The Orient, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Crisis of 1839-41

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

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Chronology

1839	April	Mahmud sends army down the Euphrates (21 April)
	June	Ibrahim crushes Ottoman army at Nezib (23 June)
	July	Mahmud dies. Accession of the underage Abdul-Mejid (14 July)
		Ottoman fleet sails to Alexandria, defects to Mehemet Ali
		Five-power note to Sultan to mediate solution (27 July)
	September	First Brünnow mission to London
	October	Palmerston proposes conceding Mehemet Ali hereditary Egypt and south Syria for life (without Acre). Soult insists on hereditary rule in all Syria
	November	Reshid Pasha proclaims Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané (3 November)
	December	Second Brünnow mission to London
1840	February	Guizot replaces Sebastiani in London. Fall of Soult ministry in France
	March	Thiers in government (1 March)
		First news of Damascus Affair published in Europe (13 March)
	May	Austro-Prussian proposal to let Mehemet have south Syria for life plus Acre fortress, acceded to by Palmerston
		Lebanese-Syrian uprising against the Egyptians
	June	Austro-Prussians convince Chekib Effendi to make offer encompassing the whole of Syria. French dither and fail to answer
		Death of Frederick William III of Prussia and accession of Frederick William IV (7 June)

(*continued*)

(continued)

	July	Palmerston threatens to resign (5 July) Lebanese-Syrian uprising crushed by Ibrahim Four powers sign Convention of London imposing terms on Mehemet Ali (15 July) News of Convention prompts wave of bellicose rage in France (27 July). Partial mobilisation of French army and navy
	August	Twin ultimatums delivered to Mehemet Ali (16 and 26 August). The Pasha plays for time
	September	British bombard Beirut, land forces at Juniyah beach (9–12 September) Sultan formally deposes Mehemet Ali (14 September) Nikolaus Becker first publishes *Rheinlied* (18 September) French approve project to fortify Paris. Army size increased again
	October	Louis-Philippe's climbdown. Thiers resigns (26 October), replaced by Guizot three days later Werther secretly offers ceasefire plan to Guizot
	November	Fall of Acre to coalition forces (4 November) Start of Grolmann-Radowitz mission to mobilise the Bund
	December	Ibrahim's army evacuates Syria
1841	January	Ottoman fleet leaves Alexandria (22 January)
	February	Sultan issues *firman* granting hereditary investiture to Mehemet Ali on restricted terms (13 February). Mehemet Ali rejects it Ottomans renew French religious capitulations
	March	Powers sign separate peace protocol in London (15 March)
	April	Dismissal of Reshid Pasha
	June	Final *firman* to Mehemet Ali: hereditary rule confirmed in Egypt at price of army limitations and annual tribute
	July	Six-power Straits Convention (13 July)
	August	Palmerston passes bill establishing Jerusalem bishopric (30 August)

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There is in nature no moving power but mind, all else is passive and inert; in human affairs this power is opinion; in political affairs it is public opinion; and he who can grasp this power, with it will subdue the fleshly arm of physical strength, and compel it to work out his purpose.

Lord Palmerston, 1 June 1829

CHAPTER 1

Three Ships

In December 1833, the ship bringing in the Egyptian obelisk that can still be found adorning the Place de la Concorde in Paris, a ship fittingly baptised the *Luxor*, entered the Seine estuary on its journey's final leg. Purpose-built and shallow-draught, she had first sailed two years earlier with the crew of workmen and engineers that were to take down and haul over the 230-ton monument from its original home. Because she was unable to navigate the shallows at the mouth of the Nile, and by construction of weak seaworthiness, she had been towed out of Egypt by a steamer named the *Sphinx*. In April of the same year, a different vessel altogether had appeared before the crowded shores of Constantinople, on the Bosphorus: the Russian admiral ship *Tsarina Maria*. The warship was the leader of the second squadron in a three-part amphibious operation designed to shield the Turkish capital from an advancing, enemy Egyptian army. She had been sent, from Odessa, on Russian initiative but with the weary approval of the Sultan, and she would assist, along with the troops she brought, in upholding the Sultan's peace. Another four months earlier, the British Foreign Office had acknowledged receipt of a report by a Captain Francis Chesney on the opening of the great Mesopotamian rivers to commercial navigation. After further preparation and an intervening parliamentary enquiry, Chesney would mount an expedition consisting of two steamers duly named the *Tigris* and the *Euphrates*. The ships, launching from England in 1835, were to chart the rivers' dangerous waters and assess the feasibility of a service connecting the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.

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The *Luxor*, the *Tsarina Maria*, the *Euphrates*: three ships, three visions of the European role in the Orient. France's mission in the Middle East was to be spearheaded by scientific endeavour and by the reawakening from slumber of its great nations, here symbolised by the retrieval of the ancient temple monument. For the Russian tsar, and with him the allied northern courts of Prussia and Austria, the priority was the preservation of the existing, legitimate order on the Bosphorus, by force if necessary. The British vision, in turn, was for civilisation to be carried in the hull of its merchantmen, to spread to Asia and elsewhere through trade and development. These three differing interpretations of Europe's Oriental destiny would, by the end of the decade, come to clash dramatically.

The Eastern Crisis of 1839–41, originating in a conflict between the Pasha of Egypt and his Ottoman overlord, shook Europe to the point of placing it on the brink of a general war. It was, according to at least one historian, the most dangerous war scare since the end of the Napoleonic wars.[1] Its indirect effects included an upsurge in nationalism known as the Rhine Crisis that was a landmark in Franco–German hostility and in the movement towards German unification. Perhaps most importantly, however, it was a key step in the return of frontline European involvement in the Middle East after centuries of disengagement. The occasion for joint Austro-British landings on the Syrian coast in 1840, it was the first instance of coordinated Middle Eastern intervention by the European powers in the modern era.[2] Closely followed by another conflict in the shape of the Crimean War and, later in the century, by creeping colonisation, it was moreover a return that would prove durable.

At the heart of the crisis was a bid for independence by Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt and master of such other Ottoman lands as Syria and the Hejaz. In 1839, when this bid was resisted and the Sultan attempted, and failed, to wrest back Syria militarily, the European great powers took matters into their own hands. While the French supported the Pasha, though, the other four powers—Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia—favoured curbing the Egyptian rebel in the interest of Ottoman integrity. The diplomatic bargaining dragged on inconclusively for a year. Finally, though, the four powers agreed against French wishes to commission an armed intervention on the ground, leading not only to the curbing of Mehemet Ali but to the generalised war scare of 1840–1.

This story has so far only been told in the conventional terms of strategic state interest. Diplomatic surveys segregate the Eastern Crisis from its political and ideological context and paint it purely as a matter of

geography and great-power competition. 'The heart of the problem was the Straits', writes Charles Webster, the author of the great Palmerstonian foreign-policy epic dealing with the 1830s.[3] That Lord Palmerston, the British foreign secretary at the time of the Eastern Crisis, had for the better part of the decade been acting in support of Liberal regimes in Europe, such as in the Iberian peninsula or Belgium, is judged irrelevant to his Ottoman policy. Nineteenth-century international history in general tends to be primarily interested in tactics or even point-scoring among leading statesmen and diplomats. How conflicts were negotiated in chancelleries and embassies, and who outwitted or outmanoeuvred whom tends to take priority, as an object of concern, over the roots of the conflict under the lens, and this has especially been the case of the clash of 1839–41.[4] Yet on what grounds the great powers chose to make their first, modern-era collective intervention in a Middle Eastern conflict surely is of prime historical concern.

Paul Schroeder distinguishes, in the period, the emergence of a new international system in Europe through the prioritisation of continental stability.[5] This contains the likelihood, already, of the elevation by the powers of European over local concerns in Middle Eastern affairs. As others have furthermore noted, 'the [European] continent was now split into two ideologically divided camps'.[6] In the congress years after 1815 and especially in the 1830s, Europe had increasingly become riven by the tug-of-war between Liberalism and Reaction—Liberalism being understood here in the contemporary sense, emphasising the Rights of Man, civic equality, freedom of the press, secularism, and representative government—with impact on most if not all of the foreign policy conflicts and interventions involving the great powers on their home continent.[7] In the 1830s, indeed, a new Quadruple Alliance (Britain, France, Portugal, Spain) formally faced a Conservative pact reconstituted at Münchengratz (Austria, Prussia, Russia). The European powers, and within each state their domestic opinions, were fundamentally divided. Is it conceivable that this would neither have affected the outlook nor influenced the decisions of the statesmen who determined the course of the Eastern Crisis?

Nor should a broader climate be ignored of renewed interest in and excitement about the Orient. Beyond the prevailing political configuration, the crisis can be traced to improving routes from Europe into the Middle East, in particular thanks to the first steamships. It took place after two decades in which trade and news had been crossing the Mediterranean at an increasing pace, and in which visitors had been enjoying ever easier

physical access to the region, a phenomenon brought home to the public by a blossoming English, French, and German travel literature. Perhaps crucially, and not wholly coincidentally, the Orient had captured European and especially Romantic imaginations anew. This was the era of Goethe's *East–West Divan* (1827), of Victor Hugo's *Les Orientales* (1829), of Pushkin's *Fountain of Bakhchisaray* (1824). In painting, Orientalism was taking its first steps. In countless fashionable written and painted works, the European public was rediscovering the mystery, the frisson of Western Christendom's old alter ego. In the academic field, many of the Mediterranean and Asia's ancient and sacral languages were being translated and their classical works popularised in what the cultural historian Raymond Schwab famously termed an Oriental Renaissance.[8] The Orient, the Middle East were once again being made available to a European public for which representations of them and attention to them had long been only occasional and sparse. The region was being brought closer and had become important again in European eyes, making it more likely to rise also on the priority lists of chancelleries.

Furnished with an increasing yet still limited flow of information about a region none of them had ever visited, the main European decision-makers were sure to absorb some of the tropes of this newfound vogue. At the very least, they were at risk of adopting the often overblown expectations it fostered. In the pithy words of an ageing Lord Melbourne, a European dispute about the Middle East was only likely to 'inflame imaginations wonderfully'.[9] The Orient, to the contenders of the Eastern Crisis, existed indeed foremost as object of fantasy, as a space unencumbered by prosaic European realities, ready to fire ever-bolder conceptions of state interest. It is a commonplace of the literature on Orientalism that European meddling in Asia found its grounding in academic and artistic productions on the Orient and the civilising discourse that emerged from them. One need not slavishly cling to the model expounded thirty-five years ago by Edward Saïd, in which Orientalist literature acted as a basis for domination and a prelude to colonisation.[10] It is noteworthy, indeed, that in 1839–41 France on one side and Britain on the other supported an independent Egypt and a viable Ottoman Empire, not colonial conquests as the Saïdian model at its most basic expression would lead to expect.[11] Yet surely these discourses and the productions on which they drew were well placed to inform and be found of relevance by the statesmen who engaged their respective countries in the Turco–Egyptian conflict.

The traditional view by which nineteenth-century great-power relations centred around the defence of sets of hard interests is meanwhile conditioned by the material on which the histories that expound it have relied. Whether on the topic of the Eastern Question, as it became labelled, or on the changing map of Europe itself, this material has chiefly consisted of the consular correspondence plus the occasional political memoir. But reliance on consular archives carries its own set of fundamental yet often unexamined assumptions. To produce detailed and well-documented accounts of the blow-by-blow of diplomatic sparring that characterises international affairs is a worthy endeavour in itself. When accounting for the broader diplomatic stakes, however, a narrow focus on consular data creates a double problem. First, consular archives are typically voluminous and well preserved, creating an impression of comprehensiveness, a self-sufficiency that encourages the relative neglect of context. Second, and crucially, the consular correspondence was by nature and of necessity preoccupied with means, with process, and with bargaining far more than with objectives, let alone motives.

Historians basing themselves solely on these archives tend to assume that policy is led by interests which, because they are scarcely ever or only tangentially defined in the correspondence, they suppose must be commercial, strategic, or colonial. Alan Sked, though his book on the contemporary international system leaves scope elsewhere to national contexts and prevailing ideologies, writes of the crisis, 'The truth was, rather, that British and French interests clashed. […] French support of Mehemet Ali's Egypt appeared to threaten British trade in the Levant and the Arabian Gulf.'[12] But did French commercial interests in Egypt justify threatening war with the combined other four powers? France's trade with Egypt was actually negligible, estimated at FRF8.5 million by Vernon Puryear compared to a supplementary naval budget for the Mediterranean alone of FRF10 million for 1839.[13] According to a contemporary observer, France was only Egypt's fifth trading partner, behind the Ottoman Empire, Austria, Britain, and Tuscany, contributing a mere 6% of Egyptian imports.[14] An official report had trade with the Levant as a whole as representing 2% of total French foreign trade.[15] This is not to deny that a prospective Egyptian or Levantine trade that was sometimes envisioned as of vast potential may not have exercised French minds—but this was, as will be seen, tied to specific assumptions about the Egyptian regime and its qualities that formed the background to French policy in the crisis.

Another common assumption is that France's engagement on the side of Egypt formed part of a colonial grand plan, some scheme beginning in Algiers and covering 'the whole African coast', in an often-quoted quip from Palmerston to François Guizot.[16] No doubt a desire for influence in Egypt and Algerian colonisation both rhymed with the abstract notion of the Mediterranean as a place of power for France—if one can discount the objections that the nascent Algerian colony was in the throes, as the Eastern Crisis opened, of a major revolt, and that an independent Egypt under an all-conquering Pasha was not the same thing as a French dominion. Yet the problem is that the Palmerstonian quip came from a British, not a French statesman, and that such words were rarely, if ever, found in French mouths, whether in parliamentary pronouncements, press statements, or diplomatic missives.

Neither should one jump to the conclusion, conversely, that Britain's opting for the Ottomans against the Pasha was all about the route to India. Britain's supposed own grand designs for Asia were hardly ever spelt out, at least in this period, quite apart from the question as to how defendable they may have been domestically. Nor, in the few instances when it arose as a topic whether in or outside official records, should the defence of the route to India be supposed to have been grounded in any precise military or commercial calculation. As Edward Ingram, the great advocate of the historical importance of great-power strategic competition in Asia himself came to write, 'Conolly's Great Game was a dream, one of the many dreamt by Englishmen in the 1830s and 1840s, of the Middle East transformed, partly by the superior and more humanitarian values built into British goods.'[17]

Interests, to matter, have first to be defined as such by diplomatists. The question is how policymakers came to construe national interests, and to what extent these were determined by public pressures or through the osmosis of publicly held expectations and beliefs. Palmerston and Adolphe Thiers, the French prime minister for the key part of the crisis, were both elected politicians. Palmerston may have been a viscount, but he sat in the Commons, fought almost every one of his elections to parliament, and was defeated several times, including in Cambridge in 1831 and South Hampshire in 1835.[18] Thiers stood at the head of a brittle coalition that owed its position to an ability to fend off anti-monarchical agitation in an unruly country. Even people such as Prince Metternich and Heinrich von Werther, the Prussian foreign minister, must be considered political men: Metternich as the self-appointed opponent of Liberalism in Europe

and Werther as the adviser to a new king, Frederick William IV, who faced persistent, popular constitutional demands. Politicians are the creatures of opinion. In formulating policy, decision-makers are likely, first, to reflect the assumptions, the biases, and the aspirations prevailing in their social or national environment. Second, they are prone to cultivate popular prejudices for outright political gain. Sometimes it is difficult to tell the difference between the two, and the actors may not have known it precisely themselves.

Nineteenth-century diplomacy, the Eastern Crisis shows, was furthermore far from the essentially closed-door, aristocratic exercise it is sometimes supposed to be. A large number of diplomatic missives were leaked into the public space, by design or by theft. In Britain and in France, policies had to be defended in parliament, sometimes in stormy circumstances. They were the object of unrelenting press scrutiny. Major international clashes such as the crisis attracted flurries of pamphlets and periodical opinion pieces, mediums of which the statesmen involved occasionally availed themselves. Even in Germany—Prussia, the German principalities, and Austria—where censorship blunted the voice of opinion, political messages could pass to violent effect via the superficially innocuous forms of poetry and song.

Admittedly, if opinion mattered, the press should not blithely be substituted for it or be assumed to have been a perfect reflexion of it. Indeed, understanding how the contemporary press functioned is just as important as appreciating the limits of the consular correspondence. The major national dailies, though fast-growing in reach, only enjoyed limited print runs. *The Times*, probably the most widely circulating, led in Britain a pack of seven stamped dailies with a total run of perhaps 50,000 in 1840.[19] In France, the two leading newspapers, the *Constitutionnel* and the *Journal des Débats* averaged between 15,000 and 20,000 copies each in the 1830s, and in Germany the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* likely stood around the 10,000 level.[20] Contemporary newspapers typically comprised only four, sometimes six or eight pages. After international and domestic political news followed local items and some advertising on the back page, plus sometimes a literary or historical feuilleton running along the broadsheet's bottom. Few newspapers had any foreign correspondents, and when they did, these were literally residents writing from the countries concerned. For this reason, news was often borrowed from other newspapers according to where it arrived first. Thus the conservative *Standard* or the evangelical *Record* might repeat what

it found in, say, the crypto-republican *Le National*, something akin to the modern-day conservative *Sun* quoting from the Marxist *Libération*. At the same time, against small print runs must be set the limited size of the respective political nations. In Britain, the voting public rose to around 800,000 after the 1832 Reform Act, but because many boroughs remained effectively closed, in practice it was smaller. In France, it was barely over 1% of the male population. Newspapers were moreover passed around or read in cafés and public places, and readership probably exceeded print runs by a fair multiple, the *Allgemeine Zeitung*'s having for example been estimated at five times its print run.[21] Most importantly, western Europe generally remained a region of notables, where a narrow group of moneyed and intellectual figures shaped and exercised a prevailing influence over broader opinion, so that what the few read and wrote mattered more than what the disenfranchised many may or may not have thought.[22]

In Britain and France, the dailies contained editorials. There were governmental and opposition newspapers, and indeed a broad array of press organs running along the full ideological spectrum. Because the main newspapers' allegiances are known, their treatment of the crisis and its main protagonists can be parsed for political alignment. In Germany, press censorship did not allow for such indecent chest-baring. Yet what was allowed to filter through the censorship is in itself instructive and revelatory of official thinking—which, in this instance, is what one is ultimately after. Prussia and Austria moreover each had their official newspaper, the *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung* and the *Österreichischer Beobachter*, and so did Russia with the *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*. Opinions could meanwhile be gathered from the German newspapers from the slant of their picked correspondents and from the letters they published, especially from elsewhere in Germany.

The contemporary press is most revealing, however, in that it chimed with a wider set of materials. Indeed, if Amable Brugière de Barante, the French ambassador to St Petersburg, was able to write of Russia, where state control over public life was absolutely stifling and the public sphere remained embryonic, 'Finally, there is Russian public opinion, which has no means of expressing itself, and no direct influence, but is, nevertheless, the medium through which government exists, and the atmosphere it breathes', surely this applied all the more to the western European states

where a lively public debate actually took place.[23] A rich collection of clues to that contemporary atmosphere is available in the form of printed and representational sources. Beyond the daily press, the scene is painted by a host of pamphlets and articles of analysis published in weeklies and monthlies. To these may be added, for the perspectives they betray of Egypt and Turkey, histories and geographies pertaining to the Middle East, the bulletins of various charitable and governmental societies, academic publications, and the fast-growing travel literature. As a gauge of the political pressures placed on the main actors, there are also the records of parliamentary debates. Then there are such sources as poetry, especially in Germany, and indeed art and representational materials. Taken together with the daily press and confronted with memoirs and archival materials, these documents help reconstitute with far greater clarity the assumptions from which statesmen were working and the various strands of opinion they were compelled to take into account in formulating their policies.

In September 1840, an Austro-British naval force bombarded Beirut and landed contingents of marines at Juniyah beach, outside the Lebanese town, disembarking with them a larger corps of Turkish troops. After a land battle against the intercepting army and after naval bombardments at Haifa, Tyre, Sidon, and especially Acre that were among the heaviest the world had yet seen, the Egyptians were defeated, their broken army condemned to melt away into the desert sands on its way home. By January 1841, when hostilities ceased, inflated estimates of the Pasha's military strength had been exposed for what they were. This story is told in Letitia Ufford's *The Pasha: how Mehemet Ali defied the West*.[24] While it sometimes takes the Pasha for hero, the book is a reminder that, as far as everyday lives and the actual redrawing of maps were concerned, the crisis had the deepest impact in the Middle East. The military operations articulated with a Syrian revolt, and the great-power intervention affected first and foremost local people's destinies, whether the Lebanese mountaineers who dealt with years of ensuing communal strife or the forced Egyptian conscripts who were killed and maimed in combat.

Neither must one forget, nevertheless, that the prize for which the Pasha and the Sultan contended and over which the great powers arbitrated was Syria, which then included Palestine and therefore the Holy Land. It would have been surprising if this had not generated considerable attention and excitement in Europe. From a religious

perspective, the crisis resonated well beyond the region. It concerned the Middle East, after all, a region no less the object of fervent position-taking than it is today, or rather which was again about to become so. The religious edges to the crisis were moreover sharpened by the Damascus Affair, a blood-libel scandal that arose in 1840 and in which the consuls of the various powers became embroiled.[25] Palestine as prize had thus not only implications for Christianity, it also concerned and mobilised the Jews.[26]

The Holy Land itself had been, in the 1820s and 1830s, the object of a booming religious literature involving books, tracts, and sermons. In Britain and in Prussia, the evangelical Protestants and their charitable organisations interested in Palestine even published their own periodicals. The joint British and Prussian churches founded a common bishopric in Jerusalem at the tail end of the crisis, in 1841. Meanwhile Britain had opened the first European consulate in Jerusalem, in 1838, and the other powers would follow in the 1840s. The actions of the main decision makers were certain to find an echo among their domestic constituencies, and indeed with international opinion, along religious as well as ideological lines. Initiatives with regard to the Holy Land, and position-taking in the struggle over Syria itself, had the potential to rally the various Christian confessions of Europe, and they offered tools which at least some of the protagonists were prepared to deploy in 1839–41. The Eastern Crisis indeed emerges as a key moment of renewed European involvement in Palestine, arguably the most meaningful since the crusades, and an involvement that has never ceased since.

This book explicitly breaks with what Alan Palmer has apologetically called the 'chaps and maps' tradition of history writing.[27] It frees the Eastern Crisis of 1839–41 from the cultural vacuum in which it has hitherto been assumed to operate. Indeed, it is equally interested in the mental maps that statesmen carry with them as in the actual map—two things which, as the international historian Zara Steiner has pointed out, sometimes differ.[28] Akira Iriye, in his landmark 1979 article on culture, power, and international relations, called for integrating domestic culture into the history of international affairs.[29] Thirty years into the cultural turn, David Reynolds has rightly warned that 'we still need close attention to the diplomatic documents that help us construct narratives of how

[…] culturally shaped actors made and implemented policy.'[30] An account focusing on motivations and their underlying conceits need not clash with histories giving primacy to diplomatic bargaining. On the contrary, both form equally valid and potentially complementary narratives, and the Eastern Crisis should be seen as having various dimensions and meanings simultaneously. Without ignoring policy articulation, this book thus seeks to tie the Eastern Crisis to the host of cultural, ideological, and religious impulses that shaped it and interacted with it.

The historical significance of the Eastern Crisis, this book argues, lies in the ideological stakes the great-power participants vested in their actions. For the first time in the modern era, but certainly not for the last, the idea that applying European models to the Middle East would lead to its improvement, indeed to its rebirth, gave rise to intervention by force. The various powers differed in their models, however, leading to incompatible diplomatic lines and to confrontation. An account of the turning point that was the crisis cannot revolve around chancellery moves alone: domestic politics and parliamentary and popular pressures constrained and even drove policymaker initiatives. Contemporary perceptions of Mehemet Ali and his regime and of the Ottoman Empire and its reforming efforts, as well as the differing levels of engagement of the powers, especially Britain and France, in fostering, publicising, and/or assuming the credit for such efforts were key to chancellery decisions to back one and not the other. The ideological lines that split Europe, the irreconcilable antagonism between Liberals and Conservatives, were foremost in informing the policies of France and its opposite, the Holy Alliance of the northern courts, with post-reform, Whig government an ambivalent third party. Religion, finally, heightened public attention and interest, further raising the stakes. It both imparted fresh momentum to the crisis, especially to the four powers united against France, and set important milestones for future European encroachment upon the region. As the European powers made their modern-era return to the Middle East, they were infused with a zeal and a sense of mission that promised to make of their decision to intervene in what had begun as an internal problem of the Ottoman Empire a landmark event.

Notes

1. Paul Schroeder, *The transformation of European politics 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1994), p. 739.
2. Napoleon's essentially propagandistic and diversionary campaign in Egypt and Syria in 1798–9 did not involve a coordinated European response, and though it became symbolically important it had no immediate aftermath.
3. Charles Webster, *The foreign policy of Palmerston, 1830–1841: Britain, the Liberal movement, and the Eastern Question* (2 vols, London, 1951), vol. I, p. 85.
4. See for example François Charles-Roux, *Thiers et Mehemet Ali* (Paris, 1951); Frederick Stanley Rodkey, *The Turco–Egyptian question in the relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832–1841* (Urbana, 1924); or Adolf Hasenclever, *Die orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838–1841* (Leipzig, 1914).
5. Schroeder, *The transformation of European politics.*
6. Brendan Simms, *Europe, the struggle for supremacy from 1453 to the present* (New York, 2013), pp. 200–1.
7. As noted, though often treated as background, in Alan Sked, *Europe's balance of power, 1815–1848* (London, 1979); or Alan Palmer, *The chancelleries of Europe* (London, 1983).
8. Raymond Schwab, *The Oriental renaissance* (New York, 1984).
9. Quoted in David Brown, *Palmerston: a biography* (New Haven, 2010), p. 214.
10. Specifically in Edward Saïd, *Orientalism* (London, 1978).
11. For Saïd's more or less nuanced critics, see John MacKenzie, *Orientalism: history, theory, and the arts* (Manchester, 1995), pp. 1–51; Michael Richardson, 'Enough said', in A.L. MacFie (ed.), *Orientalism: a reader* (Edinburgh, 2000), pp. 208–16; or Robert Irwin, *For lust of knowing: the Orientalists and their enemies* (London, 2006), pp. 277–309.
12. Sked, *Europe's balance of power*, p. 11.
13. Vernon Puryear, *France and the Levant from the Restoration to the peace of Kutiah* (Berkeley, 1941), p. 138. The number is for French imports plus exports, 1830.
14. Edme-François Jomard, *Coup d'œil impartial sur l'état présent de l'Egypte* (Paris, 1836), pp. 16–19.
15. Minister of Agriculture and Commerce to Guizot, 1 December 1840, AN / 42 AP / 56, f. 28.
16. Quoted among others in Charles-Roux, *Thiers et Méhémet Ali*, p. 37 and obtained from François Guizot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon*

temps (8 vols, Paris, 1858–67), vol. V, p. 42, where Palmerston is quoted in French ('Toute la côte d'Afrique').

17. Edward Ingram, *In defence of British India: Great Britain in the Middle East, 1775–1842* (London, 1984), p. 215.
18. Many British parliamentary seats went undisputed at the time, even after the 1832 Reform Act.
19. Stephen Koss, *The rise and fall of the political press in Britain* (London, 1990), pp. 52–3.
20. Claude Bellanger, *Histoire générale de la presse française* (5 vols, Paris, 1969–76), vol. II, p. 100; Elke Blumenauer, *Journalismus zwischen Pressefreiheit und Zensur: die Augsburger 'Allgemeine Zeitung' im Karlsbader System, 1818–48* (Cologne, 2000), p. 43.
21. Blumenauer, *Journalismus zwischen Pressefreiheit und Zensur*, p. 43.
22. For its applicability to France, see André Tudesq, *Les grands notables en France, 1840–1849* (2 vols, Paris, 1964), especially pp. 87–8.
23. Quoted in François Guizot, *M. de Barante: a memoir, biographical and autobiographical* (London, 1867), p. 144.
24. Letitia Ufford, *The pasha: how Mehemet Ali defied the West, 1839–1841* (Jefferson, NC, 2007).
25. The affair itself and its implications for European anti-Semitism are magisterially treated in Jonathan Frankel, *The Damascus Affair* (Cambridge, 1997).
26. On the British Jews, see Abigail Green, *Moses Montefiore: Jewish liberator, imperial hero* (London, 2010), pp. 133–57.
27. Palmer, *The chancelleries of Europe*, p. xi.
28. Zara Steiner, 'On writing international history: chaps, maps and much more', *International Affairs*, 73 (1997), pp. 531–46.
29. Akira Iriye, 'Culture and power: international relations as intercultural relations', *Diplomatic History*, 3 (1979), pp. 115–28.
30. David Reynolds, 'International history, the cultural turn and the diplomatic twitch', *Cultural and Social History*, 3 (2006), pp. 75–91, at p. 90.

CHAPTER 2

Diplomatic Mirages

The crisis of 1839–41 had seen a trial run with the war of 1831–3, in which Mehemet Ali had acquired Syria and the district of Adana, on the Taurus mountains, from Turkey. Though the Pasha was nominally the Sultan's appointee and he owed fiscal contributions to the Porte, Egypt enjoyed practical autonomy, and it was prepared to pursue aggrandisement at the cost of its suzerain. The Pasha, taking civil disorders for pretext, invaded Syria in 1831, provoking a military response from Constantinople which he in turn defeated at the Battle of Koniah, in Anatolia, the next year. The Sultan then invited a Russian force to the defence of his capital, an intervention that was cemented by the Russo–Turkish mutual defence treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi of 1833. A Turco–Egyptian armistice, meanwhile, had been agreed under the peace of Kutiah.

Several years passed during which the whole region was rent by the plague, and the two antagonists rebuilt their forces, but by 1838 Mehemet Ali stood on the verge of declaring himself independent and only the sternest great-power warnings could dissuade him from doing so. Hostilities resumed in 1839, and on 23 June the Turkish army met the forces of Mehemet Ali's son Ibrahim, at Nezib by the Euphrates, only to be routed again. Further Egyptian gains followed, fortuitously, with the death of Sultan Mahmud and the subsequent defection of the Turkish fleet, which left the Straits to sail to Alexandria.

The powers then intervened, and on 27 July 1839 the ambassadors of the five powers presented a joint note in Constantinople informing the Sultan of their decision to mediate, or rather impose, a solution. As events

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on the ground stood still, talks began in London, and the question became whether to leave Syria or a portion of it in Mehemet Ali's hands. Important compromise proposals to the French, at the initiative of the Austrian and Prussian courts, punctuated this bargaining without being accepted. Finally, the other four powers moved to sidestep the French position and sign, on 15 July 1840, a separate agreement known as the Convention of London. The document made for two successive ten-day ultimatums to the Pasha: the first to submit and retain south Syria for life and Egypt hereditarily, the second to retain only Egypt, also in heredity. The news of the Convention of London triggered a furore in France, extensive armament measures, and the ensuing European war scare, including the German counter-reaction known as the Rhine Crisis. It also involved, in late 1840, armed intervention in Syria with Austro-British landings, the defeat of the Pasha's armies, and the Egyptian evacuation of the Levant. International tensions only petered out slowly until formal closure was reached with the Sultan's investiture of Mehemet Ali in the hereditary possession of Egypt, in June 1841, and the signature of the 'Straits' convention of 13 July 1841.

The 1833 Prelude

The crisis of 1839–41 had its roots in its 1831–3 prelude, as had position-taking by the European great powers on the question. At the end of 1831, Mehemet Ali, for whom this was not the first piece of empire-building at his suzerain's cost, had picked a quarrel with one of the pashas of Syria and launched an army into the country. Both local forces and reinforcements sent from Constantinople were defeated in a series of battles. The Egyptians took the town and fortress of Acre after a six-month siege, and by the summer of 1832 they were masters of Jerusalem, Damascus, and Aleppo and had pushed into the Anatolian district of Adana, north of Syria. The Sultan organised yet another counter-attack, but it was repelled at the Battle of Koniah in December 1832. This evoked fears in some European courts that the Egyptians might march on Constantinople, and two missions, one Austro-Russian and one French, interceded with Mehemet Ali in favour of a ceasefire. The Egyptians were not prepared to take the considerable risks of an attack on the Ottoman capital. They advanced as far as Kutiah, in Anatolia, and opened negotiations. In May 1833, a convention was agreed between Pasha and Sultan: the Convention of Kutiah, which confirmed Mehemet Ali in the possession of the Syrian provinces.

Among the European powers, the most eager to intervene in this phase proved to be Russia, which sent a fleet to the Sultan's help in February 1833. Russian support for the Ottomans against Egypt became enshrined, in the conflict's aftermath, in the Unkiar-Skelessi treaty of July 1833. This, in classical accounts, is supposed in turn to have shaken diplomats in Paris and London because it created a Russian hold over the Turkish Straits. Yet it is important to note that, as the documents reveal, the Russian descent on the Straits was an earnestly Conservative move. The Unkiar-Skelessi treaty placed all the burden on Russia—Russian troops were to come to the defence of Constantinople if necessary, but all the Turks were required to do was to close the Straits to enemy warships, something they were likely to do anyway in most configurations. That the Tsar's intervention was not merely opportunistic, and that he genuinely wished to preserve the Ottoman Empire from Egyptian encroachments, was already shown by his withdrawal of his Egyptian consul in mid-1832, well before the march of Ibrahim into Anatolia.[1] In November of the same year, the Russian foreign minister Karl von Nesselrode wrote to Palmerston to propose that Britain provide the Turks with naval support against Egypt: 'Our interests are the same. We both want the conservation of the Ottoman Empire as representing the political combination that best enables us to ensure the Orient remains quiet.'[2] Indeed, at the time of the peace of Adrianople already, in 1829, the highest instances in St Petersburg had already decided that Turkish preservation was of strategic Russian interest. The Tsar had called a Special Committee on the Affairs of Turkey, whose members included the Chairman of the State Council Victor Kochubei, the Minister of War Alexander Chernyshev, and Nesselrode himself, to deliberate as to Turkey's future under various scenarios, and the conclusions were that Russia should make maximum efforts for the Ottoman Empire to remain standing, and on no account annex any Turkish territory in Europe without consultation with the great powers.[3]

That the Straits were important to Russia scarcely needs to be emphasised. The Turkish Straits were and are close geographically to Russia itself, and they were an important point of passage militarily both offensively—in any intervention in southern Europe—and defensively. They were also of relevance to the small but growing export trade from Odessa.[4] Preventing another power from controlling them would become a long-standing Russian goal. From the Russian point of view, however, a pure power policy aimed at controlling the Straits or indeed at an advance into south-western Asia arguably made equal sense in cooperation with Mehemet Ali.

An Ottoman partition that would have given, with the Pasha's help, Constantinople to the Tsar was probably to be excluded because it would have united the European powers against it. But even ruling out this scenario, a weak Turkey surely favoured, through Ottoman dependence and a lessened capacity to resist, Russian dominance on the Bosphorus. With Russian support, diplomatic or military, the road to Baghdad was moreover potentially open to Mehemet Ali and this would have created, in turn, a joint Russo–Egyptian front on the Persian flank. From there, it was not far to the khanates in the south of Siberia and further Asian inroads. As the Russian plenipotentiary Ernst von Brünnow would later write,

> Had Russia subordinated equity, public right, and propriety to the sole law of its private interest, as England does always and everywhere, and had its interest been to weaken the Ottoman Empire in order to take it over when the hour came, as England ascribes the intention to it, is it not obvious that in 1840 it would have weighed into the scales on the side of Mehemet Ali? [5]

The treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, though, for all its appearance of turning Turkey into a Russian protectorate, actually insured it against Mehemet Ali's encroachments and participated in a policy to preserve it whole.

The treaty furthermore had for adjunct the almost contemporary Convention of Münchengratz between Austria and Russia, a blatantly Conservative pact. Münchengratz consisted of two parts, of which the first was a solemn engagement for the conservation of the Ottoman Empire (the second part concerned Poland). As the preamble read:

> H.M. the Emperor of Austria and H.M. the Emperor of all the Russias, considering that their intimate union, during the latest events in Egypt, has powerfully contributed to preserve the Ottoman Empire from the dangers that threatened it […] have resolved to adopt this same principle of union as a fundamental rule in their future conduct in Oriental affairs. [6]

There were only two articles, both committing the parties not to recognise a new dynasty on the Sultan's throne. Dated September 1833, it was followed in October by a Berlin convention that was also ratified by Prussia and that dealt with Europe's political order generally. This was a revival of the Holy Alliance. The following year, a Quadruple Alliance was formed to join four Liberal states: Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain, in reaction to the Conservative pact. 'But, what is of more permanent and extensive importance, it establishes a quadruple alliance among the constitutional states of the west, which will serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy

Alliance of the east', rejoiced Palmerston.[7] In 1833 already, the Ottoman conflict with Egypt had become tied to the ideological division of Europe.

The British position in the Turco–Egyptian quarrel, and in particular Palmerston's, likewise first became fixed in 1833 when it was decided to take the Turkish side. This was partly in response to the Russian intervention and partly the result of more deeply seated concerns about the Ottoman Empire. As in the Russian case, this could partly be explained by tactical considerations and yet could partly be shown to brush them aside.

Palmerston wrote to his friend Edward Littleton in 1829,

> I should not be sorry some day or other to see the Turk kicked out of Europe, and compelled to go and sit crossed-legged, smoke his pipe, chew his opium, and cut off heads on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. We want civilization, activity, trade and business in Europe, and your Mustaphas have no idea of any traffic beyond rhubarb, figs, and red slippers.[8]

By the end of the 1830s, Palmerston would have become Turkey's dogged advocate, but as the decade dawned, the country attracted as yet little sympathy in British political circles. The British cabinet and the Canningite parliamentary faction, of which Palmerston was a leading member, had long supported the Greeks in their independence struggle. If some neighbouring Conservatives, among them Metternich, considered Greek independence a dangerous first chip off the block of Ottoman integrity, this had made little impression on British policy. British commitment to Turkey is sometimes dated from the Ochakov crisis of 1791. Yet beside overlooking the Anglo–Turkish war of 1807–9 and the Greek independence struggle, this ignores continuing British indifference during the Russo–Turkish war of 1828–9. Palmerston at the time explained to parliament why he had not seen it fit to support the Sultan:

> It was also my opinion, that Austria should be made clearly to understand, that the days of subsidies are gone by; and that it should have been distinctly explained to Turkey, that the people of England would be little disposed to pay for the recovery of unpronounceable fortresses on the Danube, after they had been lost by the obstinate perverseness of Turkey.[9]

The news of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, when it came, gave rise to anxiety in London just as it did in Paris. Earlier, a document supposed to have urged on the British foreign secretary the necessity of support for the Ottomans was a letter from Henry Ellis, a commissioner of the East India Company's Board of Control, dated from January 1833.[10] This made the case, in the first

intimation of a nascent Great Game, for the defence of Turkey as a buffer against Russian expansion towards India. One must be careful, though, not to take Ellis's somewhat strident warnings too literally. Undeniably, concern over Russian intrusions in, and influence over, the Ottoman Empire was of relevance to the British resolution, in 1833, to become more mindful of Turkish integrity. At the same time, this does not make the Indian frontier a hard interest that needed to be pursued on the shores of the Black Sea. First, as Jon Parry writes, 'once Russia became a threat to India, few strategists thought that it would choose Mesopotamia and southern Persia, rather than central Asia, as a route of attack'.[11] Explicit references to the defence of India are moreover extremely rare, indeed almost non-existent, in the 1832–3 correspondence between London and Constantinople, even after the news broke of Unkiar-Skelessi. Nor was everyone convinced that the prospect of a Russian lunge at the Himalaya was anything but the fruit of fevered paranoia. Talk of Russian intrigues could quickly sink into comedy, as when Gideon Colquhoun, the resident in Basra, testified before a select committee on Steam Navigation to India, in July 1834:

> Was there any Russian agent there when you were in that country?
> Not ostensibly certainly.
> In what way was the Russian agent there?
> I never knew there was any; I have heard there were spies there in the pay of Russia; I never knew this to be the fact; they were so much detested by the Turks that I do not think it would have been safe for any man to have appeared as the agent.[12]

Based on the correspondence, Palmerston himself initially did not appear concerned at the Russian naval intervention. In May 1833, after a long silence during which a number of missives by John Mandeville informing him of Russian progress had been ignored, he finally wrote back to his freshly arrived ambassador at the Porte, Ponsonby: 'Prince Lieven, in a recent conversation which I had with him, repeated in the most distinct and unqualified manner the declaration which he had more than once made to me before by order of his Court, of the entire disinterestedness with which the Emperor has lent his aid to the Sultan.'[13] The temperature in the correspondence only rose in the second half of 1833, after the news arrived of the treaties of Unkiar-Skelessi in August and Münchengratz in September.

Just as Russia might have found it in its interest to cooperate with the Pasha rather than the Sultan, meanwhile, Britain could well have found in support for Mehemet Ali a fruitful line of conduct. At the outset of

and potentially through the 1830s, Egypt rather than Turkey remained a plausible candidate as British protégé. A formal or informal protectorate might conceivably have been established over it whether alone or in cooperation with the French, had cross-Channel jealousies needed to be first defused—and indeed this was just what Lord Holland proposed in 1833.[14] Egypt was a potentially valuable trading partner. It produced cotton and silk for the use of the British textile industry. According to one estimate, British exports to Egypt had grown, by the end of the 1830s and under Mehemet Ali's rule, more than tenfold.[15] And while some historians have written that British industrialists feared competition from Egyptian manufacturing, this actually never involved more than a handful of steam engines, and Egyptian factories had by 1838 returned to animal power.[16] British merchants were prepared to make the case for Egypt: Briggs & Co., whose general manager Samuel Briggs was briefly consul-general in Cairo in the late 1820s, was ceaselessly to lobby Palmerston for a pro-Egyptian policy.[17]

Of three Indian steam routes that had been considered in Britain (via the Cape, via the Euphrates, and via the Red Sea, the latter two involving land crossings), the 'overland' or Suez route was by 1839 the only one that functioned. No one proposed driving any significant amount of trade through either Egypt or Mesopotamia: until the Suez canal was built, in the 1860s, neither could handle the level of goods traffic between India and the Far East and Britain. But Egypt provided the fastest and most economical way through for post and passengers. Two firms, Waghorn and Hill & Raven, competed on a route that took its passengers from Alexandria to Cairo via river and canal and by caravan or horse-carriage to Suez, and there were ambitious if as yet far-fetched railway schemes.[18] The competing Euphrates route, from the Syrian coast upriver on the Orontes and then down to the Persian Gulf by steamer, had meanwhile failed to come into existence: the Euphrates expedition of 1835–7, plagued by delays, breakdowns, and even deaths, had only ended in failure and disrepute.[19]

Mehemet Ali, finally, exhibited every sign of being keen to cooperate with Britain. He encouraged Briggs & Co. in its efforts. He proffered explicit overtures to the returning governor of Bombay, John Malcolm, in 1831.[20] He heeded ambassadorial warnings and refrained from making military moves in either Arabia or Mesopotamia when British troops seized Aden in 1839.[21] He made a point of meeting with British dignitaries and envoys and providing them with the resources they required for their surveys. And he would cultivate good relations with Britain after the crisis was

over and without bitterness, from 1841. As *The Morning Chronicle* wrote, 'Had England views of territorial aggrandizement or exclusive advantages on the Red Sea and Euphrates, it would win them far more easily from an Egyptian hereditary Pacha.'[22]

The initial trigger for the British swing behind Turkey was actually a warning issued by the plenipotentiary Stratford Canning, fresh from the final Greek negotiations in Constantinople, in December 1832. In a letter and memorandum to Palmerston, Canning argued that Ottoman integrity was a key British interest, and that it was at risk following the Greek war and now the conflict with Egypt. The memorandum, incidentally, tied British support to the encouragement of internal Turkish reform. Indeed, the existence of pencilled comments, in the margin, questioning Turkey's merits as a state has given rise to a historiographical controversy as to Palmerston's conversion. While it was assumed by such writers as Frederick Rodkey and Frank Bailey that the comments were by the foreign secretary himself, Mayir Vereté and J.B. Kelly have argued they are in the hand of Lord Holland.[23] Thus, for example, where the memorandum states, '[British] Influence would operate most powerfully in promoting the progress of reform and civilization throughout Turkey', the commentary in the margin objects: 'We recovered Egypt once for Turkey. We acquired or supposed that we acquired influence on the Divan. What was the beneficial result? Certainly no progress in civilization or Reform nor any such improvement of Turkish resources as we have contemplated.'[24] To the remark that Mehemet Ali only holds Syria by force, the second hand asks tartly: 'What other [right] has the Sultan?'[25] And to the proposition that the disruptions of war between Pasha and Sultan are inimical to European interests, it replies, 'Is it quite clear that war on an extensive scale in an empire which at all times & during what is called peace is the theatre of perpetual turbulence and petty disturbances is really so injurious to its commerce & improvement as this paragraph supposes?'[26] That Palmerston had by then bought into the possibility of Turkish reconstruction seems confirmed by a letter to Earl Granville dated November 1832, presumably settling the debate: 'The Turk is a better reformer than the Egyptian, because the first reforms from principle and conviction, or from political motives, the second merely from mercantile calculation', he wrote.[27] Interest in the health and merits of the Ottoman Empire as a political body acted as an equal factor, alongside fear or jealousy of Russia, in convincing the Whig policymakers to become at last supporters of Turkey.

French diplomacy, incidentally, remained oblivious to this turnaround. Albin Roussin in Constantinople and Jean-François Mimaut in Alexandria cooperated closely with their British counterparts, Lord Ponsonby and Patrick Campbell, throughout 1833. The French, during this episode, were indeed faced with easier dilemmas. In spite of their early backing of Mehemet Ali, they yet managed to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds with the mediated peace of Kutiah, which secured both the withdrawal of the Russian forces sent to Turkey's help and the maintenance of the Pasha's significant gains on the ground. The Pasha already enjoyed a good reputation both as a friend of France and as a ruler in his own right, but the French public remained in this period more preoccupied with events closer to home, notably in Belgium. The events of 1833 illustrate the importance French diplomacy attributed to the preservation of Constantinople from the Russian clutch: a special mission to the region, led by Charles-Edmond de Boislecomte, had as its first aim to convince the Egyptians to halt their advance, in part for fear it was delivering Constantinople into Russian hands. At the same time, the mission papers already revealed another prime concern: that Egypt be not abandoned by France. One alternative to a Russian intervention in defence of Constantinople was a joint European naval action against Egypt: the Boislecomte papers ruled out on principle French participation in any such action.[28]

The European powers began elaborating their respective policies on the Turco–Egyptian conflict during the 1831–3 episode—Austria and Prussia having effectively lined up behind Russia with the treaties of Münchengratz and Berlin. Superficially this reacted to events and followed the tactics of the diplomatic game. The key move in this game, however, the Russian decision to intervene militarily on the Ottoman side, was born of the prioritisation of political stability in Europe and Conservative considerations. The French and the British responses, moreover, already mixed concerns for the welfare and vitality of their new wards with their reactive reflexes.

The European Concert

By the time the crisis erupted again in 1839, great-power positions had hardened, though this was not immediately obvious, to the point of immovability. Sultan Mahmoud had never reconciled himself to the loss of his Syrian provinces, and Mehemet Ali welcomed, for his part, hostilities out of the hope that they would help make his realm hereditary

and effectively independent. In April, the Ottomans sent another army down the Euphrates in the hope of dislodging the Egyptians. Again, though, Ibrahim had the upper hand, routing this army at the Battle of Nezib in June. This disaster was compounded by the death of Mahmud in the next month and the mysterious flight of the Turkish fleet from the Dardanelles and its defection to Egypt. Once more, the great powers intervened, though this time it was with the intention of imposing a definitive solution. At the initiative of Metternich, the ambassadors in Constantinople presented to the Porte, on 27 July, a joint note placing the issue in the hands of the five powers acting in concert, in a step presently endorsed by their home chancelleries.

The problem, though, was that expectations differed as to what the European concert was supposed to achieve, especially between France and the other four signatories. Throughout the ensuing negotiations, centred in London, French demands on behalf of Egypt remained well in excess of what the other powers were prepared to grant. Nicolas Soult—premier and foreign minister until February 1840 when he was replaced by Adolphe Thiers—turned down, in the autumn of 1839, a proposal to grant the Pasha hereditary Egypt and south Syria except for Acre. Instead, Soult bargained for the whole of Syria to go to Mehemet Ali. France had acceded to the collective note of 27 July establishing the principle of the European concert. Yet the premier was already regretting the move: it prevented a repeat successful French mediation in the style of 1833, which was what the press expected.[29] Caught between public expectations and the strictures of the Note, Soult looked for a behind-the-scenes arrangement between Sultan and Pasha. The misstep that was the 27 July note required reparatory action, however, and the French ambassador in Constantinople, admiral Roussin, was soon recalled and put in the position of being made a scapegoat.[30] 'The last mail has informed us of the French press's unbelievable release of abuse against the five-power act. Such licentiousness only inspires me with a profound contempt, and it is not before the press that I feel compelled to account for having taken part in the initiative', complained Roussin four days before acknowledging his recall.[31] Roussin had come in for a personal scolding in *La Presse* one month earlier.[32] *Le Constitutionnel* had denounced the 'anti-Egyptian tendency of the mediating powers'.[33] The pack of the Paris newspapers had throughout August and September been disseminating rumours of a direct, Turco–Egyptian arrangement and complaining of European meddling against the prevailing status quo—by which Mehemet Ali remained in possession of Syria and Adana—and the interests of the Pasha.[34]

French policy remained indeed in far better tune with the Paris newspapers than with the powers. In a bizarre but revealing twist, Roussin's position as ambassador had been made untenable by a piece published in the *Journal des Débats* having alleged, in a highly pro-Egyptian correspondent's letter, that a French steamboat had carried the submission of the Turkish admiral, or *capitan-pasha*, to Mehemet Ali, the piece itself having caused consternation at the Porte.[35] And what remained secret, or at the stage of another rumour, was that the French had knowingly let the defecting fleet out of the Dardanelles and abstained from alerting anyone, as makes clear the account of an interview between the French admiral Julien Lalande, the *capitan-pasha*, and the Turkish admiral's second, Osman Pasha.[36]

'Meanwhile, public opinion was pushing us more and more in a direction where decisiveness was required and risks needed to be run. The Egyptian pasha had won among us the popularity that follows victory and good fortune', would reflect the minister of the interior Charles de Rémusat.[37] French backing for Mehemet Ali against the Sultan was, just like the British or the Russian position, anything but foreordained, and it is difficult to explain based on any obvious material stakes. If the French intention had been to establish an informal protectorate over Egypt, indeed, surely France backed the Pasha in spite of its own best interest in Cairo itself.[38] The greater Mehemet Ali's empire, the more difficult to control he would be, as bear witness Thiers's successive exhortations to Cochelet and his special envoys Eugène Périer and Alexandre Walewski, to whom he described the Pasha as 'a man of capacity and absolute will', someone it was impossible to budge.[39] An Egypt that owed its independence to France while it remained territorially confined, and even vulnerable, would have been a far better dependency, and it would also have been less problematic to patronise from the perspective of great-power relations. Yet successive French governments supported not just hereditary rule in Egypt but the retention by Mehemet Ali of the whole of Syria, preferably also in heredity, to the brink of a general European war.

In the meantime the other four powers needed to agree on a joint approach, and the Tsar sent the foreign service official Ernst von Brünnow to London with far-reaching powers, in September 1839, to broker an agreement with Palmerston. The Brünnow mission, which involved a second visit in December, is sometimes described in terms of a quid pro quo: Russia would have peace at the Straits in return for relinquishing the Unkiar-Skelessi treaty, incidentally making a general solution available

in the Eastern Question.[40] The Straits were not, however, the principal reason for Russia's interest in the Eastern Question. That they were is an optical illusion entertained by the formal closure of the Eastern Crisis, in history books, with the Convention of 13 July 1841. Metternich himself failed to see the Straits' relevance to the matters at hand: 'What does the question of the Dardanelles have in common with the dispute between the Porte and Mehemet Ali? By God! Leave it aside, where it naturally belongs.'[41] In the Austrian chancellor's eyes, the Straits were a subsidiary question only, 'an absolutely distinct question, contingent and exceptional.'[42]

There was, moreover, great willingness to cooperate from Russia's side well before Brünnow arrived in London. The Russian diplomats had already approached their British counterparts with multiple offers of cooperation against the Pasha. Nesselrode had, for example, made overtures to the British in June and July 1839 already—in the first instance asking Britain to instruct Mehemet Ali that if he passed the Taurus, it would consider itself at war with Egypt and block the Egyptian navy from leaving harbour.[43] The Tsar himself had encouraged Britain to make a naval demonstration on the Egyptian coast in 1838, as Mehemet Ali threatened to declare himself independent.[44]

As in 1833 and arguably even more forcefully, ideological motives and domestic influences played as important a role as geography in Russian policy formation in 1839–41. It is not possible to assign a view on the Eastern Question to such a body as Russian public opinion, let alone establish how it might have moved the Tsar. Russian policy may nevertheless be seen as having been reflective of swings in the national mood, and the emperor himself as apt to be swayed by conflicting aristocratic and administrative factions within his court and bureaucracy. As Harold Ingle has shown, Russian policy in the crisis years of 1839–41 was led by Nesselrode and with him a 'German' or European faction that also comprised Brünnow against the opposition of a Russophile party.[45] (Nesselrode, the son of a Westphalian landowner, and Brünnow, a member of the University of Leipzig, were two among many high-level civil servants of German culture at the Tsar's court.) And perhaps it would only have been surprising had it not been so, Russian foreign policy in the modern era having so often balanced between urges towards Western emulation and ideologies emphasising Russian specificity, whether rooted in the Orthodox confession, Slavophilia, or even the Russian people's Asian origins.

'Count Nesselrode is the chief of the German party; two-thirds of the officers in the Foreign Department are German, Lippmann, Ostensacken, Beck, Molcke, and Fuhrmann; and Russia is represented in England by Brünnow, in France by Pahlen, in Prussia by Meyendorf, in Austria by Medem', wrote the publicist and exile Ivan Golovin.[46] Prince Menshikov, the Minister of Marine, was Nesselrode's 'greatest enemy'.[47] As Ingle writes,

> The lines between the *nemetskaia partiia*, literally the 'German' or 'foreign party', and the *russkaia partiia* were clearly drawn on many issues, with the former standing for a 'European' and the latter for a 'Russian' orientation. Leadership of the former by Nesselrode was suggested by occasional references to it as the 'Nesselrodian party'.[48]

There were naturally no parties in early nineteenth-century Russia in the political sense. But there were groupings among the men in the Tsar's counsel and within the military and diplomatic services that implemented and sometimes took the initiative for policy, and these reflected broader intellectual allegiances.

Nesselrode was European-oriented, indeed the leader of a political line that prioritised Russia's role in Europe over other pursuits such as expansion in Asia. At the top of his list were the balance of power as a key factor for the preservation of peace, the defence of the established order and fight against Liberalism in Europe, and the pursuit of friendly trade relations with states such as Britain in the interest of badly needed Russian economic development. He faced a nationalist faction with a more pointed conception of Russian interest that included, at the highest echelons, the Ambassador to Vienna V.N. Tatishchev, the Minister of Public Instruction Sergei Uvarov, and the state historian and ideologue Nikolai Karamzin.[49] Everyone, of course, was in agreement that Russia's vocation was to be a Conservative state domestically—no one advocated Liberalism, and whoever did would have immediately been dismissed, perhaps worse. The nationalist faction was if anything even more staunchly in favour of autocracy than the European faction, and it stood squarely behind the state doctrine of 'Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality', or official nationality, as proclaimed by Uvarov in 1833.[50] Yet for this very reason, it naturally inclined to a more aggressive foreign policy. Official nationality was meant to embody 'the distinctive character of Russia', and it was not interested in the European order, which it tended to view as sullied and decadent.[51]

Russia should not be afraid to expand, and break from the shackles of the European balance. The nationalistic poet Fyodor Tyutchev would one day address Nesselrode as: 'O no, my dwarf, my coward unequalled!' in a poem calling for the restoration of Byzantium.[52] Many of the older nationalists had been isolationists in 1812–13, and they admired Napoleon, at least for the bolder, militaristic aspects of his regime.[53] For the same reasons, they were more likely to view favourably a policy of collaboration with the similarly heavy-handed and militarily brilliant Mehemet Ali. They wanted a forward policy in the Middle East and some, including such heavyweights as the Head of the Admiralty Board Alexander Menshikov and the commander-in-chief of the Black Sea fleet Alexey Orlov, recommended backing France and Egypt with the aim of gaining Constantinople for Russia.[54]

The Tsar wavered between these groups—between Conservatism and European inclinations and the desire to lead an expansive, nationalistic Russia—and foreign policy wove over time between the two. Nicholas I may have been an alacritous backer of official nationality but his queen, to whom he was very attached, was Prussian, and he was also close to the Prussian royal family. Russia's Eastern diplomacy was marked, in the early 1830s, by internal compromise. Kochubei, the man responsible for the strategy memorandum of 1829 enshrining the conservation of the Ottoman Empire as a Russian policy tenet, was unsurprisingly on Nesselrode's side.[55] The Treaty of Adrianople, simultaneous with the 1829 conference that had enshrined the principle of Ottoman preservation as a Russian goal, nevertheless formalised a number of earlier annexations in the Caucasus at Persian and Turkish expense. The treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was prepared by Nesselrode as foreign minister, but it was negotiated by the nationalist Alexei Orlov. The Convention of Münchengratz committed Russia to Ottoman stability, but a day after the signing of the Turkish articles, its second agreement was adopted to repress potential sedition in Poland and keep Polish activists in check: so soon after the failed Polish uprising of 1830–1, this played into Russian official nationalism and the Russification measures that accompanied it in the Kingdom of Poland.

This state of balance, however, was steadily giving way to a loss of momentum for the nationalist side, at least as it concerned the push into the Orient, not just among the services but in Russian society at large. 'The nation here cares less for conquest than Europe imagines', wrote Barante, admittedly perhaps wishfully, in 1840, and 'to send troops and ships to Constantinople was a thing more dreaded than desired'.[56] David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye has shown that academic and artistic Orientalism long oscillated, in Russia, between the pursuit of national

roots, of a national mission in the East, and straightforward borrowing from Western scholarship, especially French and German.[57] The early nineteenth-century historian Nikolai Karamzin believed that Russia had inherited its autocratic greatness from the Mongols.[58] Uvarov himself claimed eastern roots, and according to a Tsarist genealogy he was descended from a Tatar chieftain. 'Eastern antiquity, he believed, was the best antidote to the contemporary West's odious ideologies', writes van der Oye.[59] It was Uvarov who had inaugurated the chair in Orientology and the Asian Museum in St Petersburg, in 1818, helping usher in a growing fashion for the East. There was also an Oriental faculty at Kazan, teaching Turkish, Persian, and Arabian letters. A converted Persian, Mirza Kazem-Bek, was its leading scholar, and the faculty cultivated a sense of Russia's special place between East and West.[60] The Oriental faculties, finally, also served to teach Asian languages to Russian officers, explorers, and spies. The same belief in Russia's special vocation was thus carried in their satchels by many of the Tsar's military and diplomatic envoys into Asia. Examples of such men included colonel Ivan Simonich, ambassador to Teheran in 1836–8 and Jan Witkiewicz, an ex-Polish revolutionary turned Russian agent in central Asia, men who 'revered Asia as the true cradle of their past, and their future civilization'.[61]

By the late 1830s, there was reason to believe that such missionary enthusiasm had stalled, or that it was becoming more heedful of the hard realities of the Russian advance into the Caucasus and central Asia. Earlier gains at the expense of the Persians and Turks had given way, in the Caucasus, to the grind of guerrilla warfare against Imam Shamyl and his partisans. Pushkin's 'The Captive in the Causasus', published in 1822, still saw the Russian conquest in a positive, wistful light: the poem, which has a Circassian maid free a Russian prisoner, closes in Russian triumphalism.[62] 'The Fountain of Bakhchisaray', published in 1824 and in which the poet visits a decaying Crimean khan's palace, can be construed as a metaphor for its silent collapse in the face of Russian modernity.[63] 'The Journey to Erzurum', published in 1836, however, describing the poet's experience on a campaign to take that Armenian city from the Turks, contrasts with the earlier works in its dry tone, in the prevalence of death and violence, and even in its comedic aspects.[64] Lermontov had, like Pushkin, fought in the Caucasian wars. His *A Hero of Our Time*, published in 1840, tells the story of a young Russian officer who captures a Circassian princess: it is a tale of doomed Romantic youth but also of pointlessness. 'Pechorin, gentlemen, is in fact a portrait, but not of one man only: he is a composite portrait,

made up of all the vices which flourish, full grown, amongst the present generation', wrote Lermontov of his hero.[65] Meanwhile the European party conceivably felt better entitled to voice its own reservations. In his iconic *Apologie d'un fou* (1837), the Westernising essayist Petr Chaadayev mocked official nationality's sense of an Oriental mission. 'Already in its hasty eagerness, this freshly minted patriotism proclaims us the Orient's darling child', wrote Chaadayev, yet 'we are simply a Northern country, in our ideas as much as in our climate, quite far from the perfumed valley of Kashmir and the sacred banks of the Ganges. A few of our provinces neighbour Oriental empires, it is true, but our centre does not lie there, our life does not lie there and never will.'[66]

In 1837, Nicholas appointed a special commission to examine alternatives to the military conquest of the Caucasus. He visited the Crimea and the Caucasus, and the result was a number of changes in command weakening the nationalist faction.[67] More broadly, a late 1830s burst in activity and intrigue in Central Asia exhausted itself just as the Eastern Crisis was entering its critical phase, playing likewise into the hands of the Nesselrodian camp. Simonich had thus encouraged the Persian Shah to attack Herat in 1837, while Witkiewicz, who had been infiltrating Afghanistan under the name of Omar Beg, manoeuvred to have the chiefs of the other two Afghan khanates join into a league with Russia. This caused significant alarm in British India, and a squadron was sent to take Kharg Island from the Persians in 1838. Eventually the siege of Herat was lifted, though not before it had persuaded the British Indian authorities to assemble an army for launching what became the First Afghan War. Nesselrode had always disavowed Simonich, however, and the colonel was recalled by the end of 1838, while Witkiewicz was likewise sent back to Russia. Shortly thereafter, in November 1839, Russian forces launched a raid on the Khanate of Khiva whose ostensible aim was to free slaves captured by Turkmen tribesmen. Conditions forced the expedition to turn back, though, and the raid ended ingloriously. The failure of the Khiva expedition was known in St Petersburg by March 1840,[68] and the slaves were subsequently freed thanks to the intercession of a British army captain.

Perhaps both the Russian and British decision makers were engaged, at the time of the Eastern Crisis, in diplomatic and military moves on a broader geographic scale than their counterparts in France, Austria, or Prussia, and these moves can be construed, to a greater or lesser degree, to have had some impact on their thinking about the crisis itself. Yet the British side, and especially Palmerston, had by then long accepted Ottoman integrity as a good in its own right whether in the face of Russian or Egyptian

encroachment. From the Russian perspective, several salient points arise. First, the Russian intrigues described here had played themselves out by the time the Eastern Question reached its crisis point, even if one counts the aborted Khiva expedition. Second, accommodation with Britain in Persia and Central Asia was not a component of the Brünnow mission as such, certainly not formally, and it merely formed a positive background to it. Russia's pullback from Central Asia took place at its own initiative, not as the result of a grand bargain between Brünnow and Palmerston. The Russian foreign minister thus wrote to London, in October 1838, with the Tsar's handwritten comment 'more than perfect', a despatch acknowledging both Simonich's activities and the Witkiewicz mission while protesting that they had a commercial character. The despatch wrote.

> Far from any invasive ideas, this policy only aims to uphold Russia's rights, and to respect those legitimately acquired by all other powers. […] The thought of undermining the security and tranquillity of Great Britain's Indian possessions therefore never arose, and never will arise in the mind of our August Master.[69]

Third, Russia's pullback and the corresponding emphasis on its role as guardian of the peace in Europe was reflective of a more sober mood, and perhaps a disillusionment, with regard to its Oriental mission domestically on the one hand, and of the corresponding gains by the Nesselrodian faction at the expense of the nationalists on the other. Russia's Conservative policy in the Eastern Crisis was not the component of an emerging Great Game or of a single-minded focus on the Straits. On the contrary, it was led at the expense of this very game, and as a result of its loss of popularity in St Petersburg. Nesselrode's priorities had prevailed. The first preoccupation was not the projection of power in the Orient, but not to let the Middle East threaten the Restoration order in the priority that was the European arena. As the months passed, indeed, it became increasingly obvious that the main obstacle to resolving the crisis was French obduracy, not any difficulty for Britain and Russia to find a common position on a topic on which they had been in agreement from the outset.

An Elusive Compromise

If the 27 July 1839 note had created a problem for the men responsible in Paris, in London it was for the same reasons blocking diplomatic progress. To begin with, for the French, an armed intervention against the

Pasha such as was likely to be required to enforce any outside solution remained, in 1839–41, anathema. To inflict 'a second Navarino' on the Pasha (the destruction of the Egyptian fleet by the Bourbons, not the July Monarchy, in 1827) would have been publicly disastrous, as the interior minister Rémusat observed.[70] Even Louis-Philippe, whom historians sometimes consider to have been more cautious than his cabinet, was prepared to boast to the parliamentarian and confidant André Dupin of 'the vigorous resistance I have opposed to intervention under all the pretences through which it was surreptitiously attempted to impose it on the French nation'.[71] As Thiers wrote to his London ambassador, 'What will surprise you, the king is Egyptian as I have never seen him be *philippiste*. […] He makes loud exclamations, as does Mehemet Ali himself, when one proposes ceding Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities.'[72] As late as September 1840, indeed, as popular fervour was at a pitch and France remained obdurate against the intervention now afoot, Louis-Philippe would still be prepared to congratulate Thiers on his policy and his 'signal services' to king and country.[73]

Guizot, who was successively ambassador to London and foreign minister during the crisis, would write in his memoirs,

> Mehemet Ali's cause was very popular in France; carried away, as I have already said, by our recent memories and by I know not what instinctive confusion of our conquest with his conquests, of his glory and ours, we took, in the Pasha's destinies, a very lively interest, and we regarded them as important to French power'.[74]

Tied to French boldness was, indeed, a language of admiration for the Pasha's military successes and a publicly expressed belief that these created inalienable rights. Rémusat participated in policymaking under Thiers, but his most significant contribution may have been to the 1840 parliamentary address, prior to his ministerial appointment: 'But while upholding time-honoured rights, it [French diplomacy] takes events into account and does not abandon newly-minted rights.'[75] The parliamentary address to the throne attracted wide notice. Debated and voted on at the beginning of the session, it was a key tool by which deputies sought to influence policy and, conversely, through which governments accounted for their actions. It was also a short document, with no more than a few lines on each of the main topics, and each of its terms was carefully weighed. Rémusat's reference was to the Battle of Nezib of June 1839 and to the Pasha's conquests generally. Glory made a difference; victories established new rights.

