heumann, *Genscher*, p. 271.
12. Manuela Glaab, *Deutschlandpolitik in der öffentlichen Meinung* (Opladen, 1999), pp. 129–46.
13. Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name. Germany and the Divided Continent* (London, 1993).
14. For instance, Brandt's declaration on the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Reich on 18 January 1871; *Bundeskanzler Brandt. Reden und Interviews* (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1971), pp. 387–8.
15. Egon Bahr, *Zu meiner Zeit* (Munich, 1998), pp. 152–61.
16. Merseburger, *Brandt*, pp. 408–10, 478–9.
17. Philip Gassert, *Kurt Georg Kiesinger 1904–1988. Kanzler zwischen den Zeiten* (Munich, 2006), pp. 105–60.
18. Willy Brandt, *A Peace Policy for Europe* (Eng. edn, London, 1969).
19. Ibid., p. 115.
20. Ibid., p. 129.
21. Ibid., p. 101.
22. Ibid., p. 130.
23. Ibid., pp. 97, 103.
24. Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestags, Stenographische Berichte, 28 October 1969.
25. The texts of the treaties and supplementary documents are printed in Karl E. Birnbaum, *East & West Germany: A Modus Vivendi* (Farnborough, 1973).
26. Julia von Dannenberg, *The Foundations of Ostpolitik. The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR* (Oxford, 2008).
27. This took time, however. The immediate reaction in both Germany and Poland was divided. Friedrich Kießling, 'Täter repräsentieren: Willy Brandts Kniefall in Warschau', in Johannes Paulmann (ed.), *Auswärtige Repräsentationen. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945* (Cologne, 2005), pp. 205–24.
28. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 226 and, with more detail, Willy Brandt, *Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960–1975* (Hamburg, 1976), pp. 490–2.
29. Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestags, Stenographische Berichte, 14, 16 January 1970.
30. Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, 1997), pp. 59–60.
31. As a prominent SED ideologue, Otto Reinhold, put it in August 1989, 'What right to existence would a capitalist GDR have beside a capitalist FRG? Naturally none.' Ilse Fischer (ed.), *Die Einheit Sozial Gestalten. Dokumente aus den Akten der SPD-Führung 1989/90* (Bonn, 2009), p. 23.

32. Maier, *Dissolution*, pp. 135–46.
33. Mary Elisa Sarotte, *The Collapse. The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall* (New York, 2014).
34. Andreas Rödder, *Deutschland einig Vaterland. Die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung* (Munich, 2009), p. 189.
35. Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1990–1994* (Munich, 2007), p. 393.
36. Schwarz, *Kohl*, p. 528.
37. Telephone conversation with Gorbachev, 11 October 1989; Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann (eds), *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik. Deutsche Einheit. Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90* (Munich, 1998), p. 450. Kohl took the same line in a second telephone conversation on 11 November; ibid., pp. 515–17.
38. Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestags, Stenographische Berichte, 28 November 1989.
39. Küsters and Hofmann (eds), *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, pp. 572–3. In fact the message arrived only at the end of the day; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Harvard, 1995), p. 408.
40. Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage. Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin, 1991), p. 52.
41. Schwarz, *Kohl*, pp. 535–56.
42. Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990* (Munich, 2005), p. 1020.
43. Ibid., pp. 1023–7.
44. Kohl commented waspishly to Gorbachev at their meeting on 10 Feb. 1990 that Brandt was travelling through the GDR ‘like a retired Bishop conferring blessings’. Küsters and Hofmann (eds), *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, p. 801.
45. Fischer (ed.), *Die Einheit Sozial Gestalten*, p. 40.
46. Dieter Grosser, *Das Wagnis der Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion. Politische Zwänge im Konflikt mit ökonomischen Regeln* (Stuttgart, 1998).
47. Kohl was not alone in trusting to this misleading analogy; Gerhard A. Ritter, *The Price of German Unity* (Eng. edn, Oxford, 2011), p. xiv.
48. Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, pp. 131–4.
49. Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, pp. 994–5.
50. Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification* (Eng. edn, Oxford, 2009), pp. 124–6; P. Salmon, K.A. Hamilton and S.R. Twigge (eds), *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series III, Vol. VII, *German Unification 1989–90*, pp. 78–80, 164–6; Aleksandr Galkin and Anatolij Tschernjajew (eds), *Michail Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage. Sowjetische Dokumente 1986–1991* (Munich, 2011), pp. 199–200.
51. Bozo, *Mitterrand*, pp. 53–5.
52. Rödder, *Deutschland einig Vaterland*, pp. 262–4.
53. Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1990–1994*, p. 366.
54. Ibid., pp. 269–70.
55. Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, p. 1000.
56. Ibid., p. 1082.
57. Rödder, *Deutschland einig Vaterland*, pp. 357–65.
58. In discussing the problem of Germany’s future military alliance with Gorbachev on 10 February 1990, Kohl said simply, ‘A solution to this question is possible’, and in discussing how to define the military status of former East German territory in a united Germany with Gorbachev on 16 July 1990 he said, ‘At present he could not propose a solution but a form of words could be found later.’ Küsters and Hofmann (eds), *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, pp. 800, 1360.

59. Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990*, pp. 890–91. See also Brown, *The Myth of the Strong Leader*, p. 137.
60. Attali, *Verbatim, III, 1988–199* (Paris, 1995), p. 12. On the problems of Attali's record as a documentary source, see Bozo, *Mitterrand*, p. xiii.
61. Heumann, *Genscher*, pp. 271–82.
62. Ibid., pp. 170–1.
63. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 570–5.
64. Rödder, *Deutschland einig Vaterland*, pp. 235–44.
65. Heumann, *Genscher*, pp. 267–8.
66. Korte, *Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft*, pp. 455–6.
67. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 464–5.

11
Ronald Reagan

Luis da Vinha

When Ronald Reagan was elected as the 40th president of the United States in 1980, hardly anyone foresaw the sweeping transformations that would occur in international relations throughout his presidency. Reagan arrived in Washington as the quintessential Cold Warrior in a period of renewed confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.[1] His acerbic rhetoric on the malaise and threat of the Soviet regime had made him one of the most assertive advocates of a more aggressive policy towards the USSR. Throughout his presidential campaign Reagan frequently argued that the Soviets had a grand design that sought to expand influence and foment revolutions in the Third World, while isolating the United States from its allies.[2] Accordingly, the United States needed to upgrade its military capability and assert a more forceful policy regarding Soviet expansionism.[3] Reagan's outlook and policy proposals resonated with the growing belief in the United States that the Soviet Union had obtained a strategic advantage in the global balance of power, while America was in decline.[4] Reagan's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, voiced this general sentiment when he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the previous administration's apathy had consented to 'the transformation of Soviet military power from a continental and largely defensive land army to a global offensive army, navy and air force fully capable of supporting an imperial foreign policy'.[5] Not surprisingly, the Reagan administration's initial years in the White House were characterized by a growing American bellicose attitude toward the Soviet Union.

Few could anticipate the changes that would occur in the ensuing years. Reagan would leave the presidency claiming that the world was entering 'a new era in history', in which the barriers of the post-war period were being dismantled.[6] Not only did the United States and the USSR ease much of the existing military tension by signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and laying the framework for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), but Reagan also anticipated 'the possibility of a new age of prosperity and peace, where old antagonisms between nations can someday be put behind us'.[7] By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union seemed must less

menacing than it had in the beginning of the decade. In fact, within a few years of leaving the presidency, Reagan would witness the demolition of the Berlin Wall, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the USSR.

Scholars and commentators alike have diverged on their assessment of Reagan's role in the demise of the Cold War. Many have credited Reagan as being the principal architect of the US victory in the superpower struggle.[8] According to this school of thought, Reagan and his top advisors played a critical role in toppling the USSR by assuming the ideological offensive and promoting a military build-up strategy that ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet economy and the downfall of the regime. At the opposite end of the spectrum, many have portrayed Reagan as an intellectually hollow and disengaged political actor.[9] Edmund Morris embodied this outlook by claiming that Reagan was an 'airhead' whose views were not only banal, but also incoherent.[10] Many of these accounts suggest that Reagan was simply in the right place at the right time. Very few admit that Reagan had any significant influence in determining the outcome of the Cold War. In effect, according to this school of thought, Reagan was a 'lucky bumbler' who merely reacted to Gorbachev's initiatives.[11] In a similar approach, some scholars do acknowledge a significant US role in ending the Cold War. However, most enthusiasts of the 'handler school' tend to emphasize that the president simply served as a voice box for policy choices developed by the more seasoned and conservative policy-makers in his administration.[12] Some more recent accounts have tried to provide a more nuanced approach by attributing the principal responsibility for the demise of the USSR to Gorbachev, while acknowledging Reagan's active role in enabling Gorbachev's reforms and expediting change within the Soviet system.[13]

Trying to determine the causes of the demise of the Cold War is a daunting task and may produce more controversy than results. Rather than embark down this route, the ensuing chapter argues that, while elements of Reagan's mental map changed during his presidency and were determined by a high degree of political pragmatism, the overarching themes framing his worldview remained remarkably consistent throughout his political career. While championing a highly idealist rhetoric, Reagan was fully aware of the need to conform to popular sentiment. Therefore, Reagan, more than most of his contemporaries, was also able to relate to and mould the worldviews of the American public. Ultimately, Reagan provided a mental map that could rally the nation and explain and legitimize the changes in the international political environment.

From the Heartland to Washington

To assess Regan's mental map one needs to contemplate the factors underlying the representational strategies he employed, that is, the knowledge

structures that provided the framework for his global mental map. This requires understanding the sources of Reagan's assumptions about America, namely its values and its goals, and its relationship with other international actors. Naturally, Reagan's mental map was influenced by his 'life history'.[14] Particularly important was his cultural background. Born and bred in the American Midwest, Reagan embodied the general mannerisms and beliefs characteristic of that region.[15] While the Midwest encompasses many cultural traits, there are some important distinguishing regional qualities. The region's isolation is a unique feature of its identity.[16] The region's remoteness contributes to a sense of security that buttresses its resistance to change. This aspect has also underwritten the region's limited sense of history in which the past is 'fit only to be torn down and replaced by something new and better'.[17]

Intrinsic to the region's history is a marked sense of self-assurance. The adversities overcome by the region's early settlers created a sense of confidence in native Midwesterners' capacity to overcome the challenges to progress and an unwavering conviction in their own self-righteousness.[18] In this sense, the Upper Midwest was particularly disposed to the pious and moralistic character of its Puritan heritage.[19] The nineteenth century witnessed the diffusion of the Puritan-inspired cultural infrastructure to a large swath of the region. More precisely, 'the steady march of Puritan-influenced settlers from New England across the upper Midwest to northern Illinois and parts of Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, and eventually to the Pacific Northwest – brought much of the culture of New England Protestantism into the entire North'.[20] Central to the Protestant conviction espoused by Puritanism was an ideal society based on worldly asceticism. These religious values became deeply embedded in the regional culture and, despite the tendency to emphasize the secularization of American politics in the twentieth century, the unremitting power of religion to shape public discourse on broad-scale issues regarding morality and ethics should not be understated.[21]

Numerous scholars and commentators have amply demonstrated the importance of Reagan's religious beliefs on his views of the Soviets and the superpower confrontation.[22] Reagan himself was very forthcoming with his faith. In an interview with David Frost in 1968 he admitted that Jesus was the historical figure he most admired.[23] In his 1976 presidential nomination campaign Reagan was successful in infusing the Republican Party's platform with a "Morality in foreign policy" plank. By criticizing Soviet tyranny, the GOP's platform echoed Reagan's faith that 'Honestly, openly, and with firm conviction, we shall go forward as a united people to forge a lasting peace in the world based upon our deep belief in the rights of man, the rule of law and guidance by the hand of God.'[24] Once in the White House Reagan upheld his emphasis on religious values.

Because of his faith, Reagan would not sit idly as communism proliferated unchallenged. Reagan's Midwestern temperament did not accept the

transformation of America into a second-rate nation subordinate to communist Russia. As Diggins has argued with a touch of irony, 'Reagan might leave the judgment of history to God, but he was determined to make history by taking control of it.'[25] Accordingly, he considered morality and politics to be deeply entwined. In an Ecumenical Prayer Breakfast in Dallas in 1984 Reagan claimed in no uncertain terms that 'politics and morality are inseparable' and, consequently, 'as morality's foundation is religion, religion and politics are necessarily related'.[26] From this perspective, the United States had a moral obligation to fight the spiritually broken communist regime in Moscow. Christian faith could ultimately revolutionize the world and bring about the end of the Soviet empire.[27]

This assumedly righteous outlook had long informed both Reagan's mental map and his behaviour. In fact, Reagan began acquiring his reputation as a devoted anti-communist in the 1940s. As president of the Screen Actors Guild he sought to eradicate communist influence in the union movement, namely by collaborating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).[28] Over the coming years Reagan would adopt a much more assertive role in attacking authoritarian regimes and endorsing the virtues of liberal democracies. His years as a corporate spokesman for General Electric (GE) marked the culmination of his conversion from a 'liberal Democrat and New Dealer' to a conservative Republican.[29] Under the mentorship of GE's Lemuel Boulware, Reagan developed and refined his role as a champion of the free-market economy and limited government. His exposure to the economic theories of thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek, Henry Hazlitt, Lewis Haney and Ludwig von Mises and his enthusiasm in promoting GE's liberal agenda prepared him for his imminent political career. As Reagan would later admit, 'those GE tours became almost a postgraduate course in political science for me'.[30]

Reagan continued the public endorsement of his political views after leaving GE. From the start of his political career he remained devoted to his newfound convictions. In his 1964 address on behalf of presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, Reagan earned his public credentials as a staunch anti-communist by attacking the Soviet system and those that sought to appease the USSR. In his distinctive style, Reagan put forward a moral prerogative for confronting the Soviets:

> We cannot buy our security, our freedom from the threat of the bomb by committing an immorality so great as saying to a billion now in slavery behind the Iron Curtain, 'Give up your dreams of freedom because to save our own skin, we are willing to make a deal with your slave masters.'[31]

Reagan's exceptional deliverance of 'The Speech', as it became known, propelled him to the centre stage of the Republican Party and eventually opened his path to the presidency.

