THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF MASS DICTATORSHIP

Edited by Paul Corner and Jie-Hyun Lim

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Contents

Introduction

Paul Corner and Jie-Hyun Lim

Given the history of the last century, a handbook on dictatorship would seem to require little justification. Even from what is now some distance, the great dictators of the twentieth century still dominate much of historical attention and their fascination remains evident; it is enough to enter any bookshop and count the number of books with a swastika on the cover to appreciate this fascination. Dictatorship, with its utopian ambitions and its hallmark horrors, remains high on the list of public interest. But, if interest in dictatorship hardly needs to be justified, what does require some explanation is the approach adopted in this handbook, because the object of our attention is not simple dictatorship—it is mass dictatorship. The term might appear to be almost an oxymoron—the dictator is usually seen to stand alone—but its use is a deliberate attempt to extend the sphere of investigation from the leaders and the led—distinct categories, often studied apart—to that of the entire framework of dictatorship in the twentieth century which the dictator and the dominated constructed together in consent and in conflict.

Moving beyond the static picture of societies characterized by consensus and/or repression, the handbook attempts an examination of the complexities of dictatorial rule and of popular reaction to that rule, arguing, in its various essays, that twentieth century dictatorship is intimately linked to the emergence of mass society and has to be seen above all in that context. Although it may seem paradoxical, dictatorship is seen here as a collective enterprise, in which the relationship between dominator and the dominated is not simply one-directional—always from top downwards, with the oppressed having no capacity for anything but passive acceptance and resignation—but one in which the masses possess agency and have multiple methods of responding to domination and of expressing that agency, thus both reacting to dictatorship and also conditioning its behaviour. Such a symbiotic relationship makes it essential, therefore, to avoid in any analysis the separation between dictatorship and the masses. The term mass dictatorship attempts to express this understanding; it is intended to suggest that, unlike the more straightforward authoritarian dictatorships of earlier periods, the defining characteristic of the

twentieth century dictatorships is their necessary and unavoidable involvement with the masses.

In their various ways, the contributions to this handbook reflect this underlying conviction. They deal with the differing dictatorial projects of both left and right wing regimes, with the objectives that the dictatorships set for themselves, and with the methods regimes used to try to realize those objectives—methods which involved not only repression and the use of violence on a massive scale but also the more modern techniques of popular mobilization and mass persuasion. How people reacted to these methods of social control is also a central theme of certain essays; what determined popular collaboration with the regimes and what space was left for non-compliance, or even for resistance, are fundamental questions posed here. What all the contributions have attempted to do is to approach the subject as far as possible from a transnational, comparative, angle, looking more at the various aspects bound up with the concept of mass dictatorship than at isolated empirical examples; moreover a particular effort has been made to avoid the often prevalent Eurocentrism in the discussion of these questions. It is hoped that the very broad scope offered by our genuinely world-spanning team of contributors will have helped us to achieve this transnational outlook. As a brief glance at the list of contributors will make clear, this handbook aims at a global treatment of its subject, convinced that it is only through such an approach to the question of mass dictatorship that we can supersede many of the existing paradigms.

The term "mass dictatorship" requires some further explanation, particularly in respect of many of the current historical models used to analyse dictatorship. Much of what is written here reflects the newly emerging post-Cold War paradigm in the study of twentieth century dictatorship—a paradigm that places a question mark against the usefulness of both the totalitarian and Marxist models, heavily conditioned as they tend to be with the simplistic dualism imposed by Cold War competition, which aimed at putting a few perpetrators (a vicious "them") in the opposite political camp compared with many victims (an innocent "us") on our own side of the divide. In the radicalized, black and white, language of demonization characteristic of Cold War discourse and propaganda, at one extreme 'people's democracy' amounted to little more than the dictatorship of the Stalinist Gulag, while, at the other, liberal democracy was assimilated to the fascism of capitalist plutocracy. At times the terms "democracy" and "dictatorship" became so entwined in the political discourse that they seemed almost to define one and the same system. Such an amalgam of the terms of democracy and dictatorship may sound strange, but it has been discursively possible in the domain of the concepts used in relation to the history of this period. What has always been clear, however, is that—however the terms have been used—they have always been seen as opposites.

In reality a closer look at this conceptual history serves above all to shatter the antithesis between dictatorship and democracy—an idea rooted deeply in the political common sense of the twentieth century. As the German school of *Begriffsgeschichte* suggests very persuasively, dictatorship in its original usage in

the ancient Roman republic meant emergency powers provisionally invoked in a state of emergency. Its original meaning remained as such till the nineteenth century. The antonym of dictatorship was not democracy, therefore, but the normal state, and the antonym of democracy was not dictatorship, but monarchy or aristocracy. Thus, to have seen dictatorship as the antithesis of democracy—as we do now—would have seemed a strange association for the conceptual history of the nineteenth century. To nineteenth century readers, seeing the antithesis of democracy in dictatorship was no less alien than would have been the idea of connecting liberalism with democracy, given the lack of regard liberals had for democracy. A history of the concept of dictatorship raises doubts, therefore, about the Manichean dichotomy between dictatorship and democracy present in the Cold War paradigm; the antagonism between the two may be less than is generally assumed. Dictatorship, just like democracy, also requires its *demos*. Thus, while—as already suggested—the term "mass dictatorship" may seem to be something of an oxymoron, at the level of conceptual history, it is not really so difficult to couple the two words.

The concept is perhaps easier to understand if we abandon the Eurocentrism that has tended, for very obvious reasons, to dominate discussion of dictatorship and which has almost always concentrated on the nation-state. Now horizons are wider. The paradigm shift that followed the Fall of the Berlin Wall coincided with the spatial turn from the national to the transnational. The globalization of the human imagination facilitated this spatial turn, which influenced ways of perceiving the past and the present and thus the mode of experiencing the world. These developments produced striking results and suggested that previously-held distinctions might in fact be less valid. The Europe-dominated perspective, which saw in Nazism and Fascism an 'abnormal' path to modernity and, at the same time, erected the path of parliamentary democracy of the 'West' as the norm, implicitly—and sometimes very explicitly—relegated all other paths to a position of backwardness and relative underdevelopment. In this analytical framework 'West' was best; the 'Rest'—a kind of barbaric 'East'—did not make the grade. Now, through the adoption of a transnational perspective in relation to the history of mass dictatorship, two apparent opposites can be seen as part of a single whole. Thus the dictatorship of the 'East'—seen as backward, anti-modern, and reactionary—and the democracy of the 'West'—modern and progressive—can now stand together on the global horizon of modernity. It is necessary to recognise, therefore, that, in the trajectory of global modernity, democracy and dictatorship are not located in some predetermined spaces of the West and East that necessarily separate them from each other but are together in a kind of 'problem space' of constant evolution and becoming.

But neither East nor West is a geo-positivist concept. Neither is geographically fixed. The 'strategic location' of East and West in historical discourses is always in flux. What matters, however, is not any national peculiarity but the strategic position of each historical unit in our imaginary geography. A few examples serve to make this point better. In contrast to its self-portrayal as the

'East' vis-à-vis France, Germany posed its own national self as the 'West' in relation to its Slavic neighbors. Studia Zahodnie (Western Studies) in Poland has meant German Studies while Ostforschung (Eastern Studies) in Germany meant Polish studies. But the imagining of East/West in virtual reality does not stop at the German- Polish border. Posited as the 'East' by Germans, Poles regarded themselves as 'Europeans' against the 'Asiatic' Russians. In turn, Russians, despised as 'Tartars' in Europe, could represent themselves as civilized Europeans confronting barbaric Asian neighbours. Positions could be reversed, however; with its victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, Japan proved its equality with the West and Russia's affinity with the East. The global chain of East/West confrontations in a constant position change knows no end.

Many of the contributions to this volume reflect these new global perspectives, arguing that the discursive position of West and East in flux puts in question the dichotomy of a dictatorial East and a democratic West. Mass dictatorship in the global trajectory enables us to see twentieth-century dictatorship not as the end-point of a particular path of the pre-modern, but as one of the normal paths of the modern, and allows us, ultimately, to abandon 'East' and 'West' in our understanding of twentieth century dictatorship on a global scale. The global history of mass dictatorship indicates that mass dictatorship is itself a transnational formation of modernity that emerged in response to the global processes that swept through the twentieth century. The near ubiquitous presence of mass dictatorship on a global scale and in disparate historical circumstances suggests that mass dictatorship is one of many manifestations of global modernity that stem from competing desires to construct a modernist utopia by the 'follow and catch up' strategy. More specifically, the desire for colonizing power and the corresponding fear of being colonized were two locomotives that drove mass dictatorship regimes. A global history of mass dictatorship as a transnational formation of modernity puts the Holocaust, fascist atrocities, and postcolonial genocide together in a single stream of the modernist violence with the initial unleashing of colonial violence.

This reflection requires a reformulation of the question: what is the difference between mass dictatorship and mass democracy? The answer is not that simple because, at least in some respects, both seem to aim at the same goal. What if majoritarian democracy in the modern nation-state is based on the categorisation of minorities as 'others' in terms of nation, class, gender, race, ethnicity and so on? What if the majority tyrannises minorities? Is that democracy or is it dictatorship? Arguably, the cliché that dictatorship is imposed by a wilful minority upon a confused majority can explain only one dimension of dictatorship. And in the past there have been efforts to explicate dictatorship in terms that go beyond the one-dimensional explanation of heavy coercion and which are to some degree in line with the idea of mass dictatorship. The characterisation of American democracy as a 'tyranny through the masses' (Tocqueville) and the identification of 'totalitarian democracy' among French

Jacobins (Talmon) are suggestive of 'mass dictatorship' just as much as is Mao Zedong's declaration that 'dictatorship is dictatorship by the masses'.

Indeed, it is not difficult to find references to 'popular dictatorship' and even to 'people's dictatorship', not to mention 'people's democracy'. Carl Schmitt's apologetic justification of Nazism as 'an anti-liberal but not necessarily anti-democratic' regime can be put in the same context. In fascist Italy Giuseppe Bottai would argue that fascist dictatorship was more genuinely democratic than were the so-called western 'democracies' because all the people were included in the fascist scheme of things. And even today 'guided democracy' is a familiar (and rather sinister) term. But its Polish version of 'demokracja kierowana' could be found already in the Sanacja regime in the 1930s. More classically, in his address to the National Convention (1793), Barère tried to justify Jacobin dictatorship on the ground that the nation was exercising dictatorship over itself. Seen in this light, George Mosse's eccentric assumption that Robespierre would have felt at home in the Nazi's mass rallies is not so groundless after all. The Nazi Vo*lksgemeinschaft* was not a bizarre pre-modern political concept but a meta-modern political order in which the people regarded themselves as the real political sovereign. In Eugen Weber's expression, Nazism looked 'much like the Jacobinism of our time'. In this respect, it is intriguing that socialist regimes used the metaphor of 'people's democracy' as a variant of proletarian dictatorship in defining themselves. The reference to 'the people' is telling. It is in this sense that the term of 'mass dictatorship' ceases to be an oxymoron; rather it represents a focus shift from the classical idea of the coercive 'dicta-torship from above' to that of 'dictatorship from below', in which one of the principal objectives of the regime is the self-mobilisation of the people them-selves. It is only necessary to consider the role played by popular denunciation in many dictatorial regimes to appreciate the force of this self-mobilisation.

As a politico-societal project 'mass dictatorship' implies the attempted mobilisation of the masses for state projects which frequently secured voluntary mass participation and support. Once the masses had appeared on the historical scene, the voices of ordinary people could no longer be silenced or disregarded by any regime, whether democratic or dictatorial. Rather, the socio-politi-cal engineering of the modern state system demanded the recruitment and mobilisation of the masses for the nation-state project, and indeed required—if possible—their enthusiasm and voluntary participation. The efforts at popular conscription to the cause explain why some mass dictatorship regimes tried to arrive at what has been called a 'dictatorship of consent' through the rhetoric of decisionist democracy. The use of the term of 'consensus dictatorship' in describing the GDR, with its emphasis on consensus building, can be located within the same stream. It is because of this necessity for mobilisation of the masses that the study of mass dictatorship needs to be situated, not within the history of pre-modern barbarism, but within the broad transnational context of political modernity, understood in relation to modern statecraft, territoriality, sovereignty, population, egalitarian ideology and so on. It differs significantly from '*despotismo moderno*' which is created through an alliance of conservatives

and the military without mass involvement or the self-mobilization of the masses.

However, as a term, mass dictatorship seen as 'dictatorship from below' carries a slight difference in meaning from what we have described as the dictatorship of consent. One of the weaknesses of totalitarian theory has been its tendency to concentrate on the harsh characteristics of the political system of rule rather than enquire about the complex realities of social life. A frequent consequence has been the assumption of a complete polarisation of positions within the realm of domination. Yet, in the context of twentieth century dictatorships, coercion and consent, domination and hegemony, forced mobilization and self-mobilization cannot be seen as polar opposites to each other; rather they should be understood as integral parts of dictatorship in which one concept does not necessarily exclude the other. In fact, seen from the viewpoint of history from below, consent and coercion are not exclusive opposites; they can and do co-exist. Coercion itself is a multi-layered experience spanning many definitions—internalised coercion, forced consent, passive conformity, and silent resignation are just some of them. The realities of coercion and consent are subject to negotiations and interactions between individual historical actors and the mass dictatorship regime. As Konrad Jarausch has written of the GDR regime, 'its social reality involved surprisingly complex negotiations between rulers and ruled.' If we do not recognise the plurality and complexity of consent, 'dictatorship of consent' would appear to be nothing more than the successful realisation of the hegemonic political project of dictatorship from above—nothing more than action followed by reaction. Instead, the common thread running through many contributions presented here is the effort to go beyond a picture painted just in black and white—the attempt to reveal complex and multifaceted realities of twentieth century dictatorship by pluralizing and depolarizing the concepts of coercion and consent. Ultimately it is from the viewpoint of history from below that the concept of mass dictatorship can contribute to the shifting of dictatorship studies from 'dictatorship from above' to 'dictatorship from below'.

A few lines about the organization of the volume. As with any handbook, we—as general editors—do not expect that the reader will read this book from start to finish. The contributions are separate essays and should be approached as such. At the same time, while this is essentially a volume for consultation on specific issues, it is hoped that the transnational perspective adopted will allow the reader to better relate the specific to the general and to do this in ways not normally seen in the standard textbooks. The five parts into which the volume is divided represent what we consider to be the principal significant aspects of the overall problem of analysing twentieth-century mass dictatorships. Each part has a brief general introduction by a part editor which aims to assist the reader in identifying the central issues of that part. Given the limits of space, bibliography has been kept to a minimum, but it is hoped that what there is represents the essential minimum and can serve as a guide to further reading. The rationale behind the part divisions needs rather less explanation than does

the use of the concept of mass dictatorship. It may, nonetheless, be useful to the reader to have a brief overview of the key points of each of the parts.

Making sense of twentieth century dictatorship is a complex task and we have tried, through the process of division and sub-division of subjects, to tread a fairly logical path in the effort to unravel the complexities. Broadly speaking, we ask, 'What did the dictatorships hope to achieve?', 'How did they go about it and with what success?', 'Which proved to be more effective, coercion or persuasion, fear or joy, compulsion or voluntary participation?', 'How did various historical actors react to this divergence of domination?', 'How can one interpret the broad spectrum of people's reaction between enthusiastic support and drastic opposition?', and, finally and more briefly, 'What are the lessons and legacies of these dictatorships?' The transnational approach adopted in the volume means that often there are multiple answers to these questions, depending on region and on epoch, and these different answers are reflected in the individual contributions within each of the parts.

This is nowhere more evident than in the first part on 'Projects' where the initial impetus and the various originating aspirations of mass dictatorship are examined from widely differing points of view. Certain of the contributions concentrate on the ways in which regimes projected themselves very consciously towards the future, with their radical and sometimes utopian views of the evolution of history and of the capacities of the 'new man' to dominate and direct that evolution through the discoveries of science and the mechanisms of social engineering. In these initial projects are best seen what might be termed the hopes of mass dictatorship, always projected towards a radiant future; they remind us that—at least in the case of the European regimes—the traumatic experience of the First World War played a large part in determining apocalyptic visions of the new world in the making. Other contributions deal with the ways in which certain dictatorships saw their task principally as that of nation building—a task in which colonialism and the creation of empire often played a significant part. The case of Italian Fascism serves to illustrate this aspect very clearly, and both the Japanese and Korean examples are, in different ways, also very relevant, even if their historical trajectories are very different. In these contributions, as is inevitable when we are talking about projects, the role and specific characteristics of the ideologies of dictatorial regimes are discussed. In particular one chapter confronts the rather thorny question of the role of political religion in consolidating regimes and, although focused principally on North Korea, takes into account the varied experience of different regimes and the very different ways in which political religions were born and developed during the course of dictatorship.

The second part on 'Domination' moves on a less ideological level, examining the techniques and mechanisms of the ruling machine. Here the volume addresses the question of repression, possibly the aspect of dictatorship which we most associate with such regimes and with which we are most familiar. The Gestapo and the NKVD, the concentration camp and the Gulag, are never very far away from our thoughts when twentieth century dictatorship is discussed.

The meticulous organization of social control is, of course, a central feature of mass dictatorship and, even if the concept of mass dictatorship employed here rejects the idea of a total divorce between perpetrators and victims within dictatorship, there is no attempt to deny the fundamental conditioning role played by terror and by police repression in establishing that control. But, while accepting this premise and examining how such control is established, this part also looks at several of the less obvious methods of domination—the organization of the public sphere, such as it was, through the manipulation of information, the crucial part played by the state's control of material resources and of their subsequent allocation to the population, and—very important—the various ways in which dictatorial regimes used legislation to create a national community that learned to reason in terms of inclusion and exclusion, of 'us' against 'them'. Alongside the manipulation of information, control of resources and the bio-politics of population, the effort of labour coordination and memory management can be counted too as the soft aspects of hard domination.

The third part looks at the question of 'Mobilization'—the popular mobilization that was achieved not only by regimentation but also by a whole series of projects, programmes, and policies intended to stimulate popular involvement with the regime and generate a popular consensus. All the dictatorial regimes considered here pursued policies aimed at the self-mobilization of the population through popular participation; mass dictatorship could not function without such participation. If, to a great extent, the second part deals with the stick wielded by dictatorships, the third is more concerned with the carrot, for mass dictatorships not only controlled, they also offered. Indeed, access to what was on offer was one of the constitutive elements of control. Ralph Dahrendorf's accusation that East Germans had exchanged their freedom for fridges was perhaps unfairly caustic but not entirely misconceived; in some, but not all, of the regimes, consumption, or the prospect of consumption, was one of the key elements of mobilization. But it was by no means the only element. In respect of mobilization the transnational approach adopted in the contributions to this part is particularly valuable because it permits us to see the ways in which often very novel policies regarding, for example, welfare and leisure, gender, and cultural formation were used in the different regimes, often with widely differing results. And, as the concept of cultural formation will suggest, regimes stressed not only the activities of the organizations and associations that marked out the regimentation of society under dictatorship but also the attitudes and thought processes of their subjects. For this reason propaganda, with its often heavy emphasis on the cult of the leader, receives attention in this part, as does that new and powerful feature of the first decades of the last century—the film. In one way and another, popular mobilization was to be realized through the generation of the conviction that the regime had the 'correct' purpose and direction and that life had sense and either was, or would shortly be, getting better.

Part four deals with a further key aspect of all the regimes in question—the 'Militarization' of civil society, both in its organization and in its objectives. The mobilization of society to which we have referred above required its justification and war—the memory of war, war itself, or the prospect of war— provided just such a justification. In this, the experience of the First World War was central: mobilizing for what were now seen to be inevitably total wars required the kind of militarization of society, even in peacetime, that past experience of total war had determined. A characteristic of mass dictatorship in almost all its forms is the heavy emphasis laid on war and on the values and lessons of war for civil society. War was often seen as both necessary and welcome. Mussolini, for instance, saw war as the essential road to Italy's Darwinian destiny. As the contributions to this part make clear, the militarization of society permeated all aspects of normal life—education, organization, language -, putting the population in uniform and producing societies that appeared to be permanently on the brink of conflict. The value of this kind of military psychosis in creating a sense of common purpose among the population will be readily apparent. In the same way, the themes of the necessary sacrifice of one's life for the nation and the accompanying cult of death and the dead made war seem both logical and acceptable. Self-mobilization of the population might be achieved through these means—the necessity of war and the idea of the ever-present internal and external enemy being used to produce a permanent state of emergency.

Moving away from organization and mobilization, the fifth part shifts our attention to the questions of impact, reception, and response—in short, of 'Appropriation'. As explained earlier in this introduction, the concept of mass dictatorship looks at the phenomenon of twentieth century dictatorship both from above—from the point of view of the aspirations, objectives and methods of the dictators—and also from below—from the position of those subjected to domination. It posits a level of agency on the part of those subjected to dictatorship that invites careful scrutiny, suggesting that the relationship between the rulers and the ruled is usually much more complex than it might seem and frequently involves mechanisms of negotiation too often overlooked. The contributions in this part examine the whole gamut of popular reactions to dictatorship, ranging from the enthusiastic acceptance shown by the committed volunteer, through the complicity, conformity, compliance, and everyday coping of the vast majority of the population, to the uncertainties of that noncompliance often exhibited before the final stage of resistance. At every point in these analyses, the great difficulty of generalization is made clear. With the exception of the committed supporter of the regime, the words most appropriate to the mass of the population seem usually to be those of ambivalence and ambiguity in respect of the dictatorship, describing a population which was, in any case, very often attempting to live with the regime on the least unfavourable terms. The extent to which even this kind of survival strategy, typified by an astute navigation between obstacles, represented nonetheless a form of

complicity with the regime is one of the questions posed here. The complexity of the ordinary people's ever-changing attitudes under the mass dictatorship regime reflects 'practices of meandering'—Alf Lüedtke's term to describe individual trajectories in ambivalence and self-contradiction. Certainly, the simple division between victims and perpetrators to which we are accustomed begins to look uncomfortably unrealistic. The final essay in this part examines the question of victimhood, arguing strongly against the binary division adopted in traditional accounts of dictatorship and insisting on the much more complex relationship between dominators and those subjected to domination envisaged in the concept of mass dictatorship.

A Handbook like this is cannot be all-comprehensive—there are many gaps in our coverage—nor can it offer any once-and-for-all conclusions, but certain final, general considerations may nonetheless be in order, particularly in respect of the theme of lessons and legacies. Foremost among these considerations must be the importance of resisting the temptation to think that this entire story of mass dictatorship finished in 1945 with the end of the Second World War, in the 1960s and 1970s with the decline of the 'developmental dictatorships', and in 1989 with the so-called 'collapse' of communism. This is to be stressed not only in the banal sense of the continued existence of exceptions like the residual regime of Lukašenko's Bielorussia or, on a different wavelength, that of North Korea (to say nothing of the far from collapsed world of communist China), but also because it is essential that the reader should avoid the idea of total breach between the world of mass dictatorship—over and finished—and the contemporary world, seen only in terms of the 'onward march' of democratic politics. In other words, the study of mass dictatorships invites analysis not only of the past but also of certain continuities between past and present. As is evident, the problem of social control present in mass society—a problem that pushed some nations into mass dictatorships—persists, as does that of the often precarious relationship between coercion and consensus; uneven international development can also still produce the dictatorial 'catch-up' phenomenon outlined in some of the contributions here. And, as our daily newspapers remind us, 'national revolutions' that culminate in dictatorship are in no sense events of the past.

But continuities are also suggested because, in general terms, many contemporary societies, not only in the West, are experiencing what is often called a 'crisis' of democracy. The 'golden age' of economic expansion and the subsequent 'end of history' have given way to extreme political uncertainty. Lack of public participation in politics, generalized mistrust of public institutions, the lack of credibility of politicians—all are accompanied by the increasing drift towards presidential rule, often based on clear populist tendencies. That impression, so evident in mass dictatorships, of the leader and the willingly-led is once again a frequent impression. With the advent of neo-liberalism and its emphasis on the individual, the role of the state has apparently been reduced,

but, as the state has bowed out in respect of the organization of the economy and the provider of social welfare, it has re-emerged strongly as guarantor of individual security. The continual condition of emergency in which we now live, produced by terrorism and international instability, justifies and permits the concession to government of many non-democratic powers—Patriot Acts, legislation suspending habeus corpus, and the like. And, without being paranoid about the intrusive powers of information technology, it is never wise to forget that the modern state knows much, much more about any individual citizen than did the Gestapo or the NKVD. Only bankruptcy rescued Icelanders from the bio-totalitarian project of establishing a DNA bank of all citizens.

What is striking about these developments is the relative lack of popular reaction. The individualism of the contemporary world has undermined to a large degree any sense of collective interest. But that individualism, defined by the Frankfurt school in the period before the Second World War in terms of the 'isolation' and 'solitude' produced by modernity and seen as pushing people into a 'flight from freedom', no longer seeks its resolution in simple dictatorship. The axis of public interest has been partially shifted from politics (as evidenced by the aforementioned low levels of political participation in many countries) to a world modelled by consumption, by the media, and by individual celebrity. If this does not presage the introduction of dictatorship on the old model, it does nonetheless open the way for the extension of non-democratic powers, which pass unnoticed because of public distraction. Formally pluralistic but ever more dominated by relatively few interest groups, by what Michael Mann has called 'infrastructural powers', and by the capacity for manipulation of public opinion, the modern state would appear to be moving in an increasingly authoritarian direction. The population, in the main able to see world only through the filter of the media, have few defences against this tendency because it is not perceived (Peter Weir's film 'The Truman Show' is exemplary in this respect). The risk here is not so much that of a new Hitler or a resurrected Mussolini (although the public theatre of politics provided by the media has possibly increased rather than decreased the importance of personal charisma) but that of a more authoritarian state accepted in part through lack of concern for individual liberties and in part through what appears to be the necessity determined by never-ending state of emergency.

Seen in this light, the distance we generally assume to exist between mass dictatorship and modern democracy seems less than might appear at first sight. As suggested at the beginning of this Introduction, the antagonism between the two may be less than is generally thought. The fundamental problem of social control implicit in the 'democratic age' of mass society remains; the means of achieving that social control have been adapted with the times and with the changing nature of the public and have become much more sophisticated with

the changing instruments available to government and to those who support the government. This is not to say that we still live in an age of mass dictatorship—far from it; it is simply to say that many of the questions and the problems posed by the phenomenon of mass dictatorships—questions and problems examined in this volume—continue to have great relevance in the contemporary world and have certainly not disappeared with 1989.

LIST OF FIGURES

Projects

Introduction: Mass Dictatorship as Modernizing Project: Some Preliminary Reflections

Konrad Jarausch

In contrast to ancient despotism, modern dictatorships have tended to rely on the involvement of the masses to a surprising extent (Lim 2005). One line of comparative inquiry into the functioning of Fascism and Communism stresses the aspect of coercion by investigating the records of the secret police, their repressive policies, victimization of opponents and concentration camp system. Another, more recent direction of research emphasizes instead the "soft stabilizers" of dictatorial regimes such as ideological propaganda, public rituals or material incentives that generated voluntary compliance. For their self-perception as well as international reputation dictatorships required the acclamation and participation of large numbers of citizens for their political legitimation and actual functioning. Beyond personal charisma or messianic faith, it was generally a shared ideological project that cemented the bond between leaders and followers.

The endless debate about categorizing dictatorships according to their predominant traits tends to overlook the centrality of this social engineering drive to remake society. No doubt, such classifications as authoritarian versus totalitarian, personal versus party or military, conservative versus modernizing or counterrevolutionary dictatorships have their merits by highlighting significant aspects of their rule (Wiatr 2011). But the approach of analyzing dictatorial systems solely as efforts to exploit resources and repress opponents in order to gain and preserve political power ignores their ideological motives. The rhetoric of modern dictatorships is replete with references to constructing a "new man" and developing a "new society," which indicate their profoundly transformative aspirations.

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It is the common enterprise of creating an egalitarian "classless society" or a genuine "people's community" that makes modern dictatorships so dynamic and deadly, because it leaves little room for accommodation with its victims.

These ideological projects made dictatorship attractive because they offered alternate paths to modernity that promised to avoid the pitfalls of faltering capitalism and democracy. While conservative dictators like Franco attempted to preserve the power of the church, the landed aristocracy, the officer corps or the state bureaucracy, they knew that their efforts could only postpone inevitable modernization (Linz 1970). When economic troubles such as hyperinflation or depression discredited the free play of the market or legislative deadlock failed to address the social problems of parliamentary systems, the public became receptive to the allure of alternate roads to modernity. One such radical proposal was the Communist effort to overturn the class system through revolution, appealing both to workers and to intellectuals as a secular utopia. Another equally thorough effort on the opposite end of the political spectrum involved the construction of a national community by expelling enemies such as the Jews and embarking on foreign imperialism. Both of these alternatives attempted to re-engineer society in their image.

The Soviet effort to create an egalitarian socialist utopia proved especially appealing to industrial workers in advanced countries and to exploited natives in the European colonies. Lenin's victory in Russia owed much to popular resentment against Tsarist autocracy and disappointment in the loss of the First World War. At the same time, it was also a more radical effort at renewal than the Western-style Provisional Government that was preoccupied with creating a constitution while the populace hungered for "bread, land and peace." By displacing various socialist rivals, the Bolsheviks self-consciously set up a Rousseauian "dictatorship of the proletariat" *for* the people, since the Russian people seemed not yet ripe for self-government. The result of Lenin's coup was a ruthless class war against royalist Whites, moderate democrats and foreign interventionists. But the key promise was the modernization of Russian society through literacy and electrification—a futuristic vision of equality and prosperity that was hard to resist (Fitzpatrick and Geyer 2009).

At the other political extreme, Fascism offered an organic vision of modernity that rejected both decadent democracy and socialist egalitarianism. In Italy it arose from veterans' disappointment in the small spoils of a "mutilated victory" during the First World War, while in Germany a related ideology achieved its breakthrough due to the Great Depression, which discredited the struggling Weimar Republic. The goal of the curious fusion of nationalist and socialist ideas was the creation of a people's community that excluded Communists and Jews as enemies. Such a national rebirth intended to produce a more vigorous foreign policy, recapturing not just ethnic territory, but regaining vast empires beyond. In contrast to the party-centered Soviets, the Fascist movement developed a charismatic leader–follower system in which the masses were to offer acclamatory support for the dynamic *Duce* or wise *Führer*. Instead of privileging social class, Fascism revolved around an even more mythical notion of race as principle of in- or exclusion (Griffin 2007).

Both totalitarian dictatorships appealed to the masses because they promised economic development of a backward country and security against the vagaries of the capitalist business cycles. In the Russian case the Soviets were outspoken about their effort to drag a still largely agrarian society into the industrial age. Stalin's ruthless collectivization of agriculture and compulsory industrialization through the Five Year Plan became internationally famous models of leaping over intermediary stages of bourgeois development (Kotkin 1995). In Italy Mussolini's various campaigns for reclaiming land, growing grain and so on were efforts to create a sufficient economic base to make the country into a great power. In Germany Hitler's policy of autarchy was supposed to inspire enough agricultural self-sufficiency and industrial growth to sustain massive rearmament in spite of the poverty of available natural resources (Tooze 2006). While the democracies seemed unable to shake the impact of the Great Depression, the mass dictatorships looked rather dynamic by comparison.

On the international stage, both mass dictatorships strove to promote their ideological aims, restore national power and acquire imperial domains. Since the authoritarian land-based empires ruled by the Ottomans, Habsburgs, Romanovs and Hohenzollerns had collapsed during the First World War, it was the hegemony of the victorious sea-borne empires of Western Europe that the dictatorships wanted to contest. In Russia belief in socialist internationalism fostered a hope to overthrow the losses of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by sparking sympathetic revolutions in Central Europe. Among the Fascists the key aim was the erasure of the shame of defeat in the Great War and the acquisition of contiguous or transoceanic empires in order to become a major player in world politics. Since both ideological rivals were basically revisionists, seeking to alter the order of the League of Nations, they collaborated with each other in spite of their basic enmity. Where their claims overlapped in Eastern Europe the unfortunate populations were subjected to a bloodbath of unprecedented extent (Snyder 2010).

The blueprint for achieving modernity was the ruling ideology which provided a metaphysical belief system, a compass for policies and a vocabulary for communication. Though often seeming ludicrous to international observers, the professions of faith in the proletariat as leading class or the Aryan race as superior stock fulfilled an important function of creating a frame of reference that claimed to explain the course of historical development, address the problems of the present and provide guideposts for decisions on the future. Repeated rituals of acclamation such as military parades, spectacular party congresses or bogus elections reassured the leaders of unwavering public support. Membership in the ruling party was an initiation into an elite that alone had the power to decide what should be done, whereas the cult of a superhuman leader inspired the followers with faith, no matter how problematic his policies. Though secular modernization credos, these ideologies retained strong elements of a political religion (Gregor 2012).

The mass dictatorships sought to prove more modern than "moribund democracy" by claiming to be based on science and using the newest products

of technology. Updated by Lenin's revolutionary voluntarism, Marxism purported to be a scientific explanation of economics rather than a moral philosophy of history, leading to the ubiquitous practice of quoting from classic texts in order to justify present decisions. The confused Fascist blend of ideas was more actionist than rational, but even the murky speeches of Mussolini or Hitler tended to rely on intellectual authorities like Georges Sorel or Carl Schmitt and cite ethno-cultural linguistics to buttress territorial claims. Moreover, the dictators were enamored of the speed and mobility of fast roadsters and airplanes, while appreciating the persuasive power of radio broadcasts or motion picture newsreels. To spread their message, they developed an innovative propaganda apparatus which borrowed from the advertising techniques of American corporations. As a result, they appealed especially to the younger generation as dynamic and future-oriented (Jarausch 2015).

Ultimately the modernizing impulse of the mass dictatorships proved, however, inferior to a revitalized capitalist democracy. Due to the confusion of parliamentary decision making, its opponents consistently underestimated the political appeal, economic resources, cultural vitality and military power of the West. The clear line of Fascist authority may have been an advantage during the Blitzkrieg, but it was prone to strategic miscalculation, incapable of compensating for inferior resources and likely to spur resistance due to racial extermination. The Soviet party model held broader appeal due to its stress on equality and economic development, but it failed to provide sufficient consumer goods and to inspire its subjects with voluntary loyalty. In spite of all of its blemishes, such as the Vietnam War, Western modernity proved to be a more "irresistible empire" because it provided greater political freedom and a higher standard of living (De Grazia 2005). Ironically, the dictatorial path to modernization therefore turned out to be rather a dead end.

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History of Future. Imagining the Communist Future: The Soviet and Chinese Cases Compared

S.A. Smith

Communist regimes looked unwaveringly to the future: hostile towards the past, dismissive of the present, they strove impatiently towards the society to come. Communists believed that the classless society of the future was guaranteed by the long-term movement of history, which was seen to comprise a progression of stages of socio-economic development. Sooner or later, capitalism, a system of relentless accumulation based on exploitation of labour, would founder on its own contradictions and give way to a society in which the means of livelihood would be shared in common, thereby allowing the potential of all its members to flourish. In reality, communist regimes could never resolve the question of how far the future society would be brought into existence by the impersonal workings of history and how far by the willed action of revolutionaries.

It is common to describe the attitude of communist regimes towards the future as "utopian." Insofar as any movement that sets out to change the world must have some vision of the future that cancels out the sufferings of the present and justifies the sacrifices necessary to achieve it, the label is not unreasonable. Yet much current scholarship applies the term to communist regimes at all times and in all places, ignoring the fact that phases of intense, millennial anticipation of the future gave way regularly to phases that were less expectant, even sombre in mood. In the longer term, moreover, the faith of communist regimes that an ideal society could be created by an effort of collective will gave way to a more pragmatic orientation to balanced development. It is with the period of millennial anticipation of the future that this essay is concerned.

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The attitude of Marx towards utopianism was ambivalent. The decades after 1830 in Europe and the USA were the golden age of utopianism, expressed in the creation by the followers of Robert Owen in Britain and Charles Fourier in France of idealistic communities that aspired to live and work in common and be the microcosm of a future society of harmony and cooperation. In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx gave qualified approval of the "practical proposals" of the utopian socialists, which he listed as "the abolition of the distinction between town and country, of the family, of the carrying on of industries for the account of private individuals, and of the wage system; the proclamation of social harmony, the conversion of the functions of the state into a mere superintendence of production." Yet Marx contrasted the approach of the utopian socialists to his own approach, arguing that they took no account of stages of historical development or of class struggle as the motor of history; and as time went on, he came to insist more and more on the *scientific* character of his own theory.

In the two major revolutions of the twentieth century, Marxism proved to be the main, but by no means only template through which the communist regimes imagined the future. Russia and China both had long traditions that anticipated a radical overturning of the existing order. It is probably true to say that in both societies eschatological visions of a sinful world consumed in a horrifying apocalypse always outnumbered millennial visions of a paradise on earth, but in this essay such baleful, religious visions are left to one side. Instead the essay construes utopianism as the positive belief that an ideal society can be brought to fruition through collective will and moral endeavour. As already hinted, this is not a definition that all scholars accept. In a fascinating book, Karl Schlögel argues that even Stalin's Great Terror of 1937 may be seen as exemplifying Soviet utopianism, it being, he argues, a constituent element in what he calls a "Year of Adventure," which also saw Soviet aviators and explorers break world records and conquer the North Pole (Schlögel 2012). Yet although such pioneers tapped into a faith in the future that may be characterized as utopian, the psychological dynamics of the Great Terror—fear, mistrust, the breakdown of collective solidarity—were very different from the classic mood of utopianism, which is one of hope, optimism and self-belief. The attempt to stretch the term to cover all aspects of communist reality quickly evacuates the concept of any analytical utility.

At the same time, we must recognize that there is no unitary concept of utopianism. In the Russian case, Richard Stites identified four distinct types of utopianism: popular utopias, such as the legend of Belovod'e, a peasant paradise of abundance and moral rectitude; administrative utopias, such as the military-agricultural colonies of General Alexei Arakcheev (1769–1834); intelligentsia utopias such as that of Nikolai Chernyshevskii's *What is to Be Done?* (1863), which depicted a community united around work, comradeship and rational egotism, symbolized in a crystal palace; and finally, Marxist-inspired utopias, of which more below (Stites 1989). In China, too, millennial visions came in many different forms and were articulated at all levels of society, although perhaps not so much by the imperial bureaucracy as in Russia.

The Russian Revolution

The February Revolution of 1917 unleashed a passionate yearning for a just and equal society, only tenuously linked to Marxism. Freedom was the watchword of a society freed of the yoke of tsarism, with calls for an end to all "tyranny" and "slavery" and the realization of the "happiness" of the people. Revolutionary discourse soon became suffused with talk of socialism, an ideal that people interpreted according to their own lights. A pamphlet, "What is Socialism?," published in eastern Siberia, proclaimed, "need and hunger will disappear and pleasures will be available to all equally. Thefts and robberies will cease. Instead of coercion and violence, the kingdom of freedom and brotherhood will commence." Traditions of collectivism and mutual aid among the peasantry meshed easily with this vision of socialism. In the elections to the Saratov city duma in July socialist parties—badly divided among themselves—captured no less than 82.3% of the popular vote. Workers, soldiers and peasants came to associate socialism with soviet power, that is, with the decentralization of government to locally elected councils, which they counterposed to the power not only of ministers of the Provisional Government, but also of military officers, merchants, employers and managers, village elders and even kulaks.

From summer 1917, popular support for the Bolsheviks began to grow. The Bolsheviks disclaimed any notion of a blueprint for communist society, and there was no great unanimity among them as to what the future society would look like. After 1905, a tendency within the party, associated with neo-positivism, god-building and proletarian culture, had envisaged a proletariat with quasi-divine powers building a biologically, intellectually and socially perfect humanity. One of its exponents, A. A. Bogdanov, penned two novels about a communist society built on the planet Mars—*Red Star*, published in 1908, and *Engineer Menni*, published in 1913—where science had triumphed over nature through means such as nuclear propulsion, blood transfusions, unisexuality and, less positively, atomic fall-out. Lenin disliked such fantastic speculation and was altogether more prosaic in thinking about the communist future. Yet he, too, was by no means immune to utopian thinking. In *State and Revolution*, completed while he was in hiding in Finland in August and September 1917, he set out a vision of communist society in which the police and standing army were abolished, all officials elected and administration simplified to the point that even a cook or housekeeper could learn it (the latter an echo of Saint-Simon's epithet that "the administration of things" would replace "the government of men"). Yet this was also the text in which Lenin denounced "anarchist dreams" and insisted that the proletariat would need to use the coercive power of the state to crush its enemies.

Following the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks set out their long-term goal in the Soviet Constitution of 1918 as being the "abolition of all exploitation of man by man, the complete elimination of the division of society into classes, the ruthless suppression of the exploiters, the establishment of a socialist organization of society and the victory of socialism in all countries."

This vision was communicated in popular form through such media as the *Handbook of the Red Army Soldier*, published in 1918, and styled rather like a religious catechism:

> Who are you, comrade?
> If they ask you that, answer:
> "I am a defender of the toilers and poor across the world"
> What are you fighting for?
> If they ask you that, answer:
> "For justice [*pravdu*]. So that the lands and factories, and rivers and forests, and all wealth will belong to working people."

During the bitter civil war, amid escalating disintegration of society and economy, the Bolsheviks struggled to mobilize the resources of the poverty-racked country to defeat the Whites and manifold other enemies. The highly centralized system of economic administration that developed, comprising nationalization of industry, a state monopoly on grain, a ban on private trade, rationing of key consumer items and the militarization of labour, came to be known "War Communism." Thought largely to be a response to the dire state of the economy, there was no shortage of people who hailed it as the inauguration of a communist economy. As early as 1918, Iurii Larin mused, "Our children when they are grown up will know about money only from memory, and our grandchildren will know about it only from coloured pictures in history textbooks." Lenin cautioned that "it is impossible to abolish money at once," yet as efforts to stabilize the currency failed, he too acquiesced in plans to replace currency with "labour units" and "energy units." At this time, at least two variants of utopianism may be discerned within the Bolshevik party: one, to which Bogdanov and Proletkul't subscribed, believed that instilling proletarian consciousness into the masses would bring about rapid changes in the spheres of culture and the economy; the other, to which Trotsky and Lenin subscribed, believed that progress to socialism could be achieved through a crash programme to raise labour productivity and to organize labour on quasi-military lines (McClelland 1980).

The civil war spawned utopian aspirations in many other areas of life. The Bolsheviks' determination to raise the status of women and reconstruct the patriarchal family, for example, was set out in the Code on Marriage, the Family and Guardianship of October 1918. This equalized women's status with men's, removed marriage from the hands of the church, allowed spouses to retain their own property and earnings, granted children born outside wedlock the same rights as those born within and, crucially, made divorce available at the request of either party. Female party activists in the Women's Department summoned their sisters to become fighters for socialism. Efrosiniia Marakulina, a peasant instructor in Viatka province, became a poster girl for the "new socialist woman": "she forgot her family, her children, the household. With enthusiasm she threw herself into the new business of enlightening her dark, downtrodden sisters."

The civil war was a period of intense radical yearning for the future, yet it was also the period when the realities of socio-economic backwardness, poverty and international isolation began to sink home. Some of the more sweeping aspirations of 1917, such as workers' control of production, the abolition of a standing army, the abolition of "bourgeois" law and the court system and the abolition of the death penalty, were quietly dropped. In the party's new programme of March 1919, emphasis on the proletarian dictatorship as a means of "crushing the resistance of the exploiters" eclipsed references to the eventual disappearance of state power. Nevertheless the *ABC of Communism*, written by Nikolai Bukharin and Evgenii Preobrazhenskii in 1920 and rightly seen as the epitome of civil-war thinking, continued to promise that under communism "by degrees the entire working population shall be induced to participate in state administration." Incidentally, a Chinese translation of this enormously popular text was second in a list of 1927 bestsellers, despite the fact that the Bolsheviks had long abandoned War Communism by that time.

The economic and political crisis of the winter of 1920–1921 brought the Bolsheviks crashing down to reality. The New Economic Policy, inaugurated in March 1921, represented a massive deflation of radical hope. Lenin now condemned the "illusion" that one could "introduce socialist principles of product and distribution" by "direct assault." Under the NEP, peasants were allowed to trade their produce, and private industry and commerce resumed. Yet radical imagining of the future did not cease: indeed it proved psychologically necessary to those, especially young communists, who were disheartened by the reappearance in Soviet Russia of phenomena associated with bourgeois society. Advances in science and technology in particular were seized on for their socialist potential (a throwback to the thinking of Condorcet or Saint-Simon). The founding of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia enraptured Lenin: "Electrification on the soil of the soviet system will produce a decisive victory of the principles of communism in our country, the principles of a cultural life without exploiters, capitalists, landowners and merchants." A few envisaged reorganizing the whole of social life on rational, scientific lines: A. Z. Gol'tsman, former president of the metalworkers' union, proposed to put the masses "through giant laboratories, submit millions to training, to train the entirety of adult humanity, so that we build on this planet a cultured-labour *Island of Doctor Moreau*" (a puzzling reference to H. G. Wells's 1895 novel, which is actually a warning against blind faith in science). This fascination with science was mirrored in the arts too: above all, in the Constructivist movement, which strove to remake the fabric of everyday life—housing, clothing, furnishings or tableware—along rational collectivist lines. Vladimir Tatlin, the moving spirit behind the famous monument to the Third International, urged citizens to "Declare War on Chests of Drawers and Sideboards." Meanwhile architect Mosei Ginzburg construed the communal house as a "social condenser," designed to "encourage dynamic coexistence of activities and to generate through their interference, unprecedented events."

During this period of economic and social "retreat," advances towards socialism came to focus also on the realm of culture. In his last writings, Lenin invoked the concept of "cultural revolution"—hitherto associated with his rival Bogdanov—as being critical to overcoming the ignorance and squalor endemic in the country. His version of cultural revolution was rather modest, centring on promoting literacy and solid work habits among the people and on applying science and technology to social life. Others had a more grandiose conception: Bukharin averred that cultural revolution meant nothing less than a "revolution in human characteristics, in habits, feelings and desires, in way-of-life and culture," nothing less than the creation of a "new soviet person." At a time when individualism seemed to be on the rise, cultural revolution focused on fostering radical collectivism. Nadezhda Krupskaia, Lenin's wife, told the Young Communist Congress in 1924, "We must strive to bind our private life to the struggle for and construction of communism. Earlier it was perhaps not clear to us that the division between private life and public life sooner or later leads to the betrayal of communism." This commitment to collectivism was most evident in the experiments of young workers and students to create residential and work communes. Some understood collectivism in the most literal way. D. K. Bol'shakov, a peasant in a remote village in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, wrote in 1926, "We need to tell the peasants straight that socialism is when people will enjoy everything in common, when they will live the same kind of life as ants, i.e. in complete harmony."

The year 1928 saw the launch of what some historians have dubbed a real Cultural Revolution, analogous to what took place in China from 1966. Launched at the same time as the Soviet Union embarked on crash industrialization and forced collectivization of agriculture, the Cultural Revolution entailed giving "proletarian" hardliners their heads in art, music, architecture, film and academic disciplines, and shoving aside exponents of more gradualist or pluralistic approaches. Crucially, it entailed a ferocious assault on religion. As children of the Enlightenment, the Bolsheviks made no bones about the fact that communist society would be the world's first atheist society. Through the 1920s, there were determined efforts to undermine the Orthodox Church and anti-religious propaganda oscillated between shrill denunciation of the reactionary nature of religious belief and more solid efforts to weaken religious belief through scientific education. With the Law on Religious Associations of 1929, however, the state launched a full-scale onslaught on all forms of religious activity, shutting places of worship, arresting clergy and imposing punitive financial exactions on congregations.

This reminds us of the important connection between utopianism and violence, a connection that was at the heart of Stalin's "Great Break" of 1928 to 1932. The First Five Year Plan, putatively based on rational calculation, was accompanied by a rhetoric replete with military metaphors, ideas of storming and target-busting, and with appeals to heroism and revolutionary optimism: "there are no fortresses the Bolsheviks cannot storm," Stalin declared. Newspaper articles about the shock worker movement appeared with headlines

such as "A New Person is Being Born." At the same time, as Stites noted, Stalinism was a "war on the dreamers" (Stites 1989, p. 131). Many of the radical visions of the 1920s—evinced in the "new socialist woman," communal living, egalitarianism in industry, modernism in the arts—were firmly quashed, giving way to an ethos of discipline, social hierarchy and bureaucratic command. However, utopian strains within the Soviet project never died. Khrushchev's commitment to a rapid rise in popular living standards and to improving economic efficiency were not strictly utopian, yet his regime revitalized some characteristically utopian themes from earlier years: in the Virgin Lands scheme, in the revival of a militant anti-religious campaigning and, above all, in the space programme. The long-term tendency, however, especially under Brezhnev, was to reject storming into the future in favour of pragmatic developmentalism.

The Chinese Revolution

Confucianism posited a golden age in the ancient past, whose principles (*dao*) had gradually been abandoned. This golden age, as imagined by ancient philosophers such as Laozi, Zhuangzi or Mozi, bore some resemblance to the communist vision, in that it was based on the equal division of inherited property, the absence of class division, and on government by morally upstanding officials.

The concern of the good ruler should be to understand why humanity had fallen from its pristine state and to restore moral order. This fitted the dominant cyclical conception of time, evinced in the rise and fall of dynasties, the cycle of the heavens, the rotation of the seasons. Although more linear conceptions of time did exist—millenarian strains in Daoism and Buddhism had implanted a sense of the historical process as a progression from creation to eschaton—it was only in the nineteenth century, as the Chinese state came under threat from internal disorder and Western imperialism, that a few literati came to see history as a forward movement in time, the medium through which those in the present might seek to shape the future, rather than return to an idealized past.

Between 200 and 600 CE a millenarian tradition emerged, in the wake of two second-century Daoist rebellions. The Celestial Masters, who briefly established a theocracy in the west of China, set out a vision of a future society of "great peace" (*taiping*). In rejecting existing society, such movements were profoundly at odds with Confucianism, which urged individuals to improve the present order by cultivating their moral character (Shek 2007). Against a background of chronic popular unrest, millenarian strains also began to appear in Buddhism, and by the fourteenth century a mature body of millenarian thought had crystallized, which preached a message of universal salvation and was particularly associated with those religious groups lumped together by Ming officials as heretical "White Lotus" sects. However, it was only in the nineteenth century that a mass movement emerged that looked to create an ideal society on earth. The Taiping rebellion (1851–1864), though diverse in its ideology, had political aims that were not dissimilar from those

of communists. The 1853 "Land System of the Heavenly Dynasty" declared that "There will be fields and all will cultivate them; there will be food and all shall eat; there will be clothes and all will be dressed; there will be money and all will use it; inequality will cease, all will be fed and warm." At the end of the century, the scholar Kang Youwei (1858–1927) elaborated a conception of a future society as one of "great harmony" (*datong*), a concept borrowed from the *Liyun* section of the Confucian *Book of Rites*. This was a society where "All under heaven will be held in common, there will be no class divisions, all will be equal." Sun Yat-sen, the father of the republic established in 1912, imagined that the republic would be socialist, an aspiration articulated in the idea of *min-sheng*, or "people's livelihood," the third of his "Three People's Principles," an idea shaped more by Henry George than by the Second International.

A few months before coming to power, Mao Zedong reminded his fellow countrymen in the essay "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" that the ultimate goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was to "create the conditions in which classes, state power, and political parties will die out naturally and mankind will enter the realm of great harmony." It is significant that he used the Confucian term *datong*, popularized by Kang Youwei, since it reflects Mao's appropriation of elements of traditional Chinese culture into his political philosophy—something that had no parallel in the thinking of Lenin or Trotsky. When the CCP came to power in 1949 in a country racked by war, it initially defined its goal as being "new democracy" rather than socialism. Mao Zedong, however, was bent on building socialism as fast as possible, and in 1955–1956 he declared that the phase of new democracy was over and that a "socialist high tide" was swelling up, in the shape of a drive to create higher-level agricultural cooperatives and build state-owned industry as rapidly as possible. Jin Zhaoyang, a young writer who had worked in the countryside, ventriloquized the supposed enthusiasm of the peasantry for agricultural collectives. "Socialism means that our mountain district will be clothed with trees, that peach-blossom and pear-blossom will cover the hillsides. Lumber mills will spring up in our district and a railway too, and our trees will be sprayed with insecticide from aeroplanes and will have a big water reservoir."

Mao had few illusions about the extent of China's economic and cultural backwardness, but he believed that the "subjective factor"—the consciousness of the masses—could overcome objective obstacles to building socialism. In defiance of the Soviet model, which put the accent on modernizing the forces of production by installing advanced technology and prioritizing heavy industry, Mao envisaged that China should rely on the one productive force it had in abundance: namely, its people. The party should mobilize the enthusiasm, creativity and determination of the masses in order to "move mountains": values and patterns of behaviour from the past should be renounced and new values of struggle, austerity and self-sacrifice instilled. "If you are not completely reborn," Mao declared, "you cannot enter the door of communism." Such faith in the masses had no correlate in the thinking of Lenin.

Delighted with the speed with which agricultural collectives were formed, Mao in 1958 launched the Great Leap Forward, initially an attempt to catch up and surpass the capitalist West but soon turning into a drive to carry China in one fell swoop from socialism to communism (Manning 2011). Initially, the talk was of "technological revolution," with huge investment planned for big industrial and infrastructural projects but complemented by small-scale projects such as electric power generators and backyard steel furnaces. On New Year's Eve 1958, the *People's Daily* proclaimed that China would catch up with Britain in thirteen years and with the USA in twenty to thirty; by May, the Eighth CCP Congress had reduced this to seven and fifteen years, respectively. In August 1958, Mao announced that the country should move swiftly towards establishing people's communes, massive units of thousands of households, so that industry, agriculture, trade, culture, education and military affairs could be amalgamated into a single entity. The Beidaihe resolution of the same month extolled the communes as a combination of the communist principle of "each according to his needs" and the socialist principle of "each according to his work" and predicted that "ownership by the whole people" would be realized in the countryside within a few years. An extraordinary atmosphere ensued: in the words of one Western observer, "There were communal mess halls, communal kitchens, communal labour, communal indoctrination, and hortatory meetings—a form of communal living totally different from the family and village way of life." In Henan, Hebei and Shandong provinces model communes provided their members with free food, clothing, medical care, education and housing. That Mao continued to look for inspiration to China's past is evident from the fact that in July 1959 he arrived at a Central Committee meeting armed with copies of the biography of Zhang Lu (d.216), grandson of the founder of the Celestial Masters. He had made a commentary on the passage in the *Records of the Three Kingdoms* that claimed that Zhang had provided his followers with free accommodation and meals. Tragically, as peasants urged one another to "Eat until the skin on your belly is tight," the grain ran out, with in some areas a year's supply being eaten in three months.

It is clear that, initially, there was enthusiasm for this drive to go all-out to take China out of poverty and into prosperity and equality. The authorities whipped it up by encouraging workers, peasants and soldiers to celebrate the Great Leap with "new folk songs," poetry and drama. These lauded a war to subdue nature, with women and men working flat out to overcome China's backwardness. Typical was a song by Ma Ziyou, a worker in the No. 2 workshop of the Nanjing wireless factory, which blended traditional imagery with a mechanized collectivism:

Now we are overtaking England
The sound of war drums shakes the heavens
Ten thousand galloping horses leap ahead
The spring wing blows the scent of a hundred flowers
The "three evils" and "five vapours" are burned off

With one heart we are engaged in creation
You and I are inseparable parts
We work together like a machine

Peasants were encouraged to paint the great transformation that was under-
way. In Pi county in Jiangsu, no fewer than 105,000 drawings, paintings and
murals were completed between June and August 1958. In Xiashan county in
Zhejiang the peasant Ruan Weiqing depicted the future society as one in which
people relaxed amid gardens and lotus lakes, against a distant background of
smokestacks and high-rise buildings. If his and others' paintings can be trusted,
peasants associated communism above all with plentiful food, colourful cloth-
ing, elegant, Western-style housing and a Palace of Culture.

During the Great Leap the authorities strove to wrest science from the hand
of experts and place it in the hands of the people—an attempt that would be
repeated during the Cultural Revolution. Officials' ignorance of science, how-
ever, was often breathtaking. Tao Zhu, leader of Guangdong province and a
zealous believer in the close planting of crops advocated by the Soviet biologist
T. D. Lysenko, praised the "advanced elements" who had set themselves the
"bold and unheard of target" of raising 5,500 jin of rice per mu. Kang Sheng
promised that "if by national day next year (1959), Shanghai's schools are able
to launch a third-grade rocket to an altitude of 300 kilometres, they should
get three marks … A third-grade rocket with a satellite should get five marks.
This is very easy." Local cadres, in their eagerness to demonstrate that they
were accomplishing economic miracles, falsified output statistics and wasted
precious resources on grandiose schemes. Ecstatic about the reported increases
in grain yields, the central government increased grain procurements and con-
tinued to divert labour from agriculture to industry. The result was a cata-
strophic famine. Towards the end of the famine in 1961, a confidential CCP
report noted, "For a long time the masses have lost interest in collective pro-
duction. They have lost faith in the future. They say they would rather be dogs
somewhere else than people here."

In the early 1960s, Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping initiated a
sharp change of course in an effort to restore the country to economic health:
inter alia, communes were scaled down in size, private plots were restored and
farmers were once again allowed to sell produce in rural markets. None of this
was to Mao Zedong's liking. Nevertheless, in the wake of the Great Leap fam-
ine, he revised his conviction that communism could be created at breakneck
speed. As the Sino–Soviet split emerged, he poured scorn on the declaration by
the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1961 that the
Soviet Union would realize communism within twenty years, insisting that the
transition from socialism to communism would be a protracted and uncertain
process. By the mid-1960s he was firmly of the view that the Soviet Union had
ceased to be socialist: a privileged stratum of bureaucrats had "converted the
function of serving the masses into the privilege of dominating them." Only
by continuing to wage class struggle could China avoid the same fate, for only

class struggle could overcome the "three great differences"—between workers and peasants, town and countryside, and mental and manual labour—whose disappearance would be the hallmark of communist society. Whereas Stalin in 1931 had condemned the "levelling" of wages, Mao insisted on the superiority of moral over material incentives in the workplace. In 1963, communes were urged to "learn from Dazhai," a production brigade in Shanxi province that had terraced its steep hillsides by motivating its members through ideological campaigns rather than workpoints. More generally, in his emphasis on the need to overcome the division between mental and manual labour, Mao was returning to an element in Marx's vision of socialism, one to which the Bolsheviks had never paid much attention.

Already during the Great Leap Forward, schools and universities had come under pressure to open their doors to workers and peasants, and integrate study with manual labour, in line with Mao's conviction that knowledge derives from practice. In 1964, Mao called once again for a "revolution in education," demanding the abolition of selection via examinations, since this "encourages students to become bourgeois specialists by the bourgeois method of 'making one's way' and achieving individual fame, wealth and position." He dismissed a professor's exhortation to his students to read more, since "it is evident that to read too many books is harmful." Even more than the Bolsheviks in the 1920s, Mao saw the sphere of education and culture as crucially shaping the possibility of advance to communism since it was in the realm of values, norms and social practices that he believed the residues of "feudalism" and "capitalism" were reproduced. By 1966, he had become convinced that capitalist relations were gaining dominance over socialist relations in the economy and government and it was to reverse this process that he launched the Cultural Revolution. Urban students, organized as Red Guards, were exhorted to struggle against "those in power taking the capitalist road," who included not only party and state officials but also luckless teachers. They were summoned, too, to destroy the "four olds"—old ideas, culture, customs and habits—and duly ransacked homes and vandalized historic sites, painting them red or covering them with quotations from Chairman Mao. The movement quickly spilled into the factories. In January 1966, rebel organizations in Shanghai, inspired by the events in Paris in 1871, endeavoured to set up a commune, a move that was initially approved by the Central Committee, which had rashly hailed the Cultural Revolution as "a great revolution in which one class overthrows another." However, as awareness dawned that there would be no place for the party in a commune structure, Mao quickly backtracked, insisting that "revolutionary committees," comprising rebel organizations, the army and "re-educated" party and government officials, become the new form of government. It took at least two years for these committees—thanks to the army—to suppress endemic violence, factionalism and chaos.

The rebel movement itself, though riven by factionalism, was largely contained within the ideological universe of Maoism, rival groups vying to prove themselves the most loyal followers of Mao Zedong thought. That said, a few factions did seek to develop more critical reflection on China's path to

communism. Notable was Yang Xiguang's essay "Where is China Going?," published in early 1968 on behalf of the Shengwulian network in Hunan, which contended that the fundamental conflict in China was between the new "red capitalist class," to which he assigned 90% of senior party, government and military officials, and the mass of the people. The implication was that only revolution from below, based on organs elected by the masses, could overthrow this new class.

The Cultural Revolution fatally undermined utopian Maoism. As in the Soviet Union after Khrushchev, Mao's successors ditched all attempts to career into the communist future, concentrating instead on breaking out of backwardness and poverty by fostering private enterprise and opening up China's economy to the outside world, proceeding in due course to dismantle the command economy and to privatize state assets.

Conclusion

Marx left only a scant outline of what communist society might look like, so regimes that ruled in his name struggled to achieve some approximation of his vision, in conditions radically different from those Marx had assumed. In the Soviet Union within little more than a decade, the vision of communism shifted from one of decentralized soviet power to one of an all-powerful imperial national state. The Maoist vision was closer to the Stalinist vision than to the early Bolshevik one, yet it was distinctive in key respects: it placed more emphasis on the mobilization of the masses (always guided by the CCP, of course); on their ideological conditioning and moral awakening; and on the dissolution of the distinction between mental and manual. Within both communist parties, deep division persisted between those who believed the advance to communism was a gradual process, based on the application of science and technology, and those who believed that military methods of mass mobilization offered a speedier solution (in China, the people's communes were organized on military lines with party secretaries designated as "commanders" (*tongshuai*)).

Though convinced that they were superior to "utopian" socialists by virtue of their scientific understanding of the laws of history, communist regimes came under irresistible external and domestic pressure to speed up the movement of history. Their rhetoric was peppered with ideas of "breaks," "leaps" and "bridges" (Kang Sheng declared that "Communism is paradise; the people's communes are bridges to it"). This pressure produced phases of intense and violent excitement: the civil war and Stalin's "Great Break" in Russia, and the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution in China. The two latter episodes, in particular, must surely qualify as the twentieth century's most foolhardy and disastrous attempts to break into the future. Yet the claim that communist regimes were utopian *tout court* ignores those periods when they pursued more pragmatic, incremental policies, and it rests on a normative assumption that any state-backed attempt to effect rapid socio-economic development is ipso facto irrational. As the regimes aged, however, they did tend—as Mao was

only too aware—to lose revolutionary dynamism. In the last analysis, as Stites observed, "Euphoria, culture building, and visionary idealism are human attitudes that are hard to sustain over a long period" (Stites 1989, p. 226).

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Sociopolitical Engineering

Guido Franzinetti

Sociopolitical engineering (or social engineering, which is the more frequently used term) is highly contentious as a label, as a concept and as a historical practice. It encapsulates a vast set of issues, ranging from modernization to revolution, dictatorship and social utopias. It also includes a wide range of actions, ranging from welfare policies to ethnic cleansing. For this reason the debate on social engineering has often tended to focus on the theoretical aspect, rather than on the actual historical results. It has also focused primarily on the experience of social engineering in two dictatorships (Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union). This chapter would like to provide a broader comparative overview, and also to address the topic as a general element of contemporary modernity.

Social Engineering: The Term and the Concept

David Östlund has pointed out the need to stress "the historical relativity of the possible usages of the terminology of 'social engineers' and 'social engineering'" (Östlund 2007, p. 44).[1] Social engineering emerged in a succession of quite distinct contexts. The first was that of social theory at the turn of the twentieth century (1870–ca. 1920), during which this category (or categories akin to it) were used in a transnational debate, ranging from Northern Europe to the USA.

The term was first used in 1891 by Veblen, but in a quite limited sense (Veblen 1891, p. 360). A more elaborate use of the term was put forward by Jacob C. Van Marken in 1894. In 1899, William Tolman, the secretary of the League for Social Service in New York, picked up the term and propagated it. The concept was thus used in the context of the promotion of cooperation and

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social reform. After 1911, it began to be adopted as a general metaphor for machinery applied to social issues (Östlund 2007, p. 79; Podgórecki 1996).

It is symptomatic that the term originated during what has been called "the afterglow of the great Victorian Age of faith and optimism" (Carr 1987, p. 6). In short, it was a broadly *reformist* kind of approach, not intended as a radical or utopian one. At that stage there was no radical or revolutionary social engineering of any consequence. This changed during the First World War, and especially in the interwar period, when radical concepts of social engineering were articulated and implemented.

The second context in which the category emerged was in the aftermath of the Second World War, as soon as the Cold War began, when it was used in a more general fashion, as an aspect of debates on German National Socialism and Soviet Communism, which were subsumed (on the Western side) under the term "totalitarianism." The Cold War usage of the term "social engineering" may be gauged by the wording of E. H. Carr's attack on Karl Popper's advocacy of "piecemeal social engineering":

> It is Professor Popper who, at any rate in Great Britain, has once more expressed this cautious conservative outlook in its clearest and most uncompromising form. Echoing [Lewis] Namier's rejection of "programmes and ideals," he attacks policies which allegedly aim at "re-modelling the 'whole of society' in accordance with a definite plan," commends what he call "piecemeal social engineering," and does not apparently shrink from the imputation of "piecemeal tinkering" and "muddling through." (Carr 1961, p. 150)

The key aspect of Popper's argument was indeed the opposition between "utopian" social engineering and "piecemeal" social engineering.[2] Carr's attack was actually misleading, especially in his labelling Popper as a conservative. Popper was much closer to a Social Democratic position. Indeed, the *real* thrust of Carr's critique was not conservatism as such, but rather the social and economic policies of post-war Britain, which were broadly shared by Labour and Conservative governments.[3]

By this stage the term was associated with the debate on totalitarianism. Furthermore, in the 1960s and 1970s, Western European critiques of social engineering became the hallmark of both the Neo-Liberal New Right and the New Left.[4] In recent decades the term has acquired even wider currency, especially in the context of postmodern trends.

The Radical Phase of Social Engineering (1917–1955)

Social engineering, in its radical version, became a reality only after the First World War, and the succession of revolutionary breakthroughs which followed it. The war was itself the motor for what might be considered accelerated social engineering. But it is difficult to distinguish what was a by-product of military requirements from what was an intentional and conscious process (as social engineering is supposed to be).

The war did, however, establish the preconditions in which radical or "utopian" social engineering could take place. The period comprised between the outbreak of the First Word War and the aftermath of the Second World War (usually reckoned as 1945–1955) witnessed four major forms of social engineering in Revolutionary Russia, Fascist Italy, Republican Turkey and Nazi Germany.[5] These four historical breakthroughs were connected not only by the time frame they fitted into, but also by their conscious interaction.[6] All started with some kind of plan for social transformation, but since the circumstances of the seizure of power were unforeseen, the actual implementation of these plans was repeatedly modified. In retrospective analyses of these processes, this discrepancy has led to a polarization between "intentionalist" interpretations (a master plan was followed) and a "functionalist" one (actors reacted to circumstances).[7]

A related issue is the evaluation of the degree of popular support ("consent") enjoyed by these dictatorships. This is both an elusive concept in any dictatorship (which supposedly controls popular opinion) and a politically sensitive one (since apologists of dictatorships often refer to popular "consent" as a justification for the system). In practice, it has been treated as the obverse of any form of social engineering: the more "consent" a regime has obtained, the more successful social engineering must have been. This is a doubtful proposition, since it establishes a connection between what is ultimately a verifiable process (social engineering) and an event which remains opaque ("consent").

Italian National Fascism and Turkish Nationalism

Most research on "totalitarianism" has centred on the case of the Soviet and Nazi dictatorships. Italian National Fascism has also attracted some attention (as the presumed originator of the term, and as the first radical right-wing regime). But the supposed failure of Fascism to meet the criteria of real "totalitarianism" (as defined by Arendt 1958 and many others) has meant that most comparisons have excluded the Italian case and have centred on the Nazi and Soviet case (Kershaw and Lewin 1997; Rousso 1999; Geyer and Fitzpatrick 2009).

The Fascist movement began its seizure of power in 1922, and completed it in 1925–1929. It was a smoother process compared to other revolutionary breakthroughs, but this smoothness turned out to be a handicap for any blueprint it might have wanted to carry out. The basic institutions of the Italian state remained intact after 1922: the monarchy, the army and the bureaucracy. These institutions had benevolently allowed the Fascist seizure of power through the use of illegal violence against its opponents, but they were never fully absorbed into the emerging Fascist structures. The Catholic Church remained independent, and actually increased its power after 1929. Army officers pledged their loyalty to their king, not to Mussolini. This led to a radically different balance of power as compared to the situation which existed in Nazi Germany, let alone the situation in the Soviet Union. This explains also the fragility exhibited by the Fascist system when the crunch came in 1943, after the Allied landing in Sicily.

This weakness of the Fascist system has often led to the hasty conclusion that Italian National Fascism was never totalitarian, and perhaps not even such a violent dictatorship as originally assumed.[8] This approach reflects various kinds of factors (ranging from Italian social and economic backwardness, the nature of Fascist ideology, to active and passive support for the regime). The real test of the effectiveness of Fascism as a regime lies in its ability to carry out the social and institutional transformations it aspired to achieve. In terms of institutions (the bureaucracy, the legal and administrative infrastructure, the welfare state) Fascism managed to establish a durable legacy, still visible in the twenty-first century.[9] In terms of durable social change (which is the ultimate goal of any kind of social engineering) it was instead much less successful than the Nazi or Soviet systems (Corner 2002, 2009, 2012).

Despite the obvious differences (in terms of historical background, cultural traditions and many other factors) the relative failure of Italian Fascism may be more accurately understood in comparison with another case of radical breakthrough, Republican Turkey.

The modernizing drive of the Young Turks is well known, but what is less frequently remarked upon is the influence of French right-wing radicalism in their education (Zürcher 2010, pp. 112–14 and 118). The Young Turks were pursuing a form of social engineering already in 1915, with the extermination of the Armenian population (Suny et al. 2011). Republican Turkey was transformed even more radically in the aftermath of the Greek–Turkish War, with the expulsion of the Greeks (and the subsequent exchange of populations, ratified in 1923). The implementation of various forms of modernization and especially secularism were no less drastic.

At the beginning of the 1990s Ernest Gellner could argue that Turkish nationalism had been quite successful compared to other revolutionary movements:

> … the Kemalist aspiration to modernize and secularize Turkey was rather rigid in its scholastic secularism … Nevertheless, in the end it proved superior to Marxism and more durable, precisely because it did not tie the hands of its elite in social and economic policies. Its lack of a clear social doctrine eventually proved a great advantage. (Gellner 1996, p. 144)

With the benefit of hindsight, this judgement may be somewhat qualified. What is significant is not so much the fact that the success of Turkish Republican social engineering was overstated in the past (just as it was in the Soviet case), but rather the basic reason for its relative failure (as the rise of the Turkish neo-Islamic AKP illustrates). Once the new Republican regime had been set up, Turkish nationalism never seriously challenged the social and economic structure which had emerged.[10]

The limitations of modernization of Republican Turkey were also reflected in social constraints. In 1930 a group of dervishes in Menemem (near Izmir) staged an anti-secularist demonstration, killing and beheading an officer. "The aspect of the matter that was really shocking was not so much the action of

the dervishes … but the fact that over a thousand bystanders had watched these events unfold without anyone raising his voice in protest. This could, and was, interpreted as tacit support by the public for the rebels" (Zürcher 2004, p. 179).

Italian Fascism and Turkish Nationalism therefore turned out to be both relative failures in terms of social engineering. In both cases, this was not due to any lack of resolve, but rather to the consequences of the choices made in the aftermath of their seizure of power: in the Italian case, the decision not to challenge the formal institutional structure; in the Turkish case, the decision not to challenge the social and economic structure. Given these premises, it is unlikely that Fascist and Turkish Nationalist social engineering could have been more effective.

BOLSHEVISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM

The Bolsheviks did not actually have a blueprint for social engineering. Marxist tradition had always distanced itself from "Utopian" plans, since it considered itself "Scientific." The first (and only) Bolshevik utopia was produced hastily in 1919 (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1969). Leaving aside the repeated turns and uncertainties of the first decade of Bolshevik rule (first War Communism, then the New Economic Policy), the first major form of social engineering in the Soviet Union began in 1929, with the decision to collectivize agriculture as a basis for accelerated industrialization. Policies towards nationalities were also another major form of social engineering (Martin 2001). Throughout the entire Soviet period, the regime was always active in enforcing policies supposedly directed at promoting social groups (or "classes") and penalizing others. Welfare and family policies were prominent, as they were (and are) in any version of social engineering. In particular, the emancipation of women (especially in more backward regions, such as Soviet Central Asia) was seen as a key tool in social transformation (Massell 1974).

Nazi policies also aimed at carrying out an alternative form version of social engineering, framed in terms of establishing a "National/People's Community" (*Volksgemeinschaft*). The first requirement was the swift destruction of any kind of political opposition. As German society was much more advanced than Italy was at the time of the Fascist seizure of power, the use of violence against opponents proceeded at a much faster and intense pace than in Italy.[11] After this initial stage, Nazi policies were directed at discriminating and then penalizing specific groups (non-"Aryans," genetically undesirable Germans and others). In the final stage, following the outbreak of war, policies of actual extermination of targeted groups were carried out. The rest of German society, on the other hand, would remain undisturbed by Nazi *Führerstaat* provided it did not express any active opposition. It could also increasingly benefit from the effects of Nazi policies.[12]

In recent decades more attention has been paid to the identifying practices employed by the Soviet state under Stalin and by Nazi Germany in connection with their respective forms of social engineering. Both regimes aimed

"to transform society in the image of certain ascribed qualities. In the case of Soviet Russia, these revolved around class, later to be supplemented and even supplanted by nationality. For the Nazis, purification of the racially defined community became the paramount objective of social policy" (Browning and Siegelbaum 2009, p. 231).

The Soviet regime was, however, more flexible in its choice of criteria of social exclusion (and promotion). This made it much less predictable, generating a widespread sense of insecurity, at all levels. The Nazi regime was more consistent in its definition of its criteria: "those excluded were a small minority, which allowed for enthusiastic support for the regime and a strong sense of security by the majority, as well as the majority's relative indifference to the fate of minorities" (Browning and Siegelbaum 2009, pp. 264–65).

The Second World War radically altered the picture of both regimes. For the German population "participation" in the conquest and occupation in Europe, especially "in the East," was a quite different experience from the relative domestic tranquillity of the pre-war years. In the Soviet Union, instead, "the war enabled previously stigmatized groups to expunge the stains on their records through service in the Red Army or participation in partisan groups resisting Nazi occupation" (Browning and Siegelbaum 2009, pp. 262, 265). Ultimately, the flexibility of Soviet social engineering prevailed over Nazi consistency.

The Communist Bloc

The Soviet Union remained firm in the regime which was maintained until the death of Stalin in 1953, and which began to be dismantled only after 1955, with the re-establishment of "Socialist legality" (i.e. party control, as distinct from personal dictatorship and secret police control).

The most important other changes in the Soviet system took place with the territorial expansion of the Soviet Union, and the creation of an Eastern European Communist bloc.[13] These changes were destined to have a profoundly destabilizing effect on the system, internally and externally. Internally, the incorporation of previously non-Soviet territories (the Baltic states and other territories incorporated into Belorussian and Ukrainian republics) involved social (and "ethnic") engineering, with the deportation or immigration of social groups and ethnicities (Gross 1988). Externally, the creation of a bloc of communist countries over Eastern Europe, while offering an extra element of territorial security, ultimately proved destabilizing. The level of social and economic development of these countries certainly varied (from a basically Western European standard of living in Czechoslovakia, to the extreme poverty of Albania) but they all represented cultural and social formations which differed radically from the Soviet Union. The first post-war decade (1945–1955) was marked by a succession of contradictory waves of Sovietization: a first phase of relative caution, before the Paris Peace treaties of 1947 and the onset of the Cold War; then an acceleration into High Stalinism; then a cautious beginning of de-Stalinization, culminating in 1955 with the retreat of Soviet troops from Austria.

The picture varied significantly from country to country, and consequently the pattern of social engineering in each of them. Countries which were considered victims of Axis aggression were not encumbered by the need to await the verdict of the peace treaties in some cases proceeded to a rapid Sovietization (Yugoslavia, Albania); in others (Poland, Czechoslovakia) this process was delayed until 1947–1948. Countries which had been allies of the Axis powers proceeded to follow the Soviet model cautiously after 1947 (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria). East Germany (the German Democratic Republic, DDR) proceeded even more cautiously, since its final status remained undecided by the Soviets at least until 1955.[14]

"Sovietization" is a simplification. The timing and modalities of communist takeovers were all quite different, not because of the presence or absence of a "blueprint," but simply because the circumstances on the ground were so varied. Communist power always operated under a variety of constraints (social, economic or political). In the early post-war years, Soviet policy was cautious in offering a blueprint (Brus 1977). On the other hand, in 1947 Romanian Communists would be looking at Yugoslavia as a model for the establishment of communist power. The Yugoslav break from the Soviet bloc was all the more traumatic for this reason, leading to the "anti-Titoist" purges and show trials. All these sequences of events had a direct effect on the process of social and political engineering in the different countries.

Mark Pittaway has pointed out that

> While the early years of socialist dictatorship were repressive, characterized by the show trials, the elimination of civil society, the expansion of prisons and political police forces, and violent attempts to institute revolutionary social transformation, the dictatorships were unable to guarantee stability … their social and economic transformations were undermined by a lack of political support and by large-scale infra-political or submerged resistance in factories, offices and homes across the region. This led to the near collapse of industrialization and collectivization drives by the mid-1950s, and in some cases, most spectacularly in Hungary, to the outright collapse of the regime, thus forcing the dictatorship to rely on the Red Army troops for its survival. (Pittaway 2004, p. 7)

Social Engineering during the Cold War (1955–1975)

In Eastern Europe the strictly "High Stalinist" period (1947–1955) was both relatively brief, and far from successful. Yet "by the mid-1960s … socialist dictatorship rested on stronger social foundations than it had done a decade before" (Pittaway 2004, p. 7). Indeed, "mature socialism" (which is actually what Eastern Europeans had in mind when talking of "communism") only emerged after 1961–1962. In the aftermath of Polish and Hungarian events in 1956, the Soviet Bloc countries completed the second collectivization drive in agriculture. The Berlin Wall was built, burying any illusion of German reunification. Industrialization progressed, offering vast opportunities for social

mobility (peasants to blue-collar, blue-collar to white-collar) (Tepicht 1975; Connor 1979). Socialist social engineering appeared to have succeeded.

Social Engineering: The Western Version

The optimism of socialist planners in Eastern Europe was matched on the other side of the Cold War divide. Western optimism was reflected in Rostow's "Non-Communist Manifesto" (Rostow 1960), and more generally the literature of modernization theory which had been produced from the 1950s onwards (Lerner 1958).

The 1960s were the high noon of Western modernization on a global scale. In the following decade the end of the Vietnam War and the failure of the Shah's plans in Iran provided a clear indication of the limits of the effectiveness of the "high-modernist utopianism of the right" (Scott 1998, p. 89). In the short term, these developments seemed to reinforce the appeal of the Soviet model. In reality, the 1970s marked the end what Anthony Low has termed the "Egalitarian Moment" (1950–1980) (Low 1996).

In a parallel fashion, in Western Europe, dissatisfaction with post-war consensus policies (based on the welfare state and the mixed economy) produced after 1973 a rejection of social engineering (from both the left and especially the neo-liberal right).

The Socialist Bottleneck, 1975–1985

The key development in Eastern Europe was the emergence of a bottleneck in the functioning of social mobility. The deceleration of the process gradually became visible all over the bloc, even in a country such as Poland, which had been able to offer many opportunities for advancement because of the wartime population losses. A generation earlier, an electrician such as Lech Wałęsa would have been easily co-opted into the communist political apparatus. He ended up instead in a growing working-class leadership which was the basis of Solidarność, the first independent trade union of the bloc. For a communist system, which legitimized itself on the basis of proletarian emancipation, this represented the ultimate failure. This was not just the reflection of a Polish anomaly, but of a generalized process of social and economic stagnation throughout the entire bloc (Connor 1979).

The stagnation of communist societies was all the more frustrating, because it was taking place in the face of the successful transition to democracy (and rapid accession to the European Economic Community) of the right-wing authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe (Portugal, Greece and Spain). Following the change of leadership in the Soviet Union, the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe proceeded to abdicate in rapid succession, allowing a peaceful transition (sometimes termed "revolution").[15]

Post-Communism: Reverse Social Engineering?

The usage of the term "post-communism" is indicative of the difficulty in categorizing a period. It could be argued that the collapse of communism has led to an inversion of the previous processes of social engineering. This is understandable, since all social change involves some kind of social engineering. That said, the transitions to some form of market economy in Eastern Europe all reflected quite different stages of dismantlement of the communist project, and quite different historical legacies (ranging from the sophistication of Czech society to the poverty of Albania). The idea that these quite different societies were simply steamrolled into marketization through some neo-liberal "shock therapy" does not correspond to the realities on the ground. What happened was a much more disorderly process, of hasty reforms (and counter-reforms).

The only case of drastic social engineering occurred in Albania, the most tightly controlled communist state in Eastern Europe. In this case there was a state collapse, which led to a genuine revolution (1991–1992), followed by a process of actual dismantling of the public domain (Vickers and Pettifer 1997, p. 61; Franzinetti 2011).

Conclusions: The Long-Term Implications of Social Engineering

Social engineering (just as any kind of social transformation) may occur in a variety of ways, ranging from moderate proposals of social reform to drastic forms of extermination and genocide. It is quite legitimate to point out the ways in which some form of coercion is always present, but there is always the risk of dissolving all distinctions in all-encompassing notions of "social control."[16]

Notes

1. I would like to thank professor D. Östlund for sending me a copy of his article, which provides a comprehensive overview of the usage of the term "social engineering."
2. Popper (1957) was written in 1935, first published in 1944–1945. The argument on the two forms of social engineering was also put forward in Popper (1945), esp. vol. I, ch. 3, 22–25, and n. 9, pp. 210–11.
3. Carr probably associated Popper with Friedrich Hayek, who had outlined his critique of social engineering in Hayek 1944. Popper and Hayek were indeed friends, and Popper acknowledged his intellectual debt to Hayek, and in particular for his remarks on social engineering. He was also critical of the moderate version of social engineering proposed by Karl Mannheim. In current debates, Popper is sometimes classified in terms of a Cold War "Liberalism of fear" (Müller 2008). For a more nuanced discussion of Popper's thought, see Hacohen (2000).
4. For an analysis of critiques of Swedish social policies, see Östlund (2007, pp. 46–53).

5. Revolutionary and radical transformations outside Europe are excluded from this overview.

6. For an extended analysis of the interaction between Soviet and Nazi policies in occupied Eastern Europe, see Snyder (2010).

7. This distinction was originally made with reference to historiographical debates on Nazi Germany (Mason 1981), but it should be applied also to other debates.

8. Arendt argued that "Mussolini … did not attempt to establish a full-fledged totalitarian regime and contended himself with a dictatorship and a one-party rule." She offered as proof the small number and mild sentences to political offences (Arendt 1958, p. 308).

9. Any assessment of the Fascist institutional legacy should take into account the significant degree of actual continuity between pre-Fascist and Fascist policies.

10. For a useful comparison of social engineering in Republican Turkey and Communist Hungary, see Hann (1995).

11. Discussions of Italian Fascism sometimes refer to the fact that Mussolini's Italy had "only" 5,000 political prisoners. Leaving aside the accuracy of this figure, in a still backward and agricultural society, with a small political elite, 5,000 political prisoners was a quite significant number.

12. For a discussion of Nazi welfare policies, see Tooze (2006).

13. The world Communist Movement ceased to exist after the Sino–Soviet break-up in 1961. Up to that date it effectively functioned as a genuine communist "commonwealth," under the leading role of the Soviet Union.

14. On this aspect, see Åslund (1985).

15. The exceptions to this rule were only countries which were not under direct Soviet military control (Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania). The process of transition in the Soviet Union differed from the Eastern European transitions in many respects, and would require a more extensive discussion.

16. For a discussion of the use of this term, see Stedman Jones (1978).

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Colonialism and Mass Dictatorship: The Imperial Axis and the Home Front in Japan, Italy and Germany

Daniel Hedinger

The inclusion of an article on "colonialism and Mass dictatorship" in the "projects" section of this handbook might be seen as a cynical euphemism. For some of the mass dictatorships of the first half of the twentieth century—first and foremost Italy, Germany and Japan—realized huge empires. At the height of its expansion, Hitler's empire consisted of land masses which were larger than the USA, "more densely populated and more economically productive than anywhere else in the world" (Mazower 2009, p. 3). In terms of its geographical stretch and its population, the Japanese Empire even surpassed the German Reich. And in view of the unparalleled bloody record of the Axis empires the use of the word "projects" seems even more inappropriate; for many Poles, Ethiopians or Chinese—to mention but a few—these empires were all too real.

But then again, there are several good reasons to emphasize the imaginary nature and the utopian character of the imperial expansion pursued by mass dictatorships in the twentieth century. With the exception of the Axis, there are hardly any good examples of mass dictatorships which actually embarked upon large-scale empire-building. And even in these three cases, the utopian and unfinished character of the dictatorships' projects appears to predominate: all in all, the ambitions greatly exceeded the scope of what was actually achieved. One might therefore simply assert that much of the history of the Axis empires consisted of projects, illusions and dreams. However, the imaginary nature is important from yet another perspective: in all three dictatorships, colonial

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ambitions and imperial projects were a decisive factor in internal mass mobilization. In other words, mass mobilization and therefore the war effort in each of these three regimes can hardly be understood without considering their imperial dreams.

At the same time, such dreams also drove the Axis alliance. In the following I will argue that the origins and the dynamics of the Japanese, Italian and German Empires can only be understood from a transnational perspective. This reveals a pattern of interaction and collaboration between the three countries which was as multifaceted as it was reciprocal and whose density was such, that for the interwar years, one might aptly speak of an *imperial Axis.* Contemporaries already frequently emphasized the kinship between the Axis empires: the Fascist party magazine *Gerarchia* noted in 1938, "Japanese imperialism … has a mystical, belligerent and proletarian character which is in many respects only comparable with the unique proletarian imperialism of Mussolini's Italy that is itself one of the most original historical phenomena of the twentieth century" (Villa 1938, p. 190).

Here we touch upon two complex problems: first, to what extent can the Axis' imperialism really be seen as "one of the most original historical phenomena of the twentieth century," as *Gerarchia* asserted? In other words, How new was the so-called "new imperialism" of the interwar years? The following article argues that the Axis' imperialism was primarily characterized by mass mobilization, which did indeed make it a novel phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. As well as its newness, a second issue is the degree of uniqueness: How unique were the imperial ambitions of the three dictatorships discussed here? Should other twentieth-century cases also be taken into account? The most obvious candidates would be the Soviet Union and Maoist China. Both of these regimes might certainly be labelled mass dictatorships, but imperial imaginations and colonial ambitions never explicitly formed part of their programmes; on the contrary, at a discursive level they were committed to anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle. Thus in the post-1945 period the aspect of mass mobilization is largely lacking in relation to the phenomena which, from a formal point of view, might certainly be characterized as communist imperialism. The other obvious candidate would be the USA, at the opposite end of the political spectrum—not so much in the sense of being a mass dictatorship but as the most powerful and most enduring empire of the twentieth century. But this "empire for the American Century" was "based on markets rather than colonies, commerce rather than conquest" (Van Vleck 2013, p. 6) and thus fundamentally differed from Japanese, German and Italian ambitions. From a comparative point of view, the "proletarian imperialism" praised above as "one of the most original historical phenomena of the twentieth century" does indeed appear to have been a distinctive and genuine contribution made by the Axis empires. For the attempt to elevate class struggle to an international level and thus overcome class differences and tensions at home proved central for mass mobilization in all three dictatorships.

For a long time, the effects and repercussions of the three regimes' imperialism were granted scant consideration, but this has changed over the last few years. There is now widespread agreement that it is essential to consider colonial ambitions and imperial projects in order to understand the three regimes' internal dynamics (e. g. Young 1998; Ben-Ghiat and Fuller 2005; Mazower 2009; Baranowski 2011). However, there is still a lack of transnational historical approaches which critically examine the interactions between the Axis empires and their kinship. An "entangled history" approach combined with a focus on mass dictatorships reveals two sets of correlations: while imperialism outwardly triggered the alliance, inwardly it served to gradually radicalize the regime and mobilize the population. These two processes are inseparable, and in fact they only become visible in terms of their entwinement. Through such a prism, the conventional question of imperial relationships between the centre and the periphery is thus supplemented with a multilateral approach which considers global linkages and interactions. I shall initially discuss the Axis' imperial projects; for discussions of colonial imaginations and dreams illustrate how the imperialism of the nineteenth century was transformed and renewed in the three mass dictatorships. A second part compares how these projects were concretely realized. The text ends with an examination of the long shadow cast by the *imperial Axis* upon the processes of decolonization and the building of postcolonial, developmental mass dictatorships in the second half of the twentieth century.

EMPIRES OF THE IMAGINATION: THE BIRTH OF POSTCOLONIAL IMPERIALISM IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

The desire to reinvent imperialism has its origins in the First World War: on the one hand, the idea of a new and more benevolent form of colonial rule gained in significance in view of the Wilsonian concept of national self-determination and the nascent anti-colonial movements. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the Paris peace treaties often resulted from colonial issues and imperial conflict; Italy and Japan in particular subsequently demanded a new world order. Their shared conviction that the global system required fundamental revisions arose not least from the lessons which they drew from the war. In Japan especially, leading military figures began to account for Germany's defeat on the basis of its lack of a large empire. The resources which such an empire might command—both raw materials and people—appeared essential in an imminent world war. This prompted dreams of contiguous territorial and autarchic empires that were distinguished from British-type imperialism, which was seen as antiquated or old-fashioned, by criticizing its focus on military bases and overseas colonies. Ironically, the point overlooked here was that all three of the empires which had vanished with the First World War had been multi-ethnic and contiguous territorial empires. In this light, the imperial imaginations of the 1920s and the early 1930s were by no means as novel as they maintained. Yet this was scarcely harmful to the imperial dynamics which ensued. In Japan,

Italy and Germany, imperial ambitions would prove to be important factors in the revolutionary upheaval on the domestic front and likewise in terms of radicalization of foreign policy and consolidation of these countries' dictatorships. It was the combination of a dream of imperial power and the fear of getting a raw deal in the empires' global contest which smoothed the path to dictatorship in all three cases.

Combined with ideas of a more benevolent imperialism that would allow for national self-determination, new kinds of imperial projects emerged which were as ambivalent as they were contradictory. This makes them hard to characterize: for instance, scholarship on Manchukuo has referred to an "imperialism of free nations" (Duara 2007) or an "imperialism after imperialism." Both are fitting in that a common characteristic of all three was their rejection of the traditional colonialism of the so-called "Age of Empire" (1875–1914) which they saw as obsolete. Fascist Italy thus delighted in underlining the non-colonial character of its quasi-timeless *impero* by distinguishing it explicitly from Anglo-Saxon *imperialismo*, whereas German contemporaries repeatedly emphasized that the colonial era was over but that empire-building would soon provide for a new global dispensation. And Japan promoted a benevolent, pan-Asian imperialism which would create free nations in place of suppressed colonized peoples. In this light, I would suggest that the always ambivalent character of these new concepts is best grasped by means of the term "postcolonial imperialism." For this term not only captures the highly contradictory nature of the imperial projects and dreams of the Axis, it also emphasizes that the key element in all three mass dictatorships was not to acquire conventional colonies but to establish an empire. However contradictory and absurd the attempt to carry over imperialism into a postcolonial world may appear ex post, many contemporaries certainly took this seriously.

However, despite all of the common points it is worth looking at the peculiar characteristics of each country: in Italy, the rise of Fascism was itself directly linked to the imperial question. By the time of his seizure of power in 1922, Mussolini had already formulated his key ideas of the Mediterranean as Italy's *mare nostrum* and *spazio vitale*.[1] One should not be taken in by the regime's (relative) restraint in terms of its foreign policy during its first decade: on the one hand, the Corfu incident or the colonial war in Libya demonstrated Fascism's ambitions early on. On the other hand, imperial discourses played an important role in the consolidation of power, as manifested in talk of the Third Rome that would follow on from the Rome of antiquity and the Rome of the popes. Imperial ambitions initially focused on the Mediterranean region and Africa. However, this soon proved too little. As a result of efforts to "universalize Fascism" in the first half of the 1930s attention increasingly turned to the Arab world and to Asia (Hedinger 2013). The scope of imperial ambitions thus grew continuously and Mussolini frequently spoke of the Mediterranean as a prison which Italy must break free from.

In view of the Kingdom of Italy's ambitions since the nineteenth century, Mussolini's ideas were not as original as he maintained. But the protagonists did not tire of emphasizing the novelty of fascist imperialism and using this as a tool for internal mobilization. The population agreed with them on this point: how else to account for the fact that consent to Mussolini's regime peaked with the conquest of Ethiopia and the proclamation of the empire in early 1936? Imperialism became a means to keep the fascist revolution alive—at least rhetorically—and to include the masses. And for many who otherwise kept a critical distance, imperial dreams plainly offered an important source of refuge. In other words, if Fascism involved such a thing as consensus, this was most fully realized in terms of imperial adventures. Successes in these areas contributed to the regime's consolidation and likewise to its radicalization. Thus in 1938 a committee of university professors cited the establishment of the empire in East Africa as a reason to submit a programmatic declaration on Fascism's radical new race policy (Dresler 1940, p. 81).

As in Italy, "race questions" were also central to imperial discourses in Japan, albeit in entirely different circumstances. In the period after 1931, Pan-Asianism—whose roots reached back to the late nineteenth century—became entwined with concrete political programmes. In this context, race discourses had a strongly anti-Western component; several members of Japan's military—including Ishiwara Kanji, one of the architects of Manchukuo—anticipated a coming world war between East and West in which Japan would need to rely upon its Asian empire. However, for all of the emphasis placed on Asian kinship, race concepts simultaneously served to create an empire of different "nations" or "races." Besides, Japan had something in common with Italy: its imperial ambitions in the 1930s enjoyed the support of broad sections of the population, yielding hitherto unknown support for imperial adventures.

Much the same may be said of national socialist Germany. Here too, imperial dreams proved important for popular mobilization. With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the lack of enthusiasm in many sections of the German population could hardly be overlooked. Therefore the broad consensus in support of the regime's efforts to "bring Germans home to the Reich," to create *Lebensraum* in the East and/or to reclaim the lost colonies, was all the more important for the national socialists. Statements made by German prisoners of war indicate that colonialism or imperialism was an important part of national socialist mobilization efforts: many prisoners of the British stated that they had fought for "*Lebensraum* in the East" or for "colonies" more generally. In this sense, imperialism was much more than a mere tool of Nazi foreign policy, as has been long claimed.

In Germany, too, the Nazis' imperialism followed on from older traditions which reached back to the pre-First World War years: dreams of overseas colonies, irredentism and the Germanization of the East were nothing new in the 1930s. Nationalist and conservative forces committed themselves to the regime by virtue of such traditional demands. This was important during the first few years of the regime's consolidation of power in particular. But despite

all of the linkages the true thrust of national socialist expansion was shockingly new: for a European continental empire was always the key objective. All in all, this reflects a highly consistent programme of imperial expansion which Hitler had already formulated in his pamphlets of the 1920s. In his so-called "second book," he demanded eastward expansion and expressed admiration for Japanese actions against Russia. The focus on the East was so strong that Hitler had no reservations about vehemently demanding an alliance with Italy in the same work—a highly unusual position in view of German nationalists' irredentist claims in relation to South Tyrol. So, all in all, the imperial ambitions of the Nazis were inspired less by the imperialism of the Kaiser's Reich than by global developments in the immediate post-war period and were thus enticingly new.

Each nation's imperial project may have had its own specific historical background, but in the interwar years "proletarian imperialism" became a significant phenomenon for all three regimes. It was seen as an opportunity to achieve social transformation and conciliation without overcoming class society or capitalism. These ideas were associated with the notion of belonging to the "latecomer" and "have-not" nations. This was a highly materialistic concept which elevated the class struggle to the international level by distinguishing between bourgeois and proletarian nations in a curious appropriation of Marxist vocabulary. This transfer of Marxist ideas to national and imperial contexts unfolded in Japan and Italy at the same time, but in all likelihood separately. Prince Konoe Fumimaro—who would later become the Japanese prime minister on the eve of the Second World War—caused uproar as a delegate to the Paris peace negotiations when he labelled both Japan and Germany "have-not" nations in an article entitled "A Call to Reject the Anglo-American Centered Peace." In Italy, on the other hand, in distinction from the Western powers intellectuals had already characterized the country as "proletarian" immediately prior to the First World War. In the cases of both Japan and Italy, talk of a proletarian nation was allied to demands for new colonies; likewise in post-First World War Germany, where such discourses gained in popularity in nationalist and conservative circles too. In 1937, in an article entitled "Germany's Colonial Demands" published in the British journal *Foreign Affairs* the Reich's economics minister and president of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht lamented the fact that, following the occupation of Manchuria and Ethiopia, Germany was the only have-not nation left (Schacht 1937). On the whole, the mutual acknowledgment of membership of the group of poor nations became an important argument for the alliance: at the fateful meeting which Hitler held on 5 November 1937—where Hitler informed the leaders of the *Wehrmacht* and the foreign ministry of his detailed war plans—he spoke at length on the legitimate imperial ambitions of Japan and Italy, while expressing admiration for Italy's successes in Ethiopia.

At a discursive level, "proletarian imperialism" was always tied to gigantic resettlement plans. This was to resolve the economic difficulties which the home countries faced. Japan planned to send millions of settlers to the Asian mainland. Mussolini intended to send up to 6.5 million Italians to Africa by

1950. And Germany's plans for Eastern Europe were scarcely more modest. So as to distinguish this settler-based colonialism from its British antecedents, they emphasized the novelty and uniqueness of their own projects, such as Italy's "cooperative settlement system." We shall examine in detail below the extent to which these projects were actually realized. But the key point here is that the supposed resolution of the social question through the settlement of millions of so-called peasant soldiers was central to mobilization efforts in all three countries.

In this light, imperial projects were not merely a tool of foreign affairs but also played an important role in domestic policy. Settler colonialism, territorial empires, imperial autarchy and so forth may not, in themselves, have been anything new in the 1930s. In all three countries, their origins reach far back into the nineteenth century. Yet these previously elitist concepts were only extensively popularized through the mass dictatorships of the interwar period. Moreover, the individual strands had long remained isolated, generally along national borders. This too changed decisively through the mass dictatorships' instrumentalization of imperialism. From a global perspective it is not possible to identify or reconstruct a clear and single direction of influence. Still less can the genesis of the imperial Axis be attributed to German initiatives and ideas. There are many examples which point to precisely the opposite direction: Italy, for example, had for some time pursued the idea of Eurafrican cooperation under Italian leadership; this was attentively followed in Germany, frequently with much admiration and especially after the war in Europe had started. Thus one German expert could state in 1940 that "the establishment of the Italian empire in Africa is a turning point of outstanding significance not only for Italian colonial history but also for colonial history in general" (Dresler 1940, p. 78).

Brutal Implementations: The Formation of the Imperial Axis

In relation to the imperial dreams of the 1930s, it may not be possible to identify simple, unilateral or linear histories of influence and development. Even less can the genesis of a "new imperialism" be simply accounted for through national, inward-looking perspectives. Yet the decade following the occupation of Manchuria certainly provided a series of imperial moments that resulted from concrete attempts at implementation, triggered by national epicentres: the Manchuria crisis, the Ethiopian war and, finally, the creation of a Nazi empire on European soil were three such moments. If one focuses on these imperial moments, chronologies and patterns of interaction become visible. Above all, these three moments reveal political dynamics at a global level—dynamics which resulted from the entanglement of mass dictatorship, war mobilization and empire-building.

The Japanese Empire provided the first such impetus, as the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932 represented the birth of the new imperialism. Through its South Manchurian Railway Japan had enjoyed informal control of large

stretches of Manchuria for some time. And it had held colonial possessions in Korea and Taiwan since around 1900. But the establishment of Manchukuo represented something hitherto unprecedented. On the ground, military conquest, industrialization programmes and mass migration were combined in new ways, while at home the empire served to mobilize society on a military, political and economic level. To account for this all-encompassing dual function, Louise Young has aptly referred to the Manchurian experiment as a "total empire" (Young 1998).

Manchuria also represented entirely new dimensions from a territorial point of view; since it was the size of central Europe, the annexation had virtually doubled the size of the Japanese Empire at a stroke. Japan was now one of the leading colonial powers. Contemporaries recognized the significance of Manchukuo and placed it on the same level as the momentous events in Europe: "It becomes increasingly clear in retrospect that the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 was much more than an episode of annexation. … It was a turning point in Japanese history comparable with Mussolini's march on Rome or Hitler's accession to power," the journalist William Henry Chamberlin wrote (Chamberlin 1939, p. 359).

Settler colonialism was one of the defining elements of this Manchurian experiment. Here too, Japan had already gained experience, primarily in Korea. But this phenomenon would now acquire entirely new dimensions: in 1936 the government formulated the goal of settling five million Japanese peasant soldiers in Manchuria over the next twenty years. Measured against these target figures, Japanese settler colonialism can only be considered to have failed. By the end of the Second World War, only a few hundred thousand Japanese peasants had settled in the new territories. This was due to the fact that most of the Japanese who were prepared to emigrate moved to Manchuria's urban centres. If the authorities' complaints are to be believed, there was also the problem that these peasants soldiers frequently lacked the necessary skills and qualifications. In any case, this was never enough to absorb the growing population of the Japanese motherland, which was expanding at a rate of around one million per year. Thus in overall terms settler colonialism in Japan met with a fate which was similar to the situation in Italy and Germany: in all three cases, the high hopes that many people would relocate from towns and cities to new rural settlement areas proved misguided. And as in the German case, those who followed Tokyo's call ultimately paid a very high price in 1945.

However, despite all of the difficulties the concept of a new type of settler colonialism served central functions in all three countries, particularly when it came to mobilizing the population. It differed crucially from the older (chiefly British) version: it was more strongly state-centred, covered geographically contiguous areas and was combined with geopolitical and military strategies. In this sense, these settler projects mainly served broader imperial and not primarily settler ends (Elkins and Pedersen 2005, p. 13). In other words, the interests of the metropolis tended to predominate over those of the colonial periphery. Notions of Manchuria as Japan's lifeline and of the resolution of

the *Lebensraum* question through settler colonialism evidently offered great potential for identification with the military's plans for expansion—even though (or perhaps precisely because) relatively few people were actually prepared to move to the brave new empire on the Asian mainland.

Mobilization was by no means exclusively a product of government will or control. Instead, a uniquely Japanese mobilization culture developed in which private media, mass consumption and new forms of celebrating war and imperialism played a central role (Young 1998). It turned out that the effects of Manchukuo as a "total empire" were not confined to East Asia: Germany and Italy followed with great interest Japan's colonial experiment, including its training of peasant soldiers in large-scale camps in both Japan and Manchuria. The future allies were particularly impressed by Japan's industrialization programmes and by its policy of economic self-sufficiency. Moreover, Italian and German experts—who travelled to Asia increasingly frequently for study purposes—were concerned with the question of the relationship between internal radicalization in Japan, on the one hand, and expansionism and imperialism on the other. Besides, the ruthlessness and brutality with which the Japanese enforced colonial rule were not mentioned, still less criticized.

However, a second imperial impetus was necessary in order for this mutual interest to develop into something more. Fascist Italy provided this impetus, through its conquest of Ethiopia and its proclamation of a new Roman Empire. Germany attentively followed the events in southern Europe, mainly focusing on the war of colonial conquest. The prestigious *Beck Verlag* for example translated in 1937 a book which the Italian commander in chief, Pietro Badoglio, had written on the war. The military leadership especially welcomed Badoglio's message that it was a war "from which great lessons may be drawn for the future art of war, even in cases which do not involve a colonial war" (Badoglio 1937, p. 182). The Italians' brutal military conduct was seen as a model: "Military experience and lessons from the first modern war of destruction prosecuted on colonial soil" was the subtitle which the military expert Rudolf von Xylander gave to his book on the war (Xylander 1937). Thus, in relation to colonial warfare the *Wehrmacht* was not—as is frequently claimed—inspired solely by distant experiences gained during the imperial era of the Kaiser's Reich; it was instead largely influenced by the Italians' war of destruction in Ethiopia.

And how did Japan react to the war in Africa? Initially, large sections of the population sympathized with the Ethiopians, and pan-Asian intellectuals in particular were fiercely critical of the Italians' conduct. But the wave of criticism was short-lived. It had already died down by late 1935. Shortly afterwards, when Japan began to enjoy an ever-closer relationship with Italy, fascist empire-building in Africa became a recurrent aspect of Japanese pro-fascist propaganda (Fig. 4.1).

What had previously been denounced as Western colonialism was now seen as a successful example of "anti-Western" (mainly anti-British) imperialism, for which Japan also claimed to be fighting in China. For instance, in early 1936 the *Gaikō jihō*, the leading journal for foreign policy issues, predicted that Italy's

Fig. 4.1 Japanese journal "Fassho" showing Mussolini in Libya, August 1939

war in Africa would make it possible for colonies around the world to be shared out more fairly (Izumi 1936). For all three powers, the conquest of Ethiopia thus revealed global horizons and the potential for new forms of imperialism. The war in Ethiopia served above all as a catalyst for the diplomatic and political convergence of these three mass dictatorships: from this perspective, in the mid-1930s the three powers converged around Italy's empire-building.

The first phase of this convergence ended with the Anti-Comintern Pacts of 1936–1937 and with each ally's reorganization of its empire. In all three mass dictatorships, the shared anti-communist rhetoric was combined with each country's particular imperial projects. "Proletarian imperialism" now proved to be an important instrument outwardly for the development of their relationship, as it was inwardly as a tool of mobilization. The imperial Axis thus created was celebrated through a series of reciprocal visits. For instance, when the *partito nazionale fascista*[2] travelled to Japan in 1938 on its first official foreign

mission, its schedule naturally included a tour of Japan's imperial possessions. A short while later, Manchuria was an important destination for an Italian economic mission to Japan. Likewise, German delegations—party and business figures as well as the Hitler Youth—visited not only mainland Japan but also the imperial periphery. Following the outbreak of war in China in mid-1937, the Japanese welcomed such visits enthusiastically. The messages were mainly intended for domestic mass consumption: in 1938, Japanese newspapers and magazines provided daily reports on the travels of the *partito nazionale fascista* across China, Korea and Manchuria. When the mission arrived on Japanese soil, its tour of the "Exhibition on Holy War and the Chinese Incident" was staged as a media event.

The third and final imperial impetus was provided by Germany, which towards the end of the decade realized its own imperial ambitions. The Germans studied and duly acknowledged the head start that Italy and Japan had gained in this field. In August 1940 the editors of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* for example published an article written by an Italian on the "Fascist system of settlement in Africa," commenting that this concerned issues "which will become pressing ones, with the impending colonial activities of the Reich" (D'Agostino 1940, p. 362).

German empire-building may have started late, but was implemented at breathtaking speed: one year after the *Anschluss* of Austria, the Reich already included much of Czechoslovakia. A year later, in the summer of 1940, Poland and large swathes of Western and Northern Europe had been added. The next year parts of Southeastern Europe and Eastern Europe followed. Less than four years since the Munich agreement of 1938, around half of Europe's peoples lived in Hitler's empire.

This empire was in many ways a product of war: the so-called "General Plan for the East" brought colonial warfare to European soil. The Germans were latecomers to the new imperialism, but the genesis of the Nazi empire represented a radical rupture with everything that had gone before. In broad swathes of the new empire, the domestic population was neither to be "civilized" nor Germanized: in order to create *Lebensraum* for Germans, it was to be deported or exterminated. The radical nature of this policy first became apparent in Czechoslovakia and subsequently in the General Government in Poland. Accordingly, the brutality of German rule was not simply the result of a war versus the USSR which had got out of hand; it was instead the result of carefully planned imperial projects. But, as we have seen, these projects were inspired less by German colonialism under the Kaiser than by Italian and Japanese expansion in the 1930s.

