



QUEENSHIP AND POWER

SHAKESPEARE'S FOREIGN QUEENS

Drama, Politics, and the Enemy Within

Sandra Logan



Queenship and Power

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Shakespeare's Foreign Queens

Drama, Politics, and the Enemy Within

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To Robert Moses, with deep love and gratitude

PREFACE

This project has been several years in formation. It began as a response to my increasing concern about the violence of the state—about its monopoly on ‘legitimated violence’, as Max Weber defined it, about the ‘necessary violence’ of the governments of our time and of all times before ours. In our current moment we confront violence that is ‘illegitimate’—the various forms of unsanctioned violence of non-state actors (‘terrorists’), who are themselves often responding to the violence of economic and ideological imperialism, or to the agendas of such imperialism. But we also recognize the violence of poverty, of bigotry and racism, of sexism, of social disparity in access and opportunities, and of self-serving political agendas that comprise the legitimated, structural forms of violence in local contexts. Resistance to these forms of violence—violence based on the capacity to manipulate the law, or to suspend it, to limit its application or extend it, in order to deny protections to or establish restrictions on targeted individuals and groups—echoes in this project.

This is not a study of economic disparity and its ills, to which much structural violence can be traced. Rather, it is a study of a particular political problem—the problem of the abuse of sovereign authority, through which those deemed, according to the judgment of state actors, to be internal enemies, may be targeted for the retraction of rights and privileges, and punished without appropriate processes of law. However, as our awareness of structural violence suggests, such retractions and punishments often remain invisible, even to those who suffer under them. The problem, articulated by Walter Benjamin in his “Eighth Thesis on the Philosophy of History,” is that the exception has become the rule. Thus,

in conditions of systemic oppression, justified by a declared ‘emergency’ or ‘exception’—or by values and perceptions that reduce the protection and rights of some groups relative to others—it is necessary as a first step to recognize sovereign or state judgments and actions as the enablers, not the remediators, of such oppression.

Neither is this a project about women and gender *per se*. Rather, it is about those who become the targets of the sovereign decision, of sovereign judgment above law that is the prerogative of sovereignty, and according to Carl Schmitt, its defining feature. Although I deal with Shakespeare’s representation of four foreign queens, it is my contention that, through these queens, the plays demonstrate the threat to the commonwealth and the commonweal of inept, despotic, absolutist, or tyrannical sovereignty. That threat, which operates at the level of the individual in these plays, targets those who are positioned to be the best loved and the best protected of any subject in the realm: the queen (or empress) consort, the valued adviser, the honored general. It is thus the abuses of sovereign authority, its failures, and the range of responses to such abuses, that shape my analysis of Shakespeare’s foreign queens within each play. Their vulnerability reveals the danger to all subjects of sovereign will-above-law. In explicitly linking political theories of the past and the present, I aim to enrich our understanding of early modern literary texts and their cultural and cross-cultural contexts. No less importantly, I seek to recognize the ways in which these early modern debates about and representations of abusive sovereignty remain utterly pertinent to our own historical moment, although undoubtedly the specific contexts and political realities we face have changed.

East Lansing, MI

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Foreign Queens, Abusive Sovereignty, and Political Theory in the Past and the Present

OVERVIEW

This book considers how, in Shakespeare's plays, the presence, conditions, and experiences of foreign queens make visible the abusive potential of embodied sovereignty, and reveal the sovereign himself as the most likely internal enemy. Each of the four main chapters focuses upon Shakespeare's use of a foreign queen to reveal and embody the tensions within early modern English politics, and additionally, demonstrates how contemporary political terms and concepts can help us to recognize less obvious aspects of Shakespeare's plays. Much excellent scholarly work has probed the historical conditions and literary representations of queenship in early modern England, and of gender in early modern historical and literary contexts. In this book, I consider Shakespeare's depiction of four foreign queens within the courts of his plays—Katherine of Aragon in *Henry VIII*, Hermione in *The Winter's Tale*, Tamora in *Titus Andronicus*, and Margaret in the first history tetralogy.¹ I take up a set of questions not widely addressed by early modern queenship scholars: How did Shakespeare engage with and make use of the *foreign* queen at the heart of the nation? How does his representation of such women challenge the apparently straightforward opposition between friend and enemy that, according to major early modern and contemporary political theorists, defines the context of the political? What are the effects of sovereignty's authority above law, its capacity to decide on the exception and the emergency, on the

internal and external enemy? What are the options if the sovereign himself becomes the enemy to the state and the commonweal? How can subjects respond to such a situation? And how does the intersection of patriarchy and monarchy point up the problems associated with embodied sovereign authority?

While focusing on alien women in Shakespeare's royal families, this book does not primarily aim to explore gender relations *per se*. Rather, I consider how, in these plays, the experiences of foreign queens epitomize conditions that potentially affect men and women from every point within the sociopolitical structure. Through these queens, I explore a cluster of political themes of continuing importance: what it means to be divided between nations in loyalties and identity; how hospitality is offered, and whether unconditional hospitality can be achieved; how to navigate the relationship between citizenship and subjection; how banishment or exile constitutes a condition at once disabling and enabling.² In other words, my interest here is in how Shakespeare employs women characters of a particular sort—those who enter the social and political system from beyond its boundaries—as a means to explore various conditions of vulnerability, alienation, and exclusion common to domestic subjects of every social position.³ Foreign queens are uniquely vulnerable within the domestic and political space they enter, subjects of and subject to the intersecting forms of authority of the husband/king. As such, they comprise the potential target of extreme abuse, but all subjects are vulnerable to similar, though less personal, forms of political violence. Even when explicit abuse is not at issue, as it is not in the *Henry VI* plays, the effects of dislocation and isolation instigate forms of disenfranchisement and resistance that may also arise in subjects beyond the royal family and the relatively rarefied atmosphere of the court.

FOREIGNNESS: SUBJECTS AND ALIENS

Legal status in England in the early modern period was primarily a function of birth: one was born either an alien, or a subject. In *Aliens in Medieval Law*, Keechang Kim emphasizes that the concept of alien status was longstanding, but that it underwent a transformation over time as part of a larger shift in legal definitions of personal status, from its earlier basis in "*liberates* and *privilegia* to the abstract notion of political faith and allegiance."⁴ One important step in this transformation came from John Fortescue, who argued that the people born into a kingdom were natu-

rally bound in a mystic relationship to the king who was their head. Fortescue argued, as Kim summarizes, “Law (*Lex*) was responsible for the internal cohesion and unity of the mystic body of the kingdom, but fealty to the king was essentially an effect of birth.”⁵ Perspectives on alien status continued to shift as jurists debated succession questions during the reign of Elizabeth I. By the late sixteenth century, aliens in England were unable to inherit property because they were not considered bound in fealty to the English sovereign; the sovereign therefore owed them no protection, and thus their right of inheritance was not supported by law. Bodin makes this point in *Six Books*.⁶

The 1608 legal case known as ‘Calvin’s Case’ refined these ideas. For example, where John Fortescue argued that *civil* law bound subjects together in fealty to the king, in his decision on the case, Edward Coke determined that such fealty was based on *natural* law.⁷ Further, he emphasized that this fealty was to the *mortal* body of the king, not to his immortal political body, for in cases of an attempted regicide, for example, the attempt was on the body of the living king, not on the body politic as a whole.⁸ This decision, which relied upon changing views of the relationship of subjects to each other, to the commonwealth, to the sovereign, and to the law, revealed clearly that ‘alien’ was no longer purely a spatial designation—“to be born ‘within’ or ‘without’ the *legeance* was [now] a question of faith and allegiance.”⁹ In effect, birth outside the boundaries of England (and now, Scotland) marked the absence of the naturally occurring bond of loyalty that all English-born subjects held through birth. Parentage, which had been a factor in the succession arguments, was not part of the consideration at this point. The decision affirmed that the notion of allegiance to the king was the defining characteristic of subjects, and its absence the defining characteristic of aliens. By the first decade of the seventeenth century, these legal decisions had thus codified a bizarre abstraction through which place of birth was translated into a bond of fealty to the mortal body of the monarch—a direct commitment to obedience which was naturally occurring and instigated by the eternal law of nature. These decisions also suggest that the body politic and the body natural of the king were not bound inextricably together.

However, as Jane Pettegree reveals, beyond legal definitions and perceptions of ‘native’ and ‘alien’, national identity was neither stable nor essential. Specifically addressing representations of national identity on the early modern English stage, she explains, “The collective recognition of native identity relies on a consensual agreement that certain attributes

should form a ‘natural’ core ... [which] reflect[s] an aspirational identity rather than one based on unadulterated reality.”¹⁰ Pettegree suggests that, in terms of lived experience, such alignments were anything but fixed and stable: “At any point in history, collective identities are being continuously formed and re-formed as individuals experience and reflect upon their place in society.”¹¹ Beyond this internal reconfiguration, she notes, “The metaphors that generate political identities often express ... not simply a binary opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’, but more often a complex and interpenetrated matrix of ideas of ‘foreign’ and ‘native’.”¹² Thus, despite the legal notion that one is born into *legeance* to the king, we can see that the perception of self in nationalistic terms requires a constructed alignment with a system of values, privileges, rights, responsibilities, and laws that may conflict with quotidian experience. Individual subjects may find themselves entwined with foreign others—spouses, merchants, mariners, diplomats, or queens—or one’s own conditions and experiences may conflict with the ideal values and virtues defining national belonging, compromised by failed legal protection, class disprivilege, or conflicting perceptions about sovereign authority, for example.¹³

Further, religious belonging—the concept of universal Christendom, for instance—posited an alignment of virtues and values across national boundaries, through which subjects constituted themselves within an eternal community of believers and agents of devotion and conversion. The *Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos* is particularly eloquent on this communal bond: “the Church is one, of which Christ is the head, and the members [*membra*] are so united and harmonious, that none of them—not even the least—can suffer violence or harm, without the others being injured and feeling pain ...”¹⁴ The author goes on to compare the church to a body, a building, and a ship, each of which is vulnerable to complete destruction if even a small part is compromised or lost.¹⁵ The point of these arguments is to justify the intervention of foreign princes when a tyrant oppresses the people of another nation—a position that challenges the entire notion of autonomous sovereign territory. Nevertheless, allegiance to a political entity—a state, a commonwealth, a kingdom—however unstable and constructed that allegiance may be, was still rhetorically invoked and mobilized as an ideological concept in the interests of political agendas.¹⁶ And certainly, the idea of national foreignness as a metonym for differing and threatening fealties and values retains, still today, the potency that it held in the early modern period, supporting the designation of the enemy as a perceived threat to state systems.

Small wonder, then, that Shakespeare found foreign queenship such a compelling entry point for thinking about the parameters of sovereignty and its decisions. The idea that the sovereign was inherently bound to his subjects and to the commonweal, and that a foreign queen would naturally lack that bond, opens up rather than forecloses considerations of the validity of such an assumption. The two Elizabethan-era queen characters I deal with here—Tamora and Margaret of Anjou—navigate sameness and difference in complicated ways, but neither demonstrates strong or lasting fealty to the sovereigns they wed, and neither expresses unity with or concern for the body politic. They nevertheless trouble the notion of the internal enemy, and the larger idea of the subjects' bond to the monarch. The Jacobean-era queens—Katherine and Hermione—are less radical in their resistance, but these plays offer nuanced tensions between positions and relationships within the royal court. In his depiction of these queens, Shakespeare situates them differently along the spectrum of commitment to natural law and moral law, but in each case, regardless of actual guilt, they are perceived as transgressors against those overarching guidelines, and in each case they break their fealty to the king. The cause, nature, and implications of that break define the problem of sovereignty he addresses in each play.

The foreignness of these queens is a significant aspect of their relationship to husband and nation. In the early modern period, women were typically subjugated through marriage, and were to some extent severed from home and family in their relocation to their husband's household. In domestic contexts, regardless of the social status of the husband, both spouses would be subjects of the same king, positioned as such through the social hierarchy within which they had always functioned. With the familial relocation of the wife, the bond between families through marriage could offer significant advantages to both sides. In domestic royal marriage, the wife's bond with the sovereign would likely strengthen the family's overall social and political position, but all family members were, from birth, subjects bound in *legeance* to that sovereign. None of this pertained to a foreign queen. A foreign royal woman entering a new nation and new political position through marriage would thus seem to have enormous advantages even over the domestic queen consort, given that her nation of birth represented an independent sovereign state, and that a relative, possibly even her father, wielded sovereign power with some parity to that of her husband. Additionally, we are aware of the retinues that generally accompanied such queens, creating for them a sphere

of familiarity within an otherwise perhaps utterly alien context. Further, the relationship was almost invariably not simply a marriage but an alliance, either through treaty, marriage contract, or less formal pledges of good will and mutual support.

These conditions of their transformation into wives of rulers would seem to offer the greatest security to women as subjects and wives. Historically, all of this may have been the case, but nevertheless, whereas her family may have gained diplomatic and political advantages while remaining autonomous, such a woman would become a subject of her new king and nation, and this shift in subjection created difficulties for her that did not arise for domestic queens. As Shakespeare suggests in *King John* through Blanche of Castile, the divided loyalties of a woman in such a position could be wrenching. In Act 3, scene 1, as the transnational friendship secured by her marriage to the French Dauphin collapses, and her new French husband advocates for war against her English uncle, Blanche laments:

Which is the side that I should go withal?
I am with both: each army hath a hand;
And in their rage, I having hold of both,
They swirl asunder and dismember me". (3.1.253–256)¹⁷

Her image of physical dismemberment serves as a metonym for the dismemberment of the commonweal, the sovereign decision on the external enemy constituting the body politic as a sacrifice to the state's agenda. And clearly, hers was not the only diplomatic marriage to fail in its objectives—indeed, the institution seems to have been a failure in most cases, at least in the long term. Two other historical foreign queens, both of whom are featured in this book, epitomize the problem: for both Margaret of Anjou and Katherine of Aragon, the permanent bond of marriage far outlasted the diplomatic purpose of the union, reducing their value in the eyes of both families. In Shakespeare's plays, the powerfully connected and familially protected foreign queen seldom—if ever—appears and instead, their lack of resources and connections at key moments is much more the norm, particularly when threatened by sovereign judgment.

For example, by the time *Henry VIII* commences, Katherine of Aragon is a once-beloved queen and peace-pledge for a powerful alliance that has lost its political significance, and thus she has few political or personal associations to protect her. Hermione, daughter to the deceased emperor

of Russia, is likewise almost entirely alone and unprotected in her relationship to Leontes and to Sicilia. Tamora, although accompanied by her sons and her servant/lover, has no remaining connection to her realm—she is utterly cut off from her political associations and at the mercy of the Romans as a war captive. Margaret of Anjou, niece to a powerful enemy of England, arrives without dowry or retinue, is vilified for her Frenchness and poverty, and has no contact with her family or nation until late in 3 *Henry VI*. The same is true where such queens play a less prominent role, such as Hippolyta, a war captive, or Cordelia, an exile whose kinship with England's royal family is explicitly negated by her sovereign father.¹⁸ Foreignness in these plays is tantamount to isolation rather than powerful, protective connection, and in effect, disconnected from the familial and political networks of their homelands, these queens are more rather than less vulnerable than their domestic counterparts are.¹⁹

However, as women in an apparent position of weakness and subjugation within the political and patriarchal order, none of Shakespeare's foreign queens is without power and influence, and none is subsumed by the expectations of female silence and submission. For each context of apparent disempowerment, Shakespeare shows us the potential for resistance to, reconfiguration, and/or recalibration of the system, even as he remains, to my mind, utterly cynical in the context of monarchy, primogeniture, and patriarchy, regarding any real-world solutions to the problems he represents. In the plays I deal with, these queens pose a range of challenges to prescribed and enforced hierarchy, directed at both their husbands' patriarchal and sovereign authority. Additionally, two of these four queens—Katherine and Hermione—mobilize independent moral judgment as part of their challenge, asserting a superior moral order to which their husbands should rightly submit. Margaret navigates a complicated moral terrain, initially motivated by a limited, self-interested agenda focused more on personal than political objectives, but eventually the primary agent of support for the threatened monarchy she herself has inadvertently helped to undermine. Tamora initially speaks from a position of universal moral values, but quickly realigns to flout such values while fostering injustice and tyranny against the subjects who have, in her view, wronged her.

All four are mothers as well as queens and wives, and for each, to varying degrees, the maternal role defines their relationship to sovereign authority and to moral order more broadly. In a sense, maternity functions as the great leveler for these characters. They become most like other, common subjects when they speak of their maternal identities,

invoking the idea of maternal protectiveness in ways that situate them as also mothers to their adopted nation's people, but at the same time figuring their maternal selves and their children as subject to sovereign and patriarchal abuse or neglect rather than appropriate protection. Tamora's defense of her son represents her most humanized and submissive moment, and her most vulnerable one, while his execution drives her toward aggressive hatred and political destabilization. Indeed, the manner of his execution, which prefigures the dismemberment metaphor invoked by Blanche of Castile, symbolizes the destruction of Tamora's nation and her sovereignty. Margaret's defense of her son's claim to the throne becomes her source of strongest resistance, as she rebels against sovereign authority to secure his succession. Maternity is itself suspect in Hermione's case, seen as evidence of defied subjection to husband and king, while Katherine's failure to bear a male heir is interpreted a sign of her transgression against divine and natural law. And two of these queens become most culpable when they transgress against maternal values, as Tamora does when she orders the murder of her newborn child, or as Margaret does when she taunts Richard of York with the napkin soaked in his son's blood.

Male sovereign duty and authority is also figured, to some extent, through or in relationship to parenthood, although such connections vary widely across these plays. Henry VIII, desperate to sire a male heir, displaces his wife and daughter both personally and politically in that pursuit. Henry VI, himself rather infantilized early in *2 Henry VI*, comes to be seen as an unnatural father in *3 Henry VI* for disenfranchising his son. Richard III, bent on mowing down siblings to reach the throne, reaches the apex of his tyranny in the murder of the princes in the tower. Saturninus is blind to his cuckoldry, seems unaware of the resulting child's fate, and otherwise wreaks havoc on the Andronici offspring through his injustice. Leontes blames his newborn child for her putative bastardy, and he intends, and indirectly endeavors, to commit infanticide. Paternal and sovereign authority are closely intertwined, and the mistreatment of children—even adult children—by that doubly empowered figure marks the violent potential at the heart of the family/state nexus. In this context, the wife and queen becomes the opposing or enabling force. In all four cases, such responses arise when the sovereign makes judgments or takes actions that rely upon his independent power beyond law, destabilizing the commonweal.

THE NATURE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FRIEND/ENEMY DISTINCTION

Theories of sovereignty in the early modern period invariably involve the basis and nature of sovereign authority, with the homology between the rule of God in the universal order and the rule of the sovereign in the political order a common denominator. Within broader questions concerning sovereign authority, three related, overarching issues frame this project as a whole: absolutism or sovereign will-above-law; the friend/enemy distinction; and the problem of the body natural. Additionally, in the period, and still today, there is a general consensus that effective sovereignty—whether individual or corporate—must exist within a well-ordered state. The sovereign body holds the responsibility to create, change, and enforce law, to protect the territory, to sustain it economically, to declare and wage war, to make agreements and ensure peace.²⁰ Thus, sovereignty aims, in its fundamental framework, at the benefit of the commonwealth and commonweal. The central problem in each of the plays I deal with here is the exercise of such power in its monarchical form under divine sanction—what twentieth-century political theorist Carl Schmitt calls the sovereign decision. The sovereign, he argues, is the one “who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interests of the state, public safety and order, *le salut public*, and so on.”²¹ Sovereignty, then, takes its fundamental definition, not through its abstract conception, but through its “concrete application.” Thus, he writes in *Political Theology*, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”²² The sovereign decision on the exception comprises a two-fold capacity: to decide “whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what to do to eliminate it.”²³ The preservation of the state, conceived here as an abstract entity, stands as the ultimate and necessary objective.

Schmitt credits Jean Bodin, sixteenth-century jurist and political theorist, with this recognition. In the *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, Bodin examines the relationship between the sovereign and citizens, as well as between the sovereign and civil law. In his basic formulation of sovereignty, he offers a definition consonant with Schmitt’s: “Sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth,”²⁴ or, in another version, “Sovereignty is supreme and absolute power over citizens and subjects.”²⁵ As Bodin makes clear, the two faces of this power are mutually reliant—power over citizens and subjects is, in effect, the power of the commonwealth to maintain itself. In a monarchy, that ultimate power resides with

the king. Sir Thomas Smith echoes this in his definition of government and rule: “That part or member of the common wealth is saide to rule which doth controwle, correct all other members of the common wealth.”²⁶ He adds, “That parte which doth rule, define and command according to the forme of the governement, is taken in everie common wealth to be just and lawe.”²⁷ Both Smith and Bodin assert that sovereignty may reside either in one person, in a select group of people, or in the multitude, depending upon the nature of the state, but Smith—unlike Bodin—sees ‘mixed monarchy’ as a viable and legitimate variation, in which sovereign authority is divided, for example, between a monarch and a parliament.²⁸

The relationship of sovereign body to civil law is the most important aspect of the concept. For Bodin, “persons who are sovereign must not be subject in any way to the commands of someone else and must be able to give the law to subjects, and to suppress or repeal disadvantageous laws and replace them with others—which cannot be done by someone who is subject to the laws or to persons having power of command over him.”²⁹ Extending this argument, he states, “the laws of a sovereign prince, even if founded on good and strong reasons, depend solely on his own free will.”³⁰ And later, “the first prerogative [*marque*] of a sovereign prince is to give law to all in general and to each in particular,” with the important caveat that he does so “without the consent of any other, whether greater, equal, or below him.”³¹ Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty similarly places the sovereign above law: in declaring a ‘state of exception’ or an ‘emergency’, the sovereign identifies a situation that cannot be dealt with under ordinary law, and that “instead requires the application of extraordinary measures.”³² Within the polis or state, the group or individual who has been granted the power to make such decisions—or who claims the power to do so—is sovereign. Debates in early modern contexts centered on whether, as Bodin argued, sovereignty is generally unassailable, or if the sovereign in fact answers to others within the system. More radical positions, such as that of the *Vindiciae*, insist that monarchical authority is granted by the people, and may be retracted by them should the monarch fail to govern effectively. Thus, where Smith saw popular correction or overthrow of the monarch as acceptable in mixed monarchies only (he identified England as one), the *Vindiciae* author implies that no sovereign stands above those governed, and no state exists for its own good above the good of its subjects. The power to decide on the exception remains with the sovereign in this view, but if that power is abused, the people may respond through legal means or violent ones.³³

THE EXTERNAL ENEMY

Among the powers attributed to the sovereign, all of which are derived from this fundamental capacity to decide on the exception, both Bodin and Schmitt identify the declaration of war against an enemy of the state as a centrally important one. As Bodin argues, if the commonwealth is not secure, it cannot achieve its objective of providing its citizens with the opportunity to pursue a moral life. For Schmitt, “What always matters is the possibility of the extreme case taking place, the real war, and the decision whether this situation has or has not arrived.”³⁴ Because Schmitt sees the main purpose of the state to be its own preservation, ostensibly based upon the preservation of shared values and a shared way of life, the question of friend or enemy takes shape only from the perspective of that preservationist agenda. These external enemies are invariably also political entities, whose aims are parallel to those they threaten, but whose values and way of life are perceived as dangerous, whether that means that they seek territorial expansion and the control of other subjects, or that they adhere to and promote another religious, political, or economic system.³⁵ The concept of *jus belli* contains within it “the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill enemies.”³⁶ The declaration of war requires a reduction of customary rights, and inevitably, the sacrifice of life itself, and therefore constitutes a decision on the exception. The ideological basis of the recognition of the enemy is central to such sacrifices: “each participant ... [must] judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own form of existence.”³⁷ However, the citizens do not make the decision to wage war—that power belongs only to the state: “To the state as an essentially political entity belongs the *jus belli*, i.e., the real possibility of deciding in a concrete situation upon the enemy and the ability to fight him with the power emanating from the entity.”³⁸ Deciding on the external enemy is fundamental to the security and continuation of the state, and ultimately this is the prerogative of the sovereign.

THE INTERNAL ENEMY

In contemporary contexts, Derrida helps us to see that such apparently straightforward oppositions must be problematized, and that in fact, even in their articulation, they obscure tensions and contradictions that cannot be accounted for in oppositional terms, nor in dialectical ones.³⁹ Similarly,

Kim's discussion of early modern aliens and their status vis-à-vis the monarch and the state indicates a number of complications to this conception of political antinomy. Shakespeare, like these contemporary writers, problematizes the basic antinomy of the political through a wide range of means, including the way foreign queens function in relation to sovereign authority. Indeed, the friend/enemy distinction—always inherently unstable—becomes even more troubling when the discussion of the decision shifts from the external enemy to the internal one, for each of the four queens in this study comes to be regarded and treated as an internal enemy, and in each case, that designation oversimplifies the actual relationships it addresses.⁴⁰

Schmitt approaches the concept of the internal enemy by first explicating the primary objective of the state—"The endeavor of a normal state consists above all in assuring total peace within the state and its territory."⁴¹ When the state exists in this peaceful and secure condition, legal norms apply, but when the state is threatened, the norms of law are no longer applicable, and the sovereign declares a 'state of exception' or 'emergency'. But Schmitt explains that such enemies are not necessarily external to the state: "As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy. Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy."⁴² According to Schmitt, the internal enemy is a member of the citizenry, a resident within the state, or a group of such individuals, whose actions are judged to threaten the security of the state, and whose transgressions or perceived threats cannot be dealt with through normal law. Therefore, normal law being inapplicable, alternative means must be pursued: "Whether the form is sharper or milder, explicit or implicit, whether ostracism, expulsion, proscription, or outlawry are provided for in special laws or in explicit or general descriptions, the aim is always the same, namely to declare an enemy."⁴³ The ultimate objective in declaring an internal enemy is to avoid civil war, or, if this 'enemy' raises armed resistance, to respond in kind as a means to prevent the extreme possibility that such a threat poses—the overthrow of the state. Schmitt does not address the possibility that the sovereign may be the internal enemy, destructive, destabilizing, or abusive to the citizens, and indeed, his definition of sovereignty and its purposes ultimately conflicts with such an idea. He works from the underlying assumption that the preservation of the state and the sovereign also preserves the commonweal.

Bodin, to an extent, agrees with this view, in that he recognizes that a change of the form of sovereignty inherently dissolves the existing state and institutes a new one. However, he also recognizes that the sovereign may, in fact, be the internal enemy, and makes it clear that regime change is more the norm than the exception. In his analysis, the state is like a living entity, inevitably susceptible to change toward either a better or a worse form, and through either gradual or sudden means. Such changes may be instigated by internal or external enemies *or* friends, may well take place against the will of the sovereign, and *may* also take place against the will of the citizens, whether the change is for better or for worse.⁴⁴ Each of the three legitimate forms of commonwealth—monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy—has two other possible forms. A monarchy may devolve into a despotic or a tyrannical state; an aristocracy into a despotic or factious one; and a democracy into a despotic or anarchic form. A bona fide, full revolution occurs when the form of government changes, as from monarchy to democracy, or from aristocracy to monarchy. An ‘imperfect revolution’ occurs when the *quality* of the sovereign changes, but the form of sovereignty does not, as when there is a “change from a legitimate aristocracy to a factious one, or from a tyranny to a monarchy.”⁴⁵ In describing these transformations, Bodin is careful to recognize that they may be for the best—an inherently more open-ended and naturalistic view of such regime changes, and one apparently at odds with Schmitt’s view that the sovereign decision inherently represents the shared values and perspectives of the citizens.

Indeed, Bodin’s formulation of the inevitability of change, and the possibility that it may be instigated by either friend or enemy, troubles the straightforward purpose of the state and the friend/enemy opposition offered by Schmitt. If regime change may be instigated by a friend of the state, it follows that the regime itself may be considered the enemy, and this is implicit in Bodin’s model. Within Bodin’s recognition of the three possible versions of each governmental form lies a clear acknowledgment that the sovereign body—whether single, a small group, or the multitude—may function *to the detriment* of its citizens, not in the context of a declared emergency, but as a matter of course. Tyranny, factiousness, and anarchy are dangerous, damaging governmental forms that destabilize the state. Thus, one would expect Bodin to advocate for regime change—imperfect revolution at the least—when government exists in one of its corrupt or less ideal forms. He seems to imply, although it remains merely implicit, that it may be possible to distinguish between the enemy of the

current regime, or commonwealth, and the enemy of the commonweal. Such a distinction would turn upon the larger purpose of the state that he asserts—its provision and protection of the quality of life of its citizens, of their capacity to meet the requirements for survival and to thrive in the life of contemplation of higher order matters.⁴⁶ In this scenario, a sovereign who fails in this larger objective, or who actively undermines it, might be declared an enemy to the commonweal and dealt with through some extraordinary means, such as deposition or rebellion.

However, while this idea of sovereign as internal enemy seems strongly implied, Bodin unequivocally rejects rebellion as a solution. Instead, he argues, sovereign power is bounded only by what we might call a *moral* limit: “the absolute power of princes and other sovereign lordships (*seigneuries souverains*) ... does not in any way extend to the laws of God and nature.”⁴⁷ Therefore, according to Bodin, the prerogatives of sovereign will and sovereign autonomy from law refer only to the capacity to override, suspend, or judge beyond ordinary law, or civil law.⁴⁸ The sovereign always operates under obligation and obedience to the higher moral mandate upon which all human government and social hierarchy is built. The overall implication is that the sovereign who fails to submit to that order and function within the appropriate limitations will answer for his sins and transgressions through the judgment of God, to whom he is subordinate. In Bodin’s view, it is never permissible for subjects/citizens to rebel against their sovereign, to question his authority, or to conspire to remove him from office. Thus, despite the titillating idea of legitimate rebellion implicit in this theory, Bodin turns away from authorizing the subjects’ judgment of their ruler—obedience is their obligation and sole recourse, even when the sovereign is clearly identified as an internal enemy.⁴⁹

THE SOVEREIGN AS INTERNAL ENEMY

Several decades before Bodin wrote his *Six Books*, natural law doctrine shaped Melanchthon’s views on resistance, and his views influenced Martin Luther’s. In *Prolegomena to Cicero’s Offices* (1530), he writes: “Animals resist violence out of a natural instinct, for the instinct of self-preservation has been instilled by God in every nature; in man, however, two things lead to the resistance of unjust violence ... [one is] the instinct for one’s own preservation, the other thing is the notion, which teaches ... that the human race is so established as to preserve equality.”⁵⁰ Although civil society limits the use of force out of mere instinct, Melanchthon argues, “it is

permitted to repel unjust force with authorized force, clearly by the office of the magistrate, when it is possible to use his aid, or by one's own hand, in the absence ..."⁵¹ Although early on Martin Luther took a strong stance against rebellion as a means to deal with abusive sovereigns, his later writings, echo Melanchthon, situating resistance to abusive authority as a necessary option. In 1539, in a public disputation at Wittenberg, Luther spoke sharply against "that abominable monster, the Pope, that bear-wolf, who exceedeth all tyranny and oppression." He identifies him as one who "will, alone, be *without law* [*exlex*], will live secure and free and do according to his will ..."⁵² For Luther, such a figure transcended the category of mere tyrant. His overthrow of the law and the moral order that grounded it rendered him vulnerable to rebellion by the subjects whose lives and security he had pledged and failed to protect.⁵³ While Luther is specifically concerned with the abuses of the pope, his views and those of Melanchthon, upon whom he most probably drew, were applied to tyranny in general by writers such as the author of the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos*.

The accountability of the sovereign to God is more explicit in the 1579 *Vindiciae* than in Bodin's *Six Books*, and the author offers a far more challenging view of sovereign/subject relations, closer to Melanchthon's than Bodin's. This tract justifies rebellion against the ungodly or abusive ruler, insisting that sovereignty resides in the people or body politic, not in the ruler to whom they have temporarily delegated that sovereignty. This author thus takes a more contractual view of political relationships than either Bodin or Schmitt, situating sovereign power as contingent upon the effective and appropriate fulfillment of the functions of the office of sovereign, and subjecting it, not only to divine judgment, but to the judgment of the subjects who have tacitly authorized it. The tract argues that people renounce their own liberty and accept the command of another only "for the sake of some great advantage."⁵⁴ It affirms, citing Augustine, that sovereigns "do not command out of desire for domination [*dominandi*] but out of duty to show concern, not with the arrogance of ruling, but with compassion in providing."⁵⁵ Arguing that the sovereign must submit to civil law because it is built upon divine law, the author defines tyranny as an "offence committed against the commonwealth."⁵⁶ "[T]he people is conditionally obliged to the prince; but the prince is bound absolutely [*pure*] to the people. So if the condition is scarcely fulfilled then the people is absolved, the contract [*contractus*] is void, and there is no obligation [to the king by the people]."⁵⁷ When the sovereign fails in his duty, the author asks, "who can exact this punishment from the king—for this is a temporal

matter—except the whole people, to whom he swears just as it swears to him?”⁵⁸ The people under a tyrannical ruler, “is free of any crime of perfidy if it publicly renounces someone who is commanding unjustly, or attempts to recover by arms the kingdom from one who desires to retain it illegitimately.”⁵⁹ Not only might the ruler be identified as the internal enemy, in this view, but there is an *obligation* on the people to correct or overthrow him/her. In effect, being a friend to the commonwealth may require being an enemy to the sovereign. Central to this argument is the idea of the body politic. No individual subject may judge the sovereign; such judgment is the prerogative and duty of the subjects as a whole.⁶⁰

In the early twentieth century, Walter Benjamin offers a similar argument. His Eighth Thesis on the Philosophy of History states “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘emergency situation’ in which we live is the rule.”⁶¹ The lives of the oppressed, Benjamin suggests, reveal that, for many within the state, political life, and indeed social life, is an eternal and relentless state of exception or emergency, where the law fails to offer protection to the average subject, and where violence in both explicit and implicit forms shapes their daily lives. Oppression is not the result of a sovereign decision on an emergency or exception, but a lived condition that denies equal protection, rights, and opportunities. Only by recognizing this as the norm can we begin to imagine a response that would effectively disrupt the rule of law that ensures our own oppression and justifies the violence to which we are subject. “The task before us,” states Benjamin, “is the introduction of a real state of emergency; and our position in the struggle against Fascism will thereby improve” (Thesis VIII). Benjamin’s thesis can be understood as a critique of the relationship between oppression and power, and overall he advocates active resistance and even the use of violence as a necessary aspect of the response to oppression.⁶² Benjamin’s articulation of inherent systemic or structural violence allows us to recognize that any group of oppressed individuals may be subject to a permanent enactment of the sovereign decision based upon their ‘potential intractability’ or ‘unacceptability’, which serves as a justification for the denial of equal protection by the state. The hierarchies are established through some level of habitual consensus, supportive of the privileges of some groups over others on no other basis except that decision on their perceived threat to the status quo. Benjamin thus rejects the decision on the internal enemy, identifying it as a form of ongoing and unjustified oppression, a judgment outside of law that conflicts with appropriate protections under law. He also recognizes the necessity to

actively resist the sovereign when s/he is damaging to some fraction of the commonwealth.

Giorgio Agamben offers an even stronger rejection of the sovereign decision. He situates *homo sacer* in parallel to the sovereign—such a person “is simply set outside human jurisdiction without being brought into the realm of divine law,” neither remaining within the accepted juridical order nor transformed into a figure consecrated to the divine.⁶³ Thus the *sacra-tio* exists in an indefinable neither/nor condition, in a zone of indistinction, a zone lying between law and no law, a zone of existence simultaneously inside and outside the law.⁶⁴ This zone of indistinction parallels the zone of indistinction associated with sovereignty grounded in the ‘decision’. According to Agamben, “The sovereign and *homo sacer* are joined in the figure of an action that, excepting itself from both human and divine law, from both *nomos* and *physis*, nevertheless delimits what is, in a certain sense, the first properly political space of the West distinct from both the religious and the profane sphere, from both the natural order and the regular juridical order.”⁶⁵ Thus, to the same degree that sovereignty’s decision on the exception merely epitomizes and renders visible the quotidian conditions of sovereign authority and the nature of law, as Schmitt emphasizes, the condition of *homo sacer* reveals that no subject is ever truly protected by law, but is always merely subject to punishment. As Agamben puts it, “*homo sacer* names something like the originary ‘political’ relation, which is to say, bare life insofar as it operates in an inclusive exclusion as the referent of the sovereign decision.”⁶⁶ What this suggests, in terms of this book’s arguments, is that the particular case—that of the foreign queen as a subject of patriarchal and sovereign authority within these plays—defines and epitomizes the condition of all subjects, for whom she serves as the symbolic figure. The judgments to which she is subject are the judgments to which all under sovereign authority are subject, by which they are subjugated, through which they are set outside of law and punished at the sovereign’s will.

Both Benjamin and Agamben suggest that the sovereign is the internal enemy, not only when abusive, but under all circumstances. We can pose Benjamin against Schmitt, then, by recognizing their difference on the question of resistance: Benjamin sees resistance as a necessary challenge to the state’s monopoly on both morality and violence, while Schmitt sees ‘the decision’ as a response to resistance, and as the means through which the state’s monopoly on morality and violence can be ensured. Following Benjamin, Agamben posits the concepts of the decision and the exception

as the normal and normative workings of the state. For Agamben, the myth of the political—the idea of cooperation among individuals and groups who articulate and constitute justice and social order through their rational capacity and moral understanding—has been overwritten by the preservation of the state for its own sake, at the expense of both the citizens and the concept of the political itself. In one formulation, “*the sovereign nomos is the principle that, joining law and violence, threatens them with indistinction* ... the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.”⁶⁷ Derrida notes, in the same vein, that “sovereign and beast seem to have in common their being-outside-the-law ... situated by definition at a distance from or above the laws, in nonrespect for the absolute law ... that they make or that they are.”⁶⁸ Thus, although they differ in their perceptions of the scope of sovereign abuse, across these historical and contemporary definitions of sovereignty is a clear recognition of its potential for abuse, and, in our present moment, a rearticulation of critiques of sovereignty that have been surfacing since the sixteenth century. The most radical contemporary critiques reject the idea that sovereignty resides within the scope of divine and natural law, and therefore is grounded in and grounding of a positive moral order. Instead, it renders indistinguishable the functions of violence and law, and punishment is its sole purpose.

Shakespeare, himself not explicitly a political theorist, nevertheless engages with these arguments about sovereignty and its abuses, and seems to suggest, like Agamben, that sovereigns operate in a zone of indistinction, in which their judgment above law readily becomes an abusive norm rather than an exception. And whether he can be said to advocate violence against abusive sovereigns, he undoubtedly represents it in many of his plays.⁶⁹ In depicting foreign queens, whose isolation and status as wives as well as subjects exacerbates their vulnerability to that abusive norm, Shakespeare always also gestures toward the vulnerability of subjects in general, symbolically represented by these queens. Like some of his contemporary political theorists, he recognizes that the sovereign’s normal capacity to exercise will-above-law threatens at every moment to reveal him as the internal enemy whose rule relies, fundamentally, on undeclared but enacted states of exception, on unexercised but imminent violence. Particularly in *The Winter’s Tale*, we see the ease with which the husband/king perceives his wife/queen as an enemy at the heart of the family and the state, his readiness to marshal his sovereign judgment against her the

sign of his inability to rule himself, let alone others. But each of the queens I address in this book finds sovereign authority unsupportable, and through each, Shakespeare addresses the problem of embodied sovereignty and its effects on those subject to its decision.

SHAKESPEARE AND EMBODIED SOVEREIGNTY

The conception of the body politic as the immortal, political body of government and law, distinct from the sovereign, comes through clearly in the *Vindiciae*, where it serves to ground the primacy of the people over the king. The idea of the king's two bodies, a premise of medieval and early modern perceptions of political theology, posits the dual nature of kingship by theorizing the melding of the body natural—the king's mortal, fallible human body—with the body politic.⁷⁰ Central to this theory is the idea that, with the anointment and consecration of the man as sovereign, the king's "natural Defects and Imbecilities" are overcome, the body politic in effect displacing the human weaknesses and flaws that could undermine effective rule.⁷¹ As I have suggested above, this theory faced challenges from political theorists who recognized that sovereigns were often all too human, as likely to be driven by vices and desires as guided by virtues and reason. While the body politic might remain unaffected, there was no guarantee that a king's vices would be restricted to the realm of the personal, and both Bodin and the *Vindiciae* author address circumstances in which citizens are subject to abuses by the sovereign.⁷²

Additionally, both emphasize the importance of wise counsel to effective sovereignty, recognizing that its opposite can create disruption and instability. The *Vindiciae* contrasts the king's reliance upon and support of honorable and virtuous men, whom the tyrant avoids at all costs while fostering vice through every means possible. The tyrant avoids counsel, while the king seeks it out.⁷³ Both suggest that most often, personal vices and political ones are inextricably linked, as are personal and political virtues. An effective sovereign embodies and enacts the higher laws through the lower ones where possible, and draws on the higher order law where the lower order cannot be applied. The entire political system, the entire commonwealth, is united under this adherence to divine and natural law, of which civil law is the local expression. The tyrant rejects divine and natural law, and thus is likewise unchecked by and unsupportive of the rule of civil law. Whereas Schmitt does not address the problem of sovereign failure, the early modern theorists explicitly recognize and deal with the

failure of sovereignty when human weakness or corruption overcomes these limiting aspects of sovereign power, and tyrannical sovereignty does its destructive work on the commonweal. They clearly understand such sovereigns as exceptional, violating the normative moral basis for their authority, to their own great risk in the eternal scheme. Benevolent sovereignty, however rare, is the appropriate expression of governmental form.

Shakespeare seems less convinced of that ideal form as an achievable, let alone normal, expression. As an issue that occupied him in a large number of his plays, sovereign authority, its exercise, and its abuses lie at the center of this book's exploration, particularly his interest in the nature of sovereign power and its purpose, and the role of the sovereign in relation to natural and divine law. Shakespeare repeatedly suggests through his depictions of monarchy that embodied sovereignty presents troubling contradictions, particularly in the context of royal marriage. Plays featuring the king's joint roles as patriarch and monarch represent these homological forms of authority as enabling the most violent and abusive decisions. The homology itself was central to conceptions of the state, naturalizing political relationships by relating them to the family. Bodin, for example, draws on the family/state homology to discuss the reciprocal obligations of sovereigns and subjects. Like the father, who offers support, guidance, and care for his offspring, the king provides for his subjects' security and well-being. The citizens owe obedience to the sovereign as children do to their father.⁷⁴ However, while the obligations between parents and children are 'natural', the obligations between sovereigns and subjects (or citizens) are a result of the loss or relinquishment of natural liberties. Thus, the basis of obedience is different for subjects and children, although the requirement is analogous. While Bodin does not make the point, wives seem to fall somewhere between the two, bound to their husbands by contract rather than blood, and thus more like citizens than children, but also bound by the intimacy of a closely shared life, rather than existing in a highly mediated social and political relationship. Shakespeare makes effective use of this other space of wives, particularly the foreign queens I address in this book. The intersection of the sovereign's *personal* weakness with his *political* decisions operates at the center of these plays' troubling of embodied sovereignty. Each play approaches this problem from a different perspective, and each opens up in fruitful ways through a key political concept linked to that intersection of the personal and the political.

That link gains valence when we think metaphorically about the relationship between the patriarch and the sovereign. Schmitt recognizes that

other figures of authority may make a decision over life and death just as the sovereign may—he mentions the patriarch of the household as such a figure. However, their power is limited to their particular purview—they cannot decide on the distinction between friend and enemy of the state, and thus they lack sovereignty.⁷⁵ In the context of the early modern royal family, however, as Shakespeare so clearly demonstrates, the overlapping roles of patriarch and sovereign obscure the limitations on the actions of patriarch in such a determination. This leads minimally to metaphorical broadening of the application of the political distinction—while certainly a host or a patriarch cannot decide on enemies of the state unless he is also the head of the state, he can render a sovereign decision within his familial sphere of authority in terms that very closely align with those of the sovereign. This means, in short, that the patriarch may exercise judgment and take action to secure his realm of authority from those who are *imagined* to threaten it, even without proof of transgression, or due process of law. Like the sovereign, the patriarch exercises the sovereign decision, albeit with more limited scope. When the patriarch and sovereign are one, that scope becomes unlimited, with only the force of divine law, or perhaps the rebellion of subjects, as a check on that power.

FOUR KEY TERMS: FRAGMENTED IDENTITY, HOSPITALITY, CITIZENSHIP, BANISHMENT

Each of the four main chapters of this book focuses on a key term through which the particular problems of sovereign judgment are revealed—we might even say theorized—by Shakespeare. In each case, and in many other plays besides, he considers what it means to hold and use sovereign authority, particularly sovereign judgment (or will) above law. Situating Shakespeare's plays in relation to early modern political and historical texts such as Bodin's *Six Books*, the *Vindiciae*, Hall's and Holinshed's *Chronicles*, reveals how Shakespeare engaged with and intervened in the political culture of his own historical moment. In conjunction with this historicist aspect of my project, reading and thinking about Shakespeare's plays in the context of recent political and theoretical arguments reveals a surprisingly frequent anticipation of our most pressing issues by early modern writers across many genres and political positions. However, women are conspicuously absent from this various theorizing, except in discussions of household organization. In neither the early modern nor the contemporary

contexts are women considered as central to the political formation, while tellingly, women have, for most of history in most geographic locations, comprised a permanent class of the oppressed. Their absence from such theories of the political, and their presence as consistently subjugated individuals within the political and social systems, makes them significant emblematic figures in an analysis of sovereign abuse. Because of their direct relationship to political power, foreign queens, who are always in some sense like exiles separated from hearth, home, family, language, and culture, are particularly useful in the critique of sovereign violence. They navigate problematic and conflicting identities, are like guests in the households and nations of conditional hosts, resemble Bodin's citizens rather than Aristotle's, bound by duty to the sovereign and patriarch, but denied the shared virtues and values that defined eligibility for political participation. That these conditions of foreign queens in Shakespeare's plays align with key terms in contemporary theory makes it possible to consider how these plays speak from their own historical moment into ours, providing critical insights on early modern and contemporary political issues.

Although each chapter is organized around a particular queen and the key term most associated with her specific situation, the four terms—fragmented identity, hospitality, citizenship, and exile—intersect in various ways across the entire project. Each queen exists in a condition of tacit exile, each struggles to establish, retain, or redefine her place in the political structure, each experiences the authority of the conditional host, and each confronts her alien otherness. Each, additionally, teaches us that resistance is the appropriate response to abusive power, although Shakespeare typically suggests that the choice to use violence against a sitting ruler may instigate much-needed positive change, but it will redound back on the perpetrator through divine punishment. 'Necessary' and 'acceptable' are not synonymous.

FRAGMENTED IDENTITY

This book begins with Katherine of Aragon and *Henry VIII*, considering the significance of her fragmented identity in her resistance to Henry's sovereign decision on their marriage. Threatened by Henry with divorce in his pursuit of a younger wife and a male heir, she faces the loss of status, privilege, and position after twenty years as England's beloved queen. The intersecting domestic and political dimensions of this conflict reveal how a foreign queen could embody the commonweal of English subjects, citing

fealty, service, and duty as the basis for belonging, while attempting to stand against sovereign will. Through both Katherine and Wolsey, Shakespeare problematizes the legal perception that place of birth was an indicator of fealty and *leageance*. Through Wolsey, explicitly identified in the play as a domestic subject, he reveals how private agendas displace the supposed inborn allegiance of subjects that should protect the commonwealth and the body politic. By contrast, Katherine's foreign provenance and heritage have no negative effect on her comportment as England's queen, and may strengthen her capacities—she explicitly and actively mobilizes humanist values of moral and civic order in protection and support of English subjects, advocating for the fundamental positive functions of sovereignty and government. She also emphasizes that the stability of the commonwealth relies upon the reciprocal obligations of sovereigns and subjects. When her place and protection under English law are compromised by Wolsey's manipulation of the King and Henry's exercise of sovereign will, her claim to foreignness and her appeal to external justice emphasize the injustice of the insular English political context. Throughout the remainder of the play, she invokes her status as a foreigner, as well as her long residency in and adaptation to England—her Englishness *and* her foreignness—strategically according to circumstances. Although she is never declared an internal enemy, Katherine's loss of status, position, and place through the sovereign decision on the exception makes evident the vulnerability of all subjects under embodied sovereignty, and the threat posed to the commonwealth by the assertion of sovereign will. The play's explicit depiction of Henry VIII's conflation of private desires and state policies reveals the inadequacy of the friend/enemy distinction in defining political relationships.

This idea of deliberate, selective self-identification is central to Amin Maalouf's *In the Name of Identity*. He argues that we belong to various communities through which our sympathies, our sense of values and virtues, our sense of self and others, friends and enemies, are formed. Maalouf, born and raised in Lebanon, a speaker of Arabic educated in French academies in the Middle East, took up residency in France at the age of 27. Using his own fragmented identity as a touchstone, he notes, "What makes me myself rather than anyone else is the very fact that I am poised between two countries, two or three languages and several cultural traditions. It is precisely this that defines my identity."⁷⁶ Maalouf hints at the polyvalence of the term 'identity' in and of itself. In our current, most common usage, we take it to signify one's essential being, one's "distin-

guishing character or personality,” and it therefore serves as a means of defining one’s individuality.⁷⁷ This aligns neatly with Maalouf’s declaration that his unique social, cultural, political, and linguistic experience constitute who he is, uniquely. However, the term derives from the Latin *identidem*, *idem et idem* (repeatedly, same and same), and in that sense, it signifies ‘sameness’, the qualities that suggest continuity over time and that align individuals into identity groups—“the relation established by psychological identification.”⁷⁸ Such groups include both national and social relationships, with kinship, gender role, and marital status among the latter.

The two meanings overlap, indicating the aspects of an individual that mark him or her as self-consistent—as the same over time, as bearing irreducible elements of being, as well as the aspects that situate individuals as part of various groups. ‘Identity politics’ thus signifies a political stance based upon who one is, in essence—ethnic, racial, national, religious, social, or otherwise. And yet, in this articulation of essentialism emerges the sense of malleability—national, religious, social, and cultural formations affect an individual differently at different times, and both those formations and one’s role within them may actually be changed by choice or by circumstance. Even ethnic or racial identity, inevitably complicated even in its simplest form, may be understood differently within different times, contexts, or conditions. And in any case, all meanings of the term serve as a basis for distinction as well as alignment, an indication of where one person is located in relation to others.⁷⁹ As Maalouf observes, “Every individual is a meeting ground for many different allegiances, and sometimes these loyalties conflict with one another and confront the person who harbours them with difficult choices.”⁸⁰ His point is that how we choose to identify ourselves, as members of a group or as committed to a cause, is potentially self-determined. We are not bound to the oppositional, and potentially violent, antagonisms into which we are born and raised—these are not qualities of our genetic condition, but of our social and environmental condition. Nationality, religious affiliation, culture, community, and other lived experiences and effects formative of identity comprise overlapping, but sometimes contradictory forms of affiliation, among which we must inevitably choose.

Maalouf’s engagement with the multiplicity, complications, and volitions of identity serve as an important contemporary touchstone for my reading of Katherine.⁸¹ He notes that many people in our present moment live in areas that “are arenas for allegiances currently in violent conflict with one another: they live in a sort of frontier zone crisscrossed by ethnic,

religious and other fault lines. But by virtue of this situation ... they have a special role to play in forging links, eliminating misunderstandings, making some parties more reasonable and others less belligerent, smoothing out difficulties, seeking compromise.”⁸² Certainly, this is an idealistic view of how cross-cultural conflict might be quelled by individuals effectively navigating the tensions of identity. However, it rather strikingly aligns with the expectations on those women who were consigned to foreign marriages in the medieval and early modern worlds, as each of the women in this book was. This idea of the inevitable threat of violence in such cross-cultural contexts, as well as the rejection of a single identity and the insistence on multiplicity, applies helpfully to women in cross-cultural royal marriage, and thus to foreign queens generally, and to Katherine’s self-definitions in *Henry VIII*.

Jacques Derrida also provides a useful theoretical touchstone for Katherine’s situation. In *Of Hospitality*, he calls attention to the violence of our treatment of strangers, a violence that occurs in the instant of initial communication, when they are asked to identify themselves—a request that establishes insider and outsider, dominant and subordinate, self and other through the language and position of inquiry. However, Derrida problematizes this opposition, turning to *The Apology of Socrates* to suggest the ways in which claiming the status of an outsider might strengthen one’s position with relation to dominant power, the law, and the inquisitor. As Socrates’ trial commences, he addresses the court to assert the impossibility of equity in such a trial. “He declares that he is ‘foreign’ to the language of the courts, to the tribune of the tribunals: he doesn’t know how to speak this courtroom language, this legal rhetoric of accusation, defense, and pleading; he doesn’t have the skill, he is *like* a foreigner.”⁸³ Derrida’s example overturns hierarchical oppositions between insider and outsider, suggesting that the internal values of fairness and justice compel insiders to make special accommodations for outsiders in order to provide them with fair treatment under the law, as Greek law required. Socrates makes a strategic argument that mobilizes *incapacities* as points of accommodation, while it also destabilizes the very terms of the judicial interaction by challenging the categories of participation.⁸⁴ Katherine makes very similar moves in her trial, and in response to the unraveling of her queenship that follows.

Maalouf recognizes the overlapping spheres of identity that shape each of us, that both forge our sense of belonging and divide us from each other, while Derrida sees the potential advantage in being—or claiming to be—

foreign to one's context. Complementary to these perceptions of identity, theories of the strategic construction of identity have been vastly enabling for gender studies, calling our attention to the social conventions through which gender is defined, and thus the malleability of our particular self-presentations and self-definitions. Judith Butler's work on performativity is particularly pertinent. Butler takes into account the discursive construction of categories of identity (as Socrates does, in Derrida's reading), making visible their complexity and unfixity: "gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and ... [it] intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities."⁸⁵ In her analysis, just as our communal experiences shape our sense of ourselves in multiple, overlapping ways, how we are identified by others has profoundly formative effects. She emphasizes the centrality of "socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility" through which "persons are defined."⁸⁶ As a countermeasure to destabilize existing categories of identity, particularly the basic binary of male/female, she points toward "coalitional assemblages," which create "provisional unities ... in the context of concrete actions that might have purposes other than the articulation of identity."⁸⁷ In early modern terms, the culturally defined virtues of the chaste, submissive, and devoted wife become the touchstones against which both Hermione and Katherine of Aragon defend themselves, as Shakespeare mobilizes traditional and restrictive characteristics as evidence of their propriety as wives. In this sense, each defines and legitimates herself through her obedience to a regime of oppression, in what we might call a 'provisional unity' with the very means of subjection. Yet, rather than simply submitting, each also uses this history of submission to challenge the patriarchal and sovereign authority of their husband/king. If their gendered behavior is a response to the "*regulatory practices* of gender formation and division," it at the same time constitutes a means of resistance to the "normative ideal" that tends to displace the "descriptive feature[s] of experience."⁸⁸ Their virtue as women enables their opposition to sovereign judgment, and their claims to subjection support an alternative hierarchy that subsumes sovereign as well as subjects. This kind of realignment is hardly what Butler has in mind in challenging naturalized perceptions of gendered identity, but her formulation nevertheless reveals the disruptions implicit even in less radical deployments of identity.

Katherine, in particular, claims not only ideal uxorial identity, but also ideal *English* identity, privileging English subjects and the English commonweal over political agendas that threaten them. Her capacity to operate from

a more universal, overarching view of sovereign propriety in the promotion of the good of Henry's subjects gains valence through her enactment of idealized gender roles—wife, mother, queen. She aligns herself deliberately and effectively with the imagined values of the effective sovereign state, even when it becomes clear that her own position is threatened by machinations in support of private and/or self-interested political agendas. Thus, like Socrates, she challenges the justice of the state and its judges, invoking her foreignness and by demanding recourse to an external judge. She holds England to a moral hierarchy that should prevail there, but that has been overthrown.⁸⁹ She thus never abandons her claims to Englishness, even when she resorts to her foreign identity as a basis to challenge sovereign judgment. Katherine, despite her resistance, fails to bring about the intervention she seeks, and indeed, sovereign judgment overrides her through a decision on the law. In the chronicles, Henry VIII circumvents her appeal to papal judgment by issuing a statute prohibiting any English subject from making such an appeal. In the play, the judgment of both English and international ecclesiasts grants him the right to divorce her. Even when his divorce from her eliminates her relationship to him, to the throne, and to England, she remains, in his view, a subject whose right to challenge his authority is limited by English sovereign law. Further, not only does the pope fail her, but her powerful nephew, Charles I/V, whose friendship to England had been repeatedly compromised, nevertheless makes no move to demonstrate his friendship to her by challenging her husband. She reveals, by the end of the play, the vulnerabilities of foreign queens to the injustice of conjoined patriarchal and monarchical authority in diplomatic marriage. She is able to use neither English nor foreign identity and affiliation to rectify her standing in the face of sovereign judgment.

HOSPITALITY

Through its sustained focus on hospitality, *The Winter's Tale* offers a rich, complex critique of the friend/enemy distinction established through sovereign judgment. Highlighting the intersecting roles of husband, host, and sovereign, the play reveals the threat posed by the body natural to the body politic, as it depicts the vulnerability of guest, wife, and subjects under these conjoined forms of authority and judgment. Shakespeare's engagement with hospitality resonates with the concept's recent theorization by Jacques Derrida and other contemporary political philosophers, in which hospitality takes two forms: conditional and unconditional (absolute), the

latter unachievable because it conflicts with the proprietary claims of the host. However, theories of community and communalism posed by Roberto Esposito and Jean-Luc Nancy challenge the inevitability of proprietary claims, which opens the possibility for unconditional (absolute) hospitality.⁹⁰ The two halves of the play can be understood to represent the two main forms of hospitality identified by Derrida. The vilification of Hermione in the first half of the play reveals how the complicated familial and political dynamics of the royal court enable overlapping forms of abusive power that situate wives, guests, and subjects in parallel conditions of subjection. In Bohemia as well as Sicilia, the court and the sovereign are associated with hospitality in its conditional, implicitly violent form—violence that in both contexts becomes explicit when the patriarchal sovereign/host believes his proprietary control is threatened. Here, once again, we see that the sovereign’s capacity to define the internal and external enemy leads to judgments and actions that are deleterious to, rather than protective of, the state, as the sovereign himself becomes the internal enemy. However, in the pastoral Bohemian context, before Polixenes asserts his sovereign judgment, the possibility of unconditional welcome emerges through acts of kindness, charity, and friendship toward strangers, as the shared labor and leisure of the shepherds creates a non-proprietary, non-transactional community. Rural Bohemia offers unconditional hospitality as an alternative through which the oppressive institutional formations that support conditional hospitality can be resisted or reconfigured.

Hospitality, understood at its most basic level, is the acceptance of an outsider into the household, realm, or nation, the extension of welcome and care to one who comes from elsewhere.⁹¹ Unconditional hospitality sets no limits, requires no reciprocity, places no demands, asks no questions; conditional hospitality asserts and protects the host’s sovereignty precisely through the boundaries it establishes.⁹² But as Derrida makes clear, in neither the household nor the state is there a space for hospitality in its pure or absolute (unconditional) form, a form which requires one “to give the new arrival all of one’s home and oneself . . . without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfillment of even the smallest condition.”⁹³ Thus, a second form of *conditional* hospitality has emerged as the primary—or possibly the *only*—type that can be practiced or experienced. Conditional hospitality defines the “limits, powers, rights, and duties,” associated with the welcoming of strangers, and “challeng[es] and transgress[es] *the* law of hospitality, the one that would command that the ‘new arrival’ be offered an unconditional welcome.”⁹⁴ Thus, when limited access, restric-

tions of behavior or interaction, requirements of obedience or compliance, and obligations of reciprocity are present, hospitality has taken its conditional and more typical form.⁹⁵ And in this form, “since there is also no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence,” by limiting welcome, and by asserting, and forcing the guest to submit to, the conditions set by the host.⁹⁶ Absolute hospitality as a state policy is thus a fiction, an ideal form out of which and in contrast to which actual hospitality, in its conditional, inherently violent form and function, emerges.⁹⁷

At the level of the household, similar conditions apply—the proprietary authority of the host echoes that of the sovereign, and to admit a guest without conditions is, as Derrida argues, to immediately destabilize the sovereignty of the host. When there are no conditions, no questions, no demands upon the guest, proprietorship is undermined and hospitality itself becomes impossible. These perceptions of hospitality situate host/guest relationships within unequal power dynamics, where proprietary control of space and access supports the decision to admit a guest and determines the conditions under which the guest may function and remain. The proprietary claim creates the basis of conditional hospitality, and the conditions placed on the guest—spoken or unspoken—support that proprietary claim. The relationship between host and guest under conditional hospitality is thus inevitably hierarchical and violent.⁹⁸ There is no way out of this system of conditions and compliance, as Derrida’s argument makes clear. We find such a conditional model operating in the Sicilian court, and significantly, as the proprietress exercises hospitality in the name of the proprietor, the queen in the name of the king, she reveals the hidden violence of the sovereign/host, which will soon be turned against guest and wife, both judged to have transgressed the limits of welcome.

Although Schmitt’s discussion of sovereignty limits the sovereign decision to the context of the state, sovereign authority and sovereign/subject relations work powerfully as metaphors for the unequal power dynamics of the host/guest relationship. To refuse the law of the host is to reject his proprietary authority, just as subjects’ rebellious actions refuse the sovereign’s claimed authority. The ultimate exercise of sovereign authority, the sovereign decision, consists in suspending the rule of law in order to address such a threat through containment and/or punishment beyond law. The central problem lies in the arbitrary nature of this capacity to decide—as early modern debates about absolutism suggest, the exercise of sovereign will-above-law is wholly subjective. Similarly, the host possesses

the ultimate authority to decide on the propriety of the guest's actions, and in the context of hospitality, where the laws governing guest behavior are mainly implicit, the exercise of the host's proprietary authority is grounded entirely in subjective judgment. The parallel between subjects of the state and guests of the household lies in their potential subjection to the arbitrary judgment of sovereign or host, as he endeavors to protect his own proprietary position.

The concepts of hierarchy and reciprocity are central in both contexts. In the hospitable relationship, the host's extension of conditional hospitality establishes the subordination of the guest, but generally the guest is expected to serve as host in return, and the host to accept the hospitality of his guest at another time—mutual expectations that establish long-term reciprocity and situate the host/guest hierarchy as temporary.⁹⁹ However, in the case of hospitality to social inferiors, such as the needy poor in the early modern period, hospitality took the form of what we think of as charity. The host was expected to show charity and generosity toward those less fortunate, and the worthy poor were expected to remain within their appropriate demesne or parish, to work for the estate's lord, and to submit to his authority. That expectation of reciprocity is similar to the reciprocity in the realm of the political, which was based upon each fulfilling his or her obligations within a fixed, hierarchical relationship. In this hierarchy, the sovereign has obligations to see to the good of his/her subjects, and the subjects owe obedience to the sovereign. However, sovereign judgment against subjects has no limitations or checks, and there is no mechanism to ensure that the sovereign actually fulfills his/her obligations. To a great extent, this was true at the level of the parish and estate, and once again at the level of the household as well, and thus the subjected in all contexts were vulnerable if the sovereign/householder neglected his obligations, and had few—or no—means to correct the negligent overlord.