Mapping the Evil Empire

Ronald Reagan carried the themes he so cherished in his earlier years to the White House. Contrary to his predecessor, the Reagan administration did not place substantial importance in the developing world and in North–South relations. Rather, the incoming administration framed international affairs in the logic of superpower politics, emphasizing East–West relations. Reagan's mental maps were particularly centred on the US–Soviet relationship, which, he believed, overshadowed any other geographic concern – including China. Any consideration of North–South issues was significant only to the extent they were affiliated to the grander scheme of East–West relations.[32] For the new administration, 'the number one issue affecting contemporary international relations was considered to be the spread of Soviet expansionism, not the development needs of the Third World'.[33] If anything, these developing countries represented a challenge to the United States in that they were a potential hotbed for Marxist-Leninist regimes promoted and sponsored by an expansionist USSR. For instance, the Reagan administration's considerable involvement in Latin America resulted not from a concern for the region as such, but rather from a conviction that the Soviets were stirring up trouble here. As Reagan told the *Wall Street Journal*, the 'Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that's going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world.'[34]

According to Reagan and his aides, the Carter administration had proved itself too weak in countering Soviet assertiveness and had thereby contributed to emboldening its political and military expansion. Reagan's criticism, however, was not confined to Carter. Rather, it crossed bipartisan politics and attacked the détente policies of his two Republican predecessors, Nixon and Ford:

> For the most of the last 40 years, we have been preoccupied with the global struggle – the competition – with the Soviet Union and with our responsibilities to our allies. But too often in recent times we have just drifted along with events, responding as if we thought of ourselves as a nation in decline. To our allies we seem to appear to be a nation unable to make decisions in its own interests, let alone in the common interest.[35]

In Reagan's view, the very reasoning underlying détente was flawed. The attempt to accommodate the Soviets had actually bolstered Soviet aggrandizement. By unduly trusting Soviet leadership, the United States had been out-negotiated in terms of arms control and had indirectly enabled the economic development of the USSR. Answering journalists' questions on *Meet the Press* in 1976, Reagan claimed that détente 'is a one-way street' in which America was 'making the concessions, we are giving them [the Soviets] the

things they want, we ask nothing in return'.[36] For Reagan, détente had to become 'a two-way street' in which cooperation with the Soviets should be contingent on their domestic and international behaviour. However, Reagan's deep-seated distrust of the Soviet leadership and communist ideology restrained any real disposition towards maintaining a collaborative relationship with the USSR. From his perspective, communist regimes, in particular the Soviet government, were inherently deceitful and malicious.[37]

Contrary to Nixon, Ford and Kissinger, who saw the US–Soviet relationship as a geopolitical struggle, Reagan viewed it from an ideational and moral perspective.[38] Buttressed by his moralistic worldview, Reagan considered the Soviet Union fundamentally malevolent. The regime's totalitarian impulse was 'the focus of evil in the modern world'.[39] For instance, the arms race was not rooted in any Russian miscalculation about American intentions, but rather in the 'aggressive impulses of an evil empire' which sought to achieve global dominance.[40] The main inspiration for Soviet aggressiveness was its expansionistic ideology which was focused on promoting world revolution and furthering its scheme of 'bringing about a one-world Communist state'.[41] According to Reagan, 'Marxist-Leninist regimes tend to wage war as readily against their neighbors as they routinely do against their own people'.[42]

Reagan's faith provided him with an additional explanation for the source of Soviet malice and expansionism. For Reagan, Russian aggressiveness was deeply enshrined in Marxist-Leninism's commitment to atheism. From this perspective, atheism was endemic to Soviet communism. The ideological foundations of communism sought 'to make man stand alone without God'.[43] The absence of faith inherent to the Soviet ideology ultimately conveyed a malevolent quality to their intentions and activities. In this sense, Reagan's manichaeistic categorization reverberated with the basic psychic necessity individuals have for continuously redefining ourselves in terms of elementary images of 'good' and 'bad'.[44] Therefore, for Reagan, the Cold War was, first and foremost, a moral struggle in which America confronted a malevolent empire fixed on repressing the freedom of individuals around the world. As Reagan had written in his diary before assuming the presidency, 'Into the hands of Am. [America] God has placed the destiny of an afflicted mankind.'[45]

The extent of the threat facing the United States and the 'free world' was plainly spelled out by Reagan in his 1982 address to the British Parliament.[46] The current generation faced threats never before imagined, he declared. Not only was freedom imperilled, but so was human existence as we knew it. The threat of global nuclear war impinged on all free societies due to totalitarian expansionism and interventionism. Reagan echoed the message the administration had been endorsing since arriving in Washington, that is, that the most destabilizing factor in US–Soviet relations and world peace arose from 'Soviet intervention in regional conflicts' where a 'serious and sustained

international reaction will be the inevitable result, with greater dangers for everyone – including Moscow'.[47] The greatest danger derived from the fact that the USSR had concentrated its efforts in building its military capabilities, particularly its nuclear strength, while the West had been unilaterally disarming. As a result, Soviet military capabilities associated with its commitment to violent change posed the greatest threat to world peace.[48]

For Reagan, however, America's role was not just to fight and resist this 'evil empire', but to transform the USSR. At the core of Reagan's rationale was the illegitimacy of the Soviet regime which, he believed, did not reflect the will of the Russian people. Reagan regularly differentiated between the Soviet regime and Russian society. In his view, America had no quarrel with the Russian people. They were not responsible for their government's policy in the sense that 'the peoples in the Soviet Union have virtually no influence on their government'.[49] In fact, for Reagan, the Russian and American people had similar interests in securing freedom from oppression. He shared this conviction with reporters in the early months of his presidency by claiming that all individuals have 'a desire to raise their families, a desire to choose the occupation or profession they want to work at, to have some control over their lives'.[50] The statement clearly attests to Reagan's beliefs in the universality of liberalism. According to this worldview, all individuals sought liberty and freedom. Freedom was understood as an essential element for peace since freedom led to prosperity and prosperity fostered peace.[51] It was a despotic regime's attempts to subjugate these values and aspirations that ultimately nurtured the superpower confrontation. Logically, the Russian people were seen as victims of their government and, therefore, natural allies of the United States. In order to overcome this situation and transform the USSR, the US and its allies had to delegitimize the Soviet regime.

The first strategy towards accomplishing this goal was to denounce communism's impending demise. Turning Marx's historical materialism on its head, Reagan predicted that Marxism-Leninism would soon be left 'on the ashheap of history'.[52] The perceived internal contradictions of the communist government in Moscow led Reagan to envisage growing instability and turmoil in the USSR:

> We cannot ignore the fact that even without our encouragement there has been and will continue to be repeated explosions against repression and dictatorships. The Soviet Union itself is not immune to this reality. Any system is inherently unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimize its leaders. In such cases, the very repressiveness of the state ultimately drives people to resist it, if necessary, by force.[53]

As a result, Reagan prompted America and its allies to bolster their support for those who sought to unshackle themselves from the communist tyranny. Reagan's rhetorical assault on the Soviet regime continued throughout his

early years in the presidency as he criticized Russian leaders while appealing to the strengthening of the community of liberal democracies. This naturally implied restoring the waning Western alliance.[54] In particular, Reagan strengthened the relationship with Great Britain by establishing a solid rapport with Margaret Thatcher and supporting Helmut Kohl's policy of fortifying the US–German partnership. Reagan also found a trusted ally in the Pope. The call to defeat communism was also stirring the Vatican and in 1982 both parties agreed to work together to secretly sponsor the demise of communism in Europe. In particular, Reagan and Pope John Paul II concerted actions to destabilize the Polish government and support and aid the underground Solidarity movement. Both men believed that ridding Poland of its communist regime 'would be a dagger to the heart of the Soviet empire; and if Poland became democratic, other East European states would follow'.[55]

Another strategic element of Reagan's policy was to rebuild American self-confidence. The Vietnam War not only shattered the domestic consensus on America's role in international affairs but, more appallingly for Reagan, it crushed the nation's traditional optimism in its capability to overcome the trials it encountered. Reagan blamed the 'Vietnam Syndrome' for allowing the Soviets to surpass the USA in many critical areas, such as the military, and weakening the Western alliance.[56] Therefore, to successfully challenge Soviet communism, Reagan sought to restore America's faith and self-assurance and create a vision which could mobilize the nation to shoulder a more active role in global leadership.[57] Once again, Reagan was attuned to public sentiment in America. In the early 1980s there was a general anxiety regarding US power in the world and 'voters were more than ready to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam and replace it with a new posture of American assertiveness'.[58]

The reassertion of American primacy began with strengthening the nation's defence capabilities. Only through a 'position of strength' could the USA convince their 'adversaries to negotiate seriously and to cease bullying other nations'.[59] For Reagan, propping the nation's military capabilities was essential to attaining an advantageous situation vis-à-vis the USSR. The administration's military build-up relied on a significant increase in defence expenditures between 1980 and 1985, which centred on three key programmes: strategic modernization, conventional force build-up and improvement in readiness and mobility.[60] In the first five years of the Reagan administration defence spending increased by 42 per cent in real terms and over the remainder of Reagan's tenure consumed over 30 per cent of the federal budget.[61] Reagan also initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and deployed intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

Reagan was confident in the US capability to overcome the challenges in the international environment. As Gaddis has argued, Reagan was the

most optimistic and self-assured American president of the Cold War.[62] He believed the nation was stronger than it realized and that history was, in fact, on America's side. Therefore, Reagan decided to assume the offensive in rolling back Soviet communism. In his 1985 State of the Union address, Reagan envisioned a second American Revolution 'that carries beyond our shores the golden promise of human freedom in a world of peace'.[63] This revolution would be accomplished by promoting America's universal values and ideals and supporting those individuals and groups which resisted and defied Soviet policy. The traditional US policy of containment was not a suitable strategy for Reagan. At best it was a defensive strategy which sought only to confine Soviet communism. It would not bring about the transformation of the Russian regime that he so desired. Hence, the Reagan administration would implement a host of policies which sought to pressure the Soviet regime to overhaul its political system and, ultimately, reconfigure the superpower relationship. For Reagan nothing but the wholesale transformation of international relations would do:

> Our foreign policy, then, has been an attempt both to reassert the traditional elements of America's postwar strategy while at the same time moving beyond the doctrines of mutual assured destruction or containment. Our goal has been to break the deadlock of the past, to seek a forward strategy – a forward strategy for world peace, a forward strategy for world freedom. We have not forsaken deterrence or containment, but working with our allies, we've sought something even beyond these doctrines. We have sought the elimination of the threat of nuclear weapons and an end to the threat of totalitarianism.[64]

Several policy directives materialized Reagan's worldview and strategic objectives. The administration had laid the foundations for resisting communist expansion in the early months of the presidency. In January 1982, National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD) stipulated, among other initiatives, significant financial support and military assistance for Central American and Caribbean countries resisting communist insurgencies in the region.[65] From this perspective, policy towards Central America and the Caribbean region followed the premises established in the Nixon Doctrine of supporting local proxies in upholding US regional interests.

More significantly, the Reagan administration's first comprehensive US National Security Strategy (NSDD 32) encompassed the main elements of Reagan's strategic outlook, particularly accentuating the need to 'contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces'.[66] NSDD 32 also reflected the idea of exploiting the shortcomings of the Soviet economy by encouraging opposition forces in the USSR and its allies. The emphasis on economic measures to

undercut the Soviets was further instated by NSDD 66, which established the principles governing East–West economic relations.[67] NSDD 75, signed in January 1983, focused on US–USSR relations and framed Reagan's ultimate goal of transforming the Soviet system. In identifying the main goals of US policy, the directive committed the administration to

> promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The US recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression.[68]

Moreover, NDSS 75 buttressed the conviction that the USA should assume the ideological offensive by promoting the superiority of Western liberal values over Soviet communist ideology.

Changing Mental Maps or 'When Ivan and Anya meet Jim and Sally'

Reagan's unfeigned moralistic and simplified mental map had a significant impact on US foreign policy. However, Reagan's experience also provided him with a high degree of pragmatism. While the president's anti-communism was genuine, 'it was carefully restrained by *realpolitik*'.[69] Reagan was well aware of the importance of maintaining broad public support in order for policies to be successful. As mentioned above, Reagan attributed the failure of US policy in Vietnam to the lack of popular support at home. As he told US war veterans in 1980, 'If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the determination to prevail or we will not have what it takes to secure the peace.'[70] This naturally implied the American people had to be cognizant of the security challenges involved in the global struggle for freedom and have the determination to overcome them. Thus, the application of what became known as the Reagan Doctrine was subject to the president's assessment of the international and domestic context at each particular moment. The emphasis and support placed on rolling back communist regimes depended essentially on Reagan's calculation of public support for his policies.

Several examples attest to Reagan's pragmatism. While he and his administration were highly assertive in publicly countering the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, other confrontations with communists were more subdued. Moreover, Reagan was acutely mindful of when to press forward, slow down, or abandon his policies. For instance, public support was essential in the US invasion of Granada in October 1983.[71] By portraying the immediate

risks to America's vital strategic region, Reagan was able to take advantage of public sentiment and undertake the first major use of US military force since Vietnam. In contrast, Reagan's awareness of the limits of US support in aiding the anti-Sandinista groups in Nicaragua ultimately led the administration to emphasize covert operations as a substitute for open and direct assistance to the rebels. In another example, the removal of US troops from Beirut in 1984 reflected the Reagan administration's acknowledgement of the dwindling public satisfaction with developments in Lebanon.[72]

Reagan's apparent hardline policies towards the Soviet regime and its proxies held more rhetoric than substance. This helps to explain the transformation of the administration's policy towards the USSR throughout the Reagan presidency. Many commentators have attributed the transformation in US policy as a reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev's political approach. According to this line of reasoning, the change in the US–USSR relationship resulted from a new political milieu created by the new Soviet leader.[73] In reality, Reagan had demonstrated receptiveness to Soviet overtures before Gorbachev assumed the leadership of the Russian communist party in March 1985. In effect, since the early years of the Reagan presidency, Secretary Schultz had been making the case for a renewed rapprochement between the two superpowers. In early 1983, the president authorized Schultz to initiate a 'careful dialogue' with the Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.[74] This outlook was equally reflected in NSDD 75, which called for the United States to engage with the Soviets with the aim of reaching agreements which could promote mutual interests.[75]

Moreover, during his first term, Reagan acknowledged on several occasions that Soviet behaviour might result from a general misperception of the international security environment, particularly the threat posed by the West.[76] In fact, in addressing the nation on US–Soviet relations in early 1984, Reagan stressed the need to eliminate the enduring threat of nuclear war. Once again, Reagan highlighted the risks associated with 'dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculations'.[77] Therefore, Reagan called for a greater working relationship between the two superpowers in order to reduce the risk of war and meet the challenges of global poverty and disease. Reagan's early attempts at establishing greater cooperation with the Soviets have at times been dismissed as mere political calculation in light of the impending presidential elections. However, these proceedings attest to Reagan's confidence in another core set of universal values and principles that coloured his worldview.

To begin with, Reagan believed that both nations shared a common interest in removing the risk of nuclear war.[78] Although his growing anti-nuclear sentiments surprised many Americans, particularly his traditional conservative allies, Reagan had long been critical of the logic underlying nuclear deterrence. Before assuming the presidency he had hinted at the need for reductions in military capabilities – not just limitations.[79] Buttressing this

view was Reagan's profound abhorrence to the logic of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Although his grasp of the conceptual and strategic issues surrounding nuclear deterrence was limited, Reagan dismissed the rationale that called for 'each side to keep enough nuclear weapons at the ready to obliterate the other, so as if one attacked, the second had enough bombs left to annihilate its adversary in a matter of minutes' as 'the craziest thing I ever heard of'.[80] This conviction was undoubtedly strengthened by his privileged access to information and details regarding the potential level of destruction involved in a superpower nuclear exchange. Reagan's exposure to the minutiae of nuclear war and the impact of the 'war scare' in late 1983 unquestionably led him to seek negotiations as a means to defuse any impending crisis.[81]

Reagan's fears of nuclear confrontation encouraged him to try to establish a dialogue with the Soviets, with the emphasis on arms reductions. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1984, Reagan revealed a more accommodating attitude towards the USSR, claiming that the American approach to future negotiations would take into consideration Soviet concerns.[82] The following year in Geneva, the American and Soviet leaderships agreed to institutionalize a dialogue on the way to achieving a reduction in the superpower's nuclear arsenals. This in turn paved the way for the formal agreements celebrated in the following years.