Colonial war on European soil entailed a dramatic escalation in the level of violence: before the outbreak of war the victims of national socialism could be counted in the thousands, thereafter in the millions. The scope of this policy of destruction not only marks a significant contrast to the colonialism of the Kaiser's Reich, it also constitutes an important difference by comparison with what the Japanese planned and did in Manchukuo and the Italians in

Ethiopia—despite all of the violence, exploitation and racial discrimination that characterized these empires. Both the Japanese and the Italians understood that such excessive violence was an obstacle to successful empire-building and endangered their joint war effort. They criticized it accordingly. Towards the end of the war, some of those on the German side acknowledged this. In April 1944, without being familiar with its true nature, the propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels characterized Japan's policy in the occupied territories as exemplary and exceptionally clever; he emphasized that Germany should have adopted this policy as a model much earlier.[3]

However, despite all such differences the imperial Axis did not disintegrate in the period after 1940. On the contrary, imperial dreams once again proved to be a key motive for the alliance. Japan's decision to intervene in the war on the side of Germany and Italy cannot be understood outside of these contexts; the East Asian co-prosperity sphere was formulated in the summer of 1940 under the spell of Germany's successes in Europe. Japan's new policy was broadly influenced by the Nazis' plans for a new European order—just as, some years earlier, Japan's plans for an East Asian Empire had influenced its European partners. In the end, it was the prospect of acquiring the colonial empires of the defeated European countries France and the Netherlands which motivated Japan to conclude the Three Powers Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940. This entailed the three allies' reapportionment of the world into large imperial blocs. Thus, on a global perspective the imperial dimensions of the Second World War—which are often overlooked in Europe but are so evident in East Asia—become much more obvious; for many Asians, this world war was above all a colonial war between empires. And while it may be forgotten today, for a short moment in 1942 the imperial Axis seemed to be on the point of realizing its dream of a new world order.

LOOSE ENDS: THE LEGACIES OF THE IMPERIAL AXIS IN A POSTCOLONIAL WORLD

The moment of the imperial Axis was short-lived and the end came surprisingly soon. In retrospect many have argued that, in the longer term, the three have-not nations would in any case never have been able to win against the economic superiority of the Allies, once the USA had entered the war and the Germans had failed to defeat the USSR. However, around 1942 the Axis empires were economic superpowers. For example, at the height of its expansion, Germany's European empire was able to produce twice as much steel as the United Kingdom and the USSR combined (Overy 1995, pp. 3–4). And at least until mid-1942, the advantages lay with the aggressors. Why did the imperial Axis not succeed in exploiting its (economic) advantages when it had them? One main reason was that the three mass dictatorships were unable to mobilize their empires and fully exploit their potential. In Europe, the ongoing war rendered sustained empire-building impossible. The national socialists never benefited from periods of planning characterized by relative peace,

such as the Japanese had enjoyed in Manchukuo and the Italians (albeit for a shorter period) in Ethiopia. In addition, in view of the chaos and the brutality of German imperialism, Hitler's empire was unable to offer non-Germans any longer-term potential for identification or participation. The pattern was similar in Asia. For most Asians, Japan's rule simply meant pillage, destruction and exploitation. In combination with its rapidly deteriorating military position, Japan thus never succeeded in making full economic use of its empire. And Italy? In the face of British assaults Rome was unable to hold on to Italian East Africa. It was the first of the Axis empires' possessions to fall, as early as 1941. And less than two years later Italy suffered the loss of its colonial possessions in north Africa too.

By the end of the Second World War, it appeared that not much was left of the short-lived imperial Axis. Through their attempt to pursue imperialism on European soil, the national socialists had permanently discredited imperial projects for most Europeans. Together with anti-colonial movements which had been strengthened by the events in Asia, the defeat of the Axis thus marked the beginnings of decolonization and the final end of the imperial age. All of those who had already predicted in the 1930s that the war in East Asia would mean the end of Western colonialism throughout the Asian continent were proved right. The irony was that, having dreamed of the apotheosis of the nation state, Japan, Germany and Italy had for a short period created new kinds of empires. Shortly afterwards, however, through their own defeat they had helped to bring to an end all types of formal imperialism.

But was really nothing left of the imperial Axis? From the perspective of the imperial projects pursued by the mass dictatorships, the assertion that the new imperialism had vanished as though it had never existed appears exaggerated. The end of the imperial Axis by no means implied the end of mass dictatorships, any more than it entailed the end of imperial rule. It is just that mass dictatorships and imperialism now decoupled from one another. Yet this very process is a legacy of the imperial Axis which remained evident at a global level in the second half of the twentieth century. The legacy was twofold. What remained was, first of all, the inheritance of Axis' imperialism in relation to the mass dictatorships. Following the Axis' experience, large-scale colonial projects were a "no go" for virtually all of the mass dictatorships in the second half of the twentieth century. But an indirect legacy was apparent in a wide variety of cases, not in imperial discourses but in the adoption and the endurance of colonial structures. The continuities are particularly obvious in Asia's developmental dictatorships, for example in South Korea or Taiwan. As Jie-Hyun Lim (2010, p. 6) has noted in this regard, the "interaction of colonisers and the colonised is a key to understanding mass dictatorship in the post-colonial era." Japanese imperialism thus served as a role model more strongly than German imperialism did, as Manchukuo was a prototype of a developmental client state. And this was precisely the sort of state which would arise in a wide variety of contexts, at a global level, following the end of the Second World War.

However, these developmental mass dictatorships were also constitutive of new imperial formations. The second legacy is apparent in this respect: the primary heirs of the imperial Axis were the USA and the USSR, which in the post-1945 period (once again) developed a new type of imperialism. This was in some ways an ironic legacy since these powers appealed, in their respective discourses, to the anti-imperial struggle. Indeed, settler colonialism or territorial, contiguous empires found very few explicit supporters on either side of the Iron Curtain in the post-1945 period. The paradox was thus that this new type of imperialism was again nurtured by strong anti-colonial rhetoric. This was a legacy of the struggle versus the Axis. Two globally active anti-colonial superpowers thus arose which were simultaneously also empires. But these empires were fundamentally different from those of the defeated mass dictatorships. Both superpowers thus created new forms of imperialism which shaped the second half of the century by distinguishing themselves from the imperial Axis. In short, one of them lacked imperialist discourses with mass appeal, while the other was not a dictatorship. The three imperial mass dictatorships thus left a twofold legacy, albeit an ironic one: on the one hand, in the new postcolonial mass dictatorships themselves, as they often took a "developmentalist" turn after their liberation; on the other, the two superpowers which sought to impose on these mass dictatorships imperial relationships of dependence and which derived their legitimacy in distinguishing themselves from the imperial Axis.

Notes

1. "Our sea" and "living space."
2. National Fascist Party.
3. See the diary entry of 1 April 1944.

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Nation-Building and Development as Ideology and Practice

Michael Kim

Mass dictatorships are transnational formations of modernity that are inextricably linked to broader historical interactions on the global scale. All nations converge on the common project to create modern nation-states, yet the differing starting points gave urgency to the notion of "catching up with the rest." The connection between nation-building and development manifested first in nineteenth-century Europe, where a perceived sense of crisis emerged from a fatal fear of falling economically behind. Great Britain established dominance in world trade through its linkages with the Atlantic nexus of slaves, sugar plantations and industrialization. Combined with the Asian trade in commodities such as tea and opium, a formidable economic powerhouse emerged that became the envy of the world. Contrary to theories that emphasize "Protestant ethics," industrialization did not emerge because of an inherent industriousness of the British workforce. Great Britain was the first to integrate successfully with the global market by rapidly connecting its economy to the key "peripheral regions" beyond Europe. Other European powers soon followed this expansionist path to construct empires that spanned the globe.

Approximately 100 years after Great Britain's industrialization, the rapid spread of capital and technology in the nineteenth century then triggered the Second Industrial Revolution largely in Germany and the United States. The critical link between development and integration with the world economy would lead Germans at the turn of the twentieth century to substitute *Weltpolitik* for *Realpolitik* to express their expansionist imaginary and became latecomers to empire (Conrad 2010). Outside of Europe, Japan became an empire in its own right, but development spread with mixed results on the

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whole. The globe became divided into "developed" and "underdeveloped" nations, and international relations frequently collided on issues of economic aid and dependency. Nation-building was supposed to achieve parity in development, yet not every nation could successfully navigate the complex world economy. The continued sense of economic crisis and "underdevelopment" triggered persistent calls for greater levels of state intervention around the world to "catch up with the rest."

The notion that a strong state was necessary to solve the riddle of development has a long history. Europe's relative "backwardness" to Great Britain in the nineteenth century led Alexander Gerschenkron to highlight the importance of ideology in his seminal essay, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," as he compares the differences in the industrialization processes of Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia. Gerschenkron (1962) references Karl Marx's famous observation in *Das Kapital* that "The industrially more developed country presents to the less developed country a picture of the latter's future," and notes in the same essay that the "spirit" or "ideology" differed considerably among "advanced" nations and "backward" nations with regards to industrialization. Gerschenkron's essay provides an ambiguous explanation for this shared ideology, but it is clear that he posits an intellectual basis for a strong state role in late industrialization. This statist ideology of development had nineteenth-century origins but was transformed through the experience of colonialism to emerge as a powerful justification for certain nation-building practices after the Second World War. The theory of mass dictatorship applied to this incomplete thread in Gerschenkron's analysis may allow us to explicate the intellectual framework of mass dictatorships in "underdeveloped" nations and contextualize their twentieth-century ubiquity.

European Origins

The specific example that Gerschenkron offers for the differences between the "advanced" and "backward" nations is the phenomenon of Saint-Simonian socialists rather than Bonapartists reaching positions of economic and financial influence under Napoleon. The "socialist garment draped around an essentially capitalist idea" is the primary characteristic that Gerschenkron highlights as the basic conditions of backwardness. Gerschenkron's insight extends the genealogy of the developmental state to Napoleon's initial experimentations with state socialism. It is instructive to consider that Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint Simon (1760–1825) believed history had progressed to a "positive" state where the "science of man" would open a new era of prosperity. His associate and disciple Auguste Comte would later popularize the concept of "positivism" to claim that humanity progressed towards an ever-higher "positive" future. Saint-Simonian ideas expressed the need to develop a powerful nation and propagated the perspective that the nation-state could become the instrument of progressive achievements towards an ever-better future.

This Saint-Simonian vision influenced British Fabian scientistic modernism to promote the view that enlightened engineers and scientists would propel the nation towards higher stages of development (Linehan 2012, p. 122). The scientific utopianism that is behind both the Saint-Simonian and Fabian impulse to push societies forward privileges a secular "priesthood" of meritocratic and technocratic elites. Similar perspectives may be found in works of Friedrich List who translated the Saint-Simonian messages for a German audience and his "infant industry" arguments provided an intellectual rationale for the protectionist industrialization of Germany behind a *junker* elite. Russian Marxists argued for a similar function when they legitimized state-planned industrialization under the party vanguard as an inevitable path towards national development. Many different paths emerged out of the European developmental experience, yet they shared some key assumptions about the primacy of state authority, especially in the economic realm. Therefore, even though the developmental state is often associated with the non-Western world, the basic tenets of a protectionist planned economic development were already established during its European incubation period. Rather than viewing the problems of statist development as particular features of the non-Western world, we need to consider how powerful calls for state intervention were present from the earliest periods of the history of development.

The conclusion that capitalism needed to be modified with a form of socialism can be found in numerous European thinkers writing about the economic history of Europe. Joseph Schumpeter pioneered work on business cycles where the overproduction and underconsumption of commodities triggered periodic economic booms and busts. He coined his famous phrase "creative destruction" to explain the dynamics behind the successive waves of growth and recession that were at the heart of capitalist development. Schumpeter's observations about the importance of technological innovation form but a single chapter in his work, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, and the rest of the book is devoted to the failures of capitalism and the problems of democracy (Schumpeter 2006). Schumpeter observes how intellectuals inevitably move towards anti-capitalist positions and advocate a form of socialism to impose a "dictatorship not *of* the proletariat but *over* the proletariat." He praises the factory discipline that the Soviets achieved in Russia and attributes the necessity to the "unripeness of the situation" that may not be necessary in other stages of development.

Such extreme views on the need to restrain workers and modify capitalism with state intervention were once in vogue among European thinkers who attempted to explain the periodic crisis of the capitalist order. The inevitable cycles of rapid growth followed by steep economic declines throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would pose immense challenges throughout the world. Liberal orders could thrive under prolonged economic prosperity, but periodic global downturns triggered a clamor for more radical solutions to the problem of national development. As Jie Hyun Lim (2013, pp. 23–24) observes, socialism on the whole shifted from class emancipation to national liberation and therefore became a strategy for development and catching up

with the economies of advanced nations through an anti-Western modernization. In fact a curious convergence between socialism and Fascism can be uncovered in the history of the twentieth century as both ideological extremes pressed for solutions to the problem of national development.

Colonial Trajectories

While European intellectuals grasped at the reasons behind the inability of capitalism to achieve consistent growth within the constant cycles of economic booms and busts, thinkers in the rest of the world struggled with the question of how to counter the aggressive economic expansion emanating from the West. The drive for capital accumulation beyond the borders of Europe created colonies and semi-colonial relationships that introduced the concept of the center and periphery to the vocabulary of capitalist development. Lenin's theory of imperialism emerged as European nations concentrated capital into large monopolistic corporations led by large financial oligarchies. Lenin theorized that insufficient domestic demand for capitalist goods created a financial crisis that could only be resolved through external expansion into new regions for investment, raw material acquisition and consumer markets, which pushed European nations to colonize the periphery. Rosa Luxemburg would add in *The Accumulation of Capital* that capitalism is driven by the global dynamics of accumulation and argue that imperialism is at the heart of capitalist development. More importantly, Luxemburg emphasizes the co-existence in the world of different cultures of different types of society and modes of production. Leon Trotsky would provide a further insight in his *Law of Combined and Uneven Development* that countries developed unevenly and even within the backward nations themselves. This uneven state of the world would create a unique situation that was ripe for world socialist revolution.

The Marxist predictions of a socialist revolution triggered by uneven development were not realized in every part of the world, and radical solutions did not initially attract significant support among non-Western intellectuals. Instead, a combination of moderate socialism and liberal values often characterized the thoughts of emerging nationalist movements. Sun Yat-sen remains a somewhat unique figure among Chinese nationalist activists in that he is considered a hero in both Communist China as well as the Nationalist Chinese who escaped to Taiwan. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People had strong Fabian influences and his close Vietnamese associate Phan Boi Chau would also launch a moderate socialist group, the Vietnam Restoration Association in French Indochina. India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew were all a part of an illustrious group of anti-colonial leaders throughout Asia who embraced various forms of socialist-inspired development during different parts of their careers as an antidote to the problem of Western imperialism.

The integration of the globe into various empires by the early twentieth century would not allow for anti-colonial intellectuals to lead the economic development of their nations. Instead, the relentless imperialist expansion

meant that development arrived in most regions of the world via contact with the West. Only Japan successfully avoided colonial or semi-colonial relationships through the rapid construction of its own empire. Throughout much of the world, it would be colonial administrations charged with the task of economically developing the territories under their control. The colonial powers did not begin with the explicit goal of developing the peripheral regions of their empires. Yet as Peter Duus (1996) notes, the advent of Wilsonian internationalism and the era of trusteeships necessitated a different approach to colonialism. Outright control of a region without some kind of legalistic justification became difficult after the articulation of the principles of "self-determinism." Great Britain's early experiments with the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 epitomized the discovery that colonial subjects could also be the subjects of governmentality. Colonial authorities attempted to substitute the crude violence that had been deployed to instill fear among the local population with a liberal discourse of development and internationalism that searched for novel ways of administering their colonies.

Labor eventually became a key colonial resource for extraction and colonial officials from French West Africa to the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea investigated ways of utilizing the surplus colonial workforce for industrial production. The colonial state's laissez-faire trade policies with the home country destroyed traditional handicraft industries and the reorganization of agricultural production into plantation-like systems formed immense reserves of unemployed labor. The developmental implications behind this growing colonial labor pool led a Fabian, Arthur Lewis, to produce one of the classics of developmental economics, *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour* (Lewis 1954). Lewis's dual-sector model proposed that the unlimited source of cheap labor in the developing world had important implications for the possibility of capital accumulation. Lewis predicted that the surplus of labor available from the subsistence sector would allow for capitalist accumulation within the capitalist sector to eventually spread development to the entire region. However, the challenge of extracting surplus labor from colonial populations necessitated harsh state measures of coercion and control to maintain a docile workforce. The flow of migration from the subsistence sector to the capitalist sector within the colonial empires would also have the unanticipated effect of triggering wage convergence and rising demands for strict migration restrictions from the metropoles. The condition of uneven and combined development that Trotsky described would create formidable population movements that were beyond the capacity of most imperial authorities to manage properly.

The colonies themselves became a new kind of space where experiments in governmentality produced "laboratories of modernity." The technocratic urge to quantify and map out the territories under colonial domination allowed for the introduction of advanced systems for public hygiene, engineering, natural resource management and police work that sometimes would be re-exported back to the imperial homelands. The freedom to experiment and the weakness or absence of colonial civil society would allow colonial bureaucrats from West

Africa all the way to Manchuria and Korea an opportunity to implement colonial state planning on a population that was largely incapable of organized effective resistance. In understanding the nature of colonial violence, we often need the caveat that colonial regimes did not need to utilize arbitrary force. Instead, they typically enforced the maximum exercise of violence permitted within the legal framework, often with little restraint or due process. Deprived of educational opportunities and not considered fully functionally human, colonial subjects could be molded and shaped as the colonial state deemed fit. The end result is that while colonialism achieved uneven development around the world, a kind of instrumental rationality gave immense license to technocratic administrations in the subsequent "Age of Development." The syncretic formulation of "capitalism in socialist dress" combined with colonial experiments in governmentality encouraged the perspective that nation-states were the proper vehicle for social engineering in the name of "development."

Development as Ideology

The end of the Second World War in 1945 placed development at the forefront of the international agenda, which is a direction that President Truman encapsulated in his inaugural address on 20 January 1949. Truman announced as part of his famous Four Point speech that the USA would embark on a bold new program to make the benefits of scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. In essence, Truman articulated "underdevelopment" as a Cold War construct for the first time and provided a rationale for nations to join in an alliance of the "advanced" countries to benefit the "less advanced." As Gilbert Rist further explains, in effect, Truman articulated a new way of conceiving international relations based on the logic of differentiated levels of development and development took on a transitive meaning (Rist 2009, p. 73). Even the European countries had to join the US alliance as junior partners because of the devastation of the Second World War and the emergence of the Cold War. Europe now became the target of development aid through the Marshall Plan and had to cooperate with the USA to gain economic assistance. The Soviets provided their own version of economic aid relief to allied socialist nations to achieve centrally planned industrialization and collectivized agriculture. The new understandings of development meshed well with US and Soviet global interests during the Cold War. No longer holding a mandate to spread civilization like the previous colonial order, the post-Second World War development era included the sharing of technologies and wealth under superpower auspices. The new development ideology served to discredit the previous colonial order so that the US and the Soviet Union could deploy a new kind of anti-colonial imperialism. Instead of claiming to transmit moral and ethical values, as the imperialist powers had, an international rebuilding effort was now deemed necessary to better use the world's resources under the direction of the newly emerging superpowers.

Development after the Second World War was also ultimately tied to decolonization as the USA and the Soviets for their own purposes expressed hostility to European colonialism. Instead of the colonizer and the colonized, the world became divided into the developed and the undeveloped. Truman intended the Four Point speech for an American audience, just as Woodrow Wilson intended a European audience for his Fourteen Points at the end of the First World War. Yet just as the Wilsonian moment, unintended audiences throughout the developing world saw new hope in the promise offered by an American president. Development became a technical problem of utilizing scientific knowledge producing productivity growth and expansion of international trade. Underdevelopment was understood as a lack of effort and resources rather than the result of historically contingent circumstances. Much of the globe suddenly became labeled as underdeveloped and the states that wanted development aid had to accept this definition, just as the colonized essentially accepted their dependent fate under the imperialist order. Newly independent nations that had yet to figure out how to rule themselves were suddenly thrust into international relationships conducted under clearly unequal circumstances and had to travel down developmental pathways laid down by the superpower actors. In a sense, a new kind of economic dependency emerged with the elusive promise to raise the national GDP and provide a social net for all national citizens.

Behind this increasing prominence of the development question was the "idea of development" and the emergence of modernization theory. The influence of modernization theory in US foreign policy has been extensively discussed by many scholars. Critics question the extent to which the modernization theory developed by American social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s was an integral part of America's Cold War ideology that served as the basis for American expansionism (Latham 2000). From the beginning, the openly acknowledged aim of American-led modernization theory was to counter communist influences and provide an alternative path to development to Marxist-Leninist regimes. As a late developer, the Soviets had generated considerable admiration and praise for their early successes in their centrally planned economy. Thus when the Second World War ended, the vision of collectivized agriculture and heavy industrial development according to the Soviet model attracted many intellectuals in the developing world. The Americans offered their own alternative model through modernization theory, yet despite the professed goals of encouraging free markets and democracies around the world, what often emerged in the developing world were dictatorial regimes that fit within the developmental paradigm of American policy makers.

Among the many academics who contributed to the development of modernization theory, perhaps the most representative was Walter Rostow, who achieved considerable fame for authoring the critically acclaimed *Stages of Economic Growth* (1960). Rostow subtitled his book, *A Non-Communist Manifesto*, for he consciously viewed his work as a response to the challenge of Marxist-Leninism and the appeal of Soviet-style planned economies. Yet while Rostow's ultimate goal may have been to create what he called "mass

consumption societies" that resemble the United States, he advocated a level of centralized government planning and state intervention in the economy that would have been difficult to implement in the United States at the time. The powerful force that Rostow envisioned would drive the reforms of developing countries was the advent of a nationalism capable of mobilizing a nation's population for economic development and the emergence of an elite group that was prepared to place the highest priority on the modernization of the economy.

Walter Rostow, like a number of other modernization theorists, saw considerable potential in nationalism for mobilizing a nation's population. Rostow also linked what he called the takeoff stage with the emergence of a political group that was prepared to place the highest priority on the modernization of the economy. And in many cases in the developing world, the military would be the group to assume the role of a modernizing elite. In terms of US foreign policy, some scholars have argued that such ideas would eventually lead to a tolerance of military dictatorships, so long as the regimes could be viewed as progress towards modernization. The end result was that modernization theory allowed numerous US-supported governments to prioritize economic growth at the cost of civil liberties.

In a sense, modernization theory in the early postwar period was more than an academic model, for it provided a powerful narrative for understanding world development and to identify the ways that the United States could manage and shape this process, especially through the distribution of its foreign aid. Both the Soviet Union and the United States articulated their separate vision of optimal developmental pathways, and the two Koreas would be the location where they showcased their respective approaches. North Korea became the recipient of the "fraternal assistance" of socialist states as the Soviet Bloc sent over 879 million of dollars in aid between 1953 and 1960 and engineers from the GDR assisted in the reconstruction of the Hamhung industrial zone (Armstrong 2013, pp. 52–59). South Korea also became the beneficiary of billions of dollars worth of the "Free World's" generosity as it became one of the largest aid recipients after the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953. By the 1970s, both North and South Korea had achieved remarkably high growth rates, but behind the astonishing growth was an unprecedented level of development aid from both Cold War camps. Clearly, there was a need to showcase the benefits of international cooperation with the superpowers, and the two Koreas happen to be located in the part of the world where the most intense Cold War rivalry took place.

DEVELOPMENT AS IDENTITY

The advent of Soviet-style planned economies and modernization theory provided a theoretical framework of international cooperation under the framework of Cold War aid-assistance programs, but many non-aligned nations sought alternatives to the vision extended by the superpowers. The establishment of the United Nations and the launch of various initiatives such as the

Expanded Program of Technical Assistance at the United Nations suggested that development could be the outcome of a new age of international cooperation. Gatherings such as the Bandung Conference in April 1955 held in Indonesia, where representatives gathered from twenty-nine countries in Asia and Africa, issued declarations aimed at encouraging the formation of international development agencies. The Bandung Conference was in a sense the moment in history when the third world demanded development and helped provide the rationale for the rise to a new order of international development agencies. The establishment of Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development in 1958 (SUNDFED, later UNDP), the World Bank's increasing allocation of nearly all of its funds to development projects, and the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were all a product of the increasing calls for development assistance around the world.

The cooperative atmosphere for achieving world development may have emerged through the establishment of international development agencies but the general trend towards development would lead many nations down a course that sometimes eschewed international cooperation. Advocates of dependency theory such as the Latin American *dependentistas* who emerged around the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (UNCTAD) argued that developing nations had to delink from the advanced economies. Unlike the export-oriented growth strategies that emerged in the NIC of East Asia, several Latin American and African countries championed Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) schemes that aimed to achieve autonomous national economies. While ISI schemes may have emerged in the years before the Second World War as a haphazard response to historical circumstances such as the Great Depression of the 1930s rather than as a coherent policy, the presence of an intellectual movement that advocated economic self-determinism would provide a new impetus for legitimating autarkic development.

The dependency theorists argued that the center–periphery relationship resulted in capital accumulation for developed nations and stagnation for all others. The center–periphery relationship could only perpetuate the inequalities of a world system where the extraction of labor and resources from the underdeveloped world was considered to be an inseparable part of maintaining the high standards of living in the developed world. This approach to capitalist development broke from Ricardo's classic theory of comparative advantage, which assumed that all countries could produce and export those commodities of which they held cost advantages and import those commodities of which they have cost disadvantages. Much of the developing world had comparative advantages in primary products such as agriculture and minerals, which often led to highly extractive economies that benefited the firms with resource concessions and large landowners. The ascendency of dependency theory placed a new emphasis on the idea that the periphery should not just specialize in raw materials production but instead engage in import substitution industrialization to break away from the cycle of economic dependency.

At the heart of the arguments for dependency was the logic of an economic nationalism that was overwhelmingly state-centric. Keynesian macro-economic theory gave unprecedented credence to state intervention in the economies of advanced nations. Developing nations were encouraged to achieve both social welfare concerns and economic expansion. Much like the Fabian socialist nationalists of the colonial era, postwar developmental regimes believed in the capacity of technocratic elites to solve the elusive riddle of national development. Tae Gyun Park points out that nearly every South Korean intellectual in the 1950s across the ideological spectrum advocated a form of "guided capitalism" and was heavily influenced by the example of Soviet-style planned economies (Park 2001, p. 64). New industries needed protection to avoid domination by foreign companies and state bureaucrats protected native bourgeois so that they could establish their businesses free from foreign competition. Meanwhile the newly emerging field of development economics provided the effective language to apply for aid in the form of grants and loans from global lending institutions. The stress on state planning was also useful for politicians who wanted to exclude groups that they distrusted, such as farmers associations and labor unions. The developmental state therefore both took the initiative as well as suppressed initiative to encourage the notion that the state was the prime mover for raising the standard of living.

The economic boom that extended for several decades after the Second World War initially allowed for numerous successes in ISI as the world economy on the whole expanded at a rapid rate. Keynesian assumptions about the need for full employment, welfare and public expenditure encouraged socialist democracies in the developed world while the developing world hoped to soon catch up to produce their own version of the social net. Cheap labor available in various parts of the world and a revolution in container shipping allowed manufacturing to be spread to new areas of economic opportunity. However, when the inevitable world recession hit in the 1970s the structural limitations of Global Fordism came to light. The unevenness of the "new international division of labor" meant that less than ten newly industrialized nations accounted for nearly half the industrial output in the developing world (Hoogvelt 2001, p. 46). The economic downturn of the 1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s would plummet many countries into political turmoil and lead to the collapse of political regimes. Rather than produce an unprecedented era of economic prosperity, the post-Second World War period witnessed the rise of developmental dictatorships around the world.

Neither modernization theory nor dependency theory offered clear solutions to the problems they posed. In a sense, the various theories attempted to explain underdevelopment rather than the development process itself. Development ultimately became more of an identity attached to the phenomenon of underdevelopment rather than a concrete process for achieving economic growth. A postcolonial reading might suggest the presence of an identity-formation process that encourages the demonization of a hostile outside world and calls for self-sacrifice at home to overcome national crisis.

The categorization of the world into the developed and underdeveloped would prove to be highly fertile ground for the emergence of developmental dictatorships that promised to deliver economic prosperity. The political autonomy achieved by newly formed nation-states after 1945 allowed for the articulation of principles of self-determination that gave new meaning to the concept of state sovereignty. Universal values of human rights and civil liberties became defined as "Western values" that have no place in a developmental regime that prioritized economic prosperity. In defending the nation-state from the outside world, postcolonial regimes at times gave unlimited license to those leaders who offered utopian visions of future economic prosperity.

DEVELOPMENT AS PRACTICE

The theories of development largely failed to provide the optimal pathway towards economic growth. Development eluded most parts of the world outside of East Asia throughout the twentieth century. Even the successful cases of the East Asian developmental state experienced prolonged periods of authoritarian rule. Frederic Cooper (2002, p. 91) notes that the term "development" in Africa is a protean word with conflicting interpretations that can include simple aspirations such as having clean water for ordinary people, bringing in knowledge and European capital for elites, and the attainment of African rule for nationalists. Cooper further observes that liberation from colonial rule meant that rulers of newly formed nation-states would become the primary intermediaries between external resources and nationalist aspirations at home. Capital accumulation through the export of primary products and native industries was usually insufficient to achieve national development. Therefore, the task of nation-building would be entrusted in the hands of technocratic elite groups who could cooperate with donor nations and international agencies that could keep developmental assistance flowing, while securing a steady supply of primary product exports for the world markets.

Despite the vast amounts expended in the third world, developmental goals were rarely met, and what emerged instead was a complex set of nation-building practices and identity politics that greatly strengthened authoritarian rule. Development in practice often meant obtaining foreign assistance for public works and massive infrastructure developments that did not always have a clear purpose. Trillions of dollars of aid money and loans flowed into the developing world over the decades following the Second World War, but the results were highly mixed. The funneling of development assistance for the construction of various civic projects that focused more on spectacle rather than substance was a troubling legacy of the Age of Development. Gleaming new public projects arose amidst a sea of poverty, which led to the proliferation of underutilized facilities, unaccounted-for aid dollars and mounting loan repayments. Development from this perspective may be seem to be less about theory but rather a competition for international resources to construct iconic images of nation-building that were often empty signifiers of modernity.

The role of a "modernizing elite" then comes to the fore as most of the leadership of newly formed nation-states after the Second World War had previous experience working under the colonial system or received their education at the imperial metropole. Connections to outside networks could have immense value in attracting developmental assistance and foreign capital. Bureaucrats from developing nations received technical training through various international agencies, and those with university education abroad gained the upper hand. Advanced administrative training may have increased the competence of third world bureaucrats, but it rarely diminished their appetite for corruption. The highly cosmopolitan postcolonial leaderships attempted to mimic the splendor of the developed world through monumental construction projects and lavish public expenditures. The spectacle of cities turned into fantasyscapes are testimonials to the dictators that funneled vast amounts of scarce development resources for their own personality cults. While few cities can match the monumental splendor of the North Korean capital Pyongyang, which today remains a holy shrine to the father–son duo of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, many third world leaders indulged in urban projects designed to enhance their personal prestige and allow their people to identify collectively with their modernizing efforts. Asian developmental states on the whole had a major proclivity towards public spectacles designed for mass consumption, and they lobbied hard to attract mega-sports events such as the Olympics and Commonwealth Games, which some observers have dubbed "Olympism" (Black and Peacock 2011). The economic nationalism that drove the developmental state took every opportunity to showcase their modernizing efforts through various mega-sports events that aimed to draw the attention, even as they struggled with intractable social and political problems.

The need to display developmental achievements for both domestic and international audiences was a crucial goal for most third world regimes that hoped to maintain their grip on power. The consent of the masses for nation-building could be gained far easier through symbolic efforts rather than through the far more difficult challenge of raising the overall standard of living. The flow of foreign aid allowed third world dictators to build opulent presidential palaces, form well-equipped armies and amass personal fortunes that were presented as public spectacles of national power. Not all of the foreign aid went to the ruling elites as considerable amounts were sent directly to the most impoverished zones. Yet the advanced technologies introduced by aid agencies often had little impact among populations with no understanding of what to do with them or involved complex machinery that was not easy to repair. Many development schemes also involved the import of surplus goods from donor nations with little use in recipient nations or inadvertently competed with local industries that were destroyed by the process. The inflow of foreign aid to the developing world did not always misfire, but the end results inevitably produced more the illusion of development rather than concrete achievements in the improvement of livelihoods.

Symbolic efforts at nation-building were coupled with direct state intervention in the daily lives of individuals through coercive means to shape collective behaviors. As part of the need to attract outside resources, "modernizing elites" attempted to keep wages down in the production of primary products for export. The disciplining of the population was essential for maintaining state dominance in the economic realm. The labor-intensive plantations, factories and mines required strict market controls to enable low-cost production for the world markets. Weaker states allowed for the perpetuation of corporate interests that protected their concessions to extract agricultural and mineral wealth. Some nations attempted to nationalize their primary resource production, while others remained locked in colonial-era relationships with the multinational corporations that continued business as usual despite the political changes in leadership. Stronger nation-states that nationalized the export of their primary products then had to face international sanctions for seizing the assets of foreign concerns. Nation-building projects often sought autonomy, but they could not escape navigating the asymmetrical structural relationships of the global political economy.

ISI schemes hoped to delink emerging nation-states from the confines of the world market, but they still required vast amounts of foreign loans and access to foreign technology at a premium cost. The experiments in autarky aimed to protect domestic industrial production from foreign competition, yet the consumer goods that they produced could not be priced competitively for export. Instead, the successful cases of developmental regimes would emerge from those that attracted foreign investment for export-oriented growth and provided the right conditions for low-cost industrial production. The advent of Global Fordism allowed for a small number of developing nations to participate in the global production of commodities for export, but only if they were willing to ensure the optimal conditions necessary for attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). This usually meant weak labor and environmental laws, coupled with draconian measures against labor unrest. Multinational corporations that prided themselves on "corporate social responsibility" in the developed nations often engaged in questionable production practices abroad that triggered environmental disasters and took full advantage of exploitative labor relationships. Nation-building in the era of development required strong state intervention to maintain the global flows of capital and commodities across newly formed national boundaries that often masked the continuation of neocolonial relationships.

The importance of global interactions in economic development perhaps best explains the heralded success of the East Asian Tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. These East Asian states openly embraced the need to attract global capital. The world was full of economically struggling dictatorships in the second half of the twentieth century, so repressive politics by themselves did not lead to growth. The debate still continues whether or not historically contingent factors such as the Cold War assistance and the high tolerance of protectionist barriers by the United States among its Asian

allies created unique circumstances for achieving economic growth. Some critics argue that it is unlikely that such favorable international circumstances will appear again (Pempel 1999, pp. 137–81). The interesting aspect of these successful cases of development is not so much about the strategies that they employed to achieve growth, but instead the ways in which their state-building practices converged with those employed by nations that were far less successful economically. The focus on linking with external resources and heavy state intervention in the economy by technocratic elite groups that monopolized the apparatus of state power was nearly a universal phenomenon in the Age of Development. The fact that a small number of nations were able to take advantage of historically contingent strategic relationships and preferential access to markets to achieve spectacular economic growth can obscure the similarities in nation-building approaches that had their origins in the "catch-up development" of nineteenth-century Europe.

Conclusion

The imperialist powers at the height of the Age of Empire constructed dependent economic linkages with their colonies that offered little room for negotiation by their colonized subjects. The sudden collapse of the Great Powers after the Second World War opened up the possibility of reshaping colonial and semi-colonial relationships around the idea of development. Elites in the "underdeveloped world" attempted to build their newly formed nations by serving as intermediaries to external resources and investments, while attempting to meet burgeoning nationalist demands at home. The emergence of superpower politics during the Cold War divided the world into two competing camps that used development assistance to further their ideological and strategic agendas. The newly liberated nations found themselves mired in the same asymmetrical economic relationships that had characterized the previous colonial era. Navigating the complex terrain of development aid, loans and superpower politics would be a challenge that all developing nations struggled to overcome, but what is perhaps most important about this situation is the legitimacy conferred to those leaders who could gain standing on the international stage.

The global context of world development after the Second World War would become ripe for the emergence of mass dictatorships that offered the promise of national construction. While many scholars usually interpret the task of nation-building through domestic lenses, we also need to examine the transnational circumstances that brought development to the forefront of international relations. The global dynamics of development ultimately required the leaderships of emerging nations to attract foreign assistance. Aspiring nationalist leaders also needed to showcase their commitment to building a modern nation for audiences at home, and they lavished expenditures on monumental constructions, oversized militaries and grandiose infrastructure projects that did not always fit the local situation. Such quixotic ways of allocating resources can make sense when we consider the need to attain both international and

domestic support for nation-building projects. Mass dictatorships require the staging of symbolic politics within the public sphere to display strong consent for their radical agendas, even if ultimately the inability to express true discontent drew individuals away from the political realm. This phenomenon may best be understood within the framework of mass dictatorship as transnational formations of modernity that proliferated certain nation-building practices aimed at the outside world. The highly interventionist developmental states mobilized resources and articulated socialist-inspired visions of prosperity. Yet the inability to formulate sustainable developmental solutions ultimately kept technocratic elite groups in power by serving as conduits to outside resources and maintaining a monopoly on the right to "represent" a nation's interest before the international stage.

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Political Religion

Charles Armstrong

Political Religion: The History and Use of a Concept

The concept of "political religion" has its roots in the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, when the growth of secularism and the separation of political legitimacy from divine right led to new forms of politics that could be seen to function as, and even resemble, traditional religious belief and practice. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, toward the end of his treatise *On the Social Contract*, suggests that the modern state should be based on a "civil religion" that will enable political unity to be maintained. This civil religion would consist of articles reached through social consensus "not precisely as dogmas of religion, but as sentiments of sociality without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject." The authority of civil religion rests not with divine ordinance—although Rousseau insisted that faith in God should be retained, at least for ordinary men—but in the voluntary agreement of the community, the social contract. Whoever in the community does not abide by these articles should be punished, "not for impiety, but as an anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to his duty" (Rousseau 1997, p. 121). Rousseau's "civil religion" would exert the same emotional pull and power of religion, but in order to maintain social cohesion among citizens of a state rather than for religious purposes per se.

The term "political religion" itself entered European and American scholarly discourse in the middle decades of the twentieth century, largely as a response to the rise of nationalism and socialism in Europe. Eric Voegelin, a German-born political philosopher who fled Austria for the USA after the Nazi *Anschluss* of 1938, was among the first scholars to define and popularize the concept of

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political religion. In his 1939 book *Die Politische Religionen*, Voegelin argued that the "innerworldly religions" of nationalism and socialism were filling the space previously occupied by declining "trans-worldly religions," the direct result of the secularization of European society (Voegelin 1939). Around the same time, the French sociologist Raymond Aron applied the term "political religion" to Nazism and Soviet Communism (Seubert 2006, p. 291).[1] To many scholars and contemporary observers, this was particularly evident in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Sacred texts (e.g., *Mein Kampf*), messiah figures (Mussolini, Hitler), martyrs, mass rituals, the sacrifice of the individual for the collective, apocalyptic struggles with absolute evil and the unity of true believers, all resonated with long-standing elements of religious faith and practice. To be sure violence and the ever-present threat of force were important foundations for the Fascist state as well, but it is clear that Fascism and Nazism appealed strongly to the emotions and existential cravings of their citizens, and could only be maintained with a significant (though hardly universal) degree of popular support. Nationalist beliefs and rituals were reinforced through the monopoly of power by a dominant political party, and the incorporation of millions of citizens into state-directed mass organizations according to occupation and social role (labor unions, women's groups, the Hitler Youth, etc.). It was precisely this all-encompassing party-state, pervasive throughout the social and cultural space previously beyond the reach of the political—the politicization of all aspects of life under Fascism and Nazism, as well as the Communist Soviet Union—that some scholars in the post-Second World War period labeled "totalitarian" (Arendt 1958; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1966). Indeed, political religion as a concept has most often been applied to "totalitarian" party-states of the twentieth century. Totalitarianism and political religion may be considered complementary interpretations of single-party, mass-mobilizing regimes. If totalitarianism describes the all-encompassing intent and coercive power of Fascist and Communist regimes, political religion can be understood as the means by which such regimes elicit the emotional investment and voluntary support of their citizens. There is, however, a great deal of debate about the definitions and applicability of these two terms, and their relationship to each other (Maier 2004; Maier and Schaefer 2006).

Political religion is often understood functionally, that is, as the use of quasi-religious symbols and appeals to motivate citizens for the purposes of the state. According to the American political scientist A. James Gregor,

> A political religion is a system of beliefs that rejects the notion that political power emanates from a divine source. Instead, a nation or its citizens are "sacralized" and made the repository of sovereign political power. Among later ideologists, there were those who were to recognize other sacralized bases of power: the state, class, a race, or history itself. (Gregor 2012, p. 9)

Most often political religion has been applied to non-democratic or illiberal states, but some theorists have applied the term to democratic regimes as

well. Recently Joost Augusteijn, Patrick Dassen and Maartje Janse have argued that political religion is in effect the by-product of modern mass democracy. The rise of democracy and the concomitant need for popular consent at the end of the eighteenth century led to political appeals for emotional connection and loyalty that often relied on religious forms and language "providing meaning, coherence, identity, myths, rituals and a clear distinction between 'good' and 'evil.'" Over time, "politics came to resemble belief systems which claimed to explain the purpose of existence," becoming in effect a form of "secular religion" (Augusteijn et al. 2013, pp. 1–2). Emilio Gentile, perhaps the most important contemporary scholar of political religion in the twentieth century, has called this the "sacralization of politics": the use of symbols, myths, rituals, liturgies and propaganda to promote the nation-state as the object of religious devotion and the national community as a body of secular believers (Gentile 1996, 2006). Gentile defines the sacralization of politics as the process by which

> More or less elaborately and dogmatically, a political movement confers a sacred status on an earthly entity (the nation, the country, the state, humanity, society, race, proletariat, history, liberty, or revolution) and renders it an absolute principle of collective existence, considers it the main source of values for individual and mass behavior, and exalts it as the supreme ethical precept of public life. (Gentile and Mallett 2000, p. 18)

Gentile's early work focused on Fascist Italy, and the theory of political religion has most often been applied to the nationalist and socialist states of the early to mid-twentieth century, especially to the "totalitarian" regimes of Europe and the Soviet Union. As Joost et al. suggest, however, political religion can be found in other authoritarian political systems and in democracies in many times and places of the modern world, albeit in various forms and to varying degrees.

Nationalism has been a special concern for theorists of political religion, particularly in connection to Fascism and National Socialism in twentieth-century Europe. To a great extent, political religion in these cases is expressed as the exaltation of the nation to a transcendent, quasi-divine object of veneration and identification—the nation, in effect, as God. One can point to Hegel as the precursor of this conflation of religion and the modern state. In his *Philosophy of History*, Hegel (1900, p. 50) asserts that "the State is based on religion," and in the *Philosophy of Right* argues that "the rational end of man is life in the state" (Gregor 2012, p. 18). For Hegel, true religion and obedience to the state, the latter being the embodiment of pure reason, were one and the same (Gregor 2012, p. 26). Hegel's followers in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe would take his ideas in a number of different directions, but one important thread was the submission of the individual to the collective demands of the state—modern nationalism.

Although political religion developed mainly as a critique of Communist and extreme nationalist regimes in the interwar years, during much of the

Cold War period in the decades after the Second World War, the study of such regimes was dominated by the concept of totalitarianism. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and with it the end of most regimes considered "totalitarian," the concept of political religion returned as a major concern of scholarly discourse, often as a retrospective critique of now-vanished Communist and Fascist dictatorships, but also in connection to new movements that linked religion and politics in the contemporary world. In particular, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia were examined in comparative perspectives that sought to move beyond totalitarian paradigms (Fitzpatrick and Geyer 2009). Both theoretically and comparatively, these twentieth-century dictatorships gained new attention based on critiques of everyday life, the subjective experiences of individuals and areas of culture and society beyond the realm of the political. The concept of totalitarianism itself, long criticized as inadequate or misleading by "revisionist" historians of the Soviet Union as well as scholars of Nazi Germany, was itself historicized by post-Cold War scholars as a product of the Cold War; some criticized the concept of totalitarianism of having limited utility in understanding Fascist and Communist dictatorships as they truly were (Gleason 1997). At the same time, new attention to the subjective and voluntary aspects of life under single-party dictatorships lent itself to a revival of the concept of political religion. Particularly in the study of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, somewhat less so in the study of Communist dictatorships, political religion reemerged as a supplement to if not a substitute for the theory of totalitarianism (Gentile 1996; Griffin 2006). The two terms were often linked, for example in the conferences on totalitarianism and political religion organized by Hans Maier in Bavaria in 1994 and 1996, and the name of the journal *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, founded by Michael Burleigh and Robert Mallett in 2000 (renamed *Politics, Religion and Ideology* in 2011).

Since the 1930s, when the term first gained salience, political religion has been applied mostly to the study of totalitarian politics, primarily those of twentieth-century mass-mobilizing regimes. Political religion has also been a concept mostly focused on Europe, although the term has been used with reference to Communist regimes in Asia—especially Maoist China, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and North Korea. In the twenty-first century, as seen for example in the journal *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, the concept has been used occasionally in connection to radical Islamist movements. In any case, the focus of political religion has been almost exclusively on illiberal regimes and ideologies; indeed, political religion is often presented as the antithesis of liberal pluralism. Such a limitation need not necessarily follow from the definition or characteristic of political religion—Gentile's "sacralization of politics" could be seen as a feature of mass politics in all regimes, including democracies—but for the most part scholars have made a distinction between "civil religion," generally a benign and even necessary component of many democracies, and "political religion," a negative and perverse feature of extreme authoritarian or totalitarian states and movements.

Although definitions vary among scholars and analysts of the phenomenon, political religions generally exhibit most if not all of the following features:

– A coherent belief system, articulated in key texts disseminated among the community, that is intolerant of alternative belief systems
– A strong distinction between insiders and outsiders, with the in-group defined by shared ties and beliefs, and the out-group often cast as threatening or evil (the friend–enemy distinction)
– An overarching organizational structure, usually a political party, which binds the in-group, as well as subordinate social organizations based on occupation, age, gender or other criteria
– A powerful leadership which interprets and enforces the belief system, often with a single charismatic individual at its apex, holding a monopoly on truth
– A vision of the future in which current social contradictions will be resolved and society will reach an ideal, if not utopian, state
– A belief that this ideal future will be reached in historical time and achieved by human activity
– A tendency to justify individual sacrifices and collective violence for the goal of achieving this ideal future

Political religions sometimes but not always repress existing religions and seek to substitute for them. But one difference between political and "real" religions is that the former claim to be based on scientific knowledge that can be grasped by human intelligence, rather than on truth gleaned through a leap of faith. Political religions also tend to be materialistic and dismissive of the spiritual or otherworldly concerns associated with traditional religion. Political religion is therefore not the same as theocracy, which one may call *politicized* religion: politics becoming a vehicle ultimately serving a religious purpose—the spread and maintenance of religious faith, including through the use of force—rather than politics *as* religion. Theocratic rule in Iran or Islamist movements in the Middle East and elsewhere are not examples of "political religion" as this term has been commonly understood; such states and movements appeal to existing religious authorities that are connected with, but ultimately supersede, the body politic. In a theocracy, the community of the faithful and the political community are not identical: the latter is a subset of the former, which extends beyond the theocratic nation, potentially to all of humanity.

Political religion is also distinct from religious politics as commonly practiced in democratic systems, such as the use of religious themes in political discourses of the "religious right" in the United States or Christian Democratic parties in Europe. Nor does the close alignment of religious institutions and political parties in authoritarian states—such as in Franco's Spain between the Catholic Church and the Spanish state, or in contemporary Russia between the Orthodox Church and the Putin government—qualify as political religion. In such cases political and religious institutions are allied but remain distinct. In political religion, politics functions as, rather than through, religion. In other words, in the case of political religion, a politics that is not itself formally or self-consciously religious

attains many of the attributes normally associated with religion, and in some cases the state deliberately substitutes political ideology and practice for the religious equivalent and may actively suppress preexisting religious faith and practice.

Scholars differ on whether a state ideology can be called political religion by analogy (because the official ideology *resembles* religion) or due to function (politics *functions as* religion). The historian Philippe Burrin suggests the former, arguing that certain regimes borrow "symbols, rituals, attitudes and kinds of behavior" deriving from their society's religious culture (Burrin 1997, p. 330). Whether this "borrowing" is deliberate or not remains in question. Regime ideologists usually deny that they are copying religious symbols and rituals even if the resemblances may seem striking to outside observers: for example in the pseudo-Christian language of martyrdom, salvation and resurrection in the Nazi recounting of the Munich Putsch of 1923; or the reliquary cult of Lenin in the Soviet Union, reminiscent of the supposedly undecomposed bodies of Orthodox saints. Voegelin, who more than anyone else originated the term, argues that political religion fills the space of traditional religion in a rapidly secularizing society; in that sense political religions are ersatz or quasi-religions. On the other hand, Raymond Aron and Emilio Gentile lean toward a more functional interpretation of political religions, arguing that they create and maintain social bonds in the same way as traditional religions (Gentile 2006). All individuals have a need to feel identification with the social group; institutional, ideational and personal mechanisms to bring the individual into the collective and maintain social cohesion can be found in certain political systems or in systems of religious belief. As Emile Durkheim argued, religion exists to bind humans into "a single moral community" (Durkheim 1915). Ultimately, whether a political religion is "like" a religion or in some sense "is" a religion may be a false dichotomy. In either case, both religion and certain kinds of politics seem to fulfill (or try to fulfill) a set of universal human needs. A political religion is a system of beliefs and institutions that occupy the social and ideational space more commonly associated with transcendent religious faiths.

TOTALITARIANISM AND POLITICAL RELIGION

Italian Fascism, German National Socialism and Soviet Communism were the initial objects to which the term "political religion" was applied in the 1930s, and it is the first two that have received the bulk of scholarly attention in the development of this concept. Broad and systematic comparisons of right- and left-wing totalitarian politics are still relatively rare, but interpreting both through the lens of political religion has seen a revival in recent years. The Romanian-American scholar Vladimir Tismaneanu (2012, p. 3), for example, argues "both Communism and Fascism organized their political objectives in discourses of alleged emancipation, operating as political religions meant to deliver the individual from the impositions of traditional morality and legality." Above all Tismaneanu is concerned with Communism and Fascism's shared disregard for "conventional" morality, legal constraint and inhibitions on violence for the

sake of political cause and alleged historical truths—in short, the question of evil in the radical totalitarian movements and regimes of the twentieth century. Tismaneanu focuses less on the personal beliefs and mental pathologies of the leaders of these movements than on the ability of masses of followers to justify and participate in all manner of horrors in the name of the totalitarian belief system. Tismaneanu (2012, p. 4) writes that it is the "spirit of radical transformation and renewal that mobilized the masses who pushed forward both movements [Fascist and Communist] throughout their existence." Following Burrin (1997), Tismaneanu (2012, p. 236 fn. 8) presents totalitarianism and political religion as complementary terms: the former reflecting the mechanisms of power and domination, the latter the system of beliefs, symbols and rituals.

Fascist and Communist dictatorships were distinguished by their modernity: they evoked novel, forward-looking ideologies of change and transformation, rather than looking backward to traditional religion. Roger Griffin has argued that Fascism in Italy and Germany was inextricably linked to twentieth-century modernism (Griffin 2010). Communism was based on a Marxist theory of historical progress and strongly oriented toward the future goal of a classless society. Both Fascism and Communism claimed to have broken away from the myths and superstitions of the past and to have discovered the scientific principles (biological, economic) that will guide a society toward an ideal future. To be sure, Italian Fascism and National Socialism sought to lead the Italian and German nations respectively toward a glory worthy of their great imperial pasts, but through symbols, rituals and technologies that were self-consciously modern. In that sense, the ideologies of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were different from that of their Second World War ally Japan. Militarist Japan sought to fuse modern nationalist ideology with a supposedly traditionalist Shintoism, but the result was a shifting ideological montage of racism, pan-Asianism, modernism and traditionalism that constituted a much less coherent belief system than those of the other two Axis countries. Nor did Japan have a charismatic leader, a mass party, or a clear set of "holy" texts and rituals such as can be found in genuinely totalitarian regimes. Although Second World War-era Japan subscribed to a "reactionary modernism" (Ruoff 2010) that bore some resemblance to the ideologies of contemporary Italy and Germany, the Japanese case is not as clear an example of political religion.

On the other hand, Communist regimes established after the Second World War and modeled on the Soviet Union followed the doctrine, rituals and practices of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist political religion. Each national system was slightly different, and degrees of fervor varied between Communist states and over time. Maoist China combined charismatic leadership, sacred texts, mass mobilization and ideological fervor even more intensely than Stalin's Soviet Union. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Mao was portrayed as a virtual Sun God, and the "Red Book" of his writings became an icon to be memorized, parsed and waved at mass rallies. However, in contrast to the Soviet Union and its allied regimes in Eastern Europe, in China the fanatical energies of the Cultural Revolution worked not so much through the Party bureaucracy

but quite deliberately against it, under Mao's instigation (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006). Consequently the Cultural Revolution disrupted the normal workings of state and society and could not be sustained. China since the 1970s is still a Communist party-state, but one in which ideology plays a much less central or dominating role than it did during the Maoist years.

The Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (1975–1979) is an even more extreme example of the self-destructive potential of political religion. Influenced by Mao, Khmer Rouge leader Saloth Sar (a.k.a. Pol Pot) sought to outdo China's "peasant revolution" and make Cambodia into a socialist utopia virtually overnight. The result was untold violence, oppression, starvation and mass death. By the time Pol Pot's regime was overthrown by the invading army of Socialist Vietnam, as much as one-quarter of Cambodia's population of eight million had died as a result of Khmer Rouge policies. In addition to its socialist-utopian elements, the Khmer Rouge regime was viciously xenophobic and racist, seeking to purge Cambodia of all Vietnamese, ethnic Chinese, Muslim and other peoples who were not "pure" Khmer (ethnic Cambodian). In that sense, the political religion of the Pol Pot era bore a family resemblance both to Stalinism and Maoism as well as to Fascism and Nazism (Kiernan 1996).

NORTH KOREA, RELIGION AND POLITICAL RELIGION

North Korea, as the last surviving "totalitarian" dictatorship, is often understood to embody political religion in its ruling ideology more than any other currently existing state. And indeed, North Korea strikingly exhibits many of the features of political religion as defined by Voegelin, Gentile, Griffin and other scholars of the phenomenon. What is remarkable about North Korea is not so much the features of its political religion, although some of these are quite distinctive, but the durability of the regime in its revolutionary-charismatic form (Kwon and Chung 2012). North Korea has not only outlasted all other regimes founded under Soviet auspices in the aftermath of Second World War, as well as the Soviet Union itself,[2] it has also largely avoided the market-oriented reforms and integration into the world economy followed by its fellow Asian socialist states, the People's Republic of China and Vietnam. For more than twenty years, North Korea has insisted that it remains committed to its own version of Marxist-Leninist socialism, or what the regime has called "socialism of our style." Its current supreme leader Kim Jong Un, grandson of founding leader Kim Il Sung, is the third-generation leader in an unbroken succession of hereditary rule.

North Korea's political religion, centered on the "cult" of Kim Il Sung and his family, developed gradually over the course of the 1950s to 1980s. Although heavily influenced by Stalinism, and somewhat more indirectly by the quasi-Fascism of wartime Japan, North Korea moved into a unique ideological direction in the years after the Korean War and Sino–Soviet split in the late 1950s.[3] By the mid-1960s, North Korea's official ideology and *Weltanschauung* was encapsulated in the term *Juche*, meaning self-identity or self-reliance. What

North Korea calls *Juche sasang* or "Juche thought" was elaborated into a complex "philosophy" over the two decades between its introduction in the 1960s and the emergence of Kim Il Sung's son Kim Jong Il as hereditary successor in the early 1980s. Han S. Park suggests that during this time Juche was "rapidly transformed into a religious doctrine and theology" (Park 2002, p. 36). This doctrine included charismatic personality (the Great Leader and his successors); sacred texts (above all the writings of the Leader); a sacred mission (to save humanity from capitalist materialism, cultural decadence and moral decay); and even eternal life (Park 2002, pp. 46–47). The latter was embodied in the idea of the "political-social body," introduced in 1986. This idea proposed that the individual human being transcends biological mortality only by positive integration into the social body. Individuals will die, but the social collectivity—the nation—is immortal. This is of course nothing more or less than the principle of subsuming individual identity into collective life and purpose, characteristic of the ultra-nationalisms of interwar Europe. In this regard North Korea's political religion is more reminiscent of ultra-nationalism or Fascism than the class-oriented internationalism of Soviet Communism.

"Eternal life" exists in North Korea in another sense, more resonant with the Soviet experience but taken much further. As with Lenin, Kim Il Sung's body was embalmed and put on permanent display as an object of veneration after his death in 1994. Paying one's respects to Kim lying in state in Kumsusan Palace of the Sun,[4] a large building in the center of Pyongyang where Kim once had his offices, involves far more complex quasi-religious rituals than visits to the tombs of Lenin or Mao. Furthermore, the body of Kim Il Sung's son and North Korea's second leader, Kim Jong Il, was also embalmed and laid beside that of his father in Kumsusan Palace after the younger Kim's death in 2011. In 1997, three years after Kim Il Sung's death, the state erected concrete obelisks all around the country displaying the words, "The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung Will Always Be with Us." These obelisks are called "Eternal Life Monuments" (*yeonsaeng tap*). The following year, when Kim Jong Il was reaffirmed as General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party and Chairman of the National Defense Committee, the office of president was declared still occupied—by the deceased Kim Il Sung. Twenty years after his death, Kim Il Sung remains officially the Eternal President. Moreover his son, following his own death, has remained officially General Secretary of the Party. The Eternal Life Monuments have been modified to read "The Great Leaders Comrade Kim Il Sung *and Comrade Kim Jong Il* Will Always Be with Us." Ruled by two dead men, North Korea is today a "necrocracy" unique in the world. Also in 1997, North Korea introduced a "Juche Calendar" with the birth year of Kim Il Sung (1912) as "Year Zero." Deliberately or not, North Korea has replaced the Christian calendar with one based on the birth of its own "messiah."

North Korea is widely known to repress formal religion, especially Christianity, but the regime's relationship to religion is complex. Religion has had an ambivalent place in North Korea since the founding of the DPRK in 1948. On the one hand, freedom of religion is guaranteed in the DPRK

Constitution. On the other hand, state repression of religious activity has a long-established history. Article 68 of the Socialist Constitution of the DPRK states "Citizens have freedom of religious beliefs. This right is granted by approving the construction of religious buildings and the holding of religious ceremonies." However, the Constitution immediately goes on to the state: "No one may use religion as a pretext for drawing in foreign forces or for harming the State and social order." State security trumps religious freedom. More relevant to the subject of political religion, North Korean state ideology seems deliberately designed to occupy the social and psychological space of religion for North Korean people. Kim Il Sung himself was raised by a devout Presbyterian mother, and one of his first acts as North Korea's leader was to appoint his mother's cousin, a Presbyterian minister, as head of the (North) Korean Christian Federation in 1946. In the early days of the regime, "cooperative" religious leaders and congregants, such as the Christian Federation, were tolerated and absorbed into the state apparatus. After the Korean War, Christians were seen with much greater suspicion as potential agents of the Americans. Although there are four functioning churches in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital (two Protestant, one Catholic, and one Russian Orthodox) there are not known to be any churches elsewhere in the country. Buddhist temples seem to exist purely as tourist attractions rather than sites of worship. Perhaps influenced by the founding leader's own Christian background, as well as the deeply ingrained culture of Korean Confucianism (including ancestor veneration, a human-centered cosmos and the primacy of social order and stability), and above all a militant nationalism rooted in Korea's anticolonial struggle and Korean War, North Korea has developed a state ideology that appears strikingly religious in its symbols, rituals, doctrines and institutions. This ideology officially tolerates traditional religion to a certain extent, but presents itself as an all-encompassing belief system that, if taken seriously, would be a substitute for religious belief. It is an ideology that places a primacy on ideas over material circumstances—in effect, turning the Marxist notion of historical materialism on its head. Nevertheless, North Korea does not refer to a literal afterlife or a spiritual world beyond our material existence. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are not literally immortal: they "will always be with us" in memory and in the social-political body of the Korean national collective. "Eternal life" exists on a social plane, not a spiritual one. In this sense, North Korea remains in the tradition of Communist atheism, and it practices a political religion very much resonant with the Fascist, nationalist and socialist mass dictatorships analyzed by Voegelin, Aron, Arendt and others in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Over time, North Korea's political religion has increasingly emphasized ethnic nationalism; under current leader Kim Jong Un, North Korean media often refers to the "sacred bloodline of Mount Paektu" as embodied in the family of the Great Leader and, by extension, the whole Korean people. Nationalism, much more than socialism, has been at the center of North Korean political religion.

Like other political religions, North Korea's has been exclusive and intolerant of other belief systems. For nearly half a century, North Korea has emphasized its "monolithic ideology," first articulated as such in 1967, and modified and elaborated under Kim Jong Il in 1974 as the younger Kim was being groomed to succeed his father. As the anthropologist Heonik Kwon observes, the development and dissemination of this ideology was an attempt to institutionalize the charismatic authority of Kim Il Sung. Kwon writes, "the evolution of North Korea's statehood has been an epic struggle against the impermanent nature of charismatic authority and against the mortality of this authority, to which all other charismatic personas of the twentieth century eventually succumbed" (Kwon and Chung 2012, p. 4). No other charismatic political religion from the middle of the last century has survived in as pure and fervent a form as has North Korea's. Italian Fascism and German National Socialism went up in flames in the Second World War. Soviet Communism, though it lasted much longer, lost much of its fanatical intensity after Stalin and became ossified and increasingly dysfunctional under Khrushchev's successors; eventually, the whole Communist edifice in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Mongolia collapsed under the weight of its inefficiencies and internal contradictions. The Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia was toppled by the invading Vietnamese army in 1979, replaced by a more "ordinary" Communist dictatorship, and Cambodia ceased to be a Marxist-Leninist party-state after 1991. China and Vietnam, though officially Communist dictatorships, retain little of the quasi-religious fervor of their revolutionary period. Even Cuba, despite the continued leadership of the Castro family, is much less of a charismatic party-state than it was under Fidel. North Korea is perhaps the last regime with all the characteristics of political religion that gave rise to this concept in the 1930s.

Political Religion, Liberalism and Democracy

With the possible exception of North Korea, no regimes today exhibits the "classic" features of political religion observed contemporaneously by Voegelin and Aron and analyzed historically by Gentile and Griffin. Nevertheless political religion as a concept may still have salience in our current post-totalitarian era. Religion has returned as a prime motor for politics in certain movements and states, especially in the Islamic Middle East. As mentioned previously, such politicized religion may not be identical to political religion as the term has been commonly used, but the line between the religious and the political is in some cases extremely porous. Nor need the concept of political religion be exclusive to the illiberal Other of Western democracy. In democratic societies themselves, the language and emotion of religion has long played an important role in politics. As Robert Bellah observed a generation ago, America has its own version of what Gentile would later call the "sacralization of politics" (Bellah 1967). The collapse of technocratic "Third Way" governments in Europe, and the rise of populist politicians like Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands—with their tendency to evoke messianic,

evangelical language—suggests that politics as religion is far from dead even in the liberal, secular West. In a time of deepening economic inequality and social conflict, not unlike the interwar period in which totalitarian states first emerged, the uncertainty and instability of liberal democracy may be much less appealing than the moral certitudes of a political religion.

Historically, the strict dichotomy between the "civil religion" of democracies and the "political religion" of totalitarian states has not always been rigid and clear. Fascism and National Socialism took root in democratic states at the heart of Europe in the first decades of the twentieth century; the triumph of liberal democracy in Europe was not preordained, nor is it necessarily permanent (Mazower 1998). The sociologist Michael Mann has argued that some of the worst excesses of totalitarian states, including ethnic cleansing and genocide, were products of a modernization process very much linked to democratization and the emergence of mass politics (Mann 2005). In some parts of the former Soviet Empire, such as Turkmenistan, Communism has been replaced by a state-sponsored nationalism not far removed from Fascism; in others, democratization itself has led to populist xenophobia and intolerance, as in the neo-Nazi movement in Mongolia.

Democracy has always relied on "non-rational elements," including emotional appeals, irrational beliefs, charismatic leaders, rituals and forms of coercion (Augusteijn et al. 2013, p. 6). Far from a historical aberration, political religion may be inseparable from the mass-participatory politics that has become the standard political form since the Age of Enlightenment.

NOTES

1. Aron later preferred the term "secular religion" (la religion séculaire).
2. North Korea, officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) established in September 1948, began as the area of the Korean peninsula occupied by the Soviet Union following the surrender of Japan, which had maintained colonial rule over the peninsula since 1910. The southern half of the peninsula was occupied by the United States until August 1948 when it became the Republic of Korea (ROK).
3. B. R. Meyers (2010) argues that North Korea is essentially a racist-Fascist regime that has nothing to do with Soviet-style Communism. Certainly North Korea's extreme nationalism can be explicitly racist at times. But Myers sees North Korea in isolation from other Marxist-Leninist regimes which also became ultra-nationalist, and in the case of Romania under Ceasescu explicitly racist, or for that matter Stalin's Soviet Union with its sporadic anti-Semitism and anti-Asian racism, the xenophobic and anti-minority side of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the genocidal nationalism of the Khmer Rouge.
4. Like Mao Zedong and the Japanese emperor, Kim is associated with the sun; indeed his name "Il Sung," originally his guerilla *nom de guerre*, means "becoming the sun."

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Science and Technology: National Identity, Self-reliance, Technocracy and Biopolitics

Sang-Hyun Kim

INTRODUCTION

Despite their significant differences from premodern despotism, twentieth-century dictatorships have long been understood to be a result of unfortunate deviation or aberration from a seemingly "normal" path to modernity. Such conventional wisdom is now being effectively challenged in light of the growing body of more nuanced historical research over the last several decades on Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other dictatorships (see, e.g., Corner 2009; Geyer and Fitzpatrick 2009; Jarausch 1999). The contextual approaches adopted in these studies have pointed out that many dictatorial regimes in the twentieth century were deeply committed to modernizing their nations, albeit in their own ways, going beyond the top-down subjugation of a victimized population. In particular, the "mass dictatorship" perspective emphasizes the often remarkably successful mobilization of the masses in this process (Lim 2011, 2013). It contends that, rather than relying solely on coercion and indoctrination, twentieth-century dictatorships were able to garner mass consent or voluntary participation through a set of modern practices and institutions that aimed to fulfill the collective yearning for social renovation and allowed the possibility of self-empowerment from below. Thus, by highlighting the pursuits of modernization—from both above and below—under dictatorial regimes, the mass dictatorship perspective takes a step forward and calls into question the taken-for-granted distinction between dictatorships and democracies.

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While the various modern aspects of mass dictatorships have been richly explored, relatively little attention has been paid to one of the crucial constituents of the modern state machinery deployed by the regimes: science and technology. Early scholars of twentieth-century dictatorships rather uncritically accepted the assumption that science and its technological applications were value-neutral and more congruent with reason-based, liberal democracies than with ideologically driven dictatorships. They therefore tended to approach science and technology mostly as an object of political misuse, abuse, manipulation or oppression (Beyerchen 1977; Joravsky 1970). This traditional view eventually came to be challenged. Post-Kuhnian historical and sociological studies of science and technology have repeatedly demonstrated that not only the meanings and purposes but also the contents, practices and implications of science and technology are embedded in specific sociocultural, political and historical contexts (Shapin 1982; Golinski 1998; Bijker et al. 1987). In addition, more recent studies of science and technology under dictatorial regimes including Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union have revealed that, on the one hand, strategic areas of science and technology continued to receive support, and on the other hand, many scientists and engineers willingly worked with the regimes, motivated not just by careerism but also by dedication to their research and/or nations (see, e.g., Renneberg and Walker 1993; Krementsov 1997). As yet, few attempts have been made to incorporate the insights from these studies into our understanding of mass dictatorships.

The contention of this essay is that, in order to better understand mass dictatorships as modern phenomena, it is necessary to examine the role and place of science and technology in the construction and maintenance of these regimes. By definition, a modern state—whether identified as democratic or dictatorial—is an "engineering state" (Carroll 2006). From its very inception, modern statecraft has both required and, in turn, been shaped by a range of scientific and technical practices, such as those related to census, sanitation, public health and industrialization. What salient features, then, stand out in the relationship between science, technology and twentieth-century dictatorships, apart from the episodes of repression, censorship and strict controls? Mass dictatorships were driven by the desire to (re)build strong nations and the fear of not reaching that goal. This essay focuses on the four interrelated ways in which science and technology embodied and enacted these imperatives discursively as well as materially, although their concrete manifestations differed from one regime to another. First, modern science and technology served as potent symbols and markers of national strength and unity. Second, science and technology were actively mobilized by the state, with considerable support from below, to materialize the vision of a self-reliant political economy. Third, science and technology formed the basis of a technocratic logic of authoritarian governance, through which major political economic decisions were made. Finally, science and technology were also integral to biopolitical projects that sought to discipline the masses and to create a healthy and productive nation.

SEARCH FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY

Ever since the emergence of modern nation-states, advances in science and technology have been regarded, in many parts of the world, as one of the sources and standards of national pride and prestige. As noted in the previous section, however, the traditional view assumed that science and technology were devoid of ideology and politics and could properly flourish only in liberal democratic societies where their autonomy from the state was respected and protected (Merton 1973). Invocations of nationhood and state-building with respect to science and technology in dictatorial regimes were accordingly interpreted in terms of the perversions by excessive nationalism or other political ideologies. The most frequently quoted examples of these are the "Aryan Physics" (*Deutsche Physik*) movement in Nazi Germany and the triumph of Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union. The former—led by Nobel laureate physicists Phillip Lenard and Johannes Stark—attacked modern theoretical physics, labeling it as "Jewish." By the late 1930s, the movement succeeded in expelling all Jewish physicists from universities and research institutions on the grounds that physics should reflect a distinctively German national character (Beyerchen 1977). Similarly, Lysenko and his supporters waged a concerted campaign to promote Michurin's theory of hybridization as the foundation of a new "Soviet biology." The practice and teaching of Mendelian genetics—denounced as "bourgeois biology"—were subsequently banned by the Soviet authority throughout the period from the 1930s to the 1960s (Joravsky 1970).

As the two cases show, the tyranny of the dictatorships did have profound negative consequences on science and technology. Scientists and engineers were sometimes at risk of being removed from their positions, imprisoned or even executed. But at the same time, they managed to adapt themselves to the opportunities, challenges and constraints introduced by the new regimes. This was possible partly because, as in other modern states, science and technology were needed to deliver solutions to problems in industry, agriculture and the military. With the rapid demise of traditional sources of legitimation such as religions, scientific and technical knowledge also arose as a vital bureaucratic resource for legitimizing the exercise of state power. In exchange for providing these practical and political resources, the scientific and engineering communities secured institutional support for their research and development (R&D) and access to the administrative hierarchy of the state. Moreover, the entanglement of science and technology with political ideology was neither simply imposed by the ruling elites nor prompted mainly by the opportunistic responses of scientists and engineers to autocratic rule. The search for nationally specific science, for example, predates the advent of twentieth-century dictatorships. The origin of the "Aryan Physics" movement can be traced back to the mid-1910s, when the Nazi Party did not yet exist (Walker 1995). Likewise, the idea of a socialist, Slavic science—as opposed to Western, bourgeois science—took shape long before the rise of Stalin (Akhundov 1993).

The intertwining of science, technology, and a non-liberal form of nationalism, I would argue, occupied a central place in the unfolding of twentieth-century dictatorships committed to the revival of their nations based on a new social order. Jeffrey Herf (1984) suggested that the "reactionary modernist" tradition of conservative German intellectuals and engineers—which repudiated Enlightenment values of liberal democracy but reconceptualized and embraced modern technology as an expression of German "soul"—contributed to the Nazi imaginary of a united, technologically advanced nation. Italian Fascists, while apprehending the dehumanizing effects of mechanical civilization, nevertheless saw modern science and technology as essential instruments with which to develop and expand the productive capacities of the nation and to ultimately rebuild a "new Italy" (Gregor 1980). Notwithstanding the advocacy of proletarian internationalism, socialist dictatorships also exhibited comparable associations of science and technology with nationhood. As Lenin's formulation of communism as "Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country" neatly summarizes, the Soviet Union conceived science and technology as part and parcel of socialist modernization, which would help eliminate "Russian backwardness" and "catch up and overtake" Western capitalist nations (Coopersmith 1992). In the GDR, the Nazi utopia of racial purity was staunchly rejected, but a strong belief in the transformative power of technology persisted and played a pivotal role in the imagination of a modern East German socialist identity vis-à-vis West Germany (Augustine 2007).

Twentieth-century dictatorships in non-European regions were guided by an even greater urge to utilize science and technology to empower the nations. In the case of East Asia, after a series of humiliating encounters with Western powers in the nineteenth century, it became generally accepted that modern science and technology should be promptly adopted, though primarily as tools to achieve a "rich nation and strong army" and without compromising the national spirit. Thus, the focus was more on the acquisition and mastering of Western science and technology and less on the creation of science and technology bearing national characteristics. This blending of nationalism with an instrumentalist conception of science and technology was an important part of the discursive backbone of the militarist regime of imperial Japan—epitomized by the slogans, "serving the nation through science" (*kagaku hōkoku*) and "nation-building through technology" (*kijutsu rikkoku*) (Mizuno 2009). A similar "scientific nationalism" was also evident in the policies of the People's Republic of China (PRC) until the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), and its "four modernizations" (*si ge xiandaihua*) program afterwards, which framed science and technology clearly as productive forces rather than superstructures (Wang 2007). Even Mao Zedong's initiative of "mass science" (*qunzhong kexue*) during the Cultural Revolution, with its sharp critique of Western science and technology as elitist, seems to have been informed by the same goal of strengthening the nation through science and technology (Fan 2012a). In postcolonial South Korea, the Park Chung-Hee military regime (1961–1979) placed the domestication of science and technology at the center of its ambitious projects of

"modernization of the fatherland" (*choguk kŭndaehwa*) and "heavy and chemical industrialization" (Kim 2012).

Hence, twentieth-century dictatorships did not simply attempt to manipulate science and technology for immediate political ends. Rather, they seriously strove to establish science and technology as the central pillar of their nation's strength and unity. The demonstration of scientific and technological prowess and its accomplishments then functioned as manifestations of a state's capacity to materialize the widely held aspirations for a strong nation, through which the masses could witness and be assured of the benefits of membership in the new polity. It is no accident that, regardless of their ideological, political, and cultural differences, many twentieth-century dictatorial regimes were fascinated with monumental technological projects such as the operation of modernized railroads and motorways; the construction of dams and power stations; the transformation of urban landscapes; and the development of aircrafts, rockets and satellites (see, e.g., Josephson 1995; Trischler 2001). These projects were, of course, designed and implemented for practical purposes, yet at the same time they were underwritten by the vision of radically transforming a nation through state-led modernization based on science and technology. As will be discussed in the next section, however, it was the task of building a self-reliant political economy to more systematically link science and technology, the hopes and fears for a nation's future and the legitimacy of a dictatorial regime.

Quest for Self-reliance

The call for a self-reliant economy was not unique to twentieth-century dictatorships. The economic crisis of the late 1920s and the subsequent Great Depression of the 1930s led most European countries to adopt autarkic policies. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, however, continued those policies even after the end of this crisis. The two regimes envisaged economic self-reliance as a key to national revitalization. They legitimized the exercise of dictatorial state power as an effective means to attain this objective, firmly institutionalizing state intervention in the economy, although the Nazi policies were simultaneously influenced by racism. Initially, autarky was pursued domestically, for instance, by developing synthetic substitutes for raw materials and new kinds of metal alloy. As latecomers to imperialism, both regimes soon went further and sought to expand the "living space" (*Lebensraum* in German and *spazio vitale* in Italian)—into Central and Eastern Europe and into Southern Europe and North Africa, respectively—in the name of securing natural and agricultural resources for their growing industries and populations (Kallis 2000). The drive for internal self-sufficiency and import substitution—and later, imperial expansion—demanded the extensive use of scientific and technical expertise. Besides military research for rearmament and the war economy, R&D in other areas—e.g., chemistry, biological and agricultural sciences, and civil engineering—was carried out as part of the efforts to achieve economic self-reliance (Heim et al. 2009).

Such schemes were not just enforced top-down by the Nazi and Fascist leaders. Many scientists and engineers—whether enthusiastic or skeptical about Nazism/Fascism—subscribed to a nationalist vision of science and technology and were willing to conduct R&D for autarkic goals, with their techno-scientific products constituting the material basis for the regimes. The case of plant-breeding research in the two countries well illustrates the coevolution of science, technology and the project of developing a self-reliant political economy. The idea of agricultural self-sufficiency was widespread among plant geneticists and breeders even before Hitler and Mussolini came to power. The *Ardito*, a high-yielding wheat variety developed at the National Institute of Genetics for Grain Cultivation in Italy, was a product of that ambition. Only with the launching of the "Battle of Grain" (*Battaglia del Grano*) campaign by Fascists in 1925, however, did the *Ardito* begin to be grown on a massive scale. The success of this campaign, with a huge reduction in wheat imports, contributed a great deal to the consolidation of the Fascist regime (Saraiva 2010). In Germany, the occupation of the East provided plant scientists at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes with increased institutional support, as well as unique opportunities to acquire and gain control over genetic resources, wild plants and breeding know-how that were not available in their homeland. In return, they not only undertook research to develop novel crops but also gave expert advice on the agricultural aspects of the appropriation and transformation of *Lebensraum* (Heim 2008).

Science and technology were also indispensable elements of Japan's quest for self-sufficiency and colonial power. Japan annexed Taiwan (1895), Korea (1910) and Manchuria (1931) and formally announced the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (*daitōa kyōeiken*) in 1940. This period of empire-building witnessed the explosive growth of scientific and technological R&D, with the formation of new research laboratories and the expansion of technical education. In 1941, as the wartime mobilization efforts intensified, the Konoe Fumimaro Cabinet formulated the general plan for the "New Order for Science and Technology" (*kagaku kijutsu shintaisei*), which would establish stronger state coordination of scientific and technological activities for the effective and efficient exploitation of natural resources in Japan and its colonies (Pauer 1999). In the Communist Bloc, too, economic self-reliance was proclaimed a guiding principle of national development. In order to facilitate the socialist transformation from an agrarian-based or semi-industrial economy to a new, industrial one, it was believed that the dependence on foreign products, technologies and raw materials—especially from the capitalist West—needed to be curtailed. The Soviet Union, the PRC and the GDR all made tremendous efforts to organize applied R&D to overcome this problem (Lewis 1979; Volti 1982; Stokes 2000). As a result, political control over the scientific and engineering communities by the party-state apparatus was increasingly strengthened. Yet, concurrently, some of the scientists and engineers involved in major R&D programs could participate in the state's industrial planning and administration.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the experiences of colonial industrialization, as well as the witnessing of the Soviet Union's remarkable techno-economic development during its first Five Year Plan, had a deep imprint on the thoughts of nationalist elites in newly independent countries after the Second World War. Many of them espoused the vision that the state-directed strategy for rapid economic growth should be urgently implemented to "catch up" with advanced nations, which would include, among others, the development of the nation's indigenous technological capability. The dictatorship was often justified as a necessary step to realize that vision. For example, in South Korea, Park Chung-Hee's authoritarian politics encountered stiff resistance, but his crusade for a "self-reliant economy" (*charip kyŏngje*) and "self-reliant national defense" (*chaju kukpang*) elicited consent from a sizable portion of the population (Kim 2006). This campaign put the linking of science and technology with national economic growth at the forefront of its agenda. With the catchphrases of "nation-building through industrialization" (*kongŏp ipkuk*) and "technological self-reliance" (*kisul charip*), the Park regime introduced a series of new policies and institutions to harness science and technology—for example, the commencement of the Five Year Science and Technology Promotion Plans, the founding of the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the establishment of government-funded research institutes. These developments were welcomed not only by scientists and engineers but even by some of those who staunchly opposed Park's despotic rule (Kim 2012).

The degree of economic autarky envisioned by twentieth-century dictatorships differed from one case to another. South Korea's efforts to enhance its technological capability at first relied heavily on foreign technology, expertise and financial resources. Fully incorporated into the world capitalist economy, South Korea's principal source of technical aid was the United States. And yet, this reliance did little to change the Park regime's state-led nationalist development strategies with a centrally coordinated mobilization of science and technology. The United States, for its part, supported these strategies as a way of containing the spread of communism in Asia (Kim 2012). More significant is that, with some exceptions, twentieth-century dictatorships of all political stripes presented their seizure of power as the most viable path to ensuring the nation's self-reliant political economy through technologically advanced industrialization. The strength and consistency of the dictatorial regime's scientific and technological base was therefore an important prerequisite for its presumed success. As recent scholarship on science, technology and dictatorship has demonstrated, many scientists and engineers shared with the ruling elites a faith in science and technology as a panacea for the problems facing the nation and were given a special status that allowed relative freedom to proceed with their R&D (see, e.g., Krementsov 1997; Heim et al. 2009). However, as already implied above, R&D was not the only contribution scientists and engineers could make to twentieth-century dictatorships: their expertise also formed the technocratic basis for authoritarian governance.

THE BASIS FOR TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Some twentieth-century dictatorships—most notably, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the Stalinist Soviet Union—have frequently been categorized as totalitarian. The notion of totalitarianism began to be widely used, in part due to the Cold War narratives that constructed a clear line between liberal democracies and their enemies and that tended to obscure nontrivial differences among dictatorial regimes. The dictatorships generally considered totalitarian did have an important commonality: they were committed to a comprehensive transformation of society and human behavior and launched large-scale social engineering projects to achieve that goal, although the totalitarian ideal of establishing total control of society and of creating a "new man" was never fully accomplished (Scott 1998). However, other twentieth-century dictatorships with less radical ideological visions also actively pursued a series of social engineering projects to renovate and modernize their nations—for example, public health, urban planning, rural reconstruction and social welfare. Initiatives such as these necessarily involved the systematic application of scientific and technical knowledge and methods, including those of the social sciences. As the efficient organization and management of society and its resources, along the lines of high productivity and cost-effectiveness, became paramount to the functioning and maintenance of the regime, a considerable degree of administrative power began to be ceded to those equipped with scientific and technical expertise.

In fact, the logic of technocracy—a system of governance or the exercise of power based on scientific and technical expertise—appealed to political elites all over the industrialized world as an effective solution to foster their nations' strength and unity, especially in the face of impending social, political, and economic crisis. In the United States, the "technocracy movement" emerged in the early 1920s, led by Howard Scott, Thorstein Veblen and others, and gained popularity in the midst of the Great Depression. Its popularity as a political movement was transient, but technocratic thinking continued to be influential in US politics. By the time of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal administration in the 1930s, policy decisions were increasingly made by drawing on technical expertise (Fischer 1989). The trend toward technocracy was also apparent in the Soviet Union. The implementation of Lenin's New Economic Policy (1922–1928) depended substantially on the expertise of the "technical intelligentsia." Many of this group had bourgeois backgrounds and later became the targets of Stalin's repression, as in the Shakhty (1928) and Industrial Party (1930) trials. But the increased political control did not much affect the process of technocratization. A new generation of technically trained but proletarian "red experts" soon began to enter the party-state bureaucracy and to play an active role in Stalin's Five Year Plans. The "Great Purge" campaign (1936–1938) even accelerated the replacement of old party cadres with these new technical experts (Bailes 1978).

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1972)—and later Zygmunt Bauman (1989)—controversially argued it was the outgrowth of this

ubiquitous modern impulse toward technocracy coupled with the instrumental rationality of bureaucracy—rather than political irrationalism—that made possible the rise of totalitarianism and its disastrous consequences. By demarcating scientific and technical rationality from substantive ends and values, and by prioritizing the former while subordinating the latter or redefining it in technical terms, technocracy helped unleash the destructive potential of modernity. Indeed, detailed studies of slavery, forced labor and genocide in Nazi Germany have unambiguously documented that the routinized application of scientific management and technical knowledge was instrumental in organizing those atrocities (Allen 2005). This does not mean, however, that the drive to renovate Europe according to the logic of Nazi racial supremacy could be teleologically attributed to the monolithic, technocratic imperative of modernity. As post-Kuhnian historical and sociological studies of science and technology have convincingly shown, not only the effects and consequences of science and technology but also the very form and content of scientific and technical rationality are historically and socially constructed and should not be taken as a priori given (Shapin 1982). The operation of technocracy is itself deeply political, but the ways in which it becomes entwined with particular ideologies such as racism could vary, depending on specific sociocultural, political and historical contexts.

At any rate, in many twentieth-century dictatorships, irrespective of their ideological orientation, technocracy came to constitute one of the main pillars of the state administrative power. This should not be conflated with the monopoly—or intentional manipulation—of scientific and technical expertise by all-powerful rulers. The dictatorial regimes often had a "polycratic" power structure, with multiple power centers competing for expert resources. Moreover, the workings of technocracy are contingent on the acceptance of the epistemic authority of science and technology, which may well constrain the discretionary power of the regimes. Twentieth-century dictatorships nonetheless found the reductionism inherent in technocracy extremely useful—that is, the dissolution of complex sociopolitical issues into a set of technical problems deemed solvable only by the application of scientific and technical expertise—in advancing their projects of modernization and in quelling any nascent dissent over them. The masses—especially, the growing middle-class and intelligentsia—were, by and large, compliant in accepting that approach, albeit with varying degree of enthusiasm, since they also feared that erratic policies formulated in reaction to massive popular pressure would not work, jeopardizing the prospect of sustained national development. Occasionally, popular resistance against technocratic policies forced dictatorial regimes to make concessions. Usually, though, demands were absorbed again through technocratic structures—or what James Ferguson (1994) described as the "antipolitical machine"—and were depoliticized and recast as another set of technical problems to be tackled.

One of the very few exceptions to the symbiosis between technocracy and twentieth-century dictatorships was the Maoist programs of "mass science."

Asserting that science and technology were inherently political, these programs strongly criticized the technocracy embedded in the administration of the PRC. The campaign claimed that, if science and technology were to serve the masses, they should not be left to the experts alone but should "walk on two legs"—the masses and the experts (Fan 2012a). During the Cultural Revolution, urban workers and peasants were encouraged to participate in scientific research and technological development. Many intellectuals, scientists and engineers, on the other hand, were sent down to labor in rural areas and to learn from the everyday life of the masses. When the Cultural Revolution ended, however, the PRC quickly returned to the technocratic system of governance it had originally adopted. By the mid- to late 1980s, almost all leading positions in the CCP were filled by technically trained elites (Andreas 2009). Perhaps one of the most distinguished features of twentieth-century dictatorships from their premodern predecessors is not the nature and extent of coercion but this unprecedented engagement of scientific and technical experts in the exercise of power. The mass consent for dictatorial rule was then largely predicated on the belief in the effectiveness of technocratic rationality. As will be discussed, the consolidation of technocracy as a central logic of governance under dictatorial regimes was most prominent in the biopolitical projects of regulating the life and health of the population.

Instruments of Biopolitics

Among the social engineering initiatives undertaken by twentieth-century dictatorships, the implementation of "racial hygiene" policies by Nazi Germany has attracted much scholarly attention. "Biopolitical" projects that attempted to control and regulate the processes of human vitality, morbidity and mortality in the name of safeguarding a healthy nation were characteristics of the modern state (Foucault 2003). Even authoritarian forms of biopolitics—for example, eugenic sterilization to control the reproduction of the mentally handicapped—were also carried out in liberal democracies and were not limited to the Nazi regime: in fact, the first country to introduce eugenics-based compulsory sterilization programs was the United States (Kevles 1985). But it was only under Nazi Germany that the idea of racial hygiene was elevated to the level of a national imperative and came to define all areas of health and social policies. This was, to a considerable extent, incited by anti-Semitism. Still, just as other biopolitical projects did, racial hygiene policies required the regimes of truth and the means of intervention based on established scientific and technical knowledge and practices—for example, anthropology, genetics, psychiatry and so on. Detlev Peukert (1993) argued that there was an ominous yet logical complicity between racist dynamics already present within these sciences, the utopian technocratic belief in all-embracing scientific solutions of social problems and the atavism of Nazi ideology, which eventually gave rise to the monstrous machinery of murder and the death of millions.

The technocratic alliance among science, technology and the Nazi state was well illustrated in the case of the eugenically motivated euthanasia program. The program began in 1939 and, until its official suspension in 1941, nearly 300,000 patients with physical or mental disabilities, including children, were killed in Germany and its occupied territories (Burleigh 1994). The biopolitical rationale was that, in order for the nation's limited resources to be allocated to putatively "productive" members of the "people's community" (*Volksgemeinschaft*), the disabled should be rooted out. According to Hans-Walter Schmuhl (2008), the scientists and physicians involved in this program—those at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Genetics, and Eugenics, in particular—did not merely provide the Nazi regime with the technical means to realize its political objectives. Rather, they collaborated with the regime out of conviction that their scientific and technical expertise would help to bring "rational" solutions to, and thereby alleviate, the social problems Germany was experiencing. Conversely, the political elites were also willing to base and legitimize their policy decision-making on expert recommendations. In Schmuhl's words, the two groups were part of the "developmental biopolitical dictatorship" (*biopolitische Entwicklungsdiktatur*), which aspired to create a racially pure, socially homogeneous *Volksgemeinschaft* by controlling "birth and death, sexuality and reproduction, body and germ line, variability and evolution" (Schmuhl 2008).

However, other studies have indicated that the nature of Nazi biopolitics was more complicated than the elimination of the "unfit" through coercive, eugenic social engineering. The regimes of truth, on which biopolitics is established, cannot be imposed top-down by the state or by the collusion of technocratic elites. In fact, many psychiatrists and nurses who participated in the euthanasia program made eugenic decisions on their own, following the scientific paradigms they adopted and internalizing professional norms (Foth 2013). Often, parents voluntarily requested eugenic procedures for their own children, although their decisions might have been influenced by state-sponsored public education (Burleigh 1994). So even under the brutal Nazi regime, biopolitics was not simply an extension of the state's exercise of sovereign power; it also entailed the various strategies of governing life developed by multiple authorities and experts outside the state apparatuses. Furthermore, Nazi doctors and health officials conducted an aggressive anti-smoking campaign and introduced a wide range of public health measures, including strict occupational health and safety standards and restrictions on asbestos, radiation and pesticides (Proctor 1999). A number of social welfare schemes were also put in place, such as rewarding parents with tax allowances, providing young people with technical training and offering vacations for workers (Fritzsche 1996). These actions—and the employment of scientific and technical expertise in them—were intricately interwoven with the racial ideal of a pure and healthy German nation, and the emphasis was always on the enforcement of discipline, not on the opportunities for individuals. They nevertheless suggested that Nazi

biopolitics sometimes took the form of the politics of life, rather than that of "thanatopolitics," or the politics of death.

The one-child policy of the PRC represented another example of the constitutive role of science and technology in the biopolitical projects of twentieth-century dictatorships. During the Maoist period (1949–1976), population was not strictly controlled, respecting the desire of the masses in reproduction. As China was about to reenter the global capitalist economy in the post-Mao era, population growth was increasingly recognized as a serious obstacle for national development. Critical in that process were the projections of the gap between population and development produced by a group of experts in cybernetics, control theory and system engineering (Greenhalgh 2008). This new scientific approach resonated with the PRC's vision of technocratic socialist planning and was taken as the basis for population control, yielding what Susan Greenhalgh and Edwin Winckler (2005) called "Leninist biopolitics." The outcome was the introduction of the one-child policy in 1978, which centrally coordinated coercive birth controls through bureaucratic means. While these measures caused immense social suffering, they were justified as the scientific—hence, logical and necessary—solution to curb population growth and to facilitate China's emergence as a global power. Later in the 1990s, as China became rapidly integrated into global markets, the PRC gradually moved away from "Leninist biopolitics" toward "neoliberal biopolitics," with indirect state regulation and self-disciplining (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). Yet, the technocratic mode of policymaking, along with the scientization and statisticalization of sociopolitical life, continued to function as the backbone of China's biopolitical regime.

In discussing the relationship between biopolitics, fascism and democracy, Edward Dickinson (2004) rightly pointed out that the tendency among scholars to associate biopolitics primarily with totalitarian or authoritarian regimes is problematic. But it is equally problematic to assume that thanatopolitics was the only significant mode of biopolitics under dictatorships, and that science and technology were but another set of tools mobilized by the state's sovereign power for destructive purposes. Positive attempts to foster and regulate the life and health of the population could not be easily distinguished from negative ones to construct and exclude unhealthy "others" from the population or to discipline individual bodies to internalize dominant norms, values and beliefs. Even Nazi biopolitics, as sketched above, was a complex mix of the politics of life and the politics of death. Biopolitics in twentieth-century dictatorships took many different forms, reflecting the varying sociocultural, political and historical contexts in which it emerged and operated. And in each of these distinct forms of biopolitics, science and technology were integral components of its epistemic foundations as well as strategies and techniques of intervention. As twentieth-century dictatorships needed to make their biopolitical projects of disciplining the masses and creating a healthy and productive nation successful, the incorporation of science and technology into their regime-building was therefore essential.

Conclusion

As briefly reviewed in this essay, mass dictatorships in the twentieth century engaged with science and technology in various but interdependent ways. Science and technology were a key symbolic metric of a state's capacity to fulfill the collective aspiration of the masses for (re)building a strong nation. Science and technology simultaneously served as crucial material and intellectual resources for mass dictatorial regimes in their efforts to develop self-reliant political economies. The decisions the regimes made in those and other policy areas were informed by a technocratic logic of governance that prioritized scientific and technical rationality. The biopolitical projects of securing a healthy and productive nation—whether in a negative or positive form—also required science and technology as core components. It should be stressed again here that these processes can by no means be reduced to the misuse or abuse of science and technology by political power. In contrast to the picture conveyed by the Cold War Mertonian narratives, authoritarian politics did not automatically obstruct the development and use of authentic science and technology. The instances of explicit attempts to impose certain ideological doctrines on science and technology did occur, but they were rare and never fully successful. The intertwining of science, technology and political ideologies was usually more subtle—in such a way that the historical actors involved, including scientists and engineers, recognized it as natural and scientifically sound—and could be found in the apparently neutral exercises of science and technology under both dictatorial and democratic regimes.

Thus, more important for scholars of twentieth-century dictatorships is to critically examine the constitutive and constructive roles of science and technology in the very building and maintenance of mass dictatorial regimes and how they differed, or shared similarities, across diverse dictatorial regimes and from contemporaneous liberal democracies, rather than to narrowly focus on the destructive manipulation and distortion of science and technology. There have recently been a number of studies pointing in that direction. A series of new historical studies of science and technology in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union have shown that, in both regimes, science and technology not only were shaped by the dominant imaginaries of radical social renovation but also played an instrumental role in (re)producing and materializing those imaginaries (see, e.g., Szöllösi-Janze 2001; Andrews 2003; Gordin et al. 2008; Heim et al. 2009). Other works in the history of science and technology have more directly aimed at comparing the mutual relationships between science, technology and dictatorships in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Vichy France, Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal (Saraiva 2009; Saraiva and Wise 2010). All of these studies have contributed greatly to the contextual analysis of mass dictatorships. However, there are, as yet, not many comparable studies exploring how such relationships were developed and performed, as well as what distinctive features they had, in non-European regions. While there is a growing literature on the coproduction of science, technology and authoritarianism in Asia—for instance, wartime imperial Japan, Maoist China and New

Order Indonesia (see, e.g., Mizuno 2008; Moore 2013; Schmalzer 2008; Fan 2012b; Wei and Brock 2012; Amir 2012)—many more studies are still needed to fully understand its nature and dynamics.

The study of the relationships between science, technology and mass dictatorships is important not just because it provides us with a better understanding of the past. By the end of the twentieth century, the idea of justifying unitary autocratic rule as a means to realize the collective yearning for building a strong nation and/or catching up with advanced nations had lost its popular appeal. But the imbroglio of science, technology and politics is an inescapable feature of modern society, and with the perceived crisis of national security or development, an authoritarian form of such entanglement may well arise in liberal democracies. In his presidential farewell address, Dwight Eisenhower (1961) famously warned the American public of the dangers presented by the "military-industrial complex," which included the prospect of domination of science and technology by the state and business interests and the risk of public policy being captured by the scientific and technological elite. In post-military rule South Korea, the three consecutive civilian governments since 1992 were anxious to emphasize a break with past authoritarian regimes, but all proudly professed that they were the successors of Park Chung-Hee's developmental nationalist approach to science and technology. The social movement's call for public debate on the social, ethical and environmental consequences of science and technology—e.g., nuclear power and biotechnology—was seen by these governments as a hindrance to South Korea becoming a technologically advanced nation and was largely sidelined, if not dismissed (Kim 2014, 2015). There are many other examples of potential threats to the public interest and democratic values posed by the programmatic alliance between science, technology, the state and corporate power in liberal democracies. The intellectual and political questions raised by the analysis of science and technology under mass dictatorships therefore remain highly relevant for our critical understanding of the present.

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Domination

Introduction: Repression and Cooptation in Mass Dictatorship

António Costa Pinto

A comparative analysis of the institutions of political domination and control of mass dictatorships highlights some universals regardless of ideological differences and subtypes: violence toward citizens, political repression and institutions of coercion and integration. It has at been argued several times (but often forgotten) that repression and integration-cooptation are two inseparable instruments of domination in mass dictatorships. In fact, as it has been argued often, two basic conflicts shape politics in dictatorships (Svolik 2012): the first is between those who rule and those who are ruled: all dictators face threats from the masses and the political problem of balancing against the majority excluded from power is central—the problem of authoritarian coercion and control; yet dictators rarely control enough resources to preclude such challenges on their own—they therefore typically rule with a number of allies. Cooptation of elites is always present as well. Even so, both at the elite and mass level, "violence is an ever-present and the ultimate arbiter of conflicts in authoritarian politics," shaping the conduct of politics in dictatorships (Svolik 2012). Coercion remains the core feature of dictatorships, and fear, violence, intimidation and surveillance are at the core of political domination and of the maintenance of authoritarianism.

In this section we deal mainly with police forces as instruments of repression, but there is a myriad of other institutions—militaries, paramilitaries and militia, clandestine organizations and so forth—that comprise the coercive apparatus of dictatorships. Police organizations played of course a key role in the running and survival of dictatorships. As chapter "Policing and Surveillance,"

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underlines, this typically involved the application of physical coercion and the operation of systems of surveillance to control societies and suppress political dissent in the context of enhanced powers (political, legal or personal) and the extensive collaboration of segments of society. In fact, dictatorships enabled more systematic and widespread employment of citizens as informers for the police and other repressive institutions.

In their assessment of authoritarian coercive behaviour, most studies do not differentiate between types of dictatorship and their impact on different levels (and types) of repression. Repression is therefore taken for granted. They do not consider divergent hypotheses regarding which type of dictatorships are the most repressive, and they do not consider different types of repressive activity at the same time (Davenport 2007). For example, within one thesis repressive behaviour emerges when autocratic leaders are isolated and have involved a smaller number of actors in the political process (more personalist systems). By contrast, in dictatorships with a sizable network of political institutions the likelihood of coercive behaviour would be lower, for those in power are able to use alternative mechanisms of domination and control to influence the masses by "channelling" them through established political institutions (Linz 2000). This might explain both the extension and also the type of repression, since the highly bureaucratic orientation and capacity for inclusion might produce more "consensus" than other dictatorships. Another argument is that within political systems where the agents of repression (i.e. the military) directly wield power, there is a higher likelihood that repressive behaviour—especially violent activity—would be applied out of habit, and the "usual suspects," like political polices, use of "political court" systems and other devices, are replaced by simple clandestine state terror. Italian Fascism from one side and Argentina's military dictatorship from the other could be examples of this diversity.

Some students of authoritarianism base their typologies of dictatorships on this repression–loyalty binomium. For Ronald Wintrobe for instance the fact that dictatorships use these two instruments to stay in power suggests a classification of regimes: tinpots (low repression and loyalty), tyrants (high repression, low loyalty), totalitarians (high levels of both) and timocrats (low repression, high loyalty). Thus, totalitarian regimes combine high repression with a capacity to generate loyalty. Under tyranny, the regime stays in power through high repression alone, and loyalty is low (Wintrobe 1998).

It is important to stress as well that levels of repression are obviously not constant over time. By ideological, institutional and international factors dictatorships change their methods and modes of repression. That is certainly the case with the Soviet Union, Communist China or Franco's Spain, where we clearly detect different phases associated with the role of ideology and institutionalization in these regimes. Technological innovation and institutional efficiency in repressive and police systems are other elements of explanation, not to mention changes in the international arena, and international norms such as human rights, which do influence, in certain junctures, levels of repression in mass dictatorships.

The construction of internal and external enemies is another element to consider since we deal here with a structural dimension of mass dictatorships both at mass and elite level. Inclusion and exclusion are central instruments of domination and they are both ideological constructs and political devices in these regimes. As Eve Rosenhaft stresses in her chapter, "the 'mass' envisaged by self-conscious 'mass dictatorships' is never everybody, but commonly a mythic 'us' that always implies a 'them' and calls for 'them' to be identified and eliminated." This tendency towards binary thinking in mass dictatorships is a facet of their radical "modernity" and its manifestation in transformational projects. As it stressed in her chapter, the revolutionary dynamic that produced them requires such regimes not only to constantly generate enemies but also to harden binary divides through the imperative to self-reflection.

Another obvious characteristic of mass dictatorships is a specific type of knowledge management where information is centralized and censorship is systematic. Although the degree of institutionalization of censorship varies in the different dictatorships, the existence of commonalities pinpoints a systemic logic of ideological and infrastructural reinforcements in the world of communist dictatorships: prescriptive propaganda measures, making censorship part of a larger artisanal enterprise, accompanied the restrictive ones; the press laws insured the control of the Party over the content as well as over the administrative (the access to profession), financial, technical and material means of publishing. Last but not least, central news agencies acted as filters for all printed or broadcast information, despite periods of liberalization.

More complex and diverse is the way these political regimes framed interest groups and especially labour. Mass dictatorships required not only the heavy hand of the state, but also the consent and cooperation of the masses. In order to achieve their ambitious production targets, these dictatorships called upon their citizens to produce more and sometimes to consume less. In Europe and Latin America corporatism did offer autocrats a formalized system of interest representation to manage labour relations, legitimizing the repression of free labour unionism by the cooptation of some of its segments through state-controlled unions often with compulsory membership. Last but not least, corporatism arrangements were also mechanisms of integration, trying to "allow for the state, labour, and business to express their interests and arrive at outcomes that are first and foremost, satisfactory to the regime" (Kim and Gandhi 2010, p. 648). Even without using this ideological and institutional device, all mass dictatorships need to promote visions of an "organic," classless, functionalist society and corporatist ideals such as labour–management harmony and the dignity of the worker, as Janis Minimura explores in her chapter dealing with the Japanese experience.

This section concludes with the legacies of mass dictatorships and the memory management of the authoritarian past in successor democracies. Research into regime change, and particularly on transitions to democracy, has increasingly used the concept of "authoritarian legacies," especially in the case of the transition from communist dictatorships to democracy (Pinto and Morlino 2011). Although it is very difficult to measure the impact of a legacy, and few scholars use explicit definitions of what constitutes a "legacy," some emphasize

the institutional and structural features and others stress behavioural patterns. Nevertheless, Pop-Eleches introduced a definition of legacies "as the structural, cultural, and institutional starting points of ex-communist [or—we can add—any] dictatorships at the outset of a transition" (2007, p. 910). A major problem here is how to disentangle specific legacies of the previous dictatorships from historical legacies *tout court*, since what is in the closet when transitions open the doors of previous dictatorships is much more than authoritarianism.

The concluding chapter of this section deals with the construction by the new democracies of a dominant collective memory of a rupture with the past. In fact, "it is a common assumption among transitional actors, and one often repeated in the democratisation literature, that discrediting the rule of dictators is important" (Pridham 2000, p. 47). By establishing a moral and political break with a repressive non-democratic past—the key mark of which is to shift the boundaries, and patterns, of social and political inclusion and exclusion—the voice of the victims is legitimated, repression is condemned, democrats become the new winners and old repressors pariahs. Democratic legitimation takes time, and this "inverted legitimation" may help establish a clear break with the past (Valenzuela 1992, p. 48). International factors like the end of the Cold War and the emergence of an international community that was more active in the export of democratic values and institutions, conditionality in accession to regional polities such as the European Union (EU), also provoked significant strides towards the trans-nationalization of political justice associated with the legacy of dictatorships.

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Violence, Repression and Terror in Mass Dictatorships: A View from the European Margins

António Costa Pinto and Filipa Raimundo

> *We must remember that the main purpose of the trial and execution is not to save the soul of the accused but to achieve the public good and put fear into others.*
>
> Spanish Inquisitor, 1578
> (quoted in Kamen 1998, p. 174).

Repression remains the core feature of dictatorships, and fear, terror, violence, intimidation and surveillance are at the core of the systems of political domination and maintenance of modern dictatorships. Nevertheless, if repression is a structural dimension of mass dictatorships, "political" and\or "state terror," while always potentially present, is not when we define the latter as the arbitrary extermination of individuals by organs of political authority or groups (Dallin 1970, p. 1).

Repression and integration are two inseparable instruments of domination in mass dictatorships. In fact, as it has been often noted, some basic conflicts shape politics in dictatorships. The first is between those who rule and those who are ruled. All dictators face threats from the masses and the political problem of maintaining balance against the majority who are excluded from power is central: dictators rarely control enough resources to preclude such challenges on their own and therefore typically rule with a number of allies. Even so, both at the elite and mass level "violence is an ever-present and the ultimate arbiter of conflicts in authoritarian politics," shaping the conduct of politics in dictatorships (Svolik 2012). It is important to stress that repression and violence levels by ideological, institutional and international factors are obviously not

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constant over time and we can clearly detect different phases associated with the origin, consolidation and role of ideology and political institutions in these regimes. Technological innovation and institutional efficiency in repressive and police systems are other elements of explanation for levels of repression in mass dictatorships, as are changes in the international arena and international norms—such as human rights—that exert influence at certain junctures.

Another important aspect to consider is the variety of modern dictatorships (Kim et al. 2013). In assessing coercive authoritarian behaviour, most studies do not differentiate between types of dictatorship and their impact on different levels (and types) of repression. Repression is therefore taken for granted. Divergent hypotheses of what type of dictatorship is most repressive and the different types of simultaneous repressive activities are not considered (Davenport 2007). For example, according to one thesis repressive behaviours emerge when autocratic leaders are isolated and have involved a smaller number of actors in the political process (more personalist systems). By contrast, in dictatorships with a sizeable network of political institutions, the likelihood of coercive behaviour is less for the simple reason that those in power are able to use alternative mechanisms of domination and control to influence the masses, by "channelling" them through established political institutions (Linz 2000). This might explain both the extension and type of repression, since a highly bureaucratic orientation and capacity for inclusion might produce greater consensus than in other dictatorships while also targeting and repressing opponents more violently (Franz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). Another argument is that within those political systems in which agents of repression (i.e. the military) wield power directly, there is a greater likelihood that repressive behaviour—especially violence—will be applied out of habit. In this case the usual suspects—the political police and "political court" systems—are simply replaced by clandestine state terror. Italian Fascism and the Argentinian military dictatorship were two examples of this (Ebner 2011; Pereira 2005).

Some students of authoritarianism base their typologies of dictatorship on this repression–loyalty binomial. For Ronald Wintrobe, the fact dictatorships use these two instruments to remain in power suggests a regime classification of tin-pots (low repression and loyalty), tyrants (high repression, low loyalty), totalitarians (high levels of both) and timocrats (low repression, high loyalty). Totalitarian regimes thus combine high levels of repression with a capacity to generate loyalty, while tyrannical regimes remain in power through repression alone, and loyalty to them is low (Wintrobe 1998).

Repression in dictatorships comes in a number of forms within two major types: repression of civil liberties and repression of physical integrity. Since the political (and sometimes physical) survival of autocrats is the decisive element in the integration–repression binomial, extreme violence and quasi-permanent "state terrorism" might undermine the dictatorship's stability and is therefore used only in very limited occasions (Escribà-Folch 2015).

Below we will examine the dynamics of the second element of repression and repressive institutions described above in two Iberian dictatorships.

Institutionalized during the "era of fascism": António de Oliveira Salazar's New State in Portugal (1933–1974) and Francisco Franco's regime in Spain (1939–1977) both survived the Second World War and a substantial part of the Cold War. With different origins—a failed military coup followed by a civil war in the latter case and a successful military coup in the former—both dictatorships converged in the 1950s as forms of highly institutionalized authoritarianism, expressing similar values and having similar political institutions. The longevity of these dictatorships, crossing two different international systems and facing new internal and external challenges, enables us to use these two emblematic examples as a way of addressing some interpretations of the relationship between repression and dictatorships.