Although Derrida's proprietary model of hospitality offers little space to consider gender, we do know that wives participated in household hospitality in the early modern period, most often in the name of the proprietor and host, her husband. Nevertheless, the wife can be understood as herself akin to a guest. In his 1608 treatise against wife-beating, William Heale makes this parallel directly: "A husband taketh his wife from her friends, disacquainteth her with her kindfolkes, debarreth her her parent sight, and estrangeth her from whomsoever was dearest unto her; he takes her into his own hospitality; receives her into his own protection, & himself becomes her sole guardian."¹⁰⁰ Heale thus emphasizes both women's

subjection under marriage and the obligations of the husband toward them *because* of their guest-like conditions and subjection.¹⁰¹

He invokes the “*Pythagorians* law of hospitalitie” in support of his parallel between wife and guest, a law which “decreed, that *None who entered into an others house, should for the time of his aboard there, suffer any kind of injury upon any occasion.*”¹⁰² By defining a woman’s position as the entry into another’s house, Heale applies the obligations of the host to the *guest* as a protection of the *wife* against patriarchal force, but by making this parallel, he implicitly acknowledges the vulnerability of the guest, whose safety depends upon the host’s welcome and good treatment. Under hospitality’s informal injunctions, the guest is not secure from the host’s judgment and violence, and we can see immediately that the wife’s position is more complicated than that of the traditional guest. She is no mere sojourner—her position is not temporary, but permanent. Further, she lacks the capability to exercise reciprocity by claiming the position of host in relation to her husband’s position as guest; she is permanently subordinate in this relationship, much as the poor were permanently subordinate to the lord of the estate. She can be turned out—or much worse—for non-compliance. The conditions of the patriarchal family thus intensify the wife’s subjection compared to that of the guest, and as we shall see, Shakespeare emphasizes this particular intensification in his depiction of Hermione’s situation.

The play makes particular use of the dynamic between wife and guest within this system of subjection. One of the fundamental conditions of hospitality—although such conditions are seldom explicitly defined—is that the guest must respect the property of the host, must, in fact, acknowledge the host’s proprietary claim on everything in the domicile. In a patriarchal system, the most precious household property is the wife herself, through whom the proprietor begets the progeny who inherit the property he controls. The transgression of this unspoken condition is the most disrespectful violation of hospitality, and it is the very transgression imagined in *The Winter’s Tale*. Fear of this transgression points us toward the vulnerability of the husband/host, even as he asserts his proprietary claims and welcomes the guest, for the opening of the household is the opening of the host to violations of those claims. Ironically, as the wife/hostess supports and participates in that welcome, she has the capacity to instigate such a violation in the form of sexual engagement with the guest, an act that extends hospitality beyond the boundaries set by the host,

opens her body to the guest, and offers him pleasures that exceed the entertainments allowed by the host.

To recognize this possibility is to understand the extent to which hospitality relies upon mutual trust, upon the agreement of all parties to accept the limits set by the host, and upon the confidence of the host in the compliance of his guests—and his wife. At the same time, it allows us to acknowledge the agency of the wife, either in her acceptance of her con-doned role as hostess or in her welcoming of the guest beyond the bound-aries of that role. Despite the husband’s proprietary claim on the wife, her capacity to submit to or resist that claim negates her status as a mere object, and calls attention to the weakness of sovereign authority within the house-hold or the realm, for it can demand, judge, and punish, but it can never see into the hearts and minds of the subject. This, too, becomes a central element of the play’s depiction of sovereignty and its uncertainties.

Thinking about alternatives to proprietorship, and thus to conditional hospitality, is not possible within the framework defined by Derrida. However, Jean Luc Nancy and Roberto Esposito situate communalism as the antithesis of proprietorship, offering an alternative to individual claims of possession and control, and also to the perception of the common as itself grounded in property, in what is possessed in common, such as “the ethnic, territorial, and spiritual property of every one of its members.”¹⁰³ Community, Roberto Esposito explains, is based on that which is common, not that which is proper,¹⁰⁴ on “what belongs to more than one, to many or to everyone,” on what is public rather than private, general rather than individual.¹⁰⁵ The rejection of the concept of the individual as a self that is formed independent of others, who then joins with others as s/he chooses, opens another means of undoing the idea of proprietorship. Nancy thus addresses community, as “that which undoes the absolute of the individual, the one who ‘encloses’ himself and distinguishes himself from others.” He adds, “The relation (the community) is, if it *is*, nothing other than what it undoes, in its very principle—and at its closure or on its limit—the autarchy of absolute immanence.”¹⁰⁶ He elaborates that community “is always revealed to others. It is what takes place always through others and for others.”¹⁰⁷ Community requires a “declination or decline of the individual”; the individual must be “inclined ... outside itself, over that edge that opens up its being-in-common.”¹⁰⁸ Nancy further suggests that “Being cannot *be* anything but the being-with-one-another, circulating in the *with* and as the *with* of this singularly plural coexistence,” and that “[e]xistence *is with*: otherwise, nothing exists.”¹⁰⁹ Also important to the contexts of the play is

Esposito's observation that community is grounded in the concept of the gift, which situates community as a structure of relations among those obligated to one another through what they owe to the others, and what they give to the others.¹¹⁰ This idea of community as relational can, in turn, be understood in Christian contexts as parallel to Christ's sacrifice and gift to humanity, which forms the basis for the Christian community and provides the model of obligation, service, and sacrifice for others within that broad and potentially unbounded collective.¹¹¹

These values, I argue, are evident in the shepherd community of rural Bohemia. Building upon these reconfigured models of communal thought and existence, we can posit a reconceptualization of hospitality on a basis beyond proprietorship and conditionality—beyond the limits established by Derrida's conception of hospitality as always already conditional.¹¹² Significantly, moving beyond proprietorship also offers some grounds for alternatives to the patriarchal basis of hospitality, opening the way to a less male-centric conception of the dynamics of the household and the welcoming of others. As we shall see, in the analysis of hospitality in rural Bohemia, in the unconditional community, women are neither property nor guests, but instead have the capacity to function as agents and models of idealized communal values. However, even the hope and possibility posed by unconditional hospitality in the Bohemian countryside, which arises only beyond the reach of sovereign judgment, fractures and collapses when that judgment arises against these rural inhabitants. As the play concludes in Paulina's household gallery, she also exercises proprietary authority, but she does so to enable, rather than disrupt, welcome without question.

CITIZENSHIP

Titus Andronicus problematizes the idea of citizenship, in part because the play retracts from the sense of the shared values of the political context, of friendship and citizenship as grounding premises in a viable polity, discussed below. Those values, already undeniably compromised by threats of violence early in the first Act, are further undermined by Titus' assumptions about the right of the patriarch. When Tamora makes her plea for her son's life, invoking the shared values and virtues of Roman and Goth, she offers an opportunity for Titus to reconsider their relationship in terms of equality and similarity. However, even as he recognizes her similarity to him, Titus allows mere rituals of civil and religious order to displace the living discourse of human connection at the heart of friendship and citi-

zenship, definitive of the polis. Tamora's threat, following this failure of mercy, has little to do with enacting vengeance, and much to do with securing her position at the political center, even as she evades subjection by manipulating Saturninus and cuckolding him. She also enables Aaron's violence, a "tribeless, lawless, hearthless one" who inserts himself into the body politic of Rome, sundering it from itself and dismembering it. Although she works primarily in the background, through the results of her political influence, Titus is made to recognize the sovereign as the internal enemy, the threat that the body politic must resist in order to survive. Like Julia-Reinhard Lupton's "monster killer, himself akin to the monsters he overcomes," Titus "clears the ground for a new political era that must sacrifice archaic heroism in order to institute a new order of law and citizenship."¹¹³ Or he almost does. For, despite the promise of transnational commitment and community implied by Roman republic or global Christendom, Rome's turn to the Goths as brothers in arms and compatriots in virtue offers only a temporary respite from the violence of the sovereign decision. Under Lucius as the new emperor, Rome shores itself up by redrawing the boundary between friend and enemy, with the threat of death for any who disobey Lucius' judgment against Aaron.

The question of what constitutes a citizen and of what citizenship *means* has profound implications in our current moment, as it had in the early modern period, and in the classical contexts from which we borrow this term and concept. It is directly linked to a number of concepts I have already touched upon—the friend/enemy distinction, nationalism, residency, duty, community, responsibility, the hospitality of the state, and identity. For Bodin, the 'citizen' and 'subject' were synonymous, interchangeable terms that designated subjection to sovereign authority.¹¹⁴ For Aristotle, citizenship was a political designation—it represented the capacity to hold offices and participate in political debates and decisions. Man, he argued, was inherently a political animal, made so by his capacity for rational speech—that is, speech aimed at the recognition and fulfillment of justice.¹¹⁵ The fullest form of political life, he argues, includes obedience to law and commitment to justice, without which humankind devolves to its most debased condition.¹¹⁶ He suggests that citizens are knit together by a moral bond, united by the shared values and virtues that are also necessary for friendship, and under that bond, they aim for the general benefit and good of all within the family, the community, and the state.¹¹⁷ He indicates that the fundamental aim of the political community, and the laws and structures that define it, is to achieve the greatest good for those

within that community. No state is a complete unity—there are necessary debates and disagreements about appropriate *means* (policies and actions) to the desired ends. Nevertheless, there must be agreement about the *ends* of the state—the creation of the conditions and opportunities for the best possible life, which for Aristotle is a life of virtue: “for the political community aims, not at the present advantage, but at that pertaining to life as a whole.”¹¹⁸ Those who function counter to those ends function counter to the aims and purpose of community and state, placing their own pleasures and benefits above those of their fellow citizens. Man “is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity, or below it; he is the ‘Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,’ whom Homer denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone.” Implicit here is the idea that to reject the common, the general good, and the commitments to political life as a life grounded in ethical virtues, is to be, by nature, one isolated and alone, the enemy of all, in a state of inevitable war against all.¹¹⁹

Such views circulated in early modern England as well. In *The Praise of Solitariness* (1577), Roger Baynes argues that few wise philosophers prefer “*Solitariness* before societie.” Rather, many, “have utterly condemned that uncivil kind of life, which ignorant people in the beginning of the world did brutishly lead, much after the manner of unreasonable beasts” which we might call the ‘state of nature’.¹²⁰ In that state, neither laws nor friendship existed—an observation that emphasizes their parallel relationship to political life. Family, which Aristotle and Bodin, among others, take to be the basic relationship that models the state, itself was absent: “there was neither society nor friendship maintained, no man living in the bounds of lawful matrimony, no man certain of his own children, nor any law to distinguish the good from the evil maintained among them.”¹²¹ Like Homer’s outcasts, “each man then did carelessly range, and wander abroad in the desolate Wilderness, having neither dwelling nor place of abode.”¹²²

Baynes shows little interest in natural law, mentioning only that “reason [eventually] taught them to associate themselves together,” which paved the way for the gift of divine law through Moses. Through him, “God gave first the law to the line of his inheritance: from thence ... the law makers and Philosophers, first taking their instruction, began to set down both manners and institutions of living” Gradually, as civil society developed, “people began to esteem of *Humanity* and to reverence

Religion,” and something of a natural hierarchy emerged: “diverse addicted themselves to the favour of *Faith*, and to the exercise of *Justice*, and diverse other to submit themselves to the yoke of obedience”¹²³ Although he is not explicit, he suggests that three categories of social subjects emerged, some more autonomous than others, but nevertheless, “each man did esteem it a thing belonging to his duty, not only to employ the best of his labour, but also to adventure the loss of his life, for the better maintenance of the common Wealth.”¹²⁴ The aggregation into social structures followed the emergence of rationality, which many writers situate as the basis of natural law, and of civil and political society. But for Baynes, it is merely a precursor to, not a foundational basis of, society.

Baynes’ main argument, however, has less to do with the basis of law and more to do with the nature of citizenship, for as he hints here, a proper citizen is an active citizen, devoting himself to the cultivation of the commonweal, and in this sentiment he was joined by many other political theorists of the period.¹²⁵ John Case, for example, argues that a citizen has the same definition in all governmental forms—monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy: he is one “who takes part in deliberative and judicial administration and acts as a magistrate,” a definition Case takes directly from Aristotle.¹²⁶ For Bodin, citizenship is not defined by one’s active participation in the political sphere. Rather, ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ were synonymous, defined by their fealty, obligation, and subordination to the sovereign. He sees them as bound by the civil laws of the state, but also by their subjection. Bodin advocates for the contemplative rather than the active political life, first asserting that “the wise man is the measure of justice and of truth, and those reputed wise have always agreed that the end of the individual and the end of the commonwealth are one ...” This leads him to affirm that there is no “distinction of the good man and the good citizen,” contrary to Aristotle, and thus to “conclude that contemplation is the end and form of the good to which the government of the commonwealth should be directed.”¹²⁷ For Bodin, despite his interest in cultivating virtue and ensuring civil life for the greatest number, and his recognition that offices and political functions must be to some extent distributed, behind all order in the commonwealth lies the sovereign, and obedience to that sovereign authority is the centerpiece of the successful commonwealth.

Aristotle, linking citizenship and friendship, was thinking in terms of the polis, aligning these two terms through virtue as a set of shared objectives and characteristics. The capacity for participation (rational thought

and its expression in language), the capacity for altruism (commitment to the general good), and the capacity for justice (reasoned judgment) make the political community the most exalted communal form. This positive model relied on the active citizen for success. He distinguished between a good man and a good citizen through this active participation, primarily in terms of his willingness to support the political structure in which he exists. Thus, “one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This community is the state; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member.”¹²⁸

Aristotle does not refer to resistance or correction here, but embedded in this definition is an ambiguity that suggests a much more active approach than might initially be understood. If, for example, citizens are educated to support and participate in a monarchy, but end up living in a tyrannical state, good citizenship might be understood as support for the form of the regime—monarchy—but not its immediate manifestation—tyranny. As discussed above, Bodin recognized this as well, although he negates active resistance as a response to a devolved government. The *Vindiciae* author, like Aristotle, emphasizes action against tyranny as the duty of the representative or collective members of the body politic—citizens and subjects. With this in mind, I approach *Titus Andronicus* as a play that makes a distinction between the good *subject* and the good *citizen*—the former defined by his willing submission to sovereign authority, the latter by his willingness to challenge it in defense of the commonweal. This distinction is at the core of the struggle against tyranny in the play, mobilized by Tamora’s challenge to Roman citizenship.

BANISHMENT AND EXILE

Caput Lupinum was a medieval designation for the banished subject: “He bears a wolf’s head from the day of his expulsion, and the English call this *wulfeshead*.”¹²⁹ Such a one may be killed with impunity, but not sacrificed, and no one within the community from which they have been banished may offer them aid, support, or relief.¹³⁰ “He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather *abandoned* by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, inside and outside, become indistinguishable.”¹³¹ Thus, as Agamben points out, the banished one becomes “the immediate referent for sovereign violence.”¹³² The point he wishes to

make is that bare life—mere existence—is necessary to but excluded from political life. It is included as the exception, that sovereign capacity to exercise judgment above law, to suspend law, and thereby to reduce the citizen to a being with no political voice, no protection from law, and no place *within* the state, but nevertheless always in a relationship *to* the state.¹³³ Agamben calls this the “*relation of exception* ... the extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion.”¹³⁴ Central to this argument, and to the relationship between the banished one and the sovereign, is the *wulfesbeud* as definitive of the state of nature, the city without law: “Far from being a prejudicial condition that is indifferent to the law of the city, the Hobbesian state of nature is the exception and the threshold that dwells within it.”¹³⁵ When the juridical state is formed, the sole figure who retains the capacity for violence against all is the sovereign. For according to Hobbes, the “right of Punishing ... was not given, but left to him [the sovereign], and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set to him by naturall Law), as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature ...”¹³⁶ And that reveals the true nature of sovereignty: “in the person of the sovereign, the werewolf, the wolf-man of man, dwells permanently in the city.”¹³⁷

Agamben’s aim over all is to demonstrate that the state of exception is the rule—that it becomes a permanent condition when biopolitics shapes political agendas, and in this he aligns with Benjamin’s Eighth Thesis.¹³⁸ The paradox of the political is that there is no one able to declare the internal enemy when that enemy is himself sovereign, except through revolt. To revolt is to make the decision to suspend, not only law, but duty and obedience to the sovereign, in the effort to restore what has been destroyed though the sovereign’s failure to support the commonweal. The one who has been banned poses the greatest threat to sovereign authority, because with the loss of protection comes relief from obligation, duty, and obedience to the sovereign and to law within (and certainly beyond) the state’s borders. To be freed from obedience is to be freed to respond to sovereign violence and abuse. This freedom arises in Bolingbroke’s response to banishment in *Richard II*, and in Lucius’ response in *Titus Andronicus*. It is also the freedom of Kent in *King Lear*, but not quite that of Cordelia, who returns as a foreign sovereign rather than as a banished subject.

Shakespeare was deeply interested in banishment, as appears from his frequent use of the condition as a metaphor, as a central plot device, and as a touchstone for various forms of political experience and behavior. By the late sixteenth century, banishment was no longer a form of punish-

ment exacted through common law. However, it remained an option for dealing with unwanted or disruptive subjects through statutes and parliamentary acts.¹³⁹ It had become, by then, much more directly associated with the sovereign decision rather than with the legal system, and as such, was closely linked to and useful in the representation and critique of autonomous sovereign power. This shift in the authoritative basis of banishment rendered it a concept of particular interest in depicting abuses of such power. Further, the depiction of and references to banishment in the chronicles, as well as in such writers as John Foxe, provided both historical instances of the punishment, and currency to the concept.¹⁴⁰ The condition of banishment therefore remained a topic of enormous interest and rich dramatic possibility even if it had fallen out of use in common law.

Shakespeare employs banishment widely throughout the various genres of his dramatic works, as an unwelcome political condition imposed from above, as a self-proclaimed resistant relationship to central authority, and in subtler, more metaphorical ways.¹⁴¹ In its most straightforward sense, the term ‘banishment’ indicates the expulsion from sovereign territory under pain of death. In *Richard II*, both Mowbray and Bolingbroke refer to banishment in terms of loss—to be banished is to lose language, identity, “the material, the familial, the national.”¹⁴² Suffolk (*2 Henry VI*) laments the loss of Margaret’s company as the primary pain of banishment, seemingly more affected by this than by his separation from wife, nation, or language. But banishment does not entail only losses—it may also represent a release into liberty and an opportunity to redefine identity, to forge new alliances, to transform one’s perspectives and objectives, and Shakespeare frequently emphasizes this aspect.¹⁴³ We see examples of this in *As You Like It*, both through Duke Senior and through Rosalind and Cecilia. Bolingbroke (*Richard II*) likewise reinvents himself within the exclusionary economy of banishment, mobilizing a new political coalition.

The term ‘banishment’ also serves as a declaration of self-separation from the existing power structure. For instance, beyond the conditions of declared expulsion and actual geographical separation, characters sometimes become ‘outlaws’ in relation to the existing political system, which they see as disruptive of the political ideal they aim to support or assert.¹⁴⁴ Such cases of self-banishment, in which a character rejects law and sovereign authority to become an enemy within, represent a choice that signifies sacrifice and loss, but not absence, a claim to the power of banishment, often—although not always—as a means to overthrow the current monarch in the name of a greater good or the restoration of justice. As I shall

discuss in some detail, Margaret explicitly declares self-banishment for political purposes in *2 Henry VI*, and in that same play, Richard of York challenges Henry's sovereignty, making himself an outlaw although Henry never declares him one. When a banished character refuses to accept their expulsion, as Kent does (*King Lear*), the purpose is often based on a similar commitment to restoring a viable political order, as judged by the banished character, or achieving some form of justice, as Margaret aims to do in *Richard III*. Beyond these more explicit aspects of the term, banishment at times takes on a metaphorical meaning, referring to the unwelcome separation from loved ones, home, or nation—Margaret uses the term in this sense as she bids farewell to Suffolk in *2 Henry VI*, 3.1. Banishment also serves as a metaphor for death, as it does in *Richard II*, and implicitly in *Hamlet*, as well—the “The undiscover'd country from whose bourn / No traveller returns” (3.1.87–88).

Several of the above examples resonate with the invocations of banishment in Shakespeare's first history tetralogy. In fact, it is central to the dynamics of these plays. Although Margaret exists as a banished figure only in the final play of the tetralogy, she enters England in *2 Henry VI* as an unwelcome, vilified, and marginalized foreign queen whose isolation from her homeland renders her vulnerable and easily manipulated. She is, while not banished, severed from and unsupported by her homeland and family. Her short-lived commitment to a political partnership with Henry VI, which emerges late in this play, collapses early in *3 Henry VI* when she chooses the path of an outlaw, severing herself from obligation to the sovereign in order to support the political order that ensures her son's succession—a form of self-banishment. Finally, in *Richard III*, she experiences actual banishment, and again rejects sovereign authority by refusing that status. In this context, the etymology of the term ‘banishment’ creates even broader resonances. To ‘ban’ is not only to expel, outlaw, or forbid under threat of punishment; it is also to curse, condemn, or pronounce a curse upon, a meaning that arises at several points in these plays.¹⁴⁵ A ‘bane’ is that which causes ruin, or is pernicious to well-being; the agent or instrument of ruin or woe, the ‘curse’.¹⁴⁶

Woven through these related terms and definitions are the ideas of public pronouncement or proclamation, and the explicit or implicit threat of punishment. To curse is to call down divine or demonic punishment, to remove (or pray for removal) from divine protection, to declare beyond the protection of law, civil and divine. To banish is to separate from the unity of the social body as a proclaimed transgressor, to exclude and define as outside the protection of civil law, with the implication that divine pro-

tection is also retracted, since the outlaw can be killed with impunity. It is related closely to the breaking of oaths, implicitly the oath of obedience to a sovereign and to the laws(s) he represents. Margaret's curses, which call down divine judgment, invert the power dynamics between her and the Yorks, banning those who have banished her.¹⁴⁷ While Margaret's curses appear to explicate rather than mobilize the final power struggles of the War of the Roses, she nevertheless calls attention to the threat of the exile within the borders of the territory that excludes her. In this final play, herself the declared enemy, she stands against the sovereign enemy within, challenging him and his line through the power of the ban.

THE QUEEN'S ROLE

Each of the four chapters of this book provides a perspective on one of these crucial issues in political theory, while engaging with larger overarching concerns discussed in this introduction, such as the friend/enemy distinction, the problem of embodied sovereignty, and the condition of all subjects in the context of the sovereign decision. If Bodin offers only submission, evasion, or flight as the available responses to abusive sovereignty, Shakespeare indicates that various forms of resistance are also possible, though never without repercussions. Whatever the costs of resistance, however, whatever sacrifices it demands, the plays make it clear that submitting to oppression, abuse, or ineffective sovereignty merely allows tyranny to root more deeply, and places the commonweal in jeopardy. Shakespeare never advocates for the elimination of monarchy, but he shows quite clearly how vulnerable the monarch is to corruption or incompetence, how carefully he must be guided, and how important it is for citizens and subjects to attend to the health of the body politic. Because sovereignty functions in relative autonomy within its territorial boundaries, but is itself nevertheless bound by natural and divine law of a higher order, foreign queens help to highlight the moral limitations that should shape sovereign behavior. In some cases, they carry with them both the parameters of good government through reciprocal obligations, and the threat of intervention from an external power. In other cases, they show how existing weaknesses can be exacerbated when the queen is not committed to the commonweal. Regardless of whether they function positively or negatively within their particular plays, they show us how central queenship is to effective sovereignty and good government. The commonweal depends on their steadying influence, and goes awry when they fail to offer it.

NOTES

1. Tamora, of course, enters Rome as a captive queen, and becomes an empress through marriage. Nevertheless, the overall relationships remain parallel.
2. My project works through both historicist and presentist frameworks, aiming to enrich our understanding of the intersecting interests of the past and the present, of the literary and the political. A flexible conception of the relationship between past and present, historicism and presentism is offered in *The Urgency of the Now: Criticism and Theory in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Cary DiPietro and Hugh Grady (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). See their Introduction and Chap. 1. Also useful is *Presentist Shakespeares*, ed. Terence Hawkes and Hugh Grady (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007), Introduction. However, see Evelyn Gajowski, “Beyond Historicism: Presentism, Subjectivity, Politics,” *Literature Compass* 7, no. 8 (2010): 674–691, who argues that historicism and presentism are antithetical approaches.
3. Two studies of foreigners or outsiders have some pertinence for this project. Marianne Novy devotes a chapter to “Women as Outsiders and Insiders,” in *Shakespeare and Outsiders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 69–86. Her survey of women’s functions in these two categories throughout the plays is related at times to my project here, especially in her discussion of Queen Margaret in the first tetralogy. In *The Stranger in Shakespeare* (New York: Stein & Day, 1972), Leslie Fiedler includes women among the ‘strangers’ that he accounts for, placing them beside Jews, Moors, and ‘Indians’ as examples of the “borderline figure, who defines the limits of the human” (15).
4. Keechang Kim, *Aliens in Medieval Law: The Origins of Modern Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 4–5, 16. However, see also Wendy Wall, *Staging Domesticity: Household Work and English Identity in Early Modern Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), esp. 9–11, where she argues that national identity was built, not only on the sense of allegiance or alterity, but also on domestic experience.
5. Kim, *Aliens*, 5.
6. Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, abridged, trans. M.J. Tooley (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955). Tooley, Book I, Chaps. 6–7, p. 19. Where possible, I refer to *On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth*, ed. and trans. Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Franklin covers Book I, Chaps. 8 and 10, and Book II, Chaps. 1 and 5. Bodin does not address property rights or inheritance *per se*, only the lack of bond and protection

- regarding aliens. Where it is not possible to cite Franklin, I cite Tooley, also by Book, Chap., and pg.
7. Kim, *Aliens*, 180.
 8. Coke's logic is certainly susceptible to challenge, for it seems evident that an act of treason would be understood as an assault on the civil and natural laws of the kingdom, not merely the body of the king. Thus the execution of Charles I was justified as a defense of the laws and good of the commonwealth. On the relationship between the king's natural and political bodies, see Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957; 1997), 1–23. For responses to and developments of Kantorowicz, see Marie Axton, *The Queen's Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977); and Jennifer R. Rush, *The Body in Mystery: The Political Theology of the Corpus Mysticum in the Literature of Reformation England* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014).
 9. Kim, *Aliens*, 150. For Coke's full decision, see *Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke*, ed. Steve Sheppard (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2003), 3 vols., Vol. 1, Part Seven, "Calvin's Case," 162–232.
 10. Jane Pettegree, *Foreign and Native on the English Stage, 1588–1611: Metaphor and National Identity* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 7.
 11. Pettegree, *Foreign and Native*, 2.
 12. Pettegree, *Foreign and Native*, 3.
 13. See *Shakespeare's Foreign Worlds: National and Transnational Identities in the Elizabethan Age*, ed. Carole Levin and John Watkins (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 10–11; and Jean E. Howard, *Theater of a City: The Places of London Comedy, 1598–1642* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).
 14. *Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos: or, concerning the legitimate power of a prince over the people, and of the people over the prince*, ed. and trans. George Garnett (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Fourth Question, 174. The text was published in Latin in 1579, with authorship attributed to 'Junius Brutus', and circulated in many editions between 1579 and 1600. Question Four was published in English as *A Shorte Apologie for Christian Soldiours* (London: Printed by Iohn Wolfe for Henry Carre, 1588). No definite authorship has been determined. On disunity, see Carole Levin, "'Murder then not the fruit of my womb': Shakespeare's Joan, Foxe's Guernsey Martyr, and Women Pleading Pregnancy in English History and Culture," and John Watkins, "Shakespeare's *1 Henry VI* and the Tragedy of Renaissance Diplomacy," in *Shakespeare's Foreign Worlds: National and Transnational Identities in*

- the Elizabethan Age*, ed. Carole Levin and John Watkins (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 25–50; 51–78.
15. *Vindiciae*, Fourth Question, 174.
 16. Kim, *Aliens*, 8–9.
 17. For an in-depth analysis of her situation, see Sandra Logan, “Foreign Marriage in Early Modern Drama: The Exchange of Royal Women and the Problems of Political Friendship,” *Critical Imprints* (March 2017): 89–114.
 18. That is, Cordelia enters her new realm and role in much the same condition as Margaret, dowerless and alone. Her contact with England suggests how such a relationship might work in favor of her country of origin, but not how her country of origin might come to the support of her in her adopted home. In *Richard II*, the composite queen Anne of Bohemia/Isabella of Valois offers something of an exception, in that she remains on good terms with Richard throughout, and is only exiled when he loses power. She has no political resources and offers no foreign strength to Richard, however.
 19. Despite certain parallels with Margaret, the domestic Queen Elizabeth functions quite effectively in *Richard III*. The unnamed queen in *Cymbeline* is not identified as foreign, and she functions with almost complete evil autonomy throughout the play. Gertrude, in *Hamlet*, is likewise not designated as either foreign or domestic, and is the main enabler of Claudius’ claim to the throne. The main positive representation of a foreign queen in Shakespeare’s canon is the unnamed queen of *Richard II*—a composite queen representing the ideals of emotional commitment to her husband, and lacking in any political potency or positioning.
 20. Bodin outlines these aspects of sovereignty throughout *Six Books*, Franklin, I.8.
 21. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab; foreword Tracy B. Strong (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 6.
 22. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 6, 5.
 23. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 7.
 24. Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin, I.8.1.
 25. Bodin, Franklin, I.8.1, fn. for Latin edition (p. 79, line D6). Franklin notes also that the term ‘perpetual’ is added a few lines later.
 26. Smith, *De Republica Anglorum* (London: Henrie Middleton for Gregorie Seton, 1583), Chap. 1, Online: <http://www.constitution.org/eng/repang.htm>.
 27. Smith, *De Republica Anglorum*, Chap. 1.
 28. Bodin rejects the idea of the ‘mixed state’ as mistaking rule by the few or the multitude with shared rule between a monarch and a parliament, for

example. In his view, if a body actually holds power to override the monarch's decisions, including the body of law itself, then the monarch is not sovereign, and sovereignty resides wholly in the body with that decisive capacity.

29. Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin, I.8.11.
30. Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin, I.8.13.
31. Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin, I.8.56. The point here is that, if there is someone greater, this would necessarily imply that *that* person, and not the 'sovereign' under consideration, actually holds sovereign power. Thus, for example, a duke who obeys an emperor is not sovereign, but exercises granted powers subject to the emperor's decree. One of equal power would be a co-ruler, and sovereignty would be split; one of lesser power would be a subject, with no authority over the body of civil law as it stands.
32. Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 7, trans. note 3. (Some notes are Schmitt's own, some are those of the translator.)
33. Étienne de la Boétie offers a parallel but nonviolent alternative in *The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude*, written and circulated in French, and briefly influential after 1572. I have used *The Politics of Disobedience and Étienne de la Boétie*, trans. Paul Bonnefon; intro. and ed. Murray N. Rothbard (Montreal and New York: Black Rose Books, 2007).
34. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, expanded edition, trans., intro., notes, George Schwab; foreword, Tracy B. Strong (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007, Kindle edition). Quotation: Kindle locations 678–679.
35. Schmitt does not address the concept of 'terrorism', which is minimally defined as organized, politically motivated, non-state violence. The idea that it is undertaken in defense of shared values and commitments of the group instigating it, and aims at the destruction of an opposing way of life makes terrorism sufficiently parallel to state violence to be understood in much the same terms.
36. Schmitt, *Concept*, Kindle loc. 818. According to Schmitt, "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy." *Concept*, Kindle loc. 579–580.
37. Schmitt, *Concept*, Kindle loc. 593–594.
38. Schmitt, *Concept*, Kindle loc. 807–808.
39. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London and New York: Verso, 2005), Chap. 6. Originally published as *Politiques de l'amitié* (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1994).

40. Although Schmitt identifies this instability, he does not address its implications. The fact that an enemy may not always remain an enemy hardly touches upon the deeper questions this opposition raises.
41. Schmitt, *Concept*, Kindle loc. 819.
42. Schmitt, *Concept*, Kindle loc. 822. Schmitt, to my knowledge, does not discuss the exercise of the sovereign decision in favor of a subject, as when the sovereign overrides a judicial judgment and commutes a sentence of execution to a sentence of life imprisonment.
43. Schmitt, *Concept*, Kindle loc. 825–826.
44. Bodin, *Six Books*, Tooley IV.1.112–113.
45. Bodin, *Six Books*, Tooley IV.1.111–113. Bodin in fact identifies two forms of tyranny: illegitimate sovereignty, in which one who lacks the right claims sovereignty; or the abuse of subjects by a legitimate or illegitimate sovereign. See Franklin II.5.110–114. The former may be overthrown by any means necessary, in order to restore proper and legitimate sovereignty; the latter may not be challenged by the subjects through legal means or rebellion. The *Vindiciae* also makes this distinction, and is likewise more circumspect, though not as limiting as Bodin, in dealing with the tyrant by practice. Indeed, although only the people as a whole, or the officers who represent them, may rebel against a tyrant, the *Vindiciae* affirms that it is their duty to do so. See Third Question, 158–160.
46. Bodin, *Six Books*, Tooley, I.1.2–6.
47. Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin, I.8.13. This is certainly not in alignment with Schmitt's views, who apparently sees no limit to sovereign power, and who omits this in his discussion of Bodin.
48. Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin, I.8.11.
49. We find similar arguments in Martin Luther's 1523 *On Secular Authority*, and in Jean Calvin's 1536 (expanded in 1539) *Institution of the Christian Religion*. I have used the chapters excerpted from the originals and published as *Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority*, ed. and trans. Harro Höpfl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Calvin and Bodin both argue that subjects may resist commands that conflict with their moral conscience, and suffer the consequences for that resistance, but it is clear in both that flight beyond the borders of the state or passive resistance are the only forms allowable. For a useful overview of these positions and their context, see Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), Chaps. 7–8.
50. Philip Melancthon, *Prolegomena to Cicero's Offices*, 1530. Cited by Cynthia Grant Shoenberger, "Luther and the Justifiability of Resistance to Legitimate Authority," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40, no. 1 (1979): 3–20.

51. Melanchthon, *Prolegomena in Officia Ciceronis*, CR, XVI, 573, Shoenberger's translation.
52. *The Familiar Discourse of Dr. Martin Luther*, trans. Captain Henry Bell, revised and corrected by Joseph Kerby, V.D.M. (Lewes: Sussex Press, 1818), 253. Italics in original; '*exlex*' appears to suggest, not only 'without law' but 'outside of law'. An additional reference in the Appendix has "And now we know the Pope to be that bear-wolf and devourer of people, that we know also how to take heed of him, and warn our children and posterity of his tyranny" (464). This appears to be a direct quote from Luther, where the previous passage is a paraphrase.
53. See Shoenberger, "Luther and Resistance," 10–17.
54. *Vindiciae*, Third Question, 92.
55. *Vindiciae*, Third Question, 92.
56. *Vindiciae*, Third Question, 157.
57. *Vindiciae*, Third Question, 158.
58. *Vindiciae*, Second Question, 41.
59. *Vindiciae*, Third Question, 158.
60. See Third Question, 74–78. Briefly, it argues that kings "are accustomed to be inaugurated, and, as it were, put into possession of the kingdom, by the estates [*ordines*] of the realm—the peers, patricians, and magnates, who represent the corporation of the people," Third Question, 72. Thus, the people or their representatives are authorized to retract that authority when it is mishandled.
61. Walter Benjamin, *On the Concept of History*, Gesammelten Schriften I:2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974), trans. Dennis Redmond, 8/4/2001: <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/benjamin/1940/history.htm>.
62. For Benjamin's elaboration of the basis for and appropriate uses of counter-violence, see "The Critique of Violence," *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 277–300. These fragments were not published in Benjamin's lifetime. See also Sami Khatib, "Towards a Politics of Pure Means: Walter Benjamin and the Question of Violence," *Anthropological Materialism*, 6/11/2016: <http://anthropologicalmaterialism.hypotheses.org/1040>, accessed 1/2/2018.
63. Rather, Agamben argues, *homo sacer* represents the *sacratio* which is excluded "both from the *ius humanum* and from the *ius divinum*, both from the sphere of the profane and from that of the religious." See *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 82.
64. However, definitions of the sacred always include some sense of being 'set apart', usually for divine purposes, but also in some cases, for evil ones

- (Milton is cited as the example: “*But, to destruction sacred and devote,*” something Agamben doesn’t take up in his discussion). Some definitions are even more explicit: “Doom or devote to destruction” (<http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sacro#Latin>). The Greek term and its root, *saq, seem to include this definition. The Milton quote comes from *Paradise Lost*, 3.206–209. I have used David Scott Kastan’s edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2005).
65. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 84.
 66. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 85. For an insightful critique of Agamben’s use of the terms *zoe* and *bios*, see James Gordon Finlayson, “‘Bare Life’ and Politics in Agamben’s Reading of Aristotle,” *The Review of Politics* 72, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 97–126.
 67. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 31–32.
 68. Jacques Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 17. The beast that Derrida has particularly in mind is the wolf.
 69. Rebecca W. Bushnell offers useful insights on this issue in *Tragedies of Tyrants: Political Thought and Theater in the English Renaissance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), esp. Chaps. 1–2.
 70. See Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies*, 7–23.
 71. Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies*, 9–10, quoting Edmund Plowden, *Commentaries or Reports* (London, 1816), 213a.
 72. See also Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Chap. XV.
 73. *Vindiciae*, Third Question, 144. See 140–148 for a detailed description of tyranny. See also 157–160 for a discussion of the responsibilities of the officers of the kingdom.
 74. See Bodin, *Six Books*, Tooley, I.2–5.6–18; *Vindiciae* puts the homology somewhat differently: “kings command like fathers over sons, and tyrants like owners over slaves.” Third Question, 108.
 75. Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, Kindle loc. 832–833.
 76. Maalouf, *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong*, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012, Kindle edition), 1.
 77. Merriam Webster Dictionary, Identity: 2a: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity>.
 78. Merriam Webster Dictionary, Identity: 2b: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity>.
 79. For an insightful discussion of alterity in contemporary theoretical discourse and its relationship to Shakespeare’s plays, see Ken Jackson, *Shakespeare and Abraham* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2015), Introduction, esp. Kindle loc. 245–345.

80. Maalouf, *In the Name of Identity*, 4.
81. See Maalouf, *In the Name of Identity*, Chap. 1, esp. 31–32.
82. Maalouf, *In the Name of Identity*, 4.
83. Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality: Anne Defourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond*, trans. Rachael Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 15.
84. As we know, this strategy fails, however.
85. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), 3.
86. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 17.
87. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 15. To a great extent this theory of intersecting interests aligns with more explicit theorizations of intersectionality. For the foundational article on an intersectional approach to feminism, see Kimberly Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” *University of Chicago Legal Forum* (1989, Article 8): 139–167.
88. Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 16, emphasis in original.
89. Pettegree’s idea of ‘aspirational national identity’ resonates nicely here. See *Foreign and Native*, Chaps. 1, 4–5.
90. Bodin (1530–1596) is one clear source of such a theory; as we see in his *Six Books*. On Bodin’s 1606 English translation and its applicability to *The Winter’s Tale*, see Bradin Cormack, “Shakespeare’s Other Sovereignty: On Particularity and Violence in *The Winter’s Tale* and The Sonnets,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 62, no. 4 (2011): 485–513.
91. The idea of the ‘alien’ has a national resonance when the host is the nation or the realm, but must be considered to take shape as a degree of connection and intimacy—a level of friendship or relationship—in the household. Households may welcome strangers, but the relationship of the stranger to the polis and the state always necessarily precedes and to some extent defines the relationship to the household. Charting the tension between ‘guest’ and ‘enemy’ in the term ‘hospitality’. Sarah Gibson comments, “it is in fact impossible for the nation-state to be properly hospitable.” Citing Derrida she adds, “the social relations constructed through the gesture of hospitality are ... implicated in power relations, where it is the host who has both the power and the property to give to the stranger, but crucially, while remaining in control and ownership.” See “‘Abusing Our Hospitality’: Inhospitableness and the Politics of Deterrence,” in *Mobilizing Hospitality: The Ethics of Social Relations in a Mobile World*, ed. Jennie Germann Molz and Sarah Gibson (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 169.

92. Mark Westmoreland explains that the underlying form, “absolute hospitality,” involves “neither the governance of duty nor the payment of debt. It is ... ‘unconditional but without sovereignty’.” If, on the other hand, “there is an imposition, nothing is left to be called absolute.” He cites Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, 59, here. See Mark W. Westmoreland, “Interruptions: Derrida and Hospitality,” *Kritike*, 2, no. 1 (June 2008): 1–10, quotation from p. 3.
93. Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, 77.
94. Emphasis in original. Derrida opposes ‘*the*’ law of unconditional hospitality to the ‘laws’ of conditional hospitality. Derrida’s larger objective is to demonstrate the ways in which the two forms of hospitality are indissociable; neither can exist without the other, they form and are understood in relational terms, and they are both, finally, impossible because of that relationality. My objectives are not identical to his, as I am interested here in the ways that Shakespeare mobilizes these two forms of hospitality as a critique of absolute sovereignty and patriarchy.
95. As I understand these theories, the concept of reciprocity is not necessarily a part of the dynamic. Additionally, Derrida is most interested in the absolute form through which, he argues, the conditional form takes shape. I am less interested in the deconstruction of the concepts and more interested in the mobilizations of conditional sovereignty, which, finally, demonstrate the instability of the term.
96. Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, 55, 149.
97. Derrida turns to Greek conceptions of the foreigner and his/her relationship to the polis. As Westmoreland writes, “In the laws of hospitality, we find a multiplicity involving differentiation according to the right of the state. The state establishes rules through which people can be divided into citizens and non-citizens, citizens and foreigners, hosts and guests. It can identify individuals; and therefore, it can include or exclude whosoever it chooses based on the laws, which it has created.” “Interruptions,” 2.
98. That violence, Derrida explains, may take the form of a mere question, as the host asks the identity of the guest, but the potential for violence, as we see in this play, is far greater than that more subtle form. “Of Hospitality,” 55, 149. See the general Introduction, 39–41 for a fuller discussion of these ideas.
99. In *Hospitality in Early Modern England* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), Felicity Heal addresses this idea at length. See esp. 19–22.
100. See William Heale, *An Apologie for Women, or an Opposition to Mr. Dr. G.: His assertion. That it was Lawful for Husbands to Beate their Wives* (Oxford, 1609), 24, also referenced in Heal, *Hospitality in Early Modern England*, 5.

101. The parallel with the exile is striking in this description.
102. Heale, *An Apologie for Women*, 24, also quoted in Heal, *Hospitality*, 5.
103. See Roberto Esposito, *Communitas: Origin and Destiny of Community* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 3.
104. From the Latin *proprio, proprius*, one's own. This concept is the basis of proprietorship, proprietary right, etc. See Esposito, *Communitas*, 3.
105. Esposito, *Communitas*, 3–4.
106. Esposito, *Communitas*, 1–3; Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Inoperative Community,” in *Theory and History of Literature*, Vol. 76, ed. Peter Connor, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 1991.
107. Nancy, “Inoperative Community,” 15.
108. Nancy, “Inoperative Community,” 4.
109. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 3–4.
110. From the Latin *munus, munare*, this root word of ‘community’ links ‘giving’ to ‘with’, central to Esposito’s conception of *communitas*. The key for Esposito is that community is built on relationships of giving without expectation of reciprocity. For Nancy, see “Inoperative Community,” 4 (emphasis in original). For Esposito, see *Communitas*, 3. Nancy is less clear in his definition of the relationship between the individual and the group, but his idea here nevertheless resonates strongly with Esposito’s. Neither explicitly aims to engage with the idea of hospitality, but what they suggest about ourselves and our relationships (“being with” others, as Nancy puts it) implicitly opens up different possibilities for hospitality as well.
111. See Esposito, *Communitas*, 10. Also closely applicable is Louis Montrose, “‘Eliza, Queene of the Shepherdes’, and the Pastoral of Power,” *English Literary Renaissance* 10, no. 2 (1980): 153–182.
112. On the idea of rural community (but not hospitality), see Andrew MacRae, *God Speed the Plow: The Representation of Agrarian England, 1500–1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chaps. 4 and 9. Also applicable to the context of the play is Sir Thomas More’s *Utopia*, in which labor is universal, but property is communal, and social stratification is generally absent (MacRae, *God Speed the Plow*, 114). Shakespeare’s explicit awareness of the possibility of a communal society emerges in *The Tempest*, apparently with deliberate irony, where Gonzalo imagines a commonwealth with no private property, no hierarchy, but also no labor and no trade, and over which he is king (2.1.147–164). MacRae points out that Shakespeare sometimes expressed negative views of popular uprisings, as in the Jack Cade scenes in *2 Henry VI*. However,

there are important distinctions to be made between the idea of a commitment to the common good and of communal obligation, on the one hand, and the abolishment of private property *tout court* and the rising of the commons against the aristocracy, on the other. Shakespeare's most positive version of community comes here, in this limited context, but it is also fragile and not imagined as extendable to society at large in its full form.

113. Julia Reinhard Lupton, *Citizen-Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1. Lupton does not address *Titus Andronicus* in her study.
114. See Bodin, Franklin I.8.11, and Tooley I.1.3.
115. Aristotle, *The Politics of Aristotle*, trans., intro., marginal analysis, essays, notes, and indices by B. Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), 2 vols., Vol. I, Kindle ed. Accessed 1/6/18, through Liberty Fund Online Library of Liberty: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/aristotle-the-politics-vol-1--5>. References designate Bk. Chap.; followed by the numbering of the Greek text, ed. Bekker. For this note's reference, see 1.2, 1253a.
116. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.2, 1253a.
117. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans., intro., notes, and glossary Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011, Kindle edition). See esp. 9.6, 1167a–b, for an articulation of the reliance of the polis upon like-minded, morally similar men. See also Aristotle, *The Politics*, esp. Book 3, for an elaboration of the qualities and aims of citizens and rulers.
118. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.9.5, 1160a. On the heterogeneity of the political community, see also Bernard Yack, "Community and Conflict in Aristotle's Political Philosophy," *The Review of Politics* 47, no. 1 (1985): 92–112. Additionally, as Aristotle indicates in *The History of Animals*, among the various political animals only humans use the political community to achieve "both common and individual ends." Bernard Yack, *The Problem of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 51. He references *History*, 1.1.488a, trans. d'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, *Complete Works (Aristotle)*, various translators, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). Yack's translation differs significantly from Thompson's.
119. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.2, 1253a. See also Jacques Rancière, *On the Shores of Politics*, trans. Liz Heron (London and New York: Verso, 1995), 26–28.
120. Roger Baynes, *The praise of solitarinesse set down in the forme of a dialogue, wherein is conteyned, a discourse philosophical, of the lyfe actiue, and con-*

- templatiue* (London: Francis Coldocke and Henry Bynneman, 1577), 5. Reproduction of the original in the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery, digital version accessed through EEBO MSU, 07-30-2017. I have modernized the spelling of the quotes. See also Markku Peltonen, “Citizenship and Republicanism in Elizabethan England,” in *Republicanism Volume 1: Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 85–106.
121. Baynes, *The praise of solitarinesse*, 5.
 122. Baynes, *The praise of solitarinesse*, 5.
 123. Baynes, *The praise of solitarinesse*, 5.
 124. Baynes, *The praise of solitarinesse*, 5.
 125. Peltonen, “Citizenship,” 93–95. This does not necessarily conflict with Bodin’s views, but the sense of autonomy and responsibility are perhaps different.
 126. Peltonen, “Citizenship,” 93. Case’s treatise, *Sphaera ciuitatis*, was published in 1588.
 127. Bodin, *Six Books*, Tooley, I.1.3.
 128. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.3, 1276b.
 129. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 104–105. He is quoting from an undesignated source of the laws of Edward the Confessor. This term comes from medieval law, and was pronounced as a sentence on offenders whose crimes led to their banishment: (often used as an *adj.*) “*Caput gerat lupinum* (‘Let him bear the head of a wolf’), meaning that the convicted felon lacked any form of legal protection; anyone who encountered the felon might legally kill him or her as if he or she were a predatory wolf.” See *Guide to Latin in International Law*, ed. Aaron X. Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); online edition 2011: <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/lib/michstate-ebooks/reader.action?docID=3053797#>, accessed 12/29/17.
 130. The notion of the sacrifice is central to Agamben’s argument, in that he troubles the concept and conditions of sovereign power and the exception by pointing out their reliance on the designation of bare life (as opposed to political life).
 131. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 28.
 132. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 113.
 133. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 8–9.
 134. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 18.
 135. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 106.
 136. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 214. Also quoted in Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 106.

137. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p. 107. Derrida makes a similar point in *The Beast and the Sovereign*, 14–18.
138. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p. 38. See also the discussion of Benjamin, above.
139. See Jane Kingsley-Smith, *Shakespeare's Drama of Exile* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 8–13.
140. While Kingsley-Smith mentions John Foxe in her discussion of religious exile, she does not mention the influence of the chronicles in shaping early modern interest in exile and banishment, including Shakespeare's.
141. In twenty-one plays, the term 'banish', in its various forms, refers specifically to characters who have been expelled from the realm, and arises metaphorically in about three others. The term 'exile' and its variations are much less common, occurring in approximately eight plays, excluding metaphorical references. For an insightful analysis of the condition, see Kingsley-Smith, *Shakespeare's Drama*.
142. Kingsley-Smith, *Shakespeare's Drama*, 25. Her attention to the idea of what might be called unofficial exile, as when Richard II leaves England for Ireland and returns a changed man, parallels some of the more abstract notions of banishment and exile I wish to address in this chapter.
143. Kingsley-Smith, *Shakespeare's Drama*, 124–128.
144. Robin Hood is a popular outlaw figure of this sort. Titus Andronicus eventually functions in this way as well.
145. York chastises Joan la Pucelle as a "fell banning hag [and] enchantress" (*1 Henry VI*, 5.3.42); the Duchess of Gloucester uses the term in this sense in *2 Henry VI*, 2.4.25, as does Suffolk at 3.2.319 and 3.2.333.
146. Online Etymology Dictionary, modern version: http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=banish (accessed 6/15/2017); OED online, Ban, *n.1*, I.3; III.5.a.; III.3; III.7: <http://www.oed.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/view/Entry/15092?rskey=wcjLnV&result=1#eid>. Bane, *n.1.4*: <http://www.oed.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/view/Entry/15183?rskey=ZB6P3h&result=1#eid>.
147. As I discuss in Chap. 1, 40, and Chap. 5, 239–246, 'banning' is a synonym of 'cursing'.

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CHAPTER 2

Katherine of Aragon's Fragmented Identity in *Henry VIII*

FOREIGN/DOMESTIC, FRIEND/ENEMY, MORALITY/ PRAGMATISM

In *The Famous History of the Life of King Henry the Eighth, or All is True*, the relationship between England and foreign 'others' is a fundamental concern of the play.¹ The meeting between Henry VIII and Francis I of France known as 'the field of cloth of gold' establishes English/French relationships as vital to the power and authority of the king and realm.² Relationships with other monarchs, including Charles I/V of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, as well as with the pope and the learned clerics of Europe, shape the domestic dilemma concerning the royal marriage, and resonate across much larger issues and questions, including Henry's rejection of papal authority near the end of the play.³ Additionally, the queen herself represents and embodies a foreignness within the royal family, with Katherine of Aragon the daughter, sister, niece, and aunt of powerful continental rulers; at every level, from the personal to the broadly political, tensions between foreignness and Englishness permeate the play's dynamics.⁴ In this chapter I focus on the question of foreignness and of identity more broadly, considering how Katherine strategically deploys her connections both to England and its values, on the one hand, and to Spain and the broader political community of Christendom, on the other. Katherine calls up her domestic and foreign identities in an effort to exert influence, shape political policies, and eventually, to resist the effort to

push her from queenship. Her mobilization of different aspects of her identity connects to three broader political binaries that are problematized in the play: friend/enemy, foreign/domestic, and pragmatism/morality.

As the international dynamics that define the background of the play unfold around the question of the marriage as well as in relation to alliance concerns, the notions of national identity and social identity become significant. If, as Maalouf has suggested, we strategically or deliberately choose which aspects of our identity to draw on, as Katherine does at various points in the play, we are nevertheless also defined by others, either individually or systemically. Maalouf aims to challenge the idea of the unequivocal political enemy by suggesting that we are capable of making choices beyond those of the state, and that through those personal choices, we can shape perceptions that determine decisions and policies. However, personal attitudes and choices, while important, often must confront systemic and structural pressures that define us and marginalize us against our wishes—and that was no less true when Katherine faced her opponents in Henry VIII's court than it is today. As Shakespeare presents her, Katherine has only limited agency in defining herself and shaping her interactions with those who took up Henry VIII's annulment project, despite her self-directed and powerful resistance to their efforts to define her according to their agendas.

Katherine was Spanish by birth, English and Spanish by heritage, and was raised to connect her home nation to another major power through marriage, as were all of her siblings. The marriage treaty, signed when Katherine was about three, was beneficial to both nations: Spain attained England's military support against France, while Henry VII gained support for his claim and line of succession through this tacit recognition of his legitimacy by a major European power. Katherine was fluent in several European languages, and by all accounts, a brilliant, well educated, and politically astute young woman when she arrived in England to assume her place as Arthur's wife and Princess of Wales. She was ideally suited for foreign queenship, and when Prince Arthur died, and Henry wed her, she became a devoted wife, a caring queen to their subjects, and an intelligent, effective Spanish ambassador in England for several years. While Spanish by birth, then, she was fully able to enmesh herself in the domestic and international politics of England, to immerse herself in English court culture, and to assume the language and social life of her adopted nation ... and even to accept a cooling of her relationship with her father when political conditions divided these two powerful nations.⁵ Indeed, however

well she fit into the English court and however completely she embraced her new nation and adopted identity, she was somewhat isolated from her blood-family and her birth nation. Thus, as the play makes clear, she was reliant for her status and security upon the good will of her husband and king, receiving little support from Spain in her resistance to Henry's sovereign will. She was, then, a woman whose layered identity rendered her both more valuable and potentially more vulnerable than an Englishwoman in her position would have been.⁶

This layering becomes an important touchstone, as the marriage-legitimacy debate that threatens Katherine's position becomes the primary context for her invocation of different aspects of her identity at different moments in the play. As her situation grows increasingly precarious, she invokes her status as a foreigner, as well as her long residency in and adaptation to England—her Englishness *and* her foreignness—purposefully according to circumstances. Through these self-identifications, Shakespeare represents her as strategically navigating her status and situation, while her views, values, and tactics help to bring into focus the larger complications and conflicts associated with the relationship between monarchical and papal authority, and between domestic and foreign political actions and policies. In broader terms, as is so often the case, Shakespeare uses the royal family as a context in which the weaknesses of a patriarchal/monarchical system of government can be brought to the fore.

In subsequent chapters, I reveal how Shakespeare represents the overlapping powers of absolutist monarchy and patriarchy as constitutive of damaging governmental and household conditions. In this play, Shakespeare depicts King Henry VIII's reliance on Cardinal Wolsey as fundamental to his difficulty in distinguishing between friend and enemy to England, and thus in shaping politically effective policies for the stability and protection of his nation. In this sense, the play focuses, not on the monarch's insistent autonomy and abuse of his authority, as we see in *The Winter's Tale*, for example, but on his misguided dependency and naïveté as the basis of political vulnerability in both domestic and international contexts.⁷ Because Shakespeare frames Katherine as so much more adept than Henry at making such political determinations, she quickly becomes the main explicit challenger to Wolsey's position and character, as she and the Cardinal vie for the king's ear, like the good angel and bad angel perched on his shoulders. Katherine's rhetorical and conciliar nimbleness relies not only on her political astuteness, but also on her ability to deploy different facets of her identity

to influence the king, to defend her standing as wife and queen, and to disrupt an easy or straightforward distinction between friend and enemy.

At the level of the state, the rise of pragmatic and *raison d'état* policies existed, to some extent, at odds with treaties supported through marriage alliances. Marriage in both Catholic and Reformed contexts was generally considered a life-long commitment, and therefore the idea of diplomatic marriage was to establish a permanent, incontrovertible union between two actual or potential enemy states, binding them in perpetual friendship and kinship, and potentially uniting them under a single heir to both lines of succession.⁸ However, international power balancing was an increasingly mercurial process, complicated in its objectives, changeable in its directions, and subject to reconsideration as the relationships between nations and empires were strategically redefined and realigned.⁹ The Reformation exacerbated and accelerated such volatility. Against the ideal of permanent political and familial union through diplomatic marriage, the play alludes to the rapid realignment of England's political relationships with continental powers during Henry VIII's reign. It thus reveals how a diplomatic marriage might hamper the nimbleness of the state in renegotiating political relationships, and in making pragmatic choices to secure the monarchy and the nation. For example, within the play, Henry's concerns about his marriage include the recognition that continental powers might question the legitimacy of his union with Katherine, and therefore might refuse to forge alliances through marriage with his heirs. At 2.4.183–194, he reveals that the French ambassador posed such a challenge concerning their daughter Mary's legitimacy during a marriage negotiation with France.¹⁰ Additionally, in the context of the play, this marriage ostensibly bound England to Spain, in conflict with now-desirable alliances to Spain's enemies, including France, and furthermore, it was predicated on the authority of the papacy, under whose imprimatur the marriage had taken place. Such aspects of the play set foreign and domestic interests at odds with each other, to some extent, and clearly a thread of anti-foreignness emerges at some points.¹¹ Nevertheless, the play problematizes simplistic oppositions between foreign and domestic, particularly through Katherine's character and comportment, and her challenges to Wolsey.¹²

Throughout the play, conflicts related to political policy, including both domestic and international relations, center on tensions between moral and pragmatic choices. Henry's—or Wolsey's—management of English international relations reveals little commitment to moral virtue, and

emphasizes a general concern for England's stability and position within the hierarchy of competitive state agendas, but an equally general lack of success in securing the English position. However, establishing a clear demarcation between moral or ideological choices and pragmatic ones is never a simple matter. *Raison d'état*, understood as the necessity to "strive solely for the preservation, expansion, and felicity of the state, [through] the most ready and swift means," represents a negation of natural law, normative social or political hierarchies, and divine law in the pursuit of sovereign and state agendas.¹³ Nevertheless, Machiavelli's treatise on this concept was not uniformly understood to promote pragmatic, amoral action on the part of the Prince. Rather, *The Prince* was identified by some early modern readers as a warning about how sovereign power could be abused.¹⁴ Indeed, with his frequent invocation of proper moral virtues, values, and actions as preferable to necessity-driven choices, Machiavelli offers a potent reminder of the costs to the Prince of amoral choices in the context of divine judgment, while acknowledging the appeal and benefits of purely temporal, pragmatic solutions to political problems.¹⁵ In a similar vein, Shakespeare clearly recognizes negative aspects of such pragmatism, while revealing how moralistic and pragmatic motives and agendas overlap, or how pragmatism can be veiled in moralistic values and aims.

The intersection of moral and pragmatic motivations and implications permeates interactions related to the marriage question. Henry rejects the pope's capacity to judge the legitimacy of the marriage, because such judgment would override biblical prohibitions, which effectively denies the papacy a monopoly on biblical interpretation.¹⁶ His pursuit of the opinions of the clerics of the Continent and of England in support of his divorce, undertaken by Bishop Cranmer (later Archbishop), stands as a rejection of the judgment of the papacy in this matter, asserting a moral position that also grants the political state relative independence. In the context of the play, although more obliquely than in the actual event, Henry VIII's break with Rome embodies a decisive shift away from claims of monarchical legitimacy based upon papal authority—his actions reject papal authority over the state and the decisions of its ruler, implicitly negating the greatest power held by the papacy, that of excommunication.¹⁷ These actions in pursuit of the divorce are grounded in both religious and pragmatic justifications. Henry's purported view, that *Katherine's* failure to produce a male heir serves as a sign that he has incurred divine wrath and is being punished for his sinful marriage, fuels the challenges to papal authority, an authority responsible, as he sees it, for his ongoing

transgressive life. This is, ostensibly, a moral concern. At the same time, the possible rejection of his only living heir's legitimacy is primarily a problem of succession and state stability, and in this sense, his actions stem from the fundamental need to protect and secure the state. Necessity and morality are inextricably intertwined in this rational process, and any simple opposition between them oversimplifies the motivations and justifications of his decision. The third motivation for the divorce, concupiscent desire for Anne Boleyn, may in fact override both moral and pragmatic state-level decisions with private desire, but it resonates with both of the other, more complicated causes as well.

CORRUPTION VERSUS THE COMMONWEAL

Wolsey's International Schemes

The importance of international conditions to the larger problems addressed by the play begins to materialize in the first scene, as the Duke of Norfolk describes the meeting of the English and French kings at the Field of Cloth of Gold. In this highly public event, as described in detail to the Duke of Buckingham, the desire of both nations to end a lengthy and very costly war is transformed into a battle of ostentatious self-presentation that involves exorbitant expenditures both by the states and by their individual nobles. The newly forged alliance is consummated and celebrated through competitive self-aggrandizement, with "The two kings, / Equal in lustre ... now best, now worst" (1.1.28–29). Wolsey is soon identified as the orchestrator of this event, having determined the nature of the festivities and, without consulting the king, compiled the list of lords who would be called upon to participate. For several, we are told, the expense has "so sickened their estates that never / Shall they bound as formerly" (1.1.82–83), and "many / Have broke their backs with laying manors on 'em / For this great journey" (1.1.83–85).¹⁸ Norfolk's commentary reveals that the momentary glory of this event celebrating the transformation of France from enemy into friend is potentially as devastating to England as the war with France has been.

Further, the peace and alliance celebrated at such enormous cost is fleeting. Report has it that a "hideous storm" broke directly after the event, which caused "Every man" to predict "The sudden breach" of the treaty (1.1.89; 90; 94). This prediction has already proved true, "For France hath flawed the league" by seizing the goods of English merchants

at Bordeaux (1.1.94–96). Additionally, we soon learn that Wolsey, to whom Henry had granted full authority to draw the articles of the treaty as he wished without consulting the king (1.1.168–174), has since met with France's enemy, Charles I/V of the Holy Roman Empire and Spain, and accepted a bribe to “alter the King's course / and break the aforesaid peace” (1.1.188–190).¹⁹ The report situates the devastating costs of this treaty celebration as intensely detrimental to the English state and to the nobles who participated, while the storm serves as both a judgment against the proceedings and an omen of impending disaster. The king has unwisely conceded diplomatic power to Wolsey, trusting the Cardinal's commitments to his country and king, while commentary on the event reveals the threat to the commonweal and commonwealth posed by Wolsey's corruption and self-interest. As Shakespeare suggests through the disgruntled lords, “the Cardinal / Does buy and sell his [the king's] honour as he pleases, / And for his own advantage” (1.1.191–193), an opinion revealed to be widely held among nobles and commoners alike as the play develops. Henry's failure to recognize the negative effects of Wolsey's policies, as well as the self-interested motives of his actions, demonstrates the king's lack of political insight and understanding. The image Wolsey creates for himself, which Henry naïvely accepts, is one that interweaves moral credit with worldly power, while Shakespeare raises questions about the validity of his moral standing as well as his political motives, for in this initial scene, Wolsey is repeatedly identified with amoral, self-interested actions that imperil the state and the king.

These issues unfold in relatively domestic terms, with Norfolk, Buckingham, and Abergavenny expressing their concerns more about the effects of Wolsey's policies and actions on the realm and its subjects than on England's standing in international circles. Nevertheless, this opening discussion emphasizes the centrality of international policy, relationships, opportunities, and interactions to Wolsey's power and position, and to Henry's identity and struggle for legitimacy as the king of England. By promoting competition rather than self-contained confidence, Wolsey fuels the fears that keep Henry off-balance, uncertain, and dependent, particularly in international relations. The play gradually makes it clear that Wolsey's ambitions are unbounded by the territorial limits of England, and indeed, the ecclesiastical figures in the play all operate on the global stage, exercising their authority and influence across rather than within particular territorial states. Eventually, we learn that Wolsey aims for the

papacy, hoping to lay claim to a position of divinely sanctioned supranational temporal authority more potent in some ways than that of a monarch.²⁰

Katherine and England's Commonweal

Act 1, scene 1, ends with the arrest of the Duke of Buckingham, under an accusation of treason which Wolsey has orchestrated. In Act 1, scene 2, Katherine makes her first appearance, entering the king's council chamber as Henry VIII and Wolsey await the arrival of Buckingham's Surveyor, who will reveal to Henry the accusations he has already provided to Wolsey. The entire scene is an invention of Shakespeare's, providing an opportunity for an important balancing of treasonous transgressions—those of the commoners against those of Buckingham.²¹ It also reveals the tensions between Katherine and Wolsey, establishing their differing and opposed aims and objectives as counselors to the king. Katherine has come to the king, not to witness the accusations against Buckingham, but to express her concerns for the subjects of England and for the safety and security of the king and realm. Henry's view of her as his co-ruler and partner in government is made explicit when he immediately assures her that whatever her request, as the one who holds "half our power" (1.2.10–11), she has the authority to grant half the suit herself, and that "The other moiety ere you ask is given" (1.2.12). The comment situates Katherine as a figure of sovereign capacity and authority, demonstrating her acceptance in and centrality to Henry's court, her foreign provenance apparently bearing no weight on her role or value. At the same time, the audience has already learned that Henry rather freely grants such authority, and that he does so with little awareness of the character of those upon whom his monarchy leans. The scene must therefore establish the differences between the ambitious Cardinal and the dutiful queen, both of whom clearly have the king's trust.

