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Wasana Wongsurawat *Editor*

Sites of Modernity

Asian Cities in the Transitory Moments of Trade, Colonialism, and Nationalism

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Wasana Wongsurawat

There is definitely much to be said about the timing of this project, both intended and, perhaps more interestingly, the unintended. The nearly four-year span between the date of the workshop (then titled 'Sites of Modernity: Asian Cities and their Evolution through Trade, Colonialism, and Nationalism') in July 2011 and the time in which the revised manuscript could actually enter publishing process in January 2015, could definitely change one's outlook on the world and, in turn, the editor's perception towards the collected manuscript in rather significant and surprising ways.[1] The idea behind the workshop in Bangkok in the summer of 2011 was to look at the rise of Asian modernity in broad strokes—the evolution of a geographically wide span of cities from Tokyo to Mumbai through the long yet eventful time period of the 19th and 20th centuries. Oppositions to such a project were swift and plentiful from the onset. What novel discovery could be made of such an academic exercise? Modernity in Asia through the 19th and 20th centuries appears to have already been completely exhausted as an area of investigation.

[1]*Sites of Modernity: Asian Cities in the Transitory Moments of Trade, Colonialism, and Nationalism* could not have materialized without the generous support of many individuals, organizations, and institutions. The international workshop 'Sites of Modernity: Asian Cities and their Evolution through Trade, Colonialism and Nationalism,' which was the pioneer of this collection was generously funded by Thailand Research Funds, Chula Global Network and the research section of the Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University. The selection of articles and revision of the manuscript for publication was generously supported by the Faculty of Humanities, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, the Hong Kong Academy of the Humanities and Springer Press.

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What else could come out of such a workshop aside from the same old Orientalist conclusion that Asia was ushered into the modern era through the forceful hands of European traders and colonizers (Cohen 2010)? Of course, most of the cities included in this collection did come into being, first and foremost, as colonial trading posts. Even when the time period of our investigation was extended to cover the 20th century and the entire Cold War period, the same Western-centered narrative would still hold—what was not modernized by European colonizers were then modernized through American neo-imperialism throughout the Cold War era (McKinnon 2011).

Of course, I disagreed with such foreboding critiques, even way back in 2011. I think the rather premature conclusion that the study of 'colonial modernity' in Asia is necessarily Eurocentric, in fact, stems from a rather Eurocentric perception that modernity itself is a Western concept regardless of where or in which form it is produced. My explanation of the interesting and potentially useful aspect of the project back in the summer of 2011 was that too little has been done in this area in non-Western-centered terms. There are a few important premises in studying the rise of urban modernity in Asia in the 19th and 20th centuries that should not be taken for granted, yet at the same time, could not yet be completely overruled. First and foremost among these premises is the fact that impact from western aggression and interference in Asia both during the colonial and Cold War periods have a definite and, in some aspects, defining influence upon the development of Asian socio-political and economic entities contemporaneous of such times. This is not to say that the West 'ushered in' the era of modernity in the Far East with the forceful hands of colonial and Cold War interferences. Instead, the idea of my main argument behind the *Sites of Modernity* workshop in 2011 was that Western influence and interferences in the Far East both during the Colonial period and throughout the Cold War had contributed, rather fundamentally, to the destabilization of the region both politically and economically. Such destabilizing effects resulted in the emergence of crucial windows of opportunities in which unusual circumstances in East, Southeast, and South Asia allowed local agents to expand their imagination to new realms of possibilities and experiment with a wealth of new ideas, new systems, new structures, and all together a new way of life that came with the possibility of this mental expansion. The 'newness' of this mass discovery, however, should not be necessarily interpreted as something new only to Asia. In other words, the new experiments and discoveries that arose from the socio-political impacts caused by Western Colonial and Cold War influences were not simply some old Western ideas to be learned anew by the Orientals. The newness that came about in Asia during these periods were the results of the resourcefulness and inventiveness of local agents in creating and incorporating brand new institutions and social structures to satisfy the demands of European standards of modernity and civilization while allowing some degree of normalcy and familiarity of the local traditional way of life to carry on so as to preserve and develop some form of their own cultural identity—something that has become so prized and cherish in the modern world of the 19th and 20th centuries (Lee 1998).

The nine articles that make up this collection, *Sites of Modernity: Asian Cities in the Transitory Moments of Trade, Colonialism, and Nationalism,* are divided up into three major sections with the purpose of forming an alternative narrative of the three crucial aspects of the origins and rise of 'modernity' in Asia through the experience and development of cities in East, Southeast, and South Asia through the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. The first section, titled 'Colonial Structures,' demonstrates how colonial concepts and colonial infrastructures contribute to the early development of various aspects of modernity in the major cities investigated in the first three articles. Firstly, Alexander Major's "Teaching Civilization: The Role of a French Education in the Development of Modernity in Shanghai," investigates the earlier development of the modern system of higher education in China through the establishment of the French Jesuit university l'Aurore in 1903 and the establishment of its Chinese counterpart, Fudan University shortly after. Deepak Kumar explores the renaissance of modern scientific pursuits in colonial Calcutta in the second article of the collection titled "Scientific Institutions as Sites for Dissemination and Contestation: Emergence of Colonial Calcutta as a Science City." Finally, Nontaporn Youmangmee investigated the transformation of Bangkok from a coastal port and capital city dominated by marine transportation systems—rivers, canals, and coastline transport—to a land bound modern city where roads served as the predominant routes for transport and communication. The first three articles demonstrate in a most convincing manner how European imperialist influence definitely contributed to the development of some crucial modern aspects—higher education, scientific studies, and land bound urban culture—in the three Asian cities in question. Nevertheless, all three articles also argue, rather successfully, that these modern aspects of life in these first three 'sites of modernity' were far from being simple reproductions of European modernity from a century earlier. Instead, much of the developments that took place were also heavily influenced by local culture, local agents, and, not least, dynamics of interaction with other Asian cities, polities, and cultures. The sort of modernity produced during this common time period of the late-19th to early-20th century in Shanghai, Calcutta, and Bangkok was, therefore, highly novel form of integrated and, in some cases, hybridized development. The system of higher education that sprang forth from the establishment of Université l'Aurore could not simply be characterized as 'French Jesuit,' but one that came with a very strong sense of responsibility towards the emerging Chinese nation and the making of 'modern' educated Chinese citizenry. The rise of Calcutta as a science city was not simply due to British influence that had made the city the early headquarters of British India. The renaissance of scientific pursuits in this 19th century colonial center was arguably driven largely by local agents and native sons of the subcontinent. Finally, the development of modern roads in late-19th century Bangkok, despite its seemingly highly European form, was heavily influenced by the traditional geopolitics of the Siamese capital. The modern roads, aside from providing travelling surfaces for western carriages and automobiles, were also employed as physical boundaries segregating sacred spaces of temples and palaces from the profane everyday life of the common city dwellers. Modern roads also had to adapt to the different ethnic

cultures they constantly collided with as they made their way through the different neighborhoods of the capital and port city that had experienced cosmopolitanism long before the encroachment of European imperialist powers in the mid-19th century.

The second section of *Sites of Modernity: Asian Cities in the Transitory Moments of Trade, Colonialism, and Nationalism* explores another important aspect in the making of modernity in Asia—migration, transnational communities and trade networks. The second section, titled "Migration and Place-making," comprise of three articles that highlight the highly cosmopolitan nature of certain Asian port cities since prior to the height of European imperialist aggression of the 19th century through to later years of the Cold War towards the end of the 20th century. Hong Lysa's article, titled "A City-State as Migrant Nation: Singapore as the Colonial Modern," tells the story of Singapore as one of the most important hub for transnational migrant traders, capitalists, and laborers from very early on in the colonial period. Then, even upon gaining independence as a nation-state in its own right in 1965, the city-state was forced by its ruling party into a peculiar sort of 'colonial modernity,' which ensured rapid development of the economy, minimize corruption of the government, yet postponed indefinitely any potential for a working western-style democracy. That Singapore was founded as the hub for transnational migrants very early on in the colonial period is a highly crucial axiom in Hong's main argument of this article. It was the British Empire's success in closely monitoring and managing the migration, settlements, and re-settlements in colonial Singapore that allowed for order and stability in the small island city. This then supposedly translated into social harmony and economic prosperity, and therefore, later became a major justification and mantra of the People's Action Party's one-party rule under Premier Lee Kuan Yew and his successors for over half a century now. The precondition of Singapore being a migrant majority nation provides the circumstances and justification for its independent and sovereign government to rule its own nation in the 20th century as if it were a 19th century colony and even manage to set itself up as Asia's model of economic success in the 21st century. Hiroko Matsuda's "Whose Home?: Cultural Pluralism and Preservation of Japanese Colonial Heritage in Taipei City," the second article in this section, explores the affects of later wave of colonial mass migration in the case of Japanese half-century long colonial rule of Taiwan. Unlike any other city featured in this collection, Taipei's modernity was greatly influenced by Japanese imperialist aggression, which annexed Formosa Island as part of the Japanese Empire from the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 up to the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945. Efforts to preserve Japanese Colonial Heritage, especially old Japanese colonial living quarters on Qing-tian Street in Taipei City, brought about the reinvestigation of the community's mixed and conflicting memories of the colonial past. Japanese influence in the first half of the 20th century represented both the invading colonizing force of the past and the unique historical experience that could be the defining differentiation of cultural and historical identity between Taiwan and the Mainland. Taipei as a 'site of modernity' carries with it painful memories of both colonial historical baggage from the Great East

Asian War and that of a nation yet divide to the very present day. The last article in this section is my own, *Home-base of an Exiled People: Hong Kong and Overseas Chinese Activism from Thailand*. This article expands the scope of investigation further into the Cold War period, during which Hong Kong appears to become a shady middle ground for the constant negotiations and compromises among the major Cold War interest groups vying for influence in the Far East—the People's Republic of China representing the socialist camp, the US through its domineering influence in various Southeast Asian bases including Thailand, and Britain as the anachronistic colonizer of Hong Kong well through the entire Cold War period and beyond. Modernity of the Cold War era was, once again, highly transnational. The tiny territory at southeastern tip of the grand Chinese communist state remains the crown jewel of the British Empire through much of the 20th century. Nonetheless, it served as a safe haven for more than a few ethnic Chinese who were suspected by the US-dominated Thai state as communist sympathizers. Leading ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs who had spent most of their life and built their business empires in Thailand were forced into self-imposed exile so as to avoid ruining their fortunes in communist-related court cases under the military government of Thailand throughout the 1950s to 1970s. Hong Kong as a 'site of modernity' during the Cold War was a colonial space that allowed for fantastic compromises between the American anti-communists, the domineering bamboo curtain next door, and the entire transnational ethnic Chinese trade network that was caught in between.

The first two sections of this collection argued that modernity in East, Southeast, and South Asia arose and developed, in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, through the adaptation and transformation of modern influences from European colonial powers, as well as through the dynamics of transnational trade networks, the post-colonial nationalist ruling class, and historical baggage of Japanese rule during the Great East Asian War. In other words, the making of this 'Asian modernity' was far more complex than simply being 'ushered into the modern era' by culturally and scientifically superior European colonizers. The third and last section of *Sites of Modernity: Asian Cities in the Transitory Moments of Trade, Colonialism, and Nationalism* provides a conclusion of sorts. This section is titled, "Identity and Nation Building." The three articles in this last section demonstrate how the various influences—both internal and external—of the 19th and 20th century come together in various forms of amalgamation, adaptation, and transformation to invent novel and unique Asian nation-states and national identities. The first article titled, "Bangkok: From an Antique to a Modern City," by Udomporn Teeraviriyakul, explores the late-19th century transformation of Bangkok into a 'modern' capital city through the rigorous reforms of King Chulalongkorn Rama V's absolutist regime. Udomporn argues, quite convincingly, that the modern identity of Bangkok as the Siamese national capital in the late-19th century was a complex mixture of colonial modernity adapted from what the monarch learnt during his visits to neighboring British Singapore and Dutch Batavia, the traditional Brahmanic/Buddhist geo-political concept of Siam, and major compromises and allowances made in favor of the ethnic Chinese capitalists who dominated much of the Siamese economy throughout much of the 19th and

20th centuries. The result of this fantastic amalgamation appeared to be a rather surreal colonial capital in the marginally independent Siamese Kingdom, under the absolutist rule of semi-divine monarch with limited sovereign power due to extraterritorial demands stipulated in various unfair treaties signed with numerous western colonial powers through the course of the 19th century. The second article by Madhavi and Miki Desai presents an aspect of nation-building appears to be at least equally far from the European model of modernity in the case of India. The article is titled, "Nationalism in Indian Architecture: A Modern Trajectory in Twentieth Century India." Desai demonstrates how nationalist elements in Indian architecture of the 20th century can provide insights into the complex and chaotic development of the modern nation of India, from its colonial memories, to struggle for independence, and striving for unity despite extreme socio-cultural diversity up to the very present day. The third article of this section and the last one of the entire collection is the piece titled, "From the Demolition of Monasteries to the Installation of Neon Lights: The Politics of Construction in the Mongolian People's Republic," by Balazs Szalontai. This final piece will bring readers full-circle to Cold War modernity on the other side of the Iron curtain. The nomadic hunter/herder society of Mongolia discovered its own form of modernity through industry, socialism, and nationalism. Mongolia was arguably the only territory that the wartime government of the Republic of China had claimed and lost at the conclusion of the Second World War. A degree of respectable modernization was crucial for the survival of this relatively small state in between two giants. Being under the guidance of a communist government was necessary for gaining strong support from the Soviet Union against Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese government's claim of sovereignty over its neighbors of the immediate north. At the same time, distinctive cultural traditions—religious and linguistics practice being among the most outstanding—were the crucial justification to avoid being completely swallowed into the seemingly ever expanding Soviet Union at the conclusion of the Second World War. Through the Cold War era, therefore, the Mongolian government was forced to forge the modern version of its national identity from seemingly pole opposite elements. The results proved to be an absurd version of modernity that only Mongolians could come up with—one of a nomadic socialist with a soft spot for neoclassical sculptures and architectures.

The seemingly absurdness of the idea of nomadic urbanization that appears to be a crucial aspect of the main argument in the last article of *Sites of Modernity: Asian Cities in the Transitory Moments of Trade, Colonialism, and Nationalism* actually re-asserts one among the most important arguments of this collection. Is it not precisely because modernity that arose in many parts of Asia through the course of the 19th and 20th centuries has constantly been perceived and portrayed as something learned and/or copied from the West, that the West is therefore constantly held up as the desired standards, the benchmark, the ultimate goal to strive for? But what if Asian modernity is inherently 'Asian'? What if much of the inventions and adaptations of the modernizing era of the 19th and 20th centuries were done so as to survive European aggression and break free of colonial dominance, instead of trying to emulate and/or become so European despite the same old

Asian context? Then citing European standards to evaluate Asian modernity dooms nearly all 'sites of modernity' in this collection to absurdity and failure.

Considering the occurrences of the past one and a half decades, the 21st century appears to be a challenging period for much that had been taken for granted as the socio-political and economic norms of the Cold War era. The second largest economy in the world remains under the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. With the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization[2] in 2001, western fundamental political ideals, namely human rights and democracy, are no longer accepted as universal and are no longer the basic condition for economic and security support from the newly emerging superpowers of the SCO. Over thirteen years after 'The War on Terror' was declared by US President George W. Bush, following the attacks of 11 September 2001, Taliban fighters in Afghanistan declared the defeat of NATO in December 2014, concluding that the US-led coalition forces had failed to accomplish 'anything substantial' throughout its 13-year crusade (BBC News 29 December 2014). In East Asia, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was ratified in June 2010, bringing the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) closer than ever before in terms of trade, commerce, and economic mutual benefits (BBC News 12 September 2010). While Indonesia has emerged as the new beacon of democracy with the successful presidential elections and relatively stable democratic political environment in the post-Suharto era, Thailand returned to military dictatorship with consecutive coups in 2006 and 2014. Meanwhile, the 'Umbrella Revolution' that put Hong Kong under the spotlight of world media from September to December 2014 failed to result in any significant reforms in the electoral system of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. If any lessons could be taken from these developments, it is the fact that much of Asia has emerged from the Cold War era with its own set of rules and in directions that do not always coincide with the expectations of the western superpowers of the 20th century.

How are we to understand the world order of 21st century-Asia when so much that has occurred appears to be quite disorderly and counter-intuitive from the perspective of the US-dominated 20th century? At least part of the answers should lie in the thorough reinvestigation and reinterpretation of Asia's emergence into the modern era. How did the 'sites of modernity' come into being and what sorts of transformation took place as results of the socio-political and economic upheavals brought about, partially, by the encroachment of European and Japanese imperialist powers? In which directions did those transformation developed through the course of the two World Wars and then throughout the Cold War era? Only this time round, let us allow ourselves to be inspired by Charles Baudelaire's literary definition of 'modernity' in his 1863 essay, "The Painter of Modern Life," as "the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent" (Baudelaire 1995). In the spirit of Baudelaire, *Sites of Modernity: Asian Cities in the Transitory Moments of Trade,*

[2]Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) homepage (http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/index.asp)

Colonialism, and Nationalism will return to investigate those fleeting moments of transition in Asia of the 19th and 20th centuries. We shall attempt to recapture the emergence of 'modernity' in Asia, NOT as simply being imported or transplanted from the West through colonial coercion, but instead, through resourceful adaptation merged with an already strong sense of self and cultural identity. We will rediscover, in those key moments, how the socio-political and economic upheavals of the Colonial and Cold War periods had allowed for the rise of a 'new' Asia that was not simply an absurd and impossible duplication of the West, but a self-aware longterm transition into the new world order of postwar period. From this momenteous rediscovery, perhaps we could learn what the world community is so desperate to learn right at this moment of transition to the new world order of the 21st century—how to adjust and carry on in a world that is coming increasingly under the hegemonic influence of the new Superpowers of the post-Cold War period… how to survive the 'Chinese Century.'

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Chapter 2
Teaching Civilisation: The Role of a French Education in the Development of Modernity in Shanghai

Alexander Major

Abstract One of the most obvious examples of modernity being brought to Asia through trade, infrastructure development and cultural penetration occurred in Shanghai from the middle of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II. While Britain was the dominant economic force in the city, France played a significant role in intellectual and cultural development. During the concession era, Shanghai became known as the Paris of the East. While partly due to the appearance of the French Concession of the metropolis and the "city of lights" entertainment and vice available, somewhat reminiscent of Paris, the modernising French influence came variously from the economic presence, political administration and the civilising mission, which was integral to French imperialism. The establishment of the Université l'Aurore by the French Jesuits in 1903 was an important part of the modernisation of the Chinese population of Shanghai through cultural contact. Within its first decade, the university had established a medical school to teach "modern western techniques" and a law school charged with teaching "modern legal systems and philosophy". What was the impact of the training provided by this institution for the growth of modern Shanghai? How did the religious orientation of the university help or hinder the development of modernity in Shanghai? Within the multinational context of Concession era Shanghai, was a French influence discernable in its modernisation process? Sources from the university, Jesuit journals, such as Études, and articles by those implicated in the development of Shanghai will reveal the impact of this institution in the development of modernity in China's most modern city.

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Shanghai offers strong evidence of external influence on modernity in an Asian city. The international composition of Shanghai in the concession era provided varying models for the Chinese population to observe and mimic. The French contributed through the installation of their economic systems, infrastructure and the *mission civilisatrice*. Within the last of these offerings, education was a key component, providing examples through structure, programmes and cultural contact. The most significant artery of French education, the Jesuit-run Université l'Aurore, holds a singular place in the development of modernity in Shanghai.

Before 1830, China was closed to outsiders, except for a small trading post in Guangzhou, which was the port of trade established by Arab merchants in the Middle Ages. European imperial expansion in the early nineteenth century increased interest in China as a market and source of trade materials. The ruling Qing Dynasty resisted the "barbarian" invasion, but, ultimately, China would be opened by force.

The first wave of opening came as a result of the First Opium War, which was essentially a war over trade rights between China and Britain. The Treaty of Nanjing, which concluded the conflict following a series of decisive victories by Britain, secured trading rights in five Chinese ports and the cessation of Hong Kong to Britain.[1] Capitalising on China's weakness, the French concluded their own treaty (1844), which included a provision in Article XXII, which set the precedent for the expansion of Treaty Ports into foreign concessions. Beyond Treaty Port trading rights, French envoy de Lagrené negotiated the return of Christian missionaries to China, with the repeal of a Chinese imperial edict from 1724.

The acknowledged genesis of Catholicism in China was the mission of Matteo Ricci. His innovative approach of harmonising Christianity and Chinese culture, particularly Confucianism, through cultural accommodation, along side the apostolate of science, philosophy and Christian faith, became the general model of mission for many of the Jesuits who followed him. Ricci, based in Beijing, was literate in classical Chinese which facilitated his top-down approach to conversion. The strategy of identifying traditional Chinese faith with Christianity was designed to create a Chinese Christianity which was much more palatable to the local population than converting to a foreign faith (Wiest 1997). However, Ricci's successors did not maintain his early momentum. Eventually, Western encroachment and Christian mission came to be synonymous for the Chinese court, and both were shut out in the early eighteenth century.

The nineteenth-century French Jesuits in Shanghai were among those who believed Ricci's model of indirect evangelisation would still be most effective and sought to follow it (de la Serviere 1914). That is, missionaries eschewed direct preaching employing other means such as charitable works, scientific installations and education to gain the favour and attention of non-Christians. Despite their intentions, however, the new breed of Jesuit missionary in China bore little resemblance to Ricci. Most notably, the notion of cultural accommodation, of

[1]The Treaty Ports—Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen, Fuzhou and Guangzhou.

creating a Chinese Catholicism, rather than turning the Chinese into French Catholics, was lost.

Success came quickly in several the Jesuits "indirect" pursuits. Scientific accomplishments were achieved by the Jesuits of Xujiahui, publishing papers as early as 1855. The meteorological observatory that was to become the first home of the Université l'Aurore was constructed by 1873. The Sheshan astronomical observatory was in use two decades later. A magnetical observatory was operational by 1908. From the early days of the mission, artefacts were being collected that would become the basis of the world-renowned Musée Heude (natural history) and the Musée des Antiquités Chinoises.

The first achievements in education at the new mission at Xujiahui were realised in 1850 with the opening of the Collège Saint-Ignace, which coincided with the completion of the church. It is significant to note that the first school and the first house of worship were completed at the same time, suggesting that the indirect evangelisation through education was as important for the mission as the direct evangelisation of the church. The system put in place at Collège Saint-Ignace aimed to prepare the transition from primary to secondary school education and permit top students to excel in Chinese official examinations or prepare them for further study in the Chinese system. By the end of its first decade, this school was home to nearly one hundred students (Wiest 1997). Up to the late nineteenth century, the Jesuits of Xujiahui pursued a modest mission in the education of Chinese students. The Collège Saint-Ignace only provided for a secondary education and courses were taught in Chinese. Students were only exposed to French during foreign language classes, which also included English. At the dawn of the new century, this programme no longer satisfied the needs of the young Chinese students. The Jesuits would see that the appetite of their students for further Western education would be sated (Brossollet 1999).

The *Qinzaine Coloniale* noted the contribution of the Jesuits in exerting French influence over moral matters in China. The Catholic missions, which had cultivated various methods of evangelisation, are acknowledged to have acquired real authority and prestige in the Qing Court and throughout the upper echelon of Chinese society (La Quinzaine Coloniale 1901), despite their slipping influence in France.

The French contribution to the modernity of Shanghai can be observed in the physical remnants of the French Concession. However, a more significant impact in the evolution of the metropolis came through the education of a Chinese elite at the Université l'Aurore. In answering the following questions, the role of a French Jesuit education in the modernisation of early twentieth-century Shanghai will be revealed. How did the institution of a French urban identity set the framework for the influence of French education? Was the mission of Aurore concerned with the development of modernity in Shanghai? If so, what steps were taken to achieve this aim? What was the impact of the training provided by this institution for the growth of modern Shanghai? How did the religious orientation of the university help or hinder the development of modernity in Shanghai? Within the multinational context

of concession era Shanghai, was a French influence discernable in the modernisation process?

Academic calendars and student handbooks reveal some of the intended processes the Aurore was to implement. The Jesuit published journal *Relations de Chine* provides regular assessment and analysis of the progress of the institution, both academically and administratively. Colonial and other contemporary journals, such as *Revue politique et parlementaire* and *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, offer a secular perspective on the Catholic University in China. A twenty-fifth anniversary retrospective published by the university offers a particular view of the early history of the institution.

2.1 The French in Concession Era Shanghai—Creating the Paris of the East

With mechanisms in place to create and display the best and most infamous elements of French culture, Shanghai came to be known as the "Paris of the East". The French identity of Shanghai was evident in the economic systems and infrastructure; the aesthetics of the French Concession; the lifestyle and culture enjoyed by the expatriate community; the religious, particularly Catholic, presence; and the implementation of the *mission civilisatrice*.

2.1.1 Economy and Infrastructure

The port concessions were designed to dominate the regional economy, as a form of economic imperialism in lieu of full colonisation (Murphey 1974). The Chinese scholar Zheng Guanying was aware of this insidious threat and warned his countrymen, "being swallowed up by troops is a disaster men perceive easily, [but] conquest by commerce envelops the nation invisibly" (Zheng 1895). By 1850, the French Concession already had greater trade volume than Guangzhou, the original port of trade in China.

French pride in their economic presence was illustrated in the journals of the day, "aussi notre colonie de Changhaï devient-elle chaque jour plus prospère et prend-elle un essor marqué par une floraison d'entreprises qui font le plus grand honneur à nos compatriotes" (Bulletin de la Société de Géographie Commerciale de Paris 1902). For example, the primary silk markets were located in Shanghai and Guangzhou, with France, Switzerland, Italy and the USA as the largest customers. Though London once held a monopoly, Lyon, Zurich and Milan had become the most prominent distribution centres and the majority of silk inspectors were French. "C'est grâce au commerce de la soie qu'un mouvement d'émigration de jeunes Français intelligents et bien préparés s'est dessiné vers l'Extrême-Orient" (Bard

1899). French financial institutions and business practices were installed, as overseas business interests held confidence that eventually the "backward" Chinese merchants would emulate their system. In this effort, the French were in direct competition with the other colonial powers, who were working from the same premise, but all looking to modernise the economy of Shanghai. It is worth noting that it was no great accomplishment to dominate the Chinese economy, as the national budget of China was less than that of Paris alone, it was the other foreign powers that provided the real competition (Bard 1899).

2.1.2 A "Corner of Europe"

The French Concession represented the best of French technological modernisation. The Concession had electric street lights, while most towns in France were still using gas; the *Conseil Municipal* launched and managed an electric company, police force and sanitation services; roads, professional buildings and houses echoed French style and techniques (Brossollet 1999); French engineers and city planners maintained the continental feel of the surroundings; J.J. Chollot, Chief Engineer of the Concession (1893–1907), was responsible for the planning and execution of the first tramline at the request of Consul Ratard[2]; and the French Concession was well appointed with gardens and parks, enhancing the familiarity of the environment for French nationals used to the comforts of Paris.

2.1.3 Lifestyle and Culture

The belief in the universality of humanity, in conjunction with the superiority of French culture, had much to do with French identity. Some contemporary French observers felt a responsibility to instil European values in the local community. "Il est certain qu'il est préférable d'avoir les Chinois sur les concessions sous le contrôle des Européens…plutôt que de les avoir au dehors, comme c'est le cas pour les faubourgs" (Bard 1899). The assimilationist nature of French presence was central to creating the Paris of the East, as the Francisation of indigenous people broadened French impact on Shanghai. Ironically, the Chinese had an equal measure of self-assuredness in the superiority of their culture. "(Le Chinois) se croit, sans manifester ouvertement son opinion, plus capable que les Européens, sur qui il a certainement l'avantage de l'incessante résistance, et il attend l'avenir, persuade que ce dernier lui appartiendra" (Simond 1898).

The cultural penetration of French urban identity took many forms including theatre, books, cinema, recreation and nightlife. The desire to import a French

[2]The tramline opened in 1906.

lifestyle went as far as journal articles on maintaining a typical French garden in the challenging Shanghai climate (La Quinzaine Coloniale 1904). The legendary French recreation and nightlife attracted members of all communities to the Cercle Sportif français and performances by the Société dramatique (Bergère 2002). More significant to the conveying of the Paris of the East reputation was the underground nightlife. The permissiveness of vice within French controlled territory; gambling, drugs and prostitution, all tolerated by the French administration; created the "city of lights" feel so well known; and appreciated by travellers to the French capital. It is also worth noting that the standard of living was very good for all French citizens —not everyone was rich, but Shanghai had no poor French—allowing for the active pursuit of leisure (Clifford 1991).

The fact that the French administration took steps to promote the French language as a means of exerting influence was tempered by the results. Even within the French Concession, French and English were at least equally useful. "Dans la concession française a l'hôtel du consulat même, le concierge ne vous comprend pas, si vous ne lui parlez pas anglais. Vous êtes à l'église, dans la cathédrale catholique romaine, desservie par les missionnaires français; on y prêche en anglais!" (Pageot 1909). Despite the best efforts to maintain the French language in education and business, success was minimal. Other cultural customs also tended towards British norms. "La colonie étrangère tout entière a adopté la coutume des Anglais qui veut qu'on ne puisse se rendre à une invitation à dîner qu'en habit noir ou au moins en smoking" (Bard 1899).

2.1.4 Religious Presence

By 1900, France was looking to maintain a slipping influence in China. In this effort, the religious protectorate became a primary resource (Bays 1996). Missionaries were used to augment political weakness. "Catholics [whether foreign or Chinese] were surrogates for French power in China. […] In the minds of rivalrous foreigners, Catholic success was thought to presage superior French influence […] and to block British ambitions" (Bays 1996). The religious protectorate over Catholics, and later the extension of the concession to Xujiahui, expanded French influence through other Catholic foreigners and Catholic Chinese.

2.1.5 Mission Civilisatrice

The most compelling, and ultimately most successful, argument in favour of French imperialism was the *mission civilisatrice*. Even socialist leader Jean Jaurès, an avowed internationalist, spoke to the advantages of exporting French culture in the context of the *mission civilisatrice* in Morocco when he told parliament in 1903, "Oui, il est à desirer, dans l'intérêt même des indigènes du Maroc comme dans

l'intérêt de la France, que l'action économique et morale de notre pays s'y prolonge et s'y établisse" (Andrew 1976). In Shanghai, the most notable manifestations of the French *mission civilisatrice* at the beginning of the twentieth century were in education and religion.

Efforts to exert a French cultural influence came from both Paris and Shanghai. The realisation of the *mission civilisatrice* was driven by interests in the French government and those within the Concession itself. The Jesuits at Xujiahui and members of the secular French community contributed to the creation of a French cultural environment and the extension of French values into the Chinese consciousness.

Parks, public spaces and recreational areas were established so that many parts of the Concession could not be distinguished from France on appearance alone. The desire of French residents to live a "French" life—from accommodations to the basics of creature comforts to the decadence of luxury and vice-ridden nightlife—defined a large part of the interaction within the foreign community. The colonial policy of the day demanded the imposition of French culture. The drive to civilise local populations through assimilation was part of the mandate for French presence in Shanghai. Dissemination of the French language and Catholicism was a central part of the process. Each of these contributed to the creation of the Paris of the East identity of Shanghai, suggesting that this modern metropolis was, in fact, French.

However, the French urban identity of Shanghai was strongly influenced by its geopolitical setting between the Chinese administration and International Settlement. Certainly, the interaction between these three communities shaped identity in all quarters. Before the First World War, France had a privileged position among foreign powers in Shanghai; though smaller in population and weaker economically and politically, French philosophical tradition and cultural presence redefined the relationship with Chinese intellectuals. But to suggest that Shanghai deserved its recognition as a French city—the Paris of the East—would require a blind eye to the realities of economic and political influence. The transition of Chinese intellectuals to a French model led to more intellectual exchange and created a mentoring relationship for the elite of Shanghai. The accelerated agitation for reform by the Chinese business and intellectual leadership was welcomed in French journals, seemingly as a continuation of their own revolutionary and republican legacy (Rottach 1914).

The French city that had been cultivated up to 1900 was still a work in progress. However, by that date, its legitimacy was no longer questioned (Maybon and Fredet 1929). The French Concession was originally small in area, overshadowed economically and never attracted a large number of settlers from France, leading one to lament, "une communauté plus nombreuse aurait peut-etre eu lus de poids dans le développement historique de Shanghai" (Metzger 1999).

In 1900, France was still competing to be the dominant foreign influence in Shanghai and China, but, by mid-decade they had given up this goal—influence over economics and language was lost to English-speaking interests, the French military was spread too thin around the world to be a regional power. The Concession looked French, but French and English language were at least equally useful within its borders. French identity was powerful enough to assert independent ideas and

direction, but it was not powerful enough to impose these on a broadscale. French identity was able to manifest itself in concentrated areas where it could be more influential—Catholicism, intellectual life, formal education and entertainment—in part leading to the maintenance of the Paris of the East reputation through the ensuing decades.

It has been suggested that French identity did not exist in any independent manner in the light of the supremacy of the English language and the commercial power of Britain and the USA relative to France (Bergère 2002). While the points on relative power are valid—France made real efforts to exert a singular influence and, in certain areas of cultural life, succeeded. Clearly, the French administration and community felt they had something to offer and remained independent, though not dominant in politics and economy, and there are reasons for Shanghai being known as the Paris of the East, perhaps the most significant is the impact of the Université l'Aurore on the development of modernity in Shanghai.

2.2 Establishment and Mission of the Université L'Aurore

In the late nineteenth century, the French Jesuit educators in China and the administration of the Third Republic each began to explore the possibility of establishing a university in China. Once established by the Jesuits with the approval, if not the assistance, of the government, the fledging institution struggled through a period of growing pains. Disagreement over the mission to be pursued between the main Chinese benefactor (Ma Xiangbo), the Jesuit administration and government precipitated a period of internal power struggle, bargaining and compromise.

2.2.1 The University Initiative

Proposals for an institute of higher learning were pursued by the mission in Xujiahui in 1860 and 1898, but were abandoned without realisation in both cases (Metzger 1999). As the turn of the century approached, the Chinese students of the missionary school demanded further education beyond the secondary schooling offered. The Jesuit educators began to seriously explore the possibilities of providing higher education in French.

This coincided with a change in attitude from the French authorities. Though ardently anticlerical and keen not to cross-jurisdiction between church and state in France, the overseas situation was somewhat different. Having lost the battle for economic supremacy, the French were now concerned about their slipping cultural influence. To rectify this situation, the Embassy in Beijing envisioned a translators' college that would extend the use of the French language in the capital. However, the end of the Hundred Days Reform and the return of the conservative Empress Dowager Cixi to power in China put an end to dreams of extending Western

influence in the capital. In Shanghai, under the auspices of the French Concession and outside of imperial control, the opportunity for a French-language university remained. Now endorsed by the administration, the Catholic university had genuine possibilities of becoming a reality (Brossollet 1999).

The French colonial journal *La Quinzaine Coloniale* noted the effect of the secular influence of France in China by pointing out the role of French engineers in the development of Shanghai, but in the next sentence lamented the struggle to entice scholars, teachers and doctors to continue the "civilising" work underway. Encouragement is offered with the assertion that there is an excellent chance of career success for qualified individuals willing to take up the challenge. Marrying the *mission civilisatrice* with individual and national advantage the article points to a strong and wise diplomacy that can find a way to make the best use of national interests along with the moral imperative. Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé is credited with maintaining a positive relationship with China despite the internal quarrels of the Third Republic (La Quinzaine Coloniale 1901). It is within this political context that the anticlerical government in Paris decided not to oppose, and even support, the Jesuits in their attempt to provide a French standard of education for Chinese students in Shanghai. The mission to educate, along the French model, was a common goal for both Jesuit and French Republican.

The French missionaries and the political colonial lobby used the notion of exporting French culture to China, but each had a very different idea of what this should entail. For the Jesuits, the call to mission was clear, "Go into all the world and proclaim the good news to the whole creation" (Mark 16:15); the exportation of French civilisation was integral to their global evangelisation. For the French government, the civilising mission was central to political and economic goals, "It is through expansion, through influencing the outside world, that nations persist and last" (Leon Gambetta). Each side was willing to work with the other to further their particular aims often trying to manipulate circumstances to the advantage of their agenda. The most obvious example of this behaviour is the financial support that the Third Republic government provided to Catholic institutions in China, including the Université l'Aurore, under the auspices of the French protectorate over all Catholics in China, even after the passage of the French law on the separation of church and state in 1905 (Wiest 1997).

The advantages of using Jesuit resources in a proposed French university are foreshadowed in *La Quinzaine Coloniale* in 1901. Catholic missions are admired for their stability and influence despite challenges from both the Chinese and French. It is noted that at the time of writing the Jesuits had redoubled their zeal in the work of education, colleges and Franco-Chinese schools in various centres in China. This commitment is seen as the model by which French influence may best be exerted in China (La Quinzaine Coloniale 1901). This revelation allows for the anticlerical Third Republic to openly endorse and even support the mission of the future Jesuit university.

Though there was support beyond the Jesuit community for a French university in China, questions of location, composition, administration and orientation—religious or secular—were hotly debated. Noted contemporary writer on China and long-time Shanghai resident Albert-Auguste Fauvel weighed in on the importance of including a Faculty of Medicine in the French university in China regardless of the other conditions—though he clearly stated a preference for a Jesuit-run institution in Shanghai. He displayed the pragmatism of the government in asserting that the Jesuits were best placed to implement the humanitarian mission and simultaneously exert the influence of France within China.

His endorsement of Shanghai was largely based on the infrastructure (meteorological observatory, astronomical observatory, museum of natural history, printer, etc.) that the Jesuits hae established at Xujiahui, "Hâtons-nous de profiter de ce que celui-ci n'est pas encore sorti de terre et, battant le fer tant qu'il est chaud, complétons ce que les savants missionnaires jésuites ont déjà créé à Zi-ka-wei" (Fauvel 1903).

Beyond the scientific resources already established by the Jesuits, Fauvel further pointed out that when the municipal council of the French Concession decided to open a French school in 1879, they called on the Jesuits to do the teaching. Finally, he made the financial argument that the Jesuits were the most cost-effective way for the government to extend its influence, "Les finances de l'Etat ne peuvent guère supporter de gros sacrifices d'argent en vue d'augmenter notre prestige en Extrême-Orient. Il est de toute nécessité de d'utiliser là-bas ces professeurs, parfaitement brisés aux meilleures méthodes d'enseignement, que l'on appelle les Jésuites" (Fauvel 1903).

Fauvel tried to balance the anticlerical sentiment in France with the practical advantage to be gained by teaming with the Jesuits on a prospective university, "Comme nous l'avons dit les bases existent déjà à Shanghai, il n'y a plus qu'à compléter. Si on veut servir efficacement les intérêts français en Extrême-Orient on devra avec l'aide des missionnaires, fonder à Shanghai une université française dans laquelle la faculté de médecine devra, avoir un rôle prépondérant" (Fauvel 1903).

The presence of a faculty of medicine, though not realised in the initial stages of the actual French university in Shanghai, was presented as a key component for maintaining and raising French prestige for the lay observers. The initiative to launch the university was praised in itself, but Fauvel estimated that a Faculty of Medicine would bring France a thousand times more esteem in China, "la fondation d'une Université de médecine fera mille fois plus pour la gloire de notre pays dans l'Empire du Milieu que l'ouverture de cours de sciences commerciales ou autres" (Fauvel 1903).

While the endorsement of a French university in Shanghai was widely shared, a Jesuit-run institution located in Shanghai was not universally endorsed. Dr. Regnault responded to Fauvel's article in a subsequent issue of *Revue politique et parlementaires*, arguing that few of the Jesuit resources in Shanghai were pertinent to the most important aspect of the proposed university, the medical school. He suggested that Guangzhou may be even more useful given the French colonial

presence just south of the city in Indochina (Regnault 1903). Dr. Regnault further asserted that the teaching should be done in French; therefore, the linguistic advantage of the Jesuit teachers was not applicable. His anticlerical stance was made clear when he insisted that the French Faculty of Medicine should be kept separate from religious influence as a fundamental element for success, "La Faculté de médecine française ne devrait d'ailleurs pas être inféodée à des missionnaires d'une confession quelconque; elle ne devrait être ni catholique, ni protestante; elle devrait être laïque et rester indépendante de toute religion occidentale c'est là, croyons-nous, une condition essentielle de son succès" (Regnault 1903).

He further inflamed the debate by suggesting that if the Jesuits became involved in the teaching of medicine, it would lead to an epidemic of attempted deathbed conversions of critically ill Chinese by their graduates,

> Les médecins élevés et instruits par des missionnaires religieux seront des catéchistes plutôt que des médecins; ils croiront bon de prêcher leur foi partout autour d'eux; ils mêleront facilement les pratiques' religieuses aux traitements scientifiques s'ils sont logiques avec eux-mêmes, ne s'efforceront-ils pas de faire des conversions *in extremis*? N'iront-ils pas jusqu'à baptiser un malade sur son lit d'agonie 'pour sauver une âme'! Les Chinois ne verront en eux, avec raison, que des missionnaires religieux déguisés et le mouvement xénophobe ne pourra que s'accentuer (Regnault 1903).

Despite being in full agreement that a university featuring a Faculty of Medicine would be very useful politically and commercially, citing a report by Indochina Governor Paul Doumer stating that nothing served the French interest better than medical institutions, Dr. Regnault would not consider working with the Jesuits to achieve this aim (Regnault 1903). Such was the anticlerical sentiment, even in the context of the overseas humanitarian mission.

The ultimate decision to allow the Jesuits to be responsible for the French presence in higher education was aided by the excellent reputation of the Jesuits of the Xujiahui mission among French government administrators involved in the *mission civilisatrice*. This was confirmed in 1898 when the French ambassador to Beijing, Stephen Pichon, was told by the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères to facilitate the opening of a French school of higher education to be run by the Jesuits (Wiest 1997).

The French government became involved in negotiations that led to opening of the Université l'Aurore. By 1903, the government in Paris fully supported the establishment of the university by the Jesuits, but insisted that there would be no financial support for the project (Metzger 1999). However, government did become financially and logistically involved and remained so for the duration of the institution.[3] The indirect approach employed in the university certainly made support more palatable for the government.

[3]Wiest notes that as of 1997, the French government was still providing assistance to Shanghai Second Medical University, which took over the campus of Aurore in 1952 (Wiest 1997).

Simultaneous and parallel to the French musings on the viability of a French university, Chinese educator and former Jesuit working at the College Saint-Ignace, Ma Xiangbo, was developing a further study plan with some of his more accomplished students. At the time, education in China was in transition. The ancient imperial examination system that relied on the study of Chinese classics and had always been the centre of intellectual life in the empire was the subject of reform attempts and had been widely discredited by China's weakness in the face of foreign aggression. Educators variously attempted to maintain or modify the old system, adopt Western practices or create a new Chinese methodology. Ma Xiangbo was interested in developing a Western Chinese hybrid education that would constitute a meeting point of cultures and provide Chinese students with a link to their intellectual heritage, while equipping them to join increasingly Western-oriented intellectual elite.

Ma was himself a product of the College Saint-Ignace. He understood and appreciated the advantages of structure and continuity in the education process. In an attempt to insulate his students from the upheaval of the system in China, he approached the Jesuits about pursuing the project in partnership. Ma made a significant endowment of his personal funds to the Jesuits to finance the launch of the university.

Though the Jesuit missions traditionally remained disengaged from political machination and expected the same of their students, it was largely activist exiles from Nanyang Gongxue that formed the first class of students at Université l'Aurore. Reacting to strict prohibitions on Western political and philosophical materials, such as those of J.J. Rousseau, and the banning of the work of Chinese reformer Liang Qichao, one hundred students left Nanyang Gongxue along with noted scholar Cai Yuanpei in 1902. These reform minded students split between forming the Patriotic School with Cai and persuading Ma to bring his vision for a hybrid university to fruition so they could make up the inaugural class (Hayhoe 1983).

For years, Ma had been frustrated by imperial resistance to his proposed reforms of the education system and now believed that progress could be made with some form of democratisation of the government. This experience made him somewhat sympathetic to the reform and revolutionary movements that opposed the Qing Dynasty. Though it was against his own Jesuit training and contrary to the position of his partners in Aurore, Ma was willing to open the new university as a safe haven for political revolutionaries (Hayhoe 1983).

2.2.2 The Formative Years

The university opened in the spring of 1903 with great optimism and expectations. The facilities included the old meteorological observatory at Xujiahui, and the curriculum focused on the best aspects of European civilisation—science, philosophy and Latin. Within months, courses in English and French taught by Jesuit

scholars from the mission at Xujiahui were added. With the appointment of Father Perrin, as Deputy Director, and two scholastic fathers added to the professorial ranks, enrolment increased to better than 100 students for the second year. To satisfy the desire of the increased student population courses in German, Italian and Russian, fencing, dancing and piano joined those already on offer.

The Jesuits were not comfortable with this haphazard approach to academics, charging that the students had too much influence over curriculum. In 1905, they tried to implement some order. Contentious issues included the curriculum, administration, admissions and student activism. In the reorganisation, Ma Xiangbo was moved out of the way and put in charge of administering the finances. The changes led to a students' revolt. Opposition was carried to the point of withdrawal from the university by many of the students. Ma also decided to leave rather than continue under the new administrative order. The rejection of the new system and the defection of students forced the first incarnation of the Université l'Aurore to close its doors after only two years.

Despite this power struggle, the Jesuits were satisfied with the academic progress of their young students, "Le R.P. Supérieur et le P. Recteur en ont été étonnés et très satisfaits. Ces jeunes gens de 18 à 30 ans ont fait de réels progrès, en sciences (arithmétique, algèbre, géométrie, physique et chimie), en philosophie, en langues (français, allemand, anglais, latin) en histoire et géographie, sans compter le dessin (professeur P. Hermand) et les exercices militaires (1 heure tous les jours, commandés par un sergent français et le P. Ménez)" (Relation de Chine 1905). From the beginning, the programmes were quite comprehensive, incorporating fine art and physical activity into the academic programmes.

The difference in vision for the university between Ma and the Jesuits amounted to Ma's dream of a cultural meeting point between East and West, and the Jesuits ambition to create a university that was on par with the institutions of Europe. To create their institution, the Jesuits implemented strong authority at the top, a clear curriculum with structured programmes, and recruited students for whom studying would be the primary activity. Ma was blamed for his permissiveness; the student government organisation was criticised for interfering in academics and being a distraction from serious study; the curriculum was cited for being too broad and ambitious to be practical. The sanctuary offered to the revolutionaries for whom Ma held political sympathy was intolerable for the apolitical mission of the Jesuits and could not be permitted to continue. Future students would be expected to betray no political convictions, and those that did risked expulsion or arrest (Wiest 1997).

In their explanation of the failure of the first Université l'Aurore, the disgruntled students complained to the Chinese-language press in Shanghai of the undue influence exerted by the Catholic Mission. Yet, in the same articles, they praised the competence and dedication of the Jesuit faculty (Hayhoe 1983).