As well as a common US–Soviet interest in discontinuing the arms race, Reagan also believed all Americans and Russians shared a common set of universal values founded on individual freedom. This certainty was the decisive aspect underpinning Reagan's deep resentment towards the Soviet regime. In his understanding, the communists denied the Russian people their basic individual rights. Unencumbered by ideological determinants, Reagan assumed 'common interests cross all borders'.[83] Resorting to his characteristic anecdotes, Reagan asked Americans to imagine a spontaneous encounter between a Russian couple (Ivan and Anya) and an American couple (Jim and Sally): 'Would they then debate the differences between their respective governments? Or would they find themselves comparing notes about their children and what each other did for a living?'[84] For the president, the answer was self-evident. Intrinsic to all individuals and all societies is the pursuit of a more satisfying life and shared sense of worth. War is not a human aspiration. In light of that assumption, it is a government's duty to work towards providing the opportunity to 'fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and, indeed, of people everywhere'.[85] These claims resonated fully with Reagan's belief in the virtues of liberal economic and political principles which accentuate democratic government and free-market economies.

Reagan viewed Gorbachev as a man whom he could work with to improve the US–Soviet relationship and usher in significant changes in the international system.[86] Like many other US presidents, Reagan placed great faith in

personal diplomacy. He believed that in a face-to-face discussion with the Soviet leadership he could convince them of the truth of his arguments. More significantly, Reagan believed he could persuade them to implement substantial changes to their regime. He considered Gorbachev the appropriate interlocutor in this endeavour due to their shared life history:

> Here we were, I said, two men who had been born in obscure rural hamlets in the middle of our respective countries, each of us poor and from humble beginnings. Now we were the leaders of our countries and probably the only two men in the world who could bring about World War III. At the same time, I said, we were possibly the only two men in the world who might be able to bring peace to the world.[87]

While Reagan relied considerably on his faith and personal instincts in judging Gorbachev, he also received substantial recommendations from allies and friends endorsing the new Soviet leader's distinctive receptiveness to a US approach.[88] Reagan seized on the transition of power in Moscow and reached out to Gorbachev. The new General Secretary of the Communist Party proved responsive to Reagan's overture and the two men met personally on several occasions over the following months. Both thereupon moved their countries towards a decline in international tension, namely by instituting concrete initiatives towards a reduction in the arms race. By late 1987, in signing the INF Treaty, the two leaders had committed the USA and the USSR to ban intermediate nuclear weapons – eliminating for the first time an entire class of nuclear weapons – and setting the stage for ending the superpower confrontation.

During this period Reagan combined acts of accommodation and cooperation with Gorbachev with overt criticism of the Soviet regime. For instance, when asked about the potential effect of Gorbachev's popularity on Americans' perception of communism, Reagan lauded Gorbachev for being the first Soviet leader who had not publicly pledged to establish a 'one-world Communist state'.[89] Still, even this personal empathy toward Gorbachev did not entirely dampen his old anti-communist instincts. When commenting on the announced Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, for instance, Reagan stated that the 'Soviets have rarely before, and not at all in more than three decades, left a country once occupied'. As a result, the United States would continue to support those who opposed communist expansion and maintain pressure on the USSR to change its behaviour.[90] The president's insistence on applying a strong rhetoric against the Soviet regime might have stemmed from the need to uphold his credentials as a genuine Cold Warrior amid the growing criticism from conservatives over the INF Treaty. Reagan's simultaneous use of criticism and openness was best demonstrated in his well-known Berlin Wall speech. In addressing his audience, the president was unforgiving in his assessment that communist regimes were failures

characterized by 'technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind – too little food'. At the same time, Reagan tried to engage with the Soviet leader by calling on Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall and inviting him to work with the United States 'to bring the Eastern and Western parts of the city closer together, so that all the inhabitants of all Berlin can enjoy the benefits that come with life in one of the great cities of the world'.[91]

These actions were consistent with Reagan's general worldview. He maintained a visceral aversion to communism. Accordingly, he continued the rhetorical assault on the Soviet regime throughout most of his presidency. Nevertheless, his political experience and savviness recommended avoiding zero-sum games. As Reagan readily acknowledged in his memoirs: 'You're unlikely to ever get *all* you want; you'll probably get more of what you want if you don't issue ultimatums and leave your adversary room to maneuver; you shouldn't back your adversary into a corner, embarrass him, or humiliate him.'[92]

Whatever the rationale underlying his relationship with the Soviets, Reagan's growing accommodation proved critical for transforming the USSR and, ultimately, ending the Cold War. In order to implement reforms and deal with the economic challenges facing the USSR, Gorbachev needed to reduce tensions with the USA. In fact, by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union had one of the world's most under-achieving economies.[93] This gloomy economic situation was aggravated by growing military expenditures which consumed over 15 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). In order to tackle the problems facing the USSR, Gorbachev realized he had to change existing policies, particularly by defusing the tense international environment in order to concentrate on domestic reforms.[94] Therefore, while the Reagan administration did not determine the course of action Gorbachev would take, America's more accommodating attitude gave the Soviet leader the possibility of overcoming the mounting internal challenges posed by other political forces such as the KGB and the military establishment. In the end, Reagan's policy towards the USSR provided Gorbachev with 'the time and space he needed to demolish the Soviet system'.[95]

Recalibrating Reagan's Mental Map for a New World

The easing of US–Soviet tensions and a shifting international environment were evident in the final year of the Reagan presidency. The Washington Summit had changed the political climate in the Unites States. While many conservatives attacked Reagan for signing the INF Treaty, the American public was generally satisfied and optimistic about the future of the superpower relationship. The final year of the presidency would witness Reagan's approval rating grow, reaching 63 per cent by the time he left office.[96] In the meantime, Gorbachev continued to dismantle the foundations of the Soviet

empire. The Soviet leader brought an end to the Soviet–Afghan war and transformed the Warsaw Pact's strategic rationale by establishing that the military alliance would relinquish traditional territorial ambitions in Europe and assume a strictly defensive posture.[97]

Reagan reciprocated by praising Gorbachev and his reforms. In his visit to Moscow in 1988, Reagan emphasized on several occasions the new era of cooperation and friendship between the two nations. Before departing from Moscow, Reagan spoke publicly of his 'hope for a new era in human history, an era of peace between our nations and our peoples'.[98] When questioned in the streets of Moscow by ABC's Sam Donaldson on whether he still considered the USSR to be an evil empire, Reagan was quick to reject that label and claim, 'I was talking about another time and another era'.[99] On his trip back to the USA, Reagan addressed the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and renewed his conviction that a new era was imminent in which the barriers erected during the post-war could be razed. For Reagan, his strategy had occasioned a 'time of lasting change in the Soviet Union'.[100]

While the menace of the Soviet empire was receding a new threat increasingly cast a shadow over Reagan's mental maps: the threat of Middle Eastern terrorism. The emphasis on the superpower confrontation had obscured many of the developments occurring in the region in recent decades. In fact, President Carter had previously identified the Middle East as a key strategic area, second only to Europe. Reagan continued many of Carter's policies for the region, namely promoting the operationalization of the Rapid Reaction Force and bolstering Iraq against Iran. Moreover, in his first term, Reagan authorized the deployment of US military forces to Beirut in an attempt to assist the withdrawal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon. US forces were recalled in early 1984 after a terrorist attack on their compound that killed over 200 marines.

While relegated to a subordinate position in the nation's international concerns, Lebanon exposed the Reagan administration to a formidable new threat which required re-evaluating existing military doctrines and structures.[101] As a result, Reagan approved NSDD 138, which outlined a series of measures for the USA to prevent, counter and combat terrorism.[102] As terrorists increasingly threatened US interests, Reagan warned them and their state sponsors to 'be on notice, we will fight back against you, in Lebanon and elsewhere'.[103] Reagan demonstrated his resolve in following through on his threat when he authorized the US military strikes in Libya in 1986. According to the president, the military strikes were not an isolated initiative, but rather 'a single engagement in the long battle against terrorism'.[104] As Lawrence Freedman has claimed, the fight against terrorism developed into an important policy issue for Reagan and his key advisers.[105]

Yet, even in the fight against terrorism, Reagan maintained a strong dose of pragmatism. More precisely, faced with the opportunity for reducing tensions with Iran and striking a deal to release American hostages, the

Administration illegally supplied Iran with weapons. The clandestine nature of the negotiations and transactions attested to Reagan's perception that the American public would never endorse such behaviour – as substantiated by the sharp decrease in public support for the president after the Iran–Contra affair was uncovered in late 1986.[106]

Nevertheless, throughout his political career it was always the struggle between freedom and authoritarianism that dominated Reagan's understanding of the world. Most international issues were framed within the logic of the US–Soviet confrontation. Reagan's mental map reflected the prevailing Cold War outlook in the United States and the West in general. Whatever concerns Reagan harboured regarding other international issues were relegated to a secondary status. If anything, Reagan understood the need to maintain a simple and comprehensible message for the public. As Henry Kissinger has argued, while Reagan's comprehension of the workings of international relations was far from extraordinary, he understood exceptionally well the 'workings of the American soul'.[107] By associating his simplified mental map with his exceptional communicational skills, Reagan was able to frame the superpower confrontation in a clear and coherent way to the American public. Furthermore, by setting the Cold War on a moralistic basis and by presenting an optimistic outlook for the United States, Reagan was able to infuse Americans with a renewed self-confidence regarding international affairs. Ultimately, by embodying many of the contradictions present in America's relationship with international affairs, Reagan was better able to map the end of the Cold War for Americans than any other political leader.

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12 Mikhail Gorbachev

Archie Brown

Mikhail Gorbachev was not a leader whose political outlook was formed and fixed at an early age. Although some of his basic beliefs, values and political instincts can be traced back to his childhood, he had an unusually flexible and open mind by any standards, and especially for someone who made his career climbing every step of the ladder to the top of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). His way of looking at the world – his mental map – was still changing even while he occupied the highest post in the land as party General Secretary and, subsequently, as the first and last executive president of the USSR. Before Gorbachev reached the Olympian heights of the Kremlin, however, he underwent life-altering experiences along the way, some of them harsh and harrowing, that played distinctive roles in moulding his outlook. The evolution of his mental map can be understood only by contextualizing it in these decisively important events of his childhood, youth and subsequent life, each of which contributed enormously to the making of a radically reformist – and remarkably pacific – Communist leader.

Gorbachev was born into a peasant family in southern Russia on 2 March 1931. The first 22 years of his life thus coincided with the period later called 'high Stalinism' when the dictatorship of the Communist Party was accompanied by Josif Stalin's dictatorship over the party (as well as over every other Soviet institution). At different times in the 1930s both of Gorbachev's grandfathers fell foul of the political police. They survived the experience of exile and imprisonment, but his maternal grandfather, Pantelei Gopkalo, a Ukrainian who was chairman of a collective farm some 20 km from Gorbachev's native village of Privolnoe, was tortured during the 14 months following his arrest in 1937 and died a few years later at the comparatively early age of 59.[1] Until he started school, Gorbachev lived mainly in the home of that grandfather. Gopkalo had joined the Communist Party in 1928, but his wife, Vasilisa (also of Ukrainian descent), was a deeply religious Orthodox believer. Their home had an icon in the corner and portraits of Lenin and Stalin nearby – in 'peaceful coexistence', as Gorbachev later put it.[2]

There was no comparable tranquillity in the neighbourhood, however, when Pantelei Gopkalo was arrested. Once a member of a family had become an 'enemy of the people', neighbours and even relatives kept their distance for fear of being deemed guilty by association. Looking back on those years more than half a century later, Gorbachev likened it to living in a 'plague-stricken house'.[3]

Typically enough for a Communist Party member at that time, Gorbachev's grandfather did not blame either Stalin or the Soviet system for his ill treatment. The mistake was assumed to be that of the regional NKVD.[4] Stalin would have sorted them out if only he had known about the injustice. It seemed to a fair number of the victims of the repression that precisely this was happening when members of the secret police in turn began to be arrested and executed. For Gorbachev, as for many Soviet citizens of his generation, Stalin's culpability became clear only with Nikita Khrushchev's 'secret speech' to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, exposing the extent to which the 'Great Terror', especially as it affected party members, was willed and orchestrated by Stalin himself. It took much longer for those who were still young at that time, the future General Secretary among them, to appreciate that there must be something fundamentally wrong with the *system* that allowed a remorseless leader to get away with arbitrary rule and with mass murder. (Some of Gorbachev's contemporaries never did lose their illusions about Stalin, still less about the system, and that applied even more, albeit with some notable exceptions, to the older generation.)

Between a third and a half of the population of Gorbachev's native village of Privolnoe died in the famine of the early 1930s, including three of his father's siblings. Yet, just after he had lost these children, the paternal grandfather, Andrei Gorbachev, was arrested as a 'saboteur' and spent two years felling trees at a Siberian labour camp. The fate of the maternal grandfather of Mikhail Gorbachev's future wife, Raisa Titarenko, was worse. Arrested in 1937 on equally spurious grounds, he was executed. Countless families experienced such losses during the Great Terror, while somehow retaining an underlying faith in the regime. Yet, those who had lost close relatives were disproportionately more likely to be anti-Stalinist than were families on whose doors the secret police did not knock. People who had themselves been arrested for imaginary political crimes or whose loved ones had been directly targeted by the NKVD were among the most responsive to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and they were more alert than the majority of the population to the need for further reform. Gorbachev was not only in this significantly sensitized minority, he was to become in due course the principal agent of that reform.

His early life, however, also gave him reasons to identify strongly with the Soviet state, reinforcing from personal experience the Soviet patriotism which every available medium of the regime strove to instil. Mikhail

Gorbachev's father, like other able-bodied males in peasant families, was called up to the Soviet army as soon as the 1941 grain crop had been harvested. He finished the war as a sergeant-major, invalided out in the final months, having been wounded in 1945 by a German bomb. Although Mikhail was only ten when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union and 14 when the war ended, he spent much of that time working on the family vegetable plot, seeking fodder for their one cow and searching for fuel to heat the home he shared with his mother. As she had to work non-stop on the collective farm, there was no other way of keeping them both alive. (At that time Gorbachev was an only child. It was not until 1947, when he was 16, that his one sibling, a brother, Aleksandr, who went on to become an army officer, was born.) For two of the wartime years Mikhail did not attend school because there was no functioning school to attend, and for four and a half months his village was under German occupation. Years later, in conversation with the Japanese Buddhist philosopher, Daisaku Ikeda, Gorbachev said,

> We were wartime children who survived. Nothing of the life and deeds of our generation is understandable unless we take this into consideration. Because we shouldered the responsibility for our families' survival and for our own subsistence, we little boys became instant grownups. Peace, and with it our ordinary lives, collapsed before our eyes. The breakdown immediately transported us from childhood to adulthood. As children will, we went on enjoying life. We played hide-and-seek and ball games. But somehow we objectively watched ourselves playing. And we watched with adult eyes.[5]

In later years one ghastly scene from around the time of his twelfth birthday – early March 1943 – often came into Gorbachev's mind. Roaming the countryside with other children, looking for war trophies, they came across a mass of bodies in a forest. They were of Soviet soldiers who had been killed in battle the previous summer and whose rotting corpses had re-emerged now that the snow had melted. The children went home profoundly shaken.[6] During the period of German occupation in late 1942 and early 1943 the Gorbachev family was in particular danger of execution because of grandfather Gopkalo's membership of the Communist Party and his chairmanship of the collective farm. The 11-year-old Mikhail was hidden by his mother and grandmother at a farm away from their village.[7]

In the post-war Stalin years, such was the chronic suspicion of the Soviet dictator that those who had suffered the misfortune of having lived in an occupied area were regarded as unreliable at best, potentially treacherous at worst. But this was a time also of rebuilding and of a patriotic spirit in the light of the victory, won at terrible cost, over Nazi Germany. Gorbachev fully shared that spirit. He returned to school but spent every summer working in

the fields alongside his father. In 1948, when he was 17, he and his father, who operated a combine harvester, exceeded the target of grain threshed to qualify for a high national honour. His father became a Hero of Socialist Labour and Gorbachev was awarded the Order of Red Banner of Labour. The time and the circumstances of this honour, earned by the sweat of his brow, made it of all his awards the one Mikhail Gorbachev cherished most. To have been recognized, along with his father, for labour feats in the war-devastated country went a long way to cancelling out the official mistrust emanating from the family arrests of the 1930s and the stigma of having lived under German occupation.