'Our hopes and our predictions have come true; Ibrahim is the victor. […] We hope indeed there will be no more suggestion of withdrawing Syria from Mehemet Ali's possession', cheered *Le National*.[76] For *La Presse*: 'Mehemet Ali is decidedly protected by destiny. […] He has both right and fact in his favour. It is a lot.'[77]

Thiers, even while still in opposition, expounded the same views. 'It is obvious that Turkey is not capable of re-conquering these provinces [Syria]. When one cannot re-conquer provinces, do you know what it means? It means one cannot govern them', he argued in the debate on the same parliamentary address, in January 1840.[78] The future premier and foreign minister went on to advocate the hereditary possession of Egypt and Syria for Mehemet Ali. The speech was applauded by *La Presse*, usually a vocal critic of Thiers, and a number of the leading national newspapers, which reproduced it in their parliamentary sections.[79]

A more basic misjudgement may have been that French decision makers overestimated the Pasha's military strength. As Guizot would write, 'What means of combined action might be employed against him were considered […] absolutely vain and ineffectual.'[80] At the same time, Louis-Philippe seems to have worried that Guizot himself was not sufficiently sanguine as to the Pasha's military might: 'It is very important that Guizot be warned against all the illusions that are being entertained in London as to the combined five powers' actual power to act or weigh on Mehemet Ali and force him to cede what he is withholding', he wrote to Thiers in April 1840.[81] The memoirists maintain that a wide cast of French actors, ranging from the king himself and Thiers to admiral Lalande, thought highly of Mehemet Ali's naval and land capabilities.[82] The consular correspondence with Alexandria includes several surveys of the Egyptian forces, some evidently obtained from the Pasha himself. One also finds a handful of minority reports: a letter from d'Armagnac, 'ex-officer of the Egyptian army', dismissing the Egyptian performance at Nezib, and the occasional doubt from Thiers himself, and it is hard to carve out the shares of wishful thinking and obfuscation in these estimates.[83] Still, much of the instructions from Soult and Thiers to Cochelet, dealing with the necessity for the Pasha to moderate his demands, implied in tone and content that it would be very hard to do so. 'The Pasha is in an impregnable position, and he cannot be weakened or forced to yield', wrote Thiers to his Egyptian consul, and to Guizot: 'No effective measures can be employed against the Pasha.'[84]

Meanwhile the French refusal to budge perversely earned it attractive compromise offers. The situation was being watched with some trepidation

in Berlin and Vienna. 'It [the French cabinet] finds itself committed by a number of precedents and by the march of the spirit in France, which is constantly false. French policy is wilful, overactive, fiddling, and pushy, and if one of these characteristics suffices to make it dangerous, together they make it a European calamity', worried Metternich.[85] Austrian concerns centred primarily on Europe, not the East, as Metternich warned Palmerston at the peak of the war scare: 'I beg Lord Palmerston not to mistake the position of our Court with that of England, and even less so with that of Russia.'[86] As the prince wrote to his ambassador in Paris, it was important to seek a compromise in the Eastern Question in the interest of overall European stability: 'Our policy is what it has always been; it has for principle to ensure that the impulse imparted to the Orient, too great for its weak constitution, does not overturn, in the unforeseen developments it might bring, the European equilibrium.'[87]

In September–October 1839, the Viennese cabinet had encouraged Palmerston to propose the first compromise solution, to Soult, in the form of hereditary rule in Egypt for Mehemet Ali plus life tenure in south Syria, defined as the *pashalik* of Acre excluding the fortress. In May 1840, an Austro-Prussian proposal conceded hereditary Egypt and Syria for life, *including* the Acre fortress. Both successive French premiers, however, insisted on hereditary rule in Egypt and Syria: a goal which Palmerston's grudging concessions made clear was unachievable. Thiers, after he succeeded Soult, and Louis-Philippe wasted more time trying to convince the Pasha to relinquish minor possessions and accept were he given Egypt and Syria on a hereditary basis.[88] The French premier only instructed his ambassadors to climb down and ask for the equally unrealistic hereditary Egypt plus Syria for life in September 1840, well after it was too late.[89] It was felt that the Austro-Prussian proposals, however attractive in the diplomatic context, would not be acceptable to the French nation.

For the Austrians, significantly, and the Prussians who often acted as their junior partners, stability was not so much territorial, a question of balance of power, as political, a matter of Europe's ideological repose. Mehemet Ali was 'that rebel' and his aims conformed with 'absolutely subversive views'.[90] Paradoxically, the German dailies carried a significant amount of foreign news because censorship limited their ability to engage with domestic events. German readers were often closely informed, in particular, of French and British parliamentary debates and of what was said in the French and the British presses. This brought with it the danger of ideological seepage from France. Thus for example on 7–8 July 1839,

the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* reported in detail on the French navy budget speeches, which in practice concerned the Eastern Question, and specifically on speeches by Alexandre de Laborde and Alexis de Tocqueville.[91] The newspaper described Thiers's speech on the 1840 address as a 'triumph', and acclaimed Thiers as a matchless orator and an indispensable man.[92] Thiers's own later article defending his policy in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* was picked up and extensively quoted by the *Stadt Aachener Zeitung* on 4–5 August 1840.[93] All news was not pro-French, far from it: the *Allgemeine Zeitung* later also reproduced the Palmerston to Guizot memorandum announcing the 15 July Convention of London's signature, a document that offered the British side of things, for example. But German opinion could not be relied on to be shielded from French propaganda, and this was without even counting radical journals such as the *Deutsche Volkshalle*, printed in Constance, in Switzerland, and ceaselessly recycling pieces from left-wing organs such as *Le Courrier Français* and *Le National.*

French support for Egypt was indeed, and crucially, associated with a rhetoric of reform that threatened to spill over into agitation for change in Europe. The conflict between Pasha and Sultan, as seen from France, was a matter of civilisation; the Orient, it was held, needed renewal, and sovereignty must go to those best able to carry it out. 'Europe and the Orient must remain convinced that we can intervene promptly, with energy, and with nobility in a conflict in which the very interests of civilisation are engaged by proxy', wrote *Le Siècle* as the crisis opened.[94] Mehemet Ali, press and parliamentary statements alike offered, was that invaluable thing: a reformer. 'We must think of Mehemet Ali, whose relationship with the French is excellent, and who has acquired genuine rights to Egyptian sovereignty through a quite noble and courageous intellectual conquest', *Le Constitutionnel* was ready to write as early as 1832.[95] The words would find echo in a broad range of the 1839–40 press, up to the socialist *La Phalange*, which advocated supporting Mehemet Ali unequivocally at the same time as it issued a report on his reforming accomplishments.[96] 'The foundation of a state in Egypt is moreover entirely Mehemet Ali's', argued the *Journal des Débats.*[97] 'The townships of Syria will be snatched from Mehemet Ali, and the country of Egypt which he has so gloriously transformed will sink back to the rank of a vulgar pashalik', worried *Le Constitutionnel.*[98]

Belief in his reforms underlay both faith in the Pasha's military strength and commitment to his rulership rights. Incidentally, Mahmoud and with

him Turkey could make no such claim: 'He never made but incomplete reforms; he has attacked customs more than institutions, and wasted immense energy on small things.'[99] The same notion was expounded for the government, in the debate over the 1840 parliamentary address, by Abel-François Villemain, Minister of Public Instruction:

> An attempt at renovation, an attempt at transformation has been operated in this immobile and barbarous Orient. This attempt has taken two paths, with two different results. In Turkey […] the transformation attempt has been more simulated, superficial, artificial than deep and real. […] Alongside, in Egypt, under the authority of a pasha, his vassal, a more serious and effective transformation attempt has been made.[100]

And Thiers himself would argue, in a widely publicised memorandum recapitulating his policy that had only superficially been written for delivery to Palmerston,

> Of course there cannot only be, in granting or withdrawing these pashaliks from Mehemet Ali, reasons of equity or policy. The Egyptian viceroy has founded a vassal state with genius and consistency. He has proven he can govern Egypt and even Syria, which the Sultans were never able to rule.[101]

'Over here we are very Egyptian', wrote Princess Lieven to warn Lord Aberdeen that war was possible.[102] Nowhere, however, was the French passion for the Pasha more strikingly visible than in relation to Syria and the Lebanese revolt. Lebanon was the home of the Maronite Christians, who had for several years lain restless under the domination of their new sovereign. As Cochelet himself wrote to Thiers, the Maronites looked to France as their friend and protector, and they called for French support through Prosper Bourée, the French consul in Beirut, when they rose against Mehemet Ali in May 1840.[103] The French premier's response, dated 29 July, was tersely as follows: 'The most appropriate means to that aim is Syria's submission. […] It is therefore requisite that Mehemet Ali end this insurrection as soon as possible.'[104] Thiers even proposed that French influence be used to accelerate the insurgents' submission, and the three-way correspondence between Thiers, Cochelet, and Guizot only sought to underplay the extent of the rebellion.[105] The press cheered on and dismissed the insurrection as 'a peasant mutiny'.[106] For *Le National*, it was the result of lies and manipulations. 'The insurrection may be considered over; it causes the authorities no more concern.'[107] And the *Journal des Débats* exulted at the premature news that it had been put

down: 'Mehemet Ali remains the legitimate master of Syria; he is so by his victory in a country where fatalism remains law; by the superiority of his genius, of his armies, of his administration.'[108] Whereas mistreatment of the Maronites by the Porte would have been blameable, Mehemet Ali was a good enough sovereign, and the locals, while they might need to be bought off with concessions, must consider themselves satisfied. Bourée was duly cashiered for having spoken up. Dismissed for 'his presumption, his tactlessness, his wrong judgement of the situation', he was ordered to return to France at the end of July.[109]

French policy had been captured by the prevailing domestic excitement in favour of the Pasha. The Austrians and Prussians, always worried about the possible effects of French excitement both on the diplomatic and on their home ground, produced attractive compromise offers to help keep it down. These were turned down. Unfortunately, whether through public pressures or through common adherence to a credo about his strengths, abilities, and merits, the decision makers in Paris had allowed themselves to be lulled into the notion that the Pasha's interests somehow fused with those of France. The result was an unrealistically pro-Egyptian diplomatic line—and isolation as the crisis reached the turning point that was the Convention of London of 15 July 1840.

Open Clash

On or shortly before 23 May 1840, Palmerston learnt that the navy lieutenant, adventurer, and entrepreneur Thomas Waghorn had held secret interviews, or perhaps led a private correspondence, with at least five members of the cabinet to lobby them on behalf of Egypt and 'urge upon the government that recognition of Mehemet Ali was of the utmost importance to British commerce in the East.'[110] Waghorn had, in the early 1830s, abandoned a Royal Navy career that had taken him as far as Burma to pursue, with the backing of one of various colonial steam committees, the opening of the mail and passenger 'overland' route to India via Egypt. In July 1834, he had testified before the parliamentary commission that had also questioned Chesney, the proponent and future leader of the Euphrates expedition. After several years sailing through the Red Sea and laying the foundations for his service, and after a stint as a deputy consul in 1837, he was now running a functioning business.

Waghorn reportedly claimed he had five cabinet members behind him: Clarendon, Macaulay, Lansdowne, Hobhouse, and Labouchere. And according to the same memoirist, Lord Holland joined in on the airing of

these backdoor discussions to state his own disapproval of British Middle Eastern policy. Palmerston reacted with predictable fury: 'with considerable heat [he] told them that if they were dissatisfied with his conduct of foreign affairs he was quite ready to hand them over to any one who should better represent their general views'.[111] On 5 July, he would formally tender his resignation to the premier, Lord Melbourne.

Palmerston explicitly grounded his resignation in the lack of cabinet support for his Eastern policy and for the planned four-power treaty designed to coerce Mehemet Ali into a solution favourable to Turkey.[112] The problem was, as the Waghorn episode shows, not new. The cabinet was also weak, and such tactics dangerous. Yet-to-come were the triumphant 1850s and 1860s, when a patriotic foreign secretary or premier could confidently appeal to the indomitable British spirit. The late 1830s and early 1840s were the days of recession and Chartist agitation. An assassin tried to end the life of Queen Victoria in June, adding to a jittery ambience. In parliament, the cabinet relied on a brittle coalition of traditional Whigs, radicals, and Irish nationalists, and sometimes on last-minute switches from the opposition Peelites. On 9 April, the cabinet had pulled through in a no-confidence vote on the China question by nine votes only.

The foreign secretary's victory was equally narrow this time. Melbourne circulated Palmerston's resignation letter to Lord Holland, a key cabinet member both as Whig grandee and as a determined opponent to Palmerston's policy. Holland in turn offered to leave, accompanied by Clarendon. The prime minister's reply to Clarendon hinted at the cabinet's fragile position: 'We must have no resignations. We cannot stand them and, what is more, the country cannot stand them […]. Supposing that you and Holland resigned, and the rest of the Cabinet pursued Palmerston's course, what hope would there be of its success, and of its being supported?'[113] The cabinet met again on 8 July. Lord Holland's diary records, 'I understood from him [Melbourne] that he and the majority were inclined, though reluctantly, to authorize the conclusion of the treaty.' On the side of Palmerston were Minto and Hobhouse.[114] Clarendon, Morpeth, and Lansdowne are named as sceptical, but there was silence from several other members, and the cabinet consensus seems to have been weak. When the cabinet decided to forward the treaty proposal for recommendation to the Queen, it took the exceptional step of appending a dissenting minute from Holland and Clarendon.[115]

The Convention of London thus only narrowly passed, to be signed on 15 July 1840. Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia were parties to it as well as the Ottoman Empire, but not France, which had yet even to be notified of its existence. When this happened a few days later, indeed, and the news became public, it was greeted with such an explosion that weeks of disorder ensued in Paris, Lyon, and other provincial towns. The French press, with the exception of the marginal, opposition *légitimiste* papers, was uniformly outraged. Both king and prime minister felt compelled to threaten war and to take concrete military steps such as the recall of army classes.

The signature should conversely have made London's position unalterable. The furore in France seemed to leave no room for compromise, and one might have expected the matter settled. Yet Palmerston's position was challenged a second time in September–October, this time when Lord John Russell changed his mind. Russell's doubts were potentially even graver than those of Holland and Clarendon: he was the Leader of the House of Commons and a key cabinet member, and he could not be ignored.

The objections to Palmerton were basically twofold, centring first on dislike of conflict with France and old Whig Francophilia, especially of the Foxite strand, and second on indifference to the Middle East and a lack of a conviction that the Orient was of such supreme importance. The debate ostensibly also revolved around the chances of armed intervention in Syria and Egypt. This, however, only betrayed contagion from French beliefs in Mehemet Ali's impregnability—beliefs which Palmerston did not share—and a general reluctance to take any risks on behalf of a region that was not considered worthwhile.[116] Holland, nephew and political heir to the great Fox, the friend of the French revolution, thus despaired over a relationship with France that was to him all-important. The last entry in his journal, before his death in October 1840, only reads, 'Alas!'[117] Russell's concern, as his correspondence attests, was also to make conciliatory moves towards France. Holland had meanwhile written to Palmerston in October 1839, 'I do not care one rush who has Egypt or who has Syria—and perhaps I do not care quite so much as I ought, certainly not so much as many others, about the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Were either Nicholas or Mehemet Ali to swallow then up quick tomorrow, I should not think the end of the World was actually at hand.' And further, 'As to projects against India from the Red Sea and Persian Gulph [*sic*], I hold them all at nought.'[118] Later he would describe the 'territorial distribution of Western Asia' as only 'remotely affecting her [England's] own separate

interests'.[119] Even the faithful Henry Bulwer has the honesty to write, in his semi-hagiographical biography of Palmerston, that he was at the time sceptical of his mentor's line.[120]

Russell's agonising and secret agitation were the occasion for renewed, divisive cabinet councils. As the chronicler and gossip Charles Greville describes the situation at the end of September,

> Lord John […] requested Melbourne to call a Cabinet, which was done, and this important meeting is to take place on Monday next [the 28th]. At this Cabinet, Lord John is prepared to make a stand, and to propose that measures shall be taken for bringing about a settlement on the basis of mutual concession, and he is in fact disposed to accept the terms now offered by the Pasha with the consent and by the advice of France.[121]

Evidence that Russell was prepared to resign and take the matter to parliament is also found multiple times in his own correspondence.[122] Two more tense councils followed on 1 and 3 October, at which 'the rest of the Cabinet seems to have been pretty evenly balanced'.[123] Backstage, moreover, the original dissenting members were in contact, in particular through the Liberal ideologue and MP Edward Ellice, with Thiers and with Guizot, then the French ambassador in London, thus keeping the French informed of cabinet disunity and effectively encouraging them in their opposition to the treaty.[124] The French hope was that lack of consensus would either prompt a last-minute climbdown or that Palmerston would be ousted.

Far from taking place entirely in camera, these twists and turns in cabinet policy were meanwhile the object of repeated airings, and they were fed by an indirect, public cross-channel debate. Cabinet wrangling was itself disclosed in the British press. The Conservative *Standard* hinted at 'the opposition of Lord Holland and his more Jacobin section in the Cabinet'.[125] The theme that the Convention of London was Palmerston's creature and that it did not speak for the British public was very popular in France. As in France and Germany, there was also much quoting of the foreign press in Britain. Such was indeed, in this case, the degree of agitation and public attention that British dailies sometimes borrowed from the most obscure provincial French papers: *The Times* was found quoting from the *Journal de Rouen* in October 1840, and *The Observer* the *Toulonnais*, for example.[126]

The diplomatic exchanges themselves were offered up to the public through semi-voluntary disclosures and leaks. In Britain, compilations of despatches were regularly published as parliamentary papers, after the fact,

on international affairs. Thus the Eastern Crisis would be the object of a *Correspondence relative to the affairs of the Levant*, published in 1841. These were often the result of opposition motions, however, so that the foreign secretary, while he could pick what he published, was nevertheless in the uncomfortable position of being compelled to make these disclosures to begin with. It was indeed the cabinet critic and radical MP Joseph Hume who moved for the publication of the correspondence with Ponsonby on the Eastern Question, as early as March 1840, in the Commons.[127] This was for a while denied, but it did not stop Hume from waving a sheaf of letters he had otherwise obtained on the events of 1832–3, including a missive by the French ambassador Roussin to Mehemet Ali, and a note from the consul-general in Egypt Campbell to Palmerston.[128] In France, incidentally and equally mysteriously, the ex-diplomat and MP François de Valmy brandished in parliament various secret memoranda and dispatches to Ponsonby and from Ponsonby to Wellington, dated 1834, 1835, and 1836.[129] And such disclosures were sure to find their way into the press as part of reporting on parliamentary debates or otherwise. *The Times*, for example, reproduced various recent memoranda by Soult and Guizot on the Eastern Crisis in September 1840.[130]

At the height of public agitation, in August 1840, Thiers mounted a public defence of his Egyptian policy in the widely read and respected *Revue des Deux Mondes*: 'To abandon the Egyptian viceroy, to consent to proposals for despoiling him, for making him less than what he had been before the victory of Nezib was unthinkable. Public opinion in France, any reasonable opinion would have condemned it without mercy.'[131] The contenders indeed went so far as to make direct appeals to the public, especially through the publication of their own notes. Thus a lengthy note by Thiers to Guizot dated 3 October 1840 and intended to justify his position found its way, via the French newspapers, into *The Standard* and *The Observer*.[132] The *Morning Chronicle* and *Morning Post* reproduced Palmerston's letter to Guizot of 15 July, as the German newspapers did, a document which seems quite obviously to have been planted by the foreign secretary himself.[133] The Convention of London was, unsurprisingly, printed in various papers.[134] With less clarity as to its origin, the Napier Convention, signed at the end of November between the victorious British naval commander and Mehemet Ali, appeared together with attending epistolary exchanges in *The Morning Chronicle* and *The Times*.[135] And when Thiers addressed a crucial note to Palmerston on 8 October, ostensibly an ultimatum, this was not only promptly published, but it became, along with Palmerston's

response of 2 November, the object of a debate between editors as to its implications.[136]

If Palmerston, lastly, was able to use the press as diplomatic mouthpiece, so were his antagonists in the cabinet. *The Globe* was thus reputed to have become an instrument of rivalry between Palmerston and Russell.[137] After having cheered for the foreign secretary for more than two months, it suddenly proposed on 7 October,

> It seems to be assumed that it is the wish of England to destroy, or depose, as it is called, the Pasha of Egypt. But this is by no means the intention or desire of England. The object of the treaty once fulfilled by the evacuation of Syria, England will lend no assistance to the Porte for the purpose of depriving Mehemet Ali of Egypt. Nay, he may even yet preserve Acre by a timely acceptance of the treaty of July.[138]

Its tone for the rest of the month was likewise transformed, as when it commented on the Thiers note of 3 October:

> We deem it to be incumbent on this country to prove that, on her part, she is not less willing to promote whatever concessions are in her power, to avert a calamity which whoever may bring upon Europe at this time will be 'damned to everlasting fame', beyond redemption by speech or writing.[139]

The Convention of London was eventually steered through to success as the coalition it allowed for defeated the Egyptian forces in Syria in the last months of 1840, and both domestic objections and international sniping became irrelevant. Throughout, however, Palmerston's policy had needed to be defended privately and publicly in order to be sustained. So had the French position, though in this case without eventual success, even if in October fresh last-minute compromise offers were again made by the Austro-Prussians that might still have vindicated it (see Chap. 7). Throughout the crisis, including its most acute phase, public position-taking and domestic politics interacted with diplomacy, one feeding into the other and giving maximum resonance to domestic opinions.

In none of the powers, meanwhile, did policy in the Eastern Question follow an inexorably set geographic logic. Adhesion to a popular cause, the espousal of a line of conduct long despised yet now found desirable, fear of disorder and agitation, the disenchantment of overreach and the resurgence of a European vocation, such were the factors that determined the lines adopted, in order, in France, Britain, the German courts, and

Russia. The shifting-sands-of-state interest only came to settle, based on original courses taken in 1832–3, at the end of the decade. Had they followed the raw imperatives of power and geography, they might just as logically have come to form a different pattern.

Diplomatic decision-making was shaped in equal measure by domestic pressures, whether in Russia through factional antagonism, in Britain through cabinet fragility, in France by the action of public expectations, or even in Austria and Prussia through fear of French agitation. Diplomacy in the Eastern Question was the creature of a press that enjoyed an extensive transnational echo and a deep level of access to, and interest in, international affairs. It remained at threat from publics that could prove stubborn, as in France, brittle, as in the countries of the three northern courts, or simply intrusive as in Britain. Public pressures were key to policy formation in the crisis of 1839–41, arguably more so than geographic imperatives, in turn opening the door for prevailing beliefs about the region and about the two protagonists, Turkish and Egyptian, to assume a central role in chancellery thinking.

'Here we are, the Eastern Question is over at last! That great question which we made great, though it did not deserve to be made great. I hope we will now cease to meddle in the affairs of the Turks. It is best to let them sort their problems out among themselves', exclaimed Nicholas to Barante with unusual joviality after it was all over.[140] The following chapters explore why the affairs of Egypt and Turkey came to seem so paramount to so many people among Europe's contending ideological camps.

Notes

1. Eduard Lavison left in August 1832, shortly after hostilities broke out; Lavison to Boutenieff, 7 August 1832, and 'Procès-verbal d'exécution des ordres de la Mission impériale de Russie à Constantinople, du 30 Juillet 1832', in René Cattaui, *Le règne de Mohamed Aly d'après les archives russes en Égypte* (4 vols, Cairo, 1931–6), vol. I, pp. 529, 537–8.
2. Nesselrode to Lieven, 15 November 1832, in Georg Friedrich von Martens, *Nouveaux suppléments au recueil des traités* (3 vols, Göttingen, 1842), vol. III, p. 643.
3. R.J. Kerner, 'Russia's new policy in the Near East after the peace of Adrianople', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 5 (1937), pp. 280–90.
4. Bruce Lincoln, *Nicholas I: emperor and autocrat of all the Russias* (London, 1978), pp. 200–1.
5. E.P. Brünnow, *La guerre d'Orient, ses causes et ses conséquences* (Brussels, 1854), p. 39.

6. Fedor Martens, *Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères* (15 vols, St Petersburg, 1874–1909), vol. IV, pp. 445–7.
7. Palmerston to William Temple, 21 April 1834, quoted in Henry Lytton Bulwer, *The life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston* (3 vols, London, 1870–4), vol. II, p. 181.
8. Brown, *Palmerston: a biography*, p. 213.
9. House of Commons, 1 June 1829, *Hansard's parliamentary debates*, Second Series, vol. XXI, c. 1667.
10. Ellis to Palmerston, 9 January 1833, TNA / FO 78/233, ff. 57–61. Invoked in Mayir Vereté, 'Palmerston and the Levant Crisis of 1832', *Journal of Modern History*, 24 (1952), p. 149; and J.B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf* (Oxford, 1991), p. 272.
11. J.P. Parry, 'Steam power and British influence in Baghdad, 1820–1860', *The Historical Journal*, 56 (2013), pp. 145–73, at p. 149.
12. *Report from the select committee on steam navigation to India*, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (London, 1834), p. 145.
13. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 10 May 1833, TNA / FO 78/220, f. 19.
14. Henry Richard Vassall, Baron Holland, *The Holland House diaries, 1831–1840* (London, 1977), pp. 211–12. Just this sort of joint protectorate would briefly come to pass later in the nineteenth century. For a theory of nineteenth-century Anglo–French imperial collaboration, see David Todd, 'A French imperial meridian, 1814–1870', *Past and Present*, 210 (2011), pp. 155–86.
15. Kahled Fahmy, 'The era of Muhammad Ali Pasha, 1805–1848', in Carl Petry and M.W. Daly (eds), *The Cambridge history of Egypt* (2 vols, Cambridge, 1998), vol. II, p. 175.
16. Fahmy ridicules these views, as held by Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, in ibid., pp. 175–6.
17. Frederick Stanley Rodkey, 'The attempts of Briggs & Company to guide British policy in the Levant in the interest of Mehemet Ali Pasha 1821–41', *Journal of Modern History*, 5 (1933), pp. 324–51.
18. H.L. Hoskins, *British routes to India* (New York, 1928), pp. 228–32.
19. Ibid., p. 176.
20. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf*, p. 271.
21. Ibid., p. 302. See also J.B. Kelly, 'Mehemet Ali's expedition to the Persian Gulf 1837–1840', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2 (1965), pp. 31–65.
22. *Morning Chronicle*, 5 August 1839, p. 2.
23. Frederick Stanley Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston's policy for the rejuvenation of Turkey 1830–41', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 12 (1929), pp. 163–92; Vereté, 'Palmerston and the Levant Crisis of 1832', pp. 143–51; Frank Bailey, *British policy and the Turkish reform movement:*

a study in Anglo–Turkish relations, 1826–1853 (London, 1942), pp. 39–8, 56–8; and Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf*, p. 272.

24. Canning to Palmerston, 19 December 1832, TNA / FO 78/211, f. 346.
25. Ibid., f. 351.
26. Ibid., f. 342.
27. Palmerston to Granville, 6 November 1832, TNA / PRO 30/29/413.
28. Memorandum from Victor de Broglie, the then foreign minister, to Charles-Edmond de Boislecomte, dated 8 April 1833, AMAE / Mémoires et documents / Turquie / 72, ff. 5–12. This is the only strategic review filed at AMAE for the entire crisis and is as such a key document.
29. Soult to Cochelet, 17 October 1839, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Egypte / 9, f. 86. See also Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. IV, p. 349.
30. The scapegoating of Roussin would begin again in the parliamentary debates at the end of 1840: *Annales du parlement français*, 1841 (Paris, 1839–49), p. 10.
31. Roussin to Soult, 26 September 1839, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 279, ff. 71–2.
32. *La Presse*, 27 August 1839, p. 1.
33. *Le Constitutionnel*, 26 August 1839, p. 1.
34. See in particular, *La Presse*, 21 August 1839, p. 1; *Le Journal des Débats*, 8 August 1839, p. 1, and 18 August 1839, p. 1; *Le Siècle*, 23 August 1839, p. 2; and *Le Constitutionnel*, 22 August 1839, p. 1.
35. Roussin to Soult, 7 September 1839, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 279, ff. 31–2; *Journal des Débats*, 18 August 1839, p. 1.
36. Prince de Joinville, *Vieux souvenirs, 1818–1848* (Paris, 1980), pp. 127–9.
37. Charles de Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie* (5 vols, Paris, 1958), vol. II, p. 281.
38. As Guizot also points out: Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. IV, p. 355.
39. Walewski mission journal, 28 July 1840, AMAE / Fonds privés / Alexandre Walewski / 4, ff. 142–5.
40. Webster, *The foreign policy of Palmerston*, vol. II, pp. 647–9; Serge Goriainow, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles* (Paris, 1910), pp. 66–7.
41. Metternich to Apponyi, 7 August 1839, in Clemens Prince Metternich, *Mémoires, documents et écrits divers laissés par le Prince de Metternich* (8 vols, Paris, 1880–4), vol. VI, p. 374.
42. 'Etat de la question turco-égyptienne', 7 February 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Ägypten / 1, f. 7; Metternich to Apponyi, 10 September 1839, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Frankreich / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 316, f. 3.
43. Clanicarde to Palmerston, 27 July 1839 and Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, 15 June 1839, in *Correspondence relative to the affairs of the*

Levant, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (3 vols, London, 1841), vol. I, pp. 98 and 237, respectively.

44. Nesselrode to Medem, 2 August 1838, in Cattaui, *Mohamed Aly d'après les archives russes*, vol. III, pp. 165–8.
45. This is the main thrust of Harold Ingle, *Nesselrode and the Russian rapprochement with Britain, 1836–1844* (Berkeley, 1976), but see in particular pp. 21–35.
46. Ivan Golovine, *Russia under the autocrat, Nicholas the First* (2 vols, London, 1846), vol. I, p. 315.
47. Ibid., p. 341.
48. Ingle, *Nesselrode and the Russian rapprochement with Britain*, pp. 26–7.
49. Other high-ranking nationalists included the Minister of War Alexander Chernyshev, general Aleksey Ermolov, and fieldmarshal Ivan Paskevich, the head of the general staff: ibid., pp. 21, 30–6, 73–4.
50. Nicholas Valentine Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and official nationality in Russia, 1825–1855* (Berkeley, 1959), p. 73.
51. Ibid., pp. 74–5, 155–6.
52. 'A Prophecy', in F.I. Tyutchev, *Poems & political letters of F.I. Tyutchev* (Knoxville, 1973), pp. 133–4.
53. Ingle, *Nesselrode and the Russian rapprochement with Britain*, pp. 11, 34–5. On the Old Russians, Bonapartism, and Russia's Eastern vocation, see also Dominic Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon* (London, 2010), pp. 65–71.
54. Ingle, *Nesselrode and the Russian rapprochement with Britain*, pp. 34–5.
55. Ibid., p. 35.
56. Guizot, *M. de Barante*, pp. 142–3.
57. David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian mind from Peter the Great to the emigration* (New Haven, 2010), pp. 4–11, 31–92.
58. Ibid., p. 4.
59. Ibid., pp. 155–7.
60. Ibid., pp. 103–21.
61. Ingle, *Nesselrode and the Russian rapprochement with Britain*, p. 72.
62. Alexander Pushkin, *The complete works of Alexander Pushkin* (14 vols, Downham Market, 2001), vol. V, pp. 101–22.
63. Ibid., vol. V, pp. 157–73.
64. Ibid., vol. XIII, pp. 477–524.
65. Mikhail Lermontov, *A hero of our time* (London, 2011), p. 6.
66. Petr Chaadaev, *Oeuvres choisies* (Paris, 1862), pp. 139, 141–2.
67. Ingle, *Nesselrode and the Russian rapprochement with Britain*, p. 117.
68. Barante to Thiers, 18 March 1840, in Amable-Guillaume-Prosper Brugière de Barante, *Souvenirs du Baron de Barante* (8 vols, Paris, 1890–1901), vol. VI, pp. 422–5.

69. Martens, *Recueil des traités*, vol. XII, pp. 75–7.
70. Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, vol. II, p. 284.
71. Louis-Philippe to Dupin, 24 September 1839, in André Dupin, *Mémoires* (4 vols, Paris, 1856), vol. IV, p. 64.
72. Thiers to Guizot, 20 April 1840, BNF / NAF / 20613–14, ff. 76–8.
73. Louis-Philippe to Thiers, 13 September 1840, BNF / NAF / 20611, f. 222.
74. Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. IV, p. 353.
75. *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, p. 3.
76. *Le National*, 23 July 1839, p. 1.
77. *La Presse*, 23 July 1839, p. 1. See also *Le National*, 23 July 1839, p. 1; *Le Siècle*, 27 July 1839, pp. 1–2; and *Le Journal des Débats*, 27 July 1839, p. 1 and 14 January 1840, p. 1.
78. *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, p. 120.
79. *Le National*, *Le Constitutionnel*, *Le Siècle*, and *La Presse*, 14 January 1840.
80. Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. V, p. 29.
81. Louis-Philippe to Thiers, 16 April 1840, BNF / NAF / 20611, f. 107.
82. Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, vol. II, pp. 438, 472; Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. V, pp. 341–5; and Barante, *Souvenirs*, vol. VI, p. 464.
83. D'Armagnac, 25 June 1839, AMAE / Correspondance politique / Egypte / 8, ff. 176–7.
84. Thiers to Cochelet, 29 July 1840, BNF / NAF / 20613–14, ff. 179–82; Thiers to Guizot, 21 March 1840, BNF / NAF / 20613–14, ff. 17–19.
85. Metternich to Apponyi, 25 September 1839, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Frankreich / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 316, f. 44.
86. Metternich to Neumann, 15 October 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 231, f. 141.
87. Metternich to Apponyi, 26 September 1839, ibid., f. 51.
88. Thiers to Cochelet, 17 April 1840, BNF / NAF / 20613–14, ff. 59–63.
89. Thiers to Guizot, 17 September 1840, BNF / NAF / 20613–14, ff. 274–6; Thiers to Bresson, 17 September 1840, BNF / NAF / 20613–14, ff. 282–4.
90. Metternich, *Mémoires*, vol. V, p. 494.
91. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 and 8 July 1839, pp. 1497–1501, 1507, respectively.
92. Ibid., 19 January 1840, pp. 147–8.
93. *Stadt Aachener Zeitung*, 4 and 5 August 1840, pp. 2–3, 3, respectively.
94. *Le Siècle*, 25 June 1839, p. 2.
95. *Le Constitutionnel*, 20 December 1832, p. 1.
96. 'Oeuvre organisatrice de Mehémet Ali', *La Phalange*, 15 August 1839, p. 707.

97. *Journal des Débats*, 25 June 1839, p. 1.
98. *Le Constitutionnel*, 27 July 1840, p. 1.
99. *Journal des Débats*, 17 July 1839, p. 1.
100. *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, p. 106.
101. Reproduced in *Le Constitutionnel*, 14 October 1840, p. 1.
102. Princess Lieven to Aberdeen, 29 March 1840, in Ernest Parry (ed.), *The correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven, 1832–1854* (2 vols, London, 1938), vol. I, p. 137.
103. The appeal was passed on and discussed in Cochelet to Thiers, 6 and 14 July 1840, AMAE / Correspondance politique / Egypte / 10, ff. 157–8, 163–6, respectively.
104. Thiers to Cochelet, 29 July 1840, AMAE / Correspondance politique/ Egypte / 10, ff. 210–12.
105. Ibid. and Thiers to Guizot, 5 July 1840, BNF / NAF / 20613–14, ff. 126–8.
106. *Le Siècle*, 7 July 1840, p. 2.
107. *Le National*, 29 July 1840, pp. 2–3.
108. *Journal des Débats*, 4 August 1840, p. 1.
109. Thiers to Cochelet, 29 July 1840, BNF / NAF / 20613–14, ff. 183–5.
110. Herbert Maxwell, *The life and letters of George William Frederick, fourth Earl of Clarendon* (2 vols, London, 1913), vol. I, pp. 193–4.
111. Ibid.
112. The resignation letter is printed in Henry Lytton Bulwer, *The life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston* (3 vols, London, 1870–4), vol. II, pp. 356–61.
113. Maxwell, *Life and letters of Clarendon*, vol. I, p. 195.
114. Holland, *The Holland House diaries*, pp. 418–19.
115. The text of this minute is provided in ibid., pp. 420–1.
116. Palmerston's conviction that Mehemet Ali would be easy to curb is in evidence throughout the consular correspondence, but it is also noted in Bulwer, *The life of Viscount Palmerston*, vol. II, p. 350–2.
117. Holland, *The Holland House diaries*, p. 422.
118. Holland to Palmerston, 17 October 1839, ibid., p. xliii.
119. Ibid., p. 413.
120. Bulwer, *The Life of Viscount Palmerston*, vol. II, p. 322.
121. The source was the Duke of Bedford, Russell's brother: Charles Greville, *A journal of the reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852* (3 vols, London, 1885), vol. I, p. 313.
122. For example Melbourne to Russell, 26 September 1840, Russell to Melbourne, 26 September 1840, Russell to Melbourne, 2 October 1840, and Bedford to Russell, 15 October 1840, TNA / PRO 30/22/3E, respectively ff. 113–14, 127–8, 161, 211–14.

123. Greville, *A journal of the reign of Queen Victoria*, vol. I, p. 331.
124. Maxwell, *Life and letters of Clarendon*, vol. I, p. 184; Sir John Squire (ed.), *The Lieven–Palmerston correspondence, 1828–1856* (London, 1943), p. 188; and Greville, *A journal of the reign of Queen Victoria*, vol. I, pp. 310–15.
125. *Standard*, 13 October 1840, p. 2.
126. *Times*, 12 October 1840, p. 6; *Observer*, 21 September 1840, p. 2.
127. 27 March 1840, *Hansard's parliamentary debates*, Third Series, vol. LIII, cc. 181–92.
128. Ibid., cc. 210–11.
129. *Archives parlementaires: recueil complet des débats législatifs & politiques des Chambres françaises de 1800 à 1860*, Second Series (Paris, 1862), vol. 126, pp. 630–1; *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, pp. 80–1.
130. *Times*, 22 September 1840, p 3.
131. 'Politique extérieure', *La Revue Des Deux Mondes* (August 1840), p. 483.
132. *Standard*, 13 October 1840, p. 3; *Observer*, 18 October 1840, p. 2. Thiers's private files contain a printed copy of the note, proving that this was destined for publication from the outset: BNF / NAF / 20613–14, ff. 290–7.
133. *Morning Chronicle*, 29 August 1840, p. 2; *Morning Post*, 28 August 1840, p. 2.
134. For example *Morning Chronicle*, 15 September 1840, p. 3; *Times*, 15 September 1840, p. 3.
135. *Morning Chronicle*, 15 December 1840, p. 2; *Times*, 15 December 1840, p. 3.
136. *Standard*, 16 October 1840, p. 3; *Morning Chronicle*, 10 November 1840, p. 3, 16 November 1840, p. 4, and 19 November 1840, p. 2; *Times*, 13 November 1840, p. 4; and in France, *Le Constitutionnel*, 13 November 1840, p. 1.
137. Maxwell, *Life and letters of Clarendon*, vol. I, p. 213; Koss, *The rise and fall of the political press*, p. 45.
138. *Globe*, 7 October 1840, p. 2. Acre had long been lost to the Pasha under the treaty terms.
139. *Globe*, 13 October 1840, p. 2.
140. Barante, *Souvenirs*, vol. VI, pp. 623–4.

CHAPTER 3

An Egyptian Bonaparte

The indomitable Mehemet Ali was born in Kavala, Macedonia, of an Albanian trading and soldiering family.[1] From tobacco merchant and soldier of fortune, he had risen, through a combination of luck, guile, and ruthlessness, to become master of Egypt in a meteoric career that would allow Palmerston to snub him as someone who 'having begun life as the waiter at a coffee shop, wishes to end his existence as Commander of the Faithful'.[2]

Sent in 1801 as an officer in the Ottoman army to fight the French, who had invaded Egypt under general Bonaparte, Mehemet Ali had gained control of its Albanian mercenary corps. By 1805, taking advantage of the disorder left in the wake of Napoleon and the continuing strife between Ottoman and native forces, he had become master of Egypt itself, and he had promptly obtained recognition from the Sultan as its governor, or Pasha. The following few years were spent consolidating his position and disposing of internal enemies, especially the Mamluk aristocracy, the country's erstwhile de facto rulers. The Pasha and his eldest son Ibrahim—who had been groomed from early on as a military leader and became the Pasha's main commander—had then launched into a string of conquests, nominally still on the Sultan's behalf, into such neighbouring provinces as the Hejaz (1812) and Nubia (1821). Less successfully, they had been called by their overlord to intervene in the Peloponnese during the Greek national revolt (1825–7), where Ibrahim's initial victories had fallen foul to great-power intervention, though he and his father did receive Crete, or Candia, from the Sultan for their labours. In 1831–3,

P.E. Caquet, *The Orient, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Crisis of 1839–41*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-34102-6_3

finally, the relationship with their Ottoman master having soured, they had invaded and annexed Syria and had subsequently grabbed the south-Anatolian territory of Adana. In Egypt, meanwhile, the Pasha had built a conscript army of a considerable size relative to the population, and he had come to concentrate more authority than had commanded either his ineffectual predecessors in the governorship or the Mamluks.

Conqueror

The Pasha's Egypt attracted increased interest in Europe, in the 1820s and 1830s, as part of the growing attention the public was invited to devote to the Orient generally. It was controversial because it was involved in its protracted struggle with the Sultan. Yet Mehemet Ali also fascinated in his own right. More even than his Oriental mystique, his personal trajectory was marvellously suited to the Romantic age. He tended to be an object of fervent position-taking not just among friendly commentators and visiting travellers, but also among his critics. He was described as the Egyptian regime's unique inventor, and what it stood for was identified with what he stood for. His rags-to-rulership career moreover invited comparison with that other great adventurer of the age: Napoleon. Like Bonaparte, the Pasha had first been a soldier; like Bonaparte, he was a charismatic figure; like Bonaparte, he was identified with a new regime. Though it was also noted elsewhere, the resemblance was likely to resonate most loudly and sympathetically in France.

'Before penetrating into this Egypt, once lying as inanimate as the mummies in its vaults, let us rest our glance on the man who is tearing it from its centuries-old bandages.'[3] In France, it was almost an axiom that the Pasha was a great man, a genius. Guizot, among others, called him so in parliament, and so did *Le Siècle* and *Le Temps*.[4] For the diplomat Adolphe Barrot and the parliamentarian and academician Huerne de Pommeuse he was a 'great man'.[5] His visitors were typically surprised by the contrast between Mehemet Ali's energy and his slight build, as they might have been by the short but forceful French emperor. Auguste Marmont, the former Napoleonic marshal and Duc de Raguse, in his widely quoted and influential travel memoirs, and Marie-Louis de Marcellus, an ex-minister and diplomat, were emphatic about a figure they had met in person. 'Finesse and energy are what is from the outset striking in him. He has a piercing gaze, spiritual and searching, and his figure is very mobile.'[6]

He had a leader's magnetic touch: 'I was welcomed by Mehemet Ali with a degree of trust that touched me', recalled Marcellus.[7] 'One perceives a great internal strength acting through him, and that he is passionate', wrote Marmont.[8] 'His strong will knows no obstacle, overcomes everything, or breaks what it cannot submit.'[9] To strength, the Pasha added a depth that enabled him to see eye-to-eye with European statesmen: 'Indeed time soon brought on long, sustained conversations, of daily occurrence and of the highest interest.'[10] And quite unlike his more sensual Oriental peers, he was tirelessly devoted to his task, businesslike, and hard-working: 'I had seen the pomp of the court of the young pasha of Ptolemaid; here, one found all the simplicity of a chief preoccupied with business more than pleasure.'[11] 'He is up from four in the morning until eleven in the evening', revealed Antoine Clot-Bey, his French surgeon-general.[12]

The Pasha was neither the first nor the last autocrat to cultivate a hard-working image, yet so close to the imperial era these portraits were bound to evoke Napoleon, up to the reputation for doing ten things at a time and never sleeping. 'The man of the West, Napoleon, will electrify through his gaze him who, in turn, will personify the life and glory of the Orient', eulogised *La Revue des Deux Mondes*.[13] If Mehemet Ali was not quite the Bonaparte of Victor Hugo's verses ('Sublime, he appeared to the bedazzled tribes like a Western Mahomet'),[14] he sometimes came close: 'A man whom fortune had chosen to fix its destinies [Egypt's], arose like a tutelary angel to save it from ruin. This man, superior in genius and skilfulness, carried the vision of his future greatness', according to the historian Félix Mengin.[15]

Mehemet Ali most obviously invited comparison with Napoleon as conqueror, though in the Egyptian case the role was filled by a trinity also comprising Ibrahim and Soliman-Pasha, or Colonel Sèves, once a junior officer in the *Grande Armée* and now Ibrahim's second-in-command. 'Surrounded by powerful and active enemies, he is in a position not without analogy with that in which general Bonaparte more than once found himself; and jealous of proving again the nickname he once earned through his victories, he will wage a fearsome and decisive combat on the Ottoman army', wrote *La Presse* before the news of the Nezib victory had even arrived.[16] De Laborde spoke at length, in parliament, of Mehemet Ali's supposed reputation as equal to Napoleon in the Orient and about Napoleon's and Ibrahim's Syrian campaigns.[17]

Indeed, the Pasha's conquests themselves were apt to recall the Napoleonic foray in the Orient of 1798—when the already famous republican general had taken an army to Egypt, seized Alexandria and Cairo, ventured into Syria and up to Acre without taking it, then returned to France to leave his surviving troops in place until they were repatriated in British vessels in 1801. When the celebrated painter Horace Vernet thus departed for the East in 1839, he was rumoured to be planning a canvas of the Battle of Nezib as well as a visit to the French battlefields in Egypt and Syria.[18] Ibrahim's campaigns of 1831–3 only evoked French memories of Napoleon, including his less successful siege of Acre of 1799. 'I added, smiling, that the conquest of Syria seemed today less difficult than when general Bonaparte had attempted it. The Pasha smiled as well. "You have understood me", he said.'[19] During the war of 1831–3, Jean-François Mimaut, the consul in Alexandria, passed the bulletins of the Egyptian army on to the Société de Géographie, which also published a memoir on it writing of Ibrahim's 'exploits' and describing him as a brilliant tactician.[20] Marmont made the same connection: 'After having spoken of the siege of Acre by Napoleon, I shall speak of that made most recently by Ibrahim-Pasha.'[21] And when a book appeared on the campaign by the amateur geographer and historian Edmond de Cadalvène, it proclaimed that 'The spectacle was thus as brilliant as it was unexpected of that Arab army, disciplined along European lines, marching from victory to victory. […] In France, in particular, the fresh glory in which Egypt was basking moved and resonated sympathetically with memories of the Napoleonic campaign.'[22]

The Pasha's martial successes were also liable to impress non-French observers, especially of a military background. Thus the royal navy lieutenant Adolphus Slade, writing in 1839, expressed his admiration for the Pasha in a pamphlet arguing at the same time for awarding Mehemet Ali an independent Egypt under British protection.[23] The army officer Charles Scott, as his travel book to Egypt and Candia shows, was likewise impressed with Mehemet Ali.[24] Prince Hermann von Pueckler-Muskau was an admirer of Napoleon even if, as a Prussian, he had once fought against the French armies. He duly compared, in his travel book, Mehemet Ali to the French emperor, also finding a bitter lesson, after 1841, in their common defeats.[25] He also incidentally described the Pasha's critics as frustrated adventurers and 'imbecile philanthropists, mostly Englishmen'.[26] The prince was, in his domestic politics, a Liberal. His views on Egypt, which were based on multiple interviews with Mehemet Ali, were given an

airing in the British periodical *Athenaeum* from September 1839. Though they were not published in German until 1844, this significantly may be, as the preface hints, because the book was censored.[27]

Another group that was bound to find Mehemet Ali's Napoleonic credentials of interest was the community of the exiled Poles. Mehemet Ali employed Poles in his army as he employed other demobilised imperial soldiers, such as French or Italian, as the Swiss mercenary and pilgrim Johann Fässler found when he came across a Polish *Platzkommandant* in Gaza.[28] But the Polish national leaders themselves, following on the collapse of their revolt against the Tsar in 1831, considered enlisting on the side of Egypt. Prince Adam Czartoryski, the former chief of the Polish supreme council, who now ran a quasi government-in-exile from the Hotel Lambert in Paris, indeed may have masterminded a formal mission to Egypt as early as 1832.[29] Polish thinking, so fresh from the disasters of 1831, appears to have been somewhat confused, and the evidence is that potential partnerships with Egypt and Turkey were pursued in parallel.[30] The somewhat desperate hope seems to have been that a Turkish partition or loss of territory to Russia might give rise to compensation in the form of a restored Poland around Galicia or Warsaw, and more generally that a European war could scarcely make Poland's position worse than it already was, so that the Poles might as well encourage Mehemet Ali to precipitate a conflict that looked like becoming general.[31]

Czartoryski sent his representative to Egypt: Henryk Dembinski, veteran of the army of the Duchy of Warsaw and briefly the Polish commander-in-chief in 1831, just as the first Turco–Egyptian conflict was reaching its climax. Dembinski arrived in Egypt in 1833, in time to follow Ibrahim around the Taurus as an observer. Discussions meanwhile arose, in Alexandria, over the formation of a Polish army corps or the recruitment of as many as 400 Polish officers to be disseminated throughout the Egyptian forces.[32] A number of Polish officers had flocked to Egypt without waiting for the mission's results, however, and Russia had by then reopened its consulate. Mehemet Ali, who was well aware of the provocation the whole project involved, eventually shrank back from the idea.[33] All that resulted from the mission was the publication of an article friendly to Egypt in the Polish exile periodical *Le Polonais*, in which Dembinski described Russia to the Pasha as 'our common enemy'.[34]

Such machinations, and their symbolic value, were nevertheless unlikely to go long unnoticed in the three northern courts. Poland was a touchy subject, as Nesselrode's vehement protests to Paris over the language

of the Polish amendment in the 1840 parliamentary address attested.[35] Intelligence about the Polish mission in planning may or may not have been what the Tsar had in mind when he remarked somewhat cryptically to general Nikolai Muravev, in November 1832,

> This entire war [between Egypt and Turkey] is nothing other than a consequence of the subversive spirit reigning at the moment in Europe and especially in France […]. With the conquest of Tsargrad [Constantinople], we will have right in our backyard a nest of all those homeless individuals, men without a country, who have been banished from all well-ordered societies.[36]

The reverse of the coin of Mehemet Ali's prestige as conqueror was indeed that he was, in Conservative eyes, simply a rebel. The Russian consul warned Mehemet Ali against declaring independence already in 1834: 'Because one could not do so without trampling on the Sultan's rights. If, during the Polish insurrection, a Power had recognised Polish independence, can you doubt that the act would have been considered a declaration of war by Russia?'[37] His successor warned the Pasha again in 1838, emphasising that the Tsar was 'the firmest support of legitimate sovereigns' and 'the declared enemy of all revolt'.[38] Mehemet Ali's characterisation as a rebel meanwhile runs through the correspondence from Vienna and St Petersburg. Metternich similarly advised a new plenipotentiary to Egypt, Anton von Prokesch: 'I hold the principle […] that every raising of his armed fist by the vassal against the Sultan is despicable and that the maintenance of the present dynasty on the throne is a political necessity for Europe.'[39] And the French themselves were warned, in 1839, of the consequences if the Pasha were not curbed: 'We leave the Tuileries cabinet to judge of the impression such a fact would produce on every country's opinion, and of the regrettable consequences that would result for the moral authority of all governments.'[40]

The Paris cabinet was informed that the news of Nezib had been received very coldly at the Russian court: 'The displeasure [at Nezib] the emperor has manifested conforms to the disposition he has always held in Eastern affairs. In his eyes, the pasha is a rebel subject and if he must be protected against his sovereign, and fact made into law, this will be a woeful sacrifice to necessity.'[41] In the *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, the official Russian press organ, the Egyptian victory went almost unreported: 'The armies of Hafiz-Pasha and Ibrahim-Pasha have met near Nisib, in the vicinity of the Euphrates, and after a brisk cannonade the former has pulled back in disorder.'[42] As to reactions in Constantinople, 'News of the defeat

has caused consternation at the Porte [i.e. the Sultan and his court], but the most complete tranquillity reigned in the capital [among the population].'[43] The official Prussian and Austrian newspapers also underplayed the Turkish defeat, Nezib likewise being described as a mere cannonade in the *Beobachter*.[44] The military achievements of Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim were a cause for concern to the courts of the Holy Alliance to the point that they needed to be hushed up or publicly minimised.

'In the great Eastern question, we have for ally Egypt, whose interests are intimately bound with ours, whose power is borrowed from our civilization, whose commerce enriches our southern provinces, and which has audaciously thrown a victorious army on a path first traced by Napoleon's genius', glowed *Le National* as the peace of Kutiah was being agreed.[45] The notion of an Egyptian pasha following in Napoleon's footsteps was understandably attractive in France. Neither were parallels between Mehemet Ali and Bonaparte limited to French observers. The Pasha's military prowess and his spectacular career also gained him admirers elsewhere in Europe. In the Conservative courts, however, this only had negative appeal. Mehemet Ali was unwelcome whether or not his regime had borrowed from French civilisation, or perhaps precisely because it appeared to have emerged as a vehicle for spreading French values.

Reformer

At the 1819 Paris Salon, Horace Vernet, who would become Louis-Philippe's chosen historical painter, exhibited a monumental canvas entitled *Le Massacre des Mamelouks de la Citadelle du Caire* (Fig. 3.1).[46] The painting was based on a sketch by Auguste de Forbin, another diplomat who had recently visited the Pasha. Superficially, the *Massacre* looks like the typical portrayal of the Oriental despot's wanton cruelty, and it is sometimes critiqued as such.[47] Yet Forbin's subdued second-hand account and the explanatory note provided in the Salon catalogue (which does speak of an 'awful catastrophe' where Forbin only writes, 'this disaster') are too matter-of-fact for such an interpretation.[48] Vernet's oeuvre centres not on the massacre but on Mehemet Ali, and the killing scene is half-concealed under clouds of smoke. Absent from it are the gore and dead bodies in the foreground of so many contemporary battle paintings. The Pasha is not shown exulting in the carnage, but in a resolute posture, his fist clenched, gazing fixedly ahead. This is a man doing a difficult duty, the lion crouched under his other arm perhaps both a symbol of inner

Fig. 3.1 *Le Massacre des Mamelouks dans la Citadelle du Caire* by Horace Vernet ('Massacre des mamelouks dans le château du Caire ordonné par Méhémet Ali Pacha, vice roi d'Egypte (1811), 1819', huile sur toile, collection du Musée de Picardie, Amiens (© photo Hugo Maertens / Musée de Picardie), No inv. M.P.2004.17.176)

strength and a regal attribute, reminding the viewer of the ruler's duty to cleanse the realm of troublemakers.

One must indeed consider the particular place the 1811 massacre had taken in contemporary European literature. The event and its Turkish pendant, the destruction of the Janissaries of 1826, were not erected into instances of Oriental barbarity, but on the contrary as modernising necessities, as the final blow to a feudal order whose sweeping away was an essential precondition to the introduction of European civilisation. In France, moreover, this had an all-the-stronger relevance that the Mamluk military caste had been Bonaparte's designated enemy when he had arrived in 1798. Whether in the *Description de l'Egypte*, the 1798 expedition's great opus, or in later literature, the Mamluks only starred as a barbarian horde,

a pillaging mob that formed the main obstacle to the changes the French had come to bring. Joseph Fourier, in his preface, had made the Mamluks' destruction the prelude to Egyptian reconstruction.[49] Mehemet Ali, like Bonaparte, should be praised for restoring order over their severed heads, and the Société de Géographie made just that connection: 'The French occupation had suspended for a while that miserable condition, after which the fellah fell again under the Mamluks' despotism, which Mehemet Ali ended with his conquests and their destruction.'[50] Far from being a wilful killer, the Pasha had brought Egypt 'an emancipation that becomes an entirely new era for the country's existence and prosperity'.[51] Historical accounts of the Expedition were similarly unremitting. Louis Reybaud's history had the French vocation as 'to all, to inspire but hatred and contempt for their oppressors [the Mamluks], and to show how thoroughly they had exploited that land to which nothing tied them'.[52] P.M. Laurent's popular biography of Bonaparte had him more straightforwardly tell the Cairenes, 'I have come to destroy the race of the Mamluks.'[53]

The 1798 expedition, always mostly a prestige project, had indeed from the start been branded as a new civilising departure. Bonaparte had had the original idea of adjoining a contingent of 167 scientists, engineers, and artists to his army. Upon arriving in Cairo, he had founded an Institut d'Egypte comprising 35 of these scientists. This was modelled on the venerable Paris-based Institut, and it was meant to initiate the modernisation of Egypt by scientific methods. By 1801, the year in which the French were evacuated, its achievements remained scanty. But the scientific mission offered a better potential for glossing than the disastrous military enterprise. In French history as in memory, the scientific expedition soon gained precedence over the military. Thiers himself, who had originally risen to prominence as a historian of the Revolution, had written of Bonaparte's designs: 'While temporarily flattering its prejudices, he also worked to seed it with the fruits of science through the foundation of the famous Egyptian Institute.'[54] The Expedition thus became reinvented as a French project to rebuild Egypt. When, back in Paris, the returning scientists produced the *Description*, Fourier prefaced it with a list of its purported goals:

> He had proposed to abolish the Mamluks' tyranny, to extend irrigation and culture, to open a regular channel of communication between the Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf, to found commercial establishments, to offer the Orient the useful example of European industry, in short to

> make the inhabitants' condition softer and to provide them with all the advantages of an advanced civilization. One could not tend to this goal without continual recourse to science and the arts: it is with this design in mind that the august chief of the French expedition resolved to found in Egypt an institution dedicated to the furthering of all useful knowledge.[55]

It is sometimes assumed that France's defence of Mehemet Ali was tied to his employment of French advisers, from doctors to naval engineers and former imperial soldiers, and that these were the proof of backdoor influence. But it must be stressed that the Frenchmen in Egypt were adventurers, not official envoys. They were only one group among others, drawn from a number of European nationalities. Nor were they in positions of control: to key governmental and administrative positions, the Pasha appointed Albanians and Turks, with the exception of Boghos-Bey, his right-hand man, who was an Armenian.[56] The great estates went to Mehemet Ali's family. French officers found themselves among equal numbers of Greeks and Italians,[57] and Soliman Pasha, alias Colonel Sèves, the most successful of them, had had to convert to Islam and he would die in Cairo. The French experts—Sèves, Clot-Bey—did matter, but they mattered as Egyptian propagandists in France, as helping the Pasha be seen as perpetuating a French project.

For as Mehemet Ali took over, in French iconography, Bonaparte's mantle in the Orient, so was Fourier's programme attributed to him. He was a reformer and, as a reformer, he was working from a French blueprint: this became central to his image and his support in France. In parliament, Guizot claimed that 'it is Mehemet Ali who has made Egypt what it currently is, by taking over the impetus we provided', and Pierre-Antoine Berryer: 'Egypt has awakened at the sound of the French voice.'[58] The irony that Mehemet Ali had come to Egypt to oust the French, in 1801, simply went amiss. 'This new era of civilization, so happily stewarded by Mehemet Ali, is the glorious legacy he was bequeathed by our memorable Egyptian expedition', another observer put it.[59] The Pasha's transformational achievements were laid out with statistical precision in works such as Antoine Clot-Bey's *Aperçu*, Edme-François Jomard's *Coup d'œil*, Mengin's *Histoire sommaire de l'Egypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed-Aly*. A rich literature of books, geographical reports, and review articles detailed Mehemet Ali's regeneration of Egypt, as it was labelled, in itemised accounts (with chapter headings such as Budget, Agriculture, Industry, Administration, etc.) that curiously echoed Fourier.

Thus first, the Pasha had brought law and order to his conquests. Just as the elimination of the Mamluks had been the prelude to Egypt's reconstruction, the restoration of order would be the basis for prosperity everywhere. 'Soon the Pharaohs' fatherland ceased to be a bloodied scene, calm succeeded to furious anarchy, and order and security brought confidence back into the hearts.'[60] A traveller's report on Crete mailed to the Société de Géographie described the country as peaceful under the rule of a benevolent governor.[61] Charles-Edouard Guy, a former French consul, held up positive views of the Pasha's invasion of Syria, which he opined would help it acquire 'the same civilization as Egypt'.[62]

Second, this went hand-in-hand with the construction of a new army and navy. Marmont, the old Napoleonic marshal, assessed these in flattering terms in his memoirs, covering the navy and arsenal (which represented 'prodigious results'), as well as the army ('When one sees this artillery, one cannot but admire the power that has turned fellahs into such good soldiers').[63] The Société de Géographie published estimates of Egyptian army numbers in its bulletins, Jomard's *Coup d'œil* bandied around large totals, and so did Clot-Bey in his *Aperçu*.[64]

Third, the Pasha's administration was described as based on, or at least as moving towards European models. Clot-Bey asserted in the *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* that 'Mehemet Ali is the first of Egypt's governors, since the French expedition […] to organise his government more or less along European lines.'[65] Jomard even wrote that Mehemet Ali had taken a first step towards representative institutions: 'While Egypt still lacks the institutions that characterise European civilization, it is nevertheless not devoid of such assemblies to which its subjects' complaints can be introduced, and their rights discussed.'[66]

Fourth, the Pasha was developing an Egyptian infrastructure, in particular by building canals. While it was sometimes recognised that this was done with primitive technology, indeed, canal-building had the advantage of enabling grandiose comparisons with both Bonaparte and the Pharaohs. Of particular note was the Nile–Alexandria canal, or 'Mahmoudieh', over which Marcellus, among others, enthused: 'I never tired of admiring this new Egyptian marvel.'[67] And as yet more dream than reality, a Mediterranean–Red Sea canal was supposedly being planned by Mehemet Ali as it had been by Napoleon: 'We are thus warranted to believe that the reestablishment of this canal is part of Mehemet Ali's grand ideas, as it was of Bonaparte's.'[68]

Fifth, the Egyptian economy was flourishing under the Pasha's rule: 'Agriculture, hydraulic works, the mechanical arts, the first improvements in political economy have strongly boosted trade in Egypt, and multiplied state revenues.'[69] 'Mulberry and olive plantations are being multiplied, a form of cultivation that promises great results', wrote Mimaut.[70] 'Mehemet Ali has imported European manufacturing's most salient results, convinced that this industry, thus created in Egypt from nothing, would react on its elder sister and sooner or later bring about its regeneration', concurred a correspondent of *La Revue des Deux Mondes*.[71]

Sixth and last, the Pasha was fostering science, education, and public health. At Mehemet Ali's instigation, France had for several years (1826–36) hosted an Egyptian student mission, fanned out over various schools and universities under Jomard's direction. The Société de Géographie reported on the students' progress after their return to Egypt.[72] The *Journal Asiatique*, a publication dedicated to Oriental languages and literature, vaunted a new plan for an Egyptian newspaper: 'The gazette will remain as a monument to the Pasha's noble efforts to regenerate the states under his rule.'[73] And La Contemporaine, a fashionable lady and literary gossip, wrote to *La France Littéraire* of the Abou-Zabel hospital in Cairo: 'We hope this establishment, so well conceived, will be a durable monument to Egypt's regeneration, and will perpetuate among the princes who succeed its current government the grand views of its generous founder.'[74]

Mehemet Ali thus became mythologised as the executor of a however vague French project for 'regenerating' Egypt. His reputation as a moderniser also extended beyond French borders. Yet significantly, it appealed to and was more strongly held by, in particular, people of Liberal or radical leanings, people who were partisans of modernisation in the Benthamite mould or admirers of French culture, or both: a public predisposed to approve of France and its actions on the international stage.

The modernising Pasha was notably a figure of attraction among the British philosophical radicals, a section of the coalition maintaining the Whig cabinet in power. When Lord Brougham raised a question in the House of Lords, in 1839, on rumoured hostilities between Egypt and Turkey, he expressed concern that Mehemet Ali's great achievements might be imperilled: 'One reason why he felt the greatest interest in the affairs of Egypt was this […], the great wisdom and great genius for affairs which had been shown by that monarch [Mehemet Ali].'[75] Brougham listed two achievements in particular: public instruction and the suppression of the slave trade. In the Commons, the philosophical reformer Joseph Hume raised several

questions throughout the crisis, each time alluding to Mehemet Ali's merits as a ruler.[76] In March 1840, he was seconded by another radical, Charles Buller, with the words that 'His impression was, that they were going to war against the only civilized Ottoman Prince in the world, and with the man who holds the key of our Indian possessions, to bring him to the condition of a kind of Lord-lieutenant of Ireland to the Sublime Porte.'[77] (It is incidentally noteworthy that both Hume and Buller had an Indian past, yet neither saw a pro-Turkish policy as strategic.)

With admittedly more limited conviction, the Francophile Whigs were likewise prepared to give some weight to Mehemet Ali's reforming merits. Clarendon for example argued to Palmerston shortly before they were to part ways on the Eastern Question:

> As regards the progress of civilisation, too, and the development of the commercial and agricultural resources of the East, I think we have much more to expect from the Pasha than from the Sultan. It is true his government has been bad, that he has pursued a most ill-advised system of monopoly, which, together with the conscription, have kept the people in extreme poverty; still, Egypt has made great strides towards improvement under his reign; the productive powers of the country have been stimulated in a manner unknown in modern times.[78]

Lord Holland, Clarendon's partner in sedition within the cabinet, similarly seems to have been infected by the French vision, his opinion of the Pasha being that 'He is thought to be a fine and spirited fellow.'[79]

The Liberal *Edinburgh Review*, in a series of travel-book reviews published in the 1830s, was another party to comment positively on Egypt's new regime, in one place describing Mehemet Ali as 'the extraordinary person who at present presides over its destinies'.[80] And as late as January 1841, the radical *Westminster Review* argued in favour of friendship with France on the Eastern Question, in part basing its reasoning on Mehemet Ali's reforms and writing that 'while Turkey was exhibiting the most lamentable evidence of decrepitude and decay, Egypt had been rising into strength and importance'.[81] The piece was penned by the political economist, writer, and MP John Bowring, a key radical figure who, having been sent to Egypt on an official, data-gathering mission, found much good to say about the Pasha. Bowring visited Egypt and Syria in 1837–8, and he had indeed been taken in by the charm of its self-made ruler. His official report on Egypt, together with another on Syria, would be published in book form in 1840,

though not before Palmerston had had it edited and toned down, stressing in particular—alongside the positives that were increased revenue, new crops, education, religious toleration, and increased safety for travellers—the Pasha's manufacturing failures, his abusive monopolies, judicial corruption, the brutality of conscription, and the continuation of slavery.[82]

The likewise Liberal-leaning *Hallische Jahrbücher* was prepared to take Mehemet Ali's side in a set of articles on the Eastern Question that appeared in early 1840. After agreeing that the fundamental issue at stake was the transformation of the Orient along European norms, it took, in the last instalment, Mehemet Ali for model. The *Jahrbücher*'s view was that he had better enlisted European help even if this was only 'in spite of the barbarity prevalent in Egyptian government, religion, and customs'.[83] Other travellers to have written positively of Mehemet Ali's regime included the radical Welsh author and journalist James Augustus St John and the Bavarian Theodor von Hallberg-Broich, who though less a Liberal than an eccentric, was a German nationalist and the founder of a model agricultural colony in Hallbergmoos.[84] Hallberg-Broich listed the Pasha's accomplishments in his book, with special emphasis on canal-building and his innovations in agriculture: 'The Viceroy's highest goal is agriculture. […] A state based on trade without agriculture cannot last long.'[85]

Reform, finally, only attracted hostility among Conservative writers, who either saw it as dangerous or found no need for it. 'Mehmed Ali has much that is Napoleonic both in spirit and in style', wrote Metternich. 'That one had also taken the defence of the Porte against the Mamluks. As we do not agree with such phraseology, so the statement has as little value for us as for him against whom it is directed.'[86] Private reports to the northern courts tended to doubt that Mehemet Ali's initiatives constituted any progress. Public pieces, just as they might have written of the French Empire in the time of the Napoleonic wars, only emphasised the evils of conscription and government confiscation.