Repression and Terror: Two Faces of the Same Authoritarian Species?

While enjoying some similar characteristics in terms of political institutions and cultural background, Francoism and the New State of Salazar differed in their origins. Both were constructed on the foundation of the military institution; both created single parties, social institutions and other political bodies partially inspired by the example of European fascism; and in the Catholic Church both had a powerful ally and legitimizing agent. However, the fact General Franco's 1936 *coup d'état* failed, leading to a civil war, dramatically altered both its origins and the level and type of repression of the first phase of Francoism (1939–1945).

The institutionalization of Francoism in the areas controlled by General Franco's "nationalists" and from 1939 across the whole of Spain was marked by extreme and systematic violence against "republicans," a category that included all those of whatever ideology who fought the civil war on the losing side, and who were subsequently considered to be "anti-Spain." As the political institutions were being established, Francoist repression acquired terroristic characteristics that were both highly radicalized and ideological. This process of the political, physical and—in an exceptional case for a right-wing dictatorship—economic annihilation of the republican elite and their supporters was one of Francoism's founding elements; one executed in a progressively systematic and organized way to become the legitimating principle of the new political order (Jerez and Luque 2014).

The radicalization caused by civil war and its impact on the repressive nature of nascent dictatorship are well-known phenomena; however, in the Spanish case this radicalization had three core dimensions: it politicized the armed forces in a quite dramatic ideological way; it radicalized the Catholic Church, which engaged in an anti-republican crusade; and it gave a small fascist party, the Falange de las JONS, a more important role within the Francoist conservative coalition than could have been foreseen given its relative weakness at the outbreak of the civil war.

The Francoist repression of 1939–1945 sought the physical elimination of all those who could represent any type of resistance to those who had defeated the Second Spanish Republic. In the balance between co-optation and repression, the regime's exclusive use of the latter was of such a violent nature that several historians have described it as "planned extermination" (Espinosa 2002), "genocide" or even a "holocaust" (Preston 2012).

The armed forces were the agents of repression and terror during Francoism's early years. It was they who ran the security forces, executed and drove forward the summary executions, courts-martial, imprisonments and who organized the concentration camps (Osuna 2014). Some authors estimate that between 1936 and 1944 around 190,000 were either executed or died in prison. Of these, 130,000 were judicial executions and perhaps between 40,000 and 50,000 were executed without a trial. More recent research suggests the numbers executed were in the tens of thousands, with the most conservative estimates claiming an average of ten people executed every day between 1939 and 1945 (Richards 1999, p. 30). Torture accounted for the large numbers of suicides in prison, to which the authorities often reacted by executing one of the dead prisoner's relatives.

Death was just one expression of institutionalized terror. Mass imprisonments and economic discrimination and expropriation were also adopted as instruments of a global policy of repression. In 1939 around 300,000 republicans were being held prisoner in more than forty concentration camps. These camps were designed and operated as an "Arendt-style purgatory" concentration system, but with "greater emphasis on repression and identity change" (Rodrigo 2005, p. 20). While the concept only appeared during the 1970s with the clandestine terrorism models of the Latin American military dictatorships, a great number of people disappeared as well, estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000 (Casanova 2004).

Francoism also introduced two new laws: the Law of Political Responsibilities in 1939, and the Law for the Repression of Masonry and Communism in 1940. While remaining under military jurisdiction, the courts established by these laws were made up of judicial officials and activists aligned to the single party, FET y de las JONS (FET-JONS). The former was particularly radical for a right-wing dictatorship because it could (and did) expropriate the property of much of the republican elite (Dueñas 2006). The right to property lost all meaning for those who occupied political positions associated with the republicans. Between 1939 and 1942 this court heard 38,055 cases, while in this year 188,671 were awaiting trial. As expected, by the mid-1940s the coercive apparatus began to show signs of being overstretched (Osuna 2014, p. 133).

In parallel with this the regime created its political institutions; however, the unity of the armed forces and their dependence on the Caudillo were crucial for the consolidation and stability of the new authoritarian order (Casanova 2015). As Stanley Payne noted, in 1939 the Spanish dictator "was the European ruler who, both formally and theoretically, retained the most absolute and uncontrolled power" (Payne 2000, p. 487). Some of Franco's personal characteristics,

and his relationship with the institutions that constituted the base of his victory, were to influence the new political system's nature. Franco was a reactionary military man who believed in order, anti-Communism and traditional Catholicism and who was obsessed with the "liberal–Masonic conspiracy." His relationship with FET-JONS was also more utilitarian than ideological—he was not the original party leader and neither was the Falange to be a determining factor in his seizure of power—sensitive as he was to both the armed forces and the Catholic Church (the other powerful institutions involved in founding the new regime). Nevertheless, FET-JONS managed to create a party apparatus and ancillary organization, and the party controlled a considerable collection of ancillary organizations such as the Youth Front, the Spanish University Union, the Women's Section, the Syndical Organization and the Spanish equivalent of Italy's National Recreational Club (OND—Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro), the Education and Recreation Syndical Organization. More importantly, the party retained responsibility for propaganda within the regime.

The dynamics of the institutionalization of the Franco dictatorship contrast sharply with the beginnings of Salazarism. Portugal experienced a right-wing dictatorship that lasted from 1926, the year in which a military *coup d'état* overthrew the First Republic, until 25 April 1974, when the dictatorship was overthrown by another military coup. The first years of the dictatorship were of crises, revolts and military conspiracies and movements led by republican military officers calling for the restoration of liberal order; however, at the governmental level a more cohesive group of conservative generals consolidated around General Óscar Carmona, who was elected president in a fake plebiscite in 1928. In the wake of a major financial crisis, António de Oliveira Salazar was named finance minister, subsequently gaining a wide range of powers over the other ministries. Salazar was a conservative Catholic politician and university professor who remained Portugal's dictator until he was incapacitated in 1968. One of the first political institutions created by the new regime was the single party, the National Union, which was legally established in 1930 as an "anti-party party" that united all the civilian forces that supported the new regime. In 1933 a new constitution declared Portugal a "unitary and corporatist republic," in which the liberal and corporatist principles of representation were balanced. The former, however, were eliminated through subsequent legislation, while the latter were limited to the point of insignificance.

The Salazarist institutions created by the 1933 constitution formally maintained fundamental freedoms; however, they were successively eliminated by decree. The constitution retained a directly elected head of state and a parliament to which deputies were elected from a single list prepared by the National Union, and introduced a corporatist chamber. The result was a dictatorship headed by a prime minister and a national assembly dominated by the National Union through non-competitive elections. To avoid any loss of power, even to a parliament dominated by the government party, the executive was made almost completely autonomous. Censorship eliminated any suggestion of political conflict and censors devoted their attention to the opposition and, in particular, to

the fascist minority led by Rolão Preto—a group that had initially challenged the new regime. The political police were reorganized and used with remarkable rationale. All this was done from above, and with little fascistic demagoguery. It was a process that depended more on generals and colonels than on lieutenants, and more on the Interior Ministry than on "the mob." By 1934, liberalism had been eliminated and the old republican institutions replaced.

The New State inherited and strengthened the military dictatorship's repressive apparatus. While censorship was established in 1926 and controlled by the propaganda services, successive decrees increased the independence of the political police until it answered only to Salazar. Apart from repressing the clandestine opposition, controlling access to public administration was of central importance. Mechanisms were developed to improve control over the judicial branch. Political crimes, for example, were placed under the jurisdiction of special military courts with specially nominated judges. The political police were also given broad powers to determine prison sentences.

The first military courts, the Special Military Courts, were created by the military dictatorship to try republican armed rebellions on a somewhat ad hoc base. These courts, which were set up to try pro-democratic rebel officers, were transformed into the "authoritarian judiciary" that until 1945 tried all "political crimes." The use of military courts to punish political crimes is a characteristic of many civilian dictatorships; however, in the case of Salazar's New State it was just one facet of the military presence within the authoritarian political system. The press censor, the leadership of the political police and the New State's militia, the Portuguese Legion, were all led by members of the armed forces.

According to the 1933 constitution, political crimes were excepted from the prohibition of imprisonment without trial (Article 8). It also allowed "security measures"—the extension of prison sentences by administrative decision. With the consolidation of the dictatorship, political repression came under the auspices of the political police, the Vigilance and State Defence Police (PVDE), which was formed in 1933 by the merger of police forces inherited from the military dictatorship. With a strong military presence from the outset, the PVDE received technical assistance from the Italian Fascist regime and established a network of informants (Ivani 2008). Despite two name changes, Salazar's political police force maintained a constant presence and was not abolished until the restoration of democracy in 1974. While formally under the control of the interior ministry, its independence increased and it dominated the investigation and presentation of cases to the political courts. The PVDE became the spine of the system of repression, and was responsible for arresting, torturing and, occasionally, murdering the regime's opponents.

In addition to imprisonment, the dictatorship also gave itself the legal tools to purge the civil service, allowing it to remove all civil servants who expressed opposition to the government "either in the course of their duties or in their private life." There were several such purges, particularly in the aftermath of legal and clandestine demonstrations. From 1931, those seeking employment

in the civil service had to make a declaration involving "the active repudiation of communism and of all subversive ideals."

The special jails for political prisoners were maintained under the control of the political police. There were three such prisons in continental Portugal and one, in which conditions were particularly hard, on the Cape Verde island of Santiago, which is where the regime mainly sent anarcho-syndicalists, trade unionists and communists during the 1930s.

Following the consolidation of the dictatorship in the second half of the 1930s, some characteristics of political repression remained constant throughout the duration of the New State regime: political repression affected both pro-democratic activist and organized clandestine groups, in particular the Portuguese Communist Party. There is a strong correlation between the waves of anti-dictatorship political activism and subsequent repression.

From the late 1920s to the late 1930s, and especially with the consolidation of the New State, the uncertain and disconnected repression of political opponents became more systematic and unified in terms of repressive agents, with the centrality of the political police and of the special branch of the judiciary: the military courts (Rosas 2009). According to the report published by the semi-official commission created in the 1970s, from 1932 to 1945, 13,663 individuals were detained or imprisoned for political reasons (Pinto and Raimundo 2016).

International Change, Repression and Political Adaptation

The Spanish position of "non-belligerence" during the Second World War is one important reason why Franco's regime survived after 1945. Yet the survival of a non-democratic regime in a democratizing Western Europe meant the regime had to rethink its identity. In this context, it helped that Franco was faced with an international environment that, while unfavourable to autocratic regimes, was increasingly anti-communist. The start of the Cold War, the decision of the USA to cooperate with anti-communist dictatorships and the prospect of UN membership all made it clear that the Spanish regime had definitely survived the post-war period but still needed to engage in important regime change, particularly regarding its repressive apparatus.

Yet these changes were not introduced at once, and they certainly did not mean the complete abandonment of heavily repressive methods, at least until the 1960s.

There were two important and somewhat interrelated changes introduced in the Spanish repressive system after the defeat of the Axis. First, the goal of purging the nation of the "anti-Spain" element was replaced by the idea of eliminating the anti-Francoist (Ruiz 2005, p. 226). "The strategy was based on distinguishing between two kinds of enemies: the perverse, defeated republican leaders; and the good, ordinary Spaniards who had been led astray by foreign ideologies and perverse politicians" (Sanchéz 2010, p. 43). Second, after years in which repression had

been conducted almost exclusively through military courts and special jurisdictions, in which ordinary criminal law and justice played but a residual role, Franco initiated a process of progressive subordination of the military (Osuna 2014), leading to the judicialization of repression.

In this new context, Franco supressed the para-military militias and ordered the reduction of courts-marital, imprisonments and executions. The judicialization of repression also meant that members of the ordinary Spanish judicial system would now take part in special courts to repress political dissidence, "such as the Political Accountability Law, the 'General Cause,' the Special Court for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism, the Vagrancy Law, the Provincial Tax Collection Agencies, and the Labour Law" (Aguilar 2013, p. 7). In addition, members of the judicial system also collaborated extensively with the political police, the Political Social Brigade. Because of the purges that had been conducted in the 1930s—through which 6% of the judges and 12% of the prosecutors were removed—Franco was enable to secure the judicial system's loyalty.

Legislation was also adapted after 1944. A new Penal Code, more lenient than previous regulations, was approved in 1944, and in 1945 the Law of Political Responsibilities was replaced by the Liquidation Commission, resulting in the dismissal of the thousands of cases that were still pending (Martínez-López and Gómez-Olivera 2014).

Yet despite a change in means, targets and extension of repression, they did not represent the complete abandonment of tried and tested methods. On the one hand, repression became less onerous for the common citizen. According to available data, "death sentences enforced by ordinary judges for non-political offences corresponds to the 1947–75 period and amounts to 41" (Aguilar 2013, p. 8). And if "by the end of 1940 there were 240,916 political prisoners in Spain, 7,762 of them on death row, awaiting execution" (Cazorla-Sanchez 2010, p. 31), by 1952 they were already 30,000 and in 1959, the number of political prisoners had gone down to 15,000, and these were the so-called "people of ideas" (Cazorla-Sanchez 2010, p. 35). Also, the number of leftist prisoners fell, executions were generally limited to crimes of blood and monarchist activists were treated as a kind of semi-legal opposition (Payne 1987).

On the other hand, certain opposition sectors remained under severe scrutiny, namely republicans, communists and freemasons who were still subject to heavy repression. In addition, the immediate post-war years were also marked by the activity of anti-Francoist guerrilla movements and a considerable number of these guerrilla fighters were targeted by the regime until throughout the 1950s. This has even been defined as a period of "terror" in rural Spain, mainly because extreme violence was exerted both by the regime and the resistance. 'On the one hand, the guerrillas proclaimed that they were recuing "the people" from the dictatorship, thus justifying the murder of local Francoists and the extortion of rich, and not so rich, peasants. On the authorities' side, the victims of the guerrillas were martyrs and those killed or tortured in counter-insurgency operations, whether guilty or not, were simply dismissed as criminals or accomplices.' (Cazorla-Sánchez 2010, p. 30)

The same thing can be seen in the legislation. In 1947, all repressive legislation was replaced by the Law for the Repression of Banditry and Terrorism, which, while removing some crimes from military jurisdiction, was aimed at the guerrilla resistance, therefore legalizing arbitrary detentions, the application of the "ley de fugas" and even summary executions. Years later, decree law issued in 1960 retained the death penalty. And the Special Tribunal for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism was also retained, remaining unreformed for many years. Courts-martial continued to pass death sentences until 1975. Available figures suggest as many as thirteen courts-martial death sentences were handed down between 1958 and 1975 (Aguilar 2013), and political prisoners were still used to perform forced labour up until 1970, when the last penal detachment was disbanded (Ruiz 2005).

The continuation of extra-judicial methods resulted in reactions from the international community. In 1962, the International Commission of Jurists produced a report that strongly criticized the persistence of military authority in Spain. Consequently, courts-martial and the Special Court for the Repression of Communism and Freemasonry were replaced by a new special court. The Court of Public Order was established in 1963 and was made up of civil judges who were to try cases of political subversion and political crime. All political and union-related crimes the military or special courts had dealt with previously now fell under the jurisdiction of the Court of Public Order and its police arm, the Political Social Brigade. These were the main repressive instruments during the last years of the Franco regime. Between 1963 and 1977, almost 9,000 people passed through this court, which in comparative terms was made fairer than its predecessors, especially because it often resulted in acquittals. Very few cases of political subversion and crime were tried in the military courts between 1964 and 1968. Finally, in 1969, Franco approved the much-awaited Law for the Prescription of Crimes Committed before 1 April 1939, thirty years after the end of the Civil War.

From 1945 political repression was also increasingly judicialized in Portugal. The regime's opponents were rarely murdered, but the political police were able to prolong imprisonment with almost no restrictions. Following the victory of the Allies and the end of the Second World War, demonstrations calling for the liberalization of the regime and the closing of Tarrafal were organized in Portugal. Although no substantial changes took place at that time, it is true that from 1945 to 1954 Salazar did grant an amnesty to some of the prisoners in Tarrafal and decided to close the concentration camp and order the return and imprisonment of the last prisoners in mainland Portugal. Tarrafal finally closed on 26 January 1954—only to be reopened in 1962 with the outbreak of the colonial wars, when it was used to hold captured members of the African liberation movements. It is estimated that from 1936 to 1954 the camp received around 340 prisoners, of whom thirty-two did not survive (Rosas 2009).

The New State experienced some institutional alterations with the end of the Second World War, and periods of "limited pluralism" within the regime were permitted during election campaigns, during which time opponents of the dictatorship were allowed to operate legally and media censorship was relaxed.

The political amnesties that had been granted since the 1930s were now made more extensive. Both Tarrafal and the prison at Peniche were removed from the control of the political police and the special courts were abolished and replaced by civil political courts—the Plenary Courts—which were made up entirely of magistrates. These courts remained in existence until 1974. In 1945 the regime established the exceptional application of habeas corpus; however, the political police's authority was strengthened as its monopoly over the trials and "security measures" continued to allow them to prolong imprisonment indefinitely.

There are still no complete figures for the number of political prisoners held by the regime from its formation to its fall. The Commission on the Black Book on Fascism, which was established after democratization of Portugal, in 1977 to collect information on the use of repression by the regime and the number of victims, estimated the number of prisoners to be in excess of 30,000.

Although this topic will not be developed here, it should nevertheless be noted that the scale of the political police's operations in the colonies grew very quickly between 1961 and 1974, as the colonial wars of the dictatorship in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique broke out and developed. Ironically, in the 1960s some military involved in coup attempts tried by military courts escaped the heavier sentences they would have received in the "political courts."

Salazar was replaced by Marcello Caetano in 1968. The new leader reformulated some of the regime's institutions and allowed a relaxation of censorship and political repression during the first year of his premiership and the opposition leader, Mário Soares, and others were authorized to return from exile. However, by 1969, after non-free and non-competitive elections, it was clear Salazar's successor had set out on a process of "liberalization without democratization." Regardless of other institutional changes introduced in the late 1960s, there is a continuity in the succession of conjunctures of an increase of "limited pluralism," namely during "election" periods, followed by waves of repression.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Given the variety of types, instruments, procedures and domains, repression within mass dictatorships in particular, and modern dictatorships in general, is a complex area for comparative historical research. If on the one hand some forms of repression are the common patrimony in dictatorships, such as in the field of civil and political liberties, with the repression of freedoms, censorship and so forth, the level is very varied and diverse. On the other hand, the political institutions within dictatorships, such as the parties, legislatures, mass organizations and other institutions of co-optation and control, also have a significant effect on the level of repression and as on other more or less ideological aspects. The second component of repression, that relating to repressing the physical integrity of sectors of society, is even more diverse than the first.

The dynamics of repression within the Franco and Salazar dictatorships immediately raise questions about the nature and impact of the process of regime change. In the Spanish case the radicalization and brutality of a civil

war that emphasized a fundamental ideological cleavage goes a long way to explaining the consolidation and legitimization of Francoism through terror. Some dimensions of this process did not consolidate, given the outbreak of the Second World War and the defeat of European fascism, but the institutionalization of Franco's dictatorship, from the repressive point of view, brought it closer to some aspects of totalitarianism. In the Portuguese case, the standard is much closer to the vast majority of transitions to authoritarianism in inter-war Europe.

The longevity of both dictatorships, which existed during two different international systems and while facing new internal and external challenges, is crucial in explaining internal continuities and changes to repression in Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal. The judicialization of repression is another factor that should not be excluded from the analytical portrait (Pereira 2005). In the case of Portugal, the creation of "civilian political courts" with professional, albeit specially selected judges, is a consequence of the process of adaptation after the Second World War.

After the end of the global conflict, while always maintaining strong institutional continuity, the Portuguese New State extended "limited pluralism," regularly alternating between short periods of this "limited pluralism"—generally during election campaigns—followed by periods of repression. Here, as has been noted before, the Portuguese case is an example of how dictatorships within the framework of an "economy of terror" are able to achieve an optimum state: "with a small number of political murders and arrests … it has succeeded in politically atomizing the underlying population and paralysing the elite opposition" (Martins 1968, p. 329).

This is not the case in Francoist Spain, where the process of transition from state terror to more predictable forms of political repression was slow, political institutions were less open to "limited pluralism," the use of violence was more widespread, and membership in Western international institutions during the Cold War was much more limited. In the Spanish case, international pressures to proceed with the judicialization of repression and ease repression were met with an ongoing struggle against the "anti-Franco" element in which extremely repressive means were used on many occasions until the regime's end.

The dynamics of repression and political terror of the two Iberian dictatorships, their ideological basis and relatively *longue durée* in comparison challenges some "classificatory" assumptions between types of dictatorships and types of repression, introducing new elements of explanation related to the diversity of processes of regime change, creations of political institutions or changes in the international arena.

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Policing and Surveillance

Jonathan Dunnage

INTRODUCTION

Police organizations played a key role in the running and survival of twentieth-century dictatorships. This typically involved the application of a variety of forms of coercion, together with the operation of penetrative systems of surveillance, in order to control societies and suppress political dissent. This took place in the context of enhanced police powers (political, legal and/or personal) and the extensive collaboration of members of the public. Yet, oppressive measures adopted by dictatorial police systems tended to vary and shift according to a wide set of factors, including the circumstances in which the dictatorship was created, its use or rejection of previous systems of repression, its particular course of development and the wider context of international politics. Whatever the extent of their powers, police forces rarely enabled dictatorships to exercise complete control over societies, even though they conditioned the lives and well-being of large numbers of citizens and undoubtedly contributed widely to the suffering many of them experienced under these regimes.

Analysis of the police forces of mass dictatorships and the individuals staffing them revolves around a number of questions and issues: What were their functions? Who were the targets of their activities? What methods did they employ? What powers and how much institutional autonomy did they enjoy? What was the impact of their policies and behaviour on societies, communities and individuals, and to what extent did this depend on the availability of resources and the collaboration of members of the public? How were dictatorial police forces structured? How closely were they controlled by the ruling party, and how did this determine recruitment, training, career development and the culture

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and environment of their institutions? These questions can also be extended to comparisons between communist and fascist police systems, and between the policing of dictatorships and liberal political systems; often significant lines of continuity emerge between dictatorial police forces and those employed by previous (and subsequent) liberal-democratic governments, with regard to methods, structures, powers and personnel. This essay aims to provide a general response to the above questions within the space available, by engaging in a comprehensive overview of policing and policemen in several twentieth-century dictatorships, though, as a reflection of the main focus of the author's own research, it provides a more detailed analysis of the police forces of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

POLICING TASKS AND METHODS

Twentieth-century dictatorships relied on police forces to uproot political dissidence, and repress, if not eliminate, other groups or phenomena considered a threat to the state and the dominant political ideology, though the intensity of this varied between regimes and often fluctuated over time within each regime. Alongside ideological "enemies" (which included dissidents from within the ruling political party), the police could be expected to target social, ethnic, religious, cultural, sexual or criminal "categories" of citizens, as well as monitor the behaviour and opinions of the populace as a whole. Police forces were also employed to help push through major social and economic reforms, as exemplified by collectivization programmes undertaken in the Soviet Union (Shelley 1996, pp. 30, 33). While the police of newly created right-wing dictatorships largely focused their activities on uprooting the underground organization of recently outlawed left-wing parties and trade unions, and those of communist regimes on eliminating the threat to state security posed by the bourgeois "class enemy" and "imperialist agents," as, for example, in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (Fulbrook 1995, pp. 25–27, 48), other police targets, including ethnic or religious "enemies," were often similar under both types of regime. Jews, religious groups, homosexuals and other "deviants," such as the work-shy and juvenile delinquents, were the objects of police repression in both Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union, for example, though the nature of their treatment often varied (Wagner 1996; Shelley 1996). This reflected the common desire of dictatorships of opposite political persuasions to impose conformity to idealized models of behaviour, as well as new juridical contexts in which most "crimes" and "offences" were conceived as political by nature, becoming acts against the state, the nation, the "people" or the "race."

In contrast to liberal-democratic orders, in their desire to eliminate or weaken "enemy" groups or successfully enforce radical social or economic change, as well as exercise firm control over the populace as a whole, mass dictatorships prioritized preventive forms of policing, such as the placing of restrictions on an individual or on targeted groups, over the repression of a "crime" once it had been committed. This involved more intensive undercover surveillance

activities, typified by secret police organizations employing informers, the use of registers of different categories of "dissidents" or "deviants," and detention without a full judicial process. Preventive policing often developed from systems employed on a smaller and less systematic scale under earlier liberal-democratic regimes. In fascist Italy, the instruments of *confino* (internal exile—previously known as *domicilio coatto*) and *ammonizione* (police curfew), which the police were able to apply to avoid lengthy judicial procedures, represented an intensification of pre-existing methods of "crime" prevention. Applied mainly against the "dangerous classes" in Liberal Italy, especially during periods of emergency, under Mussolini *confino* and *ammonizione* were extended to control and isolate many more categories of "offenders," including active political opponents and, more generally, those who were considered politically undesirable. From 1926 onwards, the police enjoyed fewer restrictions in the application of *confino* and *ammonizione*, though magistrates continued to sit on each provincial commission responsible for administering these measures, alongside central government, police and party representatives (Dunnage 2004, p. 263; Klinkhammer 2010, pp. 400–1).

In Germany, by contrast, preventive measures similar to *confino* had not been applied before 1933. The Nazis' employment of protective custody (*Schutzhaft*), preventive detention (*Vorbeugungshaft*) and, most significantly, legislation sanctioning the indefinite suspension of individual civil rights, marked the creation of a system of "police justice" (*Polizeijustiz*) and the dramatic curtailment of judicial guarantees existing under the Weimar Republic. Moreover, these instruments were applied far more quickly and radically than in fascist Italy, as illustrated by the incarceration of thousands of political "opponents" in concentration camps within months of the Nazi rise to power. Crucially, too, unlike fascist Italy, the Nazis made no attempt to give these instruments even a veneer of legality (Gellately 2001, pp. 34–43, 91–92; Klinkhammer 2010, pp. 399–403). Nevertheless, in spite of the enhanced powers enjoyed by the police under these regimes, the contribution of both special and ordinary law courts to the fascist and Nazi systems of oppression was considerable (Klinkhammer 2010, pp. 393–399).

While preventive policing intensified under mass dictatorships, the police were still employed in more conventional types of repression, most obviously crime investigation, but also traditional forms of public order enforcement, for example during protests. Such manifestations were often brutally repressed, given their "illegal" nature and the imperative to present an image of mass consensus. In theory, the more intensive and pervasive the preventive police control of any society was, the less need there was to resort to repressive forms of policing; in practice it proved difficult for police forces to maintain an absolute hold over the activities of dissenting groups or individuals. Moreover, the regimes governing them were on occasion prepared to show a margin of tolerance towards public displays of dissatisfaction if these were localized and not strictly ideologically motivated, such as economic protests. In fascist Italy during the early 1930s, arrests following illegal strikes were often limited to union

leaders; in the face of threatened lay-offs of workers, the police sometimes urged employers to show restraint. While this was usually motivated by public order concerns, they were aware of the regime's desire to formally demonstrate that it tended to the needs of the poorer social classes, especially in view of fascism's stress on "sacrifices" to be borne by employers, alongside workers, in the name of the fatherland (Dunnage 2012, pp. 87–89).

The creation of dictatorships saw a more systematic and widespread employment of citizens as informers for the police, in comparison to liberal-democratic orders. Here we should distinguish between individuals taken on for specific tasks, usually remunerated, and those who, because of the nature of their jobs, were expected to cooperate with the police in surveying the local population. In fascist Italy, the provincial police (*questure*) employed informers, often recruited among arrested political dissidents, on a monthly renewable basis, to sound out the milieu of "enemy" groups. They also obliged individuals who required permission from the police to exercise their professions, such as hotel owners, property rentiers and caretakers of public buildings and apartment blocks, to collaborate with them. Fascist Party members were also encouraged to observe the activities of neighbours and work colleagues and to report "offences," and could be mobilized to intensify these activities during periods of high security alert (Dunnage 2008, pp. 246–52).

The extent to which dictatorial regimes employed citizens to help them maintain social order, the dynamics determining different forms of collaboration, and, by extension, the psychological effects of such forms of secret policing, have been the subject of considerable debate among historians. In communist dictatorships especially, high levels of participation by members of the public are striking. In the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, between 30% and 60% of the population are thought to have been forced to collaborate as informers for the Committee on State Security (KGB), with a lower, but equally significant, number of informers for the militia (Shelley 1996, pp. 119–20). Estimations suggest the existence of between 109,000 and 180,000 informers in the GDR during its final years, and that "over half a million people—or something approaching every thirtieth citizen of the GDR" may have acted as informers at some point during the life of the regime (Fulbrook 1995, p. 50). Such a dense concentration of informers contrasted notably with the notorious *Gestapo* (*Geheime Staatspolizei*) secret police of the Third Reich, the subject of several reappraisals: historians initially saw the Nazi secret police as a highly powerful organization, employing large numbers of spies and agents, which was key to the running of a totalitarian state. In the 1990s, new research argued that the *Gestapo* employed far fewer informers, but instead had to rely on numerous denunciations—to the point that historians now even asked whether Nazi Germany really was a police state, given that the public effectively policed themselves. More recently, the *Gestapo* have been reappraised once again, leading to a more nuanced picture of a pro-active apparatus of a Nazi police state which benefitted from voluntary denunciations in some kinds

of cases (notably minor offences, which were often subsequently dismissed), but less so in those involving "targeted enemies" (Johnson 2004, pp. 250–54).

Police forces of mass dictatorships could also be expected to engage in radical forms of oppression or "terror," including forced deportation or physical elimination, though this did not necessarily last for the duration of a particular regime and often depended on the circumstances in which it came to power and how far it intended (or was able) to transform society. During the 1930s, initially in the context of Stalin's collectivization drive, the Soviet Union engaged the militia, alongside the security police (Cheka) and army, in the repression of peasant and ethnic opposition to the regime. Under Stalin, militia action was characterized by disregard for the rule of law and brutality (Shelley 1996, pp. 33–34, 36). In Spain, widespread anti-Republican repression involving the military and police forces characterized Nationalist "liberation" of territory during the civil war (1936–1939) and the settling of accounts in the years following the end of the conflict. This included mass executions, deportations to concentration camps and forced labour. Under the rule of Francisco Franco, brutal political oppression diminished in intensity from the end of the 1940s, without ever being fully abandoned (Preston 1990, pp. 41–47; Payne 1967, pp. 415–20; Dunnage 2006, pp. 115–16).

In his quest to create a totalitarian *Volksgemeinschaft* (national community), Hitler's policy for annihilation, involving the police in many instances, reflected the alleged threat to the German people posed by whole groups of "enemies," rather than tangible opposition activities, a concept which grew in intensity in line with the escalation towards the Second World War. In this regard, from the end of 1937 onwards the earlier policy of the crime branch of the Nazi police (*Kriminalpolizei*) to try to rehabilitate criminals after prison or detention increasingly gave way to lengthy, and in some cases indefinite, internment in concentration camps (more or less amounting to a death sentence) (Roth 2000, pp. 335, 338–46). This partly reflected the influence of biological theory, which saw crime as genetically determined, and a consequent shift away from focus on individuals to whole categories of *Asoziale* ("anti-socials," including vagrants, gypsies, beggars, alcoholics, the homeless, the work-shy, pimps and sexual "criminals") (Wagner 1996, pp. 259–90). Although the Italian fascist police were also influenced by biological theories related to crime, the numbers of dissidents and other "enemies" they targeted were low in comparison to Nazi Germany and their persecutory action was not connected to any systematic programme of physical annihilation, at least as regards domestic policing before the Second World War. Nevertheless, when compared to the Liberal state, there was a significant intensification of police oppression under the rule of Mussolini (Dunnage 2004, pp. 266–67; 2012, pp. 66–67).

When police systems were not employed to enforce such radical forms of repression, they nevertheless were prone to commit human rights violations. While coercive forms of policing were not unique to dictatorial regimes, heightened police powers increased the risks of abuse. Police activities often surpassed the limits officially set by the legislative norms of dictatorial regimes

in the context of diminished public accountability of state institutions and the absence of civil rights. Hence, the post-Stalinist Soviet militia "were not compelled to hide mistakes or cover up the use of physical force because the Soviet justice system tolerated such behaviour" (Shelley 1996, p. 99). Moreover, the police of dictatorships were usually authorized to act outside the control of the judiciary and even in contradiction to it. In Nazi Germany, the secret police (*Gestapo*) were able to correct prison sentences administered by law courts; once a sentence had been completed they could preventively re-arrest the prisoner (Gellately 2001, pp. 42–43). Such heightened powers, moreover, encouraged petty corruption on the part of individual (or groups of) police officers. In the case of the Soviet Union, this was particularly widespread; the militia regularly received bribes from members of the public, as well as benefitting from their extensive responsibilities in the economic sphere, allowing them to deal in widely sought-after consumer goods (Shelley 1996, pp. 101–2).

The involvement of citizens in dictatorial police systems contributed to the creation of an environment of fear and suspicion, if not terror, which simultaneously induced citizens to engage in unpleasant forms of behaviour. In regard to denunciations, in some instances these were filed by citizens acting out of a sense of political duty. In Franco's Spain, denunciations were actively encouraged at the end of the civil war, through public announcements and the creation of denunciation centres. They were often driven by virulent personal hatred for Republican "enemies" and were rarely backed up by sound evidence. Moreover, failure to report Republicans known to have committed "crimes" was considered an offence (Anderson 2009, pp. 16–19). Often, however, denunciations taking place under dictatorships were the product of petty disputes among neighbours, work colleagues and even family members, or reflected a desire to take personal advantage of an "offence" that had been witnessed.

The extensiveness and effectiveness of dictatorial systems of oppression have been a major topic of discussion among historians of the twentieth century. Evaluations of Nazi oppression have moved from earlier beliefs in the existence of a police system which inspired "mind-numbing fear" to those questioning how far German citizens were terrified into conformity by the Nazi regime, to more recent conclusions that terror was applied selectively against "enemy" groups. Moreover, recent studies have suggested that the *Gestapo* had limited staff, but functioned efficiently by distinguishing between important and trivial cases, as a result of which they were respected by the majority of the German population, but feared by the targeted groups (Johnson 2000; 2004, pp. 250–59). In other cases, it has been suggested that the mythicization of police powers served to enhance the function of totalitarian dictatorships. During the 1980s in communist Romania, the fear induced by the oppressive nature of the police led to public overestimation of the actual size and manpower of the organization (Abraham 2004, p. 151).

Structures

The structures of dictatorial police forces in the twentieth century usually mirrored the demands placed upon them to run penetrative systems of control and, in some cases, enforce programmes for radical social transformation. As would be expected, they were subject to highly centralized control, though in practice lines of command could be more complex. Partly reflecting significant levels of continuity in policing methods of previous orders, some systems developed out of pre-existing organizations, while others fully replaced them. Depending on the nature and objectives of the regime in question, police forces could be built into the hierarchy of the ruling party.

Generally speaking, right-wing dictatorships were more likely to use the police organs of previous regimes, whether military or civilian, as a basis on which to develop their systems of repression; these could be flanked or dominated by party militias. Indicating considerable institutional continuity with the Liberal state, Mussolini's fascist regime still relied on the services of the centrally controlled regular police organs. This reflected the regime's desire to expand a policing system which already employed a measure of preventive control over society. The Fascist Party militia did not enjoy levels of power and influence comparable to the SS in Nazi Germany, demonstrating the ability of moderate fascists in the new regime to ensure that the repressive system lay outside the direct control of the Fascist Party (Dunnage 2004, pp. 269–70; 2012, pp. 44–45). The creation of the fascist dictatorship saw the reinforcement of the political activities of pre-existing police forces, alongside several new secret police organs, notably the OVRA, to which the most important operations against political dissidence were entrusted and which functioned beyond the jurisdiction of the regular police authorities (Dunnage 2004, pp. 265–66; 2008, pp. 246–49). By contrast, Hitler's Germany witnessed a more determined attempt to Nazify the German police, involving a process of centralization of pre-existing federal forces and fusion with the Nazi Party militia (*Schutzstaffel*—SS). Though formally marked by the appointment in June 1936 of the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, as Chief of the German Police, this process proved difficult to complete. In the case of the Order Police (*Ordnungspolizei*), for example, it was hard to sever their links with the administrations of the *Länder* and municipalities, while ties with the SS were often only nominal (Broszat 1981, pp. 274–76).

The police forces of left-wing dictatorships were usually built from scratch as military-type bodies, referred to as people's militias, under the control of the Communist Party. This does not mean that they were not influenced by earlier police systems. If the Soviet militia was created after the destruction of the tsarist police in 1917, throughout the period of Soviet rule it had a "quasi-military, centralized structure" which "was a legacy of both the tsarist period and the continental police tradition, as well as the violent first years of the Soviet state" (Shelley 1996, p. 63). Communist militias operated "conventional" and specialist policing branches, or in some cases were flanked by, or

auxiliary to, separate policing bodies, notably secret police organizations. In the Soviet Union, the militia were expected to assist the KGB in operations against dissidents and political activists, though there were periods in which the militia played a more pro-active role in this, such as during the Brezhnev era (1963–1982) (Shelley 1996, p. 48, pp. 179–80). In the case of the GDR, the notorious State Security Service (Stasi—*Staatssicherheitsdienst*), though becoming the dominant organ of state oppression in the 1970s and 1980s, was in the late 1940s and 1950s a component of a then more powerful *Volkspolizei* (People's Police), which also possessed border and transport police units and a paramilitary corps (which subsequently became the national people's army) (Lindenberger 1999, pp. 127–28). The Stasi would become more important to the GDR from the 1970s, in the context of international détente between East and West, when more sophisticated forms of preventive policing were required in place of more visibly repressive enforcement of its policies (Pollack 1999, p. 38).

Security institutions of the Soviet Union played a key role in the creation of police organizations in Eastern European countries, which the former occupied at the end of the Second World War. Police forces in the Eastern Bloc were modelled on the Soviet militia, though there were variations according to the ethnic composition of, and the degree of political and economic control exercised over, the individual societies (Shelley 1996, p. xvii). In some cases, notably during the late 1940s and 1950s, Soviet forms of policing were directly enforced. Bulgaria, for example, saw the imposition of a Stalinist model of rule and terror, characterized by direct control of the police by officials of the Soviet NKGB (People's Commissariat for State Security) (Delpeuch 1997, pp. 209–10).

The desire of dictatorial regimes for highly centralized policing structures did not always sit well with the requirement that the police exercise strict control over the local populace. In the GDR, the institution in 1952 of a system of *Abschnittsbevollmächtigen* (ABV), district police officers who were responsible for maintaining order and controlling, but also advising, all residents (whom they were supposed to visit regularly), created a paradoxical situation in which the reinforcement of dictatorial control of society from the centre led to the greater autonomy of officers on the ground (Bessel 1997, pp. 227–28). Moreover, supervision over dictatorial police systems from the centre could be jeopardized by the increased powers enjoyed by police officers combined with backward institutional cultures which were difficult to eradicate. In fascist Italy, the police, like much of the state administration and party, were conditioned by a pervasive clientelistic culture which encouraged personal favours and petty corruption. This partly inhibited the efficient running of the apparatus of repression, as revealed by inspections of provincial police headquarters and police schools (Dunnage 2012).

Personnel

Debates about police personnel of twentieth-century dictatorships tend to revolve around the question of how far they were subject to the control of the ruling party (as mirrored in the structures of police systems, discussed above) and politically indoctrinated. Such debates have started to be extended into a consideration of the broader nature of policing environments under dictatorships, including the employment of symbols, festivities and other rituals as a means of integrating them into these regimes. Related to this, discussions have also ensued regarding not only how ideological control of the police influenced methods of law enforcement, but also how essential processes of indoctrination actually were to the inducement of policemen to fulfil the tasks dictatorial regimes entrusted to them.

The personnel of police forces of left-wing dictatorships were generally distinguished by higher levels of political control than their right-wing counterparts, with the Communist Party playing a key role in the vetting of applications and overseeing of promotions. In Romania, for example, being a member of the Communist Party and the working class was essential for joining the police and successful careers depended on one's status within the party (Abraham 2004, p. 150). Emphasis on the loyalty of police personnel to the Communist Party could result in low levels of professionalism, disregard for the rule of law and institutional corruption. In the Soviet Union, individuals were recruited to the police on the basis of their political reliability, and training was more focused on ideological instruction (including in the history of the Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism) than on professional development, as also reflected in poor training facilities. The fact that the party was responsible for key appointments and promotions ensured that a high degree of loyalty was shown towards it, limiting police responsiveness to the needs of the community (Shelley 1996, pp. 83–96).

Under right-wing dictatorships, though there were significant variations, the extent of ideological or party control exercised over police personnel was comparatively less rigorous than under communist regimes; this partly reflected right-wing authoritarian tendencies within pre-existing police forces, many of whose members had supported the ascendancy of the earlier fascist movements. The Nazi police probably come closest to their communist counterparts in this regard. While, following Hitler's rise to power, the police continued to rely on professionals carried over from the Weimar period, there were a number of politically motivated sackings, which had already started following the Reich Chancellor Franz von Papen's declaration of a state of emergency in Prussia in July 1932. From February 1933, active Nazis were encouraged to join the police ranks, with several taking up commanding positions (Westermann 1998, pp. 43–46; Dunnage 2006, pp. 108–9). From 1937, the task of indoctrinating uniformed police officers in Nazi ideology and strengthening their "martial" character was undertaken by instructors from the SS (Westermann 1998, pp. 42–45). However, the ideological effectiveness

of processes of "Nazification" was questionable when non-political personnel were assimilated into the SS. Inspectors of the Order Police, for example, had already enjoyed long careers in the force, which lessened the significance of their newly acquired SS ranks (Koehl 1983, p. 160).

In fascist Italy, the extent of ideological control to which policemen were subjected was more limited and haphazard, reflecting the maintenance of a considerable measure of professional autonomy from the regime. It should be stressed, however, that, at least until the late 1930s, a profound and systemic "fascistization" of recruitment and training was hardly necessary to induce the Italian police to fulfil tasks which largely represented a reinforcement of the anti-Marxist and potentially authoritarian orientation of the earlier Liberal state. There is some evidence to suggest that limited political indoctrination may have inhibited some policemen when it came to enforcing more radical forms of repression, such as the killing of partisans or deportation of Jews during the Nazi occupation of Italy from the latter half of the Second World War onwards (Dunnage 2012, esp. chapters 2 and 6). If the level of fascist influence over Mussolini's police appears superficial in comparison to the attempted Nazification of their German colleagues, we should nevertheless consider the involvement of the police of both regimes in festivities and commemorations which sought to present them to the public as ideologically integrated, and to impress upon both policemen and members of the fascist/Nazi "old guard" their shared values and common political struggle. This also involved the adoption of these regimes' political symbols and gestures, such as the Roman salute. Independent of how ideologically committed they really were, it is clear that police institutions partly saw the rituals as vehicles for stressing to their political masters that they were indispensable security organs (Dunnage and Rossol 2015).

Overall, the ability of dictatorial regimes to create compliant police forces made up of individuals who were often willing to ignore the rule of law, if not commit grave human rights violations, depended on combinations of factors. Ideological training, and the direct control which the ruling party enjoyed over police organs in some cases, may have played significant roles in this. Equally, peer pressure and corporate loyalties, fear of the consequences of disobeying orders, desire for career advancement and the possibility of material advantages could also contribute to the manner in which police officers acted.

CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF DICTATORIAL POLICING

This essay has illustrated the key role played by police organizations in ensuring the functioning and survival of twentieth-century mass dictatorships, whilst stressing limitations in how far they could enforce "totalitarian" control over societies. Though a variety of factors, including foreign military invasion and government-led reform, could determine the demise of dictatorial forms of rule, the success of movements of opposition in overthrowing these regimes during periods of acute crisis often depended on how willing police and military forces were to obey orders to crush dissent. On occasion, the preparedness of such regimes to hold out was partly inhibited by the lack of willingness of

security forces on the ground to carry out instructions to repress mass rebellion, as happened in the GDR in October 1989 after the initial suppression of demonstrations (Fulbrook 1995, pp. 252–57). There were also cases in which the police contributed more actively to the demise of such regimes. Given their ability to monitor, via highly penetrative systems of surveillance, both the public mood and their political masters, police leaders were able to determine the longer-term consequences of continued support of a dictatorship. In fascist Italy, the Chief of Police, Carmine Senise, was involved in a political conspiracy against Mussolini in the summer of 1943 (leading to the temporary overthrow of the dictator), though his action was more about safeguarding a highly compromised police institution and ensuring that power passed to conservative political forces after the defeat of fascism than about restoring democracy (Dunnage 2012, pp. 176–77).

After the fall of dictatorships, programmes of democratic police reform, when they were instituted, often hit against the practical need to hold onto large numbers of professionals and avoid radical institutional change in the face of law-and-order difficulties which typically characterized the aftermath of regime overthrow. In other cases, it proved difficult for external forces, whether military occupiers or professional advisory organizations, to transmit democratic principles and practices to these institutions. In considering the legacy left by dictatorships, history has shown a tendency for the culture of oppression which they nurtured to linger on in the police well after their demise. As the experiences of policing in post-communist Eastern and Central Europe have shown, this was often evident in limited acceptance of notions regarding human rights, policing by consent and accountability to the public. Moreover, while police institutions may have adopted democratic language, it was not so easy to translate this into daily practice (Caparini and Marenin 2004, esp. Chapter 16).

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Inclusion and Exclusion as Instruments of Domination

Eve Rosenhaft

If a common (perhaps defining) feature of those regimes we call "mass dictatorships" is the practice of violence directed both inwards and outwards, then a shaping precondition for that violence is the construction of internal and external enemies. The forms and degree of violence visited on those enemies are directly related to the fact that they are constructed as outsiders to society or the polity and accordingly outside the law; the "mass" envisaged by self-conscious "mass dictatorships" is never everybody, but commonly a mythic "us" that always implies a "them" and calls for "them" to be identified and eliminated. The other chapters in this section of the handbook discuss the ways in which internal terror and coercion are ambivalent in their functions and need to be modulated in such a way as not to endanger the legitimacy of systems that ultimately rely on a level of popular consent. Ensuring that it is "them" and not "us" who are (or appear to be) the objects of state violence is one way to maintain the balance.

But that does not exhaust the logic of processes of exclusion in mass dictatorships, because in practice they are rarely simply instrumental. Rather, they always present themselves as a logical consequence of the vision of social transformation or national reconstruction that drives the regime, essential to the materialization of key values like race, class, emancipation, development, labour (and so on). Indeed, the work of exclusion and its practical consequences may be so deeply rooted in the ideological *raison d'être* of the system that it becomes counterproductive to its material survival. In the case of the Nazi dictatorship, the decision for a "Final Solution" to the "Jewish problem" that called for the deportation and murder of all European Jews coincided

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closely with an intensification of the war effort that logically demanded their continued survival as slave labour (Buggeln 2009). Conversely, the drive to identify and eliminate enemies can also be grounded in aspects of "local" culture that predate the regime or be diagnosable in terms of a cumulative logic of action independent of particular political aims (as in some generic accounts of revolutionary terror). Accordingly, while the logic of "mass dictatorships" is bound to lead us to foreground the *integrative* function of exclusionary practices, historians of particular mass dictatorships have had to give considerable attention to parsing their multiple roots, rationales and purposes, and also to the ways in which the balance between the instrumental, the ideological, the cultural and the systemic can shift over the history of a single regime.

That said, not all of the regimes that are offered here as examples of "mass dictatorship" have been characterized by the *systematic* creation of outsider or enemy *groups*. Although a defining feature of dictatorships is their willingness to use violent repression against threats to the system, the mobilization of popular sentiment in support of the regime which defines "mass dictatorship" does not, apparently, always call for the orchestration of hate or fear in the "insider" population at large or the wholesale purging of society. South Korea's developmental dictatorship was one that relied on forms of forced mobilization that generated stress in many aspects of everyday life and was underpinned by instrumental violence against opponents of the system, but Park Chung Hee's campaigns were genuinely populist—inclusionist without a complementary exclusionism. Accordingly we need to distinguish between repression and exclusion as we would between violence or coercion aimed at enforcing conformity or re-educating social or political delinquents and practices of coercion, separation and removal (or killing) that are premised on denying the possibility that their targets can ever conform (or qualify to be included). And at the same time we need to acknowledge the significant episodes in which there has been a slippage between the two.

National Socialism in Germany provides the best example of a political order grounded on the permanent exclusion of named and essentialized social groups. The programmatic term *Volksgemeinschaft* denoted the object of national reconstruction: a national/racial community conceived in explicit opposition to the *Klassengesellschaft*—class society—of industrial modernity. Membership in the *Volksgemeinschaft* depended equally on genetic inheritance and behaviour, though in the Nazis' racialized social vision, behaviour was itself an index of "blood"—an analysis that took to a radical extreme the socio-medical orthodoxy that identified forms of marginal, deviant or socially inadequate behaviour like alcoholism or educational under-achievement as congenital. Under this regime health provision was governed by the principle of the "unity of eugenic and racial policy," and welfare policy followed suit. With varied timings and degrees of consistency, people regarded as unfit to procreate or socially or "racially" undesirable were "included" in drives for compulsory abortion and sterilization and eugenic or racist murder, and systematically excluded from welfare benefits. Within this net of exclusionary principles, the anti-Semitism

that drove the Nazi leadership identified Jews as the primary target of explicitly "racial" policies; under the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 they were denied citizenship, and marriages and sexual relations between healthy individuals of "German blood" (or Aryans) and Jews were banned or sanctioned.

The term *Volksgemeinschaft* spawned a new lexical field for the naming of outsiders or "aliens": those who were not actually *fremdblütig* (of alien blood—designated racial outsiders including first of all Jews but also "Gypsies" and blacks) could nevertheless be *volksfremd* (alien to the blood-nation) or *gemeinschaftsfremd* (alien to the community). These adjectives denoted permanent and embodied qualities that could only be eliminated by eliminating the bodies that bore them. In this scheme, homosexuals and prostitutes constituted liminal categories, theoretically curable but subject to "treatment" that called for physical coercion and invasive therapies under conditions of internment which often proved fatal. Political enemies, by contrast, were treated as objects of rehabilitation or *instrumental* repression, at least in the first years of the regime; while the most outspoken and dangerous of them were murdered outright, many were released from concentration camps in return for the promise never to speak out (Burleigh and Wippermann 1991; Gellately and Stoltzfus 2001).

Italian Fascism was less consistent in its application and elaboration of "racial" principles, as Mussolini was less single-minded in his anti-Semitism than Hitler. Notions of *stirpe* (stock) and *razza* (race) were prevalent in the cultural pessimism which Fascism inherited from the *fin de siècle*, intertwined with political anti-Semitism and biological anthropology and criminology. They developed an exclusionary dynamic in the 1930s, fuelled partly by the renewed drive for "fascistization" which called for realizing the vision of a new "fascist man." The installation of "race" at the centre of policy came in 1938, with the declaration of the "Manifesto of Racist Scientists" that there existed "a pure Italian race," the creation of a government Office for Demography and Race and the beginning of a series of legal measures which excluded Jews from economic, civic and social life. Like Germany's Nuremberg laws, they also placed mixed marriages and sexual liaisons outside the law. The same year witnessed new police measures against "Gypsies," including the first moves to systematic internment. And while this looked very much like a flattering imitation of Germany, Italy's more powerful ally, there were "native" impulses to racial exclusionism in the country's colonial adventures in Africa; genocidal warfare in Ethiopia followed by the introduction of a kind of apartheid regime in the conquered territory invigorated racial thinking at home. Once the Second World War broke out the extension of internment for Jews and "Gypsies," though by no means comprehensive, meant that after the fall of Mussolini and occupation by German forces in 1943 the Nazi policies of racial elimination—separation, deportation and murder—could be imposed on Italy's outsiders with relative ease, and with the collaboration of Italian police and militia (Gordon 2009).

The cases of National Socialism and Fascism are a reminder of the intimate links between the enforcement of colour lines in colonial contact zones and racial exclusionism in the metropolis that characterize the modernity out of

which many mass dictatorships arose. In the German case, African colonies were by the 1930s a memory, though one which had left a mark on metropolitan society. The continental European empire that was to emerge from Germany's war in the east, however, was governed by strict principles of racial hierarchy that justified the exploitation of labour as well as the massacre of populations. And when the Nazis dreamed of recovering colonies in Africa, what they envisaged was a brutal form of apartheid that would bring metropolitan and colonial societies comprehensively into line with one another.

If the creation of new kinds of outsiders in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy was a self-conscious element of an attempted revolution against the industrial class society of classical modernity, in the Soviet Union the process was driven (it has been argued) by the attempt to hasten—somewhat surprisingly—the *creation* of a class society by revolutionary means. Soviet Marxism divided society on class rather than racial lines. The classical Marxist vision which emerged out of critical Enlightenment humanism was one of a future society in which the preconditions for social conflict would be abolished. Overcoming the conditions for alienation meant that there could and would be no outsiders in communism—whether to themselves or to society at large. In reality, as in the pragmatic elaborations of theory, the construction phase of socialism was one of struggle against the bearers of the old order (and as it turned out also against determined external enemies), and they had to be named. The result was the paradoxical construct of "class aliens." Sheila Fitzpatrick has argued that it was in fact the coincidence of an (actual) weakness of class structure and a crisis of social identity that resulted in a "reinvention of class that involved the ascription of class identities to citizens so that the revolutionary regime … could know its allies from its enemies" (Fitzpatrick 1993, p. 745). The chief enemies of the future in the Bolshevik vision were the "bourgeois." This was a large and shifting category that included survivors of the old order (*byvschii*, or "former people") like aristocrats, former industrialists and merchants and army officers (and also priests), the new entrepreneurs of the 1920s (NEPmen) and the intelligentsia. These groups could not be mapped effectively onto a schema of class that was meaningful in terms of political or economic power (least of all in a self-declared dictatorship of the proletariat), and this explains the elasticity of the category "bourgeois." It also meant that their quality as outsiders or enemies depended on a mythical ascription of subversive power similar in its logic to Nazism's claims about the power that Jews and other enemies who *appeared* powerless nonetheless carried in their blood: to be parasitic, to corrupt, to undermine by stealth. Better-defined enemy groups were the kulaks (wealthy peasants) and the clergy, with whom at least the regime could claim to be in active contest in repeated campaigns at reform and revolution in the countryside. Individuals identified as members of each of these groups were officially *lishentsy*—without rights. Along with "socially alien" groups they were denied the right to vote in the 1918 constitution of the Russian Republic, and they were subject to less favourable treatment in education, the courts and housing. Moreover, their "class" and the "untouchable" status that went with it was

heritable, since a key way of identifying an otherwise elusive class position (particularly before internal passports were introduced in 1932) was knowing who someone's parents were. This made them vulnerable to veritable witch-hunts in episodes of internal "class war" like the Cultural Revolution of the late 1920s, and even after legal discrimination was lifted in the 1936 Constitution, suspicion lingered. The Great Purges of 1937–1938 were directed at a new category of enemy, mainly "insiders" who—it was alleged—had turned out to be politically unreliable or traitorous; but in practice and among the victims of the terror the two categories often proved to overlap. In the extreme case, the regime's declared objective of "liquidating the kulaks *as a class*" is difficult to separate from the practices of deportation and mass death to which they were subject as embodied "class aliens."

China's Cultural Revolution presents an analogous case. In the People's Republic between 1966 and 1969, a campaign instigated from above to purge party and government of potential challengers to Mao's authority who were also painted as agents of a capitalist restoration ("capitalist roaders") developed into an authentic mass mobilization in which the "enemy" was defined in terms of a history of internal class struggle. In its sixteen-point decision of August 1966 the Chinese Communist Party called on the proletariat to "change the mental outlook of the whole society." Since the need for such a change was explained by the continuing presence of particular people—the bourgeoisie—and the lingering power of bourgeois attitudes, the logic of the movement was that revolutionary regeneration depended on identifying and removing bourgeois others. This endorsed in principle what had already begun more or less spontaneously: public attacks by school and university students against their teachers and members of the professoriate. In the following months the Red Guards formed by the students extended this movement into active and theatrical violence, spiralling from verbal attacks to public murder, against others identified as bourgeois or petty-bourgeois as well as against monuments of pre-revolutionary culture and their guardians. The label "bourgeois" came to be an epithet applied indiscriminately to label people targeted for hostile action and at the same time to impute an "essence" to them that expressed itself in their way of life and style of dress. In this context forcing them to declare (or confess) that they were "class enemies" was a nonsense; even the practice of repatriating urban intellectuals to their home villages could hardly make them insiders on the inside, and the lingering awareness of this itself provided a dynamic for continuous mobilization (or permanent revolution) on the part of the Red Guards. Hundreds of the objects of this "othering" saw suicide as the only way out of the vicious cycle. Ironically, the Red Guards were brought under control through—among other things—a policy of rustication or return to the village, purging their own bourgeois tendencies and academic hubris by turning them into "ordinary peasants or ordinary workers." After 1967 a new campaign to "cleanse the class ranks" similarly developed into an ever-expanding assault on "bad people" (in the words of Zhou Enlai) that made it even more destructive, and the 1970s continued to witness waves of attacks on

"real enemies" in which nonconformists and criminals of various stripes were caught up. The metaphor of a society excreting its human waste which was current in Maoist discourse underlines the sense in which the People's China in the Cultural Revolution replaced integration or rehabilitation with forcible exclusion that went beyond purely functional state measures (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006).

The hyperbolic or analytical use of the term "witch hunt," like the vulgar idea that in National Socialism the Jews were made "scapegoats" for something, suggests that our mass dictatorships were subject simply to a pathological dynamic that is ahistorical and potentially universal. But the tendency towards binary thinking that they display can be better characterized as a feature of their radical "modernity" and its manifestation in transformational projects. The revolutionary dynamic that produced them requires such regimes not only to constantly generate enemies but also to harden binary divides through the imperative to self-reflection. This is perhaps particularly true in the Marxist tradition, as Mao Zedong articulated in 1926 when he called on his comrades to keep in mind, "Who are our enemies, who are our friends? That is the question germane to the revolution" (Dutton 2005, p. 3). At the same time, the respective constructs of insider and outsider, friend and enemy, in mass dictatorships have also been diagnosed as reflecting cultural values and styles of thought that predate the establishment of the dictatorship and inform the actions of its agents. The proposition that Nazi genocide was the logical conclusion of a long-established and deep-rooted eliminationist anti-Semitism in Germany has been effectively debunked. But it is certainly the case that a history of everyday "othering" and hostility to Jews anaesthetized unpolitical observers to the dangers of Nazi rhetoric and eased the transition from rhetoric to action. The same unreflected attitudes served the purposes of legitimation in the Stalinist 'battle against cosmopolitanism' of 1948–49, the prelude to claims of a Jewish doctors' plot in 1952, as well as in the contemporaneous campaigns against Jews in the communist parties of Eastern Europe (Brandenberger 2005; McDermott 2008). Similarly, Fitzpatrick places the Soviet Union's creation of "class aliens" in the context of the pre-revolutionary system of *soslovie*, or ascribed status groups. Bolshevism in power has also been characterized as drawing on older Russian traditions of millenarian and Manichaean thinking, and Maoism as compounding Bolshevik Manicheanism with the Confucian tradition of dividing the world into moral and immoral (Mitter 2004).

Because outsiders always represent a *danger* to the mass, exclusion in these regimes always implies at least physical separation. In German cities under National Socialism, Jews were banned from places of public entertainment, subject to curfew and forced—mainly through indirect judicial means—to live in cramped accommodation in particular neighbourhoods. In wartime, the medieval term "ghetto" was reintroduced to designate the cities and urban districts in Poland where Jews were concentrated in anticipation of their deportation or on the way to the death camps. The camp—*Lager* or *Gulag*—as a tool of governance can be regarded as a defining feature of modern dictatorships, or

as Giorgio Agamben puts it, a "new biopolitical *nomos* of the planet" (Agamben 2000, p. 37). The concentration camp was an invention of colonial armies to deal with the short-term challenges posed by guerrilla war. Modern dictatorships have transformed the concentration camp from an emergency institution to a permanent place of segregation for the excluded. Scholars have identified more than 10,000 individual camps in Germany and Germany's occupied territories between 1933 and 1945 (Schwarz 1990). Those camps can be sorted into sixteen categories, of which the notorious death camps were the smallest category though they accounted for a substantial proportion of inmates; the putative purposes of the camps varied, and different categories of prisoner were subject to different regimes. The same variety is visible in an international comparison: the Soviet camp system began at the beginning of the 1920s as a system for "rehabilitating" enemies of the revolution, and the camp complexes that made up the Gulag under Stalin were nominally labour camps, punishment camps, criminal or political camps, transit camps, camps for women or children (Applebaum 2003).

Typically, though, the fact that these camps were established in parallel to "ordinary" penal institutions such as prisons marks the excluded status of their inmates in every case—as people outside the reach of the law. Among the paradoxes of modern dictatorships—in its most extreme form, perhaps, in National Socialism—are on the one hand the continued use of statute law to define the terms of exclusion in spite of an essentially charismatic or populist approach to lawmaking (law as the will of the Führer embodying the needs and desires of the *Volk*) or a scepticism (which Fascism and Communism share) about law as a bourgeois institution, and on the other the brutalization of "normal" prison and institutional care regimes that becomes possible when legal protections for individual rights and universalist notions of humanity are suspended. The Chinese Cultural Revolution did not build camps, but existing prison facilities like Qincheng became sites of sensory deprivation and overload and deliberate drugging (among other abuses), and of indefinite detention or release only into internal exile for some categories of prisoners. Internees were thus at the disposal of the state and indeed disposable, so that camp regimes tended to merge into common patterns of violence and physical exploitation. In spite of their nominal variety, the camps of the Gulag shared the functions of separation and labour exploitation under conditions that between 1929 and 1953 exposed 20 million or more people (to whom may be added some millions of people in internal exile though not imprisoned) to daily brutality and the imminent threat of death. Similarly, German concentrations camps had a relatively instrumental function of intimidation and "re-education" in the early years of the regime, but as a result of legislation, police practice and the radicalization of the system particularly in wartime the *univers concentrationnaire* did indeed become a cosmos of its own into which people disappeared, even though many of the camps were situated in the German heartland within the palpable purview of the included.

Where can we see the integrative function of exclusionary practices at work, and how can we gauge their impact on those who were not excluded? The mythic subject of the binary, the blood nation or the revolution under threat, can itself be a powerful object of identification for the included. In Japan's project of constructing a Pacific empire, the vision of a "Yamato race" played a dual role. It fuelled brutality against Chinese, Pacific and South and Southeast Asian populations and a "war without mercy" against European and US adversaries, and informed the social and spatial restructuring of annexed and occupied territories (as in the creation of separate Japanese and Korean districts in Seoul). But it also offered the prospect of inclusion for conquered peoples who could be construed as racial brothers or allies, and this was demonstrably effective in mobilizing allegiance from some Koreans (Dower 1986; Fujitani 2011).

The active branding and removal of social groups who were already suspect and stigmatized, introducing new laws and rigorously enforcing existing ones to "sort out" what had already been identified as a "problem" before the regime came to power, is a common feature of new dictatorships, particularly though not exclusively those of the right. The resulting claim to be restoring order and normality to a disordered society can be a source of popular support in itself. In the rise to power of their respective parties the paramilitary violence of the Fascist *squadristi* and the Nazi Brownshirts was billed as a kind of policing from below or "counter-terror," defending individuals, settlements and neighbourhoods against predatory communists. In National Socialism, "Gypsies," vagrants and prostitutes all became objects of racialized eugenic policies; public actions to remove them from public places, however, were advertised and publicly perceived as "clean-up" operations and/or initiatives against the "work-shy," valorizing honest labour in a country still suffering from mass unemployment. In the case of the creation of internment camps for German "Gypsies," action at the level of national government was preceded by local initiatives responding to public pressure. The initial project of Maoist communism in China has been characterized as being "defined by discipline and quantifiable order rather than simply by 'freedom from want'" (Kim and Schoenhals 2013, p. 6), and a radicalization of Soviet practices of criminal policing in cleaning the streets of "socially harmful elements," "hooligans" and "habitual criminals" that coincided with the Great Purges can be seen in the same light: as a potentially desirable response to the disorder arising from the dynamics of rapid social transformation (Shearer 2009).

This is about the political pay-off for removing visible outsiders. Newly created outsider groups are often invisible as individuals, like Jews, homosexuals, kulaks or members of the intelligentsia, or are able to hide or disguise themselves. In National Socialism, it was axiomatic that the fact that someone was a racial alien could be hidden in their "blood," and in spite of a large apparatus devoted to codifying racial "types," the only way to identify the outsiders among the insiders was to make them visible, through physical separation (ghettoization), deliberate immiseration and finally branding—the compulsory wearing of the Jewish star. Members of stigmatized classes in Soviet Russia went

to great lengths to "escape" into the proletariat by "disguising" themselves. Mao Zedong spoke in March 1949 of a body of "enemies without guns," lying in wait in the cities; their invisibility called for new police methods—new ways of seeing the unseeable which included the perlustration of letters—a prosaic material practice with powerful metaphorical resonance (Schoenhals 2013). Invisible enemies have an integrative power in that they can become a focus for mobilizing the rest of the population in support of the work of detecting and removing threats to the system (a common feature of modern policing in "normal" societies, too). The situation encourages and facilitates denunciation, which, irrespective of the individual motives of the denouncer, performs a declaration of allegiance to the regime and its purposes (Fitzpatrick and Gellately 1996).

A further integrative mechanism that has been mooted in some historical cases is that the creation of outlaw social groups allows for the social upgrading of those insiders who are assigned or take on the role of policing and control: however low the slave-driver, he is still superior to the slave. Ulrich Herbert used the phrase "Apartheid next door" to characterize the evidence of oral history that German workers who worked with or managed foreign forced labourers in Nazi Germany thereby achieved a status equivalent to that of South Africa's "lower white class," with the consequence that working-class antagonism to the regime was defused (Herbert 1983). More recent research suggests that the men and women who were assigned to supervise forced labourers in German factories were already relatively socially marginal, de-classed or themselves former prisoners (Timm 2009). Concentration camp guards were increasingly recruited from among people with unstable or criminal backgrounds and within the camps the Kapos (prisoner functionaries) were often convicted criminals. This leaves us poised between seeing the spaces and places of exclusion as opportunities for the not-yet-excluded to find their place in the new community and picturing a process whereby they consolidated the line between insiders and outsiders by sucking the marginal into the outsider zone.

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The Archive as Blueprint: Information in Mass Dictatorships

Ioana Macrea-Toma

The most obvious thing to say about knowledge management under totalitarian conditions would be that information is centralized, censorship is systematic and realist aesthetics is institutionalized. The present essay attempts not only to unravel the logic of the interconnectedness of the above-mentioned features, but seeks to explore the understanding of information, its definition, role and organization in socialist regimes. Instead of describing the structures of censorship or surveillance, it attempts to theorize the relationship of their different agencies to what counts as information, to its objectivity and reliability.

The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* states that "objectivism is a worldview hostile of Marxism, because it preaches the rejection of class analysis of social phenomena and is oriented toward cognition based on social and political neutrality." Accusation of objectivism haunted writers, journalists and social scientists in socialism because of the administrative actions that they (might have) incurred if failing to provide the favored description of reality. Nonetheless, the supposed neutrality from which Soviet observation and description was required to delimit themselves has already been debunked by historians as being also mythical: the alleged value-free stance of "objective" endeavors were relying at their turn on internalized ideas and virtues, playing rhetorically on the individual non-intervention as much as emotionally working with the self. What then differentiates a worldview when it *openly* rejects objectivity from another promoting objectivity through *obnubilating* its artifactual nature? Are Soviet-type documents an example of a double distortion, one naive about its assumptions and one perverted about its goals? This essay can offer a few insights about frames of conceiving truth/falsities in relationship with their performative value, with the regime of information circulation, the stakes and instruments of the production of abstractions.

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Information as an Entity: A Matter of Organization?

The centrality of organization, control and dissemination of information within the Communist Bloc is due to a specific configuration given by inheritance of "scientific" tropes of modernity, oppressive governance and Cold War rationality. It is the relationship between the promotion of unified scientific progress and the development of humanity that led to an interreading of the social and textual at the beginning of the twentieth century. Technology and information were already bound in Europe within a documentalist trend endorsed by global organizations that conceived knowledge as a "substance in the form of facts" flowing between the world, books and thinkers in a circulating manner (Day 2001, p. 3).

The need of organizing a new type of society coupled with tropes about the epidemiological spread of ideas and the immediacy of *information as revelation* made communication management first a matter of institutional organization, both in terms of control and dissemination. Information was something deemed powerful, traveling and containable, irrespective of semiotic shifts during decontextualization and replay. Extracting information or controlling it was not by default the activities of censorial and surveillance institutions; the latter emerged out of a concern with obtaining reliable information in the aftermath of the civil war and with the perception of a "profound," untamed country coexisting with an emerging political culture in the Soviet Union in 1920 (Werth 1994, p. 17). The emergency in regulating a space of uncertainty then made the consolidation of intelligence gathering synchronous with a juridical regulation of information circulation. The most enduring institution in the Soviet Union, the central organ of censorship (GLAVLIT),[1] was established in 1922 out of a Tribunal for Press, thus suggesting that statements entered the codifying system of "correctness," not of verifiable truthfulness. An editorial style of ruling pervaded the circulation of meanings as well as the course of history, with agencies or leaders possessing the external knowledge and power about the right truth. By the mid-1930s, the censorial agency expanded its focus from screening counterrevolutionary actions to controlling all economic, cultural, military and political activities, having as collaborators the secret police, the central news agency TASS and the Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Party. In comparison with the censorial systems from liberal democracies mainly dedicated to regulating mores, the socialist ones were dedicated to controlling, discriminating and filtering information and also fixing aesthetic canons. The "socialist realism" introduced in the Soviet Union in 1934 (and in late 1940s in the countries of the Communist Bloc) proved to be more of a *cultural paradigm* rather than an aesthetic norm, due to its institutional packaging with regimenting a new culture.

Although the degree of institutionalization of censorship varied in the different countries within the Communist Bloc (Hungary and the GDR did not have central censorial organs), the existence of commonalities pinpoints a systemic logic of ideological and infrastructural reinforcements. First, prescriptive propaganda measures, making censorship part of a larger artisanal enterprise,

accompanied the restrictive ones. Second, the press laws insured the control of the party over the content as well as over the administrative (the access to profession), financial, technical and material means of publishing. Third, the changing lists of tabooed topics were doubled or replaced by rarefied concepts regarding "state secrets" or "editorial responsibility." Last but not least, central news agencies acted as filters for all printed or broadcast information, despite periods of liberalization. Such interlocking mechanisms of controlling the flow of items together with their material support made possible the dismantlement of the official organ of censorship in Bulgaria in 1956 and in Romania in 1977 *without* the eradication of censorial practices.

The corollary of obscure interactions, deployed as exhausting negotiating rituals, as overlapping procedures between party and state agencies or even as exclusionary strategies among writers themselves, attested the wide-ranging internalization of blockages in periods of relative opening. The system did not persist because of the normative and rational censoring of information, but because of its arbitrariness. Structural redundancies in conjunction with the broad definitions of "state secret," "nationalism," "cosmopolitanism," "Trotskyism" or "decadent-ism" made diffuse vigilantism an operational mode which maintained the ascendance of censors over publishers while producing a subversive animation hard to disentangle in its "nonconformity." Western categories about official, legal or utilitarian censorship were blurred together with the meaning of oppositional attitudes. Beyond the extreme and classifiable cases of open dissent or *samizdat*, the confrontation with censorship also led to forms of "integrated non-conformism" (Zarestskaia-Balsente 2000, p. 13), morally attributed to duplicitous "ketman" behavior (theorized by Czeslaw Milosz) or to structural "state art." Historical, existential or fantastic writings from Romania, Bulgaria or the Soviet Union transformed Aesopian strategies in the 1960s and 1970s into fully fledged allegorical genres:[2] subtlety became an aesthetic norm, making opposition a certain form of intellocentrism even in the absence of dissidence.

The Soviet model of establishing professional unions of writers and artists at the same time as the establishment of diffusive censorial organs was implemented throughout the Communist Bloc. A centralized network of literary magazines, publishing houses and literary schools entered this unitary institutional body, sealing the pedagogical ("the art of writing"), sociological (the fashioning of the new agents of change) and political (the control and transmission of doctrine) imbrications of such an all-encompassing project. The fixation of a comprehensive, pan-soviet Writers' Union in 1936 (at the time of purges), after a series of metamorphoses privileging proletarian culture, reinforced the paradoxical understanding of *culture*. It was something valuable in itself because acquired, and yet socially and politically suspect. The blurring limits of stimulation and inhibition within a social and aesthetical modeling system produced phenomena that the bureaucratic designers of information could not foresee.

Due to the integrated circuits that linked control with social—corporate—reproduction (the possibility of hierarchical mobility and living out of one's profession), the cultural institutions under Communism attained a paradoxical solidity and prominence that enabled them to trade independence for relative autonomy and to deterritorialize the dominant discourse. The publishing infrastructure set in place on order to educate *theoretically*, proved *functionally* useful for the articulation of a professional ethos, based on remunerated free time, publication incentives and rewards. The Unions of Writers became authoritative and could allow some of their members to convert their cultural capital into a civic one and turn dissidents. In a country like Romania, devoid of traditions of communitarian sociability and of larger communicational channels with the West (except Radio Free Europe), the literary field underwent a process of self-centering which produced writings not openly critical of the regime, but still not amenable to indoctrination (Macrea-Toma 2009).

In other places the shortage of literature was overcome by reproducing typewritten texts (the copying of the poetry of Anna Akhmatova and Boris Pasternak); the practice in itself led to the articulation of social concerns outside the literary tradition. It was always around a non-institutionalized ethos that nonconformity or resistance crystallized, trying to accommodate "politics outside politics" (Falk 2003, pp. 247–57) and to organize uncensored channels of information through horizontal networking. Ideologies of "truth" emerged in dissident circles in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, placing confidence in an "anti-political" (György Konrad) society devoted to the enlightened argument, seeing inner freedom as a precondition for the struggle for human rights (Vaclav Havel) or for mere protection against dishonesty and double thinking (Solzhenitsyn). Clandestine publishing ventures in the form of printed/typed *samizdat* or recordings offered the basis for complex communicational projects which, besides acting as sources of facts about events distorted by propaganda, actually helped the birth of versatile political thinking. The Solidarity's publishing network was caught between conspiracy and democracy, informing and forming alternate publics, doing politics without political bodies.

Truth and Facts: Discursive Fields

The dilemma of breaking the information monopoly of communist states while still politically molding the opinions behind the Iron Curtain was also faced by the Western radio stations, specifically created during the early Cold War to fight communism and to "keep hope alive among people." Initiated by American officials in cooperation with émigré circles, Radio Free Europe (from 1950 onward) and Radio Liberty (from 1953 onward) acted as surrogate domestic broadcasters for the "captive" audiences in the East. They mobilized a rhetoric about freedom and democracy and a complex apparatus for gathering and processing information from and about the Communist Bloc. What was broadcast back to Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union under the guise of *truth* was

a mixture of selected and decontextualized official and leaked news, evaluated, reframed and reenacted by the mindset of the different waves of emigrants working for RFE/RL. An ethereal communicative system was thus balancing the written culture of the communist press, allowing for an adversarial and yet interdiscursive coproduction of "issues." Dissidence, socioeconomic flaws and political weaknesses were highlighted as both facts and revelations within the counter-propaganda machinery. While it is hard to ascertain the contribution of radios to the collapse of communism, one cannot discard their importance in creating a soundscape of political free-floating signifiers that gave the listeners the feeling that they could form an opinion.

In comparison with the rarefied ideological soundscape of the foreign radios, the discursive public sphere of socialism was characterized by a regime of "singleness" of meaning. The self-sufficiency of signs, disconnected from their signifiers, is one trope about Soviet ideological system. Marxism in this sense was used to consolidate a certain socioeconomic order, not to explain it. Judgments about cultural and societal norms were coded *evaluatively*, in terms of "negative" or "positive" (Bathrick 1995, p. 16). The consequences of this regime of truth based on universality and commonplaces rather than exploring and testing resulted in, on the one hand, a specific understanding and use of "facts" and, on the other, a paradoxical relationship with polysemy, both dreaded and overused. If "truth" is generally regarded as the language of the political opposition, the most challenging task for those concerned with works of art and literature produced during such regimes is to recognize their *nonconformity* as an engagement with *polysemy*.

The centrality of ideas in the Soviet Union fed on a shared assumption about the capitalizable dimension of information with the difference that knowledge economy had an all-encompassing convertible value. Because in a communist society every concrete form of the "material" world was treated ideologically as evidence of some general historic tendency, literary theorists assumed that Soviet Marxism was a "postmodern pastiche" (Epstein 1995, p. 189). Facts were exchanged as ideas, the same as goods were exchanged for money in a capitalist economy, thus acquiring a form of "correctness" as absolute truth that compensated people for their labor or "mistakes" with regards to party policy. A certain form of convertibility (because of a perceived direct equivalence with reality) was anticipated by the documentalist trend in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. For Dziga Vertov, an archive of unlabeled footages of Soviet life was supposed to accompany history-in-the-making through a constant recombination of free-floating signs, eschewing historical "outdatedness" (Papazian 2009).

THE SCOPE OF INFORMATION GATHERING

Surveillance was not just a method of protecting the government from subversion, but of fashioning people through the mapping of their thoughts. If perlustration (the clandestine opening of selected letters passing through email),

use of informants and reporting on popular moods were practices inherited from the tsarist police and wartime mobilization, what was specific to Soviet surveillance was the *redundancy* of information gathering. The problem was the *malleability of ideas* rather than disloyalties. Besides the fact that the security police established in the 20s and the 30s "special departments" in every large institution and that the Party also had a cell in those institutions (made of members who were obligated to provide information on the political moods of coworkers), what was considered a "source" transgressed the secret channels of reporting. Letters to newspapers were the subject of weekly summaries sent to the Information-Instructional Department of the Central Committee and also directly to Lenin, and then Stalin and Molotov. What resulted was a self-perpetuating system of multiplying instances of gathering data (from secret police to party and citizens, Fitzpatrick, 1997) together with the enlargement of what constituted data: reassertion of more adequate education and propaganda there followed in a vicious way.

The epistemic background of such minute searches into "thoughts" has been a long developing archeology of the individual's psyche as the location of disruptive moods. Articulated as early as the nineteenth century as a transnational, both Western and Eastern, concern with the irrationality of the crowd and the degeneration of marginal strata of population, it increasingly gathered criminologists, psychologists, geneticists and educators around a bio-social project of containing and eradicating deviance. To the medical imports of attributing heredity to a more and more complex mechanism of transmission, the Russian scientific context added the blurring of the meanings of "imitation," "contamination" and "suggestion," thus allowing for an *epidemiological reading of the spread of ideas* and for the extension of contagiousness to a whole range of disparate social phenomena. The development of medical sciences accelerated, on the other hand, the—Marxian—belief in the empirical connection between psychology and environment. Vertical methods of drilling people's psyche consequently developed on the assumption that psychological predispositions hold information about the individual life histories and the social web in which they were enmeshed (Beer 2008). Secret police files functioned like "social archives" of individual experiences common to a particular positioning within the sociopolitical matrix. Even if ultimately bearing class assessments, they relied on discretizing the "mass" into non-anonymous individuals, thus indicating the paradoxical nature of a societal project endorsing massification as well as individualization.

The totalitarian project rested therefore not only on the need to control, but on the imagined possibility of establishing a tangible inventory of facts about a continuum of visible-invisible realities. The Cold War opponents were developing in mid-twentieth century apparently similar archives of big socio-anthropological data attempting to scrutinize the realm of the subjective. What distinguishes, however, the Big File at Yale University (Lemov 2009) or the data banks of Radio Free Europe from their archival counterparts beyond the Iron Curtain is not necessarily their "scientific" or "journalistic" character,

but their target and functionality. First, the US data were externally oriented (always objectifying the Other outside the country) and transversally organized (it is not the individual unit of archiving, but a certain theme spanning a population). Second, they relied on a positivistic assumption about deriving later knowledge from mere data, while the police archives from the Communist Bloc rather produced data out of knowledge about necessary connections. While in the first case scale was motivated by "more data" as an epistemic virtue in dealing—post-hoc and externally—with stable objects of knowledge, in the latter it was a matter of proving—*in situ*—correlations.

KNOWLEDGE AND REPRESSION

Connecting preestablished knowledge and "reality" was part of the larger project of sculpting an aestheticized politico-social body. Both Nazi Germany and the Soviets were cataloguing people in their prophylactic, interventionist attempts of creating ideal societies. The differences laid in the fact that the Soviets were pursuing an arbitrary objective rather than the objective of extermination itself, looking for the enemy across mutable class lines rather than racial and bodily inscribed categories. The Marxist-inspired sociological model of transformation in the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc never abandoned the prospect of redeemability of the dangerous elements (Barnes 2011) and therefore deployed vast resources not just in mapping individuals, but in following their life trajectories and in influencing them through labor and indoctrination. Penal practice involved annihilation in case of perceived incorrigibility; otherwise it moved beyond isolation (through the penitentiary system of the Gulag) to reformation. The vast human archive served to screen not just social status and political stance, but conduct and authenticity based on a continuum of past and potential actions. The perceived malleability of individuals had a correspondent in the relentless categorization of the prisoners and—inversely—in the need for statistical generalizations. Even incriminating labels, like that of "political prisoner" had to disappear in the aftermath of the proclamation of the victory of socialism (1936) and the end of class struggle, leaving instead broad space for the interpretation of "enemies of the people" in the wake of the Great Terror.

Substantiating cases was a matter of inverted penal procedures and superposition of mass operation and individualization. Briefly informed lists were only subsequently followed by faulty investigations. At the time of the Great Terror, NKVD was first making lists of anti-Soviet "elements" by using information from agents or by fabricating evidence (Khelevniuk 2004, p. 150). Lists were a matter of group arrests rather than individual identification and investigation of a specific crime, thus proving the quota-driven imperatives, but also the categorial nature of the procedures. After the trials of Kamenev-Zinoviev, whole populations or collectives were targeted on the basis of nationality (espionage-subversive contingents of Poles, Latvians, Germans, Estonians, Chinese, Romanians etc.), and of perceived belongingness to counterrevolutionary

organizations or institutions (former White Guardsmen, tsarist officials, former members of anti-Bolshevik parties, "rightist terrorists"). The purges spread in the end to a wide range of "unreliable individuals" and—therefore—could not escape a self-devouring outcome (sectors of the Soviet bureaucracy, chekists and even NKVD agents). The resolve to fabricate big cases was only subsequently followed by the extraction of evidence through confessions by torture or through falsification of interrogation protocols. Show trials such as the Shakhty affair (1928) drew rather on theatrical and cinematic forms of legal propaganda to manufacture enemies (Cassiday 2000, p. 111) and to provide—instead of finding—positive proofs of the existence of sabotage or counterrevolutionary activities. A domino effect spread into the wider society, helped by the infectious disease metaphors from the press coverage of the events and the reproduction of self-judgment in the audience. Rhetoric and data production had never been more intertwined. The arbitrariness of the prosecuting process was nevertheless part of a rationally planned design. The existence of extensive information about the victims was now due to the high level of centralization of the operations.

Despite the voluntary or involuntary destruction of files, inventories and statistics are directly offered to historians of the Gulag, who have made extensive use of them, thus privileging comprehensive and largely numerical accounts of the phenomenon. This type of administratively oriented account leaves paradoxically little space for focused research on information cycles or documentary practices. Peter Holquist is one of the few who refers to the particular archival nature of the Great Terror by pinpointing the full subordination of the archivists to the NKVD in 1937 and to their obligation to compile card catalogues of enemies of the people by frantically combining information from the files of the White Army, other civil institutions, the acquired Baltic and Ukrainian Archives and the seized Prague archive on Russian emigration (Holquist 2003, pp. 36–37). Still inspired by an idiom of legal polemic as in *samizdat* accounts, earlier studies paradoxically devote more space to the particular documentary flaws of the purges.

DATA BETWEEN TECHNIQUES AND POLITICS: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF MANAGEMENT

A certain fabrication of evidence was at the core of the economy as well. The whole management of socialist systems was confronted with the problem of responsiveness and feedback of structures within a central-planned economy, devoid of the regulatory mechanisms of the market. This conflict led to different kinds of "compromised" data and to alternation of periods of scientific management (based on standards, rules regarding information handling) with radical measures such as mass mobilization, campaigns and coercion (Beissinger 1988). The falsification of evidence was not just a matter of missing referents (when the required outputs were not met), but of interpreting it and building a mathematical image that supplanted accuracy with apparent consistencies.

Far from constituting a parallel universe beyond which pragmatists acted, figures had as much of an impact on "reality" when they needed to be correlated as when they didn't need to be. The elimination of the requirement for a precise correspondence between ex-ante and ex-post plan figures in Hungary in the late 1960s saved a good deal of coordinating time and allowed enterprises to perform according to their capacities (Bauer 1983).

In the post-Stalin era many newly reborn sciences and academic disciplines disputed among themselves the leading role in management-science. Sociologists stressed the importance of social psychology, jurists that of administrative law, cyberneticians the scientific organization of labor and philosophers the importance of party mindedness. Under the buzzword banner of "systems approach" the very notion of "scientificity" was negotiated as being either a matter of statecraft/art or one of impersonalized procedures. Technocratic utopianism was sought to solve problems of governance without changing power relations. Technology and information flow were at the core of the socialist projects not because of their intrinsic instrumentality in speeding up actions, but because of their alleged neutral values in reaching consensus and political support. Cybernetization had a larger agenda than in the West not because of its applied character, but because of the enhancement of a discursive, declarative field in which mathematics and computing were associated with a new concept regarding objectivity, rooted not in truthfulness, but in the power of (self-)abstracting. Instead of the economic agencies, it is the military and intelligence institutions that realized the potential of large-scale information collection and processing of computer technology. In 1971, at the same time as in the Soviet Union a Statewide Automated System was devised (but never implemented), in Romania and Hungary the Secret Police installed computerized databases using state-of-the-art IBM machines (Verdery 2014, p. 14).

Data about Population: From Numbers to Intermediate Forms of Knowledge

The common belief of experts and party leaders in the scientific management of society led to the institutionalization of statistics within a central state agency as early as 1918. Contrary to the assumptions of totalitarian theories,[3] the demographic statistical data were not a priori fallible. Studies on the history of censuses attempt to analyze the tension between a statistical reason (how to think with data) and a political reason (how to act with data) and its "creative" consequences in devising new methods for collecting and treating data (Blum and Mespoulet 2003). What was specific to the Soviet state as well as to the Fascist state was the usage of demographical numbers, when favorable, in the political discourse and therefore the blurring of the boundaries between the public and private spheres. Historians of socialism confess their disarray when confronted with badly defined and temporally fluctuating categories, changing even within the same administrative unit. The discrepancy between the uniformity of tone of socialist discourses and the messy estate of their data informed a whole historical trend which focused neither on the implacable mechanism of

power, nor on the dynamic of society, but on the disparities within governance itself (Depretto 2002).

More precise and detailed in its creation of information about citizens than census was passportization. As a method of both bureaucratization of identities and surveillance, the categorizing mechanism of passports allowed police to screen the population and fight "criminality" in an arbitrary manner, when mass repression or mass mobilization (the public cooperation through "mass revolutionary vigilance") were no longer an option for control (Shearer 2004). As early as the 1930s, there were internalized ways of viewing groups through the prism of "organized–unorganized," thus subsuming different strata under the label of "socially harmful element" and imposing either the political stigma over "the criminal" or the other way round. Such passport information together with the census reports and civil registration constituted the more immediate operational basis for repression than the confessions and testimonies because of their legible form and because of the official perception that they reflected reality.

Next on the scale of "abstracting" information about people are the social sciences and investigation into people's attitudes. What is ironic is that the most formalized reading of people's profiles could *not* be performed within the surveillance apparatus of the regimes. Open—and also systematic—research into people's opinion has always been resisted; before the different "thaws," it was banned because it might have revealed hostility to the regimes. When reestablished institutionally, the interdiction of *publicly* expressing uncontrolled opinions still left social sciences in a grey zone of efforts to ascertain them indirectly. Always torn between an intelligence-gathering mandate and an internal imperative to become a science, sociology (with its polling activities) was neither a homogenous discipline nor a dissenting field. According to Connor and Gitelman (1977), the two opposing views regarding public opinion under socialism were monism versus pluralism. The first considered surveying as a consultative, problem-solving process, taking place within a general consensus and coinciding with the "objective path of historical development." It favored letters to the editor and institutional resolutions as samples of homogenous public opinion. The other view held that public opinion was pluralistic on all but "fundamental issues" and that the best tool for studying it was the sample survey. The first made sociology blend within the matrix of multiple channels of information gathering, stretching from press to party agencies. The second perspective allowed sociologists to negotiate the limits of their profession, that is, to formalize what was blurred but limited in its radicalism.

Chronologically, it was the monist mobilizational medium of newspapers that initiated research into the opinion of different publics after Stalin's death. Institutional (re)establishment of surveys and underpinning philosophies followed according to the political cultures of each country. Poland and the Soviet Union were quick to articulate their pressures from below around Khrushchev's speech from February 1956, but they differed in the reactions they enhanced. A Center for Research of Public Opinion followed in October 1956 and was

assailed by voluntary Poles who wished to become pollsters (Lebow 1999). In the Soviet Union, a Center for the Study of Public Opinion affiliated with the Academy of Sciences' Institute for Concrete Social Research became real in 1969 and was quickly dismantled in 1971 because it was perceived to be dangerous. Social scientists inside acknowledge the adventurous nature of their work because of the double bind of thematic censorship and political pressures to reveal the identities of those manifesting radical attitudes. Subjects like socialism, capitalism, Lenin, Brezhnev, the food shortages or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were proscribed; brave inquiries into political attitudes could, however, be cushioned in surveys about literary tastes (Shlapentokh 1986, pp. 453–60). Boldness in addressing political issues differentiates countries despite their institutional synchronization. In 1967 both Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia created sociological institutes, but their focus was totally divergent: while Bulgarians were more conservative in their inquiries, the Dubcek period in Czechoslovakia allowed the Institute for Public Opinion Research to play an important political role until 1969, when its focus faded to "consumerist" issues (Connor and Gitelman 1977, pp. 2–14).

It is not enough to say that the shift to trivial matters during intervals of strengthened political control is due only to a strategy of depoliticization. It is not the formulation of political questions per se which disturbs the leadership, but the comprehensive insights deriving from it. What was rather privileged was a "practical empiricism." Material issues were "facts" in need of direct action and not reflexive correlation. Micro-scale observations were not a basis for making inferences about the representativeness of a phenomenon; they were proof of its isolation. Heuristics and evidence were reverted. Soviet sociologists were expected to conduct research at the local level and present their findings as unusual or characteristic of only a small fraction of the population. Although elaborated for a US audience, the work of Goffman infiltrates the epistemic and strategic suppositions of scientists who recognize an overarching ideology *together* with the protean variety of everyday performances staged by skillful agents.

If statistics offered a way to measure and make legible the splintered views of Soviet men by avoiding both the intricacies of psychology and the homogenizing categories of dogma, more politically loyal epistemic communities could not do the same. Their use of narrative in the form of the report, summary and letter offered the illusion of direct access to a protean world of thinking while at the same time documenting it. Reports about the "mood of the population" relied on the assumption that secret inquiries would lead to authentic and usable information about people's needs and opinions. In the Soviet Union, *svodki* as a summary report on people's opinions was commissioned by the secret police and by the party's Information Department and had a tradition going back to the tsarist regime. In the 1930s their production was challenged by passportization. The failure to provide "objective" information was clear to authorities themselves. Situated between screening collectivities and framing them at the same time, reports were neither concrete in their details, nor analytic in their summarizing, perpetuating a system of smoky renderings

even when unveiling issues. In Bulgaria, an Information-Sociological Center attached to the Central Committee since 1970 produced syntheses from citizens' complaints and distributed them to the government, which could in turn respond to the most trivial material discontent. Responsiveness was a matter of "reading"[4] directly into the disparate information rather than corroborating it.

Instead of Conclusions: Informativity of Sources

The documents about opinions under the communist system have divided historical accounts. In this debate, the access to "information" about ordinary people was also second to the formulation of historiographic hypotheses. Taking advantage of partial archives (the one from Smolensk smuggled by the Germans in 1941 and arriving in the USA in 1945) or to oblique testimonies taken from refugees, studies related to the totalitarian paradigm viewed socialism as a monolithic political system without society and without a "public." Ambiguously condoning the explicative schemes of the documents themselves, deviant positions were regarded as failures of the propaganda. Usually included in this paradigm, Hannah Arendt's insights make a difference: for her, homogenization of "masses" was not a derivation of public engineering, but of a state of "homelessness" facing "universally related civilizations" and disillusionment with historic accounts from which they had been expelled. Skeptical about unattainable truthfulness, the masses—cynically—opted for consistency in lying and being lied to. Most revisionist work (Fitzpatrick 1992), departing from a paradigm seen as monolithic as the Stalinist system, first recuperated the socio-aspirational dimension of societies in the quest for upward mobility. They favored a partial consensual relationship between the state and social groups (beyond the verbal automatisms) and highlighted the flaws in the transmission of top-down information-instructions. The opening of the archives and the access to administrative sources reversed the theme of "support" to that of "resistance." One could say that the *factual* logic of the documents (that of looking for "deviance") was reproduced, with the difference that the *relevance* was reversed. Through interpretation and accretion, the historian could finally make a case for "typical and recurring themes" (Sarah Davies 1997, p. 18), thus *misreading* sources and compensating over time the frustrations of the sociologist. The problem of distinguishing between the individual intentions and the politicization of behaviors brought back the issue of the discursive interpenetration between ideology and the public(s). Privileging a textured reading of the document, post-revisionist historians (Hellbeck 2009) discarded the existence of a reality beyond the text while reaffirming consensus as a matter of the incorporation of ideology. Factuality was not a function of reported reality, but of reporting itself. "Allegiance" to the regime returned by *over-reading* the historical record. Finally, the transgression of all binaries (oppression versus resistance, resistance versus collaboration) happened when a semiotic reading was accompanied by an anthropological attention to practices of socialization and timing. "Publics" were identified as being both inside and outside the normative power of the ideology, deriving

the power of performative lifestyles from external conventions while playing with meanings in unpredictable ways (Yurchak 2006). If Hannah Arendt saw Stalinist totalitarianism as a political regimentation of people deprived of legal protection (and having only "bare life"), "publics" in late socialism could be conceived as the concretization of forms of living between "bare life" and "political life."

The whole range of information provided by the Communist archives seems to be as much about void as about message. Economic figures, censuses, statistics, information about the mood of the population, all were "produced" as in any other form of governance and yet they differ because they were part of a schizoid relationship to knowledge. In the absence of a political will to process them systematically, pieces of information were informative in their isolation, not in their corroboration; single facts were sought after either as non-representative or overly representative. Huge apparatuses gathered data that was always insufficient and yet deemed important, and were thus self-multiplying. Serialization and redundancy supplemented accuracy, consistency replaced validation, accumulation stood for comprehensiveness. An archival mode of managing the world treated information as both document and depositable (disposable) record. While Cold War opponents merely replicated such a style of relating to information as item and revelation, historians privileged one way of thinking (information was about organization) or another (it is a glimpse of "truth"). Recently, they discarded the archival mode together with its scripts, looking instead for non-scriptural forms of expression (lifestyles, affects, memories). I wonder if there is a possibility of going back to archives (as systems and not just as sources) after first disentangling a very specific Cold War *archival mode* of self-obnubilation and immediacy.

NOTES

1. Its acronym means Central Board for Safeguarding of state Secrets in the Press under the Committee for Press Affairs of the USSR.
2. Censorship was an obstacle as well as a stylistic catalyst (Kagarlitsky and Dauzat 1993, p. 91).
3. In her book on totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt discarded the statistical data from the Smolensk archives as totally unreliable on the assumption that "the regime did not gather information, but rather published information in *Pravda* about the regions; local facts that did not conform with the official wisdom were considered non-facts" (Arendt 1975, p. xxxxvi). Recent works, however, recognized the importance of understanding the creation and use of figures for the self-professed socialist governance.
4. An Institute of Suggestology affiliated with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and functioning between 1966 and 1986 gathered over time a surreal body of "scientific" questionnaires that tried to categorize people's inner lives by making them confess what a state-sponsored prophetess (Vanga) was "reading" into their past or future (Valtchinova 2009).

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Economic Control and Consent in Wartime Japan

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In mobilizing their economies for empire and war, interwar fascist dictatorships required not only the heavy hand of the state, but also the consent and cooperation of the masses. In order to achieve their ambitious production targets, these dictatorships called upon their citizens to produce more and consume less, place national interests over private interests, and join together to build an ethnic national community and regional empire. Fascist dictatorships promoted visions of a classless, functionalist society and corporatist ideals such as labor–management harmony and the dignity of the worker. In contrast to socialist dictatorships, which fundamentally transformed the relations of production, fascist dictatorships neither changed the underlying class structure nor granted workers greater political representation. By what means, then, did they seek to motivate producers and consumers?

The fascist dictatorships of Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy called for new leadership, new mass organizations and a new spirit to address the challenges of mass society, ethnic nationalism and global competition in the post-First World War era. Through technocratic planning and the application of new principles and strategies, these regimes sought to devise a "third way" between democratic capitalism and state socialism that would provide strong leadership from above without crushing private initiative from below. For these leaders, state planning represented the most modern, rational and effective means to overcome capitalist culture, which they associated with economic instability, inefficiency, social inequity and class conflict. They predicted that countries which embraced these new recent trends would be at the forefront of a new world order, while the "old world" powers which continued to cling to the liberal status quo would be left behind.

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Among the interwar mass dictatorships, Japan was distinct in being the only Asian power to challenge the liberal world order. As an Asian mass dictatorship, Japan struck different chords by promoting its anti-liberal economic policies within the framework of pan-Asianism and Asian development. Following its occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Japan embarked upon a program of Soviet-style state industrialization under the pan-Asianist slogans of "ethnic harmony" and "kingly way rule." From the late 1930s, amidst its escalating war against China and shift to a wartime footing, Japan called for the creation of a so-called "New Order" in East Asia and in Japan to "develop Asia." As it advanced into Southeast Asia and the South Pacific from 1940, Japan posed as the liberator of Asia from Western colonialism and architect of a "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" and *Grossraumwirtschaft*. Both to the Japanese people and the people of the various Asian countries, Japanese leaders sought to morally justify their empire through pan-Asianist appeals and differentiate it from Western imperialism. In this essay, I first consider the common challenges of interwar mass dictatorships in mobilizing their economies. I then examine the distinct ways in which Japan sought to pursue an Asian "third way" that transcended not only liberal capitalism and socialism, but also Western imperialism.

Fascist mass dictatorships promoted the common goals of increasing military power, securing economic independence and building a new society. All three countries saw war as a legitimate and economically productive means to achieve state objectives. Hitler and Mussolini wrote about the generative effects of war to mobilize the state, purify the soul and revitalize society. Japanese army leaders praised war as the motor of history, referring to it as the "father of creation, mother of culture," as well as an opportunity for the government to implement controversial reforms at home. They viewed military rearmament and imperial aggression as vehicles for economic recovery, growth and the mobilization of the masses. Germany and Japan engaged in extensive deficit financing and easy credit policies in order to fund their armaments and economic stimulus programs. Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 enhanced the prestige of the respective regimes domestically and provided a sense of economic security. Soviet leaders, in contrast, did not promote a romanticized view of war and primarily sought to justify military rearmament for defensive purposes. The Soviet Union was eager to prepare against a future military attack in light of its defeat by Japan in 1905 and that country's rapidly expanding presence along the Manchurian–Mongolian border. It also sought to defend itself against worldwide anti-communist sentiment, expressed in the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

The twin goals of military strength and economic autonomy led mass dictatorships to focus their economies on production and defense-related heavy industry. Fascist governments restricted private investment, equity financing and consumption in all "non-essential" civilian industries. All dictatorships eventually controlled foreign trade through foreign-exchange controls and redirected trade to the extent possible to their regional partners. More than

the European fascist dictatorships, the Soviet Union confronted a war-ravaged, backward economy after the First World War. Determined to catch up with the industrialized world by whatever means necessary, Soviet leaders proceeded to build a regional empire and a semi-autarkic communist bloc. They embarked upon an ambitious, state-planned industrialization drive, while rationing food consumption and private spending.

In fascist dictatorships, leaders aimed to achieve economic self-sufficiency through imperialist aggression. Japanese, German and Italian leaders referred to their conquests as comprising their country's *Grossraumwirtschaft* (large regional economy) and "living space." Such geopolitical concepts referred to the areas extending outward from the metropole that would possess an economic, spatial and racial unity and be largely self-sufficient. In the 1930s, fascist leaders and ideologues proclaimed that for resource-poor, mid-sized countries such as Germany, Japan, and Italy, the age of national economies had ended. The future order would be dominated by the large regional economies of the United States, Soviet Union, Germany and Italy, and Japan. They also argued that a New Order composed of pan-regional economic blocs would be superior to the international capitalist system. According to the Nazi planner Werner Daitz (1938), such a system offered greater economic stability and protection against the business cycles, and reflected the basic law that peoples should live by the fruits of their own ability and in their own space.

All mass dictatorships embraced utopian visions of a new society that purported to be morally superior to the democratic capitalist society. Fascist dictatorships advanced their own visions of national community (*kokumin kyōdōtai*) or ethnic community (*Volksgemeinschaft*) to overcome capitalist modernity. Germany, Japan and Italy advanced, to varying degrees, the notion of their racial or ethnic superiority over neighboring peoples. Their new societies would be ultra-modern, technologically advanced, rationally planned capitalist societies without liberal capitalism's class conflict, materialism, alienation and weak political leadership. By appealing to various corporativist notions, leaders sought to reduce class conflict and reorient labor and management toward national goals. They embraced modern technology and industry, while praising the virtues of agriculture and traditional gender-specific roles. Above all, they sought to cultivate a new spirit of national and racial belonging and well-being, especially among the nation's youth. All three countries looked to fascism to provide a new political religion or "sacralized politics" that would spiritually reconnect the people with their national, ethnic heritage, traditions and land. The Soviet Union's social vision, in contrast, was of a modern, industrialized, classless society in which all property was communally held and members of society were equal. This utopian ideal grew out of the earlier Bolshevist vision of agrarian communal life, in which people lived and worked together, contributed according to their abilities, and took according to their needs, as well as the fascination with modern technology and science.

Controlling Mass Economies

In studies of mass dictatorships, scholars point out the strong role of the state in the economy.[1] Modern dictatorships adopted an activist role, in contrast to the passive role of democratic countries. The difference between the democratic and dictatorial regimes stemmed from their respective political ideologies and the structural challenges arising from their particular historical circumstances. Mass democracies in the post WWI era, such as Great Britain, the United States and France, were industrially advanced, colonial powers. These countries generally operated on the liberal principles of a laissez-faire market economy, in which the invisible hand of the market guided economic activity and the state assumed a regulatory function of ensuring a level playing field. In socialist and fascist dictatorships, the state's visible hand directed the economy and assumed a centralized planning function. Pursuing its vision of state socialism, the Soviet Union played the dominant role in implementing a centralized, top-down program of rapid, forced industrialization and agricultural collectivization according to its Five Year Plans. Germany, Japan and Italy, which bemoaned their status as resource-poor, imperial latecomers, embarked upon a program of rapid rearmament, imperialist expansion and autarky through various ad hoc economic controls and multi-year plans to increasingly subjugate the private sector to state interests.

The key difference between the centrally planned economies and market economies was the market price function. In market economies, resources were allocated by price, which, together with profits, based on market price, contained important information about supply and demand, or market value. In the planned systems, the state set prices at a fixed level or according to cost, and used quotas and quantitative targets to guide resource allocation (Temin 2008). State planners, lacking market information, could only make predictions about reasonable costs, prices and quantities, which were adjusted continuously and fine-tuned in iterative fashion, with the discrepancies usually made up by the government (Okazaki 1994). In addition, since interest and dividend rates, as well as stock prices, were regulated by the state, they no longer served as market indicators to allocate funds and resources. As a result, the government became the principal funding organ for business investment. Through control of the purse, it could direct investment toward areas considered strategically important.

Mass dictatorships grappled with the common challenges of state economic planning. As the forerunner and most comprehensively planned state, the Soviet Union served as a model for state planning in fascist dictatorships in the 1930s. Germany, Japan and Italy adapted Soviet planning institutions, techniques and practices. All three countries instituted various short-term and longer-term plans. Germany and Italy implemented their first multi-year plans during the latter 1930s, while Japan launched the Manchurian Five Year Plan in 1937 and a four-year Productive Capacity Expansion Plan for Japan the following year. As became evident in all cases, planning was not a science. Without the

self-regulating, disciplinary function of the market to guide behavior, mass dictatorships had to rely on other methods to meet targets. The state might revise targets, reset price levels when costs exceeded price or make adjustments in other areas through new government directives and policies. Moreover, since their planning structures were built upon or parallel to the existing bureaucratic framework, their functions often overlapped with those of the main ministries. The result was turf battles, competition for scarce resources, and a lack of clear lines of authority in planning.

Less attention has been paid to the other important dimension of planning: mass mobilization. In order to implement their ambitious developmental strategies, mass dictatorships required not only control from above, but also cooperation from below. Leaders relied on not only the threat of punishment and terror, but also the promise of material and non-material benefits to motivate managers, workers and peasants. At times, managers and workers received capped dividends, bonuses and company perks. Particularly in the case of fascist dictatorships, in which most property was privately owned, state leaders sought induced cooperation by forcefully aligning private interests with public interests. Independent labor unions were replaced by or absorbed into state-administered mass organizations (Kasza 1995). Programs such as Germany's "Strength through Joy," Italy's "National Recreation Club" (*Dopolovaro*) and Japan's "Revitalization Movement (*Kōsei undō*)" aimed to strengthen worker loyalty and productivity through company perks and other incentives. Although terror was used on managers and workers more extensively in the Soviet Union, it always loomed in the background in fascist dictatorships. Managers who refused to cooperate could be singled out, denounced and punished. Despite the fascist dictatorship's recognition of private property, the regime reserved the right to revoke privileges associated with private ownership whenever it conflicted with national interests. Fascist dictatorships, however, ultimately sought to mobilize the economy and effect national power not only through coercion, but also the synergy of leadership, mass organization and national spirit.

Japan's Anti-liberal Turn Toward Asia

Japan's anti-liberal turn was intimately tied to its reengagement with Asia in new ways. From the time of its emergence as a modern state in 1868, Japan had adopted the national mandate of "rich country, strong army," which was interpreted at the time as "leaving Asia, and joining the West." Eager to catch up with the advanced Western powers and demonstrate its modernity, Japan embarked upon an ambitious program of liberal modernization, which included rapid industrialization, free trade, parliamentary government and imperialist expansion (Metzler, 2006). As a result of the military's victory in two major wars, the Sino–Japanese war (1894–1895) and Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905), Japan acquired an Asian empire, which by 1910 included Taiwan, Korea and an expanding presence in Manchuria. As a reward for fighting on the side of the Entente powers in the First World War, Japan acquired the German concession

in Shandong and a Class C mandate over Germany's Pacific islands. By the 1920s, Japan had become a full-fledged member of the international community and an Asian colonial power that engaged in "cooperative diplomacy." Together with the Western powers, Japan participated in the international expedition to suppress the Chinese Boxer Rebellion, the Siberian intervention, the Washington Naval Conference and League of Nations. At home, the two main political parties had firmly instituted themselves in Japanese politics and passed the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law in 1925. Through trade and diplomacy with the West, Japan had strengthened its international position. As for its Asian holdings, Japan viewed them as primarily a showcase of Japanese modernity and a buffer to the Soviet Union.

By the early 1930s, however, Japan's mandate of "rich country, strong army" acquired the opposite meaning of "leaving the West, and returning to Asia." "Rich country" came to mean self-sufficiency in Asia, and "strong army" meant mobilization for total war. A confluence of events triggered the anti-Western, anti-liberal reaction: the worldwide depression, the zaibatsu's dollar-buying scandal, the liberal government's ill-timed decision to return to gold and the signing of the unpopular London Naval Treaty. But the event that mobilized the nation and paved the way for a mass dictatorship was the Japanese Kwantung Army's seizure of Manchuria and creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. Drawing upon the lessons of the First World War, army planner Ishiwara Kanji argued that Japan needed to become economically self-sufficient in order to fight a total war against either the United States or the Soviet Union. Manchuria, which possessed untapped energy resources, such as coal, iron, oil shale and rivers, became increasingly attractive as a base for Japanese heavy and chemical industries. Moreover, in the wake of the worldwide depression and trend toward bloc economies, Japanese leaders looked to a Japan–Manchuria bloc to provide resources and markets and thereby insulate Japan from the harsh effects of global capitalism. As a result, Manchuria was now touted as Japan's economic "lifeline." The invasion of Manchuria set Japan on a collision course with the liberal powers, which refused to recognize the Manchurian state. In 1933, Japan walked out of the League of Nations after failing to obtain international recognition of Japan's exclusive rights to Manchuria.

