palgrave▸pivot

REINTERPRETING THE DUTCH FORTY YEARS WAR, 1672–1713

David Onnekink

Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713

David Onnekink

Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713

palgrave
macmillan

David Onnekink
Department of History
University of Utrecht
Utrecht, The Netherlands

ISBN 978-1-349-95135-2 ISBN 978-1-349-95136-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95136-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016956242

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016
The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Cover illustration: Détail de la Tour Eiffel © nemesis2207/Fotolia.co.uk

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom

Acknowledgements

This book has had a long gestation. In 2004, I was awarded a three-year postdoctoral VENI-grant by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) on ideology and Dutch foreign policy, which resulted in several articles and (co-)edited volumes, mainly *War and Religion after Westphalia (1648–1713)* (Farnham, 2009), *Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–1750)* (Farnham, 2011) and *Pamphlets and Politics in the Dutch Republic* (Leiden, 2011). By then I was caught up in a long-term project on the Peace of Utrecht. During that time the ideas about my book shifted decisively when my attention was captured by critical discourse analysis and its opportunities for early modern studies on foreign policy. It took some time before I decided to rethink the original draft and produce this book. I can only hope that its slow maturation has proved to be fruitful.

Throughout the years I have accumulated multiple debts. This research project was sponsored by Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) between 2004 and 2008, during which most of the research was done. I am thankful to the Research Institute of History and Culture of the Universiteit Utrecht (OGC) for its support. The Huntington Library in San Marino and the William Andrews Clark Memorial Library in Los Angeles also supported my research in their facilities in 2005.

The ideas for this book have been discussed with a number of colleagues whom I wish to thank for their intellectual generosity. Obviously it does not mean that they agree with the main thesis of this book, and I remain solely responsible for any shortcomings. I would like to thank: Duncan Bell, Lucien Bely, Emma Bergin, Femke Deen, Sebastiaan Derks,

Raymond Fagel, Linda Frey, Marsha Frey, Liesbeth Geevers, Maartje van Gelder, Beatrice de Graaf, Michiel van Groesen, Duco Hellema, Julian Hoppit, Jonathan Israel, Margaret Jacob, Ed Jonker, Nigel Little, Esther Mijers, Arjan Nobel, Michel Reinders, Hans Righolt, Ton van der Schans, Koen Stapelbroek, Erik Swart, Geoffrey Symcox, David Trim, Coen Wilders and the late Joop van Wijngaarden. I am also thankful to Steven Pincus, whose work has been the initial inspiration for this project. Jeroen Duindam and Wijnand Mijnhardt served as mentors during the first years of my research and have been very supportive. I am also very grateful to the students of the History Department of the Universiteit Utrecht who took classes on the War of the Spanish Succession and the Peace of Utrecht that I gave together with Renger de Bruin. I am very thankful to colleagues who have read and commented on a draft of the manuscript: Tony Claydon, Jeroen Duindam, Lotte Jensen, Charles-Édouard Levillain, Luc Panhuysen, Yolanda Rodríguez Pérez, Gijs Rommelse, Martine Veldhuizen and the anonymous referee. They provided thorough feedback, saving me from a number of errors and helping me to improve the quality of the book. Also thanks to Sven Hermans for his assistance with references, Kate Delaney who has thoroughly edited my text and the editors of Palgrave Pivot who have been most supportive: Molly Beck, Peter Carey, Nikita Dhiwar, Oliver Dyer, Jenny McCall and Jane Moulds.

I dedicate this book to my wife Martine Veldhuizen. If not for her continuous support and scholarly advice this book would not be here. Whilst working on this book, we experienced 'the best of times' when our daughters Rebecca (2012) and Hannah (2015) were born, and 'the worst of times' when Hannah died in hospital in March 2015. Her name means 'Grace of God' and that is how we will always see her.

Contents

1 General Introduction 1
Introduction 1
The Forty Years' War 3
Revisionist Historiography 5
Post-revisionist Criticism 7
Approach 8
Notes 10

2 Foreign Policy Discourses and the Construction of Identities 17
Method 17
Realist Discourse 20
Liberal Discourse 21
Protestant Discourse 24
Political Parties 25
Republican Discourse 27
Orangist Discourse 30
Conclusion and Operationalization 32
Notes 32

3 The Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678) 37
Introduction 37
The Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678) 39
Foreign Policy Discourses in Political Documents 41
Foreign Policy Discourses in Formal Published Documents 46

Foreign Policy Discourses in Popular Publications 48
Conclusion 57
Notes 59

4 The Nine Years' War (1688–1697) 65
Introduction 65
The Nine Years' War (1688–1697) 67
Foreign Policy Discourses in Formal Published Documents 69
Foreign Policy Discourses in Political Documents 72
Foreign Policy Discourses in Popular Publications 78
Conclusion 83
Notes 85

5 The War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) 89
Introduction 89
The War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) 91
Foreign Policy Discourses in Political Documents 93
Foreign Policy Discourses in Formal Published Documents 100
Foreign Policy Discourses in Popular Publications 104
Conclusion 113
Notes 115

6 General Conclusion 123
Notes 132

Index 133

CHAPTER 1

General Introduction

Abstract In the general introduction, David Onnekink makes the case for reinterpreting the *Dutch Forty Years' War (1672–1713)*. He explains how, according to historians, the Dutch Republic became locked in a prolonged defensive struggle against France in the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678), the Nine Years' War (1688–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713). He then proceeds to show how this interpretation rests on theoretical assumptions generated by structure of politics and realism, assumptions that have been challenged by post-revisionist scholars. Onnekink then discusses an analytical model devised by Lene Hansen, who proposes to rethink foreign policy as a discursive practice. This model forms the basis for the case studies in this book.

Keywords Realism · Post-structuralism · Foreign policy · Dutch Republic · Forty Years' War · International relations

Introduction

The author of the *True Interest of Europe*, a pamphlet justifying the Dutch war against France in 1702, dedicated his work to the 'free fought Batavians' who had taken up arms in the past against the 'mighty King of Spain' to preserve their 'Liberty and Religion'. And they should do so again, now that the King of France threatened their 'dearly bought freedom'. The Forty Years' War, the cluster of wars between the Dutch

© The Author(s) 2016

D. Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95136-9_1

Republic and France between 1672 and 1713, was interpreted by the Dutch through such narratives. The 'foreign policy story' of the defence of liberty against tyranny was rooted in the myth of Batavians revolting against the Roman Empire, but also rehashed Reformation narratives about the defence of true religion against Catholicism. The Forty Years' War itself saw the emergence of a new 'story', the rise of France as a 'universal monarchy'. The pamphleteer argued that the King of France had attempted to 'elevate himself as universal monarch of Europe'.[1] These foreign policy discourses were thus rooted in identity discourses. The Dutch Republic was represented as a free Protestant state, whereas France was Catholic and tyrannical, intent on enslaving Europe.

The Forty Years' War against Louis XIV has been primarily studied through the prism of realism and has been explained by scholars such as Joris Voorhoeve as a 'long battle against French imperialism'.[2] According to Johan Aalbers, 'the Republic was forced . . . to fight a land war' between 1672 and 1713.[3] This strategic determinism precludes choice and debate and renders foreign policy discourses irrelevant; these are just discourses. Until quite recently, most historians have argued that there was little domestic debate on the direction of foreign policy during this period; in the face of obvious aggression, debate was hardly needed.

This book intends to refute this image. It argues that the historiography of the Forty Years' War is flawed. The image of the Dutch Republic fighting against 'French imperialism' is not an objective interpretation but a selective interpretation of a seventeenth-century narrative which in itself was discursively constructed. Indeed, the very terminology, such as 'universal monarchy', used by historians is borrowed directly from seventeenth-century identity discourses. Likewise, the modern realist interpretation of the Forty Years' War as a conflict to restore the balance of power in Europe is unsatisfactory, as balance of power is not a 'timeless' concept of international relations (IR) but simply a discursive prism through which contemporaries viewed the conflict. I thus argue that the modern interpretation of the Forty Years' War as a major struggle against French expansionism is not in any meaningful way 'objective', but rooted in seventeenth-century foreign policy discourses.

This book calls for a reinterpretation of the Forty Years' War through a methodological reshuffle. I argue that seventeenth-century discourses were not so much a reflection of strategic reality, but were largely responsible for moulding that reality. I take my cue from recent developments in IR theory based in discourse analysis. This book will show how 'basic

discourses', foundational stories on IR, shaped the debates and the direction of Dutch foreign policy, discourses which were constructed from early modern theories of IR and constructions of identities. The conduct of foreign policy is not studied as a sequence of diplomatic events, but rather as a contest between grand narratives, in which views on foreign policy are intimately connected to representations of identity.

The overall purpose of this book is threefold: first, to reinterpret the Forty Years' War as a critical event in Dutch history; second, to integrate recent developments in IR theory into the study of early modern history and third, to shed new light on the formative years of international relations in Europe between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of Utrecht (1713).

The Forty Years' War

Before explaining the rationale of this argument, let us first examine the outlines of the Forty Years' War according to current historiography. The term applies to the conflict between the Dutch Republic and France from 1672 until 1713. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) established Dutch independence from Spain after the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648). In the period that followed (1648–1672), the Dutch Republic reached the zenith of its international status through its military and political power matched by its commercial successes. The Dutch pursued a foreign policy of aloofness and neutrality and concentrated on overseas trade.[4] However, during the spring of 1672 the Dutch Republic was attacked by the massed armies of France, Münster, Cologne and the English and French navies. Although England failed to defeat the Dutch fleet, French, Cologne and Münster armies invaded from the east and crushed the small and unprepared Dutch army. Only Holland held out behind the *Waterlinie*, a defensive string of rivers and inundated lands. This 'Year of Disaster' seemed to imply the fall of the Republic altogether, but the Dutch managed to fend off the invasion, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the core provinces of the state. By 1674 England had signed the Peace of Westminster, ending the Third Anglo-Dutch War, but the war against France lasted until 1678. The Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678) was only the start of a prolonged struggle with France. A 'cold war' with France lasted throughout the 1680s and lapsed into open conflict in 1688. A conflict between the Holy Roman Empire and France over Cologne in conjunction with the Dutch invasion of England triggered the Nine Years' War (1688–1697), which saw the emergence of the Grand Alliance of

England, the Habsburg Emperor and the Dutch Republic. The coalition war against France, interrupted by the Peace of Ryswick (1697), restarted in 1702. The War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) witnessed the climax of the struggle that brought the participants, and certainly the Dutch Republic, to exhaustion and ended in 1713. Forty years of almost continuous warfare had fundamentally undermined state solvency, and the Peace of Utrecht (1713) marked the end of the Dutch Republic as a great power.[5]

In effect, the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678), the Nine Years' War (1688–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) together seemed to form a struggle that lasted four decades. Modern historians therefore see this conflict as a 'Forty Years' War', a term not used by contemporaries.[6] As such it is a conceptual framework; the coherence of this string of conflicts was provided by their root cause: France's tendency to expand and the response from other European powers to check that expansionism. Since French aggression was axiomatic for Dutch politicians, they had no choice but to resist, and therefore the wars were inevitable and needed no further explanation. Johan Aalbers argued that 'The march of France aiming for a "universal monarchy and religion" during the forty years after 1672 . . . had forced the Republic more and more to wage a continental war'. Thus, a balance of power against France was formed of which Stadtholder William III became the 'architect'.[7] Although a number of historians have nuanced the image of an aggressive France, the metanarrative of French expansionism remains largely intact in modern historiography. According to Curtis Wood, 'One of the basic facts of European politics in the period 1688–1714 was the menace posed to the states of Europe by the imperialism of Louis XIV'.[8] For Simon Groenveld, 'The years between 1660 and 1715 form a distinct period in European history: the period of French expansion under Louis XIV.'[9]

Historians have thus generally presented the war against France as necessary, and therefore differences of opinion in governmental circles were unlikely. This is not to say that criticism against war policy was wholly absent, but it was usually articulated only towards the closing years of the war when economic dislocation and financial exhaustion set in.[10] The start of war usually saw consensus about war policy. This view chimes well with the development of revisionist historiography on Dutch domestic policy over the last few decades, which has rejected the traditional view of two national parties, Republicans and Orangists,

fighting over the direction of foreign policy and the position of the stadtholder.[11] Most historians have argued that at crucial moments, such as 1688 and 1702, the necessity of war silenced debate.[12]

Revisionist Historiography

This current understanding of a Forty Years' War is based upon a set of assumptions that need some further exploration. They are rooted in two theories known as structure of politics and realism. The historiography that these theories have produced I describe as revisionist, since it rethought traditional assumptions about political history.[13] Revisionism matured in the 1960s and 1970s in the field of early modern European political history and yielded a wave of studies based on thorough archival research as well as new theoretical insights.

The first revisionist trend has been the ascendancy of the structure-of-politics interpretation of Dutch domestic politics. Traditional historiography distinguished two national parties, the Republicans and the Orangists. The Republicans were led by the regents in the Province of Holland and valued free trade, a republican and decentralized state, a neutral foreign policy based on naval strength, and religious tolerance. The Orangists were led by the quasi-monarchical stadtholder (provincial governor) and focused on national unity and military safety; they were supported by the landlocked provinces and the orthodox Calvinist ministers. This two-party model was first systematically criticized by D.J. Roorda's seminal 1962 study *Partij en Factie*.[14] Although he acknowledged that in times of crisis national partisan sentiments could surface, the political system was essentially based upon local factions forged by material interest and family loyalties. Roorda's introduction of sociological tools to conceptualize party and faction revolutionized historiography and introduced structure-of-politics as an interpretative model. Roorda's approach was similar to that initiated by Sir Lewis Namier in British historiography.[15] A string of influential studies in the 1970s and 1980s endorsed Roorda's view and was dedicated to the research of local and provincial factions, in which ideological factors played a minimal role.[16]

The second revisionist trend was the ascendancy of realism in studies on early modern foreign policy, focusing on states competing with each other in pursuit of material resources on which they depended. For J.R. Jones, the Anglo-Dutch wars were 'gratuitously aggressive and for ignoble objectives, for gross materialistic gain'.[17] Most historians working in this field

were primarily empiricists, basing their work on a mass of archival material enabling them to minutely reconstruct diplomatic events.[18] Indeed, most Dutch historians avoid referring to IR theory at all, but I argue that their work implicitly endorsed realism; in most of their work foreign policy was seen to be guided by material interests.

Despite the dense narratives that seemed to underline the opportunistic and volatile nature of IR, there was also a trend towards a more structuralistic interpretation.[19] For Charles Wilson, foreign policy was the quest for 'profit and power', which in turn are decided by 'Geography and natural conditions . . . the political character of the state, and the balance between the interests of governors and governed'. These factors were responsible for 'determining the response of any particular state to the threat of attack'.[20] The work of Johan Aalbers was particularly innovative, integrating financial constraints and the social backgrounds of diplomats as determining the nature of the decision-making process and the direction of foreign policy.[21]

At the crossroads of the two revisionist developments, domestic structure-of-politics and foreign policy realism, in Dutch historiography was the Utrecht historian J. Boogman, whose influence can be gleaned from the work of a number of prominent Dutch historians.[22] In a seminal article published in 1978 on the long-term 'backgrounds, tendencies and traditions' of Dutch foreign policy, he argued that it was typified by two directions, which seemed similar to the traditional two-parties model. The Republican tradition he described as characterized by a 'maritime-republican' pacific strategy, the Orangist as a 'military-continental' one. However, Boogman's interpretation was far from traditional. He argued that these two strategies were rooted in 'interest of state', which was based upon geopolitical factors, not so much the result of intense domestic ideological and partisan struggle.[23] Following Boogman, Joris Voorhoeve, in a long-term overview of Dutch foreign policy, has argued that four centuries of Dutch foreign policy were guided by continuous 'traditions', which were in fact 'determined by the geographical position of the country, the nature of its economic interests and the slowly changing culture of its inhabitants'.[24] Boogman's view has been disputed. In 1968 M.A.M. Franken already suggested that in actual practice there was less difference between the two traditions than Boogman later supposed.[25] More recently, Simon Groenveld criticized Boogman's concept of two 'national' foreign policies altogether by focusing more on provincial or even local interests.[26]

Nevertheless, both Groenveld and Franken adopt a 'material interest' approach, which puts them squarely in the realist camp.

This, then, is the theoretical framework within which the Forty Years' War has been explained by revisionists. Neither partisan convictions nor religious or ideological sentiments played a role in this analysis: foreign policy was dictated and determined by the logic of French aggression. Studies on Dutch foreign policy took on either an empirical approach in which the events of the war are retold or a structural one in which the mechanics of foreign policy and its institutional setting are analysed.[27] In neither case is the decision-making on the eve of war studied, since the threat posed by France made debate over the direction of foreign policy unnecessary.[28] Recent works of scholars like Wout Troost and Olaf van Nimwegen, writing in the first decade of the twenty-first century, fully endorse the realist model and empirical approach of Dutch foreign policy in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.[29]

Post-revisionist Criticism

This is surprising as both structure-of-politics approach and realism have been criticized. Structure-of-politics was already challenged by Herbert Butterfield in 1957, but only in the late 1960s and 1970s did historians such as Geoffrey Holmes and Henry Horwitz successfully discredit the Namierite interpretation of late-seventeenth-century English politics, based on extensive empirical research.[30] British historiography on foreign policy has also seen the rise of post-revisionist scholarship which criticized the materialism of the revisionist scholars. One distinct source of influence was the Cambridge School, which emphasized the importance of political language. John Pocock's argument that any given policy 'is embedded in the set of political vocabularies available' has now been widely accepted by historians.[31] Influential work has been conducted on the role of grand narratives in English foreign policy in the late seventeenth century by Tony Claydon, Steven Pincus and Andrew Thompson.[32] This shift did not take place in the Netherlands until very recently, although arguably the structural interpretation still seems dominant. An important correction to Roorda's view was proposed in 1994 by J.L. Price, who argued that Roorda's very method of focusing on local politics and using prosopography disguised the 'degree to which political conviction or religious orientation may also have played their parts'.[33] More recently, historians such as Roeland Harms, Helmer Helmers, David Onnekink, Michel Reinders,

Gijs Rommelse and Jill Stern have moved away from a strictly local and non-ideological interpretation of Dutch politics by focusing on the importance of political culture in the public sphere.[34] In his 2013 monograph, Donald Haks has restored the importance of public opinion during the Forty Years' War.[35]

In IR theory, constructivism has been in the forefront of the assault on the dominance of realism, arguing that international relations are not predetermined by materialist notions but by ideas and perceptions. In this view, what appear to be hard facts, such as 'state', 'security', threat' and 'interest' are constructions rather than fixed entities. Constructivists believe that international politics depends to a large extent on identities, which, according to Alexander Wendt, are 'the basis of interests . . . If in some sense interests *are* ideas, then the causal, "ideal versus interests" model will be incomplete'.[36] Post-structuralism, a spin-off of constructivism rooted in deconstruction, connects these interests and identities to discourse. The notion that language is not a neutral medium, but that it produces meaning commands a central role here. Contrary to the realists' argument, objective reality cannot be studied; instead, one should focus on the function of foreign policy discourses in producing meaning and shaping IR.[37]

From another angle, literary scholars have long studied political culture, for instance through establishing a connection between national identity and literature.[38] Imagology, specifically, studies representations of national character using textual and intertextual methodology.[39] Even so, most if not all of these studies restrict themselves to literary representations and exclude typically political sources related to foreign affairs, such as diplomatic correspondence.[40] 'New diplomatic history' converges with the work of cultural and literary scholars by studying the cultural and linguistic dimensions of diplomacy, but remains a call to arms and lacks a clear methodology.[41]

Together, these 'post-revisionist' approaches challenge the geopolitical approach of realism and structure of politics: social realities, cultural identities, ideologies and religious considerations all influence perceptions in the domestic and international political spheres.

Approach

Post-structuralism has a proven track record and will form the point of departure and the theoretical basis of this book. So far, it has not been employed for studying early modern international relations. Copenhagen

School IR scholar Lene Hansen has devised a clear methodology to analyse foreign policy discourse. Discourse is central in post-structuralism; language does not reflect reality but is an 'interpretative optic'. Policy goals do not simply exist, they need to be verbalized, nor are there 'objective identities located in some extra-discursive realm'. Therefore, 'foreign policy discourses articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas to such an extent that the two cannot be separated from each other'. Identities and interests do not exist independently but are discursively constructed. They are, moreover, 'co-constitutive'; that is to say, there is a direct and non-causal relationship between interest and identity. According to Hansen, interests and 'identities are simultaneously constituted and reproduced through formulations of foreign policy'.[42]

Post-structuralists in turn have been criticized by realists. After all, it rings intuitively right to say that states pursue their self-interest and use whatever language they can to obtain their goals. These arguments have been countered on an epistemological level. According to Cynthia Weber, IR theories themselves should be subject to investigation. They are themselves 'stories' that 'appear to be true' and aim to analyse reality.[43] It is therefore an illusion to think that IR theories, such as the realist notion of balance of power or interest of state, are somehow beyond the historical reality. Indeed, they are part of it and are themselves narratives, 'productions of meaning'. Lene Hansen likewise questions the epistemological basis of existing theories and rejects the true–false claims of such theories. Instead, she offers a 'constitutive' theory rather than an 'explanatory', causal theory.[44]

This book will rethink the nexus between partisan politics and foreign policy in the Forty Years' War by studying political discourse. It will do so by using a tailor-made discourse model proposed by Lene Hansen, which will be outlined in the first chapter. Dutch foreign policy discourses will be analysed in which the Dutch identified themselves and others and articulated their foreign policy aims. This approach should yield an alternative understanding of the nature of the Forty Years' War and the direction of Dutch foreign policy.

The approach has additional advantages. First of all, since foreign policy is co-constitutive with identity, it will show how Dutch identity was moulded in the process of foreign policy discussions. It provides the possibility to rethink the nature of early modern Dutch foreign policy and reconnect it functionally with perceptions of identity and discursive constructions of interest. Second, it helps to bridge the artificial gap between 'high politics' and public opinion. Until quite recently, Dutch

political historians have generally dismissed the importance of popular sources aimed at the general public for understanding 'real politics', whereas cultural historians have generally steered away from explicit political sources. But an analysis of discourses can show how public debates and foreign policy documents were intertextually connected. Third, it will also help to debunk the self-explanatory realist narrative that has been so pervasive over the last few decades.

The structure of this book endorses the notion that domestic and foreign policy discourses were central in understanding the directions of foreign policy and were intimately connected. The first chapter, therefore, will attempt to reconstruct discourses on foreign policy and set out a theoretical framework and methodology for the rest of the book. These will be applied in three case studies on the three great conflicts that made up the Forty Years' War. Rather than providing an exhaustive overview, however, the focus is on key years corresponding with the beginning of each conflict: 1672, 1688 and 1702, each of which will be studied in a separate chapter. Within each chapter, three categories of primary sources will be analysed, in order to construct intertextual connections between the political and popular spheres[45]: documents related to the sphere of the decision-making process (political and diplomatic correspondence, secret resolutions), documents related to the public sphere (popular pamphlets) and documents bridging the two spheres (official political publications).

Notes

1. Pamphlets in notes are referred to by catalogue number according to W.P.C. Knuttel. *Catalogus van de pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek* (Utrecht 1978). This reference: *Het waare interest van Europa, tot conservatie van hare vryheyt* (1702) (Knuttel 14800), dedication. Titles of and quotes from pamphlets have been translated into English by me.
2. J.J.C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, profits and principles. A study of Dutch foreign policy* (The Hague 1979), 27.
3. J. Aalbers, 'Hollands financial problems (1713–1733) and the wars against Louis XIV', in A.C. Duke et al., eds, *Britain and the Netherlands VI: War and society* (The Hague 1977), 80.
4. For an overview see D. Hellema, *Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland. De Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek* (Utrecht 2006), chapter 1, and J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness and fall 1477–1806* (Oxford 1995), chapters 29–32.

5. This is the central argument of J. Aalbers, *De Republiek en de vrede van Europa. De buitenlandse politiek van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden na de vrede van Utrecht (1713), voornamelijk gedurende de jaren 1720–1733. Deel I. Achtergronden en algemene aspecten* (Groningen 1980).
6. Aalbers, *De Republiek*, 1.
7. E.g. W. Troost, *William III, the Stadtholder–King: a political biography* (Aldershot 2005), 95, who noted that William never used the term but pursued such a policy none the less; Voorhoeve, *Peace*, 27.
8. C.W. Wood, 'A study of Anglo-Dutch relations in the Grand Alliance, 1701–1706' (PhD-thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 1971), 1.
9. S. Groenveld, '"J'equippe une flotte très considerable": the Dutch side of the Glorious revolution', in R. Beddard ed., *The revolution of 1688* (Oxford 1988), 213.
10. Opposition against the war surfaced in each conflict several years after the war started. See P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'Persuasie en mediatie: de Republiek en de Vrede van Nijmegen (1678)', in S. Groenveld et al. eds, *Tussen Münster en Aken. De Nederlandse Republiek als grote mogendheid 1648–1758* (Maastricht 2005) for the Franco-Dutch War. For the Nine Years' War, see D. Onnekink, *The Anglo-Dutch Favourite. The career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st Earl of Portland (1649–1709)* (Aldershot 2007), chapter 3. For the War of the Spanish Succession, see M. van der Bijl, 'Utrechts weerstand tegen de oorlogspolitiek tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog. De rol van de heer van Welland van 1672 tot 1708', in H.L.Ph. Leeuwen et al. eds, *Van Standen tot Staten. 600 Jaar Staten van Utrecht, 1375–1975* (Utrecht 1975).
11. Most notably D.J. Roorda, *Partij en factie. De oproeren van 1672 in de steden van Holland en Zeeland, een krachtmeting tussen partijen en facties* (Groningen 1961). But see M. van der Bijl, *Idee en interest. Voorgeschiedenis, verloop en achtergronden van de politieke twisten in Zeeland, en vooral Middelburg, tussen 1702 en 1705* (Groningen 1981).
12. E.g. J. Stork-Penning, *Het grote werk. Vredesonderhandelingen gedurende de Spaanse successie-oorlog 1705–1710* (Groningen 1958), xxvi; P. Geyl, *De geschiedenis van der Nederlandse Stam* (vol. IV, Amsterdam 1959), 892; G. de Bruin, *Geheimhouding en verraad. De geheimhouding van staatszaken ten tijde van de Republiek (1600–1750)* (The Hague 1991), 410–414.
13. In English historiography, the comparable reaction in the 1960s and 1970s against the 'Whig interpretation' is generally styled as 'revisionist' as well. E.g. K. Sharpe and P. Lake, eds, *Culture and politics in Early Stuart England* (Houndmills 1994), 1ff. The term revisionist is not current in Dutch historiography.
14. Roorda, *Partij en factie*.

15. Roorda described his efforts as a 'namierization of historiography': 'Party and faction', *Acta Historiae Neerlandica* II (Leiden 1967), 196. Cf. H. Horwitz, 'The structure of parliamentary politics', in G. Holmes, ed., *Britain after the Glorious Revolution 1689–1714* (London 1969), 96–99.
16. S. Groenveld extended Roorda's thesis by pointing to provincial factions in addition to local factions: *Evidente factien in den staet. Sociaal-politieke verhoudingen in de 17[e] eeuwse Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* (Hilversum 1990); Van der Bijl criticized Roorda but did not differentiate fundamentally in his *Idee en interest*; M. Prak, *Gezeten burgers. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Leiden 1700–1780* (Amsterdam, 1985); J. de Jong, *Met goed fatsoen. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Gouda 1700–1780* (Amsterdam/ Dieren 1985). Admittedly some of these historians were aware of the limitations of their research method: e.g. Prak, *Gezeten burgers*, 12. Nevertheless, the notion of the absence of national parties has been widely accepted.
17. J.R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century* (Harlow 1988), 4.
18. I owe this observation to conversations with Geoffrey Symcox. Examples are Stork-Penning, *Het grote werk*; M.A.M. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke en diplomatieke activiteiten in de jaren 1667–1684* (Groningen 1966); Aalbers, *De Republiek*; O. van Nimwegen, *De subsistentie van het leger. Logistiek en strategie van het Geallieerde en met name het Staatse leger tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog in de Nederlanden en het Heilige Roomse Rijk 1701–1712* (Amsterdam 1995); idem, *De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als grote mogendheid. Buitenlandse politiek en oorlogvoering in de eerste helft van de achttiende eeuw en in het bijzonder tijdens de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog (1740–1748)* (Amsterdam 2002); H. Rowen, *John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland 1625–1672* (Princeton 1978); S. Groenveld, *Verlopend getij. De Nederlandse Republiek en de Engelse Burgeroorlog 1640–1646* (Dieren 1984).
19. This coincides with the neo-realist or structural-realist 'turn' in IR theory as initiated by Kenneth Waltz's influential *Structure of international politics* (1979). However, we should keep in mind that Dutch historians tend to avoid utilizing IR theory explicitly. See for instance Boogman's criticism of Rowen's empirical approach in his review in *Bijdragen en Mededelingen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 98 (1983), 212–219.
20. C. Wilson, *Profit and power. A study of England and the Dutch wars* (Cambridge 1957), 1.
21. Aalbers, *De Republiek*.
22. The historiographical genealogy of revisionism shows how it came to dominate the studies of both domestic and foreign policy. In retrospect this revisionist school can be seen to have emerged during the 1950s, and was

influenced by Boogman, himself a student of the famous Dutch historian Pieter Geyl who criticized partisan historians such as Nicolaas Japikse. Boogman was mentor of a number of influential revisionist historians. Stork-Penning, like Boogman a pupil of Geyl, wrote a realist study of Dutch policy during the War of the Spanish Succession (*Het grote werk*). Geyl and Boogman supervised the doctoral thesis, *Partij en Factie*, of Daniel Roorda, the founding father of structure-of-politics in the Netherlands (see the obituary by H. van Dijk in *Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde te Leiden 1984–1985*, 125–131). Wout Troost's PhD-thesis on William III was supervised by Roorda and fully endorsed his views. Guido de Bruin is an admirer of Roorda and wrote a rather grim analysis of Dutch political decision-making processes: *Geheimhouding en verraad*. Maarten Prak's PhD thesis, supervised by Boogman, was an essentially 'structure-of-politics' analysis of local politics and society: *Gezeten burgers*. Simon Groenveld, a colleague of Roorda, explicitly hailed his factionalist interpretation in *Evidente factien*. Johan Aalbers's PhD-thesis *de Republiek* was supervised and influenced by Boogman.

23. J.C. Boogman: 'Achtergronden, tendenties en tradities van het buitenlands beleid van Nederland (eind zestiende eeuw – 1940)', in N.C.F. van Sas, ed., *De kracht van Nederland. Internationale positie en buitenlands beleid*. (Bloemendaal 1991). The article was originally published in 1978. Cf. Boogman, 'De raison d'état politicus Johan de Witt', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 90 (1975), 379–407.
24. Voorhoeve, *Peace*. Voorhoeve's emphasis on 'peace' and 'principles' suggests an idealist, rather than a realist angle. However Kossmann argued that in essence Voorhoeve's argument was realist in nature. E.H. Kossmann, 'De deugden van een kleine staat', in his *Politieke theorie en geschiedenis* (Amsterdam 1987).
25. M.A.M. Franken, 'The general tendencies and structural aspects of foreign policy and diplomacy of the Dutch Republic in the latter half of the seventeenth century', *Acta Historiae Neerlandica* III (The Hague/Leiden 1968).
26. Cf. S. Groenveld, *Regeren in de Republiek. Bestuurspraktijken in de 17e-eeuwse Noordelijke Nederlanden: terugblik en perspectief* (Leiden 2006).
27. For example, Aalbers, *De Republiek*; R. Hatton, *Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic* (London 1950); Van Nimwegen, *De subsistentie*; Groenveld, *Verlopend getij*; De Bruin, *Geheimhouding en verraad*.
28. With the notable exception of the monograph on De Witt by Herbert Rowen, which is steeped in realism.
29. Troost, *William III*; Van Nimwegen, *De Republiek*; G. Rommelse, *The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667). International raison d'etat, mercantilism and maritime strife* (Hilversum 2006).

30. H. Butterfield, *George III and the historians* (London 1957); H. Horwitz, *Parliament, policy and politics in the reign of William III* (Manchester 1977); Horwitz, 'structure'; G. Holmes, *British Politics in the age of Anne* (London 1967); T. Harris, *Politics under the late Stuarts. Party conflict in a divided society 1660–1715* (New York 1993), 149.
31. As summarized by D.S.A. Bell, 'Language, legitimacy, and the project of critique', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27/3 (2002), 5; Cf. M. Knights, *Representation and misrepresentation in later Stuart Britain. Partisanship and political culture* (Oxford 2005), 48.
32. S. Pincus, *Protestantism and patriotism. Ideology and the making of English foreign policy 1650–1668* (Cambridge 1996); T. Claydon, *William III and the godly revolution* (Cambridge 1996); A. Thompson, *Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688–1756* (Woodbridge 2006).
33. J.L. Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century. The politics of particularism* (Oxford 1994), 59, 61. See also Jonathan Israel's review of De Bruin, *Geheimhouding, Bijdragen en Mededelingen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 109 (1994), 78–80.
34. H. Helmers, *The Royalist Republic: literature, politics, and religion in the Anglo-Dutch sphere, 1639–1660* (Cambridge 2015); R. Harms, *De uitvinding van de publieke opinie: pamfletten als massamedium in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam 2011); M. Reinders, *Gedrukte chaos. Populisme en moord in het Rampjaar 1672* (Amsterdam 2010); J. Stern, *Orangism in the Dutch Republic in word and image, 1650–75* (Manchester 2010); D. Onnekink and G. Rommelse, eds, *Ideology and foreign policy in early modern Europe (1650–1750)* (Farnham 2011).
35. D. Haks, *Vaderland en vrede: publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in oorlog (1672–1713)* (Hilversum 2013), chapter 6.
36. A. Wendt, *Social theory of international politics* (Cambridge 1999), 113–114.
37. L. Hansen, 'Poststructuralism', in J. Baylis et al., eds, *The globalization of world politics. An introduction to international relations* (5th edn, Oxford 2011), 170.
38. E.g. Y. Rodríguez Pérez, *The Dutch Revolt through Spanish eyes. Self and other in historical and literary texts of Golden Age Spain (c. 1548–1673)* (Bern 2008); M. Meijer Drees, *Andere landen, andere mensen. De beeldvorming van Holland versus Spanje en Engeland omstreeks 1650* (The Hague 1997). Cf. L. Jensen, ed., *National identity formation in Early Modern Europe, 1600–1815* (Amsterdam 2016).
39. J. Leerssen, 'Imagology: history and method', in M. Beller and J. Leerssen, eds, *Imagology: the cultural construction and literary representation of national characters. A critical survey* (Amsterdam/New York 2007), 17–32.
40. Leerssen, 'Imagology'. But see R. de Bruin et al., eds, *Performances of peace: Utrecht 1713–2013* (Leiden 2015).