The Austrian and Russian consuls privately tended to dismiss the Egyptian regime and its performance in the economic, administrative, and military fields. 'Presumption knows no bounds and everyone is struck by the results of his government system, which sees the population diminishing, trade stagnating, agriculture and industry being destroyed, security for person and property failing, and general impoverishment spreading', reported Anton Laurin of Ibrahim's rule in Syria.[87] The Russian representative Pavel Ivanovich Medem thought of Mehemet Ali that 'His vision, narrowly centred on himself, has so far only worked for his private glory,

without regard for his nation's happiness, and without contributing to its future.'[88] His predecessor Antoine Pezzoni produced a bitingly sarcastic picture of the Egyptian regime, after having poked fun in passing at such enraptured French travellers as La Contemporaine:

> In the midst of these vast conceptions, of these reforms of which the vulgar layman cannot conceive the importance, do not think the people's happiness is neglected, the good of trade or the perfecting of administration. First one imprisons without mercy all the government's creditors. […] As for trade, it will become the object of special protection; which is to say the government will take everything. […] Administration will likewise undergo a revolution […]; he will fill it with Turks, which will end up increasing the already inextricable level of waste.[89]

The *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg* reported, in 1839, jointly on Turkish measures for the distribution of wheat and growing disturbances in Egyptian-held Syria. 'Such a state of things provides a striking response to all the praise bestowed on the Pasha for his efforts to pull Syria under his iron sceptre', it wrote.[90] Later it opined that Egypt's finances were challenged and the Alexandria population restive, also gloating that a Nile expedition had failed.[91] A month earlier, the *Österreichischer Beobachter* had found Egypt unruly, the regime unpopular, and its financial situation precarious.[92] Around the same time, the *Preußische Staatszeitung* focused on the poor integration of the Turkish fleet into the Egyptian and the weakness of Mehemet Ali's armaments due to a lack of popularity, men, and leadership.[93] All three newspapers made hay of the Syrian revolt after it broke out in the spring of 1840.

The Pasha's avatars as conqueror, rebel, and reformer were thus all facets of the same identity. They all related to his crypto-French, quasi-Napoleonic figure. For to attempt reform was in itself to trouble the established order, and to espouse French ideas, or to be seen by the French to be espousing their ideas, was to align with the country of *mouvement*, a country that, under the July Monarchy, still incarnated the revolution. This was well understood by the *Hallische Jahrbücher* when it found that Mehemet Ali embodied 'the regeneration of the Orient' as opposed to the 'long-spent precepts of legitimacy'. 'And when someone in old believers' Vienna speaks of Turkish legitimacy, as though there can be no decency that does not bow to it, why should one not also think of French legitimacy [the Restoration-era Bourbons]?' it asked. 'Public opinion will never

forget that, over the territorial disputes in Asia Minor, in Poland, or on the Rhine, the great question that hangs unresolved is one of principle: civic freedom or tutelage?'[94]

'Egypt is the focus point of constitutional governments, which care deeply about civilization's progress; Egypt, fortified by this endorsement, will second their efforts in this noble enterprise', wrote Mengin in the same logic as the German review.[95] 'Be the avowed and committed protectors of this Egyptian kingdom that French civilization has contributed to founding', called *Le Siècle*.[96] Palmerston, meanwhile, understood the Francophile implications of the Pasha's modernising claims, observing wryly,

> I own I attach no weight to all that we hear about the benefits which civilization would derive from an augmentation of dominions by the Pasha. […] And surely the injury which would be done to the great interests of Europe […] would far more than counterbalance the advantage which we should derive from the establishment of écoles primaires and anatomical dissection in Syria and Mesopotamia.[97]

Yet there was more to it than schools of anatomical dissection: there were also Egypt's pyramids.

Pharaoh

'Thus, to return civilization to its ancient cradle, to discharge Europe's debt to Egypt was an honour reserved to France', wrote Jomard, the editor of the monument that was the *Description de l'Egypte*, referring at once to the Expedition's supposed civilising goals and its rediscovery of Egyptian antiquities.[98] Saïd, in his seminal *Orientalism*, argued that the study of the Eastern classics by European scholars was tantamount to a figurative colonisation of its subject cultures, paving the way for the real thing. Scholars, in cataloguing the classical Eastern civilisations, fed stereotypes of an Orient in decline and awaiting reconstruction by Europeans who were also proving that they understood it best. 'The modern Orientalist was, in his view, a hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity, alienation, and strangeness which he himself had properly distinguished.'[99] Saïd also specifically commented on the *Description*, a document recognised by many historians as the key to Egyptology's early development thanks to its rich trove of often reused ancient material, though his exegesis has been criticised, among other things, for being too narrowly focused on Fourier's preface and for paying insufficient attention to the book's many illustrations.[100] From

the contemporary French perspective, in any case, the *Description* and its successor literature fulfilled a particular role: nascent Egyptology helped memorialise the 1798 expedition. If moreover it was the cement that kept the Expedition together in public memory, by extension, since the Pasha was construed as the Expedition's perpetuator, it was also fundamental to French conceptions of Mehemet Ali's Egypt.

Jomard was a former, albeit junior member of the Expedition. He continued to advertise Egypt as correspondent and writer, and through an administrator's position at the Société de Géographie. A curator of the Bibliothèque Royale and a member of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, he also fancied himself as an expert on ancient Egypt. Jomard was indeed making a point, in his mention of civilisation's 'ancient cradle', about Egypt's bygone greatness, and this also he among others felt was a French matter. Alongside Jomard's writings and the *Description*, one must consider Jean-François Champollion's contribution after he had begun deciphering hieroglyphics in 1822. Egyptology played a three-pronged role in informing European nostrums on the 1830s Middle East. First, by memorialising the Expedition, it kept alive the belief that the Pasha's regime was the product of a French civilising mission. Second, by resurrecting ancient Egypt's splendour, it fed inflated notions of the country's prospective achievements under its reforming master. And third, because of Egyptology's debt to Champollion, it continued as a predominantly French science, reinforcing there and everywhere else the postulate that Egypt was intellectually tied to France.

The *Description*, an edited compendium of the scientific expedition's findings and notes published in the ensuing two decades and a more than twenty-volume colossus covering everything from flora and fauna to modern architecture and customs, was the Expedition's trace, its one tangible achievement. A mere glimpse at its frontispiece, though, with its monument-filled landscape framed by emblems of Napoleonic victories, suffices to show how concerned it was with ancient Egypt. Five out of the ten volumes of text were dedicated to antiquities, and six out of its thirteen volumes of plates, and even the volumes labelled 'Etat Moderne' contained constant references to ancient Egypt. If the book was in a general sense construed as having been meant to provide the statistical basis for Napoleon's reconstruction of Egypt, furthermore, the antiquities plates performed this very task on their own. Such practice was not unusual for books on architecture at the time, but in many places the plates showed the same monuments in their ruined state and, in separate illustrations,

restored as new, graphically rendering Egypt's regeneration by French scholars. They included draughtsmen's cross-sectional plans, making it look as if the French had rebuilt, or at least could rebuild, the monuments themselves, and clean bas-reliefs showing ancient Egypt's sciences, arts, and manufactures.

The reach of the *Description*, an expensive book that few people owned or were likely to be able to consult, was extended through reproductions in other books and in popular and scientific journals. Its plates were reproduced, for example, in magazines such as *Magasin Pittoresque* and *Musée des Familles* that were dedicated to the vulgarisation of science and the arts for a broad public.[101] An early, highly popular volume based on the same material as the *Description* had been Dominique Vivant-Denon's *Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte*. Denon had accompanied general Desaix into Upper Egypt in 1798–9, and his illustrated book mixed descriptions of ancient monuments with an account of the military campaign.[102] The same format was carried over in histories published in the 1830s, for example Reybaud's *Histoire scientifique et militaire de l'expédition française en Egypte*.

The July Monarchy, significantly, continued to use the same themes mixing antiquities and regeneration by the invading French in its representational materials. Léon Cogniet's *L'expédition d'Egypte sous les ordres de Bonaparte* (1835; Fig. 3.2), a ceiling fresco for the Louvre's antiquities galleries, mixed references to military planning (Bonaparte in the shade of his tent), scientific work (the men taking notes), future prosperity (the water carrier), and ancient artefacts. Cogniet's painting was reproduced in *Magasin Pittoresque* alongside an article on the Expedition that quoted from Thiers's history of the Revolution.[103] When the Luxor obelisk was erected in Paris, the socle that was specially made bore the inscription, 'Louis- Philippe, king of the French, wishing to transmit to posterity an ancient masterpiece of Egyptian art as well as the distinguished memory of a glory acquired more recently on the banks of the Nile, has arranged for the erection of this obelisk, given to France by Egypt itself.'[104] The obelisk, of course, a gift from Mehemet Ali, was in no evident way connected to the Expedition. Yet the literature and press that budded around the obelisk's arrival in Paris likewise made frequent reference to the Expedition, as in the introductory words to the book by Jean-Baptiste Lebas, the engineer responsible for its retrieval: 'The Egyptian campaign […] provided the means to explore equally successfully, for the benefit of scientific Europe, the remains of the oldest civilised people.'[105]

Fig. 3.2 *L'Expédition d'Egypte sous les Ordres de Bonaparte* by Léon Cogniet (painting at the Musée du Louvre. Image copyright: © Niday Picture Library / Alamy Stock Photo)

Ancient Egypt was meanwhile repeatedly referred to as the birthplace of civilisation, the 'ancient mother of the sciences'.[106] Lebas's book contained a controversy on the relative sophistication of the mechanical arts in ancient Egypt and modern Europe that concluded, 'Is it not more rational to conclude that the mechanical arts are no newly created science?'[107] Such publications lent credibility to the Pasha's reforms by exaggerating the degree of prosperity and advancement of ancient Egypt and therefore its latent modern potential. The popular classic *Egypte ancienne* by Jacques-Joseph Champollion-Figeac, Jean-François Champollion's elder brother,[108] made an emphatic portrait of Egypt's olden wealth and degree of advancement:

> Vast public monuments, architecture's greatest known productions, adorned the capital and Egypt's main cities; all the arts had contributed to embellish them, sculpture, painting, and the use of precious metals, glass, and the richest enamels. Egypt exploited mines and quarries, produced linen, wool, and

> cotton cloth for its inhabitants, and it did not disdain to copy or import the richest fabrics from India.[109]

It followed that reform, beginning with the restoration of order, would let Egypt's civilisation bloom again. 'Such are the signs of an advanced civilization, an equable legislation, a fully-constituted nation, and a wisely policed state', continued Champollion-Figeac.[110] Fourier had written, 'One will not be able to admire Egypt's great works […] one will compare especially the deplorable state in which it has fallen with the opulence which, within a few years, a wiser administration would bring.'[111] And inevitably this found its way into direct parallels between Mehemet Ali's regime and ancient Egypt: 'Egypt will be returned by him to the civilization of which it was the cradle', assured the Duc Decazes.[112] Léon Labat described the Pasha as a 'modern Sesostris' whose providential mission it was to bring back Egypt's ancient greatness.[113]

Incidentally, the tentative signs are that British Egyptology was marked by no such bombast. Admittedly John Gardner Wilkinson, at the time Britain's pre-eminent Egyptologist and the author of several volumes on ancient Egypt, saw fit to publish a pamphlet in favour of the Pasha.[114] But Wilkinson had spent 12 years in Egypt and such position-taking was not surprising in a person who had long been immersed in Alexandria's foreign community and who remained a member of the small international society of Egyptologists. Wilkinson intended to return, and Egyptologists tended to be grateful to the Pasha for access to antiquities. Yet Wilkinson's acclaimed and highly popular *Manners and customs of the ancient Egyptians* differed from the French literature in that, far from forever dwelling on Egypt's monumental grandeur, it dealt mostly with everyday life, containing chapters on husbandmen, brick-making, the entertainments, and common objects such as furniture. The impression, especially combined with Edward William Lane's twin bestseller, *Manners and customs of the modern Egyptians*, was one of an unchanging, traditional Egypt, not that of a glorious civilisation in the process of revival. Such was also the case, moreover, of Giovanni d'Athanasi's *Researches and discoveries under the direction of Henry Salt*—an important work because of Salt's contribution to the British Museum, inclusive among other objects of the statue of the Younger Memnon—which included a chapter on the 'customs and manners of the Arabs'.[115]

Champollion's decipherment of hieroglyphics, in any case, threatened to change everything. Champollion, born in 1790, had been too young to take part in the 1798 invasion. He had studied ancient languages as

a youth and applied his knowledge to what documents he could find in France, among others the Rosetta stone in copy, not original format.[116] When he visited Egypt, in 1828, for the first time, he spoke Arabic and could converse with the natives. For him, Egypt need be mediated neither by memories of the French presence nor the Pasha's publicists.

Neither Champollion nor his achievements were self-evidently children of the Expedition. As long as hieroglyphics remained silent, moreover, Egyptian artefacts could continue to act as symbols (of a glorious past civilisation, of the Expedition). Once the Egyptian characters became readable, these same artefacts became texts, as the archaeologist and academician Jean-Antoine Letronne duly noted: 'Since the discovery of Pharaonic hieroglyphics, these sculptures have acquired a much greater importance. They are no more just works of art; they are now historical sources.'[117] Champollion's Lettre à M. Dacier (1822), setting out the rudiments of his system for the first time, thus promised a historical Egypt, something else than the dumb and legendary destination of the Expedition. Egypt might now be seen for what it was, which even at its height remained a pre iron-age civilisation operating on basic tools. It stood to be revealed not as a land of happiness and plenty, but a society obsessed with death and bent on harnessing, at considerable human cost, theocratic power to grand funerary schemes. As a sample, one of the inscriptions on the Luxor obelisk translated by Champollion-Figeac read, 'I offer you these vases through the hands of your son, the sun guardian of truth, approved by Phré. I offer you all sorts of pure goods.'[118] Almost disquietingly foreign, such texts took the reader into a world well removed from the Liberal canons of rationality and good governance.

But Champollion died of disease in 1832. The materials collected on his one and only mission to Egypt, dated 1828–9, were published posthumously, at state expense, in *Monuments de l'Egypte et de la Nubie* (1835–45). Tantalisingly, if *Monuments de l'Egypte* was intended as a successor to the *Description*, it carried a different message: far from showing yet more monuments, this is a compendium of drawings from bas-reliefs and frescoes illustrating life and funerary practices in ancient Egypt. A collection of around 500 plates with short explanations drawing from the hieroglyphic text, it left more place to the colourful but outlandish Egyptian religion. Its arts and crafts illustrations looked appropriately low-tech. Grandiose stone constructions were nowhere to be seen, and ancient Egyptian life and death were now the focus, gaining in accuracy what had been lost in opulence.

Had Champollion survived or his work gained earlier exposure, it might have challenged the dominant narrative still typified by the *Description*. But his work only came out slowly and nascent Egyptology, which had yet to be even called that, remained, where France was concerned, essentially stuck at the stage of its Napoleonic preamble. Champollion's letter to Mr Dacier was followed two years later by his *Précis du système hiéroglyphique des anciens égyptiens*, which made translation accessible to the specialist, but his complete grammar only appeared in 1841. Controversy, meanwhile, survived as to whether his deciphering of hieroglyphics was valid. Alexandre Lenoir, an administrator of the royal monuments, was thus still able to write in 1834, 'Whatever the merits of this system and of its author, one struggles to recognise the letters of an alphabet.'[119] And Charles Lenormant, a fellow participant of Champollion in the 1828–9 mission, complained as late as 1838, 'I hear every day men who are otherwise quite enlightened ask, shaking their heads, whether it is true that this Mr Champollion has guessed the meaning of hieroglyphics.'[120]

Champollion might also have made a difference to French opinions of Egypt because he saw through Mehemet Ali's Potemkin façades. During his mission, the Egyptologist wrote both a journal and a set of letters: the journal disparaged the Pasha's regime, the letters did not. The letters were published as a feuilleton in the official newspaper *Le Moniteur*, the journal was kept private.[121] Champollion penned the following lines as he prepared to leave:

> As to the father, Mehemet Ali, he is after all an excellent man, entertaining no other aim but to extract as much money as possible from poor Egypt; knowing that the ancients used to represent it as a cow, he milks and exhausts it from dawn to dusk, while waiting finally to rip it open. Such is all the good the noble advice of such pastors as Drovetti and the great Jomard has yielded.[122]

His scepticism could thus have been the grain of sand in the machinery for vaunting the Pasha's reforms as well as memorialising the Expedition. With his death, Jomard, who had never forgiven Champollion for obtaining in his place the curatorship for Egyptian antiquities at the Louvre and had yet to acknowledge his decipherment of hieroglyphics, remained paramount. Jomard was, through his editorship of the *Description*, the Expedition's principal memorialist. Among other roles, as founding member and editor at the Société de Géographie, he was perhaps the Pasha's most active propagandist.

In his absence, indeed, Champollion was only recuperated and recycled into the Expedition's heritage, into the narrative of an Egyptian renaissance seeded by France. It had been his idea for France to acquire one of the Luxor obelisks, yet his brother Champollion-Figeac proposed dedicating it, after it arrived, 'To the army of the Orient, which occupied Egypt and Syria in 1798, 1799, 1800, and 1801.'[123] Champollion's legacy, rather than diluting it, acted to reinforce the myth of the Expedition. Raimond de Verninac began his book on the voyage of the obelisk with, 'After the Egyptian Institute's great and immortal work […] after the learned investigations and astonishing discovery of our Champollion', and he ended it with the words, 'Twice, in thirty years, had France sent to the intellectual conquest of Egypt; it had gathered the great work of the Oriental institute and Champollion's grammar.'[124] It fell to Guizot, as Minister of Public Instruction, to introduce in parliament, in 1833, the law appropriating funds to purchase Champollion's manuscripts, pay his widow a pension, and publish the *Monuments de l'Egypte*: 'Mr Champollion worked for national glory and endowed our erudition with an immortal discovery: it is beautiful that a Frenchman should have rediscovered, have heard again the language of a famous people, and that he should have on his own completed the work of an entire military and scientific expedition.'[125]

Internationally, the Young–Champollion controversy moreover only served to sharpen the nationalistic outlines of nascent Egyptology.[126] When the academician Chrétien-Siméon Le Prévost d'Iray read a poem entitled 'La Pierre de Rosette' at the Institut, in 1838, this combined paean to Bonaparte and jab at the stone's confiscation by the British:

> Called from the night's darkness
> Who discovered you? A Frenchman
> Who brought you to daylight?
> Our arts, our arms, our successes
> The arts, knowledge, industry
> My dear fatherland's honour
> Glorious sons of peace
> Of a man to whom even in fable
> Nothing is comparable [Napoleon]
> You follow the victorious chariot.[127]

Champollion acknowledged Arthur Young's contribution towards deciphering the stone's second script, hieratic, but not his finding that some

hieroglyphs were also phonetically written, specifically for writing foreign names. The somewhat petty dispute continued to plague cross-Channel relations in the field long after the fact. When the decipherer of the hieroglyphs arrived in Egypt, the British team had either mocked or, in the case of Wilkinson, avoided him.[128] Wilkinson later wrote a letter to the periodical *John Bull* ridiculing French difficulties at retrieving the Luxor obelisk, and d'Athanasi likewise disparaged French practices as wasteful in his book.[129] The small but growing community of Egyptologists was, in the 1830s, in the process of becoming more cohesive. In 1836, a group of Europeans in Cairo founded an Egyptian Society involving British, French, Italian, German, and American members, resident or not.[130] Both Wilkinson and Jomard became early participants. Yet Salt's parting words still hung in the desert air, complaining of Champollion's petty-mindedness towards Young even as he acknowledged the value of the Frenchman's find: 'Mons. Champollion fils seems to be unwilling to allow this; but the fact is evident, and surely he has accomplished too much to stand in need of assuming himself the merits of another.'[131]

In another twist, it was Karl Richard Lepsius, a Prussian, who finally laid any lingering scepticism to rest as to the validity of Champollion's grammar. Lepsius, however, would not visit Egypt until 1842. Two points indeed stand out regarding German, which in practice meant Prussian, Egyptology. The first is that it was to a large extent driven by religious motivations. Lepsius was an acquaintance of Christian von Bunsen, an evangelical nobleman who helped him secure the patronage of King Frederick William IV, including an eventual appointment at the Berlin university. But Bunsen's interest was in proving the truth of the Bible; a book on Egypt and universal history which he began writing in 1838 thus aimed 'to enquire whether it tallies with Scripture tradition as to the creation of mankind, and whether it corroborates the chronological systems based upon it'.[132] Ernst Hengstenberg's self-explanatory title *Egypt and the Books of Moses* shared similar aims; it even used information from the *Description* as part of an argument that Moses' transformation of a rod into a snake was real.[133] Another of Lepsius's supporters was the geographer and courtier Alexander von Humboldt. As Humboldt wrote, 'A so deeply learnt and talented man as Lepsius will shed a new, unexpected light on man's spiritual origins from Osortasen to Moses, which will reflect on the Hebrews' own circumstances. This aspect is very favoured by our excellent Monarch.'[134]

The second point is how embedded Prussian Egyptology remained, until Lepsius's 1842 mission, in French circles. When the philologist Julius Klaproth, another enquirer into human origins, published on ancient Egypt, this was in Paris and in French, though the book was based on the antiquities collection of a Swedish diplomat.[135] Lepsius himself owed his early progress to visits in France and Italy. And Joseph Passalacqua, who in the 1820s became Egyptian curator at the Berlin museum, likewise published in French and had first taken his collection to Paris.[136] (The fourth pillar of contemporary Egyptology in Europe, the Italian, split its membership between the other three—its most prominent representative, Ippolito Rosselini, accompanied Champollion on his Egyptian mission and published his own *I monumenti dell'Egitto e della Nubia* in 1832.) The effect was that, outside Britain and up to the Lepsius venture of 1842, Egyptology remained in European acceptance essentially a French science.

Franco–British rivalries born of the confiscation of the Rosetta Stone and the Young–Champollion controversy worked to sharpen jealousies in Paris and London. Among the rest of Europe's educated public, a conception of Egyptology as a French discipline could only play to the impression of a modern Egyptian indebtedness to French ideas. French Egyptological writing meanwhile fed exaggerated views of Egypt's natural potential, encouraging the belief that it was a valuable protectorate that must be defended at all costs.

Most significant, however, was that Egyptology kept a certain memory of the Expedition alive. This was magnified again by Champollion's name and legacy, whose more far-reaching effects were delayed by his untimely death. Egyptology continued to validate the scientific expedition of 1798 as reform blueprint. And because the Pasha stood as a reformer, the perpetuator of a French reconstruction project and a quasi-Bonaparte himself, it buttressed his position as regenerator. The Pasha, through his modernising work, was restoring Egypt to its former glory, and it was France's appointed role to safeguard this work. The American consul George Gliddon, for one, was awake to the diplomatic implications of such logical chains:

> It was accordingly explained by the Prime Minister, Boghos Bey, who stands out, in bold relief, the Master-Mind of all the palliators and excusers of Mohammed Ali, as emanating from an earnest desire, on the part of His Highness, to establish at the Metropolis of Cairo—A NATIONAL MUSEUM OF EGYPTIAN ANTIQUITIES.

> Sublime and felicitous conception! Echoed by the Semaphore de Marseilles, as a new evidence, "que ce sublime Vieillard ne rêve qu'à la prospérité, et à la régénération de l'Egypte"—re-echoed by Societies in Europe, as another proof of the progress of science under the enlightened Mohammed Ali! and, perhaps, considered by Monsieur Thiers as a valid reason for insisting on the extension of the Pasha's dominion as far as *Adana*?[137]

Propagandist

Mehemet Ali remains a controversial figure today. To a number of historians, and in contemporary national consciousness, he continues to be 'the founder of modern Egypt'.[138] Others argue that neither the Pasha's mercantilist economic system nor his governance structures were new, and that they were merely perfected after having been borrowed in the main from the Mamluks.[139] For Khaled Fahmy, Mehemet Ali only forged an Egyptian nation in opposition to his rule, through the trauma of conscription practices that were resisted to the point of self-mutilation and the crucible of endless military service.[140] 'In this manner Muhammad Ali was truly the founder of modern Egypt, an Egypt in which the Egyptians found themselves silenced, exiled, and punished, and robbed of the fruits of their labour, an Egypt to be ruled as he wished by his descendants for a hundred years after his death', writes Fahmy.[141] Webster, who was writing when Stalinism remained fashionable, thought that Mehemet Ali had given Egypt 'better government than it had had for centuries' even though this had consisted of 'a type of state socialism'.[142] Amazingly, the image of Mehemet Ali as an Egyptian Bonaparte has also enjoyed a very long lease of life. It was popular, in particular, among a category of historians sprung from the Francophone communities of Cairo and Alexandria who were also patronised by the early twentieth-century Khedives, possibly as an act of resistance to British colonial rule.[143] It has survived even longer in France, in spite of the considerable academic debunking of the Expedition's history.[144]

Whatever the reality of his reforms, however, or the novelty of his system—and it is not this book's place to express an opinion either way—the Pasha was at least and without doubt skilled at one thing: propaganda. Both protagonists in the Middle Eastern conflict had grasped that European opinion was important and that it needed to be cultivated (a point developed, with regard to the Ottoman Empire, in the next chapter). The Pasha, though, was always several moves ahead in the game. He even

ordered cannon salvos to be sounded and a day of prayers given to honour the accession of the young Abdul Mejid after Sultan Mahmud had died in July 1839, a gesture that was not lost on the editors of the *Beobachter* and the *Preußische Staatszeitung*.[145] He almost won over Champollion, unaware that this was a standard award to important guests, with the presentation of a gold-set sabre.[146] And as Gliddon noted, he used Egyptian antiquities in general to the selective purposes of his publicity, of which the grant of the Luxor obelisk to France was but the most demonstrative instance.[147]

Perhaps most striking was the time Mehemet Ali took to meet with European visitors, some of them quite insignificant. Aside from the personalities already mentioned, the number of travellers to whom the Pasha made the effort to grant audiences runs into the double digits, ranging from the Glasgow solicitor William Rae Wilson to the Bavarian medical doctor Jacob Röser; and this, of course, only counts the visitors who subsequently published an account of their travels. To professor Gotthilf von Schubert he made the gift of a live lion and a type of desert lynx called a caracal.[148] (Sadly the author does not record whether or how he brought back these dangerous beasts to his native town.) With important personages, the Pasha was even more lavish with his time, as attests the carefully cultivated relationship with Pueckler-Muskau. He even went as far as to visit Marmont while he was still in quarantine, in Alexandria, and to keep in epistolary contact with Marcellus after his departure.[149] The Pasha moreover had a special gift for telling people what they wanted to hear.[150] If, with Frenchmen, he was prepared wistfully to recall the Napoleonic campaigns, with the Englishman Edward Hogg he cracked jokes about hats no longer being considered a rarity in Syria followed by 'an arch look, and a hearty English laugh',[151] and with Germans, he was readier to discuss monarchs and railways:

> The Egyptian ruler first spoke in very favourable terms of our king Ludwig of Bavaria. Because he had the contents of the European newspapers regularly communicated to him […] he knew quite well what was happening at home; he knew that we have a railway in Bavaria (which he pictured far larger that it actually was), and that we were working on a canal between the Rhine and Danube.[152]

The Pasha's audiences with foreign visitors may also have served as an informal system for information-gathering. The evidence is nevertheless that he was keenly aware of the role of printed opinion and the importance of the press. Mehemet Ali and his minister Boghos-Bey, for

example, subscribed as members to the Société de Géographie.[153] They had it publish accounts of their expeditions to Nubia and in search of the Nile's source, placing Egypt implicitly among the exploring, not the colonised nations.[154] The Pasha had the favourable report of his reforms that appeared in *La Phalange* translated to him, the French consul reporting on this occasion that he was a zealous newspaper reader and that he hoped to be able to place a few articles himself.[155] And he followed the debates led on his behalf in Europe and made due note of Rémusat's 'newly minted rights' speech in the French parliament.[156]

Mehemet Ali's propaganda resonated differently with its various audiences, meanwhile, with correspondingly broad implications for his diplomatic position. Combined with the parallels with Bonaparte, his self-cultivated modernising image endowed him with a radical sheen. (Incidentally, Mehemet Ali did not voluntarily style himself after Bonaparte, and indeed it would have been folly to do so while he still hoped to court British support. Later in life he had a biography of Napoleon translated into Turkish and printed by his government press, and he gave his birth date as 1769, the same as Napoleon's, though also the same as Wellington's.[157] It is probable that the Pasha only encouraged his advisers and publicists in their portrayals of him as a new Bonaparte, but the parallels with the great adventurer and monarch essentially originated in Europe, not Egypt.) While he remained a much-debated figure everywhere, Mehemet Ali tended to appeal, beyond the French public specifically, to Liberal audiences. This created issues of a related yet distinct nature for policymakers both in Britain and among the two German powers.

The Pasha's modernising reputation indeed created a direct problem, in Britain, for the Whigs and for Palmerston. The cabinet could neither offend radical opinion-leaders nor be seen to be defending barbarity and stagnation against progress. The episode of Palmerston's resignation and the double cabinet crisis of 1840, and the pressure the radicals brought to bear in the Commons and Lords both showed the danger, for the Whig cabinet, of finding itself on the wrong side of enlightened opinion on the Eastern Question. Waghorn, alongside his private lobbying, had mounted a public defence of the Egyptian regime with such pamphlets as 'Egypt as it is in 1837'.[158] The foreign secretary was sufficiently aware of his problem to mark up an internal report on Egypt by his consul Campbell, himself removed in 1839 for being too supportive of Mehemet Ali, with his own objections. On Mehemet Ali's administration in Syria, Palmerston

commented, 'His having chosen to rebel against his sovereign is surely no excuse for his oppressing the people whom he was appointed to protect.' When Campbell suggested that 'persons and property are respected', his chief objected: 'except those of the people whom he governs', and elsewhere, 'it seems the only difficulty he cannot surmount is the difficulty of ruling with justice'. And when the colonel praised the prospects of Nubia under Egyptian rule and its 'usefulness alike for the interests of commerce and of philanthropy', Palmerston added tersely, 'i.e. for war & conquest & plunder & conscription & monopoly'.[159]

Fortunately for the foreign secretary, far from all British portrayals of Mehemet Ali were positive. Edward William Lane's much-read account of modern Egyptian 'manners and customs' only left the impression of a regime mired in tradition.[160] The well-known traveller and physician Richard Madden had authored a hostile work in which he called Mehemet Ali 'the hyena', a simile which the Pasha had presumably not been told of.[161] (Bowring thought earlier on that he had convinced the Pasha to end the practice of slave hunts in Nubia and the payment of Egyptian officers in slaves.[162] In August 1840, Madden would present Mehemet Ali with an address from the Anti-Slavery Convention, congratulating him on this prohibition. But radical opinion had, predictably, been fooled, or only satisfied superficially, as came out later in the same year and in 1841 both in another critical book by Madden and in the edited Bowring report.[163]) Fellow critics included the adventurer and anti-slavery activist Arthur Holroyd in Egypt and Mahomed Ali Pasha in 1837 and the Scottish missionary Maxwell Macbrair, who found that 'Everything smells of war; the curse of Egypt. For this the people are oppressed, the population diminished, and the resources of the country squandered upon foreigners.'[164] Lastly, most of the Pasha's new crop production functioned, for fiscal as much as practical reasons, on the basis of monopolies, and this ran against philosophical radical ideals. Mehemet Ali's reputation as a man of progress, nevertheless, as brandished in parliament or defended by such polemicists as Bowring and Waghorn, was enough to be of considerable nuisance value.

The same situation applied in the German states, though based on a different dynamic. The problem there was France also, but not as partner in a Liberal European policy; the problem was France as potential troublemaker, as agitator among the German and other populations. Of potential help was that, judging from both press coverage and travel writing, German observers seemed less preoccupied with the urgency of reforming

the Orient. The official newspapers, the *Beobachter* and the *Preußische Staatszeitung* ran regular news but these were essentially of an official character, and the same applied to the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, where pieces commenting on or even describing the Egyptian or the Turkish regime, rather than reporting on events, were exceedingly rare. In regional newspapers such as the *Kölnische Zeitung* or the *Stadt Aachener Zeitung*, coverage was unsurprisingly even sparser. The Middle East, an area in which the German community was not expected to project much cultural influence, was simply more remote. German writers were also more prepared to see through innovations and remark on their military ends. 'Reform in the Orient, however, whether in the Turkish empire or in the state that interests us, has chiefly touched on military matters', wrote Gottfried Wilhelm Becker.[165] And for Jacob Röser, 'So far it appears clear, that Mehemet Ali has only aimed to civilise his military arm, and it is not uninteresting to find him on the same path as the Sultan. Both rulers share more similarities in the main direction of their policy than it appears at first glance.'[166] Even when German observers lauded the Pasha's achievements, this moreover sometimes took a surprisingly Conservative twist. The admirer Maximilian Herzog in Bayern, for example, found that 'It is an important feature of his character, that he has not sought to transform the customs and uses of his people, and has left religious prescriptions and institutions untouched, while in Constantinople the introduction of civilization has been too hasty, and for this reason it may not last.'[167] Almost all British travellers, and a number of the French, felt the need to visit the slave markets in Cairo or Constantinople, and to lament the wrenching scenes they witnessed, but when Maximilian Bayern called at the Cairo market, he actually bought Nubian slaves to bring back to Europe as a curiosity.[168]

This relative indifference made it potentially easier for the Prussian and Austrian chancelleries to sell a Conservative policy in the East to the public, or to deflect objections that it was not progressive. Yet it also begged for caution. Indifference risked making for incomprehension, among the wider public, at actions that had the effect of stirring France into hostility. It made it more difficult to justify an intervention, such as the Austrian participation in the Syrian operations allowed by the Convention of London, in an area where it was felt that the French had a natural stake. A German pamphlet asked, 'What can have moved Austria and Prussia and the whole German Bund to commit to the London treaty? […] France was entitled to expect from us, as neighbouring people, if not our cooperation, then at least a certain restraint (neutrality).'[169] The more it was felt in Germany

that France had been needlessly slighted, the more it might be able to appeal for popular support in efforts to rock the Restoration order. The threat was thus that it might successfully stir radical or Liberal opinion, part of which was appropriately attuned to Mehemet Ali's modernising virtues, against the Conservative courts.

The French literature, finally, had its own share of critical works, including Cadalvène's *L'Égypte et la Turquie* and the travel books by Lebas and Verninac which, because they were about the much-publicised acquisition of the Luxor obelisk, may well have reached a wide readership. Some travellers to Palestine also criticised the Pasha's rule in Syria, though these were typically of a clerical, legitimist bent that stood at odds with the July Monarchy's fundamental dogmas.[170] Yet even Cadalvène's book was ambiguous, advocating support for Mehemet Ali as a counterweight to Russian expansion.[171] Even what negative throwaway comments the books by Lebas and Verninac contained were balanced by flattering portrayals of the Pasha himself, and everyone, besides, acknowledged that the fellah remained poor and the tax collectors sometimes exceeded their instructions. The victory of Nezib in 1839 and the defection of the Turkish fleet only vindicated the optimists: 'The facts seemed to confirm everything that had been said or written of his superior abilities.'[172]

The odd yet avant-garde saint-simoniens were in eclipse—their sect, which mixed, after the writings of the late Claude de Saint-Simon, Christianity with a cult of industrialism, having been disbanded and partly jailed in the early 1830s—and they can hardly be portrayed as typical of contemporary opinion. Under their leader Prosper Enfantin, some had gone to Egypt, in particular to join in the Pasha's grand projects, such as dams, and more generally going after a vision of world peace based on Oriental reconstruction; often disappointed, sometimes left destitute, they had also failed to publicise their disillusionment by 1840. One, Michel Chevalier, the editor of the sect's periodical *Le Globe*, had refrained from following Enfantin. Yet Chevalier had published a 'Système de la Méditerranée' advocating the zone's peaceful renewal through a programme of publicly sponsored infrastructure schemes: exactly the sort of policy Mehemet Ali was pursuing.[173] In 1840, Thiers appointed Chevalier, who had become his protégé, to the high-level executive body that was the Conseil d'Etat, and he was appointed chair of political economy at the Collège de France.

One must indeed consider who was making, in France, the Pasha's propaganda. The weight of opinion was on the side of the enthusiasts, not the few sceptics. Not only was the pro-Pasha literature more extensive;

it often followed a scientific-looking chapter format that gave it an air of credibility. Clot-Bey evidently enjoyed significant prestige in France. He published letters and monographs in La France Littéraire and in Société de Géographie bulletins.[174] He was painted by Antoine-Jean Gros, the master of Napoleonic battles, in a portrait that was presented at the 1833 Salon. The press did not hesitate to use his *Aperçu* as their source for Egyptian army numbers. Marmont's authority was itself, on the Egyptian topic, matchless. A former Napoleonic marshal, he had been with Bonaparte in Egypt in 1798–9, adding to prestige the aura of the specialist. His *Voyage* received glowing praise from the influential *Revue des Deux Mondes.*[175] The special diplomatic envoy Walewski, as he arrived in Alexandria and the scales fell from his eyes ('At every step I felt my illusions fall away on the miracle of Egypt's new civilization or the Orient's antique splendours'), would write, with the marshal's book in mind, 'More than anyone else, Marshal Marmont had contributed to fooling Europe.'[176]

Yet nothing could exceed the influence of the Société de Géographie, and regardless of public reach, it was likely to be the best key to official thinking outside the diplomatic correspondence itself. Membership of the Société, founded in 1822, read like a roll-call of the eminent personalities of the July Monarchy, and it may have been the most powerful lobby group outside the court and the parliamentary chambers.[177] Its presidents, whose inaugural speeches were reproduced in the *Journal des Débats*, included in the 1830s three ministers[178] and two dukes amid such celebrities as Emmanuel de Las Cases, Napoleon's St Helena memorialist. Its members' list was packed with parliamentarians, peers, and diplomats, including both successive consuls in Alexandria, Mimaut and Cochelet, and Emile Desages, under-secretary for foreign affairs and the most senior foreign-affairs official continuously in office from 1830 to 1840.[179] It also enjoyed the participation of high-ranking military officers, who appear to have moved seamlessly between intelligence-gathering and exploratory missions for the Société.[180] Such support made the Société an informal instrument of official French policy; what it wrote carried authority and was likely to reflect thinking at the highest echelons of government.

Mehemet Ali's self-promotion was aimed at all publics; it did not solely target a French audience. Reflecting his unique career, however, and crucially the peculiarities of French historical memory and the mythology of the 1798 Napoleonic expedition, it resonated best in France. Nascent Egyptology also helped, adding to impressions that the Pasha was executing a French reconstruction project, and that the inspiration for his regime

was French. By virtue of a modernising reputation fostered by an abundant press, geographical, and travel literature, Mehemet Ali also appealed more widely to many European Liberals and British radicals. Yet the mirror image of this persona was the rebel, the tyrant, the insatiable aggressor, in pictures that were likewise often painted in Bonaparte-like tones. The radical darling was the Conservative bugbear. To be the promoter of a French model, moreover, or to be understood as such, was itself to stake a position on the European political chessboard: it was to side with the revolution and against the Holy Alliance.

Before being a French diplomatic champion, Mehemet Ali's Egypt was thus an ideological champion. Conversely, he was doubly anathema in the northern courts. For Britain and its Whig cabinet, with its radical parliamentary extension and reform tradition, however, it was not enough to demonise the Pasha. Another modernising candidate needed to be found.

Notes

1. This chapter is derived in part from an article published by the author in the *International History Review* (2013) (copyright Taylor & Francis), available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rinh20/35/4.
2. Palmerston to Granville, 23 July 1839, quoted in Middleton, 'Palmerston, Ponsonby and Mehemet Ali', p. 412.
3. Lucien Davésiès, 'Mohammed-Ali-Pacha', *La Revue des Deux Mondes* (September 1835), p. 443.
4. Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. IV, p. 331; *Archives parlementaires*, vol. 126, p. 703; *Le Siècle*, 3 July 1839, p. 1; and *Le Temps*, 28 July 1840, p. 2.
5. Huerne de Pommeuse, 'Discours d'Ouverture', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (December 1839), p. 302; Adolphe to Odilon Barrot, undated, AMAE / Mémoires et documents / Turquie / 46, ff. 404–16.
6. Auguste Marmont, *Voyage du maréchal duc de Raguse en Hongrie, Crimée, Egypte* (4 vols, Paris, 1837), vol. III, pp. 127–8.
7. Marie-Louis de Marcellus, *Souvenirs de l'Orient* (2 vols, Paris, 1839), vol. II, p. 170.
8. Marmont, *Voyage du duc de Raguse*, vol. III, p. 128.
9. Ibid., p. 129.
10. Ibid., p. 127.
11. Marcellus, *Souvenirs de l'Orient*, vol. II, p. 170.
12. Antoine Clot-Bey, 'Notes sur l'Egypte', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (November 1832), p. 266.
13. Davésiès, 'Mohammed-Ali-Pacha', p. 444.

14. Victor Hugo, *Les Orientales* (Paris, 1829), p. 378.
15. Félix Mengin, *Considérations sur l'opportunité de reconnaître l'indépendance de l'Égypte, sous le gouvernement de Mohammed Aly* (Marseille, 1839), pp. 8–9.
16. *La Presse*, 9 July 1839, pp. 1–2.
17. *Archives parlementaires*, vol. 126, pp. 703–5.
18. 'Procès verbaux des séances', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (October 1839), p. 223.
19. Marcellus, *Souvenirs de l'Orient*, vol. II, pp. 253–4.
20. 'Procès verbaux des séances', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (January 1832), p. 34; H. Vidal, 'Mémoire sur l'expédition égyptienne contre Saint-Jean d'Acre et la Syrie', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (July 1836), pp. 10–18.
21. Marmont, *Voyage du duc de Raguse*, vol. III, p. 104.
22. Edmond de Cadalvène, *Histoire de la guerre de Méhémed-Ali contre la Porte ottomane en Syrie et en Asie Mineure, 1831–1833* (Paris, 1837), p. 2.
23. Adolphus Slade, 'The Sultan and Mehemet Ali' (London, 1839).
24. Charles Rochfort Scott, *Rambles in Egypt and Candia* (London, 1837), pp. 175–85.
25. Hermann Von Pueckler-Muskau, *Egypt under Mehemet Ali* (2 vols, London, 1845), vol. I, pp. xiii–xviii.
26. Ibid., pp. 19–20.
27. Ibid., pp. v–viii.
28. Johann Georg Fässler, *Militär-Schicksale und Reise nach Griechenland, Aegypten und dem gelobten Lande* (Bern, 1840), p. 143.
29. Adam Georges Benis, *Une mission polonaise en Egypte* (2 vols, Cairo, 1938), vol. I, pp. xxvi–xxx, 4. The thick correspondence in the two volumes of this book attests to how seriously the plan was taken.
30. See Bem to Czartoryski, 4 February 1833 and Czartoryski to Plater, 8 February 1833, ibid., vol. I, respectively pp. 34–5 and 36–8.
31. Chrzanowski to Czartoryski, 1 September 1832, ibid., vol. I, p. 4; Marceli Handelsman, *Czartoryski, Nicolas I et la question to Proche Orient* (Paris, 1934), p. 28.
32. Henryk Dembinski, 'Quelques mois en Egypte et en Syrie au service de Méhémet Ali', *Le Polonais* (1834), pp. 91–7.
33. Benis, *Une mission polonaise en Egypte*, vol. I, pp. xxxvi–vii.
34. Dembinski, 'Quelques mois en Egypte et en Syrie', p. 92.
35. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 31 January 1840, in Karl Robert, Graf von Nesselrode, *Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode, 1760–1850* (11 vols, Paris, 1904), vol. VIII, p. 8. See also Barante, *Souvenirs*, vol. VI, p. 385.
36. Quoted in Lincoln, *Nicholas I*, p. 203.

37. Duhamel to Nesselrode, 26 August 1834, in Cattaui, *Mohamed Aly d'après les archives russes*, vol. II, p. 152.
38. Medem to Nesselrode, 17 May 1838, in ibid., vol. III, p. 103.
39. Metternich to Prokesch, 10 February 1833, in Anton von Prokesch-Osten, *Mehmed-Ali, Vize-König von Aegypten: aus meinem Tagebuche 1826–1841* (Vienna, 1877), p. 37.
40. Nesselrode to Medem, 16 August 1839, in Ignace de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane avec les puissances étrangères* (11 vols, Paris, 1864–1911), vol. II, p. 476.
41. Barante to Soult, 27 July 1839, in Barante, *Souvenirs*, vol. VI, p. 273.
42. *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, 1 August 1839, p. 35.
43. Ibid., 3 August 1839, p. 40.
44. *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 19 July 1839, p. 991; *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung*, 25, 28, and 31 July, pp. 855, 867, and 870 respectively. The Prussian newspaper omitted mentioning the role of Helmuth von Moltke as strategic adviser on the Turkish side.
45. *Le National*, 30 April 1833, p. 1.
46. Vernet would become the July Monarchy's great battle painter, in particular of Napoleonic battles. On the popularity of Vernet, see Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, p. 278.
47. For example in Sarga Moussa, 'Méhémet-Ali au miroir des voyageurs français en Egypte', *Romantisme* (2003), pp. 15–25, at p. 19.
48. Auguste de Forbin, *Voyage dans le Levant 1817–1818* (Paris, 1819), pp. 230–1; *Explication des ouvrages de peinture, sculpture, architecture et gravure des artistes vivants exposés au musée royal le 25 Août 1819* (Paris, 1819), p. 126.
49. Joseph Fourier, 'Préface historique', in Edme-François Jomard (ed.), *Description de l'Egypte* (23 vols, Paris, 1809–28), vol. X, pp. iv–v.
50. Huerne de Pommeuse, 'Discours d'Ouverture', p. 302.
51. Ibid.
52. Louis Reybaud (ed.), *Histoire scientifique et militaire de l'expédition française en Egypte* (10 vols, Paris, 1830–6), vol. I, pp. 148–9.
53. P.M. Laurent, *Histoire de l'empereur Napoléon* (Bruxelles, 1839), p. 128.
54. Adolphe Thiers, *Histoire de la Révolution Française* (10 vols, Paris, 1823–7), vol. VIII, p. 244.
55. Fourier, 'Préface historique', pp. v–vi.
56. Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 78–9.
57. Samir Saul and Jacques Thobie, 'Les militaires français en Egypte de 1820 à 1860', in Daniel Panzac and André Raymond (eds), *La France et l'Egypte à l'époque des vice-rois 1805–1882* (Cairo, 2002), p. 174.
58. Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. IV, p. 331; *Archives parlementaires*, vol. 126, p. 718.

59. Léon Labat, *L'Egypte ancienne et moderne* (Paris, 1840), p. 7.
60. Mengin, *Considérations*, p. 9.
61. A. Fabreguettes, 'Journal d'une tournée faite dans l'intérieur de l'ile de Crète', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (February 1835), pp. 108–27.
62. 'Documents, Communications, Nouvelles Géographiques', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (January 1832), p. 56.
63. Marmont, *Voyage du duc de Raguse*, vol. III, pp. 172 and 286.
64. 'Procès verbaux des séances', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (May 1840), p. 319; Jomard, *Coup d'œil*, pp. 27–33. Clot-Bey's estimates were reproduced in the French press after 15 July 1840: *La Presse*, 27 July 1840, p. 3; *Le National*, 28 July 1840, p. 3; *Le Siècle*, 28 July 1840, p. 3; and *Le Temps*, 29 July 1840, p. 2.
65. 'Documents, Communications, Nouvelles Géographiques', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (November 1832), p. 270.
66. Jomard, *Coup d'œil*, p. 22.
67. Marcellus, *Souvenirs de l'Orient*, vol. II, p. 181.
68. Huerne de Pommeuse, 'Discours d'Ouverture', p. 300.
69. Jules Planat, *Histoire de la régénération de l'Egypte* (Paris, 1830), p. 12.
70. Jean-François Mimaut, 'Progrès de la civilisation en Egypte', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (August 1831), p. 83.
71. Auguste Colin, 'Lettres sur l'Egypte: l'industrie manufacturière', *La Revue des Deux Mondes* (May 1838), p. 517.
72. 'Extrait d'une lettre de M. Artin Effendi', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (May 1835), pp. 354–6.
73. Joseph Reinaud, 'De la gazette arabe et turque imprimée en Egypte', *Journal Asiatique* (September 1831), p. 249.
74. La Contemporaine, 'L'hôpital d'Abou-Zabel', *La France Littéraire* (1832), vol. II, p. 553.
75. 12 March 1839, *Hansard's parliamentary debates*, Third Series, vol. XLVI, cc. 325–6.
76. For example 27 March 1840, ibid., Third Series, vol. LIII, cc. 183–4; 1 June 1840, ibid., Third Series, vol. LIV, cc. 781–4; and 26 January 1841, ibid., Third Series, vol. LVI, cc. 83– 94.
77. Ibid., Third Series, vol. LIII, cc. 198 and 205.
78. Clarendon to Palmerston, 14 March 1840, in Maxwell, *Life and letters of Clarendon*, vol. I, pp. 190–1.
79. Holland, *The Holland House diaries*, p. 413.
80. 'Egypt and Mohammed Ali', *Edinburgh Review* (July 1834), p. 404. See also 'Modern Egypt and the modern Egyptians' (April 1837), pp. 146–73.
81. 'Egypt and Syria', *Westminster Review* (January 1841), p. 217.
82. John Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia* (London, 1840), especially pp. 15, 29, 62, and 83–103. The Bowring report on Egypt and Candia is at

TNA / FO 78/381 and Bowring's correspondence from Egypt at FO 78/345, ff. 128–39. See also G.F. Bartle, 'Bowring and the Near Eastern Crisis of 1838–1840', *English Historical Review*, 79 (1964), pp. 761–74.

83. 'Die orientalische Frage', *Hallische Jahrbücher*, 11 and 12 February 1840, pp. 280–7 and 289–94.
84. James Augustus St John, *Egypt and Mohammed Ali, or, Travels in the Valley of the Nile* (2 vols, London, 1834), vol. I, pp. 50–7.
85. Theodor von Hallberg-Broich, *Reise nach dem Orient* (4 vols, Stuttgart, 1839), vol. III, p. 38.
86. Metternich to Prokesch, 6 May 1833, in Anton von Prokesch-Osten, *Aus dem nachlasse des Grafen Prokesch-Osten: Briefwechsel mit Herrn von Gentz und Fürsten Metternich* (2 vols, Vienna, 1881), vol. II, p. 139.
87. Laurin, 6 September 1839, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Ägypten / 1, ff. 355–6.
88. Medem to Nesselrode, 25 December 1838, in Cattaui, *Mohamed Aly d'après les archives russes*, vol. III, p. 256.
89. Pezzoni to Nesselrode, 20 July 1829, in ibid., vol. I, pp. 351–3.
90. *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, 28 November 1839, p. 238.
91. Ibid., 7 and 21 March 1840, pp. 404 and 428.
92. *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 20 February 1840, p. 257.
93. *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung*, 26 February 1840, p. 227.
94. *Hallische Jahrbücher*, 11 September 1840, pp. 1746–7.
95. Mengin, *Considérations*, p. 28.
96. *Le Siècle*, 3 July 1839, p. 1.
97. Palmerston to Granville, 29 January 1833, TNA / PRO 30/29/415.
98. Edme-François Jomard, 'Tableau de l'état des sciences et des arts dans l'Egypte ancienne', *La France Littéraire* (1832), vol. IV, p. 42.
99. Edward Saïd, *Orientalism* (5th edn, London, 2003), p. 121.
100. On the *Description*, Donald Malcom Reid, *Whose pharaohs?* (Berkeley, 2002), pp. 27–34. On Saïd's use of the *Description*, see Reid, *Whose pharaohs?*, p. 13 and John MacKenzie, *Orientalism: history, theory, and the arts*, pp. xii–xxii and 11–15.
101. Gerbran, 'La statue de Memnon', *Musée des Familles* (March 1834), p. 102; 'Obélisques de Louqsor', *Magasin Pittoresque* (1833), pp. 393–5.
102. It was Desaix's advance that had opened Upper Egypt to European travellers, for whom the Mamluks had hitherto made the region too dangerous. The book, first published in 1802, was highly successful and it was often reprinted.
103. 'Expédition de Bonaparte en Egypte', *Magasin Pittoresque* (1836), pp. 353–4.
104. On the east side of the obelisk's socle, Place de la Concorde, in Latin.
105. Jean-Baptiste Apollinaire Lebas, *L'obélisque de Luxor* (Paris, 1839), p. 1.

106. For example A. Sakakini, 'Enseignement de la géographie en Egypte', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (May 1835), p. 355.
107. Lebas, *L'obélisque de Luxor*, p. 191.
108. Champollion-Figeac was a French archaeology scholar and curator at the Bibliothèque Royale, but only a writer of vulgarisations when it came to Egypt.
109. Jacques-Joseph Champollion-Figeac, *Egypte ancienne* (Paris, 1839), p. 3.
110. Ibid., p. 3.
111. Fourier, 'Préface historique', p. xci.
112. Elie, Duc Decazes, 'Discours d'ouverture', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (December 1833), p. 326.
113. Labat, *L'Egypte ancienne et moderne*, pp. 5–7.
114. John Gardner Wilkinson, 'Three letters on the policy of England towards the Porte and Mohammed Ali' (London, 1840).
115. Giovanni d'Athanasi, *Researches and discoveries in upper Egypt made under the direction of Henry Salt* (London, 1836), pp. 130–48.
116. It was in Britain, having been taken from the French in 1801.
117. Jean-Antoine Letronne, 'Topography of Thebes', *Journal des Savants* (May 1836), p. 272.
118. Jacques-Joseph Champollion-Figeac, *L'obélisque de Louqsor transporté a Paris: notice historique* (Paris, 1833), p. 89.
119. Thereby also showing he did not understand that, as Champollion had proved, hieroglyphs do not solely form an alphabet. Alexandre Lenoir, *De l'obélisque de Louqsor* (Paris, 1834), p. 11.
120. Charles Lenormant, 'Le cercueil de Mycérinus', *Journal des Débats* (16 December 1838), p. 1.
121. The reason was no doubt that Champollion hoped to keep the Pasha forthcoming with antiquities, foremost among them the Luxor obelisk.
122. Note how the Egyptological metaphor is turned on its head to the detriment of Mehemet Ali. Jean-François Champollion, *Lettres et journaux écrits pendant le voyage d'Egypte* (Paris, 1986), p. 465.
123. Champollion-Figeac, *L'obélisque de Louqsor*, p. x.
124. Raimond de Verninac Saint-Maur, *Voyage du Luxor en Egypte* (Paris, 1835), pp. 3–4. Verninac was the captain of the ship that brought back the obelisk.
125. Champollion, *Monuments de l'Egypte et de la Nubie*, vol. I, front page.
126. For early Egyptology's rivalries, in particular national, see Reid, *Whose pharaohs?*, pp. 37–44.
127. Chrétien-Siméon Le Prévost d'Iray, *La Pierre de Rosette, ou succès et revers de l'expédition d'Égypte, ode dédiée à la France toujours glorieuse, quand même!* (Paris, 1838), p. 2.
128. Jason Thompson, *Sir Gardner Wilkinson and his circle* (Austin, 1992), pp. 123–6.

129. Ibid., p. 126; d'Athanasi, *Researches and discoveries*, pp. xv–xvi.
130. The society's objects were not restricted to Egyptology, but it had a strong Egyptological slant. It counted 20 members in 1839: Reid, *Whose pharaohs?*, p. 49.
131. Henry Salt, *Essay on Dr Young's and M. Champollion's phonetic system of hieroglyphics* (London, 1825), p. 1.
132. Christian Karl von Bunsen, *Egypt's place in universal history* (5 vols, London, 1867), vol. I, p. xxix.
133. Ernst Hengstenberg, *Egypt and the Books of Moses* (Edinburgh, 1845), pp. 96–106. First published in German in 1841.
134. Humboldt to Bunsen, 18 September 1839, in Alexander von Humboldt, *Briefe von Alexander von Humboldt an Christian Carl Josias Freiherr von Bunsen* (Leipzig, 1869), p. 34.
135. Julius Klaproth (ed.), *Collection d'antiquités égyptiennes* (Paris, 1829).
136. Joseph Passalacqua, *Catalogue raisonné et historique des antiquités découvertes en Égypte* (Paris, 1826), pp. ix–xii.
137. George Gliddon, *An appeal to the antiquaries of Europe* (London, 1841), pp. 127–8.
138. Marsot, *Egypt in the reign of Muhammad Ali*, pp. 258–64; Ufford, *The pasha*, pp. 1 and 15–18; and Henry Dodwell, *The founder of modern Egypt* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 192–241.
139. Amira El Azhary Sonbol, *The new Mamluks: Egyptian society and modern feudalism* (Syracuse, NY, 2000), pp. 32–55.
140. Khaled Fahmy, *All the pasha's men* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 306–18.
141. Fahmy, 'The era of Muhammad Ali Pasha', p. 179.
142. Webster, *The foreign policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 275.
143. Sabry, *L'empire égyptien sous Mohamed Ali*, p. 21; Cattaui, *Mohamed-Aly et l'Europe*, pp. 3–9; and Driault, *L'Egypte et l'Europe*, pp. xi–xiv.
144. For example in works such as Caroline Gaultier-Kurhan, *Mehemet Ali et la France, 1805–1849: histoire singulière du Napoléon de l'Orient* (Paris, 2005). For the Expedition's historiography or for modern works placing it in a more critical perspective, see Patrice Bret (ed.), *L'expédition d'Egypte, une entreprise des lumières, 1798–1801* (Paris, 1999), pp. 81–101; Henri Laurens, *Orientales* (3 vols, Paris, 2004), vol. I, pp. 117–27; or Marie-Noelle Bourguet (ed.), *L'invention scientifique de la Méditerranée: Egypte, Morée, Algérie* (Paris, 1998), pp. 99–116 and 119–38.
145. *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 5 August 1839, p. 1077; *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung*, 11 August 1839, p. 923.
146. Champollion, *Lettres et journaux*, p. 465. Marcellus received the same gift from the Pasha: Marcellus, *Souvenirs de l'Orient*, vol. II, p. 255.
147. Gliddon, *An appeal to the antiquaries of Europe*, pp. 125–7.
148. Gotthilf von Schubert, *Reise in das Morgenland in den Jahren 1836 und 1837* (2 vols, Erlangen, 1838), vol. II, p. 105.

149. Marmont, *Voyage du duc de Raguse*, vol. III, p. 126 ; Marcellus, *Souvenirs de l'Orient*, vol. II, p. 255.
150. For further illustrations of the Pasha's use of visiting foreigners for propaganda purposes, see Fahmy, *All the pasha's men*, pp. 1–8.
151. Edward Hogg, *Visit to Alexandria, Damascus, and Jerusalem* (2 vols, London, 1835), vol. I, p. 128.
152. Schubert, *Reise in das Morgenland*, vol. II, p. 106.
153. *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (March 1833), p. 181; *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (April 1834), p. 273.
154. 'Itinéraire du Voyage de Mohammed-Aly à Fasangoro', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (November 1839), pp. 253–7; 'Traduction de la lettre de Selim, capitaine, chef de l'exploration du fleuve Blanc', *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (July 1840), pp. 54–7.
155. Cochelet letter to Soult dated 14 September 1839, AMAE / Correspondance politique / Egypte / 9, ff. 16–19.
156. Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, vol. II, p. 287.
157. Fahmy, *All the pasha's men*, p. 79.
158. Thomas Fletcher Waghorn, 'Egypt as it is in 1837' (London, 1837).
159. Patrick Campbell, 'Report on Egypt', TNA / FO 78/408A, ff. 6–115 and for marginal comments by Palmerston ff. 7, 10, and 21. See also Frederick Stanley Rodkey, 'Colonel Campbell's report on Egypt 1840', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 3 (1929), pp. 102–14.
160. Edward William Lane, *An account of the manners and customs of the modern Egyptians* (2 vols, London, 1836), vol. I, pp. 129–60 and vol. II, pp. 350–3.
161. Richard Robert Madden, *Travels in Turkey, Egypt, Nubia, and Palestine* (2 vols, London, 1829), p. 249.
162. John Bowring, *Autobiographical recollections* (London, 1877), pp. 177–8. See also TNA / PRO 30/29/16/9.
163. Bowring, *Report on Egypt and Candia*, pp. 83–103; Richard Robert Madden, *Egypt and Mohammed Ali: illustrative of the condition of his slaves and subjects* (London, 1841), pp. 110–75. For the continuation of state-sponsored slave raiding and trading under new structures in Egypt and the Sudan, see Jay Spaulding, 'Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class in the Northern Turkish Sudan', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 15 (1982), pp. 1–20.
164. Arthur Holroyd, *Egypt and Mahomed Ali Pasha in 1837* (London, 1838); Maxwell Macbrair, *Sketches of a missionary's Travels in Egypt, Syria, western Africa* (London, 1839), pp. 72–3.
165. Gottfried Wilhelm Becker, *Neueste Geschichte Egyptens und seiner Wiedergeburt* (Dresden, 1830), p. 4.
166. Jacob Röser, *Tagebuch meiner Reise nach Griechenland, in die Türkei, nach Aegypten und Syrien* (2 vols, Mergentheim, 1836), vol. II, pp. 294–5.

167. Maximilian Herzog in Bayern, *Wanderung nach dem Orient im Jahre 1838* (Munich, 1839), p. 88.
168. Ibid., pp. 87–8.
169. Johann Rauschenplat, 'Briefe über Frankreich und Deutschland' (Strasbourg, 1840), p. 3.
170. For example Baptistin Poujoulat, *Voyage dans l'Asie Mineure en Mésopotamie, à Palmyre, en Syrie, en Palestine et en Égypte* (2 vols, Paris, 1840).
171. Ed. de Cadalvène and J. de Breuvery, *L'Égypte et la Turquie, de 1829 à 1836: atlas* (Paris, 1836), pp. vii–lxviii. Cadalvène, however, appears to have been a disappointed adventurer. He attempted to broker a loan to Egypt, without success, in 1833: Sabry, *L'empire égyptien sous Mohamed Ali*, pp. 311–13. He later found employment in Constantinople and was decorated by the Sultan in 1839: *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 29 October 1839, p. 1495.
172. Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, vol. II, p. 281.
173. Michel Chevalier, 'Le système de la Méditerranée', in Pierre Musso (ed.), *Le Saint-Simonisme, l'Europe et la Méditerranée* (Paris, 2008), pp. 111–33.
174. For example Clot-Bey, 'Lettre du Docteur Clot-Bey', *La France Littéraire* (1832), vol. III, pp. 601–12.
175. Lerminier, 'Voyage du Duc de Raguse', *La Revue des Deux Mondes* (September 1837), pp. 729–61.
176. Walewski mission journal, 12 August 1840, AMAE / FP / Alexandre Walewski / 4, ff. 150 and 175.
177. An unfortunately unpublished study of the Société's colonial and foreign policy lobbying role is provided in Maxine Powell Taylor, 'Prologue to Imperialism: Scientific Expeditions during the July Monarchy' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1980).
178. Guizot, Narcisse-Achille de Salvandy, and Hippolyte-François Jaubert.
179. Membership and presidents' lists were provided in the bulletins, especially each year's December bulletins.
180. One example was captain Camille Callier, a secretary of the Société in the 1830s who, as Soult's aide-de-camp, went on an embassy to stop Ibrahim's advance into Anatolia in 1839. Callier's correspondence on this mission is at AMAE / Correspondance politique / Egypte / 8, ff. 331–6. For Callier's delivery of maps to the Société on his return, see *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (December 1840), p. 360.

CHAPTER 4

The Age of Turkish Improvement

On 3 November 1839 at ten in the morning, the members of the diplomatic corps were invited to attend a ceremony at the kiosk, or pavilion, of Gulhané, in one of the courtyards of the Sultan's palace in Constantinople. From the pavilion's first floor, reserved to the ambassadors, the dignitaries could look into a broad courtyard and, beyond the palace wall, over the sea of Marmara. The courtyard itself was filled with a throng of officials including the chiefs of the corporations, the dervish sheikhs, the three Christian patriarchs, and the great rabbi. Around a pulpit standing under a gold awning were also massed the *ulemas* and heads of the civil and military orders, the vizier, the grand mufti, the ministers, and army generals. The Sultan Abdul Mejid proceeded to walk up, in a festively attired procession and to the sound of military music, to the pavilion's upper floor. At 11 o'clock, the court chancellor or *mushir* issued from the kiosk and handed a ceremonial book bound in red to the grand vizier, who passed it on, after the performance of traditional gestures of respect, to the Reis Effendi or foreign minister Mustapha Reshid Pasha. Reshid ascended to the pulpit and waited another five minutes, until the court astrologer signalled that the time had come. 'All the world knows that in the first times of the Ottoman monarchy the precepts of the Koran, and the laws of the empire, were a rule ever honoured, in consequence of which the empire increased in force and grandeur, and all its subjects, without exception, acquired a greater degree of ease and prosperity', he read. Reshid proceeded to enunciate what would become known as the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané: a raft of measures promising among other things security of person and property

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to the Sultan's subjects. The Sultan was acclaimed by all, the dignitaries bowing to him. The call to prayer echoed from the minarets of the Hagia Sophia, and a 120-shot cannonade boomed from the palace batteries. A translation of the new edict, finally, was distributed to the ambassadorial corps. Several times in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire would launch grand reform initiatives, often with the encouragement or expected approval of European powers: on that day, from the palatial pavilion of Gulhané, the era of the *tanzimat* had been launched.[1]

Sons of Othman

Mahmud II, Abdul Mejid's predecessor, had made some attempts at change, notably in 1826 when he had crushed the Janissaries, a caste of former slave-soldiers that, like the Mamluks in Egypt, had become its own bastion within the state. There had followed army reforms, the development of better roads and a postal system, administrative appointments aimed at curtailing the regional power of *ulemas* and pashas, and notably the opening or reopening of foreign embassies.[2] As the 1830s began and with them the struggle over Syria, however, none of this was of a nature to impress sufficiently in comparison with Mehemet Ali's modernising reputation.