When the university reopened, it was under full Jesuit control. The institutional organisation and curriculum were built on the French academic model (De la Servière 1912). French became the primary language of instruction while classes emphasised

lecturing and laboratory work. The administrative structure was top-down, with well-defined programmes of study and a homogeneous and obedient student body. The Jesuits were trying to repair a reputation they felt had been compromised by the political activism of student revolutionaries. As a result, the new enrolment included younger, less politically minded students whose values could still be shaped without resistance. A noted local scholar, Professor Zeng, had been recruited to legitimise the institution within the local community, and a Chinese Jesuit, Father Laurent Li the founder of the press at Xujiahui, replaced Father Perrin (Relation de Chine 1918). Some notables of Shanghai's Christian community were brought into help with daily administration, freeing the Jesuits fathers to focus on developing the academic programmes and teaching.

At the same time, Ma Xiangbo founded another university, which attracted the dissident student population that had walked out of Aurore. This attempt at an institute of higher education proved more successful than his first. As the Jesuits kept the original name of Aurore (Zhendan), Ma launched this new institution as Fudan (renewal of Aurore). This institution is today ranked among the best universities in China.

From 94 students at the reopening of Aurore in 1905 to 172 in 1907, and this increase despite a high attrition of applicants, the necessity to move into a larger space closer to the city became acute (De la Hitte 2009). This move had been foreshadowed in an issue of *Relations de Chine* in 1905, where it was lamented that the enrolment had to be capped at 150 students, as all existing space was full, and that the permanent home would likely be erected between Xujiahui and Shanghai in the French Concession near the new hospital (Relation de Chine 1905). Though a further 160 students sat the entrance examination in January 1906, there were only 50 places on offer for the next year's intake of students (Relation de Chine 1906). The Jesuits of Aurore were beginning to feel the urgency to open the new and larger location in order to fulfil their mission.

Until 1908, the university remained housed on the outskirts of Shanghai in the observatory buildings of the mission at Xujiahui. A parcel of land in the Lujiawan district[4] of the French Concession was acquired by the Jesuits in 1904[5] and was developed into the permanent home of the university. Student residences (west) and classrooms and administration buildings (east) were constructed on opposite sides of the street.[6]

[4]In the French romanisation of the time, it was spelled Lo-Ka-Wei. This roughly corresponds to the modern Luwan District of Shanghai.

[5]Father Diniz, architect of the Mission, procured 6 hectares covering both sides of Dubail Avenue (Chongqing Lu).

[6]Ironically, the remaining structures from this campus were incorporated into Ma Xiangbo's second university, Fudan, in 1997 (Metzger 1999).

2.2.3 The Mission

When the Jesuits returned to China in the mid-nineteenth century, they saw a backward country run by an inefficient and corrupt government, torn apart by rebellions and weakened by famine and plagues. Their system of education and Christian faith was intended to create a new elite to rebuild the country on a firm Christian foundation. Aurore would provide the first-rate education necessary to facilitate these goals. In this, they saw themselves as following in the same tradition as Ricci, but the Jesuits at Aurore were guided by a different model of mission. They took what was a strategy for Ricci—the conversion of society from the top-down through indirect means—and made it the core of their method. Ricci's method relied on the missionaries becoming Chinese and on the Gospel becoming part of the Chinese culture. The Jesuits of Aurore hoped that a Chinese elite, educated at a French Catholic institution, would extol the virtues of the faith throughout Chinese society.

In setting the mission at Aurore, the Jesuits altered the approach initiated by Ricci and taken up by the mission at Xujiahui. The idea of placing Christianity within a traditional Chinese context was rejected. The pagan Chinese religious rites were condemned by the Holy See in the mid-eighteenth century, equating these rituals with French Catholicism was unthinkable. The new approach was to introduce their superior system of education, grounded in Christian principles, to create an elite intellectual class that would modernise the ancient civilisation, and even if not all converted to Christianity, they would at least sympathetic to the faith (Wiest 1997).

The published mission of the university was not quite so complex or ambitious. In the first year of the original Aurore, it was stated that the mission of the university was to allow young Chinese to study European science and give them higher education without requiring them to go to Europe or America.[7]

When the university reopened in 1905, the direction was slightly modified to indicate that the primary goal of the university was to allow Chinese students to receive secondary and higher education without going overseas and spending time in Europe or America (Programme de l'Université l'Aurore 1905). One of the underlying motives in providing a Western education on Chinese soil was the concern that when young Chinese students went abroad they frequently lost their way, either into a life of decadent excess or into atheistic, socialist or revolutionary philosophies (De la Servière 1925). Chinese students had been going to Europe and North America for university education since 1854, with about 30 studying in France by 1877, and there was some evidence to corroborate the Jesuits' concerns (Metzger 1999).

[7]"Cette université a pour but de faciliter aux jeunes Chinois l'étude des sciences européennes et de leur donner l'enseignement supérieur sans qu'ils aient besoin d'aller le chercher en Europe ou en Amérique" (Metzger 1999).

Though the missionaries at the university had hopes that students would convert to Catholicism, religion was not to be part of the curriculum. The place of the religion in the goals of the university is expressed in a later mission statement indicating that the training at Aurore aimed to create an elite worthy of its role as the leading class of China, imbued with moral and social truths; an elite of sound ideas, in touch with the Catholic religion, aware of the prejudices against it, and an appreciation during the current disarray.[8]

The Jesuits at Aurore displayed a keen respect for the "other" and developed a close relationship with the students. As Aurore grew, successive rectors lamented that these relationships were not cultivated by the growing lay faculty that had to be employed to meet the needs of the curriculum. There remained an unsatisfied desire for more young Jesuit teachers to enhance that special link between the students and the institution (Wiest 1997).

2.2.4 Bargaining for Mission and Modernity

While education and conversion remained the primary mission of Aurore, modifications to other aspects occurred over time. The overlap and interplay of interests between the Jesuit mission and the government agenda with regard to Aurore was a constant dynamic in the development of the university. Just as the government was keen to use the Jesuit mission to extend French prestige and influence, the Jesuits used the protectorate over Catholics and *mission civilisatrice* to the advantage of Aurore (Wiest 1997). Despite rampant anticlericalism in France, the Jesuits were consistently able to get assistance in the pursuit of their educational mission in Shanghai. Government and military officials from the ambassador and consul to the commander of the expeditionary force endorsed or contributed to the development of the university.

The language of instruction was always a contentious element in the execution of the Jesuit mission at Aurore. French, Chinese and English each had their supporters—French was most strongly endorsed by the French government and many of the teachers—Jesuit and lay; Chinese was favoured by some of the students and certain Jesuit teachers; English was the choice of a majority of the student population. As the mission evolved, French was entrenched as the language of instruction with the exception of certain courses in Chinese Law and language classes. Students were expected to have a sufficient level on entry to attend regular classes. Those without French-language skills could take a one-year preparatory course in French before entering the mainstream programme.

[8]"la formation de l'Aurore s'attache à créer une élite digne de son rôle de class dirigeante pénétrée des vérités morales et sociales; une élite aux idées saines avant perdu, au contact de la religion catholique, ses préjugés contre elle, et l'appréciant dans le désarroi actuel!" (Relations de Chine 1936).

The Jesuits justified the use of French as the most authentic language for the pursuit of a European education,

> The Chinese people like to go back to the origins of things and they know that, in matters of science, French owes much to Latin and is its main scion…. They trust teachers such as [French Catholic] missionaries whose knowledge of Latin and Greek make them versed in the etymology of the scientific vocabulary of all disciplines…. They know that French represents a good half of the world civilization, and that it is the key to disinterested higher studies, in short to science.
>
> Archives françaises de la Compagnie de Jésus, Fichier 2–51 complément, "l'Aurore, Université française de Lo Ka wei, près Changhai" (ca. 1907), p. 4 (Wiest 1997)

The place of the French language in the mission of Aurore is best summarised in a series of letters from the rector of the university, P. Pierre Lefebvre, to a Jesuit superior in Paris, "If you plan, within a few years, to have all the courses taught in Chinese, please stop all projects of construction and development. This measure would indeed be the death warrant of Aurore, because students would not apply here to find what is already well provided by other institutions" (Wiest 1997).

Following a directive to use the Chinese language for instruction in religious education, P. Lefebvre laments, "When the apostolic delegate asked what we did [in catechetical classes and in our sermons], I explained to him we did it in French because it seemed more useful for our students and for promoting the holy cause. Now that things have been decided against us, I wash my hands of the whole business if results are not as good as those we obtained before".[9]

In offering a place where Chinese students could enjoy the advantages of a foreign education within their own borders, and the particular benefits of French language, culture and educational practices, the Jesuits of Aurore may have attained their greatest success towards the goals of their mission and in the attempt to create sympathy within the Chinese elite for Catholicism. The Chinese governor of Jiangsu Province noted that Aurore enjoyed an excellent reputation beyond the city of Shanghai and even beyond the borders of China. As a testament to this status, he sent his own son there to study (De la Hitte 2009).

In the pursuit of their mission, the Jesuits of Aurore ensured the stability, academic standard and financial viability that would permit the institution to foster the advancement of Catholicism in China. The protection of the French government through the religious protectorate and the physical location within the French Concession of Shanghai ensured the stability of Aurore even as revolution, riot, war and political crisis went on around it. The Concession police force was called on campus as needed, and the French military was stationed nearby proving a deterrent to riotous instability, while the campus visits of French military and civic leaders, and the regular involvement of the consul general at convocation demonstrated a continuity of authority.

[9]The apostolic delegate at that time was Archbishop Celso Costantini.

Achieving a high academic standard was a founding principle of Aurore. In fact, the recognition of an Aurore education as superior to that of similar schools was seen as an indicator of the success of the institution (Relations de Chine 1906). The education at the university was always intended to rival those offered in Europe. Gaining official recognition for the qualifications conferred was relentlessly pursued. The first request for accreditation was made to the Viceroy of Nanjing by three students trained at Aurore, who subsequently passed the imperial examinations in 1905. They wanted to return to Aurore for further study and hoped that their work would result in certification recognised by the Chinese government (Relations de Chine 1905).

Though official recognition for the programs was not granted immediately, the Jesuits followed the Chinese rules and regulations on education and made the required changes to their structure. By 1912, they obtained the official recognition of the university and the degrees it granted from the fledgling Chinese republic (De la Hitte 2009). In fact, at that time, the Jesuits felt that they had established the only European standard university in Shanghai, suggesting that the Anglican St. John's University was more like a high school, the German medical school was by design a preparatory institution, and the School of the Arsenal was an insubstantial copy of the École des arts et manufactures in Paris—"Seule l'Aurore nous parait avoir les caractères sinon d'une université" (Relations de Chine 1913).

In 1918, the French Public Education Ministry granted the *cours préparatoire* at Aurore equivalency to the French baccalaureate. There were ten graduates in the first class after the accreditation. The Jesuit journal *Relations de Chine* proclaimed, "Pour la première fois, ces examens conféraient l'équivalence du Baccalauréat français" (Relations de Chine 1920).

Aurore was responsible for training many of Shanghai's elite. Graduates would go on to become the leaders of large enterprises, such as the Shanghai Electric Company, various railway lines and the tramline in Beijing (Metzger 1999). The modifications to the curriculum—adding new departments, broadening the expertise of the faculty, expanding the opportunities for in-depth research—led to an increase in Aurore alumni pursuing further study overseas, even earning entry into doctoral programmes at the Sorbonne (Wiest 1997).

Despite the assertion that the university would not receive government financial support, such funding did materialise. The Jesuits made use of their understood position as an unofficial branch of the French imperialist agenda through the *mission civilisatrice*. The strength of French Jesuit institutions limited the impact of British, American and German imperial ambitions (Bays 1996). In the context of this understanding, state purse strings were loosened to support the mission of Aurore, at least as far at it overlapped with the mission of the government.

Starting from 1913, the *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères* allocated an annual 1000 franc subsidy to Aurore. In 1916, the ministry reached in accord with Jesuits guaranteeing financial support for the university. In return, the Jesuits agreed that the direction and the administration of Aurore would retain a French character, teaching would continue to be conducted in French, and the director and the majority of professors would be French. With these concessions, the government

subsidy was increased first to 15,000 francs and then to 25,000 francs annually. The figure continued to be adjusted for inflation, administrative flux and increases in the number of teaching staff, reaching 1,600,000 francs in 1945 (Wiest 1997). This modification to the mission took some of the decision-making freedom away from the Jesuits, but ensured the financial viability so the primary mission could be perpetuated without fear of financial shortfall.

Similarly, the Municipal Council of the French Concession contributed 300,000 francs in 1915 for new construction and relocation of the Jesuit observatory and natural history museum. The improved infrastructure was to the greater benefit of the entire Concession while specifically improving the facilities of the university. The two sides remained wary of each other, but continued to work together, even taking pride in each other's accomplishments.

Through institutional stability, high academic standards and achievement and a secure financial situation, the Jesuit mission of education and assimilation could be pursued at the Université l'Aurore, the French Catholic university of Shanghai for the education of Chinese.

2.3 Lessons in Modernity

In pursuit of the aim to provide a French style and calibre of education at the institution in Shanghai, the programmes and courses offered from the earliest days reflected the norms of the day in France. As the university grew in student population and reputation, professional schools including Law and Engineering were added. Beyond the classroom, the Jesuit educators also believed that cultural contact would enhance the learning experience for the Chinese students. The combination of lessons imported directly from Europe, and the cultural understanding of Western ways afforded by environmental experience would equip graduates to lead and guide the development of China in the model of modernity set by France.

2.3.1 The Programmes and Courses

Unlike their missionary predecessors, the French Jesuits were not interested in fitting themselves into Chinese society, and they never planned to adapt the Gospel to China, nor did they look to immerse themselves in the Chinese culture. They sought to bring a superior French education to China in the model of indirect evangelisation. To this end, two programme levels were developed: *cours préparatoire*—which roughly corresponded to a Chinese secondary education and *cours supérieur*—which was meant to be at least on par with the programmes offered in Chinese superior schools, or roughly equal to a university education in Europe. The university originally offered courses under four departments: literature,

philosophy, mathematics and natural sciences. The programmes in the sciences were developed to provide practical skills for students, such as marine navigation and typhoon prediction.

The first of the *cours préparatoire* was offered in Chinese, but from the second year forward the bulk of courses were offered in French. The courses offered in the two-year *cours supérieur* were conducted in French.

For the first three years, the courses were the same for all students: French and English language classes, fundamentals of classical and modern European literature, history and geography of China and the Great Powers, philosophy, political economy, civil and international law, mathematics and science. In the fourth year, students were divided into two programmes: literature or sciences. The literature section offered unique courses in French and English literature, and further studies in law. The sciences programme featured courses in advanced mathematics, zoology, botany and geology. Philosophy, French and English language, rhetoric and history and geography were taught to both groups. While ambitious, these programmes were not out of line with those being offered at other institutions at the time. In the later years of their programme, students were encouraged to specialise in a particular branch to attain sufficient expertise. In such cases, the years of study would increase.

The first year in the new premises, 1908, brought the largest student population since opening (242 registered students (De La Servière 1925)) and a renewal of the programmes and directorship. New Director Father Allain was put in charge of implementing the new, longer programmes designed to further the academic depth offered at the Université l'Aurore. The redesigned *cours préparatoire* still lasted three years with French as the language of instruction for the final two years, now included classes in French, English, European literature, history and geography of China and the west, philosophy, mathematics, physics and natural sciences. The goal of the programme was the successful completion of examinations equivalent to those of the French baccalaureate and the possibility of advancing to the *cours supérieur* at Aurore. The *cours supérieur* was also of a three-year duration in preparation for either *licence-ès-lettres* or *licence-ès-sciences* with various specialisations within each programme (Hayhoe 1983).

2.3.2 Professional Schools

The next step in the development of the university was the addition of a medical school, Engineering Faculty and Law School. In each case, there was debate over the make-up and direction of the programme, but ultimately, the Jesuits held their control over the curriculum. In 1909, the Faculty of Medicine accepted its first class of students. The proximity of the Hôpital Sainte-Marie of the French Concession facilitated the addition of this faculty (De la Hitte 2009). As discussed in the 1903 debate, the Faculty of Medicine was seen to have value beyond the education of students in Western practice, but also as an artery of French influence (Fauvel

1903). In the context of the Jesuit university, this influence, it was hoped would eventually extend to Christianity with students adopting French Catholicism along with Western medicine.

By 1914, the addition of further programmes and the changing employment situation for university graduates precipitated a modification to the fields of study. The *cours superieur* was reorganised into three sections: *Lettres-Droit* (Arts and Law), *sciences* (science) and *Médecine* (Medicine). Courses in Chinese and French literature remained mandatory for students of all faculties whether pursuing a future as teachers, doctors, lawyers or engineers (De la Hitte 2009).

Students of *Lettres-Droit* enrolled in a four-year programme of general arts and law leading to examinations for the *licence-ès-lettres*, with the possibility of taking a fifth year to write a doctoral dissertation. The *sciences* programme was structured with three years of general sciences resulting in a certificate in a chosen discipline (physics, chemistry, mathematics, etc.), and a subsequent two years of dedicated study in a specific engineering field would lead to a professional qualification. Students of *Médecine* were required to make a longer commitment to receive their qualification. The initial programme lasted six years and resulted in a specialist certificate in anatomy, embryology, physiology and histology. Certificates in external pathology, obstetrics, surgery and internal pathology could be earned in an additional eighteen months of dedicated study (De la Servière 1925). Officials and experts from both the French and Chinese administrations certified the examination results so that the qualification could be recognised by both parties (Relations de Chine 1919).

2.3.3 Cultural Contact

Despite tight discipline, the familiarity between students and faculty bred a good rapport. The students held their professors in high esteem and showed their respect by studying diligently. Both groups demonstrated a desire to maintain the reputation of the institution. Students generally held to an 8:30 pm curfew, by which time they were expected to be in their rooms quietly studying. Lights out came at only 10 pm.

Student life was all study and quiet time. Physical activity was encouraged as part of the university experience at Aurore. The university was well endowed with sporting opportunities featuring five tennis courts, two basketball courts a running track and one of the best soccer fields in the city, "volontiers emprunté par la Ligue Anglaise, ce qui n'est pas peu dire (Relations de Chine 1919)". The greatest freedom for the students was over religion. They were free to practise as they saw fit and there was no proselytising by the Jesuits. Ultimately, Christians only ever accounted for about one-quarter of the student population.

The overall quality of the teaching combined with the diligence of the students admitted to the university ensured that a large majority of graduates went on to

successful careers, whether in law, politics, medicine or another field; the experience of student life at Aurore aided in the students' achievements after graduation.

2.4 Conclusion

From the first establishment of French residence in Shanghai, there was a desire to mimic the modernity of the home country to offer the expatriate a familiar and comfortable overseas living experience. To this end, the French Concession was modelled on Paris in infrastructure, economy and culture. Modernity in infrastructure was easily recognised in Shanghai—roads, electric street lamps, sewage systems, urban tramlines. The city had a modern trade and manufacturing economy. Social organisation and cultural activities for the foreign population mirrored that familiar in Europe. After sixty years of this presence, the French opened a university, at least in part to bring French civilisation through education to the Chinese.

From its establishment, the primary mission of the Université l'Aurore was to provide a French calibre education, demonstrating the intention to bring French modernity to Shanghai. To this end, the programmes and courses were deliberately designed to reflect key aspects of the French educational model. The resultant Chinese elite were to be the vanguard of a modern China, imbued with French values in accordance with the *mission civilisatrice*.

Students were groomed to be leaders in business, law, medicine, administration and academics as Shanghai continued to modernise along Western models as a republic after millennia of imperial rule. Thanks to Aurore, a modern French education could be earned without the upheaval and expense of going to Europe; as a result, these graduates would be more likely to remain in Shanghai and become contributors to its continued modernisation.

Jesuit mission in education was designed to develop a new educated class of Chinese sympathetic to French imperatives and, by extension, the Christianising goals of the church. Aurore struggled in its early phases due to this double mission. The church versus state conflict in France nearly aborted the project before its inception, and the role of the church in university administration led to closure and fissure before the relaunched university could become a significant modernising force in education in Shanghai. The transition from French education to Christianity never did materialise for most students. Though Catholic conversions were few, cultural conversions were plentiful—"French Modernity" was embraced.

Aurore provides a singular example of the modernisation of higher education in China; the standards set by Aurore provoked changes in the Chinese academic model. Hybrid institutions were developed to incorporate elements of the education being offered at Aurore into the Chinese system. Only Fudan could rival what Aurore offered in terms of academic quality, future prospects and modernising influence. The contribution of the Université l'Aurore to the shift in educational practice is a testament to the French influence on modernity in Shanghai.

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Chapter 3
Scientific Institutions as Sites for Dissemination and Contestation: Emergence of Colonial Calcutta as a Science City

Deepak Kumar

Abstract Scientific institutions are modern icons. These came to India as part of the colonial baggage and soon became the carriers of new ideas and in fact symbolized modernity itself. Was it is a smooth process? What debates did institutionalization spark? Quest for knowledge has never been alien to Indian society. And there were institutions too in pre-colonial times. What new changes came in the nineteenth century? Can these be explained in terms of metropolis–periphery relationship or impact/response studies? Did the process of institutionalization differ in colonial and non-colonial settings? Same could be true for the process of professionalization also. How to 'straddle the spatial and epistemological divide' between metropolis and colony? Was this a one-way transfer? One can add, was this knowledge merely or largely derivative? Could it produce autodidacts or intellectual migrants who could hold on their own? Is indigenous 'original and unsullied' to be seen mostly in opposition to modern/scientific knowledge? Could they interact? Could they change? Was a synthesis or coproduction possible? The present paper attempts to address these questions with the help of examples and illustrations from a colonial city, Calcutta. Even before South Asia was properly colonized, numerous travelers and traders had brought to fore the characteristics and peculiarities of it people and society. India was no *tabula rasa.* But as the conquest began, new forts, ports, and cities were established. Thus came into being the new port cities of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. These were to witness a distinct break with the past. In the new cities, new institutions were to be established, not in the older cities of Delhi, Hyderabad, or Lahore; some of these institutions were to become the carriers of new knowledge. It is not easy to see in them sites for exchange of knowledge as it involves a two-way process, which colonial conditions would seldom permit. They mostly functioned as sites for

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dissemination and also contestation. The transfer of knowledge, though purported to be osmotic, was not really a one-way simple process; it sparked debates and produced cross-currents. This can be seen in full-flow, for example, in the history of Calcutta.

Scientific institutions are modern icons. These came to India as part of the colonial baggage and soon became the carriers of new ideas and in fact symbolized modernity itself. Was it is a smooth process? What debates did institutionalization spark? Quest for knowledge has never been alien to Indian society. And there were institutions too in pre-colonial times. What new changes came in the nineteenth century? Can these be explained in terms of metropolis–periphery relationship or impact/response studies? Did the process of institutionalization differ in colonial and non-colonial settings? Same could be true for the process of professionalization also How to 'straddle the spatial and epistemological divide' between metropolis and colony (Arnold 2005)? Was this a one-way transfer? One can add, was this knowledge merely or largely derivative? Could it produce autodidacts or intellectual migrants who could hold on their own? Is indigenous 'original and unsullied' to be seen mostly in opposition to modern/scientific knowledge? Could they interact; could they change? Was a synthesis or coproduction possible? The present paper attempts to address these questions with the help of examples and illustrations from a colonial city, Calcutta.

Even before South Asia was properly colonized, numerous travelers and traders had brought to fore the characteristics and peculiarities of it people and society. India was no *tabula rasa.* But as the conquest began, new forts, ports, and cities were established. Thus came into being the new port cities of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. These were to witness a distinct break with the past. In the new cities, new institutions were to be established, not in the older cities of Delhi, Hyderabad, or Lahore; some of these institutions were to become the carriers of new knowledge. It is not easy to see in them as sites for exchange of knowledge as it involves a two-way process, which colonial conditions would seldom permit. They mostly functioned as sites for dissemination and also contestation. The transfer of knowledge, though purported to be osmotic, was not really a one-way simple process; it sparked debates and produced cross-currents. This can be seen in full-flow, for example, in the history of Calcutta.

The emergence of Calcutta as a science city is synonymous with its growth as an imperial city or perhaps imperialism itself. Here, one may ask, can there be an imperialist side to the core of natural knowledge? Many would argue, science is universal; certainly, you can not call it colonial simply because of its association with a colonial cities! Many believe, sociopolitical circumstances do shape natural knowledge, more so in a colonial framework. The essence of colonialism is dependency, so is that of colonial science. The colonial scientists were offshoots of the metropolitan culture and drew sustenance from it. MacLeod defines metropolitan science as not just the science of Edinburgh of London, Paris, or

Berlin, but as *a way of doing* science, based on learned societies, small group of cultivators, certain conventions, and certain priorities (MacLeod 1982). The colonial scientists were also a small group of cultivators; they also established learned societies, but the priorities, realm, and scope of investigations were not always determined by them. This made all the difference. It became mostly derivative and was, in the eyes of the metropolis, some sort of a dependent if not low science, identified usually with data gathering.

There is one more dimension. Natural knowledge serves to confer prestige on the metropolitan power and thereby legitimize imperial control over peripheral territory. But prestige alone could not have been the sheet anchor for the empire. So, the focus had to be on the applied sciences—botany, meteorology, physiology, applied mechanics, etc. I am not arguing that all science at the periphery was applied science, for example, the astronomical observations. But colonial science was primarily science applied to the production of systematic knowledge about the colony (its flora, fauna, minerals, and topography) and the solution of certain practical problems of the day. Certain material benefits did accrue and some 'development' did take place. But here the key question arises: whose development and for whom? This, however, has been the subject of several long debates.

One thing is clear, colonial science does represent an advance over pre-colonial science. For example, the pre-colonial India did not have any scientific society or any scientific journal. As a result, research remained esoteric and tended to get lost. Mostly, they were in the form of commentaries which continued with the older traditions albeit minor changes. An excellent example is Sawai Jai Singh (1688–1743) who tried to assimilate and synthesize the astronomical knowledge then available to him but who could not transcend the barriers of canonical (*siddhantic*) knowledge (Kumar 2003). He had attracted several scholars to his court but he never thought of establishing an institution that would continue and improve on his work. It was a curious situation. On the one hand, one finds Mushibullah al-Bihari writing *Risalab Juz 'la Yatajazza,* an Arabic treatise on the indivisible atom, and two other texts on motion and time (1700); on the other hand is Walih Musawi (1700–1770) writing *Murgh-namah* (on cock fighting) and *Kabutar-namah* (on pigeons) (Rahman 1982; Storey 1971). As the British strengthened their grip at the end of the eighteenth century, and as interaction with the West grew, Indians did try to look out and look within. For example, in 1790, Mir Hussain Isfahani wrote *Risalah-i-Hai'at-i-Angrezi,* a Persian text on European astronomy (Rahman 1982). Many commentaries were written during this period; although they did not entail a paradigmatic change, neither were they slavish. In fact, composing commentaries was considered a civilized form of making progress (Staal 1993). In several instances (especially in medicine), these commentaries explain scientific knowledge in terms of its own rationality and logic, but in the final analysis when the validity of certain knowledge was put to test, the sacred texts were always the standard measure. At the peak of Mughal glory, Abul Fazl had mourned 'the blowing of the heavy wind of *taqlid* (tradition) and the dimming of the lamp of wisdom… The door of "how" and "why" has been closed; and questioning and enquiry have been deemed fruitless and tantamount to paganism' (Habib 1986).

Against this background of intellectual torpor and the colonial onset, William Jones founded the Asiatic Society in 1784. This society soon became the focal point of all scientific activities in India. This was a unique experiment, probably the first such in Asia. The scope and objects of it enquiries were: 'Man and Nature; whatever is performed by the one, or produced by the other,' (Fermor 1935). What could be colonial in such magnificent objectives! Nothing. The difference lay in practice. Though the criteria for its membership was nothing more than 'a love of knowledge and zeal for promotion of it,' Indians were not taken as members until 1829, and no Indian made any scientific contribution to its journal till the 1880s.

The roots of professional and scientific colonial literature from the viewpoint of science can be traced back from the publication of the *Asiatic Miscellany* (1785). It soon flowered into *Asiatick Researches* (1788–1839) and the *Journal of the Asiatic Society* (*JAS*). Between 1784 and 1839, the Asiatic Society published 20 volumes. The demand for the publication was such that in 1798 a pirated edition was brought out in England. It is impossible to look at the *JAS* without considering the role played by Orientalism in its development. Orientalism led to the study of Eastern civilizations by scholarly Europeans. The literary researches of the 'Orientalist' scholars complemented scientific investigations in colonial India. Orientalism had its most visible manifestation in the nineteenth century and is symbolized in India by the development of the Asiatic Society. It had its supporters and detractors. On the one hand, it can be said that it rediscovered the history and culture of the subject people and cast it in a modern idiom and promoted global awareness of diverse civilizations. On the other hand, going by the critiques of Edward Said, orientalism was the vehicle by which Western civilization penetrated into the civilizational hearts of its subject and function as an inseparable handmade of imperialism. Both the defense and the critiques of Orientalism would also apply to the mindset and the body of thought and action that gave rise to these journals (Sinha TS). There is equally an element of self-interest as well as reform in their study of natural resources, topography, sociocultural traits, diseases, etc. in the native milieu.

The Asiatic Society suffered and prospered simultaneously but remained a beacon of knowledge for long. It was the sole organ of research in Asia. Whatever was done in geology, meteorology, zoology, and botany was done through the society. Gradually all these branches developed on lines of their own and blossomed into separate departments. The society multiplied by fission, like the 'philoprogenitive sponge' and gave birth at successive epochs to the Geological Survey, the Indian Museum, the Meteorological Dept., the Botanic Survey, and the Linguistic Survey (Risley 1904). As Nature noted in 1907,

> Like all the scientific organizations in the East, it has suffered vicissitudes. The short and broken residences of Europeans in the country, pressure of official work, lack of native co-workers, want of libraries of reference, and last, not least, the indifference of the Indian Government, which prefers that its servants should devote their spare time to the judgements of the High Courts or the circulars of the Board of Revenue rather than to the science and literature of the country, have at times interrupted its progress (Nature 1907).

Another important scientific society was the Calcutta Medical and Physical Society, established in March 1823. The objectives of this society were two-fold—first to collect original papers relating to discoveries in medicine and surgery, and in the branches connected with them, as researches in anatomy, physiology, botany, chemistry for the advancement of professional knowledge, for the mutual benefit of the members, more particularly with reference to Indian diseases, and treatment—the papers would be presented, read and discussed at regular appointed meetings and afterward published, and entitled transactions of the society. And the second objective was the formation of a select and extensive medical library for the use of its members. It broke the social and professional isolation of the doctors, and without any government aid, was able to publish its *Monthly Circular and Selections* regularly (Medical Selections 1833). The Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta elected four Indians—Radhakant Deb, Ramcomul Sen Madhusudan Gupta and Raja Kalikrishna Bahadur, as corresponding members in 1827 and they did produce few papers on indigenous drugs (Transactions of Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta 1827–1831).

These societies rendered invaluable services, particularly through their journals whose standard compared very favorably with that of European ones. It was no mean achievement that Calcutta, with a public of a little more than two thousand, could produce and support scientific journals such as the *Gleanings in Science and Calcutta Journal of Natural History.* The latter even attempted to establish in 1841 an Indian Association for the Advancement of Natural Science (Calcutta Journal of Natural History 1841) on the pattern of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

These voluntary societies were important institutions in their own right. I shall not cover the official institutions such as the Royal Botanic Garden, the Calcutta Mint, Geological Survey, Telegraph Department because these institutions worked along the government lines and had little public contact. The voluntary societies definitely had more stimulating effect on the city. But their works could have reached the local people only through educational institutions to which we now turn.

3.1 Educational Experiments

One of the intentions mentioned in Sec. 43 of the Charter of 1813 for the grant of one lakh rupees to be spent on education was introduction and promotion of knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British India (Howell 1872). But the Court of Directors gave no directive as to which system of science, indigenous or European, was to be preferred. The Court perhaps tried to avoid taking sides and took refuge in the neutrality of the engraftment principle, calling for the fusion of the scientific and medical technique of the East and West. The result was the whole issue got bogged down into what is known as the Anglicist-Orientalist controversy (Griffin 1972) which the former finally won.

Macaulay's distaste for science, the mechanical arts, astronomy, and engineering led to a curriculum which was purely literary (Griffin 1972). Entry of science thus got delayed. In July 1835, the General Committee of Public Instruction recommended even the abolition of the instruction of chemistry there (Home, Public 1835). An influential contemporary journal wrote: More useful knowledge is to be gained from the study of one page of Bacon's prose, or of Shakespeare's poetry than from a hundred pages of Euclid (The Huraku 1838). Against this backdrop began the Victorian era.

Purely scientific education did not fit into the exigencies of the Company Raj. But the need was felt to have a class of apothecaries, hospital assistants, surveyors, and mechanics to serve the fast-growing medical, survey, and public works departments. Training native youths was obviously much cheaper than getting technical personnel from abroad. So was opened in 1935 the Calcutta Medical College (The Centenary Volume of the Medical College of Bengal 1938) and in 1843 an engineering class at the Hindu College (125th Anniversary Souvenir of the Bengal Engineering College 1981). In 1844 was revived the idea of having a Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy. But the controversy arose whether the emphasis was to be put on pure science or on applied science (Home, Public 1845). Around same time, Dr. F.J. Mouat, Secretary of the Council of education, floated the idea of establishing a university (Mouat 1845). But it was only to be a mere examining body and thereby could not have given a boost to science education as such.

University system could not dispel the air of pessimism, which hung round science education. Rather, it got accentuated in the name of liberal education. Physical sciences were removed from the list of necessary (viz., Languages, History, Mathematics and Mental and Moral Science) subjects for B.A. Examination (Records of Govt. of India 1867). W.S. Atkinson, the DPI of Bengal, wrote: 'Indeed if I am asked what steps should be taken by this Department in furtherance of original research, my answer must be none': and then added the same old ecclesiastical cliché, the causes which have produced the degradation of centuries of moral, social and political debasement (West Bengal Archive, General, Education 1860).

It was not that the natives were not receptive enough. That the students reciprocated well can be found in what J. Prinsep wrote to O'Shaughnessy after examining the chemistry student of Calcutta Medical College: 'All the essays are extremely creditable; indeed the extent and accuracy of the information has far surpassed my expectation and I do not think that in Europe any class of chemical pupils would be found capable of passing a better examination,' (Calcutta Monthly Journal 1837).

Vernacular periodicals such as Samvad Prabhakar, Tattvabodhini Patrika, Somprakash every now and then harped upon the importance of science education and research. Somprakash, for instance, observed that in a country, such as France, even at the primary level or at the very ordinary school sufficient attention is given to science. In India, the study of true science is negligible. It remains limited to the Roorkee Engineering or Medical Colleges. In 1869, the Asiatic Society proposed

that science should be studied properly at the university level right from the entrance. But the government refused by saying that the time was not yet ripe. Is not the education department the cause of our scientific and technological backwardness? (Ghosh 1966).

Although the Calcutta University was avowedly founded on the model of the London University, the Oxbridge tradition was apparent in the exclusion of science (Nature 1872). The education system led to the acquisition of literary, rather than of scientific tastes—tastes which are best satisfied by the profession of the lawyer, teacher, or the government official (Home, Educations 1897). Bombay was the only University to confer a separate degree in science. The scientific course in Bombay, Lahore, and Calcutta was almost similar, except that English, which formed a compulsory subject at Calcutta, was altogether excluded from the two former and that Mathematics, optional in Bombay, was a compulsory subject at Calcutta and Lahore (Croft 1888). Quantitatively science course was less popular but it gave better results and was preferred by scholarship holders. In 1882, the DPI of Bengal reported that the percentage of success was 20 in literature course and 46 in the science course (DPI Report 1892). Science course continued to grow in popularity and in 1899 the Calcutta University decided to institute the degrees of BSc and MSc.[1]

3.2 From Dependence to Independence

One of the first to realize the necessity of rearticulating science in national terms was Mahendra Lal Sircar (1833–1904). In 1869, he wrote an article 'On the desirability of a national Institution for the cultivation of sciences by the natives of India.' This title is extremely significant. He argued against the prevailing contention that the Hindu mind was metaphysical and called for the cultivation of the sciences by 'original' research. He wrote, 'We want an Institution which will combine the character, the scope and objects of the Royal Institution of London and of the British Association for the Advancement of Science,' and then added, 'I want freedom for this Institution. I want it to be entirely under our own management and control. I want it to be solely native and purely national' (A Century 1976). In April 1875, **Bharatvarshiya Vigyan Sabha** (an all-India Science Society) was formed. Its objects were: (1) to discuss science as a subject by instituting a society at Calcutta, which would have branches in other parts of India; and (2) to educate the people of India in various scientific subjects and to publish all the ancient Indian tracts relating to science (Bhattacharya 1960). In 1876, after a great deal of effort and controversy, the Indian Association for Cultivation of Science was inaugurated in Calcutta. This event was no less important than the establishment, nine years

[1]Minutes of the Calcutta University, 1898–99, para 331, Members of the Science Degree Committee were J.C. Bose, E. Lafont, Mahendra Lal Sarkar, A. Pedler and P.C. Ray.

later, of the Indian National Congress, a political forum that was to spearhead the national movement. The association was a cultural challenge and symbolized the determination of a hurt psyche to assert and stand on its own in an area that formed the kernel of Western superiority.

The turn of the twentieth century saw intense debates on what the Indians had received at the end of a century and half of British rule. A cursory look at the periodicals, pamphlets, and publications of the time would show the high level of discontent with the contemporary situation (The Pioneer 1901). Even the then Governor General agreed that a huge stratum of the society retained 'the primordial elements far away from the reach of progress,' (The Dawn 1900). In the first decade of the twentieth century, amelioration was sought through the slogans of **Swadeshi** (self-reliance) and (self-rule). These were more than political slogans, rather they symbolized an intense yearning for change.[2] The 'new vision' of India that came be debated so intensely in the years to follow had its beginnings in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The quest for 'techno-scientific knowledge' preceded and facilitated the emergence of this 'vision.'

3.3 Calcutta's Scientific Pioneers

A large number of Indian interlocutors, belonging to different disciplines and walks of life, contributed to the new quest for techno-scientific knowledge. Among those who were the first to take scientific research and teaching as their career were Pramathanath Bose, Ramendra Sundar Trivedi (1864–1919), Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858–1937), and Prafulla Chandra Ray (1861–1944).

P.N. Bose specialized in geology at the University of London and later joined the Geological Survey of India. In 1886, he wrote a pamphlet on 'Technical and Scientific Education in Bengal' and a decade later published three volumes on 'A History of Hindu Civilization.' Fierce nationalism had transformed a geologist into a historian. From physical mapping, he shifted to cultural contours. He held the Brahmanical system responsible for neglecting physical science 'to a most serious extent.' The Hindu civilization carried the germs of its decay within it, he argued. But he would never agree to his (geological) Chief's perception of Indians as 'utterly incapable of any original work in natural science' (Medlicott 1880). He could see no reason why 'with an improved system of scientific education, and with just and sympathetic treatment of the young men trained in India, they will not be able to take a place in the modern scientific world.' The Japanese 'instead of being thwarted, discouraged, and set down as incapable, have been aided, encouraged and stimulated by their government to pursue science,' (Bose 1896). Bose only forgot to

[2]As a recent work argues, 'it would be erroneous to conceive Swadeshi's nativism as an atavistic upsurge of a reified tradition in the face of modernization. Rather, nationalism's nativist particularism must be situated within a broad understanding of the perceived decentering dynamic of capitalist expansion' (Goswami 1998).

mention that Japan was not a colony! But he did realize (at his own cost) that 'a just and sympathetic treatment' was not always possible in a colony. Every concession had to be literally wrung. It was a struggle in slow motion but on a high pitch. In 1886, P.N. Bose asked for science course at the FA (intermediate) level to facilitate early specialization. It was not till 1906 that an intermediate science course was introduced. He also pointed out the defects in the BSc course which in itself was divided into literary and scientific curriculum. The Presidency College had no chairs in botany, zoology, and geology. Officers of the Geological Survey were asked to teach geology on purely temporary basis. One could imagine what progress would come from such 'intermittent lectures.' So was the case also in Bengal Engineering College at Shibpur where chemistry, physics, geology, and metallurgy would be taught by 'one and the same teacher,' (Bose 1906). He wanted science subjects to be taught with an eye to their application to industry. But at the same time he warned against the dark sides of industrialism in Europe which was feeding 'the growing spirit of militarism and imperialism in the West.'[3] He would have preferred the cultivation of science and technology within 'the limits of intellectual culture.' Later, the experience of the First World War made him revert to 'the propagation of ancient culture' (as represented by India) which would 'rescue the humanity from the morass of militarism, malevolence, destitution, disease,' etc. (Bose 1929). Thus, P.N. Bose wanted change and progress but on his cultural terms and without losing Indian values.

A sharper articulation of the cultural dimensions of techno-scientific education came from Ramendra Sundar Trivedi, a science teacher at Ripon College (later its principal) in Calcutta. He wrote a number of thematically rich yet seemingly popular science articles in Bengali which were published in book form titled **Prakriti** (1896) and Jigyasa (1904). Thanks to the English education, one may have learnt a great deal. But 'have we acquired the ability to learn on our own?'

> Have we assimilated scientificity into our system? The very word science throws us into raptures, but what we ultimately imbibe is basically pseudo-science. Having heard that human hair is a non-conductor of electricity we immediately begin growing pigtails; and as soon as we learn that changes in lunar position cause tides we take our horoscopes to the astrologer. Can one think of a more piteous situation? (Chacraverti 1996)

This comes from a person with a supposedly Brahmanical and revivalist bias. But such poignant questions would have occurred only to such persons who had a deep understanding of their traditions and who could relate these to the ideas and requirements of their own time and locale. Trivedi even tried to expand the realm and definition of science.

> Science! Science! We all aspire for scientific research. As if science is confined only to physics, chemistry and physiology. As if anthropology is beyond the scope of science—as if historical analysis is outside science's concern. (Chacraverti 1996)

[3]Prophetically be wrote, 'the great wars of the future will be fought not for interests in Europe, but for interests outside Europe' (Bose 1906).

Such a holistic view may not be appreciated by the scientists now but a century ago it was not so. In fact, scientists such as P.N. Bose and P.C. Ray turned into wonderful historians. Like them, Trivedi could see the distorting influence of the colonial system and its bureaucracy. How 'mechanized' the educational system had become, the universities nothing or little more than degree-granting machines. Even private efforts had come to a naught. Trivedi criticized the content and quality of education in the **tols** and **chatuspatis**, but thought that these had at least some 'genuine respect for knowledge.' Modern educational institutions, because they followed 'mechanized routine,' failed to inculcate this genuine respect. They became what P.C. Ray later called 'golam-khanas' (slave-factories), churning out munsifs, clerks, assistant surgeons, and overseers as per the requirements of the colonial job market. Trivedi realized that this 'mechanization' could not altogether be avoided, it was part of the global change. That is why he did not become a Gandhi and attack the West with anything he could lay his hands on! Trivedi kept grappling with the two different texts. He would accept modernity but not westernization; modern university system of education but not its commercialization. Several Indian thinkers and reformers of his age, such as Vivekanand and Aurobindo, held similar views. But Trivedi was little different in the sense that he was deeply aware of the philosophical issues concerning science and scientists, and even then he would deny modern science any epistemological superiority (unlike P.C. Ray). He would rather describe Western scientists in Hindu terms; for example, Copernicus as one with Dibyachakkhu (spiritual vision), Newton as a Rishi (sage), and Helmholtz as an Abatar (incarnation) (Chacraverti 1996).

In contrast, the two most creative scientists that the late nineteenth century. India produced, J.C. Hose and P.C. Ray would fully accept the epistemological superiority of modern science, and both treated education as the most effective vehicle for assimilation and gradual diffusion of the new ideas. Both were well-steeped in Indian history and culture and could discriminate between what was to be taken and what not. J.C. Bose was a bio-physicist who worked on the 'electrical impulse and response in the living and the non-living.' Borrowing from the technical language of his discipline, he thus described the role of education in the East–West encounter:

> An impulse from the outside reacts on impressionable bodies in two different ways, depending on whether the recipient is inert or fully alive. The inert is fashioned after the pattern of the infinite repetition of one mechanical stamp. But when an organism is fully alive, the answering reaction is often of an altogether different character to the impinging stimulus. The outside shocks stir up the organism to answer feebly or to the utmost in ways as multitudinous and varied as life itself. So the first impetus of Western education impressed itself on some in a dead. monotony of imitation of things Western; while in others it awakened all that was greatest in the national memory (Sen and Chakraborty 1986).

Unlike P.N. Bose and P.C. Ray, J.C. Bose did not undertake any investigation into the 'national memory' (i.e., history). But he did try to identify his works with what he considered to be 'greatest' in his cultural inheritance. His propositions that life emerges out of non-life and that there exists an underlying unity between the

living and the non-living were taken as scientific manifestation of the **Sarnkhya** philosophy. J.C. Bose used to quote from the Vedas and had a poetic flavor; he even gave Sanskrit names to his instruments and did not see any conflict between science and religion. The contemporary opinion did not consider it mystical or 'oriental'; rather, he was hailed as a synthetical mind (The Dacca Review 1916). His works were the first authentic rebuttal of the colonial view that Indians were incapable of original scientific investigations. But his was not an ivory tower projection of education and research. He was convinced of the utilitarian value of science and wanted its widespread diffusion through proper science education. It had to be not only for the sake of scientific knowledge but 'also to harness the economic resources of the country and to show how to discriminate between industries which can and which cannot be profitably carried on under the climatic and other conditions prevailing in India,' (The Englishman 1897). To achieve this were needed a 'satisfactory' science course, good laboratories, and scholarships. Bose was particularly perturbed over the science curriculum in Indian universities. At the graduate level in Calcutta University, for example, the vast area of acoustics, heat, light, electricity, and magnetism formed only half a paper! To add to the woes of the students, too many textbooks were prescribed. The result was they looked for help books. Second-hand knowledge thus took the place of 'living science.' Even this could not be put to any use because, in the absence of any post-degree scholarship or employment, they would shift to a career in law or administration. Like his compatriots, Bose excelled in diagnosis but his solutions were limited and heavily dependent on government. All through he remained a devoted researcher, not an activist.

P.C. Ray, on the other hand, showed a higher degree of social commitment. He was an educationist, a scientist, an entrepreneur, and a Gandhian activist—all rolled into one. He spoke and wrote extensively on educational matters with rare passion, sincerity, and clarity. Himself a working scientist and deeply conscious of its industrial applications, he was one of the earliest to see science in its social context and to talk of its social relevance and accountability. He did some original research on India's scientific heritage and attempted a social explanation of what went wrong when and how. Unlike Trivedi and others, he held the Indian social and caste structure responsible for the cleavage between mental and manual work and the resultant stagnation (Ray 1909). He wanted modern education to bridge this gulf. In his view, education has to be quality oriented, not for degree but for generation of employment and wealth. The average graduate was found to be 'a licensed ignoramus,' and the degree itself served as 'a cloak to hide the degree-holders' ignorance.' Higher education should be limited to only those who feel 'an instinctive call in that direction,' (Ray 1932). The other great defect in his opinion was the undue stress on a literary curriculum. A Calcutta University student for MA degree in 1930 had to attend 230 classes in English, and only 65 in mathematics. He was equally unhappy about the intellectual narrowness of the specialist in science. He visualized a broad 'mental culture' in which science, literature, history, and philosophy were to be given almost equal attention. Legal studies which thrived on the colonial requirements had no place in this scheme. Gandhi had severely criticized

the legal profession. Similarly, Ray would exclaim, 'if I am made the dictator of the university for one day, I would shut down the Law Department for at least three years!' Apart from the defective curriculum what hurt Ray most was the medium of instruction. He was convinced that learning through a foreign medium killed originality.