Moscow University

The Red Banner award was, moreover, of decisive help, in addition to the silver medal he had received for his school performance, in securing Gorbachev's acceptance in 1950 as a grant-supported student of Moscow State University. It was also a plus that he had become a candidate member of the Communist Party.[8] The odds against a boy from a peasant home gaining admission to the oldest and most prestigious of Russia's universities were high. At the university Gorbachev sometimes wore the Red Banner insignia on his lapel. While a good many of the ex-Servicemen among the students displayed state awards they had earned in the war, it was very unusual for a student who had come straight from school to have won such an honour.[9]

For Gorbachev at that time, it seemed as if talent and hard work were rewarded by the Soviet system. He had not only received a state honour but had found himself, as a result of his own endeavours and not through connections, at a leading university and, moreover, for the first time in his life, in Moscow. His own schooling, as well as having been disrupted by the war, had been at a lower level than that of many of his fellow students from city and intelligentsia families. He had a lot of ground to make up, but he was a fast learner and he imbibed knowledge from his fellow students as well as from his teachers, a minority of whom were genuinely erudite. In spite of the tight ideological constraints within which they operated, there were several professors who succeeded in opening the eyes of the more alert members of their student audiences to different ways of thinking from Soviet Marxism-Leninism in its rigid Stalinist form.[10] Most lectures on the various branches of Soviet law were, however, far removed from social and political reality. It was from the future Soviet leader that Gorbachev's closest university friend, Zdenek Mlynář, a highly intelligent but initially credulous young Czech Communist, learned how wide was the gap between the picture painted by lectures on collective farm law and the brutal reality.[11] Writing about Gorbachev in 1985 immediately after he had become General Secretary, Mlynář noted that Gorbachev had a favourite saying as a university student which he had borrowed from Hegel, 'Truth is always

concrete.' He used it whenever 'a teacher or student talked hot air about general principles, conveniently forgetting how little they had in common with reality'.[12]

The meeting that for Gorbachev was the most important of his life took place in December 1951 when he first encountered Raisa Titarenko, a student in the Philosophical Faculty. They married in 1953. She helped to broaden his cultural horizons and they remained inseparable until her death in 1999. Within the limits of their extremely tight budgets, they took full advantage of Moscow's theatres (heavily subsidized in those days) and cinemas and read the Russian classics. Through Raisa he met such fellow students as Yury Levada, who went on to do notable sociological survey research (especially when the inhibitions on asking politically sensitive questions were removed during the Soviet perestroika), and the Georgian Merab Mamardashvili, who was later to become a dissident philosopher.

There was a striking change in the atmosphere of the university after Stalin's death, which occurred on 5 March 1953, a little over half-way through Gorbachev's five-year course in the Law Faculty. Zdenek Mlynář, writing in the late 1970s, observed that

> It became more and more obvious that even the Soviet people I knew personally sensed and knew far more about the reality of Stalinist terror in their country than I had gathered from them while Stalin was still alive. In 1954 and 1955, such things were spoken of more and more openly.[13]

Among the students he had particularly in mind was Gorbachev, although he did not mention him by name at that time. Having been expelled from the Communist Party for the prominent part he played in the Prague Spring, Mlynář took a conscious decision not to write about his student friendship with Gorbachev to avoid harming him politically through their association.[14]

Even while Stalin was still alive, Gorbachev evidently had some doubts about his methods. In the lengthy discussion Mlynář and Gorbachev recorded over several sessions in 1993–94, Mlynář recalled

> a lecture on the history of the CPSU in which Professor Golyakov discussed the fact that Lenin after the revolution had given Martov, the main leader of the Mensheviks, the opportunity to emigrate to the West. I remember after that you said to me, 'Look, Lenin didn't even go so far as to arrest Martov.' This was said when Stalin was still alive. I understood that as an expression of your negative attitude toward the trials Stalin had staged.[15]

Gorbachev's response was a clear expression of how important his five years at Moscow University in the first half of the 1950s were for him:

> Yes, we had good luck with our university. We lived under unique conditions for that time, conditions characterized by a certain degree of freedom and a creative atmosphere. We were provided with high-quality knowledge and we learned how to think. And all that was a great help to us in our future life. Before the university I was trapped in a belief system in the sense that I accepted a great deal as given, as assumptions not to be questioned. At the university I began to think and reflect and to look at things differently. But of course that was only the beginning of a prolonged process.[16]

The Stavropol Years

After graduating with distinction from Moscow State University Gorbachev spent almost a quarter of a century back in his native Stavropol territory in southern Russia. His initial intention had been to pursue a legal career, although in Russia that was not the route to political advancement. Fortunately, he soon thought better of such a choice. His first preference had also been to stay in Moscow, but his failure to do so was also a blessing in disguise. He was rejected for work in the USSR Procuracy (the supervisory body for the legal system) in the capital. He himself turned down several possibilities of working in the procuracy in regions of the Soviet Union he did not know, choosing instead to return to his native Stavropol region. He was given a job in the Stavropol procuracy and it confirmed the poor impression he had formed of this institution at the local level when he was given work experience there in June 1953. He wrote to Raisa (whom he was to marry later that year) that he found his surroundings 'disgusting', especially the manner of the local bosses. He particularly disliked 'the acceptance of convention, subordination, with everything predetermined, the open impudence of officials and the arrogance'.[17] The atmosphere in the regional procuracy was still not to his taste in 1955, and he 'worked there no more than ten days'.[18] A combination of his prestigious Moscow University degree (a rarity in Stavropol), the fact that at the university he had been active in the Komsomol (Young Communist League) organization in the Law Faculty, together with his acquaintanceship with some Stavropol party and Komsomol officials enabled him to move out of the procuracy and into the lowest rungs of the Soviet political ladder. He began in the Stavropol Komsomol organization before being transferred to the apparatus of its parent body, the Communist Party.

Gorbachev's promotion was rapid. He began as the deputy head of the propaganda and agitation department of the Stavropol regional Komsomol organization. One of his earlier tasks was to travel around the countryside, explaining to surprised and sometimes angry groups the changed party line on Stalin which followed from Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956. The details of Khrushchev's 'secret speech' were

not made available to most Soviet citizens, but as a member of the regional party committee, Gorbachev had been able to read the speech. Gorbachev's understanding of the crimes and mendacity of Stalin's regime emerged only gradually, although, for him (as for many Communists worldwide who had taken the official Soviet line on trust), Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Congress was a crucial eye-opener. Years later Gorbachev said: 'I had no real idea of the true state of affairs up until Khrushchev's revelations, and even in 1985 when I became head of the party there was still a lot I didn't know.'[19]

Only one year after entering the Komsomol apparatus, Gorbachev was appointed the organization's First Secretary for Stavropol city. By March 1961 he was First Secretary of the Komsomol for the vast Stavropol region. Two years later he was transferred to the Communist Party organization as head of one of the departments of the regional committee. In 1970, when he was aged 39, he became a member of the Soviet elite, broadly defined, when he was appointed to be a regional party First Secretary – for the whole Stavropol territory, the Soviet equivalent of a provincial governorship. Within his domain a First Secretary wielded vast authority and, in an economically important area (Stavropol was of great agricultural significance), the post rapidly led to membership of the Central Committee of the party which Gorbachev duly entered in 1971.

Spending almost 25 years away from Moscow and back in his native Stavropol territory had several advantages for Gorbachev. Although regional party officials had to accommodate themselves to the policies and pressures of the centre, they had more day-to-day autonomy and less bureaucratic oversight and interference than they would have experienced in a middle-rung post in Moscow. Gorbachev had the opportunity, and the necessity, to exercise his own initiative to a greater extent than would have been possible at that stage of his career at the centre. His Moscow University years had hugely broadened his intellectual horizons, and he took advantage of new possibilities to extend his knowledge and widen his reading.

From 1963 the Stavropol Agricultural Institute had a well-informed Director, Aleksandr Nikonov, who had grown up in independent Latvia between the wars and was knowledgeable both about agriculture and about the work of reformist Soviet economists of the 1920s who were purged by Stalin in the 1930s. Gorbachev had the first-hand knowledge of agriculture that was a product of growing up in a peasant family and of his own work in the fields. He wished, however, to acquire more expertise and so he added to his Moscow law degree by taking part-time a second first degree at the Stavropol Agricultural Institute, writing a dissertation under Nikonov's supervision on the economics of milk production. Many party officials acquired advanced degrees by having doctoral theses written for them, something that Gorbachev's pride would never have countenanced. The fact that it was another first degree he took speaks for itself. Moreover, when I interviewed Nikonov several years after Gorbachev had fallen from power,

he confirmed that Gorbachev had done all his own work in independent study for this second diploma.[20] Gorbachev met frequently with Nikonov during his years back in Stavropol and his regard for his knowledge and abilities was reflected in Nikonov's promotions to important agricultural-administrative posts in Moscow which Gorbachev facilitated after he moved into the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1978.[21]

Gorbachev's reading was untypical for a regional party secretary. He and his wife Raisa (who took the Soviet equivalent of a PhD in sociology at Nikonov's institute and subsequently taught there) subscribed to all the major literary journals in which, in spite of the censorship, important fiction and essays were published. They included the earliest publications of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (starting with *One Day of Ivan Denisovich*) in *Novy mir* in 1962. That monthly was the most anti-Stalinist of the thick journals in the 1960s and the one most eagerly awaited by intellectuals of a reformist or critical disposition. *Novy mir* could be read by anyone in the Soviet Union with the foresight to subscribe to it or with access to a decent library. From the time, however, he became a member of the Central Committee in 1971, Gorbachev had access to political literature that was unavailable to the rest of the population. Although a good many Western books, especially novels, were translated into Russian for general consumption in Brezhnev's time, there were also translations made of political works that did not fit with the Soviet view of the world. They were, however, produced in tiny print runs and made available only to the political elite, especially members of the Central Committee of the party. These included the works of Eurocommunists – Italian and Spanish Communists who were condemned for their 'revisionism' in orthodox Soviet publications – and the political writings and memoirs of Western politicians, among them social democrats such as Willy Brandt. Gorbachev, making full use of the entitlement, had many of these books sent to him in Stavropol where he and his wife, Raisa, read them avidly. When Gorbachev came to London for the first time, he surprised one of his interlocutors by immediately picking up on a reference to 'Parkinson's Law'. Gorbachev had read that book by C. Northcote Parkinson as soon as it came out in Russian translation in the mid-1970s. (It was not, in fact, one of the books forbidden to all but the highest echelon of the political elite, but appeared, on the contrary, in quite a substantial print run. It sold out immediately.) Gorbachev made sufficiently clear in that 1984 London conversation his belief that Parkinson's satirical exposure of self-perpetuating bureaucracy was highly relevant for the Soviet Union.[22]

In addition to the access to scarce information and reading matter which Gorbachev's Central Committee membership bestowed, his specific geographical location provided him with political capital. The Stavropol area, famous for its spas and exclusive sanatoriums, was a popular holiday destination with Politburo members. The most senior Politburo member to be a regular visitor was Mikhail Suslov who was number two in the party

hierarchy to Brezhnev from 1964 until his own death, less than a year before Brezhnev's, in January 1982. Suslov at an earlier stage of his career had been party First Secretary of the Stavropol region. The Stavropol resorts were also much favoured by Yury Andropov, himself a native of the region, who headed the KGB from 1967 to 1982 and was a full member of the Politburo from 1973. Gorbachev had first met Andropov in 1969 but it was especially from his own elevation to the regional First Secretaryship in 1970 that it became part of his duties to meet and converse with all leading party figures who arrived in the Stavropol territory from Moscow. They came away impressed by his abilities and intelligence. Andropov asked the Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies, Georgy Arbatov, in 1977 if the name 'Gorbachev' meant anything to him. Arbatov confessed that it did not. Andropov said that he was one of 'the completely new people with whom it is really possible to link our hopes for the future'.[23] Arbatov further recalled Andropov describing Gorbachev as 'a brilliant man working in Stavropol'.[24]

Gorbachev's status as a regional party first secretary also provided opportunities for travel to Western countries at a time when such trips were very rare for Soviet citizens. In the 1970s, he went abroad not only as a member of official Soviet delegations but – more unusually, even for a party official – as a tourist (accompanied by his wife and a small group of friends). The first Western country he visited was Italy, in 1971, and he followed that in the course of the same decade with visits to Belgium, the Netherlands, France and West Germany. Gorbachev has said on many occasions that it was during those visits that the discrepancy between Soviet propaganda about 'bourgeois' countries and real life in Western Europe became evident to him. Seeing for himself a functioning civil society and political system led him to question his 'a priori faith in the advantages of socialist over bourgeois democracy'.[25] He noted approvingly also the freedom with which people he met in Western Europe spoke, not hesitating to disagree with each other and with their governments. The Soviet group, in contrast, felt obliged 'abroad, as at home (except, of course, for discussions round the kitchen table) to display a constant cohesion and unity of views on all questions'.[26]

Moscow Again: The Evolution of a Communist Reformer

Gorbachev spent just seven years back in Moscow before he became leader of the Communist Party and hence of the Soviet Union. During that time his position within the party hierarchy strengthened and his own reformist views developed. They were more of a departure from Soviet orthodoxy than he could publicly articulate while still aspiring to the party leadership, although even his private views in the early 1980s were by no means as radical as they were subsequently to become. Gorbachev left Stavropol behind him in 1978 when he became the Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for agriculture. His subsequent promotion within the top

leadership team was rapid. While retaining his position in the Secretariat, he became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979 and a full member in 1980. When Andropov succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary in 1982 Gorbachev's responsibilities within the party leadership were expanded to embrace not just agriculture but the economy as a whole. After Andropov died in early 1984 and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko, an attempt by conservative Communists to block Gorbachev's further rise failed and he became second secretary of the party and, in that capacity, chaired Politburo meetings when the ailing Chernenko was absent.

What is especially relevant in the context of this chapter is the way Gorbachev's views developed during these years. Gorbachev took full advantage of Moscow's cultural life. While Brezhnev and other senior members of the Politburo would from time to time escort a visiting foreign dignitary to yet another performance of Swan Lake at the Bolshoi, Gorbachev, invariably accompanied by Raisa, was the only Politburo member to be a regular theatre-goer, seeing the most interesting plays. He also, however, consulted with social scientists on the condition of the Soviet economy and society and, especially from 1984, when he had oversight of international policy within the party Secretariat, with experts on foreign affairs and other countries. From 1982 he had quite frequent meetings with a reform-minded economist, Abel Aganbegyan, the director of an Academy of Sciences economic institute in Siberia, and his colleague Tatiana Zaslavskaya, a sociologist who specialized in problems of the countryside. The latter, in particular, was known for pushing to the limits criticism that would be tolerated by the Soviet authorities – and sometimes going beyond them. She had earned a party reprimand at home and some fame in the outside world when a critical analysis of Soviet social and economic institutions she presented to a closed seminar was leaked and published abroad.