41. According to Daniel Riches, *Protestant cosmopolitanism and diplomatic culture. Brandenburg-Swedish relations in the seventeenth century* (Leiden 2013), 6. Cf. M. Ebben and L. Sicking, 'Nieuwe diplomatieke geschiedenis van de premoderne tijd. Een inleiding', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 127/4 (2014), 541–552, and J. Watkins, 'Toward a new diplomatic history of Medieval and Early Modern Europe', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38 (2008) 1–14.
42. L. Hansen, *Security as practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War* (Abingdon 2006), xvi, 1, 6.
43. C. Weber, *International relations theory. A critical introduction* (Abingdon 2001), 2, 6.
44. Hansen, 'Poststructuralism', 169.
45. Cf. Hansen, *Security*, 59 ff.

CHAPTER 2

Foreign Policy Discourses and the Construction of Identities

Abstract In this chapter, David Onnekink outlines the methodological basis for the three case studies. Arguing that foreign policy is a discursive practice, he shows how two competing foreign policy discourses based on identities were developed by Orangists and Republicans: Universal Monarchy Discourse and Peace and Commerce Discourse. These discourses were built from three early modern basic discourses on international relations – realist, liberal and Protestant. The two partisan discourses are tracked through the Forty Years' War in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

Keywords Foreign policy · Discourse · Identity · International relations · Universal monarchy · Dutch Republic

Method

The methodological basis for this book is drawn from post-structuralist models proposed by Lene Hansen. Foreign policy is regarded as a discursive practice. Hence, the study of foreign policy is the study of discourses. A discourse has been defined by Norman Fairclough as 'the language used in representing a given social practice from a particular point of view'.[1] Discourses are self-referential through the principle of intertext, that is, they draw from and add meaning to existing texts. They 'do not faithfully reflect reality like mirrors . . . they are artefacts of language through which the

© The Author(s) 2016
D. Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95136-9_2

very reality they purport to reflect is constructed'.[2] Thus the point is not so much to verify truth claims of texts, but to reconstruct frames of reference and gauge their social and political impact.

Hansen applies these principles to the study of foreign policy. Central to her assumptions is the notion that there are 'constitutive relationships between representations of identity and foreign policy'. That is to say, identity and foreign policy are intimately connected in a non-causal way: identity does not lead to a specific foreign policy, nor vice versa.[3] Rather, they are continuously shaping and reshaping each other. Foreign policy discourses are thus identity discourses. Representations of identities are based on a Self–Other scheme. The way in which a foreign policy actor represents itself is connected to the way in which it represents another actor, not necessarily in a binary relationship, but 'with different degrees of . . . radical difference'.[4] According to Hansen, identity can be understood through the analysis of three different identity dimensions: spatial, temporal and ethical.[5] Spatial constructions of identity can have their roots in geographical signifiers, such as France, but also in symbolic ones, such as Rome. Temporal identities can be rooted in specific time lines, such as Dutch interpretations of French aggression as a repetition of the Eighty Years' War. They can also indicate movement, by for instance regarding a specific culture as 'backward' or describing French diplomacy as 'immovable'. The third, ethical, dimension lays out a path for action. It is related to issues of morality and responsibility. For instance, when French policy is described as a 'threat to the balance in Europe', a course of action in foreign policy, the restoration of that balance, is implicitly laid out.

Foreign policy discourses thus consist of these triple-layered identity discourses, and provide policymakers with an 'account, or a story, of the problems and issue they are trying to address'.[6] It is these identity discourses on foreign policy this book is trying to distinguish. For instance, in the later seventeenth century, France was often regarded as striving for universal monarchy in Europe. Although this accusation had some empirical foundation, it was arguably a discursive construct, which repeated and reinvented itself continuously in numerous pamphlets and newspapers as well as in declarations of war and diplomatic correspondence. Associated with universal monarchy is a range of identities attributed to France, such as 'tyranny', 'cunning', 'threat'. This identity construction of France as a universal monarchy and a threat to the peace of Europe constituted an appeal to the responsibility of the Dutch.

Foreign policy discourses draw from basic discourses, in Hansen's view ideal-type discourses, that contain 'explicit key representations of identity' and that can be proved to infuse a large and wide variety of textual sources.[7] They 'do not define one particular policy, but structure the policy space within which concrete decisions are being made'.[8] Once these basic discourses have been defined, the next step would be to analyse how they formed the building blocks of foreign policy discourses. Dutch foreign policy discourses identified the Dutch Republic as Self, and mainly France and England as the Other. The way in which the Other is constructed has a direct impact on the direction of foreign policy and how it is advocated. It is also important to note that discourses are not immutable, but can evolve and mutate.[9] Discourses changed over time between 1672 and 1713. These foreign policy discourses are highly relevant, but in order to be effective need to be distinctive. Hansen argues that it is vital to reconstruct foreign policy discourses that lead to radically different courses of action.[10]

The chapter aims to reconstruct these foreign policy discourses during the Forty Years' War. I argue that there were essentially two foreign policy discourses that dominated the discussions during this period, which I describe as (Orangist) Universal Monarchy Discourse and (Republican) Peace and Commerce Discourse. They seem congruous with what Boogman described as continental-military and maritime-pacific. As explained in the introduction, these were two 'traditions' that advocated either forming alliances in order to survive in Europe or focusing on overseas trade and neutralism in continental affairs. However, unlike Boogman, I connect these discourses to partisan ideologies, to Orangists and Republicans, respectively. Unlike Boogman, I argue that these traditions were not related to pre-determined geopolitical interests, but must be situated in a web of intertextual foreign policy discourses. Unlike Boogman, I argue that these traditions were not stable but highly malleable.

I argue that these two foreign policy discourses were rooted in three distinct basic discourses, which I describe as realist, liberal and Protestant. They were related to what one may consider as 'theories of international relations (IR)' in the early modern age. There has been surprisingly little research in the emergence of IR theory in the early modern age, a neglected sibling of political science. Nevertheless, scholars have tracked the roots of the two dominant IR theories in modern times, realism and

liberalism, in the early modern age.[11] Protestantism is not regarded as a distinct theory of IR. However, the tripartite distinction I propose is not an attempt to classify early modern IR theories, but rather to reconstruct actual discourses on foreign policy that circulated in the Dutch Republic. Most academic work on early modern IR theories has concentrated on analyses of the theoretical works, not so much on their actual application.[12] It is conceivable that there were more than three discourses available, such as a Catholic discourse. However, an extensive sample of relevant primary source material underscores the validity of this particular categorization for the case of Dutch foreign policy. I will show how realist, liberal and Protestant basic discourses formed the framework for foreign policy debates. The point of the cursory overview of these three discourses below is not so much to study these notions in depth, but rather to provide a framework of reference. Arguably, most of the diplomatic and popular primary sources betray only a limited understanding of IR theory. Moreover, the basic discourses cannot be completely compartmentalized into such neat categories; they partly overlap and authors frequently display internal contradictions.[13] Nevertheless, I argue that they are relatively coherent, and for analytical purposes the categorization holds.

Realist Discourse

Realism emerged from sixteenth-century new humanist notions of IR, partly in response to the medieval prescriptive religious notions of policy. Whereas the Christian tradition prescribed peace or just war, a policy guided by morality, realism proposed that morality should not stand in the way of the pursuit of interest. In a realist perspective states are rational, unitary and have no moral constraints when it comes to preserving political power. Writers such as Justus Lipsius were inspired by the Greek historian Thucydides and his notions on 'balance of power' and Roman chronicler Tacitus's *ragion di stato* and his notion of 'ruthless necessary power'. In realist discourse, 'necessity' is the key word that allows for any action, irrespective of its moral value. Since by its very nature necessity precludes choice, it also precludes moral choice. It is therefore possible for an action to be regarded as immoral, but since there is no other option, this is irrelevant. Necessity is guided by the existential need for 'self-preservation', and, according to Lipsius and Michel de Montaigne, these concepts are logically connected. There is no moral imperative when there is no choice. Self-preservation, necessity and amorality are therefore logically linked.[14]

A number of Tacitist authors like Hobbes were extremely sceptical about morality in politics. Good does not exist; it is just a word.[15] Others argued that precisely because of the instinct of self-preservation, peace could be obtained as something morally desirable.[16]

A key term in realism is reason of state, which is connected to interest. Thus, Giovanni Botero could argue that 'in the last resort *ragione di stato* is little else but *ragione d'interesse*'.[17] Botero popularized 'reason of state' as a guiding principle for policy in his *On reason of state* (1589), but also connected the term specifically to foreign policy.[18] Out of this view arose a conception of Europe as a collection of states each pursuing its own interest. In the view of the Duke of Rohan, military strength and geographical position were vital elements in analysing a state's interest.[19] But how to manage a system in which one state's interest clashed with another's? The greatest threat to the 'tranquillity of Europe' was hegemony, and precisely this threat loomed large in the second half of the seventeenth century. Balance of power was the answer. The connection between *raison d'état* and balance of power was further developed by Rohan's overview of European politics in *On the interest and princes and states of Christendom* (1638). With the connection of balance of power to the term 'interest' the realist discourse had reached maturity. States would realize it was in their interest to preserve themselves through alliances, and they would realize that ultimately the balance of power was the best guarantee.

Realist discourse was thus rooted in an 'ethical' dimension that underscored the 'necessity' for 'self-preservation' and the emergence of a balance of power. Spatially, it emphasized the state as a unitary actor, ignoring sub-state or supra-states connections. Temporally it focussed on shifts in power. Realist discourse developed a specific vocabulary mainly built around the terms 'state, 'necessity', 'threat', 'power', 'balance of power', 'interest', 'interest of state' and 'reason of state'.[20] Since each state had specific interests that could be determined, foreign policy should be led by certain 'maxims', another key word in realism. However, this did not mean that international developments could be fully predicted, as rulers did not always follow their 'interest' or 'reason', but were often distracted by their 'passions'.

Liberal Discourse

Liberalism deviated from realism as a theory of IR by arguing that it was not the nature and capabilities of states and of the international system that should be the basis for analysis, as the realists argued, but rather the

preferences and choices of states or supra-state institutions. Unlike in realist discourse, there was a strong predilection for resorting to international law, rather than raw power, to solve problems.[21] At the most idealist corner of the spectrum of liberalism, it could be argued that international law should guide the actions of states in the international sphere. Liberals do not deny that states have interests and that they tend to act accordingly, but they still hold that abiding by international law is in the end also in the interest of state. Whereas realism as an IR theory can be traced back to the early seventeenth century, the roots of liberalism have usually been tracked to Immanuel Kant's democratic peace theory in his 1795 essay on *Perpetual peace*, but in fact there are some seventeenth- and eighteenth-century idealist precedents. In general, the notion that morality should play a role in IR has roots in medieval Christianity and just war theory.

IR should not be based on power, as the realists argued, but on morality and natural or positive law. Hugo Grotius synthesized and added to sixteenth-century legal thought by the exponents of the Salamanca School, Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez, but also tapped into the classic and medieval notions on just war in his 1625 *The rights of war and peace*, a key work about international law based upon natural law and reason. Although Grotius' work was steeped in Christian tradition, his work argued for morality without God. The ideas of Grotius on international law were further developed by Samuel Pufendorf, who criticized the Hobbesian notion of perpetual war and wrote on just war doctrine and international law.

Realism and liberalism partially overlap in their beliefs in the centrality of the state, rationality and the importance of power. Indeed, Grotius and Pufendorf entertained ideas on the state and balance of power which seem distinctly realist in nature. Nevertheless, their views signified a deviation from realism, in which international law could be seen as a way to temper the excesses of an amoral realist system. There were also authors who went much further and criticized realism and interest of state, and who advocated a more distinct moral foreign policy. For example, Franz-Paul de Lisola's famous 1667 *The buckler of state and justice against the design manifestly discovered of the universal monarchy*, written in the aftermath of the French invasion of the Southern Netherlands, not only spoke of interest of state but also criticized it, since it should be religion that guides policy.[22] More extreme variants of liberalism can be found in the work of idealist writers such as Emeric Cruce, William Penn and Abbé St Pierre, who called for international peace based on supra-state solutions for international conflicts.

Liberal discourse was not only spatially connected to the state but also acknowledged intra-state and supra-state identities, such as Europe or Christendom as a community, and 'the nation' or 'the court'. Temporal identities were connected to shifts in power but ethically the focus was on the obligation to safeguard the peace and tranquillity of Europe. Key phrases of liberal discourse are therefore words like 'just' and 'unjust', 'treaty', 'domination', 'slavery' and 'tyranny'.

One obvious variant of seventeenth-century liberal discourse was Universal Monarchy Discourse, which warned against the threat of one prince overpowering his neighbours. The threat of hegemony can logically be linked to realism and balance of power, but Universal Monarchy Discourse was rooted in moral and religious discourses rather than in realism. Nevertheless, Tony Claydon and Andrew Thompson have argued that Protestant thinkers associated universal monarchy with Catholicism. Hence, the Protestant interest could be defended against universal monarchy through balance of power. In this view, balance of power thus does have partial roots in universal monarchy. Still, Claydon also points out that the balance of power discourse 'concentrated less on describing the *evils* of hegemony than on analysing how to stop it'.[23]

This all shows that neither balance of power nor universal monarchy are abstract principles, as realists hold, but need to be specifically contextualized in history. Early Modern notions of universal monarchy can be traced to the reign of Emperor Charles V and the dream of his advisor, Mercurino Gattinara (1465–1530), of a Catholic world empire. Dutch authors in the Eighty Years' War (1566–1648) picked up this notion but understandably considered Spanish universal monarchy as a major threat.[24] In the later 1660s the Dutch were influenced by the writings of Lisola, who argued that the aspiration for universal monarchy had shifted from Spain to France. However, it was still conceivable that the Holy Roman Emperor or the Ottoman Sultan would turn into a universal monarch, whereas some English authors in the 1660s regarded the Dutch Republic as a maritime universal monarchy.[25] Spatially, liberal discourse thus tended to focus on France. It was also built from an ethical identity construction that underscored freedom from tyranny, and tended to oppose republics and monarchies. Temporally, it looked back to the monarchy of Charles V as well as the rise of Louis XIV.

The Dutch had developed another version of liberal discourse, rooted in the temporal identity of the Dutch Republic and its 'Batavian' background. The 'imaginary historical continuity' ran from the Batavians to the

seventeenth century.[26] Gaius Julius Civilis led a Batavian revolt against the Romans in 69 A.D. This event formed the basis of a historical myth in which the ancestors of the Dutch fought for freedom against foreign oppression. It also galvanized a proto-nationalism rooted in concepts of liberty. The Batavian myth was conceived by Renaissance writers such as Erasmus and was applied to the Eighty Years' War by authors such as Hugo Grotius and the poet P.C. Hooft. Hooft in *Baeto* and Grotius in his *The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic* rehashed the Batavian struggle against Rome in their narratives of the Dutch struggle against Spain.

Protestant Discourse

Unlike realism and liberalism, Protestantism is not recognized as a precursor to modern theories of IR. Nevertheless, I include it in my analysis since it was extensively employed as a foreign policy discourse by Dutch authors. Protestant discourse was forged in three separate temporal identity constructions: the Old Testament, the wars of religion and the Apocalypse. The Dutch identified their state as a second Israel.[27] Although as a chosen people they were protected, just like Israel they lived in dangerous international circumstances, surrounded by ungodly great powers. As long as the Dutch lived according to God's will, the Dutch Republic would be kept safe, but if they faltered, the Republic could be punished or even overrun. At the same time, the Dutch had a divine responsibility to religious refugees and foreign Protestant minorities. The second construction was related to the wars of religion. The historical memory of the Eighty Years' War, a struggle for religion and liberty against the King of Spain, forged a sense of common identity, in which liberties and Calvinist religion were juxtaposed against absolutism and Catholicism.[28] As such there was a clear overlap between Universal Monarchy Discourse and Protestant discourse. The third identity construction was rooted in the Apocalypse. The end of times would inevitably see the ultimate struggle between the forces of dark and light. Such apocalyptic language figured amongst the more radical ministers, such as Pierre Jurieu, who saw the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes foretold in the Book of Revelation.

Out of these views arose a spatial identity construction of the Dutch Republic as a Protestant state and a second Israel. A 'confessional geography' was sketched, dividing Europe into a Protestant, 'true-reformed' space, and Catholic tyrannical space.[29] There was also a spatial demarcation

within states. England was seen to be clearly divided between a crypto-Catholic king and a Protestant parliament, whereas in Austria and France the 'court' was influenced by 'Jesuits' tempting the more moderate Catholic rulers to wage a religious war against Protestantism. Sometimes, England as a whole was seen as a brother that had done wrong. But the Dutch Republic itself, as well, was divided between those who stuck to true faith and those who wandered off.

Protestant discourse developed a specific vocabulary, such as 'Jesuit', 'popery', 'Antichrist', 'providence' and 'sins'. Key words were 'war of religion', 'true religion'. 'Christendom' was not part of this discourse as it rather denoted a supra-confessional view of Europe.

Political Parties

In order to understand how these discourses were utilized, I must now return briefly to a description of the Dutch two-party model. Traditional historiography saw Dutch politics as being dominated by two parties: the Prince's party (Orangists) and the States' or Loevestein party (Republicans). The Princes of Orange as stadtholders tried to centralize the government, and as captain-generals and -admirals, they controlled the army and the fleet, but they drew their main support from the army. The Prince's party found support mainly from the provinces not bordering on the sea, Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht, but also from Zeeland. They were supported by the Calvinist orthodox (the so-called Counter-Remonstrant) and later Voetian ministers (followers of Gisbertus Voetius) and enjoyed the sympathy of the general populace. On the other side stood the Republicans, also called Loevesteiners or members of the State's party, who were located mainly in the province of Holland and strove for provincial particularism. As an elite party, it garnered little support among the general populace but rested on the power of the regents of that dominant province. They were supported by more liberal Calvinist theologians (first Arminians, later Coccejans). Unlike the Prince's party, the Loevesteiners called for continental aloofness and concentrated on overseas trade.[30]

This two-party model traditionally served as an explanatory device to analyse seventeenth-century domestic conflicts and foreign policymaking. Local, provincial and national conflicts could be regarded as the results of partisan antagonism. The three key moments in the seventeenth century were 1618, 1650 and 1672. During the Twelve Years' Truce with Spain (1609–1621) a civil war between the two parties was averted, resulting in

the victory of the Prince of Orange, Maurice, the war party and religious orthodoxy, the demise of the peace party and the expulsion of heterodox Arminian ministers in 1618. The execution of the Republican leader, Grand Pensionary Oldenbarnevelt, in 1619 confirmed the supremacy of the Orangists. The renewal of the war with Spain in 1621, however, rekindled debate on the desirability of the war, which would continue until the Peace of Münster in 1648. The new Stadtholder and Prince of Orange, William II, had wanted to continue the war against the wishes of the province of Holland and clashed with the Republican city of Amsterdam in 1650. Several Republican leaders were imprisoned in the castle of Loevestein, lending its nickname to the Republicans. The Orangist party was decapitated by the sudden death of Stadtholder William II in the autumn 1650, enabling the Republicans to abolish the stadtholderate altogether. Between 1650 and 1672, the stadtholderless period, the Republican party was firmly in charge, Orangism was repressed and liberal theology flourished. In 1672 the situation reversed. As a result of the disastrous Anglo-French assault, the Republican leader Grand Pensionary John de Witt was lynched by an angry mob, which called for a reinstatement of the stadtholderate. The ascendancy of William III thus coincided with renewal of continental war (this time against France rather than Spain) and boosted the orthodox Calvinist Voetian party. In 1702, after William's death, the stadtholderate was abolished once more. This time, however, foreign policy seemed to remain consistent. The continental war policy of William III was continued, leading to the War of Spanish Succession under a Republican regime. In 1713, however, the States' party reverted to its traditional foreign policy of aloofness. In 1747, the ascension of a new stadtholder, William IV, once more coincided with renewed continental war against France.

As discussed in the introduction, historians have rejected the two-party model. However, I argue that to redefine politics as a discursive practice helps in rethinking the value of such a model for studying foreign policy. I do not call for a revival of the two-party model in an organizational sense, but I do argue that foreign policy was dominated by Orangist and Republican discourse. References to Orangist and Republican notions are explicitly articulated in seventeenth-century texts, but historians have dismissed the explanatory value of the dichotomy for analysing actual foreign policy decisions. Whereas historians have argued that the war was 'necessary', I aim to look at how Dutch authors constructed the war as necessary. Moreover, I argue that there was also a counter-discourse critical of the war effort. I thus argue the

centrality of these two partisan foreign policy discourses, fiercely competitive, for understanding Dutch foreign policy.

These foreign policy discourses were built from the three basic discourses discussed above. As stated before, these discourses do not in themselves propose a particular foreign policy, but provide a structure for foreign policy decisions.[31] It is thus conceivable that Republicans and Orangists built separate foreign policy discourses on similar basic discourses.

Both Republican and Orangist writers utilized liberal discourse but in different ways. Republicans emphasized the uniqueness of the Dutch Republic and regarded it as place of liberty, prosperity and tolerance. This was primarily so as a result of the republican government. Stadtholders constituted a threat to this freedom, and Republicans considered them essentially as they would any other monarch. Orangists believed that the Dutch Republic was a haven of freedom because of its wise constitution, which was mixed. As such they compared it to Venice. Both Republican and Orangist writers also tapped into the realist discourse. 'Interest' is a term in the work of both, but they defined it differently. Republicans argued that the interest of state was to protect trade and stay aloof from the continent, whereas the Orangists defined the interest of state as public well-being, religion and freedom, which necessitated engagement in continental affairs. In the primary sources uncovered in this research Protestant discourse seems to have been the province mainly of Orangists, who defined the Dutch Republic as a Protestant state vis-à-vis Catholics. Republican discourse was not devoid of religious expressions but saw little sustained Protestant discourse.

In the following two sections, I will flesh out these rather general views in two short case studies of pivotal Republican and Orangist works: Pieter de la Court's *Direction of wholesome political grounds* (1669) and Petrus Valckenier's *Europe in turmoil* (1675). These may be considered primary texts, meaning they were not so much the first to articulate a specifically partisan view on foreign policy, but they developed the most sustained argument and were therefore highly influential during the Forty Years' War.

Republican Discourse

Pieter de la Court's (1618–1685) *Direction of wholesome political grounds and maxims of the Republic of Holland and West-Friesland* (1669), a reworked edition of his landmark *Interest of Holland* (1662),

is radically anti-stadtholder, embraces religious toleration, advocates provincial sovereignty and hails Holland as a free and commercial republic. There is evidence that the Grand Pensionary of Holland, John de Witt, had read a draft of the *Interest* and possibly even contributed two chapters,[32] although he would have considered some of De la Court's work too radical and too impractical for policy. Still, De la Court's work defines a number of key issues heralded by the Republicans. Much has been written on De la Court's political ideas, but his views on foreign policy, to which a third of his book is devoted, have been all but neglected.

De la Court's discourse is rooted in the spatial identity of the province of Holland rather than the Dutch Republic as a whole.[33] The wider context is 'Europe' by which he primarily means the whole of Western Europe, Northern Europe and the Mediterranean area, as well as the Empire.[34] Europe consists of princes or 'states', which are the basic units of his analysis, also referred to as 'sovereign powers', 'great powers' or 'potentates'.[35] The ethical identities are mostly rooted in realism: the international arena is devoid of morality. 'The state has neither blood nor religion . . . do not trust and you shall not be betrayed.'[36] De la Court avoids the term Christendom as shorthand for Europe: the European states system has no inherent moral order, no ideal to cling to.

These states follow 'the interest of . . . state'.[37] De la Court specifically refers to the work of the Italian thinker Francesco Guicciardini, who coined 'interest of state', and the Duke of Rohan.[38] In order to understand the 'wholesome political grounds and maxims', one should, as do 'most all nations of Europe, such as Spaniards, Italians and French, express this matter with the word *interest*'.[39] However, this is where De la Court also taps into liberal discourse. For the 'interest' of a republic such as Holland consists of 'peace' because of 'fishery, commerce and shipping' and love of 'liberty' and 'lawful government and freedom', whereas monarchies are rather interested in 'conquest and glory'.[40] De la Court is not unique in his struggle to wed a moral view to realism. As Arthur Weststeijn argued, De la Court was 'merging the republican legacy with the language of reason of state'.[41]

De la Court thus articulates clear identities by distinguishing sharply between European republics and monarchies or 'single-headed governments'. Whereas republics hail liberty, monarchies 'force and make powerless', 'enforce'.[42] They have an interest in 'conquest' and 'glory' and the increase of power of their monarch through the subjection of their people.

Typical for princes is 'their appetite to dominate' and 'ambition'.[43] The result is that 'people' are sighing in 'slavery'. De la Court argues that the Dutch are 'merchants by nature', as opposed to 'princes and monarchs which are well compared to lions', predators.[44] De la Court contrasts 'Dutch diligence and modesty, the example of mercantile morality, with the ostentation and laziness of the Frenchman, the prototype of courtly corruption'.[45] As for the English, they are 'famous for [their] . . . spend-thrift and thievish nature' which he contrasts with the Dutch 'economical and frugal nature'.[46] De la Court admits that the stadtholders in the Dutch Republic display fewer evils than most monarchs, but he leaves no doubt that they are essentially the same.[47]

Temporal identities are rooted in the Dutch Revolt, in which, De la Court believes, it was not the stadtholder but Holland that resisted Spain.[48] Specific key moments also include the constitutional crisis of 1618/1619, in which Johan van Oldenbarnevelt was executed, and that of 1650, in which 'true freedom' was established. But he also refers to the Middle Ages when Holland was ruled by counts, 'awful times . . . filled . . . with contemptible wars'.[49]

De la Court is ambivalent on foreign policy. On the one hand, his liberal discourse leads him to consider alliances with other freedom-loving republics. He argues that monarchies after all do have an essential interest, which is 'to hate republics, especially new and near ones'.[50] On the other hand, realist discourse leads him to state that the policy of Holland should be guided by a 'maxim', a fixed rule of engagement in the international arena that flows from Holland's interest as a trading nation.[51] From a liberal standpoint Holland should band together with other republics, but realist logic leads De la Court to conclude that allying with such 'power-less' states as Geneva or Venice yields little practical value.[52] Neutrality and strong defences, mostly maritime, are therefore the best guarantee against the three 'powerful potentates', France, Spain and England.[53] In the end, De la Court trusts that the natural 'mistrust' between 'over-lords' will prevent them from attacking the Dutch Republic. As such, De la Court relies mainly on realist discourse, larded with liberal discourse, to construct a consistent Republican 'foreign policy story' which I describe as Peace and Commerce Discourse. Protestant discourse is absent from his book, although there are references to the Christian religion. From the identity construction of the Dutch Republic as peaceful and commercial, De la Court constructs an 'ethical identity' which calls for abstention or neutrality in foreign policy.

Orangist Discourse

Petrus Valckenier, a lawyer later turned diplomat, wrote his *Europe in turmoil… caused by the pretended universal monarchy of the French* in 1675.[54] His book is dedicated to the Prince of Orange and written in the aftermath of the Year of Disaster. The massive three-part tome provided a theoretical framework on state interest, discusses the troubles that had plagued Europe and narrated the history of the Franco-Dutch War from 1672.

The purpose of Valckenier's book is twofold. First, he wishes to understand the 'foundations and causes of wars and revolutions in Europe' as a result of the 'pretended Universal Monarchy of the French'. Second, he analyses how the Dutch Republic, having fought successfully for 80 years to gain 'freedom', collapsed within several weeks in 1672 in the face of French aggression. He attributes this reversal to the interaction of French aggression and Republican treason, and it is William III who restores both the state of Europe and the well-being of the Dutch Republic. [55]

Valckenier builds his case on the conceptual cornerstone of universal monarchy. The troubles in Europe, he states in the title of his book, are 'caused by the pretended universal monarchy of the French'.[56] He was profoundly influenced by Lisola, but was a devout Protestant for whom universal monarchy also meant universal Catholic religion.[57] It is in the second and central part of this work where this liberal discourse is employed in order to explain the rise of French universal monarchy. The temporal identity is double layered. Valckenier traces the beginning of the troubles very specifically to 1664, when Louis XIV's ambitions to annex the Spanish Netherlands first became apparent. He explains in detail that Louis is 'ambitious' as no king before him, 'inflated', 'yearning for glory'.[58] Still, Louis is simply an extreme variant of all those 'potentates who have always reckoned that their lust for rule was sufficient cause for starting a war'.[59] Louis's 'ambition has got the upper hand', but Valckenier also believes that France always wages war, either a civil or an external war.[60] He describes how Renaissance kings like Francis I tried to extend the borders of France. A phrase often deployed by Valckenier is '*overheersen*', to dominate.[61] The arrogance ascribed to Louis XIV is not just a characteristic of potentates, but also of the French people.[62] It is interesting to see that Valckenier attributes this not just to recent policies but also to French nature: 'since ancient times the French have been restless… such that they do not live in peace, but are always inclined to war.'[63]

However, the first part of the book is steeped in realist discourse. As had De La Court, Valckenier starts his book with an emphasis on interest of state: 'the right and true goal or interest of any political state is that it is conserved and augmented.'[64] According to Valckenier, each state pursued the interest of state, which was based upon the pillars of state: the political system, the judiciary, finance, religion and the army. The first part of his book seems primarily concerned with an abstract analysis of the interests of various states in Europe. He specifically fears France and its '*overmacht*', superior power, a term that makes sense in balance of power discourse.[65]

Whereas De la Court hails the tolerant nature of the Dutch Republic, Valckenier trumpets the Protestant identity of the state. His later diplomatic correspondence would betray even stronger concern for the fate of Protestantism in Europe.[66] Valckenier argues that 'the interest of state must yield to the divine [laws]'. However, the structure of the book suggests that religion is subservient to the interest of state, as he shows how religion is just one of the five pillars of state. Unlike confessional writers such as Pierre Jurieu, Valckenier does not regard 'Catholicism' as a threat.

However, universal monarchy extends the French borders through cultural influence, and it is here Valckenier connects French ambition with Loevestein policy. Because of the Republicans, the people are now 'bewitched by damnable and fleeting French customs, which they copy like baboons and meercats, and take as a model that frolicsome young ladies and courtly tailors conceive in Paris and Montpelliers'. Here Valckenier is playing to the sentiments of orthodox Calvinists who would condemn such worldly pleasures, but he also seems to evoke the religious conflicts of the 1610s, when the baboon symbolized the Arminian Remonstrant party that was supported by the 'republican' party under Oldenbarnevelt. Valckenier sees the Frenchification of Dutch culture as 'no minor cause in spurring the French king to resolve to attack these lands'.[67] Valckenier has traditionally been associated with interest of state, but it seems that, whereas he moderately uses realist discourse and rarely employs Protestant discourse, he primarily builds his case on liberal Universal Monarchy Discourse. Valckenier's identity constructions of France as a universal monarchy and the Loevesteiners as susceptible to French influence are connected to an ethical identity of the Dutch Republic as a nation in mortal danger; defence and international alliances are of the essence.

Conclusion and Operationalization

The research model proposed by Lene Hansen forms the foundation of this book. The foreign policy discourses developed by Republicans and Orangists were built from three separate basic discourses on IR. The Republicans integrated elements of realism and liberalism into a foreign policy discourse that identified the Dutch Republic as Batavian, a free-fought peaceful and commercial republic in a world of tyrannical monarchs. From this identity construction followed a foreign policy of abstention. Orangists borrowed from all three discourses – Protestant, liberal and realist, and constructed a Dutch identity signified by liberty and Protestantism. By the early 1670s, the Universal Monarchy Discourse was central in the Orangist perception. Unlike the Republicans, Orangists focused at a very early stage on France as the main culprit.

The next three chapters will show how these two foreign policy discourses were operationalized in the face of three consecutive wars in 1672, 1688 and 1702. They will also show how they interacted with real-world events. Lastly, the case studies will show how they were situated in a wider intertextual web, evolved over time, were influenced by other discourses and fostered different variants.

Notes

1. N. Fairclough, *Critical discourse analysis. The critical study of language* (London 1995), 56.
2. S.H. Riggins, 'The rhetoric of othering', in ibid. ed., *The language and politics of exclusion. Others in discourse* (Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi 1997), 2–3.
3. Hansen, *Security*, xiii, xvi.
4. Hansen, *Security*, 7.
5. Hansen, *Security,* 46. Cf. P. Chilton, *Analysing political discourse: theory and practice* (London 2004), 56 ff.
6. Hansen, *Security,* xvi.
7. Hansen, *Security*, 52–53.
8. Hansen, *Security*, 213.
9. Hansen, *Security*, 52.
10. Hansen, *Security*, 54.
11. P.R. Viotti and M.V. Kauppi, *International relations theory. Realism, pluralism, globalism, and beyond* (Boston 1999).

12. T.L. Knutsen, *A history of international relations theory* (Manchester 1997); L. Ashworth, *A history of international thought: from the origins of the modern state to academic international relations* (Abingdon 2014; D. Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge 2013).
13. E.g. Knutsen, *History*, 65.
14. Ashworth, *History*, 29–32.
15. Knutsen, *History*, 95, 97.
16. Ashworth, *History*, 34.
17. Quoted in Knutsen, *History*, 65.
18. Knutsen, *History*, 65
19. Knutsen, *History*, 109–110.
20. Cf. Viotti and Kauppi, *International relations theory*, 55, 59.
21. Cf. E. Keene, *International political thought: an historical introduction* (Cambridge/Malden 2005), 118.
22. Translated into Dutch as Franz-Paul de Lisola, *Verdediging van staat en gerechtigheid* (1667) (Knuttel 9928), 283–284. On Lisola, see C-É. Levillain, *Le procès de Louis XIV. Un guerre psychologique. François-Paul de Lisola, citoyen du monde, ennemi de la France (1613–1674)* (Paris 2015).
23. T. Claydon, *Europe and the making of England, 1660–1760* (Cambridge 2007), 194. According to Claydon, Universal Monarchy Discourse in England was at its height between 1688 and 1697, whereas Balance of Power discourse came to the fore during the debates on the 1698 and 1700 partition treaties. 158, 194. Thompson, *Britain*, introduction and chapter 1.
24. I am thankful to Yolanda Rodríquez Pèrez and Raymond Fagel for pointing me to references to universal monarchy during this period. On the relationship between the Black Legend and Spanish universal monarchy, see K.W. Swart, 'The black legend during the Eighty Years War', in E.H. Kossmann and J.S. Bromley, *Britain and the Netherlands: papers delivered to the fifth Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference, Vol.5: Some political mythologies* (The Hague 1975).
25. T. Claydon, 'The revolution in foreign policy', in T. Harris and S. Taylor, eds, *The final crisis of the Stuart monarchy* (Woodbridge 2013); S. Pincus, 'From butterboxes to wooden shoes: the shift in English popular sentiment from anti-Dutch to anti-French in the 1670s', *Historical Journal*, 38/2 (1995), 333–61; S. Pincus, 'Republicanism, absolutism, and universal monarchy', in G. Maclean, ed., *Culture and society in the Stuart Restoration. Literature, drama, history* (Cambridge 1995).
26. S. Schama, *The embarrassment of riches. An interpretation of Dutch culture in the Golden Age* (London 1991), 54; I. Schöffer, 'The Batavian myth during

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', in P.A.M. Geurts and A.E.M. Janssen, eds, *Geschiedschrijving in Nederland* (The Hague 1981).
27. G. Groenhuis, 'Calvinism and the national consciousness: the Dutch Republic as the new Israel', in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse, eds, *Britain and the Netherlands* VII (The Hague 1981), 118–135; R. Bisschop, *Sions Vorst en volk. Het tweede-Israëlidee als theocratisch concept in de gereformeerde kerk van de Republiek tussen ca. 1650 en ca. 1750* (Veenendaal 1993); C. Huisman, *Neerlands Israël. Het natiebesef der traditioneel-gereformeerden in de achttiende eeuw* (Dordrecht 1983); H. Smitskamp, *Calvinistisch nationaal besef in Nederland voor het midden der 17de eeuw* (The Hague 1947). Of course this was not an exclusively Dutch phenomenon; cf. P. Ihalainen, *Protestant nations redefined: changing perceptions of national identity in the rhetoric of English, Dutch and Swedish public churches* (Leiden 2005).
28. Schama, *The embarrassment of riches*, 53.
29. Claydon, *Europe*.
30. The obvious parallels between the Whig-Tory and the Republican-Orangist division was noted at the time: D. Coombs, *The conduct of the Dutch. British opinion and the Dutch alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession* (The Hague 1958), 12–3.
31. Hansen, *Security*, 213.
32. R. Fruin, 'Het aandeel van den raadpensionaris De Witt aan het *Interest van Holland* van Pieter de la Court', *De Gids* 29 (1865), 459–470.
33. P. de la Court, *Aanwysing der heilsame politike gronden en maximen van de republike van Holland en West-Vriesland* (1671), preface, 276, 320.
34. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 243, 306.
35. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 267, 306.
36. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 270.
37. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 1, 248.
38. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 308. A. Weststeijn, *Commercial republicanism in the Dutch Golden Age: The political thought of Johan and Pieter de la Court* (Leiden 2012), 173.
39. De la Court, *Aanwysing, 1*. Cf. Weststeijn, *Commercial*, 206.
40. De la Court, *Aanwysing, preface, 275.*
41. Weststeijn, *Commercial*, 207.
42. De la Court, *Aanwysing, preface, 4.*
43. De la Court, *Aanwysing, preface*, 270.
44. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 253, 255; Cf, Weststeijn, *Commercial*, 117 ff.
45. Weststeijn, *Commercial*, 192.
46. De la Court, *Aanwysing, preface*, 297.
47. De la Court, *Aanwysing, preface*, 13, 255, 321.
48. De la Court, *Aanwysing, preface*, 317.
49. De la Court, *Aanwysing, preface*, 11, 313.

50. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 278.
51. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 247.
52. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 279.
53. De la Court, *Aanwysing*, 240, 249–250, 281.
54. P. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa ofte polityke en historische beschrijving der waare fundamenten en oorzaken van de oorlogen en revolutiën in Europa, voornamentlijk in en omtrent de Nederlanden, sedert den jare 1664, gecauseert door de gepretenteerde Universele Monarchie der Franschen*… (1675). An updated version was published in 1688.
55. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa*.
56. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa*.
57. Cf. Charles-Édouard Levillain, 'The intellectual origins of the Anglo-Dutch alliance 1667–1677', http://britaix17-18.univ-provence.fr/texte-seance5.php.
58. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa*, 131, 133.
59. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa* 132.
60. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa* 132.
61. D. Onnekink, 'Pride and prejudice: Universal Monarchy Discourse and the peace negotiations of 1709–1710', in De Bruin, *Performances*.
62. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa* 131, 132.
63. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa*, 55.
64. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa*, 1, 24.
65. Onnekink, 'Pride and prejudice'.
66. See chap. 4.
67. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa*, 265.

CHAPTER 3

The Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678)

Abstract In this chapter, David Onnekink analyses foreign policy discourses at the start of the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678). Historiography has paid much attention to 1672 as a Year of Disaster, but has implicitly endorsed a realist paradigm of French expansionism and downplayed the relevance of political parties. In this chapter, Onnekink compares three categories of primary sources: political documents, formal published documents and popular publications. He argues that two partisan foreign policy discourses developed. Republicans initially maintained a Peace and Commerce Discourse, but switched to a Two Kings Discourse (emphasizing betrayal by the Kings of France and England). Orangists consistently utilized Universal Monarchy Discourse, that demonized Republicans and saw them and the court of England as agents of France.

Keywords Franco-Dutch War · Discourse · Foreign Policy · Third Anglo-Dutch War · Dutch Republic · Universal monarchy

Introduction

The history of the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678) from a Dutch perspective is usually contextualized within the metanarrative of French expansionism. Since the Dutch were the victims of the invasion, Dutch foreign policy has rarely been the subject of research. The exception is the work of several realist scholars on Grand Pensionary John De Witt. For

© The Author(s) 2016

D. Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95136-9_3

J. Boogman, De Witt was a 'sober realist', a label that was easily turned into a metaphor for Dutch foreign policy in general. Boogman attributed the failure of De Witt's foreign policy to his rationality, rendering him incapable of understanding irrational dynastic policies of monarchs.[1] Herbert Rowen, Charles Wilson and J.R. Jones as well focused on De Witt as a rational but somewhat short-sighted statesman.[2] Most Dutch historians have concentrated on domestic developments related to the demise of De Witt and the elevation of the Prince of Orange. The revolution that took place is almost exclusively interpreted as the result of constitutional issues rather than the result of foreign intervention.[3] In this light, the many studies on the Orange Restoration in 1672 seem surprisingly introspective.

The Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678) and the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–1674), which partly overlapped, have also been studied from English and French perspectives. The imperialist interpretation of French foreign policy has been seriously nuanced by scholars, but realism still dominates as an interpretative perspective. For Paul Sonnino, Louis XIV was not bent on destroying the Dutch state, but he was motivated by raw territorial aims.[4] In the view of Jonathan Israel, the French attack was not only based on political and territorial but also on mercantilist considerations.[5] Charles Wilson regarded the first two Anglo-Dutch Wars as the result of commercial competition, but the Third Anglo-Dutch War he attributed to the policy of Charles II.[6] J.R. Jones likewise argued that the roots were political: the Anglican-Royalist faction initiated the war to benefit the crown and make it independent from Parliament.[7] Alternatively, Steven Pincus argued that the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch wars were ideological in nature, pitting a Royalist regime against a republic striving for universal trade, whereas Tony Claydon has pointed out that anti-Dutch rhetoric in 1672 also had strong religious overtones.[8]

The chapter rethinks Dutch foreign policy on the eve of the 1672 invasion through the analysis of discourses. It investigates how the Dutch understood and interpreted events, how these were inextricably entwined with identity discourses, and how these were related to the emergence of Republican and Orangist foreign policy discourses. First, it will provide a short overview of events, followed by analyses of discourses in political correspondence, official government publications and pamphlets. The purpose is to reconstruct the main direction of foreign policy discourses, not to provide an exhaustive overview.

The Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678)

The invasion of 1672 was connected to two previous conflicts: the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667) and the War of Devolution (1667–1668). Confronted with the French invasion in the Southern Netherlands, John de Witt swiftly ended the Second Anglo-Dutch War with England in 1667 and completed the Triple Alliance of the Dutch Republic, Sweden and England to confront France, forcing it to conclude peace in 1668. However, Louis XIV held De Witt responsible for his failure, whereas Charles II realized that the Republic was a power to be reckoned with. In 1670 in the Secret Treaty of Dover, Louis XIV and Charles II pledged to jointly attack the United Provinces and install the Prince of Orange as sovereign. The French had also concluded defensive treaties with Cologne, Münster and Hanover in the summer of 1671. The Dutch could boast only a defensive treaty with Spain in the autumn of 1671. The Emperor was unlikely to intervene because of his treaty with Louis XIV in 1668. The Dutch hoped that France would respect the bilateral defensive treaty of 1662. By the winter of 1671/1672, however, they were convinced war would come. This international tension became inextricably entangled with domestic partisan struggle. On 19 January 1672 the States General informed the States of Holland that all six other provinces had resolved to appoint William III, the Prince of Orange, captain general and requested Holland to comply. There was also a popular movement to raise Orange to the stadtholderate. However, this was opposed by De Witt because it was in violation of the Perpetual Edict of 1667. He was supported by a core group of Republican cities. De Witt managed to put together a compromise, namely to propose Orange for one campaign only.

In March 1672, the English assaulted the Dutch Smyrna fleet, and in April they declared war, following the French declaration of war. A French army of some 118,000 infantry and 12,500 cavalry marched in May via Namur and Liège, passed Maastricht and made for Cologne. On 12 June, the French army crossed the Rhine at Tolhuis. At the same time, 25,000 troops of the bishops of Münster and Cologne entered the Dutch Republic from Bentheim a bit further to the north, in Overijssel. The badly organized Dutch army of some 21,000 troops was no match for the enormous French army. Faced with an overwhelming enemy force and in danger of being cut off from Holland, the Dutch abandoned the IJssellinie and retreated. On 16 June, with Utrecht considered lost as well, the States General ordered Orange to retreat behind the Waterlinie, which had

started to form on 8 June and kept the province of Holland safe for the time being. The province of Utrecht was overrun, and on 9 July Louis XIV celebrated mass in Utrecht cathedral. In the remaining provinces regents talked about capitulation. [9]

However, the Dutch admiral Michiel de Ruyter defeated the English fleet at Solebay on 6 June, which at least precluded invasion from the sea. By May 1672, Brandenburg despatched subsidiary troops to the Dutch Republic. The Emperor, alarmed by the overwhelming success of the French, signed a defensive treaty with the Dutch on 25 July. Although the combined Brandenburg-Imperial army did little to aid the Dutch, the threat it posed offered a diversion, which relieved some of the pressure. Marshall Turenne led part of the French army into Germany, and the Münster and Cologne armies decided to raise their siege of Groningen. By the winter of 1672, the French invasion had come to a grinding halt, the army blocked by the Waterlinie. Holland had successfully fended off the French invasion, and the Dutch Republic appeared to have been miraculously saved.

Meanwhile that summer, panic and anger had spread through the Dutch towns and the stock market collapsed. The government was blamed for the disaster and calls for the restoration of the stadtholderate grew louder. Starting in Dordrecht on 24 June and spreading to other towns within days, rioters demanded the elevation of the Prince of Orange to the stadtholderate. Many believed that he would be able to lead the army, indeed the country, more effectively in the current crisis. The States of Zeeland decided to offer William the stadtholderate on 2 July 1672, followed by the province of Holland. Increasingly disparaged for his conduct, De Witt decided to resign on 4 August and was succeeded by Caspar Fagel. The Republican diplomat Pieter de Groot, heavily criticized for his defeatist attitude, fled to the Spanish Netherlands. On 20 August, John and Cornelis de Witt were lynched by a mob in The Hague for having 'betrayed Church and State'.[10] The Republican regime had definitively collapsed. On 27 August, the stadtholder was authorized to purge the city councils of Holland, which were now filled with Orangists at the expense of Republicans. Starting in Dordrecht on 9 September, the stadtholder removed Republican regents. In total, 130 regents out of 460 would be replaced that autumn by the Prince. The Orangist revolution had been completed.

Foreign Policy Discourses in Political Documents

Already in the winter of 1671/1672 the Dutch were aware that war might come,[11] and John de Witt believed safety now lay in alliances and a strong defence. However, he entertained the possibility that war might still be avoided through the Triple Alliance or aloofness. The guiding principle for De Witt was the self-interest of the state, and in his extensive correspondence he used realist discourse primarily, interspersed with liberal discourse. This variant of Peace and Commerce Discourse had a more political and strategic and less commercial character than that employed by Pieter de la Court.

Central in De Witt's analysis of the situation was the realist principle of 'interest of state', a phrase he used quite often and usually multiple times in a single letter. In a letter to Cornelis de Witt, for instance he explained that a policy was either 'in the interest of this state' or 'against the interest of this state'.[12] By early 1672, there was a strong movement within the Dutch Republic to support the Spanish and their defence of the Spanish Netherlands. De Witt was opposed to a close alliance with Spain, afraid he might commit himself to war prematurely.[13] The Spanish court should take care of 'its own interest', and the subjects of the Spanish Netherlands should take care of their 'own conservation and defence'.[14] It is, De Witt argued, 'directly against the interest of the State' to send troops to the Spanish Netherlands according to the 'principium: "*Charité bien ordonnée commence de soy mesme*"'.[15] There was no need to mask the primacy of self-interest: if we do send troops to the Spanish Netherlands, De Witt argued, we will send no more than 'are necessary for its own security'.[16] The language of necessity is frequently used.

The language of interest was a vital ingredient but insufficient to justify De Witt's policy of alliances. On the one hand, it was central in De Witt's argument: interest of state superseded all. Like Pieter de la Court, De Witt argued that there was no need to support Spain, should it not be in the interest of the Dutch state; there was no necessity, no moral or ideological obligation to do so. On the other hand, De Witt still believed states were mutually dependent. Therefore, in addition to self-interest there was also common interest, the 'common cause', as De Witt put it in a discourse which is clearly more liberal. The phrase is profusely used in his 1654 book, *The Deduction*, but mainly in the context of the Dutch state domestically. In his 1672 correspondence, however, De Witt, clearly alluded to a

supranational cause which unites the interests of various states. Although De Witt did not specify what the 'common cause' meant in international context, it was an attempt to discursively connect Dutch self-interest to a supranational general cause. The Spanish court should 'for its own interest, as well as for the best of the common good cause', do what it needs to do.[17] This is where De Witt moved the language of self-interest of Pieter de la Court into a different direction. In contrast to what Pieter de la Court had argued, De Witt did believe that, in the aftermath of the War of Devolution, states needed to cooperate, but he clung to the belief that this could be done in accordance with self-interest.

Occasionally, as well, De Witt argued for that which bound the courts of 'Christendom'.[18] Unlike Pieter de la Court he thus implicitly embraced the notion of an international moral order. His use of liberal discourse, however, is more clearly apparent in his reference to morality in international relations, with terms like 'sincere' and in his insistence on treaty obligations. He juxtaposed, indirectly, the 'sincerity' of the Spanish ambassador with the 'perfidy' of the English court.[19] He also regarded a treaty as 'obliging'; for instance, it was not in the self-interest of the Dutch to protect the Spanish Netherlands to support Spain, unless it was actually attacked and they were 'ex pacto obliged' to do so.[20] Indeed, it would not be unfavourable in De Witt's opinion were France to attack the Spanish Netherlands, since it would oblige Sweden and England to intervene or be guilty of 'ill-reputed breaking of bonds'.[21]

Peace and Commerce Discourse thus did not necessarily imply neutralism, as it did for De la Court, but, in line with De Witt's Triple Alliance policy, was hesitantly open to international alliances. De Witt thus constructed an ethical identity, in which 'interest' and 'common interest' stipulated the 'necessity' and 'obligation' to take a course of action and intervene if necessary. This is shown most clearly in an important letter in which he developed a policy for four possible scenarios. If France attacked neither the Dutch nor the Spanish, there was 'no obligation'. Should either the Dutch Republic or the Spanish Netherlands be attacked, succour must be given 'ex obligatione'. It is surprising that De Witt clung to the weaker liberal 'obligation' rather than the stronger realist 'necessity', but it should be kept in mind that De Witt expected an attack on the Spanish Netherlands, not the Dutch Republic.[22] Should both be attacked, a 'common concert [is] necessary . . . for mutual aid and the good of the common cause'.[23]

But ultimately it was a realist course of action De Witt had in mind, conscious of the maelstrom of continental events that could suck the

Dutch into war should they conclude unnecessary alliances. Unlike the States General, De Witt was therefore hesitant about an alliance with Spain.[24] The French had concluded defensive treaties with Cologne, Münster and Hanover in the summer of 1671.[25] The Dutch responded by concluding a mutual defence treaty with Spain in the autumn of 1671 in order to construct a counter-balance. This, Johan Boreel wrote to Johan de Wit, caused an uproar in England.[26] The lawyer Adriaan van der Goes observed the escalation as a result of the rumours of an Anglo-French alliance in response to the Dutch-Spanish treaty: 'they say that England will fall in with France, like Spain keeps with us'. [27] Precisely because of this escalation De Witt was sceptical of the Spanish alliance, which was not necessarily in the Dutch interest. Nevertheless, he told the Spanish ambassador Manuel de Lira that the threats by Louis 'give Their High Mightinesses just cause.... to be allowed to act and even commit a first strike'.[28] According to Herbert Rowen, this consideration marked the 'collapse' of De Witt's Triple Alliance policy.[29] The pacifist–neutralist policy of De la Court had certainly been decisively abandoned. What policy turn De Witt had in mind precisely is not known, but there was not to be a first strike after all, and the Republic was invaded in the spring.

Orangist discourse painted a very different picture and took the shape of Universal Monarchy Discourse. Although the term figures rarely in correspondence,[30] the identity construction of France as a universal monarchy was widespread. The Dutch Orangist ambassador Van Reede van Amerongen, dispatched to the Empire, saw France as an evil kingdom; the French 'sleep not and seek to devour us'; they give 'sinister and wrong impressions' abroad about the Dutch.[31] France was portrayed as a predator state bent on 'ruining' the Dutch Republic.[32] The French king was a tyrant; Caspar Fagel would 'rather die ten times, if that would be possible, than be such a miserable slave to France . . . '.[33] The same discourse was used by Gerard Hamel Bruynincx, the Dutch resident in Vienna. He continuously spoke of the 'hatred' of France for the Republic, and the 'designs' the French had against the state.[34] French diplomats did not speak the truth but spread 'inventions'.[35]

Tony Claydon has argued that English observers could still regard Habsburg, rather than France, as a universal monarchy.[36] This was also true for Bruynincx, who was suspicious of the aims of the Vienna court. At all times, the state had to be on its guard against the 'cunning and covert designs and counsels'. He was, in his own words, 'pregnant with suspicion' of the intentions of Vienna. The Austrian court was difficult to

fathom. If only one could 'pull off the masque of this court, feel its pulse and discover the sentiments and that which they carry in their bosom'.[37] For Bruynincx, Universal Monarchy Discourse was rooted in Protestant ideology. As a Calvinist, he was educated by the famous orthodox minister Gisbert Voetius.[38] Whereas in a realist perspective a Habsburg-French alliance would be very unlikely, Bruynincx feared it might be possible. He believed that the lack of aid to the Dutch was caused by the Jesuits at court, 'whose counsels . . . we have good reason to suspect. It should be noted, and some surely believe it, that these men much favour the party of France these days'.[39] An international anti-Dutch Jesuit conspiracy was working deviously.

Amongst diplomats, Hamel Bruynincx seems rather unique in his blend of Universal Monarchy and a Protestant Discourse. True, most Dutch politicians, both Orangist and Republican, embraced some version of the Second Israel idea, which regarded the Dutch Republic as uniquely established and maintained by God. De Witt wrote that he hoped 'that God the Lord . . . will bless this State in her just cause and maintain her against all evil machinations'.[40] The Orangist regent Justus de Huybert saw that 'this great republic, completely unexpectedly, has been made a miracle on earth, to inspire awe and fear to all her neighbours and shake them up: the Lord our God will in due time enlighten us about the causes . . . the Lord our God is used to deliver this state by visible miracles and wonders by His own hand'.[41] However, the explicit articulation of the Dutch Republic as a Second Israel in foreign policy documents seems mainly the domain of Orangists. Amerongen wrote that 'it appears that God the Lord will punish her for her sins and withdraw His mercy'.[42] He connected the 'sins' of the nation indirectly to the Republicans. In reply to his ally Lord Weede van Dijkveld, with whom he tried to have an Orangist elected burgomaster of Utrecht, he wrote, 'It is not strange that God the Lord withdraws His blessing from the State and threatens her with so many evil tidings. The regents deal with each other faithlessly, but each of them will be accountable'.[43]

Foreign policy discourses thus also absorbed domestic identity constructions. Both in Protestant as well as liberal discourses Orangists blamed Republicans for the disaster. They had become Frenchified, sinned against God and plunged the Republic into disaster. William III himself sharply distinguished between 'Monsieur de Witt et sa cabale' and 'moy et mes amis'.[44] The identity juxtaposition was maintained by Amerongen, who complained about 'the feebleness and cowardly nature' of regents in 'this

dangerous constitution of times and affairs'.[45] He noted 'how damaging the slow resolutions' of the States General had been.[46] Fagel accused the critics of Orange of 'vile and calumnious imputations'.[47] Orangist discourse thus maintained a binary partisan construction: the Republicans had been responsible for antagonizing England whereas they should have suspected France.[48]

For the Republicans it was the other way around. De Witt complained that with the elevation of Orange, the States of Holland 'lay the foundation of their slavery with unbridled zeal and the breaking of solemn agreements and laws'.[49] It is here that the De Witt made a crucial policy decision for which he would later be vilified by Orangists. Confronted with the option of appointing Orange captain-general to reform the army, he wrote to the Republican ambassador in Paris, Pieter de Groot: 'I gladly admit that the remedy is worse than the evil itself'.[50] Unlike De Witt, De Groot was convinced that by now the march of Orange was unstoppable, and he suggested to De Witt that 'the lesser of two evils' should prevail: let Orange be captain-general, on condition that England would be bound to the United Provinces. De Groot was fully aware of the 'very dangerous consequences of being forced to elevate the Prince of Orange in such a way', but believed that, since the elevation only seemed a matter of time now, it was sound policy.[51]

Republicans also employed this binary construction in order to understand domestic divisions in relation to foreign policy, but rather used realist language. John de Witt wrote that 'there is therefore no other choice, than that either one will fall prey to France and be entirely lost or one will throw himself in the arms of England'.[52] De Groot warned the French Secretary of State that in case of a French attack on the Dutch Republic, William would be made stadtholder and 'our state would then be unbreakably tied to the interests of England'.[53] Hence France would have a vested interest to uphold the Republican regime in the United Provinces, for the States General rather argued that England was 'so related to His Highness' and had great hopes that William would be able to solve matters.[54] But this issue also brought back the fiercely liberal language of Pieter de la Court. De Witt employed a binary partisan construction, distinguishing between 'those affectionate towards milord the prince of Orange' and 'many good patriots'. These patriots, Republicans, were either in favour of De Witt's policy or enthralled with the Orangist argument 'that it is impossible for this state to withstand the power of France alone'.[55]

Foreign Policy Discourses in Formal Published Documents

No formal response to the French declaration of war was published, but there is a series of published letters between the King of France and the States General in the winter of 1671–1672. Dutch Republican sources are saturated in Peace and Commerce Discourse and built on an identity construction of France as a friend and ally. The States General stated that France regulates its actions by 'lawfulness', and the States General could not bring themselves to believe that the king would 'use his weapons against his eldest and most faithful ally', in particular because the States General had 'very punctiliously and earnestly observed' the 1662 Treaty of Paris. They acknowledged that there was a dispute on 'navigation and commerce', which could surely be solved. France was thus identified as an ally and a just one, and therefore the course of action was friendly discussion.[56] The Republican regime hoped to stave off war.

This was obviously no longer possible after England and France declared war in the spring of 1672, invalidating Peace and Commerce Discourse. The alliance between Kings of England and France led to the development of a new Republican discourse, which was also rooted in liberalism. What I call the Two Kings Discourse emphasized betrayal by the Kings of England and France and plays on the classic Republican distrust of kings and a belief in an international moral order. The problem was that, although it vindicated the Republican antipathy of monarchs, it did not specify a course of action. It is distinct from Universal Monarchy Discourse employed by the Orangists because it maintained Republican belief that Charles II was a threat to the Dutch Republic. Two Kings Discourse was also employed by Calvinists, but was rather rooted in Protestantism. In June 1672 a letter from the States of Zeeland, where Calvinism was strong, to the States of Holland was published, which referred to Charles and Louis as 'two kings' who jeopardized the 'religion, liberty and the lawful government of these lands'. It constructed popery as the most dangerous threat, connecting France with 'papists in these lands' and concluding that the papists form a 'serpent in our own bosom'.[57]

The new Orangist regime that swept into power in the summer of 1672 rejected the Republican Two Kings Discourse and fully adopted Universal Monarchy Discourse instead. Whereas the Republican regime had constructed France as a friend with which it had a dispute, the Orangists

presented France as a threat to the world. The Two Kings Discourse was thus short-lived. Indeed, despite the continuing war with England, in a letter to Charles II in 1673 the States General still constructed England as a Protestant ally, concerned about the 'Protestant Religion' and the 'eminent danger . . . [to the] safety of Christendom'.[58] Although Protestant discourse still infused the documents issued by the States General, the main thrust was steeped in an emerging discourse of Universal Monarchy. It was clear that France was a 'danger both to Europe and the Protestant religion', whereas England was a potential ally rather than a foe.

This recasting of England as an ally, despite the war, thus implied a Universal Monarchy Discourse, rather than the Republican Two Kings Discourse. There was no formal published reply to the short French declaration of war, but in November 1673 the States General published a lengthy rebuttal to the English declaration of war.[59] The reason may very well be that negotiations for peace with England were in progress and that an English public needed to be convinced.

In his declaration of war of 1672 against the United Provinces, Charles II had complained about the Dutch for their 'ungrateful Insolence, that they should contend with Us about the Dominion of these seas'.[60] Louis XIV as well had complained about the 'Treatment so unsuitable to the great Obligations which his Majesty and the Kings his Predecessors have so liberally heaped upon them'.[61] Charles referred to Dutch commercial expansion overseas and the way in which the Republican regime had treated his nephew the Prince of Orange. A large portion of the official response of the States General was dedicated to a point-by-point response to English charges. There was no getting around the fact that England had attacked the Dutch Republic unjustly in 1672. There was some liberal discourse, with the States General arguing the 'justice of our arms'.[62]

However, Orangists were able to develop an alternative identity construction, in which Charles was being detached from the two kings. The 'Court of England' and the 'ministers' were constructed as enemies and allies of French universal monarchy because 'of their secret intrigues with the French, and the connections they had with that Crown'.[63] All the time the 'English nation' had remained a natural ally because of the 'sacred bond of the same religion' as well as 'joint interest'.[64] Universal monarchy had been the root cause of all the problems. Because of the English king's 'ministers [who] had different ideas', England had fallen for the strong 'persuasions of the French'. The 'greatness of France' jeopardized the 'Peace in Christendom'.[65] It was God who had 'miraculously blocked

the designs of our enemies'.[66] The king must now choose between the 'true interest of the nation' and the 'artificial or creative idle notions and pretexts of several evil people' who had caused the war. Orangist discourse thus developed a triple identity discourse with relation to England: the English nation was an ally, but the ministers were servants of French universal monarchy. The King of England needed to break free from his ministers and pursue a right course of action.

Foreign Policy Discourses in Popular Publications

The declarations of war and the Anglo-French assault, as well as the Orange revolution, caused an unprecedented flood of pamphlets. According to Michel Reinders, some 1600 pamphlets were published in 1672.[67] For Republicans, it was particularly difficult to position themselves in the debates, as their leaders were being held responsible for the disaster. One of the cornerstones of De Witt's policy was his belief in the Triple Alliance, which had dramatically collapsed in 1672. The only feasible discursive option for Republicans in 1672 was to trumpet the theme of betrayal by England and France. Thus, although pamphleteers continued to use Peace and Commerce Discourse, the thrust of their argument was based on Two Kings Discourse. Domestically, however, the Republicans tended to restrain anti-Orangist discourse, probably because the Prince could not be held responsible for the disaster and criticism might backfire. Ingmar Vroomen has shown how a Republican critique of William of Orange was almost absent in 1672.[68] This is important because Republicans had the difficult task of masking their identity but still conveying their opinion. In other words, pamphlets that do not seem partisan at first glance may still adopt Republican discourse.

This is the case for *Unfaithfulness of the English*, an anonymous pamphlet responding to the English declaration of war. The author, 'J.V.H.' defines himself as a 'patriot of the fatherland', often a covert description of a Republican. Of course care has to be taken here, as Orangists also appropriated this term.[69] However, the thrust of the pamphlet is largely in line with Republican discourse, even if the author studiously avoids mentioning either the Prince of Orange or John de Witt. He defends Dutch foreign policy in the aftermath of the Second Anglo-Dutch War and thus implicitly the regime of De Witt. His line of defence is articulated in liberal discourse and focuses on English betrayal, in line with the Republican notions about the untrustworthiness of kings in general and

Charles II in particular, but also of the English people. *Unfaithfulness of the English* states: 'The English nation, when they have designs in the making, know how to present wondrous things . . . to justify their actions, as became clear from the hostile and unfaithful procedures of Captain Holmes in conquering Cabo Verde.'[70] The pamphlet starts off with the statement that 'Among all sorts of governments no one leads to more terrible slavery than that which is dependent on the will of a single governor'.[71] By way of illustration, he mentions a set of vices that are in line with those mentioned in the work of De la Court: a prince's 'passions', 'lust for governing', 'unholy perjury' and 'breaking of bonds'. This Republican discourse was aimed at the King of England but may very well be seen as an indirect reflection on the Prince of Orange. A second Republican mark is the categorical rejection of war, either just or unjust, because war is always incited by pride, which the author attributes to Charles II and his ministers.[72] The pamphlet refers to the 'damage of war and the ruin to commerce'.[73] In line with Two Kings Discourse, the author criticizes the breaking of treaties, which was unjust and shameful. He refers to the Old Testament, in which Israel was forbidden to break a treaty, even with pagan kings.[74]

Echoing De la Court, the author argues that 'the interest of England is generally considered to be the conservation of commerce'. The English therefore have a 'maxim' to become 'embroiled' with the state once in a while.[75] The author continues with a lengthy argument on the sovereignty of the sea, claimed by England in the declaration. He is critical of 'princes, favourites' but also of 'the English nation' for the 'fraternal war'.[76] He confirms the importance of 'self-interest' but argues that there is an overriding concern, which is to jointly oppose 'a house [that] openly goes the road of the universal monarchy'. I have argued that Republicans did not employ Universal Monarchy Discourse. Although the term is mentioned in this pamphlet once, there is no sense of Universal Monarchy Discourse at all elsewhere in the pamphlet. I have also argued that Republicans did not employ Protestant discourse. Although the author quotes profusely from the classics and the Bible, he does not foster a specific Protestant foreign policy discourse related to France or England.[77]

A similar argument was developed by the author of *The untarnished White, or the goal of Holland's true interest*, a response to the Orangist pamphlet *Several considerations on the present situation* by the preacher Jacobus Borstius. The title of the pamphlet refers to the innocence of John de Witt [white]. It was published after the lynching of De Witt and not only

defended his domestic and foreign policy but also Republicanism in general. It was violently opposed to the pamphlet of Borstius which was 'loaded with seditious theses and discourses' in which regents and members of the states were accused of being 'traitors and perjurers'. He is, the author argued, a self-professed proponent of 'liberty' and the prince of Orange, but is in effect neither.[78] It is remarkable to see, then, how restrained the pamphleteer is on the princes of Orange, although in the context it would be imprudent to harshly criticize William III. He admits that the princes of Orange have committed themselves to the best interest of the Dutch Republic; indeed he is positive on William the Silent, 'founder of liberty', but in particular praises Oldenbarnevelt for his 'unfailing loyalty' and being a 'defender of liberty', a 'faithful patriot'. He is neutral on Maurice but criticizes his religious policy ('which grieved many good patriots'). He is positive on Frederick Henry, especially because of his military enterprises, but criticizes his 'ambition'.[79] All changed, however, with William II, and he accuses the author of *Consideration* who 'scratches open the wound applied to liberty in the year 1650'.[80] In this manner, he is able to discretely criticize the foreign policy of the princes of Orange without being openly anti-William III. The princes of Orange are constructed as ambitious would-be monarchs, very much in line with De la Court.

The author continues with an analysis of Republican foreign policy and cannot but praise the vision of De Witt and others; 'everyone now tastes the fruits of their heritage of liberty'; he lauds the raid on Chatham, Cornelis de Witt and the Triple Alliance. In short, he concludes, the period between 1650 and 1672 (the stadtholderless period) was 'blessed and enriched', all thanks to the 'most faithful patriots of the land'. The cornerstone of the foreign policy story of 1672 is the construction of England as unreliable. It has 'broken' the Triple Alliance and is therefore 'perjurious'.[81] Whereas Borstius argued that Republicans are to blame, not the King of England, this pamphleteer argues that the King of England considers himself not tied to 'oaths, laws or prohibitions'. The suggestion by *Considerations* that the Republican ministers of state are to blame for offending the English ambassadors is an 'ill-reputed and fabricated lie'; this 'Libellist is a fame-robber', not just of the Dutch Republic but also of its (Republican) 'foremost ministers'. He is more 'English, French than Prince'. He argues that the King of France has been 'more faithful' than the King of England for not having broken his word.[82]

Interestingly, Republican discourse thus aimed its arrows at the King of England, rather than the King of France. The *Elaboration and notes*, a

comment on the Orangist *Several considerations*, complains about the 'pride of the King [which] will come to the fall'. The war is caused by the King of England and the 'haughtiness of several noblemen'.[83] In its temporal construction of the Dutch Revolt, England is charged as well as France. Like *Unfaithfulness* it emphasizes the 'unfaithfulness' of the Duke of Anjou, but it portrays the Earl of Leicester as 'ambitious'.[84] It mentions the 'glorious ambition' of Charles II and condemns the economic warfare of France, but focuses primarily on the 'unfaithfulness . . . broken bonds'.[85] Its anti-English discourse is firmly rooted in Grotius and his views on just war.[86] If there is such a thing as universal monarchy, one should look at England, rather than France. Connecting the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars, he observes, 'It is true that the glorious ambition of the King of England has ever been great to such an extent that he has claimed the dominion of the sea'.[87] De Witt's foreign policy was sound; it is rather Charles's ambition one should blame for the war. The author ends with an appeal to unity of the provinces, but never mentions the Prince of Orange.

Republican discourse thus trumpeted betrayal from the King of England, and to a lesser extent the King of France. There is a marginal reference to treason from within in *Untarnished White*, but the identity construction of Orangists as traitors was difficult to sustain or prove.[88] Only *Liberty disturbed* was strongly anti-Orangist, arguing that elevating William would lead to 'disturbed liberty'.[89] This pamphlet profusely uses liberal discourse warning against the Orange–Stuart connection. It speaks of 'faithless allies' and fears 'foreign slavery' and 'tyranny'. 'Why do you urge me with these Orange cords? Why do you make yourselves slaves of that House?' Central to Republican discourse was the notion of liberty from tyranny, from either foreign or domestic princes. But most pamphlets shy away from an explicit anti-Orangist stance. Thus Two Kings Discourse did not embrace classic Republican anti-stadtholderly notions.

The temporal identity construction of France and England in the Two Kings Discourse is also interesting. Both Charles II and Louis XIV claimed that the Dutch had been unfaithful by turning against them. After all, in the time of dire need, the Dutch Revolt, the Kings of England and France had come to their rescue. The Dutch needed to counter this claim. The Duke of Anjou, brother to the King of France, who was brought in by the Dutch as sovereign in 1581, had been 'unfaithful' by assaulting Antwerp, abusing his power. It was God who rescued the Dutch from the 'threat of slavery', and the author concludes that 'from ancient days sovereignty has resided in the States of each province'.[90] Nor could England justify its

claim to the role of protector of Dutch liberties, considering the 'ambitious designs' of the Earl of Leicester in 1587 in the United Provinces.[91] Much emphasis is placed on the King of France breaking treaties, being unfaithful. The British likewise, according to the *Concise Response*, 'break peace and vows, and join in with the Frenchman and the Turk'.[92]

Almost none of these pamphlets are openly Republican. And yet they put forward a nuanced defence of De Witt's foreign policy, couched in Republican discourse. They develop a consistent argument based on the identity construction of the Kings of England and France as 'unfaithful', in effect a liberal version of the Two Kings Discourse. It was their only recourse. Since the foreign policy of De Witt was sound and bringing the Dutch Republic safety and prosperity, the disaster could be explained only in terms of treason. It is noticeable that there is an implicit defence of Republican pro-French policy in that the *Untarnished White* was relatively mild on France. As in De la Court's writings, 1650 is regarded as a key year, which is a clear temporal marker for Republicans, although William III is not portrayed in a negative manner. It is, however, the ethical identity construction which lends credit to a justification of Republican foreign policy: kings cannot be trusted. This holds true for Charles II as well as for Louis XIV. Therefore, forging alliances is never sound policy. The very fact that the Dutch Republic has fallen through treason and 'breaking of bonds' confirms the fundamental notion of De la Court that one cannot hope to be safe through alliances. It is self-reliance which is vital.