> Imagine for a moment what would happen if the English lad were compelled first of all to learn Persian or Chinese or say German or Russian and then had to read through the medium of such a tongue…. in India we have adopted the most unnatural system and have to pay a heavy penalty for it (Ray 1932).

Ray realized that his own forefathers had gone 'mad' over English education but he appreciated their dilemma. In the first half of the nineteenth century, English education was necessary to acquire new knowledge. Rammohum and Vidyasagar who asked for it had also written extensively in Bengali. Later, the whole process degenerated into a 'service-seeking mania.' This Ray resented. He was not against English. He only asked for its late introduction, after the mother tongue had laid the base. J.C. Bose held similar views and recalled with pride how his father had sent him to a 'vernacular' school. This did help him relate to his surroundings. But higher education and publication of research had to be in English, the language of the scientific world.[4] They had no doubt about it. Then, the existing institutions of science education and research had to be strengthened through fellowships, laboratories, and private donations. When J.N. Tata (a leading Bombay merchant) floated the idea of an Indian Institute of Research, Ray was reticent. He would have preferred private munificence to encourage the existing institutions in different parts of the country rather than create one single island of excellence. He argued 'India is not a compact, homogenous country, like Japan; a central Research Institute with an "Imperial University" like that of Tokyo, does not seem to commend itself,' (Ray 1899). Later in 1931 when the eminent engineer M. Visweswaraya pleaded for a Technological University, Ray called it a delusion. 'In very country industrial progress has preceded progress in science and technology,' (Ray 1932). In this industrial progress, he envisaged a greater role for the businessman and workers than the graduates in science and arts. The key to prosperity lay in the spirit of entrepreneurship and not in mere technical expertise.

Ray did not advocate higher education for everyone but primary education was a different matter. As late as 1934, the Bengal Government was spending only 27 lakhs on primary education while it raised 32 crores of rupees as revenue from the province. It was a mere 0.9 % of its earning while Japan and Denmark spent about 20 % of their gross revenue on primary education. Ray cited from the Famine Commission of 1880, the Agricultural Conference of 1888, etc. on how beneficial primary education would be for the peasants. Millions perished in epidemics, and

[4]Those who were not too happy with J.C. Bose (probably Sir Asutosh Mukherjee) would make fun of his professed love for the mother tongue: 'Why does not Sir Jagadish publish his original articles in Bengali? Who knows, there may flock in Bengal, thousands of devotees from the remotest corner of the earth to learn the Bengali language' (The Century Review 1918).

the ignorant masses, steeped in superstition, looked to goddess **Sitala**. It was useless 'to din Pasteur's researches into their ear.' Ray would argue, 'an ignorant people and a costly machinery of scientific experts go ill together.' He shared the belief that 'it is education, and nothing but education, that can remove social evils, sanitary troubles and economic distress from the country, and can awaken political consciousness and create social solidarity in the people. Self-government without literacy would be nothing but a farce, and might possibly be a tragedy,' (Ray 1932).

3.4 Conclusions

The above details show that the voluntary associations and individuals played perhaps a more important role in the gradual emergence of Calcutta as a science city than direct government efforts. But government patronage was important. The establishment of scientific institutions and journals was dictated not so much by the diffusion of scientific knowledge per se as by the local management of the complex resources of the colony. The government, that too of a trading company, would naturally be guided by economic considerations. But there was no guarantee that scientific excellence would bring economic benefits. So, science came to be valued more as a cultural activity. The government asked its officials to undertake such pursuits only in 'leisure' time. Researches thus were individualistic and esoteric, the only binding cord being the scientific 'clubs.'

Another important aspect is that the practice of science remained largely alienated from its social context. In fact, one may ask, was it culturally divisive? Some found cultural dependence quite unavoidable, while others rejected all that colonialism represented and searched for identity in indigenous traditions. The spread of modern science required the penetration of indigenous science and culture by Western science. Many Calcuttans responded enthusiastically. Was it because the *bhadralok* wanted to legitimize their newly won status or was it a true craving for knowledge and improvement? The truth perhaps lies somewhere between the two.

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Chapter 4
Management of 'Public Spaces': Case-Study of Roads in Bangkok in the Reign of King Rama V

Nontaporn Youmangmee

Abstract The reign of King Rama V was an era of significant transformation of Bangkok in terms of physical space and the city scape. This was due to rapid economic development resulting from the encroachment of Western influence. One among the most crucial developments was the construction of many new roads. These roads greatly contributed to the physical transformation of the capital. Construction of roads brought about large patches of public space in Bangkok. City dwellers of all sorts use road spaces for a wide variety of purposes. Hence, the management of road space, as well as surrounding areas, including trees, footpaths, and even 'the dark side' in back alleys behind roadside shop-houses, becomes a highly crucial aspect of maintaining order and establishing a 'civilized' environment for the fledgling urban community of this newly modernized capital city. The Siamese state of that era established the surveillance unit to maintain peace and order of the newly constructed roads. Under the watchful eye of the surveillance unit, city dwellers' daily activities and habits, such as bathing, clothing, and even various entertainment and rituals, start to come under the management and control of the state. The surveillance unit was also required to watch out for certain elements that the state deemed unworthy of the modern roads, including the drunk, the insane, and the homeless. The various duties of the surveillance unit reflect the state's attempt to exercise a more dominant influence over the everyday lives of city dwellers though the management of newly established roads and public spaces of the capital.

The reign of King Chulalongkorn Rama V was an era during which Bangkok's physical development was most obvious. Consequently, the transformation of Bangkokians' lifestyle from a society that transported and commuted mostly through water channels to a more land-bound society that depended more on roads and rails was much more apparent. Under the circumstances of such rapid developments in transportation, the state devised a new measure for controlling the

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constantly increasing road space, which was becoming among the largest public spaces of Bangkok, through the establishment of the surveillance unit. This article will demonstrate the Siamese state's efforts to control its people's lifestyle by controlling the manner in which the city's public spaces were to be employed.

4.1 Development of the City Structure

When Bangkok was first established as capital, its physical characteristics were not too different from the old capital in Ayutthaya. That is, the lifestyle of most Bangkokians remained closely connected to transportation and communication through the city's numerous waterways. In the reign of King Rama V, the transformation of Bangkok into a land-bound city began to take place as one among many of the state's efforts to 'modernize' the outlook of its capital. This resulted in the need to manage the growing road space, which was rapidly becoming one among the most significant 'modern' features of late nineteenth-century Bangkok.

In pre-sixteenth-century Southeast Asia—Bangkok (early period), Phnom Penh, and Luang Phrabang (Rimmer and Dick 2009), for instance—the typical city structure included the ruler's palace, surrounded by the residents of his minister at the center. Further out would be the commercial district, which was populated mostly by Chinese and Indian merchants. There was typically no wall dividing the former administrative zone from the latter commercial zone. There was also much space for trees and vegetation throughout the city.

The construction of city walls became more common in the sixteenth and seventeenth century as a means for protection from European invaders. City walls were also employed as demarcation of the space at the center of the city, which was usually reserved for the personal use of the ruler. Foreigners and the merchant class were normally segregated from the ruling class by the establishment of this physical boundary (Reid 2004). Earlier Southeast Asian cities relied mostly upon waterways as the main routes of transportation. Hence, roads were secondary and remained underdeveloped. Most of the existing roads were made of dirt or sand. Some were even employed as public washing spaces, causing constant damage to much of the roads' surface and making traveling by land even more inconvenient. This was the common case in the Javanese city of Banten, in the Vietnamese city of Tanglong, and in the old capital of Ayutthaya in Siam (Reid 2004). These are obvious evidence that most Southeast Asian cities of the pre-modern era remained marine-based urban communities.

When Bangkok was first established as the capital, the city also relied heavily on waterways as its main transportation routes. The British envoy, John Crawford, who arrived in Siam at the end of the second reign, recorded that rivers and canals were the people's main routes of transportation and that there were only 2–3 roads (Nij et al. 1982). Not only were there few roads in early Bangkok, they were also in bad shape and very difficult to travel through. The English writer, George Winsor Earl, who travelled through Bangkok in the reign of Rama III, commented that the

roads of Bangkok were full of thick mud and travelers were often threaten by marauding vicious stray dogs (Earl 1996).

Though the use of roads remained limited, the state accorded special importance to certain roads. This was related to religious beliefs concerning the sacredness of the ruler. Hindu and Buddhist beliefs, which dominated much of the Thai cosmological imagination, supported the idea that the capital or the ruler's palace was a symbol of the Mount Meru, which is the center of the universe and is surrounded by lesser celestial structures. This idea was clearly demonstrated in the importance accorded to the building of the first roads surrounding the Grand Palace (Duangchan 1999). King Mongkut Rama IV had noted three major needs for the construction of these roads. Firstly, the roads surrounding the Grand Palace would emphasize the grandeur of the city and segregate the Grand Palace from the commoners residential area, which tended to be overcrowded and a fire hazard. Secondly, the existence of these roads could aid the palace guards in securing the palace grounds in the event of an invasion. Finally, these roads could be used for various processions, both for royal purposes and according to popular customs (Sayomporn 1983).

The roads surrounding the Grand Palace were in fact so important that King Mongkut issued a decree prohibiting commoners from using them. Hence, these roads came to serve as physical barriers segregating the Grand Palace from the commoners' residential area. Moreover, in 1868, the king ordered the construction of Charoen Krung Road in the vicinity of the Grand Palace in the attempt to deter foreigners from riding their horses on the roads surrounding the palace (Sayomporn 1983).

Nonetheless, there are evidences of the establishment of land-bound communities in Bangkok since as early as the first reign. In 1807, King Rama I ordered the construction of Wat Suthat Temple as the center of the new capital. Wat Suthat was established next to a major Hindu shrine, which had been established earlier as a symbolic representation of Mount Meru, according to traditional practice of imitating the cosmological order in the city formation. Later, in the reign of King Rama III, a community of gold-leaf producers settled in the vicinity of Wat Suthat in preparation for the royal construction project of the temple's main Buddha image. The new settlement led to the further construction of roads, connecting the market, the Chinese shrine, and the residences of the nobles in that area. From then on, some temples were constructed to face roads instead of following the old tradition of facing the river or other major waterways (Wimonsi 1994). However, despite having roads, the Wat Suthat community was not a pretty one. Many roadside areas remained untended to and eventually became the residence of vagrants and beggars. Such a dirty and unruly area at the center of the city provided the perfect backdrop for the famous satirical play *Raden Landai* by Phra Mahamontri (Sap) in the reign of Rama III. The play recounted the story of the love rivalry between a beggar and an Indian cow herder who both resided in the vicinity of the Hindu shrine next to Wat Suthat (Sujit 2005). Hence, roads in that area were simply routes of transportation for local residents. Unlike roads of the late period, they were not intended to represent the level of civilization of the Siamese capital.

The physical transformation of Bangkok became more apparent in the reign of King Mongkut Rama IV. This was the period where Western influence first came to play an important role in the state's urban development policies. After the Bowring Treaty was ratified in 1855, allowing extraterritorial rights for foreigners and foreign subjects, much of the road improvements were due to demands and complaints of Westerners who wanted to ride their horses in the city center. This resulted in the royal decree for the construction of Charoen Krung Road in 1681 in the attempt to avoid needless conflict with foreign nationals. The great expansion of the economy following the signing of the Bowring Treaty also accelerated the transformation of the capital into a land-bound city. More residential buildings and shop-houses were built along the newly constructed Charoen Krung road, similarly to the popular model of Singaporean shop-houses (Sayomporn 1983). In 1863, two more roads, Bumrungmuang and Fuang Nakorn, were constructed, equipped with extended drainage on both sides of the roads (Nij et al. 1982).

In the reign of King Chulalongkorn Rama V, after returning from his visits to Singapore and Java in 1870, the king was greatly impressed by the modern developments of the two European colonies and was determined to likewise develop Bangkok to the same physical standards. Throughout his reign, more than 110 roads were constructed within confines of the city walls, in the northern area known as 'Suan Dusit' which was designated as the new aristocratic residential area, and in the southern area where the Chinese and Westerners had taken up residents and which has become an important center of various sorts of business enterprises—including banks, rice mills, sawmills, and product depots (Sayomporn 1983).

Most of the roads that were constructed were according to Chulalongkorn's directions and were intended to connect different areas of the capital together. They were also intended to help alleviate sanitation problems in overcrowded areas, such as the Chinese community in Sampheng (Yawarat 1984). Most importantly, the construction of roads brought about significant financial gains from the sales of property along both sides of the roads. For example, the series of roads in the Bangrak area of South Bangkok were constructed with investment capital of a group of aristocrats expecting to profit in the fledging real estate market. Furthermore, the largest investor in the construction of shop-houses was the Privy Purse of which King Chulalongkorn himself had established as a business enterprise to financially support his court (Thawisin 1982).

The concurrent construction of roads and shop-houses changed the physical outlook of Bangkok. More commercial areas emerged resulting in the continuous urbanization of communities throughout the capital. These newly developed urban communities tend to rely on roads as their main route of transportation. Moreover, most shops in these newly developed commercial areas tended to sell expensive imported goods; for example, the Bumrungmuang neighborhood was famous for shops that sold watches, accessories, and imported cigarettes (Kanchana 1999). These trends reflected also the development of city dwellers' tastes according to the booming economy. The construction of new roads accommodated not only big

business, but also smaller enterprises, such as pawnshops, grocery stores, liquor stores, and opium dens, as well as a wide variety of services.

The shop-houses that began to emerge in great numbers across the capital were a novel sort of building compared to the traditional residential structures of Siamese people, which tended to be built with natural materials. The functions of these buildings were also different in that they became places for conducting business, instead of being strictly residential as was the case in earlier times. These developments, which led to the emergence of new commercial areas that were closely connected to land-bound transportation routes, also reflected the problems of the old marine-base way of life that further encouraged people to abandon the waterways in favor of roads. A prime example is the frequent damages of boathouses due to constant collisions with larger vessels (N.A. r.5/M.of the Capital 8.1/69 (1895–1896)). Along with the rapid development of the Siamese economy during that era, more foreign merchandize ships were arriving in the capitals ports and some were even navigating the Chaophraya River, causing much disruption to people of the old riverside residential areas. Also, the expansion of riverside communities was another major cause of the decline of the waterways. The increase of the riverside population resulted in greater need to consume water resources in daily life as well as the sharp increase in water pollution, resulting from the yet poorly management of such a rise in consumption (N.A. r.5/M.of the Capital 8.1/70 (1896–1897)).

As Bangkok was moving steadily toward becoming a full-fledged land-bound society, the ruling class perceived the unavoidable need to control the rapidly developing public spaces along the constantly increasing number of roads. Consequently, the 'surveillance unit' was established to re-assert state control over the new land-bound public sphere and support the improvement of Bangkok as a civilized urban center of the modern era.

4.2 Improvement of the Surveillance Unit

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a time when imperialist powers were at the height of their influence in Asia. It was, therefore, quite inevitable that the changes to the physical outlook of Bangkok during this period would not be marked by the ruling class' intentions to 'civilize' the capital according to the Eurocentric standard of modernity of those days. Hence, the most desirable image that the state of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century attempted to establish for Bangkok was focused on sanitation, brightness, and healthy air, which were the three basic foundations of urban planning across most British colonies in the Far East (King 1990). Following King Chulalongkorn's visit to British India in 1870, Bangkok's physical structures were continuously improved through the rest of the fifth reign.

As a modernizing city, Bangkok of the late nineteenth century faced similar needs as most urban centers of the colonial era. This included the need for urban

management that was based on modern scientific knowledge and technology in matters concerning sanitation, control of infectious deceases, construction, provision of clean water, and waste management (King 1990). The ruling class reacted to these needs by hiring a variety of experts, such as engineers and architects, while concurrently improving the capabilities of the surveillance unit to include responsibilities of maintaining order within the capital (Phirasi 2005).

Before the reform of the surveillance unit in Chulalongkorn's reign, maintaining order within the capital remained the sole responsibility of the police bureau, as was the traditional practice since the era of the old capital in Ayutthaya. The police bureau, which reported directly to the monarch, was responsible for securing royal residences and judging trials on behalf of the monarch. Another important state agency involved in maintaining order within the capital was the surveillance unit of the bureau of the capital, which was responsible for controlling the various districts within the capital, judging trials, and maintaining the state prison (Chulalongkorn 2008). The traditional perception of maintaining order included only the protection of the state from foreign invaders and domestic criminals (Damrongrachanuphap 1996). Such a perception continued to dominate the ruling class through the early reigns of the Chakri Dynasty. Jean-Baptiste Pallegoix, the French vicar apostolic who arrived in Siam in the third reign, reported that Siamese police would leave the Grand Palace only when a fight broke out. They would then use excessive violence to put the situation under control, making them appear most fearful in the perception of the common people. Under normal circumstances, Siamese police, unlike their counterparts in Europe, did not keep surveillance of the city (Pallegoix 2006). It was not until the reign of King Mongkut Rama IV that Siamese police work was reformed according to the Western standards. In 1860, the Police Constable was established. This organization initially included a team of Malay and Indian officers working under the command of Captain Ames (Suwan 1989). They were responsible for the surveillance of city roads and arresting thieves and robbers within the confines of the capital (Archives of the Bangkok Recorder 1994). As more roads were being constructed throughout Bangkok during this period, criminal activities started to spread into these newly established public spaces as well. In a way, this could be perceived as part of the immense effects of the rapid economic expansion following the ratification of the Bowring Treaty in 1855. In 1856, there was a public announcement that cautioned Bangkokians to securely lock the doors and windows of their roadside residence so as to avoid the frequent incidents of burglary along the roads of the capital (Prachum prakat ratchakan ti si 1968).

In the reign of King Chulalongkorn Rama V, which was a time of intense reform and centralization of governing powers, the state came to perceive the maintaining of order as more than simply protecting its realms from foreign invaders and domestic thieves. The order and prosperity of the modernized state needed constant maintenance under normal circumstance as well (Damrongrachanuphap 1996). Such a change of perception resulted in vast improvements of the organization responsible for maintaining order within the capital. The surveillance unit, therefore, came to be responsible for maintaining order at all times, similarly to what their European counterparts had been doing before.

In 1890, further reforms were carried out to resolve the previous overlapping of responsibilities between the surveillance unit and the Police Constable. These reforms were also in response to the lackluster district bureaus that tended to shift all responsibility of maintaining order within their localities to the above-mentioned two units of the central government instead. In 1886, King Chulalongkorn ordered the replacement of the minister of the bureau of the capital. Prince Phutarestamrongsak was established the new minister and the management system was reformed as the bureau committee or 'Committee Nakornbarn,' as it was called in Thai, with Prince Naresworarit as the chairman of the committee (Rosukon 1977).

Prince Naresworarit's position as the chairman of the newly established 'Committee Nakornbarn' was actually quite apt as he was formerly the Ambassador to Great Britain and had great interests in British police work (Forty 1967). The prince recounted the details of the improvements of British police work in the nineteenth century to King Chulalongkorn following the royal visit in the Malay Peninsula in 1890. The king then ordered Prince Nares to improve the capabilities of the surveillance unit so as to be at the same standards as the British colonial police force in Singapore. Accordingly, Prince Nares presented the detailed plan for reforming the surveillance unit before the congress of ministers on June 26, 1890. King Chulalongkorn then granted approval for the prince to execute his reform plans immediately with funding from the budget of that very year (Rosukon 1977).

The newly improved surveillance unit was a conglomeration of several previously separated state agencies dealing with the matter of maintaining order within the capital. New official positions were established for the reformed version of the unit and a more clarified plan of action for officers of the unit was also redrafted (Suwan 1989). Foreign personnel, especially British experts, were employed at top management levels to train Thai officers of the surveillance unit and for the sake of convenience when it came to communicating with foreigners in the foreign settlement areas of the capital (Rosukon 1977).

The need to reform the surveillance unit was related to the transformation of the Siamese capital in the nineteenth century. Bangkok had become an important port city in the trades of rice and teak, as well as become an important hub for various business enterprises, such as banks, retailers, and wholesalers (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). Bangkok of the late nineteenth century was among the top destinations for Chinese migrant laborers (Porphant 1997). The Siamese capital also provided residence for foreigners of all sorts. Among the foreigners who traveled to Siam in search of their fortune were law-abiding colonial subjects, adventurers, vagrants, as well as criminals. Following the ratification of the Bowring Treaty, however, they all equally enjoy the privilege of extraterritorial rights. Criminals who were colonial subjects could only be tried through the correct consular channels. Considering the great number of foreign consulates located in Bangkok, maintaining order in the capital was a daunting task that required highly capable officers (Forty 1967).

Nonetheless, the transformation of Bangkok's physical structure through the Siamese ruling class' attempts to modernize the state and establish Bangkok as a civilized urban center was the important driving force that allowed the surveillance

unit to play a dominant role in maintaining order within the capital, especially along the many newly constructed road into which the government had invested so much. Under Chulalongkorn's regime, the surveillance unit was authorized to employ legal measures to control people's behaviors in the vicinity of public roads so as to maintain the general order within the capital.

The laws that were issued for the employment of the surveillance unit were founded upon the basic ideas of public health and sanitation. With the basics of medical science that polluted environments were a major cause of deceases (Thawisak 2007)—polluted water sources, such as rivers and canals, being the most dangerous root cause—there was a public announcement from the fourth reign that prohibited the disposal of dead bodies and animal carcasses into public waterways (Prachum prakat ratchakan thi si 1968). Later in 1876, the Canal Custom Act was promulgated; prohibiting people from disposing wastes in canals so as to prevent the spread of germs and curb the possibility of an outbreak of serious contagious deceases (Kotmai ratchakan thi ha 1998).

As Bangkok was being developed through the construction of many new roads, the need to manage and maintain order in the vicinity of these new public constructions that were supposed to be the landmark of a civilized city resulted in the promulgation of the 53-Point Police Law in 1875. This law was to provide the general code of conduct for officers of the surveillance unit or 'police' as they were called in those days. The 53-Point Law accorded surveillance officers with the powers to care for and maintain order on public roads, which included the power to punish offenders. This law also provided a detailed list of activities that were to be prohibited on and in the vicinity of public roads, for instance; the establishment of theaters on the roads was prohibited, children were not allowed to play on the roads, any meetings or parties to be held on the roads must acquire prior permission from the surveillance unit, no equestrian training or driving instructions was allowed on the roads, bathing or defecating on roads were prohibited, fighting and cursing on the roads were prohibited, naked people were not allowed on the roads, and beggars must remain outside of traffic lanes so as not to obstruct the flow of traffic (Ratchakitchanubeksa ratchakan thi ha 1997).

The 53-Point Police Law became the model for later legislations concerning the powers and responsibilities of the surveillance unit. In 1887, the Police Congress decree on the responsibilities of the surveillance unit in caring for road areas was promulgated. This decree added more details concerning road safety, such as the prohibition of establishing buildings of which parts extend onto road space, prohibition of horse or car racing on roads, prohibition of carrying weapons on roads, prohibition of lighting firecrackers on roads, and prohibition of driving at night without headlights (Kotmai ratchakan thi ha 1998).

In 1897, the state established the Bureau of Sanitation and promulgated the Bangkok Sanitation Act of 1897, which presented a new level of modernized urban management through the use of public health and urban planning technology. This legislation established the employment of physicians and engineers as part of the state's personnel for the management of the new modernized capital (Monruethai 2002). Although the Bureau of Sanitation had been established, the state continued

to rely on the surveillance unit to maintain order in the capital. This was evident in the 1898 Bureau of Sanitation's announcement on managing the sanitation of the capital, which essentially reiterated parts of the 53-Point Police Law concerning urban cleanliness and social order on road spaces (Sathian et al. 1935).

With the transformation of the capital's physical structure, the surveillance unit's responsibilities were also adapted according to further powers accorded by new laws promulgated by the state for the sake of establishing the level of order that would meet the standard of a 'civilized' city of that era. The surveillance unit, thus, came to be the state's main agent in negotiating and controlling urban dwellers in their everyday lives, at the forefront of implementing Chulalongkorn's various urban modernization projects.

4.3 Establishing Order on the Roads

The reign of King Chulalongkorn Rama V was a time when the physical structure of Bangkok was being rapidly developed through the construction of many new roads. In addition to being the new routes for transportation, roads were also the symbols of civilization in the late nineteenth century. Hence, the management and control of the people using this newly emerged public space became the most crucial and necessary task of the surveillance unit. New laws and regulations directing state officers in their surveillance duties also so reflect the rapid adaptation of Bangkokians' lifestyle from the old water-bound community to the modern land-bound lifestyle according to what was considered the civilized manner of that era.

Prior to Chulalongkorn's reign, much of the Bangkokians lifestyle was tied to rivers and canals, which served, not only as the main route for trade and transportation, but also major outlets for disposing wastes and defecating. This could be interpreted as the normal course of adaptation of people residing in the Siamese central plains, which were essentially a river delta area. Since the geographical context could heavily influence the pattern of activities of urban residents, it is not surprising urban residents would choose to carry out their daily activities in ways that they deemed most suitable in their geographical location. In other words, the urban order of each city tends to be born of the city's geographical context, local culture, as much as (if not more than) the initial plans of the earliest founders of the city (Rapoport 1984).

The transformation of Bangkok in the nineteenth century occurred at a time when imperialist powers were exercising much influence in transforming many urban centers throughout the region into international port cities and cosmopolitan centers of trade and commerce according to the models of leading European urban centers. Much of the 'modernized' physical development of this era—urban architecture, urban planning, and various developments in transportation technologies, for instance, trains, trams, and cars—was founded upon the fundamental ideas of colonial urban planning, which accorded much importance to the clear

segregation of the modern city and the urban lifestyles between the European colonizers and the colonized natives. Roads, therefore, come to serve not only as new physical boundaries between the colonizers and the colonized, but also as an important transport route that connected the European residential areas with the Chinese commercial centers, and the port that connected them to their extended network in the global economic and commercial arena (Rimmer and Dick 2009).

In the major colonial centers of Southeast Asia of the 1880s–1890s—including Singapore, Jakarta, Surabaya, and Manila—European colonizers tended to establish their residents in the suburbs of the city, far away from the hustle and bustle of the Chinese commercial area at the center of the city. The European residential areas were known as the 'upper town' and typically included well-groomed European country gardens and glamorous hotels, nightclubs, and other luxurious entertainment centers. The Chinese commercial district, on the other hand, was known as the 'lower town.' They were mostly shop-houses constructed with wood or other natural materials in close proximity to one another and in the vicinity of the port (Rimmer and Dick 2009).

The segregation of European residential space was mainly for the sake of sanitation and security. Consequently, they needed to establish some sort of social organization to maintain order and control the natives who shared part of the urban space with their colonial masters. This was the origin of many police organization and urban legal systems in colonial Southeast Asia (King 1990). A significant part of this was devoted to the management of road space. Urban planning and urban management laws became the police' main legal implement for abolishing venders and hawkers from the city avenues. The strict controlling methods of the Europeans allowed for a high level of order and security within the segregated zones of European residential areas of the colonial cities (Rimmer and Dick 2009).

During this same period, the city of Bangkok was also being developed to the colonial European standards of civilization. Nonetheless, the structural transformation of Bangkok, unlike its many counterparts in European colonies of Southeast Asia, did not emphasize the strict segregation between the different ethnic groups. This is, of course, partly due to the fact that much of these 'modernizing' projects were initiated by the Siamese ruling class, instead of European colonizers. Much of the roads and shop-houses constructed according to the direction of King Chulalongkorn were for the purpose of supporting the rapidly growing trade and commerce of that era. The construction of roads then led to profit speculation on property prices, which in turn fed into the fast expansion of urban space and the economy, helping to enhance the image of Bangkok as the civilized and cosmopolitan center of Southeast Asia at the same time (Jirawat 1977).

The physical characteristics of Bangkok in the reign of King Chulalongkorn demonstrate a major transformation of the urban order of earlier times. Moreover, the new 'modernized' Bangkok was an undeniable evidence of Chulalongkorn's success in centralizing state power through the series of complex government reforms carried out throughout this reign. Sir Henry Norman, a British traveler, wrote of the significant transformations he came across in Bangkok during his visit in 1893 as follows:

> As soon as you enter the city gates, you will clearly realize the effects of the Siamese government being in the state that it is at present. You will also become aware of the power of the king which extends throughout his royal residence, in the wide and orderly roads, the rows of newly built houses. There are also shops along the walls of the palace, the prison, the barracks and government offices constructed with cement. All this is evidence of change for the better. King Chulalongkorn's efforts in developing his realm, from the time of his coronation when he was barely 15 years of age or 25 years ago, have been successful and evident in the eyes of his people as well as visitors from afar (Norman 1998).

The royal power which had arisen with the new urban order was expressed through many new laws, which had been promulgated with the purpose of 'civilizing' Bangkok, and the establishment of the surveillance unit for the enforcement of these laws. The surveillance unit was the first state agency to take on the responsibility of transforming Bangkok's physical structure through household surveys and evictions in preparation for new roads to be built by the Ministry of Public Works (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 46.4/19 (1891–1892)), as well as report on property prices in areas that the king had expressed intentions of developing as new commercial areas of the capital (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 46.4/36 (1898–1899)).

Bangkok roads in the fifth reign were not only routes for transportation, but also symbols of civilization. Hence, it was very important for the state to be capable of controlling the behavior of people employing this new form of public space. The state, therefore, established the surveillance unit to carry out the major task of maintaining order on the roads and roadside areas. Surveillance officers had to ensure the cleanliness of the roads at all times, which was quite a daunting task as Bangkokians of that era were still in the habit of disposing their waste and defecating on public roads (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 5.12/6 (1898–1899)). The surveillance unit was also responsible for keeping street lamps burning (N.A. r.5/m. of the Capital 8.1/199 (1900–1901)) in the evenings and protecting telegraph poles and telephone lines along public roads from thieves and vandals (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 46.3/22 (1890–1891)).

The main responsibilities of the surveillance unit were to resolve problems that tended to occur from the people's unfamiliarity with the new urban order. This, therefore, included public intervention of surveillance officers into private activities of urban residence. Among the most outstanding examples was the case of Chin Daeng (an ethnic Chinese, 'Chin,' by the name of 'Daeng') who was arrested in 1890 for violated one of the 53-Point Police Laws by taking a bath on the road and causing damage to the road surface. This case was the first of its kind since such a mundane daily activity on roads had never been considered criminal before. Chin Daeng was put on probation and prohibited from ever bathing by the roadside again (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 46.4/4 (1890–1891)). Another interesting case was the case of AmdaengMhow (Miss Mhow), a disabled woman and a beggar who was arrested in that same year for defecating by the roadside. She was also put on probation and prohibited from relieving herself in such a place again (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 46.1/16 (1890–1891)).

The dress code and manners of people using the roads was another important aspect of the 'civilized' outlook of such urban public spaces. Once when

Chulalongkorn was traveling through the new roads of Bangkok in 1899, he complained that some people dressed and acted inappropriately on the roads and in roadside areas and ordered the surveillance unit to keep stricter control of people's behavior in such public areas (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 8.1/183 (1899–1900)). In that same year, there was a royal decree prohibiting men from wearing short sarongs (shorter than knee-length) and women must be fully covered when walking on public roads. The same decree also strictly prohibited children from running around naked on the roadside. After the announcement of the decree, the surveillance unit had arrested dozens of transgressors within the period of only a few days (Jottrand 1996).

The physical transformation of the city centered around the development of roads significantly influenced the culture and customs of city dwellers as well. For example, less people-frequented temples along the riverside and the center of trade and commercial activities shifted from establishments on rivers and canals to shop-houses along major roads. Consequently, many traditions of the old marine-based community of Bangkok began to be discontinued and quickly faded from the reality of the urban lifestyle of the late nineteenth century (Sayomporn 1983).

With the emergence of new roads, the state came to be more in control of many popular festivals, rituals, and entertainment. These activities came to be carried out on the roadside and, at times, involved construction of make-shift structures that could result in damages to the road surface or obstruction of traffic, and therefore, requiring permission from the surveillance unit. Without proper permission, all such structures could be removed and demolished by the state, such as the case of Momchao Chuen whose puppet and Chinese opera theaters were demolished by the orders of the surveillance unit due to traffic obstruction charges (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 8.1/345 (1905–1906)). From 1908 onwards, all rituals that include the lighting of fireworks or firecrackers (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 8.10/9 (1909–1910)) on the roadside also required permission from the surveillance unit (Prachum Phraratchahatthalekha 1970).

Furthermore, various Chinese rituals involving the lighting of firecrackers and burning of spirit money were also banned from the roadside as it was claimed that the loud noise of the firecrackers alarmed the horses and was the cause of frequent accidents, and the open flames from spirit money burning were also a serious fire hazard (Kotmai ratchakan thi ha 1998). Many types of traditional children's games were also banned from road areas so as to alleviate traffic problems and maintain good working order of state facilities (Ratchakitchanubeksa ratchakan thi ha 1997). A major example of this was the prohibition against flying kites on the roadside because the kite lines often became tangled with telegraph and telephone lines causing frequent problems in state's modernized communication systems (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 46.3/6 (1901–1902)).

Many of the major roads in Bangkok quickly became new commercial centers with shop-houses along both sides conducting all sorts of business (Nij et al. 1982). Shop-houses soon became another crucial aspect of 'civilized' Bangkok of Chulalongkorn's reign. The king was clearly aware of the importance of shop-houses to the image of his capital from very early on in his reign. In 1870,

there was a royal decree for the renovation of buildings along the Bumrungmuang Road (Kotmai ratchakan thi ha 1998). Moreover, many of the earliest shop-houses in the newly modernized capital were the royal investment of the monarch himself. The surveillance unit was also responsible for maintaining order and security of these roadsides shop-houses. For example, vacant shop-houses often fall prey to squatters and vagrants or become hiding places for criminals (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 8.1/255 (1903–1904)). Local residents also sometimes disposed off their wastes or defecate in these unoccupied roadside buildings, causing them to become the source of contagious deceases and, at times, even become a fire hazard (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 8.1/467 (1907–1908)). All these were among the many evils and dangers that the surveillance unit had to guard against.

The state employed controlling measures for the plan and construction of buildings as one among the important ways to assure safe and tidy outlook for public roads. These control measures also help prevent fires, which used to be a major cause of damage, not only to the physical outlook of the capital, but also to the image of Bangkok as a civilized urban center. Fires that broke out more frequently in the earlier era usually occurred from carelessness in daily activities, such as cooking with charcoal stoves, not to mention arson, which was also widespread in the early nineteenth century (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 22/192 (1907–1908)). Most residential buildings of that period were built with natural materials and in some areas, especially the Chinese quarters in Sampheng, houses were built very close to each other (Sathian et al. 1935). This increased the risk of fires even further. In 1897, a law was promulgated to control the plans and materials used in the construction of buildings along public roads (Sathian et al. 1935). It also became the responsibility of the surveillance unit to enforce this law and make sure that roadside buildings were constructed accordingly for the sake of the civilized image of the modern city (Sathian et al. 1935) and to lower the risk of fires in roadside neighborhoods (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 22/142 (1905–1906)).

In the late nineteenth century, the roadsides of Bangkok were made to look 'civilized' with shop-houses, footpaths, and trees along both sides. Yet, there were many problems hidden behind this seemingly idyllic façade. In particular in small alleys connected to the roads, reports from the surveillance unit suggested that there were frequent loud arguments, noisy and smelly cooking, and frequent illegal disposal of household wastes (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 8.1/323 (1905–1906)). Areas behind the roadside shop-houses were often left in decline and eventually became fertile grounds for criminal activities. Soon after, the arrival of modern roads and the bustling new commercial activities in the roadside shop-houses, gambling dens, pawnshops, theaters, and brothels sprang up in the back alleys. Interestingly, it appeared that the state was actually inadvertently supporting the rise of these illicit entertainment centers due to the spectacular revenue they were drawing in (Nuttaya 2005).

The above-mentioned problems were also related to the special characteristics of Bangkok roads, which were more like a complex series of alley ways, unlike the great avenues in major European cities of the same era. Such characteristics greatly influenced the development of the surveillance unit. In 1890, the unit dispatched

surveillance teams for alley ways, especially in areas around the connection points between the alleys and the main road, which was where much of the criminal activities took place. The criminals were often customers of gambling and opium dens in the back alleys and were known to evade arrest by disappearing into the labyrinth of alleys between shop-houses and residential buildings. To resolve the problem, the surveillance unit started to insist that residents construct walls around their properties to make it more difficult for culprits to evade the authorities' capture (Commemorative volume 1992).

Aside from managing people's behavior and community activities on the roads and in roadside areas, the surveillance unit was also responsible for profiling people and arresting those whom they deemed to be a danger to public security or damaging to the civilized image of the city, such as beggars, vagrants, and drug addicts (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 8.1/225 (1902–1903)). Lepers and other seriously ill people who appeared to be lying about public roads were also to be rounded up and sent to receive proper care in state hospitals (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 8.1/331 (1905–1906)). Such was not only a humanitarian gesture, but also a good way of keeping city roads tidy and healthy. Petit criminals, such as thieves and pickpockets, were dealt with differently depending on their ethnic background and social status. Chinese criminals would be deported back to China while Siamese adult criminals would be banished to do hard labor in faraway provinces. Child criminals would be sent to juvenile detention on Sichang Island off the coast of the eastern province of Chonburi (N.A. r.5/m.of the Capital 8.1/525 (1908–1909)). All these measures were employed by the state in the attempt to establish order and maintain security at a level appropriate for Bangkok as a civilized capital in the era of modernization.

4.4 Conclusion

The physical transformation of Bangkok in the reign of King Chulalongkorn that occurred from the construction of roads led to the transformation of the capital's urban order. That is, the lifestyle of Bangkokians started to shift from relying mostly upon waterways for transportation to becoming land-bound communities that were established along major public roads. The state, having determined the direction of urban development and having envisioned the civilized image of modern Bangkok, also established the surveillance unit to maintain public order and support the civilized façade of the new city according to European standards. The surveillance unit came to play a most crucial role in maintaining order of road space and roadside areas that was quickly becoming among the capital's largest and most popular public spaces. The unit was entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring and controlling people's behaviors on roads and in roadside areas. The surveillance unit was indeed an agent of the state that was capable of extending state control into the everyday lifestyle of urban dwellers. It should be considered among the greatest success of Chulalongkorn's efforts in centralizing state power. This state agency

was initially established according to European models in the context of a rapidly changing state system at the height of the colonial era. Through the course of Chulalongkorn's reign and through much of the late nineteenth century, the surveillance unit faced many twists and turns in its own development as an organization and increase responsibilities handed over by the central government due to new problems arising from new circumstances of the modernizing era. Further studies of the history and development of the surveillance unit as well as the scope of its responsibilities should provide useful insights into the mechanism of the centralization of state control in Siam's era of reforms and modernization.

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Chapter 5
A City-State as Migrant Nation: Singapore from the Colonial to the Asian Modern

Hong Lysa

Abstract Singapore is the modern Asian city par excellence, which happens to be a state which is trying to grapple with nationhood. As recently as January 16, 2011, its dominant political leader of more than fifty years once again intoned: 'Singapore is an 80-storey building on marshy land. We've learnt how to put in the stakes and floats so we can go up for another 20, maybe over a hundred storeys.' The vulnerability that is posited can only be deflected by the modern—the rational, the open marketplace, not only for capital but for human resources—just as it was in the colonial period, where the population of the island was overwhelmingly immigrants. The early 1950s was another historical juncture where Singapore was celebrated as a modern city. On September 22, 1951, it received its city charter, which the professor of geography at the University of Malaya pronounced as a feat since the wisdom of the day was that equatorial places were unsuited for great cities. The celebrations were lavish (ironically causing one of the worst traffic jams the city has ever seen), no doubt to put behind the humiliation of the Japanese Occupation. Yet the occasion was also an opportunity for political bargaining, in particular on the part of the immigrant Chinese establishment leadership who had their own ways of tying together trade, colonialism, and nationalism, different from the British. Then there were the Chinese left, mostly in the middle schools too, who staked a claim in the modern as well, as opposed to the feudal and colonial. These challenges which faced British coloniality were absorbed by its successor state and remain the bedrock in the way in which it continues to conceptualize Singapore as a modern city-state.

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The phenomenon of Asian cities as sites of 'modernity' refers in the context of this chapter to the historical era in Asia in which encounters with Europe brought forth not just battles and wars, traders and officials of European courts, and chartered trading companies who inserted themselves into the prevailing economic and political system, but a nineteenth-century phenomenon where Europe sought to change the political economy of the colonies. Modernity was an intrinsic and clearly articulated part of this stage of the colonial enterprise which served an industrial rather than simply a mercantile, monopolistic economic order. As F Cooper has observed, the power of the concept comes from the assertion that modernity was the model held up before the colonized people: a marker of Europe's right to rule, something to which the colonized should aspire to, but could never quite deserve (Cooper 2005).

The willingness to accept change, whether it be secularism, urbanism, rationality, individualism are the general traits embodied in the term 'modernity.' However, they do not automatically confer the right to the colonial subjects who embraced these concepts to cross the great divide which separated them from the colonizers. The gulf that separated them was the withholding of political rights of citizenship in the colonies, the attainment of which was ostensibly the ultimate justification of colonialism, and would logically mark its expiry. Hence, the claims to modernity on the part of the colonized people, even if it were to be in the image of the colonizer, could not be fully acknowledged. They had to be seen as a couple of steps behind, lacking in one aspect or another and needing continuous tutelage even if this was administered in an indirect manner.

It took World War II which hastened the end of the British Empire, to lend urgency for the need in its colonies in Southeast Asia to cultivate a suitable social and political stratum and to identify individuals from their midst to whom power could be devolved. This process was made more complex by the force of nationalism, which appealed to a future in which the colonial vestiges would be supplanted by loyalty to a modern political concept of horizontal bonds within bounded territorial lines and equality under the law, which may nevertheless draw on putative traditions to strengthen claims of exclusivity, legitimacy, and a sense of common destiny. The leadership for such movements was to be found in the cities, where crosscurrents of colonial modernity and a more international flow of traders, scholars and intellectuals, and political activists met. Nationalism, part of modernity, was never one vision but competition in claim-making about membership, identity, control of economic resources, and defining of political systems among groups in unequal power relations in a historical situation.

In the case of the island of Singapore, which the British detached from Malaya in 1946, the ensuing decade of the 1950s saw competing claims made on modernity by political conservatives who favoured a gradual devolution of power and fervent anti-colonialists working to achieve the immediate dismantling of the colonial edifice. While it appeared that the popular mandate was won by the latter, in the end, it was a colonial modernity which triumphed, which in this context simply means the withholding of the political. Trade and colonialism have no need of political modernity in the sense of competition for popular mandate as the basis for rule, whether one is talking about the city in precolonial times, or trade which grew out of colonialism. It

was nationalism that marks the insistent disjuncture. In colonies and semicolonies, nationalism was the challenge to wrest power from the colonial, whether it be abolition of unequal treaties and extraterritorial rights as in Thailand and China, or waging a prolonged war against the colonial power and imperialism, and reordering of the economic system as in Vietnam. In Singapore, the process of decolonization was certainly far less traumatic and long-drawn than in Vietnam; in fact, it followed a relatively smooth constitutional path by comparison.

Indeed, in the mainstream telling of Singapore history, the term 'anti-colonial' hardly appears, as movements and activities with the explicitly enunciated goal of attaining independence from colonialism were categorically labeled as communist, meaning that they rejected constitutionalism, adopted subversion and violence as their *modus operandi*, and were proxies of internationalism, or more specifically the Peoples' Republic of China. The denial of the 'anti-colonial' label to those who claimed it is symptomatic of the nature of the postcolonial regime which has ruled the island since taking over from the colonial authorities and which has postulated colonial modernity as the basis of its rule and the very condition for Singapore's existence as a modern nation-state.

5.1 Born Colonial Modern

Singapore is a modern Asian city par excellence, which also happens to be a state which is trying to grapple with nationhood. The postcolonial state discourse has it that it is an 'accidental' creation in 1965, when it was 'expelled' from Malaysia, which was formed in 1963. From the nineteenth century, Singapore was part of the British Straits Settlements, and though after the war, it was made a Crown Colony separate from the Federation of Malaya, the unchallenged wisdom then was that the cut was temporary. The failure of merger within Malaysia ended up with it being a nation-state, one whose existence had been postulated by the state as being precarious, its forced exit being the work of Malay racial extremists, who saw their interests threatened by the progressiveness that Singapore represented and championed. The severance of the umbilical cord between the peninsula and the island at its tip meant that the new political entity had to fight for its survival without any natural resources to speak of in a geographic region that was hostile to it.

As a Chinese majority immigrant city, Singapore did not have the social, cultural, and historical resources to draw on for fostering an organic community. Perhaps unique among nation-states, its leadership has stressed on the perpetual threat that the island faces as a nation and the ease with which it could disappear overnight, in order to discipline its people and galvanize them into being a citizenry. As recently as January 16, 2011, Lee Kuan Yew, its dominant political leader of more than fifty years, once again intoned: 'Singapore is an 80-storey building on marshy land. We've learnt how to put in the stakes and floats so we can go up for another 20, maybe over a hundred storeys.' Lee qualified this possibility of achieving this feat by warning that it would all topple down if Singapore failed to have defense capabilities that would

stave off attacks by hostile neighbors and if 'interracial harmony' (i.e., the peaceful coexistence among the ethnic Chinese, Indian, and Malay Singaporeans) was not maintained (Lee 2011). All this would be quite familiar to anyone who has followed the developments of this assertive nation-state.

However, the roots of this particular way of assembling the trajectory of the island's history and its destiny go somewhat deeper, into its colonial past. The particular lack or a lacuna in its state discourse and practice—of political modernity, not necessarily in terms of constitution, institutions and rituals—connects the colonial and postcolonial. The absence of the modern political, usually understood as that which obtained in the imperial center, was the very essence of the colonial polity as well as its successor.

The vulnerability that Lee has posited for Singapore can only be deflected or deferred by the colonial modern: the primacy of rational administration and governance over destabilizing political competition, the open marketplace not only for capital but also for human resources—a continuity of the colonial free port and open market. As there was no entrenched feudal structure or culture to overcome, obstacles to the growth of the colony in its early years were nevertheless of necessity recorded in its history if only to clarify what that vision was and was blamed on slack, inferior British subordinate officers. The villain of the piece was the resident whom Raffles had appointed to run the colony in his absence: Col William Farquhar had served in Malacca for twenty-three years, spoke fluent Malay, and married to a local from Malacca. In order to have sufficient funds for the trading port's administration, he introduced a tax farm on sole rights to sell opium and liquor and run gambling houses. He also made provisions for an allowance to be given to the Malay chiefs. Raffles disapproved of these measures and removed Farquhar from office (Turnbull 1980). They were the practices of the pre-existing and to him decadent order, whereas he insisted on everything being 'new mold from first to last—to introduce a system of energy, purity and encouragement' (Turnbull 1980). Raffles, Singapore's founder, was a visionary of modernity: 'my time is at present engaged in remodeling and laying out my new city and establishing institutions and laws for its future constitution.' It was with satisfaction that he recorded that 'in little more than three years, Singapore has risen from an insignificant fishing village to a large and prosperous town, containing at least 10,000 inhabitants of all nations, actively engaged in commercial pursuits which afford to each and all a handsome livelihood and abundant profit' (Thomson 1951).