While Gorbachev was careful in what he said in the Politburo, deferring to its senior members and not giving them reason to doubt his reliability, he spoke more critically and frankly with a handful of people. The one person in Brezhnev's top leadership team in that category was the Georgian First Secretary, Eduard Shevardnadze. He and Gorbachev learned about the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 from the mass media, in spite of the fact that both men were at the time candidate members of the Politburo. According to Shevardnadze, they agreed in private conversation that 'it was a fatal error that would cost our country dearly'. Rather, though, than commit political suicide by speaking against this fait accompli in the Politburo, they bided their time until Gorbachev was General Secretary when the process of extracting Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. In Gorbachev's recollection it was also in December 1979 when Gorbachev and Shevardnadze met in the Abkhazian resort of Pitsunda (at that time within Shevardnadze's domain as First Secretary of the Communist Party in Georgia) that Shevardnadze made a broader and more damning assessment

of the state of affairs in the Soviet Union. 'Everything's gone rotten from top to bottom', he said, to which Gorbachev responded, 'I agree with you.'[27] (In Shevardnadze's recollection – after fewer years had passed and so, partly for that reason, probably the more reliable – this exchange, indeed, took place on a winter evening in Pitsunda, but five years later than Gorbachev placed it – in 1984.[28])

For a high party official to have discussions of this degree of frankness, it helped to be far away from Moscow. An especially open discussion of what was wrong with the Soviet Union took place between Gorbachev and Aleksandr Yakovlev – in Canada in 1983. Gorbachev had headed a Soviet delegation to Canada and met with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau as well as having a good look at Canadian agriculture. His most important conversations, however, were with Yakovlev who was in his tenth year as Soviet ambassador to Ottawa. That, for him, was a form of dignified exile from the Communist Party apparatus in Moscow where he had been acting head of the propaganda department before causing offence by criticizing Russian nationalism. In his two volumes of memoirs published in Moscow in 1995, Gorbachev says that the ambassador arranged his programme, but there is not a word about his conversations with Yakovlev at that time. The two men had become estranged by the mid-1990s. Yakovlev, though, has written of how he and Gorbachev, with no one else in earshot, walked together in the fields of a Canadian farm and began to speak without reservation. Gorbachev, as by far the senior partner politically (although eight years junior in age), took the lead. He spoke about 'the backwardness' of the Soviet Union, about 'dogmatism' and about the need for 'cardinal reforms'. Yakovlev, for his part, told Gorbachev how 'primitive and shameful' Soviet politics looked from where he was standing 'on the other side of the planet'.[29]

That such a meeting of minds took place has not only been attested by others with whom Gorbachev and Yakovlev spoke during the perestroika period but by the way Yakovlev's political career took off from that moment. Gorbachev proceeded to engineer Yakovlev's return to Moscow as director of a major and at that time influential institute, IMEMO (Institute of World Economy and International Relations). He called upon him regularly as an adviser and included him in his entourage when he paid his first visit to Britain in December 1984. Gorbachev's patronage is testified even more by the accelerated promotion Yakovlev enjoyed once Gorbachev had acquired the powers of the General Secretaryship. In March 1985 Yakovlev was not even a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. By June 1987, in advancement of extraordinary speed by Soviet standards, he was already not only a Secretary of the Central Committee but also a full member of the Politburo, one of the five most powerful people in the country and the most significant counterweight on the Politburo to the conservative forces within the party leadership. He owed this promotion entirely to Gorbachev

who welcomed and appreciated Yakovlev's reformist ideas, although as General Secretary he also made tactical concessions from time to time to those in the top leadership team who were alarmed by the speed of change.

By the early 1980s Gorbachev had reached the conclusion that the Soviet system needed serious reform as well as personnel change. He was concerned also about the intensification of the Cold War which was an alarming feature of US–Soviet relations during the first Reagan administration. When Gorbachev spoke on foreign policy, which he did from 1984 when it was included in his party portfolio, he was careful not to contradict any aspect of the current Soviet line. That was jealously guarded by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, but the tone of what Gorbachev said was different. His speech to members of the British parliament in December 1984 was a case in point, although at the time the freshness of his personality was more remarked upon than the different nuances of political language. Emphasizing that in a nuclear war there could be no winners, he added that the Cold War was not a normal basis for relations between countries, 'carrying constantly within it a military threat'.[30] To move from Cold War to fruitful negotiations and cooperation required concrete actions and not only words, although, Gorbachev added, 'in politics words are also important'.[31] The world for the first time faced the threat not just of new misfortunes but of the destruction of humanity. Accordingly, 'The nuclear age inescapably demands new political thinking (*novoe politicheskoe myshlenie*).'[32]

This was Gorbachev's first use of the phrase, 'new political thinking', which was to become an overarching watchword for the transformation of Soviet domestic and foreign policy during his years in the Kremlin. Another precept of perestroika which was anticipated in this speech was Gorbachev's introduction of the 'common European home'. 'Europe', he said, 'is our common home. A home, and not a "theatre of military operations".'[33] The Soviet focus was going to be on the speeding-up (*uskorenie*) of scientific and technological progress both in industry and agriculture. To fulfil its 'grandiose and constructive plans', the Soviet Union needed peace. 'This', he said, 'is our principled line which does not depend on any political juncture.'[34] Gorbachev's audience of British parliamentarians liked his style, but they missed what was fresh in his phraseology and, in discounting some of what he said as propaganda, they were unaware that he was setting out a prospectus for change in international relations in which he sincerely believed. Three months later he became leader of one of the world's two military superpowers and had the opportunity to put his principles into practice.

From Communist Reformer to Social Democratic Internationalist

When Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary of the Communist Party and, accordingly, the acknowledged leader of the

Soviet Union on 11 March 1985, his ideas were a mixture of the old and the new. He was unquestionably the most reform-minded member of the Politburo which had elevated him to the party leadership. However, he was chosen not because he was a reformer but for the reason that his relative youth (at 54, he was the youngest member of the top leadership team) had become an advantage following the deaths of three aged Soviet leaders in quick succession, because his abilities had impressed many within the Soviet elite and, not least, because the power and authority he already wielded as second secretary of the Central Committee meant that he was able to seize the initiative. He convened a meeting of the Politburo on the same evening (10 March) as Chernenko died, at which it become clear that no one was ready to challenge him for the succession. The following afternoon he was unanimously selected for the General Secretaryship by the Politburo and formally elected by the Central Committee. It was a Soviet leadership transition of unprecedented speed with the new General Secretary firmly in place less than 24 hours after his predecessor's death.[35]

Gorbachev's basic orientation from the outset of his leadership was to reform the Soviet system and to seek better relations with other countries worldwide – not least with Western Europe (his first foreign visit as Soviet leader in 1985 was to France), the United States (which he first visited in 1987) and China (in 1989 he became the first Soviet party leader since Khrushchev to travel to Beijing). His aims, however, became more far-reaching over time. Whereas initially he wished to see Communist reformers in the ascendancy in Eastern Europe and those countries undertaking their own perestroika, by 1988 he was declaring that the peoples of every country, whether 'capitalist' or 'socialist', had the right to decide for themselves what kind of political and economic system they wished to live in. He made this declaration in his major speech to the Nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party in Moscow in June and reiterated it an address to the United Nations in December 1988.

In the first of these two speeches – on 28 June – Gorbachev stressed 'the universality for international relations' of 'the concept of freedom of choice' which occupied a 'key place in the new thinking'. He optimistically declared that 'sovereignty and independence, equal rights and non-interference are becoming the generally recognized norms of international relations' and that 'a policy of force in all its forms has historically outlived itself'.[36] Gorbachev was deeply suspicious of military intervention, whether by the Soviet Union, the United States or any other country. His major speeches in 1988 made clearer than ever his rejection of the 'Brezhnev doctrine' whereby the Soviet Union had accorded itself the right to intervene in other 'socialist' countries to defend 'socialism' whenever it was endangered (the rationalization that had been produced to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968).[37] When the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe took him at his non-interventionist word in 1989–90, and

those countries became both non-Communist and independent, Gorbachev accepted that outcome. Soviet soldiers were kept in their barracks during popular anti-Communist demonstrations and did not fire a shot. Moreover, those East-Central European Communists who were tempted to crack down on the mounting opposition were strongly advised from Moscow to refrain from using force.[38] Only in Romania, where Gorbachev had no influence over Nicolae Ceaușescu – whose vanity, said Gorbachev, even by the standards of leading politicians, had no competitor[39] – was there serious bloodshed perpetrated by the state authorities.

A rejection of Communism by the East Europeans was the easier for Gorbachev to accept, since his own thinking by 1989–90 had evolved from that of a Communist reformer to the conceptions of a socialist of a social democratic type. He retained a respect for Vladimir Lenin and, especially in the earlier years of his general secretaryship, was much given to citing Lenin. His emphasis was on the late Lenin and the New Economic Policy (NEP) reforms, with their concessions to the peasantry and to private enterprise, introduced in 1921. Initially, perestroika-era reforms had to be justified by reference to the existing ideology, with appropriate quotations from Lenin produced for prudential purposes. Gorbachev, though, cited Lenin not only for tactical reasons, reading more political reformism into the late Lenin than was ever there. Notwithstanding that, his own political reformism soon left Lenin far behind. He embraced the notions of pluralism – in 1987 he called it 'socialist pluralism' but by early 1990 he was speaking of 'political pluralism' – and of civil society and a state based on the rule of law.[40] Embryonic political parties other than the Communist Party emerged in 1989, and in March 1990, with Gorbachev's blessing, they were legalized when the monopoly of power of the CPSU was removed from the Soviet Constitution.

Gorbachev's embrace of a market economy was slower and more hedged with qualifications than his acceptance of political democratization, even though he wished in both cases to proceed on a step-by-step basis. It was harder to do that with the economy. The problem with trying to find a halfway house between a centrally planned command economy and a market economy was that the economic system could finish up neither the one nor the other, as happened in 1990–91. Gorbachev's position was weakened by the fact that the command economy had ceased to function but the institutions of a market economy were not yet in place. When the latter were created in the post-Soviet era, they were far from being on the social democratic model Gorbachev himself had come to favour. He was not in the least attracted to Ronald Reagan's and Margaret Thatcher's favoured economic models but impressed by West Germany's 'social market economy' and by the idea of a politically and socially 'regulated market economy' favoured by West European social democrats. In the new atmosphere in Moscow, in which commentators were free to embrace previously forbidden ideas,

Gorbachev was widely mocked for espousing such a notion. How could it be a market economy if it were 'regulated' was the rhetorical question it had become fashionable to pose. In the years since then the deleterious effects of an insufficiently regulated market economy have been amply demonstrated, and not only in Russia.

Gorbachev's views continued to evolve greatly during his years in the Kremlin. They were influenced by his own advisers and by his foreign interlocutors as well as by public opinion in the Soviet Union. The last of these was essentially a new phenomenon, given expression by opinion polls in which, from the late 1980s, sensitive political questions could be asked and people were not afraid to answer honestly. (Pre-perestroika it is scarcely meaningful to speak of 'Soviet public opinion'. There was a miscellany of private and group opinions.) The *glasnost* (transparency or openness) Gorbachev espoused from the outset of his general secretaryship became within a few short years synonymous with freedom of speech. Among those who had significant influence on Gorbachev's understanding of the Soviet Union's relations with the wider world were his principal foreign policy adviser, Anatoly Chernyaev, his aide on Eastern Europe as well as on reform of the political system, Georgy Shakhnazarov, and Aleksandr Yakovlev. (Eduard Shevardnadze, Gorbachev's surprise choice as Foreign Minister in 1985 in succession to Gromyko, played a constructive and flexible role as the friendly face of the new Soviet international diplomacy, but he was not as important a contributor of ideas as those just mentioned.)

Gorbachev's meetings with Western interlocutors were also extremely important for the refinement of his thinking. He had constructive exchanges of views with US Secretary of State George Shultz, and from Shultz as well as from Margaret Thatcher he gained a better idea of how Soviet foreign policy hitherto had been perceived in the West. With Ronald Reagan, after a difficult start, he found that they had one important idea in common: the need to outlaw nuclear weapons. Gorbachev's anxiety about the possibility of nuclear war breaking out through accident or miscalculation had been present from the outset, but the 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power station had a profound impact on him and intensified his desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Gorbachev and Reagan came close to agreement on steps in that direction at their Reykjavik summit meeting in 1986 which ultimately faltered on Reagan's refusal to compromise on going ahead with his space-based defensive missile programme, the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). In their hostility to the possession of nuclear weapons, Gorbachev and Reagan were closer to one another than either man was to François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, who were passionately attached to their French and British nuclear weapons, seeing them not only as a deterrent but as symbols of their countries' continuing Great Power status.

Whereas some of those in the Soviet Union who had dogmatically defended Soviet-style 'socialism' became almost overnight converts to the advantages of capitalism (not least for themselves, with the possibility of well-placed officials converting control over property into ownership), Gorbachev continued to think of himself as a socialist but radically rethought what he meant by socialism. He had always taken ideas seriously and his favourite foreign interlocutors were the Spanish Socialist prime minister Felipe González and former West German Chancellor (by this time President of the Socialist International, the organization of social democratic parties) Willy Brandt. With González in particular he spent much time discussing what each meant by socialism and finding common ground. Gorbachev has said that by 1989 he had come to the view that the main criterion for 'calling something socialist' was 'the position of the individual in society' and that from then on 'the road I have taken has essentially been the Social Democratic conception of socialism'.[41] It was in 1989 that Gorbachev embraced the concept of 'democratic socialism' which had always been anathema to Soviet Communists who recognized it, accurately enough, as the language of social democrats who used that terminology to distinguish themselves from undemocratic 'socialists', otherwise known as Communists. (The position of 'the individual in society' was not, of course, the only criterion of social democracy for Gorbachev, but it is indicative of the fundamental character of his break with Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism that he chose to stress it as the 'main' one.)

Gorbachev wished to complement the political transformation of the Soviet system with fundamental change in the international system. No other Soviet leader ever came close to being such a 'peacenik'. Aleksandr Yakovlev, in the last book he published (and which is by no means uncritical of Gorbachev), emphasizes Gorbachev's hatred of bloodshed.[42] Thus, even though he wished to keep a renewed Soviet Union intact, he refused to countenance the crackdown, including the imposition of martial law, he was being urged to authorize by senior figures within the CPSU, the army and the security forces. Gorbachev was also extremely reluctant to support military action abroad. In the end, he endorsed the American military response in January 1991 to Saddam Hussein's incursion into Kuwait, though only because the initial aggression had come from the Iraqis and only after sending one of his advisers with long-term contacts in the Middle East, Evgeny Primakov, to Iraq to try to persuade Saddam to withdraw and avoid a war. (Unsurprisingly, Gorbachev was a strong critic of the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.) The most prominent of contemporary ideologists of Russian nationalism, Aleksandr Dugin, has condemned Gorbachev for not having been 'ready to kill'. He has said that 'Gorbachev did not have the historic right to put an end to the activity of the Warsaw Pact, and he should have exterminated Yeltsin for the breakup of the Soviet Union (if not earlier).'[43]

The institutional contours of the 'common European home' of which Gorbachev had spoken as early as 1984 in London, before he was General Secretary, were never spelled out in detail. Yet, Gorbachev, who by the later 1980s found he had more in common with West European democratic leaders than with his counterparts in the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, believed that the country he headed would become an integral part of a new Europe. Gorbachev was the key political actor in bringing about the liberalization and the rapidly developing democratization of the Soviet political system and the transformation of Soviet foreign policy. These changes were the preconditions for the regime change in Eastern Europe in 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany. That, in turn, Gorbachev supposed, meant that the renewed Soviet Union (which in the last of its projected new forms in 1991 was to become not the USSR but the USS – the Union of Sovereign States) would be an integral part of a genuinely cooperative 'common European home'. The first and most obvious reason why this did not happen was the failure of this renewed Union to become a political reality, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this chapter.[44]

Gorbachev deeply believed in the possibility and necessity of ending the Cold War. That process of moving from confrontation to cooperation had involved the peaceful departure from the Soviet orbit of the whole of East-Central Europe. Gorbachev was convinced that the demise of the Warsaw Pact opened up the opportunity for a new security settlement with Western countries who could no longer feel under threat from Moscow. In his most recent book, published in late 2014, Gorbachev is close to despair over the conflict in Ukraine, whose origins, he argues, lie in the way in which the Soviet Union broke up. He writes,

> I fought for the survival of the common Union state using all political means – and I emphasize, political means – available to me. I proposed talks on economic union and on common defence and foreign policy with Ukraine. All outstanding issues, including the status of Sevastopol and Crimea, and the Black Sea Fleet, could have been resolved during such talks.