Orangist pamphleteers had a field day. They could demonize Republican foreign policy in the wake of the 1672 disaster. Nevertheless, they still had to explain their pro-English stance in the context of Charles's declaration of war. Orangist discourse took a decisive turn in the late 1660s. It drew from the liberal and Protestant discourse of the Eighty Years' War and after, but changed direction under the influence of Lisola's *Buckler of State* (1667). Whereas the Dutch had constructed Spain as a universal monarch during the Eighty Years' War, by the late 1660s a decisive shift had taken place in which France became the new universal monarchy. Lisola's book was translated into English and in Dutch, and therefore the concept of French universal monarchy was well entrenched in Dutch political discourse on the eve of the Franco-Dutch war.[93] Like Valckenier, who explicitly paid tribute to Lisola in his *Europe in turmoil*, Dutch authors adapted the concept of universal monarchy for a Protestant public (Lisola was a Catholic).[94] Arguably, therefore, French Universal

Monarchy Discourse was imported but merged seamlessly with Dutch anti-Spanish discourse from the Eighty Years' War.

An example of the imported shift to French Universal Monarchy Discourse is *Goldmine of France*, a German pamphlet by Gerard van Wassenberg translated into Dutch in 1672. It describes France as a 'proud' kingdom which does not wage an 'honourable war' but became great by 'tricks and deceit'.[95] It uses gold to influence the German principalities, 'corrupts courts and buys them off'.[96] The temporal construction of France as deceitful ever since the Middle Ages was also used by Valckenier.[97] Wassenberg's pamphlet argues that France had 'the monarchy as an objective, and the single-headed dominion, striking fear in all the rest of Europe'. It alludes to the apocalypse by paraphrasing a verse from an epistle of the apostle Peter about Satan, describing France as 'a roaring lion, [that] walketh about, seeking whom he may devour'.[98]

Anti-French Universal Monarchy Discourse was also picked up in 1672 by Dutch Orangist pamphleteers. The author of *Position of justice and the right of war*, a satire on Louis XIV, almost literally copied the title of Lisola's work. He argues that France 'robs its people of their possessions', 'forcing its subjects into another religion' and wages war openly or 'through treason'. He reiterates the themes of 'justness' and 'just war', and sees a Catholic international conspiracy to crush Protestantism. He is pro-Orange and criticizes the pro-French regents.[99] William III himself, well-acquainted with Lisola, probably commissioned a series of English pamphlets, *England's Appeal* (1673, three volumes), which introduced Universal Monarchy Discourse in England in an attempt to sway English public opinion against France.[100] The pamphlets also appeared in Dutch in 1673. The first issue argues that France's natural resources have 'blown pompous thoughts into her for centuries'.[101] It warns that Parliament was shocked to hear 'that English interest was melted in the golden pot of France's lust for dominion . . . to the demise of the whole of Europe and the Protestant cause'.[102] As early as the time of Charlemagne the French had endeavoured to establish an empire. No sooner had the Peace of the Pyrenees been concluded 'or [France] again entertained notions of the establishment of an Empire, if possible more solid and on a stronger foundation than before [. . .]'.[103] The third part of *England's appeal* speaks of 'how treacherously the Crown of England has begun with selling England's privileges, laws and customs to the pride of France'. Moreover, it points to the 'decision to destroy the Protestants and help establishing the Roman religion.'[104]

Calvinist pamphleteers employed a specific Protestant version of the Two Kings Discourse. The *Considerations* tapped into the Second Israel discourse by regarding the Dutch Republic as a special enterprise of God who had often saved it from disaster.[105] Calvinists criticized Louis XIV but were also outspoken in their criticism of Charles II. The 1650 pamphlet by the Zeeland minister Maximiliaan Teellinck, fiercely anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic, was republished in 1672, with France taking the role of Spain. The Gouda minister Jacobus Sceperus likewise argued that France had replaced Spain as a kingdom striving for universal monarchy.[106] Calvinists were critical of Charles, and preachers like Sceperus compared both the Kings of England and France with Pharaoh or with *The Chaldeans and Babylonians* enslaving the people of Israel.[107] The author of *Considerations* criticized Charles's 'ambitious designs' for 'unlimited dominion', difficult to understand for a 'defender of the faith'![108] The Dutch did not need to be thankful for English support, on the contrary. Thus *Considerations* complained of 'the trickeries and ambitious designs of the Earl of Leicester'.[109] On the other hand, Sceperus thought Charles redeemable and appealed to God to 'Open the eyes of the King [of England], so that he sees and notices the service he does in this war to the papacy'.[110] But Sceperus also appealed to the English people: 'This should find its way into the hearts and minds of our neighbours, friends, brothers . . . and religious allies in England, to stop this pointless, useless and unjust war and struggle amongst brothers',[111] England and Holland being 'those two strong pillars of Reformed Christendom'.[112] As the author of the *Considerations* had it: 'We do not wage war with the nation, but with your king, and his courtiers.'[113]

Most Orangist pamphleteers, however, took Universal Monarchy Discourse as a point of departure. *Considerations*, a mildly Orangist Calvinist pamphlet, is critical of Charles indeed, but mainly complains of Louis XIV and his 'design formed to extend the posts of his territory as far as his ambition is extended'.[114] According to the author of *Simple burgher's conversation*, the King of France longs for expansion, the King of England and his courtiers for bounty.[115] Still, the real culprit in most pamphlets is the King of France, who is presented as a triumphant conqueror, 'challenging his brother-in-law's imperial crown', but 'pride often . . . comes to the fall'.[116] *Considerations* alludes to France's 'desire' which was 'bridled' by the Triple Alliance.[117]

Many pamphlets did not explicitly trumpet a partisan stance, but I argue that they still conformed to the Orangist or Republican foreign policy

discourses as have been established above. A broadside *On the declaration of war of the kings of France and England against the United Provinces*, for instance, was a response to both declarations of war. In scathing rhyme it inquired as to why England (in Dutch literally 'angel-land'), that 'demon-realm, has received the name of angel-land'?[118] *On the declaration* is critical of Charles as the 'unfaithful' King of England, which is significant for one who claims to be the 'Defender of the Faith'.[119] Charles stands 'on the stage of your beheaded father, and play the role of betrayer of soul and land'.[120] But it pities his subjects who are his victims. The thrust of the pamphlet utilizes Universal Monarchy Discourse: France, 'full of triumph on his victorious chariot' making 'conquests'. England is a 'mercenary of the French'.[121] As such it largely follows mainstream Orangist discourse.

Ostensibly the same is the *Concise response from England and France of a demon and three demonesses*, a broadsheet, in which England and France are criticized in vitriolic rhyme. It referred to the English people as the 'angels from hell'.[122] References were also made to the character of the English rooted in an older identity construction of Englishmen as 'tail-men'.[123] It presents demons that persuade France to wage war again and who complain about the Triple Alliance. But it does not use Universal Monarchy Discourse at all and criticizes the King of England as 'master of the sea'. [124] For all intents and purposes it could have been published by a Republican during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. If there is a universal monarch, it is England, rather than France, which is typical for Republican discourse.

The Orangists needed to counter the Loevestein accusations that the princes of Orange were like kings and that there was no essential difference between William III and Louis XIV. To the *Considerations*, 'our free government [is] an enemy of tyranny and tyrannies' in which the Prince of Orange is the 'conserver of our liberty'. The author emphasized the necessity of unity and is pleased that the 'subject of division' is gone since 'we now see a descendant of the great William heading our army'. The Prince is a 'great instrument of our precious liberty'. In this sense, as well, *Considerations* was only mildly Orangist, intent not on demonizing De Witt but persuading his adherents. Its criticism of True Freedom is restrained. The author complained about the divisions of the past and exhorts the regents to be wise. But he did not criticize the foreign policy of the De Witt regime specifically and indeed defend the Triple Alliance of 1667.[125]

Orangist Protestant discourse also took an inward turn. 'Truly, we have deserved God's wrath', the author of the *Considerations* writes. We must return to 'the frugality and humility of our ancestors', he exhorts.[126]

Indeed, the author shows 'how often the Republic, after she had been rescued by God's hand from its desperate situation, had shaken and shivered, either by an enemy from outside, or confusion within'.[127] What follows is a confessional analysis of the political history of the Dutch Republic. The author argues that the Dutch Republic 'has shone so brightly that one may not say without reason that God Almighty is the exterior and visible Architect of this exalted republic'.[128] Indeed, God had 'lifted us up from below to a State which for some time has attracted jealousy because of her prosperity'.[129] Even if it was true that the French and English were like ungodly Babylonians and Chaldeans who deserved punishment, it was also true that God used their armies to punish the Dutch for their sins.[130] Sceperus for instance, quoting from the prophet Micah, states, 'if it pleases God to have us assaulted by France and England, then it suits us to say: we will bear the Lord's wrath, because we have sinned against Him'.[131]

Medicines for Holland's illnesses likewise presents Holland as sick, ravished by corruption, decadence, faction struggles, love of luxury and libertinism.[132] The author abhors tolerance towards Arminians, Cartesians and Socinians. The regents have 'cleansed the city councils and other councils of the government of everything that smelled orange'. Thus one pamphleteer argued that the government 'has been poisoned and blinded by the Loevestein faction'.[133] Many thought the enemy within constituted an unholy alliance of Loevesteiners and Arminians. By referring to all those who were not clearly in the Voetian camp, the opponents were constructed as Arminians, and by association therefore, traitors – as they had been in 1618. It raised the spectre of the struggles during the Twelve Years' Truce between Orangists and Republicans. According to one pamphleteer, the party of De Witt is called 'the Arminians', and he argued that they were willing to support the French in 1672.[134]

Such identity constructions of Republicans as unholy traitors were countered by Republicans. According to one pamphleteer, the Voetian preachers were Orangists and were attempting to blacken all those who opposed them: 'the preachers, who are the lesser part of the blood of Holland, and who have been educated in the Genevan and Voetian School, have developed a hatred against other denominations. Those two, the preachers and the noblemen, form the Prince faction, and they call everyone who see their evil practices and oppose them Loevestein faction . . . and traitors of their country.'[135]

The important innovation of Orangist discourse in 1672 is the welding together of the new French Universal Monarchy Discourse with

traditional anti-Republican discourse. It resembled accusatory language about the Twelve Years' Truce, when Grand Pensionary Johan van Oldenbarnevelt was tried for selling out the Dutch Republic to the Spanish. Orangists now accused the Republicans of being receptive to the designs of France. *Several considerations*, for instance, by Borstius, raged that 'French gold has blinded the eyes of the Batavians'. It also constructed the Republicans as capable of doing anything to bar the Prince of Orange: 'they would have rather sold Holland in the service of France than restore his highness and belong to the English party.'[136] Another pamphlet was savage on De Witt's foreign policy, referred to the conspiracy of the Perpetual Edict (1667) and complained about the 'terrible and doomed treachery' which aimed 'to make us and our children slaves and clients of France'.[137] *Considerations* attributed the disaster to the Dutch being 'sinners', was critical of the regents and regarded William as a 'great instrument of our precious liberty'.[138] In short, Orangists identified the Republicans as traitors against the Dutch Republic and agents of French universal monarchy in a decisive shift of discourse employed since the late 1610s.

Conclusion

Despite the massive attention of Dutch historians, 1672 still lacks a consistent narrative that does justice to the invasion and the Orange revolution as well as international relations, and which functionally connects the Third Anglo-Dutch War to the Franco-Dutch War. The current interpretations of 1672 are largely realist in nature in which France and England invade the Dutch Republic for strategic and economic reasons. The emphasis of most narratives is primarily on domestic politics. Most historians agree that partisan issues were of minor concern, either in domestic or foreign policy, and local factional politics was central.

The findings of this chapter suggest several modifications to the existent image. First of all, the entanglement between domestic and foreign identity constructions need more emphasis than in existing historiography. Both political correspondence as well as pamphlets profusely connected the existence of parties to the position of the Dutch Republic in international context. Republicans presented themselves in France as a safeguard against English influence, whereas Orangists constructed Republicans as betrayers and identified themselves as natural allies of Charles II. Dutch historians have understandably argued that some of these constructions were very much at

odds with political reality, but this chapter has made clear that these were integral elements of the discourses. How Orangists and Republicans were perceived abroad is highly relevant for international politics.

I also argue that foreign policy documents can be classified as either Republican or Orangist, even if they did not ostensibly choose sides in the partisan debate. The Republican foreign policy story had a distinct flavour and drew from both realist and occasionally liberal discourses. In the correspondence of De Witt it was strongly realist, constructing the Dutch state as aloof, guarding her own 'interest', obliged to do only what was 'necessary'. At the same time De Witt was aware that the Dutch state might be in jeopardy, and he also started to develop a sense of 'common interest', opening the possibility for an international alliance with, for instance, Spain. Republican Peace and Commerce Discourse was invalidated after the invasion, and therefore Republican pamphlets primarily used Two Kings Discourse. Whereas the Dutch Republic had been faithful and abided by existing treaties, the kings had broken their word by invading the Dutch Republic. There is no sense that Louis XIV is worse than Charles II. The problem for Republicans was that they were thus unable to maintain a consistent foreign policy story.

Orangist discourse, on the other hand, recognized Louis XIV as the main culprit even before the invasion. Orangist diplomats already spoke of the designs of France at German courts and suspected its aspirations. Universal Monarchy Discourse was also picked up by pamphleteers in 1672, in translated pamphlets but also in home-grown productions. They rejected Two Kings Discourse in constructing Charles as an ally of William III. Universal Monarchy Discourse identified the English court as a victim of French intrigue. If Charles would only see his real interest, he would break his ties with France. On the road to peace in late November 1673, therefore, the States General not only countered the accusations in the English declaration of war, but focused also on the danger of French universal monarchy. By the time Valckenier wrote his *Europe in turmoil* in 1675, Orangist discourse had matured; it connected traditional anti-Republican sentiments with the rise of universal monarchy, a discourse that was also capable of identifying England as a potential ally. This was radically different from the Republican anti-English, neutralist discourse focused on self-interest.

Calvinist discourse formed a distinct section; it consisted of a Protestant version of Two Kings Discourse in which both Louis XIV and Charles II were accused of trying to bring down the Second Israel.

Notes

1. J.C. Boogman, 'Achtergronden, tendenties en tradities van het buitenlands beleid van Nederland (eind zestiende eeuw – 1940)', in N.C.F. van Sas, ed., *De kracht van Nederland. Internationale positie en buitenlands beleid* (Bloemendaal 1991), 21.
2. H. Rowen, *John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland 1625–1672* (Princeton 1978), 389, 394; J.R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century* (Harlow 1988), 186; C. Wilson, *Profit and power. A study of England and the Dutch wars* (Cambridge 1957), 11 ff.
3. With the notable exception of P. Geyl, *Orange and Stuart 1641–1672* (London 1939). Cf. D. Onnekink, 'The ideological context of the Dutch War (1672)', in D. Onnekink and G. Rommelse (eds), *Ideology and foreign policy in early modern Europe (1650–1750)* (Farnham 2011).
4. P. Sonnino, 'Louis XIV and the Dutch War', in R. Hatton, ed., *Louis XIV and Europe* (London/Basingstoke 1976).
5. J.I. Israel, *Dutch primacy in world trade 1585–1740* (Oxford 1990), 295.
6. Wilson, *Profit*, discussed only the first two wars.
7. Jones, *Anglo-Dutch wars*, 9, 179; cf. W. Troost, *William III, the Stadtholder–King: a political biography* (Aldershot 2005), 68ff.
8. S. Pincus, 'Republicanism, absolutism, and universal monarchy', in G. Maclean, ed., *Culture and society in the Stuart Restoration. Literature, drama, history* (Cambridge 1995), 244–245; Claydon, *Europe and the making of England*, 132–152. Cf. G. Rommelse, *The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667). International raison d'etat, mercantilism and maritime strife* (Hilversum 2006).
9. J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness and fall 1477–1806* (Oxford 1995), 796 ff.
10. Quoted in Troost, *William III*, 87.
11. Willem van der Goes to Adriaan van der Goes, 24 January 1672, C. J. Gonnet, ed., *Briefwisseling tusschen de gebroeders van der Goes (1659–1673)* (vol. II, Amsterdam 1909), 339.
12. John to Cornelis de Witt 11 March 1672, R. Fruin and N. Japikse, eds, *Brieven van Johan de Witt vol. 4 1670–1672* (Amsterdam 1913), 285.
13. John to Cornelis de Witt 11 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 285.

14. John to Cornelis de Witt 11 March, 13 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 288, 292.
15. John to Cornelis de Witt 11 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 288.
16. John to Cornelis de Witt 11 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 286.
17. John to Cornelis de Witt 13 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 292.
18. E.g. John to Cornelis de Witt 11 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 287.
19. E.g. John to Cornelis de Witt 17 March, 29 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 298, 303.
20. John to Cornelis de Witt 17 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 296.
21. John to Cornelis de Witt 11 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 289.
22. Pieter de Groot to John de Witt 1 January 1672, R. Fruin and N. Japikse, eds, *Brieven aan Johan de Witt vol. 2* (Amsterdam 1922), 579.
23. John de Cornelis de Witt 17 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 294.
24. Rowen, *De Witt*, 767.
25. Troost, *William III*, 72.
26. Johan Boreel to John de Witt 2 January 1672, Fruin, *Brieven aan De Witt*, 589.
27. Adriaan to Willem van der Goes 11 February 1672, Gonnet, Briefwisseling, 343.
28. John to Cornelis de Witt 8 March 1672, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 280.
29. Rowen, *De Witt*, 766–767.
30. Gerard Hamel Bruynincx first used the term 'universal monarchy' in May 1673, letter to Hendrik Fagel 11 May 1673, G. von Antal and J.C.H. de Pater, eds, *Weensche gezantschapsberichten van 1670–1720* (2 vols, The Hague 1929–1934), vol. I, 62, 63. William himself used the term first in 1678: W. Troost, '"To restore and preserve the liberty of Europe". William III' ideas on foreign policy', in Onnekink and Rommelse, *Ideology*, 291.
31. Quoted in M. van der Bijl and H. Quarles van Ufford, eds, *De briefwisseling van Godard Adriaan van Reede van Amerongen en Everard van Weede van Dijkveld (27 maart 1671–28 juli 1672)* (The Hague, 1991), 21.
32. Amerongen to Dijkveld 25 December 1671, in Bijl, *Briefwisseling*, 87.
33. Caspar Fagel to William III 1 July 1672, N. Japikse, ed., *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck, Eersten Graaf van Portland* (5 vols, The Hague 1927–37), vol. XXVI, 57–58.
34. Bruyninx to States General 31 January 1672, Antal, *Gezantschapsberichten*, 34.
35. Bruyninx to Hendrik Fagel, 5 May 1672, Antal, *Gezantschapsberichten*, 37.
36. Claydon, 'revolution'.
37. Bruyninx to John de Witt 10 December 1671, Antal, *Gezantschapsberichten*, 29, 30.
38. Antal, *Gezantschapsberichten*, xii.
39. Bruyninx to John de Witt 10 December 1671, Antal, *Gezantschapsberichten*, 27.
40. John de Witt to Johan Boreel 20 November 1671. Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 204.

41. Justus de Huybert to Constantijn Huygens 4 August 1672, 31 December 1672, J.A. Worp, ed., *De briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens (1608–1687) vol. VI 1663–1687* (The Hague 1917) 308, 318.
42. Godard Adriaan van Reede van Amerongen to Everard van Weede van Dijkveld 9 October 1671, Bijl, *Briefwisseling*, 62.
43. Amerongen to Dijkveld, 16 October 1671, Bijl, *Briefwisseling*, 69.
44. Instruction for Sylvius, January 1672, Japikse, *Correspondentie*, vol. XXVI, 41.
45. Amerongen to Dijkveld 9 October 1671, Bijl, *Briefwisseling*, 62.
46. Amerongen to Dijkveld 24 May 1672, Bijl, *Briefwisseling*, 155.
47. Caspar Fagel to William III 1 July 1672, Japikse, *Correspondentie*, vol. XXVI, 58.
48. Onnekink, 'The ideological context'.
49. John de Witt to Adriaan Paets, 13 December 1671, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 219.
50. John de Witt to Pieter de Groot 10 December 1671, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 178.
51. Pieter de Groot to John de Witt 8 January 1672, Fruin, *Brieven aan De Witt*, 582.
52. John de Witt to Pieter de Groot 10 December 1671, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 178.
53. Pieter de Groot to John de Witt 8 January 1672, Fruin, *Brieven aan De Witt*, 581.
54. N. Japikse, ed., *Notulen gehouden ter Staten-vergadering van Holland (1671–1675) door Cornelis Hop . . . en Nicolaas Vivien* (Amsterdam 1903), entry 19 January 1672, 14.
55. John de Witt to Pieter de Groot 10 December 1671, Fruin, *Brieven van De Witt*, 177.
56. *Brief van d' . . . Staten Generael van den 10 December 1671 . . . aenden Koninck van Vranckrijck* (1671) (Knuttel 9946).
57. *Brief van de . . . Staten van Zeelandt, aen de . . . Staten van Hollandt . . . 29 Juny 1672* (1672) (Knuttel 10135).
58. *Missive van de Staeten Generael . . . aenden Koninck van Groot Brittannien . . . 19 December 1673* (1673) (Knuttel 10900), 7–8.
59. *D'Antwoort van de Staten Generael . . . op de declaratie van oorlogh* (1673) (Knuttel 10844).
60. *His Majesties declaration against the States General of the United Provinces of the Low Countries* (1672), 6.
61. *The Most Christian Kings declaration of war against the States-General of the United Provinces* (1672), 1.
62. *D'Antwoort*, 3.
63. *D'Antwoort*, 30.
64. *D'Antwoort*, 3.

65. *D'Antwoort*, 30, 31.
66. *D'Antwoort*, 31.
67. M. Reinders, '*Printed pandemonium. The power of the public and the market for popular political publications in the Early Modern Dutch Republic' (*PhD thesis Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2008), 20.
68. I. Vroomen, 'Taal van de Republiek. Het gebruik van vaderlandretoriek in Nederlandse pamfletten, 1618–1672' (PhD thesis Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2012), 220.
69. We do not know who I.v.H. was, but Knuttel pamphlet 9954, written by a 'I.v.H.' is clearly Orangist. According to Michel Reinders the author of *Trouloosheyt* also employs Universal Monarchy Discourse, but it is very marginal or used in a very general manner and not directly related to France. '*Printed pandemonium', 161.*
70. 'I.v.H.', *Trouloosheyt der Engelsche*… (1672) (Knuttel 10019), 5.
71. 'I.v.H.', *Trouloosheyt*, 3.
72. 'I.v.H.', *Trouloosheyt*, 3.
73. 'I.v.H.', *Trouloosheyt*, 4.
74. 'I.v.H.', *Trouloosheyt*, 9.
75. 'I.v.H.', *Trouloosheyt*, 6.
76. 'I.v.H.', *Trouloosheyt*, 4, 5 20.
77. 'I.v.H.', *Trouloosheyt*, 20.
78. *Het onbevleckte wit, of het doel van Hollandts ware intrest*… (1672) (Knuttel 10230), 3.
79. *Onbevleckte wit*, 4–6.
80. *Onbevleckte wit*, 1.
81. *Onbevleckte wit*, 9.
82. *Onbevleckte wit*, 9, 10.
83. *Verbreydinge en aenteyckeninge op de Consideratien over den tegenwoordigen toestant*… (1672) (Knuttel 10013), 17.
84. *Verbreydinge*, 6, 7.
85. *Verbreydinge*, 11, 15.
86. *Verbreydinge*, 13.
87. *Verbreydinge*, 15.
88. *Onbevleckte wit*, 9.
89. *De gestoorde vryheyt* (1672) (Knuttel 10294).
90. *Verbreydinge*, 6.
91. *Verbreydinge*, 7.
92. *Bondigh bescheyt uyt Engelandt en Vrankryk. Van een duyvel en dry duivelinnen*… (1672) (Knuttel 10024), no pagination.
93. Franz-Paul Lisola, *Verdediging van staat en gerechtigheid* (1667) (Knuttel 9928).

94. P. Valckenier, *Verwerd Europa ofte polityke en historische beschrijving der waare fundamenten en oorzaken van de oorlogen en revolutiën in Europa, voornamentlijk in en omtrent de Nederlanden, sedert den jare 1664, gecauseert door de gepretenteerde Universele Monarchie der Franschen…* (1675), 68–9; C-É., Levillain, *Le procès de Louis XIV. Un guerre psychologique. François-Paul de Lisola, citoyen du monde, ennemi de la France (1613–1674)* (Paris 2015), 307.
95. G. van Wassenberg, *De goutmyn van Vranckryck…* (1672) (Knuttel 10028), 7.
96. Van Wassenberg, *Goutmyn*, 3.
97. Van Wassenberg, *Goutmyn*, 10; D. Onnekink, 'Pride and prejudice: Universal Monarchy Discourse and the peace negotiations of 1709–1710', R. de Bruin et al., eds, *Performances of peace: Utrecht 1713–2013* (Leiden 2015).
98. Van Wassenberg, *Goutmyn*, 12; 1 Peter 5:8.
99. *Positie van de gerechtigheyt en het recht van oorloge…* (1672) (Knuttel 10002), 2–7.
100. Levillain, *Le procès*, 276, 277. Pincus, 'Republicanism'.
101. *Engelandts appel en beroep van de secrete cabale of vergaderinge te Withall, aen en op den grooten raedt van de natie…* (1673) (Knuttel 10913), 5.
102. *Tweede deel. Engelandts apel en beroep aen en op de gemeente…* (Knuttel 10917), 3.
103. *Engelandts appel*, 5, 9.
104. *Derde deel. Engelandts apel en beroep aen en op de gemeente* (1673) (Knuttel 10918), title page.
105. *Consideratien over den tegenwoordigen toestant…* (1672) (Knuttel 10009), 5.
106. J. Sceperus, *De Chaldeen en Babylonieren onder de voeten van den Koninck aller koningen…* (1673) (Knuttel 10958), 40.
107. Sceperus, *Chaldeen*.
108. *Consideratien*, 13.
109. *Consideratien*, 6.
110. J. Sceperus, *Tweede gebedt tot Godt, om hulpe teegens de geweldige krijghsmachten der koningen van Vranckijck en Engelandt* (1672) (Knuttel 10243), 6.
111. Sceperus, *Chaldeen*, 46.
112. Sceperus, *Tweede gebedt*, 6.
113. *Consideratien*, 29.
114. *Consideratien*, 34.
115. *Eenvoudig burgerpraatje, over een boekje, genaamt consideratien over den tegenwoordige toestant van het vereenigde Nederland* (1672) (Knuttel 10014), 4.

116. *Over de declaratie van oorlogh der koningen van Vranckryck en Engelandt, tegens de geunieerde staet* (1672) (Knuttel 10005).
117. *Consideratien*, 10.
118. Over de declaratie.
119. Over de declaratie.
120. Over de declaratie.
121. Over de declaratie.
122. Bondigh bescheyt.
123. *Bondigh bescheyt*. Cf. Meijer Drees, *Andere landen*.
125. *Consideratien*, 10, 31–34.
126. *Consideratien*, 32.
127. *Consideratien*, 5.
128. *Consideratien*, 3.
129. *Consideratien*, 4.
130. Cf. J. Stern, 'A righteous war and a papist peace; war, peace and religion in the political rhetoric of the United Provinces 1648–1672', in D. Onnekink, ed., *War and religion after Westphalia 1648–1713* (Farnham 2009).
131. Sceperus, *Chaldeen*, 32.
132. *Geneesmiddelen voor Hollants qualen. Vertoonende de quade regeringe der Loevesteinse factie* (1672) (Knuttel 10377).
133. Quoted in P. Geyl, *Democratisch tendenties in 1672* (Amsterdam 1950), 30.
134. *Two letters: The one from a Dutchman to his correspondent in England; the other an answer from the said correspondent* (1673), 8.
135. Quoted in Geyl, *Tendenties*, 57.
136. *Verscheyde consideratien*, 10.
137. Quoted in Geyl, *Tendenties*, 41.
138. *Consideratien*, 32, 33.

CHAPTER 4

The Nine Years' War (1688–1697)

Abstract In this chapter, David Onnekink analyses foreign policy discourses at the start of the Nine Years' War (1688–1697). Historiography has emphasized the strategic aim of William III in 1688 to redress the balance of power, endorsed a secular realist paradigm of French expansionism and downplayed the relevance of political parties. In this chapter, Onnekink compares three categories of primary sources: political documents, formal published documents and popular publications. He argues that the two partisan foreign policy discourses of 1672 continued to develop. Republicans ignored domestic differences and rehashed their traditional Two Kings Discourse that became deadlocked in 1688. Orangists developed Universal Monarchy Discourse and Religion and Liberty Discourse and ignored the balance of power.

Keywords Nine Years' War · Foreign policy · Dutch Republic · Louis XIV · William III · Universal monarchy

Introduction

One of the most remarkable aspects of the historiography of 1688 is the relative lack of interest among Dutch historians. Although there has been some attention for the 'glorious expedition', Dutch foreign policy on the eve of the Nine Years' War and the Glorious Revolution

© The Author(s) 2016

D. Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95136-9_4

lacks a scholarly monograph.[1] Moreover, in general overviews on Dutch foreign policy this era is almost passed over.[2]

Nevertheless, several articles have discussed the Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution, which developed five alternative interpretations. The first interpretation is strategic. According to Simon Groenveld, William's intervention in England can be explained by a desire to restore the balance of power in Europe by turning England into an ally against France.[3] A second view was proposed by Jonathan Israel, who drew attention to the impact of the French *guerre de commerce* as a cause for war, in addition to strategic considerations.[4] A third interpretation was put forward by Lucille Pinkham, who argued that William fought for the English throne. Although her interpretation has found no support, there have been other historians who have emphasized the dynastic dimension of 1688.[5] A fourth view was defended by Stephen Baxter and Andrew Lossky, who argued that William safeguarded the liberties of Europe.[6] Finally, Murk van der Bijl and other historians presented William as a champion of Protestantism.[7] It seems safe to say that the first, strategic, interpretation is dominant, and that the others have been invalidated, rejected or marginalized by historians. Peter Rietbergen probably voiced a consensus view that:

> the only political issue that really counted for William was the equilibrium of Europe, the freedom of the European states – first and foremost of the Dutch Republic. Freedom, that is, from any form of hegemony which might threaten political and religious autonomy. Because the main threat to that autonomy was France, and, through it, state-dominated Catholicism, Protestantism became an issue as well – though, perhaps, to William a slightly more collateral one.[8]

The primary paradigm of interpretation for the Glorious Revolution and the start of the Nine Years' War is thus a realist one. This is also the case for historians who worked on French foreign policy, although they present an important corrective to Dutch historiography. John C. Rule and Geoffrey Symcox have questioned the paradigm of French expansion altogether. Symcox has shown how French strategy in the late 1680s was essentially defensive, concentrating on building fortresses rather than enlarging armies. The League of Augsburg, concluded in 1686, was considered a hostile move. Rule as well emphasized the fact that France felt threatened and encircled by enemies in 1688.[9]

The Nine Years' War (1688–1697)

The Peace of Nijmegen of 1678/1679 concluded the war between France and the Dutch Republic, but there was a strong sense in Europe that France continued her ambition to expand by means of the *réunions*, territorial acquisitions claimed on historical and legal grounds. However, the balance of power seemed to shift with the 1687 Habsburg victory over the Ottomans at Mohacs, allowing the Emperor to turn his attention westward. The succession disputes that arose in Cologne and the Palatinate in the late 1680s rekindled the great Bourbon–Habsburg contest for European dominion, as did the establishment of the anti-French League of Augsburg in 1686. The rise of religious tension added to the dangerous situation. In 1685 the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which made Protestantism in France illegal, and the accession of the Catholic King James II in England alarmed the Dutch Republic and raised the spectre of an anti-Dutch alliance in the vein of 1672. There was suspicion that Louis XIV was supporting James II in England to establish absolutism and Roman Catholicism on a French model. However, rising tensions between Habsburg and Bourbon, the two Catholic great powers, made it unlikely that the coming conflict would be of a confessional nature.

A combination of three unrelated succession crises sparked the war in 1688. In Cologne, the sickly Prince-Bishop Maximilian Heinrich von Wittelsbach was incapable of ruling. In January 1688, a coadjutor, Wilhelm von Fürstenberg, had been appointed who effectively took charge of the administration. However, Fürstenberg was widely seen as a French puppet, and his position was contested behind the scenes by foreign – including Dutch – diplomats. The Pope, in dispute with Louis XIV over the Gallican church, refused to confirm Fürstenberg. When the bishop died in June 1688, the Pope was unlikely to appoint Fürstenberg as successor. Both France and the Holy Roman Empire braced for war. In August 1688, Brandenburg sent an army into Cologne, which prompted a response from France in the Palatinate. The Elector Palatinate, Karl von Simmern, had died in May 1685. He was succeeded by the anti-French Philip Wilhelm von Pfalz-Neuburg, but Louis XIV disputed his right and claimed the elector's hat on behalf of his sister-in-law, the Duchess of Orleans. In September 1688 a French army besieged Philippsburg, which held out until October. In the wake of this victory, the French occupied large parts in the south of

the Palatinate. In response, the Emperor and a number of German princes declared war on France, thus effectively starting the Nine Years' War.

Meanwhile, in England the position of James II became untenable. His Catholicism had been problematic even before his accession and had led to a deadlock between Charles II and his Parliament in 1679 and its dissolution in 1681. In this light, the accession of James in 1685 went surprisingly smoothly. However, by 1687 relations between James and the political nation had soured. Moreover, the pregnancy of his wife, Mary of Modena, opened the prospect of a Catholic dynasty. Hitherto James was expected to be succeeded by his Protestant daughter Mary, but the possibility of Catholic male heir changed the situation dramatically. These two issues spiralled out of control in June 1688. James had wanted to achieve toleration for his co-religionists by issuing a Declaration of Indulgence, to be read from the Anglican pulpits. When seven prominent Anglican bishops petitioned against this, they were arrested and brought to trial on 8 June 1688. Anti-Catholicism was further stirred by the birth of a male Catholic heir, James Francis Edward, on 10 June. On 30 June, seven prominent noblemen sent an invitation to William III, an interested party because of the claim to the throne of his wife Mary, to come over and aid the English nation in peril.