The phenomenal growth of Singapore as a trading port and a magnet for migrant laborers from China and India is well recognized. On the political front, wealthy merchants were appointed to key advisory roles to ensure that their business interests were safeguarded; as community leaders, they managed the social and welfare needs of the laboring classes based on dialect and clan lines. As historian C. M. Turnbull was to generalize, for almost three quarters of a century Singapore enjoyed unbroken peace with orderly administration, and her steady expansion and prosperity were checked only temporarily by periodic international economic depressions (Turnbull 1980). Its course of constitutional and political calm lasted till the Japanese Occupation. The modernization of the infrastructure, in particular

the harbor and port facilities, was kept apace. Education in the English language to produce professionals forming a small core of local elite and middle echelon officials and employees was as far as it went. Trade kept the colony going, and as long as the interests of the immigrant traders and Western business houses were well served, the colonial authorities had only to improve infrastructure and maintain law and order. The migrant labor force was a renewable resource—there was always a ready supply in circulation, and the relationship was market-based. The potential messiness of nationalism where it came into the picture at all was largely long-distance, focused on homelands overseas. This was the case until the Pacific War and the postwar momentum of decolonization, the process of the winding up of the British Empire.

The above picture of Singapore as a well-run emporium may have underplayed its cosmopolitanism evident by the early twentieth century, for it was also at the heart of the intellectual world of Asia—a pre-eminent center of Malay culture and literature, a gathering place for political exiles from the Netherlands East Indies and for revolutionaries and intellectuals from China. 'It was a public sphere where information and ideas from outside lay in creative tension with an emerging local experience' (Harper 2001) and the groundwork for the postwar anti-colonial movement.

5.2 Celebrations and Their Malcontents

Despite the presence of these stimulations, the fall of Singapore and the Japanese Occupation clearly ushered in a new phase in the colony's political history. The Atlantic Charter and the international impetus toward self-determination were palpable. One of the major initiatives that the British worked out in order to depoliticize nationalism and to control the pace of its departure was the concept of the colonial welfare state. Five-year plans for education, health, housing, and social welfare services were drawn; trade union experts from Britain were brought into steer labor unions away from the perceived possible influence of communism, while potential local union leaders were sent on courses and tours of the mother country. Following the serious loss of prestige with its surrender to the Japanese, pageantry became the order of the day to rebuild British credibility as responsible rulers. Earlier significant anniversaries such as Queen Victoria's Jubilee (1887) and Centenary Day (1919) had of course been marked with appropriate demonstrations of colonial gratitude and loyalty at the height of empire. However, the public spectacles in the early 1950s were of a somewhat different order. They were more distinctly about a future promised, where the people as such were to be at the center of a transformation that would mark their graduation from colonial tutelage. At the same time, these events were occasions where the instabilities of the colonial system were brought to the surface in an unprecedented manner.

Education Week was held from May 8 to May 13, 1950, and was Singapore's most biggest and impressive parade since the British reoccupation in 1945 and the biggest education exhibition yet in the Far East (*Straits Times* 2 May 1950). It

involved the participation of all schools, which put up exhibitions of every aspect of school activity and culminated in a mass rally by students. In addition to demonstrating to tax payers (income tax was introduced in 1947) that their money was well spent, it aimed at displaying a collective vision of the opportunities for education which were open to all children, regardless of race or creed. In actual fact, education was then the most divisive and explosive issue confronting the government. In his address to launch Education Week, the governor referred to it as 'propaganda for democracy.' The celebrations were held amidst extremely tight security measures. Newspaper reports of the event highlighted the efficiency of the police in mufti mingling with the spectators and sharpshooters positioned in surrounding high buildings. The people were assured that they were safe from communist terror squads out to intimidate them against supporting the government initiatives to improve the education system (*Straits Times* 13 May 1950).

While the British attributed misgivings about their education policy and protests against it to members of the largely Chinese Malayan Communist Party, in fact Chinese education leaders as well as students in the Chinese middle schools saw the expansion in schools and resources allocated to them, which overwhelmingly favored English stream schools, as being aimed at eliminating Chinese stream ones. They discerned that British were trying to prolong their economic dominance even when their political rule should end by leaving behind a people that would be culturally and intellectually in sympathy with them.

The conferment of a royal charter granting it the status of a city on September 22, 1951, was, like the founding of Singapore, an occasion for the celebration of modernity. Officer Administering the Government Sir Patrick McKerron called the event 'the final coming of age of Raffles' "political child" (*Singapore Standard* 22 Sept 1951), but the times had changed. *The Singapore Standard* commissioned a 22-page supplement on that day, whose contributors were the most authoritative in their respective fields. The *Standard*, which commenced publication in July 1950, was owned by Tiger Balm king and newspaper magnate Aw Boon Haw and was the 13th newspaper in his stable. Its owner wanted it to 'stand in the forefront of Malaya's struggle for nationhood, partaking with the rest of our people not in its rich harvest but sharing as well the heartaches and suffering.' It would do this by being a 'voice of Malaya, a vehicle for the expression of public opinion by the people of this country' (*Singapore Standard* 3 July 1950). This was in contrast to the outright progovernment *Straits Times*.

Professor of geography at the University of Malaya GH Dobby noted in his contribution that with a population of a million, Singapore had become a great city and could be compared to Washington, Madrid, and Birmingham. What made Singapore different, however, was that it lays in the tropics, while conventional wisdom had it that great cities could not be located in the equatorial zone for health and sanitation considerations would militate against the possibility of a closely packed population being viable there. Dobby noted that it was poverty rather than climate which generally worked against flourishing cities in low latitudes. Singapore had the 'right kind of people' that nearby Tanjong Pinang, or Port Said did not. However, the contributors to the supplement did not have the same idea of

who the 'right kind of people' were. A.A. Sandosham, professor of parasitology, University of Malaya, was a product of the Penang Free School, a scholarship student at the King Edward VII College of Medicine in Singapore, and obtained a PhD from the London School of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. Writing for the supplement on public health, he gave a deservedly very positive report, but noted it took the catastrophe of the Japanese Occupation for the 'local men' to come into their own. He contended that the future of the health of the city rested largely on the fulfillment of the local medical men backed up by commissioners and councilors with progressive outlooks returned to office by an enlightened electorate. The photographs accompanying the article showed a local doctor testing the field of vision of a schoolgirl at the General Hospital, 'with modern appliances,' and a lecturer in radiology, also a local, explaining to students as he demonstrated the use of an X-ray machine to his students (Sandosham 1951).

The government's Public Relations Secretary G.G. Thompson noted in the supplement that city status which used to be associated with a bishopric had become associated with size and importance, but it still with no constitutional changes. It was a public and official recognition of a change already accomplished, though of course the city could not rest on its laurels (*Singapore Standard* 22 Sept 1951). Nevertheless, *The Singapore Standard* and sections of the local population saw it as an opportunity to make their bid for greater participation in political and civil life. The editorial remarked that credit for bringing 'an obscure swamp' to 'a teeming city' was routinely given to a few outstanding men, but never the thousands of nameless people who drained the swamps, built the roads, drains, and houses, set up modest foundations of commerce and industry—the 'humdrum tasks which built modern Singapore.' To the newspaper, City Day should also be a day of dedication to the elimination of poverty, and unhealthy and unhygienic conditions of life. 'The City should give expression to man's social needs, a physical utility for collective living and a symbol of collective purposes.' This was only possible if the City's institutions become more democratic and its people more aware of their responsibilities as citizens:

> We must, therefore, in the coming years remove all the barriers that stand in the way of democratic living. The people must become more sensitive to their rights to speak, think, and write freely. They must not be fobbed off with approximations of democracy or accept supinely limitations on their liberties (*Singapore Standard* 22 Sept 1951).

The expressions of discontent with the backwardness that lurked beneath the city on the part of the English-speaking population in Singapore were not new; what was significant was the outright connection that was made to political rights. The city was not authentic without democracy.

The Chinese-speaking local residents had another angle to celebrating City Day. The *Nanyang Siang Pau* noted that the highly popular evening of floats and performance procession was put together by over 200 local Chinese bodies, which did not spare any expenses. Under the leadership of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese population celebrated City Day on a large scale. The turnout was almost half a million, and the most impressive item was an 11-person-long dragon dance

and a parade of lion dancers. The paper then went into the achievements of Singapore, recognized as one of the ten self-governing cities in the British Commonwealth. The island was the key port for the export of rubber and tin and the most significant entrepot port in Southeast Asia. It was the hub of sea and air communications between the east rim of the Pacific Ocean and India, and Europe and the Middle East, and with Darwin and Hong Kong, forming the triangle of defense of the British Commonwealth.

But compared to the other cities in the British Empire, Singapore was way behind in terms of self-government. Its municipal and legislative councilors were not all elected, and franchise rights were highly restrictive, such that only 1 to 2 percent of the population could vote in the municipal elections. The Chinese had practically no voting rights as the British did not trust them, even though they were sincerely in support of Singapore. The paper reminded its readers that without the Chinese, Singapore had no future to speak of. Thus, it was imperative that the majority Chinese population be given the right to self-government (*Nanyang Siang Pau* 22 Sept 1951).

The mainstream Chinese presses were unanimous in declaring that there were no grounds for there to be any suspicion of their presence in the colony. They asserted that the overseas Chinese were peaceful, respectful of local customs and usages, and adaptable. Even though they were living in the city, they still retained their village traits of simplicity. Clan and surname associations remained strong and provided mutual help. Very few of them joined unions or political parties though they understood politics and followed it closely while shunning the limelight. The Chinese population in Singapore had suffered much hardship, particularly during the Japanese Occupation, and deserved to be heard. Also, they would not discriminate against others on grounds of race and religion (*Nanyang Siang Pau* 22 Sept 1951).

An evening paper pressed home their demographic dominance: Forming 70 % of the population, the Chinese could have ruined the celebrations by not showing their support. It also observed that if Chinese flags had been allowed side by side with the hundred or so Union Jacks that bedecked the City, 'its beauty would have been further enhanced' (*Nanfang Evening Post* 25 Sept 1951). The City Day celebrations brought to the surface calls from at least two segments of the population for greater political representation. English-speaking professionals like A.A. Sandosham spoke on behalf of the disadvantaged sections of the population, which he claimed local professionals like him could serve better than his colonial counterparts. Malayanization of the public service was a political demand which the colonial authorities found increasing impossible to stave off. Sandosham was to have a distinguished career in the University of Malaya and its successor institution, the University of Singapore.

The Chinese-speaking establishment leaders, whose views were heard through their presses, told another story. Their concern was with the political landscape with the departure of the British rulers. Their demands were similarly difficult to stave off: As they pointed out, they were the dominant majority population on the island, and their numbers would be decisive in any election with universal franchise when

they were given citizenship. However, as the beneficiaries of trade and colonialism, they were concerned with two main issues: that the economy would not be disrupted and that the position of the Chinese language and Chinese education not be threatened. Like the British, the Chinese community leaders had expected that they would carry the ground based on their traditional leadership position. The 1955 elections saw the majority of seats to the Legislative Assembly being elected ones, with the leader of the political party with the most seats forming the government, though colonial officials continued to hold the key portfolios and the governor retained reserve powers. Citizenship and franchise were liberalized, but English remained the sole language to be used in the Legislative Assembly. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce leadership launched a mass petition against this, pointing out that English would certainly decline in importance and usage once the British departed, but to no avail. The seemingly minor issue of having the Chinese flag flying with the Union Jack on City Day raised in the Chinese press was in fact pertinent to the question of British 'suspicion' of the loyalty of the Chinese in Singapore. That the 'Chinese flag' was that of the People's Republic of China (which the British gave official recognition to) did not help the case.

5.3 Rejecting the Colonial Modern

The colonial authorities made a ready association between the Chinese, in particular in the middle schools, and communism. The police raided Chinese High School and Nanyang Girls' School, the premier middle schools on May 30, 1950, hardly a fortnight after the splendor of Education Week and allegedly found communist literature on the premises. The two schools were closed, and teachers and students arrested. They were allowed to be reopened only after prolonged negotiations with the school management boards with conditions attached. Extracurricular activities and student organizations were not allowed, and the hostel remained closed.

Similarly, about a month after City Day, the colonial authorities faced a boycott by students taking the junior middle three examinations run by the Department of Education. The fate of the Chinese middle schools and Chinese education were the key issues of contention in Singapore politics in the first half of the 1950s. Prewar, the British had paid scant regard to Chinese schools, which were totally financed by the community and generally left to their own devices, unlike the English medium schools, which received generous government funding. After the war, a comprehensive ten-year plan for education was drawn up, which aimed to restructure the education system. It aimed to foster and extend the capacity for self-government by providing universal free education through the medium of the Chinese, Malay, Tamil, and English languages, recognizing the fundamental right of the ethnic groups to keep alive their ethnic languages, with English introduced as a subject from the third level of primary school. The philosophy behind this plan, which also included standardization of the curriculum, was based on the most advanced theories of pedagogy of the day as recognized at the

Imperial Education Conferences, which postulated that early education should be in the child's 'mother tongue.'

However, this plan was scuttled with the establishment of the communist government in China in 1949. The British in Malaya expected that this would deepen the influence of the Malayan Communist Party especially in Chinese medium schools and switched as fast as it could to an education policy which promoted English medium schools and the taking over of vernacular schools, in particular the Chinese medium schools by the Department of Education with the aim to phasing them out by mandating increased hours of instruction in English in their curriculum. This only increased the sense of discrimination against Chinese medium schools, which the Chinese community leaders and the students felt acutely (Hong 2011).

On May 13, 1954, Singapore witnessed the first physical confrontation between the Chinese middle school students and the riot police. About a thousand of the former, both male and female, had peacefully occupied the pavements across the road from Government House to await the outcome of a meeting between their representatives and the governor regarding the petition they had signed for exemption from national service, which they had to register before May 12, but which was extended by ten days. The students were unarmed, did not carry any placards, and did not sing songs or chant slogans. However, the riot police were called in, and the students were forcibly dispersed. Forty-eight of them were charged in court. The students petitioned for exemption on grounds that they were still schooling; the governor's failure to meet their representatives and the public display of state violence won the students much sympathy from the community. On 2 June, the students staged a mass camp-in at the Chinese High School, which lasted 22 days, during which they ran an orderly, well-organized routine of student life. The British sent community leaders who were school management committee members to negotiate with the students. They pleaded with the latter to disperse, or face the consequence of having the schools deregistered, and the fate of Chinese education hanging in balance. The students refused to give in and called an end to their gathering only when they were of the view that their demand, reduced from exemption to postponement of conscription, had been acceded to. The May 13 event marked the beginning of the mass anti-colonial movement in Singapore, in which the middle school students were to emerge in the forefront (Hong 2011). While ostensibly refusing to be conscripted as it disrupted their studies, the students were rejecting the legitimacy of a colonial government to demand conscription. The left-wing People's Action Party (PAP) which tapped into the student movements included this in its party platform when it was launched in November 1954.

However, it was not an exclusively all-Chinese middle schools' affair. The Socialist Club of the University of Malaya was in solidarity with them (Tan 2011). The editorial board of its organ, *Fajar* (Dawn), published the article 'Aggression in Asia' on May 10, 1954, protesting the formation of the military pact SEATO. The undergraduates were arrested and charged on May 28, 1954, two weeks following the May 13 event. The article had raised the question, 'How does it became "National Service" for a colonial people to be trained to fight wars in the making of

which they have no part—no choice of their foes or allies.' The Socialist Club claimed to stand with Republican India, the People's Republic of China, Republican Burma, and their allies in Asia and Africa, rather than Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai Shek, and Phibun Songgram, who stood for 'totalitarian tyranny.' Socialist Club members visited the Chinese High School during the camp-in and through the Pan-Malayan Students Federation publicized the event among international students' organizations (Poh et al. 2010).

The antipathy that the middle school students had for the colonial government was already palpable given the suspicion and neglect that they faced. The impact of the May 4 movement in China and the triumph of the CCP in October 1949 certainly cannot be underestimated, but it was local issues which consolidated the student anti-colonial movement. The anti-yellow culture movement of November 1953 came in the wake of a series of rape-murders which the police were unable to solve. When a victim turned out to be a schoolgirl, and the crime happened near a major police station, students in Chinese middle schools held meetings which teachers and principals were invited to address on the issue of yellow culture, i.e., pornographic materials which made their purveyors rich. The students staged ceremonies to burn these materials and in their analyses blamed their prevalence on the colonial capitalist system which did not brook any attempt to make a profit, especially when pornography took the minds of the poverty-stricken away from their miserable conditions. Out of the anti-yellow culture campaign, the students developed a sense of the need for a new Malayan literature, based on social realism, reflecting the dire conditions of the existence of the lower classes, offering a way out through stimulating the young to develop solidarity, promoting the burgeoning local trade union movement, and helping them to understand the forces of imperialism at play in society.

The anti-yellow culture movement was also the springboard for the consciousness of the backward position of females particularly in Chinese households. Traditional Chinese values which subordinated women were condemned. The new woman was deemed to be as enlightened and socially responsible as her male counterparts could be; progressive ideas of marriage were promoted, based on monogamy, freedom of choice in life partners, and a mutually respectful relationship (Hong 2011).

The middle school students also tried to present what they saw as wholesome culture in their school concerts, the most large scale being the one held in March 1954 to raise funds for the Nanyang University. Nanyang University, a totally community-funded institution, was the first in Southeast Asia to operate in the Chinese medium. The principal of Chinese High, in his foreword written for the concert program, declared that the university was necessary as Singapore and Malaya were on the cusp of attaining independence and needed many more university graduates. Nanyang University graduates, however, had the specific mission and role of reversing the ethnic divide in Singapore which resulted from colonial policy. Unlike the University of Malaya, which catered to the colonized elite, Nanyang belonged to the people and would run preparatory classes for candidates who failed the entrance examinations to resit them.

The sense of discrimination by the colonial government that the middle school students felt was palpable. One subject featured without fail in every graduation class yearbook throughout the 1950s: impending unemployment. By the mid-1950s, the magazines advised students not to despair. If they did not think only of their narrow personal interests, they would not hesitate to find work, though it might be as laborers or farmers, which, however, would bring them closer to the working class. Unemployment was not an individual issue, but a systemic one, the heart of which was the colonialism, along with the semifeudal values from traditional China. To them, the 1950s promised an age of progress and of democracy, for it was the tide of history (Chung Cheng High School 1959). The electrifying popular cry of that time was Merdeka—independence in Malay—and the middle school students were among the most enthusiastic in articulating the word. They had accepted that Malay was to be the national language of Singapore and Malaya, along which vernacular language and education would coexist, the rejection of English being most fundamental in the expulsion of the colonial and its replacement by nationhood, which the descendants of migrants would embrace (Chung Cheng High School 1959).

5.4 Emergency Without End

Thus far, the narrative has been of a fairly commonplace development. With empire on the decline, the British offer of a colonial modernity was no longer sufficient. The coterie of English-educated elite which it had groomed in the halls of the Legislative Council was completely in another world from the majority of the population: the Chinese-speaking masses. It was the Chinese middle school students and the trade unions which they supported which made connection with the workers, farmers, and unemployed. The students and unionists embraced a radical tradition that derived from China's anti-imperialist movement, just as the University Socialist Club stood for anti-colonialism and non-alignment. In November 1954, together with a group of graduates from British universities, they formed the People's Action Party (PAP), whose secretary-general was Lee Kuan Yew, the Cambridge-educated legal advisor to the Socialist Club and the Chinese middle school students, as well as a myriad of left-wing trade organizations. On the spectrum of political parties in Singapore in the 1950s, the PAP stood at the furthest to the left and was accused of being a front of the communists by the British and rival political parties. It was the PAP, with its mass base, which triumphed in the general election of 1959 where self-government was granted. Lee Kuan Yew accordingly became the country's first prime minister.

However, even though an outright left-wing anti-colonial party was in power, colonial modernity has survived and thrived in Singapore. To understand this, it is necessary to examine the fate of the left-wing student and trade union movement and its leaders in the second half of the 1950s and thereafter. In brief, they were eliminated from the political process through detention without trial, a sentence

allowed for under the state of emergency that had been declared in June 1948 and which has lived on in various legal mutations. The condition of emergency has been the rationale given for the continued suspension of the political manifestations of modernity in Singapore. The implementation of measures purportedly to forestall political disaster befalling the polity is what has fundamentally shaped the city-state.

The emergency was imposed on Malaya and Singapore in 1948, with the outlawing once again of the Malayan Communist Party, which was given recognition after the war for its role in partnering the British to fight the Japanese. In the Malay Peninsula, guerilla warfare ensued (a peace treaty formally ending in 1989), while in Singapore, the party went underground, ostensibly working through front organizations. Altogether about twelve hundred people were arrested in Singapore under the emergency regulations from 1948 to 1953, destroying the early radical parties, particularly the multiethnic Malayan Democratic Union (Turnbull 1980). The anti-colonial activities on the part of the middle school students were seen by the British as purely communist-directed, denying any grounds for the grievances that they voiced. This is a common cold war story which was part and parcel of decolonization in Southeast Asia. The anti-colonial movement in Singapore was crippled by the mass arrests of student and trade union leaders in 1956 and 1957 by chief minister by Lim Yew Hock, who had hoped to win the support of the British by taking a hard-line stand against the left. The most significant detainee was Lim Chin Siong, PAP assemblyman, and the trade union leader with a formidable mass following. He and other key left-wing PAP leaders were disqualified from running in the 1959 general election by a clause arrived at in the constitutional talks which barred political detainees from standing in that election. Even though Lee Kuan Yew ran on the highly popular platform that he would free the detainees if he were elected, the detainees remained in prison with the exception of Lim and seven other leading union leaders, whose releases were given great publicity.

Lim and the PAP left were expelled from the party by the Lee Kuan Yew group in 1961 for refusing to support the terms of merger which Lee proposed. While reunification with the peninsula was a goal which the people of Singapore looked forward to, the terms and conditions decided by the Federation's Tengku Abdul Rahman, the British, and Lee Kuan Yew were unclear and rushed through, to beat the 1963 election which the left was likely to prevail. Lee and the PAP would certainly lose electoral support should they arrest their former colleagues, and the Tengku exacted conditions favorable to the peninsula, including the incorporation of Sarawak and British North Borneo (Sabah) as well into Malaysia for agreeing to take Singapore in, despite his reservations that the island had too many Chinese and too many communists.

With their expulsion from PAP, Lim Chin Siong and his colleagues formed the Barisan Sosialis, which included 13 assemblymen and controlled the majority of the party's grass roots organizations. In February 1963, the British, Tengku, and Lee as members of the Internal Security Council launched Operation Cold Store, where more than one hundred leftists were detained, among them, Lim Chin Siong, and the majority of the Barisan's central executive committee members. The British

High Commissioner in Singapore had pointed out to the Internal Security Council that there was no evidence that Lim was a member of the Malayan Communist Party, or had acted unconstitutionally, but in the end he bowed to *realpolitik* (Jones 2000). The political detainees were once again unable to stand in the 1963 election, held seven months following their arrest. The Barisan Sosialis managed to put together a team of 46 candidates against the PAP's complete slate of 51 and garnered 34.7 % of the votes, which translated into 13 seats in the Assembly. This was followed closely by the arrests of Nanyang University student leaders and again in October 1963 of trade unionists, including three who had won seats in the September election. The government also closed down rural associations supportive of the Barisan and withdrew the registration of Barisan-led trade unions (Tan 2010).

Lim Chin Siong was released in 1969 at the age of 36, suffering from depression, and went into exile in Britain. His political career was destroyed. Those who held on by refusing to sign 'confessions' demanded of them to secure their release remained in detention for more than 20 years. They included former members of the Socialist Club, a prominent Malay journalist, and a Nanyang University graduate. Detentions without trial under the Internal Security Act continued in the 1960s and 1970s on allegations of communism and in one instance for chauvinism. The final arrest on communist charges was in 1987, the so-called Marxist Conspiracy, comprising lawyers, church workers, and other mostly English-educated professionals.[1]

The Barisan leadership, frustrated at the arrests with impunity of their elected National Assembly members, called for a boycott of parliament and resignation in protest by its elected members in 1966. It boycotted the 1968 general election, which, as it turned out, gave the PAP complete dominance in the legislature, a situation which ended only in 1981 when the party lost one seat in a by-election.

5.5 Asian Modernity

The coercive emergency internal security detentions by and large took care of individuals whom the party-state fingered as subversives, but in time they needed to be accompanied by a positive doctrine that explained the desirability of a one-party dominant political system. To Lee in retrospect, the Barisan boycott of parliament was 'a stroke of destiny' as the absence of an opposition allowed the ruling party to focus on economic and social development unhindered and undistracted by politicking (Yap et al. 2009). In the almost half a century since then, the Internal Security Act which allowed for detention without trial remains, as does the provision that the two-yearly renewals could go on indefinitely. In the meantime, the

[1]This mass arrest was the least convincing event at the time. In a publication marking the 50th anniversary of the PAP, it is revealed that a key cabinet minister resigned 5 years after the 'Marxist Conspiracy' arrests for he was not comfortable with the way the PAP government had dealt with the group. He did not resign immediately as the differences that he had with the government 'were not so sharp' (Yap et al. 2009). One of the detainees has written about her detention (Teo 2010).

ruling PAP has turned one-party rule into what it preached as a prerequisite for the country's much admired Asian modernity. In 'Asian' terms, it is the rule by enlightened and capable leadership, co-opted and groomed within the dominant political party itself.

As Lee Kuan Yew explained when introducing the principles of an 'Asian' political system in the early 1990s, a country must first have economic development, which required political stability and a disciplined population. Democracy came later. He gave this argument a culturalist logic: 'As an Asian of Chinese cultural background, my values are for a government which is honest, effective and efficient in protecting its people, and allowing opportunities for all to advance themselves in a stable and orderly society' (Han et al. 1998). Political stability was the requisite for economic development, which a liberal democratic system could not ensure, given that 'the losing side has been unwilling to accept the results of an election, and instead continued to agitate and oppose both inside and outside their legislative assemblies' (Han et al. 1998). However, Lee recognized that once a certain level of education and financial well-being of the population had been reached, the people would need some form of representative government, 'however chosen,' for them to forge a new consensus, a social compact, on how society settles the trade-off between further economic progress and individual freedoms (Han et al. 1998).

By the early 1980s, Lee deemed that Singapore had weathered the vulnerability of the preceding two decades when the country went through the dislocation caused by the withdrawal of the British military bases and the attendant loss of jobs and the transformation from being largely a trading port to one that included a substantial industrial sector. 'Light [had begun] to show at the end of the tunnel' (*Straits Times* 16 Nov 1984). That also meant that the demand for greater participation in politics could be expected to ensue.

A number of measures were introduced to defuse and manage the anticipated demands for a more open political system from an increasingly well-educated electorate. In the four elections from 1968 to 1980, the PAP was unchallenged in a substantial number of constituencies and won in all those contested. In 1980 for instance, it had had walkovers in 37 out of the 75 parliamentary seats and with opposition parties garnering only 21.3 % of total votes cast. In 1984, the government introduced the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) scheme after losing the landmark 1981 by-election. The scheme provided for up to three of best performers among the losing candidates to enter parliament, in an effort to meet the demand for opposition representation, without any loss of seats for the ruling party. As it turned out, two opposition candidates won their seats in the election held that year.

In 1990, the first batch of Nominated Members of Parliament (NMP) was named. They were non-partisan individuals appointed by parliament as members of the House. The NCMP and NMP schemes had the common purpose of rendering a total victory of the PAP less unpalatable for there would still be non-PAP voices in parliament even if this happened.

The even more novel Group Representation Constituency (GRC) scheme had come into effect in 1988. Voters in these constituencies chose a team of candidates

ranging from three to six members from the same party. These had to comprise at least one non-ethnic Chinese candidate in the team. The government reasoned that standing on their own, Malay, Indian, or Eurasian candidates would find it impossible to win, as the electorate in all the constituencies by this time was overwhelmingly Chinese, who, as the argument went, would always vote along ethnic lines. The perception of ethnicity as the dominant marker of identity in Singapore was underwritten by the racial classifications of colonial governance, manifested in postcolonial Singapore as state multiculturalism, which 'institutionalized colonial racial identities and woven them into the fabric of political and social life to the extent that they constitute common sense through which people conceive identities of themselves and others' (Goh and Holden 2009).

The PAP government kept the Chinese/Malay/Indian/Others ethnic distinctions which colonial rule had devised that essentialized and differentiated them in terms of governance. The postcolonial state saw 'race' as a divisive factor, which its public housing program and education policies were in the forefront of counteracting. Vernacular schools were eliminated, settlements, largely semirural ones where Malays in particular were present in significant numbers were 'redeveloped,' and its residents moved to public housing estates. In 1989, a quota based on ethnicity was introduced, where even the housing block was to be monitored to ensure that 'racial enclaves' would not be formed. Thus, Malays, forming 15.1 % of the population in 1988, were limited to 22 % living in a particular precinct and 25 % in a particular public housing apartment block in the name of racial integration (*Straits Times* 19 Feb 1989). The Group Representation Constituency scheme was thus meant to ameliorate the electoral effects of this policy. However, it also allowed for little known and untested new candidates, including Chinese ones, to become members of parliament on the strength of being part of a team led by an established cabinet minister, for example.

The initiatives to hold at bay the anticipated thirst for greater political participation on the part of a better educated and more prosperous electorate on the whole worked well. Opposition parties won a record of four single-constituency seats in 1991, but this dwindled to two in the 1997, 2001, and 2006 elections. The state-defined Asian modernity of paternalistic authoritarianism delivering an impressive economic transformation of the city-state seemed to have been given popular mandate, aided by a degree of aversion against participating in oppositional politics given the fate of those who did and were made bankrupt from libel suits against them for defaming PAP leaders.

5.6 A Migrant Nation

In his telling of Singapore's past, Lee has structured the story of a vulnerable polity without the attributes of nationhood, making a success of itself based on 'a stroke of luck, plus hard work, plus an imaginative, original team' (*Straits Times* 16 Jan 2011). The 1950s is almost 'pre-Singapore,' the premodern 'other' of chaos and the

savagery of communism which had to be defeated for the emergence of the modern city-state. The anti-colonialism of that period of which he was the leading voice in the legislature, and his mass popularity second only to his fellow PAP member Lim Chin Siong, from the Chinese stream, has been erased and replaced by the theme of anti-communism.

In the 1950s, it was Lee who made the most trenchant arguments in the legislature about simply labeling communism for anti-colonialism and condemning the use of the emergency regulations. The nationalism that pervaded the 1950s, a key aspect of which was the working out by Chinese school students—for instance of what it meant for them to be Malayan, how Chinese language and culture could flow into the enrichment of a 'Malayan culture,' how to end the racial divides imposed by colonialism, how to end the exploitation of the working classes, what economic model should the new society be adopting—all these discussions were forgotten and repudiated even before they had a chance to germinate. Those who participated in these debates and explorations were condemned as dangerous subversives. In his memoir, Lee has said that he and his coterie in the PAP had been extremely naïve to believe as they did then that they were then dealing with idealistic, righteous students instead of communist digits. He called himself 'ignorant, gullible and stupid' on this score, but at the same time explained that he had to 'harness some of these dynamic young people to his cause for it to succeed' (Lee 1998).

Since then, Lee has taken over the discourse and principles of colonial modernity, in positing the threat of villainous communists and the necessity of using the Internal Security Act. In the normalization of emergency conditions in Singapore, political participation on the part of the citizenry has been circumscribed; the party-state, rather than the electorate, was given the task of 'preventing duds' getting into parliament. The model of colonial modernity is postulated as the *sine qua non* for the very survival of the immigrant city as nation-state. The success of Singapore as a global city has certainly given much credence to it. The boast of having brought Singapore from a Third to a First World sums this up, where the latter is defined by economic growth, efficiency of the civil service and provision of infrastructure and social amenities, absence of official corruption, areas in which the country routinely was among the top performers in international rankings. Explained as an Asian modernity, the Singapore system has presented itself as a model, particularly for non-Western societies without a liberal democratic tradition emerging into the globalized system, or as one journalist put it: 'a clean city, developed economy, incorrupt government and, best of all, a one-party system without Western-style democracy' (Peh 2012).

Singapore's current and third prime minister has reiterated the wisdom of his elders in the lead up to the May 2011 general election that 'there is simply not enough talent to form two "A" teams to govern Singapore well, when a small country like Singapore has to have the strongest possible team to compete globally.'

However, the election produced 'shock' results by Singapore standards. For the first time since it was introduced in 1988, the ruling party lost a Group Representation Constituency; all at once, five Workers' Party members became

MPs for Aljunied GRC, in the process defeating two cabinet ministers and a senior minister of state who was slated to be Speaker of the House. Among the other 'firsts' which typified the 2011 elections, the PAP obtained a 60.14 % win, its lowest since Singapore became independent in 1965, and was faced with the most credible new opposition candidates ever, an unprecedented number who were at least a match to the PAP candidates in terms of academic qualifications and work experience.

The triumphant Workers' Party, which won 6 parliamentary seats, had called for voters to support its striving for 'a first world parliament,' with its slogan, 'For People, For Nation, For Future.' One 'hot button' issue during the election was the number of foreigners that the government was allowing into Singapore. The promigrant policy to bring in 'foreign talent' to keep the economy competitive globally meant that one out of every four persons residing in Singapore was a foreigner. This had implications at least in popular perception on the competition for jobs, cost of housing, and straining of the transport system but above all societal ambivalence and angst across Singapore society about the meaning of nationhood and citizenship (Tan 2011).

Significantly, a postelection issue unrelated to the usual economic issues has gained unprecedented attention. It has to do with heritage. Government plans to do away with Bukit Brown, a cemetery with about 100,000 graves within 0.9 m^2 of land. The oldest tombstone is that of a person who died in 1833 and was reburied there when the original cemetery where he was interred was redeveloped. Bukit Brown cemetery functioned from 1922 to 1973. Bukit Brown, the last cemetery of significant size left in the country, was earmarked for residential use as part of the Urban Redevelopment Authority's Concept plan 2001. However, groups have emerged a decade later, urging for Bukit Brown cemetery to be recognized as a heritage site. A representative argument put forward to counter the government's refrain that the choice was between looking after the dead, or the housing needs of future generations, called this a false dichotomy, for 'keeping these sites the way they are is about who we are and want to be as Singaporeans, about what we value and how we connect to our nation' (*Today* 10 March 2012).

When the government confirmed that its plan to cut a road across part of the cemetery would proceed with immediate effect, with some adjustments to lessen the numbers of graves to be exhumed, and the construction of a bridge along part of the road to benefit the fauna in the wooded area, the civil society groups called for a moratorium on Bukit Brown. They pointed out that national discussions were underway over housing, transportation, and immigration, and called for studies of biodiversity and hydrology, as well as projections on housing and transport and the optimum population size, so that the people could study the proposal in detail (*Straits Times* 20 March 2012).

In the civil society groups' discourse, the developmentalist state was challenged for being driven only by market considerations in a globalized world economy and failing to understand nationhood. Citizenry whose memory of what to them made Singapore home, who treasured the constantly diminishing presence of landscapes they grew up with, articulated the vocabulary of identity, heritage, and belonging.

At the same time, the government was also challenged on what it deemed it did best: long-term vision and planning. It was questioned on whether the 'common sense' it imbibed of more roads and housing for an enlarged population derived from immigration was the only option.

The modernity of the global city that the party-state envisaged refused to recognize the contradictions that it faced in terms of nationhood and belonging, circumscribing the 'Asian' elements to mean political, social, and cultural docility to its explication of the label. As with the colonial regime, such a top-down approach to modernity meets its limits in the organic demands of its citizens for accountability to their understanding of what citizenship of a modern state meant.

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Chapter 6
Whose Home? Cultural Pluralism and Preservation of Japanese Colonial Heritage in Taipei City

Hiroko Matsuda

Abstract The government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) used to state that the purpose of cultural heritage preservation was to promote Chinese civilization. Today, however, it is said that the purpose of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act is to promote the multicultural environment of the country. The aim of this paper is to examine how examples of Japanese colonial heritage are preserved and reused against the backdrop of recent trends of cultural pluralism and consumerism in contemporary Taiwan. None of the Japanese-style architecture was officially recognized as part of the cultural heritage until the early 1990s in Taiwan. However, in recent years, Japanese-style residential houses dominate officially recognized cultural heritage in Taipei City. With a particular focus on Japanese-style residential homes located on Qing-tian Street in Taipei City, the paper explores how residents of the street came to recognize that the old wooden houses, some still in use, are worth preserving and developed the movement for preserving both the houses and their surrounding scenery. Through analyzing the transition of Japanese colonial heritage in Taipei City, the paper demonstrates how interpretations of Japanese colonial heritage in the city are negotiated among the varied interests of heritage owners, neighbors, local governments, and private enterprises that repurpose historical buildings for commercial uses. I argue that contemporary cultural pluralism and consumerism not only recognize diverse cultural heritages left by various ethnic groups in Taiwan's history, but also allow people to maintain flexible interpretations of particular historical buildings.

6.1 Introduction

Although contemporary Taiwan's ethnicity seems to be predominantly Chinese and rather homogeneous, several different racial and ethnic groups have resided there throughout history. The first settlers were the aborigines, who compose approximately

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2 % of the population today. In the seventieth century, the Dutch East Indies Company occupied southern Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Spanish, who had already occupied the Philippines, built their commercial base in the northern part. Although none of these European colonists remained in Taiwan for more than forty years, their settlements attracted Chinese mainlanders to move over to the island. Even after Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong) expelled the Dutch in 1662, the Chinese population constantly increased between the seventieth and nineteenth centuries. The Qing Dynasty destroyed Koxinga in 1684 and ruled the island until it was ceded to Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Japanese rule lasted for fifty years and brought a number of civilian Japanese to Taiwan. Then, Taiwan was once again turned over to the Chinese government after Word World II. About 480,000 Japanese, including both civilians and militants, left for Japan, and over a million of Chinese immigrants moved over to the island instead.

Today, legacies of various ethnic and racial groups' settlements can be observed in the form of historical architecture and ruins across the island. In particular, Japanese colonial heritages that were newer than those of the Dutch and Spanish can be found across the island, and some of them are still in use either as public buildings or as private properties. Japanese colonialism brought a number of Japanese civilian settlers to Taiwan, and the Japanese population increased to over 400,000 by the end of World War II. Hence, Japanese colonial heritages in Taiwan included not only public buildings such as the colonial government's office, but also a number of regular accommodations that were resided by civilian settlers.

The aim of this paper is to examine how Japanese-style houses that used to be resided by civilian settlers are recognized as cultural heritage in contemporary Taiwan. With a particular focus on Japanese-style residential houses located on Qing-tian Street of Taipei City, this paper explores how residents of the Street came to recognize that the old wooden houses, some of which are still in use, are worth preservation. It also explores how the movement for preserving the houses and surrounding scenery was developed. Due to the success of the residential movement, some of the Japanese-style houses were officially appointed as cultural heritage—"*guji*" meaning "Monument" or "*lishi jianju*" meaning "Historical Building"—and the area was recognized as the special district for the preservation of landscape. One of the appointed houses, under the management of National Taiwan University, was renovated for adaptive reuse and opened as a restaurant in 2011. In exploring the transition of the officially appointed cultural heritage, the last part of the paper discusses how the private accommodation was transformed to become a heritage and commercially oriented public space.

Scholars of heritage studies have been increasingly interested in colonial heritages in East Asia. Yet, studies are inclined to heritages in Singapore and Hong Kong.[1] Taiwan's Japanese colonial heritages have been less known to the rest of

[1]Recent studies on heritages in Hong Kong and Singapore include Henderson (2008, 2011), Beaumont (2009), and Ku (2010).

the world.[2] In fact, Taiwanese scholars have paid special attention to Qing-tian Street's Japanese-style houses and the residential movement. Some of these previous works examine the transformation of Japanese houses from the architects' viewpoint,[3] and others analyze policies and community activities toward the preservation of the Japanese-style houses.[4] However, the previous studies only examined the transformation of houses and the development of preservation until some of the houses were appointed as Monument or Historical Building in 2006. Based on my field research between September 2006 and July 2007, and several short-term visits including interviews with the street's residents between August 2008 and May 2012, my study covers the recent development that took place after the Street was appointed as the special district for the preservation of landscape.

As Laurajane Smith suggests, heritage is not merely a physical place; rather, it is "a cultural process that engages with acts of remembering that work to create ways to understand and engage with the present, and the sites themselves are cultural tools that can facilitate, but are not necessarily vital for, this process" (Smith 2006). Japanese-style accommodations that were built during the Japanese colonial period had been perceived for decades as no more than regular accommodations of private individuals. This paper examines the cultural process that made the Qing-tian Street's accommodations cultural heritage and demonstrates how the meaning of cultural heritage continues to change under the dynamic economic, social, and political climate of contemporary Taiwan.

6.2 Cultural Heritages in Contemporary Taiwan

In 1945, based on the agreement made at the Cairo Conference, the mainlander-controlled Kuomintang (KMT) regime began to rule the native population of Taiwan. In 1949, the KMT lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and took refuge in Taiwan, while maintaining the national title

[2]Recent studies on Taiwan's heritages published in English include Chen and Chen (2010), Wang and Lee (2008), and Wang (2004).

[3]Architects' studies on Qing-tian Street's Japanese-style houses include Kuo Yawen, Takada Mitsuko, and Shimizu Takafumi, "Nihon tôchi jiki ni okeru Shôwachô no keisei katei to Nihonjin kyojûsha ni yoru kyojû jôkyô [A Study on the Formation of Showa-cho and the Living Conditions of Japanese Residents during the Japanese Colonial Period: A study on the Transformation of the Living Space of Japanese-style Houses in Taiwan]," *Nihon kenchiku gakkai keikakukei ronbunshû* [Journal of Architecture and Planning, Architectural Institute of Japan]74–640 (2009): 1297-1305.

[4]Studies on Qing-tian Street's Japanese colonial heritage include Kuo Lixue, "Taibei-shi Wenzhou-jie, Qing-tian-jie shequ wenhua zichan baocun gongzuo tantao [A Study on the Preservation of Cultural Properties: the Cases of Wenzhou Street and Qingtian Street Communities]" (Master diss., National Taiwan Normal University, 2007); Zuo Xiangju and "Guji baocun zuowei yizhong kongjiande shehui shengchan [Historic Building Conservation as Social Production of Space: the Movement of Japanese Style Building Conservation in Qingtian Street, Taipei]" (Master diss., National Taiwan University, 2006).

"Republic of China" or ROC. In stressing the ROC's role as the true heir to the orthodox Chinese tradition and to defend its political legitimacy, the government rapidly and forcefully promoted "Mandarinization" over the island, which had been under the strong influence of Japanese assimilation policy.

During the 1950s and the 1960s, the KMT government paid attention to some historical sites in order to attract international tourists. However, the government was less interested in preserving Taiwan's local historical sites and instead built a number of buildings in the classic Chinese architecture style that represents Taipei as the center of Chinese politics. Thus, the idea of heritage preservation had not been developed until the mid-1970s, when Taiwan's intellectuals were increasingly concerned about their own local traditions and cultural properties. Taiwan's intellectual atmosphere was certainly under the influence of the global trend that people in industrial nations ought to reappraise native traditions and local culture. Moreover, economic development and improvement in living standards made common people more interested in leisure and cultural activities in the late 1970s (Chen 2006).

Despite the social concern for local traditions and culture, preservation of cultural heritage had not been institutionalized until the 1980s. Nonetheless, the government had revealed its own idea about Taiwanese cultural heritage. Historical sites and properties that represent how Chinese crossed the Strait and were developed in Taiwan during the Qing period were considered worth preserving by the government. On the other hand, the government ordered the removal of any building and monument that was considered to represent Japanese imperialistic ideas including Japanese shrines and monuments of Japanese political figures (Chen 2006).

In 1981, the Council for Cultural Affair (CCA) was established, followed by the enactment of Cultural Heritage Preservation Act in 1982 and Enforcement Rules of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act in 1984. Since then, the government has been actively working for preservation of cultural heritage. Yet, as the KMT government maintained its conventional notion of cultural heritage, only historical sites, buildings, and other cultural properties that originated in the time before Qing period were recognized as cultural heritage. Thus, those originating in the Japanese colonial period were excluded from the list of cultural heritage preservation (Chen 2006).

The notion of cultural heritage has radically changed against the backdrop of Taiwan's political trends since the late 1980s: democratization and "Taiwanization[5]" of ROC. Taiwanization of ROC means the fall of the ideology that KMT is the only legitimate government to rule over China (Wakabayashi 2008). First, Taiwanization was partly promoted by the international environment of the 1970s. As the ROC lost the recognition of international societies, many of which came to establish diplomatic relationships with the People's Republic of China, it became hard for the KMT government to identify itself as the single

[5]In this article, the meaning of "Taiwanization" is "*bentufa,*" commonly used in Taiwan.

legitimate Chinese government. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the KMT government, under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo, slowly reformed its political structure and policy to adopt the reality that its control was only effective for Taiwan island and its surrounding islands.

Democratization in the 1980s and the eventual lift of martial law in 1987 accelerated the further Taiwanization of the ROC. The rise of Taiwanese national consciousness has demonstrated two dimensions: integration and diversification. Until the early 1980s, the KMT government had vigorously promoted the cultural policy of Mandarinization, which is based on the political imagination of unification between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. Taiwanization of the ROC formed the alternative national imagination that Taiwan is the single autonomous unit and that it is comprised of several different groups of people. Cultural pluralism had finally become the mainstream discourse in the mid-1990s (Lu 2002). In 1997, the fourth revision of the Constitution made the additional statement, "the State affirms cultural pluralism and shall actively preserve and foster the development of aboriginal languages and cultures" (Office of the President 2012). In summary, democratization and Taiwanization of the ROC created the alternative identity that Taiwan is composed of groups with different cultural backgrounds, and these groups should be equally recognized in the society.

Democratization and Taiwanization of ROC radically changed the cultural heritage preservation. First, as cultural pluralism has become the mainstream discourse of Taiwan's society and politics, local and rural culture that used to be downgraded under the Sino-centric ideology is now considered the essential part of Taiwanese culture (Lu 2002). Second, whereas the central government used to be the single and foremost authority to recognize what are cultural heritages of Taiwan, local governments and local communities have come to play a major role in preservation and management of cultural heritages. Since the city government at the direct municipality level and the county (city) government at the county (city) level were recognized as the competent authority of cultural heritages in 1997, the Taipei Municipal Government, under the leadership of Chen Shui-bian, swiftly appointed a number of architectures that were built during the Japanese colonial time as either Monument or Historical Building (Chen 2006).

Furthermore, empowerment of local communities greatly moved heritage preservations forward. In 1994, CCA implemented the Integrated Community-Making Program (*shequ zongti yingzao*), which created the new wave of community development throughout Taiwan. The idea of community building itself was not new to Taiwan, since it was introduced in the 1960s. However, no matter how the government adopted community development policies, lack of political freedom made it difficult for people to actively join community activities. In refreshing the conventional notion of community development, the Integrated Community-Making Program stresses people's spontaneous participations and democratic decision-making (Huang 2010). Indeed, the government's policy change on local communities was the reaction to a variety of community movements that became active during the time of democratization. Rather than suppressing local groups that could be the political threats to the existing regime, the KMT government chose to

intervene in community initiatives and integrate them into the political project (Wakabayashi 2008). Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which took over the government for the first time in 2000, succeeded the Integrated Community-Making Program. In 2002, the "Plans for New Home Community Building" (*xin guxiang shequ yingzao jihua*) was formally included in the DPP government's national development plan entitled "Challenge 2008—Plans for National Development" (Council for Economic Planning and Development 2012).