Ultimately an optimist by nature, however, Gorbachev expresses confidence that eventually 'a revival of the new thinking in international affairs' will take place, since there is no alternative 'if we are to save the world in which we live'.[45]

Notes

1. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reform*, Vol. I (Moscow, 1995), pp. 39–41.
2. Ibid., p. 38.

3. *Izvestiya*, 7 December 1990, p. 4.
4. The name of the Soviet political police changed from time to time. During the last quarter of a century of the Soviet Union's existence, they were known as the KGB. During the very worst years of Stalin's terror, they bore the initials, NKVD, the Russian abbreviation for People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
5. Mikhail Gorbachev and Daisaku Ikeda, *Moral Lessons of the Twentieth Century: Gorbachev and Ikeda on Buddhism and Communism* (London, 2005), p. 14.
6. Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, Vol. I, p. 50.
7. Ibid., p. 46.
8. Ibid., p. 59.
9. Pavel Gratsianksy, an academic lawyer in the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, whom I knew well, overlapped with Gorbachev in the Law Faculty of Moscow University. When I asked him in the early 1980s if he had known Gorbachev at the university, he said that he had known him very well by sight. He was widely recognizable on account of his Order of the Red Banner. It distinguished him from all the other students in the Law Faculty who, like Gorbachev (and Gratsiansky), had been too young to fight in the war.
10. One of Gorbachev's favourite teachers was Stepan Fedorovich Kechek'yan, whose education had taken place before the First World War and had included study in France. He lectured on the history of political and legal thought from the ancient Greeks to the Enlightenment and beyond. Referring to his lectures, Gorbachev said, 'He opened an entire world of ideas for us . . . The history of human thought, a world we had not known, excited our minds.' See Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdenek Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York, 2002), p. 22. Professor Kechek'yan was a knowledgeable and kindly man, as I can testify from personal experience. When I was attached to the Law Faculty of Moscow State University as a British Council exchange scholar for the first three months of 1966, Kechek'yan was my academic adviser.
11. Zdenek Mlynář, 'Il mio compagno di studi Mikhail Gorbaciov', *L'Unità*, 9 April 1985, p. 9.
12. Ibid.
13. Zdenek Mlynář, *Nightfrost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism* (London, 1980), p. 27. Mlynář was the principal author of the Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968, a reformist document vehemently condemned in Moscow. Following the Soviet invasion, Mlynář resigned from political office and was subsequently expelled from the party. A leading dissident in the 1970s, he was a founder-signatory of the oppositional document, Charter 77. From 1977 he lived in exile in Vienna. His political memoir, *Nightfrost in Prague*, was first published in 1978, both in a Czech *tamizdat* edition (in small format, suitable for smuggling into Communist Czechoslovakia) and in German.
14. Some years before Gorbachev became Soviet leader, I said to Mlynář that I assumed he would not wish me to quote him by name on anything he had said to me about Gorbachev. 'Only after he has become General Secretary', he agreed with a smile, since his hope that this might happen was very much less than a confident expectation. Mlynář himself published not a word about Gorbachev until his friend had been duly installed in the Kremlin, but then wrote the long and informative article on their student years together for the Italian Communist Party newspaper, *L'Unità*, cited in note 11.
15. Gorbachev and Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev*, pp. 22–3.

16. Ibid., p. 23.
17. Raisa Gorbachev, *I Hope: Reminiscences and Reflections* (London, 1991), p. 66.
18. Ibid., p. 81.
19. Ibid., p. 20.
20. I interviewed Aleksandr Nikonov in Moscow on 20 April 1994. For more detailed discussion of Gorbachev's relationship with Nikonov, see Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 43–4.
21. In the same year that Gorbachev became the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union responsible for Agriculture, Nikonov moved to the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in Moscow. In 1984, by which time Gorbachev was second secretary within the party and wielding increasing influence, Nikonov was appointed head of that academy. From 1986 (when Gorbachev was already General Secretary), Nikonov combined that post with the deputy chairmanship of the State Committee for the Agro-Industrial Complex.
22. Archie Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford, 2007), p. 47.
23. G.A. Arbatov, *Zatyanuvsheesya vyzdorovlenie (1953–1985 gg.): Svidetel'stvo sovremennika* (Moscow, 1991), p. 303.
24. Arbatov interview in Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, *Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers* (New York, 1989), p. 312.
25. Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, Vol. I, p. 169.
26. Ibid.
27. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Naedine s soboy* (Moscow, 2012), p. 277.
28. Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (London, 1991), p. 37.
29. Aleksandr Yakovlev, *Sumerki* (Moscow, 2003), p. 354.
30. M.S. Gorbachev',Vystuplenie pered chlenami parlamenta Velikobritanii, 18 dekabrya 1984 goda', in Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i* (Moscow, 1987), Vol. II, pp. 109–16 (110).
31. Ibid., p. 111.
32. Ibid., p. 112.
33. Ibid., p. 114.
34. Ibid., p. 115.
35. For further detail on Gorbachev's accession to the General Secretaryship, see Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World*, pp. 37–42, esp. note 26, pp. 39–40.
36. Mikhail Gorbachev in *XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 42–3.
37. Gorbachev himself has said that he made it clear enough to the East European leaders as early as 1985 that the 'Brezhnev doctrine' of limited sovereignty no longer applied to them. It appeared, however, that his interlocutors 'did not understand me very well and even did not believe me'. See Mikhail Gorbachev, *Ponyat' perestroyku . . . Pochemu eto vazhno seychas* (Moscow, 2006), p. 70.
38. Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The Soviet Union and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997), pp. 86–7, 186.
39. Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reform*, Vol. II, p. 392.
40. Space does not permit a detailed chronological account here of the social democratization of Gorbachev's thinking during his years as Soviet leader. For such an analysis, see Archie Brown, 'Did Gorbachev as General Secretary Become a Social Democrat?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 65.2, March 2013, pp. 198–220.
41. Gorbachev and Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev*, p. 79.

42. Yakovlev, *Sumerki*, p. 520.
43. Aleksandr Dugin, 'Perestroyka po-evraziyski: uspushchennyy shans', in V.I. Tolstykh (ed.), *Perestroyka: Dvadtsat' let spustya* (Moscow, 2005), pp. 88–97 (96).
44. See Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism* (London, 2009), chapter 27, 'The Break-up of the Soviet State', pp. 549–73; and Serhii Plokhy, *The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union* (New York, 2014).
45. M.S. Gorbachev, *Posle Kremlya* (Moscow, 2014), 'Posleslovie', pp. 405–10, esp. p. 410.

13
Nelson Mandela

Rita Barnard and Monica Popescu

Introduction

Nelson Mandela's 1994 autobiography *Long Walk to Freedom* concludes with a moving meditation on the way in which his concept of freedom gradually broadened out until it extended far beyond the personal, racial and national, to become an all-inclusive vision of a universal and indivisible liberty. It is because of this broad humanistic vision that Mandela became a figure of global importance, even though his time in office as the first president of a newly democratic South Africa was, in fact, quite brief. The history of how this happened, how Mandela accrued this international status, especially after his release from prison in February 1990, has already been traced by many other writers. It is a fascinating story: at once a drama of international reconfiguration, of national reimaging, of transnational solidarity, of the media, of machinations on the part of opposing political parties and, of course, of a fine, tactical performance of dignified selfhood. That story is already part of our history of the twentieth century. But how did Mandela see the world and how was this vision constrained or enabled by political circumstances? If he came to be received by the world as a galvanizing emblem of moral world citizenship and as an embodiment of the possibility (however short-lived) of an entirely new post-Cold War global dispensation, how did Mandela's own cognitive map of the world originate and evolve to match this moment? What were its outlines, its lineaments of political aversion and solidarity?

A Note on Sources

To answer these questions it is inevitable that scholars return to the various biographies, and to *Long Walk to Freedom*. But we must do so with an understanding that it is a ghostwritten work and one that does the work of national reconciliation: it is, if you will, a *Bildungsroman* as national allegory. More useful, for scholars with an interest in 'mental maps', may be the

collection *Conversations with Myself* and the quotation book *Nelson Mandela by Himself*, both put together by the research team of the Nelson Mandela Foundation.[1] These two books, lacking the constraints of the chapter division, temporal sequences, life episodes and the generally teleological thrust of traditional autobiography, allow for the transnational dimension of Mandela's life, as well as the Cold War background against which his role in the anti-apartheid struggle unfolded, to emerge quite clearly. In these books the information about Mandela's life is recast in a more flexible format, so that local aspects of the anti-apartheid struggle fit within a larger international political frame (in the quotation book, for instance, a remark on the role of 'civic associations' sits side by side with a remark on 'China'). This allows for a reading in which China, India, Cuba, Ghana, the USA and the UK, all of which feature as independent entries in the quotation book, contextualize the anti-apartheid struggle, and present it against the background of other countries' demand for independence and their fight against the threat of neocolonial powers. The fragmented format of the two books encourages further data processing by keyword searches of electronic text, an approach that highlights a constellation of Cold War terms, influences and points of dialogue that stretch beyond Mandela's visit abroad in 1962 and which allow for the submerged Cold War global landscape to surface as an integral part of the anti-apartheid struggle.

This is not to say that *Long Walk* is devoid of international interest – not at all. Indeed, as Lize van Robbroek has noted in her discussion of the comic book version of the autobiography, even such things as Mandela's sartorial choices articulate his sense of the various audiences to whom he addresses his visual self, whether as Africanist, respectable lawyer, negotiator in a suit or elder statesman in his famous Madiba shirt.[2] The way in which Mandela deployed his own iconic image implied a vision of the world to which he was appealing and in which he was creating a place for South Africa. We might suggest, additionally, especially since the discussion in this chapter remains broadly chronological, that the searchable electronic version of *Long Walk to Freedom* enables us to read this text too against the grain of its narrative. By tracing out the various occurrences of the word 'world', for instance, one might find a way to read the book not as a *Bildungsroman*, but as a work of spatial imaginings: an account, precisely, of the construction of the mental map of one of the heroes of the twentieth century.

The Making of the Map: 1918–60

Mandela was born in 1918 in Mvezo in the rural Transkei in what is now the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. His father Nkosi Gadla Mapakaniswa Mandela was the headman of the village and advisor to the Thembu king, a descendant, as the Xhosa describe it, of the left-hand side of the royal house. In his reminiscences about his happy childhood – a rural life of

stick-fighting, herding cattle, listening to the stories and ruminations of elders – Mandela asserted that his world at this stage was 'entirely shaped by custom, ritual and taboo'. He was 'a country boy', he said, 'whose range of vision and experience was influenced mainly by events in the area in which he grew up and the colleges to which he was sent'.[3] Yet, it would be a mistake to see Mandela's early mental map as merely village-bound. By the time of his birth, the Xhosa people had, after all, been forcibly compelled for over two hundred years to extend their sense of the relevant world beyond the local and the immediate: such is the nature of colonial encounters. During their brutal war against the British government of the Cape Province in 1854 (the time of the Crimean War), the Xhosa people learned that the English had an enemy – the Russians – and the Xhosa, assuming these Russians to be ancestors, posted sentries on the hills to await their arrival by sea. The Xhosa practice of incorporating the names of different countries into personal names – NomaRussia, NoEngland, NoMoscow and so forth – is a sign of a kind of aspirational internationalism, one that complicates narrow and ahistorical conceptions of pristine African traditionalism. By the 1880s Thembuland was fully under British administration and also subject to energetic missionary activity. These processes were also accompanied by the expansion of the capitalist world system, especially after the discovery of gold; it meant that village men across rural South Africa could be drawn as miners into the sphere of industrial modernity with its ambivalent mix of destruction and empowerment. Thus the imaginings of Mandela's generation – and, indeed, two before his – included the possibility of work in Johannesburg and elsewhere on the Witwatersrand. Decades later, Mandela was still to recall the name of a particular boy in his circumcision class who bragged about his many visits to the glittering city up north.

The schools Mandela attended at Clarkebury and Healdton in the Eastern Cape were Wesleyan mission schools. Here he received an education that was almost entirely British: the curriculum fostered in him an abiding appreciation of a certain style of English gentlemanliness and an admiration for parliamentary democracy. Though he was later to mimic him with some irony, Mandela seems to have been impressed by his headmaster, Dr Arthur Wellington, who claimed to be a descendant of the famous duke, who 'saved civilization' – for Europe and 'for you, the natives', as he liked to tell Mandela and his fellows.[4] African culture, Mandela once claimed, did not exist in the curriculum: if Africans were noted in the textbooks, they were savages and thieves.[5] And yet, one of the crucial incidents he remembers from high school suggests a different kind of cognitive mapping. The performance of the praise poet Samuel Mqayi at his school etched itself permanently in Mandela's mind. Brandishing a spear, Mqayi divided the constellations between the nations of the world – ceding the entire Milky Way to those greedy nations of Europe, the British, the French and the Germans, but reserving for the House of Xhosa the bright morning star: the star by which

the years of manhood are counted. To judge by Mandela's reflections on this incident in his autobiography, it was for him both an acknowledgement of a wide, unequal world and a validation of a broad Xhosa (rather than narrowly Thembu) identity.

From Healdton, Mandela moved to Alice to study at the distinguished University of Fort Hare. Though the town was small (Mandela describes life there as a sanctuary from the world), it drew students from across Southern Africa, and among its faculty members were cosmopolitan figures with degrees from abroad like D.D.T. Jabavu and J.B. Matthews. It was a place that fostered in its students a sense that a leadership position would fall to them almost naturally: an assumption that Mandela (who, as it turned out, had to travel a very difficult road to leadership) retrospectively casts as provincial and naïve. But we should also remember that this was the era of the Second World War and Mandela took a great interest in its unfolding. He recalls listening to Winston Churchill's speeches and confesses to having identified with General Jan Smuts, a world leader of distinction, but one who, like Mandela, spoke English with a strong accent that revealed his rural and colonial origins. It is also interesting to note, given his deft performances in the USA after his release from prison (his ability to cite American cultural history and invoke its heroes), that Mandela once performed the part of John Wilkes Booth in a play that included a recitation of Lincoln's Gettysburg address.