The problem was that in prevailing European wisdom, the Ottoman Empire was unwell. Turkey was considered, in a time-honoured tradition characteristic of political and travel commentary alike, to be in terminal decline. This both invited European covetousness over its less solidly held territories and made it difficult to recruit allies in struggles such as that with the Pasha of Egypt. The free-trade polemicist Richard Cobden, for example, found that 'on the ocean, as upon land, this fierce people [the Turks] have always been the scourge of humanity, and a barrier to the progress of commerce and civilization'.[3] Travellers to the East were likewise the source of a rich seam of writing of the head-shaking, pessimistic type that reached, through Thornton and Volney, a century back or longer. Marmont, just arrived in Constantinople, was already observing,

> One could barely tell it was the capital of a dying empire, with no more than a municipal existence. I disembarked in a suburb, where I saw, without entering it, Ayoub's mosque. This is where the Sultan girds the sabre of Othman when he ascends the throne: a vain ceremony, which only recalls the power and energy of their common ancestor to underline the weakness of his descendants.[4]

Neither did it help that the Ottomans had lost effective control, in the last decades, of Algiers, Greece, and the Romanian principalities, though it is worth noting that at least some historians deny that the Turkish Empire was anything but improving in wealth and stability, finding in European commentary and diplomatic encroachment a circular argument.[5]

Not all the literature on Turkey was negative, and Sultan Mahmud was also a source of friendlier pontificating on Turkish regeneration. Indeed, the Turkish rulers, without scaling the propaganda heights of which Mehemet Ali was capable, were not naively passive at the game, and they had recognised the power of European opinion. The expansion of the consular service in Europe, beyond the immediate needs of diplomacy, evinced a desire to be seen to communicate along European norms. The Sultan had also launched a newspaper, the *Moniteur Ottoman*, under the editorship of the Frenchman Alexandre Blacque, designed to publicise his reforms and disseminate favourable views on them. The *Moniteur* in turn published reviews of positive works on Turkey originating in Europe.[6] Abdul Mejid, meanwhile, liked to receive visitors in understated dress and European-style surroundings.[7] And both Sultan and Pasha welcomed having their portraits made by European artists and would be painted by the visiting Scotsman David Wilkie, in 1840 and 1841 respectively. The challenge remained, nevertheless, to dispel stereotypes of decadence that risked seriously hindering the renewed efforts of Ottoman diplomacy.

The European country in which Turkey suffered the most problematic reputation was probably France. Perhaps this reflected in part the prevailing zeal for the Sultan's rival, the anointed French champion. Yet beyond mere partisanship, the Ottoman Empire was the wrong sort of state for the French: insufficiently national, too heavily weighed under the fossilised sediment of tradition, suspiciously looking like an *ancien régime* conglomerate. As a corollary, its reforms were judged insufficiently radical, too piecemeal and lacking in impetus. This was all the more surprising, indeed, that much of the external apparel of Mahmud's early initiatives was French, from the language of the *Moniteur Ottoman* to military tactics and uniforms. (There was a similar paradox in the continued prestige of the French language and manners in Russia, France's ideological enemy, though both likely reflected carried momentum from the Enlightenment era, in which the French court and literary world had held such prominent roles.)

As noted in Chap. 2, French opinion-leaders tended to dismiss Turkish reform efforts and belittle them in comparison with the Egyptian. And while tropes about Turkish decadence and political frailty were not limited

to France, they were pervasive in a French press and literature which, even when it took Turkey's side against Russian ambition, took it for granted that it was at threat of collapse and that tended to see its best hope in the endorsement of Mehemet Ali and his model. For the *Journal des Débats*, Turkey was 'very ill' and for *Le Siècle* 'what it misses is not territories, it is administrative science, it is civilising force'.[8] In the more lyrical lines by the poet Honoré Blanc, 'Omar's descendant in darkness swings / He wrestles with death and over he falls / Soliman's sword, that hero's weapon / Pulls him under in deathly waters / Living skeleton, his empire is but a shadow.'[9]

Tied to these tropes of Turkish decline were an implicit identification with the sort of state which, since the Revolution, it had been France's role to combat: authoritarian and anti-nationalistic. For the expert writer and disillusioned adviser L. d' Aubignosc, 'Turkey has arrived at a flagrant stage of decomposition, and reforms […] have only set under a naked glare the infirmities of a people stupefied by despotism.'[10] Marmont judged that the Sultan faced insurmountable obstacles to change and asked, 'Where are the national elements he might stir and on which he might lean?'[11] For the celebrated historian of the crusades Joseph-François Michaud, 'Had Mahmud found himself at the head of a European society, he could have addressed the peoples' patriotism; but patriotism, as we know it, is not a virtue of the Osmanlis.'[12] Accordingly, when the Turks lost the Battle of Nezib, the root cause was, as *Le Siècle* wrote, that 'among the Turks the war was not national', while the leftist polemicist Victor Considerant went so far as to judge that it was Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim who 'have in Turkey the consent of the Turkish party, of the patriot's party'.[13]

Any reforms were meanwhile either seen to be held back by purblind hostility, or marked by insufficient ambition and the lack of a radicalism of which only a revolutionary state was capable. The Pasha's propagandists, such as Clot-Bey and Jomard, expectedly made negative comparisons of Turkey with Egypt, but so did many a travel writer and pamphleteer, beginning with Marmont's carefully documented dismissal. Generally there was somewhat less material published, in the expert print and travel literature, on Turkey than on Egypt, which was where the more exciting show was being performed. Yet the reason was also that it was simply accepted, by writers spanning the full spectrum of political outlooks, that Turkey was 'a gouty greybeard'.[14] The consensus in the mainstream press thus was, with *Le Siècle*, that 'Mahmud's intentions have been worth more than his acts', and that 'his reforms have almost all been superficial.'[15] For the leftist *La Phalange*, 'In our days, two men have attempted to introduce reforms

in the Orient: Mahmud in Turkey and Mehemet Ali in Egypt. The first, unfortunately, has failed to understand the reformer's role; he has pursued innovations as if out of fancy; he has acted lightly, imprudently, without discernment and without a reasoned plan.'[16] The *Constitutionnel*, finally, pointed to the original problem, which was that Turkey was incapable of the fundamental start that was offered Egypt:

> Mehemet Ali drew on a clean slate; he has, so to say, created everything and destroyed what stood in the way of his designs. Mahmud, on the contrary, has been forced to graft his reforms onto ageing institutions; he has had to combat his subjects' mores, uses, and habits. Thus did he do little more than alter forms without being able to modify anything fundamentally.[17]

Between 1827 and 1835, the Austrian historian and Orientalist Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall published a *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, the most notable German-language work of the period on the Muslim world and a book that stood 'virtually alone' in German literature in paying attention to modern Muslim history and literature.[18] The massive, four-volume history was testimony that the Ottoman Empire, having safely receded from the threat it once was, could now be contemplated, from Vienna, with admiration for its past glories. Indeed, the multi-volume work can fairly be said to have exalted the Sultans, and with them the time-honoured structures of their empire.

> The expression that the Turks will be Turks should not permit us to pass an unfair judgement on the people's character, which in the Ottoman Empire less than anywhere else can be blamed for governmental corruption; even less so over government itself, so long has the imperial constitution stood upright.[19]

If, in France, the Ottoman Empire was considered incapable of in-depth remodelling on European lines or of any sweeping transformation, this correspondingly had more chance of being viewed with approval in the Conservative northern courts. Both the *Österreichischer Beobachter* and the *Preußische Staatszeitung* agreed that 'salvation will come from the Porte itself, it will not come from great men, powerful neighbours, or wise advice, which in Turkey are as rare as anywhere else, but from its very organism, from its long isolated masses which, in spite of all reforms, endure and time again have been its most powerful shield from danger'.[20] When Metternich wrote to Abdul Mejid to congratulate him on the Edict of Gulhané, this was at the same time to advise him to be wary of change,

especially sudden change: 'May he not make mistakes in his choice of objectives and enlist the passage of time to his aid. May he never be in any excessive hurry.'[21] It was indeed better to follow the Austrian model, paternalistic, multi-national, and Conservative:

> It is thanks to the care the late Emperor Francis has placed in respecting the different nationalities within the Monarchy, to consult on all occasions the true needs of his peoples without letting sonorous phrases impress him, that this Sovereign has been able safely to conduct the countries gathered under his government through half a century of folly and to help them emerge contented, wealthy, and prosperous from the struggles into which the misfortunes of the time had pulled them.[22]

The *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, in a rare review article dating from the mid-1830s, likewise rejected the implementation of European-style government in Turkey in a culturally relativistic piece that emphasised the merits of multinational empires, the strength of religious bonds over national, and the advantages of paternalism over class difference:The tie of religion, stronger and more binding than the limits of geography, unites them in heart. […] The Arab and the Osmanli, both subjects of the Sultan, do not differ from one another, more than the Pole and the Russian, who serve the same Emperor, nor more than the Hungarian and Bohemian, who both are Austrians.[23]German commentators were prepared to suppose, like most Europeans, that Christian societies enjoyed a better condition than the Muslim, and yet religion was considered a firmer basis for legitimacy in Turkey than nationality, even if that religion was Islam. Later, upon Abdul Mejid's accession, the Augsburg newspaper opined that Mahmud had gone 'too fast' in his reforms, and that coming improvements to the army and navy must be introduced 'alongside the banner of Islam'.[24] And after the victory over Mehemet Ali, the Austrian chancellor lectured his former ambassador Anton von Prokesch, who had once fallen for the Pasha's siren calls, as follows:That a Mehemet Ali could not found an empire based on technical improvements, monopolies, popular oppression, French adventurers, the bribery of European tourists, and newspaper articles, I was all the more sure, that had Mahomed, instead of writing the Koran, spent his time assembling regiments and manufactures with the help of European instructors, Islam would never have arisen.[25]

The solution, according to Metternich, was thus simply to survive, to outlast the transitory evil that was pressure for change. 'To defend oneself

from the attacks of an evil, the best remedy is to try to live longer than that evil', he wrote in a recapitulation of the Eastern Question.[26] The Ottoman Empire was founded upon a stronger base than Mehemet Ali's 'parasitical plant' and 'everything exceeding mere preservation measures would not participate of healthy practices, as does anything that exceeds the faculties of those who take on a task they are unable to fulfil'.[27]

Nesselrode would have agreed, who upon Abdul Mejid's accession looked forward to Turkey's 'respite' from an 'inopportune agitation'.[28] The Ottoman Empire was animated with 'ideas of conservation' that must be seconded. Nesselrode's ideal candidate for steering the Porte through the many shoals of the Eastern Question was similarly not Reshid Pasha, the man who had been reading from under the golden awning of Gulhané, but the old and wily vizier Khosrew. The Russian chancellor wrote upon learning the news, in June 1840, of the vizier's departure,

> This morning we received the news of Khosrew's dismissal. […] Meanwhile, I consider this event very unfortunate. He was the only man who still enjoyed some influence in Turkey and who, through his great experience and firm hand, was the only one capable of mastering the numerous elements acting towards dissolution which the empire contains and which the reforms of Reshid Pasha, now Turkey's real master, will increase rather than diminish.[29]

Khosrew was a long-standing enemy of Mehemet Ali, having commanded over him in Egypt in 1801 yet having been ousted as governor in 1804. He also embodied old-style Turkish intrigue and conservation, or at best very gradual and piecemeal adaptation, by contrast with the Pasha's ambitious schemes. A year earlier, the *Allgemeine Zeitung* had lauded his administrative vision: 'He sees that Sultan Mahmud had gone too far and without an actual plan in his reform projects, causing confusion within the state apparatus.'[30]

Not all German writers found in Ottoman timelessness a thing to be admired. On the contrary, the radical or progressive exegetes of the Pasha's good works often found Turkish reform urgent yet either impossible or lacking. 'Like the ruins of humanity, the Turks lie over the ruins of Europe and Asia, and seem to await retribution with an unworried calm. […] The Sultan's newly founded civilization is an admixture of the highest nonsense through which a spark of reason gleams, but which none understands and he himself is unable to achieve', wrote Hallberg-Broich.[31] The *Hallische Jahrbücher* opined of Mahmud, 'He honours the future, he

wants the future; but the future wants him not; and the same means that were chosen to avert his people's fate serve to make it all the more inevitable.'[32] And further,

> The dissolution of this empire of the unfree belongs to the march of history and to godly reason; it is at once in keeping with the thrust of European and world history, a consolation prize for the tragedy of Islam, and a motive of justified joy over the great oriental revolution, which is speedily calling forth and civilising new peoples and states, whether the House of Habsburg likes it or not.[33]

Yet the *Jahrbücher* were commenting on another history book, this one more contemporary in scope, namely Ernst Münch's *Mahmud II, Padischah der Osmanen*.[34] A history of Mahmud's reign written immediately after his death, this took the Sultan for hero. A traditionally military and political narrative, it paid little attention to reform except insofar as it concerned the plot. Two features indeed stand out generally in relation to the Austro-German literature on Turkey. First, seen from the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman lands may have looked all the less in burning need of reform that they did not differ markedly in aspect, at least as far as their joint border was concerned, from the Habsburgs' non-German, easternmost possessions. At the same time, having ceased to be the threat to Vienna they had once been, the Turks could safely be invested with the Romanticism of a once mighty foe. (Nor was there, in the days of Metternich, a policy to expand into the Balkans, as would only arise after the loss of the Italian provinces and German dominance, far later in the nineteenth century.) Second and most importantly, as to the German lands proper, the Ottomans were not only equated with remoteness in time but with remoteness in space. Turkey was part, indeed the very centre, of the eternally distant Orient, an Orient to which Germans related quite differently than the far more locally involved French and British.

Among travel writers, narratives of Turkish decline thus remained rarer or more muted, and a greater preparedness survived to seek after the Orient's magic. Whereas French and British writers often found Constantinople dirty and rickety, one Austrian visitor noted its 'cleanliness and splendour, as one encounters them only in the greatest European cities'.[35] 'The thousands of lamps, whose magical light radiates from the mosques, the glare of the coffeehouses, shops, etc., cast Constantinople in a sea of light, making its reflection sparkle in the waters of the Bosphorus, of the golden horn and the Propontis', continued the same account in its characterisation of the Ottoman capital.[36] Gotthilf von Schubert's portrayal zoomed in on

the great sites both Muslim and Christian and was almost purely historical, and likewise that of the classicist Karl Eduard Zachariä.[37] Zachariä indeed noted regretfully, 'Since the reforms of Sultan Mahmud, one only finds anymore in Constantinople the leftovers of Oriental life and bustle, as they were described by older travel writers.'[38] *Orient und Occident*, a work of fiction by the Austrian geographer and penman Anton Groß-Hoffinger, set during a Russo–Turkish war and steeped in mysticism and religion, made subtle fun both of Russian designs on the Bosphorus and of efforts to improve Turkey.[39] For Friedrich von Tietz, a travelling Prussian chancellor of legation, Constantinople was nothing but beautiful and charming, filled with brightly dressed men and women and grand monuments; even its wild dogs, ordinarily judged dangerous pests, were found amiable.[40] And incidentally, Tietz's account evinced respect for Islam: 'That the Koran, generally speaking, is opposed to the desirable progress of the mind, is untrue', he opined.[41] Indeed, Prokesch himself had written of the Turks, showing the contrast between German and French outlooks: 'What Chateaubriand and other sanctimonious pedants say, that the Turks wish to destroy the Holy Sepulchre with fire and sword, is false. Who would have stopped them? On the contrary, it is they who watch over it.'[42]

The same attitude was incidentally found among German travellers to Egypt. It was best that the Nile country also should remain distant, its capacity for amazement intact. 'I found myself in another part of the world—in Egypt! Which has so rarely been visited by German people', proclaimed in wonder the merchant Joseph Pallme on arrival.[43] When the Bavarian professor Gotthilf von Schubert met with Mehemet Ali, the visit's highlight was not the Pasha's piercing gaze or the political acumen evinced by his conversation, it was the nightly journey through Cairo's winding alleys with for guides a lantern and an armed guard, it was the wait among the throng of mullahs and well-wishers on a Ramadan evening in the palace's antechambers and, after he had been ushered in, it was the Pasha's priceless, diamond-encrusted hookah. The professor even expressed disappointment that the interpreter (into French) had not been idiosyncratic enough in his translation or true enough to Oriental forms.[44]

Generally, the German-language literature was less prepared to buy into the necessity of Oriental modernisation and more interested in tradition and timelessness. Goethe's great Orientalising literary work of the time, the *West–eastern Divan*, published in its final edition in 1827, began with the following verses: 'North and South and West are quaking / Thrones are cracking empires shaking / You must flee; the East will right you.'[45]

In Goethe's vision, the Orient was not a place to be modelled on the West, but rather to seek refuge in from the West's strife and turmoil. The *Divan* was emblematic of a German version of Oriental conquest that was purely imaginary, confined to the poetic, the spiritual, the sentimental realm, and that let the Orient belong in an unblemished remoteness. The book's imagery celebrated the East as place of riches and wonder, not backwardness and disorder but the scent of roses and the song of nightingales: 'A turban decks our emperor's attire / They call it a crown. But that is just a name! / The pearl and jewels! Let the eye admire! / The loveliest garb is muslin all the same.'[46] The Ottoman East was different, a place to be respected rather than recast in the European image. The first words of the *Divan*'s first poem, 'Hegira' or 'flight', could even be interpreted as flight from revolution. Indeed, they were written as the laureate poet returned for the first time to the Rhineland after it had been rescued from the French, in 1814. In a prescient irony, the literary monument and paean to the East that was the *Divan* mapped out, in its conception, onto the poet's journey along the Rhine, just as the Eastern Question, for the Germans, would in 1840–1 mutate into the Rhine Crisis.

The *Divan*, finally, was also inspired by Goethe's conversations and correspondence with Orientalists. And precisely German Orientalism was arguably first and foremost about the German *Volk*. Admittedly it was also in large part religious, centring around Christian and Jewish exegesis. 'The German tradition was imbued with exegetical aims and with suppressed romantic longings, both of which made German scholars ill-suited to apply their knowledge to the real-existing Orient', writes its historian Suzanne Marchand.[47] Yet what featured perhaps even more prominently in German academic Orientalism was an enquiry into European, German origins and, with it, the agenda of better defining, and ultimately reuniting, the German people. Surprisingly, the main focus of the German tradition was indeed not the much closer Middle East, but Persia and especially India. Apart from the *Divan*, other artistic works belonging to the Oriental 'renaissance' included poems by Friedrich Rückert, who translated Sanskrit poetry and wrote *Die Weisheit des Brahmanen* (1836) and *Brahmanische Erzählungen* (1839). A number of chairs in Sanskrit opened in German universities in the first decades of the nineteenth century, including in Bonn (1818), Berlin (1821), and in Erlangen, Koenigsberg, and Munich (1826).[48] Translations from the classical Indian language became popular, in the same decades, among Germany's literary and academic classes. Fuelling this popularity, Friedrich von Schlegel

had argued, in 1808, that the European languages were descended from Sanskrit, and he found cultural affinities between the medieval Germans and the Indians and Persians. Beyond linguistic and religious considerations, Schlegel had moved on to theories of ancient migration, setting the origins of a Teutonic race in a place north of India.[49] Schwab writes that in his *Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur* (1812), Schlegel established ancient myths and epics, Indian and Greek, as 'the honour guard of the *Nibelungenlied*'.[50] His *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (1808), and with it the fascination for Hindu myths, echoed through German philosophy in the Romantic era, from Schelling to Hegel.[51] Schlegel was emulated by Julius Klaproth, who in 1823 coined the term 'Indo-Germanic' and was in this sense a precursor to Aryanism. That, according to Klaproth, Sanskrit was 'the oldest dialect, the representative of all others' was the basis for fresh theories on ethnology and migration.[52] This was, finally, recuperated by such politically influential figures as Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt and by Bunsen, who would write in his universal history,

> German philology, to any one who has cultivated it since Frederic Schlegel, must necessarily present the great truth, that a method has been found of restoring the genealogy of mankind, through the medium of language. […] The civilisation of the human race is principally due to two great families of nations. […] Of these, the Indo-Germanic seemed to me the one which carried on the main stream of history; the Aramaic, that which crossed it, and formed the episodes in the divine drama.[53]

Its biblical component aside, German Orientalism was thus not ultimately about the Orient, on which it turned its back, but all about Germany. Unlike its French or British counterpart, it did not map a Western vision onto the Orient (to the extent one accepts that this is all, or part, of what academic Orientalism did), but the reverse. And this was ultimately consistent both with a literature that sought out the East's unchanging foreignness and failed to find value in its reformation, and with policies and a great-power diplomacy for which the priority remained Germany and/or its contours in the form of the Rhineland.

A reforming Ottoman Empire was thus not a likely candidate for a French champion: it was the wrong sort of state and was besides unable to assume the type of radicalism to which Mehemet Ali could pretend. Conversely, regardless of or even in spite of the modernisation efforts of

Mahmud, its staying power, its very inertness were suited to appeal to the policymakers of the northern courts. And it did not need to stand for change to agree with Romantic German philosophies of the East—on the contrary. Except for a radical fringe whose ideological role model was France, a Middle East that failed to stir was what the Austro-Germans stood to expect. To the British, however, neither position was liable to be found attractive, especially while Britain remained led by the Whigs, the party of the great Reform Act.

Free Trade and Monopolies

Stratford Canning's parting shot to the Ottoman Empire had been that it must reform or die. 'The Turkish Empire has reached, in its decline, that critical point at which it must either revive and commence a fresh era of Prosperity, or fall into a state of complete dissolution', his December 1832 memorandum began.[54] Reform was 'the best and only hope of maintaining the independence of the Turkish Empire, and improving the condition of its inhabitants.'[55] And Canning argued that a carve-out dealing a large slice of the Ottoman Empire to Mehemet Ali would end its chances of pursuing the 'system of improvement' that was essential to its long-term hopes of survival.[56]

From the Whig point of view, any diplomatic calculations relying on Turkey were pointless without reform because the Ottoman Empire would then neither be capable of rescue nor indeed worth saving. Having taken the decision to stand by the Ottoman Empire, they must also stand by its improvement efforts, or rather one was a reciprocal condition for the other. Webster himself recognised that 'His [Palmerston's] whole moral position in the Near Eastern Question depended on the supposition that the Ottoman Empire could be reformed.'[57] And this was made all the more necessary by Mehemet Ali's progressive reputation among certain sections of the public and political class. Mahmud was able, in the 1830s, to attract praise from a handful of British observers.[58] Charles MacFarlane, popular historian, long-time resident of Constantinople, and an authority on Turkey, had diagnosed the problem as follows:

> A surer, and more permanent basis of honour and prosperity, without which, indeed, the one proposed will be found of sand, would be a general moral reform of the departments of government; for, at present, all is corrupt, from the heads of the divan and pashas or proconsuls, to the aghas of villages and

> officers of custom-houses. […] The people are as much, nay more ground than ever: the tenure of property and life is as insecure as heretofore, and the decisions of justice are still regulated on the amount of bribes.[59]

For Turkish efforts to be made credible and earnest-sounding to the British public, Palmerston and Ponsonby needed to take charge.

Opportunity had fittingly materialised as early as 1833 in the unlikely person of David Urquhart: impoverished Scottish squire, former Greek independence fighter, and protégé of William IV, the English king having for some reason developed a special interest in Turkey. Urquhart had somehow converted to the Turkish cause, and he was to publish a number of influential books and pamphlets in praise of the Ottoman Empire and its potential as British partner. His perfectly timed *Turkey and its resources* came out in the immediate aftermath of Canning's memorandum, and it may be considered in many ways the blueprint for 1830s Ottoman reform under the British aegis. This volume and its successors, such as the more political and polemical article 'England, France, Russia, and Turkey', were indeed widely read and were extensively reviewed and quoted, including in the *Literary Gazette*, the *Edinburgh Review*, the *British and Foreign Review*, the *Quarterly Review*, and the *Foreign Quarterly Review*.[60] The historian Frank Bailey writes that Urquhart's ideas 'were accepted by a great body of the English public who regarded him as an authority on Eastern Affairs', and the pro-Turkish contemporary David Ross wrote of his first book, 'A revulsion [i.e. a complete change] of opinion not in England only, but throughout Europe, has been the consequence.'[61]

Urquhart was awarded a foreign-office mission at the end of 1833 to gather geographical data in Eastern Europe and Asia. Earlier that year, he had written several times to Palmerston to stress the Ottoman Empire's 'almost unbounded prospects of commercial prosperity' and Britain's prospective role in helping in the 'political reestablishment of Turkey and […] its permanent prosperity, by calling forth its abundant resources'.[62] In March 1834, it was decided he should settle in Constantinople, where he soon obtained the rank of consul. After a hiatus during which the Tories were briefly in power, he returned to the Ottoman capital in 1836, this time as secretary of embassy, and he began intensive preparatory work on a Turco–British commercial convention: the future Balta-Liman treaty.[63]

Urquhart is perhaps better known for his anti-Russian paranoia and his obsessive bating of Palmerston. He was dismissed from the service after the 1837 *Vixen* affair, in which he attempted to foment a war with Russia

over the military resupply of Circassian guerrillas by a British merchant ship that was subsequently seized by the Tsarist navy, and he would never forgive the foreign secretary. Already, in 1840, he became the coordinator of a Chartist campaign, through press and pamphlet, to indict his nemesis as a Russian spy and a traitor.[64] It may thus seem perverse to suggest he was a key piece in Palmerston's Turkish chess set. Yet quite apart from the possibility that Urquhart's 1840 antics only raised the profile of pro-Turkish views and thus indirectly bolstered Palmerston's position, the Scotsman's early imprint on British position-taking in Turkey is easily established. Urquhart enjoyed the support of both the foreign secretary and Ponsonby until the *Vixen* affair, and in spite of his already erratic behaviour. The Scotsman gave his own stamp of approval to Palmerston and his Eastern policy in an 1836 issue of the *Portfolio*, a periodical he edited and in which he published insider materials obtained at the foreign office and elsewhere—a nineteenth-century version of WikiLeaks.[65] Indeed, Palmerston continued to support and appoint Urquhart to new postings well after the *Portfolio* had begun to raise eyebrows. The cross-fertilisation went even further; according to one writer, 'Ponsonby read, corrected, and subsidised Urquhart's famous pamphlet *England, France, Russia, and Turkey*.'[66] The Tories, meanwhile, were not afraid to resist royal solicitations to keep him employed.[67] As the *Quarterly Review* would write, Urquhart was a 'Frankenstein' of Palmerston's creation.[68]

David Urquhart was Turkey's early, indeed its ceaseless advocate. He was the spark that ignited the programme of Turkish reform as endorsed by Palmerston and Ponsonby along contemporary Whig-Liberal political views, and his books, starting with *Turkey and its resources*, were both seminal and an invaluable key to contemporary foreign-office thinking about the country. From the outset, Urquhart's plans for Turkey were suffused with a gradualism anchored in legitimacy and tradition that was quintessentially British in inspiration and that contrasted with the sweeping, Cartesian French model incarnated by Mehemet Ali. Thus, for Urquhart as for the Palmerston–Ponsonby team, the Ottoman dynasty and its established institutions, far from a hindrance, were a source of strength. Mahmoud, benefiting from 'the prescriptive rights of the oldest dynasty in Europe; is possessed of more extensive legal authority than any sovereign in Europe', proclaimed Urquhart.[69] In almost Burkeian accents, Turkish liberties owed their vigour to an ancient pedigree: 'Man's social rights, and his political constitution, are defined and preserved [in Turkey] by a few but simple and inestimable convictions, deeply engraven [*sic*] on every

man's bosom.'[70] Similarly, Palmerston would write to Bulwer in 1838, 'When people say that the Turkish empire is rapidly falling to decay, one always replies, "It will last our time if we try to prop it up, and not to pull it down; besides, an empire which has endured for centuries is likely to outlive the creation of yesterday, such as is Mehemet Ali's authority."'[71] This broke with the French vision, the vision that cheer-led the Pasha and by which novelty was the fount of progress, and nations, not sovereigns, were the guarantee of dynamism. But the adaptation of existing institutions was also what had characterised the Reform Act, and a paternalistic gradualism appropriately typified the Whig approach to Turkish institutional change. 'His [Mahmoud's] internal administration has been characterised, as contrasted with former reigns, by economy, moderation, humanity, and administrative progress, gradual but real.'[72] As to future change, according to Urquhart, 'All prudent reform in Turkey must reduce itself to a restoration of the ancient rule originally derived from, and lately revived in all its ancient purity in Arabia itself […] which is exactly the plan which he [the Sultan] has shown an inclination to adopt.'[73] Likewise, when the Ottoman Empire published new fiscal measures, in 1840, Palmerston would write to the Turkish foreign minister Reshid Pasha:

> Her Majesty's Government who take the deepest interest in the Regeneration of Turkey, are delighted to find that Reshid Pasha is going to work in so wise and judicious a manner, and that instead of endeavouring to set up prematurely new institutions, which would be repugnant to the habits and prejudices of the Turkish nation, he is progressively improving and developing the old institutions of his Country, and in truth bringing them back to their ancient purity and vigour.[74]

In a more programmatic sense, at the heart of *Turkey and its resources* was the notion, first, that Turkey's economic potential promised its political reconstruction, and second that free trade was the required key to unlock it. 'Commerce is free in Turkey', it simply proclaimed.[75] Much could indeed be made of Turkey's astonishingly low 3 % import tariff. The only modification that was needed was the abolition of internal barriers and of certain 'recently' introduced monopolies.[76] 'Thus, three hundred years ago, the sultans, by an act of munificence and of reason, anticipated the most ardent desires of civilized Europe, and proclaimed unlimited freedom of commerce', wrote Urquhart quoting the *Moniteur Ottoman*.[77] The book even mocked a speech by Thiers to the French Chamber of

Agriculture and Commerce that defended mercantilism.[78] The Scotsman went on to make the case for free trade alongside a lengthy itemisation of Turkey's untapped potential, concluding, 'Let extensive depots of English wares be established on the Danube and at Trebizonde, and Turkey will find in them better support than in fleets or armies.'[79]

(Historians now tend to date the rise of a free-trade ideology in Britain to the 1840s or later, yet this surely reflects a particular focus on domestic politics, especially on the all-important abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the agitation of the Anti-Corn Law League.[80] The First Opium War, almost contemporary with the Eastern Crisis, showed trade at work as motive for international action. The cabinet, it may also be pointed out, represented by Clarendon, Bowring, and Granville, had attempted to initiate a free-trade treaty with France in the 1830s.[81] The Exchequer and Board of Trade had undertaken tariff reductions in the 1820s and 1830s, and one only needs to consult *The reform ministry and the reformed parliament* to find freedom of trade lauded there.[82] Yet perhaps it is best to define free trade here not as the conviction that Britain itself should have no tariffs whatsoever, but simply as the idea that free trade produced prosperity.)

Associated with freedom of trade was moreover a belief in fiscal restraint—as had traditionally been the case in Britain, where the struggle against 'old corruption', or a nexus of indirect taxes and royal patronage, had been an old Whig rallying cry. 'Freedom of commerce and of industry, is not, indeed, with them an object of independent inquiry; it is a consequence which flows from, and which never can be separated from, direct taxation', wrote Urquhart.[83] The criticism that Ottoman central power had become too weak was turned on its head. 'Prosperity is invariably the consequence of the *neglect* of the central administration.'[84] Low and even taxation promised prosperity, provided a few abuses and poor practices such as tax farming could be ended, and prosperity in turn guaranteed political recovery. As Urquhart had written to Palmerston before his mission, 'The only advantage she [Turkey] requires is to be left alone. Industry is free, commerce is free, taxation is direct and burdens are equal.'[85] This had the further advantage of contrasting with Mehemet Ali's blameworthy agricultural and trade monopolies: 'All the public supplies are raised without government monopolies, grinding taxation, or stopping the progress of industry and population.'[86] It also made free trade, more than a matter of mutual profit, a component of good governance, and thus an essential strand in any Ottoman reconstruction policy.

Unlike most of his Austro-German counterparts, lastly, Urquhart was prepared to praise Mahmoud's reforms even if this praise was couched in terms of the renewal or modernisation of an ancient constitution. The destruction of the Janissaries, that bulwark of feudalism and corruption, paved the way for strengthening the state based on the consent of what he called the 'municipalities': communities to which fiscal responsibility was allegedly devolved. In an idea that was developed at length, Turkey's institutions were thus characterised by

> […] two principles of vast practical importance […] perfect freedom of industry and commerce, by the placing of taxation directly on property; and a rural municipal organization, which, called into existence and maintained in activity for financial purposes, has been the means of dispensing justice, of mitigating oppression, and of replacing patriotism by local affections and common sympathies.[87]

Parallels can here be drawn with British parliamentary tradition, as indeed they were drawn with more ancient myths: 'This forced guarantee-ship resembles the voluntary associations of the Anglo-Saxons.'[88] The result was greater justice and less arbitrariness, to be contrasted with Mehemet Ali's 'systematic oppression'.[89]

Laissez-faire economics and trust in the security of persons and property were not exclusively British ideas; they were Enlightenment ideas, and they were shared by many European Liberals. In glossing Mehemet Ali's achievements, his admirers also stressed the restoration of order as a unique precondition to prosperity. Yet none of the Pasha's modernisation programmes was framed as the revival of time-honoured liberties, as indeed it could scarcely be. Authoritarian impulse was what characterised the genius conqueror's programme. Egypt was praised for Mehemet Ali's grand infrastructure designs, his centralisation and use of tax-raising powers, for his centrally run initiatives in the economic and military fields alike, not for his inexistent trade or fiscal liberalism.

The importance Palmerston attached to the future Balta-Liman trade convention is attested by his delegation of the trusted Bulwer to replace Urquhart after he was dismissed. Bulwer set to work, based on the Scotsman's preparatory steps, in 1837, first in London and later in Constantinople itself. Though the ground had been cleared, the negotiations carried on, through several draft agreements, into the summer of 1838. The problem was not the already low import tariff, but internal tariff and non-tariff barriers which, because they were a source of revenue

and patronage alike, required some coaxing to get abolished. Finally, on 16 August 1838, what became known as the Commercial Convention of Balta-Liman—after its place of closing in a suburb of the Ottoman capital—was signed. The treaty gave Britain most-favoured-nation status, it abolished all permits, monopolies, and internal restrictions to the resale of imports, and established a new tariff of 12% on Turkish exports and 5% on imports.

What mattered as much as the improved terms obtained for British merchants, however, was that the Ottoman Empire was now set on its path to regeneration by economic means. For Ponsonby, the treaty established 'liberal and wise principles', and 'is good for the nation [Turkey] at large'.[90] Ponsonby incidentally attributed the negotiations' success to Reshid Pasha, who was fast becoming Britain's man. The monopolies were dismantled that threatened to 'destroy the life of the Turkish Empire', and the new convention, as he predicted, could now bring 'the enormous increase in the commerce of this country that must arise without delay out of the improved state of things'.[91] *The Morning Chronicle* commented in the following month with a piece praising Ponsonby for, 'while alive to the defects of the Turkish rule', remaining hopeful 'of the regeneration of the country under wise and energetic rulers, provided it be allowed fair play'.[92] And Palmerston shared in the general excitement and foresaw that the convention would one day extend its beneficent arm over Mehemet Ali's dominions also:

> I send you the ratifications of the Commercial Treaty, and an excellent thing it is. […] [Mehemet Ali] says he will evade it. That will not be so easy; and he will find that in the long run it is for his advantage as well as for that of the Sultan; that is to say, for the advantage of the people whom they govern.[93]

The foreign secretary even obtained the title of Viscount for Ponsonby as recompense for his role in the treaty.[94]

Meanwhile, little of this cheer caught on outside Britain. For the French observer d'Aubignosc, Reshid Pasha had been downgraded to the role of a 'travelling salesman'.[95] Mahmud's Austrian biographer, Münch, who described Urquhart as 'a diplomatic-public relations factotum' and who was utterly indifferent to the Turkish monopolies, only treated Balta-Liman as a politico-diplomatic step.[96] Barante reports that Nicolas considered the Balta-Liman treaty with jealousy, as a political move, and that it only caused Nesselrode and Boutenieff to become preoccupied over increased British influence in Turkey.[97] Nor did the French, unlike the British, incidentally exhibit any concern over the pernicious influence of

Mehemet Ali's monopolies, whether in public or in private. The army captain Charles de Beaufort d'Hautpoul simply reported to Soult that they were necessary to the regime.[98] The *Journal Asiatique* defended them against accusations that they were abusive.[99] Marmont justified them based on the central importance of the Nile and of hydraulic works to Egyptian agriculture, and to the fellah's inability to innovate on his own.[100] As to more rigorous economic analysis, neither Auguste Colin in *La Revue des Deux Mondes* nor Jomard in his *Coup d'oeil* bothered to discuss the monopolies and they scarcely even mentioned them.[101]

This was all the more significant, finally, that the Balta-Liman treaty was no mercantilist move aiming to secure exclusive advantages for British merchants. As Bulwer and his fellow negotiators on the British side fully expected already at the time of the negotiations, the same commercial terms would soon be acceded to by the other European powers.[102] Balta-Liman was thus followed by a Franco–Turkish agreement in November 1838, Austria was assured most-favoured-nation status in 1839, and the treaty eventually became the basis for all foreign trade in Turkey.[103]

A Turkish Magna Carta

As the international historian John Charmley has noted, 'Palmerston envisaged a process of modernisation in which the Ottoman Empire would be subject to the sort of processes being applied by the Whigs to the British Constitution.'[104] This was indeed the decade of Whig reform at home, ushered in by the parliamentary makeover that was the Reform Act of 1832. The Tories, whether Wellington or, after the Melbourne cabinet fell, Aberdeen, were not interested in intervening in internal Turkish affairs and correspondingly indifferent to reform. Wellington even turned down a request to accommodate Turkish trainees at Woolwich, Portsmouth, and Sandhurst in early 1835, a plan which was taken up as soon as Palmerston returned later that year.[105] But the Whigs had heeded Stratford Canning's clarion call, and the thread was picked up again as they resumed at the foreign office.

It was Britain's role, agreed Urquhart, to guide Turkey through renewal:

> Obstacles [to reform] can only be removed by strengthening the hands of the government, by acquiring influence over its councils, and be exercising that influence judiciously. […] It is incumbent on England carefully to

> distinguish the good from the evil dispositions of her charge, to encourage the first as sedulously as to repress the last, and, above all, not to neglect example when enforcing precepts.[106]

To Britain belonged 'the honour or the loss, nay, more the profit or the loss, of her [Turkey's] preservation or destruction'.[107] Urquhart's dispensations became the blueprint for Turkish reform in its main thrusts: the Balta-Liman trade convention, the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané, and the follow-on measures of 1840.

Reshid Pasha left Constantinople for London, having been appointed ambassador earlier in the month, fresh from the first great step in the Turco–British rapprochement that was Balta-Liman and the day after the convention was signed. The new appointment would be the preliminary to an even grander stroke. Reshid spent the following year between France and England, and his primary role was unsurprisingly to lobby for support in the dispute with Mehemet Ali. Yet he was also preparing, during what appears always to have been a temporary mission, for his return to office and increased influence. It is unclear exactly how closely Palmerston and Ponsonby piloted the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané, Turkey's most publicised reform decree in a decade. Though Reshid also passed through Paris, certainly the French had no part in it, busy as they were with blaming Roussin, around the same time, for his diplomatic failings and replacing him with Edouard de Pontois.[108] But there is enough evidence for close Turco–British consultation both in London and in Constantinople after Reshid's return. On or before 11 August 1839, Reshid thus met with Palmerston and submitted a preparatory memorandum which they had ostensibly discussed in detail, and for which he expected the foreign secretary's advice. Blaming corruption and arbitrariness for the empire's failures, this called for the application of the rule of law to bring about the 'inevitable regeneration' of the Ottoman Empire. The memo, renouncing radical change, insisted nevertheless on measures to ensure the security of person and property. 'This would not consist in obtaining liberties, but only for life and property, the general security already sanctified by the empire's civil and religious laws.'[109] It thus echoed a key concern found both in the Palmerston–Ponsonby correspondence and in the Urquhart works. It also responded to a fundamental lack identified, for example by MacFarlane, in the British literature on Turkey. Reshid consulted with Ponsonby on the same topic, after his return to the Ottoman capital, in September and October. And while the British ambassador's letters imply that the initiative belonged

to Reshid, Palmerston's suggest that he considered Ponsonby at least a co-author when the Edict was at last formally published in November 1839: 'Your Hatti Sheriff was a grand Stroke of Policy, & it is producing great effect on public feeling both here & in France. I never have despaired of seeing Turkey rear her head again as a substantial element in the Balance of Power.'[110]

The Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané, made public in the ceremony described at the beginning of this chapter, was a short document that skilfully mixed Muslim rhetoric and Enlightenment tenets. In format, it was a quite general, indeed a vague declaration of principles, much like British constitutional norms and unlike, say, the French declaration of the Rights of Man. Its opening lines paid homage to revered tradition, which, while this may have had antecedents in Muslim legal practice, also fitted well with British, specifically Whig gradualism. 'But since a century and a half a succession of accidents, and different causes, have led to people's ceasing to conform to the sacred code of laws, and to the rules which flow from it', it thus read early on.[111] The new measures it promised as a remedy came under three heads: security of person and property, regularity of taxation, and the regular levying of soldiers. The document referred implicitly to the Balta-Liman treaty in its fiscal chapter: 'Fortunately for the people, some time back they have been delivered from the vexatious system of monopolies—those bad sources of revenue.' On conscription, it also took a side jab at Mehemet Ali's system, which was 'dealing a mortal blow to agriculture, as well as an injustice in itself'. Crucially, however, in security of life and property and in taxation, its first two headings again fitted exactly the Urquhartite programme and long-standing foreign office exhortations. The document even proposed establishing some form of representative institution to guarantee these rights, and to consent to taxes: 'Our Council of Justice, augmented by new members, and by the adjunction of the ministers and nobility of the empire, shall assemble in order to prepare laws for the security of life and fortune, and the regulation of imposts.' It should come as no surprise, then, that the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané should have been welcomed, in various reactions, as a Turkish Magna Carta.[112]

Unlike the hasty and artificial reforms of Mehemet Ali, so the message went, the new Turkish undertakings would require time to bear fruit, but they gave reason to hope for genuine progress. As seen from London, they concurrently called for the protecting hand of Britain to give them time to work and justified such support by their promised results. Ponsonby enthused that

> What has been done is excellent in conception and execution. It is in perfect unison with the Religion and interests and feelings of the People, and at the same time provides security for the great interest of every class of subjects, whilst it infringes no rights or privilege of any. It is a victorious answer to those who say that this Empire cannot be saved by its ancient government, and that the spurious regeneration to be worked out by the Pasha of Egypt is its only preservation.[113]

Palmerston felt the need to congratulate Reshid Pasha besides privately commending his own ambassador:

> Your Excellency may assure the Porte that Her Majesty's Government will afford them all such support and countenance as a foreign government can properly give, towards the carrying out of the excellent principles which are set forth in this Hatti Scherif; and Her Majesty's Government most sincerely wish Reshid Pasha all the success which he so well deserves, in his praiseworthy endeavours to improve the institutions, and thus to promote the happiness, the prosperity, and the power and independence of his country.[114]

More encouragement came from the foreign secretary when follow-on reforms by Reshid were passed, in 1840:Much of what he does will take root, and confer inestimable advantage upon Turkey. It is only by giving the Empire Institutions that it is possible to regenerate it, and my belief is that by such means wisely planned, and vigorously and perseveringly followed up it will be possible to restore the Empire to a respectable degree of vigour.[115]

There is indeed evidence that both Palmerston and the new Viscount found increasing faith in the Ottoman Empire's future. 'Turkey is not going down; on the contrary she is rallying; slowly if you will, and to superficial observers imperceptibly. But light from without has been let in upon the interior of Turkey', Palmerston had written to George Hodges in 1838, then consul-general in Serbia.[116] In September 1839 he wrote to Bulwer,

> As to the Turkish empire […] the component parts of a community are undergoing daily the process of physical renovation and of moral improvement. Therefore all that we hear every day of the week about the decay of the Turkish empire, and its being a dead body or a sapless trunk, and so forth, is pure and unadulterated nonsense.[117]

In pieces that may or may not have been planted by the foreign office, the milestones of Turkish reform were also noted in the British press,

including, in addition to the Edict of Gulhané, the adoption in the next year of a new penal code, the abolition of tax farming, and other fiscal measures, and the introduction of a European-style address from the throne.[118] *The Morning Chronicle*, the most influential of the Whig-Liberal papers, hailed the Hatti Sheriff itself with the emphatic words that 'these changes give the only hopes that can be conceived of a regeneration, or even of a duration, of the Turks and of their empire. […] Let industry acquire fortune, and talent distinction, with security of keeping as well as earning, for self and for posterity, and the Turkish character will soon undergo a transformation analogous to its laws.'[119] *The Foreign Quarterly Review*, long a Turkey sceptic, likewise published the text of the Hatti Sheriff, commenting, 'We cannot wonder that a wise policy has attempted to render even the present state of political uncertainty, affording as it does a breathing-time for Turkey, available for her internal improvement.'[120] Not everyone was convinced, and the Tory press was expectedly more equivocal. *The Times* wavered between approval and doubts that reforms would be consistently applied.[121] Yet Whig and radical titles were widely supportive. The timing, finally, of the Gulhané announcement is noteworthy, coming just as the Soult government was digging its heels in, Brünnow was preparing to visit London for a second time, and Palmerston was beginning to consider the necessity of a reversal of alliances.

This is indeed not to deny that the desire to thwart, or contain, Russia was also a factor in British support for the Ottoman Empire. Urquhart himself was rabidly anti-Russian, and the policy turnaround of 1832–3 was accompanied both by Stratford Canning's warning and the Russian descent on the Straits. The coincidence of bouts of Turkish reform and British military or diplomatic support, whether in the 1830s or in the later phase of the *tanzimat* that began in 1856, has been noted elsewhere.[122] But, apart from the problem that the immediate threat in 1839–40 as in 1832–3 was posed by Mehemet Ali's aggrandisement, not Russian aggression, the contest with Russia must also be recognised for having been an ideological contest. Concerns over Baghdad and Mesopotamia, the emerging game of alliances and rivalries between Russia, Britain, and Persia, intervention in the Persian Gulf, alarm over Afghanistan and the Khiva expedition: all this may have formed a more or less immediately pertinent background to British support for the Ottoman Empire. Yet to the extent there was an emerging Great Game, this Great Game was by definition only the expression of a wider project for the Orient, a project in which it was assumed that Europe was destined to take Asia over,

and it only remained doubtful which European nation was to perform the task. Britain was Russia's ideological opponent in Asia as in Europe. Canning, in his 1832 memorandum, had described the Tsarist state as a power 'already too great for the general interests and liberties of Europe': this was the only thing in the document with which the sarcasms in the margins agreed, whether they were Holland's or Palmerston's ('This is most just and true').[123] In the Whig but also in the Tory press, the regular shorthand for Russia was 'the Autocrat'.[124] Even the Conservative *Times* was prepared to write, on the subject of Anglo–Russian rivalry in Asia, of

> […] the eternal hostility of principles which tend to the highest freedom of man on the one hand, and to his lowest debasement on the other—the irreconcilable dissension which ought to separate a power that exists only to covet, to conquer, and to crush, from a power whose dominion has in more auspicious times and under abler guidance encircled the globe with honest enterprise and free institutions.[125]

A reforming Ottoman Empire was an empire that conformed to the British, not the Russian model, for the Orient.

According again to Barante, meanwhile, in Russia itself, the Hatti Sheriff was only greeted with discomfort. 'The Russian cabinet affects to find no useful importance in it. It is spoken of as a kind of parody. It is the butt of jokes', wrote Barante. But:

> I do not doubt that, whatever their simulated indifference, they much dislike the incident. It contributes to proving and establishing an influence that is not theirs. It is furthermore a proclamation of liberal principles, made at their very door, in a country regarded as barbarous and less advanced than them on the path of civilization.[126]

And though the Edict met with a favourable echo, at least initially, in a large slice of the European press, among none of the other powers did it garner any palpable support.

Mehemet Ali may have been 'sharply upset' at the Edict's propaganda value, in the words of the French consul Adrien Cochelet.[127] It was nevertheless dismissed by his counterpart in Constantinople, Pontois, as mere theatre: 'The rational and equitable principles proclaimed by the Hatti Sheriff are too far situated from the ideas, habits, and needs of the Orient to triumph from abuses so ingrained and that conspire to maintain such powerful vested interests.'[128] Nor did there come, while Palmerston took pains to write personally, any congratulatory letter from Soult, and the

responses from Paris make it clear that there was no interest in the Edict from that corner. On the scene itself, the Prince de Joinville, the king's son, who was present in Constantinople at the time and had been invited to attend the ceremony as a guest of honour, only ridiculed it and confided to his journal, 'This Turkish nation […], it won't be saved by the miserable rag that was publicly read today.'[129]

Admittedly, the French press mostly welcomed the Hatti Sheriff in a positive spirit. *Le Journal des Débats* reported both on the text and the ceremony and described 'the attempt at regeneration that the Porte has just tried' as 'a curious and important event'.[130] *La Presse* greeted it as a landmark, *Le Constitutionnel* compared it favourably with Mahmud's reforms, and *Le Siècle*, while voicing doubts as to its ultimate effectiveness, bestowed praise upon it.[131] Yet this only reflected the widely held belief that reform was what the Orient was in urgent need of, and interest anyhow soon waned in the Edict's fate and in further Turkish initiatives. There was no sustained follow-up in any of the main French dailies and, by the following year, *Le Siècle* was back to speaking of 'reforms to which the people do not pay the least attention.'[132] For *L'Orient européen social, religieux et littéraire*, a publication more for the Middle East boffin than the general reader, Reshid's reform, 'a flower grown in the hothouse, an edifice built of brittle wood, like these shipwreck's shelters assembled upon the sea sand, will fall at the first breath of the peoples' anger'.[133] 'O Hatisherif of Gul-Hané', the author sighed, 'what illusions you had given rise to, even before your birth!'[134]

For Metternich, finally, even the very general terms of the Hatti Sheriff went too far. The chancellor struggled, in his congratulatory letter, to find virtue in it other than that 'its principles are just, as they are based on religious law, which for any State is the first of all laws'. Practical problems, he thought, were only to be anticipated: 'His Highness may meet certain difficulties in the practical application of the principles in question; but what governmental measure isn't exposed to such difficulties?'[135] And the letter was the occasion for a lecture warning against the perils of granting constitutions:

> To *grant* a Constitution is to upset the State in the very foundations on which it rests and, in the last resort, it is to give it *phrases rather than reality*; for none can grant what does not exist. Such is the case of what one calls a *Constitution*, which a Sovereign cannot grant, for what has such value is and can only be the product of a certain historical basis, and of what time alone can procreate and complete.[136]

For the *Österreichischer Beobachter*, similarly, the focus was on the Gulhané ceremony, not on the Edict itself or its implications for Turkey. 'The performance, which one could enjoy from the kiosk, was highly picturesque and imposing', was the newspaper's main point.[137] Perhaps surprisingly, the *Preußische Staatszeitung* published its own news of Gulhané, and even hailed the Edict as progressive and as proof that Abdul Mejid was his father's worthy successor.[138] After a couple of short paragraphs, it provided a German translation of the Edict. Yet the bulk of the main German dailies seems to have drawn its inspiration from the *Beobachter*. Both the *Kölnische Zeitung* and the *Stadt Aachener Zeitung* lifted the news from the Austrian newspaper, including its description of the elaborate formalities.[139] So did the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, which avoided commenting in this or other issues on the reach or meaning of the Hatti Sheriff. The text was the same as in the *Beobachter*: 'The delightful view over the Asian coast, the sea of Marmara and the Princes island, the abundant crowd's multicoloured costumes […] all of this, favoured by the most wonderful weather, made a truly enchanting sight.'[140]

The Syrian Landings

The inexorable alignment of the British model with Turkey and the French with Egypt made their presence on opposing sides in the 1839–41 conflict more than predictable. By 1840, when the decisive moment came to sign and enact the Convention of London, British commitment to a reforming Turkey had convinced Palmerston, and the cabinet he willy-nilly swung behind him, that to back the Ottomans was the right policy regardless of whether the threat was Russian or Egyptian. The events of 1839–41 take on, in this light, their own different cast. The decisive factor was not that Russia suddenly decided to drop Unkiar-Skelessi, as historians have so often supposed. By the time of the Brünnow mission, Palmerston had long and firmly become wedded to a path of Turkish support already. Turkish integrity must be supported, and Turkey was worthy of being supported, it being worthy both a condition and an argument for such support. Britain had swung behind Turkey in 1833, initiating years of efforts to secure its improvement and the parallel hardening diplomatic commitment. This commitment, not the tactics of 1839 or 1840 or even a wider Anglo–Russian truce, was what stood at the bottom of the British policy choices in the Eastern Crisis.

In a process that could only further cement existing commitments among their respective European backers, press arguments both for and against either of the Oriental contestants moreover contributed to raising

the ideological stakes. While Turkish credentials had suffered a blow in June–July 1839 after the Ottoman defeat at Nezib and the fleet's defection, the accession of the young and impressionable Abdul Mejid promised a fresh start, as Gulhané and the ensuing measures intimated. It also left more room for Reshid Pasha to make his mark. And increasingly the storm centred on the charismatic but controversial Mehemet Ali as the clash of models intensified and events attracted closer public attention.

The Morning Chronicle, a publication closely aligned with Palmerston himself, had already set the tone in an early piece by its Egyptian correspondent:

> In the many changes which have occurred here the native Egyptians have little altered their condition—slaves they always were, and still remain. Mehemet Ali has increased the burden of their exorbitant taxation, and has added the curse of conscription, perhaps the only evil they really feel acutely, and which we daily see them resort to the most atrocious mutilations to avoid.[141]

As the crisis progressed and intervention approached, the *Chronicle* increasingly vilified the Pasha, 'the crafty and selfish ruler of Egypt', or simply 'a despot'.[142] It was followed in this path by *The Morning Post*, which, having begun by expressing confidence in Turkey and in 'Rechid Pasha, so well known in England for his energy and activity, and his enlightened policy', would end by writing that 'there exists not an unpaid traveller in, or writer on, Egypt, and especially Syria, that does not proclaim [Mehemet Ali] a tyrant'.[143] The Conservative *Standard* and the all-important *Times* were as a rule steadfastly critical of the cabinet. Even if it remained disbelieving of Turkish reform itself, however, *The Times* turned increasingly virulent against Egypt, printing for example negative reviews of a book by Antoine Clot-Bey, Mehemet Ali's surgeon-general, and finding that the author made 'a strange amalgamation […] between the notions of Oriental despotism and those of French centralization'.[144] It likewise published the more critical parts of Bowring's reports on Egypt and Syria, stressing the continuing slave trade and Egyptian poverty.[145] *The Standard* elaborated on the 'well-known cunning' of the 'barbarian tyrant' Mehemet Ali.[146] Giving voice, like many of the other newspapers, to the travel writers, its editors published Madden's more critical passages alongside their own commentary.[147]

Against these voices arose a rearguard of defenders of the Egyptian Pasha. First, there was the indefatigable Waghorn, who managed to place letters in a good number of the major British dailies in May, June, July,

and October 1840.[148] Then there was *The Morning Herald*, classified by some historians as Tory but in this period difficult to place and in some respects more radical-sounding. Initially supportive of British policy, it began gunning for Mehemet Ali, with an interesting sense of timing, in October 1840. More Russophobe than pro-Egyptian, however, the newspaper seems to have been loosely aligned with the Urquhartite and radical campaign against the foreign secretary. Waghorn knew his public, meanwhile, and in what terms he must plead his cause: 'All testify to his [the Pasha's] improved system of government there, when compared to the corrupting and decaying one of Turkey.' And '[Mehemet Ali] instead of being a tyrant, as the *Globe* says, has done more for Egypt in his time than any other *living* man has done in any other part of the world'. Every time, Waghorn put forward Egypt's growing economic clout, progress towards modernity, and military weight, appealing jointly to Britain's selfish and humanitarian interests.[149]

The operations in Syria and the independent rebellion that preceded them were soon, however, to provide a focal point for this clash by proxy. The central weapon in the contest between models became, as affairs reached a crisis point, the Syrian uprising that began in May 1840. The initial revolt by Lebanese Maronites and Druzes, temporarily put down by Ibrahim in July, was later to expand around Syria and take on military significance as the Turco–British forces became able to make weapon deliveries, share intelligence, and coordinate military moves with the rebels in the autumn, in particular under the leadership of the British agent Richard Wood. In the meantime, though, the rebellion by Lebanese and Syrian mountaineers and tribes became the proof, for the Pasha's detractors, of the greater desirability of Turkish government over Egyptian. The first news of the rebellion appeared, in Britain, in July 1840. After Palmerston denounced Ibrahim's atrocities in parliament in August, they turned, in the press, into a cry for humanitarian intervention and ultimately for vindication for the landings as these began in September.[150] *The Globe*'s own coverage of the Eastern Crisis only became regular on the emergence of the news from Syria. As the editors found,

> The different tribes in Syria are rising against the cruel despotism of Ibrahim Pasha, and Britain ought not to let the opportunity pass unimproved for re-annexing Syria to the Turkish empire. Humanity and policy determine us to give our suffrage in favour of the Porte. We see Turkey lightening the burdens of the people, while Ibrahim is striving to make them seven-fold more heavy than they ever were before.[151]

Showing how much cross-party appeal the Syrian cause had, *The Times*, followed by *The Standard*, in addition to ordinary reporting by its correspondents, published several appeals by the insurgents and announced that 'the insurgents had hoisted the Turkish flag, and proclaimed that they fought for their legitimate Sovereign the Sultan'.[152] And for *The Morning Chronicle*, the conclusion naturally followed that British-inspired Turkish laissez-faire was superior to Egyptian rule:

> The French are constantly confounding strong governments with national welfare. What if the government of the Sultan be not stronger than it has been? A country, of which the labouring classes are better off than the same classes in England [as Bowring, quoted on the same page, wrote was the case in Syria before the Pasha had occupied it], with mountainous ranges like Lebanon, exhibiting high cultivation by an industrious and spirited population, was not in a condition generally to be pitied.[153]

French reactions to the Syrian revolt, and the press's tendency to belittle it, were discussed in Chap. 2. In the three northern courts, though Turkish reform aroused only lukewarm feelings, there was no lack in readiness for criticising the rebel Pasha's regime, especially in contentious Syria. The Austro-German press thus came, as news of the revolt arrived and events progressed towards military intervention by the treaty powers, as close as a censored media could get to declaring open season on the Pasha's system. The *Österreichischer Beobachter* began reporting on the Syrian uprising as early as 1 July.[154] The rebellion continued to be regularly written on and, at the end of the month, the newspaper produced a document, entitled 'Proklamation der Bergbewohner des Libanon an die Freunde des Vaterlandes', containing a long indictment of Egyptian tyranny and of the illegitimacy of its government.[155] This was followed by the publication of a letter by Ibrahim full of sinister threats to the Lebanese and, on 13 September, the *Beobachter* reproduced a long portrait, borrowed from the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, excoriating the Egyptian governor.[156] The 15 October issue, finally, again quoted Bowring's report on Syria via *The Morning Chronicle*, focusing in particular on the evils of conscription (and incidentally showing Palmerston's presence of mind in having asked Bowring to edit his reports before publication).[157] The *Preußische Staatszeitung* followed a similar line, reporting for example on the repression of the Syrian insurrection in a story packed with atrocities and Egyptian brutality on 23 August, and producing a Lebanese petition to Abdul Mejid to free the

country from Mehemet Ali's cruelty and oppression on 14 September.[158] The *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, finally, was unfriendly in its reporting on Mehemet Ali from the start, and it began following the Syrian insurrection in earnest on 8 July.[159] Even the rigidly tight-lipped *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg* found the courage to speak, albeit in an indirect notice treating of the British parliamentary debates, of Mehemet Ali's regime in terms that had it as an 'unimaginable tyranny' and 'the most oppressive despotism that can be found on Earth'.[160]

Like the German readership, British opinion and the statesmen that both led policy and sold it to the public needed to be on the moral side of the conflict. Syria, especially from the time of the revolt, provided the ideal humanitarian cause. This helped rally a public that could only be concerned at the prospect of hostilities with France. It helped ensure that, even after Russell's anxieties rocked the cabinet in September–October 1840, there would be no going back on a course already set. Yet the Syrian cause also gave voice to the British espousal of the gradualist, Turkish model. Palmerston and the Whigs needed it all the more, indeed, that the case for Ottoman improvement had long had to be made against a background of doubt and doom-mongering. Syria was where the Pasha's failed system could be superseded and replaced by its superior, British-sponsored rival in a smaller and more controllable laboratory than was the ramshackle Ottoman Empire taken as a whole. The most vivid illustration, indeed, of British policymakers' commitment to Turkish reform was their continuing insistence on it during the conflict itself and after it was won, in 1840 and 1841.

When commodore Charles Napier, the commander of the forces anchored off Syria, called for its population to rise anew against Mehemet Ali, his first appeal was thus reportedly to Gulhané:

> Syrians, you know that a Hatti Sheriff has been proclaimed by the Sultan, which protects the life and property of all his subjects, and which is everywhere in full execution. Beside this the allied Powers undertake to recommend the Sultan to make your condition happy and prosperous. Inhabitants of the Libanus […] I call on you to rise and shake off the yoke under which you are groaning.[161]

Already, in May that year, in the heat of the diplomatic bargaining, Palmerston had taken the risk of bragging to Guizot about the positive effects of the Hatti Sheriff.[162] Before the guns had even stopped sounding, he insisted it be applied in Candia and, with the ink barely dry on the Napier Convention with Mehemet Ali, in Egypt: 'But there can be

no doubt that the Treaty of Commerce of 1838, and the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané must apply to Egypt; and they will make a great change, and will afford great security to the Sultan and to the People.'[163]

The Hatti Sheriff was to be ceaselessly invoked, in public and private, throughout the following months. The Ponsonby protégé Richard Wood came to be, after the invasion had succeeded, in virtual control of Syria itself. Originally a consul attached to the British embassy in Constantinople but now in possession of a broadly worded special *firman* from the Sultan, by early 1841 Wood was making appointments, writing laws, and he was busy working on constitutional arrangements for the territory. In February, he posted a new group of governors to the various districts and towns, and Ponsonby warned him that 'The Hati Sherif of Gul Khane will be a vast source of strength to those who seek to set up moderate and wise government.'[164] Ponsonby was preaching to the converted. As soon as the Anglo-Turkish troops had landed in Sidon, in October, Wood had in one breath announced the nomination of the Turkish governor, Ahmed Izzet Pasha, appointed a new town headman, and proclaimed the good news, to the inhabitants' 'greatest enthusiasm', that 'henceforth they should be governed according to the *Hatti Scheriff*'.[165] Throughout his reporting to Ponsonby in 1840–1, Wood would not cease to make reference to the paramount importance of tax fairness and of security of person and property as enshrined in the Gulhané edict.[166] Wood later developed doubts as to Izzet Pasha's attachment to the same values. After these were relayed in London, Palmerston wrote back to enjoin,

> I have to instruct your Excellency to represent immediately to the Porte that the interests of the Sultan and the Honour of the British Crown require that the Pasha sent to govern in any part of Syria should be a man who will, actively and in good faith, carry into effect the provisions of the Hatti Scherif of Gulhané, and fulfil the promises made to the Syrians in the name of the Sultan by the British Agent, Mr. Wood.[167]

The letter went on to question the Sultan's appointment and to request a change, and Izzet was soon recalled.

When the same fate awaited Reshid Pasha, meanwhile, Ponsonby and Palmerston became quite concerned. The fear, again, was not that this was Britain's man, but rather that his precious reforms were jeopardised. 'All the efforts of Great Britain to be useful to the Sultan in His Highness's present contest with Mehemet Ali would be marred if Reshid Pasha were to be removed from his post', Palmerston began to fret.[168] The foreign secretary asked Ponsonby to intervene, stressing again not Reshid Pasha's diplomatic role but that

> He is understood to have been the principal author of the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané […] improvements which ought to be introduced into the general administration of the Turkish Empire, and especially into the practical dispensation of justice […and] the person most likely to have the will and the means of enforcing practically throughout the empire the faithful execution of the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané.[169]

Indeed, when Palmerston was called to congratulate the Sultan formally on behalf of Queen Victoria, and the occasion came to celebrate the joint victory, the lesson he drew was again to stress the 'enlightened justice and benevolence' of Abdul Mejid's great act and to urge him to 'follow it up by such other practical measures of reform as may be necessary' even as the Edict itself was 'strictly and faithfully executed'. The Syrian revolt was proof that tyranny could only be short-lived, and in several florid pages, the Ottoman monarch was exhorted to build further on the foundation stone of the Hatti Sheriff, 'the memory of which will live for ever in the grateful recollection of the subjects of the Porte'.[170] All this, finally, came well after success had been achieved in diplomatic and military action: Britain had fought for a reforming Ottoman Empire, and it was not about to relinquish its prize.

Ronald Hyam argues that nineteenth-century British international policy was animated by an inextricable mixture of economic and ideological motives: 'Ideologically the Victorian desire was to *improve* the rest of the world by a programme of Christian regeneration, spreading civilisation on the British model. This was, they believed, the only perfection open to mankind, and it was God-ordained.'[171] Abigail Green suggests that British nineteenth-century imperialism was an imperialism of human rights, resting on the three-pronged promotion of commerce, Christianity, and humanitarian causes.[172] And both Green and Hyam note that what applied to the colonies also applied to Turkey even while Britain sought to prop it up rather than bring it under its control.

As to Palmerston, the indomitable British foreign secretary, he is often portrayed as a man of lukewarm political convictions. Diplomatic historians typically portray him as having been hardnosed and calculating, and his biographer Kenneth Bourne has him as 'an optimist, not an enthusiast; a pragmatist, not a moralist'.[173] Yet Muriel Chamberlain is no doubt right to warn that 'in fact the third Viscount Palmerston was an extraordinarily complex character'.[174] Palmerston had supported both the Catholic Emancipation of 1829 and the 1832 Reform Act. He came to the foreign office as a Canningite, primed to rise to the pulpit in defence of Liberal

regimes. David Brown's biography conjures up a more ideologically grounded character, laying stress on the future statesman's education under the philosopher Dugald Stewart, in Edinburgh, and on the influence of Scottish Enlightenment ideas.[175] That Palmerston thought Britain had a vocation to civilise the rest of the world is moreover on record:

> The system of England ought to be to maintain the liberties and independence of all other nations […]; to throw her moral weight into the scale of any people who are spontaneously striving for freedom, by which I mean rational government, and to extend as far and as fast as possible civilization all over the world. I am sure this is our interest.[176]

No doubt the Balta-Liman treaty was expected to benefit British trade, but such benefits and a genuine interest in Turkish reform need not have been mutually exclusive. At the very time of the Eastern Crisis, Palmerston was making belligerent moves for the 'opening' of China; he was pursuing fresh measures against the slave trade through the negotiation of a five-power treaty; he had been an interventionist for Liberalism in the Iberian peninsula for several years. It should come as no surprise that he took Ottoman reform seriously, as a long-term good both for Turkey and for Britain itself.