The coincidence of the implosion of Japanese liberal capitalism with the Manchurian invasion provided the occasion for pan-Asianism to emerge as a basis for mass politics in Japan. The army promoted Manchuria as the antithesis of liberal Japan. They claimed that in place of the liberal world economy, founded upon the abstract, rational notions of the invisible hand, utilitarianism and comparative advantage, Manchuria provided Japan with a concrete, physical space with natural resources and utopian pan-Asianist ideals. In the popular imagination, Manchuria represented an exciting frontier that was far from Japan's metropole and its corrupt party politics, big business and entrenched elite interests. In contrast to Korea and Taiwan, Manchuria had romance because it reconnected the Japanese to their Asian continental and cultural roots. Part of this vision was inspired by Manchuria's vast size. After its

incorporation, Japan nearly quadrupled its land mass and increased its population by nearly 50%. Leaders liked to compare Japan's new frontier with that of the United States and Soviet Union. Japanese intellectuals, both on the left and right, looked to Manchuria as a safe haven and alternative to the excesses of liberal capitalist Japan. Manchuria promised to resolve the problems of unemployment and overpopulation in Japan by providing jobs and abundant land.

THE MANCHURIAN EXPERIMENT

Manchuria represented Japan's first experiment with a fascist mass dictatorship. In designing the new state, the Kwantung Army sought to create an anti-liberal, pan-Asianist "advanced national defense state." The army's vision was informed by several principles. First, it viewed war as the necessary and inevitable means for countries to move from one era to the next. Second, it argued that total war, in contrast to traditional war, was a totalitarian "strategic synthesis" of various military, political, economic, social and cultural elements (Milward 1977, p. 17). The army conceived of the economy as part of a broader, integrated planning effort closely linked to new forms of mass mobilization, including a state mass party, propaganda bureau, youth groups and labor organizations. Third, it believed that the momentous technological advances of the early twentieth century had transformed the nature of industry, warfare, society and the state giving them a greater planning character and calling forth the need for a new type of leader with technocratic expertise.

Drawing upon the assistance of Japanese left-wing economists and right-wing activists, Kwantung Army officers established the state of Manchukuo under pan-Asianist principles. The titular heads of the new state were Chinese elites. Army officers and Japanese bureaucrats made all key decisions, however, with the latter taking on an increasingly important role in economic affairs. Japanese leaders created technocratic planning organs, a state science institute, an academy to train bureaucrats, a film company, a university comprised of students of the various ethnicities and a vanguard mass party, the Concordia Association. Although Japanese leaders had sought to mobilize the Asian masses through such organizations, they made little headway because their policies were imposed by force from above. In addition, their pan-Asianist ideals quickly gave way to pragmatic policies to make Manchuria an appendage of Japan's expanding war machine.

The cornerstone of the Manchurian venture was the creation of a planned economy to effect rapid, heavy industrialization. Critical of liberal capitalism, Kwantung Army officers sought to exclude the participation of Japan's leading financial conglomerates, the *zaibatsu*, and looked to Soviet models of state planning. The army drew upon Soviet experts from Japan's South Manchurian Railway Company and Japanese technocratic planners to design state-owned, industry-based "special companies" and a Manchurian Five Year Plan. Despite its outward socialist trappings, Manchukuo differed from socialist mass dictatorships in fundamental ways. Manchurian development was driven by the

ideals of pan-Asianism, not socialism, although some of Manchukuo's architects did harbor socialist visions of peasant liberation and a more egalitarian society. In contrast to the Soviet dictatorship, Japan's vision of Manchuria was regionally and ethnically defined and promoted particularistic Asian spiritual ideals, not universal ideals of socialism and world revolution.

Despite the army's high hopes, Manchuria's planned economy proved a great disappointment. Its production figures did not match those of private industry in Japan. Leaders failed to attract Japanese and foreign capital. From 1936, the army changed course and recruited the commerce ministry bureaucrat Nobusuke Kishi to restructure Manchuria's industries. Kishi mediated between the army and private business and searched for a middle way between the army's state capitalism and liberal capitalism. The army wanted to attract Japanese expertise and capital but retain state control over industry. Business was hesitant to invest in Manchuria due to the obvious political and business risks, as well as distrust of the army's anti-liberal stance. Kishi sought to give state control a friendly face by establishing clear limits on the state's authority over private industry and emphasizing its supporting role in guiding industry toward national goals. Using his extensive business and political connections, Kishi convinced Nissan president Yoshisuke Ayukawa to transfer his company to Manchuria and merge it with the various special companies to form the new Manchurian Heavy Industries Corporation. Nissan was an acceptable partner to the Japanese army because as a "new zaibatsu," its business seemed more focused on technology than profits. The state guaranteed Nissan a minimum dividend and as well as a relatively free hand in promoting industrialization. Beginning with the transfer of Nissan operations to Manchuria, Japanese leaders sought to find a medium between free enterprise and state control in which the state would provide guidance from above, but preserve private initiative and profits for managers and investors. The experiment with Manchurian state planning and the lessons derived from it represented the first step in Japan's search for a "third way" between capitalism and socialism (Mimura 2011).

BUILDING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ECONOMY

The extensive experience acquired in state planning in Manchuria did not fully prepare Japanese bureaucrats for the challenges involved in implementing a controlled economy in their own country. Whereas in Manchuria, Japanese leaders were able to start from a "blank slate" in industrial planning, in Japan they faced a completely different set of hurdles. Leaders confronted a fully developed political and economic system with well-defined political, business, labor and consumer interests. Leaders revised their strategy to coordinate the development of heavy industry in Japan and Manchuria through a five-year plan in each country and launched only the Manchurian Five Year plan in 1937. Implementation of the Japanese Five Year Plan would involve the extensive reorganization of Japan's economy through the imposition of multiple con-

trols, including regulation of various commodity markets, price controls, the redirection of capital for heavy industry and control of foreign exchange and trade. The uproar that year over Japan's first control law, the Electric Power Control Law, gave officials a taste of the battles to come.

The outbreak of the second Sino–Japanese war in 1937 provided an unexpected and more immediate rationale for the military's national defense program, but it also added new complications. Unlike the Manchurian invasion, the war in China became increasingly unpopular. The government failed to provide a clear and compelling reason for Japanese aggression against the Chinese. From an economic standpoint, the war drained precious resources away from the military's long-term plans to mobilize for total war. Total war proponents such as Ishiwara had recommended that Japan avoid military conflicts for at least five years in order to develop and stockpile enough resources for a future, final war. Moreover, the war with China generated unfavorable press abroad. From 1938, the United States began to call for a "moral embargo" to end US shipments of vital raw materials, machine tools and military-related equipment to Japan. Even its Axis partners, Germany and Italy, were reluctant to terminate their amiable relations and lucrative commercial ties with China.

Japan's controlled economy centered on a series of annual and multi-year plans to mobilize raw materials for heavy industry and establish munitions-related facilities (Nakamura, 1994). From 1938, recently established Cabinet Planning Board produced annual materials mobilization plans for over one hundred important commodities, such as coal, iron, steel and aluminum in order to fulfill the short-term needs of the military. For the longer term, the government replaced the original Five Year Plan for Japan with a four-year Production Capacity Expansion Plan to establish the infrastructure for munitions production (Hara 1998, pp. 230–33). The state sought to implement these war mobilization plans under Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro's "Three Fundamental Principles of Finance and Economics," which were: increasing productive capacity, managing the supply and demand of materials, and maintaining the international balance of payments. In other words, the mobilization plans represented the starting point for the state to control raw materials, foreign exchange, trade, investment, prices and interest rates. Officials at the Cabinet Planning Board soon realized that the task of implementing the mobilization plans was much more difficult than drafting them. The state's attempt to apply ad hoc controls to each aspect of the economy as complications arose led to a heavily bureaucratized economy accompanied by political battles among and between ministries and firms, a two-tiered price system and a flourishing black market.

State planners acknowledged that the problems with state control resulted from three interrelated problems. The first was weak political leadership at various levels beginning at the top. Until 1941, cabinets were generally short-lived, typically lasting for no more than a year, with the exception of Konoe Fumimaro's cabinets from 1937 to 1939 and from 1940 to 1941.

Prime ministers were incapable of uniting the people and curbing the political conflicts and competition over scarce materials and funds among firms and the ministries, especially between the army and navy. They attributed Japan's weak leadership to its liberal government, in which power was divided and dependent upon popular support and political responsibility was shared among various groups. As a result of the division of power, the original planning vision became diluted by political infighting among special interests. The second problem was one of organization. As Japanese officials pointed out, the problem was not so much weak cabinets or individual leaders, but the lack of organization of the state as a whole, including mass organizations (Taniguchi 1940, p. 10). They argued that Japan was still clinging to the laissez-faire, pluralist political system of the Meiji era and had not yet awakened to the organizational requirements of the new era. The third problem concerned national spirit. They believed that more than the material constraints, the real challenge was a spiritual one. The new world order required a new spirit, which should be generated within mass organizations by the power of leadership. This leadership power, based upon national organizations and a global Japanese spirit, would enable Japan to increase the productive power of the state and improve the people's welfare (Kamei 1938, pp. 147–49).

The Economic New Order

Through the New Order movement, Cabinet Planning officials attempted to create a new type of mass economy that went beyond both Anglo-American-style market economy and Soviet-style command economy (Yanagisawa 2015). On the one hand, they criticized mass democracy for focusing too much on individualism, equality and majority rule. As they explained, in mass democracies the individual was too strong and the leader was too weak. As a result, there was conflict between the state and the masses. Planners argued that although democratic capitalist countries had created robust economies in peacetime, their systems were too feeble and inefficient to mobilize the masses for total war. On the other hand, they criticized the Soviet mass dictatorship as a form of "premodern despotism," which overemphasized the totality of the state over the people and crushed individual will and creativity. In such a system, they claimed, the masses became passive, obedient subjects, who were unable to actively support state goals.

Officials sought a new principle to realign the relationship between the state and society in such a way that the part and the whole would work together and identify themselves as one entity. They advanced the so-called "leadership principle" as the basis for the New Order. As one Japanese economist explained, the leadership principle defined the relationship between the individual and group, part and whole, and individual and totality at various levels in society. At the macro-level, one saw this principle in the relationships between the individual and society, nation and state, and state and world. At the micro-level, it

was expressed in the relationship between the family and clan, group member and group, and association member and association. Within oneself or one entity, it was the relationship between flesh and spirit, small ego and big ego, matter and spirit, and subject and object (Taniguchi 1940, p. 43). In each case, the individual part and the whole represent organic components of a synthesized and symbiotic totality, in which each part is dependent upon the others to promote their well-being. Hence, according to officials, the nature of "control" was not "coercion and submission," through dictatorial rule from above or majority rule from below, but rather a reciprocal relationship of "guidance and cooperation" between the leader and the masses.

In the Cabinet Planning Board's "Outline of Fundamental National Policy" of August 1, 1940, officials presented the domestic New Order as a holistic, organic, totalitarian entity composed of many individual parts represented by "new orders" for industry, finance, labor, science-technology, communications and regional and demographic planning. According to officials, the New Order aimed to create an advanced national defense state, reflecting the military's view of war mobilization as a totalitarian synthesis of various aspects of society. In order to change Japan's economy from a liberal "controlled economy" to a fascist "managed economy", officials tried to simultaneously reform many areas of the economy under the new leadership principle.

Japanese leaders attempted to cultivate a cooperative relationship between the state and the masses through organizations and programs in each new order. The organization connected the leader with the masses by conveying the will of the leader from above, as well as the desires of the people from below. It became the focal point of economic administration and represented a form of indirect control by the state. Among the more prominent and controversial organizations were the industry-based control associations, the Greater Japan Industrial Patriotic Association and the cooperative financing system. A central component of the plans for the Economic New Order, put forth in September 1940, was the compulsory control associations based on specific industries and commodities. The control associations formed the intermediary link between the state, which provided directives through a government advisory board, and the firm members. Japanese planners sought to revise the system of capitalism by "separating capital from management" and making management accountable to the state, rather than to shareholders (Mimura 2011, pp. 150–54).

JAPAN'S *GROSSRAUMWIRTSCHAFT*

Following the announcement of the establishment of the "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" by Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke in August 1940 and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940, Japan set out to build a large, self-sufficient economy (*kōiki keizai*) encompassing East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Similar to Germany's *Grossraumwirtschaft*, with which it was often compared, it represented the

economic vision of Japan's so-called "New Order in Asia" or "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere." Japanese economic claims to this vast region were made possible by Germany's defeat of France and the Netherlands in the spring of 1940 and its agreement to forfeit the French and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia. Under the Tripartite Pact of 1940, Germany and Italy recognized Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands as Japan's exclusive sphere of interest. Through the Axis alliance, Germany, Japan and Italy sought to stake out their own claims for a share of the sphere of liberal capitalism and thereby obtain the necessary resources to compete with the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Japanese leaders argued that the domestic New Order was a prerequisite for the construction of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere and its Asian *Grossraumwirtschaft*. The large regional economy was considered to be the application of the leadership principle in the international sphere. Both Japan's domestic and Asian new orders were portrayed as economically and morally superior to the mass democracies and Soviet-type dictatorship. Leaders contrasted their large regional economy with the depression-era liberal economic blocs. According to Japanese leaders, whereas the liberal economic bloc was passive, defensive and oriented toward peace and a return to the liberal international system, *Grossraumwirtschaft* was proactive, offensive and geared toward war and the establishment of a new world order. The former was organized as a federation based on mutual political agreement, while the latter was organized along functional and ethnic hierarchies in organic fashion. Planners argued that if Japan retained its old liberal, monopoly capitalist system, then its Asian empire would be no more than a form of Western-style imperialism. Hence, a new principle for Japan's domestic and Asian New Order was necessary to effect a different type of empire in order for Japan to manage an immense amount of capital, labor, materials and technology and rapidly expand productive power in the region.

Although Japanese officials and intellectuals claimed that Japan was liberating Asia from the West and promoting Asian development, their actual policies suggested a more complex and grim picture. Like German and Italian visions of regional empire or *Grossraumwirtschaft*, Japanese plans reflected an essentially materialistic and chauvinistic attitude toward East and Southeast Asia and an intention to treat these regions as raw material suppliers and subcontractors of the Japanese state. Asian coprosperity and development implied a hierarchical view of Asia in which Japan would be the leader and master of Asia's fate.

Note

1. For a concise formulation of this difference in the Japanese context, see Johnson (1982).

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Maneuvering Memories of Dictatorship and Conflicts: The Baltic States, Central and Eastern Europe, and Russia

Nobuya Hashimoto

INTRODUCTION

A seemingly convincing but actually dubious narrative on historical memory is prevailing among East Asian public and intellectual spheres. That is to say, reconciliation among different historical memories of the traumatic near past has been encouraged in Europe through sincere dialogue and cooperation to establish a common history, which has contributed to European integration, while antagonistic and disputable memories of wars and colonization have been seriously fixed in the international and domestic politics of East Asian countries. The former is considered to result from the wholehearted remorse and apology of the Germans, and the latter is, according to the commonly accepted perception, provoked and accelerated by the rude and thoughtless words and deeds of impenitent Japanese political elites, and their reluctance to make an official apology and offer compensation to victims. The simple contrast between Germany and Japan in itself hits the nail on the head when abstracting the historical context of the Cold War and its remnants, and seems irrefutable for Japan. Recent proliferation of political and diplomatic strains between neighbouring countries in Eastern Asia have, in a paradoxical way, manifested the significance of German efforts for *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and the creation of *Erinnerungskultur*, which have decreased national hostility and promoted peaceful relationships with neighbouring nations.

Nevertheless, we find a great amount of works on European contemporary history that address such themes as "contested pasts," "conflicted memories," "memory war" and so on when we turn our attention slightly eastward

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from Germany. They provoke the impression that confrontation, rather than reconciliation, between different historical memories also seems conspicuous in the central and eastern parts of Europe. Actually, Tony Judt exhaustively depicted the divergent configuration of different European memories of the Second World War and its subsequent arrangements in both Eastern and Western Europe in the epilogue of his distinguished *Postwar* (Judt 2005). Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger refer to "The Patchwork of Memory" in Europe, especially pointing out the different experiences of the Second World War and "totalitarian regimes" in the eastern and western parts of Europe. Together with Stefan Troebst, they differentiated four variations in the European memory landscape (memory regimes), in accordance with the geopolitical division of Europe into four subregions by an exiled Polish historian, Oakar Halecki:

> … an Atlantic-Western European memorial community comprised of former Western military opponents of Germany and focusing on D-Day of 1944 and 8 May of 1945, should be distinguished from German-Speaking West-Central Europe with its multiple traumata resulting from the experience of two dictatorships, bombing raids, and total defeat. A further distinction should to [*sic*] be made with respect to East Central Europe, whose nations had to come to terms not only with two occupations in succession but, moreover, with being at the mercy of Soviet power as permitted by the Yalta conference. In contrast, victory in "The Great Patriotic War" continues to provide a unifying bond for historical identity in the Eastern European states of the Russian Federation. (Jarausch and Lindenberger 2007, p. 4)

Stefan Troebst, furthermore, distinguished four types of post-communist cultures of remembrance in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries based on their different attitudes to the communist past: (1) the Baltic states; (2) Hungary, Poland and Ukraine; (3) Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Albania; and (4) Belarus, Moldova and the Russian Federation (Pakier and Stråth 2010, p. 58). Jarausch and Lindenberger's third and fourth variations are subdivided further in his scheme. Memory regimes in Europe have diverged into many segments, and, therefore, the normative image of reconciliation of memories and unification of European history that prevails in Eastern Asia apparently misses the mark in spite of its moral significance.

The deepest gulf of historical memories in Europe seems to run between the Russian Federation and the Baltic and CEE countries, and the confrontation between them is embroiling the European community. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the defrosting of memories frozen under the Cold War and the revised or newly produced national history in each country have disclosed antagonistic factors. Especially since the EU's eastward enlargement in 2004 and the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War the following year, oppositions began to accelerate into harsh political conflicts in Europe. Herein, we observe that different memories of the near past, especially experiences of the Second World War and

dictatorship, have been mobilized and reorganized for political aims, which have increased the risk of new conflicts. The aim of this essay is to pick up the experiences in the eastern part of Europe (especially the Baltic states and Russia) as a case study, and to show how history and memory politics by these states have utilized and manipulated different memories of the war and the communist regime for their own interests, and how the international relationships in Europe have been strained and swayed by these events. The depiction of European cases in this essay will suggest that the mainstreaming of history and memory politics, and the conflicts stimulated by them, is not a peculiar phenomenon of Eastern Asia but a common event observed in a more globalized dimension in the post-Cold War era.

History and Memory Politics in the Baltic and CEE States

In the Baltic and CEE countries that accomplished regime transition from socialism to capitalistic liberal democracy and the recovery of sovereignty and independence through the East European revolution in 1989 and disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, traumatic memories caused by the geopolitical position and tragic events "between Stalin and Hitler" have been implanted at the core of their national identity. History and memory based on victimhood in these countries has been widely put forward in both domestic and international spheres of politics. Even though differences in their situations during the Second World War and in their relationships with Russia have brought subtle or significant divergences to their policies, these countries have commonly made the exposure and condemnation of violence and crimes against humanity committed by the two "totalitarian" regimes of Nazism and Stalinism (Communism) the cornerstone of the (re)construction of national memories and contemporary history, especially emphasizing the criminality of Stalinism. For example, Baltic countries condemned their incorporation into the Soviet Union as forcible military occupation by the Soviets, and asserted that the deportation to Siberia in 1940 and 1949 was "genocide" by the Soviet occupational regime, while they sometimes rationalized collaboration with the Nazi occupational regime (Legion of *Waffen SS*, Auxiliary Police and so on) as an unfortunate but irresistible act under the successive occupations by the Nazis and the Soviets, and even admired the former collaborators, who had participated in armed resistant movements against the Soviet occupation regime, as national heroes for liberation and independence. Besides this, we can refer to many disputes over Soviet crimes in these areas that were nationally remembered and symbolized, such as Polish remembrance of the massacre in the Katyn Forest, accusation by the Ukrainians of the Great Famine in 1932–1933 and so on. Even though they have been obliged to somehow pay attention to the perpetratorhood of their compatriots-collaborators as individuals under pressure of the globalized pursuit for Holocaust responsibility since the

Stockholm International Forum in 2000, the Baltic and CEE countries have promoted the construction of contemporary national history and *Les Lieux de mémoire* as state projects, emphasizing the deprivation of sovereignty, independence and statehood, and the national victimhood resulting from regime violence. We perceive herein a typical expression of "victimhood nationalism" as "a vital element of transnational memory" in the contemporary world (Lim et al. 2014, p. 37).

The first step of memory rearrangement was the institutionalization of history and memory politics and the establishment of relevant state institutions and agencies. While the preservation and management of documents of security agencies and secret police under dictatorships became an important (and sometimes controversial) issue for memory politics, the establishment of state agencies that were directly charged with the promotion of history and memory politics came one after another—the Institute of National Remembrance in Poland (1998), the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes against Humanity (1998–2007), the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory (2007), the Commission of Historians of Latvia (1998), the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania (1997), the International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania (1998), the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes in the Czech Republic (2007), the Nation's Memory Institute in Slovakia (2003), the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania (2006) and so on (Mink and Neumayer 2013, pp. 155–70; Stan and Nedelsky 2013). They vigorously organized international conferences, research and publication activities, compilation of materials for instruction, and foreign publicity and propagation. The Polish Institute of National Remembrance has the competency to identify crimes of totalitarian regimes, as well as the function of preserving documents, carrying out research and furthering education. The fact that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which established the jurisdiction of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, was adopted in 1998 is noteworthy for understanding the reason these institutions were established after 1998. The Baltic and CEE states commenced their enterprises, using the Statute for legitimation of their activities. Such museums and memorials as the Occupation Museum in Riga and the House of Terror in Budapest were founded to visualize and impress the crimes of the occupational or totalitarian regime on visitors, and create a national memory of them. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory was also established, under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko in 2006. Though these institutions play the role of constructing an official history and memory, they have been criticized sometimes for endorsing factional aims or personal grudges in political conflicts.

Regulation against the denial of communist crimes and the admiration of totalitarian regimes also has been advanced in each country, imitating the history and memory laws in West European countries that prohibit denial of the Holocaust, massacre of Armenians and so on. Article 5 of Lithuania's Law

on Meeting makes it illegal both to "display the flag or state emblem of Nazi Germany, the USSR, or the Lithuanian SSR" and other things that symbolize the Nazi and Soviet regimes, and "perform the national anthem of Nazi Germany, the USSR, or the Lithuanian SSR."[1] Latvian Criminal Law provides that "a person who commits public glorification of genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, or war crime," or who publicly denies or acquits these crimes, should be punished through "deprivation of liberty for a term not exceeding five years" or other punitive sanctions (Section 74-1).[2] According to these articles, veterans of the Red Army and Soviet Partisan Units are forbidden to wear old uniforms and decorations in these countries, which means denial of the collective historical memory of not a few people who yearn and hold nostalgia for the Soviet era, especially Russian-speaking minorities. On the other hand, the prosecutions and trials of former state security and oppression authorities personnel who had engaged in the deportation of local residents and violent repression of opponents and dissidents have been advanced in accordance with articles on genocide and crimes against humanity newly included in the Criminal Laws, and the non-applicability of the statute of limitations or retroactivity of these articles. Vasilii Kononov, a former heroic officer of the Soviet Partisans in Latvia, was arrested and found guilty in the Supreme Court of killing the villagers of the Latgale region. Though his "victims" were "peaceful civilians" according to the Court's decision, the defendant asserted they were "armed collaborators for the Nazis" and that killing them was the lawful execution of criminals. The defendant appealed his case to the ECHR in Strasbourg (Mälksoo 2011; Romanov 2011). Legal procedures involving former personnel of the Soviet authorities meant the retelling of past events, from the Soviet forms of narratives to the forms congruous with the regime transition, and constituted an important part of history and memory politics.

First, history and memory politics of the Baltic and CEE countries should be considered as their own peculiar processes of transitional justice, which rectify the injustices carried out by undemocratic dictatorial regimes and recover human rights and honour. Furthermore, they have been related to the diplomatic strategies of these countries, having acquired the self-confidence of fully fledged European liberal democratic states through regime transition and EU and NATO membership. The Baltic states have imputed full responsibility for communist regime crimes to the Russian Federation, which they consider as the sole "continuator state" of the Soviet Union, and demanded apology and compensation for these. History and memory politics of Estonia and Latvia have been correlated to the inferior treatment of Russian-speaking minorities in these countries, who are identified with Soviet "occupants" (or their descendants), and who have been deprived of citizenship and some civil rights for a long time. The reason is very simple: "while one of the aggressors—Germany—has openly apologised for its deed," "the other—Russia—still refuses to acknowledge historical facts, not to mention apologising for the injustice committed" (Laar 2007, p. 2).

Furthermore, these states have challenged the Western or Atlantic formula of the Second World War as "the War of Democracy against Fascism," and have demanded it be reformulated by paying rational attention to their own experiences of successive "occupations" by two "totalitarian regimes." The conventional periodization of contemporary history, which considers 1945 as the celebratory year of victory and liberation, was rejected by these countries, and the new formula was submitted along with a demand for the acknowledgement of their victimhood. According to them, the long years beginning with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and its Secret Protocol in 1939 and culminating with the collapse of the Berlin Wall (1989) and dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) should be grouped together as a continuous and integral whole. Moreover, the Baltic and CEE states have not hesitated to challenge the postulate of "Nazism as the unparalleled, incomparable absolute evil" that had been repeatedly confirmed in the German struggle for *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. They have developed the seemingly revisionist argument that equates Stalinism (or communism) with Nazism, utilizing the concept of totalitarianism, and consider that the former was much worse than the latter, as the communist regime had been maintained longer than Nazi rule. In Ukraine, the opinion that the Great Famine (*Holodomor*) in 1932–1933 was the genocide of the Ukrainian nation, whose victimhood exceeded the tragedy of the Holocaust, has prevailed. This identification of *Holodomor* with genocide has been a hot topic not only in Ukraine but also the international community. Lastly, we should add that this kind of rewriting of history was inseparable from the neoliberal reform of the economy and of politics prompted by regime transition, reminding us that Hayekian neoliberalism was intimately connected with his harsh criticism of totalitarianism.

History and Memory Politics in Putin's Russia

In the Russian Federation, to which the Baltic and CEE states imputed full responsibility for the crimes of the communist regime, counteractive and fierce politics of history and memory have been developed, cautiously since Putin's inauguration as President in 2000, and more boldly since the 60th anniversary of Victory Day in 2005. The Russian government has promoted powerful national (or imperialistic?) integration, positioning the self-sacrificing contribution of the heroic Soviet soldiers and citizens in "the Great Patriotic War" as the core of patriotism. Both influential politicians and representatives of patriotic popular (especially youth) movements in Russia assaulted Estonia and Latvia, abusively labelling them as "Fascists" or "(Nazi) SS States." A good example of the memory conflicts between them was the violent incident by the mainly Russian-speaking population at the centre of Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, in April 2007, subsequent protest actions at the Estonian Embassy in Moscow and the cyber attacks on the Estonian governmental institutions from Russia. The incident was provoked by the decision of the Estonian government to relocate the Monument of the Red Army Soldier, and remains of soldiers

buried under it, from the centre of the city to the military cemetery in the suburbs. While the relocation meant the removal of a symbol of Soviet occupation for the Estonians, it was the destruction of the nucleus of collective identity for the Russian-speaking population. The Russian Federation perceived the events as an unscrupulous denial of the significance of the Second World War as a just war against the injustices committed by Fascists. Estonia, according to Russian judgment, exhaustedly revealed its nature as a Fascist state.

The incident triggered the foundation of a governmental institution for history and memory politics in Russia. In 2009, then President Dmitry Medvedev established "the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests," which was directly under the President and composed of representatives made up of high officials of many governmental institutions, including the armed forces and State Security Authority, as well as a few specialists of historical studies. "Counteraction against the falsification of history" was apparently placed among the state's strategic issues. Parallel to this, bulky volumes of *The Great Patriotic War* (12 vols, 2011) (Velikaya otechestvennaya voina 2011) began to be published under the chief editorship of the Minister of Defence. D. Medvedev contributed a short foreword to the first volume, in which he called out to the public for the intensification of the struggle against "the falsification of history" and "attempts to justify Nazism." The present President Vladimir Putin wrote in his foreword to the second volume, the "historical memory of Russians is always assaulted by the forces who try to depreciate the feat of people who fought" and spoke of the necessity for a "strictly academic and objective" description of historical events in the war. The implication of "counteraction against the falsification of history" is exhaustively manifested therein.

Some historians, both within and outside of Russia, severely criticized the Presidential Commission because of its threat to the academic freedom of historical studies. The American Historical Association and the French movement Liberté pour l'Histoire led by Pierre Nora sent open letters and messages expressing their concern to the President. Nilolai Koposov, a critical (dissident?) historian in Russia, has consistently observed the Commission's activity and the legislation of "Memory Law" (Koposov 2011). The Commission was suddenly abolished three years after its establishment, as it was judged negatively for the inadequate outcome of its activities and work. In its place, the Russian Historical Society was organized in 2012, with a more scholarly and sophisticated appearance. However, as its Chairman is Sergei Naryshikin, a former Chairman of the Presidential Commission and former Chief of the Presidential Administration, as well as a present Chairman of the State Duma (Lower House), the political continuity between the Commission and the Society is indisputable. The Society has engaged in a wide range of scholarly and educational activities since its foundation, and we need to look at them carefully in order to understand the outcome of history and memory politics in Russia.

In respect of the publications that had received financial and moral support from the Presidential Commission, it would be hasty and inadequate to characterize

their political features as altogether identical, since they ranged widely in their character. On the one hand were extremely patriotic and aggressive publications that harshly criticized both "the falsification of history" of foreign states and the liberal-minded history textbooks in Russia (e.g., Guzenkova 2010), and on the other hand were the purely academic collections of materials and explanatory articles of wars (e.g., Sakhalov et al. 2009). It is still hard to assess the real outcome of the revision to the administrative procedure for archives, including their usage by foreign scholars, which the Commission set up on its agenda. Nevertheless, Dr Nataliya Narochinitskaya, one of the influential members of the Presidential Commission, held extremely chauvinistic views on Russian history. She asserted the legal flaw of the independence of the Baltic states in the interwar era, and publicly declared that their annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940 was "the deed to restore justice," as "there had never been any legitimacy in their separation from the Russian Empire, and there had occurred solely the temporal loss of the territory as a result of the civil war and the revolution" (Narochinitskaya 2010, p. 143). These words make it seem as if she aims to get back the imperial territory that Russia had lost a century ago. Her statements on history and memory politics amazingly echo Putin's preface mentioned above:

> Today history has become an instrument for the politics of a series of states that urge the society to antagonise against the development of relationships and cooperation with our country. It is in Ukraine, and in Georgia, the Baltic States and Poland that it [the instrumentalization of history for politics] occurs. (Narochinitskaya 2013, p. 206)

Both Putin's preface and Narochinitskaya's statement manifest their strong feelings of being victimized by the groundless and hostile assaults from the Baltic and CEE countries, carried out in spite of the great contribution of the Soviets in the Second World War.

The history and memory legislation that had been initiated and manoeuvred by N. Narochinitskaya long smouldered in the State Duma. The oppression against the "Memorial" movement at the end of 2008, the mission of which was to preserve the memories and records of victims of Stalinism, triggered preparation of a bill by the members of the State Duma. The bill aimed to criminalize the denial of Nazi crimes in the Second World War and the glorification of the Nazis and their accomplices, as did legislation in the Baltic and CEE states with respect to the denial of communist crimes. The bill was too rough and ready for the government to approve it. Eventually, MPs could not even submit it to the Duma for discussion, and it did not enter into legislation. Nevertheless, though it had been pushed to the background under temporary good relationships with foreign countries for a while around 2010, the bill was revived soon after the Ukrainian crises in 2014. "The Federal Law on Counteraction against Rehabilitation of Nazism, Glorification of Nazi Criminals and their Accomplices"[3] and relevant Acts were passed in the Parliament and signed by the president in May 2014. It is obvious that these laws were a counteraction

against history and memory politics and the similar (but opposite in direction) legislation in the Baltic and CEE states, as well as a threat to the academic freedom of historical studies and social sciences in Russia. We should take into consideration that this type of legislation of history and memory politics is prevailing transnationally despite differences of their targets and aims. Legal manipulation and control of the memories of past events, and identity politics through legislation, seem to have become very common in the post-Cold War era.

We can point out the characteristic features of history and memory politics in Russia under the presidencies of Medvedev and Putin: (1) evasive dealings with Stalinism with infrequent critical utterances; (2) tactical "willingness" to acknowledge historical facts and responsibility (not always offering apology) of the Soviets for such undeniable criminal actions as the Katyn massacre; (3) large-scale recreation and popular diffusion of the myth of the "Great Patriotic War," especially the glorification of the self-sacrificing and heroic contribution of the Soviets to the victory against Fascism and the liberation of Europe; (4) thorough counteraction against the denial or distortion of "the results of the Second World War" that were decided and confirmed at Yalta, Potsdam, Nuremberg and Tokyo. Probably, the popular foundation for such a political strategy could be found in the sentiment widely spread among the Russians: victory against Fascism as "the absolute evil" is one of a few symbols that could supply a heartfelt affirmation of self-confidence for people who inherited the rapture of victory and the myth of the war, on the one hand, and were tormented by the loss of self-confidence because of the regime collapse and economical break down, as well as the traumatic memories of the socialist era, on the other hand.

At last, the glorification of victory in "the Great Patriotic War" should not be identified with admiration of the former Soviet regime, nor regarded as the rehabilitation of the Marxist theory of history and economics. Even though there exist theoretically difficult problems in the relationship between Putin's "state capitalism" and neoliberalism, some scholars point out that the neoliberal programs of economic and social reforms as well as "sovereign democracy," a peculiar concept of democracy in Putin's Russia, are grafted to history and memory politics (Koposov 2011, p. 137). As far as the relationship between memory politics and neoliberal policies is concerned, Russia and the Baltic and CEE states appear homologous. History and memory conflicts between them are never between different regimes, nor are they between different civilizations. Rather, they reflect regional segmentation and the power struggle under a globalized economy.

History and Memory Politics in Europe's International Relationships

The Council of Europe (COE), Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU) and other international organizations in Europe became the arenas for battles over history and memory politics.

Russia and the Baltic and CEE states have severely clashed with each other in these institutions. As stated before, the Baltic and CEE states, having acquired the self-confidence of fully fledged European countries by means of accession to the EU and NATO, have demanded the reorganization of the mainstream view of the Second World War in the West by thrusting seemingly revisionist-like arguments at the European community, and have struggled fiercely not only with Putin's Russia but with left-wing political groups in the West. On the contrary, Russia has utilized these institutions, especially the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), for taking counteraction against the Baltic countries.

The dispute burst forth soon after the EU's eastward enlargement in 2004. Members of the European Parliament (EP) from the Baltic and CEE states ventured to dispute with their western colleagues over whether they should celebrate the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 2005 as the victory and liberation of Europe, or remember it as the beginning of the further subordination and oppression of Eastern Europe. Though the EP's resolution of "The future of Europe sixty years after the Second World War" was obliged to be eclectic and logically inconsistent, these states, encouraged by the success of having their claim included in the resolution, have strengthened their demands to the EU and other European organizations for revising their orthodox view of contemporary European history, and have succeeded in shaking the postulate about the uniqueness of Nazi crimes. The EU's institutions have discussed the matter thoroughly and taken various decisions in response to their demands: the EP resolved the "Declaration of the European Parliament on the proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism" (P6_TA(2008)0439) in 2008 and "European conscience and totalitarianism" (P6_TA(2009)0213) in the next year; the European Commission created the "Report from The Commission to The European Parliament and to the Council: The memory of the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe" (Document 52010DC0783) in December 2010, and the Council adopted "Council conclusions on the memory of the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe" at the 3096th Justice and Home Affairs Council's meeting in Luxembourg in June 2011. Though criticism of totalitarianism follows an extension of the Western values of the Cold War era, the Declaration of European Day of Remembrance included the symbolic significance of getting over the postulate of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, because it established the date when the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and its Secret Protocol were concluded as the "European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism," and equated the crimes of Nazism with those of Stalinism. The Council's Conclusion also included the sentence, "many Member States have experienced a tragic past caused by totalitarian regimes, be it communist, national socialist, or of any other nature, which have resulted in violations of fundamental rights and in the complete denial of human dignity." Since the establishment of the European Day on 23 August, this memorial day have been observed and commemorated in various countries.

Among other European organizations, the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE passed the resolution of "Need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes" (Resolution 1481 (2006)) in 2006, and took the initiative to begin a series of condemnations of dictatorships in Europe.[4] On the other hand, the Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE (OSCE PA) adopted the Vilnius Declaration in 2009, which included the "Resolution on Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the OSCE Region in the 21st Century."[5] In this document, the OSCE PA supported the Declaration of European Day of Remembrance "in order to preserve the memory of the victims of mass deportations and exterminations" and called for a "united stand against all totalitarian rule from whatever ideological background," referring to the 70th anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. As both COE and OSCE include the Russian Federation as a full member state, the discussions in both parliamentary assemblies heated up, and the Parliament of Russia harshly criticized the resolutions that were adopted by the assemblies in spite of disagreement from the Russian side. The Upper and Lower Houses of the Russian Parliament released a joint statement, in which they expressed their fierce opposition to the equation of Nazism and Stalinism as well as to the establishment of European Day of Remembrance, referring to the Munich Agreement approving the Nazis' eastward intrusion, and suggesting the expediency (or amnesia?) of the Western Powers.[6] Moreover, Russia responded fiercely to the case of Vasilii Kononov at the ECHR and referred even to the abolition of the court. In this case, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR approved no violation of the European Convention of Human Rights in the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court of Latvia. Russia considered that the decision by the Grand Chamber violated the Nuremberg principles by judging a combatant of the Allied Powers, and that soldiers who bombed Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki should have been found guilty for the massacre of peaceful civilians if an anti-Fascist hero of the Soviet Partisan movement was brought to judgement. The revision of the postulate of the uniqueness of Nazi crimes triggered by the Baltic and CEE states has produced not only concern among West European publics that it might bring the relativization of the Holocaust, but also a serious crack between Europe and Russia that would seem hard to repair. The Russian Federation has been obliged to grow seriously dissatisfied with and mistrustful of the West, because, according to Russian thinking, the West enforced the eastward enlargement of not only the EU but also of NATO, in spite of Russia's deep concern and fierce opposition to the latter for the sake of its own security. And, after all, Western Europe began to approve of the unjust assault on history and memory issues from the Baltic and CEE states. This point is significant in that it probably foreshadowed the recent strained relationship between Europe and Russia.

Unexpectedly enough, if considering the international relationships described above, Russia has established joint scholarly commissions on historical issues with such countries as Germany, Austria, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and so on, and has advanced dialogues on the discordances between

them. Though Russia offered to establish a similar commission with Estonia, the latter refused it because of the poor prospect of meaningful outcomes.

The Joint Commission for the investigation of contemporary history of Russo–German relationships (the Russo–German Joint Commission of Historians) was proposed at the summit meeting of the then president of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and the Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl in 1993, and actually started functioning, belatedly, in 1998.[7] The Russo–Polish Group on Complex Issues had its starting point at the summit meeting in 2002, but it took time to start working because of the worsening relationship between the two states. The first meeting of the Group was not held until 2008. While the Russo–German Joint Commission began in 2013 to jointly publish the standard books of the history of bilateral relationships since the Enlightenment (Möller and Tschubarjan 2013-), the Russo–Polish Group achieved joint publication in both Russian and Polish languages (Rotfeld and Torkunow 2010), in which Russian and Polish historians wrote articles addressing the same subjects about fifteen complicated events in the near past between these two countries. If we scrutinize the results of these two experiences and the famous attempt at dialogue in history textbooks, as well as other attempts at cooperation between Poland and Germany altogether, we can expect to clarify the possibilities and limitations of the transnational dialogue of historians. As for the Russo–Polish dialogue, however, we cannot tell whether its outcome was accepted widely by the state and society of both countries and contributed to improving relationships between them.

It is the Russo–Latvian Joint Commission of Historians that has proved fruitless. The Commission was established through the agreement of Dmitri Medvedev and Valdis Zatlers, then President of Latvia, at the end of 2010. However, according to the Russian statement, it turned into "the forum for the ideological propagation of the Latvian official refrain, 'Soviet Occupation' and Latvian Legionnaires of *Waffen SS* as freedom fighters for Latvia" (Simindei 2014, p. 5). Probably, Latvia shared the same (but reversed) evaluation about the Commission. It was abolished in September 2014 after the Ukrainian Crisis, without any meaningful results. It apparently exemplifies the possibility that the Joint Commissions of Historians, founded on political considerations, facilitated the friction rather than encouraged reconciliation through dialogue. In spite of the widely prevailing expectation for the Joint Commissions of Historians to accomplish the elucidation of historical truths and the facilitation of mutual understanding and reconciliation, the results seem uncertain and untrustworthy, depending on political and diplomatic considerations.

Conclusion

The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation jointly celebrated the 70th anniversary of victory in the Second World War on 9 May 2015 in Moscow and on 3 September in Beijing. One year before the celebration in Moscow, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin agreed at the summit meeting in Shanghai that

Russia and China will carry out joint events for the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the victory against German Fascism and Japanese Militarism in the European and Asian theatres of military operations in World War II, and continue decisive counteractions against attempts to falsify history and undermine the post-war world order.[8]

History and memory conflicts in western and eastern parts of Eurasia were organically connected and situated in the same dimension through the agreement between the presidents of both states, though the schemes and configurations of friction are quite different from each other in the West and the East. This means that history and memory conflicts in each region are no longer national or bi-national issues, but constitute the conglomerate whole of the globalized and complicated political antagonism in the post-Cold War era, though European scholars concentrate their attention on only national or European historical experiences and memories, and Asian and Japanese historians are inclined to devote themselves to the idealization of the German experience as their paragon for the opposition of the history and memory politics of Japan. Historical memory has globally begun to be politicized more than ever, and utilized as a powerful instrument for procuring mass agreement with political and diplomatic aims based on national interests in international relationships, which in turn seems to exacerbate the conflicts and worsen the situation. Thus we should no longer idealize and mythicize any "good practices" of political reconciliation through the usage of historical memories, but rather establish a transnational analytical framework for investigating the global configuration and mechanism by which history and memory are politicized and accelerated into conflict in each nation and state (Hashimoto 2015).

Notes

1. http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_e?p_id=483429&p_tr2=2.
2. http://www.scafbook.net/read/the-criminal-law-valsts-valodas-centrs-3795994.
3. On the legislative processes and links to the texts of the legislation, see the following article written by N. Koposov: http://www.russ.ru/layout/set/print/Mirovaya-povestka/Post-scriptum2.
4. Cf. Resolutions of the PACE: "Combating the resurrection of Nazi ideology" (2006), "Need for international condemnation of the Franco regime" (2006), "Commemorating the victims of the Great Famine (Holodomor) in the former USSR" (2010) and so on.
5. http://www.oscepa.org/publications/declarations/2009-vilnius-declaration/261-2009-vilnius-declaration-eng/file.
6. http://www.duma.gov.ru/news/273/58991/?sphrase_id=1542137.
7. http://www.deutsch-russische-geschichtskommission.de/publikationen/online-publikationen.
8. http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/1642.

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Mobilization

Introduction: Mobilization as the Key to Mass Dictatorships

Karen Petrone

Mobilization is one of the most crucial concepts in analyzing mass dictatorships. In his definition of "mass dictatorship," Jie-Hyun Lim argues that "modern dictatorship presupposes the support of the masses. The term 'mass dictatorship' implies the attempted mobilization of the masses by dictatorships, and that these frequently secured voluntary mass participation and support" (Lim 2011, p. 3). Mobilization is thus the dynamic and ever-changing relationship between the agents of a dictatorial state seeking to propel its people to action on the state's behalf, and the people who might potentially be voluntarily self-propelled into action. This relationship can shift dramatically over time as the circumstances change within a given mass dictatorship. Tracing the transformations in this relationship provides an effective way to study mass dictatorships.

Because of the utopian aspirations of many mass dictatorships, the notion that the citizens of the dictatorship are being remade plays a very important role in mobilization. Citizens are invited to reforge themselves into new (and better) people through voluntary participation in state activities that reshape the self. The promise of mobilization is one of renewal and transformation. Mass dictatorships employ a wide variety of mobilization techniques, seeking to appeal to and satisfy the psychic and physical needs of a population being made anew. State agents recognize the complexity of individuals and their social contexts and approach mobilization in multifaceted ways. This inherent multiplicity of methods is demonstrated by the wide variety of mobilizational contexts discussed in this section of the handbook: films, gender and memoirs, the creation of larger-than-life heroic figures, sports, propaganda during demonstrations and state holidays, the establishment of leader cults, and the politics

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of populism. In these various moments of mobilization, mobilizers often seek to engage the physical bodies of the participants as well as their emotions.

Notably, the motivation of the volunteers, whether they participate from sincere enthusiasm, material self-interest, self-preservation or a complex mixture of these possibilities, is less important to the state than the fact of participation that proves the popular legitimacy of rule. It is also important to remember that mass dictatorships show a willingness to use state violence to achieve their goals, and the spectrum of voluntary choices is, in part, shaped by the very real possibilities of potential coercion. Mass dictatorships employ the entire spectrum of motivations but represent participation as enthusiasm above all else. And, indeed, these dictatorships could not succeed without a strong measure of demonstrated voluntarism.

This brings us to another important point about mobilization. Because enthusiasm is theoretically the norm, state agents should not have to work very hard to mobilize the population, as the voluntary participation of the masses should occur spontaneously. In reality, of course, state ideologues, planners, organizers and agents have to work very hard to produce what seems like a natural or spontaneous effect. Mobilization is thus a process that is most effective when it seems to be effortless, even though it is labor-intensive and time-consuming to create a high level of voluntary enthusiasm for the goals and programs of the state. Many of the essays in this section reveal these laborious efforts at mobilization be they through the design and implementation of cultural products such as films, monuments, newspapers and textbooks, or through the orchestration of displays of public emotion at commemorations honoring heroes and leaders, holidays and physical culture and sporting events.

Though most of the essays in this section explore the effects of mobilization from within the mass dictatorships, one essay explores Russian and Iranian émigré women's memoirs to examine the reception of women's revolutionary mobilization abroad. This essay reminds us that what might be glorified as spontaneous mobilization within a mass dictatorship might be viewed as unnatural and perverse by its enemies; in this particular case women's engagement in revolutionary movements in Russia and Iran causes "gender panic" in the United States. Mobilization thus has a transnational impact beyond its cultural work in creating popular legitimacy for a particular state. Those who deny the legitimacy of the state interpret mobilization as coercion, brainwashing and atomization of the population. This tension between voluntarism and coercion both in reality and in representation is an important analytical tool in studying both mobilization and mass dictatorship.

The concept of mobilization describes the dynamic relationship between citizens and the state in mass democracies as well as in mass dictatorships. In mass democracies, however, the number of entities that carry out mobilization is multiplied, as the agents of mobilization are more likely to be independent from the state than in mass dictatorships. Nonetheless, the processes of creating political legitimacy and consent, and constructing new and better citizens, look very familiar across national boundaries and across the spectrum of dictatorship

and democracy. Several of the essays in this section contain comparative analyses of the British and French Empires and the United States in relation to twentieth-century mass dictatorships. Understanding that mobilization's call to voluntarism and impetus to self-transformation are phenomena that cross boundaries between dictatorships and democracies allows for a more nuanced analysis of the operation of political power in the modern world.

Future research can build on this understanding of the commonalities across political systems while, of course, recognizing and documenting differences. The sheer diversity of modes of mobilization calls for additional study; the changing relationship of mobilizers and the mobilized can be effectively captured through close analysis of a variety of media: all of the arts, sports (both participatory and spectator), rituals, monuments, urban reconstruction and commemorations of the groups and individuals who modeled devotion and enthusiasm, just to name the most obvious. Proponents of the history of everyday life such as Alf Luedtke have led the way in demonstrating the value of micro-history, in which the mobilization of a particular group in a particular context can be discerned through close analysis. Luedtke's investigation of industrial workers in Nazi Germany shows how mobilization could produce both cooperation and even pleasure among segments of the population who were not necessarily the strongest supporters of Nazi ideology (Luedtke 1994, p. 98).

Each mass dictatorship or democracy has its own ecosystem of mobilizing tactics and there is much work to be done not only on individual media, but also on how the various mobilizing forces fit together. Likewise, there is more work to be done in understanding the roles that gender, sexuality, class/social status and race/ethnicity play in the work of mobilization. While it has been very well documented that the exclusion of outsiders (such as kulaks in the Soviet Union or Jews in Nazi Germany) has played a crucial role in mobilization, less attention has been paid to the relationships among various groups of the mobilized. What are the hierarchies among the "included" participants, and how do they work to strengthen the attachment of certain groups of the population to the state?

Finally, the area of reception requires further study. While many mass dictatorships have left abundant records of the thoughts and aims of the organizers of mobilization, it has been much more difficult to capture the reactions of the mobilized. While some memoirs, letters and diaries exist, and the organizers' preoccupations can help the researcher to sketch out the reactions of participants, there is more work to be done in gauging the perceptions and motivations of the mobilized. While organizers in mass dictatorships were happy to interpret voluntary participation as enthusiasm, it falls to the researcher to find ways to document the complexities of motivation and to understand the nuances of why participants gave their support to mass dictatorships.

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Historians, Authoritarian States and Spectator Sport, 1880–2020

Robert Edelman

Like all the major social theories of its era, socialism did not anticipate the explosion of sports activity that occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century. During these years, the burgeoning working classes gained a measure of free time from their labors on the factory floor. They used this increased leisure in a variety of ways, including the playing and watching of sports. When workers took this time to relax, socialists hoped their pursuits would be rational and healthy. A number of groups on the left promoted sporting activities, but these efforts assumed a minor role in the activities of the various electorally successful socialist parties whose intellectual leaders were largely indifferent to the new trends that were entertaining so many workers.

The rationality of the Marxist tradition made it difficult for many socialists to make sense of sport's more irrational pleasures. This was a theory that placed labor and production at the center of its analysis. As such, it was poorly equipped to comprehend the world of play. When confronted with workers watching football on Saturdays and playing it on Sundays, most pre-First World War European socialist politicians preferred that the masses spend their free time in the classroom or on the picket line. A relatively small segment of socialist opinion thought sport could teach lessons of solidarity and comradeship, but their views did not gain great traction among the left's leadership. If anything, conservatives, whose patrons surely had more leisure time, proved far more comfortable with the study and practice of leisure.

After the First World War, the subtle thinkers of the famed Frankfurt School sought to integrate Marxism with the particular understanding of the unconscious pioneered by Freud. Men like Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and

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Herbert Marcuse developed a critique of mass culture, stressing its appeal to the more irrational instincts of society. Spectator sports, jazz, the cinema and other amusements were seen as harmful compensations for capitalism's distortions of the human spirit. In particular, they found competitive sport to be an especially pernicious expression of capitalism's devotion to Social Darwinian notions of struggle. Even the self-denial of training for sporting activity was seen as dangerous.

These theories took on added importance after the Nazi triumph in 1933. It fell to the Frankfurt School in emigration to provide an explanation for the failures of socialism and the rise of fascism in the interwar period. For them, popular culture, and sport in particular, took much of the blame for the tragedy. By contrast, Italian thinkers and others on the right had stressed the joy, ecstasy, aggression and (their word) virility of sport. They embraced its spontaneity and spirit of adventure. Still, the left did not entirely drop the ball. During the explosion of commercialized spectator sport in the 1920s, organized socialist and Communist parties supported competing international sporting bodies that organized a wide range of activities and put on a series of Worker Olympiads in the major cities of Europe. These events attracted far more participants and almost as many viewers as the bourgeois Olympics, which had consciously excluded plebian elements and limited the participation of women.

The intellectuals and party leaders of the new Bolshevik government brought similar reservations about big-time professionalized spectator sport to the early debates about what should be done about sport. They had rejected the Victorian version of amateurism advanced by the Olympic movement. At the same time, the intensely commercialized sporting spectacles of the 1920s repelled them. By the middle of the decade, however, the Soviets came to accept the notion of a competitive militarized sport in which a high-performance elite could inspire the masses who would then exercise and thus become fitter workers and soldiers. The traumas of the Civil War (1918–1921) established a link between athletic activity and the armed forces when the newly organized Red Army found many of its soldiers to be unfit. That relationship never entirely disappeared until the final collapse of communism.

During the late 1930s, the leadership supported the creation of a thriving professional spectator sport industry with the formation of a formally amateur, high-performance soccer league of "demonstration teams" modeled on those in capitalist states. This last step involved the rejection of traditional leftist commitments to economic and social equality. Marxists had understood the benefits of participation in physical activity, but they were far from comfortable with passive masses paying to watch the actions of a talented and privileged few. Yet, as early as 1931 and throughout the rest of the prewar period, Stalin embraced the idea of social, cultural, economic and political hierarchy. A new Soviet political, social and cultural elite emerged just as the nation entered the nightmare of the Great Purges, and athletes became a big part of this new Communist upper crust. They were highly paid and generously privileged.

In these multiple ways, Soviet sporting activity can be seen as an exception to the left's broader uncertainty about the production of mass sporting spectacles. The political purposes of the giant physical culture parades and multi-sport festivals called Spartakiads appeared to be similar to fascist mass displays in Nuremburg and Bologna. In the USSR, these large occasions, precursors to modern mega-events, took place in the main squares of the major Soviet cities. They were ways to demonstrate the USSR's successful embrace of modernity. Yet, these massive events in all these places cannot be subsumed under a broader "totalitarian" category. Soviet sport was supposed to be rational, bureaucratic and instrumental. The bodies on display were never consciously eroticized (Petrone 2000, pp. 23–45). Instead, the participants were described as "machines." Men and women marched through Red Square on Physical Culture Day in roughly equal numbers and women were always a visible part of Soviet sport.

The extreme right did things differently. They sought to display a hyper-masculinity. Women were supposed to watch beautiful men, swoon and thusly produce healthy and strong servants of the state. Nazis and Fascists stressed sport's irrational elements. They embraced its intense emotions and embraced sport's inescapable spontaneity. They welcomed the dangers of the unpredictable and saw sport as a way to demonstrate the superiority of their majority ethnic groups. Communists, following Lenin, stressed planning, conscious activity and control. They sought to use sport to bring all the nations and ethnicities in the Union together, while creating fit workers and soldiers for the state.

As things turned out, none of these authoritarian regimes was ever completely happy with spectator sport, especially the world's most popular game—football. As the British journalist Simon Kuper has noted, sport turned out to be a "slippery tool" in the hands of dictators (Kuper 2003, p. 27). Only Mussolini fully welcomed the spectacles of professionalized spectator sports. His domestic and international political use of the great successes of the Italian national football team, which won World Cups in 1934 and 1938 and at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, supported the project of nation-building in what had been a diverse and unruly new state. These triumphs were supposed to make Fascism more attractive and less feared to a public that was undergoing its share of deprivation.

Unlike Mussolini, neither Hitler nor Stalin was comfortable with big-time spectator sports. Both dictators were personally indifferent to athletic activity, and both preferred the predictability of amateur Olympic sport, even if Hitler suspected its internationalism and Stalin had doubts about its elitism. The Soviet leader never missed a Physical Culture Day parade, but he never attended an actual sporting event. Similarly, Hitler's least comfortable moments came as he watched German football teams fall to smaller nations, most dramatically to Norway during the 1936 Berlin Olympics.

All three sport systems sought to organize social classes, regions and ethnic groups that were not always comfortable with being organized. In this regard, Italian Fascism and Soviet communism actually had more in common with

each other than with Nazism, which was far more able to "coordinate" sport for state ends. Both the Italian and the Soviet regimes attempted, with partial success, to use spectator sport in asserting the power of the center over often unruly localities. Crucially, there was no single "totalitarian model" for spectator sport. The concept was not helpful in understanding the ways spectator sport actually worked. Indeed, the very practices of its audiences undermined most state attempts, regardless of the form of government, to control the citizenry through non-violent means that generated consent for the dominance of repressive regimes (Edelman 2003, p. 11; de Grazia 1981, pp. 11–23).

MAKING SENSE OF SPECTATOR SPORT

Sport has also been a slippery tool in the hands of a broad range of scholars from various political persuasions. For much of the twentieth century, the story of sport was the province of journalists and history buffs, not the concern of university-trained and -based scholars. It was not until 1938 that an internationally eminent historian even tackled the question of sport when the moderate conservative Johan Huizinga published his work, *Homo Ludens*. Strictly speaking, Huizinga's subject was play, something far from synonymous with sport. Since animals and children engaged in play, he viewed the ludic impulse as irrational and timeless. Play, Huizinga argued, was the force that propelled culture creation, and culture, for him and many others, was the driving force of history (Huizinga 1949, p. 3). Writing at a time of economic depression in the capitalist world and what appeared to be swift industrialization in the USSR, Huizinga was responding to traditional Marxist theories of history which had always placed work and production at the center of their analysis. What the left saw as a diversion from the class struggle, Huizinga celebrated as a source of social cohesion, what the American sociologist Janet Lever in her study of Brazilian soccer later called "people's consciousness of togetherness." Especially in large far-flung and highly diverse lands like Italy and Germany or Brazil and the Soviet Union, Lever argued, "large scale sport presents an alternative mechanism for using primordial loyalties to build political unity and allegiance to the modern, civil state" (Lever 1983, pp. 4–6). "Primordial" is the key word here, as it connects to Huizinga's notion of the timelessness of play.

Over the last two decades, however, students of nationalism have questioned the concept of an unchanging primordialism. Belief in what were often described as the biologically derived characteristics of ethnic groups was highly divisive, undermining the coherence of those modern states which sought to bring many nationalities together into multicultural entities, some of which would be called empires. As Benedict Anderson famously stated, nations were "imagined communities," and the process of that imagining was historically specific. Nation states emerged in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and, without such entities the idea of nationalism itself was impossible (Suny 1993). Nevertheless, one can still argue that spectator sport can be viewed as one element of socialization and cohesion that can blur perceptions

of otherwise divisive class and ethnic distinctions, creating a unity that may be illusory but, nevertheless, has significant political consequences.

Over time, it became a cliché to claim spectator sport fostered such cohesion by functioning as a "safety valve"—a harmless way of releasing dangerous pent-up aggression. The athlete was said to act out the anger, rage and frustration sports fans experienced as part of their own mundane daily existences. Watching sport provided a vicarious experience through which members of the public sought to compensate for the inadequacies and hurts of their own lives. A more sophisticated version of this approach was later offered by the German émigré sociologist, Norbert Elias. For him, sporting contests replicated the excitement of battles but did so in the context of rules that limited the violence of war: "spectators at a football match may savor the mimetic excitement of the battle swaying to and fro on the playing field, knowing that no harm will come to the players and themselves." Elias, who saw modern sport as part of the civilizing process that limited the violence of earlier eras, argued the excitement of watching such contests could be "liberating" and have a "cathartic effect" which could "counterbalance the stress tensions of … non-leisure life" (Elias and Dunning 1986, p. 43).

Spectator sport played similar roles in the USSR and in Fascist Italy but not so much in Nazi Germany. The creation of national professional football leagues in Italy in 1929 and the USSR in 1936 saw the emergence of mass spectacles that required the movement of athletes from place to place on improving means of transport and fostered broad national discourses about shared passions and pleasures read about in the press and listened to on radio. Part of nation-building projects in both nations, the Italian and Soviet football leagues also had the contrary effect of fanning local rivalries.

In the Soviet case, the trials of daily life during "high Stalinism" were such that citizens often desperately sought fun and entertainment on the margins of the great industrialization drive and the terror. On the surface, it appeared sports like football could play the diversionary role of safety valve, but seemingly powerful regimes did not support the game with that aim in mind. Soviet mass culture in general, and sport in particular, was supposed to be didactic, teaching important life lessons, but they could not perform this function unless they were entertaining. Soccer in Italy posed another set of difficulties for Mussolini's state which embraced the game more comfortably than did the Stalinist regime. In the land that gave the world Roman "bread and circuses," the diversion of subordinate social groups from the class struggle was an essential part of Fascist political strategy.

Yet, as Eric Dunning has argued, spectator sport could provide an escape from surveillance and control. More than in any other form of popular culture, the audiences for spectator sports have not simply watched. They have also played visible roles in the spectacles. Fans were able to exploit the contradictions of spectator sport to grab a measure of agency from political systems which normally afforded them little. Neither Soviet nor Italian citizens were required to attend sports events, and the two regimes could not force citizens

to support specific clubs or worship state-manufactured heroes. This had even been true under liberal capitalism. The powerful could not dictate to the powerless when it came to team support. These were choices made freely by individuals regardless of the system, and in doing so lovers of sport were taking one small step on their own in the process of constructing politically charged identities. Spectator sport under capitalism, Fascism and communism was always consumed by hard-to-organize publics in ways its organizers did not intend. Michel de Certeau described the ways ordinary people have used the realm of consumption to resist and deflect the power of dominant orders, regardless of the economic system:

> To a rationalized, expansionist and at the same time centralized, clamorous, and spectacular production corresponds *another* production called "consumption." The latter is devious, it is dispersed, but it insinuates itself everywhere, silently and almost invisibly, because it does not manifest itself through its own products but rather through the ways of *using* the products imposed by a dominant economic order … Pushed to their ideal limits, these products and ruses of consumers compose the network of an antidiscipline … The tactics of consumption, the ingenious ways in which the weak make use of the strong, thus lend a political dimension to everyday practices. (De Certeau 1984, pp. xii–xiii, xv, xvii; italics in original)

The irreducible spontaneity of spectator sport always posed difficulties for regimes, be they liberal or illiberal. The sports world has been a place in which talent could, though not always, be rewarded and pleasure be experienced regardless of the political allegiances of those who both watched and played. Accordingly, sport has enjoyed a measure of autonomy from the dominant structures of any society. Yet, this did not mean, as many conservatives have argued, that sport was entirely independent from the political. Regardless of the system, big-time, elite sport has always been about elites mobilizing and projecting their wealth and power.

Marxism, Sport and Popular Culture

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, both Western and Soviet Marxists shared a negative view of all forms of popular culture under capitalism. During the 1960s, however, fundamental differences emerged between these two groups as leftist thinkers living in capitalist countries sought to incorporate play and leisure into their theories of social change. Traditional Marxists had always considered sports to be a relatively healthy activity. They had argued that the surrounding social context determined the extent to which sports were pure or corrupt. This view was contested by thinkers of the New Left, who criticized not only spectator sport but all athletic activity when it involved competition. Neo-Marxist writers in the West instead idealized play, which they argued was subverted by high-performance sport. The sexual sublimation demanded by such activities was seen as repressive. These arguments, with

their echoes of the old diversion theory, were not new. Yet, in their preference for the freedom of unfettered play New Left sports theorists like Jean-Marie Brohm and Gerhard Vinnai were much closer to the spirit of Huizinga's conservative position than to the more ascetic Marxist tradition. Neo-Marxists criticized Communist sport with its utilitarian concerns for labor, productivity and warfare.

The critique of sports, and spectator sports in particular, was but one element of Neo-Marxist thinking on the political impact of mass culture. This approach drew heavily on the Frankfurt School's more complicated version of the diversion theory. Here, Theodor Adorno was the most vocal opponent of what he saw as debased forms of amusement. Focusing on jazz, he claimed the industries of mass culture reduced their consumers to states of "masochistic passivity." This disdain for the very activities so many workers had come to enjoy led later left critics to condemn Adorno and his colleagues for an elitism that had damaging political consequences. Yet, the Frankfurt School's contempt for mass culture derived not from the fact such culture was democratic but precisely because it was not. The industries that generated the products of mass culture were in no way controlled by subordinate social groups under both capitalism and communism. Here, the Frankfurt School shared the asceticism and intellectualism of the rest of the Marxist tradition. In reaction to fascism's cult of the body, these thinkers came to reject activities that placed primary importance on anything but the mind. For those who had lived through interwar Germany, the Nazi glorification of physical aggression was too closely tied to militarism for its victims ever to be comfortable with any expression of the sporting mentality.

With the political eclipse of the New Left in the 1970s, Marxists and other leftist intellectuals came to change their attitudes about sports and popular culture. The views of neo-Marxists and the Frankfurt School were no longer seen as all-embracing, despite the fact that they continued to explain much about the political ideology of spectator sports. As an explanation for the left's failures in the 1930s and 1970s, Neo-Marxism had its attractions, but this approach led to a political pessimism others were not willing to embrace. To admit the power of the capitalist industries of pleasure and entertainment was to accept likely political defeat. The descendants of the Frankfurt School were repelled by the by the fact that much of the male working class, even many leftist intellectuals, had come to enjoy the pleasures of spectator sport, but the elitism of this rejection of mass culture in all its forms could only lead to estrangement from the masses. To criticize capitalist sports may have made sense intellectually but to attack all sports and all forms of popular culture as repressive was an act of political suicide.

Beginning with the 1970s, others on the left sought to incorporate both sports and a new understanding of popular culture into their analyses of social change. Such theorists as Rob Beamish and Richard Gruneau felt it was no longer politically possible to dismiss these activities as contemptible. Instead, they argued that sport's "unregulated, boundary-straining, spontaneous component"

was potentially liberating and progressive (Beamish 1982, p. 169). John Hargreaves suggested that sports, with their striving for improvement, could be seen as a utopia in which the promises held out but denied by capitalism could be realized in microcosm. Hargreaves did not claim that sports could be a model for a properly functioning capitalism. Rather, athletic contests could indicate ways of transcending the limitations of the social system of which they might be a part. While such theories had echoes of the conservative cult of play for its own sake, these writers were arguing that the left should not cede the most attractive, even joyful, elements of sports to the political right, as had happened under Fascism.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, sports also became the subject of professional historians whose work was informed by various versions of Marxism. They were part of a larger cohort of social historians who came to examine not only sports but other practices of play and leisure as well. Such scholars as Elliot Gorn, Robert Wheeler, Tony Mason, Eric Hobsbawm and, later, Richard Holt reaffirmed the relationship between the rise of professional spectator sport and the maturation of industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth century (Hobsbawm 1983, p. 283). Their analyses accepted the connection between a specific phase of capitalist development and the emergence of professional sports, but they avoided seeing spectator sport as part of conscious, diversionary conspiracies hatched by the forces of order. These scholars sought instead to put sport in historical context and demonstrate the ways the mode of production influenced rather than determined the practices of athletic competition.

Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams and their colleagues at Birmingham University's Centre for Contemporary Studies offered a variety of theories about popular culture that provided alternatives to earlier New Left thinking. Basing much of its thought on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci, the football-loving founder of the Italian Communist Party, the Birmingham School rejected the notion that the public uncritically accepted the messages of popular culture placed before it. Hall characterized this idea as "deeply unsocialist." Rather, different groups and individuals manifested a variety of responses. For Hall, popular culture has been the terrain on which a contest between subordinate and dominant social groups takes place: "Popular culture is neither the popular traditions of resistance to these processes [of social transformation] nor is it the forms which are superimposed on or over them. It is the ground on which the transformations are worked." In this sense popular culture can be distinguished from mass culture, which comprises the products generated by the industries in these fields. Mass culture can then be seen as one of the constituents of popular culture, but it is not by itself popular culture.

Instead, Hall suggested three broad categories of response to mass culture. In what he called a "dominant" response, the messages of these products are fully accepted by the public that consumes them. In a "negotiated" response, certain elements of the message may be disputed, but the overall system is still accepted. Finally, there is the possibility of an "oppositional" response in which the public rejects not only the messages but the system that produces them (Hall 1981, p. 232). As applied to sport by Hargreaves, this approach

suggests there are many possible responses to sport spectacles. The result is less a direct diversion than a fragmentation and disorganization of various subordinate social groups. This process has facilitated what came to be called the political and cultural hegemony of dominant classes who no longer required the tools of direct control, surveillance and violence to obtain the consent of the masses (Hargreaves 1986, p. 222). In this sense, hegemony has been, as Raymond Williams suggested, not a formal system, ideology or conscious conspiracy, but "a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living" (Williams 1977, p. 110).

Pierre Bourdieu devoted a considerable part of his career to analyzing the complicated relationships between popular culture and social class. In analyzing sport under capitalism, he stressed the possibilities for resistance athletic activity could provide: "The social definition of sports is an object of struggles … the field of sporting practices is the site of struggles in which what is at stake … is the monopolistic capacity to impose the legitimate definition … and function of sporting activity" (Bourdieu 1978, p. 830). In refusing to concede the cultural power of sport to the political right, both Hall and Bourdieu gave students of popular culture in general and sport in particular a way of seeing these activities as "contested terrain" in which the result was far from predetermined. Where the good people of Frankfurt saw mind control, the thinkers of Birmingham saw possibilities for resistance and agency.

It was not until the collapse of the USSR that the idea of applying these ideas to the study of the Soviet Union gained traction among historians who were primarily but not entirely on the left. When Richard Stites published his pioneering study of Soviet popular culture in 1992, he opened paths that have since been followed by scores of scholars who have now established a flourishing field of study (Stites 1992). For decades, the very idea of popular culture in the USSR was seen as impossible. Western scholars had embraced a narrow understanding of what they thought to be Socialist Realist mass culture which it was assumed (following the Frankfurt-tinged logic of the old totalitarian school) was blindly accepted by a passive society. It was thought only a thin layer of the intelligentsia rejected the state's mass culture industries. Over the years, what we now call the revisionist school of scholars of the Soviet experience have chipped away at this view, establishing the existence of considerable social and cultural resistance to what had been thought to be the unlimited power of the state. As Soviet-era archives opened and the historical profession reoriented itself under the influence of the cultural turn, it has become clear that the methods and theories used to make sense of capitalist popular culture can, with certain caveats, be transposed to the case of recently existing socialism. Sports, with their irreducible spontaneity proved a problematic instrument in the hands of Soviet elites who sought to maintain their control of what had eventually become a fractious society.

It turned out the "Big Red Machine" that came to dominate Olympic competition and serve the needs of the state did not mirror the power and success of the Soviet system. Rather, it masked the USSR's many weaknesses. Formally

amateur, the Soviet sports system fostered the development of a flourishing professional spectator sport industry the aims of which often conflicted with the oft-stated goals of the party-state's Olympic-centered enterprise. Soviet sport, like its capitalist counterpart, privileged athletes and organizers. It generated oceans of rubles, as well as hard currency. In consuming the spectacles of the state, fans were able to ascribe their own meanings to sport, create their own identities and worship their own heroes. Try as it might, the party-state could not force its citizens to support particular teams or learn lessons of obedience and discipline. This was especially true for football which elites around the world have sought to control with often confounding results. Communist sport also turned out to be contested terrain. The Birmingham School forced students of popular culture to pay attention to the audience. Soviet fans could always ask, "Should I stay or should I go?" When officially organized sporting events became boring, "lovers of sport" exercised their right to sit at home, forcing organizers to listen to the complaints of ordinary people and, in the process, corroding the authority of the party-state.

What Is to Be Done After the Fall

Initially, the collapse of Communism ushered in an era of capitalist triumphalism. Anything in the realm of social or economic policy that had a whiff of socialism was swept away in the first painful throes of Russia's trial by shock therapy. In an era of a newly emerging globalization, an internationalized capitalism now seemed the only way forward, and scholars who still took parts of Marxism seriously found fewer takers for their ideas. Of course many on the left did not lament the disappearance of the last vestiges of the Soviet version of socialism, but in the light of a new globalism driven by international television and the Internet, a serious examination of old truths seemed to be needed, and, indeed, such shifts had been going on inside the historical profession for some time.

Increasing dissatisfaction with an older social history had led many researchers across a broad range of political perspectives to begin a serious rethinking of the proper subjects of historical examination. Themes, like popular culture and the human body, which had once been seen as marginal, now became central to the concerns of the profession. This shift, called variously the "cultural," "literary" or "linguistic" turn, proved particularly fortuitous for the study of popular culture in general and sport in particular. The ideas of Hall, Williams and their colleagues, now called "cultural studies," proved particularly well suited to the new scholarly environment. This approach, based in a version of Marxism, was able to make a fruitful transition to the new emphases. For those on the left, this did not involve the abandoning of the previous tradition. Rather, culture, once seen by conservatives and liberals as an autonomous realm, was integrated into the research process in a variety of ways that went well beyond the well-worn base and superstructure relationship.

Instead of focusing on easily studied institutions which produced large paper trails, historians began to examine those spaces between institutions in which popular attitudes and mentalities were more likely to be revealed.

Trade unions, political parties and factory floors continued to be important, but it was now necessary to look at the street, neighborhood and family as well. Here the German school of Alltagsgeschichte, pioneered by Alf Ludtke and his colleagues, led to an examination of new areas of everyday life during the 1990s. In the hands of these skilled researchers, this school did not simply record the quotidian and banal that seemed to make life "work."

So inescapably liminal a human activity as spectator sport proved to be a powerful engine of often competing identities, legends, myths and stories, all of which ascribed meanings to the experience of watching sport and derived meaning from what were often its least material manifestations. Modern sport, which began life in the nineteenth century with the explosion of associativity under mature capitalism, seems an especially rich field for the further development of this approach. The pubs, churches, factories, block associations and groups of neighborhood friends that gave rise to the earliest sports clubs were deeply embedded in the communities that gave them life. The processes by which those groups grew and flourished were intensely historical, involving conflict, contest, agency and change.

Invoking Marx's *The German Ideology*, scholars turned to the processes of consumption, which were given equal weight to those of production. Department stores, the music hall, fashion, food, sex, dance, cinema, television and, of course, spectator sport were all now fair game. This shift had further consequences. Feminist scholars had long argued that traditional Marxists had seen production as a male realm. Consumption by women, carried on under capitalism inside nuclear families, required equal attention. Gender now had to be taken even more seriously than previously. The greater concern with feminism led in turn to an interest in masculinity, and sport, the "male bastion" of the nineteenth century, became a prime site for the examination of the historical construction of manhood.

In his masterful work, *Sport and the British*, Richard Holt, without disparaging the struggle for female inclusion, stressed that the history of sport, especially in nineteenth-century Britain, was, like it or not, a history of men. Since, as R. W. Connell has argued, the study of gender is inescapable from the study of the body, research on sport led to a growing interest in what came to be called "body culture." The concern with gender and bodies, so central to the work of Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, provided an important revision of cultural studies. For all his love of football, Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony focused on mental rather than physical processes. Yet, as Richard Gruneau has shown, concern for the body and with it gender provides a missing link that can complete our theoretical understanding of modern sport. "Bodily disciplines, habits and ceremonies," he wrote, "both constitute and express the relative powers of classes, regions, racial and ethnic groups and genders. They also constitute and express differences in power between organizational client groups and their supervisory or administrative superiors" (Gruneau 1993, p. 85). As Bourdieu noted, "There are a great many things that we understand only with our bodies, at a subconscious level without having the words to say them" (Bourdieu 1988, p. 160).

I cannot claim there is any direct connection between the collapse of communism and the explosion of high-quality scholarship on sport we have witnessed over the last twenty years. Yet, it should now be clear that the study of sport in all its forms has enormous potential for deepening and broadening our understandings of popular culture, gender and the human body. It is no longer clear early in the twenty-first century what it is that is left of the left. Nevertheless, the "Great Recession" of early twenty-first-century capitalism means words like "socialism" no longer induce universal derision. The debates of the early twentieth century are still relevant to our present concerns. Here, I suspect I am knocking down an open door. If anything, the gains that have been made by sports studies began when scholars, evolving out of the traditions of Eric Hobsbawm and Edward Thompson, turned their attention to this most dynamic form of popular culture. To extend this progress, I think we should continue mining those newer fields I have mentioned here.

Additionally, scholars of sport need to turn their attention to two other approaches. All of sport, but particularly spectator sport, is intensely visual and highly emotional. Indeed, one cannot imagine sport without either. In our present globalized world of satellite television transmissions, we now consume nearly all our sport through media, and we interpret what we see through the multiple and often contradictory pseudo-filters of cyberspace. In order to attract viewers, the commercial purveyors of these spectacles must foreground the most eye-catching images of the events they present, and their commentators must highlight the emotionality and excitement of what may, in fact, be the most mundane of contests. A Monday night matchup between Bolton and Stoke City must be sold as yet another "game of the century." Whether it is goals in soccer, slam-dunks in basketball or home runs in baseball, television privileges the sensational and obscures the more subtle but equally necessary elements of any game. Athletes take cues from this emphasis and develop their skills in ways that distort and mask important parts of the sporting process like practice and training.

Both the visual and emotional turns foreground sport's inescapable subjectivity. Sports historians, who have now amply demonstrated the impact of the mode of production on their subject, should neither dismiss nor ignore this trend which has found traction in our profession. Art historians like Mike O'Mahony have demonstrated the ways the production of images deepens our understanding of the sporting process. It is, as Elias described it, "the quest for excitement" that impels us to the playing field, stadium, television screen, newspaper and finally to the equally pleasurable activity of writing about it all. Having done the hard material work, we do not now need to fear subjectivity. Rather we should situate it, analyze it and embrace it. Only the most retrograde idealist would make claims about the autonomous beauty of sport or tout its independence so beloved by the Victorians. Either in person or in our homes we can scream, cry, chuckle, curse, shout, joke, jump and exult, but always we must think.

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Aesthetics, Propaganda and Culture in Mass Dictatorships

Karen Petrone

In many places across the globe, culture between the two world wars possessed a set of common characteristics that were both novel and unique to this particular time period. The cataclysm of the First World War had redrawn the map and unsettled social hierarchies. New governments replaced old empires with the promise to remake and renew humanity. At the same time, social and gender relations were transformed and the "New Woman" claimed a more active role in the public and social spheres. Simultaneously, there were substantial advances in mass media. Advertising techniques spread, film and radio became ever-more popular and more prevalent, and elaborate civic celebrations and mass festivals became an ever-more common feature around the world.

Scholars of illiberal "mass dictatorships" have long recognized the potency of this conjuncture between the rise of the popular mass media and the political desire to construct the new Soviet Man, the new Italian, the new German and the new Japanese. These interwar governments sought to change humanity in part by reshaping the public realm. Historian Peter Kenez described the Soviet Union as a "propaganda state" that, while embracing the possibilities of modern mass media, drastically narrowed what it was possible to say in public and "succeeded in preventing the formation and articulation of alternative points of view." He argued that, as a result, "[t]he Soviet people ultimately came not so much to believe the Bolsheviks' world view as to take it for granted" (Kenez 1985, p. 253). The idea of a "propaganda state" that shaped and limited the possibilities for personal expression has often been applied to other mass dictatorships of the era. This essay will explore two particular aspects of propaganda in mass dictatorships: the extent to which mass culture, including propaganda and mass festivals, shaped identities, and the kinds of identities they shaped.

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It is important to keep in mind that while public culture in the interwar democracies was never under the same kind of centralization and control as in the mass dictatorships, British, French and American public culture during and between the wars also underscored and reinforced ideals of civic and national identity that were challenged in Europe by war and in the United States by immigration. In *Soviet Mass Festivals*, Malte Rolf explores the similarities between American and Soviet festivals and argues for a common didacticism across civic festivals that aimed to teach citizens how to belong to their respective countries. In the American case, many interwar festivals "were actively and explicitly geared towards Americanizing new immigrants" (Rolf 2013, p. 174). A famously ideological example of such a festival took place in the Highland Park Ford Motor Plant during the First World War. The graduation from the Ford English School included the following ritual:

> All the men descend from a boat scene representing the vessel on which they came over; … into a pot 15 feet in diameter and 71/2 feet high, which represents the Ford English School. Six teachers, three on either side, stir the pot … Into the pot 52 nationalities with their foreign clothes and baggage go and out of the pot after vigorous stirring by the teachers comes one nationality, viz. American.

As historian James R. Barrett notes, "lest anyone miss the point, each of the workers emerges from the pot dressed in an identical suit and carrying a miniature American flag" (Barrett 1992, p. 996). This "melting pot" ritual makes it clear that neither the Soviet Union nor the fascist states held a monopoly on a social engineering agenda or on the use of heavy-handed propaganda to teach their citizens how to behave.

Particularly noteworthy here is the idea that civic ritual could be effectively employed to teach "backward" immigrants how to become advanced American workers. Across the globe, both liberal and illiberal states sought to mobilize new populations to contribute to their economic progress by teaching the rural population, youth and women how to become urban and productive citizens engaged in the advancement of state modernization projects. It behooves the scholar of mass dictatorship to consider the interwar "propaganda states," both democratic and authoritarian, against the backdrop of their common era and their common dilemmas of urbanization and modernization.

In the American case, the students at the Ford Plant were literally learning the new language of English in order to be better workers for the Ford Company, as opposed to learning how to fit their ideas and activities into a new state ideology. And, at the moment of performing this ritual, they seemed to be acquiescing to their new identities as American workers in their identical suits and waving their flags. However, we cannot know the extent to which these workers embraced the ideology inherent in this ritual in the long term. When they went home, did they put their usual clothing back on? Speak their native language? Socialize with other workers from their home countries? Teach their children their native languages? Or did they embrace an Americanized identity

that went beyond the highly tendentious form of this ritual? No doubt the answers vary, but the reexamination of the relationship of form and content in interwar propaganda helps us to understand the mechanisms of propaganda in both mass democracies and mass dictatorships, and this propaganda's inherent strengths and limitations.

STALINIST AND LATE SOCIALIST DISCOURSE

Peter Kenez is certainly correct in arguing that the Soviet public realm was far more state-centered and far more tightly controlled by censorship than the public sphere in the mass democracies, but whether this tight control could successfully prevent the formation of alternative points of view is up for debate. Both Kenez and literary scholar Jeffrey Brooks emphasize the formulaic nature of Soviet discourse of the interwar era, with Soviet propagandists repeating formulas to illiterate peasants like "magical incantations" (Kenez 1985, p. 133). Brooks has pointed to the ubiquitous discourse of gratitude in the Soviet press during the Stalin period in which Comrade Stalin was the source of the population's well-being and Soviet citizens thanked him profusely for securing their happiness (Brooks 2000). Malte Rolfe has suggested that the era was marked by the seemingly endless repetition of a fixed number of official Soviet symbols. He suggests that the Stalinist culture of the 1930s was a "hall of mirrors" in which a limited cultural canon of approved Soviet references was repeated over and over again, reflected in and refracted against one another in all fields of Soviet culture. This mirroring encouraged a "cultural inner Sovietization" which he defines as "assimilating people into a milieu containing a new, official canon of practices, symbols, and rhetoric" (Rolf 2009, pp. 601, 604; 2013, p. 5). Rolf emphasizes that participation in festival practices and communication with Soviet officials were sufficient to Sovietize the self, whether or not Soviet ideals had been internalized. He sees the new Soviet person as an entity "in which different cultural paradigms were superimposed on one another like sediments that constantly shift at different speeds but are always related to one another" (Rolf 2013, p. 148).

Kenez and Brooks, on the other hand, make a conceptual leap from the limitation and repetition of Soviet discourses to the prevention of alternative ways of thinking. In *Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades*, I argued that Soviet celebration culture was a double-edged sword: Soviet and Party leaders sought to use celebrations to promote legitimacy and authority, but Soviet citizens could use celebration culture "to express alternative, unofficial, and subversive viewpoints" (Petrone 2000, p. 3). In the fifteen years since this work was published, I have come to realize that opposing the state to its citizens in a binary of domination and resistance is perhaps not the best way of conceptualizing the problem. I would still argue, however, that removing alternative worldviews from Soviet discourse did not necessarily remove them from people's lives, and would caution against envisioning a hermetic Soviet culture impervious to non-Soviet thoughts and identities. Furthermore, it could be argued that the

very need to repeat the message so frequently was evidence of state anxiety that the population was not readily adopting its ideals; repetition could be demonstrating both the domination of a particular worldview and the imperviousness of some segments of the population to the state's core ideals.

Rereading Kenez's work in light of later scholarship, I am now struck by his insight that propaganda produced an atmosphere in which Soviet citizens took the Bolsheviks' worldview "for granted." This formulation stops short of claiming "belief," or the successful inculcation of any particular kind of Soviet identity. Instead, it focuses on the acceptance of and participation in a Sovietized way of life. Historian Stephen Kotkin has also suggested that Soviet citizens learned how to "speak Bolshevik," establishing hybrid identities that both embraced elements of the Soviet system and preserved elements of their pre-Bolshevik worldviews (Kotkin 1995). While they learned to "speak Bolshevik," newly educated Soviet workers did not altogether forsake their "native" languages. The repetition noted by Kenez, Brooks and Rolf could lead to a tacit acceptance of ubiquitous Soviet cultural forms without a deep reading of them or the assimilation of their messages.

Historian Serhy Yekelchyk points out that like modern-day scholars, Soviet officials of the late Stalin period could not tell what people thought or believed, and so they were obliged to monitor what people did and how they behaved. Soviet citizenship was manifested in practice and in the public display of certain civic emotions such as love for the motherland, gratitude to Stalin and, during the Second World War, hatred of the Nazis (Yekelchyk 2006, pp. 529–30; 2014). In the immediate post-Second World War context, Soviet rituals and festivals took on a significant political meaning because they were opportunities for the Soviet authorities to verify that Soviet citizens were indeed behaving in a state-sanctioned way. The rituals of the 1930s served a similar function of symbolizing through practice that the population had accepted the status and attributes of the New Soviet Man and Woman. By marching in a parade or attending a celebratory meeting, Soviet citizens demonstrated fluency in Soviet culture and a willingness to participate in that culture. They therefore displayed their new Soviet identities for all to see, modeling the clothing and accouterments of the ideal New Soviet Person. However, it was then, and is still now, an open question about whether they felt comfortable in their new Soviet clothes. It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern the extent to which Sovietization transformed worldviews, and the extent to which it remained merely a series of habitual actions.

Writing primarily about the post-Stalin period, anthropologist Aleksei Yurchak has suggested that after the death of the central authority figure of Stalin, the forms of authoritative Soviet discourse became increasingly detached from their content, allowing Soviet citizens an enormous range of creativity and the ability to live rich individual lives while simultaneously following all of the official Soviet rules (Yurchak 2006). This was why Soviet citizens were emotionally ready for the end of the Soviet Union, although no one foresaw its downfall. *Everything Was Forever, Until it Was No More* is a powerful reading of late Soviet culture, and I would argue that it also sheds light on the interwar period.

From the very beginning of the Soviet Union, the propaganda state placed more emphasis on form than content for logistical reasons. Often the nearly illiterate or newly literate public had difficulty grasping the essence of Soviet ideology, and, official "conversations" about Soviet policy in the workplace, for example, were limited by the skills of both instructors and students. That the conversation was held and workers attended was more important than the content transmitted in the conversation. As Yekelchyk argues, since the state could monitor who was conforming to Soviet life, while it could not monitor what people believed or understood, the disconnection between form and content was inherent in the very makeup of the Soviet propaganda project. Although form was extremely important in German propaganda as well, the Nazis were not as reliant on form alone, as the German public was better educated, had more access to mass media (especially radio and film) and had been gradually exposed to Nazi ideas through years of election campaigns.

The work of Yurchak and Yekelchyk puts the ideas of Kenez, Brooks and Rolf about the repetition of the canon, the circular and enclosed discourse and the magical incantations into an entirely new light. Perhaps only a few Soviet citizens used celebrations to subvert the state, but many more Soviet citizens might have fully engaged with the forms of celebrations as dedicated Soviet citizens at the same time that they disengaged from (or even misunderstood) the ideological messages inherent in the festivals in pursuit of their own goals. They could wear the clothes of the New Soviet Man while defining their status as individual modern subjects in an entirely different way than the state envisioned. There is a good deal of evidence, for example, that Soviet women engaged with certain strands of official propaganda to carve out personal spheres of achievement. Yurchak rejects the idea that this self-actualization fueled by the adherence to state forms should be called resistance; instead he suggests that this was a realm of activity that was mutually constitutive with the state, as the empty forms and individualizing content reinforced one another.

Moving away from the tendency to think in dichotomous terms of a heroic subject resisting state oppression, Yurchak creates a much messier reality. His subject takes state-mandated activities for granted and yet employs them creatively to construct a self-actualization that is not necessarily congruent with the state's ideals (in this case, of the New Soviet Man). This subject gives power to the state by constituting its exterior manifestations while taking power from the state in engaging in individually rather than collectively motivated activities.

Yurchak's analysis has some points of commonality with Vaclav Havel's 1978 self-consciously dissident account of the workings of power and ideology in Czechoslovakia. In his essay "The Power of the Powerless," Havel introduces the figure of the greengrocer who hangs a poster in his window proclaiming "Workers of the World, Unite!" in order to demonstrate his obedience to the state and therefore to be left in peace. Havel identifies the working of ideology in the hanging of the poster as a "sign" of compliance that hides the operation of power. He points out that the greengrocer would not hang a poster that read "I am afraid and therefore unquestioningly obedient." Havel argues

that "if ideology originally facilitated (by acting outwardly) the constitution of power by serving as a psychological excuse, then from the moment that excuse is accepted, it constitutes power inwardly, becoming an active component of that power." For Havel, the only way to destroy the power of ideology was for the greengrocer to step "out of living the lie," and begin "to live within the truth" (Havel 1978). While both Yurchak and Havel agree that participation in socialist ideology was "mutually constitutive" with the state, Havel does not see the possibility of self-actualization within the system; breaking out into "the truth" was required for freedom.

It is crucial to recognize that there was a great deal of variability in the process of identification with the state and in the potential for "inner-Sovietization." Jochen Hellbeck has forcefully argued that some Soviet diarists longed to subsume their individual selves into the collective and engaged in prolonged internal struggles to reshape their own mentalities and life histories to conform to collective ideals (Hellbeck 2006). Yet these intensely inner-Sovietizing subjects may have been as far from the rule as were the explicitly resisting subjects "who stepped out of living the lie." Work by Yekelchyk and Yurchak raises the possibility that many Soviet subjects responded to the endless repetition of a fixed number of symbols and tropes in Soviet propaganda by simultaneously accepting them and tuning them out.

This theoretical model has significant implications for thinking about the nature of propaganda in all mass dictatorships (and mass democracies too). To what extent did the numbing repetition of official symbols and ideas engage and transform the population? Or were these symbols largely accepted as part of the lived landscape as backdrop to citizens' engagement in their own individual endeavors? There is some danger in importing the theories of Yurchak and Yekelchyk to the 1930s and imagining Soviet discourse as facilitating a seemingly benign individual self-development. The Brezhnev era eschewed mass terror while targeting only those who were overtly oppositional to the Soviet state, in Havel's terms only those "living within the truth." During the Second World War, the definition of the Nazis as hated enemies was grounded in the horrifying realities of the war. But during the 1930s, the "enemies of the state" were largely imaginary as neither "kulaks" in the rural setting nor "traitors to the state" existed in real life. It was Soviet propaganda and ritual that created these "others" against which the unified Soviet population was supposed to stand.

In August 1936, for example, the Soviet state organized demonstrations to show popular support for the death sentences meted out by the court in the proceedings of the case against the "Trotskyite–Zinovievite Terrorist Center." Demonstrators carried slogans such as "Death to the Traitors" and propaganda depicted the enemies as snakes, mad dogs, vermin and other animals to be exterminated. In this particular context, appearing at a demonstration and defining oneself as a loyal Soviet citizen affirmed and facilitated the carrying out of state violence in the form of the death penalty against people who had been unjustly accused. This compliance aided the Soviet state in killing hundreds of thousands of innocent people and sending millions of others to forced labor camps in "the gulag archipelago." Even those Soviet citizens who

attended the parade without absorbing its message upheld the ideal of terror against "the other" in Soviet society. In such a case, participation seems more like complicity in the state's project of defining "us" and "them" than creative use of a state event to define one's own personal sphere. Like Havel's green-grocer displaying the required slogans, participation in these parades enforced state power over others.

However, there were other Soviet celebrations that provided much more of an opening for simultaneous support of the state project and the development of individual aspirations. Despite the fact that the Soviet state was far more anti-religious than the Nazi state, in the middle of the 1930s, they reintroduced the New Year holiday replete with some of the trappings of Christmas, such as a decorated "fir tree" and holiday merriment. This was an opportunity to show that the Soviet Union cared for its children and could celebrate a new prosperity after years of hardship. Most Soviet authorities downplayed political content and permitted celebration to occur both in public and in private. New Year's Day appealed to individuals and could also allow for the surreptitious celebration of Christmas. In this particular case, the form was the content, and this correspondence of form and content produced both compliance and a greater degree of individual self-actualization than some of the other celebrations at the time.

In the extreme example of Stalinist terror, which affected large segments of the population, did the othering of enemies serve only the process of internalizing Soviet ideology? Or could clinging to approved activities and rituals also create a safe zone in which outer compliance allowed for inner questioning? Conversely, to what degree did the performance of external conformity serve to build acquiescence for the enactment of state violence on the "others" so frequently defined by festivals and rituals, even in the absence of strong ideological conviction on the part of the performers?

To complicate matters further, the construction of individual identities was not static. Citizens' transformations were not permanent, and new identities had to be constantly remade and reinforced. As one Soviet university student who later emigrated from the Soviet Union explained, most of the participants in Soviet demonstrations, even including members of the Komsomol, "felt some inner resistance, something akin to embarrassment and humiliation at the necessity of carrying 'Bolshevik icons,'" or placards with the images of revered Soviet leaders. However, sometimes, "one's sense of humiliation would suddenly give way to an opposite feeling—a sense of extreme pride and feverish enthusiasm" (Petrone 2000, p. 45). The goal of the analyst is to recognize the complexity and contingency of responses to propaganda, the varied construction of selfhood, and the complex nature of complicity in mass dictatorships (Chatterjee and Petrone 2008).

The German Case

While the nature of propaganda aimed at immigrants in the United States shows the strong transnational aspects of didactic propaganda attempting to create modern subjects in the interwar period, there are still significant differences in

the use of propaganda among mass democracies and mass dictatorships. Below I consider Nazi Germany in comparison to the Soviet Union. While recent scholarship on the Soviet Union suggests that Soviet citizens may have been more disengaged from the political goals of the Soviet state than earlier scholarship proposed, recent scholarship on Nazi propaganda seems to be trending in the opposite direction.

In a compelling article on Nazi Christmas, Joe Perry argues against previous scholarship that suggested that the Nazification of Christmas was inauthentic and ineffective. He contends that many Germans willingly participated in campaigns for "national unity" and that promoted a particularly "German Christmas." These campaigns also fueled boycotts and attacks on Jewish-owned stores. Thus, "privatized, individualized acts of holiday shopping now helped naturalize the exclusions of the racial state and reinforced the social death of German Jews" (Perry 2005, p. 580). This perspective turns the argument of Yurchak on its head, suggesting that the highly individualized, privatized actions of German citizens simultaneously shaped their not-necessarily Nazi self-actualization at the same time that they forwarded the state's exclusion of the Jews. Rather than in the socialist cases where ideology supported a static system of empty forms, or provided, in Havel's words, "a bridge of excuses" between state and people, the private and individual actions of German citizens advanced Nazi ideology.

Perry argues that when they unavoidably participated in Nazi Christmas rituals, "Germans entered a realm of mediation where official appropriations and vernacular traditions came together in what appears to be a surprisingly comfortable synthesis, in which 'the capacity for submission as well as the pleasure of being involved were stimulated simultaneously'" (Perry 2005, p. 587). Here Perry is drawing on the work of Alf Luedtke, a pioneer of everyday-life history, to suggest the ways in which participation in official holiday events produced a complicated and multifaceted response in German citizens. The implication of Perry's (and Luedtke's) work is to suggest that one could be simultaneously Nazified and individualized through Nazi celebrations, engaging in Nazi-oriented behavior for personal reasons that preserved an individual sphere of autonomy.

Ever since the introduction of the term "totalitarian," there has been a struggle to understand the daily engagement of ordinary people with the Nazi and Soviet states. In *Life and Death in the Third Reich*, Peter Fritzsche argues that "National Socialism did not succeed through seduction or paralysis or hypnosis. It was by turns unsettling and meaningful to millions of people" (Fritzsche 2008, p. 12). Here, Fritzsche, like many of the scholars of the Soviet Union discussed above, seeks to move away from the older model of imagining Germans as only being acted upon by Nazism, and instead looks to the ways in which they, as active agents, found meaning in the Third Reich. He examines, for example, the "Heil Hitler!" salute to discuss both the progress of outward Nazification of the population and the meanings that Germans gave to the transformation of their daily life by the use of the new greeting—a decision that they had to consciously carry out dozens of times a day.

Fritzsche points out that those who used the "Heil Hitler!" salute as nothing more than an ordinary greeting or to hide their own misgivings, made the greeting "more commonplace" and "enhanced the sense of acclamation." At the same time, regime insiders could never be sure whether people who used the greeting were "true believers" or "mere opportunists." Nevertheless, it was the "appearance of unanimity, which overwhelmed nonbelievers and prompted them to scrutinize their own reservations" (Fritzsche 2008, pp. 20–4). As in the Soviet Union, the pressure for outward compliance produced conformity in behavior, and the voluntary actions of some citizens compelled other citizens to behave in certain ways; yet the externally verifiable behavior left large openings for internal feelings of doubt and ambivalence toward the Nazi project. Whether they were doubtful or enthusiastic, however, those who saluted contributed to drawing boundaries of a national community that included some and excluded others, thus demonstrating the power of Nazi ideological constructs even if participants followed them only mechanically. Performing the Nazi salute, like participating in a Soviet demonstration demanding the death sentence for traitors, or hanging a poster that said "Workers of the World, Unite!," strengthened mass dictatorship whether or not it was deeply felt.

Yet the popularity of a ritual mattered. Nazi Christmas celebrations produced pleasure and submission simultaneously, subtly drawing some Germans closer to Nazi ideals. While Nazi Christmas struck personal chords that engaged German citizens, eventually the general populace grew tired of the Nazi salute. As the war progressed, more and more Germans returned to traditional greetings or mocked the salute by saying "heal Hitler" rather than "Hail Hitler."

Internal Versus External

We are left with the conundrum that, if we accept Yurchak, in the late Soviet period, the repetition of forms and formulas bereft of internalized meanings prepared the way for the rapid collapse of the entire ideological system once Gorbachev introduced alternative discourses. Yurchak suggests that the power of Stalin as leader held the system together in the interwar period; there is ample evidence, however, that in ideological terms, the interwar system was in many ways as hollow as the postwar system, and the act of participation was always more powerful than the internalization of ideological messages. There were at least some opportunities for individual self-actualization in the Stalin era, under the cover of proper Soviet participation. How then to account for the robust nature of the interwar German and Soviet ideological systems in which majorities of the populations were compliant to the state in the face of extreme ideological pronouncements and the violent elimination of "enemies?"

The German scholarship suggests the paradox of an ideology that does not necessarily win over its adherents, but nonetheless encourages them to behave voluntarily in ways that satisfy their own emotional and social needs while at the same time reinforcing the actions of the state. Yet it too recognizes that Germans could participate in Nazi activities by merely adhering to form without

assimilating content at all. The Soviet scholarship both acknowledges the existence of an ideology that appeals to individuals desiring to remake themselves into New Soviet People, but also suggests a large swath of the population that takes ideology for granted and participates in it only as necessary. The outward conformity to state dictates turned out to be a very powerful tool in the hands of both governments that claimed legitimacy and authority derived from this mass involvement and used this legitimacy to carry out violence against state enemies.

Where then do individual identities fit into this schema? There is fluidity in these identities, as individuals embraced different aspects of state ideology at different times. They sometimes were fervent and at other times indifferent. Citizens actively engaged this ideology to choose meaningful aspects, while ignoring or rejecting other parts of the same discourse. Some citizens gained power and self-actualization through state discourse and others lost it. Yet by consenting to participate, even if they did so shallowly and mechanically, citizens ultimately gave the state more power over themselves and their peers than the state gave them. In this mutually constitutive system, adhering to form lent power to content that citizens may or may not have endorsed.

Like the participants in the American melting pot ritual, participants in Soviet and German rituals had choices both in whether to participate, and in how deeply they assimilated the ideologies proffered to them. In the mass dictatorships discussed here (and likely in mass dictatorship in general) citizens engaged with the state across a wide spectrum, from complete engagement in inner-Sovietization or inner-Nazification to dedicated compliance, to more indifferent compliance, to outright opposition. Citizens could move from one of these categories to another, but most of this spectrum regularly engaged in compliance to form.

Ultimately the choices of whether and how to participate mattered greatly. While both mass democracies and mass dictatorships longed for citizens to embrace their ideologies fully, in the mass dictatorships, adherence to form produced powerful ideological effects even in the absence of deep engagement with ideology. While the Nazi state, crushed by external defeat, rapidly lost its popular legitimacy, it took decades of the hollowing out of ideology to have an impact on the legitimacy of the Soviet Union. In the mass democracies, the inculcation of ideology was not the monopoly of the state, and other institutions, such as American corporations, engaged in the didactic promulgation of Americanism. As a result, when citizens chose to ignore the content of ideology in favor of mere form, they did not directly destabilize state power but rather the social and economic relations of the era.

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Rituals, Emotions and Mobilization: The Leader Cult and Party Politics

Daniel Leese

The leader cult is a near ubiquitous phenomenon in the history of twentieth-century mass dictatorships. Leaders of Fascist, National Socialist, communist or Baath Party organizations, Latin American and Southern European "strongmen" (*caudillos*), African and Asian autocrats, they all came to fuse their personal imagery to different degrees with the symbols and discourses of national liberation movements or, in post-revolutionary settings, the nation state itself. Prior to Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956, the term "personality cult" or "cult of the individual" and the associated meanings of personal aggrandizement, media control and enforced public rituals of worship were rarely used to denote a specific form of governance. The word "cult" was used in derogative fashion to discredit certain competitors or enemies or it was employed to characterize types of seemingly irrational allegiance. Karl Marx thus sharply criticized the "repugnant … and nauseating … cult of the Crown" in Britain or the "Napoleon cult" in France (Heller and Plamper 2004, pp. 24–25). The notion of "cult" with its religious references to church rituals and liturgy has remained notoriously opaque and, with the exception of Mao Zedong, no twentieth-century dictator has self-consciously argued for the need of sustaining a leader cult. Even Hitler was careful to distinguish the "high-reasoned approach to reality" (Burleigh 220, p. 11) of National Socialism from what he perceived as mystic and primitive cult movements.

In the following, the term "modern leader cult" will be employed to denote the organized worship of state or party leaders by means of mass media, accompanied by varying degrees of popular support, irrespective of the nature of the political regime. While the secret speech led to a massive popularization of

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the concept of "personality cults" after 1956 in public discourse and scholarship, Cold War-era rhetoric commonly linked the emergence of cults primarily to socialism and hindered comparative analyses of the forms and functions of modern leader cults in transnational perspective. Detailed studies of the leader cults of fascist dictators such as Mussolini have appeared in recent years only (Gundle et al. 2013). The cults of most African, Latin American and Central Asian leaders are still in dire need of further research. This overview will highlight four important aspects of modern leader cults: first, it will delineate what was specifically "modern" about the organized worship of twentieth-century dictators. Second, it will summarize the fairly well-explored functional dimension of personality cults within party politics. Third, it will trace the role of rituals and emotions in sustaining leader cults. And finally, this chapter will look at how leader cults could assume both mobilizing and disciplining functions. Despite important differences among the cults, the overview attempts to demonstrate that leader cults were not simply a carry-over of premodern practices of worship or inexplicable instances of an irrational mass craze but presented a fundamentally modern attempt at creating resonant political symbols by way of relying on the infrastructure of the modern state and the most advanced technology available.

LEADER CULTS AND MODERNITY

While cults around secular or religious leaders may be observed in premodern societies as well, such as the symbolism surrounding absolutist rulers like Louis XIV, these traditional forms of venerating the king's body as representation of the state differed in many important aspects from its modern-day successors. The worship of modern dictators was no longer based on the divine right of kings or czars but on the notion of popular sovereignty. Therefore, the impact of the French Revolution deserves special attention. The decisive break with former grounds of legitimacy, the creation and propagation of Republican symbols, the championing of reason and rationality, and the transfer of religious terminology to the secular realm all provided important preconditions for the emergence of modern leader cults. Napoleon III was probably the most prominent example of a sovereign during the nineteenth century, who adapted his ruling strategies to this changed environment by way of relying on populism and the emerging mass media to elevate his personal image. Contemporaneously, this style of leadership was referred to as "Caesarism," a phrase harking back to the noninstitutional power seizure of Roman emperor Julius Caesar, or as "Bonapartism," a form of quasi-dictatorial rule based on occasional public plebiscites. During the late nineteenth century, these concepts also came to be attributed to the rule of German chancellor Bismarck by his enemies, and although Bismarck never achieved unrestrained political power, a veritable cult was fostered around him both during and after his lifetime. The statues and towers devoted to the "iron chancellor," as well as the multifold commodity items, ranging from huge statues to Bismarck beer mats,

reveal a dimension of genuine public veneration that was common to some but not all modern leader cults.

Public sentiment was particularly strong in settings, where leaders were able to merge their personal symbolism with discourses of national liberation or in the context of the actual founding of a nation state. The worship fostered around "fathers of the nation" such as Mustafa Kemal, the "Atatürk," in Turkey or Sun Yat-sen in China in the early twentieth century attest to the potency of crafting narratives of personal destiny by means of mass media, even if these did not always translate into political power. The cults of these two leaders, who promised to lead the former Ottoman Empire, the "sick man of Europe," and the partly colonized Qing Empire into a brighter future, were founded on doctrines of nationalism, republicanism and, more generally, a scientistic belief in historical progress and change. Both leaders strongly sensed the importance of inventing modernizing ideologies to replace or at least to refashion traditional systems of belief. While other late nineteenth-century thinkers in China thought to transform Confucianism into a vehicle of modernization and change, Sun Yat-sen opted for a conscious break with traditional thought and religion. He famously compared the Chinese people to a sheet of loose sand, in dire need of a modern, unifying ideology, which came to be known as the "Three Principles of the People": nationalism, democracy and people's welfare. Religion played a much more prominent role in Turkey. Islam could not simply be discarded but had to be assigned a specific place and to be accompanied by a modernist, secular ideology, which came to be termed "Kemalism." The larger narratives of national unification, social transformation and "authoritarian developmentalism" (Hanigoglu 2011, p. 192), which accompanied these early twentieth-century leader cults, reveal a truly modern belief in the changeability of human destiny that is irreducible to mere personal aggrandizement.

Unlike their premodern counterparts, modern leader cults were not only directed at pacifying elitist factions but at the whole populace. They were "children of mass politics" (Plamper 2012, p. xvii) and in their fully developed forms cannot be disassociated from the institutions of the modern state such as conscription, schooling and especially the birth of mass media and the invention of mass production that allowed for the uniform reproduction of images and commodity items beyond the narrow confines of the court or a group of revolutionaries. The modern leader cult was a truly comprehensive phenomenon that impacted on the lives of every citizen, for example through mandatory salutations and speaking conventions ("Heil Hitler!"), radio or television transmissions of leader speeches, the delivery of imagery to the most remote regions, as well as enforced rituals of confession and worship. Dictators and their supporting bureaucracies relied on the most advanced technological means available within a given situation to portray themselves as the unifying symbol of a given polity. While by 1937, CCP politician Mao Zedong employed woodcut block prints to claim his superiority within party circles in the isolated region of Yan'an, contemporary Republican Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek in 1938 had his adopted name "zhongzheng" ("loyal and upright")

blasted into the sky over the capital city of Nanjing using colored tail emissions of two fighter planes. Advanced technology and mass media were clearly of major importance. And yet the political outcome, at least in settings where political power was contested, crucially depended on strong inner-party and army networks as well as on a certain resonance of the cult's narrative claims and symbolism with local cultural traditions and expectations. A successful personality cult could not simply be transplanted or copied from one cultural environment to another, as especially the turgid leader cults of Felix Gottwald in Czechoslovakia or of Erich Honecker in the GDR reveal. They needed to be embedded in larger discourses of national liberation, relief from prior victimization at the hands of imperialist oppressors or the overthrow of a corrupt political leadership.