If the Fort Hare years were formative for Mandela's mental maps, his impulsive escape to Johannesburg (to avoid a marriage arranged by his chiefly guardian) was decisive. Johannesburg, a vibrant cosmopolitan city, was always a polyglot place, founded by miners and merchants from all over the globe. Mandela writes about the city as a space of transformation, where 'a poor peasant could transform himself into a wealthy sophisticate'.[6] His sojourn in the township of Alexandra, especially during the 1948 bus boycott, offered lessons in a gritty urban cosmopolitanism against the odds: 'In spite of the hellish aspects of life in Alexandra, the township was also a kind of heaven. Instead of being Xhosas or Sothos or Zulus or Shangaans, we were Alexandrans. This created a sense of solidarity; differences were being erased.'[7] As Mandela became increasingly active in the ANC, he was first drawn to the racial thought of a young intellectual called Anton Lembede. Africanism in Lembede's key was already transethnic, modern and to some extent symbolic or rhetorical; but it drew strong lines of exclusion: communism, for instance, was unacceptable as a 'foreign' ideology. Mandela, as Philip Bonner and others have demonstrated, came to adhere, certainly by the time of the Defiance Campaign in 1956, to a politics of non-racialism: a position influenced by the experience of working across lines of colour with communist and Indian colleagues.[8] This was, needless to say, a far more ecumenical and syncretic position than Lembede's and one that has invited parallels with the earlier transformation of Gandhi in the same city. To be sure, the comparison can be taken only so far, since Mandela was not wedded

to non-violence (he was more drawn to Nehru, the modernizer and practical politician); but, as Jonathan Hyslop has argued, both Gandhi and Mandela learned in Johannesburg to work across inherited lines of social distinction.[9] The city's dynamic and hybrid modernity helped both to develop an inclusive rather than sectarian idea of nationalism, which Mandela was able to put into practice many years later, after his release from prison.

Hyslop's eloquent essay makes a further important point. Though Mandela was shaped by his schooling in a way that placed London at the metropolitan centre of his imagined world, the style he gradually adopted in Johannesburg during the early apartheid years was 'notably Americanized'.[10] We may observe here a curious contradiction in South African politics and culture. During the Cold War era (about which we will say more later), the Afrikaner nationalists saw themselves as firmly on the side of the West in the bi-polar global system, opposed to the godless communists; yet a visceral anti-Americanism drove other aspects of the nationalists' vision: it led, for instance, to a loud disapprobation of pop music as a dangerous communist influence on South African youth; and it meant that television (viewed as an American influence) only came to South Africa in 1976. But black urbanites, especially in the freehold township of Sophiatown during the 1950s, joyfully absorbed American cultural influences, and in the process transformed their unaccommodating dwelling spaces into what Ulf Hannerz has called a semi-periphery: an exciting zone of contact and transfer between the broad world and the local, where a certain kind of cosmopolitanism could be not only imagined, but performed, often through modes of consumption and various forms of artistic expression – in ways that Mandela, with his boxing gloves, bespoke suit, floral tie and his Oldsmobile (a rare possession for a black South African) clearly relished.[11]

Such forms of expression and mobility might seem trivial in the context of this volume's collective discussion of the geopolitical imaginary of world leaders; but we must remember that apartheid was designed to curb the aspirations and shrink the mental maps of black South Africans: its geographical and educational schemes were designed to force them not to inhabit the modern, urban world at all. With this in mind, the fact that the politically ambitious Mandela hung pictures of Roosevelt, Stalin, Gandhi and the storming of the Winter Palace in 1917 on the wall of his little matchbox house in Orlando is quite poignant. These images of identification and aspiration confirm Hyslop's conception of the city as a site that generates imaginative encounters beyond its immediate confines.[12]

Revolutionary Alignments: 1960–62

A decisive event in South African history was, of course, the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, which elicited intense anger abroad and pushed key ANC leaders – notably Mandela himself – towards a conviction that armed

struggle had become the only viable political option. He was aware of the momentousness of the move and therefore zealously sought to broaden his understanding of world politics. 'We must make a thorough study of all revolutions, including the ones that failed', he wrote in his diary.[13] Mandela therefore read Luis Taruk's book *Born of the People*, about the agrarian insurgency in the Philippines, Menachem Begin's *The Revolt*, Che Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare* and Mao Ze Dong's *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War* (the Long March, he later declared, was a revolutionary 'masterpiece').[14] He even studied the Boer guerrilla, Deneys Reitz's memoir of the Boer War.[15] In other words, Mandela strove to see the task of the armed wing of the ANC (Umkontho we Sizwe), formed in 1961, in a broadly comparative context: not as something exceptional, but as part of decolonizing and revolutionary struggles elsewhere in the world. Fidel Castro's bold actions, in particular, provided Mandela with arguments for his strategy: in his debates with the principled communist, Moses Kotane (who believed that it was not yet time to abandon organization of grassroots resistance), Mandela invoked the vanguardist success of the Cuban Revolution, declaring that if one waited for the textbook revolutionary moment it would never come.[16]

The surprise elicited by Mandela's continued loyalty to Castro and Gaddafi after his release from prison (when he was recast as a kind of saintly reconciler) makes little sense if one grasps the context of political formation: the years of his most serious study of world politics took place in the post-Bandung moment, in which revolutionary change still seemed a possibility. So, while the South African transition to democracy could not have occurred before the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, Mandela's own mental map cannot be grasped without bearing in mind the geopolitical configuration that held sway at the time of his most extensive journey before his imprisonment: his 1962 trip to various newly independent African states, only a few years after Bandung, with the Cuban and Algerian revolutions and Nasser's takeover in Egypt still in the very recent past. Mandela's account of the tour presents him as something of an excited Africanist: he takes note, for instance, of the dignity of Emperor Haile Selassie formally presiding as head of state, and notes the antiquities of Egypt as a mark of Africa's proud place in the long history of civilization. But he also travelled as an aspirant guerrilla fighter and revolutionary, whose comparative political imagination is constantly on the alert. Mandela learned, for example, from Dr Mustafai of the FLN in Algeria that the organization had at first envisaged a heroic military onslaught like Dien Bien Phu, but that they were soon brought to the realization that guerrilla warfare, waged with the aim of forcing a change in the world's perception of the political stakes in the conflict, was their only option. Whether the overthrow of apartheid was to happen under a red, Marxist or a black, Africanist revolutionary banner would also shape the alliances and forms of support the ANC could receive. Kenneth Kaunda, a former ANC colleague and future president of Zambia,

warned Mandela that African leaders were closely scrutinizing what appeared to be his party's too-close alliance with the South African Communists, at a moment when a tide of nationalism and black pride swept across the continent. 'Communism was suspect not only in the West but in Africa', Mandela inferred.[17]

Global public opinion, in other words, becomes increasingly important in Mandela's calculations (as much so as his efforts towards fundraising and military training) and this also was the target of his speech from the dock at the Rivonia trial, where he and his comrades, fully prepared to hang for the crime of sabotage, received life sentences instead. And it was important that European and American audiences be swayed by the heroism of the accused and the justice of their cause. But it is also crucial to bear in mind that the underground ANC's strategies were forged against a Cold War backdrop: these comparisons elicited by Mandela's readings and travels were a mode of inscribing himself and the ANC–SACP alliance on his mental map of the Cold War.

The View from Prison: 1963–90

It is fascinating to consider Mandela's sense of the world during the 27 years of his imprisonment. If one visits Robben Island where he was incarcerated until 1982, one is immediately struck by its geographical remoteness. It is not a hell hole: the simple minimal structures remind one somewhat of apartheid-era schools or post offices. It is signally some way off the African continent (Mandela called himself a 'citizen across the waves'), but with a grand view of it.[18] The impressive façade of Table Mountain in the distance served as a constant reminder of the nation to which the prisoners' sacrifices bound them. It stood not only as a symbol of disconnection but of hope and solidarity – transnational solidarity too. Mandela was able to relate Robben Island to other island prisons where anti-colonial insurgents were detained: the Andaman Islands and Fernando Po. There were, to be sure, moments in which Mandela sensed complete isolation: when, as he puts it, it felt as though the world itself was dying. But, Robben Island also offered a rich trove of shared experience and knowledge: Mandela (not unlike Nehru) writes of the pleasure of sharing the years of confinement with educated and well-travelled colleagues, including people like Neville Alexander, who entered Robben Island with a PhD from Tübingen, and Mac Maharaj, who studied at the London School of Economics. One should also remember that among the prisoners in Section B isolation cells was Herman Andinga Toivo ya Toivo, the leader of the South West African People's Organization: such contacts made it possible for Mandela to continue viewing the South African struggle in a comparative light.

The isolation of prison, of course, made for a particular keenness to acquire news: it is touching to read, for instance, how Mandela acquired the information that his comrade Rusty Bernstein was in Zambia from a

scrap of newspaper he picked up at the Robben Island Quarry. The prisoners' slow and incrementally successful struggles to win rights for more humane treatment always included the rights of access to newspapers and study and library privileges. Mandela's reading continued to have an international and comparative cast (evident, for instance, in his likening of Shaka to Kutuzov, the Russian general, about whom he read in *War and Peace*).[19] Mandela also had the foresight to learn Afrikaans and read Afrikaans literature: something that stood him in good stead in the ultimately successful communications with Afrikaner nationalists. All of these efforts confirm Mandela's declaration, in a moving letter to a friend, that he managed in prison to 'remain cosmopolitan in [his] outlook'.[20] Curiously, this attitude might have been more difficult to accomplish by those who, in the grim years following Mandela's imprisonment, were subjected to apartheid's brutal geographical structures, the daily grind of commuting, the slow violence of living in small matchbox houses in areas devoid of shops or libraries and electricity.

In 1982, Mandela was moved to Pollsmoor Prison, with five of his old Rivonia companions. Here they felt the sense of physical confinement more profoundly than ever: Mandela cites the experience of Oscar Wilde, 'the little tent of blue that prisoners call the sky'.[21] Yet, increasingly, as his brief diary entries from the period indicate, he had a keen sense of his own mounting international status: he notes the many honorary doctorates and freedoms of various cities abroad that started to come his way. If Mandela already had a sense, during his statements from the dock, that he was playing for a world audience, which would condemn the apartheid regime and question its legality, that sense only increased as the anti-apartheid struggle became global in the 1980s. The 1980s were the era of Reagan and Thatcher: the left in the UK and the USA found itself entrapped by conservative policies at home and depressing adventurism abroad like the Falklands war and the US invasion of Granada and machinations in Nicaragua. In this political climate (especially in the USA, where race continued – and indeed continues – to pose unresolved issues of inequality and injustice) the political battle in South Africa, with its clear ethical and affective stakes – increasingly projected onto the figure of the world's most famous prisoner – invited a deferred and displaced moral intensity on the part of a youthful political generation. One might even say that their mental maps were extended: Mandela's example, Barack Obama, then a student, confesses, 'helped awaken [him] to the wider world', and brought a sense that 'one did not have to accept the world as it is'.[22]

After 1990: The End of Cold War

The apartheid era began in 1948 and it ended on 11 February 1990 when the new Nationalist Party president F.W. de Klerk made his stunning announcement in Parliament that the banning of all the underground political parties

would be rescinded, that Nelson Mandela would be released and that the time for negotiations had begun. The timing of this announcement had everything to do with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Whether we see it in an idealistic way, as a response to the new configurations of political freedom, or as a cold calculation that the ANC was weakened by the fact that it could no longer rely on logistical support from the Soviet bloc, is in a sense irrelevant. With de Klerk's announcement, South Africa's position in the world radically changed.

To understand how radical that change was, it is useful to underscore the simple and obvious fact that the timespan of apartheid coincided with the Cold War. The Cold War climate determined the rhetoric of apartheid politicians who projected the image of white South Africa as the last outpost of Christianity and Western civilization standing alone against the Marxist enemy at the gates (or, more accurately, in the frontline states sympathetic to the anti-apartheid struggle). It served to create support out of white fears of the red and black. The Cold War was cited by apologists to justify apartheid and to distract attention from the oppressiveness of the regime. But the same Cold War climate actually shaped the alliances formed by the African National Congress and its ally, the South African Communist Party. In similar ways, even if pursuing opposite goals, the leaders on both sides of the apartheid divide inscribed themselves as actors on the geopolitical and cultural maps of the Cold War, simultaneously limited by the East–West fault lines, yet able to tap into its discourses in order to make their voices heard.

With the end of apartheid South Africa was transformed from 'polecat to a miracle', as Mandela put it: it became global in a new way (as was most dramatically evidenced by the unprecedented number of world leaders and celebrities from a huge spectrum of political persuasions who arrived for Mandela's inauguration in 1994).[23] It is therefore tempting, especially in the context of this international study of mental maps, to discuss his presidency only in terms of foreign policy and his interventions in regional and global affairs. But it is important not to lose sight of the fact that apartheid – the term after all means 'separateness' – was a spatial mode of exercising power and this meant that the struggle to transform the country was therefore also an exercise in recreating the national map. The new government faced the vast practical task of reincorporating the bantustans into nine new provinces and reorganizing racially segregated local authorities into more appropriate administrative units. Mandela's charisma facilitated the spatial reimagining of the nation in ways that exceeded the bureaucratic. In discussions of his efforts at nation-building, his deft sartorial choices (like his famous donning of a springbok rugby jersey during the 1996 World Cup final) are often noted; but his journeys, his choices of performance venues, were possibly equally important in this essentially symbolic task. We might think here of his decision to cast his vote near the birthplace of former ANC president John Dube in Natal province (the Zulu Inkatha Party joined the election very

late and after much violence), his travels to the Afrikaner separatist enclave of Orania and also his renaming of the presidential mansion in Cape Town as Genadendal (Valley of Mercy), in honour of an old Moravian Mission station and a historically 'coloured' town.

James Barber is nevertheless right to emphasize the fact that 'the domestic revolution also transformed [South Africa's] foreign relations' and its standing in the world.[24] In Mandela's first two years after his release from prison, he visited 49 different countries: his epic diplomatic (and fundraising) journeys are a measure of the high priority the ANC placed on reconquering global visibility after having been underground for so long. One cannot but be struck by how well Mandela, the long-time prisoner, performed in this capacity: an accomplishment that is surely a sign of his intellectual preparation for the assumption of power, which he had always believed to be possible. As Tom Lodge has observed, Mandela's familiarity with Anglo-American culture facilitated his performance and rapturous reception in the UK and the US.[25] During his triumphal 1990 tour of the USA, Mandela consistently refused interviewers' urgings to comment on US politics, but he nevertheless tapped into deep political rifts in US society, so that his presence, as some commentators noted at the time, also influenced the mental maps of many African Americans: a correspondent for the *Village Voice*, for instance, observed that, during his visit, African Americans could for a brief while feel themselves to be at the centre of world politics. Mandela, as Lodge puts it, 'consolidated the leadership credentials' of African American leaders and reignited a fire that had been extinguished in the void left by the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X.[26]

But the contradictions, gaffes and moments of bemusement in these years are also striking. For Mandela and his government, it was important to foster the country's standing as a regional power in Africa and it is therefore no accident that Mandela's first international trip was to countries that had hosted the ANC during its time underground, many of which he recalled from his formative African journey in 1962. The contrast between the two moments is interesting: whereas in the 1960s, Mandela's advocacy of non-racialism was not particularly popular with African leaders, including Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, on his return to that country, Mandela was met by a rapturous crowd of half a million Tanzanians – an event that repeated itself in many venues. But as his presidency unfolded, relationships with African nations were not entirely smooth. He failed to sway General Sani Abacha to stay the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa; his attempts to broker a peace agreement in Congo also met with little success. Even his vice president, Thabo Mbeki, felt that Mandela had overstepped a (morally dubious) golden rule in Africa – that African states do not criticize each other – with his calls for sanctions against the Abacha regime in Nigeria. Late in his presidency, however, Mandela's efforts as chief negotiator in the Burundian civil war were more effective: not least because of his ability, on the one hand, to appeal

to the Burundian people and, on the other, to bring no less of a political celebrity than Bill Clinton to meet with the negotiators, thereby exposing their behaviour to global scrutiny and raising the stakes for a successful accord.