In making her appeal to Henry, Katherine approaches as a supplicant, ignoring Henry's assurances of his favor toward her and of her equal monarchical authority. She kneels before him, informing him that her main point in coming to him is to petition him to "love yourself, and in that love / Not unconsidered leave your honor nor / The dignity of your office" (1.2.14–16). She goes on to inform him that loyal counselors have been sent out to his subjects, and that these taxes are so burdensome, his subjects' loyalty has been compromised. They "vent reproaches," both against

Wolsey, as the taxes' author, and against the king, in terms harsh enough that they border on rebellion, (1.2.23–29).²² The Duke of Norfolk affirms that the taxes are so onerous, they are destroying the economic stability of the laboring classes, who now rise up, “compelled by hunger / And lack of other means, in desperate manner ... all in uproar” (1.2.34–36).

This exchange situates Katherine as a deft, diplomatic, and careful adviser. In revealing that she has been asked by loyal advisers to bring this matter to the king's attention, she simultaneously invokes her unique intimacy with and influence over him, and swells the potency of her voice by connecting it to that of other concerned counselors. She thereby intensifies the message and expands the scope of the petition to imply that she speaks as a representative for the alarmed and loyal nobility.²³ She reveals the inappropriateness of the exactions, acknowledging the emotional and material damage they have wrought, and establishes a direct and explicit causal relationship between the abusive taxes and the subjects' rebellion, indicating that even innate loyalty and customary obedience cannot stand in the face of such extremity. While her petition implicitly links concern for the well-being of England's subjects to Henry's security as ruler, and situates the taxes as a threat to both the political and economic stability of his realm, she does not invoke the good of the subjects or his responsibility to them as a central aspect of her plea. Instead, she frames her morally motivated argument in pragmatic terms, appealing to Henry's sense of self-preservation rather than to his moral values. Her understanding of the relationship between abused subjects and an unstable commonwealth is obvious, but in focusing on Henry's well-being, and through that concern, on the well-being of the nation, she situates her appeal as primarily personal and supportive rather than political and critical. Further, she is revealed here to be more knowledgeable about the realm's condition than the king is, and as better connected to the king's subjects of all levels, for Henry seems to be completely unaware of the taxes or the turmoil they have caused (1.2.38–39).²⁴

Katherine mentions, in her plea, that Cardinal Wolsey has received the primary blame for these taxes, but that Henry himself has not escaped reproach by his subjects. When Wolsey denies any particular responsibility, she sharply challenges him, asserting that, while he may claim to be merely one of the voices of the king's council, he in fact frames schemes that others are not willing to countenance, and pressures them into supporting them. She informs Henry that the taxes have been justified on “the pre-*tense*” that they pay for Henry's “wars in France” (1.2.60–61), which she

clearly rejects as their actual purpose, implying that Wolsey is responsible for spreading this idea. Katherine's plea alludes to and shares important elements with the concerns Buckingham expressed earlier. Situated in close proximity to Buckingham's critique of Wolsey and of the expense of the tournament and treaty celebration in France, and referencing the costly wars leading up to that meeting, her argument similarly suggests that foreign and domestic policies and problems are closely linked, and that these linked issues are fundamentally related to the scene's other events and interactions. With international and domestic entanglements clearly on the table, the scene explicates the nature of the conflict between Wolsey and Katherine, with the queen portrayed as altruistic in her objectives and perceptions, and as assertively opposing Wolsey's manipulative, self-serving strategies and aims. While no references are made to foreignness as a specific concern, the domestic upheaval that Katherine has come to discuss cannot be separated from the foreign policies and interactions that have so radically weakened the realm economically, and her powerful advocacy for the king and his realm contrasts with Wolsey's self-focus and far-ranging plans. The foreign queen opposes the English Cardinal, the latter seeking international power, influence, and prominence at the cost of domestic stability, the former wholly committed to supporting her English husband and monarch and strengthening the English commonwealth and commonweal.

The tension between Katherine and Wolsey intensifies as the scene continues. When Henry declares that the taxes are against his pleasure (1.2.68), Wolsey again insists that he had no particular part in their implementation. He deflects attention from Henry's question about the nature of the taxes, defending himself against Katherine's accusations of abusive authority, as well as against the censure of the populace and lords. He attempts to justify his position by asserting that the actions of statesmen are often misjudged by the uninformed, and that "We must not stint / Our necessary actions in the fear / To cope malicious censurers" (1.2.77–79). Wolsey's political philosophy thus situates government in an agonistic relationship with the governed, and proclaims unjust criticism a liability to which statesmen are inevitably subject. His defense implies that both Katherine and those she speaks for can be included among the "ignorant tongues" and "sick interpreters" who condemn policies they fail to understand (1.2.73; 83). Henry, however, rejects Wolsey's self-defense and negates his political philosophy, rebuking him and insisting that "Things done well / And with a care exempt themselves from fear" while

“Things done without example, in their issue / Are to be feared” (1.2.89–92). The criticism of Wolsey’s decisions is explicit, and Henry further presses this concern that Wolsey is implementing dangerous new policies. He demands to know whether Wolsey has “a precedent / Of this commission,” and, answering his own question in the negative, asserts the necessary subordination of the monarch to the law: “We must not rend our subjects from our laws / And stick them in our will” (1.2.93–94), he cautions Wolsey. Henry, in this moment, voices an anti-absolutist position, suggesting that not only moral concerns, but also pragmatic ones, may require limitations on the king’s sovereign power.²⁵ Once he acknowledges awareness of what the Cardinal has been up to, Henry voices his disapproval of Wolsey’s policies, actions, and philosophy about government, and indicates that the Cardinal has been responsible for implementing such policies without the king’s knowledge or approval, and beyond what is allowable by precedent or law. The exchange reveals the extent to which Henry has abdicated responsibility to Wolsey, and while the play has as yet offered no explicit evidence of Henry’s wider moral failings, there is little question that Henry’s deflection of blame fails to exonerate him from responsibility for Wolsey’s decisions and their effect. These implications resonate, once again, with the criticisms offered by Buckingham and Katherine which gesture toward the king as an enabler, whether aware or unaware, of the Cardinal’s destructive machinations.

The point gains greater emphasis when, in order to resolve this situation, Henry commands that letters of pardon be sent out to every man who has refused to pay the taxes (1.2.99–102), putting Wolsey in charge of rescinding the commissions he had previously authorized. He thereby supports Katherine’s perspective that most subjects forget their loyalty only when impossible circumstances drive them into desperation, her attitude that the interests of the realm are best served through the reasonable treatment of the populace, and her reminder that the king’s security and viability depend upon maintaining his subjects’ devotion and good will. Henry’s objections, rebuke, and pardon emphasize a pragmatic approach that recognizes a monarch’s need to be judicious in his policies and practices, and that acknowledges his accountability to his subjects and his reliance on their good will for the security of his realm and crown, as Katherine has suggested. The scene suggests that the king is well meaning but somewhat oblivious to the workings of his government, to the responsibilities of sovereignty, to the questionable values and aims of his closest adviser, Wolsey, and to the sharp tensions between Wolsey and Katherine.

The rhetorical strategies through which Shakespeare shapes Katherine's self-presentation in this scene emphasize her status as a subject—a status she shares with the very people she pleads for, despite Henry's willingness to grant her autonomous sovereign authority. Even as she claims a privileged position through her intimate connection to the king, which allows her to speak both for those who lack that relationship and for those whose only political voice is rebellion, she recognizes the tenuousness of her position. "I am much too venturous / In tempting your patience, but am boldened / Under your promise of pardon," she tells him just before revealing the exact nature of the taxes Wolsey has implemented (1.2.55–57). Rather than actively taking up the monarchical authority Henry grants her, she approaches him as a supplicant, but one well-loved enough and loving enough to be attended to.

However, when it comes to her challenges to Wolsey, she speaks as his moral and political superior, revealing that his responsibility for this divisive tax policy comes from his capacity to use his privilege and position to bend the members of the king's council to his will. She offers no supplication to him, despite his high religious office, and in sharp rejection of his claims that he is misunderstood in his aims and intentions. Wolsey's secret instructions to his secretary to "let it be noised / That through our intercession this revokement / And pardon comes" (1.2.118–120) reveal his aim to shift the blame for the taxes to the king alone, and emphasize Henry's failure to deal effectively with this unreliable public official. These self-serving and duplicitous actions corroborate Katherine's views of the Cardinal's methods and aims, and also resonate with the denunciations of Wolsey that we have previously heard from the Duke of Buckingham. Indeed, Wolsey's desire to shield himself from blame, which arises repeatedly in this scene, and his effort to direct the people's rebellious anger toward Henry alone, situate his self-interest in stark contrast to Katherine's devotion to Henry, his subjects, and the English nation. She is framed, through her pleas, admonishments, accusations, and revelations, as an ideal wife and subject, on the one hand, and as an astute political adviser and ruling partner, on the other, even as she navigates the dangerous shoals of potential monarchical displeasure, emphasizing her insistent subjection as the means to avoid offending the king and losing his favor.²⁶ Her awareness of how vulnerable subjects are to monarchical displeasure is echoed by Wolsey, who repeatedly attempts to evade or deflect royal censure for his actions, but whose confident, manipulative, and even patronizing demeanor suggests a very different perception of

his relationship to the king and to royal power. Katherine succeeds in challenging Wolsey in this first exchange, and appears to prevail in shaping policy and influencing Henry, but her intervention has no lasting effect on Wolsey's power or aims, and in the larger battle between support of the commonweal and the pursuit of personal advantage, Wolsey retains the upper hand.

The first half of the scene thus tests the influence of two close advisers to the king—Wolsey and Katherine—and pits them in a contest of wills against each other, allowing Katherine to triumph in the short term in her plea for Henry's subjects over Wolsey's self-justifications, self-serving philosophy, and self-interested objectives. Shakespeare shapes this exchange around Katherine's understanding of the *realpolitik* of the court, a counterpoint to Wolsey's ambition and Henry's gullibility, reordering events so that the tax rebellions that happened several years later would serve to frame Katherine's identity and roles in relation to royal husband, court, king, and realm. Katherine's self-presentation and interactions in this scene suggest that she operates in a double register, embracing the positive relationship between monarch and subjects as a fundamental concern, but situating her suit as one aimed primarily at Henry's benefit, making her appeals to his own self-interest and pragmatism rather than basing them on idealized moral values. She appears to hold the higher values, but doesn't rely on Henry sharing a purely abstract notion of moral law to achieve her ends. As Shakespeare constructs her character, she both embraces the ideals of an overarching moral order, and promotes that moral order through practical, interest-oriented advice—a navigation that suggests the potential positive aspects of *raison d'état*, and that destabilizes the apparent binary between moral and pragmatic advice.

Katherine and the Fall of Buckingham

The scene continues with Shakespeare's presentation of the hearing of the Duke of Buckingham, for which Katherine remains present. The juxtaposition of the two events—the rebellions of the commons against the abuses of government, and the supposed rebellion of Buckingham against the authority of the king—helps to strengthen and develop the opposition between Katherine and Wolsey, particularly regarding their perceptions about the relationship between king and subjects.²⁷ It also reveals the king's vulnerability to Wolsey's influence. When Katherine laments that Buckingham has “run in [the king's] displeasure” (1.2.111), a sentiment

that Henry acknowledges to be felt by many, he seems to suggest that those who sympathize with or feel sorrow over Buckingham's situation lack clear political understanding. His own view of the situation relies on flawed maxims concerning moral choice, as he opines that men like Buckingham will inevitably redirect their great virtues toward baser aims, and "the mind growing once corrupt, / They turn to vicious forms ten times more ugly / Than ever they were fair" (1.2.117–119). Thus, although once a man "enroll'd amongst wonders," Buckingham "Hath into monstrous habits put the graces / That once were his, and is become as black / As if besmeared in hell" (1.2.120; 124–126). According to his logic, Buckingham is both guilty beyond question, and irredeemable. Henry, having opened the scene with heartfelt thanks to Wolsey for his "great care" in discovering this threat to the king's person and the realm's security (1.2.2), here reveals that he has been persuaded by Wolsey's account of the matter, and his comments to Katherine reiterate and reaffirm that he has already determined Buckingham's guilt. Further, although he voices a maxim about the likelihood of corruption, he fails to perceive that same flaw in Wolsey, or to consider the source of the accusations. Katherine, while she never defends Buckingham's innocence, speaks up during the hearing against the Surveyor, revealing that Buckingham discharged him from his office "On the complaint o'th' tenants" (1.2.174)—complaints that he used bribery against them, according to Holinshed.²⁸ She goes on to admonish the Surveyor to "Take good heed / You charge not in your spleen a noble person / And spoil your nobler soul" (1.2.174–176). The actual facts of the case call into question the reliability of the witness, reveal the questionable character and values of the Surveyor, and reinforce the idea that Buckingham values the king's subjects and actively supports their well-being over a man of higher status but lower virtues. Once again, then, Shakespeare structures the scene to situate Katherine as possessing information that Henry lacks, a key factor in evaluating the evidence given by the accuser.²⁹ Her rebuke to the Surveyor might also be understood as a challenge to Wolsey, for the resonances between the Surveyor's self-serving actions against the tenants and his vindictive vengeance against Buckingham resonate strongly with Wolsey's motives and actions, and are enabled by him. Indeed, once the accusations have been fully articulated, Wolsey turns to her and demands of *her* whether "his highness [may] live in freedom / And this man out of prison?" (1.2.201–202), indicating that he sees her as the only challenger to Buckingham's fate.

Wolsey, as Shakespeare situates him, uses this moment to turn the tables to his own benefit, revealing a supposed conspiracy against the king's life, and thus indicating his deep concern for the king's welfare. He thereby regains the king's favor after the rebuke concerning the taxes, and demonstrates that his prescient understanding of the ambitions of men like Buckingham far outstrips Katherine's naïve good opinions. The audience later learns that Wolsey is known to manage court affairs to eliminate adversaries and competitors, so that for those "the King favours, / The Card'nal instantly will find employment— / And far enough from court, too" (2.1.48–50). In this case, he has removed those who might have supported Buckingham, and indeed, appears to be intent on permanently removing this rival for the king's favor and ear. Additionally, as we hear in Act 2, scene 1, others besides Katherine strongly suspect that Wolsey orchestrated the fall of the Duke, whether or not he ever spoke the words of treason of which he has been accused.³⁰ The scene effectively shows the lengths to which Wolsey will go in order to achieve his ends, and contrasts his successful destruction of Buckingham with Buckingham's vows to reveal the Cardinal's nefarious secret allegiances and agreements to the king in the previous scene. The implications for Katherine are also significant, for she clearly poses a threat to Wolsey's influence and power, despite his relatively successful navigation of the intertwined domestic and international crisis that is presented in this scene. Her eventual removal from her position of influence, while not yet broached by the play, emerges in relation to this depiction of Wolsey's other manipulations, clearly aligns with his methods as observed by First Gentleman at 2.1.47–49, and serves his long-term interests.

There are additional implications to Shakespeare's construction of this scene and character interactions. While Wolsey successfully brings Buckingham to his knees through these accusations, there is no clear indication of Buckingham's guilt or innocence—the question remains unresolved. That alone seems telling, for Henry is easily persuaded that this once-valued lord has turned dangerously against him. However, with the rebellion over the taxes as the framing condition of Buckingham's hearing, not only is Wolsey's damaging influence made explicit, but the motivations for rising against the crown *in general* are also rendered intelligible. In the case of the commoners, with the stability of realm and monarch hanging in the balance, Katherine—supported by Norfolk—convinces Henry that his subjects act against their natural love of him only out of desperation and necessity. Buckingham's threats, as they are reported,

strike more directly at the king and, as Wolsey emphasizes, at himself (1.2.139–143), making a harsh judgment more likely, while Buckingham’s ambition is suggested as the motive. Yet, we hear no hint of such ambition from Buckingham’s own mouth, and what we do hear suggests that, like the frustrated lords here as well as in other plays, Buckingham resents and fears the Cardinal’s influence over the king, and sees himself and other peers of the realm as displaced by a dangerous, manipulative favorite. The scene’s focus on a single witness, one whose honesty is explicitly questioned, problematizes the verdict and emphasizes Wolsey’s role in procuring this particular outcome. Buckingham’s threats, if in fact he has made any, are contextualized by his concern for the good of the realm and the protection of the king from a corrupt influence, much as Katherine’s counsel aims to prevent Wolsey from destroying the commonweal for his own benefit.

Thus, while the play offers no certainty about Buckingham, and allows the accusations against him to prevail, as they did historically, the structure of the scene strongly encourages a comparison between the two forms of rebellion—that of the commoners and of Buckingham—and emphasizes the role of Wolsey in both. Henry’s blindness to Wolsey’s manipulations, his inability to parse and deal with the actual power struggle that surrounds him, and his failure to pursue truth in the case of Buckingham’s accusers, signal his incapacities as a sovereign, and both forms of rebellion are directly related to this incapacity. Although this scene opens with Henry offering heartfelt thanks to Wolsey for protecting him from “a full-charged confederacy” (1.2.1–4), the scene suggests that Wolsey represents a far greater threat, holding little commitment to king or country, and willing to sacrifice the security of the realm for his own benefit.³¹

As these two most intimate advisers to the king confront each other, Katherine advocating for England and Henry’s stable rule, Wolsey advocating for himself and his international position and power, the king remains oblivious to their struggle for influence, or the motivations behind their sharp disagreements and efforts to shape his decisions. Thus, Shakespeare, working more through innuendo and intimation than explicit assertions of guilt or innocence, provides a sense of the challenges faced by a monarch—his vulnerability to manipulation, the fallibility and questionable motives of even the most trusted adviser, the difficulty of seeing the whole picture, or of maintaining a firm grasp of all policy decisions and their implications. In the context of significant international tensions, Wolsey’s scheming points,

not to the danger of his connection to the supranational authority of the pope, but to the threat of his personal ambition and weak moral grounding. By contrast, Katherine, whose international connections and possible influence remain invisible at this point, articulates values and views that emphasize the necessity of maintaining a strong, stable domestic front. She also defends the subjects' loyalty and commitment to their sovereign even when they rebel against his policies and actions, emphasizing their natural allegiance, and advocating trust and empathy rather than harshness. Katherine, attached to England only through her connections to Henry, consistently advocates for the king's best interests in this scene, and in each encounter she confronts Wolsey and challenges his instrumental motives. The interactions also emphasize that, if Englishness becomes a touchstone of positive identity later in the play, mere Englishness alone can never ensure loyalty and devotion to the king and nation, as Wolsey's actions so clearly remind us. Conversely, Katherine's foreignness, which will later become an explicit marker of her identity, does not render her dangerous or threatening to England's interests. She is, at this point, explicitly devoted to king and commonweal.

FOREIGN IDENTITY IN THE TRIAL OF KATHERINE

Wolsey's Foreign Aspirations

Although Shakespeare gives us no hint of Katherine's outsider status in her first scene, in the interim between that scene and her second appearance, the question of the foreign emerges as central to the developing divorce drama, initially through Wolsey, and eventually through Katherine as well. The hints about his self-promoting diplomacy that arise in the first scenes of the play are compounded in Act 2. The rumor of Wolsey's aims to push the king into a divorce from Katherine is first heard at 2.1.147–161, a scene which also reveals that he is urging this divorce out of personal vengeance against Katherine's great-nephew, Charles V: "For not bestowing on him at his asking / The Archbishopric of Toledo" (2.1.162–164). Katherine is merely collateral damage in this retaliation scheme. At 2.2, Norfolk and Suffolk suggest that Wolsey is like fortune's eldest son, a "King-Cardinal" who turns the fortunes of others as he wishes. According to Norfolk, "he has cracked the league / Between us and the Emperor" and he

dives into the King's soul and there scatters
 Dangers, doubts, wringing of the conscience,
 Fears and despairs—and all these for his marriage.
 And out of all these, to restore the King,
 He counsels a divorce ...”

(2.2.23–29)

This plot to undermine the royal marriage has links to Wolsey's additional international aims, which include negotiating a new alliance with France by wedding Henry to the French king's sister, the Duchess of Alençon.³² Thus, the league that Wolsey was bribed to forge with Charles V, breaking the treaty with France that was celebrated with the ostentatious Field of Cloth of Gold tournaments, is now itself broken, with both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire set aside in Wolsey's pursuit of self-aggrandizement in international contexts. Again, it is not foreignness itself, but the willingness to place England at risk for personal benefit in supranational contexts that is figured as damaging to the nation and the king.

Against this more explicit background of Wolsey's role in domestic and international intrigue, Katherine makes her second appearance in Act 2, scene 4, in which the marriage between her and the king is put on trial. The scene offers the first of the play's several elaborate pageantry scenes, with the focus intensely on ecclesiastical authority and position. Wolsey enters accompanied by symbolic markers of his positions in the state and the church. These include two short silver wands typically carried before the dignitaries of a cathedral; the great seal and the cardinal's hat, marking Wolsey's two primary offices; two large silver crosses symbolizing Wolsey's archbishopric and his role as papal legate; and a silver mace and two ornamental pillars marking Wolsey's office as cardinal.³³ The rich layering of symbolic markers of office for Wolsey in particular, and for all the church figures present, added by Shakespeare to this scene, stands in stark contrast to the lack of symbolic markers for the monarch. Henry enters with the sword and mace as his only symbols, and Katherine is accompanied only by her gentleman usher, with no evident ceremonial symbols to mark her position. Although the king takes his position on the raised dais under the cloth of state, with the two cardinals sitting under him and the other church figures arranged in a consistory flanking them, it is clear that ecclesiastical authority permeates this court, and that power emanating from the pope authorizes the proceedings. The scene's explicit visualization of the limits of sovereign authority under temporal papal authority situates Henry's

initial divorce attempt, and this trial, within the accepted parameters of religious hierarchy under Catholicism. However, it is Wolsey's power and authority that dominate in this scene, visually and symbolically. Shakespeare, through these representational means, explicates one of the central problems with which the play grapples—the capacity of highly-placed church figures, drawing power from beyond the boundaries of the state, to wield that power within the realm independent of sovereign will or control, and in ways that suggest almost complete autonomy even from papal constraint. Once again, Wolsey's problematic relationship to the English state and monarch is made tangible and visible.

Katherine's position as peace pledge has been compromised repeatedly, not least by the alliance with France that opens the play. The instabilities of her position intensify as Wolsey manipulates England's international relations for his own purposes, and as her capacity to draw on her own nation and family for protection are compromised by her necessary support of Henry and England in these shifting alliances. In the scenes building up to Katherine's trial, while anti-Frenchness receives significant play in Act 1, scene 3, there is no parallel condemnation of Spanish culture, politics, or fashion. Wolsey's orchestration of the divorce is connected directly to his foreign ambitions (2.1.161–164), and his choice as the target of a new marriage, “the French King's sister” (the Duchess of Alençon, 2.2.40), emphasizes his desire to use England's power to increase his own in international contexts, despite the negative connotations of that alliance and of French influence more generally.³⁴ He also seeks to weaken Katherine's connections to her foreign relations, having “cracked the league” between England and the Holy Roman Emperor/King of Spain, Katherine's nephew, Charles V (2.2.23–24), thereby setting the scene for the shift of favor away from Katherine herself, despite her overall commitment to England and its subjects.

Katherine's Claims to Foreignness

Much more than when the treaty with Spain remained significant in English foreign policy, as the trial commences in Act 2, scene 4, Katherine's foreignness becomes an important touchstone of identity, a resource beyond England's power nexus that provides her with some possible support for her position. Her plea before the court expresses her situation much in the vein of Socrates in his plea before his Athenian judges with which it resonates in several significant ways.³⁵ Socrates engages his

accusers by undermining the coherence and validity of their claims, and most centrally argues that if he is found guilty (of corrupting the city's youth and of atheism), it will be because of false gossip and slander, not because the formal charges are tenable. Additionally, he asserts that whatever duty one owes to the state or to one's superiors, one owes a greater duty to God, and he will not neglect that duty in mere temporal obedience. Also significant is Socrates' invocation of time as a mitigating factor in his pursuit of justice—if he had been given more time to defend himself, and had been willing to stoop to emotional appeals, he might have been more successful in persuading the jury. Additionally, as discussed in the general introduction to this book, Derrida calls attention to Socrates' claim to *foreignness*, through which he attempts to gain an advantage in a disadvantaged context, despite the fact that he was not, in fact, foreign to Athens.³⁶ Socrates' purpose in making this claim is to situate himself as alienated from the language of the court, but also implicitly to the *values* and *objectives* of the court and the trial—a suggestion that justice cannot be achieved when that is not, in fact, the aim of the trial.³⁷ This argument lies at the core of Katherine's response as well, and foreignness as well as injustice become tools in her defense.

Katherine enters the court at or near the rear of the processional, and is given a place at some distance from the king, and in a position that blocks her direct access to him. The formal proceedings require that the chief parties in the trial be called to acknowledge their presence, and in effect, to acknowledge the validity of the court's commission. Rather than answering when so addressed, Katherine rises from her place, walks around the court in order to come directly before the king, and kneels at Henry's feet, disrupting the proceedings and seizing the opportunity to speak before any charges are read or justifications for the trial given. She rejects the parameters of the trial, for which both domestic and foreign clerics have offered their judgments on the illegitimacy of the marriage, and in which the cardinals and papal legates Wolsey and Campeius sit as judges. Instead, she approaches Henry as the sole judge, appealing to him directly and individually, situating herself as a supplicant subject to his sovereign judgment and authority alone. As she did in Act 1, scene 2, she kneels at his feet, and from that submissive position, frames her plea by explicitly asserting her gender and foreignness, and characterizing them as disadvantages: "Sir," she says to Henry,

I desire you to do me right and justice,
 And to bestow your pity on me, for
 I am a most poor woman, and a stranger
 Born out of your dominions: having here
 No judge indifferent, nor no more assurance
 Of equal friendship and proceeding.
 (2.4.11–16)

Through this speech, Katherine attempts both to signal her difference in terms of nation and gender, and to set shared values and virtues—the desire for fairness and justice—against her position as a stranger and a subordinate.³⁸ She invokes her actual foreignness, focusing on her status as a stranger, and suggesting that the prejudices of her English judges cannot be overcome, which renders her in jeopardy of injustice because no one could be as well-disposed toward her as toward a true English subject, or see her as a true friend of Henry and England.³⁹ Her initial plea calls attention to the vulnerability of a foreign queen, whose status and place within the realm were entirely reliant on the good will of her husband, and whose external relationships and fealties could be held against her in questions of national interest. However, we can also see resistance in this plea, with the invocation of her foreignness a deliberate strategy to strengthen her position.⁴⁰ Katherine's invocation of her foreignness offers a Socratic defense, asserting that justice cannot be achieved under the circumstances of this trial.

As the scene continues, her resistance develops along other lines as well. Although Shakespeare shapes her character in her first scene to embody the ideal subject, queen, and adviser to the king, here he articulates the tenuousness of her position, emphasizing, as Katherine's own words do throughout both scenes, her relative vulnerability to lapses in Henry's benevolence and good will. Additionally, with the trial and execution of Buckingham already accomplished, the audience is made quite explicitly aware of how vulnerable even an English subject was with Wolsey surreptitiously holding the reins of government. Wolsey, then, is her primary opponent in these proceedings, and the strategies through which she engages with the court and with the questions concerning her marriage reveal an intention to disrupt the lines of authority and the terms of evaluation that have been established by the papal legates and by the king's appeal to the ecclesiastics of England and Europe. In the question of marital legitimacy that is the main focus of the trial, she shifts the focus from illegitimacy based on a biblically grounded concept of tacit incest to legiti-

macy based on the fulfillment of duty. Her defense, offered directly and exclusively to Henry, rejects theological precepts and asserts culturally defined parameters of appropriate comportment for wives and subjects. Focusing on her identity as wife and queen, she requests that Henry inform her of how she has displeased him or failed in her duty to him, and, calling up the vulnerability of her position, she asserts that she

has ever been a true and humble wife,
 At all times to your will conformable,
 Ever in fear to kindle your dislike,
 Yea, subject to your countenance, glad or sorry,
 As I saw it inclined.

(2.4.21–25)

Her invocation of what seems an entirely domestic context for their interactions emphasizes the idea of marriage in its most traditional patriarchal form, nothing like the partnership that Henry alludes to in their first scene together.⁴¹ According to those parameters, she challenges his withdrawal of his “good grace,” highlighting the difficulty of her situation and the delicacy of her navigation of her role. Far from being a threat to him, even her associations and friendships, she says, have been determined by his preferences:

When was the hour
 I ever contradicted your desire,
 Or made it not mine too? Or which of your friends
 Have I not strove to love, although I knew
 He were mine enemy? Which friend of mine,
 That had to him derived your anger, did I
 Continue in my liking? Nay, gave notice
 He was from thence discharged?

(2.4.25–32)

Even as she seems to speak only in terms of the personal, referring to her roles as wife and subject, mentioning friendship and duty, there is also an implicit reminder that she has relationships across the sea, her family and friends who have been much at odds with England and its king, particularly over the matter of peace with France. Rather than cultivating those relationships that have been rejected by Henry, she has restricted herself to only those whom Henry himself has embraced as friends, even when she has known them to be her enemies—and Wolsey is also undeniably implicated here.⁴² She has, she intimates, committed herself fully to Henry and

to England, despite her foreignness and her official role as peace pledge and diplomatic spouse linking England and Spain, and despite her vulnerability to Wolsey's animosity and schemes.

As her plea continues, she goes on to elaborate on her devoted service over the twenty years of their marriage, emphasizing its longevity, and mentioning that they were "blessed / With many children" (2.4.34–35), highlighting the success of that relationship and making no mention of the failure of five of their six offspring to survive, including three sons.⁴³ Her shaping of history in this moment serves her need to claim both physical and moral righteousness.⁴⁴ She challenges Henry to name "and prove" any lapse in her duty to him as husband and king, or transgression against her marriage bonds (2.4.35–39), suggesting that the burden of proof lies on him, not on her. And finally, she invokes the wisdom, judgment, and determination of their fathers, Ferdinand of Spain and Henry VII of England, whose own judgment was supported by "a wise council ... / Of every realm" (2.4.49–50), which debated the marriage question and "deemed [the] marriage lawful" (2.4.51). Her three central points, then, are that the marriage is lawful according to a past, unbiased evaluation; that she has fulfilled her duties as wife and queen throughout the twenty years of their life together; and that they have enjoyed a (re)productive sexual relationship throughout those years. These emotional appeals stand in contrast to the assertion of her status as stranger, for clearly her aim here is to establish the certainty of their socially appropriate intimacy, her subordination as a wife and subject, and their mutual devotion over their many years together. To judge against this history of devotion would be to treat her as the stranger she initially claims to be, as one whose allegiance cannot be located or identified, as a potential enemy whose alignments and aims are unknown.

She ends her plea by requesting that the king "spare [her] till [she] may / Be by [her] friends in Spain advised" in this difficult matter (2.4.52–53), reminding him *explicitly* now that she has resources beyond the boundaries of England, if only she would be allotted time to consult with them and call them to her aid. These proceedings, she suggests, threaten to disrupt what has been, until now, her willing subjection to her husband and her willing service to her adopted nation. Her plea, directed only at Henry, circumvents the authority of the pope and the court, casting in almost entirely personal terms what might easily become, as she hints, a matter of dangerous international disagreement. As is always the case for a foreign queen, Katherine suggests obliquely here that her abuse at the hands of

her English husband might raise the displeasure of her family and create an international incident, to the detriment of England and its king. Yet, she continues to acknowledge Henry's authority and her submission to him, asserting that, if he will not allow her to obtain the counsel of her friends in Spain, "I' the name of God, / Your pleasure be fulfill'd!" (2.4.54–55). Despite the hints about possible Spanish displeasure at her treatment, she remains, at this point, loyal to Henry.

It is only when Wolsey attempts to assuage her concerns about the questionable justice of the trial that she grows angry, asserting that Wolsey has "blown this coal betwixt my lord and me" (2.4.77), and declaring her belief that, "Induced by potent circumstances," he is her enemy (2.4.72–73). She calls attention to the threat she faces, her status as queen these twenty years now challenged, and asserts her status as "daughter of a king" (2.4.70), a position that cannot be taken from her, and which reminds her listeners once again that she has connections beyond England. The tears that threaten to stifle her voice, she "turn[s] to sparks of fire" directed at Wolsey, calling him her "most malicious foe" (2.4.81), and "not / At all a friend to truth" (2.4.81–82).⁴⁵ She makes explicit her refusal to accept Wolsey as her judge: "I ... make my challenge / You shall not be my judge (2.4.73–76), and then intensifies that refusal: "I utterly abhor, yea, from my soul, / Refuse you for my judge" (2.4.79–80). Goaded by Wolsey's answering defense of his character, actions, and intentions, she goes on to malign his character in more direct terms, as she did in Act 1, scene 2, contrasting her simple honesty and weakness with his feigned meekness, suggesting that he is hypocritical and abusive of his position and authority:

You're meek and humble-mouthed;
 You sign your place and calling, in full seeming,
 With meekness and humility: but your heart
 Is crammed with arrogancy, spleen, and pride.

...

You tender more your person's honour than
 Your high profession spiritual; ... again
 I do refuse you for my judge; and here,
 Before you all, appeal unto the Pope
 To bring my whole cause fore his holiness,
 To be judged by him.

(2.4.105–108; 115–119)

Her accusations against Wolsey reveal and negate simplistic views of friend and enemy, identifying this internal, English churchman as a greater enemy than she could ever be. Her defense in this scene begins with her initial appeal to Henry to recognize her disadvantages in this trial, and then emphasizes her duty and devotion in primarily domestic terms. She then shifts to invocations of her friends in Spain, and makes an explicit plea that Henry allow her to seek the counsel of her Spanish "friends," affirming that she will submit to his pleasure if such counsel is denied. Yet, finally, she declares her intention to appeal to the pope as an authority beyond the limits of the court, and above both cardinals and king.⁴⁶ All three stand as alternatives to the intended authority of the judges. The first represents an appeal to patriarchal duty and sovereign authority in an otherwise inequitable and unjust situation; the second introduces the actual international context that affects her status; and the third makes an appeal to divine authority embodied in the temporal world, an appeal to transcendent moral judgment which is unaffected, ideally, by worldly biases. Thus, she concludes by again negating the validity of this trial, and making an appeal to the only source of justice left to her if Henry should refuse to defend her cause.

Suggesting that this trial concerning the marriage is an unnecessary reopening of a settled issue, and maligning the judges as biased against her, she pares down to a clear hierarchy the lines of judgment that she would find acceptable: the only domestic judge she will admit is Henry himself, and the only foreign judge is the pope. She explicitly contrasts herself—foreign but devoted to Henry and England—with Wolsey—English but working only for his own benefit and gain. She implies that her transformation from friend into enemy through these accusations conflicts with her twenty-year service as friend of England despite her foreignness, and it is clear that Katherine's invocation of her foreign identity is meant to prick Henry with the irony of his actions. Her plea calls attention to her vulnerability under his sovereign authority, but it also threatens to make explicit Henry's subjection to the authority of the pope, while his actions render England vulnerable to censure from, and possible reprisals by, her former countrymen, those she must now embrace as her only friends. Finally, she refuses to respond to the Court Crier's call for her return as she exits the court, affirming her rejection of the court's validity, and refusing to obey what is, in effect, a command from the king himself.

From the first lines of the scene until her exit, Katherine strategically invokes her foreignness, her relationship to foreign powers and authority, including papal authority, and Henry's vulnerability to such powers and authority should he continue to pursue a divorce from her. At the same time, her references to her virtues as a wife, mother, and queen remind Henry and the audience that she has, until compelled to do otherwise, embraced her chosen Englishness over that inherent foreignness. Henry, subject to Wolsey's manipulation and dishonesty, has left her no other recourse. The scene thereby makes clear Katherine's dilemma, as Henry's pursuit of a divorce thrusts her from her position as adoptive Englishwoman and co-ruler, and forces her to strategically redefine herself in terms of her alien identity and relationships, even as she continues to articulate the abuses and manipulations that have misled the king and damaged the English nation.⁴⁷

After Katherine's exit, further international concerns emerge as Henry exonerates Wolsey of all blame in his pursuit of a divorce. As the king reveals, it was not Wolsey who raised the questions about the legitimacy of the marriage, but the Bishop of Bayonne, in his role as French ambassador, who was present in England to discuss the marriage of the princess Mary to the Duke of Orleans—the second son of the French king. Bayonne had requested an interval in the negotiations in order to return to France and determine the legitimacy of both the king's marriage and his daughter. This potential rejection of an important marriage alliance, Henry reveals, caused him to recognize that England's international position and security as a nation might depend upon rescinding his marriage vows to Katherine, wedding a more acceptable queen, and producing a more readily acceptable heir, preferably male.⁴⁸ We can once again see that ideology and pragmatism are closely linked in this concern, with the moral and political questions distinct but interrelated, and additionally, that the papal dispensation which had permitted the marriage to take place was deemed insufficient to legitimate it beyond question in the eyes of other monarchs.

As the play represents these events, Katherine is correct in her assertion of Wolsey's manipulative, self-interested, and damaging policies and projects, which have been thoroughly revealed through various scenes and affirmed by other characters. Nevertheless, Shakespeare leaves in question the actual causes and motives for the proposed divorce, while suggesting that Henry is not the only monarch, nor the first one, to question the authority of the pope in this circumstance. The renegotiation of

sovereign power among these variously situated international figures is not an explicit element of the play's plot, but it figures repeatedly in thematic, representational, and justificatory terms, and is centrally connected to Henry's pursuit of a divorce. The closing moments of the scene also indicate that Katherine is not limited by Henry's authority or by that of the papal legates, and her refusal to accept the right of the court to judge in this case leads to her decision to appeal to the pope directly, a decision that can be rescinded only by her. Cardinal Campeius therefore advises Henry that the trial cannot continue with Katherine absent, and that "Meanwhile must be an earnest motion / Made to the Queen to call back her appeal / She intends unto his holiness" (2.4.230–232). This independent appeal to the pope recognizes him as an authority above the court or the king, reiterates the international significance of the marriage question, and establishes even more clearly the context for Katherine's strategic manipulation of her identity.

FROM QUEEN TO HOUSEWIFE

Reclaiming Englishness

Katherine displaces her assertion of her foreignness in Act 2, scene 4, with an insistence on her Englishness in Act 3, scene 1, where she is confronted again by the two papal legates, Wolsey and Campeius. They have been sent to pressure her into granting Henry the divorce he now so desperately seeks, an aim, according to his subjects, arising more from the prick of desire than the prick of conscience he so sanctimoniously invokes, and again Wolsey is explicitly blamed (2.2.15–20).⁴⁹ The scene takes place in the enclosed space of Katherine's apartments, where she and her women pass the heavy time in domestic work and quiet entertainment. Informed that the cardinals wish to speak with her, Katherine repeats her self-characterization as "a poor weak woman ... fall'n from favor" (3.1.20), obliquely mentions the cardinals' hypocrisy, and expresses her distrust of their intentions (3.1.21–23), a demonstration of her resilient political acumen despite her self-abnegation. Her assertion of her role as "part of a housewife" (3.1.24), emphasizes the modest labor to which she now devotes her time, in contrast to her former political role and to the dangers she still faces. Her parenthetical comment that she "would be all [housewife]" (3.1.25) suggests that she welcomes the depoliticization of her life, favoring her private functions over her public ones, much as she did in the trial scene.

Yet, this desire cannot be fulfilled in a context where personal and political are utterly intertwined, and where the household over which she has presided as queen forms the heart of the nation. Further, if she truly desires a life of private domesticity, the most direct path to that outcome would be compliance with Henry's request. However, to comply would be to acknowledge that her marriage has been sinful, and the weight of that sin would rest on her alone, stripping her of her domestic *and* her political role while Henry would lose nothing. Resistance, then, is her only reasonable choice, despite her expressed wish to become merely a housewife, and that resistance turns on her iconic purity of body and soul *as* a wife. Her insistence on a public discussion of her situation emphasizes her wifely virtue, an acknowledgment of the public and political value of her personal morals, as she rejects Wolsey's request that they step into her private chamber to discuss her situation. Her comment that "Truth loves open dealing" not only reiterates that she has nothing to conceal, but also suggests that Wolsey's desire for privacy is related to his disingenuous virtue and his unjust aims. Her history of willing subjection to an English husband and king, explicit in her trial speech and suggested again here, overlaps with her refusal to converse in Latin. When Wolsey addresses her in the language of church and law, she assures him that, since coming to England, she has not been "such a truant ... / As not to know the language I have lived in" (3.1.41–43). Her insistence that they converse in English thwarts his effort to keep their interaction private even when an audience is present, while her references to her long residence and linguistic fluency emphasize her acculturation into and commitment to Englishness, which resonates with her attitudes and comportment in her first scene.⁵⁰

She goes on to argue that speaking in "A strange tongue" will make her situation seem "more strange [and] suspicious" (3.1.44), the repetition of 'strange' suggesting the unnaturalness of Wolsey's mission, and indicating that his foreign speech aims to make Katherine herself seem more questionable as well as less English. When she asserts that "The willing'st sin I ever yet committed / May be absolved in English" (3.1.48–49), she reemphasizes the purity of her immortal soul, and suggests obliquely that Wolsey's only proper role would be as her confessor, not her accuser. At the same time, her comment casts Wolsey himself as a stranger, not only one whose linguistic facility in a foreign tongue marks him as an outsider to common English subjects, but whose agenda marks him as an enemy of

England, while Katherine emphasizes her own alignments with English language, virtues, and values. The exchange echoes and inverts the courtroom conflict, with Katherine now situating herself as almost inherently English, and Wolsey as the one asserting customs, values, and language alien to those of this nation. She also calls into question his virtue and his agenda, hinting that even if he does “speak in English” (3.1.45), lending political transparency to the exchange *if* he will “speak truth (3.1.46), his habitual dishonesty leaves little hope that even understanding his words will make the truth any more accessible. Where foreignness was a source of strength and strategic resistance in the formal legal context of the court, it becomes a source of unreliability and alienation from English values here, and Katherine actively distances herself from that condition, while hinting that it applies to Wolsey. English, in this scene, functions as the language of honesty, guilelessness, openness, and accessibility, allowing her ladies to hear what transpires, and her insistence on English situates Katherine as a mere woman, distinct from her accusers and unlearned in the face of their power and knowledge.

Yet, this assertion of her Englishness is also ironic, given that she cannot stabilize her situation through her attachments to England, and she is—or at least *feels*—unprotected by laws and rights that would apply to any English subject. As she states in the trial scene, and reiterates here, none will take her part against the king. Indeed, she counters Wolsey’s assurance that her “hopes and friends are infinite” (3.1.80–81), by noting that all those friends reside in England, and asks him whether the two cardinals can imagine “That any Englishman dare give [her] counsel, / Or be a known friend” to her against the king’s pleasure, and continue to live safely as a subject (3.1.81–86). To aid her would be to bring down the king’s wrath upon oneself, to undermine one’s own good standing as a subject. In the context of her claims to an Englished identity, then, it has become evident that the reciprocal obligations of subjection and protection have been breached. Indeed, her identification with England and Englishness offers no defense against a sovereign whose integrity has been compromised by a personal agenda.

Her resistance to the divorce, repeatedly framed by her insistence that she has adhered to her proper uxorial roles, reveals how obedience to unacceptable sovereign demands becomes increasingly difficult as the threat of arbitrary sovereign judgment escalates, an echo of both the rising of the commoners against the onerous tax, and the trial of Buckingham. Nevertheless, while ample evidence of sympathy and pity for her

mistreatment circulates in the play, her situation strikes no common chord with English subjects, nothing that would raise a rebellion, although the stakes are unimaginably high. The path to tyranny is being laid step by step as Henry circumvents her demand for papal review, as revealed by her references to the danger subjects would face should they dare to take a moral stance in the face of sovereign will. She concludes rightly that she will find no reliable support in England, and that those she can confide in, trust, and depend upon to fairly “weigh out” her situation are, “as all by other comforts, far hence, / In mine own country” (3.1.86–90).

She stands, in effect, outside of England, an obstacle to the English king’s will and a member of the Christian world whose final temporal recourse for justice lies beyond England, in the judgment of the pope. The scene’s juxtaposition of her attachment to England, its emphasis on English as the language of her identity, reinforces the sense of her closeness to English subjects and her immersion in her adopted nation’s culture and values. Yet, she also conveys her vulnerability to the cardinals’ power as well as the king’s, simultaneously embracing her connections to England and acknowledging the threat those connections now pose, for it is in her roles as wife, queen, and subject that Henry wields power over her. She is not without living relatives and supporters beyond the borders of England, but although a conflict with Spain over this matter was theoretically possible, the play offers no indication that Spain had an interest in following such a course.⁵¹ Shakespeare emphasizes Katherine’s understanding of her distance from real security, and of the unlikelihood that she would obtain justice under the judgment of the king and his papal legates, but she also suggests to Wolsey that he is not immune from a fate like hers—a fall from grace and a loss of position. Her awareness of the tenuousness of royal favor, the intractableness of monarchical will, and the arbitrary basis of sovereign judgment remind the audience that all subjects stand, finally, in the same defenselessness that she does. The king’s concern for law and precedent in Act 1, scene 2, is here pushed aside in the pursuit of the realm’s perceived security and the king’s personal desire. This exercise of sovereign will might achieve Henry’s desired ends, but Katherine recognizes that, in absence of law, no security exists for the realm’s subjects—that without moral, social, and legal limitations on monarchical authority, all subjects are vulnerable to the monarch’s willful actions.

Despite her invocation of her Englishness early in the scene, the scene is striking for the way Katherine’s comments situate her as isolated in the nation she has called home for two decades. She wishes she “had never

trod this English earth, / Or felt the flatteries that grow upon it" (3.1.142–143), thereby again recalling the afflictions she suffers under Henry's willful rejection, and the lack of comfort England offers in her current condition. Beyond her own situation, she pities her ladies-in-waiting, "Shipwrecked upon a kingdom where no pity, / No friends, no hope, no kindred weep for me" (3.1.148–149), reaffirming the universal vulnerability of subjects in such a context. Despite the potential for foreign intervention on her behalf, and her hope to mobilize such an intervention, the shipwreck metaphor emphasizes the unlikelihood that Spain will be her salvation—she is bereft of the protections that might have saved her, and those who have offered her service are equally bereft of support or aid.

Campeius and Wolsey similarly recognize the power of the sovereign decision, obliquely but unmistakably confirming her fear that she places herself in grave danger by refusing to comply with Henry's wishes. "The hearts of princes kiss obedience, / So much they love it, but to stubborn spirits / They swell and grow as terrible as storms," cautions Wolsey (3.1.160–163), and Campeius is even more direct: "The King loves you. / Beware you lose it not" (3.1.170–171). Their comments, general in their scope, indicate both that Henry will tolerate no resistance even from a once-beloved wife and queen, and that Katherine is now positioned like any other subject in the realm, retaining no special closeness to or protection under the king. These veiled threats at last win Katherine's willingness to hear their counsel, but in fact she never agrees to the annulment, asserting the legitimacy of her marriage, her fidelity and devotion to the king, and her purity until the end of her final scene. In 3.2, we learn that, with the case referred back to Rome and no judgment forthcoming, Henry relies on the "opinions" of Archbishop Cranmer, "which / Have satisfied the King for his divorce, / Together with all famous colleges / Almost, in Christendom" (3.2.64–67). According to this judgment, Katherine lost her title, and was designated as the Princess Dowager of Wales—a title she refused to accept, as both the chronicles and Shakespeare make clear. The international basis of this judgment, counter to the original papal approval of the marriage, and in circumvention of the pending papal review, situates Henry and England in a bid for at least partial autonomy from Rome that is supported, implicitly, by those who approve of the divorce. Katherine, on the other hand, has no apparent advocates in her resistance to the divorce, and proves to be as friendless and isolated as she has claimed to be, protected neither by her ties to Spain and to the Holy Roman Empire, nor by her ties to England. Although lacking access to English justice, she remains

subject to Henry's sovereign will, and in effect, she is left like an `exile or a stranger both in England and Spain, a "tribeless, lawless, hearthless one," banished from the realm of the political, not by choice or by nature, but through the king's political and personal decision.⁵²

Neither Wife nor Queen

Katherine's final scene, 4.2, initially takes her beyond the turmoil of the temporal world. Hearing the tale of Wolsey's transformation from arrogance to humility, and of his peaceful death following his fall from favor, she appears to forgive him. She settles into sleep and dreams of a spiritual blessing that reaffirms her resolution of worldly antagonisms, her separation from political concerns and struggles. Perhaps more importantly, the vision offers the promise of a heavenly community that will restore to Katherine a sense of purpose and belonging, and honor her moral stature in recompense for her loss of worldly position and place, an affirmation of her place in the larger moral order.⁵³ This vision situates her above human judgment and control, and places her in a direct relationship to the divine that simultaneously negates the necessity of mediations by temporal religious authorities, and asserts her innocence of the moral transgressions that Henry has imagined to be the cause of their reproductive difficulties. The vision validates Katherine's testament to her own moral purity in previous scenes, offering a clear divine affirmation of her choices and actions. Further, her inclusion in this community transcends her alienation from English and Spanish identity, providing a place of belonging beyond temporal and political boundaries.⁵⁴ That promise remains with her when she awakens.

However, with the arrival of a messenger who fails to acknowledge her royalty, her peaceful resolve and sense of distance from worldly concerns are quickly lost. Just as the dream figures fade as she returns to her temporal condition, her attachment to her social status again becomes evident. The visitor, Caputius, ambassador from her nephew, the Holy Roman Emperor, also reawakens her desire to intervene in worldly affairs, not for her own sake, but for that of her daughter. He has come, not at the bidding of her nephew, but out of his own duty to Katherine, and also at the bidding of King Henry. He bears a message from the king, who has sent him to express his concern for her failing health, and to offer her comfort. She receives this comfort bitterly, but offers pious wishes for Henry's health and well-being, and expresses her hope that he will "ever flourish" even as she prepares to "dwell with worms," her "poor name / Banished the king-

dom" (4.2.127–128). This reference to banishment emphasizes the sovereign judgment against her, which has—unjustly in her view—wiped away her political presence and place in England, implicitly branding her as an enemy, in contrast to her exonerating heavenly vision. There is no mention by Caputius of a message from her "Friends in Spain," no indication that there have been larger repercussions to the retraction of marital status and political place, to the breaking of a peace pledge and alliance forged through her marriage. In the *realpolitik* of the moment, Katherine holds no value, and she expresses her understanding of that in the clearest terms.

Nevertheless, despite her reduced condition, she asks Caputius, as a boon to her, to carry a letter to the king that she had planned to send through less personal means. In this letter she asks him to look kindly on their daughter Mary, to care for her and educate her, to raise her well as "the model of our chaste loves" (4.2.133), and to love her "a little ... for her mother's sake, that loved him / Heaven knows how dearly" (4.2.137–139). The plea is not for Mary's place in the succession, only for Henry's responsibility as Katherine's former husband and as Mary's father and sole remaining protector. While not explicit, these requests suggest that the divorce does not, in fact, negate Henry's responsibilities as father, even if he has banished Katherine herself from hearth and bed, leaving her in economic deprivation, as well as social and political isolation. Katherine also implores Henry to provide for her serving women and men, who have suffered with her in poverty rather than abandon her. There is no indication of criticism in this note, but the contrast between her trusted, devoted servants and Henry's neglectful indifference is nevertheless evident. She claims no explicit national affiliation here, and her interests and concerns are all for the domestic sphere, the household she will leave behind and the daughter who innocently suffers for her father's choices. This domestic theme has resonated throughout the play. In Act 1, she foregrounds her role as the humble wife while serving as the caring counselor. In Act 2, she defends herself as a chaste and devoted spouse while invoking her links to foreign nations and her reliance on papal authority. In Act 3, she claims to hope for nothing more than sequestered housewifery while preserving her status as queen through resistance to Henry's attempts to gain her compliance. Here, actually reduced to her household context, she has nothing left but the hope that Henry will heed her plea to care for those subjects who have served her. Her appeals attempt to raise Henry's awareness of his moral obligations, his responsibilities as householder and father, if not as monarch. If this final, indirect interaction with him echoes her first admo-

nitions to care for himself by acknowledging and taking up his responsibilities to his subjects, it also resonates with her reminders in subsequent scenes of her dutiful obedience to his patriarchal and monarchical authority, and his failed reciprocation. The duality of her self-presentation as a wife and queen continues even when Henry no longer acknowledges her in either role. Indeed, her insistence on her status continues even as she expresses her final wishes for her burial: “Although unqueened, yet like / A queen and daughter to a king inter me” (4.2.72–73), she requests. She thereby affirms her links to both England and Spain, to her family by marriage and her family by blood, her natal, social, and political royal status across national contexts resonating as her final thought and desire.

Shakespeare’s (and Fletcher’s) depiction of Katherine’s insistent attention to the polyvalence of her national and familial identity, to her multiple roles and her strategic self-presentation as daughter *and* wife, wife *and* queen, queen *and* counselor, brings into high relief the complexities of a royal woman’s navigation of her social and political roles, particularly in contexts of diplomatic marriage. At the same time, her fall from monarchical favor and her sense of alienation from the nation she has adopted as her own gesture toward the problem of sovereign will-above-law that is critiqued by the king himself in Act 1, scene 2, but that becomes the basis for his eventual break with Rome and with Katherine. Despite the positive implications of Henry’s rejection of papal authority and the freeing of England from the yoke of the Catholic church,⁵⁵ the play assertively reminds us that the distant power of Rome was not the most perilous or damaging aspect of the church’s authority with relation to monarch and state. Rather, as Shakespeare repeatedly recognizes, it is the personal weaknesses of the king, his inability to distinguish actual friends of the crown and state from enemies, his vulnerability to self-serving manipulators, and his freedom to exercise his will-above-law in the pursuit of readily intertwined personal and political objectives, that render sovereign monarchy so dangerous. And it is significant that Henry’s reliance on Wolsey, so central to his failings as a monarch in the first half of the play, is merely displaced by a reliance on Cranmer in the second half. That Cranmer is depicted in positive terms, as supportive of Henry’s new queen and new religious direction, that he favors monarchical autonomy from Rome, does little to mitigate the obvious power of his influence.

The foreign queen can be seen as a cipher for the condition of subjects as a whole in the context of *raison d’état*: their value and security within the state rely on monarchical benevolence, while their access to justice

depends upon the king's acceptance of legal precedent and process. Act 1, scene 2, contrasts Katherine's ability to recognize the corruption of Buckingham's Surveyor in his treatment of the Duke's tenants with Henry's failure to see Wolsey's abuses of the king's subjects through his unjust taxes, or to understand the threat that Wolsey poses to his own authority and security through such abuses. The problem embodies the difference between valuing subjects and justice intrinsically, as Katherine does, and valuing them only in terms of their impact on the stability of the state, as Henry does. Henry's subjection of monarchical authority to law and precedent comes only out of concern for what will be tolerated by his subjects, not out of consideration of the force of law or its importance in establishing and maintaining a context of justice for its own sake. Even before the enticements of Anne Boleyn as a sexual partner push the king toward a conflation of his personal desires with his concerns for the stability of the state, the play shows us that he thinks primarily in terms of self-preservation and *raison d'état* rather than concern for his subjects' well-being. That fundamental perspective enables the ready conjunction of personal and political objectives in the restructuring of his conjugal relationships, and in the related restructuring of his political relationships, particularly his relationship with Rome and with the continental states.

Significantly, despite being English, and despite the retrospective prediction of her daughter's salvific reign that closes the play, Anne Boleyn would fare worse than Katherine in the long run, not merely banished from bed and hearth, but accused explicitly of adultery and treason and executed for her supposed crimes. Her father, an English peer who had been richly rewarded with titles and positions by Henry as he pursued Anne, accepted the judgments against her without resistance and lost his own position as Lord Privy Seal in the process. That history, although unspoken, cannot have been absent from the minds of the audience as they watched the closing act of the play.⁵⁶ Domestic marriage creates its own forms of vulnerability, for the families of English-born queens are themselves no more than subjects, with few resources to resist the will of the sovereign when his favor and affections fade. For a foreign-born queen, at least the threat of reprisal exists as long as she sustains a familial and political bond to her nation of birth. In Katherine's case, links to both familial and papal powers beyond England's borders, although never explicitly mobilized in the play, may have provided some protection, perhaps enough to prevent her execution, though not enough to secure her position as queen. In the context of larger international stakes and agen-

das, a marriage alliance that had long lost its purpose exerted little pressure on Spain, but perhaps just enough to limit Henry's actions with regard to his foreign queen. As England's isolation and the autonomy of the English king increased as a result of the break with Rome, the vulnerability of English subjects at all levels also increased. By contrast, the effects of diplomatic marriage and a supranational church offer a potential limit condition for sovereign power, a check on the otherwise unlimited scope of will-above-law in the sovereign decision. That limit condition disappears in the context of a purely internal political and religious authority, as the remainder of Henry's reign would demonstrate.⁵⁷ The effects on his subjects are oblique in the play, but far-reaching and highly disruptive in actual history; the effects on Katherine are immediate and explicit, and call attention to the vulnerability of subjects under absolutist sovereign will. While Katherine fades into the background before this play's denouement, she nevertheless serves as a reminder of the abuses that would follow. She was the first in a line of queens whose reproductive utility—or lack of utility—served as the justification for Henry's conflation of the personal and the political that echoes in so many of Shakespeare's plays, particularly where family and state overlap in his depictions of diplomatic marriage. In this play, and in those that follow in this study, the failures of personal monarchy are made evident particularly where the mistaking of friend for enemy and enemy for friend occurs within the royal family, at the heart of the court and the nation.

NOTES

1. I follow the practice of Oxford World's Classics editor of the play, Jay L. Halio, in referring to the play as *Henry VIII*, and to the author as Shakespeare, even when discussing those scenes that are now generally attributed to John Fletcher. For a discussion of attribution variations, see Halio, "Introduction," *King Henry VIII*, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 16–24. All quotations come from this edition, unless otherwise indicated. For further comments on the authorship question, see John Margeson, "Introduction," *King Henry VIII*, The New Cambridge Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 4th printing 2012), 4–14. Sources include James Spedding, "Who Wrote Shakespeare's *Henry VIII*?" *Gentleman's Magazine* (August 1850): 115–124 and (October 1850): 381–382; Samuel Hickson "Who Wrote Shakespeare's *Henry VIII*?" *Notes and Queries* (August 1850): 198 and subsequent issues; Cyrus Hoy, "The

Shares of Fletcher and His Collaborators in the Beaumont and Fletcher Canon (VII),” *Studies in Bibliography* 15 (1962): 71–90. More recently, Thomas Merriam demonstrates how tracking occurrences of usages attributable to Shakespeare but not Fletcher by through-line numbers rather than by scenes, offers a very strong indication that specific scenes attributed to Fletcher show the hand of Shakespeare as well. Thus, he argues, rather than a neat division of scenes between authors, we actually have collaborative writing of a much more integrated sort. See “Though This Supplementarity, yet Ther is Method in’t,” *Notes and Queries* 50, no. 4 (2003): 423–426, the response from MacDonald P. Jackson, “*All is True* or *Henry VIII*: Authors and Ideologies,” *Notes and Queries* 60, no. 3 (2013): 441–444, and Merriam’s follow-up response, “A Reply to ‘*All is True* or *Henry VIII*: Authors and Ideologies’,” *Notes and Queries* 61, no. 2 (2014): 253–256. For references to other Shakespeare plays, I refer to *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1997), unless otherwise indicated at the point of citation.

2. This meeting took place in 1520, and was largely arranged by Cardinal Wolsey, who was Henry VIII’s Lord Chancellor and thus his chief adviser. See Halio, *Henry VIII*, “Introduction,” 13. The Duke of Buckingham, who hears Norfolk’s report in the play, was actually present at the event and a key figure in some of the interactions, but Shakespeare has situated him as too ill to attend, and thus as available as an audience and commentator.
3. Charles I/V was co-ruler of Spain from 1516; his mother, Joanna I of Spain ruled after the deaths of her father and mother, Ferdinand and Isabel (Castile and Léon from 1504, Aragon as co-ruler with Charles I from 1516). Charles also became Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. His rule of Spain is not mentioned in the play, nor is Joanna’s rule and co-rule, which offered an example of successful female succession and rule in another realm. He is referred to as ‘the Emperor’ throughout the play.
4. Katherine was the youngest surviving daughter of the powerful Spanish monarchs, Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabel I of Castile. Although foreign by direct parentage and by birth, she was also closely related to the English royal family, through her great-grandmother Catherine of Lancaster, and her great-great-grandmother, Philippa of Lancaster, both daughters of John of Gaunt who had married into the Castilian and Portuguese royal lines, respectively. There has been some interest in the significance of the ‘foreign’ in scholarship on the play. Halio, for example, sees the wooing and wedding of Anne as indicative of the preference for native English over foreign influences, and thus usefully calls attention to the idea that foreignness is a liability in the play. He does not address

Katherine's role as England's foreign queen, or the play's engagements with the question of foreignness more generally—indeed, he emphasizes the elision of foreign connections and dynamics. See Halio, *Henry VIII*, "Introduction," 11; 13. By contrast, see Hero Chalmers, "'Break Up the Court': Power, Female Performance and Courtly Ceremony in *Henry VIII*," *Shakespeare* 7, no. 3 (September 2011): 257–268. She makes the key point that, in her role as a "foreign, Catholic queen consort" (259), the power of Katherine's performance instigates empathy that serves to "heighten awareness of the plight of subjects in the face of the abuse of regal power" (258)—a point central to my argument as well. She thus fruitfully connects Katherine's foreign identity to her function in the play, and attends to the parallel between Katherine's plight and that of other subjects under absolutist rule. A number of scholars connect Katherine's foreignness and Catholicism to that of Anne of Denmark, queen of James I/VI. See, for example, Donna Hamilton, *Shakespeare and the Politics of Protestant England* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 163–190; and Susan Frye, "Anne of Denmark and the Historical Contextualisation of Shakespeare and Fletcher's *Henry VIII*," in *Women and Politics in Early Modern England, 1450–1700*, ed. James Daybell (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 181–193. Hamilton's analysis traces in rich detail the resonances between the play and actual historical conditions.