The attempt to link personal imagery with narratives of national salvation is not unique to dictatorial systems and thus the instigation of public support for a certain political leader with reference to popular sovereignty aided by the institutions of the modern state is no sufficient definition of a modern leader cult, since these characteristics similarly apply to systems of democratic competition between different party leaders. Unlike democratic election campaigns that rely on marketing strategies to render the respective candidate most appealing to a wider audience, modern leader cults are characterized by what I refer to as an attempt of "authoritarian branding" (Leese 2011, pp. 16–17) elsewhere. Leader cults are mostly employed as means of mobilization and as such can only function over an extended period of time if the dissemination of leader images and texts in the public sphere is constantly monitored and controlled. Without such acts of censorship or without a "directed public sphere" (Cheek 1997, p. 7), the glorification of an individual leader is always bound to incite critical reactions and satirical comments that may serve to contradict the official narrative. Full-blown leader cults therefore can only develop within regimes who command sufficient resources to effectively control the public sphere and to restrict mockery of the cult's often outlandish claims to private settings. Nascent personality cults, on the other hand, may be witnessed in democratic settings as well, especially in times of perceived national or political crisis.

LEADER CULTS AND PARTY POLITICS

A fundamental difference between democratic election campaigns and mobilization by means of a modern leader cult is presented by structural features sustaining the latter within a political system based on personal loyalty rather than personal conviction and individual rights. While in democratic parties various types of patronage and clientele politics may also be found, the danger of non-compliant behavior in an authoritarian or even totalitarian system creates much stronger incentives to advance the cause of a certain leader in order to achieve personal ascension or at least to gain political protection. Singing the praises of a leader and his policies in such cases should not be confused with fervent

belief but should be read as a specific form of signaling loyalty and political reliability. The panegyrics of worship present a type of political communication, which serves to establish patron–client relationships, networks that continuously fuel sycophantic behavior and severely undermine governing efficiency. The resulting cult discourse is usually characterized by very emotional rhetoric, structured along binaries of love and hatred. Adoration for the leader's political genius finds expression as well in fierce opposition against his perceived adversaries. Belief in the semantic claims is not of primary importance as long as both party members and populace act "as if" they believe in them. Compliance is commonly ensured through various systems of informing on others or outright persecution. The level of public acclamation in many ways therefore resembles an index of political anxieties rather than genuine adoration.

With regard to the importance of leader cults within party politics, a distinction has to be drawn between cases of political rivalry, for example in the case of a succession crisis or a not-yet-fully consolidated party organization, when different factions champion their respective leaders, and, on the other hand, the uncontested cult of a certain dictator or autocrat. An example for competing leader cults may be found in an early phase of the Chinese Revolution. The CCP during the late 1930s witnessed several competing attempts of establishing the supremacy of different leaders such as Wang Ming or Mao Zedong that coexisted with the leader cult of nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. Simultaneously, there even sprung up foreign sponsored cults of local leaders such as former emperor Puyi as the puppet leader of Manchukuo, Wang Jingwei's feigning as national leader within the Japanese occupied parts of Eastern China, or Sheng Shicais attempts at creating a leader cult in Soviet-dominated Xinjiang. Many high-ranking cadres of the CCP that were principally opposed to the instigation of modern leader cults, such as Liu Shaoqi or Zhou Enlai, thus acceded to the elevation of a particular leader, in this case Mao Zedong, to counter the impact of Nationalist Party cult-building in the public sphere. Backing out of these demonstrations of allegiance, however, came at the cost of betrayal. By merging the imagery of a single leader with the larger aim of the socialist revolution, criticizing the party leader became coterminous with betraying the revolution, which led many seasoned cadres to follow Mao Zedong even as he came close to destroying the very political system they had jointly created. A similar claim could be made for the case of Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the Great Purge of the late 1930s, when veteran cadres acquiesced to the purge and killing of their former comrades.

A fully established leader cult turned out to be a double-edged sword for political parties. The centering of public emotion and political loyalties in the official persona of the leader provided the respective dictator or autocrat with a means of mobilization that was distinct from the party organization as such. It provided the means for "charismatic mobilization" (Andreas 2007, p. 437) outside the boundaries of the bureaucratic party state. In cases, were the party organization pursued a higher, purportedly scientific aim, such as the building of socialism, the leader cult could lead to severe clashes because doctrinal

questions had to be adapted according to personal loyalties. A much safer way of centering public emotion and political loyalties in the official persona of the leader was the employment of posthumous cults. While leader cults in mass dictatorships were mostly built around living leaders, the instrumental value of a deceased leader within party politics proved to be enormous. The most prominent of these posthumous cults include the worship of Lenin fostered by his "best pupil" Stalin in the Soviet Union, the Sun Yat-sen cult in China and the cults fashioned around Kim Il-Sung and Kim Yong-Il in North Korea. There are even a few instances of utilizing the petrified image of a not-yet-deceased leader by political rivals within the party, such as after the ouster of Ho Chi Minh through his rival Le Duan in Vietnam. Because these leaders could no longer interfere with present-day decisions, their image could be utilized to stabilize party rule based on the image of collective leadership. Most contemporary leader cults still function along these lines of venerating previous leaders as deceased paragons of revolutionary virtue, yet the cult as a means of political communication continues to impact on party politics. Even the most successful of the current authoritarian ruling parties, the CCP, repeatedly had to contain the blossoming of subcults around provincial-level leaders, most recently during the 2012 Bo Xilai affair, because the structural factors sustaining the emergence of leader cults within mass dictatorships have been patched over rather than effectively curtailed.

EMOTIONS AND RITUALS OF POWER

Modern leader cults are characterized by varying degrees of public acclamation, including mass assemblies, parades or small-group rituals. The phenomenon as such is no novelty, yet the scope and intensity of mass mobilization assumed an unprecedented dimension. The participation in these rituals of power served to both demonstrate and actualize the power of the leader and his party organization (Rolf 2013); however, participation could take on the most diverse forms. While for example in Nazi Germany, the leader as charismatic orator unified and energized the "atomized" masses, as Hannah Arendt (1951, p. 323) famously observed, Communist Party national day parades and assemblies effectively combined organized leader worship with demonstrations of prescribed social stratification. Representatives of specific strata were thus placed closer to the center of power than others, consciously excluding certain groups altogether. These rituals of power relied on elaborate strategies of orchestration to display a unified image of the respective leadership in the public sphere. The size and quality of the leader portraits, the specific arrangement of slogans and the level of mass involvement were all carefully pondered by ritual specialists in the respective propaganda departments and left multiple traces in archival memory. They mirror the significance attached to the role of public emotions and shared symbolism by twentieth-century mass dictatorships.

While the ornamental function of the masses in these displays of power is clearly discernible, a purely aesthetical interpretation is in danger of

underestimating the degree to which mass dictatorships were able to rouse public passion, at least for a limited period of time. The image of the leader as the most important symbol of military parades stood at the apex of a whole network of small-group rituals, mythic narrations and shared symbolism that served to channel emotion and produce group solidarity for the regime's purposes. A prominent example that immediately reveals the potency of cult-building and small-group rituals is the reaction of the CCP to the devastating impact of the Great Leap Forward, the largest (human-induced) famine in world history. Unlike Stalin, whose public image was reduced in times of national crisis, the cult of Mao Zedong was consciously used as a way of both mobilizing the masses and of containing the impact of the famine on regime stability. Details on how "emotional bonding" with the regime worked were published as an outcome of CIA operations in Tibet. Here in 1961 a set of classified People's Liberation Army documents was captured by intelligence officers (Cheng 1966), which contained valuable information on how political commissars in the army used the cult to limit the disintegrating effects of the famine on troop morals. Based on local-level trial spots, a three-step process was devised and later implemented on a national scale. It consisted of a comparison between past hardship and present "sweetness" of life through carefully nurtured model heroes and activists, an investigation into the sources of individual difficulties in the present by way of showing personal deviations from the correct path of development or the interference of evil class enemies, and finally the guided study of short Mao texts to create a moment of group solidarity and shared emotion, symbolized by images and texts of the CCP Chairman. Key to the success of this molding of crowd emotion was the choice of locally accepted models, complete control of the staging process and ritual innovations in order not to hamper ritual efficiency over time. As a result of this attempt at emotional bonding, the icons of the leader cult were invested with an aura that could be termed "sacred" and which was separated from the failures of specific political campaigns.

The small-group rituals, which were explored in myriads of different forms and highly different rates of success in twentieth-century mass dictatorships, are well in accord with what sociologist Randall Collins terms "interaction ritual chains." Building on the work of Durkheim and Goffman, Collins analyzes how through occasions that combine a mutual focus of attention with a high degree of "emotional entrainment" (Collins 2004, p. 42) and bodily synchronization, feelings of group identity are attached to certain symbols, which serve to prolong the sentiment. The symbols of worship thus obtain their specific value or "sacredness" through the emotional investment of certain groups. In this sense, the fundamental rules fueling the cults of certain sports figures or musicians are not all that different from the seemingly strange and irrational leader cults in mass dictatorships. Mao's "mass receptions" in front of the Gate of Heavenly Peace in 1966 by Red Guards or the adoration accorded to Hitler and Mussolini during public appearances in the 1930s may serve to illustrate this point. However, as mentioned above, the coercive apparatus of the party

state clearly distinguishes the modern leader cult from other types of star cults, because losing group membership in the former case most often was coterminous with political persecution.

The "success" of a leader cult depended on multiple factors, not least on the ability of lower-level administrators to adopt the right measures of linking the symbols of the central leadership with locally resonant discourses and events. Strategies that worked in the Soviet Union were not necessarily accepted in Cuba or North Korea. Tito's "baton" that was carried through Yugoslavia each year (prior to 1956) before it was presented to the leader on his birthday would not have found local resonance in other settings, and the episode of mango worship in the People's Republic of China in 1968 would probably have estranged anyone but those present in the creation of these specific sacred objects. The manifold rituals of worship are neither per se religious nor inexplicable. They rather attest to the importance of analyzing the social meanings attributed to certain objects associated with modern leader cults in their specific historical contexts.

Mobilization and Discipline

Recent literature on communist dictators such as Stalin and Mao Zedong witnesses a return of the paradigm of totalitarianism. The leader cult here is commonly treated as a mere outgrowth of personal vanity and power-craving. Such superficial treatment underestimates the degree of public resonance which some of the modern leader cults were able to incite contemporaneously, as well as the continuing potency of the cult symbols even long after the horrible crimes of these dictators had been made public. Sustained, national-level leader cults were not devised by the top leadership alone. They usually first appeared in the guise of "congratulations" or as tributes offered by followers and were then "reluctantly" accepted by the leader himself. This procedure of publicly downplaying personal worship, while simultaneously doing little to discourage a future upsurge of veneration is characteristic of the "immodest modesty" (Plamper 2012, p. 124) displayed by party dictators. Leader cults needed a large amount of bureaucratic planning, controlling and monitoring in order to relay a unified image and message. They were the result of multiple interactions between party leaders, officials at various levels of government and feedback of local activists. However, a study of modern leader cults also has to take public reception and acceptance of the cult's claims into account, despite the difficulty of finding traces on the reception side in the archives.

The leader cult was commonly used as means of mobilization at predetermined dates such as national day or the leader's birthday. Yet the enormous power generated by these shared symbols of worship was most dramatically revealed in circumstances when a leader chose to rely on the cult as a means of extra-bureaucratic mobilization, by-passing the common routines of image control and calling for personal leadership. The first years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1969) demonstrate how a leader cult

could be used to call on the masses directly to engender political and social change. While party leaders such as Hitler used exuberant rhetoric to rouse the masses, Mao's presence remained silent, aloof and mystical. His sayings were printed in ever-greater quantities but provided no blueprint for action. The Cultural Revolution is therefore a unique example to show the galvanizing power of a successful modern leader cult as well as of revealing its limits as an instrument of governance. The aloofness Mao's near sacred image had in public perception removed the aging party dictator from the dreariness and pitfalls of everyday politics and remaining social inequalities. Just as in Nazi Germany, where the saying "if only the *Führer* would know" came to bridge the gap between the leader's image and the everyday experience of party dictatorship, Mao Zedong's public image was disassociated from the failures of Communist Party policies.

Mao's call upon youth to rebel against established authorities ushered in a phase of unprecedented cult-building, during which each of the emerging groups and factions tried to demonstrate their exceptional emotional attachment to the CCP Chairman. While in other mass dictatorships leader statues and imagery were fashioned by official party organs, cult imagery in the People's Republic of China had been fairly restrained following a March 1949 order that forbade the naming of cities and factories after living party leaders. Starting in 1967, tens of thousands of statues appeared all over China with the remaining party leadership frantically trying to maintain a certain degree of aesthetical and political control over the cult products. Simultaneously, other groups tried to independently assess and adapt Mao Zedong's political thought to contemporary circumstances.[1] This enormous potency of committing people to political action is one reason why leader cults are still perceived as a viable instrument to rouse political passions by neo-Maoist thinkers today.

By late 1967, however, Mao Zedong had to recognize that the forces of self-mobilization, which he had incited by way of relying on the leader cult, were incompatible with bureaucratic governance and endangered national unity, as thousands of factions engaged in military combat throughout the country. At this point, Mao decided to recast the leader cult from a means of mobilization towards an instrument generating compliance. With the help of the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese populace was organized in innumerable study classes, which no longer called for creative rethinking of Maoist ideology but requested unconditional obedience and loyalty to whatever political directive was relayed from the party center. Small-group rituals and synchronized bodily movements such as "quotation gymnastics" or "loyalty dances" sprung up and revealed the increasingly formalistic nature of the cult. The excessive rhetoric of worship that emerged in the wake of the cult's disciplining function rendered regular political communication increasingly cumbersome and once power had been restored with the help of the army, the most excessive forms of the cult were reduced as normal bureaucratic procedures were reinstated.

The cult had been used to mobilize the populace against parts of the party establishment and then been turned into a tool mandating unquestioning

obedience, resulting in a loss of the leader's political credibility given the ever-new turn of events. This is not to say that modern leader cults always needed genuine conviction on the part of the populace in order to work effectively. As long as the ruling party retained its hold on power and commanded sufficient resources, the masses could be forced into compliance, even to the point of outright cynicism, as the Assad cult in Syria revealed (Wedeen 1999). The Cultural Revolution shows the incompatibility of extra-bureaucratic mobilization by means of the cult within the setting of a party dictatorship. The movement was successful in creating cult icons that functioned near universally and were refashioned in the most diverse settings,[2] yet it did not offer a new solution on how to reshape political participation based on charismatic mobilization.

CONCLUSION

The modern leader cult as an attempt at centering shared public emotions in the persona of a political leader by means of mass media emerged during the second half of the nineteenth century. It culminated in the cults cultivated around leaders such as Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin and Mao Zedong during the twentieth century and became a hallmark of mass dictatorial rule. Prior to Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956, leader cults remained a political instrument rather than an issue of theoretical observation and study. Post-1956, most dictators officially renounced the value of personality cults, yet without eliminating the structural factors contributing to the continuing impact of the leader cult, such as patron–client relations within the party or a heavily censored public sphere. By the late 1970s, modern leader cults witnessed a marked downturn on a global scale. While Nicolae Ceaucescu in Romania, Enver Hoxha in Albania and the Kims in North Korea still clung to accustomed practices of worship, most other authoritarian ruling parties came to champion collective leadership.

This essay has attempted to show that modern leader cults were a crucial feature of modern mass dictatorship and thus should not simply be relegated to supposed remnants of former czar or emperor worship. Quite to the contrary, modern leader cults relied on the most advanced techniques and theories available to create resonant political symbols in order to strengthen regime stability. If applied to settings of political or social revolution, leader cults could garner massive public support, as long as the respective propaganda departments skillfully combined these icons with narratives of national salvation. A crucial factor for sustaining leader cults in authoritarian systems was the lack of rules governing political ascent, thus allowing for the formation of patron–client relationships and asymmetric modes of communication. Flattering one's superiors was one strategy of gaining political protection. Yet while inner-party networks were crucial for the emergence of leader cults, studies should also focus on the modes of generating mass support by way of small-group rituals and the channeling of emotions. If effectively employed, the rituals could provide the party leader with a strong source of extra-bureaucratic power, which, however,

few dictators used to destabilize their own party organization. Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution revealed the enormous potency of leader cults to rouse the populace against the party state itself, yet he ultimately shied away from completely destroying party control, thus turning the cult from a means of mobilization into an instrument guaranteeing compliance. No leader cult was quite like the other. Future research therefore has to pay closer attention to similarities and differences of modern leader cults in transnational comparison. The growing body of research on cults in different regions has already begun to shed light on these questions, which, far from being mere epiphenomena of psychopathic leaders' personal vanities, point at a crucial element of mass dictatorships that is not all that different from the veneration of certain objects and individuals witnessed in other parts of the world.

Notes

1. Compare the case of the *Shengwulian* detailed in Wu 2014.
2. For a recent compilation of how one particular item of the Cultural Revolution, the Little Red Book, was adapted in different settings, see Cook 2014.

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Populism and Dictatorship

Federico Finchelstein

Dictatorship is one of the foundations of modern populism. And yet, populism is not dictatorship. In fact, in the context of the early Cold War period, modern populism represented a democratic renunciation of dictatorship. This renunciation of mass dictatorship created a new authoritarian form of democracy. By paying special attention to Peronism, the first case of a modern populist regime after 1945, this chapter argues that "mass dictatorship" is central to the genealogy of populism. More specifically, the fascist dictatorial experience was one of the reasons behind the emergence of populist regimes but it also helped define them in opposition to it. In dialogue, but also in contrast, with a literature that emphasizes the more recent oppositional links and continuities between populism and Cold War dictatorships, I stress the need to understand this ambivalent, oppositional nature of populism in terms of the populist negative response to the fascist version of dictatorial rule that had preceded the Cold War (Crespo 2014; Rouquié 2011, pp. 114–15, 119–34, 251–59). In other words, populism has been a form of anti-liberal authoritarian democracy well before the emergence of Cold War dictatorships. It was and is defined by its contextual rejection of dictatorship while still carrying some of its ideological dimensions, especially the remnants of the fascist global experience of mass dictatorship that ended after 1945.

While many scholars, including myself, argue that populism is neither left nor right, in fact historically it has been both. A defining characteristic of modern populism is fluid transition from right to left and vice versa. This is in an ideological pendulum that nonetheless always keeps central faces: an extremely sacralizing understanding of the political; a political theology that considers the people as being formed by those that follow a unique vertical leadership; an

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understanding of the leader as being essentially opposed to oligarchic elites; an idea of the political antagonists as enemies who are potentially (or in fact) traitors to the nation; a charismatic understanding of the leader as an embodiment of the voice and desires of the nation as a whole; a strong executive and the discursive, and often practical, dismissal of the legislative and judicial branches of government; a radical nationalism and an emphasis on popular culture as opposed to other forms of culture that do not represent "national thought"; and finally an attachment to a vertical form of electoral democracy that nonetheless rejects in practice dictatorial and anti-institutional forms of government (Bernal et al. 2014; de la Torre 2015).

Can populism as an ideology, a movement and a regime, be democratic while at the same time being highly anti-institutional? Can an anti-institutional style of politics that shares so many dimensions with dictatorship become its opposite? I would argue that actually this has been the experience of modern post-fascist populism. Thus, the answer to these questions is much related to how and why this happened after 1945. Moreover, the answer is at the center of the complex contextual relations between populism and dictatorship, which is to say that the theoretical question about the affinities between populism and dictatorship needs to be framed historically.

To be sure, both attempted to overcome a perceived sense of the crisis of liberalism that they identified with a crisis of democratic representation. They also rejected the mediating role of institutions and aimed to establish a direct organic link between the ruler and the people. But what are the differences between populism and dictatorship? The main difference lays at the issue of political violence, or even political persecution and political death. While populist democracies are closer in practice to a Weberian notion of violence as solidifying power when it is monopolized by the state and not executed by it, dictatorships tend not only to monopolize violence, but also to exert it on its citizens. Let's first explore the anti-institutional dimension of dictatorial rule and how it is centrally related to political violence.

As Andrew Arato has taught us, all modern dictatorships can actually be engaged in highly ideological, "anti-institutional politics." In this sense, modern dictatorships can present forms of radical revolutionary violence that are opposed "to existing forms of normalcy (defined by legality, procedural democracy or bureaucracy)" (Arato 2000, pp. 926, 937; 2002; Kalyvas 2007; Arendt 1959). Thus, some modern dictatorships can engage in the language and the actual violence of the total abjection (dehumanization) of the Other that Hannah Arendt mistakenly believed was excluded from nontotalitarian forms of dictatorship. In other words, nontotalitarian dictatorships can be actually engaged in radical anti-institutional violence and do not need to resemble the fascist totalitarian formations. At the same time, fascist dictatorial formations can also be engaged for some time in institutional politics but only to a limited extent because the execution of the state's monopoly of violence, and not its Weberian restriction, is a key dimension of their ideology. The corollary of this violence defines fascist dictatorial anti-institutionalism. Arato's point is that not

only fascist but also non-fascist dictatorships can be equally anti-institutional. In other words, mass dictatorship can be nontotalitarian but also, at the same time, extremely violent and highly ideological. The case of Argentina's Dirty War dictatorship (1976–1983) perfectly illustrates this point. The Dirty War was not a real war but an illegal militarization of state repression. This extreme violence was not exclusive of Cold War Argentina but also appeared in Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia and many other dictatorial formations. They all shared a rejection of democratic procedures and they all engaged in widespread repression and killings. In the Argentine dictatorship of the 1970s, ideology drove bureaucratic processes of elimination. Technocratic mediations did not limit the radicalization of ideological imperatives. As it was the case with other camps in history, the administrative power of the state actually organized them as sites of ritualized violence. In the Argentine concentration camps there was no limit to dictatorial violence. Within the camps, the dictatorship was fully autonomous from public view and it imposed a "total domination." It was a world created to achieve, and reconfigurate, the ideological postulates of fascist theory (Finchelstein 2014, introduction).

These Cold War dictatorial forms of dictatorship were very different from populism's peculiar understanding of the political (Canovan 1981; Laclau 2005). But could modern populism be equally anti-institutional? It is clear that populist anti-institutionalism rejected the dictatorial stress on violence and repression as a *sine qua non* condition for the legitimacy and sustainability of the regime. Even so-called moderate dictatorships such as the Franco regime in Spain after 1945 or the Brazilian dictatorship (1964–1985) not only displayed the state monopoly on violence and the consequential limitation of its use as a political metaphor but they also used it as an actual recent memory of repression, torture and state killings. In contrast, modern populism is not theoretically, or practically, rooted in violent foundations but rather in electoral decisions by the people. Even when General Juan Domingo Perón, or later Commander Hugo Chávez and many others, attempted coups in their previous histories, as populist leaders they more or less rejected the violence that is more typical of mass dictatorships. Perón himself, as we will see, was the leader of a military dictatorship but relied on elections and other democratic procedures to justify his rule and this situation made a difference with respect to the use of extensive state violence against the opposition. Populism combined, and still combines, a high degree of anti-institutional politics (even presenting some totalitarian patterns) with a low degree of anti-institutional violence.

Populism's anti-institutional dimensions were a result, but also a negation, of the fascist past. Populism was connected to fascist theory but also explicitly accepted its demise and the creation of a non-liberal "Third way" anti-communist democracy. Populism is little related to other Cold War forms of dictatorship that were often explicitly anti-populist, but it is more related to fascism. And yet, populism is not fascism at all, which is to say that it is not dictatorial in the fascist-anti-institutional sense. Despite recent historiographical attempts to downplay the latter, historians like Paul Corner have stressed the

centrality of the dictatorial repressive dimensions of fascism. And this centrality of repressive violence marks a key boundary between populism and fascism (Albanese 2014, pp. 3–14; Corner 2002, pp. 325–51, 2012; Traverso 2003; Pinto and Kallis 2014).

While fascism clearly rejected democratic procedures, populist versions of democracy after 1945, such as Peronism in Argentina or Varguismo in Brazil, not only rejected this anti-institutional politics (and their consequential politics of violence) but they also embraced free elections and more generally electoral representation as it is regularly conceived in liberal democracies. In this formal sense, populism cannot be considered a form of dictatorship. But populism proposed a rejection of "demo-liberalism" that often conflated legality with legitimacy and ignored some political freedoms while stressing or even expanding social rights. Can we talk about a populist form of totalitarianism? To be sure, this populist rejection of liberal democracy was often perceived by anti-fascist observers as resembling the totalitarian dimensions of fascist dictatorship. This was, for example, the view of anti-fascists like the Italian sociologist Gino Germani and the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges (Finchelstein 2015; Germani 1978). Contextually, it is understandable how these intellectuals would uncannily react to statements by Peronists that resembled recent dictatorial forms of leadership. For example, Eva Perón, the wife of the general, elevated him to a totality that encompassed the nation and the people: "I haven't done anything; everything is Perón. Perón is the Homeland, Perón is everything, and all of us are at an astronomical distance from the Leader of the nationality. The Homeland is saved, because it is in the hands of general Perón" (Perón 1951, p. 254).

Elements of the fascist theory of a dictatorial form of leadership were very clear in this example of Peronist self-understanding, from the "astronomical distance" between the leader and his subjects to the messianic notion of the leader as a transcendental savior of the people and the nation. And yet, this leader had been elected and then reelected and he never abolished free elections.

Peronism was originally rooted in dictatorship and its leadership was significantly vertical. But in contrast to classic fascism, which used democracy to destroy itself and establish a dictatorship, Peronism originated in a military dictatorial formation—the Argentine military dictatorship of 1943–1946 that had Perón as its strongman—but established a popular and authoritarian democracy. According to Argentine historian Tulio Halperín Donghi, the example of fascism not only oriented but also disoriented Peronism. This disorientation was related to the fact that fascism was out of context vis-à-vis postwar realities (Donghi 1994 and 1995). Peronism shared a past and many elective affinities with fascism (Lewis 1980, pp. 242–256; Spektorowski 2003). These elective affinities were expressed across the Atlantic by Peronists and neo-fascists alike. But there were also substantial divergences, especially with regards to the role of violence as well as with respect to the theory and practice of democratic representation.

After 1945 many anti-fascist observers failed to see the dual post-fascist nature of the Peronist idea of representation (and more generally the populist one) and

the equally dual nature of the interaction between the leader and his followers. I will briefly address the latter, while this chapter will later, and more extensively, address the dual nature of contextual populist notions of representation.

Peronism combined and often did not integrate two different sets of expectations: those of Perón and those of the majority of his followers. Ideologically, the leader was rooted in the fascist tradition but as a cunning politician he often betrayed his fascist roots to please the majority of his working-class followers. At different times in the history of Peronism this mutual deafness regarding different ideologies and expectations within Peronism was arguably mutually beneficial to all the members of the movement. In an early Cold War moment of increasing ideological polarization, the muting of differences between the military leader and his popular base increasingly solidified the movement. It promoted vertical loyalties and opportunities to simultaneously enjoy material benefits and symbolic victories. But the fact remained that, despite many assertive claims by both the leader and the followers, the leader remained anchored in the revolutionary totalitarian synthesis that stemmed from the anti-enlightenment. This is why the original Peronist populist movement was not fascist but Perón's "mentality" was. And yet, Peronism (like early Cold War populism as a whole) was not a dictatorship but an authoritarian form of democracy. In practical terms, the result of this interaction between non-fascist political needs towards and from the base and Peron's fascist mentality was the creation of modern Argentine populism. This populism was defined by the marriage of social reform, state interventionism, nationalism and anti-imperialism with the logic of single-party rule, social polarization, clientelism, censorship of the press, ostracism and the persecution of opponents up to, in some cases, prison and torture (de la Torre 2010; Finchelstein 2014; Rein 2012). Thus, populism cannot be considered dictatorial when, especially after 1945, it explicitly stressed the political legitimacy of democratic representation. My main argument in this chapter is that modern populism is not a form of mass dictatorship because of two connected historical reasons: the first reason is the contextually driven populist rejection of fascist dictatorial violence. The second is the issue of electoral representation and the dual notion of popular sovereignty that populism put forward. I explore these interconnected issues in the next two sections, especially but not exclusively by focusing on Peronism as the first modern populist regime that emerged in Latin America out of this postwar context when mass dictatorship was overly delegitimized in the West.

The Post-fascist Context and the Renunciation of Fascist Dictatorship

Populism and fascism belong to a converging political and intellectual history. This is the case even when we take into consideration the apparent contradiction that while the core of populism is democratic but not liberal, the core of fascism is dictatorial. In fact, democracy was born with its dialectical other, the contemporary and reactionary counter-enlightenment that

at different times contested it from within or from without. Rooted in the counter-enlightenment but also incorporating the masses, different proto-populist movements (in Austria, France and other places before 1914) played the democratic game while attempting to limit democracy from within with xenophobia, racism and extreme forms of nationalism performed in the name of the people (Sternhell 2006). Eventually, and in transatlantic contexts like Germany or Italy or Argentina and Brazil, and especially after the practical and symbolic devastations of the First World War, proto-populism was radically reformulated as fascism.

This crisis of democratic representation led in many European countries to totalitarian dictatorships. In short, it led to the elimination of democracy and its replacement with totalitarian forms of dictatorship. If these premodern forms of populism first often ended with the destruction of limited forms of democracy, it is only after the fall of fascism that populism reemerges as a vertical, and often intolerant, form of democracy. This experiment in political ideology first originated as a regime outside Europe: Argentine Peronism. Thus, after the fall of European fascisms in 1945, the new modern populism emerged first in Latin America. To be sure, there were important interwar Latin American precedents such as Cardenismo in Mexico, Yrigoyenismo in Argentina and Varguismo in Brazil (Ferreira and de Castro Gomes 2001; Knight 1998; Mackinnon and Petrone 1998). But all these experiments turned out to be responses to a different context marked by the global war between fascism and anti-fascism. In contrast, Argentine Peronism was the first global attempt to "democratize" fascism for the Cold War. In other words, in a new context where democracy had reemerged as the most legitimate form of government in the West, fascists worldwide, but especially and originally in Latin America, went back to fascism's proto-populist roots and organically reframed them for the postwar context.

As an illiberal outcome of modern democracy, fascism was rooted in the previous experiences of authoritarian proto-populist reactions to democracy from the early Bonapartism of nineteenth-century France, to Boulangerism, to the social Christian anti-Semitism of Karl Lueger in *fin de siècle* Vienna. But once in power, starting in 1922 in Italy and in 1933 in Germany, fascism had destroyed democracy from within. After their global defeat in 1945, many fascists, and global right anti-communists, realized that fascism, in order to gain legitimacy, could no longer be rooted in dictatorship. This signaled the emergence of modern populism as we still know it today. The genealogy of modern populism is rooted in this radical attempt to reinscribe the fascist tradition, and more generally, its anti-institutional dictatorial violence.

For the fascists that had survived the demise of their regimes, the Cold War presented a new dichotomy between the liberal democratic forms of capitalism and soviet communism. They desperately wanted to escape this perceived dichotomy. Modern populism first emerged as a proposed "third position" aiming to overcome the Cold War dilemma between communism and liberalism. In its first historical instantiation (i.e. the first historical experience where this "democratic" rethinking of fascism took place), populism was called Peronism. Rather than Peronism adopting a pre-formatted version of Cold War neo-fascism, Argentina saw the first movement that attempted to adapt

the legacy of fascism to a novel democratic framework. Argentine Peronism represented the first case of a modern populist movement and regime. Rather than being the platonic form that shaped all others, Argentine populism was the first regime, the first actualization of a global concern shared by global anti-communist thinkers and militants, including the fascists, about a renewed need to overcome liberal democracy and "real socialism." Situated far from the European fascist experiments, and without being excessively touched by their resounding defeat, Argentina became a viable space for transnational fascism, and more generally anti-communism, to rethink itself in a very different context.

Peronism was rooted in the centrality of the national community as being above individual rights, but this centrality would not totally exclude the Other in practical terms. The populist distance from fascist violence was clear. Fascists wanted to kill enemies; Perón wanted to convert them into citizens. He wanted them to vote for him. To be sure, as President Perón said, his enemies "should know that they will pay a high price, if they forget that in this land when it was needed to impose what the people wanted it did not matter how many Argentines should die" (La Vanguardia 1948, p. 2). The verbal violence against these imaginary enemies of Peronism and the nation contrasted with the low degree of physical violence and repression displayed by the regime. Perón displaced violence to the future. Perón's position was reactive and rhetorically violent as an imaginary response to the violence of the enemy but he never came close to adopting war and violence as a normative definition of populist ideology. In Peronism, total war was safely relegated to the Peronist rhetorical horizon and was far from historical reality. Although it was framed in the context of the early Cold War, the populist organized community was not a community for war. Modern populism was anchored in the Cold War but it was not populism that put in practice its "hottest" dimensions. In contrast, "hot" war and high levels of violent repression would be practiced by many anti-populist Latin American dictatorships (from Argentina to Guatemala).

Populism was a response to the crisis of political representation that had created fascism and then contributed to its demise. But if modern populism was rooted in fascism it was also extremely different from it. Fascism aims at dictatorship, whereas populism (as far as modern history is concerned) never destroyed democracy. In countries such as Argentina or Brazil, populism made democracy less pluralistic in terms of political rights and more inclusive in terms of social rights. To be sure, populist democracy was nationalistic and less cosmopolitan and emancipatory than movements situated to its left. However, it also increased electoral participation and social rights. In that regard, populism could also be seen at times as an ambivalent enhancement of democracy.

DICTATORSHIP AND POPULIST REPRESENTATION AFTER FASCISM

If Modern populism was a reformulation of fascism, it was especially so with respect to the issue of political representation. When Carl Schmitt conceived his theory of dictatorship, he presented two ideal types: commissarial and sovereign dictatorship. While the former stands for continuity as a way to correct radical

changes and it is presented as a historical bracket, the latter imposes a radical change, even a revolutionary change in the political system (Schmitt 2013). Although, Schmitt made clear that this typology disintegrated into actual histories that combined both forms of dictatorship, it would be possible to argue that fascist mass dictatorships were much more sovereign than commissarial in the sense that they created a new political order which they presented as epochal.

Populism also presented itself as an epochal change but in practice it represented a return to democratic "normalcy." Populist theory was far away from the representational logic of mass dictatorship. In fascist theories of representation, the leader represents a unitary equation along with the people and the nation. The leader is not elected in the liberal democratic sense but nonetheless it is believed to permanently represent the "will of the people." This is at the root of the fascist form of representation which is dictatorship. In contrast, populist experiences after 1945 had a much more ambivalent view on perennial forms of representation. Although there was an enduring tendency from Perón to Hugo Chávez to increasingly delegate power in the Presidency, procedures of electoral democracy continuously imposed limits on the leader's own desires of total representation. In contrast, fascist dictatorships presented a full delegation of power which was not mediated by any means of true electoral representation. Fascism erased the democratic system of electoral representation, while populism historically represented its reenactment after 1945. Thus, if Franco, Hitler, Mussolini or the Argentine fascists proposed to destroy democracy, populism resurrected its legitimacy after the demise of fascism. Fascist mass dictatorships eliminated electoral representation, populist leaders like Perón or Vargas relegitimized it in an anti-liberal and corporative sense.

Whereas in a populist democracy the leader leaves power by either constitutional limitations or more simply by being defeated in elections, there is no such situation in fascist or even more "commissarial" forms of Cold War dictatorships (e.g., in the cases of the Brazilian and Uruguayan military dictatorships). The fact that populist leaders like Perón, or more recently Commander Hugo Chávez, when encountering constitutional limits called for elections to reform the constitution as in Argentina in 1949 or Venezuela in 2007, epitomizes this situation very well (Negretto 2013). In contrast, at the moment that the populist leader ignores democratic procedures, populism leaves behind its renunciation of dictatorship and it becomes one. This was for example the case of Peruvian populist President Alberto Fuijimori and his *autogolpe* (self-coup) of 1992. When the leader does not acknowledge the possibility of having to step aside when facing conditional limits, populism is unraveling and, in a sense, it ceases to be populist. Populism is an authoritarian version of democracy that, as Nadia Urbinati put it, disfigures democracy but never destroys it (Urbinati 2014). Even when populism attempts to downplay constitutional checks and balances it never presents a fully vertical unitary executive as was the case with fascism.

Fascism was a revolution against democracy. In contrast, after 1945 populism reformed the status quo, creating an authoritarian democracy. This democracy presented a dual nature. It included electoral representation but also a unitary idea of leader, people and nation. In such a context, where the leader was also identified with a national totality, there was not a great deal of legitimacy for political minorities, who nonetheless were free to challenge the populists in open elections.

In speaking in the name of the people in a nonrevolutionary context, Cold War populism presented a democratic anti-communist alternative. Populism emerged after 1945 as a way to engage in democratic ways, which are anti-liberal; or to put it differently, it attempted to democratize anti-liberal politics for a period in which fascism could no longer be sufficiently legitimate.

For General Perón, fascism could not be replicated; for a new epoch a new truth was needed. Perón proposed a new form of "organic" democracy. This organic nature of the movement would lead to political supremacy in the long term. But it was clear to populists that this supremacy would be achieved by winning plebiscitary elections that confirmed the dual nature of the leader, who was at the same time an elected representative and a quasi-transcendental conductor of people. As Perón often said, "The people should know … that the conductor is born. He is not made, not by decree nor by elections." He added, "It is essential that the conductor finds his own molds, to later fill them with a content that will be in direct relation, according to his efficiency, with the sacred oil of Samuel that the conductor has received from God" (Perón 1944, p. 149).

Peronism was the first regime in postwar history to present such a change from dictatorship to authoritarian delegative democracy (O'Donnell 1994). Fascism had been defeated in the West. Perón understood very well that the new order that he put forward, his widely proclaimed "third position" between capitalism and communism, had to be framed as a democracy. This Peronist third position was centered at the question of how to do illiberal politics in a democratic key. All traditions were now up for grabs. Borrowing from the left and the right, Perón displayed an eclectic view. This ideological eclecticism that Perón shared with Mussolini, distanced him from the Italian dictator in practical, and later theoretical, terms. Peron's was an attempt to continue the tradition of the anti-enlightenment in the context of the Cold War. In that sense fascism is not the only past of populism but basically a bracket between the populism of Peron and the pre-populism of someone like Karl Lueger in Vienna before the coming of fascism. With Cold War populism, the illiberal politics of the masses returned to the politics of electoral representation.

Fascism in history represented a theoretical and practical rejection of this idea of representation. It was a rejection of any democratic possibility and implied the establishment of dictatorship. After 1945, this idea of dictatorial representation is defeated and Junta dictatorial leaders such as Perón destroyed the Argentine dictatorship from within and from above.

Conclusion: From Fascist Mass Dictatorships to Cold War Populist Democracies

Populism shares with the other big "isms" of the past century (liberalism, communism and fascism) the idea of popular sovereignty as constituting the main source of legitimation for the political. In other words, in all these "isms" the leadership was theoretically defined as representing the people. In theory, this was supposed to be a result of a decision by the people. Thus, populism, fascism, liberalism and real socialism agreed on the notion of the people as the main legitimation for political representation. Of course, they historically differed on their theories and practices of representation. Fascism and real socialism presented the popular nature of the leadership as the outcome of mythical or teleological foundations. They did not need elections to confirm a dictatorial revolutionary rule. In contrast, populism has been closer to liberalism in its emphasis on electoral forms of representation. After 1945, and unlike fascism, or real socialism, liberalism and populism stood against mass dictatorship. In all these political ideological formations and their contextual ramifications, the leader and the system were legitimized because the people wanted this, or so their interpreters said. They disagreed in practice on how to make that possible because basically in liberalism and populism there was a focus on electoral representation, while in fascism and real socialism electoral procedures were not the main practice of legitimacy for the leader who was nonetheless presented as the ultimate and permanent representative of the people.

But if postwar populism and Cold War liberalism in history shared a methodology of political representation that was rooted in democratic means, from the perspective of the history of political theory, they belonged to significantly different intellectual traditions. In theory, all these isms equated democracy with mass participation. But the ideas for the widening of democracy that liberalism and communism presented were based in the tradition of the enlightenment; the fascist and populist versions were explicitly anti-enlightenment. In fascism, and also to some extent in some versions of populism, particularly the anti-communist populism of Peronism after 1945, the realization of popular sovereignty was conceived as a rejection of the legacies of the French revolution. Thus, if we focus on the theory, populism might have been closer to dictatorship than what it represented in its political practices. And yet, one cannot understand ideas without their political practice. Especially in the postwar period, both dimensions affected and changed each other, constantly turning populism into first, a reformulation, and then a renunciation of fascism.

The constant interaction between democratic realities and authoritarian tendencies led postwar populism to present a dual source of legitimation according to which the leader was the leader because of electoral representation but also because of a firm belief in the populist political theology. In other words, populism put forward a belief in the elected leader as a transcendental charismatic figure whose legitimacy went beyond electoral representation (Arato 2013).

Notions of popular sovereignty lay at the center of these populist theologies. In practice, these dual forms of representation engendered unitary notions of

the people, anti-pluralist views, attacks on freedoms of expression and even plebiscitary and delegative notions of democracy, but they did not lead to the demise of democracy itself.

In this context, the populist leader's legitimacy is related to the faith that the followers are supposed to have in her or his leadership as the embodiment of the people and not only as a result of the practical dimension of the leader being elected by the people. The leader is sacralized and his theory of representation is partly a form of representation of the will of the people by means of popular possession of the leader's self. The leader is possessed by the people, or so he says. As Hugo Chávez maintained, "I am not myself, I am the people" (De la Torre 2013, p. 278). In classic Peronism, the idea of Peron as the godlike personification of the people was also central. Eva Perón explained that "Perón is a God for all of us, to the extent that we do not conceive of the sky without Perón. Perón is our sun, Perón is the water. Perón is the life of our country and the Argentine people" (Perón 1999, p. 244).

This unitary identification between people, leader and nation was central in fascism but it was never dual. It was not significantly mediated, and limited, by the legitimacy of electoral representation. In fascist dictatorship and populist democracy, the leader represented the people through embodiment. And yet there is a stark radical difference between fascist mass dictatorships and the populist regimes.

In populism, as we have seen, this mythical leader legitimized its authority through a dual legitimacy. In this context, the moment of embodiment was not necessarily related to a democratic form of representation and yet on the other hand there was a legitimacy that came through the fact that this representative had been elected. This is a key part of populist theory and practice. As long as postwar populist leaders did not break with electoral practices they represented non-liberal democratic regimes. Thus, in populism, faith in the leader was not only an outcome of the fact that she or he has been elected. The leader's aura also preceded the electoral moment and pertained to a mythical order of things that stood against the liberal order. As a response to this liberal order, postwar populism engaged in democracy and, at the same time, was highly critical of liberal democracy. After the dictatorial era of classic fascism, classic populism reconnected electoral democracy with anti-communism and anti-liberalism. Populism represented an unexpected and contingent democratic actualization of the long-standing reactionary anti-enlightenment tradition. It was an experiment in democratic politics and a response to the dictatorial form of the political. But it was a response from within the illiberal tradition.

As a secularized form of the sacred, fascism and populism put forward a secularized political trinity (leader, nation and people) as their main source of legitimization. Both put forward a political theology. Within these movements, there was no contradiction between the actual people and the notion of the representation of the people in the body of the leader. It was embodiment as representation. This trinitarian myth of representation rested on the notion that somehow a man was the same as a nation and the same as the people.

This was a conflation between one person and two concepts. In fascism, this idea of personification did not require any rational means, such as electoral representation. In contrast, in populism democracy became a key part of the political equation because in its classic postwar form it constituted a chimera between two distinctive traditions of representation: the electoral and the mythical dictatorial one. The fact that early Cold War Latin American populists combined both forms of political representation was contextual and ideological. The dual nature of populism eventually combined democratic and dictatorial traditions, the enlightenment and the anti-enlightenment, electoral representation and political theology. The postwar result of these combinations was not a mass dictatorship but a new form of authoritarian and anti-institutional democracy.

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Gender Mobilization and Gender Panic: Soviet and Iranian Revolutionary Memoirs and the Exile's Imagination

Choi Chatterjee

In October 1917 the Bolsheviks electrified the world by seizing and abolishing private property in the Soviet Union, the crowning achievement of the bourgeois revolution that had started a few centuries earlier in Europe and was slowly spreading to other parts of the world. Not content with their supreme act of iconoclasm, the Bolsheviks also declared war on the bourgeois family: on the property-owning patriarch and his worthy counterpart, his docile, monogamous and essentially housebound and house-proud wife, the undisputed mother of his children. Bolsheviks defiantly pronounced marriage, the hitherto rock-solid and monogamous union that had been sanctified by centuries of legal, religious, political and social accretions, to be a voluntary state of affairs that a man and woman could enter and leave of their own volition. In the new Soviet Union a marriage was dissolved when either partner desired put an end to their union. A postcard mailed to the marriage bureau was sufficient to mark the end of a relationship.[1]

Instead of alimony and child support from the husband, the Soviet government promised women that they would have access to education, jobs, socialized health care and pensions. Bolshevik feminists declared that since the demands of domestic life kept women out of the public sphere, housework and child-rearing be outsourced to state-run cafeterias, laundromats, crèches and kindergartens. Critics both within the Soviet Union and abroad feared that the dissolution of the family would adversely affect women's social and economic standing. The advent of the independent New Soviet Woman was seen as a mixed blessing, and the prospect of free love outside the bounds of marriage, and the impending "nationalization of women" for political purposes, made Bolshevism an even bigger threat to social stability. Twinned images of the

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beautiful but sexually promiscuous Alexander Kollontai, Commissar for Social Welfare, and that of the exploited and faceless Soviet babushka, epitomized everything that was wrong with the Bolshevik revolution and its strategy of gender mobilization.

In 1979, another revolutionary government in Iran electrified the world with its radical pronouncements and its gargantuan aspirations for world conquest. Once again, the status of women served as the key to decoding the achievements and failures of the revolution. The chador-clad face of Masoumeh Ektebar, screaming *Marg bar Amrika* (Death to America) from outside the embassy in Teheran during the lengthy hostage crisis, seemed emblematic of everything that had gone wrong in Iran in 1979. Venerable bearded clerics who had seemingly stepped out of the Middle Ages threatened not only to obliterate the presence of women from the modern public spaces of the Shah's Iran with their torrent of Islamic legislation on dress codes, but worse still the oppressive regime had the power to mobilize legions of veiled women who took to the streets in vociferous support of the clerics! Even while Khomeini's regime demanded that women cover themselves decorously, excise cosmetics from their face and frivolous adornments from their bodies, and prevent the promiscuous mixing of the sexes in public, private as well as media spaces, they envisioned that women would play a major role in the Islamic transformation of society as participants in the newly demarcated public spaces, as members of the morality police, the dreaded *komiteh* (in an ominous echo of the Soviet *komitet*) that policed public spaces, and as conduits of morality and religion within the home.

Both in 1917 and 1979, observers realized the far-reaching potential of the mobilization strategies unleashed by the Soviet and Iranian projects. Both revolutions induced widespread fear, loathing and panic as populations in the West recoiled from what they perceived to be the more extreme manifestations of the new social order: the new gender norms and the new sexual codes governing the behavior of both men and women. In many ways the position of women both in the Soviet Union and Iran became an index of the health of the regime as policymakers, academics and journalists, influenced by important émigré voices, analyzed the Soviet and the Iranian revolutions, and more importantly tried to understand what went wrong with the ideological experiments that appeared to be aberrational deviations from Western models of modernization and development. The oversexed New Soviet Woman flaunting her social and economic independence from patriarchy paralleled the birth of the Modern American Woman who fled in large numbers to the bohemia of Greenwich Village in New York, escaping the dreaded torpor and conservatism of small-town America through the early decades of the twentieth century. The gender revolution in the Soviet Union ominously echoed the social reverberations that threatened patriarchy and the nuclear family within the USA during this tumultuous period (Stansell 2000). At the other end of the century, the unsexed and chador-clad Iranian woman, whose subjectivity and individuality were seemingly obliterated by the imposition of

the obligatory black wimple, threatened the gains that American women had made in the aftermath of the feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The intervention of Kate Millet, the well-known American feminist, into Iranian politics in 1979, was not merely a quixotic gesture based on a misunderstanding of the Iranian situation as many have alleged, but symptomatic of the core values of the post-Second World American feminist movement that sought to extend to their sisters abroad the rights that they had gained so painfully and so recently at home (Millett 1982). Millett's journey to Iran also reflected the imaginative internationalism of the rebellious student generation of the 1960s and 1970s that banded together across the world in defiance of imperialism, capitalism and patriarchy.

In this essay I yoke together two disparate and different gender revolutions, one that occurred in 1917 and the other in 1979, to answer three important questions. First, why was the Soviet and Iranian mobilization of women viewed in the USA through the lens of what I call gender panic, and can we compare the etiology of fear and loathing that they generated across transhistorical contexts? Tropes of fear engendered by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the Cold War were recycled endlessly in Western understanding of Khomeini's Iran and the Muslim world after 9/11. Second, what role did Russian and Iranian émigré women in the USA play in determining the core images and representational forms used to understand the Soviet Union after 1917, and Iran after 1979? What on surface appear to be quintessentially American attitudes and reactions, on closer examination seem to be based on evidence provided by influential émigrés such as Tatiana Tchernavin, Tatiana Tolstoy, Azar Nafisi and Nahid Rachlin, acting as dependable native informants about the conditions of everyday life for women in the aftermath of revolution. Women's experiences of summary arrests, dispossession, censorship, the forcible breakdown of the family and expulsion from the homeland helped to garner public support for the anti-Soviet and anti-Iranian orientation of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. Third, can we analyze these émigré accounts as comparable texts, and as representative of a genre of literature from the twentieth century? While these English-language memoirs have been analyzed primarily as discursive phenomena that enabled an interventionist American foreign policy, I believe that this postcolonial reading can be further enriched by a feminist approach grounded in the history of emotions; one that restores agency, subjectivity and authorial voice to the memoirists themselves. In the conclusion of the essay I compare the complex subtexts embedded in the memoirs about the rites of mourning for a lost homeland, the traumatic emotions created by forced emigration and, finally, the possibilities inherent in the fractured identity of an exile in the United States.

It is interesting to consider that in comparison to the virulent response to the liberation of Soviet women, the conservative gender agenda of fascist mass dictatorships in Italy, Germany and Spain in the 1930s that decreed that the kitchen and home was the proper place for women drew little critical scrutiny at the time of inception. It was only with the onset of feminism in the 1960s

that fascist policies were deemed retrograde and harmful. In contrast, while revolutionary Iran has been universally criticized for its conservative attitudes towards women from its inception, recently scholars have been producing in-depth studies of the radicalizing potential of Islamic feminism within the family and the state and ways it can lead to a greater awareness of women's rights (Osalan 2009; Mahmood 2011). The topic of gender within mass dictatorships is still a largely unexplored terrain and transnational and comparative analysis of mass dictatorships across the ideological spectrum has the potential to introduce new questions and approaches to the field of women's history and gender studies (Lim and Petrone 2011).

Women and Revolutionary Russia

Women were destined to play an important role in the newly minted Bolshevik public sphere after 1917, and Lenin declared unequivocally that every female cook should learn how to steer the ship of state. Despite accusations of misogyny that have dogged many of the Bolshevik leaders, and even through the darkest days of Stalinist repression when women were incarcerated in record numbers in camps, the Soviet Union remained unwavering in its commitment to the advancement of women in the public sphere. The Soviet state instituted affirmative action policies to increase women's employment in factories, farms, educational institutions and party and state organizations. During the course of the Five Year Plans starting in 1928, the state created a network of childcare institutions in order to enroll millions of women in factories and collective farms. From the middle of the 1930s the Soviet Union became more overtly pronatalist in a desperate attempt to increase its population as it feared war and invasion from the East and the West. Like their authoritarian counterparts in Germany, France and Italy, the government began to celebrate heroine mothers of large families and criminalized abortions in order to stem the rising tide of terminated pregnancies as the vast majority of Soviet women entered the workforce (Hoffman 2003). But there was always an overt assumption both on the part of the authorities as well as Soviet women that home and motherhood should not preclude women from participation in the labor force or in political and cultural activities. While many, including feminists in the East and in the West, criticized the double burden that was placed on women, the liberation of Soviet women rested on the sturdy pillar of economic independence. The state maximized opportunities for women in many spheres of the economy and society in its interventionist, paternalistic and often brutal fashion (Goldman 1993; Chatterjee 2002; Krylova 2010).

Despite the best attempts of the Bolsheviks, their program of women's liberation was deeply misunderstood in the West and this misrepresentation formed the basis of a highly effective anti-Soviet propaganda that circulated through much of the twentieth century. As early as 1919, the Overman Committee in the Senate that was charged with investigating German propaganda held a separate set of hearings on the activities of Bolsheviks in the United States. Apart

from the many accusations that were leveled at the Bolsheviks that included the appropriation of private property and enacting class terror against the bourgeois, one of the most interesting and the most persistent calumnies had to do with the alarming conditions of women under Soviet rule. In several sets of testimonies that were presented on the Senate floor, American visitors to revolutionary Russia claimed that Bolsheviks were teaching Russian women the principles of "free love" and those between the ages of 18 and 45 were forced by the Commissars to cohabit with men (Delegard 2012).[2] In other more sensationalist testimony, Red Guards and Bolshevik soldiers were accused of raping Russian women at will.

The charge that Russian women were to be nationalized along with private property in the Soviet Union, and that this ideology was legitimated by nothing less than the *Communist Manifesto*, was repeated in many American newspapers from 1919 to 1920. Many were shocked by the fact that marriage had lost all religious significance in the land of the Bolsheviks and was converted into a mere civil ceremony, and that divorce and abortions were available on demand. The propaganda implied that women, without the protection of the father and the husband, became objects of general use and circulation, and that Bolshevism was a threat not just to free markets and private property but to the sanctity of the nuclear family, the bedrock of a liberal political system. The unprecedented concern about the fate of the Soviet woman in part reflected larger American fears about the new gender roles that were charted by the suffrage movement and the campaigns to legalize contraception and abortion at home (Mickenberg 2014). Also, the rising tide of labor unionization and militant strikes that grew dramatically in number during the First World War, coupled with the left-leaning sentiments of a sizable portion of American intellectuals during this period, was of considerable concern both to the government as well as the growing middle class that welcomed the modernity of consumerism but were suspicious of organized labor and organized feminism that accompanied the processes of modernization and industrialization.

Alexander Kollontai became the public face of Bolshevism, but readers were more interested in the details of her private life[3] than the fact that she was an internationally renowned feminist, an accomplished novelist, an important theoretician and a highly effective party organizer who had worked among factory women in St Petersburg (Clements 1979). Rheta Dorr, a feminist journalist and a progressive activist, who visited Russia in 1917, later recalled with some disdain that "Madame Kollontai looked a curious blend of school teacher and murderess, with an intelligent brow but the loose wet mouth and fat throat of a nymphomaniac" (Dorr 1924, p. 345). Other journalists, using the language of bourgeois melodrama, hinted salaciously at Kollontai's troubled past, her inexplicable rebellion against the norms of her upper-class upbringing, and the fact that she had a flagrant affair with Pavel Dybenko (among many others), a working-class sailor who was many years her junior. Kollontai's sexual misadventures not only rendered her unfit for her position as the Commissar for Social Welfare but also cast dark suspicions on her plans to destroy the nuclear family and the

authority of parents and the church over children's upbringing. American conservatives feared that the Soviet plan to transfer child-rearing to the custody of state institutions implied a more sinister intent: that socialized institutions of learning would serve as effective points of brainwashing by a propaganda state intent on creating a Soviet generation that was loyal to the Party alone.

Other Bolshevik women, including Elena Stasova, a high-ranking Bolshevik and a subsequent functionary for the Comintern (Communist International), received her share of abuse in American newspapers. Editorials painted a terrible picture of degeneracy that was created by the unnatural elevation of women to positions of power and authority in the government, armed forces and secret services. An editorial claimed that "the fact in itself might be consoling but the atmosphere created by Bolshevism is so demented, everything becomes there so disfigured and monstrous, that this feminism carried to excess assumes the character of a fearful disease."[4] Women in positions of public authority *ipso facto* became publicly available women, and charges of sexual immorality engendered by a revolution that was destroying the "natural family" and the even more "natural" gender regimes of society served as a subtext for much of the public commentary on Soviet Russia.

Over time, these charges of sexual profligacy faded especially as American feminists, left-leaning journalists and academics, fellow travelers and communists such as Ella Winter, Susan Kingsbury, Anna Louise Strong, Louis Fischer and Maurice Hindus among others, took it upon themselves to investigate the conditions of women under the communist regime. Most were impressed by the Bolshevik attempts to institute the vestiges of a welfare state, draw women into factory labor, educational and cultural institutions, and into organs of the party and the state. The New Soviet Woman upon closer examination turned out to be delightfully modern and almost an American feminist in her independence, her boyish athleticism, her creativity and her sense of gender equality. Moreover, she did not pine for a bourgeois existence surrounded with material goods, but hungered for romance with a partner who was as dedicated as she was to the liberation of humankind. But this view of the New Soviet Woman circulated among a small section of the American left and was soon buried under an avalanche of negative publicity that was generated by autobiographies of upper-class and noble émigré Russian women that became immensely popular during the 1930s. Memoirs of the Russian Revolution of 1917, coupled with accounts that spoke to the harshness of the Stalinist labor camps, created a highly influential trope of fear about communism, one that cast women as primary victims of this monstrous ideology that effaced their subjectivity, their class identity and in the last essence their distinctive femininity (Holmgren 2008).

Starting with Anna Vryubova's (lady in waiting to the Tsarina Alexandra) melodramatic account of her sufferings under the Bolsheviks, there was a constellation of English-language memoirs published by upper-class Russian women such as Alexandra Tolstoy, Irina Skariatina and Tatiana Tchernavin.[5] In these searing accounts we see gently bred women, many of whom were of aristocratic origin, robbed of their noble estates at gunpoint by committees of

uncouth soldiers, workers or peasants. They were forced to barter their heir-looms and antiques for a few slices of bread, and suffer from starvation and cold. Even more frightening than the loss of material possessions was the post-revolutionary rudeness of servants, and overt expressions of hatred from members of the lower classes who vented their anger with insults and even blows. The unspeakable vileness of Bolshevik committees that forced these "former peoples" to engage in demeaning manual labor was more unbearable than the act of sweeping sidewalks and digging ditches under armed escort. The bewildering descent down the social ladder was accentuated by the fact that noble husbands, fathers and brothers—men who had created political ecosystems that allowed upper-class Russian women to move freely in the Russian Empire and beyond—were emasculated and proved incapable of defending their womenfolk from the Bolshevik onslaught. Vryubova, Skariatina, Tolstoy and Tchernavin were imprisoned by the authorities and forced to share close quarters with violent and lice-ridden female criminals. Their books record the uncertainty of revolutionary days and serve as a marked counterpoint to the well-ordered existence before 1917 that included summers at country estates, poetry readings by the fire, balls during the St Petersburg season and the poignantly recalled solicitude of an army of governesses, nannies and servants.

The First World War marked the destruction of the nobility across Europe, and in many ways these memoirs written by exiles from the Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian empires served as funerary rites for a dying caste. Americans, prone to suspicions about the privileges of a hereditary class, were less interested in the destruction of the noble lifestyles, but were aghast at the effacement of marks of distinction in ethics, morality, dress, speech and culture among members of the intelligentsia by a revolutionary regime that was intent on mindless equalization within society. Censorship, the wanton destruction of centuries of inherited high culture in noble estates and churches, the muzzling of intellectuals and the brutalization of women of breeding and education became the hallmarks of modern totalitarianism. According to the memoirs the Soviet state was creating a generation of prematurely aged women, broken down by chronic hunger, malnourishment and hard labor, with little access to the culture and the refinement of the Russian Silver Age except in their thoughts and memories. With the onset of the Cold War the pictures of an aged babushka, sweeping the streets of Moscow, or leaning on a pitchfork in a bleak countryside, clad in rough gray clothing became a staple of influential publications such as *Life* magazine. And gulag memoirs that were smuggled out of the Soviet Union after the Second World War confirmed the worst fears about the destruction of cultured and sensitive men and women by the Soviet state.

Women and Revolutionary Iran

The February Revolution that brought down the Tsarist regime in 1917 started on 8 March, International Women's Day, by striking women workers in Petrograd. Subsequently this holiday became an important part of both

the Soviet and the world feminist calendar. Although the Russian and Iranian empires had significant border disputes through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Russian left-wing thought, art, literature and cinema was to greatly influence the Iranian intelligentsia despite the widespread censorship practiced by the Shah's secret service (Matin-asgari 2013). Thus it was not mere happenstance that on 8 March 1979, thousands of Iranian women, many of them clad in jeans and open-toed sandals, took to the streets of Tehran to defy Khomeini's imposition of the all-enveloping black chador on Iranian women first at work and subsequently in all public places, and his changes to the family law that had granted women considerable equality in terms of marriage laws, child custody and inheritance under the Shah (Paidar 1995).

However, unlike their Russian counterparts, Iranian women were not able to topple the clerical regime, and instead women from groups as diverse as radical-left intelligentsia, to members of the Mujahideen who had initially supported Khomeini against the oppression of the Shah's regime, as well as Westernized and upper-class Iranian women, watched in dismay as they lost many of the rights that they had won in the previous decades. Not only was veiling deemed mandatory after 1979, but divorced women lost custody of their children. Women were pushed out of gender-segregated institutions of higher learning and government offices, and many other fields such as medicine. Polygamy was re-legalized, the age at which women could be married was lowered to nine and laws were instituted that advocated the use of stoning and flogging as appropriate punishments for adultery. Women made a few modest gains in terms of strengthened legal rights during divorce, but their position was vastly unequal to men.

As in the Soviet Union, the revolution did not always follow the intentions of the male leaders and architects. Despite Khomeini's overt fondness for Fatimah, the Prophet Mohammad's daughter, who according to him was a pure icon of suffering and religiosity, the regime was intensely dismayed by the ways in which the revolution mobilized Iranian women both socially and politically. Women refused to be cowed by the authorities and did not act as an undifferentiated political block. While some activists asked for liberalization of Islamic laws, others took the government to task for their lax enforcement of the regulations on veiling. Under Khomeini's successors Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, female enrollment in educational institutions rose to significant levels and women entered politics, workforce and government service in record numbers. In the 1990s under the government-instituted policies of birth control, fertility rates fell dramatically across the nation. Religion even became a source of empowerment as women educated themselves in Islamic jurisprudence and developed Islamic feminist perspectives on women's rights (Keddie 2000; Osalan 2009; Terman 2010).

However, as in the Soviet case, the American media presented few positive achievements of the Iranian revolution, preferring to fixate on the imposition of the veil, public floggings and the gradual disappearance of women from the public sphere. Images of Iranian women marching confidently for freedom on International Women's Day were soon replaced by pictures of veiled Iranian

women, as faceless, shapeless, unsexed beings. Farah Dibah, wife of the Shah, was a fashion icon for many both in the East and West and her Parisian couture marked in many ways the sophistication of Tehrani women, but under Khomeini we learned with incredulity that the Iranian woman could be publicly lashed for showing a lock of hair, a polished finger nail or even a slightly rouged cheek. She could be thrown into jail without a warrant, raped and even executed. The misogynistic Iranian male apparently paralleled in the private sphere the brutal behavior of the regime. Stories about the oppression of Iranian women that circulated widely in the American media were often based on memoirs and fiction published by Iranian émigrés fleeing the revolution, much like their Russian counterparts in the aftermath of 1917. The memoirs, however, present a complex picture of Iranian culture and of émigré identity that resists facile generalizations about the oppression of Muslim women.

Both Muslim and Jewish émigré women write evocatively about the jagged landscape of Iran dominated by the Elburz Mountain, the sunbaked plains where pistachios and mulberries grow, and beaches along the shores of the Caspian Sea where many spent their childhood summers. The texts are marked with memories of saffron-infused pilafs and chelo kebobs, poetry sessions devoted to the recitation of Ferdowsi and Rumi, the romance of Shiraz's derelict rose gardens, and the grandeur of Iran's pre-Islamic architectural heritage in Persepolis. Others write about highly educated mothers and grandmothers, professional women who led free and independent lives, travelling between Western Europe and Iran. While these books rhapsodize about the warmth of extended families, of bossy aunts and mothers, of caring fathers and uncles, they are also critical of patriarchal customs and mores.[6] Nahid Rachlin bitterly recounts the story of her effervescent sister, Pari, who aspired to be a film actress. But her modern and educated family, believing such dreams to be senseless, forced her into an arranged marriage much against her wishes. Pari died unattended in mysterious circumstances, a victim of both her family's conventions and that of the revolutionary times during which so many lives were swept away. Ruya Hakkakiyan records with loving detail the life of the affluent Jewish community in Tehran, her father's love of literature, her joyous and unsupervised childhood, before their expulsion from the land of their ancestors after 1979. She tells the story of the beautiful Muslim woman Bibi, who worked secretly to advocate Khomeini's cause, but then fell victim to the authorities. Bibi was imprisoned and tortured by Khomeini's police. But even as they turn a critical lens to their Iranian past, the memoirists express a chronic heartache for the land and the people that they have left behind. And like their Russian counterparts they also analyze the possibilities and limitations of recreating an exile's identity in the United States.

The Exilic Imagination on Trial

In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, Tatiana Tchernavin's and Alexandra Tolstoy's sweeping criticisms of the Soviet Union did not go unchallenged, and scholars and journalists charged them with presenting an elitist

view of their personal sufferings while distorting the many achievements of the regime (Grant 1936, p. 7; Stern 1937). A review of Tatiana Tchernavin's work, *We Soviet Women*, observed that it was "more a series of episodes than a connected narrative, and the theme as well as the actual sentences have an irritating abruptness. The dialogue is especially halting. This critical tirade may seem far too long and unnecessary, but I feel that Madame Tchernavin is of invaluable aid to anti-Communist propaganda and her books should be much better" (McL 1936, p. 502). In a similar vein many scholars believe that the American media and the government have circulated orientalist images of the down-trodden, brow-beaten and backward Muslim women to justify their military and imperialistic interventions in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan and create anti-Islamic propaganda (Carruthers 2009; Abu-Lughod 2013).

One book in particular, Azar Nafisi's, *Reading Lolita in Tehran*, an international bestseller, has been especially singled out for misrepresenting revolutionary Iran (Nafisi 2003). Nafisi herself has been accused of propagating Western values as enshrined in the Western literary canon, and of serving as an invidious agent of American imperialism. According to Hamid Dabashi, "the function of the comprador intellectual is not to expose and confront such atrocities; instead, it is to take that element of truth and package it in a manner that serves the belligerent empire best: in the disguise of a legitimate critic of localised tyranny facilitating the operation of a far more insidious global domination—effectively perpetuating (indeed aggravating) the domestic terror they purport to expose." (Dabashi 2006). In her memoir, Nafisi, a Westernized, upper-class left-wing idealist, returns home to Iran in order to participate in the revolution. But events soon eclipse the more liberal nature of her political vision and she loses her job as Professor of English at Tehran University because of her refusal to don the veil. Depressed by her lack of employment as well as her sudden political irrelevance in her homeland, Nafisi starts a book club with a group of female students. Encouraged by Nafisi her students read *Lolita*, *Great Gatsby*, *Pride and Prejudice* and *Daisy Miller*, among other works of fiction, and in the process they create a space for the exchange of ideas about literature, art, politics, feminism and everyday life.

In a perceptive article Amy DePaul has argued that *Reading Lolita* is a complex work that is more literary than propagandistic, and that Nafisi has employed totalitarian imagery borrowed from the representation of the Soviet Union to indict the regime in Iran (DePaul 2008). Nafisi's near obsession with Vladimir Nabokov, an aristocratic émigré who fled Russia after the Bolshevik revolution and became a notable Russian-American writer, serves as a literary bridge linking state oppression, censorship and the politicization of everyday life under totalitarian regimes in both Iran and Russia. Nafisi draws on well-honed Cold War images of the Soviet Union to explain phenomena such as censorship, ubiquitous bureaucracy and intrusion of the state into the private sphere, and like Nabokov she explores the trauma of exile, both internal and external. She writes of being blindsided by historical events that spun out of control and careened down paths that she, Nafisi, had never intended to take

as a young student radical in the United States and Iran. She describes the "unbearable lightness of being," the feelings of uselessness and insignificance, to use another Cold War metaphor, that is engendered when one refuses to accept the normative dictates of a totalitarian state.

Jochen Hellbeck has explored with great subtlety the overwhelming desire of Soviet citizens, both intelligentsia and working class who lived under Stalinism, to join the magic circle of socialism (Hellbeck 2006). He argues that conformism to the dictates of state ideology was not only engendered by fear and oppression, but arose from a desire for social acknowledgement and integration. The subscription to any totalitarian ideology (be it religious, market-driven or social-collectivist) brings a sense of certainty that one is on the right side of history, and endows us with a gargantuan self-righteousness. Enrolling in a cause heightens our self-consciousness and endows the mundane acts of everyday life with moral significance. Within the magic time of totalitarianism, we believe that we are witnesses to and participants in important historical events. Acts motivated by pure belief in any ideology also calm the chronic self-doubt, the inner turmoil, anomie and the spiritual dis-ease that is the hallmark of the human and not only the modern condition. But what happens to those who refuse to believe, who continue to harbor doubts and to question the reigning ideologies? Those that continue to imagine alternative scenarios and different endings to the novel are rarely rewarded by totalitarian regimes.

When I read the Nafisi's book soon after it was published in 2003 I had wondered why she had used Nabokov's *Lolita* to educate her students instead of works by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Evgenia Ginzburg or Varlam Sholomov to explain the perils of totalitarianism.[7] Later, I realized that in *Lolita*, Nabokov explores pedophilia/totalitarianism from the point of view of the victimizer rather than the victim. Nabokov's hero, the pathetic but cunning Professor Humbert Humbert (whose very name is boringly repetitious like state propaganda), has to justify his every hideous act of violation with a torrent of words. Humbert, like every verbose and paternalistic dictator, feels the need to endlessly justify his political acts. Nafisi's choice of other books such as *Pride and Prejudice*, *Great Gatsby* and *Daisy Miller*, alerts the reader that she is not interested in exploring the Western canon. Her students do not read Milton, Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Nietzsche or even Hannah Arendt or Czeslaw Milosz to explore issues of moral freedom. Nor do they read the classic texts of Western feminism by George Elliot, Virginia Woolf or Simone de Beauvoir.

Nafisi's book-list does not serve as didactic source of authority to her students seeking an imaginative alternative to Khomeini's interpretation of Islam. Gatsby, Daisy Miller and Elizabeth Bennet are ambiguous characters whose choices, compromises and decisions are hard to decipher. Sometimes their actions exasperate and annoy us, while their many weaknesses and desires mirror our own. Most importantly these novels force us to imagine alternative endings to the plot as outlined by the authors. What if Gatsby had reined in his obsession with Daisy earlier in the text and tried to understand her true nature? What if the worthy Elizabeth Bennet had decided to become a feminist

heroine and eschew the bourgeois marriage much as Jane Austen did? Nafisi writes about rereading the famous Iranian poets during the Iran–Iraq war, Rumi and Ferdowsi, who spoke in the allusive language of poetry, a language that refuses to be captured within any definitive interpretations and allows each reader to exercise interpretive license. Readers of gulag memoirs will recall that the poetry of Pushkin brought great solace to the inmates.

Who is an exile and how does one go into exile? Is the exilic identity necessarily liminal, as the subject hovers between homelands and cultures unable to go home but creating a home of sorts nonetheless? The word has intense class connotations, as it implies a person of wealth and privilege, one who owned so much in the former life that they have the luxury of mourning all that they have lost. Unlike a refugee, a word often qualified by the adjective "penniless," an exile's journey, however arduous, ends in a place where one has the time and space to engage in nostalgia for things past, express regrets over decisions, metaphorically turn over the objects of memory. Considering the body of memoirs engendered by the Soviet and Iranian revolutions (and in this essay I have only considered those that were either written or translated into English), it is safe to conclude that most writers came from well-to-do homes, were often highly educated and despite many initial hardships were able to integrate into mainstream American society with a considerable degree of success. In exile these women were able to reflect upon the vicissitudes of life, the tumultuous nature of class warfare and the meaning of individual life stories cast adrift in the ocean of historical events that was defined by totalitarianism.

The creation of exilic identity through the writing of memoirs is an act of subjectivity through which these stateless women mapped and reclaimed a fractured and then hyphenated identity: Russian-American and Iranian-American. Even though their intellectual production was used to further the political ends of émigré groups, both Russian and Iranian, and was hijacked by the foreign policy of the United States during the Cold War and during the war against the Axis of Evil, it is important to remember that these memoirs were written by women who were trying to understand the complexity of revolutionary events and make sense of why they had suddenly became irrelevant and superfluous in their own homeland. While stories of loss, of homesickness, of makeshift and tenuous identities, and the eternal hope of return constitute the essential warp and the woof of the exilic imagination, they also challenge the totalitarian logic of nation states in the modern world.

Notes

1. I thank Afshin Matin-asgari for his vast knowledge about Iranian history and for generously sharing his sources and ideas. This article has also been improved by suggestions from Scott Wells, Karen Petrone and Houri Beberian.
2. *Bolshevik Propaganda. Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate* (1919), Washington, D.C., pp. 35, 137, 147.

3. *New York Times (1857–1922)*, 10 September 1922; *The Lynden Tribune*, 28 October 1920, available from http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn88085445/1920-10-28/ed-1/seq-16/, accessed 4.17.2014.

4. *New York Tribune*, 25 December, 1921, page 3, available from http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030214/1921-12-25/ed-1/seq-21/, accessed 4.19.2014.

5. Princess Cantacuzène (1999), *Revolutionary Days. Recollections of Romanoffs and Bolsheviki 1914–1917* (Chicago: Lakeside Press); Emma Cochran Ponafidine (1931), *Russa –My Home. An Intimate Record of Personal Experiences Before. During and After the Bolshevist Revolution* (Indianapolis: Bobs-Merrill); Emma Cochran Ponafidine (1931), *Russa –My Home. An Intimate Record of Personal Experiences Before, During and After the Bolshevist Revolution* (Indianapolis: 530 Bobs-Merrill Co.); Marie, Grand Duchess of Russia (1931), *Education of a Princess. A Memoir* (New York: Viking Press); Irina Skariatina (1931), *A World Can End* (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith); Olga Tchernoff (1936), *New Horizons. Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution* (Westport: Hyperion Press); Alexandra Tolstoy (1931), *I Worked for the Soviets* (New Haven: Yale University Press); Tatiana Tchernavin (1934), *Escape from the Soviets* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.); Tatiana Tchernavin (1936), We Soviet Women (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.); Anna Vyrubova (1923), *Memories of the Russian Court* (New York: The Macmillan Company).

6. Asayesh, G. (1999), *Saffron Sky. A Life Between Iran and America* (Boston: Beacon Press); Davar, A. (2007), *My Name is Iran: A Memoir* (New York: H. Holt); Hakkakian, R. (2004), *Journey Form the Land of No. A Girlhood Caught in Revolutionary Iran* (New York: Crown Publishers); Moaveni, A. (2005), *Lipstick Jihad* (New York: Public Affairs); Rachlin, N. (2006), *Persian Girls. A Memoir* (New York: Penguin); Saberi, R. (2010), *Between Two Worlds. My Life and Captivity in* (New York: Harper).

7. According to Dr Scott Wells, Nafisi's book-list represents the literary curriculum in American educational institutions and is composed primarily of popular works that have been adapted for film and television. I thank him for this insight.

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CHAPTER 21

The Nature of the Hero in Mass Dictatorships

Catriona Kelly

The heroic figures of Bolshevism, Fascism and National Socialism have acquired, in retrospect, a strange invisibility. Portraits of Lenin and Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler would to this day be recognized by educated adults over most of the developed world. Their bravura portraits have the same familiarity as the bombastic architecture of triumph—Milan Railway Station, the pinnacled skyscrapers of Moscow or the ceremonial designs of Albert Speer. There is an enormous historical literature, both specialist and general, dealing with the so-called "leader cults," which extensively debates whether these cults actually expressed "charismatic" authority of the sort identified by Max Weber, or conveniently filled the power vacuum that emerged after the First World War, acting as a symbolic or imaginative representation of political power (see e.g. Plamper 2012). Yet, despite the recognition that the "branding" of mass dictatorships (like "branding" in the commercial world) often depended directly on "human interest," and the extensive attention given to the political symbolism of the different regimes, the ways in which these dictatorships identified and celebrated heroism are less familiar (Heller 2008, p. 3).[1] With historical distance, people may dimly remember "the Soviet boy who betrayed his father to the authorities," but by no means everyone can recall that his name was Pavlik Morozov, let alone say what the father himself was supposed to have done. Those who are vaguely aware that the "Horst Wessel Lied" was the National Socialist anthem are unlikely to have much idea who Horst Wessel was.[2] And so on.

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To the people who actually lived in mass dictatorships, on the other hand, heroes were woven into the fabric of their experience. Their feats were celebrated at state festivals and in the mass media, and reported in the textbooks used for teaching schoolchildren; their lives were the stuff of popular legend, as well as officially sanctioned texts. The pilots who rescued the crew of the SS *Chelyuskin*, the Soviet icebreaker marooned for months in the Arctic Sea before being crushed by ice and sinking on 13 February 1934, became familiar to most of the population after they were welcomed in Moscow, becoming the first official "Heroes of the Soviet Union"; they lent their names to streets all over the country.[3]

Over the course of their existence, the propaganda machines in the mass dictatorships generated large numbers of heroes, some ephemeral, others with a lasting impact. While few if any were invented from start to finish (in contrast to the satirical portrait of the "totalitarian hero" Comrade Ogilvy in George Orwell's novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*), biographies were adapted and embellished in order to suit the ideological objectives of the day. Some heroes were new creations; others were established national or international figures, including famous writers and artists as well as military leaders, political thinkers and monarchs. To do justice to the thousands of people who made up the pantheons in these different societies would require a substantial book, and vast amounts of first-hand research, since the overwhelming majority of hero cults have received little or no historical investigation.[4] The most I can attempt is an introduction to the historical roots and characteristics of hero cults in the three ideologically dominant European mass dictatorships—the Soviet Union, the Third Reich and Mussolini's Italy—and to their significance in terms of the political culture of the mass dictatorships.

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The origins of the heroes of early twentieth-century mass dictatorships were both traditional and distinctive. One context for their evolution was the cults of heroes that developed in the ancient world, commemorated in works of art that retained canonical status into the modern period—epics such as *The Iliad*, statuary and architecture (Fig. 21.1). Yet if the hero as demi-god, of superhuman stature in a physical as well as spiritual sense, was one model, another was Christian sainthood, shaped from its origins by the ideals of self-sacrificing martyrdom and principled resistance. Rather than subordinating others, saints sacrificed themselves, and their spiritual power emerged from denial of the body (Wilson 1985, p. 10).

While models of sainthood were adapted and transformed over the centuries of Christian practice, belief in the significance of the saints' capacity to endure and transcend suffering retained its significance.[5] The classic patterns of martyrdom came to be absorbed even by political dissidents who were hostile to Christianity. From 1880, the mur des fédérés (Communards' Wall) in Père Lachaise Cemetery, alongside which 147 supporters of the Paris Commune were shot and tossed into a common grave on 28 May 1871, was the site of rituals of commemoration. One of the Commune's leaders, Théophile Ferré,

Fig. 21.1   Sir Arthur Westmacott, Achilles (1822), Hyde Park, London (Photographed by Catriona Kelly, 2014)

executed on 22 November 1871, became the subject of a posthumous cult, his shattered skull exhumed and put on display like a saintly relic [Kselman 1995/2005]. Russian radicals also had an established tradition of ceremonially honouring the fallen dead, and the interment in the Champs de Mars, a former military parade ground, on 23 March 1917 of those killed during the armed struggles of the previous month became a major event of the so-called "February Revolution" in Petrograd.

It was precisely martyrs who were also to become the earliest heroes of the mass dictatorships. 1918 saw the transformation of the Champs de Mars into "Victims of Revolution Square," a revolutionary pantheon honouring the Bolshevik fallen, including, for example, Moisei Uritsky, first head of the Cheka (secret police) in Petrograd, murdered on 20 August 1918. On 28 October 1923, the first anniversary of the "March on Rome" was commemorated in Mussolini's Italy by ceremonies across the country, including a parade and open-air mass in the capital itself (Berezin 1997, pp. 85–88). Among the many events to celebrate the heroism of the Nazi dead was a march through Berlin on 22 January 1933 to the Nikolai Cemetery, where Hitler made a speech at

the grave of the murdered storm trooper Horst Wessel, himself author of a song dedicated to those "shot by the Red Front and reactionaries" that became the anthem of National Socialism. The image of the slain radical saint was so potent that it generated a kind of "Euromartyr" competition between opposing political forces: the figure of a slaughtered teenage musician made his way from German Communist tradition ("the little trumpeter") to Nazi legend (in a recasting by Horst Wessel that changed "the blood of red guards" to "the blood of swastikas"), before resurfacing as the "little drummer boy" portrayed by the Soviet poet Mikhail Svetlov.

Drawing on rituals that inspired transcendent emotions and what the philosopher Charles Taylor has termed a sense of "fullness," Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin, and the propagandists who carried out the "general line" of cultural policy, were exploiting perceptions and associations traditionally attached to "the sacred" and to religious practices.[6] The lives of heroes—such as those of the Soviet boy martyr Pavlik Morozov—employed characteristic motifs of hagiography: the "conversion" to righteousness of a figure formerly ignorant of the true faith (here, communism), or, on the other hand, the inbuilt righteousness of the hero from his or her earliest childhood.[7] But the spirit in which the martyrs celebrated by the mass dictatorships lived and died was very different from the spirit embodied in their Christian predecessors. Rather than perishing in a spirit of resignation (in Christ's own words, "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do"), they went down fighting.[8] Forgiveness was not their aim; they were locked in perpetual conflict with the enemies, whether political, social or national, who threatened the survival of the cause that they espoused.[9]

Even if some had, in fact, been killed in unheroic circumstances—by accident, in street brawls or in conflicts that had nothing to do with high politics—the representations of them emphasized their commitment to the cause and the fact they had perished in the struggle for it. "Not victims—heroes lie in these graves," proclaimed the text by Anatoly Lunacharsky carved into the stone walls of Champs de Mars. The 1929 memorial to those gunned down by Tsarist troops on 9 January 1905 ("Bloody Sunday") showed a colossal male figure angrily waving in defiance and encouragement of his comrades (Fig. 21.2).[10]

Later Soviet heroes continued this tradition: written legends, monuments and portraits alike emphasized their implacability, a trait of character that was just as essential as valour and endurance.

It followed that commemoration of the martyred dead should be militaristic in character also. Thus, at the mass in Rome for the "three thousand fascist martyrs" in 1923, "at the moment the priest raised the Eucharist … a trombone sounded, the troops presented arms, and the fascists raised their arms in a Roman salute" (Berezin 1997, p. 88). The result of this action was not only to make the fascist funeral itself sacred, but also to desecrate Christian ritual, since the presentation of arms during an ordinary mass would have been considered obscene.

Even in Germany or Italy, which never instituted a state policy of rational atheism of the kind found in the Soviet Union, the status of the new heroes (like

Fig. 21.2   Memorial to the victims of Bloody Sunday (Photographed by Catriona Kelly, September 2011)

that of the new rituals) was not so much Christian as anti-Christian (Borkenau 1940). The new saints did not look forward to an afterlife of spirituality and evanescence: they lived on in the present, martial world. "Comrades, raise your banners. Horst Wessel, who lies under this stone, is not dead. Every day, every hour, his spirit is with us, he marches in our ranks," Hitler declared in 1933. Depictions of their bodies were lasciviously materialist also: a supposedly documentary photograph of the Soviet war heroine Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya transformed her into a modern St Agatha, breast lopped off after she defied commands to betray the cause (Fig. 21.3).

No picture of an Orthodox saint would ever have represented suffering in such grossly literalist detail, since martyrdom was but a continuation of the

Fig. 21.3 Photograph by Sergei Strunnikov showing the mutilated body of Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya, originally published in Pravda, 27 January 1942, p. 3

self-abnegation that saints had lived with before their death.[11] The background to the obsession with the physical facts of death in mass dictatorships was the preoccupation with the living body, the central orientation point of the heroic genres in the visual arts, and of the parades that marked major festivals.

Rather than the natural and indeed desired end point of a virtuous existence, death was an aberration. As Hitler put it in a funeral tribute to the murdered Nazi leader Wilhelm Gutloff in February 1936, "In being witnesses to the sacred state of mind that underlies a struggle of this kind, such victims are guarantees of victory and success … Our dead have all come to life again. They march not just in the spirit, but in their living selves alongside us."

In this respect, the culture of mass dictatorships overcame an important challenge to faith offered by the realist perceptions of the nineteenth century, the anxiety about the capacity for transcendence of the suffering body. (In Dostoevsky's *The Idiot*, for example, the starkly naturalistic portrayal of the Christian Saviour in Holbein's *Dead Christ* became the source of traumatic doubt.) The ideologies on which they were founded gave a significance above time to a particular kind of self-assertion and self-transformation that were also characteristic of nineteenth-century culture. To the Romantic contempt for bourgeois morality that had been expressed in, say, the cult of Napoleon, was added an emphasis on the universal capacity for the reshaping of body and soul. Some part in this may have been played by the domestication and democratization of saints' cults that took place right across Europe in the course of the nineteenth century.[12]

But the mass dictatorships were faced with the task not just of creating state power, but also of consolidating this. In the second perspective, martyrdom was less useful. More important here was the "self-made man," a popular spin on the ethos of perfectibility propounded by Enlightenment philosophy.

Immensely influential in making this figure known across Europe was the work of the Scottish writer Samuel Smiles. His *Self-Help*, originally published in 1855, was translated into dozens of languages in the following decades, and, whether as model or irritant, was familiar to swathes of the educated public, as well as the autodidacts for whom it was written. Over hundreds of pages of exhortation and examples, the book reinforced the importance of self-reliance. As Smiles himself observed in the introduction to the 1860 edition, the book sought to illustrate that people's "happiness and well-being as individuals in after life, must necessarily depend mainly upon themselves; upon their own diligent self-culture, self-discipline, and self-control—and above all, on that honest and upright performance of individual duty, which is the glory of manly character." Social origins were of no consequence; perseverance would carry the day. Among models of success, Smiles listed in the initial chapter such "great men of humble origin" as Sir Richard Arkwright, "the inventor of the spinning-jenny, and the founder of the cotton manufacture of Great Britain; Lord Tenterden, one of the most distinguished of English Lord Chief Justices; and Turner, the very greatest among landscape painters." If Christian saints had always been distinguished by awareness of a greater spiritual reality, Smiles's heroes had their sights fixed on the present world. "After life," in Smiles's terms, referred purely to a phase in the linear development of personal biography.

For Smiles, "self-culture" was primarily a matter of reading and close study (the ingestion, for example, of his own books, and those of the authors whom he celebrated). By the turn of the twentieth century, the drive to acquire "culture" was understood more broadly. The rise in the prominence and influence of social hygiene also led to an emphasis on the need for a personal search for physical fitness. Readers of behaviour literature were now encouraged to go through a process of "hardening" (*Verhärtung—zakal*) of their minds and bodies; to "educate the will," but also to temper the muscles. "Manliness" meant both toughness of mind, and toughness of physique.

This was not a question of license to rampant individualism. Within mass dictatorship, what Smiles had termed "the honest and upright performance of individual duty" became a society-wide imperative. So, too, did bodily fitness. As the slogan of the Soviet physical culture movement put it, citizens were supposed to be "fit for labor and defense." Alongside fostering social cohesion by acting as shared objects of reverence, heroes were role models, showing how the righteous members of the masses should themselves live.[13]

At the same time, the emphasis on martyrdom as the supreme form of commitment to the common good provided a way of undermining the arrogance that was likely to be generated when society, and particularly young members of this, was turned into an elite fighting force, as with the sport and fitness programs that provided decorations and star appearances in parades to the most skilled and enthusiastic.[14] In all the mass dictatorships, the public was constantly reminded of self-sacrificing heroism: not just by rituals in which wreathes were laid and flags lowered, but in books and films, and in the names

of streets and institutions in places large and small. To this day, manhole covers in Florence bear the name of the Fascist hero Giovanni Berta, because the factory where they were made was named after him, though other traces of his cult have disappeared (Fig. 21.4).

Martyrs were thus not the only type of hero with significance in mass dictatorships. They were particularly important at times of crisis: when the regimes were establishing themselves, or under threat. The celebration of martyrs suggested not just that everyone should be ceaselessly vigilant (look what enemies had done to the best of the land!), but that being dissatisfied over material hardship was a form of treason, a betrayal of the noble self-sacrifice of which some were capable. At more secure periods, the pantheon became larger and more varied, accommodating figures from folklore and from the historical and cultural heritage. In the Soviet Union during the late 1930s, for instance, the heroes of folk epic (*bylina*)—celebrated in the final decades of Tsarist rule—began to be promoted as figures of national importance, rather than (as they had been in the 1920s) the products of a specific time, place and social class. Other notable beneficiaries of the search for national heroes were Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. During the Second World War, the Tsarist general Alexander Suvorov, and warrior-saint Alexander Nevsky, joined the pantheon. As well as representing "the cause," heroes could also represent "the nation"; but they could also stand for less elevated concepts of civic virtue, such as rescuing children from burning buildings, or being kind to animals.

Above all the heroes, and still further beyond the normal compass of human behaviour, stood the supreme figure of reverence—the dictator himself. In contrast to the abstract forces portrayed in such influential dystopian novels as Evgeny Zamiatin's *We* and George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the lead-

Fig. 21.4 Manhole cover made by the Giovanni Berta foundry, Florence (Photographed by Catriona Kelly, November 2013)

ers of actual mass dictatorships had a definite and precise symbolic presence. Certainly, the traits of personal biography were scrupulously adapted, with anything discreditable edited out; little information about personal life was in general circulation at all. The leader's godlike status was underlined by titles such as "the genius of all peoples" (used about Stalin), catchphrases along the lines of "Mussolini is always right" and the ever-present references to the adulation of highly placed followers (in the words of Rudolf Hess about Hitler, "He was always right and will always be right"). This mythic, simplified image of the leader was systematically disseminated; press photographs were as carefully choreographed as official portraits.

Heroes varied in terms of their capacities; none was of all-embracing significance. It was the leader's role to encompass the culture at large, dissolving the boundary between "state," "party" and "nation." A whole gallery of different images portrayed the variety of roles: the wise strategist, poring over campaign maps; the avuncular figure, surrounded by small children; the compelling orator. As with the martyrs who slipped between different national and political traditions, the characteristics of the dictator crossed boundaries as well. The Hitler salute originated in Italy, and Mussolini seems also to have pioneered the myth of the dictator's particular rapport with children: Maria Buonamici's children's book *Duce nostro* (1933), showing children grouped round a portrait of the Italian leader, appeared a good two years before such images were widely disseminated in Russia or Germany.

All the same, there were differences of nuance. Mussolini was, for example, the only mass dictator with the physical presence of a hero—it is hard to imagine Stalin or Hitler cutting a dashing figure on a horse, even in fiction. Both Stalin and Hitler were puny, physically speaking, and only the latter a really effective orator. The keynotes in the myths—Stalin as the plain, practical, down-to-earth and modest figure, quietly puffing his pipe and offering advice with a genial twinkle, Hitler as the impassioned visionary—went with different political styles, with Stalin as the "machine politician" where the other leaders leant much more on direct personal authority (Gorlizki and Mommsen 2009). The mechanisms of dissemination for the cults also differed: in the Stalin case film was crucial, in Germany cinema mainly promoted "Führer types" of ideal leadership, rather than the leader himself. But overall, the differences served only to confer a necessary individuality on figures who were supposed to be endowed with the particularity of genius. The fundamental point was to capture a new type of political authority—gifted with the gravitas of a monarch, but more approachable, closer in style of life and behaviour to the mass of the population.

The closeness was, of course, illusory. Ordinary citizens could not aspire to emulate the leader, but at best, if they were exceptionally lucky, to meet him. Propaganda such as Georgy Baidukov's *Meetings with Comrade Stalin* (1939) dwelt on how even the most famous heroes aspired to this blessed opportunity. For the masses, it was the "godlings" rather than the gods who were of relevance in terms of models.[15] Added to this, such "godlings" tapped

the reverence that had traditionally been offered to figures such as saints.[16] But above all, they embodied the crusading ambitions of the ideology they stood for. Leaders could stand at the apex of the hierarchy, resting on their laurels and surveying the society that they controlled with indulgence, or, if they preferred, severity. Frenzied activity was left to those lower down the pyramid, who did the actual work of social transformation. Neither "godlings" nor workers were—in mythic terms—a threat to the leader, since everything that they did was sanctioned and commended by him, and since they, like all other members of society ("enemies" aside) joined in the festivals and rituals of loyalty, such as the offering of thanks and gifts to the leader.[17] While the pantheon included more combative figures, these were safely dead, and hence not a threat to the political hierarchy. Alongside such figures of peculiar self-sacrifice and devotion, those who were merely talented, intelligent or "normally" remarkable, had to retreat into the background. It was not until the 1960s that a different type of hero—exemplified by Yuri Gagarin, the affable and down-to-earth pioneer of space travel—began to emerge. But by then, the age of "mass dictatorships" was also at an end.[18]

NOTES

1. Heller has in mind "trade characters," such as the Geico Gecko, which "puts a friendly face on an otherwise inanimate (or sometimes inhumane) product," but his discussion considers only the dictators themselves, alongside "logos" such as the swastika etc.

2. This also applies to living in the countries where the dictators once held sway, at any rate if Russia is anything to go by. Pavlik Morozov's father was always said in Soviet versions of his life to have committed some offence (its nature varied) to do with collectivization (supplying false registration papers to kulaks was one version, concealing grain another). By the late Soviet period, people supposed him to have been "a kulak" himself, or even a collaborator with the Nazis.

3. For a discussion of the reception of the Chelyuskin pilots in the context of Stalinist public culture, see Petrone 2000, pp. 50–78.

4. Among Soviet heroes, only Pavlik Morozov has received extended treatment, most recently in Kelly 2005. Coverage of other heroes has been left to journalists. So far as German and Italian heroes go, the secondary literature seems to be limited to references in passing.

5. On changes in perception of the saints, see e.g. Delooz 1985, pp. 189–192, and Greene 2010.

6. There is an enormous literature on the nature of religion and secularization generally, and its relation to mass dictatorships (particularly the Third Reich). Here my definitions of religious emotion draw particularly on Hervieu-Léger (2000) and Taylor (2007). While martyrdom is of course not exclusive to Christian culture (Islam particularly has many examples), it was Christian tradition, even in the multinational society of the Soviet Union, that provided the most influential models, by reason of being the majority faith at the time when the Bolsheviks took power.

7. As I have described elsewhere (Kelly 2005), the early lives of Pavlik employed the "conversion narrative" stereotype (a boy from a dirty chaotic household in a

remote and benighted village learns political consciousness), while later ones emphasized the boy's status as an exemplary school pupil etc.

8. This is according to the legends. The facts often seem to have been different. For instance, Giovanni Berta, the young worker who became a fascist hero in Florence, died after being beaten and tossed into the Arno while cycling across one of the city's bridges. A contemporary account, in the diary entry of Mario Piazzesi for 27 February–2 March 1921, states merely that the body had traces of a terrible beating. The boy hero Kotya Mgebrov, interred on the Field of Mars, died, aged nine, after being thrown by louts from a Petrograd tram in 1922; the newspaper reports of the day attributed this to counter-revolutionary motives (see e.g. *Petrogradskaya pravda*, 26 April 1922), but there is no objective evidence that it was not simply an accident, given the horrendous overcrowding on public transport at the time.

9. The stigmatization of enemies was just as politically salient a feature of the cultures of the mass dictatorships, and each type of representation reinforced the other.

10. On Pavlik Morozov, see Kelly (2005). There are, as yet, no scholarly examinations of the lives of other heroes, but figures such as the war hero Aleksandr Matrosov (killed while using his own body to defend a gun emplacement) and Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya (see below) have been re-examined by media sources, which have concluded that the former was the pseudonym of a Bashkir orphan (his ethnic origins were never mentioned in official Soviet hagiographies), while the latter may not have been the person executed by the Nazis under the name "Tanya the Partisan."

11. Notable also was the firm line drawn between saintly relics (fragments of the bodies hallowed in advance by virtuous behaviour) and the relics of heroes. In Soviet usage, the former were *moshchi*, and the latter *relikvii*. The tokens in the second class definitely did not include body parts: rather, they might be items of clothing etc., as in the "museum apartments" of political leaders and great writers, such as the Pushkin Museum on the Moika in Leningrad, or the Lenin Museum in the former Smol'nyi Convent. At the same time, the cult of Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya emphasized the spiritual: as the first story about her death, Pavel Lidov's "Tanya," published in *Pravda* on 27 January 1942 (p. 3), emphasized, "warriors will visit her tomb to bow down to the earth and her remains, and say soulful Russian words of thanks. And to the mother and father who brought her into the world and raised this heroine; and to the teachers who educated her; and to the comrades who tempered her spirit like iron."

12. Among saints with plebeian origins were Bernadette, to whom was vouchsafed the vision of the Virgin Mary at Lourdes, and Brother Conrad, the porter at the St Anne Monastery in Altötting, Bavaria. Central to the latter cult was not just his philanthropy, but the saint's own role as a lay brother. Thérèse of Lisieux, another extremely popular figure of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was the daughter of two artisans in a small town in Normandy, and her spiritual biography presented her as an exemplar of ordinariness. Similar in the Russian Orthodox world were the cults of "holy fools" such as Xenia of Petersburg, who, if not born into socially marginal circumstances, chose so to live. Equally important at this point were the advances in disseminating material about the saints. Nineteenth-century Russia, for instance, saw not only a surge in popular brochures and newspaper articles about saints, but even the presentation of saints' lives in magic-lantern-show format.

13. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw increasing interest in the social value of heroes as role models and socially consolidating forces: Thomas

Carlyle's *On Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in History* (1841) was followed by a good deal of spadework in the new discipline of psychology, especially "paidology" (child study, child psychology). An early twentieth-century Russian example was Nikolai Rybnikov's 1916 study of the "ideals" of village schoolchildren (comprising mainly ranked lists of those figures they considered heroic, including, for example, Lomonosov, Jesus Christ and their own parents).

14. The point about arrogance is made in Pinfold (2001, p. 63). Anxieties about the possible arrogance of Young Pioneers (the Communist organization for children aged 9 or 10 to 13 or 14) were also common by the late 1930s (Kelly 2005).
15. For the term "godling," see Wilson 1985, p. 2.
16. One cannot, to be sure, push this too far—for instance, Soviet heroes did not, in official legend, perform miracles such as healing the sick or reconciling enemies. The result was that people continued to appeal to Christian saints for intercession on such matters, something that worried both the authorities and representatives of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy.
17. For a study of the ritualized exchange of symbolic gifts from the dictator on one side, and gratitude from the masses on the other, as a trope in Soviet culture, see Brooks 2001.
18. Yuri Gagarin's approachability and possession of the "human touch" are strongly emphasized in the recent study of his cult (Jenks 2011). In turn, Gagarin is the main example of a Soviet hero who has survived into the post-Soviet period, though the early post-Soviet discussions about the truth, or otherwise, behind the legends about the life of Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya were replaced in the 2010s, as the war cult became more entrenched, by exposure of assault on her as myths.

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Banality in Vision: Cinema and Mass Dictatorship

Han Sang Kim

When Veit Harlan's *Der Herrscher* (*The Ruler*) (1937) and Hans Steinhoff's *Ohm Krüger* (*Uncle Krüger*) (1941), the two notorious Nazi films that had been prohibited after the Second World War, were shown restrictively in Seoul in 2008, under the strict guidance of the German government, many Korean film historians expressed their impressions with one voice that the films looked considerably similar to some South Korean films from the 1960s and the 1970s. They did not fail to mention that the points of similarity were, in fact, banal and exoteric while they had eagerly looked forward to watching something lurid and staggering made by the notorious propaganda machine. Though such perceptions were not based on scholarly analysis, they allow one to presume that there had been certain characteristics shared between the German cinema in the Third Reich and the South Korean cinema during the Park Chung-Hee regime. The "banality" of the two Nazi films is reminiscent of Hannah Arendt's renowned concept (1963). However, apart from merely demonizing the Nazi cinema as "evil," it also raises the question of what the cinematic representations share in common as a tool of domination.

Unlike Nazi cinema, South Korean cinema from the Park Chung-Hee era has not been stigmatized as something malicious and immoral. Rather, films from the 1960s and the 1970s are recalled as a hazy trace of the national past, which has cultural codes that are understood as old-fashioned but still inherent in contemporary Korean culture. For instance, the label "sinp'a [new-school]," one of the key terms frequently used to explain Korean melodramatic films that have an excessively tragic development of female suffering, is commonly summoned when blaming a soap opera for its vulgar narrative and pathological

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tragedy but, at the same time, admitted as something inseparable from the Korean national identity. Considering that the films made on the path to the *Yusin* dictatorship, including *Love Me Once Again* (1968), are mostly understood as the prototype of the sinp'a genre by today's audiences (Lee 2007), it is interesting to note that such a cultural vestige of despotism is not tabooed but recognized as a banal taste still remaining in contemporary Korean culture.

Interestingly, the "banal" impression of the films from the despotic period is also seen from the German audience watching a Nazi film. Nele Harlan, a granddaughter of Veit Harlan, says that she felt the film was "so cheesy and really banal" after watching her grandfather's most notorious film, *Jud Süß* (*Jew Süss*) (1940), which had scared her with its evil reputation for a long time (Moeller 2008). The other granddaughter, Lena, adds that she "had thought it was really extremist" but had to ask herself, "What's so terrible about it?" (Moeller 2008). While the film obviously contains narratives of extreme hatred against a specific racial group, its cinematic expressions look rather common and even immature to the descendants of the creator, who are supposed to be overcome with guilt.

The banality of both national cinemas during despotism is of special interest in respect to the idea of mass dictatorship. It indicates that a chain of specific inclinations to form cinematic imagery have become the "habits" that are common, repetitive and "not removed from everyday" cinematic practices (Billig 1995). They are the habits shared at least between autocratic South Korea and the Third Reich. As the banality of nationalism, which Michael Billig conceptualized, serves as the "endemic condition" to reproduce the "established nations," these habitual cinematic practices spun off from the cinemas of nationalization can be considered as a part of the mechanism that reproduces modern nation states. In the sense that it is a matter of aesthetics and tastes, the habitualization and internalization of such practices might function "in the dimension of bio-politics in mass dictatorship" (Lim 2011).

What, then, made the films from Europe's barbaric past look similar to those of a far distant postcolonial state in East Asia, South Korea? Eric Rentschler's discernment as an American-born film historian provides a clue to this question: "The utopian energies tapped by the feature films of the Third Reich in a crucial manner resembled, indeed at times consciously emulated, American dreams" (1996). This once again calls attention to the homogeny between mass dictatorship and mass democracy. Neither do Nazi films "simply rant and rave" (Rentschler 1996), nor are the films of "banal nationalism" from the Western democracies just "benign" (Billig 1995). They share the same objective "to nationalize the masses" (Lim 2011).

In the postcolonial states, the isomorphism comes to the fore as a matter of continuities and discontinuities between the colonial and postcolonial periods. As citizens of a developmental dictatorship that had been liberated from Japanese colonial rule, South Korean audiences were accustomed to the utopian vision of the Japanese Empire and its well-connected illusions from Nazi Germany and Manchukuo, as well as to a blueprint for the future in imitation

of American dreams. The situation was similar in the cases of other postcolonial states in East and Southeast Asia after the Second World War, including Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and South Vietnam. Certain cinematic practices used to control the colonized and sustain the colonial states were redeployed to legitimize dictatorial domination by the newly established governments and to promote America during the Cold War confrontations in Asia.

This entry traces the shared characteristics of cinematic practices by such dictatorships in the twentieth century, including the Third Reich, the Empire of Japan, French Indochina, British Malaya, the Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of Korea, to examine the modalities of domination that recurred in their national cinemas. First, it will demonstrate how film as a transnational medium contributed to creating national boundaries by inventing shared memories of the past. It will then examine what the role of film stars in the cinematic narratives was in supporting the dictatorships. Lastly, the chapter will investigate the biopolitics in cinematic representations that Otherized certain groups from the national community and invented the border between friend and enemy.

The National Past in Transnational Perspectives

As a new form of technology and entertainment, film reached each national boundary in the ebb and flow of global commerce at the opening of the twentieth century. This natural-born transnational medium that had originated in the West was introduced to non-Western regions, bringing the idea of the modern nation state. Imported films were frequently shown near the open ports and functioned as contact zones to stimulate recognition of nations in the modern world. Exotic foreign scenes in imported motion pictures provided a good reason for distinction between nations and war-spectacle films played a pedagogic role to instruct viewers about the principles of modern states. As the idea of "the international" had preceded the term "nationalism" in Europe (Mitchell 2000), the transnational media environment of cinema contributed to shaping the national imaginaries in the countries importing films.

The shared past of a nation is a common and repetitive topic for the films of mass dictatorship, including both commercial and non-commercial films. By dramatizing a historical event, the cinematic experience connects things of the past with the collective identity of a current national polity, defines the nation state as a continuum with a history, and draws a strict boundary between those who can share the past and those who cannot. In mass dictatorship, historical films were frequently used to secure the legitimacy of the governing power. Cinematic spectacles dealing with the past could detoxify the irrationalities of the present.

The South Korean case at the early stage of nation-building between the Liberation and the Korean War convincingly demonstrates such aspects of historical films. Between 1946 and 1948, a local film production called "Kyemongmunhwahyŏphoe [Cultural Association for Enlightenment]" produced a series of historical films, including *The Chronicle of An Chunggŭn*

(1946), *The March First Revolution* (1947), *Yun Ponggil the Martyr* (1947), and *Yu Kwansun* (1948). All of these films dealt with the independence movement and activists during the colonial period. The production consisted of several rightist filmmakers, such as Yi Kuyŏng and Yun Pongch'un, who had been involved in the independence movement in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Their pursuit of the theme of anti-colonial movements in the past might be a self-manifestation of the non-communist and right-wing nationalist filmmakers in the liberation period. However, at the same time, those films could also be a means of domination for the upcoming mass dictatorship regime.

The US Army Military Government in Korea regarded the autonomous and liberal filmmakers who supported the establishment of a united Korean government as potential enemies and imposed restrictions on their film distribution activities. After the heated controversy on the trusteeship of the Korean Peninsula in late 1945 and early 1946, the left-wing and right-wing groups in the southern part of the peninsula held considerably different standpoints regarding state formation, and filmmakers were also divided. In that sense, it is noteworthy that these right-wing filmmakers continued to seek the cinematic historicization of the colonial past whereas the left-wing ones focused on current political issues regarding state formation and suppression by the US Military Government. While many leading right-wing politicians and administrators had been involved in collaborating with the Japanese Government-General so that the governing power in South Korea was accused of a lack of legitimacy at the moment of the establishment of the separate government, such historical films dealing with the anti-colonial past made by a relatively unalloyed nationalist group could be a useful excuse for the domination.

More often than not in the cinematic representations of the past, premodern monarchies are equated with present nation states with regard to their territories, members, and traditions. As Hobsbawm's definition of "tradition" (1983) indicates, the past invented and illustrated in the cinematic imagination designates fixed, invariant practices. The manufactured historical continuity accords mythic underpinnings to the existing regime, regardless of its irrelevance to the modern nation-state system.

An interesting case is found in the South Vietnamese film, *Sons of Hai Ba Trung* (*Sons of Trung Sisters*) (1962). The film was produced by the Department of Psychological Warfare under the Ministry of National Defense in 1962. As a military agency-made film, this film depicts the militarization of the South Vietnamese armed forces and emphasizes their excellence. It borrows the main idea from a story of domestically famous historical figures, the Trung Sisters. They were the leaders of a revolt in 40 CE after 150 years of Chinese rule. While the Trung Sisters' uprising was put down after three years, their spirit remained in a personality cult of the Vietnamese people and became more popular in the independence period (Taylor 1983). At the time of the film production, there used to be an annual parade to celebrate them as depicted in this film. Considering that China was the supporting power for North Vietnam, one can understand that the resurgence of such historical figures in

the South Vietnamese national commemoration conveyed a criticism of the current Chinese involvement in Indochina. This demonstrates that the South Vietnamese government could recall the collective memory from a historical event to build a shared identity. *Sons of Hai Ba Trung* excavates the case of heroic warriors about 1900 years ago to backdate the intrepid national identity of South Vietnamese people, driving in the thin end of the wedge that the national spirit has existed unchanged for such a long period of time.

