

*The Balkan Wars
from Contemporary Perception
to Historic Memory*

Edited by

KATRIN BOECKH
& SABINE RUTAR



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Editors

Katrin Boeckh
Institute for East and Southeast
European Studies
Regensburg, Germany

Sabine Rutar
Institute for East and Southeast
European Studies
Regensburg, Germany

Department of History
LMU Munich, Germany

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Fikret Adanır is a retired Professor of Southeast European History, University of Bochum, and Professor Emeritus of History, Sabancı University, Istanbul. His research is focused on Southeast European and Ottoman peasantries, modernization, and comparative perspectives on empires. He is the author or co-editor of *Die Makedonische Frage* (1979); *The Formation of National Elites* (1992); *Geschichte der Republik Türkei* (1995); *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (2002); *Osmanismus, Nationalismus und der Kaukasus: Muslime und Christen, Türken und Armenier* (2005); and *1915: Siyaset, Tehcir, Soykırım* [1915: Politics, Deportations, Genocide] (2015).

Katrin Boeckh is Senior Researcher at the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg and extraordinary Professor for East and Southeast European History at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich. Among her publications are *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (1996); *Stalinismus in der Ukraine: Die Rekonstruktion des sowjetischen Systems nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (2007); (with Ekkehard Völkl), *Ukraine. Von der Roten zur Orangenen Revolution* (2007); *Serbien. Montenegro. Geschichte und Gegenwart* (2009). Her research interests include religious networks during the socialist era, transformations of value discourses after the end of socialism as well as ethnic conflicts and their consequences in Eastern Europe.

Daut Dauti is a PhD candidate at the University of Leeds–School of History, working on his dissertation on *The British Foreign Policy and the*

Albanian Question 1876–1914. As an International Fellow at the Kettering Foundation in Dayton (USA) he researched subjects in the field of history, media and democracy, and politics and traditional deliberation among Albanians. Within this program he has published *Building an Independent Media in Kosova* (English and Albanian) and *Assemblies and Ancient Deliberation according to the Code of Lek Dukagjini* (English, Albanian, and Chinese). He recently completed a study on *Collective Decision Making Practices among the Albanians between the Congress of Berlin (1878) and Albanian Independence (1912)*.

Svetlozar Eldarov is Professor of History at the Institute of Balkan Studies & Center of Thracology in Sofia. His research interests cover the wars in the Balkans, the Macedonian question, Orthodoxy and Catholicism, and Bulgarian–Croatian relations.

Florian Keisinger received his PhD from the University of Tübingen in 2008 with a study on “Uncivilized Wars in Civilized Europe? The Balkans Wars and Public Opinion in Germany, England and Ireland, 1876–1913.” He works for an international company.

Stjepan Matković is Senior Researcher at the Croatian Institute of History in Zagreb and a specialist in Croatian history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between 2001 and 2007, he was the Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Contemporary History* (*Časopis za suvremenu povijest*). From 2007 to 2010 he was the director of the Croatian Institute of History. He has recently co-edited (with Marko Trogrlić) the volume *Iz korespondencije Josipa Franka s Bečom: 1907–1910* [From the correspondence between Josip Frank and Vienna circles, 1907–1910] (2014).

Eugene Michail is Senior Lecturer in Contemporary History at the School of Humanities of the University of Brighton (UK). He works mainly on transnational European themes, especially in the context of Greece and the Balkans, but also Germany and Britain. His research focuses on war and violence, popular culture, collective memory and “memory shifts,” cross-cultural contacts, and the history of history-writing. He is the author of *The British and the Balkans: Forming Images of Foreign Lands, 1900–1950* (2011), and he is currently researching Western reactions to the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, as well as the uses of history in the current Greek crisis.

Bisser Petrov is Associate Professor at the Institute of Balkan Studies & Center of Thracology in Sofia. In his PhD thesis he is concerned with “Non-Communist Resistance in the Occupied Balkan Countries during World War II.” His research interests cover the wars in the Balkans, especially the Second World War, occupation, resistance, collaboration, and civil war.

Edvin Pezo is Senior Researcher at the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg, Germany. In 2013, he published a monograph about migration policy in Yugoslavia and the emigration of different Muslim ethnic groups to Turkey (*Zwangsmigration in Friedenszeiten? Jugoslawische Migrationspolitik und die Auswanderung von Muslimen in die Türkei, 1918 bis 1966*, Munich: Oldenbourg). He is the Coordinator and Managing Editor of the six-volume *Handbuch zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*. In the handbook, he is the author of the chapter on the decade of wars between 1911 and 1922/23. Currently, he is researching the formation and exercise of power and authority in socialist Yugoslavia.

Nicolas Pitsos is Affiliated Researcher in the Center for European and Eurasian Studies at the National Institute for Oriental Languages and Cultures (Paris) and Lecturer in Balkan History at the Institut Catholique d’Études Supérieures. He is currently pursuing research on the reception and remembrance of the Eastern question within French and Greek societies.

Stefan Rohdewald is Professor for Southeast European History at the University of Gießen. He focuses on urban history, discourses of remembrance, and entanglements between Eastern and Western Europe. His publications include “Vom Polocker Venedig.” *Kollektives Handeln sozialer Gruppen in einer Stadt zwischen Ost- und Mitteleuropa* (2005), co-editing *Sport zwischen Ost und West* (2007); *Lithuania and Ruthenia. Studies of a Transcultural Communication Zone* (2007); *Kooperation trotz Konfrontation. Wissenschaft und Technik im Kalten Krieg* (2009); *Götter der Nationen. Religiöse Erinnerungsfiguren in Serbien, Bulgarien und Makedonien bis 1944* (2014). Between 2017 and 2023 he will coordinate the priority program *Transottomanica: East European–Ottoman–Persian Mobility Dynamics*, financed by the German Research Foundation.

Sabine Rutar has been a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg since 2008. She is the Editor-in-Chief and the Managing Editor of the multidisciplinary social science quarterly *Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society*. Since 2012, she has earned fellowships at the Imre Kertész Kolleg in Jena, the Centre for Contemporary History in Potsdam, the International Research

Center “Work and Human Life Cycle in Global History” at the Humboldt University in Berlin, and, currently, at the Berlin Center for Cold War Studies. Recent publications include the chapter “Nationalism in Southeast Europe since 1970” in the *Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (2013); and editing a special issue of the *European History Quarterly* on “Violence in Late Socialist Public Spheres” (2015). Presently, she is completing a monograph on labor deployment in Yugoslav mining industries under national socialist occupation (1941–44/45).

Günther Sandner teaches at the Departments of Political Science and of Economic and Social History at the University of Vienna. He is currently Senior Fellow at the International Research Center for Cultural Studies (IFK) in Vienna. His research interests include intellectual history and political theory. In 2014, he published a biography of Otto Neurath (*Otto Neurath. Eine politische Biographie*).

Dubravka Stojanović is Professor of History at the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Belgrade, where she teaches global contemporary history. Her research interests include modernization and Europeanization processes in Southeastern Europe, democratization in Serbia, the history of Belgrade, the relations between history and memory, as well as history textbooks research. Recent publications include *Iza zavese. Ogledi iz društvene istorije Srbije 1890–1914* [Behind the curtain. Essays in the social history of Serbia 1890–1914] (2013) and *Radanje globalnog sveta. Vanevropski svet u savremenom dobu 1880–2015* [The birth of the global world 1880–2015] (2015).

Petar Todorov works at the Institute of National History, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia, and is a Research Fellow at the University of New York in Tirana, Albania. He researches the social and urban history of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Ottoman Empire and Southeastern Europe, with the history of education as well as the (ab)use of history in contemporary societies. He completed his studies in France and Macedonia and was a Visiting Researcher and Visiting Professor at Şehir University in Istanbul.

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The Balkan Wars from Perception to Remembrance

Katrin Boeckh and Sabine Rutar

The years 2012–13 marked the centennial of the Balkan Wars, which preceded the First World War and “reshaped the map of south-eastern Europe” (*The Economist*, November 9, 2012). In the face of the “memory boom” prompted by these recent centenaries, this volume combines contemporary perceptions and those of historical memory in light of the fact that the Balkan Wars have yet to find their appropriate place within the collective historical memory of twentieth-century warfare in Europe.

In what is called the First Balkan War (October 1912–May 1913), Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria declared war on the Ottoman Empire; in the Second Balkan War (June–August 1913), Bulgaria fought Serbia and Greece over the Ottoman territories they had each just gained. From July onward, Serbia and Greece were supported by Romania, who entered the war hoping to seize the southern Dobruja from Bulgaria. These hopes were realized. Albania was declared an independent state in

K. Boeckh (✉)

Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg, Germany

Department of History, LMU Munich, Germany

e-mail: boeckh@ios-regensburg.de

S. Rutar

Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg, Germany

e-mail: rutar@ios-regensburg.de

November 1912 and was thus a product of the First Balkan War. The historical region of Macedonia, a main theater of war, consisted mainly of the territories of today's Republic of Macedonia, established in 1991; Pirin Macedonia, today in Bulgaria; and Vardar Macedonia, today in Greece. The Ottoman Empire's loss of most of its European territories in the conflict was a warning sign of its inner weakness; it ceased to exist in 1922, in the aftermath of the First World War, and was succeeded by modern Turkey. As is evident by this enumeration of territorial-political changes, the states existing today in the area can hardly offer a satisfactory framework for exploring the history of the two Balkan Wars, which exerted a more profound impact on the region than even the Great War. And yet, in Southeastern Europe, scholars addressing and researching these first European wars of the twentieth century have mostly adopted a traditional military and/or political history perspective, firmly rooted in the respective national master narratives of the former belligerents. Our volume intends to challenge precisely these master narratives.

Western scholars, on the other hand, if they have paid attention to the two Balkan Wars of 1912–13 at all, have tended to see them as a “prelude” to the Great War; their interpretive frameworks place them merely “in the shadow” of the subsequent global conflagration. Mostly, the Balkans have been treated as a peripheral historical region at the mercy of great-power politics. Such a view allows hardly any room for “sites of memory,” let alone “sites of mourning” (Jay Winter) derived from the local experience of the war, perceived from the vantage either of the victors or the defeated.¹

As an effect of the centennial attention on the wars, a few other new books deserve mention; none, however, focuses much on mnemonic issues. Ottoman/Turkish perspectives on the sociopolitical implications of war and nationalism have been provided in one collectively authored volume,² and Eyal Ginio's monograph especially has recently filled a pressing research lacuna.³ Important comparative insights into the policies of the European great powers during the several small wars preceding the Great War have

¹ A recent corrective to this master narrative has been offered by the authors in Oto Luthar, ed., *The Great War and Memory in Central and South-Eastern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2016); cf. the introduction to the volume by Oto Luthar and Nikolai Vukov, *Beyond a Western-Centric Historical Interpretation of the Great War*, 1–17.

² M. Hakan Yavuz, Isa Blumi, eds., *War & Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, and Their Sociopolitical Implications* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013).

³ Eyal Ginio, *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath* (London: Hurst, 2016).

been provided by another collective volume,⁴ while French and Romanian perspectives are the focus of two French publications.⁵ The editors of the present volume, finally, have provided a collective volume in which authors explore the wars in their sociopolitical and sociocultural contexts, placing societal, political, and military actors at the center of attention, entangling events and using microhistorical tools to examine local contexts.⁶

Given the complex and overlapping multiethnic and multinational layers of historical agency, as well as the sheer quantity of settings, of languages involved, and, ultimately, of canonical traditions to be challenged, a collectively written volume represents the proper, if not the only, format to comprehensively examine the topic. In this volume, scholars from all over Europe have offered their expertise from various academic backgrounds and have produced a multifaceted narrative defying any nation-state framework. Their case studies communicate with one another through a common methodological intention of “writing in” these wars into European collective memory beyond the exclusivity of the nation-state perspective, even as they pay tribute to its relevance for the historical memory of the societies directly affected by these wars.

The authors in this volume throw light on the ways in which, by means of these wars, the metaphor of the Balkans as Europe’s “powder keg” was perpetuated, reactivated, and instrumentalized throughout twentieth-century European history, in the “West” and in the “East,” up to the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in the 1990s. Besides this rather reductive “memory” of what the Balkan Wars meant, little is known in other world areas about the importance these wars have played in the construction of historical memory and of their perception among the former belligerent states. This volume presents these constructions—in a cohesive manner—to an international readership, and integrates them with the hitherto largely exclusive national master narratives.

The volume strengthens the emerging field examining the enmeshed and comparative histories of Southeastern Europe, represented for example

⁴William Mulligan, Andreas Rose, and Dominik Geppert, eds., *The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁵Catherine Durandin and Cécile Folschweiller, eds., *Alerte en Europe: la guerre dans les Balkans (1912–1913)* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014); Catherine Horel, ed., *Les guerres balkaniques (1912–1913). Conflits, enjeux, mémoires* (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2014).

⁶Katrin Boeckh and Sabine Rutar, eds., *The Balkan Wars 1912–13: Intimations of 20th Century Warfare* (forthcoming).

by the recent three-volume study *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*.⁷ The wars and violence of the twentieth century are of pivotal relevance in the current debates on the proper interpretation of twentieth-century European history. Arguably most emblematic in this respect are Timothy Snyder's *Bloodlands* and in particular Christopher Clark's *Sleepwalkers*, which represents an effort to Europeanize, if not globalize, the history—and thereby the memory—of the First World War.⁸ Especially with reference to the latter book, our volume works toward an increased inclusion of the Balkans and Turkey into the ongoing debate.

Part I, “War in the Balkans—Towards the End of Empire,” reflects on the meaning of the Balkan Wars within the interpretative framework of the end of the imperial era. From the perspective of the Ottoman Empire, both the historical premises and the contemporary relevance of some features of propaganda and mechanisms of “othering” prevalent in the early twentieth century were amply employed to mobilize public opinion in support of the “just cause” against the Ottoman Empire. The construction of the image of the “enemy” and the rhetoric of its dissemination implicitly or explicitly referred back to the *longue durée* anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish discourses of earlier eras, yet only in the face of the First Balkan War did their nurturing amount also to anti-imperialism (Fikret Adanır). Part and parcel of the road “to the end of empire” is the meaning of the violence and the demographic changes triggered by the wars, as these were to become issues perpetuated in the history of twentieth-century warfare in the region, up to the Kosovo war of 1999 (Edvin Pezo). Albania, non-existent as a state when war broke out, may be regarded as a “historical winner” of the wars. While war was still being waged, Albania was proclaimed independent in 1912. Nevertheless, the borders of the new state as they had been drawn were perceived as insufficient, a “national tragedy” even, because they disregarded the fervent attempts by international

⁷ *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*: vol. 1, Roumen Daskalov and Tchavdar Marinov, eds., *National Ideologies and Language Policies* (Leiden: Brill, 2013); vol. 2, Roumen Daskalov and Diana Mishkova, eds., *Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions* (2014); and, in particular, the third volume, Roumen Daskalov and Alexander Vezenkov, eds., *Shared Pasts, Disputed Legacies* (2015), which focuses on core mnemonic threads common to the region, yet *not* on its wars. Cf. also Sabine Rutar, ed., *Beyond the Balkans: Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe* (Vienna: Lit, 2014).

⁸ Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic, 2010); Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Penguin, 2012).

supporters of Albanian statehood to propagate a comprehensive solution for the Albanians (Daut Dauti). Another major thread was—and has in many ways remained—the perceived dichotomy between “the East” and “the West.” For example, the Pan-Slavic movement regained momentum in the face of the First Balkan War in terms of the mounting impulses of solidarity directed against the perceived enemies in both the “West” and the “South,” the “Turks” (Katrin Boeckh). The chapters in this part thus come full circle in providing insight into issues that remain pivotal to an understanding of contested memories up until today.

Part II, “European Eyes on the Balkans—Reassuring the Self,” focuses on the image of the “powder keg,” so successfully reanimated during the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in the 1990s. Since Edward Said and Maria Todorova skillfully displayed the persistent images of the “other,”⁹ the negative alter ego of the West (in Todorova’s words), serving to reassure the Western self of its “superiority,” comparatively little has been done to empirically diversify the persistent stereotypes framed by keywords like “backwardness” and even “savagery.” As the authors in this part make quite clear, a key motif of the gaze toward the “other” in the Balkans was, precisely, self-assurance. The means for such self-assurance was based on the information that journalists on—or near—the war provided to a broader audience in Europe and all over the world. They became the wars’ first interpreters. Generally, information on the conflicts in the Balkans in 1912–13 was generated by the print media: journalists collected information as far as war censorship allowed them to. In fact, their impressions from the theaters of war were often based on second- or even thirdhand pieces of information. Objectivity, even if aspired to, was hard to come by, and reporters as well as those offering other testimonies often took a firm, opinionated stand and confirmed their own convictions in their writings and statements. Leon Trotsky, writing for the newspaper *Kievskaya mysl*,⁹ criticized the militant capitalist system in his sketches from the Balkan capitals, while at the same time, the Austrian economist Otto Neurath was interested in furthering his theories on the usefulness of war-economy schemes even for times of peace (Günther Sandner). Irish journalists recognized the war as a model for the Irish fight for independence and sought to make use of the Balkan crisis for their own political goals (Florian Keisinger). Organs of the French press, depending on their ideological outlook, oscillated between leftist

⁹ Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin, 1995); Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, first edition 1997).

republican and rightist anti-modernist interpretations of nationalism in their comments on the war events, views that were heavily influenced by contemporaneous French political flashpoints, like the Dreyfus Affair and the “Eastern Question,” with its differing geopolitical interpretations of French interests (Nicolas Pitsos). Many Croatian intellectuals and especially the politically active youth were incited to voice new expressions of national euphoria in the face of the Serbian and Montenegrin armies’ successes. Croatian public figures, at that time, acted within the Hungarian domain of Austro-Hungary. The war in the Balkans strengthened their opposition to the Dualist Monarchy and inspired an ever-more militant attitude within the youth movement, whose members perceived in it a more generally valid model for the solution of the South Slav question (Stjepan Matković). Thus, as the chapters to this part reveal, the commonalities with the situation of the belligerents was what modeled and motivated perceptions, whether these common interests concerned the striving for independence, the quest for geopolitical influence, nationalist affinities, or anti-imperial politics.

Part III, “Memories of Victory and Defeat—Constructing the Nation,” draws the line through time up to the present, scrutinizing the construction of historical memory of the wars in various settings. With the exception of the Ottoman Empire, all belligerents succeeded in considerably extending their state territories—the crucial reason why, in Southeastern Europe, the memory of the Balkan Wars has been more important than that of the First World War. As to the political and public remembrance of the Balkan Wars, a huge dynamic is discernable: monuments were erected to praise war heroes and military leaders; a cult of masculinity was enforced, which extinguished from public memory moments of “weakness”; war victims were erased from that discourse, as nobody even so much as mentions the dead, the injured, the widows, or the material costs of the wars.

In Southeastern Europe, the construction of the historical memory of the Balkan Wars throughout the twentieth century hovered around ideas of heroism and victimhood, aiming at solidifying the nation-state. The Balkan Wars inflicted a traumatic territorial loss for the Ottoman Empire. This trauma survived in the republic, strengthened Turkish nationalism and made it more aggressive. Also, it buried the last dreams of Ottomanism, in the sense of a cohabitation between communities that were tied together in terms of their loyalty to the Ottoman state. Remembrance went from the suppression of lost lands and military defeat alike by a state that wished to erase any trace of the imperial legacy to the emergence, during the 1990s, of a new form of Ottomanism, in the sense that the various unspoken memories

of the defeat and the loss of European Turkey were finally expressed, on the one hand, and the way to a reimagination of the *Pax Ottomanica* in the Balkans could now be paved, on the other. Unfortunately, given the recent passing of the author commissioned to write the “Ottoman memory chapter,” Vangelis Kechriotis, and with such short notice, we were unable to find an author who could take over his task.

A detailed stroll through Bulgarian historiography testifies to how the defeat of that country in the Second Balkan War was turned into a heroic tragedy that alienated Bulgaria from the other Balkan states. To compensate for the loss of Macedonia after the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria would join strategic alliances with those powers that promised Macedonia to Bulgaria: in the First World War, with the Central Powers; in the Second, with the Axis powers. Thus, one could say, Bulgaria lost its Second Balkan War twice more in the two world wars (Svetlozar Eldarov, Bisser Petrov).

Crossing nationalizing lines, the reiteration of religious motifs in remembering the Balkan Wars—and both World Wars—clearly reveals the analogous ways that mnemonic master narratives have been constructed, yet in a fashion that has insisted on mutual exclusivity and that over time has become more nationalized, militarized, even secularized (Stefan Rohdewald). In the realm of history education, the contents of textbooks show how authorities wish a certain event to be memorialized. The significance of the Balkan Wars for strengthening national consciousness in Serbia is traceable from the immediate postwar years through today—representing a century of quests for a myth-building collective remembrance (Dubravka Stojanović). In the Republic of Macedonia the task arguably has been most complex, as today’s state does not geographically correspond to the historical region of Macedonia at the time of the Balkan Wars, which stretched into today’s Greece and Bulgaria. The complexity has not been eased by the various contestations directed toward Macedonia by its present neighboring states, down to its very name and, thereby, its existence. And in fact, the partition of that historical geographic Macedonia and the “catastrophic” consequences for the “Macedonian people” have remained the core topoi of Macedonian historiography, strengthening an ethnocentric and nationalist myth of victimization of ethnic Macedonians (Petar Todorov). And finally, the scarce and superficial attention paid to the Balkan Wars in Western historiographies is the neglectful counterpart to the overemphasis given to them in local societies. Interestingly, Western historiography has perceived the Balkan Wars nearly exclusively in terms of its military actions. The focus on war atrocities was renewed in the face of the

Yugoslav wars of dissolution, all too often erroneously labeled the “new” Balkan wars (Eugene Michail). The story, thus, once more comes full circle.

In this vein, we chose for the cover image of our book one of Robert Delaunay’s “Circular Forms,” painted in 1912, the year of the outbreak of war. Not only was Delaunay’s style dubbed “Orphism,” after Orpheus, who according to legend was born in Thrace—a core theater of the Balkan Wars—with the myth around him combining Oriental influences with, precisely, Thracian, or Balkan, ones. More importantly, Delaunay’s painting symbolizes a moment of fragile harmony in the chaos of the modern world. Given that the Balkan Wars were, in Europe, the first major violent act in the demise of what was to become “the world of yesterday,” in the words of Stefan Zweig,¹⁰ Delaunay’s visual metaphor proves intriguing. His “Circular Forms” “hover indeterminately between the abstraction of their form and the referentiality of that same form in light of their titles (i.e. Sun, Moon, and Sun and Moon) ... treading the fine line between abstraction and its resistance.” The French word for painting, “tableau,” in its modernist conception, implied the internalization of “‘bizarre dissonances’ and the greater speed of modern life through an increased emphasis on material flatness,” of which Delaunay proves to be an apt representative.¹¹

After the end of the military actions in 1913, no period of peace followed in the Balkans. On the contrary, while the new state borders were drawn, guerilla fighting continued, with informal military groups terrorizing the civilian population and expelling those whom they called “non-natives” from their respective newly gained territories. On the state level, the Balkan governments introduced propaganda campaigns accusing the other former belligerents of having committed war crimes. Alas, the large number of pamphlets, reports, and leaflets documenting the atrocities committed during *and* after the wars by all sides involved did not reach the diplomats of the great powers, whose decisions about the future of the former Ottoman territories reckoned only with their own interests.¹²

With a ground of disinformation prepared in this way, the dissonances in the official memories of the Balkan Wars abounded—not least between

¹⁰ Stefan Zweig, *Die Welt von gestern. Erinnerungen eines Europäers* (Berlin: Insel, 2013 [orig. 1942]). First published in English translation as Stefan Zweig, *The World of Yesterday: Memories of a European* (New York: Viking, 1943).

¹¹ Gordon Hughes, *Resisting Abstraction: Robert Delaunay and Vision in the Face of Modernism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 97ff.

¹² Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 365–70.

Western and Eastern Europe. While Western Europe forgot about the Balkan Wars shortly after their end, in Eastern Europe, and especially among the belligerents, their memory is of constitutional and ongoing importance for the respective nation-states, and encompasses a quest for a harmonious representation, a remembrance without contestation. And while the Western audience has not even been willing to differentiate between the First and the Second Balkan War and their different alliances, Bulgarian historians characterized the Second Balkan War as the “inter-alliance war,” whereas Turkish historians often enough spoke only of “the” Balkan war, showing no reference whatsoever to the intra-Balkan conflict that ensued—fragmentation on varying levels, thus.

One of the main reasons for the East–West gap in perceptions is the differing meanings of the Great War. In Western Europe it has come to be perceived as *the* original catastrophe of the twentieth century; that is, beyond the collapse of the imperial “world of yesterday,” this conflagration bore within it the seeds of revenge and further destruction. But in Eastern Europe, the Great War cemented the status quo ante that had resulted from the Balkan Wars. Thus here, the “preluding” regional wars, rather than the subsequent global conflagration, have been perceived as defining the threshold of national histories. To be sure, one aspect is common to all historiographies, in East and West alike: there has been hardly any scholarly debate that has been profound and pluri-dimensional; on one side, nation-building efforts dictated the historiographic pursuits, while on the other there was simply a lack of interest to do anything other than affirm stereotypes. Be that as it may, the Balkan states—whether victorious or not—claimed a unique “copyright” on the Balkan Wars. In these wars, it was they who were the leading actors on the battlefields. They had formed a Balkan league, and they had decided to go to war against the Ottomans. Not so in the First World War, where instead they were drawn into becoming the smaller partners of the so-called great powers—there was much less acquisitory potential here.

PART I

War in the Balkans:
Towards the End of Empire

Ethnonationalism, Irredentism, and Empire

Fikret Adanır

This chapter aims to highlight the historical premises and the contemporary relevance of some features of propaganda and mechanisms of “othering” prevalent in the early twentieth century that were amply employed to mobilize public opinion in support of the “just cause” of the young Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire. The focus is on the image of the “enemy,” how its construction and rhetoric of dissemination relied to a large extent on the anti-Islamic/anti-Turkish discourses stemming from much earlier periods. For example, the offensive of 1912 was officially proclaimed by the allied monarchs to be a “Holy War to free our brethren” (in the Montenegrin text), a war of “the Cross against the Crescent” (in the Bulgarian text), a struggle against a “medieval system of feudal exploitation” (in the Serbian text), and a “crusade of progress, civilization, and liberty against Asian conquerors” (in the Greek text).¹ The Balkan War thus was conceived and propagated as a crusade both in the sense of a Christian remedial enterprise and of an effort to demonstrate the

¹ German translations of the declarations of war, including that by the Ottoman Empire, are available in Andreas Hemberger, *Illustrierte Geschichte des Balkankrieges 1912/13*, vol. I (Wien, Leipzig: Hartleben, 1914), 42–48.

F. Adanır (✉)

Department of History, Ruhr University, Bochum, Germany

Department of History, Sabancı University, Istanbul, Turkey

e-mail: fikretad@gmail.com

superiority of European civilization. What is striking in comparison is that the text of the Sultan's declaration of war merely stressed the Ottoman citizens' duty to defend their common homeland, abstaining from attributing any religious meaning to the unfolding conflict.² This difference reflects a third, less noticed element of the conflict in the Balkans, namely, the conceived disparity between the ethnically and confessionally homogenized national society on the one hand and the religious and/or ethno-cultural plurality to be observed in an empire on the other. Whereas the Balkan states were bent on emancipating the "brethren" still under Ottoman domination and justified to that end a quasi-imperial expansionism that was to generate a fierce rivalry among themselves, the Sultan's government was engaged since the middle of the nineteenth century and especially after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 in a process of political integration. Thus it "relied on the assumption that the different religious and ethnic groups inhabiting the Ottoman state could be united under the vague ideology of a secular multi-ethnic Ottoman nationality."³

I

The vocabulary of national liberation of the nineteenth century was reintroduced on the eve of the First Balkan War. It was asserted that the Ottoman Empire was "a country with no future, 'a corpse on its deathbed,' 'Europe's ulcer,' and the Turks were 'Asiatic barbarians.'"⁴ A manifesto publicized on the occasion of a mass gathering in Sofia at the end of July, 1912, demanded,

² Ibid.

³ Eyal Ginio, "Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream," *War in History*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2005), 156–77, here 158. Interestingly, the general conscription introduced in 1909 allowed the Christians to perform their oath of loyalty on the Bible, the Jews on the Pentateuch, and the Muslims on the Koran. The result was a precarious equilibrium to be safeguarded vigilantly, the more so as some non-Muslims were unwilling to serve under the crescent as their banner. See Fikret Adanir, "Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–1913," in Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman Naimark, eds., *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 113–25.

⁴ Yura Konstantinova, "Allies and Enemies: The Balkan Peoples in the Bulgarian Political Propaganda during the Balkan Wars," *Études balkaniques*, vol. 47, no. 1 (2011), 109–48, here 111.

War for a free and independent Bulgaria against the barbaric Asiatic Turkey!
 ... The entire Christian world is outraged by the bloody regime of Turkey ...
 We are summoned by Europe's conscience to throw away the Asiatic barbarity out of the lands of the Peninsula. Now is the chance to accomplish this great feat of liberation, civilization and humanism.⁵

Once the hostilities commenced, the Orthodox Church hurried to stress the crusade character of the struggle. As one member of the Bulgarian Holy Synod pointed out, this war “‘for the realization of God’s justice’ was waged by ‘the sword brought by Christ the Savior’ against ‘the infidels’ crescent of oppression and blood,’ in the name of ‘the triumph of justice, peace and the life-giving cross’ and ‘raising the cross in the place of the crescent.’”⁶ Indeed, in November, 1912, as the Bulgarian army approached the Çatalca position, the last line of defense before the Ottoman capital, Tsar Ferdinand and his subjects became virtually possessed by the prospect of a triumphant entry into Tsarigrad (Constantinople), Christianity’s centuries-old object of yearning. Chromolithographs distributed to the troops “showed a ghostly Constantine XI, the last Byzantine emperor, guiding the Balkan kings ‘toward St. Sophia in the distance.’”⁷ It is no wonder that Prince Constantine of Greece, the victorious commander-in-chief of the Greek army in 1912, whom many considered worthy of enthronement as Constantine XII (and thus the legitimate successor to the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI), published the part of his correspondence dealing with the war in the Balkans under the heading of “The Crusade 1912–13.”⁸

An equally important aspect of the Balkan allies’ war propaganda was the belief that they fought as the avant-garde of European civilization

⁵ Eadem, “Political Propaganda in Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars,” *Études balkaniques*, vol. 47, nos. 2–3 (2011), 79–116, here 83–84.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 95–96. The Christian holy war rhetoric ignored the fact that the Ottoman army of 1912 comprised a high percentage of Christian recruits who carried on their headgear not a crescent but a cross. See Otto Kefler, *Der Balkanbrand 1912/13: Militär-geschichtliche Darstellung des Krieges gegen die Türken* (Leipzig: Reflektor-Verlag, 1913), 54.

⁷ Stephen Constant Foxy, *Ferdinand, 1861–1948, Tsar of Bulgaria* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1979), 259, as quoted in Adam Knobler, “Holy Wars, Empires, and the Portability of the Past: The Modern Uses of Medieval Crusades,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 48, no. 2 (2006), 293–325, here 319.

⁸ [Constantine of Greece], *A King’s Private Letters. Being Letters Written by King Constantine of Greece to Paola Princess of Saxe-Weimar during the Years 1912 to 1923* (London: Eveleigh Nash & Grayson, 1925), 27–135.

against Asian barbarians. Obviously, such a mindset was not a product of Balkan social milieus alone but also a reflection of stereotypes of “Oriental” peoples pervasive in Western culture. A popular account of the causes of the Ottoman defeat concluded that in European Turkey, “organized, efficient work, which means culture” was lacking, a result of the fact that “the Turks atone a historical guilt, the roots of which lie in the psyche of their prophet.”⁹ A more “scholarly” study published by a university press in the United States started with the blanket statement that “[t]he expulsion of the Turks from Europe was long ago written in the book of fate. There was nothing uncertain about it except the date and the agency of destiny.”¹⁰ A Frenchman who toured the region in 1912–13 as secretary general of “l’Office central des nationalités” and correspondent for the newspapers *La Dépêche*, *L’Indépendance Belge*, and the *Manchester Guardian* construed, after interviews with the Muslim mayor of Greek-occupied Salonica and the local mufti in May, 1913, that the Turks “are dreamers, people unfit for modern civilization, the workings of which appear to them as too complicated.”¹¹ Even Baron d’Estournelles de Constant, the distinguished president of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, did not hesitate to confess that once the hostilities had started, “we could only wish for the triumph of four young allied peoples in shaking off the domination of the Sultans of Constantinople, in the interest of the Turks and perhaps of Europe herself.”¹²

This benign attitude drew upon a rhetoric that somehow anticipated Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations discourse.¹³ It had evolved in the course of centuries, and its chief reference was to Western Christian cultural tradition, as expressed clearly in the following passage:

⁹ Alfred Meyer, *Der Balkankrieg 1912/13: Unter Benutzung zuverlässiger Quellen kulturgeschichtlich und militärisch dargestellt*, part 1 (Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1913), 11–12.

¹⁰ Jacob Gould Schurman, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1914), 3.

¹¹ Jean Pélissier, *Dix mois de guerre dans les Balkans: oct. 1912–août 1913* (Paris: Perrin, 1914), 229.

¹² Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, DC: The Endowment, 1914), 1.

¹³ See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (1993), 22–49; idem, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Gideon Rose et al., eds., *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate* (New York: Foreign Affairs Books, sec. ed., 2010).

We ourselves, products of a western civilization established by the Catholic Church—whose national renaissance was engendered by the Protestant Reformation—whose national development has been inspired by subsequent religious revivals, can scarcely realize the disadvantage to the growth of a community whose progressive forces get no inspiration from Protestantism and whose conservative forces are not firmly founded in Catholicity.¹⁴

Here one can detect, along with a covert censure of the role the Greek Orthodox Church played in Balkan history, also an echo of sympathetic Westerners' profound disillusionment in face of the Second Balkan War, a bloody conflict that was perceived as outright fratricide prompted by jealousies about who would get the largest share of the spoils. However, the International Commission, which had identified "the weakness and want of foresight of Turkey" as the fundamental cause of the war of 1912,¹⁵ was astonishingly convinced of Ottoman culpability also in the war that broke out among the victorious allies in 1913. Its reasoning was that it was Ottoman weakness that had made it possible for the Balkan states to achieve such a spectacular success, so much so that "the change was too abrupt. It produced the deplorable results we are to study under the aspect of the 'excesses' committed by the different nationalities."¹⁶ Thus it also transpires that an inquiry into the conduct of the war was deemed necessary only after it was realized that "the second war was ... a war of religion, of reprisals, of race, a war of one people against another, of man against man and brother against brother."¹⁷

In retrospect, it becomes clear that members of the elites associated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace considered ethno-religious and cultural diversity—following the *zeitgeist*—a circumstance unbecoming to a modern polity and held a strong central government with a homogeneous national society to be a precondition for successful state-building. In their view, the Ottoman conquerors of the late medieval period had planted the seeds of systemic corruption in society as they established a decentralized political order—even though this order might have provided for agreeable conditions for the subject peoples organized

¹⁴ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Nationalism and War in the Near East (By a Diplomatist)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915), 22.

¹⁵ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission*, 49.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

in religious communities. Thus the awesome verdict that “[t]he decadence of the Turk dates from the day when Constantinople was taken and not destroyed”¹⁸ can be read as a misdirected castigation of the Ottoman *millet* system.¹⁹ It is remarkable that the pluralist Ottoman system was criticized in a similar vein even in respect to the disintegration of Yugoslavia at the close of the twentieth century:

[T]he Ottoman system, with its separation of subject peoples on a confessional rather than territorial basis while granting considerable local autonomy, inhibited the homogenization through assimilation to a homogenic language and culture that was creating larger proto-national and national communities in other parts of Europe.²⁰

Against this background, the forced migrations that accompanied or followed the Balkan Wars appear as phenomena correlative to the formation of nation-states. Indeed, the author of the Carnegie Endowment’s second volume, quoted previously, pointed out that the “expulsion of human beings out of a determined region” was a logical consequence of the Balkan Wars. A Balkan state that had succeeded “in extending its political frontier” would certainly try to render the conquered territory ethnically and politically homogeneous: “It ‘exterminates’ other nationalities within the new frontier until the line is co-terminous with its own nationality.”²¹

¹⁸ Ibid., 40. For exhaustive critiques of the Carnegie Endowment’s approach to the phenomenon of war in the Balkans, see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, updated ed., 2009), *passim*; Lene Hansen, “Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the ‘Third’ Balkan War,” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no. 3 (2000), 345–62; Dietmar Müller, “Die Balkankriege und der Carnegie-Bericht. Historiographie und völkerrechtliche Bedeutung”, in *Der “Carnegie Report on the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars 1912/13”. Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte im Völkerrecht und der Historiographie*, ed. by Dietmar Müller and Stefan Troebst (=Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung, vol. 24, no. 6, 2014), 7–24.

¹⁹ On the *millet* system, see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, 2 vols. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982).

²⁰ Dennison Rusinow, “The Ottoman Legacy in Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Civil War,” in L. Carl Brown, ed., *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 78–99, here 81.

²¹ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, 284.

II

The nation-state formation in the Balkans in the course of the nineteenth century can be seen as a response to modernization, that is, a transition from a traditional to a “modern” society under the triple impact of the Enlightenment, the political ideas introduced by the French Revolution, and the new socioeconomic dynamics created by industrialization. The Islamic society at large appears not only left out of these developments, but is regarded almost intuitively as the categorical opposite of modernity and progress. Thus by the eighteenth century, Muslim rulers were habitually depicted as Oriental despots.²² Despotism in this context “suggested a static and slavish society, a backward and corrupt polity, with arbitrary and ferocious rulers governing servile and timid subjects.”²³ Consequently, Catherine II’s “Greek Project” of the early 1780s, which aimed to restore the Byzantine Empire as *secundo-geniture* of the House of Romanov, was warmly received by philosophers and *Encyclopédistes* such as Voltaire, Diderot, and D’Alembert.²⁴ The idea of creating a new Greek empire apparently as an alternative to the Russian scheme found adherents also among French commercial circles, where it was hoped to find compensation in the Mediterranean basin for the losses suffered in Canada and India—at the Ottomans’ expense.²⁵ Actually conceived as an

²² Lucette Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Thomas Kaiser, “The Evil Empire? The Debate On Turkish Despotism in Eighteenth-Century French Political Culture,” *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 72, no. 1 (2000), 6–34.

²³ Asli Çirakman, “From Tyranny to Despotism: The Enlightenment’s Unenlightened Image of the Turks,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1 (2001), 49–68, here 56. Cf. also Jack Goody, *The Theft of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 99–122. For an approach stressing the internal political objectives of this discourse, see Rebecca Joubin, “Islam and Arabs through the Eyes of the Encyclopédie: The ‘Other’ as a Case of French Cultural Self-Criticism,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2000), 197–217.

²⁴ Hugh Ragsdale, “New Light On the Greek Project: A Preliminary Report,” in Roger Bartlett, Anthony G. Cross, and Karen Rasmussen, eds., *Russia and the World of the Eighteenth Century* (Columbus, OH: Slavica, 1988), 493–501. But cf. also Edgar Hösch who plays down the historical importance of this project: “Das sogenannte ‘griechische Projekt’ Katharinas II.: Ideologie und Wirklichkeit der russischen Orientpolitik in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 12 (1964), 168–206.

²⁵ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 64–69.

Enlightenment project, Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1798 was hailed by many in the West as the harbinger of a colonial Near East.²⁶

In the post-Napoleonic era, the isolation of the Ottoman Empire continued. Although a member of various coalitions during the war years, the Sublime Porte was not invited to the Congress of Vienna, where the state system was redesigned according to the requirements of the conservative restoration.²⁷ The Congress had originally contemplated a general guarantee for all European borders, but the idea was dropped because of Russian unwillingness to extend such a guarantee to the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire.²⁸ This exclusionary attitude was largely a reflection of the Christian principles behind the Holy Alliance, the founding document of which explicitly stated that the signatory powers considered themselves "all as members of one and the same Christian nation."²⁹

Indeed, the period saw a remarkable upsurge in Christian revivalism. The Evangelical movement, which had its beginnings in the Pietist milieu of northern Germany at the time of the Counter-Reformation and had spread thence to New England and the British Isles, by the 1820s had grown into a worldwide phenomenon.³⁰ Profoundly transformed under the influence of the Romantic movement, which was itself an artistic, literary, and intellectual current with roots in Pietism,³¹ a transatlantic Evangelicalism had emerged and announced itself in terms of a radical millenarianism in both its pre- and postmillennial forms.³² An essential

²⁶ See the contributions in Patrice Bret, ed., *L'expédition d'Égypte, une entreprise des Lumières, 1798–1801* (Paris: Technique & Documentation, 1999).

²⁷ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 517–82; Mark Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 69–157.

²⁸ Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, 148.

²⁹ See Reference Library of Diplomatic Documents: The Holy Alliance Treaty of September 26, 1815, http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_alliance.html, accessed July 14, 2016. Cf. also Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, 558–59.

³⁰ Grayson M. Ditchfield, *The Evangelical Revival* (London: University College London Press, 1998), 9–24; John Wolfe, *God and Greater Britain: Religion and National Life in Britain and Ireland 1843–1945* (London: Routledge, 1994), 38–47.

³¹ Isaiah Berlin, *The Roots of Romanticism*, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 36.

³² Richard Carwardine, *Trans-Atlantic Revivalism: Popular Evangelicalism in Britain and America, 1790–1865* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978); David W. Bebbington, *Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History From the 1730s to the 1980s* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 81–84; Martyn Percy, "Whose Time Is It Anyway? Evangelicals, the

aspect of this movement was missionary activity at home and abroad, organized and supported by numerous societies established between the 1790s and 1810s.³³ In anticipation of the second coming of Jesus Christ, missionaries, especially North American ones, were moved by “the belief in the restoration of the Jews to Jesus and to Palestine.”³⁴ Appearing in growing numbers in the Levant from 1819 onward, they were earnestly determined to recover the Holy Land.³⁵ They equated Islam with “both backwardness with regard to the Enlightenment and depravation in religion, politics, and culture,” but they still “believed that the Muslims had ‘much of truth in their system’ and that they were to be won over for, not ruled out by, the Kingdom.”³⁶ However, after finding not only the Jews but also the Muslim population quite impervious to their preaching, their energies were redirected toward achieving a spiritual and cultural revival of Christian communities of the East.³⁷ For that matter, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was already convinced in 1814 that the ancient and venerable churches of the East, “which have been preserved for us for so many ages in the midst of their enemies, are destined ... one day to effect the downfall of the Mahometan religion.”³⁸ Deploying an intense activity in all spheres of life, in both urban areas and the countryside, missionary societies contributed greatly to the

Millennium and Millenarianism,” in Stephen Hunt, ed., *Christian Millenarianism: From the Early Church to Waco* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 26–38; and Mark Patterson, Andrew Walker, “‘Our Unspeakable Comfort’: Irving, Albury, and the Origins of the Pre-Tribulation Rapture,” in *ibid.*, 98–115.

³³Ditchfield, *The Evangelical Revival*, 95, 116–17; John Wolfe, *The Expansion of Evangelicalism: The Age of Wilberforce, More, Chalmers and Finney* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2007), 166–75.

³⁴Hans-Lukas Kieser, *Nearest East: American Millennialism and Mission to the Middle East* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2010), 34. See also John A. Andrew, *Rebuilding the Christian Commonwealth: New England Congregationalists and Foreign Missions, 1800–1830* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1976).

³⁵Ussama Makdisi, “Reclaiming the Land of the Bible: Missionaries, Secularism, and Evangelical Modernity,” *American Historical Review*, vol. 102 (1997), 680–713.

³⁶Kieser, *Nearest East: American Millennialism and Mission to the Middle East*, 40.

³⁷Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Jeremy Salt, “A Precarious Symbiosis: Ottoman Christians and Foreign Missionaries in the Nineteenth Century,” *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1985–86), 53–67.

³⁸Quotation in Thomas Otakar Kutvirt, “The Emergence and Acceptance of Armenia as a Legitimate American Missionary Field,” *Armenian Review*, vol. 37, no. 3 (1984), 7–37, here 14.

construction of a collective past for these communities and especially an ethno-national identity.³⁹

The result was a programmatic shift in focus in national liberation movements from civic liberties promised by the French Revolution to identity formation on the basis of ethnic descent—a development with far-reaching consequences. Initially, men like Adamantios Korais, Rigas Velesinlis, or Vasil Levski, while demanding the establishment of a Greek or a Bulgarian state on the basis of popular sovereignty, had not envisaged ethnically homogeneous societies ruled by monarchs. What they had contemplated was virtually multiethnic republics that integrated even the indigenous Muslims as full citizens.⁴⁰

But the Greek revolution, propagated by a few intellectuals abroad and supported enthusiastically by European Philhellenes, came early on under the control of local warlords and priests. Thus the insurgents in the Peloponnese in early 1821 were led by a bishop under the banner of Christ; they wrought havoc among Muslim communities, killing about 40,000 Muslims (and an estimated 5,000 Jews) within a short time. The Muslims retaliated by massacring Christians elsewhere, “making negotiated settlement impossible.”⁴¹ At the end, it was a European military intervention that facilitated the establishment of an independent kingdom by 1832.

³⁹ On the role of American missionaries in the Balkans, see William Webster Hall, *Puritans in the Balkans: The American Board Mission in Bulgaria, 1878–1918: A Study in Purpose and Procedure* (Sofia: Kultura, 1938); James F. Clarke, *Bible Societies, American Missionaries, and the National Revival of Bulgaria* (New York: Arno Press, 1971); Barbara Reeves-Ellington, *Domestic Frontiers: Gender, Reform, and American Interventions in the Ottoman Balkans and the Near East* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013).

⁴⁰ See Notis Botzaris, *Visions balkaniques dans la préparation de la révolution grecque (1789–1821)* (Geneva: Droz, 1962), 183–209. Cf. also Apostolos Daskalakis, *To politeuma tou Rigas Velesinli: Istoriki ke kritiki episkopisis meta tou keimenou tou Sintagmatos ke ton antistoihon tis Gallikis Epanastaseos. Scholia ke ermineutike simcioiseis* [The regime of Rigas Velesinlis: a historical and critical reflection on the text of the constitution and that of the corresponding French Revolution. Comments and explanatory notes] (Athens: Vagionaki, 1976). For a programmatic expression of Levski’s wish that in Bulgaria a brotherhood of all should emerge, irrespective of ethnic or religious affiliation, see the letter he wrote to Ljuben Karavelov, dated July 25, 1872, in: Kirila Vūzvūzova-Karateodorova and Rada Kūncheva Kazandzhieva, eds., *Levski vūv vremeto: Dokumentalno memoaren i literaturen sbornik, posveten na 150-godishninata ot rozhdenieto na Vasil Levski* [Levski in his era: a collection of memoirs and literary documents on the occasion of the 150th birthday of Vasil Levski] (Sofia: Būlgarski pisatel, 1987), 65.

⁴¹ Frederick F. Anscombe, *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 68. On the Greek revolution and

The first decade of the new state was marked by a bitter debate about how to determine who was a Greek. The members of the conservative camp, comprising indigenous elites like village headmen and militia captains, were primarily concerned with securing public office for themselves, and so they insisted on the liberal principle of *ius soli*, according to which only those residing in the kingdom could acquire citizenship.⁴² But in 1844, the so-called *megali idea* was formulated, which ushered in the romantic concept of nationalism that imagines a nation to be an organic community of shared destiny. In this view, Greece was not the tiny kingdom at the tip of the Balkan Peninsula but a practically indefinite territory encompassing all lands associated with Greek history or the Greek race.⁴³ Obviously, with this shift in the middle of the nineteenth century, “religion prevailed as the dominant criterion for defining the modern Greek nation, marking the beginning of irredentism ... it determined Greek national identity and has had a tremendous impact on relations with other Balkan peoples.”⁴⁴ In the same year, 1844, in which Ioannis Kolettis held his *megali idea* speech before the constituent assembly in Athens, Ilija Garašanin, Minister of the Interior in Belgrade, drafted his program known as *načertanije*, which envisioned the creation of a Greater Serbia. Like his Greek counterpart, Garašanin, too, recalled the glories of the pre-Ottoman past and elaborated on the parameters of Serbian irredentism.⁴⁵ The Greek and Serbian cases corroborate the impression that Balkan nationalism was from the

Philhellenism, see, among many titles, William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free?: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Richard Clogg, ed., *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays To Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence* (London: Macmillan, 1973); David Howarth, *The Greek Adventure: Lord Byron and Other Eccentrics in the War of Independence* (London: Collins, 1976); Helen Long, *Greek Fire: The Massacres of Chios* (Bristol: Abson, 1992); Stathis Gourgouris, *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

⁴² See Elpida Vogli, “*Ellēnes to genos*”: *i tautotita ke i ithageneia sto ethniko kratos tōn Ellinon 1821–1844* [“Greeks by descent”: identity and citizenship in the nation-state of Greece, 1821–1844] (Heraklion: Crete University Press, 2007), 161–296.

⁴³ On Ioannis Kolettis’ speech before the constituent assembly in 1844, see Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 48.

⁴⁴ John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece. The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present* (London: Hurst, 2002), 228.

⁴⁵ Charles Jelavich, “Garašanin’s Načertanije und das großserbische Programm,” *Südost-Forschungen*, vol. 27 (1968), 131–47; Paul N. Hehn, “The Origins of Modern Pan-Serbism—The 1844 Načertanije of Ilija Garašanin: An Analysis and Translation,” *East European Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 2 (1975), 153–71.

start a Janus-faced project: It meant simultaneously emancipation from Ottoman rule and expansion at the expense of fellow Balkan nationalities.

The response of the Sultan's government to this ethno-national challenge amounted to promoting the formation of a civic imperial nation. The edicts of 1839 and 1856 stressed legal equality and equal access to public office, regardless of religious or ethnic allegiance.⁴⁶ The implementation of this project, however, not only did not placate nationalist separatism and irredentism, but also contributed to the destabilization of peripheral regions such as Ottoman Bosnia and Albania in the west and the Armenian and Kurdish provinces in the east. Neither was the idea of a secular Ottoman citizenship well received by the Muslim populace.⁴⁷ Even the Western allies during the Crimean War did not seem to be convinced of the necessity, let alone the practicability, of Ottoman reform. The British ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe opined in a 1856 memorandum that, after all, Europe was near, "with its science, its labor, and its capital"; he insisted that "independent Ottoman modernization was impossible," since with "[t]he Koran, the harem, a Babel of languages" there were "so many obstacles to advancement in a Western sense."⁴⁸

⁴⁶For interpretations of the reform decrees, see Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 52–80; Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, pp. 144–54. The question of equality is addressed in Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes concerning Christian–Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," *American Historical Review*, vol. 59 (1953–54), 844–64; Bernard Lewis, "Tanzimat and Social Equality," in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Paul Dumont, eds., *Économie et sociétés dans l'Empire ottoman: Actes du colloque de Strasbourg (1er–5 juillet 1980)* (Paris: CNRS, 1983), 47–54.

⁴⁷Halil İnalçık, "Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vol. 5 (1973), 97–127. See also Ahmet Cevat Eren, *Mahmud II. zamanında Bosna-Hersek* [Bosnia-Herzegovina during the reign of Mahmud II] (Istanbul: Nurgök Matbaası, 1965); Vladimir Stojančević, *Južnoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom carstvu od Jedrenskog mira 1829. do Pariskog kongresa 1856. godine* [South Slav peoples in the Ottoman Empire from the Peace of Adrianople 1829 to the Congress of Paris 1856] (Belgrade: PTT, 1971), 179–228 and 257–284; Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992), 136–92; David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 38–86.

⁴⁸David Gillard, ed., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, part 1: *From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War*, series B: *The Near and Middle East 1856–1914*, vol. 1: *The Ottoman Empire in the Balkans 1856–1875* (Frederick, MD, 1984–85), 20, quoted in Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *American Historical Review*, vol. 107, no. 3 (2002), 768–96, here 768, note.

III

The Eastern Crisis of 1875–78 destabilized intercommunal relations in the Balkans further. The region began to suffer from the consequences of a “demographic warfare” that was going on in imperial borderlands.⁴⁹ In the decade following the Crimean War, a significant number of Muslim refugees evicted by the tsarist regime from the Crimea and the Caucasus were resettled in Danubian Bulgaria. Especially the Caucasian mountaineers (mostly Circassians) proved difficult to accommodate by local society, not least because the Christian part of the population viewed them as undesirable strangers deliberately brought in to disturb the intercommunal balance.⁵⁰ In such an atmosphere, in July 1875 a peasant uprising broke out in Herzegovina which soon spread to Bosnia and excited nationalist feelings also in Serbia and Montenegro.⁵¹ In early 1876, the movement sprang over to Bulgaria. Unable to draw on regular troops, local authorities resorted to the service of Muslim militias. Especially the role played by Circassian irregulars in the bloody suppression of the so-called April Uprising in the district of Batak in May, 1876, and the sensational manner in which the news of this event was conveyed to the Western public, turned the opinion in Europe against the “Turk” with renewed vehemence.⁵² William E. Gladstone’s famous pamphlet on the “Bulgarian Horrors,” written with a view to arousing public sympathy in Europe for

⁴⁹For the concept of “demographic warfare,” see Mark Pinson, “Russian Expulsion of Mountaineers from the Caucasus, 1856–66, and its Historical Background—Demographic Warfare: An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policy, 1854–1866,” PhD thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1970.

⁵⁰Mark Pinson, “Ottoman Colonization of the Circassians in Rumili after the Crimean War,” *Études balkaniques*, vol. 8, no. 3 (1972), 71–85. For a contemporary evaluation, see Felix Kanitz, “Die Tscherkessen-Emigration nach der Donau,” *Österreichische Revue*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1865), 227–43.

⁵¹Vasa Čubrilović, *Bosanski ustanak 1875–1878* [The Bosnian Uprising 1875–1878] (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1930), 61; Dimitrije Djordjević, *Révolutions nationales des peuples balkaniques 1804–1914* (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1965), 126–27.

⁵²Iono Mitev, *Istoriia na Aprilskoto vŭstanie 1876* [The history of the April Uprising], vol. 2: *Obiaviane, boini deistviia i potushavane na vŭstanieto* [Declaration, military operations and the suppression of the Uprising] (Sofia: Bŭlgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1988), 187–213; Richard Millman, *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875–1878* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 146–64; Tersuya Sahara, “Two Different Images: Bulgarian and English Sources on the Batak Massacre,” in Peter Sluglett and M. Hakan Yavuz, eds., *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin* (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2011), 479–510. See also the contributions in Martina Baleva

the fate of Christian Slavs under Ottoman rule, contained patently racist judgements beyond the traditional anti-Islamic rhetoric:

Let me endeavour very briefly to sketch, in the rudest outline, what the Turkish race was and what it is. It is not a question of Mohammedanism simply, but of Mohammedanism compounded with the peculiar character of a race. They are not the mild Mohammedans of India, nor the chivalrous Saladins of Syria, nor the cultured Moors of Spain. They were, upon the whole, from the black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity. Wherever they went a broad line of blood marked the track behind them, and, as far as their dominion reached, civilization vanished from view.⁵³

The Turks should “one and all, bag and baggage,” said Gladstone, “clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned.”⁵⁴ Encouraged by Pan-Slavic agitation in Russia, the small Balkan states Serbia and Montenegro declared war upon the Ottoman Empire in July 1876, and the end of Ottoman rule in the Balkans appeared imminent.⁵⁵

As anti-Turkish sentiment reached its peak in Europe, Ottoman society was shaken by the news of extraordinary events. In early May, the German and French consuls in Salonika were murdered by an agitated Muslim crowd. A few days later, student demonstrations in Istanbul led to a change in the government, thus preparing the ground for the success of the Young Ottoman movement, some leaders of which began to play an important political role in those days.⁵⁶ At the end of the same month, Sultan Abdulaziz (1861–76) was deposed and taken into custody where he committed suicide. While this incident gave rise to conspiracy theories,

and Ulf Brunnbauer, eds., *Batak kato miasto na pametta / Batak als bulgarischer Erinnerungsort* (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2007).

⁵³W. E. Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* (London: John Murray, 1876), 9.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 31.

⁵⁵The Serbian forces under the command of a Russian general included more than 4,000 Russian volunteers. See Sergei A. Nikitin, *Slavianskie komitety v Rossii v 1858–1876 godakh* [Slavic Committees in Russia in the Years of 1858–1876] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1960), 319–320. Cf. also David MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875–1878* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); idem, *The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974).

⁵⁶On the Young Ottoman movement, see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).

Murad V, the successor to the throne, developed signs of mental illness and had to be replaced in late summer by yet another prince, Abdulhamid II (1876–1909).⁵⁷ By the end of October, the Ottoman army, thanks also to the services of Circassian irregulars, dealt a decisive defeat to the South Slav forces, compelling them to ask for peace.⁵⁸ This unexpected development was perceived in Russia as a blow to the prestige of the foremost Slavic power, obliging the tsarist regime to plan for a unilateral military intervention. The Powers attempted to resolve the crisis by convening a conference at Constantinople in December 1876. Disregarding the protests of the Young Ottoman government, which promulgated the first Ottoman constitution that guaranteed the equality and the basic civic liberties of all subjects, the conference proposed the creation of two autonomous Bulgarian provinces to be administered by governors approved by the Powers and, incidentally, the prohibition of Circassian settlement in the Balkans.⁵⁹ When the Sultan's government interpreted such a solution as incompatible with Ottoman sovereignty and refused to comply with it, Russia took it as a pretext to declare war in April 1877, pretending to act on behalf of Europe.⁶⁰

The military operations in the Balkans proceeded unfavorably for the Ottomans.⁶¹ By the beginning of 1878, the Ottoman government, impressed not least by the sheer number of Muslim refugees flooding the

⁵⁷ A contemporary account of these developments can be found in: [David A. Mordtmann], *Stambul und das moderne Türkenthum. Politische, sociale und biographische Bilder von einem Osmanen*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1878).

⁵⁸ İ. Halil Sedes, *1875–1878 Osmanlı Ordusu Savaşları* [The operations of the Ottoman Army, 1875–1878], vols. II–III: *1876–1878 Osmanlı-Sırb Seferi* [The Ottoman Serbian Campaign of 1876–1878] (Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1935), 208–16.

⁵⁹ The protocols of the conference are published in Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, III: *1856–1878* (Paris: Pichon, 1902), 400–94. See also Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963).

⁶⁰ Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyasiyye* [Important political questions], ed. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987), 251–253. For the Tsar's manifesto announcing the war, see Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814*, vol. 4: *1875 to 1891* (London: Printed for H.M. Stationary Office by Harrison & Sons, 1891), 2598–99.

⁶¹ Western observers reported high numbers of Circassians serving with the Ottoman army in Bulgaria and the “atrocities” committed by them. See A. J. Schem, *The War in the East: An Illustrated History of the Conflict between Russia and Turkey with a Review of the Eastern Question* (New York: H.S. Goodspeed & Co., 1878), 118, 228, 231, 460; Wentworth

Ottoman capital, asked for peace. At San Stefano (a suburb of Istanbul) on March 3, 1878, a triumphant Russia dictated severe conditions such as the creation of a Bulgarian state stretching from the Black Sea to Albania with access to the Aegean; the enlargement of Montenegro at the expense of Ottoman-Albanian districts; and the introduction of extensive reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Crete, Epirus, Macedonia, and Turkish Armenia.⁶² However, the implications of such a drastic change in the balance of power in Europe gave rise to demands for a general European congress to revise these terms. Faced by a British–Austrian coalition at the Congress of Berlin (June–July 1878), Russia was forced to accept a more moderate reformulation of the terms of San Stefano. The Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, 1878) provided for an autonomous Slavic principality restricted to Danubian Bulgaria (but including the sandjak of Sofia). In Thrace, as an additional autonomous province under a Christian governor-general, “Eastern Roumelia” was to be formed. In Thessaly and Epirus, a border rectification to the advantage of Greece, a non-belligerent, was intended, while the rest of European Turkey was promised reformed administrations similar to that granted in 1868 to Crete. Finally, Romania was to cede Bessarabia to Russia and receive as compensation territory elsewhere (Dobrudja), while Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶³

IV

This political order worked out at Berlin proved from the start a precarious solution to the Balkan question. The national elites in the region were, more or less, all frustrated: What angered the public in Bulgaria most was the fact that Macedonia (the vilayets of Salonika, Monastir/Bitola, and

Huyshe, *The Liberation of Bulgaria: War Notes in 1877* (London: Bliss, Sands and Foster, 1894), 151–64.

⁶² *Great Britain: Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, signed at San Stefano, 19 February/3 March, 1878* (British Parliamentary Papers: “The Blue Books”), Turkey, No. 22 (1878) [C. 1973] (London: Harrison and Sons, 1878). Cf. also *San Stefano: Zapiski grafu N. P. Ignat’eva*, ed. A. A. Bashmakov and K. A. Gubastov (Petrograd: Novoe vremia, 1916).

⁶³ For the text of the Treaty of Berlin, see “Vertrag zwischen Deutschland, Oesterreich-Ungarn, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Italien, Rußland und der Türkei,” *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*, no. 31 (Berlin, September 11, 1878), 307–45 (French with German translation), a facsimile reprint in *Der Berliner Kongreß 1878: Protokolle und Materialien*, ed. Imanuel Geiss (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1978), 369–407.

Kosovo) was left under the Sultan's rule. The Bulgarian protest against the "dictum" of Berlin soon took the shape of an insurrectionary movement in the Ottoman provinces the slogan of which was the achievement of the "Bulgaria of San Stefano" (*Sanstefanska Bŭlgariia*).⁶⁴ When Bulgaria and the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia—in complete disregard of the Treaty of Berlin—accomplished their unification in 1885, the prospects of the Bulgarian cause regarding Macedonia seemed brighter than ever. Yet by now also Serbia and Greece had their own plans in respect to European Turkey. Serbian grievances arose from a perceived double injustice: By giving Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary, the Powers not only had deprived Belgrade of an essential component of "Greater Serbia," but they also had left Serbia economically and strategically cut off from the Adriatic Sea.⁶⁵ Furthermore, by establishing a new Slavic state in the Balkans, the principality of Bulgaria, they had created a potent rival to Serbian leadership of the South Slavs. Especially poignant in this connection was that Bulgaria as envisioned at San Stefano claimed also the vilayet of Kosovo, that is, virtually "Old Serbia." This explains to a large extent why Serbia answered the Bulgarian unification of 1885 with a declaration of war, and, as the conflict ended with a humiliating Serbian defeat, why friendly relations between the two neighboring countries proved hard to maintain in the aftermath.⁶⁶

From the standpoint of Greece, Macedonia was, by historical right as well as by cultural orientation, just like Thessaly, Epirus, or Thrace, indisputably a Greek territory. This argument had its justification partly in the fact that about one half of the Orthodox Christians in the region stood under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. These Christians were therefore counted as Greeks, whereas the other half, who only recently had opted for the Bulgarian Exarchate, were viewed as Schismatics, to be regained for the Mother Church—no matter that Bulgarian and Serbian nationalists, who viewed language, and not religion,

⁶⁴The 3rd of March, the day on which the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano was signed, was formally decreed as Bulgaria's Liberation Day in 1990. See Stefan Troebst, "Fluchtpunkt San Stefano—Nationalismus in Bulgarien," *Die Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte*, vol. 37 (1990), 405–14.

⁶⁵Dimitrije Djordjević, *Izlazak Srbije na Jadransko more i Konferencija ambasadora u Londonu 1912* [Exit of Serbia to the Adriatic Sea and the Conference of Ambassadors in London 1912] (Beograd: [s.n.], 1956).

⁶⁶Vladan Djordjević, *Istorija Srpsko-bugarskog rata* [The history of the Serbo-Bulgarian War], 2 vols. (Belgrade: Nova Štampanija "Davidović," 1908).

as the decisive criterion for determining national affiliation, regarded the followers of the Greek Patriarchate, or the Muslims of Slavic descent, as Bulgarians, simply because they spoke a Slavic dialect.⁶⁷ The volatility of the situation was further heightened on account of a formulation in the imperial decree announcing the establishment of the Exarchate: It implied that Macedonian dioceses could attain their incorporation into the new autocephalous church provided that not less than two thirds of the inhabitants of Orthodox faith expressed their wish to do so through a plebiscite.⁶⁸

Consequently, Christian communities in the region experienced an intense intercommunal struggle geared to winning, respectively not losing, the necessary majorities. Through various educational and literary societies (*sylogoi*) under its control, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople tenaciously pursued a Hellenization of Macedonian Slavs.⁶⁹ To this end, some Orthodox clerics openly collaborated with

⁶⁷ On linguistic nationalism in the Balkans, see Norbert Reiter, "Sprache in nationaler Funktion," in Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, ed., *Ethnogenese und Staatsbildung in Südosteuropa* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), 104–15; Claudia Hopf, *Sprachnationalismus in Serbien und Griechenland: Theoretische Grundlagen sowie ein Vergleich von Vuk Stefanović Karadžić und Adamantios Korais* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1997). The following account draws on Fikret Adanir, "The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire, 1878–1912," in Andreas Kappeler, Fikret Adanir, and Alan O'Day, eds., *The Formation of National Elites* (Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850–1940, 6) (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 161–91; idem, "The National Question and the Genesis and Development of Socialism in the Ottoman Empire: The Case of Macedonia," in Mete Tunçay and Erik J. Zürcher, eds., *Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1923* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 27–48; idem, "Socio-political Environment of Balkan Nationalism: The Case of Ottoman Macedonia, 1856–1912," in Hans-Georg Haupt, Michael G. Müller, and Stuart Woolf, eds., *Regional and National Identities in Europe in the XIXth and XXth Centuries* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 221–54. For more recent, monographic treatments of the Macedonian question, see, inter alia, Vemund Aarbakke, *Ethnic Rivalry and the Quest for Macedonia, 1870–1913* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2003), and İpek K. Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

⁶⁸ For an English translation of the imperial decree, dated March 12, 1870, see Richard von Mach, *The Bulgarian Exarchate: Its History and the Extent of Its Authority in Turkey* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907), 13–15. The conditions under which the Greco-Bulgarian schism took place are analyzed by Thomas A. Meininger, *Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate 1864–1872: A Study in Personal Diplomacy* (Madison, WI: The Press of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1970).

⁶⁹ Stephanos J. Papadopoulos, "Ecoles et associations grecques dans la Macédoine du nord durant le dernier siècle de la domination turque," *Balkan Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1962),

armed bands sent from the Kingdom of Greece, where nationalist feeling was especially excited in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The defeat suffered in 1897 stressed the urgency of Greek efforts even more, especially since the Ilinden Uprising of 1903, unleashed by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), seemed to have tilted the balance in favor of the pro-Bulgarian element.⁷⁰ But the Ilinden Uprising in the summer of 1903 did not achieve one essential goal—the unity of popular masses against Ottoman rule. Already by the end of August 1903, the movement was suppressed, many Slavic villages having been destroyed in the process with several thousand people seeking refuge in Bulgaria. With a view to alleviating the situation, the Powers devised in November 1903 the reform program of Mürzsteg, which included, however, the proposition that “[a]dministrative boundaries within Macedonia were to be redrawn ... along national lines.”⁷¹ In other words, intercommunal strife could begin anew, this time over the most advantageous lines for the parties involved.

V

Under these conditions, there could hardly be any hope of achieving the liberal goal of “a multinational brotherhood of all Ottoman subjects,” the objective of the nineteenth-century Ottoman reformers.⁷² The defeat in the Russian War of 1877–78 had shifted the interethnic/interconfessional

397–442. Philip Carabott, “Aspects of the Hellenization of Greek Macedonia, ca. 1912–ca. 1959,” *KΑΜΠΙΟΣ: Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek*, no. 13, 2005, pp. 21–61, here 23–31.

⁷⁰Theodore G. Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek–Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism 1866–1897* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984); Dimitris Livanios, “‘Conquering the Souls’: Nationalism and Greek Guerrilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904–1908,” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, vol. 23, no. 1 (1999), 195–221; Basil C. Gounaris, “Preachers of God and Martyrs of the Nation: The Politics of Murder in Ottoman Macedonia in the Early 20th Century,” *Balkanologie*, vol. 9, nos. 1–2 (2005), 31–43. On the Ilinden Uprising of 1903, see, inter alia, Duncan M. Perry, *The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements 1893–1903* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), and Keith Brown, *Loyal Unto Death: Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013).

⁷¹Mathew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1966), 271. Cf. Steven W. Sowards, *Austria’s Policy of Macedonian Reform* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1989).

⁷²Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 40.

balance within the empire; the loss of territory with Christian majorities, on the one hand, and waves of Muslim immigrants from these lost territories to Anatolia, on the other, had accentuated the preponderance of the Muslim element. Not least in view of the imperialist expansion of Europe into parts of the Muslim world, the situation in the realm of the Sultan-Caliph demanded a pro-Islamic reorientation. Indeed, Abdulhamid II had early on initiated this reorientation—henceforth, questions of demography, geography, and political loyalty were to be viewed in a new light.⁷³ Thus, already at San Stefano, the Ottoman delegation had suggested the exchange of the Muslims living in the north of the Balkan ridge for the Christians living in the south. If accepted, this would have been an early case of compulsory population exchange.⁷⁴ The regime began to utilize refugees as well as local Muslims as instruments of pressure upon Christian populations in Eastern Anatolia, but also in the Balkans, setting the Kurds against the Armenians, the Albanians against the Serbs. At the same time, the Sultan appealed to the support of those Christian groups who were, at least temporarily, willing to respect the status quo and who could therefore be counted on as allies against national secessionism. Thus the followers of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Macedonia were viewed with special favor, since Hellenism was ready—at least provisionally—to tolerate the status quo in European Turkey.⁷⁵

⁷³ Kemal H. Karpat, “The *hijra* from Russia and the Balkans: The Process of Self-Definition in the Late Ottoman State,” in: Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, eds., *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 131–52; idem, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Cf. also Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998).

⁷⁴ See Safvet Pasha’s report to the Sublime Porte of 15 February 1878, in: Türkgeldi, *Mesâil-i Mübimme-i Siyasiyye*, vol. 2, 313–17. Cf. also Bilâl N. Şimşir, ed., *Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri: Belgeler / Emigrations turques des Balkans: Documents*, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1970), preface of the editor, clxvi–clxxiv.

⁷⁵ Bozhidar Samardzhiev, “Traits dominants de la politique d’Abdulhamid II relative au problème des nationalités (1876–1885),” *Études balkaniques*, vol. 8, no. 4 (1972), 57–79; Stephen Duguid, “The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2 (1973), 139–55; Janet Klein, *The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). Cf. also Fikret Adanir and Hilmar Kaiser, “Migration, Deportation, and Nation-Building: The Case of the Ottoman Empire,” in René Leboutte, ed., *Migrations et migrants dans une perspective historique: Permanences et innovations* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000), 273–92, and Fikret Adanir, “Bevölkerungsverschiebungen, Siedlungspolitik und ethnisch-kulturelle

The Young Turk opposition to the Hamidian regime gaining in momentum at the turn of the century heralded the resurgence of Ottomanist policies. Men organized in the secret Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) believed that with the restoration of the constitution of 1876 (suspended since 1878), the parliamentary system could be firmly established and within that framework national differences could be reconciled peacefully.⁷⁶ The Russian revolution of 1905 and the partial success of the constitutional movement in Persia since 1906 were encouraging developments. As a matter of fact, the CUP's acceptance of an invitation to collaborate with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in 1907 was made possible by an agreement that the latter recognized the principles of Ottomanism and henceforth abstained from appealing to Europe on behalf of the Armenian national cause, while the CUP pledged itself to seek a solution to the Kurdish–Armenian conflict in the eastern provinces.⁷⁷ Hence Young Turk opinion was quite shocked when Khristo Matov, a leading figure of the IMRO, declined the invitation extended by both CUP and the Armenian Dashnak Party to attend the Young Turk congress in Paris in December 1907. Matov justified his position as follows: “We want autonomy for Macedonia. We have no interest in joining those who wish to rejuvenate Turkey.” When the Armenians repeated the invitation, he added, “With Armenians and even with Young Turks we could come to an understanding only in the field of subversion: both they and we should undertake actions with a view to undermining the authority of the Turkish state.”⁷⁸

Homogenisierung: Nationsbildung auf dem Balkan und in Kleinasien, 1878–1923,” in Sylvia Hahn, Andrea Komlosy, and Ilse Reiter, eds., *Ausweisung–Abschiebung–Vertreibung in Europa: 16.–20. Jahrhundert* (Innsbruck, Wien, Bolzano: StudienVerlag, 2006), 172–92.

⁷⁶Scholars have stressed the modernist mentality of the Young Turks, who apparently considered separatist nationalism to be a reflection of society's divergence from the path of scientific progress, neglecting thereby the political dimension of the nationalities problem. See M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); idem, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁷⁷Hratch Dasnabedian, *Histoire de la Fédération Révolutionnaire Arménienne Dachmaktsoutioun (1890–1924)* (Milan: Oemme Edizioni, 1988), 87; Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 61–66, 78–81; Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 107–109.

⁷⁸[Khristo Matov], *Khristo Matov za svoiata revoliutsionna deinost: Lichni belezhki* [Khristo Matov on his revolutionary activities: personal notes] (Sofia: [s.n.], 1928), 53.

Still, the revolution of July 1908 saw a spectacular fraternization between Muslims, Christians, and Jews, with prisons opening their gates and political activity of all shades of opinion being allowed for the first time. However, for public opinion in Europe, this was a rather abrupt change. Many contemporaries seemed worried about the fate of the non-Muslim populations, which they deemed to be in peril should European protection cease. Quite typical was the assessment by Paul Miliukov, the leader of the Kadet Party (Constitutional Democrats) since 1905 and the foremost protagonist of Russian imperialism during the First World War, who visited Macedonia during the early days of the revolution:

Before me were ... yesterday's lord and slave, hangman and victim, and I thought to myself, what has become of the customs of age-old domination, on the one hand, and of the submissiveness of the Christian "rayi," on the other? And what would happen if "equality" would be expressed, in say, the loss of that protection [by Europe] under which was hidden the real inviolability of the Christian community?⁷⁹

The CUP elaborated its position on the national question in a programmatic paper in August, 1908. The paper highlighted the principles of popular sovereignty, provincial autonomy, school instruction in the mother tongue at the elementary level, universal conscription regardless of religious affiliation, and agrarian reform.⁸⁰ Since the revolution in July, some Young Turks had been sounding the leaders of other groups as to the chances of a common platform in the political field. From the start, they encountered difficulties in their dealings with the IMRO leadership. The Macedonian revolutionary movement had experienced a split in 1905. Since then, the so-called "left" wing under the leadership of Yane Sandanski in Serres had been arguing for a federalist solution to the national question within the framework of the empire.⁸¹ So it was not surprising that Sandanski publicly disowned Bulgarian nationalism after the revolution of 1908. As chairman of the newly established People's Federative Party (*Narodna Federativna Partija*), he demanded democratization of the political system, administrative autonomy for the

⁷⁹ Paul Miliukov, *Political Memoirs 1905–1917* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1967), 180.

⁸⁰ Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Politisches Archiv (PA), XXXVIII/409, Pára to Achrenthal, Salonik, August 17, 1908, no. 179, and August 20, 1908, no. 181.

⁸¹ See Georgi Pŭrvanov, "Dimo Hadzhidimov i natsionalno-osvoboditelnoto dvizhenie, kraia na XIX v.–1912 g." [Dimo Hadzhidimov and the National Liberation Movement, end of 19th century to 1912], *Istoričeski pregled*, vol. 47, no. 2 (1991), 55–70.

provinces, abolition of national, religious, and social privileges, separation of religious from state affairs, secular education in state schools, and universal conscription.⁸² On such a basis, the CUP swiftly reached an understanding with the “Sandanists” of Serres. The pro-Bulgarian nationalist wing, however, which was dominant in the IMRO, was loath to assume a similar position, not least because public opinion in Sofia was hostile to the new regime in the south. Some politicians believed that the Young Turks were pursuing the denationalization of the Bulgarian element in Macedonia.⁸³ Others thought the normalization of the situation in European Turkey would harm the Bulgarian national cause.⁸⁴ Some even complained that “the Bulgarians in Macedonia were now free citizens, not a single Bulgarian was in prison, and Europe sympathized with the Young Turks.”⁸⁵

In short, the negotiations with the IMRO leader Khristo Matov in August, 1908, produced no positive results.⁸⁶ This led some Young Turks to despair. A certain Tahsin Bey (Uzer), who served at the time as district governor (*kaymakam*) in Macedonia, regretted the opportunities missed in a distant past. He thought that the sultans of the sixteenth century should have carried out the Turkification of the Balkans instead of marching all the way to Central Europe. They would have thus spared him and his colleagues the burden of dealing with bandits called revolutionaries.⁸⁷ The question of Bulgarian independence in the autumn of 1908 shattered the last hopes of reconciliation. The Grand Vizier’s desire to be present in Sofia as a gesture of goodwill on the occasion of the declaration of Bulgarian independence remained unheeded; the government in Sofia preferred instead to collaborate with Austria-Hungary and exploited the issue of independence as a means of discrediting the Young Turk regime.⁸⁸

⁸² Nicolae Ciachir, “Nekolku informatsii od romanskite arkhivi za Iane Sandanski” [Some information on Iane Sandanski from the Romanian Archives], in Dimitar Mitrev, ed., *Iane Sandanski i makedonskoto natsionalno osloboditelno dvizhenie* (Skopje: Institut za natsionalna istoriia, 1976), 171–72.