Having been empowered by the Integrated Community-Making Program, local communities became active agencies to claim their cultural rights to preserve, maintain, and utilize cultural properties in their own living environments. Residential movement for preserving Japanese-style residences on Qing-tian Street is one case showing community initiatives in heritage preservation. The following sections illustrate the historical background of Japanese-style residences on the Street and then explore how heritage preservation is integrated into community development empowered by the Integrated Community-Making Program.

6.3 Making Japanese Professors' Community

By November 2011, 150 Monuments and 160 Historical Buildings were officially appointed in Taipei City, of which 16 Monuments and 44 Historical Buildings are Japanese-style accommodations that were built during the colonial time (Department of Cultural Affairs 2012). This indicates that Japanese-style residences comprise a great deal of Taipei's officially recognized cultural heritages.

From the outset of the Japanese rule, the central government affirmed Japanese settlements and launched several reclamation projects in Taiwan. However, as the government-led migration projects were never successful, farmers accounted for only a small percentage of the Japanese population in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the civilian Japanese population steadily increased without any institutional initiatives. By 1930, the Japanese population increased to approximately 230,000, which accounted for about 5 % of the total population. A majority of Japanese immigrants were associated with public service or commerce and industry. In 1930, 40 % of the Japanese workers were either public servants or freelancers, and 38 % were associated with commerce and industry (Taiwan Sôtokufu 1934).

In 1930, Taipei City accommodated approximately 68,000 Japanese (Taiwan Sôtokufu 1934). The city was largely divided into residential areas comprised of the Taiwanese and Japanese, although the borderline between these two areas was unclear and overlapped. While Taiwanese have been concentrated in the west side that was developed before the Japanese colonization, Japanese tend to reside in the central part as well as the east and south sides of the city. Since the 1920s, educational institutions, including Taihoku College (*Taihoku Kôtô Gakkô*), Taihoku College of Commerce (*Taihoku Kôtô Shôgyô Gakkô*), and Taihoku Imperial University (*Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku*), have been concentrated in the eastern part of the city. Accordingly, teachers, professors, and their families have tended to live

in the area. Qing-tian Street used to be commonly known as *Showa-chô* (Showa Ward). In the 1920s, the area was developed mainly to be the residential district for professors and teachers of Taihoku College of Commerce, Taihoku College, and Taihoku Imperial University, although residents included teachers of other schools, public officials, and other professionals (Kuo 2009).

Development of Taiwan's higher education during the 1920s was inseparable from the southward expansion policies of Japan. Taihoku College of Commerce,[6] which was founded in 1919, aimed particularly to bring up businesspersons who could have success in Southern China and Southeast Asia (Taiwan Kyôikukai 1995). Since the time of foundation in 1928, Taihoku Imperial University has highly emphasized Taiwan's politico-geographic advantage and advocated its unique mission of promoting sciences on in the tropics and subtropics, including Southern China and Southeast Asia (Taiwan Kyôikukai 1995). Many of the Showa Ward residents moved over to Taipei, because they were attracted by the Taiwan's politico-geographic advantage to develop researches on tropical sciences (Kuo 2009).

The residents of Showa Ward included a number of prominent figures including Utsushikawa Nenozô[7] and Iso Eikichi[8]—both of them known as the scientists who greatly impacted the science and agriculture of modern Taiwan. Many of the residents built their houses with an intention of settling down in Taiwan for good. Thus, every house was well designed with good quality and demonstrated owner's individual tastes and preferences. Typically, a residence of Showa Ward was a one-story house, being made of *hinoki* wood, which was considered the best material for Japanese-style houses (Kuo 2009). After Japan lost WWII, the KMT government seized the residences in the Showa Ward. Most of the residents left Taiwan between 1946 and 1947. A few residents remained because they were ordered by the KMT government to remain in Taiwan for specific purposes. Japanese professors lost positions at the schools, and ethnic Han Chinese scholars then took most of these positions. The Showa Ward remained a residential area for professors of the University, yet it was renamed "Qing-tian Street" after the Qing-tian prefecture of Zhejiang Province of mainland China (Chen 2002).

Under the KMT government, most of the Japanese statues, shrines, and sites that represented Japanese colonial legacies were destroyed, but Japanese-style houses

[6]Taihoku College of Commerce was originally founded in 1919 with the title of Taiwan Governor General College of Commerce (*Taiwan Sôtokufu Kôtô Shôgyô Gakkô*); later, it was renamed at the time Tainan College of Commerce was established in 1926.

[7]Utsushikawa Nenozô (1884–1947) was originally from Fukushima prefecture. He was awarded his doctoral degree at Harvard University and had taught at several different schools including Keio University and Taipei College (*Taihoku Kôtô Gakkô)* before obtaining the professorship at the Department of Ethnology of Taipei Imperial University.

[8]Iso Eikichi (1886–1972) was born in Hiroshima prefecture and awarded his doctoral degree from Tôhoku Imperial University. He devoted himself to improve species of Japonica rice in Taiwan and succeeded in generating the very famous Hôrai rice. After WWII, he worked as the special advisor for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry under the ROC government and moved back to Japan in 1957.

remained and were occupied by either native Taiwanese or new settlers from mainland China. Zuo Xiangju points out that Japanese-style houses were left untouched because Taipei City suffered a serious housing shortage immediately after World War II (Zuo 2006). Indeed, because over a million Chinese mainlanders along with the KMT government moved over to Taiwan, the population of Taipei City almost doubled in ten years.

Today, more than 60 years after the war, Qing-tian Street is one section of the administrative district called Long-an Li (Village), of the greater Da-an District in Taipei City. In January 2012, Long-an Village was comprised of 3440 households and 8083 residents (Taipei Municipal Government 2012). Qing-tian Street covers approximately one-third of Long-an Village. The backgrounds of the Street's residents are diverse. There are still a significant number of professors and lecturers of the National Taiwan University in the area, but it can no longer be called primarily a residential area for high-ranking professors. Nevertheless, the Street is distinctive, as Japanese-style residences in good condition are concentrated in this neighborhood. According to the research conducted by the Taipei Municipal Government in 1999, about 80 percent of the Japanese-style residences are located in either Zhong-zheng, Zhong-shan, or Da-an districts. In 2000, 1,224 Japanese-style residences were recognized in these three districts at the heart of Taipei City (Taipei Municipal Government Civil Administration Office 2000). In 2007, 35 Japanese-style residences were recognized on Qing-tian Street (You 2007).

6.4 Community Movement and Colonial Heritage

Some residents might have been aware that Qing-tian Street had maintained a distinctive atmosphere with Japanese-style residences and big old trees planted in their gardens. Yet, the Japanese-style houses never drew particular attention until the Street's residents inaugurated the community movement in the early 2000s. Until the 1990s, similarly to other average residential areas of Taipei City, Qing-tian Street's community ties were weak, and there was no strong sense of solidarity among neighbors. However, in December 2002, several local residents of the neighborhood held a community event that appealed to the other residents and encouraged them to conserve the community environment. This inaugural event was promoted by a couple of neighbors who had attended a community workshop coordinated by the Institute for Environmental Education at National Taiwan Normal University and Taipei Wen-shan Community College (Research Institute of Environment Education 2003).

The workshop, which was held from August to November 2002, was entitled "Let's Begin a Green Community—Da'an District Urban Planning and Community Development." It guided students through the natural environment, history, and culture of the neighborhood, as well as the procedure for green community development. Through the lectures and field trips organized by the workshop, two of the students who lived near Qing-tian Street realized that Long-an Village,

including Qing-tian Street, was full of invaluable old trees that are rarely found in the rest of Taipei City. Hence, immediately after the completion of the workshop, they threw an educational event entitled "Discover Green Treasures of Long-an Village" and appealed to residents to protect the invaluable old trees in the neighborhood (Research Institute of Environment Education 2003).

Having been influenced by the inaugural community event, the chief of Long-an Village, as well as several local residents in the neighborhood, started to gather regularly beginning in April 2003. They met in order to discuss community development, which included conserving the old trees. Approximately 30 residents attended the inaugural meeting and discussed the various problems the community faced. In addition to discussing issues such as the noise pollution and the maintenance of the old trees, they agreed to continue considering what made up the outstanding character of their community. In the second meeting, the group named themselves the "Qing-tian Community Development Workshop." With the intention of developing community activity, they formed their agenda with the "Qing-tian Green Shade Recovery Project" and applied for a subsidy from the Department of Cultural Affairs of the Taipei Municipal Government. In August 2003, the project was granted $220,000 (TW), which is equivalent to about $8000 (US) (Research Institute of Environment Education 2003).

In discussing how to preserve the old trees in the neighborhood, the members of Qing-tian Community Development Workshop reached the conclusion that they needed to preserve the Japanese-style residences that were built in the 1920s and 1930s. This was not only because most of the old trees were in fact planted in the spacious gardens of these Japanese-style residences, but also because the Japanese-style residences create the unique atmosphere of the neighborhood. Meanwhile, the Japanese-style residences of Qing-tian Street also drew attention from Taiwan's central government. In 2002, the Ministry of Finance established the National Assets Operation and Management Committee in order to improve the management of national properties and ratified the "Regulation for Unused or Inefficiently Used Public Properties" (Ministry of Finance 2012). The KMT government appropriated the Street's Japanese-style residences in 1945, and many of them have been under the management of National Taiwan University. Efficiency of the property use was questioned, as some of the old residences were unoccupied, and a single family or a couple occupied others (Zhou 2003a). It should be noted that the land price of Qing-tian Street was rapidly increasing at that time, and there was potential for the National Taiwan University to earn more by demolishing the old Japanese-style residences and building high-rise apartments in their place.

The Qing-tian Community Development Workshop opposed the governmental plan of demolishing the Japanese-style residences because the preservation of the Japanese-style residences was crucial to maintaining the unique atmosphere of the community and preserving a green environment in the neighborhood. One of the community activists commented, "The government considers the Japanese-style houses are 'inefficiently used', but their values are priceless—they are the site of architectural history, colonial history as well as the collective memory—they create the unique historic atmosphere. Moreover, the Street's green environment is

invaluable from the ecological viewpoint. It makes up for the green shortage of urban life" (Zhou 2003b). Another activist, who has resided on the Street since he was teenaged, said, "My childhood memory will disappear!" (Zhou 2003b). Since the residents realized that the Japanese-style residences were at risk of demolition, they started to stress the value of these Japanese-style residences even though their initial goal was to maintain a green community and improve their living environment.

The Qing-tian Street's residential movement demonstrates the multiple faces of community development along with heritage preservation in contemporary Taipei city. First, although the Street's residents are the ones who proposed the issues and moved the residential movement forward, the local government and the community college (*shequ daxue*) played a significant role in initiating and developing the community activity. Second, residents claim to preserve the Japanese colonial heritages not necessarily because they are nostalgic about the colonial past, but because these colonial heritages are located in the midst of their living environment, thus composing some residents' childhood memories. This nostalgic feeling is well represented in the residents' expression, "my childhood memory will disappear!" (Zhou 2003b). Third, in Taipei City, protection of natural environment is an integral part of cultural heritage preservation. Indeed, protection of old trees in the city is integrated into the cultural heritage preservation in Department of Cultural Affairs of Taipei Municipal Government (Taipei Municipal Government 2012a). It should be noted that residents of the Street, which is in walking distance to National Taiwan University and National Taiwan Normal University, tend to have strong educational and economic backgrounds. Hence, they are likely to be keen on their own living environment being positive. In fact, one of the most active residents is a female teacher who teaches biology at high school and thus is fairly knowledgeable about the Street's natural environment. Another active resident, who later became the president of Association for Qing-tian Community Development, majored in environmental studies in the USA, making him concerned about the neighborhood's environmental issues.[9] This indicates that preservation of the Japanese colonial heritages was intrinsic to active residents' serious concern about the community environment.

6.5 Cultural Significance

As noted in the previous section, the KMT government had recognized only those buildings that originated in the time before the Japanese colonial period as being worth preservation. It was also stated that cultural heritages should represent the Chinese ancestors' past legacies of developing the island since the Qing Dynasty. According to the Enforcement Rules of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act that

[9]Interview by the author, April 6, 2010.

was enacted in 1984, the title of Monument should be appointed based on these criteria: (a) holds historical, cultural, artistic, scientific, monumental, and other academic significance; (b) how long ago it was created; (c) relates to an important historical event or person; (d) represents particular techniques and style of an era and region; (e) quantity; (f) condition of preservation; (g) size; and (h) environment (Weng 2009).

Yet, the idea of cultural heritage in Taiwan has been radically changed over the last twenty years. Taiwan has increased the number of officially recognized cultural heritage sites in recent years. The critical moment occurred when *Zitenglu* Tea House—it is also known as Wistaria Tea House in English—was appointed as the Monument by the municipal government for the first time. Wistaria Tea House, which is located near National Taiwan University, was originally built in the 1920s as an accommodation for colonial government officials. After the fall of Japanese empire, it was utilized as the accommodation for the ROC Ministry of Finance official. Then in 1981, it was refurbished as the tea house. As it is located near the University, prominent intellectuals and opinion makers gathered there, and Wistaria Tea House became known as the center of the liberalism and democratization movement in the 1980s (Zitenglu 2012). In 1997, the Taipei Municipal Government appointed the Tea House as Monument, neither because it is aesthetically important from architectural point of view, nor because it represents an important historical event in the distant past. Instead, it was appointed because it symbolizes the memory of the democratization movement in the 1980s. The appointment of Wistaria Tea House opened the way to a broad definition of cultural heritage beyond Sino-centric ideology and allowed diverse interpretations of what is historically important and culturally valuable to the people of Taiwan (Chen 2006). According to the criteria that were set in 2005, Monuments should be appointed based on these measures: (a) holds historical, cultural, and artistic significance; (b) relates to an important historical event or person; (c) represents particular techniques and style of an era; (d) rare and difficult to recreate; (e) holds significance in architecture history and has reuse value and potential; and (f) holds other relevant significance (Ministry of Culture 2012a, b). This indicates that the definition of cultural heritage has been broadened, and the current criteria pay more attention to whether buildings and monuments have potential for reuse.

In an attempt to save the Japanese-style residences in the neighborhood, Qin-tian Street's residents searched for the history and cultural values of the residences. In April 2004, the Qing-tian Community Development Workshop became the Association for Qing-tian Community Development. Around the same time, the Association held a public exhibition entitled "Discovering Qing-tian—Pictures and Historical Relics Exhibition," beginning April 24, 2004, for a period of one month. The Exhibition not only demonstrated to the public the unique features of the Japanese-style residences, but also introduced important historical figures who resided in these residences (Zuo 2006). In other words, the Exhibition attempted to justify the preservation of Japanese residences by highlighting the historical significance of professors and scientists who lived in the Japanese-style houses for the past 80 years.

Not only the Qing-tian Street's residents but also the National Taiwan University in charge of a number of Japanese-style residences reacted to the "Regulation for Unused or Inefficiently Used Public Properties." In May 2003, the Institute of Building and Planning of National Taiwan University conducted an investigation on 284 Japanese-style residences that have been used as the University professors' accommodations. These included 19 houses on Qing-tian Street. Based on the research, the research group claimed particular historical significance of several houses by highlighting the fact that they were the former residences of prominent intellectuals and scientists who had great impacts on Taiwan's history. In memory of the University's particularly important emeritus professors, they suggested preserving the houses and utilizing them as the University facilities such as a lecture theater or research center (Zhou 2003a).

Yet, it is wrong to assume that National Taiwan University was as a whole supportive of preserving the Street's Japanese-style residences. On the contrary, the University administration was rather reluctant to support the appointment of the Japanese-style residences that have been utilized as the University teachers' accommodations. In August 2004, the Department of Cultural Affairs of Taipei Municipal Government held a public hearing to discuss the appointment of cultural heritages on Qing-tian Street. At the meeting, the Association for Qing-tian Community Development, which had proposed the cultural heritage preservation on the Street, requested a total of 35 Japanese-style houses to be recognized either as Monuments or as Historical Buildings. The National Taiwan University was alone in being strongly opposed to the Association's proposal. The representative of University administration maintained, "in case nineteen of the residences currently under the management of the University will be appointed all at once, we need to spend another $200 millions (NT) for renovation, and will have to spend $8 millions (NT) every year for maintenance. Such financial burden will certainly become the obstacle for the University's future development (Zuo 2006)."

Despite the University's opposition, in November 2006, the Department of Cultural Affairs of the Taipei Municipal Government appointed three of the Japanese-style residences on Qing-tian Street as Monuments and six of them as Historical Buildings. As of June 2012, four of them have been appointed as Monuments and seven as Historical Buildings. The Department for Cultural Affairs clarifies the reasons why some of the houses were appointed to be either Monuments or Historical Buildings. For instance, the Japanese-style house of Lane 7 No. 2 was appointed to be Monument in 2007 for these reasons: (a) The house was built in the 1930s as the residence for the Japanese professor of Taihoku Imperial University who built his private property in a style unique and different from regular public dwellings of the time; (b) the house was resided by Liu Rong-biao, professor of the Department of Veterinarian at National Taiwan University, and it maintains the original form as it was built in the 1930s; and (c) the house was built according to the regulations of Taipei City planning during the time, and it demonstrates the regulations for architecture and city planning of that time (Taipei Municipal Government 2012b).

The other Monuments and Historical Buildings were also appointed for similar reasons—the houses are original in terms of interior and exterior designs, yet demonstrate some characteristics of Japanese-style houses of the time. They are also valuable because prominent professors of National Taiwan University have resided in them. Interestingly, in referring to residents of these heritages, the government only mentions residents of the postwar period. It never mentions the prewar professors who were the initial owners of the houses. In other words, the houses of Qing-tian Street are considered valuable with regard to the cultural significance of architectural style that represents the Japanese colonial period and historical importance of ethnic Han Chinese professors living in these Japanese-style houses during the post-colonial era.

While some of the houses were formally appointed as either Monuments or Historical Buildings, in 2007, the neighborhood was appointed as the "landscape preservation district" in order to preserve the valuable cultural heritages and maintain the original forms of the Japanese-style residences (You 2007). Thus, not only individual Japanese-style houses were considered as culturally and historically significant, but also the district itself was recognized highly in terms of the green environment and cultural atmosphere. At the same time, residents within the district were all impacted by the strict regulations on land and property use.

6.6 From Private Accommodation to Cultural Heritage for the Public

While the governmental authority has recognized both the unique atmosphere of Qing-tian Street and value of the Japanese-style residences, the community no longer promotes active demonstrations for saving old trees and old houses. Indeed, since the community group successfully developed the residential movement, Qin-tian Street has become widely known for its good living environment and unique atmosphere created by Japanese-style residences. Ironically, as the popularity caused an increase of real estate value in the neighborhood, Qing-tian Street became one of the largest targets of real estate investment. Moreover, although residents were initially willing to preserve the unique landscape of neighborhood, some of them began to complain about the regulation imposed because the Street was appointed as the "landscape preservation district." In 2011, due to the residents' complaints about the strict regulations, the Taipei Municipal Government proposed to release some of the regulations with regard to the residents' land and property use within the "landscape preservation district" (Kuo 2011). Therefore, even after the governmental authority recognized the value of the Street's landscape and Japanese-style residences, there are still possibilities for changes in the neighborhood's landscape in near future.

Furthermore, it is important to be aware that an official appointment does not guarantee appropriate maintenance of cultural heritages. Certainly, the legal authority prohibits the demolition of Monuments and Historical Buildings and

regulates their use. Yet the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act also states that it is the owner who is in charge of maintaining cultural heritages (Ministry of Culture 2012a). Ironically, the appointed Japanese-style houses have been well preserved until today because they have been privately used and well maintained by residents. Once they are officially recognized as either Monuments or Historical Buildings, the owner needs to take a great responsibility to restore and maintain them for the public.

As it was mentioned in the previous section, the National Taiwan University, which is the manager of nine out of eleven Monuments and Historical Buildings on Qing-tian Street, has financially struggled to maintain the appointed Japanese-style accommodations. To solve this management issue, the University has attempted to put its cultural heritages in private agencies' trust. In fact, it is not unusual to maintain the appointed cultural heritages in contemporary Taiwan in this way. Until the early 1990s, cultural heritage preservation only meant to preserve the existing state. Since the revision of Cultural Preservation Act in 1997, owners and managers of Monuments and Historical Buildings have become allowed to reuse them in various forms (Weng 2009). Today, some of the Monuments and Historical Buildings have been renovated to become art museums and galleries, while others have been reborn as public theaters and exhibition halls. Some of the smaller-scale cultural heritages were reborn as restaurants or cafes. Wistaria Tea House is the first and foremost example of Monument that has been reused as the tea house, and this form of adaptive reuse has been getting more popular in recent years.

In June 2011, one of the four Monuments on Qing-tian Street, which is known as the "Former Ma Ting-ying's Residence," was placed in a private agency's trust and opened as the restaurant called Qing-tian 7-6. This was originally built in 1931. The family of Adachi Masashi, a professor at the Faculty of Agriculture of Taihoku Imperial University, resided there. Partly because Prof. Adachi studied abroad in Germany, the USA, and the UK, before taking a position at Taihoku Imperial University, he built a new house combining Japanese and European architectural styles. The house was attached to a large garden with a European-style flower bed and swimming pool (You 2007).

After Prof. Adachi's family left Taiwan at the end of World War II, Prof. Ma Ting-ying and his family moved into the house. Prof. Ma was born in China and received two doctoral degrees from both Tohoku Imperial University and Berlin University. In 1945, Prof. Ma, who was capable of communicating in Japanese, was sent to Taipei for the requisition of Taihoku Imperial University. Later, he took a position of professorship at the Department of Geology at National Taiwan University (You 2007).

After Prof. Ma passed away in 1979, his family remained until 2007. The family was then ordered to leave because the house was appointed to be one of the four Monuments on Qing-tian Street. Since the Ma family, who had successfully maintained the place for their own private use, had moved out, the house deteriorated without any daily keepers. Then, in May 2010, National Taiwan University put Golden Seeds Education Organization (*Huangjin Zhongzi Wenhua Shiye Gongsi*) in the trust of management of the "Former Ma Ting-ying's Residence."

The manager and his colleagues are all alumni of the Department of Geology at National Taiwan University where Prof. Ma had been teaching for over twenty years. Having passed the adjudication of Taipei Municipal Government's Department of Cultural Affairs, the Organization spent $5 million (NT) to renovate the house and opened Qing-tian 7-6 in June 2011.[10]

Similar to the Westaria Tea house, Qing-tian 7-6 blends the two different elements of commercially oriented restaurant and educationally oriented public space. While Japanese dishes are served at the restaurant space, free guided tours of the "Former Ma Ting-ying's Residence" are conducted almost everyday. Educational activities such as open lectures also take place periodically. According to the manager, the main concept of Qing-tian 7-6 is not the old Japanese-style house itself. Instead, the main concept is people's stories of happenings around the house since the Japanese colonial age and the time spent under the KMT one-party rule until today (Qing-tian 7-6 2011a). Nonetheless, the narratives told in Qing-tian 7-6 incline toward the stories surrounding Prof. Ma Ting-ying after the fall of Japanese empire as represented in the title "Former Ma Ting-ying's Residence." Indeed, while the house was renovated to become a restaurant, a fossilized old tree that is about 2 m in diameter was placed outside of the house. The garden was also attached with a large board decorated with samples of a variety of rocks and stones found across Taiwan. Apparently, they have nothing to do with the private lives of any former residents, but with one exception. The educational material of geology ties the knot between former resident Prof. Ma Ting-ying and the current manager of Qing-tian 7-6.

In addition to demonstrating the educational materials of geology in memory of Prof. Ma Ting-ying's academic achievement, his private life and family history are told through the guided tour. One of the tour guides is Ma Guo-guang, the eldest son of Ma Ting-ying. He is also known as Liang-xuan, a well-known freelance writer in Taiwan. In 1991, Liang-xuan published a book entitled *Zai shijian li* (Within Time), which is his autobiographical essay collection, exploring his childhood around Qing-tian Street. Thus, participants of the tour can enjoy the "real voice" of former resident Ma Guo-guang, also known as Liang-xuan, the author of a book exploring the post-colonial history of Qing-tian Street.

While the post-colonial history of Monument is well narrated especially with regard to the human stories of Prof. Ma Ting-ying's family, human stories of Prof. Adachi's family, the initial residents of the house, are less known. Certainly, particularities of the Japanese-style architecture are well explained in any of the site's introductions. However, because Prof. Adachi's academic achievement and his family stories are seldom told, the Japanese colonial period is treated as if it is the background history of the main characters' stories (Ma Ting-ying's private and public life history).

Since the official opening in June 2011, Qing-tian 7-6 has been very popular. It has been reported by a number of newspapers, fashion magazines, and tourists'

[10]Interview by the author, August 11, 2011.

guidebooks both in Chinese and in Japanese, and there were over 7000 visitors for the first three months (Qing-tian 7-6 2011b). Furthermore, it was given the golden award of 2011, "Revival of Old House" or "*Laowu Xinsheng Dajiang*" in the category of commercial building by the Taipei Municipal Government (Qing-tian 7-6 2011c). Due to the attractive renovation of the former private accommodation and its successful conceptualization of Monument, Qing-tian 7-6 has been commercially successful for the first year since opening.

However, it is doubtful that Qing-tian 7-6 is well connected to the rest of the Qing-tian Street community. None of the current residents of Qing-tian Street have participated in the management of Qing-tian 7-6. Ma Guo-guang used to live in the Street, but he moved out of the neighborhood long ago. Certainly, Qing-tian 7-6 has been commercially successful, which has made both Qing-tian Street and the Former Ma Ting-ying's Residence famous nationwide. But, it is questionable that the success of Qing-tian 7-6 has achieved the goal of the Street's community activity that made great efforts to improve the neighborhood's living environment and uniquely formed historic and cultural atmosphere.

6.7 Conclusion

Japanese-style residences account for a great deal of the cultural heritage sites now officially recognized by the Taipei Municipal Government. Many of the Japanese-style residences were maintained during the post-WWII period for practical reasons, but had never been considered cultural heritages under the KMT one-party rule. They came to be recognized as cultural heritages only after cultural pluralism became the mainstream discourse of contemporary Taiwan and the notion of cultural heritage radically changed in the 1990s.

Other types of architecture built by Japanese colonialists have been appointed as either Monuments or Historical Buildings. However, unlike public buildings such as stations and office buildings, many of the Japanese-style residences are located in the midst of people's living districts. Therefore, neighbors may claim preserving Japanese-style residences not necessarily because they are nostalgic about the colonial past, but because preservation of the residences may be directly linked to their living environments or childhood memories.

Lastly, this article has demonstrated how the official appointment of cultural heritage and its maintenance are two different issues. Many of the Qing-tian Street's Japanese-style residences have been under the management of National Taiwan University, yet tenants have privately maintained them. Once the buildings are appointed as Monuments or Historical Buildings, managers are required to make them open to the public. In recent years, it has been increasingly common for owners of Monuments and Historical Buildings to put them in private agencies' trust for adoptive reuse. "The Former Ma Yi-ting's Residence" is the first and foremost example of a building on Qing-tian Street that has been renovated by a private company for adoptive reuse. The meanings imposed on "the Former Ma

Yi-ting's Residence" continue to change. While the private accommodation was transformed to be a public space, narratives have been produced to attract visitors and make a profit.

Japanese colonialists migrating to Taiwan against the backdrop of Japanese southward expansion policies initially built Japanese-style houses on Qing-tian Street. Later, the houses were appropriated by the KMT government and taken over by ethnic Han Chinese residents. Then, in opposing the Ministry of Finance's proposal of demolition, the neighbors claimed for preservation of the houses as if they were trying to regain their own memories, histories, and residential rights to protect good living environments. However, once the houses were officially recognized by the Municipal Government, they became the cultural heritages of the public of Taipei City while being managed by a private company. Japanese-style residences in Taipei City, including those on Qing-tian Street, are not simply cultural heritages that represent the Japanese colonial past. They also accommodate memories of residents, neighbors, and the general public from different generations of Taiwan. The houses' value is continually reinterpreted through negotiations of different parties' present needs.

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Chapter 7
Home Base of an Exiled People: Hong Kong and Overseas Chinese Activism from Thailand

Wasana Wongsurawat

Abstract Hong Kong during the Cold War years was like an anachronistic time capsule, which provided a special space for negotiation and compromise in between the contesting Cold War ideologies and the raging nationalist fervor of the newly established modern nation-states of East and Southeast Asia in the post-World War II era. While the People's Republic of China had established itself as an alternative leading power of the Communist bloc following its stellar success in the Korean War, Thailand, since the conclusion of the Second World War, had been a devout and devoted ally of the USA in the Cold War. Hong Kong, then still a British colony, came to serve as an asylum for ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs from Thailand who had been in danger of being persecuted by overzealous anti-Communist military government for their ethnic, familial, and cultural ties with the ancestral homeland. At the same time, the colony of Hong Kong also seemed to have served as an ideological no man's land upon which contesting Cold War participants from all sides—communist agents from the PRC, American CIA agents, the Thai consular general, and British colonial authorities—to collect and trade intelligence. Such 'underground' activities of intelligence gathering were then further reflected and implemented in various state policies and decisions in each respective home country throughout the Cold War era.

7.1 Hong Kong: World Between Worlds

Like a snake or a caterpillar, the world has a way of shedding its geo-political skin at the dawn of each new era. The nineteenth century was the age of imperialism where empires raced to expand their dominion to every furthest corner of the Planet Earth. From the wilderness frontiers to the depths of tropical jungles, imperialist adventurers untiringly staked claims for their empires until only a few obscure

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pockets of territories remain uncolonized and left to figure out the enigmatic puzzle of entering the modern era and establishing their own nation-state through their own free will. Siam was one such a place from the mid-nineteenth through to the early twentieth century. Though heavily influenced by European imperialist pressures throughout the precarious reign of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V 1868–1910), Siam provides an enigmatic space within the modern history of Southeast Asia where the logic of nation-building through anti-imperialist independence movements does not quite work out. The course through which *Siam becomes Thailand* (Stowe 1991) is forever complicated with the complex involvement of the monarchy in the nationalist movement and the difficult position of a communist force without a foreign imperialist foe to overcome. It is indeed the in-between spaces like late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century Siam that provide historians of the nation-state a wealth of contradictions to work with and make the discussion of issues like nationalism and anti-imperialist movements remain problematic and invigorating even into the second decade of the twenty-first century.

The same sort of politically enigmatic space Siam provided for the world in the age of imperialism could be found in Hong Kong during the Cold War years. As the old geo-political skin of the imperialist world was being shed and the new skin of the world of nations was emerging, the global community entered the era of the nation-state and most colonies throughout Asia gained independence soon after the conclusion of the Second World War. Remnants of the old empires remained only in sparse pockets of colonial influence protected from the tide of time by obsolete yet binding unequal treaties of the imperialist age. Hong Kong was one among the outstanding examples of such places. Its vicarious position as a British colony and a bustling port city right at the contentious edge of the People's Republic of China makes it a prime negotiating space among the contending parties of the Cold War Era. Despite Britain's obvious position among the anti-Communist countries, Hong Kong's colonial status renders it out-of-place in a world of independent nation-states. It becomes a space of exception where Britain continues to act as an imperialist power despite the Cold War politics of Hong Kong's immediate surroundings. Retaining sovereignty in Hong Kong meant relinquishing many obvious claims of nation-state politics in the age of the Cold War. The peculiar formula, which immerged when all parties involved in the Hong Kong situation, insisted on playing by the rules of the imperialist era despite the reality of the Cold War context (Carroll 2006).

While Hong Kong during the Cold War years appeared to provide a relatively safe and civil refuge for all contending parties, one group in particular seemed to privilege from their peculiar transnational history and their long-time association with Hong Kong's unusual non-nation status. If one were to understand Hong Kong in the Cold War years as a special space in between competing Cold War ideologies, the overseas Chinese should definitely be described as the special people in between competing nationalisms of the People's Republic of China and all the newly

established nation-states of Southeast Asia. The overseas Chinese from Thailand, in particular, found themselves in a most vicarious position at the outbreak of the Cold War. They had struggled to maintain their transnational flexibility—remaining both Thai and Chinese in identity and, for many, in citizenship as well—from the first rise of the Thai nationalist movement during the reign of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI 1910–1925) through to the end of the Second World War. The commitment to their transnational status and continuous underground support for the Chinese war efforts, in fact, helped to connect the anti-Japanese Free Thai Movement with the Nationalist Chinese forces, resulting in Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's endorsement of FTM's anti-Japanese stance that eventually allowed Thailand a place among the victors of the war despite having entered into formal alliance with Japan in December 1941. Considering their beneficial ambiguous position in the Second World War, Thailand should have been a perfect in-between place for the nationally ambiguous in-between people like the overseas Chinese. Nonetheless, the conclusion of the war brought Thailand squarely into the American sphere or influence. Consequently, the postwar government in Thailand pursued a fiercely anti-Communist policy and the overseas Chinese community suffered much pressure for their familial ties in Mainland China, which by 1949 had become the People's Republic (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). Therefore, as ambiguous Thailand was transformed by the Cold War to become an unambiguous ally of the USA, many among the overseas Chinese community in Thailand sought refuge in the new world between worlds that had emerged in Hong Kong in the postwar era of the nation-state.

From the early 1950s when to the world first witnessed the PRC's awesome show of military might in the Korean War to the mid-1970s when the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution finally drew to a close, Hong Kong provided a safe haven for overseas Chinese entrepreneurs from Thailand to escape the state's anti-communist suspicion and persecution. For many, Hong Kong served as the safest destination upon deportation by the Thai state. Not only did it provide a welcoming Chinese environment, the bustling port city was a perfect place to connect with the greater overseas Chinese trade network as well as the rest of the business world, both from the side of the free world and underground connections with agents of the People's Republic. The unique political status as well as geographical positioning of Hong Kong made it the ideal place to continue and expand one's business enterprise even in the midst of the political typhoon that was the Cold War in Asia. At the same time, Hong Kong also served as a highly reliable source of intelligence for all parties involved in the Cold War. While the CCP and several other communist bodies from Southeast Asia made contact with their agents in the free world, British, American as well as agents of the Thai state exchanged crucial information concerning the communist movements from each of their areas in Hong Kong. This tiny British colony became a bustling limbo upon which all

parties were free to mix and mingle, see and be seen, and carry out their Cold War agenda in a space locked in the freedom of an earlier era.[1]

7.2 Hong Kong and the Overseas Chinese: A Shared History

The series of events that brought the tiny island of Hong Kong to the forefront of Chinese history are closely related to China's transition into the modern era as well as the first origins of Chinese nationalist movements. Many scholars have agreed that the Qing Dynasty's defeat in the first Opium War marked the major turning point upon which China entered into the modern era. The geographical location of Hong Kong, as the first international port entrance to the Chinese Empire, bares significant implications in the history of the overseas Chinese. Coastal inhabitants of South China had been known as fishermen and seafarers long before the establishment of the Qing Dynasty in the mid-seventeenth century. Manchu persecution[2] together with economic difficulties due to over population, political instability and natural disasters drove a great number of Southerners to seek their fortune overseas from the late seventeenth century through to the early nineteenth century. By the outbreak of the First Opium War, there was already a sizable ethnic Chinese community in Southeast Asia, most of them concentrated in Siam and the East Indies Archipelago. In other words, the Treaty of Nanjing, which concluding the First Opium War and ceded Hong Kong to British suzerainty, only made China

[1]These rather dubious dynamics of Hong Kong as a gray zone of intrigue during the Cold War were quite vividly presented in both recently published memoirs of former Communist operatives in Southeast Asia, recent studies on the history of the Siamese Communist Party, as well as archival documents from the Hong Kong Public Record Office (HK PRO 1951, 1955).

[2]The relationship between the Qing court and the overseas Chinese began with much hostility. During the early establishment of Manchu rule, a significant number of Ming loyalists fled the Mainland in order to settle in Southeast Asia, outside of Manchu dominion. Those who remained in the southern provinces of Fujian and Guangdong carried on through the tradition of secret societies and sworn brotherhoods. Many supported Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong)'s anti-Manchu forces that continued the fight from the Ming's last stronghold on Formosa Island. The Qing resorted to extreme measures in the attempt to suppress these dissidents, including the Kangxi Emperor's late seventeenth-century edict to evacuate the entire Fujian coast inland to prevent any possibility of the rebels replenishing their supplies from the Mainland. This edict, together with Kangxi's absolute ban on all private trade in the South China Sea, might have contributed to the eventual subjugation of the Formosan rebels. It definitely resulted in much hardship and resentment among the Chinese southerners, many of whom were traditionally sea-faring people and many of them emigrated to Southeast Asia as a result. Despite the fact that the ban was lifted by the mid-eighteenth century, animosity toward the Manchu's remained high in overseas Chinese communities and the Qing court itself continued to perceive the "abandoners of ancestral tombs" with great suspicion (Skinner 1957).

open to Western imperialist penetration for the world had been opened to overseas Chinese adventurers long before (Carroll 2006).

The establishment of Hong Kong as a British port, however, in a somewhat roundabout way, brought the overseas Chinese back in contact with domestic Chinese politics. The manifold increase of Western influence that was gushing in through Hong Kong as well as the constantly dwindling authority of the Manchu rules that was becoming most apparent in the South resulted in a series of revolts and rebellions. The most damaging of these domestic unrests was no doubt the Taiping Rebellion, which bore uncanny traits of Christian influence.[3] British domination of international port cities in South China also led to a new wave of mass emigration—a large portion of which was connected to the flourishing coolie trade. This had direct impact on the expansion of ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia as well as all major cities in the Asia-Pacific region. By the twilight years of the nineteenth century, the overall economic success of most overseas Chinese communities was becoming a major inspiration of the great yet unrealized potential of the successfully modernized Chinese nation. Reform leaders—among them Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao being prominent examples—rushed to garner support from overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, Europe, and as faraway as North America. Sun Yat-sen, credited as the Father of the Chinese Revolution, not only spent part of his formative years as a member of the Chinese Diaspora, but was also said to have proclaimed the overseas Chinese communities to be the 'Mother of the Revolution.'[4]Even the Qing court, by the dawn of the twentieth century, was seeking financial and technological support from leading overseas Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia (Godley 1981). Within the span of barely half a century, the opening of Hong Kong had brought the overseas Chinese back to the center stage of Chinese politics, whether as highly influential expatriates or newly awaken revolutionaries.

Throughout much of the first couple of decades of the twentieth century, Hong Kong, not unlike other foreign concessions like Shanghai or Canton, served as a refuge and safe meeting place for revolutionaries plotting against the Great Qing Dynasty as well as the repressive authoritarian regime of Yuan Shikai that succeeded it. Once the Kuomintang succeeded in becoming the dominant governing force on the Mainland in the late 1920s, Hong Kong again received its fair share of CCP refugees resulting from the great purge of April 1927 (Chao 2010). For the overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia, the British colony gained a prominent position in the history of their contribution to the ancestral homeland again in the late 1930s. As Japanese forces rapidly advanced southward following the official declaration of war

[3]Hong Xiuquan the founder and supreme commander of the Taiping movement (1950–1964) was initially inspired by a pamphlet he received from Protestant Christian missionaries he encountered in Canton. Upon later studying the contents of the pamphlet, Hong concluded that he was the younger brother of Christ and had been sent by God to rid China of the Manchu's corrupting influence.

[4]华侨为革命之母 (Jianli 2011).

by the KMT government in July 1937, Hong Kong began to replace conventional port cities—especially Xiamen and Shantou—as the main point of transit in remittance route from Southeast Asia to South China (Hicks 1993). Even after Hong Kong was invaded and captured by Japanese troops in December 1941, the British banking and postal services continued to be the safer and preferred choice for many Southeast Asian Chinese in remitting money in support of the Chinese war efforts and to alleviate the sufferings of kinsman in war torn South China (Phannee 2003).

Once Southeast Asia was nearly completely overrun by Japanese troops, Hong Kong came to serve as a headquarters of sorts for overseas Chinese underground anti-Japanese movements. Refuge in Hong Kong was especially crucial for overseas Chinese dissidents in Thailand, which despite retaining marginal sovereignty had, by December 1941, entered into formal alliance with Japan and openly declared war upon the leading Allied Powers. Hong Kong became the ultimate destination for many ethnic Chinese leaders who were deported by the Thai government on anti-Japanese charges, including organizing boycotts of Japanese goods and businesses in Thailand and supplying manpower, financial, and technical support for the Chinese war efforts. The British colony, even under Japanese occupation, continued to be a significant base for communications between various underground anti-Japanese movements throughout Southeast Asia, including the China-branch of the Free Thai Movement. Hong Kong indeed had a crucial role to play in the FTM's successful connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his subsequent endorsement declaration in February 1943 (PRO: FO 371/35983 1943).

7.3 Hong Kong in the Korean War and the 'Peace' Rebellion

For a brief period immediately following the conclusion of the Second World War, Sino-Thai relations remained cordial and the overseas Chinese communities involved in anti-Japanese activities during the war could be recognized for their contributions to the fortunate outcome on both the Thai and Chinese side. Under Prime Minister M.R. Seni Pramoj,[5] the postwar Thai government was making good

[5]M.R. Seni Pramoj was the Thai minister to Washington DC at the outbreak of the Second World War in Southeast Asia. Upon the announcement of Prime Minister Phibunsongkhram that the Thai government has entered into formal alliance with Japan, Seni broadcasted from the USA that such a decision did not represent the true will of the Thai people and, upon that instance, declared the establishment of the Free Thai Movement that would work in support of the Allied Powers to free Thailand from Japanese Occupation. Hence, Seni became the leader of the US branch of the FTM. There was also a UK branch comprised mostly of Thai students studying in the UK and members of the royal family in exile after the fall of the absolute monarch in Thailand following the 1932 Revolution. That Seni was chosen as the postwar Prime Minister over Pridi Phanomyong—wartime Minister of Finance and FTM leader in Thailand—who was favored by the British government was a clear indication of US influence that would come to dominate Thai politics throughout the Cold War Era.

on its FTM promises to the Chinese Nationalist government. Almost all anti-Chinese laws and regulations promulgated during Premier Phibunsongkhram's wartime government were abolished. The postwar government also, at long last, assented to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. All this in the attempt to assure that Thailand would indeed be included among the victors in final postwar settlements and secure a place in the newly formed United Nations.

News from Hong Kong, however, portrays a different story concerning the Thai government's relationship with its ethnic Chinese minority in the period immediately following the conclusion of the Second World War. Reports of a violent crackdown of Chinese patriots preparing for the celebration of the 'Double-ten' Chinese National Day in Bangkok Chinatown[6] exploded on the front page of all the leading papers in Hong Kong. Contrary to the Thai government's portrayal of the incident as a minor 'misunderstanding' in several publications in New York and Washington DC, the Chinese press in Hong Kong interpreted the incident as an undeniable expression of the Thai state's anxiety and paranoia concerning its wartime sins against the overseas Chinese community and, despite owing so much to this ethnic minority, found it necessary to stamp out any rumors and suspicions that the Republic of China—by then a proud member of the UN Security Council—might come to dominate Thailand in the postwar period. Fortunately for the Thai government, firm support from the USA coupled with growing domestic problems in China, tensions from the incident was smoothed over through the investigation process, and Sino-Thai formal diplomatic relations were successfully established, leading to the formal acceptance of the Thai state into the United Nations by December 1946 (Wongsurawat 2010).

The Yaowaraj Incident bore much evidence that all was not well in the relationship between the Thai state and the overseas Chinese community. Many of the prominent leaders of the community who were actively involved in the anti-Japanese movement and supporting the FTM during the war came under suspicion for possible traits of anti-government and unpatriotic (toward the Thai state) attitude. Hong Kong, where their grievances had been aired most vocally, came to be considered as a seditious hub of anti-government activities. The Thai government's perceptions took a turn for the worst with the fall of the Kuomintang regime on the Mainland and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in

[6]On September 23, 1945, a group of overseas Chinese patriots were rehearsing the parade for the Chinese National Day celebration on 10th October when they were stopped by Thai police officers who informed them that it was illegal to display foreign national flags without the mandatory accompaniment of the Thai national flag. Since the group did not have Thai flags on hand, the police officers proceeded to take down all Chinese national flags from the surrounding displays. This caused much dismay to the ethnic Chinese. Loud arguments soon turned to violence when the police officers called for reinforcements. The military arrived with their tanks, Chinatown was cordoned off, and a full-scale shootout took place for the following hours. Nearly, a dozen civilians were killed, scores wounded, and the Chinatown business area was completely shutdown for the following week. The incident has been known as the 'Yaowaraj Incident' after the main street in Bangkok Chinatown where violence first broke out (NA [2] PMO 0201.77/16 1945).

1949. This is where Hong Kong, in her colonial time capsule, was called into question concerning her true allegiance in the Cold War Era. Though the UK positioned itself squarely in the Free World Camp, Hong Kong with its colonial status happened to be situated too close to the PRC for the comfort of the overly anxious anti-communist Thai government.

Upon the outbreak of the Korean War, the Thai Minister of Interior was alerted by reports of the Thai Consular General in Hong Kong that the British colony was again used as a hub for clandestine meetings of communist sympathizers among the overseas Chinese elite from Thailand (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005). Most alarmingly, the sea transport service between Hong Kong and Thailand, which had long been dominated by overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, had then become a fundraising venue for the support of the communist forces in the Korean War. Agents of the Foreign Ministry reported that, once on board the ships, communist agents would rally support for the communist war efforts and, by the end of every trip, would gather sizable cash donations as well as munitions pledges from passengers and crew members alike. Despite being quite unacceptable from the point of view of the Thai state, which was then among the Allied Forces fighting in support of the United Nations on the Korean Peninsula, these ship-fundraising incidents usually occurred on international waters and, therefore, beyond the Thai state's jurisdiction. Even if a government informant was present on the ship and alerted authorities upon arrival, hard evidence was almost impossible to come by and most passengers as well as crew members would tend to be less than cooperative with Thai authorities. Police officers would sometime arrest passengers upon arrival on suspicions of being a communist sympathizer. Some of these arrests would result in deportation, but most would eventually be released for lack of evidence. Ultimately, the Thai state was less successful in curbing actual communist support than inciting further hostility between the state and the already quite disgruntled overseas Chinese community (NA [2] PMO 0201.89/2 1951).