5. While Shakespeare does not allude to this cooling, it is acknowledged by historians. By the time of the play's setting, Charles V was also King of Spain, which may have re-strengthened Katherine's relationship with her homeland, although that possibility is absent from the play.
6. This situation is repeatedly represented by Shakespeare through his foreign queens. The resonances with Hermione are quite explicit, as she laments her inability to call upon her father or family when Leontes abuses her, as I discuss in Chap. 3. Margaret of Anjou faces similar isolation and vulnerability, especially in *2 Henry VI*, as discussed in Chap. 5. Tamora's separation from her Goth countrymen seems much more strategic, rather than being conditioned by slowly unfolding political dynamics, and of the four plays discussed, is the only one in which the marriage does not have the diplomatic purpose we see in the other three plays. Comparing these queens to Elizabeth Woodville in *Richard III*, for example, or the queen dowager Eleanor in *King John*, offers some insight into the relative strength and security of these domestic queens in contrast to the foreign queens I focus on in this book, although foreign queens may have had *potentially* more security through their familial connections.
7. There are striking resonances with the *Henry VI* trilogy, which address the implications of monarchical dependency. I consider this in Chap. 5. *Richard II* offers another interesting parallel, especially as Richard grows

- increasingly assertive of his sovereign rights and will, as Henry VIII does here (though in both cases, not necessarily more politically astute).
8. While marriage was not considered a sacrament in Protestant doctrine, it was considered a holy union, ordained by God, and supportive of moral behavior. See Carole Levin, *The Heart and Stomach of a King* (2nd edition) (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 49; Susan Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony: The Courtships of Elizabeth I* (London: Routledge, 1996); and Patricia H. Fleming, "The Politics of Marriage Among Non-Catholic European Royalty," *Current Anthropology* 14, no. 3 (June 1973): 231–249. Carrie Euler explains the range of views on divorce in the period, in "Heinrich Bullinger, Marriage, and the English Reformation: *The Christen State of Matrimonye* in England, 1540–1553," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 34, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 367–393.
 9. In fact, however, marriage-secured alliances were not often successful diplomatically in the long term, and of course, pragmatic action cloaked in moralistic rhetoric was relatively normal throughout European history. Seldom did an heir emerge from such a marriage who would go on to rule both realms. The alliance of Aragon and Castile is one exception. While their realms remained distinct, after accession Isabel and Ferdinand ruled both realms jointly, and this union led to the eventual unification of Iberian territories into Spain. The marriages of their offspring strengthened Spain's relationships with several key European powers, including Portugal and the Holy Roman Empire, with pertinence for the politics of *Henry VIII*. One very early literary representation of the unreliability of treaty-based marriage comes from *Beowulf*, which throughout highlights the tensions such marriages produced, and recounts the failures of two. See *Beowulf*, trans. Seamus Heaney (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2000).
 10. In fact, historically, this challenge to the legitimacy of the marriage and its offspring arose when the Holy Roman Emperor/King of Spain Charles I/V agreed to wed the princess Mary Tudor, Henry and Katherine's daughter. See Hall, *Chronicle*, 782. Spain's council raised the question, according to Hall, and it circulated publicly enough to destabilize Henry's position as well as the legitimacy of his daughter. I have used Edward Hall, *The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Families of Lancastre and Yorke* (Hall's *Chronicle*), 1548 edition (London: Printed for P. Johnson, etc., 1809; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1965).
 11. The critique of French fashions and manners adopted by English courtiers who have spent time in the French court is perhaps the most explicit of such elements. Act 1, scene 3, is devoted to this critique. The play ironically juxtaposes this critique with Henry VIII's first encounter with Anne Boleyn in the following scene. She had been educated abroad in the

- Netherlands and France, and had served at the court of Queen Claude of France.
12. The play resonates with England's changing relationship to Spain during the reign of James I/VI. By 1610, his view of Spain was relatively benign, and the Spanish were no longer seen as the kind of threat they were in the reign of Elizabeth I. See Mark Rankin, "Henry VIII, Shakespeare, and the Jacobean Royal Court," *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900* 51, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 349–366; and Jonathan Baldo, "Necromancing the Past in *Henry VIII*," *English Literary Renaissance* 34, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 359–386.
 13. Bogislav Philipp von Chemnitz, *De Ratione Status in Imperio Nostro Romano-Germanico* quoted in Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978* (New York: Picador, 2009) (Lecture 10).
 14. For useful overviews of complex receptions of *The Prince*, see Erica Benner, *Machiavelli's Ethics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Hugh Grady, *Shakespeare, Machiavelli, and Montaigne* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Ruth W. Grant, *Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
 15. The dynamics of this late play echo but invert those of the first history tetralogy, as discussed in Chap. 5. Henry VI's refusal to compromise his immortal soul in the service of the commonweal or through the duties of sovereignty weakens his capacities as a ruler and leader. The notion that the sovereign takes on a sacrificial role emerges at various points throughout Shakespeare's plays, including the most frequently discussed instance, Henry V in his musings before the battle of Agincourt. For a useful discussion of the demands on fathers/sovereigns in relation to the story of the sacrifice of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22, see Ken Jackson, *Abraham and Isaac* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015).
 16. There were biblical passages supporting both sides of this debate about the legitimacy of the marriage, but Henry and his supporters chose to ignore those that worked against their intentions. See Halio, "Introduction," 4.
 17. Hall and Holinshed include the explicit statute prohibiting English subjects from appealing to papal authority, which was retroactively applied to Katherine. See Hall, *Chronicle*, 795; Holinshed, *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 929: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7723. For the 1587 edition of Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland*, I have used The Holinshed Project's 1587 edition: <http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/toc.php?edition=1587>. In this online edition, the history of England post-1066, published in 1587 as Vol. 3, is published as Vol. 6.

18. This metaphor of literally 'wearing' one's manor on one's back (transforming productive land and holdings into attire for a single impressive appearance), echoes similar concerns about misguided ostentation and fashionable self-presentation in other historically oriented plays. Perhaps the earliest example in plays potentially related to Shakespeare's canon arises in *Woodstock*, where Thomas of Woodstock stands in sharp contrast to, and is highly critical of, the more elegantly attired lords of the court. See *Thomas of Woodstock, or Richard the Second, Part One*, ed. Peter Corbin and Douglas Sedge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 1.3. There are comments on fashion in *Richard II* as well, where the interest in continental attire among the king and his favorites indicates their misguided values and misdirected energies. See, for example, 2.1. In *Henry VIII*, the rise of French fashion and French-influenced comportment among English courtiers is sharply critiqued at 1.3.
19. Buckingham swears to Norfolk that his information is unimpeachable, and that Wolsey is guilty of treason for this behind-the-scenes dealing. Charles was Katherine's nephew, but in the play she is not involved in this negotiation, or even aware of it. Historically, she may well have been.
20. In fact, Shakespeare does not clarify whether Wolsey supports the annulment or not. Wolsey's claims *not* to have incited the king to this course of action is corroborated by Henry, but neither Henry nor Wolsey can be considered reliable voices on the subject, given Henry's misjudgment of Wolsey and his failure to see Wolsey's hypocrisy, which is apparent to Katherine and his courtiers.
21. Holinshed includes a detailed set of accusations, but they are not revealed to the king directly by the Surveyor, nor to Katherine. See *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 862–865: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7287.
22. In fact, an actual rebellion was put down in part by the Duke of Norfolk, and he affirms in this scene that the commissions have caused rebellion among the sore-pressed subjects.
23. While she does not identify her instigators as members of the nobility, it appears that Norfolk was not ready to broach this topic with the king on his own, and Buckingham has already suggested that Wolsey prevents the peers from accessing and advising the king. Her role as intercessor thus resonates with Buckingham's concern that Wolsey "Take[s] up the rays o' th' beneficial sun, / And keeps it from the earth" (1.2.56–57), a reference to Wolsey's ability to absorb the king's attention and keep others at a distance. The lines do not specify whether she speaks for loyal lords or for well-placed commoners, but the support of her plea by Norfolk and Suffolk, at least, seems evident.

24. Henry's ignorance of the taxes is "genuine," according to Halio, 1.2.38–39 note, who assumes that Holinshed and Hall are historically accurate in reporting this point. Walter Cohen suggests, by contrast, that Shakespeare builds a nuanced representation of Henry as an "oddly abstracted" figure, either "culpably unaware or disingenuously disavowing knowledge" of this and other problems instigated by Wolsey's policies and decisions. His analysis resonates with other views of the play as deeply ironic, and with my reading of its critique of embodied sovereignty. See his introduction to the play in *The Norton Shakespeare*, 3111–3118, quotation from 3116.
25. The link between absolutist authority and moral corruption arises in most critiques of absolutism, but we also find it among proponents of absolute sovereign authority like Bodin. He notes that "It is no matter for wonder if there have been few virtuous princes. There are, after all, few virtuous men, and princes are not usually chosen even out of this small handful. It is therefore remarkable if one does, among many, find one excellent ruler. And once such a one is exalted to a position in which he has no superior save God alone, assailed as he then is by all the temptations which are a trap even to the most assured, it is a miracle if he preserves his integrity." See Tooley, IV.1.115–116.
26. Alison Thorne addresses the need to attend more closely to the dramatic and political functions of such characters as Katherine. See her "'O, lawful let it be/That I have room ... to curse awhile': Voicing the Nation's Conscience in Female Complaint in *Richard III*, *King John*, and *Henry VIII*," in *This England, That Shakespeare: New Angles on Englishness and the Bard*, ed. Willy Maley and Margaret Tudeau-Clayton (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 105–124, ProQuest ebrary. Web. August 28, 2015.
27. In fact, the taxes were implemented several years after the hearing and trial of the Duke of Buckingham. See Halio, "Introduction," 15. For an insightful reading of the trial scenes and their relationship to historiography, see Ivo Camps, "Possible Pasts: Historiography and Legitimation in *Henry VIII*," *College English* 58, no. 2 (February 1996): 192–215.
28. Halio, note to 1.2.173–174. See Raphael Holinshed, *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 856: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7245.
29. For a discussion of the play in relation to law and justice, see Gerard Wegemer, "Henry VIII on Trial: Confronting Malice and Conscience in Shakespeare's *All is True*," *Renaissance* 52, no. 2 (2000): 111–130.
30. See the conversation between the two Gentlemen, 2.1.40–44.
31. Hall offers no commentary on the trial of Buckingham or its outcome, except to lament that "the grace of truth was withdrawn from so noble a man" whose allegiance had failed, and who was brought down by "ambition ... false prophesies ... and evil counsail." *Chronicle*, 624. Holinshed keeps an objective distance throughout his account, emphasizing paren-

- thetically “so saith the indictment” at several points, See Vol. 6, 864: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7305). Holinshed asserts that he has merely reported the incidents as he took them from his sources, and that he offers no judgment. He concludes the account with a comment about Wolsey’s role, noting that it was rumored “the cardinall chieflie procured the death of this noble man, no lesse fauou|red and beloued of the people of this realme in that season, than the cardinall himselfe was hated and en|uiued.” *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 864: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7308.
32. See 2.2.40 and Halio’s footnote to these lines.
 33. Various sources note that the two crosses and the two pillars were always carried before Wolsey in official appearances. See Halio, footnotes to 2.4.0.8 and 2.4.0.11. Hall offers only a general description of this entry, mentioning that the Legates enter with “Crosses Pillers, and Axes, and all the Ceremonies belonging to their degree.” The Cardinal enters with them and is seated among them (*Chronicle*, 757). Holinshed offers even less detail. See *Chronicles* 1587, Vol. 6, 907: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7552. For a discussion of the play in relation to its sources, see Annabel Patterson, “‘All is True’: Negotiating the Past in *Henry VIII*,” in *Elizabethan Theater: Essays in Honor of S. Schoenbaum*, ed. Samuel Schoenbaum et al. (Newark: University of Delaware Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1996), 147–166.
 34. See Susan Breitz Monta, “‘Thou Fall’st A Blessed Martyr’: Shakespeare’s *Henry VIII* and the Polemics of Conscience,” *English Literary Renaissance* 30, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 262–283; for a discussion of anti-French sentiment in the play, see 273–274.
 35. There are certainly indications that Shakespeare had a knowledge of at least some of Plato’s writings. Hamlet’s monologues are one touchstone, almost explicitly echoing Socrates’ apology in his meditations on death, for example (3.1.64–98), and there is a reference to Xanthippe in *The Taming of the Shrew* (1.2.69). In “Fat Knight, or What You Will: Unimitable Falstaff,” Ian Frederick Moulton addresses parallels between Socrates and Falstaff; see *A Companion to Shakespeare’s Works: The Comedies*, ed. Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 223–242. Moulton notes, however, that it is not likely Shakespeare had read Plato or Xenophon on Socrates in depth, but that he probably gleaned a great deal from *Plutarch’s Lives*, with which he was apparently quite familiar, and that he would have been familiar with the more popular stories about Socrates from other sources, verbal and written. Such familiarity was hardly necessary in any case, as the main content and much of the language of the speech comes directly from Holinshed, *Chronicles*, 907: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7555. The speech thus

- seems to suggest that Katherine may have used Socrates' defense to shape her own defense at this trial, or possibly that Hall or earlier sources had shaped it according to this well-known example of unjust prosecution.
36. Plato, "Apology," or "The Death of Socrates," trans. Benjamin Jowett, Project Gutenberg: <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1656>, 11/3/2008; latest update 1/15/2013; accessed 11/10/2015.
 37. His entire defense emphasizes his own adherence to truth and reveals the false reasoning and apparent private agenda of his judges.
 38. In addition to the Socratic resonances, Maalouf's comments about the role of the marginal figure in contexts of conflict offer another pertinent echo of this kind of argument. Maalouf, *In the Name of Identity*, 1–4. For my discussion of this concept, see Chap. 1, 23–26.
 39. Campeius is clearly not English, but neither is he her countryman. In any case, as becomes clear, she aims her comments primarily at Wolsey, whom she firmly believes means her ill.
 40. In his reading of the "Apology of Socrates," Derrida reminds us that Socrates compares himself to a foreigner in order to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the judges of Athens, invoking what should be a marker of weakness or marginal status as a means to gain a more generous hearing. See *Of Hospitality*, 15–23. See also my discussion in Chap. 1, 14–15.
 41. As discussed above, 68.
 42. The speech elaborates upon and departs from Holinshed's rendition in these details of her adherence to Henry's specific wishes concerning "friends." See *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 907: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7555.
 43. That point, of course, was central to Henry's own qualms of conscience—he took the deaths of their male offspring, in particular, to be signs of God's judgment against the marriage.
 44. Mary Nelson, "Shakespeare's *Henry VIII*: Stigmatizing the 'Disabled' Womb," *Disability Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (January 2009): no pagination.
 45. This language closely echoes Holinshed's report of her maligning of Wolsey before the court, which he paraphrases, unlike the quoted passage concerning her fidelity, purity, etc. The paraphrased section follows Holinshed's account of Henry's exoneration of Wolsey and his justifications for seeking an annulment. Holinshed, *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 908: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7561.
 46. The resonances with the defense of Hermione in *The Winter's Tale* are striking. Allison Machlis Meyer addresses the rejection of temporal authority and the turn to divine authority in John Foxe's representation of the death of Anne Boleyn, linking it to other scaffold speeches by women in

- Foxe's treatise, as well as to the play's parallel between Katherine and Anne Boleyn as subject to the king's sovereign will. See "Multiple Histories: Cultural Memory and Anne Boleyn in *Acts and Monuments* and *Henry VIII*," *Borrowers and Lenders: The Journal of Shakespeare and Appropriation* 9, no. 2 (October 2015): 3. The strategies of self-martyrdom through bodily and spiritual purity, and through subjection to God, are strongly resonant with the representation of Katherine's in the play. See also Nadia Bishai, "Which Thing Had Not Before Been Seen?: The Rituals and Rhetoric of the Execution of Anne Boleyn, England's First Criminal Queen," in *The Rituals and Rhetoric of Queenship: Medieval to Early Modern*, ed. Liz Oakley Brown and Louise J. Wilkinson (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2009), 171–185. For parallels between Anne and Katherine, as well as Katherine and Hermione, see Michael Dobson and Nicola J. Watson, *England's Elizabeth: An Afterlife in Fame and Fantasy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 295, note 33. Additionally, in "Mariological Memory in *The Winter's Tale* and *Henry VIII*," *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900* 40, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 311–337, Ruth Vanita offers a rich set of parallels between Hermione and Katherine.
47. However, for a reading that sees the play as reaffirming Henry's patriarchal will, see Kim H. Noling, "Grubbing Up the Stock: Dramatizing Queens in *Henry VIII*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (1988): 291–306.
 48. These revelations by Henry closely follow Holinshed's account. See Holinshed, *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 907: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7559.
 49. Thomas Merriam analyzes the use of the term 'conscience' throughout the play in ways that insistently link the sexual and moral tensions of the divorce and remarriage question. See "Though This be Supplementarity," 423–426. See also Monta, "Thou fall'st a blessed martyr," and Ali Shehzad Zaidi, "Self-Contradiction in *Henry VIII* and *La cisma de Inglaterra*," *Studies in Philology* 103, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 329–344.
 50. In Hall, this exchange occurs before the trial. Portions of Katherine's speech against Wolsey in the trial scene are taken from this account. According to Hall, the exchange took place in French, was written down by Campeius' secretary and translated by Hall, *Chronicles* (756). The play follows Holinshed's account in reporting the initial speech in Latin, which the queen quickly halts, requesting them to speak in English. Holinshed, *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 908: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_7564.
 51. Hall suggests that Spain had sent objections, but little is made of the potential threat, and the historical distance of Katherine from her family and countrymen seems to have left her without support in this difficult time. *Chronicle*, 796.

52. The quotation, which Aristotle takes from Hesiod, comes early in *Politics*, Book 1, and exemplifies his view that man is inherently a political animal. The full passage is as follows: “Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the *Tribeless, lawless, heartless one*, whom Homer denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone” (1.2, 1253a). Katherine is of course not an outlaw in any simple sense of that term, but certainly, she exists now beyond the protection of law, and in resistance to her status as determined by the English king and state, as well as the judgments of Christendom more broadly.
53. She indicates that “a blessed troop / Invite[d] me to a banquet, whose bright faces / Cast thousand beams upon me like the sun” (4.2.87–89).
54. For a reading that situates the scene in terms of martyrdom, see Amy Appleford, “Shakespeare’s Katherine of Aragon, Last Medieval Queen, First Recusant Martyr,” *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 40, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 149–172.
55. Positive from a Protestant-leaning perspective and context.
56. For a particularly insightful reading of such implicit aspects of the play, see Frank V. Cespedes, “‘We Are One in Fortunes’: The Sense of History in *Henry VIII*,” *English Literary Renaissance* 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1980): 413–438.
57. The *Vindiciae* defends intervention by foreign sovereigns in the case of tyranny, and certainly in the case of forced adherence to a ‘false religion’, which might be either Catholicism, Protestantism, or something else. Fourth Question, 173–184. See also the discussion of ‘tyranny’ in Chap. 1, esp. 7–8, 13–18, 37, 41.

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The Friend, the Enemy, the Wife,
and the Guest: Conditional
and Unconditional Hospitality in *The
Winter's Tale*

CONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY IN THE SICILIAN COURT

The Winter's Tale is a story of the intersecting power dynamics of sovereignty, patriarchy, and hospitality; of the conditions of inhospitableness underlying the thin veneer of courtly hospitality in both Sicilia and Bohemia; and of the tenuous alternative to that inhospitableness in rural Bohemia.¹ The two halves of the play, with the action divided between the Sicilian court and the Bohemian countryside, can be understood to represent the two main forms of hospitality identified by Derrida: conditional and absolute (or unconditional), respectively. Under conditional hospitality, Leontes' willful exercise of sovereign authority, which ultimately targets Hermione, makes visible the threatening potential of the interlinked domestic and political realms, and the overlapping forms of abusive power that situate wives, guests, and subjects in parallel conditions of subjection and vulnerability.²

Hermione is especially subject to punishment for what Leontes perceives to be her subversion of his proprietary control, despite being a foreign queen. With her Emperor/father deceased, she lacks the external connections that once would have offered possible protection from her tyrannical husband/king, as Leontes explicitly acknowledges. The sovereign's capacity to define the internal and external enemy leads to

judgments and actions that are deleterious to, rather than protective of, the commonweal, as the sovereign himself becomes the internal enemy. Leontes learns too late—or nearly too late—that there is a law beyond his judgment and will, as, seeking to control those subject to him, he confronts the limits of proprietary power and absolute sovereignty. Although the same conjunctions of proprietary, patriarchal, and sovereign authority dominate the Bohemian court, the alternatives to proprietary, reciprocal, transactional hospitality exist tenuously in the Bohemian pastoral community—a community built on shared labor and shared leisure, in which charitable deeds toward strangers demonstrate the unbounded giving-without-expectation that Esposito finds embedded in the etymology of ‘community’.

Hospitality, Reciprocity, and Sovereign Authority

In the opening scene of *The Winter's Tale*, the exchange between Archidamus and Camillo establishes hospitality as a central theme in the play, and defines three fundamental aspects of conditional hospitality between a guest and a host of approximately equal means and status. We learn that hospitality places obligations upon the guest to reciprocate by taking the role as host and offering hospitality in turn, providing a warm, generous welcome that mirrors, to the degree possible, the welcome he enjoyed as a guest. Inversely, we learn that the host's extension of hospitality obligates him to become the guest in turn, accepting hospitality from his former guest with grace and gratitude. Finally, we learn the appropriate social forms of interaction between guest and host as they operate within the relationship of hospitality. Camillo alludes to the *host's* debt of reciprocity, and expresses an intention to pay that debt in the near future by becoming Bohemia's guest: “I think this coming summer the King of Sicilia means to pay Bohemia the visitation which he justly owes him” (1.1.5–7). Archidamus expresses Bohemia's gratitude as guest by emphasizing the difficulty of reciprocating effectively: unable to provide equally lavish entertainment, “We will give you sleepy drinks, / that your senses, unintelligent of our insufficiency, may, / though they cannot praise us, as little accuse us” (1.1.10–12). The reciprocal nature of the guest/host relationship is clear in this exchange, while each obliquely and implicitly conveys an attitude about their relationship that is apposite to the role they have played. As guest, Archidamus emphasizes the host's efforts and care, exaggerates the debts he has incurred by accepting hospitality, and

expresses both the desire to reciprocate and the difficulty of doing so sufficiently. In effect, he figures the debt as unpayable, and the acceptance of hospitality an ineradicable obligation, a permanent commitment. Conversely, as host, Camillo downplays his efforts and reduces the debt owed by the guest, while affirming his obligation to allow the guest to pay that debt by becoming the host in turn, understating the hierarchical aspect of the relationship, and alluding to its temporary nature and future inversion. This scene sets the terms of an ideal or appropriate exchange between guest and host, and stands in sharp contrast to the exchange between Polixenes and Leontes that follows in scene 2.³

As Act 1, scene 2, opens, Polixenes, like Archidamus in the previous scene, attempts to fulfill his immediate obligations before departure by offering a typical hyperbolic expression of gratitude that he acknowledges as insufficient to discharge his debt to Leontes (1.2.3–10). Leontes presses him to continue a while longer in the role of guest, as a good host should, but fails to fully play his part as host by reassuring the guest that the debts are not terribly heavy, as we saw Camillo do in the previous scene. Instead, he tells Polixenes, “Stay your thanks awhile / And pay them when you depart” (1.2.8–9), suggesting that indeed the debt he owes is great, and will presumably continue to increase if he extends his stay. When Polixenes offers the formulaic excuse that he wants to avoid “tir[ing] your royalty,” Leontes merely insists “We are tougher than that, brother” (1.2.14; 15), his laconic reassurance implicitly acknowledging that hosting Polixenes is a burden, however well Leontes is able to bear up under it.⁴ Further, readily agreeing that the guest accrues debt to his host, Leontes avoids acknowledging the reciprocal debt that he is himself accruing—the debt to assume, in turn, the role of guest, to suspend the comfortable position of sovereign/host and accept the hospitality of another, and the subjugation that implies. The reciprocal exchange, of which Camillo speaks freely in the previous scene, remains unspoken here, signaling Leontes’ unwillingness to relinquish his superior position.

Should Leontes recognize their mutual debt and commit to a moment of future reciprocity, that projected future inversion of roles would create a sense of the long-term equity between host and guest which the extension of conditional hospitality has temporarily defined in hierarchical terms. Leontes’ acknowledgment of his own future obligation would signal his respect for Polixenes’ sovereignty, their relative equality. In that case the guest/host relationship would have a sense of extension beyond the restrictions placed upon the guest in the immediate moment, and the

dynamic nature of the relationship, both in the instant and in the future, would be established. Leontes claims to see Polixenes as a brother, to offer an open and generous welcome, and to desire an extension of Polixenes' visit as a continuation of that positive relationship. However, he makes that welcome into a burden on both himself and his guest, and far from offering the give and take of friendship, Leontes asserts his sovereign dominance and reminds Polixenes of his unpayable debt. Leontes' reluctance to lose the comfort of absolute authority, hinted at here, grows more assertive as the play unfolds.

Hermione, on the other hand, seems much more clearly to understand and accept the conditions of the host/guest relationship, perhaps because she is herself, like Polixenes, a foreign sojourner in the Sicilian court, and as a wife, one whose term of residence has no end. Hermione's sympathetic response to Polixenes can be connected to this shared condition, her separation from the place of her birth and upbringing, from her family, language, and culture resonant with his relative separation from his life in Bohemia. The significance of her foreignness is made explicit in Act 3, scene 2, but the first signs of her different understanding of the host/guest relationship emerge as she responds to Leontes' request that she step in to take up the debate with Polixenes about staying or leaving. Rather than addressing their guest, she chides Leontes for lacking enthusiasm: "You charge him too coldly," she scolds. She then points out that assuaging Polixenes' natural concerns would be a more effective mode of persuasion: "Tell him you are sure," she instructs her husband, "All in Bohemia's well" (1.2.31), emphasizing that indeed such news has recently arrived. With this reassurance, Hermione immediately puts to rest Polixenes' concerns as a sovereign whose temporal and physical distance from his territory leaves him questioning the stability of his authority. She recognizes the difficulties created by an absence from a distant home-nation and family, aiming to allay Polixenes' "fears of what may chance / Or breed upon [his] absence" (1.2.11–12), the main reason he offers for wanting to depart. In contrast, Leontes, also in possession of the news from Bohemia, has failed to assure Polixenes of his sovereign security—a significant omission in a host who ostensibly wishes for his guest to remain. As for Polixenes, he has not expressed his desire to return to his own family and culture—personal concerns that, Hermione notes, would win the support of all the court's women to see him speedily upon his way. Rather, he focuses on his political role, as if to reassert it in a context where he has been subordinate to Leontes as his guest for most of a year. While she

acknowledges the significance of his political commitments, her reminder of Polixenes' dual roles as patriarch and monarch alludes to the overlapping but potentially conflicting commitments of the personal and the political that will become so central to the dynamics of the play. This mention of personal reasons also invokes the power of women in the extension of hospitality, which here is based on a recognition of familial obligations and emotional ties—the kinds of feelings to which women's experiences as wives, whose separation from family was a systemic norm, would perhaps make them especially sensitive.

Hermione suggests that, without tangible political concerns, and having failed to introduce the compelling familial commitments that she and the other women value, Polixenes has no legitimate basis for his insistence on departure. However, rather than simply negating his expressed reasons for wishing to depart, Hermione attempts to negotiate a compromise, through which she affirms the obligation to become guest that Leontes has failed to express. She pledges that, if Polixenes stays one week longer in Sicily, when Leontes visits Bohemia, she will “give him [her] commission / To let him there a month behind the gest / Prefixed for's parting” (1.2.40–42). Hermione's proposal quadruple's Polixenes' concession, emphasizing the debt Leontes accrues in the act of hosting, and the obligation to discharge that debt by accepting the position of guest in turn.⁵ Her proposal articulates and invites agreements concerning mutual commitment and responsibility that are the markers of a true alliance and heartfelt cooperative relationship between the two monarchs. The offer is a striking one, for it situates her as a fully vested diplomat and household representative who speaks in the place of her king and husband, binding him in promises that he will be obligated to uphold. She claims authority in the exchange, but asserts it in the pursuit of a resolution that will please both parties equally, assuming (as she seems to) that Leontes is sincere in his personal and political friendship to Polixenes and enthusiastic about continuing their relationship on this new, more intimate footing.⁶ Where Leontes attempts to secure his position as sovereign and host by failing to acknowledge the mutual debts of host and guest and the demand for reciprocity, Hermione recognizes the nature of both sovereignty and host/guest relationships, asserting for Polixenes a restorative future as sovereign and host to which she herself, as a foreign wife, will never have recourse. Yet, through her empathetic connection to the perspectives of a foreign other, Hermione demonstrates the powerful capacity that her position makes possible. She uses that capacity to exercise temporary authority as

sovereign/host, but she does so in Leontes' name and in service to his interests (as she perceives them), not in the attempt to expand or exercise that authority for her own benefit.

However, her pledge of reciprocal commitment fails to persuade Polixenes. He offers no further excuses, responding to her entreaties with a simple refusal: "No madam ... I may not, verily" (1.2.44–45), a response that is tantamount to a rejection of reciprocity, and that functions instead as an attempt to reclaim sovereign autonomy. For both Polixenes and Leontes, then, the stakes of this newly revived intimate relationship appear to be unacceptably high, a leveling of hierarchy that neither is willing to accept.⁷ In response, Hermione challenges Polixenes through a hypothetical reciprocal exchange, in which, however he escalates his refusals, she will equally intensify her challenges to him, countering his assertions with those of her own:

Though you would seek t'unsphere the stars with oaths,
[I] Should yet say, "Sir, no going." Verily,
You shall not go. A lady's "verily" is
As potent as a lord's. Will you go yet? (1.2.48–50)

Clearly teasing and bantering in this response, Hermione nevertheless explicitly matches her status as a lady to Polixenes' status as a lord, negating not only gender hierarchy, but his autonomous sovereign will. She thereby mocks his recourse to the comfortable arbitrariness of the sovereign decision—a privileged form of declaration that requires no justification, and that will soon support Leontes' accusations against both Polixenes and her. Such a declaration, she suggests, cannot free one from the reciprocal obligations of social or political relationships.

When she offers the still-refusing Polixenes a final choice, to remain in Sicilia as "My prisoner or my guest" (1.2.55), her ultimatum deploys the very form of absolute power that both sovereigns have implicitly relied upon. Her invocation of this form of power reveals and critiques the tensions between sovereign will and relationships of reciprocal obligation, such as friendship or love—or indeed, of the political itself.⁸ She poses the judgment of sovereign and host as a means to force Polixenes' acceptance of the reciprocal debts that ideally both kings should willingly embrace. Her authority arises from her claim to the role of host—the one who establishes the terms of hospitality and evaluates the guest's level of compliance—but also from her claim to sovereignty, which threatens through

power-above-law. In retracting the option to depart, the only alternative open to a guest who no longer wishes to abide in his host's household, Hermione reveals the inevitable outcome of unrestrained sovereign will—the collapse of friendship, the naming of the enemy, and the threat of unjustified violence. However playfully she invokes her authority over him, she exposes the guest's vulnerability to arbitrary judgment and the collapse of congenial residence, revealing the violence at the heart of conditional hospitality.⁹

In capitulating to the power of the host and accepting his continued role as guest, Polixenes emphasizes his innocence, but also expresses the concern that he might be accused of some greater offense against hospitality:

To be your prisoner should import offending,
Which is for me less easy to commit
Than you to punish. (1.2.56–58)

His allusion to the arbitrary and unchecked power of the host to interpret and judge suggests that pledges of reciprocal obligation and promises of a future inversion of the host/guest hierarchy obscure the actual nature of the host/guest relationship. Although the homology between absolute sovereign and host has not yet been made explicit, this exchange between Hermione and Polixenes hints at the resonance between them. Hermione, playing the sovereign/host, demonstrates what unjust judgments may come from the conjunction of absolute authority and undefined conditionality. In effect, her apparently jesting threat makes visible the idea of sovereign will-above-law that Leontes fundamentally embraces, and that had supported Polixenes' refusals. She becomes, soon after, the explicit and vulnerable object of the dominant authority of her host, husband, and king, as Leontes interprets her gestures of hospitality toward Polixenes as an imagined transgression of her status as guest, wife, and subject.

Sovereign/Host/Husband and Subject/Guest/Wife

Up to this point, Shakespeare has only hinted at the frustrations Leontes experiences as host and sovereign—his attempt to keep Polixenes longer in his court has failed, while Hermione's has succeeded, and he wryly notes that difference. When he compliments Hermione for her success, she anatomizes the difference between willing subjection and compelled

compliance, suggesting that Leontes would do well to make better use of the former: “You may ride’s / With one soft kiss a thousand furlongs ere / With spur we heat an acre” (1.1.93–95). Her good-natured taunts regarding his parsimony with praise elicit a much more telling revelation. Her last well-spoken moment, Leontes indicates, was when

Three crabbed months had soured themselves to death
Ere I could make thee open thy white hand
And clap thyself my love. Then didst thou utter,
“I am your forever.” (1.2.102–105)

His depiction of their courtship, with its suggestion of his debased subjection and bitter decay as he awaits her agreement, again emphasizes his discomfort with the limits of sovereignty—his frustration surfaces here, as in his invitation to Polixenes, when he cannot force compliance. In this recollection, Hermione, but not Leontes, proclaims love and eternal commitment. Her eventual willingness to subject herself to him in accepting his proposal defines, in his eyes, their marriage and the conditions of her place in his court. Her agreement in the case of marriage, like Polixenes’ agreement in the case of remaining a guest, both lead to Leontes’ successful, if temporary, return to dominance and control, and neither, it appears, includes a reciprocal commitment from Leontes. In this framework, Hermione is accepted as a wife under terms that emphasize her position of subservience, and her position as, in effect, a guest—reliant upon and beholden to the host and monarch, her husband, for her sustenance and (as it turns out) for life itself. That she is in fact foreign makes this reliance even more emphatic, for she, like Polixenes, is truly a guest in Leontes’ eyes, subject to the whims of his domestic and political authority.

The accusations and trial that comprise the concluding scenes of the first half of the play depict an intensification of the parallels between wives and guests articulated by Heale, and the similar vulnerability of both.¹⁰ Almost immediately upon praising Hermione for her success in persuading Polixenes to stay, Leontes begins his slide into demonic jealousy, driven, it appears, by his recognition of the physical and emotional connection between his wife and his guest. In asserting his role as sovereign, husband, and host, Leontes inadvertently calls into being their shared condition as foreigners and guests, a condition that ironically situates him, in his warped imagining, as excluded from their sociable, emotional connection.¹¹ In effect, he sees himself as stranger, outsider, alien, despite his

insistent exercise of sovereign authority as husband and king, and his attempt to assert his role as host over guest and wife alike. That Leontes chooses to see the interactions between Hermione and Polixenes in their worst possible light, and to make assumptions about this unlikely transgression suggests, not that something has changed in them, but that something has changed in him. What has changed, in the course of the preceding interactions, is Leontes' security in the state of unchallenged sovereignty, which has been traded for one of debt and reciprocity in the relationships of hospitality—a shift in status negotiated by Hermione, and utterly at odds with his sense of absolute authority as the right of kings.

This undermining of his sovereignty is coupled with the reminder that the power of the subjected lies in their right to refuse what cannot be commanded. It is not, then, surprising that he is depicted in the following scenes as grappling with his inability to see into and actually to control the hearts and minds of his subjects, including his wife, his son, and his courtiers. For the husband, host, and king, power and knowledge are in tension—necessarily, his relationship with wife, guest, and subjects is based on trust and reciprocal respect, on what is expected and pledged, the surety of which remains unknown. In Leontes' view, the right of the wife, guest, or subject to refuse access to the inner heart and mind is coupled with the right to abuse, to act against the trust that grounds authority. He finds to his dismay that, within each of these overlapping relationships, nothing can be known for certain, that power itself fails in the crisis of knowledge, and that simple oppositions of dominance and control have no grounding where certainties concerning obedience break down.

When Leontes claims to have “drunk, and seen the spider” (2.1.45), he substitutes speculative interpretation for actual evidence, and “projects his own perception and reasoning hegemonically onto the world, or ‘impose[s] the kingdom of the mind upon his subjects.’”¹² Indeed, knowledge of the relationships of his household remains beyond his grasp—he has no means to see what lies beyond the surface of the friend, guest, spouse, or subject. Confronted with that uncertainty, he clutches at the one certainty he can register: the commonness of infidelity: “many a man there is ... / holds his wife by th'arm, / That little thinks she has been sluiced in's absence” (1.2.190–192). He finds the feigned fidelity of wife and neighbor galling, and from his perception that “the tenth of mankind” are deceived by “revolted wives” (1.2.197), he generalizes to a universal principle of deception by those who should, he believes, be subjugated to his authority. Leontes endeavors to reassert his authority and his confidence by

claiming to know what cannot be known—by rejecting trust and reciprocity, and embracing an imagined certainty, painful though it is. The unreadability of the subject, the limitations on sovereign and patriarchal authority to force compliance, or to detect disobedience beneath the façade of obedience, fuel his fantasy, aligning this imagined transgression with the implicit resistances to the authority of the host and sovereign earlier in the scene, as he translates the intangibility of knowledge into material reality, however unwelcome. The parallels between wife and guest at this moment are powerful and compelling, as Leontes' capacity to reduce either to an enemy and a prisoner reveals the arbitrary and groundless nature of the sovereign decision, and the instability of the friend/enemy distinction. He has declared Hermione's guilt and made her his prisoner in an exercise of power that literally enacts the threat Hermione employed to prevent Polixenes' departure.

Despite what he sees as transgressions against his authority as husband and host, Leontes does not, initially, extrapolate from suppositious cuckoldry to more general disobedience. However, when he orders Camillo to kill Polixenes, and Camillo resists Leontes' authority and rejects his command while feigning obedience, his deception, once discovered, further reinforces Leontes' sense of the unreliability of subjection, and expands the scope of his accusations. Polixenes' escape with Camillo intensifies Leontes' sense, not only that he has been deceived, but that there is no certainty left in his world. If Leontes' initial logic was inductive, arriving at the specific guilt of Hermione through the general rule of women's infidelity, he now works deductively, taking the specific instances of resistance to his authority as the general failure of the monarch's authority over his subjects. Once Leontes has begun to believe that the laws of marriage, of friendship, of hospitality, and of monarchy have no force, he begins to exercise sovereign will, to judge and punish beyond the limits of law. Built on pure supposition, his accusations have escalated to treason and a plot against his life (2.1.47), as well as infidelity, paired transgressions against his public and private person, against his state and domestic security, against his roles as husband, host, and king. Invoking the royal prerogative, he denies the need to seek counsel, admonishing his lords for their inability to see what he believes to be clear evidence of Hermione's guilt (2.1.162–164). Indeed, even as he reveals that he has sent for the judgment of the oracle, affirming that it will determine his own actions (2.1.186–187), at the same time, he remains clear in his conviction that

his judgment is unassailable, and reveals that he has appealed to divine judgment only to appease others (2.1.189–193).

Both Polixenes and Hermione have been transformed, by his commands, from friends of the sovereign and the state into enemies whose imagined relationship and presumed disrespect for his authority threaten his positions as husband, patriarch, and king. As this perceived threat escalates and expands in Leontes' imagination, he throws aside all restrictions on his actions, turning to the sovereign decision as the only means to preserve himself and his state. Hermione's particular vulnerabilities as a foreign queen become increasingly evident as Leontes indicates publicly that his actions are necessary to achieve these appropriate sovereign objectives. He frames her imprisonment in precisely such terms, justifying it as necessary to prevent her from fulfilling the imagined plot against his life, which he believes she might perform on her own, her supposed co-conspirators having fled (2.1.195–196). In private, he ruminates on the loss of his sovereign security, and, plagued by his inability to avenge himself on Polixenes and Camillo, identifies Hermione as the only available target of his vengeance:

the harlot King
Is quite beyond mine arm, out of the blank
And level of my brain, plot-proof; but she
I can hook to me—say that she were gone,
Given to the fire, a moiety of my rest
Might come to me again. (2.3.4–9)

She is the only one utterly without the means to escape or avoid punishment, and in this context, he frames that hoped-for punishment as a relief to his own mental anguish—as a private rather than a public good. Shakespeare makes it explicit, then, that Hermione is particularly vulnerable, trapped in her condition as wife and guest, subject to the will of her abusive husband and host, and subject to a sovereign who is more concerned with private revenge than with justice.

The Internal Enemy: Sovereignty on Trial

Initially, as the trial begins, Leontes' public face is one of care, concern, and honesty, as he affirms his "great grief" at the need for this trial and his love of Hermione, and declares himself "cleared / Of being tyrannous,

since [he] so openly / Proceed[s] in justice” (3.2.1; 4–6).¹³ Hermione, however, recognizes that her integrity and reputation have been compromised by these charges of treason and adultery, which pit her word against that of her husband and king. She negates the possibility of a fair trial or just judgment in the temporal court, where Leontes holds sway, but alludes to divine judgment as the source of truth: “powers divine” will ensure that “innocence shall make / False accusation blush and tyranny / Tremble at patience” (3.2.27; 29–31). As Leontes becomes increasingly unable to contain his anger and maintain a façade of public equanimity, his inclination toward such absolutist judgments rapidly grows more explicit. He soon abandons all pretense of justice, publicly declaring, “Thy brat hath been cast out,” and “so thou / Shalt feel our justice” (3.2.85; 87–88), and proclaiming that Hermione can expect nothing less than death for her obvious transgressions. His threat of “our justice” marks this, through the use of the ‘royal we’, as the act of a sovereign, but also reveals that the ambit of that justice includes only his own person and perspectives.

Hermione responds to Leontes’ threats of execution by embracing the fate that awaits her, and by laying out the abuses to which she has been subject. She has lost his favor for no discernible reason; has been denied access to her son, as though her ‘corruption’ were contagious; and her newborn daughter has been sent to seemingly certain death, “the innocent milk in it most innocent mouth” (3.2.98). Hermione’s explication of her personal humiliations and deprivations at Leontes’ hand identifies these as the actions of a husband against his wife, as he denies her maternal and uxorial rights, privileges, and roles. Yet the force of Leontes’ actions comes from his sovereign will, which he mobilizes in service of his perceived personal wrongs, aligning patriarchal abuse and sovereign power-beyond-law. He operates within the fantasy of unchecked patriarchal and monarchical power, confident in his right to decide without restraint on the condition of those subject to him. Through this arbitrary application of the sovereign decision, he endeavors to eradicate the limitations on his power that he has already acknowledged—the capacity for the subjected to offer surreptitious resistance to his authority and will, which no ruler, husband, or father can definitely discover or completely suppress.

Through Hermione’s challenges, Shakespeare calls attention to the vulnerability of all subjects in the face of sovereign authority, to the king’s prerogative to judge beyond the law. In this sense, Hermione can be understood to stand for all who are subjected under monarchy. At the same time, resonating on the personal and the domestic levels, this accusa-

tion reveals the limitations of hospitality, situating the household as a site of potential violence against those who exist within it, those who are subject to conditional security and arbitrary retractions of that security, whether wife or guest. Hermione's status as wife, subject, and guest points up her intensified vulnerability to the violence that exists within any one of those conditions, situating her as a quintessential but representative victim of the sovereign's judgment and decision. She has been transformed, through that decision, from seemingly comfortable subjection to abjection. Shakespeare's depiction of this turn to the decision on the exception without knowledge or proof, this mobilization of these conjoined forms of authority in the pursuit of a personal agenda, challenges the notion of absolute sovereignty, and negates the supposed perfection of the unified bodies natural and politic.¹⁴

Recognizing the fallibility of the mortal lawgiver, and the vulnerability of local and temporal law to the whims of the sovereign, Hermione dismisses Leontes' groundless "surmises" as "rigor, and not law" (3.2.111). She resorts instead to divine law and divine judgment, the overarching and undeniable limit on Leontes' sovereign power: "I do refer me to the oracle / Apollo be my judge" (112–113).¹⁵ She makes explicit her rejection of Leontes' temporal authority, and his shared subjection to an external power. Immediately following this call for divine judgment, Hermione suggests an additional form of oversight of absolute sovereignty—the duty of foreign princes to wield the sword of divine justice when tyrants abuse those under their authority.¹⁶ However, it is immediately clear that such an intervention remains unavailable to her. "The Emperor of Russia was my father," she declares, suggesting her connection to rulers beyond this tyrant's realm: but adds, "O that he were alive, and here beholding / His daughter's trial!" (3.2.117–119). Her desire, that her father might "but see the flatness of my misery ... with eyes / of pity, not revenge!" (3.2.119–121), suggests the potential threat of her father's power, now lost, which in the domestic sphere might have pressed Leontes to treat his wife with honor, trust, and respect, and in the political sphere might have checked him in his tyrannical excesses.¹⁷ That her father can no longer respond to his daughter's situation with either pity or vengeance emphasizes Hermione's isolation, while also indicating the protection implicitly afforded to any foreign queen by her family's capacity for martial and/or diplomatic influence. As the daughter (and possibly sister) of potent rulers, she might be protected from her royal husband's whims and judgments, but without that interventive potential, she is subject to his arbitrary

abuses of her place and person. With Leontes' tyranny taking place almost entirely in the 'private sphere' of his family and court, there is little likelihood that another ruler will step in and hold him accountable to higher law. The invocation of her dead father illuminates the delicacy of her situation as Queen of Sicilia—she is a foreign queen in an inhospitable environment, reduced to the state of exception, her value as a wife, mate, and mother violently denied, the security provided by her familial affiliations no longer available for solace or support.

Her exposition of her foreign status in this moment suspended between territorial sovereignty and divine intervention situates Leontes' Sicilian court in a global political dynamic that, under other circumstances, might legitimately limit his claims to unrestrained authority and judgment. Not only might Polixenes rally at a challenge from Leontes, but he might legitimately bring his military force to bear on his former friend, should he recognize Leontes' tyranny and transgressive political actions.¹⁸ Leontes' reluctance to pursue revenge against Polixenes makes this clear:

The very thought of my revenges that way
Recoil upon me—himself too mighty,
And his parties, his alliance; let him be
Until time may serve. (2.3.19–22)

Leontes recognizes that Polixenes is out of reach because he has left the jurisdiction of the Sicilian state, to say nothing of Leontes' household, but also that as a powerful king, his position and alliances make him a dangerous target. Hermione's situation is quite different, as Leontes has revealed:

For present vengeance,
Take it on her—Camillo and Polixenes
Laugh at me, make their pastime at my sorrow;
They should not laugh if I could reach them, nor
Shall she, within my power. (2.3.22–26)

Hermione remains within his grasp, as he has already recognized, and by asserting her foreign status and her lack of external connections, Shakespeare creates a circumstance in which she is without any familial or political resources such as those that protect Polixenes.¹⁹

Lacking those personal and political protections, Hermione's appeal to divine law as an alternative to civil law and sovereign authority situates

Leontes within the broader political hierarchy defined by Bodin, in which foreign rulers may legitimately intervene in contexts of tyranny, and in which all sovereigns are subject to divine law. Bodin implicitly links these forms of oversight, while the *Vindiciae* explicitly does so.²⁰ Hermione's appeal and the theorists' definitions suggest the limitations of sovereign authority, bounded as it is by the territory in which it is exercised, and subject, as it is, to divine judgment. With no other lines of protection, Hermione resorts to the only remaining authority, and in this case, that authority appears to respond. Leontes' refusal to accept the validity of the oracle serves as the pivot point in the play, in which his fantasy of absolute authority collapses in the face of what must be seen, in the play's context, as a divine judgment against his arbitrary exercise of power. With Mamillius' death, the divine judgment against his abuses of his intersecting powers becomes suddenly clear to him (3.2.144–145).

Such limitations on sovereign power lie within the theoretical framing of sovereignty, but there can be no explicit or spoken law that limits the exercise of sovereign will. Divine and natural law are implicit, not explicit, and in this sense they are like the laws of hospitality—they are grounded in accepted and expected moral behavior, but like the sovereign of a commonwealth, the host has wide scope in framing his household rules and in judging transgressions against them. Husbands, like hosts, retain a high degree of autonomy and sovereign will within their limited commonwealths. And so, patriarch, host, and monarch share a potential for sovereign judgment and the sovereign decision, in which will is asserted above law. Within the power dynamics of conditional hospitality, the welcome extended to the foreign wife, like that extended to the guest, is always potentially subject to sovereign retraction. By layering these various forms of sovereignty, Shakespeare theorizes their similarity, and explores the implications of their overlapping threat. As Hermione invokes her status as an entrapped 'other' within the foreign context of the Sicilian court, her situation marks the extreme condition of alienation within a system that positions husbands as hosts, and thus as proprietors whose control of their domestic space parallels the violent potential of sovereignty and the vulnerability of all subjects. Hermione, with the actual conditions of her own status as guest, wife, and queen made visible by Leontes' repudiation of the oracle, enacts a rejection of Leontes' authority and withdraws from the domestic space of her abuse. She recognizes him as the internal enemy, but enacts her resistance to his authority and judgment by evasion and retraction, removing herself rather than offering a direct challenge. Still a

foreigner on Sicilian soil, she takes refuge in the household of Paulina, a woman who has been her advocate and her servant, who will keep her safe while challenging Leontes' sovereignty as her daily habit and official charge. Under these conditions, where sovereignty, proprietorship, and patriarchy cannot reach, Paulina opens the way to unconditional hospitality, welcome without question, for sixteen years.

PASTORAL COMMUNALISM AND UNCONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY IN RURAL BOHEMIA

Shakespeare creates an alternative to the conditional hospitality of the court in the lives of the shepherds of rural Bohemia, whose isolation from courtly life and the proprietary, hierarchical structures of that life, opens the way to other modes of thinking and acting. The play suggests that the shepherds' sense of obligation and willing service to fellow human beings has emerged within the circumscribed context and shared conditions of a life of pastoral labor.²¹ He does not *reiterate* from his source text the material terms and humble values of pastoral life that would have been widely understood by early modern audiences, but instead provides a depiction that *builds* from this common set of perceptions, to emphasize the importance of moral action rather than mere satisfaction with simplicity and humility.²² Additionally, although these communal values ground the pastoral context, the play's representation of unconditional hospitality is not limited by that context. Rather, those values develop within, but are carried beyond, the circumscribed shepherd community, suggesting that, as Esposito argues, community is not merely an attribute that unites individuals within the same "totality," nor is it a "substance that is produced by their union."²³ This unconditional community extends beyond those who are aware of its existence and values. The parable of the 'good Samaritan', ironically depicted in Act 4, scene 3, serves as one model and instance of these values, but Shakespeare does not seem interested in promoting an idealized version of Christianity here. Rather than being rooted in formal religious understanding, the ethics of the shepherds appear to emerge from quite a different set of sensibilities. They are linked closely to perceptions about nature and the struggle for survival, to the shared condition of humans *as* humans in the face of a harsh and unforgiving environment, and to the necessity of labor as a fundamental and universal aspect of existence within this context.

Reframing Pastoral Complaint

Unlike Sicilia, which is depicted only through a single, seemingly insular courtly space in the first half of the play, Bohemia has several disparate but interconnected facets.²⁴ The scenes on the sea coast, in the court, and on the road bring us forward to the current moment, sixteen years after Perdita's adoption, with each site defined by values and actions that are distinct from those of the pastoral space proper. The sea coast, where Antigonus enters Bohemia in Act 3, scene 3, is dominated by nature, a force subject to no human authority or control, answerable to no moral imperative—a site of indiscriminating violence that decenters the human.²⁵ The court, which appears only briefly as a separate space, is embodied by Polixenes, a monarch as autocratic and violent in his realm of Bohemia as Leontes in his court of Sicilia. The country road that runs between and links the pastoral world of the shepherds and the more commercial, market-oriented world beyond reveals both dangers and opportunities to those who travel it, and carries with it elements of economically grounded instrumental reason, epitomized by Autolycus.²⁶ And finally, the pastoral realm itself, apparently isolated and insulated from these other areas, yet clearly connected to and influenced by them, functions as an idyllic but fragile space in which moral alternatives to conditional hospitality, as well as to the abusive authority of the host/patriarch/sovereign, are cultivated.²⁷ This distinction between Bohemia's spaces becomes important as the interactions from Act 3, scene 3, onward bring the value systems associated with these spaces into contact and conflict, and engage with questions of hospitality from differing perspectives.

The pastoral space of Bohemia offers neither the direct agrarian complaints concerning social inequities and labor often found in late medieval pastoral, with its explicit criticism of disparities between rich and poor, nor a simple mystification of pastoral labor through its alignment with courtly leisure, as recent scholarship has characterized Elizabethan pastoral. Instead, a more indirect critique emerges, focusing on the social and moral differences associated with such tangible disparities within the early modern social formation. Rather than focusing upon the material conditions of labor and inequity *per se*, the play presents the possibility of a communal, non-hierarchical social formation which stands as an alternative to hierarchical, monarchical, and patriarchal order, and depicts unconditional hospitality in place of the violence of the conditional form associated with those institutions.²⁸ To be sure, even in the Bohemian contexts of the play

Shakespeare engages with the extended scope and effects of the proprietary claims of the sovereign/host. He reveals that they reach, inevitably, to the farthest boundaries of the realm, and that proprietorship bears with it the enactment of violence against any and all who are perceived as transgressors against the sovereign will.²⁹ Nevertheless, before that enactment of violence occurs, well along in Act 4, scene 4, the play presents an image of pastoral life as a social formation entirely different from the proprietary, hierarchical mode of the court, which therefore offers an alternative to the inevitable violence of conditional hospitality associated with such tyrannical socio-political formations. Considering Perdita's role in relation to those of Old Shepherd and Clown, in particular, and placing the pastoral characters in relation to those of the Bohemian court, the play can be understood as a critique of courtly policies that suppress the relatively non-hierarchical, communal, mutually supportive mode of pastoral life, and thus as a reframing of pastoral complaint. At the same time, the play situates the pastoral mode of life as somewhat fragile, and to some extent, expresses nostalgia for a lost past, a past undermined and destabilized by the values and power of proprietorship that intrude explicitly and violently when Polixenes intervenes in Act 4, scene 4.

The Moral Values of Pastoral

The communal and unconditional values of Bohemia's shepherd community become visible from Old Shepherd's first appearance. We first encounter him on the Bohemian sea coast, out to retrieve two hapless wandering sheep before a wolf finds them, with a storm ravaging land and sea, and (unbeknownst to Old Shepherd) the infant Perdita abandoned to her fate by the Sicilian lord Antigonus, who has just been chased from this very spot by a fierce bear. In this scene, Old Shepherd is a man in his late sixties, hard-working, weather-seasoned, and perhaps slightly curmudgeonly.³⁰ He enters grouching about local young men whose hunting has (he believes) caused his sheep to scatter, obliquely expressing both resentment and moral criticism of their activities, which he says also include "getting wenches with child, wronging the ancients, stealing, fighting" (3.3.63).³¹ These young men, who are implicitly characterized as frivolous, careless, and violent, are thus situated in contrast to Old Shepherd, who lives an unaffected, humble existence based on labor and careful husbandry, and who has braved the storm and ventured forth to rescue part of his scattered flock.

The idea that the wild lads mentioned by Old Shepherd are responsible for the “getting” of illegitimate children sets the scene for his discovery of the abandoned Perdita a few moments later. He immediately identifies the infant with just such liaisons: “I can read waiting gentlewoman in the scape. This has been some stair-work, some trunk-work, some behind-door work” (3.3.71–72), he comments, emphasizing the clandestine and illicit nature of such interactions. The repeated term ‘work’ contrasts their self-interested labors and his own selfless ones. While he imagines that secret transgressions have led to this infant’s abandonment, Old Shepherd adopts her immediately, without any knowledge of her identity, or with the worst assumptions about that identity imagined and accepted: “I will take it up for pity,” he immediately decides (3.3.74). With this unconditional welcome of the child into his life and household, the scene suggests Old Shepherd’s recognition of the need—in the face of a wild, aggressive natural environment and a self-serving, corrupt human society—to cultivate mercy, hospitality, and community where none of these is inherently present. He endeavors, through compassion, to undo, undermine, or circumvent that violence, offering welcome, comfort, and protection to a stranger. Even with the subsequent benefits that come from his discovery of the gold left with the abandoned child, his actions are first framed as an extension of human concern toward another without hesitation, conditions, or limitations. Her abandonment is a result of Leontes’ wrongful judgment against Hermione and his threat against the family of Antigonus, but through Old Shepherd, Shakespeare offers the counterpoint of unconditional welcome to the violence of conditionality and sovereign judgment. Perdita, unlike her mother, enters as a guest in a nonproprietary context, where her alien status is eradicated in the embrace of her unquestioning foster father.

Clown soon enters the scene recounting two woeful incidents of human ravishment: the storm has sunk the ship that carried Antigonus to Bohemia, drowning all the mariners, and Antigonus is, at that very moment, being eaten by the bear that chased him off stage in the previous scene. In both catastrophes, nature is depicted as not merely indifferent to human suffering, but as relishing it: “the poor souls roared, and the sea mocked them; and ... the poor gentleman roared, and the bear mocked him” (3.3.95–97), Clown reports. Granted such agency, nature’s violence echoes the violence of the court, but operates in a proprietary purview which is the antithesis of any form of hospitality: on this wild sea coast, all are equally unwelcome, unprotected, and vulnerable. The scene, by juxtaposing these

two forms of violence, situates Leontes' indiscriminate accusations, threats, and actions in parallel to the indiscriminate actions of nature, emphasizing the emptiness of hospitality's welcome when it takes the conditional form. The predations of this aggressive, destructive natural world are explicitly counterbalanced by the discovery of the abandoned child, with Old Shepherd noting "Thou met'st with things dying, I with things newborn" (3.3.119–120), an observation that reminds both us and the characters that birth and death are part of the inevitable natural cycle that encompasses humans along with all living things.

But the scene also reminds us that not all births are equal, nor all deaths, and the interventions of Old Shepherd and Clown serve to correct imbalances caused by human choice. Clown and Old Shepherd know nothing about what brings the unfortunate lord and infant to their shore—they know only that they are fellow human beings in distress. Instigated by empathy for their abject humanity, Clown undertakes an extension of unconditional hospitality similar to that of Old Shepherd, taking on the danger and toil of burying the unfortunate Antigonus' remains once the bear has finished with him.³² He attends to interring this stranger as a duty and service that has no reward and that creates potential risks for himself, in an effort to return a sense of human dignity to a man who has become the prey of a wild beast. This selfless action offers the gift of rehumanization in the face of natural violence and dehumanization, literally incorporating Antigonus as a being formed through community, despite the impossibility of his ever recognizing that community or giving back to it. As Nancy argues, "Death is indissociable from community, for it is through death that the community reveals itself—and reciprocally."³³ Clown's enactment of humanity, of care and concern for the stranger as though he were a neighbor, can be understood as a bodying forth of his community through the adherence to and extension of its basic values of giving. As in the parable of the Good Samaritan, which expands the notion of the neighbor to encompass all of humankind, the test of those values lies in one's response to strangers, not to those who are familiar, and Clown, like his father, appears to embrace that idea.

Even after the sixteen-year interval that separates the earlier action of the play from the later scenes, we see a similar response to human violence once again in Act 4, scene 3. When Clown, en route to purchase provisions for the sheep-shearing feast, encounters Autolycus groveling in counterfeit distress on the roadway, claiming to have been beaten and robbed of his money and clothing, the young shepherd immediately offers

assistance to this suffering stranger.³⁴ The task that has brought Clown out onto the road is one aimed at nurturing and supporting the community of shepherds from which he has come and through which he is defined. He has set out, with a pouch of gold earned through the shared labor of sheep-rearing and sheep-shearing, to provision a feast in celebration of the successful labor of that community. In the process of relieving Autolycus, he offers to him not only his empathy and concern, but also the gold that is intended to fund those purchases. Shakespeare thereby situates Clown, once again, as willing to give without condition, as extending unconditional hospitality by incorporating an apparently distressed stranger into the shepherd community, including him as a recipient of the economic benefits of their shared labor and mutual concern for each other.³⁵

Clown, while he obviously does not know that Autolycus is a thief, expresses his awareness that predatory thieves operate in the area. Nevertheless, despite this awareness, he engages with this apparently distressed stranger without hesitation or limitation, empathizing with his pain and humiliation, and freely offering whatever he has to alleviate the feigning victim's suffering.³⁶ His desire to offer aid to a suffering stranger is not affected by concern for himself or by his awareness that he might be taken advantage of, as he instead enacts the most charitable response possible. Autolycus, as he accepts Clown's assistance, elaborates on his misfortune with a falsehood that links this moment directly to Clown's earlier act of hospitality toward Antigonus, cautioning Clown to handle him "softly" because his "shoulder-blade is out" (4.3.72–73), an echo of Clown's description of the bear tearing out Antogonus' shoulder-bone in the scene on the sea coast (3.3.92). Shakespeare, then, apparently wants his audience to connect Clown's previous action with this one, to recognize that, even after a sixteen-year interim, Clown functions consistently in these catastrophic and dehumanizing moments, bringing his humanity and his generosity to the aid of these distressed strangers, one a victim of nature's violence, the other a counterfeit victim of human violence. The scene suggests the risks and costs of unconditional hospitality, of giving to and caring for others, and yet Clown's choice remains admirable, and preferable to the alternative—the refusal to offer aid to a stranger.

In these interactions, the ethics of unconditional hospitality are predicated upon the conception of community as a structure of relationships grounded in obligation to others, and Shakespeare makes it clear that such obligation is not limited to those who are recognized as members of that community. As with Old Shepherd's adoption of Perdita and Clown's

burying of Antigonus, this unquestioned assistance to or welcoming of the stranger is directly linked to both individual and communal labor, and is definitive of unconditional hospitality, of giving aid freely to others without expectation of reciprocation or recompense. With this sense of community as the basis of unconditional hospitality, pastoral Bohemia differs in fundamental ways from the court of Sicilia as well as from the wild, unruly sea coast, dangerous road, and court of Bohemia. The host who sets limits based upon his proprietorship is antithetical to the concept of community. Conversely, the host whose unconditional welcome is based, not upon proprietorship but upon his obligation to others, not upon autonomous subjectivity and its consequent authority, but upon relational identity, must form his sense of hospitality through the logics of community. This fundamental opposition, which Shakespeare structures into the two halves of the play, suggests that unconditional hospitality built on communal relationality offers an alternative to conditional hospitality built on proprietary right, which is itself linked to the sovereign decision. It becomes obvious through Polixenes' actions at the sheep-shearing festival, however, that such communal relationality is also subject to the sovereign decision. Indeed, sovereign proprietorship encompasses not only the immediate context of the family and court, but the entire realm, where all subjects exist in a state of vulnerability parallel to that of the wife and the guest.

The Intrusion of Conditional Hospitality

It appears that the autonomy of rural Bohemia, its distance and difference from the court, has generally allowed the shepherds to function as though they were beyond the reach of the sovereign decision, perhaps truly unaware of the danger posed by sovereign authority, and of the violent courtly alternative to their overall habit of unconditional hospitality. Old Shepherd and Clown operate in a world where causes and effects are decipherable, knowable, and containable, even if—as in the violent storm on the sea coast—unpredictable, in part because their world is bounded and relatively secure. This insularity is, to some extent, an additional grounding premise of the values that shape their community, even as they continue to practice those values in encounters with those from beyond its boundaries. Like Hermione in Act 1, scene 2, who initially sees her position within the court as secure and unthreatened by Leontes' power, the shepherds function as though they are beyond sovereign control, free of

the hierarchies that define the larger social formation of which they are a small and separate part.

Perdita, despite her rustic nurture in the shepherd community, has made an external connection that disrupts this apparent insularity. In love with and beloved by Prince Florizel, she recognizes the larger, intensely stratified social formation in which they exist, and fears the king's discovery of his son's passion: "Even now I tremble / To think your father by some accident / Should pass this way, as you did" (4.4.18–20), she exclaims to Florizel. She counters his assurances of his fidelity and unshakable commitment to her with the certainty of Polixenes' censure: "Your resolution cannot hold when 'tis / Opposed, as it must be, by th' power of the King" (4.4.36–37). This awareness of the threat of sovereign power exacerbates her sense of the difference in status and sensibilities that separate her from Florizel. She is uncomfortable with the costumes they have donned for the sheep-shearing, which invert their social standing, and she characterizes the sheep-shearing festival itself as filled with foolish antics and homely entertainments that may not be to his liking.³⁷ At the same time, she does so in a series of formally phrased appeals that acknowledge his status and position her as his inferior, which she fully believes herself to be. Perdita's fear situates the actions of the lovers as a knowing transgression, hidden in secrecy and dishonesty—the very sort of transgression that Leontes imagines of Polixenes and Hermione—in this case, the transgression against the proprietary claims of a sovereign over his son, which are analogous to such claims on the guest or the wife.³⁸ Her fear is based on a projection of the repercussions for transgressions against proprietary authority, the counterpoint to Leontes' judgment of such an imagined transgression, and his assertion that knowledge is the poison that has overcome him (2.1.39–45). Leontes' fear is based upon false knowledge regarding a particular case of infidelity, but his more encompassing fear has to do with confronting the limitations on his ability to control his subjects, guests, wife, and, as it turns out, his future. In other words, through the supposed transgression of guest and wife, Leontes 'sees' the limitations of his power, while Perdita sees the reach of that form of power and its threat in the person of King Polixenes. Such knowledge utterly transforms one's perspective not only on oneself and the world, but also on one's relationships with others, and it clearly sets Perdita apart from the other shepherds and shepherdesses. Shakespeare thus establishes a contrast between Perdita's fearful awareness of the reach of sovereign power, and the secure obliviousness of the pastoral community at large to its

scope and nature. In a related contrast, we see the conditional nature of the proprietary welcome in relation to the expansive extension of unconditional, communally grounded hospitality in rural Bohemia.