If Turkey, insufficiently national and too heavily laden with traditional institutions to look like anything but an *ancien régime*, was inimical to the French Oriental model, it only appealed to the northern courts through its reputation for immobility. Thanks to Mahmud's early efforts, however, the Ottoman Empire could pretend, by the 1830s, to Whig reforming patronage. After several exploratory years, decisive steps were taken in the form of the Balta-Liman Convention and Reshid's Edict of Gulhané. The Syrian rebellion of 1840 against Mehemet Ali, and the echo it found in the British media, could only help broaden the appeal of the Ottoman cause. Yet together with the years of pro-Turkish diplomacy to which it had been the handmaiden since 1833, Britain's espousal of Ottoman reconstruction, though a programme of free trade, laissez-faire, and security of person and property, had by then already made its alignment in the Eastern Question all but predestined. Born of the competition with Mehemet Ali and his French-inspired system on one side, and the scarecrow of autocratic Russia's grand designs on the other, the regeneration of Turkey had become, for the Palmerston–Ponsonby team, an end of its own. All that was needed further to envenom the confrontation between models was that paramount Victorian, and Middle Eastern, concern: religion.

Notes

1. The ceremony's description is taken from the *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 20 November 1839, pp. 1601–2 and the quote from the *Morning Chronicle*, 27 November 1839, p. 2.
2. Malcolm Yapp, *The making of the modern Near East 1792–1923* (London, 1988), pp. 106–8.
3. Richard Cobden, 'England, Ireland, & America', in *Political writings* (2 vols, London, 1867), vol. I, p. 22.
4. Marmont, *Voyage du duc de Raguse*, vol. II, p. 10.
5. Yapp, *The making of the modern Near East*, pp. 92–6.
6. See for example David Ross, *Opinions of the European press on the Eastern Question* (London, 1836), pp. iii–xvii and 10–104.
7. Charles William Vane, Marquis of Londonderry, *A steam voyage to Constantinople* (2 vols, London, 1842), vol. I, pp. 272–3.
8. *Journal des Débats*, 17 June 1839, p. 1; *Le Siècle*, 7 October 1839, p. 1.
9. Honoré Blanc, *Ibrahim, ou l'Orient et l'Occident* (Paris, 1840), p. 4.
10. L. d'Aubignosc, *La Turquie nouvelle jugée au point où l'ont amenée les réformes du Sultan Mahmoud* (Paris, 1839), p. 44.
11. Marmont, *Voyage du duc de Raguse*, vol. II, pp. 99–100.
12. Baptistin Poujoulat and Joseph-François Michaud, *Correspondance d'Orient* (7 vols, Paris, 1833–5), vol. II, p. 300.
13. *Le National*, 23 July 1839, p. 1; Victor Considerant, *De la politique générale et du rôle de la France en Europe* (Paris, 1840), p. 15.
14. Fabvier, Charles Nicholas, *Orient* (Paris, 1840), p. 12.
15. *Le Siècle*, 18 July 1839, p. 2.
16. 'Oeuvre organisatrice de Mehémet-Ali', *La Phalange*, 1 September 1839, p. 710.
17. *Le Constitutionnel*, 15 August 1840, p. 1.
18. Suzanne Marchand, *German Orientalism in the age of empire* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 100. Hammer-Purgstall's book was dedicated to the Tsar.
19. Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches* (10 vols, Pest, 1840), vol. IV, p. 682.
20. *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 25 January 1840, p. 122; *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung*, 18 January 1840, p. 71.
21. Metternich to Stürmer, 3 December 1839, in Metternich, *Mémoires*, vol. VI, p. 385.
22. Ibid., pp. 384–5.
23. Quoted in Ross, *Opinions of the European press on the Eastern Question*, p. 114. Full article pp. 109–23.
24. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 July 1839, p. 1605.
25. Metternich to Prokesch, 12 December 1840, in Prokesch-Osten, *Aus dem nachlasse des Grafen Prokesch-Osten*, vol. II, p. 191. For Prokesch-Osten's

positive views on Egypt, see Anton von Prokesch-Osten, *Erinnerungen aus Aegypten und Kleinasien* (3 vols, Wien, 1831), vol. II, pp. 105–202.

26. 'Etat de la question turco-égyptienne', 7 February 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Ägypten / 1, ff. 2–3.
27. Ibid., ff. 3–4.
28. Nesselrode to Medem, 6 August 1839, in Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte*, vol. II, p. 466–7.
29. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 27 June 1840, in Nesselrode, *Lettres et papiers*, vol. VIII, pp. 29–30.
30. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 July 1839, p. 1605.
31. Hallberg-Broich, *Reise nach dem Orient*, vol. IV, pp. 4–5.
32. 'Die orientalische Frage', *Hallische Jahrbücher*, 11 February 1840, p. 282.
33. Ibid., p. 283.
34. Ernst Münch, *Mahmud II, Padischah der Osmanen* (Stuttgart, 1839).
35. *Der Orient in seinem gegenwärtigen Zustande mit Rückblicken auf die Vergangenheit dargestellt in einer Reise über Konstantinopel, Kleinasien, Syrien und Palästina* (Wien, 1840), p. 49. For a British account finding Constantinople 'overrated', see Londonderry, *A steam voyage to Constantinople*, vol. I, pp. 156–61.
36. *Der Orient in seinem gegenwärtigen Zustande*, p. 28.
37. Schubert, *Reise in das Morgenland*, vol. I, pp. 140–217.
38. Karl Eduard Zachariä, *Reise in den Orient in den Jahren 1837 und 1838* (Heidelberg, 1840), p. 281.
39. Anton Johann Groß-Hoffinger, *Orient und Occident* (Berlin, 1833).
40. Friedrich von Tietz, *St Petersburg, Constantinople, and Napoli di Romania in 1833 and 1834* (New York, 1836), pp. 100–64.
41. Ibid., p. 133.
42. Anton von Prokesch-Osten, *Reise ins heilige Land im Jahr 1829* (Wien, 1831), p. 122.
43. Joseph Pallme, *Meine Reisen durch Sicilien, Aegypten, Syrien und Palästina* (Rumburg, 1840), p. 83.
44. Schubert, *Reise in das Morgenland*, vol. II, pp. 101–8.
45. 'Hegira', in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *West–eastern Divan* (Bern, 1998), p. 5. The *Divan* was first published in 1819 and reissued by Goethe in 1827.
46. 'Book of Suleika', Goethe, *West–eastern Divan*, p. 267.
47. Marchand, *German Orientalism*, p. 78. For German Orientalism's religious focus, see also pp. 95–120.
48. Ibid., p. 95.
49. Friedrich von Schlegel, *On the language and wisdom of the Indians* (London, 2001), pp. 496–514.
50. Schwab, *The Oriental renaissance*, p. 213.

51. Ibid., pp. 211–21.
52. Julius Klaproth, *Asia polyglotta* (Paris, 1823), pp. 42–4.
53. Bunsen, *Egypt's place in universal history*, vol. I, pp. x–xi.
54. Canning to Palmerston, 19 December 1832, TNA / FO 78/211, f. 337.
55. Ibid., ff. 351–2.
56. Ibid., ff. 341–2.
57. Webster, *The foreign policy of Palmerston*, vol. II, p. 769.
58. See for example Robert Walsh, *A residence at Constantinople* (London, 1836), vol. II, pp. 264–319; Edmund Spencer, *Travels in Circassia, Krim Tartary, etc.* (2 vols, London, 1837), vol. II, pp. 201–5; and of course Ross, *Opinions of the European press on the Eastern Question*, pp. 1–104.
59. Charles MacFarlane, *Constantinople in 1828* (London, 1829), p. 270.
60. 'Turkey and its resources', *The Literary Gazette* (July 1833), pp. 440–1; 'Turkey and its resources', *Edinburgh Review* (October 1833), pp. 114–43; 'Commercial relations with Turkey', *British and Foreign Review* (October 1837), pp. 468–506; 'England, France, Russia, and Turkey', *Quarterly Review* (February 1835), pp. 229–61; and 'Sketches of Turkey', *Foreign Quarterly Review* (February 1834), pp. 161–228.
61. Bailey, *British policy and the Turkish reform movement*, p. 165; Ross, *Opinions of the European press on the Eastern Question*, p. ix.
62. Urquhart to Palmerston, 12 February 1833, TNA / FO 78/233, ff. 140–9.
63. Urquhart's early career can be traced from TNA / FO 78/232, FO 78/233, FO 78/249, and FO 78/279.
64. Robert Monteith, *Reasons for demanding investigation into the charges against Lord Palmerston* (Glasgow, 1840); William Cargill, *Address of William Cargill to the South Shields Chamber of Commerce, May 4, 1840: on the foreign policy of England* (London, 1840); David Urquhart, *The crisis* (Paris, 1840); and *The Morning Herald*, 15 October 1840, p. 3 and 17 October 1840, p. 3. It is unclear to what extent earlier denunciations of Palmerston in the *Morning Herald*, e.g. 5 September 1840, p. 4, or 2 October 1840, p. 2, were inspired by Urquhart. Urquhart's campaign was meanwhile sneered at by *The Globe*, e.g. 18 August 1840, p. 2.
65. David Urquhart, *The portfolio* (London, 1836), pp. 54–8. On the *Portfolio*'s sources, see Charles Webster, 'Urquhart, Ponsonby, and Palmerston 1830–41', *English Historical Review*, 62 (1947), pp. 327–51.
66. G.H. Bolsover, 'Lord Ponsonby and the Eastern Question (1833–1839)', *Slavonic Review*, 37 (1934), pp. 98–118, at p. 106.
67. Holland, *The Holland House diaries*, p. 337.
68. 'Britain's threatened war with the world', *Quarterly Review* (December 1840), p. 265.

69. David Urquhart, *The Sultan Mahmoud, and Mehemet Ali Pasha* (London, 1835), p. 22.
70. Ibid., p. 45.
71. Palmerston to Bulwer, 13 September 1838, in Bulwer, *The life of Viscount Palmerston*, vol. II, p. 285.
72. Urquhart, *The Sultan Mahmoud, and Mehemet Ali Pasha*, p. 21.
73. David Urquhart, *Turkey and its resources* (London, 1833), p. 90.
74. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 4 February 1840, TNA / FO 78/389, ff. 36–7.
75. Urquhart, *Turkey and its resources*, p. 127.
76. Ibid., pp. 187–90.
77. Ibid., p. 131.
78. Ibid., pp. 121–2.
79. Ibid., p. 174.
80. On the pre-Repeal antecedents of free trade, both Whig and Tory, see Anthony Howe, *Free trade and Liberal England 1846–1946* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 2–3 and 8–10.
81. The related letters from Bowring to Granville are at TNA / PRO 30/29/16/9.
82. John Charles, Earl Spencer, *The reform ministry and the reformed parliament* (London, 1833), pp. 47–9.
83. Urquhart, *Turkey and its resources*, p. 16.
84. Ibid., p. 17.
85. Urquhart memorandum to Palmerston, 12 January 1833, TNA / FO 78/233, f. 140.
86. David Urquhart, *A statement of facts by a resident at Constantinople* (London, 1835), p. 30.
87. Urquhart, *Turkey and its resources*, p. viii.
88. Ibid., p. 30.
89. Urquhart, *The Sultan Mahmoud, and Mehemet Ali Pasha*, p. 40.
90. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 19 August 1838, TNA / FO 78/332, ff. 117–22.
91. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 16 and 21 April 1838, TNA / FO 78/330, ff. 214–17 and 232–5 respectively.
92. *Morning Chronicle*, 15 September 1838, p. 2.
93. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 13 October 1838, in Bulwer, *The life of Viscount Palmerston*, vol. II, p. 288.
94. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 29 April 1839, TNA / FO 78/352, ff. 110–11.
95. D'Aubignosc, *La Turquie nouvelle*, p. ix.
96. Münch, *Mahmud II, Padischah der Osmanen*, pp. 186, 160, and 196.
97. Barante, Dépêche Officielle, 25 October 1838, in Barante, *Souvenirs*, vol. VI, pp. 141–9.

98. Hautpoul to Paris, 31 May 1839, AMAE / Correspondance politique / Egypte / 8, ff. 118–28.
99. Reinaud, 'De la gazette arabe et turque imprimée en Egypte', p. 245.
100. Marmont, *Voyage du duc de Raguse*, vol. III, pp. 329–41.
101. Auguste Colin, 'Lettres sur l'Egypte: commerce', *La Revue des Deux Mondes* (January 1839), pp. 63–81; Jomard, *Coup d'œil*, pp. 14–19.
102. Bulwer, *The life of Viscount Palmerston*, vol. II, pp. 261 and 265.
103. Vernon Puryear, *International economics and diplomacy in the Near East; a study of British commercial policy in the Levant, 1834–1853* (London, 1935), pp. 126–7.
104. John Charmley, 'Britain and the Ottoman Empire 1830–1880', in Keith Robbins and John Fisher (eds), *Religion and diplomacy: religion and British foreign policy, 1815 to 1941* (Dordrecht, 2010), p. 73. See also Bailey, *British policy and the Turkish reform movement*, pp. 177–80.
105. Bailey, *British policy and the Turkish reform movement*, pp. 146–7.
106. Urquhart, *Turkey and its resources*, p. 191.
107. Ibid., pp. v–vi.
108. The correspondence between Paris and Constantinople makes it clear that the Edict of Gulhané came as a surprise in Paris: AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 279, ff. 133–63.
109. The memorandum and cover note, dated 11 and 12 August 1839, are at TNA / FO 78/383, ff. 66–7 and 68–75 respectively. Bailey describes this as having been written by Palmerston, in which case this is either a misinterpretation or there is another document by the foreign secretary in another file: Bailey, *British policy and the Turkish reform movement*, p. 184.
110. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 2 December 1839, PP / GC / PO /732. For the Ponsonby letters relating his conversations with Reshid, see 30 September 1839 and 24 October 1839, TNA / FO 78/359, ff. 61–2 and 157–8 respectively.
111. This translation is taken from *Morning Chronicle*, 27 November 1839, p. 2.
112. For example *Morning Chronicle*, 28 November 1839, p. 2; *Morning Herald*, 28 November 1839, p. 2; and *Morning Post*, 19 December 1840, p. 6.
113. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 5 November 1839, TNA / FO 78/360/1, ff. 14–17. See also Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston's policy for the rejuvenation of Turkey', p. 173.
114. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 2 December 1839, TNA / FO 78/353, ff. 156–7.
115. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 12 May 1840, PP / GC / PO / 740.
116. Quoted in Brown, *Palmerston*, p. 215.

117. Palmerston to Bulwer, 1 September 1839, in Bulwer, *The life of Viscount Palmerston*, vol. II, pp. 298–9.
118. For example and respectively in *Morning Post*, 2 June 1840, p. 6 and 11 June 1840, p. 4; *Morning Chronicle*, 7 February 1840, p. 3; *Times*, 31 January 1840, p. 6; *Morning Chronicle*, 9 April 1840, p. 3; and *Morning Post*, 9 April 1840, p. 5.
119. *Morning Chronicle*, 28 November 1839, p. 2.
120. 'Turkey, Egypt, France, Russia', *Foreign Quarterly Review* (January 1840), p. 392.
121. *The Times*, 28 November 1839, p. 4, 31 January 1840, p. 6, and 30 June 1840, p. 5.
122. Bailey, *British policy and the Turkish reform movement*, pp. 59–62; Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston's policy for the rejuvenation of Turkey', pp. 163–92; and for the post-1856 period, Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876* (New York, 1973), pp. 52–3. The second, post-1856 phase of the *tanzimat* was also patronised by Stratford Canning, now Lord de Redcliffe.
123. Canning to Palmerston, 19 December 1832, TNA / FO 78/211, f. 347.
124. For example in the *Morning Pos*t, 24 July 1840, p. 4; *Morning Herald*, 3 September 1840, p. 4; and 'Turkish Empire', *Westminster Review* (July 1833), p. 178.
125. *Times*, 6 July 1840, p. 12.
126. Barante to Soult, 22 November 1839, in Barante, *Souvenirs*, vol. VI, pp. 357–8.
127. Cochelet to Soult, 20 November 1839, AMAE / Correspondance politique / Egypte / 9, ff. 133–6.
128. Pontois to Soult, 5 November 1839, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 279, ff. 166–8.
129. Joinville, *Vieux souvenirs*, p. 136.
130. *Journal des Débats*, 27 November 1839, p. 2.
131. *La Presse*, 27 November 1839, p. 1; *Le Constitutionnel*, 27 November 1839, p. 1; and *Le Siècle*, 27 November 1839, pp. 1–2.
132. *Le Siècle*, 11 April 1840, p. 1.
133. *L'Orient européen social, religieux et littéraire* (2 vols, Paris, 1840), vol. II, p. 60.
134. Ibid., vol. I, p. 8.
135. Metternich to Stürmer, 3 December 1839, in Metternich, *Mémoires*, vol. VI, p. 379.
136. Ibid.
137. *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 20 November 1839, pp. 1601–2.
138. *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung*, 26 November 1839, p. 1347.

139. *Kölnische Zeitung*, 26 November 1839, p. 3; *Stadt Aachener Zeitung*, 26 November 1839, pp. 1–2.
140. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 November 1839, pp. 2622–3.
141. *Morning Chronicle*, 22 January 1839, p. 2.
142. Ibid., 16 September 1840, p. 2 and 18 September 1840, p. 2.
143. *Morning Post*, 9 May 1839, p. 2 and 24 October 1840, p. 7.
144. *Times*, 23 September 1840, p. 3.
145. Ibid., 15 October 1840, p. 3 and 16 October 1840, p. 2.
146. *Standard*, 5 October 1840, p. 2.
147. Published in the *Standard*, 7 October 1840, p. 2 and 12 October 1840, p. 3. The use of travel writing by the dailies was not consistently partisan, however: see Bowring in the *Morning Chronicle*, 22 August 1839, p. 3, Clot-Bey in the *Morning Post*, 30 September 1840, p. 7, and Puckler-Muskau in the *Morning Post*, 30 September 1840, p. 2.
148. *Morning Chronicle*, 19 May 1840, p. 4; *Morning Post*, 19 May 1840, p. 6, 1 June 1840, p. 7, and 12 October 1840, p. 2; *Morning Herald*, 26 May 1840, p. 6; *Morning Herald*, 31 July, p. 6; and *Standard*, 26 May 1840, p. 3.
149. See for example the *Morning Chronicle*, 19 May 1840, p. 4.
150. Ibid., 7 August 1840, p. 2 and 6 October 1840, p. 2. For Palmerston's intervention, see House of Commons, 6 August 1840, *Hansard's parliamentary debates*, Third Series, vol. LV, cc. 1368–75. For humanitarian action as contemporary foreign policy motive, see Abigail Green, 'Intervening in the Jewish question 1840–1878', in Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim (eds), *Humanitarian intervention: a history* (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 139–58.
151. *Globe*, 27 July 1840, p. 2.
152. *Times*, 29 July 1840, p. 4. See also *Times*, 27 August 1840, p. 3 and 12 September 1840, p. 5; *Standard*, 29 August 1840, p. 3.
153. *Morning Chronicle*, 1 October 1840, p. 2.
154. *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 1 July 1840, pp. 915–16.
155. Ibid., 29 July 1840, pp. 1057–8.
156. Ibid., 30 July 1840, p. 1063 and 13 September 1840, pp. 1295–6.
157. Ibid., 15 October 1840, pp. 1461–2.
158. *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung*, 23 August 1840, p. 941 and 14 September 1840, p. 1030.
159. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 July 1840, pp. 1519–20.
160. *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, 8 August 1840, p. 662.
161. *Globe*, 9 September 1840, p. 2; *Morning Post*, 11 September 1840, p. 2.
162. Guizot to Thiers, 13 June 1840, BNF / NAF / 20610, ff. 130–5.
163. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 14 November 1840, PP / GC / PO / 763 and 4 December 1840, PP / GC / PO / 767.

164. Ponsonby to Wood, 25 February 1841, in Richard Wood, *The early correspondence of Richard Wood: 1831–1841* (London, 1966), p. 233.
165. Wood to Ponsonby, 8 October 1840, ibid., p. 174.
166. For example, Wood to Ponsonby 25 June 1840, 19 September 1840, and 24 February 1841, ibid., pp. 145, 167, and 223–4.
167. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 9 November 1840, TNA / FO 78/391, ff. 69–70.
168. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 9 November 1840, TNA / FO 78/391, f. 72.
169. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 1 April 1841, TNA / FO 78/427, ff. 165–72.
170. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 24 February 1841, TNA / FO 78/427, ff. 132–43.
171. Ronald Hyam, *Britain's imperial century, 1815–1914* (Basingstoke, 2002), p. 90.
172. Abigail Green, 'The British empire and the Jews: an imperialism of human rights?' *Past and Present*, 199 (2008), pp. 175–205.
173. Bourne, *Palmerston: the early years*, p. 622.
174. Muriel Evelyn Chamberlain, *Lord Palmerston* (Cardiff, 1987), p. 1.
175. For the ideological underpinnings of Palmerston's foreign policy in the 1830s and 1840s, see also J.P. Parry, *The politics of patriotism* (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 147–52.
176. Palmerston to Lord Beauvale, 21 March 1838, quoted in Brown, *Palmerston*, p. 217.

CHAPTER 5

Christian Zionists

On 5 February 1840, Father Thomas, a Sardinian who was superior at a Franciscan monastery in Damascus, disappeared from the town along with his servant, Ibrahim Amara. Two days later the French consul, Ulysse de Ratti-Menton, who was empowered by the Turkish Capitulations to lead enquiries into judicial matters touching on Catholic establishments, alerted the Syrian authorities to possible wrongdoing. The friar and his helper, who were known to care for the sick and the poor, had last been seen in the Jewish quarter and suspicions of murder soon fell on a Jewish barber. The barber, subjected by the local governor to several days of torture, eventually made a full confession and incriminated further members of the Jewish community. More Jews were soon arrested and accused of having engaged in rabbinical, ritual murder. Spreading faster than spilt wine on a white tablecloth, the persecutions led to the death of a witness from flogging and went on to involve mass incarcerations, involving mere boys but also Jewish butchers and gravediggers, of whom three more died from police brutality. Meanwhile the French consul made his position all the more questionable by zealously spurring on the enquiry as head investigator and by coldly welcoming evidence based on torture. Indeed, the active participation of Ratti-Menton and the looser involvement of the other consuls—notably the British and the Austrian, who even hid a witness in his consulate—ensured the matter would fast gain publicity in Europe.[1]

The Damascus Affair promptly mobilised Jewish publications and associations. In Britain and France, in particular, a joint campaign was

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launched by Sir Moses Montefiore, President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and Adolphe Crémieux, lawyer, MP, and vice president of the Central Consistory of the Jews of France. On 10 July 1840, Montefiore embarked for Alexandria on a joint mission with Crémieux to plead the Damascus Jews' cause.[2] The affair also mobilised the European press. More material clues were unearthed, such as a shoe having supposedly belonged to Amara and a cache of animal bones that were proclaimed to be human. Relayed by Ratti-Menton among others, these were alternatively seized on or ridiculed by the Jews' detractors and defenders. (Incidentally, the double murder's true perpetrators were never found, and it is supposed that it may have had to do with a dispute between father Thomas and a Muslim muleteer.) On 13 March, the *Sémaphore de Marseille* had been the first to break the news that a group of Damascus Jews was suspected of having murdered an Italian cleric. Newspapers in Paris, London, and several German cities soon followed suit.

An Unwelcome Affair

The events of Damascus, coming at the worst possible time diplomatically, just when the powers were debating whether to seek fresh compromises or engage in coercive action, were a public relations disaster for Mehemet Ali. Sherif Pasha, the governor of Syria who was responsible for the mass incarceration and torture of so many innocents under the investigation, was his adopted son and son-in-law. It had all been initiated by the local consul of the one power that was friendly to him. And it just had to have happened in Syria, the territory his partisans said he ought to retain because he was the better steward for it.

When Mehemet Ali was painted by David Wilkie the following year (Fig. 5.1), he may have asked to be seated on 'a common "Dover", with leather straps for arms, and two cushions' that was a gift from Montefiore.[3] If so, we can be sure that the Pasha, with his keen sense of public image, was making a calculated statement, and that he was at the very least acknowledging the powerful resonance of the affair and of Jewish sympathies in Europe and in particular in Britain. The plight of the Damascus Jews indeed found a tremendous echo among the British public, of which the press response was but one part. When *The Morning Chronicle* first tackled the Damascus persecutions, on 18 April, it thus immediately set itself against 'such impossible accusations to the Jewish residents of Damascus'. Very soon they would be raised as proof against the Egyptian regime,

Fig. 5.1 *Mehemet Ali* by David Wilkie (painted in 1841 and now at the Tate Gallery. Image copyright: © Lebrecht Photo Library/Alamy Stock Photo). Possibly seated on a chair that was a gift from Montefiore

as when the newspaper wrote that 'The events of Damascus form a bad specimen of the boasted civilisation of Ibrahim Pasha, Governor of these countries.'[4] The affair would also be raised in parliament, and it was the object of a mass rally at the aptly chosen Egyptian Hall at the Mansion House in London on 3 July.

Jonathan Frankel, in his opus on the affair, already provides a wide-ranging and thorough survey of public European responses to the Damascus events. Yet it is worth examining these more specifically in the light and context of the politics of the Eastern Crisis. (Frankel's analysis of the European press is impressive, but it underplays such newspapers as the *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung*, important, with regard to the Eastern Crisis, as a Prussian political marker, and conversely it focuses, in France,

on the narrowly Catholic titles that were *La Quotidienne* and *L'Univers* more than on the high-circulation dailies.) The affair was greeted differently in Britain and in Germany on one side, and in France on the other, with repercussions for position-taking and the ability for the contending parties to sell their policies to domestic and foreign constituencies. Frankel moreover leaves open his interpretation of Thiers's handling of the affair and, though it remains difficult to provide a definitive assessment, more interpretative material may be contributed as to the French premier's motives for standing behind Ratti-Menton.

The outcry was the most pronounced in Britain. The percolating details of the enquiry, the buried bones, blood stains, and smuggled witnesses, were scrutinised with passionate attention and the evidence, blatantly forced as it was, was consistently found wanting. *The Globe* spoke of the 'monstrous charges brought against the Jewish community without the slightest evidence of probability'.[5] *The Standard* likewise reported assiduously on the investigation and unambiguously took the Jewish side. There could be no doubt, moreover, that this reflected badly on the Pasha and his French backers. *The Morning Post* was prompt to find the proceedings 'a deep stain on the government of Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pacha'.[6] At *The Morning Herald*, the editors took up the Jews' cause with gusto, comparing their persecution to trials for witchcraft:

> This appears to be the law at Damascus at the present day—that is, within the dominions which Ibrahim Pasha governs for his father, Mehemet Ali—both of whom have been represented, by superficial writers, as extraordinary specimens of eastern civilisation […]. They are both, we admit, remarkable specimens of energetic barbarism—but of barbarism, unquestionably, very dark and intense.[7]

As Frankel points out, *The Times* was a lone but influential voice prepared to provide space to sceptical opinions, especially the argument that if rabbinical murder could be ruled out among English Jews, it might yet be practised in the East.[8] The weight of readers' letters, however, even in the *Times*, was on the side of the Jews. Any fence-sitting may furthermore have arisen out of concern over the broader impact on the Jewish community if the Damascus group was ever found guilty conclusively, as when 'a Clergyman of the Established Church' wrote, 'It is, Sir, the interests of Christians, who revere the Old Testament as much, or even more than the Jews, to rebut from its religion the very suspicion of such a charge.'[9] The thrice-weekly evangelical *Record*, finally, described by one historian as 'Victorian Britain's most

successful religious newspaper', with 'the largest circulation by far', and as representing 'the political stance of the majority of Anglican evangelicals',[10] stood squarely on the side of the Damascus Jews. *The Record* condemned the 'horrible imputations' that had been made to the Jews; it took Thiers to task on his defence of Ratti-Menton; and it kept reporting regularly on the Damascus Affair throughout 1840, alongside coverage of the Syrian rebellion and hostile commentary on Mehemet Ali's regime.[11]

Public reactions were not confined to the press. Robert Peel raised the affair in parliament, asking for Britain's influence to be used on behalf of the Jews and incidentally exhibiting detailed knowledge of the case.[12] Palmerston must have relished replying that

> […] upon hearing of the circumstances, he had immediately instructed Colonel Hodges, the Queen's Consul-General at Alexandria, to bring the subject under the serious attention of the Pasha of Egypt, to point out to him the effect which such atrocities as these must produce on the public mind in Europe, and to urge him, for his own sake, to institute such inquiries as would enable him to punish the guilty parties, if guilty parties there were, and to make such an atonement as was in his power to the unfortunate sufferers.[13]

The Mansion House rally produced impassioned speeches and resolutions of the type expressing 'the greatest horror [at] the recital of the cruelties inflicted upon the Jews in the East' and 'earnest hope that an immediate and impartial public investigation will take place, so as to disprove, in the face of the whole world, the atrocious calumnies invented and propagated by their persecutors', words that were reported everywhere in the newspapers.[14] Extraordinarily, moreover, in the same month a similar affair arose at Rhodes over the disappearance of a Christian boy and in which the English representative, J.G. Wilkinson (not the same person as the eponymous Egyptologist), played the role of Ratti-Menton. In this case, however, Palmerston immediately chastised his vice-consul and made a peremptory request to the Turkish authorities to desist.[15] Ponsonby would soon be able to report that the case had been buried and the island's governor cashiered, all redounding to the timely credit of both the cabinet and the Turkish government.

In Germany and especially in Prussia, the Damascus Affair found a similarly powerful echo. In Damascus, the investigations were temporarily brought to a halt in March by the Austrian consul, Caspar Merlato,

when a prominent local Jew and Austrian subject, Isaac de Picciotto, produced a Christian alibi for the night of the murder. It was likewise the Austrian consul in Egypt, Anton Joseph Laurin, who would lead efforts in favour of retrials and justly conducted investigations in the following months, though George Hodges also handed in repeated remonstrances from Palmerston. In May, Laurin organised a demarche underwritten by several foreign consuls asking the Pasha to end the practice of interrogations under torture, a request with which Mehemet Ali appears to have complied.[16] Meanwhile, Thiers's response to the growing scandal was to have Cochelet delegate the vice-consul Maxime des Meloizes to make his own investigation.

The *Österreichischer Beobachter* first reported on the Damascus Affair on 11 April in great detail and on its front page. This repeated reports incriminating the Jews whilst also reporting on the harsh measures meted out to them.[17] The newspaper soon changed its tune, according to Frankel at Metternich's prompting.[18] The next day, indeed, another article pointed out that the bone find consisted of animal bones, and that the Jewish Easter fell at a much later date than the murder, ridiculing the blood-libel story. This also mentioned the Rhodes Affair.[19] From then on, the Viennese broadsheet's reporting faithfully took the side of the Damascus Jews. Since its format, and the absence of editorials, precluded overt position-taking, this took the shape of letters and extracts from other newspapers, such as a missive from the Syrian Jews to Mehemet Ali challenging him to stop being their oppressor and become their protector.[20]

The *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* likewise condemned the persecutions and supported the Damascene victims 'whose martyrdom recalls the darkest times of the Middle Ages'.[21] It did not hesitate to incriminate Ratti-Menton, publicised Cochelet's refusal to sign the Laurin petition, and it poured scorn on the Des Meloizes enquiry.[22] It even reported, wrongly, at the end of April, that the actual killer had been found and was a Druze.[23] The two Rhineland newspapers that were the *Kölnische* and the *Stadt Aachener Zeitung* covered the affair less regularly, yet they unambiguously came down on the same side as the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. The *Kölnische Zeitung* published letters by Crémieux and Laurin on 5 June.[24] Both newspapers dismissed the blood libel, and the *Stadt Aachener Zeitung* took the opportunity to denounce Ibrahim's rule in Syria as cynically manipulative of religious hatred.[25] The reputational fallout for Mehemet Ali was thus uniformly bad in Germany.[26] Count Hans von Königsmark, the Prussian ambassador in Constantinople, even wrote, after suggesting that the whole affair was a plot from the local

authorities intended to grab badly needed funds from the Jews, that this should be the occasion to move publicly against Mehemet Ali: 'Meanwhile this tragic event will not be exploited in vain if it is used to indispose public opinion in Europe and even in France against the Egyptian Pasha's barbaric and rapacious administration, and to reduce to its true value the so-called civilization he has introduced in Syria.'[27]

The reaction, judging from its official newspaper, was indeed the strongest in Prussia. The *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung* unequivocally took the Jews' side from the start. Picking the news up from the *Amsterdamsche Handelsblatt* in April, it began by observing how 'the Jews in Damascus find themselves in a deplorable situation' before blaming a 'fanatical population' and its 'nonsensical belief' in the use of Christian blood in Easter celebrations for the 'inhuman' manner in which the Jews had been thrown in jail and tortured.[28] The Berlin daily produced, along news of the enquiry, several letters and appeals in April, and in May it reported on the death of multiple victims in jail and the dangers posed to the community by anti-Jewish agitation in Syria.[29] Its coverage was, on average over the April–June period, almost twice-weekly, a record for European press treatment of the affair. On 10 June, the newspaper reproduced a long letter from the Austrian consul Merlato to Laurin, and on 15 June it gave details of Laurin's petition and its signatories, including Cochelet's shameful refusal to participate.[30] It even informed its readers of the Mansion House rally.[31]

Russia had its own track record of abuse when it came to Jewish populations, and the affair was not mentioned in the *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*. The Russian consul in Egypt, Medem, however, assisted Laurin in his demarche and was one of its signatories, informing his own superior in Constantinople of 'the persecutions practised against the Jews' and 'the horrible torments that have been inflicted on the Israelites'.[32] It is thus worth observing that, beyond the individual merits of a Laurin, a Metternich, or a Palmerston, the alignment of the powers and their representatives on the Damascus Affair (after some initial confusion, such as when the British representative in Damascus, Nathaniel Werry, supported Ratti-Menton) followed that on the Eastern Crisis. Or perhaps it was just that the French, in spite of the obvious, refused to admit the absurdity of their consul's and Mehemet Ali's position.

Heinrich Heine apparently assigned Thiers's stance in the Damascus Affair to a desire to court Catholic French opinion, though Frankel's dismissal of the notion—based on the correspondence between Paris and the

Holy See over another, contemporary Catholic–Jewish spat—is quite convincing.[33] Frankel believes it had more to do with standing by his consuls, men he needed in the Eastern Crisis.[34] He thus describes Thiers's attitude as contradictory, not frankly anti-Semitic. An indirect source writes that Thiers endorsed an article in the *Messager* to the effect that 'the Jews in the Middle Ages were fanatical enough to have required nothing if not Christian blood for their Passover; that the Jews in the East still maintain such superstitions'.[35] At the same time, his letters to Cochelet shed doubt on an investigation based on torture.[36] A look into Thiers's private archive has unfortunately yielded no new clues as the French premier's personal views. The impression prevails, however, that in his calculations the Damascus incident remained essentially subordinate to the Eastern Crisis.

Encouraging this impression is the relative indifference that appears to have characterised the leading French press organs. If opinion was not to be roused either way, there was less pressure to make a stand, however cynical this may sound. The *Journal des Débats*, after some initial shilly-shallying the most sympathetic of the main dailies, published and warmly endorsed Crémieux's first letter of protest on 8 April.[37] The editors later frankly took the side of the Jews and produced more letters providing evidence in their favour, writing of 'the afflicting details of the persecutions inflicted on the Oriental Jews accused of the murder of the priest killed in Damascus' and calling for the French government to intervene.[38] They also announced and bid good luck to the Montefiore–Crémieux mission.[39] Even at the *Débats*, however, reporting was only sporadic. It was even sparser in the other dailies. *La Presse* first mentioned the Damascus murders on 20 March, but in the *faits divers* section in its back pages and without further comment.[40] This news of a 'frightful crime' was followed up with another similar insert, also covering Rhodes, on 28 March, and by a letter providing a fuller account by a capuchin friar in May.[41] This was all there was, though, and the editors never commented on the affair, not even on the occasion of Thiers's speech defending Ratti-Menton in parliament. The *Constitutionnel* was similarly notable for its silence: its first mention of the affair seems to have been an indirect and agnostic report obtained from the *Journal de Smyrne* and published on 29 April, which incidentally tried to blame the Turks for similar excesses committed in a village named Haskuey.[42] On 30 May it reproached Ratti-Menton for the recourse to torture, and it published a fresh letter by Crémieux on 3 June, yet this was all the extent of its reporting.[43] *Le Siècle* was first roused to attention when the editors reacted, favourably, to the initial Crémieux letter.[44] Other than

a back-page mention of the enquiry's progress at the end of May, however, the affair was basically never raised.[45] It garnered little more than one laconic mention in *Le Temps*, lastly, and while *Le National* did publish three letters by Crémieux, the editors never offered their opinion.[46] It was not so much that the French press was hostile—indeed, it appears to have been less anti-Semitic than Frankel sometimes implies—it seems to have been uninterested. Perhaps this was a case of embarrassed patriotism over the French consul's ill-starred role. Yet in a country that prided itself as a champion of human rights the world over, such restraint was surprising unless the tribulations of the Jewish community of Damascus are presumed to have interested the average French reader less, say, than his British or Prussian counterpart.

As to the need to stand by a French diplomat in a sensitive region, this was no doubt important. Yet it was not important in isolation, and Ratti-Menton was of low rank in the service and of unremarkable standing as an individual. As has been seen, Roussin in Constantinople and Bourée in Beirut could easily, and even usefully be cashiered. Though Cochelet, in Egypt, was evidently convinced that the murder was 'the act of a fanatical Rabbi', there was still the opportunity, by the time Thiers reacted, to make him fall in line, as Palmerston did with both Werry and Wilkinson.[47] The ultimate worry, arguably, was France's position in connection to the Pasha's regime and its civilising credentials. Thiers hinted as much when he expressed private regrets over Ratti-Menton's zeal and contrasted local excesses with the Pasha's 'broad-minded views'.[48] The Crémieux letter published in *Le Constitutionnel*, while indicting Ratti-Menton and Cochelet quite seriously, strove to make Mehemet Ali look innocent (quoting a local lawyer, it wrote, erroneously, that 'Mehemet Ali had at first given the order to dispense justice, but without torture').[49] And *Le Siècle*, in its almost inexistent coverage of the affair, and though its editors professed themselves incredulous as to the charges levied against the Jews, found the time to write, 'But we regret that he [Crémieux] has let himself be drawn into issuing accusations against Mehemet Ali and against the Eastern Christians which no presumption authorises.'[50]

One dimension of this prioritisation of the broader Eastern situation, finally, may have had to do with the politics of the brewing Syrian revolt. In June, Ratti-Menton wrote to Thiers to forward a missive by the Lebanese leader Emir Beshir: the consul supported the rebel cause while explaining that he had cautioned the Emir and his partisans not to take up arms.[51] Ratti-Menton was also active in playing intermediary with Syrian

and Maronite figures, and he used religious leaders to provide support to Mehemet Ali against the rebellion. As Cochelet advised him,

> It is foremost in the Lebanon that we need to exercise our full influence to prevent the return of foreign intrigue and enlighten the chiefs and inhabitants. It seems to me that the steps taken, with this aim in sight, in approaching Emir Beshir, the Maronite patriarch, and Sheik Botros Kasam will have the happiest result. […] He will need to assure the Maronite patriarch of the highest protection the French government will not cease to accord to the Catholic cult and the Maronite nation, but he will warn him most formally that we have no intention of supporting any insurrection.[52]

This took place after Thiers had sprung to the defence of his consul, but the Syrian revolt was not the first of its kind, and taking the side of the local Christians, not the Jews, in the Damascus Affair may have helped gain favour with the Maronites at a time when it was necessary for them to stand firm by Mehemet Ali, or alternatively it may have attenuated France's own betrayal of their cause. As a footnote to these machinations, none other than Des Meloizes took over the Beirut consulate, from Bourée, in the middle of August.[53]

Frankel makes the point that paradoxically, France, the European country where the Jews enjoyed the most extensive civic rights became, in the affair, their opponent, whereas Austria and Prussia, where they remained far from full emancipation, acted as their friends. The answer provided is that in the country of civic equality and integration, the Damascus Jews could safely be viewed as backward Orientals, whereas paternalistic reflexes remained alive in places such as the Viennese court.[54] (Metternich's commitment is indeed all the more impressive that he is known to have made private anti-Semitic observations elsewhere.) Controls, restrictions placed on Jewish populations, had counterpart responsibilities and a degree of protection from the state. The relative French indifference, as evinced by the attitude of the mainstream press, showed such relationships had ceased to apply in a country of citizens. The Damascus Affair, meanwhile, helped solidify the camps created in the Eastern Crisis and around Mehemet Ali's controversial persona. France was again isolated at the Pasha's side, with the other four powers ranged against it. Yet most important was probably the difference in religious outlooks between an already largely secularised France, a deeply Catholic yet post-Enlightenment Austria, and, especially, the Protestant monarchies of Britain and Prussia.

Signs of the Times

The anonymous writer of the travel book *Der Orient in seinem gegenwärtigen Zustande*, contradicting the book's very title, conceived of the journey he was relating as a pilgrimage, an exploration of the Orient's religious past: 'The earliest religious education binds us to the land where Moses took God's chosen people, which Salomon's wisdom glorified, and David's psalms have made immortal.'[55] The author's journey ends in Jerusalem, and the last, numinous scene is a midnight ceremony performed in the church of the Holy Sepulchre.[56] Maximilian Bayern likewise began his volume with the words, 'I had long nurtured the ardent desire to tread the holy soil of that land to which the first memories of childhood attach, the cradle of our religion, and if I may so express myself, the motherland or our Saviour.'[57] And even Von Tietz, though he stood very far from the Holy Land and no closer than the other side of the Bosphorus, gushed that 'there is an indescribable emotion whereby one is overpowered on the first view of another quarter of the globe, particularly when that quarter is scriptural Asia'.[58] French authors, by contrast, even explicitly Christian authors of the political right, had long ceased writing in this style, a style that belonged to Chateaubriand's now dated *Itinéraire*. 'At the gates of Jerusalem, if I were asked from what standpoint I consider these antique lands, I would reply that there is no need to choose. Everywhere I confronted history, and my own recollections, to the things I saw', explained Henri Cornille.[59] Eugène de Salles sandwiched his trip to the Holy Land between two longer visits to Egypt; for Baptistin Poujoulat, the region was primarily the 'theatre of the wars of the cross'; and Lamartine closed his travels not with a candlelit ritual by the Holy Sepulchre but with a 'Political Summary'.[60]

The pilgrimage mode of travel account remained alive among some British writers, notably William Rae Wilson in *Travels in Egypt and the Holy Land*, Earl Lindsay in his *Letters on Egypt, Edom, and the Holy Land*, and W.R. Wilde in *Narrative of a voyage*.[61] In Britain, however, the Holy Land, beyond conventionally Christian imagery, invoked evangelical sensitivities which, drawing from a Protestant tradition of attention to the Bible, also involved unique Jewish sympathies. As Donald Lewis shows, in his study of nineteenth-century Christian Zionism, British Protestantism was steeped in a philo-Semitic tradition that had its roots in seventeenth-century Calvinist doctrine. The chosen people deserved reverence for having been the original recipients of God's mysteries. The Bible made it clear that, in spite of their

trials and tribulations, the Jews remained the subject of divine attention and divine promise. As the preacher and co-founder of the Church Missionary Society Thomas Scott wrote, the Jews had been 'honoured by God, and made blessings to mankind, above all other nations'.[62] Notwithstanding parallel ambitions to convert them to Christianity, British Protestants were often respectful, even admiring, of Jews, a stance that could be traced back to the repeated rediscovery of the Old Testament.

To be kind to the Jews was thus a Christian duty, the admonition raised in sermons and texts to kindle in one's heart 'a brighter flame of love to the Jews'.[63] This explained, alongside humanitarian concerns, the British mobilisation in favour of the Damascus victims (this admixture of impulses being on show at the Mansion House meeting, which brought side-by-side radicals and activists such as Bowring and Daniel O'Connell, nonconformist pastors, and Church of England evangelical luminaries).[64] The Jewish people was, however, the object of yet more specific assumptions with regard to Palestine and to the period in which the Eastern Crisis itself unfolded. The crisis hinged around a dispute as to the proper allocation of Syria, a territory which, as then conceived, included the Holy Land. This had essential implications, in the British evangelical context, as to the Jews and their relationship to that land.

Ever since the revolutionary wars, evangelical expectations had indeed been flowering of a return of the Jews to their antique homeland. Religious authors had begun to publish anew on biblical prophecies, particularly from the Old Testament, and to predict the approaching 'restoration of the Jews to Palestine'. A number of well-known divines had already published or delivered sermons on the subject in the 1800s and 1810s, their numbers growing further in the 1820s and 1830s: George Faber, Thomas Scott, Charles Simeon, Lewis Way, Alexander Keith, James Hatley Frere, Edward Bickersteth, Hugh McNeile, to name but a few of the most prominent.[65] In this unabashedly eschatological literature, the event was to herald either the beginning of the millennium or the return of Jesus Christ himself. And the Restorationist movement, it must be noted, belonged to the Church of England and Church of Scotland, not the nonconformist chapels. It may originally have been stimulated by anxieties born of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, later helped by the growing interest in the Holy Land of the Romantic era and, lastly, have been boosted by the expectation held among certain groups of Central European Jews that the Messiah would arrive sometime in the 1840s.

Whatever the trigger, in any case, the message itself was unambiguous. 'Our Lord specially prays for the LITERAL ZION', preached reverend

Bickersteth.[66] God had promised the Jews the return of Palestine, and 'it cannot fail'.[67] Such was written in prophecy, and such would come to pass. 'The Jews shall be restored as a nation to the land of their forefathers. In proof of this, I refer to the language of our text, as plain and explicit.'[68] The text here was Ezekiel 37.21, 22, but other key sources included the books of Isaiah and Daniel, among many Old and sometimes New Testament texts. 'The prophecies, exclusive of many others, need no comment', affirmed Alexander Keith. 'They declare, as clearly as language can, that the Jews shall return to Judea, and be at last permanently re-established in the land of their fathers.'[69] The continuing unbelief of the Jews was to cause them 'great tribulations', but grace would be given to those that survived, Jesus would appear to them, and they would be sanctified, to be again adopted as the people of God.[70] The Jews were indeed, crucially, to convert to Christianity as a prelude to the general conversion of the Gentiles and as part of the same divine promise.[71] And going further, the same prophecies and a careful analysis of history enabled the interpreter to set an approximate date for their realisation. Thus, as James Hatley Frere wrote,

> The Jubilee, together with the day of Atonement, not only holds out to the Jews the promise of their future restoration to their own land, when God shall pardon, and cast into oblivion all their past national sins and transgressions, through the atoning blood of Christ, but also fixes, when considered in connexion with the vision of the Great image of Daniel, the period when these promises shall be fulfilled.[72]

The 'SIGNS OF THE TIMES' were at hand, of which three of the most salient were the consuming of popery as a result, in Catholic countries, of the assault upon it by the 'infidelity' born of the French Revolution, the preaching to the Gentiles as spearheaded by Britain's missionary movement, and the preaching to the Jews.[73] For Faber, the Restoration and other events were 'about to take place', announced by a period of trouble and closing a great span of 1260 years.[74] According to Bickersteth, the approximate time for these events, beginning with the Restoration, could be discerned based on a prophetically verified period of twice 1260 years calculated from the first captivity of the Jews, in Babylon, and the Restoration might begin in 1843 or 1918.[75] (Perhaps the second date, coming as it did one year after the Balfour Declaration, ended up being more accurate.) Alternatively, counting with a period of 75 years foretold by Daniel and beginning with '*the Antichristian war of the infidel king and his associates* at *the time of the end*' (i.e. the Napoleonic wars), one

should expect the millennium to begin in the 1860s, and the Restoration some years before that.[76] For Frere, 1867 was the date marked for Christ's return and the union of the Jewish and Gentile churches, and 1847 was specifically that of the 'civil establishment and restoration of the Jews', noting that 'then, or very possibly several years prior to it, the awful event of the battle of Armageddon, will take place'.[77] Generally, millennial calculations thus centred on the 1860s, with the Restoration due to happen some number of years beforehand, depending on how troubled the times began to look.[78] Sometimes these troubles were even linked to the Eastern Crisis, as in reverend Frederic Fysh's *The Time of the End*, subtitled, 'Or the Sultan of Turkey the wilful king, and Mehemet Ali the king of the south pushing at him, as foretold by Daniel', or his *The times in which we live*, in which he did not fail to announce that 'the way [is] prepared for the return of the Jews to their own land'.[79]

This is not to claim that everyone in Britain expected the world to end in 1867. Many religiously indifferent people or high-church Anglicans were more likely to look upon prophecy as a curiosity. Even among evangelicals, there existed differences of interpretation, in particular between pre- and post-millenarians. The nonconformist editor Josiah Conder spoke for some who wished to prioritise conversion over the Restoration and were prepared to denounce pre-millenarian Restorationism as 'the offspring of Jewish error'—though notably Conder neither doubted the validity of prophecy, albeit in a vaguer, figurative sense, nor that the Restoration was a genuine prospect.[80] Nor should one conflate evangelical affection for the chosen people with radical agitation for Jewish emancipation under the British constitution: the evangelical Zionists were opposed to any such proposals, only considered likely to erode both the Jews' own identity and Britain's character as a Protestant state. Yet even if pre- and post-millenarians disagreed as to whether the Restoration would bring about the Second Coming or merely the millennium and the eventual conversion of the Gentiles, they found common ground in viewing the return of the Jews to Palestine as an important, indeed a divinely ordained endeavour. For the post-millenarian Simeon, it was a Christian duty to attend to what God had announced and to labour to convert the Jews; for the pre-millenarian Bickersteth, lack of agreement over the timing and sequence of the Second Coming must not be a hindrance to missionary efforts, and, 'Well may we labour by means of Religious Societies thus to "hasten the coming of his kingdom".'[81] The use of prophecy was, concretely, 'previously to the event, to raise general expectations, and thus

quicken us to duty, excite our hopes, and stimulate our labours',[82] and both pre- and post-millenarian aspirations thus tied into the widely popular British missionary movement.

Nor indeed should one underestimate the widespread willingness to take prophecy literally. The reason prophecy existed was to help prepare for actual events, and it was submitted to such painstaking exegesis because it was expected to yield practical results: invariably the literature contradicted figurative interpretations to reaffirm a literal view of the Restoration.[83] 'I daily see more plainly the total inconsistency of taking prophesies otherwise than in their grammatical historical sense', wrote the renown Jewish convert and missionary Joseph Wolff.[84] The Church of Scotland minister Alexander Keith's *Evidence of the truth of the Christian religion, derived from the literal fulfilment of prophecy*, emphasising literalness in its very title, was hugely popular, seeing well over 50 editions and translations in the ensuing decade. Thomas Chalmers hailed it as 'found in almost every home', and sales ran into the tens of thousands.[85] And lay writers might doubt the detail, but they rarely derided the principle of such literal analysis. Thus when Adolphus Slade met with Wolff on his travels and discussed prophetic interpretation, Slade expressed scepticism not because he found the whole idea absurd, but only because the calculation was unreliable: 'They are ingenious, and the connexion of them good; but no calculation from the data in the old Testament can be relied on.'[86] Many travellers to Palestine and the Middle East themselves harked back to biblical prophecy. One of Earl Lindsay's designs was 'to allude to the subject of many reflections in these volumes—the literal accomplishment of prophecy, as displayed in the actual condition of Egypt, Edom, and Syria', and Maxwell Macbrair found, in the depredations of Mehemet Ali's regime in Egypt, that 'thus the prophecies of scripture have been fulfilled'.[87]

Far from belonging to the fringes, the Restorationist literature, indeed, could expect to find a warm reception among a British public whose propensity it remained to view the Middle East through a biblical lens. The sheer number of reprints of many of the books quoted here is the proof of their reach. Restorationism was a mainstream subject, as its echo in the religious press showed, whether in *The Christian Observer*, which ran a long discussion on it in 1838, or the more militant *Protestant Magazine*.[88] And the subject found an equally earnest treatment in the general press. *The Globe*, in one example, produced a piece on the 'present state and prospects of the Jews', itself borrowed from the highbrow literary review *Fraser's Magazine*, writing that 'the Jewish race, at this day, is perhaps the most striking seal of

the truth of the sacred oracles'.[89] *The Quarterly Review*, in another, ran a long, supportive article on the subject in 1839 ('"Query", says Dr. Wolfe, in his last published journal, "is not Mohammed Ali, after all, the cruel lord mentioned in Isaiah as the predicted ruler over Egypt?"').[90]

This indeed remained what Boyd Hilton has famously called the 'age of atonement'.[91] Not everyone was necessarily caught up in evangelical fervour. Yet few were those for whom Palestine did not carry an explicitly religious resonance. Popular knowledge about and interest in the region continued to be mediated by religion and specifically the Bible. Even laymen's works such as John Carne's *Recollections of travels in the East*, John Hartley's *Researches in Greece and the Levant*, and Richard Burgess's *Greece and the Levant* took their reader through Syria Bible in hand.[92] *The Saturday Magazine*, a popular weekly dedicated to the diffusion of general knowledge, apart from running a set of articles on the 'Early lessons on Christian evidences' that did not fail to feature prophecy and the Jews, chose to print in 1837–9 a long set of pieces entitled 'Illustrations of the Bible from the monuments of antiquity' that was really a portrait of the region through biblical scenes.[93]

More broadly, this was the emergence of British Orientalist painting. But while French Orientalism, approximately born in the 1830s, began by depicting North Africa, British painting of the Orient remained, at least until the 1840s, chiefly biblical. The wrathful landscapes of Turner's *Tenth Plague of Egypt* (1802) or *The Deluge* (1805) had found emulators in the gloomy and doom-laden canvases of Francis Danby (*The Delivery of Israel out of Egypt* (1825), *Opening of the Sixth Seal* (1828)) and especially in the apocalyptic creations of John Martin, with their dark, tilting skies and minuscule human figures crushed by monumental structures on a divine scale (e.g., Fig. 5.2). Martin, in addition to earning critical acclaim and prizes for his biblical canvases, played host to royalty, political luminaries, literary celebrities, and 'artists, scientists and theologians' as he reached the height of his career in the late 1820s and early 1830s.[94] His biblical images were disseminated among a wide public as mezzotints sold either independently or in book form.[95] His themes and their interpretation chimed with the desires of a public hungry for eschatological metaphors. Art historians tend to date British Orientalism proper to the 1840s and beyond, beginning with Wilkie and David Roberts.[96] Yet Roberts, who had travelled to Egypt and Palestine in 1838–9, returned to Britain in 1840 to exhibit paintings of his travels at the

Fig. 5.2 *Jerusalem from the Road Leading to Bethany* by David Roberts (David Roberts, *The Holy Land: Syria, Idumea, Arabia, Egypt, and Nubia* (3 vols, London, 1842), vol. I. Reproduced by permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library). The work triumphantly toured the country in 1840

Royal Academy. An even wider distribution was achieved of what was to become *The Holy Land: Syria, Idumea, Arabia, Egypt, and Nubia*, a massive multivolume portfolio of prints (e.g., Fig. 5.2), through an exhibition touring London, Edinburgh, and 'almost every provincial town of consequence', and through its sale by subscription and to subscribers including such celebrities as Queen Victoria, Charles Dickens, and the Archbishops of Canterbury and York.[97] Though Roberts himself was not an evangelical, the volumes were laden with scriptural quotations. The introduction, which consisted of a history of the Jewish people, duly concluded, 'But Inspiration declares the triumphs of the future, with a voice firm and as distinct as that in which it ever pronounced the calamities of fallen Israel. The dawn of its unending day will be the restoration of the exiles of Judah.'[98]

Missionary Twins

The Damascus Affair resonated with deeply held British evangelical sympathies, and coincidentally took place at a date that matched prophetically inspired anticipations. So did the Eastern Crisis itself, and the tug-of-war it encompassed over Syria and the Holy Land. This had all the more potential diplomatic impact, however, that in both Britain and Prussia Restorationism could rely on established lobby organisations.

Spearheading missionary action among Jews and acting on Restorationist hopes, indeed, was the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, or LSJ for short. Founded in 1809, and originally patronised by such personalities as the Duke of Kent (the father of Queen Victoria), the abolitionists William Wilberforce and Zachary Macaulay, and the future chancellor of the exchequer Lord Bexley, the LSJ aimed to convert Jews to Christianity. It had its own periodical, under the appositely double-edged title of *Jewish Intelligence*, reporting on Jewish communities in Europe and elsewhere, engaging in theological debates, and edifying its readers with rare if moving conversion stories. It sent preachers throughout the country to spread the message and collect contributions, and it engaged in broadly defined missionary action. It was as deeply philo-Semitic as its aims allowed, holding the Jews to be 'that wonderful nation, whose blessing and privilege it is to be the stewards and depositaries of the Divine oracles'.[99] The LSJ was also prepared to mobilise when Jews were persecuted or threatened, as happened in Damascus and in Rhodes. It thus sent a memorial to Palmerston in May 1840 to lobby for intervention on the victims' behalf, and its representatives, who included the Bishop of Ripon, met with the foreign secretary in person to press the point.[100] It fought the blood libel through the press and at the pulpit. And it sent its own enquirer to Damascus, the convert George Pieritz, to gather information and publish a book, partly serialised in *The Times*, to rebut the charges.[101]

The still limited historical literature on nineteenth-century Christian Zionism tends predominantly to have trained its lens on Lord Ashley, the future Shaftesbury—Donald Lewis's invaluable contribution being a prime example of such focus. This is understandable given Shaftesbury's high profile as a social progressive, his evangelical piousness, his family ties to such powerful politicians as Palmerston and Melbourne, and the rich written source his thousand-plus page diary offers. (Ashley's wife, Lady Cowper, was Palmerston's step- and likely natural daughter, and he enjoyed a close connection with the foreign secretary.) Yet excessive concentration

Fig. 5.3 *Joshua Commanding the Sun to Stand Still* by John Martin (first presented at the Royal Academy in 1816 and printed as a mezzotint in 1827. The picture is privately owned. Image copyright: © Liszt collection / Alamy Stock Photo). The work depicts the Hebrews conquering the Holy Land with divine help

on Ashley risks paradoxically underrating the LSJ's influence. Sir Thomas Baring, not Ashley, was president of the LSJ: son of the eponymous banking house's founder, landed magnate, MP, patron of the arts, and future fellow of the Royal Society. Thomas Baring's son was Francis Baring, the chancellor of the exchequer. Another prominent member and speaker for the LSJ was John Labouchere, 'an extremely religious man and well known for his charitable and philanthropic labours'.[102] John lived next door in London to his elder brother, Henry Labouchere, the President of the Board of Trade and another cabinet member, and the Laboucheres, through their mother, were the nephews of Thomas Baring and the cousins of Francis Baring. The LSJ's reach extended into the highest echelons of British society, and through the Baring–Labouchere compact it enjoyed a second confidential line of access, alongside Ashley, into the deliberations of the Melbourne cabinet. Its patronage by such figures, finally, and by prominent Church of Scotland clergy and Anglican bishops (the Archbishop of Canterbury

would become a patron in August 1841),[103] proved that, far from belonging to the lunatic fringe, it enjoyed establishment status and was widely considered a serious and respectable institution.

The LSJ also had ties to a sister organisation in Prussia, so that it was able to act as a backdoor diplomatic channel on religious issues. Philo-Semitic British evangelicalism itself indeed found parallels in contemporary Prussian Pietism. Thus, in January 1822, 'a group of men [had] gathered at the Berlin residence of General Job von Witzleben to found the Berlin Society for the Promotion of Christianity among the Jews'.[104] The society (for short, the BSJ) published missionary journals, and it became the centre for various auxiliary societies in Prussia. It drew, in its home state, from a high-level access perhaps even superior to that of the LSJ in Britain. Witzleben had been chief of the Military Cabinet, and fellow founding members included the court chaplain Franz Theremin, the theologian Friedrich August Tholuck, and Johann Peter Ancillon, once tutor to the crown prince and a future foreign affairs minister. Later directors included Ernst Hengstenberg, founder and editor of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, the professor of ecclesiastical law and politician Friedrich Julius Stahl, and several close associates of the future Friedrich Wilhelm IV. As Christopher Clark writes, though the society did not enjoy wide clerical membership, it 'did represent the attitudes of a disproportionately powerful, if socially narrow, Christian constituency to the "Jewish Question" in Prussia'.[105]

Admittedly, German neo-Pietism differed from the British brand in its lack of millennial expectations, and in Prussia the accent was more on conversion as Christian obligation, and less on the Jews as people.[106] Theologians such as Hengstenberg were prepared to take Old Testament prophecy literally, but this was mainly to prove that it had foretold Christ's original coming and Christianity.[107] Relating the Hebrew prophecies solely to Christianity's advent risked robbing them of any predictive value as to the Restoration or the Second Coming. Tholuck's view was thus that, while part of the Old Testament's value did lie in the foretelling of the arrival of Jesus Christ as redeemer, the interpretation must be essentially theological, and if the Second Coming was also comprised in the prophecies, this was not attached to a specific timeframe or to the Restoration.[108] Bunsen's notes likewise show that he had read Faber's exegeses on the matter, but he doubted the literal validity of prophecy except in a self-referential, biblical context.[109]

Nevertheless, preaching among the Jews was best done, for a devout such as Bunsen, by beginning in Palestine and by tying conversion to Jewish national feeling and to their ancestral land:

> It is thus clear, that the actual mission work among the Jews will begin, when the Gospel is preached to them in connection with the land of their fathers. Neither is it a question of undertaking a crusade to hand over Palestine to converted Jews: hundreds of thousands of them could live there under the protection of the Porte.[110]

When the Pietist review *Neueste Nachrichten aus dem Reiche Gottes* commented on the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané, this was to read into it an opening for missionary work in Palestine:

> Because this law protects all religions, so does it open to the missions and the propagation of the Bible a new sphere of activity of the most satisfactory kind, and indeed the point in time can no longer be so far, when Israel's sons will acknowledge and adopt the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and his son Jesus Christ, and in accordance with the prophecies of Zacharia 9,16 and John 10,16. He will welcome again his flock.[111]

When the BSJ was founded, Witzleben wrote to Thomas Baring with a report including a transcript of the opening address, its constitution, and a founding members' list that was accordingly reproduced in the LSJ's periodical. 'The conversion of all the other nations will only be completed after their [the Jews'] conversion, nay, that the Israelite Christians will be the principal instruments in the universal conversion', the address wrote, implying shared messianic goals.[112] And theological distinctions need not hamper cooperation. The two societies remained in close contact into the 1830s. They exchanged visits and members. Many of the missionaries on the LSJ's great missions were Prussian or Prussian-educated, including George Pieritz, its appointed enquirer into the Damascus case, and John Nicolayson, the man who did most, in the period, for its establishment in Jerusalem.[113] British missionaries similarly worked in Prussian Poland in cooperation with the BSJ.[114] As twin organisations, the two societies were ready to work alongside each other, by 1840, to influence the diplomatic process as it related to the Holy Land.

When Lord Ashley learnt of the foreign secretary's difficulties in the cabinet, his response was to propose 'writing constantly in the *Times* against Mehemet Ali to unmask his bad proceedings and take away all sympathy

from his atrocious character'.[115] The door was open for Palmerston to appeal, directly or indirectly, to evangelical sympathies both in order to strengthen his precarious position domestically and to cement his coalition internationally. The British foreign secretary had already written to Hodges on the Damascus events:

> You will represent to Mehemet Ali the extreme disgrace which the barbarous extremities perpetuated at that place reflect upon his administration, and you will observe upon the astonishment Europe will feel at finding that under the rule of a chief who has prided himself upon promoting civilization, upon establishing security for person and property, and upon maintaining public order, atrocities such as these should have been committed.[116]

At the end of May, Palmerston wrote again to stress 'the injurious effect which has been produced upon public opinion in England', and when the Crémieux–Montefiore mission left, he instructed Hodges to second the deputation's efforts and provide it with 'every facility for the prosecution of their enquiries', these instructions to extend to the Prussian interpreter Louis Loëwe and to Adolphe Crémieux, even though they were not British subjects, as they were 'engaged in an understanding in which the British Government feel an interest'.[117] These moves earned Palmerston popularity domestically and, as Ashley appreciated, indirectly helped push his policies through. One of the motions passed at the Mansion House meeting, whose transcript was reproduced throughout the London press, was to thank the foreign secretary for his prompt interference in the Damascus Affair. Intervention on Jewish behalf was the occasion for the press publication of flattering letters to and by Palmerston, for example when *The Morning Chronicle* printed an exchange of letters between the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the foreign ministry on the subject of British interposition at Damascus.[118] *The Morning Post* published a number of letters of thanks to the Lord Mayor for calling the Mansion House meeting, one of which by Palmerston 'to say how much gratified I feel at the manner in which my name is mentioned in the fourth resolution'.[119] Letters of thanks were also exchanged with the Lord Mayor by the Prussian ambassador Heinrich von Bülow and the Turkish plenipotentiary Chekib Pasha, and both Brünnow and Nesselrode published letters of sympathy for the Damascus Jews in the British press.[120] This made the link between diplomacy in the East and the affair, which was also implicitly made by the newspapers' parallel reporting on political events.

By contrast, the affair weakened Thiers's ability to resort to public diplomacy in the crisis, whether or not he scored points with a legitimist Catholic opinion on which his position was not reliant. At home, Thiers was challenged in parliament in June by Bénédict Fould and François-André Isambert, belonging to the far more important groupings, for him, that were the centre and dynastic left respectively. The best the French premier could do was to stonewall his interlocutors, dance uneasily around the issue of torture, then appeal to nationalism by defending a consul 'locked in struggle with all the other foreign agents'. Incidentally he also attacked the international Jewish community with veiled conspiracy arguments, expounding the idea that 'they are more powerful in the world than they pretend to be'.[121] (Laurin had had the bad idea of writing directly to Baron James de Rothschild, consul-general in Paris under Rüdolf Apponyi, and ask him to put pressure on Ratti-Menton via Paris.[122]) But the issue, from a diplomatic perspective, was not how the affair looked in France, but how it reflected on the Pasha and on French support for his regime in both Britain and Germany: constituencies in which Thiers stood to outmanoeuvre Palmerston through his cabinet difficulties on one side, and Metternich through the threat of popular, radical appeal on the other. In both of these arenas, the Damascus Affair only cost him credibility. As Guizot had just warned the French premier from his post in London, 'The affair is making quite a bit of noise here; opinion is convinced of the Jews' innocence and is provoking the intervention of the governments of Europe in their favour.'[123]

As for Montefiore, he had the misfortune of arriving in Alexandria just after the four powers had delivered their ultimatum to Mehemet Ali, in the middle of August. (In another irony, this was also when Madden, who as Montefiore's physician and friend was travelling with him, chose to convey the Anti-Slavery Convention's award.) Mehemet Ali granted the Damascus Jews a pardon later that month—and perhaps it is the pardon that was meant to be stressed by the choice of chair in the Wilkie painting (Fig. 5.1)—but, finding this insufficient, Montefiore moved on to Constantinople. The news of the pardon, besides, only appeared in the European press in October, too late to help the Pasha.