⁸³ Tushe Vlahov, *Kriza v bŭlgaro-tŭrskite otnosheniia 1895–1908* [Crisis in Bulgarian-Turkish relations 1895–1908] (Sofia: Bŭlgarska akademiia na naukite, 1977), 156–57.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 161.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 161–62.

⁸⁶ In his memoirs, Matov ridicules the Young Turks’ eagerness to reach a reconciliation: *Khristo Matov za svoiata revoliutsionna deinost*, 56–58.

⁸⁷ See Tahsin Uzer, *Makedonŭa eŭskiyaluk tarihi ve son Osmanlŭ yonetimi* [History of brigandage and late Ottoman rule in Macedonia] (Ankara: Tŭrk Tarih Kurumu, 1979), 219–20.

⁸⁸ See Radoslav Popov and Elena Statelova, eds., *Spomeni za obiaviavane na nezavisimostta na Bŭlgarija 1908* [Memoirs relating to the declaration of the independence of Bulgaria 1908] (Sofia: Otechestven front, 1984), 24–32.

On 5, 6, and 7 October 1908, respectively, the declaration of Bulgarian independence, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the unification of Crete with Greece were announced.

This turn of events was a severe blow to the prestige of the new constitutional regime in the empire only two months after the July revolution. The pro-CUP circles felt bound to show some sort of reaction which took the form of a boycott movement, directed chiefly against Austro-Hungarian and Greek commercial interests.⁸⁹ It was accompanied by a discourse on “national economy,” stressing initially the need for domestic industrialization, but implying, in the last analysis, the elimination of the mostly non-Muslim “comprador bourgeoisie.”⁹⁰ And after the experience of the so-called counter-revolution of 1909, the CUP leaders began to take more authoritarian measures in order to preserve the presumed unity of state and society. In the process, some liberties were curbed due to a general ban on associations founded on the basis of ethnic affiliation, confiscation of firearms from the populace in some parts of Macedonia and Albania, even election fraud.⁹¹ Not only liberal circles at home but also potential adversaries abroad began to assume an inimical attitude. The introduction of conscription in Epirus, for instance, was commented in

⁸⁹Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement: Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 39–88.

⁹⁰Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement*, 79–88, 119–35. On the precursors of “national economy” in the Hamidian period, see Ahmed Midhat, *Ekonomi Politik* (Istanbul: Kirk Anbar Matba’ası, 1296/1880); François Georgeon, “L’Économie politique selon Ahmed Midhat,” in: Edhem Eldem, ed., *Première Rencontre Internationale sur l’Empire Ottoman et la Turquie Moderne* (Istanbul: Isis, 1991), 461–79. Cf. also Ahmed Güner Sayar, *Osmanlı iktisat düşüncesinin çağdaşlaşması (Klasik Dönem’den II. Abdülhamid’e)* [The modernization of Ottoman economic thought (from the Classical Period to Abdulhamid II)] (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1986), 395–417.

⁹¹On the *coup d’état* of April 13, 1909, see Aykut Kansu, *Politics in Post-Revolutionary Turkey, 1908–1913* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 77–125. An account of the constabulary as well as military steps taken with the purpose of providing internal security is in Mehmet Hacısalıhoğlu, *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage (1890–1918)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), 291–308. On irregularities during elections, see Stoian Makedonski, “La Révolution jeune-turc et les premières élections parlementaires de 1908 en Macédoine et en Thrace orientale,” *Études balkaniques*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1974), 133–46; idem, “La régime jeune-turc et les deuxième élections parlementaires de 1912 en Macédoine et Thrace orientale,” *Études balkaniques*, vol. 14, no. 2 (1978), 58–71. Cf. also Hasan Kayalı, “Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1919,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3 (1995), 265–86.

Athens as “Turkish policy of disregarding ancient customs and privileges and attempting to enforce a dead uniformity throughout the Empire.”⁹² And Milovan Milovanović—the Serbian Foreign Minister in 1908–12, the Prime Minister of Serbia in 1911–12, and an architect of the Balkan Alliance of 1912—confided to the British ambassador in Vienna that

there was only one source of vitality still left in the Ottoman dominions, and that lay in the old Turks who were held together by faith in their religion and who would never admit that the Christian races were on a level with themselves. The Young Turk ideal that all the races who live on Turkish soil can be welded together into one nation by a sense of patriotism is a dream.⁹³

Uprisings in Albania and Yemen since 1910 further undermined any belief in the future of the multiethnic empire. Politically discredited and socially alienated from the masses, the CUP was practically deprived of its influence by the time the Italians invaded Ottoman Tripoli (Libya) in 1911. But their [Old Turk] successors in office were hardly able to implement any significantly new policy, apart from insinuating that the centralism of the CUP was going to be replaced by a more conciliatory approach to local demands for autonomy—first in Albania and then in Macedonia.⁹⁴

VI

It might have been this intention to grant autonomy to an Albania that would have encompassed also Kosovo and partly the vilayet of Yanina which prompted the Balkan states to act.⁹⁵ By the beginning of July 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria were prepared militarily for an offensive against the Ottoman Empire; the Ottoman government was aware that these countries had

⁹² Public Record Office (PRO), London, Foreign Office (FO) 371/1009/17734, Elliot and Grey, Athens, May 12, 1910, No. 73.

⁹³ FO 371/1003. 4632/4632/10/44A (No. 19.) Confidential, Cartright to Grey, Vienna, February 6, 1910. Printed in G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914*, vol. 9: *The Balkan Wars* (London, 1933), 117–18.

⁹⁴ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA), Berlin, Türkei 142/35/13078, Wangenheim to Auswärtiges Amt, Cipher Tel., Constantinople, July 27, 1912, No. 196.

⁹⁵ This is how the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy interpreted it. See Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold’s circular to the embassies in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, and St. Petersburg of August 13, 1912, in K.u.K. Ministerium des Äußern, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend die Ereignisse am Balkan. 13. August 1912 bis 6. November 1913* (Vienna, K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1914), 1–2.

been reinforcing their border units, but avoided taking countermeasures lest they would get irritated.⁹⁶ As late as September 21, the Sublime Porte discounted even reports arriving from their envoy in Sofia which warned against an imminent offensive by the Balkan allies.⁹⁷

Such astonishing passivity was largely a reflection of the deplorable conditions prevailing in the imperial army on the eve of the Balkan Wars. Some of the best units were not available because they were engaged in Albania or Yemen against insurrectionary movements. Due to the Italian invasion of Tripolis, many talented officers were on mission in North Africa. Since an Italian landing also on the Anatolian coast seemed probable, a good number of divisions had to be concentrated at Smyrna and near the Strait of Dardanelles. The mobilization of the army, ordered on October 1, 1912, proved from the outset a failure. No enthusiasm for war could be discerned in the country, and those called to the colors were—irrespective of their religious affiliation—unwilling to serve, buying themselves free, if they could afford it, or simply fleeing to a neighboring country.⁹⁸ In order to replenish the numerically weak regular infantry in Thrace, ten reserve divisions had to be called in, which included many non-Muslim recruits, but the troops were hardly trained and the units short of officers.⁹⁹ The numerous cases of panic in the first phase of the operations were partly due to this state of affairs, along with poor equipment and provisioning:

Men, demoralized by bad weather, inadequate clothing, especially the miserable footwear, since days without rations, without officers who could do something, ... had already at the outset run out of ammunition on account of

⁹⁶ PA AA, Türkei 142/35/15126, Military Report, No. 609, Constantinople, August 27, 1912.

⁹⁷ PA AA Türkei 203/1/16334, Wangenheim's Cipher Tel. of September 22, 1912, No. 297.

⁹⁸ Hans Rohde, *Meine Erlebnisse im Balkankrieg und kleine Skizzen aus dem türkischen Soldatenleben* (Charlottenburg: P. Baumann, 1913), 7.

⁹⁹ PRO, FO 371/1500/42894, Major Tyrrell to Lowther, Constantinople, October 5, 1912, No. 68. A journalist who interviewed Ottoman prisoners of war in Bulgaria found out that Christians, even elderly men of over 40 who had never served before, had been gathered together to fill the ranks. Richard von Mach, *Briefe aus dem Balkankriege 1912–1913. Kriegsberichte der Kölnischen Zeitung von Richard von Mach* (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1913), 50. Cf. also Abdullah Paşa [Kölemen], *1328 Balkan Harbinde Şark Ordusu kumandanı Abdullah Paşanın hatıratı* [Memoires of Abdullah Pasha, the commander of the Eastern Army during the Balkan War of 1912] (Istanbul: Erkân-i Harbiye Mektebi Matbaası, 1336/1920), 14–15.

shooting erratically. Since no new ammunition was coming in, a battalion had started to retreat, dragging along the other, advancing columns as well.¹⁰⁰

While German circles in the Ottoman capital attributed—in rather vague terms—the apparently all-pervasive defeatism to the influences emanating from a pro-Entente position strongly represented at the Porte as well as to the anti-Turkish sentiments of the local Christian populations,¹⁰¹ the Austro-Hungarian Consul Max von Herzfeld, who had experienced the siege of Adrianople (November 1912–March 1913) from within the fortress, explicitly blamed Ottoman Bulgarians and Greeks for having contributed to the Ottoman defeat:

“As soldiers they often went over to the enemy, or they deserted; as peasants they destroyed railway tracks, blew up bridges and cut telegraph lines, as irregulars they served virtually as ersatz until the Bulgarian troops arrived.”¹⁰²

Leon Trotsky, too, at the time correspondent in Bulgaria, adhered to the view that the enlistment of Christians in the Sultan’s army was bound to de-emphasize the role of Islam, the only moral tie between political authority and the armed forces, and this in turn was the cause of a significant degree of disheartenment among simple-minded Muslim soldiers.¹⁰³

By contrast, Christian opinion in the Ottoman Balkans seems to have been enthusiastic about the war with Turkey.¹⁰⁴ In Macedonia, one of the most critical regions in this regard, not only pro-Bulgarian IMRO activists but even Yane Sandanki, notorious for having been a collaborator of the CUP, volunteered to serve the national cause.¹⁰⁵ Except in a few fortified cities, such as Adrianople, Yanina, and Scutari, Ottoman resistance was broken very early. Especially spectacular was the drive of the Bulgarian army through the plains of Eastern Thrace towards the Straits, coming to

¹⁰⁰ G. von Hochwächter, *Mit den Türken in der Front im Stabe Mahmud Muchtar Paschas. Mein Kriegstagebuch über die Kämpfe bei Kirk Kilisse, Lüle Burgas und Cataldza* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1913), 25.

¹⁰¹ PA AA Türkei 203/7/19365, Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, Constantinople, November 4, 1912, No. 486, Cipher Tel.

¹⁰² PA AA, Türkei 203/16/11579, German Embassy Constantinople, June 7, 1913, No. 181, Incl. “I. The Period of the Siege. Written in January, 1913.”

¹⁰³ Leon Trotzki, *Die Balkankriege 1912–13*, transl. from the Russian by Hannelore Georgi (Essen: Arbeiterpresse Verlag, 1996), 222.

¹⁰⁴ Igor Despot, *The Balkan Wars in the Eyes of the Warring Parties: Perceptions and Interpretations* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2012), 55–80.

¹⁰⁵ See Hacısalıhoğlu, *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage*, 367–78.

a stop only at Çatalca, the last line of defense before the imperial capital.¹⁰⁶ Detachments of irregulars, in the Bulgarian case partly recruited from among the Macedonian and Thracian immigrants in Sofia, contributed significantly to the success of allied arms.¹⁰⁷ One author has pointed out that the First Balkan War, though waged against the Ottoman Empire, was in fact “a conflict by and against civilians ... Of all the agents of terror, bands of irregulars prompted the greatest fear.”¹⁰⁸ But also the regular armies, both Bulgarian and Greek soldiers, systematically burned Muslim villages, the inhabitants were killed or forced to flee. In most localities in Thrace, the Muslims fled even before the Christian enemy arrived, about half a million persons seeking refuge in Anatolia.¹⁰⁹

By all accounts, the Ottomans had suffered a catastrophic defeat. But since some renowned officers associated with the CUP had been absent (in North Africa) during the decisive battles in Thrace, the CUP could conveniently push the brunt of responsibility onto its opponents. At the same time, a group of influential figures in the CUP was determined to bring about a reversal of this development. By carrying out a *coup d'état* on January 23, 1913, this group under the leadership of Enver Bey established a military regime that would last until 1918. However, various attempts geared to dislodge the Bulgarian army from the approaches of Constantinople all failed; even heavily fortified Adrianople, under siege since November 1912, surrendered to the enemy on March 26, 1913. Consequently, the CUP-led government was obliged to accept the severe conditions of the Treaty of London (May 1913) which practically liquidated Ottoman rule in Europe.¹¹⁰

But the victorious allies were soon to disagree over the issue of delimiting their respective zones of occupation. In 1904, Serbia and Bulgaria had

¹⁰⁶ For an exhaustive treatment of the campaigns in Thrace, see Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 77–162. See also Despot, *The Balkan Wars in the Eyes of the Warring Parties*, 81–148.

¹⁰⁷ For a detailed account of Macedonian militias' successful operations in Thrace, see Petür Dürvingov, *Istoriia na Makedono-Odrinskata opülchenie* [History of the Macedono-Adrianopolitan Legion], vol. 1 (Sofia: Dürzhavna pechatnitsa, 1919), 101–326.

¹⁰⁸ Benjamin Lieberman, *Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 58 and 62.

¹⁰⁹ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 148–207. Cf. Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg: Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 257–73; Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995), 135–77.

¹¹⁰ Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000), 69–79.

reached an agreement to the effect that as neighboring states they would continue to demand political autonomy for Ottoman Macedonia, and only if this proved impracticable would they arrange for a fair division of the region among themselves.¹¹¹ But the Alliance of 1912 included a Greece that was determined to translate into reality the ideals of “Greater Greece.” From the perspective of Athens, it was indispensable to attain control over the land route to Constantinople, and this necessitated that at least the southern parts of Macedonia and Western Thrace should be acquired by Greece.¹¹² This accounts for the virtual race for Salonika between Greek and Bulgarian forces in 1912, until the city was surrendered to the former on November 9, 1912.¹¹³ In other words, while the military potential of Bulgaria was spent in the battlefields of Thrace, the Serbs and the Greeks were able to occupy rather easily the major part of Macedonia. Deeply offended by this “unjust” partition, Bulgarian generals began to prepare for action against their allies already in April 1913, triggering the Second Balkan War by a surprise attack against both Greek and Serbian positions in June.¹¹⁴ Surrounded from all sides (Serbia, Greece, Rumania), Bulgaria could not resist long. In face of this unexpected development, the Ottoman army crossed the recently established border in Eastern Thrace not only with the purpose of regaining Adrianople, but also taking revenge. Bulgarian and Greek villages were destroyed, and Christians in various places were pressured to leave. More than 50,000 people took refuge in Bulgaria, and about that many Greeks migrated to Western Thrace.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹For the relevant stipulations of the Serbo–Bulgarian agreement of 1904, see Ernst C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), 463–64 and 466–68.

¹¹²See Spyridon G. Ploumidis, “From the Old to the New Greater Greece: The Bellicose Evolution of the Greek Great Idea (1912–13),” *Études balkaniques*, vol. 49, no. 2 (2013), 68–90.

¹¹³Yura Konstantinova, “The Race for Salonika,” *Études balkaniques*, vol. 49, no. 2 (2013), 44–67; Richard C. Hall, “The Role of Thessaloniki in Bulgarian Policy during the Balkan Wars,” *Balkan Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2 (1992), 231–41. Cf. also Sadık Ulvi, “Tahsin Paşa Ordusu ve Selânik’in Teslimi” [Tahsin Paşa forces and the surrender of Salonika], *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 158 (February 1997), 38–44, and no. 159 (March 1997), 51–61.

¹¹⁴According to General Fichev, Head of the Operations in Thrace and Chief of the General Staff during the Second Balkan War, it was General Savov, highest in command after Tsar Ferdinand, who had conceived the idea of an attack upon Greece already in April 1913. See Ivan Fichev, *Balkanskata voina 1912–1913: Prezhivelitsi, belezhki i dokumenti* [The Balkan War 1912–1913: experiences, notes and documents] (Sofia: Dürzhavna pechatnitsa, 1940), 427–32. Cf. also Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913*, 102–105.

¹¹⁵N. Konstantinov, *Rodna Trakiia: Spomeni, Rechi, Statii* [Native Thrace: memories, speeches, articles] (Sofia: Pechatnitsa “Süglasie,” 1925), 80–88; Tefik Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya’da*

VII

The Balkan Wars strengthened the already rampant tendencies towards ethnic homogenization. In areas under Bulgarian occupation, especially the Slavic-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) were subjected to a severe policy of assimilation: within the span of one year, about 200,000 persons were forcibly converted to Christianity.¹¹⁶ Later on, Greek-speaking Christians would be pressured, either to accept becoming Slavophone or to emigrate to Greece.¹¹⁷ The Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913), which concluded the Second Balkan War, established a new status quo in Southeastern Europe, but mainly in territorial terms. The peace settlement was followed by policies implemented with a view to bringing the ethno-demographic reality in congruence with the new territorial map. Thus the Treaty of Constantinople negotiated between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire provided for a reciprocal exchange of populations living in a specified zone along both sides of the new border in Thrace. The pertinent populations, roughly 50,000 on each side, had already been expelled, so that the treaty's stipulations had meaning merely with regard to regulating property matters retrospectively.¹¹⁸

Similar policies were implemented also in the Greek-held areas. On the one hand, the authorities encouraged immigration of Greek Orthodox inhabitants from districts such as Strumitsa, Doiran, and Melnik, which were expected to remain as Serbian or Bulgarian territory. On the other hand, the immigration of Greeks from Bulgarian-occupied Western Thrace was discouraged. The Greek government was apparently prepared—with the intention of thwarting the consolidation of Bulgarian claims on the coastal zone—even to support the autonomy movement of the local

Millî Mücadele [National struggle in Thrace], vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, sec. ed., 1987), 67–89.

¹¹⁶Mary Neuburger, *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 41–42; Velichko Georgiev and Staiko Trifonov, *Pokrústvaneto na Búlgarite Mokhamedani, 1912–1913: Dokumenti* [Christianization of Muslim Bulgarians, 1912–1913: documents] (Sofia: Akademichno izd-vo “Prof. Marin Drinov,” 1995)

¹¹⁷Theodora Dragostinova, “Speaking National: Nationalizing the Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900–1939,” *Slavic Review*, vol. 67, no. 1 (2008), 154–81; eadem, *Between Two Motherlands: Nationality and Emigration among the Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900–1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 17–116.

¹¹⁸For an English translation of the treaty, see Great Britain, Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 107 (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1914), 713–14.

Muslim population.¹¹⁹ Prime Minister Venizelos seems to have entertained the conviction that an autonomous Western Thrace would fall within a few decades “like a ripe apple” by itself into the lap of Greece.¹²⁰

In respect of the situation in the Ottoman Empire, one can speak of a momentous shift in *weltanschauung* and political orientation that took place during and in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars. The dominant opinion attributed the disastrous defeat above all to the lack of national enthusiasm in the average Ottoman soldier. The “betrayal” of non-Muslim recruits who had defected to the enemy during the first skirmishes, was seen as another decisive factor. The general tenor of the discussions was that the humiliation of the defeat brought with it the chance for a “national rebirth.” The formerly promoted idea that all ethno-religious communities were constituent elements of one and the same polity began to be disparaged as cosmopolitanism and was gradually replaced by a nationalist discourse that also utilized populist and corporatist notions. Aspirations to the unity of language, ideals, and action of the people, sometimes propounded in Social Darwinist terms, soon prevailed among the educated elite.¹²¹ This change reflected already in a pogrom-like anti-Christian riot near Smyrna in early 1914. It seems that it was agitation conducted by CUP agents among Muslim refugees from Macedonia that triggered a major exodus of the local Greek population out of the area.¹²² Clearly, homogenizing tendencies of the modern nation-state had reached even the shores of Asia Minor, boding ill for the chances of coexistence in a still multiethnic society.

¹¹⁹ N. Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978), 280–90.

¹²⁰ Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, 261.

¹²¹ On this reorientation towards Turkish nationalism during the period under consideration, see Richard Hartmann, “Ziya Gök Alp’s Grundlagen des türkischen Nationalismus,” *Orientalische Literaturzeitung*, vol. 28 (1925), 578–610; Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London: Luzac and the Harvill Press, 1950); Niyazi Berkes, ed. and trans., *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959); François Georgeon, *Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935)* (Paris: Éditions ADFP, 1980); Zafer Toprak, “Osmanlı Narodnikleri: ‘Halka Doğru’ gidenler” [Ottoman Narodniks: those who went “towards the people”], *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 24 (1984), 69–81; Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876–1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1985).

¹²² See Matthias Bjørnlund, “The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification,” *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2008), 41–58; Emre Erol, “Organised Chaos as Diplomatic Ruse and Demographic Weapon: The Expulsion of the Ottoman Greeks (*Rum*) from Foça, 1914,” *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis*, vol. 10, no. 4 (2013), 66–96; idem, *The Ottoman Crisis in Western Anatolia: Turkey’s Belle Époque and the Transition to a Modern Nation State* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

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Violence, Forced Migration, and Population Policies During and After the Balkan Wars (1912–14)

Edvin Pezo

Almost no war in Southeastern Europe has been characterized so dramatically by violence, population shifts, and “ethnic cleansing” as the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. They marked a development that substantially and enduringly changed the ethnographic composition of the region. Broadly speaking, the states and societies of the Balkans were fundamentally transformed during the decade of conflict that began with the Balkan Wars, continued with the First World War, and ended with the Greco–Turkish War of 1919–22. In addition, during the Balkan Wars opposing military forces targeted civilians¹ for the first time in twentieth-century Europe and set, as Elisabeth Kontogiorgi has stated, “new standards for cruelty and destruction.”²

¹ Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000), 136.

² Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, *Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: The Rural Settlement of Refugees 1922–1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 37. She refers specifically to Macedonia.

E. Pezo (✉)

Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg, Germany
e-mail: pezo@ios-regensburg.de

Violence, forced migration, and government efforts to establish new pillars of population policies during and after the Balkan Wars affected large territories of the Balkan region and, to varying degrees, all ethnic groups who lived there. Members of all these groups experienced violence directly or knew of it indirectly from secondhand information; all were affected by the dissolution of the Ottoman state throughout its European territories and the simultaneous spatial extensions of the nation-states of Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania. In fact, the deep and formative experience of violence and deracination engendered by both Balkan Wars, as well as the significant level of violence during the postwar periods, constitutes what Reinhart Koselleck has called the “space of experience” of a population—“experience” meaning a permanent process in which perception, interpretation, and action coincide.³ At the same time, the war experience in the Southeast European countries formed their “present past, whose events have been incorporated and can be remembered,” as well as their “horizon of expectation” in its dimension as a “future made present” (*vergegenwärtigte Zukunft*). This envisioned future directs itself “to the not-yet, to the nonexperienced, to that which is to be revealed,”⁴ whether in the contested area or, with regard to emigrants and refugees, in their countries of destination. The disappointments, hopes, and expectations created at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially in times of war, have had a strong impact upon Balkan politicians in their conceptions of policy oriented toward the nation-state. Within local societies, these conceptions and population policies affected particular groups who did not fit the ideal description of “loyal citizens” and did not harmonize with the concept of a nation-state.

The disappointments, hopes, and expectations that formed before and during the Balkan Wars and in the tense postwar period need to be seen against the background of violence, migration, and various national endeavors to establish population policies. This chapter demonstrates the interconnections and interactions among the elements of this background, and argues that the region’s societies were confronted with a

³See Nikolaus Buschmann and Horst Carl, “Zugänge zur Erfahrungsgeschichte des Krieges. Forschung, Theorie, Fragestellung,” in idem, eds., *Die Erfahrung des Krieges. Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001), 11–26, 18.

⁴Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 259.

transfer and transformation of violence through 1914, so that forms of “hard violence”—especially evident in times of war—shifted to those of “soft violence” that emerged in the postwar period and became embedded in population policies, for example the citizenship laws, settlement and migration policies, and peace treaties. Therefore, my focus lies on the blending of violence and demographic upheaval, which radically changed the “horizons of expectation” of a rapidly nationalizing environment. Here I argue that violence, migration, and population policy must be linked to be understood, and explore how the scope of action changed in the Balkans from the prewar period through 1914. Both the micro and macro levels of action are addressed. The main emphasis is on the ethnically heterogeneous Muslim population. At this time their homeland was in a state of crisis, and the nation-states in the Balkans often perceived them as unwanted remnants of the Ottoman Empire. A second focus is on the Ottoman Empire and its perceptions of the Balkan Wars, seen as a humiliating catastrophe after losing most of its territory in Europe—or rather on its reactions to such a loss, which were palpable in its population policies of the time, as well as in subsequent years.

In historical research, the analysis of violence in Southeastern Europe played a minor role before the wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia.⁵ Since then, historians have focused on “ethnic cleansing” as a part of the forced migrations triggered by war, and have described its mechanisms, aims, and dimensions in ways that extend far beyond the Yugoslav wars.⁶ The Balkan Wars of 1912–13, however, have been the subject of few scholarly studies, let alone comparative ones, that address the development and evolution of violence employed by state and non-state actors, or on the nexus between violence, war, and postwar politics.⁷ Neither the extent

⁵ See, with an introduction to the field of violence, Wolfgang Höpken, “Gewalt auf dem Balkan. Erklärungsversuche zwischen ‘Struktur’ und ‘Kultur,’” in Wolfgang Höpken and Michael Riekenberg, eds., *Politische und ethnische Gewalt in Südosteuropa und Lateinamerika* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001), 53–95, 55.

⁶ Cf. Philipp Ther, *Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten. “Ethnische Säuberungen” in modernen Europa* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); Holm Sundhaussen, “Forced Ethnic Migration,” *European History Online* (EGO), <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/sundhaussenh-2010-en>, accessed July 11, 2016; and Norman Naimark, “Ethnic Cleansing,” in *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence*, <http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/ethnic-cleansing-0>, ISSN 1961-989, accessed July 11, 2016.

⁷ Relevant aspects of violence and migration during the Balkan Wars, discussed in more recent publications, can be found in Berna Pekesen, “Expulsion and Emigration of the Muslims from the Balkans,” *European History Online* (EGO), <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/>

of violence nor its salient features in the context of “ethnic cleansing” operations carried out during the 1912–22 decade of the Balkan Wars has yet to be scrutinized in depth and with consideration of the region’s specific conditions, that is, the population’s ethnic composition and political affiliations both in wartime and its aftermath. Nevertheless, research about violence and migration during war should not be reduced to a consideration solely of “ethnic cleansing,” but rather should bear in mind the transformative character of violence for societies as a whole.

Processes of state disintegration and state-building are a core issue in this regard, and their investigation must take account of the unwillingness of politicians and the armed forces to limit violence. In the Balkan Wars, violence was concentrated in contested regions, especially in areas of geo-strategic importance which had an ethnically and/or religiously diverse population claimed by various nation-states. Moreover, the power vacuum created by the demise of the Ottoman Empire, a process that started well before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, acted as a catalyst for violence.

Therefore, the pervasive violence of these years remains a major challenge for historians who have never gone beyond their nation-state frameworks. In Albanian and Serbian historiography, for example, the range of interpretations has produced conflicting meanings that are close to irreconcilable. The Albanian historian Zekeria Cana, for instance, argues that the events of 1912 and 1913 put into action Serbia’s “genocidal plans” of ethnic “cleansing,” whereas the Serbian historian Zoran Janjetović stresses that “Serbian excesses” were the result not of a proactive policy but of human weakness and the lack of discipline in certain parts of the army.⁸

[pekesenb-2011-en](#), accessed February 4, 2016; Stefan Sotiris Papaioannou, “Balkan Wars between the Lines: Violence and Civilians in Macedonia, 1912–1918,” PhD thesis, University of Maryland, 2012; Üğür Ümit Üngör, “Mass Violence against Civilians during the Balkan Wars,” in Dominik Geppert, William Mulligan, and Andreas Rose, eds., *The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 76–91; see also various articles published in Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi, eds., *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, and Their Sociopolitical Implications* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013).

⁸Zekeria Cana, *Politika e Serbisë kundrejt çështjes shqiptare 1903–1913* [Serbia’s policy toward the Albanian issue] (Prishtina: Instituti Albanologjik i Prishtinës, 2006), 274–75; Zoran Janjetović, *Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva. Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji 1918–1941* [The emperors’ children, the kings’ stepchildren: national minorities in Yugoslavia 1918–1941] (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2005), 102–103.

THE ROAD TO THE FIRST BALKAN WAR: DYSFUNCTIONAL
OTTOMAN POWER STRUCTURES, WAR PREPARATIONS,
AND EXPECTATIONS

Even before the outbreak of the First Balkan War, dysfunctional power structures in the Ottoman Empire had brought about an increasing use of physical violence by various parties. In the Balkans, the Ottomans had been confronted with Albanian uprisings and growing demands for autonomy from 1909 onwards. Paramilitary units composed of members of specific ethnic or religious groups posed a substantial security problem for the Ottomans, who failed to contain the violence.⁹ For example, Constantinople could not resolve the “Albanian question” or suppress the Albanian uprisings, which represented a threat to national aspirations expressed by the Montenegrin, Serbian, and Greek political elites. The possible creation of a territorial, political, and administrative unit dominated by Albanians caused them to fear the emergence of a serious rival for their territorial claims. The existing order, based on the stipulations of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, had already been seriously undermined by the outbreak of the Italo–Turkish War in September 1911 and was now in danger.¹⁰ The Ottoman status quo was thus substantially at risk as war preparations by the Bulgarian and Serbian governments moved the “Macedonian question” toward a military solution. Both Bulgaria and Serbia intensified their bilateral talks, which were mediated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the autumn of 1911.¹¹ While doing so, they staked out their geopolitical spheres of influence, an effort that resulted in the creation of a secret appendix to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia, signed in Sofia on 29 February/13 March 1912. In this agreement, the parties expressed their willingness to take military action against the Ottoman Empire.¹² War now became a realistic

⁹According to official Ottoman statistics, no fewer than 359 paramilitary units (with approximately 4,200 members) plied their dreadful trade in Macedonia in 1911, most of them in the *vilayets* of Salonica and Kosovo; see *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, vols. 4–5 (1912), 81.

¹⁰See Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 11.

¹¹Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 25–26.

¹²See Article 1 of the secret appendix to the treaty. Both parties declared that intervention could be triggered if “internal disorders arise in Turkey, of such a character as to endanger the national or state interests of the contracting parties.” Article 2 defines, albeit unclearly,

option. Soon afterwards this option was made even more attractive by the formation of the first major alliance among the Balkan states, based on a series of bilateral treaties concluded among Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro. The new alliance, the Balkan League, was directed primarily against Constantinople.

The Balkan League countries went to war with the slogan “the Balkans for the Balkan peoples,” suggesting a desire for self-determination and declaring that the Ottoman Empire, specifically the Turks, constituted an alien element. But the states in the Balkan League, in fact, did not consider the interests or the liberty of the Balkan peoples. Rather, they enforced the existing national interests of the Balkan states,¹³ as they demonstrated in the spring and summer of 1912 during the Albanian insurrections against the government of the Young Turks. The Albanian insurgents entered Prishtina by force at the end of July and occupied Skopje by mid-August to emphasize their political demands. The Sublime Porte’s concessions on Albanian autonomy threatened the geopolitical aspirations of the existing Balkan states in the context of the “Macedonian question” and became the decisive incentive for a strike against the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴

The societies in the Balkans had become psychologically prepared for war through a “novel form of intensity and radicalism” on the part of their governments and intellectual elites.¹⁵ Ideologically, there were attempts to justify the First Balkan War, fought between October 1912 and May 1913, as a struggle of Christendom against Islam, as a *mission civilisatrice*, and as a “final battle.”¹⁶ The public discourse in the Balkan states was characterized by strong calls for solidarity with the other Christian Balkan

the territorial claims of the signatories; see the Supplement to the *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1914), 3–5.

¹³ Konrad Clewing, “Staatsensystem und innerstaatliches Agieren im multiethnischen Raum. Südosteuropa im langen 19. Jahrhundert,” in Konrad Clewing and Oliver Jens Schmitt, eds., *Geschichte Südosteuropas. Vom frühen Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2011), 432–553, 487.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 487.

¹⁵ Wolfgang Höpken, “Archaische Gewalt oder Vorboten des ‘totalen’ Krieges? Die Balkankriege 1912/13 in der europäischen Kriegsgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Ulf Brunnbauer, Andreas Helmedach, and Stefan Troebst, eds., *Schnittstellen. Gesellschaft, Nation, Konflikt und Erinnerung in Südosteuropa. Festschrift für Holm Sundhaussen zum 65. Geburtstag* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 245–60, 255.

¹⁶ See Fikret Adanir, “Bevölkerungverschiebungen, Siedlungspolitik und ethnisch-kulturelle Homogenisierung. Nationsbildung auf dem Balkan und in Kleinasien,” in Sylvia Hahn, Andrea Komlosy, and Ilse Reiter, eds., *Ausweisung–Abschiebung–Vertreibung in*

states and peoples, as well as appeals to take revenge for “five hundred years of slavery.” The editorial in the October 5/18, 1912 issue of the Belgrade daily *Politika*, published one day after the official declaration of war against the Porte by Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, vividly illustrates the passion for getting rid of the Ottoman Empire and all it stood for:

Today, all Balkan states assent as one man ... Eight hundred thousand allied soldiers soon will be found together in the center of the Balkans; they will reach out to each other's hands and correct the error of a long-lasting past, an error that was paid for with five centuries of slavery and millions of Christian heads. ... The allied cannons will now act as an eye-opener and show that the Christian states in the Balkans are still alive and that they are powerful enough to free their living brothers, and take revenge for the dead. The holy war for the liberation of the Christians has begun, and its success is certain. The result of the war will be expressed with three words: Asians to Asia.¹⁷

Expectations at the beginning of the First Balkan War ran high, as it was purported to be a “just war,” a war of liberation against the Ottoman Empire, which had become a synonym for backwardness and despotic rule. In Serbia, for example, parts of the population reacted enthusiastically to mobilization.¹⁸ In essence, the region's societies became radicalized, and I hypothesize that these states willingly promoted violence before the outbreak of war.

THE CONDITIONS AND EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE DURING AND AFTER THE BALKAN WARS

A strong link can be assumed between such enthusiastic patriotic fervor on the one hand and violence on the other. It is certain that the ensuing violence was not limited to state-led military actions. Violence achieved an almost region-wide dimension through the engagement of “irregular forces” as well as armed civilians in the fighting, although the battlefield

Europa. 16.–20. Jahrhundert (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2006), 172–92, 181–82; Höpken, *Archaische Gewalt*, 256.

¹⁷ *Politika*, October 5 [18], 1912, 1.

¹⁸ Borislav Ratković, “Mobilization of the Serbian Army for the First Balkan War, October 1912,” in Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjević, eds., *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 146–57, 150.

and the home front remained largely separate realms. On the whole, as Wolfgang Höpken has pointed out, the events of 1912–13, the intensity of “regular” warfare, and in particular the excess of violence, took on a new quality, never before seen in the region and anticipating in many aspects the radicalized and increasingly “ethnicized” warfare that would become typical of the twentieth century.¹⁹ In numerical terms, most of the victims of the First Balkan War came from the ethnically heterogeneous Muslim population, for whom the war meant a radical loss of sovereignty and control. In fact, especially after the defeated Ottoman army had given up its positions, a power vacuum led to large-scale violence against the civilian population. British Vice Consul Reporting from Skopje, Walter Divie Peckham, described how, with the departure of the last Ottoman troops from the city, “looting, principally of flour and rifles, began.”²⁰ In these circumstances, the violent actions of civilians and “irregular forces” had particularly pernicious effects. At the same time, the newly appointed Serb authorities were often unwilling or unable to exercise control. For example, the British vice consul in Monastir/Bitola observed that during the war of 1912, “the Christians took very ample revenge on the Moslem ‘brigands’ by reducing all Moslem villages between Monastir and Gijavat to ashes and carrying off all the cattle and other possessions of the inhabitants.”²¹ Furthermore, the vice consul added, “the prefect is aware, and he shows it, that the Christians take the law into their own hands in dealing with Moslems, and the authorities do nothing to prevent it.”²²

Another, better-known witness of the disastrous failure of the rule of law was Leon Trotsky. As a war correspondent for *Kievskaja Mysl'* (Kievan thought), he was shocked by the brutality of the military and

¹⁹Wolfgang Höpken, “Performing Violence: Soldiers, Paramilitaries and Civilians in the Twentieth-Century Balkan Wars,” in Alf Lüdtke and Bernd Weisbrod, eds., *No Man's Land of Violence: Extreme Wars in the 20th Century* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 211–49, 236–37.

²⁰Vice Consul Peckham to Sir Ralph Paget; Üsküb, November 2, 1912, in B. Destani, ed., *Ethnic Minorities in the Balkan States 1860–1971*, vol. 2: 1888–1914 (Slough: Archive Editions, 2003), 258–59, here 259.

²¹Vice Consulate Monastir/Bitola, January 9, 1913, in *ibid.*, 269–76, here 272. See also another case of revenge described by Aleksej Timofejev, “Srpska gerila u balkanskim ratovima. Kulturne, društvene i političke tradicije četničkog rata u Srbiji” [Serbian paramilitary formations in the Balkan Wars: the cultural, social and political tradition of irregular warfare in Serbia], in Srđan Rudić and Miljan Milković, eds., *Balkanski ratovi 1912/1913. Nova viđenja i tumačenja* [The Balkan Wars. new views and interpretations] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut/Institut za strategijska istraživanja, 2013), 93–110, here 106.

²²Vice Consulate Monastir/Bitola, January 9, 1913, in *ibid.*, 269–76, here 272.

paramilitary forces, which he had witnessed during a visit to Skopje, where his impression was one of anarchy unleashed. Here it appears that the paramilitaries in particular revealed themselves to be agents of excessive violence, mostly recruited, in Trotsky's view, from "idlers, ne'er-do-wells, vicious lumpen elements—in general, from the dregs of society—they have made murder, robbery and violence ... a savage sport." Even the military authorities were allegedly "embarrassed by the bloody bacchanalia into which the partisan struggle has degenerated," so they disarmed the paramilitary forces and sent them back home before the end of the war.²³

It seems that the mass violence and atrocities largely occurred during the period of transition after the Ottoman retreat. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also provides evidence that this was the case. Its famous report, which concerns the areas occupied by Bulgarian forces, states that the "Moslem population endured during the early weeks of the war a period of lawless vengeance and unmeasured suffering."²⁴ While paramilitary groups played a decisive role during this period of extraordinary violence, they worked for the most part in close cooperation with their aligned armies, "preparing the ground" for conquest or appearing on the scene after the army had left but before a civilian administration had yet been established.²⁵

Yet it was not only this "transitional phase" that was rife with violence. After the war's end and the establishment of civil administrations, the population was again confronted with violence. Whereas during the war the "symbolic conquest" of the "Other" had been characterized by the destruction of ethnic or religious symbols in the villages,²⁶ a policy of

²³ Leon Trotsky, "Behind the Curtain's Edge" [first published in *Kievskaja Mysl'*, December 23, 1912], *The Balkan Wars, 1912–13: The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1980), 266–72, here 271.

²⁴ *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, DC: The Endowment, 1914), 72; see also 76 regarding the early weeks of the First Balkan War as a "period of extreme brutality."

²⁵ Höpken, *Performing Violence*, 234. See also the case study about the Macedonian Adrianople Volunteers from Tetsuya Sahara, where the author states that the distinction between irregulars and the regular units was irrelevant and that "intimidations and exemplary killings were carried out intentionally and as part of a premeditated military plan." Tetsuya Sahara, "Paramilitaries in the Balkan Wars: The Case of Macedonian Adrianople Volunteers," in Yavuz and Blumi, eds., *War and Nationalism*, 399–419, here 417; see also Aleksandar Stojčev, "Učešće Makedonaca u balkanskim ratovima u sastavu srpske vojske" [Participation of the Macedonians in the Balkan Wars as part of the Serbian Army], in Rudić and Milkić, eds., *Balkanski ratovi*, 77–86, here 81.

²⁶ Höpken, *Performing Violence*, 232–33.

forced mass conversions now sought to destroy religious identity and thus, in the case of Muslims, sever an important link with the Ottoman Empire. This policy applied primarily to Slavic-speaking Muslims in the Rhodope Mountains (Pomaks) and to Catholic Albanians, as well as Albanian- and Slavic-speaking Muslims in areas occupied by either Bulgarian or Montenegrin forces.²⁷

After the Second Balkan War in June and July 1913, violence erupted to a large degree during the Albanian insurgency and its suppression by the Serbian army in September and October 1913. Along the border with the “newborn” state of Albania—a rival for territory whose population was predominantly non-Slavic—Serbian and Montenegrin rule was seriously challenged. Both states failed to integrate the Albanians, owing not only to a weak civil and military administration in the occupied areas²⁸ but also to the ruling elites’ low opinion of Albanians, who were often viewed as anarchic and were associated with the Ottoman Empire. Serbian nationalists stereotyped the Albanians as primitive and uncultured.²⁹ Their scorn was likely one cause of the excessive use of force against the Albanians during the First Balkan War as well as the 1913 insurgency.

The Serb government in Belgrade could not pacify the newly acquired regions, which were pervaded by Albanian rebels (*kaçaks*) and members of the Macedonian national revolutionary movements. The scenario of

²⁷ See, for the Bulgarian case, the reports of British consular officials in Salonica, Kavala, and Plovdiv, written in February and March 1913, published in Destani, ed., *Ethnic Minorities*, 295–96, 299–304, 352–63; see also Fatme Myuhtar-May, “Pomak Christianization (Pokrastvane) in Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913,” in Yavuz and Blumi, eds., *War and Nationalism*, 316–60; see, for the Montenegrin case, Šerbo Rastoder, “Nekoliko dokumenata iz bečkih arhiva o pokrštanjima i iseljavanju muslimanskog stanovništva iz oblasti koje je Crna Gora oslobodila u balkanskim ratovima 1912/1914” [Some documents from the archives of Vienna regarding baptisms and emigration of the Muslim population from the districts liberated by Montenegro during the Balkan Wars 1912/1914], *Almanah* 41–42 (2008), 277–306; and Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1998), 254–55.

²⁸ Janjetović, *Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva*, 106–107.

²⁹ Predrag J. Marković, *Ethnic Stereotypes: Ubiquitous, Local or Migrating Phenomena? The Serbian–Albanian Case* (Bonn: Druckerei der Universität Bonn, 2003), 59–60; see, as an example, the editorial “Nova nacija” [New nation] in *Politika*, November 20 (December 3), 1912, 1. The first sentences read as follows: “Besides all the theories and evidence, Albanian nationality remains not possible to prove by other means than force. Albanians do not have in their lives and their history any trace of unity and abilities for joint development. They represent a group of wild, of disagreeing, tribes. And they can only be maintained artificially as state unity.”

the First Balkan War repeated itself in September and October 1913, when Serbian forces crushed the rebellions in the border region of today's Kosovo and in the region of Ohrid/Debar, here in collaboration with Greek armed forces.³⁰ This happened immediately after the Second Balkan War, which was described by the International Commission on the Balkan Wars, under the sponsorship of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as “the most uncalled for and brutal war of modern times.”³¹ But the violence of these postwar events initiated by the rebellion was no less intense. Villages were systematically burned, people were massacred, and mass migrations occurred.³² The Carnegie Report describes the events following the Second Balkan War as follows:

Houses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred *en masse*, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind—such were the means which were employed and are still being employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians.³³

It is evident that all the Balkan nation-states founded their programs of territorial expansion on violence, a practice not uncommon in European state-building. The period from 1912 to 1914 in the Balkans saw a massive outburst of violence that also affected the civilian population. The violence was directed especially against certain ethnic and/or religious minorities, although the Balkan Wars had been fought between state armies rather than between such groups. To estimate the numbers of civilian (war) victims is highly problematic and still represents a gap in research about the Balkan Wars. Reliable numbers regarding all ethnic groups are not available, in contrast to existing military casualty figures for the Balkan Wars;³⁴ furthermore, existing statistical counts are often construed and exploited in nationalist terms.

³⁰Vladan Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929. Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS* [The Yugoslav state and southern Serbia 1918–1929. Macedonia, Sancak, Kosovo and Metohija] (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002), 27. See also Janjetović, *Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva*, 108–109.

³¹*Report of the International Commission*, 265.

³²For example, in the region of Ohrid thirty villages were said to have been burned by Serbian and Greek armed forces in September; see Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, 27.

³³*Report of the International Commission*, 151.

³⁴Military casualty figures are given in Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 135–36.

The Balkan states and their institutions benefited from both the controlled and the uncontrolled use of violence, which enabled them to reaffirm and extend their state's territory into the occupied areas. They willingly accepted ethnically "cleansed" regions, thus, at least partially, supporting the practices involved in such cleansing. Much of the population, above all Muslims and members of other non-dominant ethnic groups, experienced powerlessness, were forced to live in anarchy, and were subjected to arbitrary violence at the hands of the new authorities both during the war and in its aftermath.³⁵ As a consequence, ethno-nationalist portrayals of enemies were consolidated and nationalist values reinforced even after the war was over.

THE BALKAN WARS AND MASS MIGRATION: SOME STATISTICAL OBSERVATIONS

The Balkan Wars saw a massive displacement of people, both as refugees and as internally displaced persons, which the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's report describes as "the second characteristic feature of the Balkan Wars." Their report vividly portrays how "all along the railways interminable trains of carts drawn by oxen followed one another; behind them came emigrant families and, in the neighborhood of the big towns, bodies of refugees were found encamped."³⁶ The creation of waves of refugees was an essential effect of the Balkan Wars, not only because political and military rulers were confronted with them, but also because of the broad consequences for social policy and population engineering in the region. Attempts to quantify these migration movements must remain approximate, owing to the lack of reliable sources and due to the great number of migration movements over a short period of time.

Evidence for the breadth of such forced movements can be found in the account of Alexandros A. Pallis, a Greek official and an expert for settlement issues who wrote in 1925 about the vast scale of migratory movements in the Balkans. He argued that Macedonia and Thrace, provinces which had changed hands as a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and the Great War

³⁵ Of great value is a volume of sources—British consular reports—edited by Bejtullah Destani and Robert Elsie, mainly from Monastir/Bitola, showing the struggle of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria for the region of Monastir as the suffering of the non-dominant ethnicities: Bejtullah Destani and Robert Elsie, eds., *The Balkan Wars: British Consular Reports from Macedonia in the Final Years of the Ottoman Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

³⁶ *Report of the International Commission*, 151.

of 1914–18, “witnessed mass-movements of whole populations on a scale which can hardly be paralleled, unless one goes back to the period of great racial migrations which coincided with the break-up of the Roman Empire.”³⁷

For the historical region of Macedonia, Pallis counted no fewer than seventeen migratory shifts from the outbreak of the First Balkan War in 1912 to the end of 1924, which had resulted from forcible migration and “voluntary emigration,” or had been effected under the terms of treaties and the “exchange of populations.”³⁸ Another example that illustrates the complex situation in the region is the development in Monastir in 1913. A census of inhabitants, made by the Serb administration at the beginning of 1913, showed a drastic shift in migration: from a total of about 60,000 persons (approximately 30,000 Christians, 24,000 Muslims, and 6,000 Jews) at the beginning of 1913, there were at least 20,500 persons who emigrated by the end of the year (16,000 Muslims, 3,000 Christians, and 1,500 Jews); additionally, 8,000 Muslim refugees from unspecified areas were counted in the town.³⁹ The large number of those who died before reaching a safe refuge raises a problem of quantification, not least because large numbers of refugees perished while moving back and forth in the hope of returning home.⁴⁰

Numerically, Muslims who left their homes were the largest group. However, the displacement of members of other groups should not be underestimated. For example, at the beginning of 1914, Bulgaria registered an estimated 150,000 immigrants and refugees—most of them probably Christians. To give another example, an alleged 170,000 ethnic Greeks fled to Greece between the end of 1912 and March 1914.⁴¹ Muslim refugees sought refuge in areas under Ottoman and, to a lesser degree, Albanian control. As Justin McCarthy has pointed out, Muslims fled to three main gathering points during the First Balkan War: Albania (generally), Thessaloniki, and Edirne.⁴² In 1913, Constantinople became a destination, too.

³⁷ Alexandros A. Pallis, “Racial Migrations in the Balkans during the Years 1912–1924,” *Geographical Journal*, vol. 66, no. 4 (1925), 315–31, 315.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 317.

³⁹ Vice Consulate Monastir/Bitola, January 12, 1914, in Destani and Elsie, eds., *Balkan Wars*, 187.

⁴⁰ Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821–1922* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995), 157–60; see also Pallis, “Racial Migrations in the Balkans.”

⁴¹ Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, 261 (Greece) and 267 (Bulgaria).

⁴² McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 156.

Thessaloniki was the primary destination of refugees up until the outbreak of the First World War because of its transport connections via rail and sea. Katrin Boeckh, by comparing statistical data collected by the Serbian Consulate in Thessaloniki with other data, has established that most of the Muslim refugees came from the parts of Macedonia that were occupied by Serbia and Greece. Allegedly, 240,000 Muslims immigrated to the Ottoman Empire via Thessaloniki in the period between November 1912 and March 1914, with immigration being especially pronounced in the second half of 1913, that is, during and after the Second Balkan War.⁴³ Given that children under the age of six were not counted in these statistics, one may estimate that there were at least 250,000 émigrés. Their place of refuge and stopover was primarily the capital, Constantinople, through which up to 100,000 refugees passed by the beginning of January 1913, when supposedly another 40,000 refugees were counted in Thessaloniki and other Macedonian locales.⁴⁴ If one adds to these data the figures that the Ottoman Directorate for Settlement of Tribes and Refugees gathered about Muslim refugees—177,352 persons in 1912–13 and 120,566 in 1914–15⁴⁵—the aggregate number of Muslim refugees was between 350,000 and 400,000 from the end of 1912 until the outbreak of the First World War.⁴⁶

Besides Constantinople and Asia Minor, the new state of Albania became, after its foundation, the “patronage country” of Albanians seeking shelter, and the second chief destination of primarily Albanian-speaking Muslim refugees. Several tens of thousands fled to Albania upon the suppression of the Albanian uprising in September/October 1913 by the Serbian army in the region bordering Albania.⁴⁷ According to press reports by the Austrian socialist Leo Freundlich, in Shkodra alone between 8,000 and 10,000

⁴³ See Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, 258.

⁴⁴ *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, vol. 3 (1913), 49.

⁴⁵ See Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations* (London: Constable, 1922), 138. An assessment of the authenticity of the figures of the Ottoman Ministry of Refugees is given by McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 175–76 (footnote 125).

⁴⁶ Hereto see additionally the overview of different existing numbers in the literature given by Nedim İpek, “The Balkans, War, and Migration,” in Yavuz and Blumi, eds., *War and Nationalism*, 621–64, here 638–49.

⁴⁷ See the press agency reports of the “Albanische Korrespondenz” from October and November 1913, published in Robert Elsie, ed., *Leo Freundlich. Die Albanische Korrespondenz. Agenturmeldungen aus Krisenzeiten (Juni 1913 bis August 1914)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012).

Albanian refugees were counted in November 1913; 7,000 were counted near Shala and another 7,000 in Iballë, both towns being situated in the northeastern district of Pukë.⁴⁸ Given this strong concentration of refugees in northern Albania, they probably came primarily from the nearby Kosovo region. Additional tens of thousands of refugees, supposedly from Macedonia, poured into central Albania.⁴⁹ Because of the relative proximity to their home regions and the fact that they could not expect help from the new government in Tirana—and because the Ottoman Empire increasingly restricted the immigration of Albanians (see below)—a significant proportion of these refugees returned home. In many cases they found their homes destroyed.

MIGRATION AND POPULATION POLICIES AS CONSEQUENCES OF THE BALKAN WARS

Clearly, a significant degree of violence as well as mass migration were inescapable elements of the Balkan societies' experiences between 1912 and the outbreak of the First World War, constituting a veritable common "space of experience," albeit with different expressions depending on the society in question. The events generated further developments in the region and shaped the "horizons of expectation" of the population with respect to the ambitions of their "nationalizing state" to create an ethnically homogeneous society. This was reflected in the population policies of all Balkan countries during the postwar period, where institutionalized "soft violence" directed especially against members of ethnic or religious groups can be found who did not fit into the design of the dominant nation and its state-sanctioned vision.

Characteristically, the arrival of refugees in most parts of the region often caused further violent conflicts and even led to there being more refugees, which makes it difficult to assign exclusive roles of perpetrator or victim to the actors.⁵⁰ Arnold Toynbee aptly describes this development in Greek–Turkish relations, in which "the arrival of the Rumelian refugees

⁴⁸ Ibid., 215–16 (agency report of November 5) and 234–35 (agency report of November 22).

⁴⁹ Ibid., 234 (agency report from November 22). Other estimates suggest that Albania accommodated between 50,000 and 100,000 refugees in mid-November 1913 (probably including refugees from Greece); see *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, vol. 11 (1913), 207.

⁵⁰ Cf. Ther, *Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten*, 70.

from the end of 1912 onwards produced an unexampled tension of feeling in Anatolia and a desire for revenge.”⁵¹ Attitudes and expectations regarding minorities changed radically, especially in the Ottoman Empire, where the Balkan Wars and the loss of the Balkan provinces and the Aegean islands constituted “a trauma of the first order”⁵² and generated a “culture of revanchism.”⁵³ The mistrust of supposedly disloyal, primarily Christian minorities arose in the midst of a shift toward a Muslim-Turkish nation-state model that placed a territorial focus on Anatolia. Such a shift set in motion a catch-up process of differentiation similar to previous developments in the Balkan nation-states, which had all undergone a distinctive process of de-Ottomanization for several decades, one in which Muslims were perceived as unwanted remnants of a backward, despotic system incompatible with contemporary ideas of progress and European modernity. The Balkan nation-states undertook the regulation and management of migration processes with an eye to domestic settlement, citizenship issues, and the creation of real opportunities for refugees and internally displaced persons in order to finish a course whose direction had been set decades before. The adoption of such population policies was typical for Southeastern Europe and its nationalizing nation-states. The Ottoman Empire made use of similar policies, especially after the disaster of the Balkan Wars.

Indeed, the Ottoman Empire itself became a modern nationalizing state. According to Erik-Jan Zürcher, by the end of 1912 and with the First Balkan War, Ottoman-Muslim nationalism became the strongest ideological current in the Ottoman Empire, in which the dominant position of the Turks was taken for granted.⁵⁴ After the Young Turks (Committee of Union and Progress/CUP) seized power in a *coup d'état* in January 1913, evidence of Turkification and calls for Turkish dominance in the empire became even stronger.⁵⁵

The First Balkan War had profound consequences for “suspicious groups” such as Muslim Albanians, and it was decisive for population policy in the Ottoman Empire. Muslim Albanians were not only accused of being responsible for the war and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire

⁵¹ Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, 139.

⁵² Erik Jan Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 118.

⁵³ Üngör, “Mass Violence,” 86.

⁵⁴ Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 93–94, 148.

⁵⁵ Cf. Erol Ülker, “Contextualising ‘Turkification’: Nation-Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908–18,” *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 11, no. 4 (2005), 613–36, here 622.

in Europe by the Young Turk press,⁵⁶ but in some cases they were also dismissed from the civil service and expelled from the empire, particularly from Constantinople.⁵⁷ It appears, moreover, that similar hostile measures were even directed in some places against Muslim Albanian refugees coming from the Balkans.⁵⁸

In addition, migration policy acquired still larger significance in the Ottoman Empire when the Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress placed demographic resettlement at the heart of its policy, taking the view that coming to terms with displacement and population (re)settlement was vital to ending the empire's string of territorial losses.⁵⁹ New migration laws and regulations came into force in 1913, when Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire signed a peace treaty (September 16/29), which formulated the idea of population exchanges (see below). With respect to Albanians, the authorities began to drive them from western Anatolia to inner and eastern Anatolia, always abiding by the order that Albanian immigrants should settle in specified regions and mix with other ethnic groups.⁶⁰ Such a policy toward putatively disloyal groups, which should also be seen within the context of the Ottoman Empire's "atrocities propaganda" discussed by Doğan Çetinkaya,⁶¹ can also be observed in the replacement of non-Muslims in the economy with Muslim Turks, as outlined in the National Economy program launched by the Young Turks in 1914.⁶²

⁵⁶ Elsie, *Leo Freundlich. Die Albanische Korrespondenz*, 29 (agency report of June 24, 1913). Cf. also Çağdaş Sümer, "What Did the Albanians Do? Postwar Disputes on Albanian Attitudes," in Yavuz and Blumi, eds., *War and Nationalism*, 727–38.

⁵⁷ The *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient* suggested that in April and May 1913 many Albanians were expelled from the Ottoman Empire. *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, vol. 5 (1913), 82. Further notes regarding the dismissal of Albanian officials and the expulsion of Albanians in 1913 and 1914 can be found in the agency reports published in Elsie, *Leo Freundlich. Die Albanische Korrespondenz*, 30–31, 37, 42, 94, 314.

⁵⁸ See the case of sixty Albanian families coming from Kosovo who were expelled to Piraeus; cf. *ibid.*, 73 (agency report of July 31, 1913).

⁵⁹ Fuat Dündar, "The Settlement Policy of the Committee of Union and Progress 1913–1918," in Hans-Lukas Kieser, ed., *Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 37–42, here 38.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 38–39.

⁶¹ Cf. Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, "Atrocities Propaganda and the Nationalization of the Masses in the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars (1912–13)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 46 (2014), 759–78.

⁶² Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 71.

Another social consequence of the Balkan Wars was the so-called Boycott Movement of 1914, which involved organized protest and economic boycotts against the empire's enemies: it became a tool in the repertoire of Muslim-Turkish nationalism. The Boycott Movement, supported by the government and the CUP, targeted Ottoman Greeks in particular.⁶³ Inflaming Muslim-Greek relations in an already tense atmosphere, it resulted in strained bilateral relations between Constantinople and Athens.

At the beginning of 1914, the "Islands Question," the controversy about sovereignty over the Aegean islands, was still not solved. The "Macedonian question," as well as the related influx of Muslim refugees, also remained a controversial political topic. Another factor, equally geopolitical in nature, further complicated the situation, namely the Turkish elite's fear of an invasion of Asia Minor by Greece. The continuing presence of non-Muslims in Thrace and along the coastal regions was increasingly perceived as a threat.⁶⁴

As a result, about 100,000 Ottoman Greeks were forced to emigrate from "Eastern Thrace and the Asiatic littoral" in 1914.⁶⁵ Following these developments, in May 1914 the Ottoman ambassador in Athens, Galip Kemali Bey, met with Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and proposed that the Greek inhabitants of the Aydın *vilayet* (also known as the *vilayet* of Smyrna or Izmir) be exchanged with the Muslims of Macedonia and Epirus.⁶⁶ In the following months, Constantinople and Athens basically agreed on a population exchange based on the principle of "voluntary" emigration, which included the Greek inhabitants of eastern Thrace. But there was no ratified official agreement for this policy.⁶⁷

In essence, this "foresighted measure"⁶⁸ was based on the perceived usefulness of regulating population matters to address geopolitical and security concerns. The approach reflects a favorable view of demographic engineering and ethnic homogenization, specifically through the exchange

⁶³ Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, "Muslim Merchants and Working-Class in Action: Nationalism, Social Mobilization and Boycott Movement in the Ottoman Empire 1908–1914", PhD thesis, University of Leiden, 2010, 190.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 191–92.

⁶⁵ Pallis, "Racial Migrations in the Balkans," 318.

⁶⁶ Yannis G. Mourellos, "The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey," *Balkan Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2 (1985), 389–413, here 393.

⁶⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, 399–411.

⁶⁸ Ther, *Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten*, 79.

of minority populations. In fact, this approach had been stipulated in an annex to the previous year's peace treaty between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Constantinople, September 16/29, 1913) and was regarded as a solution to the political problems in the Balkans. The governments in Sofia and Constantinople had agreed to facilitate an optional mutual exchange of Bulgarian and Muslim populations in entire villages within a zone not exceeding 15 km on both sides of the common frontier.⁶⁹ In reality, most of the people who would be affected had already emigrated—the annex expressed the desire to confirm a *fait accompli* and to compel the remaining inhabitants along the border to follow suit.⁷⁰

After this first peace treaty, the next two peace treaties involving the Ottoman Empire, with Greece (Treaty of Athens, November 1/14, 1913) and with Serbia (Treaty of Constantinople, March 1/14, 1914), respectively,⁷¹ reinforced the tendency to promote the erosion of the region's multiethnicity in favor of mono-ethnic national states. Even though the treaties contained amnesty provisions, their aim was to consolidate the results of the Balkan Wars. With the exception of the treaty with Bulgaria, which gave only Bulgarians the right to return within two years (Article 9), refugee issues were not addressed. This treatment of refugees and displaced persons became established practice in similar agreements made over the following decades. Return was neither welcomed nor offered as a real option. In this respect, a paradigm shift occurred only with the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, which regulates the rights of refugees and displaced persons under the terms of Annex 7. Indeed, for one of the most influential NGOs, the International Crisis Group, the ability of refugees to return to their prewar place of occupancy was “the key to the successful implementation” of the peace agreement and the basis for a multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷²

Until that agreement, exceptional in this regard, all the peace treaties in the Balkans through 1995 were calibrated to facilitate the emigration

⁶⁹ Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 18.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷¹ All of these treaties are published in George Fr. de Martens, ed., *Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités et Autres Actes Relatifs aux Rapports de Droit International*, third series, vol. 8 (Leipzig, 1914 [reprint: Aalen, 1960]).

⁷² “Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement,” *International Crisis Group Balkans Report*, vol. 80, Sarajevo, October 28, 1999, 32, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/Bosnia%2032.pdf>, accessed July 11, 2016.

of minorities by providing them the right to opt for their “patronage country.”⁷³ This right was consistent with the national settlement policy of all the states involved,⁷⁴ especially Greece and Serbia. Serbia increased its territory by about four fifths and Greece by almost 100 percent,⁷⁵ thus reversing the proportions of minorities in the politically sensitive border regions in favor of the dominant peoples of the constitutive nations.

CONCLUSION

The Balkan Wars did more than change the internal borders of the Balkan states and their ethnic compositions. Villages, burned and destroyed, disappeared from the maps; refugee settlements developed into new town districts; and the faces of old neighborhoods (*mahalas*) were transformed. The states of the region provoked these developments and then had to come to terms with their consequences. The experience of the Balkan Wars gave rise to new measures designed to fulfill the expectations of the political elite to homogenize the region’s nation-states. There was a transformation of “hard violence,” evident in times of war, into the “soft violence” institutionalized by government bodies. Citizenship laws, settlement and migration policies, and peace treaties initiated processes unparalleled in the history of the Balkans. The entire region, especially the civilian population, was affected by violence of a hitherto unimagined scope and severity. The death and destruction wrought by two wars triggered unprecedented levels of mass migration, forming a profound common space of experience in which various societies emphasized different perceptions of the Balkan Wars. The Balkan states espoused a strong impulse to ethnically homogenize their societies in the short time between 1912 and the outbreak of the First World War, not only through the tools of war, but also by means of population policy. These homogenizing tendencies dominated the horizons of expectation of the Balkan societies and became apparent in ethno-nationally and geopolitically motivated population policies. The interconnection and interaction of violence and population movements left

⁷³ Muslims—former inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire—living in Bulgaria, Greece, or Serbia could opt for citizenship in the Ottoman Empire; conversely, option rights could also be exercised by Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs living in the Ottoman Empire.

⁷⁴ Cf., with details for the individual states, Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg*.

⁷⁵ Cf. the figures published by Lord Courtney of Penwith, ed., *Nationalism and War in the Near East (By a Diplomatist)* (London: Clarendon, 1915), 298.

a deep impression on the political actors within the Balkan states and their societies and led to the consolidation—and in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the decisive formation—of nation-states in the region as to a new quality of policymaking by means of population policy.

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Gjergj Fishta, the “Albanian Homer,” and Edith Durham, the “Albanian Mountain Queen”: Observers of Albania’s Road to Statehood

Daut Dauti

This chapter looks at the emergence of Albania’s proclamation of independent statehood in November 1912—a few weeks into the First Balkan War—through the eyes of two contemporaries, the Franciscan priest Gjergj Fishta (1871–1940) and the English anthropologist and travel writer Edith Durham (1863–1944). Both supported, from different perspectives, the Albanian national movement. At the time, their writings had a strong influence on public opinion in Albania, Britain, and wider Europe. Still today, Fishta and Durham hold an undisputed place in Albanian historiography and collective memory.

Albanian scholarship and history textbooks consider the Balkan Wars 1912–13 as a major event in Albanian modern history, given the proclamation of the Albanian state on November 28, 1912, shortly after the outbreak of the First Balkan War. Independent statehood is considered a success of the Albanian national movement, which was supported by

D. Dauti (✉)

Department of History, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

e-mail: hydd@leeds.ac.uk

Austria-Hungary and, partly, by Italy. At the same time, however, most of the Albanian literature considers the subsequent actual establishment of an independent Albania a national tragedy, as half of the Albanian population and half of the territories where Albanians lived remained outside the borders of the new state. These borders were determined at the Conference of Ambassadors in London in July 1913.

For some Albanians, the roots of the tragedy are to be found in decisions that had already been taken during the Congress of Berlin in 1878, decisions which had ignored the Albanian Question. The decision made in Berlin to redraw the borders of the Balkan states created the potential for new conflicts and the repetition of old ones. The border changes had triggered a series of events on the ground and had created new national and international problems, which ultimately led to the Balkan Wars.

The Albanian question was not discussed as a separate or independent issue during the Congress of Berlin. None of the Great Powers had brought it to the agenda. The Albanian League, which had formed in June 1878 to present the Albanian national cause, had sent a delegation to Berlin, but German Minister President Otto von Bismarck (1815–98), the head of the Congress, had refused to meet them. The memorandum that the Albanian League had sent to the British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli (1804–81), had produced no effect either. The main point of the memorandum had been the League's request for Albanian independence. It had specified that Albania consisted of four Ottoman *vilayets*: Kosovo, Shkodra, Manastir, and Janina. In Berlin, thus, the issue of Albania had been touched on only as a secondary question in moments when the borders of Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece were discussed.

It can be maintained that the Albanian League, in and after 1878, failed to achieve independence or autonomy of the four *vilayets* mainly because it had no support from the Great Powers. According to Albanian literature and history textbooks, the refusal of both the Powers and the Ottoman Porte to acknowledge and address the national problem of the Albanians reflected negatively on the region, as it enabled neighboring countries to contribute to the escalation of the problem even further. As the Powers and the Porte, which brutally suppressed the League in 1881, did not recognize the national aspirations of the Albanians, the neighboring countries saw fit to prepare for territorial expansion into lands hosting majority Albanian populations.

However, the League did in fact succeed in preventing the annexation of much of its territories to Greece, Montenegro, or Serbia, and the members also succeeded in marking the territories of the four mentioned

vilayets as in fact pertinent to Albanians. They declared Albanians all those who spoke Albanian in these territories. Yet the League had not succeeded in uniting the Albanians, be it under one single Ottoman *vilayet* or any other autonomous administrative unit. After the experience of neglect at the Congress of Berlin (1878), Albanian nationalist leaders began to strive in a more poignant manner for the autonomy or independence of the four Ottoman *vilayets* that they defined as Albanian territory. These objectives persisted until the Balkan Wars (1912–13).¹

GJERGJ FISHTA, THE “ALBANIAN HOMER”

The period 1878–1912 thus marks an enhanced phase of Albanian national mobilization. Recent Albanian scholarship and history textbooks dealing with this period focus very much on Albanian nationalist discourses. Regarding the Balkan Wars in particular, the focus, unsurprisingly, lies on Albanian statehood and on atrocities committed against Albanians.²

After the Congress of Berlin, Albanian intellectuals and political leaders continued to raise the national spirit among Albanians, although with limited means. In fact, publications in the Albanian language were banned by the Porte.³ What became more important was the influence of various literary publications that were published abroad, predominantly with patriotic content. Among the best examples of such literature that had a special effect on Albanian national feelings and became very popular were the works of Gjergj Fishta, a Franciscan priest and convinced Albanian nationalist. Many Albanologists consider him to be the “Albanian Homer.”⁴

¹This overview is based on Albanian literature. See: Tajar Zavalani, *Histori e Shqipnis* [History of Albania], vol. 2 (London: Drini, 1966), 5–49.

²A recent book which focuses on Albanian statehood and atrocities committed against Albanians is *Historia e popullit shqiptar* [The history of the Albanian people], vols. 1 and 2, published in Tirana in 2002. The book is a compilation of works by a group of well-known Albanian historians. It is widely used as a history textbook in middle schools and higher education, including universities in Albania and Kosovo.

³In 1902, the Sultan ordered the closure of the few Albanian schools and publications that existed in Albania. In 1908, the Albanian language and schools were legalized by the Young Turks after the promise they made to Albanian leaders to join them. But the Young Turks soon changed their minds and figured that schools and language were promoting Albanian nationalism. After they came to power, they closed down the schools and banned publications.

⁴Cf. Robert Elsie, *Historical Dictionary of Albania* (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 139.

Fishta's most influential publication became "Lahuta e Malcís" (The Highland lute), a poem of 15,613 lines. "Lahuta" is a historical and epic verse written between 1902 and 1909 and enlarged in several subsequent publications which continued until 1939, and was rediscovered again in Albania after the fall of communism in 1991. The epos tells the history of northern Albania from 1862 to 1913. "Lahuta," written in the beginning of the twentieth century, was widely based in the tradition of oral verse "Këngë Kreshnikësh" (Songs of the frontier warriors), which resemble the century-old songs and stories of other Balkan nations. The base of "Lahuta" thus was Albanian mythology and legendry which was influenced by the great epics of classical antiquity such as Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, Vergil's *Aeneid*, and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.⁵

Fishta's literary works, mostly nationalist in their approach, were popular until 1945, when the communists came to power in Albania. In the anti-religious environment established by the new regime, obviously clerics like Fishta ended up being banned. Yet, he was banned not only for being a religious man. Things were more complex. In July 1945, the communist governments of Albania and Yugoslavia signed a "Treaty of Friendship" and a number of other agreements which gave Yugoslavia an "effective control over all Albanian affairs," including the field of culture.⁶ Fishta's literary works were forbidden in Albania because Albanian communists considered them to be anti-Slavic and as such could damage the new friendship with Yugoslavia. The fear of Fishta's popularity became so vivid that communist activists dug up his bones secretly from his grave in the Franciscan Church in Gjuhadol and threw them into the river Drin near Shkodra.⁷ Also the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* of 1950 described the epos "Lahuta" as "chauvinist and an anti-Slav poem," while Fishta was characterized as "a spy [who] extolled the hostility of the Albanians towards the Slavic peoples, calling for an open fight against the Slavs."⁸

After the Balkan Wars and the First World War, those Albanians that found themselves included into the newly established Kingdom of Serbs,

⁵ Cf. Robert Elsie and Janice Mathie-Heck, eds., *Songs of the Frontier Warriors: Kenge Kreshnikesh. Albanian Epic Verse in a Bilingual English-Albanian Edition, An Albanian Epic* (Mundelein, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci, 2004); cf. also Robert Elsie, *Albanian Literature: A Short History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 121–22.

⁶ Elsie, *Albanian Literature*, 129.

⁷ Gjergj Fishta, *The Highland Lute*, trans. Robert Elsie and Janice Mathie-Heck (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), xvi.

⁸ As cited in Elsie, *Albanian Literature*, 130.

Croats, and Slovenes (from 1929, Yugoslavia) were denied the right of education in their mother tongue. The Albanian language continued to be suppressed, as it had been during the Ottoman Empire. As there were no Albanian books allowed to be published or distributed, Fishta's "Lahuta" became unavailable. However, "Lahuta" was also a song which was sung during private gatherings, and this practice could not be controlled by Serb or Yugoslav authorities. There were singers who knew "Lahuta" by heart. Gradually, "Lahuta" took on the form of a national hymn for the Albanians in Kosovo. Between 1913 and 1945, among Albanians in Kosovo, "Lahuta" in this "private" way continued to serve as a means for "cultivating Albanian patriotic feelings."⁹

After 1945, Albanians in Yugoslavia, under the principle of "Brotherhood and Unity," were allowed to acquire education in the Albanian language. Paradoxically, while Fishta's works were forbidden in communist Albania, this was not the case in Tito's Yugoslavia. Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, and elsewhere in Yugoslavia continued to have access to Fishta's works. In Albania, Fishta made his way back to popularity only after the demise of communism, and especially in the northern part of the country. The Catholic Church, even in recent publications, has emphasized the religious character of "Lahuta," given that it was composed by a Catholic cleric and starts with "Help me God, as you once helped me." To be sure, Fishta refers to God in several other occasions and ends his epic when independent Albania was established—"And fulfilled was thus God's promise."¹⁰ Although Fishta attributed to the formation of Albania a divine character, it is hard to conclude that this makes "Lahuta" a religious work. It is clearly a nationalist one, though.

In "Lahuta" (Canto 7), Fishta described the situation in the Congress of Berlin as one where all Balkan nations, except the Albanians, had their protectors:

Now the Seven Kings and sultan,
In Berlin have come together,
There they've started taking counsel,

⁹"Lahuta e Malcis"—himn atdhedashurie ["The Highland Lute"—country loving hymn], *Gazeta Telegraf*, December 17, 2012, <http://telegraf.al/kulture/lahuta-e-malcis-himn-atdhedashurie>, accessed on June 22, 2016.

¹⁰Xhavit Beqiri, *Lahuta e Malcis—një vepër misioni* [The Highland Lute—mission's work], *Drita*, February 9, 2015, <http://www.drita.info/2015/02/09/lahuta-e-malcis-nje-veper-misioni/>, accessed on June 23, 2016.

...
 I am filled with doubt, suspecting
 Something evil's going to happen
 To Albania and its people,
 For they're lacking friends, *kumaras*,¹¹
 Who on behalf could parley
 And prevail upon others.¹²

The neighboring countries, Montenegro in this case, were described as determined to expand toward the Albanian lands. The Montenegrin ruler, Prince Nikola, pleaded in person or rather begged the Congress for Albanian land, Fishta wrote. The Montenegrin prince, although in reality he was not present in the Congress, was portrayed in a satirical and cynical way. If Albanian lands were surrendered to him, Albanians would never cease fighting as they would never agree to live under a “Slavic yoke”:

Look who's here, it's Prince Nikolla,
 Moaning, robes and garments wrinkled,
 Two hands wide his shawl protruding,
 Trudging forwards on his snowshoes,
 'round his knees are ragged trousers
 Stones would bleed in pity for him.
 ...
 May God curse him and condemn him,
 Sultan, king or any other
 Who agrees to sign a warrant
 Snatching land from the Albanians,
 Under Slavic yoke to put them,
 Make pay both tithes and taxes.
 For, by God, by Him we worship,
 Never will we cede our homeland
 Lest we fight, blood to our kneecaps.¹³

“The Highland Lute,” in similar ways that other literature did, called for protection of the four *vilayets* from the neighbors Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, and has remained popular among Albanians to this day. As a recent study shows, regarding the period of the Congress of Berlin

¹¹ In several Balkan Slavic languages, the meaning of *kum[ara]* is “godfather.”

¹² Fishta, *The Highland Lute*, 59–61.

¹³ *Ibid.*

and after, history textbooks in Kosovo today largely continue to praise the events that have contributed to forming national consciousness and promoting patriotic acts.¹⁴ Albanian scholarship points out that after the Congress of Berlin, Albanian leaders continued to plea for the attention of the Powers, asking for their support, but to no avail. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, supporting the Albanian national cause meant to reduce, if not end, Ottoman presence in Europe, and this was not what the Powers wanted.¹⁵ Albanians would rise against the Ottoman Empire several times before the Balkan Wars and approach the Powers for assistance, but they refused. During one such rising in June 1883, Albanians of the north asked the British Consul if there was any hope of support from the British government.¹⁶ Austria-Hungary had been approached earlier, but their representatives had told the mountaineers not to expect any help, as Vienna only protected the Catholic confession in Albania instead of insurgents against the Sultan's authority. Being thus disappointed with the Austro-Hungarian government, the Catholic mountaineer thought of raising the British flag "as a sign they were fighting for liberty under the aegis of the only nation which really understood what liberty meant."¹⁷ Upon this, the British government confirmed its policy:

There is only one British interest in North Albania, and that is that perfect harmony should exist between the Sultan and his subjects—a state of things which could not be if the mountaineers fancied they could put pressure on the Turkish Government through foreign aid.¹⁸

Keeping "perfect harmony" between the Porte and Albanians proved impossible. However, the Powers continued not to take seriously the Albanian efforts for autonomy or independence; they considered the Albanian insurrections to be local and directed only against taxes, despotic rule, or specific functionaries. From 1878 to 1912, Albanian leaders,

¹⁴ Shkëlzen Gashi, *Trashëgimia kulturore: Një histori e patreguar—trashëgimia kulturore në tekstat mësimore të historisë së Kosovës—Cultural Heritage: An Untold Story—Kosovo's Cultural Heritage in Kosovo's History Textbooks* (Prishtinë: Ec ma ndryshe, 2016), 4.