Perdita and Florizel, whose love-match threatens the social and political hierarchies of Bohemia, attempt to evade or at least suspend the repercussions of bringing these two worlds together, but Shakespeare structures the sheep-shearing festival to engage explicitly and critically with the conflicting moral orders they represent. The festival provides us with the most direct and extended example of unconditional hospitality, but also with the failure of such hospitality in the face of its opposites—sovereignty, proprietorship, patriarchy, and conditional hospitality. As the disguised Polixenes and Camillo enter the festival space with the other celebrants, Old Shepherd explicitly asserts the tradition of unconditional hospitality, admonishing his daughter to take up her role as hostess and extend the proper welcome to their guests at the feast:

Fie, daughter! When my old wife lived, upon
 This day she was both pantler, butler, cook,
 Both dame and servant; welcomed all, served all;
 Would sing her song and dance her turn; now here,
 At upper end o'th' table, now I'th' middle;
 On his shoulder, and his; her face afire
 With labor, and the things she took to quench it
 She would to each one sip. You are retired,
 As if you were a feasted one and not
 The hostess of the meeting. (4.4.55–64)

Old Shepherd describes a full, unlimited, unconditional welcome, acknowledging and celebrating the hostessing labor of his wife. Her successful role as mistress of the feast is defined through her fluid movement across the categories of domestic labor and entertainment: provisioner, hostess, and guest. Her welcome in the idealized past provided both the material and the convivial elements of the celebration as she attended to the general needs of the company, as well as to each guest's particular comfort and pleasure. The signs of her exertions as hostess—as well as of her enjoyment of that role and of the celebration she created and fostered—were revealed in her face, aflame with the toil of her service and her drinking. She served her guests and drank with them, toasted them and joined in the singing and dancing; she encouraged each of them to

fully partake of the feast's offerings, to enjoy the products of her labor, assuring them of her pleasure in their pleasure. She "welcomed all, served all," providing the same attention to every participant, making no distinctions, holding nothing back, with the exuberance of her hospitality everywhere evident.

This unconditional hospitality, built on her labor as a hostess, epitomizes the social formation of pastoral Bohemia, emblematic of Shakespeare's differentiation of the values and practices of court and countryside. The recollection of Old Shepherdess' open-armed values, actions, and example most expressively defines the space of pastoral Bohemia, serving as the central, fundamental model of the unconditional alternative to male proprietorship, patriarchal authority, and conditionality.³⁹ Her capacity for welcome reveals the core around which the values of community have coalesced, and of which the actions of Old Shepherd and Clown in earlier scenes are but more mundane examples. The feast itself is predicated on the shared labor of the sheep-shearing and on the profits that labor yields, classed and gendered forms of labor that are structured through and constructive of communal relations. While Old Shepherdess' labor is not communal in the sense of being a shared effort, it is nevertheless communal in its aims and implications, an open-hearted demonstration of how non-proprietary engagement can serve the needs of all, of how relationships can be structured along communal rather than proprietary lines.⁴⁰ Her hospitality is not limited through subjection to Old Shepherd, who makes no claims on her, shows no concern for her ebullient interactions with other men, and praises her for her freedom rather than attempting to rein it in.

Shakespeare's inclusion of this recollection emphasizes how the sense of hierarchy or proprietorship that dominate the first half of the play, and the conditions associated with that courtly, sovereign, and patriarchal setting, can be countered. Beyond the material and emotional aspects of these various forms of labor, such labor is related to the idea of the *'munus'*—the obligation that is formed with the gift of community, a gift that is not 'repaid' in any measurable form despite the exchanges that continually occur in the communal flow of reciprocity without recompense.⁴¹ It is in giving, not in receiving, and in sharing, not in owning, that the terms of community are established, and the possibility for unconditional hospitality may emerge. This recollection by Old Shepherd thus offers an explicit and elaborate example of the fundamental practices of laboring and giving that lie at the heart of the rural Bohemian community—practices that

align with the extension of hospitality we have already witnessed within and from the shepherd community through Old Shepherd's and Clown's various interactions with those from outside.

One further link between hospitality and community is important here. In the recollected hospitality of Old Shepherd's wife, the unconditional nature of the proffered hospitality comes not only from the fullness or generosity of the welcome, but also from its lack of restriction. In the same mode, in Old Shepherd's admonition to Perdita to take up the traditional role of "mistress o' th' feast" (4.4.55–68), he urges her to "bid / These unknown friends to's welcome, for it is / A way to make us better friends, more known" (4.4.64–66). This act of unrestricted welcome, more clearly than the earlier scenes of welcome, demonstrates that the rural Bohemian community is built upon a sense of obligation which is not predicated on what one has received or may receive from others. The community forged in the various labors of shepherding, shearing, milking, cooking, and host-essing is not exclusionary, despite the central role labor plays in constituting social relations. The unboundedness of this sense of community counters the idea that the stranger must somehow prove his similarity, his shared values and virtues, his status as 'friend', before being admitted, or provide information about himself in an unequal demand for revelation that initiates the violence of conditionality. Indeed, as Old Shepherd has it, their status as friends is assumed, something to be fostered and cultivated, not in the hope of gain, but in the exercise of appropriate obligation. He urges Perdita to extend a welcome that comes without questions and without limitations, as his wife once did.

However, Perdita's welcoming of these strangers is anything but unconditional. As she extends the hospitality of the pastoral space to these unknown guests, she seems out of step with the sensibilities and values of the community, completely unable to fulfill the role of hostess as Old Shepherd has described it. In framing the festival scene with her awareness and fear of sovereign authority, Shakespeare connects her restricted welcome to the violence of the conditional, with its hierarchies and behavioral boundaries, even before she knows the identities of the strangers. In place of the unrestrained pleasure of service and celebration modeled by Old Shepherd's wife, her greeting of the two strangers is highly formal and reserved, emphasizing hierarchical order and establishing distance and deference—signs of awareness that echo her earlier expressions of concern about the potential wrath of the king. Addressing first Polixenes, then Camillo, she intones, far from enthusiastically, (*To Polixenes*) "Sir, welcome. /

It is my father's will that I should take on me / The hostess-ship o'th' day.
 (*To Camillo*) You're welcome, sir" (4.4.70–72). This formality continues as she undertakes a highly stylized gifting of flowers, each symbolically associated with the age of the recipient:

Reverend sirs,
 For you there's rosemary and rue; these keep
 Seeming and savour all the winter long.
 Grace and remembrance be to you both,
 And welcome to our shearing. (4.4.73–77)

Her insistent marking of difference through this ritualized gifting functions in sharp counterpoint to the jovial intermingling of one and all that the Old Shepherd's wife so successfully fostered. Perdita cannot take up the fluid movement across the guest/host divide that defines an unconditional welcome, instead invoking the specter of difference and distinction symbolically and rhetorically throughout her interactions with the two unknown guests and with the other guests as well. Rather than initiating a congenial celebration, she enters into a debate with Polixenes concerning art and nature. Even when they appear to come to an agreement that nature makes all art, and thus no art is unnatural (4.4.97), she still archly asserts "I'll not put / The dibble in the earth to set one slip of them [gillyvors]" (4.4.99–100). She then brings their conversation to an abrupt close by giving flowers "Of middle summer ... / To men of middle age [Polixenes and Camillo]" (4.4.107–108). Her welcome of the shepherds continues in the same vein, as she wishes for spring flowers from Proserpina's basket to suit their youth and royal or maiden status respectively. The pastoral trope of the aristocratic foundling whose nature overcomes his or her rustic nurture receives full play in this moment, with Perdita unknowingly defending the inherent perfections of the aristocracy that she embodies. She asserts the 'natural' as superior to the artful, just as her unlearned virtues and charms are perceived to elevate her above her station, and just as she would be loved for herself, rather than for any 'painting' that would improve her (4.4.101–103).

Perdita expresses awareness of the difference between her current comportment and that of her past, as she remarks, "Methinks I play as I have seen them do / In Witsun pastorals—sure this robe of mine / Does change my disposition" (4.4.133–135). In contrast to the positive image of celebratory conviviality in Old Shepherd's description, she has told

Florizel before the guests arrive that “our feasts / In every mess have folly, and the feeders / Digest it with a custom” (4.4.10–12), suggesting that her own judgment of these celebrations is less positive than that of the other participants. Here, as in her similarly formal speech in her interactions with Florizel earlier in the scene, her awareness of hierarchy and difference shapes and conditions her welcome, and alienates her from the unconditional values of her community. Her apprehension about Polixenes’ discovery of their love for each other seems to dampen her enthusiasm for both the festival itself and for the welcoming of the status-marked strangers, but even her relationship with Florizel appears to cast her shepherd’s life in a different, less appealing light, as she imagines it would be seen by those from outside and above.⁴²

Like Perdita, Old Shepherd appears to be negatively affected by the presence of these strangers. He is no more successful than Perdita in extending an encompassing, celebratory, boundary-crossing welcome to the guests of the sheep-shearing festival. Although he initially encourages their welcome and describes the proper form of hospitality for the feast, Old Shepherd also acknowledges the strangers’ apparent social difference from the rest of the celebrants and begins to make accommodations for those differences. For example, upon hearing that a group of country laborers disguised as ‘saltiers’ (satyrs) have offered to perform a dance for the gathering, he refuses to admit them: “Away!” he says, “We’ll none on’t; here has been too much homely foolery already” (4.4.327–329), echoing Perdita’s earlier judgment of the festivities. Addressing Polixenes, he adds, “I know sir, we weary you” (4.4.328–329). Old Shepherd’s concern that the entertainment is too homely for these guests suggests a much less unbounded perspective on hosting than the one he advocated to Perdita at the opening of the festivities. He agrees to let the dancers perform only when he learns that Polixenes would welcome the entertainment. When he admonishes his servant—“Leave your prating; since these good men are pleased, let them come in—but quickly now” (4.4.335–336)—he asserts his authority and opinion in ways that conflict with the notion that all are equal and equally welcome.

In place of a congenial communal connection to one and all, Old Shepherd’s denigration of the entertainments and his sharp comments to his servant situate him as a proprietor, host, and master for the first time in the play. Like Perdita, he acknowledges and attempts to accommodate the superior status of these guests, but also endeavors to comport himself as though he were somehow more like them than like his fellow shepherds.

This emergence of differentiation, deprecation, and deference signals the tensions connected to entertaining those from a higher social rank, those whose tastes and judgments are taken to stand outside the compact of giving-without-restraint that marks and defines the shepherd community. At the same time, it reminds us that Old Shepherd, despite his economic advantages, has not generally perceived of or comported himself as socially above the other rural folk; rather, he has until now considered himself to be utterly connected to and enmeshed in their communal interactions and values. All in all, this appears to be a very different festival than those of the past, and in no small part that is due, both to Perdita's discomforts as a hostess or to her 'inherent' differences from the other shepherds, and also—perhaps primarily—to the welcoming of these strangers who appear to constrain unconditional hospitality by their very presence. Such constraint would not be felt if there were no awareness of the threat posed by social difference and hierarchy. Clown, for example, appears to recognize, but sees no significance to, the strangers' status difference, while under the shadow of such awareness, Perdita's extension of unconditional welcome is compromised, and Old Shepherd fears their negative judgment of the festivities and responds accordingly.⁴³ Between the two of them, Shakespeare emphasizes the tensions that these particular, recognizably more elite strangers bring forth when they join the rustic celebration.

However, it is not the stilted welcoming of strangers, or even the awareness of distinction and differentiation that finally destroys the shepherd community. Rather, it is Polixenes' insistent assertion of his own authority as sovereign, which introduces into this innocent rural setting the violence of courtly power. When Polixenes reveals himself as father and king, he initially proclaims his proprietary right over those in his household, much as we saw in the Sicilian court. He lays claim to Florizel as the object and subject of his authority, threatening to deny his son's inheritance of position and place, of familial and successive connections. Polixenes thereby places himself in much the same situation as Leontes, in danger of destroying his line of succession, and willing to do so rather than accept a daughter-in-law that he believes to be admirable in her qualities but base by birth.⁴⁴ Polixenes' assertion of his rights in regard to Florizel are disputable, as well as cruel and self-destructive.⁴⁵ However, the arbitrary nature of the sovereign decision as well as its injustice come to the fore even more forcefully when Polixenes, certain that he has been duped not only by Florizel and Perdita, but by Old Shepherd as well, accuses the old man of treason and threatens him with hanging

(4.4.417–419). His vicious threat to mar Perdita’s beauty and “devise a death as cruel for thee / As thou art tender to it” (4.4.437–438), similarly asserts his power over life and death as sovereign and judge-beyond-law, situating all subjects as objects which are possessed, and which can be dispossessed or destroyed through the sovereign’s will. This is the effect of the conditional hospitality of the state, where the boundaries of the territory mark the only limit—or the first limit—to the sovereign decision.⁴⁶ The arbitrariness of sovereign authority in this depiction is especially significant, as once again the assertion of proprietary right supports the decision to act beyond law, based on the *perception* of transgression, not on proof. Further, the conflation of patriarchal and monarchical judgments reminds us again of the parallel between the household and the court, and echoes the retraction of hospitality that created the instabilities and anguish of the first half of the play.

Florizel offers the only deliberate resistance to this exercise of patriarchal and sovereign authority in the Bohemian context.⁴⁷ Invoking an image of dehumanized subjection that would result from his obedience to Polixenes’ royal and paternal decree, and asserting his refusal of that subjection, he insists “What I was, I am; / More straining on for plucking back, not following / My leash unwillingly” (4.4.461–463).⁴⁸ Like Hermione’s response to Leontes, Florizel rejects his father’s authority, declaring “From my succession wipe me, father; I / Am heir to my affection” (4.4.477–478). He asserts the moral imperative to which his own vows have committed him, opposing that moral obligation to patriarchal and sovereign authority and embracing the consequences of his “faith” and his “honesty” (4.4.484). He chooses self-exile rather than submission, responding to his father’s threats as both Polixenes and Hermione responded to Leontes earlier in the play.⁴⁹ In their varied but analogous circumstances, the guest, the wife, and the heir resort to flight from the household and from the conditional, retracted welcome of the patriarchal sovereign, refusing to accept his exercise of sovereign will and judgment, and denying him authority *over* them by denying his access *to* them.⁵⁰ Polixenes, unlike Leontes, pursues his son beyond the boundaries of his state, traveling to Sicilia and asserting his authority in the face of Florizel’s resistance. In that context, he invokes his compromised friendship with Leontes to request Florizel’s arrest for his disobedience—a request that completes the wrongful transformation of his son into an enemy of his state. Further, in the same lord’s report, we hear that, as Old Shepherd and Clown plead for mercy, “Bohemia stops his ears, and threatens them

/ With divers deaths in death" (5.1.200–201). Polixenes' assumptions about the guilt of his subjects run parallel to those of Leontes, and portend the same dire outcomes.⁵¹

There is, as Polixenes' actions demonstrate, no space that is not potentially dominated by proprietorship, and the fleeting glimpse of the pastoral, communal alternative collapses in the violence of sovereign will. Nevertheless, we have caught a hint of it, have been witness to its mode of interaction through Clown and Old Shepherd, and have been told of its most full-bodied form in the description of Old Shepherdess. The depictions of pastoral values and interactions thus establish an alternative model against which the effects of the sovereign decision can be measured, particularly against the claims of proprietary right and control over guests, wives, and subjects that dominate the courtly context in the first half of the play, and that emerge again in the second half. Its effects are devastating. The community built on shared labor and shared pleasures, shared obligations and shared objectives is shattered by this intrusive assertion of hierarchy, monarchy, and patriarchy, and Old Shepherd, as well as Clown, retreat from their communal values in the face of Polixenes' threats. At Clown's advice, in a desperate attempt to save himself from sovereign punishment, Old Shepherd vows to go to Polixenes and reveal that Perdita is not his daughter, thereby reasserting her alien status and negating the familial ties that would connect their fate to hers. Doing so, he believes, will eliminate his responsibility for her actions, assuage Polixenes' anger toward him, and lift the threats of death that so terrify him. His illogical idea that Polixenes will be mollified when he learns that Old Shepherd is merely Perdita's foster father points, ironically and obliquely, to the realities of familial commitment even in the absence of blood ties—a form of unconditional welcome that transcends the conditional family unit. His hope that he will be saved by this denial of paternity reminds the audience that, in the context of a lifetime of care and nurture, their familial relationship is undeniable, and we are led to recognize that Old Shepherd has open-heartedly *fathered* Perdita, whether or not she is his progeny. Old Shepherd's attempt to repudiate the paternal bond and the associated responsibility it entails reveals the degree to which the unconditional community has been fractured by Polixenes' intervention. Old Shepherd's action stands in stark opposition to the values he has apparently embodied and enacted throughout the play, and exposes the destructive force of sovereign will. It also echoes Leontes' denial of paternity, and for the second time situates Perdita as a princess who belongs to no one.

Shakespeare is clearly troubled by the consolidation of monarchical authority into its absolute form, and by the exercise of sovereign will that results from this consolidation.⁵² Yet, as the denouement of Act 4 suggests, his concerns extend beyond absolutist sovereignty. Rather, he targets the conjunction of patriarchal and sovereign authority as most fundamentally perilous, for in each situation depicted in the play, proprietary claims are assumed and asserted through patriarchy, which stands as the foundation of the judgment of transgression, the retraction of welcome, and the violence of conditional hospitality. The failure of the king's body politic to control the erratic impulses of the body natural, which Shakespeare invokes and addresses in a great many of his plays, thus becomes an explicit problem depicted here.⁵³ Sovereign authority enables judgment above the law, but proprietary right frames the real or imagined transgressions of the guest, wife, and subject as grounded primarily in the personal, while also holding implications for the political. Relating the idea of familial proprietorship to the contrast between conditional hospitality in the court and unconditional hospitality in the shepherd community, Shakespeare situates Old Shepherd's fostering of Perdita, and even his intention to deny his paternity, as a non-proprietary, and thus non-patriarchal basis for the family, in contrast to the proprietary, patriarchal model practiced at court. Old Shepherd's repudiation of proprietary claims—his claim *not* to control Perdita's actions—makes fatherhood a very different condition for him, just as he has described his wife's role as hostess in terms that emphasize the freedom, self-direction, and volitional engagement of her giving, rather than her subjection and obedience to his will.

The Fantasy of Forgiveness

In Sicilia it is the perceived, and in Bohemia the actual transgression against the patriarch's claimed rights, against his personal authority over his family, that instigates the threats of violence and the destruction of the household and its correlative, the royal family, and thus of the succession itself. Patriarchal claims coupled with the sovereign decision, the judgment of the host or sovereign, make manifest the intrinsic violence of the system. The unconditional actions of the shepherd community of Bohemia suggest that if proprietary claims are relaxed, and especially if the wife/guest/subject can be understood to model a more empathetic, connected, and giving approach to personal and thus to political dynamics, the

inherent violence of these systems might be reduced, if not eliminated. To live in mutual reliance and mutual trust seems infinitely better than to defend readily threatened dominance. The depiction of the shepherd community in rural Bohemia suggests that the absence of the proprietary, while it will not eliminate hierarchy and sovereignty, may help to equalize the relations within the family, and thereby transform the relationship between sovereign and family, with possible similar effects on the relationship between sovereign and subjects. The chain of relationships established throughout the play, between husband/host/sovereign and wife/guest/subject, suggest as much.

Further, just as the interactions in rural Bohemia offer idealized alternatives to proprietary, patriarchal authority and its implicit violence, Act 5 extends the implications of this potential for transformation, providing a courtly model for reducing patriarchy and thereby reforming familial relationships, while also challenging absolute sovereignty. The opening of Act 5 reveals that Leontes has subjected himself to grief and repentance, attempting to atone for his failures as father, husband, and sovereign, and that he clearly recognizes that his disrespect for Hermione as his wife fueled his inappropriate actions as a sovereign. He sees that those actions constituted wrongs not only against his wife, friend, and subjects, but against himself as well, as a husband who has lost “the sweet’st companion that e’re man / Bred his hopes out of” (5.1.11–12), and as a monarch whose judgments have left his kingdom “heirless” (5.1.10).

Paulina, however, stands as a goad to Leontes’ conscience and a constant voice for the overarching divine authority that limits sovereign power. When Dion encourages Leontes to forgive himself and remarry to save the kingdom from the “dangers [posed] by his highness’ fail of issue” (5.1.27), she counters that, should Leontes choose to marry again in the hope of producing an heir, he “should to the heavens be contrary, / Oppose against their wills” (5.1.45–46).⁵⁴ In response, Leontes accepts Paulina’s arguments, and laments that he did not heed her counsel earlier, upon which Paulina extracts a promise from Leontes that he will never wed unless she willingly grants him leave. The suggestion of Leontes’ remarriage, while framed as an issue of state by Dion, is reframed by Paulina as a matter of the sovereign’s submission to divine will and of mastered patriarchal authority. In demanding his submission to her judgment, Paulina claims authority to determine whether and when Leontes will wed, but that authority is grounded in the oracle of Apollo, a divine figure to whom she affirms their universal subordination, in keeping with

Bodin's and the *Vindiciae's* assertion of the sovereign's subordination to divine law. Her exercise of will and power can thus be understood as a service to Leontes and to Apollo, rather than an exercise of independent authority, and it is this model of service, so parallel to the giving of the shepherd community in pastoral Bohemia, that begins to offer some hints of a redefined courtly space. Leontes' willingness to accept service of this sort, service that contradicts his own inclinations and rectifies his misjudgments, suggests that he, too, has begun to move beyond his earlier autocratic perspective.⁵⁵ Change may just be possible within this system—a possibility almost as remote as the miracle of Hermione's resurrection.⁵⁶

Paulina's care for Hermione over the sixteen-year interval between her 'death and resurrection' represents an additional instance of unconditional, non-proprietary giving-without-return. Even as she admonishes Leontes and endeavors to bend him toward a more generous, open, less proprietary perspective, she undertakes the labor that, should the turns of fate allow, will reunite Hermione with her daughter and restore the royal line. In the play's final scene, she proclaims her proprietorship, welcoming her visitors openly and without restriction, but claiming the statue as a part of her private collection, and asserting her control over it and over all interactions with it. She threatens to limit Leontes' access, situating him finally in the position of supplicant that he has taken as the natural and proper role of others throughout his regency. And then she relinquishes that authority, granting Hermione the agency that had been denied her by her sovereign spouse. In this short interaction, Shakespeare recreates the dynamics of conditional hospitality, and then allows them to fade away as Hermione steps forward and reclaims her place. This, too, offers some hope for a future that is less dangerous and less violent than the past.

Despite these hints at possible reformation, the events of the final Act engage with the play's repeated indictment of proprietary power, offering a fantasy conclusion that could not be imagined beyond the boundaries of fiction. The reformation of Leontes, the recovery of Perdita, and the revival/revelation of Hermione are all equally fantastic. They draw us into a world of impossible outcomes, with each succeeding event more unbelievable than the last. The idea that complete forgiveness is possible—that the death of the young Mamillius is truly of no consequence to his mother or to the realm, that Hermione will forget that Leontes has denied her the pleasures of nurturing her daughter into adulthood, that Leontes' repentant demeanor (which is questionably sincere) is sufficient to win Hermione's love—is no more believable in the world of real events than

Hermione's resurrection. Shakespeare offers up these outcomes, hints that such forgiveness has occurred or will occur, grants us the comedic ending we desire, but he does so under circumstances which underscore their unlikelihood. Each event is reported as less believable than the last, with witnesses emphasizing the 'amazing' nature of the unfolding revelations. These newly revealed truths are "so like an old tale that the verity ... is in strong suspicion" (5.2.28–29), and additional details, such as the report of Antigonus' death, are "Like an old tale still, which will have matter to rehearse though credit be asleep and not an ear open" (5.2.60–61). The revelation of these events is described as "an act ... worth the audience of kings and princes, for by such was it acted" (5.2.78–79), emphasizing its fictive, performative nature. And finally, the reawakening scene is, as so many scholars have noted, framed as the bringing to life of a work of art, enacted through the art of Paulina's performative incantations, which achieve an outcome that, "Were it but told you, should be hooted at / Like an old tale" (5.3.116–117).⁵⁷

We are presented with the disquieting assurance that yes, proprietary violence, the withdrawal of hospitality, and the sovereign decision can readily be retracted, their damage repaired, their devastating outcomes reversed. As the differences between *Pandosto's* ending and Shakespeare's suggests, it only requires a miracle. What is most important here is not whether Hermione escaped the abuse of her husband and king through a sixteen-year self-sequestering, as the play hints, or through some kind of spell or potion that allowed her to sleep the years away, or through the miracle of death and resurrection.⁵⁸ In the first instance, she is granted the agency to resist Leontes and withhold herself from him, while the latter makes her a passive object in a context of divine intervention. I much prefer the former interpretation, but the most striking and significant aspect of this conclusion is that Shakespeare provides a comforting resolution that encourages us to accept Hermione's revival and her forgiveness of Leontes—or at least, the possibility of that forgiveness—while reminding us in every possible way that it is a fantasy. In the world beyond fiction the violence of patriarchy, absolute sovereignty, and conditional hospitality cannot be overcome so readily. The emphatic fictiveness of the play's conclusion displaces the tragedy brought about, first by Leontes' sovereign judgments, and then by Polixenes' similar actions. Even if such transformations were possible, these reparations to the violence of sovereign judgment, brought about through various forms of resistance to that judgment, are not permanent solutions, but temporary correctives. What will occur

in the future depends, as always, upon the will of the sovereign, which remains intact despite the miracles of restoration and forgiveness. Although these unlikely events have changed *some* of the outcomes of sovereign judgment in the artificial and artful world of the theater, remaking tragedy into comedy, they cannot be relied upon as correctives to the effects of such judgment in the world beyond the stage.

Neither is the unconditional hospitality that works in the context of pastoral family and community a viable alternative to the violence of sovereignty. Unconditional hospitality cannot function at the level of the court or the state, where hierarchy and propriety are the defining characteristics.⁵⁹ At the same time, no state is isolated from other social relations, particularly from those of family, friendship, and human connection more broadly—by ‘neighborliness’ or the shared condition of the human—and perhaps it is there, where the greatest abuses occur, that the possibility for change also exists.⁶⁰ There are, as I have suggested, hints that such change is underway in Leontes’ court, limited through it is by the ongoing potential for the exercise of sovereign judgment. As for the survival of unconditional hospitality in the countryside, the most extensive, idealized version depicted in the play occurs as a reminiscence of communal commitments, of welcoming and giving that has perhaps been lost with Old Shepherdess’ death. It nevertheless emerges, if only in the telling, as a possible space where labor, community, and obligation may exist beyond the reach of the proprietary, the patriarchal, and the monarchical. If Shakespeare concludes in the courtly context of conditional hospitality, he does so with the hope of at least some forms of change there. Moreover, the memory of unconditional hospitality and communal mutuality echoes as a thing that may yet be found, not necessarily in the space of the court, but perhaps once again in the space of the countryside. Or perhaps that, too, is a miracle that exceeds credibility.

NOTES

1. In *Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2011), Chap. 5, Julia Reinhard Lupton addresses “Hospitality and Risk in *The Winter’s Tale*,” and reads hospitality through Hannah Arendt’s articulation of the intersections of performance and politics in human action. Her argument is that politics enters *The Winter’s Tale* through Hermione’s navigation between public and private, a navigation mobilized by hospitality. More directly related to

my analysis is that of David Ruiters, "Shakespeare and Hospitality: Opening 'The Winter's Tale,'" *Mediterranean Studies* 16 (2007): 157–177. He focuses primarily on the opening scenes of the play, touching upon Derrida's deconstructive conception of the gift, the debts created by giving, and concerns about reciprocity, which I deal with in detail through the differing forms of hospitality theorized by Derrida. See also Christopher Pye, "Against Schmitt: Law, Aesthetics, and Absolutism in Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale*," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 108, no. 1 (2009): 197–217. I am also grateful to James Kearney for allowing me to read a draft of his book chapter, "Hospitality's Risk, Grace's Bargain: Uncertain Economies in *The Winter's Tale*," now published in *Shakespeare and Hospitality: Ethics, Politics, and Exchange*, ed. Julia Reinhard Lupton and David Goldstein (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 89–111. Through Levinas, Kearney also focuses on the idea of the gift, and on the instabilities of the hospitable dynamic of the Sicilian court. On Bodin's 1606 English translation and its applicability to *The Winter's Tale*, see Cormack, "Shakespeare's Other Sovereignty," esp. 486–496. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations of *WT* within this chapter refer to *The Winter's Tale*, ed. Stephen Orgel (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For other references to Shakespeare's plays, I refer to *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1997), unless otherwise indicated at the point of citation.

2. For an alternative but related set of oppositions, that is, the "systemic law of works" versus the non-normative, non-judicial "law of faith," see James Kuzner, "*The Winter's Tale*: Faith in Law and Law in Faith" *Exemplaria* 24, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 260–281.
3. See Heal, *Hospitality*, for an in-depth study of hospitality in the period. Also central is Daryl W. Palmer, *Hospitable Performances: Dramatic Genre and Cultural Practices in Early Modern England* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1992). However, he does not address *The Winter's Tale* in this study.
4. For a reading of this scene as an assertion of Polixenes' claim to his own place and authority, see Cormack, "Shakespeare's Other Sovereignty," 488.
5. Pertinent to this understanding of hospitable reciprocity is the idea of gift exchange. Karen Newman addresses this concept from an anthropological perspective, especially focusing on excessive giving and the impossibility of reciprocity, in "Portia's Ring: Unruly Women and Structures of Exchange in *The Merchant of Venice*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 19–33.
6. At 1.1.21–30, Camillo remarks on the nature of their past, more distant interactions and on the expected continuation of this more intimate and personal mode of interaction in the future.

7. For a discussion this scene in relation to Levinas, ethics, and their idealized former state of grace as “twinn’d lambs,” see Kearney, “Hospitality’s Risk,” 91–95.
8. See the *Vindiciae*, Third Question, 67–172, esp. 158–160. Bodin, *Six Books*, does not establish a contractual relationship, but he does address the duties of both sovereign and subjects, Franklin, I.8, and II.5. The acceptable response of subjects, however, is markedly different.
9. Kearney alludes briefly to Hermione’s unveiling of “the power relation in the guest-host dynamic.” “Hospitality’s Risk,” 91.
10. In his 1608 treatise against wife-beating, Heale makes an explicit case for the parallel between the wife and the guest, *Apologie for Women*, discussed in Chap. 1, 30–31. See also Heal, *Hospitality in Early Modern England*, 5.
11. Lupton, *Thinking with Shakespeare*, 168, links Leontes’ delusional psychosis to his psychological condition: “his foreclosure of all attachments returns in the real as paranoid delusion.” While Leontes’ mental and emotional state is clearly pertinent, I focus primarily on his perception of relations of power, and his response to the perceived destabilization of his position in such relations.
12. Virginia Lee Strain, “*The Winter’s Tale* and the Oracle of Law,” *English Literary History* 78, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 557–584: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41236558>. Quotation from 565. Quote within quote is from Jonathan Goldberg, *James I and the Politics of Literature: Jonson, Shakespeare, Donne and Their Contemporaries* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 23.
13. For a discussion of Leontes as himself on trial in this scene, see Bradin Cormack, “Decision, Possession: The Time of Law in *The Winter’s Tale* and the *Sonnets*,” *Shakespeare and the Law: A Conversation Among Disciplines and Professions*, ed. Bradin Cormack, Martha Nussbaum, and Richard Strier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 44–71.
14. See Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies*, 1–23, and my discussion of this concept in Chap. 1, 19–20.
15. Both Bodin and the *Vindiciae* explicitly make the point that the sovereign is subject to divine law. See the discussion of this point in Chap. 1, 15–22.
16. Bodin and the *Vindiciae* emphasize the right and obligation of princes to deliver foreign realms from tyrannical rulers. The *Vindiciae* is by far the more detailed. See Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin, II.5.113–114 and *Vindiciae*, Fourth Question, 173–185.
17. See R.W. Desai, “‘What Means Sicilia? He Something Seems Unsettled’: Sicily, Russia, and Bohemia in *The Winter’s Tale*,” *Comparative Drama* 30, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 314–315, for a discussion of the implications of these

- lines in relation to English perspectives on Russian emperors, particularly Ivan the Terrible and Ivan the Great, and the threat of military reprisal.
18. Again, this is explicit in Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin, II.5.113–114, and in the *Vindiciae*, Fourth Question.
 19. In *Pandosto*, Greene gives the Russian provenance to Egistus' wife. Pandosto "saw that Egistus was not only of great puissance and prowess to withstand him, but had also many kings of his alliance to aid him, if need should serve, for he was married to the Emperor's daughter of Russia." For these reasons, Pandosto decides not to pursue vengeance against Egistus. See Robert Greene, *Pandosto: The Triumph of Time*, 2nd edition (Imprinted at London for I. Brome, 1592), sig. Biv: http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:173412:9. Although Shakespeare eliminates this threat from Russia, Pandosto's choices resonate clearly with Shakespeare's emphasis on the danger of pursuing revenge against Polixenes, and also suggest how important such family ties could be in protecting the foreign queen.
 20. This issue is addressed in the *Vindiciae*, Fourth Question, 173–185.
 21. The idea of communism of this early sort is most frequently associated with uprisings against inequitable social and economic conditions. In this play, the pastoral community is not united by such recognitions and resistances, or by an opposition to the leisured and exploitative life of the aristocracy—indeed it is not an oppositional definition in any obvious way.
 22. In *Pandosto*, Fawnia expounds on the humble satisfactions of a simple pastoral life. See sig. C: http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:173412:19.
 23. Esposito, *Communitas*, 2.
 24. Deborah T. Curren-Aquino notes that the first three acts are marked by their interior spaces, and characterizes the Sicilian court as claustrophobic. See *The Winter's Tale*, ed. Susan Snyder and Deborah T. Curren-Aquino (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), "Introduction," 11–12.
 25. By contrast, some ecocritical, environmental, and feminist scholars situate rural Bohemia at large as dominated by Nature, in a quasi-divine, personified form. See for example Jennifer Munroe, "It's All About the Gillyvors: Engendering Art and Nature in *The Winter's Tale*," in *Ecocritical Shakespeare*, ed. Daniel Brayton and Lynn Bruckner (Farnham: Ashgate, 2001), 139–154. Online; accessed 6/24/2014.
 26. While Hugh Grady does not deal with this play in *Shakespeare's Universal Wolf: Studies in Early Modern Reification* (Oxford: Oxford University

- Press, 1996), his introduction and much of his analysis are applicable to an understanding of *Autolyclus* within this framework.
27. Curren-Aquino, "Introduction," 18–19, identifies these four distinct regions of Bohemia, but classifies them all as part of Bohemia's pastoral world, albeit a much more complicated pastoral world than one typically expects to see. Note: Curren-Aquino identifies the "Introduction" as hers in the Acknowledgments (xii). She frames pastoral in terms of the contrast between the corrupt city or court and the idealized countryside, defining this contrast "in terms of sterility vs. fecundity, sophistication vs. simplicity, and artifice vs. naturalness" (10). I think it is important to recognize Bohemia's spaces as distinct. Other important studies on early modern pastoral include Terry Gifford, *Pastoral: The New Critical Idiom* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1999; 2008; 2010); Paul Alpers, *What is Pastoral?* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996); William Empson, *Some Versions of Pastoral* (New York: New Directions Publishing, 1974); and with a broader scope, Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). See also Louis Adrian Montrose, "'Eliza, Queene of the Shepherdes', and the Pastoral of Power," *English Literary Renaissance* 10, no. 2 (1980): 153–183; and Andrew MacRae's insightful chapter on "Rural Poetics," in *God Speed the Plow*, Chap. 9. Focusing on the genre of 'pastoral' across time, MacRae extends—and sometimes challenges—Montrose's analysis, and he additionally addresses a range of other scholars who have posited a 'dissolution' or deterioration of pastoral from medieval to late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century versions. As counter-examples, he discusses Alexander Barclay's early sixteenth-century *Eclogues*, a poetic work that includes both labor and explicit complaint. See for example, the opening to Eclogue 1: online: http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:4687:5, accessed 2/4/2018. He also discusses the continental genre of *The Kalendar of Shepherdes*, which was widely adapted from the French into English editions, and offers depictions of the material aspects of rural life and addresses the "concerns of rural labor" as well as Empson's "'universal subjects'" (266). For a critique of and corrective to the plethora of negative perspectives on Elizabethan pastoral in contemporary scholarship, see Linda Woodbridge, "Country Matters: *As You Like It* and the Pastoral-Bashing Impulse," in *Re-visions of Shakespeare: Essays in Honor of Robert Ornstein*, ed. Evelyn Gajowski (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 189–214.
 28. Annabel Patterson, *Pastoral and Ideology: Virgil to Valéry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), engages with Elizabethan pastoral as a critical political and ideological form. Focusing on Virgil's *Eclogues*, she

- attempts to reframe the question that has circulated in many key studies of pastoral, from “what *is* pastoral” to “how is pastoral *used* differently in different historical moments?” Her objective is to reveal how pastoral represents and mobilizes “competing ideologies” (8). Her perceptions about pastoral are thus similar to those of Williams, *The Country and the City*, and in sympathy with the arguments of Woodbridge.
29. This would of course be understood or assumed in the case of Leontes as ruler as well, but the point is made explicit through Polixenes.
 30. He gives his age as eighty-three at 4.4.450, so he would be approximately sixty-seven here.
 31. Florizel, we learn, first encountered Perdita while hunting with his falcon (4.4.15), which suggests a social class above that of the shepherd community, but not necessarily royal or aristocratic. ‘Doricles’, as Perdita’s family knows him, is said to possess land of some value (4.4.170–171), but he is believed to be, not of the court, but of an intermediate social standing by everyone except Perdita, who knows of his royal provenance. The young hunters and trouble causers referenced by Old Shepherd seem to be similarly situated.
 32. While he dismisses the danger, it is nonetheless present. See 3.3.109–111.
 33. Nancy, “Inoperative Community,” 15.
 34. See Barbara A. Mowat, “Rogues, Shepherds, and the Counterfeit Distressed: Texts and Infracontexts in *The Winter’s Tale* 4.3,” *Shakespeare Studies* 22 (1994): 58–76, which situates this scene in relation to victim naïveté in the cony-catching pamphlets. Hugh Grady’s discussion of instrumental reason, Shakespeare, and theory, in *Shakespeare’s Universal Wolf*, 1–26, is also quite pertinent to the implications of this scene.
 35. See 4.3.31–115.
 36. See 4.3.99–115. Shakespeare does not provided an instance in which a known thief is treated with an unconditional welcome, but it is not beyond the realm of imagining.
 37. I have in mind here the exchange at 4.4.5–24.
 38. See Orgel, “Introduction,” 48, where he cites the letter from Prince Henry to his father James, acknowledging his father’s right to dispose of him in marriage as he wished for *raison d’état*. See also Sandra Logan’s extended analysis of the Kenilworth entertainments, in which she explores in detail the queen’s efforts to control Robert Dudley as a pawn in her marriage games, and his effort to keep his marriage to Lady Sheffield secret. See *Text/Events in Early Modern England: Poetics of History*, Chap. 2, 91–186. Such manipulations and determinations were completely the norm for male as well as female members of the royal family, and generally for the aristocracy as well.

39. The play does not, of course, name her, but it seems to me to be appropriate to refer to her with a name parallel to that of her spouse.
40. See Wall, *Staging Domesticity*, 9–12 for a discussion of women’s domestic labor as constitutive of household relationships beyond the marital.
41. Esposito, *Communitas*, 10.
42. This contrasts starkly with Greene’s depiction of Fawnia’s pride in her humble status. In *Pandosto*, she insists that she will love Dorastus “only when Dorastus becomes a shepherd.” See: http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&res_id=xri:eebo&crft_id=xri:eebo:image:173412:19, accessed 2/4/2018.
43. Clown, off singing and buying trinkets from Autolycus in the company of the other shepherds, comments “my father and the gentlemen are in sad talk, and we’ll not trouble them” (4.4.307–308). He thus acknowledges the strangers’ status, but does not appear to see it as a threat, even as he notes the dampening effect it has on the festival.
44. At 4.4.156–159, Polixenes comments to Camillo about the remarkable qualities of Perdita; presumably these comments are not meant to be seen as merely a performance for the purposes of duping his son, but rather, as a revelation of his actual perceptions of her.
45. Although in civil contexts the law of primogeniture was inviolable, the strict succession of the eldest son in monarchical situations was not a settled question, nor, in the converse situation, was it unquestionably accepted that a monarch’s will could determine his or her successor. See A.R. Braummuller’s introduction to *King John* for a succinct overview of the laws concerning primogeniture and inheritance, and the practices of monarchical succession. He makes a particularly useful distinction between *testament* and *will*, and explains the relationship between the laws of primogeniture, which prohibited the exclusion of the eldest son from inheritance, and the practices of monarchical succession, which at least in the sixteenth century, accepted (somewhat uncomfortably) the determinative force of a former monarch’s will. The succession conflicts of the Elizabethan period give testament to that discomfort. *The Life and Death of King John*, ed. A.R. Braummuller (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989; 2008), 54–61.
46. The decision to wage foreign war indicates an extension of the sovereign decision, the claim to the right over life and death beyond the boundaries of the state.
47. Camillo appears to provide assistance to Florizel and Perdita, but he betrays them to Polixenes.
48. Polixenes orders him to abandon Perdita completely—a decree that reproduces the initial abandonment ordered by her father.

49. Hermione, if we accept that she has sequestered herself for sixteen years, rather than that she has died, undertakes a similar flight, which removes her from Leontes' household, although not from his sovereign territory.
50. It is ironic that Polixenes, once the wronged guest of Leontes, now abuses his role as sovereign, father, and host in much the way that Leontes did.
51. Their redemption from this sovereign judgment is one of the many fantastic elements of the comedic ending of the play.
52. Stephen Orgel, *Winter's Tale*, "Introduction," 49–50, offers a problematic counterargument to this interpretation, negating views such as the one presented here. A critique, however, does not have to call for the elimination of the institution of patriarchy or monarchy, nor does it have to offer an alternative. Surely there is nothing neutral or positive about the forms of authority depicted in this play.
53. For example, he offers a similar critique in *King Lear*, where conditional hospitality is central to the breakdown of relationships. The play depicts Lear's assumptions concerning patriarchy and proprietorship—even without property—which make him first a rather difficult host, and then a rather difficult guest. Katherine Eisaman Maus has taken up questions of property in *King Lear*, but does not connect it to hospitality. See *Being and Having in Shakespeare* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
54. She wrongly suggests that the oracle's judgment was that Leontes would not have an heir until the lost child is found (5.1.40). In fact, the oracle is less specific, saying only that he "shall live without an heir if that which is lost be not found" (3.2.132–134). The tally of losses is enormous, and includes the deaths of Mamillius and Antigonus, as well as the loss of Hermione's love and trust, which is perhaps the most difficult loss to restore.
55. For various perspectives on forgiveness and redemption in the play's conclusion, see Kearney, "Hospitality's Risk," 104–107; Julia Reinhard Lupton, "Judging Forgiveness: Hannah Arendt, W.H. Auden, and *The Winter's Tale*," *New Literary History* 45, no. 4 (2014): 641–663; Grace R.W. Hall, "Alienation, Separation, Redemption, Reconciliation, and Resurrection in *The Winter's Tale*," in *Reconciliation in Selected Shakespearean Dramas*, ed. Beatrice Batson (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), 190–207; Katherine Eggert, *Showing Like a Queen: Female Authority and Literary Experiment in Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), Chap. 5; Lynn Enterline, "'You Speak a Language that I Understand Not': The Rhetoric of Animation in *The Winter's Tale*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (1997): 17–44. See also Curren-Aquino's commentary on the conclusion, 41–62.
56. See Kuzner "Faith in Law," for the idea of a compromise between forms of authority based in law and in faith.

57. But see Curren-Aquino, 49; see also Ronald P. Draper, *The Winter's Tale: Text and Performance* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), 72. Draper comments briefly on the simultaneous belief and disbelief of the audience concerning Hermione's resurrection, acknowledging that we recognize the romance elements, and that thus we understand the scene's fictiveness. Quoted in Curren-Aquino, 49.
58. The 1913 silent film version of *The Winter's Tale*, *Una tragedia alla corte di Sicilia* ("A Tragedy of the Court of Sicily"), Italy: Milano Films, 34 mins., dir. Baldassare Negrone, grapples with several of the dilemmas of the play. In the film, Paulina uses a potion to put Hermione to sleep so that she may pass as dead, and orchestrates a grave-robbery in order to remove Hermione from the tomb once she has been buried. Viewed July/August 2007, Folger Shakespeare Library.
59. Shakespeare does not seem to suggest that a complete elimination of sovereignty or monarchy is desirable, but he certainly appears to advocate for a reform of the uses of political authority in this play, and elsewhere in his canon.
60. Again, the parable of the 'Good Samaritan' is pertinent, as it extends the concept of 'neighbor' to a near-universal.

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CHAPTER 4

Strange Bedfellows: Friend, Enemy, and the Commonweal in *Titus Andronicus*

THE FRIEND/ENEMY DISTINCTION AND THE INTERNAL ENEMY

Titus Andronicus has generally been read as a play too excessive in its violence and too idiosyncratic in its structure to rank among the best of Shakespeare's works—or even to rank among his works at all in some earlier assessments. The play's engagement with early modern political and topical concerns has been of interest to scholars for some time, and that scholarship has powerfully enriched our understanding of the play. Building on that work, I focus specifically on how the play responds to tyranny as a political problem, and on the role of Tamora as an internal friend and enemy of the state, a proponent of absolutism, and the perceived disrupter of political and moral order.¹ Two questions are of particular interest: how does Shakespeare engage with concerns about abusive sovereignty and the role of the foreign queen in that dynamic; and how does the play connect Tamora's identity and actions to the transformation of Titus, Marcus, and Lucius, from devoted subjects into rebels against the Roman sovereigns? From the perspective of political theory, several broader problems or debates are also pertinent in this analysis. How are the interrelated responsibilities of sovereigns and citizens or subjects defined and enforced? How does embodied sovereignty undermine the preservation of the state? How does it increase the potential for the abuse of sovereign authority and of the sovereign decision, including the decision

on the external and internal enemy? And is rebellion against the ruling figure of the state ever legitimate and justifiable?

The concept of political friendship is central to this play. In *Politics*, Aristotle parallels the values and virtues that form the basis of both friendship and citizenship, and grounds the fullest form of political life in obedience to law, commitment to justice, and support of the common good. Without this moral bond, which supports the higher, collective objectives of a well-ordered state, political, social, and communal order collapse into debasement and disorder.² Rational political debate reveals the best path to the overarching ends or objectives—securing the general good, and pursuing long-term security, stability, and benefit for the population, but rational order relies upon moral order. Those who function counter to those ends function counter to the aims and purpose of community and state, placing their own pleasures and benefits above those of their fellow citizens. This notion of the moral unity of the state echoes beneath the surface of Shakespeare's Rome, reverberating in the assumptions and assertions of the various Roman characters, particularly Marcus and Titus. The play's opening scene suggests that appropriate means—public discussion and debate—have been abandoned, as Saturninus and Bassanius encourage civil strife in their respective bids for the imperial diadem. Once Saturninus claims sovereignty, his focus on his own interests and his lack of concern for the good of his subjects align him clearly with the tyrannical ruler described by Aristotle, displacing the sovereign's obligation to foster the commonweal and commonwealth with defensive protection of his imperial status.

According to Aristotle, tyranny "is ... the opposite [of kingly rule], for the tyrant pursues good for himself; and it is quite manifest ... that tyranny is the most inferior regime ... the opposite of the best."³ In their discussions of tyranny, both Bodin (briefly), and the *Vindiciae* (much more extensively), acknowledge that the primary threat to the commonwealth and commonweal may be the sovereign figure him- or herself. In such a context, Bodin argues, subjects of a legitimate sovereign must bow to his rule, however abusive. The *Vindiciae*, by contrast, concludes that it is the duty of the subjects as a whole to preserve and perpetuate the state and its values, and if necessary, to overthrow a sovereign whose actions undermine the fundamental objectives of political life.⁴ Walter Benjamin is also useful here, for in addressing his own contemporary contexts, he notes, "all violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-preserving. If it lays claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits all validity." He goes on to

note that, “persons or communities” must “wrestle ... in solitude” even with the commandment against killing, and, “in exceptional cases ... take on themselves the responsibility of ignoring it.”⁵ The point, as it applies to *Titus Andronicus*, is that *sovereign* violence enacted beyond the structure and function of law lacks legitimacy, as does the violence of subjects if it lacks the aim of restorative or constructive transformation. Shakespeare explores precisely this question: what drives subjects or citizens to claim sovereign authority and judge the sitting ruler—to identify him or her as, in effect, an enemy of the commonwealth or commonweal, and to act on that judgment?

The unfolding plot thereby complicates Schmitt’s basic antinomy of the political, between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, and troubles the notion of citizenship grounded in rational discourse, focusing to a great extent on the unstable relationship between the ‘victorious Titus’, the Roman state he has so devotedly served, and the sovereigns whose reign devolves into tyranny. In the process of redefining Titus’ status vis-à-vis the state, the play also engages in broader questions concerning the reciprocal responsibilities of ruler/subject relations, and reveals the full negative potential of a foreign queen, in this case one whose chance marriage to the emperor places her in the most intimate circle of political power. Shakespeare endows Tamora with the potential to serve as a positive influence on the weak, self-indulgent Saturninus, and situates her as fully grasping the moral and ethical obligations of citizenship and appropriate rule, but as lacking in the moral self-restraint that would support Rome’s ideals and correct the emperor’s dangerous tendencies. Further, through her moral disorder, she becomes an embodiment of Rome’s corrupted political present, opposed to Lavinia as symbolic of Rome’s ideal potential. Titus’ situation is transformed by the injustice of Saturninus’ rule, which emerges through his own failures as a sovereign, and is enflamed by Tamora’s advice, choices, and actions. These conditions turn Titus toward asserting his responsibilities to the state as a good citizen, in place of his devotion to Saturninus as a good subject. In depicting this dynamic between the embodied state, the alienated subject or citizen, and the resistance to injustice, *Titus Andronicus* mobilizes personal commitments for political purposes, exposes the unreliability and incompleteness of the friend/enemy distinction, and raises profound questions about violence as a tool of the state *and* as a tool of resistance to state violence. Shakespeare seems to suggest that such a response to tyranny may be necessary, but nevertheless leaves us with serious questions about the implications of such a response.

The Virtues of Rome

Titus Andronicus returns to Rome just as his brother, Marcus, has succeeded in quelling the escalating conflict between the two claimants to the Roman diadem.⁶ Before Marcus steps in, armed conflict in support of the respective claims of Saturninus and Bassianus arises as a very real possibility, with both willing to sacrifice peace and lawful process to promote their own election through force.⁷ Interrupting this threatened violence, and speaking for “the people of Rome” (1.1.20), Marcus makes a rational plea for peace, invoking the value of Titus’ self-sacrifice, and affirming that virtue as fundamental to his idealized Romanness, along with his courage, his dedication, and his honor. As this conflict concerning the imperial succession indicates, little remains of Rome’s adherence to the values of a polity committed to the general good, or to rational discourse as the basis of political decisions. The deterioration of Roman social, moral, and political conditions and values is strongly evident, even before Tamora and Saturninus assume their imperial roles. The play in fact opens with a challenge to the friend/enemy distinction, situating both prospective successors—and soon enough, most of the Andronici—as potential threats to the peace of the state and the good of the people.

When Titus rejects the imperial diadem for himself and instead bestows it upon Saturninus, he demonstrates that his devotion to the stability of Rome shapes his actions in peace as well as in war. He epitomizes the values appropriate to both a good subject and a good citizen, values that he believes to be aligned and inseparable. For Titus, service to Rome and service to the Roman emperor are synonymous.⁸ When Mutius draws his sword in defense of Bassianus’ claim on Lavinia, and Titus slays his own son for this ‘treasonous’ action, he again shows his willingness to make personal sacrifices to secure the state and the emperor. Such actions place the power of father and ruler above law, moral judgment, and reasoned inquiry.⁹ However, there is no indication that *anyone* involved in this series of events prefers rational judgment over martial conflict—the rule of law is broken on both sides, and the temporary peace again gives way to violence. Further, whatever legal claim Bassianus may hold on Lavinia, the amoral implications of the abduction become explicit when Lucius refuses his father’s command that they “restore Lavinia to the Emperor” (1.1.296), assuring him that she will be returned “Dead, if you will, but not to be his wife, / That is another’s lawful promised love” (1.1.297). Lucius invokes law as the basis for this threatened sorricide and disobedience to father and ruler.

Both Titus and his sons see themselves as friends of the state, not as its enemies, even as they clash over the tenets of the political community they claim to support and uphold. Tensions between duty to the sovereign and duty to the state are evident throughout, as when Bassianus defends his own, personally motivated actions by submitting to “the laws of Rome” (1.1.407) rather than to the new sovereign’s will. At the same time, he defends Titus’ actions, asking his brother/emperor to show appropriate favor to Titus, who has “expressed himself in all his deeds / A father and a friend to thee and Rome” (1.1.422–423). Bassianus thereby emphasizes Titus’ public virtue, evinced by his willingness to slay his own son in defense of the emperor. Titus, from his own perspective, and in the view of Bassianus, is the state’s and the emperor’s greatest friend, never compromised by private or personal interests, and that sense of commitment and public virtue holds firm, despite Saturninus’ failure to acknowledge it.¹⁰

Saturninus, for his part, has no interest in distinguishing between guilt and innocence in this instance, instead making the sovereign decision that his own brother and all of the Andronici are enemies to the state and to his person. He situates their opposition to his claim on Lavinia as a challenge to his sovereign authority, taking their actions as an affront to his political honor and power. Refusing to acknowledge Titus’ intention to return Lavinia to him, Saturninus characterizes the entire family as “Confederates all thus to dishonor me” (1.1.303), and subsequently accuses them of “mak[ing] a stale” (1.1.303–304) of him—a term with complicated sexual and feminizing implications.¹¹ He rebukes Titus in particular for humiliating him “with that proud brag ... / That ... I begged the empire at thy hands” (1.1.306–307). In doing so, Saturninus reframes this event as a deliberate plan on Titus’ part to situate him as a weak supplicant to Rome’s great general, and to humiliate him publicly. His claim on Lavinia has been transformed, from an honor granted to the family into a test of his subjects’ duty to their ruler, and the Andronici have, he believes, failed that test. Titus has been reclassified, from war hero and savior of Rome, to conspirator against the new ruler. Although certainly the Andronici, including Titus, have revealed themselves to pose some threat to public safety through their willingness to “bandy” and “ruffle in the commonwealth of Rome” (1.1.312–313), they pose no significant danger to the state or the emperor. Saturninus’ scathing *political* condemnation of the Andronici is triggered, not by a clear political threat, but by a *personal* sense of affronted honor, and by his outrage at being made, as he sees it, a target of ridicule and contempt. His is an impulsive,

petulant reaction to alleged personal and political disrespect, rather than a measured response to a threat against state security—the latter being the only acceptable basis for declaring an internal enemy. It also signals, yet again, his lack of qualifications for his position: just as he did in the opening conflict, Saturninus allows personal retribution to displace procedural and restorative forms of justice that define effective sovereignty and support a functional commonwealth.

Saturninus' actions and those of his brother and the Andronici reveal a fracturing political community, a community ideally grounded in rational deliberation, compromise, and shared moral commitments to the collective good of the citizens and the state, but destabilized by perceptions of personal injury, eruptions of lawless violence, and the dangerous certainties supporting individual agendas and judgments. Even those characters who retain the necessary communal commitments—the proper *ends*—employ *means* that situate their actions as problematic. The chaos of “headless Rome” depicted here emphasizes the need for a functional political hierarchy (1.1.186), with Shakespeare creating a seemingly straightforward connection between the depicted Roman past with its uncertain succession, the English past, in which questionable successions created extreme social and political turmoil, and the possible English future, with its lack of a definite heir.¹² Yet, the resolution of the succession question in Rome, far from relieving the disruption that marks the headless state, introduces more intensely disruptive conflicts which elicit far more uncertainty, particularly concerning moral judgment, the common good, and a stable political order.

Tamora, Roman Values, and the Enemy as Friend

Tamora, who enters the play early in Act 1, as the captured queen of the Goths, is a clearly identified external enemy and spoil of war, bound and displayed “to beautify [these Roman] triumphs” (1.1.110). The entrance of Titus with Tamora and his other captives creates a visual parallel between the “yoked [Goth] nation” (1.1.30), and the unruly Roman populace, which has just submitted to Marcus' reproaches. The scene thus brings internal and external conflict into juxtaposition, with Titus having conquered the external foes, and Marcus having subdued the internal ones, and both firmly situated as dedicated to Roman peace and stability. Despite their effective and admirable actions, however, the specter of violence from outside and inside renders any straightforward opposition between

‘alien other’ and ‘proper citizen’—or more specifically, between friend and enemy—untenable. This blurring of the fundamental antinomy of the political comes through strongly in the events that unfold between the conflict over the diadem and the skirmish over Lavinia. Although Marcus refers to the defeated Goths as “barbarous” (1.1.28), Titus, a weary soldier and proud but bereaved father, offers no negation of Goth valor or humanity. Even in granting his sons’ request for a sacrifice to appease the ghosts of their brothers, he honors Alarbus as he condemns him to death: “I give him you, the noblest that survives, / The eldest son of this distressed queen,” Titus intones (1.1.102–103). His references to Alarbus’ nobility as well as Tamora’s status and her emotional condition acknowledge their humanity and political capacity, not their barbarity. As she pleads for the life of her son, Tamora’s response to this judgment explicitly invokes the shared values and virtues of Roman and Goth.¹³ She addresses the Romans as her “brethren” (1.1.104), asserting a communal and familial link between the two nations. She begs Titus to pity “A mother’s tears in passion for her son” (1.1.106), and emphasizes their commonality and their similar emotional attachments to their offspring: “if thy sons were ever dear to thee, / O, think my son to be as dear to me!” (1.1.107–108). War drives all men (and women) to violence, and her sons have undertaken “valiant doings in their country’s cause” (1.1.113), just as Titus and his sons have done. Both sides undertake their battles out of commitment to “king and commonweal,” and she directly parallels piety in Titus’ sons as warriors for Rome with that of her own sons as warriors for the Goths (1.1.114–115). Invoking another virtue which they should all recognize and share, she challenges Titus, if he wishes to “draw near the nature of the Gods” (1.1.117), to emulate them “in being merciful” (1.1.118), rather than emulating their power over life and death. Finally, addressing him as “thrice-noble Titus” (1.1.120), she reminds him that “Sweet mercy is nobility’s true badge” (1.1.119), suggesting that his very identity as a noble Roman is bound to a demonstration of mercy. She implicitly argues that they are both people of virtue, and that Titus has the opportunity here to demonstrate his *global* as well as *Roman* citizenship through a recognition of commonalities that unite Roman and Goth despite the necessary fiction of difference that war has imposed on both sides.

Although she begins with an acknowledgment of his military conquest and her own suppliant position, she asks Titus to see her in another light. She situates herself, not as an enemy, too different and too threatening to be trusted, but as a potential friend, as one who shares with him a sense of

family, of reason, of virtue, of mercy, and of commitment to king and country, and as one who aims at the general good rather than at private satisfaction.¹⁴ Her plea is framed in the language of the commonweal, demonstrating the basic elements of discursive capability which would qualify her in Aristotle's terms as a member of the political community—logos in its full sense of language and logic, pathos in her suitable emotional appeals, and ethos in her self-presentation as aligned with the values of Rome. She emphasizes her moral similarity to Titus and to all law-abiding Romans, ironic given the barbarity of Roman behavior as it has already been displayed in the conflict between Saturninus and Bassianus, and as it will continue to unfold within the still-developing opening scene. She resituates the relationship between Titus and herself in peacetime terms, identifying them as two private individuals whose values and virtues align in support of a Roman model of citizen-friendship. Tamora thereby elides the state agendas and public roles that had pitted them against each other, suppressing her role as queen and military leader of the Goths in favor of her domestic roles and personal virtues.

In his response, Titus reminds her of the Goths' responsibility for his own family's losses, situating the sacrifice as a necessary obligation to the 'shades' of his lost loved ones, and emphasizing the piety of his sons' request. Yet, he asks Tamora to "patient" herself and "pardon" him, and to recognize that it is precisely the obligation to family—to the living brothers and to the slain ones—that renders this act unavoidable (1.1.121–123). Titus' response seems implicitly to accept Tamora's claims of rational capability, framing the sacrifice as a comprehensible and necessary action intended to protect the Roman state and its citizens—one to which he expects her to consent. Without the sacrifice, the "unappeased" ghosts of the dead might cause "prodigies on earth" (1.1.100–101), as Lucius cautions, a threat to both the family and the entire commonweal. Titus asks Tamora to recognize that he has no choice in this matter, that his duty cannot be overthrown by his sympathy to her situation. By contrast, the sons, both living and dead, seem to call for retribution, and Titus' refusal to withhold that vengeance, even as he makes a case for its necessity, provokes Tamora's reciprocal vow of revenge, or retributive justice.¹⁵ The rational and the moral come sharply into conflict here, as Tamora and her sons recognize the threat that Titus poses to them, identifying him as an enemy, and recognizing Roman justice as the actual barbarity—as "cruel, irreligious piety" (1.1.130).¹⁶ In this first exchange, Tamora has perhaps the strongest grasp of ideal Roman values of any char-

acter in the play, and beyond laying claim to them herself, she attempts to hold Titus to those values. The sense of her as the readily identified enemy ‘other’ is counterbalanced not only by the terms of her plea, but also by Titus’ rejection of that plea. His failure to seek a solution that would recognize the value of moral judgment rather than tradition, and thereby transform the obligations of *both* Rome and its enemies, thus fails to lay the groundwork for a more peaceful and stable future. Tamora, then, is not defined in simplistic terms of insurmountable alterity to Rome’s idealized values, nor is Titus clearly an ideal citizen grounded in such values, as becomes increasingly clear as Act 1 unfolds.¹⁷ Shakespeare challenges any easy distinction between friend and enemy in this context.

Saturninus is not present when Tamora makes her plea to Titus, so he has no knowledge of her rational capacity and claims to virtue. When she is presented to him as a spoil of war and a vanquished enemy, he is attracted to her “hue” (1.1.261) comparing her to “the stately Phoebe” who “Dost overshadow the gallant’st dames of Rome” (1.1.316–317), which suggests that, in typical Goth fashion, she is fair-haired and fair-skinned.¹⁸ He assures her that, “Though chance of war hath wrought this change of cheer, / Thou com’st not to be made a scorn in Rome. / Princely shall be thy usage every way” (1.1.264–266), a pledge that again suggests there is no sense of her inherent alterity. This acceptance of her is clearly reinforced when Saturninus’ betrothal to Lavinia is disrupted by Bassianus’ claim on her, and he impulsively offers to make Tamora empress, officially transforming her status from enemy into friend of the state, and elevating her to a social and political position that resonates with the position of a queen in diplomatic marriage.¹⁹ Her plea to Titus earlier in the scene, of which Saturninus remains unaware, establishes her viability for such a role, emphasizing her rational capacity and her understanding of Roman virtues. In accepting the role of empress, she vows to be “a handmaid ... to his desires, / A loving nurse, a mother to his youth” (1.1.331–332), accentuating traditional Elizabethan roles of domestic subservience, suggesting that his needs and desires will dictate her actions, but also calling attention to his youthfulness and implicitly to his incapacities as a man and an emperor. By swearing to such terms “in sight of heaven” and “to Rome” (1.1.329), she acknowledges the scope of her responsibilities, but her actual vow evades the public demands of her new position, emphasizing instead her private duty to the emperor alone.