Mandela's own struggle moved him to conduct a foreign policy in which human rights featured centrally. However, the old Cold War lineaments of his mental map – the abiding sense of revolutionary solidarity – often made for ambivalence on this score. He certainly risked alienating the USA and the UK by his insistence that the enemies of one's friends are not necessarily one's own enemies, and retained amicable relationships with countries like Cuba, Libya, Syria and Iran, where the climate for human rights was dismal. This loyalty (regrettable to established powers of the global North), however, brought with it some positive possibilities: it was Mandela who was able to bring about negotiations with Libya that led to the extradition of the Lockerbie bombers and a resolution of sorts to that painful episode. As Lodge puts it, Mandela was in some ways able to act as a kind of mediator between the USA and the UK and the global South.[27] Those older Cold War mental maps were still residually visible in Mandela's conduct and thought. What to the ANC appeared as the perplexing about-turn executed by former Eastern European allies, who ditched communism overnight and proceeded to pursue a capitalist lifestyle, brought about diplomatic tensions. If Prague, Budapest and East Berlin had generously hosted ANC members, acting in consonance with the principles of internationalism and 'the solidarity of the peoples', the governments freshly installed after the fall of the Wall opened up diplomatic and trade relations with the National Party in Pretoria with astonishing alacrity. In 1990 Mandela ignored an invitation to visit Prague shortly after de Klerk had been there. It was only after 1992, when an ANC delegation met with Eastern European counterparts to talk about the challenges of transition, that the sense of betrayal and perplexity experienced by the ANC–SACP alliance began to ease.[28]

It is also interesting in this context to observe the influence of rising Asian nations on Mandela's thinking (one might recall again his admiration for the 'masterpiece' that was Mao's revolution). His visit to Davos in 1992 is often noted as a moment when he fully recognized that the ANC's policies of nationalization were unworkable in the new post-Cold War economic dispensation – especially given the fact that the apartheid government had left their successors with empty coffers. The revolutionary fantasy of a redistribution of wealth was tempered perforce by the unexpected fragility of the South African economy. But it was apparently his conversations with attending industrialists from China and Vietnam that finally persuaded Mandela that South Africa should adopt a neoliberal, business-friendly macro-economic policy, even though that plan went against the expectations of many political comrades – not to mention the nation's hopeful and long-suffering poor. It is in this politico-economic context that one

might understand his interest, stirred during a state visit to Malaysia, in the controversial *bumiputra* schemes of reserving jobs in the public sector for ethnic Malays: there were, he thought, interesting comparisons to be made between South Africa and Malaysia, in the sense that the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie had emerged in both countries as a national priority. Interestingly, one finds Mandela here reverting to his point (suppressed, incidentally, in the communist stalwart Ruth First's edition of his speeches from the 1950s under the Nehruvian rubric, *No Easy Walk to Freedom*) that he was in favour of the development of a national bourgeoisie and that free enterprise might flourish once democracy had been established in South Africa.

Conclusion

A small anecdote in Mandela's autobiography allows for a final characterization of his mental map of the world. It is one of those moments in his writing when we get a sense of Mandela as an old man, long removed from the world, whose ideas were shaped in earlier historical moments, and yet also very much a man of his own particular moment of greatness: the end of the Cold War. Mandela recounts how, after his triumphal tour of the USA, his plane stopped to refuel at Goose Bay, Canada. At the edge of the tarmac in the freezing weather, he saw a group of young people in parkas and asked who they were: 'Eskimos', he was told. Mandela went over to shake their hands, and they greeted him with struggle slogans, like 'Viva ANC!' His reflections are worth citing: 'In my seventy-two years on earth', Mandela muses,

> I had never met an Innuit [*sic*] and never imagined that I would . . . What struck me so forcefully was how small the planet had become during my decades in prison; it was amazing to me that a teenaged Innuit living at the roof of the world could watch the release of a political prisoner on the southern tip of Africa. Television had shrunk the world, and had in the process become a great weapon for eradicating ignorance and promoting democracy.[29]

The encounter with these young people was particularly striking to Mandela, as the passage makes clear, because he could identify with the Inuit as colonized subjects. There are parallels, he tells us, between the plights of black South Africans and the Inuit people: as aboriginals who were historically mistreated by a white settler population. He even recalls how the 'racist, colonialist textbooks' he read in his mission schools used to represent 'Eskimos' as backward people – just as Africans were cast only in the roles of 'savages and thieves'.[30] Implicit in this autobiographical recollection from his presidency, then, is a modernist and modernizing vision: one of a new

world, still fresh and strange to the former prisoner, but one in which new connections and insights may be forged through a comparative understanding of historical struggles. What is revealed beautifully here is what Elleke Boehmer has described as Mandela's postcolonial assertion: that humanness and Africanness (or Inuit-ness for that matter) are co-extensive, not antithetical.[31] Mandela's mental map in the era when he finally became a national and global leader remained fundamentally shaped by his own formation as an African nationalist in the era of the Cold War; but it was flexible enough for him to reclaim, for his country and its citizens, a stake in a moment of geopolitical transformation, where the potential for new modes of political solidarity and global citizenship seemed to lie open.

Notes

1. Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (Boston, 1994); Nelson Mandela, *Conversations with Myself* (New York, 2010); *Nelson Mandela by Himself: The Authorised Book of Quotations* (London, 2011).
2. Lize van Robbroeck, 'The Visual Mandela: A Pedagogy of Citizenship', in Rita Barnard (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Nelson Mandela* (New York, 2014), pp. 244–66.
3. Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, p. 408.
4. Mandela, *Long Walk*, p. 37.
5. Tom Lodge, *Mandela: A Critical Life* (Oxford and New York, 2006), p. 4.
6. Mandela, *Long Walk*, p. 55
7. Mandela, *Long Walk*, p. 77.
8. Phillip Bonner, 'The Antinomies of Nelson Mandela', in Barnard (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Nelson Mandela*, pp. 34–45. Recently discovered documents suggest that he was more than just sympathetic to the non-racialism of his Marxist colleagues. Long concealed due to the ideological pressures of the Cold War, his adhesion to the South African Communist Party probably took place in 1960. See Paul S. Landau, 'The ANC, MK, and the "Turn to Violence" (1960–1962)', *South African Historical Journal* 64.3, 2012, p. 548.
9. Jonathan Hyslop, 'Gandhi, Mandela, and the African Modern', in Sarah Nuttall and Achille Mbembe (eds), *Johannesburg: The Elusive Metropolis* (Durham, 2008), pp. 124–35.
10. Hyslop, 'Gandhi, Mandela, and the African Modern', p. 132.
11. Ulf Hannerz, 'Sophiatown: The View from Afar', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20.2 1994, pp. 181–93.
12. Hyslop's thought here is influenced by Georg Simmel's formulation in his famous reflections on the metropolis: 'The most significant characteristic of the metropolis is the functional extension beyond its physical boundaries . . . a city consists of its total effects which extend beyond its immediate confines.' Idem. 'Gandhi, Mandela, and the African Modern', pp. 121–2.
13. Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, p. 101.
14. Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, p. 105. Mandela's interest in China goes back even before this period of intensive reading. 'We must talk to the Chinese about revolution', Mandela urged Walter Sisulu before the latter embarked on a journey through the Eastern bloc in 1953. See *I Will Go Singing: Walter Sisulu Speaks of*

His Life and the Struggle for Freedom in South Africa. In Conversation with George M. Houser and Herbert Shore (Cape Town, 2001), p. 89.

15. Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, p. 107. See also Jonathan Hyslop, 'Mandela on War', in Barnard (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Nelson Mandela*, pp. 162–81, and the chapter 'Spear of the Nation', in Martin Meredith, *Mandela: A Biography* (New York, 2010), pp. 192–202.
16. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, p. 271. See also a good discussion in Meredith, *Mandela*, p. 197.
17. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom*, p. 295.
18. Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, p. 133.
19. Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, p. 259.
20. Mandela, *Conversations with Mys*elf, p. 182.
21. Cited in Meredith, *Mandela*, p. 347.
22. Barack Obama, Foreword to Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, p. xi.
23. Mandela, *Conversations with Myself*, p. 380.
24. James Barber, *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Revolution: 1990–1999* (Athens, 2004), p. 5.
25. Lodge, *Mandela*, pp. 191–2. Lodge's chapter, 'Embodying the Nation', provides an excellent synopsis of Mandela's international impact and reception after his release from prison.
26. Lodge, *Mandela*, pp. 196–8.
27. Lodge, *Mandela*, p. 215.
28. Zdenek Cervenka, *African National Congress Meets Eastern Europe: A Dialogue on Common Experiences* (Uppsala, 1992).
29. Mandela, *Long Walk*, p. 584. For a discussion of this passage in relation to Mandela and global modernity, see Rita Barnard, 'Introduction', in idem (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Nelson Mandela*, p. 7.
30. Mandela, *Long Walk*, p. 584; Lodge, *Mandela*, p. 11.
31. Elleke Boehmer, *Nelson Mandela: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2008), p. 142.

Conclusion

Jonathan Wright and Steven Casey

In this, the last of these three volumes, which have ranged across the world in the twentieth century and examined some forty of the outstanding political leaders of their period, active in different regions and political systems, it is time to assess what the 'mental maps' approach can bring to the study of political leadership. In recent years the study of political leadership 'has made a comeback'.[1] Alongside structuralist, institutionalist and rational choice approaches to politics, interest in leadership has again come to the fore.[2] This renewed recognition of the importance of political leaders, and of leadership as an interactive process in different political systems, is a welcome development. Also welcome is the recognition that, because of the complexity of the subject and the range of approaches to studying it – theoretical, institutional, administrative, psychological, biographical and regional to mention only some – the search for universal laws is futile: 'The best we can offer is not prediction but informed conjecture.'[3]

The 'mental maps' approach clearly lies at the historical and biographical end of the spectrum. It is also flexible. The degree of ideological commitment, rigidity or adaptability, even brutality or humanity, varies from leader to leader. The flexibility of the concept may reduce its utility for those who seek to construct scientific models of leadership. On the other hand, it is able to capture what is distinctive about particular leaders. It is also a reminder of the age profile of leaders. It is easy to forget that the formative years for a leader may belong to another age. Konrad Adenauer, born in 1876 and Chancellor of West Germany from 1949–63, was exceptionally long-lived and long in office. His rapprochement with France in the 1950s had its roots in his failed attempts at the same as Lord Mayor of Cologne in the 1920s. But the leaders of the interwar period, discussed in our first volume, were all born in the second half of the nineteenth century; the leaders of the early Cold War before or during the First World War (Fidel Castro, born in 1926, being the only exception); and the leaders in this volume either in the same period or, at the latest, in the 1930s. To take only the example of the United States, it mattered that Roosevelt and Truman had witnessed the failure of

the Wilsonian vision of a new liberal order and the League of Nations and that Kennedy and Johnson had lived through British appeasement of Hitler (indeed Kennedy wrote a thesis about it) and fought against the Japanese. None of them was likely to think in isolationist terms. It mattered too that Kissinger was a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany and, as a historian of post-Napoleonic Europe, understood both the working of realpolitik and the possibility of great powers co-existing. It also mattered that Nixon had considerable experience of foreign policy in his two terms as Eisenhower's vice president. And it mattered that Reagan had been so preoccupied with the harrowing prospect of nuclear war since the dawn of the Cold War.

Every 'mental map', like all political leadership, is also interactive – it is made up of the engagement of the leader with both domestic politics and the international relations of his or her state. What the concept offers is therefore not simply an insight into the minds of important individuals but also, through those minds, insight into the cultures, political systems, regional contexts and ideologies which shaped those minds and which, in their turn, helped to shape their time and the future. It also affords a perspective across cultures into the influence of seminal events, above all in the twentieth century the two world wars, on leaders of quite different backgrounds. Consider in this volume the way in which Kohl and Gorbachev, both teenagers on different sides in the Second World War, were able to communicate through that shared experience and the supreme value each placed on peace. In a completely different setting and different way, the war in Asia launched Soeharto's career, as he served first in the Dutch Indies army, then under the Japanese and finally as a commander of the new Indonesian army. The 'mental maps' approach thus offers a way of understanding international history which combines leaders and their immediate backgrounds with the decisive events of the period. In that way it can act as a unifying thread drawing together the main currents of the international history of a particular period.[4]

The focus of our first volume, on the era of two world wars, was mainly European, with only three chapters devoted to non-European leaders, Roosevelt, Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong, and Hamaguchi. The balance has shifted in the subsequent volumes as Europe ceased to dominate the international system. The first volume was also marked by the clash of radical ideologies, fascism and communism. At the same time, with the examples of Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong, and Atatürk, different models of modernization were coming to the fore. The second volume was characterized by the return of liberal internationalism, which had faded in the 1920s in Europe and Japan, but was now underpinned by the commitment of the United States. President Truman together with the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, Konrad Adenauer and even – though frequently going his own way – President Charles de Gaulle, all subscribed to the concept of Western democratic values in the competition with Soviet power. On the Soviet side, Stalin remained committed to an imperial view of

security through territorial control, though he was not able to enforce it on Tito in Yugoslavia, who had his own ambitions. Khrushchev – though more creative than Stalin in testing the limits of the political gains to be made in the nuclear age – also took bigger risks, which led in turn to a desire of both superpowers to limit those risks in what was to become one basis for détente. At the same time the dominance of the bipolar superpower order was never complete. In the 1960s Mao Zedong moved openly to challenge what he saw as Soviet hegemony. And the decolonized world that had once been ruled by the European powers had leaders like Nehru in India and Nasser in Egypt, who explored the possibilities of non-alignment, though in each case they discovered that there were limits to their ability to play the superpowers off against each other. In this our third and final volume the focus has become the partial and uneasy stabilization of superpower relations and relaxation of tensions in Europe in the 1970s, followed by the collapse of that international system and a brief moment when it seemed possible that values common to Western and Soviet and East European leaders might make possible a new international order. The liberal principles which had prevailed over Nazi Germany and its allies in 1945 were now, it seemed, shared not only with a united Germany and independent Eastern Europe but also with a Soviet leader who spoke of ‘our common European values’.[5] Those values were, however, unevenly supported in that world and remained strongly contested beyond it, most obviously – in political terms – in China. Unsurprisingly, hopes of a ‘new world order’ were soon disappointed. But that story belongs to the ‘mental maps’ of a subsequent era.

Notes

1. R.A.W. Rhodes and Paul ‘t Hart, ‘Puzzles of Political Leadership’, in idem (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership* (Oxford, 2014), p. 17.
2. Ibid. The *Oxford Handbook* contains chapters by some 60 authors from different disciplines looking at both normative and empirical issues, different regions and political systems. See also Michael Foley, *Political Leadership. Themes, Contexts and Critiques* (Oxford, 2013) and, on a particular theme, Archie Brown, *The Myth of the Strong Leader. Political Leadership in the Modern Age* (London, 2014).
3. Rhodes and Hart, ‘Puzzles of Political Leadership’, p. 16.
4. A fine example of this approach is Zara Steiner’s international history of Europe in the 1930s. She writes, ‘Again and again in the course of this book, I have called attention to the shaping force of the ideological assumptions of those in power. Core beliefs, not only about the nature of international politics but also about the human condition, to an important extent created reality as it was perceived by statesmen.’ Zara Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark. European International History 1933–1939* (Oxford, 2011), p. 1048.
5. Gorbachev’s address to the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 6 July 1989). Available at http://www.cvce.eu/obj (accessed 13 April 2015), p. 4. For a contemporary analysis, see Neil Malcolm, ‘The “Common European Home” and Soviet European Policy’, *International Affairs* 65, 1989, pp. 659–76.

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