¹⁵ Kristaq Prifti, ed., *Historia e popullit shqiptar* [The history of the Albanian people], vol. 2 (Tirana: Toena, 2002), 230–34.

¹⁶ British National Archives (BNA), Foreign Office (FO) 424/129, No. 100, Green to Granville, June 11, 1883.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

with few publications, tried to win the minds and hearts of public opinion in Europe, but without much success. Gjergj Fishta's Homeric epos was among the most lasting literary masterpieces among these publications.

EDITH DURHAM, AN ENGLISH WRITER ON “THE BALKANS FOR THE BALKAN PEOPLES”

Significant help to internationally propagate the ideas of the Albanian national movement came from Edith Durham (1863–1944) who in 1900 arrived in the Balkans more or less by accident. Durham had attended Bedford College (1878–82) and had later studied art at the Royal Academy of Arts in London. Until 1900, Durham had exhibited widely her drawings and illustrated many publications, including a volume of the Cambridge Natural History published in 1899. She came to Montenegro at age 37 for medical reasons, as her doctor had advised her to spend some time in warmer climate. She arrived at Cetinje, the capital of Montenegro, where she discovered a taste for southern Balkan life “that she was to retain for the rest of her life.”¹⁹

In Montenegro, Durham started writing about places in the Balkans and entered the world of travel writers. Of all British and other foreign travelers to the Balkans, Durham became a significant representative, and not only for Albania. Within less than a decade, she earned a reputation as a serious ethnographer and anthropologist, as a journalist, political activist, as well as relief or humanitarian worker, and authored the following books: *Through the Land of the Serbs* (1904); *The Burden of the Balkans* (1905); *High Albania* (1909); *The Struggle for Scutari* (1914); *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle* (1920); *The Sarajevo Crime* (1925); *Some Tribal Origins, Laws and Customs of the Balkans* (1928). Durham's contact with the Balkans seemed to have fulfilled her life purpose. She identified with the land and the people; alas, her views and support for Montenegrins, Serbs, Macedonians, and Albanians changed along with the events that led to the Balkan Wars. More precisely, the violence and the reluctant policies of the Powers were the reason that made Durham change her mind to support the Balkan nations.²⁰

¹⁹ John B. Allcock and Antonia Young, eds., *Black Lambs and Grey Falcons. Women Travelling in the Balkans* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 9–10.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

Durham used Cetinje as her base, from where she travelled to Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, and Macedonia. In 1904 she published *Through the Land of the Serbs*, a book where she exposed her belief in the Gladstonian liberal doctrine—that is, the classical liberal belief in self-help and freedom of choice, on free trade, little government intervention in the economy, and equality of opportunity through institutional reform, named after the Victorian British Prime Minister William E. Gladstone—which contained optimism about the future of the Balkans, without, however, showing much regard for the Muslim population. Based on this doctrine, Durham believed that the Balkan peoples should be left to work out their destinies. She soon discovered, however, how this doctrine proved “unworkable and inappropriate.” Based on experiences she had gained in Serbia and later in the four Albanian *vilayets*, Bosnia, and Montenegro, she became convinced that the borders imposed by the Treaty of Berlin were artificial and were increasing ethnic tensions. Durham warned that the Balkan system as imposed by the Powers at the Congress of Berlin was about to collapse, together with the Ottoman Empire.²¹

Her book supported the perceptions of those who believed that the Treaty of Berlin had failed to satisfy the Balkan states' demands, and it encouraged the British liberals to continue further lobbying against it. Among these British liberals were those who established the Balkan Committee in July 1903, a few days before the Ilinden uprising in Macedonia. The Committee members were mainly Gladstonians who felt agitated against the Ottoman regime and supported Christian minority rights in the Balkans. The aim of the Balkan Committee was to awaken British public interest about the Balkan people and remind the government of the responsibilities it had assumed in the Treaty of Berlin, including to protect the Christian population under the rule of the Porte. In its first public announcement, the duty of the Committee was to “obtain and diffuse accurate information” by means of “lectures, pamphlets, articles in the press and questions in Parliament.”²²

Durham, however, in the meantime had turned into a supporter of the Serbian cause, palpable throughout her book on Serbia, and particularly in her opinion on the question of Shkodra. She supported the

²¹ Marcus Tanner, *Albania's Mountain Queen. Edith Durham and the Balkans* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014), 54.

²² Eugène Michail, *The British and the Balkans. Forming Images of Foreign Lands, 1900–1950* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 11.

Serbian claim over the town although almost entirely inhabited by an Albanian-speaking population. Durham maintained that the Serbs were entitled to the north Albanian town on historical grounds. Less than a decade later, however, she would change her mind and protest against the Serb and Montenegrin attack on Shkodra. She became convinced that the town, as the entire *vilayet* of Shkodra, should belong to the newly established state of Albania.²³

With her first book on Serbia and many other articles she published subsequently about the Balkans, Durham entered into a fierce conflict, for example, with Henry Noel Brailsford (1873–1958) and Robert William Seton-Watson (1879–1951), both members of the Balkan Committee. Brailsford was known as a supporter of the Bulgarian national cause, while Seton-Watson unreservedly supported the Serbian cause. Durham strongly maintained her own opinions which were based on the principle “the Balkans for the Balkan people”; because of this view she made many other enemies among the Balkan specialists in Britain at that time.²⁴ Yet, it was her belief in this very principle that brought her close to the Albanian national cause. Without any doubts, she tried to apply this principle in every possible and impossible way, never abandoning it. There is no evidence to show that Durham was in contact with socialists but regarding the Balkans and Albania she was certainly in the same line with European socialists as Leon Trotsky and Leo Freundlich as well as Serbian socialists such as Dimitrije Tucović, Kosta Novaković, Dragiša Lapčević, and so forth. All of them, as well as Durham, condemned atrocities against Albanians and supported Albania’s right to independence. In Britain, in 1912 Durham was among a wide group of liberals and conservatives who formed the Albanian Committee. The president of this committee, Aubrey Herbert, who came from the Carnarvon family and was a conservative member of the Parliament, wrote that “she [Durham] would have been a suffragette if these other things had not come her way.”²⁵

The article “From An Albanian Point of View” that Durham published in March 1903 in the *Pall Mall Gazette* can be considered her first attempt to present the Albanian national aspirations to the British public.²⁶ In August 1903,

²³ Edith Durham, *Struggle for Scutari* (London: Edward Arnold, 1914), 3–8.

²⁴ Allcock and Young, *Black Lambs and Grey Falcons*, 16–17.

²⁵ Bejtullah Destani, ed., *Albania’s Greatest Friend—Aubrey Herbert and the Making of Modern Albania* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 108.

²⁶ Bejtullah Destani, *M. Edith Durham, Albania and Albanians. Selected Articles and Letters 1903–1944* (London: Centre for Albanian Studies, 2001), 2.

the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) launched an uprising, known as the Ilinden Uprising, and, as a consequence, escalated an already simmering Macedonian crisis. The Porte intervened to crush the uprising, and armed bands in Macedonia soon turned against each other. Durham went to Macedonia, first sent by the Balkan Committee in a fact-finding mission, but stayed there to help the refugees as a humanitarian worker and as a nurse serving in hospitals. With this experience, Durham affirmed herself as an important member of the small British Balkan expert writers group. In Britain these writers were mostly members of the Balkan Committee and managed to occupy the public sphere, thereby decisively influencing which events would attract public attention. They established a trend which regarded the Ottoman Empire as a regime of tyranny, unmanageable and unable to reform, the “sick man of Europe,” precisely. The vast majority led a pro-Balkan, pro-Christian, and anti-Ottoman (Muslim) discourse.²⁷ Durham, although of an anti-Ottoman attitude, explained the meaning of such discourse:

When a Moslem kills a Moslem it does not count; when a Christian kills a Moslem it is a righteous act; when a Christian kills a Christian it is an error of judgment better not talked about; it is only when a Moslem kills a Christian that we arrive at a full-blown “atrociousness.”²⁸

In the Macedonian conflict, Durham had observed Christians, that is, Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Macedonians, commit unspeakable massacres against each other in the name of Christianity. The uprising in Macedonia was seen in Europe as a process of Christian liberation from the Muslim Ottoman Empire. But the way the Christians wanted to liberate themselves from the Ottomans also included a fight against each other in order to create a national advantage, which disgusted Durham. “Such was the Christianity which at that time was being prayed for in English Churches,” she wrote about the events that took place in 1904 in Macedonia.²⁹

Durham aimed to explain the source of the tensions which led to the Balkan Wars. She pointed out that the Western ideas, which were forced upon the Balkan states, were incompatible with the reality she had seen on the ground. She also dismissed the idea widely maintained in Britain and other European countries that religion was the main factor causing

²⁷ Michail, *The British and the Balkans*, 81.

²⁸ Edith Durham, *The Burden of the Balkans* (Edward Arnold: London, 1905), 81.

²⁹ Edith Durham, *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1920), 83.

conflicts in the Balkans. Rather, it was nationalism, which, ultimately, would end Ottoman rule in Europe, she maintained in 1905.³⁰

During the Macedonian crisis, Durham pointed out that the Albanian question was the biggest problem of the Balkans, yet not even being addressed by the Porte and the Powers. She warned the British government and the public that ignoring the Albanian question was a big mistake:

Study of the Macedonian question had shown me that one of the most important factors of the Near Eastern question was the Albanian, and that the fact that it was always left out of consideration was a constant source of difficulty.³¹

Becoming more familiar with the Albanian national cause, Durham discovered that the principle “the Balkans for the Balkan people” was not as inclusive a concept as most of the Balkan Committee members believed. In reality, this principle excluded the Albanians, as the future of the Balkans was envisaged to be free from Ottoman rule. Durham saw the Albanian national cause central to the Balkan problems and criticized the Powers, particularly Britain, for not supporting the Albanian national cause. In 1904, Durham was employed at the British Bible Society based in Manastir (Macedonia). She journeyed to Albania to sell Bibles and came to know Albanian intellectuals who were mostly nationalists and who in fact hoped to find a solution to their national cause within the principle “Balkan for the Balkan peoples”. Durham became fascinated with Albania and started to support the Albanian cause. However, she had now chosen to support the “wrong” people, of whom very little was known in Britain and in Europe as a whole. The majority of Albanians were Muslims, and in the West were viewed as supporters of the Ottoman Empire. Durham’s efforts to present Albanians in the same manner as other Balkan peoples meant more dissonances among the British Gladstonian liberals. However, with strong determination, with her great experience and knowledge, Durham secured herself a respectable place among the members of the Balkan Committee and among academics in Britain. Decades later the well-known British historian A. J. P. Taylor considered that if “a man with an intelligent interest in foreign affairs would read Miss M. E. Durham on Albania ... he would be better informed than if he had stuck to official channels.”³²

³⁰ Durham, *Burden of the Balkans*, vii–viii.

³¹ Durham, *Twenty Years*, 87.

³² A. J. P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers* (London: H. Hamilton, 1957), 96.

Motivated by her interest in anthropological and ethnographical studies, Durham spent considerable time among the mountaineers of northern Albania. By 1910 she was widely known in the region. For many Albanians, she was popular as their “protector” in the West where she worked tirelessly to publicize their cause and get support. Therefore, the mountaineers “proclaimed” her as “Krajlica e Malevet” (Mountain Queen). This honorary title encouraged her will and authority to represent the Albanians before the rest of the world.³³

Durham supported all Albanian rebellions against the Porte, including the Great Insurrection of 1911, organized by northern mountaineers. Albanian leaders such as Ismail Bey Qemali (1844–1919) contacted European powers, including Austro-Hungary, to inform them about the insurrection before it started.³⁴ Austria-Hungary and the other powers were not pleased with this step. Durham was worried, as she wished to see Vienna apply the principle of the “Balkans for the Balkans peoples” and support the Albanian national cause. The event led to handing over a “12-point-memorandum” to the representatives of the European powers, which had been compiled in Montenegro and demanded Albanian autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Durham helped the Albanians draft the memorandum, yet she observed how the Austro-Hungarian consul in Shkodra “begged the Albanians to remain quiet only for two more years.” He “promised” them they would be free if they waited. While Durham was encouraged by this promise, she saw that many Albanians reacted with “We have had enough of Austria.”³⁵

By that time, the Albanians of the north, most of them Catholic, had lost the little faith they held in Austria-Hungary and the other European powers. Most of the Albanians that Durham met seemed to believe that the Powers were mainly interested in occupying foreign land and that they, for example, were pleased with Italy’s attack on Libya in 1911. When Durham tried to convince them that this was not true, she heard the reply, “Oh yes,

³³Tanner, *Albania’s Mountain Queen*, 150–51.

³⁴Maringle Verli, *Shqiptarët në optikën e diplomacisë austro-hungareze 1877–1918* [Albanians in the view of Austria-Hungarian diplomacy 1877–1918] (Tiranë: KLEAN, 2014), 199–201.

³⁵BNA, FO, 195/2406, Durham to Foreign Office, December 28, 1911. The letter was delivered to the Foreign Office through Henry W. Nevisan, a well-known British journalist and war correspondent from the Balkans.

that's what they say. But we know the powers. They are like brigands. They quarrel by day—but by night they go out robbing together.”³⁶

This was the view of many Albanians towards the Powers just before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. They continued their national struggle, yet without hoping for European support any longer. In May 1912, a general insurrection started in what was to become Albania, but it was Kosovo that became the main battlefield—first, because the bulk of the Ottoman troops was concentrated there and, second, because parts of the *vilayet* of Kosovo and the entire *vilayet* of Manastir, which largely corresponds to today's Macedonia, had been marked by Albanian leaders as where the eastern border of the future Albanian state was to be drawn. On August 11, a group of 200 Albanian fighters entered Skopje and displayed the Albanian flag in the main town square. There was no reaction from the Ottoman army or administration. The next day, 6,000 more insurgents arrived. By August 15, the number of insurgents that entered Skopje had reached 30,000. There was no opposition as the Ottoman army did not come out of the barracks. However, in Albanian historiography August 15, 1912 has been entered as the date of the “liberation” of Skopje.³⁷

The Porte was forced to endorse all of the Albanians' terms, known as the “14-points-demand,” which effectively meant that the status of an autonomous entity had been achieved. However, during autumn 1912 the situation in the Balkans developed unfavorably for the Albanians. There was no time for the Porte and the Albanian leaders to start building autonomy. According to Albanian scholarship, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro were not happy with what the Albanians had achieved.³⁸

Durham maintained, as still do most Albanian historians, that Albania's autonomy was the main cause for the Balkan Wars: Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece did not recognize this autonomy, and chose to invade precisely the territory of the four *vilayets* that the Albanian leaders had marked as their national territory. In August 1912, Durham alarmed the British press about the signs of armed conflict. She was convinced that Montenegro was trying to force the Porte to declare war by provoking the Ottoman army near the border with the Kosovo *vilayet*. Durham went to Andrijevica on August 27, 1912 and saw the Montenegrin army with heavy artillery

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Kristo Frashëri, *The History of Albania. A Brief Survey* (Tirana: s.n., 1964), 491.

³⁸ Ramiz Abdyli, *Lëvizja kombëtare shqiptare 1911–1912* [The Albanian national movement], vol. 2 (Prishtinë: Instituti i Historisë, 2004), 380–82.

positioning along the border. Arms and ammunition were distributed to Montenegrin and Serb civilians in the border region.³⁹

Observing closely the developments in Montenegro, Durham predicted that the beginning of a war was a matter of days. The Powers did not support the Albanians' request for autonomy or independence, and the neighboring countries were about to move into the newly autonomous Albania. Durham observed that Albanians were lacking a leader like Giuseppe Garibaldi, capable of uniting them against their neighboring threats. Therefore, she once again changed her opinion about the Ottoman Empire. Just before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars she maintained that the immediate expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe, something she had previously wished for, was not a good idea. When the autonomy was granted to Albania in August 1912, Durham suggested that the presence of the Ottoman regime should be continued for a couple of more years. Within that suggested period, the Porte could serve "as a kind of protective incubator" for the new Albanian state.⁴⁰

WAR: THE REFUSAL OF DURHAM'S PRINCIPLE

The Balkan League excluded the recognition of any sort of Albanian political entity. Also, as Durham was to discover, the League had no intention of applying the principle "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." At dawn, on October 9, 1912, Durham went to Mount Gorica near Podgorica, where she saw King Nikola "posing majestically" in front of his army. Durham watched the king order his heavy artillery to fire towards Albania. The First Balkan War had begun and Durham hurried off to send the news to England. For many days, she was the first and the only war reporter from Montenegro. Most probably, she also was the first woman war reporter ever. Newspapers were keen to receive her reports. She wrote for several days and made headlines for the *Manchester Guardian* and *Chronicle*, but stopped after discovering "to her disgust that they were cutting and even doctoring her articles."⁴¹

The Montenegrins' aim was the occupation of Shkodra, the biggest and most prosperous Albanian city at that time. Shkodra, soon to be sieged, became one of the reasons why Durham ended her friendly

³⁹ Durham, *Twenty Years*, 195–96.

⁴⁰ Tanner, *Albania's Mountain Queen*, 167.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 160–61.

feelings towards Serbia and Montenegro. Initially, she had accepted the Declaration of War issued on October 18, 1912 by King Petar of Serbia:

The Turkish governments showed no interest in their duties towards their citizens and turned a deaf ear to all complaints and suggestions. Things got so far out of hand that no one was satisfied with the situation in Turkey in Europe. It became unbearable for the Serbs, the Greeks and for the Albanians, too. By the grace of God, I have therefore ordered my brave army to join in the Holy War to free our brethren and to ensure a better future.⁴²

According to most Albanian and Kosovar history books, the idea of fighting the Ottoman Empire for liberating the “Serbs, the Greeks and the Albanians from the unbearable” regime of the Porte was welcomed, but the incursion and the behavior of the Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek armies in Albania were rejected and characterized as “chauvinist” and as such unacceptable.⁴³ The “liberation” of the Albanians by the armies of the Balkan League, particularly by the Serbian and Montenegrin ones, is explained as an “invasion of enemies” or of “hereditary foes.” This interpretation also entered the school curriculum and still dominates textbooks in Albania and Kosovo. The explanation in these books is no different from that of Gjergj Fishta in his verses in “Lahuta” (Canto 29):

Like a river overflowing
 When engulfed by snowy landslides,
 Like the mountain torrents flowing
 Down into the fields of gravel,
 Thus the Slavs attacked Albania,
 Kaçanik, the Adriatic,
 Veleçik and Salonica,
 Choked the country in their talons,
 Slaying, slaughtering, enchaining,
 Beating with a club their victims,
 Stealing land and snatching booty.
 This is how the conflict ended.⁴⁴

⁴²Leo Freundlich, *Albania's Golgotha: Indictment of the Exterminators of the Albanian People*, http://www.albanianhistory.net/1913_Freundlich_Golgotha/index.html, accessed on July 1, 2016.

⁴³Cf. Prifti, *Historia e popullit shqiptar*, 503.

⁴⁴Fishta, *The Highland Lute*, 390.

Durham, on her part, shortly after war had broken out, was engaged in humanitarian relief work with the Montenegrin Red Cross where she found out about war atrocities. Her accounts in fact confirm Fishta's verses as above. Durham was terrified when a Serbian officer told her about his "heroism" in Kosovo and "nearly choked with laughter" as he mentioned how he had "bayoneted the women and children of Luma." Other officers told Durham that within a short time in the occupied lands "no one would dare speak that dirty language" (Albanian). They openly spoke about the violence being used in converting Muslim and Catholic Albanians into Christian Orthodox. Durham was also told that "in one generation we shall thus Serbize the lot."⁴⁵ For the Albanian scholarship and literature, such behavior was a result of deliberate anti-Albanian policies which were planned by the Serbian government to "exterminate Albanians."⁴⁶

While Durham disapproved of this policy as against the principle of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples," precisely defending it would soon change her mind about Austria-Hungary. By the beginning of December 1912, the Powers considered intervention, in order to avert a European war. On December 17, 1912, on the initiative of the British Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, the Powers and the Balkan countries gathered in London to find a solution. A Conference of Ambassadors was opened at the British Foreign Office. Austria-Hungary and Italy were determined to show that Serbia, Greece and Montenegro were becoming a danger for peace in Europe because of their occupation of Albania. Vienna, aiming to check the territorial expansion of Serbia, proposed the creation of an independent Albania which would include most of the territory of what is today Kosovo.⁴⁷ This also meant that Greece, Serbia and Montenegro were not going to divide Albania the way they wished. Austria-Hungary kept insisting to continue with its established policy in the region under the principle "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." Vienna used this policy as a "back-up for the interdiction of a Serbian land-grab on the Adriatic," which meant that Serbia would not be allowed to keep a port in the middle of a country inhabited by Albanians.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Durham, *Twenty Years*, 202.

⁴⁶ See Prifti, *Historia e popullit shqiptar*, 507.

⁴⁷ Frank Maloy Anderson and Amos Shartle Hershley, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa 1870-1914* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), 333-34.

⁴⁸ Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Penguin, 2013), 282.

Finally, the principle “the Balkans for the Balkan people” brought Durham and Austria-Hungary together. But it was refused by most of the Powers and by all countries of the Balkan League. From this point onwards, Durham showed full support for Austro-Hungarian plans and action in the Balkans. This also meant that she now fully identified with the Albanian national cause. This is evident for example in the way in which Durham referred to the military commander Esat Pasha Toptani with the same language as any other Albanian nationalist. She regarded Toptani as a traitor when he surrendered Shkodra on April 21, 1913 to Montenegro and also saw him as the main obstacle to the effective establishment of the Albanian independent state. She viewed Italy as another obstacle. On the occasion of the Shkodra crisis and regarding the role of Italy, Durham wrote,

Italy played an oddly double game. She was bound by Treaty to assist Austria to preserve the integrity of Albania. But she did not object to King Nikola, father of the Queen of Italy, taking the town if he could. Italy was striving for influence in Montenegro, out of hatred of Austria, and failed to see that the South Slav, not the German-Austrian, was her real danger.⁴⁹

While the Ambassadors Conference was in session during summer 1913, Durham went to south Albania to report about the Greek occupation and atrocities in order to influence the decision-making process in London. At one point, while entering an Albanian town, a Greek officer ordered her to stop or he would shoot if she preceded further. She continued walking and told him: “You can’t, I’m English.”⁵⁰ She wrote about this event, pointing out cynically that she was ready to risk her life for her principle and to show to the occupying armies, the Greeks in this case, that some people who belong to a particular European Power cannot be killed in Albania.

Durham’s commitment to her principle distanced her from Montenegro and Serbia. She did not approve of the violence that was applied by Montenegrins and Serbs against Albanians. The “liberation” turned into an occupation of Albania and this was a fact which, for Durham, stood against the principle of “the Balkans for the Balkan peoples.” In October 1913 Durham even packed up the gold medal which had been given to her by King Nikola and returned it to him. Regarding this decision, she wrote,

⁴⁹ Durham, *Twenty Years*, 204.

⁵⁰ Tanner, *Albania’s Mountain Queen*, 177.

I had often expressed surprise at persons who accepted decorations from Abdul Hamid, and that now I knew that he and his subjects were even more cruel than the Turk I would not keep his blood-stained medal any longer. I communicated this to the English and Austrian Press. The order of St. Sava given me by King Petar of Serbia, I decided to keep a little longer till some peculiarly flagrant case should occur, and this I expected soon.⁵¹

From now on, Durham's war reports amounted to atrocity testimonies committed against Albanians. Albanian leaders used Durham's writings as a strong proof to reinforce their nationalist discourse and argue against the violence of the invading or occupying armies. After the war was over, King Nikola of Montenegro, with whom Durham had ended a long friendship without any regret or hesitation, delivered a speech to his returned soldiers:

With blood your hands are, my blessed soldiers, because you have broken the chains of slavery to your dearest brothers. Hopes of millions of living and dead Serbs are realized. ... You took revenge for the failure in Kosovo and brought back and raised the honour of the Serbian arms. ... Let us not forget that Europe took Shkodra from our hands; after 20 days we captured and lowered our flag there. We have not given away Shkodra because we do not give away our historic rights.⁵²

Aversion towards Austria-Hungary and Albania increased further in Montenegro when the Montenegrin army was forced out of Shkodra. The Russian, French, and Italian diplomats in Cetinje expressed similar feelings. Describing the behavior of Montenegrin officials and people in Podgorica, Durham wrote,

Furious at loosing Scutari [Shkodra], they swore they would retake it and take Bosnia, too. I told them not to talk so foolishly. They cried: "We—the Serb people—have beaten the Turk. We are now a danger to Europe. We shall take what we please. The Serbs will go to Vienna. We shall go to Sarajevo. We have the whole Russian army with us. If you do not believe it—you will see. We shall begin in Bosnia!" This was in May 1913.⁵³

⁵¹ Ibid., 215.

⁵² Archives of Kosovo, Prishtina, Govor Kralja Nikole: 'Harbri moji vojnici' [King Nikola's speech: My brave soldiers], XXIV/K.1-1-1913.

⁵³ Durham, *Twenty Years*, 205.

Durham wanted the world to know about the tensions among the Serbs and Montenegrins after the Balkan Wars. She underlined that they were dissatisfied and angry with the result of the wars because they had not gained enough territory from Albania, and Austria-Hungary was to be blamed. According to Durham, Albania, which had become an independent state during the Balkan Wars, would become a prelude to another big war which would start within a year. And in fact, during the First World War the same armies and some of the powers invaded Albania again.

DURHAM'S LEGACY

Edith Durham left Albania in August 1914, a few days after the First World War had begun, and a few days before Prince Wied (1876–1954) left Albania, who had reigned as sovereign of the Principality of Albania from March 7 to September 3, 1914, appointed at the fifty-fourth session (July 29, 1913) of the Ambassadors' Conference in London.⁵⁴ After Durham arrived in London, the first thing she did was send back to King Petar of Serbia the Order of St. Sava he had given her. She wrote a letter accusing him “guilty of the greatest crime in history,” Franz Ferdinand's assassination in Sarajevo, which she considered an attack on Austria-Hungary.⁵⁵

Durham's stance on the Balkan Wars made the Albanians consider her among the best friends they had. However, she refused to take part in the state-forming process of the new country—Albania. She disliked Ismail Qemali, the state's founder, and she never wanted to meet King Zog, considering them both undemocratic and immoral. After she left in 1914, she visited Albania only once, in 1921. “Tired. Don't feel as if my Albania existed any more,” she wrote during her visit.⁵⁶ Durham's Albania was to include all Albanians in one state, but she did not see the principle “the Balkans for the Balkan peoples” applied in this case. In London, defending this principle, she never stopped debating with supporters of Serbia (later Yugoslavia), most usually with Seton Watson and Rebecca West, on behalf of Albania, until she died in 1944.

⁵⁴ See the Final Decision of the London Conference on Albania in Robert Elsie, *1913. The London Conference*, http://www.albanianhistory.net/1913_Conference-of-London/index.html, accessed on July 1, 2016.

⁵⁵ Durham, *Twenty Years*, 240.

⁵⁶ Tanner, *Albania's Mountain Queen*, 215.

The *Albanian Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, published in 1985 in Tirana, remarked that “She [Durham] remained until the end a defender of the Albanian national cause.”⁵⁷ During communism (1944–91), Durham was molded along the ideological limitations. Most probably she was the only “foreign friend” of Albania to have been remembered with respect although most of her works had never been translated nor promoted in communist Albania. The Albanian communist leader, Enver Hoxha (1908–85), made an honorable exception for Durham. “Scholars such as Durham were not spies and did not write badly about Albania,” he wrote in his political diary.⁵⁸

Durham seemed to overstate the coherence of the Albanian national movement. Also, in this, Albanian historians seem to follow her, a study on the Kosovar history textbooks suggests. The role and unity of the Albanian political leaders of that time is depicted in an exaggerated manner. Kosovar and Albanian textbooks do not mention any divisions between the Albanian political leaders. The failure to create an Albania which would include all Albanians is depicted as the result of obstacles put forth by the neighboring states, which were supported by the majority of the Powers.⁵⁹

Durham remains known as a supporter of the Albanian national cause but in reality she believed in the principle of treating equally the national aspirations of all Balkan nations. She was in favor of establishing states that respected the principle of ethnic distribution, which was denied to Albanians in a more severe manner than to other peoples. Today, Durham is far less known for her humanitarian work, another principle that she applied to all victims of war. She expressed the value of this principle in an exchange with R. W. Seton Watson. Regarding the appalling conditions of Albanians who were displaced and became refugees after the Balkan Wars and First World War, she wrote,

You seem to regard these populations as mere pawns to be shifted on the board according to political needs. To me they are all suffering human beings with whom I have been under fire—for whose sake I have risked enteric, smallpox & have wrestled with poisoned wounds. And with whom

⁵⁷ Allcock and Young, *Black Lambs and Grey Falcons*, 9–10.

⁵⁸ Enver Hoxha, *The Anglo American Threat to Albania. Memoirs of the National Liberation War* (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1982), 134.

⁵⁹ Shkëlzen Gashi, *Kosova 1912–2000 in the History Textbooks of Kosova, Albania and Serbia* (Pristina: KAHCR and KEC, 2012), 14–15.

I have hungered and been half frozen. I feel it a duty to show the means by which they have been annexed and trampled on.⁶⁰

Durham's writings about Albanians living under Yugoslav sovereignty served to remind them that their national question was not solved. During the communist period in Yugoslavia the history textbooks had to avoid authors such as Durham, but they were not banned. When Slobodan Milošević came to power in Serbia and later Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, Durham and other Albanian nationalist literature regained importance. Milošević's policy was seen as dangerous for Albanians, and this fostered the need for nationalist literature. After the Kosovo war (1999) and after Kosovo became independent (2008), the need for such literature grew even further.⁶¹

The reason for the present popularity of this literature can be explained by Kosovo–Serbian relations. Even though Kosovo became independent, many Kosovo Albanians, including their government, regard that the problem is not fully solved as Serbia continues to disregard Kosovo as a separate and independent state. Edith Durham once more seems to have made a considerable impact on Albanian literature and history textbooks, while Gjergj Fishta continues to “feed” patriotic feelings. Albanian historians consider Durham's accounts as neutral, and therefore credible, a “neutral foreign source,” although she was involved and directly interested in the outcome of the Balkan Wars. As did Durham, the most recent textbooks in Kosovo blame the Powers for the “carving up of Albanian lands,” while the presence of the Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek armies in Albania during the Balkan Wars is considered an “incursion” (in the case of Albania) or “occupation” (in the case of Kosovo). The Kosovar textbooks underline the Albanian involvement in the war as a necessary resistance or as a step of “defensive nationalism,” because Albanians had to fight against the Ottomans for liberation and in defense against the invasion or occupation by the neighboring states.⁶²

Thus, the legacies of Gjergj Fishta, the “Albanian Homer,” and the British travel writer Edith Durham both persist through the lens of events that shaped much of their respective lives—the Albanian national movement,

⁶⁰As cited in Christian Medawar, *Mary Edith Durham and the Balkans 1900–1914* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1995), 145, http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=23726&local_base=GEN01-MCG02 accessed on July 1, 2016.

⁶¹Gashi, *Kosova 1912–2000*, 50–54.

⁶²Ibid., 14–15.

the Balkan Wars, and the Albanian statehood, launched from the midst of this violent warfare. What is more, the most recent history of the last three decades has only helped to foster their monumental legacy in Albania.

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The Rebirth of Pan-Slavism in the Russian Empire, 1912–13

Katrin Boeckh

Public opinion mobilized patriotic fervor in the lead-up to the First World War, setting the stage for conflict. But mass mobilization did not emerge spontaneously; it had a history. In Russia, this history had begun some years before and peaked during the Balkan Wars in 1912–13. The distance between the rulers and the ruled in Russia was bridged by the Pan-Slavic idea revived during the Balkan Wars. Scholars have commonly diagnosed how, prior to 1914, Pan-Slavism exercised no political impact in Russia.¹ But this chapter argues that Pan-Slavism was a leading factor preparing the politically engaged segment of Russian society for a European war. The Balkan Wars and territorial changes in the Balkans were the main events that spurred the rebirth of Pan-Slavic activity in Russia. Scrutinizing the entanglements among Russian foreign policy, diplomacy, and public

¹ Astrid S. Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 133; Vladimir A. D'iakov, *Slavianskii vopros v obshchestvennoi zhizni dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii* [The Slavic question in social life before the Revolution in Russia] (Moscow: VO "Nauka," 1993), 184.

K. Boeckh (✉)

Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg, Germany

Department of History, LMU Munich

e-mail: boeckh@ios-regensburg.de

opinion, I will describe in this chapter how officials and civilians—far away from the battlefields—agitated in 1912–13 and how Pan-Slavism became a resurgent political discourse within the Russian civil society that was developing around the eve of the First World War. While there were numerous Russian organizations and groups focused on science, culture, sports, and other spheres,² only a few of them were concerned with politics. Among this latter group were the Pan-Slavic organizations.

This article focuses on facets of Pan-Slavism in Russia, on collective Pan-Slavic events in Russia during the Balkan Wars, and on two outstanding agents of Russian Pan-Slavism during the Balkan Wars: the newspaper *Novoe Vremia* (New time), an influential mass media outlet, and the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, Nikolaus von Hartwig, who maintained an important position until just before the outbreak of the First World War. Along with the existing historiographical analyses of prewar Russia, I draw mainly on *Novoe Vremia* itself, which regularly reported on Pan-Slavic activities, and on British and German diplomatic correspondence, which commented on them.

THE APPEARANCE OF PAN-SLAVISM IN RUSSIA

Pan-Slavism originally aimed to unite all Slavs. It had its heyday during the nineteenth century, when several Pan-Slavic conferences were convened. The first was organized in 1848 in Prague, where Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy discussed their common interests for the first time.³ In Russia, Pan-Slavism was rooted in Slavophilia, a movement during the nineteenth century that broadly objected to European values and influences inside the Russian Empire. Only after the defeat and military disaster of the Crimean War (1853–56) did the Russian government show interest in Pan-Slavism as a way to gain influence in Europe. After the next Pan-Slavic conference in Moscow in May 1867, which led to a climax of Pan-Slavic feelings among Russians, Czar Alexander II declared his support of Pan-Slavic interests.⁴ From then on, the Russian government presented itself as the

² Joseph Bradley, *Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), and Anastasiia S. Tumanova, ed., *Samoorganizaciia rossiiskoi obschestvennosti v poslednei treti XVIII–nachale XX v.* (Moscow: Rossiiskaia politicheskaia entsiklopediia ROSSPEN, 2011).

³ Andreas Moritsch, ed., *Der Prager Slavenkongress 1848* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2000).

⁴ For an overview of the origins of Pan-Slavism in Russia, see Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism: 1856–1870* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985 [1956]); Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (New York: Vintage, sec. ed.,

protector of all Slavs, who figured in the “Oriental Question.” The Russian Czars insisted on their patronage of the Orthodox and Slav peoples in the Balkans, still dominated by the Ottoman Empire. But Russian Pan-Slavism was exclusive: neither Poles nor Ukrainians—both groups being Slavs within the Russian Empire—participated in Pan-Slavic activities, such as the 1867 Moscow conference. The reason they did not do so was obvious: After the Polish insurrection of 1863–64, the Russian Empire denied Poles autonomy and political rights, forbade Ukrainians to use their own language, and suppressed the Greek Catholic faith. Within Habsburg Galicia, on the other hand, Ukrainians enjoyed a relatively free cultural existence, and the Ukrainian national movement in “Ukrainian Piedmont” grew steadily.

Nevertheless, among Russians within the Russian Empire in the second part of the nineteenth century, Pan-Slavic ideas became popular as an adjunct to Russian nationalism. Originally an inclusive cultural movement, Pan-Slavism in Russia turned into a territorial doctrine when activists and politicians founded a variety of organizations in several cities. In Moscow, the Slavic Benevolent Committee was founded in 1858; similar organizations were established in Saint Petersburg in 1868, in Kiev in 1869, and in Odessa in 1870. These groups fostered solidarity among Slavs by offering social services such as the awarding of money, books, grants, and jobs, and they established libraries in the Habsburg and Ottoman empires and within Russia.⁵

Orthodoxy influenced politics abroad, too. While the Pan-Slavs under Habsburg rule had aimed for a religious unification within the Catholic Church, the Russian Orthodox Church’s influence on Slavs outside the Russian Empire intensified. But the lack of a common confessional basis and shared Slavic language meant the various Slav peoples interpreted Pan-Slavism from discrete nationalist points of view. Nikolai Danilevskii’s book *Rossia i Evropa* (Russia and Europe, 1869) raised the most important programmatic issue of Russian Pan-Slavism. It declared a persistent antagonism between Russia and the West and postulated the reunion of all Slavs under the protection of the Russian Czar. The book and the activities of Russian Pan-Slavic circles made clear that “Russian Pan-Slavism ... in its ultimate synthesis is best described as a manifestation of Great Russian nationalism.”⁶ Likewise, these discourses demonstrate Pan-Slavism’s

1960); Frank L. Fadner, *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia: Karazin to Danilevskii, 1800–1870* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1962).

⁵Volodymyr Kosyk, “Pan-Slavism,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, <http://bit.ly/29pF4I9>, accessed November 9, 2016.

⁶Fadner, *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia*, 354.

ambiguity and its broad range of meanings: Pan-Slavs first defined their aims to be the cultural unity of all Slavs, suggesting a supra-national movement, but then Pan-Slavism transformed itself into a political and national movement endorsing Russian autocracy and Orthodoxy.

The political activities of Pan-Slavic groups in Russia grew energetically when, beginning in 1875–76, the South Slavs in Herzegovina and the Bulgarians rebelled against Ottoman hegemony. The *Moskovskii Slavianskii Komitet* (Slav Committee of Moscow), under the leadership of Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov (1823–86, leader of the committee, 1858–78) in particular, became a strong mobilizing force by organizing a general campaign among the Russians in favor of the Bulgarians then in revolt. It prompted the general impression that the Pan-Slavic organizations had coerced Alexander II to wage the Russo–Ottoman War (1877–78) against his will. In the eyes of the Slav public, public opinion and Askakov’s activities had provoked the war. However, the war had broken out due to political motives more than anything else.⁷ On the other hand, Pan-Slavic committees supported the Serbs, gathering money for military aid and sending some 5,000 volunteers to the battlefields, thus gaining significant Serbian respect.⁸

At the turn of the twentieth century, accompanied as it was by modernization and industrialization, the complexion of Russian Pan-Slavism changed. The newly proclaimed “Neo-Pan-Slavism” or “Neo-Slavism” no longer officially insisted on Russian predominance among the Slav nations.⁹ Instead of formulating its own positive and original aims, Pan-Slavism found a new cornerstone in its rejection of German hegemony and Pan-Germanism. The political opponents were such Pan-German societies as the *Alldeutscher Verband*, the *Gustav-Adolf-Verein*, and the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein*. Russian Neo-Slavists, including Vladimir Alekseevich Bobrinskii (1867/68–1927), their most prominent figure and Duma member, and other leaders such as the Czech activist Karel Kramář (1860–1937), organized the Pan-Slavic congresses in Prague (1906) and Sofia (1910) in order to strengthen inter-Slavic ties against a common German threat. In Sofia, the Russian delegation comprised several dozen politicians, among them Bobrinskii, the secretary of the Duma; A. A. Tushkov and activists

⁷ Stefan Lukaševič, *Ivan Aksakov, 1823–1886: A Study in Russian Thought and Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 129.

⁸ Jacob Langer, *Corruption and the Counterrevolution: The Rise and Fall of the Black Hundred* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Microform, 2007), 21.

⁹ Caspar Ferenczi, *Nationalismus und Neoslavismus in Rußland vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1984).

from Pan-Slavic organizations such as Obshchestvo Slavyanske Vzaemosti (the Slavic Benevolent Society); Sokol, represented by about eighty members; and journalists such as D. N. Vergun, an editorial writer from *Novoe Vremia*, and his colleague A. A. Stolypin (the brother of Petr Stolypin, prime minister from 1906 to 1911). Serb politicians in particular took the opportunity to establish closer relations with these leaders. Serb diplomats were perceptive enough to convince Serbia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue them special invitations for a trip to Belgrade.¹⁰ Prior to the outbreak of the First Balkan War in October 1912, then, Serbia was especially well positioned in the Russian Pan-Slavic community.

RUSSIAN POLICY AND PAN-SLAVIC POLITICIANS DURING THE BALKAN WARS

The Balkan League's attack on Ottoman troops, which caused the outbreak of the First Balkan War, was not in Russia's genuine interest, as it disturbed the political equilibrium in the Balkans. During the Balkan Wars and the international crises of 1912–13, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov (1860–1927; foreign minister, 1910–16) had to bear in mind several aspects of the Balkan Question: Austria-Hungary was—on the diplomatic front—still Russia's main antagonist during the Balkan Wars. Russia tried to expand its indirect field of interest in Southeastern Europe, carefully watching the Austro-Hungarian positions in the Balkans. Although military confrontation between Austria-Hungary and Russia had threatened to break out several times during 1912–13, international diplomacy had helped avert it.

The future of the Ottoman Empire, and especially of Constantinople, was another key concern for Russia during the Balkan Wars. Russia had a vital interest in monitoring the Turkish Black Sea Straits and dominating the Black Sea, which was of major economic importance. Thirty-seven percent of Russian exports and over three quarters of its grain shipments went through the straits, whose brief closures in 1912 and 1913 had alarmed the Russian public.¹¹ Sazonov stated repeatedly that the Russian

¹⁰ Popović, the Serb *chargé d'affaires* in Saint Petersburg, to the Serb Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, May 27 / June 9, 1910, in Milosch Boghitschewitsch, *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens 1903–1914*, vol. 1, *Geheimakten aus serbischen Archiven* (Berlin: Brückenverlag, 1928), 158–59 (no. 135).

¹¹ Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860–1914* (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987), 285.

government could not allow another country other than Turkey to control the straits, insisting that if they fell into the hands of the “wrong state,” it would signal the subordination of southern Russia’s economic development.¹² Taking this situation into account, he pleaded for a peaceful solution during the Balkan Wars, particularly when the Balkan alliance dissolved with the outbreak of the Second Balkan War. Russian diplomats argued that Serbia needed Bulgaria’s support to unite the Serbs.¹³ The official Russian position during the Balkan Wars attempted to diffuse the conflicts while the Pan-Slavic movement in Russia fueled them.

Prior to the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Pan-Slavic discourses in Russia were restrained. Even in 1912, the Austrian ambassador in Saint Petersburg admitted that extremist Pan-Slavism was not very common in Russia, although he cautiously remarked that Pan-Slavic convictions were latent in every Russian, as “there was a certain degree of Slav solidarity in all of them.”¹⁴ Only with the ongoing Balkan Wars did Pan-Slavism gain momentum and adopt a wider platform, in particular when the military actions of the “Slav brothers” in Southeastern Europe backed great-power nationalism and imperialism under Russian dominance. A part of the Russian elite, after all, expressed these ideas. It was the right-wing press, military officers, industrialists, and members of the Petersburg upper class who predominantly bore Pan-Slavic convictions. Their most prominent forum was the Saint Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Society, which in 1913 boasted 255 regular members, who held top positions and numbered among the highest ranks in both the armed forces and the civil service.¹⁵

Furthermore, members of the royal family openly uttered Pan-Slavic declarations during the Balkan Wars. Some within the Czar’s family fervently advocated Pan-Slavic beliefs for personal reasons: prominent among these supporters were the “Montenegrin princesses,” the daughters of the

¹² Ronald Bobroff, “Behind the Balkan Wars: Russian Policy toward Bulgaria and the Turkish Straits, 1912–13,” *Russian Review*, vol. 59, no. 1 (2000), 76–95, here 77; Dominic C. B. Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), 45.

¹³ Barbara Jelavich, *Russia’s Balkan Entanglements 1806–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 247.

¹⁴ Quoted in Alan Cassels, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 1996), 122.

¹⁵ Zdenko Zlatar, “‘For the Sake of Slavdom’: St. Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Society—A Collective Portrait of 1913,” *East European Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 3 (2004), 261–98, here 264–65.

Montenegrin King Nikola (1841–1921), Anastasija (1868–1935) and Milica Petrović-Njegoš (1866–1951), who had married two royal brothers and had become grand duchesses of Russia. Anastasija heavily reinforced the Pan-Slavic convictions of her second husband, Grand Duke Nicholas, a cousin of Czar Nicholas. Her sister Milica lobbied her husband, Grand Duke Peter Nikolaevich, on behalf of Pan-Slavic issues—and did so especially in favor of vital Montenegrin interests.¹⁶ However, the princesses' positions were not strong enough to protect their father King Nikola from being criticized in the Russian press, as the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which administered censorship of the press, allowed *Novoe Vremia* to publish critical commentaries when Nikola visited Russia.¹⁷

Czar Nicholas II, on the other hand, generally highlighted Russia's role as a protector of the Slav peoples in the Balkans and spoke sympathetically about them. Reflecting in April 1913 on the Slav peoples' victory in the First Balkan War, he admitted that he would have supported Serbia and Bulgaria in their war against the Ottomans had they not been victorious. He explained to the British ambassador, George Buchanan, that he would have intervened “even at the risk of provoking an European war.”¹⁸

While the Russian Duma generally toed the cabinet's political line, certain representatives of parties in the Duma—Constitutional Democrats, and specifically Kadets, Octobrists, and Rights—favored closer ties between Russians and other Slavs in order that Russian interests would be firmly maintained in the Balkans and the Black Sea Straits. These deputies participated in Pan-Slavic congresses and meetings and wrote for a network of Pan-Slavic journals and publications. Count Bobrinskii represented the Russian nationalists in the second, third, and fourth Duma. Founder of the Galician-Russian Benevolent Society (*Galitsko-russkoe blagotvoritel'noe obshchestvo*) in 1902, he was regarded as the foremost Russian Neo-Pan-Slavist. He participated in the 1908 Pan-Slavic Congress in Prague and subsidized the

¹⁶ Both of them advocated for Montenegrin foreign issues. See Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996), 254.

¹⁷ Popović, the Serb *chargé d'affaires* in Saint Petersburg, to the Serb Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, January 15 / February 7, 1912, in Boghitschewitsch, *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens 1903–1914*, vol. 1, 201 (no. 164).

¹⁸ George W. Buchanan to Edward Grey, Saint Petersburg, April 14, 1913, in Dominic Lieven, ed., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, part I, *From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War*, series A, *Russia, 1859–1914*, vol. 6 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983), 313–16, here 314.

Russian movement and press in Austria-Hungary. He was often interviewed in the press during the Balkan Wars and was frequently present at Pan-Slavic events, some of which he initiated himself. Another politician, the Octobrist party leader Aleksandr Guchkov (1862–1936), actually set up field hospitals staffed by Russian volunteers to assist Slav combatants.¹⁹

Other Pan-Slavists adopted a more moderate orientation. One of them was Pavel Miliukov (1859–1943), the leader of the Kadet Party. Miliukov respected the position of other Slav peoples more fully than some other Pan-Slavists and did not regard the Russians to be the dominant group among them. He represented a pro-Bulgarian position and, as expressed in a 1915 speech in the Duma, even favored a Macedonian solution as a compromise between the Serbian and the Bulgarian positions. In his opinion, not only the Bulgarians but also each country that had broken the Serb–Bulgarian agreement of February 1912 should be blamed for starting the Second Balkan War.

But the realization of Pan-Slavic ideas was not at all the aim of Duma politics during the Balkan Wars. Despite declared Pan-Slavic convictions among its members, the Duma acted rigorously to intervene in other Slav questions of the time, following the exclusive policy line. In 1913, the Duma refused the use of Polish in municipal administration, and even replaced the expression “Czardom of Poland” in a reform bill put forward in the Upper House concerning the Polish kingdom. Diplomats such as the British ambassador, George Buchanan, characterized this decision as a “striking example of the dangerous nationalistic feelings that pervade the Upper House, and ... in curious contrast with the fervent ebullitions of Pan-Slavist sympathies for the Slav races in other parts of the world.”²⁰

ACTIVITIES IN FAVOR OF THE BALKAN SLAVS

The Pan-Slavic movement’s ascension in Russia during the Balkan Wars upset the balance of international diplomacy. Diplomats in Germany and Austria-Hungary remembered the consequences of Aksakov’s campaign, which had alarmed Russian society four decades earlier.²¹ In 1912–13,

¹⁹Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism since 1856*, 140.

²⁰George W. Buchanan to Edward Grey, Saint Petersburg, April 21, 1913, in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, part I, series A, vol. 6, 316.

²¹Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin (PA), Türkei 203—Balkankrieg Band 3: Kohlhaas to Bethman Hollweg, Moscow, October 3, 1912.

especially, they helped integrate Pan-Slavic actors. Pan-Slavic circles in Russia regarded the outbreak of the First Balkan War as morally justified, and even necessary, as it was waged against Muslims. When the Bulgarian ambassador Stefan Paprikov left Saint Petersburg for the Bulgarian headquarters in October 1912, this signaled to Pan-Slavic organizations that they should openly support the Slavs in the Balkans in several ways. Their social activities provided material help for the soldiers and the suffering populations in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. Social events like meetings and “Slav banquets” provided platforms and networks that reinforced Pan-Slavic and Russian nationalist convictions. Moreover, demonstrations and celebrations in the streets—especially in the Russian capital—proved Russian society’s sympathy toward the Balkan Slav peoples.

Social Activities and Military Support

The first actors to emerge in favor of the “Slav brothers in the Balkans” were Pan-Slavic associations disseminating Pan-Slavic propaganda. The Saint Petersburg Slavic Committee began to collect money across the country. Other organizations, including the Society for Slavic Culture in Moscow, the Society for Slavic Scholarship in Saint Petersburg, and others, also worked along these lines. They organized social activities to help impoverished and distressed “Slav children.” For example, on December 2, 1912, a parents’ circle in Saint Petersburg organized a party and a bazaar for children, raising funds for suffering children in the Balkans.²² The organizers of a special evening remembering the “Slav tribune” Aksakov followed a similar formula. This time, not only orphans and mothers afflicted by the Balkan Wars but also persecuted Armenian families in Asia Minor would receive the charity event’s revenue—and, indeed, such initiatives reached their intended destinations. The evening was generally dedicated to Aksakov’s commitment to the South Slavs, the promotion of their concerns among Russian society, and the explanation of the Armenians’ current situation in Asia Minor.²³

Likewise, Pan-Slavic groups such as the Slavic Philanthropic Society, the Cadet National Club, and others organized meetings with Duma members to discuss the Russian position and to host informative presentations,

²² “K balkanskim sobytiim” [On the events in the Balkans], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13185, November 24 [December 7], 1912, 14.

²³ “Aksakovskii vecher” [Evening in Honour of Aksakov], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13185, November 24 [December 7], 1912, 14.

such as a lecture on “The Events in the Balkans” given by a certain A. A. Bazhenov in Saint Petersburg on a Friday evening in December 1912.²⁴ In order to present a scholarly foundation for the movement, a historical description of Pan-Slavism by Aleksandr Pynin, first published in 1878, was reedited for publication in 1913.²⁵

While a Pan-Slavic public was quickly at hand in the Russian capital, the second city, Moscow, lagged behind.²⁶ One problem was the organization of the Slavic Benevolent Society (Slavianskoe blagotvoritel’noe obshchestvo) in Moscow, as their president, the former general and general consul in Belgrade, Artur Cherep-Spiridovich (1858–1926), had been living in Paris for years. When he was asked for demission, he gave no written answer. At the beginning of the Balkan Wars this Moscow society, which had once been very active, had few members and was not prepared for new activities. Discussions about reviving the local “Slavic committee” also continued in October 1912.

Meanwhile, officials organized medical support for the Balkan states in Saint Petersburg. The Russian Red Cross prepared teams of medical doctors. Nearly three hundred physicians and nurses were sent to the war zone, and about 850 beds for wounded soldiers were made available. A Russian-Bulgarian committee in Saint Petersburg was very active in providing support for hospitals in Bulgaria. By the beginning of December 1912, it had already sent four transports with medical materials and clothes to military hospitals in Sofia and Lozengrad, where warm garments, underwear, tea, and sugar were especially needed. Eleonora, the Bulgarian Czaritsa, cordially thanked the committee for its help.²⁷ Together with Serbs and Montenegrins, the Russian-Bulgarian Committee organized a “Balkan bazaar” from 15 to 17 December 1912. In Moscow, the Orthodox Church initiated military and medical help.²⁸ Citizens and

²⁴ *Novoe Vremia* no. 13204, December 13 [December 26], 1912, 6.

²⁵ Pynin’s book was reprinted for the third time in 2002, when Pan-Slavism in Russia arose again in the wake of the new wars in the Balkans: see Aleksandr Pynin, *Panslavizm v proshlom i nastoiashchem* [Pan-Slavism past and present] (pub. 1878, 1913, 2002) (Moscow: Izdatel’skii dom “Granitsa,” 2002).

²⁶ PA AA, Türkei 203—Balkankrieg Band 3: Kohlhaas to Bethman Hollweg, Moscow, October 3, 1912.

²⁷ “V rusko-bolgarskom komitete” [In the Russian–Bulgarian committee], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13185, November 24 [December 7], 1912, 14.

²⁸ PA AA, Türkei 203—Balkankrieg Band 3: Kohlhaas to Bethman Hollweg, Moscow, October 3, 1912.

Pan-Slavists collected money, organized military hospitals, and equipped volunteers—allegedly 500—with arms. Even commissioned pilots and airplanes left for the Balkans.

Russian medical help not only supported those in Southeastern Europe who needed it: the initiatives were also used to collect information about what was going on in the fighting. It was not a coincidence that, together with the Russian Red Cross, military representatives went to the Balkans as representatives of charitable or medical organizations: General Tripkov, president of the Russian Red Cross, traveled to South Serbia in the first weeks of 1913, and another general and a colonel representing a Russian benevolence society appeared in Prizren at the same time.²⁹

Pan-Slavic Banquets

From the outbreak of the First Balkan War, the Russian capital's Pan-Slavic community regularly organized meetings, which attracted a growing number of visitors. At first, these meetings were called *Slavianskii obed* (Slavic dinners) and *Slavianskaia beseda* (Slavic conversations), but later these dinners were enlarged into Slavic banquets. The banquets were a special platform for political meetings in pre-revolutionary Russia, constituting a semi-political forum in which the czarist police did not intervene. The "banquet campaign" appeared for the first time at the end of 1904, before the 1905 Russian Revolution, when a series of political banquets emerged to mobilize politically interested people and develop the revolutionary atmosphere that eventually led to the inauguration of a limited Russian constitution.³⁰ With the Balkan Wars, the use of banquets as political platforms were revived. Here, the guests—mostly politicians, professors, artists, and journalists—debated the latest news and developments in the Balkans, reassured themselves about their common national-Russian interests, and criticized Russian politicians for not pursuing the aims aligned with these interests. But they never went so far as to demand the abolition of the czarist regime or a complete change in the political system. While political discussion was an important "formal" reason for these meetings, the way that these meetings served as a forum for the higher social strata represented another motive to have them, as they were glamorous events

²⁹ PA AA, R 14229: Griesinger to Bethmann Hollweg, Belgrade, March 1, 1913.

³⁰ For this unprecedented phenomenon in Russian history, see Terence Emmons, "Russia's Banquet Campaign," *California Slavic Studies*, vol. 10 (1977), 45–86.

where members of high society gathered in a casual atmosphere to eat, drink, and “raise a glass” to heroic Pan-Slavists.

The Pan-Slavs had no clear political program. Instead, attendees of the meetings glorified the Russian past and Pan-Slavic efforts, celebrating both the movement’s success and efforts countering the backlashes against it. This was the case when the participants of the “Slavic conversation” at the end of January 1913, organized by General A. N. Skugarevskii, “raised their glasses in honour of the ladies and especially of the daughter of the Slav general Cherniaev,”³¹ who was present there and at other Pan-Slavic occasions. Her father, Mikhail Cherniaev (1828–1898), had been a fervent Russian Pan-Slavist and editor of the Pan-Slavic journal *Russkii mir*. He did not have any military successes while serving as commander of the Serb forces during their 1876 rebellion against the Ottomans. As a consequence, the relationship between Serbia and Russia cooled, and Russia subsequently focused on Bulgaria. But this was all (purposefully or not) forgotten in the “conversation.”

The discussion also entailed certain territorial and strategic questions that speakers addressed from their own points of view. When disputing the fate of Metohija/Kosovo, A. A. Bashmakov, president of the Slavic organization Slavianskoe obshchestvo, maintained that Metohija was an old Serb-inhabited territory and should not be handed over to Albania. On the same occasion, the future Bulgarian policy was brought to the fore, when the Bulgarian painter Stoianov spoke fervently against the Russian press’s insinuation that if Russia did not now assist Bulgaria, Czar Ferdinand would make an alliance with Germany. This, Stoianov insisted, would never happen; the Bulgarian people would prevent it, because they would never betray Bulgaria’s devotion to Russia. Nevertheless, Bulgaria fought the First World War on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, hoping for territorial gains in Macedonia.

The Slavs of the Habsburg monarchy were also discussed repeatedly. In this sense, Colonel Baliasnyi drew the guests’ attention to the Slavs still under foreign political dominance: the “little Russians” in Galicia, he maintained, were oppressed “because of their faith and language.” Then a toast for the Slavic brothers in Transcarpathia, a region in the Carpathian Mountains belonging to the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary, was made. Another speaker postulated fervently that Austria-Hungary must immediately return the Danube delta and the Transcarpathian Rus’ to Russia.

³¹ “Slavianskaia Beseda” [Slavic conversation], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13230, January 19 [February 1], 1913, 13.

Sometimes visitors to these Saint Petersburg meetings were closely connected to events on the battlefields. The *Slavianskaia beseda* on December 5 (new style) 1912 was a very dramatic meeting,³² because of a public reading of a letter from the military doctor Konstantinovich, previously a visitor of Slavic dinners himself and now working in the Grand Duchess Militsa Nikolaevna's field hospital for the Montenegrin army.³³ Konstantinovich dramatically described surgeries he had to conduct without anesthesia, while also expressing his full admiration for his "brave patients," the "heroic Montenegrin soldiers," and the "courageous Montenegrin mothers." In the end, Konstantinovich's letter called upon the guests of the Slavic "conversation" to raise their glasses to the "unification of all Slavs under the strong protection of the great, invincible, and fraternal Russia." After the subsequent discussion on the Balkan War, a collective telegram addressed to the new State Duma was sent. According to a guest at the "conversation," factions of the Nationalists, Progressives, and Octobrists were open to Pan-Slavic arguments. To enforce this position, the guests of the *beseda* reminded the Duma to be the conscience of the Russian people and to not lose courage in the fight for the Balkans' liberty and the Slavic idea.³⁴

The first Slav banquet was organized from December 16 to 29, 1912 in the Palkina restaurant, an event fixed at the last Slav "conversation." During the first banquet with 120 guests, the organizers' speeches highlighted their common interests: devotion to the Russian Czar and to the Slavic peoples outside the Russian Empire. According to them, the Pan-Slavs wanted to raise their voices so that they would be heard in the Duma. The conservative press reported about the first Slav banquet as follows:

The vice-president of the Slavic society prof. P. A. Kulakovskii, A. A. Bashmakov [the organizer of the banquet] and the academician Sobolevskii sat on the central chairs at the table. The first toast, precious to each Slav, was proposed by P. A. Kulakovskii to the Russian Czar. A common "Hurrah!"

³² Most of the given dates here are both in the old style, according to the Julian calendar, and in the new style, according to the Gregorian calendar instituted in 1918 in Russia.

³³ "Slavianskii obed" [Slavic Dinner], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13185, November 24 [December 7], 1912, 14.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

In the first speech, Nikanorov declared that “[...]the Slav lunches were not only an amusement, but they are to educate social thinking. And they already find an echo in the Duma. ... People say to us we are only talking. But directing the social thinking is already the first step to acting. Our thoughts must be to direct things[.]”³⁵

The Balkan War was seen not only as a Slav-Ottoman conflict but as a vital Russian question and a matter of imperial magnitude. In their political intentions, the guests of the banquet saw themselves to be acting in the tradition of Aksakov’s Slav Committee. The banquet’s organizer Bashmakov underlined that the strength of Czar Alexander III’s reign (1881–94) had resulted from “Aksakov’s words, which had given birth to a Pan-Slavic movement and Russian self-confidence.” Expectations varied as to what their banquets would achieve: one artisan expressed severe pessimism, while another speaker insisted they “could not move one single soldier, but they could move the heart of the government.”³⁶

The Pan-Slavs were overjoyed by the Balkan League’s victory in the First Balkan War: Skugarevskii organized a second Slav banquet on January 27 (February 9), 1913 at the Hotel Regina in Saint Petersburg, where about 500 participants celebrated the military success.³⁷ This banquet more clearly carried the whiff of political affirmation, as it was attended not only by many well-known public figures, artists, writers, and journalists as well as the prominent Slavophiles Count Bobrinskii and Branchaninov, but also by several members of the Duma, including representatives of the Progressive, Octobrist, Nationalist, and Right parties. Initially, the banquet participants decided to send a telegram to the Russian Emperor expressing their devotion, and they raised the cheer “God save the Czar!” This telegram was answered by Czar Nicholas, who underlined his sympathies for his “brothers” in the Balkans.³⁸ They then composed a second telegram to the kings of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and

³⁵ “Slavianskii banquet” [Slavic Banquet], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13209, December 18 [31], 1912, 5.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ “Vtoroi slavianskii banquet” [The Second Slav banquet], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13247, January 27 [February 9], 1913, 4; *Schulthess’ Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, vol. 29 (1913) (Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1915), 611.

³⁸ The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Thurn, Saint Petersburg, January 31–February 13, 1913, in *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. Diplomatische Aktenstücke des österreichisch-ungarischen Ministeriums des Äusseren* [= ÖUA], vol. 5 (Vienna, Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1930), no. 5789, 720–21, here 720.

Montenegro: “The participants of the second Slav banquet, full of joy because of the new victories of the fraternized Bulgarian, Serb, Montenegrin, and Greek weapons, send to your Majesty their most honest wishes to bring the initiated cause to a successful end.”³⁹ The next items on the agenda were speeches by I. V. Nikanorov, V. V. Karlinskii, Count V. A. Bobrinskii, P. V. Lavrov, D. N. Vergun, and the aforementioned A. N. Branchaninov. These addresses must have been very convincing, because shortly afterwards the guests unanimously passed a resolution flatly declaring that they would represent the patriotic feelings of the largest part of the Russian society. They enthusiastically welcomed the fresh victories of the allies and wished that the Balkan League would bring the whole Balkan Peninsula back into the lap of “Christian culture and civilization.” They stated that the mistake of summoning a conference of the great powers must not be repeated after the allies’ fresh victories. Russia, which was seen as indissolubly bound up in the Balkan question by its “one-thousand-year-old dream” to place the cross over St. Sofia in Constantinople, must not indulge in fruitless pacifism nor entertain the interests of speculators. Russia should defend its prestige and interests by armed force if necessary, rather than deferring the settlement of “historical tasks”—meaning Russia’s expansion—out of fear about international revolutionary forces.

The party guests overtly declared their wish to continue to wage war against the Ottomans until Russia took Constantinople—a program which had failed in 1878 because of British naval resistance. The idea of waging a war for Constantinople in 1912–13 did not frighten the Pan-Slavs, as they highlighted repeatedly. Except for the mentioning of historical reasons, the banquet guests did not justify their deployment of this old Russian dream and project launched by Czar Catherine II. To them, the direction of the Russian politics was clear: to use military forces for Russian expansion. The resolution ended with the following affirmations:

Indignantly refuting the idea of the possibility of a wholesale revolutionary movement in the event of war as an undeserved slander of the Russian people, those attending the banquet affirm that the Russian people do not desire war, but are not afraid of it, and that to yield to Austria-Hungary or to save Turkey from final disintegration is not compatible with the national prestige and interests of Russia and with the best traditions of Russian history.⁴⁰

³⁹ “Vtoroi slavianskii banket” [The Second Slav Banquet], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13247, January 27 [February 9], 1913, 4.

⁴⁰ George W. Buchanan to Edward Grey, Saint Petersburg, February 10, 1913, in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, part I, series A, vol. 6, 308–309.

More concrete political plans were not discussed. Only once, a *beseda* guest asked how Slavs could prevail over their German enemies living next to them.⁴¹ His own answer was to outnumber Germans via colonization and then promote each Slavic people's talents. Such statements demonstrated the predominance of historical visions, hopes, and blatant illusions, and the lack of precise political ideas within the Pan-Slavic movement.

However, the Slav banquets continued. The fifth such event took place in May 1913; it was planned for a maximum of 300 people, but many more registered to attend.⁴² Similar Pan-Slavic events were organized in other Russian towns, too. Slav banquets in Moscow were not numerous, but when they were held the agenda was similar to that of their Saint Petersburg counterparts: toasts were raised to the Balkan kings, the military glory of the Balkan peoples was praised, and telegrams giving political advice were sent. The banquet on 1 April 1913 requested that Foreign Minister Sazonov act in a way more appropriate to a great power.⁴³ Sometimes letters were read at these evenings. At the *Slavianskii obed* on April 4, 1913 in Saint Petersburg, participants read a telegram sent by the Montenegrin king, as well as an address from a *Russkoe sobranie* (Russian assembly) in Kiev.⁴⁴ All in all, the Slav "conversations" and banquets fostered the conviction that war achieved important national aims. Russian society's wealthy tier welcomed this position, even accepting the risk of a war in Europe.

DEMONSTRATIONS AND REACTION

Pan-Slavic activities soon stepped up: there were open demonstrations against Russian Balkan politics, which tried to diplomatically solve the conflict in Southeastern Europe at the ambassadors' conferences in London and Saint Petersburg.⁴⁵ But diplomacy was not enough for nationalist and Pan-Slavic circles in Saint Petersburg, who desired the Russian

⁴¹ "Slavianskii obed" [Slavic Dinner], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13185, November 24 [December 7], 1912, 14.

⁴² "Blizhaishii slavianskii banquet" [The Next Slavic Banquet], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13322, April 3 [26], 1913, 4.

⁴³ *Novoe Vremia* no. 13297, March 19 [April 1], 1913, 3; Telegrama slavian S. D. Sazonovu [The Slavs' Telegram to S. D. Sazonov], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13301, March 23 [April 5], 1913, 4.

⁴⁴ "Slavianskii obed" [Slavic Dinner], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13300, March 22 [April 4], 1913, 5.

⁴⁵ As for the ambassadors' conferences in London and Saint Petersburg, see Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, 40–50.

government to interfere more aggressively to protect Slav interests in the Balkans. Organs of the press, Duma deputies, and the Pan-Slavic public voiced their discontent. While the first months after the outbreak of the First Balkan War saw no public opposition, in March 1913 Pan-Slavic demonstrations began in the streets of Saint Petersburg. For Bobrinskii, they were evidence that Russian society—after being astonishingly quiet during the winter months—had now lost patience.⁴⁶

Pan-Slavic activities peaked in April 1913, when demonstrations in the Russian capital took place almost daily. One reason for this fervent outpouring was the crisis erupting over Scutari/Shkodra and the international discussions about whether the city should be handed over to the new Albanian state or to Montenegro.⁴⁷ Not surprisingly, the leading figures in these demonstrations were the two Montenegrin princesses in Saint Petersburg and the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. On April 3, 1913, while Albanian and Serb troops besieged Shkodra, Russian Pan-Slavists organized demonstrations in support of their “Slav brothers.”⁴⁸

Prominent Pan-Slavs also exploited the heated atmosphere to connect the Balkan battlefields to Russian aspirations in Galicia, where they declared Slavs to be oppressed by Austria-Hungary. The propaganda of the Pan-Slavic demonstrations in Russia drew on religious motives: namely, the Habsburg government’s alleged endangerment of the Orthodox Church. In addition, Bobrinskii was active in Galicia and channeled Pan-Slavic organizations, Russian Orthodox priests, and agitators to support local Russophiles and their newspapers against Vienna, as the Austrian authorities detected.⁴⁹

The visits of Balkan states’ representatives to the Russian capital were made public knowledge, and people in the streets clamored to meet them. In particular, the Saint Petersburg trip of General Radko Dimitriev

⁴⁶ “Sobytiia dnia” [Events of the Day], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13297, March 19 [April 1], 1913, 2.

⁴⁷ Regarding military and diplomatic actions see Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, 46–48.

⁴⁸ Michael Epkenhans ed., *Albert Hopmann, Das ereignisreiche Leben eines “Wilhelminers.” Tagebücher, Briefe, Aufzeichnungen 1901 bis 1920* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2004), 315.

⁴⁹ Klaus Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Rußland. Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Rußland (1907–1914)* (Vienna: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2001), 213. In November 1912, Russian troops concentrated along the Galician border near Cześćochowa; Vienna reacted by strengthening its own troops in Galicia. But at that moment, the proponents of a peaceful policy asserted themselves against the more aggressive line taken by others.

(1859–1918), commander of the Bulgarian army that had decisively defeated the Ottoman troops at Lozengrad and Lüle Burgaz (Thrace, October–November 1912), to meet Russian military leaders became a public event in March 1913. *Novoe Vremia* hailed him as “the hero of Lozengrad”; crowds, Russian journalists, members of the Russian general staff, and cadets from military schools celebrated him, while women tossed flowers. He occupied the center of attention, while other members of the Bulgarian delegation—Danev, the president of the Bulgarian parliament, Bobchev, the Bulgarian envoy in Saint Petersburg, and a secretary of Bulgarian Czar Ferdinand—were outshone by his obvious popularity.⁵⁰ This delegation, together with other prominent Pan-Slavic visitors, took part in a solemn mass on March 30 at the Church of Resurrection of Jesus Christ in Saint Petersburg to give thanks for the fall of Adrianople.⁵¹

This event became a turning point, as the government increasingly felt that public order was being endangered. Namely, after the mass the first serious incident occurred, which involved czarist guards reacting violently against demonstrators. A Pan-Slavic demonstration formed after the ceremony was finished, and the policemen tried their best to prevent some 3,000 demonstrators from reaching the Austrian embassy. From there, the demonstrators turned toward the Serb embassy, singing the Russian national anthem and songs of triumph. But then the situation spun out of control; mounted police units whipped people in the street, who in turn burst out in hysterical shouting. Some people were seriously injured. Four women and an officer were thrown to the ground by police horses.⁵² The next day, March 31, brought a similarly dangerous confrontation between demonstrators and guards: a Pan-Slavic crowd holding aloft Russian and Pan-Slavic flags was encircled by mounted police on Nevskii Prospect. All day long, security forces had to protect the Austrian embassy.⁵³ The Austrian

⁵⁰ “Ot-ezd gen. Radko Dimitrieva” [*sic*] [General Radko Dimitriev’s departure], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13297, March 19 [April 1], 1913, 5; “U generala Radko Dimitrieva” [At General Radko Dimitriev], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13296, March 18 [31], 1913, 1. After the Second Balkan War, Dimitriev was sent to Saint Petersburg as a minister plenipotentiary. During the First World War, he was granted Russian citizenship and became commander of a Russian corps. In 1918, he was shot by the Bolsheviks.

⁵¹ “Slavianskii moleben” [Slavic prayer], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13296, March 18 [31], 1913, 3.

⁵² “Slavianskaia manifestatsiia” [Slavic Manifestation], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13296, March 18 [31], 1913, 3.

⁵³ “Slavianskaia manifestatsiia” [Slavic Manifestation], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13297, March 19 [April 1], 1913, 2.

ambassador in Saint Petersburg, Thurn, characterized the demonstrations as an expression of the “excessively instigated Russian people’s soul,” which could be used to force the Russian government to indulge their will.⁵⁴

When Pan-Slavic grumblings coalesced into a growing opposition to official politics, the government—the turmoil of 1905 still fresh in mind—reacted harshly. Following the events of late March, a demonstration in front of the Serb and Bulgarian embassy in Saint Petersburg was organized on April 6, 1913 to express sympathy for the Balkan Slavs. But when the crowd turned toward the Austrian and German embassies, the police again violently beat back protests with whips. When a committee headed by Skugarevskii and Bobrinskii organized two huge Pan-Slavic demonstrations on the same day to celebrate the Serb and Montenegrin victory of Shkodra and the Greek and Bulgarian victory at Çatalca near Constantinople (November 1912), events took a turn the government had wanted to avoid at all costs.⁵⁵ The organizers had met the interior minister beforehand to discuss the appropriate march routes. As they were allowed to hold the demonstrations on condition that they made sure “revolutionary elements” would not participate,⁵⁶ Skugarevskii and Bobrinskii invited Slavophile students to take care of public order. The committee included two commemorations for dead Balkan soldiers and for the persecuted Orthodox in Austria-Hungary. The ceremonies would take place in the Kazan’ Cathedral and in the Church of the Saviour of Spilled Blood (Chram Spasa na krovi) in Saint Petersburg. Anti-Habsburg protest marches led by military and church representatives such as bishops, generals, and officers followed the church masses.

Led by Skugarevskii, the protesters proceeded to the fortress of Saints Peter and Paul, where delegates laid a wreath on the tomb of Alexander III with the inscription, “To the Emperor Alexander III, who recognized Montenegro as Russia’s only friend,” and a cross was laid on the tomb of Alexander II. The protesters fiercely objected to Montenegro being “robbed of Shkodra,” wearing banners with the inscriptions “Skutari to Montenegro.” But they also demanded the installation of “the cross over

⁵⁴The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Thurn, Saint Petersburg, March 30–April 12, 1913, in ÖUA, vol. 6 (Vienna, Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1930), no. 6596, 133–34.

⁵⁵“K slavianskoi manifestatsii” [As to the Slavic manifestation], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13302, March 24 [April 6], 1913, 3.

⁵⁶George W. Buchanan to Edward Grey, April 7, 1913, Saint Petersburg, in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, part I, series A, vol. 6, 312.

St. Sophia” in Constantinople, shouting “down with Austria.” During the demonstration, one of Sazonov’s purported speeches was circulated, although it was obviously a fake. Another demonstration proceeded to the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serb legations. When the Serbian minister appeared at the balcony, he was cheered by the crowd, who then carried a Serb flag down the Nevskii Prospect to Saint Isaac’s Square. Here, the police had to prevent the protesters from approaching the German embassy.⁵⁷ Foreign commentators reported that “tens of thousands” of protesters congregated on the Nevskii Prospect;⁵⁸ *Novoe Vremia* estimated that 50,000 people participated.⁵⁹

Although the day’s events went by without violence, they signaled the czarist government’s determination to stop mass activities. The government feared that Pan-Slavic agitation could seriously menace the institution of the monarchy. Henceforth, the authorities prevented students and soldiers from attending demonstrations, which were prohibited on April 8. Czar Nicholas II explained to British ambassador Buchanan that he did not believe the majority of Russians shared the demonstrators’ opinions:

The recent demonstrations and the Pan-Slavist agitation did not represent the real views of the Russian people, and were rather a fictitious development. They were, indeed, being engineered for the purpose of embarrassing the Government and encompassing its fall. The majority of Russians did not want war so long as their own interests were not attacked.⁶⁰

After demonstrations were banned, open opposition collapsed. However, elements of Saint Petersburg’s society still publicly and unconditionally sympathized with the military successes of the Balkan peoples. Full of enthusiasm and showing no visible difference in dedication to their convictions, they hailed Serb and Bulgarian military successes equally. When the city of Shkodra was handed over to the Montenegrin army in April 1913, joyful meetings erupted in the streets of Saint Petersburg, and the press was effusive. On April 23 a meeting took place in the Russian capital to express the visitors’ thanks for the fall of Shkodra.⁶¹ A brief high mass

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ *Colonist* [Nelson, New Zealand], vol. 55, no. 13693, April 8, 1913, 5.

⁵⁹ *Novoe Vremia* March 25–April 7, 1913, no. 13303, 2.

⁶⁰ George W. Buchanan to Edward Grey, Saint Petersburg, April 14, 1913, in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, part I, series A, vol. 6, 313–16, here 314.

⁶¹ *Schulthess’ Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, vol. 29 (1913), 615–16.

was celebrated in Preobrazhenskii Cathedral, attended by many officers. Then the assembly passed through the crowded Liteyny Prospect singing the national anthem, cheering for Montenegro, and marching in the direction of the Serb embassy. There, nearly 3,000 protestors wildly celebrated the Montenegrin victory.