However, in her subsequent counsel to Saturninus, even more plainly than in her plea to Titus, she demonstrates a clear sense of Roman political

and social values, explicitly recognizing these values and articulating them publicly in order to better conceal her newly forged intentions. Tamora intervenes when Saturninus, having already condemned the Andronici as traitorous threats to his authority and conspirators with Bassianus (1.1.299–307; 309–313), turns his imperious eye on his brother, asserting that “if Rome have laws or we have power / Thou and thy faction shall repent this rape” (1.1.403–404), invoking both law and his power above law.²⁰ She recognizes the danger of Saturninus’ sovereign judgments, and in response explicitly situates herself as an impartial witness of events, one with the capacity to “speak indifferently for all” (1.1.430), urging the new emperor to hear her “suit ... [and] pardon what is past” (1.1.431). Her supposed objectivity rests on her distance from Roman concerns—on her outsider status—as well as on her age, wisdom, and experience as a ruler. Once again, then, Tamora articulates a similarity to Roman virtue, invoking her superior fairness and judgment, in this case literally *because* she has no connection to the contending parties and no personal investment in the events. When Saturninus protests that his honor would be compromised in complying with her advice, Tamora overrides his perceived dishonor with an assertion of her own honor, linking her advice and actions to the guidance of the Roman gods (1.1.434–436). She attests to Titus’ “innocence in all” (1.1.437)—a reference to his actions on Saturninus’ behalf—and characterizes Saturninus’ judgment as “vain suppose” (1.1.440).²¹ She speaks truth in these lines, and offers sound advice, seeming to take up her role as empress in the fullest sense of that term, cognizant of what it means to rule wisely in Rome, and ready to counsel Saturninus to follow that path—or so her public voice suggests. As Shakespeare scripts Tamora, she fully demonstrates an understanding of Roman virtues and values, as well as the capability to serve effectively as the proponent of justice and fairness in the unsteady Roman state—testament to her capacity to overcome difference and mobilize similarity in the service of the commonwealth and commonweal. She has, of course, no actual intention to do so.

The carefully structured contrast between her overt and covert roles offers further insight into Tamora’s cognizance of Roman values, particularly those concerning the sovereign. She also further demonstrates her ability to assess political conditions and offer practical political counsel, advising Saturninus to project a positive image while disguising potentially damaging intentions and actions—stereotypically Machiavellian strategies.²² Indeed, she functions as the only articulate political theorist of the

play, demonstrating her understanding of the demands of Roman citizenship and political participation, as well as of Roman imperial power, the nature of sovereign judgment, and the strategies of survival for state and sovereign. In her clandestine advice that Saturninus hide his “griefs and discontents” (1.1.440), and in her reminder that he is “but newly planted” on his throne (1.1.444), she again asserts a rational perspective to counter his emotional one. She goes on to apprise him of how readily both “the people, and patricians” might recognize his injustice toward Titus, “And so supplant [him] for ingratitude” toward this valued and respected citizen and military leader (1.1.445–447). This admonition reveals that she is fully aware of how Romans view the responsibilities and obligations of their ruler, and stresses the importance of maintaining popular support for his government despite his imperial position and power. This representation of the foreign empress indicates that she has a far greater capacity for sound political judgment than does Saturninus.²³

As she continues, however, she not only offers the self-centered emperor surreptitious assurance that she shares his desire for personal vengeance against the Andronici, but situates herself as the independent agent of retribution. “Yield at entreats” (1.1.449), she coaxes,

and then *let me alone*,
 I'll find a day to massacre them all,
 And raze their faction and their family,
 The cruel father and his traitorous sons
 To whom I sued for my dear son's life,
 And make them know what 'tis to let a queen
 Kneel in the streets and beg for grace in vain.
 (1.1.449–455, emphasis added)

She not only enacts and encourages defensive dissembling, she places herself between Saturninus and his vengeance, requesting that he submit to her will in order to better achieve his own objectives, as well as allowing her to achieve her own. Her oath reveals a hatred of the Andronici at least as deep-seated as that of Saturninus, in sharp contrast to the rational nature of her political advice, but we can see that both the personal vendetta and the political restraint aim to protect her position by securing that of Saturninus. And in identifying the Andronici as a faction, not simply a family, she situates this as a political as well as a personal vendetta.

Having gained a foothold at the center of the political realm through her marriage and her advice, Tamora guides Saturninus in the restoration of Titus, publicly instructing the emperor to “Take up this good old man, and cheer the heart / That dies in tempest of thy angry frown” (1.1.457–458). She then publicly renounces her Goth identity, and thus her alterity: “I am,” Tamora assures the newly reinstated Titus, “incorporate in Rome, / A Roman now adopted happily” (1.1.459–460), an unequivocal assertion of the Romanness she had begged him to recognize just over 300 lines ago. Here, however, she describes an actual transformation—she is no longer threateningly apart from Rome, but now willingly and by mutual consent, a part of Rome. In effect, she implicitly negates fears of her apparent difference and enemy status.²⁴ At the same time, she establishes a metonymic relationship between herself and this new Rome—a relationship in which she incorporates (embodies) and represents the vindictive Roman state.

As she continues, she reveals her understanding of her proper imperial role and of the parameters of friendship to the state, which she did not explicitly acknowledge earlier. She deceptively situates herself as the public peacemaker, declaring “This day all quarrels die, Andronicus” (1.1.462). Asserting a fundamental Roman quality, she adds: “let it be mine *honor*, good my lord, / That I have reconciled your friends and you” (1.1.463–464, emphasis added). In this new role, she has healed a rift and restored the Andronici to the position of friends to the state—or so she publicly proclaims. Turning to Bassianus, she declares, “For you, Prince Bassianus, I have passed / My word and promise to the Emperor / That you will be more mild and tractable” (1.1.465–467), accepting personal and political responsibility for his future actions much as a legal guardian or parent would. Thus, her public actions and assertions position her as holding the good of Rome and the honor of the royal family above any private interests or concerns, and as capable of transcending her status as enemy of Rome, to become a pillar of imperial virtue and a newly forged friend at the heart of the state. The enemy status of the transgressive Roman citizens is negated and Roman unity ostensibly restored, built on Tamora’s mediating presence.

Shakespeare shapes Tamora’s character specifically to introduce this problematic of friendship, employing the term in its various forms repeatedly as the scene draws to a close. Bassianus defends Titus as having “expressed himself in all his deeds / A father and a friend to thee and Rome” (1.1.422–423). When Lucius and Marcus obey Tamora’s advice to “ask pardon of his majesty” (1.1.472–473) and inadvertently rekindle

Saturninus' anger, Tamora, again performing the role of peace-maker with apparent sincerity, smooths over the breach, insisting to Saturninus "we must all be friends" (1.1.479), and extracts from him the pardon that she has so persistently sought. Saturninus concludes by pardoning Lavinia, assuring her that although she "left [him] like a churl" (1.1.485), in her place he has "found a friend" (1.1.485) (Tamora) to replace her, and inviting Lavinia "and [her] friends" (1.1.490) to be his guests in the feasting of both brides. In effect, the extended family of Rome, which now includes the Andronici, Tamora, Bassianus, Saturninus, and Tamora, is pledged in friendship to each other and to Rome at the end of the scene. The danger of being declared and treated as an enemy has been overcome by Tamora's Roman virtue and political acumen, and Saturninus' imperial forgiveness—or so it seems, and so the Andronici seem to believe. In actuality, the Andronici have been declared an internal enemy, and the assurances of friendship merely lull them into acquiescence. Indeed, with the good of the commonweal and the state set aside in the interest of personal vengeance by both Tamora and Saturninus, the internal enemies are clearly those who wield sovereign power, not those who respond to or resist it. The situation cannot be dealt with in terms of Schmitt's model, in which the values and way of life of the society are protected through the sovereign decision on the exception. Clearly, the sovereigns are the greatest threat, and potentially the greatest enemies to the commonweal. Saturninus confuses self-righteousness with rightful sovereign action, but Tamora knows the difference between political virtue and the course she has chosen to steer.

SOVEREIGNTY, INJUSTICE, AND THE UNCERTAINTIES OF VENGEANCE

Tamora's Gendered Condition

Although Tamora has apparently taken the reins in the pursuit of vengeance against the Andronici, she articulates no plan to act against her sworn enemies, and initiates no actions against them during the course of the play. Neither does she offer any resistance to Rome itself, readily accepting a reconfiguration of her status and title in the promise of life, relative liberty, and political power, and much like Saturninus, endeavoring to secure that position mainly by securing Saturninus' imperial authority. When she does pursue violence, the motive is quite distinct from her revenge vow. Her

main reason for acting against the Andronici is the threatened revelation of her infidelity to Saturninus, which emerges first in Act 2, scene 3, and remains fundamental to her choices throughout the remainder of the play. Thus, even as the most compelling transgressions against the Andronici occur in 2.3, eventually triggering their reciprocal vows of vengeance, Tamora's own actions in the scene are disconnected almost entirely from her initial vengeance vow, and are instead formulated to emphasize the gendered nature of her moral and political malfeasance.²⁵

Multiple plot threads involving transgressive sexuality develop in these first few scenes, all connected to the new ruling family. Saturninus embraces Tamora, not because of her apparent virtue, but because of her physical attractiveness. His infantilization is made explicit when she promises to be his nursemaid, and her capacity to control him through sexual means is introduced by Aaron at 2.1.23–24, when he calls her “This siren, that will charm Rome’s Saturnine, / And see his shipwreck and his commonweal’s.” Aaron, in parallel, uses sexual means to control Tamora, whom he “in triumph long / Hast prisoner held, fettered in amorous chains” (2.1.14–15). Under Aaron’s tutelage, Tamora’s sons are deflected from relatively acceptable, unrequited Petrarchan sexual passion, toward the violent Tarquinian conquest of their object of desire, Lavinia. This superfluity of sexual transgressiveness functions in specific, necessary ways to limit the range of responses to Tamora, in particular, and to her intimates as well—Aaron, Demetrius, Chiron, and Saturninus. The loss of her son Alarbus through sacrifice renders Tamora potentially a sympathetic figure, one whose unlawful actions might be understood as a response to the state’s failure to offer law and justice, and to constitute a necessary turn to retributive justice when civil justice has lapsed. If she were presented as exacting personal vengeance for her son’s execution, that act of vengeance might seem acceptable, or even heroic. Instead, linked to Rome’s lost capacity to make moral choices supportive of the common good, her transgressive sexuality becomes the means through which her moral corruption can be demonstrated most easily, and Shakespeare takes pains to ensure that her dangerous sexuality rather than her desire for retributive justice dominates her decisions.

In Act 2, scene 3, as Tamora and Aaron meet in the forest, she appears almost completely uninvested in the plot that he outlines for her, caught up instead in her desire for an alfresco sexual dalliance, which contrasts explicitly with the ‘Blood and revenge ... hammering in [Aaron’s] head’ (2.3.39). Aaron informs her directly what will occur (2.3.42–44), but she

appears either unaware of or uninterested in the general plan and the specific details until directly instructed by him in how to function in the upcoming interactions. She receives from Aaron the letter written by him to implicate Quintus and Martius, which he delivers to her with dismissive instructions to “Give the king this fatal-plotted scroll” and “question me no more” (2.3.48–49), not even bothering to reiterate this part of plot. He also instructs her to instigate a quarrel with the approaching Bassianus, which her sons will “back” whatever the nature of the conflict (2.3.52–54). In this first interaction, Tamora clearly lacks interest in vengeance, and instead, concupiscence dominates her behavior.

As the scene develops, it is not the recollection of her vow of vengeance that wrenches her attention away from sexual pleasure, but Bassianus and Lavinia’s chiding for her inappropriate seclusion with Aaron. Inferring a sexual liaison from the circumstances in which they find her, and from rumor, Bassianus affirms “The king my brother shall have notice of this,” and Lavinia adds “Ay, for these slips have made him noted long, / Good king to be so mightily abused” (2.3.85–87).²⁶ In agreeing to leave her to “joy her raven-coloured love” (2.3.83) while they set off to inform Saturninus of her infidelity, the couple places Tamora in an intensely vulnerable position. In early modern England, whether or not in Rome, the adultery of the sovereign’s wife was considered treason, a capital crime.²⁷

When Tamora’s sons enter, she claims that Bassianus and Lavinia have called her a “foul adulteress” and a “[1]ascivious Goth” (2.3.109; 110)—her own words, not theirs. She assures Chiron and Demetrius that these accusations are false, but explains that her accusers have threatened to bind and leave her overnight in this “barren detested vale” (2.3.100–104), aiming to expose her to its horrors, and drive her mad or cause her to die of fright. She thereby suggests that the two have threatened to directly avenge these spurious transgressions, circumventing law and undermining justice. In making these false accusations, Tamora situates herself as a victim of vengeance, suggesting that such vengeance cannot be answered within the system of law, but only through violence in kind: “This vengeance on me they had executed. / Revenge it, as you love your mother’s life, / Or be ye not henceforth called my children” (2.3.113–115).²⁸ Her sons do so immediately, killing Bassianus as they have always intended to do.

The plot to kill Bassianus, hatched by Aaron in order to prevent the prince from revealing the identities of Lavinia’s violators, becomes for Tamora a means to prevent the exposure of her own transgressions. Her accusations transform her sons’ pragmatic murder into a defense of her

‘wrongfully’ maligned virtue, while preempting any comments from the royal couple that might reveal her sexual infidelity. Bent on that objective, she then demands the poniard used to kill Bassianus, so that she can “right [her] wrongs” by killing Lavinia with her own hand (2.3.121)—a simple expedient that would safeguard her secret infidelity by ridding her of the only other witness. Her sons, of course, resist this demand, reminding Tamora that they have other plans for Lavinia—indeed, their intention to ravage Lavinia lies at the very center of these events, the sole reason for the murder of Bassianus and for the framing of Quintus and Martius that follows. When Tamora agrees that they can proceed with Lavinia’s defilement, she indicates that their victim should not be allowed to “outlive” their assault, which would endanger all of them (2.3.132). None of this has clearly to do with either the insults Saturninus has imagined, or the sacrifice of Alarbus. Tamora’s initial vengeance vow has no discernible part in her desire to destroy these foes who have threatened to divulge her infidelity, and despite her assertions, what they *have* threatened is not vengeance, but sovereign authority and law as the remedy for her moral transgressions.

This lack of commitment to her initial vengeance vow continues during her interaction with Lavinia. Lavinia shifts between invocations of the inherent qualities of idealized womanhood shared by her and Tamora, assertions of Tamora’s brutality for failing to embrace that female similarity, and pleas that she make a moral choice rather than acting on innate, barbaric character. None of this has any effect, but Tamora does begin to speak in a different register when Lavinia reminds Tamora of Titus’ pity on her, having granted her life when she was captive and “when well he might have slain thee” (2.3.159). Suddenly recalling the initial cause of her vengeance vow, Tamora declares that, if Lavinia had “in person ne’er offended [her], / Even for [Titus’] sake [is she] pitiless” (2.3.162). She now makes this the reason for Lavinia’s abuse: “Therefore away with her, and use her as you will; The worse for her, the better loved of me” (2.3.166–167). Yet, despite her words, we know this is *not* the reason for the upcoming abuses—they lie at the center of the plan, the cause of all that has and will occur in this scene. Tamora’s words make her seem culpable for the rape, which would likely have occurred even without her agreement. Her vengeance vow returns to the forefront, but there exist only oblique connections between the motives for her actions in this scene and her once-again-overt commitment to the obliteration of the Andronici.

Throughout the scene, other characters’ various references to revenge are similarly out of step with what we understand as their actual motivations.

Twice in Act 2, scene 1, Aaron refers to *Tamora's* desire for vengeance (2.1.24; 122), but never to his *own*, so his claim early in this scene that vengeance is “hammering in my head,” seems as fabricated as his flattering assurances to Tamora which immediately follow, describing her as “empress of my soul” (2.3.39; 40). In his perspective, he sits at the apex of the socio-political hierarchy manipulating those below him, including Tamora, and he situates himself as committing evil for its own sake, not as a retributive rebalancing of wrongs by wrongs.²⁹ Chiron and Demetrius, as though convinced to kill Bassianus by her extravagant tale, readily comply with Tamora's demand for revenge, verbally and physically making that murder seem to be an impulsive act of vengeance, rather than the premeditated and expedient means to other ends that it actually is. With vengeance so problematically invoked by each of these characters, Shakespeare seems at pains to undermine the notion of revenge as a motive for what transpires in the woods, despite the apparent connection to Tamora's vow against the Andronici and their “faction.” Tamora's actions are mainly grounded in self-protection against the revelation of her infidelity, her sons seek sexual satisfaction, not retributive justice, and Aaron admits to gaining nothing tangible from this plot: the point, for him, is to “beget / A very excellent piece of villainy” (2.3.6–7). The scene, far from establishing a clear relationship between claims to vengeance and acts done in its name, underscores how readily revenge can be falsely invoked, and how unfixed it is in its origins or justifications. The deliberate misalignment of cause and effect related to Tamora's actions in 2.3 reflects also on the secret retribution vows of Saturninus in Act 1.

While destabilizing the logic of vengeance, the scene pointedly establishes and emphasizes the significance of Tamora's sexual infidelity. Not only does the threat of revelation drive her toward active violence, but her compromised position vis-à-vis Roman values and Roman stability works to define one of the most central oppositional dynamics of the play, and in fact, one of the only oppositions that actually remains stable as the play unfolds—the opposition between chastity and licentiousness. While Goths in general are not depicted as ‘lascivious’, Tamora is distinguished from other Goths, set apart from Roman characters, and situated in contrast to Lavinia by her explicitly sexual intractability, portrayed as a deeply rooted moral disorder which also marks her sons, and which sweeps destructively across the social and political landscape. The play, with its frequent mythological references, invites metaphorical, allegorical, and analogical interpretations of its events, and through such interpretations, these oppositional

sexual characteristics can be linked to *moral* virtue and vice more generally, and thus to *political* virtue and corruption, as defined both in classical and early modern political theory, and in the interactions of the play.

As Tamora and Lavinia confront each other in this scene, Lavinia begs to die rather than face the destruction of her chastity, that primary female virtue, which stands as proxy for the ideals of Roman political virtue, a figurative representation of what is at stake, and what can be lost, in the failure of justice and democratic process. Her resulting trauma makes visible Rome's dismembered justice, and embodies the condition of the maimed political system in general.³⁰ When Marcus finds her wandering in the forest, he laments that formerly, "kings have sought to sleep in" the "circling shadows" of her arms (2.4.19), but she now stands despoiled of that diplomatic and political functionality, a transformation that emphasizes her allegorical relationship to the Roman polity.³¹ By contrast, in addition to Tamora's known moral defiance, the insistent maternal imagery of Lavinia's entreaties to Tamora, Chiron, and Demetrius, as well as her truncated appeal to Tamora's potential womanly kindness (2.3.136), and her final lamentation, "No grace, no womanhood? Ah, beastly creature, / The blot and enemy of our general name!" (2.3.182–183), further situate Tamora as fulfilling a woman's designated roles, but doing so as the antithesis of womanly propriety. Beyond this more obvious negative status, Tamora's sexual, procreative, and maternal functions are literally productive of the evils that plague Rome—evils embodied and perpetrated by her sons and her lover. As an extension of her moral menace, in the logic of the play the licentiousness and viciousness of her sons situate her as the source of Rome's political and moral ravishment, through the acts committed against Lavinia. This relationship is made more explicit in Tamora's masquerade as Revenge in Act 5, scene 2, in which her sons play the roles of Rape and Murder, their depraved actions directly linked to her impersonated identity. Lavinia herself, bereft of her social and political value as a wife and mother, remains potentially the vessel for the germinating seed of this sexual assault, a further possible perpetuation of Tamora's immorality through her sons' foul act.

Finally, no mere woman, Tamora is revealed as the incarnation of imperial corruption, its façade undamaged but its function distorted from beneficent nurture to malevolent impairment. Her lasciviousness marks her degraded moral condition, while her sexuality serves as the main tool of her subjugation of Saturninus, "lull[ing] him whilst she playeth on her back" (4.1.98), incapacitating him and thereby enabling her to exercise

her will in his place. The threat she poses is repeatedly framed in sexual and maternal terms, situating her as the literal and figurative matrix of Rome's ruin, despite the relative lack of direct damage attributable to her.³² Her transgressions remain generally unknown, however, so that her son by Aaron, an obvious manifestation of her adultery, becomes the one tangible piece of evidence against her, silently testifying to her moral depravity, "Our Empress' shame and Stately Rome's disgrace," as the Nurse describes him (4.2.60).³³ The child's blackness reflects, not his own evil but his mother's, as well as Aaron's "stamp" and "seal" upon her and the child (4.2.69). Additionally, the reference to Muletius' white baby (4.2.152–154) reminds us that Tamora's adultery might have remained hidden, an undetected threat to patriarchal and political order.³⁴ Tamora's understanding of Roman values, made so clear in 1.1, serves as the inverse of her embodied identity, the valences of her enemy status intensifying as her moral corruption becomes explicitly defined, and as she embeds herself more deeply into the political system as the emperor's ostensible friend, counselor, and soulmate. Indeed, she repeatedly advocates absolutist values that support Saturninus' imperial claims, but that conflict with a more democratic, deliberative model of politics that is idealized, if generally out of reach, in the play. It becomes clear that rational understanding, which she demonstrates effectively in the first Act, is insufficient to secure the good of the citizens and the state through appropriate sovereign judgment and action. The play strongly suggests that moral commitment, or submission to what early modern political theorists refer to as 'divine law', is the necessary correlative to reason and civil law. Only through this framework can friend be distinguished from enemy. Tamora has become an internal enemy, not because her Goth identity is indelibly other, but because, as the play constructs her, she is driven to destabilizing, destructive pragmatic actions by her moral depravity, which belongs to her alone, not to her Goth heritage or culture.

In keeping with this overall shift away from revenge and toward moral corruption, Tamora's vengeance gains no additional momentum in the succeeding Acts of the play. In Act 3, scene 1, she and Saturninus return Titus' severed hand "in scorn," along with the heads of his sons, and are reported to have made "[His] grief their sports" (3.1.236–237). Saturninus refers to the executions as punishment "by law" (4.4.53), while Tamora knows the killings to be both wrongful and unjust, though necessary to prevent suspicion from falling on her own sons. Expediency, not vengeance, motivates her here, while Saturninus, unaware of the actual events,

takes his autocratic political cues from her. In Act 4, scene 2, the Nurse brings Aaron their child, conveying Tamora's directive to "christen it with thy dagger's point" (4.2.70)—an explicit order for the murder of her own flesh and blood, and his. Aaron's resistance to the commanded infanticide is generally perceived as grounded in parental pride and affection, and thus as an uncharacteristic sign of humanity, but he also expresses obvious satisfaction in the child as the material and symbolic marker of his disruptive power, explicitly at odds with Tamora's desire to excise this manifestation of her infidelity. Tamora readily rejects the familial bond, recognizing how indelibly the child marks her as an outsider and enemy, intent on eliminating this visible sign of her moral alterity, and far more interested in securing her own position through the child's death than in vengeance against her own supposed foes and Rome's—the Andronici. The scene again emphasizes the weakness of vengeance as a motive for her actions, and the escalating violence resulting from her initial sexual choices. Interlinking her sexual, social, familial, and political violations, and positioning Saturninus as the dupe of her schemes, Shakespeare situates the moral judgment of the ruler as inseparable from the sovereign decision, suggesting that personal corruption and political virtue cannot coexist.

Tamora next appears in Act 4, scene 4, following the scene in which Titus and his cohort make appeals to divine justice as a remedy to Rome's afflictions. That, too, signals the opposition between mere rational understanding, which seems beyond Titus at this point, and the necessity of divine law, to which he makes his bizarre appeals. Hearing of Titus' actions, Tamora initially mollifies Saturninus, counseling him to calm his anger concerning these implicit accusations of injustice, and to show forbearance toward the distressed man for his age and his woes—wise political advice aimed at stabilizing the volatile Roman commonwealth. She situates Titus as a disempowered fool, one whose actions are unthreatening, immaterial, and symbolic, rather than intentional material assaults. Even when Aemilius enters and informs them of the external threat posed by Lucius and his army of Goths, as well as the internal threat posed by the citizens, she attempts to reignite Saturninus' failing imperial confidence and dismisses the now-evident peril. She assures him that the mere reminder of his sovereign presence, like the passing "shadow of [the eagle's] wings" will quell any opposition from the "giddy men of Rome" (4.4.84; 86), promoting absolutist authority over concern for the commonweal and his discontented common subjects. She proposes to remove the apparent spurs to this popular discontent, to "enchant" Titus with

words “sweet and ... dangerous” (4.4.88–89) and to persuade him “with golden promises” to induce Lucius to abandon his army of Goths and return to Rome (4.4.96). Her dismissal of the Andronici’s potential for actual political resistance situates their defiance as a fleeting reaction to their perceived wrongs, but not as a serious challenge to imperial sovereign authority. Her fear that her sexual transgressions will be discovered has been assuaged, her vows of vengeance forgotten. Her current aims and interests are to secure her position by securing the position of the emperor, and to rule Rome by ruling him. The order to execute the hapless Clown emphasizes the mundane violence of their tyrannical sovereign authority—the state of exception has, as Benjamin suggests of more recent, real-world events, become the norm.³⁵

There is little indication of what Tamora intends even as she undertakes her theatrical inducement of Titus in Act 5, scene 2. Certainly, if we are to believe that she has a plan to take advantage of this moment and annihilate her remaining foes when they are gathered under one roof, this scene provides an ideal opportunity for her to reveal that plan in some way, either in an aside or in a later monologue. However, at no point does she refer to an intention to commit violence on her avowed adversaries, and indicates instead that the banquet is a mere distraction which will afford the opportunity to disband the Goths or turn them against the Andronici:

And, whilst I at a banquet hold [Lucius] sure,
I'll find some cunning practice out of hand,
To scatter and disperse the giddy Goths,
Or, at the least, make them his enemies.
(5.2.76–79)

It appears, not only that she is far removed from her intentions to destroy the Andronici, but also that she has no apparent designs on the destruction of Rome or Saturninus, even as her own former subjects rally against the Roman state. She offers no indication that she is aiming at a more violent outcome, and there is no undercurrent of vengeance in this attempt at beguilement.

She also evinces a surprising lack of concern about the safety of the imperial entourage in the upcoming parley. In promising Titus the opportunity to confront “The Empress and her sons, / The Emperor himself, and all thy foes” at his banquet (5.2.116–117), where “at thy mercy they shall stoop and kneel, / And on them shalt thou ease thy angry heart” (5.2.118–119), Tamora acknowledges the danger to which she exposes

herself and her family with her plan. There would be no point in placing themselves in Titus' hands if she imagined that they would come to harm, but as this scene is set up, she underestimates both Titus' perceptions of Saturninus' culpability for the failure of justice, and his readiness to act against the sovereign to whom he demonstrated such fealty earlier in the play. Similarly, unaware that Lavinia has revealed her sons' guilt, and that Aaron's hand trick and the sovereigns' scorn for Titus' good-faith offer of ransom have transformed the Andronici, she fails to see herself or her sons as probable targets of vengeful violence. She willingly places Chiron and Demetrius in Titus' custody and she herself later returns under her own volition. She remains unconcerned, even when Titus suggests that, as Revenge, she should show her good intentions by killing Rape and Murder directly on the spot (5.2.45–47). She also ignores his suggestion that her 'minions' should go into the "wicked streets of Rome" and to the "Emperor's court" and "do . . . some violent death" on Chiron, Demetrius, and Tamora because "They have been violent to me and mine" (5.2.98–109). She pledges to do exactly as Titus has suggested, indicating that she sees him as passively reliant on her and her actions, unwilling or unable to take up the rod of vengeance for himself.

By her exit in 5.2, she appears to have achieved the sum of what she has planned—Titus has agreed to hold the banquet, call Lucius back to Rome, and confront his enemies in his home. She tells her sons that she will now return to Saturninus and inform him "How I have governed our determined jest" (5.2.139), affirming that what we heard her propose in Act 4, scene 4, and undertake in her conversation with Titus in Act 5, scene 2, represents the entire scheme. This aside to her sons would be the ideal moment for Shakespeare to indicate that something more threatening has been put in place, but no such indication is offered. Rather, Tamora seems to assume that Titus remains a good subject despite his woes, and that finally, his obedience to sovereign authority will win out over his desire to avenge his family's wrongs.³⁶ As he builds toward the final scene of the play, Shakespeare emphasizes Tamora's complete retreat from vengeance as her driving force, as well as her illusions about her own influence and capabilities, her failure to appreciate her opponents' sense of wrong, and her misjudgment of their willingness and capacity to act against their acknowledged foes. It is as though she now believes the metaphor of the imperious eagle with which she soothed Saturninus in Act 4, scene 4, while the audience sees the ironic hubris of her position.

From Good Subject to Good Citizen

As the play traces out the trajectory of the Andronici's turn against Saturninus, it reveals the difficulty of the transformation from obedient subject to resistant citizen, especially accentuating Titus' reluctance to face the breakdown of the hierarchical system in which he has so confidently invested and from which he has so frequently benefited. His confidence in sovereign favor surfaces at several points in Act 1, shouts out ironically in Act 2, scene 2, and despite the trampling of judicial process the end of Act 2, scene 3, even there Titus submits to sovereign authority. Indeed, he expects Saturninus' to accept bail for his sons, pledging that they "shall be ready at your highness' will / To answer their suspicion with their lives" (2.3.297–298). Saturninus ignores Titus' pledge to stand as guarantor of his sons' submission, asserting their guilt beyond doubt and proclaiming his intention to exact the most severe punishment possible: "Let them not speak a word—the guilt is plain; / For by my soul, were there worse end than death, / That end upon them should be executed" (2.3.301–303). The trappings of proof are present—the two Andronici in the pit with Bassianus' body, the letter plotting his death, the bag of gold mentioned in the letter. However, as in other instances of sovereign judgment, the process of judicial consideration is absent, trodden underfoot as Saturninus enacts the sovereign decision, encouraged by Tamora and, as we soon learn, supported by the Tribunes. Nevertheless, Titus obeys Saturninus' command to follow him (2.3.299), and offers no consolation to his captive sons, obedient despite his ill treatment by the emperor. Similarly, he accepts Tamora's dissembling promise to intervene on his sons' behalf, apparently still convinced, as he indicates to Marcus in Act 1, that she will be "beholding to the man / That brought her for this high good turn so far" and will "nobly him remunerate" (1.1.396–398). He remains, at this point, an obedient subject, confident in the system that has favored and honored him.

His expectation of special consideration surfaces again as he pleads for the lives of his sons at the beginning of Act 3. There, he invokes his age, his service to Rome, and his "blood in Rome's great quarrel shed" (3.1.4), a plea that reaffirms his longstanding status as Rome's great friend, defender, and supporter. He situates his own value and virtue as the basis for a stay of execution from the Tribunes and Judges, perhaps in the interest of opening the way to a fair trial, with appropriate judicial process and judgment. It is clear that the Tribunes and Judges have the capacity to intervene and override Saturninus' judgment, but they fail to do so, and in that failure, allow

the emperor's will to displace law and reasoned judgment.³⁷ Shakespeare, then, emphasizes the lack of concern for justice, not only in the already compromised and tyrannical Saturninus, but in the entire Roman judicial system. The failure of the Tribunes to heed Titus' plea for pity, or provide a context in which to weigh the evidence against the accused murderers of Bassianus, becomes a primary factor in destabilizing Titus' commitment to Saturninus. This suggests that judicial *process* is as important to the beleaguered general as judicial *outcome*, and that some counter-measure to sovereign judgment is needed to achieve justice. The Tribunes represent Titus' last hope for justice within the Roman political and social system, and when his plea to them fails, that hope also begins to fail.

Thus, when Lucius reveals his banishment, Titus takes it as a release from the subjection that Rome imposes on its citizens—"they have befriended thee," he tells his son (3.1.52), situating his declared enemy status as a favor granted by the internal enemies of the commonweal. His assertion that "Rome is but a wilderness of tigers" (3.1.54), acknowledges that his cherished state is no longer a civil society where true justice reigns, but a place beyond law where the shared obligation to fair treatment, duty, and obedience are neglected rather than protected, and where the state's committed friends can be treated as enemies with impunity. With the devastating entrance of Lavinia, Shakespeare draws the parallel between Titus' own symbolic dismemberment as a citizen and subject, and Lavinia's actual condition. Nevertheless, when Aaron arrives, supposedly sent by Saturninus, to deliver the false offer to accept Titus' hand as ransom for his condemned sons, Titus praises the emperor as "gracious" and the offer as "sweet tidings," deeming the harsh ransom an "easy price" for his sons' lives (3.1.157; 159, 197). Just as he readily accepts Saturninus' forgiveness and functions as though he were fully comfortable in his favor and status following the fracture of their amity in Act I, he again embraces what he takes to be the emperor's terms of forgiveness here, despite the horrific sacrifice they represent. Notwithstanding his wavering confidence in the system to which he has devoted himself, Titus seems always ready to compromise when Saturninus makes a demand. Here, his willingness to be dismembered in order to prevent the beheading of his sons suggests a willingness to relinquish political agency, and to submit to Saturninus' absolute political authority, to his power-above-law.³⁸ It also makes material the rhetorical and metaphorical dismemberment of which Titus has so recently complained, substituting his material loss for the symbolic lack of political potency.

Finally, the return of his own hand with the severed heads of his sons, along with report of the imperial couple's "scorn" and mockery of his ransom offer and his grief (3.1.235–237), confirms Titus' view of them as enemies to himself and to Rome, and it is only after this ultimate outrage that he commits himself to vengeance. At this moment, so recently willing to accept Saturninus as a friend to him and to Rome—though a terribly harsh one—Titus now recognizes Saturninus' failure to maintain justice and security within the state as a moral as well as a political failure, stemming from his personal weakness, but reverberating through the system as a whole. His immediate plan addresses these systemic and imperial failures as well as the wrongs against his family, as he bids Lucius to take up his exile: "Hie thee to the Goths and raise an army there" (3.1.284). Lucius pledges to do so, vowing to "requite your wrongs, / And make proud Saturnine and his empress / Beg at the gates like Tarquin and his queen" (3.1.295–297). Accepting that the path to Rome's salvation lies in the elimination of the emperor, Lucius explicitly pairs Tamora with Saturninus in his pledge to overthrow this regime, the metaphor of the maimed state and its ruler's incontinence echoing in his invocation of Tarquin, with Tamora's culpability for Saturninus' corruption implied in their shared future punishment.³⁹

Until this point, Titus has apparently held to the belief that Roman ideals have existed as a possible reality even under an abusive absolute sovereign, and has imagined that his defense of his *emperor* is a defense of those ideals. Now he begins to see his homeland in a different light, as a place where the sovereign's arbitrary judgments undermine the values and virtues of its citizens—a situation directly related to, reflected in—and as Titus now knows—intensified by his embrace of Tamora and acceptance of Aaron. If Titus appears in Act 1 to favor a unified, undivided version of sovereignty, and to see patriarchal and sovereign authority as similarly unilateral, by Act 3 he has begun to see that such a model of government creates tyranny and undermines positive virtues and values, at least at the level of the state. That Titus inquires whether Saturninus himself might be responsible for Lavinia's assault (4.1.62) indicates how far his view of Saturninus has fallen from his granting of the diadem in Act 1, and reaffirms the link between his maimed daughter and the maimed state. In depicting this turn away from the emperor, Shakespeare suggests that it must be possible for the citizens to judge the sovereign and to make for themselves the sovereign decision concerning friend and enemy. He thereby indicates that the preservation of the state may require the citizen

to “bring about a real emergency,” to become an enemy of the sovereign in order to remain a friend of the state.⁴⁰ As the play’s final scenes suggest, however, doing so may undermine the very values, and severely damage the institutions, that such actions seek to preserve.

When Lavinia reveals the identities of her assailants, Marcus again invokes Tarquin’s rape of Lucrece, taking Brutus’ vow as the pattern for their own pledge to “prosecute ... / Mortal revenge upon these traitorous Goths” (4.1.91–92), and explicitly linking this particular crime to the larger political transgressions that Lavinia’s mutilated body symbolizes. Titus, however, reveals his awareness of Tamora’s central role in the traumas they have experienced, and identifies her as the main threat they will have to face in the future. He advises Marcus not to act precipitously to obtain vengeance against Chiron and Demetrius, cautioning him,

... if you hunt these bear-whelps, then beware:
 The dam will wake an if she wind ye once;
 She’s with the lion deeply still in league,
 And lulls him whilst she playeth on her back;
 And when he sleeps will she do what she list.
 (4.1.95–99)

With this suggestion that Tamora has sexually beguiled Saturninus, and the concern that, when his attention is elsewhere she operates with a free hand, places relatively full responsibility on her for the injustice suffered by the Andronici, while also implying that Saturninus has neglected his sovereign duties to dally with his new empress. Largely, Saturninus is seen as undermined by his own sexual dependency, by his relative unmanliness under Tamora’s influence. Such implications resonate with the symbolic implications of Tamora’s interaction with Lavinia, discussed in the previous section.

Titus also takes personal responsibility for the miseries of Rome, acknowledging that his decision to “thr[o]w the people’s suffrage” on Saturninus has enabled this tyrannical sovereignty (4.3.19–20). This suggests that he sees it as his corollary responsibility to correct the problems Saturninus’ rule has wrought. The Andronici articulate no immediate plan for avenging Lavinia’s wrongs, but the commitment to a *coup d’état* remains alive, as we are reminded in Act 4, scene 3. There, Marcus hopes that Lucius will be successful in his bid to “Join with the Goths and with revengeful war / Take wreak on Rome for this ingratitude, / And vengeance on the traitor Saturnine” (4.3.33–35).⁴¹ In this same scene, the

petitions to the gods, particularly Astrea and Pluto, emphasize the absent relationship between justice, moral order, and divine law, which Titus expresses in personified, symbolic terms. The judgment of Saturninus as a traitor suggests that the emperor has abandoned his commitments to Rome, and with this reference, Marcus, Tribune for the common subjects, makes it clear that the Andronici have seized sovereign authority and openly declared the emperor to be an internal enemy, justifying the rejection of his legitimacy and the rebellion against him. Given that Marcus is a Tribune, and the people of Rome are willing to follow the Andronici in overthrowing Saturninus for his tyranny, the action has legitimacy, according to at least some political theorists of the period.⁴² Yet, vengeance suggests personal retribution, not political rectification, and thus, in relation to the ideal of rational, morally grounded political order, the notion of vengeance against a tyrant is out of place, a personal response to a political problem. However, through its allegorical, personified depiction of political wrongs, the play destabilizes the distinction between personal and political transgressions and responses, intertwining them in ways that reveal their inseparability in the context of embodied monarchy. By framing the overthrow of Saturninus as retribution for his destruction of Roman justice, and the execution of Chiron, Demetrius, and Tamora as vengeance for their defilement of Lavinia (as the embodiment of Roman virtue), the Andronici's vow reveals the intertwined personal and the political motives for their actions.

Vengeance and the Breaking of the Commonwealth

Tamora's plan to beguile Titus by appearing to him as Revenge and winning his cooperation opens the way to the more personal aspect of the Andronici's two-pronged vengeance plan. From the moment Titus gains custody of Chiron and Demetrius, he wastes no time in setting this plan into motion, immediately binding them, reciting their transgressions against him and his, informing them of the fate that awaits them, and undertaking it, providing an onstage spectacle of the first phase of their "martyr[dom]" (5.2.180). They are not solely the targets of his revenge, however—they are also the means of his vengeance on Tamora, made explicit through his invocation of Procne's revenge on Tereus, which implicitly situates her as the main target despite his lack of tangible proof of her guilt.

I have suggested above that Tamora can be understood as the antithesis to Lavinia, her lasciviousness and abusive imperial position set against and destructive of justice and virtue, Roman ideals embodied by Lavinia. Beyond this figurative opposition, Shakespeare seems intent upon establishing Tamora's responsibility in more oblique, more abstract ways that are comprehensible within the logic of the Roman world of the play. Although Tamora has not, herself, committed a single act of violence in this play, and has little direct culpability for the violence that occurs, Titus nevertheless seems to arrive at an analogical justification for his actions against her. The dynamics of the play suggest that she holds the duty to ensure morally appropriate behavior in her offspring, just as Saturninus is obligated to uphold justice and security among Roman subjects, and just as Titus is expected to rule his family as *paterfamilias*. Titus makes the link between sovereignty and patriarchy evident in Act I, where he enacts his authority as *paterfamilias* in agreeing to the sacrifice of Alarbus, and in killing Mutius for his lawlessness, and also when he selects Saturninus as, in effect, the *paterfamilias* of Rome. The play situates Tamora as responsible for her family in ways that echo the model of Roman and English patriarchal family structure, through her claims in Act I to hold a parental position parallel to that of Titus, and through her willing cooperation rather than parental correction in the plot against Lavinia and Bassianus.⁴³

The role of the sovereign similarly required moral control over the self as well as the nation. During the reign of Elizabeth I, in particular, the moral status of the queen was a constant topic of concern, and her own assertions of virginity and purity reveal how difficult it was to separate physical from moral respectability, and effective self-rule from effective rule of the nation. The accounts of her speech to her troops before the battle of Tilbury, however inaccurate or constructed they may be, reflect a desire to situate the English queen as a courageous, powerful, and unrelenting opponent of Spanish Catholic incursion, who figures her military defense of her realm as the self-defense of her physical body and moral integrity.⁴⁴ In an extension of this metaphor of martial purity, a Dutch engraving dated 1598 depicts her in cartographic form as a martial, regnal map-figure who embodies Europe, her sword-bearing (or scepter-bearing) arm formed of Britain, her other arm incorporating Italy and holding her orb of office.⁴⁵ The body of the queen and the body of the empire are one in this image, and the defense of the latter would inevitably take the form of the defense of the former. These images of queenship and power suggest the cultivation of a sense of sovereignty that intersects

inseparably with the sense of physical continence and the moral integrity that both supported and extended beyond the physical, to encompass social and political ethics more broadly.⁴⁶

Tamora, then, conflicts sharply with the necessary ideal of queenly continence, and with the associated demands for moral leadership, both as a mother and as an empress. The targeting of Tamora is also logical in terms of early modern views of women and their social roles, which held that women were expected to accept their subordination to their husbands and to enforce hierarchy within the household—roles that situated them as guardians of both social and moral order. In running a thrifty and efficient household, maintaining children's respect for and obedience to their social superiors, and participating in public forms of social correction, a woman's moral integrity, while often under critique for failures, was central to maintaining the integrity of her family.⁴⁷ A woman's own moral comportment, self-containment, and self-direction were closely linked, evinced by her effective guidance and oversight of her offspring, while poor housewifery and moral laxness were almost inevitably conjoined.⁴⁸ Tamora need not commit crimes personally and actively in order to be held accountable, then, and Shakespeare represents Titus as especially interested in asserting her ultimate culpability for the crimes of her progeny. He informs Demetrius and Chiron, as he prepares to execute them, that he will bake their heads into pies and "bid that strumpet, your unhallowed dam, / Like to the earth swallow her own increase" (5.2.190–191), doubling Procne's vengeance on Tereus. The analogy emphasizes the direct responsibility of Tamora, placing her in the situation of the rapist Tereus, while the ritualized and formalized nature of the execution of Tamora's sons underscores their guilt and situates Titus' vengeance as appropriate justice, negating any sense of parallel between Procne's son and these two.

In effect, Tamora's sons are figured as the external projection of her inner corruption, rendering visible what is hidden within her, much as Rome's disabled justice is made visible through Lavinia's and Titus' dismemberment. Additionally, they are products of debasing nurture by Aaron, whose access to them is enabled by Tamora's sexual infatuation and transgressions, which situates her morally proscribed behavior as an avenue for her offspring's moral corruption as well, again placing responsibility on her as well as on them. Yet, the need to target her for vengeance despite the limited evidence of her guilt suggests that she represents something beyond her own corrupt nature. Although Tamora is not present in this scene, the two women once again work as counterpoints to each

other, with Tamora's embodiment of the actualities of the Roman imperial state emphasizing its autocratic, self-serving, and immoral basis, in contrast to Lavinia's personification of its ideal, morally grounded, beneficial—and disabled—form. Chiron and Demetrius' ravishment of Lavinia gives physical form to the political destruction wrought by their mother's influence, an extension and materialization of her political effect.

Indeed, the play inverts the image of Queen Elizabeth's purity and self-declared protection of the English state, to offer the threatening image of a foreign queen of deleterious moral character insinuating herself into and undermining Rome's (actually already deteriorating) idealized state. Tamora initiates a conquest from within, which Saturninus is too self-interested and too morally weak to resist, and exacerbates the already-existent conflicts between personal and communal benefit among the elite of Rome.⁴⁹ Thus, in an analogy to Elizabeth I in her idealized embodiment of England, transgressions against Lavinia's chastity and integrity (physical and moral) instigate a martial, political vengeance scheme as well as a personal one, Lucius with his *coup d'état*, Titus with his bloody banquet. Saturninus, too, becomes culpable in this analogy. His impulsive choice of the captive Goth queen as his empress and wife suggests that, beyond lacking the political awareness or diplomatic concern that typically shaped royal marriages to foreign spouses, the match represents the dominion of desire over reason, and Tamora repeatedly takes advantage of that tendency in Saturninus.⁵⁰ Even if he never transgresses sexually in more obvious ways, and is victim rather than perpetrator of that particular transgression in Tamora, he, too, reveals an incontinence and impetuosity that exacerbate his absolutist leanings, limited political acumen, and vulnerability to manipulation. The responsibility of the sovereign to uphold justice is the model and pattern for such responsibility in the family. In the realms of both family and state, this imperial couple has not only failed to function as a positive force, but has in fact served as a negative one, as enemies to the state at the level of both the personal and the political. The sovereign who cannot govern himself is no sovereign. Worse yet, the sovereign who cannot manage his own household or retain the fidelity of his own spouse, who cannot see beyond the attractions Tamora offers to parse her inner being, lacks the wisdom and insight to rule. Much as her sons serve as a projection of her own inner corruption, Tamora outwardly reflects and actively feeds Saturninus' unmanaged and immoral inner condition.

Lucius, banished on pain of death from Rome and no longer a subject of Saturninus, offers the possibility of the valid overthrow of a tyrant and legitimate seizure of the imperial diadem—a political solution to the problem of tyranny.⁵¹ However, despite the wrongs against them, the vows of vengeance, the obvious incompetence of the emperor, and the known threat of Tamora and her entourage, both Marcus and Lucius seem to accept that Titus has set aside his vow of vengeance in the interest of reestablishing justice through a reformation of the current regime. Thus, when Lucius enters in Act 5, scene 3, it appears that he has taken the invitation to parley at face value, and that he is acting in accord with this retraction of the military option, assuming that Titus has agreed to some form of rapprochement. He comments to Marcus as they approach the home of the Andronici, “Uncle, since ’tis my father’s mind / That I repair to Rome, I am content” (5.3.1–2), to which the accompanying Goths assent: “And ours with thine, befall what fortune may” (5.3.3), which seems to suggest that they don’t expect to pursue a military solution. However, his directions to Marcus indicate clearly that a large number of Goths are present, for he instructs his uncle to “see that the ambush of our friends be strong,” adding “I fear the Emperor means no good to us” (5.3.9–10). The attack, then, appears to be suspended temporarily, and Lucius arrives at the banquet intending to pursue a possible diplomatic reconfiguration rather than a military coup, but also is aware that he and his family are intensely vulnerable under the circumstances of this meeting.

Tellingly, there is no indication that Lucius is aware of his father’s already enacted and unfolding vengeance, and his own stated plan regarding Tamora is to reveal her sexual transgression by presenting Aaron “unto the Empress’ face / For testimony of her foul proceedings” (5.3.7–8). Lucius knows by this time of the crimes of Chiron and Demetrius, and of Tamora’s role in them, but with the use of the term ‘testimony’, it appears that he means to pursue a legal resolution to those transgressions, even as he fears and distrusts Saturninus and expresses concern that they have been called in under false pretenses. Indeed, even if the confrontation with Saturninus should fail, his most extreme anticipated action as he approaches the parley does not seem to be regicide, but revelation, deposition, expulsion, and shaming. There is, then, no more agreement about methods among the Andronicus dissenters at the end of the play than there was at the beginning, despite their shared suffering and sense of injustice that extends beyond the personal to Rome itself. Titus aims for a more general blood-bath which would presumably include Saturninus and the imperial

guard, as he hopes his banquet “may prove / More stern and bloody than the Centaurs’ feast” (5.2.202–203). Lucius and Marcus seem much less committed to violent vengeance at this point, perhaps merely following what they believe to be Titus’ lead, but apparently willing, nonetheless, to negotiate with their sworn enemies. Thus when Lucius and Saturninus begin to goad each other, Marcus steps in to restore politic exchange, charging them to “break the parle” (dispute) (5.3.19), reminding them that “These quarrels must be debated quietly” (5.3.20) and that they have come together “For peace, for love, for league, and good to Rome” (5.3.23). So powerful is the image of sovereign authority that, much like Titus’ willingness to sacrifice his hand and political agency to gain Saturninus’ good will in Act 3, scene 1, Lucius and Marcus arrive in Rome ready to accept Saturninus’ reign if he can be redeemed from his Goth queen’s enchantment, and believing that Titus shares that perspective.

Although Titus has already rejected the authority of Saturninus, judged him to be an enemy to Rome, transgressed against the rule of law, and put his vengeance plan into motion, neither does his own plot appear to target the emperor, instead focusing on Tamora and her sons as his personal enemies and the enemies of Rome. As the banquet commences, the trappings of rational order can be seen, with Titus seeming to defer to Saturninus’ position as emperor, and initiating a reasoned discussion with him, requesting a sovereign judgment concerning the act of a father slaying his ravaged daughter. When Saturninus affirms the propriety of the decision-beyond-law of Virginius in killing his daughter, Titus observes that this judgment provides “A pattern, precedent, and lively warrant” for him to do the same (5.3.43), an observation which he immediately puts into action. Titus has identified Saturninus’ views and values as the model for his own, underscoring the role of the sovereign in defining and exemplifying the moral order of the commonwealth. The term ‘warrant’, in particular, alludes to acceptable authorization for the murder.⁵² In having Titus solicit sovereign approval for an unlawful action that purports to fulfill the needs of both father and daughter where law cannot, Shakespeare emphasizes the emperor’s responsibility for justice and underscores the potentially unanticipated implications of his judgments. In his inquiry and in the subsequent ‘mercy killing’ of his ravaged daughter, Titus’ words call attention to the ultimate causes of political and social injustice in Rome, the state’s vulnerability to the sovereign’s will-above-law, to the failed processes and protections of law and justice under abusive sovereignty. Lavinia’s death, which eliminates the embodied symbolic manifestation of

the sovereign's misused responsibility, marks Titus' break with the ideals that have defined his hope and shaped his obedience—his misguided confidence in embodied sovereignty and its judgments. As she has represented Rome's dismemberment and destruction, she becomes the sacrifice that opens the possibility for a new future, and Titus, too, is poised to become a sacrifice, the cost of acting on his rejection of sovereign authority. His killing of Lavinia, like his killing of Chiron and Demetrius, reflects Titus' decision to move beyond law and rational discourse, to suspend law in order to redeem the foundering state.

The façade of rationality continues as the characters present respond to Titus' execution of his daughter. Saturninus functions as though he still wields the power to do justice, as though some form of justice were still possible, as his demand to "fetch [the assailants] hither" suggests (5.3.58). In a reasoned defense of his action, Titus denies that he is responsible for his daughter's death: it was "Not I; 'twas Chiron and Demetrius" (5.3.55), he asserts, encompassing his daughter's death in "all this wrong," and suggesting that, despite having not killed her outright, they brought her life to an end. When he declares that they are "bakèd in this pie, / Whereof their mother daintily hath fed" (5.3.59–60), the passive construction of these revelations distances him from the execution of her sons, as though larger motions of justice were responsible, not mere human vengeance. When he reveals that Tamora has consumed "the flesh that she herself hath bred" (5.3.61), she is included in the circle of guilt, this bizarre and carefully wrought retribution again emphasizing Tamora's accountability for her sons' actions, as she is effectually made to undo her sons' birth and retract them back into her body.

When Titus stabs Tamora, the semblance of rationality finally shatters, as he proclaims only "'Tis true, 'tis true; witness my knife's sharp point" (5.3.62), an act of vengeance that leaves his reasons for killing her unspoken. Similarly, Saturninus reacts, not as a sovereign, judging and condemning Titus or calling for his arrest, nor in fulfillment of his initial vengeance vow, but as a husband, wildly and immediately reacting by returning "this accursèd deed" (5.3.63) in kind. And Lucius, despite his earlier readiness to lead a military coup, and his more recent, judicious and juridical approach to the proceedings, responds viscerally to avenge his father's murder in an explicitly personal *lex talionis* regicide: "Can the son's eye behold his father bleed? / There's meed for meed, death for a deadly deed" (5.3.64–65). Despite the build-up of political abuse and the preparation for a political response, in the final frenzy, Tamora is killed for

bearing and raising corrupt sons, Titus for killing Saturninus' wife, and Saturninus for killing Lucius' father. The challenges to tyranny, to the enemy within, and to abused justice are all left aside in this retributive rampage, and the notion of vengeance contracts down to violent action and immediate violent response—to the chaos of a tyrannical state.

The assertion of the rational in this scene of mayhem, emphasized through the turn to interwoven rhymed couplets leading up to Tamora's death, as well as through Titus' logical and reasonable claims and the give and take of the dialogue, models and yet undermines the idea of rational discourse as the basis of political order. It is, Shakespeare suggests, insufficient to ensure justice, inadequate in the absence of a moral foundation for that rationalism. By co-opting sovereign judgment as his own, asserting his right to decide above the law, and acting against Saturninus, Titus rejects obedient subjection to the embodied sovereign, in order to act as a citizen obligated to the good of the state and community. However, in making this shift to independent vengeance, he rejects the methods and structures of the political community—reasoned public debate, civil law, and just condemnation of the internal sovereign enemy. In his effort to preserve the fundamental Roman ideals of justice, he tramples them. The thin veneer of rationality he lays over his actions against the imperial family is insufficient to meet the requirements of communal political reason. Thus, Titus' turn to vengeance and his exercise of sovereign authority and judgment, though perhaps comprehensible as a response to the harms he has suffered, conflict with the function and purpose of the political community as fully as Saturninus does in his judgments and actions. As even the author of the *Vindiciae* affirms, the subject has no right to judge and act alone—he must operate only in the context of the body politic in which he is embedded.⁵³

By opposing the injustice of a tyrannical ruler to the vigilante-like actions of a single citizen who lays a similarly personal claim to sovereign judgment, Shakespeare suggests that the autonomous judgments of embodied sovereignty, whether exercised from the position of ruler or citizen, produce the same chaotic effect, destructive of rather than preserving the commonweal.⁵⁴ The depiction of this range of abuses of power pushes not only against the absolutist model of government Saturninus represents, but more generally against judgment outside of law, regardless of the form of authority behind that judgment. The play suggests that there are many ways to become an enemy of the state, and if it is explicit about the absolute sovereign's threat in this regard, it is no less attentive to the

misperceptions that instigate self-determined retaliation from the equally threatening subject/citizen. Tamora, and ultimately Saturninus, were responsible for the slow deterioration of justice and rights, an incremental and almost invisible exercise of sovereignty that might have continued for decades. Titus responds by bringing about a crisis so devastating that the very survival of the commonweal is immediately threatened. Rome is left either to “be bane unto herself / [to] ... Like a forlorn and desperate castaway, / Do shameful execution on herself” (5.3.72–75), or, as Marcus pleads, to learn to knit back together the fragments of community left in the wake of his revenge—to return to rational and moral government.

Rome's New Beginning

The move toward relative restoration and unification involves the reframing of what has just occurred, from circumstantial violence to protection of the commonweal. Additionally, it requires the ultimate expulsion of those who have been deemed destructive and a restoration of those who can be reconciled within the polity of Rome, a reassertion of the distinction between friend and enemy that has been so thoroughly destabilized by the events of the play. Marcus invites Lucius—“Rome’s dear friend”—to speak (5.3.79), and Lucius begins by justifying these murders to the people of Rome by enumerating the wrongs against the Andronici and the commonweal. He establishes a parallel between Titus’ actions as a general in defense of Rome against its external enemies, and his actions as a citizen in defense of Rome against its internal enemies: His “tears [were] despised, and [he was] basely cozened / Of that true hand that fought Rome’s quarrel out, / And sent her enemies unto the grave” (5.3.100–103). Additionally, Lucius asserts about his own actions that, although banished, he turned the Goth’s “enmity” to friendship for Rome’s cause (5.3.105–106; 107), and he resolutely affirms his commitment to Rome and its political well-being, as “the turned-forth ... / That ha[s] preserved [Rome’s] welfare in [his] blood” (5.3.108–109). He thereby situates himself as the exiled friend who has preserved the ideals of the Roman commonweal despite his unjust banishment, and implicitly indicts the emperor as an enemy to those ideals, and thus to Rome itself. Finally, calling attention to his service to Rome, which, like that of his father, has preserved Rome from its external enemies, he indirectly addresses his murder of Saturninus as well, declaring, “from [Rome’s] bosom [I] took the enemy’s point, / Sheathing the steel in my advent’rous body” (5.3.110–111). He

thus alludes to Saturninus as an internal foe whose presence threatened Rome's very survival, and whose murder by an exiled subject should be seen as salvific rather than as treasonous capital crime.

When Marcus speaks, he reveals the baby as the sign of Tamora's sexual transgression, and identifies Aaron as "Chief architect and plotter of these woes" (5.3.121). He then asks the auditors to judge whether Titus had "cause ... to revenge / These wrongs unspeakable, past patience, / Or more than any living man could bear" (5.3.124–126), providing the very judgment he has asked for from the lords and Tribunes. He makes no explicit connection between Tamora's infidelity, the vicious actions of her sons under Aaron's tutelage, and Saturninus' failings as a sovereign, and yet, this is the logical path he asks his auditors to walk. He suggests that revenge was a necessity in the absence of justice under law, linking Tamora's obvious infidelity with her beguilement of Saturninus and the effects of his political incapacitation. In effect, Lucius and Marcus justify the regicides by transforming the personal vengeance of Titus and Lucius at the moment of commitment into political terms, their attack justified by the intemperance and injustice of Rome's sovereign enemies, whose deaths are claimed as necessary for Rome's salvation.

Aaron is presented as the main instigator of the wrongs against the Andronici, whose freedom to act was enabled by Tamora's infatuation with him and by Saturninus' infatuation with her. By making her empress and accepting her as his arm of vengeance, Saturninus invites her anger and her licentiousness into the theater of sovereign power, and through her presence, Aaron also gains access and scope for his desire to commit "notorious ill" (5.1.127). Like the child who is presented as evidence of Tamora's base actions, Aaron's blackness does not so much mark his own inevitable corruption, as become the symbolic outward inspiration for the twisting of his inner being toward his own worst impulses and desires.⁵⁵ The play indicates as much when Aaron comments, after gulling Titus of his hand, "Let fools do good, and fair men call for grace. / Aaron will have his soul black like his face" (3.1.203–204), lines that indicate that effort is needed to transform his inner being to match his skin—a relatively standard invocation of the opposition between 'fair' and 'dark' that nevertheless troubles any simple assumptions about the alignment of internal and external.

If Aaron's evil is a choice, and his corrupt soul a work of his own ongoing effort, so we should also see Tamora and Saturninus, since neither appears to be represented as the 'type' of their national origin, with other Goths and Romans evidently able to function in more balanced, moral,

and reasonable ways than either of these characters.⁵⁶ There is, however, a hint of heritable character in Tamora's concupiscence, for as Aaron comments, Chiron and Demetrius acquired their lustiness from their mother, an inborn trait, but their violence from him, a result of corrupting nurture (5.1.98–101).⁵⁷ With this layering of inherent and cultivated corruption in Tamora, and in his representation of her as a foreign queen with obvious knowledge of Roman values and political conditions, Shakespeare offers the possibility of her sound moral and political guidance to the clearly wayward Saturninus, and of her potential for friendship to the commonweal. He thereby structures the play to reveal the positive potential as well as the deleterious actuality of her influence and actions, never identifying her cultural and natal alterity as the basis of her corrupting influence. In this, his most negative rendering of foreign queenship, Tamora's personal moral depravity overrides her positive political potential, and her gendered position as mother, wife, lover, and empress heighten and intensify the effects of that moral degeneracy. The possibility remains, however, that had she been more able or willing to manage her sexual drives, she might have guided Saturninus and Rome to a better outcome.⁵⁸

The possibility of a better future remains uncertain as the play concludes, simplistic oppositions between friend and enemy eliding the complications that remain. Lucius, still bloody from his recent regicide, is hailed by the Romans present as "Rome's gracious governor" (5.3.145). He responds by uttering a hope that he *will* "govern so," and thereby "heal Rome's harms and wipe away her woe" (5.3.145–147), suggesting that the state of emergency has ended, and that Rome's political and judicial processes will be restored.⁵⁹ Saturninus is reintegrated into the political community as Lucius invites Saturninus' "loving friends [to] convey the Emperor hence, / And give him burial in his father's grave" (5.3.190–191), just as Lavinia and Titus will be buried in their "household monument" (5.3.193). No mention is made of Saturninus' imperial service, but his place in Rome is not denied, and the certainty that he *has* friends in Rome suggests that Lucius no longer sees him as an enemy. The remaining Andronici gather around Titus to perform honorable obsequies, and through the rites of death, more firmly reinstate him in the political and social community that his vengeance very nearly destroyed. Lucius, Titus, and Saturninus are affirmed as friends to Rome through these declarations and rituals.⁶⁰

Although Lucius does not determine Aaron's guilt, he is asked by Aemilius to sentence him, and thus Lucius' first act as emperor is to

declare Aaron's fate. He condemns the unrepentant prisoner to public suffering and a lingering death by starvation and exposure, emphasizing his former status as an enemy within, revealed, judged, and now restrained under sovereign authority. Lucius' declaration, that "If anyone relieves or pities him, / For the offence he dies" (5.3.181–182), situates Aaron as a foe who may not be redeemed, whose human needs may not be met, whose suffering may not be relieved, and who stands beyond and is inassimilable to the community, a manifestation of absolute alterity.⁶¹ His suffering will also be the community's suffering, as they are forced to deny their own human impulses and steel themselves against his anguish as he "stand[s] and rave[s] and cr[ies] for food" (5.3.179). It is as though, through this subjection to the demands of the flesh, Aaron is to be forcibly reminded of his humanness, and in the denial of humanity from others, made to confront his own inhumanity. Lucius' pronouncement also extends beyond the authority granted to him, affirming the vulnerability of subjects under sovereign will, as he threatens death to any who disobey the doom he has pronounced on Aaron—they may become the enemy as readily as he has. The clarity of his categories is chilling, particularly given his turn to the enemy Goths as a means to redeem Rome from injustice. Now Lucius declares, as Saturninus himself may have done, that the friend of Rome obeys, while the friend of Rome's enemy becomes Rome's enemy.⁶²

If Aaron's punishment consists of confronting his own humanness and the inhumanity of others, Tamora's murder has left her beyond such lessons, and no suffering can be inflicted upon her to appease the Romans she has wronged. Denied the rituals of respect for the dead that acknowledge shared humanity, Tamora is expunged, not only from the political community, but from the human as well, "that ravenous tiger" whose corpse will be thrown outside of the city walls for "beasts and birds to prey" upon—a fate that Aaron, too, will no doubt face eventually (5.3.194; 197). The Q1 edition of the play ends with the repetition of 'pity' in the last two lines, posing a homologous relationship between Tamora's destructive character and her subjection to nature's callousness as the final images of the play. Her life, devoid of moral limits, removes her from human compassion, human connection, and human respect. It relegates her to a place outside of social and political life, where nature's lack of civil restraint matches the Roman perception of her own pitiless nature, an echo of the retributive justice that she first invoked, that she

helped to instigate in the Andronici, and by which she died. She ends at the opposite end of the spectrum from her self-positioning in Act 1, where she emphasized her understanding of the ideals of Rome, pushing Titus to embrace those values and accept her as an equal and a friend. Not only has her potential for friendship been negated by her own actions, but she has been identified as the antithesis of Rome's ideal citizen, lacking in reason, compassion, and moral grounding. Shakespeare does not aim to situate her as pitiable or her death as undeserved, and like Aaron, she embodies the moral corruption that renders the distinction between friend and enemy a supposedly straightforward determination.