By then, preparations for an intervention were already in progress. William had been acquiring funds to finance an expedition to England, and sounded out key Dutch politicians for support. But they were confronted with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, they believed in the possibility of a repetition of 1672. If James and Louis were plotting an invasion, a pre-emptive strike would make sense, especially if there was support in England for an invasion. On the other hand, should there be war, a French army would likely again invade the Netherlands, in which case it would be irresponsible to send out an army to England, rather than defend the southern borders. It is not known when the final decision was made, but when it became clear in September that France had diverted its attention and invaded the Palatinate, William felt safe taking his army to England.

On 10 October, William showed his cards by publishing a *Declaration*, in which he explained his reasons for invading England. For the sake of 'Religion and Liberty', he came to mediate between the king and the nation. A fleet of some 300 vessels and 15,000 crack troops crossed the Channel, unopposed by the English fleet, forced to keep in port because of

contrary winds. The fleet landed in Torbay on 5 November. A slow march to London enabled English volunteers to join the army. Confronted by the invading army and treason within the ranks of his own forces, James fled the country in December. Between December and February a self-appointed Convention discussed the situation. Had James abdicated, and if so, who would succeed him? In February Parliament offered the crown to William and Mary. In response to the French declaration of war in November 1688, the Dutch issued a declaration of war in March 1689, followed by England in May, thereby formally engaging England and the Dutch Republic in the Nine Years' War against France. In September 1689 England, the Dutch Republic and the Emperor concluded the Grand Alliance against France.

Foreign Policy Discourses in Formal Published Documents

The autumn of 1688 saw an official trialogue between England, France and the Dutch Republic, reflecting on the complex international relations, mediated through government publications of diplomatic letters and resolutions. The focus was primarily on England and Cologne, rather than the Palatinate. On 9 September 1688, the French ambassador D'Avaux handed over a memorial to the States General, warning them to refrain from interference in English domestic affairs. He suggested that Louis would take it very ill should the Dutch take any hostile actions towards England; 'the bonds of friendship and the alliance he has with the King of Great Britain, would...oblige him to come to his rescue'. Moreover, an invasion of England would be regarded as an 'open rupture' with France and a 'manifest breach of peace'.[10] This memorial was of monumental importance because D'Avaux constructed Louis and James as close allies, raising the spectre of repetition of 1672. D'Avaux also presented a second memorial that same day, in which he threatened the Dutch against intervening in Cologne. Louis vouched that he would 'maintain' Fürstenberg 'against all who would trouble him'.[11]

The official publications are set in the context of frantic diplomatic negotiations that autumn, in which both England and France presented the Dutch Republic as warmongering. The French minister Croissy told the Dutch ambassador in Paris, Willem van Wassenaar-Sterrenburg 'that the armament of the State, both at sea as on land, alarmed all their neighbours' and that the Dutch must have 'a design on England or on France.

That they wanted to start the most cruel and unjust war against the King of England that was ever heard of'. Wassenaar dismissed Croissy's arguments. It was not the States General that alarmed their neighbours but the King of France 'who came down the Rhine with his army, and had so many troops along the frontiers of the state, which occupied the bishopric of Cologne'. Was it any wonder, Wassenaar asked, that the Dutch prepared to defend themselves, 'in order not to find themselves in the same predicament as in the year 1672, which was still fresh in their memory?'[12]

The English ambassador in The Hague, Ignatius D'Albeville, as well feared a Dutch intervention. However, he believed the threat of the French 9 September memorial was counterproductive. There was no actual alliance between England and France, and the mere suggestion could cause an uproar in Parliament. D'Albeville vehemently countered the notion of an Anglo-French understanding and condemned the threats Louis had made towards the Dutch.[13] On 14 September the States General declared to D'Albeville that they had no intention of waging war on 'the king and his people'.[14] On 16 October, the States General acknowledged that they were now convinced there was, after all, no alliance between France and England.[15]

However, in the official documents that followed that autumn, it was precisely this construction of the conjunction of the Kings of England and France bent on destroying the Dutch liberties and religion that dominated public discourse. The *Reasons for parting* is a short document relating the speech of William of Orange in the States of Holland on 26 October 1688, the eve of his departure. He argued that his 'objective [is] to work for the honour of God, the well-being of our Fatherland and of the Christian religion' and 'to relieve her of the fear of her neighbours, and to tone down the tyrannical pride of some, and to stabilize our liberty, and also religion'. In short, he was concerned about the 'interest of the state and of the church'.[16]

The *Resolution* of the States General of 28 October follows the 26 October *Reasons for parting* and explains why the States General 'assist' William III in his expedition to England. It makes a sharp division between 'the English nation' and the king on religious grounds, since James, advised by 'the evil counsel and induction of his ministers', had tried 'to suppress her liberty and ruin the Protestant religion through the introduction of the Roman Catholic religion'.[17] Moreover, there was a real danger, as the 'kings of France and England were connected through a very good

intelligence and friendship', indeed had established a 'close and particular alliance'. Both kings, 'because of interest of state, and hatred of the Protestant religion . . . will tear down this state'.[18] Both in internal English affairs as well as with regard to the position of the Dutch Republic, the emphasis is on the maintenance of the Protestant 'religion and liberty' in both states. It stops short of speaking of a religious war, since emphasis is put on the fact that William is not anti-Catholic, but it does suggest that there is a war against the Protestant religion impending. It thus rests on an identity construction of James and Louis being united in their efforts to crush Protestantism. There is, however, no reference at all to Europe as a whole, although there is one single reference to the 'common good of Christendom'.[19] The emphasis on the alliance between James and Louis precludes universal monarchy language. There is no suggestion that James has been bought by French gold, but there is the suggestion that the English court has provided evil counsel. This is the Protestant version of Two Kings Discourse, rather than Universal Monarchy Discourse. Nor is there any language in the documents that is in anyway related to balance of power or balance of Europe; 'interest of state' hardly figures in the document.

This is important because it has often been suggested that the slogan William used in his *Declaration*, 'for the Protestant Religion and Liberties of Europe', was really propagandist and used for an English audience only. Henk Slechte strongly suggested that the propaganda was for make-believe only, hiding the 'real' motives of William.[20] According to Jonathan Israel as well, William's *Declaration of Reasons* with its emphasis on religion was disingenuous and concealed his real purpose, which was to make allies of Spain and the Emperor in order to establish an international alliance.[21] But the theme of 'Religion and Liberty' is widespread in Dutch documents and matches the discourse employed in both the *Resolution* as well as the *Reasons for parting*, which focus on the danger of James and Louis to Dutch liberties and religion. Moreover, although it is true that the *Declaration* focused primarily on England, it is easy to overlook that it also specifically referred to the Dutch situation. In the *Declaration* it is suggested that the threat from England resembles the situation of 1672, 'when the States General of the United Provinces were Invaded in a most injust warre'.[22]

But although Orangists employed a Protestant version of Two Kings Discourse to justify the invasion of England, by the autumn there were also signs of a re-emergence of Universal Monarchy Discourse. The Dutch declaration of war against France of 1689 is often passed over by historians but is an essential addition to the series of documents. It was issued on 9

March 1689 in response to the French declaration of November 1688. Since England was now an ally, Two Kings Discourse had evaporated, even if the document is centred around a temporal construction of 1672; the war of 1688 is connected to the French invasion of the Netherlands in 1672. The declaration provides a short summary of events which serve to justify the armament of the Dutch as a 'necessary precaution' against the 'designs of the King of France against this state'. The discourse echoes that of the 1673 declaration because of its emphasis on injustice. The invasion of France in 1672 was undertaken 'without just cause'. The Dutch defended themselves in 1672 against 'such injust violence'. The declaration recalls the 'cruel actions of the French which are unheard of' in 1672. Unlike in the 1673 declaration there are also signs of Universal Monarchy Discourse. France has tried 'to lure us into sleep . . . with sweet words and solemn assurances'. We must prepare ourselves against France's 'evil designs and machinations'. There is a noticeable concern for 'navigation and commerce', but it is enclosed in an emerging Universal Monarchy Discourse. France had a 'design' on the Dutch Republic. It tried to weaken the state, 'so that it would be ruined in its commerce, navigation, fishery and finance, and could easily be taken'.[23]

However, the thrust of the argument of the declaration of war is not couched in Universal Monarchy Discourse but in what I call Religion and Liberty Discourse, a Protestant-liberal discourse focusing on the defence of religion and liberty, which ties in well with the Protestant Two Kings Discourse. The Dutch Republic identifies itself as a Protestant, even more specifically Reformed state. The Prince of Orange has defended 'true reformed religion, liberty and the dear fatherland'. There is frequent reference to 'religion and liberty'. This religion pertains to the 'true reformed religion' and is also connected to the 'cruel persecutions' of 'those of the Reformed religion' in France.[24] The language is, however, surprisingly introspective. Religion and liberty are not explicitly linked to Europe; there is indeed no reference to Europe or Christendom at all, only the religious ties with Huguenots are emphasized. Nor is there any reference to a European balance of power or is France described as a threat to the peace of Europe. The focus is solely on the Dutch Republic.[25]

Foreign Policy Discourses in Political Documents

The emphasis on 'Religion and Liberty' also figured prominently in the debates in the States of Holland, initially in the context of the Protestant Two Kings Discourse. On 29 September 1688 the Grand Pensionary

reported that William III 'had considered the state of affairs, both of the religion and the liberty and well-being of the state, both of which are in a perilous condition'. That it was 'evident that the Kings of France and England both were planning to suppress, if possible, the Reformed religion'. He warned of the 'attempt of the Kings of France and England to ruin us, both with great zeal for the Catholic religion'.[26] In France, Louis XIV had 'annulled one of the most fundamental laws of the realm, which had served to end the civil war in France, namely the Edict of Nantes, and everyone knew how he had treated those of the Reformed persuasion. That the King of England was no less zealous for the popish religion, and had tried to [establish] it in his realms.'[27] The States fully accepted William's analysis and took a secret resolution to support William in his invasion of England. 'There was no doubt as to the intentions of both esteemed kings, to subvert both the Reformed religion as well as the state'. The States emphasized the 'very close connection' between the Kings of England and France. In short, 'not just the state, but the entire Reformed community' was in jeopardy.[28] The outlines of this international confessional conspiracy were also explicitly articulated by Caspar Fagel in a speech in the States of Holland on 26 October. According to the Grand Pensionary, 'the records of the year 1672 have clearly shown that the condition of God's church since some time after have been very sorrowful; and that it was meant to extirpate us once and for all'.[29]

This Protestant discourse was shared by a number of diplomats in the field, but had a more distinctly European flavour. Petrus Valckenier, for instance, author of *Europe in turmoil* and now agent in the Empire, repeatedly reported on the point of view of the 'papists' in the Imperial Assembly in Regensburg, who 'hoped for a good success of the designs of the King of France' with the result 'that their religion would be on the throne again in England, and that the same will occur in our state eventually'. The Dutch would soon feel the consequences; they would be assaulted in order 'to annihilate the nest of heretics, as they call our state'.[30]

Protestant discourse avoided the explicit notion of religious war whilst maintaining the image of danger to the Protestant religion by employing 'the court' as the central identity construction. The resident in Vienna, Gerard Hamel Bruynincx, for instance, constructed the Habsburg court as one in which the Emperor could either follow his 'interest' or listen to his Jesuit advisers and choose to crush Protestantism. He could either ally with the Dutch Republic or choose to side with France. Bruynincx wrote

alarming messages about the persecution of Protestants in Transylvania and complained that German Protestant rulers see things 'more from the perspective of the world than from God'.[31] But, he argued, this is in the 'province of religion, and not at all political'.[32] The distinction between Catholicism and Jesuit advisers at court is important; it allowed Protestants to maintain fear of a religious war instigated by Jesuits, whilst at the same time believe in the possibility of cooperation with (moderate) Catholics or the Emperor.

The analysis was partly shared by special ambassador Jacob Hop, who wrote in November 1688 about the efforts of 'several eager Roman coreligionists at the court, who have been enticed by the clergy to make the expedition to England of your highness suspect'. Moreover, the Emperor had been encouraged 'to establish a good relationship and close connection with France and England, which was largely supported by the interest of the Roman religion'. These efforts were countered, Hop argued, through William's letter in which he showed moderation about Catholicism in England; William promised that 'Catholics will not be persecuted'. But unlike Bruynincx, Hop was convinced that for the Emperor 'interest' of state prevailed. The Emperor would never try to prevent a Dutch invasion of England 'because England is . . . attached to France'. As such, Hop did confirm the notion that England and France were bound together.[33]

Religion was also an important theme amongst Catholics. The King of France had called upon Catholic princes to support his war against the heretical Dutch Republic and England. Although the King of Spain and the Emperor did not heed his call, they must have been sensitive to the suggestion 'that the design of His Highness the Prince of Orange would be the effect of a league of Protestants rulers and princes for the destruction of the Roman religion'. A secret resolution of the States General of 22 November 1688 shows that the Dutch realized they must counter the charge.[34] To Hop's mind the allegation was nonsense, but it had to be dealt with.

From England, the Protestant discourse was fed by the Dutch ambassador Arnout van Citters, who sketched an image of the Stuart court as being torn between the 'most violent' Catholics, including the Jesuit Father Peter and the 'moderate Catholics', who were either in favour of or against a French alliance.[35] However, Citters himself did not employ a specifically Protestant discourse and did, moreover, not believe in an Anglo-French understanding.

Nor did the ambassador in France, Van Wassenaar-Sterrenburg, who like Hop, rarely used Protestant discourse. Even in the turmoil of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the correspondence of Wassenaar remained factual and descriptive. Nor did Wassenaar construct France as dangerous or bent on war with the Dutch Republic. In France he needed to counter the accusation of the French minister Croissy, who argued that the Dutch either 'had designs on England or on France: that they were preparing the most cruel and unjust war against the King of England that was ever heard of'. Croissy assured Wassenaar that there was 'no alliance' between France and England. Wassenaar argued that the militarization of the Dutch was for 'security and commerce of her inhabitants' and that the state was wary 'not to come into the similar unfortunate circumstances as in 1672, which were still fresh in their minds'.[36]

Orangists also regarded the transnational implications of such confessional alliances. Hans Willem Bentinck, special ambassador for William III, met Paul Fuchs, the representative of the Elector of Brandenburg, in August 1688. The Dutch needed Brandenburg military support to cover their military campaign to England. Bentinck argued that it was clear that Louis XIV and James II were trying to subvert the Protestant religion in England. They would do so in the Dutch Republic as well, leaving the German Protestant princes helpless. Bentinck argued that the Austrian Jesuits concurred with these plans.[37] Should aid not come, 'everything will be lost', he wrote to Johan Ham, the Dutch envoy in Berlin. The Dutch simply had to intervene in England or 'the Republic and religion are lost'.[38]

William's private correspondence yields little information since it is mostly of an operational nature, but there is evidence of liberal discourse. To his confidant Dijkveld he wrote in December 1688: 'It is a great blessing that we have achieved so much in such a short time. God shows His mercy in this, and that through a Parliament these realms may be made useful in order to assist our State and her allies.'[39] In several letters there is also evidence of the 'religion and liberty' theme. In a letter to Gastañaga, the Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, he stated '*que mon intention n'est nullement d'aller détrôner le Roy d'Angleterre, ny d'extirper les Catholiques Romains qui sont dans ces royaumes*'. However, he continued, '*je me trouve obligé en honneur et en consience d'y aller maintenir les subjets dans leur loix et religion, et procurer une liberté de conscience selon les loix*'. The Westphalian settlement thus allowed William to fight for religion and liberty without causing a religious war.[40] Remarkably, William

used neither balance of power discourse nor Universal Monarchy Discourse, even though sparse references to balance of power can be discerned in his earlier correspondence.

Religion and Liberty Discourse was certainly distinct from, but tied in well with a Protestant version of Universal Monarchy Discourse. Unlike Universal Monarchy Discourse, however, it was able to justify the invasion of England, placated Huguenots in Dutch service and had the capacity to put pressure on German Protestant princes for fear of a resurgent Catholicism in Vienna.

In comparison, Republican discourse was surprisingly meagre. The main opposition to the invasion of England and the Nine Years' War came from Amsterdam. The burgomasters faced a dilemma. They were unwilling to support William in starting a war and did not believe France had the capability to start one on its own. They could take their cue from the reassuring correspondence of Wassenaar. However, one burgomaster warned D'Avaux in late July 'that if any disturbance should arise about the affairs of Cologne, or any other place, it would not be in their power to prevent the consequences'.[41] Moreover, there is little evidence of the commercial or pacifist language traditionally employed by the Republicans. Rather it seems that the forceful Religion and Liberty Discourse overwhelmed them. D'Avaux believed that although the Amsterdam burgomasters expressed concern about their trade, 'the preservation of peace was now no longer the sole motive that determined their resolutions; that the article of religion swayed them most'.[42]

But obviously William's grand strategy met with little enthusiasm among Republicans. The crucial aspect of 1688 domestic relations is not that the Prince of Orange and the Republicans reached consensus, because they did not. Rather, I argue, Republican discourse reached a deadlock. Throughout the 1680s, the Republicans had steered a neutral course of appeasement. This was the whole rationale of their foreign policy. By 1688 this rationale failed them. Of great importance are the deliberations of the four burgomasters of Amsterdam. On 26 September, Johannes Hudde, Nicolaas Witsen, Johan Appelman and Cornelis Geelvinck met to discuss the speech of William in the States of Holland. The private notes of Hudde reveal discussions on intervention in England. The discussions opened with the analysis that the burgomasters were clueless as to what decision to make, but felt strong pressure from the unified advice from The Hague to concur with the Prince. In their view it was clear 'that we are unable to block this enterprise', and should they not consent they would earn the

wrath of the Prince, most of the Holland cities, the preachers and the people. It was decided that Amsterdam would consent to William's request for support on condition that he gives full details as to what sort of assistance was needed. Hudde's personal considerations about the affair are revealing. What factors, he asked, would weigh against supporting the Prince? First of all, 'if it failed!', what to do then? Moreover, there was a real chance that invading England would result in war, and there was uncertainty as to which allies the Dutch could expect to support them. Given the deteriorating financial position, the decline of fortifications and the decreasing profits from trade and industry, poverty would only become worse in case of war. Lastly, if the Prince of Orange were abroad, who would be here to lead the army? On the other hand, Hudde reasoned, it was clear that the 'King of England intended to overpower us for two reasons: political and ecclesiastical . . . that they only wait for a good opportunity . . . which appears from what they have done, and said'. Moreover, if an intervention by William would succeed, 'the Protestant religion and our state will both seem to be secured'.[43]

Hudde's argument was consistent with the Republican Two Kings Discourse, but he was unwilling to draw the conclusion that intervention was necessary. He was unable to come to a decision: 'these considerations bring me to very great perplexity'. Hudde and presumably his colleagues were swayed by the pressure from the States of Holland and the Prince as well as the inclinations of the people, 'which are very clear; therefore I would argue that it would be better to consent to the request of His Highness, rather than not'. After all, Hudde concluded, the expedition would take place anyway, and if Amsterdam would not support it, it would only be blamed should the operation fail, in which case Amsterdam would become very isolated. Burgomaster Hudde argued that it was to be expected that France would intervene in England. Moreover, a Dutch intervention would incite a French declaration of war. Should, he argued, the invasion succeed, all will be well. If the affairs would fail because the King of France would lend assistance, at least that would create a diversion.[44] However, this was precisely why Nicolaas Witsen was extremely reluctant to support William. Whereas Witsen agreed that the threat of France was great, he pointed to the tradition in Dutch foreign policy of self-defence. The Eighty Years' War, he argued, was essentially a war of self-defence. But now the Dutch were about to start a war, one that would actually provoke a declaration of war. This, Witsen argued, was a revolution in foreign policy, and he would prefer to wait and leave the matter to Providence.[45]

Foreign Policy Discourses in Popular Publications

The years 1688 and 1689 witnessed a flood of pamphlets, although many fewer than in 1672. There has been relatively little research into this phenomenon.[46] Emma Bergin was the first to show a remarkable emphasis on religious arguments in the pamphlets. Significant as well is the fact that both the invasion in England and the declaration of war appeared uncontroversial. I have not been able to find a single pamphlet that condemned the invasion of England or the war with France. It is only in 1690 that serious opposition against William III surfaced in a series of pamphlets in relation to a dispute between Amsterdam and the Earl of Portland, the favourite of William III. These, however, contain classic Republican arguments against the stadtholderate in the vein of De la Court, but say next to nothing about the war with France.

Pamphlets circulating before or during the Glorious Revolution were overwhelmingly religious in nature and played on the theme of a Jesuit conspiracy between the courts of England and France. As such they clearly matched the 1672 Protestant Two Kings Discourse. At the same time, they fostered the image of French aspirations for universal monarchy. *The English herring baked on a French grill*, for instance, plays primarily on the first theme.[47] It is fiercely anti-Catholic, rages against the 'Roman cursed beast', and constructs Louis XIV in the wake of Nantes as a 'cursed Tyrant' who is labouring 'to destroy the true church of Christ entirely'. 'Loyola's spirit' and his disciples want to enthrone 'Babylon's whore'.[48] It discusses the efforts of Father Peter in England and Father La Chaisse in France to crush true religion: Europe will soon be brought 'under the Roman seat and the power of the Pope' by 'La Chaise and Peters'. The international Jesuit conspiracy is central here. This pamphlet was published in the summer of 1688 after the birth of the Prince of Wales, the 'bastard' of Father Peter.[49] The events in England concerning the birth of the Prince and the imprisonment of the bishops thus formed the context of vitriolic anti-Catholic pamphlets. They also drew from events in France caused by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Thus pamphlets reminded the Dutch of 1672 and exemplified the Protestant Two Kings Discourse. This was highly suitable rhetoric to justify an invasion of England, probably more so than Universal Monarchy Discourse as it fostered a sense of urgency and emphasized independent agency of the King of England.

Universal Monarchy Discourse gained a boost from the unleashing of French troops in the Palatinate in September but nevertheless predated

French military action. The *Spirit of France* was probably written in the spring of 1688. It is not so much the international Jesuit conspiracy that is central here, but universal monarchy. It speaks of the government of France which rests on 'buying and bribing, its golden louis are the passports which open the gates for his conquests'. It refers to its 'dominating spirit', and shows how Louis aspires to be 'supreme monarch of Europe'. The lengthy pamphlet identifies 'the spirit of France' through a series of 'maxims with regard to Europe in general', and systematically shows how Louis XIV has operated in relation to individual states. It warns James to beware and mind the English interest; he should not become a 'puppet of the French king'. The author does refer to 1672, but sees France as the sole cause of the war. England is constructed as an ally who had been seduced by France in 1672 to wage war on the Dutch Republic. Fürstenberg is identified as a 'dangerous and restless man controlled by France' whose actions enable France to increase its influence and make its way to 'the throne of the European Monarchy'.[50]

By the autumn of 1688, Universal Monarchy Discourse dominated Dutch pamphlets, rather than the Protestant Two Kings Discourse, especially when the invasion of England was already in progress and war with France became imminent. In a pamphlet responding to the French declaration of war in November 1688, the author speaks of the 'designs of the all-enforcing Louis XIV'.[51] Another pamphlet, *The humiliation of France foretold*, likewise speaks of the French attempt 'to obtain the universal monarchy', which it had aspired to for forty years. Louis XIV had 'taken the French monarchy up to a high point of honour'. Moreover, 'this king has filled not just Europe but all parts of the world with rumours of his victory', and one can only marvel at the 'wondrous additions to his greatness'.[52] The dominance of Universal Monarchy Discourse over the Protestant Two Kings Discourse is important, as it was more consistent with Orangist discourse in 1672. As such there was a large degree of discursive stability. Even so, the clear difference was that the 1688 pamphlets infused Universal Monarchy Discourse with a far greater amount of Protestant discourse.

Orangist pamphleteers thus not only constructed identities of France and England that justified war against France but also made intervention in England necessary, legitimate and urgent. In response, Republicans were overwhelmingly silent. Emma Bergin, who has done extensive study of Dutch pamphlets published in 1688 and 1689, found no Dutch pamphlet that criticized the invasion of England. There were, however,

two foreign pamphlets circulating in the Dutch Republic that did. One was a Jacobite pamphlet, entitled *The Prince of Orange his Declaration: Shewing the Reasons why he invades England*.[53] The pamphlet printed the *Declaration* and replied to it.[54] A copy of the pamphlet is in the collection of the Royal Library in The Hague. Possibly the pamphlet circulated publicly in the Netherlands, but it is also possible that someone got hold of just one copy. However, another pamphlet, *Avis donne a . . . le Prince d'Orange*, also in the Royal Library, did circulate for sure and must have had an impact, as it was forbidden by the Hof van Holland in March 1689.[55] According to Bergin, it is therefore legitimate to ask whether this pamphlet might have reflected a section of Dutch public opinion.

Whilst it is possible to suggest that Republican pamphlets were suppressed, I do not think this very likely, for during a constitutional crisis involving Amsterdam and William III one year later, in 1690, the Dutch public was flooded with venomous anti-William pamphlets. It could be argued that the Republicans in 1688 were caught by surprise by the quick sequence of events, but this is unlikely as well. From the summer of 1688 tensions had been rising, and Orangist pamphleteers already flooded a Dutch public with anti-French and anti-James pamphlets; there was plenty of time for Republican authors to come up with an alternative. I also consider it highly unlikely that Republicans simply agreed with William's foreign policy, given their outspoken hostility in 1690. I therefore argue that they were confronted with a discursive deadlock. The 1672 discourse the Republicans employed, the Two Kings Discourse, was one of betrayal. Charles II and Louis XIV had broken their word; the Dutch had been deceived, but the Republican regime was not to blame. It was quite possible in 1688 to sustain this line of reasoning. Indeed, Republicans could re-identify James II as a successor to Charles II who had scandalously betrayed John de Witt. The problem was, however, that such an identity construction worked for interventionist Orangists, but deadlocked Republican policy discourse, which was based on trust and treaty, reason and neutrality. For the Republicans to maintain this foreign policy discourse, what steps would have to be taken? Discursive stability with 1672 could have been maintained, but would have emphasized a defensive stance. In the face of the alarming rhetoric of the Orangists and the accumulation of crises in Europe, neutrality may have seemed a chimera in 1688. But one can only speculate. Whatever the reason, Republicans were absent in the 1688 pamphlet debate. By November 1688 it was too late anyway. The spectacular success of William's invasion made any

criticism of the Prince futile and Republican discourse unconvincing. Moreover, when France declared war that same month, any moderate discourse with regard to France was bound to fail.

This interpretation gains credibility when the 1689 pamphlets are considered. In the debate Republicans were also remarkably absent, but Orangist pamphleteers did make an effort to include Republican discourse in their pamphlets. These were published in the face of the Anglo-Dutch union established in the spring of 1689 through the coronation of William III, who was now a de facto leader of both England and the Dutch Republic. There was widespread enthusiasm about William's feat in stemming the danger from James II and bringing England into an alliance with the Dutch Republic. But there were three reasons for Republicans to organize opposition. First, the elevation of William to the throne of England played into the fears of Republicans that William III was, after all, nothing more than an absolute monarch intent on increasing his power in the Dutch Republic as well. Second, as Republicans had been hesitant about the war with France anyway, they now reasoned that William had drawn them into this war. Third, a long history of commercial competition with England heightened their suspicion of the alliance, increased by William's refusal to use his power to crush the hated Navigation Acts, which blocked Dutch ships from trading with England.

Holland's bliss lies in her unity with England is a lengthy Orangist pamphlet published in the spring of 1689. According to G.N. Clark, who studied this pamphlet, it uses commercial arguments to support the alliance with England, but I believe this observation is off the mark.[56] The pamphlet rather develops a Religion and Liberty Discourse and refers to the Glorious Revolution which has 'rescued [England] from slavery of popery' and equals the 'Kings of France and England' with the 'Jesuit fathers La Chaise, and Peter'. The pamphlet opens with the statement that 'religion is of the highest importance'; this assertion is not merely rhetorical: a substantial part of the pamphlet is devoted to earlier religious struggles in Europe. But as in the work of Valckenier the emphasis is on religion as a pillar of the state. The 'unbreakable unity between these provinces and the three said kingdoms' is mainly based on religion. The true reformed religion is the 'axis' of the welfare of the state.[57]

At the same time it develops Universal Monarchy Discourse. It speaks of 'France's unlimited lust for domination', her 'unlimited ambition for ruling' and presents France as the 'all-ruler' of Europe. The French are placing 'border fences [marking] their lust for dominion'. At the same

time it uses realist language when it speaks of the necessity to 'balance France'. As such, it is a typical Orangist pamphlet, which clearly draws from Valckenier, freely mixing 'Two Kings', universal monarchy and realist discourse.[58]

However, I argue that the main purpose of the pamphlet is not so much to defend the war against France, but to draw in the Republicans by integrating a modified Peace and Commerce Discourse. For Clark was right that the author is also concerned with commerce. The author argues that commerce is the 'foremost bond' between England and the Dutch Republic. He tries to persuade the Republicans that naval wars have proved disastrous for both England and Holland. Some say that England and Holland are competitors, but 'the World is wide, and the sea large enough for both Nations'. *Holland's bliss* argues that 'one should always prefer a war on land to a war at sea' because when commerce continues the costs of war can be borne. This is why peace with England is needed. He argues that France had invaded the United Provinces in 1672 to destroy Dutch commercial power. Also referring to 1672, he argues against the Republicans that the Dutch need to find a way of dealing with commerce with England and need to give in to the English demand of the flag, 'they being a Crown and we a Republic . . . we should grant them that honour'. The author is clearly an Orangist and criticizes De Witt, but he still is moderate. He favours the 1668 Triple Alliance and speaks respectfully of De Witt, but argues that he became 'blinded by passion'. All in all, he wants to make sure that he respects the 'great, flourishing trade of Amsterdam'. The Williamite slogan of religion and liberty is incomplete; indeed, he concludes the pamphlet, with the statement that he is concerned with 'Religion, Liberty and Commerce'.[59]

Holland's bliss thus clearly develops an Orangist argument but tries to persuade Republicans. Less conciliatory language is employed by the author of *The happy imminent consequences from the unity and connection between their majesties William III and Mary II . . . and Their High Mightinesses* [the States General]. The author, an Orangist, insists upon the 'necessity' and 'connection of the English and the Dutch'. This pamphlet, however, fully embraces Orangist Religion and Liberty Discourse. It heralds 'reformed religion and liberty' in the Dutch Republic and sometimes speaks rather of 'Protestant religion and liberty'. Like *Holland's bliss* the author refers to 'liberties, religion and commerce' in 1672, but commerce is reflected upon only in passing. The pamphlet is strongly anti-Catholic and refers to the English Civil War and Charles I's

plans to introduce 'popedom' [*pausdom* in Dutch, distinct from popery] in England. It complains about the conduct of the French court over the past years, with its cardinals (Richelieu and Mazarin) and the Jesuits with their 'figments of the mind'. The Jesuits are not just Catholics; 'they are the toughest teachers of the Roman church'. It sympathizes with the Huguenots in France who are being persecuted.[60]

Alongside it employs Universal Monarchy Discourse. A discursive bridge is provided by the statement that there is a relationship between 'Roman and unlimited power'. It is imperative to 'liberate Europe from slavery'. France tries to expand through 'law as well as injust means' and the 'French court' will never be short of 'pretexts to break the most sacred contracts'. Fortunately, we can be assured that 'neither flattery and promises, nor pensions and golden louis will have the power to disarm the Protestant princes'. The French 'court' is accused of striving for 'universal monarchy', and only the 'turnaround of England' has prevented this. The author longs for the 'humiliation of France' and calls for 'extirpation of tyranny and the restoration of the peace of Europe'.[61]

Conclusion

Dutch historians of 1688 have provided several interpretations of the Glorious Revolution and the Nine Years' War, but generally agree on the centrality of the threat to the balance of power in Europe. The Dutch intervened in England to turn her against France. Protestant, ideological or commercial interpretations have generally been sidelined. Domestically, there is a strong sense that parties were absent and that some sort of consensus had been achieved on the eve of the invasion of England.

The chapter has produced results which lead to a recalibration of this interpretation. The most remarkable aspect is the virtual absence of Republican discourse in 1688 in the public sphere. There were no Dutch pamphlets which argued against the war, nor any critical of the Glorious Revolution. It was only in 1690 that domestic opposition to William III would gain ground in an extensive propaganda campaign against the Earl of Portland. However, some foreign anti-war pamphlets circulated. I argue that Republicans were confronted with a discursive deadlock. The suggestions of an alliance between France and England reminded them uncomfortably about the 1672 disaster. England was traditionally constructed as a commercial competitor, but the main issue

was now clearly political. After the Glorious Revolution, traditional anti-English discourse would obviously fail. France was traditionally constructed as an uneasy neighbour, but French foreign policy and commercial warfare soured relations with Amsterdam. In the 1680s Amsterdam followed a policy of abstention, and arguably that policy was continued right up to late 1688. The notes from burgomaster Hudde from Amsterdam do not suggest consensus, but express ‘perplexity’ about the situation. Peace and Commerce Discourse seemed at odds with current threats, and Two Kings Discourse might necessitate intervention. Either way, the virtual absence of relevant sources precludes a conclusion on the nature of Republican discourse in 1688.

The second remarkable finding is the virtual absence of balance of power discourse and the dominance of Protestant discourse. The dominant interpretation of 1688 as a war fought to restore the balance of power finds little resonance in the primary sources. Throughout the summer of 1688, a Protestant Two Kings Discourse and Religion and Liberty Discourse dominated the public sphere, which constructed 1688 as a repetition of 1672: the threat of an invasion of the Kings of France and England loomed large. Much more than in 1672, however, this discourse was infused with Protestant, anti-Jesuit images. These were not so much two unjust kings; they were manifestations of an international Jesuit conspiracy. By the autumn of 1688, however, after the invasion of England, Universal Monarchy Discourse dominated the writings of the Orangists alongside Religion and Liberty Discourse.

In Orangist political correspondence and official publications in connection to the Glorious Revolution Religion and Liberty Discourse dominated. The resolution of the States General emphasized that the ‘kings of France and England were connected through a very good intelligence and friendship’. Based on this identity construction, the Dutch envisaged an immediate threat to their security and took the revolutionary step to invade England. Whilst Two Kings Discourse suited the invasion of England, the war against France necessitated another discourse. Universal monarchy is prevalent as a theme in the correspondence of Orangist diplomats but less so in the formal documents, which almost exclusively focus on the defence of Protestantism. This is not just the case in documents connected to the Glorious Revolution, but also the official declaration of war against France in 1689. Indeed, whereas universal monarchy was a major theme in pamphlets and in correspondence, it is surprisingly absent in official documents which use the Religion and Liberty theme.