The Damascus Affair combined with the Syrian revolt to provide the British foreign secretary with a humanitarian angle in the Eastern Crisis. The Rhodes Affair even helped burnish the Sultan's reputation, and to showcase Anglo–Turkish cooperation. One also notes the proximity of the Mansion House rally, exactly two days, to Palmerston's own resignation

drama. Meanwhile both Thiers and Mehemet Ali stood tarnished. Perhaps French opinion remained mostly indifferent, or even eager to punish the Jews on the ultra-Catholic fringe, but internationally their credibility had been undermined. As both Palmerston's and Thiers's positions were being rocked by the signature of the Convention of London, and as both resorted to public diplomacy for defence, such relative shifts in their credibility mattered.

Yet of greatest significance was that the affair and the Eastern Crisis itself tapped, in Britain and to some extent in Prussia, into expectations and plans tying Palestine to the Jews and to Protestant proselytising among them. That the Damascus Affair took place at the same time as the crisis was a coincidence; that it had such an echo was not. The airing of religious incidents, indeed, and the fanning of religious fervour, stood to add Palestine as one of the issues to be addressed as part of a solution to the conflict at hand. In Britain in particular, the wish was widely shared for the crown to extend its protecting arm over the dispersed Jews, and it combined with the notion that Palestine was their intended destination. This, in turn, tied into the British and Prussian missionary vocations and could rely, as an object, on the practical sponsorship of such organisations as the LSJ and BSJ. The stage was set both for religion to impart an increased acuteness to the crisis in its post-15 July 1840 phase, and for the Holy Land to become again, after so many centuries of neglect, an area of contention for the European powers.

Notes

1. This summary of the affair's early course is drawn from Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, pp. 17–48.
2. The story of Crémieux and Montefiore's campaign is told in Green, *Moses Montefiore*, pp. 133–57.
3. Frederick William Robert, Viscount Castlereagh, *A journey to Damascus* (London, 1847), vol. I, pp. 233–4.
4. *Morning Chronicle*, 18 April 1840, p. 2 and 11 May 1840, p. 2.
5. *Globe*, 5 July 1840, p. 2.
6. *Morning Post*, 11 April 1840, p. 2.
7. *Morning Herald*, 25 April 1840, p. 4.
8. Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, pp. 137–46.
9. *Times*, 26 August 1840, p. 5.
10. Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism*, pp. 93–5.
11. *Record*, 6 July 1840, p. 3; 3 August 1840, p. 3; 16 July 1840, p. 4; and 30 July 1840, p. 3.

12. House of Commons, 22 June 1840, *Hansard's parliamentary debates*, Third Series, Vol. LIV, cc. 1383–4.
13. Ibid., c. 1386.
14. *Morning Chronicle*, 4 July 1840, p. 7; *Morning Post*, 4 July 1840, p. 2; *Standard*, 4 July 1840, p. 3; *Globe*, 5 July 1840, p. 2; *Morning Herald*, 4 July 1840, p. 6; *Times*, 4 July 1840, pp. 6–7; and *Record*, 6 July 1840, p. 3.
15. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 5 May 1840, TNA / FO 78/389, ff. 115–18; Palmerston to Wilkinson, 23 May 1840, TNA / FO 78/413, ff. 161–4.
16. The note is at AMAE, in Cochelet to Thiers, 7 May 1840, AMAE / Correspondance Commerciale et Consulaire / Alexandrie / 28, ff. 471–2.
17. *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 11 April 1840, pp. 515–16. The front-page treatment respected the newspaper's habitual country-order of reporting, which had Turkey, or the Ottoman Empire, first.
18. Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, p. 138.
19. *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 12 April 1840, p. 521.
20. Ibid., 26 May 1840, p. 741.
21. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 May 1840, p. 1071.
22. Ibid., 13 May 1840, p. 1071; 14 June 1840, pp. 1326–7; and 21 June 1840, p. 1384.
23. Ibid., 26 April 1840, p. 935.
24. *Kölnische Zeitung*, 5 June 1840, pp. 3–4.
25. *Stadt Aachener Zeitung*, 3 April 1840, p. 1.
26. The exception, among important newspapers, was the *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung*: Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, pp. 141–7. Frankel has a more mixed opinion of the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*'s position than is presented here.
27. Königsmark to Werther, 20 May 1840, quoted in Joseph Meisl, 'Beitrage zur Damaskus Affäre', in Ismar Elbogen (ed.), *Festschrift zu Simon Dubnows Geburtstag* (Berlin, 1930), p. 229.
28. *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung*, 15 April 1840, p. 423.
29. Ibid., 27 April 1840, p. 467; 29 April 1840, p. 475; 30 April 1840, p. 479; 11 May 1840, p. 535; and 17 May 1840, p. 547.
30. Ibid., 10 June 1840, p. 639 and 15 June 1840, p. 659.
31. Ibid., 11 July 1840, pp. 763–4.
32. Medem to Bouteneff, 25 May 1840, in Cattaui, *Mohamed Aly d'après les archives russes*, vol. III, p. 372.
33. Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, pp. 192–3.
34. Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, pp. 191–4.
35. Ibid., p. 136.
36. Ibid. and Thiers to Cochelet, 9 May and 19 June 1840, AMAE / Correspondance Commerciale et Consulaire / Alexandrie / 28, ff. 454 and 492–3.
37. *Journal des Débats*, 8 April 1840, p. 3.
38. Ibid., 20 April 1840, pp. 1–2.

39. Ibid., 28 June 1840, p. 1; 5 July 1840, p 2.
40. *La Presse*, 20 March 1840, p. 3.
41. Ibid., 28 March 1840, p. 3; 4 May 1840, p. 3.
42. *Le Constitutionnel*, 29 April 1840, p. 2.
43. Ibid., 30 May 1840, p. 2 and 3 June 1840, p. 4. Frankel attributes, with reason, the newspaper's coolness to ministerial restraint and Thiers's own ambiguous stance: Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, p. 115.
44. *Le Siècle*, 9 April 1840, p. 1.
45. Ibid., 27 May 1840, p. 1.
46. *Le Temps*, 5 June 1840, p. 2; *Le National*, 9 April 1840, pp. 3–4; 9 May 1840, pp. 7–8; and 5 June 1840, p. 4.
47. Cochelet to Thiers, 30 April 1840, AMAE / Correspondance Commerciale et Consulaire / Alexandrie / 28, ff. 439–40. For Cochelet's conviction of Jewish guilt see also Cochelet to Thiers, 5 March 1840, AMAE / Correspondance politique / Egypte / 9, ff. 321–2 and 2 April 1940, AMAE / Correspondance politique / Egypte / 10, ff. 9–10. For Werry's initial blunder and his scolding by Palmerston, see Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, p. 53 and Palmerston to Werry, 21 May 1840, TNA / FO 195/162/2.
48. Thiers to Cochelet, 27 June 1840, AMAE / Correspondance Commerciale et Consulaire / Alexandrie / 28, ff. 495–6.
49. *Le Constitutionnel*, 3 June 1840, p. 4.
50. *Le Siècle*, 9 April 1840, p. 1. Also quoted in Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, p. 114.
51. Ratti-Menton to Thiers, 5 June 1840, AMAE / Correspondance Politique des Consuls / Turquie / Consulats divers / 11, ff. 224–5.
52. Cochelet to Ratti-Menton, 20 August 1840, AMAE / Correspondance politique / Egypte / 10, f. 272.
53. Cochelet to Thiers, 14 August 1840 and Thiers to Cochelet, 25 August 1840, AMAE / Correspondance Commerciale et Consulaire / Alexandrie / 28, ff. 515 and 519 respectively.
54. Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, pp. 191–4 and 440–1.
55. *Der Orient in seinem gegenwärtigen Zustande*, p. 2.
56. Ibid., pp. 281–3.
57. Bayern, *Wanderung nach dem Orient*, p. 1.
58. Von Tietz, *St Petersburg, Constantinople, and Napoli di Romania*, p. 106.
59. Henri Cornille, *Souvenirs d'Orient, Constantinople, Grèce, Jérusalem, Égypte, 1831, 1832, 1833* (2nd edn, Paris, 1836), p. 314.
60. Eusèbe de Salles, *Pérégrinations en Orient* (2 vols, Paris, 1840), vol. II, pp. 255–421; Poujoulat, *Voyage dans l'Asie Mineure*, vol. I, pp. v–vii; and Alphonse de Lamartine, *Voyage en Orient 1832–1833* (2nd edn, 2 vols, Paris, 1841), vol. II, pp. 543–74.
61. William Rae Wilson, *Travels in Egypt and the Holy Land* (London, 1831); Alexander Crawford, Earl of Lindsay, *Letters on Egypt, Edom, and the Holy*

Land (2 vols, London, 1838); and W.R. Wilde, *Narrative of a voyage* (London, 1840).

62. Thomas Scott, *The Jews a blessing to the nations, and Christians bound to seek their conversion* (London, 1810), p. 4.
63. Andrew Bonar, *Narrative of a mission of inquiry to the Jews from the Church of Scotland in 1839* (Philadelphia, 1843), pp. v–vi.
64. See Green, *Moses Montefiore*, pp. 140–1 and, for a contemporary report, *Morning Chronicle*, 4 July 1840, p. 7. For British intervention in Jewish causes over a longer period spanning most of the nineteenth century, see Green, 'The British empire and the Jews'.
65. Edward Bickersteth's bibliography alone has more than thirty books on biblical prophecy for the 1820s and 1830s to 1835: Edward Bickersteth, *A practical guide to the prophecies* (London, 1835), pp. 252–4. See also Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism*, pp. 74–84.
66. Edward Bickersteth, *The restoration of the Jews to their own land* (2nd edn, London, 1841), p. 33. First published in 1835.
67. Ibid., p. 37.
68. Hugh McNeile, *Popular lectures on the prophecies relative to the Jewish nation* (3rd edn, London, 1840), p. 141.
69. Alexander Keith, *Evidence of the truth of the Christian religion, derived from the literal fulfilment of prophecy* (10th edn, Edinburgh, 1833), p. 389.
70. Bickersteth, *The restoration of the Jews*, pp. 152–63.
71. See for example Bickersteth, *A practical guide to the prophecies*, pp. 47–59; George Stanley Faber, *A general and connected view of the prophecies* (2nd edn, 2 vols, London, 1809), p. iii; and Charles Simeon, *The conversion of the Jews* (London, 1821), pp. 43–4.
72. James Hatley Frere, *Eight letters on the prophecies: relating to the Last Times* (London, 1831), p. 25.
73. Bickersteth, *The restoration of the Jews*, pp. 134–6 and 163.
74. Faber, *A general and connected view of the prophecies*, p. iv.
75. Bickersteth, *A practical guide to the prophecies*, pp. 76–7.
76. Faber, *A general and connected view of the prophecies*, p. 276.
77. Frere, *Eight letters on the prophecies*, pp. 29–31.
78. Such is in particular the chronology on which a conference at the Albury estates of the banker and philanthropist Henry Drummond settled. See Henry Drummond, *Dialogues on prophecy* (London, 1828), pp. ii–iii and 350–1 and Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism*, p. 85.
79. Frederic Fysh, *The Time of the End* (Bath, 1839) and *The times in which we live* (Bath, 1839), p. 9.
80. Josiah Conder, 'Modern Millenarianism', *Eclectic Review* (March 1829), pp. 198–230.
81. Simeon, *The conversion of the Jews*, pp. 27–31 and Bickersteth, *A practical guide to the prophecies*, p. 72.

82. Bickersteth, *A practical guide to the prophecies*, p. 228.
83. See for example McNeile, *Popular lectures on the prophecies*, pp. 149–52.
84. Joseph Wolff, *Journal of the reverend Joseph Wolf in a series of letters to Sir Thomas Baring* (London, 1839), p. 194.
85. Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism*, p. 138.
86. Adolphus Slade, *Records of travels in Turkey, Greece* (2nd edn, 2 vols, London, 1833), vol. II, p. 457.
87. Lindsay, *Letters on Egypt, Edom, and the Holy Land*, vol. I, p. vi; Macbrair, *Sketches of a missionary's travels*, p. 149.
88. *Christian Observer*, May 1838, pp. 267–7, July 1838, p. 443, August 1838, pp. 518–20, and November 1838, pp. 665–8; *Protestant Magazine*, March 1840, p. 82.
89. *Globe*, 23 September 1840, p. 1.
90. 'State and prospects of the Jews', *Quarterly Review* (January 1839), p. 171.
91. Boyd Hilton, *The age of atonement* (Oxford, 1988). The title is a wink at Asa Brigg's classic, *The age of improvement*, to which the previous chapter also alludes.
92. John Carne, *Recollections of travels in the East* (London, 1830); John Hartley, *Researches in Greece and the Levant* (2nd edn, London, 1833); and Richard Burgess, *Greece and the Levant; or, diary of a summer's excursion in 1834* (2 vols, London, 1835).
93. *Saturday Magazine*, 20 January 1838, pp. 22–3; 30 December 1837, pp. 251–4 to 21 September 1839, p. 112.
94. Christopher Johnstone, *John Martin* (London, 1974), pp. 19–20.
95. Ibid., pp. 18–19.
96. For example Nicholas Tromans (ed.), *The lure of the East: British Orientalist painting* (London, 2008), p. 10.
97. Debra Mancoff, *David Roberts: travels in Egypt & the Holy Land* (San Francisco, 1999), pp. 6–7 and 107–10.
98. Roberts, *The Holy Land*, vol. I, p. 29.
99. 'Modern Jewish translations of the Bible', *Jewish Intelligence* (January 1840), p. 1.
100. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 30 May 1840, TNA FO 78/389, ff. 148–9; Thomas Baring, on behalf of the LSJ, to Palmerston, 28 May 1840, TNA FO 195/162/80.
101. George Wilden Pieritz, *An account of the recent persecution of the Jews at Damascus* (London, 1840).
102. Algar Thorold, *The life of Henry Labouchere* (London, 1913), p. 15.
103. *Jewish Intelligence* (September 1841), p. 323.
104. Christopher Clark, 'Missionary politics: Protestant missions to the Jews in nineteenth-century Prussia', *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, 38 (1993), pp. 33–50, at p. 33.
105. Ibid., p. 34.

106. See Christopher Clark, 'Pietism and the Jews', in Jonathan Strom (ed.), *Pietism in Germany and North America 1680–1820* (Farnham, 2009), pp. 268–9.
107. See Ernst Hengstenberg, *Christologie des Alten Testaments und Commentar über die messianischen Weissagungen der Propheten* (Berlin, 1836) and *On the interpretation of Isaiah chapter LII* (Edinburgh, 1835).
108. August Tholuck, *Hints on the importance of the study of the Old Testament* (Edinburgh, 1833), pp. 239–65.
109. Christian Karl von Bunsen, *A memoir of Baron Bunsen* (2 vols, London, 1868), vol. I, pp. 469–72 and 484.
110. Christian Karl von Bunsen, *Das evangelische Bisthum in Jerusalem* (Berlin, 1842), p. 14.
111. 'Denkwürdige Constitution in der Türkei', *Neueste Nachrichten aus dem Reiche Gottes* (January 1840), p. 42.
112. 'Report of the Berlin Society', *The Jewish Expositor and Friend of Israel* (April 1822), p. 166.
113. Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism*, pp. 55–60.
114. 'Bericht über die Wirksamkeit der Missionare der Londoner Gesellschaft zur Beförderung des Christenthums unter den Juden im Königreich Polen, im Jahr 1839', *Neueste Nachrichten aus dem Reiche Gottes* (May 1840), pp. 211–24; 'Siebzehnter Bericht der Gesellschaft zur Beförderung des Christenthums unter den Juden, zu Berlin, über das Jahr 1839', *Neueste Nachrichten aus dem Reiche Gottes* (August 1840), pp. 365–7.
115. Brown, *Palmerston*, pp. 231–2.
116. Palmerston to Hodges, 5 May 1840, TNA / FO 78/403, ff. 20–3.
117. Palmerston to Hodges, 30 May 1840 and 27 June 1840, ibid., ff. 27–8 and 33–5.
118. *Morning Chronicle*, 28 May 1840, p. 4.
119. *Morning Post*, 24 July 1840, p. 2.
120. *Standard*, 23 July 1840, p. 1; *Morning Post*, 24 July 1840, p. 2; *Morning Chronicle*, 7 October 1840, p. 4; *Morning Post*, 7 October 1840, p. 1; and *Standard*, 7 October 1840, p. 1.
121. *Le Constitutionnel*, 3 June 1840, pp. 3–4.
122. Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, pp. 101–3. For the Rothschilds' involvement in the affair, see Niall Ferguson, *The world's banker* (London, 1998), pp. 417–22.
123. Guizot to Thiers, 18 May 1840, BNF / NAF / 20610, f. 96.

CHAPTER 6

To Jerusalem

> As we drew nearer to Jerusalem the aspect of the surrounding country became more and more sterile and gloomy. The land was covered with thorns and briers, and sadly did the words of the Psalmist rise to the thoughts: 'He turneth rivers into a wilderness, and the water springs into dry ground; a fruitful land into barrenness, for the wickedness of them that dwell therein!' *Ps.* cvii. 33. But solemn as were the feelings excited by the melancholy desolateness of the rocky hills and valleys through which we were passing, they were suddenly lost in a sense of rapture and indescribable joy, for now the Holy City itself rose full into view, with all its cupolas and minarets reflecting the splendour of the heavens.[1]

European travellers often described Palestine as empty and desolate, dark premonition only to give way to rhapsody as they approached its religious places and monuments. According to De Salles it was barely cultivated and peopled, outside its few ancient towns, by primitive tribal villagers.[2] For Lindsay, Bethlehem and Jerusalem themselves were lively enough, but Judea was a wasteland.[3] Jerusalem, remote of access from the coast, was sometimes cut to visitors by the plague. Bowring thought that it had no more than 10,000 inhabitants, its only manufactures soap and 'crosses, beads, rosaries, and amulets, and mother-of-pearl shells, which are brought generally from the Red Sea, and engraved with religious subjects, chiselled in relief'.[4] In contemporary drawings, the Holy City was just that: a collection of religious buildings encircled by walls that seemed to belong to the Middle Ages or even antiquity. The trope that Palestine

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was empty, rooted in equal measures in scripture itself, in truisms about Oriental despotism, and in antiquarian preoccupation, would have a long life, and it would underpin both Restorationist and colonial schemes alike well beyond their heyday.[5] From the European perspective, it was as if nothing had happened there since the crusades. And indeed, for the first time in the modern era, the European powers were about to make their presence felt again in the Holy Land.[6]

The Restoration Cometh

Historians debate whether the opening of a consulate in Jerusalem in 1838 by Britain, the first power to do so, was undertaken for religious or for more practical reasons. Thus Mayir Vereté finds that the need was to cope with an increased number of pilgrims and travellers, while Lewis argues that the consulate was the fruit of LSJ lobbying.[7] Since early Victorian diplomatic thinking was prone to marry, in the elaboration of British interests, practical pursuits with moral purpose, perhaps this is an unnecessary dichotomy. At any rate, the deliberative process that took place at the foreign office suggests that the LSJ and its aims were intimately involved. The LSJ had long been hoping to open a church in Jerusalem and have it operate as the seat of its proselytising activities and, under the leadership of its representative Nicolayson, it had been running a mission there since 1833. The church was to run services in Hebrew, and the British presence was to achieve the twin aims of converting Jews and encouraging them to settle in the Holy Land. Vereté's contention that the opening of the Jerusalem consulate was ordinary business is moreover undermined by the paper trail: Palmerston decided to appoint a consul in Jerusalem, on 3 November 1836, over an unfavourable memorandum by his undersecretary John Backhouse and over the objections of Campbell, who as consul-general in Egypt and therefore Syria had authority for the region.[8] It is not clear that Palmerston was swayed by Ashley, even if a later entry in Ashley's journal claims so.[9] But it does seem that Campbell finally relented when presented with the Protestant church plan:

> But if a British Protestant Chapel be established at Jerusalem, it appears to me the appointment of a British Consular agent there will be a matter of necessity to insure a proper respect and support to the Clergyman and other desservants of that Chapel […]. This is the principal reason which leads me to believe that the establishment of a British consular agent in Jerusalem will be highly desirable.[10]

The new consul, William Young, was made an honorific member of the LSJ before his departure, was elected to its general committee, and had been vetted prior to his appointment by both Nicolayson and Ashley.[11] No sooner was the consulate opened, moreover, than the preoccupation emerged not so much to offer protection to visiting British citizens but generally to Jews. Though Jerusalem lay under the Pasha's control, Mehemet Ali had insisted a *firman* must be obtained from the Sultan because of the city's religious importance, and this was only granted in June 1838.[12] Young was detained on his journey by an outbreak of the plague and only arrived in Jerusalem in the spring of 1839. Before he had even arrived, a controversy had arisen as to how wide his remit was to afford protection to Jews. Campbell, whose relationship with Young appears to have been fraught, wrote that the new consul was only empowered to represent Jews of the various European nationalities—not, by implication, Ottoman Jews.[13] This was superseded in London, however, when John Bidwell wrote to Young that 'I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to state that it will be a part of your duty as British Vice Consul at Jerusalem to afford protection to the Jews generally; and you will take an early opportunity of reporting to his Lordship upon the present state of the Jewish Population in Palestine.'[14] The matter remained unresolved, made potentially explosive by the Capitulations (long-standing treaty agreements between the Porte and various European countries granting immunities to their representative, their subjects, and specified entities, including religious establishments) and problematic by the presence in Jerusalem of a number of European Jews who had come to finish their lives there and had presumably become Ottoman subjects.[15] Young chose to interpret his instructions narrowly, but then wrote to Palmerston to complain and ask for clarification.[16] Palmerston, though, failed to oblige, calling for circumspection while at the same time leaving the door open for Ponsonby to lodge appeals in Constantinople itself on Jewish behalf.[17] It seems Palmerston was simply unsure how far he could go within the bounds of his Turkish relationship. The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge's *Saturday Magazine* saw things in a more straightforward light:

> Indeed, of so great importance has this rapidly increasing community [European Jews settling in Palestine] been considered by our Government, that a British vice-consul was, in September last, appointed to reside in Jerusalem, where he is now fixed; his jurisdiction extending to the whole country within the limits of the Holy Land; 'he is thus accredited, as it were, to the former kingdom of David and the Twelve Tribes'.[18]

Meanwhile preparations for the church itself were proceeding apace, also with the foreign secretary's support. Thomas Baring had thus been petitioning Palmerston to help establish a Protestant church in Jerusalem since 1837. The foreign secretary had followed the matter up with Campbell, Young, and eventually with Ponsonby.[19] The foreign office file has a short note that summarises well what had taken place by 1839:

> How stand these questions? P.
>
> At the request of Sir Thomas Baring, who applied on behalf of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge amongst the Jews, Colonel Campbell was instructed in March 1837 to obtain the consent of Mehemet Ali for the building of a Protestant Church at Jerusalem. […] Colonel Campbell reported that Mehemet Ali declined to give a firman on the ground that Jerusalem was a Holy City and that permission must be obtained from Supreme Authority at Constantinople. Lord Ponsonby was accordingly directed to obtain a firman from the Porte, but H.E. reported, that the Turkish government declined to grant it, on the grounds stated in the accompanying letter to Sir Thomas Baring.[20]

Mehemet Ali dared not provide an authorisation in a matter that belonged to the commander of the faithful, and the Sultan was unprepared to affront Muslim sentiment. Palmerston's advice was meanwhile to buy a house and 'having fitted it up, & having performed divine service therein for a certain time, at length to apply for permission to repair their chapel', which Muslim law allowed.[21] This is what Nicolayson proceeded to do after he had obtained permission from Mehemet Ali, amid more sniping between Young and Campbell over the 'Hebrew Christian Church'.[22] As the Eastern Crisis brewed, however, the foreign secretary, having resolved to make 'a fresh attempt to overcome the scruples of the Porte', urged Ponsonby again to obtain Turkey's consent in May 1840.[23] Finally, Baring returned to the charge, feeling the circumstances could not but have improved, at the beginning of 1841. Expressing his gratitude to Palmerston's earlier efforts and advice, he also stressed the support of the Archbishop of Canterbury and Nicolayson's fresh ordination.[24] Palmerston transmitted all this to Ponsonby, writing, 'I leave you to take such steps as you may think best calculated for the accomplishment of this object, but it is a matter in which Her Majesty's Government take a deep interest and in which they are extremely anxious to succeed.'[25]

Before the Eastern Crisis had broken out, the British foreign secretary had thus already been at work, at least partly at the instigation of the

LSJ and its members, establishing an official presence in the Holy Land. This was moreover oriented towards the protection of Jews, especially foreign-born and, at least as far as the evangelical public was concerned, the move had a strong Restorationist flavour. In parallel, the LSJ had been busy entrenching its own missionary presence in the Holy City, also with official help. Britain was ready, as the crisis began, to push for an increased diplomatic presence in the Holy Land grounded in a formal or informal status as protector of the Jews. Palmerston accordingly stood to draw, as his diplomacy became increasingly controversial, from the recognition among evangelical opinion that these policies were likely to garner.

In 1839, the Committee of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland launched a 'mission of enquiry' among the Jews to travel through Europe and the Levant. Combining missionary and Restorationist aims, the foray was announced as the project of men who '"will never hold their peace, day nor night, till the Lord make Jerusalem a praise in the earth" (Isaiah, lxii. 6,7)'.[26] Two of the participants were authorities on prophecy: Dr Black, Professor of Divinity at the Marischal College of Aberdeen, and Alexander Keith. The mission surveyed Jewish communities in Italy, Austrian Poland, Moldavia, and Egypt, but its goal was Palestine. Seamlessly cooperating, from the moment of its London send-off, with the LSJ and other missionary bodies, it was guided around the Holy Land itself by Nicolayson.[27] Upon its return, the Committee issued a memorandum to lobby Palmerston. Its timing was exquisite; the mission had received its first press coverage just as the Damascus Affair broke out, and it submitted its memorandum at the height of the Eastern Crisis:

> The Commission are most anxious that in any future settlement of that country [Syria], under the auspices, or with the concurrence of Britain, your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government should take measures, as far as possible, for protecting the Jews against oppression and injustice (to which recent events show that they are still liable) and also to obtain full religious toleration in that part of the Turkish Empire, and the free access of Protestant missionaries to all its inhabitants.[28]

Palmerston copied the memorandum onward to Ponsonby with the remark that 'the matters to which it relates excite a very deep interest in the minds of a large number of persons in the United Kingdom' and that 'the Sultan would enlist in his favour the good opinion of numerous and powerful classes in this country' were he to follow the memorialists' recommendations.

Palmerston's own suggestion was that the Porte should invite European Jews to settle 'in any part of the Turkish dominions, but more specially in Syria' through an edict granting such settlers 'full security for their persons and property, and free liberty to go and come'. Again, this was tied to a scheme by which Britain would indirectly act as their protectors, as

> […] it would probably contribute much to give confidence to such Jews as might determine to settle in Palestine, in consequence of such an Edict, if the Porte would consent that, whereas the Jews in Palestine might sometimes find a difficulty in causing their complaints to be submitted to the Porte, they might be at liberty to transmit any such complaints to the Turkish government through the British consular officers, and through the British Embassy at Constantinople.[29]

Palmerston's eagerness to accommodate Restorationist lobbies did not escape the attention of the British religious press and public. The Restoration as prospect indeed attracted increasing interest in Britain as the Eastern Crisis unfolded. The missionary and church establishments lobbied ever more actively for it, or for Britain to act as protector to the Jews in the East, which, as the Church of Scotland memorial and Palmerston's response showed, was tied to Restorationist aspirations. The evangelical press speculated about it. So did, in large measure, the daily press, which both picked up stories from religious publications and published its own and readers' opinion pieces on the subject.

Jewish Intelligence thus opened its September 1840 issue with the 'Proceedings of the Church of Scotland in behalf of the Jews' alongside pieces reporting on the Damascus Affair and the 'honourable acquittal of the Jews at Rhodes', praising Ponsonby and Reshid Pasha.[30] Further issues elaborated on the memorandum itself and incidentally reproduced a reply from Palmerston's delegate John Backhouse.[31] Shortly thereafter, *The Record* published a separate Glasgow memorial to Palmerston on the 'Conversion of the Jews' which, incidentally, also thanked the foreign secretary for arranging protection by the Jerusalem consul.[32] A 'Memorial of the Acting Committee in Glasgow of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, for Promoting Christianity among the Jews' had indeed been forwarded to the foreign office on 5 November 1840. The memorialists wished to establish a permanent mission in Palestine and requested special protection for missionaries, as well as 'to Jews themselves, resorting to the Holy Land, or resident in the countries adjoining, so as to prevent the

recurrence of the cruelties to which they have been recently subjected at Damascus and Rhodes'.[33] A month later, letters came from the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London, requesting among other things that 'the toleration which we desire for the Christian subjects of the Porte should also be extended to the Jews, and it should secure to both protection from the previous oppressions practiced upon them'.[34] Such appeals were also taken up in parliamentary petitions. R.H. Inglis, for example, asked on behalf of his constituents for England to be made the protector of Protestants and Jews by the Porte in March 1841, and another petition was presented in the Lords by the Bishop of London, at the request of 'a most respectable body of individuals at Sheffield'.[35]

The evangelical press offers evidence of the rising excitement Restorationism generated as the crisis unfolded and British military intervention in Syria approached. The very atmosphere of disorder created by the war scare, and the prominent British role, seemed to validate prophetic anticipations. *The Christian Observer* talked wildly of the 'Apocalyptic drying up of the Euphrates', and announced that Palestine was 'the predicted scene of great events yet unaccomplished'.[36] There was an explosion in the meetings of the 'Auxiliary Societies' of the LSJ, with more than 80 public events and collections reported throughout Britain, in places as varied as churches, town halls, and the Manchester picture gallery, in August 1840 compared to only 15 in March, providing evidence of mounting popular mobilisation.[37] The crisis also resulted in growing acknowledgment of the LSJ in the religious periodicals. *The Christian Observer* congratulated the LSJ on its successes in the Eastern Crisis and in its 'efforts in progress to make Jerusalem again "a praise of the earth"'.[38] An address to Palmerston by a public meeting in Carlow organised by the LSJ was endorsed by *The Record*, repeating that now that 'almighty God has delivered Palestine from the power of the Egyptians, chiefly by British arms', Her Majesty's Government should become the protector of the Jews 'in the lands of their fathers'. The newspaper dutifully reproduced the Restorationist speeches made at the LSJ's annual meeting in the next month.[39]

Most important, however, was how the Restoration as idea seeped into the public debate and gained traction from both religious and practical grounds through the daily newspapers and political periodicals. A letter entitled 'Return of the Jews to the Holy Land', written along the model of prophetic interpretation and having the Sultan as 'King of the North' and Mehemet Ali as 'King of the South' appeared in a number of the leading dailies on 29 and 30 January 1841.[40] By then the idea of Palestine as a buffer state between

Turkey and Egypt, or as a vaguer locus for the immigration of European Jews and the civilising influence they might bring, had been making steady progress through various opinion pieces, letters, and editorials. Already in March of the preceding year, *Blackwood's Magazine* had been musing that

> the new life infused into the stagnant governments of Asia, even by their being flung into the whirl of European interests, look not unlike signs of the times. It may be no dream, to imagine in these phenomena […] some preparatives for that great providential restoration, of which Jerusalem will yet be the scene.[41]

In 1839, *The Quarterly Review* had given voice to Ashley in a review of Lindsay's *Letters on Egypt, Edom, and the Holy Land* that turned into a Restorationist pamphlet.[42] The news of the Convention of London and the rebellion in Syria gave rise to more focused speculations. On 27 July, the editors of *The Globe*, after predicting that security of life and property in Syria would promptly render the country fertile and prosperous, added that 'the Jews would, of course, be included in such an arrangement; and a period be put to those terrible persecutions which have lately excited so much sympathy in this country'. Notably, while they specified that they 'indulge[d] no visionary notions' nor believed in any 'supernatural impulse', they nevertheless thought fit to caution that 'There is a blessing on record for those who shew kindness to the children of Abraham. Now is the time for Britain to set about deserving it.'[43] And a reader proposed four days later to give Syria neither to the Porte nor Egypt, but to the Jews as a solution to the dispute. 'The restoration of the Jews to Syria and Palestine is an event which, if there be any truth to the predictions of Scripture, must one day happen', and added benefits included increased trade and prosperity and the creation in the region of a British friend and barrier to Russian ambitions, in a policy that would 'cover the country with a glory far beyond all the most successful conflicts could give'.[44] *The Times* even picked up on the piece and its 'deeply interesting subject', and saw in it a trial balloon for an actual cabinet initiative.[45]

Equally telling was how these views seamlessly joined humanitarian considerations, religious vision, and practical aims such as trade and imperial defence. Another correspondent of *The Globe* listed three key reasons, apart from checking French bravado, for persisting in Britain's course in the Eastern Question: 'compassion for the ill-used tribes of Syria', 'a regard for the Jews', and 'a reverence to commerce and our Indian possessions'.[46] In *The Times*, 'A Christian gentleman', after lamenting the recent Jewish persecutions, opined that 'There are political reasons arising from the

present aspect of affairs in Russia, Turkey, and Egypt, which would make it to the interest not only of England but of other European nations, either by purchase or by treaty, to procure the restoration of Judea to its rightful claimants.'[47] The editors themselves offered,

> Even to those, however, who, like ourselves, mix much more of what is worldly than divine in their speculations respecting the future fate of Syria, it does not seem among the most improbable of suppositions that the restoration and nationalization of the Jewish people, however improbable at present, may ultimately become the means of reconciling conflicting pretensions, and of establishing a new focus of civilization in that interesting region.[48]

A reader of *The Standard*, finally, matched lyrical force to conviction in a biblically inspired poetical contribution entitled 'The Gathering in of the Jews':

> The great river Euphrates shrinks low in its bed, […]
> Over thee, O Jerusalem, and all Palestine.
> The 'Isles of the West'—they are waiting for thee,
> And the proud 'ships of Tarshish' are rolling at sea
> With the wealth of a world to furnish thy halls;
> For the 'sons of the stranger' shall build up thy walls. […]
> The wail of a people has risen on high—
> Their travail is o'er and their triumph is nigh;
> Let the nations of Europe kneel down and adore,
> For the 'Sanctuary's cleansed', and 'the visions' is o'er.[49]

Admittedly, millenarian scriptural expectations themselves did not always segue nicely into Palmerston's plans for the region. Another sign of the times was Ottoman decay, its impending collapse the harbinger of the awaited apocalyptic transformation. The very faltering of Turkey was often seen as a positive development, as in, 'The Turkish empire is wasting, the unclean spirits of Popery, lawlessness, and infidelity, are stirring up and gathering the kings of the earth to the last war.'[50] The weakening of the Ottoman Empire was a 'judgement' inflicted on it that simultaneously paved the way for the Restoration.[51] The Sultan, moreover, was the head of that false religion: Islam. As the commander of the faithful he only led the 'followers of the false prophet', and Britain ought not to stand in the way of the inevitable decline of this religion of 'wickedness'.[52]

Yet this must, first, be placed in due perspective. Islam was not, at the time, evangelicalism's prime figure of hate nor its choice object of invective. This was reserved for popery, the 'Man of Sin' opposed to the 'true religion', the 'spiritual tyranny', 'the Antichristian Power', the 'Great Apostacy'.[53] Catholicism was the great evangelical bugbear, not the supine Islam.[54] *The Protestant Magazine*, edited by the philo-Semitic Charlotte Elizabeth, existed almost solely to denounce popery and popish plots. The pope was the Antichrist, papal Rome was Babylon, and its tottering the very first of the signs, 'the day of Christ's wrath, and the year of his redeemed, in which he will avenge upon the Papacy and the Papal nations, the death of his saints, having commenced in the year 1792'.[55] For a minor Satan, indeed, and a close second was the revolutionary ideology, the infidelity imbued with 'the noisome and grievous sore of Atheism', the 'revolutionary and infidel spirit' that was 'the rod with which Christ smites the nations and inflicts deserved punishment upon them'.[56] If the Greek revolt was the sixth vial of the apocalypse, Robespierre's terror had been the second and 'the imperial tyranny of Buonaparte' the fourth.[57] Thiers and the French republican left were now calling for a revolutionary war on behalf of the Pasha, it should be remembered. Mehemet Ali the secullariser, the radical darling and bearer of the French revolutionary impetus, was no better, indeed was a worse calamity than the Sultan. The religious press, moreover, was sometimes the most keenly attuned to ideological undercurrents. 'The notion which lurks at the bottom of the French sympathy for the Pasha is a reminiscence of Buonaparte's expedition, in 1798. Mehemet Ali has laboured to keep alive this impression, and to put himself forward as the heir and representative of the short-lived and delusive hopes of that period', wrote *The Record*.[58] And this was in addition to the point that 'The prophesy of Isaiah is indeed fulfilled respecting Egypt, "The Egyptian will I give over to a cruel lord." (xix. 4).'[59]

Second, the Damascus Affair, in addition to being the very kind of tribulation inflicted on the Jews that could only announce their return to Palestine, had closed the door on any conceivable position-taking on the side of Mehemet Ali. To cooperate both with popish France, to side with the *ultra*-Catholic hero Ratti-Menton, and with the persecuting Pasha would have been anathema. Thiers, by standing by his consul, had handed victory to his antagonist on a silver platter: in opposing Mehemet Ali, Palmerston was fighting at once the contending yet equally hateful infidelity and popery. Palmerston's intervention in the affair, and his ability to

obtain prompt action from the Ottomans at Rhodes, were the proof that his policy placed Britain on the right side of events.

Third and crucially, the Jewish cause made the case for Palmerston's interventionism. It was the ideal antidote to indifference, pacifism, and shoulder shrugging about the Orient. It readied British acceptance of a forward policy in the Middle East, and it paved the way for the rallying around the flag of a body of opinion that at the time tended, in the main, to be hostile to the Whigs because of their reliance on Irish backing in parliament and perceived assaults on the Church of England in such fields as education. Prophecy was a call to arms, or at least to action. The scripturally informed could be sure to be in the right camp in the forthcoming conflict. The nations that opposed the Restoration 'will rush headlong to their own destruction', but 'the people of England will know that it is the will of God that the Jews should return to their own land' and be saved from catastrophe.[60] Britain was that 'prevailing maritime power of faithful worshippers' identified in scripture that was to help achieve God's designs.[61] The 'protestant British people' were an 'elect nation' whose labours were designed for the important purpose of preparing the world for the great judgment of Armageddon.[62] Britain would be rewarded for its role, and the preacher Philip Hirschfeld went so far as to assert that 'if she be now the mistress of the world, she owes her superiority to her efforts, and zeal, and sacrifices to dispense the blessings of the gospel to the Jews'.[63]

The Eastern Crisis itself was seen as providential. Palestine was being 'rescued from the oppressive power of Egypt' (cf. Fig. 6.1)[64] As *Jewish Intelligence* offered, 'The present is evidently an extraordinary crisis, which calls for increased exertion; it is an opportunity which may never again be afforded to Christians for showing their love to the Jewish nation. May the Church be enabled to act promptly, liberally, and wisely, under the guidance of her Great Head!'[65] *The Record* published the text of the Convention of London on 31 August. In the same issue, the editors swung behind the cabinet's diplomatic and war policy, they published an extensive report on the Rhodes Affair featuring Palmerston and Ponsonby's good roles and, returning to the crisis in their editorial, they wrote to outline the centrality of Palestine within it. ('But while the Jews as a people have thus been forced on the attention of the nations, their ancient country has become no less important, and the question, who is to occupy *it*, makes one great

Fig. 6.1 *The Departure of the Israelites* by David Roberts. (Painted in 1829 and now at the Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery, this was also shown in the popular dioramic format at the Royal Bazaar in Oxford Street in 1833. *Image copyright*: © World History Archive / Alamy Stock Photo). Biblical persecution had been a starting point for the return to Palestine

difficulty in settling the conflicting claims between the too-powerful ruler of Egypt and his nominal master at Constantinople.').[66]

Eitan Bar-Yosef would dispute Donald Lewis's contention that Palestine loomed so large in nineteenth-century British consciousness.[67] According to him, Jerusalem was a spiritual metaphor, another name for the home of the true religion that was Britain, or England as in Blake's poem. Obsession with the biblical city never had any imperial implications. Yet Bar-Yosef's view does not necessarily contradict Lewis's if Palestine was to Judaism what Britain was to the true faith of Protestant Christianity, and if British intervention in the Holy Land was meant to be on the Jews' behalf. In 1839–41, Jerusalem did help justify the projection of British power in the region, but it did so in a roundabout, pro-Jewish manner.

Because religious matters remained of the Sultan's resort, pushing an evangelical or missionary agenda required the maintenance of good ties in Constantinople rather than in Alexandria. Yet there was, fourth, another way in which the LSJ's plans, and indeed the Restoration itself, fitted in with Palmerston's pro-Turkish policy. On 1 August 1840, Ashley recorded in his diary,

> Dined with Palmerston—after dinner left alone with him—propounded my scheme [the Restoration] which seemed to strike his fancy; he asked some questions & readily promised to consider it. […] And it seems he will yet do more. But tho' the motive be kind, it is not sound. I am forced to argue politically, financially, commercially; these considerations strike him home; he weeps not like his Master, over Jerusalem, nor prays that now at last she may put on her beautiful garments.[68]

It is invariably taken for granted that 'politically, financially, commercially' here refers to British interests.[69] But reading what Palmerston wrote on to Ponsonby, one realises that these considerations applied equally, and perhaps primarily, to the Ottoman Empire. Shortly after the meeting, the foreign secretary wrote to Ponsonby 'to recommend the Turkish government to hold out every just encouragement to the Jews of Europe to return to Palestine', urging,

> There exists at present among the Jews dispersed over Europe a strong notion that the Time is approaching when their nation is to return to Palestine, and consequently their wish to go thither has become more keen, and their thoughts have been bent more intently than before upon the means of realising that wish. It is well known that the Jews of Europe possess great wealth; and it is manifest that any country in which a considerable number of them might choose to settle, would derive great Benefit from the Riches which they would bring into it.
>
> Whether Mehemet Ali accepts the first or the second offer which is to be made to him, in either case, it would be of manifest importance to the Sultan to encourage the Jews to return to, and to settle in, Palestine, because the wealth which they would bring with them would increase the Resources of the Sultan's Dominions, and the Jewish People, if returning under the sanction and Protection and at the invitation of the Sultan, would be a check upon any future evil design of Mehemet Ali or his successor.[70]

The plan was in the 'political, financial, commercial' interests of Turkey. It also chimed with Ottoman reform and British conceptions in that 'it is obvious that full and complete security for Person and Property is

the necessary foundation upon which any such Invitation could rest', as the letter continued. This was moreover a leitmotiv of Palmerston's Restorationist recommendations to his ambassador, such as in his missive to Ponsonby on the Church of Scotland memorandum, which concluded with the words,There can be no doubt that very great benefit would accrue to the Turkish government, if any considerable number of opulent Jews could be persuaded to come and settle in the Ottoman Dominions, because their wealth would afford employment to the people, and their intelligence would give an useful direction to industry, and the resources of the state would thereby be considerably augmented.[71] *Jewish Intelligence* likewise noted, 'In conformity with the Hatti Scheriff, which has been proclaimed at Gulhané, the Jewish nation shall possess the same advantages, and enjoy the same privileges as are granted to the numerous other nations who submit to our authority.'[72] The periodical was referring to a scheme pursued by Moses Montefiore to buy land in Palestine and encourage European Jews, in particular Russian, to settle on it. And while the project, incidentally, was an unlikely one if only because very few European Jews actually seem to have had any desire to move to such a dangerous region, it was the object of another petition by Ashley forwarded with the strongest encouragements to Ponsonby.[73]

Most important to Palmerston was no doubt the propaganda impact of a Restorationist foreign policy. Admittedly the foreign secretary failed to win over some of the key religious reviews, notably *The Christian Observer* and the somewhat fanatical *Protestant Magazine*. *The Christian Observer* disliked both sides in the conflict, distrusted the balance of power, and wanted Britain to be generally more peaceful. The best it could do was to give grudging approval to the cabinet's conduct in the crisis in its April 1841 issue, and to hold Palmerston and Melbourne to their promises to protect Christians and Jews in Syria.[74] The *Protestant Magazine* flatly refused to endorse the Convention of London because it joined Britain to Austria, 'a Popish state', and to Russia, 'a State professing the Greek faith'.[75] Its hostility to the friends of Daniel O'Connell seems to have been insuperable. But *Jewish Intelligence* stood on the administration's side throughout the crisis, thanking Palmerston for his handling of the Damascus and Rhodes affairs, providing space for the publication of flattering official correspondence with the Church of Scotland Committee, Thomas Baring, and other personae, and generally enthusing about Britain's providential position. The more regularly published, widely read, and influential *Record*, moreover, otherwise a habitual critic of the Whig cabinet, gradually swung

behind Palmerston. On 3 August, the editors made an implicit endorsement of British policy, ending with the observation,

> We know from prophecy that the Holy Land is not to be forever trodden down by the Gentiles. […] It is possible that the disputes about the possession of Syria may issue in results tending to the fulfilment of prophecy. It is possible that Syria may be erected into a separate power, and thus made a sort of intermediate check to the ambition of Egypt on the one hand, and on the other to the desire of the Porte to regain her lost empire.[76]

The newspaper wavered between support and criticism in the ensuing months, but it eventually rallied behind the flag and ended up granting Palmerston a warm accolade:The position assumed and maintained by this country has been noble, as well as commanding; and it has pleased God, with whom the issues of all events belong, to give striking success to our exertions in all parts of the world. […] We think it just to repeat, that the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to these leading matters appears to have been wise and judicious, and do much credit to the Foreign Secretary.[77]

Proof that evangelical propaganda paid off comes from an often-quoted letter from Lady Palmerston to Princess Lieven of November 1840:

> We have on our side the fanatical and religious elements, and you know what a following they have in this country […] They are absolutely determined that Jerusalem and the whole of Palestine shall be reserved for the Jews to return to—this is their only longing (to restore the Jews). Mehemet Ali is regarded as the persecutor of the Jews, and the Sultan as their protector. If we yield the Pashalic of Acre or the smallest piece of territory, it will be held against us, and we shall probably be thrown out at the opening of Parliament in favour of the Tories.[78]

There is a gloating side to the letter, which was addressed to Guizot's mistress. It nevertheless cogently summarises how Palmerston, having gained the support of 'the Duke, Aberdeen, and Peel' and 'then again the *Standard* and the whole of the Carlton Club', outmanoeuvred his cabinet opponents.[79] Following on his preparatory steps, the Tories were waiting in the wings to pursue the same policy, except even more forcefully. Palmerston had captured the prevailing mood in Britain, his handling of the crisis was popular, and he, not his antagonists, had the wind in his sails.

As well as helping British policy stay the course, meanwhile, evangelical opinion had gathered a fresh intensity of its own in its philo-Semitic commitment to the Holy Land. Beyond its propaganda effect, the foreign

secretary's handling of the Eastern Question, in 1840–1, and his alacritous response to Restorationist lobbying before and after, both imparted to and absorbed from Jewish concerns a new and accelerated kinetic power. Restorationism had become subtly woven, before Acre had even fallen, into Palmerston's Eastern policy. This was to have further impact on the crisis's resolution and outcome in 1841.

Plans for Jerusalem

After the Pasha had been defeated and his armies chased out of Syria, at the beginning of 1841, the powers began to seek a treaty solution that was acceptable to all parties. France, in particular, needed to be brought back into the diplomatic fold, especially as the situation remained tense on the Rhine frontier. The Sultan was making recognition of Mehemet Ali as hereditary sovereign of Egypt difficult and, as per Brünnow's original request, the Straits also needed to be addressed. It is in this context that the future of Jerusalem or Palestine—the terms having been used, at the time, almost interchangeably—emerged as a formal great-power concern.

Palestine's political future had been raised, during the crisis, in Catholic circles and among conventional Protestant activists, as the archives provide occasional evidence. A March 1841 bulletin from the French embassy in Constantinople, for example, mentions 'a circular in the Italian language, signed, it is said, by an Austrian consul', asking for 'the formation of a Christian Kingdom in Syria to serve as buffer between Turkey and Egypt'.[80] A somewhat ludicrous rumour arose around the same time of a plot to restore the Kingdom of Jerusalem with the Duc de Bordeaux, the French legitimist monarchical pretender, at its head.[81] An 1840 tract by the Belgian scholar C.B. Houry asked for an independent, Christian Syria, though this followed a practical more than a religious argument.[82] The legitimist *La Quotidienne*, meanwhile, had noted with jealousy the Restorationist piece published in *The Globe*, 27 July 1840, asking, 'Is England seeking to capitalise on the Damascus Affair? We have been saying, from the beginning, that the affair might become more political than judicial: have we now reached the point we had foretold?'[83]

Catholic observers mostly seem to have failed to grasp the evangelical excitement, however, or to have matched it with a zeal of their own. De Salles, when he visited Jerusalem, came across the LSJ mission and Nicolayson. Though he approved of converting Jews, his laconic observation was that 'They have here come to die, not to change; to close their

eyes, not to open them.'[84] De Salles himself proposed the creation of a Christian kingdom in Palestine and Syria combining somewhat hazily the authority of the Order of Malta and that of Emir Beshir, whom he assumed was Christian.[85] (Beshir kept the ambiguity open over his religious affiliation, Druze or Maronite.) De Salles was nevertheless well-nigh unique in doing so among Catholic commentators and travellers to the region, and his proposals, besides, were grounded not in religious considerations as such but in the contemporary commonplace that the Christian was superior to the Muslim order. The same could be said of Lamartine's widely noted 'Political Summary', which failed to bring up Jerusalem and made no mention of faith except to preach religious neutrality and toleration, and whose starting point was the French revolution.[86] Nor was the Holy Land's status a question that arose noticeably, if at all, in either the French or the German Catholic periodicals. The essential *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, in the French context, in particular failed to discuss Palestine, and so did *La Presse*, the doctrinaire mouthpiece, in the key period when Guizot returned from London to replace Thiers at the governmental helm and foreign ministry. The *Beobachter* cultivated a studied indifference to the religious ramifications of the Syrian reconquest, and *La Quotidienne* was more unusually silent, though in May 1841 it somewhat unexpectedly lamented the failure of a supposed Austrian project to establish archduke Frederick as a Christian king over Jerusalem.[87] French pundits, admittedly, could scarcely advocate the Christianisation or colonisation of Palestine even while they argued it must remain under the Pasha's authority—this indeed explains the relative silence of the other main French Catholic title, *L'Univers*, which consistently upheld Mehemet Ali.[88] Yet it is striking that, even though the Pasha had done much to facilitate access to the Holy City by European visitors, religious tolerance and the preferential treatment of Christians were items basically absent from the materials of his arch-propagandists, beginning with Jomard.[89]

Notwithstanding the ostensibly muted public enthusiasm, in the Catholic world, for re-establishing a European presence in Jerusalem (few conclusions may be drawn from Orthodox Russia's narrow public sphere, though the same impression prevails there), the great powers did produce various plans, in the early months of 1841, for altering to a lesser or greater degree the Holy City's status. Mayir Vereté, the historian, has indeed speculated that Guizot—who by the end of October 1840 had returned from London to replace Thiers as foreign minister—came up with a fully fledged project to internationalise Jerusalem as a free Christian city, and he

has proposed to ground in that original design a series of plans elaborated by the powers in 1841.[90] In an article building on a source-based book by Lucien Wolf that prints various archival documents relating to Palestine, Vereté suggests that Guizot set out to sell his political vision to his diplomatic interlocutors in Berlin, Vienna, St Petersburg, and London, and that he may have gone so far as to offer the crown of the new Kingdom of Jerusalem to the brother of the King of Naples, the Prince of Capua.[91]

The great-power plans for Jerusalem and the diplomacy surrounding them are important features of the Eastern Crisis, both in its resolution phase and its outcome. Three points must be made, however, in relation to the prevailing Wolf–Vereté account specifically and as to their role in the crisis more generally. First, there was no Guizot plan as such, at least not in the sense of a blueprint or treaty proposal. Second, though the formalisation of Austrian and Russian proposals dealing with the Holy Land owed something to Guizot's initiative, these and especially a parallel Prussian plan were at least in part self-generated. Third, an emphasis on Guizot overstates the Catholic impulse with regard to Jerusalem, in 1840–1, as compared to the Protestant and especially the Protestant Zionist.

Because Guizot's moves would have been so seminal, had they consisted in or led to anything politically concrete, an analysis of the historical minutiae behind the Vereté conjecture is required. Vereté's inquiry was constrained by source limitations flagged by the author himself. It also relied on a group of secondary documents jumping back and forth between French, Russian, and English, creating a Chinese whispers effect: Wolf's book, a piece by a L. Kamarowsky published in the *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, and a history of Russia under Nicholas I by Sergei Tatishchev.[92] As far as primary sources went, Vereté based his analysis, apart from memoirs, on British Foreign Office (FO) files only. An examination of a wider set of archives—in addition to FO, the French diplomatic archives (AMAE), Guizot's private papers (at AN), the Prussian state archives, and the Viennese state archives—yields a different result.

There was, indeed, no formal Guizot plan for Jerusalem, at least as far as the historian is ever able to prove a negative or to opine on the absence of surviving documents. The trigger for Vereté's investigation was a Guizot letter to Barante, the ambassador in St Petersburg: this is available both at AMAE and among Guizot's private papers at AN, but it has nothing other than generalities.[93] The idea that the powers might make a gesture in favour of the Syrian Christians or afford them certain unspecified guarantees is found in letters to François-Adolphe de Bourqueney,

Guizot's replacement in London, Edouard de Pontois in Constantinople, Charles-Joseph Bresson in Berlin, and Louis-Clair de Sainte-Aulaire in Vienna, but none of these came even close to spelling out a political programme for Jerusalem or Palestine.[94] The most specific aspiration Guizot came to voice was that the powers might seek after 'what guaranties one may obtain from the Porte for the Christian population of Syria, not only in its own interest, but in the general interest, Ottoman and European.'[95] This was followed by a call, to be reflected in an eventual peace treaty, for 'certain stipulations in favour of Jerusalem', about which the French foreign minister, however, only specified,

> I do not know what is possible, nor in what form or within what bounds the European intervention might be able to procure Jerusalem with a little security and dignity, but governments that complain, however rightfully, of the weakening of popular religious belief might themselves, when the opportunity arises, give this belief some shining sign of adhesion and interest.[96]

The Prussian and Austrian archives draw a similar blank. No plan was mentioned to Heinrich Friedrich von Arnim, the Prussian ambassador. And while Apponyi did make one mention to Metternich of an unspecified interest in making Jerusalem, 'that Holy site which contains our Lord's sepulchre, a neutral city open to the free practice of all the Christian cults', Guizot, when pressed, could only explain that 'he wished to do something in favour of Christian practice in Jerusalem, and that the unique opportunity to do so be not neglected'.[97] Guizot's private correspondence with Bourqueney, who was a friend as well as a colleague, reveals nothing more of significance, and various memoranda files for the Ottoman Empire at AMAE are similarly empty. As to Naples being offered the Jerusalem crown, lastly, the correspondence with the French ambassador in Naples makes no mention of any discussion regarding Jerusalem or the Syrian Christians, and neither do Guizot's private records.[98] Guizot was a thorough record keeper, and it is very unlikely a blueprint for a new state centred on Jerusalem would have been kept neither in his private papers nor at the foreign ministry.

When the French foreign minister listed any action in favour of the Syrian Christians as a potential point for the upcoming treaty, moreover, this was only among other useful suggestions such as free access to the Suez and Euphrates trade routes into Asia.[99] Throughout his correspondence, indeed, ran the preoccupation that whatever diplomatic agreement should solve the Eastern Crisis must look like something new, not like a reiteration

of the Convention of London. Guizot had replaced the belligerent Thiers with a peace policy that was perceived in France as a surrender. He had foremost a domestic problem: the July Monarchy's public standing had gravely been impaired by what ended up as an Oriental fiasco (on which more in the next chapter). The Eastern Question remained an explosive topic well into 1841, and any move that gave the impression that France was acceding to the Convention of London was domestically anathema. The first religious promptings, to Bourqueney in London, were made in December 1840. By February 1841 these had effectively been dropped for lack of results. Not only did Guizot have no actual plan for Palestine, his efforts to have the powers come up with a gesture in favour of its Christians were always half-hearted. 'This is what comes to my mind, my dear friend, when I let it wander as it pleases. Take all of this as I offer it to you; only say, only disclose as much of it as you see fit', he had from the start cautioned Sainte-Aulaire.[100] Guizot had hoped to achieve some public French play, appealing to a Conservative, clerical opinion but principally enabling the ministry to spring free from the shackles of the Convention of London, not to project Catholic or French power in the Holy Land.[101]

The six months between the defeat of Mehemet Ali and the formal closure of the Eastern Crisis with the Convention of July 1841 nevertheless witnessed the production of an Austrian, a Prussian, and a Russian plan for Jerusalem, all circulated to some or all of the other powers.[102] The Russian plan, circulated on 24 March 1841, was unambiguously drafted in response to the Prussian and/or Austrian initiatives. The Austrian memorandum was elaborated in early February and forwarded to FO on 3 February, and the Prussian plan in-between the other two, having been sent to FO on 24 February. All this leaves open the possibility for these proposals to have been formalised in response to Guizot's however vague and guarded soundings. Indeed, the main reason for Metternich's counter-proposals seems to have been to defuse the French demarche, the priority being to avoid making the situation more conflicted than it already was. Nevertheless, the evidence is that the Austrians and certainly the Prussians had been contemplating initiatives with regard to the Holy Land prior to Guizot's approach. A December 1840 letter to the Austrian *internuncio* in Constantinople, Bartolomäus von Stürmer, thus recommended the Syrian Christians 'to Reshid Pasha's solicitude' and made a list of requests for reaffirming the Capitulations and enforcing better protection for religious establishments and pilgrims in the Holy Land.[103] Bunsen's memoirs, meanwhile, while they suggest that the drafting of the Prussian plan may have been triggered

by the French initiative, also show that the Prussian chancellery had been contemplating action at Jerusalem well before Bresson's approach: Bülow and the Cults Minister Johann von Eichhorn had, as early as August 1840, written to the Viennese court about the protection of Christians in the Holy Cities, and the chancellery had acknowledged receipt of various private requests for intervention in the Holy Land.[104]

The contents of the Russian proposal, the last chronologically, are best dealt with first and most succinctly. This consisted of ten points: an impressive list ostensibly which, however, offered little innovation in substance. Points (1) and (2) thus merely called for the confirmation of existing church privileges and the appointment of a new Pasha for Palestine. The project was otherwise preoccupied with Jerusalem's religious establishments, and principally aimed at buttressing Orthodoxy's standing against encroachments from other Christian faiths. Points (3) and (6) dealt with internecine conflicts between the Christian sects, and points (4) and (7) with judicial abuses over the religious orders. The rest concerned the Orthodox hierarchy and the Holy Sites, such as (5), 'To re-establish the Orthodox patriarch in Jerusalem, who has taken refuge in Constantinople for his safety, and enable him to re-establish discipline among the clergy under his authority' and (8), 'To forbid the Turkish soldiers standing guard at the gates of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre from entering the church.'[105] This was a narrow programme, then, backward-looking and offering little to anyone beyond Jerusalem's existing ecclesiastical communities.

'My files are brimming with projects and proposals treating of this object', wrote Metternich to Philip Neumann in a message designed for the French chancellery. 'Among these plans, some aim to turn Syria into *a Christian republic*; others call for the restoration of the *Kingdom of Judah*; yet others make of Syria an excellent location for disposing of the surplus population of certain countries.'[106] Metternich's own plan, for all his dismissiveness, nevertheless was at first sight more ambitious than the Russian. What the Austrian chancellor proposed, in a memorandum forwarded to Paris, London, and Berlin, was that the Porte appoint a high-level plenipotentiary in Jerusalem to be the interlocutor for new, special representatives of the Christian powers.[107] This was potentially far-reaching because such Christian representatives were likely to accrue significant authority under the Capitulations. Last-resort appeals were moreover to be routed through the ambassadors of the Christian powers, a recipe for creeping great-power takeover. Yet this was already hedged: 'The point is not to innovate as to substance; it is to maintain established

privileges and regularise anew what once existed, what has fallen into disuse over the course of past centuries.'[108] To Guizot's proposal of procuring Jerusalem 'some security and dignity', which Apponyi had reported to mean some status of neutrality, the Austrian chancellor meanwhile replied very guardedly. Jerusalem was one of Islam's four holy cities, he observed, and the successor to the Caliphs could not renounce his rights over it.[109] The Catholics were in a minority there, and the Turkish authorities were their best guarantee from Greek and Armenian encroachments.

The Austrian chancellor's priority, indeed, was stability in Europe, not grand religious gestures that only risked dividing it further. He wrote,

> In all these projects—and our times are rich in elaborators of projects of all kinds—one thing is forgotten: the conservation of the Ottoman Empire. […] Our line in the Turco–Egyptian question should suffice to discourage those who like to let their imagination run loose, if anything could ever discourage men whose imagination is so fervid.[110]

His replies persuaded the French to ratchet down their already unfocused expectations. Guizot was asked, via Sainte-Aulaire, to end his probing while the Austrian furbished their own plan, then that plan itself was gradually watered down.[111] A comparison with Metternich's December 1840 missive to Stürmer, whose points were confined to the confessional sphere, indeed suggests that this is what the February memorandum was designed to do. The Metternich proposals were duly reduced to more modest proportions in the following months: the system of great-power representatives was dropped, and so were last-resort ambassadorial appeals, leaving only the concept of a Turkish functionary for the oversight of Christian liberties. Eventually, in June 1841, the Porte appointed, based on the joint representations of the powers, the general Jayar Pasha as 'military governor of Jerusalem and Gaza for the special protection of the Christians'.[112] Pious instructions were sent to the governors of the various Syrian *pashaliks* to respect their Christian populations, and the European ambassadors were copied on the circular.[113] The reaffirmation of the Capitulations with regard to religious establishments, which took place at the French request around the same time, was of long-term importance because it created stakes in the Holy Land anew for the chancelleries. In the immediate, however, cooperation between the two Catholic powers had been reduced to extracting from the Turks a politically insignificant gesture.[114]

The Prussian plan, finally, was by far the boldest. It was meant to apply to Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth, and its points (1), (2), and (4) together

granted not only self-governing status to the Christian communities of these three cities, but also lower taxes and judicial immunity under 'Residents' appointed by the great powers. Point (3) transferred the ownership of the Christian Holy Sites to the powers. But (5) was the most far-reaching, granting sovereignty over the three main confessional communities respectively to Russia (Orthodox), Austria and France jointly (Catholic), and Britain and Prussia jointly (Protestant), that is, through their Resident, and assigning a guard of 60 soldiers to each Resident.[115]

The memorandum was prepared by the Prussian king, or for him by general Joseph Maria von Radowitz, a member of the king's informal, close entourage.[116] This direct or indirect royal authorship is important, for two reasons. First, it confirms that the plan was not or not chiefly prepared in reaction to earlier proposals, namely from the French, to whom it was not even forwarded. Frederick William IV, who acceded to the throne in the middle of 1840, had a long-standing interest in the Holy Land as well as being the patron of artists and academic Orientalists.[117] Among his closest advisers were also a number of Pietists, and indeed members of the Berlin Society for the Promotion of Christianity among the Jews, the BSJ. Admittedly, Radowitz was a Catholic and not a member of this evangelical coterie. Frederick William's desire for Christianity, and specifically the Protestant confession, to make its mark again in Jerusalem also belonged to a Conservative, church-and-state policy that was in part a reaction to Liberal demands having arisen in Prussia as early as his accession ceremonies (on which more in the next chapter). But the king's Pietist connections are also important because, second, they explain why the Prussian plan was buried so quickly and without ado. As soon as they had failed to be endorsed by the powers, the proposals, rather than being submitted for piecemeal discussion, were dropped and Radowitz replaced by Bunsen.[118] Bunsen's task was to work with the foreign secretary and the Anglican hierarchy to inaugurate a joint Anglo-Prussian bishopric in Jerusalem. And Bunsen, who had spent some time in England, had long been preparing for his task in cooperation with the LSJ. The Christian plans, strictly speaking originating in the chancelleries themselves more than in public pressures or even private lobbies, had yielded limited results and were about to make way for different projects. It is worth noting, at this point, the closing suggestion of the original Radowitz memorandum: 'One could moreover submit to collective deliberation whether the five Powers might not also stipulate liberties similar to those to be obtained for the Christians in favour of the Jews domiciled or on pilgrimage in Jerusalem.'[119]

The Bishopric

Guizot may well have picked up his own ideas on Palestine during his six-month stint as ambassador in London, just when the evangelical excitement was at its peak.[120] Indeed, Guizot himself was a Protestant and, as a historian of the English Civil Wars, he may even have known that it was Cromwell who had allowed the Jews back into England and understood the significance of this in the context of evangelical philo-Semitism. It is perhaps noteworthy that another treaty point with which the French foreign minister toyed was free navigation on the Euphrates, also a pet project of the British. Whatever the case may be, while in the last phase of the crisis strictly Christian initiatives relating to Jerusalem were petering out, the cause of Protestant Zionism enjoyed unabated strength.

Ostensibly the establishment of a Protestant bishopric in Jerusalem originated in an assignment entrusted by Frederick William to Bunsen, on which he was appointed in April 1841. Superficially, moreover, this looked like a conventionally Christian venture: a project marrying Prussian royal and evangelical zeal to the Anglican hierarchy. The new bishop, though consecrated an Anglican, was to represent the faithful of the two Protestant powers. Frederick William had broad views that were expounded in a memorandum submitted by Bunsen to Palmerston in July 1841. This requested that the subjects of both crowns, be it as travellers or as settlers, be guaranteed in the Ottoman Empire 'that protection of Person and Property, which the Hattischerif of Gulhané promises to all inhabitants of Turkey' and demanded 'legal acknowledgement and equal protection for their Religion'—whether this was to rely on the Capitulations was not specified, but the wording suggested such was not the case.[121] Already, though, the BSJ's and LSJ's fingerprints were on the document. Even though the completion of the Jerusalem church was not an explicit aim, the Bunsen memorandum mentioned as an exhibit that the Church of England, actually the LSJ, was erecting buildings for a church in Jerusalem. And one need not read far between the lines to come to the conclusion that its key concern was Protestant Jewish converts: the document stressed the acquisition of land, in particular in Palestine. Its object moreover was 'from the Porte the Promulgation of a law of settlement', and this was clearly aimed at the Jews, who were named alongside Christians.