However, at the same time, the analogy between the current political situation and the national historical event revealed a paradox of the Ngo Dinh Diem government and the Republic of Vietnam. According to an analysis report on Viet Cong propaganda by the US Information Service (USIS) in Saigon in 1963, Viet Cong regarded the Ngo Family as "a puppet and lackey of the U.S. Imperialists." They also believed that "the Vietnamese people had a historical past of defeating colonialist invaders" (RG306, p. 4). Therefore, historical legitimacy was one of the key features of propaganda and counterpropaganda between North and South Vietnam, while the South Vietnamese government had its roots in the colonial system. It was the last stage of the Ngo Dinh Diem Government, which had expelled the pro-French government and proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam in the southern half of Vietnam in 1955. At that time, governmental propaganda film productions in South Vietnam began to make films dealing with local issues and policies to prevent alienation of the public. The Ngo government was hostile to tenant farmers and rural guerrillas, and this became the cause of waning popularity and north and south confrontation. Considering that the Ngo government's fall was primarily due to the distrust and disillusionment among the public, symbolized by the Buddhist crisis in 1963, the government-made cinematic illusion of the premodern past seems to have been to little avail in persuading people in South Vietnam.

Both cases in South Korea and South Vietnam demonstrate that the nationalizing projects through cinematic representations of the past were seriously affected by transnational politics, including colonization and decolonization, Cold War confrontations, and neo-imperial interventions. The national boundaries in these postcolonial nations were formed by imagining their "foreign" relations with other countries, such as the USA, Japan, China, and France. The idea of genuine historical continuity of a nation was rather an illusion and could be maintained only by securing a proper external condition that justified the ruling power. However, when the illusion once established a solid foundation, it obviously played a larger role to sustain the domination of mass dictatorship, as one can see in the cases of Korean independence activists like Yu Kwansun and An Chunggŭn. Their "pure" pathos in sacrificing themselves for the great cause of national independence was embraced as something free from a seditious communist impulse and patched to the rather imperfect nation-building narratives of the South Korean regime. Cinematic representations of such national heroes and heroines recurred frequently in the course of contemporary South Korean history and were accepted by the public as proud but obviously banal themes.

National Stars: Personification of the Regime

While historicization of the national past was to a great extent a matter of the narrative structure, the role of film stars in the cinema of mass dictatorship was to the letter a matter of cinematic representation. Their rise to stardom and the public's fascination were mostly outside the area of a logical persuasion, but rather remained in the realm of emotion, taste, and sexuality. It is, however, undeniable that the inexplicable attractiveness of film stars was considerably significant in persuading the public.

Shining examples are found from the films of the Third Reich, including the cases of *Robert Koch, der Bekämpfer des Todes* (*Robert Koch*) (1939) and *Die Entlassung* (*Bismarck's Dismissal*) (1942). Dealing with the great German names of past ages, both films share the one significant cinematic element together to bid for popular favour: the main actor, Emil Jannings (1884–1950). The German actor had become famous in the silent era, performing in such films as *Madame DuBarry* (1919) and *Der letzte Mann* (*The Last Laugh*) (1924), and entered Hollywood in 1927. However, he suffered from the unavoidable impact of talking pictures and had to return to Germany in disgrace due to the poor results of the films in which he took the leading parts during his contract with the Paramount Studios until 1929. The Nazi films, such as *Robert Koch* and *Die Entlassung*, were an escape from his frustration with his short-lived Hollywood career.

What the propaganda machine of the Third Reich wanted to see from him was an ideal of "a withstander as well as an unyielding ruler" (Lewin 2008). He now was an embodiment of the virile spirit that was believed to maintain the regime. In *Robert Koch*, he performed the role of the historic physician and microbiologist, Robert Koch, and illustrated the story of a great German who had rescued humankind by discovering the causative agents of cholera, tuberculosis and anthrax. By eliminating and foreclosing the role of Jewish figures who had affected Koch's discovery in reality, the cinematized medical hero became a historical evidence of the eugenic superiority of the Aryan races. In *Der Herrscher*, *Ohm Krüger*, and *Die Entlassung*, Jannings continuously took the roles of heroic leaders, either chosen from historical figures or fictionally invented, that demonstrated the personified ego of the dictatorial power. Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, awarded him the title of a Staatsschauspieler (state actor) in 1936.

The frequent use of star figures in dramatizing the national past was an effective way to make spectators involved in "the projection-identification complex" of cinema (Morin 1961). "The projection of the spectator onto the hero" not merely "divinizes" the star, but, at the same time, makes him or her "consumed, assimilated, [and] integrated" through the process of identification (Morin 1961). Jannings's heroic roles were set up both to mythicize the German past and to mobilize the current German audiences for the future. Goebbels knew that the stardom of an actor was not precisely separated from the actor's real life, so the conferment of the honor of a Staatsschauspieler was a

strategy of a deliberately contrived sort to evoke public attention to the actor's ideal contribution to the regime in reality.

A similar contribution was required of Kim Sŭngho (1917–1968), a South Korean actor who took the same leading role as Jannings when one of Jannings's Hollywood features was remade in Korea. Kim rose to stardom in the mid- to late 1950s and his first Jannings cover (1959) in *The Way of All Flesh* (1927) was one key to his success. Kim's pattern in performing fatherly figures, including the hero in *The Way of All Flesh*, was characterized by gentle powerlessness, which reflected the discouragement of his generation that had passed through the colonial rule, division of the nation, and the Korean War (Kim 2007). His symbolic fatherly appearance gained steady popularity from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, so that he could continuously take the leading roles in mainstream Korean films. The propaganda machine of the Rhee Syngman Government, which preceded the Park Chung-Hee Government and established the early model of anti-communist mass dictatorship in South Korea, inevitably gave attention to Kim's stardom. The government-manufactured agitational group, Anti-Communist Entertainers' Corps, used Kim's fame and prestige to mobilize actors and actresses to a pro-government agenda and cast them for undisguised propagandistic films, such as *The Independence Association and Young Rhee Syngman* (1959). As Jannings had devoted himself as a state actor of the Third Reich, Kim Sŭngho, in his real life, had to lend himself to the political projects to support the dictatorial regime in South Korea.

As a matter of course, gender politics operated in such cinematic personification of dictatorships. Contrary to the heroic and fatherly figures that both Jannings and Kim demonstrated, the female stars in the screen world of mass dictatorship presented rather a differentiated logic of integration. They showed, in a word, how the governed could be successfully assimilated to the governing power by embodying the supporting roles next to male stars. Li Xianglan (1920–2014), also known as Ri Kōran, in the Japanese Empire is a good example. In the 1940 film, *Shina No Yoru* (*China Night*), Li took the role of a Chinese woman who fell in love with a Japanese military officer. As a Manchurian-born, ethnic Japanese actress, her specialty was native-level fluency in the language of the colonized. Hiding her real ethnic identity, she became the star of the entire Empire, impersonating a woman of the colony who became affectively and sensually intimate with a man of the colonial power. It is noteworthy that Li Xianglan was especially popular in colonized regions, not only northern China but also Korea and Taiwan. She was a manipulated emblem to propagate the diversity of the regime, as well as an embodiment of internalized subordination shared by the colonial audiences.

Gender schema in stardom, however, was not a simple matter. As the object of worship, the female stars at times defied expectations of them. The image of Ch'oe Ŭnhŭi (1926), the South Korean star actress who had stayed on top over the two decades from the 1950s to the 1960s, can be understood in ambivalent ways. Ch'oe was a representative actress in the Shin Film Production and appeared as the heroine in several pro-government

features, including *Rice* and *The Red Scarf* (1964), during the time of Park Chung-Hee. Similar to Li Xianglan, Ch'oe's specialty was performing a woman who had deep knowledge of the call for national unity and played second string to her male counterpart. Her frequently recurring image of a sincere wife/lover asserts itself in both films strongly. However, her acting of the supporting roles, in the literal structure, often went against the expectations of the original role in terms of her physical and audiovisual presence in the frame. In *Rice*, Ch'oe performs the role of a country girl who eagerly assists her fiancé to enlighten villagers and mobilize them for the agenda of modernization. While the couple's interaction represents a typical man–woman relationship based on gender division, what evokes the villagers' attention in the material reality is her appearance and voice, rather than his. The camera shoots her on an angle of elevation and the reverse shot goes down towards the villagers when she gives a passionate speech supporting her fiancé. Such an overwhelming presence of Ch'oe Ŭnhŭi was, in fact, not new in this film. In one of her earliest successes, *A College Woman's Confession* (1958), Ch'oe took a role of a female college graduate and performed a court scene in which she emphatically advocated for an uneducated rural woman, occupying the eyes and ears of the public. In *Evergreen Tree* (1961), a novel-based film that attracted Park Chung-Hee's military junta, the camera also looked upward to her when Ch'oe performed the role of a voluntary teacher giving a lecture in front of country children. In this series of films, she did not challenge the patriarchal order but, at the same time, she enabled the audience to get into an ecstasy of seizing the female initiative on a sensory level. Such a tension between gender norms and the betraying images could be one reason for her long-lasting popularity. When Ch'oe was kidnapped to North Korea, she appeared in a novel-based socialist film, *Salt* (1985), and took the role of a woman who became politically awakened akin to Gorky's *Mother*. Ch'oe and Sin Sangok, her husband and the director of the film, were acclaimed as having enhanced the expressiveness of North Korean cinema, which, in large part, depended upon the ambivalent portrait of Ch'oe.

It is insufficient to categorize the popularity of the stars of mass dictatorship as a result of only a few examples. Nevertheless, it should be remarked that the clear banality of their recurring roles is the basic characteristic that explains the relationship between the stars and the regime. There was a point where the repetitive self-replication of popular star images and the production of a paragon that mass dictatorship needed mutually reinforced one another.

The Biopolitics of Inventing Friend and Foe

What made the notorious anti-Semitic film, *Jud Süß*, be understood as "so cheesy and really banal"? Rentschler interprets the shape of Süß, the infamous Jewish character in the film, as "a latterday Dracula who infects the German corpus" (Rentschler 1996). The Otherization of the cinema of mass dictatorship shares common styles and conventions with ordinary entertainment cinemas in mass democracy. Enemy elements usually emerged as malicious,

immoral and untrustworthy, but they were illustrated as so highly contagious that people on the friendly side could easily be converted into hostages. It was crucial for those representations to provide a guideline to distinguish enemies among the population on the micro level since they could always spring up from the inside. Therefore, the strong hatred toward Süß was, in fact, a part of a technology to separate a group of the existing population from the German community, which demonstrates a resonance with Foucault's theory of bio-politics (Foucault 1978; Lim 2011).

The technology of inventing friend and foe in Nazi cinema hence resembled the common practices of anti-communism in the United States and its allied countries. In South Korea, the making of anti-communist films was promoted by the governmental-level agencies every time the regime consolidated its dictatorial rule. In 1949, when the establishment of a separate South Korean government fostered strong resistance among nationalists and leftists, USIS Korea produced an anti-communist feature, entitled *A Fellow Soldier*, for the first time in Korea and led the trend (Kim 2013). Park Chung-Hee's military junta formulated a national policy on anti-communism and started to control film companies by enacting the Motion Picture Act in 1962. This promoted a boom of anti-communist films in the 1960s. In 1973, when the Park Government amended the Act following the establishment of the *Yusin* constitution, a governmental agency named the Korean Motion Picture Promotion Corporation was set up and produced government-sponsored anti-communist films. These anti-communist films were made to send a signal to Koreans that the ruling power was aware of enemies' existence in the state and would track them down. Such routine warning signs induced people to discipline themselves to be cautious about any anti-government discourses and exclude the "evil" pro-North Others from the Same, namely "docile bodies" that were obedient to the ruling power (Foucault 1977).

The issue of anti-communism was not only crucial in the propaganda films of the divided nation. It was also important in the re-colonized territories of the Allied Powers, including British Malaya where diverse ethnic and religious identities crossed one another. Since its establishment in 1946, the Malayan Film Unit (MFU) successfully brought back the British colonial expertise in film propaganda to fight indigenous communist guerrillas. As these guerrillas were based in farming villages and jungle regions during the Malayan Emergency, MFU's counterpropaganda activities developed to penetrate distant rural areas with mobile units. During the Emergency, MFU produced a chain of anti-communist films to win the hearts and minds of the Malayan people. One such MFU film during the Emergency, *Leave Evil for Good* (1955), demonstrates an interesting case of inventing the Other. Narrated in the first person, the film shows a story of a youth converted from a communist to an anti-communist speaker. The protagonist was affiliated with a guerrilla unit stationed in the jungle of Malaya. After witnessing a corrupted leader's brutal murder, he comes to a resolution to desert from the unit and surrender to the government. From this point on, the film shows common visual expressions

in their depiction of the new foe, communists. The use of sound and lighting is somewhat reminiscent of the British Second World War propaganda films against Nazi Germany. However, to put it more straightforwardly, the film follows the Hollywood conventions depicting evil. The insidious atmosphere of the communist guerrilla camp shares certain expressions of film noir of the 1940s and 1950s.

One notable characteristic of this film is in the depiction of the government official. As the communist guerrillas were mostly Chinese residents in Malaya, the film also casts Chinese-looking actors as the guerrilla soldiers. However, in the scene of the protagonist's surrender to the Malayan government, the actor for the government official is not a Malay nor a Chinese; he is a Caucasian who looks British. The first-person voiceover narrator continuously calls the white man "government," not a government official. In this scene, the body of a Caucasian man in itself embodies the government of Malaya. This shows how such films skirted the issue of ethnicity in building a national boundary through anti-communism. As is generally known, the conflict in Malaya during the state of Emergency was not only because of ideological confrontation, but also due to ethnic tension between Malays and Chinese. Most of the communist guerrillas were working-class Chinese, while Malays were defending their vested rights of preferential treatment as the majority. The government official in the film, therefore, could have been a Malay in actuality. By casting a Caucasian for the part, this film implicitly set up another ethnic hierarchy over these two Asian ethnicities. Over the entangled layers of ethnicity, class and religion, the Caucasian government official's white skin draws a boundary that looks inviolable and absolute. On the eve of the Federation's ostensible independence within the Commonwealth of Nations in 1957, the film shows the order of ethnicity in this mass dictatorship of re-colonization.

Ethnic typification was also used in French Indochina during the period of re-colonization in the 1940s. A USIS post was stationed in Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), the capital of the French colony of Cochin China, and started its regular motion picture activities in September 1946 at the latest (RG59, 9). Indochina was one of the former enemy territories of the United States, and so the US Department of State regarded the mission of reeducation as necessary. After the fall of the Japanese Empire, France pursued a recovery of colonial rule in Indochina and the USA was an amicable ally. However, at the same time, the peninsula became one of the earliest theaters of war in the ideological confrontation of the Cold War. The declarations of independence by Viet Minh, Pathet Lao, and Khmer Issarak were not recognized by France and their disputes over sovereignty eventually brought the First Indochina War from December 1946 to August 1954. Even though US military intervention in the war did not start until September 1950 when the US Military Assistance Advisory Group arrived in Saigon, US film propaganda activities had been in action throughout the mid- to late 1940s.

In these early propaganda activities, most films shown were American documentary films dubbed in French language (RG59, 9). The use of French-language dubbing might have been chosen out of convenience. Most American propaganda

films imported to such former enemy territories had to be printed and dubbed in well-equipped film studios in the USA, such as the US Army Signal Corps' Army Pictorial Center in New York (RG59, 2539). Thus, dubbing in French might be easier than Vietnamese, in hiring staff to translate and narrate. French-dubbed films, moreover, could be shown in other regions, including France and its colonies. The alliance with France, however, should also be considered as a background for USIS to strategically distribute propaganda films in French. Not a few American films depicting the Second World War were shown in Saigon during the 1940s, including *The Nazis Strike* (1943), *Memphis Belle* (1944), *The Fighting Lady* (1944), and *The True Glory* (1945), and all of them emphasized the power of the alliance on large or small scales (RG59, 9).

It is noteworthy that a 1944 film, *Salute to France*, was one of the films shown frequently in Saigon. The film was directed by the renowned French director Jean Renoir, with the codirection of an American scriptwriter, Garson Kanin. The project was launched by the US Army Office of War Information (OWI) to "acquaint the [American] soldiers with French customs and to portray French history sympathetically" (Bergstrom 2006, pp. 45–56). Therefore, this film is full of expressions that celebrate French culture to attract audiences. The three main characters in this film respectively embody soldiers of the USA, the UK and France. They show different attitudes and characteristics, but eventually understand one another as close allies. While Viet Minh was declaring independence from Japan and France, this Second World War film could function as counterpropaganda to justify French rule, apart from its original context. With the French dubbing, this film was shown to 48,835 Vietnamese as of May 1949 (RG59, 9).

As the common cinematic imagery of enemies accompanied the allegory of disease and infection, the reverse was also frequently found in the theme of public health. One of the most viewed USIS films in South Vietnam during the 1940s, *Water, Friend or Enemy* (1943), was a Disney animation sponsored by the US Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. While a considerable number of films dealing with hygiene and public health were frequently shown in Saigon during this period, obtaining sanitary habits was regarded as being armed against potential enemies in many of the USIS films. As seen in another Disney animation, *Winged Scourge* (1943), harmful insects and germs were often likened to enemy soldiers. Hence, modern hygienic discourses were imported from America through the analogy with the wartime identification between friend and foe. Both films were widely released in US-allied countries, including South Korea. Such a repetitive analogy between disease and enemy elements strengthened the public imaginary of an unconquerable regime.

Cinema of Collective Dreaming

The cinema of mass dictatorship was a promise for the collective dream. Clausen, Emil Jannings's character in *Der Herrscher* (*The Ruler*), gives a speech as the owner of a munition factory: "We are here for millions of people and to create millions of jobs and food. We are here to work for the national

community [Wir sind dazu da, für Millionen und aber Millionen Arbeit und Brot zu schaffen. Wir sind dazu da, für die Volksgemeinschaft zu arbeiten]." The industrialist's heroic devotion to the national community is concluded in this scene through his donation of all of his assets to the state. This symbolic scene integrates the goals of cinematic illusions offered by mass dictatorship. By organizing the past events into a national narrative, idealizing the star figures as an emblem of personal dedications to the nation, and inventing a fabricated reference line to identify friend or foe, the cinema of mass dictatorship aimed to maintain the landscape of collective dreaming, namely, the national community (*Volksgemeinschaft*).

It would be banal to emphasize the banality of the cinema of collective dreaming. The slogans of bright future and the promising images of the collective dream were tediously repetitive and based on simple blind optimism. However, it would also be undeniable that the banality of such sweet dreams might create the condition for naturalizing and internalizing the rule of mass dictatorship.

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Militarization

Introduction: Militarization and Dictatorship in the Age of Total War

Daniel Hedinger

Any account of the militarization of entire societies in the twentieth century would scarcely be complete without mention of the concept of total war. Indeed, this novel and absolute form of waging war left its mark on the Age of Extremes, particularly on the first half of the century. It did so, above all, in demanding the militarization of the home front and thus mass social mobilization in support of the war effort (on the concept of total war, see Koschmann et al. 1998; Chickering and Förster 2003b). Yet, what better regime than a mass dictatorship to link militarization with the masses and mobilization with totalitarianism?

The totality of twentieth-century warfare entailed an erosion of boundaries both geographical and temporal. It tore down geographical limits in that the wars of the first half of the century ultimately enveloped and spanned the entire globe. It also overcame spatial boundaries in the sense that the borders between the internal and external—the front and "back home," soldiers and civilians, wars prosecuted between nation states and civil wars—disappeared. On the other hand, the duration of these conflicts also meant that temporal boundaries were transcended: many contemporaries—including Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle—saw the events following the assassinations in Sarajevo in 1914 as a "Second Thirty Years War" (Churchill 1948, preface). And even in times and places where peace reigned, people were often confronted with mass social mobilization which followed the logic of total war. In this way, militarization also left its mark on the comparatively peaceful decades of the Cold War.

From a historical point of view, total war is a child of the First World War. The true victor of this war was not a nation, a state, an empire or a class, but war

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itself (Leonhard 2014, p. 999). Its result was a dynamization of the relationship between the front and the home. Over the coming decades it proved impossible to regain control over the military momentum that the First World War had unleashed, since the total mobilization of political, economic and social resources which the war had demanded had also provided fresh scope for agitation, participation and violence. In the first decade following the Paris peace conference, these new cultures of violence were inwardly channelled, fomenting communist or fascist revolutions in many societies; all of this encouraged a militarization of civil society, or what was left of it. In this light, the effects of the First World War were highly contradictory, tragic and ironic all at the same time, as the victory of the democracies over the monarchies entailed the genesis of mass dictatorships. In his lecture *Society Must Be Defended*, Michel Foucault sought to document the extent to which war may be understood as the midwife of modern societies (Foucault 1997). Analogously, the totalization of war and the militarization of civil society may be seen as the midwife of mass dictatorships.

This is the dominant narrative of the so-called Age of Extremes (Hobsbawm 1994). But talk of total war as the father of all things in the twentieth century rolls off the tongue rather too easily. It risks becoming a platitude, a sort of master narrative that seeks to account for everything and ends up explaining nothing. Several difficulties with such a narrative become obvious precisely in relation to the question of militarization in mass dictatorships, first in terms of whether mass dictatorships invented their own specific and intrinsic form of militarization: as case studies show, the various regimes differ so strongly in terms of the degree and the nature of mobilization in each that we will seek in vain an ideal type of militarization in twentieth-century mass dictatorships. Moreover, while mass dictatorships differ from one another they sometimes strongly resemble the democracies. This is evident in the field of civilian preparations for war: paramilitary, aerial defence exercises, civil defence courses or ritualized commemoration of the dead assumed very similar forms in a variety of different systems. Indeed, in the past century dictatorships and democracies appear to have often converged precisely in relation to militarization; in terms of mobilization on the home front, these otherwise different systems often resembled one another, influenced one another and even interacted with one another.

This closeness appears all the more disconcerting upon closer examination of the origins of total war. The scholarship has rightly emphasized that these developments were by no means merely a result of the First World War. Instead, the origins of total war reach back far into the nineteenth century. A frequently asserted hypothesis is that it was a child of the twin revolution of popular sovereignty and industrialization (Chickering and Förster 2003a, p. 4). Or more precisely, "If the growth of democracy created a tendency to total war, the growth of industry created an increasing capacity for it" (Howard 2005, p. 378). But if so total war and the militarization of an entire society would be primarily a product of the genesis of capitalism and democracy. The similarity between militarization in twentieth-century mass dictatorships and capitalist democracies would thus be neither an accident nor a coincidence

but the logical outcome of the shared past. In turn, the "remote kinship" (Schievelbusch 2005) of fascism, national socialism and the New Deal would not be all that remote after all and would be revealed not only through forms of "staging," architecture and so forth but also, and above all, through militarization and mobilization in these societies.

However, at an empirical level this kinship thesis is still very much a minority view in the scholarship. In the extensive debate on totalitarianism, total war is seen as more of a by-product of dictatorships. In the German case, for example, the thesis is that the "radicalization of warfare that [Erich] Ludendorff envisaged required dictatorial leadership" (Kutz 2003, p. 191). In this light, total war was not so much the father of mass dictatorships. On the contrary, the establishment of a dictatorship was a *conditio sine qua non* for the successful prosecution of total war. But was this really the case? If one compares the effects and the extent of militarization on a global level in the period after the First World War, then doubts are in order. To be sure, many dictatorships shared a belief in the superiority of their militarization efforts over those of the war-weary capitalist democracies. Their confidence resulted from their belief in the superiority of their planning, the advantages which they enjoyed thanks to their centralized control of power and the New Man whom they had created.

Yet over the course of the twentieth century it was the democracies which proved their military superiority, despite all of the predictions otherwise. This was apparent not only during the Second World War, but also in peacetime: the Soviet Union's inability to keep up in its arms race with the USA contributed to its downfall. One could argue that economic inferiority was the main reason for this. But mass dictatorships were not even superior in regard to the economics of militarization: measured as a percentage of total gross domestic product, the United Kingdom and Germany committed virtually the same level of expenditure to arms production during the Second World War, both reaching notable levels of over 50%. These were figures which always eluded Fascist Italy, for all of its efforts (cf. Harrison 1998). On this view, the limits of militarization appear to have been defined not by ideology but simply by the economic capacity and organizational structure of the society in question.

Moreover, within the mass dictatorships there were major differences in terms of their economic approach to total war, so that it is also impossible to identify an ideal type of economic mobilization. For instance, while Germany and Japan, for all of their latent anti-capitalist rhetoric, left ample scope for private-sector initiative, the Soviet Union relied entirely upon state planning and control. Overall, looking back at the twentieth century, it would seem that it was precisely those societies that were never forced to demand total mobilization of their populations which were best equipped to wage total war on their enemies—America's wars are surely the prime example for this. In this light—and this is not without a certain irony—while the objective of total war may have been used by way of justification for dictatorship, once established a dictatorship was by no means a guarantee of success in prosecuting total war.

Does this mean that there is no systematic link or privileged relationship between mass dictatorship and militarization at all? I do not think so, for a comparative global perspective does reveal several connections between the two. First of all, even if total war cannot be understood as having originated in the dictatorships, the mass dictatorships of the twentieth century were in many respects a product of the post-1914 totalization of war. In a first phase, these dictatorships benefited from the breakdown of the distinction between the front and the home, by turning violence inward through the civil wars which brought them to power. In the longer term they benefited from the waning of the distinction between peace and wartime, as they used mobilization to push through their utopian social projects. Seen in this light, the militarization of society frequently served less as preparation for war than to stabilize the regime in question. More often than not, in dictatorships military mobilization became a permanent, ritualized exercise which served the goal of domestic peace more than that of external war.

Second, the degree of wartime mobilization is a good criterion for a comparative discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each dictatorship and thus to establish their specific characteristics, moving beyond the paradigm of totalitarianism. Moreover, while these regimes' militarization measures may not have looked much different (or been more successful) than those of the democracies, their efforts did generally prove superior to the despotism of conventional dictatorships. In other words, from a military point of view the mass dictatorships outperformed their authoritarian relatives and predecessors. Thus the level of military mobilization provides a particularly apt context for a discussion of whether these dictatorships did in fact build upon and reach the masses.

Finally, the mass dictatorships do differ from the democracies in some respects in regard to militarization: for instance, a combination of militarized youth training, mass rallies and universal conscription appears to be a common representational feature of many mass dictatorships, albeit differently embodied in each case. Moreover, the mass dictatorships generally lacked compensatory mechanisms by which to keep militarization in check. They were commensurately radical in their use of violence, acting ruthlessly not only against their enemies but also against their own societies. This is particularly apparent during the Second World War in the USSR, as well as in the German and Japanese empires. In the latter two cases, the totalization of war and thus the militarization of society peaked amid their impending defeat. The specific combination of mobilization, violence and self-destruction may thus be seen as a defining characteristic of several of the mass dictatorships of the twentieth century. In this sense, it might be said that in waging total war these mass dictatorships may have found their true selves.

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Mass Production and Mass Dictatorships: The Economics of Total War in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, 1933–1945

Kenneth Slepyan

Historians have long observed the strong connections between mass dictatorships and total war. For states centered on the concepts of struggle and conflict as their ideological reasons for being, fighting a total war means that conflict is no longer a metaphor but a reality around which societies can be restructured and transformed. Certainly, for both Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, the Second World War was the apotheosis of their respective socio-economic transformations, culminating processes that had begun with the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 and Stalin's "revolution from above" at the end of the 1920s. Yet, despite this general similarity, the ways in which these mass dictatorships responded to the demands of total war differed significantly. These differences, based on ideological, socio-economic and military factors, meant that each state followed unique economic mobilization strategies and policies, which in turn affected the war's outcome.

Well before the beginning of the Second World War leaders in both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union assumed that the next war would be a total war. Indeed, the German and Soviet economies were militarized long before the first shots of the war were fired. In Germany both the military leadership even before 1933 and Adolf Hitler believed that the economy should be as self-sufficient as possible and subordinated to military needs to enable full mobilization in case of war. Similarly, Stalin in his five-year plans and Soviet military thinkers, such as Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskii, also stressed the need for developing a self-reliant industrial economy to support a modern mechanized military.

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Both states also anticipated and even welcomed the inevitability of war, though from different ideological premises. For Nazi Germany, rooted in a Social Darwinist worldview, war was both an end in itself and a means to its main goal: the establishment of a *Lebensraum* in the East, enabling the domination by the "Aryan race" in Europe. The acquisition of living space would also facilitate the goal of autarky. This living space could only be realized through conquest, which in turn necessitated war with the Soviet Union. Hence, war—both the preparation for and waging of—was to be a permanent and defining feature of the Thousand Year Reich. For his part, Stalin assumed that the innate hostility of the capitalist camp, heightened by the Great Depression, would lead to a capitalist attack on the USSR. Citing Russia as the target of foreign invasions since the Mongols, Stalin famously told a group of industrial managers in 1931 that war with the capitalist West was all but certain. "We are a fifty or hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good the distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us."

The ideological necessity of mobilizing all of society to engage in inevitable conflict was also rooted in the other two significant mass dictatorships of the era, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan. Yet because the social, economic and political transformations of interwar Nazi Germany and the USSR were much more fundamental, the comparison is particularly revealing of how mass dictatorships approach the economics of total war. Despite some important similarities, in the end the two preeminent mass dictatorships pursued different armament strategies. Though they shared ideological views about the immediacy of war, the advantages of autarky, the urgency of mobilizing society to fight a total war and, consequently, devoted an extraordinary percentage of their economic resources to war, their histories, social and economic structures, and ultimately their military contexts and objectives meant that their approach to armaments production diverged significantly. By examining each countries prewar armament policies, their wartime production programs and the impact these decisions had on their respective civilian populations, it will become evident that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union may have found their true selves in fighting a total war, but if so then arms production in a total war revealed essential ways these states differed from each other.

German Rearmament in the 1930s

Historian Wilhelm Deist reminds us that "The traditional picture of the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1939 usually obscures the fact that only a few years earlier the total German armed forces consisted of the 100,000-man army and the navy permitted by the treaty of Versailles" (Deist 1990, p. 375). The growth in German military strength from 1933 to the outbreak of war in 1939 was astonishing. In just six years the army expanded from 100,000 men to 2.75 million men and approximately 3,500 tanks. The air force increased from 670 aircraft to over 4,000 front-line modern aircraft. Naval personnel also expanded fivefold. To achieve this growth all other economic policies were

subordinated to the demands of rearmament. While historians continue to debate whether the Nazis' initial economic program in 1933–1935 prioritized economic recovery and employment (Overy 1994) or were from the get-go centered on rearmament (Tooze 2006), there is general agreement that by 1936 at the latest, the German economy was fully directed toward an ever-accelerating armaments program. While exact figures for the cost of rearmament are difficult to calculate precisely, Tooze contends that "The armaments programme of the Third Reich was the largest transfer of resources ever undertaken by a capitalist state in peacetime," as military spending grew from 1% of the country's national output in 1933 to 20% by 1938 (Tooze 2006, pp. xxv and 659). Put another way, Germany's public expenditure on the military increased from 4% in 1933 to approximately 50% just before the outbreak of war in 1939 (Albelshauser 1998, p. 138).

This rapid expansion of the German military and the general militarization of the economy had its origins even before the Nazi takeover. Following the First World War, prominent German military figures such as General Erich Ludendorff and War Minister Wilhelm Groener called for the development of a war economy in peacetime, a *Wehrwirtschaft*, to mobilize economic resources to enable Germany to prepare for and fight a total war. Hence, Ludendorff, Groener and others hoped to avoid a replay of the previous war which had so dramatically demonstrated Germany's economic vulnerability, especially when compared to the resource-rich Allied powers.

Plans for rearmament began immediately with the Nazi ascension to power. Reichswehr generals told Hitler as early as February 1933 that they were willing to accept the Nazification of the military in exchange for rearmament. German industrialists also supported the rearmament drive, especially in the context of the economic depression. Significantly, Hitler showed his preference for private industry by refraining from a state takeover of defense enterprises, which the military had advocated. In contrast to the USSR's centrally planned and controlled economy, the German business sector's continued independence and its insistence on pursuing its own interests against the demands of the military to subordinate economic concerns to military ones would be a constant source of tension between the two until the end of the war. At the same time, the rearmament drive facilitated the imposition of the Nazi mass dictatorship as more and more aspects of German society and its economy were subordinated to the state's goal of preparing Germany for the inevitable war to come.

The industrial foundation for this expansion was a curious mix of some of the world's largest and most modern industrial enterprises and other manufactories producing goods by artisan craft techniques (Tooze 2006, p. xxii). Relatively few German firms used American mass production methods, particularly the assembly line. German-manufactured weapons tended to be high quality but relatively costly and slow to produce when compared to foreign competitors. For example, the Junkers works in Dessau was capable of building only eighteen tri-motored Ju-52 aircraft per year before 1933 (Deist 1990, p. 488). Germany's massive rearmament placed major strains on this system.

Nazi Germany's rearmament can be divided into two phases. The first phase, from 1933 to 1936, was more cautious and relatively anchored in economic and industrial realities. Economics Minister and Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht drafted the initial economic strategy for rearmament, the "New Plan." It aimed to establish an autarkic economy through government control of foreign trade, whose purpose was to facilitate the rearmament drive, particularly the acquisition of key strategic raw materials. Foreign currencies were also strictly regulated. A substantial part of arms production was financed by highly inflationary "Mefo bills," in which a shadow company, the Metallurgische-Forschungsgesellschaft, backed by one million Reichsmarks from four major manufacturers, including Krupp and Siemens, was allowed to present bills to arms producers who in turn could cash in the bills with the Reichsbank. This scheme enabled the Reichsbank to turn on the printing presses to fund rearmament. Not surprisingly, with these mechanisms rearmament proceeded quickly. While short-term goals for the navy and air force were kept comparatively modest due to the lack of resources and to minimize antagonizing the Western Allies, by the autumn of 1936 the army had already expanded to 36 infantry divisions and three armored divisions, the objective originally set for 1939 (Deist 1990).

Beginning in 1936, whatever balance existed between rearmament plans and the economic means for achieving them was upset by a dramatic surge in military spending. Encouraged by his foreign policy successes and his own impatience to secure living space, Hitler instructed his quite willing service chiefs to draft mobilization plans so to make Germany ready for war by 1940. Some historians have interpreted this decision as evidence that Hitler intended to start a full-scale war by then (Deist 1990), although others push the date of intended war back to the mid-1940s when several major rearmament programs were to be completed (Overy 1994).

To meet the demands of this accelerated armaments drive and to ready Germany's economy for war by 1940, in 1936 the "Four Year Plan" was launched under the direction of Hermann Goering. The Four Year Plan was intended to overcome Germany's supply bottlenecks in raw materials, fuel and food by developing alternative and artificial sources. It also established state-owned industries such as the massive Hermann Goering Steel Works and the new Volkswagen plant to manufacture equipment the private sector could not or refused to produce. In effect, the Four Year Plan and its associated industries became a rival to German capitalism. Hitler's announcement of the plan made this clear: "The Economics Ministry has merely to set national economic tasks, and the private sector has to implement them. If however the private sector believes that it is unable to do this, then the National Socialist state will know how to solve these tasks itself" (cited in Abelshauser 1998, p. 145). The selection of Goering, a political leader who lacked economic expertise, indicated that the Nazi leadership viewed rearmament as primarily a political problem, and that the economic constraints could be overcome by the powerful application of political will. Schacht, who saw these measures as inflationary

and damaging to Germany's overall economic position, resigned from the Economics Ministry in the fall of 1937 and was fired from the Reichsbank presidency the next year, further signaling the subordination of the German economy to the needs of rearmament. For their part, while some generals feared that Hitler's expansionism would lead Germany into a war it could not win, most supported him, and only considered the technical and logistical problems of rearmament without thinking about the broader implications of Hitler's program (Deist 1990). This myopia was characteristic of the German generals' strategic and political vision: capable of drafting brilliant military operations, they consistently failed to see the big picture of what they were doing, or even whether the larger strategic goals they pursued were feasible or desirable.

The economic obstacles, however, were real and could not be willed away. Simply put, there were insufficient resources available to meet the ever-increasing demands for arms and military infrastructure. Coal, oil, steel and strategic metals were all in short supply, and the Four Year Plan had only mixed success in procuring or developing alternative methods and supplies. Shortages in labor supply, especially after 1936 when full employment was reached, created another critical bottleneck. To prevent the competing needs of industry and agriculture for manpower to detract from the Wehrmacht's rearmament drive and to create more inflation in the form of escalating wages, labor mobility was curtailed and wage and price controls were introduced. While there was some effort to rationalize and modernize production methods, to increase worker efficiency, too many enterprises continued to rely on labor-intensive production methods. Finally, competition among the armed services for scarce materials and labor further complicated efforts. A central office was established in the War Ministry in 1938 to coordinate service orders. However, senior officers bypassed this office whenever possible and went directly to Hitler or other top officials to secure their needs. Thus, in 1938 additional expansions of armament procurements for all three services were granted but labor and raw material shortages eventually forced a severe cutback in all military orders. To the German leadership, this crisis only highlighted the need to obtain living space to secure the required raw materials and food sources, which in turn required more armaments. This circular reasoning further drove the push for war as the living space could only be acquired through war.

The rearmament drive had a marked impact on Germans, even in peacetime. While they cheered the arrival of full employment by 1936 (helped by the renewal of conscription in 1935), workers chafed at the wage controls, work-mobility restrictions and other measures designed to stifle consumer demand in the cause of rearmament. Germans in the bottom half of the economy suffered the most as their share of the national income fell in the 1930s from 25% to 18%. However, there is little empirical evidence to support Tim Mason's thesis that the Nazi leadership went to war in part to defuse a political crisis in the working class. Although workers and others faced some material deprivations, they also experienced the real benefits of the *Volksgemeinschaft* (national or racial community), including paid vacations, extended health insurance, and

marriage loan programs, as well as the promise of future joys such as acquiring a new *Volkswagen*. The popular legitimacy of the *Volksgemeinschaft* thus allowed the Nazis to fulfill their other plans. Furthermore, Tooze notes that workers in particular took pride in their contributions to the country's revived military strength (Tooze 2006).

By 1939, the overall results of the German rearmament drive were mixed. By any reasonable estimate it had achieved remarkable results: starting from almost nothing the German military had expanded to well over three million men. Because it had rearmed basically from scratch, the Wehrmacht had Europe's most modern weapons and was most immediately ready for war. German generals gambled that these weapons used in conjunction with aggressive and fast-paced operations (later to be known as "the blitzkrieg") would avoid the prolonged total war that was Germany's undoing in the First World War.

Avoiding a long war was essential since, despite the rearmament program's many achievements, many critical insufficiencies remained. Despite the efforts of the Four Year Plan to achieve autarky, Germany remained highly vulnerable to blockade and other forms of economic warfare. Its available resources still did not match its ambitions and it lacked the infrastructure and material resources to fight a drawn-out war of attrition. The following statistic underscores this vulnerability: by early 1939 23% of the German economy was devoted to military spending, while the British and American economies each were spending only 12% and 2% and had only just begun their respective mobilizations (Tooze 2006, p. 310). In short, should Britain and the USA have time to flex their industrial muscles in an extended war, Germany would be at a severe disadvantage.

Soviet Rearmament in the 1930s

In a mirror image to Germany, the USSR began the 1930s with a sizeable, if ill-equipped, standing army, but with a negligible industrial sector. Over the course of the decade it built an industrial base necessary for modern war, though at enormous human and material cost. The First Five Year Plan (1928–1932) prioritized heavy industrial and defense-related enterprises. Like their counterparts in the German military, Red Army leaders promoted the militarization of the economy as essential to national defense. To accommodate military requirements the newly constructed plants often had a dual capacity to produce either civilian or military goods. Thus the Cheliabinsk Tractor Factory, designed with the capacity to produce 40,000 tractors yearly, could be converted in wartime to produce light tanks. Enterprises were also supposed to include mobilization plans for immediate conversion to wartime production, although these plans often were of limited use when war actually came (Samuelson 2011). Some effort was made to locate the new factories in the Urals and Siberian regions, outside the range of potential enemies. However, because of existing communications, transportation and other infrastructure requirements many were built in western areas which later came under German occupation (Sevost'ianov 2004; Barber and Harrison 1991).

During this same time the Soviets also established a military-industrial administrative infrastructure. Eventually four commissariats were created to oversee specific aspects of defense production. These administrations were further expanded and subdivided as the complexity of weapons systems grew (Samuelson 2000).

Soviet military doctrine strongly influenced the types and numbers of weapons produced. The Soviet military planned to fight a fast-paced war based on large numbers of tanks, aircraft and other mobile forces, using Tukhachevskii's concept of "deep battle." This doctrine envisioned a short, violent conflict in which there would be little time to mobilize and produce the necessary weapons and ammunition (Sapir 1997). While Tukhachevskii and other leading exponents of deep battle were purged in 1937, Stalin and his remaining generals still endorsed the plan that an attack on the USSR would be immediately repulsed followed by a grand Red Army counteroffensive. This strategy meant that large stocks of weapons had to be available. By 1941 the Red Army had 18,700 tanks and 16,000 aircraft compared to Germany's 5,600 tanks and 5,700 planes (Sevost'ianov 2004, Vol. 1, p. 44). While these numbers were impressive, by 1941 most of these tanks and aircraft were obsolete, lacking essential components for modern mobile warfare such as radios (Sapir 1997). Because of political pressure to maintain high production figures, industrial managers were reluctant to introduce technological upgrades that would slow down production. As a result, unlike Germany, the prewar Red Army, which was also expanding rapidly during this time, suffered from what historian Evan Mawdsley has called "premature standardization." Political interference by Stalin also affected the quality of weapons, from his intervention in the technical designs and requirements of tanks to his imprisonment of important airplane designers (who nevertheless continued their work in the Gulag) (Mawdsley 2005).

While still a poor country, the Soviet Union's rapid industrialization in the 1930s gave it the industrial base necessary for fighting an extended total war. Although there is some debate as to whether the Soviet economy should be considered militarized before 1939 (Samuelson 2000; Stone 2000), historians agree that once war in Europe began in 1939, the Soviet economy moved rapidly to a war footing. Work hours were extended dramatically, accompanied by draconian laws to prevent worker absenteeism and mobility. Military production was increased and strategic resources were stockpiled. By 1940 over 32% of the country's budget was devoted to military needs (Sevost'ianov 2004, Vol. 1, p. 335). On paper, the Soviet Union should have been well prepared for war when it came in June 1941. The decision, however, to build so many thousands of increasingly obsolete machines, itself a product of the Stalinist fixation on high production figures, meant that the country was less prepared than it ought to have been (Stone 2000).

As in Nazi Germany, the combined emphasis on heavy industrial and defense production came at the expense of the consumer. The Soviet standard of living remained poor throughout the 1930s, and citizens grumbled over the scarcity

of the most basic items. Yet as was also the case with the German counterpart, the emergence of state-sponsored social welfare programs, coupled with promises for a better, richer society in the future, enabled many Soviets to justify today's sacrifices in hopes for a better tomorrow. And, like many Germans, Soviets were proud of their country's growing military and economic strength, particularly when compared to the weakness of Russia's "backward" past. This ability of mass dictatorships to envision a future that legitimated present-day burdens gave them a fundamental advantage over mass democracies in mobilizing their respective populations.

Jacques Sapir has remarked that German and Soviet approaches to rearmament "in a fateful" irony led both countries to policies that prepared them for an immediate war without a drawn out mobilization (Sapir 1997, p. 211). Yet important differences remain which stemmed from their economic means and strategic aims. On the whole, the German military was smaller but had a technological edge on the Red Army with its vaster stocks of increasingly obsolete weapons. Yet this technological superiority, and Germany's more developed and wealthier economy, were still not sufficient to attain the Nazis' goal of *Lebensraum*, especially if the conflict escalated into a global war with the United States. The USSR's large stockpiles of inadequate tanks and aircraft, along with its doctrinal and military-organizational deficiencies, left the country dangerously exposed, particularly if war broke out suddenly. On the other hand, its control of natural resources and its prewar industrialization drive left the Soviet Union better prepared to fight an extended war so long as that conflict was limited to a conventional land war.

Total War and Arms Production in Germany, 1939–1945

The Second World War was a war of choice for Germany, based on its presumed need for obtaining "living space," ultimately from the Soviet Union. Hitler believed that securing this goal would also inevitably be part of an even larger confrontation against the Western Allies, including the United States (Tooze 2006). Given the vast material and population resources its enemies had at their disposal, drawing either on overseas empires (Britain, France) or on entire continents (the USSR, the United States), Germany's best chance for winning the war was through quick victory.

The concept of the "blitzkrieg," the use of high-speed armored forces and aircraft to destroy the enemy in a quick, violent campaign, was intended to provide just this outcome and to avoid a prolonged war of attrition that had ensnared Germany after the failure of 1914s "Schlieffen Plan." In this way, "blitzkrieg" would further Germany's ideologically determined expansionism. Some historians have argued that Germany, following this "blitzkrieg strategy," did not fully mobilize its economy to fight a total war and continued to produce consumer goods until 1942 so as not to lose the support of the German home front. More recently others have contended that the German economy was fully committed to war as early as 1939–1940. However, it took

several years before more resources could be allocated to weapons production from the infrastructure projects to which they had been assigned earlier. German military spending doubled in 1939/1940 and again in 1941/1942 from the years preceding the war, while civilian consumption per individual fell by one quarter between 1939 and 1942, and remained below that of British civilian consumption throughout the war. Measures such as enforced savings plans, increased taxes and strict rationing were all used to reduce consumption to what Hitler believed was an acceptable "existence minimum" to pay for the war effort (Overy 1994). Germany's fundamental problem was, as Mawdsley observes, that its economy simply lacked the resources to fight the Allies, particularly since it had to provide weapons for the land, sea and air: tanks, artillery, and a myriad of other weapons and vehicles for the war against the USSR and later the Western Allies once they landed in Europe; U-boats to fight the Battle of the Atlantic; and fighters in the desperate attempt to defend the Reich from American and British strategic bombing (Mawdsley 2005). While a brief window existed after the fall of France and before the entry of the United States into the war when Germany was fighting "only" Britain and then the USSR, even then its resources were strained as Hitler and his military leaders anticipated the eventual global struggle with the Western Allies while having to acquire and then "police" the occupied territories in the East. Given these circumstances, German industry could not meet every need. The combination of Nazi goals and lack of German resources meant that the odds were long that Germany could win a total war. The ways in which Germany produced its weapons were also detrimental to fighting a total war. The reliance on artisanal craft methods used by many firms continued into the war years. The German military further hindered production by its frequent demands for incorporating new technological or engineering modifications no matter how minor, which slowed production runs. (E.g., dive-bomber enthusiasts in the Luftwaffe high command demanded that the four-engine heavy bomber, the Heinkel 177, have a dive-bombing capability. This requirement, which was never satisfactorily met, set the project back years.) The preference for high-finished, high-quality goods over standardized and less refined assembly-line produced weapons meant that fewer weapons were produced, while the resulting qualitative difference was insufficient to overcome Allied numerical superiority. Production was further complicated by the vast array of weapons types and variants, requiring large numbers of specialized spare parts. The familiar bottleneck of labor supply also intensified. Conscription demands reduced the labor force from 39 million to 29 million even as manpower needs for agriculture and industry grew. The already high percentage of women in the work force before the war (37.4% of the work force) limited the additional number of workers available even when the number of women in the work force rose to over 50% by 1944. The lack of a central office for the allocation of resources created further inefficiencies and bottlenecks. As a result, Overy estimates that production per worker in the arms industry *fell* by 24% in 1939–1941 (Overy 1994).

Yet beginning in 1942 German armaments production accelerated substantially even amidst ever-increasing Allied pressure. Traditionally much credit has been given to the reforms and rationalization measures introduced by the heads of the Armaments Ministry (created in 1940), Fritz Todt, and especially Todt's successor Albert Speer, who took over following Todt's death in early 1942. These included greater control centered in the Armaments Ministry at the expense of the military and other agencies, more "self-reliance" by manufacturers, increased use of mass-production techniques, the reduction of weapons types and models in production, and more efficient use of raw materials. According to one estimate these changes helped raise individual worker productivity by 60% from 1939 to 1944, a figure even more impressive if one considers Overy's estimate of worker production decline cited above. But even with this "production miracle" Germany could barely keep pace with the USSR, never mind the combined resources of the Western Allies. And once the full force of Allied strategic bombing was felt by the second half of 1944, hammering Germany's fuel supplies, communications lines and production centers, arms production declined rapidly.

However as Rolf-Dieter Mueller and especially Adam Tooze have pointed out, the "production miracle" was as much a product of propaganda as it was the result of real improvements in German production. While rationalization of production was critical, so too were important increases in labor supply and raw materials in the critical areas favored by Speer. In order to meet production goals (and thus inflate the statistics of the production miracle) obsolete weapons were produced in huge numbers long after they were outclassed by the Allies' models (e.g. the Me-109 continued as the mainstay of the Luftwaffe's fighter arm despite its having been first deployed in 1937) (Mueller 2003; Tooze 2006). This decision was similar to the Soviet prewar practice of achieving high production targets even when the weapons in question were obsolete. And as in the Soviet experience of 1941, Allied firepower superiority meant that German losses only accelerated.

Fundamental to the Nazi conception of war was the ruthless exploitation of the occupied territories, a point left out of Speer's retelling of the production miracle. In the most industrially developed areas of the Nazi empire, production and key resources were diverted to German ends, while agricultural areas were subjected to enforced starvation so that their food could supply the German Reich (Mazower 2008). Yet the wasteful inefficiencies already noted and the corruption of high- and low-level German personnel limited the benefits of occupation. Hence, although Germany and its occupied territories averaged 33.4 million tons of steel per year from 1941 to 1944 compared to the USSR's 11.3 million, the former still produced fewer weapons than the latter (Mawdsley 2005, p. 51). Perhaps the most important contribution was through forced labor, which, despite Speer's postwar claims to the contrary, he readily employed. The war economy utilized some seven million foreign laborers, many of whom were forced to come to Germany with ever-escalating applications of coercion and terror. Ultimately they amounted to

one fifth of Germany's labor pool. Mazower estimates that of the 1.65 million concentration camp prisoners engaged in the German war economy, only 475,000 survived (Mazower 2008, p. 311).

As Tooze and others have stressed, Germany's inability to keep the pace with Allied production was not so much a failure of German production, but the almost inevitable outcome of going to war against powers possessing much greater resources. That Germany faced this crisis was because of its own ideologically driven assumptions and goals. Once the war began, the mass dictatorship engaged in the murderous plunder and exploitation of conquered peoples and lands in a vain attempt to acquire the living space it imagined it needed.

Total War and Arms Production in the USSR, 1941–1945

In his speech to Soviet citizens on 9 February 1946, Stalin claimed that the USSR's victory over Germany vindicated the Soviet system. And indeed Soviet industry triumphed in either matching or out-producing Nazi Germany in key weapons systems, as Appendix 1 indicates. Given the loss of territory and population that the USSR suffered due to the initial success of Operation Barbarossa, this was indeed a remarkable achievement. Wartime conditions highlighted critical strengths of the Soviet system, particularly the success of its leadership, mid-level managers and the population to adjust to crisis situations, the rapid and effective conversion from peacetime to wartime production, and the determination of the entire society to defeat the enemy. The Soviets were also helped by the fact that their war was fought essentially as a conventional land war limited to a single (albeit vast) front, unlike Nazi Germany's multi-front and multi-dimensional conflict.

Although the Soviet economy had been working under wartime discipline since June 1940, the shock and effects of the German blitzkrieg on the Soviet Union were catastrophic. By the end of 1941, territory containing two-fifths of its prewar population (1940), 85% of its prewar aviation factories, 60% of its armament, explosive powder, pig iron and coal production, and 50% of its steelmaking and rolling capacity were under German control (Barber and Harrison 1991). The first order of business was to evacuate critical industries and their workers to safety. Attempts by some government agencies to draw up evacuation plans in the late 1930s were deemed "defeatist" in the atmosphere of the purges, therefore administrators had to draft evacuation plans on the fly even as German troops approached their areas. That approximately 2,500 plants and their personnel were moved in such chaotic conditions was near-miraculous. Relocated factories, often sited in areas lacking housing and having the barest of other supporting infrastructure, usually required six to eight weeks minimum to return to production (Barber and Harrison 1991).

As in Germany, worker supply was a major constraint. While the USSR was often thought to have unlimited sources of manpower, in actuality, even before 1941 there were few labor reserves available. The German occupation reduced

this pool by several tens of millions. The combined demands of the military and war production meant that some 13 million replacement workers had to be found. These new workers, many of whom came from the countryside, consisted primarily of students, women, and the elderly. To ensure the efficient use of the work force, a Labor Committee was established at the beginning of the war. However, it did not have the power to enforce national coordination among other competing agencies until November 1942. Additional restrictions and punishments were added to the draconian labor laws of June 1940, which had criminalized lateness and absenteeism, although in actuality punishments usually came in the form of fines and other such penalties rather than imprisonment. Unsanctioned labor mobility continued to trouble industrial managers (Barber and Harrison 1991; Samuelson 2011).

Ironically, given the comparative disparity in 1941 between the size of the Soviet gulag population and prisoners in Nazi concentration camps—approximately 1.5 million in the former, 60,000 in the latter (Barber and Harrison 1991; Tooze 2006)—forced labor was less essential to the Soviet war effort than to the German. The gulag population actually declined during the war to 663,000 prisoners in January 1944 as arrests fell and the able-bodied were conscripted. Despite official instructions that required the remaining prisoners to be adequately fed and cared for so that they could contribute to the war economy, conditions in the camps so deteriorated from their already low starting point that large numbers of prisoners were unable to work, and many of the weakest died, further reducing the camp population. Nevertheless, overseen by NKVD head Lavrentiy Beria, forced laborers contributed to the war effort, particularly building railroads and producing ammunition. Approximately 10–15% of all Soviet ammunition was made by gulag inmates.

These measures helped secure the material prerequisites for arms production, but in a system as heavily centralized as the USSR's, efficient administration was absolutely essential. John Barber and Mark Harrison note that Soviet industrial administration was characterized by two systems: a "formal" centralized administrative system composed of a hierarchy of commissariats and factories answering to them, and an "informal" system based on personal and economic relationships that cut across formal administrative boundaries. Both systems were employed in varying degrees and were critical to the overall functioning of the war economy. At the apex was the State Defense Committee (GKO), created on June 30, 1941. The GKO was led by Stalin and seven other Soviet leaders, each of whom was responsible for several economic and military spheres. Two thirds of the GKO's approximately ten thousand directives focused on the economy and war production. It relied on both the formal administrative hierarchy and informal personal relationships, depending on what was needed. The GKO gave the Soviet war economy the centralization of authority that Nazi Germany lacked, at least until 1942–1943 when Speer was able to assert his authority over the disparate elements of German arms production (Barber and Harrison 1991; Sevost'ianov 2004, Vol. 1).

While the GKO helped anchor the formal system, there were still limits to what it could accomplish. Breakdowns in the supply system forced individual factories to rely increasingly on the informal arrangements with other factories, collective farms and raw material suppliers to procure the necessary resources for their enterprises. The pell-mell execution of the first five-year plans inadvertently gave Soviet industrial managers the experience they needed in the even more chaotic wartime environment. At the same time, some elements of prewar planning and preparation proved helpful, such as the experimental tank workshops located in the Cheliabinsk tractor factory, which later helped workers convert shop floors and assimilate modern tank designs. Lennart Samuelson argues that these and other similar measures help explain "why the Soviets managed to improvise a wartime economic system in 1941 at so many enterprises that was to exceed the seemingly superior German economy" (Samuelson 2011, p. 133).

The GKO's decision to limit production of weapons types to a small number of models was also critical. For example, for much of the war the Soviets produced only two tank models (the T-34 and KV), both of which were superior, at least until 1943, to the much wider assortment of tanks deployed by Germany. Unlike the Germans, the Soviets refrained from making numerous changes to their existing models, therefore enabling them to produce in 1942 over 24,000 tanks and self-propelled guns to the Germans' 9,200. By 1943 the German Panther and Tiger tanks reasserted individual superiority over their Soviet counterparts. However, by this time the Soviets' great numerical advantage neutralized any qualitative differences. In addition, a superior weapon on the battlefield did not necessarily make for a better overall weapon in the war: the more sophisticated German tanks were much more unreliable and difficult to repair in the field; the cruder but hardier Soviet tanks could be repaired relatively quickly and easily, and thus were a greater presence on the battlefield (Overy 1996; Sapir 1997; Mawdsley 2005).

Soviet emphasis on mass production made this numerical advantage possible. Production methods were also adapted to meet the abilities of the largely unskilled labor force of women, youth and the elderly. Corners were cut when possible, such as leaving the rubber rims off of tank wheels and stamping tank turrets instead of welding them. As a result the average number of labor hours to manufacture a tank was reduced from 8,000 hours in 1941 to 3,700 in 1943 (Overy 1996). This time savings was crucial since on average the Red Army needed to replace one-tenth of its tank force *every week* (Barber and Harrison 1991, p. 181). By 1943–1944, the Red Army was much better equipped than the Wehrmacht and enjoyed overwhelming firepower superiority. German soldiers, on the other hand, experienced what Omer Bartov has termed a "demodernization" at the front as the number of tanks and guns to stave off the Soviet onslaught became fewer and fewer.

It should be noted that the Soviets were greatly aided by the Allies. Increasing pressure from the Allies forced the Germans to divert resources away from the Eastern Front, while the Allied strategic bombing campaigns and the naval

war against the U-boats meant that the Soviets did not have to invest in their own complex and expensive weapons systems. Lend-lease aid was also essential, not so much for heavy weapons, but for the trucks and other vehicles that gave the Red Army mobility, and for the food and medicines that enabled the population to continue to work (Overy 1996; Mawdsley 2005). One wonders whether the irony of this situation was lost on Stalin and other Soviet leaders who had pressed for autarky in the early 1930s.

The Soviet economic response to the German invasion was swift and massive. By 1940 17% of its GDP was devoted to defense. This percentage increased to 61% in 1942 and 1943, a strain made ever worse on the civilian sector since the GDP during the war years was smaller than before the war. Overall, wartime GDP civilian output fell by almost two-thirds while the defense-production share more than tripled. So many resources were put into military production that by 1943 more allocations had to be given to the civilian sector to prevent the collapse of the entire economy.

The demands placed on Soviet workers in these conditions are almost unimaginable. In vital war industries like tank factories, Soviets worked 12–13 hour days (not including breaks) with only 2–3 days off per month at best. Official rations were insufficient to keep the population adequately fed, and much time and energy were spent finding supplemental food sources, as well as clothing and other necessary consumer items that were now in short supply. In addition, single mothers had to find care for their young children, and often brought them to the factory floor. In many respects the burdens faced by Soviet workers were akin to those endured by forced laborers under Nazi control, excepting those enslaved in concentration camps.

Total War and the Civilian Population

Given the increasing difficulties felt by both ordinary Germans and Soviets, the extensive ability of the mass dictatorships to mobilize their respective populations was critical. The burden of keeping Germans relatively well-off fell on the occupied territories as their economies were reoriented to benefit the German economy and ordinary Germans as food and other consumer goods were diverted to the Reich. As conditions worsened in Germany under the Allied bombing and as it became increasingly evident that the war was lost, Germans nevertheless continued to support and contribute to the war effort. The Nazi regime successfully intertwined the fate of the regime with the defense of the homeland so that it became psychologically difficult for Germans to abandon one without the other. Relatedly, as news about the Holocaust and other atrocities seeped back home, the fear (or realization) that the Allies would regard ordinary Germans as complicit in Nazi crimes provided further impetus for continuing to work for the war effort. Finally, as the regime entered its final months, in one last spasm of violence, more coercion was applied to anyone deemed to be defeatist, including summary executions.

While Soviet citizens also faced state discipline for failing to do their national duty, this seems to have had relatively little impact on their willingness to support the war effort. Nor did Soviet citizens have the relative luxury of obtaining supplies at the expense of other populations as in the German case. Yet quite similar to the case of Nazi Germany, the Soviet state and its citizens were connected by a compatibility of interests. The official slogan "All for the Front!" had real meaning to men and women working in arms factories when it was their loved ones for whom they were working. The great triumph of Soviet propaganda was its linking official calls for national defense with the personal interests of Soviet people. And if these appeals were not sufficient, the widespread knowledge of German atrocities on Soviet soil, skillfully promoted by the Soviet propaganda establishment, imbued ordinary Soviets with an almost unquenchable hatred and desire for revenge.

The German and Soviet mass dictatorships possessed important similarities. Both states' policies were shaped by ideological visions which assumed war in the near future, and sought to establish autarkic economies that would enable them to survive an extended war. Both dictatorships also used the full power of the state to convince, compel, and if necessary coerce their populations to produce for the war effort. At the same time, they also had significant differences that profoundly influenced the way their wartime economies functioned. The continuation of private enterprise in Germany put some limits on the state's ability to organize industry, unlike the Soviet case in which industry itself was a part of the state's apparatus. The different objective circumstances and political cultures of the two states also affected the way their militaries were equipped before and during the war. Finally, the compatibility of each state's ideological and strategic objectives to their actual resources was critical: because of its objectives, Germany found itself fighting wars on multiple fronts, requiring a strikingly different force mix, while the USSR with more limited aims had to fight only one type of war with a smaller set of weapons systems. The Nazi and Soviet mass dictatorships certainly shared important characteristics, but the particulars of their contexts ultimately determined the way they and their populations fought their wars.

Appendix 1. Annual production figures

Weapons (country)	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Total
Tanks and SP guns (Germany)	ca. 1,300	2,200	5,200	9,200	17,300	22,100	57,300
Tanks and SP guns (USSR)	2,950	2,794	6,590	24,446	24,089	28,963	89,832
Tanks (Britain)	969	1,399	4,841	8,611	7,476	5,000	28,296
Tanks (USA)	–	c. 400	4,052	24,997,	29,497	17,565	76,511
Aircraft (Germany)	8,295	10,247	11,776	15,409	24,807	39,907	110,441

(continued)

Weapons (country)	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Total
Aircraft (USSR)	10,382	10,565	15,735	25,436	34,900	40,300	137,318
Aircraft (Britain)	7,940	15,049	20,094	23,672	26,263	26,461	119,479
Aircraft (USA)	5,856	12,804	26,277	47,826	85,998	96,318	275,079
Artillery (Germany)	ca. 2,000	5,000	7,000	12,000	27,000	41,000	94,000
Artillery (USSR)	–	–	–	49,100	48,400	56,100	153,600
Artillery (Britain)	1,400	1,900	5,300	6,600	12,200	12,400	39,800
Artillery (USA)	–	ca. 1,800	29,615	72,658	67,544	33,558	205,175

Source: Overy 1996, pp. 331–32

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Conscription and Military Education

David R. Stone

Carl von Clausewitz famously remarked that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Conscription is no less political, produced by a complex interplay between popular attitudes towards military service, the military's needs, governmental priorities and economic reality. Governments since antiquity have regarded their right to self-defense as giving them the concurrent right to compel military service of able-bodied adult males in defense of the state. Though the principle that the state has the right to demand service is essentially universal, the precise implementation of conscription has varied enormously, depending on the particular circumstances of a state.

Mass dictatorships are no exception to this diversity of systems. While such dictatorships have in common a broad emphasis on the imperative of national defense, their widely varied systems to draw military manpower from their population often resemble most closely other governments of different political organization but similar strategic situation. Contrary to the literature on totalitarianism, which emphasizes the structural similarities among regimes, conscription has followed a different pattern. Mass conscript armies, militias intended for partisan defense of the homeland, and relatively small, volunteer forces have all proven compatible with one-party authoritarian regimes. The Soviet Union in the 1920s, though it consistently stressed the imminent danger of war with the capitalist world, had only a relatively small fraction of its military-aged population under arms. The postwar Soviet Union, by contrast, expected and actually achieved something very close to universal service by men, though with substantial exceptions for health, education and family status. Its satellite GDR employed long-service career soldiers until 1962,

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when it moved to mandatory universal conscription. Mandatory universal service in the North Korean army can extend up to ten years, though in practice the term is generally substantially shorter. Yugoslavia's model of total national defense, based on a defense-in-depth using partisan tactics by the entire population, looked more like the Swiss or Finnish model than it did other one-party regimes. Dictatorships relying on mass mobilization might seem particularly prone to idealize conscription, but even this generalization falls short. The People's Republic of China has maintained the principle that all men can be called upon for service, but in practice has relied almost entirely on volunteers to staff its People's Liberation Army. In part as a result of this diversity, but also because of the natural specialization imposed by knowledge of relevant languages, the military systems of mass dictatorships have generally been studied in isolation, as national cases, rather than in comparative context.

The power of national tradition and the realities of geography can and do matter more than political organization. Indeed, continuity over time in a particular country, even across periods of violent revolutionary change, can be quite striking. The Soviet system of conscription, for example, was recognizably the lineal descendant of Imperial Russia's, incorporating mass universal service administered through local military districts calling up age-based cohorts of young men. China's avoidance of conscription in favor of volunteer forces likewise shows great stability. What mass dictatorships have in common, far more than the particular workings of their conscription system, is the effort to systematically prepare their civilian population for the possibility of war and the need to sacrifice for the needs of the military.

The increasing scope and destructiveness of warfare over the last two centuries have naturally led governments and military establishments to seek to systematically organize their societies for war. Indeed, the most productive definition of militarization employs precisely this standard: the degree to which political, economic and social institutions have been structured to meet the demands of war (Gillis 1989). What marks mass dictatorships off from other forms of political organization is not so much the pressure imposed by modern warfare to prepare economy and society for mass violence, since that is more or less universal. Instead, mass dictatorships lack the countervailing pressures that hold militarization in check. Soviet military thinkers, like those in other states, saw in the 1920s and 1930s that total war required total social organization for war. They saw their advantage, however, in their ability to impose that organization more completely and more effectively than capitalist states could (Stone 2000). By contrast, imperial Germany before the First World War was one of Europe's most militarist states, in the sense of the prominence of uniformed soldiers in governing society, and likewise militarized, in the sense of systematic organization for warfare. Nonetheless, there were a number of countervailing pressures against military demands. An elected *Reichstag* employed the power of the purse to check military spending, as no voters enjoy high taxes. The large and powerful Social Democratic Party was pacifist in its sympathies and critical of the German state, and took advantage of a relatively free press to

criticize militarism (Craig 1955). By contrast, mass dictatorships, not required to answer to opposition parties, public critique, or tax-averse voters, are much more free to invest in preparations for war, whether that take the form of investing money in weaponry or its citizens' time in mandatory military service. The rest of this essay will explore the modern history of conscription and military education in mass dictatorships, particularly focusing on the very different experiences of China, Germany and the Soviet Union.

Conscription and Militarization Before the First World War

In the broad history of conscription, the French Revolution of 1789 and the 1871 German victory in the Franco–Prussian War are signposts that mark key changes in the relationship between the state, the army and the individual. Those dates do not mark precise moments in time as much as they serve as shorthand for broad periods of the introduction of new systems. The French Revolution of 1789 changed conscription by shifting the basis of recruitment in European states. Prior to the French Revolution, armies in Western Europe had generally been manned by long-service volunteers or foreign mercenaries. Soldiers were drawn from the dregs of the lower classes, men the Duke of Wellington with some affection termed "the scum of the earth." Long-term service did provide stability and some degree of professionalism, reflected in tactics of the period: linear formations on the battlefield rewarded speed and precision and required astounding levels of discipline to enable soldiers to withstand intense musket fire. Years of service in relatively cohesive formations promoted precisely those qualities. These long-service, professional armies were necessarily small, and contributed to the relatively low impact of eighteenth-century warfare on civilian populations compared to earlier and later periods.

The French Revolution shifted Europe away from long-service professional armies towards universal service by citizen-soldiers motivated, at least in theory, not by material gain but instead by a potent blend of nationalism and ideology. Beleaguered by enemies at home and abroad, the Committee of Public Safety on 23 August 1793 decreed a "Levée en Masse" under which "all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the armies." This was not as revolutionary as it may seem: as suggested above, all states believed they could demand that men participate in the defense of the state. In addition, the decree explicitly labeled mass conscription as a wartime expedient "until the enemy shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic." Nonetheless, new rules for politics changed the rules of warfare. This first requisition produced some 400,000 soldiers for France's armies. Though these new armies had less training and discipline than the old model armies they faced, professional skill came with time and other European armies had no choice but to match the French army's imposing size. Clausewitz, himself a veteran of the French revolutionary wars, recognized the way in which new political ideas enabled the mobilization

of armies far more massive than those which Europe's Old Regime could sustain. By the end of the Napoleonic period, 600,000 men fought at the Battle of Leipzig (1813), making it three to four times larger than the largest battles of the eighteenth century.

In the wake of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, governments were no longer willing to sustain in peacetime the massive armies they had built for war, so military establishments became smaller and more manageable. The new era of nationalism made the recruitment of foreign mercenary regiments obsolete, but a number of policy choices were available. The Anglo-American option, possible only because of geographic isolation, was to staff small armies with long-service volunteers. In Russia, where the dominance of serfdom in the countryside made returning trained fighting men to rural areas risky, the practice was to conscript a fraction of available peasant manpower for long-term service. Beginning in Russia from the mid-1600s, the tsars would periodically demand a quota of able-bodied men, say one recruit for every twenty households, under a system that lasted two centuries and provided a ready means for nobles and village elders to dispense of drunkards, thieves and malcontents. A standard twenty-five year term in the ranks was essentially a life sentence, and Russian peasants famously held funeral ceremonies when sending their unlucky sons off to the army. The Russian model had the advantage that soldiers became well trained and inured to military life. It reduced the Russian army's capacity to expand quickly in wartime, however, as it did not produce a significant number of trained reserves in the civilian population.

Many European states after Napoleon fell into a slapdash system of lotteries and substitutes, mixing short tours of basic training for some with long-term service for less fortunate (or less well-connected) conscripts. In France, a small fraction of the population was obliged to serve a relatively long term of six to eight years in the army (though much shorter than the twenty-five characteristic of the Russian system), while others served only a few months. Paid substitutes, a common mechanism in many conscription systems, allowed the well-off to avoid military service and created, in effect, a class of lifetime professional soldiers. Austria-Hungary had a similarly patchwork system, under which some did three years in the regular army followed by service in the reserves while others went straight to the territorial militia. After 1867, a characteristic Habsburg complication split the Austro-Hungarian Army further with the establishment of the Honvéd for the Hungarian half of the empire, serving as something between a territorial militia and a Hungarian national army (Gooch 1980; Cohen 1985).

The real innovation in conscription systems took place in Prussia. As the smallest of the Great Powers of the Napoleonic era, humiliatingly crushed by Napoleon in 1806–1807, Prussia used its formidable administrative capacity to implement the first really universal conscription system in Europe. Under the terms of the *Wehrgesetz* of 1814, engineered by War Minister Hermann von Boyen, Prussians were obligated to spend three years in active service (reduced to two years in 1833), two years in the reserves and fourteen years in the

Landwehr territorial militia. Though this provided the essentials of the Prussian mobilization system, the *Landwehr* remained institutionally and culturally distinct as a popular body largely outside the control of the Prussian state, hindering its use as an integral part of the Prussian army in the event of war. In addition, the *Landwehr* received those young men not needed as part of the regular army's annual intake of 40,000, but its part-time and unprofessional nature prevented it from doing an adequate job of training them. As a result, a further series of reforms began in the late 1850s and early 1860s under the leadership of Wilhelm (first as regent and then as King of Prussia), War Minister Albrecht von Roon, and Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke. These aimed to restore three years of service on active duty, closely integrate the reserves and *Landwehr* with the regular army and systematically prepare to use Prussia's railroad system to speed the mobilization and deployment of troops. As a result, Prussia could in the event of war mobilize a far larger force than its civilian population or standing army would seem to allow, while avoiding the crippling expense of lifetime service armies like the Russian. Implementing such a system was politically fraught: Prussian taxpayers resented the expense of such an extensive military machine and Prussian liberals feared the burgeoning power of the army. In the political deadlock that resulted, Wilhelm appointed Otto von Bismarck to the office of Chancellor in 1862 in hopes of pushing the military reforms through the Prussian *Reichstag*. Bismarck succeeded through a series of judicious compromises, but only victory against Austria-Hungary in 1866 ended the controversy over the military reforms. Bismarck's government was able to browbeat much of the newly formed North German Confederation into adopting the Prussian model. German elites also recognized the army as a useful tool of social cohesion, breaking down regional and class divisions in service of national unity (Craig 1955).

Victory in the 1870–1871 Franco–Prussian War confirmed the superiority of the Prussian military system. The result was a general move on the part of all European powers except Britain, regardless of their political system, to a Prussian model of universal short-service producing a trained reserve ready for mobilization in the event of war. Outside of Europe, Japan adopted a similar system in 1873. The speed of transition varied: French anti-militarism and elite reluctance to serve slowed the move to a Prussian model. Universal military service was also an ideal, not a reality. In practice, no army wished to have every single young man reaching military age. In addition to some who fell short of minimum standards of physical state or intelligence, many armies simply could not afford to feed and train a full cohort. All states thus exempted some men from service on grounds of health, and others simply because they were superfluous to military needs. The details varied: by 1914, French concern over Germany's demographic advantage meant the abstract goal of universal military service was almost achieved in actual practice, with 85% of young men going through military training. Elsewhere, the percentage was much lower, and budgetary constraints often meant that universal service only actually included half the young men (or even fewer) reaching military age. Deferments

or exemptions for health, enrolment in higher education or difficult family circumstances trimmed each year's cohort of young men to a more manageable size. This had little to do with the nature of the ruling regime. On the continent, republics and autocracies alike employed mass conscription to build cadre armies supplemented by extensive reserves (Gooch 1980).

Russia's Tsar Alexander II, as part of a comprehensive series of reforms of Russian society in the wake of the Crimean War (1853–1856), overhauled the military as well. Changing Russia's long-service model to universal short-service required the prior emancipation of Russia's serfs, proclaimed in 1861. Once this ensured that discharged soldiers would be free men, War Minister Dmitrii Miliutin implemented a new system of universal service based around military districts. The initial term of service was set at six years followed by nine in the reserves, but in practice the term was quickly reduced. Unlike European norms, certain ethnic groups, notably Central Asian Muslims, were excluded from conscription.

CONSCRIPTION IN AN ERA OF TOTAL WAR

The armies that went to war in 1914, with the exception of Britain's small, professional, long-service force, were all built on the same lines. A small cadre of long-serving officers and non-commissioned officers, alongside a larger force of young men doing their regular service, were supplemented by a flood of reservists returning to the colors with the announcement of mobilization. During the First World War, the horrific toll of human life at the front strained existing conscription systems to breaking point. All armies followed similar expedients of gradually eliminating deferments, shifting younger and able-bodied men away from rear service to the front lines, and extending the age limits of conscription. The United Kingdom managed to rely on volunteers for the first year and a half of the war, but at the beginning of 1916 was forced to implement conscription. The United States followed the same path, enacting a conscription law only six weeks after declaring war against Germany. Russia extended conscription to previously exempted populations, triggering a massive uprising in Central Asia in 1916.

When Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik party seized power in Russia in November 1917, its need for a military was not yet clear. Improvised Red Guard militias, composed of sympathetic workers and soldiers, proved more than sufficient to seize Petrograd from Aleksandr Kerensky and Russia's Provisional Government. These militias then spread the revolution to the rest of Russia's major cities. Based on the model of contagious revolution after 1789 and 1848, the Bolsheviks expected the quick spread of revolutionary ideals and the transformation of the First World War into a civil war between the proletariat and the forces of existing order. This would have obviated the need for a conventional military, so the Bolsheviks made little effort to arrest the ongoing disintegration of imperial Russia's army. It quickly became clear to the Bolsheviks, however, that world revolution was not imminent, that Germany could drive a

very hard bargain from Lenin's new government in return for peace and that the Bolsheviks' domestic opponents, ranging from monarchists to moderate socialists, were quickly organizing to push them from power.

The result was a crash program led by veteran revolutionary Leon Trotsky to organize a military based on conscription and compulsion far beyond the norms of European societies before that point. The new Soviet state established a model subsequently adopted by one-party states and mass dictatorships elsewhere, combining mass peacetime conscription through old tsarist mechanisms with extensive political indoctrination and pre-call-up training for youth and the civilian population. Able-bodied men were drafted into the new Red Army under the same system of age cohorts and military districts employed by the old tsarist army. To be sure, the chaotic circumstances of the Russian Civil War meant that there were many paths other than centralized conscription to move manpower into the Red Army. Armies at the fronts routinely dragooned local manpower into their units, or culled prisoners for potential fighting men. Russian peasants were generally hostile to both Reds and the anti-Bolshevik Whites, and desertion was rife from both sides, so there was little to be lost by pulling soldiers from prisoners-of-war. In late 1917 and early 1918, when the chief threat was from Germany, a number of Russian imperial officers volunteered for the Red Army on patriotic grounds. Once those officers were in the Red Army, and once the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ended the German threat, they were then used against their fellow countrymen. The Bolsheviks employed military commissars to guarantee the loyalty of these unwilling commanders, and further on 2 August 1918 conscripted all non-commissioned officers of the tsarist army for service as officers in the new Red Army. This marked a real step forward in state compulsion: while states have forced men to become soldiers, service as an officer has generally been a voluntary act (Reese 2000).

At the end of the Russian Civil War in early 1921, the Red Army had five million men under arms, far more than the regime could afford to feed and maintain. It thus engaged in rapid demobilization, postponing the construction of a stable and coherent system of conscription until the mid-1920s. Under Mikhail Frunze, who succeeded Trotsky as head of the Soviet military in 1924, the Red Army established a mixed system under which some conscripts served a two-year term as soldiers in a Red Army of 562,000 men, while others became part of a territorial militia, liable for initial training and subsequent part-time service while retaining their civilian employment. The administrative structure of Soviet conscription was recognizably the same as that established by Miliutin under the Russian Empire. The central link was the military district (*oblast'*), which maintained records of draft-age men, oversaw pre-draft military training, and managed the actual call-up. Soldiers were drafted by local commissions in their *raion*, roughly equivalent to an American county, several thousand of which served as the lowest level of Soviet administration. Peasants were, as a rule, less educated and perceived by the regime as less politically reliable, and so were more likely to be shunted into the part-time territorial militia, leaving

urban dwellers and industrial workers overrepresented in the regular army. Just as under the tsars, conscripts often showed up drunk to have their heads shaved and be fumigated for lice. Soldiers completing their two-year service left the army in autumn, replaced by new recruits who spent their first winter acquiring a modicum of military training to supplement the pre-draft skills the Soviet regime also promoted.

In the mid-1920s, an annual call-up could muster 1.2 million men reaching draft age; of those, approximately half were unsuitable because of their health, family circumstances or some other cause. Of the remaining 600,000, barely a third were necessary to maintain the Red Army's full-strength divisions. The rest were shunted into the territorial militia, where they were responsible for five years of part-time service, starting at three months of training in their first year and diminishing thereafter. Soldiers generally served close to their homes to better enable them to carry out part-time service without pulling them away from civilian work. Since the territorial militia was a much lower priority for the Red Army's high command, it received less competent officers, less funding and less equipment.

In 1935 the Soviet regime dissolved the system of territorial militia as inadequate in coping with the demands of modern mechanized warfare. For several years prior to this, the Red Army had gradually converted many of its territorial divisions to regular divisions. Soviet industrial growth and the impending danger of war made a fully trained and large regular army both possible and desirable. Further driven by the imminent threat of war, in 1939 the term of service in the army was extended to three years, and by the end of 1940 the Red Army reached a peacetime strength of 4.2 million men. The trauma of war itself both vindicated the Soviet conscription system, in that the Soviets mobilized and trained an astounding collection of manpower—35 million men over the course of the war—and strained that system to its breaking point. In the desperate days of 1941, ill-trained and poorly equipped worker militias were slaughtered in the ultimately successful effort to save Moscow from the German onslaught. As the Red Army liberated territory occupied by the Germans, Soviet partisans and young men were swept up as ad hoc replacements to fill depleted units.

The Soviet innovation lay not so much in conscription itself, for that had been essentially universal for continental European states, but instead in the systematic organization of society for war and particularly the institution of military training for the civilian population. On 22 April 1918, the regime decreed mandatory military training for all young men. The Red Army established *Vsevobuch* (Universal Military Training for Laborers) as a means of preparing men up to age 40 for service in the Red Army as well as more elementary preparation for school-age children. Women could participate on a voluntary basis. The ideal was to provide approximately one hundred hours of basic training in the workplace, whether the factory or peasant village, outside of normal working hours. Though the chaos and material poverty of the Civil War meant that concrete implementation always fell short of proclaimed goals, *Vsevobuch* did manage to provide at least elementary training to five million people.

In the early 1920s, as the Soviet military suffered from starvation budgets, the regime attempted to find ways to transfer the burden of supporting defense away from the state to Soviet society. Part of the answer through the 1920s was *shefstvo* (patronage), whereby local governments, factories or other social organizations adopted a military unit to provide moral and material support. More persistent, though, were massive social organizations intended to provide systematic pre-draft military training to Soviet youth. In the mid-1920s, the Soviet government encouraged the creation of three voluntary societies to promote aviation, preparation for chemical warfare and the general needs of Soviet defense. Those organizations were combined in 1927 into Osoaviakhim (Society of Friends of Defense and Aviation-Chemical Development). It was unique in the Soviet system in that it was a public, mass and ostensibly voluntary organization.

This particular combination of universal training and political compulsion marks one of the few ways in which mass dictatorships are distinct. Certainly groups intended in part to promote military preparation existed in other societies. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, German shooting clubs, the Czech nationalist Sokol organization and the Scouting movement created by Robert Baden-Powell all had military elements. These were, however, private organizations, not arms of the state. They also had a variety of purposes besides the strictly military, promoting the health and vitality of the nation or even purely recreational ends. The Soviet Osoaviakhim, while theoretically voluntary, was closely intertwined with the Soviet state and the Red Army, and clearly intended to serve the goal of military preparation. Osoaviakhim extended throughout the Soviet state, from the central government down to local branches in schools, factories and collective farms. Though it always had to scramble to wheedle scarce resources from local government, it enjoyed the backing of the Red Army's high command. Its responsibilities included broad education in basic military skills such as marksmanship. The Red Army expected that new conscripts would have received some basic level of familiarity with military life. Osoaviakhim carried this out through 120-hour training courses. They extended far beyond this, however, to encompass more technologically sophisticated training; its titular responsibilities for aviation and chemical warfare required this. Soviet youth received training in flying gliders, parachute jumps and the basics of aviation maintenance, as well as short courses in particular military specialties (radio operation, for example). By 1933, Osoaviakhim ran more than 2,000 training centers throughout the Soviet Union, and the number of trainees each year reached into the millions (Odom 1983).

Germany's experience of conscription under mass dictatorship resembled that of the Soviet Union in that it saw a return to the essential structure of the draft and military manpower policy prior to the First World War. Outside of the Soviet Union, the end of the First World War returned Western states to their status quo. Continental Europe continued to employ a system of universal short-service and reserves, while the United States and the United Kingdom

returned to small, professional armies. The major exception, of course, was Weimar Germany, which was limited by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles to a force of 100,000 men, 15% of the size of imperial Germany's peacetime army, and barred from using conscription. Under the leadership of Hans von Seeckt, the *Reichswehr* made a virtue of necessity. Von Seeckt built a highly professional and well-trained force geared towards expansion, preparing officers and enlisted men to lead much larger formations in the event of war. In essence, officers and men were trained to handle responsibilities in wartime one level higher than their peacetime rank would indicate.

Though Adolf Hitler had support within the German military, much of the aristocratic and socially conservative army elite viewed him and the Nazi movement with distaste, however much they shared his antipathy to the strictures of the Versailles Treaty and the institutions of the Weimar Republic. Hitler reconciled the German generals to Nazi rule in 1933 in part by the prospect of renewed conscription and military expansion. Even before conscription, the Nazis instituted compulsory labor service (initially for university students) to accustom young men to physical training and communal living under the authority of the state. Under active discussion from 1933, conscription was formally reintroduced in 1935. Universal service applied to all non-Jewish men reaching age eighteen and entailed a single year under arms, extended to two years in 1936. By contrast to Hitler's overhaul of other German institutions, Nazi conscription policy was quite traditional (Craig 1955).

Hitler followed the Soviet lead in employing youth organizations to prepare for war. The Hitler Youth was relatively small and insignificant prior to the Nazi takeover of power in 1933, after which it benefitted from the abolition or absorption of competing religious and political youth groups, as well as increasing social and administrative pressure on young people to join. By the outbreak of the Second World War, membership was mandatory and essentially universal. In addition to its obvious ideological functions, the Hitler Youth devoted a great deal of time and attention to military preparation; Erwin Rommel, noted commander of the Africa Korps, served in the late 1930s as the German Army's liaison to the Hitler Youth. In peacetime, the systematic promotion of physical activity and sport had a military rationale but also served to improve the health and well-being of the German nation. Hiking, map-reading and camping likewise provided indirect training for war. The Hitler Youth also had substantial programs offering focused training in useful skills of driving, automobile maintenance, glider piloting and riflery. In 1942, as a result of the growing strain that total war put on German manpower, Hitler ordered the expansion of training camps to prepare young German men in their late teens for military service, a system which had become universal by the end of 1943.

At the most abstract level, the mass dictatorships of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany show fundamental similarity: state-sponsored organizations trained young people for military service, while the military relied on universal short-service and reserves for manpower. China, by contrast, has followed a quite different path. China's enormous population relative to the states on its periphery has meant that a universal service army is both staggeringly expensive

and superfluous to the state's security needs. Moreover, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China's lack of a strong central government meant that systematic conscription was impossible to implement. As political movements and warlords struggled for power after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911–1912, the extraordinary diversity of regimes in China makes generalization difficult. Warlords could and did impress mass numbers of soldiers on an ad hoc basis, but most governments lacked the administrative capacity or economic basis to engage in systematic conscription. The CCP and its Socialist Youth League, created in 1920–1921, engaged in political indoctrination and mobilization of youth but refrained from military training in this early period in favor of building membership and infiltrating other social organizations. Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang made repeated attempts in the 1920s and 1930s at forming auxiliaries to mobilize popular energy: coopting the Boy Scouts and creating the Blue Shirts and the New Life Movement. All aimed at strengthening the nation and Chiang's Nationalist Party; none was predominantly military in their focus. Even in 1938 as the Guomindang was retreating west from Japanese attack, the creation of the Three People's Principles Youth Corps was aimed at building political support, not providing military training. Indeed, the first systematic military training in China in this period seems to have come from the Japanese-collaborationist Chinese Youth Corps, which organized detachments of young Chinese for local self-defense and policing (Mulready-Stone 2014).

Conscription and Mass Dictatorships During the Cold War

After the Second World War, the Soviet conscription system continued in its essentials the pattern established by the tsarist empire: all young men were theoretically responsible for military service. Maintenance of this massive conscription system with the Soviet Union's population of 300 million produced the largest military in the world by the end of its existence, amounting to six million men. Only India or China might have matched that, but both those states relied on volunteer, professional forces, not conscription. The postwar Soviet Union returned to the imperial Russian principle of extra-territoriality. When possible, conscripts served outside their home region, abandoning entirely the territorial militia of the 1920s. Like the tsars, the Soviet state offered deferments for family circumstances (particularly children of invalid parents), and like all conscription systems excused recruits in poor health. Higher education permitted delaying military service and a reduction in the total length of service to eighteen months from two years, but often included the requirement to train as a reserve officer while moving through university. These reserve officer appointments were highly desirable for Soviet elites, as they generally enabled men to avoid full-time active service altogether. Over the course of the postwar period, military service became increasingly distasteful to Soviet elites and non-Russian nationalities. Draft avoidance, fraudulent medical exemptions and creative use of higher education deferments became standard. Reluctance to serve

was worsened by the phenomenon of *dedovshchina*, or hazing of new recruits. After an overhaul of conscription law in 1967, the intake of new recruits and discharge of veterans took place twice yearly instead of annually. This seems to have undermined unit cohesion, and produced a dramatic jump in the systematic abuse of new arrivals and ethnic minorities (Jones 1985; Odom 1998; Reese 2000).

In the Soviet Union's East European satellites, the aftermath of the Second World War witnessed immediate demobilization. As Cold War tensions increased in the late 1940s, Joseph Stalin compelled the reintroduction of conscription and expanded military production along lines quite similar to the Soviet system. The sole exception was East Germany, where the recreation of military forces proceeded more slowly. After first establishing militarized police, the National People's Army was officially created only in 1956, and made entirely subservient to the Warsaw Pact's United Command. Manned initially on a voluntary basis through a combination of high pay and food rations with political cajoling, the NPA shifted to mass conscription in 1962 for eighteen months' service.

After the Second World War, the Soviet civilian training organization Osoaviakhim went through a series of reorganizations, emerging in 1952 as DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy). This became particularly important as the burden of conscription eased somewhat. In 1967, the standard term of service was reduced from three years to two (four years to three in the navy). In partial compensation for losing training time, preliminary training for school-age youth was expanded. Girls as well as boys were included in this training, though their program spent less time on weapons training and more time on first aid and practical nursing. In addition, *DOSAAF* offered an extensive range of training courses to prepare young people for more specialized service.

During China's war with Japan (1937–1945), a combination of patriotism, ideological indoctrination and a devastated civilian economy meant that the CCP could rely on volunteers to man its army. Quality of recruits was not high: it often took its soldiers from bandits, refugees, socially marginal elements and (after 1949) veterans from the defeated Guomindang armies. The Guomindang itself instituted conscription as a wartime measure, but managed to gather far less manpower relative to population than the other states at war. The CCP organized a popular militia in areas under its control to serve as a manpower reserve for the Chinese Red Army. When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, the principle of universal military service was again proclaimed, but with implementation that fell far short of this goal, as the state simply could not afford full conscription. During the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s, Mao's regime stressed the importance of universal militia service, but this aimed primarily at mobilizing manpower for economic goals, not military ones, and continued in practice to be much more selective than universal. The Chinese military also seems to have regarded this militia as an attempt to infringe on its professional responsibilities, not an integral part of a system of national defense, and offered it little institutional support.

More recently, the People's Republic's immense population has made conscription generally unnecessary. The yearly intake of approximately a million new recruits can be met by as little as 10% of the annual cohort of young men reaching military age. The central government imposes regional recruiting targets, but military service is reasonably well compensated and prestigious. As a result, volunteers fulfil most or all of the quota, and only a minimum of compulsion by local authorities is necessary to supply the Chinese military's manpower needs. Increasing economic opportunity in China since the 1980s has reduced the material incentive to volunteer for military service, and the Chinese military has found its recruit pool dominated by rural youth instead of the better-educated urban population it would prefer. Increasing use of Chinese nationalism by the regime in Beijing has provided a partial counterweight.

In the wake of the Cold War, many states have either eliminated conscription or reduced the standard term of service. Rampant draft evasion in the Soviet Union has continued into contemporary Russia, which as a result has engaged in a long and fitful process of gradually introducing professional soldiers on long-term contracts to its military. The People's Republic of China continues to rely on volunteers. The increasing technological sophistication of modern warfare means that short-service conscripts are less useful militarily. At the same time, the incomplete wave of democratization after the end of the Cold War has enabled more public opposition to conscription. Many states which in theory employ conscription in practice provide numerous exemptions. North Korea, which continues to employ full-scale conscription to produce a mass army, is thus an atavism in this way as in so many others.

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Language, Discourse and Performativity

Marek Jeziński

If we assume that men are the animals able to use symbols in their everyday life, it has also to be assumed that language is the most powerful and potent system of symbols employed by human beings. People talk, argue, discuss and by the use of language they try to create and shape the world according to their wishes and expectations. Moreover, they do so on the basis of socially shared and negotiated symbols employed to make an impact on the listeners. Apart from informative function, language, as a set of symbols, is characterized by certain performative features related to political power, as it provides the integration of a group or the exclusion of the others. Therefore, it is not surprising that such figures as kings, dictators, leaders, shamans, witch-doctors, religious leaders and politicians use language to exercise their power over the masses and make their potency visible. On the other hand, the masses are ready to accept the suggestions and orders on the basis of a commonly shared definition of social situation expressed in language. To put it more simply, our social life, regardless of time and place, is constructed by the symbols shared in the public sphere and maintained by the usage of language both in official situations and in everyday life. Such aspects as the magical powers of language, the elements of polarization and social integration or exclusion are used in the official language by the people in power to assure the obedience of the masses.

In this essay I examine the features and functions of language used in the public sphere, especially in non-democratic regimes (authoritarian, socialist and communist ones) in Europe. I try to discuss the question, What is so attractive in language itself that the people in power perceive this form of symbolic communication as a basic means by which they maintain the construction of political

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and national identities and shape the policy they follow in the public sphere? Language with its performative potency serves the political class as a special instrument helping to enforce conformism and subjugation to the authorities.

The Main Features Political Language

Language as the most complex set of symbols is used by all societies in the public sphere, official situations and in everyday life. From the perspective presented in this essay, the public sphere is the most significant one: regardless of the type of political regime the public figures employ language to present themselves in the best possible light, to stigmatize political enemies, and to persuade the masses that their ideas and ideologies are the most suitable for a current situation. This is so in the case of democratic systems (by the use of language, the political class generally attempts to seduce the electors and gain their votes), while in non-democratic states (i.e., totalitarian or authoritarian) they employ language as a means of captivating the masses, making them unable to manifest their point of view (especially the discontent against the leaders), and pursuing the struggle against political foes who are stigmatized and presented in a negative light. Thus, language is perceived as the most powerful means by which the politicians enforce their will upon citizens and ensure legitimization for a political system. It is not surprising then that politicians of all regimes and epochs attempt to control the linguistic means used in any particular system in order to define the situation at economic, cultural, social and political levels. This provides the basis for those decisions which are intended either to change the existing status quo or to maintain their positions.

The most important elements present in the language of politics in every system can be identified in the strong polarization of political discourse, symbolic and ritualistic use of linguistic means, and the selectivity of content the politicians try to use in public. All these elements are indicative of the symbolic aspect of language and the performative potency of discourse: by using language people express their ideas or political visions and act in the public sphere.

The polarization of political reality constitutes the basic characteristic of political language in both non-democratic and democratic states. This feature implies that the value sign is attributed to every aspect of life, and all phenomena can be labelled in language as "good" or "bad" and "desired" or "undesired." Thus, ideas, ideologies, objects, parties and—of particular importance—people are supposed to be distributed according to the wishes of a particular politician and the division is manifested as a linguistic label (or labels) ascribed to the phenomena. In this perspective everything can be named as decent or indecent, moral or immoral. Such divisions are present in everyday life and come as a kind of human reaction to reality as such: people need to feel safe in their everyday activities, therefore they simplify reality and plan the mental constructs of good–bad, desired–undesired or safe–danger to provide a certain label to phenomena. This kind of thinking is also present in another symbolic system significant for men, that is, religion: the division of the spheres

that compose the world into the profane and the sacred is rooted in the same kind of perception of reality. The sacred sphere of noble gods and spirits, sanctified, maintained and cared about in the proper way, is supposed to convey certain desired benefits for society, while the ill-natured spirits and spiteful gods are perceived as the ones who bring disasters to the community. This feature of religion and language is noticeable in the case of Manichean religion where the aspects of light and darkness, good and evil are strictly isolated one from another and cannot be mixed under any circumstances (since the mix might bring the ultimate calamity for a particular group of people). A similar phenomenon is observable in politics, especially in non-democratic discourse: it is strictly subjugated to the ideological divisions and consequently, the labels of "good" and "evil" are ascribed to every phenomenon as a certain constant symbolic stigmatization. Thus, the political foes are perceived as the eternal enemies, and accordingly, they are to be excluded from the social sphere, by means that include physical elimination. Consequently, in the political discourse of propaganda, the opponents' ideas are categorized as maleficent, their standpoints are always considered as wrong and the activities they perform are labelled as harmful and detrimental for other people, for society as a whole and for the political system as such. Therefore, this feature of "newspeak" practised in totalitarian regimes can be named as "political Manicheism," since it is based upon strict and rigid categories attached to all spheres of social and political life and the inflexible character of the whole discourse. The Soviet propaganda of the twentieth century, especially of the Stalinist period, provides examples of this: "kulaks" (the category of rich peasants) or small businessmen were stigmatized as anti-socialist elements and class enemies, ideological opposition activists were labelled as "mad" or "insane" people, while other nations as a whole (e.g., Americans, Germans) also were stigmatized as enemies (see for instance, the propaganda of the Cold War used by the Soviet leaders).

The question of nationalistic discourse is best visible in times of war when the military enemies (for example, German and Japanese soldiers) are stigmatized as Fascists or during propaganda campaigns, when the ideological enemies are often portrayed as rats, worms, thieves, deviants or mentally ill persons who should be kept in hospitals for proper treatment. Similarly, people who were against communism and tried to promote different values (not only related to capitalism) such as those of the youth subcultures were also treated as anti-socialist elements, were stigmatized in official discourse and state police action was taken against them. In the 1970s and 1980s young hippies and punks in Moscow, Leningrad, Krakow and Warsaw were frequently investigated, attacked by armed militias, expelled from schools, drafted to the army and sometimes confined to mental hospitals (as was the case of one of the most recognized Russian punk musicians, Jegor Letov, who was given shock treatment in a Siberian mental hospital).

More importantly, the custodians of political propaganda in totalitarian regimes can impose new connotations to phrases or change the meaning of words in use according to their political and ideological needs. Such

manipulations with discourse are present in all systems, but they are most clearly visible in non-democratic ones. Again, Soviet propaganda is the perfect example. The word "fascist" was used in the Stalinist period not to label the sphere of ideological views of the enemies, but represented a category isolated from political ideas, and its meaning shifted towards certain kinds of moral custom, indecent behaviour, cruelty, malicious activities. Thus the users of this propaganda manipulated words by imposing the broadened meaning in order to condemn all enemies—labelled as "Fascists" regardless of the real political ideas they held. Victor Klemperer (2006) provides similar examples from the Third Reich propaganda of the Hitler period. For instance, the word "incest" was redefined by propaganda as "sexual intercourse with a person of non-Aryan origin," instead of the definition based on blood relations drawn from cultural anthropology—that is, sexual intercourse between two people who are close relatives. Incest as a cultural phenomenon is negatively stigmatized and in almost all cultures it is an activity labelled as taboo. Therefore, this negative connotation was used by Nazi propagandists who even passed laws regarding this sphere: thus someone who went out with a non-Aryan person (mainly those of Jewish origin) could potentially be accused of incest—an accusation which involved the moral sphere.

In the case of democratic regimes, polarization in political discourse usually takes the form of stigmatization of the enemy. The figure of the foe is used in party propaganda constantly: an opponent is identified, labelled as the oppositional force and then stigmatized as the one that obstructs the progress of the state, damages the activities of other people and so forth. The phenomenon takes the form of constant critique of an opponent which is disseminated through the channels available to politicians, and also by the media (e.g., in public discussions, interviews with journalists, parliamentary orations, electoral broadcasts). Moreover, the struggle in the political arena is sometimes presented as a real fight against a foe who is supposed to be hurt by any accessible linguistic means while, on the contrary, the speaker is presented as an attractive, eloquent and able politician (Walton and Macagno 2014). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the new media are often used for the dissemination of this kind of discourse (political blogs, news sites and party sites). Additionally, the electronic public media are also used as the means by which the political struggle is aimed at the electors: here the politics presented in the media must meet the criteria of attractiveness for the mass audience (Wodak 2009). In speeches, pronouncements, interviews and so forth political leaders regularly stress the basic opposition between the two sides of political conflicts, manifested in the "us versus them" political division represented in the rhetoric practised in the public sphere.

The phenomenon indicated above is closely related to the question of selectivity of content in politics. This involves the tendency to show the providers of information in the best possible light, as those who enjoy social support of the masses, and to present the adversaries in the worst light as people who counteract the progress of a country. Thus politicians tend to underline and

exaggerate their own victories and diminish their defeats, while they present the opposition politician's activities in the reverse manner, frequently stressing responsibility for disasters and suggesting that their successes are not worth mentioning in the public sphere. The practice is visible in all types of political regime, but propagandists in totalitarian regimes show this characteristic most clearly; thus, the propaganda of the 1970s in Poland (under Edward Gierek as General Secretary of the Polish communist party) was called "the propaganda of success" to indicate the constant tendency to stress the victories of the party and its leaders, said to be realizing the programme of socialism—the one possible path to progress in the country. As Michał Głowiński (1990) emphasized, totalitarian regimes underline spectacular successes of the economic sphere they control, while they use euphemisms and metaphors to mask the defeats they suffer. For instance, the press and TV programmes in Poland during the socialist period did not inform the public about crises, opposition movement or the workers' strikes in Poland (in 1980), or about economic crises and plane or train accidents in the Soviet Union. Information concerning such facts were banned and tabooed: the official propaganda tried to ignore them as long as it was necessary or useful. Similarly, the Third Reich propaganda, as Klemperer (2006) observed, tended to use imprecise categories such as, among many, "innumerable," "unrepeatable," "unimaginable" or "the eternal" to persuade the masses in Germany that the Nazi leaders were able to control the situation and to plan a promising future, in which the German nation would enjoy the full victory of national socialism.

Language and Power

Political discourse could be defined as those patterns of behaviour and attitudes expressed in a symbolic form which political actors present to the public sphere. It is diversified according to the form and the substance of the texts generated by the speakers in public. Such texts embrace the written and spoken word, gestures, non-verbal messages, and the context in which political communication takes place. The contexts are defined by a particular situation in which the actors are placed and by the cultural dependencies that shape the activities of the people in power. Discourse used by a public actor reflects the ideology promoted by the purveyor of that discourse, including his or her political views, demographic and social background, or the attitude towards different political processes (e.g., modernization, Westernization, traditionalist attitudes etc.). Discourse also represents the political *universum* in axiological categories related to wider cultural patterns of behaviour, seen as desirable or non-desirable from a social point of view.

From the perspective adopted in this study, the language of politics is strictly related to political power, that is, the possibility of substantial and regular influence on other people (i.e. activity should be significant in terms of the results, ensuring people are ready to act in a way desired by the one who gives orders, and the activity should be able to be repeated within a certain span of time).

Power in politics is treated as the main goal at which all political actors aim. The relation of power implies the possibility to influence the activities of other people, controlling them and steering their activities to a greater or lesser degree. Such relations of power are of regulative character: by modelling the activities of other people, politicians try to redefine social conditions in which they act and the direction of the influence is mainly controlled by the one who achieves an advantageous position in the relation of power.

Political discourse is practised by actors creating and influencing patterns, attitudes and social activities desirable form the point of view of the purveyor of information. Therefore, cultural patterns are defined mainly in terms of moral or immoral, good or bad and so forth. From this perspective, language reflects not only institutional bases of politics (e.g., ideology as such, party system, the electoral law, parliamentary relations etc.) but also the attitude of political actors towards wider cultural processes manifested in a particular country.

These attitudes are manifested in political discourse in the form of political myths, in which the whole span of time and history as such are defined and shaped according to the wishes of particular political leaders (Jeziński 2003). Such myth is perceived as a narrative serving as a tool of legitimization of a particular party or ideological standpoint in a social system: although it refers to the present conditions in which parties act, it is deeply rooted in tradition and it contains the future plans and prospects useful for the particular actors. Thus, such stories refer to (1) the past, that is, the times of foundations of a given ideology, party, movement, taking the form of cosmological myths (such as the myths of the Golden Era); (2) the present times (presenting the current political or social plans of an actor); and (3) the future. They cover the plans the actors try to impose in the public sphere, and also this type of narrative through myths presents the desirable social and political order which will be installed after the politicians of a particular movement take the power and change political reality. Consequently, they will be able to impose social orders according to their wishes and needs (these myths take the form of the eschatological stories concerning the end of time).

A myth is perceived as a certain story as it creates a kind of common *universum* of meanings based on symbols and, moreover, it is expressed only in the symbolic system. It is a declaration or a statement performed in political or social conditions defined by a sender of information. Thus, it creates a platform of reference for the meanings expressed in the process of telling the story and mythmaking schemes. This community of meanings takes the form of the common vision of a state shared by a politician and a citizen. People tend to create certain socially shared frameworks which are supposed to integrate those who take part in the act of political communication. In this sense, a word can create reality by labelling certain aspects of real events, institutions, persons or activities people perform. The political usage of words is supposed to captivate the audience or to bewitch reality by employing emotions and associations related to a given part of reality. It could be assumed, however, that such enchanting political reality is close to manipulation: by the handling of a word or repeating

certain information, the sender of the text creates the suggestion of their compliance with non-linguistic reality.

In the political language of democratic systems, symbolic use of words is related to magical thinking as such, and is connected with the effectiveness in the public sphere that politicians try to accomplish through their activities. Such formulas as slogans or catch-phrases used commonly by politicians, political parties and movements are designed not only in order to charm the electors by expressing the main ideas promoted by the organizations in attractive words, but also to help the politicians to define the aims of their group and support or convey their positive image within the political arena.

In totalitarian regimes in turn, the latter phenomenon is exercised by using a kind of quasi-sacralized, or quasi-idealized discourse which contains strong emotional and metaphorical linguistic categories. It is perfectly represented in the holy book of Soviet communism, that is *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)* (published in the Soviet Union in 1936). All the events that took place in the history of the Party are mythologized in the text, especially the stories related to the activity of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. He acted as the invincible prophet of the revolution combining the features of a supernatural hero and common man, close to ordinary people and taking care of their needs. As one can read in *History of the Communist Party* (1939, pp. 16–17, 22–23):

> Lenin enjoyed the warm affection of the politically advanced workers whom he taught in the circles. … In 1895 Lenin united all the Marxist workers' circles in St. Petersburg (there were already about twenty of them) into a single League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. He thus prepared the way for the founding of a revolutionary Marxist workers' party. Lenin put before the League of Struggle the task of forming closer connections with the mass working-class movement and of giving it political leadership. … Under Lenin's guidance, the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class linked up the struggle of the workers for economic demands—improvement of working conditions, shorter hours and higher wages—with the political struggle against tsardom.
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> But Lenin continued his revolutionary activities even while in exile. There he finished a highly important scientific work, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, which completed the ideological destruction of Narodism. There, too, he wrote his well-known pamphlet, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats.* Although Lenin was cut off from direct, practical revolutionary work, he nevertheless managed to maintain some connections with those engaged in this work; he carried on a correspondence with them from exile, obtained information from them and gave them advice.

Mythological images are generally supplemented by the sharp stigmatization of a political enemy. This phenomenon is identified as an immanent part of political language as such; nevertheless, it is fully manifested in the case of political myth. The presence of a figure of an enemy is employed for the

generation of bilateral opposition and also it is used in the process of engineering the integration of those who share the particular political ideology. The juxtaposition of Lenin (and later Stalin) with Trotsky in Stalinist propaganda substantiates the point: they were located on the opposite parts not only of the ideological spectrum but the ontological as well. They epitomize the good and the evil, respectively, as their activities are presented in a way that cannot be either ignored or put into question. As in all myths, the tale is presented as one that cannot be undermined: one has to believe in it or reject the whole standpoint embodied in a particular mythology. Enemies present juxtaposed visions of reality and of desired social order, therefore; their points cannot be mixed with each other. In general, in totalitarian politics those who win take control over the means by which they can symbolically and linguistically humiliate and physically eliminate those who lost the ideological confrontation.

The above division of myths and discourse in politics into three parts indicates that such stories, regardless of the nature of the political systems in which they are generated, shape the general framework in which the social system as such and the politicians competing for the power in the public sphere function. Political myth dominates the discourse the actors practice: it is bound up with the current political struggle against enemies and serves as a narrative used to legitimize the place a particular actor takes in the system. Such discourse is mainly presented in black-and-white terms on the axiological spectrum. Discourse in politics, as indicated before, sets the reality in terms of strict divisions into right and wrong, although these categories are flexible and they are defined by the public figures according to their current political goals. The notion of the "truth" in political language is compliant and can be defined, managed and used with no relation to non-linguistic reality. The figure of Lev Trotsky in the Soviet propaganda of the Stalinist period serves as the epitome of the phenomenon: he was the comrade of Vladimir Lenin, acting as one of the main revolutionists and the general architect of the Bolsheviks' victory in 1917. After the death of Lenin (in 1925), he was marginalized by Joseph Stalin who was afraid that Trotsky would take power in the Soviet Union. Thus, propaganda presented Trotsky as the morbid vermin who damages the healthy roots of revolution. Finally, Trotsky was expelled from the country and killed by Stalin's agent in 1940. A similar fate awaited such revolutionary leaders as Sergey Kirov, Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Yezhov and Grigori Zinoviev. These figures held a prominent place in the Bolshevik party in the 1920s and early 1930s but were totally expunged from the handbooks of the history of revolution, official propaganda notes or photographs presenting the leaders of the Soviet country. This activity of the Soviet propagandists served as the basis for depicting the political customs of the perfect totalitarian regime of Oceania in George Orwell's *1984* (1949), in which "newspeak," that is, language used by people, is totally subjugated to the decisions of the political rulers.