Yet, however clearly these lines are drawn at the end of the play, the Roman actions that bring us to this expulsion of radical alterity include merciless human sacrifice, filicide, execution without trial, treasonous conspiracy against the sovereign, and regicide. The symbolic expulsion of the identified enemies of Rome does little to settle the question of whether and how the commonweal will restore itself, given what remains in place. Disjunctions between Rome's ideals and its actual values and practices remain obdurately in place, embodied not only in the new sovereign, but in the complacency of the body politic. The collapse of justice and the actions beyond law countenanced and permitted by Saturninus and Tamora have been resolved by the Andronici's claim to sovereign judgment and sovereign action, and then by the punishments meted out by the new sovereign. With the more obvious threats to the state recognized and targeted, the norms of government *may* be restored, as the final lines of Q2, Q3, and the Folio indicate, leaving Lucius and the Roman citizens "afterwards to order well the state / That like events may ne're it ruinate" (5.3.199.3-4). However, such a future is possible only if we believe, not only that the individuals responsible for these "heavy haps" have been appropriately punished, but also that the commitment to rational debate, rule of law, and distributed sovereignty has been restored. That possibility seems unlikely in the context of suspended judicial process and unrestrained sovereign judgment in these final moments of the play. The play forcefully reveals the enemy, to be not only the threatening foreigner who enters and manipulates the political system, but also those who countenance the collapse of values that define the ideal, rational, and moral Roman commonweal, and that enemy remains, always, inevitably, within.

NOTES

1. On the topicality of the play, see Rebecca Ann Bach, "Titus Andronicus: Transcendence and Succession," *Journal of Narrative Theory* 29, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 1–26. On the Goths as a positive model for Elizabethans, see Ronald Broude, "Roman and Goth in *Titus Andronicus*," *Shakespeare Studies* 6 (January 1970): 25–34. On more general political themes, see Jonathan Bate, *Titus Andronicus*, "Introduction," Arden Shakespeare 3rd series. On this and other plays in relation to gender and racial politics, see Ania Loomba, "Sexuality and Racial Difference," in *Shakespeare: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory, 1945–2000*, ed. Russ McDonald (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 794–816. For links between historical and contemporary theoretical approaches to the play, see Cary DiPietro and Hugh Grady, "Presentism, Anachronism and the Case of *Titus Andronicus*," in *The Urgency of the Now: Criticism and Theory in the 21st Century*, ed. Cary DiPietro and Hugh Grady (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 9–37. Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, textual citations to this play refer to *Titus Andronicus*, ed. Eugene M. Waith (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). For Shakespeare's other plays, I refer to *The Norton Shakespeare*, unless otherwise indicated at the point of citation.
2. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.3, 1276a&b.
3. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.10.2, 1160b.
4. Bodin, Franklin II.5.110–126; *Vindiciae*, Third Question, 154–172. Schmitt has little to say about tyranny.
5. Benjamin, "The Critique of Violence," 287, 298.
6. On claims to the right to rule in Aristotle's analysis, see Bernard Yack, "Community and Conflict in Aristotle's Political Philosophy," *The Review of Politics* 47, no. 1 (1985): 99–100.
7. For a more positive reading of Bassianus' position see Anthony Young, "'Ripen Justice in this Commonweal': Political Decay and Regeneration in *Titus Andronicus*," *Renaissance Papers 1998*, ed. T.H. Howard-Hill and Philip Rollinson (Raleigh, NC: Camden House for the Southeastern Renaissance Conference, 1998), 42–43.
8. Using the idea of election helped Shakespeare to focus on the central problem of sovereign will-above-law, rather than on primogeniture *per se*, although as is often the case in other plays, primogeniture receives critical attention as well.
9. See Raymond Westbrook, "Vitae Necisque Potestas," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 48, H. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1999): 207. In the examples he cites, "the assumption is that the father had the right to kill his son for the commission of an offence for which he would otherwise have been

- tried and executed by the public authorities” (207). By contrast, see Young, “Ripen Justice,” 46.
10. Saturninus acknowledges only Titus’ decision to grant him the diadem, not his service and commitments to the state. See 1.1.234–243.
 11. While “laughing-stock” is clearly a referent (Waith, 1.1.304 footnote), also applicable is the idea of being used “as a means or tool for inducing some result, as a pretext for some action, or as a cover for sinister designs.” *OED* stale n.3, def. 5. Other resonances include “A lover or mistress whose devotion is turned into ridicule for the amusement of a rival or rivals.” *OED* stale n.3, def. 5; and def. 4, “More fully common stale: a prostitute of the lowest class, employed as a decoy by thieves. Often ... used *gen.* as a term of contempt for an unchaste woman. Obs.” The sexual implications resonate in interesting ways with the developing relationship between Saturninus and Tamora, particularly since Saturninus is subordinate in that relationship.
 12. For links between the Roman past and the early modern British present, see Clifford Chalmers Huffman, “Bassianus and the British History in *Titus Andronicus*,” *English Language Notes* 11, no. 3 (March 1974): 175–181.
 13. For a related reading of this exchange, see Glenn Odom and Bryan Reynolds, “Becoming Roman/Comings-to-Be Villain: Pressurized Belongings and the Coding of Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationality in Peele & Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus*,” in *Transversal Enterprises in the Drama of Shakespeare and His Contemporaries: Fugitive Explorations*, ed. Bryan Reynolds (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 183–226. However, they aim to show Tamora’s “deceit conceit”—her deceptive “assimilation” of “Roman identity in order to expel Titus from it.” Quotation from p. 200.
 14. Her articulation of their similarities avoids the obvious problem that she is ineligible for political friendship, not because she is a Goth, but because she is a woman, and indeed this difficulty is readily overcome when marriage becomes the means for cementing a bond of friendship with Rome. In terms of Roman law and the status of women, for much of the republican and imperial periods women were eligible for citizenship of a partial sort—they had no political voice and could not hold public office, but were protected under Roman law and enjoyed fairly robust property and inheritance rights.
 15. On Tamara’s plea and turn to retributive justice, see William John Birch, *An Inquiry into the Philosophy and Religion of Shakspeare* (London: C. Mitchell, 1848), 59–61. Online: <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001019017/Home>, accessed 7/3/2016. See also Aparna Khasgir, “Ending as Concordia Discors: *Titus Andronicus*,” *Studia Neophilologica* 73, no. 1 (2001): 36–47.

16. Chiron, horrified by this judgment, compares the Romans unfavorably to the Scythians, emphasizing their barbarity.
17. Young sees the play as engaging with tensions between Republican (traditional) and Imperial (new and decadent) values, and aligns Tamora with the latter, along with Saturninus (41). Odom and Reynolds (“Becoming Roman,” 199–202) endeavor to disrupt widely accepted oppositions between self and other, white and black, etc.
18. But see Odom and Reynolds, “Becoming Roman,” 200. They argue that Tamora changes “hue” in the course of the play, from dark to light.
19. However, as I indicate in Chap. 1, she cannot be other than alien by early modern English standards, and the instability of such friendship is evident in each of the cases I address in this book. Nevertheless, in both *HVIII* (Chap. 2) and *WT* (Chap. 3), the queen functions as a friend to the king and realm despite her alien status, but is eventually treated as an enemy. The case of Margaret of Anjou is more complicated.
20. Although this threat links law and sovereign power, it also distinguishes them.
21. The idea of vanity is also attached to this judgment, which is very much in keeping with Saturninus’ character.
22. See Machiavelli, *The Prince*, esp. Chap. XV. For complications of Machiavelli’s project, implications, and reception of *The Prince*, see Erica Benner, *Machiavelli’s Ethics*; Hugh Grady, *Shakespeare, Machiavelli, and Montaigne*; and Ruth W. Grant, *Hypocrisy and Integrity*.
23. Such responsibilities and obligations resonate strongly with early modern theories of sovereignty as well, including those of Bodin, Smith, and the *Vindiciae* author.
24. These lines echo those of Anne of Bohemia (Anne O’Beame) in *Thomas of Woodstock*, but to a quite different purpose. On Anne O’Beame, see Logan, “Foreign Marriage in Early Modern Drama,” 92–96.
25. Aaron orchestrates the events and moves them along their intended path as the scene unfolds. Tamora may have contributed to them, as Aaron indicates at 2.1.121–126 and at 5.1.108, and she participates in them with varying degrees of awareness and clarity of objective. Ania Loomba sees them as full accomplices and “almost interchangeable.” See Ania Loomba, *Gender, Race, Renaissance Drama* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), Chap. 2, esp. 46–51. However, to me it seems important to attend to the differences between them throughout. Their motivations are strikingly different. For a recent, insightful reading of Aaron, see Ian Smith “Those ‘Slippery Customers’: Rethinking Race in *Titus Andronicus*,” in *Shakespearean Criticism*, ed. Michelle Lee, vol. 85, Gale. Literature Resource Center, Gale Group, 2005: http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/H1420063607/LitRC?u=msu_main&sid=LitRC&xid=71605ab5, accessed 1/6/2018. Originally published in *Journal of Theatre and Drama* 3 (1997): 45–58.

26. Although the time frame is distorted here and elsewhere in the play, the point is not altered by that distortion—they have seen enough to make an accusation.
27. Edward III's Treason Act of 1351 made adultery with the "King's companion" (his wife) an act of treason. Anne Boleyn was accused of and executed for adultery as a form of treason in 1536, along with several of her accused partners; Mary Queen of Scots was also suspected of treasonous sexual acts coupled with a murder plot.
28. Marion Wynn-Davies recognizes that "[w]hen rape occurs it inevitably threatens the values of the patrilineal society and necessitates a breakdown of its value systems and laws," and notes that in the play, "the problem of rape ... [is associated with] lineage and political accountability." She links Tamora to Shakespeare's *Venus (Venus and Adonis)* as similarly bearing "the threatening sexuality of a puissant woman" in contrast to Lavinia's similarity to Lucrece's "abused and depersonalized" maidenhead. Less convincingly, she suggests that Tamora can be seen as "a distantly refracted image of Elizabeth I." See "'The Swallowing Womb': Consumed and Consuming Women in *Titus Andronicus*," in *The Matter of Difference: Materialist Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare*, ed. Valerie Wayne (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 129–152; quotations from pp. 133–134. On Tamora's unruly sexuality, see Joyce Green MacDonald, "Black Ram, White Ewe: Shakespeare, Race, and Women," in *A Feminist Companion to Shakespeare*, ed. Dymphna Callaghan (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000; 2001), 188–207.
29. His overt statements to this effect come at 5.1.124–144 and 5.3.183–189.
30. For readings of Lavinia as symbolic of Rome, see, for example, Andrew Hadfield, "Tarquin's Everlasting Banishment: Republicanism and Constitutionalism in *The Rape of Lucrece* and *Titus Andronicus*," *Parergon* 19, no. 1 (January 2002): 77–104; and Joan Fitzpatrick, "Foreign Appetites and Alterity: Is There an Irish Context for *Titus Andronicus*?" *Connotations* 11, nos. 2–3 (2001–2002): 127–145. See also Evelyn Gajowski, "Lavinia as 'Blank Page' and the Presence of Feminist Critical Practices," in *Presentist Shakespeares*, ed. Terence Hawkes and Hugh Grady (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007), 121–140. Kindle edition.
31. See Sandra Logan, "Interpretive Multiplicity: Audiences and Mediators on the Shakespearean Stage," *Gramma Journal of Theory and Criticism* 15 (2007): 49–66.
32. I am thinking here of the historical definition of this term: "matrix, n." OED Online. June 2016. Oxford University Press. <http://www.oed.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/view/Entry/115057?rskey=wbjYIk&result=1>, accessed 6/16/2016). Definitions 1 and 2a are apt. See also Chap. 5, Margaret of Anjou as matrix of trauma, both the maternal source and the most extreme sufferer of woe, 243, 246.

33. Mythology, which itself proves unstable, is of course open to widely varied interpretations. For example, the Philomel myth, which is so closely paralleled in Lavinia's ravishment, serves as a touchstone and model for chastity avenged, but also for sexual conquest as the path to satisfaction.
34. While Roman succession was not bound by primogeniture, Titus' reference to that model at 1.1.224 makes Rome more parallel to England than it actually was in this regard. See also note 8, above.
35. Benjamin, "Eighth Thesis on the Philosophy of History," *On the Concept of History*: <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/benjamin/1940/history.htm>. For a contextualizing discussion, see Chap. 1, 16–17.
36. Even Marcus believes that Titus will not take vengeful action: he is "yet so just that he will not revenge," Marcus incorrectly observes (4.1.127).
37. Paul Raffield takes it as a given that the judges and Tribunes have not challenged the sentence of death pronounced by Saturninus against Titus' sons. See "'Terras Astraea Reliquit': Titus Andronicus and the Loss of Justice," *Shakespeare's Imaginary Constitution: Late Elizabethan Politics and the Theater of Law*, ed. Paul Raffield (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 18–50.
38. As Katherine Rowe notes, in the "Renaissance tradition of manual semiotics ... the hand is the preeminent sign for political and personal agency." "Dismemberment and Forgetting in *Titus Andronicus*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (1994): 279–303; quotation from 280.
39. Livy refers to Tarquin's "wicked queen" as an additional target of punishment, as well as all of their offspring. Livy's telling also makes kingship itself blameworthy, with Brutus vowing to eliminate that institution forever from the Roman state. See Titus Livius (Livy), *The History of Rome*, Book 1, Chap. 59, ed. Benjamin Oliver Foster: <http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:latinLit:phi0914.phi0011.perseus-eng1:59>. Shakespeare makes no mention of Tarquin's queen in *The Rape of Lucrece*.
40. Here, in addition to Benjamin's Eighth Thesis, the idea of 'frames of exception' introduced by Lihi Ben Shitrit becomes useful. See *Righteous Transgressions: Women's Activism on the Israeli and Palestinian Religious Right* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 1–31.
41. The linking line naming Lucius is missing, but logically may be inferred. See Bates' emendation at 4.3.32, and Waith's comment on the missing line at 4.3.32, footnote.
42. The *Vindiciae* offers an elaborate argument to this effect. See esp. Third Question, 154–174, on tyrants by practice.
43. For women's role in governing the household, see Edmund Tilney, *The Flower of Friendship: A Renaissance Dialogue Contesting Marriage* (1578), ed. and intro. Valerie Wayne (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 121. Wayne comments on women's moral role in her discussion of Plutarch's *The Morals*, "Introduction," 16–17.

44. For a detailed discussion of the extant versions of this speech, see Louis Adrian Montrose, *The Subject of Elizabeth: Authority, Gender, and Representation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), Chap. 11, esp. 148–152.
45. Montrose, *The Subject of Elizabeth*, image and analysis 154–157. The juxtaposition of these two images, the verbal one of the queen at Tilbury, and the visual one in the Dutch engraving, is Montrose’s.
46. While these visual and verbal representations are unquestionably gendered, sexual and moral continence in male rulers was similarly important, as we see in Marlowe’s depiction of Edward II, for example, and which Shakespeare alludes to in *Richard II* at 3.1.11–13. The restrictions and demands on male princes and sovereigns are frequently overlooked as we endeavor to recognize women’s restriction and oppression in the period.
47. See Tilney, *Flower of Friendship*, 121.
48. See Wall, *Staging Domesticity*, particularly the “Introduction.”
49. This image of Tamora is more explicitly drawn in *The History of Titus Andronicus*, where she is given much clearer motivations and a more definite role in some of the violence that occurs in the play, and where her ability to move the emperor toward injustice is more explicit as well. See *Titus Andronicus*, Waith, Appendix A, 195–203, which includes a modernized spelling version of the 1736–1764 chapbook, *The History of Titus Andronicus, the Renowned Roman General*.
50. Again, in the *History* this is explicitly a diplomatic marriage, not a fulfillment of Saturninus’ desire.
51. This military return of the exile is a frequent trope in Shakespeare’s works, as in *Richard II*, *Coriolanus*, *Richard III*, *Macbeth*, etc. Both Bodin and the *Vindiciae* author support the overthrow of a tyrant by a foreign prince, which in effect, Lucius has become. See Bodin, Franklin II.5.113; *Vindiciae*, Fourth Question, 96–105.
52. Bate comments on the multiple meanings of the term in his note to 5.3.43.
53. *Vindiciae*, Third Question, 172.
54. On the problem of lawless blood feuds in Elizabethan England, see Kenji Yoshino, “Revenge as *Revenant*: *Titus Andronicus* and the Rule of Law,” *Yale Journal of Law & Humanities* 21, no. 2 (1979): Article 1 (no page numbers). Online: <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol21/iss2/1>, accessed 7/2/2016. On the idea of revenge as justice, and the “fine line ... between the use of force with the authority of the state and the zealotry of individual operatives,” see Dympna Callaghan and Chris R. Kyle, “The Wilde Side of Justice in Early Modern England and *Titus Andronicus*,” in *The Law in Shakespeare*, ed. Constance Jordan and Karen Cunningham (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 38–57; quotation from 39.

55. The similarity to Shakespeare's representation of Richard III is striking. Richard also suggests that his inner being must be shaped to match his exterior image. See, for example, *3 Henry VI*, 5.6.78–79, and *Richard III*, 1.1.16–31. Both citations taken from *The Arden Shakespeare* series, ed. Cox and Rasmussen, and Siemon, respectively. See also Jonathan Bate, "Staging the Unspeakable: Four Versions of *Titus Andronicus*," in *Shakespeare from Text to Stage*, ed. Patricia Kennan and Mariangela Tempera (Bologna: Cooperativa Libreria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 1992), 97–110, in which he discusses the Ravenscroft Restoration adaptation of the play and its sympathetic representation of Aaron. Ravenscroft added lines to create such sympathy.
56. For early modern perceptions of astrological—and especially planetary— influence on character, see *Ptolemy's Astrology*, esp. 26, 28. English trans. 1530; copy from Huntington Library, EEBO facsimile, STC 140:12. On the classical resonances of Tamora's cannibalism in relation to the reign of Saturn/Saturninus, see D.J. Palmer, "The Unspeakable in Pursuit of the Uneatable: Language and Action in *Titus Andronicus*," *Critical Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (1972): 320–339, esp. 326.
57. Lavinia's pleas in Act 2, scene 3, similarly suggest that both nurture and nature are responsible for the corruption of Chiron and Demetrius.
58. There is some parallel between Tamora's moral condition and that of James VI, already a likely candidate for the English throne. Depictions such as that of Edward II in Marlowe's play of that name indicate that such concerns were, perhaps, already circulating when Shakespeare wrote this play. The depiction of Richard II in the anonymous *Woodstock* hints similarly about sexual incontinence and moral corruption in the sovereign, and despite the heterosexual nature of their relationship, Saturninus as well as Tamora is implicated in the influence of the body natural on the sovereign's capacities, in ways similar to that of these other sovereigns.
59. This emergency aligns more with Benjamin's popular disruption than with Schmitt's sovereign decision. See Chap. 1, 9–16.
60. Nancy, "Inoperative Community," 15, situates rituals for the dead as an ultimate basis for community. See my discussion of Esposito and Nancy in Chap. 1, 28–32, and in the context of *The Winter's Tale* in Chap. 3, 130. The dead cannot reciprocate—an aspect of such rituals that makes them definitive of community.
61. Jean E. Howard offers a brief allusion to Aaron's situation vis-à-vis the Roman community in "Is Black so Base a Hue?" in *Shakespeare in Our Time: A Shakespeare Association of America Collection*, ed. Dympna Callahan and Suzanne Gossett (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 107–113.
62. Of interest here is Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,

1987; 1988; 1990). Unger argues that it is essential to distinguish “between formative structures and formed routines . . .,” given that “institutional and imaginative frameworks of social life supply the basis on which people define and reconcile interests, identify and solve problems.” Only by making “the institutional and imaginative structures of society explicit” can we avoid blindly replicating the “formed routines” that they support. We see here, in the close of the play, how readily Lucius and the Romans slip back into their “formed routines” (4). See also Anthony Brian Taylor, “Lucius, The Severely Flawed Redeemer of *Titus Andronicus*,” *Connotations* 6, no. 2 (1996–1997): 138–157.

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Margaret and the Ban: Resistances to Sovereign Authority in *Henry VI 1, 2, & 3* and *Richard III*

MARRIAGE AS BANISHMENT

Margaret of Anjou's will to power and dominant role, as described by the chronicles, has become a major defining aspect of her character for many scholars of the first tetralogy.¹ Perceptions of her are powerfully shaped by the views of Yorkist antagonists in the plays, and by stagings of her as a railing hag in *Richard III*—by far the most performed play of the tetralogy. Yet, Shakespeare, much more than Hall or Holinshed, is attentive to Margaret's problematic status as she enters the English court, a status strikingly different from that of most other foreign queens he represents.² Not only does he grant her much less explicit political influence, authority, and agency than she holds in the chronicles, but in the three plays that prominently feature her, particularly in *2 Henry VI*, Shakespeare creates a sustained and complex representation of Margaret's alien status and political ambiguity.³ Her transformation from hated and politically naïve peace pledge in the beginning of *2 Henry VI*, to champion of the Lancastrian cause in *3 Henry VI*, to banished enemy and vituperative voice of vengeance in *Richard III*, involves a fascinating navigation of the uncertain territory between friend and enemy, epitomizing both the threat and the promise of a foreign queen.

As I discuss in Chap. 1, throughout the tetralogy the concepts of banishment, exile, and outlawry circulate in explicit and implicit forms, both disabling and enabling, depending upon character and circumstance.⁴ Margaret, in particular, is framed by these concepts in shifting and

complicated ways. In *2 Henry VI*, her foreign provenance defines her alien, enemy political status; her separation from home, family, nation of origin, language, culture, situate her outside the social and personal networks of the English court; her poverty and ostracism limit her capacity to overcome resistance to her queenship. Under these circumstances, she is most harmful as she colludes with Suffolk to overthrow Gloucester and claim her own place as queen by restoring Henry VI's sovereign authority. In the following two plays, she embraces and deploys self-banishment as a political tool, and engages in forms of banning, or cursing, that empower and support her resistance to sovereign decisions and authority. Indeed, she operates most powerfully to positive or negative effect when she is situated as marginalized, an outsider, or banished—categories that she repeatedly claims as they suit her purposes. In *3 Henry VI*, Margaret remains the staunch defender of the seated monarch, but does so through her resistance to his sovereign authority, demonstrating how the body politic and the body natural might be separated through resistance to the *actions* of a detrimental ruler, rather than to his *position*.⁵ Nevertheless, this resistance to sovereignty becomes the touchstone of her challenge to Richard III in the final play of the sequence, where she rejects the legitimacy of Edward's and then Richard's *monarchy*, and consequentially negates their sovereign authority.

Margaret refers to her “woeful banishment” only in *Richard III* (1.3.192), but her story of exile begins much earlier in the tetralogy, in a metaphorical form parallel to that of many foreign wives or queens.⁶ There is no legal banishment, no exclusion from social or even political connection, as a woman is traded across national and political boundaries to build a bridge between enemy nations. Nevertheless, through characters like Katherine de Valois in *Henry V*, Shakespeare is quite clear on the personal implications of such an arrangement—on the sacrifices and adaptations required of the peace-pledge wife, who is thrust into new linguistic, cultural, social, and political systems through the act of diplomatic marriage.⁷ She becomes, inescapably, subject to a foreign king within a foreign nation, subordinate within marriage to a patriarch who was, before this alliance, an enemy to her sovereign, her nation, and her family. Shakespeare represents Margaret as far less personable than Katherine, and certainly as less morally grounded than Hermione or Katherine of Aragon, whom I address in the first two chapters of this book. Perhaps for these reasons, and for her frequently negative representation in the chronicles, the implications of

her status in England, as Shakespeare depicts her, have been underexplored.⁸ Nevertheless, her position as an outsider is worth considering, for it appears to shape her choices and actions throughout these plays.

HENRY VI 1&2: MARGARET AS OUTSIDER AND ENEMY

Margaret's first appearance, in Act 5 of *1 Henry VI*, defines her as a marginalized figure in relation to European royalty, a quick-witted, humble, but self-confident princess, daughter to a king in name only. In this initial encounter with Suffolk, she evinces no hubristic or inappropriate self-inflation, in contrast to his self-promotional plans. She readily declares that her lack of wealth and status render her "unworthy to be Henry's wife" (5.3.124). She also defers to her father to approve the proposed marriage, and rebuffs Suffolk's inducements to send a love token through him, as he angles for a kiss that he finally delivers, and which she dismisses as a "peevisish token" (5.3.191).⁹ In *2 Henry VI*, she is equally humble in her first appearance at the English court, addressing King Henry as "Great King of England, and my gracious lord", and "mine alder-leifist sovereign" (1.1.24; 28). This submissive greeting implicitly evinces her utter isolation from her friends and family, and her dependence upon Henry's good will and pleasure. She comes to England, not as a well-connected ruling partner, but as a supplicant, bringing nothing of material value to the marriage, and beholden to both the king and his factor for her position as England's queen. Her reception among the peers of the realm is anything but warm, despite Henry's pleasure at her arrival, and the difficulty of her situation becomes immediately clear. While they blame Suffolk, not her, for the marriage agreement, she is at least closely associated with and tainted by its disastrous concessions—the relinquishment of Anjou and Maine. Even worse, while marriage is permanent, the alliance is explicitly temporary—eighteen months only, after which enemy relations may again displace the limited friendship secured by this treaty between England and France. In the play as well as in the event, Margaret begins her role as queen with the knowledge that in the near future, her new husband might resume aggressions against her homeland, or her uncle might again endeavor to reclaim territory lost to the English pursuit of supposed rightful possession.¹⁰ The peers convey as much in their negative responses to the reading of the terms of marriage. However, in the context of the play, this temporary league with France is not, in fact, the main problem faced by England, nor is this marriage itself inherently detrimental.

Rather, as this scene reveals, whatever past martial glory England can claim, the factionalism that divides the lords against each other poses a far greater threat than the possible rise of France against England's imperialist effort. The longstanding conflicts and alignments of that factionalism unfold as the scene continues, revealing not only these internal tensions, but the duplicitous agendas of numerous figures proximate to the king.¹¹ The play does contrast the glorious martial past, grounded in feudal values and valor, with the self-promotional ambitions of the troubled present, but it situates the gains of that celebrated past as immensely costly and ephemeral, suggesting that conquest and expansion require an untenable investment in human and material resources. Further, distrust and competition between factions have cost England dearly in the battles depicted in *I Henry VI*, negating external war as the unifying endeavor that heals internal conflicts.¹² Much as the peers express their anger and dismay in terms of the loss of former glory, their ignoble backbiting negates this self-claimed nobility, and situates that nostalgia as lacking an objective correlative.¹³ While Suffolk is the immediate and obvious object of derision because of the concessions of the marriage contract, Gloucester becomes the main target of those whose self-interested political ambition drives the divisive dynamics of the court, and whose weak loyalty to the king undermines what power King Henry might claim as his own.¹⁴ Margaret's arrival in England and the revelation of the terms of the marriage are not catalysts to this factional conflict. They merely provide an occasion for the expression of preexisting and long-cultivated ill will and malicious intentions, or resistance to those negative drives on the part of a small handful of characters supportive, for the moment, of Gloucester and King Henry. Nevertheless, the marriage terms feed perceptions of Margaret as an enemy within, despite her lack of responsibility for the conditions of her entry into the seething maelstrom of the English court.

Her Subordination to Suffolk

Margaret demonstrates no knowledge of these internal conflicts on her arrival, and is unfortunately naïve about the deep divisions among the peers of the realm. She apparently understands little about the tensions this marriage has created, and has few tools at her disposal to navigate these troubled waters. Between the factionalism and her marriage contract, she remains an outsider, powerless, frustrated, and unable to assume her rightful position as England's queen. Her lack of wealth limits her

capacity to forge friendships and establish herself autonomously, rendering her an ongoing burden on the English coffers, and, as Shakespeare depicts her, angry and destabilized by the limitations her financial status creates.¹⁵ Margaret is especially insulted by the Duchess of Gloucester, who “sweeps it through the court with troops of ladies, / More like an empress than Duke Humphrey’s wife” (1.3.78–79), outshines the new queen, and “scorns [her] poverty” (1.3.82). Shakespeare is careful to confirm that Eleanor is a threat, revealing both the duchess’s vanity and her ambition to displace the queen, while Margaret recognizes that she is caught in a struggle for status with a subject who should minimally offer strategic deference, if not heartfelt friendship and guidance.¹⁶ Isolated from friends and family, Margaret’s vulnerability to such challenges is greater than it would be were she surrounded by a proper retinue. She lacks, it seems, even the train of women that would establish her position and respectability. Mistakenly, Margaret translates the threat of the duchess into the intentions of the duke, bristling at the influence and power wielded by the Lord Protector, and fatally misinterpreting the power dynamics of the court.

Margaret’s alignment with Suffolk becomes the most salient factor in her role as queen in these early years, as lacking other supporters, she grows increasingly dependent on the ambitious duke. Her complaints to him at 1.3.43–50 about Henry’s lack of autonomy and her own subjection to Gloucester allow Suffolk to position himself as the enemy of her enemies, and to cultivate her view that Gloucester’s Protectorship subordinates both Henry and herself, disrupts proper hierarchy, and prevents the king from exercising his rightful authority. Motivated primarily by her own indignities and her lack of respect for King Henry, Margaret places herself entirely in Suffolk’s hands as he pledges that he will “In England work your grace’s full content” (1.3.68). He goes on to situate the two of them as collaborators in his plan for her triumph over her supposed enemies, and schools her on the strategies they must follow to achieve success. He assures her that an alliance with the Cardinal and other lords will serve their short-term objective of overthrowing Gloucester, but prove no obstacle in the longer term: “one by one, we’ll weed them all at last, / And you yourself shall steer the happy helm” (1.3.100–101). He thereby affirms and extends her judgments of the ambitious peers, plants the idea of independent political authority in her head, and suggests obliquely that somehow even the king himself will pose no obstacle to her unlimited power. There is no sense here that she is manipulating or managing this

assault on the peers—Suffolk is masterfully in control of both the plot and the queen at this point in the play. Their exchange demonstrates the degree to which Margaret lacks political understanding appropriate to her role or to the context of this English court, and shows that she is in fact a pawn of Suffolk, despite her desire for authority and her frustrations with the limitations of her husband’s position, and her own. Further, although Suffolk evinces debilitating passion for Margaret in their initial encounter in *I Henry VI*, there is no indication of personal passion here. He does not abandon reason in his pursuit of fleshly pleasure, but instead mobilizes charisma to bind Margaret to him and help him to work his political will.¹⁷ His plans for increasing his own power in the court seem to hinge upon his ability to control Margaret and use her as his factor, a strategy more reliant on deception and manipulation, than on mutual, deeply felt emotional devotion. At this point, Suffolk has her exactly where he wants her, and his vow to “rule both her, the king and realm” (*I Henry VI*, 5.5.108?) seems nearly a *fait accompli*.

Margaret acts mainly within the bounds of Suffolk’s influence, even as she begins to challenge Gloucester openly, as at 1.3.119–120. There, she responds to the duke’s reprimand for her intervention into state affairs by demanding “If he [the king] be old enough [to make his own decisions], what needs your grace / To be protector of his excellence?” Suffolk takes up and elaborates her challenge immediately after Gloucester’s rejoinder, a structure that emphasizes the link between Margaret and Suffolk, but which also suggests that Suffolk bears the primary capacity to exploit factional dynamics. Margaret’s affront to Eleanor occurs in the same interaction, demonstrating her newfound security under Suffolk’s guidance, but also revealing a lack of discretion, the exercise of which might better serve her own ends and those of her allies. This confidence emerges again in the trial of Eleanor for conjuration and treason. After she is charged and sentenced, King Henry—with relative kindness—requests that Gloucester leave behind his staff of office, assuring the troubled duke that he will be “no less beloved / Than when [he was] Protector to [his] king” (2.3.26–27). Margaret reframes that request, invoking the infantilizing effect of Gloucester’s stewardship, under which, in her view, “a king of years [has been] protected like a child” (2.3.28–29). She then strips away Henry’s mollifying assurance: “God and King Henry govern England’s realm! / Give up your staff, sir, and the King his realm” (2.3.30–31). Voicing this as her command, she actually merely reiterates Henry’s judgment, sharpening its implications. When Gloucester complies, she affirms

proper hierarchy will now be restored, declaring, “Now is Henry King and Margaret Queen,” and, retrieving the relinquished staff, asserts Henry’s authority: “there let it stand, / Where it best fits to be, in Henry’s hand” (2.3.43–44). Her own position relies on Henry’s position—on this point she seems clear.

Nevertheless, Suffolk’s influence has apparently bolstered her self-assurance and strengthened her resolve, authorizing her to disparage the rapidly waning Gloucester: she gloats that he is now “scarce himself, / That bears so shrewd a maim, two pulls at once; / His lady banished and a limb lopped off” (2.3.40–42). Her amputation metaphor evinces a deep hatred of the duke, and transforms loss of office into violent physical harm. Suffolk’s delivery of the closing commentary of the trial invokes moral justice, fundamental to his shaping of the queen’s perspective: “Thus droops this lofty pine and hangs his sprays, / Thus Eleanor’s pride dies in her youngest days” (2.3.45–46). Our knowledge of Suffolk’s larger agenda undermines the implication of this assertion of moral right—an effect reinforced by the final incidents of the scene, which depict the ludicrous trial by combat of Horner and his servant Peter. If Margaret begins to find her political voice in this scene, Shakespeare increasingly reveals the impropriety of her values and judgments, and her commitment to her own benefit through her alliance with Suffolk. He depicts events directly and indirectly pertinent to her limitations and to the impropriety of the court’s exercise of the fractured justice Suffolk has instigated.¹⁸ Eleanor’s prediction of Gloucester’s final demise at the hand of his courtly enemies further emphasizes the triumph of political ambition over justice. Citing Suffolk’s influence on the queen, she warns Gloucester that Suffolk “can do all in all / With her that hateth thee and hates us all” (2.4.51–52), affirming Margaret’s ill will and her vulnerability to Suffolk’s control. This warning reminds the audience of Margaret’s malleability and subjection to Suffolk’s influence, a much more dangerous condition than her Frenchness, but a condition that links her foreignness, her limited understanding of the courtly context she has entered, and her potentially powerful mediating role.

Her Role in Gloucester’s Trial and Death

In the preparation for and confrontation with Gloucester in Act 3, scene 1, Margaret seems to take up her role as a moral and political counselor to King Henry—a position often ascribed to queens—cautioning him about the dangers posed by the “rancorous” and ambitious duke (4–41). She

begins her warning by contrasting Gloucester's past behavior as a humble, properly submissive public servant with his present comportment as an imperious, ambitious, political vaulter. Ignorant of the threat posed by York, and oblivious to the broader factionalism, Margaret identifies Gloucester as the greatest menace to Henry's life and crown, and offers a tale of his secret yearnings and nefarious intentions based upon what she claims to read in his changed demeanor. She speaks from a position of apparently perspicacious insight, her counsel motivated only by "the reverent care [she] bear[s] unto [her] lord" (3.1.34). Having taken the initiative in this scene, Margaret appears to function in a dominant position with regard not only to the king, but also to her co-conspirators. Yet, despite her expressed concern for Henry, her counsel is linked directly to larger political plots against Gloucester and the king, and she remains a pawn in those plots. Her lack of influence is pointedly depicted here, as her persuasive interpretation of Gloucester's behavior has no material effect on the king. Further, she plays no role in the calculated effort to establish his guilt: all of the supposed evidence of his transgressions comes from the lords. York's ambition to claim the throne for himself, conveyed in his aside at 3.1.87–92, and Suffolk's aims to empty the court of his rivals, and delude Margaret into thinking the two of them work for her benefit and Henry's, contrast with Hall's depiction of the queen as the primary mover of this attack on Gloucester. According to his account, the lords act only "by her permission, and favor," and she is determined to "deprive and evict out of all rule and authority, the said duke [Gloucester]," and "take upon her, the rule and regiment, both of the king and his kingdom."¹⁹ This view of Margaret has little resonance with Shakespeare's depiction of her thus far, for in the play, she is never in control of these events. Further, Hall makes no mention of Henry's perceptions about or response to the events of Gloucester's 'trial' and murder. By contrast, Shakespeare's Henry is not convinced of Gloucester's guilt by their deceptions: "Ah, uncle Humphrey, in thy face I see / The map of honour, truth and loyalty" (3.1.202–203), he laments, but has no means through which to counter their assertions, save his own contrary interpretation of the duke's demeanor and intentions. It is not simply that Henry fails to see the course of action he could follow, or fails to follow the course of action that he sees—rather, he recognizes his isolated, unsupported position in the face of what amounts to a *coup d'état* that includes his queen, relinquishes his sovereign judgment to his peers, and exits the court.

After Henry departs, Margaret's hints that law and justice are of little concern to her: "This Gloucester should be quickly rid the world, / To rid us of the fear we have of him" (3.1.233–234). Nevertheless, she has to be convinced that murder offers the best solution to Gloucester's putative threat. York's comparison of Gloucester to an "empty eagle ... set / To guard the chicken from a hungry kite" (248–249) elicits Margaret's schoolgirl-like response: "So the poor chicken would be sure of death" (3.1.251). Suffolk's metaphor of the fox who threatens the flock even "Before his chaps be stained with crimson blood" (3.1.259), similarly offers a commonplace for preemptive violence which Margaret finds convincing. When the Cardinal picks up this line of argument, proposes murder, asserts that protection of the realm and the king are their primary objectives, and asks for the approval of those present (3.1.275–277), Margaret follows Suffolk in agreement.

Hardly a scene of Margaret's dominance, these interactions make evident the ways in which she has been taught to see through the lens of corruption wielded by these conspirators, and manipulated into participating in the complete overthrow of justice. This exchange reveals the upward flow of ambitious lords into the vacuum created by Gloucester's collapse, with York the most ambitious and dangerous, for he aims not merely at control of the king, but at the crown itself. In the play's problematizing representation of the enemy within, Gloucester is declared a threat to the sovereign and the state, judged as such by those whose varied self-promotional agendas render them, one and all, enemies to the king and commonweal. Margaret, too, in this scene, comes to be explicitly defined as an internal enemy, misled into colluding with Henry's enemies to overthrow sovereign authority and the rule of law. Yet, she knows as well that she has no place without Henry, her enemy status an outcome of her naïve unfamiliarity with the strategies of factional competition and political ambition that fuel the actual enemies of the commonweal.

When Suffolk announces Gloucester's death in Act 3, scene 2, and Henry collapses, Margaret's recognition of her reliance on him is explicit in her panic: "How fares my lord? Help, lords! the king is dead" and "Run, go, help, help! O Henry, ope thine eyes!" (3.2.33; 35). Yet, when Henry strikes out in terms that suggest he holds Suffolk directly responsible for the duke's death (3.2.39–53), Margaret attempts to deflect Henry's judgment and protect Suffolk. She implies that such an allegation is unjust, and that in accusing her favorite, Henry incriminates her as well: "It may be judged I made the duke away; / So shall my name with slander's

tongue be wounded, / And princes' courts be fill'd with my reproach" (3.2.67–69). She also, characteristically, turns the trauma back on herself, lamenting, "This get I by his death: ay me, unhappy! / To be a queen, and crown'd with infamy!" (3.2.70–71). Despite his lack of response to these lamentations, King Henry's further expression of grief for Gloucester elicits an even more histrionic speech, in which Margaret declares, for the first time in the play, her utter reliance on Henry. This explicit declaration of allegiance and subordination emphasizes her foreignness, her trials, and her lack of resources, should he abandon her. She depicts her departure from France as a kind of self-determined exile from her homeland, in which she severs her ties to the past and sets all hope on her future. She invokes the adversity of the passage across the sea, suggesting that, despite the opposition of the fates and elements (3.2.82–87), she was determined to reach England or perish on the sea (3.2.88–91)—a claim that emphasizes her desire to embrace England as her new home and nation. In an effort to bind herself to England and to Henry, she says, she cast a heart-shaped jewel into the sea toward England: "the sea received it, / And so I wish'd thy body might my heart" (3.2.108–109). She then suggests, in her melodramatic misery at Henry's cruelty to her (3.2.92–100, 114–121), that she has been banned from Henry's affection, or is cursed with an unloving and uncaring husband, and is therefore bereft of all friends and supporters save Suffolk. Most explicitly, she contrasts the perils of the sea voyage, the weather, and possible shipwreck with the hardness of Henry's heart, his ready rejection of her affection, and indeed, *his* guilt as *her* murderer, whose harsh disdain and disregard for her have driven her to seek solace from Suffolk, "the agent of thy [Henry's] foul inconstancy" (3.2.115). Her fluid rhetorical realignment of forces and affections in this speech certainly distorts the conditions represented in the play, but it also conveys the tenuousness of her situation, heightening the sense of Margaret's alienation from those around her, and her isolation from homeland, family, and friends. Her appeal to Henry, and her indictment of his treatment of her, suggest that she sees her own vulnerability, has begun to recognize Henry's potential power, and attempts to elicit sympathy and comfort from him. With his silence, the scene reveals Margaret's failure to manipulate Henry, while suggesting Henry's recognition of his actual situation—of his vulnerabilities as king, and of the threat posed by these internal enemies, whom he clearly understands as such.

With the announcement that the duke was murdered, and with Suffolk and the Cardinal implicated, King Henry's inability to exercise sovereign

authority earlier in the play is displaced by decisive judgment here. Having lost confidence in the system of law, he makes the sovereign decision on the exception,²⁰ circumventing due process with his banishment of Suffolk, in the effort to preserve the commonweal as well as his own position. It is his first sovereign action, and it signals a temporary but important transformation in his relationship to his office.²¹ The implications of this representation of Henry have significance for Margaret as well. Her effort to plead for Suffolk raises the strongest reaction yet from the king, as he reprimands her for defending the man that he has just declared an enemy of himself and the commonweal: “Ungentle queen, to call him gentle Suffolk! / No more, I say: if thou dost plead for him, / Thou wilt but add increase unto my wrath” (3.2.290–292). He then affirms that his own sworn oath constitutes an “irrevocable” decree (3.2.294)—a declaration of the most absolute sovereign authority he has exercised thus far. Henry ends by invoking his territorial sovereignty, emphasizing the scope of his power and the right over the life and death of his subjects within the realm. In the typical trajectory of tragedy, Suffolk has risen to his peak of flagrant disregard for moral and political propriety, has promoted and helped to enact the murder of a clearly innocent man, and now commences the inevitable downward slide that follows.²² King Henry’s assertion of sovereign authority, long withheld, signals the end of Suffolk’s domination, and thus the loss to Margaret of her only apparent ally at court.

Her Change of Allegiance

The implications of this shift surface as Margaret bids farewell to Suffolk. In this parting scene, his excessive Petrarchan passion aims partly at ensuring her willingness to use her influence to reverse his sentence. At least, he recovers remarkably from his despondency by the time his life is threatened at 4.1. Margaret, for her part, has expressed no undying love for this duke before the parting scene, and even here, she demonstrates very little interest in making pledges of deep affection. As she issues her reciprocal ban, or curse, on the king and Warwick in response to Suffolk’s banishment, she stakes an independent claim on her destiny, seeming to pledge herself to Suffolk and declare herself as an enemy to the husband who has failed to cherish and protect her (3.2.300–302). However, the parting scene also reveals her dawning recognition of how unsuccessful she has been in her attempts to influence the king, and how vulnerable she has grown through her recent actions. For example, she proposes to use her

influence with the king to end Suffolk's banishment, pledging, "I will repeal thee, or, be well assured, / Adventure to be banished myself" (3.2.150–151). Yet she also indicates that, with his absence, her banishment will be enacted, and her pledge thereby fulfilled: "And banished I am, if but from thee" (3.2.351). Her declaration of active intervention becomes merely a weak vow that tacitly acknowledges the limits of her influence, and banishment thereby takes on the sense of a personal separation rather than a political condition.

Once she learns that the king may pass their way and find them together, she urges Suffolk to depart quickly (3.2.386–387), and, ignoring his desperate declaration that he would rather die with her than live apart, she offers him a pragmatic reassurance, tells him to "take my heart with thee," and gives him a parting kiss (3.2.408).²³ Strikingly resonant with the tale she tells Henry earlier in the same scene, of throwing her heart into the sea to bind herself to him in love, the gesture seems more calculated than sincere. Further, while she expresses concern that the king will kill Suffolk if he finds them together, this seems to be an expeditious strategy rather than a legitimate concern, for Suffolk has three days to prepare for departure, and should be under no threat in the meantime. It is she who stands to lose by being seen with the vilified and exiled duke, and she seems motivated by self-interest here as much as concern for him. Thus, even in this most dramatic exchange with her supposed lover, Margaret is not depicted as passionate beyond reason, and her actions and words suggest that she is more concerned about Henry's opinion of her than about her relationship with Suffolk.²⁴ There are hints here that, with Suffolk's departure, she may gradually begin thinking strategically, acting to protect herself and to secure her relationship to the one man who holds her fortune in his hands, and upon whose fortune her own fate depends—the king himself. However, despite several rhetorical gestures to that effect, she has not yet transferred her loyalties.

The upheavals of Act 4 offer the first hints of an alignment between Margaret and Henry. As Henry faces down the Cade rebellion, he demonstrates political understanding, concern for his subjects, and the capability to make the necessary decisions and take the necessary actions to secure his realm. Margaret's role in these events is minimal. Her loss of Suffolk clearly leaves her friendless and isolated, with the permanence of his absence now sealed by his death. She appears at the beginning of Act 4, scene 4, carrying with her his severed head, and inconsolably grieving his death, hardly the virago who rules the realm. Rather, Margaret grapples

with loss and grief while Henry, supported by his few loyal lords and subjects, manages the crisis of a kingdom in rebellion. Although she makes an effort to rally against her anguish and “think on revenge” (4.4.3), she fails to muster the fortitude to do so, instead laying Suffolk’s head on her “throbbing breast” (4.4.5), as though this death were merely *la petite mort*, a fleeting fantasy that she likewise cannot sustain.²⁵ Her reliance on Suffolk is here emphasized in her own words when she wonders how “this lovely face [that] / Ruled like a wandering planet over me / ... could not enforce them [his murderers] to relent” (4.4.14–16). This self-description is in keeping with the way she has been depicted throughout the play to this point. The forces of chaos unleashed by Gloucester’s death do not, as we see here, raise Margaret to the role of sovereign in Shakespeare’s representation—a departure from Hall, who terms the twenty-sixth year of Henry’s reign as “the first year of the rule of the Queen.”²⁶ Rather, at this point in the tetralogy, Shakespeare raises Henry to a position of relatively effective and autonomous rule, while providing no indication that Margaret, in particular, influences his decisions and actions.

Indeed, Henry’s impatience with her behavior comes through when he reprimands her for continuing to grieve for Suffolk, and challenges her to align herself with her appropriate role:

How now, madam!
 Still lamenting and mourning for Suffolk’s death?
 I fear me, love, if that I had been dead,
 Thou wouldst not have mourn’d so much for me. (4.4.20–23)

Her assurance that, under such circumstances, she would “not mourn, but die for thee” (4.4.24) suggests that, whether or not she feels actual affection for Henry, she sees the necessity of convincing him, not only of her devotion but of his misunderstanding of her, much as she does in her long speeches of 3.2. As in those interactions, Henry does not reply to her claim, expressing neither passion for nor subjection to her, and offering no comfort—as though her histrionic comportment has no effect on him. If Shakespeare wished to align his presentation of this relationship with the chronicles, such moments would provide the opportunity to demonstrate Margaret’s sovereign domination, but instead, he negates her political efficacy and influence over the king.

Henry, in the meantime, has faced down the challenge to his monarchy posed by Jack Cade and his supporters, and now prepares to deal with the

more potent challenge by the Duke of York. At this moment, he calls Margaret to him, admonishing himself as much as her: “Come, wife, let’s in, and learn to govern better; / For yet may England curse my wretched reign” (4.9.47–48). Thus, despite the difficulties they have faced, he takes her as his royal partner in a pledge to surmount the traumas of the stormy past, and fulfill the duties of monarchy that he has finally begun to comprehend. There is hope, at this point in the tetralogy, that Henry, rising now to his rightful position and stretching his sovereign capacity like a fledgling does its wings, will become the king that England requires. Shakespeare nicely suggests this by interweaving the confrontation between Henry and York with the entry of Alexander Iden bearing the head of Cade. His pledge, having been knighted for his execution of Cade, to “live to merit such a bounty, / And never live but true unto his liege” (5.1.81–82), contrasts with the false submission of York, and symbolizes the possibility that the realm might rally behind the king. History, however, has it otherwise, and so perforce does Shakespeare, but where his sources emphasize Henry’s incapacities, Shakespeare depicts his potential. Margaret, who has yet to assert autonomous political authority, nevertheless soon shows that she has accepted Henry’s command to join him in defending the realm.

The juxtaposition of York’s false submission with Iden’s heartfelt pledge of fealty comes as Henry has once again been trapped into imprisoning a trusted adviser—Somerset in this case—in order to mollify York. Just after Iden has been knighted, Margaret interrupts the audience with York, entering with Somerset (whom Buckingham has just sworn, on his honor, is prisoner). Henry gives rapid whispered instructions to conceal him, aiming to deceive York and preserve the fragile peace. Margaret instead declares, “For thousand Yorks he [Somerset] shall not hide his head, / But boldly stand and front him to his face” (5.1.85–86), her challenging words suggesting that she is now stepping forward with a champion of the king. Shakespeare offers no justification or explanation for this appearance, which perhaps makes Margaret seem impolitic. However, her declaration forces York’s hand and renders his intentions visible, rather than allowing his prevarications to mislead those he means to destroy. Her action, then, may suggest an appropriate and remedial political choice rather than a thoughtless impulse, and it is also the first moment when Margaret’s decision overrides Henry’s—she wields sovereign authority with this declaration, and proclaims open opposition to York’s threat. Henry appears still to hope that diplomacy and the right of rule will pre-

vail, but Margaret sees that England has entered a state of emergency, with York as the internal foe who clearly threatens war. As York becomes more vehement and armed action becomes more likely, Margaret, taking an increasingly active role in the defense of Henry's right—and her own—calls for Clifford to stand against York and his sons. As trusted lords begin to declare their allegiance to Henry or to York, Henry raises challenges to those who turn from him, and, as the threats to the crown increase and as the divisions between factions become clear, his willingness to recognize the internal enemy sharpens. Although Margaret has briefly exercised sovereign authority in this scene and catalyzed this conflict, it is Henry who calls for Buckingham to “arm himself” and prepare for battle (5.1.192). He thereby makes the declaration of war that is the sole provenance of the sovereign, joining with Margaret to acknowledge and respond to the emergency. Her actions and his responses suggest how powerful they might become as a united sovereign unit. The moment, more than any other in the tetralogy, depicts a potentially viable Lancastrian monarchy. As for York, in refusing to comply with the will of the sovereign, he has made himself an outlaw whose actions threaten the state and the ruler, for even if his claim is just, his methods conflict with the parameters of just war as well as natural and divine law.

In the final scene of the play, Margaret's identity as an active protector of the king and the realm becomes more explicit. Henry, disheartened by the defeat of his supporters, is all too willing to resign himself to providence, but Margaret has no intention of relinquishing his crown or her own. The play has not yet introduced young Prince Edward, and so it is the protection of herself and her husband, as queen and king, that she advocates. Her frustration is obvious as Henry refuses to fight or flee, but she also recognizes that reason may yet prevail over his despondency, and that he may be encouraged to rally and save himself. “Now is it manhood, wisdom and defence,” she urges him, “To give the enemy way and to secure us / By what we can, which is no more but fly” (5.2.75–77). Margaret, now apparently committed to their mutual future, has begun to show her strategic capabilities and political intentions. Here, she recognizes pragmatic necessity and the need for active self-preservation, charging Henry to take responsibility for his survival as a monarch. Having begun as an inexperienced stranger in the English court, an isolated figure lacking in support or connections, frustrated and readily manipulated, she has become a powerful and perspicacious defendant of the crown, a partner to the king in supporting Henry's claim and thus her own position and place.

3 *HENRY VI* AND MARGARET'S SELF-BANISHMENT

The stakes rise as *3 Henry VI* commences, for soon it becomes clear that Margaret defends, not only her husband's claim, but that of her son, and to do so, rejects Henry's sovereign authority. She distinguishes monarchy from sovereignty, body natural from body politic, championing Henry's rightful succession and long possession, but resisting his sovereign decisions—a position directly connected to and dependent upon her maternal role. She enters the play just after Henry has made his agreement with York to “entail / The crown to thee and thine forever” (1.1.194–195), an agreement that maintains his own title but negates his son's claim as successor.²⁷ It is obvious that, had Margaret been present, she would have prevented Henry from making such an agreement. As it stands, she characterizes Henry as an “unnatural ... father” (1.1.119), contrasting *his* neglect of his parental role with *her* willingness to be tossed on the soldiers' pikes before agreeing to such a compact (1.1.244).²⁸ Foregrounding her role as Edward's mother, she links the pain of childbirth to the nourishment of her infant with blood, rather than milk, invoking the pelican image with its mythological self-sacrificing instinct, also associated with Elizabeth I in her care of the nation. Thus, as Shakespeare depicts Margaret at this moment, she idealizes herself and her care of the young prince as tantamount to the support of the commonweal and rightful rule, opposed to Henry's failure to shed his “dearest heart-blood” rather than disinherit his son and abandon his realm to a usurper (1.1.223).²⁹ She also asserts her superior political understanding, recognizing that Henry is no safer than “a trembling lamb environed with wolves” (1.1.242). She is able to parse York's obviously predatory and amoral nature, referring to him as the “savage Duke,” and warning Henry that to entail the crown to York and his heirs is “to make thy sepulcher / And creep into it far before thy time” (1.1.24; 235–236). “Thou hast undone thyself, thy son and me” (1.1.232), she chides, emphasizing her dependency and her son's on Henry's role as monarch.

Henry, in submitting to his enemy, has himself become the enemy of the commonweal, in Margaret's view.³⁰ With this recognition, she leaves off chastising, and proclaims herself divorced “Both from thy table ... and thy bed” (1.1.248), a pronouncement resonant with the language of Gloucester when he declares of his wife, “I banish her my bed and company / And give her as a prey to law and shame” (*2 Henry VI*, 2.1.188–189).³¹ Her declaration functions as both a personal and a politi-

cal act, one that separates her from her domestic relationship with Henry, denies him his patriarchal role, and negates his sovereign authority over her, until “that act of Parliament be repealed / Whereby my son is disinherited” (1.1.249–250). Margaret in effect embraces self-banishment, suspending her hard-won role as queen, in order to assert her intention to fill the role that Henry has evaded—the martial defender of his monarchy.³² If Henry, steeped in Christian virtues, lacks *virtù* in the Machiavellian sense, she will embrace the qualities by which a prince shields his realm and his right—not for his sake, and not for her own, but for the sake of *her* son. Significantly, Margaret makes no claim to her own political authority, but aims instead to provide her son with the path to his own just claim.³³ Her son adheres to her position, refusing his father’s request to remain with him, and assuring King Henry, “When I return with victory from the field / I’ll see your grace; till then, I’ll follow her” (1.1.261–262). With this choice, he rejects his father’s sovereign authority in favor of his mother’s military leadership, taking up the active martial identity that his father has never been willing to fulfill.

Despite this separation and rejection, Margaret remains joined to England through her connection to the successor by birth—an indelible bond. Her intervention aims to restore her son’s successive right by overcoming both the detrimental action of the seated sovereign and the threat of the internal foe, but she must support that hoped-for future by waging illegal civil war. Margaret’s self-banishment from Henry’s sovereign and patriarchal authority situates her as an outlaw, one no longer protected or bound by the laws of the state she now struggles to preserve. That role now defines her actions, and Margaret never refers to herself as queen throughout the course of the play—she negates her own political authority in order to confront the Yorkists on their own terms. By positioning her thus, Shakespeare places her directly parallel but opposed to York. To a great extent, he does so by changing the terms of the entailment as reported in the chronicles. In Hall, after a long, careful deliberation, both houses of Parliament find York’s claim legitimate, but they reject the idea of another deposition. Rather, they determine that Henry, having ruled for thirty-eight years, should finish out his reign, with York as his Lord Protector. Further, the *conditions* of the compact are all placed upon King Henry: he must not take any action that infringes the agreement, or York will immediately be granted the crown.³⁴ Shakespeare, by contrast, places the decision entirely in Henry’s hands. Instead of being forced to accept the judgment of Parliament, Henry makes a sovereign decision on the

exception, retaining his capacity to judge above law independently, and to act in the preservation of the state against internal conflict—to quell and bring to obedience an internal enemy who threatens the stability of the realm. If his initial impulse is to resist without restraint this challenge to his crown, the unacceptable costs of that choice are evident in his own words: “first shall war unpeople this my realm. / Ay, and their colors ... / Shall become my winding-sheet” (1.1.126–129). To avoid a devastating civil war, he chooses instead to sacrifice his son’s legacy, a short-term solution that allows him to avoid an immediate concession of sovereignty.

Further, and most significantly, when Henry agrees to “entail / The crown to thee and thine forever” (1.1.194–195), he does so

Conditionally, that here thou take an oath
To cease this civil war and, whilst I live,
To honour me as thy King and sovereign,
And neither by treason nor hostility
To seek to put me down and reign thyself. (196–200 emphasis added)

The oath he exacts places the burden of compliance on York, so that, as Shakespeare shapes these events, York becomes the primary transgressor—a significant departure from the chronicle sources. Since he has pledged submission as the basis of his eventual succession, when York decides to overthrow and kill Henry and claim the throne for himself, he immediately negates his rights under the oath he has sworn, and commits to acts of treason and murder. He thus becomes an outlaw, an internal enemy who, having rejected the authority of the sitting sovereign and the constraints of law, now resides outside the protection of law, allowing him to be killed with impunity. He bears the *caput lupinum*, regardless of the justness of his succession claim, and he has placed himself beyond redemption.³⁵

Thus, as Shakespeare sets up the action of this play, both York and Margaret reject Henry’s sovereign authority and operate outside of law and hierarchy. The one endeavors to overthrow the existing political order and implement a new, ‘legitimate’ order; the other defends the existing, perhaps less legitimate political order against the threat of its overthrow. Yet, the dilemma of this conflict is never resolved, as Shakespeare, who frequently echoes the failures of primogeniture voiced in the chronicles, deflects the determination of legitimacy away from the claims of successive right, to the question of moral character, merit, and capability.³⁶ York describes himself and his ambition in appallingly negative terms, fights only for himself and his own claim, tramples law and

justice in order to promote his own agenda, and refers to the English subjects as so much fodder for his bloody insurrection. Margaret, by contrast, has made the decision on the friend/enemy distinction, despite having relinquished her title and position. In that sense, Shakespeare positions her as the subject who acts against the authority of the sovereign, but also against the realm's enemy.³⁷ However, while Henry does not participate in the military response to York, he fully supports Margaret's decision to lead that effort, recognizes the truth of her indictments of York, remains confident in her love for him and their son, and *hopes* she will be "Revenged ... on that hateful Duke" (1.1.266). However problematic her position as a rebel against the king's authority, Shakespeare's framing of this play gives Margaret the superior moral stand, while York's will to power and the overall bloody-mindedness of his entire faction place them on highly questionable moral ground, despite the possible validity of their succession claims.

Reframing Rebellion as Military Heroism

The play continues to engage with this tension between martial and moral virtue, or between virtue and virtù. In Act 1, scene 4, after his army's defeat, York's declarations of his legitimacy as a warrior blurs the boundary between the appropriate and inappropriate use of martial force, obscuring his unacceptable aims behind his battlefield courage, and revealing how such heroic claims shape perceptions of moral acceptability. Margaret's gendered inability to wield the sword of justice on the battlefield excludes her from this artificial economy of heroic martial action and self-definition. Thus, she confronts York only in his defeat, attempting to humiliate him, force him to acknowledge his transgressions, and elicit from him a confession of his guilt, which would explicitly justify her martial judgment against him.³⁸ When she fails in that effort, she chides Northumberland for his sympathy toward York, and follows Clifford's knife-strike with one of her own, delivering it as a retaliatory blow: "And here's to right our gentle-hearted king" (1.4.176). She thereby frames the blow as a part of the trial by combat of the battlefield, an act of retributive justice within a divinely sanctioned context, despite its decidedly unheroic and belated nature. Even without this justification, York's status as an outlaw allows him to be killed with impunity—at least according to civil law. However, as in the tetralogy as a whole, these opposing justifications for transgressions against natural and divine law and sovereign authority serve to highlight the problematic position of both the Yorkist rebels and the Lancastrian defendants.

Henry, by contrast, has made it clear that he will not act against divine law in defense of his life, realm, or crown. In Act 2, scene 2, he laments York's beheading and begs God to "withhold revenge," denying that he has "wittingly ... infringed [his] vow" (2.2.7–8). Shakespeare suspends judgment on the Yorkists for the time being, using this moment to situate Margaret and the Lancastrians in relation to divine law, and building the tensions of the play's moral alignment by allowing the Yorkist position to hold sway. Through Henry's plea, Shakespeare indicates that Margaret's martial law decision over the life of a battlefield captive raises the specter of divine retribution against Henry himself, and suggests that neither his own inaction nor Margaret's rebellious violence are without repercussions. The costs of these positions become increasingly evident as the Yorkists rally and eventually triumph. Thus, while the play does not suggest a decipherable providential agenda, the role of divine law is emphasized repeatedly as a fundamental aspect of a morally grounded commonwealth and appropriate sovereign action.³⁹ The slow unfolding of divine judgment, and the inscrutability of its actions and aims, become part of the complex dynamic between these warring factions, allowing the question of justice to hang suspended and unanswered for most of the tetralogy.

In this play, Henry's fleeting capacity for sovereign authority dissipates almost immediately, and in its place, his supporters, led by Margaret, override his wishes and his aims, asserting their objectives in his name. From their perspective, the preservation of the state requires disobedience to the judgment of the king, a complication of the simple antinomy of the friend/enemy distinction, and a departure from the idea that only the sovereign can decide on the exception. Both Smith and the *Vindiciae* resonate here, but while Shakespeare demonstrates very little support for *popular* rebellion against sovereign authority in these plays, he situates this simultaneous rejection of Henry's sovereignty and defense of his monarchy against one such rebellion as justified and necessary, despite its costs. Margaret's negation of Henry's sovereignty expands as Act 2, scene 2, continues. In the verbal confrontation with the Yorkists that begins at 2.2.81, Margaret and Clifford challenge Edward's sovereign claim, while Henry attempts to calm the stormy exchange, apparently aiming to reconcile their mutual animosity into amity, as he also attempted in 5.1 of *2 Henry VI*, and in 1.1 of this play. Margaret, impatient with this mollifying effort, challenges him to "defy them ... or else hold close thy lips" (2.2.118), and when he again attempts again to speak, Clifford stops him, insisting that words cannot cure "the wound that bred this meeting," and admonishing him to "therefore be still"

(2.2.121–122). It thus becomes increasingly evident that, even as they fight to defend his right to rule, Henry's supporters hold him in contempt, refusing to offer obedience or even respect.