What effect did these demonstrations have on Russian politics? Sazonov, who was not willing to support Russian military actions in the Balkans, conceded in his memoirs that he was nevertheless aware of the street protest that embarrassed the Russian allies, but this did not influence the “steady and conscious work of the Russian government. The prohibition of demonstrations stopped the unhealthy tendencies being imported by irresponsible persons.”⁶²

A NEW SLAV TIME: NOVOE VREMIA

Following the Congress of Berlin, the Pan-Slavic movement in Russia closely observed the fate of the Slavs in the Balkans through the new form of popular journalism. Pan-Slavic journals like *Moskovskii Ezhdel'nik* (Moscow Daily), *Russkaia Mysl'* (Russian Thought), *Slavianskii Mir* (Slavic World), *Slavianskie Izvestiia* (Slavic News), and others depicted their Slav brothers in the Balkans as oppressed by the Ottomans, and they expressed strong support for Macedonia's independence. While these journals were neither very popular nor long-lasting, the right-wing *Novoe Vremia*, one of the most important newspapers in Russia, had long supported a Pan-Slavic course of action. Its first number was published in 1868, and it lasted until the newspaper was closed shortly after the Bolshevik takeover in 1917. The reason was obvious: *Novoe Vremia* unanimously toed the czar's political line, especially after Aleksei Suvorin (1834–1912) acquired ownership of the newspaper in 1876.⁶³ When he died in August 1912, one of his sons inherited a flourishing, popular conservative newspaper and a reliable forum for Russian Pan-Slavic ideas.

⁶²Sergei D. Sazonov, *Vospominaniia* [Memoirs] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1991), 104–105.

⁶³On Suvorin's life and career, see Effie Ambler, *Russian Journalism and Politics 1861–1881: The Career of Aleksei S. Suvorin* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972); Efim A. Dinershtejn, *A. S. Suvorin. Chelovek, sdelavshii kar'eru* [A. S. Suvorin: a man who made his career] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998); *Telochranitel' Rossii. A. S. Suvorin v vospominaniach sovremennikov* [Russia's bodyguard: A. S. Suvorin in the memoirs of his contemporaries] (Voronezh: Izdat. Im. E. A. Bolchovitinova, 2001).

In the years prior to the First World War, *Novoe Vremia* very clearly manifested anti-Austrian positions. It published reports that were so critical that the journal itself became a matter of foreign politics. Half a year prior to the outbreak of the First Balkan War in April 1912, the Russian government went so far as to sever its contact with *Novoe Vremia* because of the newspaper's spiteful attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, Saint Petersburg, embarrassingly enough, assured Vienna it would denounce *Novoe Vremia*'s insults against Austria-Hungary.⁶⁴ During the months of the Balkan Wars in 1912–13, the military events were not the only topic in *Novoe Vremia*, but they featured prominently. In every issue, *Novoe Vremia* dedicated articles and commentaries to the events in the Balkans and reported short messages, *Telegramy*, about the official Russian position, the international disputes, and their effect in Russia. Often enough, the newspaper attacked the Russian government for acting reluctantly.

The wars themselves were described in a rather sober, unemotional way, providing only sparse details of military actions (this was forbidden by the censors), and also not printing exact information about battlefield brutalities, cruelties, and atrocities. The paper offered only a few words about how both irregular and regular troops from the belligerent countries terrorized civilian populations, or about the long stream of refugees escaping with nothing more than their lives. In other words, the newspaper depicted the Balkan Wars as “clean conflicts,” offering only the scarcest and oblique information about its widespread atrocities.

According to *Novoe Vremia*, Russian intervention in the wars themselves consisted mainly of diplomatic activities, as well as the sending of medical staff. This topic was occasionally emphasized with a certain pride. In the beginning of 1913, the paper reported on the activities of a Red Cross unit sent to Sofia under the sponsorship of the Merchants' Society of Saint Petersburg.⁶⁵ *Novoe Vremia* proved that the squad had made an energetic effort by providing numbers: between November 5 and December 28, 1912, its medical staff had treated 5,104 injured in the military hospital and had performed 150 surgeries. The newspaper published the names of three doctors and six nurses supported by an Orthodox priest from Kishinev, noting they were highly appreciated in Sofia.

⁶⁴ *Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, vol. 28 (1912), Munich 1913, 425.

⁶⁵ “Krasnyi Krest' na Balkanach” [The Red Cross in the Balkans], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13247, January 27 [February 9], 1913, 4.

Novoe Vremia displayed a certain bias towards the Slav Balkan states, defending Serbia, glorifying Montenegro, and reproaching Bulgaria. Consequently, Serbia came to be seen as Russia's close younger brother; Montenegro was highly appreciated for its military merits during the First Balkan War and especially in the siege of Shkodra, while Bulgaria's reputation was, in the eyes of *Novoe Vremia*, overshadowed by the pro-Austrian policy of Czar Ferdinand. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate these two opposing views of the "Slav brother" states, showing a triumphant King Nikola storming Shkodra (Fig. 5.1), while the "Hohenzollern youngster" Czar Ferdinand stands in the shadow of Austria-Hungary and Germany (Fig. 5.2). *Novoe Vremia* refused to criticize Serbia's military actions in the Balkans. When rumors appeared about Serbs committing atrocities against Albanians in Skopje and Prizren, *Novoe Vremia* declared them to be untenable, citing local Catholic priests who stated that the Serb army had not committed a single act of violence against the civilian population.⁶⁶

The most difficult situation arose with the inter-allied war, the Second Balkan War, when Bulgaria and Serbia stood on opposite sides of the trenches and Russia tried to arbitrate the conflict. *Novoe Vremia* would not accuse either of its Slav brothers, but predicted that neither would win; there would be only losers. Instead of partitioning their rich heritage, they had begun to spur each other on. Standing on the edge of an abyss, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece would have to choose to either tumble down or to stop at the last minute.⁶⁷ *Novoe Vremia* characterized the Second Balkan War as "fratricidal" and saw the quintessence of the Balkan "tragicomedy" in the small Balkan states' wish to achieve greatness: "Greater Serbia," "Greater Bulgaria," and "Greater Greece." However, the Balkan Peninsula could hardly offer enough space for all these aspirations.⁶⁸ Interestingly—and quite unlike its policy during the First Balkan War—*Novoe Vremia* published more reports this time on civilian losses, refugees, and other victims.

The most sensitive topic was the conflict with Austria-Hungary. In the eyes of *Novoe Vremia*, the Danube Monarchy suppressed Pan-Slavic sentiments whenever possible. So *Novoe Vremia* observed Pan-Slavic demonstrations in Austria-Hungary very carefully and directed its readers'

⁶⁶ "Oproverzhenie razskazov o nasiliach Serbov nad Albantsamy" [Denial of the stories about Serbs' violence against Albanians], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13289, March 11 [24], 1913, 2.

⁶⁷ "Posledniia minuty" [The last minutes], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13387, June 20 [July 3], 1913, 3.

⁶⁸ "Dovol'no drany!" [Enough of the dragged!], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13401, June 4 [17], 1913, 2.



Fig. 5.1 The Montenegrin King Nikola posing as an attacking Cossack—a well-known reference to Russian readers—with the Russian Emperor Aleksandr III behind him resembling a guardian angel (*Novoe Vremia* no. 13327, April 20 [May 3], 1913, 4)




Fig. 5.2 The Bulgarian Czar and “younger Hohenzollern” Ferdinand “getting a present” from Austria–Hungary and Germany, if he is a “good boy” (*Novoe Vremia* no. 13315, April 6 [19], 1913, 13)

attention to the consequences faced by those involved: In March 1913, the administration of Split, Dalmatia, organized a demonstration in favor of the Balkan people led by the city's mayor, Katalinić. Demonstrators expressed their unanimous sympathy for their Slavic brothers. They hailed the Serb and Montenegrin kings as well as the Bulgarian czar. Twenty people were arrested, nine were questioned by the police, and several others were tried for treason.⁶⁹ *Novoe Vremia* distrusted Austrian policy in the Balkans, especially when Vienna demanded political rights and economic privileges following the Berlin Treaty in Ottoman- and now Serb-occupied territories in Macedonia.⁷⁰ The newspaper hinted at “Austrian intrigues” and violations of Serb sovereignty. When Austrian foreign policy pressed for an independent Albania to prevent Serbia from accessing the Adriatic Sea, *Novoe Vremia* had its own particular perspective and stated it was cynical that the Austrian foreign minister, Count Leopold Berchtold (in office 1912–15), had declared that Albanians had the right to exist as a nation with their own state, but that on the other side Vienna had “robbed” Bosnia-Herzegovina “from the Serb people,” preventing the Serb population there from living in a Serb state.⁷¹ *Novoe Vremia* asserted that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s population was exclusively Serb, and historically it was a Serb territory. Nevertheless, *Novoe Vremia* also reported unbiased factual information on Austria-Hungary, such as the two hundredth anniversary of the Pragmatic Sanction and its importance for Habsburg policy.⁷²

Novoe Vremia did not overtly cast the Ottoman Empire—the enemy of all Balkan states—negatively. It described the empire, which was withdrawing its troops step by step from Europe, as a tragic loser of the First Balkan War; it was as if Russia was lamenting the gradual collapse of a fellow empire. But *Novoe Vremia* could not resist reminding readers that Russia had won the war against the Ottomans in 1877–78.⁷³ Bulgarian

⁶⁹ “Slavianskia demonstratsii v Avstrii” [Slavic demonstrations in Austria], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13301, March 23 [April 5], 1913, 3.

⁷⁰ “Posiagatel’stvo na nezavisimost’ Serbiia” [An infringement on Serbia’s independence], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13305, March 25 [April 7], 1913, 3; “Avstriiskii intrigi” [Austrian intrigues], *ibid.*

⁷¹ “Rech’ gr. Berchtol’da” [A speech of Count Berchtold], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13168, November 7 [20], 1912, 3.

⁷² “Gabsburgskii iubilei” [A Habsburg jubilee], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13317, April 8 [21], 1913, 2.

⁷³ “Voina. (Mysli i vpechatleniia)” [War (thoughts and impressions)], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13167, November 6 [19], 1912, 4.

and Serbian media outlets welcomed *Novoe Vremia's* Pan-Slavic articles. In Bulgaria, newspapers cited *Novoe Vremia* and expressed the hope they might influence Russian foreign policy in the Balkans,⁷⁴ while in Serbia Russian journalists were rewarded for their work and activities in favor of Serbia. After the Second Balkan War, the Serb minister in Saint Petersburg, Popović, compiled a list of sixteen Russian journalists to be honored with a prominent Serb decoration, the Order of St. Sava. These journalists worked for *Novoe Vremia*, *Večernee Vremia*, *Russkoe Slovo*, and *Birzhevye Vedomosti*. Boris Suvorin (1879–1940), Aleksey Suvorin's son and publishing heir to *Novoe Vremia*, was given his award for sending an airplane to Serbia.⁷⁵

HARTWIG'S PERSONAL INTERPRETATION OF PAN-SLAVISM IN BELGRADE

Russian foreign policy and its attempts to diffuse the international conflict during the Balkan Wars provided the main guidelines for Russian diplomats, too. Nonetheless, one of the most important diplomats and most prominent Pan-Slavic protagonists during the Balkan Wars, Nikolaus von Hartwig (1857–1914, born in Georgia with a German family background), followed a personal line that severely endangered Russian diplomacy. He maintained the sensible position of the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, while pursuing his own interpretation of how to fulfill directives.⁷⁶ Shortly after his arrival in Belgrade on September 14, 1909, he

⁷⁴ PA AA, R 14216: Von Bülow to Bethmann Hollweg, Sofia, September 18, 1912.

⁷⁵ Popović, the Serb *chargé d'affaires* in Saint Petersburg, to the Serb Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade (no date) in Boghitschewitsch, *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens 1903–1914*, Band 1, 408–9 (no. 394).

⁷⁶ Hartwig was chief of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic department and was known for his Slavophile convictions stemming from the Russo–Ottoman War in 1877–78, when as a young man he was very impressed by the Russian assistance given to “brother Slavs”: Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism since 1856*, 166. As to Hartwig's personality, see, from the Serbian perspective, Marco [Božin Simić], Nikola Hartwig. (Spoljna politika Srbije pred Svetski Rat.) [Nikolaus Hartwig. (Serbia's foreign politics before the World War)], *Nova Evropa*. Knj. 17 (April 26, 1928) no. 8, 256–78; whereas the Austrian historical point of view has been very critical: Hans Uebersberger, “Zur Vorkriegsgeschichte Serbiens,” *Berliner Monatshefte*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1933), 15–55, especially 42–45. According to Uebersberger, Hartwig knew about the preparations for the assassination in Sarajevo as well as Pašić and the Serb king Aleksandar; see idem, *Österreich zwischen Rußland und Serbien. Zur südslawischen Frage und der Entstehung des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Graz: Böhlau, 1958), 299.

was soon already exercising significant influence over Serb foreign policy; the American consul was hardly mistaken in calling him “the champion of Pan-Slavism.”⁷⁷ Hartwig found a kindred spirit in Nikola Pašić, the Serb prime minister and foreign minister between 1912 and 1918. Soon Hartwig became a constant adviser to the Serb government.⁷⁸ His considerable sway over the Serb prime minister was based on mutual interest: “How far Hartwig followed the ideas of Pašić or Pašić those of Hartwig would be interesting to know. It was no doubt a case of diamond cut diamond, for when two such capable and strong-willed men work together there must be give and take.”⁷⁹ Hartwig himself saw his role in Belgrade as reinforcing Russo–Serb solidarity as much as possible in order to ensure effective united action in a possible conflict with Vienna.⁸⁰ He identified Russian foreign policy with Serb national politics, hardly concealing his contempt for Sazonov’s positions. Sazonov, on the other side, was embarrassed because Hartwig’s interpretations of Russian policy in Belgrade significantly complicated his task.⁸¹

In 1912 Hartwig, together with his counterpart Nekliudov in Sofia, brokered the creation of the Balkan League among Serbia and Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece.⁸² But while Hartwig had planned to orient the league primarily against Austria-Hungary, their members had other aims: The Balkan League declared war on Constantinople—against Saint Petersburg’s wishes. As Russia was unable to stop the First Balkan War, Hartwig made the best of the situation. In the end, he succeeded in binding Belgrade and Saint Petersburg together, or at least played a prominent role in involving Serbia in Russian foreign policy. In addition to representing “official” Russia, Hartwig felt he also represented “unofficial”

⁷⁷The American consul in Belgrade, Maddin Summers, to Department of State, July 1, 1919. Address on the Political Situation in the Balkans Prior to the War, in Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of the Balkan States: 1910–1939, Document 870.00/3 = National Archives Microfilm Publications, Washington, DC, Decimal File 870, Roll 3.

⁷⁸Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars: 1912–1913* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), 28.

⁷⁹Ibid., 27.

⁸⁰Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*, 41.

⁸¹Sazonov, *Vospominaniia*, 95.

⁸²Edward C. Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), 63, 86–89; Andrew Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908–1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 39–46.

Russia—the Pan-Slavists. As a result, he often gave the Serb government the impression that Serbia would get more support from Russia than the official line allowed for. Twisting Sazonov's instructions, in his communications with the Serb government Hartwig would frequently embellish or exaggerate the extent of Russian sympathy for Serbia. Hartwig himself did not care much about accusations that he represented Serb rather than Russian positions, or that he was in permanent contact with the Serb King Peter, giving him advice concerning Austria-Hungary. Confronted with these accusations, he answered that he had not met Peter for half a year, and then had done so only together with other diplomats. He claimed that he had never had separate talks with him and saw the Serb foreign minister only if developments necessitated doing so.⁸³

After the Second Balkan War, Hartwig stuck to his “Serb convictions” and participated in official events commemorating the victory. On November 26, 1913, the anniversary of the Serb occupation of the city of Üsküb/Skopje was celebrated, including a *Te Deum* sung in the former Bulgarian church under the auspices of the municipality. The Russian consul was the only member of the consular corps present. The other diplomats all ignored the invitation because they feared their official presence would be interpreted as formal recognition of Serbia's annexation of the new territories, which the Ottoman Empire still legally retained.⁸⁴ Apart from this, Hartwig helped to repair the broken ties between Serbia and Bulgaria when difficulties arose between the two countries in connection with a prisoner exchange. Hartwig successfully resolved this problem and brokered the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Sofia. To him, this was a “matter of personal prestige.”⁸⁵

It is an irony of history that Hartwig died in the Austrian embassy in Belgrade while talking to the Austrian ambassador Wladimir Giesl (1860–1936). Rumors flourished in Serbia about the presumably unnatural causes of his death. His British colleague Crackanthorpe's explanation seems to be more likely: Hartwig's demise was due to a heart attack caused by an excess of regret for not having hoisted the Russian flag at half-mast on the day of Archduke Franz Ferdinand's funeral service. Crackanthorpe added,

⁸³ “Russkii poslanik v Belgrade o tekushchich sobytiach” [The Russian envoy in Belgrade on the current events], *Novoe Vremia* no. 13185, November 24 [December 7], 1912, 14.

⁸⁴ Public Record Office (PRO), London, F.O. 371/1748, fol. 184: General Correspondence. Political. Serbia. Crackanthorpe to Edward Grey. Belgrade, November 8, 1913.

⁸⁵ PRO, London: F.O. 371/1748, fol. 127: General Correspondence. Political. Serbia. Crackanthorpe to Edward Grey. Belgrade, December 17, 1913.

[I]t is probable that the interview must have been, on Monsieur de Hartwig's side, somewhat emotional, sufficiently so as to hasten an end which, according to doctors' evidence, could in any case have been deferred a few days. I am however assured that the conversation between the two Ministers was quite friendly.⁸⁶

This statement throws a rather different light on the relationship between Hartwig and his Austrian colleagues in Belgrade. Giesl, too, in his memoirs written some years later, felt convinced that had Hartwig still been alive, the First World War would not have broken out; he would have convinced the Serb government to fully accept the Austrian ultimatum.⁸⁷ Coming from a political opponent, this characterization is remarkable, and it proves that the Austrians knew nothing about the misleading diplomatic notes and recommendations Hartwig sent to Saint Petersburg.⁸⁸

Regarding the continuity of Pan-Slavism in Serbia, Hartwig did not fall into oblivion in the years that followed. He was buried in Belgrade, and in 1939 the city erected a new tombstone for him. The late "champion of Pan-Slavism" was remembered more than twenty years after his death, when Yugoslavia—on the eve of the Second World War—was threatened by Nazi Germany. But within the context of Pan-Slavism in Russia, which still exists, Hartwig was no longer remembered.

Generally, Pan-Slavism in Russia before the First World War emerged abruptly when the Ottoman territories in the Balkans were at stake during the Balkan Wars in 1912–13. Pan-Slavism provoked the expression of collective national sensibilities. It referred to glorious Russian power, but the interests of individual actors also shaped it: Hartwig, the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, pushed Serb interests in the Balkans; the Montenegrin princesses in the Russian capital enhanced the position of the Montenegrin dynasty; and Bobrinskii fraternized with the "Slav brothers" in Austria-Hungary. Russian newspapers like *Novoe Vremia* channeled public criticism toward the official course taken by Russia during the Balkan Wars, and the Russian elite celebrated Russia's powerful past with the Slavic banquets. Whatever the deeper motives for these demonstrations of Pan-Slavism, the czarist regime reacted according to the political demands of the time. First,

⁸⁶ PRO, London: F.O. 371/2099, fol. 443–44, here fol. 444: General Correspondence. Political. Serbia 1914. Crackanhorpe to Edward Grey. Belgrade, July 13, 1914.

⁸⁷ *Zwei Jahrzehnte im Nahen Orient. Aufzeichnungen des Generals der Kavallerie Baron Wladimir Giesl* (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1927), 260.

⁸⁸ Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, 253.

it oppressed and forbade public protest marches in the streets, fearing for its own safety. Then, with the beginning of the First World War, it instrumentalized Pan-Slavic claims in order to mobilize Russian patriotism. The official Russian war propaganda machine overwhelmingly used Pan-Slavic slogans in leaflets and other publications to encourage the czarist army's soldiers.⁸⁹ Pan-Slavism was a malleable rhetoric that could be deployed in the support of many ideas, allies, and aims. In his August 3, 1914 manifesto expressing Russian support for Serbia, Czar Nicholas openly connected the Slav idea in Russia with the country's interests abroad.⁹⁰ Thus the Pan-Slavism that originated in the Balkan Wars in 1912–13 became the last political idea to be disseminated before the collapse of the empire. As they had to leave Russia after the Bolshevik takeover, most Russian Pan-Slavists tragically became victims of the First World War.

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⁸⁹ See A. B. Astashov, *Propaganda na Russkom fronte v gody Pervoi mirovoi voyny* [Propaganda on the Russian Front in the years of the First World War] (Moscow: Speckniga, 2012), 9–42, 282–84, 289–90, 367–69, and others.

⁹⁰ Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, 275.

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PART II

European Eyes on the Balkans:
Reassuring the Self

Marianne Staring at the Balkans on Fire: French Views and Perceptions of the 1912–13 Conflicts

Nicolas Pitsos

In October 1912, the news-addicted French public could read the following comment in the Belle Époque's most popular newspaper: "I don't like war, because it spoils every conversation. In fact, these days, it is difficult to hear anything other than discussions on the Balkan Wars."¹ The grumblings of *Le Petit Parisien's* editorial writer demonstrate how French public debate was preoccupied with the Balkan Wars, especially during its first few months, when information related to the conflict took up almost half of the front pages of the four most popular French newspapers (*Le Journal*, *Le Matin*, *Le Petit Journal*, and *Le Petit Parisien*). The diffusion of "atrocities news" during the operations of July 1913 caused interest to decline (see Table 6.1).

Exploring textual and iconographic sources such as newspaper articles and photographs, I will analyze how French society perceived the violence

¹ Paul Ginisty, "La semaine parisienne," *Le Petit Parisien*, 14 October 1912.

N. Pitsos (✉)

Center for European and Eurasian Studies at the National Institute for Oriental Languages and Cultures (INALCO), Paris, France

e-mail: nikolaospitsos@hotmail.com

Table 6.1 The share of information related to the Balkan Wars appearing on the front pages of French newspapers (in percentages)

	<i>Le Petit Parisien</i>	<i>Le Petit Journal</i>	<i>Le Matin</i>	<i>Le Journal</i>	<i>Le Temps</i>	<i>Le Figaro</i>	<i>L'Humanité</i>
Oct 1912	48.6	47.3	46.5	49.9	20.4	15.6	46.6
Nov 1912	39.7	49.0	45.5	51.1	20.7	17.0	49.7
Dec 1912	27.4	28.5	20.4	31.7	12.5	10.3	12.2
Jan 1913	21.7	15.3	13.4	23.4	12.2	9.3	15.8
Feb 1913	13.4	8.7	12.5	12.6	8.5	3.9	8.7
Mar 1913	18.5	10.4	7.8	12.0	2.5	4.9	4.1
Apr 1913	14.4	15.0	24.7	14.4	8.6	6.8	6.6
May 1913	16.4	10.2	5.0	10.0	7.9	5.7	3.6
Jun 1913	10.8	7.1	5.0	5.9	5.0	3.3	5.3
Jul 1913	21.4	24.8	19.7	24.3	11.0	11.8	14.0
Aug 1913	11.4	5.6	7.2	12.2	13.0	7.2	6.9

and nature of Balkan Wars in 1912–13. My corpus of sources comprises a variety of newspapers, offering a panoramic view of the French political landscape at the time, which was shaped around five fundamental topics: the legacy of the French Revolution, the recognition of the Third Republic, the law of the separation of church and state, the orientation of social policies, and the definition of a nation. The stances taken on these issues outline the essential features of what Serge Berstein calls a “political culture” and what Christophe Charle considers the distinctive marks of a right- or left-leaning orientation.² The diversity of the titles I include covers the broad perception of the Balkan Wars according to the various political sympathies expressed in the public arena (see Table 6.2).

²Christophe Charle, *Le siècle de la presse: 1830–1939* (Paris: Seuil, 2004), and Serge Berstein, ed., *Les cultures politiques en France* (Paris: Seuil, 2003).

Table 6.2 French newspapers divided by ideological orientation and circulation

<i>Newspapers</i>	<i>Ideological orientation according to Serge Bernstein's concept of "political culture"</i>	<i>Ideological orientation according to Christophe Charle</i>	<i>Circulation</i>
<i>L'Action Française</i>	Traditionalist/nationalist	Royalist	19,000
<i>L'Aurore</i>	Radical (secularist)	Radical	7,000
<i>L'Autorité</i>	Traditionalist/nationalist	Bonapartist	24,000
<i>La Bataille Syndicaliste</i>	Socialist	Socialist	45,000
<i>La Croix</i>	Traditionalist/nationalist	Right-wing	140,000
<i>L'Echo de Paris</i>	Traditionalist/nationalist	Right-wing	120,000
<i>Le Figaro</i>	Traditionalist	Right-wing	37,000
<i>Le Gaulois</i>	Traditionalist	Right-wing	30,000
<i>La Guerre Sociale</i>	Socialist	Socialist	52,000
<i>L'Humanité</i>	Socialist	Socialist	72,000
<i>Le Journal</i>	Liberal/republican	Republican/ right-wing	810,000
<i>L'Illustration</i>	Liberal/republican	Republican	120,000
<i>La Lanterne</i>	Radical (secularist)	Anti-clerical	33,000
<i>Le Libéraire</i>	Libertarian	Libertarian	(n.a.)
<i>La Libre Parole</i>	Traditionalist/nationalist	Anti-Semitic	47,000
<i>Le Matin</i>	Liberal/republican	Republican moderate	670,000
<i>Le Petit Journal</i>	Traditionalist/nationalist	Republican/ right-wing	835,000
<i>Le Petit Parisien</i>	Radical/republican (secularist)	Republican	1,400,000
<i>Le Radical</i>	Radical (secularist)	Radical (secularist)	29,000
<i>Le Temps</i>	Liberal/republican	Center-left	36,000

One of this study's conceptual cornerstones is its metaphorical consideration of history's narrative as a three-story building, each story sheltering a different process. The first establishes and pieces together historical facts. The second story is devoted to opinions expressed about a historical event and the news disseminated about it within a given society. Finally, the third story is "furnished" with works studying how a historical event has been revisited by historians or commemorated by individuals or official institutions. Although a synchronic study of an individual's perception of a conflict would usually be placed on the second story, the three levels of historical analysis are far from isolated from one another. On the contrary, they constantly interact, and the analysis of this interaction helps explain the process of perception.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE CAUSES OF THE BALKAN WARS

First of all, as far as the causes of the 1912–13 wars are concerned, two perceptions prevailed among the French citizens who expressed themselves in the media. One of the most prominent socialist activists, Louis Dubreuilh, wrote in *L'Humanité*:

All those who despise socialism, and who are at the same time enemies of peace, are trying to attribute causes of moral and spiritual order to the war triggered off in the Balkans. ... According to them it is a struggle of races and religions: Aryans against Turkic peoples, Christians against Muslims, the cross against the crescent.³

The use of ethnic, racial, and cultural enmity to explain the conflict is a dominant etiological discourse when it comes to perceiving war.⁴ Nationalist, anti-republican, and Islamophobic thinkers invited their fellow citizens to grasp the Balkan Peninsula as a fracture zone, a point where religions and civilization clashed. Some eighty years later, right-wing thinkers such as Samuel Huntington would once again popularize the concept of a clash of civilizations; Huntington's model coincided with mainstream interpretations of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.⁵

As Vesna Goldsworthy maintains in her contribution to the collective work *Balkans as Metaphor*, since the end of the nineteenth century the perception of secular fault lines in the Balkan Peninsula has gone hand in hand with recourse to “ancient hatreds” as the preferred explanation for every conflict linked to the “Eastern Question.”⁶ However, not everyone in French society agreed with the ethnic strife leitmotiv. Alongside

³ Louis Dubreuilh, “Ni croix, ni croissant,” *L'Humanité*, 21 October 1912.

⁴ Tim Allen, “Perceiving Contemporary Wars,” in Tim Allen and Jean Seaton, eds., *The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence* (London: Zed Books, 1999), 43.

⁵ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). This work reproduces some older interpretational schemes in the historiography of international relations, such as the one developed by the British historian Arnold Toynbee, which concluded that civilizations, considered as relatively stable and homogenous cultural entities, were the proper unit of analysis for historians.

⁶ Vesna Goldsworthy, “Invention and In(ter)vention: The Rhetoric of Balkanization,” in Dušan I. Bjelić and Obrad Savić, eds., *Balkans as Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 26. For a panoramic presentation of the different sequences of the Eastern Question, see Alexander Macfie, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923* (London: Longman, 1996).

political analysts who emphasized the geopolitical context in which these conflicts took place,⁷ the editorial writer of the libertarian newspaper *Le Libertaire* observed that “today” (October 1912) there was talk of ancient hatreds, turning Muslim and Christian peasants into fierce enemies. But in 1908, the Young Turks’ revolution “was to be the Turkish 1789. Have we not seen the Christians who inhabited the Ottoman Empire join this movement enthusiastically[?],”⁸ he asked rhetorically.⁹

For their part, socialist thinkers maintained that reducing the social and economic factors that underlay these conflicts to religious or ethnic criteria depoliticized and at the same time “culturalized” them.¹⁰ Opposed to an explanation of ethnic, racial, and cultural antagonism, they favored a materialistic approach, which understood war as a competition for resources. Thus, socialist perceptions of the Balkan Wars emphasized the conflicts’ mercantile and irredentist motives. At L’École des Hautes Études Sociales, the socialist economist Francis Delaisi declared the wars’ underlying causes to be economic and, above all, to be a consequence of the Balkan states’ search for new export markets for their products.¹¹ Marty-Rolland, a trade union secretary, addressed a crowd of 1,000 in the Capitol Theatre in Toulouse, claiming that the war was the result not of patriotism—as allegedly presumed by nationalists both inside and outside the Balkans—but of the clash of economic interests. And he went on to compare it to the recent Spanish–American, Anglo–Boer, and Russian–Japanese conflicts.¹²

⁷ Some recent studies, such as Misha Glenny’s *The Balkans 1804–1999: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers* (New York: Penguin, 1999), focus on the antagonisms dividing the Great Powers during the conflicts related to the Balkan dimension of the Eastern Question.

⁸ Silvaire [pseudonym of Gédéon Bessedé], “Guerre de féodaux,” *Le Libertaire*, 26 October 1912. This newspaper was founded by Sébastien Faure and Louise Michel, two of the most prominent figures of the Paris Commune.

⁹ Many French contemporary observers viewed the Young Turks’ revolution as an opportunity to overcome antagonisms within Ottoman society, as well as a chance for the empire to advance toward a more democratic and liberal political system.

¹⁰ Dubreuilh, “Ni croix, ni croissant.” For the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s see Berna Günen, “The European Press Coverage of the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” PhD thesis, Institut d’études politiques de Paris, 2011. The author concludes that the commentators’ insistence on ethnic discourse to explain the causes of the Yugoslav wars depoliticized them almost completely.

¹¹ Archives Nationales, Paris, F/7/13328, “Agitation contre la guerre,” conference par Delaisi, 17 November 1912.

¹² Archives Nationales, Paris, F/7/13328, “Agitation contre la guerre,” Toulouse, 19 November 1912.

This imperialist image of the Balkan Wars contrasts with the crusade-like perception taken by the right-wing political and academic elites. Jean-Louis Vaudoyer, of the right-wing nationalist newspaper *Le Gaulois*, compared the Balkan military operations to the 1911 Italo–Ottoman War,¹³ claiming that “history always repeats itself. Last year, Italians disembarked in Libya; now other Christians are invading Muslim countries. How could we not think about crusades?”¹⁴ At the same time, the right-wing Catholic newspaper *La Croix* asserted that “the thousand year-old struggle between the Cross and the Crescent goes on tirelessly.”¹⁵ This latter approach echoed the Balkan allies’ rhetoric, which justified the First Balkan War campaigns in terms of the religious deliverance of oppressed populations. In so doing, they recycled the myth of liberation behind their expansionist plans, and tried to stir the sympathy of European Christian audiences, who were particularly receptive to Islamophobic discourses that resulted from political and cultural representations of Islam.

As far as political representation was concerned, European colonial powers feared that their Muslim colonial populations could unite under a pan-Islamic doctrine and pose a serious threat to their rule. Colonial officials’ and Orientalist scholars’ statements about the cross-border spread of Muslim solidarity provoked this anxiety. French nationalists and pro-colonialist politicians were especially anxious that their adversaries, in particular the Germans, could harness these sentiments and destabilize the North African French colonies. Regarding the cultural dimension of the representation of Islam, religion and civilization had already fallen victim to the geographical imagination of Western Europe’s Orientalists, who had established representational associations between the Occident and the Orient, Europe and Asia, Christianity and Islam. The notions that, on the one hand, the Orient was essentially different from the Occident and, on the other hand, that the Occident was synonymous with political, cultural, and moral superiority formed key elements of these dichotomies. These concepts were accompanied by the sense that Western rule brought civilization and progress to regions characterized as the Orient by thinkers from Europe’s Great Powers.¹⁶

¹³This war opposed Italy and the Ottoman Empire during 1911–12. Italy wanted to gain control of the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitana and Cyrenaica (modern Libya) to achieve its colonialist projects and compete with other European colonial powers.

¹⁴Jean-Louis Vaudoyer, “Guerres d’autrefois,” *Le Gaulois*, 7 January 1913.

¹⁵“La guerre est générale dans les Balkans,” *La Croix*, 19 October 1912.

¹⁶For a genealogy of the evolution of representations of the West and the East, from the early Romantic movement’s fascination with the Orient through the dominant imperialist/

Nevertheless, the different factions of the French Catholic-Christian movement did not unanimously share this Islamophobic perception of the nature of the Balkan Wars. Besides Pierre Loti, who had personal affinities with the Ottoman Empire, there were other voices, too, who expressed themselves in right-wing newspapers such as the “Bonapartist” *L’Autorité*, maintaining that the Balkan allies’ operations could jeopardize the interests of Catholic congregations in regions ruled by the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷ These commentators viewed the sultan’s authority to be a more trustworthy guarantee of the continuation of their cultural and confessional activities¹⁸ than the intolerance and potential competition of what they described as the “schismatic” Orthodox kingdoms.¹⁹

No matter how ambivalently Catholic-leaning newspapers presented the wars’ crusading character, various newspapers published images of priests blessing soldiers before battle in order to insist on the wars’ religious nature.²⁰ Conversely, socialists were aware that the allies’ propaganda presented the conflict as confessional in order to conceal their governments’ true motives. They published the same images to criticize what they considered the manipulation and commandeering of religion in the name of irredentist, expansionist plans.²¹ Lingering memories of the Dreyfus Affair and echoes of the controversies surrounding the law separating church and state fueled public debates in France; the Balkan Wars represented a pretext for the anti-Dreyfusard, anti-secularist camp to celebrate the alleged alliance between the army and the church. On the other hand, the defenders of Captain Dreyfus’s innocence and of the 1905 law saw an opportunity to denounce the two institutions’ vested interests and guilty alliance.

Going back to the 1912–13 Balkan Wars, a contributor to *L’Action Française*, the nationalist-monarchist newspaper and a regular platform

colonial representation of such a bipolar geographical scheme, see Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹⁷ See the opinion expressed by J. Odelin, in *L’Autorité*, 17 October 1912.

¹⁸ For a global view of French interests within the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the twentieth century, see Jacques Thobie, *Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l’empire ottoman, 1895–1914* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1977).

¹⁹ Thérèse Aubaret, *Lettres sur la guerre balkanique* (Poitiers, 1913), 3.

²⁰ “Le métropolitain de Belgrade bénit les drapeaux serbes,” *Le Monde Illustré*, 12 October 1912, or “À Sofia, bénédiction des troupes partant pour la frontière,” *Le Journal*, 13 October 1912.

²¹ “La bénédiction des drapeaux serbes,” *L’Humanité*, 19 October 1912.

for the extreme-right-wing publicist Charles Maurras, commented on the Serbian army's entry into the Ottoman city of Usküb (Skopje):

Shame on the narrow-minded spirits and the poor imaginations who persist in denying the fact that the living are increasingly ruled by the dead. Shame on the mean minds for whom the chain that links together the generations of one people, is invisible ... [He concludes:] this is how history and the past determine the reality of today.²²

As Zeev Sternhell notes in his studies on the rise of fascism,²³ two major political traditions divided French society at the end of the nineteenth century. On the one hand, we find the intellectual descendants of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution's humanist, rationalist heritage. In opposition to them were the advocates of cultural, biological, or racial determinism, inspired by theories related to social Darwinism and nationalist doctrines.²⁴ They rejected the core idea of sociopolitical modernity, according to which people are able to create a future inspired by their will for progress. One of the most renowned prophets of French nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century, the writer and politician Maurice Barrès, developed a landmark idea of nationalist theory, asserting that a "nation" finds its origins in the earth and that every member of this community is linked to the dead.²⁵ When applied to history, this organicist theory led to historical determinism and anachronistic readings of the past. Such approaches also dominated Balkan countries in the form of "continuity scenarios" with regard to each nation's existence.

The legitimate or arbitrary character of the wars in the Balkans was also evaluated as a result of the perception of the region's history and more particularly the role of nations in its shaping. The concept of nation was either viewed as an eternal entity or perceived as a social construct. Gédéon Bessedé, writing in the anarchist newspaper *Le Libertaire*, considered the Balkan Wars to be a perfect demonstration of what he called the

²² Léonce Beaujeu, "La revanche de Kosovo," *L'Action Française*, 31 October 1912.

²³ Zeev Sternhell, *Naissance de l'idéologie fasciste* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), and *Les anti-Lumières: Du XVIIIe siècle à la guerre froide* (Paris: Fayard, 2006).

²⁴ Within this conceptualization of international relations, shaped by principles emanating from social Darwinist theory, the West was set at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of human evolution.

²⁵ This definition and conception of nation dominated German discourse and was opposed to Ernest Renan's idea of "a general will" needed to establish a national community.

lies of nations, insofar as the traditional mainstays of nationalist mythology, such as linguistic community, common ethnic origins, or shared historical traditions, were shaped by states through brutal methods of forced assimilation. On the other hand, the philhellenist journalist Georges Bourdon published an interview in *Le Figaro* with the Greek prime minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, which claimed that the Greeks “had not conducted a war of conquest” but rather had waged war to take back what had once belonged to them.²⁶ By endorsing this statement, the French newspaper contributed to the dissemination and mediatization of continuity scenarios that dominated the national mythologies of the Balkan kingdoms, and stemmed from the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire’s European possessions. As far as the Greek case is concerned, this process is synonymous with the expansionist, irredentist project of the 1840s named the “Great Idea,” elaborated only several years after a Greek state was created at the expense of the Ottoman Empire’s territories in the southern Balkan Peninsula. This project aimed to nationalize the Byzantine Empire’s heritage²⁷ and to appropriate its frontiers.²⁸ The conceptual model and the dominant interpretation of the Balkans’ past, within such nationalist history narratives, systematically denied the fact that in such multiethnic, multicultural empires as the Roman, “Byzantine,” or Ottoman cases, the notion of nation or the question of national consciousness was completely absent and irrelevant to the dominant categorization and self-definition of these empires’ subjects or to the way the imperial authorities classified them.²⁹ Nationalist Balkan historians wove an imaginary thread of historical continuity for the nations “fabricated” within the

²⁶ “Venizelos interviewé par Bourdon,” *Le Figaro*, 27 August 1913.

²⁷ Apart from the Greeks and their Byzantine dreams, the Bulgarians also sought to establish the boundaries of the First and Second Bulgarian Empires, whereas the Serbs wished to recover the territorial extent of Stephan Dušan’s fourteenth-century state. See Richard Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000), 2.

²⁸ As Robert Gildea asserts, “what matters is myth, not in the sense of fiction, but in the sense of a construction of the past elaborated by a political community for its own ends.” Robert Gildea, *The Past in French History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 12.

²⁹ Andrew Wachtel remarks in *The Balkans in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) that for Balkan populations national identities were fluid and remained so into the twentieth century. Within Ottoman society, the millet system, referring to society’s organization on religious principles, cut across other potential markers of identity, such as nation, class, and gender. See also Kemal Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State, from Social Estates to Classes, from Millets to Nations*

states created throughout the Eastern Question intrigues,³⁰ resulting in the nationalization of historical periods and political structures predating Ottoman times.³¹ Consequently, a disjunction arose between those who believed the myth of national continuity or revival, and those who considered such terms problematic. National consciousness was viewed as a natural phenomenon—already latent among the Balkan peoples—rather than as a social and historical construct dating back to the late eighteenth century. At the beginning of the Eastern Question, as Mark Mazower has highlighted, the future citizens of Balkan states were largely unaware which nation they belonged to, or even that they belonged to one at all.³²

In France the Balkan Wars were, furthermore, viewed with an eye on the status of Alsace-Lorraine. Nationalist and right-wing thinkers experienced the allies' operations as a dress rehearsal for an action that would satisfy their yearning to avenge the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, which had resulted from the French defeat in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war.³³ In their minds, the Ottoman Empire was subjugated to German influence, whereas French generals and industries had trained and equipped the Balkan allies. They viewed Balkan victories as paving the way for a future French conquest. On the other side, socialists and pacifists feared this conflict would degenerate into a generalized war pitting the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance. The declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan allies' unwillingness to submit their demands for a peaceful settlement to the newly founded Permanent Court of Arbitration were seen as

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), and Raymond Detrez, *Developing Cultural Identity in the Balkans: Convergence vs. Divergence* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005).

³⁰For questions related to how nation-states were created before the development of corresponding national societies, see Fikret Adanır and Faroqui Suraiya, eds., *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden: Brill, 2002) and Paschalis Kitromilidis, "Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans," *European History Quarterly*, vol. 19 (1989), 149–94.

³¹For the will of Balkan nationalists to "nationalize" the historical periods of the medieval kingdoms in the Peninsula, see Alexandru Madgearu, *The Wars of the Balkan Peninsula: Their Medieval Origins* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008).

³²John Lampe and Mark Mazower, eds., *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004).

³³Maurice Barrès is considered, alongside Charles Maurras, as one of the main thinkers on ethnic nationalism in turn-of-the-century France, which is associated with "revanchism," the desire to regain control of Alsace-Lorraine, annexed by the newly created German Empire at the end of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.

a serious threat to European stability and peace. The Permanent Court of Arbitration had been established in 1899 in The Hague, and its creation represented the first international institution for the settlement of disputes between states. That was why socialists and pacifists denounced the war-mongering policies of the Balkan governments, but they also criticized the militarization of French society, opposing the prolongation of compulsory military service from two to three years, as had been proposed by a wide range of political forces, from the moderate Republicans to the nationalist right-wing parties. The frictions around the vote on the *loi des trois ans* (the law of three years), one of the main issues at stake during the 1913 parliamentary elections, dominated debates in public and in the media.

Moreover, French socialist citizens had mobilized themselves in a series of protest marches in favor of a federalist state model to be implemented in the Balkans, notably in the regions at the core of the territorial disputes. Rigas Velestinlis, an Ottoman intellectual of the Rum millet at the end of the eighteenth century, had first proposed federating the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula. At that time his idea mainly entailed the replacement of Ottoman governance with a republican federalist state. By the end of the nineteenth century, the status of the Ottoman Empire's European provinces was at stake. Almost every Balkan country claimed the region referred to as Macedonia by European and Balkan experts, which corresponded to the *vilayets* of Selanik, Manastir, and Kosovo. On the eve of the October 1912 conflict, the project of federalizing Macedonia gained support among socialist thinkers in both Western Europe and the Balkans. Members of the Ottoman socialist association Federacion, joined by their comrades within the International Socialist Bureau, fought for a peaceful settlement of the territorial dispute and the creation of an autonomous province gathering together all the Ottoman subjects of various ethnolinguistic and confessional communities.

On the other hand, pro-war, right-wing observers expressed both their hostility to a multicultural political model and their desire to see nationally homogenous states emerge from these conflicts. As racist theories had infiltrated European political thought by the late nineteenth century,³⁴ the racialization of French nationalism fell in line with the plans of Balkan nationalists bent on shaping their territories in accordance with their exclu-

³⁴ Sarga Moussa, ed., *L'idée de race dans les sciences humaines et la littérature, XVIII^e-XIX^e siècles* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003).

Table 6.3 French perceptions of the causes, nature, and settlement of the First Balkan War

Culturalist, racist view: ethnic, religious, racial, or cultural backgrounds to the conflict	Materialist view: rivalries for political, economic, cultural hegemony; irredentist-expansionist plans as true motivations behind conflict
Crusade-like war	Imperialist-colonialist campaign
Humanitarian, fair war of liberation	Aggressive, arbitrary war of conquest
“Continuist”-nationalist view of belligerent territorial claims; myth of the nation existing before Ottoman period	Perception of key players’ territorial claims in terms of selfish motives; the nation as a social construct since the late eighteenth century
Militarist view; horizon of expectation: Alsace-Lorraine revenge	Pacifist and/or antimilitarist view: fear of a large-scale war and hope for the settlement of territorial or bilateral disputes through an international high court
Creation of nationally homogenous states as desired settlement	Creation of republican multicultural federal state/union

sivist, assimilationist state concept.³⁵ On the same wavelength, the conservative, pro-Balkan allies’ political analyst André Cheradame asserted in the nationalist newspaper *Le Petit Journal* that the war opposing “Christians and Turks” in the Balkans was the result of “the diversity of cultures that a prolonged experience has proved to be incompatible between each other, [rather] than the result of racial differences.”³⁶ This statement demonstrates the premises of a cultural, differential racism—widely adopted by far-right movements today—who tend to discard theories of biologically based racism and preach instead the strict separation of different ethnic or cultural groups on the basis of their presumed incompatibility.³⁷ Table 6.3 synthesizes the two poles of politically inclined French perceptions of the causes, motivations, character, and settlement of the First Balkan War.

³⁵ Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 137.

³⁶ André Chéradame, “La Guerre des Balkans et les intérêts de la France,” *Le Petit Journal*, 17 October 1912. Such statements reveal the widespread and very common confusion among religion, nationality, and ethnicity concerning the definition of the Balkan people from the Eastern Question up through today.

³⁷ See the works of Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, nation, classe: les identités ambiguës* (Paris: La Découverte, 1988) and Pierre-André Taguieff, *La Force du préjugé: essai sur le racisme et ses doubles* (Paris: La Découverte, 1988).

PERCEPTIONS OF THE VIOLENCE OF THE BALKAN WARS

While competing views on the nature of the First Balkan War divided French thinkers depending on their ideological sympathies, geopolitical considerations, experiential fields, and horizons of expectation,³⁸ they unanimously viewed the Second Balkan War as a conflict motivated by divergent territorial claims. The violence which characterized both Balkan Wars generated different perceptions of the savagery of these conflicts. On the one hand Paul Souday, a French literary critic, declared in a regional newspaper that Oriental people like the Turks, the Serbs, and the Bulgarians “are particularly warlike. I think that in the Occident, the bourgeois and working-class people are wiser, and such belligerent passions could not easily be stirred up.”³⁹

Such essentialist views reveal the direction of widespread Orientalist discourses. They also position the Balkan people, in space and history, within the imaginary geography mapped by Western Europeans onto the Eastern Question.⁴⁰ This brand of thinking perceived the Balkans to be part of the Orient/East. Moreover, such statements reproduce the stereotype that violence and brutality are constituent characteristics of spaces or people characterized as “Oriental” and are completely alien to the “civilized way” that Occidentals conducted war.⁴¹ Whoever is included in this Western

³⁸ Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Koselleck argues that “in differentiating past and future, or (in anthropological terms) experience and expectation, it is possible to grasp something like historical time” (3). This is why, according to him, any historian should act a bit like an anthropologist, in the sense that any analysis of the past involves not only our categories of time, but also those of the contemporaries of the time we study.

³⁹ Paul Souday, “La vie à Paris,” *La France de Bordeaux et du Sud-Ouest*, 21 October 1912.

⁴⁰ Concerning the invention of a geo-cultural Orient, Edward Said distinguishes three levels of “Orientalism.” First, he identifies research on the Orient as “Orientalism.” Second, and in a more general sense, he defines Orientalism as a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and, most of the time, the Occident. The third meaning focuses on Orientalism as a discourse dealing with the Orient. See Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979), 2. For further studies on the notion of Orientalism see Inge Boer, *After Orientalism: Critical Entanglements, Productive Looks* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003).

⁴¹ These perceptions of violence during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 remind us of the debates raised in France and other European societies during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. As various authors in the essay entitled *Balkans as Metaphor* saw it, the Balkan space and the Balkan peoples were associated with intrinsically violent practices, whereas atrocities committed during conflicts taking place in other areas of the European continent, such as the First

European narrative construct of the Orient is exiled to an irretrievable state of otherness,⁴² and at the same time is identified through characteristics the West wishes to expel from its own self-image.⁴³

On the other hand, a journalist writing for the right-wing Catholic newspaper *La Croix* reminded his readers that although some newspapers fulminated against the massacres in the Orient (and no matter how much he too deplored this carnage), the human losses of the French Revolution and the French Commune had largely outnumbered those of the Balkan Wars.⁴⁴ For his part, a journalist for *Le Gaulois*, after accusing the Prussians of having manufactured war and having “systemized the unreasoned brutality of the First Republic’s armies,”⁴⁵ took it out on the Japanese, declaring “they have added something even more ferocious to the way of conducting war, everything is working ‘à la japonaise’ in the Balkans”; “science presides over dreadful carnage. As Paul Bourget once put it, science does not necessarily signify civilization. There is such a thing as scientific barbarism.” Alongside the expression of anti-revolutionary, anti-modernist, and nationalist non-Balkanist views of violence, other voices compared these wars’ cruelty to the policies of repression practiced by European colonial powers. In his newspaper *L’Humanité*, Jean Jaurès

and the Second World War or the Civil War in Spain, were seen as extreme aberrations, rather than typical symptoms of the usually rational, liberal, and civilized Western Europe. This selective recourse to the violence of the 1912–13 wars to account for the violence of the 1990s Yugoslav wars, and the trend of viewing atrocities in the Balkans as “the expected natural outcome of a warrior ethos, deeply ingrained in the psyche of Balkan populations,” was also noticed by Maria Todorova in her *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 137.

⁴²Rana Kabbani, *Europe’s Myths of Orient: Devise and Rule* (London: Macmillan, 1986), 5. “Terms like ‘primitive, savage, pre-Colombian, tribal, third world, undeveloped, developing, archaic, traditional, exotic, ‘the anthropological record,’ non-Western and Other ... all take the West as norm and define the rest as inferior, different, deviant, subordinate, and subordinateable”; in Marianna Torgovnik, *Gone Primitive: Savage Intellectuals, Modern Lives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 21.

⁴³Mike Crang, *Cultural Geography* (London: Routledge, 1998), 66. In order to avoid developing an “Occidentalism,” essentialist approach, we should note that during the First World War, the representational division between a “civilized” us and a “barbaric” enemy was reproduced inside what had been identified up to then as the West, mostly between French and German media wars centered on atrocities stories. For an illustration of how French propaganda worked during that period to demonize German soldiers, see Robin Andersen, *A Century of Media, A Century of War* (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 5.

⁴⁴“Ceux qui frémissent devant les massacres d’Orient,” *La Croix*, 9 August 1913.

⁴⁵Lucien Corpechot, “Les Révolutionnaires,” *Le Gaulois*, 8 December 1912.

published photographs showing atrocities committed by French soldiers during their campaign in Morocco. Amilcare Cipriani, an Italian anarchist and anti-militarist, observed that the Balkan allies, despite flattering themselves as being civilized, had claimed a civilization that was merely superficial, as had been shown by the Italian slaughter of the local population in Libya, the French massacre of Algerians and Moroccans, Belgian and German atrocities in the Congo, and actions by the English in Transvaal and the Russians in Persia and within their own territories. Thus, this perception of war violence did not associate savagery exclusively with Balkan/Oriental peoples.

Apart from the general perception of violence during the Balkan Wars, different views existed with regard to the main players involved in practices such as the mistreatment of civilian populations and prisoners of war. The 1913 Carnegie Endowment report and scholars' recent research provide us with testimonies and documents of massacres and atrocities committed by belligerents or local populations in the Ottoman Balkans during the 1912–13 wars.⁴⁶ Although historians and legal scholars did not commonly use the term “ethnic cleansing” until the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, as Benjamin Lieberman notes,⁴⁷ it can indeed be applied to the terrifying events of the earlier Balkan conflicts. Besides having diplomatic and military aspects and exerting a tragic effect on many human beings, the Balkan Wars also constituted a propaganda war, especially as far as the dissemination of news about atrocities was concerned.⁴⁸

Between October and December 1912, French newspapers were inundated with news accusing Ottoman soldiers or paramilitaries of violent acts of brutality. Only the socialist and radical newspapers accorded space to atrocities committed by the allies. Several isolated voices emerged to protest this unilateral media coverage of atrocities, on behalf of thinkers labeled as Turcophiles, especially Pierre Loti and Claude Farrere.⁴⁹ News coverage was influenced not only by personal affinities or ideological sympathies but also by pre-existing representations of the Other. In this sense,

⁴⁶ Benjamin Lieberman, *Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), and Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995).

⁴⁷ Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 4.

⁴⁸ For the different theories of story selection see Herbert Gans, *Deciding What's News* (New York: Pantheon, 1979).

⁴⁹ Pierre Loti collected evidence of the Allies' atrocities against Ottoman Muslim populations in a work entitled *La Turquie agonisante*, published in Paris at the end of 1913.

the Islamophobic and anti-Turk French newspapers tended to publish news of atrocities—whether true or false—to demonstrate their favorite stereotypes of Turkish brutality. Furthermore, the majority of the nationalist papers published news and photographs praising the Balkan allies for their humanity and their gentle treatment of prisoners of war and civilians. During the Second Balkan War, Czar Ferdinand’s soldiers initially came under fire from nearly the totality of French newspapers. As soon as the Bulgarians managed to circumvent their media isolation, which had allowed their adversaries to filter the vast majority of their news, they began to counterattack their enemies’ propaganda machine. The semi-official French newspaper *Le Temps*, particularly close to the government, became the battlefield where accusations of atrocities were mixed with denials, and where each belligerent tried to publish his own version of the news and disclaim the accounts of his adversaries.

As Robin Andersen has remarked, tales of such intensity aimed to “enrage public opinion.”⁵⁰ On top of that, the enemy “had to be demonised beyond all recognition, placed outside the human family and civilisation itself.”⁵¹ Such narratives of exclusion provided the necessary psychopolitical context necessary to win public opinion or at least tolerance concerning the ethnic-cleansing practices of the Balkan armies. A statement by the Marquis de Segonzac, a war reporter for the nationalist newspaper *L’écho de Paris*, suggests the success of this sort of propaganda. Referring to the Balkan Turkish/Muslim population, he declared that “the civilised world has the right to destroy them and the duty to drive them out of the civilised countries in any way.”⁵² During the Second Balkan War, Greek propaganda—orchestrated by King Constantine himself—paved the way for justifying the ethnic-cleansing practices of his army against Exarchist populations in Ottoman Macedonia, in the name of responding to atrocities committed by Bulgarians.⁵³

As a result of this propaganda war, competing narratives thrived during the Second Balkan War, such as those that addressed whether blame should be accorded to the Greeks or Bulgarians for arson in the city of

⁵⁰ Andersen, *Century of Media*, 6.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² “Les atrocités turques,” *La Libre Parole*, 24 November 1912.

⁵³ For the atrocities committed by the Greek army during this campaign, see Tasos Kostopoulos, *Polemos ke ethnikatharsi, 1912–1922* [War and ethnic cleansing, 1912–1922] (Athens: Vivliorama, 2007).

Serres.⁵⁴ Thus, we see that for the way a society perceives an external war, what matters is not only the degree to which the media reports on atrocities, but also how such news is presented. Another example is the case of Muslim refugees, who were victims of large-scale persecutions during the First Balkan War. A liberal newspaper such as *Le Journal* drew its readers' attention to the squalid conditions in which these refugees were condemned to live.⁵⁵ Nationalist and ultra-Catholic newspapers such as *La Croix* and *Le Petit Journal*, however, cynically characterized the same event as "[t]he return to Asia." Such a comment betrays a total lack of sympathy for the refugees, while also illustrating one of the dominant discourses of Islamophobia: hostility to the very presence of Muslim populations in Europe.⁵⁶

At the same time, the Balkan belligerents, in order to stigmatize their enemies or arouse sympathy and support for their own claims, tried to remind the French public of past events when they had been identified as victims. One very eloquent illustration of this propaganda mechanism occurred when the Greek ambassador to Paris sent a reproduction of the Delacroix painting of the Chios massacre, dating to the beginning of nineteenth century,⁵⁷ to a Greek-friendly newspaper, *L'Excelsior*.⁵⁸ He did so in the full knowledge that this image was an integral part of French society's experiential space,⁵⁹ and thus he hoped it would trigger hostile reactions toward the Ottoman Empire's claims of territorial integ-

⁵⁴ News from Greek sources published in *Le Figaro* on 15 July 1913 declared Bulgaria responsible for this criminal act. On the contrary, statements of Bulgarian origin published in *Le Radical* on the same day accused the Greeks for the arson that broke out in the city.

⁵⁵ "Le grand exode des populations turques des Balkans," *Le Journal*, 17 November 1912.

⁵⁶ "Le retour vers l'Asie," *La Croix*, 17 November 1912.

⁵⁷ Eugène Delacroix painted *The Massacre at Chios* in 1824, only two years after the massacre took place. He depicted the devastated landscape and the Christian victims of Ottoman troops on the island of Chios after their decision to join the rebellion of other Ottoman Christian populations in the southern part of the Balkan Peninsula, in what is known in historiography as the Greek War of Independence.

⁵⁸ Greek Foreign Office Archives, Athens, Balkan Wars, 1913/47/5, Paris, n°3745, letter of the Greek ambassador in Paris to the Greek Foreign Office, 27/9 January 1913.

⁵⁹ Another sequence of the biased media coverage of violence taking place in the context of the Eastern Question was the 1877–78 Russo–Ottoman war. Atrocities were committed by both sides, but it was mainly the Ottomans who were blamed for these events. At the same time, the victims of Russian and Bulgarian atrocities committed against Muslim populations in the Ottoman region of what is now Bulgaria were largely ignored by Western European societies and public opinion. See Tetsuya Sahara, "Two Different Images: Bulgarian and English Sources on the Batak Massacre," in Hakan Yavuz, ed., *War and Diplomacy: The*

city. The Ottoman Empire could have reminded French citizens of the massacre of Muslim and Jewish Ottoman populations during the fall of the Tripolitsa fortress in the central Morea region during the Greek War of Independence (1821–27),⁶⁰ but this event did not occupy a similar place in the French imaginary.⁶¹

Thus, as we see here exemplified, the way a society perceives an outside conflict is a multi-factorial process consisting of a dialectic between opinions and information, present discourses and experiences, and future expectations and remembrances of past events in order to shape collective representations of the Other, the Elsewhere, and the Past. The French ideological landscape existing at the eruption of these conflicts in the Balkans was characterized by a shift in the concept of nationalism from a leftist republican hobby-horse to a right-wing anti-modernist theme. Moreover, the alliance among militarist, anti-secularist segments of French society during the Dreyfus Affair and the passage of the 1905 law separating church and state were factors that exerted a huge influence on French perceptions of the Balkan Wars. Personal affinities with the main players in the conflict, as well as different geopolitical interpretations of French interests within the Eastern Question and the various levels of representations of Balkan Otherness, eventually combined to make up Marianne's multifaceted gaze over the blazing Balkans in 1912–13.

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⁶⁰Lieberman, *Terrible Fate*, 9.

⁶¹The manipulation of past events in order to serve and promote present goals is reminiscent of references to Chetnik and Ustashi crimes committed during the Second World War that were commandeered by Serbian and Croatian propaganda during the 1990s, at home as well as abroad.

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The Irish Question and the Balkan Crisis

Florian Keisinger

IRELAND AND THE BALKAN WARS, 1912–13

In October 1912, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia—united in the Balkan League—undertook a joint effort to shake off centuries of Ottoman dominion.¹ Over the course of the Balkan Wars, which lasted about ten months, more than 200,000 soldiers were killed, and one can only speculate how many civilians lost their lives. On top of that, hundreds of thousands of people were abducted from their homes and systematically displaced to other areas or countries.² In the summer of 1913, just after the end of the Second Balkan War, an international group of experts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace traveled to the Balkan region to conduct a survey on the causes and the conduct of the wars. They concluded, “Every clause in international law relative to war on land and to the treatment of the wounded, has been violated by *all* the belligerents, including the

¹ André Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars* (New York: Basic, 2002); Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000).

² Wolfgang Höpken, “Gewalt auf dem Balkan—Erklärungsversuche zwischen ‘Struktur’ und ‘Kultur,’” in Wolfgang Höpken and Michael Riekenberg, eds., *Politische und Ethische Gewalt in Südosteuropa und Lateinamerika* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000), 53–95, here 54–55.

F. Keisinger (✉)

Private Enterprise (Airbus Group), Berlin, Germany

e-mail: Florian.Keisinger@yahoo.de

Romanian army, which was not properly speaking belligerent.”³ However, the Carnegie commission did not make the distinction that the forces of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia were occupying armies, whereas the Ottoman army was in retreat. This resembled, more or less, the depiction of the wars that had been published in the London *Times* just a few months earlier. In December 1912, the newspaper described the warfare in the Balkans as “appalling savagery” to which “it would be difficult to find a parallel even in the wars of the Middle Ages.”⁴

One characteristic of the Balkan Wars was the ethnically motivated violence perpetrated by its combatant states. Fueled by the aspired outcome of the wars—an allegedly homogenous nation-state—violations of the rules of orderly warfare, as stipulated for instance in The Hague’s Conventions, occurred frequently. The Balkan Wars, though officially wars between states, were fought as people’s wars, in which the ejection and even destruction of the enemy, including its civilian population, played a crucial role from the conflict’s outset in October 1912.⁵ Over the course of the wars, the distinction between regular armies and irregular paramilitary troops became increasingly blurred, especially as the irregular bands were supported by their governments and moved in the shadows of the official armies. “Whole nations are marching forth for battle, leaving behind them only the women and children and the old men,” the *Times* of London wrote during the First Balkan War, referring to the Balkan States.⁶ Therefore these wars, because of how they were fought, anticipated as none of the wars of the nineteenth century had the horrors and the destructiveness of the First World War. Of course, Western Europeans of the time, who read extensively about the Balkan Wars in their daily newspapers and weekly journals, could not know this.⁷

³ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, DC: The Endowment, 1914), 13–14.

⁴ *The Times* (London), 9 December 1912 (the newspaper analysis in this article is based on the comments section).

⁵ Wolfgang Höpken, “Blockierte Zivilisierung? Staatenbildung, Modernisierung und ethnische Gewalt auf dem Balkan (19./20. Jahrhundert),” *Leviathan: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, vol. 25, no. 4 (1997), 518–38.

⁶ *The Times* (London), 17 October 1912.

⁷ For the perception of the wars in the Balkans from 1876 until 1913 in German, English, and Irish newspapers and journals, see Florian Keisinger, *Unzivilisierte Kriege im zivilisierten Europa. Die Balkankriege und die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland, England und Irland, 1876–1913* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2008).

The Balkan Wars were events of great interest not only for the citizens of the great continental European powers and of England, but also for the Irish. Irish newspapers and journals, such as the nationalist *Freeman's Journal* and the unionist *Irish Times*, reported daily on the events in Southeastern Europe. The *Irish Times* alone, in the period between 1 October 1912 and the end of July 1913, published 156 lead commentaries on the Balkan Wars, as compared to 147 in the *Freeman's Journal*. In addition, countless daily articles on the news pages informed readers about the latest war developments.

For all European powers, as well as for Ireland, the so-called Eastern Question—the problem of how to deal with the European dominions of the declining Ottoman Empire⁸—was of tremendous national interest, though for rather different reasons. The European powers had a relatively direct political and military interest in the outcome of the Eastern Question. Since the 1870s, Europeans had been convinced that every threat of war or even minor conflict in the Balkans could potentially cause the outbreak of a major European war, turning the whole continent into a fireball.⁹ The socialist *Clarion* suggested in 1897 that “what we call the Eastern Question might be more properly called the European Question”¹⁰; for the *Times* in 1908, the Eastern Question was simply “the nightmare of European diplomacy.”¹¹

This explosive potential distinguished the Eastern Question from other national questions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the efforts of Irish nationalists to set up an independent Irish nation-state. Unlike the Eastern Question, the Irish Question never encompassed the possibility of a European war, and was therefore seen solely as a British problem. On the contrary, in the Balkans every minor disturbance and conflict, even local revolts in Macedonia in 1903,¹² prompted European newspapers to express concerns about maintaining the “peace of Europe.” The *Times*, on 18 August 1903, published the following reflections:

⁸ Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923* (London: Macmillan, 1968).

⁹ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans 1804–1999: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers* (London: Penguin, 1999), 135–248.

¹⁰ *Clarion*, 22 May 1897.

¹¹ *The Times* (London), 8 October 1908.

¹² Vemund Aarbakke, *Ethnic Rivalry and the Quest for Macedonia, 1870–1913* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2003), 97.

Were it merely a question as between Turkey and the Macedonian committee on the one hand, and Bulgaria and these identical committees on the other hand, we might watch the struggle with some calm ... But in the Near Eastern question the Powers of Europe are directly interested—less, it is true, from personal motives, if we except Turkey, Russia and Austria, than from a desire to ensure that no new *régime* is introduced in the Balkans whose advent may in the smallest degree disturb the existing balance of power.¹³

Irish nationalists were well aware of the special interest taken by all European powers in the Eastern Question. As the *Freeman's Journal* pointed out in October 1912, the “Near Eastern Question” was undoubtedly seen as a “European problem”; the “Near Western Question,” on the other hand, was a problem “with which England has to deal.”¹⁴ This distinction, however, did not stop Irish nationalists from viewing the First Balkan War as an inspiration for their own strivings to establish an independent Irish nation-state. Therefore, the perception of the Balkan Wars among Irish nationalists differed widely from those of both their unionist Irish counterparts and observers in other European states. During the First Balkan War Bulgaria in particular was seen as a stirring example of how a small and allegedly weak country could free itself from foreign occupation. For example, *Freeman's Journal* argued,

It is full of interest to us in Ireland to know that the most important member of the Confederacy, Bulgaria, bears both in her history and in the condition and character of her people a remarkable resemblance to Ireland. She has a population of about the same size as ours. Her people, like ours, are mainly agricultural. Like us she has passed under the yoke of the conqueror. ... The resemblance to Ireland does not end here. For our literary revival Bulgaria can show a literary revival. ... Beginning before 1835, it produced a revival of Bulgarian instead of Greek as the national language. ... The parallel is not an exact one in every point, but it is striking enough and should prove a stimulus to the effort of Ireland, and a ground for hope. The artillery of Bulgaria won her battles, but there were greater forces which made Bulgaria. The triumph of Bulgaria is a triumph for the ideas which made her nationality as well as a triumph for her Creusot guns.¹⁵

¹³ *The Times* (London), 18 August 1903.

¹⁴ *Freeman's Journal*, 7 October 1912.

¹⁵ *Freeman's Journal*, 22 November 1912.

The Irish newspaper's perception of the Balkan Wars also shows that the often assumed dichotomy between constitutional Irish Home Rulers aiming for a peaceful settlement of the Irish Question on the one hand, and radical nationalists on the other, aiming for a military solution to the problem, needs to be made more nuanced. In the years before the First World War, not only radical newspapers and journals such as the monthly *Irish Freedom* but also moderate papers like *Freeman's Journal* and the *Irish Independent* considered the actions of the Balkan states during the First Balkan War to be an inspiration for Ireland, representing a legitimate model for settling not only the "Eastern" but also the "Western" question.

NEWSPAPERS, WAR CORRESPONDENTS, AND THE COVERAGE OF THE BALKAN WARS

At the outbreak of the First Balkan War, all relevant newspapers sent war correspondents to gather firsthand information and impressions from the war zone in Southeastern Europe. The two Irish newspapers with the largest circulation, the *Irish Times* and its nationalist counterpart, the *Freeman's Journal*, both sent reporters to the Balkans.¹⁶

It is important, however, to point out that during the Balkan Wars most correspondents did not come close to the front lines or the theater of war. Due to strict censorship, they were mostly restricted to the various capitals. They were permitted only brief excursions outside their hotels or military camps, and these outings were strictly controlled by the military authorities. Practically all diaries and memoirs of correspondents published during or immediately after the Balkan Wars addressed the restrictions to their working conditions imposed by each of the Balkan states. These correspondents admitted that they did not actually get to see anything of the wars. They were acutely aware of their predicament: Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, for instance, correspondent for London's *Daily Telegraph*, assumed that all the belligerent states had spent considerable effort and expense to train their censors to keep reporters away from the places where warfare was actually being conducted. Shortly after the end of the Balkan Wars, he recalled,

¹⁶Felix L. Larkin, "The Dog in the Night-Time: The *Freeman's Journal*, the Irish Parliamentary Party and the Empire, 1875–1919," in Simon Potter, ed., *Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain: Reporting the Empire, 1857–1921* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), 109–23.

The only exercise we were allowed during this war was a tour, which took place daily after lunch, when we were expected to ride two and two behind a Turkish officer, like schoolgirls out with their mistress on the parade of some South Coast watering-place.¹⁷

Philip Gibb (*The Graphic*) and Bernhard Grant (*The Daily Mirror*) expressed the opinion of many of their colleagues when, in their joint memoirs published in 1913, they compared the situation of the war correspondents during the Balkan Wars with that of “prisoners of war.”¹⁸ Cyril Campbell, a reporter for the London *Times*, went so far as to apologize to the public for the amount of misinformation circulating about the Balkan Wars. In his anonymously published memoirs of the Balkan Wars, which appeared in 1913, he wrote, “The veil of secrecy ... which has been cast over events by a vigilant General Staff may have led to the insertion of errors which only time can disclose. For such we apologize.”¹⁹

In November 1912, the Irish *Freeman's Journal* mentioned that all the correspondents were still stuck in the capitals of the Balkan states and Turkey.²⁰ Similar comments can be found in the *Irish Independent*, which bemoaned that the correspondents were forced to do nothing, while a few miles away history was in the making.²¹ During the Second Balkan War, the *Irish Times* pointed out that all reports from the Balkans had to be treated with suspicion, as “the absence of impartial correspondents from the theatre of war makes it difficult to check the value of the official statements from either side.”²² Similar statements can be found in English and German newspapers. Just a few weeks after the war broke out, the *Manchester Guardian* informed its readers that “on neither side are war correspondents allowed to send messages from the front.”²³ In July 1913, *The Times* pointed out that all reports from the Balkan Peninsula during the wars had to be taken with caution due to the strict censorship imposed on reporters by all belligerent states.²⁴ And the *Daily Chronicle* even stated, in November 1912, that “the military authorities of the four

¹⁷ Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, *With the Turks in Thrace* (New York: G. H. Doran, 1913), 100.

¹⁸ Philip Gibbs and Bernhard Grant, *Adventures of War with Cross and Crescent* (London: Small, Maynard and Company, 1913), 167.

¹⁹ ‘A Special Correspondent’ [Cyril Campbell], *The Balkan War Drama* (London: Andrew Melrose, 1913), 7.

²⁰ *Freeman's Journal*, 9 November 1912.

²¹ *Irish Independent*, 28 October 1912.

²² *Irish Times*, 8 July 1913.

²³ *Manchester Guardian*, 25 October 1912.

²⁴ *The Times* (London), 3 July 1913.

[Balkan] kingdoms must have agreed beforehand that war correspondents should neither see anything nor say anything.” If this had previously been made clear, the *Daily Chronicle* concluded, it would have refrained from sending reporters to the Balkans in the first place.²⁵

However, these difficulties did not stop the newspapers from publishing extensively about the wars in the Balkans. All European newspapers, including those in Ireland, reported daily on what was (allegedly) going on in Southeastern Europe between October 1912 and July 1913.

NATION-STATE AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE: IRELAND AND THE BALKANS

There are certain parallels between Irish and Southeastern European history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both in Ireland and in the Balkans, national movements reached their climax in the years around the First World War. And not only were the Balkan Wars conducted with extreme brutality by all belligerents; Irish history between 1910 and 1923 is also marked by significant outbursts of violence and hatred, or, as Peter Hart has called it, an “ethnic power struggle.”²⁶ Ethnically motivated violence, perpetrated by Catholics against Protestants in the south and vice versa in Belfast and the northern counties, was a common phenomenon in the years before and after the Easter Rising of 1916. Between 1912 and 1926, the Protestant population in the twenty-six counties, which from 1921 onwards made up the Irish Free State, dropped by 34 percent; Protestants in the north during the same period, however, increased only 2 percent, while the Catholic population in the north was reduced also by 2 percent. Before 1910, the shift of population between the northern and southern parts of Ireland had been roughly equal.²⁷ This significant demographic change cannot be solely traced back to emigration and the allegedly high number of Protestant casualties during the First World War. Instead, the experiences of Irish Protestants between 1911 and 1926 were marked, according to Hart, by “extreme violence, flight, and massacres.”²⁸

²⁵ *Daily Chronicle*, 28 November 1912.

²⁶ Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. at War 1916–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 9.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 223. Hart describes the 1911–26 developments in Ireland as “unique in modern British history, being the only example of the mass displacement of a native ethnic group within the British Isle since the seventeenth century.”

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 227.

The outbreak of revolution and violence in Ireland in 1916 was spurred by the radicalization and militarization of Irish society in the years leading up to the Easter Rising. A new debate from 1910 onwards about the possibility of Home Rule for Ireland²⁹ led to the formation of paramilitary units³⁰ on both sides—in the Catholic south as well as in the Protestant north. In the spring of 1913, 100,000 men from the unionist “Irish Volunteer Forces” faced 180,000 equally trained and armed nationalist “Irish Volunteers,” forerunners of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), established in 1919. This landscape of well-organized religious hatred as well as a readiness for violence created a reality which, between 1912 and 1923, anticipated all the nightmare images of ethnic conflict in the twentieth century: the massacres and anonymous death squads, the burning homes and churches, the mass expulsion and trains filled with refugees, the transformation of lifelong neighbors into enemies, the conspiracy theories and the terminology of hatred. Munster, Leinster, and Connaught can take their place with fellow imperial provinces, Silesia, Galicia, and Bosnia, as part of the postwar “unmixing of peoples” in Europe.³¹

In his 2005 book *The Dark Side of Democracy*, Michael Mann mentions revolutionary Ireland in one line with countries like the United States, Russia, India, and Germany, in which ethnically motivated violence played an important role in their national histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.³² Manus Midlarsky, in his study of twentieth-century genocides, even dedicates a separate chapter to the Irish case.³³

Biographies of authors like Patrick Pearse show that there was a grey zone between allegedly moderate Home Rulers and revolutionary separatists in Ireland at the beginning of the twentieth century. Before Pearse became known as one of the leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising, he acted for several years as the editor of the moderate nationalist Gaelic journal

²⁹ Alvin Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History 1800–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 106–41; Alan O’Day, *Irish Home Rule 1867–1921* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 240–65.

³⁰ For the unionist side, see Timothy Bowman, “The Ulster Volunteer Force and the Formation of the 36th (Ulster) Division,” *Irish Historical Studies*, vol. 32, no. 128 (2001), 498–518. For the nationalist side, see Michael Laffan, “Violence and Terror in Twentieth-Century Ireland: IRB and IRA,” in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld, eds., *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1982), 155–74.

³¹ Hart, *The I.R.A. at War*, 240.

³² Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–2.

³³ Manus I. Midlarsky, *The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 354–63.

An Claidheamh soluis, where he supported the implementation of Home Rule. Additionally, the ideas of figures such as Daniel O’Connell and James Parnell, who before 1916 were seen as devotees of a constitutional settlement of the Irish Question, were in fact not too different from those of allegedly radical nationalists such as the eighteenth-century rebel Wolfe Tone or the contemporary leader James Stephens: “Both types of leader were trying to blend local ideological traditions with modern political ideas, whether constitutional or revolutionary.”³⁴ Therefore, Mark Tierney is right when he argues that modern Irish historiography has to get away from an “either-or” perspective when it comes to explaining Irish nationalism:

The two nationalist traditions—the constitutionalist campaign for reform undertaken at Westminster, and the extremist campaign for revolution, including outbreaks of agrarian violence and plans for a large-scale military uprising—existed side by side in Ireland between the famine and the Treaty of 1921. The inter-relationship between these styles of nationalism was complex and was of immense importance at some of the most crucial phases of Irish history.³⁵

Perry Curtis, Jr. came to a similar conclusion, though for an earlier period of time, 1840–80, when he pointed out that

the two forces in question [radical and constitutional Irish nationalism] were bound together in a close and complex relationship ... and the interplay of moral and physical force was inscribed in the discourse of Irish nationalists ... What is illusory is the binary interpretation of nationalist strategy, which posits a profound ideological divide between moral and physical force and leaves little or no room for politicians (or poets) who operated somewhere between and around these two poles.³⁶

Curtis, like Tierney, concludes that in the nineteenth century the national movement in Ireland was not characterized by an “either-or” position; rather, its main figures adopted a pragmatic orientation toward what was possible and which measures needed to be taken. In other words, “Peaceably if we can; forcibly if we must.”³⁷

³⁴Tom Garvin, *The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1981), 13.

³⁵Mark Tierney, *Modern Ireland since 1850* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978), 10.

³⁶Perry Curtis, Jr., “Moral and Physical Force: The Language of Violence in Irish Nationalism,” *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 27, no. 2 (1988), 150–89, here 154–55.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 188.