The relationship between the Thai state and the overseas Chinese with regard to their activities in Hong Kong took a turn for the worse with the organization of the Asia and Pacific Rim Peace Conference in October 1952 (*Da Gong Bao* 3 October 1952; *South China Morning Post* 4 October 1952). The conference was hosted by the PRC government in protest of American involvement in the Korean War. Leading figures in communist movements throughout the world rushed to Beijing to represent their parties. The Thai Consular General in Hong Kong, again, notified the government that several leading personalities from the overseas Chinese community in Bangkok also expressed the intentions of being present at this so-called Peace Conference in Beijing (NA [2] PMO 0201.89/7 1952). The list included not only prominent ethnic Chinese leftwing activists such as the novelist Kularb Saipradit and the journalist Aree Leevera, but also former FTM war heroes such as Sa-nguan Tularak[7] who travelled to and met with acquaintances in Hong Kong

[7]Sa-nguan Tularak was the leader of the second Free Thai envoy to the Republic of China in 1942. Though his intrigues are less publicized in mainstream Thai history, his name figure prominently in the Chinese records concerning the Free Thai Movement. Assessing from KMT archival materials, it is almost certain that it was Sa-nguan's FTM envoy—presented chiefly as

once too often before his alleged contribution in the Beijing Peace Conference. The report became the key evidence that led to the arrest of 104 individuals as communist sympathizers and serious threats to national security. These arrests later came to be known as the 'Peace Rebellion,' after the 'Peace Commission of Thailand,' which was established in April 1951 in anticipation of the 'Peace Conference' in Beijing in the following year. Of the 104 suspected communist sympathizer arrested, 54 were tried and convicted. Some were sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment. A few received the maximum 20 years sentence. All were, nonetheless, released under the Clemency Act of 1957 in celebration of 2500 years of the Buddhist Era (1957 AD/2500 BE). The notorious arrest of more than a hundred suspects in the suppression of a so-called rebellion that never occurred in practice was only one among numerous examples of the Thai state's brutal suppression of any hint of ethnic Chinese communist sympathizers during the early Cold War years (Charnvit 2001).

7.4 Hong Kong: A Space for Negotiation or Contestation?

Aside from providing a wealth of anti-Communist intelligence for the Thai government through the Consular General's Office throughout the Cold War years, Hong Kong also frequently became a space of contestation and/or negotiation between state governments both within the Free World Camp and from opposite sides of the Cold War battle line.

The 'Quan Wan' or 'Tsun Wan' riot of 1956 is a prime example of the kind of ideological contestation/negotiation that was occurring and re-occurring throughout the Cold War years in Hong Kong. The incident that took place in the town of Tsun Wan, which was located approximately 5 miles from central Kowloon, broke out during the 'Double Tenth' National Day celebration. The violence originated from the good intentions of a resettlement officer who ordered some Nationalist Chinese flags to be removed so as to lower the heightening tensions between the pro-KMT and pro-CCP Chinese settlers in the outskirts of Kowloon. However, almost as soon as the order was carried out, rumors spread across the pro-KMT settlements that the communists were behind this sudden change in settlement policy. Consequently, pro-CCP settlements came under violent attacks and some suspected communist sympathizers were assaulted; a few were brutally murdered. The British authorities were slow to respond at the initial stages as they did not expected such degree of

(Footnote 7 continued)

representatives of the overseas Chinese who had long suffered in Thailand for their unwavering support for the Chinese war efforts—that convinced the Generalissimo to make the historic broadcast endorsing the Free Thai Movement in February 1943.

violence from Chinese settlers who seemed to live and work along side each other for the rest of the year without so much of a violent argument. However, as October 10 drew to a close and it became obvious that the violence was not about to die down with the festivities, the police intervene in full force, employing live munitions and operating with orders to fire without hesitation. The riots were suppressed completely by October 12, leaving 59 deaths in total and more than 500 injuries.

The Tsun Wan Riot became a major bone of contention between the British authorities of Hong Kong and the PRC government. Premier Zhou Enlai made a statement on behalf of the Chinese Communist government demanding the British authorities to take full responsibilities of the lost lives and properties of communist Chinese residing in the colony. Premier Zhou further criticized the British authorities for not taking decisive measures to suppress the unrest from its earliest stages and insinuated that the British were providing latent support for KMT agents to intimidate and harass pro-CCP factions within the settlements of Mainlanders in Hong Kong. The Chinese Communist government even resorted to a thinly veiled threat in suggesting that, if British authorities prove to be incapable of maintaining peace and harmony within its own colony, the People's Republic may have no other alternative than to intervene in protection of its own community of civilian supporters residing in settlements such as Tsun Wan town. British authorities, of course, responded by assuring the international community that it was fully capable of maintaining peace and order within its far-eastern colony and that any forced intervention on the part of the People's Republic of China would only complicate matters and most likely escalate the degree of animosity and violence in Tsun Wan.

For the purpose of this paper, what appears to be even more intriguing about the Tsun Wan Riot is the wealth of documentation in forms of reports and memoranda from the Consular General in Hong Kong to the Thai government in Bangkok. This is, no doubt, partly due to pure coincidence that M.L. Bua Khittiyakorn, King's Bhumibol (Rama IX)'s mother-in-law, and HRH Princess Kalayaniwattana, the King's sister, were traveling through Hong Kong when the riot broke out and, therefore, had to extend their stay at the Consular General's residence until the situation came strictly under control again. The royal coincidence aside reports from His Excellency Mr. Charat Chalermtiarana, the Thai Consular General to Hong Kong, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs prove to be highly informative, both in terms of general facts of the events that took place in Hong Kong and neighboring areas prior to, during, and immediately after the riot broke out, as well as the Consular General's own assessment of the situation and his views concerning this incident in the context of the Cold War (NA [2] FA 16.28/14 1957). It is very obvious from Charat's reports that he mostly blamed the pro-Communist faction in Hong Kong for the 'Double Tenth' disaster in Tsun Wan Town. He mentioned that such violent uproar was quite unusual considering the fact that the pro-KMT faction in Tsun Wan had been celebrating their National Day in the exact manner for the past several years and no disturbances had ever been recorded earlier. The sudden change of policy was highly suspicious in this case. Also, despite the outbreak of unexpected violence, from Charat's point of view, the British authorities handled the situation extremely well and all was brought under control in a matter of several hours. So confident was

he in the British that he assured the Thai Foreign Ministry that the high-ranking members of the Royal Family stranded at this residence at the time safe away from harm's way and should not become a cause for great worry and anxiety on the part of the government or their Majesties the King and Queen. Charat then went further to insinuate that this may be a ploy on the side of the PRC government to find an excuse to forcefully reclaim Hong Kong as Chinese territory so as to ender the many decades of what the Chinese refer to as 'National Shame' several years ahead of schedule. He mentioned that the Communists had a way of portraying overly sympathetic images for communist sympathizers residing in free countries and that the same sort of defamation was being carried out in Thailand as well. Charat warned Thai authorities to beware of this unless they desire to be overthrown by the subaltern masses who had been duped into believing that the state was constantly intimidating and harassing the communists with no good reason at all (NA [2] FA 16.28/14 1957).

It appears that the level of anxiety and paranoia in matters related to Hong Kong and possible communist activities of the overseas Chinese in Thailand was constantly high among the Thai government agents throughout the 1950s. A constant stream of reports and memoranda was sent and exchanged between the Consular General and the Thai Government concerning these matters. Many cases, the Tsun Wan Riot being one among them, appeared to be quite plausible threats. Some, however, are quite ludicrous in hindsight. There were several mentioning, for example, of the secret supreme commander of the communists in Thailand being one of the leading overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of the Chen (Tang) clan (NA [2] PMO 0201.89/7 1950–1952). Speculations of his true identity came in great variety, but among the leading candidates was none other than the founder of Bangkok Bank, Chin Sophonphanich (Chen Bichen/Tang Piekching). While the allegations hardly make sense considering the possibility of a leading capitalist being the secret grand master of the communist movement to overthrow the capitalist state, it is quite intriguing to note that the Chinese community in Thailand saw many of its leading entrepreneurs relocating to Hong Kong during the 1950s, and Chin was among the first of this exodus.

Another highly intriguing case was the 1954 allegations against B.L.H. Trading Company under the supervision of Kasem Pangsriwong, Chief Executive Officer and only son of found, Hainanese migrant B.L. Huo. For generations, the Pangsriwong family had been actively patriotic and, as result, repeatedly got into deep trouble with authorities. B.L. Huo himself, having succeeded in establishing a highly profitable drug manufacturer in Siam in the early twentieth century, became deeply involved in underground anti-Japanese activities during the Second World War. He was deported from Thailand for many years in the early 1940s for sending medical supplies to aid Chinese soldiers at the frontline. Fortunately, with the Allied Powers' victory, he was able to return after the conclusion of the war (Koson 1968). Kasem, his only son, studied pharmacology with the aspiration to continue his father's business empire. He became the first Thai national to earn a Masters Degree in Pharmacology from the USA as was among the founders of the first Faculty of Pharmaceutical Science in Thailand at Chulalongkorn University (Kasem 1976). After the conclusion of the Second World War, however, Kasem

himself, like many other leading personalities in the ethnic Chinese community in Thailand, came under pressure for his family's wartime connections with Mainland China. Not unlike Chin Sophonphanich, Kasem chose to treat this period of difficulty as an opportunity to expand his business by establishing new shop fronts in Hong Kong. Business was good for a few years until, in 1954, the Cold War finally caught up with him. B.L.H. Trading was accused by the US government of supplying strategic goods (i.e., antibiotics) to agents of the Chinese Communist Party. This charge, if successfully proven, would prevent B.L.H. Trading from importing any manufacturing resources from the USA, which would essentially put the B.L. Huo's entire business empire to ruins. The charge was no doubt quite ridiculous to begin with, considering that it was impossible to identify any Chinese client walking into a drug store as being a communist agent or not. Yet, the threats posed by such a charge were real enough to get Kasem and his team of lawyers to give evidence in the USA. Not surprisingly, the charge against B.L.H. Trading was subsequently dropped and Kasem was allowed to return to Thailand and continue his business in both localities. No severe damage was brought upon B.L.H. Trading; nonetheless, such a case provides historians with a glimpse of the amount of intelligence gathered and traded by and among government agents of all major powers involved in the Cold War that goes on within this tiny British colony of Hong Kong (Department of Commerce Appeals Board 1954).

7.5 The Closing of an Era: Hong Kong Returns to the Motherland

The Cold War ended early in China with the ending of the 10-year catastrophe that was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. More than a decade later the Soviet Union collapsed. Yet, it took even longer to mark the end of British colonialism in China. By the time Hong Kong was completely decolonized in 1997, the world was already moving on to the next era—beginning to get comfortable in its new globalized skin. The twentieth century was drawing to a close and the much anticipated twenty-first century was said to be a Chinese one. It is then probably most fitting that the ways of the world in the last century would be turned upside down and China—the constant victim of the twentieth century—would become the hegemon. The overseas Chinese who hardly had a legitimate space to stand in the world of nations now ride the high tides of globalization, conquering the four corners of the business world as the British imperialist warriors did in the nineteenth century.

Time has run out for the frozen era of British colonialism. Hong Kong has moved on to become a different kind of space for negotiation and contestation. In a world where China is set to become the most dominant economy within the coming decade, Hong Kong has become the gateway that connects the awesome production power of South China with the insatiable world market. This former British colony is also a mighty flood gate for Chinese political reform. Exactly how much the CCP

is willing to relinquish political control within its realm so as to accommodate the world market it so covets, Hong Kong's political status should be the best indicator. In September 2014, Hong Kong has emerged once again as a peculiar middle ground for political negotiations of sorts. Unlike the height of the Cold War era when agents of the iron and bamboo curtains and those of the so-called free world converge in the outdated colonial space of Hong Kong, in 2014 the middle and lower income classes of the island city state protest for democracy from a Chinese Communist government that fully embraces the world market yet refuses to let go of its authoritarian control in the long forgotten name of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat. The Cold War is obviously over with the absolute victory of capitalism and the People's Republic of China has become the most obvious manifestation of how liberal democracy and human rights are not really necessary for financial growth and domination of the world economy of the twenty-first century. What has become widely recognized as the 'Umbrella Revolution' in Hong Kong between September and December 2014 appeared to have ended in an uncomfortable truce between the unyielding state power of the People's Republic and the temporarily subdued pro-democracy activists. Not unlike the situation during the colonial era, there were allegations coming from both sides concerning underground activities and undisclosed—potentially unethical—trade of intelligences and information related to *umbrella activities* in Hong Kong late in 2014. Beijing and the pro-establishment side accused the pro-democracy demonstrators of receiving support from anti-PRC 'foreign'—especially 'Western'—entities. The pro-democracy camp condemned the state for employing secret society thugs against the protesters so as to make it appear like the state also had the legitimate backing of 'people's power.' Hong Kong as a 'Special Administrative Region' of the People's Republic of China continues to serve as a crucial gray area of negotiation and contestation for the uneasy global economy in the age of globalization and a new super power at once torn between the desire to embrace the free market and the obsession of maintaining absolute control in the political realm of a bygone era.

Not unlike their former home base in exile, the overseas Chinese in Thailand have also moved forward into a new era. Contestation over the nationality of the ethnic Chinese has become a thing of the past in Thailand. In this highly ironic day and age, the Chinese Communist government has such close ties with the Thai Royal Family that the overseas Chinese could boast a special kind of royalist nationalism of their own. Overseas Chinese activism has, in the present day, become the mainstream dominating culture of the urban middleclass. While Hongkongers took to the street in protest for full-scale democracy in the Umbrella Revolution of 2014, Thais continue to struggle amidst the silence of martial law declared under yet another coup d'état. There is little doubt that the May 22nd coup led by the then Commander of Royal Thai Army, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, received overwhelming support from the well-educated urban capitalist and middle classes who had been continuously demonstrating against the democratically elected regimes of both Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006) and his sister Yingluck (2011–2014). The first movement, People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD),

succeeded in bringing about the 2006 coup, which drove Primier Thaksin into exile to the present day. However, when his younger sister subsequently won the following election and became the 28th Prime Minister, the anti-Shinawatra movement reincarnated as the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) and paved the way for the latest coup, which yet again ousted Yingluck from her position of power. In this highly ironic turns of event, it appears that many among the scions of those ethnic Chinese who were persecuted by the military governments, both during the Second World War and throughout the Cold War period, have been firmly invested in supporting both the PAD and PDRC.

In the rather depressing tendency of the twenty-first century, the ruling powers that govern this world have become much more united than they once were in the heyday of the Cold War. The grand era when a prominent banker and the owner of a multinational pharmaceutical corporation could have been accused of being communist sympathizers is no more. In this day and age, capitalists of the world unite. The Chinese economy is currently the second largest in the world and is intricately connected with the vastly influential transnational Chinese network of trade and commerce. Descendants of the overseas Chinese who had dominated the kingdom's economy through much of the modern era continue to dominate much of the Thai economy of the twenty-first century. The only difference is that the military dictators of Thailand have now arrived at a much better understanding with the communist dictators of the People's Republic of China, both sharing a significant degree of suspicion toward 'Western' constructs, such as liberal democracy and human rights. In the age of globalization, ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs of Southeast Asia are no longer exiled people. Riding the high waves of global capitalism, their home base is now even more firmly established with the support of capitalist dictatorship states. The world has indeed turned upside down and the transformation of Hong Kong through the Cold War period bears witness to it.

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Chapter 8
Bangkok: From an Antique to a Modern City

Udomporn Teeraviriyakul

Abstract The arrival of European imperialism during the nineteenth century had a great impact on Asia. Each Asian country responded differently to the challenges. Fortunately for Thailand or Siam (Siam is the former name of Thailand. The Thai Government changed the name of the country from Siam to Thailand in 1939), King Mongkut and King Chulalongkorn ably faced up to the challenge, employing diplomatic strategies which helped protect Siam from imperialist domination. Their reforms helped Siam become a modern nation. A number of Thai scholars recognize the so-called First Grand European Visit of King Chulalongkorn in 1897 as an important turning point for a new and modern Siam. As a result of that trip, many historic reforms and modernizing projects were undertaken. In fact, however, some degree of modernization had taken place in Siam even before King Chulalongkorn visited Europe. Networks of roads and other modern innovations were first introduced in Bangkok during the reign of King Mongkut (1851–1868) and extended by King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910). As Bangkok continued to integrate into the Western economy, King Mongkut understood that the capital needed to become a modern city of international stature. To achieve this aim, a model, a European-like city in the region, was needed to guide the transformation. Two prominent cities in Southeast Asia, Singapore and Batavia, were selected. During the reigns of King Mongkut and his son, King Chulalongkorn, both Singapore and Batavia were scrutinized for this purpose. During his first overseas journey in 1871, King Chulalongkorn visited Singapore and Batavia. Back in Bangkok, he moved ahead with more changes that would eventually result in far-reaching physical and administrative reforms in the capital city.

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8.1 Introduction

By the nineteenth century, Asia had changed significantly, both politically and economically, as the world economy was being transformed. European activities in the Orient played a role in rapid changes in industry and communications. In many industrialized countries in Europe, there were new markets and new demands for raw materials. Europeans, especially the British, intensified their activities in the Far East (Kullada 1997). Communications became much more rapid using telegraph lines in the late 1850s and 1860s, by the development of steam-powered sea transport and with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. European ports and cities were linked more directly with regional Southeast Asian markets, bringing all more fully into the stream of global commerce.

The first Europeans arrived as merchants. Later, their government trade missions came, carrying the flag of liberalism. To occupy markets and gain access to profitable resources, they not infrequently used military power to enforce their will. The dictum, 'taking up the white man's burden,' comes from this era, reflecting cultural and racial biases used to justify incursions (Waugh 2007), as occurred in China in the Opium War in 1842. Countries across the vast scope of Asia targeted by such predatory expansion also became linked into a network of world trade via commercial treaties and military expeditions.

When the Napoleonic wars ended, European powers increased their investments in Southeast Asian trade more intensely than ever. After building up Singapore, the British tried several times to negotiate a commercial agreement with the Siamese government which would abolish the monopoly system. In 1821, the government in British India sent an envoy, John Crawfurd, on a mission to the court of Siam. Unfortunately, he failed in the negotiations. Again in 1825, Henry Burney was sent with a view to obtaining a commercial agreement with Siam under King Rama III. Under the pressure of British military expansion in Burma, the Siamese court in 1826 signed the Burney Treaty. Even after concluding that agreement, however, Siam abandoned this treaty at the end of the reign. The British were eventually able to put an end to Siam's monopoly trade system with the 1855 Bowring Treaty.

Siam's entry into the Western economic system became clearer, particularly after the signing of the Bowring Treaty. Siam and its capital city were modernizing as trade flourished, and new standards of Westernization became more familiar. Bangkok, Siam's face to the world, needed a model, a reference point by which to transform herself. The nearby colonial cities of Singapore and Batavia would serve the purpose. Thus, in 1861, King Mongkut sent his first high-ranking official to observe the colonial administration in Singapore. After Prince Chulalongkorn ascended to the throne as the fifth king of the Chakri Dynasty, he made his first journey abroad in 1871 to Singapore and Java (Batavia). As a result of this trip, the young king found much to help him in developing and modernizing Bangkok. The administrative system of the old city was reformed, and the capital undertook to become a modern urban center. By 1897, when King Chulalongkorn made his first visit to Europe, Siam was ready to be presented to the West as an acceptably 'civilized' country.

8.2 Bangkok and the Modern World

By the nineteenth century, Bangkok, the center of the divine and worldly powers of Siam, was gingerly dealing with the economic system and cultural civilization of the West. Siam had, since the seventeenth century, engaged in commerce with the Europeans, particularly during the reign of King Narai in the Ayutthaya period. As these relations were successful, the Europeans had expanded their trade activities. The Ayutthaya kingdom had profited from this trade and had been introduced to a number of Western technologies and innovations, among them firearms, turrets, medical knowledge, and some kinds of desserts (Damrong 1925). Unfortunately, after the Burmese defeated Ayutthaya in 1767, most Europeans gave up trading at the ancient capital. The few that remained moved downriver to settle in the new royal city, Krung Thep (City of Angels) or Bangkok (Ban-kok).[1]

Almost from their inception, Thonburi (1767) and Bangkok (1782) were particularly successful in attracting Chinese shipping (Reid 2004). Emerging from years of Siam's internal strife, Bangkok was eager for opportunities in commerce, particularly by the early nineteenth century, through sugar trading networks with China. Under a tributary relationship, Bangkok had long carried on a flourishing sea trade with China, becoming a hub for Chinese products in Southeast Asia. Bangkok was known as the largest independent port in Asia for China, after Canton.[2] During that time, the Siamese government promoted the large-scale cultivation of sugarcane for export.[3] As sugar was in great demand in Europe, Siam became a major producer for the world market. A major market for Chinese products and sugar exports, Bangkok attracted many European traders to Siam after the fall of Ayutthaya.

The returning Europeans, however, were much more aggressive. They did not want to trade as equals, but insisted on dictating terms. With the arrival of imperialism under the banner of free trade, Siam came under inexorable pressure, particularly from the British. After the Napoleonic Wars, the British were in even greater competition with the Dutch and the French for commercial access to China. Siam, as one of the China's tributary states and a center for Chinese products, came under British scrutiny after the founding of Singapore. The Siamese government wanted to trade with the British, and soon business with Singapore was brisk.

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[1]After the fall of Ayutthaya, the new center of Siam moved south from Ayutthaya. At that time, King Taksin established a new capital city, Thonburi, on the west bank of the Chao Phraya River in 1767. Later King Rama I founded his own Chakri Dynasty and moved the capital again, this time to the east bank. The new city was called (in short) Krung Thep (the City of Angels).

[2]Malloch recorded that most ships anchored at Siam's ports, including Bangkok, during the reign of King Rama III (1825–1850) transported products from the southern ports of China (Malloch 1852). Also, Crawfurd declared in his journal in 1828 that Bangkok was the largest port in Asia (Reid 1997).

[3]Originally, Chinese trader recommended the Siamese court to cultivate the sugarcane plantation for producing sugar (Kullada 2000).

Siam became an important trading partner, offering goods both for re-export and for consumption in Singapore and on the Peninsula. Singapore soon became the second largest importer of Siamese products. Shipping increased dramatically, soon exceeding the number of junks coming from Cambodia and Cochinchina. Shippers and traders from Siam, most of them Chinese, profited from trading in Singapore's free port. British traders, by contrast, gained little from trading in Siam. In the beginning, they faced the warehouse monopoly and various fees and restrictions to which Chinese traders were not subject (Kullada 2000).

It was because of these unequal conditions that the British in 1821 sent John Crawfurd to negotiate for better terms. Though that attempt failed, they succeeded in 1826 in concluding the Burney Treaty, demonstrating the expansion of their power. The British had moved closer to Siam's western and southern borders after defeating the Burmese and successfully penetrating the Malay Peninsula. The royal elites could not ignore the European threat to Siam's political stability. King Rama III had foreseen that the West would become a new political threat to Siam. At the end of his life, the king had given final instructions to his ministers:

> 'There will be no more wars with Vietnam and Burma. We will have them with only the West', and also, 'Beware of the Farangs.[4] Learn from them as much as possible but do not worship them blindly. Don't let them take the country away from you' (Pramoj and Pramoj 1987)

The late policies of King Rama III toward the West and conflicts in the Malay States exacerbated the situation between Siam and the British. Prince Mongkut ascended to the throne in 1851. The Fourth King was well known and respected in European diplomatic circles. He hoped to prevent conflicts by assuring Westerners that Siam was ready to open its doors. The new king soon invited Sir John Bowring, the British General Governor in Hong Kong, to sign, in 1855, the commercially important Bowring Treaty. As a result of this and other similar treaties, Siam was further integrated into the West's economic system. Bangkok, especially, while facilitating new trading activities and new standards for urban living, had to renovate its administrative and financial systems.

On the one hand, the Siamese court saw the arrival of Europeans as a new threat. On the other, some nobles became involved in and made a profit from trading with the 'farangs.' In particular, Siam's Bunnag family,[5] the Phra Khlang[6] during the reign of King Rama III, prospered in their private business deals as builders of Western-styled, square rigged vessels with greater capacity than the traditional junk. Their ships were better protected against the elements, required less crew, and were cheaper to operate. The Bunnag continued their trading activities with China

[4] *Farang* originates from 'foreigner,' in particular, Caucasians.

[5] The ancestors of the Bunnag family were Persian merchants who came to Siam during the Ayutthaya period. they served as officials of the royal court during the Ayutthaya and Bangkok periods. The powerful Bunnag clan supported the Chakri Dynasty in the early Bangkok period. In Thai history, they are known as 'king makers.'

[6] 'Phra Khang' refers to a position as head of the Royal Treasury in Siam.

and Singapore in the 1840s. They encouraged their children to learn Western sciences and technology. During the reign of King Mongkut, they supported and organized modernization projects in Bangkok. Dealing with the expanding activities of the British convinced the royal elites and nobles that the influence of the Western economic system would be very significant for Siam. New economic opportunities beckoned Siam. On the other hand, the political stability of the region clearly faced new risks and uncertainties (Kullada 1997).

American missionaries brought their own version of civilization into Siam in the mid-nineteenth century as Western trading activities expanded in Southeast Asia. During the reign of King Rama III, many British and Americans came to Bangkok for trade and evangelism. The Siamese government accommodated them cautiously, becoming more wary after Britain and France showed their colonial stripes in China and Southeast Asia. Siam witnessed imperialist threats carried out against Burma, China, and Vietnam, while British and French pressure pushed against Siam from the occupied Malay States and Cambodia. The danger was real, especially for the political interests of the kingdom. King Rama III maintained a semi-isolationist policy toward the West, resisting the works of Christian missionaries in his later years. Siam was able to keep these foreign interests at bay until the end of the third reign. Westerners pushed hard to make their liberal trade policies and 'racial destiny' the global standards of civilization, trends which strongly impacted Siam in the mid-nineteenth century.

In the midst of imperialist pressures during the reign of King Rama III, young Siamese elites showed more interest in the science, engineering, and technology shared by American missionaries than by their religious teaching. Where proselytizing failed, modern Western knowledge found willing ears. Advanced scientific studies revealed clearly how the West had come to power. Prince Mongkut, a half-brother of King Rama III and a monk for 27 years, was an energetic reformer. While in the monkhood, he established the rather strict 'Dhammayutika' Buddhist sect in Siam. A true scholar, the young prince/monk was also interested in secular studies, particularly the new knowledge coming in from the West. Wat Bowornniwet, the temple where he served as abbot, became a center of Western learning. While in the monkhood, he studied English language with American and French missionaries. As he became more fluent, he enthusiastically studied Western mathematics and science, particularly astronomy (Waugh 2007). Other royal elites and nobles were also interested in learning from the West, among them Prince Chuthamani,[7] Prince Krom Luang Vongsa,[8] Luang Sidhi,[9] and Nai Mode Amatyakul.[10] Some studied abroad in Singapore and in the West.

[7]In addition to his military role, Prince Chuthamani served King Rama III as official translator of English documents and secretary for English correspondence (Cady 1964).

[8]He took up the medical profession and learned Western medicine from American missionaries (Damrong 1925).

[9]He was fascinated with the art of shipbuilding and continued to study building ships of war and steamers more than languages (Damrong 1925).

[10]He later became a director of the Mint and studied chemistry and machinery (Damrong 1925).

American missionaries had an important role in fostering positive attitudes toward Westerners and the West. As Chao Phraya Sri Suriyawonge told George F. Seward, a consul of the USA, '*Not gunboat policy forces Siam to open the door, likewise China, but, in fact, it is successful as a result of American Missionaries' roles*' (Artarrun et al. 1976). This was true of Siam during the nineteenth century. American missionaries made many good friendships with Siamese elites, helping them extend their understanding of the world through the study of language, science, and foreign ideas (Steinberg 1985). This knowledge helped them understand more clearly the situation that Siam was facing and suggested some clues about how to handle it. More importantly, since they already had friendly relations with Westerners, the Siamese court did not hesitate to use diplomacy. New knowledge and technology enabled Siam to adjust to the new 'international' standards. Confronted by the West, Siam chose awareness over isolation. Siamese elites experimented with Western lifestyles and fashions. 'Westernization' even became popular in the royal court and became the new standard of development.

8.3 Bangkok in Transition

Siamese elites recognized that the world was changing and developed new policies accordingly. Not long after the Second Anglo-Burmese War, Siam's foreign policy officially changed from semi-isolation to opening the country to foreign intercourse (Pramoj and Pramoj 1987). This shift came about very clearly after Prince Mongkut succeeded to the throne in 1851, becoming King Rama IV of the Chakri Dynasty.

King Mongkut was aware of the disadvantages faced by Siam's armed forces. It was clear that the balance of power in the region had shifted from China to Europe. Siam ceased to act as a tributary state of China and began to cultivate relations with the West.

Negotiating treaties with the Europeans, the Siamese government had to give up its monopoly of royal warehouses. Agricultural production and the need for transport infrastructure were increasingly promoted to feed Bangkok's centralized export economy. In short, by the time Siam confronted the challenge of conceding trading rights to Western powers in the 1850s, substantial economic change had already taken place. The new world trade system had already begun to transform the character and function of Bangkok: The city's commercial economy was tied to an economic system dominated by the West (Askew 2002). As the West ensured that its economic system flourished in the nineteenth century, there was intense and aggressive competition. Much of traditional Old Bangkok would not survive unscathed.

After Siam made many accommodations, the volume of trade coming through Bangkok and other port cities in Southeast Asia, particularly Singapore, grew

dramatically.[11] The number of foreign ships visiting Bangkok increased more than tenfold, and Siam became one of the world's largest exporters of rice and teak (Steinberg 1985). As steam replaced sail and the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, large-scale exports from Southeast Asia to Europe became cheaper and faster. Siam sent rice to Singapore from whence ships continued on, passing through the Suez Canal to Europe. Cheap transportation enabled Siam to compete in Asian markets and gain huge profits (Ingram 1971). Thus, participation in international trade from the 1850s allowed Siam's exports to flourish.

Meanwhile, with greatly expanded foreign trade and contacts abroad, the character of life in Bangkok rapidly changed. Harbor facilities, warehouses, and shops were constructed. The King invested in new streets of shops. Following the traders came more missionaries, artisans, and professionals. More Westerners were formally employed as tutors, translators, police officers, labor officials, and shipmasters. To conduct international trade and anticipate the needs of foreigners, Western ideas and techniques were borrowed and adapted to provide new government services (Steinberg 1985). As Siam became part of the modern world in the nineteenth century, Bangkok transformed itself into a modern city on a par with well-developed colonial cities in the region.

Originally, Bangkok was a sacred, riverine city, similar to Ayutthaya. After King Rama I established his new dynasty, he chose the east bank of the Chao Phraya River as the site of his new capital. It was called 'Krungthep,' the 'City of Angels.' Somehow, foreigners preferred to stick with a version of an old related name, 'Bangkok.'[12] King Rama I based the plan of Krungthep on models from Ayutthaya, both in religious ideology and in strategic location. Bangkok is made more accessible and also protected by the Chao Phraya River and an east-bound canal. The city expanded toward a vast, fan-shaped, swampy area which stretches out to the east. That wetland was suitable for cultivating rice and also offered a natural obstacle to invaders (Thaitakoo 1992). The original character of Bangkok was therefore riverine. A location on higher dry ground was not selected.

As much as possible, the layout of the new capital city replicated Ayutthaya. Canals were the main avenues of transportation, vital spaces for city life. In the *Dynastic Chronicles of the First Reign,* the wish to remember Ayutthaya in shaping Bangkok is stated outright in the case of the excavation of the Mahanak Canal:

> The king wanted the Mahanak canal to be a place where people of the capital could go boating and singing and reciting poems during the high-water season, just like the custom observed at the former capital (a reference to Ayutthaya – author's note). (Thipakorawong 1935)

[11]During the 1850s and 1860s, the number of steamships operating out of Siam doubled from 146 in 1850 to 302. At the same time, the value of Siam's international trade increased from 5.6 million to 10 million baht (Wyatt 1984).

[12]Ban Kok was a village in existence since the Ayutthaya period. Located near the mouth of the Chao Phraya River, it was established as a small fortress town to protect the strategic waterway leading to Ayutthaya city and to collect taxes from merchants who sailed upriver to Ayutthaya for trade (Sujit 1999).

The Mahanak Canal is an example of how Bangkok was developed as a riverine city like Ayutthaya. Many canals and creeks were excavated as waterway links within the city. One of the purposes of digging was to extend the boundaries of the city. The Rob Krung Canals (i.e., Bang Lampoo and Ong Ang) were excavated during the reign of King Rama I and the Padung Krung Kasem Canal under King Mongkut (Van Beek 1982). These canals, besides serving transportation, recreation, and drainage purposes in daily life, were also important as a defense network.[13] Canals were also dug or repaired to facilitate the flow of tax revenues to Bangkok (Eoseewong 1982).

Bangkok used the river and the canals as primary transportation routes within the city, and many settlements were located along waterways. Floating houses faced the waterways, and people commonly went about in their own boats, as in Ayutthaya. Not surprisingly, many foreign travelers who came to Bangkok in those early times described it as a floating city:

> …numerous temples roofed by glazed tiles look sparkling in the sun and it makes the capital of Siam really a great city. On each side of the river, there are houses floating on the water on thick bamboo rafts in rows of 8, 9, or 10. The river presented a busy scene for numbers of boats, a row of Chinese junks and native vessels. Neither roads nor wheel carriages are there. In boats, people can go easily to almost every place. (Thaitakoo 1992)

John Crawfurd, who came to Bangkok in 1821, described the river and the canals in Bangkok as a part of city life, while no roads were seen:

> The face of the river presented a busy scene, from the number of boats and canoes of every size and description which were passing to and fro. The number of these struck us as very great at the time, for we were not aware that that there are few or no roads in Bangkok, and that river and canals form the common highways, not only for goods, but for passengers of every description. (Crawford 1977)

The waterways continued to support the economy and social life into modern times. During the reigns of King Mongkut and King Chulalongkorn, canal networks remained useful in Bangkok. As noted in the Bangkok Calendar in 1871, during the 1860s, canals helped expand the city eastward, supported life in the capital, and linked Bangkok with thousands of surrounding acres of rich paddy fields and sugarcane districts. Canals also shortened links with the nearby cities (Porphant 1999).

In those days, there were no roads to speak of, nor were wheeled carriages used in Bangkok. Prior to the construction of the New Road, no carriage roads existed in Bangkok outside the royal palace compound. Some roads around the royal palace had been brick-paved, but they were not in common use, and their primary purpose was decorative or ceremonial. They allowed the king to undertake personal meetings and attend to public administration. Most of the roads in the city were, therefore, inside or adjacent to the royal palace (Porphant 1999). Foreign travelers

[13]During Rama III's reign, the Saen Saep Canal was built toward the east for sending reinforcements to support armies fighting in Cambodia (Sternstein 1985).

who visited Bangkok and wanted to walk about the city during the 1830s described the streets as 'narrow, dirty, and muddy' (Porphant 1999). As the city modernized and more roads were constructed, Bangkok became land-based and abandoned its riverine traditions.

Bangkok was established as the center of divine power, a sacred city, as Ayutthaya once was. At that time, King Rama I undertook construction of the Grand Palace and the Royal Temple within the city walls as the center of supreme power in Brahman tradition. The Front Palace and other palaces for royal relatives were placed at strategic locations to protect the Grand Palace and the capital (Thaitakoo 1992). According to tradition, the site of the king's palace was the very center of this world under the influences of the universe, the point at which the microcosm is connected with the macrocosm. The Grand Palace, surrounded by high walls, represented cosmic supremacy as well as worldly power. The area of the Grand Palace was vast, containing many buildings with special functions such as the throne hall and a multitude of government offices. To the northwest of the Grand Palace was a large field. This 'Sanam Sumen'[14] (later renamed 'Sanam Luang' by King Mongkut) also reflected a cosmological idea. The placement of the Front Palace also followed the Ayutthaya model (Tomosuki 1993). The royal palace compound was also surrounded by quarters for officers, elites, commoners, and slaves. This was the symbolic layout of the heart of Bangkok in the early period. It retained the forms of traditional concepts and focused on social relations. A dense population gathered around centers of political and economic power like the villas or palaces of powerful elites. In this respect, Bangkok resembled a number of other Southeast Asian cities (Tajudeen 2005). As in the period of Ayutthaya, the king allotted foreign communities their own places. These were mostly Chinese and Portuguese, living within the city and in scattered areas to the north and south.

Strong walls and citadels were constructed and fortified. To protect Bangkok from invaders, fourteen fortresses and canals encircled the city, duplicating the plan of Ayutthaya. The names of some fortifications, such as the Phra Sumen Fortress,[15] refer to traditional cosmology. Phra Sumen was the highest celestial mountain and the center of the cosmic universe. Cosmology was needed in order to maintain authority to govern the state (Tomosuki 1993).

Later, foreign trade flourished and wars decreased, making the old fortresses less important. During the second expansion of Bangkok, King Mongkut ordered the excavation of the Padung Krung Kasem Canal, extending the city beyond the canal that previously encircled it. As a precaution, a few fortresses were also erected

[14]Its principle purpose was as a cremation ground for royal funerals. During the 1830s when Siam was threatened by Vietnamese armies, King Rama III ordered that the Sanam Sumen be sown in rice seed to intimidate the enemy (Van Beek 1982).

[15]The Phra Sumen Fortress was located on the most northern point of the Rattanakosin Island and duplicated the Phet Fortress in Ayutthaya (Wongtes 1999).

(Sujit 1999). The new canal became a primary route for transportation and commerce rather than for military purposes. Later, during the reign of King Chulalongkorn, most of the old fortresses were demolished for the construction of new roads and renovations (Bunnag et al. 1982). Today, only two remain—Pom Phra Sumen and Pom Mahakarn (Sujit 1999).

By signing treaties, Siam integrated into the economy of the West. In the mid-nineteenth century, Bangkok was an international port city with an increasing number of European ships at anchor and more European residents in the city. These foreign residents were relatively few in number, but they helped transform Bangkok into a more European-like city. Those who settled in Bangkok after the Bowring Treaty arrived with an idea of civilization and the intention to plant Western values in Siam. They requested more roads for land transport within the city. In the 1860s, Western consuls were complaining of ill health due to the lack of roads for their carriages. They asked for more streets in the capital. This is recorded in the Thipakorawong Chronicle of 1861:

> In the third month foreign consuls all signed their names to a petition which they presented to the King (Rama IV). It said that the Europeans were used to going out in the open air, riding carriages or riding horseback for pleasure. These activities had been good for their health and they had thus not suffered from illness. Since their coming to live in Bangkok, they had found that there were no roads to go riding in carriages or on horseback for pleasure and they had all been sick very often. (Smithies 1993)

In response to this request, King Mongkut ordered Chao Phraya Srisuriyawonge (Juang Bunnag) to construct Charoen Krung Road, the '*New Road.*' This road extended to the south of Bangkok and was actually segmented into a number of streets, for example, Bamrung Muang and Pheung Nakhon. Later, it was extended into Sampheang, the Chinese commercial zone. To transform an area within the city into a 'modern zone,' King Mongkut ordered the construction of more streets lined with shophouses, for example, Tanao Road between Bang Lumpu and Bumrung Muang Road.[16] Initially, these new buildings were copies of shophouses in Singapore. Unfortunately, early in the reign of King Chulalongkorn, they were destroyed in a fire. However, after he returned from Singapore in 1871, King Chulalongkorn commanded that they be rebuilt, once again in the style of Singaporean shophouses (Rasri 2004).

The area soon became a new commercial zone, decorated with colonial architecture and a modern carriage road. The shophouses built by the government were rented to foreigners, mostly Westerners and Chinese. From these buildings, the tenants catered to officials of the court and the royal family, providing them with exotic and expensive imported products, mostly from Europe (Anan 2002). Not

[16]Since the early Bangkok period, the area around Boworn Niwet Temple was an area of settlement for immigrants who moved from the city of Tanao. At first, they lived along the Bang Lampu Canal and then moved to this area when King Rama III built Boworn Niwet Temple as a center of this community. King Mongkut later ordered the construction of Tanao Road to link Bamrung Muang with Bang Lampu. This area was developed into a new zone with a row of Singaporean-style shophouses (Rasri 2004).

surprisingly, this venue becomes a popular shopping place for the upper classes in Bangkok. King Mongkut hired many foreigners to help in the work of modernizing Siam. For convenience, an area near the Grand Palace was provided with a row of shophouses for these guest workers. Modern architecture began to spring up along both sides of the roads from the Chao Phraya River to the Padung Krung Kasem Canal, for example, Ta Tien, Ta Chang, Mahachai Road, and Charoen Krung–Bamrung Muang–Pheung Nakhon roads.

In this way, Bangkok gradually gave up much of its riverine character and changed from a traditional to a modern city. D.B. Bradley, an American missionary, expressed his opinion in his own publication in December 1866 that Bangkok needed better roads if Siam was to develop on a par with the capitals of the 'civilized world' (Charnvit 1996). King Mongkut was quite concerned about the need to modernize Siam. He did not want Europeans to view the Siamese as semibarbarians. This great care for the future of the nation was certainly a factor in the King's decision to construct modern facilities supporting Western economic practices in Bangkok.

During the time of King Mongkut, however, Bangkok was still mostly a riverine city as only a few roads had been built. In 1864, Henri Mouhot was still able to write that, '*Bangkok is the Venice of the East and whether bent on business or pleasure you must go by water.*' But by the reign of King Chulalongkorn, the demand for land use within the city had increased so much that the king reluctantly gave permission to demolish a city wall and some forts. These sacred symbolic protectors of the divine city were torn down with sadness and misgiving. The king struggled to make the decision, but he could not resist the force of modernization. As he said, '*...I feel uncomfortable to demolish a city wall. I'm afraid that either the spirits or people would be angry*' (NA Public Work Department R.V 8.3/7). Sections of the city wall were demolished to provide foundations for roads. Even the fortifications of the Front Palace (Wang Na), the palace of the Second King which occupied a part of Sanam Luang, were demolished. During the reign of Chulalongkorn, a huge of carriageway was built, with elegant bridges—some of which still survive—of iron or marble, passing over canals (Smithies 1993). In Bangkok, roads were continually extended and modern communications were adopted. Steamer traffic and the installation of telegraph lines (1861) and gas lighting (1866) inexorably brought Bangkok into the orbit of global modernity. One might also say that the need for urban expansion and transformation steadily wore away the old character of the divine city, till there remained little more than a memory of Old Bangkok.

With the extension of foreign trade from the 1850s, Siam's expanding economy, and the increasing number of European inhabitants, Bangkok's port was more active than ever. *Commercial expansion pushed forward the ongoing transformation and modernization of Bangkok* (Peleggi 2002). The waterfront had new wharves and warehouses. The commercial zones featured new rows of brick shops vending imported goods, and there were newly paved roads and horse-drawn carriages. Increasing industrialization brought steam-powered rice mills and sawmills (Wyatt 1984). By the end of King Mongkut's reign, there were three bustling

zones to the west and southwest of the city walls, the port along the lower Chao Phraya River; a commercial area housing mainly Chinese, Indians, and Malays; and a district for European consulates and factories (Peleggi 2002).

Bangkok's upper and middle classes became leading consumers of foreign ideals and tastes, expressed in Western lifestyles and fashions, which had been brought into Siam by Europeans who arrived after the Bowring Treaty.

8.4 Bangkok Sees Singapore and Batavia as Models

The energetic expansionism of the Europeans had global impact. Extending their power, they forced other countries to follow their terms, often using military force to take control of resources and markets. So-called free trade and colonization planted European ideas and culture around the world.

King Mongkut tried to make Bangkok more European, more 'truly civilized.' However, since the royal elites had not actually been to Europe, they looked to Singapore and Batavia as their primary models.

Known for its modernity and beautiful European architecture, Singapore was an important commercial hub and a jumping-off point for traders and travelers. King Mongkut had foreign friends who spoke with admiration of Singapore. It was a door to the West and a good urban model for Bangkok in the eyes of the King, his closest circles, and his government. The King asked Dr. D.B. Bradley to write articles for the Singapore press promoting Siam as a modernizing country (*Straits Time* 8 July 1861). A high-ranking Siamese official, Chao Phraya Srisuriyawonge, was sent there for a month to observe administrative practices. Upon his return, he was assigned to supervise the construction of the *Charoen Krung Road*, also known as the **New Road**. Chao Phraya Srisuriyawonge later served as regent during the early reign of King Chulalongkorn and, in 1871, organized the first royal visits to Singapore and Batavia[17] for the young King.

Prior to those journeys, the upper and middle classes in Bangkok had, of necessity, only imagined what European countries looked like: Most people actually got their impressions from a Thai poem composed by Mom Rachothai, '*Voyage to London.*'

After managing the early period of détente, King Mongkut sent Siamese ambassadors to Europe for the first time in nearly 200 years,[18] trying to manage a delicate balance with the European powers. In 1857, Siam sent ambassadors to

[17]Batavia was included in that trip of 1871. The regent (the former Chao Phraya Srisuriyawonge—Juang Bunnag) recognized the need to realize a balance of power in relation to the Europeans. He had once expressed a desire to visit Batavia and Surabaya when a representative of the Dutch East Indies had an audience with King Mongkut. Hence, he was quite ready to organize a trip to Java for the young King.

[18]In 1607, during the reign of King Ekatosarot, the first recorded Siamese embassy was sent to Holland to deliver messages and to establish diplomatic relations with Prince Maurice of Orange.

England. Mom Rachothai[19] was the principle translator on that trip. In his poem, '*Voyage to London,*' he described the cities and people, the economic activities, and the many sights and sounds encountered during the long journey from Siam to England. The Siamese ambassadors had an audience with Queen Victoria and the British royal family and visited other new industrial cities, for example, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, and Sheffield. '*Voyage to London*' became popular reading among Siam's intellectual elites. Dr. Bradley bought the copyright from Mom Rachothai and published '*Voyage to London*' in 1861.[20] The account provided an impressive picture of modern cities in England and awakened the elites in Bangkok to the need to modernize Siam.

Ancient Siamese custom forbade the King himself from making an overseas journey.[21] In fact, until the reign of King Chulalongkorn, a Siamese monarch had never traveled to Europe. King Mongkut sent a high-ranking official to take a close look at Singapore, a 'European-like city.' In 1861, Chao Phraya Srisuriyawonge (Juang Bunnag)[22] and Prince Krommamun Vishnunarth Nibhadhom visited the Siamese Malay States and Singapore for one month, as reported briefly in the Bangkok Recorder (Nattawut 2008) and The Straits Times (*Straits Time* 6 July 1861). What Chao Phraya Srisuriyawonge officially reported to the King is not known exactly. However, it is clear enough that the King was very interested in Singapore as a model. After his return from this mission, Chao Phraya Srisuriyawonge was put in charge of constructing the roads within the city which foreign residents had been requesting. Recognizing that ancient customs should not obstruct his view of a world in transition, the King began planning to visit

(Footnote 18 continued)

Siam's first official envoy was sent during the reign of King Narai. Several diplomatic envoys were also sent to France in that period (*Prachum Phongsawadarn Lemtee 27* 1968).

[19]He was a member of the royal family. He had, in his youth, served Prince Mongkut. When the Prince was in the priesthood, he made friends with American missionaries and studied English with them, as did Mom Rachothai. His English was very good, and he was at ease communicating with foreigners. After Prince Mongkut came to the throne, Mom Rachothai was promoted and served the king in foreign affairs. When the first diplomatic envoy was sent to England in 1857, Mom Rachothai was the ambassador's chief translator. Mom Rachothai also made a record of this voyage for King Mongkut. The translator's own diary explains what he saw throughout the voyage. When published in book form, it was very popular. When King Chulalongkorn paid his first visit to Europe, he used '*Voyage to London*' as a guidebook (Rachothai 2010).

[20]This book was the first to be copyrighted by a Thai author. Dr. Bradley gave it the title, 'Niras London (Voyage to London).'

[21]In a written reply in 1849 to Mr. and Mrs. Eddy of Waterford, his friends in New York, Prince Mongkut explained that it was due to ancient custom that the royal family never went abroad, except for expeditions of war. As a result, he was not at liberty to accept their invitations (Pramoj and Pramoj 1987).