Notes

1. But see A. van der Kuil's short *De glorieuze overtocht: de expeditie van Willem III naar Engeland in 1688* (Amsterdam 1988).
2. J.C. Boogman, 'Achtergronden, tendenties en tradities van het buitenlands beleid van Nederland (eind zestiende eeuw – 1940)', in N.C.F. van Sas, ed., *De kracht van Nederland. Internationale positie en buitenlands beleid* (Bloemendaal 1991).
3. S. Groenveld, '"J'equippe une flotte très considerable": the Dutch side of the Glorious Revolution', in R. Beddard ed., *The revolution of 1688* (Oxford 1988); cf. W. Troost, 'De buitenlandse politiek van Willem III en het begin van de Britse evenwichtspolitiek', in R. van den Berg et al., eds., *Jaarboek Oranje-Nassau Museum 2002* (Rotterdam 2003); R. Bastiaanse and H. Bots, *Glorieuze Revolutie* (The Hague, 1988).
4. J.I. Israel, 'The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution' in idem, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment. Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact* (Cambridge 1991); but see P. Dreiskämper, *Aan de vooravond van de overtocht naar Engeland. Een onderzoek naar de verhouding tussen Willem III en Amsterdam in de Staten van Holland, 1685–1688* (Utrecht 1996), 66.
5. L. Pinkham, *William III and the respectable revolution. The part played by William of Orange in the revolution of 1688* (Cambridge Mass. 1969); S.B. Baxter, *William III* (London 1966). Cf. E.H. Kossmann, 'Koning-Stadhouder Willem III', in idem, *Vergankelijkheid en continuïteit. Opstellen over geschiedenis* (Amsterdam 1995).
6. Baxter, *William III*; E.O.G. Haitsma-Mulier, 'Willem III in de geschiedschrijving', in Van den Berg, *Jaarboek*, 22–23.
7. M. van der Bijl, 'Willem III, Stadhouder-koning, pro religione et libertate', in W.F. de Gaay Fortman, ed., *Achter den tijd. Opstellen aangeboden aan dr. G. Puchinger* (Haarlem 1986), 155–182; I. Schöffer, 'Het grote waagstuk. De overtocht van Prins Willem III naar Engeland in 1688', in A.G.H. Bachrach et al., eds., *Willem III, de stadhouder-koning en zijn tijd* (Amsterdam 1988). Tony Claydon has drawn attention to the shift in discourse in which the English in the 1690s fought against the cruelty of persecution, rather than Catholicism per se. Tony Claydon, *William III* (Harlow 2002), 139.
8. P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, 'William of Orange (1650–1702) between European politics and European Protestantism: the case of the Huguenots', in J.A.H. Bots and G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, eds., *La révocation de l'édit de Nantes et les Provinces-Unies* (Amsterdam 1986), 35–36.
9. In Geoffrey Symcox's words, 'The crisis of 1688 overtook the French government': 'Louis XIV and the outbreak of the Nine Years' War' in R. Hatton, ed., *Louis XIV and Europe* (London 1976), 188.

10. Count D'Avaux, *Memorien* 9 September 1688 (Knuttel 12754).
11. D'Avaux, *Memorien*.
12. Wassenaar to Fagel 7 October 1688, Nationaal Archief (NA) (The Hague), 3.01.18 – 217.
13. Ignatius D'Albeville? to Charles Middleton 14 September 1688 OS, British Library (BL), Additional Manuscripts (Add Mss) 41816.
14. Quoted in J. Wagenaar, *Vaderlandsche historie… XV* (Amsterdam 1756), 441–442.
15. D'Albeville? to Middleton 6 October 1688 OS, BL Add Mss 41816.
16. *Redenen van afscheyt van sijn Hoogheyt den Heere Prince van Orange* (1688) (Knuttel 12783), 3, 4.
17. *Resolutie inhoudende de redenen die haer Hooghe Mogende hebben bewogen, om Syne Hoogheydt, in persoon naer Engelandt overgaende, met schepen ende militie te assisteren* (26 October 1688) (Knuttel 12785), 1.
18. *Resolutie inhoudende de redenen*, 4, 5.
19. *Resolutie inhoudende de redenen*, 5.
20. C.H. Slechte, 'Propaganda voor de Prins. Kunst als propaganda, propaganda als kunst', *Boekenwereld* 5 (88/89), 86.
21. Israel, 'The Dutch role', 120–123.
22. *The declaration of his highness William Henry* (1688) (Knuttel 12773), 7.
23. *Declaratie van Oorlogh* (1689) (Knuttel 13092), 1–3.
24. *Declaratie van oorlogh*, 1–2.
25. On the effective relationship between Orange strategy and power of anti-Catholic discourse. Claydon, *William III*, 59.
26. Report of William, presented in the States of Holland on Wednesday 29 September 1688. *Secreete resolutien van de Ed. Groot Mog. Heeren Staaten van Holland ten West-Vrieslandt. Beginnende met den jaare 1679 en eyndigende met den jaare 1696 incluis. Vijfde deel* (n.p., n.d.), 230; Cf. Hudde's notes of the 26 September 1688 meeting of the burgomasters, quoted in J. F. Gebhard, *Het leven van Mr. Nicolaas Cornelisz. Witsen (1641–1717)* (2 vols., Utrecht, 1882), vol. II, 169.
27. *Secreete resolutien*, 230. The original text reads 'supplant', rather than 'establish', which is clearly a mistake.
28. *Secreete resolutien*, 234–235.
29. Deputies to the Amsterdam burgomasters 26 October 1688, Gemeentearchief Amsterdam 5029–5090.
30. Petrus Valckenier to Caspar Fagel, 4 March 1688, NA 3.01.18-284.
31. Gerard Hamel Bruyninx to Caspar Fagel 10 July 1687, Antal, G*ezantschapsberichten*, 382.
32. Bruyninx to 18 September 1687, Antal, *Gezantschapsberichten*, 385.
33. Jacob Hop to William III 25 November 1688, Antal, *Gezantschapsberichten*, 396, 397.

34. Jacob Hop to Hendrik Fagel 12 December 1688, Antal, *Gezantschapsberichten*, 401.
35. Despatch Aernout van Citters 1 October 1688, BL Add. Mss 17677.
36. Willem van Wassenaer to Caspar Fagel 7 October 1688, NA 3.01.18 – 217.
37. M. Grew, *William Bentinck and William III (Prince of Orange). The life of Bentinck, Earl of Portland, from the Welbeck correspondence* (London 1924), 112–120.
38. Hans Willem Bentinck to Johan Ham 20 July 1688, Japikse, *Correspondentie*, vol. XXIV, 132, 133.
39. William III to Dijkveld 19 December 1688, Japikse, *Correspondentie*, vol. XXVIII, 74–75.
40. William III to Marquis Gastañaga, 29 October 1688, Japikse, vol. XVIII, *Correspondentie*, 48.
41. *The negotiations of Count d'Avaux, ambassador from his most Christian Majesty to the States General of the United Provinces* (4 vols., London 1754), vol. IV, 187.
42. *Negotiations*, 180.
43. Gebhard, *Witsen*, vol. II, 168–174.
44. Gebhard, *Witsen*, vol. II, 168–174.
45. Gebhardt, *Leven* I, 326–327.
46. But see E. Bergin, 'The revolution of 1688 in Dutch pamphlet literature: a study in the Dutch public sphere in the late seventeenth century' (PhD-thesis University of Hull, 2006); Slechte, 'Propaganda'.
47. *Den Engelschen bokkum gebraden op een France rooster... door Pater la Chaise en Vader Peters* (1688) (Knuttel 12665).
48. *Engelschen bokkum*, 3–5.
49. *Engelschen bokkum*, 11, 23.
50. *De geest van Vrankryk, en de grondregelen van Lodewijk de XIV aan Europa ontdekt* (1688) (Knuttel 12727), 4, 13, 39, 41, 44.
51. *Korte aenmerkingen over de declaratie van oorlogh door den koningh van Vrankryck tegens haar hoog mog. de heeren Staten Generael der Vereenigde Nederlanden* (1688) (Knuttel 12718), 2.
52. *De vernedering van Vrankryk voorzegt, en uyt haar eigen beleyd beweezen* (1688) (Knuttel 12730), 3.
53. *Declaration of William Henry.*
54. According to Claydon, *Godly revolution*, 27, this was a Jacobite pamphlet.
55. Bergin, 'The revolution', 178.
56. *Hollants heyl, in haar eenigheit met Engeland gelegen* (1689) (Knuttel 13291); G.N. Clark, 'The Dutch missions to England in 1689', *English Historical Review*, 35 (1920), 529–57.
57. *Hollants heyl*, 3–4, 17–35 *passim*.
58. *Hollants heyl*, 6, 10, 18, 22.

59. *Hollants heyl*, 5–9, 11–14, 36.
60. *De gelukkige aanstaande gevolgen uit de unie en verbintenis tusschen haar majesteiten Wilhem de III en Maria de II... en de... Staten Generaal der Vereenigde Nederlanden* (1689) (Knuttel 13293), 10–11, 13, 18, 27.
61. *Aanstaande gevolgen*, 2, 15, 29, 31–32, 35.

CHAPTER 5

The War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713)

Abstract In this chapter, David Onnekink analyses foreign policy discourses at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713). Historiography has emphasized the united Dutch strategic and commercial war aims to redress the balance of power and safeguard Spanish trade and thus endorses a realist paradigm of French expansionism. It has also downplayed the relevance of political parties. In this chapter, Onnekink compares three categories of primary sources: political documents, formal published documents and popular publications. He argues that the two partisan foreign policy discourses of 1672 and 1688 continued to develop. Republicans criticized Orangist policy and used Peace and Commerce Discourse to argue against the war. Orangists ignored the balance of power and developed an explicitly secular version of Universal Monarchy Discourse.

Keywords Dutch Republic · War of the Spanish Succession · Foreign policy · International relations · Universal monarchy

Introduction

Dutch historians have generally presented the War of the Spanish Succession in natural sequence to the Nine Years' War and argued that the Dutch had no choice but to confront France. Olaf van Nimwegen believed that William III 'could obviously never allow' the French in the

© The Author(s) 2016

D. Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95136-9_5

Spanish Netherlands.[1] There was no break in the direction of foreign policy after the death of William III in March 1702, two months before the start of the war.[2] Johan Aalbers argued 'that Heinsius and his associates had no choice during these years' but to fight a continental war in the face of the 'bitter reality of the French danger'.[3] In light of this obvious danger, most historians have also emphasized national unity. In the absence of opposition, the government waged a war that could count on national support. Amsterdam conducted 'a truly national policy', Johanna Stork-Penning stated.[4] Pieter Geyl argued that 'the principles which fuelled William's policy were, in the fullest sense of the word, "national"'. Disagreements were only relative and reflected different degrees of anti-French sentiments.[5] Nevertheless, both Geyl and Stork-Penning marvel at this apparent consensus.[6] In his recent solid study of public opinion during the Forty Years' War, Donald Haks likewise concluded that there was overwhelming unity in public support for the war, essentialized in the ubiquity of the term 'Fatherland' in popular sources.[7] This historiographical consensus has led to a lack of analysis of the road to war from a Dutch perspective, and most studies restrict themselves to relating the chain of events that put the war into motion.[8] To date, there is no monograph on the Dutch Republic in the War of the Spanish Succession.[9]

There has been some dissent, which has not found its way into general historiography. Jonathan Israel argued that Heinsius should not have committed the Dutch Republic to continental war, which was 'a betrayal of the republican consciousness and commercial traditions of the Republic'.[10] He stated that there was a real difference of opinion between William and Amsterdam. Murk van der Bijl as well stressed the re-emergence of partisan struggles during the run-up to the war, in which Utrecht steered 'a clear course: anti-stadtholder and aimed at a speedy peace with France'.[11] Moreover, Israel has also pointed to the commercial dimension of the war, in addition to the strategic one that has been emphasized by Dutch historians. The Dutch were just as interested in checking Bourbon power as in preventing Britain from making commercial gains.[12]

French historians have argued that Louis XIV was not intent on expansion anyway. According to the classic work of Arsene Legrelle, French diplomats in 1702 were convinced that Dutch foreign policy in 1702 was steered by William III into an anti-French course. They continued to stress the significance of partisan struggle during the war.[13] More recently, Olivier Chaline argued, sensibly, that the French king's only objective was to secure French borders; he had no offensive intentions. Indeed,

the War of the Spanish Succession was simply the result of 'the clash of commercial and American ambitions' of both France and the Maritime Powers.[14] Historians working on Spain have tended to focus on the issue of trade. According to Barbara and Stanley Stein, French inroads on Spanish trade 'triggered open warfare'.[15] More severe on the Maritime Powers is Michael Walzer. According to him, the declaration of war of the Maritime Powers initiated what must be interpreted as an unjust war, since it was not in response to an imminent threat, but upon a supposition of a future threat. The Dutch and British argument was that the balance of power could in the future be disturbed if France and Spain would indeed unite, which constituted a danger, and that therefore the cause of war was just. In Walzer's view, the War of the Spanish Succession was thus a preventive, and therefore unjust, war.[16]

The War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713)

The War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713) is often regarded as a continuation of the Nine Years' War (1688–1697). The Peace of Ryswick (1697) was overshadowed by the issue of the Spanish Succession. The King of Spain, Carlos II (1650–1700), had no issue and was not expected to live long because of his ill health. There were two main claimants to the Spanish inheritance. The Dauphin, the French Crown Prince, was one of them. His father Louis XIV was married to Maria Theresia, daughter of the Spanish King Philip IV and half-sister to King Carlos II. Although she had renounced her claim to the Spanish throne, Louis considered the renunciation void because Spain had never paid her dowry. The other claimant was Emperor Leopold I, who was the son of the sister of Philip IV, Maria Anna, and who claimed the inheritance on behalf of his son Archduke Charles.

This was not just a legal issue. Were the whole of the Spanish inheritance to come into the hands of either a Bourbon or Habsburg pretender it would result in a hegemonic power, which Europe had not seen since the days of Charles V. One way to resolve this problem was to agree to partition the Spanish empire. The first Partition Treaty was concluded between Louis XIV and William III in 1698 and allotted the bulk of the inheritance to a third party, the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, grandson to Philip IV, with compensation for the two main pretenders. Unfortunately the prince died in 1699 at the age of six. The second Partition Treaty, concluded in 1700, allotted Spain, the Spanish Netherlands and the overseas empire to the

Archduke, and Naples and Sicily to the Dauphin. There were three problems with the treaty. First, it was concluded by France, England and the Dutch Republic, but not accepted by the Emperor. Second, the King of Spain did not accept the principle of partitioning of his empire in the first place. Third, the specific treaty was highly contested by opposition parties in England and the Dutch Republic, who feared French commercial dominance in the Mediterranean.

The treaty, which was concluded in utter secrecy, came under heavy fire in the English parliament by the Tories and in the Dutch States General by Amsterdam. By November 1700, the treaty had lost relevance anyway. Carlos II died on 1 November and left a testament in which he allotted the entire inheritance to a grandson of Louis XIV, Duke Philip of Anjou. As a consequence, the Emperor prepared for war to claim his inheritance by force. Louis XIV decided to accept the inheritance and thereby broke the partition treaty with England and the Dutch Republic. Although he was vilified at the time for treachery, the King himself considered that war was inevitable anyway since the Emperor braced for war, whereas the English Parliament was not inclined to support William's guarantee of the treaty.

War started in June 1701 when the Emperor, freed from Ottoman threat after the Peace of Karlowitz (1699), despatched into Italy Eugene of Savoy, who defeated the French marshal Nicolas Catinat. Within England and the Dutch Republic opinions were divided. William III and Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius felt betrayed and interpreted the decision of Louis XIV as an act of war. There were many, however, who argued that the second Partition Treaty was ill-advised and the testament was valid. Amsterdam had turned against the treaty and held up the ratification for a long time. Now it voted to uphold the Testament of Carlos II and accepted Philip of Anjou as King of Spain. The problem for William and Heinsius was that there was no clear legal argument against accepting the last will of the King. Both the States General (22 February 1701) and English Parliament (19 April 1701) acknowledged Philip as King of Spain. However, two issues became stumbling blocks towards a peaceful resolution. First, Philip refused to renounce the French throne, which opened the possibility of personal union of France and Spain in the future. Second, in February 1701 French troops preventively occupied Dutch Barrier towns in the Spanish Netherlands, strongholds established in defence against future French aggression.

The French ambassador Count D'Avaux was despatched to negotiate with the Dutch delegates and Alexander Stanhope, the English ambassador

in The Hague. The Dutch and the English demanded compensation for the Emperor, a division between the crowns of Spain and France, evacuation of the Barrier Towns and preservation of trade rights in the Spanish Empire (22 March 1701). The negotiations came to naught, and D'Avaux left in August for France, leaving Barré as a *chargé d'affairs*.

On 7 September 1701 the Second Grand Alliance was concluded between England, the Dutch Republic and the Emperor. The purpose was to ensure the division of the French and Spanish crowns, claim a reasonable satisfaction for the Emperor, possibly Italy and the Spanish Netherlands, and commercial rights in the West Indies for the Maritime Powers. All three Allies pledged troops to support the effort. The issue of the West Indies was relevant and urgent, as Philip had granted the *asiento de negros*, the monopoly on trans-Atlantic slave trade to Spanish colonies, to the French *Compagnie de Guinée et de l'Assiente des Royaume de la France* in August 1701. The Grand Alliance preceded the death of James II on 16 September 1701 and the subsequent recognition by Louis XIV of his son James Francis Edward as King James III of England, which was interpreted by England as an indirect act of war. It is doubtful whether it was meant as such by the Sun King, as Louis argued that he recognized William *de facto* and James *de jure*, but the legitimacy of William III had been a sore point in mutual relations ever since the Glorious Revolution and had resulted in an equivocal settlement at Ryswick.

War seemed inevitable from then. In 1701 Portugal and Savoy had been incited to join the coalition of the Two Crowns (France and Spain), whereas in 1702 Bavaria and Cologne joined the coalition. The allies also acquired additional support, however, primarily from Brandenburg-Prussia, Hanover, Hessen, the Palatinate, Münster and Baden. In 1703 Portugal and Savoy left the Two Crowns and joined the Grand Alliance after a successful diplomatic offensive. War had already started in 1701 as Imperial troops under the command of Eugene of Savoy entered Italy. By the spring of 1702 the Grand Alliance was ready for war. On 15 May 1702 the three allies issued separate declarations of war on France.

Foreign Policy Discourses in Political Documents

Republican language was primarily employed by Amsterdam, the heart of resistance against a renewal of the war. As had the English parliament, Amsterdam voted for a reduction of the army in 1699. The city had also been very critical of the second Partition Treaty. Whereas it had endorsed

the first one, it criticized the second because it would have endangered Dutch commercial interests in the Mediterranean. Amsterdam also refused to ratify the second Partition Treaty because it would jeopardize the relationship with the Emperor.[17] Under heavy pressure Amsterdam gave in, and the treaty was ratified by the States of Holland on 13 May 1700.

Republican arguments were rooted in traditional Peace and Commerce Discourse, in which France was identified as a friend with whom a peaceful relation could be maintained in order to protect commercial interests. They also argued for a moral interpretation of international relations: a war with France would be unjust, whereas the testament of Carlos was a valid document. Amsterdam reasoned that, although there was concern about current developments, these were not worth fighting a war over. The city voted for a good relationship with France and, unlike William and Heinsius, wanted to accept the last will of Carlos II. On 5 January 1701, it made mention of the 'calamities which will befall the state if we were to oppose acceptance of testament of the King of Spain who has recently died'. The city argued that the 'difficulties' of declining the will would outweigh those of accepting it since it will result in 'open war' with France. The reasons were twofold. First, accepting the will was the right thing to do. Amsterdam had been always been opposed to the Partition Treaty and therefore saw no reason to uphold it. The most important thing was that 'the Duke of Anjou would have to be recognized as King of Spain'. Amsterdam saw 'the effective opposition against the said testament as dangerous and ruinous for the State'. Moreover, if Anjou was not recognized, it could be a stumbling block in Franco-Dutch relations.[18] We must 'trust in the friendship of France and Spain' rather than block Anjou and so cause a pretext 'to injure the State'.[19] Second, the justness of such a war would merit 'important reflexions'.[20] In short, the Republicans remained faithful to their identity construction of France as a friendly nation and in upholding morality in international relations. Unlike in Orangist discourse, which regarded Philip as a puppet of France, Spain was seen as an independent actor. Philip was a legal ruler, established through 'the affection of the high nobility as well as the respective governors, the mood of the people and most of all, his own power and that of the King of France'.[21] Moreover, interest of state also prescribed the acceptance of Philip. Spain's neighbour, Portugal, had also recognized Philip and has 'the same interest as this State'.[22]

The conclusion was therefore clear. 'Because the war with France and Spain would be disadvantageous and dangerous for the Republic, all efforts

of this state would have to be made to prevent war'. Moreover, Amsterdam was against augmentation of troops so as not to 'give just reason for offending France or Spain, nor attack those powers'.[23] What can we do 'after a heavy war'?[24] Moreover, 'a war would have to be evaded; the more so because the burgomasters and city councillors would regard such a war as ruinous for the commerce and navigation of these lands'.[25] There is no trace in the arguments of a war for commerce, rather a peace for commerce – although it should be noted that these remarks stem from before the assigning of the *asiento* to a French company.

The construction of France as a friendly state went alongside more realist language as well, which deviated from earlier Republican language in one important respect: Republican language stressed the importance of 'security' for the Dutch Republic. France had to 'promise' that the Spanish Netherlands would not be parted from Spain. Unlike in 1672 (but not inconsistent with the notions of John de Witt) and 1688, moreover, stress was put on the international constellation. Dutch security was linked to peace in Europe in general. The overarching catchphrase, which was repeated throughout the resolutions, was 'security for the state in particular, and the conservation of peace in general'.[26] These must be achieved through a negotiated settlement with D'Avaux through the means of a 'Plan, or project of security for the State'.[27] This project involved 'some security for the State and some satisfaction for the Emperor'.[28] Even in March 1701, after French troops occupied the Spanish Netherlands, Amsterdam talked about a 'treaty we hope to be able to make with France'.[29] We must 'help direct' matters to a conference; the State has 'reason to evade war'. Amsterdam thus constructed France as a reliable friend and opted for appeasement, whilst at the same time looking for security. Augmentation of troops or buying of horses, however, would backfire; 'deliberations on these matters would have to be suspended until the time we have a response from the King of France'.[30] Both Amsterdam documents and related pamphlets contrasted Republican reason with the uncontrolled passion and warmongering of the Orangists. Rather than going to war, Republicans argued, we should wait until we speak to D'Avaux, so that we 'can take a decision with more maturity and foundation'.[31]

For the States of Holland, the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands by the French meant a clear break in relationships, tantamount to a *casus belli*: 'the affairs have ... considerably changed their nature' so that 'our defence and that of our belonging conforms to the right of nature'.[32] Amsterdam

countered by arguing that the Dutch themselves were to blame and asked 'whether the lack of recognizing the Duke of Anjou for King of Spain would not appear to remain a stumbling block'. But even if this were not so, war would be ruinous in any circumstance.

Amsterdam ultimately gave in to the majority in the States that opted for war, but the process through which this was done is difficult to track, unfortunately. Evidence, however, points to continuing resistance to war but giving in under majority pressure, not consensus. The approval of adhering to the Grand Alliance of September 1701 was passed with only minor criticism.[33] Amsterdam concluded that 'the friendship and alliance of the Emperor is best in these circumstances and very necessary, while the appearance of an agreement with France is getting less and less likely'.[34] It would be tempting to suggest that the city was swayed by the granting of the *asiento* to a French company that summer, but there is no evidence of this in the city council minutes.

Amsterdam's resistance to war must have drawn some confidence from the correspondence of Jean Vroesen, the Dutch embassy secretary in Paris. He reported that the French court was sure to conduct war, but 'either with the Germans . . . or with the Milanese'.[35] Vroesen was certainly not in the Orangist camp; he had a Loevestein pedigree (his father had been ousted by William III in 1672 from the Rotterdam city council), and he himself would later become associated with an atheist tract.[36] Vroesen was signalling anything but an immediate threat from France, rather the contrary. On 27 March 1702, for instance, Vroesen wrote to Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius that 'the inclination for peace is great here, but the question is upon which conditions'.[37] Vroesen also made clear that the French court feared the threat from the allies.[38] In April 1702, there was a skirmish near Bonn in which French troops were assaulted by the Dutch marshal Nassau-Saarbrücken. The French were 'unclear as to whether the said prince was a general [sic] in service of the State, and that therefore this action should be regarded as the beginning of an open rupture with the Republic.'[39] Another skirmish in Antwerp seemed to support the image in France 'that their High Mightinesses prove from day to day that they are inclined to wage war'. These cumulative indications led the French to conclude that 'War is held for certain here, but deliberations alternate as to the manner in which they will agitate from this side. Some are for the offensive, others for the defensive; the latter seems to be preferred so far.'[40] When the Dutch declaration was issued, it resulted in a shock in Paris. 'You may well think that

the declaration of war from the State is here at the moment the main subject of conversation'. Although it was expected, its aggressive tone still came as a surprise. The French 'had not imagined that Their High Mightinesses would have undertaken an act of such boldness'.[41] The English declaration of war which followed later was seen as expressed 'in much milder terms' than that of the States General.[42]

Whereas Republican rhetoric focused on appeasement and presented France as reasonable partner and even regarded Orangists as warmongers, the Orangists generally took an opposite view. There is more information on the Orangist camp through the extensive correspondence of William III in England and Anthonie Heinsius in the Dutch Republic, who agreed on strategy in general terms. They had pinned all their hopes on the 1698 and 1700 Partition Treaties with France, which, it needs to be emphasized, constituted a drastic change in policy. Indeed, Universal Monarchy Discourse needed to be ignored completely in explaining the rationale of the Partition Treaty, which was based on common interest and a certain level of trust between Louis XIV and William III.[43]

Initially after the death of Carlos, the policy of William and Heinsius was to 'show promptitude from our side to fulfil the treaty'.[44] They did, however, recognize the multitude of problems, not least that 'most people [in England] were pleased that France preferred the testament to the treaty'.[45] Moreover, the Spanish ambassador Don Bernardo Quiros warned that 'if the Testament would not be accepted, there will be war'.[46]

The response by William and Heinsius was one of a sense of betrayal and opened the way back to Universal Monarchy Discourse, even if the term was never employed by William and Heinsius. William complained about the 'unheard of procedures of France'. Despite his misgivings he would not have believed that France would break 'such a solemn treaty'. The official reasons conveyed by the French ambassador 'are so disgraceful, I cannot believe they have the nerve to produce such a document'.[47] William also referred to French 'intrigue' and 'evil designs'. France was 'more proud than ever', '*orgueilleux*'.[48] With reference to the breaking of the Partition Treaty, Heinsius complained that 'such an example can, I think, not be found in history'. The French are 'shameful', their 'method unacceptable'.[49] The negotiations for peace were a ruse. 'The French take their time, in order to make preparations for war under the semblance of peace, and attack us and our allies.'[50] The Earl of Portland concurred with the sentiments of William because '*j'aijme mon Religion, et hais lesclavage*'.[51]

William contrasted the shiftiness and deceit of the French with his own reliability and steadfastness. His letters to Heinsius were always signed with the phrase ‘I remain unchanged’.[52] Connected to steadfastness was ‘vigour’, a term used very often by William and Heinsius, referring to the moral courage to stick to principles. ‘[O]utward vigour’ was the best response to the threat of French universal monarchy; it would lead to a ‘reasonable security’ because war is not in ‘the interest of France’.[53] William and Heinsius constructed a similar identity split between two kinds of regents: the ‘firm members’ and those who were weak and lacked vigour.[54] Indeed, the ‘feeble maxims’ of Amsterdam will bring us ‘under the dominion of France’.[55] So their effort was to make sure that regents would become ‘firmer’.[56] In addition to the lack of ‘vigour’, Republicans regents were accused of being blind: ‘Several principal regents [see] the matter properly, but many of them . . . do not, considering the matter only superficially, believing the testament is the best means for Europe to keep the peace . . . anyone who sees the matter deeper would surely change his view.’[57] Fortunately, several regents were beginning to understand. The Amsterdam burgomaster Hudde ‘is beginning to apprehend the matter’.[58]

This all fits into the Universal Monarchy Discourse; as long as the Dutch regents were uncertain, they were vulnerable to French intrigue; the ‘cunningness of the French and Spanish ministers . . . will contribute to evil things’.[59] Heinsius juxtaposed certainty with the ‘indecision of the gentleman of Amsterdam’.[60] We should appear to be striving for peace but ‘not fear’ war, whereas Amsterdam continues in her ‘ancient fear and maxims’.[61]

The same discourse was employed for England, where there was a contrast between William and ‘the nation’ and ‘parliament’, which, like Dutch regents, ‘were blind’. The English were not just blind but ‘changeable’, whereas William ‘remain[ed] unchanged’.[62] The English were ‘afraid of war’.[63] They were ‘confused’, ‘not to be persuaded with reasonable arguments’, ‘impossible to understand’.[64] William was assured that ‘the people here [in England] who are violently against the war, concur in everything with the notions of the gentlemen of Amsterdam, without paying attention to reasonable security’.[65] William himself was steadfast, however, and assured Heinsius ‘that England will not separate itself from Holland in the negotiations’.[66] Both Heinsius and William continuously spoke of ‘England and the State’.

Surprisingly, the conjunction of Spain and France did not result in a revival of anti-Spanish discourse. William and Heinsius stuck to Universal

Monarchy Discourse and constructed Spain as a victim of French intrigue. There was initially a hope that Anjou would accept 'Spanish maxims', but also a fear that the Spanish Netherlands would fall into French hands.[67] But soon they were convinced that 'Spain must now be considered to be under the dominion of France'.[68] This was confirmed by the Orangist ambassador in Madrid, Francisco Schonenberg, who was sure that the court of Spain is 'blind French'.[69] Schonenberg described the Spanish court as chaotic, variable and weak. This allowed the French to bring the Spanish into slavery. As he wrote in March 1701, 'this [Spanish] court [is] making its glory to sink deeper and deeper into blind dependence and regard for his Christian Majesty'.[70] Heinsius as well agreed that 'France is now master of Spain'.[71]

Remarkably, balance of power discourse is virtually absent from their correspondence. The word 'balance' is only used twice by Heinsius, once in connection with a regional power balance in Scandinavia and only once in connection with the position of France in Europe. Both William and Heinsius employ the term 'dominion [*overmacht*] of France' only once throughout their entire correspondence. The latter term is used several times in connection with a specific battle, but not so much in international relations. Neither William nor Heinsius use the term Christendom to describe the common cause of the continent, and there is no hint of the 'religion and liberty' discourse which was used profusely in 1688. Nor do they talk about trade. The 'peace of Europe' or 'peace in Europe' as a phrase is used on occasion.[72]

The most remarkable feature was an emerging discourse on 'security', a shift already noted by Johan Aalbers.[73] Neither the liberties of Europe nor the Protestant religion, but the 'security' of the Dutch Republic was of importance. The anchor of that 'security' was the Spanish Netherlands.[74] William and Heinsius talked about the importance 'to keep the Spanish Netherlands from French hands'.[75] In the view of Heinsius, 'the conservation of the Spanish Netherlands [is] a foundation on which we shall have to build. Having established that security, we have to persuade the State with all possible vigour of her true interest.'[76] The problem was that the position of the Bavarian elector, who was governor, was uncertain. Moreover, 'the militia of the State [in the Spanish Netherlands] are very much hated by the Spaniards'.[77] Security discourse could be connected to both the balance of power and Universal Monarchy Discourse, as 'security' was constructed as the binary of 'threat' or 'fear'. Indeed, the Spanish ambassador disagreed with Heinsius, arguing that 'There should be not talk of security because there is no fear.'[78]

Orangists and Republicans shared this central concern with 'security', which became an integral ingredient of both their discourses. The question was, however, what is that implied for a course of action? William and Heinsius advised a policy of 'keeping firm', while Amsterdam believed that it was precisely firmness that would 'hasten the war'.[79] The French ambassador D'Avaux, supporting the Republicans, warned that 'people in France were convinced that [the Dutch] were seeking war'.[80] Heinsius and William were strongly in favour of augmenting the army lest the Dutch Republic be 'overwhelmed', but Edam and Amsterdam were strongly against it because it would irritate France.[81]

These matters made Heinsius and William decide on a vigorous policy, which would either lead to all-out war (which is what they expected) or cow France back. France was a universal monarch, working under 'pretexts of peace' but was meanwhile rearming.[82] William had no doubt that France 'was resolved to start a war'.[83] Moreover, the absence of certainty, 'without having security, and living at the mercy of France, is the worst evil that can happen to us'.[84] It was 'absolutely necessary' that the State prepare for war.[85] As such, the recognition of Philip of Anjou by William and Heinsius was disingenuous. Notwithstanding their negotiations with D'Avaux they were already bracing for war.[86] Amsterdam was against war, particularly as long as the English Parliament was hesitant, and could not 'approve' a preventive strike.[87] For William and Heinsius this was no longer an issue. We must not 'speculate' on 'who shall start first, or later, who will be attacker or not, for it is all but pretexts, so that France will always win'. Heinsius constructed the simple 'truth that we have long since already been attacked'.[88] In this context, war was indeed inevitable because it had already started.

Foreign Policy Discourses in Formal Published Documents

Throughout 1701, the States General published a series of resolutions and memorials constituting an official trialogue with the crowns of France and England and the States General. A French and Dutch public were serviced by the translation of French memorials into Dutch and Dutch resolutions into French.[89] At first glance Universal Monarchy Discourse was thin. A letter of the States General to the King of England of May 1701 spoke of 'intrigues and divisions in the Empire',[90] and a published letter by the

Dutch ambassador to the King of England stated that it was the French 'objective to gain time, to put themselves in a posture of war'.[91] But this discourse seems restricted to Anglo-Dutch communication. It was only when war became inevitable that a resolution by the States General spoke of 'all evil machinations and assaults of [our] enemies'.[92]

On closer look, however, a discourse can be distinguished that may be described as a variant of Universal Monarchy Discourse and is consistent with the correspondence, a discourse centring around the term security. Two key phrases define this discourse namely 'security' and its flipside 'fear', or variants on 'danger'. It was the immediate consequence of the threat of universal monarchy, but articulated in a veiled manner. A memorial of the States General to England stated that 'England and Holland together find their security, which spur them to maintain the general tranquillity'.[93] The connection between 'tranquillity', a phrase often used in international diplomatic language, and 'security' is noteworthy in this series of documents. In a memorial of the States General to D'Avaux as well there is mention of 'preserving peace and general tranquillity in Europe, and the security of this State in particular'. They formulate as a triple goal the 'maintenance of the peace and general tranquillity, which largely form the basis for their particular security, and to provide reasonable satisfaction for his imperial majesty'.[94] The phrase linking 'general peace' to 'particular security' is the most frequent in all the documents.[95]

The security discourse absorbed the identity construction of a close alliance between England and the Dutch Republic, with plenty of documents mentioning 'England and Holland' in tandem and in combination with 'security'. In a published letter of May 1701 to the King of England, the Dutch hoped that 'Europe sees that nothing is more beneficial for its security than the Alliance with England, and your friendship to us'.[96] D'Avaux acknowledged the emerging coalition, but in July 1701 warned 'that the effect of the strict union would be war rather than peace'.[97] In a published resolution of August 1701, the States General responded, arguing they were just concerned about 'mutual security and defence'. They juxtaposed the 'close alliance of England and Holland' as a defensive measure with the 'close union between France and Spain', which was a threat to their security.[98]

'Security' became a 'necessity'. In May 1701 the States General reasoned that they needed to 'secure' their frontiers. Although there was no war, 'We are necessitated to take these measures, and everything we would

normally do during open war.'[99] By November the States General spoke of 'impending war', which forced them to take measures for 'the security of the State'. It was a *de facto* declaration of war. It was argued that although there was officially peace, 'these times barely deserve the name of peace', and that 'measures must be taken as if it were a time of war'. Because of the French armies in the Spanish Netherlands, 'the State must be regarded as being under siege'.[100]

The issue of commerce played little role in any of the formal notifications. The published resolution of November 1701 is an exception in referring to the French intention to 'trouble [our] commerce.'[101] There was still a remnant of the 1688 Religion and Liberty Discourse. Resolutions of July and November 1701 spoke of the maintenance of 'liberty and religion', but the phrase is far less frequent.[102] The term Protestant religion is not used at all in any of these documents; the reference to the 'conservation of the liberty and the preservation of the exercise of the true reformed religion' in a resolution published right after the death of William III in March 1702 is a rare exception.[103] In a published letter of the States General to England of May 1701, in which an alliance is proposed, there is no reference at all to Protestantism.[104] Nor was there reference to the liberties of Europe. In all of the official documents, there is striking absence of references to the balance of power.