The other example is of an inclusive character: the democratic opposition in Poland at the beginning of the 1980s—that is, the group of workers and intellectuals gathered in the Solidarity movement—was labelled as an

anti-socialist movement of a counter-revolutionary character. To counteract this political and social force, the communist party imposed martial law in 1981. After a few years the communists had to face a deep economic crisis and in the middle of the 1980s they realized that they would have to include (at least to some degree) the opposition in the process of the reforms which were supposed to lead to the recovery of the ruined economy. Additionally, they faced strikes in industrial regions of Poland, shortages in the market and the rise of mass discontent expressed by the citizens. The communist party then was only reluctantly ready to share power and—first of all—responsibility for the country with the Solidarity opposition. Therefore, the opposition, once called "anti-socialist forces" and an "illegal workers' movement," in 1988 was presented as a seemingly responsible social force in communist propaganda. Moreover, the party had to convince itself and the Soviet Union leaders (Mikhail Gorbachev who was the First Secretary of the communist party at that time was ready to accept the change both in the region and in Russia) that the reform path they took was right and that they still had control over the main resources in the country. At the end of the 1980s the government signed a temporary agreement with the opposition to legitimize the reforms and the Solidarity movement and the opposition leaders were labelled as a "half-legal opposition." Eventually, in the Spring of 1989 they signed "the Round Table Agreements" which sanctioned the presence of the opposition in the June 1989 general elections. Although the elections were not fully democratic, the Solidarity camp won 33% of the seats in the lower chamber of the Parliament, and after three months Tadeusz Mazowiecki (one of the main opposition intellectuals supporting the workers' movement) became prime minister, thus accelerating democratic changes in Poland and in the whole region.

Political Language and Symbols

Linguistic habits are the bases for political rituals performed by all authorities, and ritual ceremonies held in the public sphere allow the political class to be visible to the masses, to manipulate the public and help to enforce obedience to orders or create social support for their decisions. The aspects of linguistic behaviour in the political sphere indicated above are always present in discourse practised by politicians.

The language of politics is related to the symbolic dimension of power. This dimension has to be visible to the participants of the political or social system: it is an indispensable condition for every state structure as it provides a kind of control over power itself. Symbols generate real activities in the public sphere and they are perceived as the focal centres for the masses: people tend to impose significant meanings to the symbols, worship them and perform certain activities in the symbolic sphere. As Georges Balandier (1972) indicated, power exists only in the context of "the stage," namely, it has to be visible, observable and easy for the evident verification for those who are controlled. It means that the symbolic attributes can be ascribed to political power, as they

make authority noticeable for the citizens and recognizable for other political systems or counter-elites. The "stage" of power is related to rituals, the execution of sovereignty and the performative character of political activities: they are used for the symbolic and functional maintenance and reproduction of the system. Such rituals, on the one hand, demonstrate the effectiveness of the authorities in respect of their ability to control the activities undertaken by the citizens in the public sphere. On the other hand, rituals legitimize the system as such by reproducing the definition of a situation promoted by those who are in power. The ritual theatre of power confirms the majesty of authority, as it underlines the existence and continuity of power, and it creates conviction about the necessity of power and its legal character. Therefore, authority must be not only visible to a citizen, but also attractive and colourful, according to the old imperial saying, "panem et circenses." The ritual ceremonies of politics should be perceived as theatre in which the actors try to meet the needs of the public. This means that politics, regardless of the type of political regime, is supposed to be eye-catching for the members of a community by providing a certain kind of entertainment to the masses, and the political class, as Murray Edelman indicates in *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (1988), has to attempt to plan such ritual behaviour as a kind of political spectacle with its special features. Evidently, all political state systems are based on ritual ceremonies to a lesser or greater degree. Social and political leadership work in the system as a functional and structural demand indispensable for systemic stability. Also they accomplish performative functions: by using the rituals and enforcing political decisions the authority creates, maintains and reproduces the system. Thus, the leaders conducting the ritual try to persuade the observers that their structural position cannot be questioned and that they have the rights to represent a particular society or a nation as a whole.

Such "existence on the stage" delimits the most important aspect of all power, namely, its symbolic conditions. From this point of view, rituals and ceremonies cannot be treated as hollow or vacant entertainments of the elites and the masses, but are symbolic confirmation of the continuity of power. In this spectacle the political leaders perform an essential role, as they physically perform ritual ceremonies, but also, by using their real image, they legitimize a political system as such, its history and the patterns of political culture prevailing in a given society. In this perspective, the king, the president or the prime minister are perceived not as single political roles separated from other roles, but as the personification of the system as a whole. Therefore, the overthrowing of a person exercising power in a particular state is an act of symbolic character in the first place. Revolutions behead the kings in the public to indicate the significant character of the changes and the symbolic character of the great turn: the beheading of Louis XVI in France (1793) or the trials and executions of Saddam Husain in Iraq (2006) and the Romanian communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu (1989) provide the epitomes of the phenomenon.

The symbolic dimension of political language implies that the words do not exist outside the symbolic environment: they are rooted in context, as the

contextual usage of words can create desirable associations and, more importantly in politics, emotions. Thus, language used by the politicians in public must be related to such contexts. Each political environment creates different conditions for the use of language: mass meetings, TV pronouncements, radio speeches, books, campaign leaflets, press interviews, Internet sites and so forth create the space to which linguistic means have to be fixed. More importantly, such relativization of verbal contact between the politician and the customer is typical of each case of political communication.

The use of symbols can be found in all political systems, democratic and non-democratic. In democratic countries the use of symbols is enormously important: party flags, colours, the "victory" sign used by Winston Churchill during the Second World War and by the "Solidarity" movement in Poland, or the pronouncing of certain words ("democracy," "pluralism," "ecology," "political correctness" etc.)—all serve as the illustrations of this phenomenon and are visible in political rituals such as campaigns, elections, party meetings, especially during the time of social crises, when the integrative function of symbols in politics can be noticed more clearly. Also in totalitarian regimes, the role of symbols is of immense importance. By evoking and creating a symbolic sphere, authority unites an in-group and indicates an enemy, realizing the unity of the masses and making power visible and legitimized, because in such regimes the role of ideology based on the symbolic sphere is crucial. The examples of a fat, rich, cigar-smoking American on the one hand, and a white pigeon of peace on the other, which were frequently depicted in the Soviet or Polish propaganda of the communist era, exemplify this question. They were permanently employed as one of a means of direct political struggle. The visual and verbal signs used during martial law and afterwards in Poland (1981–1986) also confirm the above thesis. Among many symbols employed during that period, one can find such epitomes as: the national colours of white and red, the shape of country borderlines, a cross, an anchor with a stylized "S" (which referred to the symbol of the Polish underground during the Second World War), a white eagle with red outlines as the sign of Poland's independence, or the red letter "S" as a symbol of the "Solidarity" social movement used by the anti-communist opposition on the one hand, and on the other, the pictures of Vladimir Lenin with a red banner used by the communist government, the symbols representing the alliance of the peasants and the workers. Also the political actors employed the pictures of symbolically loaded public and historic figures who were significant for Poles. For instance, the "Solidarity" and opposition movement positively pictured such names as: Lech Wałęsa ("Solidarity" movement leader), Czesław Miłosz (the winner of the literary Nobel Prize), Jerzy Popiełuszko (the anti-communist catholic priest killed by the agents of the communist secret police) or Pope John Paul II, and negatively depicted such people as the General Secretary of the Polish communist party Wojciech Jaruzelski (particularly the dark glasses he wore as a symbol of the "dark side" of the communist regime was portrayed frequently), and the Soviet leaders who played a negative role in Polish history in the twentieth century such

as Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin or Leonid Brezhnev. In the first half of the 1980s, they were portrayed in political jokes and spiteful cartoons, or in the everyday discourse Poles practised at that time, creating a sphere of symbolic resistance against the Soviet-controlled government.

Conclusion

The elements of political language discussed in this essay are supposed to influence the activities of the masses and successfully persuade the citizens that the vision of the future presented in the ideological texts, the political pronouncements or real activities in the political arena, will lead the whole country indisputably to success. Such discourse features as the polarization of reality, the ritualization of all political activities, the symbolic character of political language or the selectivity of content are permanently used by politicians in the public sphere to build their position as effective professionals. By using the ritualized formulas, they seek to represent specific groups of electors, to express their ideological visions and try to behave as people who are legitimized in the positions they hold. At the same time, they try to impose a specific model of thinking accepted by the masses and expressed in the language they use in public in the search for the pragmatic means for the process of the efficient legitimization of power. Political communication in states takes different forms on various levels concerning public real activities or the symbolic sphere, and language is the main and the most powerful means by which effectiveness in the public sphere is achieved.

The activities people use to perform political rituals depend on the actor's attitude to politics and the symbols used in this sphere. The form of the rituals and symbols used in them are variable because politicians are ready to model and shape such signs according to the requirements of the current political situation. People are bound together in the framework of the state or nation by the sets of keyword-ideas which evoke the same emotions for the citizens, regardless of their race, religion, sex/gender, ideological orientation, occupation and so forth. It is not surprising, then, that national loyalty is maintained first of all by the conscious use of symbols commonly shared by people. Consequently, all aspects of political reality are reflected in the symbolic sphere manifested by language, and it can be asserted that symbol is the element that constitutes the most significant core of public figures' activities in political systems of every type.

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Women's Total War: Gender and Wartime Mobilization in the Japanese Empire, 1931–1945

Ryuichi Narita

Introduction

Focusing on Japan, in this essay, I will explain the concept of "total war," specifically through examining the total war experienced by Japan during the Second World War. In particular, I will analyze this topic from the perspective of the civilians who were mobilized during the war. In other words, I will observe how exactly the war mobilization was carried out, how it changed history and finally how it affected Japanese society. Moreover, this study also analyzes how the total war system was developed, and conducted by citizens at the bottom.

I will not focus on the mobilization of soldiers in this essay, but rather the mobilization of women, including women from Japanese colonies at the time. Different from a typical war fought solely on the battlefront, the Second World War turned into a total war that was fought on the home front and even included people of the colonies. In other words, it can be considered a "women's total war." And in addition to performing total war to own the colony, the country experienced defeat—it is about the total war historiography of Japan. While the analysis of Japan's total war system has two aspects, universal and unique, I will examine the total war system as an example of mobilization of colonial people. It is also a study of how the total war system led to defeat.

Originally, the total war began as the Second World War movement during the Asian-Pacific War (1931–1945). From the Manchurian Incident (1931), through the Second Sino–Japanese War (1937) and until 1940, Japan had

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been deploying troops into China. From 1941, during the Asian-Pacific War and while the war with China continued, Japan began to fight against Allied Powers such as the United States, Great Britain and Holland.

At this time, Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin were colonies of Japan. The people of these colonies worked as engineers and coal miners, but during the closing years of the Asia-Pacific war, men were mobilized even as soldiers. Through mobilizing not only Japanese citizens but also citizens of the Japanese colonies, a total war unfolded in the Japanese Empire. Triggered by the war itself, a mobilization plan was designed, leading to a state of total war. With the enactment of *Kokka sōdōin hō* (the National Mobilization Law) in the year of 1938, they created a system to mobilize citizens and necessary supplies.Triggered by the war itself, a mobilization plan was designed, leading to a state of total war. With the enactment of *Kokka sōdōin hō* (the National Mobilization Law) in the year of 1938, they created a system to mobilize citizens and necessary supplies.

Under this system of national mobilization were three fundamentals: (1) political and economic mobilization; (2) mobilization through ideologies based on nationalism and militarism; (3) and the agreement that those at the top (i.e. the government) and those at the bottom (i.e. the general public) would each do their part.

In 1940 (under the rule of Konoe Fumimaro) the new system was realized and the war mobilization was completed. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA/*Taisei yokusan kai*)[1] became the center of this system. The association merged and gained control of all groups and organizations which had up until that time existed independently. Additionally, they established their own prefectural, metropolis and neighborhood-level branches.

When the war with the Allied Powers began in 1941, the movement progressed even further, resulting in more assistance organizations. The Japanese-Literature Association (Nihon bungaku hōkokukai), and later the Japanese-Speech Patriot Association (Dai-nippon genron hōkokukai) were formed and put under ideological regulations. Moreover, the Japanese Industrial Patriot Association (Da-inippon sangyō hōkokukai), the Agricultural Patriot Association (Nōgyō hōkokukai), the Commerce Patriot Association (Shōgyō hōkokukai), the Maritime Association (Nippon kaiun hōkokudan), as well as each of those industries were placed under regulations. Finally, groups based on age and gender such as the Greater Japan Women's Association (Dai-nippon fujinkai) and the Greater Japan Youth Association (Dai-nippon seishōnendan) were also created.

Through such formation of groups and organizations, mobilization was systemically designed. What is notable here is that on one hand, this movement was based on a chain of command in which those "on top" would be the ones to organize everything in order to effectively administer the war regime. On the other hand, it was considered the responsibility of those "at the bottom" to act in accordance by voluntarily and independently participating in the movement.

In earlier years, of the war regime, emphasis was put on control and regulation. However, in more recent years, the war mobilization system, as elicited above, also included the concept of mobilization from "the bottom." More specifically, the total war system took advantage of social order by placing citizens at the peripheries in order to support those at the center.

In fact, women, colonial citizens, as well as children and disabled people were targeted for this mobilization. For example, in the case of people with visual impairment, in the total war system they were made to identify the sound of enemy aircraft (by model) and were marched. A total war was conducted based on the fact that they agreed to this mobilization. It is the logic that justified physically unimpaired people participating in the war because "even" disabled people followed the system. Failure to comply was serious as it was unacceptable to be uncooperative; people with disability were severely condemned as "second-class citizens." In other words, this mobilization system also displayed aspects which aimed to both take advantage of social paradoxes and also to reform society itself. In this essay I will examine this topic from a gender-based perspective. In the first instance, while concentrating on Japanese politics, I will discuss the relationship between total war in Japan and women. In the second, I will study a woman, Oku Mumeo, who took part in the war mobilization system specifically. In the third, I will present the contradictions women faced through the total war system. In the last, I will analyze from women's point of view the expectations women faced under total war.

Japanese Women and the Mobilization for Total War

If we view the above statements in relation to women, we can see: that (1) the Empire of Japan implemented the mobilization of women in pursuit of total war, and that (2) these women actively participated in the war in an attempt to change the idea that women were "second-class citizens" in a male-dominated society.

Female independent activity in the war became a mixture of voluntary participation from women, and mobilization requested by the government. In the case of Japan, women were expected to practice government propaganda. Women had collected contributions and ironware. In addition, they sent off soldiers going to battle, visited injured soldiers and also comforted families of the war-dead.

There is an interesting episode regarding this topic. In order to create an education system for wartime, the Japanese Ministry of Education appointed Yayoi Yoshioka, who was one of the leaders of the women's movement, to Kyōiku shingikai iin (the Education Commission of Inquiry), which was charged with promoting a wartime educational structure. Yoshioka expressed her dissatisfaction because she was not named as a member of the special committee of 74 members and she was the only woman. Japanese government did not utilize women, they just used women. Despite this fact, this incident is representative of how women actively participated in the war in order to improve their social rank.

A female writer once said, "We have all-of-a-sudden become not just simply women, we have become 'home front women'" (Mori 1937). During the total war, the false illusion was created that war participation at the peripheries would eventually advance those people toward the center. With the notion that Japan was heading towards a turning point, women began to recognize it as their role in society to actively participate in the war. However, it is hard to overlook the fact that women's roles were marginalized. They voluntarily assigned themselves the tasks of consoling soldiers. They thus sent *Ian-bukuro* (comfort bags), wishes for safety and good luck belts called one thousand stiches (*Sennin-bari*).[2]

Women of the middle class were not the only ones to participate in the movement. Women of the labor union also participated by doing things such as seeing off soldiers; sending charms, comfort bags and donations; as well as comforting bereaved families. Women of the labor union asserted the importance of fulfilling their role on the home front, and to not take for granted the fact that their husbands and brothers were risking their lives as soldiers to protect their motherland. The labor union participated in the war based on mobilization orders from the government. Originally, the Japanese labor union took an important role cooperating with government war policy and functioned as a base of the war mobilization system in wartime.

Left-wing women also started a new movement. They organized the Social Democratic Women's Association (Shakai minshū fujin dōmei) that had been at the center of the proletarian movement, and they wanted to get rid of the bourgeois management. On top of that, left-wing women created the Japanese Socialist Women's Association (Nihon kokka shakai fujin dōmei) in 1932. While advocating anti-capitalist and anti-communist ideals, they also separated themselves from Social Democracy. They requested affinity from the nation and helped raise money for families who had family members sent off to war. At the same time, they also advocated protecting Japan's special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria.

Women from the Japanese National Socialist Women's Association decided to stop trying to do the same things as men and rather focus on using their "self-awareness as a woman," to construct a "new society." In order to "correctly develop Japan" and "liberate the lifestyle of the general public," they created the slogan "*Katei e! Katei e!*" (To home! To home!). They fought for the ideas of "returning to the household" and "protecting the lifestyle of the mother-and-child" with the goal to reform capitalistic society from a woman's standpoint. "A true women's movement is one which arises from the home" (Women's Frontline 1932).

The feminist movement progressed by women's rights activists had reached the point where advocating socialism was a part of the war mobilization movement as well. It was considered a woman's contribution to her country by taking part in the "national reconstruction movement" while taking care of the children and household. The women's labor force was heavily involved regarding the questions of how to understand capitalism, the country and the war, and where to place criticisms.

At the time, government policies were divided into two sides regarding whether to include or exclude female soldiers (Ueno 1998). In Japan, where women were excluded from becoming soldiers, there were movements from women coming from both sides of the argument. The movements from each side of the argument, along with government policy itself, became intertwined, creating complex circumstances.

Furthermore, the wartime system required the positive participation of colonial women. In a roundtable talk that appeared in *Fujin kōron* (Women's Public Opinion) in May of 1940, Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981), one of the leaders of the women's movement in Japan, talked about unification; she urged people not to divide "the main land" and Korea as part of the vision of "creating a new order in East Asia" (*Toa shinchitsujo kensetsu*). She also encouraged Korean women, including the supporter of Korean women's education Shindok Hwang (1898–1983), who had the same view as Ichikawa. Hwang asserted the idea of changing from a "public territory" (one in which Japanese and Koreans were separate) to a "private territory" (in which Japanese and Koreans were considered the same). During the closing years of the war, Hwang's previous "anti-Japanese" nationalistic view had turned into one supportive of the development of the Japanese Empire for the sake of stabilizing Korea.

A Female Activist: Oku Mumeo

I would like to now investigate female participation during the total war from a different perspective. I will mainly focus on a female activist named Oku Mumeo (1895–1997). She was born the daughter of a blacksmith in Fukui prefecture. Oku Mumeo was a very rare example among women at the time, as she went on to study in higher education at Japan Women's University in Tokyo. After graduating from the university, Oku became a journalist, covering stories related to labor unions. Furthermore in 1920, she, along with fellow women's rights activists Hiratsuka Raichō and Ichikawa Fusae, was involved in the establishment of the organization called the New Women's Association (Shin fujin kyōkai), which advocated women's rights and suffrage. The New Women's Association helped gain the recognition of women's participation in politics, and had a huge effect in the women's rights movement. The law forbade women's participation in political meetings and was repealed by the New Women's Association.

In addition to that, in 1923 Oku formed the Working Women's Society and organized a movement for the average woman in the labor force. The names of the movement changed many times, from Working Women (Shokugyō fujin) to Women and Labor (Fujin to rodō) and then finally to Women's Movement (Fujin undō). However, it was in fact the frequency of changes to the movement itself which showed Oku's interest in and dedication to the matter of women's rights. She combined the concepts of "work" and "female" in order to create a new movement. Oku accepted the concept that it was a woman's role to manage the household, and therefore it goes without saying that she advocated the traditional concepts of motherhood.

Taking this standpoint, Oku focused on the idea of "consumerism" and searched for a path in which women could actively participate in society. She formed a consumer's cooperative society in which only women could participate, and was appropriately called women's consumers' co-op (Fujin shōhi kumiai). With the formation of this union, as opposed to men, who were involved more with production and manufacturing for the war, women carried out a movement from the home in which they managed the purchasing of products. Within this movement, they aimed to achieve a Social Reform Movement (Shakai kaizō undō) through the aspect of product consumption. Subsequently, women's consumers' co-ops changed when men left their workplaces and women engaged in production.

In other words, in order to strive towards a reform of society, product consumption, which had previously been something that was kept private, was made into something more public and shared between people (specifically women). This meant that women, who had before been isolated and considered to be just simply part of individual houses, began a more communal lifestyle shared with other women. In 1930, from this movement emerged "women's settlements." These settlements even progressed as far as the establishment of communal lifestyle facilities called "working women's homes" (Oku 1932). Here, women met and created open facilities where they could work and study together. Furthermore, in addition to rooms to stay for the night, daycares were also implemented. This facility was created also to meet the demand for consultation, regarding birth control and marriage. Moreover, there were also school-review study sessions held during the night. However, more so than anything else, this institution was created so that women could carry out household labor together. Thus, cooking areas and laundry areas were included. The purpose of this was to reduce women's burdens through joint housework. The working women's house was run until burned out by an air raid in 1945.

This experiment of Oku was formed in order to (1) oppose a society controlled by men, (2) reform the capitalistic society and (3) gain the independence of women in society via a women's movement through product consumption. Overall, it could be considered as a social reform movement from a women's standpoint, based on daily life activities and consumerism.

However, the total war system took in the war effort from the "bottom" and from the "peripheries" of society, and the independence gained from the movement became more focused on the movement for the sake of the war effort mobilization and less focused on women. In other words, the independent movement for the liberation of women merged with the movement for the war effort, and became no more than just part of the support of the country's war efforts.

The reason for this was the change in the meaning of consumerism, which resided in the government's action to make product consumption more public as soon as the nation entered the wartime period. As product consumption was made more public, it came to be considered a social act. This was not in order

to oppose previous standards and acknowledge women in society, but rather it was the acknowledgement of women indirectly related to the effort of women who met national needs. In other words, it became just part of the total war system. Along with changes to the concepts of "public" and "private," the course of direction and total meaning of the collective effort of women was reversed.

Oku stated, "In this time of war, while this is our time, it is really for the sake of putting in labor and effort for the nation. It is not we who decide things. It is, in fact, the nation who decides" (Oku 1942). In addition, she also talks about how women's ideals and morals would change with the participation of women during the war. Oku's active contribution towards the mobilization of women, through encouraging them to participate as citizens of the nation in a mental and spiritual sense, became beneficial for Taisei yokusan kai (IRAA) during the war. Furthermore, Oku asserted that the wartime system was a time in which women progressed, and became able to create a new path for themselves.

Under the total war system, women, who had up until that point been considered as second-class citizens, became considered as national subject. In the middle of a High Defense Nation (*Kōdo kokubō kokka*), war was pursued under large-scale war mobilization. The fact that women became acknowledged and considered as true citizens was due to the wartime system. Female nationalization came to be recognized by the government; that is, it was absolutely imperative to obtain women's cooperation to maintain the wartime system. In other words, it was women's participation in the wartime system when it comes to women as subjects. During total war, the social contributions of those at the "bottom" were requested, were taken and integrated with action from the "top." The more those at the peripheries of society who were considered as second-class citizens were placed at such a low social rank, the more they desired to be acknowledged as national subjects. During the wartime system, they were able to participate independently and from there gain this type of acknowledgement.

In addition, under the wartime system, "cooperation" was guaranteed, and as this cooperation grew stronger, women as a group in society became more important. Furthermore, during total war, as rationalism and efficiency became more prominent, and because women's ideals and requests were able to be fulfilled, female movement leaders such as Oku embraced the total war efforts.

Gender Roles in the Mobilization

During female participation in the war, whereas men battled on the front line, women supported them from the home front by performing "women's roles." The general concepts of the wartime system were to participate in ways judged appropriate to one's gender, and to accept them.

Women had amassed experience in the feminist movement, which began in 1910; they drew on it to take part in the wartime system. They put much of their efforts and energy in supporting the nation, but they occupied a difficult position between dependence and independence, privileges and restrictions,

and assertion and compliance. The Japanese economy concentrated on the war industry and suffered from a shortage of daily commodities as the war escalated. Under these circumstances women took peculiar positions as they faced food and clothing securement.

As the conflict raged, women were expected to improve living conditions, as revealed in the slogans "recycling" and "improved conservation." In times of emergency, it found expression in such acts as the simplification of ceremonial occasions and the abolition of the double use of Japanese and Western clothing. Thus, a frugal consumer lifestyle which depended on female choices in the home was emphasized. Especially this movement progressed after the Sino–Japanese War commenced. With the need for thrift, social inequality also began to dissipate.

Under this war regime, the nation achieved the publicizing of consumer lifestyle, as well as the feminization and unification of those areas. During the times of war, the public domain was reorganized by so-called feminization. Private areas were made public which led these areas to develop into female-dominated ones and also segued into a more harmonious lifestyle (in the lower level). During these times of war, inequality, which had been based on vested interests, also began to dissipate.

In this way, as irrationalities based on traditional ideas were reformed and women became able to get out of the house and participate more actively in society, they began to feel liberated, which was one aspect that came out of this state of total war. However, issues between women and "the household" began to emerge. Within Kokumin seishin dōin (the National Mental Mobilization Movement), three fundamental ideas were portrayed as being "loyal to one's home": "The promotion of healthy family tradition," "the practice of an appropriate lifestyle" and "the education of children as citizens of the empire of Japan." These were the core concepts to the overall notion that "the home is the cornerstone of a prosperous nation." In addition to women doing their roles outside of the home to support the war, women were repeatedly told that they must not neglect their roles as homemakers.

It was said that "each task as a homemaker" may either create the foundation of a flourishing nation or be the source of a collapsing one, and stressed that working to maintain harmony within the household fulfilled a praiseworthy duty to one's nation. It was in this way that women were mobilized and told to independently participate in the war to fulfill their role as a Japanese citizen. Although the idea of independence in women contradicted traditional values, Japan continued to mobilize in this way.

This also meant that femininity and masculinity within the nation were emphasized and gender roles did not change. Better put, nationalization progressed while strictly following these ideas of gender. Women, who were assigned to the home front, were told to protect the house and family, and to actively play a role in society, which included labor, in order to support the war. Meanwhile, the classic role, maintaining the home, required supporting workplaces where men had gone. The incompatible demands were required under the war system to women.

Under the wartime system, the idea of "the household" was stressed and the Ministry of Education attempted to reveal the "true meaning of the household." The concept of the household was used to establish "wartime citizen morals" and as a source to "enhance the fighting spirit." Thus, a plan to give mothers "refinement training," reform the "household lifestyle" and establish a "mother's class (school)" was created.

In other words, this meant that the traditional concepts of "mother" and "wife" were emphasized. Women were ordered to create an ideal lifestyle and teach it to their children while taking care of all household chores. It meant that on top of assigning conventional gender roles to women, they were also told to take care of "inferior labor" jobs to support the war (Gabriel et al. 1994).

In this sense, the assigned roles were considered to be for the sake of the war, and a differentiation was made between the battle front (for men) and home front (for women). Furthermore, the idea that the male–female relationship was that of a master–subordinate one went unchanged. Moreover, the concept of the "righteous warrior" and his "companion" emerged. Women were educated to become *ryousai kenbo* at both schools and the home. It is a classic discourse which describes women's "good" lifestyle to become a dutiful wife and devoted mother, at the same time it has been said it was valuable way of lifestyle as a woman to the nation. In other words "ryosai-kennbo" of the war, without breaking the wartime system, has become a thing to support the wartime system.

However, this nationalization of women was accompanied by the publicizing of what had been previously private. The magazine *Housewife's Companion* (May 1945) gave the practical example of using a communal kitchen. Because the communal kitchen reduced the amount of gas needed and saved a lot of trouble, it was considered to be economical and was highly recommended during the time of war. With the use of the communal kitchen, the dinner table, which had been previously considered to be a "private domain" shared with one's family, was transformed into a "public domain." *Housewife's Companion* was one of the major magazines for women, first published in 1917. It was a magazine for enlightened nuclear-family housewives, and its articles were practical. The magazine presented a new women's role under the wartime system. This was one way that a change in society was systematically accomplished during the wartime system. Obviously, women's lifestyles changed when air raids intensified, when their homes were burned down and when children were evacuated to the country side.

In this way, women during the war held three different positions. The first was "a mother": *Boshi hogo hō* (the mother and child protection law) was created, and pregnant/new mother certificates were issued. Additionally, it was encouraged for women to have many children and to be a "military mother." Second was the role of "a wife": widows of the war were advised to not do anything that may captivate a man's interest, whether it was in their clothing or in their language.[3] This was for the "protection" of the home front, as well as a response to an incident where military authorities violently backlashed when hearing that a war widow had remarried.

Last, regarding the role of "housewife," widely read magazines became the source of knowledge for the roles of the homemaker. The magazine *Housewife's Companion* revealed how to prepare as a housewife and advised the type of lifestyle that a housewife should lead. They offered real-life examples and through doing so, taught women their wartime roles.

The Public and Private Sphere

Under the state of total war, women were requested "to fight" and "to give." These seemingly contradictory functions were the means by which they could "devote themselves to the emperor." They were expected to do "manly" jobs, while still showing "womanly virtues," creating a complex contradiction between "aggressiveness" and "passivity" (Koonz 1987). In other words, during the war mobilization, women were told to do the jobs of men (fight), and in fact were mobilized to military training such as air defense exercises. As the war intensified they trained how to use bamboo spears, and at the same time to obey men (give). Not only was the male-dominated structure of gender not broken, but it was in fact strengthened even more.

Some women were, however, more directly active in battle. These women were war nurses, "comfort women" and military writers. Gender roles also come into play here. Women were located in the battle's "private domains" (i.e., the peripheries), because they were thought to belong there in such private realms (i.e., the household).

As the social structure of gender during the war changed, as did the privacy of actions such as product consumption and household chores, it was then that "the physical body" became the recurring theme within the idea of private things becoming public. During the war, publicizing caused by the nation (through mobilization) interfered with family/household concerns such as nursing, pregnancy, childcare, as well as *Irei* (the comforting of spirits) and funerals. In other words, private affairs took place in a social context, and the differentiation between "private" and "public" began to change.

Women were involved in this process; their social activities and war participation became deeply connected. They attempted to escape from the "private realms" to which they had formerly been limited by joining the military, such as reporting and nursing, and by more directly participating in the war. However, the conditions (both before and at that time) did not stray away from traditional gender roles, and the structured order of gender became even sturdier. For example, war nurses boarded "hospital ships/boats" to take care of injured soldiers; they thus participated in the "fighting" fringe of the war and not on the battlefield. Behind the scene, these military nurses were the "comfort women" (military prostitutes). On the periphery of the battleground, the hierarchy genders persisted; men were the masters and women were the subordinates, as well as a contrast between what happened on the surface and what happened behind closed curtains.

"Comfort women" offer an example of sexual violence in wartime. After the Nanjing massacre of 1938, the "comfort stations" at Shanghai came under

military control. Their purposes were to prevent sexually transmitted diseases by forcing women into sexual labor as "comfort women." They consisted of both "Japanese" women and also women from colonies such as Korea. In addition to gender-based issues, issues of race and class revolving around "empire vs colonies" also emerged. It was the aftermath of the might of empire that many Korean colonial women were mobilized as "comfort women." Japanese imperial army soldiers cruelly discriminated against Korean "comfort women" rather than Japanese ones.

When gender became even more highlighted during the war, combined with the redefining of "public" and "private," it allowed the social structure of gender to become even more rigid. The relationships of men and women, as well as battlefront vs home front, turned lopsided and unstable. However, as the gender roles began to stray from tradition through mobilization, a tear was created in what was before considered the self-evident principles of masculinity and femininity. With that one small tear, topics about emotions in relation to gender roles in writing such as magazines became more talked about. Voices became heard, repeated so frequently that it became a cliché.

During the mobilization, the nation attempted to create an agreement between the genders on their roles. However, the lack of a real foundation for these supposedly ideal gender roles, along with the inevitable negative reactions of women toward their status, developed.

Concluding Remarks

In closing, it is worth mentioning the subject of women and battle. At the end of the Asia-Pacific War, women started a movement to join the military. In March of 1945, as Japan headed towards the deciding battle, national organizations such as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei yokusan kai) were gathered and unified to make up the Volunteer Corps (Kokumin giyū sento tai). Furthermore, it created the Law of Voluntary Military Service (Giyū heieki hō) and in June of that same year the call for volunteer soldiers was made, and the National Voluntary Troops was formed. A plan to arm civilians was designed, and women were also integrated into the combat scheme.

However, the Empire of Japan headed towards defeat and occupation thereafter. In recent years, there has been a tendency to chronologically connect the loss of Japan and occupation of Japan, as if there were no gap in between. From the point of view of gender, roles also remained consistent during this period. Finally, even during the occupation period, the historical effect of total war can been found. It shows that gender formation was built upon wartime mobilization, and has never changed even when experienced a decisive event. Both male and female gender roles and subjective action by women under the leadership of men have remained. Defeat was unsatisfactory to bring a new female gender order. Despite the fact that Japan has been practicing postwar democracy, they have failed to change the past's gender roles.

Notes

1. At the outset of Konoe's second term as prime minister in July 1940, he finally moved to proclaim a Political New Order by creating the IRAA. All political parties were required to dissolve themselves, and elected politicians were told to join the new association as individuals. But just as the *zaibatsu* accepted but co-opted the system of economic controls, the Minseitō and Seiyūkai parties preserved some prerogatives within the new structure (Gordon 2003, p. 216).
2. *Sennin-bari* means Japanese women's praying for soldiers not to shoot at the war front. Many women sewed thread on a piece of cloth.
3. *Housewife's Companion* (*Shufu no tomo*) (Shufunotomosha 1945).

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Mobilizing Death: Bodies and Spirits of the Modern Japanese Military Dead

Akiko Takenaka

The cult of death is almost always constructed upon the already dead. In early modern Europe, for example, the dead from previous wars played an important role in the cult of war death, most often through the creation, commemoration and mythologization of martyrs from particularly notable or tragic deaths (Baird 1992; Mosse 1990). Starting with the Napoleonic wars and especially from the First World War, the common man too was mobilized to take up arms for military conflicts that were propagated as an honorable cause, and therefore worth participating in and even dying for if necessary. With the mobilization of the common man came strategies for transforming the idea of honorable war death into tangible forms, such as official narratives, museums and memorials, some constructed even as the conflict was taking place (Winter 1995). Through such processes, death was reconfigured as sacrifice for a larger cause, national gain was said to outweigh the personal loss, and ultimately, death itself was considered to have been transcended (Mosse 1990).

In order to examine and analyze the Japanese cult of death and its relationship to the larger, modern phenomenon of mass dictatorship, I focus on the period of the Asia-Pacific War (1931–1945).[1] During this period the Japanese cult of death developed into its ultimate form, most famously represented by the suicidal missions of *tokkō* pilots as well as the civilian mass suicides in Saipan and Okinawa, both from the final months of the war. From documents left behind, we know today the emotional travails of the young pilots, as well as coercion exerted both externally by the military leaders and internally by ideas cultivated through patriotic education. These documents demonstrate the complexity in the ways that the state mobilized the masses and how the masses responded to state mobilization during war. Yet, even into the last months of war, death in

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battle was aestheticized and promoted through official venues as the ultimate sacrifice possible by a Japanese and an act every Japanese was proud of committing. This cult of death that produced extraordinary numbers of apparently voluntary war dead fully contributes to the criteria of a modern form of mass dictatorship, for which support by the masses was essential (Lim 2010).

In Japan, military death was aestheticized most directly through ties to the emperor, considered to be a god at the time. According to the state-imposed narrative, the act of fighting and dying for the emperor was the ultimate sacrifice a Japanese male could achieve, and the entire population was indoctrinated to uphold this idea. Every Japanese was instructed to accept war death in the family with pride and gratitude, rather than sorrow and grief. The military put into place two systems by which each war dead could be mobilized for the cult of death: the treatment of the bodies of the war dead, and the memorialization of their spirits. In both instances, the military established practices through which death was transformed into a spectacle.

A key institution that contributed to this spectacle of death was Yasukuni Shrine. The shrine, which occupies a site adjacent to the imperial palace in central Tokyo, was conceived in 1869 as a military memorial to commemorate deaths for the imperial cause. Originally enshrined there were the men who died in battles leading up to the Meiji Restoration, in the process of restoring political power to the emperor. With the establishment of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy, and with the start of Japan's wars of imperialism, military dead continued to be enshrined therein. During its semi-annual rituals, the spirits of military dead were called into the shrine grounds, purified and enshrined within the shrine, where it was understood that they had merged into a collective god that protects Japan (*gokokushin*). During the Asia-Pacific War, elementary school education systematically taught the honor of Yasukuni enshrinement. Newspapers and mass-market magazines featured stories of heroic souls that had transformed into the god of Yasukuni, and of family members who were grateful for the enshrinement. In the early years of the war, each war dead received multiple local memorial rituals prior to Yasukuni enshrinement, which was conducted at the national level. In this manner, the dead were tended to individually, and yet honored collectively for their service to the nation. And throughout, strict regulations were put in place so that the entire process remained highly organized and visible.

In order to examine the phenomenon of the cult of death through a Japanese case study, I have organized this essay around the fate of one Japanese army private named Kurokawa Umekichi, who died in 1934 while stationed in northern China. I trace Umekichi's journey through objects left behind: 420 objects and documents associated with his military service, his death, the return of his ashes and various memorial services have been stored in a custom-made cedar box and preserved first by his father, and later by his younger brother.[2] The post-death practices associated with Umekichi, as well as their representation in mass media, illustrate various strategies for the construction and propagation of the cult of death. At the time of Umekichi's death, less than

three years into the Asia-Pacific War, all death-related practices, including cremation and memorial at the battlefront, as well as the reception and memorialization of his ashes back home, received extraordinary care and attention. But this was not the case in the later years of the war. Due to the lack of time and resources, the death rituals of many who died in the later years of the war were more truncated than those of Umekichi. But as I demonstrate below, the truncated treatments of both the body and the spirit of the fallen soldiers were still configured to appear as if the state continued to treat their military death as carefully as they did in the earlier years. Death-related practices on the homefront thus played a central role in the promotion of pride and gratitude until the end of the war. Further, through their regulated treatment of the bodies and spirits of the dead, the military and the state were also able to maintain firm control over the bereaved families, who no longer had ownership of death rituals associated with a close family member.

The "Honorable Death" of Army Private Kurokawa Umekichi

Kurokawa Umekichi was enlisted in the Imperial Japanese Army in late 1933, the early stages of the war. Japan's view of the military conflict in northern China at the time was overwhelmingly positive, as its military had achieved a series of victories, and the death toll had not climbed to the unfathomable magnitude of the later years. Mass media constantly conveyed, through newspaper articles, photographs and newsreels, success stories of Japanese troops helping the development of Japan's puppet state Manchukuo. Umekichi's experience was typical for a man who was enlisted in the early years of the war. He received a grand, celebratory send-off with banners decorating the front door of his family's home, an official speech by the head of the neighborhood association and a parade beyond the local train station as far as his regiment's gate. And after his death, too, the military treated his body and remains with great care.

Immediately after enlistment, Umekichi was stationed in Dunhua, China. After six months of training, he was assigned to guard the Kyōhaku Academy, a local school for young Japanese immigrants to Manchukuo. On 9 June 1934, eight days after completion of his training, Umekichi was ambushed and severely injured during a multi-day supply transport mission. He died the following afternoon, and was cremated on site the same day. His ashes were flown back (along with the ashes of four other men who died from the same attack) to Dunhua on 18 June and, after a brief tribute, temporarily entrusted to the Dunhua branch of Higashi Honganji Temple. On 28 June, a portion of his ashes was buried at Goryō-gaoka, a cemetery inside the Kyōhaku Academy. Another portion of his ashes was interred at a local war memorial. A wake for Umekichi and his four comrades was held on 10 July, exactly one month after their death. The following day, Umekichi's unit held a stately memorial at the temple for the five men. The remainder of his ashes was divided into two: one portion was buried at the temple, and the other was sent home in a box of

unvarnished wood wrapped in white cloth (*kotsubako*). By this point, Umekichi and his comrades' ashes had already received multiple memorial services.

The box with Umekichi's ashes left the Dunhua temple on 12 July 1934 and traveled to the port city of Dalian via Changchun (capital of Manchukuo) and Mukden (current-day Shenyang). A sergeant from Umekichi's unit was charged with supervising transportation. The trajectory of this trip is well recorded. The sergeant carefully recorded the details of the trip, including not only the route, but more notably, the kinds of people who welcomed the remains at various points during the trip. Even before leaving Manchukuo, Umekichi's journey created spectacles along the way. According to the transportation log, fifty-three names were recorded in association with his wake and send-off in Xinjing, the capital of Manchukuo on 13 July. On 14 July, Umekichi's *kotsubako* arrived in Mukden, where it received another sizeable memorial service. Personal names were not recorded for this event, but the log notes that dozens of people were present. On 15 July, the ashes traveled by train to Dalian. Representatives of local women's groups and other associations welcomed and paid tribute at stations along the way. Umekichi and his comrades received another memorial service at Dalian with "hundreds of school children and citizens" in attendance. According to the log, many made offerings of flowers, sweets and lanterns at the services. The log documents the extent to which the military mobilized Japanese residents in Manchuria to participate in the war effort.

On 16 July, the box embarked by boat from Dalian to Kobe, Japan. Umekichi's *kotsubako* received similar tributes en route to his home. Among the objects preserved by his family are numerous business cards that traveled home with him. The cards were left by people who greeted his ashes at various stops within Japan. The majority of the cards belonged to members of various veteran's associations, as well as the Patriotic Women's Group (Aikoku Fujinkai) and Women's Group for National Defense (Kokubō Fujinkai)—two leading Japanese women's groups that mobilized housewives for home-front support activities. The cards are grouped by city and prefecture, and we find that Umekichi's ashes briefly stopped in at least ten locations between Kobe and his hometown. Large numbers of people gathered at each stop to pay tribute to Umekichi's *kotsubako* and to make offerings of flowers and sweets. The objects left behind thus attest to a series of elaborate commemorations at multiple locations with no association with the deceased. But most of these people did not attend these events voluntarily. The reason why the ashes of Umekichi—an army private from a small town in Kanagawa—received a hero's welcome in so many places is because the crowds in attendance were organized by the women's groups, veterans associations and elementary schools. Most of those gathered had been forced to attend as a part of these organized groups. The military also sent detailed schedules and instructions in advance with the expectation that crowds would be mobilized. The result was a well-orchestrated and intensely experienced display of appreciation for Umekichi's sacrifice and achievement.

Umekichi was the first war dead from his small hometown. The town's annual summer festival was cancelled in deference to the events marking the return of Umekichi's *kotsubako* and his funeral. The mayor accompanied Umekichi's parents to receive the *kotsubako* at Kamakura Station on 20 July. Two days later, his hometown hosted an elaborate Buddhist-style funeral at the Kanazawa elementary school. Newspapers reported that the procession that transported Umekichi's ashes from the local temple to the school stretched more than one kilometer. Neighbors recalled that the funeral lasted at least three days. Surviving documents suggest the Kurokawa residence received guests for over a week. Local newspapers report several thousands in attendance at the funeral. Notable figures sent funeral offerings, including the Emperor and Empress, Army Minister, Chief of Staff and other military leaders.

Umekichi's death was reported in local newspapers as early as 13 June 1934. *Yokosuka bōeki shinpō*, for example, headlined his death as "My son's death that I have offered to the Emperor: the emotional tears of father Tomizō," and reported that the father was "joyful at heart for the son whose death [he is] proud of," while smiling through tears (13 June 1934). *Tōkyō nichi nichi* newspaper reported that Tomizō said "It is at least a consolation that my son has died for the nation" (13 June 1934). Local press continued to follow the story about Umekichi's war death, often using phrases such as "honorable war death (*meiyo no senshi*)" and "heroic spirit (*eirei*)"—expressions popularly used to describe war death during the Asia-Pacific War. The narrative that the local press presents is a familiar one that promoted the cult of death: a young man loses his life at war, the family is proud of his contribution to the national cause, and his death is acknowledged, appreciated and commemorated at both local and national levels, even by the emperor.

Memorial Ritual at Yasukuni Shrine

The town's funeral was not Umekichi's final memorial service. It was not uncommon to conduct multiple events for a single military dead during the early years of the war. Furthermore, memorial sites for the dead were not restricted to one location or a single religious tradition. In fact, in modern Japan the military dead typically received multiple memorial rituals (Iwata 2005). Many towns and villages conducted their own public memorial service, usually in the Buddhist style. Some held Shinto-style services at the prefectural *gokoku jinja*.[3] The family of the deceased often conducted a private funeral in accordance with their own religious beliefs, as for other family members. Most families also followed the Buddhist tradition of memorializing the deceased at their family altar (*butsudan*). Beginning in the late 1930s, many cities, towns and villages constructed the *chūreitō*, a communal memorial built following a single design guideline, on which names of the dead were engraved, and into which personal effects such as nail clippings and locks of hair were deposited (Takenaka 2009).

The most notable memorial service for Imperial Japan's military dead was the *shōkon* ritual at Yasukuni Shrine: a ritual that developed out of memorial rites conducted amidst the Meiji Restoration battles. During the *shōkon* ritual, it was understood that the spirits of the war dead were called in from the battlefields, purified and collectively merged into the god of Yasukuni. Umekichi was a part of the 49th collective enshrinement ritual conducted in April 1935 to commemorate 813 war deaths that occurred in Manchuria. In early April, Umekichi's family received a large brown envelope from the Army Ministry's Committee for Yasukuni Shrine Special Festival. Among other documents in the envelope was a smaller white envelope containing a formal notice of Umekichi's Yasukuni enshrinement: a rectangular card with gold edging and a gold cherry flower stamped on the top center. Following instructions provided by the military, Umekichi's father Tomizō, mother Aki, and younger brother Kikuzō traveled to Tokyo using the discounted train tickets and a subsidy of fifteen yen provided by the Patriotic Comfort Association (Aikoku Jippei Kai). The family stayed at the Military Hall (Gunjin Kaikan) in Tokyo, where they remained until the thirtieth. They participated in various events organized by the military, and visited several sites in Tokyo. This elaborate trip that accompanied a family member's war death provided more than an opportunity to participate in the memorial ritual. As I illustrate below, the trip encompassed a much larger agenda not only for the family that attended the ritual, but also for all Japanese families who already had sent a member to war or were about to do so.

The *shōkon* ritual for the approximately 2,400 bereaved family members who gathered from around the country took place on 26 April 1935. They were instructed to sit at designated places on the shrine grounds by seven in the evening for the ritual that commenced at eight o'clock. In attendance were members and representatives of the military units associated with the war dead being enshrined, as well as representatives from all military divisions throughout Japan and officer training schools in Tokyo. Head priest Kamo Momoki officiated at the ceremony in the presence of ten priests. The ritual concluded when a wooden box, into which the spirits were believed to have gathered, was purified and transported on a palanquin into the main shrine (*Yomiuri*, 27 April 1935).

Like other families invited to the *shōkon* ritual, the Kurokawa family had also received, in their package, tickets to various facilities in Tokyo. Among the Yasukuni-related documents preserved by Kikuzō is an envelope that had contained such tickets. The inventory lists the following: free passes for Tokyo city trams; certificates for visits to the Shinjuku Imperial Garden and an imperial treasury hall; tickets for the Imperial Museum, Yūshūkan Museum and the National Defense Hall; and entrance tickets to various entertainment facilities in Tokyo, including the Ueno Zoo and Hanayashiki amusement park in Asakusa. What this suggests is that, in exchange for the death of their loved one, family members of the war dead were not only invited to the enshrinement ritual, but also granted a sightseeing tour of Tokyo. In reality, this Tokyo visit was the first, and very often the only chance for most to visit the capital city. The combination of pride, gratitude and grief—emotions associated with

the families' activities in Tokyo—closely aligned with the officially sanctioned narrative of experiencing war death in the family. Further, these activities were highly visible. The bereaved families were identifiable from the badges that they were required to wear. They also no doubt stood out—country people walking around designated sites in groups, on specific dates in spring and fall. In other words, during their tour of Tokyo, they were performing as grateful families, and being put on display as such.

The public memorial services and praises in mass media raised awareness for the official recognition granted to the war dead. Families in attendance had received detailed instructions on how to behave properly at these events. The visibility of the families attending these services publicized to the rest of Japan the care with which the military were tending to the war bereaved. The presence of the bereaved families also demonstrated to the passersby the proper ways that one must behave upon a loss of a family member. The bereaved families were transformed into role models for the rest of Japan, demonstrating appropriate emotions—pride and happiness instead of grief and sorrow—when encountered with the loss of a loved one. They were thus fully integrated into the promotion of the Japanese cult of death. Further, the link between war death and the emperor (it was understood that Yasukuni Shrine was the only site where the emperor would pay his respects to an ordinary dead), added the concept of gratitude to war death. Japan's cult of death not only made war death a source of pride for the bereaved families, but more significantly, one that deserved gratitude—a wartime Japanese was to feel grateful to be able to serve the emperor and receive his recognition.

A Spectacle of *Kotsubako*

Umekichi died at a time when each military death was given individual attention. The number of war dead was still small enough so that time and resources were sufficient for the performance of Umekichi's cremation and memorial rituals close to the battlefield, and to make sure that his ashes returned home safely. The multiple elaborate rituals certainly promoted and popularized the cult of death. The protocol that the military and local organizations had followed for Umekichi and other cases in the earlier years of the war had been established in May 1904 during the Russo–Japanese War (Harada 2001). Additional regulations announced in May 1938 required the ashes—or clips of hair in cases where ashes were not available—of every military dead to also be deposited in a designated military memorial, further regimenting the treatment of the bodies (Harada 1998). Even in the last years of the war, when it was impossible to even acknowledge individual death on the battlefield, political and military leaders still fabricated the image that they were carefully tending to both the dead and the family left behind. Each war dead "returned home" in a box identical to the one that contained Umekichi's ashes. Each bereaved family could anticipate the receipt of an invitation to a Yasukuni enshrinement. This section will examine some modifications to the processes for the war dead in the last years of the war, including the return of ashes and Yasukuni enshrinement.

Numerous families received a *kotsubako* in the years during and immediately following the Asia-Pacific War. It was understood that these boxes contained the actual ashes of the dead, cremated on the same battlefields where the men fell. In many cases, they did, as was the case with Umekichi. But as the war intensified, so did the difficulty of battlefield cremation. Instead of taking the time to cremate the entire body, surviving troops chopped off a hand or even the little finger from the dead bodies and carried them until they reached a location safe enough for cremation. Fingers further came to be replaced by portable, non-perishable body parts that did not require cremation, such as locks of hair, nail clippings and teeth. They were sometimes stored in safety by its owner before his death, or otherwise retrieved from the corpse by his comrades (Namihira 2004). For deaths that occurred while troops were far away from their base, the surviving members had to hold onto the ashes and other mementos until they arrived at a site from which these items could be sent to Japan. But it was not uncommon for the men who carried their comrades' mementos to be killed as well. In the more disastrous battles of the last years, starting with the Battle of Guadalcanal (August 1942 to February 1943), retrieval of even the smallest body parts was no longer possible, as mutilated corpses quickly piled on battlefields. In fact, many corpses were only identifiable as Japanese troops from the tattered remains of uniform attached to their near-naked bodies (Ichinose 2004). There were many instances of bodies lost to the Pacific Ocean along with the ship or plane that carried them. Nevertheless, the war dead typically returned to their family as a wooden box.

What then did most of these boxes contain? In many cases, the box that family members of the deceased received contained a piece of paper, a rock from the battlefield, or a handful of sand in place of ashes. Recipients typically placed the box on their family altar, and later in the family grave. Even during the war, it was well known that some, if not almost all boxes did not contain the ashes or a piece of bone of the deceased. Although some families were infuriated about the contents, most chose to treat the box as if it contained the actual remains of their loved ones. In the case of a Shizuoka family whose son sunk during transport to a southern island, a piece of paper was found inside the box that was returned in lieu of the son. The family added to the box the lock of hair and clips of nail that he had left with them prior to his departure, and conducted a traditional Buddhist funeral as if the box contained the son's real ashes (Namihira 2004). The family's action suggests that they made a conscious decision to believe that the box contained ashes, despite their knowledge that the son had sunk with the ship.

The return of one box—whether empty or otherwise—for each war dead was a costly operation. But it had implications beyond offering closure for the families. The boxes were meant to be visible to the public. They were often transported back by returning troops, who each carried one box wrapped in white cloth that hung from their neck. Military documents of the time include numerous correspondences concerning soldiers' ashes, from identification, transportation and receipt back home, to funding for these activities. In the latter half of the 1930s, the majority of such documents concerned transportation

of the ashes, including details of the boat or train schedule.[4] Dissemination of such information assured that the boxes would be welcomed by a formal ceremony at major transition points such as Kobe Harbor and Tokyo Station, as well as their final destinations.

Many regions stipulated how to greet the return of the local war dead either at key locations such as the local train station, or along the road on which the troops paraded back. For example, in Kiryū City, Gunma Prefecture, a temporary altar was always placed at the Kiryū train station whenever the boxes were scheduled to arrive. The boxes, upon arrival at the station, were placed at the altar, where representatives offered incense during a Buddhist memorial service. Nearby residents were instructed to fly flags at half-mast, and to line the streets from the station to welcome back the ashes (Gunma-ken 1971). At Utsunomiya City, Tochigi Prefecture, instructions for welcoming the troops (carrying the boxes) were delivered to the residents along with the train schedule. Towns and villages along the train line were assigned stations at which residents were to welcome back the troops. At Utsunomiya Station, representatives of various local organizations, businesses and schools lined up according to the map that had been distributed. Instructions detailed mandatory activities, proper attire, as well as the length of time people were to remain in their welcoming positions (e.g. 15 minutes for foot soldiers, 45 for cavalry and 105 for artillery) (Tochigi-ken 1979).

The performance ensured the visibility of the boxes, reinforcing the idea that the lives lost were greatly appreciated, and that the military was tending to the fallen with utmost care. And since the process did not require the proper retrieval of ashes, its continued practice was possible into the final years of the war. With few men returning from the front, the boxes simply materialized at local unit offices, where they were handed over to the families. While lacking in the pomp and flair of the past, memories of the parades from the earlier years reminded the recipients that the return of the boxes was something for the family to be proud of, and furthermore, evidence of the military's care for the dead. In reality, however, the military considered foot soldiers expendable and replaceable, and strategies in the later years never included reinforcements, protection or proper medical attention for its men. In fact, the majority of Japanese military death in the fifteen years resulted not from combat-related causes, but rather from starvation (Fujiwara 2001).

The memorial ritual at Yasukuni Shrine also provided the means for the Japanese state and the military to create the impression that each soldier and their families were individually cared for. Memorial rituals at Yasukuni Shrine, like one that the Kurokawas attended, took place every spring and fall. Invitations continued to be extended to the family members of those memorialized. The visits always included the *shōkon* ritual, speeches by military leaders, sightseeing in Tokyo, and a chance to enter into the main shrine to pay tribute to the god of Yasukuni. The mass media always reported details of the events and featured interviews with bereaved families. Starting in 1932, every *shōkon* ritual was aired live through radio, and people both in Japan proper and its empire were instructed to listen.

Starting in 1939, a new feature was added to the families' visit: group photographs of the bereaved families. The group photographs, along with snapshots of various activities by the families during the visit, were compiled into an album, which typically presented in chronological order the events that took place in and around Yasukuni during the memorial and festival. The album had already been produced for most rituals and mailed to the families. The group photographs, however, ensured that every participant was recorded and included in the album. The idea of distributing one album per each deceased is astounding in terms of cost, particularly in the later years when over twenty thousand were being enshrined at each event. But the implication of the albums spread far beyond the immediate family. Families, upon receiving the albums back home, most likely shared them in the community and within neighborhood or women's associations along with the stories of their trip.

These photo albums and the practice of communal viewing became particularly meaningful in the last years of the war, for not everyone who had lost a family member was awarded a trip to Tokyo. To be more precise, the vast majority were not. Enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine was a multi-step process that included compilation of detailed paperwork as well as formal blessings of the emperor. Consequently, the enshrinement rate of the Asia-Pacific War deaths at the end of the war was only a little over 10%: of the 2,319,994 currently enshrined at Yasukuni, the rituals had only been completed for 251,135 by August 1945 (Takenaka 2015). There was a long time lag between death and enshrinement; and the delay increased as the war intensified. While Umekichi's spirit was enshrined a little less than a year after his death, the enshrinement of the deaths from Pearl Harbor (December 1941) onwards, for example, only began in earnest in April 1944 (Yasukuni Jinja 1973). As such, families typically had a multi-year wait until they could travel to Tokyo to participate in the enshrinement of their loved one. The photo album, then, provided these families-in-waiting a vicarious experience of the *shōkon* ritual and associated events: something they could look forward to. The viewing experience would have been another opportunity for the bereaved family members to act as role models. The owner of the album could present the photographs and their stories with pride; those gathered around would listen and respond with respect for the man who had just completed the most honorable duty for the nation. Here too belief in the cult of death was reinforced.

Conclusion

The practices associated with both the bodies and spirits of the war dead played a central role in the development and popularization of the cult of death in Imperial Japan. The treatment of war dead and their representation in mass media mobilized the wartime Japanese to transform themselves into masses that supported the national cause. At the same time, the Japanese cult of death enabled the military to maintain firm control over its people. The narrative of Umekichi's heroic homecoming seems to illustrate the weight of responsibility

felt by the state and the military to ensure a proper treatment of the dead. But the practice of posthumous homecoming symbolized the military's (and not the family's) ownership of the body. It was the military that conducted the death rituals, which, under normal circumstances, would have been undertaken by the immediate family. The family members did not receive the opportunity to participate in a regular end-of-life ritual, and instead needed to rely on (and trust) the military to properly take care of its dead. When the military returned the boxes—empty or otherwise—the family needed to contend with the fact that the deceased's service to the nation was complete. Further, families also needed to give up ownership of the spirit of the war dead, since it was understood that they had merged into the god of Yasukuni.

The obligation of loyal subjects to the imperial state did not terminate with one's death. Just as the body of the dead mattered to the family, or perhaps *because* the body mattered to the family, it too mattered to the military. By regulating the fate of both the body and the spirit of their dead, the military demonstrated control over their men. For the Japanese society in which the living had maintained a close relationship with the dead, manipulations of the dead greatly affected relations among the living. The military thus also cast authority over the family of the men by controlling the ways that the bodies may or may not be returned to them. As such, even the heroic return of Umekichi's remains can be considered, alongside the enshrinement of his spirit at Yasukuni, as the state's ownership of its military personnel.

At the same time, the mobilization of wartime Japanese through the cult of death was only possible because many wanted to participate in the cult. As was the case with the parents of the young man whose ship sunk in the ocean, many chose to accept the system that the state imposed upon them. Many grieving families expressed not only feelings of honor, but also appreciation for having their loved ones enshrined at Yasukuni. Of course many expressed only what they were expected to say for fear of being accused of being unpatriotic, but for many others the feeling of appreciation was sincere. And still others consciously chose to think in state-sanctioned ways. For many, we can assume it helped with their mourning process.

The structure of the Japanese cult of death remained even after Japan's defeat. In a document dated 4 December 1945 preserved in Nishikatsura Town, Yamanashi Prefecture, a manager in charge of repatriation made an inquiry about a complicated problem. Bereaved families, who were still waiting for the return of the ashes of the loved ones, had started to request some kind of a replacement since they understood that the actual ashes would most likely not return. Photographs or some other material would suffice as long as the government issued it, the families maintained. The village head (Nishikatsura was a village in 1945) agreed to present the families with tablets (*reiji*) in place of the ashes (Yamanashi-ken 1999). Here too was an instance where families chose to believe in the cult of death. The state and the military relied on the cult of death to motivate men to fight. But the most significant role the cult played was helping those left behind come to terms with their loss.

While war death-related practices of modern Japan have produced troubled legacies, perhaps most famously with the ongoing controversies associated with Yasukuni Shrine, they certainly were effective in wartime mass-mobilization. The modern Japanese cult of death shares common characteristics to those of contemporaneous dictatorships such as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in its use of ideas such as sacrifice, virtue and martyrdom to aestheticize war death, and its transformation of heroic death into tangible forms, including memorials and museums. Furthermore, the Japanese cult of death most importantly functioned to console those left behind, just as with the European instances. The men who took off to fight had little choice in their fate once they were drafted. But it was those left behind who often chose to subscribe to the cult of death so that their loss would not be meaningless. Many on the homefront fully embraced this cult of death, and, in the case of Japan, continued to do so even after the end of the war.

Perhaps the most distinct difference for Japan is how the cult is remembered today. The phrase "mass dictatorship" does not appear to exist in Japanese, suggesting that the complex relationship between the ruler and the masses in a modern dictatorship has not been explored adequately. Many Japanese today fault the wartime government and Yasukuni Shrine for coercing men to fight recklessly at war and for forcing the homefront population to support the cause. The 1978 enshrinement in Yasukuni Shrine of men who were convicted of Class A war crimes at the Tokyo Trials further reinforced the idea that Yasukuni Shrine was the central culprit that caused tremendous suffering to Japan at war. Narratives of those who consented to state coercion for a variety of reasons rarely were incorporated into the Japanese collective memory. Thus, the discourse of victimhood continues to prevail in Japan today.

Notes

1. Japan's military conflict spanning the years 1931–1945 has been variously named over the years including "Pacific War (Taiheiyō Sensō)" and "Fifteen-Year War (Jūgonen Sensō)." Most Japan scholars now favor the term Asia-Pacific War (Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō) to represent Japan's wars both in Asia and the Pacific. The term initially only covered the years 1941–1945, but has since taken on a wider coverage, sometimes from 1937 or from 1931.
2. An inventory of these objects as well as copies of various documents are available in Sakai 2006. Details on activities and memorials associated from Umekichi are all based on information from this collection.
3. Literally translated as "nation-protecting shrines," these were prefectural versions of Yasukuni Shrine incorporated into a nationwide hierarchical network of shrines and memorials that situated Yasukuni at the top.
4. Many such documents are preserved at the National Institute for Defense Studies (Bōeishō Bōei Kenkyūjo) and available online at http://www.jacar.go.jp.

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Appropriation

Introduction: The Agency of the "Masses"

Eve Rosenhaft

The concept of "mass dictatorship" is distinguished from other analytical accounts of twentieth-century authoritarian regimes by its insistence on the subjectivity and agency of ordinary people. In Western languages, at least, deploying the term "mass" in this analytical frame involves a self-conscious appropriation and revisioning of a key word of classical modernity: the vision of the *mass* as a political actor was a product of the cultural pessimism of the *fin de siècle*, in which anxieties about the growing confidence of organized labour and the anomic conditions of urban life found support in new theories of crowd psychology. In this analysis, the crowd (*foule*, *folla*) of Gustav Le Bon (1895) and Scipio Sighele (1891) and the subject of Freud's *Massenpsychologie* (1921) was typified by irrationality and suggestibility; while the mass could be moved to action by certain stimuli, its inherent intellectual state was passivity. It was in this character that radical politicians, mainly of the right, simultaneously celebrated and objectified the mass—as the subject of a new kind of political revolution and the object of calculated campaigns of propaganda and mobilization both before and after the seizure of power. We know that Hitler read Le Bon (Wiesen 2008, p. 150). Accordingly, when historians and political scientists speak the language of "mass" (as distinct, for example, from class), there is always a danger of recapitulating the vision of ordinary people as passive, brainwashed or at best suffering from false consciousness. "Mass dictatorship," by contrast, invokes a dialectical relationship between the structures of domination which envision the population as a mass in order to contain it and that population as a body of autonomous actors whose actions and *habitus* are co-constitutive of those structures. Even in the preceding chapters, which focus on the objectives and methods of the respective dictatorial regimes, ordinary

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people have been at the centre of consideration, because each of the regimes in question placed a vision of the whole nation or body politic at the centre of its ideology and its planning for the future. The chapters in this section explore the ways in which people appropriated those visions: how they responded to what the regime offered, invested time, energy and sentiment in the projects it proposed, evaded its claims or indeed openly resisted its demands.

At either end of the spectrum of popular response we have attitudes and practices that seem relatively unproblematic. Open resistance or opposition there certainly was, though the rhythms of and possibilities for dissent varied systematically with the character of the regime—with both socialist systems in Eastern Europe and the Park Chung Hee system providing spaces for dissent. Variation is also associated with the tenacity of the regime; Soviet Communism survived for nearly three generations, and China is still nominally a People's Republic, and this has allowed for a more effective breaking of the opposition's political traditions and memories than either National Socialism or Fascism could achieve. It is also the case that dictatorial systems that have collapsed or reformed relatively recently have yet to be fully researched. At the other end of the spectrum, enthusiastic participation in the projects of the regime, through individual volunteering and active engagement in official organizations and activities, is a measure of the effectiveness of mobilization as an instrument of state hegemony (see Part III). From the regime point of view these mobilizations had the radical and potentially transformative consequence (indeed the purpose) of evacuating private life and exhausting individuals and communities. Alongside this, though, every mass dictatorship has depended on individuals continuing to fulfil or taking up new functions in the day-to-day running of bureaucratic and police systems, in more than tacit affirmation of regime objectives. The concept of "desk murderers" (*Schreibtischtäter*) invoked by Jie-Hyun Lim evokes the constitutive paradox of these systems: a crucial *combination* of the everyday and the extraordinary or monstrous (Kershaw 1981).

When we come to popular attitudes in the middle of the spectrum, the radical nature of these regimes complicates the assessment of structures of consent in two respects: the first relates to the rhetoric and reality of political systems which recognized no space outside the purview and control of the state; as the leader of the German Labour Front Robert Ley put it, in National Socialism the individual "is to have no private life and certainly not to set up any private bowling clubs" (Sopade 1980). By the same token, there was no space for action that did not have a political implication. The Germans invented the term "internal emigration" to characterize self-conscious disengagement as a strategy for physical and psychological survival under National Socialism, mainly on the part of artists and intellectuals, but as Paul Corner spells out, for most people in mass dictatorships the range of possible postures short of active commitment was not so much a spectrum as a continuum. Indifference was unthinkable, simple non-compliance a crime. It was often a decision of the police rather than the individual actor that transformed practices of everyday coping into either consent or dissent—though the level of system tolerance was

often determined at the local level by the internal dynamics and resilience of particular communities and collectives.

The second element of complexity relates to the fact that the dictatorships under consideration here have all been guilty of significant crimes against their own and (usually) other populations, and in most cases their pariah character was reinforced by defeat in war, system collapse or internal reform processes which meant that the generations that pursued or lived through the dictatorial project turned out to be historical "losers." As a result, our assessments of patterns of appropriation are always coloured by forensic notions of culpability, and the attribution of consent is never far from the imputation of responsibility and the charge of guilt. This is apparent in Elissa Maïlander's account of everyday conformity, in which individual acts of keeping one's head down and apparently unproblematic consumption of cultural spectacles are exposed as forms of complicity. The forensic reflex remains powerful and inevitable in spite of the insight encapsulated in Primo Levi's (1989) phrase "the grey zone," which has become a key term in Holocaust studies (Petropolous and Roth 2005): like the internal life of the concentration camp which Levi anatomized, whole systems operated in such a way as to force impossible moral choices on individuals. The important analytical insight that the line between victim and perpetrator can go through individuals—or that each individual can be both depending on the particular historical circumstances—is articulated here by Jie-Hyun Lim. In considering mass dictatorships as objects of transnational memory, he is exploring (among other things) the imaginative agency of ordinary people as they retrospectively interpellate themselves into the community of the blameless.

It is historians' focus on the structures of everyday life and close attention to the practices that constitute them, with its turn away the chimera of collective attitudes or mentalities and the power of the state to shape them, that has generated readings of these "grey zones" that allow for the variety of human experience without losing either analytical bite or ethical engagement. Here the insights of German *Alltagsgeschichte* and Alf Lüdtke's concept of *Eigensinn*, both informed by a politically engaged inquiry into the roots of Nazism, have been key. If there is a research frontier in the study of popular appropriation in mass dictatorships, it may be in applying the same techniques with equal rigour to the study of memory cultures. The concept of "mass dictatorships" originated in an effort to understand persistent nostalgia for a dictatorial past (Lee 2009), but the study of *habitus* formation and everyday practices *within* the regime cannot provide a sufficient answer. The reappropriation of the dictatorship past as "memory" must itself be a matter of individual and collective practices within, below and beyond the global media conversations that remain the focus of transnational memory studies.

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"Unwilling to Work Under a 'Zombie'": Mass Dictatorship and Normative Choice in Japan, the United States and Canada During the Second World War

Takashi Fujitani

Zombies as *hikokumin* (Negated National Subjects)

During the Second World War "zombies" were said to be playing a role in the Canadian war effort, but in ways that the mainstream population and press disparaged as cowardly and insufficiently patriotic. These zombies apparently roamed Canadian society during the war, served in the military and worked in strategic industries—and yet they were objects of popular disdain. Who were these strange creatures and why might the figure of the zombie be relevant for an essay on mass dictatorship in Japan and North America during the Second World War?

The title of my essay comes from an article that appeared in one of Canada's major daily newspapers, the *Globe and Mail* (22 August 1944). According to this article, about thirty "girls" in one of the buildings at the Central Experimental Farm near Ottawa had refused their labor because "many had relatives overseas and were unwilling to work under a 'Zombie'." The "girls" ended their work stoppage only after a non-zombie replaced the zombie sergeant-major as the leader of their group. Moreover, this was not the first time that zombies had been the source of a disturbance at the Farm, for "[e]arlier in the summer considerable trouble was allegedly caused when a number of 'Zombie' N. C. O.'s were brought into the staffs employed in the various sections."

As was commonly known in Canada at the time, zombies such as these were only allegorically the horrific undead who had been entertaining people out of

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their wits in North America from the 1930s. Many Canadians used this epithet to refer to military draftees who failed to volunteer for overseas duty. Above all, it was said that these strange beings lacked the will to fight—to truly put their lives on the line. As the historian Daniel Byers (1996) has made clear, these zombies became targets of scorn and even physical violence for their unwillingness to serve overseas. The existence of zombie soldiers had been made possible by the original stipulations of the Canada National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA)—which was modeled on the British Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1940 and which the Canadian Parliament passed on 21 June 1940. The NRMA had granted the government sweeping powers to mobilize resources for the total war effort, including providing it with the legal grounds for implementing military conscription. However, as a concession to those who had strongly opposed the draft, section three of the Act stipulated that no one could be required to serve in the armed forces outside of Canadian territory. In other words, overseas service could only be on a voluntary basis. To be sure, successful passage of the April 1942 plebiscite on conscription released the government from this legal restriction and made it possible to draft men for overseas duty. However, Prime Minister Mackenzie King did not send NRMA conscripts overseas until November of 1944, and then only to a limited degree (Byers 1996, p. 202).

But we must still ask, Why the figure of the zombie as the allegorical antithesis of the ideal military man and by extension the normative national subject? To begin to answer this question we must first recognize that the zombie in popular culture of the 1930s and 1940s differed from the zombie that has become popular over the last few decades. As one specialist has put it, unlike films in more recent decades such as those by George A. Romero, "the fear incited by these early films comes from being turned into a zombie rather than being killed by one. The central horrific feature is therefore the loss of autonomy and control" (Bishop 2010, p. 69). Thus in Victor Halperin's 1932 classic film, *White Zombie*, which was the first feature-length treatment of the zombie figure in cinema history (Rhodes 2001, p. 13), white people are brought back from the dead to provide plantation labor in Haiti. But they are returned to the world of the living without souls and can only work at the behest of the evil zombie master named Murder Legendre, who is played by Bela Lugosi. The transformation of the film's heroine into a zombie is slightly different from that of the other white zombies in that she is tricked into inhaling voodoo powder, which results in her only appearing to be dead. She is then dug out of the grave as part of a scheme by the wealthy aristocrat, Beaumont, who wishes to have her despite her betrothal to another man. In another twist, Murder, the master of voodoo decides to turn the schemer Beaumont himself into a zombie so that he can take the heroine for himself. Regardless of the process by which they become zombies, however, the consistent theme is that all those who enter into zombiehood become bereft of any significant interiority. They are soulless and can only follow the commands of whoever is their master. Similarly, in Halperin's *Revolt of the Zombies*, the even more bizarre

1936 sequel to *White Zombies*, the zombies are mindless automatons who have no will of their own. Armand, the protagonist who has discovered the secret to making zombies turns his unfortunate Cambodian servant into one of them and then asks, "Can you think or speak except as I command?" "No master," is all that the expressionless servant turned zombie can utter.

Following some of the most interesting work on these early zombie films, it is possible to recognize the projection of postcolonial and racist anxieties onto the screen. In the case of *White Zombies*, which was set in Haiti, it is hard to avoid seeing the deep-seated fear of whites that the positions of the imperialists and the colonized might well be reversed under the Haitian Republic, with this fear projected through the image of enslaved white women. Historically, we need to recall that the USA had been occupying Haiti since 1915 and that the marines would not completely leave until 1934, just two years after the film's release. While not as much has been written about the sequel, the colonial and racist theme is even more explicit because the first zombies to be spotted are Cambodian zombies who have been recruited into the French army along the Franco–Austrian border in the First World War. It turns out that the original secret to making zombies was to be found in Cambodia, that local zombies had constructed the wondrous Angkor Wat Temple and that if the colonized Cambodians were to recover their souls they would become unruly subjects and revolt against their colonial masters.

Yet I want to suggest that even as the zombie figure in North American popular culture was a projection of the contradictions and anxieties emerging out of imperialism and colonialism, it was also a negative allegory for the ideal national subject in war. In fact, they are surely connected, with representations of the zombie as colonial Other providing the antithesis to the normative, self-composed national subject, particularly in times of war or the apprehension of war. When a sarcastic film critic for *The Billboard* (13 Jun 1936), the Cincinnati-based entertainment industry magazine, panned *Revolt of the Zombies*, he described the white zombie-maker, Armand, as a "sort of supernatural Hitler" who subjected everyone to his control.

The North American total war regimes required not mindless pawns who simply followed orders, as was exemplified in the zombie soldier, but active subjects of self-knowledge who had the capacity to make choices—that is, to be self-determining subjects who could choose even death in service to the nation. In this sense, the zombie serves as a suggestive starting point in mass culture for thinking through what Lim Jie-hyun has called mass dictatorship under total war regimes. I find this concept or the idea of a "people's dictatorship" particularly appealing and the figure of the zombie especially stimulating for reconsidering the distinction which is usually made between Japan as fascist, totalitarian or authoritarian, and the Allied Powers, especially the United States, which have promoted themselves as the liberal democratic paragons of the free world. Instead, although they were obviously singular products of history, the wartime regimes on both sides of the Pacific can similarly be considered mass dictatorships—if by the latter we mean authoritarian regimes that

mobilize the people as active and knowing subjects who will participate not only in the projects of the regimes, but in their own domination. To be sure, these mass dictatorships employed repression or power working in its negativity, but they also operated by means of what Foucault (1991) described as the rationalities of governmentality in which power operates through not just the external negativity of sovereign power, but self-disciplinization and what he theorized as the governing of self-government, or as I would put it, by guiding individuals through a matrix of freedom in which they are constituted as subjects through their acts of making choices.

While the ideology of free election makes it difficult to see the guiding hands which enable our choice-making, in these situations there are clearly right and wrong choices. For instance, the national subject may be presented with the choice of volunteering for military service, or not, but there is effectively only one correct choice. The individual must make the normative choice or be cast out as an incomplete or insufficient national subject. The latter, I would argue, is the essence of the zombie within the national context, as well as the Japanese *hikokumin*, which means literally the non- or negated national subject.

FREEDOM UNDER STATES OF EXCEPTION

For many years, particularly in the Cold War period, many scholars of Japan propagated the view that the Japanese people in the 1930s and 1940s were essentially duped into following the military leaders who had hijacked the figure of the emperor as the central rallying point for the Japanese expansionist empire. Moreover modernist social scientists such as Maruyama Masao (1961; 1974) and Ōtsuka Hideo (1948) insisted that the Japanese people had lacked the critical subjectivity that could be found in the liberal subject in the West, thus precluding individuated resistance to ultranationalism and Japan's brand of fascism. Maruyama characterized Japan as plagued by a mode of thought and a personality type characteristic of a *Gemeinschaft* rather than a *Gesellschaft* in which premodern social relations obstructed the development of a unified, free and responsible subjectivity. Thus Japan's fascism had been founded upon feudalism or put in the obverse, the incompleteness of modernity.

Despite the brilliance of several of these modernists, most prominently Maruyama, one consequence of this othering of Japanese-style fascism, or I would say the Orientalizing of Japanese-style fascism, was that they contributed to exceptionalizing the Japanese case, thereby precluding a fuller investigation into fascism as a modern global phenomenon that transcended the East–West divide. But even more pertinent to this essay—which might in part be a statement about my discomfort with the comparative fascism method itself, which always risks setting ourselves up as the "good guys" perched on an Archimedean point who gaze down upon the world to determine just who is bad enough to qualify as fascist—such a view of Japan during the 1930s and 1940s as essentially premodern or at least incompletely modern made it nearly impossible to consider how Japan and the Allied Powers as the leaders of capitalist modernity in the Asia Pacific might actually be commensurable with one another.

Yet when we remove the expectations that have been preformed by the familiar binaries of Axis–Allied, fascist–non-fascist, liberal democracy–totalitarianism, and East–West—it becomes possible to consider Japan and the Anglo-American Allied Powers (including the USA, Britain and Canada) during real or even imagined wartime as comparable national security states,[2] each dealing with the global crises of capitalism, each threatened by class conflict as manifested in the relations between labor and capital as well as the specter of Communism, each facing challenges to their empires by nationalist movements, each by their imperialist ambitions participating in the disintegration of what Carl Schmitt (2003 [1950, 1974]) described as the Eurocentric global order or *nomos* of the earth, and the point that I want to take up most centrally, each experimenting with new strategies of governance by which to most efficiently mobilize national subjects through the application of not just coercion and power in its negativity, but through the management of life, freedom and the nurturing of consent.

Even a quick listing of ways in which the Japanese and North American powers in the Second World War managed their total war systems and their populations by combining coercive, violent and exceptional legal measures that effectively suspended the law, on the one hand, with measures to elicit voluntarism and freedom of choice, on the other—suggest more resemblances than discontinuities across the Axis–Allied divide, resemblances that might be considered shared features of mass democracy/dictatorship or a people's dictatorship. While the exceptional legal powers granted by the Meiji Constitution to the Japanese emperor as sovereign have been much remarked upon, including his ability to make law through imperial ordinances, a consideration of liberal regimes that transcends the ideology of liberalism should give us pause in making such a stark distinction between Japan and the Allied Powers. Long ago Carl Schmitt (2005 [1934]) and more recently Giorgio Agamben (2005 [2003]) recognized that liberal constitutional regimes have always incorporated mechanisms by which their governments can declare states of exception to the normal functioning of constitutional procedures and protections. And as Agamben reminds us, the state of exception in the Euro-American context is "a creation of the democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one" (Agamben 2005, p. 5).

In the case of Canada, the War Measures Act of 1914 gave enormous powers to the government not only in times of war, but vaguely enough whenever the executive determined that a state of "war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended" existed. The Act thus conferred wide discretionary authority on the government to determine when any of these conditions were even considered imminent, and authorized it with broad powers of censorship, arrest, detention, deportation, the appropriation and disposition of property, and more in the interests of "the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada." With regard to the Second World War, on 1 September 1939 the Mackenzie King government determined that Canada had been in a state of "apprehended war" since 25 August. And on 3 September 1939—that is, one

week before Canada formally declared war with Germany—the government invoked the War Measures Act of 1914 to proclaim a series of sixty-four regulations as internal security measures, which together came to form the Defence of Canada Regulations. As the well-known historian and sharp critic of these regulations summarized long ago,

> Together they [the regulations] represented the most serious restrictions upon the civil liberties of Canadians since Confederation. In addition to the almost unlimited authority provided by the War Measures Act itself, the Defence of Canada Regulations provided the Liberal government of W. I. M. King with powers to intern without trial, prohibit specified political and religious associations, restrict freedom of speech and the press, and confiscate property. (Cook 1974 p. 38)

Considered as law, these Regulations provided the legal foundations that enabled such actions as the removal and internment of Japanese Canadians from security areas, the confiscation of their property, the prohibition of numerous associations such as the Communist Party and the Jehovah's Witnesses (incidentally, these latter were among the same elements targeted by the Japanese intelligence organs and the police), and in one very famous case of an individual, the arrest and three-year imprisonment of the Montreal mayor, Camillien Houde, for nothing more than his opposition to national registration (Cook 1974).

In the United States the most dramatic and extraordinary tool used to maintain the security and unity of the nation through the discretionary power of the executive, whether in times of war or peace, has been the executive order. Executive Orders do not require congressional approval and have been used for instance: by Truman, for the purpose of establishing loyalty review boards to discharge civilian government employees judged to have been disloyal during the war; by Carter to cease investigations and indictments of Vietnam War draft evaders; and by George W. Bush to establish the Homeland Security Department prior to its authorization by Congress. During his four terms as President from 1933 to 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt issued no less than 3,728 Executive Orders.[1] Among them, perhaps the most notorious and well known was Executive Order 9066, issued in February 1942, which made it possible to legally remove Japanese Americans from the West Coast and to place them in internment camps in the nation's interior. The Order directed the Secretary of War to "prescribe military areas…from which any or all persons may be excluded" and left it up to the "Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander" to determine by "his discretion" how to restrict the "right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave" the designed areas. The Order identified no authority except for the Office of the President itself: the text's self-authorization declared that the Order came "by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy." In the language of Schmitt and Agamben, the President identified himself as the sovereign who could unilaterally declare the state of exception.

And yet, the American President is not simply an absolute dictator. Agamben has argued that Abraham Lincoln was an absolute dictator for an extended period of time because he simply bypassed Congress to raise an army and made it legally possible to suspend the writ of habeas in an area he deemed to be a militarily strategic zone. He "imposed censorship of the mail and authorized the arrest and detention in military prisons of persons suspected of 'disloyal and treasonable practices'." He proclaimed the slaves emancipated on his authority alone, and authorized the arrests and trials by court martial of not only all those he named "Rebels" and "Insurgents," but even those suspected of aiding them and anyone "guilty of any disloyal practice." Yet it might even be more appropriate to consider Abraham Lincoln as a people's rather than an absolutist dictator because at least in his own image he acted as if he did so on behalf of the people. Through the democratic revolutions sovereignty had passed to the people, so that Lincoln apparently felt compelled to explain that while his actions might not be "strictly legal," he judged his sovereign power to be an expression of the will of the people, or in his own words, "what appeared to be a popular demand and public necessity" (quoted in Agamben 2005, p. 20).

Despite the exceptional authority legally conferred upon the Japanese emperor, the American president and the Canadian executive, I return now to one of the most critical points of this chapter: namely, that despite the absolute authority of the sovereign power in these situations, all these national regimes also sought to produce consent and active subjects of self-knowledge who would willingly participate in national policies and projects, most especially war.

To be sure, the mainstream classical Marxist, modernist and modernization theorists' understanding of "what went wrong" in Japan during the 1930s and 1940s, did not engage with the possibility that the subjectivities of the Japanese people might not have been so different from those of citizens in the Western liberal democracies at that time. But the works of a few important scholars offer insights for considering comparabilities across the Allied–Axis divide. Although not explicitly about the wartime period, the early writings of the historian Yasumaru Yoshio (1974) on the relation between the people and nationalism are still very suggestive. One of the most rigorous and conceptually sophisticated historians of his generation, Yasumaru warned in his essays dating from as early as the 1960s that the modern subjectivity whose emergence he had identified among the people prior to the Meiji Restoration of 1868 had ambivalent implications. On the one hand, this self-constituting, self-reflexive subjectivity that bore great resemblance to the modern subject in the West, could be the source for a radical critique of the social totality. But on the other hand, he warned that historically the nation state had captured that modern popular subjectivity and turned it into the vehicle for the people's active, self-reflexive and knowledgeable participation in both their own domination and the later projects of the emperor-centered, militarist and expansionist regime. Thus although Yasumaru did not cite Foucault, his Foucauldian understanding of the modern subject as both subjected to power and as an active agent

remains extremely useful for understanding how Japanese national subjects might have been led to imagine themselves as just as free or even more free than the citizens of liberal democracies during wartime—that is to say, just as free to willingly submit themselves to the militaristic and expansionist projects of the nation.

In fact, as the more recent work of Yoshimi Yoshiaki (2015 [1987]) has shown, the common people during wartime were not simply automatons, blindly and mindlessly following the emperor and their military leaders. Instead, in his path-breaking book Yoshimi described a messy world in which Japanese nationals of all social backgrounds from the highly educated and professionals, to poor farmers, tradesmen, schoolteachers, colonial settlers, common soldiers at the front, to minorities, colonial subjects and others—how they responded without unanimity, but with the vast majority actively and self-consciously participating in what he described as "grassroots fascism." Yoshimi pointed out that even as popular dissension existed, this enthusiasm for the empire extended to some among even the most marginalized elements in national and colonial society. In fact, I might add, dissension about and even popular criticisms of the Japanese wartime regime testify to a logic of governmentality, which always assumes messiness and the possibility of resistance because this modality of governance requires freedom as the condition for its operation. Furthermore, Yoshimi noted that in a survey of the consciousness of young men of eligible age conducted in 1940, only 1.3% agreed that "dictatorial politics are a good idea." And consistent with this view these men claimed that while the Germans and Italians lived under dictatorial regimes, the Japanese under their New Order did not.

The extent to which the Japanese and American wartime regimes attempted to manage, rather than eliminate freedom during wartime is evidenced in many ways. For instance, the USA and Japan were the only major powers in the war to continue their elections. The British, on the other hand, suspended them from 1935 to 1945 (Harvey 1992, p. 755). To be sure, the 1942 election in Japan could be and is often considered a partial sham since the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Organization Council, which was a direct product of the Tōjō government despite its official status as non-governmental, recommended a slate of 466 candidates to fill the 466 seats of the Lower House. However, interestingly enough, 85 non-endorsed candidates defeated their recommended counterparts, including four future postwar prime ministers. This result as well as the generally conflicted background to even the recommendation system has often been cited to make the point that Japan never became a completely one-party state (Arima 2002, pp. 300–3); but we should also consider that the limited pluralism in evidence in the election resulted directly from the desire of the government to show that the people approved of the government's policies of their own free will—or put differently, to persuade the people to make the right choices. In this sense, A. D. Harvey's term "plebiscitary dictatorship" seems to fit the American and Japanese situations quite well. As for Canada, not only did it hold a general election in the spring of 1940 to bolster

the Mackenzie King government, the government called a plebiscite in 1942 to approve implementation of the military draft. The people, in other words, were guided toward making a choice that would result in eligible men having no choice in the matter of military service.

Even with regard to censorship, which was practiced by all the belligerents, the US and Japanese regimes favored self-censorship rather than directly applied repression. As Jonathan E. Abel (2012) has shown through his meticulous research in the Japanese censorship archives, "the explicit and visible" work of censorship reached a highpoint in the transitional period between the period of so-called Taishō Democracy and total war—that is, 1928 to 1936—and fell as the war intensified and challenges to the empire increased. As he puts it, "censorship practices became increasingly concerned with the effacement of its very practice," and after its "peak the [censorship] offices did not have to work as diligently, because the mechanism had been internalized" (Abel 2012, p. 13). Working from a Derridean-inspired perspective on the positivity of censorship, Abel makes it clear that in these regimes (and perhaps in our own) censorship worked most powerfully and successfully when authors, artists, publishing houses and other agents in civil society imposed prohibitions on themselves.

NORMATIVE VOLUNTARISM AMONG THE RACIALLY MARGINALIZED

The extent to which wartime mobilization in the USA and Japan worked at least as much through the presentation of choices and the expectation of voluntarism as it did through direct force can perhaps best be gauged from the fact that these regimes ultimately demanded that even the most disprivileged and marginalized groups actively support the war effort. The tension between racist marginalization, on the one hand, and the expectation of voluntary participation is perhaps nowhere more in evidence than in the cases of minority and colonized subjects who were expected to make the proper choice of volunteering in service to the nation.

The example of the Japanese Americans who were the victims of President Roosevelt's sovereign authority to declare the state of exception over a specifically racialized population is an excellent case in point. We tend to think of Japanese Americans corralled into internment camps through negative images such as exclusion. These images are not unwarranted and they need to foreground our understanding of the position occupied by racialized populations under the total war regime. Japanese Americans—citizens and noncitizens, mixed-race as well as supposedly "pure" Japanese, babies and orphans as well as men and women of all ages—approximately 120 thousand of them were expelled from the West Coast of the United States, with most then confined in camps that did not completely shut down until after the war. As for the US Territory of Hawaii, while no mass internment took place, the entire territory

became a de facto internment camp because the civil and then military authorities declared martial law immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack and only lifted it in late October 1944 (Okihiro 1991).

Despite the reality of this sort of treatment, it is also imperative to recognize that power in this context did not operate through repressive means alone. Ironically, not long after their removal and incarceration, the civil and military authorities rejected the view that the entire Japanese race had to be excluded from the national community and the war effort.[3] Instead, they came to the conclusion that America needed to include at least the loyal among them. The government's War Relocation Authority then endeavored to present life in the camps as anything but undemocratic and unfree. They turned the image of the camp into a model of a healthily functioning liberal democracy with provisions for neighborhood elections, town meetings, schools, nominal freedom of speech and religion, newspapers, hospitals, beauty pageants, barn dances, clubs, sports and in the Manzanar camp even a model orphanage and eventually an accredited junior college. Except for those considered irredeemably disloyal and their families who were interned at Tule Lake, the internees literally even came to be called "free individuals." But who were these incarcerated free individuals?

From February to March 1943, ten teams of military personnel joined with civilian camp administrators to submit every adult internee in the ten camps to a loyalty questionnaire. While there were several versions of the questionnaire and slight wording variations in each, the key and most well-remembered questions today were numbers 27 and 28, which presented internees with the choice of affirming or disavowing their loyalty to the United States. In every version of the questionnaire, number 27 essentially asked the internee if he or she was willing to serve in the armed forces. The core section of number 28 asked every individual to "swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America" and in the version intended for male citizens, it in effect repeated the call to arms by adding, "and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces." Never before or since has an entire US subpopulation been subjected to what amounts to a loyalty oath applied strictly on the basis of race or national origin, although the process of winnowing out what were called at the time the disloyal "goats" from the "loyal" sheep certainly prefigures what in more recent history has been called "racial profiling," with assessments of individual guilt or innocence occurring after an entire group was targeted as prone to disloyalty or criminality.

The irony of this undertaking, in which the civilian government and the Army provided every Japanese American internee with the opportunity to individually and freely affirm loyalty to the nation despite confinement in the starkly unfree space of the camp, was not lost on even those conducting this ritual of free choice. Targeting especially the American citizens whom they wanted to recruit as volunteer soldiers into the Army, they conceded in the "Relocation Center Address" which they read verbatim in every camp that "You may object

that this—your life here—is not freedom," but they insisted nonetheless that the process of registering the internees, conducting the questionnaires and recruiting Army volunteers depended "finally upon the voluntary acts of free American citizens" (quoted in Fujitani 2011, pp. 137–38). Insisting that America always afforded its members freedom of choice it observed that

> Not all Japanese Americans are loyal to their government. Not all members of any group of our population—even those whose ancestors came here hundreds of years ago—are fully loyal to their country. That is so because ours is a free society permitting the individual often to choose in what measure he will contribute to the common good. (quoted in Fujitani 2011, p. 138)

Not surprisingly the recruitment drive for army volunteers on the US mainland was a miserable failure. By June 1943, more than four months after the President himself announced that Japanese Americans would henceforth be eligible for Army service, only 1,208 men out of about 19,606 eligible male citizens in the ten camps had volunteered. In contrast, in Hawaii, where mass removal had not taken place, by early March some 9,509 out of roughly 25,000 eligible men had applied for voluntary induction. Clearly, the attempt to convince men in camp that they were truly free to make the choice to become soldiers collided too violently with the reality of their self-perceived incarcerated condition. The point that I have tried to make, however, has less to do with the success or failure of this particular campaign in the camps, than with demonstrating that the regime favored willing and active subjects from even among the most abjected and unfree of the nation's subpopulations—in this case even from among those who had been momentarily expelled from the national community by the exceptional authority invested in the executive.

Likewise, it is common and not inappropriate to imagine Japan's colonial subjects during the war through negative images such as coerced labor, sacrificial slaughter (as in the case of Okinawans in the Battle of Okinawa), and perhaps most notoriously, sexual slavery. Yet the so-called "*kōminka*" campaign as practiced in various degrees across the increasingly nationalized space of these colonies is a strong indication of the regime's commitment to constituting willing subjects for the war effort. *Kōminka* literally means "making imperial subjects" and was characterized by the desire to turn formerly complacent or even resistant colonials into active agents in support of the Japanese Empire's projects. As works such as those by Tomiyama Ichirō (1990) on Okinawa and Leo Ching (2001) on Taiwan have argued, in the late colonial period the authorities did not consider the superficial appearance of assimilation to Japanese norms sufficient. Instead, the demand for cooperation went deeper, into the interiority of the colonial subjects. Policies such as the name-changing campaigns in Korea and Taiwan, the pressure to speak in Japanese as Japanese subjects, the increasing circulation of propaganda and the expansion of education in schools and training centers—these formed a matrix intended to constitute the colonized people into willing Japanese nationals.

To be sure, the extreme means by which the regime attempted to transform the colonized into Japanese, at least insofar as service to the nation went, resulted in many instances of resistance—including by partisans, communists and ethnic nationalists. Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny the counter-examples of numerous individuals, elite or not, who willingly participated in the aims of the empire. For instance, Korean writers and filmmakers as renowned as Yi Kwang-su (canonized as Korea's first modern novelist), Chang Hyŏk-chu (one of the Japanese Empire's most prolific writers) and the filmmaker Hŏ Yŏng (who participated in the Japanese assault on Java as a member of a propaganda corps attached to the Sixteenth Army) explicitly and repeatedly tried to show in their works that becoming Japanese through such acts as volunteering to soldier for the Japanese Empire offered the most certain avenue for self-determination and happiness.

Many late colonial films used the trope of the Korean volunteer soldier to promote the idea of freely chosen submission to the Japanese nation. Between 1940 and 1945 Japanese and Korean directors made at least seven feature films on the theme of Korean volunteers in the Japanese military, and another on Koreans in the border police (Fujitani 2011, pp. 305–6). Let us consider just two of these on the question of choice and subjecthood, although any of them would confirm the main argument.

Love and the Vow (J. *Ai to chikai*, K., *Sarang kwa maengsŏ* 1945) was a film co-directed by Imai Tadashi, one of Japan's most well-known and highly regarded filmmakers, and Ch'oe In-kyu, one of the most accomplished Korean film directors of his generation. The work fits neatly into the genre of the *Bildungsroman*, the novel of formation, in that the protagonist overcomes the uncertainties of youth and develops into mature and civilized adulthood, while reconciling the contradictions between his own troubled interiority and the demands of the normative social order. In other words, as Franco Moretti has noted about the *Bildungs* novel, in the end the protagonist acts "as a 'free individual,' not as a fearful subject," and in this reconciliation he "perceives the social norms as [his] own" (Moretti 1987, p. 16). In this deeply disturbing film the Korean youth finally becomes this fearless and free subject through the self-determining act of volunteering to die as a kamikaze pilot.

Similarly, in *Suicide Squad at the Watchtower* (J. *Bōrō no kesshitai*, K. *Mangnu ŭi kyŏlsadae* 1943) the narrative unfolds around the theme of voluntary death. In the film's dramatic highpoint, Japanese and Korean border policemen as well as their wives and lovers resolve to take their own lives rather than risk capture by the attacking partisans. Here it is revealing to note that in the Japanese title of the film the word for "suicide" is *kesshi*, which means literally choosing death. Moreover, during the war the (forced) mass suicides that occurred in places such as Okinawa and the Pacific were called *jiketsu*, which means literally, self-determination. In all these cases, then, the individuals were supposed to come into full and free subjecthood as Japanese nationals by choosing the ultimate sacrifice.

Of course, these were state-approved representations and we should not regard them as unmediated reflections of the interiorities of the colonized peoples under wartime. Nonetheless, we can conclude that these films, literature

with similar narrative structures (such as by Chang Hyŏk-chu [Chang 1944]), as well as a wide array of state propaganda—these diagrammed an ideal relationship of power in which the late colonial and increasingly nationalized order in Korea and Okinawa provided an imaginary matrix of freedom within which subjects were supposed to constitute themselves as self-reflexive and active agents in the normative order. If they did not, of course, force and brutality could be and were used to punish as well as discipline the unwilling.

Final Thoughts

Even granting the obvious fact that the US, Japanese and Canadian total war regimes were singular formations that should not be conflated, the term mass (or alternatively people's) dictatorship, which highlights the mobilization of the people in all three as both free and unfree, as subjected to power and subjects of power, allows us to recognize them as products of the same historical moment—that is, the modern moment when government was supposed to represent the people even as it required the force of the transcendent sovereign. To be sure, a skeptic might point to the "elephant in the room" of this conversation, namely, the Japanese emperor. In this connection it is well worth considering Michael Hardt's and Antonio Negri's (2000) observations on what they describe as the modern "transcendental schema." By this they mean that all modern political systems whether they are called democratic, plural or popular—all have "only one political figure: a single transcendent power." Closing the gap between Hobbes and Rousseau as well as monarchical and republican forms of government,[4] they observe that regardless of whether the people contract with one another to submit themselves to Hobbes's absolute sovereign leader ("God on Earth") or to Rousseau's republican absolute, "the whole community," the effect is the same. Each associate alienates himself and all his rights to a power which can only be single and transcendent. The endpoint for Negri and Hardt is none other than what they call "totalitarian democracy," a term that we might add to mass and people's dictatorship to indicate how power in liberal democracies such as North America operates in ways that are alarmingly similar to what we have othered through images of the Oriental emperor, Tōjō, Hitler, Mussolini and yes, the zombie.

Notes

1. Available from: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/roosevelt.html.
2. The pioneering work criticizing such binaries is the edited volume by Yamanouchi, Koschmann, & Narita (1998 [1995]).
3. The following analyses of Japanese Americans and Koreans during wartime is drawn from Fujitani (2011).
4. On this point Hardt and Negri echo Carl Schmitt's earlier (2008 [1938]) reading of Hobbes; for the quotes and argument summarized here, see pp. 83–113.

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Collaboration as a Transnational Formation of Modernity: The Conduct of Everyday Life and the Birth of the Modern Subject

Michael Kim

Mass dictatorships are transnational formations of modernity with complex sociopolitical mechanisms that enabled the project to spread throughout the globe. The ideological motivations for constructing a dictatorship from below may vary, but at the heart of the phenomenon are a common set of practices and collective understandings associated with modernity. One of the important goals of the mass dictatorship paradigm is to argue against exceptionalist arguments like the *Sonderweg* thesis that posits a special "deviant" path to the development of German democracy vs the "normal" development of the West (Lim 2013, p. 13). The notion of a universal/modern/normal democracy in the "West" juxtaposed against a particular/premodern/abnormal dictatorship in the "Rest" encourages binary perspectives that perpetuate Eurocentric biases in the writing of history. Rather than accept exceptionalist explanations that explain twentieth-century history as a case of deviant paths away from the European enlightenment, we should highlight those areas where we can witness a convergence of transnational political practices that encourage "voluntary" participation under repressive regimes around the world.

In mapping mass dictatorships onto the transnational history of modernity, it is useful to view colonialism and the Holocaust on the same continuum of violence committed against those groups deemed to be less deserving of life. Indeed, the German colonial experience, in many ways, can be said to have anticipated the extreme violence of the Holocaust. However, unlike the Holocaust, which posited an insurmountable gap between the superior and inferior races, colonialism on the whole contains the slim possibility of

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redemption for the colonial subject. The Enlightenment rationality behind the colonial enterprise encourages the view that colonial subjects could one day achieve full personhood under the right limited conditions. The concepts of mandates and trusteeships that emerge after the First World War present the notion that the colonized can become sovereign after an extended period of tutorship. The possibility for collective self-reinvention under this framework suggests a path to escape one's degraded status by absorbing the "enlightenment" of the colonizers. Here we may posit that mass dictatorships, which require "voluntary compliance" and mass participation, can often thrive in situations where people sought collective advancement. In fact, the issue of collaboration strikes at the heart of the question of "voluntarism" in mass dictatorship as individuals felt compelled to cooperate with oppressive regimes despite their collective subjugation. Therefore, we need a closer examination of the collaboration process and to consider how certain circumstances may encourage active compliance and even enthusiastic participation of individuals in systems of widespread political repression. Through this analysis, we may unlock the operation of not only colonial regimes but any modern system that compels a broad level of collaboration.

Collaboration and Colonialism

Postcolonial perspectives can provide valuable insights into the key role of collaboration in mass dictatorships, because colonized subjects may be motivated by more complex factors than simply the fear of violence and the desire for material rewards. Empires on the whole have long experienced the need to work with local authorities and provide political patronage, because conquered elites had to be given stakes in the imperial system to produce subordinate agents, who sometimes even threatened to hijack the imperial order (Cooper 2005, pp. 23–24). While there has been a long history of collaborators appropriating imperial authority, we may also need to understand the phenomenon in its modern manifestation. More complex forms of colonization require collaboration on a far larger scale than the early colonial attempts because of the need to mobilize the entire colonial population. From that perspective, we may view the issue as a particular form of modern governmentality, where dominated subjects are encouraged to internalize social norms and regulate their conduct to obtain the recognition of the colonizers. As Tak Fujitani observed about the situation in wartime colonial Korea and wartime America in the 1940s, at a certain point minority populations became viewed as "worthy of life, education, health and even to some degree happiness, precisely because these systems came to regard the health and development of even abjected populations as useful for the regime's survival, prosperity and victory in war" (Fujitani 2011, p. 26). The colonial context is somewhat different from a modern nation state, because of the stark contrast between those subjects deemed fully deserving of constitutional protections vs those who are considered unfit for the rules and regulations of the modern world. Yet it is precisely the fact

that colonizers consider their colonized subjects to be inherently inferior that they may be compelled to regulate their everyday conduct to be judged worthy of life, education, health and happiness.

Many scholars of imperialism have noted that the concept of *mission civilisatrice* offered hope for colonial subjects willing to adapt and conform to the expectations of the colonizers. Here we might highlight the significance of the assimilation process and note that Western liberal critics such as de Tocqueville often played instrumental roles as the architects of Algerian colonial assimilation policy (Pitts 2005). What's particularly interesting about French assimilation policy is that only a small number of Algerians successfully assimilated from a legal sense, because religion was an important factor. There is an exclusionary aspect of liberalism that allows for limits on who can be eligible for full membership, which assimilationist policies often bring to light. Assimilation essentially means that colonized subjects must behave exactly like the colonizers in all their observable actions. The colonized who do not embrace the assimilationist schemes discover that they remain outside the boundaries of what colonial authorities define as "the modern." This tendency of modern societies to reward those who conform to strict social and cultural expectations is not an exclusive feature of the colonial era. Indeed, the invention of the modern subject encourages the idea that we must all collectively regulate our conduct and accommodate ourselves to strict societal expectations. Once an idealized peoplehood emerges, so does the urge to internalize a set of cultural norms associated with modern individuals. Those who show the proper conduct befitting a modern person may be accepted by society, yet colonial circumstances tend to introduce a fundamental ambiguity about the criteria for full citizenship. The colonized individual's capacity to reason may be questioned because of his or her membership in colonial society. The task then is for the colonized to convince the colonizers that they can reform their inherent backwardness through a strict control of their conduct in everyday life.

Therefore, while recognizing that collaboration with empires has a long tradition that stretches back into ancient history, it may be useful to consider how, concurrent with the rise of the modern nation-state, colonialism in the early twentieth century encountered the problem of how to incorporate the general population while still maintaining a stark division between the colonizers and colonized. Those who are born as national subjects rarely question the conditionality of their status as national subjects. Loyalty to nation, state and national community is assumed to be innate. Yet for colonial subjects there is not automatic admission and therefore they can only display through their daily conduct that they "belong" to a national community. It may be precisely this ambiguity that drives colonial collaboration, especially at moments when colonial powers increasingly introduced techniques of modern governmentality to rule their colonial subjects. The colonized and the colonizers negotiate the boundaries of this ambiguous social terrain to define ways to show acceptance of the colonizers' world. In many cases, no other alternative may have been visible on the political horizon for the colonized subjects. We might view this

colonial assimilation process as a form of regulating conduct in everyday life that has profound implications for understanding mass dictatorships as a transnational formation of modernity.

COLLABORATION AS COLLECTIVE REINVENTION

While the colonial order can provide key insights into the collaboration process, we do need to examine the process from a more universal lens. One starting point for an inquiry into the broader issue of collaboration in world history may be Vichy France during the Second World War. In particular, Robert Paxton's seminal work, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944*, may have a particular resonance because of his suggestion that French collaboration with Nazi Germany emerged from a desire for reform within French society in the 1930s and in some ways anticipated the direction of postliberation France (Munholland 1994, p. 806). The Vichy regime enacted numerous measures designed to reinvent French society through the use of coercive state power and to achieve their own version of a nationalist socialist revolution. We may keep in mind that there were some aspects of Nazism that appealed to a sense of building a modern national community, which Peter Fritzsche captures in his observation that

> If the Nazis were modernizers, it was less on account of their efficacy in destroying traditional social milieus, as Dahrendorf claims, than of their capacity to manufacture an alternative public sphere in which Germans identified themselves increasingly as *Volksgenossen*. At least at certain times and places, they accepted Nazi premises about the equality of opportunity, responded to appeals in the name of the nation, and internalized many of the regime's hideous racial distinctions. (Fritzsche 1996, p. 7)

The desire of Germans to reinvent themselves as an alternative collective free of modernity's flaws had an appeal among some French elites who also dreamed of collective self-fashioning. In that respect, French historians have argued that anti-Semitism and the desire to implement radical solutions to France's social problems did not originate entirely in the Nazi movement, for they also had a convergence with fascist trends that already existed in France before the German invasion. This mixed legacy of French collaboration with Nazi Germany has left postwar French society with a particular obsession with its collaborationist past and the "Vichy Syndrome" that struggles over the collective memories of this historical period (Rousso 1991). Many of France's postwar leadership had ties to the Vichy past and their past records of collaboration became subsumed under a myth of patriotic resistance to achieve a sense of postwar national integration.

The example of Vichy France poses a number of important questions for the study of mass dictatorships. French historians and the French public have long debated the troubling possibility that the differences that separate historical

aggressors from historical victims are not always so sharply defined. While clearly the Nazis program for the New Order was enforced on French society, there were certain intellectual trends of pre-occupation France that were receptive to Nazi ideology. The French collaborators with the Nazi regime may have held their own particular ideological vision for French society that was compatible but not entirely identical with Nazism. Therefore, French collaboration with the Nazi regime can be interpreted in a more complex manner than simply attributing the phenomenon to the desire of collaborators to achieve self-aggrandizement. A transnational history of collaboration needs to consider the possibility that mass dictatorships often thrive in situations where there is a fundamental push for collective reinvention and historical agents among the repressed who wish to accelerate the transformation under authoritarian dominance.

The historical context of Vichy France is far removed from colonial Korea, but it may be useful to consider some potential similarities to explore the transnational dimensions of collaboration in the modern age. During the colonial period, various Korean intellectuals expressed their rationale for why Koreans should support the Japanese Empire. In the process, Korean intellectuals actively sought to appropriate certain aspects of Japan's imperial ideology. The desire to reshape Korea through collaboration with the Japanese appeared at the earliest moment of the Japanese Occupation. One of the largest populist organizations that boasted over 100,000 members, called the *Ilchinhoe* or the Advancement Society, had openly supported the Japanese annexation in 1910, which has led to various speculations about the prevalence of a Pan-Asianist discourse and criticisms of their naïve understanding of Japanese intentions. However, the Advancement Society may have been connected to an earlier movement called the Independence Club, and they accepted Japan's claims to "civilize Korea" to push for populist rights and reforms that limited dynastic authority.[1] The Japanese disbanded the Advancement Society after the annexation of Korea in 1910, because they preferred to work with the existing elite groups. However, we can see through this interaction that the possibilities for collective reinvention within the imperial polity had motivated potential collaborators from an early period of colonial history.