“ONLY IN THE HISTORY OF IRELAND ...”: IRISH
PERSPECTIVES ON THE BALKANS

Due to their own history, Irish nationalists were convinced that they could better understand the developments in the Balkans than anyone else. Already in 1876, in the context of the “Bulgarian atrocities,” *The Nation* pointed out that only in the history of Ireland can scenes be found to compare to those that are being perpetrated in Bulgaria and the northern parts of Turkey. In reading them one must be irresistibly reminded of the savageries of the Elizabethan and Cromwellian soldiery in Ireland.³⁸

Depictions of the killing of Bulgarians by the Turkish regular army, as well as by irregular *bashi-bazouks*, could also be found in *Freeman’s Journal*, which accused the Turks of cruelly slaughtering more than 40,000 innocent men, women, and children. “That happy province [Bulgaria],” *Freeman’s Journal* concluded, “has just passed through horrors worse than those which befell Wicklow in 1798.”³⁹

At the outbreak of the First Balkan War, *Freeman’s Journal* reminded its readers that the experience of an oppressive power’s cruelties “is not altogether unknown to Irish history.”⁴⁰ And *The Nation* diagnosed a “common instinct of savagery” shared by Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, which explains the “bond of sympathy” between the two oppressors. “No man recognises more fully than the Briton the right of the Turk to hang, outrage, torture, dismember, and burn his own rebels,” it stated.⁴¹

As bad as the crimes of the Ottomans had been in their European dominions over the previous century, the *Irish Freedom* pointed out in its December 1912 issue, they were “insignificant in comparison with the crimes of England in Ireland in the same period.”⁴² While the British used “terror and annihilation, massacre [and] persecution” to turn Ireland into the “slave pen of Western Europe,” the Ottoman in Southeastern Europe proved to be a softer occupier:

³⁸ *Nation*, 22 July 1876.

³⁹ “[O]ver a hundred towns and villages have been laid in ashes, horrible tortures have been inflicted on the prisoners, and the women of Bulgaria, famous throughout the East for their purity and their virtues, have been subjected to those nameless wrongs which humanity blushes to name.” *Freeman’s Journal*, 11 July 1876.

⁴⁰ *Freeman’s Journal*, 7 October 1912.

⁴¹ *The Nation*, 28 April 1913.

⁴² *Irish Freedom*, no. 26, December 1912.

He left the conquered people the free and complete enjoyment of their language; he respected in much their religion, and as for their manners and customs he warred only with men, and left to those he overthrew the things he scorned to assail. They lost their independence and the right to self-government, but they retained almost everything else essential to national and racial survival. ... Had England been in Turkey's place neither Greek, Serb, Bulgar, nor Rumanian would today be in existence. ... Compared with the Englishman in Ireland and the result of his rule there, the misgovernment of the Turk in Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria has been that of a kindly indolent extortioner who, once his taxes were paid and the rank of his armies supported, left the misgoverned the possession of their own souls and the enjoyment of their national consciousness.⁴³

As they did during the Second Boer War (1899–1902),⁴⁴ Irish nationalists not only observed the events of the Balkan Wars but actively supported what they perceived to be a “national” liberation struggle. Though Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia gained international support, this was limited mostly to compatriots who had lived abroad and had now returned to join the troops of their former home countries.⁴⁵ Irish support of the Balkan states in their fight against the Turks was an exception. Irish nationalist newspapers were well aware of the Irish volunteers in the ranks of the Balkan armies (“Irishmen are held in great respect”)⁴⁶ and frequently featured reports about them. For instance, an Irish gentleman from Cork, a former teacher who joined the Bulgarian troops as a volunteer in October 1912, filed a report on the battle of Kirk Kilisse (22–24 October 1912) for *Freeman's Journal*:

Lead was singing through the air, and shrapnel screaming, and men were groaning in pain, but you soon grew indifferent to the whiz of the bullet, the pandemonium of bursting shells, and the agony of the dying. ... Our men, hitherto jolly and good-humoured, seemed all of a sudden to become possessed by devils. Smiles wore off faces which became fixed with a sudden purpose. The treasured wrongs of 600 years were fresh in our hearts.⁴⁷

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Donal Lowry, “Nationalist and Unionist Response to the British Empire in the Age of the South African War, 1899–1902,” in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jefferey, eds., *A Military History of Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 379–80.

⁴⁵ Hall, *Balkan Wars*, 15.

⁴⁶ *Freeman's Journal*, 19 November 1912.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

However, personal links between Ireland and the Balkans were not restricted to the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, as *Freeman's Journal* pointed out on another occasion during the First Balkan War.⁴⁸ In 1904, the Irishman Pierce O'Mahony had set up an orphanage specifically for those children whose parents had been killed in their fight to free Macedonia from Ottoman domination. Even though many of these children had gone on to settle in Ireland, they were now reported to be joining the struggle for their homeland's liberation:

Two boys saw their father, who was unarmed, shot down in the street and the body eaten by dogs, the family not being permitted to bury him. Another boy, whose parents had both been killed by Turks, was tending sheep for hire in the mountains of Macedonia, when he was set upon by Turkish soldiers. His skull was smashed and his throat cut from ear to ear. He was buried for dead, but a shepherd's dog unearthed him, and he gradually recovered ... The young students are now on the way to the front.⁴⁹

As a unionist newspaper, the *Irish Times* presented its readers with a very different picture of what was going on in the Balkans. The depiction was similar to that of conservative English and most German papers; it emphasized that Ottoman rule in Southeastern Europe was important for the stability of the region as well as an important precondition for the preservation of peace in Europe as a whole. In this context, the insurrections of Bulgaria and Serbia in 1876–78 were seen as posing a direct threat to European peace because, as the *Irish Times* made clear, the “insignificant [Balkan] States” were acting not on their own but as Russian “puppets.”⁵⁰ Therefore, according to the newspaper, it was the Ottoman side that had fought a just war in 1877–78, with each soldier defending “his home, liberty, life [and] all that makes life worth having” against the Russian invasion of the Balkans.⁵¹

This position did not change in the following years, and it is no surprise that during the Balkan Wars Irish unionists took a clear position in favor of the Turks and against the Balkan states. For the *Irish Times*, what Irish nationalists called a struggle for national independence was nothing but another Russian attempt to gain control over Southeastern Europe. The

⁴⁸ *Freeman's Journal*, 6 November 1912.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ *Irish Times*, 7 September 1877.

⁵¹ *Irish Times*, 27 September 1877.

unionist paper appealed to the European powers to put an end to the war, if necessary through the use of military force against the Balkan states, because otherwise the “smaller nations of Europe will develop a perfectly legitimate contempt for *les grandes Impuissances*.”⁵²

However, in one instance the unionist paper disagreed with the consensus among the European powers. This concerned the question of Albania, which was founded in 1912 as a buffer between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The *Irish Times* did not support the European plan, because in their eyes it was impossible to turn a semi-civilized people into an independent nation. Instead it supported the resistance of the inhabitants of Koritza/Korçë, which was due to become part of newly founded Albania in accord with the will of the European Great Powers. The parallel with Ulster is obvious, the *Irish Times* explained to its readership in April 1913: “In each case an outside Power is trying to force a small, but very virile community to become separated from the country to which it is united by bounds of loyalty, and to join itself instead to another and smaller country.”⁵³

When the people of Koritza took up arms, the newspaper welcomed their struggle:

They have a corps of volunteers, which they call the Sacred Legion. It is formed of private citizens of every age and rank who drill at least twice a week. They have supplied themselves with arms and ammunition ... There is a supplementary committee of ladies, who are not less determined than their husbands and brothers to resist the yoke of Albania. ... “Union or death” is the motto which they emblaze upon their banners, and carry before the columns of their army. Obviously the same phrases might be substituted in Belfast for the cry, “We will not have Home Rule.” And the spirit of Epirus is illustrated in the sayings of leading citizens, which might many of them be repeated north of the Boyne without the change of a word: “Sooner than see our beloved town handed over to Albania, we could burn every house down. The Powers may shoot us down, but they can’t make us abjure our religion.” Change the names, and these sentences might be put in the mouth of an Orangeman. The moral is that Ulster is not singular in her resistance. Brave men always resist oppression by methods like these.⁵⁴

⁵² *Irish Times*, 24 April 1913.

⁵³ *Irish Times*, 25 April 1913.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

“WHAT FREES THE BRAVE?” THE BALKAN WARS AND IRISH
NATIONAL LIBERATION

At the outbreak of the First Balkan War, the *Irish Times* had expressed doubts about the Balkan League’s military strength. It described the Bulgarian army as inexperienced, the Serbian troops as “not well trained,” and the Montenegrins as “utterly unfit to undertake any extensive operation”—they had to deal with the Ottoman soldier, “one of the finest fighters in Europe.”⁵⁵ However, a few weeks later, the unionist newspaper had to admit that it had underestimated the military strength of the small Balkan states: “The Balkan Federation ... has proved her greatness as united Germany proved her greatness at Sedan.”⁵⁶ Around the same time the paper declared an end to the Eastern Question: “The sword of the Balkan Confederacy has cut the Gordian Knot, and made a complicated situation almost ridiculously simple. It looks as though events will give a natural and final solution to the Eastern Question.”⁵⁷ Similar depictions of the events in the Balkans in the autumn and winter of 1912–13 could be found in conservative English newspapers as well as most of the outlets of the German press.⁵⁸ However, the period of enthusiasm for the Balkans was short-lived. The *Irish Times* described the Second Balkan War as “a breach of all laws of morality and international politics,” and the small Balkan states, which just a few months earlier had been celebrated as “gallant little nations,” were once again “half-civilised ... greedy vultures,”⁵⁹ whose selfishness threatened to turn the peace in Europe upside down.⁶⁰

The nationalist Irish newspapers also did not deny that the First Balkan War was an extraordinarily cruel and violent conflict. As the *Irish Freedom* pointed out, the Balkan states “have thrown aside diplomacy and settled the freedom of Albania and Macedonia as men should settle such questions—by the sword.”⁶¹ Even the moderate *Irish Independent* saw the First Balkan War as a clear sign of what “self-sacrificing patriotism” can inspire even in small nations:

⁵⁵ *Irish Times*, 11 October 1912.

⁵⁶ *Irish Times*, 4 November 1912.

⁵⁷ *Irish Times*, 30 October 1912.

⁵⁸ Keisinger, *Unzivilisierte Kriege im zivilisierten Europa*, 77–107.

⁵⁹ *Irish Times*, 8 July 1913.

⁶⁰ *Irish Times*, 3 October 1913. “The stage appears to be neatly set for a third Balkan War.”

⁶¹ *Irish Freedom*, no. 26, December 1912.

Kings and Princes have taken their place at the lead of armies; Queens have devoted themselves to the personal direction of the Red Cross services. Reservists some of whom have made profitable business connections for themselves in England or America have hastened home at their own expense to take their places with the colours. The military organisation of the Allies has been as nearly as possible perfect in every detail.⁶²

Unsurprisingly, the Second Balkan War did not capture the interest of Irish nationalists the way the first war did. Some papers, such as *Irish Freedom*, did not even mention it; others just referred to it as a tragedy; *Freeman's Journal* described it as “not only criminal, [but] stupid,”⁶³ and the *Irish Independent* simply called it a “barbarous event.”⁶⁴

Finally, nationalist Irish newspapers used the Balkan Wars to draw comparisons to the situation in Ireland. Though *Freeman's Journal* acknowledged the atrocities committed, it expressed the view that “a few thousand sacrificed on the battlefield” was nonetheless better than the “many thousands yearly tortured to death by the familiar methods of Turkish misgovernment.”⁶⁵ Irish nationalists regarded the atrocities to be an unpleasant but unavoidable side-effect of the road to freedom. Moreover, what caught their attention was the question of whether the Balkan Wars could serve as an inspiration for Ireland. That the tiny state of Montenegro—“with a population much less than that of the single county of Cork, and very little larger in area”⁶⁶—had started the First Balkan War in October 1912 was recognized with a certain interest by Irish nationalist newspapers. For *Freeman's Journal*, the move toward an independent Montenegrin nation-state was a “glorious and inspiring example ... Can anyone think that any nation need remain slaves or helots, if only they have the brave hearts?”⁶⁷ The *Irish Freedom* had no doubt that the war in the Balkans should be seen as a sign: “What Frees the Brave?” the paper asked, and gave the answer straight away: “The sword!”⁶⁸ Though the journal admitted that the English were superior to the Irish in terms of soldiery, the Balkan War showed “that all that is wanted is will and courage

⁶² *Irish Independent*, 2 November 1912.

⁶³ *Freeman's Journal*, 10 July 1913.

⁶⁴ *Irish Independent*, 12 July 1913.

⁶⁵ *Freeman's Journal*, 9 October 1912.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Freeman's Journal*, 12 October 1912.

⁶⁸ *Irish Freedom*, no. 26, December 1912.

... and one man fighting for liberty is worth ten fighting against it.”⁶⁹ The upcoming fight for Irish freedom will be a cruel struggle—“many will have fallen, and all will have suffered [but] ultimately the Irish Nation will only be built upon dead bodies and broken hearts.”⁷⁰ The chances of victory were good, the *Irish Freedom* stated, because the “strength of England is less than that of Turkey” and was mainly naval, “and her navy would be no use against us.” The newspaper continued:

Every young Irishman should train his body and mind for war, and always keep before his thoughts the following lines: “Fighting men with guns in hand, this alone can free our land. ... We have always insisted it can be done; and Bulgaria is a heavy reinforcement to that opinion.”⁷¹

Bulgaria also appeared to be an inspiration for other nationalist Irish newspapers during the First Balkan War. One hundred years before, Bulgaria had been a “forgotten nation,” as the *Irishmen* reminded its readership. Now the country had shaken off Ottoman domination and had become an independent nation: “These examples teach us that a nation can rise again, even from what seems to be its grave, if only it has faith in itself.”⁷² Finally, for the *Irish Freedom* it was obvious in autumn 1912 which path the Irish nation had to pursue:

Forty years ago Bulgaria was a slave state like this country. [Today] its population is less than four millions, and its revenue is six millions. Our population is over four millions and our revenue is twelve millions. ... Vae Victis! Remember that, O’England, in the hour of your own debacle.⁷³

CONCLUSION

The Balkan Wars were a matter of great media interest throughout the Western world. In Ireland, nationalist and unionist newspapers alike sent journalists to the belligerent states. The Irish nationalists perceived the war to be a brave struggle for national independence, whereas the unionists regarded it as a blow to stability in the Balkans and therefore a threat

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ *Freeman’s Journal*, 9 October 1912.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² *Irishmen*, no. 2, February 1913.

⁷³ *Irish Freedom*, no. 26, December 1912.

to peace in Europe. However, due to censorship, correspondents were mainly restricted to the capital cities. Information from the theater of war was scarce, and the reports that were made available came only through official military sources. The lack of verifiable information meant that the discourse on the Balkan Wars was open to a variety of interpretations. On the one hand, the Ottoman Empire was blamed by Irish nationalists, while on the other hand, the Balkan states were blamed by Irish unionists, for committing atrocious war crimes. While the unionists were roughly on the same wavelength as the conservative English newspapers and most of the organs of the German press, Irish nationalists wholeheartedly supported the struggle of the small Balkan states for national independence.

Moreover, Irish nationalists not only supported the Balkan states' fight against Ottoman dominion during the First Balkan War, but also considered it an inspiration and model for the desired outcome of the "Western Question." Against the backdrop of a new debate from 1910 onwards on the possibility of Home Rule for Ireland, as well as the establishment of large paramilitary organizations by both Catholics and Protestants, the full spectrum of Irish media showed a growing willingness to accept a military settlement of the Irish Question. The perception of the Balkan Wars in the discourse of the nationalist Irish press can be seen as a prelude to the Irish revolutionary years of 1916–1923; it shows that the often-stated dichotomy between a small group of radical Irish separatists on the one side, and the vast majority of moderate nationalists aiming for a constitutional solution of the Irish problem on the other, had already been blurred several years before the Eastern Rising of 1916.

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Political Narratives in Croatia in the Face of War in the Balkans

Stjepan Matković

This chapter addresses the Croatian perception of the Balkan Wars, armed conflicts whose meaning helped transform social relations and the overall atmosphere in Croatia in terms of the national question—a key problem of that era. Although the war proper did not extend to lands with Croatian populations, all of which were within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, albeit in various administrative units, the military operations of the Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire drew the interest of politicians and the general public in Croatia. The wars' events took place close by, and it became ever clearer that its outcome might have effects that would go well beyond those of a local conflict. The Balkan Wars affected the dynamic of local relations between peoples and ignited conflicts across Europe, thereby stimulating a consideration of a systemic solution to the Croatian national question, which was still the main topic of contemporary political discussions in Croatia.

When speaking about internal relations within Croatia, it is important to emphasize the changes that worsened the domestic situation during the period preceding the First Balkan War's outbreak. National relations with the surrounding neighbors in the Austrian part of the Monarchy also became

S. Matković (✉)
Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Croatia
e-mail: matkovic@isp.hr

more pointed. At the end of 1911, the Croatian government increased its repressive measures, jailing opposition politicians. The results of elections for the Croatian Sabor (Parliament) that same year demonstrated the weakness of the government, which could not ensure the orderly enforcement of the Austro-Hungarian and Croatian-Hungarian financial settlement decrees. The only way out of this dead end was to seek a compromise with elements of the opposition through various tactics. Initially the government, attempting to circumvent the constitution, introduced a commissariat as a way of pacifying the Croatian political scene. This measure, despite the change heralded by the arrival of the Croat–Serb coalition at the government’s helm and the attendant reorganization of power, revealed the Croatian public’s continuing dissatisfaction with its subordinate position in Austria-Hungary. With Slavko Cuvaj’s appointment to the Royal Commissioner’s office of the triune kingdom of Croatia–Slavonia–Dalmatia in 1912, the government dissolved parliament, imposed preventive censorship, and introduced absolutist measures—a clear sign of the state’s disorder and one more indication of a deep constitutional crisis between Croats and Magyars.

But the political scene was in turmoil in Hungary as well. Long-standing tensions between the crown and Hungarian politicians—stemming from disagreements over military law and recruiting—were joined by increasing demands for the democratization of all spheres of public life, pointing to dissatisfaction with the existing distribution of power across the wider social spectrum. The political disquiet culminated in unsuccessful assassination attempts on the prominent politicians Slavko Cuvaj (1912), Ivo Hervoić (1912), and Ivan Skerlecz (1913), which demonstrated not only the intense disapproval of the Viennese ruling classes, but also internal discord and a clear desire for fundamental reform. Both the Croatian and the Hungarian examples illustrate how repressive measures could only be a palliative solution; they could not postpone reforms commensurate with modern political processes with respect to both national and other political freedoms. Finally, in Croatia there was increasing reluctance to express loyalty to Francis Joseph and his administrative apparatus; the predominant view held that Vienna was attempting to hold on to power by playing the various nations of the Empire off against one another.¹ As a result, an inevitable struggle to affirm the sovereignty of nations became more widespread; to legitimate this mood in relation to Austria-Hungary, it was important to make the public aware of Croatia’s rights as a state and its cultural ties to other South Slav nations.

¹Steven Beller, *Francis Joseph* (London: Longman, 1996), 197.

CHANGES IN POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the Balkan Wars, and the First World War produced new patterns of thinking in international politics that responded to the need to come to terms with the national question in Croatia and more broadly in the southern Slav lands within Austria-Hungary. This region comprised the Slovene lands, the Vojvodina region, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had recently received its own constitution. In fact, at their root these political concepts of nationhood were not entirely new; in some ways they had been evident in earlier periods. Until the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, the dominant approach to solving the national question consisted of a search for a federalist or trialist reform of the Dual Monarchy. The idea of trialism was supported for the most part among certain Viennese circles, because it provided them with an advantage in their discussions with Budapest.² Numerous Croatian politicians believed that the creation of a new territorial entity would satisfy the demands of the Habsburg South Slavs.

This idea sprang from the belief that, despite its many internal problems, Austria-Hungary was a European great power, a key member of the Triple Alliance alongside Germany and Italy. In terms of Austria-Hungary's internal organization, the dominance of Austrian Germans and Hungarian Magyars could be subject to reform, so as to allow for the autonomy or even independence of national states—including Croatia—that would remain bound by the Habsburg monarch's sovereignty. This point of view was dominant among the established political parties until the last year of the First World War, when a majority of the Croatian political parties in the homeland agreed to establish a state for all South Slavs. Nevertheless, a small minority remained committed to a solution within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy until the end.

On the other hand, some actors drew on the traditions of Croat Yugoslavism, and members of the nationalist youth movement considered the wider arena, moving ever closer to the idea of a South Slavic state built on the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy, which would first have to consider the interests of Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnian and Habsburg Serbs. This idea stimulated a discussion about the pro-Yugoslav groups' shared

²For more on the programs of the various political parties see Tihomir Cipek and Stjepan Matković, *Programatski dokumenti hrvatskih političkih stranaka i skupina 1842–1914* [Programmatic documents of the Croatian political parties and groups, 1842–1914] (Zagreb: Disput, 2006).

connection with the independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. The emigrant Yugoslav Committee, which from the beginning of the First World War fought to break ties with Austria-Hungary and create an integral Yugoslav state, expressed this line of political thinking. Its ranks included adherents of the youth movement that advocated a revolution to achieve a model Yugoslav nation during the Balkan Wars. Of course, the idea of Yugoslav integralism, combined with secessionist tendencies toward Austro-Hungarian constitutional arrangements, was not readily apparent in the approaches of legitimate parties and political groups.

To a limited extent, these views drew on the well-known tradition of political Yugoslavism championed by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815–1905), which dated back to the 1860s and 1870s. Proposing a solution to the sensitive Eastern Question, and placing an emphasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Strossmayer had publicly advocated for South Slavic Christians to maintain harmony with each other for the purpose of the struggle of civilizations between the cross and the crescent. In reality, however, he opposed the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy and the extirpation of all the historical South Slav nationalisms.³ His type of Yugoslavism and national unity was epitomized by the phrase “with education to freedom,” which spoke to the importance of cultural efforts to unite the various South Slav nations—especially those of Southeastern Europe. In this traditional sense, conflicts with the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century renewed anti-Ottoman sentiment and an anti-Turkish narrative. The latter included the motif of a “Revenged Kosovo,” as well as the idea of Slavic unity and “holy war,”⁴ which had an important place among some Croats in strengthening a Serbophile mood and the Yugoslavian propaganda tied to it.

³William Brooks Tomljanovich, *Biskup Josip Juraj Strossmayer: Nacionalizam i moderni katolicizam u Hrvatskoj* [Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer: nationalism and modern Catholicism in Croatia] (Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti—Dom i svijet, 2001). This is a translation of the author’s PhD dissertation, “Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer: Nationalism and Modern Catholicism in Croatia,” Yale University, 1997.

⁴Josip Smodlaka, one of the leading politicians in Dalmatia, used the term *guerra santa* during the First Balkan War in his correspondence with Robert William Seton-Watson. See Josip Smodlaka, *R. W. Seton-Watson i Jugoslaveni. Korespondencija 1906–1941* [R. W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: correspondence 1906–1941], vol. 1 (Zagreb, London: Sveučilište u Zagrebu and the British Academy, 1976), 116. On similar motifs in literature from an earlier era, see Davor Dukić, “Contemporary Wars in the Dalmatian Literary Culture of the 17th and 18th Centuries,” *Narodna umjetnost*, vol. 40, no. 1 (2003), 129–58.

The Balkan Wars, then, represented a turning point in the political mentality of many Croatian intellectuals. They created new expressions of national euphoria, especially following the successes of the Serbian and Montenegrin armies, whose victories stimulated strong opposition to the Dualist Monarchy and inspired an ever-more militant attitude in the youth movement. In other words, a majority of the younger generation increasingly rejected further parliamentary struggles, supporting instead violent opposition to the Habsburg imperial idea. In terms of nationalist ideology, the Croatian youth saw the successful example of the Ottoman Empire's disintegration as an apt model for the solution of the South Slavic question.

THE WARS' IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL SCENE

Newspapers exercised the most important influence on public opinion during the Balkan Wars; they mirrored the stances taken by various political parties and social groups.⁵ Numerous dailies, weeklies, and monthlies followed the wars' events, drawing their information from a variety of sources. Recent research has shown that despite being subjected to preventive censorship and distribution bans, newspapers are key to understanding public opinion and the creation of the Balkan Wars' political images.⁶ Moreover, via their commentaries, newspapers displayed ever-more dissatisfaction with the attitude of the dominant circles in Croatian politics, which could not overcome their subordination to the Dualist government. Despite censorship, newspapers in Civil Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina often notified the public about developments in top-level political circles and on the battlefields. The public followed with

⁵ For a good overview of the influence of newspapers on public opinion, see Josip Horvat, *Povijest novinstva Hrvatske 1771–1939* [History of the Croatian press, 1771–1939] (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 2003), 324–27.

⁶ Igor Despot, "Balkanski ratovi (1912–1913) i hrvatska javnost" [The Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and the Croatian public], MA thesis, University of Zagreb, 2007; and idem, *Balkanski ratovi 1912–1913 i njihov odjek u Hrvatskoj* [The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913 and their reflection in Croatia] (Zagreb: Plejade 2013); Ante Bralić, "Zadarski fin-de-siècle—Političke i društvene prilike u Zadru i Dalmaciji uoči Prvog svjetskog rata" [Zadar's fin-de-siècle—political and social conditions in Zadar and Dalmatia on the eve of World War I], *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, vol. 39, no. 3 (2007), 731–55; and Zlatko Matijević, "Balkanski ratovi na stranicama 'Riječkih Novina' (1912–1913)" [The Balkan Wars in the "Riječki Novine" (1912–1913)], in Nela Veronika Gašpar, ed., *Zbornik Franje Emanuela Hoška: Tkiyo kulture* [A Festschrift for Franjo Emanuel Hoško: the tissue of culture] (Rijeka: Kršćanska sadašnjost—Teologija u Rijeci, 2006), 189–215.

great interest the beginning of the war, the circumstances surrounding the diplomatic maneuverings related to the conflict, and news of Kumanovo, Skadar (Scutari), and Čataldža (Çatalca). For the most part, the news reports satisfied the public due to the wartime successes against the Ottomans. Some newspapers published reports from special war correspondents who enthusiastically celebrated the successes of the Serbian or Montenegrin armies in their dispatches from Belgrade or Cetinje.

A group of young volunteers—about one hundred—joined the Serbian army, soon complemented by several doctors and nurses, thus affirming the side they supported in the war. At the same time, rather lively activities were taking place at home. Money was raised in many cities for the Red Cross divisions of the Balkan states. The artistic celebration of old myths valorizing the victory of Kosovo provided the best example of support for the cause. Demonstrations of solidarity for the Balkan states took place in Dalmatia, causing the disbanding of certain administrations; the newspapers reported on this development as an example of how repressive measures were spreading beyond Civil Croatia, where the commissariat was in power. Alongside the several newspapers which reported on various aspects of the hostilities and offered information drawn from international and domestic sources, many eminent intellectuals and politicians delivered lectures during the war. Most prominent among the lecturers was the university professor Ferdo Šišić (1869–1940). Through his analysis of historical literature, he increased public awareness of Balkan themes, as did a number of prominent literary figures, who introduced readers to Serbian literature and explained the value of the Balkan allies' success. Stevan Galogaža (1893–1944), a Croatian Serb, was a visible proponent of these discourses. As a volunteer in the Serbian army during the war, he regularly dispatched reports to Zagreb newspapers and provided information about cultural life in Serbia, informing readers about the quality of Serbian literary works. Following the end of the First Balkan War, advocates for the national unity of the Croats and Serbs published in Sisak a book entitled *Balkanski rat* (The Balkan war), which bore witness to the public's interest in information about the hostilities.

As far as war crimes were concerned, the media reported very little about them, particularly during military operations, when the first order of business was to provide detailed descriptions of the Balkan states' success at the expense of the Ottomans and the resulting reaction of the Great Powers. Nevertheless, with the passage of time, the Catholic press accorded more attention to war victims, in particular giving details about the exile of Catholic

Albanians. After the peace settlement, the Serbian press in Croatia reported acts of violence committed against their co-nationals, while some outlets among the Croatian press paid attention to Bulgarian victims, drawing on the reports and photographs provided by international agencies. All in all, the Balkan Wars acquainted the Croatian public with a regional situation that it had previously taken little interest in.

In the wake of the military successes of the Serbian and Montenegrin armies, Yugoslav integralism and Serbo-Croatian nationalism intensified and gradually came to shape the notion that Serbia must act as the South Slav Piedmont. Even prior to the Balkan Wars, widely known Croatian artists such as Ivan Meštrović (1883–1962) and Ivo Vojnović (1857–1929) had promoted their view of the advantages of political and cultural Serbianism for the general idea of Yugoslavism.⁷ Along with emphasizing Belgrade's centrality for all South Slavs, they highlighted the importance of fallen heroes from Kosovo, recasting them in the framework of Serbocentric Yugoslavism. On the heels of this growing tendency toward Croatian–Serbian unification, supporters of political integralism, including Niko Bartulović (1890–1945), Ljubo Leontić (1887–1973), Vladimir Čerina (1891–1932), Oskar Tartalja (1887–1950), Milostislav Bartulica (1893–1984), and other young, predominantly Dalmatian nationalists, put forth the view that only the Serbian dynasty and army could bring about the creation of Yugoslavia.⁸ Emerging from these ranks was a group who championed the Yugoslavian unitarist ideology, rejected parliamentary struggle, and supported violent methods of regime reform. Progressive youth in Rijeka, at a meeting held immediately prior to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, requested that the leadership of the Progressive Party accept the program of the Belgrade National Unity club on behalf of the “nationalist youth,” provoking a conflict with the party leadership and marking a widening gap between the young Croatian activists and the older generation. Thus, when the Serbian Army won the Battle of Kumanovo, it came as no surprise when prominent members of the youth movement sent a

⁷Ivo Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Porijeklo, povijest, politika* [The national question in Yugoslavia: origins, history, politics] (Zagreb: Durieux, 1995), 80–81; and Norka Machiedo Mladinić, “Političko opredjeljenje i umjetnički rad mladog Meštrovića” [Political commitment and artistic work of the young Meštrović], *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, vol. 41, no. 1 (2009), 143–70.

⁸Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje*, 81. See also Nikola Žutić-Velebitski, *Niko Bartulović rimokatolik četnik* [Niko Bartulović, the Roman Catholic Chetnik], vol. 1 (Belgrade: Serbian Radical Party, 2010), 16–17.

telegram to the head of the Serbian government that read, “We bow to the avengers of Kosovo and the founders of Yugoslavia.”⁹ The expansion of the Serbian state’s territory and the army’s hard-fought battles and successes strengthened this segment of the Croatian political camp.

The high school youth’s perception of political relations and national identities in Civil Croatia demonstrated broader changes. Even before the outbreak of the First Balkan War, they had organized a strike and large demonstrations, which for a time suspended clearly developed ideological divisions and united nationalists, liberals, Christian socialists, and social democrats in the struggle against the regime. Dissatisfaction with the introduction of the commissariat transformed the youth movement’s views. The Balkan allies’ victory meant yet another change: evoking David and Goliath, they insisted that the joint efforts of smaller states could allow them to triumph against more powerful enemies—a principle applicable to Croatia’s position vis-à-vis Vienna and Budapest. The poem “Stara pjesma” (“Old Poem”), by the popular writer and mentor to the young generation Antun Gustav Matoš (1873–1914), for instance, evinces the Croats’ deep hurt about their nation’s condition: “Among peoples we Croats now / are the last, slaves without power / sentenced to fall and perish without honor.” This attitude foregrounds the hope for change, even though it conflicted with the principles that had hitherto determined Croatian politics. At the same time, this sense of hope also affected the movement of young Croatian nationalists.¹⁰ The latter primarily comprised high school students who worked with the Young Croat movement. During the Balkan Wars, its followers increasingly endorsed the idea of revolution, directing collective consciousness to the memory of Eugen Kvaternik, who in 1871 had led an unsuccessful rebellion against the Austro-Hungarian authorities.

The creation of Kvaternik’s anti-Habsburg cult sanctioned the idea of self-sacrifice for the sake of national interests and emboldened

⁹Josip Beroš, “Ujevićeva politička djelatnost” [Ujević’s political activity], *Riječka revija*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1966), 91–104, here 94.

¹⁰A. G. Matoš exercised important influence on the young members of the Croatian Party of Right. In one issue of the review *Mlada Hrvatska*, he stated, “I am a hard Croat, but if I am forced to stop propagating Croatianism, I would prefer to propagate Serbianism rather than turning into a Magyar, German, or Italian.” *Mlada Hrvatska*, vol. 3 (1913), 102–4. This comment could also be applied to the youth ranks of the Party of Right, which until then had been emphatically critical of the Serbian national idea.

fighters to carry out a revolution. In this context, leaders of the Croatian nationalist and Catholic youth movements visited Belgrade before the outbreak of the First Balkan War.¹¹ They bluntly criticized the passivity of the major parties, demanded the reform of nationalist politics, and condoned the use of force: that is, they advocated a national revolution that would transform the existing state of affairs. Some speakers invoked the example of the young Bosnian would-be assassin Bogdan Žerajić, who had attempted to kill the chief administrative official in Bosnia and Herzegovina two years earlier. Almost all representatives spoke in favor of a Yugoslavian nation, leaving open only the question of whether this future joint state should be organized as a monarchy or a republic. At the same time, individual Croatian supporters of Yugoslav integralism established links with the secret Serbian society “Unity or Death.” Two unpublished poems—“Gdje su naša Kosova i groblja” (“Where are our Kosovos and Graves”) and “Zora” (“Dawn,” 19 September 1913)—demonstrate the influence of Serbia’s victory in the Balkan Wars. These poems can be found among the papers of Mile Budak (1889–1945), one of the leaders of the Young Croat movement who did not support the turn toward Yugoslav integralism. In the first poem he writes,

The whole east shines in the morning of a new day
 hot blood is on the flag of our people steaming
 the warm hearts of those buried rises
 when freedom’s tooth wrecks the past.
 Blessed are you, who know how to fall that way
 fortunate souls, illumined by glowing banner,
 whose honor was secretly nurtured.
 Blessed are you, fathers of fortune, conquering sons.
 And my people? Shame on them!
 Fate has buried it in its skirt
 Every day a battle is lost to us,
 Every army a new unit of slavery,
 Those whose hearts and hot blood is spilled
 Are for us a defeat, new graves.¹²

¹¹ Mirjana Gross, *Povijest pravaške ideologije* [History of the ideology of rightism] (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu, 1973), 394.

¹² Hrvatski državni arhiv [Croatian State Archive], Zagreb, fund Matica hrvatska, private papers of Mile Budak, box 163.

The second poem continues in the same vein:

From the east comes a dawn lush and young.
 On her head a wreath of the sun's rays, in her hand she carries
 Fire and warms the night-time cold
 The hardworking farmer reaps and binds, collects and cuts.

These verses highlight the consequences of the Balkan Wars through the eyes of one of the most consistent advocates for Croatian nationalism.

But the Balkan Wars led to more than a new, more militant generation advocating national unity; a portion of the older generation also underwent an ideological evolution. Established Dalmatian politicians such as Ante Trumbić (1864–1938) and Juraj Biankini (1847–1928) led their ranks. Once adherents of the ideas of the Party of Right and the National Party, they came to support Yugoslav nationalism as the only way to check the aspirations of their larger neighbors. Unlike younger patriots, the older generation of politicians from Civil Croatia, which had traditionally been in favor of the Yugoslav idea, did not entirely reject the broad spectrum of parliamentary constitutional struggle within the monarchy and publicly advocated a peaceful solution. Above all, the elders called for the termination of the commissariat and the reinstating of the constitutional status quo, and openly welcomed the recent defeat of Ottoman Turkey. The Croatian Serbs among them were especially pleased by the outcome of the Balkan Wars. Their main newspaper, *Srbobran*, a daily published in Zagreb by the Serbian Independent Party, wholeheartedly supported Serbia's position, in contrast to their Croatian partners in the Croat–Serb Coalition, who attempted to maintain neutrality, especially when war broke out between Bulgaria and Serbia. *Srbobran*, which sent correspondents to the battlefield, resented other party and non-party organs for their neutrality toward the belligerents, insisting that this attitude was “insincere and Bulgarophile.”¹³ In other words, they demanded that the people accept that Macedonia—notwithstanding its ethnic make-up—had become part of the Serbian state and that Serbia had proved to Europe that it had become the nucleus of the Balkans.

In contrast to conflicts that were rooted in competing national issues and were circumscribed by them, the Balkan Wars raised other considerations. The Social Democratic Party openly opposed the war. It believed that the

¹³ “Obzor-ova ozbiljnost” [The gravity of the newspaper “Horizon”], *Srbobran*, no. 146 (1913), 1.

war only served the interests of capitalism, the bourgeoisie, and advocates of militarism, and was especially opposed to Austria-Hungary's involvement, assuming that its views toward the Balkans were nothing more than a reflection of its imperialist ambitions.¹⁴ It regarded the creation of a Balkan confederation, in which all members would be equal and independent of the politics of the Great Powers, to be a solution to the conflict. The Social Democrats attempted to display their impartiality by publicizing the reports of their Bulgarian and Serbian ideological colleagues, in order to demonstrate that only they could overcome the national conflicts among the Balkan states and unite the region's workers. However, the Social Democrats' influence was weak, because the working classes, which represented only a small fraction of the population, could not play a large role in politics. Stjepan Radić (1871–1928), the leader of the Croat People's Peasant Party, criticized the war as well. Although he showed some sympathy for the victors during the First Balkan War (he had traditionally supported various concepts of Slavism and the idea of national unity), when the Second Balkan War broke out he assumed an entirely pacifist stance, judging the war to be “an awful massacre” among “Balkan and Christian Slavs.” He wrote,

The Balkan Alliance is destroyed, and instead of one strong and honorable whole, instead of a new power, which should have renewed order, freedom, and progress in the Balkans, the old torments are repeated, the old chaos and the old impotence before every stranger. ... The first and main cause of this is the victory of political demagogues in Bulgaria and Serbia, that is, the kind of politicians who do not consider the past or the future, and see only their most immediate interests in the present.¹⁵

The Balkan Wars introduced new interpretations of traditional ideologies, which, paradoxically, grouped even exclusively Croatian concepts under the umbrella of unitarist Yugoslavism. During the wars most members of the Croatian public openly sympathized with the Serbian side; in 1913 they began to criticize the Bulgarians for their perceived destruction of South Slav solidarity. But a portion of the public adhered to the view taken by some Croatian nationalists, primarily members of the Party of

¹⁴Vitimir Korać, *Povijest radničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji* [History of the labour movement in Croatia and Slavonia], vol. 1 (Zagreb: Workers' Chamber for Croatia and Slavonia, 1929), 229.

¹⁵Stjepan Radić, “Braća i nebraća” [Brothers and non-brothers], *Dom*, no. 27 (1913), 1.

Right (“rightists”), who saw the Habsburg dynasty’s main task to be the unification of the Balkan rulers in one alliance around Austria-Hungary. According to this notion, the Balkan states should be protected from the influence of other Great Powers—above all Russia and Italy. The principle “the Balkans for the Balkan people” conveyed these people’s need to guarantee their political freedoms and opportunities for economic progress. In other words, Austria-Hungary’s mission was to create an association of the small Balkan nations, whose interests would be protected. Champions of the Party of Right thus viewed Ottoman Turkey entirely differently from the majority of the supporters of Serbia. Unlike the ideology of those espousing the national unity of Croats and Serbs, the “rightists” followed their own party tradition, which expressed some pro-Islamic positions and was not anti-Turkish. As in the wars of 1875–78, the “rightists” started from the position that Croatian interests in the Balkans did not conflict with Turkish unity; thus, the Croats had no reason to become “excited by the success of the armies of tiny Balkan states.”¹⁶ Alongside their views of the Turkish factor, the leadership of the Party of Right desired an alliance with the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who supported their “religious brothers” during the Balkan Wars because the fate of the Sandžak region and of parts of Macedonia and Kosovo determined which authorities would dominate their neighborhood. Hence the “rightists” and their Muslim allies sought an understanding among the Balkan peoples and a reformed Turkey in order to prevent other Great Powers from encroaching on the region. When it became clear that the Ottoman Empire was losing its European territories, members of these circles proclaimed that Croatian politics should concentrate exclusively on its own national interests. In fact, this call embraced nationalism, something that the victorious Balkan nations had already supported.

The Balkan Wars’ outcome strengthened Serbia’s position in the eyes of numerous Croats, and the public was obviously displeased by the behavior of Austria-Hungary and the ruling Habsburg dynasty. The wars proved the strength of the Yugoslav idea, indicating the manner in which some of the contradictory phenomena that had arisen from settling accounts with the Ottomans could be resolved. Namely, while the allies were euphoric following their victory in the First Balkan War against the Ottoman

¹⁶ Philippe Gelez, *Safvet-beg Bašagić (1870–1934): aux racines intellectuelles de la pensée nationale chez les musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine* (Athens: École française d’Athènes, 2010), 500.

Turks, the outbreak of the Second Balkan War stimulated doubt about the integrity of South Slav interests, which generally included a Bulgarian component. The Serbian–Bulgarian conflict inspired a special variant of Yugoslav propaganda. According to Ante Tresić-Pavičić (1867–1949), a well-known literary figure and politician who was Dalmatia’s representative in the Viennese Imperial Council, Bulgaria’s exit from the Yugoslav circle ensured the hegemony of “our race” over those who were a “Tatar mix”—an allusion to different national origins.¹⁷ In his play *Simeon Veliki* (Simeon the Great), written some time earlier, Tresić-Pavičić had denounced the Bulgarian rulers for attempting to create hegemony in the Balkans, thereby rejecting the idea of a Balkan national federation extending to the Black Sea coast. In his correspondence with the mayor of Ljubljana, Ivan Hribar (1851–1941), who also became an outspoken Yugoslav unitarist and visited Belgrade and Sofia during the Balkan Wars, Tresić-Pavičić drew Hribar’s attention to the unavoidable need to revise the content of the Yugoslav idea among its Croat and Slovene proponents.¹⁸

The Albanians’ aspirations for statehood—another controversial issue among the peoples of the Balkan region—also came to the fore. For the Croatian public, Albanian statehood symbolized several things. On the one hand, a certain part of the public felt deep displeasure with the policy of the Great Powers, since the Albanian question had led to the creation of Albanian autonomy, while the demands of the South Slav peoples within Austria-Hungary, who supposedly had greater national rights, went unheeded. Not questioning the right of all peoples to freedom, some prominent public figures were convinced that the Albanians “were not prepared to take care of themselves,” but they nonetheless had procured rights still denied to the Habsburg South Slavs.¹⁹ The leaders of the Croat–Serb Coalition proclaimed,

¹⁷Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica (National and University Library), Ljubljana, private papers of Ivan Hribar, letter from Ante Tresić-Pavičić, 19 July 1913. In this letter Tresić-Pavičić—still speaking from the perspective of “South Slav interests”—expresses regret that Salonika and Kavala had fallen to the Greeks. At the time of the war he published a brochure in verse entitled “Ko nedodje na boj na Kosovo” [He who does not come to the Battle of Kosovo].

¹⁸Stjepan Matković, “Ivan Hribar i Hrvati” [Ivan Hribar and the Croats], in *Hribarjev zbornik* [Essays on Hribar], ed. Igor Grdina (Ljubljana: Institute for Cultural Studies ZRC SAZU, 2010), 93–104, here 101.

¹⁹See the letter of Ivo Lupis Vukić to Robert William Seton-Watson, 4 December 1912, in Smodlaka, R. W. *Seton-Watson i Jugoslaveni. Korespondencija 1906–1941*, 121.

On this occasion the Croat–Serb Coalition for its part expresses the hurt of the entire Croat and Serb people of the Monarchy. The leading statesmen of the Monarchy show more concern and understanding for the autonomy of the half-wild Albanian tribes, who do not represent either a political or an ethnic whole, than respect for the existing, legally protected constitutional autonomy of the ancient kingdom of Croatia, which is inhabited by cultured Croatian and Serbian people who in battles against Turkish-Albanian aggression gained priceless credit for the preservation of the Monarchy.²⁰

Representatives from Dalmatia and Istria in the Imperial Council openly condemned Austro-Hungarian politics that

advocated for Albanian state autonomy, showing more generosity toward the destructive Ottoman Empire, rather than justice for its own people, which for ages had created a constitutional life and culture for itself and which, numbering several million in strength, talented and brave, living on the borders with the Balkan states, inhabits the all-important southern territory of the Monarchy.²¹

Their opponents from the ranks of the Party of Right had similar thoughts: “If this has led to a new conflict, the responsibility in one sense belongs to Europe, which has yet to arrange anything, yet with the almost incredible creation of Albania has created a new rift among the Balkan peoples.”²²

It is clear that politicians considered this development to be the result of the Great Powers meddling in the national question. By competing for dominance in the Adriatic, Austria and Italy ensured that the national question remained unresolved. The proponents of Yugoslav unitarism viewed the Albanian question through the prism of imperial pretensions, which in the final analysis determined the political boundaries of the time and did not take into consideration the ethnic basis of the new state.

A change was also perceptible among the followers of the Croatian Catholic movement. Their newspaper, *Riječke novine* (Rijeka news), had its own correspondent in Cetinje during the course of the Balkan Wars. The reports of Milko Kelović (1889–1971) contributed to the country’s

²⁰ Većeslav Vilder, *Bika za rogove. Gdje je izvor spora srpsko-hrvatskog? Gdje je rješenje?* [Bull by the horns: where is the source of Serbo-Croatians’ dispute? Where is the solution?] (London: Demos, 1957), 181.

²¹ Cipek, Matković, *Programatski dokumenti*, 660.

²² “Novi rat na Balkanu” [New war in the Balkans], *Hrvatska*, no. 499 (1913), 1.

anti-Turkish mood, while simultaneously opening other questions about internal politics. In one anonymous article entitled “Balkan i jugoslaven-sko pitanje” (The Balkans and the Yugoslav question) he wrote,

The victories of the Balkan nations are our victories too ... This is not only a struggle of one race against another; rather this is a struggle of culture against non-culture, the struggle of the oppressed against tyranny, the struggle of peoples, who are aspiring to their most primitive rights. The Slavic genie has brought down Turkish absolutism like a lightning bolt and removed the shackles that have held these poor peoples for centuries. ... Slavic victories open many tired eyes, because they see that in the Slav not even the worst absolutism could kill human dignity, extinguish the desire for freedom, or kill life energy. This is a fact of inconceivable significance not only for the Balkan nations, but also for all Slavic nations, especially those who live in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. On its southern borders, small but powerful states are forming, in which constitutionalism and freedom reign. ... And where is that power which will stamp out the joy over brotherly victories, sympathy for the victors, hope, and living desire for freedom?²³

Kelović wholeheartedly favored the annexation of Shkodra/Scutari/Skadar by Montenegro during the Balkan Wars:

The Montenegrin king entering Skadar in the manner of Bismarck will certainly pronounce, “Here we are and here we stay.” The ruler of Montenegro did not state that only force will evict him when he enters Skadar. But the capture of Skadar is one of the most beautiful though bloody events in the long history of Montenegro; it is as if fate itself had willed the Montenegrins to capture this eagle’s nest. During these days the last Serbian units passed below the town of Skadar, aside from a few volunteers. With pride Montenegro can say that the city is liberated by Montenegrin blood alone.²⁴

These quotations demonstrate how the national consciousness of the representatives of Croatian Catholicism was oriented toward Yugoslavism.

Even politicians who supported a political solution to the national question exclusively within Austria-Hungary addressed the changing mood directly. In this sense, they were particularly opposed to the ideology of Yugoslavism, considering it a contribution to the interests of Serbia and

²³ Matijević, “Balkanski ratovi na stranicama ‘Riječkih Novina’ (1912–1913),” 189–215.

²⁴ Milko Kelović, “Skadarske impresije” [Impressions from Scutari], *Riječke novine*, no. 107 (1913), 2–3.

the power of its dynasty—that is, as harmful to the tradition of Croatian state rights. We can highlight two examples of the so-called Austro-Croatian point of view. The first relates to Ivo Pilar (1874–1933), one of the political champions of the Croats in Bosnia, who wrote pessimistically,

After the Balkan Wars, Croats, who in the last fifty years were unable to achieve even the most modest success, are left astonished by the successes of the Balkan peoples and Serbia, and this strengthens the Serb option even more, which existed even before the annexation. With capable agitation, a tendency to support our craftsmen with military contracts, the celebration of and support for Croatian artists, writers, actors, and other prominent public figures, and certainly by other small gestures, which foment great friendships, Serbia is gaining an ever greater influence in Croatia, so much so that this feeling is valid in Serbia: Croatia is ripe for falling into Serbia's lap. The Croats will support the Serbs when it comes time to settle accounts with the Monarchy.²⁵

Iso Kršnjavi (1845–1927), at one time the head of the Department of Education and Theology, was no less pessimistic. Later he joined Starčević's Croatian Party of Right and attempted to move closer to influential Viennese circles. According to him,

Events in the Balkan Peninsula have inspired first Serbian, then many Croatian circles with a deep excitement, which, in spite of all measures, is leading to the expression of lively manifestations and demonstrations. More even than these developments, the current situation is characterized by the fact that, despite the government's ban, in a short amount of time a rather large sum has been collected for the Serbian Red Cross. And Croats participated in this to the same extent as Serbs. Even today we can argue that Bosnia and Dalmatia are lost to the Monarchy. In Croatia, the same end is being pursued diligently from above. Even in dreams, dynastic Croatianhood was pushed to the side and suppressed in order to gain the Serbs, and now we are getting our thanks for this. The Balkan Alliance is already peeking over the fence. The radiant bride from a Nibelung myth has faded away ... The Monarchy today stands alone and we will live to see the sublime image of everyone running for Serbia, as today they run for Italy. ... The younger generation had moved closer to the Serbian idea even before. Now it stands in the light

²⁵ This citation is taken from Pilar's brochure *Svjetski rat i Hrvati. Pokus orientacije hrvatskoga naroda još prije svršetka rata* [The World War and the Croats: an Attempt of Orientation of the Croats Nation Even Before the End of the World War], which he wrote under the pseudonym Dr. Juričić (Zagreb: Breyer, 1915), 19.

of sure victories, while despised and rejected Croatianhood stands for Magyar slavery, against which there is no protection in the Monarchy. With what kinds of views would one have to establish a party against Serbdom, when today it stands for freedom and independence?²⁶

CONCLUSION

History shows that the prognosis of the Habsburg Empire's destruction and the creation of a Yugoslav state came to pass. The Balkan Wars stimulated a wave of changes in public opinion. The idea of Croat–Serb unitarism entered through the main doors and very quickly spread to the broadest segments of the Croatian youth, who propagated unconditional national revolution. Even older politicians promulgated the belief that Austria-Hungary was irreparable and that the unification of “17 million Yugoslavs” was inevitable.²⁷ The flame of national enthusiasm for a new integralist idea spread ever wider. The shots in Sarajevo demonstrated that the time for direct action had indeed arrived.

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²⁶ Iso Kršnjavi, *Zapisci. Iza kulisa hrvatske politike* [Records: behind the scenes of Croatian politics], vol. 2 (Zagreb: Mladost, 1986), 680–81.

²⁷ Josip Smodlaka's phrase “L'avvenire dei 17 milioni di Jugoslavi è garantito” appears in Smodlaka, R. W. *Seton-Watson i Jugoslaveni. Korespondencija 1906–1941*, vol. 1, 116.

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Deviationist Perceptions of the Balkan Wars: Leon Trotsky and Otto Neurath

Günther Sandner

In historiography, the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 are closely connected with certain key developments, including the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of new nation-states before and, in the case of Albania's independence, during the Balkan Wars, and, not least, the approach of the First World War. These events are usually viewed as parts of a broader historical development in which the fighting and conflicts in the Balkan region played a decisive role.¹ Many decades later, during the 1990s, the wars of that era in the former Yugoslavia provoked a renewed discussion and examination of the battles between different nation-states, nationalities, and ethnic groups that took place in the

¹Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000); Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996).

G. Sandner (✉)

Departments of Political Science and of Economic and Social History,
University of Vienna, International Research Center for Cultural Studies (IFK),
Vienna, Austria

e-mail: guenther.sandner@univie.ac.at

Balkans shortly before the Great War.² Had the warring parties failed to solve their problems in the past, and were the conflicts of 1912 and 1913 reemerging in these late twentieth-century wars? Have the Balkans always been a belligerent region? Is a peaceful future simply unthinkable because of the historical rivalries among its ethnic groups?

In contrast, the perceptions of contemporaries in 1912 and 1913 were quite different. The following essay deals with two striking examples of the views of contemporary observers of the Balkan Wars: Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) and Otto Neurath (1882–1945). These two intellectuals, a Russian political activist and Marxist and an Austrian economist and philosopher, each had connections and relations of a personal and professional nature with the contested region. Trotsky had already traveled in the area and had established some links with Balkan socialists in the years before the wars.³ Neurath, in turn, was a politically minded scholar and activist, a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy who had thorough knowledge of the Dual Monarchy's conflicts with the Serbs and Montenegrians. He had participated in the debates about the future of the multinational empire in his student days,⁴ though he had not written on the Balkan problem. However, the particular views of these men on the Balkan question were always views *from the outside*. Neither was an uncritical sympathizer or follower of any of the warring parties. Moreover, their points of view differed to a considerable degree from the mainstream discourse of their respective homelands. Both Neurath and Trotsky were sent to the Balkan region to describe, analyze, and explain the conflict to their readers at home in Czarist Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The circumstances surrounding their respective investigations, however, varied significantly.

To scrutinize the similarities and differences between the perceptions of the Russian revolutionary and those of the Austrian economist, this paper addresses the following questions. First, who were these two analysts, and what were their political and societal roles and positions during these years? Second, how did they conduct their research, and what kind

² George Frost Kennan, "Introduction: The Balkan Crises: 1913 and 1993," in idem, ed., *The Other Balkan Wars. A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1993), 3–16.

³ Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky 1879–1921* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 201.

⁴ Otto Neurath to Ferdinand Tönnies, undated [July–August 1909], Estate of Ferdinand Tönnies, Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek Kiel.

of presentation did they choose for their readers? Third, what was the message of their articles, not only in matters of politics and economics but also with respect to cultural and civilian life in a time of war? Fourth, how did they describe the war itself: the military actions, the strategies and the fighting, the military techniques, even the atrocities? And finally, what role did these war experiences play in the respective intellectual and political biographies of Trotsky and Neurath going forward?

THE PROTAGONISTS: LEON TROTSKY AND OTTO NEURATH

Of the two Balkan War correspondents examined here, Leon Trotsky is undoubtedly the more prominent historical personage. Published biographies have produced rather conflicting images of Trotsky's personality and his role in history.⁵ Trotsky himself wrote a widely read autobiography that has been translated into many languages.⁶ In general, the writings on Trotsky's life differ considerably in their assessment of his political thinking, his activities as a politician, and his role in both Russian history and the history of international socialism. Some basic facts, however, are undisputed. He was born Lev Davidovich Bronstein in Yanovka (Bereslavka), Ukraine, in 1879. While a young man, he became a left-wing political thinker and an activist in the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party. Beginning in 1903, the party was divided into two camps: the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. Trotsky acted as a unifier in this era of political tensions, but was unsuccessful in bringing the two groups together. He left the Menshevik faction and joined the Bolsheviks prior to the October Revolution of 1917. Outside the Russian Empire, he was a well-known and popular leader in the international labor movement after the Russian Revolution of 1905, owing to his prominent role in the Saint Petersburg Soviet. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, he became one of Soviet Russia's leading politicians and was active as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and as People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, beginning in March 1918.

⁵The classic, partisan, pro-Trotsky biography is Isaac Deutscher's three-volume study, *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky 1879–1921*; *The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky 1921–1929* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky 1929–1940* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). The most recent of the critical and (especially in this case) hotly disputed biographies is Robert Service, *Trotsky: A Biography* (Basingstoke: Pan, 2009). See, for example, the harsh critique of Service's book by Trotskyite author David North, *In Defense of Leon Trotsky* (Oak Park, MI: Mehring Books, 2010).

⁶Leon Trotsky, *My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography* (New York: Scribner, 1930).

The Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War (1918–20) is usually considered one of Trotsky's major political achievements. As a result of Lenin's death in early 1924 and the rise of Josef Stalin and his bureaucratic regime, however, Trotsky was gradually removed from power. Trotsky strictly opposed Stalinism. He was expelled from the Communist Party and exiled from the Soviet Union in 1929. Opposed and hated by Soviet officials, he soon became one of the leading anti-Stalinist Marxists in international socialism and served as the head of the so-called Fourth International. Turkey, France, Norway, and finally Mexico were among his countries of exile between 1929 and 1940. Despite strict security precautions, he was assassinated in his Mexican home on Stalin's orders by a Spanish-born agent of the NKVD, the Soviet security and intelligence agency, in August 1940.

For my purposes here, however, it is necessary to focus on the period beginning when Trotsky came to Vienna as an exile in October 1907. As a rather prominent political figure of the left and a well-known writer and journalist, he was welcomed by many leftists in the cultural and political circles of prewar Vienna. But he commented very critically, especially in his 1930 autobiography, on the left-wing Austrian political milieu with which he became familiar during his seven years in Vienna, where he lived until 1914. Among the people he met were the socialists Rudolf Hilferding, Otto Bauer, Max Adler, and Karl Renner. These were well-educated men whose knowledge in many fields was superior to his own, as he acknowledged in his writings, but they were no revolutionaries.⁷ Although he sympathized with Victor Adler, the founder of the Austrian Social-Democratic Workers' Party—at the time of the Balkan Wars, he called Adler “one of the wittiest men in Europe”⁸—the so-called Austro-Marxists were the main targets of his scathing critiques and ridicule. They were windbags and philistines, not the sort of people that would make revolutions, he believed. However, there seems to be a difference between Trotsky's retrospective autobiographical assessments and the actual views he held during his Viennese exile. It is clear that he later reinforced his critique of his left-wing associates in the city. “During his stay in Vienna,” his biographer Isaac Deutscher notes, “he was less hard on them and felt gratified by their friendship.”⁹

⁷ Ibid., 207.

⁸ George Weissman, ed., *The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky: The Balkan Wars 1912–13* (New York: Monad Press, 1980), 57.

⁹ Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, 185.

Otto Neurath was born in Vienna in 1882.¹⁰ He studied mathematics and natural sciences in Vienna and economics and history in Berlin. After finishing his military service, he taught political economy in a Viennese business school. He married Anna Schapire, a feminist who died shortly after the birth of their son Paul in 1911. Before the First World War, Neurath participated in the meetings of the so-called first Vienna Circle with, among others, the mathematician Hans Hahn and the physicist Philipp Frank, and traveled to the Balkan region, where his stay was financed by a grant from the Carnegie Foundation. During the war, he earned his *Habilitation* in political economy (1917) at the University of Heidelberg and served as director of the Museum of War Economy in Leipzig. In March 1919 he became director of the Office for Central Economic Planning in Bavaria, a position he held during the short-lived Munich Soviet Republic of April 1919. When this socialist experiment was ended by force, he was imprisoned, then deported to Austria. In early 1920, he began his career in “Red Vienna” (1919–34) as the director and the initiator of certain institutions, the most important of which was the Museum for Society and Economy. At this time, the Vienna Method of Pictorial Statistics—later known as Isotype (an acronym for International System of Typographic Picture Education)—came into being. In the 1920s, the second Vienna Circle, guided by the philosopher Moritz Schlick, was established, and Neurath became one of its most important members. The end of the Austrian Republic in February 1934 forced him to emigrate. In his exile he first directed the Mundaneum Museum in The Hague, but after the German invasion of the Netherlands in 1940 he fled to England. At Oxford, together with his third wife, Marie Reidemeister, he founded the Isotype Institute. He remained in England until his sudden death in December 1945.

Neurath has at least a twofold importance as a twentieth-century scholar and intellectual. First, he was one of the main proponents, from the 1920s onwards, of the philosophical movement of logical empiricism, or neo-positivism, together with scientists and philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick, and Hans Reichenbach, and was a

¹⁰For further biographical information, see Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, eds., *Otto Neurath: Empiricism and Sociology* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973); Nancy Cartwright et al., *Otto Neurath: Philosophy between Science and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Paul Neurath, “Otto Neurath (1882–1945)—Life and Work,” in Elisabeth Nemeth and Friedrich Stadler, eds., *Encyclopedia and Utopia: The Life and Work of Otto Neurath* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), 15–28. The first biography of Neurath was recently published by the author of this essay: Günther Sandner, *Otto Neurath. Eine politische Biographie* (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2014).

cofounder of the Vienna Circle, which advocated a “scientific conception of the world.”¹¹ Second, he was the inventor of the international picture language mentioned above, Isotype. Similar pictograms are still in use today. His contributions to visual education and the philosophical aspects of his intellectual life continue to be rediscovered. But initially, and especially before the First World War, Neurath was principally an economist. Although his economic work was an important intellectual and social-scientific reference point around the time of the Great War, this period of his life is almost completely forgotten today.

Neurath and Trotsky most probably never met. But both were well known in Viennese intellectual and political circles before the First World War, and both seem to have visited the same public places. One such locale may have been the Café Central in Vienna’s first district, where the meetings of the first Vienna Circle most likely took place with Neurath as one of its regular participants.¹² Trotsky was a frequent patron of this famous coffeehouse, where he took part in discussions and played chess.¹³ According to an oft-quoted anecdote, Victor Adler (or possibly someone else) was talking about a coming revolution in Russia, whereupon a high-ranking Austrian official (or a politician, perhaps the foreign minister) said mockingly, “And who will lead this revolution? Perhaps Mr. Bronstein from the Café Central?”¹⁴

EXPEDITIONS IN THE BALKANS: TROTSKY AND NEURATH AS WAR CORRESPONDENTS

From Vienna, Neurath and Trotsky each traveled to the Balkan region shortly before, during, and immediately after the wars. In many respects, their experiences were quite similar to those of many other journalists and war correspondents. Direct access to the battlefields was strictly limited, many sources were not trustworthy, and reporters were often dependent on secondhand information. In addition, there were communication barriers because of the region’s various languages. The reports filed by

¹¹Friedrich Stadler and Thomas E. Uebel, eds., *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis* (Vienna: Springer, 2012).

¹²Thomas E. Uebel, *Vernunftkritik und Wissenschaft. Otto Neurath und der erste Wiener Kreis* (Vienna: Springer, 2010).

¹³Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, 186.

¹⁴As far as I know, there is no reliable source to verify that this episode actually happened.

Neurath and Trotsky had certain peculiarities, however, that endow them with special qualities.

What were their respective starting positions in autumn 1912? At the beginning of the First Balkan War, Neurath was already an established scholar in the field of economics, and was teaching political economy at a Viennese business school. He had finished his studies in the history of economics in Berlin in 1906 with a dissertation supervised by historian Eduard Meyer and economist Gustav Schmoller, the first part of which had been published (“The Conceptions in Antiquity of Commerce, Trade and Agriculture”).¹⁵ Later he did his postdoctoral studies in Vienna, which included the seminars of Friedrich von Wieser and Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, which he attended together with his future opponent Ludwig von Mises.¹⁶ Neurath also knew the Austrian economist Eugen von Philippovich, who was active in the Social Policy Association (Verein für Socialpolitik), of which Neurath was also a member.

Like Neurath, the economists Böhm-Bawerk and Philippovich were active in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This institution was founded in 1910 by the American industrialist Andrew Carnegie to support scientific studies on the causes and possible prevention of wars and to secure permanent peace all over the world. The Balkan Wars, however, presented the first major challenge for the new organization. A number of research studies on different war-related topics had been scheduled by the institution. Philippovich was one among others searching for sufficiently qualified economists. Against this background, it is not surprising that Neurath applied successfully for a fellowship and worked in the Endowment’s Division of Economy and History. As a fellow of the Carnegie Endowment, Neurath aimed to document and analyze the economy in the Balkan region within the framework of his peculiar theory of war economics, which will be described later. His final report, “The Effects of the Balkan Wars on Austria-Hungary with Special Regard to Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Russia, Montenegro, Albania, Italy, Germany and Switzerland,” is listed in the Carnegie Yearbook for 1913–14.¹⁷

¹⁵ Otto Neurath, “Zur Anschauung der Antike über Handel, Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft,” *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, vol. 34, no. 2 (1907), 145–205.

¹⁶ In his memoirs, Mises wrote about these seminars and characterized Neurath in not-very-friendly terms as someone who always put forth absolute nonsense with fanatical forcefulness. Ludwig von Mises, *Erinnerungen* (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, 1978), 24.

¹⁷ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ed., *Yearbook for 1913–1914* (Washington, DC: Adams, 1914), 92.

Although the Endowment had indisputably pacifist aims, it stressed that its orientation was strictly scientific: “The questions are to be discussed scientifically, and as far as possible without prejudice either for or against war,” the report announced.¹⁸ As we will see, this claim dovetailed nicely with Neurath’s approach to economics and his self-conception as a scientist.

The situation of Leon Trotsky was quite different. Banished from his homeland, the Russian political activist and revolutionary traveled to the Balkans mostly as a reporter for a radical-liberal Russian newspaper with Marxist sympathies. Trotsky urgently needed journalistic work to support his family in their Viennese exile, as his political and revolutionary activities were mostly unpaid. When asked by a Russian newspaper to be its special correspondent for the conflict breaking out in the Balkans, he was offered an opportunity that possessed two appealing aspects: he could gather further experience in European and international politics, and at the same time would be guaranteed continuously paid work on a long-term basis.

Thus Trotsky, as mainly a partisan political journalist and commentator, and Neurath, as an economic expert, went to the Balkan Wars under different auspices. Both began writing many articles in the autumn of 1912, most of which were published by a single periodical in each respective case. For Trotsky, this was the daily *Kievskaja Mysl'* (Kievan thought), what he would later call “a popular radical paper of the Marxist hue”¹⁹ and his biographer Isaac Deutscher would characterize as “a widely-read radical Liberal daily.”²⁰ Neurath’s preferred journal was the independent but mostly liberal *Der österreichische Volkswirt* (The Austrian economist).

Trotsky also published articles in periodicals such as *Odesskie Novosti* and *Pravda*—the latter of which he edited himself in Vienna for three and a half years. Neurath, too, had additional options for publication, including small monographs and pamphlets. As an Austrian economist, Neurath published his articles, essays, and reports as a well-known figure who was addressing a Viennese readership educated in economics. In Trotsky’s case, the relationship between author and audience was more complicated. As an opponent of the czarist regime, he needed to choose a pseudonym (“Antid Oto”), and all his contributions had to pass through Russian censorship, ever watchful and efficient. “But I never wrote what I did not

¹⁸ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ed., *Yearbook for 1911* (Washington, DC: Adams, 1912), 93.

¹⁹ Trotsky, *My Life*, 230.

²⁰ Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, 184.

want to say," he later claimed.²¹ However, even under such circumstances, many Russian readers may have known the identity of the author offering critical analyses from the Balkans.

Neurath and Trotsky each made several trips to the Balkans and visited some of the same specific destinations. Nevertheless, each man had certain special interests that included investigations in regions not at the center of international attention. Neurath, like Trotsky and many other correspondents, was very active in Belgrade, which he visited several times, first at the time of mobilization and the beginning of the First Balkan War, after Serbia's victory in the Battle of Kumanovo on 23–24 October 1912, and again during the Second Balkan War. He also spent some time in Sofia. In addition, he analyzed the effects of the war in regions not directly involved in the fighting, such as Bosnia and Galicia. He gave a summary description of his journeys in a letter sent to Ferdinand Tönnies after the Second Balkan War, in which he wrote that he had once been in Bulgaria, six times in Serbia, once in Bosnia, three times in Croatia, twice in Hungary, twice in Galicia, twice in Bohemia, once in Bucovina, and, not long before, had even been in Berlin.²²

As early as September 1912, the editor of *Kievskaja Mysl'* had asked Trotsky to go to the Balkans as the paper's special correspondent. He left Vienna in early October and went first to Serbia and Bulgaria. A few weeks later he returned to Vienna, where he continued writing articles on the situation in the Balkans. He went back to the Balkan region when the Second Balkan War broke out. And when it ended in summer 1913, he traveled to Dobrudja, Romania, where he analyzed postwar conditions.²³

THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDERS: PERCEPTIONS

Although there was some overlap in the locales they visited and even in their methods of investigation (which included firsthand observation, historical contextualization, and interviews with politicians and experts), Neurath and Trotsky differed in their special interests and approaches. Trotsky was always sure to embed his perceptions deeply in the historical context of the Balkans. He analyzed the history of the Balkan region in great detail, discussed the consequences of the Turkish revolution comprehensively and

²¹ Trotsky, *My Life*, 230.

²² Otto Neurath to Ferdinand Tönnies, undated [1913], Estate of Ferdinand Tönnies, Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek Kiel.

²³ Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed*, 201–209.

with some sympathy, portrayed the political protagonists in the Balkan countries—individuals as well as political movements and parties, especially those of Bulgaria and Serbia—and always critically discussed and eventually denounced the role of the great powers. Although Russia, which had initially encouraged a pan-Balkan alliance before the war to oppose the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, was its main object, his critique was many-sided. Some of his images even of Serbian and Bulgarian politicians were obviously drawn without much respect. Nikola Pašić, the head of the Serbian government, was one of the individuals he portrayed in great detail and not without sarcasm. “Pašić is not an orator, or a journalist, or a fighter; he is not a brilliantly talented man. In general, *he does not shine*,” is how he characterized this leading politician.²⁴ When he described his interview with Pašić, he focused on the man’s intellectual capacity in a pejorative way:

In an attempt to make the work easier for him, during my interview with him I translated from Russian into German and from German into Russian. I had been told beforehand that Pašić knew both languages. Nevertheless, the interview went very badly. When I told some Belgrade friends about this, they replied, “Yes, he speaks Serbian like that, too.”²⁵

Whether or not this was true, Trotsky’s description was in no way a friendly portrait. His interviews extended to many politicians and journalists. He managed to depict many of the official protagonists—several members of the Serbian government, for example—but he also talked with ordinary soldiers, civilians, and, perhaps most important, Turkish prisoners of war.²⁶ And he documented conversations among passengers that he more or less accidentally overheard on his train journeys.²⁷ In sum, Trotsky the well-known leftist remained a Marxist-trained political and partisan intellectual, but he operated primarily as a passionate journalist. The collection of his articles on the Balkan Wars is not only valuable for its historical documentation but also represents a corpus of brilliant journalism.

Like Trotsky, Neurath spoke with politicians and journalists, but he also interviewed many political and especially economic experts, along with bank directors and businessmen. Often he carefully described his own observations, especially those made while traveling through Serbia. In the preface to his

²⁴ Trotsky, *War Correspondence*, 90.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 192–97.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 57–60.

study “Serbia’s Successes in the Balkan War,” he lists his sources: discussions with leading Serb politicians; information given by civil servants, bank managers, and merchants in Serbia and Austria-Hungary; communications with statesmen of the monarchy; and Serbian and non-Serbian publications, especially the Austro-Hungarian and German consular reports.²⁸

In contrast to Trotsky, he rarely spoke with ordinary people, or at least he did not report such conversations. One reason for this may be that he did not speak any of the local languages, such as Serbian, Bulgarian, and Turkish. Trotsky seems to have interviewed Serbian politicians only in Russian, and perhaps occasionally in German if the interviewee understood the language. In any case, he seems not to have *spoken* Serbian²⁹ although, in contrast to Neurath, he probably understood it fairly well. Perhaps both Neurath and Trotsky had help from translators, but if so they never mentioned it in their articles. There was, however, a further difference between the Russian and the Austrian correspondent: Neurath tended to avoid addressing ideological issues in the strict sense and instead focused on seemingly impartial economic analysis, the area of his expertise. In sharp contrast, Trotsky wrote very partisan analyses and discussed his favored political policies, such as a future federation of the nationalities in the Balkan region and a rejection of any influence from czarist Russia.

In sum, it is obvious that Trotsky first and foremost focused his reports on questions of history and politics, whereas Neurath was mainly, although not exclusively, interested in economics. But the two men also understood their particular roles in considerably different ways.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

In many of his early articles on the Balkan Wars, Trotsky heavily criticized the “sultan’s despotism” exercised by the Ottoman Empire in the past.³⁰ In this respect he declared some sympathy with the Young Turks’ revolution. But he was convinced that the future of the Balkans was not Turkish. Trotsky instead favored the concept of self-determination and welcomed the establishment of a federation of Balkan states as a promising model for

²⁸ Otto Neurath, “Serbia’s Successes in the Balkan War: An Economic and Social Study” [1912], in: Thomas E. Uebel and Robert S. Cohen, eds., *Otto Neurath, Economic Writings: Selections 1904–1945* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), 200–61, here 201.

²⁹ Trotsky, *War Correspondence*, 90.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

the future. With respect to the great powers, he took an unambiguously non-interventionist and anti-imperialist approach. He strongly relied on the region's social democratic parties, which he believed should anticipate the federal model being put in place.³¹ Despite having sympathies with the peoples previously oppressed by the Ottomans, Trotsky was also aware of "chauvinism" within the Balkan nationalities, and he vigorously opposed these tendencies.

One may note that Trotsky changed some of his political views during the two wars. During the First Balkan War, he became increasingly skeptical of politics and warfare as conducted by Serbia and Bulgaria. When he was in Sofia, for instance, he heavily criticized Bulgarian censorship and propaganda.³² He seems to have been shocked when Serbian or Bulgarian soldiers told him what they had done to their Albanian or Turkish enemies: "War is revealed as, first and foremost, a vile thing, if you just lift up one edge of the curtain that hangs in front of deeds of military prowess," he wrote at the end of 1912.³³ He tried to unmask the ideology of Pan-Slavism and insisted that the Balkan countries needed to pursue their goals without the help of czarist Russia. It irritated him that so many Serbs and Bulgarians counted on Russian help.

Immediately after the Second Balkan War, he focused on Romania, which he portrayed as an underdeveloped semi-feudal state ruled by corrupt elites and dominated by an aggressive anti-Semitism that disgusted him.³⁴ In Trotsky's view, it was Romania that in the end had become the real profiteer of the war.

In sum, the initial struggle for independence from the Turks seems to have lost Trotsky's support because he became displeased by the results of the wars. Quite surprisingly for a committed Marxist, Trotsky wrote comparatively little on the economies of the Balkan states. Nevertheless, he was convinced that the wars would substantially damage the Balkan economies for many years. In this respect, he differs greatly from Neurath. Whereas Neurath doubted that the Serbian economy would suffer significant damage (see below), Trotsky already forecast economic decline at the time of mobilization.³⁵

³¹ See, e.g., the article "The Bulgarian and Serbian Social Democrats," in Trotsky, *War Correspondence*, 29–36.

³² *Ibid.*, 257–60.

³³ *Ibid.*, 272.

³⁴ See Trotsky's article "The Jewish Question," *ibid.*, 494–504.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 63.

Economics, however, was the predominant theme in Neurath's articles. His primary thesis corresponded to his approach to wartime economics (*Kriegswirtschaftslehre*). This was a subdiscipline of political economics that Neurath had established around 1910.³⁶ His main thesis was, first, that wars did not necessarily result in economic decline, a hypothesis he tried to prove by citing historical examples such as the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War. Second, he stated that there were several instruments of wartime economy, such as central planning based upon statistics, and the practice of an economy-in-kind and a barter economy, which even in peacetime would improve the people's standard of living. In his view, a war economy worked much better than the market economy (he used the German term *Verkehrswirtschaft*). It was in this theoretical context that he studied and further differentiated the phenomenon of war economy in the Balkan Wars. He repeatedly stated that well-organized agrarian economies without large land holdings, such as those in Serbia and Bulgaria, were much better equipped to cope with war than the economies of either semi-feudal or industrialized nations. The most important reasons for this advantage, in his view, were the presence of free peasants, a relatively equal distribution of land, well-functioning communitarian structures such as the family and the village community, the development of cooperatives, and the fact that during times of recruitment and mobilization there will always be family members who will remain at home and cultivate the soil.

In his numerous articles and essays, Neurath proved himself an expert on the history, nationalities, and religious context of the Balkans. His main interest, however, was Serbia, on which he focused most of his investigations and texts. Only in some of his publications did Neurath go beyond economics. His reflections on politics demonstrated that even his political sympathies were first and foremost on the Serbian side, a preference quite surprising for an Austrian. He stressed the role of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece as cultural pioneers in the region, because these peoples possessed a richer tradition of education and democracy (which he related to the Orthodox Church) than the Albanians in particular.³⁷ This pro-Serbian attitude, however, resulted in an amazingly harsh critique of the politics of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He blamed Austrian politics and the press for being prisoner to a sort of anti-Serbian mood that blocked their view of the actual political scene and, above all, the economic

³⁶ Otto Neurath, "Through War Economy to Economy in Kind," in Neurath and Cohen, eds., *Empiricism and Sociology*, 123–57.

³⁷ Neurath, "Serbia's Successes," 227.

situation. And he strongly advocated policies of economic cooperation between Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.³⁸ Neurath also criticized the fact that Austria-Hungary had lost its privileged economic position in Serbia, especially in the years before the Balkan Wars, for political reasons. He argued that in fact hardly any damage had been done to Serbia by the political conflicts and the customs war with the Monarchy. He was convinced that Serbia had been enjoying prosperity in the decade before the First Balkan War.