In practice, indeed, it was safe to describe the Bunsen mission as a Christian Zionist endeavour with barely disguised Restorationist aims. As noted, there existed in Prussia a background of interest in Palestine

married to otherwise domestic Jewish missionary efforts. The *Neueste Nachrichte aus dem Reiche Gottes* for example mixed articles about the forthcoming conversion of Israel (as people) with serialised reports from the Church of Scotland mission to Palestine.[122] This was further liable to spill into political calculation at the Berlin court, where the Pietist presence was strong. From the start, though, the Jerusalem bishopric had been an LSJ project, associated with the church on which Nicolayson had already taken the first steps.

Bunsen had spent a year in England already in 1838–9, where he had been feted by the learned, the great, and the powerful in British society. The guest of lords and the correspondent of such figures as Thomas Arnold, Bunsen had privately met with both Baring and Ashley, with whom he stayed in epistolary contact.[123] He had been a visiting speaker at the annual meeting of the LSJ in 1839, alongside Baring, Ashley, Bickersteth, and the ex-British envoy to Berlin and BSJ member Sir George Rose, who found the opportunity to enthuse, 'The King of Prussia, indeed, seems to know that Babylon is Rome; he knows the enmity against the Protestant faith, and he has levelled his aim against its mastery by the support he is giving to the Jewish cause.'[124] In August 1840, Bunsen had written to Ashley to encourage him in the construction of the Protestant church in Jerusalem, asking, 'Is the coincidence of the Oriental Crisis with the visible signs of the revival of Zion not a most remarkable circumstance?'[125] The Prussian baron was incidentally also in contact during his mission with the newly appointed cabinet minister and BSJ president Ludwig Gustav von Thile, whom he had long known as a member of the new king's circle.[126] And a letter from Bunsen 'to Berlin' dated September 1840 writes of a land scheme, apparently a different scheme than Montefiore's, for settling converted Jews in Palestine, a plan which was supposedly submitted privately to Palmerston.[127] When he arrived in London in 1841, finally, Bunsen was steered through his procedure—which involved meeting both with the foreign office and with the Church of England hierarchy down from the Archbishop of Canterbury—by Ashley and by Alexander McCaul, the author of *The conversion and Restoration of the Jews* (1837) and the LSJ's in-house theologian.[128]

By the time Bunsen met with Palmerston, the cabinet had lost its majority and a general election been called. Palmerston rushed the required parliamentary act, the Foreigners Consecration Act Amendment, through the House of Lords on 30 August 1841, immediately before the cabinet's resignation.[129] Officially Palmerston had written to Ponsonby that the British government 'adopts with great earnestness the plan proposed

by the King of Prussia' and privately that he was 'very anxious' about a matter 'which will excite great interest in this country and all through Protestant Germany'.[130] The first bishop, consecrated in December 1841, was Michael Solomon Alexander, a professor and a converted English Jew and another member of the LSJ. In the words of, among others, *The Morning Herald*, he was simply 'the bishop of the Jews'.[131]

There were subtle but important differences of position between Bunsen and his suzerain, Frederick William, who seems to have vacillated between conventionally Protestant and Zionist feelings, but whose prime interest remained the recognition of Protestantism in the Holy Land more than the Restoration. The king thus gently rebuked Bunsen over his draft pamphlet for trumpeting the foundation of the bishopric to the German public. The king's ambition was more cautious: 'chiefly to be able to tell myself that I have not failed to contribute to the foundation of a church so placed that it may one day become the centre of the Jew-Christians and of a great union of the evangelical confessions, if it must be God's will, though I only await it in patience and humility'.[132] The end result of the Bunsen mission, nevertheless and notwithstanding these differences of emphasis, was that the Prussian initiative allowed itself to be hijacked by the Prussian plenipotentiary and, through him, by the LSJ. As Bunsen wrote to his wife upon announcing the news of Alexander's selection as future bishop, 'So the beginning is made, please God, for the restoration of Israel.'[133]

If there was no formal British plan for Jerusalem, and if Palmerston brushed off Guizot's original soundings, via Bourqueney, in December 1840, this was, meanwhile, for good reason. Palmerston, in parallel to the LSJ's church and bishopric schemes, was pursuing his own associated action. Such was likely to continue to appeal to evangelical opinion. Uniting the protection of the Jews with British representation in the Ottoman Empire, however, this was also calculated to entrench the British influence that had been built separately through Turkish reform. Palmerston thus repeatedly urged on Ponsonby the importance of dealing with his multiple requests regarding the Jews and Jerusalem, privately impressing upon him the power of evangelical opinion at home. 'Please don't lose sight of our recommendation to the Porte to invite the Jews to return to Palestine. You can have no idea how much such a measure would tend to interest in the Sultan's cause all the religious Parts in this country, and their influence is great and their connexion extensive.'[134] Again on Restoration plans, in November 1840, he wrote, 'Pray try to do what you can about these Jews; you have no idea to what an extent the interest felt about them goes.'[135]

The foreign secretary was making a triple-play on evangelical expectations. First, the topic had tremendous propaganda value in Britain, and second, it fitted into his Turkish reform agenda. But third, as the events of 1841 confirmed, Palmerston's religious strategy was fast becoming a tool for projecting British power, a second leg in a more general vision for a British, or British-shaped, Middle East.

When Ponsonby informed his special envoy Richard Wood of the signature of the Convention of London, and as preparations were under way for Wood to go pilot the landings in Syria in coordination with the rebels, the ambassador added as a post scriptum, 'You must take care *not to speak of Palestine* because I am not certain what may be done about that country.'[136] Since Palestine is referred to by name here, something which the treaty does not do, and since indeed the treaty was perfectly clear as to what was to happen to the Syrian territories according to the twin ultimatums to Mehemet Ali, this can only mean Ponsonby thought that Palestine might, in one form or another, be carved out—and based on the consular track record, that it was to be carved out for the Jews.

As military operations reached a conclusion, the plans for placing Jewish populations under British protection that had been mooted at the opening of the Jerusalem consulate were revived. These were tied both to the Damascus and Rhodes affairs, which served as pretext, and to the Restoration because it was felt European Jews were more likely to move to Palestine if Britain could counter-guarantee them security of person and property. In February 1841, at the tail end of a protracted epistolary exchange with Ponsonby on the subject, Palmerston wrote to acknowledge information that the Porte had objected to granting Britain the protection of Ottoman Jews. He nevertheless hoped the Turks 'may still be induced' to grant British protection to 'the Jews who may settle in Palestine', asking that Ponsonby make again the most strenuous efforts.[137] The ambassador wrote back a month later to announce that the Porte had promised to 'attend to the reports that may be made by this Embassy of any oppression that may be practiced against the Jews', though at the same time opining he did not think any 'special immunities' should be sought from the Turks.[138] Some writers, fixated on great-power jockeying, have assumed this to mean that Palmerston was seeking to obtain for Britain a fresh position under the Capitulations.[139] From this perspective, Palmerston's efforts would have ended in failure. Yet on the contrary, the foreign secretary had made it clear that a special position under the Capitulations was not what he sought: 'I think it would be best that the Sultan should not

place the Jews formally under the Protection of Foreign Consuls, because the Principle of Foreign Interference between a sovereign and his subjects is bad; and Jews coming to settle in Turkey ought to be considered as subjects of the Sultan.' The difference, however, was legalistic, a matter of process. The same letter, dated November 1840, anticipated the scheme that was eventually chosen: 'some Turkish Ministers of the Porte were bound to receive Jewish complaints […] and our English Consuls might be instructed to make known to our ambassador at Constantinople any causes of such complaint for which no speedy redress was obtained'.[140] On 21 April 1841, capitalising on the Turks' positive response, the foreign office accordingly sent a circular despatch for distribution to all consuls in the Ottoman dominions, instructing them as follows:

> As regards the administration of that Law [Turkish law, guaranteeing full security of person and property inter alia to Jews], the Porte has declared its determination that the Jews shall have the full benefit of the Protection which the Law affords them and as a Proof of that Determination, the Porte has assured Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that it will attend to any representation which may be made to it by her Majesty's Embassy, of any Instance of oppression practised against the Jews.[141]

The consuls were instructed to attend to Jewish complaints or instances of oppression, to make 'diligent enquiry of the circumstances', and promptly to refer these to Ponsonby or his successor. Britain's consular arm was protectively to extend over all Ottoman Jews after all, even if this was deemed relevant 'especially in Palestine'. Nor was there any doubt, indeed, that this tied into the Restorationist idea:

> I am very glad the Sultan has given a Firman in favour of the Jews to Montefiore; I hope he will allow the Jews in Palestine to make their complaints when there are any through the English consul and ambassador. This will given them confidence; it would be virtually placing them under British Protection; and if the thing could be so stated it would be better still. You can have no idea of the extent of interest which is felt upon this matter in England and Scotland, especially among the members of the established Church in both countries, and there is nothing the Sultan could do that would make him more popular in England, than an encouragement of this kind to the Jews to go and settle in Palestine.[142]

There is, finally, evidence that Palmerston's strategy of harnessing the LSJ and Protestant Zionism to his diplomacy went yet further. Especially

intriguing in this respect was the appointment of Hugh Henry Rose as consul-general in Syria in 1841 instead of the far more experienced candidate, and favourite for the role, that was Richard Wood. Wood assumed, after he had finished reorganising Syria wholesale, or rather as he remained stuck halfway through the thankless task, that he would get the post. So did Ponsonby. The nomination in his stead of Rose, at the time a colonel, as Britain's highest representative in Syria just when the Bunsen plan and bishopric were being pushed may well have been more than a coincidence. Wood, it must be noted, had the disadvantage of being a Catholic. But Rose's confessional edge went beyond simple Anglicanism. Partly Prussian-educated, Hugh Rose was also the younger brother of Sir George Henry Rose, the ex-Prussian envoy and militant member of the LSJ.

Hugh Rose, moreover, as future Syrian consul-general, was prepared to play the missionary card in his own name. Rose became the self-appointed champion of the Druze, who he argued were made nervous by the power which the Lebanese Maronites were to accrue under Wood's political arrangements, and were anxious at new tax apportionments. His proposal was that Britain should draw in the Druze as its protégés in Syria. The plan, however, had chiefly a religious dimension, and as early as May 1841 Rose had dangled the notion to Palmerston that 'the Druze would give up the shadow of a religion which they now have, and embrace Protestantism'.[143] The Druze sheiks, moreover, according to Rose, were keen to be sent English educators for village schools to be created. And this scheme soon divulged its true colours, as Palmerston in turn dispatched none other than Nicolayson for a conference between Rose and these sheiks, in Beirut.[144] At that meeting, it was reportedly agreed that the Church of England would be sending 'instructors' to Druze schools to be established 'in each village', the design to be funded by 'one of the three existing church societies' under instructions from the Bishop of London.[145] As, unknown to Rose, Palmerston was about to leave office, the new consul-general had meanwhile written again about the Druzes' 'Christianisation', recommending a missionary for the task and suggesting that no less than Alexander McCaul, the LSJ theologian, meet with Palmerston to explain.[146] Ponsonby, incidentally, was incensed. Having asked that Wood be made consul-general, the ambassador protested when he was not named to the post.[147] He was reduced to copying his subordinate on the Rose–Palmerston Druze plans, complaining that he was 'disgusted' by Rose's appointment, and writing to Wood in alarm at 'the follies committed by Palmerston at the instigation of Colonel Rose'.[148]

For the British foreign secretary, what began as a propaganda play thus showed signs of morphing into far more serious engagements by the end of the Eastern Crisis. The extraordinary confluence of long-held millennial expectations, the Damascus Affair, and the Eastern Crisis itself did not just make Restorationism seem actual and even urgent. That the crisis was internally conflictual, both via cabinet struggles and in the public sphere, ensured Restorationist projects became entwined with policy. Gestures by Palmerston fed momentum behind an idea which, in turn, helped spawn fresh plans such as those of colonel Rose. The Jewish cause meanwhile combined usefully both with the Syrian rebellion in its humanitarian implications, and with the more earnestly espoused Turkish reform in its economic and constitutional aspects. At first little more than a nod to a powerful lobby, it had turned into the second pillar of a more general British design for the Middle East.

Jerusalem ended up not making it in the treaty that closed the Eastern Crisis. One must differentiate between the formal settlement in the shape of the July 1841 Convention, however, and the closing situation on the ground, including its religious ramifications. The great powers had become again engaged, after centuries, in the Holy Land, with potentially vast long-term consequences. This did not escape Nesselrode, notwithstanding the anti-Semitism of his reaction to the Jerusalem bishopric's foundation:

> I am more than ever furious at the Pietists. They have created an entirely gratuitous new complication for us in the Orient. The Catholics have been causing us enough aggravation already, now we will have the Protestants on our backs with all their sects, Methodist and others. Religious conflicts in the nineteenth century! […] Really, common sense is every day disappearing from the face of the Earth. And what crowns this Pietist feat is that the famous Alexander who has been appointed bishop is a baptised Jew.[149]

The Capitulations and great-power prerogatives with regard to the Holy Sites had been reaffirmed, and so had the importance of protecting the Christians at Jerusalem, however symbolically and ineffectually for now. This had been achieved, notably, in spite of mixed and even lukewarm attention from the Christian publics other than Protestant. Such might not always be the context.

The startling conclusion, meanwhile, is that as the European powers turned their covetous gaze once more to the Holy Land, the predominant

impulse was not Catholic or Orthodox, but Protestant and specifically Protestant Zionist. Restorationism exhibited, in 1840–1, more dynamism than crusading. Evangelical Zionism was able to command the greater combination of public interest and political clout, and to harness both Prussian and British diplomacy to its aims. This sounds all the more unlikely given that less than 15 years later the Eastern Question would re-emerge, with the Crimean War, on the basis of blatant Catholic–Orthodox rivalries. Hindsight should not obscure the evidence from 1840 to 1841, however, and much would have happened by the 1850s: evangelicalism had begun to pass its peak, the upheavals of 1848 had taken place, the associated Balkan nationalisms having invited Russian interference, and in France and Prussia revolutions had come and gone, leaving in one country a more clerical and in the other a less Conservative regime. The renewed religious involvement of the powers in Syria and Palestine, furthermore, in 1840–1—through the Jewish affairs, the opening of consulates, the Jerusalem bishopric, engagement in Damascene and Lebanese confessional rivalries, and the reaffirmation of the Capitulations—had also left its own trace.

In December 1840, with the news still fresh from the coalition victories against the Egyptians, Lady Palmerston wrote to her husband, the foreign secretary:

> I feel like you very strongly that there is something miraculous in the course of late events. It *cannot* be accident that all these things should have so turned out! My impression is that it is the restoration of the Jews and fulfilment of the Prophecies. But we shall see what comes next, and I have long been thinking of this, even before your letter and all the circumstances you mention, some of which had escaped me. It is certainly very curious and Acre seems to have fallen down like the walls of Jericho, and Ibrahim's army dispersed like the countless hosts that were enemies of the Jews, as we see in the Old Testament.[150]

The letter to which she was replying appears to have been lost. One will never know what the tantalising words 'like you' referred to exactly, or what 'all the circumstances' were that Palmerston had mentioned to his spouse and confidant, or what he had written to prompt this pious sally. Yet the nagging impression is that, for all his presumed religious indifference, the British foreign secretary himself may have momentarily become caught in the evangelical excitement he had done so much to stir.

Notes

1. Judith Cohen Montefiore, *Private journal of a visit to Egypt and Palestine* (London, 1844), pp. 271–2. Lady Montefiore was in Palestine in 1838–9. This chapter is derived in part from an article published by the author in *Middle Eastern Studies* (2015) (copyright Taylor & Francis), available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fmes20/51/2.
2. De Salles, *Pérégrinations en Orient*, vol. I, pp. 261–7.
3. Lindsay, *Letters on Egypt, Edom, and the Holy Land*, vol. II, pp. 52–67.
4. John Bowring, *Report on the commercial statistics of Syria* (London, 1840), pp. 7 and 21.
5. For the cultural grounds on which these tropes stood, and their implications, see Eitan Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land in English culture 1799–1917: Palestine and the question of Orientalism* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 81–5.
6. Napoleon's own foray never left the coast and was as short-lived as it was inconsequential. The story of his appeal to the Jews has been proven to be based on a forgery: Laurens, *Orientales*, vol. I, pp. 123–43.
7. Mayir Vereté, 'Why was a British consulate established in Jerusalem?' *English Historical Review*, 85 (1970), pp. 316–45; Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism*, pp. 225–31.
8. Reproduced in M. Eliav, *Britain in the Holy Land 1838–1914: selected documents from the consulate in Jerusalem* (Jerusalem, 1997), p. 113.
9. The entry, dated September 1838, is quoted in Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism*, p. 226.
10. Campbell to Palmerston, 19 September 1837, reproduced in Eliav, *Britain in the Holy Land*, p. 115.
11. Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism* , p. 235; Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, p. 291; Eliav, *Britain in the Holy Land*, pp. 24 and 46; and Green, *Moses Montefiore*, p. 127.
12. Mehemet Ali was likely happy to this pass on, and what could only be thorny religious issues, to the Sultan.
13. Campbell to Young, 21 November 1838, TNA / FO 78/368, ff. 154–7.
14. Bidwell to Young, 31 January 1839, TNA / FO 78/368, ff. 130–1.
15. See Campbell to Young, 28 May 1839, TNA / FO 78/368, ff. 204–6; Young to Palmerston, 26 June 1839, TNA / FO 78/368, ff. 200–3; and Young's report, 25 May 1839, TNA / FO 78/368, ff. 183–90.
16. Young to Palmerston, 13 August 1839, TNA / FO 78/368, ff. 241–6.
17. Palmerston to Young, 12 December 1839, TNA / FO 78/368, f. 271.
18. 'Restoration of Israel', *Saturday Magazine* (16 November 1839), pp. 187–8.
19. Bidwell to Young, 13 June 1839, TNA / FO 78/368, ff. 136–7; Palmerston to Ponsonby, 20 May 1840, TNA / FO 195/162/75.
20. Internal foreign office note, 9 June 1839, TNA / FO 78/368, ff. 168–9.

21. Strangways to Baring, 11 September 1837, TNA / FO 195/162/75.
22. Young to Palmerston, 9 September 1839, TNA / FO 78/368, ff. 263–4; Campbell to Young, 16 November 1839 and Young to Campbell, 27 January 1840, TNA / FO 195/162/75.
23. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 20 May 1840, TNA / FO 195/162/75.
24. Baring to Palmerston, 1 February 1841, TNA / FO 195/180/21.
25. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 8 February 1841, TNA / FO 78/427, ff. 42–4.
26. Bonar, *Narrative of a mission of inquiry to the Jews*, pp. 1–2.
27. Ibid., pp. 127–94.
28. 'Memorial of the Commission of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland', 18 November 1840, TNA / FO 195/165/248.
29. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 24 November 1840, TNA / FO 78/391, ff. 110–12.
30. *Jewish Intelligence* (September 1840), pp. 273–82 and 282–91.
31. *Jewish Intelligence* (December 1840), pp. 370–1; *Jewish Intelligence* (February 1841), pp. 33–5.
32. The newspaper writes that this is from the Edinburgh committee, but the text matches with that of the Glasgow document: *Record*, 5 November 1840, p. 1.
33. 'Memorial of the Acting Committee in Glasgow of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, for Promoting Christianity among the Jews', 5 November 1840, TNA / FO 195/165/251.
34. The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London to Palmerston, 4 December 1840, TNA / FO 195/165/278. Sent on for action in Palmerston to Ponsonby, 22 December 1840, TNA / FO 78/391, ff. 186–7.
35. House of Commons, 12 March 1841, *Hansard's parliamentary debates*, Third Series, vol. LVII, cc. 143–4; House of Lords, 26 March 1841, *Hansard's parliamentary debates*, Third Series, vol. LVII, cc. 608–9.
36. *Christian Observer* (November 1840), pp. 684–5.
37. Both numbers exclude Ireland. *Jewish Intelligence* (August 1840), pp. 265–8; *Jewish Intelligence* (March 1840), p. 77.
38. *Christian Observer* (June 1841), p. 382.
39. *Record*, 26 April 1841, p. 3 and 10 May 1841, p. 3.
40. *Morning Chronicle*, 29 January 1841, p. 2; *Standard*, 29 January 1841, p. 3; and *Morning Post*, 30 January 1841, p. 2.
41. 'Jerusalem', *Blackwood's Magazine* (March 1840), p. 357.
42. 'Letter on Egypt, Edom, and the Holy Land', *Quarterly Review* (January 1839), pp. 166–92.
43. *Globe*, 27 July 1840, p. 2.
44. *Globe*, 31 July 1840, p. 2.
45. *Times*, 17 August 1840, p. 3.
46. *Globe*, 14 August 1840, p. 3.

47. *Times*, 26 August 1840, p. 6.
48. Ibid., p. 4.
49. Signed 'Chatham, February 8' and published in *Standard*, 11 February 1841, p. 3. The passages in quotation marks were all footnoted to biblical verse.
50. Bickersteth, *The restoration of the Jews*, p. 163.
51. Frere, *Eight letters on the prophecies*, pp. 3–4.
52. Bonar, *Narrative of a mission of inquiry to the Jews*, p. 46; Wolff, *Journal of the reverend Joseph Wolf*, p. 25.
53. Bonar, *Narrative of a mission of inquiry to the Jews*, pp. 3–4; Keith, *Evidence of the truth of the Christian religion*, pp. 13, 350, and 391–6.
54. Catholicism likewise tended to be the principal opponent to Judaism, as the Damascus Affair confirmed.
55. Bickersteth, *A practical guide to the prophecies*, p. 94; Faber, *A general and connected view of the prophecies*, pp. 79–83; and Frere, *Eight letters on the prophecies*, p. 2.
56. Frere, *Eight letters on the prophecies*, pp. 3, 16.
57. Ibid., pp. 13–16.
58. *Record*, 28 September 1840, p. 2.
59. Wolff, *Journal of the reverend Joseph Wolf*, p. 164.
60. Fysh, *The times in which we live*, pp. 20–1.
61. Faber, *A general and connected view of the prophecies*, pp. viii–ix, 25–6, and 49–50. The biblical reference is both to Daniel and to Isaiah's more mysterious term, the 'ships of Tarshish'.
62. Frere, *Eight letters on the prophecies*, pp. 52–8.
63. Philip Hirschfeld, *Strictures on the past history of the Jews and on the future prospects of the people* (2nd edn, Geneva, 1835), pp. 89–90.
64. Bickersteth, *The restoration of the Jews*, p. lxxxii.
65. *Jewish Intelligence* (August 1840), p. 272.
66. *Record*, 31 August 1840, pp. 2–4.
67. Bar-Yosef, *The Holy Land in English culture*, pp. 1–17.
68. Quoted in Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism*, p. 183.
69. Frankel draws the same conclusion: Frankel, *The Damascus Affair*, p. 306.
70. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 11 August 1840, TNA / FO 78/390, ff. 77–80. Quoted in Lewis, *The origins of Christian Zionism*, p. 184.
71. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 24 November 1840, TNA / FO 78/391, ff. 110–12.
72. *Jewish Intelligence* (January 1841), p. 6.
73. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 25 November 1840, TNA / FO 78/391, ff. 118–19.
74. *Christian Observer* (April 1841), p. 254.
75. *Protestant Magazine* (September 1840), pp. 280–1.

76. *Record*, 3 August 1840, p. 4.
77. Ibid., 7 January 1841, p. 4.
78. Lady Palmerston to Princess Lieven, 13 November 1840, in Squire, *The Lieven–Palmerston correspondence*, p. 196. Also quoted in Webster, *The foreign policy of Palmerston*, vol. II, p. 763.
79. Lady Palmerston was right that the Conservative *Standard* rallied to Palmerston's policy. It even denounced his cabinet opponents at the crucial time of the early October meetings and the public controversy with Thiers: *Standard*, 13 October 1840, pp. 2–3. The Carlton Club was the prime Conservative club.
80. Bulletin, 27 March 1841, AMAE / Mémoires et documents / Turquie / 41, f. 38.
81. Pontois to Guizot, 6 July 1841, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 283, ff. 147–8.
82. C.B. Houry, *De l'intervention européenne en Orient* (2nd edn, Paris, 1842). First printed in 1840 and quoted in *L'Univers*, 15 August 1840, p. 1.
83. *La Quotidienne*, 30 July 1840, p. 2.
84. De Salles, *Pérégrinations*, vol. I, pp. 280–1.
85. Ibid., p. vol. II, pp. 87–403.
86. Lamartine, *Voyage en Orient*, vol. II, pp. 543–74.
87. *La Quotidienne*, 20 May 1841, p. 1. The article apparently conflated rumours gathered from the various diplomatic plans with the archduke's participation as an officer in the landings.
88. See for example *L'Univers*, 22 August 1840, p.1 and 1 October 1840, p. 2.
89. For praise of Islam by Jomard, see Jomard, *Coup d'œil*, p. 51.
90. Mayir Vereté, 'A plan for the internationalisation of Jerusalem 1840–41', *Asian and African Studies, Journal of the Israel Oriental Society*, 12 (1978), pp. 13–31.
91. Lucien Wolf, *Notes on the diplomatic history of the Jewish Question* (London, 1919).
92. L. Kamarowsky, 'La question d'Orient', *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, 3 (1896), pp. 397–428; Sergei Tatishchev, *Vneshniaia politika Imperatora Nikolaia* (St Petersburg, 1887), pp. 566–77. For an unravelling of the misunderstandings created by this chain of sources, the chronological errors that crept into it, and the problems stemming from inaccuracies in the original archival documents, see P.E. Caquet, 'Guizot's absence of a plan for Jerusalem', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 51 (2015), pp. 224–37.
93. Guizot to Barante, 31 December 1840, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Russie / 196, ff. 323–4 and AN / 42 AP / 9 / 3. The letter is also reproduced in the Barante memoirs, where Vereté found it: Barante, *Souvenirs*, vol. VI, pp. 559–60.

94. Guizot to Bourqueney, 18 December 1840, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Angleterre / 656, ff. 222–7 and 13 February 1841, AN / 42 AP / 9, ff. 237–42; Guizot to Pontois, 6 February 1841, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 282, ff. 53–4; Guizot to Bresson, 5 February 1841, AN / 42 AP / 8 / 3; and Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, 13 January 1841, found both at AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Autriche / 429, ff. 24–6 and at AN / 42 AP / 8 / 2.
95. Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, 13 January 1841, ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. A letter or plan passed on to Arnim would have been recorded at GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 4930 or I, 4931, or possibly I, 7361. Apponyi to Metternich, 5 and 7 January 1841, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Frankreich / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 320, ff. 1–8 and 13–14 respectively.
98. For a more thorough exploration of these and other archival sources, and of the likely nature of contacts with the Neapolitans, see P.E. Caquet, 'Guizot's absence of a plan'.
99. Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, 13 January 1841, AN / 42 AP / 8 / 2; Guizot to Bourqueney, 23 February 1841, AN / 42 AP / 9, ff. 286–7.
100. Guizot to Sainte-Aulaire, 13 January 1841, AN / 42 AP / 8 / 2.
101. Rumours appeared in the Catholic dailies of an initiative in favour of a Christian Jerusalem. These were not governmental papers, though, and the timing suggests they reflected, rather than led, the Guizot initiative: *L'Univers*, 10 January 1840, p. 1 and 3 March 1841, p. 1; *La Quotidienne*, 14 March 1841, p. 1.
102. All three are reproduced, albeit with chronological errors, in Wolf, *Notes on the diplomatic history of the Jewish Question*, pp. 107–16.
103. Metternich to Stürmer, 18 December 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Türkei VI / 78, ff. 565–70.
104. Christian Karl von Bunsen, *Aus seinen Briefen und nach eigener Erinnerung geschildert von seiner Witwe* (3 vols, Leipzig, 1868), vol. II, pp. 200–2.
105. Tatishchev, *Vneshniaia politika Imperatora Nikolaia*, pp. 570–1. See also Wolf, *Notes on the diplomatic history of the Jewish Question*, pp. 109–10.
106. Metternich to Neumann, 8 February 1841, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 282, f. 71.
107. Memorandum, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 282, ff. 77–82; FO 7/301/80; and HHStA / Staatskanzlei / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / Preußen / 178, ff. 108–15, where the document is dated 9 February 1841.
108. Ibid. Nesselrode agreed and repeated the exact same language back to him: Nesselrode to Metternich, 11 March 1841, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Russland III / 123, ff. 171–6.
109. Sainte-Aulaire to Guizot, 26 January 1841, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Autriche / 429, ff. 32–3.

110. Metternich to Neumann, 8 February 1841, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 282, f. 71.
111. Sainte-Aulaire to Guizot, 23 January 1841, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Autriche / 429, ff. 29–30; Apponyi to Metternich, 19 February 1841, HHSta / Staatenabteilungen / Frankreich / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 320, ff. 129–31. See also Guizot to Bourqueney, 16 February 1841, where the French desiderata have been reduced to obtaining guarantees of justice and good administration from the Porte, and where Bourqueney is copied, for explanation, on the Austrian correspondence, AN / 42 AP / 9, ff. 253–4.
112. Memorandum, 20 June 1841, TNA / FO 78/435, f. 125.
113. Pontois to Guizot, 27 June 1841, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 283, ff. 120–7 and 130–3.
114. France obtained separately confirmation of its Capitulation rights over Catholic institutions in Jerusalem and Syria: Pontois to Guizot, 7 March 1841, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Turquie / 282, f. 155.
115. Werther to Bülow, 24 February 1841 and attached Memorandum, TNA / FO 64/235, ff. 63–4 and 65–8. See also Wolf, *Notes on the diplomatic history of the Jewish Question*, pp. 114–16.
116. Bülow to Palmerston, 6 March 1841, TNA / FO 64/235, ff. 59–62; and as related in Radowitz's diary in Paul Hassel, *Joseph Maria von Radowitz* (Berlin, 1905), p. 95.
117. For Frederick William's entourage and his political and religious philosophy as crown prince, see David Barclay, *Frederick William IV and the Prussian monarchy, 1840–1861* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 29–37 and 84–7.
118. Radowitz himself clearly described the Bunsen mission as a successor and substitute to his own: Hassel, *Radowitz*, p. 96. So did Bunsen: Bunsen to Palmerston, 3 July 1841, TNA / FO 64/235, f. 119.
119. Memorandum, 6 March 1841, TNA / FO 64/235, f. 68.
120. Vereté noted the existence of an evangelical, Restorationist contemporary context: Vereté, 'A plan for the internationalisation of Jerusalem', p. 26.
121. Memorandum, 15 July 1841, TNA / FO 195/183/187.
122. 'Aufruf zur Verbreitung des Wortes Gottes unter den Juden', *Neueste Nachrichte aus dem Reiche Gottes* (January 1841), pp. 19–22; 'Palästina: Reisebericht des Deputierten der Kirche Schottlands', *Neueste Nachrichte aus dem Reiche Gottes* (April 1840), pp. 174–82; and 'Segensreiche Betrebungen der Schottischen Kirche 1840', *Neueste Nachrichte aus dem Reiche Gottes* (March 1841), pp. 131–41.
123. Bunsen, *A memoir of Baron Bunsen*, vol. I, p. 509.
124. *Jewish Intelligence* (June 1839), pp. 125–41.
125. Bunsen, *Aus seinen Briefen*, vol. II, p. 151.
126. Ibid., pp. 120, 123, and 174.
127. Ibid., pp. 151–2.
128. Bunsen, *A memoir of Baron Bunsen*, vol. I, pp. 607–8.

129. 30 August 1841, *Hansard's parliamentary debates*, Third Series, vol. LIX, c. 473.
130. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 26 July 1841, TNA / FO 78/429, ff. 61–4; Palmerston to Ponsonby, 26 July 1841, PP/GC/PO/788 and 16 August 1841, PP/GC/PO/790.
131. *Morning Herald*, 13 November 1841, p. 3.
132. Frederic William IV to Bunsen, 26 August 1841, in Frederick William IV, *Aus dem Briefwechsel Friedrich Wilhelms IV. mit Bunsen* (Leipzig, 1873), p. 94. For a discussion of the bishopric in Frederick William's policy, see also Barclay, *Frederick William IV and the Prussian monarchy*, pp. 84–5.
133. Bunsen, *A memoir of Baron Bunsen*, vol. I, p. 609.
134. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 4 September 1840, PP/GC/PO/750.
135. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 25 November 1840, PP/GC/PO/766.
136. Ponsonby to Wood, 4 August 1840, quoted in Wood, *The early correspondence of Richard Wood*, p. 152.
137. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 17 February 1841, TNA / FO 78/427, ff. 68–75.
138. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 27 March 1841, TNA / FO 78/432, ff. 287–8.
139. For example Frederick Stanley Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston's policy for the rejuvenation of Turkey', pp. 183–5.
140. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 4 November 1840, PP/GC/PO/762; see also Palmerston to Ponsonby, 24 November 1840, TNA / FO 78/391, ff. 110–12.
141. Foreign Office Circular, 21 April 1841, TNA / FO 195/181/95.
142. Palmerston to Ponsonby, 4 December 1840, PP/GC/PO/767.
143. Rose to Palmerston, 22 May 1841, TNA / FO 78/455, ff. 66–72.
144. Palmerston to Rose, 26 July 1841, TNA / FO 78/454, ff. 23–6. A.B. Cunningham, Wood's biographer, writes, though without corroboration, that Rose told Palmerston that the Druzes were originally Jewish: Wood, *The early correspondence of Richard Wood*, pp. 29–30.
145. Rose to Palmerston, 7 September 1841, TNA / FO 78/456, ff. 263–71.
146. Rose to Palmerston, 30 August 1841, TNA / FO 78/456, ff. 272–3.
147. Ponsonby to Wood, [unknown] April 1841 and 28 June 1841, in Wood, *The early correspondence of Richard Wood*, pp. 236 and 259.
148. Ponsonby to Wood, 15 September 1841 and 11 December 1841, in ibid., pp. 273 and 275.
149. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 30 November 1841, in Nesselrode, *Lettres et papiers*, vol. VIII, p. 153. Nesselrode had from the start expressed displeasure at Frederick William's foreign religious plans: Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 28 December 1840, in Nesselrode, *Lettres et papiers*, vol. VIII, p. 102.
150. Lady Palmerston to Palmerston, 3 December 1840, in Tresham Lever (ed.), *The letters of Lady Palmerston* (London, 1957), p. 243.

CHAPTER 7

The Nile of the West

The news of the 15 July Convention of London, which broke in Paris in the evening of 26 July 1840, promptly met with public fury.[1] The press bayed for war, and there were long-lasting disorders, on the streets and at public gatherings, in the capital and in numerous provincial towns. King and prime minister both made bellicose declarations, and they did nothing to dispel the tempestuous popular mood. An armaments programme was on the contrary begun immediately, involving large-scale troop levies and fortification-building. Across the border, in hitherto indifferent Germany, the impression correspondingly gained fast that a revision of the 1815 treaties was being threatened, including the loss of the Rhineland to France. Then, in September, an unknown jurist and writer from Bonn named Nikolaus Becker published a poem entitled the 'Rheinlied' in the newspaper. The ode, calling for the Rhine to remain German, was soon picked up by other dailies, by poets, and by political diarists. It was put to music and it began to be sung everywhere. It was imitated and it was prized. Around the patchwork of German states, nationalists of all stripes had suddenly risen up in unison and, in a fracas that lasted well into 1841, they began to clamour for Germany to find the unity that was necessary to be able to defend itself.

The Eastern Crisis in its last phase did not just affect great-power involvement in the Holy Land: it also had a lasting impact on the national movements of Europe and specifically on German nationalism, through what became known as the Rhine Crisis. In addition to the 'Rheinlied' itself, this was indeed the time the famously militaristic 'Wacht am Rhein',

P.E. Caquet, *The Orient, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Crisis of 1839–41*, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-34102-6_7

by Max Schneckenburger, was composed, and the future German national anthem, the 'Deutschlandlied' by August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben. The Rhine durably became a staple of Franco–German antagonism. More immediately, the popular tussle closely followed and partly overlapped with some of the key diplomatic moves of the Eastern Crisis.

Feeding the Tiger

The danger of a French revolutionary surge, and the associated threat to European stability, came to the fore with the great-power line-up in the Eastern Question and specifically the Convention of London. Yet it had already become a factor in Austro-Prussian diplomacy in the spring of 1840, when the powers began to consider fresh compromise offers to the Franco-Egyptian camp. To none of the parties was it a surprise, and just this sort of concern was a reason why the negotiations had dragged on for so long. The revolutionary risk was indeed, as the Austro-Prussians realised, always latent.

The problem lay both in the nature of the July Monarchy as a regime and in the contemporary resonance of French missionary nationalism with the Napoleonic legend, and therefore with anything Egyptian. The July Monarchy was a regime of the 'juste milieu', poised between courting and fending off revolution. Born both of the July Revolution of 1830 and of its subsequent suppression, it stood as neither reactionary nor militant. Louis-Philippe, 'Roi des Français', not 'de France', owed the crown to the people while presiding over a limited parliamentary system with a narrow franchise and a powerful aristocratic component. This created a need both to cultivate popular elements and to keep them at bay. The formation of the 1839 Soult government was typical: after two months of parliamentary wrangling, it had suddenly been formed in reaction to an attempted republican uprising in Paris. And the risk of disturbance was always present. 'Anonymous letters keep coming from everywhere, containing terrible threats', recorded Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador, as the republican conspirators were being tried.[2]

No doubt Louis-Philippe, who had had to live through 22 years of exile, was no friend of Napoleon. Yet both as an antidote to the republican threat and as expression of the regime's populist aspirations, he was prepared to lead a propaganda policy that pandered to the revolutionary and Napoleonic legends. When Louis-Philippe decided to fill the abandoned palace in Versailles with a gallery of paintings, he had it dedicated, in typical

reconciliatory fashion, 'to all the French glories'. But while also extolling the glories of kings such as Louis XIV and St Louis, this inevitably left the lion's share to the revolution and empire. When someone objected to the choice of a painting as dangerous, the king replied, 'No, I will not shrink from popular passion, but I will silence it by braving it.'[3] Similarly, Louis-Philippe had the *Arc de Triomphe*—projected by Bonaparte to commemorate revolutionary and imperial battles—completed at the top of the Champs-Elysées, and he had the bronze column crowned by a statue of the Emperor put up again on the Place Vendôme.

The erection of the Luxor obelisk on the Place de la Concorde participated of the same spirit. Acquired, on Champollion's advice, by a special embassy in the last days of the Bourbons, the obelisk was only brought back and placed in its final location by Louis-Philippe. The whole operation was a considerable enterprise, designed from the start to create maximum publicity. A special ship had been built, the *Luxor*, to bring the obelisk to Paris, flat-bottomed and equipped with five keels so it could navigate the Nile, with movable masts so it could better handle loading and pass under the Seine bridges. The *Luxor*'s voyage took three years, from 1831 to 1833, and involved multiple procedures by a specialised team of engineers and sailors for pulling the monolith down, moving it to and down the Nile, and eventually shipping it to Cherbourg and up the Seine. The obelisk waited a further three years in Paris while a lively debate was conducted as to where to put it.[4] Wooden obelisks were built to gauge the effect in front of the Invalides and on the Place de la Concorde, and the matter was even discussed in parliament.[5] The final ceremony, performed on 25 October 1836, was a huge event: according to Claude-Philibert Rambuteau, *préfet* of the Seine, it was attended by a 900,000-strong crowd (Fig. 7.1).[6] Louis-Philippe watched from a balcony overlooking the square before distributing *légion d'honneur* awards to key participants.

Just as significant was the obelisk's final location, which the king personally selected.[7] The spot where the monument still stands is, thereabouts, where Louis XVI was beheaded in January 1793. The site was also where the king reviewed that core revolutionary institution, the national guard. 'The king mounted his horse in the Tuileries courtyard […] then sat with his general staff at the foot of the obelisk, facing the swing bridge, and the citizen army marched past him.'[8] The effect was even noted by the chronicler and wit the Duchesse de Dino: 'The setting sun bathed in a golden light the top of the Obelisk and of the Arc de Triomphe, and was reflected in the troops' breastplates and arms. It was, I was told, wholly magical.'[9]

Fig. 7.1 *Erecting the obelisk* ('Erection de l'Obélisque de Louqsor sur la place de la Concorde à Paris. 25 Octobre 1836', print. Image copyright: ©ACTIVE MUSEUM / Alamy Stock Photo). Note the throng in the foreground

The decision to return the name of 'Concorde' to the square (from 'Place Louis XVI') and to put up in its centre what was widely perceived as a memento of the revolutionary epic was typical of the July Monarchy: it spoke of reconciliation with a nod to the revolution's domestically less contentious moments. It also showed how the monarchy was prepared to use Egyptian symbolism and Franco–Egyptian friendship to bolster its legitimacy and popularity at home.

Louis-Philippe called on such people as the ex-Napoleonic marshal Soult to head his governments. In the hope of fending off actual mutiny, he cultivated revolutionary imagery and pandered to the revolutionary memory. Support for Mehemet Ali, the man so widely identified with Napoleon, participated of the same policy, and it risked being pursued to the point of recklessness. It was the appointment of Thiers as premier and foreign minister, however, that jolted the Austrians into appeasement of the revolutionary monarchy in the Eastern Crisis.

Thiers's biography under the Restoration is worthy of a Balzac novel: a successful writer, then newspaper editor, MP, and junior minister, he

had married into a stock-broking fortune before rising to the prime ministership. Having started out as a journalist, he was well acquainted with the power of the press. (The July Monarchy itself owed its existence to a Paris press rebellion, against the Bourbon July ordinances of 1830.) Thiers had moreover penned a history of the French Revolution, would go on to write a sequel covering the consulate and empire, and was a professed admirer of Bonaparte. A social climber who owed his position to an ability to compose with the left, he can only have been conscious of the need to cultivate popular feeling.

Indeed, Thiers had barely arrived when his government took the initiative for what was conceivably the grandest of the July Monarchy's propaganda operations in the same vein: the return of Napoleon's ashes to France. According to Rémusat, who introduced the scheme in parliament on 12 May 1840, 'The popularity of this act of the ministry was equal to that of the man I had been right to call a *popular hero*.'[10] The announcement met with wild acclamations, it was followed by a prolonged interruption, and the vote was 280 in favour to 65 against.[11] The parliamentary commission proposed doubling the one-million franc budget and, when this was turned down, the press opened a public subscription to supplement it. The ceremony itself was scheduled for December. Meanwhile, there was good reason to expect French diplomacy in the Eastern Question, already difficult to sway under Soult, to become dangerously obdurate.

Aptly, Thiers and the cabinet that took its name from its date of formation had been assembled on 1 March: in the French language, the month of the god of war. 'What has happened in France […] is a revolution within the revolution', Metternich hurried to write to Berlin and St Petersburg.[12] Already the Austrian chancellor had been concerned about French diplomatic stubbornness, France's domestic politics, and radical agitation in a country described as 'subject to an immense moral disorder'.[13] Metternich had written to Apponyi to comment at the fall of the Soult government, copying his ambassador in Berlin, Joseph von Trautmannsdorff, with the observation that 'France, as it would be pointless to ignore, has in the last few years taken very definite steps in the direction of evil.'[14] The same jitteriness would pervade the Austrian correspondence throughout the year. On 20 August, for example, Metternich would agonise to Apponyi that 'France's ill is the Revolution, and it is only because Thiers represents it that he is strong.'[15] Later in the same month, the chancellor sent a circular to the Austrian imperial missions in Germany and Italy to guide responses on the Convention of London and soothe apprehensions. The missive, exhibiting more nervousness than composure, warned that 'What must be

feared is that infernal spirits having been invoked, they will be difficult to conjure away, and that they will cause a political question to degenerate into revolutionary propaganda.'[16]

There had been minor early skirmishes in the German press. In January 1840, the *Kölnische Zeitung* thus ran a set of letters entitled 'The Rhine frontier, Letter of a Prussian Rhinelander to Mr Mauguin', ostensibly in response to a speech by the left-leaning member of parliament François Mauguin. The German public could be touchy: Mauguin had scarcely said anything noteworthy in parliament, though he had failed to find kind words for Prussia.[17] The *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* had likewise extrapolated from a Lamartine speech belonging to the 1839 French navy debates, 'According to Lamartine there only remains for the West, meaning basically France, to let Russia advance and devour Turkey, with the condition that France should make up for Russia's expansion with its own territorial increase. What increase? The Rhine frontier, naturally: that much was clear from Lamartine's speech even if he did not dare spell it out.'[18] Such reactions tended to be defensive, but there was no telling exactly what direction a German outburst might take, or what wider European impact it might have.

Historians rightly argue that the Rhine Crisis not only gave a fresh impulse to German nationalism, but that it also strengthened the Conservative strand within it and ended up playing into the hands of the German powers, especially Prussia.[19] In this sense, it was a French own goal. Yet first, what was good for Prussia was not necessarily to Austria's benefit—on the contrary. Second, this is to take a long-term view, and there was beforehand much uncertainty as to what might happen in Germany itself should the French begin calling for a revolutionary war. Mauguin had not actually asked for the Rhineland. Combined with an explicit renunciation of the disputed territory, French propaganda might have turned out far more harmful to the German courts. Third and crucially, there were broader European risks. The July Revolution itself had sparked, in 1830, another revolution in Belgium, in turn creating a diplomatic standoff that had taken a decade to resolve, and it had given rise to a Polish revolt, to a wave of Liberal agitation in several German states leading to the establishment in the following three years of constitutional regimes in Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony, and to Liberal uprisings in the Italian duchies and the papal states. The risks associated with French instability were actually twofold: they included possible demands for territorial changes in Europe—whether in France's own favour or on

behalf of friendly nationalities such as the Poles or the Italians—and the risk of revolution in France itself, with the unpredictable consequences that so often attended it.

With the arrival of the Thiers ministry, Metternich began to fret both about the internal French situation, which he judged 'eminently dangerous', and the stalled Eastern Question, as evidenced by his multiple exhortations to envoys in Paris, London, St Petersburg, and Berlin.[20] 'Will Mr Thiers be able to resist influences which he will find all the more difficult to moderate that he has in large part contributed to creating them himself?' he rhetorically asked Apponyi shortly after the new premier's appointment.[21] On another occasion, the chancellor summarised his views as follows:

> I foresee two types of dangers: one relates to the care the new premier will take to reinforce his position abroad with the cooperation of the Liberal faction; the other to the efforts he will be making to colour his ministry with an activity that is not in France's real interest, but that is quite inconvenient for Europe's political repose.[22]

As regarded the crisis, these letters, crucially, were interlaced with a set of proposals originating in April–May 1840 for major compromise offers in the Eastern Question, some made through Palmerston and some behind his back, and some of which amounted to an almost complete climbdown. The key to these proposals was thus a set of two long letters, both dated 25 April, to Philipp von Neumann, Austria's plenipotentiary in London. These were also copied to Trautmannsdorff and Apponyi in Berlin and Paris, and a detailed memorandum was attached purporting to recapitulate the Eastern Question in all its elements.[23] After taking stock of the situation, the materials expressed the fear that the situation might lead to a war 'so grave in its essence, and serious in its possible consequences' that it was preferable to pursue the path of compromise '*as far as reason may permit*'. Fear of France was never quite spelt out, but it flowed from the analysis and from the point identified as the main stumbling block, namely that whilst coercion would be easy with the participation of all five powers, it was judged unfeasible with only four, or feasible but certain to draw a French response as soon as Alexandria was attacked. Metternich did not think highly of Mehemet Ali's own capacity for resistance. The problem was France, as the memorandum concluded: 'Material action by the four Powers to the exclusion of France thus contains a war principle, since their operation's very success would become the cause of certain war. Yet this is what the Powers have so far taken utmost care to avoid.'[24] The second

letter correspondingly contained more practical recommendations as to what might be contemplated in order to avoid so awful a prospect. This again went through lengthy considerations before delving into territorial matters, proposing eventually that Mehemet Ali be given, first, heredity in Egypt plus Arabia 'within the limits within which Arabia has for centuries—more or less nominally—formed part of the Ottoman domain', and second, 'government for life of the five pashaliks of which Syria is composed, with the personal investiture of the descendants whom Mehemet Ali would designate'.[25] This, then, amounted to acceding to the full French demands on Egypt's behalf, hereditary Egypt and Syria, and adding in the Hejaz for good measure. Metternich, of course, was not about to offer this directly to the French: Apponyi was copied for information, and the letter was foremost for Neumann's benefit. Yet it was a blank cheque to Neumann.

Neumann proceeded to discuss a compromise offer to the French with Palmerston, who by then was already angling for a four-power treaty. Palmerston gave in partially, proposing, in May 1840, to add Acre and its militarily important fortress to his older offer of hereditary Egypt plus south Syria for life. This was submitted to Guizot, then still ambassador in London, and a response was awaited from the French side.[26] This much is detailed in existing diplomatic accounts, and so are in outline at least the near-contemporaneous backdoor negotiations that ensued via a new Turkish ambassador, Chekib Pasha, who arrived in London late May or early June.[27] For in parallel to these official dealings and as the French failed to respond, indeed, Neumann and his Prussian colleague Bülow attempted to capitalise more discreetly on the arrival of this new Turkish envoy. According to Neumann, Chekib was impatient over the London proceedings and keen to pursue an arrangement more likely to conciliate France while maintaining essential interests such as the recovery of Adana, Candia, and the fleet—but implicitly letting go of Syria, though this was not stated outright.[28] There followed a series of meetings at which both Palmerston and Brünnow tried to change Chekib's mind. The Turkish envoy nevertheless proceeded to approach Guizot with these terms, in mid-June.[29] (Neumann's report to Vienna on the subject was sent in code, suggesting this was not for Palmerston's perusal.) Meanwhile, stressing that this was not just a Turkish, but in equal measure at least an Austro-Prussian initiative, Neumann continued to argue for ceding the whole of Syria in meetings with Brünnow, Bülow, and Palmerston.[30] When they refused, he went to Guizot himself with the offer, evidently without informing them.[31] The Austrian negotiator even went above Palmerston's head and approached Melbourne, this also at his chancellor's suggestion.[32]

The exact sequence of the final (verbal) exchanges having taken place between mid-June, when Chekib and Neumann were making their proposals, and mid-July, when the four-power plenipotentiaries agreed to proceed to a separate treaty, cannot be drawn with complete clarity from the correspondence. The French seem to have made the fateful mistake of waiting for Mehemet Ali's reaction and, after playing for time in responding to Palmerston's proposal, to turn it down without having agreed anything on the basis of the more advantageous, back-channel offers.[33] In any case, Metternich changed his mind at the end of June, ostensibly out of anger that the Pasha himself was being consulted, but possibly at the first news of the Syrian revolt.[34] Perhaps he had simply run out of patience, or come to the conclusion that, if the Pasha was only being emboldened, compromise offers were becoming counter-productive. Most notable, nevertheless, was how far he had been prepared to go, and how these offers arose as interlinked with the fear of antagonising France and concern over French revolutionary instability and propaganda. Metternich's strident warnings about the dangers of a Thiers cabinet did more than frame the sudden production of a compromise offer—indeed a surrender offer, judging from its maximum permitted terms—they were tied to it.[35] The Austro-Prussian proposals to France of the spring of 1840, a milestone in the diplomatic plot, were prompted by ideological concerns, namely the urge to thwart revolutionary impulses and to avoid rocking the Restoration order.

The Prussian participation in these dealings, finally, is also well attested, though Prussian diplomacy took a backseat to the Austrian, in part due to the temporary vacuum created by the death of Frederick William III in June. Metternich kept his Prussian counterparts closely informed, and Guizot described the May–June soundings as coming from both Bülow and Neumann. The correspondence between Bülow, Helmut von Maltzan in Vienna, and the Prussian foreign minister Werther furthermore confirms that Bülow was involved in various conciliatory soundings in May and June.[36] That they were all working on the basis of Metternich's magisterial analysis, or instructions, from 25 April is also clear:

> The negotiations in London are making no progress. We had hoped that the instructions of Prince Metternich addressed on 25 April to Baron Neumann and the clear and strongly reasoned overview that was attached to it would make a salutary impression on Lord Palmerston, and that he would at last enter frankly into the views of the Austrian cabinet. But to our lively regret, we find the foreign secretary returning to the error of his old ways.[37]

In October, the situation would repeat itself, and fresh, last-minute approaches would be made to the French, this time with the Prussians in the driving seat. By then, though, the French revolutionary furore had had occasion to break out in the open.

Unmuzzling the Tiger

When Louis-Philippe learnt of the signature of the Convention of London, he apparently burst into such a rage that the queen had to shut the door into the adjoining gallery to cover the noise. His resentment seems to have been particularly hard at the Austrians and Prussians, and when he saw their ambassadors, he let fly at them: 'You want war: you will have it, and if necessary, I will unmuzzle the tiger. It knows me, and I know how to play with it. We shall see if it respects you as it respects me.'[38]

The revolutionary tiger scarcely needed to wait for Louis-Philippe to let it out of the cage. The French newspapers instantly began calling for a war of retribution, supported by a flurry of angry pamphlets. Lasting well into 1840, there were public demonstrations and disorders in Paris and several of the provincial towns, including such backwaters as Caen and Corbeil. 'In every mouth […] there is but one thought, one word, and that is, immediate destruction to the Ministry, the power, the government, which will suffer to be accomplished amidst the ruins of the smoking Syrian towns this grand drama of the fall of Mehemet Ali, or rather of civilization itself!' wrote the *Journal de Rouen* in support of one such instance in its own town.[39] The *Marseillaise* was sung everywhere in theatres and public places—and it was not, at the time, the national anthem, but a militant revolutionary song calling for the blood of foreign soldiers to fertilise France's furrows. The government indeed quickly moved to put the country on a war footing. In July already, it called up reserves in the form of the 1837–9 army classes which, together with the 1840 class, brought army strength up to 480,000. An extra budget of FRF8 million was approved for the navy, and plans were unearthed to fortify Paris, the aim being to remedy what had been perceived as a key weakness at the end of the Napoleonic wars. In October, Thiers would propose measures to bring forward the class of 1841 as well, which would have brought in another 150,000 men, and for converting the National Guard into a military force.

Historians sometimes attribute the Rhine Crisis to calls for compensation from the French.[40] This is to take a significant shortcut. The French chancellery never made any demands for compensation, in the Rhineland or elsewhere, if only because that would have involved dropping the all-important

Pasha. Cochelet himself, from Egypt, asked for revolutionary agitation to be used to save Mehemet Ali, helpfully suggesting that, as consul in various posts,

> I have been in contact with all classes of people in Italy, in Germany, in Russia. If you only knew, Monsieur le Ministre, how our ideas ferment in all these countries, and how much a different state of things is desired. Russia itself is ringed with peoples who are only waiting for the moment to rebel. […] These dispositions must be nurtured.[41]

Other interpretations are that the violent French reaction was prompted by isolation, and the perception that the Convention of London was but a repeat of the 1815 peace settlement.[42] While such resentments no doubt played a role, both positions ignore the ideological dimension involved and the salient point that, in the public French discourse, agitation, war in Europe always remained an extension of the confrontation taking place in the main theatre that was the Orient. Mehemet Ali and his regime had been vested with certain ideological stakes: defending these in Europe only fitted France's international mission, within or outside European borders.

Among the Paris press, including ordinarily lukewarm newspapers, the outcry, tapping into France's revolutionary vocation, anticipated the war measures. *Le Temps*'s diatribe has already been quoted elsewhere: '[Europe] may try to play the terrible game of war with us, we shall play with it the formidable game of revolutions.'[43] For *Le National*, 'You must help Italy, the Rhenish states, entire Germany, and up to Poland to shake off their chains. […] It seems we are on the verge of war; and this news, taking slumbering interests by surprise, has found opinion ardent.'[44] Revolutionary war tied jointly into friendship with Mehemet Ali and France's mission to come to the aid of struggling nations. The *Journal des Débats*, after opining that 'the government is arming; it is right to do so', delved in the same editorial into past support for the Greeks and France's unwavering and impartial aim to foster 'the development of all vital forces among governments and of all the resources of their peoples'. It added, 'we ask for the Pasha what victory has given him, and it is not France that pushed Sultan Mahmud to declare war so imprudently to a vassal whose genius and power remain the last and the most solid prompts to the Ottoman Empire'.[45] Bellicose feelings were widely shared and widely proclaimed. The *Breton*, based in Nantes, would later announce that it expected 'with impatience the signal to fight'; the *Courrier de Lyon* would ask that France conserve 'the influence we have over the world's destinies, by assisting the Pasha in his courageous resolution'; and the *Courrier de*

Rouen judged darkly that 'war, immediate war is the only means of conserving our honour'.[46] And as the landings began in Syria, the editors of *Le Siècle* cried out, 'The canon shooting at Beirut will ring to the extremities of Europe and the world. Not one Frenchman worthy of the name has failed to feel the blow in the bottom of his heart.'[47]

Whether from calculation or conviction and likely from a combination of both, Thiers and Louis-Philippe played the card, in the Eastern Question, of a populist foreign policy. Yet playing up to nationalism in the international arena meant, in the Romantic age, meeting specific ideals. If the July Monarchy was to be 'the sole and legitimate heir to all the proud memories of which France boasts', it had to live up to French nationalistic conceptions.[48] Philippe Darriulat, in his portrait of the French left, emphasises both the Liberal nature of patriotism and the missionary zeal that characterised it in this period. Being a patriot meant supporting neighbouring nationalisms, whether in its Belgian, Polish, Italian, or even German manifestations. France was the revolutionary leader fighting, shoulder to shoulder with the oppressed, the reactionary monarchies of Metternich and the Tsar.[49] And this went beyond the political left. It was a feature of Romantic nationalism that it considered history a key component of national identity.[50] History in the Romantic period typically harked back to the nation's glorious times and, in northern Europe, this often meant the Middle Ages. But the French nation's glorious times were the revolution and empire: because it harked back to these overwhelmingly, French Romantic nationalism was fundamentally Liberal in inspiration, revolving around France's role as leader among sibling nations.

Thus the writer and MP Louis de Carné on Italy and Germany, in *La Revue des Deux Mondes*: 'It was reserved to France to prepare these peoples for liberty by awakening among them the notions of independence and national unity.'[51] For Edgar Quinet, the essayist and historian, France's main moving force internationally was its Liberal leadership ('This motive is the civilizing instinct, a general urge for initiative in furthering modern society's progress').[52] When parliamentarians proclaimed that 'France's position is great and disinterested' or pamphleteers that France 'is just and has no ambitions', this was not completely disingenuous.[53] For the republican militant Victor Considerant,

> No! No Nation can be compared to the French Nation for its sociability, its cosmopolitanism, its political generosity, its liberality towards fellow Peoples, for its ability to connect with them, and for this need for Justice and Humanity that presses it to rush to the assistance of the weak, the oppressed, of any Nation struggling for its Nationality, for its Liberty![54]

The same ideals continued to be conveyed, as the war scare rumbled on, in the press and pamphlet campaign. *Le National* described France as 'the hope of all those who suffer, the protection of all oppressed peoples'; it was 'united by the sacred ties of fraternal humanity with the peoples of Europe'.[55] For *Le Siècle*,

> If she can deliver Poland, she will; if she can free Italy, she will do so as well; if a spontaneous movement arises among the fragmented states of Germany to find surer guarantees of independence than the puny laws of the German Confederation, she will offer her support, without ever an attempt to infringe upon their sovereign rights.[56]

In the call to arms that was a tract by Jean-François Destigny,

> Let us cry out for Poland's deliverance
> Our call will cross the Balkan summits
> Let us stir without delay sleeping volcanoes
> We are free of the allied tyrants' pact
> Let us kindle Spain ablaze, and Italy
> Galvanise Europe […][57]

For another pamphleteer, furthermore, 'The world stretches its arms out to us, and we demand its independence: frustrate no longer its legitimate hopes! The Rhine confederation, Hanover, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal, Sicily, the Walachian and Moldavian provinces will be our auxiliaries. Circassia, Egypt, Persia, Arabia, entire India, China are the natural enemies of oppressive England!'[58] National solidarity indeed needed not to be limited to Europe. Quinet's pamphlet '1815 et 1840' is sometimes invoked to tie the post-15 July furore to recollections of the encirclement of 1815.[59] But in the same tract, Quinet argues France must be strong in the Orient to protect its budding liberties, just as it should do in Europe: 'Let France proclaim herself the protector, not of a plot of land, but of the continent's nascent liberties [Asia, where Egypt was often placed].'[60]

Indeed, thanks to Mehemet Ali, Egypt now found its own place as an astral body in formation in the French planetary system of nations. The Pasha's French-inspired reforms were identified, among his friends and propagandists, with an Egyptian or Arab national impulse. Thus for Mengin, 'Mehemet Ali identified with the Egyptians, and would give the nation institutions that would strengthen it anew and commit it to its new destinies.'[61] For Jomard, 'the dominant nation in Egypt is awakening from apathy'.[62] Labat expressed the aspiration that 'Under France's protection,

the land of the Pharaohs will regain its ancient rank among nations, as will do sooner or later Greece, which our arms have returned to freedom.'[63] And for Marmont, one of the Pasha's achievements was to have contributed to 'the development of a moral order among the Arab population, which feels a propensity to become a nation'.[64] In the press, likewise, the *Courrier Français* called Mehemet Ali's conquests 'the new Arab empire', and in parliament Carné argued that 'The power of the Egyptian movement is precisely in the idea of nationality that has arisen there as in Greece.'[65]

Admittedly, there were doubts among some of Mehemet Ali's partisans, and confusion as to, first, whether one was speaking of Arab or Muslim nationalism, and second, how the Pasha, who was of Turkish culture, could be leading an Arab revival. *Le Siècle* thus glossed somewhat cryptically upon 'the often ingenious and plausible arguments Mr de Carné has deployed in favour of the Arab nationality and Egyptian power', to go on nevertheless to defend Egyptian independence.[66] The literary critic Saint-Marc Girardin generally praised Mehemet Ali, but he disagreed with Clot-Bey that the Pasha was a champion of Arab nationalism: 'Who to believe now? Mr Clot-Bey in his favourite idea of an Arab empire, has against me Napoleon. I have on my side Mehemet Ali.'[67]

Yet Clot-Bey's invocation of Napoleon was once again significant. According to him, Napoleon had prophesised in his memoirs that 'The provinces of the Ottoman Empire that speak Arabic wished for a great change, and expected a new man.'[68] The Mehemet Ali–Bonaparte parallel was fundamental. Nationalism on the Nile could only be nascent. Its exegesis stressed the role of the army and of Mehemet Ali's victories in creating a national nucleus. Thus as Cadalvène wrote, 'No strong sympathies for the Egyptian Arabs should be attributed to Mehemet Ali […] but in attaching them to himself, he has changed a race into a people.'[69] For Lucien Davésiès, similarly, 'By associating the Arabs to his victories, he prepares the rehabilitation of their race.'[70] But this also had a Napoleonic underpinning, for since in the Expedition's mythology the French had gone to Egypt to liberate the Egyptians (cf. Fig. 7.2), Mehemet Ali's leadership, echoing and perpetuating the Expedition, must be fulfilling the same goal. As a stanza in Le Prévost d'Iray's jingoistic *Ode* read,

> Fear contrary fortunes no more
> Unhappy inhabitant of the Nile
> Towards you a brotherly people
> Arrives as a generous host
> Coming to defend your cause.[71]

Fig. 7.2 *Napoléon aux Pyramides* by Antoine-Jean Gros. (painting posthumously presented at the 1836 Salon and bought by the king for Versailles: *Explication des ouvrages de peinture, sculpture, architecture et gravure des artistes vivants exposés au musée royal le 1er Mars 1836* (Paris, 1836), p. 100. Image copyright: © Heritage Image Partnership Ltd / Alamy Stock Photo) Right foreground: the Egyptians welcome their liberator

It was France's mission to defend the freedom of the Egyptians as a 'brotherly people', in a perfect echo of feelings towards, say, Poland. In another example, Cadalvène concluded his book on the Syrian war with a flourish linking the Expedition and Mehemet Ali, including, 'Under the flag of the Republic was born the liberty of a slave people [the Egyptians].'[72]

In almost Hegelian fashion, neither Mehemet Ali nor Napoleon needed themselves to be democrats in order to be the bearers of history's onward Liberal march. Laurent's history explained that even if Napoleon had crowned himself a monarch, 'He was nevertheless the most powerful of democrats, the greatest innovator, the propagandist the most dangerous to old Europe.'[73] Similarly, for Davésiès: 'Mehemet Ali determined progress in Egypt as Napoleon had done in Europe, through despotism.'[74] And for Planat: 'Holding the reins of despotic power, [Mehemet Ali] consented to enlighten his subjects, and he sought to make them worthy to be counted among the nations.'[75]

To be a challenger of the *ancien régime* order was in itself to be a nationalist. As the Greeks had done before him, Mehemet Ali challenged the status quo, the *ancien régime* characterised in the Orient by the Ottoman Empire. By dint of his being an Oriental Bonaparte and a reformer, he had earned for Egypt a place in the pantheon of awakening nations which it was France's self-appointed role to promote. The Pasha, as well as a good pupil of the Expedition, was a revolutionary, a bearer of the French ideological standard.

> Ibrahim, Ibrahim! O novel phenomenon
> You tear through the veil of time's obscurity
> The future of our times in your sword resides
> And all nations yearn for your aegis
>
> Against the whole world when we must fight
> To save friendly peoples
> No doubt standing in our ranks will you be called to face
> Our common enemies.[76]

J.B. Flandin, another 1840 pamphleteer, advocated ceding Algeria to Mehemet Ali in exchange for Crete, of greater naval value, and concluding an offensive–defensive alliance with Egypt.[77] For the periodical *L'Orient Européen*, 'France must intervene effectively, which means as a friend and not a conqueror, recognising national rights wherever they arise, as she has recognised them in Egypt.'[78] Rémusat elaborated on 'our general policy […] to support new powers friendly to progress, and Muslim power in the Orient through the addition, if not the substitution, of the Arab nationality to the Turkish.'[79] Even Guizot discerned emerging sovereignties behind the parcellation of the Ottoman Empire: 'What I say of Greece, I shall also say of Egypt.'[80] If the Pasha's bid for an independent Egypt was the expression of a national movement, it was France's vocation to support it.

That backing for Mehemet Ali was grounded in France's Liberal vocation is confirmed by the stance of the legitimist and anti-Liberal *La Quotidienne*. The newspaper, consistently friendlier to the Turks than to the Pasha, reported at length on the Syrian insurrection, ridiculing stories that they were the fruit of British plots and taking the side of the Syrian rebels.[81] More generally, the legitimist broadsheet mocked, in favour of hard bargaining, a foreign policy grounded in ideology.