[22]Chao Phraya Sri Suriyawongse was one of the most important figures in King Mongkut's court. He was well known among the new generation for his interest in Western science, engineering, and steamship construction. After King Mongkut died of malaria in 1868, the Chao Phraya served as regent during the early reign of young King Chulalongkorn (1868–1873) (*Straits Times* 3 August 1861).

Singapore himself. Unfortunately, after a trip to the south in 1868,[23] the King fell seriously ill and died within 2 months. However, King Mongkut's plan was accomplished by his successor, King Chulalongkorn.

Batavia in the Dutch East Indies was another model for modernizing Bangkok, especially after King Chulalongkorn visited the city (along with Singapore) in 1871. Soon after King Chulalongkorn ascended the throne, the Regent, Somdej Chao Phraya Srisuriyawonge (Juang Bunnag), informed foreign consuls that the young King would study administrative systems by visiting and observing colonial cities like Singapore and Dutch Java (Batavia). This inaugural royal overseas journey was organized in 1871. Imtip emphasizes that this journey was a study tour (Suharto 2001). The young king came home with new ideas about how to make Bangkok a more modern city. For example, he had new ideas about changes that could be made in the layout of the city, in the civic sphere, and in public buildings. The King established a museum and an Officers' Club within the Grand Palace compound, duplicating Batavia's museum and Concordia Military Club. The King also commanded that both sides of the muddy Ku Muang Derm be reinforced with cement, from Chang Rongsi Bridge to the mouth of Talad Canal. Roads were also constructed along both sides of the canal.[24] A drawbridge was built (the 'Vilanda Bridge') duplicating one in Batavia.[25] The King adopted a European design from Singapore to renovate his private throne room, and he ordered his officials to dress and to dine in European style.

During this reign, the number of roads and shophouses in the capital multiplied. The look of Old Bangkok with its moats and complicated networks of canals underwent a marked change. Now, there were many colonial-style buildings (Tanabe 1977). Shophouses along earlier roads in the city now mostly followed the Singaporean style, which was quite popular (Porphant 1999). A document of Public Works in the reign of King Chulalongkorn records the following:

> King Rama IV ordered the construction of Charoen Krung, Bamrung Muang and Phueng Nakorn, and after finishing, the next thing to do was to construct buildings along both sides of Bamroung Muang and Phueng Nakorn. These buildings duplicated models from Singapore (NA Public Work Department r5 m 9/18.22)

The commercial area and civil spheres that emerged between the 1860s and 1890s generally reflect the transformative influence of Singapore and Batavia. Other aspects of Western cultures, including costume, dining, and fashion (traditional hairstyles, for example), were adapted to the social life of royal families and nobles. The number of European shops in Bangkok also increased after the King visited Singapore and Batavia. Stores were selling European products and offering

[23]In 1868, King Mongkut led an expedition to the Malay Peninsula south of Hua Hin, to verify his calculations of the solar eclipse of August 18, 1868. Upon his return, the King fell ill of Malaria and died on October 1, 1868.

[24]The two roads refer to Rachinee and Assadang roads.

[25]In fact, the crossing drawbridge or Vilanda Bridge was a Dutch model from the reign of King Mongkut (Sansani 2004).

new services in salons, dressmaking, and tailoring, for example. A photographer's shop soon opened as well. King Chulalongkorn's 1871 journey abroad was a landmark in favor of Western culture for the royal court and for Bangkok.

8.5 Transforming Bangkok

During the modern period of Siam, the traditional character of Bangkok as a divine and riverine city was profoundly changed. Increasing land use obviated the importance of the old fortifications. To use land and connect road networks, King Chulalongkorn ordered the demolition of the defensive walls and fortresses, the traditional cosmological symbols which protected the Grand Palace, the divine center of worldly power, and its inhabitants. The Brahmans saw each fortress as a representative of the god protectors of the city. In this case, however, beautification and modernity took precedence over sacredness.

At first, the new roads within the city were rather short. Waterways continued to function as primary transportation routes and social spaces for people in the city until the reign of King Rama VI. Siamese historically preferred to situate along rivers and canals in their floating houses. Some huddled along the city wall in a jumble of makeshift huts. The Chao Phraya River, its tributaries, and canals were social spaces for marketing, leisure, and religious activities. Images of this floating city amazed foreign visitors. By contrast, good streets were few and hard to find. They were usually reserved for royal ceremonies and as walkways for the King. Foreign consuls and European residents had to ask for a good carriage road within the city to improve their quality of life. The few short roads had little impact on local people, who still mostly lived on the water.

In response to the pressure of increasing global markets, more agricultural area and good transport were needed. As a result, new roads appeared running parallel to canals, and more long roads were constructed within the city. Meanwhile, canals were excavated to extend agricultural areas. King Mongkut had several canals excavated on the west side of the Chao Phraya River to facilitate cultivation and trade. King Chulalongkorn had the Prem Prachakorn Canal constructed to open farmland to the east (Damrong 1963). Changing the physical landscape significantly affected the livelihood of the people of Bangkok. The number of floating houses decreased steadily as steamboat traffic increased, for the big ships made heavy waves as they passed by. People had to leave their floating houses to live in brick buildings instead.

According to the traditional concept of 'Ti Luang (Land of the King),' the King had authority to reclaim any land within his kingdom. For example, when Krung Kasem Road was joined with Charoen Krung Road and the Padung Krung Kasem Canal, the Department of Public Works demolished houses along the canal to make the city more beautiful and to provide a new road. King Chulalongkorn's government compensated those who were displaced by such projects and provided them with a row of rental, live-in shophouses. New construction was forbidden without

permission from Public Works (NA Public Work Department r5 m 2/2). Public spaces for social activities were also provided. For example, King Chulalongkorn established a museum and a botanical garden (Saranrom Garden). Even Sanam Luang was renovated in ways that somewhat resembled the Koningsplein in Batavia (Damrong and Narissara 1995). The latter was described as:

> …bordered by broad well kept roads planted with tamarind trees, along which one beautiful villa after another is linked together The Koningsplein, that is to say the roads bordering it, is the beloved walking place of that part of the Batavia population living in its vicinity, (Merrillees 2000)

Originally, Sanam Luang had its own role to play in traditional cosmology. Later, after seeing Batavia, King Chulalongkorn ordered the reshaping and planting of tamarind trees to encircle the field. Sanam Luang hosted a number of public activities and royal ceremonies during his reign.

Prince Damrongrajanupab tells in his memoir how, when King Chulalongkorn ordered the extension of Bamrung Muang Road, the adjacent land had to be appropriated. This happened with the extension of the Bamrung Muang Road as well. The houses along those roads were demolished. The King was pleased to negotiate with the owners and promised that the government would permit them to construct new buildings (designed by the government) along the new extensions. For those with no money to invest, the royal Privy Purse would pay first and then collect a rental fee from the tenant. If the owner could pay for the renovation, the government would transfer the right of possession to that person (Damrong 1963).

8.6 Conclusion

With the pressure of imperialism expanding in Asia and the growth of the market economy after the 1850s, Old Bangkok in its traditional form as a riverine and sacred city could not support the new world trade system and the trend of Westernization. The city needed to be transformed to fit the new international standards of that period. King Mongkut saw Siam at that time as only 'half civilized' and worked to make the country truly 'civilized.' Thus began a series of transformations first launched during the reign of King Mongkut and extended during the reign of King Chulalongkorn. King Mongkut looked to Singapore as a model for modernizing Bangkok in the image of a modern colonial city. Bangkok became a prominent center of shipping and commerce in the changing economic system. Wars with the neighboring countries declined as European imperialism overtook Asia, making Bangkok's fortifications suddenly seem less important. King Mongkut ordered the excavation of a canal encircling the city, while King Chulalongkorn demolished most of the city's fortifications to open up space and to extend roadways.

Bangkok aimed to be a modern city like Singapore and Batavia. King Mongkut learned from Singapore, and his successor was influenced by his father's ideas. After King Chulalongkorn ascended to the throne in 1868, he visited Singapore and Batavia to observe the character of a modern city. As a result of that journey, the King adopted some public institutions and Western fashions for the royal court and the city as well. Even before the King's First Grand European Visit in 1897, European 'metropolitan modernity' was already being adopted in Bangkok. The impact of the monarch's first royal visit in Europe did affect customs in Siam's royal court and resulted in changes in some parts of the capital. Those reforms took place early in the reign of King Chulalongkorn. The shape of the capital, its traditional customs, and the livelihood of Siamese people were all affected by Westernization. Places representing flourishing Old Bangkok have been preserved as examples of the nation's heritage and as tourist attractions.

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Chapter 9
Nationalism in Indian Architecture: A Modern Trajectory in Twentieth-Century India

Madhavi Desai and Miki Desai

Abstract At the turn of the twentieth century, India was the brightest jewel in the British crown. During the nineteenth century, Indian cities were developed on the models and European ideas of town planning and architecture. They also made urban design inserts and urban renewal schemes, added to existing medieval cities, built numerous cantonments and civil lines. The history in the first half of the century speaks of two strong and conflicting undercurrents that India experienced within the framework of modernity. On the one hand, the rulers attempted to project their presence and power through an imperial attitude. On the other hand, Indian nationalism increasingly had a parallel effect on the creation of appropriate symbolism. Revivalism became a political tool affecting all aspects of the society as the struggle for Independence intensified. Personalities like Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore had a strong impact on the ideology of the society. Art Deco often transformed into Indo Deco in architectural and urban design projects in metropolitan presidency towns such as Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. They shared a distinctive pattern of urban morphology and were centres of modern education, science, industries, culture and politics. The shifting of the capital from Calcutta to New Delhi in 1911 heralded critical and all-pervading British efforts at the making of a new "Rome". The last strokes of the colonial era were found in Lutyen's Delhi (1913–1930). Thus, there were internal (nationalist) and external (modernist) ideas and forces simultaneously at play within the pace of modernization. This paper will attempt to analyse the ideology, events and other forces that shaped the notion of nationalism as reflected in modern architecture and urbanism of this historic era.

All photographs are by Miki Desai unless otherwise mentioned.

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9.1 Introduction

Industrial revolution and modernism led to the greatest advancement of material power in the history of man in the form of modernization. The nineteenth century was also an era of colonization in almost half the world over when the European powers were the colonizers who brought the ideas of modernism to the colonies. Almost all non-Western civilizations attempted to import the political, social and economic values of modernism to recreate their own cultures in order to achieve modernization. The colonial rule in India too brought exposure to the Western world, to education, concepts, technology and the ideas of industrialization. Though the French, the Portuguese and the Dutch ruled India in small parts, it was the British who had the political control of a majority of the land for a period of about 200 years who remain the main colonial powers addressed in this paper.

After the great Indian mutiny of 1857, the Queen of England took over the control of the country from the East India Company, thus the British becoming the imperial rulers from being traders. The unsuccessful mutiny was the first visible gesture that had the overtones of nationalism but was rooted in the religious sentiments of both the Hindus and the Muslims whose regiments were formed on religious biases. England was then able to gradually consolidate its hold over India in the form of what is known as the "British Raj". The second half of the nineteenth century saw the rise of the imperial power reaching its zenith when India shone like the brightest jewel in the British crown, only to lose it in 1947. The history of the first half of the twentieth century speaks of two strong and conflicting undercurrents as India struggled to emerge from the colonial rule to being a free democratic nation. On the one hand, the rulers attempted to project their presence and power through a modified yet imperial attitude and expression. On the other hand, with heightened socio-political consciousness, nationalism increasingly gathered a parallel momentum under the Indian nationalist umbrella through the creation of appropriate symbolism and the acts of resistance. The idea of modernism was, however, the concurrent theme during the entire twentieth century.

Revivalism became a political tool affecting all aspects of the society as the struggle for Independence intensified. It thematically transformed painting, sculpture and literature including art and architecture. In the post-Independence period, in the multi-faith country committed to secularism, the ideology of Hindutva gave rise to a different kind of concept of the Hindu nation which affected the appropriation of urban space as well as architecture.

Buildings are primarily the products of a particular political, economic and social system. Wide-ranging spatial and social contexts in which buildings are produced and consumed are the arenas of investigations for us. What existed in India was monumental architecture with aristocratic patronage and craftsmen/artisan-oriented design/build traditional processes. Opposed to that colonial architecture represented an important phase in the modernization of the country, when a stark medieval lifestyle got greatly modified. Imposed, emulative and resisted changes as manifested in the physicality of living environments have far-reaching implications, as

can be seen from the study of the Indian case. The penetration of colonial ideas/policies and their impact on local institutions and building processes created situations of confrontation between the foreign and indigenous values and ultimately between tradition and modernity. Hindutva ideology, on the hand, attempted to transform urban space and create religious icons. This paper will attempt to analyse the ideology, events and other forces that shaped the notion of nationalism as reflected in modern architecture and urbanism of this historic century.[1]

9.2 Architecture of the British Raj

Many transformations took place in the built environments during the British Raj. When the British were traders earlier, the nature of architecture was mundane and functional without much response to the Indian context where military engineers played an important role in design and construction. However, there was a shift in attitude as the British crown took over the governance of India in 1858. They introduced new institutions such as railway stations, law courts, colleges, hospitals and post offices including changes at the urban level. Stylistic changes occurred from the neoclassical and Gothic Revival to Indo-Saracenic towards the end of the nineteenth century, and to Art Deco, Indo Deco and the international style in the twentieth century. There were expressions of identity, power and superiority representing social and philosophical disparities between the ruler and the masses.

By many Western societal and cultural standards and views that the British held when they first encountered the Indian people, they were in their eyes socially, culturally, politically and scientifically backward. The masses were illiterate, ruled by a select few, determined by heredity, which wielded all power and knowledge including religious teachings that were disseminated through the select Brahmins. The Indian society associated Europe with "modern" values. Through the changes introduced by modernity during the colonial period, the most dramatic transformation in the traditional Indian society was in the material sphere, affecting not merely the economic structure but also their social behaviour and modes of thinking.

Architecture was the fulcrum of the colonial regime. With their civilizing mission, the British brought to their colonial subjects a different kind of architecture, laden with its own imagery and symbolism as well as new technology of building methods and materials. These ideas and elements that the British brought to Indian architecture fundamentally changed not only the general appearance, but also the meaning, function and how architecture was viewed by the Indians. There was an indirect imposition of lifestyle and behaviour of self on the others. The Indian architectural symbols, imbued with religious, moral and historical meaning, were

[1]An earlier version of this paper was printed in the conference proceedings of mAAN 2003, "Documenting Built Heritage: Revitalization of modern Architecture in Asia", Surabaya, Indonesia. It is further developed and draws from the authors' book Lang et al. (1997).

being changed and rewritten by the British Raj, all in the name of their own progress. The introduction of new building technologies and materials rendered the old system of master craftsmen irrelevant to the new modes of building. "The search to achieve a truly Imperial style appropriate to the country over which they ruled occupied the British for the duration of the Raj" (Davies 1985). The British set up Public Works Department in 1862 to look after "empire building" that became an instrument of modernism through the built environment interventions on a large scale. Incorporation into new buildings, especially those serving function previously unseen such as railroad stations, libraries or other public amenities, became the most recognizably British.

9.3 Neoclassical

Neoclassical style was the deliberately chosen mode of the East India Company until its dissolution. Most of the buildings were adaptations of the designs by leading British and European architects of that time as early attempts were made at adapting the classical idiom in an Indian context, especially for churches and other public buildings. In a sense, the neoclassical buildings announced the British intention to remain permanently as colonial rulers (Metcalf 1989). Many of the imposing structures were derived from Palladian models. Most neoclassical buildings were monumental in scale where the impressive grandeur was undertaken consciously for political reasons. There was extensive use of elements such as pediments, arches, balustrades, column capitals and other European motifs, representing the military and cultural supremacy of the West to the Indians (Fig. 9.1).

Fig. 9.1 The Senate Hall in Madras by Chisohm in Indo-Saracenic style

9.4 Indo-Saracenic

After the great mutiny of 1857, an effort was consciously made towards making the architectural expression more "native". Indo-Saracenic architectural style emerged out of this political ideology of the rulers. Elements from Indian architecture were visually amalgamated onto standard generic British building types. The hybrid style combined diverse Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic antecedents with Gothic and Victorian elements, while spatial planning remained largely European. Even today, many colleges, palaces and other institutions such as hospitals exist as examples of the blending of the two cultures. In most cases, the plan organization of these buildings was based on precedents in Europe. But the facades had predominant references to elements/components of historic Indian architecture. Major government-owned institutional buildings such as administrative and collector offices, law courts, municipal headquarters, railways stations and universities were built in this style during the late nineteenth century, particularly in Madras (now Chennai) but also in Bombay (now Mumbai) and Baroda.[2]

British and European architects designed in this self-conscious manner though simultaneously neoclassical buildings also continued as some times desired by the top British authority. The Indian craftsmen were employed in the building process of Indo-Saracenic edifices, but they did not have the creative freedom earlier enjoyed by them. They were subservient to the designers and carried out the details under supervision. In a sense, the beginnings of revivalism of sorts can be then traced to this development at the end of the nineteenth century. However, with changes in the political and social scenario, other forces affected architecture of the country. By the turn of the twentieth century, certain socio-political and administrative developments in the British Raj had set a context for the gradual rise of the nationalist sentiments.

9.5 Political and Social Background

The emerging middle class had created a new urban culture. The first generation of English-educated Indians were in awe of the perceived British culture. They espoused increasing modernity and appropriation of the industrial, financial and governmental institutions of the West. Modern education had opened the doors to economic and political power on a widespread scale. In addition, in the universities set up by the British, they learnt about the two great concepts of nationalism and democracy besides civil liberties. The liberal ideals had a profound impact on Indian intelligentsia. They perceived the glaring difference between these ideals and the behaviour of the British society in India. They nurtured these tools and eventually used them against the rulers during the build-up of the freedom struggle.

[2]The old nomenclatures are used here for cities.

By the 1880s, the middle class was spread throughout the country and was well connected through the English language, ideas and attitudes. Ironically, all modern processes became means of uniting the country and inspiring the spirit of nationalism. Besides English as a common language, it was also the extensive railway and later telegraphic network, the common administrative structures and economic framework that brought a sense of connectedness. However, the leadership in general came from the educated elite class. Within this nationalist context, the milestone came in 1885 with the setting up of Indian National Congress, headed by Sir Allan Hume, an Englishman. It became a vehicle not only for political but also for social reforms.

Simultaneously, there were efforts of indigenous reformers, who felt that Indian traditions and customs were in danger of being wiped out by European culture. They promoted nationalist ideas as the path for India to recover her lost glory. Apart from this, the main political event was the partitioning of Bengal in 1905 that gave impetus to the Swadeshi Movement (1903–1908), resulting in the revival of every aspect of Indian cultural life such as education, religion, languages, dresses, art and architecture. It emphasized non-cooperation with the British Raj and the development of a national lifestyle as opposed to the colonial one. It focused on the need for self-reliance. Its goal was also to draw people from across the country together in the struggle for independence. Some of the effective tools were boycott of fabric from Briton and the promotion of the hand spun fabric, "Khadi" which became an icon of nationalism. The freedom fight was long and massive for India. Its participants courted and incurred imprisonment through the flouting of laws and underground activities. Some others worked intensely within the existing legal and intellectual frameworks.

The nationalist ideology of self-reliance challenged the colonial import of product and technology as well as the notion of cultural superiority. Eventually, the Indian nationalist movement became a mass movement that inspired millions of people into participating in a prolonged popular struggle. It eventually found an echo in art and architecture though in architecture, the impact was rather indirect and short-lived as we will see later. In the art world, it was reflected in the nationalist dramas, poetry and paintings.

9.6 Modernism and Nationalism in the Arts

At first, modern European techniques and Victorian art forms were used by Indian painters to represent traditional myths. As the twentieth century progressed, there was questioning of the European hegemony over arts as a result of the growing nationalist thinking. It had an effect on the creation of appropriate symbolism which was aimed at a rise of self-esteem and the search for identity of the citizens. The liberal arts and ideas of the artists were the real catalysts in this development.

The Bengal School of Art based in Calcutta and Abanindranath Tagore, the nephew of the renowned poet Rabindranath Tagore, led the way towards revivalism

through an ethnic and a modernist expression in Indian paintings including free adoption and mastering of various techniques. "Bengal school during the early decades of this [twentieth] century, had the position of avant-garde at its initial stages, which we could consider to be the beginning of modern art in India…." (Parimoo 1984–1985). The thoughts/writings of E B Havell and A K Coomaraswamy were also extremely influential on the art scene in portraying views against European ideas of "what is Indian art". Havell, an English arts administrator, an arts historian and a writer, was the principal of the Government School of Art, Calcutta, from 1896–1905. He was inspired by the Arts and Crafts movement in Europe. He advocated an art education in India through revival of native Indian styles of art, while rejecting the previous emphasis placed on European traditions. He championed Indian craftsmanship and Indian concepts of aesthetics and design.

Coomaraswamy defined the real goal of India's nationalist struggle to be the propagation of the great ideals of the Indian culture. He strongly believed in the revival of lost traditions for a bright future of the country. In addition, Japan as a country and a culture exerted great influence on Indian artists and thinkers. "Japan became a model for India. The links between Japanese and Indian nationalism in art were closely established…. This idea of a Pan-Asian civilization acquired a special relevance for nationalist pride in India, for it placed Indian religion and philosophy at the heart of this civilization" (Guha-Takurta 1850). From the very beginning of the twentieth century, Japanese artists visited India, especially Kukuro Okakura who was a staunch Japanese nationalist. He brought the message of an awakening of Asia with his publications and interactions in Bengal. The Tagores and other artists were thus influenced by Japanese philosophy as well as artistic techniques. Rabindranath Tagore also went to Japan 3 times during the time period of 1916 to 1929. Tagore made sincere efforts at nurturing a Pan-Asian identity.

Many other artists also contributed to the development of this school of thought. India's aesthetic standards differed tremendously from those of the classical West. The alternative style of artistic expression/aesthetics created a new focus in the art scene, symbolizing a renewed self-esteem and national confidence. In most cases, the depiction of nationalism was subtle and analogous rather than direct. The painting of "Bharat Mata" by Abanindranath was one of the exceptions and became a direct symbol in the movement. The concurrent upheavals in Western art driven by the advent of modernism provided Indian artists in post-1920 India a powerful tool of colonial resistance. The discipline of architecture, however, was affected in an indirect manner compared to the arts scene though various attempts were made to rekindle the spirit of India in buildings (Fig. 9.2).

Fig. 9.2 An Ayurvedic College in Jamnagar

9.7 Revivalism in Architecture

Indian architecture underwent fundamental transformations during the colonial period. As mentioned above, the changes in the imperial expression began in the late eighteenth century after the Crown took over the ruling of the country. When the popularity of the Indo-Saracenic waned, two stylistic schools of thought began to dominate the scene, the Modernist and the Swadeshi/Revivalist as the twentieth century progressed. At the time, there were no clear-cut differences between various people working for or towards a pan-Indian nationalism. The relationship of the nationalist thought and architecture reflected coexisting philosophies, especially the battle between revivalism and modernism in intellectual thinking. Among the nationalists, there were different points of view as to how to best achieve the target of greater self-sufficiency, autonomous decision-making and safeguarding as well as preserving what remained of Indian traditional skills and customs. "The rise of nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiments in the twentieth century fuelled the idea of reclaiming a pristine and glorious pre-colonial past. In the construction of new nationalist identities, ancient and medieval pre-colonial histories of architecture once again took precedence" (Hosagrahar 2002).

The development of the revivalist trend in architecture was parallel to what was happening in the arts as it responded to several internal and external forces. "Revivalism in Indian architecture has taken three forms: one was concerned with the recreation of the traditional ways of building with the mistri, the master builder … It is revivalism of design production. The second….argues that architects should borrow

the modes of thought that established the great architecture of the past and not use its manifestations as types to be copied. It is revivalism of design procedures. The third acknowledges the utility of new technological advances but believes that stylistic devices can be borrowed from the great eras of India's past. It involves a revival of an aesthetic" (Lang et al. 1997).

Since revivalism draws on the past and India, like any other country, had many "pasts", the resultant aesthetic often became eclectic in nature. There were references to the architectural form, design principles and elements of the Hindu, Islamic and Buddhist edifices, influencing public and private buildings, institutions, religious places and many others. By and large, the revivalist buildings followed the plan organization and form development of the popular trends in lifestyle and use-the modern model-replacing certain elements, motifs and ornamentation with specific Indian ones. The predominant elements were domes, pillars, sloping overhangs, extensive mouldings and decorative grills. The revivalist buildings often had Indian clients and Indian designers.

9.8 Rabindranath Tagore and Shantiniketan

There were several personalities from the nineteenth century whose thoughts and ideas influenced architecture in different ways, finally building up to the nationalist impact. Lockwood Kipling (as an educator), James Fergusson (as a historian), F S Growse (as a civil service officer) and Swinton Jacob (as an architect and a documenter) are a few of the influential people. In the twentieth century, personalities like Mahatma Gandhi and Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore had a strong impact on the nationalist ideology of the society which we will see in detail.

In Bengal, the Tagores (Rabindranath, Abanindranath and Gaganendranath) were the chief founders of what would be later called the Bengal school of artistic thought which was strongly revivalist in character. In 1901, Rabindranath Tagore, the leading Bengali poet, thinker and philosopher of the time, started a school of art and culture at Shantiniketan, on an estate owned by the Tagore family, modelled on the lines of the ancient gurukul system[3] as an alternative to classroom learning. It was in a rural setting with the aim being among nature. The school was later expanded into a university called Visva-Bharati in 1921 which was pre-eminently indigenous to India by nature. In general, Shantiniketan was established in the nationalist spirit to impart swadeshi education as an effort to break away from the European model of education sweeping the country then. The founding of the art school at Shantiniketan had a profound impact on the evolution of art in India.

[3]A gurukul was a type of school in India in the ancient period, residential in nature, with the students living on the same campus (called ashrams) as the guru. The students were treated as equals irrespective of their social standing. Besides intensive learning, they used to help him in his day-to-day life, including the carrying out of mundane chores such as washing clothes and cooking.

Architecture in Shantiniketan began with simple rural structures, but later, there was a more intellectual and aesthetic approach. It became more pan-Asian and revivalist folk in sharp contrast to the radical Modern Movement of the West that was affecting the built environment of the country. Surendranath Kar was a painter of the Bengal School of Art, closely associated with Shantiniketan. He became the executive secretary of Tagore's Visva-Bharati University in 1935 and had considerable contact with Mahatma Gandhi. Kar designed five houses in the Uttarayana complex, Rabindranath Tagore's chief residence, at Shantiniketan, under the guidance of Tagore: Konaraka, Udayana, Shymali (Shyamolee), Udichi and Punascha. Each house had specially designed furniture. These houses were philosophical and aesthetic experiments, the idea being to evolve an architectural language in the national context. Kar also designed a total of five projects in the city of Ahmedabad in Gujarat.

Shymali was built in 1935 to house Mahatma Gandhi on his visits to Shantiniketan. Based on Assam vernacular, it was built of mud and had a roof that was a mixture of mud, pitch, cow dung and finely chopped *bena* reeds. Its entrance was a large *chaitya-griha* drawing on the Buddhist architectural past. Its exterior had relief works based on art themes of the Santhals, a local tribe.

The intellectual basis for the design of Konaraka, Udayana, Udichi and Punascha at Shantiniketan differed. They were more eclectic in their design ideology. Konaraka resembled the standard British bungalow of the era in its layout. Two bedrooms with attached bathrooms were located on the north-western and south-western sides of the building. In the centre was a drawing room. In front was a large open-to-the-sky patio.

Punascha was a small, one-storey house with a very down-to-earth quality to it through low heights and human scale. Except for the Buddhist references in the columns in the facade, there were no other decorative motifs. The use of a number of glassed windows made it rather transparent. The interiors were interconnected and simple. Its horizontality, transparency and plain surfaces made it quite elegant and modern for its time (Fig. 9.3).

Udayana, in contrast, while being European in overall massing, was highly eclectic in its symbolism. It was started in the early 1920s but construction continued until 1928. Its architecture was an agglomeration of styles and elements. A predominantly three-storey building, it had a prominent portico with Buddhist pillars. A *chhajja* of Mughal character ran around the portico. In front was a large verandah supported not by classical European columns but rather by the ones that were Buddhist in size and nature. Each storey was topped with a moulding that stepped out as the building went higher. The balconies had carved stone railings rather like those of the *Diwan-e-khas* at Fatehpur Sikri. The interiors expressed Japanese influence but also had contemporary Art Deco overtones. The rooms had low windows because the furniture was traditional and seating was on the floor. Though consciously harking back to architectural traditions of the past, the Shantiniketan dwellings were distinctly modern in layout. These houses have

Fig. 9.3 A View of Udayana at Shantiniketan (Photograph courtesy Samit Das)

remained hidden in the mainstream historical recognition until recently.[4] While offering no formal architectural education, Tagore's architectural experiments in Shantiniketan provided considerable food for thought in helping some Indian architects break away from the European precedents (Fig. 9.4).

Surendranath Kar was invited by Ambalal Sarabhai, a leading industrialist, a mill owner and a philanthropist of the city of Ahmedabad in Gujarat to design his own residence for his large, joint family in 1935. Surendranath Kar was known to be an advocate of Indian architectural idiom. Built in the revivalist mode, this sprawling mansion with its inlaid-marble floors and spacious rooms is situated within a picturesque and well-landscaped garden. The porch, the staircase, balconies, overhangs, columns and the brackets most of which are clad in red sandstone have their

[4]When we went through architectural schooling in the late 1960s and early 1970s, we had no idea about this though Shantiniketan was famous for education of fine arts.

Fig. 9.4 Sarabhai House, Ahmedabad, 1935 by Surendranath Kar

Fig. 9.5 Sabarmati Ashram of Gandhi in Ahmedabad

origin in traditional Indian architecture. The flooring in many key spaces is in free-flowing patterns in broken ceramic tiles. The terraces have been laid out for out-of-the-doors living where a verandah is often present. Besides Rabindranath Tagore and Shantiniketan, Gandhi was another important figure to influence architecture in the first half of the twentieth century (Fig. 9.5).

9.9 Mahatma Gandhi and His Ashrams

In 1915, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi returned to India from South Africa, signalling a new era in the fight for independence as he took on political and spiritual leadership of the country. He brought with him processes of passive resistance and civil disobedience that he had experimented with in Africa. He set up ashrams in Ahmedabad and later in Sevagram where he lived with many followers while leading the freedom struggle till 1947. Gandhi lived in an extremely simple manner. He had very clear ideas about rural India and its future. He felt that India would perish and her mission in the world will get lost if she did not have her villages any more. He imagined the rural houses to have courtyards, to be constructed from local materials, using self-help and locally available skills (Gupta 1995). His ashram in Ahmedabad (and in Sevagram) personified these ideas. Small and simple single-storeyed structures with tiled roofs dot the ashrams among lush green trees even today. He projected his philosophy of life through the architecture of his ashrams. Since so much of the nation's attention was focused on Gandhi during the freedom struggle, these views had an indirect impact on architecture in India that brought about a sense of folk aesthetics, simplicity of form/materials/techniques and a serene environment.

The houses in Gandhi's ashrams were essentially vernacular huts drawing on the regional rural architecture but were shaped by his thinking. He believed in equality and austerity. They stood in strong contrast to contemporary classical houses in other parts of India. They, however, built on his earlier experiments at the buildings in the Phoenix Ashram outside Durban in South Africa. His ashrams portrayed simplicity of design to match his philosophy of life. The living quarters were Spartan and minimal. They displayed the spirit of equality as well as his social and religious beliefs. They symbolized his statement, "My life is my message". Gandhi's influence on architecture was thus spiritual rather than stylistic.

9.10 Regional Expressions

India was and still is a vast and multicultural country. The nationalist influences combined with regional forces brought about hybridization and eclectic stylization. Most important of all, they resulted in distinct regional expressions. Certain features remained constant such as spatial organization and adaptation to new technology, while other regional factors contributed to the differences in architectural manifestations. There was response to the regional climate and a sense of adaptability to local cultures and building materials. Local craftsmen were allowed to express their versatility in making structures, elements and ornamentation. As the twentieth century progressed, the buildings got more and more indigenized (Fig. 9.6).

Fig. 9.6 Vidhan Soudha in Bangalore

There were regional impacts of nationalism all over the country. In the south, for example, the buildings took on a peculiar southern mould. The Vidhan Soudha in Bangalore is the legislative building of the state of Karnataka, designed almost immediately after independence as a special project promoted and supported by Chief Minister Hannumanthaiya. It is a prime example of creating a political identity through an edifice. It projected a conscious Kannadiga image while some others took on a Dravidian garb. It was the new symbol of power and authority. It was lavish and elaborately embellished with eclectic elements. Vidhan Soudha projected a markedly nationalist-modern aesthetic based on Hannumanthaiya's nostalgia for the Hindu monarchical order. The chief minister was trying to "culturally reconstruct a newly constituted state with a princely Mysore social order that was rudely interrupted by colonialism" (Nair 2002).

In Gujarat, some of the early revivalist modifications occurred in the facades of the traditional houses located in the inner medieval cities. By 1920s, the new domestic typology of the bungalow had become popular in the middle class. At first, the elites used the Palladian layouts but as the typology began to respond to the regional culture and people's lifestyle; by the 1930s, some bungalows were made in the nationalist spirit. In another example, the College of Arts building at the Osmania University in Hyderabad was an attempt to reflect the specific Islamic image of the Nizami culture with the use of the Arabic references for the building to stand apart symbolically.

9.11 Modernist Influences

Modernism in the international context has complex origins in the West, mainly in the industrial revolution accompanied by political and aesthetic transformations as well as changes in the social premises. If modernism was an ideology, architectural historians have identified its dominant physical and stylistic manifestation as the Modern Movement. Basically, modernism is an attitude, based on the premise that change away from the past is required in order to make the future better. Modern aesthetics sought to replace the classical order with simple geometry, rejected decoration for the sake of it, emphasized abstraction and functionalism as well as honesty of materials. Closely integrated with the visual arts, modernist ideas had an impact on not only architecture but also on urban design and city planning.

Modernism came to India as a dominant paradigm that was connected first to colonization, then Westernization and finally now to globalization. "Modern Movement forms of architecture and urban design were transplanted—as part and parcel of imperial, colonial and post-colonial regimes—to various parts of what, later, became known as the third world. They were overwhelmingly deployed, under unequal relations of power, as part of an ideology of domination, exploitation, and modernization" (King 2007). When ideas are transplanted, they often get translated.

9.12 The Art Deco

Thus, almost simultaneously to the revivalist fervour, architecture began to be shaped by modernist international movements such as Art Deco and to lesser extent Streamline Moderne. The rubric *Art Deco* was derived from the 1925 *Exposition Internationale des Arts Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes* (Desai et al. 2012). In architecture, it was a style of rich surfaces, sensuous textures and flowing forms influenced by the speed of movement afforded by airplanes and cars. By 1930s, Art Deco was accepted as being "modern" in India and was articulately executed, especially in the Metros for public buildings such as cinema halls, hotels, office buildings and occasionally a palace including in the making of the bungalows. This style also began to echo in the smaller cities and towns across the country. Many buildings incorporated luxurious materials: marble, ivory, ebony and other expensive materials. At the same time, new materials such as concrete, glass, wrought and cast iron opened up new architectural possibilities. Some buildings were restrained in style, and others were more sculptural (Fig. 9.7).

The Art Deco (and to some extent Streamline Moderne) style captured the attention of many architects, British and Indian, working in the major cities of India during the 1930s as European and American images travelled to India. The best-known and most dramatic Art Deco examples consisting of new cinemas and picture palaces quickly became landmarks of an emerging modernity, especially in

Fig. 9.7 Commercial buildings in Madras in Art Deco style

Mumbai. Art Deco was focused on styling and was more aristocratic in form and patronage (Dwivedi and Mehrotra 2008). In addition to commercial buildings, major areas of Art Deco bungalows and apartments were also developed during the period. They had flat roofs, curving windows, horizontal bands and a variety of decorative motifs. They often had a curved verandah or a balcony. The buildings used bold horizontal forms and pastel colours. The decoration consisted of abstract forms, embossed emblems and ornamental grills of steel. In form, both internal and external, they owed much to the design of the great ocean liners of the 1920s and 1930s. Even today, we could find some excellent Art Deco examples due to the versatility and excellence of the craftsmanship available. The buildings that used "Indian" elements of the past can be termed "Indo Deco" buildings.

9.13 Indo Deco

During the 1930s, there was an increased interest in indigenous cultures in many parts of the world. As an art and architectural form, Art Deco lent itself to easy indigenization. At times, in the cities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, and also in smaller towns, Art Deco took on a particularly Indian "Indo Deco" flavour. It came into being as a result of the nationalist fervour of the time. Indian architects and *mistri*s used it symbolically to project their identity (Fig. 9.8).

These were essentially Art Deco buildings in terms of form and spatial organization, but the ornamentations were "Indianized". It was a process of regional transformation in order to reduce the foreignness of the buildings. They included

Fig. 9.8 An Indo Deco Bungalow in Ahmedabad

sloping overhangs, corbelling and the use of cement *jali*s and projected brick course bands over parapets. While most Art Deco houses were asymmetrical in form, a few of the Indo Deco houses and institutions retained the symmetry. Thus, there were internal (nationalist) and external (modernist) ideas and forces simultaneously at play within the pace of modernization.

9.14 Planning and Urban Design

Beginning from the factories in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the forts, settlements to the making of the new capital in twentieth-century Delhi, the colonial urban experience left immense imprints. During the nineteenth century, Indian cities were developed on the European models and ideas of town planning. They shared a distinctive pattern of urban morphology and were centres of modern education, science, industries, culture and politics. These ideas of town planning and architecture were new to India, concepts emerging out of their own urban history. The Europeans, more specifically the British, built new cities, made urban design inserts, created urban renewal schemes, added to existing medieval cities and built numerous cantonments as well as civil line settlements. The concept of Westernization was greatly expressed through this medium including the new ideas of parks and gardens. There was an emergence of a new urbanity based on industrial and structural functionalism. Thus, modernist design was part of the

Fig. 9.9 One of the buildings of the Banaras Hindu University, Banaras

colonial and capitalist construction of India's major cities. With the British yearning for a classical European past, there was an overwhelmingly European image of the public architecture of all cities. Because of government being in charge of most of these interventions, nationalist influences remained minimal at this level. Banaras Hindu University was an exception to this while the making of New Delhi presented an entirely different synthesis of European/Indian concepts (Fig. 9.9).

9.15 Banaras Hindu University

The Banaras Hindu University was conceived in 1905 as a nationalist endeavour, akin to Shantiniketan. It was a major project for the nationalists as an alternative to the British-founded universities though it was close in pedagogy to them. BHU had a semicircular layout of roads based on the cosmic Hindu order with a radial pattern of sunrays. The administration, colleges and hostels were laid out in concentric rings with the residential quarters being the farthest. The architecture of the university was strongly and consciously revivalist in nature. This is most pronounced in the entrance façade where the brackets and friezes have decorative elements from traditional Indian temple architecture. The attempt was to have "Hindu" architecture based on past precedents. Though the idea of semicircular roads cut by the radial ones has concept value, the movement within the campus is rather confusing.

9.16 New Delhi

The British viewed themselves as the successors to Mughals and used architecture as a symbol of power. The shifting of the capital from Calcutta to New Delhi in 1911 heralded perhaps the most critical and all-pervading British efforts at the making of a new "Rome". New Delhi became the crowning glory of the British Raj as a systematically planned capital city. The British viceroy made architect Sir Edwin Lutyens responsible for the overall plan of Delhi. He was specifically directed to "harmonize externally with the traditions of Indian art". Thus, the Western architecture with Indian motifs was created that included *chajjas, jalis* and *chhattris*, as stylistic devices in the Viceroy's House (now Rashtrapati Bhavan). Herbert Baker added the imposing buildings of the South Block and the North Block, which flank the Rashtrapati Bhavan during the construction of New Delhi 1913–1930.

The British created this grand built environment in the face of a fast-growing Indian resistance regarding the presence and role of the colonizer through the last strokes of the British era. Though reluctant at first, Edwin Lutyen's genius lay in his ability to translate the past into the present without directly copying it, responding to the climatic forces and blending the classical with the traditional. The making of the imperial city of New Delhi was a very important gesture in spite of the fact that the British had to leave India 17 years later. Lutyen established the style of classical modernism with Indianized ambience that was followed for a few years even after the independence, especially in the design of prominent government institutions.

9.17 The Search for a Post-colonial Indian Modern Identity

The bipolarity of Western imperialism and Indian nationalism still seemed to have ramifications in the architectural thinking in India in the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s. In a sense, the idea of revivalism is, perhaps, cyclic in nature. During the decade of the 1970s, a number of events coincided to suggest to Indian architects that looking at one's own heritage within one's cultural frame might be the way forward within the backdrop of predominant modernism. Perhaps, the most important event of all was the celebration, in 1969, of the centenary of Mahatma Gandhi's birth and the revisiting of his ideas about India. Inevitably, questions were raised about the directions in which architecture was headed. The architectural thinking was also influenced by the general disillusion with modernism as well as the new trends of critical regionalism and postmodernism that the rest of the world was embracing at the time. This can be called the phase II of nationalist influence on architecture.

Since then, a quest in spirit is perceived on the architectural scene as once again, a group of the now self-confident Indian architects searched for a true "Indian"

architecture, attempting to use traditional building forms and techniques to deal with the issues of contemporary life. Some architects based their work on an understanding of the principles that shaped vernacular forms, but others were simply entranced by vernacular elements or construction processes to include an underlying Indian character. A few focused on design/build processes of traditional construction practices where the craftsmen are given a lot of freedom of expression in using building materials that they knew how to creatively explore. This was actually harking back to the precolonial period when all buildings were craftsmen designed and built. There was, once again, a focus on culture and the "local" including an encouragement of using regional materials and techniques though the form often responded to the modernist lifestyles. In that sense, there was often a link with the modernist–functionalist tradition.

Phase III began in the 1990s when India moved away from closed economy and socialist policies after reforming and opening up the economy, inviting widespread global influences. This impact increasingly bridged the gap between India's culture and traditions and the Western lifestyle. The anxiety of a part of the population about losing the identity of the nation got translated into a major revival of use of ancient building scriptures texts in contemporary designs. At another level, the Hindutva political movement grew stronger, resulting in the construction of religious structures and appropriation of urban spaces with a new rigour, promoting narrow socio-political agendas heralded by the ideology of Hindutva which took shape in the 1980s through spatial strategies to convert public spaces into Hindu spaces.

There has been the resurrection of Vedic principles of the canonical texts such as the *Shilpa Shastra*s in recent decades which impacted architecture as a newly revived phenomenon. These are ancient treaties of building sciences with religious and astrological basis that deal with architecture and urban design. They consist of sixty-four treatises specifying the layout of different types of cities, villages, dwelling places, palaces and other elements as well as construction details (Lang et al. 1997). Thus, their influence ranges from town planning to site orientation to vertical limits. These books also determine the plan type as per the caste/occupation as well as the location of functions on the site vis-à-vis the cardinal directions. A substantial amount of astrological information of the client is required in order to make a correct conceptual diagram for any building, be it a house or an institution. The traditional expert, based on the stars of the owner and those of the site, makes a location diagram for siting and designing the building. Most of these books have regional versions in India.

Although the reliance on the ancient *shastra*s never disappeared from the Indian scene, it was mainly through the masons, not architects, and primarily in the south that the ancient *Shilpaic* traditions had continued. However, they are now very popular almost everywhere in the country as clients and entrepreneurs engage with the global world but simultaneously reinforce their beliefs in the ancient. This has given rise to a new set of building practitioners–experts of Vastu, who interpret or audit designs based on their understanding of the rules. In the modern architectural practice, the owner goes to a *Vastu Shastri* prior to getting plans done by a modern

architect. After initial guidance of the expert, the architect takes over and prepares an architectural design that gets executed under his/her supervision. The Vastu expert and the architect often work in cooperation with each other throughout the process of design.

The constitution of India that came into effect in 1952 after Independence in 1947 has a strong secular religious commitment as a modern nation state, thereby separating religion and the state and relegating religion to the private realm. But the rise of Hindutva politics has been one of the most significant developments in it post-colonial history. The Hindu nationalists promote it to reclaim India as a homeland of Hindus with diminished rights of religious minorities.[5] The rigorous efforts at counter-modernity through the construction of Hindu temples are linked to this phenomenon. They are constructed with bold symbolic representations from the past in terms of its form, spatial disposition and intricate ornamentations. According to Rahul Mehrotra, there are three broad categories under which these faith-reinforcing structures can be classified. The first are the large temple complexes that are now being produced to monumental scales. They are built by master craftsmen (often a hereditary occupation) through the traditional methods of construction and are often financed by the Indian diasporas, as an expression of their idea of nationalism and nostalgia. The second kinds are famous temples such as Tirupati that are exactly replicated and erected in other parts of the country in a process of commercialization of faith. These neotraditional temples are pale imitations of ancient monuments, sitting in a new cultural/urban landscape. And the third types are institutions that carry on practices under the guidance of spiritual Gurus, located in large ashrams that often resurrect ancient imagery and rituals. There has been an enormous increase in people's participation in Kumbh and other religious *mela*s. In addition, in today's context, there exist numerous branches of the mainstream Hinduism or its practices which gave rise to many other faith-based groups that have a high following of highly educated masses (Mehrotra 2011). One of the most active and prominent such faith is Sri Swami Narayan Sect which is globally represented through huge, intricately ornamented temple complexes (Fig. 9.10).

The concept of "Hindutva" is continued to be espoused by the organizations like the RSS and political parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Besides temples and religious ashram complexes, there has been direct and indirect impact on the urban space due to Hindutva politics which has played with the anxiety between the Hindu and Muslim communities, especially after incidences such as the destruction of Babri Musjid in 1992 in Ayodhya and the pogrom in 2002 in Gujarat which systematically and violently targeted Muslims. In a detailed analysis of the case study of the city of Ahmedabad in the state of Gujarat through the past 4 decades, Renu Desai suggests that the divisive politics of Hindutva has systematically constructed Muslims as the religious other, resulting in a "communalized city".

[5]In the Indian context, most scholars reject the theoretical rubric of 'fundamentalism' for the ideology of Hindutva. Rather, they term it either a manifestation of nationalism or a crisis of secularism (Rajagopalan 2011).

Fig. 9.10 The Swaminarayan Temple in Gandhinagar, Gujarat (Courtesy BPS, Akshardham)

Orchestrated violence and other practices have created segregation (and often ghettoization) of Hindu and Muslim neighbourhoods. This has reshaped the urban landscape as more and more Muslims move out of mixed housing (Desai 2011). This phenomenon is common through many cities of India such as Mumbai, Hyderabad, Bhopal and many others. In another instance, Mrinalini Rajgopalan notes the insertion of Hindu iconography via making of statues of Hindu historic figures at traffic intersections in an Islamic-origin city of Agra in an indirect attempt at modifying its visual landscape (Rajagopalan 2011).

9.18 Conclusions

The concept of nationalism became highly relevant in the Indian history in early twentieth century when it helped form a distinctive identity to the Indian polity and provided a basis for questioning colonialism. It inspired the freedom movements against the British rule, including social reform movements. The evolution of the architecture of India, unfortunately, did not happen in a natural manner due to the colonial interventions. Compared to the arts, the progress of nationalist manifestations was rather slow in architecture as it depended on client support. The British certainly did not promote the nationalist symbols. The larger government projects, public buildings and planning projects were, therefore, least affected. The private

houses and some institutions got moulded by this concept due to the personal choices and philanthropic efforts of the Indians.