During the height of the Great East Asian War (1937–1945) in the Second World War, Korean collaborators again dreamed of aligning their aspirations with Japanese expansion. Japan's spectacular victories on the Asian mainland in the late 1930s and early 1940s captured the imagination of leading Korean intellectuals who saw an opportunity to participate in the construction of an East Asian New Order. News of the rapidly advancing Japanese armies and the fall of key Chinese cities like Shanghai and Nanjing sent major shockwaves throughout the Korean peninsula. During this period, the Japanese forcibly attempted to mobilize millions of Koreans for their war effort and assimilate them as Japanese under the slogan of *naisen ittai* or "Japan and Korea are One Body." The Japanese understood that they were fighting a "total war" that required the mobilization of not just Japan but their colonial possessions as well. It was at this juncture that many Koreans had to make a pragmatic

assessment that collaboration with Japan was necessary for survival, but there were also those who were fascinated by the possibility that a reformist power would not only transform Korea into a long-desired modern state, but Japan proper as well (Kim 2007, pp. 35–43). For example, the literary critic Ch'oe Chae-sō (1908–1964) hoped to secure an autonomous space for Korean culture within the broader rubric of Japanese imperial culture and argued that the survival of the Korean people depended on their acquisition of a proper national consciousness as a member of a strong state that was capable of defending them against the destructive forces of the world.[2] Much like in Vichy France, one might view collaboration in colonial Korea as a phenomenon that partly emerged from a desire for collective reinvention and the construction of an alternative national community through the exercise of authoritarian power. The collaborators themselves may have had complex reasons for cooperating, but at the heart of their logic of collaboration was a desire for national reformation.

COLLABORATION AS EVERYDAY CONDUCT

The desire to reconfigure the nation may explain the phenomenon from a somewhat generalized perspective, but collaboration ultimately manifests itself in the realm of everyday life. Here we may consider the controversies surrounding Hannah Arendt's work, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* which gave rise to the term "banality of evil." Eichmann may have harbored considerable doubts about the Final Solution until the Conference of the Undersecretaries of State in January 1942, when he could liberate himself from his sense of guilt after witnessing the leaders of the Third Reich arrive at a consensus plan of action (Arendt 2006, p. 114). The possibility that countless numbers of ordinary Germans might have resolved similar concerns to participate in the Holocaust poses a difficult question regarding the rationalization of everyday actions. The critics of Arendt's work have pointed out that Eichmann may not be such a typically "banal" personality, yet what remains true is that the Final Solution would have been impossible without the active involvement of a large number of Germans. The challenge today may be to identify those conditions under which individuals could make critical decisions to comply with the demands of authoritarian systems.

The key issue that arises from the Eichmann case is the possibility that he may have been a lukewarm Nazi, yet his enthusiasm in carrying out his duties came from his ability to disassociate his thoughts and concerns from his everyday actions. The ways in which collaboration becomes deeply embedded in the conduct of everyday life may be examined through the case study of Yi Kwang-su (1892–1950), who penned perhaps one of the richest collaborationist texts in the history of the Japanese empire entitled "My Confessions" (Kwang-su 1964). One might compare him to the famous case of the writer Robert Brasillach (1909–1945), who was executed for his pro-Nazi sentiments, in that his crimes were of an intellectual nature (Kaplan 2000).

Like Robert Brasillach, we can trace in his prewar writings many indications that he held strong rightist beliefs. However, Yi Kwang-su's literary reputation was considerably greater, and he was without question one of colonial Korea's most celebrated authors. Further complicating Yi Kwang-su's case was that he was a colonized Korean, who struggled with his sense of elite superiority vis-à-vis other ordinary Koreans, but suffered from a sense of collective inferiority vis-à-vis the colonizers.

Yi Kwang-su developed a nationalist consciousness early in life, and as Cho Kwang-ja notes he may be considered a "pro-Japanese nationalist" (Cho Kwan-ja 2006). One of the interesting propositions here is how a deeply committed nationalist like Yi Kwang-su could turn towards active collaboration with the Japanese during the Second World War. Yi Kwang-su claims in "My Confessions" that his mutual identification with his fellow Koreans started at an early age. He recalls a trip back to Korea during his early studies in Japan, when a Japanese conductor saw him in his Western-style suit and directed him to a car for Japanese passengers. In anger, he declared that he was a Korean and chose to ride in the Korean car. He then relates his shame at the sight of Koreans in traditional white dress fighting each other for seats and spitting on the ground. After witnessing the distressing scene, Yi Kwang-su vows to devote his life to the goal of transforming the Korean people. One of the highlights of his early life episodes was a speech by the famed nationalist, An Ch'ang-ho (1878–1938), who stated in a lecture that a people without a country are a "vulgar people" so how could any Korean consider himself be an aristocratic *yangban* by himself (Kwang-su 1964, pp. 230–32)? Yi Kwang-su could not imagine himself to be a "modern subject" no matter his level of education and cultural sophistication as long as he identified himself as a member of a "vulgar" colonized people.

Yi Kwang-su attempted to lead a cultural nationalist movement based on an emphasis on cultural development and the expansion of education.[3] When An Ch'ang-ho was captured in Shanghai in 1932 and returned to Korea, he gathered together many leading cultural nationalists into the *Tonguhoe* or "Friends Association." Yi Kwang-su claims that he gained new courage to join because a great personage like An Ch'ang-ho had the power that he lacked to effect change (Kwang-su 1964, p. 273). In many ways, the arrest of 181 members of the *Tonguhoe* or "Friends Society" and the executives of the *Hungŏp kurakbu* or "Industrial Advancement Club" represented a key preemptive strike by the wartime colonial regime in 1937–1938. Many prominent cultural nationalists associated with these two movements upon their release from prison became active collaborators and served in leadership positions of pro-Japanese associations. Yi Kwang-su began his journey down the path of collaboration by becoming the head of the Korean Authors Association in 1939 that the colonial state formed to control wartime literary production. After the death of An Ch'ang-ho in 1938, Yi Kwang-su claims that he viewed collaboration with the Japanese as the only possible option to achieve his long-term nationalist goals. Yet not all of the Japanese colonial officials were convinced that he had truly

"converted." Yi Kwang-su began his collaborationist career while still undergoing trial for his involvement in the *Tonguhoe*. During the court sessions, the prosecutor accused Yi Kwang-su of not changing his nationalist views and that he would do whatever was necessary to achieve his goals. Yi Kwang-su writes that he blurted out in response, "The prosecutor is correct. I speak of the emperor and *naisen-ittai* only on behalf of the Korean people. If doing so does not benefit the Korean people, then I will launch an independence movement" (Kwang-su 1964, p. 274).

Yi Kwang-su expresses his willingness to regulate his everyday conduct and conform to the role of an "imperial subject" because of his love for the Korean people. His embrace of Japan's assimilation policy must be understood within the context of a colonial reality where he could not be considered a modern subject unless he lived his everyday life like the Japanese. Therefore, in Yi Kwang-su's narrative, there was no contradiction in his statement that he would become "Japanese" to save the Koreans. What he essentially expressed was his willingness to enter the Japanese world of modern governmentality. Yi Kwang-su would become a "proper Japanese" and support the wartime mobilization, as long as he could obtain the collective salvation of the Korean people. By submitting to the system of modern governmentality, he hoped that Koreans could become recognized as modern subjects worthy of life, health, education and happiness. This exchange of "proper behavior" for inclusion in the modern orders may be a universal phenomenon, but the social mechanism becomes far clearer under colonial domination.

Collaboration as Collective Memory

After liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, Yi Kwang-su offered in "My Confession" a detailed rationale for his actions on behalf of his "nation." John Treat notes that Yi Kwang-su follows a similar logic as Marshal Pétain in France, Albert Speer in Germany and Sukarno in Indonesia in his belief that he had a special role to play by "shielding" the people during an inevitable historical process (Treat 2012, p. 96). Each of the four individuals attempted to absolve themselves after 1945 through their claims of acting on behalf of the collective national interest. Here though, we encounter the problem that the nations that they claimed to support did not exist before 1945. The authoritarian political orders that they served did not require a consideration of larger moral questions. Their actions in support of the war were fully sanctioned and rewarded by the respective pre-1945 regimes as a means of demonstrating their loyalty. Yi Kwang-su's everyday conduct only became problematic after the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, when a new regime decided to pass retroactive legal judgement on the past.

In "My Confessions" Yi Kwang-su asks for moral absolution because he had never once abandoned the nationalist cause. John Treats suggests that Yi Kwang-su's claims may be understood as a variation of "false *tenko*," which refers to the claims of leftist Japanese intellectuals who had supported Japan's

war effort but resumed their radical activity after 1945. Various claims of false conversion could be found throughout the world in 1945, as newly sovereign states emerged out of the ruins of the Second World War. However, Korea may again provide a useful historical example because of the peculiar way that the collaboration issue developed during the postliberation period. Yi Kwang-su along with many other collaborators faced the humiliation of public collaboration trials after the South Korean national assembly established the Special Commission to Investigate Anti-Nationalist Acts (Special Commission) on 7 September 1948. The investigations identified over 7,000 suspected collaborators and indicted 682 for arrest in January 1949. The Special Commission put hundreds of prominent collaborators on trial and criminalized their "anti-nationalist acts" until the Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) government decided to disband the effort, because some of the key members of his regime became entangled in the proceedings. The National Police demanded the release of high-level government officials; when the Special Commission refused, they arrested its members on 6 June 1949. Ironically, the investigators of "anti-nationalist acts" were themselves accused of conducting "anti-nationalist" acts by the South Korean National Police. The trials ruined many personal reputations, but the looming battle against communist North Korea allowed some collaborators to dismantle the Special Commission to return to their positions at the highest ranks of the South Korean state.

Many of the released collaborators, including Yi Kwang-su, were kidnapped to the North when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. While the North Koreans never put Yi Kwang-su on trial, his kidnapping created a paradoxical situation where he entered the legal jurisdiction of a different postliberation Korean state with its own separate legal process for punishing collaborators. Whatever legal decisions and punishments he received for his collaboration in the Republic of Korea were nullified the moment he crossed over the Thirty-eighth parallel and entered the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He ultimately died in a postliberation Korea where no legal judgement on his past collaboration was ever rendered. As Yun Hae-dong observes, if collaboration is indeed a "crime" against the nation, then the boundaries of that nation must first be defined; the collaboration trials, in fact, label certain actions to be crimes against the nation for the first time (Hae-dong 2014, p. 148). Collaboration trials on the whole are part of the process of establishing the political legitimacy of newly established nations. Yet which Korean state had the legitimacy to cast judgement over Japanese collaboration, the Democratic People's Republic in the North or the Republic of Korea in the South, was never clarified due to the division of the country by the Soviets and the Americans.

The complexities of collaboration in colonial Korea were buried and silenced for over a decade after the Korean War. The collaborator controversies appeared briefly in South Korea during the crisis that began 22 February 1964 with the announcement of the proposed Japan Korea Normalization Treaty and ignited by the massive protests involving tens of thousands of students on 3 June 1964. The public in general believed that the treaty did not adequately

address the historical issues with Japan and protested the unilateral methods used by the state to implement the agreement. Students from Seoul National University began a hunger strike on 30 May 1964 that inspired a broader student protest movement, which was joined by opposition politicians. The Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) regime decided to arrest 1,120 students and politicians over the 3 June incident. The controversies generated two years of violent clashes and led to the deployment of military units to quell the unrest. In the end, the issue of collaboration became subsumed under a developmental discourse that was eager for economic cooperation with Japan. President Park Chung Hee, who had graduated at the top of his class in the Japanese army's Manchurian military academy, was particularly susceptible to accusations of collaboration, and his security forces heavily suppressed the opposition against the Japan Korea Normalization Treaty. The South Korean state continued to censor anti-Japanese discussions within the public sphere after 1965, because of the fear that recalling the past may lead to social unrest and jeopardize economic cooperation with Japan.

The beginnings of the democratization process in 1987 after decades of military rule would revive the memories of Japanese collaboration, and the mounting public pressure during the subsequent decades led to the launch of the Presidential Commission for the Investigation of Collaboration with Japanese Imperialism (Presidential Commission) in 2005. The Presidential Commission started with the ambitious goal of "rectifying" history. The aim of the commission was to free the Republic of Korea from further historical controversies over collaboration and bring justice to a process that had been circumvented since 1949. However, it soon became evident that the Presidential Commission's goals could not be met so easily because of the difficulties in retroactively casting historical judgement. As Henry Rousso noted after the trial of Maurice Papon (1910–2007), efforts to rectify the past cannot serve the goals of history, memory and justice simultaneously. "Memory militancy" may be an attempt to redress the wrongs inflicted on the victims, but the justice process is inevitably entangled in the contemporary political process and the desire to achieve a representation of the past that a national public can collectively embrace (Wood 1999, pp. 43–44). The 2005 Presidential Commission in Korea had the same difficulties as the Maurice Papon Trial in 1998 in reconciling these fundamentally conflicting demands. The commission could not address some of the most famous examples of Japanese collaboration like President Park Chung Hee due to a clause that limited the prosecution of individuals below a certain rank in the Japanese Army. A strict insistence on legal proceedings and evidence meant that many famous collaborators could not be prosecuted despite their notoriety. The final indictments were only a small fraction of those widely known to have collaborated with the Japanese, and they represent both a lack of documentary evidence as well as the political considerations that restricted who could be prosecuted by the law.

After an exhaustive process of review and debate, 1,007 collaborators were finally identified. Instead of historical reconciliation, what the commission produced is a testament about the ambiguities of history. The largest group of

collaborators, which was a little over half the 1,007 total, emerged during the wartime period of 1937–1945 (Hae-dong 2014, pp. 160–61). Furthermore, the largest increase was in the two categories of culture and the state apparatus, which shows the importance of propaganda and the colonial bureaucracy in the mobilization process. The majority of collaborators before the war broke out in 1937 were Korean elites who received peerage within the Japanese aristocracy. The wartime system required active collaboration of ordinary Koreans to be effective and the commission's report shows that the colonial state suddenly had a need for a large number of collaborators to carry out various duties once the war broke out.

The Presidential Commission ended its work in 2009 after declaring a resolution of the collaboration issue, but some fundamental questions remain. In particular, the commission's focus only on the documentable act of collaboration led to some quixotic implications. Even though an individual is capable of carrying out many different kinds of crimes, the commission only reviewed those acts that it defined to be disloyal to the nation. The Presidential Commission struggled to define the conditions that produced collaboration and the focus only on observable actions greatly limited the scale of the investigations. The interesting aspects of the commission's conclusions were the inadequate definitions of collaboration and the insistence on a high level of historical evidence, which allowed numerous individuals to avoid being implicated in the trials. The 1,007 collaborators identified by the Presidential Commission were only a fraction of the over 7,000 identified by the Special Commission in 1948, for they only included collaborators who happened to fit into the 2005 guidelines for prosecution. While careful legal considerations may have produced a transparent process, the debates over what level of prominence within the colonial system should result in automatic inclusion was an arbitrary standard that could have either greatly increased or reduced the number of prosecutable cases. The Tokyo War Crimes Trials have long been criticized for being an example of ex post facto-ism and "victor's justice," but in many ways one of the lingering issues of the trials was the fact that they didn't define enough actions to be universal crimes against humanity such as the activities of the infamous Unit 731 (Simpson 2009, pp. 608–13). As John Treats argues, Yi Kwang-su may not be responsible for the actions of the entire Japanese Empire, but he is responsible for choosing to be an active agent and making a moral choice to either comply or not comply with the demands of the colonial state (Treat 2012, p. 98). As one of Korea's leading authors, Yi Kwang-su's everyday conduct in supporting the Japanese war effort may have had a far greater impact than an ordinary Korean. Therefore, he may need to be evaluated by a far higher moral standard to consider the full implications of his wartime actions. Ultimately, the issue of collaboration needs to be judged upon a set of universal principles that transcend the politics of the nation-states to assess if they were crimes against humanity rather than a single nation. Such an idealistic proceeding, however, may be extremely difficult to undertake without the establishment of a single world government and nearly impossible to carry out once the passage of time destroys the evidence of what had taken place in the past.

CONCLUSION

The issue of collaboration in Korea requires a regional perspective because the nations of East Asia and Southeast Asia that were occupied by the Japanese have had a similar history of forgetting and silencing this legacy. Political orders cannot be founded on moral ambiguity, and therefore the issue of collaboration has long remained a controversial topic in every region that experienced Japanese rule (Barrett and Larry 2001; Mitter 2000; Brook 2005). For the most part, newly established states want to believe that collaboration was almost nonexistent and resistance to Japanese rule was universal. Yet collaboration in late colonial Korea was just as complex as Vichy France, where French intellectuals attempted to harness the Nazi movement for their own ultranationalist agendas and to achieve collective reinvention. Korean collaborators too may have understood the significance of the war on the East Asian mainland to be an opportunity to escape their colonized plight and participate in the construction of a society where they might stand as equals with the Japanese. In that sense, colonial collaboration was not simply an externally driven phenomenon, for the domestic responses to the inequities of the colonial order, the intellectual trends towards extremist politics and the desire to participate in empire-building, were all critical components.

The outbreak of the Great East Asian War in 1937 and the emergence of extremist elements within Japan may have given new hope to Korean collaborators that they could realize a major transformation of colonial society. Intellectuals from both the left and right led the collaborationist discourse of colonial Korea, but often their common meeting point was a desire to use radical state power to resolve the problems of colonial Korea. In this sense, there was an important aspect of collaborationist discourse that was based on an internal clamor for extremist solutions and reflected a hope that the Korean people might make collective gains through the rapid expansion of the Japanese Empire. In some respects, issues of collaboration may be understood in terms of the opportunity structures of empire. If history is viewed from the moral perspective of the nation-state, then collaboration with the enemy can only result in outright condemnation. Yet if we historicize the choices that lay before the historical actors, we inevitably start to see the grey zones emerge. In the end, however, the collaborationist logic encouraged active compliance with Japan's war goals and led to Korean participation in the devastation in East Asia in the wake of the advancing Japanese armies. The curious bed-fellows of Korean collaborators and Japanese Imperialists cooperating in the invasion of the Asian mainland may not fit neatly into the binary of victim and victimizer. Yet the clear victims were the millions of ordinary Koreans who were mobilized for military duty and forced labor in mines and factories. The Korean collaborator elites conducted themselves like loyal Japanese subjects to encourage millions of ordinary Koreans to sacrifice their lives for the Japanese Empire, yet they did not desire to be held accountable for their actions after liberation in 1945.

Yi Kwang-su provides one final rationale for his situation in "My Confessions" which is worth further consideration. He compares his situation to the hundreds of elite Korean women who were sent as hostages to the Manchus after their second invasion in 1636 (Kwang-su 1964, p. 283). King Injo (1595–1649) had to issue a special decree that the returning women be bathed at a designated site and punished anyone who questioned their chastity. Yi Kwang-su argues that these women could never return to their roles as mothers and wives if they had been questioned individually about their conduct. Yi Kwang-su may be correct that national integration was the highest goal in liberation Korea and forgetting the past may have provided a path to redemption for all collaborators. However, his comparison with the captured women attempts to remove the agency from his actions, just as Eichmann in Jerusalem attempted to absolve his role in the Holocaust as unavoidable given the historical circumstances. The final section of his autobiographical account describes a scene after a lecture in Tokyo where he encouraged Koreans to join the war effort. He found himself at a loss for words when a group of young Koreans met him privately to tell him that they did not believe his message, and they wanted him to bury his true intentions in the ground for them to later dig up. Yi Kwang-su strangely provides no further explanation of this episode, perhaps because he realizes his impact on the impressionable young men who heeded his call to sacrifice their lives for Japan. Collaboration with the Japanese was made possible precisely because Koreans could convince themselves that moral absolution for their everyday conduct was available, and they did not want to think about the consequences of their actions. What collaboration may demonstrate is the ability of modern governmentality to rationalize even the most extreme actions in everyday life. Understanding this quixotic logic of collaboration may provide us with some invaluable insight into the conditions that facilitate the emergence of mass dictatorships in the twentieth century.

Notes

1. Yumi Moon's research echoes studies on wartime occupations in terms of how local elites are often willing to work with whoever controls the central government to preserve their local dominance. In the case of the Advancement Society, those affiliated with a new religion called the *Tonghak* or Eastern Learning had displaced the local elites and took over the tax revenue collection under the protection of the Japanese military. When the Japanese no longer needed the assistance of the Advancement Society they preferred to work with the traditional local elites instead (Moon 2013, pp. 39–45).

2. Ch'oe Chae-sŏ (1908–1964) was a graduate of the English Literature department of the Keijō Imperial University, which later became Seoul National University. He was a noted literary critic who edited the literary journal *Inmunp'yŏngron* and played an influential role as a literary critic (Suh 2011, pp. 53–75).

3. Nationalist activists in Korea focused on cultural and educational developments after the March First Incident in 1919 and advocated a gradualist approach towards the independence of Korea (see Robinson 1988).

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Everyday Conformity in Nazi Germany

Elissa Mailänder

Simply stated, modern dictatorships rely on mass participation. Scholars including Jie-Hyun Lim contend that this "backing from below" (Lim 2010, p. 3) is a constituent element of all forms of mass dictatorship.[1] However, this assertion requires closer analysis of concrete forms of participation such as the autonomy of mobilized men and women. These regimes pressured their citizens to conform politically, socially and sexually: one was either part of the "in-group" or an outsider and thus an enemy of the regime. From the repudiation of homosexuals in Fascist Italy (Benadusi 2012) to the persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany (Wildt 2012), "out-groups" faced serious repression. Indeed, Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich represent an undisputed and international point of reference on dictatorship. Other examples, such as Mussolini's Fascism in Italy, Stalinism and Maoism were also highly (self-)destructive. Hence, violence is another defining component of mass dictatorship, and raises additional key questions: How did in-groups cope with routine violence? What were the ways in which ordinary citizens conformed to or resisted these norms? Finally, how did they handle social pressure in their everyday lives? In order to answer these questions, it is particularly important to look at the nascent phase of dictatorial regimes, when these administrations established standards for the society they envisioned. Yet ordinary citizens under the thumb of these mass dictatorships also shaped behavioral paradigms.

Theories of totalitarianism have explained the destructive force of Fascist and Stalinist mass dictatorship from a functionalist perspective by focusing on the instruments and institutions of repression and control. However, the history of everyday life has challenged these models, particularly in regard to the Third Reich and the GDR. An everyday historical approach examines Nazi and other

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societies ruled by mass dictatorship from the experiences of ordinary people. Scholars of everyday life have demonstrated that most individuals attempted to lead ordinary lives, even under exceptionally harsh circumstances, including state coercion (Geyer and Fitzpatrick 2009). Alf Lüdtke has shown how individuals negotiated normal, and often quite comfortable, lives within the two German mass dictatorships (Lüdtke 2009). Lüdtke's micro-historical perspective, however, eschews minimizing the repressive nature of the dictatorial regimes. On the contrary, his work probes the choices people made to survive in the face of political mobilization, workplace pressure, housing shortages, food rationing, conscription and war losses. Everyday life during the Third Reich cannot be understood as normal or abnormal, integrative or alienating, receptive or resistant. According to Andrew Bergerson, "normalcy and abnormality, community and society, are not objective categories but subjective experiences produced through cultural mechanisms" by the historical actors (Bergerson 2004, p. 35). The mechanisms for coping in dictatorships are thus manifold and often disjointed, ranging from enthusiastic engagement to resistance and capitalizing on opportunity without accepting the politicized rhetoric.

Drawing on Karl Marx, Alf Lüdtke developed the concept of "appropriation" (*Aneignung*) to describe a diverse, formative and "sensual" interpretation of the lived reality—discourses, practices and compulsions—by the historical actors. From this perspective, social norms are not implicit, but something that individuals must first reify and then enact in ways that are not always consistent. Hence, it is the ambiguous social practices of ordinary citizens, rather than their political motivations that explain broad support for or assimilation within a dictatorial regime. This micro-historical approach to the everyday necessitates not only a reduction in scale to the level of the individual, but also a highly nuanced understanding of people's agency. Without the silent, intimidated, ambivalent or, in some cases, enthusiastic conformity of an overwhelming majority of German society—what I refer to as "Nazi society"—Hitler's regime would simply not have persisted from 1933 to 1945, much less been able to carry out its murderous policies. It is therefore important to understand the less spectacular aspects of the Nazi dictatorship, both positive and negative, that seem otherwise banal.

This chapter examines the destructive violence of Nazism through three case studies that further reveal parallels with Italian Fascism and animate a broader discussion on mass dictatorships. The three examples are different temporally and geographically and expose how individuals coped with repressive regimes on a daily basis. Moreover, these cases pay particular attention to the intersection of ordinary habits and extraordinary violence that created new social rules and norms of behavior.

Keeping One's Head Down

Two months after Adolf Hitler came to power, a young clerk went to work in the library of the Berlin Supreme Court. It was business as usual. Lawyers and judges carried briefcases and rushed through the halls while the mostly male

readers in the library quietly pored over their books (see Haffner 2000, pp. 145–49). The concentration and silence were broken by a sudden disturbance: doors slamming, intense shouting, and the sound of tramping boots. Some readers approached the library's security clerk about the commotion. Whispers of the word "SA," an acronym for *Sturmabteilung* (often referred to as "storm troopers" or "Brown Shirts"), could be heard. "They're coming to kick out the Jews," one man said, which provoked laughter from some in the room. The atmosphere became increasingly tense and restless. Another man started to pack his belongings in a flustered haste when a police officer entered the library and calmly announced: "The SA is in the building. If you are Jewish, gentlemen, you'd better leave the building." Some left the room while others, intimidated, remained seated. A commanding voice outside was shouting, "Jews out!" Someone countered the statement by saying, "They've already left," which was followed again by shallow laughter. The door was flung open suddenly and a group of men in brown uniforms entered the library. "Non-Aryans (*Nichtarier*) must leave the premises immediately," shouted their leader. A storm trooper asked the young clerk, "Are you Aryan?" The young man, who had little time to process the request, responded, "Yes" with almost no hesitation.

This scene where violence unexpectedly shattered a peaceful professional context is useful for examining how different individuals cope under unanticipated circumstances. First, the reaction of the observer to the events, Sebastian Haffner, who was born in 1907, merits our attention. Shortly after this incident, he emigrated with his Jewish girlfriend to England, where he wrote an autobiographical report on the rise of Nazism. Taking a self-reflective approach, Haffner remembers vividly his aversion to the new Nazi language and the racial division of Germans into "Aryans" and "Non-Aryans." In the face of the SA, he tried to disappear by remaining silent in his seat and hanging his head over his books. Yet, his revulsion at Nazi racial ideology did not trump his readiness to conform when confronted with the question of his own "race": Haffner answered affirmatively and, in so doing, confirmed the Nazi racial ideology he despised in a very explicit and tangible way. Haffner maintains that immediately afterward he felt immense shame and a sense of defeat, because he had acquiesced and conformed, not only to the social situation, but also to Nazism.

Second, the role of the terror sowed by paramilitary squads cannot be downplayed. Like the Italian Black Shirts (*squadristi*) in the 1920s, the Brown Shirts were a very present and aggressive force in the public life of Germany during the early 1930s. Sven Reichardt's comparative study of these Italian and German Fascist groups has analyzed the political and social foundations of terror. Reichardt has shown that the SA and *squadristi* were composed of primarily young men who shared a strong group identity based on violence, alcohol and a hyper-masculine habitus. Wherever they went, trouble followed. Their aim was to taunt political or racial opponents and defy the remnants of democratic state power (Reichardt 2002, pp. 135–38). The SA boldly referred to the Berlin Supreme Court library by the term *Lokal*, which has a range of meanings from the colloquial "joint" (associated with its use to mean "pub"

or "bar") to the bureaucratic "premises." The choice of expression displayed the group's disrespect for the Court and its library, its employees and users. The library was not only a space of intellectual work but also represented the independence of the legislative power in Germany. The violent penetration of this space was a performative act, in which the SA attacked state authority and clearly announced to all present that a new era with different laws and norms had begun.

Yet one cannot attribute the episode merely to the agency of the storm troopers and Haffner. The silent or active bystanders—the users and employees of the library—also influenced this event. The laughter of some readers in the library, who presumably were all Aryan jurists, is revealing. While their behavior does not necessarily indicate they were convinced National Socialists or sympathetic to the Brown Shirts, it may be understood as an expression of fear or embarrassment. More significantly, however, this laughter communicated to the wider audience that the SA actions were acceptable. Furthermore, it represents their attempt to clearly distance themselves from Jewish colleagues. The jurists also tacitly communicated that they would not intervene.

In their own ways, the users and employees of the library conformed to the situation and thereby significantly contributed to the act of discrimination and violence. Most disturbing, however, is that even a decided anti-Nazi such as Haffner was nonetheless implicated in the Nazification of daily life. Indeed, historian Paul Steege emphasizes that only through the lens of the everyday historical perspective is simultaneity and contradiction of this situation apparent, further offering a way to engage with its complicated tensions (Bergerson et al. 2009, p. 567).

If we situate the social dynamic in the court library within its wider political context, the scene is significant. The same day, the Nazis issued the *Gleichschaltung*, a law that forced all state organizations to conform to National Socialist policies. One day later, on 1 April 1933, the Nazis initiated a nationwide boycott of Jewish businesses and the offices of Jewish professionals such as doctors and lawyers. Furthermore, the Law for Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, also known as the Civil Service Law, was passed on 7 April 1933. This law defined a "national" civil service in strict political and racist terms, forcing political opponents of the Nazi regime and tenured civil servants considered non-Aryans, to retire. A week after the incident in the court library, Jews and political opponents could no longer serve as teachers, professors, judges or in other government positions. Moreover, the Nazis subsequently passed a similar law concerning lawyers, notaries, doctors, musicians and other liberal professions. Employees and officials in the public sector concurrently had to provide a so-called "Aryan certificate" that confirmed their full membership in Nazi society.

Significantly, what the jurists, lawyers and judges in the Berlin Supreme Court library had scoffed at one day materialized into a harsh reality within one week. This case illustrates at a very concrete level how the ordinary Germans enacted and appropriated the regime's discriminatory policies. Their acquiescence, or,

in Haffner's case, momentary conformity, created a bifurcated radical dynamic of inclusion and exclusion.

Building a Nest

In 1942, a young Viennese woman received the notice of the death of her beloved husband.[2] He had died on the Scandinavian front. Hedi G. sat down and handwrote a twenty-five page autobiographical note. It was a way to remember the good days with her husband and also a method of mourning her painful loss. Like Haffner, we cannot consider Hedi G. to be a supporter of the Nazi movement. Born in 1913, she worked as a secretary and was politically more aligned with the Social Democratic Party, though without being politically active. She and her husband did not necessarily welcome the political changes in Austria after 1934, but they nevertheless complied unenthusiastically with the new regime by avoiding what she termed "politics" and retreating into their private life.

Hedi G. did not consider herself a political person. "The swastika flags, I had not heard much about this H…[Hitler] before, but suddenly I felt odd, I felt in danger," she wrote. Yet, she reveals herself to be an attentive observer of the political changes that occurred in Vienna on 13 March 1938, with the official annexation of Austria (*Anschluss*) to the Third Reich. "We had a lot of leisure time back then and Hans and I went to the city center where all those people gathered, greeting each other enthusiastically with Heil H…Total strangers greeted each other, people greeted us too, but neither of us could get a greeting out of our mouths." This greeting was indeed a very important sign for the radical changes going on Viennese everyday culture. Andrew Bergerson has pointed out in his study on Hildesheim the political importance of informal social relations, including practices such as greetings (Bergerson 2004, pp. 15–35). During the 1920s only an insider group close to the Nazi Party used the *Hitlergruß*, but it gained popularity in Germany after 1933. The more people practiced the Nazi salutation, the more it became visible that people had conformed to this new norm and thus to the new regime. However, Bergerson notably distinguishes between different degrees of conformity to Nazi codes. Some people only reluctantly deployed it when addressing Nazi authorities, while others deliberately engaged in it, some in a playful, ironic manner. Indeed, simple gestures changed substantially in Berlin and later in Vienna, and this shines a light on the ways in which the everyday landscape of social relations evolved.

Hedi G. wrote in 1942 that she and her husband observed other apparent behavioral changes in the Viennese in public:

> … time went by, and things occurred that a sane person could not have imagined: people ransacked Jewish businesses, smashed their windows, threw the merchandise onto the streets where the lowest kind of people, the scum of humanity, fought for these stolen goods. One asked oneself if these were the same people with whom one had lived before in the same city. Or where did

these beasts suddenly come from? The newspapers reported that the excited crowd overran the Jewish shops, but in fact, this crowd was run by a couple of SA men (one should not call them "men") and youth from the Hitlerjugend. I saw it with my own eyes, as I never paid attention to hearsay.

This subjective view of the political events in Austria in 1938 shows the degree to which violence was present and pervasive in Vienna, and also how enthusiastically, indeed frenetically, the majority of Viennese participated in the Nazi regime. These were the same citizens with whom Hedi G. had contact before 1938, but they had adapted their behavior to the new rules.

This Austrian case gives us an interesting insight into the process of Nazification. In contrast to the German population in 1933, the Austrians had little exposure to major ideological Nazi propaganda in the years before the *Anschluss.* Following a political crisis in March of 1933, Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß (Christlichsoziale Partei) declared a state of emergency and banned all leftist parties from the government. With a new constitution enacted in May, Dollfuß nudged Austria towards an authoritarian, conservative regime. After the assassination of Dollfuß and an attempted Putsch by the Austrian National Socialist Party in July of 1934, his successor, Kurt Schuschnigg, outlawed the Nazi Party, installing an ultra-Catholic, single-party system. The Austro-Fascist regime clearly distanced itself from the Nazi party. It considered National Socialism far too liberal for their religious and moral precepts. As a result, supporters of Hitler left the country. Today, scholars estimate that 98,330 Austrians were early, "illegal" members of the Nazi party between 1933 and 1938, out of a total number of 550,000 registered Austrian party members through 1945 (Tálos et al. 2001, p. 853). Even though the conservative-clerical Fascist state was clearly anti-liberal and anti-Semitic, the Austrians were not exposed to the same kind and amount of racist propaganda as their German counterparts. And yet, their anti-Jewish acts of repression mirrored those of their German neighbors. As soon as the *Anschluss* took effect, the Viennese were openly violent against Jews and felt authorized to vandalize Jewish businesses and humiliate Jews publically.

What Hedi G. describes in her letter is an extremely rapid collective process of changing behavioral patterns. Acts of violence were certainly provoked by SA members, as she notes, but they were also largely applauded or carried out by ordinary Austrians, who not only looted businesses, but more and more actively participated in collective violence. Michael Wildt has shown that collective violence against Jews in provincial regions of Germany in the 1930s was a fundamental moment of empowerment for the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft* (Wildt 2012) at the individual and state levels. Participation by ordinary citizens in shaming rituals and especially physical violence created a collective lived identity that transformed the idea of a *Volksgemeinschaft* into a concrete social reality.

Similarly, the *squadristi* used violence in 1920s Italy to establish their own political rule and enact their understanding of a new Fascist masculinity. Physical violence had a distinct performative component: humiliating political

opponents in public—often with overt sexual connotations—was a power-ful ritual that reasserted the masculine Fascist pride. It also consolidated and strengthened the militia's camaraderie, as Lorenzo Benadusi (2012, p. 27) has convincingly demonstrated in his study of homosexuality in Fascist Italy. Violence against objects and people thus is not only a moment of destruction that creates suffering and pain for those who endure it. It is also human action and experience that served to empower and aggrandize the participants.

Hedi G. reported that the Viennese publicly ridiculed those people who continued to buy goods at Jewish businesses by displaying them in shop win-dows or forcing them to walk the street while wearing derisive posters. "It felt like the depths of the Middle Ages," she wrote. The "era of witch-hunts must not have been any different. Nobody bothered us, we did not get involved with any of this and avoided all those things." However, there were various ways in which the Viennese engaged in violence. According to her accounts, Hedi G. and her husband did not approve of any of this. Yet, the last sentence accu-rately summarizes their position. In theory they disagreed with the political regime and the collective violence against the Jews, but they remained bystand-ers to it. She and her husband certainly did not encourage the men and women who vandalized Jewish businesses. Indeed, she harshly condemned these illicit and abusive acts in her private letter. Yet, like many others in mass dictatorial regimes, she disconnected from the regime and politics by withdrawing into the private world of her marriage, home and neighborhood. When the couple began to lose friends—it is not clear if she is referring to fallen soldiers, emi-grated or even deported friends—she showed little concern. "Well, you get over it," she noted, "as long as you have such a magnificent person like my H. at your side." Within her narrow social environment, Hedi G. remained happy in her role as housewife, silently coping with loss, and conforming to the regime's demands, despite her apparent refusal to participate actively in Hitler's mass dictatorship. This changed when her husband was conscripted. Here, the loss directly impacts her own private life: the departure of her hus-band triggered rage, grief and disapproval of the military. But even in this case, she raised no further questions nor did she write or discuss her feelings outside of her marriage. Like many ordinary people, Hedi G. inhabited a depoliticized private life, a "nest" where she and her husband could comfort themselves from the harsh realities of the outside world.

Scholars of mass dictatorship have referred to Nazi Germany as a "niche society" (Lim 2010, p. 9). Indeed, it was precisely this niche existence that allowed Hedi G. to draw a clear line between "the Nazis" and herself. Yet, the situation is more complex. Hedi G. and her husband's reluctance to engage actively in violence did not mean that they were immune to the political pro-cess of radicalization. In fact, social and cultural theories on violence have dem-onstrated the important role of the observers in the process (Koloma Beck 2011). A triangular relationship between perpetrators, victims and bystanders exists in most instances of violence because there is usually a direct or implicit observer involved. Thus, bystanders who tacitly observe acts of violence or

discrimination contribute fundamentally to creating a space of legitimacy and impunity where some agents feel authorized to behave in a brutal manner. There is always a broad spectrum of reasons why people remained (and remain) silent: fear, hesitation, timidity, indifference or even inhibition. But irrespective of their motivation, observers encourage perpetrators of violence by the very act of watching and remaining silent. Supposedly passive observers who silently conform thus have a role in created violence, not only in Nazi Germany but also in other mass dictatorial regimes. Hedi G. and her husband therefore had an active role in the changing of social norms and the creation of new, violent and discriminatory patterns of behavior.

CAPITALIZING ON THE REGIME

Encounters with Nazism were not entirely defined by violence and discrimination. Instead they existed within a parallel world of joy and entertainment. Legitimate members of the in-group profited from the benefits both regimes had to offer. Nazi Germany's economic recovery from the travails of the Weimar period increased consumerism that mirrored its citizens' expectations of a "good and comfortable life." This included the state-funded film production company UFA, the budget and repertoire of which rivaled Hollywood. The Nazi organization *Kraft durch Freude* (Strength through Joy) offered a wide array of projects, as did its counterpart, the Italian Fascist *Dopolavoro*. Festivals were important venues where the regime not only celebrated past traditions, but also, most importantly "the dream of the Fascist future" (Corner 2015, p. 85). National Socialism and Italian Fascism appealed particularly to young people, whom the regimes integrated in youth movements as well as in sport and leisure activities.

Unseen amateur color footage of the 1939 Nazi cultural festival "Day of German Art" in Munich is very telling. It was filmed barely six weeks before the outbreak of the Second World War; Hitler, the Nazi elite and seemingly the entire city of Munich attended the festivities. This highlights the importance of mass events in promoting and legitimizing the dictatorship. In the early 1990s, two British filmmakers discovered the footage, which was shot by Hans Feierabend, a dedicated amateur filmmaker and member of a Munich film club. A subsequent documentary about Feierabend's footage juxtaposed historical source material with interviews with the former participants, ordinary Germans and a member of the Jewish community of Munich who survived the Holocaust.[3]

Munich held particular actual and symbolic significance for National Socialism. It was not only the *Hauptstadt der Bewegung* (capital of the movement), but, in the eyes of Adolf Hitler, the German capital of art. The city was thus perfectly suited for a three-day festival of German art. The weekend chosen for these festivities was 14 July 1939. We do not know if this date was chosen intentionally, but Robert Wistrich noted in the documentary that it coincided with the 150th anniversary of the storming of the Bastille in 1789 (Wistrich and Holland 1995). The festival was held at several locations in Munich and

included public concerts, folk dancing and other forms of amusement. For the Nazi elite, the major event was an exhibition of Nazi art at the Haus der Kunst, specially built in 1937, which Hitler curated and opened in person. For the general population, the highlight of the weekend was undoubtedly the monumental parade, celebrating 2,000 years of German art and culture, which wove its way through the streets of Munich.

The color footage shot by Feierabend is striking for today's viewers, who are accustomed to black-and-white images extracted from the weekly newsreels which the propaganda ministry released in German cinemas. The film renders Nazism surprisingly approachable, vibrant and perhaps even appealing. Munich unfolds in sumptuous splendor, its buildings decorated with flags, flowers and colored ribbons. One million people reportedly attended the festival, as Wistrich explains in the movie (00:28:43–00:28:58). "Everyone joined in," admitted a former participant whom the two British filmmakers interviewed (00:29:14–00:29:18).

It is tempting to dismiss the parade as kitsch, but it is significant as a cultural performance and lived experience. According to Winfried Nerdinger, a scholar of historical architecture, more than 4,000 people worked at the festival. Nerdinger calculated the time invested in the preparations for the event at 1.7 million hours (00:31:09–00:31:32). Not only the festival itself, but also the rehearsals for the official day are important, They suggest the appeal of community. But we are bound to note that for the women who participated it was not necessarily the ideology but the performative act of *Volksgemeinschaft* that attracted them.

Female participants glowingly recall their experiences at the festival when confronted with the documentary. They were young, unmarried women dressed as princesses, Valkyries and damsels for the parade and met several hours a week to rehearse. The film does not reveal much "behind the scenes" action. However, Josefa Hamann reports that she took dance lessons, while the happy few learned how to walk properly. First and foremost, her recollections epitomize the pleasure and pride the women felt at being in the festival preparations:

> Just imagine, thousands of meters of flags and materials and statues. I mean, it was an enormous festival, it was quite unbelievable. … Officially, it did not really have anything to do with politics. For us, it was just a beautiful day, the chance to meet people. Also, we were recreating something with all those different costumes, weren't we? We were really happy. (00:06:23–00:08:03)

Even in her seventies, Josefa Hamann had not forgotten what she called a "lovely experience." A simple advertisement in the newspaper encouraged her to apply spontaneously to participate in the festivities. Indeed, she explained in the documentary that "for young people this kind of thing is always exciting."

But not all applicants were accepted. According to Hamann, "you were chosen according to height…the Nordic race was supposed to be shown off"

(00:32:00–00:32:29). Although Hamann stated that she had not realized what sort of event she agreed to participate in (00:31:46–00:31:59), her statements demonstrate that she quickly became deeply involved in it. The amusement factor was certainly her initial motivation. But participation demanded conformity and, ultimately, acquiescing to the positive image the regime wanted to transmit.

But this proved easy, as the Nazis orchestrated the parade to play upon the sentiments of Munich's citizens. The parade route mainly followed a path representing the city's glorious history under King Ludwig I of Bavaria. As historian Nerdinger explains in the documentary (00:30:27–00:30:34), the regime effectively linked the legacies of the first half of the nineteenth century with the new era, thereby adding further legitimacy and splendor to the Nazi cause. This eclectic mix allowed those who did not necessarily share the political values and artistic style of the Nazi regime to entirely and safely engage with the parade.

And it worked. The Munich festival represented how "the Fascist spectacle was drawn down into the affective worlds of the everyday," to quote Geoff Eley (2013, p. 71). Nazism developed an appealing program that satisfied its consumers. Walter Benjamin has noted that this kind of mass spectacle, in which Germany's youth in particular participated, wedded aesthetics into political life. The regime's ability to infuse itself in ordinary life was impressive. Robert Wistrich points out that aesthetic enchantment and mass entertainment was an "essential instrument for winning over masses of ordinary people, who they believed, probably rightly, shared their tastes" (00:39:38–00:39:49). The Munich parade further underscores the concrete and efficient ways in which ideology and social practice comingled. The power of Nazi propaganda exercised through rallies, youth camps and festivals lay in their ability to entertain and create group cohesion. It generated willingness to participate in and conform with the regime.

For Hamann and others, taking part in the festival was simply taking advantage of what the regime had to offer without necessarily engaging with its political message. They attributed little or no political meaning to the performance that tacitly celebrated the Nazi vision of *Volk*. From an everyday historical perspective, however, their attendance constituted political engagement. Moreover, these women not only conformed to the positive self-representation of the regime, but also were an active part of Nazi propaganda. These experiences and memories of the "unpolitical" good old days helped bind people to the regime and had a lasting impact. When confronted in the early 1990s with the images of the 1939 event and their youth, the participants could not help but reconnect with the memories of joyous preparations and a glorious festival weekend.

Conclusion: Individual Behavior and Mass Dictatorship

According to Michel Foucault, neither Fascism nor Stalinism are "diseases of power." In fact, he considered that "in spite of their historical uniqueness they are not quite original" (1983, p. 209) because they relied on power relations

discernable in other societies. The sheer magnitude of these dictatorships differentiates them from other historical authoritarian regimes. But the ubiquity and scale of coercion and violence do not refute the fact that, even in a mass dictatorial regime, power applies itself in the immediate circumstances of everyday life. The history of everyday life complements the analytical shift introduced by Foucault regarding violence and power. Foucault and historians of everyday life contend that power is not only a question of legal or institutional legitimacy, but must be framed as a "microphysics of power" that brings into play the relationships *between* individuals and groups. In contrast to theories of totalitarianism, power is the sum of a complex nexus of individual actions. It is within this web that mass dictatorships evolve and acquire their destructive impact.

Mass dictatorships cannot be understood simply within a frame of coercion and norms imposed by a regime. An analysis from the perspective of the history of everyday life looks *inside* Nazi society and seriously interrogates the concepts of coping and conformity. It examines ordinary men and women living in a mass dictatorship and their willingness "'to go along' and to 'put up' with the regime's crimes" (Eley 2013, p. 48). The three cases presented in this article—an act of discrimination and affirmation in the library of the Berlin Supreme Court in 1933, violence in Vienna in March 1938 and a sumptuous popular celebration of art in Munich in July 1939—have shown the ways in which ordinary citizens conformed to the Nazi regime and its policies. They demonstrate how moments of terror (Haffner), racist violence (Hedi G.) and pleasure (Josefa Hamann) are intimately connected with conceptions of normality and how it operates within its broader political context. The cases reveal a key structural dialectic of mass dictatorships: even if one withdraws from politics altogether or keeps her or his political action at a minimum, it is impossible to escape the nexus of the regime's power. Although individual actions or gestures of withdrawal or non-conformity cannot be dismissed, simply coping, as disinterested or reluctant as it might be, tacitly implies support and contributes to the power and stability of the regime. Conformism is ambivalent, meandering through a broad spectrum of coercion and consent. But it has an eminent social impact and political meaning. It helps create a new political culture.

There is no sharp line between political and apolitical actions. They are less about *being* a Nazi or Fascist than about *acting* and *tolerating* these forms of behavior (which is not to deny that there *were* people committed to regime goals at every level of society in each mass dictatorship). Using an everyday approach sheds new light on the question of culpability for violence and repression. *Eigensinn*, another key concept of the history of everyday life, must also be critically engaged with in order to understand mass dictatorships. Rejecting political messages and withdrawing into one's private sphere, Alf Lüdtke has emphasized, are moments of resistance. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that such acts fundamentally contradict actual subservience (Lüdtke 1993). Even if opponents like Haffner, Hedi G. or Josefa Hamann withdrew or distanced themselves from the constraints or demands of a regime, their behavior

nevertheless reinforced structures of domination and supported discrimination and terror. I would argue that even *Eigensinn* contains traces of conformity. This does not mean these individuals are accomplices, but in the context of a violent mass dictatorship, even passive conformity implies active co-responsibility for repression and crimes committed. Without the conformity and tolerance of ordinary citizens, dictatorships could not gain (or claim) mass support.

Notes

1. I sincerely wish to thank Jennifer L. Rodgers and Eve Rosenhaft who read and commented earlier versions of this article and who helped me to sharpen my focus and thoughts.
2. Source for this section: Institut für Zeitgeschichte Vienna, Sammlung Frauennachlässe (SFN), NL 82, autobiographical notes Hedi G.1942.
3. *Good Morning, Mr Hitler*, directed by Luke Holland, Paul Yule, BBC 4, 1993.

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Non-compliance, Indifference and Resistance in Regimes of Mass Dictatorship

Paul Corner

THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE UNITY

Mass dictatorship—surprising as it may sound—should be seen as a collective enterprise. Despite the commanding position of the dictator—an individual usually marked out as being in some way personally unique—the masses have a fundamental role to play. The cheering crowds and people-packed squares are not simple choreography as they might seem, not just colourful extras to a ruthless will to power on the part of the dictator, but constitute an integral part of the dictatorial whole; without them the dictator stands alone—and the mass dictator cannot stand alone. The people are supposed to be "one with their leader" when it comes to crucial decisions and they are required to express their support in a visible and often vocal manner. The demonstrable consensus of the masses, whether real or apparent consensus, is a key feature of mass dictatorships. It is sufficient to watch newsreels of Hitler at Nuremberg, of Mussolini in Piazza Venezia, of Stalin in Red Square or—nearer to our times—of Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square to appreciate this connection. The intended demonstration of a link between the leader and the led is evident, the role of popular acclamation obvious. It is for this reason that mass dictatorships differ from more simple authoritarian dictatorships, where repression rather than consensus is the dominating characteristic.

For a mass dictatorship, non-compliance with the regime breaks the golden rule of national unity and popular consensus, therefore. It suggests something that no mass dictatorship would like to admit—which is that people, even in mass dictatorships, have agency. They can make choices; they can choose to ignore, or even refuse, the dominant ideology and, if they so wish, they can

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deny the acquiescence accorded to the regime by the majority. In both communist and fascist regimes, in which the individual is required (in theory) to identify with the collective enterprise and renounce all personal and private objectives which do not coincide with the objectives of the regime, individual, "private," subjectivity is supposed to be replaced by the internalization of the collective spirit and by the denial of the role of individual agency. For communists, historical determinism necessarily reduced the role of the individual; for fascists, even if historical determinism was not asserted as such, there was a presumption of fascist superiority that promised an inevitable fascist triumph as long as the individual remained in line with the leader. "The Party knows the way," "Mussolini is always right," "Hitler knows best"—these and other slogans were intended to leave little room for personal choice or critical private judgement. They were slogans that suggested that faith in the party, the leader or the movement was to replace rational thinking and determine personal action. Conformism in these circumstances was not only convenient; it was—more importantly—the mark of recognition and acceptance of domination and the renunciation of individual agency. The non-complier was not simply a political nuisance, therefore; he or she represented very much more, because non-compliance, in the final analysis, was a challenge which threatened to put the whole dictatorial structure in question; what was supposed to be total and integral became instead, at the hands of the non-complier, partial and fractured.

Disincentives to Non-compliance

As so much of the literature on the subject makes clear, mass dictatorial regimes work very hard to ensure compliance, precisely because it is an essential ingredient of this kind of regime. In the historical cases cited above, incentives to comply were used to great effect, ranging from the dacha in the USSR, through subsidized housing, access to special shops, holidays, foreign travel, promotion at work, down to the cheap cinema tickets available to members of the Italian fascist university groups. State control of almost all resources was fundamental here; it ensured that rewards and privileges were available for those who conformed, in particular for those who conformed with enthusiasm. Indeed the unwritten message of these regimes ("We can make life very difficult for you if we want to") meant that compliance and conformism were the attitudes that best guaranteed a "normal" life in what were, very often, very difficult circumstances ("ordinary life in extraordinary times" as Sheila Fitzpatrick has put it). The element of implied blackmail could hardly be ignored, although many would undoubtedly also see the opportunities offered by the regime in very positive terms. What was essential was less the attitude—constrained or enthusiastic—than the fact of accepting, willy nilly, inclusion in the dictator's community.

Attitudes would probably be less divided in respect of a further aspect of state control—that of violence. Violence—sometimes amounting to terror—as a mechanism to ensure compliance is a constituent part of dictatorial

domination, and it is hardly necessarily to dwell on this aspect. Gestapo and Kripo, NKVD and KGB, OVRA and PolPol in Italy—all are abbreviations that remain synonymous with violent repression, against which the individual citizen had little or no redress. In particular, violent repression of opposition organizations meant that non-compliance was more likely to be individual than collective. The reliance on violence—explicit and implicit—does, however, generate the paradox evident in most dictatorial regimes—that between the cheering crowd and the secret police, between apparent ecstatic popular enthusiasm and the grim reality of repression. We will return to this paradox later, but here it is sufficient to underline the extent to which violence was intended to ensure the public image of national unity and avoid unsightly manifestations of opposition. Apparent consensus for the regime was a crucial element of mass dictatorship and violence was a factor in realizing this element (Corner 2011). The greater or lesser use of violence depended on the circumstances, but when Mussolini said "We want to rule with the consensus of the Italians, but if that consensus is lacking, we still have force," he showed that he understood the mechanisms of mass dictatorship very well. Non-compliance had to face this kind of reality.

A further aspect of control that should not be overlooked—an aspect that appears to have been common to most mass dictatorships—is that of denunciation. The role of denunciation in engendering fear among the population can hardly be overstated; nowhere more, perhaps, than in the Soviet Union, where those who had invented a new biography in order to fit in with the requirements of the regime were in constant danger of being "unmasked" and their aristocratic or bourgeois origins revealed. Non-compliance was a high-risk operation for those with "spoiled biographies" to hide because a denunciation could always be just around the corner and a trip to the gulag not long in following. Similarly, in Nazi Germany, denunciation played a prominent role in aiding the operations of the Gestapo; indeed Robert Gellately has gone as far as to describe German society under Nazism as a "self-surveillance" society, in which people controlled their own words and actions for fear of being denounced to the authorities by acquaintances, casual or—very often—otherwise (Gellately 2001). In the same way, in fascist Italy, it was an official obligation to report anti-fascist conversations overheard in public; those who did not could be punished if their omission came to light. Taxi drivers were supposed to report any "loose" conversation they heard in the backs of their cabs, doormen to denounce unusual occurrences in their buildings and domestic servants were under the same obligation to denounce unguarded comments made by their employers. Fear of denunciation was such that, in the late 1930s, police informers actually wrote to their controllers lamenting the fact that people had stopped talking about politics in bars, on buses and in other public places because of the conviction that "there are ears listening everywhere." This silence made the informers' job much more difficult, and clearly it was a silence related to fear of denunciation. Again, the "space" available for non-compliance—if it was to be non-compliance of the kind that did not land you in prison straight away—was restricted.

Non-compliance, Necessity and Navigation

The inference in much of what has been said above is that non-compliance—understood, at this point, more in the sense of deliberately not following the rules laid down by the regime than in that of actively resisting those rules—was essentially politically motivated; by breaking the rules, you also—to some extent—tried to break out of the straightjacket in which you were bound. Of course, this was not always the case; indeed, it is probably true to say that it was frequently not the case. For example, recourse to the black market for food in the Soviet Union in the 1930s was more or less unavoidable in the big cities and meant breaking the rules; it was a clear statement, through action, that the system was not working as it should. Yet it was generally dictated more by the need to survive than by any desire to subvert the workings the regime. Situations characterized by shortage more or less imposed non-compliance of this kind; shortage produced the strange distinction in the Soviet Union between what was officially available and what was available in reality—one aspect of the "dual reality" in which Soviet citizens lived. But behaviour of this kind does point up the fact that non-compliance with the (official) rules in certain situations is not necessarily incompatible with acceptance of the regime. It was perfectly possible to sing the praises of Stalin in the morning—and do so seriously—and still buy meat on the black market in the afternoon.

Such non-compliance—the most common form of non-compliance—probably fits better under the rubric of survival strategies than under that of opposition. It represents the kind of action imposed by the necessities of the situation and not by any clear political choice. Even so, it is not without political significance, given that the politics of survival are essentially personal and private rather than collective in their inspiration. They push people into a zone in which the rules of dictatorship are in conflict with day-to-day practices—not a zone any dictatorial regime is eager to cultivate. Faced with restricted opportunities in many directions, people use their own initiative in order to take the opportunities they see to exist, subordinating ideology to necessity and to opportunity. It is a kind of behaviour which corresponds well to what Alf Lüdtke has termed "navigation"—certainly one of the most useful terms when discussing non-compliance (Lüdtke 1989). Applied best to regimes in which rules and restrictions were the order of the day, navigation indicates the ways in which people learn to dodge and duck around the restrictions in order to cope with the world in which they find themselves, adopting a whole series of strategies of survival which often represent, in effect, a flouting of the system in formal terms but remain nonetheless in some way compatible with the system.

"Navigation" seems to have been a characteristic of popular behaviour in both interwar communist and fascist regimes—less so, perhaps, in Nazi Germany—and became common practice in the Soviet satellite regimes of post-1945. With the partial exception of Nazi Germany, all were regimes of scarcity, perpetually promising a future prosperity they could never achieve. Scarcity of resources and of opportunities provided the essential backcloth for

"navigation." For, if scarcity was a weapon the regime could use to its advantage, in the sense of providing privileged access to goods and services for some, it was also a factor that offered opportunities to others. This produced not only the black market, but also the shady world of official corruption, of private networks based on personal contacts, of nepotism and clientelism. In the Soviet Union *blat* (contacts and connections, however formed) was the grease of many transactions. People learned to "navigate" within this world in order to survive; to some extent it often represented almost an alternative world to the official one, which accepted its existence and turned a blind eye. In some cases—in fascist Italy, for example—it seems to have been tolerated by the regime because the regime was itself corrupt.

Strictly speaking "navigation"—because of what it represented in terms of the rules of the regime—was non-compliance; it was a deliberate search for and use of alternative routes—those which avoided and circumvented the official routes. In the Soviet Union, the existence of this alternative and parallel world seems to have been both known and accepted by everyone; the force of *blat* was the frequent subject of jokes and cartoons in newspapers—an open secret. But, precisely because "navigation" was usually based on private initiative and concerned personal interests, the degree to which it threatened the establishment should not be underestimated. Alternative worlds threaten mass dictatorships because they suggest alternatives to the official reality, as defined by the regime. And, if one of the key tasks of a dictatorship is that of "defining reality" for its subjects, this represents a significant chink in the armour of the dictator.

An example of the way in which "navigation" might potentially undermine any respect for the official system is provided in the recent autobiography of a famous Russian cook, now resident in the United States. She recounts how, as an adolescent schoolgirl in Moscow in the 1970s, she was fortunate enough to attend a school full of the children of diplomatic staff. This permitted her to get hold of foreign goods—chewing gum, Coca Cola, even jeans—which she would trade for refined meals in one of the best restaurants reserved for the *Nomenklatura*. The food was a reward in itself (and led to her career), but the greater reward for her lay in circumventing the system, not through any direct opposition, but through exploiting an opportunity for her own personal advantage. The value of this reward she only fully recognized when first faced by an American supermarket, where she understood the difference between the boredom of being able to buy anything and everything and the triumph of "obtaining" restrictedly available goods as a child in the USSR. Again, the private and the personal are in evidence at the expense of the collective.

Non-compliance and the Force of Tradition

One "alternative world" to the collective thrust of the mass dictatorship was—as we have seen above—the world of the personal and the private. This was not exclusively a world of the individual, but could also involve powerful societal forces. The degree to which regimes succeeded in penetrating the family and

in changing the values associated with family life is one of the key questions in assessing the real significance of mass dictatorships for ordinary people. Recent research on the history of the family under dictatorial regimes (Ginsborg 2014) suggests strongly that the family unit was extremely flexible when faced with the challenge of new forms of social regimentation and that, in general, it survived as a unit on better terms than might have been expected. In many ways, the family represented a haven of non-compliance. Few families were like those of Pavlik Morozov in the Soviet Union, where the son denounced his father to the authorities for his alleged anti-Soviet attitudes, and attempts to turn him into a Soviet hero appear to have been met by scepticism on the part of many. People simply did not want sons who denounced their fathers. Even in the Turkey of Kemal Ataturk, family traditions survived remarkably well and modernization often ended at the threshold of the home. Police informers in Italy commented in the late 1930s (i.e., after more than 15 years of fascism) on the fact that the regime had been unsuccessful in penetrating the family circle and that the old "democratic liberal" or socialist ideas were still being expressed around the kitchen table, particularly by the women of the household. A further confirmation of this conservation of the family as an area outside the control of the fascist party came in Turin in 1935, when more than 1,500 local fascist activists were asked to enrol their wives in the party in order to increase numbers. They refused en masse, making various excuses, but all, in reality, keen to maintain the family outside the reaches of the regime and also, very clearly, to maintain their own role of authority within the family.

In this last example the non-compliance of the fascist activists with the directives of the regime was provoked by these directives coming up against long-established traditions—in this case concerning the family—which refused to bend in the face of dictatorship. Here, of course, we move well beyond the area of non-compliance through necessity and enter the area of non-compliance through choice—choice often determined by traditional practices or beliefs. These choices could involve something as elementary as the use of language. A good example is provided by those Venetian gondoliers who, when reminded that, according to the new rulings of the fascist government, they were supposed to use the "Voi" form of address and not the "Lei," replied that the ruling was for the "gentlemen" and that they would continue to use the language their mothers had taught them. In much the same way, the persistence of pre-revolutionary mindsets was one of the principal problems facing the Soviet regime and it remains surprising to discover that, as late as 1937, 57% of Soviet citizens still declared on the census form that they were (religious) believers, well-knowing that this reply was unacceptable to the atheistic communist regime. Religion was, in fact, one of the principal reasons for non-compliance with dictatorship. In Italy the competing totalitarianisms of church and state were never really resolved. Even if Mussolini succeeded in signing the Concordat with the Catholic Church in 1929, Catholic organizations remained a thorn in the side of the all-embracing regime for most of the 1930s, providing refuge for those who did not want to oppose directly but, at the same time, did not

want to comply with the priorities of faith required by the fascist political religion. Involvement in church activities was difficult to challenge in a strongly Catholic country and provided an excellent means of side-stepping, without clamour, the obligations of the regime. All in all, the continuing respect of tradition, even in a revolutionary context, provokes strong doubts about the extent to which societies, supposedly unmade and then remade by the new regimes, were ever really dismantled in the first instance.

NON-COMPLIANCE, *EIGENSINN* AND ESCAPISM

The distinction between the often ambiguous nature of non-compliance from necessity and that represented by deliberate individual choice will by now be evident. Even so, the political content of both kinds of non-compliance cannot be taken as given. If this is fairly evident in the case of necessity pushing people to either break or circumvent the rules of dictatorship, it is less immediately obvious in the case of personal choice. Dictatorships exercise domination and personal reaction to that domination may be more related to questions of dignity and identity than to any precise rejection of the political colour of that domination. As Alf Lüdtke has suggested with his concept of *Eigensinn*, people may react to domination by seeking to create or defend their own personal space which in some way both guarantees and protects their individual identity from the incursions of an interfering regime. Often this reflects personal rebellion against authority more than a direct political statement. The worker who deliberately works slowly and reacts badly to the instructions of the foreman—someone who may be a direct representative of the regime within the factory—may do so as much to assert his or her own identity as to contest the political position of the foreman. The creation of a personal space, which is to be respected by others, even by authority, is the real objective of such behaviour. Its expression may seem little more than the expression of bloody-mindedness—the desire to be difficult just for the sake of being difficult—but its significance is much broader in as far as it represents the affirmation of the individual in a context that assigns to the individual no such right of affirmation.

Some regimes recognized this issue by going to meet the demands for recognition of—in particular—industrial workers. The Nazi leadership made great efforts to establish some kind of dialogue with a potentially hostile working class, fearing precisely an extensive expression of non-compliance with the imperatives of the regime for greater industrial production. In much the same way, the Soviet cult of the Stakhanovites was intended to boost the self-image of the conscientious industrial worker, but to do this within the context of production for the collective Soviet society. Only in fascist Italy did efforts to woo the industrial working class fall repeatedly on hard ground; Mussolini's speeches to the assembled car workers in Turin in both 1932 and 1939 were greeted by silence and folded arms—the expression of a position of—in this case, significantly, collective—non-compliance with the demands of the regime which a furious fascist leader understood only too well.

A further example is provided from a less working-class setting. The affirmation of personal dignity was very much the case with the five distinguished doctors of Prato (Italy) who had directed the prenatal clinic for women in the town since 1919. Instructed in 1930 to enrol in the fascist party because, in 1926, their clinic had been transformed by law into a branch of the fascist prenatal organization, they refused and—with a courtesy bordering on contempt—resigned their positions. Clearly, enforced collaboration with the regime, which they had accepted for several years, was one thing, membership of the party another. Here politics was involved, but the personal dignity of the doctors, reluctant to identify with a violent, repressive and all too often vulgar regime, seems to have been paramount. There was a clear refusal to have that "space"—both personal and professional—invaded by external domination.

Exactly the same traits are discernible in Joachim Fest's recent autobiography—the "Not I" of the title being a clear distancing of himself (and his elitist Prussian bourgeois tradition) from the uncultured Nazis (Fest 2014). Viktor Klemperer's Diary provides multiple examples of professional people behaving in the opposite way. These were mainly university teachers who, like their Italian counterparts (apart from nine of them), all decided on showing loyalty to the regime, judging that non-compliance with Nazi regulations could only be realized at a price much higher than they were prepared to pay (Klemperer 1998–99).

Individual agency within the context of domination was also evident in non-conformist behaviour that in one way or another belied the authority of the regime. Jokes were the most common form of such behaviour; no regime escaped from the attentions of those who made fun of leaders, regulations and—at times—utopian objectives. Sometimes jokes were no more than a simple recognition of the comic side of the regimes people lived under, but sometimes they were something more. The ability to joke about Stalin or Hitler could be a form of affirmation of identity; it could sometimes be the establishment of a distance—more often than not illusory—between the dominated and domination, a way of saying "They can do their worst; I can still laugh at them." *Eigensinn* was at work here, with the creation of an "us" and "them." The regimes tolerated jokes as a safety valve, but only up to a point—the tellers of jokes that ridiculed Mussolini got five years of internal exile within Italy if caught.

Jokes were a form of escape—often no more than a momentary escape from the harsh realities of dictatorship. Alcohol was another—an escape to an alternative world where, for as long as the vodka lasted, it seemed that no one could touch you. In the same way as it was said in the nineteenth century that two penny-worth of whisky was the quickest way out of Glasgow, in Moscow in the 1930s a third of a bottle of vodka, consumed with strangers under the stairway, was the quickest way out of the harsh reality of communism. This was *Eigensinn* in a way reversed; it was the destruction of individual personality. It was, nonetheless, a way of creating an individual "space" in which, for a limited time, authority could not intrude. Well depicted in Venedikt Erofeev's novel,

Moscow to the End of the Line, the place of alcohol-embalmed inner migration in the zone of non-compliance is not to be underrated. Sometimes, of course, alcohol could have more effervescent effects. The newly sober Italian worker who tried to defend himself from charges by saying, "When I hit the bust of Mussolini over the head with the chair, I had no intention of offending the Duce" found little sympathy among the police for his non-compliance with the rules of respect for dictatorship.

Alternative worlds were very much present in the Soviet satellite countries after 1945, principally, but not exclusively, among the young. As had been the case with the Edelweiss Pirates in Nazi Germany, dress, hair styles, music and sexual habits could all be used to realize what was, in effect, a challenge to the system. In the GDR in particular, an alternative youth culture, clearly mimicking many aspects of life in the West, developed between the 1950s and the 1960s. Wearing tight jeans and listening to rock music were expressions of evident non-compliance with the severe morality of the communist authorities—an all-too-obvious declaration of a desire to be elsewhere, where such behaviour was considered normal. Even skateboarding appears to have been given a political content (Palmowski 2009). Aspects of this kind of non-compliance represented by alternative youth cultures were also present in the last years of the Soviet Union—a world already in transition in many ways—brilliantly described in Alexei Yurchak's *Everything Was Forever, until it Was No More* (2006). In what he terms the "Deterritorialized milieus" and the "Imaginary West" inhabited by Soviet youth, there is clear evidence of a regime's failure to "define reality" for its citizens, leaving the door wide open for forms of non-collaboration that represented a real rejection of the system.

Non-compliance and the "as if" Factor

A brief mention should be made of the "as if" factor—that is, of the role of dissimulation within mass dictatorships. Non-compliance would often be masked by apparent compliance. Indeed, part of the process of "navigation" within regimes of mass dictatorship was to seem to be obeying the rules or to conform to requirements, while in fact not doing so. This method of operating, which some raised almost to the level of an art form, was so widespread that it gave cause for concern to more than one dictatorship; the dictator knew that he could not trust the cheering crowd because the popular technique was to cheer the dictator in the morning and break his rules later in the same day.

In the Soviet Union in the 1930s, where the importance of social origins in the assignment of roles within the system often led people to assume two distinct personalities—the "public" persona, as verified by their (often false) documents, and a private self which corresponded more closely to the realities of their background. People would behave—willingly or unwillingly—"as if" they were good proletarian communists, even if they were anything but that. Such a position can, of course, be read as a desperate need to comply rather than as evidence of non-compliance, but the pretence involved in the process left people in

uncertain and ambiguous positions in respect of the regime, persistently hiding a part of themselves—a private part—from public view. Rather paradoxically, dissimulation of this kind was both compliance and non-compliance with the regime, a complex and ambivalent position which was, however, unlikely to do much in the long run to strengthen the hold of the dictatorship.

Seeming to comply, but in fact not doing so, was very much in evidence in Italy in late 1935, when Mussolini asked all married women to donate their gold wedding rings to the nation as a contribution to the cost of invading Ethiopia. Most undoubtedly did so and those who did consign their ring received an alloy substitute—it was the visible receipt for patriotic sacrifice. However, provincial authorities reported at the time that there was a brisk undercover market in non-official alloy rings; women were buying and wearing these—and, of course, keeping their wedding rings well hidden. A variant on the theme was to find or procure a ring much inferior to the real one to hand over on the appointed day. Men were also complicit in these operations, protesting—very significantly— that it was not the gold that was in question, it was the sanctity of the family, of which the ring was the symbol. Here was perfect non-compliance—acting "as if" you were in agreement with the regime and obeying its dictates, but in fact, for personal and private reasons, frustrating the regime's efforts.

Non-compliance, Indifference and Resistance

Well exemplified in the case above, the retention of some kind of individual agency in certain situations, even in the context of mass dictatorship, should not be read as implying that non-compliance was the default position of the majority of the population in these regimes. For most people, attitudes were undoubtedly much more complex; ambivalences and ambiguities rather than clear black-and-white positions were the common characteristics of life under dictatorship. People approved of some things, they hated others—it was where the balance lay between the two for the majority that might determine the success or failure of the regime.

Within this picture, indifference was hardly an option; you might not be interested in politics, but, under a mass dictatorship, politics was interested in you. Inclusion, participation, mobilization, belonging to the community— these were all part of the generation of the "mass" side of dictatorship and were difficult, probably impossible, to avoid on a permanent basis. It was possible not to go to the demonstration or the local party meeting simply because they were considered tedious and boring, but it was unlikely that the absence would go unnoticed and that the indifference could continue for long. Certainly, what did often take place under these regimes was a taking of distance from the regime, a refusal to collaborate when collaboration was requested. In fascist Italy provincial authorities continually lamented the fact that able and educated people—the people who would have been best suited to run provincial affairs—refused to put themselves forward for office because of distaste for the regime and a desire not to become too involved with it. "Taking distance"

from politics was clearly a form of non-compliance, although, to some extent, the regimes themselves invited such a response from their subjects when they controlled—and often completely stifled—political debate. If, as has been alleged, East Germans willingly exchanged their freedom for refrigerators, it was a sign that they preferred even limited access to consumer goods to the dull routinization of political life the regime offered them. The refusal to follow the ideological enthusiasms of the regime represented a form of non-compliance, although it might be more realistic to site it in the categories of acquiescence to the inevitable and resignation (Lindenberger 2009). Certainly it was one form of non-compliance that the regime could face with relative tranquillity.

Such a consideration points up the fact that non-compliance is not the same as resistance. Non-compliance positions itself within the regime; "navigation"—that Schwejkian slalom between and around official obstacles so common under these regimes—takes place within the context of the regime. It recognizes limits and boundaries beyond which it must not go. More often than not it represents the attempt to live on the least unfavourable terms within the regime. Thus, it does not challenge the regime directly, as resistance might, but undermines its authority more subtlety by denying the bases on which mass dictatorship is founded—those bases of collective unity and conformity we have examined above. The assertion of individual agency in the form of non-compliance, even within the limits set by the regime, attacks the fundamental bedrock of dictatorship because it represents the refusal to recognize total domination.

Where non-compliance tips into resistance is, of course, a crucial moment. It is, however, in no way a necessary moment; the link between the two positions is possible but by no means inevitable—precisely because the non-complier is positioned within the system and not outside it. The attitude of the worker who deliberately goes slow in order to assert his own identity vis-à-vis the boss, and that of the workman who deliberately sabotages his machine in order to prevent vital production, is very different. The first may, but does not necessarily lead to the second, just as critical dissidence within the system does not necessarily imply total opposition to the system. Resistance occurs at the point in which the decision is taken to position oneself outside the regime, working against it rather than attempting to navigate within it.

Resistance to domination has found one of its best analysts in the American anthropologist James C. Scott. His Indonesian peasants (in Weapons of the Weak) offer resistance rather than non-compliance when, despite apparent conformity with the requirements of the domination to which they are subjected, they seek, through their "hidden transcripts" of opposition, to subvert the system in which they find themselves. Interestingly, the origin of their resistance lies in the fact that the introduction of capitalist farming had destroyed the traditional practices on which authority was based, provoking among the peasants a profound sense of injustice at the terms of their exploitation. In the eyes of the peasants, authority had lost its legitimation, therefore, and could with justice be resisted through a whole variety of strategies.

Modern mass dictatorships are hardly peasant societies, but many of the same factors operate in provoking resistance. The legitimation of regimes, which, more often than not, are regimes that owe a great deal to violence and physical repression, may be questioned by the citizens; the privileges of a communist *Nomenklatura* (or the "new caste," as the corrupt provincial leaders of fascist Italy were called) may provoke a profound sense of injustice among the population—at times almost a "moral revolt" against the breach of what are considered to be traditional rights. But, as long as the domination of the regime is thought to be inevitable, injustice will be endured, and widespread resistance will be unlikely to occur. One of the features that kept the post-war communist system alive for so long appears to have been the general belief among the populations of the Soviet Bloc countries that the system would never change; it was thought, as Yurchak has reminded us, to be "forever" and, therefore, to some extent, normal and natural. The naturalization of the inescapable was one of late communism's best tricks. Resistance develops with great difficulty in such circumstances. Not accidentally, both Hitler and Mussolini talked about the inauguration of a "new era," about regimes that would last a thousand years.

Collective resistance is likely to develop when there is belief in the possibility of change. Put in Gramscian terms, it occurs when there is a weakening of the cultural hegemony of the dictatorship (Abercrombie 1980). It may not always reflect the penetration within society of an alternative culture; indeed it frequently finds its tools, at least initially, in the rhetoric of the regime itself, denouncing the failed realization of the regime's propaganda promises. The student critics of Italian fascism at the end of the 1930s employed the regime's own empty rhetoric about "social justice" in order to contest the falsity of the dictatorship, just as in Poland the Solidarity movement articulated its opposition to the communist regime using a terminology drawn from the rhetoric of the regime itself. But, while it may not always reflect an alternative culture, resistance usually does contain a vision of a different future. The rejection of the domination of dictatorship invites ideas about what might replace it and, in so doing, fractures the "reality" manufactured by the regime.

In many cases, what pushes a critical attitude towards a regime—an attitude that might have been reflected in non-compliance—into resistance, either active or passive, is the emergence of a situation that removes alternatives and enforces choice. Clearly, for the anti-Nazi White Rose movement, the conditions within Germany in 1942–1943 made the choice of virtually open resistance seem unavoidable, even though the likely consequences of such action were all too obvious. In this case increasing knowledge of the atrocities being committed on the Eastern Front combined with deep-rooted religious belief to determine action. In other circumstances clarity of choice is imposed because the very existence of a person, a family or even a whole community may be at stake. Situations provoked by war provide the best examples. The shifting positions within the Jewish leadership of the Warsaw ghetto reflected the realization that the alternatives to resistance, represented by compliance and limited collaboration with the Nazis, had disappeared; armed resistance was the only

possible answer to oppression at that point. In Italy in the Autumn of 1943, when the Nazis had occupied most of the peninsula, the prospect of being conscripted into the army of Mussolini's Repubblica Sociale or, even worse, of being deported to work in German factories, pushed many young men—often relatively unpoliticized up to that point—into the partisan bands. Again in Italy during the German occupation, the decision of peasant families—the women in particular—to shelter Allied soldiers who had escaped from imprisonment, even though they knew that the penalty, if discovered, was immediate execution, represents an act of resistance the significance of which the women themselves often underplayed. By their actions—much more than non-compliance—the families placed themselves outside the neutral role the Nazis had assigned them and, by so doing, rejected all those positions of acquiescence, accommodation, resignation and conformism on which mass dictatorships depend so much for their domination of the population.

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Victimhood

Jie-Hyun Lim

UNREMEMBERING VICTIMHOOD

A bitter irony of mass dictatorship is that perpetrators became self-asserted victims in retrospect. Many perpetrators among the *kleine Leute* perceived themselves as victims, explaining apologetically that they were forced to commit crimes. Given the substantial degree of popular backing, self-mobilization, consent from below and plebiscitary acclamation enjoyed by the regime, people were indeed very likely to be "victims" of their own complicity. Rank-and-file perpetrators alleged they happened to be just in the wrong place at the wrong time of the mass killing. Some of them asserted they never fired a shot. Others acknowledged they did, but they claimed implausibly that they were blameless instruments of the alien will of an overwhelming power. Like Adolph Eichmann, many a middle-ranking desk murderer claimed when challenged that he (or she) had never pulled the trigger, never killed, never slapped the victim's face and even had never been an anti-Semite. In a travesty of Kant's categorical imperative, Eichmann claimed that, as a loyal civil servant, he was obeying not only orders, but the law.

This was the alchemy of turning petty perpetrators into victims. How was this mnemonic magic possible? Where have all the perpetrators gone? Is it possible to imagine a world consisting solely of victims without victimizers? How can we position the individual victimizer within the collective (self-asserted *or* externally acknowledged) of a victimized nation, class, gender or race? Conversely, by what standard might we discern an individual victim among the collective victimizers? Who bears responsibility for what happened? Is it possible for the same person to be simultaneously victim and victimizer? Where is

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the dividing line between victims and victimizers? What if the dividing line runs through each individual? Is it only the victimizer's half in each individual who is responsible? What about the other victimized half in each individual? How can we settle the relationship of the victim and victimizer within one individual or any single collective?

The answer is never easy. It is elusive, fluid, liminal, ambivalent and polyphonic, depending on who did what to whom in whose memory. The global memory space is even more complicated. It would be naïve to believe that transnational civic virtues can guarantee the shift in the global memory of dictatorship from an apologetic to a critical one. In fact, the emergence of new transnational memory communities has made apologetic memories of victimhood more contested but if anything more potent, as nations are increasingly engaged in "a distasteful competition over who suffered most." In this context, as the global public sphere tends to be more sympathetic to innocent victims, trajectories of contested memories of victimhood have come to be coloured by the nationalist appropriation of notions of global accountability (Lim 2010). The memory of collective victimhood among perpetrators thus contributes to their posthumous victory by decontextualizing their victimhood and prevaricating the criminal past.

This essay aims to interrogate self-asserted victimhood in the transnational memory space of mass dictatorships. Historical scrutiny of such claims may result in an act of *unremembering* which can disengage the mnemonic subject critically from the memory of collective victimhood. It is about being open to the plural memory that disremembers victimhood by bridging the binary of victims and perpetrators in the liminal space of contradictory memories. That never means either flat denial or prevarication of the brutal past and of heinous crimes. Through historical contextualization rather than the flat denial of the suffering endured by perpetrators and accomplices, it distinguishes complex realities from "the prevarications of historiography" (Jarausch and Geyer 2003, p. 12). This more nuanced and polyphonic contextualization of victimhood would reveal the complexity of the past and thus enable us to rethink questions of transitional justice beyond the narrow frame of jurisprudence by reflecting on the forms and implications of a liminal justice.

Victimhood in Apologetic Memory

The Moscow Tripartite Conference in 1943 interpreted the annexation of Austria on 15 March 1938 as an imposed action and thus "null and void." Austria was recognized by the Allied Powers as the "first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression." The Moscow Declaration on Austria shows how the Allies connived at the myth of Austrian victimhood. A small band of Austrian exiles had been eager to put the blame on "Prussia" or "Nazi-Prussia," despite the fact that many Austrians had been in support of the *Anschluss* and the absorption of Austria into the *Ostmark*. Though the "delirious enthusiasm" and "boundless popular jubilation" for the *Anschluss* had faded especially

after the battle at Stalingrad in 1943, Austrians' "emotional bond of loyalty to Hitler" remained largely intact. The figures for participation in Nazi crimes are telling. While Austrians made up only 8% of the population of Greater Germany, they constituted 14% of the SS and 40% of those involved in killing operations from the euthanasia programme to Auschwitz (Bukey 2000, p. 43). The image of Austria as the Hitler's first victim could thus easily be challenged by any careful historical scrutiny.

The illusion of Austrian victimhood reflects a certain historiosophical bias shared by the Allies. It was Winston Churchill who took the initiative in making Austrians into Hitler's first victims. In his address on 19 February 1942 Churchill promised to liberate Austria from the "Prussian yoke." For the British living in memory of the First World War, the arch-enemy was still the Prussians. Churchill even wished to treat the south Germans more mildly than Prussians in the north. For Churchill it was Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism that had to be destroyed. To some extent Churchill's perception of the Prussian enemy was shared by Russians in the Soviet Union. The Junkers were key villains in the communist demonology of the Nazi regime. Communist historiography equated the Junkers with Nazis, which resonates historiographically the Leninist conception of the "Prussian path to capitalism." Implicitly Churchill's "Prussian yoke" and Lenin's "Prussian path" shared a vision of the peculiarities of German history which eventually facilitated the triumph of Fascism in Germany.

The historiography of the first post-war decades had similar implications. The peculiarities of German history were characterized in terms of the belated nation (*die verspätete Nation*), the aborted bourgeois revolution, the feudalization of the bourgeoisie, aristocrat-led industrialization, the blocked development of parliamentarianism, an illiberal and anti-pluralistic political culture, and so on. All of this, summed up as "Prussianness," exemplified the deviation from a presumed liberal democratic normality, which (in this analysis) accounted for the failure of Weimar democracy and the rise of Nazism. And it implied a distinction between evil Junker-Prussian Nazis and good ordinary non-Prussian Germans. Paradoxically enough, the focus on Prussia-as-Germany could exonerate ordinary Germans from culpability in the same way as American orientalism represented the ordinary Japanese servile to imperial power as victims of the military leadership.

In this historical scenario most Germans had been victimized by a handful of evil Junker-Prussian Nazis who were solely responsible for the war and the Holocaust. The self-image of West Germany in the period of Konrad Adenauer's chancellorship (1949–1963) was coloured by the claim to victimhood. In the turbulent memories of the Nazi past in Germany, most good Germans were either Hitler's first victims or the last ones—or both. In this view, a handful of evil Junker-Prussian bad guys wielded terror and coercion most of the time, and occasionally propaganda over good Germans. This was complemented by an emphasis on the suffering of ordinary Germans at the hands of their enemies—through the terror-bombing by the Western Allies and expulsion, rape, plunder and revenge on the part of the Slavic Easterners.

German suffering from the Allied bombing and the communist expulsion returned to the centre of public discourse after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In the Cold War era victimhood had been selective in both Germanys. In West Germany the suffering of expellees from Eastern territory and German POWs imprisoned in the Soviet Union were emphatically mourned. Their private memories structured the public memory of communist brutality and the loss of the German East. The *Documents on the Expulsion* published by the Federal Office for Political Education were full of reports of terror, rape, plundering, separation of families, forced deportations, starvation, slave labour and killings. In East Germany the expulsion of Germans from fraternal communist countries could never be discussed publicly. The rape of German women by Red Army soldiers was a taboo. Instead of criticizing the heroic Red Army, the Allied bombing of East German cities such as Dresden was interpreted as a devious plan to sabotage socialist reconstruction in the GDR, so that in every respect GDR citizens had been victims primarily of the Allied attacks. At times the suffering of the bombing victims in eastern Germany was equated with the suffering of the Jews in the Holocaust. It is telling too that West German historians of the expulsion compared the suffering of German expellees under communists with what Jews had suffered under Nazis (Moeller 2001; Niven 2006).

Freed from the ideological constraints of the Cold War, the post-1989 discourse of German victimhood became more vociferous. For instance, Jörg Friedrich's account of the Allied bombing conflated the suffering of German civilians with the suffering of European Jews through a promiscuous use of terms that are central to the Holocaust narrative: *Einsatzgruppe*, *Gaskeller*, *vernichtet* and *Zivilisationsbruch*. What is evident in Friedrich's victimhood narrative is a sort of intentional decontextualization. His story of bombing includes Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but excludes Guernica and Wieluń, in both of which German Major General Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen led the air raid of the *Luftwaffe* on the civilian targets. This contrasts with a historically responsible and politically productive contextualization, which would not justify the Allied bombing as a punishment for historical culprits but rather expose a historical complexity and ambiguity beyond the dichotomy of absolute good and evil.

Erika Steinbach, the president of the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV), an association of German expellees, has been more aggressive in her assertion. Steinbach is not reluctant to describe the camps in which expellees from what are now parts of the Czech Republic and Poland were held in terms of "forced labour, extermination camp and genocide." The "genocide of more than 15 million people" was her estimate of the victimhood of the German expellees. While she equated the misery of German expellees with the suffering of Jews in the Holocaust, the Poles and Czechs who victimized these expellees were equated with Nazi perpetrators. Indeed Steinbach compared the right-wing Polish government of the late 2000s with the neo-Nazis in Germany for its indifference to the question of expulsion. In Steinbach's decontextualized world of victims, it was not important that these German expellees were hardly innocent of responsibility for Nazism. Rather, she has pursued "an age-old

strategy of self-exculpation, [in which] one guilt is set against the other and thereby reduced to zero."

In post-Fascist Italy, Benedetto Croce represented apologetic memory in his treatment of Fascism as a parenthesis in Italian history. In his account, Fascism was a short episode imposed by foreign infiltrators, alien to the history of the real and authentic Italy. By comparison with Nazism, Italian Fascism was presented as benign and all the moral brutality or physical atrocities as having been committed by German soldiers, drug addicts, homosexuals and sadists at large: perpetrators were basically alien to the national body politic of Italy. Every effort was made to distance Italy from its Fascist past by stressing the anti-Fascist tradition and exalting the role of the Italian Resistance in the years 1943–1945, which established an implicit distinction between "good Italians" and "bad Fascists." It also facilitated the shift away from collective responsibility and culpability for the Fascist atrocities on the part of ordinary Italians. Thus what remained from the Fascist past was a collective self-image of a victimized nation. No wonder that there was no Italian Nuremberg and "Fascism disappeared—conveniently for many—into a black hole" (Corner 2009, pp. 122–23).

Compared to other Axis powers, Japan as "the only nation ever to have been atom-bombed" (*yuiitsu no hibakukoku*) could enjoy a privileged position in promoting its own victimhood. The single-minded assertion that Japanese were the victims of the atomic bomb seemed to counter balance the Japanese war and colonial atrocities. Especially after the Soviet Union's acquisition of the first nuclear weapon, "Auschwitz and Hiroshima as terrible twin symbols of man-made mass death" were often conjured up to invoke Japanese victimhood. Radhabinod Pal, the Indian judge at the Tokyo trial, confirmed this by suggesting that the American use of the atomic bomb might be deemed to be the closest counterpart to Nazi atrocities in the war. All the anguish and agony that Japanese people suffered was to be epitomized by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hiroshima as an absolute evil was often compared to the Holocaust.

No wonder that the word Holocaust itself (in the translated form) was used as early as in 1949 in Japan. Takashi Nagai, a Catholic medical doctor known as the saint of Urakami church, addressed the Nagasaki victims as "the lamb without blemish, slain as a whole-burnt offering on an altar of sacrifice, atoning for the sins of all the nations during World War II." Nagai picked up the term *hansai* (燔祭), the Japanese translation of "Holocaust" from chapter 22 of the book of Genesis to explicate the sublime world-redemptive suffering of the Japanese *hibakusha*-A-bomb victims. Nagai's speech is one of the earliest records to make a public use of the Holocaust in the post-war world. With its biblical semiotics, *hansai* facilitated the nationalist sublimation of victims (*his-gaisha*) into sacrifices (*giseisha*), which is at the root of victimhood nationalism as a political religion. By transposing *pro domino mori* into *pro patria mori*, it was possible to sacralize the fallen soldiers and the suffering of the nation (Takahashi 2005).

Conventional wartime atrocities seemed insignificant compared to the apocalyptic hell of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki easily became a way of forgetting the Nanjing massacre, comfort women, maltreatment of POWs and countless other atrocities. The term "Pacific War" introduced by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was another deliberate conceptual tool to waive Japanese responsibility for waging war. With its focus on the bilateral conflict between America and Japan, "Pacific War" downplayed Japanese military aggression against its Asian neighbours. That explains partly why "the Japanese people don't have much consciousness of having invaded China and have a tendency to emphasise only the sufferings they bore in the Pacific War" (Orr 2001, p. 32).

In the public memory of post-war Japan, however, it was Japanese military leaders who victimized the innocent Japanese even before the A-bomb. The public memory that mythicized the ordinary Japanese as innocent victims rather than accomplices to wartime atrocities was not only self-generated. SCAP encouraged this morally comfortable tale from another direction. SCAP worked under the assumption that the Japanese people had been slaves of feudal habits of subservience to authority—a patronizing orientalist view that exempted ordinary Japanese from culpability. This discursive amnesty was paid for with the agency of ordinary Japanese. They became passive subjects, blindly loyal to authority and thus innocent of the nation's various transgressions done in their names and with their participation, so that "it became commonplace to speak of the war dead themselves—and indeed, of virtually all ordinary Japanese—as being victims and sacrifices" (Dower 2002, p. 228).

Historiographically, SCAP's vision resonates well with the dominant *Kōza-ha* interpretation of Japan's history as one of deviant modernity, a Japanese version of the German *Sonderweg* thesis, whose key terms are semi-feudal serfdom, parasitic landlordism, the "arrested development" of the bourgeoisie, a militarist form of finance capital, the patrimonial role of the state, immature modern subjectivity and so on. Firebombings, *hikiage* (the repatriation of Japanese civilians), the suffering of the Japanese POWs and the wartime misery of hunger and military oppression have been emphasized also to vindicate the notion of Japanese victimhood. By projecting the guilt and responsibility onto the evil militarists as *hi-kokumin* (anti/non-national) perpetrators, ordinary Japanese could stay as *kokumin* (national) victims. If Japanese military leaders as *hi-kokumin* victimizers are totally responsible for the war and colonial atrocities, the ordinary Japanese as *kokumin* victims are exempt from accountability (Sakai 2014).

What underlies the metamorphosis of petty victimizers into victims is thus decontextualization, whose logical consequence is the ahistorical justification of the historical aftermath. It is certainly true that the Japanese A-bomb victims, POWs and expellees suffered, and many Germans were victimized by firebombings, expulsion and incarceration in the Soviet camps. But it is also true that neither the Japanese nor the German victims were innocent of responsibility for the atrocities that resulted from colonialism and Nazism. The notion of

"victim" is inherently unilateral, and the decontextualization of Japanese and German suffering in terms of victimhood accordingly gives rise to a furious response from their counterparts who themselves had been the objects of brutal violence before and during the Second World War. They respond to the decontextualization practised by Japanese and German victimhood nationalisms with overcontextualization, which serves to justify their violence against Japanese and German civilian expellees. Both decontextualization and overcontextualization need to be replaced by a more nuanced polyphonic contextualization.

It is "history from below" that brought historical actors back to the stage. If the conventional "history from above" tried to explain the dictatorship in terms of coercion and propaganda, the new approach put a focus on dictatorship from below, resting on consent and persuasion. Terminological debutants like "mass dictatorship," *Fürsorgediktatur*, *Konzensdiktatur*, "everyday Fascism" and "palingenetic consensus" introduced in the 1990s signal the shift from coercion to consent in dictatorship studies. Paradoxically, that shift promoted the critical memory of dictatorship by focusing on the agency of *kleine Leute* who cannot thereby remain passive victims. Once historical actors are back on stage, they cannot be exonerated from responsibility and culpability. The memory of genocide on the individual level reflects the dictum that "structure does not kill but individuals do." Mass killing had been continuously implemented and supplemented by ordinary men who made the improvisatory and face-to-face decisions in local conditions.

In studies of Nazism, coercion has given away to consensus as a general understanding of the way ordinary people thought and behaved during the "Third Reich." The existence of an "underlying consensus" and massive backing of Hitler from below implies that those "ordinary good Germans" bear the responsibility for the regime's terror and criminality. Revisionist studies of Stalinist Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 have tended to emphasize "Stalinism as a civilization" more than a regime and focus on "Stalinist subjectivity" by exploring ego documents. De Felice's thesis of mass consensus cast doubts on the divide between good Italians and bad Fascists and disturbed many Italians' image of themselves as anti-Fascists and victims. It is doubtful that the Fascists succeeded in moulding the Italian mind into the "homo Fascistus," but welfare provisions, new labour laws and leisure activities were undoubtedly welcomed by the urban working class (Corner 2009). The Japanese historians' debate on the total war system of voluntary participation and self-mobilization, the collaboration of feminists, colonial mobilization and the continuity between the total war system and post-war democracy can be put in the same context.

The shift from coercion to consent and from victims to perpetrators in dictatorship studies represented the challenge to the Cold War axiom that "the people" could not have been supporters of Fascism. If the right-wing interpretation envisioned the liberation of the East European peoples from the yoke of the communist terror, the communist party historiography supposed that workers suffering from the capitalist exploitation in Western Europe would

overthrow capitalism some day. Paradoxically enough, the totalitarianism paradigm and the Marxist one shared a simplistic demonism which posits a few perpetrators (the dictator and his cronies) and many innocent victims (the people). The Manichean presentism of the Cold War blinded both camps to the contradictory overlapping of the positions of the victim and perpetrators even within one individual and thus to the liminality of victimhood memory.

Second *Historikerstreite* and Liminal Victimhood

The break-up of the Cold War system freed both the history and memory of the mass dictatorship from the Manichean presentism which had triggered the German *Historikerstreit* of the early 1980s as a chain reaction in transnational memory space. Post-communist historiography in Eastern Europe and postcolonial historiography in Asia represent a second wave of *Historikerstreit* after the fall of the Berlin Wall. If the German *Historikerstreit* revolved around the issue of the relativization of the Holocaust, the postcolonial and post-communist *Historikerstreit* at large re-problematized the issue of complicity and collaboration. Initiated by democratization, modernization and system transformation, the combination of postcolonial critical approaches, the political project of democratizing democracy in post-dictatorial regimes and *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in post-communist Eastern Europe accelerated the debate in a memory space that was increasingly global.

The postcolonial *Historikerstreit* broke the repressive connection between history and the nation, and thus destabilized the binary of national resistance and colonial collaboration, of colonial continuity and postcolonial discontinuity. In the East Asian memory space, Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria, was a typical liminal space. In fact, both the rightist and leftist dictatorships in the two Koreas inherited historical legacies of the defence state, military mobilization, national ceremonies, big sports festivals and Confucianism as the official ideology from Manchukuo. A strange amalgam of the American Taylor system, social engineering and mobilization that characterized the total war systems in the interwar Germany and Japan (on the one hand) and the planned economy and industrial warriors of Soviet Union (on the other) flowed into the developmental dictatorship in South Korea through Manchukuo (Han 2014). If one sees modernity as a product of the interaction between the colonizers and the colonized, the diachronic and synchronic overlapping of colonial continuity and postcolonial discontinuity seems inevitable.

The *Historikerstreit* over "mass dictatorship" in postcolonial Korea has focused on the question of the responsibility and complicity of the masses in conformity with the dictatorship. In the South Korean context, the concept of mass dictatorship argues for a multifaceted approach to the Park period, shifting the focus away from the domain of the political and power institutions to the domain of the cultural and the everyday lives of ordinary people in the multiple, variegated and often conflicting dimensions. Engaged in critical dialogues with history from below, including *Alltagsgeschichte* and coming to

terms with the past in Europe, it has challenged both nationalist and *min-jung* (populist) narratives with their Manichean and demonizing tendencies. By asking how far the masses voluntarily consented to the Park regime, "mass dictatorship" problematizes the forms of oppression that operated in generating consenting subjectivity in the masses, a subjectivity which is presumed to persist into the present, albeit in different forms and to varying degrees. Its purpose is not to naturalize or legitimize the dictatorship, as some critics have alleged.

The mass dictatorship approach represents an act of historiographical self-interrogation that entails a critical re-examination of the process of democratization by exploring the forms of oppression that still exist in democracy. The political experience of democratization in South Korea shows that a fascist *habitus* still prevails in everyday practices and influences people's way of thinking, despite the fact that the developmental dictatorship as a political regime is long gone. The point was to try to explain the tenacity of that *habitus* and the strong nostalgia for the developmental dictatorship among democratic citizens and to consider how to democratize a democracy haunted by the legacy of dictatorship. Though the thesis of mass dictatorship has come under fire from left-liberal historians and sociologists, its moral implication is far from that of apologetic memory. On the contrary, it is the myth of the working masses as resistance fighters and innocent victims in the old anti-fascist demonology that justifies self-exculpation and apologetic memory (Lee 2009).

In the European memory space, postcolonial criticism pays attention also to the guilty thread that links colonial genocide and the Holocaust. Viewed from a postcolonial perspective, the colonial (dis-)continuity between German colonial genocide, the Nazis' Eastern occupation policy and the Holocaust can be explained in terms of a memory of Euro-colonialism, though not of a linear continuity (Zimmerer 2004). As black radical intellectuals have insisted, West European colonialism, Fascism and Nazism shared the same practices, methods and objects. The Nazi utopia of a racially purified German empire was mimicry of Western colonialism, "turning imperialism on its head and treating Europeans as Africans." Nazi Germans must have felt a kind of "white man's burden" vis-à-vis Slavic people as "white negroes." And "the Slavs would provide the German equivalent of the conquered native populations of India and Africa in the British empire." Indeed, "Western" colonialism provided an important historical precedent for the Nazi worldview. A historical connection between colonial genocide and Nazi crimes is undeniable (Mazower 1998, p. xiii).

The postcolonial critique of genocidal complicity resonates with the denationalization of memory. For example, deconstructing the patriotic memory of resistance revealed the past of collaboration and genocidal complicity in the wartime history of the Vichy regime. Paradoxically, the de-resistantialization could make it possible to criticize collaboration and complicity in the deportation of Jewish neighbours. But the critical engagement with the memory of genocidal complicity did not stop at the "Vichy syndrome." Soon the "Algerian syndrome" followed. Maurice Papon on trial personified the dual complicity:

the round-up and deportation of the Jews from Bordeaux in Vichy France and bloody killing of Algerian immigrant-demonstrators on 17 October 1961. Nevertheless, he was convicted and sentenced only for the crime committed against Jews. From this point of view, the memory of genocidal complicity in France and other European countries was certainly denationalized, but not yet de-Europeanized.

The post-communist *Historikerstreit* resonates well with the postcolonial one for its memory shift from victimhood to complicity. If Adam Michnik's self-questioning of "whether we are not all children of totalitarian communism, whether we do not all carry inside ourselves the habits, the customs, and the flaws of that system" epitomizes the theme (Michnik 1998), the occupation museum in Tallinn embodies the mind map of post-communist *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. Two massive mock-up trains are installed at the gateway into the back half of the exhibition, one bearing the Nazi swastika, the other the Soviet red star. Two locomotives in the centre stage of the museum represent the political symmetry between two totalitarian regimes. It reminds one of Andrzej Wajda's film, *Katyn*, which begins with scenes of the dramatic encounter of the two bands of Polish refugees in the middle of the bridge near Kraków. Nazi Germans are chasing the one group fleeing to the east, while the Red Army is hunting the other band to the west.

The "Prague declaration on European conscience and communism" signed on 3 June 2008 reflects this bitter wartime memory of "nowhere to go" among East Europeans. The Prague declaration calls for "the equal treatment and non-discrimination of victims of all the totalitarian regimes" based on the recognition of both the Nazi and communist crimes as crimes against humanity, and suggests the day of signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August as "a day of remembrance of the victims of both Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes." But the Prague declaration rapidly met with opposition. The "seventy years declaration" signed on 20 January 2012, the seventieth anniversary of the Wannsee Conference of 1942, criticized the Prague declaration's "attempts to obfuscate the Holocaust by diminishing its uniqueness and deeming it to be equal, similar or equivalent to communism" and advocated "distinct days and distinct programs to remember the Holocaust and other victims of other twentieth-century totalitarian regimes."

The clash between two declarations reflects the difference in historical experiences during and after the Second World War. If East Europeans tend to emphasize the similarities of Communism and Nazism as totalitarian regimes, West Europeans maintain the uniqueness of the Holocaust. The difference does not matter. What needs to be problematized here is the essentialist perception of the Holocaust. The question of uniqueness and comparability is not an either/or question, but bound to the specific historical context. If the relativization of the Holocaust contributed to apologetic memory in the German *Historikerstreit*, the discourse of Holocaust uniqueness is choking critical memory in Israel. Whether the effect is critical or apologetic would depend on the discursive loci of uniqueness and relativism in specific historical contexts.

We need to "agree to disagree," a position which can promote multiple memories, recognition of cultural difference and empathy with others.

When Leszek Kołakowski emphasized the necessity of a painful *Historikerstreit* in post-communist Eastern Europe, he had in mind a catachronic challenge to the vision of East Europeans' dual victimization by Nazism and Stalinism that would involve recovering the memory of their own perpetration. But the process had already begun in 1987 when Jan Błoński published the essay "Biedny polacy patrzą na getto [Poor Poles look at the ghetto]." Błoński's seminal essay initiated an argument not about culpability for what they did, but about their sins of omission. It lifted the Polish discussion on the Holocaust beyond legal positivism to the level of ontological ethics. The debate revealed a deep trauma in those Poles who felt the guilt of being helpless witnesses to atrocity. By way of remembering perpetration instead of victimhood, that catachrony critically unsettled Poles' self-perception as innocent victims.

Błoński's awakening essay was then followed by the publication of Jan Gross's book *Sąsiedzi* (Neighbours) in May 2000, which triggered a "*Historikerstreit po polsku*." The heated controversy over the Jedwabne massacre brought "a genuine moral revolution" to post-communist Poland and awakened the sleeping awareness of complicity in the region. In the words of Hanna Świda-Ziemba, what Jedwabne taught her was that "only a thin layer of ice separates innocent prejudices from crime" (Świda-Ziemba 2004, p. 103). Despite Jan Gross's calm appreciation of the Polish response to his book, reluctance to admit guilt is rampant among Poles. The collective memory of apologetic victimhood had no room to accommodate such a drastic metamorphosis from innocent victim to "Homo Jedvanecus." The image of a clean Poland as the fighting nation could not accommodate a guilty consciousness of the Holocaust, and anti-Semitism remained a requisite of patriotism as it had been in 1946, when Polish workers responded to the news of the Kielce pogrom with refusal to condemn the perpetrators publicly and opposition to an anti-pogrom resolution.

Coming to terms with the Stalinist past in Poland (and Eastern Europe at large) calls for unsettling the ethnic hierarchy of victimhood. In the era of Stalinism, the memory of the Holocaust was repressed and marginalized since it did not fit in the Soviet narratives of the anti-Fascist front of the working class and of the Great Patriotic War. Citing Michael Steinlauf,in the essential communist narrative, the Holocaust became an object lesson in the horrors of the last stage of monopoly capitalism … The site of Auschwitz-Birkenau became a monument to internationalism and commemorated the resistance and martyrdom of "Poles and other nationalities," among whom, alphabetically and therefore "democratically," Żydzi (Jews) came last. (Steinlauf 2003, p. 264)That explains why it was impossible to publish the Polish version of Wladyslaw Szpielman's *Pianist* in People's Poland.

The genocide of Polish Jews was submerged beneath a narrative of Polish ethnic tragedy. The widely repeated statement that "six million Poles died during the war" promoted the victimhood fantasy that Poles had suffered the most. Jews were integrated into the Polish nation only in the politics of numbering

victims of the Polish citizenship. The Holocaust was interpreted as a German-Jewish conspiracy against Poles to minimize Polish wartime martyrdom and suffering. In the public memory fabricated by the Party, it was the Poles who were sentenced to annihilation by the Nazis while the Jews were relocated. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was seen as "a specific kind of fighting of the Polish underground." Witold Kula, a prominent Polish economic historian, commented on the Polish victimhood nationalism sarcastically: "In the past the Jews were envied because of their money, qualifications, positions … today they are envied because of the crematoria in which they were burned."

The East European *Historikerstreit*, including the Jedwabne controversy and the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in the Baltic states, shows how obsession with national victimhood makes them blind to their own active complicity in the Holocaust. What is no less problematic in the East European *Historikerstreit* is that it has never confronted the postcolonial critique. Wojciech Roszkowski, a popular anti-communist Polish historian in the "second circulation" under the martial law and a co-signatory of the Prague declaration, writes that the nineteenth century was characterized by the extension of European civilization to the rest of the world; in his bestselling 2004 history textbook for secondary schools the Eurocentrism is unmistakable. In order to contribute to a global critical memory, a new historiography of Eastern Europe needs to provincialize European memory through the multidirectional negotiation of the memories of the Holocaust, the two totalitarian regimes of Nazism and Stalinism, and postcolonial criticism.

As Vaclav Havel constantly stressed, the line did not run clearly between victimizers and victims. Rather, it ran through each individual. Not everyone was an accomplice but everyone was in some measure co-responsible for what was done, and this hints at a liminal victimhood. Günther Grass's 2002 novella *Im Krebsgang* is a good example. While *Im Krebsgang* focuses on the tragic fate of about 8,000 German civilian refugees on the *Wilhelm Gustloff*, which was torpedoed and sunk by a Soviet submarine, it never fails to contextualize the disaster by alluding to the history of the ship in the service of the Nazis' "Strength through Joy" campaign and the Nazi career of its dedicatee. The book alludes to the fact that the thousands of German victims on board of the *Wilhelm Gustloff* could be Nazi collaborators-victimizers.

The historical meandering implied in Grass's title "crabwalk" sends out a warning against the revisionist historiography of the 1990s which essentializes the suffering of the Germans by decontextualizing it. But the victimization of German civilians on board is not bluntly denied. This is in stark contrast with Yoko Kawashima Watkins's *hikiage*-East Asian expulsion narrative (*So Far from the Bamboo Grove*, 1986), which focuses on the ordeal the author's family had to go through in the course of repatriation from the northern Korean peninsula and Manchuria following Japan's defeat in the Second World War. In this *hikiage* narrative Japanese colonialism is totally silenced; atrocities seem to have been committed by the colonized and the Japanese colonizers to have been victimized by Koreans and Chinese. A critique of the decontextualization

of colonial history in Kawashima-Watkins's novella does not deny the suffering of the Japanese repatriates. What it draws attention to is the liminality of victimhood or the historical aporia which makes it impossible for the narrative to take account of the contradictory overlapping of victims and victimizers within a single historical subject.

Conclusion

Coming to terms with the past of mass dictatorship demands a "thick description" of consent and coercion as a multilayered experience in everyday lives. The dictum "structure does not kill but individuals do" points to the culpability of historical actors. In challenging victimhood memories of dictatorship, the mass dictatorship thesis does not exonerate ordinary people from historical responsibility and juridical culpability. Forms of oppression up to and including mass killing were continuously implemented and supplemented by ordinary men who made improvisatory and face-to-face decisions in local conditions. Indeed mass killers were not crazy perpetrators but everyday human beings—normal people.

In contrast the moralist dualism that posits a few bad perpetrators and many innocent victims facilitates the displacement of the historical responsibility of "ordinary" people. The moral comfort that the image of crazy perpetrators brings to us results not only in self-exculpation but also in moral disarmament. A historical scrutiny of memories of victimhood should lead us to the existential-ethical proposition: placed in comparable situations and similar social constituencies, you or I might also commit murderous ethnic cleansing. When the historical position of victims becomes awkward, shattered, conflicted, ambivalent, dislocated and disjointed through the application of liminal and polyphonic justice, the global memory of mass dictatorship will shift from an apologetic to a critical one.

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