It dismissed as puerile the notion that Nezib had established any rights for the Pasha, called for a return to the 27 July 1839 concert, and simply labelled Mehemet Ali, 'the dictator'.[82] As defeat loomed, the Pasha would become 'this poor potentate', and while the Liberal press was busy calling for a revolutionary war, *La Quotidienne* made it clear it did not believe France had the support of any of the European nationalities, professing incredulity at revolutionary 'propaganda'.[83]

Yet the ideological nature of French support for the Pasha was best borne, lastly, by the crisis's course in the last months of 1840. On 20 October, the March government fell, effectively dismissed by Louis-Philippe, and Thiers was replaced at the foreign ministry by Guizot, who then returned from London. The Liberal Thiers now found himself in opposition to the Conservative, *doctrinaire* Guizot. The parliamentary session for 1841 was called ahead of time, to begin on 23 November. As soon as its text was submitted, the address caused a storm. The parliamentary discussions themselves were extremely heated, lasting into early December, focusing well-nigh exclusively on the Eastern Crisis, and culminating in an epic Thiers–Guizot verbal joust.

The Sultan had meanwhile pronounced the deposition of Mehemet Ali on 14 September. One of the debate's key exhibits was Thiers's quite public 8 October Note, sent to London in his cabinet's last days and worded much in the style of an ultimatum: 'Prepared to take part in any acceptable arrangement based on the double guarantee of the Sultan's and the Pasha's existence, France cannot consent to the execution of the deposition pronounced in Constantinople.'[84] It was open to interpretation whether the Note laid down a genuine *casus belli*, the French embassy having received assurances in London against the Pasha's deposition, and the Note's very meaning became an object of argument. Thus according to the Conservative *Journal des Débats*, 'It is the 8 October Note that has untangled the Eastern Question by making peace.'[85] The centre-left *Le Siècle* opined, on the contrary, 'What is the object of this note? To protest against the Sultan's decree and place Mehemet Ali's position as Egyptian Viceroy under French guarantee.'[86]

Yet beyond the comedic aspects of blame and counter-blame, what was significant was the political alignment that promptly established itself: the Liberal centre and left now became established as the Pasha's defenders, the Conservatives as his betrayers. This is not to dismiss the roles of wounded pride, republican Anglophobia, or hatred of Russia behind the hysteria of 1840. But the hysteria could only go as far as it did because its

ultimate moving force was ideological. Louis-Philippe and Guizot refused to guarantee the Pasha, therefore they were traitors to France itself. There was no good reason for the factions to split along these lines in the recriminations game: Soult and Guizot had been frontline defenders of the Pasha in 1839 and up to October 1840. Rather, Liberal opinion had from the start espoused the Pasha's cause, rooted in the memory of Revolution and Empire. Moderates and *doctrinaires*, up to this point caught up in the general approval of Mehemet Ali, now balked at the possibility of war itself. To true believers, they were deserters.

The public reception of the address was calamitous, the mass of the left and Liberal newspapers pitting themselves against the moderate *La Presse* and *Journal des Débats. Le Constitutionnel* spoke of 'the patriotic indignation which the proposed text has attracted'.[87] *Le National* wrote, 'It has caused the centre parties to blush, the centre left and left to boo it'.[88] According to *Le Siècle*, 'a heartfelt cry of indignation rang from the benches of the left and centre left'.[89] In parliament, discussions were just as tempestuous (the record observing 'movement on the left', 'session interrupted for several minutes', etc.).[90] Davésiès had dashingly condensed Mehemet Ali's credentials: 'Revolutionary, he withdrew his country from the Porte's authority. […] Conqueror, he invaded Arabia, Nubia. […] Founder, he has resurrected the Arab nationality.'[91] The same equation obtained in parliament. The left stood by Mehemet Ali, often using the 8 October Note as a wedge to denounce Guizot and to demand firmer commitments in favour of the Pasha. Barrot mourned the French revolutionary momentum only to continue to defend the Pasha's rights: 'I believed for a moment in our recovered energy, greatness, and dignity in facing Europe [thanks to] that part of the population that was the most devoted to the July revolution. […] New rights have been established in the Orient; they are under French safeguard.'[92] The republican Garnier-Pagès thundered, 'We are threatened with an anti-revolutionary war. We shall make a revolutionary war.'[93] And even the moderate Tocqueville saw how high the stakes went, confessing that war was, for him, an option: 'Why is nothing said of this other fait accompli [the 8 October Note] that is honourable, that protects its honour? […] There is one extremity which we must avoid, even by war: to abandon now and for ever the hope of playing whatever role in the Eastern Question. (Acclamations on the left.)'[94]

On 15 October, a gunshot was fired at the king's carriage as it was rolling along the Quai des Tuileries. The would-be assassin, Marius Darmès, was not the first to make an attempt on Louis-Philippe's life. But this was

the first time foreign policy was invoked as the reason. Rémusat, who led the investigation as interior minister, would report that 'When questioned over his motives, he muttered something containing the name "Beirut".'[95] Louis-Philippe had avoided war, but he would never dare review the National Guard again. Guizot was now in charge of government, wedded to a Conservative policy. In the deepest irony, the return of the Napoleonic ashes ceremony, performed in December, now became a dangerous moment. Victor Hugo describes in his journal how the crowds, in sub-zero temperatures, flocked to watch the ceremonial chariot grind, past giant plaster-casts of victories, towards the Invalides. A chasm had opened between the people's devotion and the disrespect, bordering on cynicism, of the monarchical elites.[96] The crown prince, Joinville, only returned to Paris in December, having gone to fetch the ashes back from St Helena. Because he had been away for the last few months, he found the mood puzzling:

> As the ashes made their triumphal entry down the Champs-Elysées, between two rows of soldiers and national guards holding off an immense crowd, in-between diverse acclamations I often discerned the cry of: '*Down with the traitors!*' which at first I did not comprehend. It was coming from so far away! But it was explained to me that the cry was aimed at my father and his ministers, guilty of having refused to launch France into a general war on behalf of Oriental affairs.[97]

Support for the Pasha was rooted in France's Liberal international mission. Liberating, through war, the oppressed nationalities of Europe was merely to do on the home continent what France was already doing in the Orient through Mehemet Ali. The revolutionary war threats that arose from July 1840 did not, in the French view, so much move the conflict's locus from the Middle East to Europe as extend it to a worldwide scene, as the importance of the Eastern Question was felt to warrant.

As to the Rhineland, war ultimately implied border changes for the related reason that it meant the abolition of the 1815 order. But this need only happen as an expression of recognition and adhesion from the liberated peoples themselves. Here also, ideological considerations prevailed over the details of this or that territory's allocation. As Considerant summed up the public feeling, 'France would soon recover, if she wanted, and with the consent of Austria and Prussia, the borders of the Alps and the Rhine: but what would matter anyway that Savoy, the Rhine Provinces, Belgium be called France, when these countries were open and

devoted to France just as France would be open and devoted to them?'[98] The Rhineland was not a demand or even a prize to be won for liberating Europe. Its reunion to France was simply a part of how the chips would fall in the new revolutionary order and, if things so happened, the natural result of the Rhinelanders' own Liberal yearnings. Across the same river, unsurprisingly, things were not necessarily seen in the same light.

Facing the Tiger

> They shall not have it,
> Our free German Rhine,
> Though like greedy crows
> They hoarsely cry for it […]
>
> They shall not have it,
> Our free German Rhine,
> Until its flood has buried
> The limbs of our last man![99]

So ran the first and last stanzas of the 'Rheinlied', the poem by Nikolaus Becker which inaugurated the Rhine Crisis. It is worth, from the outset, noting the obvious: that the poem does not claim for Germany the Rhineland, but the Rhine itself. This was an atavistic cry, an emotional more than a reasoned demand. In what only risked turning into a dialogue of the deaf, it was the German soul that was being defended.

Becker's poem was first published on 18 September 1840 in the *Trierische Zeitung*. Its author had hitherto been utterly unknown. Yet both the piece itself and the sentiment caught on with astonishing intensity. The 'Rheinlied' was put to music immediately by the choirmaster of Trier. It was published in the *Kölnische Zeitung* on 8 October, and put to music again by a Viennese composer, Konradin Kreutzer, to be played in a Cologne theatre a week later.[100] Poetry and song allowed sensitive statements to circumvent censorship: rhyme was more elliptical than prose, and what was merely sung was more difficult to edit out. Becker's poem was soon heard all over Germany, and it would eventually be put to music in more than 200 versions. Villeroy-Boch even made plates with its stanzas printed on them. Broadening again its impact, another 70 or so copycat poems about the Rhine or Germany or both soon appeared.

These were often published in the press, in turn emboldening editorships and readerships to publish their own letters and articles. Among these poems, indeed, were the 'Wacht am Rhein' by the equally obscure Max Schneckenburger, which would become extremely popular after the war of 1870, and Hoffmann's 'Deutschlandlied' which, published in 1841, was destined to become the German national anthem.

By November 1840, it was clear that a veritable popular explosion was taking place, and this wove into the politics of the German Confederation. The need to react to French armament measures justified putting the forces of the Bund on a readier footing. Frederick William dispatched the army general Karl von Grolmann and the faithful Radowitz to Vienna in November. A convention was promptly signed by which Prussia agreed to consider a French attack on Italy a *casus belli* and Austria agreed to provide an army to defend the Rhine. Radowitz and the Austrian general Heinrich von Hess were subsequently to tour the principalities to ensure they were put in a proper state of readiness. In practice, though, the Austrians braked on the proposed measures, and leadership soon passed to the Prussians. Prussia was faster to mobilise its own forces, and historians agree that it scored significant points at Austrian expense within the Bund.[101] But there was also a popular dimension to Frederick William's actions. The Prussian king awarded a prize to Becker. A large part of the Rhineland was Prussian. What military measures were taken in the Bund were noticed by the German public, especially in the prevailing climate of nationalistic indignation, which itself lasted well into 1841. The new Prussian king thus emerged as a better defender of the German national pride and unity than the Austrians.[102]

In the long run, the Rhine Crisis favoured the *kleindeutsch* national solution by which Prussia rather than Austria performed German national unification. It only led to a weakening of cross-border French influence, and it was for France a defeat without a war. Things look slightly different, however, in the shorter time frame of the last few months of 1840. From the perspective of the Eastern Crisis itself, the German popular surge is indeed notable for two paradoxes, of which the first has to do with its original trigger.

Becker's poem was dedicated, in a gesture of defiance, to Lamartine. The reference was to a speech by the French writer and MP on the 1840 parliamentary address, in which France's immediate borders, including the Rhine, were identified as priority areas for expansion.[103] In German perceptions this became conflated with the revolutionary calls that arose

from the end of July. Yet the irony was that Lamartine had consistently been a lone voice distancing itself from the Oriental aspirations that were the basis for these calls.[104] The parliamentary speech in question already made that clear: Lamartine's argument was that France would do better to abandon an illusory glory in the Middle East and prioritise the near-abroad instead. He was even mocked for this: 'The Rhine is not part, that we know, of Mahmud's succession', sniggered *Le National*.[105] Lamartine, still a Conservative at this stage of his political trajectory, acted throughout as a maverick. He had denied any lasting value to the 'Arab system' of Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim.[106] He had been alone in speaking up to dismiss the repatriation of Napoleon's ashes.[107] *La Presse* was prepared to publish a long diatribe resurrecting his project, laid out in *Voyage en Orient*, for an effective Ottoman partition and attacking the policy of support for Egypt, but this was promptly shouted down, virulently so, in particular by *Le Constitutionnel* and *Le Siècle*.[108] Having warned already that European patriotic sympathies might not be with France, Lamartine published, in the hope of soothing animosities, a 'Marseillaise de la Paix' in June 1841:

> Roll superb and free betwixt your wide banks,
> Rhine, Nile of the West, cup of nations!
> And of the peoples drinking your lively waters
> Carry away the quarrels and the ambitions![109]

By contrast, the poem had the Orient as a dry and sterile place:

> The distant Orient languishes in the sun! […]
> The shadow of the Pyramids
> Measures deadened hours by the grains of bleached sand.

The piece was attacked by Quinet among others who, by then, had seized the cudgels and began asking for what the German scribblers had always thought they wanted.[110] Yet Quinet's original '1815 et 1840' had never called for annexing the Rhineland, and it barely mentioned the Rhine until the preamble to a second edition was penned in November 1840.[111] The priority, in France, remained the Orient. While in Germany the construction was beginning of a statue to commemorate the ancient victory of Arminius over the Varus legions, of the German *Volk* over the Latin invader, on the other side of the Rhine, in Strasbourg, the French thought only of putting up a memento to Kléber, the victor of Heliopolis and brief successor to Bonaparte in Egypt (Fig. 7.3; cf. 7.4).[112]

Fig. 7.3 *Statue of Kléber* (inaugurated in 1840, image copyright: © imageBROKER / Alamy Stock Photo). The Rhine Crisis: comedy of differing priorities

Fig. 7.4 *The Hermann Denkmal* (begun in 1841. For a contemporary celebration of the monument, see F.J. Schwanke, *Hermann der Cherusker und sein Denkmal* (Lemgo, 1841). Image copyright: © Performance Image / Alamy Stock Photo). The Rhine Crisis: comedy of differing priorities

The second paradox, more directly relevant to the diplomacy of the Eastern Crisis, was that the Prussians initiated a second attempt at French appeasement in October 1840, even as both the landings in Syria and the Rhine Crisis agitation were getting under way. The Sultan's ill-advised move to pronounce the deposition of Mehemet Ali caused palpable dismay in Vienna for its likely effects in France.[113] Yet it was from Berlin, this time, that the initiative came for a bold compromise plan.

According to Petr von Meyendorff, the Russian ambassador,

> […] the bad mood felt by Metternich when he learnt of Mehemet Ali's deposition, which may have been no more than disguised fear, has caused the cup of Werther's pusillanimity to overflow—he had cramps from it. […] He always comes back to his idea that France has been insulted by not being informed beforehand of the treaty, that the excitability of this nation of madmen has been gratuitously awakened.[114]

Already Prussia had been granted a special exemption from the Convention of London in a separate act, stating that in case of hostilities between the powers, 'Prussia retains full liberty of action, including that of observing a strict neutrality.'[115] It also appears that Werther, taking advantage of the hiatus created by the royal succession, had attempted to countermand Bülow's authorisation to sign the treaty itself at the last minute.[116] At the beginning of October, the Prussians began to lobby the signatory powers in London for fresh compromise offers to be made to the Pasha and the French and to seek peaceful solutions before coercive action was taken any further.[117] On 14 October, Werther authorized the attaché Alexander von Schleinitz—Bülow being away—to probe Neumann and Palmerston about a plan by which Mehemet Ali would get Egypt and Acre immediately, plus 'for life, for him or his children, a few Pashaliks'.[118] Such nagging continued throughout October, and on 2 November, as the Egyptian defences were collapsing and the town itself was about to fall, Werther was still complaining to Maltzan in Vienna that Palmerston was being too rigid and that the *pashalik* of Acre should be conceded.[119]

Ostensibly this was as far as Prussian compromising went. Yet when support failed to be found in London, the evidence is that the Berlin chancellery initiated secret approaches to the French. The game was subsequently given away—as it appears, due to French indiscretion—and a trace is provided in the form of a strongly worded complaint by Lord William Russell, the British ambassador in Berlin, who at the end of November asked that Werther either disavow Bülow or provide an explanation for such a breach of Prussia's commitments.[120] The Prussian idea was for a ceasefire plan by which time would immediately be called on military operations and the Pasha allowed to retain Acre and its *pashalik* if his troops still held it. This clearly violated the Convention of London, whose twin ultimatums had long passed. Werther denied that his ambassador ever approached Bourqueney, though his letters to Bülow copying him on the Russell

accusations and the subsequent Bülow–Palmerston exchange give the distinct impression he was badly trying to cover his traces.[121] Palmerston eventually dismissed the matter, no doubt anxious not to antagonise the Prussians needlessly after all had been won.[122] But the plan is found in the French archives, and it had been mooted to the Austrians earlier on.[123] A Bourqueney note to Guizot, transcribing Bülow's words, describes the ceasefire plan in full, and nor was there any doubt that Bülow was speaking on instructions from Berlin.[124] Ironically, as had happened in the spring, the offer failed to make any headway not because of Prussian hesitations but because the French felt this was still insufficient. 'No account is taken of the territories the Pasha still possesses, the Pashaliks of Alep and Damascus, Adana, the Taurus passes', complained Guizot with an astounding degree of misjudgement.[125]

The fear in Berlin, as it had been in the spring, was of a war with revolutionary ramifications. Yet this almost desperate preparedness to compromise does not tally with Prussia's performance as the bolder and more nationalistic of the two German powers in the Rhine Crisis. Nor was the change of stance reflective of Thiers's replacement by a more peaceful party in Paris: the Prussian ceasefire proposal was made to Guizot, and Guizot himself would remain quite warlike as far as French armaments were concerned well into 1841. The apparent discrepancy is chiefly a question of timeframe, indeed, and the reasons for it are threefold. There was, first, an element of delayed reaction to the Rhine Crisis, so that its positive implications could not be entirely visible to Werther at the time he was still seeking to pacify the French. Second, the assumption of German leadership by the Prussians was the result of a changing of the guard in Berlin after the accession of Frederick William IV. And third, though it eventually emerged as a Conservative win, one should not underestimate the risks of instability of subversion that long remained inherent to the Rhine Crisis itself.

Judging from the two official newspapers, the Austro-Prussian authorities were in no hurry for the German populace to be informed of French revolutionary provocations. The news of the Convention of London itself only came out in the *Beobachter* on 6 August 1840. On 7 August, mention was made of French army measures, but without further explanation, and the French outcry was only made known on 11 August through quotes from the *Morning Chronicle* and *Morning Post* attacking Thiers.[126] The *Preußische Staatszeitung* quoted the *Constitutionnel* and *Journal des Débats*, but it focused strictly on the French anger at England and at Palmerston. None of the revolutionary language employed in Paris was reprinted, though calls for

raising army numbers were.[127] Any implications for Germany were glossed over except as implied by French troop-raising. This was significant both because it was expressive of official caution and because the official organs gave their cue to the news published in many regional papers.

The Rhineland newspapers themselves were similarly slow to take offence at French agitation. The *Stadt Aachener Zeitung*, though it picked up the news of French rearmament as early as 1 August, framed it in the context of the Orient and Anglo–French relations.[128] The newspaper quoted Thiers's *Revue des Deux Mondes* pieces, preoccupied with Oriental diplomacy, and the tone was quiet throughout August, without a letter or editorial touching on Franco–German relations. It was not until 2 September that any reaction appeared to French claims about the Rhineland, and this in a letter from Freiburg politely denying there were any armaments on the German side.[129] On 3 September, the newspaper reported that a 6000-strong banquet in Chatillon had called for a revolutionary war and the revision of the 1815 treaties, and that the *Marseillaise* was being sung everywhere in Paris, yet again without evoking more than earnest wishes for continued peace.[130] Some protests did appear in the *Kölnische Zeitung*: a reprint of an article from the *Augsburger Zeitung* that blamed the German press's silence for French delusions about the Rhineland and suggested the matter be set straight in the interest of peace and quiet on both sides of the border, an article copied from the *Hannoverische Zeitung* blaming France for disturbing the peace and warning that it would have the Bund for enemy, and a short letter from a Berlin correspondent stressing that 'our fatherland is not called Prussia but Germany'.[131] Yet this newspaper too was quiet throughout September, going so far as to publish, on 17 September, a Berlin letter complaining French threats were being made too much of and warning that while the country was ready for defence, 'Prussia is engaged in Oriental affairs, but not directly, like Russia, Austria, and England.'[132]

That war threatened from France and that the situation was serious was clearer from reading the all-important *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, yet this likewise published very little by way of German reaction in August, and there was a complete pause in September. 'We do not believe in war', the newspaper had a correspondent write after quoting the *Débat*'s bellicose statements on 5 August.[133] A biting piece appeared attacking French republicanism in the middle of the month amid a handful of similar letters of complaint, but this advocated giving France a free run in the Orient with German support against Britain and Russia in order not to have to give up

the Rhineland.[134] The initial German reaction to French war-mongering seems to have been primarily one of embarrassment, or at worst polite reprimand. The Orient was an area of French, but not German priority, and France had been slighted by the signature of the Convention of London. As late as 21 October, the *Aachener Zeitung* editor Louis Lar, while now ridiculing French pretensions over the Rhineland, warned that Turkey was not important to the Germans and that 'The great fight that is looming concerns not Europe but Asia.'[135]

This delay in the German reaction is also observed in official Prussian reports from Cologne and Düsseldorf, and from the French consul in Munich.[136] French armaments took time to muster. As, in October, it became evident that they were to sit largely on France's eastern borders, the whole dispute began to seem less remote. Yet the slowness of the German reaction was only part of the explanation for the Prussian change of tack of that autumn. Frederick William IV had succeeded his father in June. Inevitably it took time for him to make his mark, put in place new personnel, and instil a fresh dynamism to policy. Frederick William fiercely hated Bonapartism, having been traumatised as a child by the royal family's flight from the French during the Napoleonic wars.[137] While he shared with his predecessor a Conservative political sensibility, he was more inclined to bold public actions. His first months were largely taken up, however, with the grand, traditional accession ceremonies that marked the beginning of the reign: the public homage festivities, or *Huldigungen*, that took place in Königsberg in September and Berlin in October. Centring around the official vows of the Estates of East and West Prussia at Königsberg and the other Estates of the Realm at Berlin, these included long public dinners, concerts, and regattas, as well as, for the first time, public speeches by the king.[138] In the meantime, the king made a few appointments and a first few gestures, such as the rehabilitation of the formerly banned Ernst Moritz Arndt, the patriotic historian and poet of the wars of liberation, in August. But any significant change in personnel had to wait for the last months of 1840 and even 1841.

Indeed, from the perspective of Prussia's assumption of a new line of policy in Germany in response to the Rhine Crisis, the turning point was the king's appointment of Grolman and Radowitz to their special mission for mobilising the Bund, in November 1840. The king seems to have been more bellicose than Frederick William III or Werther: 'The King himself, in spite of his peaceful language in public, thinks a lot of war', reported Meyendorff to his chief in St Petersburg.[139] Radowitz, who was

likewise a thorough Conservative, welcomed war outright. He only found the moment propitious for Prussia to rid itself of the Liberal threat: 'The means were at hand at the very moment when one could only feel that the confusion produced by the July treaty was a blessing, and that we should not passively hold back but follow the path to war with all our might.'[140] Frederick William's plenipotentiary was also a German enthusiast: 'Prussia's policy must be German through and through', he felt.[141] Helping bring conviction both to his mission to rally the Bund and his harnessing of popular national energies, his view was that 'The decisive aim of Prussian policy must be the achievement and maintenance of an indubitable hegemony in Germany.'[142] Finally, that these notions were meant as a break with earlier, more internationally emollient practices was clear from his own notes. Radowitz characterised Werther as 'a complete nullity, already in peaceful times without any coherent ideas or concepts, and in the very moment paralysed with the concern not to let the breach with France widen any further'.[143] As to Austrian policy, it only blended together 'indolence, nihilism, and mistrust'.[144]

Frederick William may also have been thrown off balance, and prompted to react with an appeal to resurgent national feelings, by Liberal demands that arose as early as the *Huldigung* ceremonies themselves. The Prussian diet's memorial to the king reminded him of constitutional promises made by his father, and the reformer and governor of the Prussian province Theodor von Schön raised the matter again in meetings with him at Königsberg. According to Schön, the events around the *Huldigung* were followed both by a propaganda barrage by the police ministry in Berlin and a tussle between the popular and the administrative party to gain influence with the new king.[145] Schön was left, in the following months, with the uncomfortable role of hiding or defending Liberal pamphlets from his sovereign, and his next speech to the Landtag was perforce highly Conservative, denouncing foreign revolutionary agitation and excusing police intervention.[146]

As comparisons show of the German political literature in the years before and after, the Rhine Crisis was a victory for the Conservatives and a defeat for Liberals and friends of France alike.[147] Nor was there any doubt as to the breadth and popularity of the outbreak sparked, or heralded, by the 'Rheinlied'. Soon after the *Kölnische Zeitung* had published Becker's poem, it celebrated the Rhineland's first 25 years under the Prussian crown, proclaiming that it wished to continue to belong to Prussia: the floodgates had opened.[148] Letters began to pour in denouncing French bellicosity and arrogance. Compared to September, the tone changed completely,

both stylistically with much more direct and aggressive language, and in content and frequency. On 22 October, a correspondent made short, sarcastic thrift of French pretensions to Rhineland sympathies.[149] By the end of the month, anger had reached explosive levels, with an article on the Rhineland entitled 'Über den Rhein' and signed 'Germanus' running into the next issue, and another praising the 1815 treaties.[150] Louis Lar in the *Aachener Zeitung*, after several articles of measured analysis, finally let slip that 'Freedom without piety is mere license and leads to tyranny; he who has luck or genius buries freedom instead in his pocket and becomes another Robespierre or Napoleon.'[151] From October, his editorials turned squarely to the Rhineland issue and attacked French pretensions, renouncing earlier sympathies for the July Revolution and writing that 'the Rhine must always be a German river'.[152] There was a flurry of poems in November, and the newspaper also tracked the triumphant progress of 'Rheinlied' through small-town Germany. The inhabitants of Mainz issued a silver cup to Becker with the words, 'the German Mainz' on one side and on the other: 'To the author of the German national song: they shall not have it, our free German Rhine.'[153] Becker was soon proclaimed 'our national poet', and things continued in the same vein in December and into 1841.[154] Arndt meanwhile paid homage to the 'Rheinlied' and published new nationalistic poems such as 'While Thiers stirred up the foreign foe' and 'What is the German fatherland?', containing the verse: 'Blücher, Arminius! / It must be! The whole of Germany must thus be!'[155] There appeared pamphlets such as 'Frankreich und Deutschland am Neujahr', filled with anti-French historical references and satirical verses and ending with a collection of 'German war-songs on the Rhine'.[156] And according to the *Augsburger Zeitung*, whose tone, whether in reader's letters or editorials, had likewise turned completely in October, the soldiers at the Prussian king's birthday celebrations shouted, 'War! War! Death to the French!'[157]

Yet if the outburst's very strength and patriotism could only have encouraged Frederick William's policy change when it came, it cannot be relied on to shed light on Prussian diplomacy prior to it. The German press and the public's delayed reaction spoke in favour of Prussia's original caution. Nor could it so easily be foreseen that this reaction would flow, from the Conservative and Prussian standpoint, in the right direction. Radowitz himself wrote that before the Rhine Crisis, there was no relying on a German national impulse against France. Until then, 'The effects of the July Revolution continued to work on neighbouring countries, especially Germany; a great national upheaval against France was in no way to be expected.'[158] Even through the Rhine Crisis, moreover, there remained

an undercurrent of subversion to German national demonstrations, an associated element of Liberal and even radical demands of the kind that had shaken the Prussian king in Königsberg.

The reports from the secret police provide evidence both of the existence of such seditious agitation in Germany and of the type of concerns that led the Austrians and Prussians to initiate the compromise diplomatic offers they made to Thiers and Guizot in 1840. There was a group of German exiles in Paris, as there were of other nationals, sitting in a Palais-Royal café and attempting to smuggle pamphlets and periodicals into the principalities.[159] More seriously, a number of Germany's leading intellectual figures retained a Liberal allegiance through the crisis.[160] The industrialist and Rhenish politician David Hansemann only drew the lesson from French threats that Prussia must be made stronger by constitutional reform. Hansemann remained anti-Russian, and the solution that was German unification was aimed both at France and Russia.[161] The diplomat, writer, and socialite Karl Varnhagen von Ense likewise remained convinced a constitutional Prussia would have been stronger. He also worried about a growing atmosphere of dissatisfaction in Berlin: 'Liberalism shows an unchanged capacity for broadening in influence against aristocratic rule and Pietism. There rules among the people a healthy good sense, but also dispositions towards terrorism. The king is much criticised.'[162] There was indeed continued constitutionalist sniping in Prussia, and it is hard to escape the impression that the atmosphere of popular excitement only encouraged it. A pamphlet entitled 'Vier Fragen' excoriated arbitrary rule and called for a parliamentary system.[163] The *Hallische Jahrbücher* retained a staunchly Liberal line throughout, refusing to choose between 'victory over France and political Reaction, or defeat and national humiliation', and finding that 'Salvation and the future, the happiness and greatness of our fatherland are in the hands of the opposition and, to be direct, in the hands of the Prussian opposition.'[164] The popular mood was fickle, and the crowd once aroused prone to unpredictable swings, as the Frankfurt censor reported:

> The voice which right now has arisen in Germany, however national it sounds, has no deep roots. It is poetical as much as political. […] Tomorrow the same poets who are defending the Rhine from France will just as well take a revolutionary direction. German poetry since 1830 has been a snake that changes its skin with every new event, and if one believes that the demonstrations that have been organised around the *Rheinlied* will be sustained, one is seriously mistaken.[165]

In December, the 'Rheinlied' was requested by the public in Franfurt's Weidenbusch Hall, but also the 'Marseillaise'.[166] Nationalist enthusiasm, once it reached mass levels, could run into unforeseen directions, and Thiers's public diplomacy might well have been more successful had it not been for the unfortunate Rhineland issue. Nor did Germany's Liberal writers watch the triumphal progression of the 'Rheinlied' idly. There circulated a number of parodies of Becker's poem, ditties with such stanzas as, 'They shall not have it / Our free German Rhine / As long as the greedy crows / Are not chased from nest and egg.'[167] The *Hamburger Telegraph* refused to print Becker's verses, but it had a satire of it entitled, 'To the new French-eaters' that included the lines, 'You will not give the Rhine? / Give not away also this / A free German life / A free German house.'[168] The poet Eduard Prutz published a more serious response revolving likewise around the word 'free' and using it to complain about censorship and monarchical rule, and Franz Dingelstedt came out with a 'Also a Rheinlied, but without Becker' among other pieces, asking the newly anointed Frederick William to grant popular demands.[169]

The nationalists themselves, finally, could be just as threatening. An article published by the *Augsburger Zeitung* in August addressed the Rhine issue early, but this was actually to complain that the German principalities were stifling the nationalism which the French had unwittingly stirred: 'The German governments will not deny us the recognition, which has been granted to us by foreigners against their interests. […] The German people, the German press have not deserved now to be so distrustfully treated.'[170] Nationalism aimed at national unification. Ultimately it stood to sweep away the still numerous small German principalities. By nature it tended to upset the Restoration order. The author of the tract 'Der Bund der Deutschen und Franzosen', a veteran of the war of 1813–14 made the case for national unification under a Liberal banner and with French help.[171] Georg Herwegh published a collection of poems that mixed nationalistic odes such as a 'Rheinweinlied' and 'An den König von Preußen' with radical messages such as the self-explanatory 'Vive la république' and 'Das Lied vom Hasse'.[172] But perhaps the most dangerously subversive was Hoffmann von Fallersleben. Shortly before he composed the *Lied der Deutschen*, Hoffmann published a volume entitled *Unpolitische Lieder*, a collection that was anything but apolitical. A number of its poems were explicitly anti-French, such as 'Maîtres de danse', but many also derided the German order, such as 'Die orthodoxen Royalisten', mocking

Conservative grovelling before police and censorship. 'Wir wollen es nicht haben', apart from echoing Becker's lines, described Germany as a 'paradise of the servant and the soldier' and a 'hunting ground for potentates'. A 'Türkische Liturgie' was explosively subversive, and 'Rheinlied und Rheinlied' contrasted the images of Becker's poem, which it quoted, and drunken Hessians throwing rocks in the river, ending, 'Here throw our blind Hessians/Heavy stones in its bed.'[173] Hoffmann would end up being dismissed from his Breslau professorship in 1842. As the censor recognised, the author of the future German national anthem was but a fiendish radical.[174]

The course of a popular outburst such as the Rhine Crisis could not be predicted. That it turned out as predominantly patriotic, pro-Prussian, and Conservative, leaving radical contestation as a suppressed undertone, cannot be gainsaid. But before the fact, the prospect of popular, national agitation only asked to be viewed with mistrust and even trepidation by such men as Metternich and Werther. Urging him to stand firm within the Bund but to show flexibility in the Eastern Question, Metternich wrote to the newly crowned Frederick William IV,

> Whether or not France wants war, it is positive that in that country Germany is regarded as an arena where all manner of French acrobats are free to come and show their skill. Mr Thiers, who is a great artist in the genre, speaks of war as if it were a legitimate means for France to pull out of trouble and teach others lessons.[175]

Nor could the nationalist genie absolutely be counted on to remain under control after Frederick William had decided to let it out of the bottle: constitutional demands, and the smuggling in of radical messages among national songs, kept the risks of disorder present. This, not the German nationalist outbreak's longer-term impact, informed Austro-Prussian diplomacy in 1840. Fear of what French revolutionary agitation might trigger, especially in Germany, drove the Austro-Prussian compromise initiatives that were a key feature of the negotiations in the Eastern Crisis.

As passions began to die down, in 1841, Nesselrode would characterise the French monarchy as 'a synagogue of loudmouths' and describe Metternich and Werther as having exhibited 'an incredible poltroonery' in handling the crisis.[176] Thiers pursued and even incarnated, in the Eastern Question, a populist foreign policy, and Louis-Philippe went along because, given the Egyptian associations in French memory, his monarchy's

self-characterisation made it natural and perhaps essential to do so. The policy also tapped deep into their compatriots' self-image. Support for Mehemet Ali belonged to the universalist, Romantic-era brand of French nationalism. Rooted in the memory of Revolution and Empire, infused with a Liberal mission, this saw in an independent Egypt a leader of the French cause among nations, explaining the French rage at the Convention of London. Conversely, it was because they understood the ideological nature of their problem that the Austrian and Prussian chancellors were prepared to do so much to find a solution. Put simply, Syria was not worth the risk of revolution in Europe. The Rhine Crisis's radical undertones suggest that the prospects of disorder in Germany were real. To give the French and the Pasha what they wanted in the Orient was a small price to pay, if only the British and Russian allies could be brought on board, to avoid the destabilisation of Restoration regimes in Europe.

Notes

1. This chapter is derived in part from an article published by the author in the *International History Review* (2013) (copyright Taylor & Francis), available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rinh20/35/4.
2. Rudolf Apponyi, *Vingt-cinq ans à Paris 1826–1850* (Paris, 1913), p. 370.
3. Camille, Comte de Montalivet, *Fragments et souvenirs* (2 vols, Paris, 1899), vol. II, p. 259.
4. Involving pamphlets and newspaper articles, for example Viator, *Sur l'emplacement de l'obélisque de Louqsor* (Paris, 1833); Jean-François Miel, *Sur l'obélisque de Louqsor* (Paris, 1834); and *Journal des Débats*, 16 January 1835, p. 1.
5. Alexandre Delaborde, *Description des obélisques de Louqsor figurés sur les places de la Concorde et des Invalides* (Paris, 1833), p. 13.
6. Claude-Philibert, Comte de Rambuteau, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1905), p. 389.
7. Ibid. Other proposed sites had included the plaza in front of the Madeleine and the Louvre courtyards.
8. Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, vol. II, p. 393.
9. Dorothée, Duchesse de Dino, *Chronique de 1831 à 1862* (4 vols, Paris, 1909), vol. II, p. 154.
10. Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, vol. II, pp. 314–15.
11. *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, p. 618.
12. Metternich to Trautmannsdorff, 6 April 1840, HHStA / Staatskanzlei / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / Preußen / 175, f. 188.
13. Metternich to Apponyi, 19 November 1839, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Frankreich / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 316, ff. 42–5 and 46–9.

14. Metternich to Apponyi, 5 March 1840, HHStA / Staatskanzlei / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / Preußen / 175, ff. 139–42.
15. Metternich to Apponyi, 20 August 1840, in Metternich, *Mémoires*, vol. VI, p. 438.
16. Dated 27 August 1840, ibid., pp. 478–81.
17. *Kölnische Zeitung*, 25, 26, and 27 January 1840, pp. 1–2 of each issue. The speech is at *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, pp. 92–9.
18. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 July 1839, p. 1500.
19. Veit-Brause, 'Die deutsch-französische Krise von 1840', pp. 279–80; Brendan Simms, *The struggle for mastery in Germany, 1779–1850* (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 160–2; and Schulze, *The course of German nationalism*, pp. 64–7. For an account of Prussia's outmanoeuvring of Austria within the Bund, see Robert Billinger, 'They sing the best songs badly: Metternich, Frederick William IV, and the German Confederation during the war scare of 1840–41', in Helmut Rumpler (ed.), *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Frage 1815–1866* (Munich, 1990), pp. 94–133.
20. Metternich to Apponyi, 1 May 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Frankreich / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 319, f. 8. See also Metternich to Neumann, 6 May 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 230, ff. 126–31.
21. Metternich to Apponyi, 6 May 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Frankreich / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 319, f. 39.
22. Metternich to Trautmannsdorff and Metternich to Ficquelmont, 6 April 1840, HHStA / Staatskanzlei / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / Preußen / 175, f. 190.
23. Both letters Metternich to Neumann, 25 April 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 230, ff. 34–59; Metternich to Trautmannsdorff, 29 April 1840, Staatskanzlei / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / Preußen / 175, ff. 211–42; and Metternich to Apponyi, 6 May 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Frankreich / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 319, ff. 65–92.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Neumann to Metternich, 8 May 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 228, ff. 61–71; Guizot to Thiers, 8 May 1840, BNF / NAF / 20610, ff. 84–7.
27. Webster, *The foreign policy of Palmerston*, vol. II, pp. 683–9.
28. Neumann to Metternich, 10 June 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 228, ff. ff. 27–37. See also Chekib to Guizot, 31 May 1840, in Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. V, pp. 441–3 and Chekib to powers, 2 June 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 7354 / 66. Chekib's initiative loosely coincided with the dismissal of Khosrew, Mehemet Ali's arch-enemy, as Grand Vizier in Constantinople.

29. Neumann to Metternich, 15 June 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 228, ff. 75–83.
30. Neumann to Metternich, 22 June 1840, ibid., ff. 91–6. This letter was also coded.
31. Guizot to Thiers, 15 June 1840, in Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. V, p. 201.
32. Neumann to Metternich, 23 June 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 228, ff. 103–8; Metternich to Neumann, 27 June 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 230, ff. 77–80.
33. According to Webster, Chekib or Neumann only offered Syria for life, and Thiers insisted on heredity, and Guizot indeed writes that Bülow and Neumann approached him on this basis: Webster, *The foreign policy of Palmerston*, vol. II, pp. 684–5; Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. V, pp. 197–203. This was all informal, however, and Neumann's own reports to Metternich are less explicit: Neumann to Metternich, 12 and 15 June 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 228, ff. 61–4 and 75–83.
34. Metternich to Neumann, 24 June and 10 July 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 230, ff. 3–14.
35. For example in Metternich to Neumann, 6 May 1840, Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 230, ff. 126–31; Metternich to Trautmannsdorff, 6 May 1840, Staatskanzlei / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / Preußen / 175, ff. 264–72; and the instructions themselves, Metternich to Neumann, 25 April 1840, Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 230, ff. 34–59.
36. Bülow to Werther, 20 and 24 May 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 7354 / 56 and 58; Werther to Maltzan, 22 June 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 7354 / 27. On Prussia's willingness to concede Syria, see also Petr von Meyendorff, *Ein russischer Diplomat an den Höfen von Berlin und Wien* (3 vols, Berlin, 1923), vol. I, pp. 102–3 and Werther to Maltzan, 4 May 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 7353 / 20.
37. Werther to Maltzan, 2 June 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 7354 / 23.
38. Thureau-Dangin, *Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet*, vol. IV, pp. 242–3. Also quoted in Price, *The perilous crown*, p. 302. Louis-Philippe was closely involved in foreign policy, and that he singled out the Austrians and Prussians suggests he knew where the weakest links were in the diplomatic chain.
39. Quoted in *Times*, 12 October 1840, p. 6.
40. Veit-Brause, 'Die deutsch-französische Krise von 1840', p. 1; Simms, *The struggle for mastery in Germany*, p. 157; and Schulze, *The course of German nationalism*, p. 64.

41. Cochelet to Thiers, 26 September 1840, BNF / NAF / 20609, ff. 35–7.
42. Bury and Tombs, *Thiers: a political life*, p. 70; Darriulat, *Les patriotes*, p. 88.
43. Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, p. 229; *Le Temps*, 28 July 1840, p. 1.
44. *Le National*, 28 July 1840, p. 1.
45. *Journal des Débats*, 31 July 1840, pp. 1–2.
46. All quoted in *Le Constitutionnel*, 11 October 1840, p. 1.
47. *Le Siècle*, 5 October 1840, p. 1.
48. The spokesman's words when the ashes law was introduced in parliament. *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, p. 618.
49. Darriulat, *Les patriotes*, pp. 38–51.
50. See Thomas Nipperdey, 'In search of identity: Romantic nationalism', in J.C. Eade (ed.), *Romantic nationalism in Europe* (Canberra, 1983), pp. 1–15.
51. Louis de Carné, 'De l'Allemagne depuis 1830', *La Revue des Deux Mondes* (April 1838), p. 138.
52. Edgar Quinet, 'Allemagne et Italie', in *Œuvres complètes* (11 vols, Paris, 1857), vol. VI, p. 137.
53. Rémusat in the discussion of the 1840 address: *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, p. 3; J. Froment, *La guerre. Aux armes!* (Paris, 1840), p. 21.
54. Victor Considerant, *De la politique générale et du rôle de la France en Europe* (Paris, 1840), p. 73.
55. *Le National*, 24 November 1840, p. 1.
56. *Le Siècle*, 19 August 1840, p. 1.
57. Jean-François Destigny, *Aux armes!* (Paris, 1840), p. 8.
58. Le Noble-Aubert du Bayet, *A l'Angleterre guerre à mort!* (Paris, 1840), p. 4.
59. For example Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, p. 232.
60. Edgar Quinet, '1815 et 1840' (Paris, 1840), pp. 68–9.
61. Mengin, *Considérations*, p. 10.
62. Jomard, *Coup d'oeil*, p. 54.
63. Labat, *L'Egypte ancienne et moderne*, p. 7.
64. Marmont, *Voyage du duc de Raguse*, vol. II, p. 105.
65. *Courrier Français*, 7 October 1839, p. 1; *Archives parlementaires*, vol. 126, pp. 638–9.
66. *Le Siècle*, 2 July 1839, p. 1.
67. Saint-Marc Girardin, 'Méhémet Ali', *La Revue des Deux Mondes* (September 1840), p. 906.
68. Clot-Bey, *Aperçu*, p. 519.
69. Cadalvène, *Histoire de la guerre de Méhémed-Ali contre la Porte ottomane*, p. 416.
70. Davésiès, 'Mohammed-Ali-Pacha', p. 451.
71. Le Prévost d'Iray, *La Pierre de Rosette*, p. 3.

72. Cadalvène, *Histoire de la guerre de Méhémed-Ali contre la Porte ottomane*, p. 445.
73. Laurent, *Histoire de l'empereur Napoléon*, p. 8.
74. Davésiès, 'Mohammed-Ali-Pacha', p. 457.
75. Planat, *Histoire de la régénération de l'Egypte*, p. 11.
76. Blanc, *Ibrahim, ou l'Orient et l'Occident*, pp. 5–6.
77. J.B. Flandin, *Aux armes!* (Paris, 1840), p. 12.
78. *L'Orient européen social, religieux et littéraire* (2 vols, Paris, 1840), vol. I, p. 22.
79. Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, vol. II, pp. 281–2.
80. From a July 1839 parliamentary speech quoted in Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. IV, p. 329.
81. *La Quotidienne*, 19 July 1840, p. 3 and 11 August 1840, pp. 1–2.
82. Ibid., 29 July 1840, p. 1.
83. Ibid., 31 July 1840, p. 1 and 28 July 1840, p. 2.
84. Quoted in *Le Siècle*, 20 October 1840, p. 2.
85. *Journal des Débats*, 29 November 1840, p. 1.
86. *Le Siècle*, 20 October 1840, p. 1.
87. *Le Constitutionnel*, 24 November 1840, p. 1.
88. *Le National*, 24 November 1840, p. 1.
89. *Le Siècle*, 24 November 1840, p. 1.
90. *Annales du parlement français*, 1841, pp. 3–309.
91. Davésiès, 'Mohammed-Ali-Pacha', p. 459.
92. *Annales du parlement français*, 1841, p. 114.
93. Ibid., p. 223.
94. Ibid., p. 144.
95. Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie*, vol. II, p. 486.
96. Victor Hugo, *Journal 1830–1848* (Paris, 1954), p. 54.
97. Joinville, *Vieux souvenirs*, pp. 156–7. See also Dino, *Chronique*, vol. II, pp. 436–7.
98. Considerant, *De la politique générale et du rôle de la France*, p. 12.
99. Nikolaus Becker, 'Rheinlied', translation taken from Schulze, *The course of German nationalism*, p. 65.
100. Werner Deetjen, *Sie sollen ihn nicht haben*! (Weimar, 1920), p. 15.
101. Billinger, 'They sing the best songs badly', pp. 94–113; Simms, *The struggle for mastery in Germany*, pp. 160–2.
102. See also Veit-Brause, 'Die deutsch-französische Krise von 1840', pp. 262–78.
103. *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, pp. 99–105.
104. The irony is noted in Deetjen, *Sie sollen ihn nicht haben!*, p. 14 and Veit-Brause, 'Die deutsch-französische Krise von 1840', pp. 126–7.
105. *Le National*, 12 January 1840, p. 1. The speech was also criticised, among others, in the *Journal des Débats*, 12 January 1840, p. 1 and in *La Presse*, 12 January 1840, p. 1

106. *Archives parlementaires*, vol. 126, pp. 649–53.
107. *Annales du parlement français*, 1840, pp. 624–7.
108. *La Presse*, 24 August 1840, pp. 1–3; *Le Siècle*, 25 August, p. 1; and *Le Constitutionnel*, 27 August, p. 1.
109. Alphonse de Lamartine, 'La Marseillaise de la paix', *La Revue des Deux Mondes* (June 1841), pp. 794–9.
110. Edgar Quinet, 'Le Rhin', ibid., pp. 932–6.
111. Quinet, '1815 et 1840', pp. 5–20.
112. Kléber had died in Egypt. The pedestal of his statue shows the battle of Heliopolis. The Hermannsdenkmal is situated in the Teutoburg forest in Ostwestfalen-Lippe.
113. See Metternich to Neumann, 5 October 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Großbritannien / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 231, ff. 19–32.
114. Meyendorff to Nesselrode, 6 October 1840, in Meyendorff, *Ein russischer Diplomat*, vol. I, p. 129. See also Berlin to Schleinitz, 2 October 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 7358 / 33, in which the Prussians regret the act of deposition and ask for mitigating explanations to be given to France.
115. Protocol, 14 August 1840, in Martens, *Recueil des traités*, vol. XII, pp. 142–3.
116. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 25 September 1840, in Nesselrode, *Lettres et papiers*, vol. VIII, p. 39; Meyendorff to Nesselrode, 10 October 1840, in Meyendorff, *Ein russischer Diplomat*, vol. I, p. 133.
117. Werther to Liebermann, 8 October 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 7358 / 16.
118. Werther to Schleinitz, 14 October 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 7358 / 34.
119. Werther to Maltzan, 2 November 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 7359 / 44.
120. Russell to Werther, 23 November 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 5183 / 1. On French indiscretion: Granville to Palmerston, 6 November 1840, *Correspondence relative to the affairs of the Levant*, vol. III, p. 2.
121. Werther to Bülow, 26 November 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 5183 / 5.
122. Palmerston to Russell, 2 December 1840, GSPK / III. HA MdA / I, 5183 / 7.
123. Metternich to Trautmannsdorff, 11 November 1840, HHStA / Staatskanzlei / Diplomatische Korrespondenz Preußen / 176, ff. 303–18.
124. Bourqueney to Guizot, 2 November 1840, AMAE / Correspondance Politique / Angleterre / 656, ff. 139–45.
125. Guizot to Bourqueney, 4 November 1840, ibid., ff. 146–7.
126. *Österreichischer Beobachter*, 6, 7, and 11 August 1840, pp. 1103, 1108, and 1121–2.
127. *Allgemeine Preußische Staatszeitung*, 2, 3, 4, and 5 August 1840, pp. 833, 857, 861, and 869.
128. *Stadt Aachener Zeitung*, 1 August 1840, p. 2.
129. Ibid., 2 September 1840, p. 2.
130. Ibid., 3 September 1840, p. 2.

131. *Kölnische Zeitung*, 6, 8, and 20 August 1840, pp. 1–2, 1, and 1–2.
132. Ibid., 17 September 1840, p. 1.
133. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 August 1840, p. 1741.
134. Ibid., 13 August 1840, pp. 1805–6.
135. *Stadt Aachener Zeitung*, 21 October 1840, p. 1.
136. Official Prussian reports from Cologne and Düsseldorf confirm quite accurately that spirits only became agitated from late October 1840: Joseph Hansen (ed.), *Rheinische Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte der politischen Bewegung, 1830–1850* (4 vols, Essen, 1919), vol. I pp. 195–6 and 272–5. According to Baron Bourgoing, German opinion blamed the treaty, not the French, until October: Anton Chroust (ed.), *Gesandtschaftsberichte aus München, 1814–1848* (Munich, 1935), pp. 188–201.
137. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, pp. 28–9.
138. Ibid., pp. 52–5.
139. Meyendorff to Nesselrode, 20 October 1840, in Meyendorff, *Ein russischer Diplomat*, vol. I, p. 137. See also Hassel, *Radowitz*, p. 92.
140. Hassel, *Radowitz*, p. 83.
141. Radowitz, *Gesammelte Schriften* (5 vols, Berlin, 1852), vol. IV, p. 97.
142. Ibid., p. 98.
143. Hassel, *Radowitz*, p. 82.
144. Ibid., p. 100.
145. Theodor von Schön, *Aus den Papieren des Ministers und Burggrafen von Marienburg Theodor von Schön* (Halle, 1875), pp. 255–8.
146. Ibid., pp. 259–65 and 271–4.
147. Veit-Brause, 'Die deutsch-französische Krise von 1840', pp. 169–72 and 197–205.
148. *Kölnische Zeitung*, 16 October 1840, p. 2.
149. Ibid., 22 October 1840, pp. 1–2.
150. Ibid., 29 October 1840, pp. 1–2.
151. *Stadt Aachener Zeitung*, 28 November 1840, p. 2.
152. Ibid., 6 October, p. 1.
153. Ibid., 11 November 1840, p. 2.
154. Ibid., 25 November 1840, p. 1; *Kölnische Zeitung*, 25 November 1840, p. 1.
155. Ernst Moritz Arndt, *Gedichte* (Berlin, 1860), pp. 412–3, 415, and 504. The poems were from 1840–1.
156. Niklas Müller, *Frankreich und Deutschland am Neujahr 1841* (Mainz, 1841).
157. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 November 1840, p. 2503.
158. Hassel, *Radowitz*, p. 80.
159. Hans Adler (ed.), *Literarische Geheimberichte* (Cologne, 1977), pp. 51–3.
160. For continuing Liberal dissidence during the crisis, see Veit-Brause, 'Die deutsch-französische Krise von 1840', pp. 197–8 and 206–7.

161. Hansemann wrote a long memoir, dated August or September 1840, 'Denkschrift über Peußens Lage und Politkk', in Hansen, *Rheinische Briefe und Akten*, pp. 197–268.
162. From Varnhagen's diary, January 1841: Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, *Denkwürdigkeiten des eignen Lebens* (3 vols, Frankfurt, 1987), vol. V, p. 288.
163. Johann Jacoby, *Vier Fragen, beantwortet von einem Ostpreußen* (Mannheim, 1841).
164. 'Ludwig Börne', *Hallische Jahrbücher*, 22 December 1840, p. 2442; 'Die Leipzige Allgemeine Zeitung und die öffentliche Meinung', *Hallische Jahrbücher*, 15 February 1841, p. 154.
165. Adler, *Literarische Geheimberichte*, p. 79.
166. Ibid., p. 69.
167. Ibid., p. 70.
168. Quoted in Deetjen, *Sie sollen ihn nicht haben!*, p. 35.
169. Eduard Prutz, *Der Rhein* (Leipzig, 1840); Franz Dingelstedt, *Lieder eines kosmopolitischen Nachtwachters* (Tübingen, 1978), pp. 131–3; and 'Osterwort', Franz Dingelstedt, *Gedichte* (Stuttgart, 1845), p. 102.
170. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 August 1840, p. 1932.
171. Wilhelm Schulz, *Der Bund der Deutschen und Franzosen* (Strasbourg, 1841).
172. Georg Herwegh, *Werke und Briefe* (Bielefeld, 2005), pp. 17–18, 52–5, and 32–5.
173. August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben, *Unpolitische Lieder* (2 vols, Hamburg, 1840–1), vol. I, pp. 5, 9, 21, and 58 and vol. II, pp. 8, 104, and 123.
174. Adler, *Literarische Geheimberichte*, p. 62.
175. Metternich to Frederick William IV, 9 October 1840, in Metternich, *Mémoires*, vol. VI, p. 492.
176. Nesselrode to Countess Nesselrode, 25 February 1841 and Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 18 March 1841, both in Nesselrode, *Lettres et papiers*, vol. VIII, pp. 129 and 132.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

The Eastern Crisis of 1839–41 was the scene of a three-way contest between European ideologies. France, the Liberal champion, supported the revolutionary statesman that was Mehemet Ali; Britain, the country of adaptive constitutionalism, threw its weight behind a reforming Turkey; and the Conservative northern courts defended the status quo and Ottoman legitimacy. Far from obeying geographic imperatives in the form of identifiable, material interests, the diplomatic contenders pursued political blueprints. Or rather both notions fused, with such blueprints coming to stand for interests. 'The political doctrines of the respective Powers often have far more influence on the policies they follow than their own interests', as wrote Radowitz.[1] As soon as the conflict between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan became the object of great-power intervention, its course began to espouse Restoration Europe's ideological fault lines, and far less the Middle Eastern map's actual fault lines. Accordingly, the European struggle between Liberalism and Reaction soon became writ large over that between Pasha and suzerain.

Mehemet Ali, as the chief troublemaker and the challenger of the established order in the Orient, was perhaps a natural partner for France, the adversary of the Restoration system in Europe. Yet core to French support for the Pasha's regime were the peculiarities of the memory of the 1798 expedition. The crisis took place at a time when the Napoleonic legend was reaching its zenith and recollections of the doomed emperor only basked in the aura of the Romantic age. Bonaparte himself had styled the Expedition as a civilising enterprise by bringing along a scientific

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contingent and later publishing its work in the *Description de l'Egypte*. Mehemet Ali, seconded by a full platoon of propagandists, some of whom were working on the ground as his advisers, only took over the Napoleonic mantle. Helped by his own astonishing career, by the fortuitous but prominent role of Egyptology and Champollion's contribution, by his adoption of showy modernising initiatives, the Pasha became a French hero. In the public discourse, he became a continuator of the French civilising mission. Bonaparte was remembered as a political progressive, however, and mythology mandated that he had been the champion of aspiring nations. Mehemet Ali, the foe of the traditional, multinational, mosque-and-state Ottoman Empire, was well placed to inherit that role also. He was thus reinvented as defender of the French ideological vocation, as another vehicle for the march of revolutionary freedom: a phenomenon without which the post-15 July 1840 rage that erupted among the French public—and by extension the Rhine Crisis—is unexplainable.

Suitably impressed with the popularity the Pasha enjoyed on their home ground, Louis-Philippe and Thiers both bought into and resolved to make use of the necessity of defending him. Successive French governments, from Soult to Thiers to Guizot, led as pro-Egyptian a policy as shifting circumstances allowed. They went so far as to dismiss, in the hope of superior deals, the attractive compromise offers that their very stubbornness had invited. There was a propagandistic side to the positions of the king and his warlike prime minister: in the case of Thiers, driven by the urge to bolster a fragile parliamentary coalition and by the same token his own, precarious position, and in the case of Louis-Philippe by the hope of fending off republican threats and other democratic demands. Yet their policy of support for the Pasha more basically acted as an extension of what the July Monarchy stood for domestically. Itself the heir to France's recent glories, the product of a revolution, and a friend to France's international Liberal ideals, the regime could not but embrace the cause of the modernising Pasha, the shadow revolutionary leader who had arisen on the banks of the Nile.

If the British line, and specifically Palmerston's, was to espouse neither the position of France nor that of Russia, this was also by design far more than by default. Britain, both geography and the power of the Royal Navy ought to have dictated, had the greatest possible number of policy options. Indeed, the turning point only came in 1832–3, when the foreign secretary decided it was Britain's role to line up behind the striving Ottomans. A lack of belief in Mehemet Ali's resilience, his regime being

perceived as artificial and lacking in proven durability, partly motivated this choice. Tied to it, however, was also a refusal to find in the mere upholding of the status quo something else but a recipe for decay and an eventual Turkish collapse. As the seminal Stratford Canning memorandum spelt out, Turkish reform was the essential condition for British diplomatic and military backing. One remained wedded to the other as the Middle Eastern conflict progressed to its 1839–41 acme, so much so that when Brünnow finally appeared at the door to propose upholding the Turks, British cooperation was a foregone conclusion. Palmerston and his staff went to work on their appointed task. Turkish reform, originally the initiative of Mahmud, became moulded in a British and specifically Whig image. The benefits of free trade were promised to be brought by the Balta-Liman treaty of 1838, and those of good governance by the proclamation of security of person of property contained in the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané of 1839. The years of effort built into the policy, and the corresponding belief in its potential for success, inform the British foreign secretary's commitment to promulgating the Convention of London and his tenacity through the attending cabinet clash. The British commitment to, and belief in, Turkish reform are also illustrated in the sharpest possible colours by the invading force's insistence that it was the solution to the many problems of Syria.

For the northern courts, finally, the paramount aim was to deflect the threat of sedition as embodied by Mehemet Ali as rebel against his sovereign, and with him of thwarting the ever unruly French cause. The Pasha's modernising credentials were only viewed with suspicion—all the more so that they typically found favour with radical European audiences—and nor was Turkish reform judged to be of much interest. The point was that monarchical legitimacy must prevail and the cancer of struggles for independence, especially if styled as national struggles, be stifled. Yet there were important differences of emphasis among the three Conservative allies, and these had an impact on the course of the diplomatic negotiations. In Russia, the decision to prioritise stability in Europe over the prospect of gains in the Eastern theatre was the result of a swing of the pendulum. The so-called German party embodied and led by Nesselrode deemed Russia's position as protector of the fragile Restoration world more important than its ambitions as Asian hegemon. It was temporarily in the ascendant. For the Prussians and Austrians, holding the centre of Europe together, and particularly Germany, was a more permanent goal. Thwarting the rebel Pasha, the Egyptian Bonaparte, was useful and

important, but not if that meant paying in real coinage in the near-abroad. Syria was not worth the Rhineland, or the risk of Italian unification. For Metternich and for Werther, the threat of revolutionary contagion was real, and the prospect of spreading instability by the unpredictable French ever present. Correspondingly, each in turn made proposals to the French, in the spring and in the autumn of 1840, which if enacted would have snatched victory from the teeth of looming defeat for the Pasha. Such was indeed the level of concern, bordering on panic, that both the Austrian and the Prussian chancellors even dared going behind their allies' backs with these offers.

If the Eastern Crisis impressed Europe's own ideological clashes upon the Middle East, it also put the Holy Land back on the European political agenda. 'In the meanwhile, in the remarkable providence of God, all Europe has been interested in the state of the Holy Land', went the terse imprecation of Bickersteth, the preacher and interpreter of prophecy.[2] In the rush back to the Holy Land, moreover, Zionism in its Protestant incarnation was temporarily the main force. Surprisingly, Palestine became the object of hopes and plans for the Jews, and future Jewish converts to Protestantism, far more than for Orthodox or Catholic Christians. This was partly the effect of the early Victorian missionary spirit, that inseparable companion to the spread of British trade and power around the world. Yet the fortuitous Damascus Affair, the still swelling force of British evangelicalism, and the lack of a direct Protestant presence in the region all combined to place the Jewish cause before the Christian. There were no or almost no Protestants in the Ottoman Empire, and for the British as for the Prussians, the Jews came to hand as surrogate coreligionists. Another factor was that French support for Mehemet Ali on the one hand, including that of such Orleanist clericals as the editors of *L'Univers*, and Austrian reticence on the other, combined to mute endeavours for the re-creation of a Catholic stronghold in Palestine. And though Russia did signal its desire to see its presence in the Holy Places respected, Orthodoxy likewise failed to be raised in significant fashion, being a rallying cry of the Russian nationalists rather than Nesselrode and the Westernisers.

The future promised to be more conflictual, however, as far as the Holy Land was concerned. The raising of plans for Palestine, for Jerusalem, or for the Holy Sites, as tentative as they remained and however abortive they turned out, the opening of consulates in Jerusalem beginning with the British, the precedent for intervention in situations of confessional strife set by the Damascus Affair—all promised more European interference on

religious grounds. The continuing disorder in Syria after it was cleared of Egyptian troops moreover presented the risk that, spurred on by European promises of protection, factionalism might morph into quarrelling between religious groups. Most important perhaps, the Ottoman Capitulations had been renewed. While the wording remained mild and the guarantees offered limited, the door had been opened to increasingly stringent, and mutually incompatible, European demands.

'Let us speak no more of the Pasha, who seems to have been like so many things in this world but a phantasmagoria', concluded Princess Lieven as the crisis was drawing to a weary end.[3] As the concerns and conceits of its main protagonists recede into the past, the Eastern Crisis's transnational features become less immediately graspable. It has accordingly been tempting for historians to portray it as a mere territorial clash. Yet as one plunges anew into contemporary contexts, these features only become more salient again. The protracted Eastern Crisis was in large part a propaganda contest, a contest that crossed multiple borders in its reach for audiences. If the often-cited and translated Jomard and Marmont were the Pasha's publicists, then the equally influential Urquhart was Turkey's great apologist. From Thiers's to Palmerston's calculated pronouncements, and including such trial balloons as those of Russell or even Lamartine, public diplomacy was employed with an impressive frequency. Religious causes also cut across borders: Guizot's timid steps in favour of a Christian Jerusalem were recuperated by Metternich, and the Anglo-Prussian bishopric in Jerusalem arose as an important coda to the crisis. Most importantly, as position-taking in the respective camps confirms, of course, the Eastern Crisis was the target of the opposing forces that were Liberalism and Reaction, forces that tore through Restoration Europe and had been spurring so many of its national and international upheavals.

The Eastern Crisis of 1839–41, seen from the perspective of the European taskmasters who were responsible for its outcome, was but a clash of ideologies and national missions. In Thiers's impassioned words, France 'will take up arms in the cause of civilisation, for it is civilisation that is being hated on the banks of the Nile as on the banks of the Seine!'[4] Palmerston had long proclaimed that Britain's responsibility, less forcibly but no less forcefully, was that 'She stands umpire between hostile and excited parties; she holds the balance between extreme and opposing principles; her task is "Pacis imponere morem"; and this task she may continue to perform no less to her own advantage, than for the benefit of the rest of the civilized world.'[5] For the sceptical Metternich, such pretensions were

nothing but dangerous folly, and the only issues worthy of consideration those of legitimacy and rebellion: 'If the existence of the rebel Pasha could be erased entirely, we would not oppose it, considering that we cannot be the dupes of phantasmagorias nor of fine words, such as over the respect owed to *Egyptian civilization* or to the genius of its inventor!'[6]

The powers had intervened in the great contemporary conflict of the Middle East, and they had done so with policies that reflected their ideological preoccupations and alignments. The need to bring European reform to the Orient, the manner in which it must be done, or the absence of it, were determinant factors in deciding what line to adopt and who to back. Religious missions, and a renewed interest in the Holy Land, helped mobilise publics in favour of intervention. Whether in Egypt itself or in Turkey, or elsewhere in the Middle East, both religiously grounded involvement and the notion that it was a European vocation to help establish better political governance were ideas destined to endure.

Notes

1. Journal entry is from 1839, Joseph von Radowitz, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. IV, p. 88.
2. Bickersteth, *The restoration of the Jews*, p. lxxxii.
3. Princess Lieven to Aberdeen, 4 January 1841, in Parry, *The correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven*, vol. I, p. 157.
4. 'Politique extérieure', *La Revue Des Deux Mondes* (August 1840), p. 486.
5. Palmerston in Spencer, *The reform ministry and the reformed parliament*, p. 104.
6. Metternich to Neumann, 1 January 1840, HHStA / Staatenabteilungen / Frankreich / Diplomatische Korrespondenz / 319, f. 71.

Afterword

I am sometimes asked how much the circumstances of the Eastern Crisis apply to the Middle East's modern travails. It is all too tempting to try drawing fixed lessons from international clashes, or to seek to make one's object of study relevant by painting it as similar to this or that current event or situation. The Eastern Crisis is not a template from which to extrapolate policy proposals. Besides, events never leave a blank slate on which the same game can be re-enacted again exactly as before. If the crisis is an interesting or an important object of historical study, this is mostly as starting point to a longer subsequent history of Western involvement in the region.

With these caveats clearly laid out and this disclaimer put before the unsuspecting reader, a few points of comparison may nevertheless be ventured. One major difference is Islam: central to Middle Eastern affairs today, it seems to have played very little role in 1839–41 and to have preoccupied no one or almost no one, not even the main Muslim actors. Neither was oil, of course, of any significance, though here perhaps a better parallel is to be found, since the commodity, however valuable in itself, seems to exercise imaginations to the same degree and in the same way that the Orient's fabled economic potential did in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As of the time of writing, meanwhile, Egypt is governed by a military dictatorship monopolising a good slice of its resources. No doubt this is proof of Mehemet Ali's astonishingly enduring legacy, though that legacy is far from being solely

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responsible. A civil war having originated in a popular uprising rages in Syria, though it appears more severe than the rebellions of the 1830s and 1840s. Zionism proper has arrived with the foundation of Israel, but its Protestant version, having effectively died out in Britain, has only migrated to the United States, where it continues as a major factor for Western intrusion into the Middle East.

Perhaps the most striking parallel, though, is that the press continues to treat Middle Eastern events, in almost systematic fashion, as motives for Western intervention. It remains a staple of the public sphere that it is an American and a European duty to get involved, and through such intervention to bring about a better Middle East—more prosperous, less fanatical, more democratic—regardless of whether the last round of intervention proved in any way successful, or even when it may reasonably be construed to have led to the very problems it is expected to solve. One would expect, finally, the policymakers who decide on such efforts to be better informed than were Palmerston or Metternich. Yet as the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction suggests, information often flows from decision-making and not vice versa, especially with regard to a region that remains endowed with so much emotive and evocative power. How policymakers come to delineate the interests they believe they must uphold in the international arena remains as valid a question today as it was in 1839–41.

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