It was, nonetheless, an important phase in the history of Indian architecture which has not been adequately recognized by historians. It resulted in a rise of self-esteem and a sense for identity for the people of India that created crucial support. It became a symbol of national dignity, honour and confidence. However, it was often romantic in nature and lasted for a limited period of time. It served a purpose in the struggle for independence, but nationalistic thinking also brought a certain internalization and narrowness. It failed to bring fundamental changes in the processes of design and construction where modernist concepts dominated.

There was an inherent connection between modernity and nationalism. As an ideology, nationalist thinking originated out of the modern education received by the Indian middle class. In its architectural manifestation, the impact of nationalist thinking often remained on the surface as the plan organization continued to be modernist in conception. In other words, the idea was to embrace the modern lifestyle even while making a conscious reference to the Indian culture through the physical form and symbolism used.

With the opening of India to world economy, technology and culture, the questions of national identity resurfaced in the post-colonial era when Hindu nationalism got framed within the global modernity. In the field of architecture and urban design, the issue was indigenousness, the politics of place and cultural continuity. If nationalist influence was limited to individual buildings in colonial India, the ideology of Hindu nationalism is modifying not only the religious landscape but also urban spaces and practices in a major way. However, the full impact of Hindu conservative ideology and politics still needs to be mapped in the public and private realms.

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Chapter 10
From the Demolition of Monasteries to the Installation of Neon Lights: The Politics of Urban Construction in the Mongolian People's Republic

Balazs Szalontai

Abstract In Stalin's Soviet Union, architecture, just as other fields of culture and art, was expected to adopt the doctrine of socialist realism, according to which the various nations of the USSR were to create a new architecture that would be 'national in form and socialist in content'. In practice, this meant that Soviet Stalinist architecture drew inspiration, among others, from the monumentality of nineteenth-century historicist architecture, and even from Russia's medieval cultural heritage. Due to Soviet influence, socialist realism became an official doctrine in post-1945 Mongolian architecture, too, but in that country, the implementation of the 'national in form and socialist in content' principle proved a particularly uphill task. At the time of the establishment of the Mongolian Communist regime, the majority of the population, nomadic herders as they were, lived in felt-covered, portable yurts. The permanent buildings that existed in the capital and elsewhere were, almost invariably, Buddhist monasteries, most of which would be ruthlessly demolished by the Communist authorities in 1937–1938. For this reason, Mongolian Communist architecture could hardly, if at all, rely on national cultural traditions and was prone to imitate its Soviet and European models to the utmost extent. To mention but one example, the equestrian statue of Sukhe Bator at the capital's main square depicts the Mongolian Communist leader riding a big European horse, rather than a small Mongolian horse. While many Mongolian intellectuals felt that rapid modernisation destroyed national traditions, the leadership actually considered much of Mongolia's cultural heritage an essentially retarding influence. And yet the Communist leaders' determination to build a European-style city did not lack nationalist motivations. In their eyes, European-style public buildings and apartment blocks constituted symbols of modernity that would enable Mongolia to reach a status equal to the other socialist countries. Aware that their economically underdeveloped country was looked down upon by the 'fraternal' Communist regimes, the Mongolian leaders opted for rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, even in defiance of Soviet preferences and guidelines. Their megalomaniac plans were often at variance with local

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economic and climatic conditions, but if the Soviet bloc aid donors pointed out these natural obstacles, the Mongolian leaders did not hesitate to accuse them of being unwilling to assist Mongolia. While they did not play upon either cultural nationalism or Pan-Mongolism, their views seem to have been similar to civic, state-centred nationalism, in which economic nationalism was the main element.

For most foreigners, the name of Mongolia invokes images of vast steppes sparsely populated by tent-dwelling nomadic herders, rather than neo-Classicist urban architecture and a city notorious for its air pollution and traffic jams. At present, however, over 60 % of Mongolia's 2.75 million inhabitants live in urban settlements—mainly in the capital city, Ulaanbaatar, whose rapidly growing population already exceeds one million. In 2000, Mongolia's urbanisation rate (57 %) was considerably higher than the rates of such Asian countries as Indonesia (42 %), China (37 %), Vietnam (25 %) and Thailand (21 %) (Dore and Nagpal 2006).

The process that has transformed Mongolia's nomadic pastoral society to such a dramatic extent was a rather unique one in several respects, comparable only to the urbanisation of the Soviet Union's Central Asian republics and Kim Il Sung's North Korea. In the formative decades of Mongolia's modern urban development (1921–1990), urban construction was far more a state-controlled than a spontaneous process, shaped by a single political party (the communist Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, MPRP) and a single external patron-state, political model and aid donor (the Soviet Union). The unusually strong impact that state-set architectural norms made on the evolution of Ulaanbaatar and the other Mongolian cities reflected not only the monolithic political system of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) but also the relative weakness (and subsequent forceful elimination) of the competing alternative influences. This situation had much in common with the post-1953 development of Pyongyang, for the saturation bombing to which the US Air Force had subjected the city during the Korean War created a *tabula rasa* for Kim Il Sung, enabling him to put his grandiose architectural visions into effect.[1]

Since urbanisation and industrialisation constituted central tenets of Soviet communist ideology, the establishment of a Soviet-controlled 'people's republic' in Mongolia was bound to produce a decisive effect on the country's urban development, sooner or later. Ironically, the Mongolian communist leaders, having internalised the Marxist-Leninist doctrines about the primacy of heavy industry over agriculture and light industry, eventually became so committed to industrialisation that they sought to implement such a policy even if their Soviet patrons wanted to allocate a different economic role to the MPR in the 'socialist camp'.

[1]On North Korean architecture, see Roger Mateos and Jelena Prokopljevic, *Corea del Norte, utopía de hormigón. Arquitectura y urbanismo al servicio de una ideología* (Brenes: Muñoz Moya Editores, 2012). In the process of writing this essay, I have accumulated a number of debts to my friends and colleagues, such as Ryan Nelson and Carl Robinson, for their invaluable assistance.

But from the perspective of socialist urban planning, Mongolia's pre-communist heritage presented formidable obstacles, not only because of the persistence of nomadic pastoralism and the extremely low rate of urbanisation but also because the traditional structure and functions of the national capital were by no means compatible with the objectives and preferences of the new regime. If the introduction of socialist urban planning required quite drastic innovations even in such metropolitan cities as Moscow and Beijing, this was doubly true in Mongolia. The new criteria of urban development implied not only the construction of new buildings but also the massive destruction of old ones. Traditions of urban architecture did exist in pre-communist Mongolia, but in the eyes of the MPRP leaders, most of this legacy did not deserve preservation.

To be sure, Mongolia's pre-modern architectural traditions were hardly comparable to those Inner Asian commercial cities whose development received a long-term stimulus from their traditional association with the Silk Road, such as Samarkand and Bukhara. Throughout the medieval and early modern era, nomadic herders constituted the majority of the Mongol population. In the heyday of the medieval Mongol Empire, the Mongol rulers were temporarily able to redirect the Silk Road trade via Qara Qorum (Karakorum), their first capital, but in the centuries before and after this period, the northern route of the Silk Road extended westwards through what is now China's Xinjiang province, largely bypassing the Mongol lands. The walled city of Qara Qorum functioned more as an administrative centre than a commercial one, and for this reason, it began to decline soon after Qubilai Khaan (1260–1294), the grandson of Chinggis Khaan, relocated his capital to the Chinese city of Dadu (now Beijing) (Steinhardt 1988). Having been destroyed by Chinese troops in the late fourteenth century, Qara Qorum re-emerged as a Mongol capital in the early sixteenth century, only to be given up permanently afterwards.

In fact, this pattern—a relatively short existence and the predominance of administrative and strategic functions—seems to have been similarly characteristic of the other major cities that had been created in this geographical region before the Mongol Empire: 'The urban centres developed by the steppe polities in eastern Inner Asia did not emerge from a gradual process of growth, but instead were founded to serve specific, predetermined functions' (Rogers et al. 2005). In certain respects, the latter observations were also applicable to the urban development policies of the Mongolian communist regime, which drastically transformed the national capital from a religious centre into an administrative and economic one, and created wholly new industrial and mining cities in Darkhan and Erdenet, respectively.

The origins of the present capital, Ulaanbaatar, can be traced back to 1651 when a mobile Buddhist monastery-town, known at different times such as Ikh Khüree, Da Khüree ('great monastic city') and Örgöö ('palace dwelling', in Russian transliterations as Urga), came into existence about 250 kilometres from the current site of the city to function as the seat of the Jebtsündamba Khutagts (the spiritual leaders of the Mongolian Buddhist church). Composed of *ger*s (yurts) and collapsible wooden buildings, Khüree experienced frequent relocation in the subsequent decades until it settled in its present area in 1778. Due to the predominance of

the Buddhist clergy in Mongolian social life, the seat of the Jebtsündamba Khutagts evolved into the most important settlement in Outer Mongolia, gradually overshadowing the administrative centres controlled by the country's Manchu (Qing) overlords, such as Khovd and Uliastai. From the eighteenth century, Khüree's prominence was further reinforced by the creation of an office of Manchu *amban*s (imperial residents) and a Chinese commercial centre in the city. In 1911, when Outer Mongolia declared its independence from China, the eighth (and last) Jebtsündamba Khutagt became the theocratic ruler (*Bogd Khaan*) of the new state. On this occasion, he renamed the city as Niislel Khüree ('monastic capital') (Majer and Teleki 2006).

The growing number and importance of permanent buildings may be gauged from that in 1924, there were as many as 750 Buddhist monasteries with 113,000 lamas in Mongolia, a country of less than 800,000 inhabitants. Since each religious complex had an average of five temples, the total number of architectural constructions is estimated to have been about 4,000. Some of these buildings, such as the temples of Maider of Ikh Khüree monastery and Ongyn Gol, were skilful combinations of Tibetan architecture and the traditional Mongolian marquee style. The eight Jebtsündamba Khutagt also started to show interest in Western technologies and architecture. Among others, his European-style Winter Palace was built as a gift from Russian Tsar Nicholas II in 1905 (Tsultem 1988).

The existence of a settled national capital of undisputed paramountcy from the eighteenth century distinguished pre-modern Mongolia from those Central Asian countries where the present capital cities—Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan, Dushanbe in Tajikistan, and Ashgabat in Turkmenistan—had been settlements of little significance until their conquest by Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century, and their current primacy is wholly attributable to the developmental policies of the Soviet regime. Still, A.M. Pozdneev, a Russian traveller who visited Khüree in 1892–1893, found it a distinctly pre-modern city:

The external appearance of the Khüree cannot seem otherwise than unattractive to the European. … The lamas do not build their houses on the street, and, when you enter the Khuree, you can see nothing but fences and gates. … On both sides of the gate at every house there are short wooden stakes driven into the ground for tethering the horses of visitors. This is the appearance of every street in Urga. Within the [yard] there are usually two Mongol yurts. This is the winter residence of the lama and his kitchen. If a lama is rich, he also builds a wooden house where he spends the summer. … the streets of the Khüree during the greater part of the day are so deserted that one may go through the entire Khüree without encountering more than five or six persons, in spite of the comparatively large population (Pozdneev 1971).

In the early twentieth century, Khüree had approximately 25,000 inhabitants, of whom as many as 10,000 belonged to the Buddhist church. Chinese merchants and artisans constituted the second most numerous section of the population, while the Mongolian lay population, composed as it was of such diverse strata as princes, nobles, itinerant lamas, tailors, cobblers and beggars, remained relatively less significant (Majer and Teleki 2006). Under such conditions, the idea of fostering

Soviet-style revolution, industrialisation and urbanisation faced formidable obstacles in Mongolia, for the supposed vanguard class of socialism—the indigenous industrial proletariat—was conspicuous by its absence.

The Soviet Russian leaders, whose political and military intervention in Mongolia played a decisive role in the creation of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1924—at which time Khüree was symbolically renamed as Ulaanbaatar ('red hero')—were by no means unaware of these obstacles. After all, the Soviet-backed 'revolution' that brought the Mongolian People's Party (MPP)—the predecessor of the MPRP—to power in 1921 was directed mainly against external (Chinese and White Russian) opponents, rather than domestic ones. In the early and mid-1920s, the party, uniting such diverse elements as herdsmen, lamas and nobles under the banner of nationalism and moderate reform, hardly constituted a suitable vehicle for radical social transformation (Bawden 1968). In this period, a combination of external factors—the temporary flourishing of the market-oriented New Economic Policy (NEP) in the USSR, and Soviet efforts to improve relations with China—also induced the Kremlin to tread cautiously in Mongolian politics, instead of irritating the Chinese government (which continued to lay claim for Mongolia) by imposing a policy of rapid communisation on the MPR.

The flexibility of the Mongolian communist authorities manifested itself, among others, in their temporary tolerance towards the foreign private firms which sought to make investments in the MPR. In fact, the modern buildings that started to appear in Mongolia in the late nineteenth century and in the first decades of the twentieth century were mostly constructed on the initiative of foreign residents or with the involvement of foreign experts. From the 1860s on, Khüree's growing Russian community built a consular office, a post office, an Orthodox church, and a doctor's office. In the mid-1920s, the total number of foreigners in Mongolia stood at 51.207, of whom 23.919 were Chinese and approximately 2.700 of German, British, American, Danish, French, Polish, Hungarian and Italian origin (Batbayar 2001). Technical experts from Germany and other Western countries created a few small industrial plants, including a brick factory. The buildings of the electrification board and the state printing house were designed by a Hungarian architect named József Geleta and a German specialist, respectively. The buildings designed by Soviet architects, including the State Bank, the Radio and Postal Communications Committee, the office of the Mongoltrans company, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Military Club, bore a strong influence of the European constructionist and modernist style that reigned in Soviet architecture in the 1920s. At the same time, some European architects, particularly Geleta who designed the capital's first modern theatre, sought to combine European modernism with the traditions of Mongolian architecture. Capped with a cupola, the National Theatre resembled the shape of a *ger*, all the more so because its structure lacked columns (Tsultem 1988).

Despite the gradual appearance of such modern buildings, in the early 1930s the skyline of Ulaanbaatar was still dominated by steep-roofed monasteries and *ger*s surrounded by wooden walls. The city's population did not exceed 50.000, and the first factories found it difficult to recruit a sufficient number of permanent workers, since few nomadic herders showed interest in this kind of employment

(Robinson 2009). In this sense, the communist leaders felt constrained by the slow pace of urbanisation, but in other respects, their own policies actually contributed to this phenomenon. That is, the authorities, who feared that an uncontrolled influx of 'backward rural elements' into Ulaanbaatar might hinder them in re-educating the city's inhabitants in a progressive spirit, sought to prevent urban residents from visiting the countryside without permission, and strictly controlled rural–urban migration as well.[2]

Another political obstacle to industrialisation and urbanisation was the regime's growing hostility to foreign private entrepreneurs. By 1928–1929, the factors that once induced Moscow to refrain from radical policies in Mongolia were no longer in operation. Following the elimination of the NEP in the USSR and the post-1927 breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviets, determined as they were to isolate their satellite both from China and the Western countries, pressured the MPRP leaders to expel the Chinese merchants as well as the German, Swedish and Danish technical experts from the country. By the end of the decade, Maimaachen, the once flourishing Chinese quarter of Ulaanbaatar, appeared underpopulated and deserted (Majer and Teleki 2006). Some of the buildings the Western companies had constructed were later converted into a cinema, a department store and a philharmonic building, respectively (Tsultem 1988).

These acts of repression were dwarfed, however, by the mass terror that took place under Khorloogiin Choibalsan, Mongolia's supreme leader from 1936 to 1952. Following Soviet instructions, between September 1937 and November 1939 the secret police arrested as many as 56.938 people (including 17.335 lamas), of whom 20.396 were executed. The purge dealt a heavy blow to the regime's own elite and apparatus, too, but the Buddhist clergy suffered an even worse fate. All high-ranking lamas were executed, while middle-ranking ones went to prison, or to Soviet labour camps, for 10–15 years (Batbayar 1999a, b).

A peculiar architectural aspect of the terror was the utilisation of the recently built National Theatre for purposes of political propaganda. In October 1937, the authorities held a Soviet-style show trial in the theatre, with 'reactionary head lamas' in the dock. Such trials, in which the defendants were coerced to plead guilty to trumped-up charges of subversion and pro-Japanese espionage, had been unknown in Mongolia before the 1930s, and the absence of a modern urban mass media prevented the regime from publicising the proceedings as effectively as it had been done in Stalin's USSR. Since only 8.5 % of the population over 8 years of age could read, the trial's speeches were broadcast through loudspeakers for the crowds gathered around the theatre (Kaplonski 2008).

The campaign against the clergy directly affected traditional Mongolian architecture, too, for the authorities demolished all but a handful of the country's monasteries, misappropriating or simply destroying their valuable objects and holy books. Of the 767 registered monasteries, as many as 724 (including over 2,000 temples and 312 religious schools) had been razed to the ground by August 1939.

[2]I am indebted to Dr. Borbála Obrusánszky for providing me with this information.

Wooden buildings were simply burnt down, and the few stone buildings spared by the destruction were converted to prisons, hospitals, or warehouses. The amount of confiscated clerical property may be gauged from that the officials involved in the campaign requested more than 1,000 three-tonne trucks to bring the seized statues, precious stones, icons and other valuable items to Ulaanbaatar. A number of golden, silver, bronze and copper statues, such as the immense statue of Avalokiteshvara Bodhisattva in Gandantegchinlen Monastery, were transported to the USSR and melted down for bullion or bullets (Majer and Teleki 2006).

Choibalsan's anti-clerical campaign created an even deeper rupture in the cultural and architectural development of Mongolia than the persecution to which Stalin had subjected the Orthodox church in Russia. While the number of functioning churches did undergo a similarly dramatic decline in the USSR between 1928 and 1940 (from over 29.000 churches in Russia proper to less than 500), many churches were allowed to re-open after the Nazi invasion in 1941 when the Stalin regime sought to involve the Orthodox Church in its campaign to appeal to Russian patriotic sentiments against the foreign invader (Miner 2003). In contrast, the post-1937 Soviet-Japanese conflicts over Mongolia resulted in the permanent stigmatisation of the Mongolian Buddhist church as a 'collaborator of Japanese imperialism', rather than its incorporation in the state-defined national identity. Only a few Buddhist buildings, such as the Summer and Winter Palaces of the last Jebtsündamba Khutagt, the Choijin Lama Temple and the partially demolished Erdene Zuu Monastery, were converted into museums. In 1944, Stalin instructed Choibalsan to reopen Gandantegchinlen Monastery, apparently because he wanted to convince US Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, who visited the USSR and Mongolia in that year, that religious freedom continued to be observed under communist rule (Ookhnoi 2001). During the following decades, Gandan, staffed as it was by a small number of politically subservient lamas, remained the sole functioning Buddhist monastery in the MPR, as a token homage to traditional Mongolian culture (and as a tool of Soviet diplomacy in Asia).

Consequently, the demolition of the monasteries, having deprived Mongolia of almost every permanent building constructed in the pre-communist era, also considerably discouraged the future generations of Mongolian architects from using forms which could be associated with clerical architecture. Due to the near-complete absence of secular permanent dwellings in pre-1911 Mongolia, Mongolian urban planners and architects were less able to draw inspiration from their nation's architectural past than their Soviet Stalinist mentors who considered the monumentality of nineteenth-century historicist architecture, including its neo-Classicist elements, worth imitating (Ookhnoi 2001). For this reason, communist Mongolian architecture was more prone to imitate foreign (primarily Soviet and European) models than pre-revolutionary Mongolian buildings.

In the first decade of Choibalsan's rule (1936–1945), the Mongolian communist regime seems to have been relatively more able to destroy the old order (and old architecture) than to create a new one. During the Sino-Japanese War and World War II (1937–1945), military expenditures consumed over half of the budget, greatly hindering the state's efforts to modernise the economy, educate the

population and stimulate urbanisation. From 1936 to 1939, the number of industrial workers underwent a fourfold increase, but, due to the extremely low initial level (2,400), it still did not exceed 10.100. In any case, the growth of the working class was, to a great extent, an enforced process, for disrobed lower-ranking monks were compelled by the state to work as artisans and labourers. As late as 1941, about 90 % of the population was still illiterate. Despite the establishment of Choibalsan University in 1942, the first large-scale literacy programme did not begin until 1947 (Worden and Savada 1991).

This is not to say that urban modernisation was entirely absent in the 1930s and early 1940s. A minor but important step forward was the Soviet-assisted construction of a few industrial plants, such as a large Industrial Combine producing smoked meat, leather goods, woollen coats and sheepskin coats (1930–1934), a wool-washing plant (1942), and a meat-packing plant (1946) (Mandel 1949). Furthermore, these structures were no longer made of wood but of more permanent building materials. The significance of this change may be gauged from the fact that the first buildings of the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Theatre and a cinema, having been constructed in the 1920s mostly out of wood, were all destroyed by fires, sooner or later. In contrast, the new factories remained in operation throughout the subsequent decades (MTS 24/b 004449/1958). This may be regarded as a mixed blessing, for their equipment was becoming increasingly obsolete. In 1959, the Hungarian embassy in Ulaanbaatar reported that the Mongolian government decided to upgrade the Industrial Combine at the cost of over ₮3 million, for its facilities had not undergone any sort of modernisation during the last twenty-plus years (MTS 24/b 001577/1959).

All in all, the dynamic growth of Soviet-style urban construction started only after World War II, in the late Choibalsan era (1946–1952), and particularly under Choibalsan's successor, Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal (1952–1984). In these decades, the MPRP leaders, frustrated as they were by the fact that the MPR's inherited underdevelopment had continued to persist in the first 25 years of the new regime, made frantic efforts to catch up with the more advanced East European 'people's democracies'.

The first massive construction projects were launched during the country's First Five-Year Plan (1948–1952), during which ₮203.6 million was invested in this sector. By the end of the plan, the authorities managed to create such modern public edifices in Ulaanbaatar as the Government Building, the State Library, the Drama Theatre, the Eldev-Ochir Cinema and a maternity clinic. They also started constructing residential buildings, each of which was composed of 64 apartments. Since a city-wide sewerage system would be established only in 1959 when the Water Supply and Sewerage Authority came into existence, these first blocks of flats had their own water and septic tanks (MTS 24/b 004449/1958).

Under Tsedenbal, the rapidity of urbanisation was truly breath-taking, particularly if compared with the slow pace of urban development in the first decades of the communist era. During the Second Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) and the subsequent Three-Year Plan (1958–1960), state investments in construction jumped to ₮598.7 and ₮700 million, respectively. The first scientifically based plan of

developing Ulaanbaatar, prepared as it was in 1953 with the involvement of Soviet experts, expected the city's population (with the area of the Nalaikh coal mines included) to increase to 130,000 by 1970. However, the actual growth of the city turned out to be far more dynamic than the one envisioned by the planners. The population reached 152,000 as early as mid-1958 and continued to rise at such a high rate, to 180,000 by 1960, and to 402,300 by 1980. At the latter date, half of the total Mongolian population already lived in cities (Kaser 1982).

The unexpected rapidity of urban population growth showed not only the strong effect that state-driven economic policies, like the forceful campaigns of agricultural collectivisation (1958–1959), produced on rural–urban migration but also the limits of state control over the process of urbanisation. While the political leadership could, and did, impose its will on the major construction projects, the state's financial and technical means proved woefully inadequate to micromanage every aspect of urban growth. In 1958, only 39.2 % of the population in Ulaanbaatar lived in permanent buildings, and no more than 12 % of the homes were provided with central heating, running water and sewerage. Three-fifths of the city's inhabitants still resided in *ger*s, and the authorities calculated that if the entire population was to be housed in permanent dwellings, it would be necessary to build flats at a rate of 70–80,000 square metres per annum during the next 5–8 years. In reality, however, the rate of flat construction did not exceed 12–15,000 square metres per annum (MTS 24/b 004449/1958).

The capabilities of the Mongolian construction industry were by no means sufficient to fulfil the ambitious aims of the MPRP leadership. To achieve the targets of the Second Five-Year Plan, the construction sector would have needed as many as 300–400 engineers, but their actual number stood only at 150. The two brickyards that operated in Ulaanbaatar in 1958 were theoretically capable of producing a total of 120 million bricks per annum, but in practice, their performance proved much lower. As the Hungarian embassy ruefully reported,

It would be possible to ensure uninterrupted production throughout the whole year if the plants were provided with doors. At present, 60 % of the [bricks] produced by the two factories are shoddy because of the improper mixing of materials and the low level of work discipline (MTS 24/b 004449/1958).

Under such circumstances, the wide gap between the high labour requirements of the massive construction projects and the scarcity of the domestic workforce could be filled only by the extensive utilisation of foreign labour. At the end of 1945, the Soviet government sent as many as 12.318 Japanese prisoners of war to Mongolia for such purposes. Among others, Sükhbaatar Square, the current Academy of Management and the first large apartment blocks were built by these prisoners (Batbayar 1999a, b). In October 1947, however, the surviving Japanese were shipped back to the USSR, and Mongolia's own supply of skilled labour proved insufficient to replace them. In 1952, the number of workers and officials employed in the construction sector did not exceed 1.300. Fortunately for the MPRP leadership, in the fall of that year China signed an agreement of economic cooperation with Ulaanbaatar, which prepared the ground for the policy of dispatching Chinese construction workers to Mongolia. Thanks to the latter's

contribution, by 1958 the number of workers and officials employed in the construction sector had risen to 12.000, of whom no less than 8.900 were Chinese (MTS 24/b 004449/1958).

In 1955, China provided economic aid worth ₮160 million to the MPR for the purpose of industrialisation and flat construction. This assistance rendered it possible to build a new brickyard (with a capacity of 25 million bricks per annum), a stadium, a sports palace and a weaving mill in Ulaanbaatar, a wood-processing factory in the city of Sükhbaatar, and a glass factory in Nalaikh (MTS 24/b 004449/1958). The latter plant may be used as an example to demonstrate that Chinese assistance was not confined to the process of construction. In 1958, 136 Mongolian labourers and 18 Chinese technical experts worked in the factory. Of the Mongolian employees (for whom the Chinese also built apartments in a residential area of 1.700 square metres), 42 had received training in China. Since the calorific value of Nalaikh's own coal reserves turned out to be insufficient for the efficient operation of the glass furnaces, the factory was supplied with coal from China (MTS 24/b, 001577/1959).

Such a high reliance on Chinese labour made Mongolia greatly vulnerable to Chinese pressure, for the Chinese government did not hesitate to use its economic clout for political purposes. Following the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Beijing at first attempted to gain Ulaanbaatar's loyalty by offering to send additional workers. In May–June 1960, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai travelled to Mongolia and invited the MPRP leaders to visit China's Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR), where, he said, 'one can see real industrial progress, not the kind of [underdevelopment] that has existed over here during the 40 years of pro-Soviet orientation'. Zhou promised to assist the MPR to achieve a similar level of industrialisation, provided that the Mongolian leadership showed readiness to adopt a pro-Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet dispute (MST 25/a, 008157/1/1961).

Since the MPRP leaders proved unwilling to openly defy their long-time Soviet patrons, China switched to coercive measures. From 1960 on, the USSR was compelled to provide not only technical support but also labour and building materials to the Soviet-financed projects in Mongolia, because the Chinese authorities no longer supplied labour to such ventures (MST 25/e, 007716/1960). In 1961–1962, the Chinese workers employed at China's own projects organised a series of strikes so as to put pressure on the Mongolian government, and in 1963–1964, Beijing recalled the majority of its workers from Mongolia (Radchenko 2003). The resulting gap in the work force had to be filled, at least partly, by Soviet soldiers. Nonetheless, as late as 1966 4.000 Chinese workers were still engaged in flat-building in Mongolia. The host authorities sought to prolong their presence, the negative side-effects notwithstanding. Namely, the preferred modus operandi of the Chinese labourers was to complete the walls of a building in a very short time (for purposes of propaganda), and drag out the construction of its inner facilities as long as possible (for purposes of pressure) (MST 104–999, 005022/1/1961).

Describing the effect the Sino-Soviet rift produced on Mongolia, the prominent American Mongolist Robert A. Rupen declared that 'every day in every way [the MPR] has been a firm supporter of the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet quarrel and

in all things' (Rupen 1963). At first sight, the thesis of the Mongolian communist leaders' abject subservience to the Kremlin is duly confirmed not only by the consistently pro-Soviet tone of their public statements but also by their excessive imitation of Soviet practices in all spheres of life, including urban construction. Due to its visibility and permanence, urban architecture did constitute a powerful symbol of Soviet political and cultural influence in Mongolia, but—unknown to contemporaneous external observers except the communist embassies in Ulaanbaatar—the various questions of urban development also created substantial friction between the MPRP leaders and their Soviet aid donors.

In the late 1940s and the 1950s, Mongolian architecture was heavily influenced by Stalinist neo-Classicism. Designed by Soviet architects, the Foreign Ministry, the first building of Choibalsan University and the National Academic Theatre of Opera and Ballet were built in a strict proportional form and decorated with Ionic capitals, Corinthian order, columns, and pilasters (Tsultem 1988). The architectural form of these cultural institutions faithfully reflected the fact that European-style literature, art, and music were rapidly implanted in Mongolia, partly replacing or overshadowing traditional forms of culture and entertainment. In 1948, the authorities held the first symphonic concert in Ulaanbaatar and decided to set up a puppet theatre. The first modern Mongolian operas (*The Three Sorrowful Hills* and *Path of Happiness*), the first Mongolian ballet (*Our Cooperative*) and the first Mongolian symphony (*My Country*) were also created in the early 1950s.

Since the Soviet buildings and statues which served as models for Mongolian architects and sculptors were inspired not only by concepts peculiar to communist ideology but also by various pre-revolutionary styles, such as nineteenth-century historicist architecture, the imitation of Soviet models often meant the indiscriminate imitation of European cultural concepts and forms of expression that local citizens, at least initially, often found alien, unattractive, and even more or less incomprehensible. Unlike the spontaneous forms of transcultural diffusion, this state-controlled process, which one might classify as forced or hierarchical diffusion, was prone to pay insufficient attention to the preferences of the local audience.

In the field of visual art and architecture, the equestrian statue and mausoleum of revolutionary leader Damdin Sükhbaatar constituted particularly conspicuous examples of the inflexible imitation of European models. To commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1921 revolution, in 1946 the Choibalsan regime decided to boost the posthumous personality cult of 'Mongolia's Lenin' by entrusting a sculptor named S. Choimbol with the task of making a large-scale equestrian statue of Sükhbaatar. Once completed, the authorities erected the statue at the central square named after the leader. Sükhbaatar Square, a location where Buddhist *tsam* ceremonies had once taken place, was to assume a social and political role akin to Moscow's Red Square—that is, a public space to hold military parades and state-controlled mass rallies.

The Sükhbaatar statue also conveyed important symbolic messages, both intended and unintended. On the one hand, it elaborately expressed the regime's claim to have achieved true national liberation. The revolutionary leader, dressed in a traditional Mongol *deel*, proudly vows in an inscription below: 'If we, the whole

people, unite in common effort and common will, there is nothing in the world that we cannot achieve, learn, and succeed in' (Robinson 2009). On the other hand, the statue also symbolically revealed that behind the façade of independence, Mongolia's development closely followed Soviet guidelines. Having been trained in the USSR, Choimbol depicted Sükhbaatar riding a horse whose impressive size and appearance had more in common with European cavalry horses than with the small, stocky, short-legged—but extremely sturdy—native horses of Mongolia. In fact, a surviving photograph that shows the revolutionary leader on horseback depicts a common Mongolian horse, but the sculptor—or his Soviet mentors—probably did not regard his actual horse as sufficiently majestic, or simply thought it unnecessary to modify the statue in accordance with local conditions.

Following the death of Choibalsan in 1952, his embalmed body and Sükhbaatar's exhumed remains were interred into a mausoleum built on Sükhbaatar Square, in obvious imitation of Lenin's Mausoleum in the Red Square. The two buildings were similar to each other not only in function but also in shape, albeit they differed in colour. Nevertheless, in Mongolia the idea of such a public mausoleum stood in a stronger contrast with local customs of burial than in Russia. Notably, Trotsky, who opposed Stalin's plan to embalm Lenin's corpse, pointed out that such a measure would be uncomfortably similar to the earlier public veneration of the relics of Orthodox saints (Figes 1997). In traditional Mongol practices, however, corpses were usually left unburied, with no gravestone erected, and in those cases when the lamas did embalm the bodies of certain Buddhist dignitaries, the latter were buried in coffins, in a sitting position as if in prayer. European-style burial practices started to make inroads only in the 1950s when the MPRP regime issued a law on 'hygienic burials' (Humphrey 2002).

Nevertheless, the emphasis the Mongolian communist leadership laid on Soviet-style urban construction seems to have been motivated by a peculiar mixture of pro-Soviet sentiments and nationalist inclinations, rather than mere subservience. Painfully aware of the fact that the other communist regimes did not hold their economically underdeveloped country in high regard, the MPRP leaders sought to reach modernity in the shortest time possible. In their eyes, European-style public buildings and apartment blocks constituted symbols of modernity that would enable the MPR to reach a status equal to the other socialist countries. If the communist states providing economic aid to Mongolia pointed out that one or another planned project appeared incompatible with local economic and climatic conditions, the MPRP leaders did not hesitate to accuse them of being unwilling to assist their country.

For instance, in 1960 a party leader named Damdinjavyn Maidar asked the city council of Budapest to construct eight- and ten-storeyed buildings in Ulaanbaatar—a request that the Hungarian officials considered excessive and refused to fulfil. On the same occasion, another MPRP leader, Tsagaan-Lamyn Dugersuren, asked the Hungarian delegates to provide Ulaanbaatar with neon signs, another symbol of modernity. When the Hungarian ambassador disagreed on the grounds that neon lighting might not survive the severe Mongolian winter, Dugersuren rebuffed him in such a rude way that shocked the 'fraternal' diplomat:

> Look, Comrade Ambassador, we are interested in the neon lights, not in why they cannot be installed. If the city council of Budapest really wants to help us, then they should rack their brains to make neon lights capable of withstanding even 50-60 [Celsius] degrees of frost. This would be a really fine gift. (Szalontai 2004)

For similar reasons, the MPRP leaders showed little interest in preserving those elements of Mongolia's cultural heritage which foreigners might regard as indicators of backwardness. For example, in 1959 the Hungarian ambassador reported that in the opinion of some Mongolian leaders, the inner cover of the *ger*s should be made of plastic to be produced in Mongolia, rather than felt, the material traditionally used by nomadic herders. Actually, felt—an excellent thermal insulator with fire-resistant properties—was probably more suitable for this purpose than plastic, but the MPRP cadres obviously considered plastic a symbol of modernity (Szalontai 2004). Furthermore, the authorities were often positively unwilling to allow foreigners to see those aspects of Mongolian life which they considered backward and uncivilised. In 1958, a visiting Hungarian archaeologist who wanted to visit tribal reindeer herders in north-western Mongolia found the MPRP officials hardly, if at all, cooperative. As he complained in a letter,

> They may feel ashamed of the fact that the people living there travel on reindeerback, instead of by car, or for some other reason. The vice-chairman of the local Institute of Culture took offence at that I was interested in that region in a prehistoric sense; he took it as if [I had said that] the local people lived in the prehistoric age – which is, of course, partly true. (Szalontai 2004)

The aforesaid episodes of friction reflected a fundamental disagreement between the Kremlin and the Mongolian leadership group headed by Tsedenbal. Anxious to create a division of labour within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the Soviets were of the opinion that the MPR should concentrate on the development of its traditional export sectors, that is, livestock farming and mining. Having pointed out that the Mongolian government's industrialisation drive—which they considered excessive and unnecessary—was based on the financial exploitation of the rural sector, they prodded the MPRP leadership to provide sufficient material incentives to the hard-pressed pastoral population. In contrast, Tsedenbal and his followers, determined as they were to catch up with the more developed communist countries, urged the USSR, China and the East European states to support the rapid industrialisation of the MPR. They apparently thought that the role Moscow assigned to Mongolia in the COMECON would perpetuate the backwardness of their country. In 1961, the vice-chairman of the State Planning Office flatly told a Hungarian diplomat that the Mongolian government's intention to construct a blast furnace was motivated not only by economic considerations but also by political ones. That is, the MPRP leaders regarded the creation of an indigenous heavy industry as a prestige project aimed at demonstrating Mongolia's developed status (Szalontai 2004).

Soviet–Mongolian debates over industrialisation directly affected the geographical patterns of urban construction in the MPR. In the course of the First Five-Year Plan (1948–1952), the regime's construction projects were mainly

confined to the capital. During the Second Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) and the Three-Year Plan (1958–1960), such projects outside Ulaanbaatar received ₮200 million (33.4 %) and 462 million (66 %), respectively (MTS 1945–1964, 6, 24/b, 004449/1958). Nevertheless, in 1961 80 % of Mongolia's industrial capacity was still concentrated in the capital, whereupon the government decided to create a new industrial city named Darkhan in the northern part of the country, close to the Soviet border (MTS 1945–1964, 6, 24/b, 007903/1/1961). This step towards urban decentralisation seems to have been at least partly inspired by the Kremlin, which provided substantial aid for the construction of Darkhan. Notably, in 1960 the Soviets bluntly told the MPRP leadership that they would not give any additional economic assistance for the industrial development of Ulaanbaatar, since the capital's population had already exceeded one-fifth of the country's total population and thus, in the opinion of the Soviet diplomats, 'reached a dangerous level'. As a consequence, the Mongolian leaders were compelled to shelve some of the construction projects they intended to carry out in Ulaanbaatar during the next Five-Year Plan (MTS 1945–1964, 7, 25/e, 007716/1960).

Thus Tsedenbal and his followers found themselves in a vortex of conflicting external and domestic interests. Since they proved unwilling to adopt a pro-Chinese stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Beijing reneged its earlier promise to build a blast furnace in the MPR. Thereupon the Mongolian leaders asked the Kremlin to construct such a plant in Darkhan, only to be rebuffed by the Soviets who saw no economic justification for the project (MTS 1945–1964, 7, 25/e, 007716/1960). Furthermore, Tsedenbal's pro-urban, industry-first economic strategy by no means enjoyed the unqualified support of the entire party elite. In January 1962, the MPRP CC held a plenum at which a number of cadres, inspired as they were by the process of Soviet de-Stalinisation, sharply criticised both Tsedenbal's economic policies and his reluctance to condemn Choibalsan's reign of terror. They stressed that the government's industrialisation drive had produced an adverse effect on livestock farming (which they considered the mainstay of the economy), yet it failed to yield the desired results (MTS 1945–1964, 7, 25/a, 008/RT/1962). Due to their pressure, the plenum also took a few steps towards de-Stalinisation, albeit only modest ones. For instance, Choibalsan University was renamed as State University, but the city of Choibalsan continued to bear the dictator's name. Nor did Tsedenbal remove Choibalsan's body from the mausoleum in a similar way as Nikita Khrushchev had dealt with Stalin's remains (MTS 1945–1964, 7, 25/a, 0028/RT/1962).

The regime's model of development also faced criticism from those Mongolian intellectuals who felt that the MPRP leaders, out of subservience to the USSR, had failed to make sufficient efforts to preserve Mongolia's cultural heritage and national traditions. As Professor Byambiin Rinchen, a prominent representative of this view, put it, 'They forgot that the history and culture of the Mongolian people did not begin in the 1940s but more than one thousand years ago' (MTS 1945–1964, 4, 5/f, 006645/1956). Among others, he bitterly complained of the Soviet-enforced replacement of the traditional Mongol script with the Cyrillic script, the demolition of the Buddhist monasteries and the mass execution of lamas.

Actually, the Tsedenbal regime seems not to have been fully indifferent or hostile towards Mongolia's cultural legacy. The structure and ornamental motifs of certain modern buildings did reflect the influence of Mongolian architectural traditions. Thanks to the initiative of B. Chimed, who played a central role in urban planning as early as 1953, the design of the Drama Theatre skilfully combined elements of European neo-Classicism with the quadratic plane and double-tier marquee roof of traditional Mongolian architecture. Similarly, the works of such later architects as B. Dambiinyam and A. Hishigt, including the House of Health Education, the Astronomical Observatory, the second building of the State University and the Meteorology Building, extensively used traditional elements, like round shapes. Many residential tower blocks were also decorated by traditional meandering ornaments (Tsultem 1988).

Still, N. Tsultem, the author of a Mongolian architectural book published in 1988, had ample reason to lament:

> The buildings of Central Exhibition Hall, Centre of Scientific Information, the Palace of Pioneers, House of Young Technicians, and Airport were designed by the Soviet specialists. It is a pity that in [the] majority of these buildings, attention was not paid to the national character, which made them look more like European buildings. … Therefore [the] contemporary stage of town building demands to solve these problems more intensely. By using widely engineer-technical science means and materials, and basing on the national traditions, the Mongolian architects are seeking new forms and methods to further the creative development of Mongolian architecture (Tsultem 1988).

At the time when Tsultem wrote these words, the MPRP leaders—then headed by Jambyn Batmünkh (1984–1990), the successor of Tsedenbal—finally started to realise the necessity of making certain concessions to the hitherto suppressed nationalist sentiments of the population. In early 1989, the authorities declared the lunar New Year (*Tsagaan Sar*) a state holiday, re-started the education of the traditional Mongol script and began making a movie about Chinggis Khaan (whose figure had been described as 'reactionary' in the Soviet-inspired Mongolian historical works published in the Tsedenbal era) (MTS 1989, 60, 104–120, 001499/1989). In March, Batmünkh told a Soviet interviewer that the demolition of the monasteries under Choibalsan had deprived Mongolia a great part of its cultural heritage (Worden 1991).

Nonetheless, these steps were taken too late to save the regime. In the early 1960s, the MPRP leadership was still capable of overcoming the political crisis generated by domestic economic problems and Soviet de-Stalinisation without encountering a major social upheaval, and from 1965 to 1980, its rule remained stable and unchallengeable. In the late 1980s, however, cracks started to appear in the edifice of MPRP dominance. Certain segments of Mongolian society, drawing inspiration from Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika*, became increasingly critical of the performance of the communist developmental model as such.

Paradoxically, the very same process of rapid urbanisation that the MPRP leadership had considered one of its major achievements played a central role in putting an end to communist rule in Mongolia. By the late 1980s, the total number of urban residents (1.116 million) had considerably exceeded the rural population

(0.877 million). The population of Ulaanbaatar reached 548,400, that is, over 25 % of the country's total population (Batbayar 2002). Due to the massive rural–urban migration, livestock farming started to face a labour shortage, whereas the swollen urban population had to cope with growing unemployment and other social problems which the authorities could hardly, if at all, solve. Debates over these problems started to influence intra-party struggles as early as 1983 when CC Secretary P. Damdin—who sought to discredit B. Altangerel, the head of the capital's party organisation—collected a formidable amount of shocking statistical data about living conditions in the poorer districts of Ulaanbaatar. The Hungarian embassy summarised the findings of Damdin's report as follows:

> There are over 40,000 yurts in the capital alone, and their number is increasing, rather than decreasing. In the capital, the number of pit latrines is 120,000. Due to the miserable living conditions, there is a constant danger of epidemics, and infant mortality is very high. Urban public transport, water supply, and power supply is of an extremely inferior quality (MTS 1983, 91, 104–125, 005963/1983).

By 1989, the total number of jobless persons had risen to 120,000, of whom 35,000 lived in or around Ulaanbaatar (MTS 1989, 60, 104–120, 001499/1989). Due to the population's high demographic growth, unemployment was likely to become even more serious in the next decade. Under such conditions, an increasing number of young people starting out on their careers felt it imperative to find a quick and effective solution to the economic crisis. It was the urban youth that provided the fledging pro-democracy movement with a much-needed mass basis. Better educated and informed than the older generations, they were, in many respects, the 'products' of the same system that they brought down in early 1990 (Batbayar 2002). In these months, Sükhbaatar Square metamorphosed from a state-controlled public space into a forum for massive protest demonstrations. In February, the demonstrators toppled the Stalin statue standing in front of the National Library—an act of great symbolic importance, all the more so because in the USSR, most statues of the dead dictator had been removed as early as the 1950s and 1960s, but the MPRP regime, as mentioned before, proved reluctant to follow Khrushchev's example (Rossabi 2005).

Following the democratic transition, Mongolia underwent a spectacular upsurge of cultural nationalism. Formerly suppressed or downplayed elements of Mongolia's historical past and cultural heritage, such as Buddhism and the figure of Chinggis Khaan, were reincorporated into the national image. These dramatic changes made a strong impact on urban architecture, too. In 2006, on the eight hundredth anniversary of the creation of the medieval Mongol Empire, the mausoleum of Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan, having been demolished in 2005, was replaced by an immense monument to Chinggis Khaan. In a hall capped with *ger*-shaped green glass domes, the figure of Chinggis sits in the centre, surrounded by his son and grandson, Ögedei Khaan and Qubilai Khaan (Morozova 2008).

The elevation of Chinggis and his lineage to cult status was accompanied by the partial deconstruction of the communist regime's leadership cult. The corpses of Sükhbaatar and Choibalsan were ritually burned, and the ashes entombed in another

place, under supervision of the Buddhist clergy. The authorities replaced the statue of Stalin—which is now to be found, of all places, at the Ismuss Nightclub—by a statue of Professor Rinchen, whose non-conformist and nationalist views had earned him four years in prison under Choibalsan and frequent harassment under Tsedenbal (Robinson 2009). Through these acts, the nation's pre-communist traditions were symbolically superimposed upon the communist past.

And yet the shift from the communist leadership cults to the cult of Chinggis Khaan was neither as clear-cut nor as universal as one might assume. The elimination of communist monuments remained within certain limits, not least because the post-communist MPRP—which renamed itself as Mongolian People's Party (MPP) only in 2010—has dominated the legislature during most of the twenty-plus years that passed since the democratic transition. For instance, the city of Choibalsan still bears the dictator's name. Nor were the statues of Sükhbaatar, Choibalsan and Lenin removed or demolished in the same way as communist monuments have been in Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the post-communist MPRP went so far as to erect a statue of Tsedenbal, which stands half-way between the Rinchen statue and a statue of Sanjaasürengiin Zorig, the most prominent leader of the pro-democracy movement in 1990.

All in all, the long-term changes that the urban development programmes of the MPRP regime have brought to Mongolian society and public thinking were similarly complex and ambivalent. On the one hand, they did break the pre-modern pattern of cyclical rise and decline of administrative capitals and ensured the lasting primacy of Ulaanbaatar in the national economy. In 2003, the capital contained one-third of the country's population but produced over half of its wealth (Human Development Report Mongolia 2003). In the sphere of post-transition politics, only ultra-traditionalists like Ts. Nyam-Osor envisioned a future Mongolia in which there would be no cities. On the other hand, nomadism and rural life remained a central component of contemporary Mongolian national identity and national self-representation. It may be considered symptomatic that the ubiquitous paintings which decorate offices and apartments in present-day Ulaanbaatar—and which usually reflect the influence of European impressionism and socialist realism, rather than the more traditional *mongol zurag* (Mongol-style painting)—mostly depict rural scenes, such as *ger*s, pastoral life and the beauty of Mongolian nature; cityscapes, by contrast, are conspicuous by their rarity.

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