His most detailed investigation was his pamphlet "Serbia's Successes in the Balkan War." What were the reasons for Serbia's successes in the First Balkan War? he asked rhetorically. First, the country not only had a very homogeneous economic and social structure but also reflected national and religious unity. It was still a peasant state in which the majority of the population worked the land and large land ownership played almost no role. That meant that every peasant who joined the army left behind family members who were familiar with the work that still had to be done at home, which is why the war's material losses could quite easily be made up. But for Neurath, Serbian success was a question not only of an economic but also of a political structure. In his analysis, the Serbs formed a "primitive agrarian democracy."³⁹ The traditional Serbian *zadruga* (extended family) provided for the collective working of the land by means of the institution of the cooperative, which was also important for education. In Neurath's view, these traditional structures had helped Serbia economically during the war. He presented statistical data demonstrating that although a war was going on in 1912, the Serbian harvest that year was not much worse than it had been in 1911.⁴⁰ In his view, the cooperatives had enhanced economic stability and increased the fighting strength of the country. Thus, the damaging effects of war on agriculture had considerably been reduced by Serbia's agrarian make-up and its community organization, and the country's food supply remained relatively independent of imports from foreign countries during wartime.

For Neurath, however, Serbia's success resulted not only from its own strength but also from Turkish weakness. Although the Serbs could enjoy the advantages of an agrarian state based mainly on an economy-in-kind, and despite the general enthusiasm of the masses for the military actions

³⁸ Otto Neurath, "Österreich-Ungarns Balkanpolitik" [1912], in Rudolf Haller and Ulf Höfer, eds., *Otto Neurath. Gesammelte ökonomische, soziologische und sozialpolitische Schriften, Teil II* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1998), 14–30.

³⁹ Neurath, "Serbia's Successes," 202.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 203.

and of course their successes, there were also external reasons why the outbreak of war was extremely favorable for Serbia. Neurath also stressed the incompetence of the Turks in failing to develop an appropriate administration and to organize a military apparatus.⁴¹

Both Trotsky and Neurath came from multinational states that had relatively close relations and conflicting political interests with regard to the Balkan region. Therefore they both took the political problem of nationalities very seriously. What Neurath and Trotsky had in common was, first, their rejection of the policies of the great powers, especially Russia (Trotsky) and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Neurath). Second was their sympathy, albeit not undivided, with the Balkan states' fight for independence. But independence was less important to Neurath, and it obviously would lose its relevance in Trotsky's case.

THE WAR AND ITS ATROCITIES

Neither Neurath nor Trotsky were ever close to the battlefields in 1912 or 1913. What they knew about the war and its struggles was what they were told by others: army officers, soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians. Both realized at quite early stages of the war that atrocities and other cruelties had occurred. "This was not the first nor the last time atrocities directed against civilians occurred during a European conflict," explains Richard C. Hall, but it was "the first time in the twentieth century that opposing military forces targeted civilians."⁴² Neither Neurath nor Trotsky ignored those facts. Trotsky, for instance, often wrote his articles from the perspective of ordinary, even suffering soldiers, who themselves could become barbaric murderers, as he noted with consternation. He portrayed atrocities primarily by citing the oral testimony he had heard. He accused the Serbs and Bulgarians in particular of conducting a war of annihilation. In his partisan reporting, he excoriated the Russian press for its one-sidedness. He charged that, apart from his own reports, only articles detailing Turkish cruelties were published in Russia, while similar acts committed by other combatants' forces—especially those of Serbian and, in the First Balkan War, Bulgarian soldiers—were consistently ignored. He complained about all "those cruelties and atrocities that the victorious soldiery inflicted upon Turks and Albanians with the scandalous connivance

⁴¹ Ibid., 227.

⁴² Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913*, 136.

of most of the Russian press.”⁴³ Even in his autobiography does he recall that Bulgarian atrocities in particular were constantly ignored via a “conspiracy of silence on the part of the Russian press.”⁴⁴ Certain organs of the Russian press, however, supported Russian policies, as the official Russian position favored a Balkan federation before the First Balkan War.

Neurath’s perspective was comparatively detached, but he too was aware of barbaric practices in the war. In contrast to Trotsky, he discussed atrocities not in terms of particular concrete incidents but only in an “objective” manner, as when he wrote “that it is likely that a great number of atrocities were committed.”⁴⁵ And in contrast to Trotsky, neither his personal experiences and observations nor the course of the war in general changed his views, which were mostly formulated in an impartial manner but nevertheless remained rather pro-Serbian. He continued to demand from his country and its government more moderate and constructive policies in their dealings with Serbia. Like Trotsky, he was aware that warfare, and atrocities in particular, were a matter not only of official army formations but also of numerous gangs that had formed on virtually all sides. “In the Balkan war the gangs were active, supported, as probably before, by the governments of the Balkan states, by the provision of arms, ammunitions and officers,” he wrote. And, he added, “Official circles in Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece blamed them for all the cruelties which were suffered by non-combatants. Reliable people claim that regular troops also occasionally took part in the killing of non-combatants.”⁴⁶

The killing of civilians had officially been outlawed by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. In the Balkan Wars, however, civilians were frequently victims of atrocities. Both Neurath and Trotsky assumed that a large number of innocent people had been murdered. Neurath believed that the “wild instincts” unleashed in the Balkan Wars were stronger than those in any of the wars of the nineteenth century. But why did this happen? Beside the “bitterness accumulated over years,” it was also the “low level of development” of the ethnic groups involved that was responsible, he believed: “Apparently more than in any other European wars of the nineteenth century, every kind of unruly instinct was let loose during the Balkan war.”⁴⁷

⁴³ Trotsky, *War Correspondence*, 311.

⁴⁴ Trotsky, *My Life*, 227.

⁴⁵ Neurath, “Serbia’s Successes,” 226.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

THE BALKAN EXPERIENCES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

Neurath's and Trotsky's perceptions of the Balkan Wars differed in many respects. They focused on different elements of the wars; they diverged, at least to some degree, in their positions toward the warring factions; and they obviously did not have the same set of interests. Nevertheless, both used their experiences in the Balkan Wars in their later scholarly and/or political lives and careers.

Neurath interpreted the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 primarily as empirical evidence for his approach to war economies. His reflections on a war economy as a promising model for a planned economy in peacetime, in which people could live in happiness and freedom, led to his support for "total socialization," his participation in the postwar socialist debates on economics in Germany and Austria, and his rather unsuccessful engagement in the Bavarian revolution in the spring of 1919.⁴⁸ His experiences in the Balkan Wars may also have made him—or confirmed him as—a follower of the Austro-Marxist concept of the cultural autonomy of nationalities. This concept included a rejection of the Kautskian view, according to which national peculiarities would more or less disappear in a future socialist society. The Balkan Wars had demonstrated that the question of nationalities could not be resolved so easily, and this is probably why Neurath's utopian vision of socialism included the persistence of national differences.⁴⁹

Trotsky later discussed his time as a journalist in the Balkan Wars. The wars strengthened his rejection of the ideology of Pan-Slavism and of chauvinism in general. More than that, he seems to have believed that his exposure to warfare had prepared him for his appointment as People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs in March 1918, a notion that Robert Service has ridiculed as "poetic exaggeration" in his highly controversial biography of Trotsky. In all of Trotsky's articles summarized by Service, Trotsky seems not to have been interested in the strategies or tactics employed by the belligerent forces. What could he have learned in terms of warfare?⁵⁰ But while Trotsky theoretically remained a proponent of the self-determination of oppressed nations

⁴⁸ Otto Neurath, "Total Socialisation: Of the Two States of the Future to Come" [1920], in Uebel and Cohen, eds., *Otto Neurath, Selected Economic Writings*, 371–404.

⁴⁹ Günther Sandner, "Nations without Nationalism: The Austro-Marxist Discourse on Multiculturalism," *Journal for Language and Politics*, vol. 4, no. 2 (2005), 273–91.

⁵⁰ Service, *Trotsky*, 127. Service gives no reference for Trotsky's quotation.

and nationalities, he nevertheless saw no reason to preserve any unique national cultural traits in a socialist state.

Although both were disappointed with or even shocked by what they had heard about cruelties and atrocities, neither Neurath nor Trotsky ever became a pacifist in the strict sense. Both men, however, later interpreted the wars in light of particular economic conditions. Wars, each man believed, would disappear once the international working class had successfully defeated capitalism and had overthrown the competitive market economy. As war correspondents, however, both developed approaches that departed markedly from the policies adopted by their own countries. Whereas Neurath opposed Austria's anti-Serbian politics and propaganda, Trotsky pseudonymously attacked the converse policies advocated by the Russian press and pursued by its political leaders. Both men, however, realized and repeatedly maintained that the Balkan Wars could only be the *prelude* to a Great War.

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PART III

Memories of Victory and Defeat:
Constructing the Nation

Bulgarian Historiography on the Balkan Wars 1912–13

Svetlozar Eldarov and Bisser Petrov

Bulgarian historiography on the Balkan Wars during the past 100 years was inevitably affected by various factors. The most important of these were the degree of public interest in the events, the impact of the current political situation, and the authors' awareness and overall competence. Meanwhile, the study of the subject did not progress linearly, but followed the ups and downs of the historical development of the Bulgarian state itself, gaining momentum in some periods, remaining stagnant in others. Still, interest in the Balkan Wars has remained alive from the conflicts' end to the present day. The attention they receive is easily understandable because the Balkan Wars and their consequences determined Bulgaria's fate for decades afterwards; moreover, contemporary Bulgarians possess a historical memory of these wars, and will doubtless continue to do so in the future.

S. Eldarov (✉)

Institute of Balkan Studies and Center of Thracology, Sofia, Bulgaria
e-mail: sveldarov@abv.bg

B. Petrov

Institute of Balkan Studies and Center of Thracology, Sofia, Bulgaria
e-mail: bisser_p@hotmail.com

This chapter intends not to provide a bibliographical review of the subject but rather to identify and highlight key periods and trends in the development of the Balkan Wars' historiography in Bulgaria. The survey presented here is not exhaustive; rather, it focuses on authors and titles that are emblematic of particular periods or best exemplify their political and ideological contexts, revealing the variability of characteristics given to the Balkan Wars over time. Hence, the chosen approach is chronological rather than problem-based, because the latter orientation would require an examination of one or more aspects of the wars themselves. In this way the chapter seeks to achieve greater consistency and clarity in evaluating and generalizing about the vast, often divergent historiographical material in order to acquaint readers with the achievements and failures alike of Bulgarian historians writing on this subject. For Bulgaria, the controversial nature of the Balkan Wars, which began triumphantly and ended catastrophically, reverberates in its scholarly interpretations. Over the past 100 years, four clearly distinguishable and dramatically distinct stages stand out in the development of Bulgarian historiography. Each has been significantly marked by crucial events in Bulgaria's history.

STATE NATIONALISM

The first stage covers the years from immediately after the Second Balkan War (or the Inter-Allied War, 1913) until the establishment of the communist (totalitarian) political regime in 1944. This "classical" period was the most intensive time of scholarly study and mass popularization of the Balkan Wars. But in terms of its political context, especially during its second half, it should be called the "state nationalism" stage.

The profusion of books published in this period may be divided conditionally into two major groups, corresponding to the author's background: these books are either political-documentary¹ or military

¹Ivan Geshov, *Balkanskiyat süyuz. Spomeni i dokumenti* [The Balkan League: Memoirs and Documents] (Sofia: Gutenberg, 1915); idem, *Prestüpnoto bezumie i anketata po nego. Fakti i dokumenti* [The Criminal Insanity and the Inquiry into It: Facts and Documents] (Sofia: Balkan, 1914); Stoyan Danev, *Nai-nova diplomatičeska istoriya (ot Vienskiya kongres do dnes)* [Recent Diplomatic History (From the Congress of Vienna to the Present)] (Sofia: Hudozhnik, 1935); idem, "Moite audientsii pri Nikolai II" [My Audiences with Nicholas II], *Sila*, no. 19 (1922); idem, "Balkanskiyat süyuz" [The Balkan League], *Rodina*, no. 2 (1939); idem, "Primiriето v Chataldza na 20 noemvri 1912 g." [The Armistice in Chataldza of 20 November 1912], *Rodina*, no. 3 (1939); idem, "Londonskata konferentsiya prez 1912–1913 g." [The London Conference of 1912–1913], *Rodina*, no. 4 (1939); Andrei Toshev, *Balkanskite voini* [The Balkan

history accounts.² The division is conditional because authors in both groups transgressed the sphere of competence of the other group. Very often politicians wrote about purely military matters and vice versa.

Wars], vols. 1–2 (Sofia: Hudozhnik, 1929–1931); idem, *Bŭlgariya i neimite sŭsedi* [Bulgaria and Its Neighbors] (Sofia: M-vo na nar. prosveshchenie, 1943); Mikhail Madzharov, *Diplomaticheska podgotovka na nashite voini. Spomeni, chastni pisma, shifrovani telegrami i poveritelni dokladi* [Diplomatic Preparation for Our Wars: Recollections, Private Letters, Ciphred Cables, and Classified Reports] (Plovdiv: Hr. Danov, 1932); Stefan Bobchev, *Stranitsi iz moyata diplomaticheska misiya v Petrograd. 1912–1913* [Pages of My Diplomatic Mission to Petrograd: 1912–1913] (Sofia: Hudozhnik, 1940); idem, *Begal pogled vŭrhu balkanskite sabitiya do i sled 16 iuniy 1913* [A Glimpse at the Balkan Events before and after 16 June 1913] (Sofia: Nov zhivot, 1935); Georgi Kalinkov, *Rumŭniya i neinata politika spryamo Bŭlgaria* [Romania and Its Policy toward Bulgaria] (1911–1913) (Sofia: Balkan, 1917); Ivan Salabashev, *Spomeni* [Memoirs] (Sofia: Knipegraf, 1943); Atanas Shopov, *Kak ni se nalozhi Balkanskata vojna* [How the Balkan War Was Imposed on Us] (Sofia: Gutenberg, 1915); Aleksandar Girginov, *Narodnata katastrofa. Voimite 1912–1913 g.* [The National Catastrophe: The Wars, 1912–1913] (Sofia: Voen.-izd. fond, 1926); Stoyan Omarchevski, *Balkanskata vojna. Neimite prichini i posledstviya* [The Balkan War: Its Reasons and Consequences] (Sofia: Zemled. zname, 1913); Dimo Kiorchev, *Politika i sŭyuzi* [Policy and Alliances] (Sofia: Iskra, 1917); Sofroni Nikov, *Balkanskata vojna* [The Balkan War] (Sofia: S. M. Staikov, 1913); idem, *Vinoven li e Tsaryat za pogroma* [Is the King Guilty of the Rout?] (Sofia: Iskra, 1913); idem, *Istoricheskoto znachenie na pogroma* [The Historic Significance of the Rout] (Sofia: Iskra, 1913).

² Ivan Fichev, *Vissheho komanduvane prez Balkanskata vojna 1912 g. Ot nachaloto na voinata do Chataldzha vklyuchitelno* [The High Command in the Balkan War: From the Beginning of the War to Chataldzha Inclusive] (Sofia: Voen.-izd. fond, 1927); idem, *Chataldzha. Takticheskata studiya* [Chataldzha: A Tactical Study] (Sofia: Voen.-izd. fond, 1930); idem, *Balkanskata vojna, 1912–1913. Prezhlivelitsi, belezhki i dokumenti* [The Balkan War, 1912–1913: Experiences, Notes, and Documents] (Sofia: Dŭrzh. pech., 1940); Radko Dimitriev, *Treta armiya v Balkanskata vojna, 1912* [The Third Army in the Balkan War, 1912] (Sofia: Voen.-izd. fond, 1922); Nikola Ivanov, *Balkanskata vojna 1912–1913 g. Deistviyata na 2-ra armiya, obsada i ataka na Odrinskata krepost* [The Balkan War 1912–1913: The Operations of the 2nd Army, Siege and Attack on the Adrianople Fortress] (Sofia: Voen.-izd. fond, 1924); Georgi Vazov, *Spomeni ot Balkanskite voini* [Recollections of the Balkan Wars] (Sofia: Knipegraf, 1929); Petar Dŭrvingov, *Istoriya na Makedono-odrinското opŭlchenie* [A History of the Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteer Corps], vols. 1–2 (Sofia: Dŭrzh. pech., 1919, 1925); idem, *Balkanskata vojna—kakto e bila vizhdana, kogato sa se razvivali samite sŭbitiya* [The Balkan War as it Was Seen as the Events Themselves Evolved] (Sofia: Voen.-izd. fond, 1941); Nikola Zhekov, *Bŭlgarskoto voinstvo* [The Bulgarian Soldiery] (Sofia: Br. Miladinovi, 1928); Anton Razsukanov, *Balkanskata vojna* [The Balkan War] (Sofia: Voen.-izd. fond, 1939); Atanas Hristov, *Kratka istoriya na Osvoboditelnata vojna, 1912–1913 g.* [A Short History of the Liberation War, 1912–1913] (Sofia: Voen.-izd. fond, 1921); idem, *Istoricheski pregled na voinata na Bŭlgariya sreshu vsichki balkanski dŭrzhavi—1913 g.* [A Historical Review of Bulgaria's War against All Balkan States—1913] (Sofia: Voen.-izd. fond, 1922); Todor Kantardzhiev, *Kratka istoriya na Balkanskata i Sŭiuznicheskata voini* [A Short History of the Balkan and the Inter-Allied Wars] (Sofia: S. M. Staikov, 1928).

Similarly, there was no consensus in the military camp, and in their postwar writings these authors frequently were out to settle old scores.³

The first group includes prominent political figures who held positions of power and left us their memoirs: premiers, ministers, and diplomats. As a rule, they sought the moral, political, and legal rehabilitation that was necessary for them at the time that they were writing. Precisely because they possess the flaws of biased, self-justificatory memoirs, these works are precious—and under-researched—contemporary source materials. These authors faced works written by activists in the opposition, rife with accusations against them; the wars' events were interpreted in terms of partiality, partisanship, and expediency. Eventually, these views created a general impression of blurred political responsibility and a lack of personal culpability for the catastrophic outcome of the wars.

The official “birthday” of Bulgarian military historiography on the Balkan Wars coincided with the institutionalization of military history studies in Bulgaria. A decree of King Ferdinand on 5 August 1914 established the Military History Commission at the General Staff of the Army. This filled a void in Bulgaria, for such institutions had existed since the second half of the nineteenth century in many European armies. Its main task was to complete a history—initiated by a group of writers a few years earlier—of the Serbo–Bulgarian War of 1885 and focus on the study of the recently ended Balkan Wars.⁴ Founded just three months before Bulgaria entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, the Commission was not destined to enjoy a calm, fruitful scholarly existence. Reestablished in the midst of the war in 1916 and restored after the 1919 Treaty of Neuilly, it commenced its real activity at the beginning of the 1920s. In view of the conditions under which it worked—political, economic, and moral crisis in a defeated state, and imposed cuts and restrictions on the armed forces—the Commission nonetheless succeeded in fulfilling its tasks and won recognition as a leading academic

³Ivan Fichev, “Kriticheska studiiia vŭrhu truda na generala ot pehotata Radko Dimitriev ‘Treta armiya v Balkanskata vojna’” [A Critical Study on the Work by General of the Infantry Radko Dimitriev “The Third Army in the Balkan War”], *Voennoistoricheski sbornik*, nos. 7–8, 9–10 (1927–28), no. 1 (1928).

⁴Todor Petrov, “Sŭzdavane i nachalni stŭpki na Voennoistoricheskata komisiya, 1914–1946” [Establishment and Initial Steps of the Military History Commission, 1914–1946], *90 godini organizirani voennoistoricheski izsledvaniya v Bŭlgariya. Sbornik dokladi i nauchni sŭobshteniya, izneseni na mezhdunarodna nauchna konferentsiya v Sofia, 26–27 oktombri 2004* (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2004).

institution in the field of military history studies in Bulgaria. An important prerequisite for its scholarly activities was its organizational integration with the Military History Archive, which, among other things, collected and stored the documentation on the Balkan Wars, from operational plans and the High Command's most important directives to the war diary of the last volunteer company.

In 1921, the Commission formally requested that a few dozen active and reserve officers participate in the writing of Bulgaria's military history. Former "top brass" responsible for the Bulgarian army's strategic planning and command in the Balkan Wars were asked to write memoirs, including the Second Commander-in-Chief Mikhail Savov, the Chief-of-Staff of the Operative Army Ivan Fichev, and the Chief of the Operations Section Stefan Nerezov. From 1927, the Commission, as a scholarly body, began publishing the *Military History Journal*, designed to promote the study of the wars for national unification.⁵ By 1944, the *Journal* had released nineteen volumes with a total of ninety-eight issues, filled with articles, studies, and monographs on the history of the First and the Second Balkan Wars as well as on Bulgaria's other wars. In addition, books were regularly published in the Military Library Series of fifty printer's sheets a year, some of which addressed the Balkan Wars. The Military History Commission's most significant contribution in studying the history of the Balkan Wars in the period between the two World Wars, however, was its monumental history in seven volumes (some of them in two parts), which totaled 3,507 pages and provided numerous maps, plans, and so on.⁶

The Commission worked in close cooperation with the Military Publishing Fund, set up in 1919 as a military trading company and a distinct legal entity. The Publishing Fund's goal was to publish books and periodicals on military history and to act as a private initiative in order to avoid the restrictions of the Neuilly Treaty. In addition to the output of the Military History Commission, it published the newspaper *People and Army*, a continuation of the former gazette of the Ministry of Defense, *Military News*, and the periodicals *Military Journal*, *Bulgarian Soldier*, *Sergeant's Journal*, *Modern Infantry*, *Our Cavalry*, and *Artillery Review*,

⁵ *80 godini "Voennoistoricheski sbornik." Yubileina nauchna konferentsiya* [80 Years "Military History Journal": An Anniversary Academic Conference] (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2007).

⁶ *Voinata mezhdu Bŭlgariya i Turtsiya 1912–1913* [The War between Bulgaria and Turkey], vol. 1–7 (Sofia: Dŭrzhavna pechatnitsa, 1933–37).

which contained valuable memoirs, eyewitness accounts, and other material on the Balkan Wars.

In addition to its flourishing within this institutional framework, Bulgarian historiography on the Balkan Wars developed as a private initiative. Many authors, military men and civilians alike, submitted their manuscripts to private publishing houses. In terms of typologies, the literature on the Balkan Wars between the two World Wars ranged widely, encompassing single-author and collective monographs based on a huge amount of war documentation; reminiscences of high-ranking commanders and their colleagues lower in the hierarchy, frequently biased; professional analyses by military experts; amateurish but largely objective recollections of participants from the battlefronts; official regimental histories, full of pathos, that were published for propaganda purposes; and critical evaluations by individual authors, published as justifications or denunciations.

A common feature among all these writings is the perception of the First Balkan War as “the war between Bulgaria and Turkey, 1912–1913” in the Bulgarian historiography of this period. This was the title of the Military History Commission’s seven-volume work, as well as of many other monographs, articles, and memoirs. The authors and publishers’ formal explanation was that the eastern or Thracian theater of operations was the main battlefield—the one most crucial to the war’s outcome. Not surprisingly, the shortest volume of the Military History Commission’s publication dealt with the activities of the Serbian and Greek armies in the western or Macedonian theater of operations. It came to only 273 pages, and also covered the activities of the Bulgarian Seventh Rila Division in Macedonia and other Bulgarian detachments in the Rhodopes. The Military History Commission planned the publication of a three-volume history of the Second Balkan War, but because of the outbreak of the Second World War only the first volume, covering the events through 21 June 1913, saw the light of day.⁷

Though often flawed by their subjectivity, the works of this period, often accompanied by documents, became an indispensable foundation for the next generations of scholars. Bulgarian historiography in the 1920s and 1930s can be seen as the product of a national school, strongly marked by the trauma of political catastrophe and the unresolved status of

⁷ *Voinata mezhdū Būlgariya i drugite balkanski dūrzhavi prez 1913 g.* [The War between Bulgaria and the Other Balkan States in 1913], vol. 1, *Prichinite i podgotovkata na voinata do 21 yuli* [Reasons and Preparations for the War up to 21 July] (Sofia: Dūrzh. pech., 1941).

the country's national projects. Despite its Bulgaro-centrism and thematic fixations—mostly on Bulgaria's role in the building of the Balkan League and the hostilities at the Eastern front—it still remains the most sophisticated body of work ever created in Bulgaria on the Balkan Wars.

IDEOLOGICAL DOGMATISM

The second stage in the development of Bulgarian Balkan Wars historiography represents a complete negation of what had come before and can be defined as the “period of ideological dogmatism” or the “period of national nihilism.” Both phrases aptly characterize this stage, which begins with the establishment of the communist regime in Bulgaria on 9 September 1944 and lasts until the late 1970s. There was hardly a sphere of Bulgaria's academic and spiritual life that suffered as much from ideological revision as that of the “historical front,” precisely the domain in which the struggle with “Great-Bulgarian chauvinism” took on sinister proportions. Leading Bulgarian historians were branded as “reactionaries,” “fascists,” and, precisely, “Great-Bulgarian chauvinists,” and suffered greatly from such stigmatization. Their works were banned and confiscated; under Party orders the content of history textbooks was completely revised and cleansed of “fascist” and “Great-Bulgarian” elements. State and Party leaders were actively involved in a Marxist-Leninist rewriting of Bulgarian history, which meant that Bulgaria's participation in the Balkan Wars was opened up to new interpretations.

Evacuated during the Anglo-American bombing, the Military History Commission returned to Sofia at the end of December 1944. Despite the losses and damage suffered, it set itself a significant scholarly task—to finish the second and third volumes of *The War between Bulgaria and the Other States in 1913*, and the remaining volumes of the *History of the First World War*. However, the military historians' enthusiasm was quickly and brutally dashed. Taking the form of an organizational-structural reform, a purge of the former “cadres” was carried out, accompanied by Stalinist ideological indoctrination. At the beginning of 1946, the Commission was transformed and renamed the Military History Department of the Ministry of National Defense; the following year, the *Military History Journal* was banned. The institutional and ideological transformation of Bulgarian military studies and the change in personnel were accompanied by the replacement of its prior concerns with new themes—study of the Balkan Wars, alongside Bulgaria's other wars fought from 1878 to 1944,

forcibly yielded to other scholarly priorities, such as the antiwar activities of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Partisan resistance, and the participation of the Bulgarian army in the final phase of the Second World War.

Civilian historical studies were also affected when the subject of the Balkan Wars was officially discredited. In a 1947 article in the journal *Historical Review*, Yaroslav Iotsov, the head of the Department of Modern and Current History in the Institute of History at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, defined the Balkan Wars as “aggressive wars for markets.”⁸ This concise text on the diplomatic preparations and the course of the First and Second Balkan Wars contained only five quotes: one from Stalin, three from Lenin, and one from the Serb Stoyan Protich.

In fact, the reevaluations of the 1940s and 1950s were not original. They had been taken from the views of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Narrow Socialists) on the wars and “enriched” with Stalinist flavorings. Authors were enabled to present the Balkan Wars as outwardly aggressive toward other countries in the conflicts and inwardly oppressive toward the proletariat within Bulgaria. It is interesting to note that the utopian idea of a Balkan federation, promoted at one time by the Narrow Socialists as a universal panacea for the Balkan Peninsula’s problems, was revived in a slightly modified fashion by their successors; however, for reasons beyond their control, its realization, though seemingly more feasible this time, once again failed. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of publications in these decades communicated the Narrow Socialists’ attitude toward the wars in general and focused on their subversive activities among the rank and file in particular.

Most historians, some of whom eventually reached the top of the academic hierarchy, took their first academic steps as Party historians. Their professional debut was a kind of rite of passage, necessary for a successful career. And this inevitably included the profanation of “bourgeois historiography.”⁹ Bulgarian historiography remained, with a couple of exceptions, at this level until the early 1980s.

The first divergence from the official line was related to an unexpected and short-lived *détente* in Bulgarian military history studies at the

⁸Yaroslav Iotsov, “Balkanskata voina” [The Balkan War], *Istoricheski pregled*, nos. 4–5 (1946–47), pp. 435–55.

⁹See for example the article by Krumka Sharova, “Burzhoaznata istoriografiya i uchastieto na Bŭlgariya vŭv voinite” [Bourgeois Historiography and Bulgaria’s Participation in the Wars (1912–18)], *Istoricheski pregled*, no. 2 (1950).

beginning of the 1960s. In stark contrast to the position held by their civilian colleagues (one of neglect), military historians once again focused on the Balkan Wars. The first signs of this change were evident as early as 1952, when the *Military History Journal* was resurrected. That its rebirth coincided with the anniversary of the First Balkan War was hardly accidental. Bulgarian military historians' interest in the Balkan Wars, which was doubtless supported institutionally as a way to bolster patriotic propaganda in the armed forces, later took the form of a large, 500-page collected volume, serious in content, published in 1961.¹⁰ The bulk of its team of authors consisted of active and reserve officers, employees of the Military History Department at the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense, under whose imprint the book appeared. It thus succeeded to offer a professional, competent summary of the legacy of Bulgarian military history studies before 9 September 1944. It paid the inevitable ideological tribute dictated by the contemporary political situation, but did so in a restrained manner in comparison with the unconditional verdict of civil historiography. The acceptable formula was found via a broader interpretation of certain Lenin quotations, according to which the First Balkan War had had “objectively progressive results,” despite the aggressive plans of the Balkan bourgeoisie. Subsequently, the trend of making use of Lenin’s assessments of the Balkan Wars intensified; particularly cited was his series of articles for *Pravda*, written immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, where he spoke in a generally positive manner about the Balkan League and saw war as a chance to cleanse the “feudal” remnants in European Turkey and create a Balkan Federal Republic.¹¹

The thesis of the “objectively progressive nature” of the Balkan Wars allowed military historians—for the first time since the establishment of the Communist regime—to examine them in a scholarly manner and commemorate them publicly. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of war in 1962, an academic conference was held in Sofia and selections from its proceedings were published in an anniversary issue of the *Military History Journal*, along with participants’ memoirs and a detailed bibliography of Bulgarian historiography between the two World

¹⁰ *Balkanskata vojna, 1912–1913 g.* [The Balkan War, 1912–1913] (Sofia: Voenna izdatelstvo, 1961).

¹¹ Iono Mitev, “Otsenki na V. I. Lenin za Balkanskata vojna (1912–1913 g.) i vlianieto im vŭrhu bŭlgarskata istoriografiya” [V. I. Lenin’s Assessments of the Balkan War (1912–1913) and Their Influence on Bulgarian Historiography], *Voennioistoricheski sbornik*, vol. 39, no. 1 (1970).

Wars.¹² A similar event took place in 1963 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the capture of Adrianople.¹³

During these years, Bulgarian historiography tended to study the First Balkan War and largely overlooked the second conflict, about which there had been far fewer scholarly assessments. Moreover, unlike in foreign historiographies, in Bulgaria the term “Inter-Allied War”—instead of Second Balkan War, the term commonly accepted abroad—had been adopted from the outset. There are several possible reasons for this imbalance in scholarship, but the primary factor was doubtless the catastrophic end to the second war. The motivation to write was weaker, spirits were low, and victorious fervor was absent. However, works dealing solely with the Second Balkan War did exist. The best of these books in this period was a collective monograph published in 1963.¹⁴ Some of its authors were also contributors to the edition of the Military History Department at the General Staff of the Ministry of National Defense. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Military History Department’s monograph and the articles in the *Military History Journal* at the beginning of the 1960s revived the original Bulgarian school of the period between the World Wars.

At that time, however, such a revival could not pass unnoticed or unpunished; moreover, once it gained momentum with military historians, the same approach began to pervade the study of other fields. As a result, after 1963 consideration of the Balkan Wars disappeared almost completely from the pages of the *Military History Journal*. This absence explains why the sixtieth anniversary of the Balkan Wars in 1972 passed unnoticed by military and civilian historians alike. Nothing noteworthy was published—not in the *Military History Journal*, the *Historical Review*, or the newly established periodical of the Bulgarian Historical Society, *Centuries*.

Nevertheless, timid attempts to revive interest in the Balkan Wars, conscious or not, emerged due to changes of direction and emphasis within Bulgarian historiography. The First Congress of the Bulgarian Historical Society was held on 27–30 January 1970. In the plenary lecture, Dimitür Kosev mentioned the problem of nationalist nihilism. He believed that with only a few exceptions, Bulgarian historians had overcome this tendency. On the other hand, nationalism could only

¹² *Voennoistoricheski sbornik*, vol. 33, no. 2 (1962).

¹³ *Voennoistoricheski sbornik*, vol. 32, no. 2 (1963).

¹⁴ *Mezhdusŭiuznicheskata vojna 1913 g.* [The Inter-Allied War, 1913] (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 1963).

accompany the attribute “bourgeois” and thus could only be ascribed to the foreign falsifiers of Bulgaria’s history; therefore, it was already a phenomenon alien to Bulgarian historiography.¹⁵ Henceforth, the label “bourgeois nationalism” would rarely be attached to works by Bulgarian authors of the pre-1944 period.

In 1972 there emerged another development in the attitude of post-1944 historiography toward the Balkan Wars: the publication of a small collection of articles and documents entitled *The Middle Rhodopes and the Balkan War*.¹⁶ Given the subject’s general neglect, the only logical explanation for its timing seems to be related to the contemporaneous campaign to force Muslim Bulgarians in the Rhodopes to replace their Turkish-Arab names with Bulgarian-Slavic ones. One way or another, however, the old and the new trends coexisted for some time, neither of them able to prevail categorically over the other.

SOCIALIST NATIONALISM

The third stage of Bulgarian Balkan Wars historiography began on the cusp of the 1980s. It proved to be a complete break with the previous phase. The trigger was intensified Bulgarian patriotism, along with mass preparations for the celebration of the thirteen-hundred-year anniversary of the foundation of the Bulgarian state (681–1981), but the real reason lay in the Party elite’s intention to use nationalism to solve the regime’s economic, political, and ideological crisis. If we can call the period between the World Wars “classical” in terms of Bulgarian nationalism, the 1980s can be regarded as its “renaissance.” This period can be labelled the “stage of socialist nationalism.”

On 13 February 1980, at the Institute for Military History at the General Staff, an academic discussion was held, entitled “On the Nature of the Bulgarian Army and the Wars Waged by It, 1885–1918.” Twenty military and civilian historians took part in this forum, which included the

¹⁵ *Pŭrvi kongres na Bŭlgarskoto istoricheskoto druzhestvo, 27–30 yanuari 1970* [First Congress of the Bulgarian Historical Society, 27–30 January 1970], vol. 1 (Sofia: I-vo na BAN, 1972), 77–94. See also, Iono Mitev, “Otsenka na voinite ot 1912–1918 g. na Pŭrviya kongres na bŭlgarskoto istoricheskoto druzhestvo” [Assessment of the Wars of 1912–1918 at the First Congress of the Bulgarian Historical Society], *Voennoistoricheski sbornik*, vol. 39 no. 2 (1970).

¹⁶ Branko Davidov (ed.), *Srednite Rodopi i Balkanskata vojna* [The Middle Rhodopes and the Balkan War] (Plovdiv: Hr. Danov, 1972).

giving of papers, lectures, and speeches. The nine papers deemed to be most significant were published in a separate issue of the *Proceedings of the Institute for Military History at the General Staff and Military History Learned Society*.¹⁷

The academic discussion and its proceedings were, in fact, the last (and ultimately predetermined) clash between the ideological dogmatism of the outgoing era and the scholarly pragmatism of its succeeding phase. In a sense, the terms “discussion” and “clash” are just euphemisms, as their real meanings do not fit the realities of a dictatorial state. In a sleight-of-hand reversal, historians who had defined the First Balkan War as “aggressive” now glorified it as “liberating.” If there was a “clash” of these, ideas, and concepts, it had taken place not on an academic level but within the highest echelons of the party-state. The so-called discussion was actually a manifestation of the unanimous consent that cloaked the party’s will with academic approbation and categorically proclaimed the new attitude to the First Balkan War as a progressive, just, and liberating war, indeed a logical, natural appendix to the Russo–Ottoman Liberation War of 1878. Nevertheless, this academic discussion triggered the reorganization of historical studies in Bulgaria. That same year the publishing house of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences released a monograph by Dimitar Gotsev which even more vividly associated the Balkan Wars with the Macedonian Bulgarians’ national liberation struggle.¹⁸

In 1982, seventy years after the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, the recently created organizational infrastructure and the support of the new (along with reoriented old) academic cadres allowed the popularization of the newly decreed interest in the Balkan Wars. This was not difficult to achieve, because the state now stood behind scholars and academic institutions as never before. Significantly, the first academic conferences on the Balkan Wars after a twenty-year hiatus were held not in Sofia but in Blagoevgrad and Kŭrdzhali—closer to the Macedonian and Turkish borders, symbolizing the regime’s determination to march in formation with both socialism and nationalism. The main emphasis was put on the liberation of Pirin Macedonia and the Rhodopes, respectively. That same

¹⁷ *Izvestiya na Voennoistoricheskoto nauchno druzhestvo. Priturka kŭm sp. Voennoistoricheski sbornik* [Proceedings of the Institute for Military History at the General Staff and Military History Learned Society: An Addendum to Military History Journal], vol. 31 (1981).

¹⁸ Dimitŭr Gotsev, *Natsionalnoosvoboditelnata borba v Makedoniya 1912–1915* [The National Liberation Struggle in Macedonia, 1912–1915] (Sofia: I-vo na BAN, 1981).

year, the *Military History Journal* published a jubilee issue on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Balkan Wars. In addition to general articles on the Balkan League, the Bulgarian army, and military leadership, there were articles on little-known or previously ignored themes, such as Bulgarian propaganda abroad during the wars, foreign reporters in Turkey, and foreigners in the Bulgarian army.¹⁹ Essays and articles also appeared in the pages of the *Historical Review*, *Centuries*, and other academic periodicals and series.

In the scholarly criticism and political propaganda, however, the greatest importance was given to the book *The Feat, 1912–1913*, a popular account of the First Balkan War—the reasons behind it and preparations for it, as well as its events and consequences—informed by the work of the interwar military history school and presented in an ideologically acceptable form.²⁰ The Military Publishing House released the book, which enjoyed an enormous print run, as a monograph by Lieutenant General Kiril Kosev, head of the Chief Political Section of the Bulgarian People's Army. In fact, the academic personnel of the Institute for Military History in its entirety was mobilized to prepare the work. Despite or maybe precisely thanks to the collective nature of the project, the book enabled military and civilian historians to research the Balkan Wars.

A national conference on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Balkan Wars was held on 25 March 1983 in Sofia. It was organized by the Ministry of National Defense, the Chief Political Section of the People's Army, the Institute for the History of the Bulgarian Communist Party of the Central Committee of the BCP, and the Institute of History of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Kiril Kosev, who had thoroughly developed the thesis of the progressive, just, and liberating nature of the First Balkan War, gave the keynote lecture. A total of thirty papers were presented, some of which still have scholarly value. The conference proceedings were published in a special volume of the *Proceedings of the Institute for Military History at the General Staff and the Military History Learned Society*.²¹

Authors and themes emerged in the first academic forums and publications of the early 1980s that would come to dominate Bulgarian historiography in the years that followed. In general, they can be divided

¹⁹ *Voenoistoricheski sbornik* 51, no. 4 (1982).

²⁰ Kiril Kosev, *Podvigŭt* [The Feat] 1912–1913 (Sofia: Voенno izdatelstvo, 1983).

²¹ *Izvestiya na Voenoistoricheskoto nauchno druzhestvo*, vol. 37 (1984).

into three groups. First, the military historians naturally preferred the themes of war preparation, battle orders, and strategy and tactics.²² Availing themselves of easy access to the vast bibliographical wealth of the Military History Library at the Institute for Military History, and to the collections—untouched for decades—of the Central Military Archives, they were nonetheless hamstrung by their lack of historical education and research experience. Thus, they largely reproduced, interpreted, and updated the military history heritage of the period between the two World Wars. The second group of authors consisted of well-established, prominent civilian historians who had either previously taken an aloof stance toward the Balkan Wars or had examined them in the spirit of politically indoctrinated negation.²³ Their favorite themes were the wars' political and diplomatic aspects, embodied in the pre-1944 heritage.

The third, most promising, and original group of authors belonged to a new generation of scholars who were entering or gaining ground in historical studies, most of whom committed themselves to unexplored

²² Petūr Stoilov, “Za haraktera na bŭlgarskata armiya i na vodenite ot neya voini prez perioda 1877–1918 g.” [On the Nature of the Bulgarian Army and the Wars Waged by It in the Period 1877–1918], *Izvestiya na Voennistoricheskoto nauchno druzhestvo*, vol. 31 (1981); idem, “Nyakoi osnovni nauchni problemi na Balkanskata voina 1912–1913” [Some Basic Scholarly Problems of the Balkan War, 1912–1913], *Izvestiya na Voennistoricheskoto nauchno druzhestvo*, vol. 37 (1984); Atanas Peichev, *Bŭlgarskata voenna strategiya prez epochata na kapitalizma* [Bulgarian War Strategy in the Period of Capitalism] (Sofia: Voenna izdatelstvo, 1985); idem, *Zarazhdane i razvitie na bŭlgarskoto voenno izkustvo* [Origins and Development of the Bulgarian Art of War], 681–1945 (Sofia: Voenna izdatelstvo, 1988); Iliya Iliiev, *Armenskata dobrovolcheska rota v Balkanskata voina 1912–1913* [The Armenian Volunteer Company in the Balkan War, 1912–1913] (Sofia: Voenna izdatelstvo, 1989).

²³ Lyubomir Panaiotov, “Balkanskiyat sŭyuz i voinata ot 1912–1913 g.” [The Balkan League and the War of 1912–1913], *Voennistoricheski sbornik*, vol. 51, no. 4 (1982); Simeon Damyanov, *Bŭlgariya i balkanskite strani po vreme na voinite* [Bulgaria and the Balkan States during the Wars] 1912–1918 (Sofia: Voenna izdatelstvo, 1986); idem, *Bŭlgariya vŭv frenskata politika* [Bulgaria in French Policy] 1878–1918 (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1985); idem, “Evropeiskata diplomatsiya v navecherieto i po vreme na Pŭrvata balkanska voina (1912–1913 g.)” [European Diplomacy on the Eve and during the First Balkan War (1912–1913)], *Voennistoricheski sbornik*, vol. 51, no. 4 (1982); Elena Statelova, “Bŭlgaro–grŭtskite politicheski otnosheniya v navecherieto na Balkanskata voina” [Bulgarian–Greek Political Relations on the Eve of the Balkan War], *Izvestiya na Voennistoricheskoto nauchno druzhestvo*, vol. 37 (1984); Milcho Lalkov, *Balkanskata voina 1912–1913. Nauchnopopulyaren ocherk* [The Balkan War 1912–1913: A Popular Essay] (Sofia: Otechestven front, 1982).

spheres of research, such as propaganda,²⁴ war and culture,²⁵ the Bulgarian national liberation movement in Macedonia and Adrianopolitan Thrace,²⁶ and Serbian and Bulgarian provisional governance in Macedonia.²⁷ However, with state control exerted over what was allowed to be published, only selected articles and essays by them appeared; their main studies remained unpublished in the form of doctoral theses. Georgi

²⁴ Ivan Ilchev, “Vŭnshnopoliticheskata propaganda na bŭlgarskata natsionalna kauza prez Balkanskite voini (1912–1913)” [Foreign Policy Propaganda of the Bulgarian National Cause During the Balkan Wars (1912–1913)], *Voennoistoricheski sbornik* 51, no. 4 (1982), 80–98; idem, “Bŭlgarskite evrei v natsionalnata propaganda na Evropa po vreme na voinite (1912–1918)” [Bulgarian Jews in Europe’s National Propaganda during the Wars (1912–1918)], *Godishnik na obshtestvenata kulturno-prosvetna organizatsiya na evreite v NRB*, vol. 16 (1981), 183–94; idem, “Karnegievata anketa na Balkanite prez esenta na 1913 g. Organizatsiya, izvŭrshvane, mezhdunaroden otzvuk. [A Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in the Autumn of 1913: Organization, Accomplishment, International Repercussion], *Istoricheski pregled*, no. 10 (1989) 15–28; idem, “Development of the International Propaganda of the Balkan States, 1821–1923,” *Études balkaniques* 24, no. 4 (1988), 58–71.

²⁵ Romyana Koneva, “Kulturna politika na Bŭlgariya prez perioda 1912–1918” [Bulgaria’s Cultural Policy in the Period of 1912–1918], PhD thesis, University of Sofia, 1984; eadem, “Kulturnata politika i deinost na Shtaba na deistvashtata armiya 1915–1918” [Cultural Policy and Activities of the Headquarters of the Operative Army], *Voennoistoricheski sbornik* 55, no. 5 (1986); eadem, “Kulturnata politika na Bŭlgariya sled natsionalnata katastrofa (septemvri 1913–septemvri 1915)” [Bulgaria’s Cultural Policy after the National Catastrophe (September 1913–September 1915)], *Istoricheski pregled*, no. 5 (1987).

²⁶ Svetlozar Eldarov, “Srŭbskata vŭorŭzhena propaganda v Makedoniya (1901–1912)” [Serbian Armed Propaganda in Macedonia (1901–1912)], PhD thesis, University of Sofia, 1985; Todor Petrov, “Vŭorazhenata borba na VMORO v Makedoniya i Odrinsko (1904–1912)” [The Armed Struggle of IMRO in Macedonia and Adrianople Region (1904–1912)], PhD thesis, University of Sofia, 1987; Todor Petrov, Svetlozar Eldarov, “Bŭlgarskite dobrovolcheski cheti v Iztochna Trakiya prez Balkanskata vojna” [Bulgarian Volunteer Bands in Eastern Thrace during the Balkan War], *Izvestiya na Voennoistoricheskoto nauchno druzhestvo*, vol. 37 (1984).

²⁷ Gotsev, *Natsionalnoosvoboditelnata borba*; idem, “Polozhenieto vŭv Vardarska Makedoniya (okt. 1912–okt. 1913). Vŭstaniето v Tikveshko i Ohridsko [The Situation in Vardar Macedonia (October 1912–October 1913). The Uprising in the Regions of Tikvesh and Ohrid], *Godishnik na Sofiyskiya universitet—Istoricheski fakultet*, vol. 69 (1980); idem, “Revolutsionното dvizhenie vŭv Vardarska Makedoniya [The Revolutionary Movement in Vardar Macedonia] (1914–1915), *Godishnik na Sofiyskiya universitet – Istoricheski fakultet*, vol. 71 (1981); Georgi Genov, “Unishtozhavaneto na bŭlgarskite natsionalni institutsii i inteligentsiya v Egejska Makedoniya prez 1912–1914 g.” [The Destruction of the Bulgarian National Institutions and Intelligentsia in Aegean Macedonia, 1912–1914], *Bŭlgariya 1300. Institutsii i dŭrbayna traditsiya*, vol. 3 (Sofia: Bŭlg. ist. d-vo, 1983); idem, “Bŭlgarskoto voenno gubernatorstvo v Makedoniya (noemvri 1912–iuni 1913 g.)” [Bulgarian Military Governorate in Macedonia (November 1912–June 1913)], *Istoricheski pregled*, no. 7 (1985).

Markov from the Institute of History at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, a former member of the Institute for Military History at the General Staff, stood out as an informal leader of this “third wave.” In this period he published numerous essays and articles in military and civil periodicals and was a fixture in academic forums on the Balkan Wars. In 1989, he summarized his studies in a voluminous monograph, which has remained the main accomplishment of Bulgarian historiography from its third stage.²⁸ Just a couple of years later, Markov published a monograph on the Second Balkan War.²⁹ It can reasonably be argued that the 1980s were the most productive period of Bulgarian historiography on the Balkan Wars since 9 September 1944. This momentum continued to develop naturally in the first half of the 1990s, with the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria in November 1989 playing no special role in this evolution.

In 1992, the eightieth anniversary of the Balkan Wars was commemorated with academic conferences in Sofia, Blagoevgrad, and Kŭrdzhali, whose proceedings were published in special collected volumes.³⁰ That same year, as a member of the International Commission of Military History, the Institute for Military History at the General Staff was entrusted with preparing and publishing an issue of the *International Journal of Military History*, which was edited in six official languages. The issue dealt with the Balkan Wars and consisted of sixteen articles, divided into three sections.³¹

²⁸ Georgi Markov, *Bŭlgariia v Balkanskiia sŭyuz sreshtu Osmanskata imperiia* [Bulgaria in the Balkan League against the Ottoman Empire] (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1989); sec. enlarged ed. (Sofia: Zaharii Stoyanov, 2012).

²⁹ Idem, *Bŭlgarskoto krushenie, 1913* [The Bulgarian Collapse, 1913] (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na BAN, 1991).

³⁰ Trendafil Mitev and Momchil Ionov, eds., *80 godini ot Balkanskite voini 1912–1913. Sb. materialii ot nauch. konf. Sofia, 1993* [80 Years since the Balkan Wars 1912–1913: A Conference Volume. Sofia, 1993] (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1995); Ivan Todorov (ed.), *Balkanskite voini, 1912–1913. Sb. statii ot nauchna konferentsiya, provedena prez oktombri 1992 g. vŭv V. Tŭrnovo* [The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Proceedings of an Academic Conference Held in October 1992 in V. Tŭrnovo] (Veliko Tŭrnovo: Univ. izd. Sv. sv. Kiril i Metodii, 1995).

³¹ *Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire. Edition bulgare*, L’Institut d’Histoire Militaire, Sofia, vol. 74 (1992).

ENDLESS TRANSITION

The fourth stage in the development of Bulgarian historiography on the Balkan Wars, which lacks both the clearly delineated inception dates of the previous stages and their unique features, can be called the “stage of transition.” It began somewhat unnoticeably in the mid-1990s and was marked by a decreasing interest in the Balkan Wars as a research topic. The removal of dictatorial forms of ideological control helped the professional reorientation of Bulgarian historians to what, for ideological reasons, had been unoccupied niches, commonly known as blank spots in Bulgarian history. While this new development would seem a positive phenomenon at first glance, the process also contained flaws. Very often, curious amateurs broke into fields of serious study, “enriching” them with their “contributions,” which they promoted as the only correct interpretation.

During this stage of Bulgarian historiography, Markov remained the most authoritative and, to a certain degree, the only expert on the problems of the Balkan Wars. In inverse proportion to his rising administrative career, Markov made research contributions to the knowledge of the Balkan Wars that remained on the level of the work of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The non-academic gap was filled by another “authority”: Bozhidar Dimitrov, the director of the National Museum of History. Until the political changes of 1989, he was known as a specialist in medieval studies, but he quickly shifted to national issues. Thanks primarily to his media appearances, he won recognition as a leading figure on the problems of the Macedonian Question, military history, archaeology, and anything that could be defined as “national” and “patriotic.”³²

The bright side of the new times was manifested in the release of works, memoirs, and diaries by politicians, military officials, diplomats, and lesser-known war actors written mainly during the “classical” stage, which, for one reason or another, had not been published before 1944 or afterwards.³³

³² Bozhidar Dimitrov, *Voinite za natsionalno osvobodzhenie 1912–1913; 1915–1918* [The Wars of National Liberation] (Sofia: Univ. izd. Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2001); idem, *Istinskata istoriya na Balkanskata vojna* [The True History of the Balkan War] (Sofia: 168 chasa EOOD, 2007).

³³ Stiliyan Kovachev, *Dnevnik na generala ot pehotata, 1876–1918. Spomeni* [A Diary of a General of the Infantry, 1876–1918: Recollections], ed. Stiliyan Noikov (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1992); Simeon Radev, *Konferentsiyata v Bukuresht i Bukureshtkiyat mir ot 1913 g. Memoari* [The Conference in Bucharest and the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1913: Memoirs] (Sofia: Tina pres, 1992); idem, *Tova, koeto vidyah ot Balkanskata vojna. Memoari* [What I Saw in the Balkan War: Memoirs], ed. Trayan Radev (Sofia: Nar. kultura, 1993);

On the other hand, “classical” writings were also reprinted.³⁴ There was also a growth in translated literature, mainly by foreign eyewitnesses,³⁵

Atanas Shopov, *Dnevnik, diplomatsчески raporti i pisma* [A Diary, Diplomatic Reports, and Letters], ed. Iliya Paskov (Sofia: Maked. nauchen inst, 1995); Petür Abrashev, *Dnevnik* [A Diary], ed. Petür Svirachev (Sofia: Akad. izd. Prof. Marin Drinov, 1995); Momchil Ionov, *Makedoniya, 1912–1913. Dnevniitsi i spomeni* [Macedonia, 1912–1913: Diaries and Recollections] (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1995); idem, *Zhalbi i südbi na búlgarite v Makedoniya prez Balkanskite vojni* [Grievances and Fates of the Bulgarians in Macedonia during the Balkan Wars] (Sofia: Komteks, 1998); Vasil Kolarov, *Pobedi i porazheniia. Dnevnik* [Victories and Defeats: A Diary] (Sofia: IK Hristo Botev, 2001); *Voinishki dnevnik na Petür Zhechev Kurdomanov za Balkanskata vojna* [A Soldier’s Diary of Petar Zhechev Kurdomanov of the Balkan War], ed. Stanka Georgieva (Sofia: RITT, 2001); *Edin mnogo dúlug pút. Dnevnik na Stoyan Hristov Kamburov* [A Very Long Way: A Diary of Stoyan Hristov Kamburov], ed. Hristo Milkov (Sofia: Uniskop, 2003); Nikola Dodov, *Dnevnik po Balkanskata vojna* [A Diary on the Balkan War], ed. Aleksandar Kitanov (Sofia: Voенno izdatelstvo, 2006); Gencho Stainov, *Pisma ot Odrin, 1912–1913. Pisma i snimki ot Balkanskata i Mezhdusayuznicheskata vojni, nyakoi ot koito nepublikovani dosega* [Letters from Adrianople, 1912–1913: Letters and Pictures from the Balkan and the Inter-Allied War, Some of Them Unpublished So Far], ed. Radina Nancheva (Sofia: Izd. atelie Ab, 2009); *Po pútitstata na bezsmúrtieto. Spomeni na uchasnitsite vúv voinite za natsionalno obedinenie 1912–1913* [On the Roads to Immortality: Recollections of Participants in the Wars of National Unification], ed. Ivan Lalev (Veliko Túrnovo: Abagar, 2010); *Saga za Balkanskata vojna. Dnevnik na sveshtenik Ivan Dochev* [A Saga about the Balkan War: A Diary of Chaplain Ivan Dochev], ed. Lizbet Lyubenova (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2012); Radko Belchev, *Dnevnikút mi ot Balkanskata vojna 1912–1913. Razkazút na edin roten pisar ot púrvo litse* [My Diary From the Balkan War: A First-Person Account of a Company Clerk] (Sofia: Voенnoist. komisiya, 2012).

³⁴ Ivan Fichev, *Izbrani proizvedeniya* [Selected Works], ed. Georgi Vúlkov (Sofia: Voенno izdatelstvo, 1988); Stoyan Danev, *Memoari* [Memoirs], eds. Elena Statelova and Krústyo Girginov (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1992); Petür Dürvingov, *Moeto vreme. Spomeni* [My Time. Recollections], ed. Dimitür Minchev (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1996); Nikola Ivanov, *Izbrani proizvedeniya* [Selected Works], ed. Petür Stoyanov (Sofia: Voенno izdatelstvo, 1989); Mikhail Madzharov, *Spomeni* [Recollections] (Sofia: Damyan Yakov, 2004); Dimo Kiorchev, *Vreme na nadezhdi i katastrofi (1905–1919). Dnevniitsi i polit. studii* [Time of Hopes and Catastrophes (1905–1919): Diaries and Political Studies], ed. Iliya Paskov (Sofia: Búlg. pisatel, 1994); Lyubomir Miletich, *Razorenieto na trakiiskite búlgari prez 1913 godina* [The Destruction of Thracian Bulgarians in 1913], ed. Hristo Hristov (Sofia: Svyat, 1991).

³⁵ Oton Barbar, *Moite spomeni ot voinite, 1912–1918* [My Recollections of the Wars] (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1993); Rione Piuo, *Ot Sofia do Chataldzhia* [From Sofia to Chataldzhia] (Sofia: Kolibri, 2009); Vladimir Sis, *Kritichnite dni na Búlgariya* [Bulgaria’s Critical Days] (Sofia: Multitroid i Multiprinting, 2005); idem, *Grobovete na Trikeri* [The Graves of Trikeri], Fototip. izdanie (Varna: Fondatsiya VMRO, 2010); Uil Múnro, *Búlgariya i neinite hora. S opisanie na Balkanskite vojni, Makedoniia i makedonskite búlgari* [Bulgaria and Its People: With a Description of the Balkan Wars, Macedonia, and Macedonian

as well as of regional studies,³⁶ new biographical essays,³⁷ companion volumes,³⁸ and albums.³⁹ Interest was shown in aspects inherent in war that had effects on local civilians, something that had been omitted by

Bulgarians] (Sofia: Vesela Lyutskanova, 1997); Richard von Mach, *Pisma ot Balkanskata vojna, 1912–1913. Voenni korespondentsii na “Kölnische Tsaitung” ot Ribard fon Mah* [Letters from the Balkan War, 1912–1913: Kölnische Zeitung War Reports by Richard von Mach], ed. Valentin Spiridonov (Veliko Tŭrnovo: Abagar, 1998); idem, *Balkanski raboti. Proizvedeniya* [Balkan Affairs: Works] (Sofia: Vesela Lyutskanova, 2002); Anri Pozi, *Voinata se vrŭshata* [War Returns] (Sofia: Planeta 7, 1992).

³⁶ Georgi Markov, ed., *90 godini ot osvobozhdenieto na Rodopite. Sbornik* [90 Years since the Liberation of the Rhodopes: A Collected Volume] (Smolyan: PrintaKom OOD, 2003); Ivan Markov, *Osvobozhdenieto na Nevrokop, 1912* [The Liberation of Nevrokop] (Blagoevgrad: Irin-Pirin, 2002); Boyan Nenov, *Balkanskata vojna i osvobozhdenieto na Pirinskiya kraj ot tursko robstvo* [The Balkan War and the Liberation of the Pirin Region From Turkish Slavery] (Blagoevgrad: BON, 2007); Anachko Nedelkov, *Mezhdusyuznicheskata vojna—1913 g. v Kyustendilsko i Bosilegradsko* [The Inter-Allied War—1913 in the Regions of Kyustendil and Bosilegrad] (Stara Zagora: Litera print, 2005).

³⁷ Dimitŭr Azmanov, *Bŭlgarski vishi voenachalnitzi prez Balkanskata i Pŭrvata svetovna vojna* [Bulgarian High Commanders in the Balkan and the First World War] (Sofia: Voenna izdatelstvo, 2000); Hristo Bozhkov, *Pŭlen general Nikola Zhekov i negovoto semeistvo* [Full General Nikola Zhekov and His Family] (Sofia: Zvezdi, 1999); Georgi Kazandzhiev, *General ot pehotata Georgi Todorov. Epopeya na edin zhivot* [General of the Infantry Georgi Todorov: An Epopee of a Life] (Dobrich: Matador 74, 2008); Boris Drangov, *Sbornik materialni i nauchni izsledvaniya* [Boris Drangov: A Collection of Materials and Scholarly Studies] (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1993); Iliya Marinov, “Generalŭt ot pehotata Pavel Hristov” [General of the Infantry Pavel Hristov], *Izvestiya na Natsionalniya tsentŭr po voenna istoriya*, vol. 54 (1992).

³⁸ *Ofiterskiyat korpus v Bŭlgariya (1878–1944)* [Bulgaria’s Officer Corps (1878–1944)] vols. I–V (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1996); Svetlozar Nedev, *Komandvaneto na bŭlgarskata voiska prez voinite za natsionalno obedinenie* [The Bulgarian Army Command in the Wars of National Unification] (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1993); Petko Iotov et al., eds., *Bŭlgarskata armiya v Pŭrvata Balkanska vojna, 1912–1913. Entsikl. spravochnik* [The Bulgarian Army in the First Balkan War, 1912–1913: An Encyclopedic Guide] (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1997); *Makedono-odrinskoto opŭlchenie 1912–1913 g. Lichen sŭstav* [Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteer Corps 1912–1913: A Muster Roll] (Sofia: Univ. izd. Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2006); Anastas Totev et al., *Mezhdunarodni dogovori, svŭrzani s voinite za obedinenieto na bŭlgarskiya narod 1912–1913* [International Treaties Related to the Wars of National Unification of the Bulgarian People 1912–1913] (Sofia: Univ. izd. Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2000).

³⁹ *Voinata takava, kakvato beshe. Bŭlgariya v Pŭrvata balkanska vojna, 1912–1913* [The War As It Was: Bulgaria in the First Balkan War, 1912–1913] (Sofia: Univ. izd. Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2012); *Balkanskata vojna 1912–1913. Ilyustrovana bronika* [The Balkan War 1912–1913: An Illustrated Chronicle] (Sofia: IK Svetovna biblioteka, 2012). The Institute for Balkan Studies at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences released in 2013 a special issue of its journal, see: *Études balkaniques* (Sofia), vol. 49, no. 2 (2013): The Balkan Wars.

historians in the previous stages,⁴⁰ and also in propaganda and cultural policy.⁴¹ Conferences, held as a rule on anniversaries, became traditional and their proceedings were published.⁴²

It was against this background of academic knowledge and interest that, in 2012, Bulgaria held a national commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of the Balkan Wars. The centers of these solemn October events were Blagoevgrad, Veliko Tŭrnovo, Stara Zagora, Kŭrdzhali, and Smolian, all of which were host to international academic conferences; or, more precisely, some of the participants in the international academic conference held on 3 October in Sofia toured to these places. Before and afterwards,

⁴⁰Todor Petrov et al., eds., *Natsionalnoosvoboditelnite borbi na bŭlgarite ot Makedoniya i Odrinska Trakiya prez Balkanskata vojna (1912–1913)* [The National Liberation Struggles of the Bulgarians in Macedonia and Adrianopolitan Thrace in the Balkan War (1912–1913)] (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1994); Svetlozar Eldarov, “Posledniyat krŭstonosen pohod. Bŭlgarskata pravoslavna tsŭrkva i pokrŭstvaneto na bŭlgaromohamedanite prez 1912–1913 g.” [The Last Crusade: The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Conversion of the Bulgarian Muslims in 1912–1913], *Bŭlgarska istoricheska biblioteka*, no. 4 (2000); idem, *Pravoslaviето na vojna. Bŭlgarskata pravoslavna tsŭrkva i voinite na Bŭlgariya 1877–1945* [Orthodoxy at War: The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and Bulgaria’s Wars 1877–1945] (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2005).

⁴¹Paraskeva Kishkilova, *Balkanskite voini po stranitsite na bŭlgarskiya pechat* [The Balkan Wars on the Pages of the Bulgarian Press] (Sofia: Akad. izd. Prof. Marin Drinov, 1999); Rumyana Koneva, *Golyamata sreshta na bŭlgarskiya narod. Kulturata i predizvikatelstvata na voinite, 1912–1918* [The Great Encounter of the Bulgarian People: Culture and Challenges of the Wars, 1912–1918] (Sofia: Akad. izd. Prof. Marin Drinov, 1995); Petŭr Kŭrdzhilov, *Zagadkite na filma za Balkanskata vojna* [The Mysteries of the Documentary about the Balkan War] (Sofia: Titra, 2006); idem, *Filmŭt “Balkanskata vojna” v istoriyata na bŭlgarskoto kino* [The Documentary *The Balkan War* in the History of Bulgarian Cinema] (Sofia: Inst. za izsl. na izkustvata—BAN, 2011).

⁴²90 godini ot Balkanskata vojna. Yubileina voennonauchna konferentsiya, Sofia, 15 oktombri, 2002 g. [90 Years since the Balkan War: A Jubilee Military History Conference, Sofia, 15 October 2002] (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2003); *Dvadeseta mezhdunarodna nauchna konferentsiya po voenna istoriya na tema: Voenni sŭyuzi i koalitsii prez XX vek, posvetena na 95 godishminata ot nachaloto na Balkanskata vojna, 1912–1913, 2–5 oktombri 2007* [Twelfth International Scholarly Conference on Military History: Military Alliances and Coalitions, on the Occasion of the Beginning of the Balkan War, 1912–1913, 2–5 October 2007] (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2003); *90 godini Balkanska vojna. Sbornik ot Mezhdunarodna nauchna konferentsiya. Kŭrdzhali, 8–9 oktombri 2002* [90 Years Balkan War: A Collected Volume of an International Academic Conference, Kŭrdzhali, 8–9 October] (Kŭrdzhali: Reg. istor. muz., 2002); *Dokladi i sŭobshcheniya ot Natsionalnata nauchna konferentsiya “90 godini ot Balkanskata vojna i Osвобожденieto na Srednite Rodopi” — Smolyan, 17–18 oktombri, 2002* [Reports and Papers of the National Scholarly Conference “90 Years since the Liberation of the Middle Rhodopes” — Smolyan, 17–18 October 2002] (Smolyan: PrintaKom OOD, 2003).

national academic conferences were convened in other towns: Svilengrad, Velingrad, and Gabrovo. The majority of papers presented by Bulgarian scholars, predominantly museum and archive employees, confirmed the impression that Bulgarian historiography on the Balkan Wars is seemingly permanently recycling the accomplishments of the period between the two World Wars and the 1980 and 1990s.

It is difficult to foresee the pattern of the next stage of Bulgarian historiography on this topic, which forms part of the greater, more significant problem of historical memory and national identity—it is not clear whether it will be a new revival or a new negation. We hope that the development of Bulgarian historical studies will depend not only on political developments but on scholarly competence and civil morality as well.

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Religious Wars? Southern Slavs' Orthodox Memory of the Balkan and World Wars

Stefan Rohdewald

Until the nineteenth century, medieval religious *lieux de mémoire* such as the Kosovo myth (referring to the battle of Sultan Murad against Prince Lazar on Kosovo Polje in 1389), Kliment of Ohrid (ca. 835–916), Saint Sava (1175–1236), Cyril (ca. 826–869), and Methodius (815–885) were (re)produced not in national, but in dynastic and clerical social contexts and often across the borders of church provinces and (former) realms: saints labeled “Bulgarian” in the Ottoman Empire were venerated in the churches and monasteries of the Serb Patriarchate in Peć, and vice versa. The aim of their veneration was primarily religious, that is, the commemoration of the imagined community shared by the saints alive in heaven and the Christian believers on Earth. Cyril and Methodius were venerated in a Byzantine, then in a Bulgarian and overall Slavonic context as religious missionaries and scholars. They gained fame only to a limited degree among larger groups, as their relics are missing or are located outside the area (Cyril was buried in Rome).

S. Rohdewald (✉)

Department of History, University of Gießen, Gießen, Germany

e-mail: Stefan.Rohdewald@geschichte.uni-giessen.de

Bishop Kliment—a disciple of Cyril and Methodius—and Sava, son of the Serbian Grand Prince Stefan Nemanja and the first Serbian bishop, were venerated among a broader circle, since their remains have been accessible (although in the case of Sava only until 1594, when the relics were allegedly burned by the Ottomans). The myth about the martyrs of the battle on Kosovo Polje in 1389 evolved first in liturgical texts, then in folk songs and tales.¹

Yet only within the framework of national movements did these *lieux de mémoire* crystallize national identities or visions of national modernity during the nineteenth century, although their initial veneration was—in the case of Cyril and Methodius—to a great degree Slavonic or transnational. In the nineteenth century, one can distinguish more or less clearly a *secularization* of the saints, while within the context of historicism and nationalism during the 1930s these saints served to *sacralize* nationalism.² In the context of the Balkan Wars and the First World War that soon followed, the veneration of religious *lieux de mémoire* changed. Now, their surrounding discourses became militarized and employed as a means for mobilizing the masses in arms, too:³ they were used to legitimize territorial claims and military action against neighbors through the harnessing of religious fervor and nationalized historical narratives. The ultimate aim was to subvert the social, institutional, and discursive structures of the Ottoman Empire and to replace them with new social and national forms of rhetoric and institutions. The emigration or flight of large parts of the Muslim and/or Turkish population was taken as par for the course, if not appreciated positively.

¹There are extensive chapters on medieval and early modern practices of veneration pertaining to the *lieux de mémoire* mentioned here and the relevant international research in Stefan Rohdewald, *Götter der Nationen. Serbische, bulgarische und makedonische religiöse Erinnerungsfiguren (ca. 800–1944)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2014), 41–152.

²Martin Schulze Wessel, ed., *Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006). On Cyril and Methodius, see Stefan Rohdewald, “Figures of (Trans-)National Religious Memory of the Orthodox Southern Slavs before 1945: An Outline on the Examples of SS. Cyril and Methodius,” *Trames. A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol. 12, no. 3 (2008), 287–98, http://www.kirj.ee/14120/?tpl=1061&c_tpl=1064, accessed 11 July 2016.

³Jan Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Nikolaus Buschmann and Dieter Langewiesche, eds., *Der Krieg in den Gründungsmythen europäischer Nationen und der USA* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003).

SAINTS AS “AGGRESSIVE AND DEVOUT FIGHTERS”:
FORERUNNERS TO THE MILITARIZATION OF MEMORY
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

As early as the Serbian uprisings at the beginning of the nineteenth century, medieval saints like King Stefan of Dečani (1285–1331) played a role in mobilizing the populace.⁴ But the militarization of the rhetoric of the veneration of the saints themselves changed only with the commemoration of the thousand-year anniversary of Cyril’s death in 1869. In the newspaper *Macedonia*, published in the Ottoman capital of Constantinople, an anonymous journalist invoked the “altar of Slavic rebirth” and a “struggle for the existence” of the Bulgarian people not only led by its clerics but encompassing the people in its entirety.⁵ Cyril, as an “invisible,” allegedly “great military leader” and a “bold fighter and warrior of Christ,” was imagined as participating in this ongoing “struggle for the existence of the whole Bulgarian people”:

Thus, the remembrance of the name and the work of this first zealot can support our clerics ... and inspire the strength and energy of the people in this gruesome struggle. And what can be more strengthening and emboldening than when we feel the presence of this great war leader [*voevoda*], who has fought and who is fighting today with us in our ranks.⁶

Cyril, traditionally commemorated in his role as a living saint, served immediately to sacralize the military fight for the nation’s project. But this militarization and even partial efforts along these lines remained exemptions in this period. In 1885, during a commemoration of the death of Methodius, the former foreign minister of Bulgaria, Marko Balabanov, described Cyril and Methodius to be “chosen and self-denying warriors [*vojnici*] in the field of education that does not know any borders.”⁷

⁴Leontije Pavlović, “Korišćenje kulta Stefana Prvovenčanog u XIX veku u političke svrhe” [The Usage of the Cult of Stefan the Firstcrowned for Political Purposes during the 19th Century], in idem, ed., *Neki spomenici kulture. Osvrti i zapažanja* [Some Monuments of Culture: Reviews and Notices] (Smederevo: Narodni Muzej, 1964), 65–94, here 65.

⁵*Makedoniia*, no. 10, 1 February 1869, 1.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Marko Balabanov, “Deloto na dvamata solunski bratija mezhdu Slovenete izobshcho i Bulgarete osobito” [The Deeds of the Two Brothers from Salonica among the Slavs in General and Especially among the Bulgarians], in *Sbirka ot rechii i skaski, narochito prigotveni i skazani pri urecheni sluchai prez turzbestvoto ot 6 Aprilij 1885 g. v Sofiia* [Collection of

Although there had been warrior saints in the region's history such as Demetrius of Salonica,⁸ the brothers had certainly never been embedded in such an explicitly martial context.

In Serbian contexts, early rhetorical peaks in the nineteenth century are also apparent. For example, in 1887 M. V. Radonjić wrote in the Saint Sava Association's journal *Brotherhood* in Belgrade about the "struggle for nationality [*narodnost*]" and gave Sava, the founder of the autocephalous Serbian Church (1219), a prominent role in this process.⁹ By "erecting monasteries, churches and schools," he should have provided "his people ... with a spiritual weapon to fight."¹⁰ If Sava was only a spiritual weapon, the remembrance of the late medieval battle on Kosovo Polje was developed from the late nineteenth century onwards as a means of directly militarizing the national imagination.¹¹ The maquette of a temple on Kosovo Polje, conceived by the famous Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović (1883–1962) as early as 1904 to foster his transnational Yugoslav project of various international exhibitions, is one of the most famous results of this process.¹² With Meštrović's endeavors, Serbian national epic narratives became modern art, expressing the new "Yugoslav Idea."¹³ His work suggests that culture should be transformed

Lectures and Speeches, Prepared and Held at the Celebrations of 6 April 1885 in Sofia]. *Osobna priturka kum XIV knjižbka ot Periodičesko Spisanie i na Bulgarskoto Knizbovno Družestvo v Sredec* [Special Supplement to Vol. 14 of the Periodical Journal and the Bulgarian Literary Association in Sredec]; part 2 (Sredec 1885), 51–87, here 53.

⁸ Christopher Walter, *The Warrior Saints in Byzantine Art and Tradition* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).

⁹ M. V. Radonjić, "Borba za narodnost, s naročitim pogledom na prošlost polapskih Slovena, Slovina, Čeha i Srba" [The Fight for Nationalism, with a Special View of the History of the Elbe-Slavs, Slovens, Czechs, and Serbs], *Bratstvo*, no. 3 (1887), 50–104, here 88.

¹⁰ Ibid., 92. On Sava see Bojan Aleksov, "Nationalism in Construction: The Memorial Church of St. Sava on Vračar Hill in Belgrade," *Balkanologie*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2003), 47–72.

¹¹ E.g. Miodrag Popović, *Vidovdan i Časni krst. Ogled iz književne arheologije. Drugo, dopunjeno izdanje* [The Day of Vid and the Cross of Honor: An Essay of Literary Archeology. Second, enhanced edition] (Belgrade: Slovo Ljubve, 1977); Branimir Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide* (New York: New York University Press, 1999).

¹² Andrew Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 55–60; Maria Meštrović, *The Making of a Master* (London: Stacey International, 2008), 51–59; Predrag Marković, "Die 'Legitimierung' der Königsdiktatur in Jugoslawien und die öffentliche Meinung 1929–1939," in Erwin Oberländer, ed., *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1919–1944* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001), 577–631, here 626–27.

¹³ Jovo Bakić, *Ideologije jugoslovenstva između srpskog i hrvatskog nacionalizma 1918–1941* [The Ideology of Yugoslavism between Serb and Croat Nationalism, 1918–1941] (Zrenjanin: Gradska Narodna Biblioteka "Žarko Zrenjanin," 2004), 181–87; Wolfgang Höpken,

into “racial messianism.”¹⁴ With the sacralization of the myth of Kosovo, Meštrović constructed a transconfessional, transnational Southern Slavic modernity within the framework of *fin de siècle* art. His project proved to be a productive reinvention of myth, which had been thoroughly nationalized only in the nineteenth century.¹⁵ In the years before the Balkan Wars, the mobilization of nationalist euphoria intensified. The media referred especially to the medieval battle on Kosovo Polje and relevant epic narratives.¹⁶ In this context, Sava, too, was further established as a factor in national militarization. In a 1909 sketch about Sava, the history teacher Pavle Sofrić wrote that he had been a religious “statesman and commander” and an “aggressive and devout fighter.”¹⁷ Together with his father Nemanja, Sava should be imagined as a warrior and a promoter of progress.¹⁸

“LIVING IS THE BULGARIAN GOD”: BEFORE THE WAR AND DURING VICTORY

In Bulgaria, too, the nation’s sacralization had been prepared before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, and it contributed to the mobilization of the populace. Bulgarian secular and church publications at the beginning of the twentieth century increasingly connected Cyril and Methodius with militaristic rhetoric. Ecclesiastical authors adapted the already established secular national discourse on the saints. In 1903, the *Newspaper of the Church* wrote about “the harm of the much enduring Macedonia,” the “fatherland” of the brothers, and the troubles caused by “our enemies for 500 years,” that is,

“Zwischen nationaler Sinnstiftung, Jugoslawismus und ‘Erinnerungschaos’. Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtskultur in Serbien im 19. und 20. Jh.,” in Walter Lukan, Ljubinka Trgovčević, and Dragan Vukčević, eds., *Serbien und Montenegro. Raum und Bevölkerung—Geschichte—Sprache und Literatur—Kultur—Politik—Gesellschaft—Wirtschaft—Recht* (Österreichische Osthefte, Sonderband 18) (Berlin: LIT-Verlag, 2005), 345–91.

¹⁴Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 202.

¹⁵Höpken, “Zwischen nationaler Sinnstiftung, Jugoslawismus und ‘Erinnerungschaos,’” 358.

¹⁶Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (London: Pan, 2002), 252; Holm Sundhussen, *Geschichte Serbiens. 19.–21. Jh.* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2007), 213.