When William died in March 1702, the French reidentified the Dutch Republic as a state that was now once more free and a friend to France. The French agent Barré called upon the Dutch 'to cease to fear the proximity of so many troops they see at their frontiers; because it is up to them, whether they wanted to be friends'.[105] The States General did not budge. They argued that Barré 'wants to suggest that the true security and interest of the State would be in breaking the bonds with England and other princes, and trust in the pretty promises of France, to lay down the arms without qualms and submit in all humility to the most Christian King'. The very fact that France has threatened with war meant that 'we must inevitably expect war with France'. Although Louis had not attacked, the Dutch could claim just fear: the 'awe-inspiring armies of the Most Christian King upon our borders' was clear: 'this fear induces [this State] to look around for ample means, to prevent the coming danger', and make alliances, conscious of the fact that they could not withstand the violence of France alone.[106]

Based upon these notions the Dutch framed their declaration of war, which was signed on 8 May 1702 and published several days later.[107] It

was a lengthy document, rather different from the one-page English declaration.[108] The States General insisted that 'we had done our utmost to . . . preserve the continuation of peace and tranquillity'. The Dutch in 1702 reforged the image of an epic struggle with France, which they dated back to the 1660s, and cast it in unequivocal Universal Monarchy Discourse. The declaration of war of 1702 stated 'That the King of France [had] for a long time since cast his Eyes upon these Provinces'. France wanted to invade the Dutch Republic and 'in order to accomplish his Design', the document continues, 'twice attack'd this Republic, *viz.*, in the Years 1672 and 1688 by a most unjust and violent War'. French foreign policy since 1672 has been consistent in its aspirations for universal monarchy.[109] The Forty Years' War, as a concept, thus fully emerged in the forged connection between of 1672, 1688 and 1702.

The declaration of war must be regarded as a revolutionary document in Dutch foreign policy history. It was the first, possibly the only, time that the Dutch Republic declared war on a continental power. The justification of preventive war necessitated a long document, which was highly complex and rather confused. On the one hand, the threat from France was presented as so evident that a justification was hardly necessary. On the other hand, the document listed a range of arguments as to why war was justified. One of these was the accusation of France breaking a treaty of partition. The problem with such a line of reasoning was that the Dutch had officially accepted the Testament of Carlos, which they were now challenging. This they justified by insinuating that the Testament was a fabrication, but the argument was hardly convincing. The thrust of the argument is therefore related to the exorbitant power of the King of France which must be countered. But it is not so much a matter of balance of power; the argument is couched in Universal Monarchy Discourse; it is not so much military or diplomatic evidence that is produced but a character sketch of the King of France. It is 'evidently known', the document states, 'that the designs of the present King of Spain against the liberty of our State and commerce, are the same as those of the King of France . . . that the King of France and the present King of Spain are one and the same in effect'.[110]

There are several references in the document to 'liberty and religion' (rather than vice versa), constructing discursive stability with the 1688 declaration of war. But the thrust of the argument is couched in Universal Monarchy Discourse, which is surprisingly secular in tone. France has tried to 'make its way to the universal monarchy', for Louis XIV to 'gratify his

vast ambition'.[111] Christendom has long feared France's attempts to 'obtaining universal monarchy'.[112] Indeed, 'Nothing is more evidently known, than that if that King had succeeded in his Design, and took possession of these Provinces, he would thereby have made his way to the universal monarchy.'[113] The States General was forced to go to war because France and Spain tried to 'ruin our subjects in ruining their commerce,' whereas they had tried to negotiate for 'general tranquillity and out private security'.[114] Because of the union France had an 'exorbitant power'.[115] The States General did not wish to, but they had been 'forced' to declare war.[116]

Foreign Policy Discourses in Popular Publications

Unlike in 1672 and 1688, relatively few pamphlets were published on the war. Inasmuch the War of the Spanish Succession is regarded as a continuation of the Nine Years' War, one would expect discursive stability throughout the period between 1688 and 1702. However, whereas most pamphlets in 1688 played upon the language of European Protestantism, the 1702 pamphlets are marked by a conspicuous absence of religious language and focus primarily upon the danger of universal monarchy in secular language.

Universal Monarchy Discourse is clearly the hallmark of Orangist discourse. The *Considerations of state on current affairs*, for instance, spoke of 'The history of the deeds and trickeries of the French court which have been conducted since over forty years to obtain the Spanish Succession'.[117] Universal Monarchy Discourse was rooted in the spatial identity of France as a power aspiring to dominate the continent of Europe. This spatial identity was multilayered. Most pamphleteers identified the main culprit as the King of France, but the *Considerations* saw three main actors. 'The trickeries of Princes are great and many . . . But I put it that the French court uses these more than any other Prince has ever done.'[118] 'The French Court' was an elusive construction (no court adviser is ever mentioned by name in the pamphlets) but arguably served a purpose; a court's composition changed often and was therefore susceptible to sudden change and therefore unreliability. A third identity, in addition to King and Court, was the French nation. The *Considerations* suggested that the imperiousness of the French king and his court were deeply rooted in French national culture. 'Tedious, yes endless are the insolences of the French Nation, in speech, writing and deed.'[119] 'The

French way' became proverbial for the brutal manner in which France dealt with other powers.[120] *The true interest* as well focused on France's methods, which were 'secret negotiations, deception, and the spending of much money'.[121] The interest of France was 'lust for dominion and greatness'.[122] The emphasis on the nation suggested that at heart French foreign policy was unlikely to fundamentally change.

Thus French temporal identity was two layered. Long term, the French nation was warmongering and would not essentially change. Short term, a deceitful court might suggest peace, but it could not conceal French nature. This identity construction of France was of crucial importance to Orange pamphleteers, who had to deal with the sudden turnabout in Orangist foreign policy after the collapse of the Partition Treaty agreements. As long as Louis XIV was an ally of William III he could not be constructed as an aggressive universal monarch, but the French breaking their agreement fitted perfectly with Universal Monarchy Discourse. It was vital, though, to argue, as the *Considerations* did, that the treaty was never proposed by William III, but rather by Louis XIV.[123] *The true interest* sketched how Louis XIV, 'through his deceitful persuasions has brought matters to such a state' that England and the States General signed the treaty in 1700.[124]

This freed the way for Orangist pamphlets to wholeheartedly employ Universal Monarchy Discourse. 'It is undeniable that the King of France, and those of his secret council, since more than fifty years, have made up their minds and deliberated to elevate him as Universal Monarch of Europe', wrote a pamphleteer in 1702.[125] The temporal identity of France is set in the context of the Spanish Succession, which had been the object of French desire ever since the 1660s. Mazarin had been the architect of the design by arranging the marriage between Louis XIV and Maria Theresia through 'intrigues'.[126] The author referred to 1672 and 1688. The *Considerations* actually quotes the Dutch declaration of war of 1702, stating that the 'King of France [had] for a long time since cast his Eyes upon these Provinces'.[127] It connected 'the three Wars 1672, 1688, and 1702', observing that 'we can determine that these three wars have been waged against us by Louis without justification'.[128] *Reflections upon current affairs* follows a similar timeline. It argues 'that the royal French monarchy, as the ruler of the foremost nation, [believes that it] has been placed in this world by God to become the monarchy of the whole of Europe'.[129] Thus, as in formal documents, pamphleteers constructed the three separate conflicts as a Forty Years' War.

The temporal and spatial identities lead to the construction of an ethical identity of France as a striving for universal monarchy. The French court always used pretexts, broke its word.[130] The French court's conduct since the Treaty of Ryswick 'has not been upright'.[131] Negotiations were doomed to fail, indeed would be dangerous. The author of *Reflections upon the current age* argued that Louis XIV 'uses the art of words of sincerity' to his advantage. The French use the language of peace, which we are 'foolish enough to believe'. They master the 'art of sincere words'.[132] The treachery is deep. It was not a matter of simply rejecting the Partition Treaty. The testament of Carlos II was 'achieved through intrigue and procured', the *Considerations* argued.[133] According to the *Unmasked Frenchman* as well, the title of which referred to a 1670 pamphlet by Lisola, the production of the testament had been part of an 'evil design' and 'secret intrigues'.[134] The pamphlet is fully dedicated to show how the French king was striving to 'bring Europe under his power . . . ' and that with regard to the French people, 'there has always been either war between them, or preparations for war, or an unsteady and doubtable peace'. France strove for 'general dominion', showed 'lust for rule and dominion', and was known for the 'greed of the King'.[135] Typical for Universal Monarchy Discourse, pamphleteers rather referred to French warmongering identity and intentions than to concrete evidence.

The spatial identity of England was significantly different from 1688; 'nation' and 'court' had more or less evaporated from the discourse. This was so despite the fact that there were deep rifts within parliament concerning William's foreign policy, coming to a clash in 1700 and 1701 after the publication of the Partition Treaties. *The true interest*, written just after the death of William III, recognized the differentiated English identities, but assured that 'the true Interest of England, is that the Queen and her Parliament are of one mind'.[136] It hoped for concord between Scotland and England, and an alliance with the United Provinces.[137] The *Considerations* as well spoke of 'England and Holland' as a natural unity.[138] The temporal identity of England was not touched upon, and 1688 is mentioned only as a 'happy revolution' in *The unmasked Frenchman*.[139] Both the spatially and temporally constructed identities of England make an alliance with England a natural and given aspect.

The identity construction of Spain was more subtle and somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, Spain was the ancient enemy, while, on

the other hand, it was a recent ally. But what was it now? In *The true interest* Spain is described as a victim of French aggression but not an innocent one: 'the whole Nation has been cowardly' to submit itself, all because of a 'coerced Testament', which will turn them into 'slaves of France'.[140] As a result, according to *The unmasked Frenchman*, 'France [sits] on the throne of Spain, and is master of all of the Spanish Netherlands.'[141] For all intents and purposes, Spain was no longer regarded as an independent actor but as a slave to France. This necessarily implied that the Spanish Netherlands were considered to be conquered by the French. Spain was just another victim, even if agency was assigned to the Spanish nation (which was foolish to accept Philip) and some members of the Spanish court (who were bought by France). Carlos II was presented as a neutral character; his testament was the result of French intrigue. According to *The true interest*, it was a 'produced testament'.[142] Philip was regarded as a puppet of France. These identity constructions of Spain thus maintained discursive stability with regards to the threat of French universal monarchy.

As a consequence, Philip's decision to allow French troops in the Spanish Netherlands must be seen as the result of French intrigue. It was not a legitimate action of the new king to safeguard his territories but a French strategy to carry out a long-term design. The result was also that the Spanish Netherlands, 'that necessary Barrier for our State', were now in the hands of France. Surprisingly as well, there was no temporal identity construction of Spain as an ancient enemy. A rehash of anti-Spanish discourse of the Eighty Years' War would have been reasonable to expect. There are several such indirect references. For instance, *The true interest* refers to Eighty Years' War. The Dutch had been resisting 'Spain's despotism and tyranny [and] great power' during the Dutch Revolt.[143] But such references were scarce and did not develop into a full anti-Spanish discourse. There was a time when Spain was the enemy, when 'Philip the Second, with no less zeal than Louis the Fourteenth, aspired to universal monarchy'.[144] But that was now history. The *Unmasked Frenchman* plays on ancient fears when it concluded: the Republic now allies herself against 'French and Spanish tyranny, and the long sought universal monarchy of Europe'.[145] But most pamphlets constructed Spain as dependent on France in order to sustain Universal Monarchy Discourse.

The balance of power figured only sporadically in Orangist pamphlets, nor is there much reference to 'interest of state'. This discourse was rooted in realism rather than in liberalism, like the Universal Monarchy

Discourse. The distinction may seem academic at first glance, as both warned against French power. But in the context of 1700–1702 the difference was important. Universal Monarchy Discourse would have been incapable of espousing the Partition Treaties; it would be unthinkable to deliver additional territories into the hands of France by treaty. From a balance of power perspective, it could be defended. There are sporadic references to a balance of power in Orangist pamphlets, referring to the balance between Bourbon and Habsburg, such as *The true interest*.[146] The *Considerations* is one of the few pamphlets that refers to 'the balance in Europe'.[147] But the balance of power remains marginal in most pamphlets.

Noteworthy as well is the striking absence of Protestant discourse. Unlike in 1688, when the conjunction of two Catholic Kings, James and Louis, led to anti-Catholic hysteria, the coalition of the Kings of France and Spain, the two most powerful Catholic monarchs in Europe, one of which was an ancient enemy, the bringer of the Spanish Inquisition, did not stir the least confessional sentiment. Moreover, the Protestant and Universal Monarchy Discourse could have easily been merged in a 'universal monarchy and universal religion' discourse. There is no evidence any of this happened. *The true interest* looked at the matter of religion with detachment. It did criticize the Elector of the Palatinate for persecuting Protestants, but argued that both the Swiss Reformed and Catholic cantons have reason to fear France.[148] Although the author was concerned about the religious clause in the Treaty of Ryswick of 1697, which was injurious to German Protestants and revived fear of a Catholic league, he argued that it was a French concoction to sow discord in the Empire.[149] It was to be preferred that the Empire take the religious sensibilities of the Dutch and English seriously, lest the 'love of the two nations will somewhat weaken'.[150] But even the Pope, like all the Italian princes, had a vested interest in defending himself against France's 'universal monarchy'.[151] Jonathan Israel has plausibly argued that in 1688 the Dutch had to be very careful with religious discourse in order to placate the Emperor.[152] But in 1702 the situation was very different. The Emperor was already at war with France, and Dutch pamphleteers could have utilized Protestant discourse successfully in order to sway a hesitant population to go to war. Why secularization set in is therefore unclear.

The maturation of a more secular Universal Monarchy Discourse and the decline of Protestant discourse led to a shift in the self-identification of the Dutch Republic. There were still references to its Protestant nature.

The author of the *Considerations* speaks of 'our Republic', and insisted that it stood for 'liberty and religion'.[153] But references to the Protestant identity of the Dutch Republic were in decline. Against the tumultuous Spanish and the treacherous French court, the Dutch juxtaposed their own identity in more secular terms as a peaceful state abiding by just laws, who had 'just cause' in declaring war.[154]

There were several exceptions. First, poems on the death of William III in 1702 largely rehashed the 1688 Protestant discourse on the Prince of Orange, but did not necessarily reflect on foreign policy. Second, the dedication of *The true interest* is strongly Protestant in nature, even if the pamphlet itself is primarily secular in tone. The dedication referred to the Prince of Orange ('another Moses') who had been God's instrument to save 'a second Israel from Spanish despotism and tyranny'.[155] Third, there is a marginal cluster of pamphlets that rehashed the 1688 anti-Jesuit discourse, but these were all translated from English. *Harlequin*, for instance, fictionalized a conversation between James II, Louis and father Chaise.[156] *England's close friends* spoke of 'Jesuits, priests and all the rest of those unruly sorts of people' and 'Jacobites, receivers of French money'.[157] Fourth, a small selection of short satirical Dutch poems referred to Jesuits, as for instance the *Princely lanterlu game*, a playful one-page broadside.[158]

Domestic identity constructions also differed considerably from 1672 and 1688. Most notably, Orangist discourse did not generate domestic opposition identities, despite the fact that Amsterdam initially protested against the war and despite the fact that the Williamite regime collapsed only two months before the actual start of the war. The discourse was conciliatory, probably because in practice the war aims of the Orangists and Republicans could be seen to converge. The *Considerations* was written just after the start of the war. It was Orangist in its mourning of the 'lamentable passing away' of William, which meant that the Dutch now lacked a 'head at sea and on land'. However, the pamphlet seemed to accept the absence of a Stadtholder and concluded that now 'it is the duty of the Regents to take care that the Republic will come to no harm'.[159] *The true interest* as well is silent on the matter of the stadtholderate but expected that the States General will elect 'one or another Protestant prince' for captain general.[160] The author notes that 'people nowadays speak in all kinds of societies, coffee houses, ships and wagons of the changes in the United Netherlands' because of the death of William III.[161] However, he strongly advises against a repetition of the 1672

revolution and calls upon readers to respect the regents and the 'Fathers of the Fatherland' [the States General].[162] The States General needed to levy additional taxes, and it was the duty of the 'Patriots and citizens [*ingezeten*]' to pay these promptly.[163] Nevertheless, this pamphlet was certainly not Republican in nature; the dedication was strongly confessional-Orangist and hailed William the Silent as a Moses. Still, the author argues, if it pleased God to send a new Joshua to fight battles and free the nation from slavery, He would do so through the States General.[164]

I have found no Orangist pamphlets condemning Republican opposition to war. *The true interest* is mildly Orangist in nature; it emphasizes the historical role of the stadtholder, the importance of unity between the provinces and the importance of the Christian religion. It hardly mentions commercial interests, although 'liberty . . . religion and commerce' is a recurring theme in the analysis.[165] Stadtholder William, by the grace of God, had foreseen the danger and made sure the Dutch Republic was in a strong military position.[166] The Republic being robbed of such an 'illustrious and praiseworthy Head', the States General trusted in God's providence, which had kept the Republic safe for thirty years.[167] 'Patriots' were citizens [*ingezetenen*] who paid their taxes loyally, 'and protect the Republic against the enemies of the Fatherland, religion, commerce and navigation'.

It is only at the very end of his pamphlet that the author makes a sustained case for the commercial interests of the Dutch Republic, pleading for freedom at the seas and in trade, especially in the Mediterranean and the West Indies.[168] It is certainly not advocating a war for trade, not really interested in commerce, but seems to connect with specific Republican concerns. It could be argued that, in order to placate Republicans, Orangists needed to incorporate commercial arguments. Unlike in 1688, the issue of Spanish trade necessitated this. *The unmasked Frenchman* therefore, although fully employing Universal Monarchy Discourse, also concluded: should Louis XIV conquer the Republic, he would be 'master of the sea and of trade, and owner of both the fountains of riches, of the East and West Indies, so that he could make the law for the entire world'.[169] As in 1689, Orangist pamphleteers made an effort to incorporate some Republican discourse in order to strengthen national unity.

The Protestant domestic discourse was almost absent in 1702, with the exception of a series of panegyric pamphlets on the death of William III. Only the dedication of *The true interest* referred to the Dutch Republic as

having been freed from the 'Spanish and Roman yoke', 'elevated to the amazement of the world' but lapsed into 'pride, in spiritual and material prostitution'. As a result of this 'ungodliness', just as in 1672 and 1688, God 'sends his rod for the third time', and sets France and Spain against the Dutch.[170]

The literature on the War of the Spanish Succession suggests that there was no protest against the war. Historians have speculated on the question as to whether this implied consensus or perhaps intervention by the authorities.[171] However, I argue that there did exist a small body of anti-war pamphlets that can be divided into three categories: anti-William III pamphlets, Republican arguments for peace and translations from English pamphlets.

A satirical poem devoted to the death of William III, which was published a few years later but is dated 1702, is in the Royal Library in The Hague as a handwritten pamphlet. It lamented the 'oppressed Batavians' but celebrated the freedom that William's death implied: 'liberty, liberty regained, your ruler lies down'. It complained how William 'was able to ascend the Dutch throne', exercised 'stadtholderly violence' and made 'willing slaves'. However, the poem does not refer to the war at all, although the author praises Republican heroes like 'De Ruyter' and 'De Witt'.[172]

A Republican pamphlet fully devoted to developing a Republican argument against the war is *The Spanish partition*. Republicans could not utilize Universal Monarchy Discourse, and this pamphlet is largely devoid of any reference to universal monarchy, enslavement by France or secret designs. It does attribute evil habits to monarchs in general, such as 'insinuations, falsities, gifts, threats', but insists that such practices have been practised by both Habsburg and France.[173] It advocated avoiding war. It is couched in traditional Republican language but picks up on a new trend: the emergence of balance of power discourse. It refers to the dispute between Habsburg and France and concluded that France tried to 'have the balance turned to her side', so it would seem the task of 'England, and Holland, to keep the balance', which will suck them into war.[174] Through the acquisition of Spain, France would become 'necessarily even more powerful', whereas it was 'a fixed maxim that one must not let a powerful neighbour come near'.[175] Since at the moment Habsburg was less dangerous than France, it made sense to prefer Habsburg to France in the Spanish Netherlands. The author employed this line of argument to show how their dispute would lead 'undoubtedly

to a new war'.[176] Remarkably then, where Orangists avoided references to the balance of power, it was picked up by Republicans to argue against a possible war.

The pamphlet also stays true to the classic Republican adherence to international law. It explicitly defends the 'validity and lawfulness' of the testament of Carlos II.[177] It defends his decision to reject partition, for 'the balance would have turned to [the] side' of France.[178] The pamphleteer criticizes implicitly the outrage of the Orangists at Louis's decision to accept the will. If I were French, he stated, I would be in favour. A king knows 'his interests'.[179] Indeed, he condemns Orangists for sticking to the Partition Treaty 'through doubtable means' and denying the validity of the testament. Unlike Orangist pamphleteers, he believes that the Spanish nation 'has enthroned her King with general approval'. Philip may be the grandson of Louis, but that does not mean 'that therefore the interests of France and Spain would instantly be the same'.

The pamphleteer accuses Orangists of being warmongers who might force their case against France 'through arms'.[180] But should the Dutch challenge France it might combine its force with that of Spain and so form a powerful enemy alliance.[181] The author contrasts his own patience and reason with Orangist authors 'who so easily get agitated that they call for nothing but war'.[182] War is neither 'in the interest of England nor Holland', and they have already waged a 'long and costly war', whereas commerce 'is just being revived'.[183] If there really has to be war, 'the primary objective of this war would have to be the obtaining of the commerce of Spain and the Levant', but 'in doing so, the means by which we would try to secure commerce, would be the cause . . . of her ruin'. It would be ruinous to the Dutch merchant fleet.[184]

The harvest of pamphlets in 1700–1702 is unusually poor when compared with 1672 and 1688, but there was a great influx of English pamphlets that were translated into Dutch and galvanized both the Republican and the Orangist camps. *Reasoning on the continuation of peace*, for instance, translated from English, reinforced the liberal-republican argument.[185] It was not in the 'interest' of France, England or Holland to have war. 'Folks who live from trade, their true interest is peace'.[186] With the exception of a reference to German Princes as 'slaves' of France, it explicitly neutralized the Universal Monarchy Discourse by arguing against those who were afraid that France would 'deceive' us. It was not a matter of 'promise' but of 'necessity' that Louis XIV would stick to Ryswick, for France had shown itself 'incapable' in the last war.[187] It

strongly emphasizes the importance of English and Dutch 'trade in the East, her shipyards and manufactures ... her trade on France, on Spain, and through Spain on the Spanish West Indies' and fears this will be lost through war. The pamphlet does, however, insist on a barrier in the Spanish Netherlands.

Discourse of an upright Englishman, however, also translated from English, bolsters Universal Monarchy Discourse. It argues that a 'just war' was to be preferred to a 'slavish peace'.[188] There was 'just fear' and reason to 'prevent the dangers of the rising power of France'. Unlike in Dutch pamphlets, the Protestant discourse still held sway: France's 'objective is for us and the Protestants of Europe'. Unlike in Dutch pamphlets, universal monarchy was equated with universal religion: 'a French yoke will enslave, our consciousness will be tyrannised by a Spanish inquisition'. In the end, Louis XIV would try to 'enslave the whole of Europe to his lust for dominion, to become the Universal Monarch of Christendom'.[189]

The pamphlets identified as Republican almost exclusively can be dated in 1701 and do rely on the possibility of a negotiated settlement with France. When this possibility seemed to evaporate in late 1701, no new pamphlets appeared. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession, there was a sustained Republican Peace and Commerce Discourse. When war came, Orangist Universal Monarchy Discourse dominated public debates.

Conclusion

Dutch historiography of 1702 has reached consensus on interpretations of both the international as well as domestic politics of the Dutch Republic. Internationally, it presented the War of the Spanish Succession as a natural consequence of French foreign policy, which was aggressive and aspiring for universal monarchy. The Dutch had 'no choice' but to confront France. Domestically, historians marvel at the national unity shown by politicians, including Amsterdam, in their willingness to go to war. The emphasis was overwhelmingly on strategic issues, although some historians have argued that commercial reasons were crucial in the Dutch decision to go to war.

The chapter has yielded conclusions that stand in tense relationship to the current state of historiography. First of all, it has shown a sharp division between Republican and Orangist discourses on foreign policy.

The resolutions of the Amsterdam city council contain a Peace and Commerce Discourse that blatantly contradicts the Universal Monarchy Discourse of the Orangists. Whereas the Orangists expected to go to war, the Amsterdammers argued that negotiations with France could yield success. Moreover, they argued that Orangist policy itself was unjust and provocative and a cause for war. The importance of this conclusion cannot be overstated. It means that there was a clear counter-discourse in 1701 to Universal Monarchy Discourse. It falsifies the claims of historians that the War of the Spanish Succession was evidently necessary. Dutch historiography has identified with the dominant discourse of the time. It also means that there is no clear evidence that the War of the Spanish Succession was articulated as being waged for both strategic and commercial reasons. Orangist discourse fostered no commercial language at all, and Republican pamphleteers argued against war altogether. It was only when war had been declared that Orangist pamphleteers made efforts to placate Republicans and argued that commerce in the Spanish Indies was part of the reason the Dutch had to go to war. Mutual constructions of Orangists and Republicans were surprisingly mild. Orangists were constructed as warlike regents led by emotion, whereas Republican regents lacked 'vigour'.

Republican discourse, deadlocked in 1688, resurfaced in 1700–1702, but in a modified version. It still constructed France as a potential friend, argued against Orangist warmongering and consistently argued that war was bad for trade. It also argued that the Dutch should steer clear of balance of power politics, and insisted that the Orangists were on the brink of starting an unjust war. It is notable that, when war seemed inevitable, Republican anti-war discourse more or less evaporated.

Orangist discourse was typified by four distinctive features. First, there was a noticeable rise of references to 'security', which was realist in nature but was in harmony with Universal Monarchy Discourse. Second, there were hardly any references to the balance of power. At first sight this is difficult to explain, given the centrality of the concept in contemporary British discourse. One explanation may be that Republican pamphleteers developed traditional liberal–realist discourse in 1701 to incorporate the balance of power. They argued that it was precisely the balance that would suck the Dutch into an unfortunate war; Universal Monarchy Discourse allowed for no such unequivocalness. Third, there was a striking absence of Protestant discourse, quite unlike 1688. Lastly and most importantly, the most distinctive feature of Orangist discourse was the continuous centrality of universal monarchy in all

pamphlets and most correspondence. It underscores continuity with 1688 discourse, albeit now secularized. Indeed, the theme of universal monarchy in itself provided a self-explanatory rationale for war. Louis XIV was the universal monarch and controlled his grandson, and had a design against the Dutch Republic. And so, for the first time in their history, the Dutch undertook the revolutionary step to declare war on a continental power.

Notes

1. O. van Nimwegen, *De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden als grote mogendheid. Buitenlandse politiek en oorlogvoering in de eerste helft van de achttiende eeuw en in het bijzonder tijdens de Oostenrijkse Successieoorlog (1740–1748)* (Amsterdam 2002), 15.
2. J.G. Stork-Penning, 'The ordeal of the states – some remarks on Dutch politics during the war of the Spanish Succession', *Acta Historiae Neerlandica* II (Leiden 1967), 107ff; P. Geyl, 'Nederlands staatkunde in de Spaanse Successie-oorlog', in idem, *Kernproblemen van onze geschiedenis* (Utrecht 1937), 193.
3. J. Aalbers, *De Republiek en de vrede van Europa. De buitenlandse politiek van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden na de vrede van Utrecht (1713), voornamelijk gedurende de jaren 1720–1733. Deel I. Achtergronden en algemene aspecten* (Groningen 1980), 1.
4. J.G. Stork-Penning, *Het grote werk. Vredesonderhandelingen gedurende de Spaanse successie-oorlog 1705–1710* (Groningen 1958), xxvi.
5. Geyl, 'Staatkunde', 193.
6. Stork-Penning, *Grote werk*, xxvi; P. Geyl, *De geschiedenis van der Nederlandse stam* (vol. IV, Amsterdam 1959), 892.
7. D. Haks, *Vaderland en vrede: publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in oorlog (1672–1713)* (Hilversum 2013).
8. E.g. A.J. Veenendaal jr., 'De Republiek voor het laatst als grote mogendheid 1702–1727', in *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden vol. 9* (Bussum 1980), 16–30; W. Troost, *William III, the Stadtholder–King: a political biography* (Aldershot 2005).
9. But see A.J. Veenendaal sr., *Het Engels-Nederlands condominium in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden tijdens de Spaanse Successie-oorlog, 1706–1716* (Utrecht 1945); Aalbers, *Republiek*, focused on the post-1713 years, Stork-Penning, *Grote werk*, on the peace negotiations between 1705 and 1710, Van Nimwegen, *Republiek*, on the Barrier, M. van der Bijl, *Idee en interest. Voorgeschiedenis, verloop en achtergronden van de politieke twisten in Zeeland, en vooral Middelburg, tussen 1702 en 1705* (Groningen 1981), on local and regional politics.

10. J.I. Israel, 'Heinsius, Dutch raison d'état and the reshaping of the Baltic and Eastern Europe', in J.A.F. de Jongste and A. J. Veenendaal, eds., *Anthonie Heinsius and the Dutch Republic 1688–1720. Politics, war, and finance* (The Hague 2002), 25–44; Cf. Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 970.
11. M. van der Bijl, 'Utrechts weerstand tegen de oorlogspolitiek tijdens de Spaanse Successieoorlog. De rol van de heer van Welland van 1672 tot 1708', in H.L.Ph. Leeuwen et al. eds., *Van standen tot Staten. 600 jaar Staten van Utrecht, 1375–1975* (Utrecht 1975), 137.
12. J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness and fall 1477–1806* (Oxford 1995), 969.
13. A. Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne. Vol. IV: La solution 1700–1725* (Paris 1892), 96; Geyl, 'Staatkunde', 194.
14. O. Chaline, *La règne de Louis XIV* (Paris 2005), 130, 135–136.
15. S.J. Stein and B.H. Stein, *Silver, trade, and war: Spain and America in the making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore 2000), 116, 120, 121.
16. M. Walzer, *Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations* (New York 2015), Chap. 5.
17. H.J. van der Heim, 'De traktaten tot verdeeling der Spaanse monarchie (1698–1704)', *De Gids* 48 (1884), III, 42–91, 269–297.
18. Resolution 5 January 1701, in Secrete Resoluties Amsterdamse Vroedschap 5025, Gemeente-archief Amsterdam [GAA], 101–109.
19. Resolution 7 February 1701, GAA 5025, 121–122.
20. Resolution 5 January 1701, GAA 5025, 103.
21. Resolution 5 January 1701, GAA 5025, 103.
22. Resolution 3 February 1701, GAA 5025, 116.
23. Resolution 10 February 1701, GAA 5025, 127.
24. Resolution 5 January 1701, GAA 5025, 103.
25. Resolution 5 January 1701, GAA 5025, 103. The exact same argument is made in a Republican pamphlet, *Spaanse verdeelinge en successie, naaktelijk vertonende de belangens van de staaten van Europa daar by geinteresseert, insonderheyd van den Koning van Engeland, en mijn Heeren de Staten* (1701) (Knuttel 14596). See below.
26. Resolution 3 February 1701, GAA 5025, 114. Cf. Resolution 16 February 1701, 8 March 1701, GAA, 5025 136, 148.
27. Resolution 25 February 1701, GAA 5025, 142.
28. Resolution 7 February 1701, GAA 5025, 121.
29. Resolution 20 March 1701, GAA 5025, 156.
30. Resolution 3 February 1701, GAA 5025, 116–118.
31. Resolution 7 February 1701, GAA 5025, 120.
32. Resolution 10 February 1701, GAA 5025, 125.
33. Resolution 3 August 1701, GAA 5025, 189.
34. Resolution 3 September 1701, GAA 5025, 194–195.

35. Jean Vroesen to Anthonie Heinsius 20 March 1702, A.J. Veenendaal, ed., *De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702–1720* (20 vols., The Hague 1976–2001), *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën* vol. CLVIII, 4.
36. Lynn Hunt et al., *The book that changed Europe. Picart & Bernard's* Religious ceremonies of the world (Cambridge/London 2010), 325.
37. Vroesen to Heinsius 27 March 1702, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, vol. CLVIII, 40.
38. Vroesen to Heinsius 7 April 1702, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, vol. CLVIII, 82.
39. Vroesen to Heinsius 14 April 1702, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, vol. CLVIII, 95.
40. Vroesen to Heinsius 21 April 1702, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, vol. CLVIII, 114.
41. Vroesen to Heinsius 22 May 1702, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, vol. CLVIII, 223.
42. Vroesen to Heinsius 29 May 1702, Veenendaal, *Briefwisseling*, vol. CLVIII, 241.
43. D. Onnekink, 'The Spanish Partition Treaties: a re-evaluation', in G. Richardson, ed., *The contending kingdoms of France and England: 1066–1904* (Aldershot 2008), 161–177.
44. Heinsius to William November 1700, in F.L. Krämer, ed., *Archives ou correspondance inédite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau.* 3rd series, (vol. III, Leiden 1909), 227.
45. William to Heinsius 19 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 241.
46. Heinsius to William III 23 November 1700, Japikse, *Correspondentie*, XXIII, 519.
47. William to Heinsius 16 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 235.
48. Heinsius to William III 26 April 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 515.
49. Heinsius to William III 23 November 1700, Japikse, *Correspondentie*, XXIII, 519.
50. Heinsius to William III 16 December 1700, Japikse, *Correspondentie*, XXIII, 520.
51. Earl of Portland to Jean de Robéthon 5 September 1702, BL, Stowe Mss 222, fo. 150r.
52. *Passim*, Krämer, *Archives.*
53. Heinsius to William III 24 December 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 325.
54. Heinsius to William III 15 February 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 409.
55. William III to Heinsius 1 March 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 437–438.
56. Heinsius to William III 30 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 267.
57. Heinsius to William III 23 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 254–255. Cf. William III to Heinsius 10 December 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 294.
58. Heinsius to William III, 26 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 261.
59. William III to Heinsius 10 December 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 294.