Two Versions of History

This stand-off between Yorkists and Lancastrians also moves the marriage question to the forefront. Edward, the York heir who now carries on Richard of York's rebellion, attempts to place all blame for the civil war on Henry, reframing his own rebellion as a justified and necessary corrective. He declares that Henry's marriage to Margaret "washed his father's fortunes forth of France / And heaped sedition on his crown at home" (2.2.157–158). In particular, he blames the marriage for instigating factionalism and rebellion, targeting Margaret's provenance and lack of means, her putative sexual infidelity, and her pride as causes of the unrest and conflict that they now face—accusations that echo those made against her by his father in Act 1, scene 4. Shakespeare thus shows how the Yorkist faction used history strategically to deflect culpability for the effects of their actions, although the plays have made it clear that the factionalism was well in place before the marriage, and that ambition was the main disruptive force among the peers. As subjects in rebellion against the seated sovereign, threatening internal enemies who have instigated and undertaken civil war against the state, they situate Margaret as the enemy taken into the heart of the royal family, transformed from external to internal foe, implicating Henry as well as her. Richard of York's intention to claim the crown is represented here as a response to the marriage and its effects, a heroic effort to restore what has been lost, while Margaret becomes the destroyer of England's martial glory and expansionist agenda, and Henry the enabler who bought this scourge down upon them.

However, Shakespeare counters this Yorkist version of history by allowing the Lancastrian view to emerge in the aftermath of their defeat in this battle, negating the idea that either Margaret or the marriage is responsible for the disorder that has destabilized the commonwealth. At the end of Act 2, scene 6, Young Clifford, near death on the battlefield, makes no mention of the marriage, but blames the destabilization on Henry's failure to stand against the Yorks, to make the sovereign decision on the enemy and act to preserve the realm. Just as the sun god, Phoebus, should "never [have] given consent / That Phaëton should check [his] fiery steeds" (2.6.11–12), Henry's acceptance of York's claim, his agreement to make

him Lord Protector, and his failure to treat York as an enemy to the commonweal, have brought down destruction on the realm. “Henry,” he admonishes,

hadst thou swayed as kings should do,
Or as thy father and his father did,
Giving no ground unto the house of York,
They never then had sprung like summer flies;

...

And thou this day hadst kept thy chair in peace. (2.6.14–17; 20)

York’s borrowed brilliance has attracted the support of the easily misled “common people” (2.6.8), while the chariot of power swerves out of its proper orbit and “scorche[s] the earth” (2.6.11–13).⁴⁰ The commonweal has been undone, not by an alien Frenchwoman’s will to power, or by the loss of French territories, but by internal enemies of an entirely different sort—weak monarchy and self-serving subjects. Indeed, Margaret has the perspicacity to challenge Henry’s sovereign decision granting Richard of York legitimacy. She recognizes him, and subsequently his son Edward, as the enemies within that must be stopped, overriding Henry’s sovereign judgment with her rebellion.

Clifford’s view of these events, expressed through mythological metaphor, follows Margaret’s judgment in separating the king’s natural body from his state—the charioteer from the chariot—emphasizing Henry’s inappropriate choices, and York’s inadequacies as a potential ruler. While Shakespeare gives voice to both sides, before and after the battle, Clifford’s version of history resonates much more closely with the version Shakespeare depicts in these plays, and with the Lancastrian support project that Margaret has instigated. These conflicting representations point not only to the biases of history, but also to Shakespeare’s challenge to the received views of these events. He is particularly attentive to the willful self-delusion with which the Yorkist claims were pursued, however legitimate their line of succession may have been, for they are depicted in this metaphor and throughout the tetralogy as unprepared for and incapable of monarchy. As they rise to power they demonstrate the hollowness of their moral righteousness; Edward promises to be no more capable than Henry as a king, and as the scene with Lady Grey reveals, Edward is a far worse man.

Appeal to a Foreign Prince

Margaret, unlike Henry, does not passively accept defeat as a judgment against herself or her son's claim. Having failed to protect Henry's claim or secure her son's succession through her martial leadership, and with Henry now truly stripped of his sovereignty and sequestered in Scotland, she undertakes a diplomatic mission in the name of "England's true-anointed lawful King" (3.3.29), again supporting Henry's interests when he cannot support them himself. She returns to her homeland to throw herself on the mercy of her blood relations, although she never invokes that familial bond, instead seeking the intervention of a foreign sovereign to redeem the Lancastrian monarchy from its usurping foes. Far from declaring her rights as queen, Margaret approaches King Lewis in all humility. She compares the lost past, when she was "Great Albion's queen" (3.3.6-7), to her now-fallen state, in which "mischance hath trod my title down, / And with dishonour laid me on the ground" (3.3.8-9). Although she describes Henry as "banished" (3.3.25), she refuses to accept the judgment of the usurping Edward IV. Instead, she insists on the moral righteousness of her cause as she pleads for King Lewis's "just and lawful aid" against their foes (3.3.32), warning Lewis to "draw not on ... danger and dishonor" (3.3.75) in binding himself to and backing the moral transgressors, "For though usurpers sway the rule awhile, / Yet heavens are just, and time suppresseth wrongs" (3.3.76-77). Assuring Lewis that the Yorkists, too, will be judged, she cautions him that choice and volition determine humans' relationship to the divine, and his own standing in God's judgment is at stake in his decision.⁴¹ Her plea to him serves as a defense of her own actions against the Yorkists, and despite her humble approach, she speaks powerfully of the moral questions connected to her cause, a voice of sovereign judgment even when bereft of the title and position of queen.

As Warwick interrupts her audience with Lewis and makes his bid for a French alliance, Margaret astutely observes: "His demand / Springs not from Edward's well-meant honest love, / But from deceit, bred by necessity" (3.3.66-68). Warwick's almost compulsive use of Edward's title suggests the nature of that necessity, while Margaret counters by naming him a "usurper" and "tyrant" (3.3.28; 76; 69; 71), the latter term referring to his unjustified seizure of the crown, rather than to the nature of his rule.⁴² In place of legally grounded arguments about lineal descent, and morally grounded ones about legitimacy, Warwick scoffs at the "three-score and

two years” of Lancastrian rule as a “silly time / To make prescription for a kingdom’s worth” (3.3.93–94), and dismisses Henry’s genealogy, suggesting that the loss of territories gained by his predecessors negates the legitimacy of his succession. While his mention of the length of Lancastrian rule references Bodin’s argument concerning prescription, his failure to make a serious case undercuts the credibility of his position.⁴³ Shakespeare, while never resolving the succession question, provides a much more sympathetic view of the Lancastrian claim, with Margaret, here as elsewhere, the eloquent defender of Henry’s legitimacy.

That question has little valence for King Lewis, in any case, as he accepts Warwick’s mere word that Edward IV’s succession is proper and legitimate. Rather than making a moral judgment in this difficult case, Lewis resorts to pragmatic choice, just as Henry, meditating in Act 3, scene 1, on the upcoming confrontation in France, predicted he would. The revelation of Edward IV’s decision to reject the marriage alliance in favor of a domestic lust-match, even as Warwick pursues the French marriage, tilts the balance in Margaret’s favor. This personal insult to Lady Bona suddenly stimulates sympathy for Margaret’s cause, as the disgruntled princess declares, “My quarrel and this English Queen’s are one” (3.3.216). Lewis and Warwick likewise see Edward IV’s decision as an affront to Lady Bona, as well as to their own honor and positions, and are bent now on avenging themselves on Edward. In the course of the tetralogy, some few characters act out of support for sovereign right, as they understand it, and Warwick has been one such character, convinced that York has the superior claim to the throne. Here, he readily abandons his devotion to the Yorkist claim, citing misdeeds toward himself and his family as the basis for his change of heart, an echo of the malleable commoners under Jack Cade in *2 Henry VI*. King Lewis, more persuaded by Warwick’s vows of vengeance than by any sense of political justice, pledges his support as well. This international alliance thus takes the same shape as the domestic ones, with justice framed by most characters in personal rather than political terms.

Margaret, however, has been steadfast in her alignment throughout this play. With his staging of this scene, Shakespeare again negates the image of Margaret as driven by an ambition to overthrow social, political, and gender order—an image powerfully conveyed in the chronicles—instead depicting her as a servant of the Lancastrian state, a dedicated mother, a proponent of Henry’s sovereign claim, and a defender of her son’s right of succession. Well-versed in the use of the revelatory aside by this point, or

the soliloquy that establishes hidden intentions, he does not use such techniques to depict Margaret as duplicitous or secretly ambitious for her own gain. The Yorkists repeatedly voice their various intentions to claim the throne, even at the cost of regicide (or fratricide). Young Prince Edward expresses his desire to fight to the death for his right, and Margaret promotes his claim, but never makes such a claim in her own name. The chronicles offer copious material to support her self-promotion, but Shakespeare never puts those thoughts into Margaret's words, nor does he suggest that she rules Henry or shapes his actions. Even in the exchange before the battle of 2.2, discussed above, although she silences him in the verbal sparring before the battle, Henry make his own decisions and holds to his own conscience, despite the opposing views of his supporters and his estranged queen. In place of the chronicles' vilification of this foreign queen, Shakespeare offers a sympathetic, nuanced, and comprehensible exploration of her complicated choices and actions.

Margaret's Last Stand

Margaret's final appearance in this play occurs in Act 5, scene 4, after the triumph of Warwick and his allies against the Yorkist forces, the reestablishment of Henry as king, the defection of Clarence, and the deaths of Warwick and Montague at the battle of Barnet. She addresses the troops before the fateful battle of Tewkesbury, not claiming leadership as her right, but asking for them to follow her despite the odds. She invokes the image of the ship of state to catalogue the damage that has been done to the Lancastrian forces by the Yorkists, and offers hope that Oxford, Somerset, and the French friends they have recruited will serve in place of their lost heroes. Despite the battered condition of the ship/state, "Yet lives our pilot still" (5.4.6), she declares, referring to King Henry, now in the custody of Edward IV. If that pilot has, in the past, abandoned the helm to weep into the sea, "whiles in his moan the ship splits on the rock, / Which industry and courage might have saved" (5.4.10–11), she proposes, as a temporary stay against their present danger, "though unskilful, why not Ned and I / For once allowed the skilful pilot's charge?" (5.4.19–20). Shakespeare seems intent on showing both her bitterness at Henry's weakness, and her humbleness as she offers herself as the last hope for the foundering enterprise. For the first time in this play, she proposes to take control of the state, a state now reduced to the bare-bones fighting force surrounding her—and even here, she asks for rather than claims leadership, links her

own authority to that of her son, and situates herself as pilot only for the nonce.⁴⁴ As she admonishes them to commit to a fight that is unavoidable, her courage inspires both her son, who praises his mother's "valiant spirit" (5.4.39), and the remaining military leaders, Oxford and Somerset, whose positive reception of Margaret's leadership in this desperate moment contrasts with the notion that hers is an unacceptable gender transgression. Her final speech before the battle returns to the theme that has been consistently hers:

Henry, your sovereign,
Is prisoner to the foe, his state usurped,
His realm a slaughterhouse, his subjects slain,
His statutes cancelled and his treasure spent,
And yonder is the wolf that makes this spoil. (5.4.76–80)

Her support of Henry's claim remains unequivocal, and unequivocally distinct from any form of self-interest. The foe here is not just a foe to the Lancastrian faction, but to the state and its survival, the Yorkist claimant situated as the wolf that preys upon the realm's hapless, but not yet helpless, sheep.

Edward IV's battle speech reinforces this representation. He declares that "the thorny wood" of the Lancastrian line "Must by the roots be hewn up yet ere night" (5.4.67–69), a reference to regicide and to an act of family against itself. And as Richard notes when he uses this same metaphor at 3.2.174–175, the one who hews at such a wood both rends and is rent by thorns—an acknowledgment of the problematic nature of the Yorkist endeavor. In contrast to Margaret's argument for relief of wrongs and transgressions, Edward offers an argument for violence that inevitably redounds back on the perpetrator, framing his endeavor in negative terms, rendering his cause questionable, and implicitly acknowledging the inevitable costs of the Yorkists' actions. That inevitability becomes more explicit when, having triumphed and claimed the throne once again, King Edward pledges to preserve the life of the Lancastrian Prince Edward, but takes umbrage at the recalcitrant prince's accusations of their treason and his claim to the right of succession, and impulsively stabs him. In doing so, he makes explicit the founding of his dynasty on the blood of his family's opposing branch. His solution to the challenge to his legitimacy is murder, and in uttering, as he makes his knife strike, "Take that, the likeness of this railer here" (5.5.39), he punishes Prince Edward as the heir to his mother's *verbal* resistance. Indeed,

although Edward's murder of the prince echoes Margaret's one act of physical violence in the tetralogy, her primary tool has been her violent speech, her willingness to challenge sovereign authority and political counter-claims with condemnatory language.⁴⁵

Margaret, who has defended her son's claim through aggression against threats to her offspring, responds to her son's murder with invective that invokes both the personal and the political implications of this act.⁴⁶ Referring to the assassination of Caesar, she links the York brothers' status as "murderers" and "traitors" (5.5.53; 52), and goes on to curse them in their dual roles as parents and rulers: "if you ever chance to have a child, / Look to his youth to have him so cut off / As deathmen, you have rid this sweet young Prince!" (5.5.65–67). As she is removed from court, she reiterates this curse: "So come to you and yours as to this Prince!" (5.5.82). Denied death, but suffering from the choices she has made, she begins to take up her ultimate purpose: she will "live to fill the world with words" (5.5.44), an accusation by Richard that anticipates the role she will play in *Richard III*.⁴⁷ Richard's murder of the captive Henry, coupled with the death of Prince Edward, brings to a close the Yorkist vengeance on the house of Lancaster, and the divine retribution that has circulated in their justifications of their actions. Margaret, for her collusion in Gloucester's murder, though not herself the perpetrator, for her battlefield execution of Richard of York, and for the stabbing of young Rutland despite her absence from that event, has become the living emblem of that vengeance, the embodiment of divine judgment for daring to wield the sword of justice against her son's foes. For her, the cycle of violence has come to an end, and she is condemned to live with its emotional aftermath. Henry becomes the sacrifice, the one consecrated to God, while Margaret becomes the *āzāzel*, the one who is not sacrificed, but upon whom the sins of all are symbolically laid.⁴⁸

In the final scene of the play, Edward IV, who now wields power "Repurchased with the blood of enemies" (5.7.2), returns to the theme of martial courage and honor that has characterized the Yorkist perspective throughout the tetralogy, once again defining the York-centered historical view of these events despite the counter-evidence offered by the play. Emphasizing the warrior valor of their defeated Lancastrian opponents and embracing the rhetoric of chivalric honor and respect for the worthy foe, he cloaks in civility their uncivil internecine war:

What valiant foemen, like to autumn's corn,
 Have we mowed down, in tops of all their pride!
 Three Dukes of Somerset, threefold renowned
 For hardy and undoubted champions;
 Two Cliffords, as the father and the son;
 And two Northumberlands, two braver men
 Ne'er spurred their coursers at the trumpet's sound.
 With them the two brave bears, Warwick and Montague,
 That in their chains fetter'd the kingly lion
 And made the forest tremble when they roared. (5.7.3–12)

Within this rhetorical reframing of the bitter and devastating insurrection, Shakespeare allows to echo the destruction of many an English hero, kinsmen, and former ally, emphasizing the unsavory nature of this martial conflict despite the claims to honorable, justified, courageous battle. The new king expresses his satisfaction that the Yorkist line now rests in security, their martial success having “swept suspicion from our seat” (5.7.13), as though the history of treachery and murder that has brought him to the throne can be rhetorically veiled from divine scrutiny. The irony of his situation and the hollowness of his security become evident, in this triumphant moment, as the greatest threat to his dynasty—his own brother Richard—pays dissimulating homage to his newborn nephew. And as Edward himself dandles his infant son in his arms, kissing him and telling the child that all his efforts have been for him, recasting his will to power as a sacrifice for the Yorkist dynastic future, his words ironically resonate with Margaret's devotion to her son throughout the play. As Edward refers to the child as ‘Ned’, Shakespeare reminds us of Margaret's use of this affectionate nickname for her own son, sharpening the contrast between the king's words and his deeds, and intensifying the implication that the fate of this next young Edward—the hope of the new king—will not be a happy one.

RICHARD III: MARGARET'S REFUSAL OF BANISHMENT

Margaret's embodiment of Lancastrian anguish and retribution continues in the final play of the tetralogy. She has experienced the alienation of an exile in *2 Henry VI*, the power of a self-banished outlaw in *3 Henry VI*, and in *Richard III*, we learn, she has actually been banished by King Edward IV, Shakespeare radically reconfiguring her relationship to

England and her final interactions there.⁴⁹ When Margaret first appears on stage in Act 1, scene 3, she prowls around the periphery, asserting her version of historical truth in response to the Yorkist contentions concerning power, position, and hierarchy—their discord resonating with that of the opening scenes of the first two plays of the tetralogy. Her absent presence reveals her alienation and separation from the occupants of the court, a figure at the end of her natural and political life, powerless and friendless once again in the agonistic world in which she has never quite belonged. Her surreptitious comments counter Yorkist erasures, reinscribing the transgressions against the house of Lancaster and its supporters, the outlawry, treasons, and murders that have put this new regime into power.⁵⁰ Her physical peripherality emphasizes her distance from the center of power, as her unregarded speech echoes in the interstices like a foreign tongue, accentuating her status as an outsider while she asserts her rightful place in the political hierarchy.

With her first lines she declares herself to be the enemy of the ruling family, negating their legitimacy: in response to Queen Elizabeth's complaint of "Small joy ... in being England's queen" (1.3.111; 109), she mutters, "Thy honour, state, and seat is due to me," but she lacks any tangible means to enact that claim. Nothing remains of the Lancastrian resistance, with Margaret seemingly the sole surviving representative of the anti-Yorkist cause. No uprising against the Yorkist monarchy disrupts its claims to or consolidation of power, no internal foes challenge Edward's legitimacy in this play until Margaret arrives. Indeed, when Richard criticizes the queen, her deceased husband, and her brother Rivers for their support of King Henry, Rivers responds that "We followed then our lord, the sovereign king, / So should we you, if you should be our king" (1.3.146–147). In asserting unwavering fealty to the office of king, and implicitly denying allegiance to the cause or judgment of legitimacy of the monarch *per se*, Rivers articulates the most rigorous view possible of a subject's allegiance. Under the circumstances represented in the play, however, even Bodin, with his conservative perspective on loyalty and subjection, allows that a usurper may be overthrown by whatever means are necessary, if the aim is to restore the legitimate ruler. "No one," Bodin insists, "has the right to seize the sovereignty and make himself master of those who had been his companions, no matter what pretense of justice and virtue he may offer."⁵¹ By that criterion, from a Lancastrian perspective rebellion could be justified against Edward IV, but there is no legitimate ruler to restore—Margaret is

not eligible to take the throne as the Lancastrian queen, and Richmond remains exiled in France and is apparently forgotten.⁵² When rebellion does arise, it comes as a response to Richard's usurpation of his nephew's place and his other tyrannical actions, not as a reassertion of the Lancastrian claim—an important distinction from Bodin's perspective, and apparently from Shakespeare's.⁵³ At this point, Margaret stands alone in regarding Edward IV as an internal enemy, a tyrant who has deposed the rightful ruler. Through her, Shakespeare keeps alive the challenge to Yorkist legitimacy, again, not as a judgment on their claim, but as a critique of their means of pursuing it.

When Margaret emerges from the shadows and reveals herself to her foes, challenging their claims, Richard demands of her "Wert thou not banished on pain of death?" (1.3.166), revealing her actual status as an outlaw, declared as such by sovereign judgment for the first time in the tetralogy. She responds, "I was; but I do find more pain in banishment / Than death can yield me here by my abode" (1.3.167–168). Here, as elsewhere, she makes no claims of acquired Englishness or concern for England, and rejects banishment, not for its erasure of cultural or linguistic belonging, nor of connection to the land and former subjects, but rather, for its displacement of her status as queen.⁵⁴ The position she willingly relinquished in defense of her son's claim in *3 Henry VI*, she here embraces as her indelible title and right, an affirmation of her insistent, resistant position as rebellious friend to the (now defunct) Lancastrian nation. Her assertions of her own sovereignty indicate her refusal to accept the legitimacy of Edward's rule: "Which of you trembles not that looks on me? / If not, that, I being queen, you bow like subjects, / Yet that, by you deposed, you quake like rebels?" (1.3.159–161). Insisting on her queenship, she contests her status as subject to any present in the court or the realm, challenging both her own vulnerability to banishment and Edward's right to pronounce it. Later in the exchange, when Rivers threatens repercussions for her unruliness, she turns his remark back on him, demanding service and homage as her just due: "To serve me well, you all should do me duty; / Teach me to be your queen and you my subjects" (1.3.250–251). She thereby reframes the conditions that place her in England, rejecting the negation of her queenship, implicitly denying King Edward's authority over her, and refuting the Yorkist claim to the throne, sovereign authority, and the succession.⁵⁵ This theme develops as she continues to insist on her rights as queen:

A husband and a son thou owest to me;
 And thou a kingdom; all of you allegiance:
 The sorrow that I have, by right is yours,
 And all the pleasures you usurp are mine. (1.3.169–172)

She expressly figures her relationship with her foes in terms of debt—they have stolen their place from those to whom it rightfully belongs, and in the process bereft her of her loved ones. Some of the debts she enumerates are personal in nature, indicating her losses as a wife and mother; others are political, and still others are conditions that meld the two kinds of trauma, sorrow displacing pleasure, usurpation displacing right. Her language of debt suggests the possibility of restitution, but such restitution is foreclosed, both because the dead cannot be restored to their places or to her, and because, as a foreign queen consort, her own claims on English allegiance are unimaginable within the context of early modern political structures.⁵⁶ She is queen dowager as Henry's widow, but her banishment would negate her title entirely, denying her all protection under law. Her debt metaphor thus makes visible the irreparable damage the overthrow of Henry's monarchy has wrought, defining what is owed but unrepayable, a burden that the new regime will never shake off. However, despite her claims to queenship, she does not seek to return a Lancastrian to the throne, not simply because she is unaware that one has survived the slaughter, but rather, because she has lost all reason to champion the Lancastrian cause, no longer having a stake in that line's success.⁵⁷ Thus far, her insistence on the illegitimacy of the Yorkist political order looks backward toward the past, and at this point in the exchange, Margaret's condemnatory assertions serve only to challenge the current government, not to frame an alternative. This critique, although not the predominant sentiment among characters at this point in the play, grows increasingly viable as Richard's villainy undermines any residual confidence in Yorkist rule. That it eventually takes the form of a Lancastrian restoration is incidental to Margaret's agenda, which has yet to be made manifest.

Cursing and Banning

Cursing, which Margaret has deployed in the past, becomes, in the context of her banishment, her one means of political action. By deploying curses against her political foes, Margaret embodies and enacts the etymological

and conceptual correlations between cursing and banishment. Banishment is linked not only to exile, outlawry, and enemy status, but also to the magical qualities of language through the concept of ‘banning’ as ‘cursing’.⁵⁸ The declarative transformation of a friend of the polity into its enemy bears in its linguistic and practical roots the idea of a literally transformative pronouncement. As a performative utterance, the declaration of banishment brings into being a condition and a set of relationships that did not previously exist. It *constitutes* the targeted person as an enemy with the declaration that they are one, *excludes* them from all social and political place, *condemns* them to a life without protection or obligation, and thereby *dooms* them to an existence bereft of humanity and divinity. Yet, to be declared the internal enemy and forced out negates one’s subjection to territorially bounded sovereign authority, and establishes an agonistic relationship with the former sovereign.⁵⁹ The sovereign, in banning a subject, defines the limits of his/her own authority by excluding them from the territory within which his/her own sovereignty may be exercised, and beyond which subjection is not required.

By remaining within England and directly challenging the York rulers, Margaret negates the Yorkist claim to a bounded territory of authority, rejecting Yorkist sovereignty, and therefore the Yorkist sovereign decision. As in *3 Henry VI*, she chooses to act under her own authority, but there, she embraces her outlaw status in order to defend a Lancastrian England that would secure her son’s accession. Here, in insisting upon her queenship, she declares her place within a political context that no longer exists, within a Lancastrian England that—as it seems—has been utterly destroyed, but that nevertheless represents to her the only legitimate state. From that position, attached to an apparently lost past, and speaking as the sole remaining sovereign figure, she appropriates the performative aspect of banishment through the curses she pronounces, turning judgment back on the perpetrators. In cursing them, she literally bans them, drawing on the etymological parallel between these terms, but by banning/cursing, she calls down divine judgment, declares them enemies, denies their social and political place, places them beyond divine protection, subjects them to their own inhumanity. This enacted channeling of divine judgment emphasizes the ultimate, divine source of sovereign authority, as Margaret simultaneously asserts her own sovereign position and acknowledges it limits through the invocation of the moral order and power of the deity. In this sense, Margaret submits to divine law—a shift from her rejection of Henry’s sovereign authority and her rebellious

defense of his monarchical claim in the previous play. There, she claims autonomy in order to pursue a cause outside of Henry's declared law, asserting her own judgment and will. With her curses, Margaret invokes an authority, not only beyond her own apparent powerlessness, but beyond the power of all sovereigns. Alienated from the governing bodies that she targets, stripped of her place in the English political order, she calls down the sword of divine justice from her location external to the sovereign order she challenges, beyond the command of any temporal sovereign authority, this time not through military defense, but through the enacted power of performative language. Negating her own foreignness and banishment in order to claim queenship of and friendship to England, she also subjugates Edward IV's national and sovereign autonomy under divine judgment, delegitimizing his rule.

As she steps forward to confront her foes, Margaret does not begin with cursing. Rather, responding to Richard's demand, "what mak'st thou in my sight?" (1.3.163), she declares that her presence there has no purpose "But repetition of what thou hast marr'd; / That will I make before I let thee go" (1.3.164–165). Her turning of his own language back on him—a strategy they both employ—signals the struggle for control over language's performative potential that marks the dynamic between them. Her assertion suggests that she will speak only to give witness to the wrongs of the past, but also indicates that she has power over him to hold him in thrall to that testimony. Richard counters by claiming that she now suffers divine retribution for her transgressions against moral law, her losses and her ongoing suffering affirming the righteousness of the Yorkist cause. Richard's inclusion of Rutland's killing among her offenses situates her as the representative of the Lancastrian cause as a whole, not only in the eyes of the Yorkists, but also in the eyes of God—she becomes the one that carries the sins of all. Margaret, taking up this claim of righteous vengeance by the divine sword, weighs the many losses on her side against the one loss on theirs—"that peevish brat" Rutland (1.3.193)—and declares her intention to mobilize this divine power on behalf of the Lancastrians. "Can curses pierce the clouds and enter heaven? / Why, then, give way, dull clouds, to my quick curses!" (1.3.194–195). It is as though she only here discovers the power of cursing, taking her lesson from her hated foes. Having struggled to assert her own preeminence within the state, defended sovereign authority against internal enemies by rejecting sovereign authority herself, and set herself outside of law as a means to support sovereign right, she finally relinquishes her political project in order to embrace a

moral agenda—one with personal motives, but without personal redemption or political restoration. Because this represents, in effect, a resignation of ambition and material gain, she becomes an ideal vehicle for the materialization of divine judgment, which Shakespeare figures as inescapable, undoing the Yorkists as it has undone the Lancastrians. Divine retribution needs no human will to direct it, but her curses make tangible the causal relationships in the events that follow, and demonstrate that the rhetorical reconfiguration of history by the Yorkists cannot undo the moral transgressions of their path to sovereignty.

Her plea for divine punishment begins by enumerating the harms perpetrated by the Yorkists against herself and the Lancastrians, petitioning heaven for retribution that equates with the transgressions in the mode of *lex talionis* (1.3.196–202). King Edward’s death by surfeit requites King Henry’s death by murder, signaling the overreaching of Yorkist actions, and the excess of their certainty. Death in youth for Edward’s son retaliates for the death of Margaret’s son, their echoing names and titles indicting King Edward as his own son’s murderer. Turning to Queen Elizabeth, she condemns her to the same fate as her own, focusing first on her loss of status and title. However, for Elizabeth, she has more harms in store:

Long mayst thou live to wail thy children’s death;
 And see another, as I see thee now,
 Decked in thy rights, as thou art stalled in mine.
 Long die thy happy days before thy death;
 And, after many lengthen’d hours of grief,
 Die neither mother, wife, nor England’s queen.
 —Rivers and Dorset, you were standers by,
 And so wast thou, Lord Hastings, when my son
 Was stabbed with bloody daggers: God, I pray Him,
 That none of you may live his natural age,
 But by some unlooked accident cut off. (1.3.203–213)

This curse on Elizabeth explicates the trauma Margaret experiences from her losses primarily as a mother and wife, not only as a queen; her curses on Elizabeth’s brother and son are meant to increase her successor’s anguish, as well as bring down divine punishment on them for standing by when her own son was murdered. Although, as Elizabeth rightly claims, “I never did her any [harm] to my knowledge” (1.3.308), Richard recognizes, through his own self-serving perspective, that Elizabeth has benefited from the harms

done by others, including Richard's own part in bringing about Edward's monarchy (1.1.309–311).

The situation of the new queen resonates strongly with that of Margaret herself at the beginning of 2 *Henry VI*, in which the dominant female figure of the court—Eleanor, Duchess of Gloucester—flouts Margaret's authority and position, while the peers associate her with the loss of male honor through her marriage contract.⁶⁰ The threat of Margaret's foreign provenance and relative poverty is translated into the threat of Elizabeth's relatively low social status, associated with the loss of male honor through her promotion of her family into the peerage and displacement of the royal brothers by her own family members.⁶¹ Further, Elizabeth stands against Richard throughout the play, serving as a voice of history parallel to Margaret's against his attempted reinscription of events for his own benefit.⁶² Rather than the one-to-one correspondence of harms associated with *lex talionis*, the 'death for death' with which she curses the male figures in her opening salvo, Margaret heaps hoped-for misery on the head of the already-unhappy queen, woes that echo the losses Margaret has experienced. In this sense, she aims to equate Elizabeth with herself as the most wronged figure in a landscape of trauma, the nexus of Yorkist grief and suffering, as Margaret has been the nexus of Lancastrian suffering. As such, each of them is figured, quite literally, as the matrix within which and from which their own greatest pain has emerged, the children they bear marking them for anguish far beyond their political losses. Although neither is the direct target of their foes' violence, they experience collateral damage in much the same way that the nation as a whole has suffered, grieving widows and fatherless children the most devastating aftermath of this conflict.

Richard, who has been the target of Margaret's fierce invective on the battlefield and in the court, who was directly responsible for the death of Henry VI, and who had a vicious hand in her son's death as well, becomes the target of her most vituperative curses:

If heaven have any grievous plague in store
Exceeding those that I can wish upon thee,
O, let them keep it till thy sins be ripe,
And then hurl down their indignation
On thee, the troubler of the poor world's peace.
The worm of conscience still begnaw thy soul;
Thy friends suspect for traitors while thou liv'st,

And take deep traitors for thy dearest friends;
 No sleep close up that deadly eye of thine,
 Unless it be while some tormenting dream
 Affrights thee with a hell of ugly devils. (1.3.216–226)

These curses invoke the pains of a living hell, anticipating for him betrayal, torment without relief, and no respite even in sleep. She reinvokes divine punishment in the hope that his actual suffering, ripened with his sins, will be far worse than anything she can imagine or call forth. Time thus becomes a central aspect of her curse upon Richard, a recognition that no personal loss will affect him, but that the slow erosion of his capacity to deceive and manipulate will leave him increasingly isolated and impotent politically, while his heinous choices will haunt and undermine him, and increase his ultimate punishment. As she attempted unsuccessfully with York (3 *Henry VI*, 1.4), she endeavors here to eventuate Richard's confrontation with his conscience, in which he will be brought to acknowledge his transgressions—an outcome that once again fails to materialize. Practical concerns, it seems, not moral introspection, shape the Yorkist political imaginary. Nevertheless, by the end of the play Richard's condemnation to eternal punishment would have been obvious to Elizabethan audiences, even as he attempts to dismiss the biting 'worm of conscience' that plagues him through his dream.⁶³ Although scholars tend to see Margaret's curse on Richard as disrupted by Richard's interjection of her name at 1.3.232, Margaret in fact brings this initial series of curses on him to a close, ending her sentence and establishing the terms of punishment that she seeks.⁶⁴ If his conscience never begnaws his soul, the main content of these curses nevertheless comes to pass.

In the second phase of her curse on him, Margaret shifts to observational interpretation, reading the signs of his body and declaiming on their signification. With this declamation, not a curse for the future, but a catalogue of the signs of his cursed condition from birth, she attempts to link Richard's external condition to his satanic provenance "sealed in [his] nativity" (1.3.228), identifying it as an index of his internal condition from the beginning. In her account of him, Richard's physical condition marks him as destined to wreak havoc, and thus her curse would, if she completed it, call forth the inevitable unfolding of his demise as a preordained outcome. Yet, she also situates Richard as an omen or judgment called forth by the Yorkist abandonment of divine law, their pursuit of self-interested ambition over the values of national stability and continuity,

which shifts the focus from his birth to more recent choices and actions.⁶⁵ Thus, her emphasis on the swollen nature of Richard's body—the “bottled spider” reference, for example (1.3.241), suggests that his physical abnormalities make manifest these familial and personal excesses in the pursuit of power for its own sake. Similarly, the image of the “rooting hog” (1.3.227) not only invokes his heraldic device (the white boar), but also references the willful upheaval of the very ground of the realm, its political system. She thereby links physical deformity and political transgression in a nonlinear, but nevertheless causal, relationship.

This idea of culpability for transgressive political ambition emerges again when she projects an end to this regime based on its bloody usurpation and regicide, rather than on a preexisting embodied familial destiny: “O God, that seest it, do not suffer it; / As it is won with blood, lost be it so” (1.3.270–271). She also, however, more explicitly suggests that Richard embodies and makes visible a divine judgment upon his family, and on the ambitious courtiers who surround him, a notion that gestures both toward predetermined and judgmental conceptions of divine oversight: “Sin, death, and hell have set their mark on him, / And all their ministers attend on him” (1.3.292–293). Margaret here situates Richard as a satanic agent, his actions calling forth the worst impulses of his followers, while ensnaring each of them in the sticky threads of their own ambition, warped judgment, and instrumental reason.⁶⁶ If Richard thus becomes the touchstone of her prophesy, the evidence in the world that God aims to punish the Yorkist line for their transgressions, she also recognizes that the current political and familial situation they all face has been brought about by, and continues to unfold through, individual human volition in the moment. Margaret interprets Richard's physical condition as a marker of divine judgment, but she also situates him as the agent of a long-term, slowly unfolding, destructive Yorkist trajectory in which his transgressive violence is linked to a physical state that both prefigures and reflects the man he has become, and the king he will become.

She concludes her banning with a general curse, one that emphasizes the universal subjugation of this ruling echelon, with all of them “subjects to [Richard's] hate,” he to theirs, and “all of you to God's” (1.3.301–302). These curses, individually and collectively, reflect the inevitability of divine judgment, and serve as a reminder that the suffering of their enemies under a parallel judgment, a condition now embodied by Margaret, does not release them from their own culpability. The house of York has acted to correct a Lancastrian transgression, as they have deter-

mined it; Margaret herself has acted to correct a Yorkist transgression and paid immeasurably for that choice. Through Margaret's curses, Shakespeare thus invokes and acknowledges the cycle of divine retribution—the inevitable punishment for immoral human action, even when that action may seem to rectify other wrongs. In early modern perspectives, human action of any sort fulfills divine will—sometimes positively, sometimes negatively—but the responsibility lies with the agent, because how one chooses to act shapes the immediate temporal context and its after-effects. The only certainty is in the inevitability of the individual reckoning.⁶⁷ Whether or not Margaret's banning is itself a cause of Yorkist punishment, she provides an index of the actions and choices that have rendered them culpable as internal enemies to the commonweal, and subject to divine punishment—a culpability acknowledged by characters in the play as they fall from glory to ignominy and death.

In her final appearance, in Act 4, scene 4, Margaret opens the scene with her observation that time is bringing her predictions to their inevitable conclusions: “So now prosperity begins to mellow / And drop into the rotten mouth of death” (4.4.1–2), she gloats, suggesting a natural course of development in which temporal success ripens, then decays. Margaret's perspective, which frames the action of the play through prophesy and its fulfillment, emphasizes the inevitability of this outcome, Richard's demise as certain as his initial apparent success has been. She characterizes Richard as “hell's black intelligencer” (4.4.71), a mere “factor” who serves his masters (4.4.72), who exists only as a means to entrap other souls for the satanic powers who also control him. His judgment is nearly upon him: “At hand, at hand / Ensues his pitious and unpitied end” (4.4.73–74), she declares, both heaven and hell anxious to deliver him to eternal damnation. From her perspective, divine justice is at last unfolding, her Yorkist enemies falling in judgment of their transgressions against the Lancastrians.

As the Duchess of York and Queen Elizabeth enter, lamenting their losses, Margaret invokes the logic of *lex talionis* once again, balancing death for death, York for Lancaster, offering a terrible summation of the effects of this internecine conflict, and situating the current moment in relation to her view of the past. This interaction demonstrates the extent to which Margaret shares with these Yorkist women their mutual hatred of Richard, while their reference to their own losses again emphasize the extent to which women become both the nexus and matrix of trauma.⁶⁸ The duchess suffers as “the issue of his mother's body / Makes her a pew-

fellow with others' moan" (4.4.57–58), her motherhood itself a curse not only on her own family but on the nation as a whole. Queen Elizabeth, who "didst usurp [Margaret's] place ... now dost ... / Usurp the just proportion of [her] sorrow" (4.4.109–110), her suffering dependent upon her maternity, as Margaret's has been, while others' maternal losses intersect with and amplify her own. The three, their hopes and lives blasted by the workings of time, vengeance, and divine judgment, unite in cursing Richard in an effort to turn that judgment against him, despite their continued discord. Margaret, in particular, never ceases in her taunting or acknowledges their shared trauma, committed to her stance as enemy to the internal enemies. Yet, when she figures herself and Elizabeth as oxen yoked in the same harness, "[f]rom which," she says, "even here I slip my wearied head / And leave the burden of it all on thee" (4.4.112–113), her metaphor nevertheless suggests that Margaret sees Elizabeth as replacing her role as goad to Richard's downfall. In effect, declaring her intention to return to France, she relinquishes her place, acknowledging Elizabeth explicitly as heir to her pain and trauma, and implicitly as heir to her resistance. Her banning ends and she takes up her banishment, now able at last to embrace her exodus from England. Margaret's transformation over the course of the plays moves her from margin to center to margin again, her status as an outsider formed first through the circumstances of foreign marriage, reformed through her self-separation from Henry's sovereign law, and reformed again through her rejection of Edward's authority and her commitment to divine justice. It is from outside that Margaret claims her strongest voice.

Continuing Resistance

As Elizabeth takes up the yoke of resistance, she does so in a way utterly different from Margaret's, and clearly much more viable from a political, patriarchal, and social perspective—as a mother protecting but also mobilizing her daughter as the vector for political transformation. However unsavory Richard's suit for her daughter's hand may be—and the exchange between them emphasizes again, in agonizing detail, the harms Richard has perpetrated—Elizabeth seems slowly to recognize that her daughter's only hope lies in marriage to the survivor of this upcoming battle for the throne, to the internal enemy or the external challenger. In response to the trial by combat to determine who will rule England, she ultimately leaves open the option to match her daughter with the winner, whomever

that may be.⁶⁹ Thus, fully articulating the many arguments against trusting Richard or believing in his promises, she nevertheless seems to recognize that her daughter may become the necessary peace pledge within the realm, the one who will secure the throne for the one who rules.⁷⁰ She gambles on remaining at the center of power, forging a path of political activism that avoids direct action or violence, and thereby evades divine retribution. From a position of weakness and alienation, Elizabeth rejects the male determination to assert monarchical right through combat, situating her daughter as the linchpin for the future of the English monarchy, not just for the early modern era, but as it turns out, down to the present day. Within the limited choices available to women, the former queen hedges her bet in a context where, if the challenge to Richard III as an internal enemy should fail, her daughter will become queen nevertheless.

The challenger, Richmond, is unquestionably portrayed as an infinitely better man than Richard, and as holding the potential to function as an infinitely better king. Nevertheless, at the end of the play, Shakespeare's staging of the successful armed rebellion of subjects against the sitting king, with Richard's repeated references to them as rebels, gestures toward the inevitable cycles of history and the impossibility of any firm distinction between friend and enemy.⁷¹ In the play, there is no indication, however more capable of statecraft Richmond seems than Richard, that the conflicts have come to an end, or that Richmond's rebellion against Richard's monarchy will somehow escape the burden of culpability for violence against the seated king. As the chronicle sources situate him, and perhaps in historical reality, Richmond was impelled by historical necessity to challenge an intolerable tyrant, and managed to claim the crown as Henry VII and maintain his sovereignty despite almost constant challenges from those claiming to be Yorkist heirs.⁷² The relative success of the Tudors, legitimated by their century of rule, must likewise be contextualized by the youthful demise of two male heirs, Arthur and Edward VI; the abusive enactment of sovereign judgment by Richmond's successor, Henry VIII; the rise of religious conflict and alternation that deeply divided the realm; and a sequence of successors without issue or heirs. If this is a natural telos or grand narrative of the arrival of the end of history, it looks suspiciously like a negative judgment on the Tudor line. As the Tudor era draws to a close, Margaret reminds Shakespeare's audiences, through her suffering, her cursing, and the fall of her enemies, that even those who fulfill divine will through violence are culpable for their actions, and that divine retribution never rests, however slow and indecipherable its interventions may be.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The tetralogy as a whole offers consistent challenges to the friend/enemy distinction, repeatedly depicts the problems of embodied monarchy and the failure of the body politic to reform the body natural, and emphasizes how readily even a well-meaning sovereign can become the enemy within. It also reminds its audiences that historical narrative is shaped by the agendas and alignments of its writers, with Henry in this case granted the potential for effective sovereignty, had his nobles been willing to support him. For Margaret, Shakespeare represents the human causes and responses that might have motivated her, but also situates her at the center of a conflict over sovereignty in which she alone acts consistently for the good of the seated line of succession. Had he followed Hall and Holinshed, he would have presented a far more self-interested and ambitious queen, and a more unproblematically Yorkist view of history.

As they stand, these plays take up complicated questions of ongoing political significance, as do the plays in the other main chapters of this book. Considered in the order in which they appear, the plays represent increasingly aggressive forms of resistance: Katherine, in *Henry VIII*, merely declares her purity and seeks external temporal support for her position through an appeal to the pope. Hermione, in *The Winter's Tale*, declares her purity, seeks divine judgment directly, and removes herself from Leontes' reach until that judgment can be enacted. Tamora, in *Titus Andronicus*, dissembles her friendship while enacting the role of enemy to the sovereign and the state, not as a vengeful virago, but as a concupiscent deceiver. As internal enemy, she participates in the evisceration of justice, contributing to political conditions in which the commonweal can be revived, if at all, only through violence. Margaret, in *2 Henry VI*, is initially vulnerable because of her alien status, but in *3 Henry VI* she embraces the role of enemy within, in order to resist challenges to the Lancastrian dynasty that the king himself will not defend. She carries on against the Yorkist regime in *Richard III*, challenging the internal enemy by aligning herself with the sword of divine justice—a shift from her active martial role to a more passive, but apparently more effective, form of resistance. If later plays, like *Henry VIII* and *The Winter's Tale*, depict more explicit abuses of the queen, and more evasive, less martial solutions to those abuses, these earlier plays demonstrate that those who experience political alienation may well mobilize that condition toward radical, possibly even violent, political transformation.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Jean E. Howard and Phyllis Rackin, *Engendering a Nation: A Feminist Reading of Shakespeare's English Histories* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997); Phyllis Rackin, *Stages of History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 73–75, 158; Kathryn Schwarz, “Stealing the Breech in Shakespeare’s Chronicle Plays,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 49 (1998): 140–167. Earlier arguments to this effect include: Leah Marcus, *Puzzling Shakespeare: Local Reading and Its Discontents* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 51–95; Marilyn L. Williamson, “When Men Are Rul’d by Women: Shakespeare’s First Tetralogy,” *Shakespeare Studies* 19 (1987): 41–59; Patricia Ann Lee, “Reflections of Power: Margaret of Anjou and the Dark Side of Queenship,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 183–217. However, Lee does recognize variations in Margaret’s role at different points. Juliet Dusinberre offers a broader overview of women’s roles in *Shakespeare and the Nature of Women*, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan, 1996). Also pertinent is the more generous reading of Margaret offered by Carole Levin through historical sources and other literary representations. See “Queen Margaret in Shakespeare and Chronicles: She-Wolf or Heroic Spirit,” *Scholars and Poets Talk About Queens*, ed. Carole Levin (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 111–131.
2. In *Titus Andronicus*, Tamora is similarly without resources and supporters when she enters Rome. However, members of her own family and retinue (Aaron) accompany her, so she is not initially quite as isolated as Margaret is; when she abruptly becomes empress, there is little indication that she suffers from limited resources or respect until her affair with Aaron is revealed. For other arguments concerning Shakespeare’s negative representation of Margaret, and the relationships between historical and literary representation, see Kavita Mudan Finn, “Bloodlines and Blood Spilt: Historical Retelling and the Rhetoric of Sovereignty in Shakespeare’s First Tetralogy,” *Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England* 30 (2017): 126–146, and “Tragedy, Transgression, and Women’s Voices: The Cases of Eleanor Cobham and Margaret of Anjou,” *Viator Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 42, no. 2 (2016): 277–303. Also applicable is John Watkins, “Shakespeare’s *1 Henry VI* and the Tragedy of Renaissance Diplomacy,” in *Shakespeare’s Foreign Worlds: National and Transnational Identity in the Elizabethan Age*, ed. Carole Levin and John Watkins (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2009). Helen E. Maurer, in *Margaret of Anjou: Queenship and Power in Late Medieval England* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003), offers a nuanced reassessment of Margaret and her political role, arguing that, although she played a central role in the political realm, she had relatively limited direct power and generally functioned in circum-

- spect ways. For primary sources, see Hall, *Chronicle*, esp. 205–220; and Raphael Holinshed, *Chronicles*. See esp. Vol. 6, 611–716.
3. The significance of her impending change in status is evident in *1 Henry VI*, but her actual change in status becomes evident only in the following three plays. Throughout this chapter, citations of the first tetralogy refer to the following: *King Henry VI Part 1*, ed. Edward Burns (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2000); *King Henry VI Part 2*, ed. Ronald Knowles (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2004; London, Oxford, and New York: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2009; 2016); *King Henry VI Part 3*, ed. John D. Cox and Eric Rasmussen (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2001; London, Oxford, and New York: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2010; 2016); *Richard III*, ed. James R. Siemon (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2009; London, Oxford, and New York: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2010; 2016). For other Shakespeare plays, I refer to *The Norton Shakespeare*.
 4. Among the banished are Fastolfe (*1 Henry VI*); Eleanor and Suffolk (*2 Henry VI*); and Margaret (*Richard III*). While not explicitly banished, both Henry and Margaret suffer the pains of banishment (*3 Henry VI*); Margaret experiences actual banishment in *Richard III*. Other characters self-exiled or removed for their safety include Dorset and Buckingham (*Richard III*).
 5. For a discussion of the concept of the king's two bodies, see Chap. 1, 19–20. For preservation of the body politic through challenges to the body natural, see Chap. 1, 3; 10; 19.
 6. See the discussion for foreignness and foreign queenship in Chap. 1, 2–8.
 7. See also Logan, *Foreign Marriage*, 100–110.
 8. But see Kavita Mudan Finn, “‘A Queen in Jest’: Queenship and Historical Subversion in Shakespeare’s *3 Henry VI* and *Richard III*,” in *Representations of Elizabeth I in Early Modern Culture*, ed. Alessandra Petrina and Laura Tosi (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 244–256.
 9. Much depends upon how this scene is performed, of course, but there is nothing in the text itself to suggest that Suffolk has actually succeeded in winning her over.
 10. Watkins, “Shakespeare’s *1 Henry VI*” 71–73, situates her historically as fulfilling her role of appropriate intervention in support of peace and friendship between France and England.
 11. Finn comments insightfully on this issue. See *The Last Plantagenet Consorts: Gender, Genre, and Historiography, 1440–1627* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, Kindle edition), 148–149. Also applicable is Nina S. Levine, *Politics, Gender, and Nation in Shakespeare’s Early History Plays* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1998), 81.
 12. In *1 & 2 Henry IV* and in *Henry V*, Shakespeare reminds his audiences that English unity is more a rhetorical trope than a lived reality.

13. Shakespeare depicts the conquest of France in *Henry V*, but in addition to the complicated representation of English glory in that play, the ephemerality of Henry's martial success is invoked explicitly in the epilogue, placing the moment in relation to its unstable past and even more unstable future. Norman Rabkin's iconic essay, "Rabbits, Ducks, and Henry V," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (1977): 279–296, offers a clear assessment of the play's irreconcilable tensions. Nevertheless, when situated within the long trajectory of these two tetralogies, the positive, potentially teleological understanding of *Henry V* becomes far less viable, at best a flash of triumph in an otherwise grim and murky process of unfolding disruption and deterioration.
14. In his introduction to *2 Henry VI*, Ronald Knowles comments, "The aristocratic cohesion of chivalry was bound to fail since its ideals of loyalty, service and self-sacrifice" conflicted with the "harsh reality of human motives" (48).
15. This financial lack is a frequent point of attack by the Yorkists as the tetralogy unfolds, while it has little valence in the chronicles, despite the acknowledgment of the terms of the marriage, including the lack of dowry (Hall, *Chronicle*, 204; Holinshed, *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 624: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_5615). Referencing the lack of dowry Hall notes that the more significant issue was the "whole fiftene" that Suffolk "demaunded ... in open parliament," as well as the relinquishment of Anjou and Maine. See Hall, *Chronicle*, 205; Holinshed, *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 625: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_5621.
16. See also 1.3.131–132, for the accusation of Gloucester's excessive spending of public funds for "sumptuous buildings and [his] wife's attire." Margaret's complaint about their relative visible displays of status is reinforced by this accusation. Hall relates that Gloucester's "enemies" plant the idea that he has appropriated public funds for private benefit. From this, Shakespeare creates Margaret's sense of alienation connected with this disparity of display. See Hall, *Chronicles*, 208–209.
17. For an alternative reading, see Howard and Rackin, *Engendering*, 72–73.
18. Knowles, *2 Henry VI*, "Introduction," 79–80, traces the resonances between flawed forms of justice in the play.
19. Hall, *Chronicles*, 208–209. Holinshed indicates only that she followed her father's advice that "she and the king should take upon them the rule of the realm, and not ... be kept under, as wards and mastered orphans." See Vol. 6, 626: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_5633.
20. On the sovereign decision, see Chap. 1, 9–14.

21. The departure from Hall's representation of this event is striking. Hall reveals that Henry banished Suffolk for five years only, and indicates that the judgment was intended only to assuage the commons in the short term, not as a reprimand of the duke, whose guilt the king did not acknowledge or accept (219); Holinshed follows Hall: *Chronicles*, Vol. 6, 631: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_5672.
22. After describing Suffolk's ignominious death, Hall asserts his guilt: "This end had William de la Pole, first duke of Suffolk, as men judge by God's punishment: for above all things he was noted to be the very organ, engine, and deviser of the destruction of Humphrey the good duke of Gloucester, and so the blood of the Innocent man was with his dolorous death, recompensed and punished" (219). Holinshed echoes closely, Vol. 6, 632: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_5675.
23. Howard and Rackin characterize Margaret as clearly dominating Suffolk here. See *Engendering*, 72–73.
24. Suffolk recovers remarkably well from his love-pangs, for when we next encounter him, he masterfully asserts his identity, his close connection to the king, and his relationship with Margaret as evidence that he should be released or ransomed rather than killed (4.1.44–45; 50–64). The preference for life rather than death seems to have rapidly asserted itself, now that the opportunity to manipulate Margaret has passed.
25. Howard and Rackin offer a helpful interpretation of this moment, in which Margaret is utterly undone by the loss of Suffolk. Difficult to reconcile with earlier arguments that she has dominated him throughout, the moment nevertheless aligns their reading and mine. See *Engendering*, 74.
26. Holinshed Vol. 6, 627: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_5639, replicates the quoted passage. Hall, *Chronicle*, 210, adds that by giving "too much credence ... to evil and flattering counselors," she allowed "mischiefs" to increase to the point where "by no means after they could be either overcome or resisted." Both situate Margaret as wielding sovereign authority, but Hall is more explicit.
27. Ken Jackson reads this as a parallel to the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac. See *Shakespeare and Abraham*, Chap. 2.
28. Clifford makes a similar argument about natural and unnatural parenthood at 2.2.23–33, chastising Henry for being a less natural father than "unreasonable creatures" and birds who "Make war with him who climbed unto their nest. / Offering their own lives in their young's defense."
29. But see Finn, *The Last Plantagenet Consorts*, 157, note 57, for a suggestion that this image might be associated with witchcraft, and thus link Margaret to Joan. She cites Kristin M. Smith, "Martial Maids and Murdering Mothers: Women, Witchcraft and Motherly Transgression in *Henry VI* and *Richard III*," *Shakespeare Yearbook* 3 (2007): 143–160, as the source of this idea.

30. My analysis of this scene intersects at some points with the analysis of Howard and Rackin. See *Engendering*, 84–87.
31. Finn calls attention to this parallel in “Tragedy, Transgression, and Women’s Voices,” 301.
32. Her language in reference to their son shifts, identifying him as “thine” at 1.1.225, and as “my” at 1.1.250.
33. A representation that aligns with Maurer’s overarching historical argument about Margaret’s circumspection. See *Margaret of Anjou*, esp. Chap. 1. For an insightful reading of this commitment in the plays, see Kathryn Schwartz, “A Tragedy of Good Intentions: Maternal Agency in *3 Henry VI* and *King John*,” *Renaissance Drama* 32 (2003): 225–254.
34. Hall, *Chronicles*, 249. Holinshed adds a passage that places some burden on York as well. He was never to attempt, countenance, or allow the “abridgement of the naturall life of king Henrie the sixt, or ... the hurt or diminishing of his reigne or dignitie roiall, by violence, or anie o[ther] waie.” See Vol. 6, 657: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_5818, accessed 1/4/2018.
35. On the *caput lupinum*, see Chap. 1, 37.
36. Shakespeare’s refusal to resolve the succession question occurs again at 2.2 and 3.3. Finn, among others, notes the repeated, unproductive arguments concerning bloodline. See “Bloodlines and Blood Spent,” 129–130. For an earlier argument on this problem, see Coppélia Kahn, *Man’s Estate: Masculine Identity in Shakespeare* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 59–60.
37. While the *Vindiciae* author advocates subjects’ rebellion when the sovereign threatens the stability of the realm, he does not place this capacity in the hands of individual subjects; rather, the body politic as a whole must agree to act against the sovereign. See *Vindiciae*, Third Question, esp. 154–172. Thus, even as Shakespeare seems to tap into this radical approach to subject-driven judgment, he situates Margaret as insufficiently grounded in the general will of the people. Nevertheless, York’s position as an outlaw allows for direct violence against him, by any subject.
38. See Finn, “Bloodlines and Blood Spilt,” 132–134, for a reading of this scene that focuses on its destabilization of succession. Also insightful is her analysis in *The Last Plantagenet Consorts*, 158–160.
39. See Chap. 1, 14–22, for a discussion of the connection between sovereign judgment and divine law.
40. While York, in this metaphor, appears to be the sun, he is “misproud” (2.6.7), and shines only through Henry’s consent, the true Phoebus. But see the note to 2.6.11–13, in which Cox and Rasmussen identify Henry as the analogue to Phaeton, and York to Phoebus, which seems to invert this metaphor’s application to the play.

41. This warning resonates with both Bodin and the *Vindiciae* in their assurance that sovereigns answer to God for their actions. See Chap. 1, 19–20.
42. Both Bodin and the *Vindiciae* address two kinds of tyranny: tyrants by lack of title, or tyrants by practice. See Chap. 1, note 44.
43. Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin, II.5.112. Bodin’s argument concerns a usurping ruler who retains his position, rules justly, and is succeeded by his heirs. If such a ruler faces no challenge to his sovereignty for a significant period of time—say one hundred years—then “the prescription of so long a period can serve as a title.” As Warwick suggests, the Lancastrian line has not ruled long enough to be judged legitimate through prescription.
44. Although she offers to steer England as its pilot, here as elsewhere, she does not assert a shared identity as English, and makes no claim to authority in her own name.
45. See also Finn, “Tragedy, Transgression, and Women’s Voices,” 292, 303.
46. In *Women and Revenge in Shakespeare* (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 2011), Marguerite Tassi particularly emphasizes not only Margaret’s devotion to her son’s legacy, but her maternal love. See 116–147.
47. Richard asks “Why should she live to fill the world with words?” when Edward prevents him from killing Margaret. Finn notes the power of women’s words in these plays. See “‘A Queen in Jest,’” 292, 303.
48. OED online, scapegoat *n.* 1. “In the Mosaic ritual of the Day of Atonement (Lev. xvi), that one of two goats that was chosen by lot to be sent alive into the wilderness, the sins of the people having been symbolically laid upon it, while the other was appointed to be sacrificed.” The initial example comes from the Tyndale Bible, Lev. xvi. f. xxix^v “And Aaron cast lottes ouer the .ij. gootes: one lotte for the Lorde, and another for a scapegoote. [So 1537, 1539, 1560 (Geneva), 1568, 1611.]” Quoted in OED.
49. As many have noted, she had already died when this play’s events occur.
50. She also serves as a narrator providing the back-story to the current moment, identifying characters in this play by their actions in previous plays—an economical means to establish the history that is vital to understanding the current play’s situation. It is, additionally, an ideological move, establishing sympathy for the erased traumas of the past. Margaret’s role as Lancastrian historian is recognized by Finn, “Bloodlines and Blood Spilt,” 134.
51. Bodin, *Six Books*, Franklin II.5.110. He adds, “If a subject seeks, by whatever means to invade the state and steal it from his king or ... to turn himself from a fellow-citizen into lord and master, he deserves to be put to death.” See my discussion of tyranny in Chap. 1, 7–8, 13–18, 37, 41. For details on the question of restoration, see Franklin’s footnote *, *Six Books*, II.5.112.

52. He is the subject of two key plotlines in Hall. In the first, Edward IV attempts to extradite him, ostensibly to wed him to a York daughter but actually to kill him and eliminate his threat (322–324). In the second, after Richard III takes the throne, the Bishop of Ely attempts to persuade the Duke of Buckingham to claim the crown and save the realm, but Buckingham recognizes the superior claim of Richmond, and supports his marriage to a York daughter and leadership of the overthrow of Richard III (352–392).
53. See my discussion of tyranny in Chap. 1, 7–8, 13–18, 37, 41. Richmond is, of course, a weak claimant of the Lancastrian line, but the play downplays that aspect of his legitimacy, emphasizing instead his relative merit and his challenge to an abusive ruler. In the play, references to actual political usurpation (other than Margaret’s) come at 4.4.367; 4.4.371; 5.2.7; 5.3.112; 5.5.4. Of these, only the ultimate one, the “long-usurped royalty” invoked by Lord Stanley, seems to refer to the deposition of Henry VI.
54. Such losses are eloquently expressed by both Mowbray and Bolingbroke in *Richard II*, 1.3.
55. Madonne M. Miner raises questions about Margaret’s status in “‘Neither Mother, Wife, nor England’s Queen’: The Roles of Women in *Richard III*,” in *The Woman’s Part: Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare*, ed. Carolyn Ruth Swift Lenz, Gayle Greene, and Carol Thomas Neely (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980), 35–55; see esp. 41–42.
56. Dowager queens retained the title and style of queen, but not the political position; foreign consorts were generally denied the right to rule independently in the marriage contract. See, for example, the marriage contract of Philip of Spain and Mary I. For a transcription and analysis of that document, see http://rbsche.people.wm.edu/H111_doc_marriageofqueenmary.html, accessed 7/6/2017.
57. In the context of the play she does not seem to know of Richmond’s existence, and offers no prophesy about Richard’s fall from power *per se*.
58. Seimon, *RIII* Introduction, makes the point that public verbal outbursts, especially by groups, were a form of political action (20–25). For a commentary on the supernatural effects of curses in the period, and the “collective symbolic, somatic, and ritual power of cursing, wailing,” etc., see Tassi, *Women and Revenge*, 71–73, quotation from 72. See also Thorne, “‘O, lawful let it be/That I have room ... to curse awhile’,” who addresses the political function of the cursing of women characters including Margaret.
59. See my discussion of banishment in Chap. 1, 37–41.
60. Although Shakespeare significantly downplays the role of Margaret Beaufort, wife to Lord Stanley and Richmond’s mother, Queen Elizabeth complains of her disrespect, much as Queen Margaret complains of Eleanor’s disrespect in Act 1, scene 3, of *2 Henry VI*.

61. Elizabeth as daughter of a dowager duchess was a middling aristocrat, but her father was of a much lower rank, and for the purposes of the play, that lack of status is emphasized by her enemies in the court. On Richard's negative representations of and challenges to Elizabeth, see Finn, "'A queen in jest,'" 248–250. The historical Elizabeth was far more active in promoting her family members than is the character in the play; she matched a number of her sisters with earls and dukes, and a brother with a duchess, significantly transforming her family's social and political connections. See Ralph A. Griffiths, "The Court during the Wars of the Roses," in *Princes, Patronage and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age, c. 1450–1650*, ed. Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 41–67. A number of Elizabeth's brothers fought on the Lancastrian side during the recent battles, and her first husband died defending Henry VI's claim.
62. Finn, "'A Queen in Jest,'" 248–249.
63. In fact, his tormenting dream consists of the appearance and ill wishes of his victims, and their prayers for support of Richmond's cause, not a plague of 'ugly devils', as Margaret predicts here. The nature of this dream emphasizes both the voices of history, and past actions rather than internal condition or divine determination.
64. The punctuation is not an artifact of modern editorial practice—she completes two curse-sentences in the First Folio before Richard interrupts the third. See the digital text of the Folger Shakespeare Library's First Folio copy No. 68: <http://www.folger.edu/the-shakespeare-first-folio-folger-copy-no-68#page/Histories%2C+page+178+/mode/2up>.
65. Often, deformity in children was ascribed to the sins of their mothers, fathers, or community, or to the impression made on the mother by some external object or image. Such deformity was therefore not seen as a marker of the child's inevitable sinfulness, and in at least some cases, not an effect of sinfulness of any sort. Nevertheless, the relationships between internal and external were subject to constant and highly varied theorization in the period.
66. Machiavelli is, of course, credited with promoting instrumental, or 'ends-oriented' rationalism. It seems clear, however, that he in fact calls attention to the inevitable costs of instrumental reason, even as he admits the inefficiencies of moral reason.
67. This idea becomes more explicit in *Henry V*, where Henry explains to the disheartened soldiers that other men's sins are not the responsibility of the king: "Every subject's duty is the King's; but every subject's soul is his own" (*Norton Shakespeare, Henry V*, 4.1.164–165).
68. Carole Levin makes a related point in "Queen Margaret in Shakespeare and Chronicles," 124.

69. By contrast, according to Hall, Elizabeth succumbs to Richard's manipulations and sends all of her daughters to him, and urges her son to return to England to receive the "greate honoures and honorable promociones" promised to him (406). Holinshed concurs, Vol. 6, 750: http://english.nsms.ox.ac.uk/holinshed/texts.php?text1=1587_6493. For a developed reading of the implications, see Barbara Hodgdon, *The End Crowns All: Closure and Contradiction in Shakespeare's Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 104–112.
70. For a similar argument, see Finn, "'A Queen in Jest,'" 251–252.
71. See, for example, 4.4.332, 482, 528. There is a tendency to see this conclusion in positive terms, however. See for example, Rackin, *Stages of History*, Chap. 2, and Finn, *The Last Plantagenet Consorts*, 146–147. See also Barbara Hodgdon's *The End Crowns All*, Chap. 4, which offers a nuanced reading of this play, attentive to varied stagings and their implications, and to the tensions within this final scene.
72. This instability is traced out in detail by Hall. In the initial decade of Henry VII's reign, he was threatened by the Earl of Lincoln, son of John de la Pole in support of Lambert Simnel as the impersonator of Edward, Earl of Warwick (Clarence's son) (*Chronicle*, 428–435), and by Perkin Warbeck, claiming to be Prince Richard, Duke of York (Edward IV's younger son) (*Chronicle*, 462–463; 472–474; 483–488; 491).

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