¹⁷Pavle Sofrić, *Tri priloza za poznavanje narodne duše kod nas Srba* [Three Speeches about the Cognition of Our Serbian People’s Soul] (Niš: Pavlović i Stefanović, 1909), 18.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 12.

by being under the “Turkish yoke.”¹⁹ In 1906, the priest Mihail Himitliiski wrote that Cyril and Methodius were “fighters for Orthodoxy and Slavdom” as well as the “first Slavic giants [*velikani*]” and “warriors for the Bulgarian book and language” in the “giant struggle with the enemies of Orthodoxy and Slavdom, the Roman Pope and the German clerics.”²⁰ Moreover, he connected secular nationalist rhetoric on the nation’s “renaissance” with the Christian conception of resurrection.²¹ As the ultimate continuation of this merger of national and Christian rhetoric, a new conception of God was born.

The son of a leader of the Liberal Party, the novelist Pencho Slavejkov wrote in the fifth part of his “Bloody Song” (1911),

God and Bulgaria—a unity
of twofold flesh
God and Bulgaria call upon us
to the oath
and we are giving this oath
in front of the cross
We are living for him, for him
we are dying.²²

Within this conception of an oath to fight until death for the fatherland, Slavejkov identified God with his nation and wrote about them as a unity in a nationalist-theological manner. The expression “of twofold flesh” certainly referred to Christ’s twofold nature. The identification of God with nation in this discourse—voiced while the Balkan Wars were escalating—opened the horizon for the conception of a “Bulgarian God.” Indeed, one of the “national awakers,” Ivan Vazov, wrote about “the living Bulgarian God” in 1913, celebrating the successes of the Bulgarian forces in the First Balkan War:

Moving days, great days! I don’t know, whether another people has experienced such. Triumphs, glory! ... But living is the Bulgarian God. He has guarded us during the darkest centuries; he guarded us

¹⁹ *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, no. 19, 10 May 1903, 2. Cf. Roumen Daskalov, *Images of Europe: A Glance from the Periphery* (Florence: EUI Working Papers in Political and Social Sciences, 94/8, 1994), 6–7.

²⁰ “Sv. Sv. Kirili i Metodij—borci za pravoslavie i slavjanstvo” [SS. Cyril and Methodius—Fighters for Orthodoxy and Slavdom], *Blagovestitel’*, vol. 4, no. 3 (1906), 121–23.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Pencho Slavejkov, *Kurvava pesen’* [The Bloody Song], vol. 2 (Sofia: Pridvornata pech., 1913), 45.

at Shipka, Slivnica, Liuleburgas—
 and today he is watching our fortune. Today, too, he is watching us, the
 invisible guardian of the people [*strazh Naroden*],
 and he will not leave us,
 Oh, living is the Bulgarian God, our great
 God, and he is performing miracles for us.
 Because justice is with our sword, and we have here a great vocation,
 and a glorious role in eternal history
 is being depicted for us by the watching fortune.
 And, again, we will prevail! And even higher
 our free flight
 will defy the forces of hell!
 Oh, living, living is the Bulgarian God!²³

There could be no higher degree of the nation's sacralization. For my purposes here, it must be emphasized that the Balkan Wars' martial setting was what had inspired these sentiments. Only during the late 1930s and the Second World War would Vazov's words be quoted more often. His rhetoric, although certainly inspired by the experience of war, has to be explained by a larger discursive context, too.

The deification of the nation is a characteristic of modern nationalism. As early as 1813, Ernst Moritz Arndt, a German nationalist and romantic poet, wrote about a "German God"²⁴ in his poem "German Consolation" ("Teutscher Trost"), in the context of the Napoleonic wars. His *Catechism for a German Soldier* is paradigmatic of the propaganda advocating a national "holy war," utilized in nearly every subsequent war in which the Germans participated up through and including the Second World War.

HISTORY AS "SACRAL DRAMA": SERBIA AFTER KUMANOVO AND THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

The victorious battle of Kumanovo in October 1912 was very quickly framed as a successful revenge for 1389. It served as pseudoscientific evidence for the alleged supremacy of a "Serbian race" over the Turks.²⁵

²³ Ivan Vazov, *Subrani suchineniia* [Collected Works], ed. Georgi Tsanev, vol. 4, *Lirika 1913–1921* [Poetry 1913–1921] (Sofia: Bulgarski Pisatel, 1976), 95–96.

²⁴ Ernst Moritz Arndt, *Lieder für Teutsche im Jahr der Freiheit* (Leipzig: Fleischer, 1813), 114–15.

²⁵ Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (München: Oldenbourg, 1996), 119–20.

Within the framework of a sacral drama of national history, the rhetorical and performative combination of the remembrance of the battles of Kosovo Polje and Kumanovo were then popularized as central elements of Serbian and Yugoslavian national identity leading up to the Second World War.

A very important step in the development of the Serbian discourse about the battle of 1389 was its connection with the First Balkan War. With the progress of the increasingly successful war campaign, the remembrance of Kosovo gained significance for the Serbs. Within this framework, the monarchy tried to inscribe itself into the Kosovo discourse. After the battle of Kumanovo against the Ottoman forces, Petar Karađorđević traveled to the monastery of Dečani in October 1912 to light a candle that would shine only after vengeance for the 1389 battle was achieved.²⁶ With this performative, symbolic action, Petar made himself the main actor in the central national Serbian myth.

The media's transmission of the experience of war directly influenced the rhetoric of Nikolaj Velimirović, who voluntarily participated in the Balkan Wars as a priest. Shortly after the victory, he wrote in the *Newspaper of the Serbian Church* about the victory of the "soul of the Serbian people" and the "prophecy" of Kosovo, arguing against a non-national approach to history.²⁷ Thus, he deliberately reflected the discourse on Kosovo and tried to direct the discussion in another direction: Serbia's territorial expansion should be understood as the fulfillment of "divine justice" and as a second "Vidovdan."²⁸ In particular, the songs sung "under Ottoman slavery" were presented as purely Serbian and prophetic.²⁹

In 1913, Velimirović described Vidovdan in the journal of the Serbian Orthodox Church as the main principle guiding the delineation of

²⁶ Banac, *The National Question*, 292; Melissa Bokovoy, "Scattered Graves, Ordered Cemeteries: Commemorating Serbia's Wars of National Liberation, 1912–1918," in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds., *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001), 236–54, here 239; cf. Melissa Bokovoy, "Kosovo Maiden(s): Serbian Women Commemorate the Wars of National Liberation, 1912–1918," in Nancy M. Wingfield, Maria Bucur, eds., *Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 157–70.

²⁷ *Vesnik srbske crkve*, October–December (1912), vol. 23, 841–53, reprinted in Nikolaj Velimirović, *Izabrana dela* [Chosen Works], ed. Ljubomir Ranković, vol. 12 (Belgrade: Glas Crkve, 1997), 102–13, here 105. About Nikolaj, see Klaus Buchenau, *Kämpfende Kirchen. Jugoslawiens religiöse Hypothek* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2006).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 107.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 109.

historical periods of national history: “1: Rise and Fall, 2: Repentance, 3: Resurrection. Few national histories have such clear epochs, such definite struggles, and such unity.” The churchman reconfigured national history as a “sacral drama.” In this interpretation he wrote about Kosovo Polje as a “sacred region.” Kosovo would be the “culmination of the dramatic action in our history. In short, with one word, Kosovo is the whole of the drama.” He went on:

Our history is in this sense the most classic, nearly the only one, of Europe. The history of the other European peoples doesn't know this oriental kind of tragedy [*tragizam*]. Our history differs from the Egyptian and the Israelite only by the deficit of a separate religion of the people.³⁰

By identifying with “Orientals” and Jews, Serbia would reach classical or Old Testament status and cultural significance. The imagination of collective endurance was used to claim a messianic standing among “modern peoples,” explicitly claimed as the supreme form of the “most classic” prestige in Europe. But for now, a “black tragedy” had changed to a day of joy with the victory at Kumanovo on 24 October 1912, “the first joyful Vidovdan since the battle on Kosovo Polje.”³¹ The horizon of expectation turned from one of revenge to one of eternal salvation. Thus, Velimirović framed the experience of war in a partially new discourse, which would gain increasing importance in the years through 1944, and again after the 1980s. Velimirović may serve as an example of the way that discourses can be observed and to some degree changed by individuals and their experiences.³²

The Balkan Wars and the Serbian forces' eventually successful occupation of Vardar Macedonia coincided with a Serbian appropriation of the discourse about Cyril and Methodius. In 1913, Milivoje Bašić wrote in the *Calendar of Resurrection*,

All this was necessary to explain that the Saints Cyril and Methodius were first of all Serbian apostles, and then Slavonic, in a broader sense. Yet by no means were they “Bulgarian apostles,” as they are called by the Bulgarian thieves, who have it in their blood to steal it from others, and who have managed to find so-called scientists [to propagate] this trend

³⁰ *Glasnik Pravoslavne Crkve*, no. 12 (1913), reprinted in Velimirović, *Izabrana dela*, 20–21.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Thomas Welskopp, *Das Banner der Brüderlichkeit. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie vom Vormärz bis zum Sozialistengesetz* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 2000), 56–57.

by [paying] money. Is it correct to call these people by the Tatar name as Bulgarians, only because they preached the word of God in the Serbian language to the Serbian people?³³

Thus, within the framework of the victorious remembrance of Cyril and Methodius, Macedonia could be imagined as the “cradle” of the Serbian people in order to legitimize the occupation. In the context of the struggle over Macedonia, the territories of the projected nations of Bulgaria and Serbia overlapped broadly; the earlier religious and transnational remembrance of the brothers became increasingly secularized at the turn of the nineteenth century and was nationalized at its end. In this entanglement of national strategies, the day of the brothers on 11 May was declared a state holiday in Serbia after the Balkan Wars, to be honored beginning in 1914.³⁴ Sofia did not follow suit. Regardless, the holiday did not gain great significance in Serbia, either, then or later.³⁵

“HOW TOLERANT” THE TURKS WERE: REMEMBERING THE LOSS OF MACEDONIA IN BULGARIA AFTER THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

Despite the loss of great parts of Macedonia during the Second Balkan War, there was no question that the militaristic rhetoric would continue in Bulgaria. In 1914, Bishop Neofit Velichki put forth the view in the *Newspaper of the Church* that being “warriors” had been the brothers’ ideal.³⁶ According to Velichki, “the Czar and the statesmen” were responsible for the unsatisfactory results of the Balkan Wars.³⁷ The bishop described it as the church’s mission to raise “true and positive citizens,” “dedicated and patriotic statesmen,” and “true warriors for the Cyrillo-Methodianic ideal”—an ideal that consisted “foremost” in “national unification”: the “irredenta,” Vardar Macedonia, and other territories had to be regained.

³³ *Vaskrsenje. Kalendar za prostu 1914 godinu* [Resurrection: Calendar for the Year 1914] (1913), 52.

³⁴ Cf. Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić, *Kult slovenskih apostola Ćirila i Metodija kod Srba* [The Cult of the Slav Apostles Cyril and Methodius among the Serbs] (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1986), 85.

³⁵ Claudia Weber, *Auf der Suche nach der Nation. Erinnerungskultur in Bulgarien von 1878–1944* (Berlin: LIT-Verlag, 2006), 198.

³⁶ *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, no. 19, 10 May 1914, 217–19, here 217.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 218.

The statement's rhetoric was immediately repeated in another article about "terror in Macedonia" and the alleged destruction of "altars and icons of the SS. Cyril and Methodius," in which the author wrote about the "yoke of monstrous terror by 'cultivated conquerors,'"³⁸ a rhetorical adaptation of the older discourse about the "Ottoman yoke." Nevertheless, the celebrations of Cyril and Methodius on the streets of Sofia on 11 May 1914 were more enthusiastic than they had been before. The *Newspaper of the Church* connected its report about them with the wish for "freedom for the enslaved and the unification of the Bulgarian tribe."³⁹ Having "almost liberated [the whole of] Macedonia," the "third, contemporary [Bulgarian] Empire" was now beginning, explained the leader of the Bulgarian Exarchate. In his conception, the church, the nation, its youth, and science all warranted the future of an Orthodox societal modernity.⁴⁰

During the First World War, the Bulgarian veneration of Cyril and Methodius remained connected to the religious figures of memory that were prominent for their Slavic neighbors. As reported after the war, a Bulgarian army officer gave a speech on the brothers to his soldiers—"Bulgarian sons!"—when celebrating their holiday at the front close to Monastir/Bitola with a military parade. He compared them to Saint Sava of the Serbs and Aleksandr Nevsky of the Russians and thanked them for having "saved the whole of the Slavic tribe from darkness and doom."⁴¹

Not only politicians, church leaders, and military officers, but philologists, too, inscribed themselves into militaristic discourses with the help of Cyril and Methodius. The linguist and dean of the Faculty of History and Philology of the Sv. Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia, Benjo Tsonev, wrote in 1915 that Cyril and Methodius and their followers were the "pillars of the Bulgarian Church and fighters for the Bulgarian word."⁴² In his eyes, the new "enslavement" by the Serbs was worse than that of the Turks. The Bulgarian commemoration was explicitly contrasted with the veneration of the brothers in "Old and New Serbia," that is, in Kosovo and Macedonia, "after having declared them to Serbians." The Ottoman Empire now seemed a tolerant place, in comparison: "Alas! The victory over the Turks was needed to show

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 219–20.

³⁹ *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, no. 20, 17 May 1914, 238–39.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 239.

⁴¹ *Sv. Sv. Kiril i Metodi 24/11 Maj 1921 god* [SS Cyril and Methodius, 24/11 May 1921] (Sofia: Ministry of National Education, 1921), 8.

⁴² Benjo Tsonev, *Slava Kirilu i Metodiuu!* [Praise Cyril and Methodius!] (Sofia: Glushkov, 1915), 3; cf. Weber, *Auf der Suche nach der Nation*, 172–73.

how tolerant they have been to us!”⁴³ Tsonev remembered the national “struggle” of the nineteenth century under the sign of Cyril and Methodius and used it as an example of the contemporary fight for “all-national unification,” turning their veneration into a war cry.⁴⁴ In this martial context, after the attack of the Russian Navy on Varna in 1915, Czar Ferdinand turned the Nevski Cathedral in Sofia into the Cathedral of Cyril and Methodius.⁴⁵

Thus, with the Balkan Wars and the first years of the First World War, the commemoration of national religious figures intensified processes of radicalization and further militarization, as well as sacralization. Again, such processes were firmly set within a European context: the “sacralization of the nation at war” has been analyzed in relation to France, too. Christological elements, earlier connected to the monarchy, were transferred to conceptions of a sacral nation.⁴⁶ This development became more prevalent in Bulgarian and Serbian discourses leading up to 1944. In 1916, the millennial anniversary of the death of Kliment of Ohrid was to be remembered. The theologian and editor of the official church newspaper, Danail Laskov, wrote in 1915 about the plan to erect a monument honoring Kliment; this saint would embody a “heroic” national conception to counter “horrific militarism,” “bloody wars,” and “religious indifference.” His monument would confront those “generals” and “emperors” responsible for the current wars. Instead, the “religious spirit” and the “sound mind of the Bulgarian people” would stand for a pacifist, anti-imperial, and religious project of the nation⁴⁷—a view that did not gain much support.

LIBERATED FROM “SLAVERY”: OHRID REGAINED FOR BULGARIA

When Bulgaria occupied Serbian-held Vardar Macedonia in 1916 during the First World War, Kliment Ohridski as well as Cyril and Methodius were, once again, reproduced as central figures of Bulgarian history and

⁴³ Ibid., 12–13.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 15.

⁴⁵ Dmitry I. Polyvianni, “The Foundation of the Third Bulgarian Tzardom: Ferdinand von Saxe-Coburg-Gotha in Bulgaria (1887–1908),” in János M. Bak et al., eds., *Gebrauch und Missbrauch des Mittelalters, 19.–21. Jh.* (Munich: Fink, 2009), 109–19, here 119.

⁴⁶ Jörn Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation. Kriegsdeutung und Nationsbestimmung in Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten 1750–1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 823.

⁴⁷ Danail T. Laskov, *Zhivot i deinost’ na sv. Kliment Ohridski s edna negova propoved* [Life and Deeds of S. Kliment of Ohrid] (Sofia: Sv. Sinod, 1915), 4.

memory. “The catastrophe of 1913,”⁴⁸ when parts of just-conquered Macedonia were lost to Serbia and Greece during the Second Balkan War, was forgotten during Cyril and Methodius’s national holiday in 1916, as Bulgaria and its allies now occupied even larger territories in Macedonia. Remembrance of the brothers could again be used to imagine and legitimize a unified territory:

From the Danube to the White Sea, from the Black Sea to the Morava, to [the mountains of] Shar and Ohrid, the memory of the brothers, which has inspired the Bulgarian tribe with the noble ideal of freedom and education, is being glorified and lauded without hindrance.⁴⁹

The imagination of national enemies, who used to be the Ottomans or the Phanariotes, now changed: Serbs and Greeks were denounced as the “wrong friends,” who were “more dangerous than Turkish slavery [*robstvo*].”⁵⁰ Thus, the situation was framed within a post-Ottoman if not postcolonial rhetoric. Celebrations for the day of Cyril and Methodius were planned for Sofia, and from 8 to 10 August in Skopje as well as Ohrid, too.⁵¹ Aleksandur Teodorov-Balan, the first rector of the University of Sofia and, in 1907–10, secretary of the Bulgarian Exarchate, told the academic public that Kliment Ohridski had been an intercessor “in the war for the unification of the Bulgarian fatherland.” In 1915, he had “heard the prayers” and performed the “liberation from three years of Serbian domination” as a “miracle.”⁵²

In 1917, the young church historian Ivan Snegarov, in his pamphlet *A Great Light on the Bulgarian Land: Saint Kliment Ohridski and His Spiritual-Cultural Meaning*, imagined Macedonia to be the “eternal

⁴⁸ *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, no. 20, 27 May 1916, 197–98, here 197.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Rumjana Koneva, *Goljamata sresbta na bulgarskijia narod. Kulturata i predizvikatelstvata na Vojnite 1912–1918 g.* [The Great Encounter of the Bulgarian People: Culture and the Evocation of the Wars, 1912–1918] (Sofia: Akad. Izdat. Prof. Marin Drinov, 1995), 67; Björn Opfer, *Im Schatten des Krieges. Besatzung oder Anschluss—Befreiung oder Unterdrückung? Eine komparative Untersuchung über die bulgarische Herrschaft in Vardar-Makedonien 1915–1918 und 1941–1944* (Münster: LIT-Verlag, 2005), 111; Weber, *Auf der Suche nach der Nation*, 199–200.

⁵² Aleksandur Teodorov-Balan, *Sv. Kliment Ohridski v knizhevnia pomen i v nauchnoto direne* [Saint Kliment Ohridski in Literary Memory and Scientific Research] (Sofia: Durzhavna Pechatnica, 1919), 3–4.

cradle of Bulgarian longings and ideals.” Kliment was the “alpha and omega of Bulgarian characteristic [*samobitnost*]” and thus the Christ of Bulgarian nationality.⁵³ The historian Snegarov continued: the “spirit of Kliment” should be the “force” used to create a “Bulgarian nationality,” with Macedonia as the “heart of Bulgarian consciousness.” Nevertheless, it was “Mother Bulgaria” who was to be honored foremost, “because after all the fame of Saint Kliment is the fame of Mother Bulgaria, having given birth to such a divine son, such a great fighter [*ratnik*] for justice and enlightenment.”⁵⁴ The relationship between the “Mother of God” and Christ was used here to depict the relationship between a sacralized “Mother Bulgaria” and her “divine son.” Kliment, who had so recently served to express pacifist ideals, now became a warrior.⁵⁵ He was to be venerated as the “reliable guardian.” Snegarov, then, renewed his function as a guardian saint of Bulgaria.⁵⁶ Only with the occupation of Ohrid during the Second World War was this attempt to nationalize Kliment surpassed.

REMEMBERING “THE REVENGE OF THE BATTLE ON KOSOVO POLJE”: SERBIA DURING AND AFTER THE WORLD WAR

With the loss of Macedonia during the First World War, the Kosovo myth—shown above to have paradoxically Europeanized Serbia via an identification with the East—could be used to identify Serbia with the Occident, too. On 15 June 1917 the newspaper *Great Serbia*, published in Salonica under the French military government, published an article entitled “Vidovdan,” which declared that the Serbian people had “shed so much blood for its liberation, as no other people.” Moreover, it highlighted the new conception of Serbia’s role as the “great defender of Europe” and touted the alleged achievements of the Serbs “guarding the West against the aggressive East.” Thus, Serbia was turned into a part of a Western Antemurale against the “East.”⁵⁷

⁵³ Penčo Snegarov, *Veliko svetilo nad bulgarskata zemja* (*Sv. Kliment Obridski i negovoto duhovno-kulturno znachenie*) [A Great Light over the Bulgarian Land (Saint Kliment of Ohrid and His Spiritual-Cultural Significance)] (Sofia, 1917), 21.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 21–22.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 22.

⁵⁷ *Velika Srbija*, no. 427, 15 June 1917, 1.

With the end of the First World War, the main function of the remembrance of Vidovdan became the veneration of the victims of the 1912–18 wars. For example, in 1922 the leading Belgrade newspaper *Politika* published an article entitled “Vidovdan,” addressing the memory of the victims of one exemplary Serbian village, and spoke about the “Golgotha” of the peasants. At the same time, the new “constitution of Vidovdan” became a *lieu de mémoire* in its own right and a sign of national “progress.”⁵⁸

The remembrance of the wars remained important for the discursive practices of the Serbian and later the Yugoslav monarchy. Writing about the celebration of the victorious battle of Kumanovo, the official newspaper of the Serbian Orthodox Church quoted a community leader of Kumanovo, Toma Grigorjević, who greeted the king and the queen in 1912. In his words, the battle should be the “most beautiful emerald in Your Majesty’s crown.” In the king, “reliable committed, and thankful, the heart of a descendant of the glorious Nemanja and Dušan the mighty is beating”—although the king was in no way related to the medieval Nemanjić dynasty.⁵⁹ Prime Minister Nikola Pašić reproduced the old discourse of “the revenge of the battle on Kosovo Polje,” characterizing the tenth anniversary of Kumanovo as marking the “liberation of Old Serbia.” In addition, the newspaper of the Serbian Orthodox Church expressed the view that Karlo Hajzler, a member of parliament for the Croatian Republican Peasants’ Party, had “glorified” the battle of Kumanovo. In his greetings to the king, Hajzler spoke about the battle as the “fundament of the unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” According to him, “the Croats would increasingly like to defend national unification until the last drop of blood.”⁶⁰ Thus, the newspaper also partially reproduced the Yugoslav remembrance of the battle.

Beginning in 1923, the editors of the newspaper *Serbian Kosovo*, especially Stanojlo Dimitrijević,⁶¹ proposed the erection of a church on the Kosovo field, adopting an old unrealized project. The public debate on this topic partially developed in this journal. The project would anchor and durably represent the Serbian culture of memory “in our South” through

⁵⁸ *Politika*, no. 5091, 28 June 1922, 1.

⁵⁹ *Glasnik*, no. 20, 15 [28] October 1922, 320–25, here 324.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Srpsko Kosovo*, no. 22, 15 November 1925, 9.

architectural means.⁶² Kosovo was described as “our greatest sanctuary” and “our Jerusalem”—“or better as our *Hadžiluk*” (a word borrowed from Turkish, meaning pilgrimage), where the remains of military leaders and fighters would rest. The bones of soldiers killed in action from around the globe could be gathered there. The place would become a center of memory, including the remembrance of Ottoman warriors killed in the 1389 battle. The “holy bones” and the church would represent and foster the Yugoslav national unity of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.⁶³ A letter to the editor written by T. N. Lazarević called for the erection of a “pantheon of all great and meritorious sons of our three-named people, who have contributed with their work to our unification.”⁶⁴ And indeed, in 1923 the community of Stimlje, located close to the battlefield, built a church for the victims of Kosovo—the community was able to collect nearly 1,000,000 dinars from the inhabitants of the region.⁶⁵

In 1937, for the first time, “great” celebrations of the Sokol, the state-directed sports association, were organized in Skopje to honor the twenty-fifth anniversary of the “liberation” of South Serbia, including a ceremony in the People’s Theater there; Velja Popović, the secretary of Skopje’s Sokol Association, read a greeting from the president of the Sokol Association of the Yugoslav Kingdom addressed to the king, declaring that the “slavery” that had begun in 1389 had ended with the battle of Kumanovo: “Kosovo has been avenged.” In the afternoon, celebrations in “Sokol’s stadium” took place in the presence of nearly 30,000 spectators. Sport, the army, and the Kosovo myth—the commemoration of war—served as pieces of a platform that put the nation on a sacral stage: “A high altar was put on the podium, covered by a broad tricolor.” In the presence of Dr. Rogić, the minister for physical education, and other notables, a relay race and military music commemorated Kumanovo.⁶⁶ Leading representatives of the local society and the state as well as athletes publicly affirmed the construct of “South Serbia.” The connection of remembrance with an ongoing militarization of society is illustrated by the growing number of publications about the advancements of teachers on the Vidovdan holiday⁶⁷—and not on the day of Saint Sava, who was, after all, the national patron saint of the schools.

⁶² *Srpsko Kosovo*, no. 12–13, 15 [28] June 1925, 6.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶⁴ *Srpsko Kosovo*, no. 18, 15 September 1925, 5.

⁶⁵ Bokovoy, *Scattered Graves*, 242.

⁶⁶ *Politika*, no. 10448, 28 June 1937, 6.

⁶⁷ *Politika*, no. 10449, 29 June 1937, 8.

During the 1920s and 1930s, then, the discourse was connected not only to veterans and certain bishops but was disseminated in the media by journalists, politicians, and historians. Even more impressively, it became central to social practices, as it was staged in large-scale public performances. With the help of the state-sponsored Sokol, the capital Belgrade, too, was turned into a kind of stadium, and Kumanovo and Vidovdan were celebrated in the streets of Skopje.

BULGARIA AFTER 1918: CALLS FOR A WAR AGAINST "SLAVERY" IN YUGOSLAV VARDAR MACEDONIA

After Bulgaria's loss of Vardar Macedonia to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918, the attempts of its government to resolve the difficult situation came to the fore. Stoyan Omarchevski, the minister of education, commemorated the day of Cyril and Methodius in 1921 in an official publication about the societal postwar crisis that the brothers, by enabling the Bulgarians to look for "sound elements" in the past to ensure their continued existence, could help the nation to "overcome." The brothers' doings would become the Bulgarians' "shield and defense."⁶⁸ While revising national myths about the brothers,⁶⁹ Omarchevski remained within the rhetoric of war in delivering his message.

At the same time, Macedonian émigrés in Sofia engaged in an intensive publicity campaign that used national saints like Kliment Ohridski and Cyril and Methodius to suggest that Macedonia was a core part of Bulgaria. The Sofia newspaper *Macedonia*, the "Organ of the Macedonian Brotherhoods in Macedonia," touted the motto "Macedonia for the Macedonians." By 1921, it had already extensively chronicled the changes in remembrance practices for Cyril and Methodius in what was now Yugoslav Macedonia. On 23 May 1921, the Executive Committee of the Union of Macedonian Brotherhoods in Bulgaria published an "invocation" in *Macedonia*: the memory of the "Slavic Enlighteners and Apostles" should be simultaneously venerated, secretly in Macedonia and publicly "by the masses" in Bulgaria. This collective demonstration would prove to a global public the vividness of the brother's "spirit," which seemed to depend on the practice of commemoration. On the other hand, the feast in the Bulgarian context helped foster the Macedonian émigrés' identification with Bulgaria.

⁶⁸ *Sv. Sv. Kiril i Metodi 24/11 Maj 1921 god.*, 3.

⁶⁹ Weber, *Auf der Suche nach der Nation*, 214–15.

Macedonia depicted the commemoration of the brothers as “a holiday of great mourning.” Cyril and Methodius were cast as awakeners of “a great race; they resurrected the Slavic people.” But the celebrations were sad, since “neither Dobrudža nor Thrakia nor Macedonia are participating.” The saints were, again, deemed effective in inspiring a spirit of resistance and warfare: “A people, the first receiver of the great deeds of SS. Cyril and Methodius, who ... has given thousands of fighters for its [the people’s] spiritual and political freedom, who did not die during the long and dark slavery, who has endured gruesome defeats, may not die!”⁷⁰

The writers’ observation of the Serbian-Yugoslav context for the veneration of the brothers across the border was decisive for the discourse about the brothers in Sofia. *Macedonia* criticized Serbian usage of the brothers, who, apart from some acknowledgment from historians, were largely forgotten in the Serbian political realm and had even been eliminated from calendars until 1913. The Bulgarian press perceived the implementation of Yugoslavian strategies of remembrance of Cyril and Methodius in Macedonia as a continuation of warfare by other means. *Macedonia* wrote about “hostile” encounters during commemorations of the brothers and those of Sava, organized by “Serbian agents”—even in small villages—to replace the veneration of Cyril and Methodius. From 1918, “Serbian authorities” had given the celebrations of Cyril and Methodius a “Serbian character” and used them as a “means of assimilation.” But this was not successful, as was observed in Sofia, where nostalgia for a lost Macedonia still ruled.⁷¹ This émigré Macedonian discourse, too, commemorated Kliment Ohridski in the context of the wars. The people of Ohrid, who had died for “political independence” from the Yugoslavian state—denounced as a “desecrator of the deeds of Saint Kliment”—were venerated.⁷²

SAINTS AS “FIGHTERS” IN THE BULGARIAN ARMY

After some years, most Bulgarian media organs adopted the discourse established by Macedonian émigrés in Sofia. The veneration of Cyril and Methodius again became militaristic in character. In 1935, the editor of the journal *Legacies (Zaveti)*, Nikola Balabanov, wrote an article in the official newspaper of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church entitled “Fighter of the Bulgarian Spirit,”

⁷⁰ *Makedoniia*, no. 144, 23 May 1921, 1.

⁷¹ *Makedoniia*, no. 145, 29 May 1921, 1.

⁷² *Nezavisima Makedoniia*, no. 36, 14 December 1923, 4.

which discussed “our national, political and cultural renaissance.” Kliment Ohridski was the only saint he counted among the “fighters in the army of the consolidators of the Bulgarian spirit in the past.”⁷³

In 1936, Todor Krajničanev wrote a pamphlet about Cyril and Methodius that contained phrases such as “[t]he culturally victorious weapon, the blood of the heroes is the greatness of the Slavic spirit and the face of the strong state is the illustration of mighty Bulgarian nationalism.” The brothers’ call was simple, in his view: “Fight for freedom!”⁷⁴ These sorts of summons intensified again with the beginning of the Second World War. The historian Zvezdelin Tsonev explained in 1940 that it was the alphabet allegedly invented by Cyril and Methodius, “our sanctuary,” for which “Bulgarian sons have shed their blood and have died with a smile on their lips.”⁷⁵

After Bulgarian and German forces “liberated” Macedonia again in 1941, the use of the two saints as a means for the legitimization of territorial expansion was consolidated. In 1942 Boris Jotsov, the minister of education, discussed the holiday of Saint Ivan of Rila and all the “awakeners of the people” on Radio Sofia: “Isn’t it their spirit, inspiring the brave Bulgarian warrior...?”⁷⁶ One year later, on the holiday of Cyril and Methodius, the newspaper *Ours* (*Nashenets*) declared the “continuous struggle” to be the “essence,” the “historical fate” of the Bulgarian people; Cyril and Methodius’s deeds were a “weapon” for this “fight for existence.”⁷⁷ The fight for the “unification of all Bulgarians in one state” was the “first ideal of the first awakener of the people,” as the newspaper declared on the 1943 holiday of Saint Ivan of Rila: “Seventy years since the liberation, three generations have fought for this ideal and are fighting for it. It has been reached at last.”⁷⁸ Thus, the developing Bulgarian “cult of war” was characterized by national, secular conceptions as well as religious figures of memory.⁷⁹ War was imagined as already spanning three generations, with those who had fought the Balkan Wars and the First World War at the center.

⁷³ *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, no. 27–28, 29 June 1935, 322–23.

⁷⁴ Todor Krajničanev, *Kiril i Metodii i slavianstvoto* [Cyril and Methodius and the Slavs] (Sofia, 1936), 3.

⁷⁵ Zvezdelin Tsonev, *Sv. Sv. Kiril i Metodii. Epokha na slavjanskoto prosveshthenie* [Cyril and Methodius. An Epoque of Slavic Enlightenment] (Sofia: Ignatov, 1940), 6.

⁷⁶ Boris Jotsov, “Den’t na narodnite buditeli,” *Uchilishten pregled*, vol. 41, no. 9 (1942), 1119–24, here 1122.

⁷⁷ *Nashenets*, no. 123, 22 May 1943, 1.

⁷⁸ *Nashenets*, no. 146, 30 October 1943, 1.

⁷⁹ Cf. Weber, *Auf der Suche nach der Nation*, 349–62, especially 359.

CONCLUSION: THE “GERMAN GOD,” THE “BULGARIAN
GOD,” AND “HEAVENLY SERBIA” AS A EUROPEAN
CONTEXT

In 1918, after the loss of most of Macedonia to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the Macedonian émigrés in Sofia successfully influenced Bulgarian discourses in making the lost territory—claimed by Bulgaria since the Treaty of San Stefano—and Kliment Ohridski the very essence of the imagined Bulgarian nation, calling for the area’s renewed conquest. This would occur in 1941, when Bulgaria was an ally of Nazi Germany. The experience of war and emigration, one could argue, led to new expectations and, eventually, to their realization, although under different circumstances. In addition, the discourse culminated in the rhetoric that formed during the celebration of the annexation. Mirroring what transpired within the Yugoslav or Serbian context, the Bulgarian remembrance of the war spread socially far beyond its observance among war veterans. Thousands of schoolchildren as well as teachers, historians, politicians, and members of the army celebrated Kliment Ohridski as well as Cyril and Methodius and Ivan of Rila with demonstrations in Sofia and other cities.

As in Serbia, these Bulgarian figures were central in the formation of national rhetoric from the nineteenth century onwards. The discourse of the French Revolution and of European national movements changed older, medieval practices of veneration; the experience of new uprisings and wars reinvented the *lieux de mémoire* in a modern setting. Thus, the Balkan Wars certainly led to new rhetorical constellations. But they, once again, modified rather than replaced earlier discourses. The mass demonstrations of the 1930s were entirely new, though: just as experience has to be understood through concrete social contexts and expectations, discourses, too, should be analyzed in concrete social and spatial frames of public performance, and not only as texts.

Of special interest here is the regional entanglement of the remembrance of war with older discursive figures of national identity, produced by the simultaneous usage of such figures as Cyril and Methodius, and to some degree Kliment Ohridski, in both Bulgarian and Serbian contexts. The *longue durée* of the national competition between “small power imperialisms”⁸⁰ in the (post-)Ottoman setting was pivotal for the increasing deployment

⁸⁰Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1945), 320–60.

of figures of national religious memory in their respective settings. Finally, the combination of martial, national, and religious discourses has to be seen within a contemporary European framework as central elements of modern collective identities, rather than a specific phenomenon limited to Southeastern Europe. A specific characteristic for each of these respective contexts was the choice of concrete figures: instead of Luther as a German “prophet,” here Cyril and Methodius were chosen. Instead of Clovis/Chlodwig/Louis, Stephan, Václav, Olaf, Erik IX, or Vladimir, this choice fell on Boris in Bulgaria and the Nemanids in Serbia. Instead of Bonifatius or Saint Patrick, the selected guides here were Saint Sava and Kliment Ohridski. The development of Southeastern European *lieux de mémoire* is a history of entanglements. It did not take a great leap to invoke a Bulgarian or a Macedonian “God” or a “Heavenly Serbia” instead of a German one; to do so was just to perform another act of speech on a European stage. As shown, the militarization and national sacralization of figures of memory during the Balkan Wars, their further consolidation during the First World War, and their continuous and intensified adaptation in the years until 1944 need to be understood within a wider European frame.⁸¹ Many Frenchmen perceived the First World War to be a “holy war,”⁸² even if practices of national religious remembrance consolidated existing denominational differences, as they indeed did in France (and in Germany as well).⁸³ Even if such ideologies as the “German Christians” or the conceptions of Alfred Rosenberg from the 1930s to 1945 were not really popular,⁸⁴ they are comparable to the consolidation of the Kosovo myth into an explicit “ideology” in the 1930s. The rhetoric of a “crucified nation”⁸⁵ and its “resurrection”

⁸¹ Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 823.

⁸² Gerd Krumeich, “Gott mit uns? Der Erste Weltkrieg als Religionskrieg,” in Gerd Lehmann, ed., *Gott mit uns. Nation, Religion und Gewalt im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 273–83, here 282–83. During the First World War, the cult of “Christ the King” and *Sacré Coeur* were important for German and French Catholics: see Claudia Schlager, *Kult und Krieg. Herz Jesu–Sacré Coeur–Christus Rex im deutsch-französischen Vergleich 1914–1925* (Tübingen: Tübinger Vereinigung für Volkskunde e.V., 2011), 479–83.

⁸³ Helmut Walser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 233.

⁸⁴ Richard Steigmann-Gall, *The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Anton Grabner-Haider and Peter Strasser, *Hitlers mythische Religion. Theologische Denklinien und NS-Ideologie* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2007).

⁸⁵ Alan Davies, *The Crucified Nation: A Motif in Modern Nationalism* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2010).

was common in many illiberal European modernities until 1945. The call to arms was supported not only by generals, politicians, and journalists, but also by historians and church leaders.⁸⁶

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⁸⁶ E.g. Heinrich Grosse, “Niemand kann zwei Herren dienen.” *Zur Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche im Nationalsozialismus und in der Nachkriegszeit* (Hannover: Blumhardt-Verlag, 2008); Horst Junginger, ed., *The Study of Religion Under the Impact of Fascism* (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

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The Balkan Wars in Serbian History Textbooks (1920–2013)

Dubravka Stojanović

The Balkan Wars have provided convenient historical events for constructing a mythic national and historical awareness in Serbia. They were the most popular wars in modern Serbian history, announced at the time in the media as “the day of reckoning” and “the realization of the Old Testament goal.” They achieved their “constructive potential” because of the great victory over the mythical “age-old enemy,” and because, as a result, the territory of Serbia doubled in size. Furthermore, the Balkan Wars’ narrative fostered, as it still does, the building of politically expedient attitudes regarding Serbia’s neighboring nations and the Great Powers. Meanwhile, the wars’ events enable the construction of individuals’ historical positions, grounded in the mythologized idea of a “victim nation” which—being historically “just” and “righteous”—stoically endures the rapacity of those who surround it. The quantity of material available to create politically useful narratives meant that interpretations of the Balkan Wars went through a number of interesting mutations in the history textbooks used in Serbia during the eras of both Yugoslav states and after the fall of Yugoslavia. Such interpretations entered the school curriculum quite

D. Stojanović (✉)

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

e-mail: dubravkasto@gmail.com

early—one finds them in the first textbooks to be published after the First World War in 1920. This fact alone demonstrates the significance of these wars for the construction of national and historical awareness, because by introducing virtually contemporary events into history textbooks, educational authorities imposed their “correct” interpretation and defined future generations’ relation to them.

INTERPRETING THE CAUSES LEADING TO WAR

Analysis of textbook interpretations of the Balkan Wars during the last century shows that, depending on the political situation when the books were published, the wars’ causes were interpreted very differently. These causes are very complex, but precisely for this reason does the textbooks’ selection of information betray their authors’ intentions and their need to paint these events in particular colors. To begin with, the influence of direct historical experience is very noticeable. In the early textbooks written right after the First World War, the most recent enemies—Austria-Hungary and Germany—are blamed for the Balkan Wars. Along with making discreet remarks about the difficult situation in the Ottoman Empire, the dominant interpretation claimed that these two powers, especially Austria-Hungary after the 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, continued to push toward the Sanjak, encouraging Albanians and Turks to commit crimes against the Serbs.¹ The Balkan Wars were placed in the context of the German policy of advancing to the East, situating the core of the problem within a wider European framework: “The threat to Serbia and the Balkans posed by the German onrush was obvious not only to Serbs but also to other Balkan peoples.”² It is important to note how these events entered the textbooks so early because the same thing would happen in the 1990s, when the wars in Yugoslavia were already being interpreted in schools from 1993 onwards, even as the wars were still ongoing. Both instances are linked in that they clearly demonstrate the political importance of the teaching of history.

¹Milenko Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca* [History of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes], vol. 2 (Belgrade: Stari telegraf, 1920), 110; Luka Zrnić, *Istorija srpskog naroda i ostalih južnih Slovena za srednje i stručne škole* [History of Serbs and Other South Slavs for Secondary Schools] (Belgrade: Knjižarnica Rajkovića i Čučkovića, 1920), 72; Poleksija Stošić, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca* [History of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes] (Belgrade: Narodna Prosveta, 1922), 127.

²Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 110.

From the 1930s onwards, Serbian textbooks presented a more even-handed account of the wars' causes. Its standardized narrative held that Serbian hardship under Ottoman rule, increased taxation, and an overall worsening of conditions following the Young Turk revolution had decisively provoked the war.³ The wars' goals were cast in terms of the defense and protection of compatriots: "The Balkan Christian states could not sit by and watch the suffering of their compatriots in Turkey and became very engaged in an effort to come together in a joint struggle against Turkey."⁴ Interestingly, some authors emphasized examples of violent actions committed by the neighboring nations, but these incidents were not given a coherent interpretation that would clarify the nature of ethnic conflicts in the Ottoman Empire to students. The textbook authors appear to have decided, on their own accord, which of the neighboring nations would be blamed the most. Some books mention only "the savage Arnaut [Albanian] attacks on the Serbs,"⁵ while others insist that Bulgarian crimes against the Serbs in Macedonia had compelled Serbia to intervene: "In the early twentieth century the conditions of the Balkan Christians under the Turks suddenly deteriorated. Then the Bulgarians intensified their *chetnik* campaign and directed it simultaneously against the Turks and Arnauts and against the Serbs."⁶ The socialist era ushered in new interpretive themes regarding the wars' causes. While some textbooks simply declared that "the goal of the allies was to drive out the Turks from the Balkans,"⁷ in other places we find sharp criticism directed at the Serbian government's national goals: "The plans of Austria-Hungary for spreading out over Sanjak toward Thessaloniki threatened the expansionist aspirations of the Serbian bourgeoisie."⁸ These approaches present a totally different picture of the war: one of conquest, and not a strictly defensive conflict. This view was completely in line with the socialist government's position

³ Mihailo Miladinović and Miodrag Rajičić, *Opšta istorija s istorijom trgovine i kulture* [General History with the History of Commerce and Culture] (Belgrade: Kreditna i Pripomoćna zadruga Proforskog društva, 1935), 132; Đordje Lazarević, *Istorija Jugoslovena za srednje i stručne škole* [History of Yugoslavs for Secondary Schools] (Belgrade: Narodna prosveta, 1937), 171.

⁴ Lazarević, *Istorija Jugoslovena za srednje i stručne škole*, 171.

⁵ Stošić, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 127.

⁶ Miladinović and Rajičić, *Opšta istorija s istorijom trgovine i kulture*, 132.

⁷ Đordje Knežević and Bogdan Smiljević, *Istorija za drugi razred stručnih škola* [History for the Second Grade of Secondary Schools] (Belgrade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, 1963).

⁸ Relja Novaković, *Istorija za III razred gimnazije* [History for the Third Grade of Secondary Schools] (Belgrade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, 1962), 235.

on the monarchical regimes, especially their national ideologies. Strong anti-nationalist discourses lay at the basis of the new socialist federation, which adopted a critical stance toward all previous interpretations of the past, in particular historical myths. In this way, socialist Yugoslavia claimed its legitimacy as a state via its claim that it had solved national problems and had prevented the upsurge of nationalist ambitions and hegemonic tendencies which had threatened certain Yugoslav peoples.

THE FIRST BALKAN WAR: EXPEDITIONS INTO NORTHERN ALBANIA

The key to interpreting the Balkan Wars in all of the textbooks was the idea of a defensive war of liberation. It was necessary, then, to “creatively intervene” in the presentation of events and facts. Interestingly, the Serbian army’s advance to the Adriatic through northern Albania—a publicly declared war goal of the Serbian government—is only mentioned in the first textbook published after the Balkan Wars, along with the reasons which had motivated Serbia:

Ever since it came into being, the new Serbian state has constantly sought access to the sea and to the world’s commercial routes. This necessity now pushed Serbia to create an unrestricted passageway to the sea, and therefore the two already mentioned formations of the Serbian army set forth to cross the steep Albanian highlands on a route never before crossed by any army.⁹

This book describes in great detail the problems the Serbian army faced in this impenetrable terrain and the hunger and frost that wore out its troops, as well as clashes with Turkish and Albanian units.

The authors of subsequent textbooks reduced descriptions of these events, skipped over their causes, and tended to neglect the predicaments faced by the Serbian army. Thus, the Serbian army’s drive to gain access to the Adriatic Sea through northern Albania is presented not as Serbia’s war aim but as an accidental military action. A 1927 textbook notes, “The Serbs captured Ohrid and Resen, and the remains of the defeated Turkish army retreated to Albania, through whose cliffs and mountains two Serb regiments went with great difficulties, reached the Adriatic Sea

⁹Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 115.

and entered Durres.”¹⁰ Such narratives try to explain how the Serbian army “accidentally” entered the Albanian mountains while pursuing the remnants of the Ottoman army.

More often, the Serbian incursion into northern Albania is presented by chronologically interchanging certain events, so that it seems that the Serb army ended up in northern Albania only to help the Montenegrin units near Shkoder, even though these events were not immediately related: first, there was a campaign, in November 1912, to push to Durres; later, in February 1913, another campaign sought to help the Montenegrins in Shkodra. The first such interpretation is found in the 1922 textbook, where the author writes, “Following the victory at Shkoder, our army began to conquer Albania, moving to the Adriatic coast and taking Lesh and Durres.”¹¹ Conflating these two Serb army campaigns toward the Adriatic masks Serbia’s territorial aspirations and its longing to secure access to the sea, because these aims would throw into question the allegedly defensive nature of the wars. Therefore this “chronological mutation” is accepted in almost all later textbooks.

In the textbooks from the socialist period we do find critical overtones regarding the northern Albania expeditions. These missions were condemned as acts of expansionism and as representing “aspirations of the Serbian bourgeoisie to gain an exit to the sea,” interpreted as an “imperialist tendency.”¹² Socialist textbooks were also the first to mention that “the Serbian occupation provoked Albanian resistance and rebellion,”¹³ which was consistent with the socialist regime’s consistent suppression of nationalism.

This posture changed during the time of Slobodan Milošević’s presidency: textbooks published in 1993 abandoned such a critical approach and reverted to the earlier “chronological mutation” that creates the impression that access to the Adriatic resulted only from Serbia responding to the need to help its Montenegrin allies: “The Serbian army joined the Montenegrin forces which were active in Sanjak, and then, making their way across Northern Albania, they reached the Adriatic and joined the sections of the Montenegrin army engaged in the siege of

¹⁰ Lazarević, *Istorija Jugoslovena za srednje i stručne škole*, 171.

¹¹ Stošić, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 128.

¹² Đordje Knežević and Bogdan Smijejić, *Istorija za drugi razred stručnih škola* [History for the Second Grade of Elementary Schools] (Belgrade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, 1967), 11.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Shkoder.”¹⁴ Omitted here again is any acknowledgment that there were two distinct crossings into northern Albania and that these were attempts to achieve an important military objective.

After the end of Milošević’s regime in 2000, new layers of interpretation entered the history textbooks, which describe Serbia’s push toward the Adriatic and across northern Albania as being fully legitimate and regard the creation of Albania as a problem. There is also an additional construct applied to the Serb–Albanian conflict, fully in accord with the political tensions caused by the loss of sovereignty over Kosovo in 1999:

Through the creation of the Albanian state, Serbia lost a significant part of the territory that it was supposed to have The Albanian state was created, and in the decades that followed, it was to be the factor of instability in this part of Europe, and always hostile to Serbia.¹⁵

The most recent textbooks, written after the liberalization of the book market, offer more realistic interpretations that examine the goal of forcing a passage to the coast and clearly differentiate the two incursions into northern Albania. These textbooks include information about the Serbian army’s retreat from Albania under Austro-Hungarian pressure—something which previous generations of textbooks did not mention.¹⁶ This is an important step forward, since textbook narratives have usually omitted descriptions of military defeats that did not strengthen national pride, which was seen as one of the goals of teaching history. At the same time, the newest textbooks are the only ones that have spoken about the controversial regime established by the Serbian government in the newly liberated areas in 1913, which became a source of conflict between the ethnically mixed populations of Kosovo and Macedonia. For the first time, the following description appears in a Serbian history textbook:

¹⁴Nikola Gaćeša, Ljiljana Mladenović-Maksimović, and Dušan Živković, *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole* [History for the Eighth Grade of Elementary Schools] (Belgrade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, 1997), 27.

¹⁵Kosta Nikolić et al., *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole* [History for the Eighth Grade of Elementary School] (Belgrade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, 2005), 49.

¹⁶Rados Ljušić and Ljubodrag Dimić, *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole* [History for the Eighth Grade of Elementary School] (Belgrade: Freska, 2010), 70; Petar Vajagić and Nenad Stošić, *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole* [History for the Eighth Grade of Elementary Schools] (Belgrade: Klett, 2011), 55.

The new winds of war made it impossible for Serbia to establish good public administration in the newly annexed areas. Serbia did significantly increase its size, but was not able to stabilize the state and govern it in a way that would make the newly liberated areas and the motherland equal in every way.¹⁷

THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

The Second Balkan War has enjoyed a relatively unchanging interpretation despite the various political systems governing Serbia during the twentieth century. The abiding interpretation casts Bulgaria as the ideal archenemy, being fully responsible for the war. Bulgaria has been described as an ally that asked for too much, broke agreements, and treacherously stabbed its allies in the back. All generations of textbooks concentrate special attention on Bulgaria's perceived ingratitude toward the Serbian army's aid during the Battle of Adrianople. Some textbooks, particularly older ones, describe this Bulgarian "treason" very emotionally. This was probably influenced by the still-fresh animosity resulting from the First World War:

When the remaining Serbian army found out about this lowly deception of the unfaithful ally, it made haste to aid their brothers. The bloodiest of battles ensued in Bregalnica, never before witnessed in the Balkans. The Bulgarians were defeated and punished as they deserved for their betrayal and treacherous attack.¹⁸

It is interesting to note that in the period between the two wars, textbooks were published in which Turkey was not mentioned as having fought with Serbia against Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War, because such a political shift did not resonate with a romanticized interpretation of the past.¹⁹

The socialist period differed slightly in its characterization of the Second Balkan War. It was represented as an unnecessary and fratricidal conflict—a consequence of the allies' conflicting demands that partly cast blame on Serbia as well: "Both Serbia and Bulgaria demanded too much, which made the conflict unavoidable."²⁰ In contrast to past cases, these textbooks unambiguously point to the incompatible

¹⁷ Ljušić, Dimić, *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole*, 70.

¹⁸ Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 117; Stošić, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 128.

¹⁹ Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 117.

²⁰ Knežević and Smiljević, *Istorija za drugi razred stručnih škola*, 11.

ambitions of the allied states as the main cause of conflict, without solely blaming the Bulgarians: “Both Serbia and Bulgaria were harsh in their demands, and a conflict was inevitable.”²¹

Textbooks from the Milošević era evaluate the war as unjust,²² without providing much commentary, while textbooks published after Milošević’s fall are injected with a strong dose of national romanticism; the events of 1913 are additionally exploited to insist that Serbia is endangered. In bold print, one textbook notes, “By not gaining access to the sea, Serbia was in less favorable a position than other Balkan states. . . . Serbia and Montenegro were forced to defend their national interests from Bulgaria.”²³ This passage is the sort of example that proves the thesis that the fall of Milošević’s regime opened the door for an “authentic” nationalism that criticized Milošević for being a communist.²⁴ The latest textbooks, currently in use, again note that obstinacy from Serbia and Bulgaria alike caused the war. They also state that because both sides were unyielding, war was inevitable: “Both Bulgaria and Serbia avoided Russian arbitration with regard to dividing Macedonia; thus, the Russian czar’s attempt to save the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance failed, and war was the inevitable consequence.”²⁵

THE IDEOLOGICAL CRAFTING OF HISTORY

Ideological hues have colored the textbooks’ factual presentations of the causes for war. During the interwar period, members of the elite spoke about “Serbia’s duty to liberate the Serbian people, who had been harassed for centuries.”²⁶ Thus the key interpretational frames were formulated: the wars were to be interpreted as wars of liberation—defensive and just. In later textbooks this characterization became almost a formula, reduced to concise, apodictic language that did not permit debate or the exploration of dilemmas: “The First Balkan War was just, and the Second one was unjust.”²⁷

²¹ Novaković, *Istorija za III. razred gimnazije*, 239.

²² Gaćeša, Mladenović-Maksimović, and Živković, *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole*, 29.

²³ Nikolić et al., *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole*, 69.

²⁴ Dubravka Stojanović, “DOS: Otvaranje traumatičnog kruga?” [DOS: Opening of a Traumatic Circle?], in eadem, *Ulje na vodi* [Oil on Water] (Belgrade: Peščanik, 2010), 212–57.

²⁵ Ljušić, Dimić, *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole*, 70.

²⁶ Vukićević, *Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 111.

²⁷ Gaćeša, Mladenović-Maksimović, and Živković, *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole*, 29.

However, these early framings of the Balkan Wars have been accompanied by a variety of ideological shadings, engendered by the exigencies of different eras and by political needs. Thus, immediately following the First World War, some textbooks stated that the problem that had led to the wars had been solved via the principle of national self-determination,²⁸ thus demonstrating a clear Wilsonian influence. Other books published between 1918 and 1941 also include remnants of the ideology of integral Yugoslavism. They mention the joy that Serbian victories produced for other Yugoslavs, who “considered the war as their own,”²⁹ as these wars “realized the five-centuries-old Yugoslav dream.”³⁰

The socialist period brought its own ideological baggage. Books from the time include critical views and condemnations of the Serbian bourgeoisie’s expansionist aspirations, or directly question its intentions of conquest, especially the attempts by “the Serbian bourgeoisie” to secure access to the Adriatic Sea.³¹ But despite these criticisms, the Balkan Wars were also perceived to provide a convenient pretext to communicate useful political messages. The argument that these wars had also brought “a liberation from feudalism” was among such considerations³² and mirrored the fact that the change in sociopolitical systems was part and parcel of the Marxist interpretation of history, with class struggle as its main historical *movens*. This socialist ideological framework gave the Balkan Wars an additional dimension in their characterization as wars of liberation, which in socialist terminology meant the liberation of a particular class, not just the nation.

Textbooks published during the rule of Slobodan Milošević retained this dualism but placed slightly more emphasis on the greatness of the national victory: “The goal of the Alliance was the national and social liberation of the Balkan countries.”³³ This interpretation was fully in accordance with Milošević’s hybrid ideology, which retained a socialist ideological heritage but situated a national component within it, or more precisely, before it. It is interesting that a post-2000 textbook includes a new layer of national

²⁸ Danilo Vulović, *Opšta istorija novog veka za osmi razred srednjih škola* [General Modern History for Eighth Grade of Secondary Schools] (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1934), 177.

²⁹ Miladinović, *Opšta istorija sa istorijom trgovine*, 133.

³⁰ Vasilj Popović, *Istorija novog veka za VIII. razred* [Modern History for the Eighth Grade] (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1940), 165.

³¹ Novaković, *Istorija za III. razred gimnazije*, 236.

³² Knežević, Smiljević, *Istorija za drugi razred stručnih škola*, 11.

³³ Gaćeša, Mladenović-Maksimović, and Živković, *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne škole*, 26.

romanticism: namely, the struggle for Christianity, made synonymous with a struggle for Serbian civilization: “The centuries-long struggle of the Balkan people to liberate themselves from the Turkish rule ended with the First Balkan War, and Serbia was able to victoriously return to the source of its civilization.”³⁴

THE SYSTEM OF VALUES

The Balkan Wars helped disseminate national myths and an epic value system. As a glorious victory, they offered an ideal framework for strengthening national pride and creating an identity according to heroic military traditions. Under all the political systems of the previous century, the celebration of the army and its importance was an integral part of a Serbian upbringing and education.³⁵ Textbooks of all generations insist on the enthusiasm and joy that the wars initiated. The first generation noted that “Serbs rushed to the battlefield”³⁶ and that “the news of preparations for the war against Turkey brought joy to the entire Serbian people,”³⁷ who gained “the wings of the hawk and flew to the fields of battle.”³⁸ Descriptions of the wars note that “this was not about one army’s quest, but the quest of an entire people,”³⁹ where “only one command was known: forward!”⁴⁰ The Serbian army’s advance into Kosovo was described in very emotional terms, including descriptions relating how soldiers, “while going through Kosovo, wept with joy.” Battles, like the one near Bitola, are described in epic terms: “The Serb army crossed in battle rivers and plains, going through hip-deep water singing. Through the thunder of canons and the blast of rifles, the song ‘Hey Morava, my village in the plains’ echoed.”⁴¹ In all generations of textbooks, the progress of the Serbian army is followed with pronounced enthusiasm and

³⁴ Nikolić et al., *Istorija za osmi razred*, 47.

³⁵ Dimitrije Djordjević, *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije* [Perspectives from Recent Balkan History] (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1989), 213.

³⁶ Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 111.

³⁷ Miladinović, *Opšta istorija s istorijom trgovine i kulture*, 133.

³⁸ Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 111.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Stošić, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 128.

is described as “irresistible”⁴² and “heroic,”⁴³ inspired by “epic heroism”⁴⁴ and “unbreakable moral strength.”⁴⁵

Although more restrained, textbooks from the socialist era did give in to sentiments of national pride, noting that “Turks were run into the ground.”⁴⁶ The Milošević era did not introduce a stronger rhetoric, but the books which came after his fall reintroduced warrior values. Since the fall of Milošević’s regime was perceived to be the end of communism, some intellectual circles understood it as a return to “national roots” and to represent the possibility of creating a new nationalistic narrative founded on “true national values.” The official publishing house for textbooks (Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika) turned its monopoly of the textbook market into a monopoly of historical narrative; only in 2010, ten years after the political change of 2000, were alternative textbooks allowed. Thus, textbooks from this period note that the war had been won due to the “bravery and perseverance of Serbian soldiers and their officers,”⁴⁷ placing special emphasis on the high morale that resulted from the struggle against the Ottoman Empire, which was once again labeled an archetypical enemy: “Officers in particular excelled in providing moral encouragement, impatiently anticipating a great victory over a centuries-old enemy.”⁴⁸

All textbooks stressed that the Serbian army was more successful than the allied forces. The key idea is that Serbian victories were more important than others, and the allies would have been unable to achieve their own goals without Serbian aid. This claim is made in the very first textbook written after the First World War: “The allies won as well, but their armies could not go forward with such success. That is why Serbia, after accomplishing its task first, started helping its allies.”⁴⁹ The help given to the Bulgarians at Adrianople and to the Montenegrins at Shkodra are central themes, but some books also mention the aid given to the Greeks. In the context of the First Balkan War, some texts assert that the Greeks, “even though they suffered very much, regained strength through Serbian

⁴² Zrnić, *Istorija srpskog naroda i ostalih južnih Slovena za srednje i stručne škole*, 73.

⁴³ Stanoje Vulić, *Istorija srpskog naroda za srednje i stručne škole* [History of the Serbian People for Secondary Schools] (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1926), 46.

⁴⁴ Popović, *Istorija novog veka za VIII. razred*, 126.

⁴⁵ Lazarević, *Istorija Jugoslovena za srednje i stručne škole*, 172.

⁴⁶ Knežević, Smiljević, *Istorija za drugi razred stručnih škola*, 11.

⁴⁷ Nikolić et al., *Istorija za osmi razred*, 68.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁴⁹ Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 115.

successes, and skillfully managed to wrest Thessaloniki from the Turks.”⁵⁰ Something analogous was said to have happened in the Second Balkan War: “The Serbian army had the most glorious battle in Bregalnica, and, after that, the Greeks began to have some success as well.”⁵¹

Such statements provide a foundation for a myth of chivalry, built on the concept of “the noble hero”; as formulated in one of the early textbooks, “A Serb is a good hero, a brave and noble knight.”⁵² This image contrasts sharply with the equally potent “victim nation” motif, for which the Balkan Wars also provide a good matrix, in particular through the constant, formulaic repetition of the ingratitude of Serbia’s allies, primarily the Bulgarians.⁵³ The Great Powers are also listed as enemies, as, according to all the textbooks, they prevented Serbia from fully gaining from its military victories, unjustifiably taking away territories that Serbia regarded as its own.⁵⁴ Lessons related to the Great Powers also use an emotive style that evokes a sense of historical destiny.

History is presented as an “eternal return of the same,” and its teaching is based on the idea that it moves cyclically: “The Serbian people were wronged at the London meeting by the Great Powers, the same way they had been at the Berlin Congress.”⁵⁵ This creates an impression of “history as fate,” which, regardless of the changed circumstances, repeats itself over and over again. Such an understanding of historical time strengthens the epic interpretation of past and present, which suggests that nothing better can be expected in the future. This epic temporality buttresses myths of knighthood and injustice, which later established a strong mythic story about a Serbia that wins in war and loses in peace.

However, to evaluate the interpretation of the Balkan Wars as “a model for historical consciousness,” ancient history is of prime importance. The Balkan Wars here serve as “transmitters” of the Middle Ages, as a “transformer” connecting contemporary generations with “the place of their historical birth.” There is a moment in the past that “corrects” a broken timeline, connecting ancestors with descendants and renewing an epic understanding of time, where time stands still. The very first textbook to describe these wars already includes all the key motifs: “revenge for

⁵⁰ Popović, *Istorija novog veka za VIII razred*, 73.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁵² Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 113.

⁵³ Lazarević, *Istorija Jugoslovena za srednje i stručne škole*, 172.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁵⁵ Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 116.

Kosovo” and “fulfilling the Kosovo behest”;⁵⁶ there is a cry for vengeance: “For Kosovo Kumanovo, for Slivnica Bregalnica.”⁵⁷ Romanticized terminology conveys heightened emotions:

The Serb made haste to reach the battlefield, in order to fulfill the Kosovo pledge, to fulfill his duty. ... He rejoiced in unity and solidarity; he gained the wings of a falcon and flew towards the battlefields of the ancient Serbian state, where his forefathers bravely fought in the past.⁵⁸

The events are described not only as revenge, but also as a return to one’s own past: the Serbian army “liberated a territory full of memories of the Serbian medieval state and culture. With the liberation of these countries, a five-centuries-old Yugoslav dream of revenging and liberating Kosovo, about which songs were sung, was fulfilled.”⁵⁹ The heightened emotions of these lines testify to a need to strengthen the Kosovo myth by educating the new generations about the force of the Kosovo commitment. Painted as being done at the behest of the ancestors, Kosovo’s defense and protection becomes the responsibility of the generations to come. Thus the future is built on the foundation of the past, the present merely connects past and future, and individuals are nothing but executors of historical orders.

There are also key historical personalities, among whom the textbooks establish direct historical continuity. Thus King Petar Karađorđević “after 520 years stepped into Skopje, the capital of [medieval King] Dušan,”⁶⁰ and Shkoder, “the seat of the first Serbian kings,”⁶¹ was liberated. Ancient heroes are even recognized in contemporary figures: “The strength of Prince Marko was awakened in the Serbs.”⁶² Since the socialist period, however, textbooks have refrained from evincing such historical connectedness. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, the Kosovo myth has not been included in the teaching of the school system, since the “birthplace” of the socialist regime was the Second World War, which became a new cradle for historical myths. That is why, after the fall of Milošević, new textbooks

⁵⁶ Ibid., 111.

⁵⁷ Zrnić, *Istorija srpskog naroda i ostalih južnih Slovena za srednje i stručne škole*, 74.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Popović, *Istorija novog veka za VIII. razred*, 165.

⁶⁰ Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 111.

⁶¹ Zrnić, *Istorija srpskog naroda i ostalih južnih Slovena za srednje i stručne škole*, 74.

⁶² Vukićević, *Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 112.

concentrated on revising the role of the Second World War as the basis of a reinterpretation of history, leaving aside the “Kosovo issue.”

This analysis has demonstrated that the Balkan Wars were convenient events for building key components of the Serbian national-romantic myth, and that they were used to send political messages that were needed in every political phase that Serbia and Yugoslavia went through during the twentieth century. The ways the textbook authors have selected facts, emphasizing some while ignoring others, reaffirm the idea that history is “the science of the present” and that each generation writes it from the beginning. This contextual reading of textbooks illuminates how an analysis of certain historical events shows the way our contemporary world reflects an image of the past like a mirror.

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From Bucharest 1913 to Bucharest 2008: The Image of the Balkan Wars in Macedonian Historiography and Public Discourse

Petar Todorov

“There is only one truth. There is only one Macedonia. You may partition it, or break it to pieces, but it will still remain our dearest.”¹ These lyrics not only represent an example of the trends in Macedonian music culture at the beginning of the 1990s, but, more importantly, the significance of the Balkan Wars (1912–13), the partition of geographic Macedonia, and its use on the eve of Macedonian independence from socialist Yugoslavia in 1991. This event, that is, the Balkan Wars, is presented by mainstream Macedonian historiography as “the most tragic” event in national history,

¹The lyrics are from the song “Pearl of the Balkans” (Biser balkanski), written by Jovan Pavlovski. The music was composed by Hilmi Bilbil. The song won the most popular and most influential Macedonian folk songs contest “Valandovo folk festival” in 1990. In this chapter, the transliteration of Macedonian Cyrillic letters to match Latin letters is according to the system adopted by the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1970, except in the case of “ј,” transliterated as “gj.”

P. Todorov (✉)
Institute of National History, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: todorovpetar@yahoo.com

with long-lasting consequences for Macedonia and the “Macedonian people.” One can also notice an abundance of epithets such as, “years of destiny” or “evil minded” (event). Moreover, in the judgment of Macedonian historians the wars led to the “mutilation,” “devastation,” “partition,” and “crushing” of Macedonia, “covered with blood.”² However, a survey of the Macedonian historiographic production shows that what is perceived to be “the most tragic” historical event in the history of ethnic Macedonians is not a subject of continuous research. Macedonian historians in both the socialist/Yugoslav and the post-socialist/post-Yugoslav contexts remain focused on the national struggle for liberation and statehood.³ In fact, the numbers are indicative of this. Today, to my knowledge, there are no more than five monographs and three conference proceedings on the subject matter (published from 1958 until the present day). Half of them were published recently as a result of the centennial anniversary of the Balkan Wars.

The disregard for the Balkan Wars in Macedonian historiography has also been noted by Tchavdar Marinov.⁴ In his noteworthy article on the remembrance and forgetting of the Balkan Wars in Macedonia, the main aim was to analyze the interpretative strategies of this event: the engagements of the Macedonians during the wars, the role of the representatives of the Macedonian national cause, and the delicate question of Serbian rule established after the Balkan Wars. Thus, Marinov focused on the deconstruction of interpretations, which he considered as crucial and most controversial in the Balkan Wars narrative. In fine points he shows the selective approach of mainstream Macedonian historians, whose aim has been to present the Macedonian nation as a victim of its neighbors.

²The term Macedonians or Macedonian historiography in this chapter refers to the ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Macedonian historians. The ethnic Albanians and historians living in the Republic of Macedonia have different views and memories of the Balkan Wars.

³For the Macedonian historiography see Irena Stefoska, “Nation, Education and Historiographic Narratives: The Case of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (1944–1990),” in Ulf Brunnbauer and Hannes Grandits, eds., *The Ambiguous Nation: Case Studies from Southeastern Europe in the 20th Century* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013), 195–229; Ulf Brunnbauer, “History, Myths and the Nation in the Republic of Macedonia,” in idem, ed., *(Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism* (Münster: Lit, 2004), 165–201; Ulf Brunnbauer, “Serving the Nation: Historiography in the Republic of Macedonia after Socialism,” *Historien*, vol. 4 (2003/04), 161–82.

⁴Tchavdar Marinov, “Mémoire ou oubli des guerres balkaniques en république de Macédoine?” in Catherine Horel, ed., *Les guerres balkaniques (1912–1913): Conflits, enjeux, mémoires* (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2014), 325–42.

However, Marinov does not venture into other aspects of the wars, such as political and public discourse, official commemorations, and historical education. Also, the latest publication on the subject matter was not included in his analysis.

This chapter deals with historical interpretations on the one hand, and political and public discourses on the other. More particularly, it examines the ways in which the image of the Balkan Wars was constructed in both the socialist/Yugoslav and the post-socialist/post-Yugoslav context of Macedonian historiography. In addition, the chapter presents the ways in which these historical interpretations have shaped the present Macedonian political and public discourses, especially after the NATO summit in Bucharest (2–4 April 2008), where the Republic of Macedonia was denied entry into NATO due to the Greek veto.

PAVING THE PATH FOR STUDYING THE BALKAN WARS

The first study on the Balkan Wars conducted in Macedonia was published in 1958.⁵ Its author, Gjorgji Abadžiev, was a prominent member of the Macedonian socialist intellectual elite. As he states in the foreword, his aim was to show the Macedonian public “the facts in the light of their true, objective existence, that will facilitate the consideration of the causes, content, meaning and results” of the Balkan Wars.⁶ Led by these intentions, the study examines the politics of the Great Powers and the Balkan states in the context of the solution to the Macedonian question, the participation of Macedonians in the war as well as the activities for an autonomous Macedonia, and the results and consequences of the wars. His approach paved the path for future historians in terms of topic selection. Until the present day, with only minor changes, this approach has not been significantly challenged. The history of these wars was and remains political and nationalist history.

Regarding the narrative, the study represents a solid example of the Macedonian Marxist and nationalist historiography, through its ethnocentric selection of topics and intense rhetoric of national victimization. Namely, very often we read about the Macedonian victimhood and more importantly the partition of geographical Macedonia by the three neighboring

⁵ Gjorgji Abadžiev, *Balkanskite vojni i Makedonija* [The Balkan Wars and Macedonia] (Skopje: INI, 1958).

⁶ Abadžiev, *Balkanskite vojni*, 5.

states. The Bucharest treaty of 1913, where the partition was sanctioned, holds a central place. Therefore, we can claim that the study, despite the author's intention of "showing the facts in the light of their reality," is very selective in its approach and does not take into account all the aspects of the wars. On the other side, the author, like all good Marxist historians of the time, tries to understand the causes and consequences through the paradigm of social classes. This approach makes the first official interpretation of the Balkan Wars in Macedonian historiography endorse two paradigms that coexist—the nationalist and the Marxist one. Until the fall of socialism, the differences in the representation of the two paradigms depended on the perspective of the respective author.

Ten years after the first study on the Balkan Wars appeared, another prominent intellectual, also a Marxist historian, Petar Stojanov, published his first of two books dedicated to the Balkan Wars and the First World War.⁷ Stojanov opened a new approach in terms of chronology, treating the Balkan Wars as one segment of the wars fought from 1912 until 1918. This chronological concept was subsequently followed by scholars in the next two decades. As an illustration of this point, in 1988 a conference on the Balkan Wars and the First World War was organized by the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU).⁸ Petar Stojanov also authored the chapters dedicated to the Balkan Wars in three volumes titled "History of the Macedonian People" (1969).⁹ In his contribution, Stojanov further reinforced the Marxist rhetoric in defining the causes and consequences of the wars. Thus, in terms of the paradigm of classes, the Balkan Wars were defined as an event that had both a positive and negative character. Positive because it removed the "Ottoman feudal system" and negative because in fact the "Turkish feudal exploiters" were replaced by Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian capitalists. In the nationalist paradigm

⁷ Petar Stojanov, *Makedonija vo vremeto na Balkanskite i Prvata svetska vojna (1912–1918)* [Macedonia during the Balkan Wars and the First World War] (Skopje: INI, 1969).

⁸ Manol Pandevski, ed., *Makedonija vo vojnite, 1912–1918: prilozi od naučniot sobir održan vo MANU na 16 i 17 noemvri 1988* [Macedonia during the Wars of 1912–1918: Proceedings of a Scientific Conference in the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts on 16 and 17 November 1988] (Skopje: MANU, 1991).

⁹ Petar Stojanov, "Makedonija vo vreme na Balkanskite vojni [Macedonia during the Time of the Balkan Wars], in *Istorija na Makedonskiot narod* [History of the Macedonian People], vol. 2: *Od početokot na 19 vek do krajot na Prvata svetska vojna* [From the Beginning of the 19th Century to the End of the First World War], ed. Dančo Zografski i Ljuben Lape (Skopje: INI, 1969), 355–81.

the Balkan Wars were uniquely defined as negative because they resulted in the partition of “ethno-geographic Macedonia” and brought to the Macedonian people a new “yoke.”¹⁰

Such proposed definitions of the wars’ character and descriptions of the events in general promotes the myth of victimization, which at its center includes the myth of the partition of geographic Macedonia. Stojanov, like all other authors dealing with the national question, claims that the most tragic consequence of the Balkan Wars for the Macedonian people was the “loss of their national cohesion” and the fact that they “were submitted to the politics of denationalization with the aim to destroy their national existence.”¹¹ Ten years later, Stojanov published his second book on the Balkan Wars, this time focusing on the place of Macedonia in the politics of the Great Powers.¹² The book further reinforced the view of the Great Powers as the inevitable enemy of the Macedonians, a view that would have long-lasting consequences for Macedonian society and political discourse.

In the 1970s and the 1980s, historians did not focus on the topic of the Balkan Wars as they were more motivated to study the partisan movement during the Second World War and the Macedonian national and revolutionary movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the last two decades of the socialist historiography no more than five research articles were published in Macedonia that were dedicated to the Balkan Wars, or, to be more precise, to the consequences of the wars and their place in national history and the “national development” of ethnic Macedonians. Most were published in the 1980s.¹³ With no exception, these articles

¹⁰ Stojanov, *Makedonija vo vremeto na Balkanskite i Prvata svetska vojna*, 228.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 232.

¹² Stojanov, *Makedonija vo politikata na golemite sili vo vremeto na Balkanskite vojni 1912–1913* [Macedonia in the Politics of the Great Powers during the Time of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913] (Skopje: INI, 1979).

¹³ Todor Simovski, “Balkanskite vojni i nivnite reperkusii vrz etničkata položba na Egejska Makedonija” [The Balkan Wars and Their Repercussions concerning the Ethnic Situation of Aegean Macedonia], in *Glasnik na INI*, vol. 16, no. 3 (1972), 61–75; Gligor Todorovski, “Selskoto stopanstvo vo Vardarska Makedonija po Balkanskite vojni (1912–1915)” [The Rural Economy in Vardar Macedonia after the Balkan Wars (1912–1915)], *Glasnik na INI*, vol. 21, no. 1 (1977), 135–63; Petar Stojanov, “Nekolku sovremeni i podocnežni gledišta i ocenki za Prvata Balkanska vojna 1912–1913” [Some Contemporary and Recent Views on the First Balkan War 1912–1913], *Glasnik na INI*, vol. 26, nos. 2–3 (1982), 19–28; Manol Pandevski, “Makedonski istoriski megjnici vo srednovekovnoto i ponovo doba: mestotot na godinite 1371, 1878 i 1912” [The Macedonian Historical Milestones in the Middle Ages

further reinforce the Balkan Wars as a tragic event in Macedonia's national history. The end of the 1980s brought two more publications pertinent to the wars, the conference proceedings from the above-mentioned conference organized by the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU), and a monograph on the Great Powers and their politics towards Macedonia during the First Balkan War.¹⁴ Marxist rhetoric remained an inevitable part of the writings' ideology published in the late 1970s and the 1980s. However, while Petar Stojanov relied on the concept of class paradigm, the other historians emphasized nationalist rhetoric.

An in-depth analysis of the above-mentioned publications of narratives reveals three main points that are important to underline in order to understand the discourse of the Balkan Wars in Macedonian historiography during the Yugoslav socialist period. The first is the importance of these wars in the shaping of the myth of victimization; the second is the definition of the role of the Balkan states and the Great Powers during the wars; and the third relates to the attitudes of ethnic Macedonians during the Balkan Wars and their endless insistence regarding the existence of a distinct Macedonian national identity, one that is different from their Slavic neighbors.

THE MYTH OF VICTIMIZATION

The myth of victimization is one of the most important and strongest historical myths in Macedonian historiography.¹⁵ The victimization of the Macedonians is mainly constructed through the interpretation offered for the Ottoman period and more importantly the politics of the neighbor states. It is exactly the Balkan Wars that connect both elements and represent a central event in the construction of this myth. All

and the New Era: The Place of the Years 1371, 1878 and 1912], *Glasnik na INI*, vol. 31, no. 3 (1987), 137–58; Manol Pandevski, "Balkanskite vojni i nivnoto mesto vo makedonskiot nacionalen razvitok" [The Balkan Wars and their Place in the Macedonian National Development], *Prilozi MANU*, vol. 18, nos. 1–2 (1987), 45–59; Kočo Sidovski, "Stavot na Italija kon Vtorata balkanska vojna" [Italy's Position Towards the Second Balkan War], *Glasnik na INI*, vol. 32, no. 2 (1988), 71–85.

¹⁴ Jovan Donev, *Golemite sili i Makedonija za vreme na Prvata balkanska vojna: neкои međunarodni političko-pravni aspekti na odnosot na golemite sili kon Makedonija za vreme na Prvata balkanska vojna* [The Great Powers and Macedonia during the First Balkan War: Certain International Political and Legal Aspects of the Great Powers' Attitude towards Macedonia during the First Balkan War] (Skopje: INI, 1988).

¹⁵ Brunnbauer, *Historiography, Myths and the Nation*, 165–201.

studies accentuate the partition of Macedonia by the three neighbors, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. Very often, the partition is defined by using a set of epithets that aims to stir up a reader's national emotions. When it comes to the act of partition, historians often describe Macedonia as a defined political and economic subject, not as an imagined geographical region that was once part of the Ottoman Empire. The significance of the partition is often described as very tragic and with long-lasting consequences, namely that Macedonia and its people were subjected to a "new yoke," "a loss [of] national cohesion" (considered by some historians as the most tragic consequence), and "the destruction of the integral Macedonian economy."¹⁶

Led by these assumptions and by their ethnocentric approach, historians reinforced the myth of victimization by trying to place the Balkan Wars as a central element in Macedonian national development and history. Manol Pandevski, another influential historian and member of the MANU, claimed that Macedonia in 1913 "*de facto* and *de jure* lost its many centuries of integrity in its geographical and ethno-geographical borders," although it is not clear how a geographical region can lose its legal status. Defining the Balkan Wars as a milestone of Macedonian national history in the first half of the twentieth century, he considered the year 1912, along with 1371 (the Battle of Maritza) and 1878 (the Berlin Congress), as a turning point in the historical development of the Macedonian people. Often, and without reference to primary or secondary sources, he considered 1912 an important year because of the new conditions in which the Macedonian national identity developed in the years after the war until 1944 and the foundation of the socialist Macedonia as part of the Yugoslav federation.¹⁷

Another important element in the shaping of the myth of victimization is the narrative of "suffering" of the Macedonians and the numerous crimes committed against them. In this way, historians often remind us that the Macedonians before, during, and after the war were submitted to "pursues," "assimilation," and "terror."¹⁸ In many occasions, historians

¹⁶ Abadžiev, *Balkanskite vojni*, 170–71; Stojanov, *Makedonija vo vremeto na Balkanskite i Prvata svetska vojna*, 231–32; Pandevski, "Balkanskite vojni," 54, 58; Simovski, "Balkanskite vojni," 74.

¹⁷ Pandevski, "Balkanskite vojni," 50.

¹⁸ Abadžiev, *Balkanskite vojni*, 163, 170; Stojanov, *Makedonija vo vremeto na Balkanskite i Prvata svetska vojna*, 179, 183–92, 230–32; Pandevski, "Balkanskite vojni," 45–58; Simovski, "Balkanskite vojni," 68–74.

do not offer sources, and, if they do, the exploitation of the sources is very selective. That is the case with the much-quoted Carnegie Endowment report on the Balkan Wars, used almost exclusively to show the crimes against the Slavic-speaking Christians. The few examples of crimes perpetrated by Christians against their Muslim neighbors are relativized and justified:

“The Christian population payed back for all what they suffered by the Turkish violent and unjust acts of brutality and robbery, as well as for the bloody repressions, insurgencies and other unrests.”¹⁹

The studies do not differentiate the culprits who committed crimes against the Macedonians: all neighbors, the Great Powers, and, in less measure, the “deceived Macedonians” and members of the Macedonian revolutionary organization allied to Bulgaria. While it is true that there were numerous cases of crimes, it is the selectivity, the frequency of their interpretations, and their framing that have a central place in the creation of this myth. Moreover, following Chiara Bottici, the need to define a group of people in a given political context shapes myths, and this is quite obviously the case for how the Balkan Wars are presented in Macedonian historiography and, consequently, public discourse.²⁰

THE BALKAN NEIGHBORS AND THE GREAT POWERS

The role of the neighboring states is the second point of the Balkan Wars discourse that has repercussions for political discourse. Without exception, studies dealing with the Balkan Wars dedicate a chapter on the Balkan countries of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia as well as the Great Powers’ politics towards Macedonia, which includes Russia, the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, and Italy. Guided by the Marxist approach, Stojanov and Abadžiev blame the capitalist bourgeoisie of these countries, thus implicitly defining Macedonia as a victim to Great Power imperialism and the Balkan states.²¹ Moreover, the partition of geographic Macedonia in some cases is compared with the colonial politics of European countries

¹⁹ Abadžiev, *Balkanskite vojni*, 163–64.

²⁰ Chiara Bottici, *A Philosophy of Political Myth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 14.

²¹ Abadžiev, *Balkanskite vojni*, 12–63; Stojanov, *Makedonija vo politikite*, 10–14.

in Africa.²² Like disciplined Marxist historians, with a few exceptions, they dedicate sections on the activities of the socialist groups from all of the above-mentioned states. The activities of these groups are defined as positive, that is, in favor of the Macedonian national struggle. Therefore, it seems that the socialist historiographical production tries to avoid ethnic designation of foreign politics towards Macedonia by applying a class-based approach.

However, ethnic designations were not completely excluded. The narrative constantly insisted on the triple partition by the neighbor states and the regimes they established after the wars. Although historians did not distinguish between the different cases nor did they grade the harshness of the neighbors' policies, some authors did underline the Greek state and the "Greek nationalists" as the most effective in their aim to assimilate the Macedonians.²³ This example can be linked to the reinforcement of the nationalist paradigm in the historiography of the 1980s, as the class paradigm gradually weakened.

The significant place of the Great Powers in the Balkan Wars and its consequences for Macedonia were further reinforced by the publication of two studies on the matter. As already mentioned, in 1979 Petar Stojanov published his book on the question of Great Powers and Macedonia. Nine years later, Jovan Donev published his book on the activities of the Great Powers during the First Balkan War. Although Donev in his study avoids the paradigm of classes, both authors blame "the great powers that had used the Macedonian villages and towns as a bargaining chip by which they confirmed the partition," and argue that "the decision of the great powers to cede the territory of Macedonia to the Balkan allies was against the principle of international law."²⁴

This way of interpreting the wars and the role of the Great Powers and neighbor states represented only one of a series of narratives that cyclically depicted the Macedonians as inevitable victims of their neighbors and the Great Powers. In addition, all failures of the nation in the struggle for liberation were commonly attributed to the *other*, that is to the neighbors and Great Powers. Despite insisting on the negative role played by the *other*, there were narrative attempts to justify and/or to relativize the role of some of the Macedonian revolutionaries during the conflict and the numerous Macedonians who took part in the wars.

²² Pandevski, "Balkanskite vojni," 50–51.

²³ Pandevski, "Balkanskite vojni," 58.

²⁴ Stojanov, *Makedonija vo politikata*, 186; cf. Donev, *Golemite sili*, 138.

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MACEDONIANS IN THE WARS: A QUESTION OF IDENTITY

The role of ethnic Macedonians during the Balkan Wars represents the third important element in shaping the wars' image. The idea of expelling the Ottomans from the Balkans pushed many Christians from the Ottoman territories to join the war efforts of the Balkan states. Namely, many volunteers joined the Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian armies or their paramilitary installations in Ottoman Macedonia. Some Macedonians, members of the Internal Macedonian-Odrin Revolutionary Organization—IMORO (VMORO), participated as an independent body, yet in coordination with the Bulgarian advancing armies. However, the participation of the Macedonians in the wars, defined as aggressive and anti-Macedonian, led the Macedonian historians to a difficult position to defend the myth of purity of the national movement and the struggle for liberation, as well as to defend the distinctiveness of ethnic Macedonians from their neighbors.

Based on the attitude and activities of the Macedonians during the wars, the historians, in general, divide them into three different groups. The first, considered to be the majority of Macedonians (the broad masses), is explained as friendly to the war against the Ottoman Empire, a war that would bring them the long-expected liberation.²⁵ In this way, historians assigned to Macedonians an important and active role in the expulsion of the Ottomans. With no exception, the studies describe this group, that is, the “Macedonian people,” as a unified body with one political view, without taking into consideration the socio-professional and political complexity of Macedonian society. At the same time, the narrative claims that the Macedonians took arms to fight the Ottoman army, but “were not aware of the secret plans of the neighbor states.”²⁶ Such interpretation bears no logic: as Marinov pointed out, either the Macedonians are represented here as naïve or their participation in the wars is interpreted as a necessary compromise to liberate themselves from the Ottomans.²⁷ In this context, the definition of the First Balkan War as a war for liberation and the subsequent removal of the “feudal system” and the second one as war for the partition of Macedonia, should not be regarded only as typically Marxist. Rather, it should be considered as an argument in favor of some historians' claims about alleged Macedonian naivety.

²⁵ Abadžiev, *Balkanskite vojni*, 115–51; Stojanov, *Makedonija vo vremeto na Balkanskite i Prvata svetska vojna*, 65; Stojanov, “Makedonija vo vremeto,” 364.

²⁶ Stojanov, “Makedonija vo vremeto,” 364, 369.

²⁷ Marinov, “Mémoire ou oubli,” 326–32.

The second group is made up of Macedonian people who were “deceived by the influence of the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek propaganda.” In this group we find the names of Todor Aleksandrov, Aleksandar Protugerov, Hristo Matov and other leaders of the VMORO, usually defined as “bulgarized [bugarizirani] renegades of the Macedonian revolutionary and liberation movement.”²⁸ In a broader perspective, this group and their activities represent only one segment of the official account on the activities of the *vrhovisti* in the Macedonian revolutionary organization,²⁹ that is, a group of revolutionaries who according to Macedonian historians acted in favor of the Bulgarian national interests in Macedonia. The anti-national position is assigned also to the Macedonians who joined the Serbian or Greek armed groups in the territory of Macedonia.

The third and the smallest group is defined as pro-Macedonian and was made of the members of the St. Petersburg colony led by Dimitrie Čupovski, of Krste Petkov Misirkov, as well as one section of the VMORO led by Jane Sandanski. By no exception, they are considered to be a group that had “recognized and were aware of the real plans for conquering Macedonia” or they had “recognized a new danger for the Macedonian people.”³⁰ Their activities in favor of autonomy for Macedonia are underlined, as the narrative constantly insists on the different ethnic origins of the Macedonians vis-à-vis the other Balkan nations (Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs). Namely, we read how Čupovski and Petkov Misirkov insisted that the Macedonians are a distinct nation in order to convince the Great Powers to support the idea of an independent Macedonia. Additionally, parts dedicated to the military activities of Sandanski are underlined and defined as crucial for liberation of some towns and areas, like Melnik in today’s Republic of Bulgaria. Moreover, the narrative ends with a story of the conflict between Sandanski and Bulgarian military officers over the character of the wars and the liberation of Macedonia. In this conflict Sandanski is presented as the defender of Macedonian independence. It is obvious that the historians aim to show the independent activities

²⁸ Abadžiev, *Balkanskite vojni*, 117–18; Stojanov, *Makedonija vo vremeto na Balkanskite i Prvata svetska vojna*, 67–71; Stojanov, “Makedonija vo vremeto,” 364–65.

²⁹ The term “vrhovisti” is derived from the Sofia-based Macedonian Supreme Committee defined by Macedonian historians as a pro-Bulgarian organization. The term was initially used to denote the members of this Committee, and later it was assigned to all the pro-Bulgarian activists of VMORO.

³⁰ Abadžiev, *Balkanskite vojni*, 115–62; Stojanov, *Makedonija vo vremeto na Balkanskite i Prvata svetska vojna*, 117–30.

of Sandanski and his group and their contribution toward victory over the Ottoman army, as well as Sandanski's pure and Macedonian ethno-national character.

This logic of explaining the position of different groups of Macedonians demonstrates the importance for the historians to "preserve" the purity of the national liberation movement, which makes this myth the second most important after the myth of victimization. It is obvious that, based on the interpretations, the accounts do not take into consideration the complexity of the question of participation in the wars, while also attempting to see this question from an already predetermined point of view. Perhaps, it is this controversial position of the Macedonians during the wars that should be considered one of the reasons for the negligence in studying the Balkan Wars.

The attempt to define the attitude of Macedonians actually reveals the main concern of Macedonian historiography, which is to prove the existence of a distinct Macedonian nation. It can be claimed that the definition of the Balkan Wars represents an important element in the creation of the Macedonian ethno-national identity, so decisively shaped by defeat and the reaction to the politics of the three neighbor states. In addition, it should be mentioned that the historians in question did not try to confront their views, that is, they did not engage in debates. Repeatedly we read the same claims, arguments, and epithets in favor of supporting the three main above-mentioned points on the Balkan Wars. Without the necessary challenges and discussions, the overall production of Macedonian history on the Balkan Wars resembles a dogmatic teaching.

THE POST-SOCIALIST CONTEXT

The events of the late 1980s and early 1990s for Macedonia did not mean only the fall of socialism and the inauguration of pluralism and weak democracy. Additionally it also meant independence from Yugoslavia, which led to the strengthening of the nationalist discourse in historical interpretations and in political discourse. One would expect that these conditions would have led to more studies on the Balkan Wars, a topic considered after all by Macedonian historians as a milestone in recent national history. However, a review of historiographical production after 1990 reveals an even larger negligence when it comes to the topic than before. Not a single article was published in any of the Macedonian historical journals. Only one study dealing with the establishment of new authorities in the Serbian

part of Macedonia was published in the mid-1990s. However, the Balkan Wars represented a relevant topic in national histories. For example, this is the case with the “Military History of Macedonia” and the new edition of the “History of the Macedonian People.”³¹

In many ways the interpretations offered in these studies repeat the established views on the character and the consequences of the wars. Furthermore, the topics that these few studies deal with are the very same topics already discussed in the Yugoslav period. One significant change that can be assigned to the end of the socialist period and independence from the Yugoslav federation is the further reinforcement of the nationalist rhetoric, noticeable already since the 1980s. Thus, we read that the Serbian–Greek alliance was the “beginning of the ‘traditional relationship,’ also frequently cited in our days, something that Macedonians have always been very allergic to.”³² As the nationalist rhetoric was rising, the class paradigm witnessed gradual abandoning. However, Marxist terminology was not completely abandoned. Terms like “Balkan bourgeoisies,” “Serbian bourgeoisie,” and “Ottoman feudalism” are still used today.³³

The first change in the definition of the Balkan Wars during the 1990s incorporated Albania as the fourth state that controlled the smallest part of the territory of “ethnographic Macedonia” where ethnic Macedonians lived.³⁴ This change cannot only be related to the reinforcement of nationalist rhetoric since the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, but also to the rising interethnic problems between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. On the other hand, this marked the first time

³¹ Vanče Stojčev, *Voena istorija na Makedonija* [The Military History of Macedonia], (Skopje: Voena akademija—General Mihailo Apostolski, 2000); Ivan Katardžiev, ed., *Istorija na makedonskiot narod: Makedonija meĝu Balkanskite i Vtorata svetska vojna (1912–1941)* [The History of the Macedonian People: Macedonia in-between the Balkan Wars and the Second World War], vol. 4 (Skopje: INI, 2000).

³² Pandeovski, “Balkanskite vojni,” 50.

³³ Gligor Todorovski, *Makedonija po rasparčuvanjeto 1912/13–1915: Opštествeno-politički, ekonomski i prosvetni priliki vo Vardarskiot del na Makedonija* [Macedonia after the Partition in 1912/13–1915: Sociopolitical, Economical and Educational Conditions in Vardar Macedonia] (Skopje: Matica makedonska, 1995), 7; Katardžiev, *Istorija na makedonskiot narod*; Lidija Gjurkovska, “Ekonomskite posledici od Balkanskite i Prvata svetska vojna vo industrijata vo Vardarskiot del na Makedonija” [The Economic Consequences of the Balkan Wars and the First World War in Industry in Vardar Macedonia], in Dragi Gjorgiev et al., eds., *Balkanot: lugje, vojni i mir* [The Balkans: People, Wars, and Peace], (Skopje: INI, 2015), 221.

³⁴ Todorovski, *Makedonija po rasparčuvanjeto*, 9.

that Albanians were included in any narrative on the Balkan Wars in Macedonian historiography. The sections on the consequences for the region, the elimination of the Ottoman Empire, the unrealized national goals of the suppressed peoples, both Albanian and Macedonian, led to a new period of “permanent instability, wars, and [ethnic] intolerance that last until the present day.”³⁵ This interpretation shows an intention to present together Macedonians and Albanians as inevitable victims of their neighbors.

Related to the shared position of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians vis-à-vis their national struggle and neighbor relations, it must be mentioned that this is the first time that both ethnic groups are put in the same place when it comes to studies on the Balkan Wars. This interpretation was reaffirmed in a conference organized in 2013 by Macedonian and Albanian historians from Macedonia, to commemorate a revolt against the Serbian authorities in 1913 in what is today the southwestern part of the Republic of Macedonia.³⁶ Another reference to the gradual change in the perspective of the place of Macedonians and Albanians is in the naming of this revolt. While historians from the socialist period referred to it as the “Albanian revolt of 1913,”³⁷ historians participating in the conference used a new name, the “Ohrid–Debar September revolt of 1913.” It seems that this change is a result of a need to improve interethnic relations; in this case at the expense of a third neighbor that plays the role of common enemy—Serbia. However, interpretations offered for other historical periods do not represent the Albanians as brothers in victimhood, but rather as inevitable enemies of the Macedonians.

THE CENTENNIAL OF THE BALKAN WARS

The next series of publications on the Balkan Wars was related to their centennial. In this context, the first book completely dedicated to the Balkan Wars was published after more than five decades.³⁸ In 2012 and 2013, the

³⁵ Katardžiev, *Istorija na makedonskiot narod*, 11.

³⁶ Dragi Gjorgiev, ed., *Ohridsko–debarskoto septemvrisko vostanie od 1913 godina/Kryengitja e Shtatorit në Ohër e Dibër e Vitit 1913* [The Ohrid–Debar Uprising in September 1913] (Skopje: INI, 2014).

³⁷ Stojanov, *Makedonija vo balkanskite*, 193–99.

³⁸ Vančo Stojčev and Aleksandar Stojčev, *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor i podelbata na Makedonija vo 1913 godina* [The Bucharest Peace Agreement and the Partition of Macedonia in 1913] (Skopje: INI, 2013).

Macedonian academy organized two conferences.³⁹ Another conference was organized by the Institute of National History, where, however, the Balkan Wars were only a trigger for the discussion of war and peace in broader terms.⁴⁰

Regarding the topics discussed by the historians, the research interest is still focused on the political and military aspects of the war, with social history completely ignored, a phenomenon which ultimately mirrors the nature of Macedonian historiography to examine history in a linear way and dominantly through an ethnic prism. Again and again, there is the story about the neighbor states supported by the Great Powers in their objective to “breakdown,” to “tear apart” and/or to “partition ethno-geographic Macedonia.” In addition to this, historians did not forget to discuss the situation of the civilian population during and after the wars, the participation of Macedonians in the wars, and the insistence on a distinct Macedonian ethno-national identity. Only a few slight changes can be noted, which, however, do not redefine the main character of the discourse, but only further reinforce the nationalist narrative and negative role of neighbor states and the Great Powers.

The motives behind the last series of historiographical productions are not much different from the those from the socialist period. Again, we read that the main aim is to present the “historical truth” of the Balkan Wars and the sufferings of the Macedonian people. Maybe the best and the most honest description of what lies behind most of the historiographical contributions is that offered by the two military historians Aleksandar and Vanče Stojčev:

to show the truth about the diplomatic reframing of the Macedonian territory where Macedonian people lived for centuries, for owning, hiding and falsification of the evidence for existence of the distinct Macedonian people and Macedonian nation by the great powers and neighbor countries, or for the continuous denial of the Macedonian identity before and during the Balkan Wars with lasting consequences.⁴¹

³⁹Vlado Kambovski, ed., *100 godini od Balkanskite vojni: prilozi od naučniot sobir održan na 3–4 dekemvri 2012 godina* [100 Years from the Balkan Wars: Proceedings of the Scientific Conference on 3–4 December 2012] (MANU, 2013); Vlado Kambovski, ed., *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor, Makedonija i Balkanot: međunaroden naučen sobir po povod 100 godišninata od potpišuvanjeto na Bukureškiot miroven dogovor održan na 31 oktombri i 1 noembri 2013 godina* [The Bucharest Peace Agreement, Macedonia and the Balkans: An International Scientific Conference in the Name of 100 Years from the Signing of the Bucharest Peace Agreement: Proceedings of a Scientific Conference on 31 October and 1 November 2013] (Skopje, MANU, 2014).

⁴⁰Gjorgiev et al., *Balkanot: lugje, vojni i mir*.

⁴¹Stojčev and Stojčev, *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor*, xix.

On the other hand, some historians publicly calculate what exactly the “truth” should entail as they advise that “for the sake of good neighborly relations this truth [on the Macedonian character of the Ilinden uprising and its Bulgarian appropriation] should not be emphasized.”⁴² The last examples explain the deterministic and anachronistic view of history as well as the understanding and the role of the historian and the past in Macedonian society.

With no exceptions, culpable for this situation are the neighboring states supported by the Great Powers, thus contributing to a continuation of the narrative established in the socialist period. However, based on the deterministic and anachronistic view of the Balkan Wars and the present political situation, also taking into consideration the high level of political statements, we can notice that the negative role of the Great Powers and neighboring states is even more stigmatized: “Bucharest remains a dark point for Macedonia. The situation is very similar to the one 98 years ago when in Bucharest in 1913 the neighbor states with the support of the great powers divided Macedonia.”⁴³ Another slight change that can be observed is the level of culpability assigned to neighbors and the Great Powers. While most historians do not distinguish between the countries, with some emphasizing Bulgaria⁴⁴ and some considering Greece as the archenemy of the Macedonians, their politics is defined as genocidal. Such is the case with the two military historians. Namely, they openly claim their intent to underline Greek politics against the Macedonians “because of the current position of denial of Macedonian identity by the Republic of Greece and the blocking [of] the Euro-Atlantic perspectives of Macedonia.”⁴⁵

The politics of Greece towards Macedonia, that is the denial of its constitutional name and distinct Macedonian ethnonational identity, had an effect on the interpretations surrounding the attitudes of some of the Macedonian revolutionaries, where the question of a distinct Macedonian ethno-national identity still plays an important role. The new view on Greece is undoubtedly influenced by contemporary relations

⁴² Ivan Katardžiev, “Motivite za objavuvanje na Balkanskata vojna vo 1912 godina i odbeležuvanje na nejinata stogodišnica vo 2012 godina” [The Motives for Declaring the Balkan War in 1912 and the Commemoration of its Centennial in 2012], in *100 godini od Balkanskite vojni*, 92.

⁴³ Stojčev and Stojčev, *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor*, 346.

⁴⁴ Katardžiev, “Motivite za objavuvanje,” 87–106.

⁴⁵ Stojčev and Stojčev, *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor*, xx.

between Macedonia and Greece. Since the proclaimed independence of 1991, and especially after 2006 with the direct involvement of the right-wing government led by VMRO-DPMNE in the historical-political engineering of Macedonian national history, historiography has been emphasizing ancient Macedonian history and incorporating it into the national canon. Therefore, in many articles we find the discourse of the continuity of the Macedonians since ancient times. Thus, in the sections dedicated to the Macedonian struggle for independence, the narrative often reminds the reader that the revolutionaries were affected by the idea of ancient Macedonia or that they were descendants from the era of Alexander the Great.⁴⁶ In addition, in the views of Macedonian historians who understand the nation as a biological and primordial phenomenon, ancient Macedonia serves also as “argument” of the distinct ethnic identity of Macedonians through the centuries. It is obvious that the aim is to show that geographical Macedonia belongs only to ethnic Macedonians. In this way, ancient Macedonia becomes an integral part of the discourse applied to the Balkan Wars.

The offered examples also show that the line between history and politics in these studies is very thin. A significant number of the articles contain political statements about the nation and the present relationships of Macedonia to its neighbors, especially Greece. In general, they all see Macedonia as a victim since the proclamation of independence. Thus, the reader is often reminded that Macedonia today is a victim just like it was a hundred years ago. In this context, often the Bucharest of 1913 is paralleled with Bucharest 2008 when Greece vetoed Macedonian NATO membership.⁴⁷ Moreover, political lessons are also sought to be taught:

⁴⁶ Blaže Ristovski, “Makedonskiot faktor pred i vo vremeto na Balkanskite vojni” [The Macedonian Factor before and during the Balkan Wars], in *100 godini od Balkanskite vojni*, 27; Vlado Popovski, “Porazot na idejata za Makedonija vo Balkanskite vojni—pričini i faktori” [The Defeat of the Idea for Macedonia in the Balkan Wars—Reasons and Factors], in *100 godini od Balkanskite vojni*, 77; Aleksandar Trajanovski, “Učestvoto na makedonskite dobrovolci vo bugarskata armija vo Balkanskite vojni (1912–1913)” [The Participation of Macedonian Volunteers in the Bulgarian Army in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913)], in *100 godini od Balkanskite vojni*, 147–69.

⁴⁷ Stojčev and Stojčev, *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor*, 346; Katardžiev, “Motivite,” 100; Biljana Popovska and Ivanka Dodovska, “Makedonija sto godini po završuvanje na Balkanskite vojni [Macedonia, One Hundred Years After the End of the Balkan Wars],” in *100 godini od Balkanskite vojni*, 212; Marija Pandevska and Makedonka Mitrova, “Balkanskite vojni i aktuelnite sostojbi na Balkanot [The Balkan Wars and the Contemporary Balkans],” *Balkanica Posnaniensia. Acta et Studia* 20 (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Historii UAM, 2013), 105–116.

The research of the archives will not erase the Bucharest borders and unify Macedonia, yet it can be certainly argued that the truth about Macedonia will be spread worldwide which will enable the Macedonians to bring back their dignity and struggle for European integration.⁴⁸

Another example shows the manipulation of history for political purposes. Namely, the definition of the Balkan Wars is (ab)used to spread messages against the neighbor states and Great Powers, and the current political opposition (the Social Democratic Party) is defined as anti-Macedonian and the reason why Macedonia should abandon EU aspirations.⁴⁹ These examples not only show the complete ignorance and misuse of history for political purposes, but also demonstrate a fierce nationalist rhetoric and even promotion of conspiracy theories against Macedonia and the Macedonians. The Balkan Wars thus not only represent solid grounds for the development of historical myths, but also for political ones, which, in turn, strongly influence both political and public discourse.

Another change worth mentioning is the incorporation and reinterpretation of some events and persons considered in the socialist period to be anti-Macedonian. That is the case with the interpretations offered for the participation of Macedonians in the Balkan Wars and some revolts against the newly established authorities. Today two different views exist concerning this question. The first still sees the eminent members and leaders of the VMORO as “vrhovisti” and “pro-Bulgarian oriented,” that is, traitors to the Macedonian national cause.⁵⁰ On the other hand is the view that considers this group pro-Macedonian or neutral, thus trying to incorporate them into the national canon.⁵¹ In addition, the new

⁴⁸ Stojčev and Stojčev, *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor*, 346, 347.

⁴⁹ Stefan Vlahov Micov, “Sto godini po Bukureškiot mir. Povtoruvanje na istorijata” [One Hundred Years after the Bucharest Peace], in *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor*, 161–65.

⁵⁰ Ristovski, “Makedonskiot faktor,” 42–43; Popovski, “Porazot na idejata,” 83–85.

⁵¹ Stojčev and Stojčev, *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor*, 31–53; Zoran Todorovski et al., *Sozdavanjeto na sovremenata makedonska država* [The Creation of the Macedonian Contemporary State] (Skopje: Makedonska reč, 2014), 79–89; Zoran Todorovski, “Povedenieto na makedonskite revolucioneri i intelektualni sili za vreme na Balkanskite vojni” [The Behaviour of the Macedonian Revolutionaries and Intellectual Forces during the Balkan Wars], in Gjorgiev et al., *Balkanot: lugje, vojni i mir*, 169–83; Trajanovski, “Učestvoto na makedonskite dobrovolci,” 147–69; Aleksandar Stojčev, “Voenite dejstva na voozruženite formacii na Makedonskiot narod vo Balkanskite vojni (1912–1913)” [The Military Activities of the Armed Formations of the Macedonian People in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913)], in *100 godini od Balkanskite vojni*, 171–93.

interpretations, regardless of their view, have completely removed the previous definitions of the “naivety” of the Macedonians who took up arms to fight the Ottoman army. Moreover, there is a tendency to present them as armed formations of the Macedonians.⁵²

On the other side, the pro-Macedonian attitude of Krste Petkov Misirkov is challenged as he is presented to be at a certain point oriented toward the unification of Macedonia and Bulgaria, a view presented in order to counterargue the views of Blaže Ristovski and his interpretations on the role of the Macedonian revolutionary organization and Krste Petkov Misirkov during the Balkan Wars.⁵³ This is by no means the result of the democratization of society after 1990 that has also affected historiographical production and interpretations. Although Macedonian historiography is still unified around main processes important for shaping Macedonian identity, we recognize the appearance of the first debates between historians over the role and attitude of Macedonian revolutionaries and national activists during the Balkan Wars.

In addition to this change, events that were either ignored or defined as Albanian are now considered to be part of Macedonian national history. With the exception of the revolt in the regions of Ohrid and Debar, previously known as the Albanian revolt, now we often read that the Macedonians organized another revolt against the Serbian authorities, that is, the Tikveš uprising of 1913. The events are depicted as the will of the Macedonians to fight for liberation from the newly established Serbian administration. The results and the consequences of the uprising are defined as terrible for the Macedonians, who were victims of the Serbian army which was responsible for the massacre of many innocent civilians.⁵⁴ It seems that the historians were eager to further strengthen the myth of victimization and to argue that the Macedonians offered resistance against the new authorities, thus nationalizing and eliminating the elements considered to be the weak points in defining the position of the Macedonians during the war.

In conclusion regarding historiographical production, it can be claimed that since 1990, and especially with the centennial, a further

⁵² Stojčev and Stojčev, *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor*, 31–44.

⁵³ Todorovski, “Povedenieto na makedonskite,” 169–83.

⁵⁴ Stojčev and Stojčev, *Bukureškiot miroven dogovor*, 77–84; Todorovski et al., *Sozdavanjeto*, 82–83.

reinforcement of nationalist rhetoric can be noticed, a strong influence of politics but also first historical debates. The definition of the wars remains the same, as they are still considered to be a milestone and the most tragic event in the history of the Macedonians, who are uniquely presented as inevitable victims of their neighbors and the Great Powers. Some scholars today, like their colleagues from the socialist period, claim that the years 1913 (the Bucharest treaty), 1878, and 2001 (the conflict between Albanian rebels and government forces) represent “historical turning points in the history of the Macedonians.”⁵⁵ In this way, the mythological representations of the Balkan Wars encourage nationalistic rhetoric and implicitly suggest future actions for greater states. The same patterns and interpretations in historiography can be seen in historical education throughout Macedonia. The strong politicization of the history of the Balkan Wars, together with the complicated political situation inside the country and the relationship with its neighbors, has strongly influenced the country’s political and public discourse.

POLITICAL AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

Today, the Balkan Wars are not only a topic discussed between historians in their close circles and round tables, but they also represent an important question in the public and political discourse and are a part of Macedonian culture, particularly as the mentioned example of a folk song shows. The very emotional description of the wars and their consequences have led to a feeling of strong frustration among ethnic Macedonians and the Macedonian political and intellectual elite. Moreover, during the last decade, the Balkan Wars have become one of the most exploited historical questions in Macedonian society. Three reasons seem to be crucial for this: the important place of history in Macedonian society; the abuse of history by mainly right-wing political and intellectual elites; and the Greek veto of 2008.

The public interest for this history, including the Balkan Wars, dramatically increased after 2006 with the establishment of the right-wing government led by VMRO-DPMNE. History, especially national

⁵⁵ Biljana Ristovska-Josifovska, “Trkalezna masa—Makedonija niz istoriskite presvrtnici 1878–1913–2001” [Round Table—Macedonia through the Historical Milestones 1878–1913–2001], in Gjorgiev et al., *Balkanot: lugje, vojni i mir*, 635.

history, became one of the main topics in political speeches and in talk shows. Like never before, ethnic Macedonian historians presented their views about the national history in public. A series of historical documentaries was produced, too, presenting the view of historians on questions from antiquity to the present day. A survey of newspapers shows that the Balkan Wars and the Bucharest treaty were abused for political purposes in relation to two important moments. The first is the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 and the second is 2012/2013, the centennial of the wars.

The NATO summit in 2008, as expected, had an important effect on the Macedonian intellectual and political elite. The most influential newspapers, including those opposing the policies of the right-wing government, shared their views on the importance of the summit and reminded the public of Bucharest 1913 and its consequences for Macedonia. Obviously, influenced by the dominant view of national history, they warned that entering NATO would represent an important victory for the Macedonian people, correcting the historical injustice from 1913, a year marked by the suffering of Macedonians. Moreover, they claimed that entering NATO could represent satisfaction for the centuries-old aspirations (*vekoven stremezh*) of the Macedonians for freedom and statehood.⁵⁶ In this context, the Greek veto unleashed a burst of emotion and frustrations. Some journals reported that Bucharest had become part of the Macedonian destiny.⁵⁷ Five years later, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski declared that Bucharest 2008 was the second injustice for the Macedonians, with 1913 being the first.⁵⁸

This statement symbolizes the second wave of exploitation in public and political discourse of the Balkan Wars and more precisely the Bucharest peace treaty. Most of print and online media published a series of articles in which again Macedonian historians were presenting their views on the importance

⁵⁶ Erol Rizaov, "Po sto godini, Makedonija povtorno vo Bukurešt" [After Hundred Years, Macedonia again in Bucharest], *Utrinski vesnik*, 27 March 2008, 18; Vladimir Tulevski, "Bukurešt 1913–2008" [Bucharest 1913–2008], *Večer*, 7 March 2008, 15.

⁵⁷ "Bukurešt po vtor pat istoriski za Makedonija," *Vest*, 1 April 2008, 2.

⁵⁸ Nikola Gruevski, "Nepravdata od Bukurešt ne treba da ne demotivira" [The Injustice from Bucharest Should Not Demotivate Us], *Telegraf*, 27 July 2013, <http://www.telegraf.mk/ns-newsarticle-18921-gruevski-nepravdata-od-bukurest-ne-treba-da-ne-demotivira.nsp>, accessed 11 July 2016.

of the Balkan Wars.⁵⁹ For example, the Macedonian Information Agency (MIA) published a feuilleton in fifteen parts.⁶⁰ The only difference is that at 2012/13 the left-wing and critically oriented intellectuals were not a part of the Macedonian victimhood discourse. In addition, many debates were organized by academic institutions and NGOs. In this series of mixed historic and political statements, historians were warning the public of the danger that Macedonians are surrounded/besieged (*sardisani*), that Macedonia still suffers from the consequences of the Balkan Wars, and that the Great Powers still play their game.⁶¹ Regarding the latter, during the round tables organized by the Institute of National History, a former ambassador of Macedonia blamed the international factor—that is, the USA and EU—for their decision to not accept Macedonia as an independent state, with the final goal of closing the Macedonian question.⁶² Others claimed that the name issue with Greece actually began during the Balkan Wars.⁶³ In the same year Macedonian national television produced a special documentary on the Balkan Wars named “The Bucharest peace treaty and the partition of Macedonia in 1913.”⁶⁴ The historical documentary opens with journalist reports from the NATO summit in 2008.

⁵⁹ “Prvata balkanska vojna beše za podelba na Makedonija” [The First Balkan War Was for the Partition of Macedonia], *Nova Makedonija*, 19 October 2012, 7; “100 godini Bukureški miroven dogovor—prokletstvoto na palatata vo koja e podelena Makedonija,” <http://mkd-news.com/100-god-bukureshki-dogovor-prokletstvoto-na-palatata-vo-koja-e-podelena-makedonija/>, accessed 11 July 2016.

⁶⁰ “Feljton za Balkanskite vojni: Sto godini podocna” [Feuilleton for the Balkan Wars: One Hundred Years Later], *Macedonian Information Agency*, <http://www.mia.mk/mk/Inside/RenderSingleNews/277/132131177>, accessed 11 July 2016.

⁶¹ “Makedonija beše najgolema žrtva na Balkanskite vojni” [Macedonia Was the Biggest Victim of the Balkan Wars], <http://a1on.mk/wordpress/archives/68469>; “Makedonija ušte gi trpi posledicite od Bukureškiot dogovor” [Macedonia Still Suffers from the Consequences of the Bucharest Treaty], http://kanal5.com.mk/vesti_detail.asp?ID=10936 and <http://24vesti.mk/makedonija-ushte-gi-trpi-posledicite-od-bukureshkiot-dogovor-smetaat-istoricharite>; “Profesorot Minovski tvrdi: Sardisani sme od site strani” [Professor Minovski Claims: We’re Besieged from all Sides], *Republika*, <http://republika.mk/?p=95831>; “Debata za Balkanskite vojni—togaš i sega rešavaat golemite sili” [The Debate about the Balkan Wars—Today as Then, the Great Powers decide], <http://republika.mk/?p=118678>, all accessed 11 July 2016.

⁶² Ristovska-Josifovska, “Trkalezna masa,” 635.

⁶³ “Blaže Ristovski: Problemite so imeto počnuvat so Bukureškiot dogovor” [Blaže Ristovski: The Problems with the Name Begin with the Bucharest Treaty], <http://www.plusinfo.mk/vest/96999/Blazhe-Ristovski-Problemite-so-imeto-pochnuvat-so-Bukureshkiot-dogovor>, accessed 1 July 2016.

⁶⁴ The producer of the documentary is Boris Damovski and the scenario was written by the military historian Aleksandar Stojčev.

Regarding public discourse during the period before the NATO summit in 2008, for motives to be examined, the journalists and the public were spreading rumors that the Bucharest peace treaty of 1913 would expire in 2013, a moment that would allow the Republic of Macedonia to unite with the other parts. In this context, many historians denied those rumors by presenting the integral texts of the treaty. However, the denial of the Bucharest treaty was not absent. Some scholars publicly denied the legal basis of the treaty.⁶⁵ Others went even further in denial. In 2013 an extreme nationalist group called “Macedonian manifest” symbolically burned a copy of the agreement at Skopje’s main square in front of the colossal statue of Alexander the Great. During the burning ceremony of the “Bucharest treaty” members of the Macedonian manifest sent messages that Macedonians should be united and that they must prevent a new Bucharest treaty, which can occur as a result of the negotiation over the official name of the country. Others, although minor politically extreme-right groups, and coalition partners of the ruling party of VMRO-DPMNE, have asked that the Bucharest treaty be revised.⁶⁶

CONCLUSION

It is obvious that the Balkan Wars, more precisely the Bucharest peace treaty of 1913, represent an important symbolic *lieu de mémoire* in Macedonia and for ethnic Macedonians. The narrative of the Balkan Wars is a story of victimhood embodied in the intentions of the neighboring states and the Great Powers to prevent the realization of independent Macedonia and especially in the peace treaty of Bucharest that sanctioned the partition of geographical Macedonia. It is exactly this event that represents a synonym for the Balkan Wars as the many titles of books and articles indicate. Thus, the interpretations and the public discourse surrounding the Balkan Wars gave a sense of injustice, and continuous struggle against the neighbors and the Great Powers for an independent state, making the wars not only a historical but also a strong political myth. In this context, without any doubt, we can say that today in

⁶⁵ “Voeniот istoričar Vanče Stojčev predupreduva—Bukureškiот dogovor ne e validen” [Military Historian Vanče Stojčev is Warning—The Bucharest Treaty Is Not Valid], *Dnevnik*, 4 March 2008, 5.

⁶⁶ “TMRO: Pokrenuvanje na makedonskoto prašanje pred ON i revizija na Bukureškiот dogovor” [TMRO: The Macedonian Question to Be Raised in UN and to Revise the Bucharest Treaty], <http://24vesti.mk/tmro-pokrenuvanje-na-makedonskoto-prashanje-pred-i-revizija-na-bukureshkiot-dogovor>, accessed 11 July 2016.

Macedonia, and among ethnic Macedonians, exists a siege mentality. The established views of the Balkan Wars during the socialist period, the role that history and historians continue to play in Macedonian society, and the present relationship between Macedonia and its neighbors, especially the Greek politics of blocking Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations, fueled the development of the paranoia. Some of the views even went as far as conspiracy theories that Macedonia is surrounded by enemies willing to destroy it. Thus, in the context of the present political crisis in Macedonia, the latest speeches of President Gjorgji Ivanov and the former prime minister and president of the VMRO-DPMNE, Nikola Gruevski, which referred to the foreign actors' (Great Powers) attempts at "destabilization with the ultimate aim to redefine Macedonia," are examples of statements in which the Great Powers are defined as the enemy of Macedonia and Macedonians.

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The Balkan Wars in Western Historiography, 1912–2012

Eugene Michail

The outbreak of the Balkan Wars in October 1912 triggered a flood of interest across Europe. The heavy defeats of the Ottoman army in rapid succession made it soon obvious to all that a radically new chapter had opened in the history of the Balkans, which would have repercussions well beyond the region. Europe looked on in awe. “Never, perhaps, on the stage of history has such a complete transformation scene been enacted in so short a time,” declared Arthur Evans—the excavator of Knossos and a long-standing Balkan specialist—in the *Contemporary Review*.¹ This moment was seen as one of those seminal turning points that have the capacity to change everything, of the sort that preoccupy scholars and the public for generations.

The wars went on for almost ten months, delivering further dramatic turns that hardly anyone had anticipated in the autumn of 1912. Interest remained high throughout the two conflicts. Political and historical studies of causes and effects began being published only a few weeks into the first conflict.

¹Arthur Evans, “The Drama of the Balkans and Its Closing Scenes,” *Contemporary Review*, vol. 102 (1912), 761–66, here 761.

E. Michail (✉)

School of Humanities of the University of Brighton, Brighton, UK

e-mail: e.michail@brighton.ac.uk

They were soon followed by the first eyewitness accounts from the war fronts. The final peace treaty in August 1913 took the Balkans off the front pages of international newspapers. Now it would be the time of the scholars. But less than a year later the First World War broke out, and that moment never came. Here was a historic event that ended up without historians.

It is striking how little work focused on the Balkan Wars has been published in Western European and North American historiography since 1914.² Between the First World War and the end of the Cold War there were less than a handful of books dedicated solely to the subject. Academic journals were similarly void of any focused studies. It was only in the 1990s that the events of 1912–13 would again attract some attention from historians. But even then in most cases the wars were a mere background for other stories, a one-dimensional event. References remained superficial, recycling a limited number of facts and hermeneutical motifs.

Still, despite the many gaps in the historiography, there are enough dedicated studies of the Balkan Wars and many more scattered references in wider historical studies to form an opinion on the changing place of the conflicts in the Western historical imagination in the hundred years from 1912 to 2012. Looking at sources primarily from Britain, Germany, and the United States, this essay identifies the main phases and shifts in the representations of the wars of 1912–13.

The rhythm and qualities of these changes were dictated on one level by the fluctuation of the international perceptions of the relevance of the Balkans to the rest of Europe and the wider Western world. The Balkans have been generally a rather infrequent topic of interest for the rest of the world, a fact that is reflected in the peripheral place of the Balkans in Western historiography and the popular perceptions of what constitutes “European history.” In 2009, Richard J. Evans published a short overview of 200 years of British academic engagement with European history. The Balkans featured in it minimally, mainly as one aspect of R. W. Seton-Watson’s multi-faceted career.³ On another level, scholars’ attitudes to the Balkan Wars were also deeply affected by ideological trends and paradigm shifts in academic

²Wolfgang Höpken, “Archaische Gewalt oder Vorboten des ‘totalen Krieges’? Die Balkankriege 1912/13 in der europäischen Kriegsgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Ulf Brunnbauer, Andreas Helmedach, and Stefan Troebst, eds., *Schnittstellen: Gesellschaft, Nation, Konflikt und Erinnerung in Südosteuropa* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 245–60, here 246–47.

³Richard J. Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 106, 111, 119.

historical studies, both on a national and an international level. It is interesting to note that while interpretative frameworks kept on changing, national variations among Western opinion have been steadily declining since the end of the Second World War, to the point that from the late Cold War onwards we could talk of an overall homogenized Western view of the Balkan Wars.

There have been three distinct phases in scholarly engagement with the Balkan Wars. The first, from 1912 to the Second World War, saw a plethora of publications, focusing primarily on the political and military details of the wars. In the second phase, which was the longest and lasted until the end of the Cold War, research was scattered and the wars were framed mostly as turning points in the much wider process of the region's political and social development. The last phase, from the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars onwards, saw a boom in references to the wars in specialist and more general literature alike, which showed, however, almost an exclusive interest in the wars' violence.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND THE FIRST STUDIES

The First Balkan War was the first time that the local states in the region had allied militarily against the Ottomans, in defiance of the expressed wishes of most of the Great Powers of the time. It was also the first major war on European soil since the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–78, and thus provided a unique opportunity to see armies trained in modern warfare in actual war conditions. A stream of journalists, self-declared experts, and diplomats descended on the region soon after October 1912, witnessing and reporting on the war. Their published accounts—newspaper articles, books, reports, memoirs—were to be the main historical record relied on by future research and writing on the wars.

Whenever extraordinary events attract international interest in otherwise little-known foreign lands, knowledgeable specialists are in short supply. This was the case during the Balkan Wars. As a result, most of the firsthand writings were primarily the work of journalists who also often doubled as experts on the region, and sometimes had close contacts with the local élites and politicians.⁴ While there, most of these writers, with few exceptions, were mainly concerned with covering the political and military development of the war.

⁴ Eugene Michail, *The British and the Balkans: Forming Images of Foreign Lands, 1900–1950* (London: Continuum, 2011), 29–51.

Although the majority of the sources produced in 1912–13 were not written by professional historians, this does not mean that they were not informed by a historical outlook. The authors discussed the wars in terms of causes and effects and frequently described the events they covered within wider explanatory frameworks of long-term historical change. These approaches predictably reflected the mainstream discourses of their time, and had yet to be affected by the social and economic themes that would become more prominent after the First World War.

One influential such discourse was a stream directly fed by the cultural determinism of Orientalism. Many sources on the Balkan Wars projected an assumed absolute backwardness on the part of the Ottomans as the root of the empire's inevitable collapse. Hence the otherwise committed pacifist Norman Angell (1872–1967) wrote an extraordinary piece early in the war justifying the attack by the Balkan states, declaring that the “fundamental causes of this war are economic ... because conquest was the Turk's only trade.”⁵ Moreover, it was not uncommon to find a certain Christian *revanchisme* attached to this discourse, as the wars were often portrayed to be the last act in the long play of the expulsion of the Muslim conquerors from Europe. “The establishment of Europe's freedom was fulfilled; the final step taken,” asserted the self-proclaimed expert Noel Buxton (1869–1948), a Liberal MP who headed the London-based Balkan Committee.⁶

While Orientalist denigrations of the defeated Ottomans were a universal theme across all the Western writings on the Balkan Wars, some crucial variations emerged when attention shifted from the long term to the short term, to the micro-politics and diplomacy of the wars. It is worth noting that a common Western approach toward the local national movements in the Balkans did not begin to appear until at least after the Second World War. At the time of the Balkan Wars and for the ensuing decades there were clearly varying views, affected by one's nationality and ideology.⁷

German and Austro-Hungarian sources tended to adopt a negative stance, often described as conservative, toward the Balkan “national liberation” movements. As became clear in the summer of 1914, the governments

⁵ Norman Angell, *Peace Theories and the Balkan War* (London: Horace Marshall, 1912), 10.

⁶ Noel Buxton, *With the Bulgarian Staff* (London: Smith and Elder, 1913), 21.

⁷ Florian Keisinger, *Unzivilisierte Kriege im zivilisierten Europa? Die Balkankriege und die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland, England, und Irland, 1876–1913* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2008), 101–8.

in Berlin and Vienna, due to their territories' geographical proximity to the Balkan lands, were seriously concerned that local developments would exert a direct impact on the regional balance of power, with repercussions affecting their own strategic interests. Hence German and Austro-Hungarian national concerns directly influenced the views taken of the Balkan Wars. A typical example in this regard is Friedrich Meinecke's (1862–1954) *Deutschland und der Balkankrieg* (1912), focusing primarily on Russia's role in instigating the Balkan alliance and the possible benefits it might gain from the war.⁸

On the other hand, there was the pro-nationalist, liberal approach mainly found among British and French observers, who in 1912 tended to have a fairly sympathetic attitude toward the Balkan national causes. The victories of the Balkan allies were portrayed as delivering the region's long-overdue liberation from foreign rule. Sympathetic authors drew from the increasingly popular teleological discourse on nationalism and the nation-state. According to this view, the defeat of the Ottoman forces was merely one chapter in the much wider development of history, according to which all the old continental empires were destined to disintegrate, leaving the nation-state to emerge as the modern and indisputably dominant new form of state organization, at least on the European stage. It is no surprise that such a perspective was not popular in Vienna. The outcome of the First World War a few years later was to lend a retrospective justification of this interpretation of history and hence its naturalization as a given fact: the Balkan people were historically destined at some point to "liberate" their lands and to form their independent nation-states.⁹ Seen from this vantage, the First Balkan War was often described in the colors and terms of just-war discourse.

Seton-Watson, one of the most articulate advocates of this view, played a crucial role in making it mainstream through his exceptional influence upon British political and academic perceptions of the Balkans during the first decades of the century.¹⁰ In a professorial speech, delivered almost a decade after the Balkan Wars, he spoke characteristically on "the influence

⁸Troy Paddock, *Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2010), 73.

⁹For an assessment of the historic forces that fed this narrative of the inevitable collapse of the continental empires at the start of the twentieth century, see Dominic Lieven, "Dilemmas of Empire 1850–1918: Power, Territory, Identity," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 34, no. 2 (1999), 163–200.

¹⁰Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London: Methuen, 1981).

of history upon the national revival,” admiring how “in 1912 the soldiers of the Serbian King Peter wept when they debouched upon the sacred field of Kosovo.” The national “liberation” of the Balkan lands was thus seen as the most natural historical development.¹¹

The linearity informing this common pattern of perception was further fed by a plethora of speculative analyses of the different ways the Balkan alliance could be transformed into a political project in the future.¹² Comparison to the recent success stories of Italy and Germany was obvious, and was often explicitly made. The Balkan states were affirming the European norm and, moreover, they were a part of it.

The Second Balkan War turned this enthusiasm into bitter disappointment. The short but very violent conflict between the erstwhile allies in the summer of 1913 had a profoundly unsettling effect on many linear narratives, and not least on projections of nationalism as an emancipatory and progressive force. However, the explanation for this outburst of what was seen as self-destructive violence among the Balkan people was not sought in a wider analysis of the negative side of nationalism as such. The root cause for the analysts was to be found instead in a Balkan exceptionalism, a particular malfunctioning of Balkan national movements and the political cultures that fed them. This theme dominated the literature on the wars until the late 1920s, and would return in the 1990s.

A major preoccupation of all writings of the period on the wars was what can be termed the Balkan war-guilt debate. Who was to blame for the collapse of the Balkan alliance of 1912? The question of Bulgaria’s responsibility increasingly dominated the field from the middle of the First World War onwards, resembling in many ways the parallel discussions on the German *Kriegsschuldfrage*. The reputation of Bulgaria, as a result of its alliance with the Central Powers, became entangled with the negative stereotype of Germany after 1918. The general consensus saw the Bulgarian leadership as being wholly responsible, although there were enough critical voices on the roles of Greece and Serbia to keep the issue alive well into the interwar period.¹³

One feature of this first phase, with long-term repercussions for the availability of sources for future researchers, was the scant attention paid by

¹¹ R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Historian as a Political Force in Central Europe* (London: School of Slavonic Studies, 1922), 30.

¹² Hermenegild Wagner, *With the Victorious Bulgarians* (London: Constable, 1913), 1.

¹³ R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (London: Constable, 1917), 276–77; George Mylonas, *The Balkan States* (Saint Louis: Eden, 1946), 88–104.

contemporary accounts to the actual experience of the war on the ground. “The correspondents saw both much and little; they observed all that led up to the war, and they saw the ‘products’ of the war: wounded men, prisoners, the glow of fires,” noted Leon Trotsky, who covered the wars for *Kievskaya Mysl*.¹⁴ What they failed to pay much attention to was the human experience on the war front or on the home front. The voice of the Balkan people tends to be absent in all firsthand accounts by Western writers. This was partly due to their authors’ lack of interest, which reflected the political and cultural milieu of their time. The language barrier did not make things easier, either, as it forced all foreign observers to overly rely on the secondhand information offered by their local contacts. The persistent efforts of all Balkan states to tightly control the movements of foreign correspondents made the situation even more difficult.

This lack of information from the war front was soon to be addressed, at least in part, by a work of lasting significance: the Carnegie report. The importance of the report’s publication cannot be stressed enough, as it quickly became an authoritative source on the history of the Balkan Wars. This was precisely its authors’ intention. From its conception, the document was planned to turn the events of the Balkan Wars into a case study of the evils of war in general. To be most successful it had to be persuasive, so it relied heavily on firsthand eyewitness accounts, oral testimonies, interviews, and photographs. It also had to preempt any accusation of partisanship, of siding with a particular local national cause.¹⁵ For this reason the research and writing of the report was undertaken by an international group of experts, representing all the Great Powers of the time: the United States, Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. The project thus successfully addressed many methodological problems, and, crucially, included visits to a number of sites in different countries and referred to a number of eyewitness testimonies. Most importantly, it systematically covered in a thick volume a variety of hitherto unex-

¹⁴ George Weissmann and Duncan Williams, eds., *The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky, The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913* (New York: Monad Press, 1980), 117. See also Maria Todorova, “War and Memory: Trotsky’s War Correspondence from the Balkan Wars,” *Perceptions*, vol. 18, no. 2 (2013), 5–27.

¹⁵ Still, immediately after its publication the report was dismissed by many pro-Serb and pro-Greek experts as a blatant effort of pro-Bulgarian propagandists to whitewash Bulgaria’s crimes. See, for example, Ronald Burrows, “Review of ‘Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars,’” *Athenaeum* (29 August 1914), 223–24.

plored questions. It had long chapters on topics such as “The War and the Non-combatant Population” (including subchapters such as “The Bulgarian Peasant and the Greek Army”), “Economic Results of the Wars,” and “The Moral and Social Consequences of the Wars and the Outlook for the Future of Macedonia.”¹⁶ The report remains today the richest primary study of the wars.

However, when analyzing the development of the historiography of the Balkan Wars, what is most interesting is the way the Carnegie report has itself been used as a primary source since its publication. On this level its domination is absolute. It is often used not just as the best but as the *only* source on the topic. As Misha Glenny asserted in 1999, “anything anyone in the West knows about the Balkan Wars” had been learned from the Carnegie report.¹⁷ From a historiographical perspective this utter domination of the field by one single source is truly extraordinary. What is constantly overlooked is that the whole conception of the report and the interpretive models it adopted reflected a particular ideological agenda.¹⁸ Commissioned by the Carnegie Endowment, a pioneering nongovernmental organization, and supervised by the 1909 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Paul Henri d’Estournelles de Constant (1852–1924), the authors’ remit went well beyond its actual analysis of the wars. Their main aim was to provide arguments in support of the nascent pacifist movement and the parallel efforts to establish some sort of international law on war and war crimes—an agenda which returned to the forefront in the 1990s.¹⁹ Regardless of its good intentions, the report’s original agenda carried its own prejudices and deterministic readings of the wars’ history, as can clearly be seen from the preface, written by Nicholas Murray Butler

¹⁶ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, DC: The Endowment, 1914).

¹⁷ Misha Glenny, “Only in the Balkans,” *London Review of Books*, vol. 21, no. 9 (1999), 14.

¹⁸ Some insightful analysis is provided in Daniel Marc Segesser, “The International Debate on the Punishment of War Crimes during the Balkan Wars and the First World War,” *Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 31, no. 4 (2006), 533–54, here 534–35.

¹⁹ Trotsky picked up early on the advantages gained by a state condemning the crimes committed in others’ wars, as such a move: (1) might prevent more crimes being perpetrated; (2) affirms the moral health of a group that cannot accept such crimes happening; (3) “cleanses the social atmosphere” among the wider population in the country, itself subject to all forms of injustices; and (4) is itself an attack against those within the country that support the aggressors. Weissmann and Williams, eds., *The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky*, 292–93. See also Frances Trix, “Peace-Mongering in 1913: The Carnegie International Commission of Inquiry and its Report on the Balkan Wars,” *First World War Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2014), 147–62.

(1862–1947), the endowment’s president and a future recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize (1931):

The purpose of such an impartial examination by an independent authority was to inform public opinion and to make plain just what is or may be involved in an international war carried on under modern conditions. If the minds of men can be turned even for a short time away from passion, from race antagonism and from national aggrandizement to a contemplation of the individual and national losses due to war and to the shocking horrors which modern warfare entails, a step and by no means a short one, will have been taken toward the substitution of justice for force in the settlement of international differences.²⁰

FROM THE FIRST WORLD WAR TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The Carnegie report was published the same year that Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo. The events of the summer of 1914 were to cast a long shadow over the historical interpretations of the Balkan Wars. In this period, the wars were most commonly referred to in Western historiography as the conflict that prepared the ground for the Great War. The connection became almost axiomatic, even as all other details of the events of 1912–13 faded from public memory. It is still reflected in the common labeling of the First World War as a “Third Balkan War.”²¹

In what became the most significant and lasting effect of the First World War in relation to the historiography of the Balkan Wars, the events of 1912–13 were soon viewed almost exclusively through the new interpretative patterns established by the Great War. Focus now fell on the dark side of nationalism and on the related subject of mass violence. The Balkan Wars were seen as the incubator of these new destructive forces. Expressive of this new reading of the 1912–13 conflicts was Arnold Toynbee’s (1889–1975) assertion in 1915 that in “the present catastrophe [of the First World War] the curse of the Balkans has descended upon the whole of Europe, and laid bare unsuspected depths of chaotic hatred.”²²

²⁰ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report*, iii.

²¹ Joachim Remak, “1914: The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered,” *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 43, no. 3 (1971), 353–66, here 365. Bernard Wasserstein, *Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37.

²² Nevill Forbes et al., *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1915), 247.

The other major effect of the First World War was its absorption of all public attention and research, leaving the Balkan Wars with nobody outside the Balkans caring to write or read about them. No more books were published on the Balkan Wars for decades. This was an abrupt halt in the processing of the Western memories of the wars and in the production of their history. Until the 1990s any academic interest in modern Balkan history remained patchy. Already from the 1920s onwards, the historians of the region—professional or not—regarded the Balkan Wars as a settled matter that had been superseded by more recent developments. The wars felt like a distant past. It was the post-Versailles Balkan states that attracted scholars, if they were attracted at all.

Partly because of the shrinkage in importance of the Balkan Wars, the years following the end of the First World War witnessed a seemingly slight but very significant shift in their representation: the memory of the two wars fused into one, so that it came to be grasped as a single event that began in October 1912 and ended in August 1913. Parallel to similar trends within the Balkans, authors ceased distinguishing between the first and the second war. As a result, the two wars were seen in effect as one unit, as two episodes sharing the same plot. Most crucially, in this view—which persists today—the image of the Second Balkan War tends to absorb that of the first conflict, ignoring the great differences between the two wars, both in their causes and in their effects, as well as their divergent initial reception across the world. This homogenization was a key step in a process that dehistoricized the conflicts, making them more pliable as a signifier of external, unrelated messages and more exposed to misrepresentations and stereotyping.

It was only at the very end of the 1930s that the first authoritative study of the war since the Carnegie report was published: Ernst Helmreich's *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*.²³ Based on Helmreich's (1903–97) doctoral research conducted in Balkan and other European archives, his study was to become the definitive source on the diplomacy of the wars, as the Carnegie report already was for their impact.²⁴ Helmreich's book was

²³ Ernst C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938).

²⁴ Diplomatic history remained the main focus of publications on the Balkan Wars, especially during the second half of the Cold War. See, for example, Richard J. Crampton, *The Hollow Detente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 1911–1914* (London: G. Prior, 1980), and Andrew Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908–1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).

the last major publication on the wars for the next fifty years. The work reflected certain wider trends in Western historiography on the Balkans in that period. That the author was based in the United States was a sign of the gradual shift of expertise on Balkan history to the other side of the Atlantic, often led by Balkan émigrés. Before the book's publication, articles by Helmreich had appeared in journals in Britain, Germany, and the United States, acquiring a unique cross-national reach.

Once published, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars* was reviewed across a wide range of journals, thus offering a rare opportunity for reviewers to take stock of the historians' treatment of the Balkan Wars up to that point. That "[t]he Balkan Wars of 1912–13 have not shared with the war of 1914 the minutely careful attention of scholars" was an understatement.²⁵ Bernadotte Schmitt, the editor of the *Journal of Modern History*, hailed the book as the first serious historical study of the wars, but criticized it for not considering the events within a wider European perspective—a criticism that would not be out of place even today.²⁶

During the Cold War there was a further decrease in interest in the Balkan Wars. At this point the wars had become a footnote to European history. Even in more focused histories of the region they did not occupy a considerable place. However, one interesting development, especially from the 1940s onwards, was a shift in the interpretive framework in which the wars were presented. On the one hand, there was the Cold War-induced return of the narrative of Great Power politics. On the other hand, there were the structuralist approaches which saw the wars primarily as a key transitional moment in the socioeconomic development of the region.

The former trend was especially noticeable in relation to the presentation of the causes of the First Balkan War, where attention shifted away from nationalism, which by then was increasingly seen as a force of declining potency and analytical relevance.²⁷ Seeking to grasp the roots of the wars, Leften Stavrianos (1913–2004), in his monumental *The Balkans since 1453*, went back to the Great Powers conference of 1878, noting that "the direct and logical outcome of the Berlin settlement was the Serbian–Bulgarian War of 1885, the Bosnian crisis of 1908, the two Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, and

²⁵ Margareta Faissler, "Review: The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912–1913," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1940), 113.

²⁶ Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "Book Review: The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 54, no. 3 (1939), 448–50. See also Höpken, "Archaische Gewalt."

²⁷ M. Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900–1970," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1973), 77–100.

the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914.”²⁸ In his history of the Balkans, originally published in 1968, Edgar Hösch (b. 1935) worked along similar lines, suggesting that the Austrian annexation of Bosnia had triggered the First Balkan War, which then went on to be a cause of the First World War.²⁹ Small actors had limited agency in the context of the Cold War.

The structuralist reading of the Balkan Wars, for its part, mainly came to the fore in the exploration of their long-term effects. The wars, in this view, had given a final shape to the modern political, social, and economic identity of the region. This was their greatest legacy. The irredentism and nationalist antagonisms that they had generated were a regrettable side effect, which, however, in the tranquility of the Cold War seemed to be long resolved, and hence was inconsequential in the long run. The roots of this approach are to be found in the popularity of modernization theories throughout the period. It was most clearly articulated by the *Annales*-educated, United States-based scholar Traian Stoianovich (1920–2005) in his *A Study in Balkan Civilization*, published in 1967. The aim of the book, one of the most original English-language works on Balkan history in the twentieth century, was to offer a Braudelian total history of the Balkans. However, the breathtakingly wide scope of the short, first edition had no space for the Balkan Wars, while a quick note about the “voluntary’ expatriation” of minorities explicitly referred to the postwar years after both world wars.³⁰ When a revised version of the book was published in the 1990s the Balkan Wars finally made their appearance in its pages, but only in the “Economy” section, in relation to the material repercussions of the population transfers and expulsions during and after the wars.³¹

By the 1990s, of course, Stoianovich’s work stood out not just due to its originality, but also because it was out of tune with the new intellectual and political framework of the time. With regard to the Balkans, all that scholars and readers now wanted to know about was the region’s history of extreme nationalist violence.

The contrast between the 1990s and all the previous decades, in which no one had shown any interest in the violence and crimes of the Balkan

²⁸ Leften Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (London: Hurst, 2000), 412.

²⁹ Edgar Hösch, *The Balkans: A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Day*, trans. Tania Alexander (London: Faber, 1972), 140. Hösch’s focus on Austria possibly also reflected the period’s popular consensus on the role of Austria and Germany as the key agents of destabilization in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century.

³⁰ Traian Stoianovich, *A Study in Balkan Civilization* (New York: Knopf, 1967), 119.

³¹ Traian Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe* (New York: Sharpe, 1994), 199–200.

Wars, could not have been starker. In many ways the Carnegie report had been the exception that proved the rule. During the 1912–13 events, many observers had noted that all the massacres would soon be forgotten and that posterity would focus on the long-term historical implications of the conflicts. By 1923, in the third, updated edition of William Miller's (1864–1945) standard history of the Balkans, there was no mention of any aspect of wartime violence.³² Stavrianos in 1958 concentrated his attention on the demographic changes that resulted from the Balkan Wars, without reference to the violence that generated these population movements.³³ A quarter of a century later, in 1983, Barbara Jelavich (1923–95) also excluded any reference to the violence of the wars from her two-volume work that was to become the new standard history of the modern Balkans.³⁴

THE EFFECT OF THE YUGOSLAV WARS

The outbreak of the Yugoslav wars brought renewed attention to the Balkans. As had happened with the Balkan Wars eighty years earlier, this rise in the demand for information on the region meant an opening of the supply chain to non-historians. In the short term, the gap was once more filled primarily by journalists. But in the longer term, that is, by the end of the 1990s, it was filled by scholars from a wide range of disciplines, from sociology and anthropology to literature, each bringing along their own methods and questions. Despite their diverse origins, however, most were preoccupied with one major question that had pushed its way to the forefront of Balkan historiography: How could this outbreak of extreme violence in the heart of Europe be explained? Authors dipped into the past for answers.

Particularly for nonspecialists, it was easy to draw attention to the similarities between the Balkan Wars and the Yugoslav wars, making direct causal or typological links between the violence of the 1990s and that of eighty years earlier.³⁵ There is a myriad of examples of this pattern. “1994? Non: 1914!” was the exclamation of the journalists Daniel Vernet and

³² William Miller, *The Balkans: Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro* (London: Unwin, third ed., 1923).

³³ Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, 537–40.

³⁴ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 99.

³⁵ For a more nuanced comparison between the two periods, see Wolfgang Höpken, “Performing Violence: Soldiers, Paramilitaries and Civilians in the Twentieth-Century Balkan Wars,” in Alf Lüdtke and Bernd Weisbrod, eds., *No Man's Land of Violence: Extreme Wars in the 20th Century* (Göttingen: Wallstein 2006), 211–49.

Jean-Marc Gonin in their 1994 book on the Bosnian War, immediately after dedicating a whole page to a passage from the Carnegie report on the Balkan armies' aim of the "complete extermination of foreign populations" during the Balkan Wars.³⁶ Tim Judah, in his widely translated *The Serbs*, saw no problem in borrowing a phrase from an eyewitness account from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s ("They are not human beings") as the title for his chapter on the Balkan Wars of the 1910s. All basic rules in the study of history had been forgotten. He then continued,

The Balkan Wars were to set the precedent in this century for massive waves of ethnic cleansing and the forced migrations of hundreds of thousands of people. All the worst evils that were witnessed in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 were present in the Balkan Wars.³⁷

It was this same perception of indisputable continuities that popularized the usage of the term "Balkan Wars" to describe the conflicts of the 1990s not just in the mass media but even in specialized publications. That such a link ignored the most basic facts of the Balkan Wars did not seem to matter: with the exception of Kosovo, the wars of 1912–13 had taken place in areas that were very different from those of the 1990s, while, with the exception of the Serbs, the rest of the belligerents of the original Balkan Wars (Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Romania, and even the still federalized Montenegro) had no role in the new conflicts. The "Balkan Wars" had thus become a narrative tool, a myth full of burdensome meanings but empty of any of its original historical substance.

Two main themes were thus attached to the wars of 1912–13 in the 1990s. First was the responsibility for causing, through a long-distance ripple effect, the contemporary wars: local nationalisms had produced the First Balkan War and had led inevitably to the second conflict, which then fed the lasting bitterness and antagonisms which finally sought resolution through the wars of the 1990s. The second theme was that the Balkan Wars had acted as a crucible for the forms of extreme violence that the international public was witnessing on its television screens: not only

³⁶ Daniel Vernet and Jean Marc Gonin, *Le Rêve Sacrifié: Chronique des Guerres Yougoslaves* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1994), 92.

³⁷ Tim Judah, *The Serbs* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, sec. ed., 2000), 83–86. Not uncommon were identifications of the conflict of the 1990s as a Third Balkan War: e.g. Mojmir Križan, "Postkommunistische Wiedergeburt ethnischer Nationalismen und der Dritte Balkan-Krieg," *Osteuropa*, vol. 45, no. 3 (1995), 201–18.

had the Balkan Wars brought to the surface the worst side of an atavistic, culturally informed violence particular to the Balkans, but the belligerents had also developed brand-new methods of mass violence against populations they deemed alien.

One outstanding point in this redefinition of the Balkan Wars as an event primarily distinguished by its exceptional violence was the reliance of all references on a single source: the Carnegie report. This was partly because of the dearth of any comprehensive studies on the subject and partly the result of a lack of research skills or will. But what is most interesting is why so many authors felt satisfied to consult just one source in making major judgments on the nature of Balkan history, and why so many editors and publishers felt it acceptable to publish their work. A typical example is Paul Mojzes's *Balkan Genocides*, which built its case on the genocidal nature of the 1912–13 wars on seventy-six footnotes, forty-seven of which were from the Carnegie report—which was also the main source for many of the other books he cited.³⁸ One reason for the report's unquestionable appeal was the return to the forefront of international politics of a liberal idealist agenda that had its roots in the same tradition that had produced the 1914 Carnegie report in the first place. In the 1910s this trend was preoccupied with pacifism and in the 1990s it centered on humanitarianism. In both cases a war in the Balkans had offered a convenient rallying ground.³⁹

The other reason for the appeal of the Carnegie report, and by extension of this general identification of the Balkan Wars as being at the root of many of the Balkans' troubles, was cultural. This was the main target of Todorova's seminal *Imagining the Balkans*, which starts by teasing out the implications of the Carnegie report's 1993 republication, this time prefaced by George Kennan.⁴⁰ Todorova's work came largely as a response to

³⁸ Paul Mojzes, *Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), 242–46.

³⁹ Fabian Klose, "The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Three Centuries of 'Enforcing Humanity,'" in idem, ed., *The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 6–12.

⁴⁰ Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3–6. For an excellent overview of the 1990s literature, see Erika Abazi and Albert Doja, "International Representations of Balkan Wars: A Socio-Anthropological Account in International Relations Perspective," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2016), online at DOI:10.1080/09557571.2015.1118998.

the tendencies mentioned above, which linked the violence of the 1990s with some innate Balkan propensity toward violence; Todorova exposed all such talk as part of a wider cultural discourse, a “Balkanist” trope that had come to dominate perceptions of the region. However, despite its impressive force as a deconstructive critical weapon, on a basic level *Imagining the Balkans* accepted one fundamental premise of the popular assumptions it was critiquing: the continuity between 1912 and the 1990s. For the targets of her criticism the continuity was factual, while for her it had to do with discourse. The book’s conclusion was that the negative image of the Balkans froze “around World War I,” and, with the Balkan Wars being the key violent event of those years, the implication was that the image of the wars has also been “frozen.”⁴¹ Thomas Emmert summarized this consensus among this miniature academic field of Balkanist studies, noting that “[i]t was the brutality of the Balkan Wars that most blame for the extremely pejorative connotation associated with the term ‘Balkan.’”⁴² But this linkage represents another sort of linear reading, overemphasizing the often fragile continuities in the representations of the wars.⁴³

At the end of the 1990s, scholarly references to the Balkan Wars started shifting once more: the conflicts were seen as an important background chapter not just for the Yugoslav Wars but for genocide and mass violence more widely. As the field of genocide studies expanded rapidly from the late 1990s onwards, scholars started looking beyond the familiar case studies of Armenia, the Holocaust, and Rwanda, and toward a more comprehensive history of genocide. The Balkan Wars were soon included in this wider picture. Few sources made the leap of calling the Balkan Wars genocidal. Still, the 1912–13 conflicts became a standard reference point in the history of violent mass killing and dislocation of ethnic populations, what is most commonly known since the 1990s as “ethnic cleansing.” In this framework the Balkan Wars were seen as the causal link not to the far-distant Yugoslav wars but to the Armenian genocide that began only a couple of years after 1913.⁴⁴

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁴² Thomas A. Emmert, “A Crisis of Identity: Serbia at the End of the Century,” in Norman M. Naimark and Holly Case, eds., *Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 160–78, here 165.

⁴³ Eugene Michail, “Western Attitudes to War in the Balkans and the Shifting Meanings of Violence, 1912–91,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 47, no. 2 (2012), 219–39.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Eric D. Weitz, *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 4; and Donald Bloxham and Fatma Müge Göçek, “The Armenian Genocide,” in Dan Stone, ed., *The Historiography of Genocide* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 363–66.

The Balkan Wars were once more seen through a narrow lens. Specialist historians of the Balkans still acknowledged that the roots of “ethnic cleansing” were to be found more broadly in nineteenth-century European ethnic nationalism. Even within Balkan history, as Holm Sundhaussen repeatedly asserted, the Balkan Wars were just one chapter of a century-long history of population expulsions and homogenization policies that had lasted until the late 1940s.⁴⁵ What distinguished the Balkan Wars in this longer history was the role played in them by the local, modernizing states in taking the “advantage of a military conflict to pursue long-range demographic goals.”⁴⁶ This is where the most elaborate explanations of the link with the Armenian genocide put their focus, the Young Turks having adopted a skewed understanding of their own state modernization project under the influence of the war aims of the victorious Balkan belligerents of 1912–13.

But few of the nonspecialist scholarly studies of genocide that reached the bookshelves showed much sensitivity for such details. This was the first time that the wars had been incorporated into wider narratives beyond the narrow confines of Balkan history, something that had been a long-term deficit in the study of the conflicts. But the way this opening up was done seemed primarily to reproduce the decontextualized stereotyping of the conflicts. Instead of placing the Balkan Wars within a wider comparative framework that would include other parallel wars, all effort was put solely in locating the Balkans within oversimplified causal genealogies, making too much of obvious links and forgetting any idea of a complex analysis. The Balkan Wars thus became the easy go-to reference point as the first modern ethnic cleansing. To this assertion authors would frequently add almost instinctively the adage that the typology of the violence of 1912–13 was also very similar to that of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, “such as the burning of houses.”⁴⁷ The examples are endless, even in works of otherwise scrupulous scholarship.⁴⁸ It will be interesting to see where this incorporation of the history of the Balkan Wars within the much more dynamic and volatile field of genocide studies will lead.

⁴⁵ Holm Sundhaussen, “Nation und Nationalstaat auf dem Balkan. Konzepte und Konsequenzen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” in Jürgen Elvert, ed., *Balkan: Eine europäische Krisenregion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997), 77–90, here 87.

⁴⁶ Mark Mazower, *The Balkans* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000), 106. See also Mark Biondich, *The Balkans: Revolution, War and Political Violence since 1878* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 79–84.

⁴⁷ Jacques Semelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 234.

⁴⁸ Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 7.

In some ways the study of the Balkan Wars now faces the same research and theoretical limitations that many other conflicts face.

Exploring 100 years of Western perceptions of the Balkan Wars, it is interesting to note that a common body of “Western” opinion does emerge particularly after the Second World War, reflecting the breakdown of national boundaries in academia, particularly for peripheral historical topics of no direct relevance to contemporary political sensitivities. Clearly, a dominant Western discourse does exist—a key assumption underlying Todorova’s analysis of Balkanism. One needs only to notice the thickness of intertextual references, especially in the non-English literature of the last twenty-five years. Of course, such discourses are hardly ever as coherent in time or in space as they are often assumed to be by their critics. But this should not mean that their study be abandoned. On the contrary, the aim should be for a further elaboration of the pluralities and shifts that inform these narratives, along with a readiness to identify the moments of convergence.

In the case of the historiography of the Balkan Wars, the most impressive pattern is not the frequently alleged continuities, but rather the discontinuities that characterize the ways the conflicts have been researched and represented throughout the decades. An initial boom in interest was soon followed by a long silence, dotted with few and rather superficial references. By the end of the century, interest in the Balkan Wars made an impressive comeback, albeit as a metaphor rather than as a historical event.

In the two peak moments of scholarly interest, at the start and at the end of the twentieth century, the Balkan Wars were studied through very different interpretive frameworks. In the 1910s, the primary interest was the political meanings of the war, within the context of Balkan and Ottoman history, as well as in relation to the First World War. In the 1990s the focus was entirely on the violence of the wars, as a cause and inspiration for the crimes committed during the Yugoslav wars, and even for the European century of genocide.

Clearly, a number of histories are still missing and new modes of interpretation need to be brought forth. For this to happen, a rich body of original new work on the wars needs to be published. But even after the renewed interest in Balkan history since the early 1990s, there has been very little major new research on the wars.⁴⁹ The many conferences that

⁴⁹ The main exceptions are Katrin Boeckh’s study of the immediate postwar period and Richard Hall’s military history of the conflicts: Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg: Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996); Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2000).

took place on the centennial anniversary of the wars and the subsequent publications that started emerging made space for a considerable new wave of studies to come to the fore. It remains to be seen whether this new body of work will manage to challenge the wider patterns of remembering the wars.

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