60. Heinsius to William III, 24 August 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 552.
61. William to Heinsius 7 June 1701, 17 June 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 537, 541.
62. i.e. William III to Heinsius, 19 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 242.
63. William III to Heinsius 14 December 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 295.
64. William III to Heinsius 19 April 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 504.
65. William III to Heinsius 15 April 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 499.
66. William III to Heinsius 19 April 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 504.
67. William III to Heinsius 19 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 242.
68. Heinsius to William III 17 December 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 307.
69. Heinsius to William III 21 December 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 321.
70. Francisco Schonenberg to Earl of Manchester 10 March 1701, C. Cole, ed., *Memoirs of affairs of state containing letters written by ministers employed in foreign negotiations from the year 1697, to the latter end of 1708* (London 1733).
71. Heinsius to William III 14 January 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 364.
72. Heinsius to William III 19 November 1700, 17 December 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 243, 307.
73. Aalbers, *Republiek*, 42.
74. I.e. Heinsius to William III 23 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 256.
75. Heinsius to William III 26 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 260.
76. Heinsius to William III 26 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 262.
77. Heinsius to William III 23 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 256.
78. Heinsius to William III 3 December 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 275.
79. Heinsius to William III 2 March 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 461, 464.
80. Heinsius to William III 5 April 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 482.
81. William III to Heinsius 18 January 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 368.
82. Heinsius to William III 21 January 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 378.
83. William III to Heinsius 15 March 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 457.
84. William III to Heinsius 31 May 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 534.
85. William III to Heinsius 3 June 1701, Krämer, *Archives*, 535.
86. William III to Heinsius 16 November 1700, Krämer, *Archives*, 236.
87. Heinsius to William III 13 January 1702, Krämer, *Archives*, 623.
88. Heinsius to William III 3 January 1702, Krämer, *Archives*, 608, 609.
89. *Memorie van…grave d'Avaux…aan de heeren Staten Generaal* (16 February 1701) (Knuttel 14570); *Extrait du registre des resolutions des hauts & puissant seigneurs les Etats Généraux des Provinces-Unies des Païs Bas delivré au Comte d'Avaux le lundi 21 Fevrier 1701* (Knuttel 14572).
90. *Translaat der missive van de heeren Staaten Generaal aan den koning van Engeland* (13 May 1701) (Knuttel 14581), 3.
91. *Memoire qui a été presenté à Sa Majesté Britannique, par M. de Geldermalsen, envoyé extraordinaire de L.H.P.* (1701) (Knuttel 14575).

92. *Extract uyt het register der resolutien van de Hoogh Mog. Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden* (25 March 1702) (Knuttel 14747), 3.
93. *Memoire qui a été presenté.*
94. *Memorie gepresenteerd door den heer Stanhope, envoyé extraordinaris van zyn Brittanische Majesteyt… mitsgaders van 't geene de heeren Gedeputeerden van haar Hoog Mogende de Heeren Staten Generaal… aan den heer grave D'Avaux* (1701) (Knuttel 14580), 6.
95. i.e. *Extract uyt het register der resolutien van de Hoogh Mog. heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden* (1 August 1701) (Knuttel 14588), 2; *Extract uyt het register der resolutien van de Hoogh Mog. heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden* (4 November 1701) (Knuttel 14592), 1; *Extract uyt het register der resolutien van de Hoogh Mog. heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden* (15 July 1701) (Knuttel 14625), 1.
96. *Translaat der missive*, 3.
97. *Memorie van den heere grave d'Avaux… aan de heeren Staten Generaal der Verenigde Nederlanden* (26 July 1701) (Knuttel 14585).
98. *Extract uyt het register* (1 August 1701), 3, 7.
99. *Translaat der missive*, 3.
100. *Extract uyt het register* (4 November 1701), 1, 2.
101. *Extract uyt het register* (4 November 1701), 2.
102. *Extract uyt het register* (4 November 1701), 3; *Extract uyt het register* (25 March 1702), 3; *Extract uyt het register* (15 July 1701), 1, 3.
103. *Extract uyt het register* (25 March 1702), 3.
104. *Translaat der missive.*
105. *Memorie van den Franschen resident aen haer Ho. Mog. de heeren Staten Generael* (31 March 1701) (Knuttel 14752).
106. *Aenmerkingen op de memorie van den Fransche resident Barre aan de Hoog Moogende heeren Staaten Generaal der Vereenigde Nederlanden* (Knuttel 14756), 2–4.
107. Heinsius to Earl of Portland 12 May 1702, Japikse, *Correspondentie*, vol. XXIV, 413.
108. *Declaration of war* (13 May 1702 OS); *Manifest houdende de redenen waerom de Hoogh Mog. heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden genoodtsaeckt zijn tegens de koningen van Vranckryck en Spaigne den oorlogh te declareren* (8 May 1702) (Knuttel 14760). The quotes are from the English translation of the declaration, *A manifesto containing the reasons which have induced the lords States General of the United Netherlands, to declare war against the kings of France and Spain* (1702).
109. *Manifesto*, 3.
110. *Manifesto*, 12.

111. *Manifesto*, 4, 6.
112. *Manifesto*, 9.
113. *Manifesto,* 3–4.
114. *Manifesto*, 5, 12.
115. *Manifesto*, 6.
116. *Manifesto*, title. In the Dutch version it reads ‘forced’, which was translated as ‘induced’.
117. *Consideratien van staat over den jegenwoordigen tijd strekkende onder anderen ook specialijk tot elucidatie van de redenen waarom de koninginne van Groot Brittanje &c. als mede de Hoog Mogende heeren Staten Generaal der Vereenigde Nederlanden genootsaakt zyn tegen de koningen van Vrankryk en Spagne den oorlog te declareren* (1702) (Knuttel 14803), 20.
118. *Consideratien van staat*, 8.
119. *Consideratien van staat*, 6.
120. *Consideratien van staat*, 19.
121. *Waare interest*, 9.
122. *Waare interest*, 10.
123. *Consideratien van staat*, 17.
124. *Waare interest*, 7.
125. *Waare interest*, 1.
126. *Waare interest*, 2.
127. *Consideratien van staat*, 14.
128. *Consideratien van staat*, 15.
129. *Reflexien op den toestand des tijds*... (1701) (Knuttel 14587), 3.
130. *Consideratien van staat*, 8–9.
131. *Consideratien van staat*, 5–6.
132. *Reflexien*, 4.
133. *Consideratien van staat*, 6.
134. *D’ontmaskerde Fransman naaktelyk vertonende dat de tegenwoordigen toeleg van Vrankryk eygentlijk niet anders is, als by dese conjuncturen van tijden, de Vereenigde Nederlantse Provincien te subjugeren, om op de ruinen van de selve den standaart van een universele monarchie op te regten* (1701) (Knuttel 14619), 13. Levillain, *Le procès*, 223–229.
135. *D’ontmaskerde Fransman*, 3–6.
136. *Waare interest*, 51.
137. *Waare interest*, 53.
138. *Consideratien van staat*, 16.
139. *D’ontmaskerde Fransman*, 11.
140. *Waare interest*, 54; cf. 60.
141. *D’ontmaskerde Fransman*, 19.
142. *Waare interest*, 10.
143. *Waare interest*, dedication.

144. *D'ontmaskerde Fransman*, 21.
145. *Waare interest*, 75.
146. *Waare interest*, 50.
147. *Consideratien van staat*, 16.
148. *Waare interest*, 45, 68–71.
149. *Waare interest*, 31.
150. *Waare interest*, 33.
151. *Waare interest*, 15–16, 19.
152. Israel 'Dutch role', 123.
153. *Consideratien van staat*, 20, 23.
154. *D'ontmaskerde Fransman*, 26, cf. 27.
155. *Waare interest*, dedication.
156. *Briefwisseling tusschen Jakobus den II en Lodewyk den XIV als mede tusschen Harlequin en Vader la Chaise* (1701) (Knuttel 14550).
157. *Engelands boezemvyanden*... (1701) (Knuttel 14559), 1.
158. *Het vorstelyk lanterlu-spel* (1701) (Knuttel 14569).
159. *Consideratien van staat*, 10.
160. *Waare interest*, 81.
161. *Waare interest*, 80.
162. *Waare interest*, 75.
163. *Waare interest*, 78.
164. *Waare interest*, dedication.
165. *Waare interest*, 73.
166. *Waare interest*, 74.
167. *Waare interest*, 75.
168. *Waare interest*, 82–83.
169. *D'ontmaskerde Fransman*, 21.
170. *Waare interest*, dedication.
171. Haks, *Vaderland*.
172. *Op de doot van William den derden* (1702) (Knuttel 14696). Published in 'K.J.V.D.E.H.', *Nederduitse keurdigten* (Schiedam 1707), 241 ff.
173. *Spaanse verdeelinge en successie, naaktelijk vertonende de belangens van de staaten van Europa daar by geinteresseert, insonderheyd van den koning van Engeland, en mijn heeren de Staten* (1701) (Knuttel 14596), 3.
174. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 3, 5.
175. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 5.
176. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 5.
177. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 8.
178. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 12.
179. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 12.
180. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 13.
181. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 14.

182. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 14.
183. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 13, 14.
184. *Spaanse verdeelinge*, 14.
185. *Redeneringe over de continuatie van de vrede* (1701) (Knuttel 14620).
186. *Redeneringe*, 3–4.
187. *Redeneringe*, 5–6.
188. *Vertoog van een opregt Engels Protestant, beweerende dat een rechtvaardigen oorlog eer te verkiesen is als een slaafachtige vrede*... (1701) (Knuttel 14608), title.
189. *Vertoog*, 3, 4.

CHAPTER 6

General Conclusion

Abstract In the general conclusion, David Onnekink argues that the study of foreign policy as a discursive practice has called into question the traditional realist interpretation of the Forty Years' War as a struggle against French imperialism. During the Forty Years' War (1672–1713) two foreign policy identity discourses were sustained that can be related to distinct partisan stances. Orangists developed a Universal Monarchy Discourse that justified the war against France, whereas Republicans developed a Peace and Commerce Discourse that emphasized the importance of neutrality and peace for the sake of commerce and interest of state. Hence, the image of a Forty Years' War against French imperialism was primarily generated by Orangist discourse. The intertextual connections between formal, political and popular sources are remarkably consistent, which problematizes the sharp distinction between high politics and popular opinion.

Keywords Forty Years' War · Dutch Republic · Foreign policy · International relations · Universal Monarchy · Discourse

The general conclusion of this book is not so much the invalidation of the claim made by Dutch historians that the Forty Years' War was a war against French imperialism, but the realization that international politics is ultimately a discursive practice. The foreign policy discourse of French

© The Author(s) 2016

D. Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95136-9_6

universal monarchy was constructed in the time itself and shaped one of one of the greatest conflicts of the early modern age. Modern historiography has more or less sustained what is a partisan seventeenth-century foreign policy discourse.

The conclusion that the Dutch Republic witnessed a fierce debate during the Forty Years' War is hardly surprising. After all, the Republic experienced sweeping changes that incited corresponding reactions. During this period the Dutch were confronted with matters vital to their interests and the very foundations of their state were threatened. A successful French invasion would have meant the end of liberty, Protestantism and prosperity based on commerce. A debate did emerge about the desirability and necessity of grand-scale warfare and its consequences: the threats to the continuance of political and religious liberty, economic dislocation, redistribution of trade, taxation pressure, the influx of immigrants, domestic religious tensions and centralizing political forces. Significantly, the beginning of each of the three wars fought between 1672 and 1713 coincided with a regime change. This study has shown that two distinct partisan foreign policy discourses developed involving fundamental assumptions about religion, centralization, the necessity of war, the direction of grand strategy and the significance of commerce

The Peace of Utrecht which ended the Forty Years' War was highly controversial in the Dutch Republic. Although France was successfully contained and a Barrier was acquired in the Spanish Netherlands, the Dutch lost special trade rights in the Spanish Americas. Senior negotiator Willem Buys 'wished [the peace] would have been different'.[1] Republican pamphleteers, however, hailed the end of the war in a discourse rooted in the 1660s. One 1714 pamphleteer wished that 'this European balancing should be left to others' and should be 'banned' from the 'Republic of Holland'. He argued that 'war is always harmful, unless it is waged for liberty' because the 'well-being' of the Republic was based upon 'navigation, fishery, commerce and manufacture'. Monarchies will always be 'ready for a good opportunity to prey on republics and bring them under their power' whereas 'the first principles of republican governments spring from love and peace'.[2]

Orangists like Simon van Slingelandt, secretary of the Council of State, argued, on the other hand, that it was necessary that 'lesser powers of princes and state band together against the dominion [*overmacht*] of a prince or state who is too strong for each of them separately'.[3] The shift away from Universal Monarchy Discourse during the Forty Years' War and

these references to balance of power after the Peace of Utrecht is noticeable, but the emphasis on the 'necessity' of an alliance against France, which will not change its 'maxims or interests', was part and parcel of Orangist anti-French sentiments. From a different angle came Jacob van Surendonck, secretary and adviser to Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius, who in 1713 expected the imminent outbreak of a 'fourth war', which would thus continue the Forty Years' War.[4] Surendonck observed that Catholic powers in all surrounding states gained in force. Louis XIV, the universal monarch, would not change his ways; he concocted the Peace of Utrecht with the English Court, which was dominated by the Tories, who were plotting the return of the Catholic Jacobite Pretender to the throne. In Surendonck's Protestant Universal Monarchy Discourse, not the Peace of Utrecht but the Hanoverian Succession of 1714 marked the real end of the Forty Years' War. The key dates in his chronology were 1672, 1688 and 1714, all of which witnessed Protestant successions, which were the ultimate safeguard for the Dutch Republic.[5]

Whatever their take, for all of these writers, the Forty Years' War was a conceptual framework that played a central role in their notions on international relations and would continue to do so. In 1725, Sicco van Goslinga, a prominent Frisian regent, still spoke of 'anti-French principles which after three wars had inspired all of the elder regents'.[6]

This book has tracked the discursive construction of the Forty Years' War through an analysis of seventeenth-century foreign policy discourses. I have argued that two distinct foreign policy discourses emerged, even in documents that were not ostensibly partisan. These can be labelled as Orangist and Republican. A possible critique is that they are not always clearly linked to partisan convictions. However, the partisan labels are basically more appropriate for these discourses than the Boogmanian labels of continental and maritime, as these presuppose geopolitical origins that are deeply at odds with the shifting nature of the discourses. Another possible critique is that there were numerous discourses available. What about the interests of specific provinces or mercantile communities? Although it is possible that such discourses circulated, I have found little evidence and argue that most discourses gravitated towards these two partisan foreign policy discourses.

Lene Hansen argued that a foreign policy discourse articulates radically different identities. This book has shown how distinctive Orangist and Republican foreign policy discourses did indeed develop diverging identities. Each had a substantial degree of coherence and stability, was adaptable to new circumstances and was generally advocated by the same

agents throughout the Forty Years' War. This was so despite variations and incoherent discourses in the sources that have been analysed.

Orangists developed the most pervasive and powerful foreign policy discourse of the late seventeenth century. Universal Monarchy Discourse was rooted in the Eighty Years' War but shifted towards an anti-French discourse, which remained forceful throughout the Forty Years' War. Unlike during the Eighty Years' War, however, it was surprisingly secular in 1672 and 1702. In 1688, Religion and Liberty Discourse ran parallel to Universal Monarchy Discourse. It emphasized the threat of the Catholic Kings of England and France and justified the Glorious Revolution. Although Universal Monarchy Discourse was thus consistently employed in 1672, 1688 and 1702, it changed shape and ran parallel to Religion and Liberty Discourse in 1688.

Republicans consistently ignored any reference to universal monarchy and stuck to the classic realist–liberal Peace and Commerce Discourse developed in the 1660s. In 1672 Republicans were in a difficult position as De Witt's foreign policy had failed. Republican pamphleteers tapped into another Republican argument on the deviousness of kings, who were, unlike republics, not to be trusted. However, that Two Kings Discourse was deadlocked in 1688. If a similar discursive logic were to be followed, Republicans in 1688, confronted with the same situation as in 1672, would have had to argue for peace and aloofness, but precisely that policy had failed in 1672. Republicans were therefore confronted with what they described as 'perplexity' and were conspicuously absent in the public sphere. But they were worried about the offensive nature of the invasion of England. In 1702 the situation was different. Republicans did not believe the Dutch Republic was in imminent danger, and accused the Orangists of a foreign policy that they described as provocative and unjust. Peace and Commerce Discourse was once more employed to protest against the war, but it was less neutralist and more concerned with security. It would resurface in 1714 after the war.

Discourses were far less clear on the domestic partisan identities, and the conclusion that can be drawn on the validity of the two-party system in the Dutch Republic is ambivalent. Whereas mutual identity constructions of parties were very distinct in 1672, in 1688 and 1702 they were couched in much milder and vaguer terms. The purpose of this book was not so much to verify or falsify the claim that Dutch parties were organizationally influential, but rather to establish the existence and relevance of partisan discourses. These have been clearly established on foreign policy, but were less clear on domestic differences.

A major purpose of this book was to show how foreign policy discourses were built from identity constructions. Dutch observers had various discourses at their disposal: France as a threat to the balance of power, France as a threat to Dutch independence, France as a threat to the liberties of Europe, France as a Catholic zealot or France as an ally and friend. Each of these identity constructions opened a range of foreign policy options and restrictions. For instance, the construction of France as a warmongering nation that from ancient times had aspired for dominion ruled out any reasonable settlement, such as the Partition Treaty of 1700. But that same construction was highly appropriate for declaring war in 1702. Identity constructions were mutually dependent in foreign policy discourses. For instance, in Universal Monarchy Discourse in 1702, Philip of Anjou needed to be constructed as a puppet of France in order to retain discursive stability. A Two Kings construction would not have worked because a negative discourse on the King of Spain would have revived the memory of the Eighty Years' War, in which France was often an ally. Moreover, it would also mean that Carlos II, a former ally, suddenly turned enemy on his deathbed. Universal Monarchy Discourse prescribed that the testament of Carlos II was part of an evil French design. A most interesting identity construction was that of the King of England. Even in wartime, Orangists constructed Charles II as a potential friend.

A conclusion can be drawn on the explanatory power of discourse analysis. A plausible realist critique is that the Forty Years' War would have happened anyway, irrespective of which discourse was employed given the danger of French expansion. This book has shown that this was not the case. Discursive identity constructions were connected to real policy events. The weakness of Universal Monarchy Discourse and the strength of Two Kings and Religion and Liberty Discourse in 1688 were clearly connected to the invasion of England. Constructing the King of England as an independent actor was a vital ingredient in the decision to cross the Channel. Religion and Liberty Discourse was widely spread in most policy documents in 1688 and cannot be dismissed as propaganda. For 1702 this case is even stronger. The power of Universal Monarchy Discourse is shown in the Orangists' decision to wage a preventive war. Historians have argued that the Orangists were right: there was a danger from France. However, a clear Republican Peace and Commerce counter-discourse was established, which identified France as a great power that could be reasoned with. Whereas Universal Monarchy Discourse embraced the notion that negotiation would lead to conceit, Peace and Commerce

Discourse argued for precisely the opposite. Whereas Orangists argued they waged a necessary and just war, Republicans worried about the unjustness about Dutch foreign policy and its provocative nature. Within the Universal Monarchy paradigm, war was indeed inevitable.

A conclusion that can be drawn is that Dutch historiography on the Forty Years' War, which strongly emphasized the aggressive nature of French universal monarchy aspirations and cites the balance of power as an explanatory principle, is not so much invalid, but rather off the mark. Modern historiography is not an objective analysis but a newer version of Orangist foreign policy discourse. To put it simply, it remains trapped in a seventeenth-century foreign policy story of French universal monarchy.

However, the emphasis on balance of power in modern historiography on the Forty Years' War rests on a complete absence of primary sources evidence.[7] Only an a priori belief in the realist paradigm can sustain such an analysis. Indeed, although there are numerous references to 'Interest of state' in foundational works of both Republicans and Orangists, the term is surprisingly thinly used in pamphlets, political correspondence and formal documents. The term balance of power is all but absent.

An obvious realist counterargument is that even if the correspondence and policy sources do not consistently reveal the use of economic and strategic realist discourse, it still holds true that what politicians were really after were precisely economic and strategic goals. The argument would be that, first, the French threat was 'obvious', and Dutch defence 'necessary'. The argument would continue that, second, an unintended balance of power did actually form even if it was not articulated at the time. And the argument would close by stating that, third, the armies did after all march, whatever the rhetoric. These three arguments can be countered. First, the statement as to what politicians were 'really' after is extra-historical, based on assumptions rather than historical research. Second, whether an unintended balance of power did or did not form lies in the eye of the beholder; only a crudely materialist interpretation would see a balance of power in a situation in which the actual participants did not see one. What seems clear is that Dutch contemporaries did not articulate the existence of such a balance, nor formulate policies that were related to it. Third, the issue of whether the armies did march despite the rhetoric suggests a disconnection between language and real-world events that cannot be substantiated. Indeed, what this research has shown is that the armies did march precisely because of the discourse that was employed. Arguably, if the Dutch had not

developed Universal Monarchy Discourse in 1702, or if Republican discourse would have proved dominant, war might have been averted. This shows an intimate relationship between the formulation of foreign policy and actual events. It does not imply an *a priori* validation of the value of discourse analysis, but it does invalidate realist criticism that it is incapable of explaining real-world events.

One point of criticism that has been issued against this research was that it is restricted to discourses and ignores historical 'context'. One could argue, for instance, that the Dutch were more concerned with religion in 1688 simply because of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes through the Edict of Fontainebleau in 1685. The latter rendered Protestantism in France illegal, and led to forced conversions and a mass exodus of Huguenots, which sharpened international religious tensions. Discourses thus obviously reflected upon the historical context of religious antagonism. The problem, however, is, that 'context' is not an objective entity which can be studied separately from discourse. To quote Lene Hansen, discourse is the only valid 'interpretative optic' of that context, the only instrument capable of giving meaning to an event such as the Edict of Fontainebleau. Indeed, the Edict itself was a discursive act, itself an interpretative optic of religious divisions in France.[8] The point is thus not so much to argue that discourse is more important than historical context, but rather that the two cannot be separated.

In the development of these identity constructions the Dutch state continuously reformulated its own identity. In 1672, the Dutch represented themselves as the innocent victim of royal aggression, a just state abiding by international law and minding its own, commercial, business. In 1688, on the other hand, the Dutch reconstructed themselves as a bulwark of freedom for Europe, in the face of the evident threat to religion and liberty. The rise of Protestant discourse between 1672 and 1688 is striking. Equally striking is its demise in 1702, when the self-identification of the Dutch was remarkably parochial, partly focused on the tranquillity of Europe but primarily on the security of their own state.

Several additional observations can be made with regard to the intertextual nature of the discourses. A first one is the strong degree to which Dutch discourses were connected to foreign discourses. E.H. Kossmann has argued that notions on balance of power were partly English in origin,[9] whereas the anti-French version of Universal Monarchy Discourse was introduced by Lisola. These foreign discourses were moulded and adapted, and integrated into existing Dutch discourses.

A second and connected observation is the impact of public opinion. Some of the sources openly speak of the strong pressure from public opinion on foreign policy decisions. This project has mainly tried to argue that there is an intertextual relationship between policy documents, formal documents and public opinion documents. Realist historiography has drawn a sharp division between high politics and public opinion. High policy decisions were made in an environment in which the laws of rationality, strategic opportunism and economic gain reigned. Public opinion was emotional, moody, ideological and unstable. Politicians would therefore hide their 'real' motives from the public. Cultural historians have more or less ignored classic foreign policy sources. Thorough comparative research in the primary sources has revealed no such simple schism. First, the relative dearth of realist discourse was prevalent in all three categories of sources, although it is true that realist discourse was more prevalent in policy documents while liberal and Protestant discourse dominated in popular sources. Second, there is nevertheless a clear connection between the three categories: for each case study, all categories of sources were mostly dominated by one particular discourse. As such, there was a remarkable harmony between public and policy sources about the interpretation of a particular war.

The conclusion is evidently not that all these sources are essentially the same. I do nevertheless argue that historians of early modern international relations should pay serious attention to public opinion sources, and cultural historians to foreign policy sources. Obviously different categories of sources were genre specific. Universal Monarchy Discourse in pamphlets is far more explicit and ubiquitous than in political correspondence. Moreover, the mix between realist and liberal language also differs in these two kinds of sources. Nevertheless, the conclusion remains that all three categories of sources show a remarkable consistency in references to universal monarchy in 1702. Likewise, the pervasive Religion and Liberty Discourse in pamphlets, foreign policy documents and formal documents in 1688 is striking.

A disclaimer must be made. This book consists of three case studies, and even for each case study a selection of sources has been made. In 1672 more than a thousand separate pamphlets were published, which would have been impossible to study. Moreover, there have been other flashpoints that might have been included in this study. For instance, there was a violent domestic debate about French expansion in the years 1683 and 1684, and in 1675, 1690 and 1702 and 1703 there were fierce domestic

constitutional debates, which have not been studied. For pragmatic reasons, debates on the Peace of Nijmegen, Ryswick and Utrecht have been left out; their inclusion would have involved three additional case studies, which were unfeasible in the context of this book.

The overall purpose of this book is programmatic. I argue that Lene Hansen's method can yield important results in the study of early modern international relations. The analysis of foreign policy discourses and the reconstruction of identities is a new way of looking at international relations and provides an opportunity to rethink and overhaul the traditional narrative of the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic. This is often narrated in an ostensibly neutral-empirical manner, but I argue that it is couched in a realist framework that has now lost much of its validity. Realist historiography is just another discourse on foreign policy.

This recognition is important, because just as the historiography of the Eighty Years' War shaped the founding myths of the Netherlands (Protestant and free), so did that of the Forty Years' War. It is part of a grand narrative of the identity of the Dutch Republic as a small state, morally superior in the face of great-power aggression. Foreign policy discourses, however, had an enormous impact. In 1672, the Dutch Republic can still be described as a victim, but Religion and Liberty Discourse stirred them to start an offensive war against England in 1688. Universal Monarchy Discourse even led to preventive war in 1702. In whatever terms one wishes to describe these differences, there is a noteworthy and paradoxical development, namely the increasing defensive stance of France in contrast to the increasingly aggressive nature of Dutch foreign policy. Surely the image of the Dutch Republic as a victim of French aggression cannot be sustained for the entirety of the Forty Years' War.

An analysis of foreign policy discourses thus sheds light on the construction of national identities. Obviously, this analysis needs to be set in an even wider geographical and temporal context. This book has also shown that national identities are constructed in international and intertextual dialogues on international relations. Intertextuality therefore needs to cross geographical boundaries, a difficult but necessary task. Temporal extension is also necessary. To what extent did foreign policy discourses hold sway over time, and were they capable of being revived? In what sense are current foreign policy discourses connected to early modern ones? How is the illusion of long-term discursive stability maintained? These are relevant questions. A Dutch governmental report of 2010 functionally

connected the Voorhoevian long-term 'traditions' of Dutch foreign policy to current policy advice on 'recent Dutch contributions to international peace missions'.[10] The persistent belief in such constructed, long-term traditions and its impact upon current foreign policy validates further research into foreign policy discourses.

Notes

1. Willem Buys to Anthonie Heinsius 12 April 1713, A.J. Veenendaal, ed., *De briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702–1720* (20 vols., The Hague 1976–2001), *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën* vol. CCXXVI, 693.
2. *Korte schets van's lands welwezen door de laatste vrede* (1714) (Knuttel 16231), 86–87.
3. S. van Slingelandt, *Consideratien over de defensive alliantiën welke jeegenwoordig aangebooden worden aan den Staat in conjunctie met Groot-Brittanniën* (Nov. 1715), W.A. van Rappard, ed., *Briefwisseling tussen Simon van Slingelandt en Sicco van Goslinga 1697–1731* (The Hague 1978), 307.
4. J. Surendonck, *Remarques op de voorslaegen van vreede die bij Vrankrijk gedaen sijn off gedaen sullen worden* (March–May 1709), NA, 3.20.57-161.
5. J. Surendonck, *Consideratien over het poinct van de Protestantse religie; en wat bij dese geluckige omwendinge in Groot Brittaninien tot bevestiging van dien, en bevordering van de waere Godtvrugt soude kunnen, en behooren gedaan te werden* (26 September 1714), NA, 3.20.57-263.
6. Quoted in Stork-Penning, *Grote werk*, 5n.
7. This is consistent with the findings of H. Duchhardt, 'The missing balance', *Journal of the History of International Law* 2 (2000), 67–72.
8. L. Hansen, *Security as practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War* (Abingdon 2006), 6.
9. Cf. E.H. Kossmann, 'In praise of the Dutch Republic: some seventeenth-century attitudes', in idem, *Politieke theorie en geschiedenis* (Amsterdam 1987), 174.
10. B. Knapen et al., *Attached to the world. On the anchoring and strategy of Dutch foreign policy* (WRR report, Amsterdam 2010).

Index

A
Aalbers, J., 2, 4, 6, 10n3, 11n5, 12n18, 12n22, 13n27, 90, 99, 115n3, 115n9
Amsterdam, 11n12, 12n16, 12n18, 13n24, 14n34, 14n38, 14n39, 26, 59n11, 59n12, 76–78, 80, 82, 84, 85n1, 85n4, 85n5, 85n7, 85n8, 90, 92–96, 98, 100, 109, 113, 114, 115n1, 115n6, 132n9
Apocalypse, 24, 53
Appelman, J., 76
Arminians, 25, 56
Asiento, 93, 95, 96
Austria, 25

B
Balance of power, 2, 4, 9, 20–23, 31, 33n23, 66, 67, 71, 72, 76, 83, 84, 91, 99, 102, 103, 107–108, 111–112, 114, 125, 127–129
Barré, 93, 102
Barrier, 92, 93, 107, 113, 115n9, 124
Batavians, 1–2, 23, 57, 111
Bavaria, Electoral Prince of, 91
Baxter, Stephen, 66, 85n5
Bentheim, 39
Bentinck, Hans Willem, 11n10, 60n33, 75, 87n37 (cf. Portland)
Berlin, 75
Bijl, M. van der, 11n10, 11n11, 12n16, 60n31, 66, 85n7, 90, 115n9, 116n11
Boogman, J., 6, 12n19, 12n22, 12n23, 19, 38, 59n1, 85n2, 125
Boreel, J., 43, 60n26, 60n40
Borstius, J., 49–50, 57
Botero, Giovanni, 21
Brandenburg, 15n41, 40, 67, 75, 93
Butterfield, H., 7, 14n30
Buys, W., 124, 132n1

C
Carlos II, 91, 92, 94, 106, 107, 112, 127
Catholicism, 2, 23, 24, 31, 67, 68, 74, 76, 85n7
Chaisse, Father la, 78
Chaline, O., 90, 116n14
Charles, Archduke, 91, 92
Charles II, 38, 39, 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 57–59, 68, 80, 127

© The Author(s) 2016

D. Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95136-9

Christendom, 21, 23, 25, 28, 42, 47, 54, 71, 72, 99, 104, 113
Citters, A., 74, 87n35
Clark, G.N., 81, 82
Claydon, T., 7, 14n32, 23, 33n23, 33n25, 38, 43, 59n8, 85n7, 86n25
Coccejans, 25
Cologne, 3, 39, 40, 43, 67, 69, 70, 76, 93
Constructivism, 8
Counter-Remonstrant, 25
Court, Pieter de la, 27, 34n32, 34n38, 41–42, 45
Croissy, Colbert de, 69–70, 75
Cruce, E., 22

D
D'Albeville, I., 70, 86n13
D'Avaux, Count, 69, 76, 86n10, 87n41, 92–93, 95, 100, 101, 118n89, 119n94
Dijkveld, E. van Weede van, 44, 60n31, 61n42, 75
Dutch Republic, 2–4, 10n4, 13n25, 13n27, 14n33, 14n34, 19, 20, 23–25, 27–32, 34n27, 39–47, 50, 52, 54, 56–58, 62n67, 67, 69, 71–75, 79–82, 90, 92, 93, 95, 97, 99–103, 108–110, 113, 115, 116n10, 124–126, 131, 132n9
Dutch Revolt, 14n38, 29, 51, 107

E
Eighty Years' War, 3, 18, 23, 24, 52–53, 77, 107, 126, 127, 131
Emperor, 4, 23, 39, 40, 67–69, 71, 73, 74, 91–96, 108
England, 3–4, 11n13, 19, 25, 29, 33n23, 39, 42, 43, 45–58, 59n2, 59n8, 66–84, 87n56, 92, 93, 97, 98, 100–102, 105, 106, 111, 112, 117n43, 126, 127, 131
Eugene of Savoy, 92, 93
Europe, 1–4, 14n34, 14n38, 15n41, 18, 19, 21, 23–25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33n23, 47, 52, 53, 58, 59n3, 59n4, 59n8, 60n30, 66, 67, 71–73, 78–81, 83, 85n9, 91, 95, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104–108, 113, 116n10, 116n15, 117n36, 127, 129

F
Fagel, C., 40, 43, 45, 60n33, 61n47, 73, 86n30, 86n31, 87n36
Forty Years' War, 1–5, 7–10, 19, 27, 90, 103, 105, 123–128, 131
France, 1–4, 7, 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 29–32, 33n22, 39, 42–58, 62n69, 62n94, 66–79, 81–84, 87n47, 89–108, 111–114, 117n43, 119n108, 124–127, 129, 131
Francis I, 30
Franco-Dutch War, 3, 4, 11n10, 30, 37–64
Fuchs, P., 75
Fürstenberg, E. von, 67, 69, 79

G
Gastañaga, Marquis de, 75, 87n40
Geelvinck, C., 76
Gelderland, 25
Geyl, P., 11n12, 12n22, 59n3, 64n133, 90, 115n2, 115n6
Glorious Revolution, 11n9, 12n15, 65, 66, 78, 81, 83, 84, 85n3, 85n4, 93, 126

God, 22, 44, 47, 51, 54, 56, 70, 74, 75, 105, 110, 111
Goes, A. van der, 43, 59n11
Goslinga, S. van, 125, 132n3
Grand Alliance, 3, 11n8, 69, 93, 96
Groenveld, S., 4, 6–7, 11n9, 11n10, 12n16, 12n18, 12n22, 13n26, 13n27, 66, 85n3
Groot, P. de, 40, 45, 60n22, 61n50, 61n51, 61n52, 61n53, 61n55, 86n26, 120n117, 132n3, 132n5
Grotius, H., 22, 24, 51

H
Haks, D., 8, 14n35, 90, 115n7
Hamel Bruynincx, G., 43, 44, 60n30, 73
Ham, J., 75, 87n38
Hanover, 14n32, 39, 43, 93, 125
Hansen, L., 9, 14n37, 15n42, 17–18, 32, 125, 129, 131, 132n8
Harms, R., 7, 14n34
Heinsius, A., 90, 92, 94, 96–100, 116n10, 117n35, 125, 132n1
Helmers, H., 7, 14n34
Hessen, 93
Hobbes, T., 21
Holland, 3, 5, 10n3, 11n11, 12n16, 12n18, 14n33, 14n38, 25–29, 34n32, 39, 40, 45, 46, 49, 54, 56, 57, 59n2, 70, 72–73, 76–77, 80–82, 85n4, 86n26, 94, 95, 98, 101, 106, 111, 112, 124
Holmes, G., 7, 12n15, 14n30
Holy Roman Empire, 3, 67
Hooft, P.C., 24
Hop, J., 74, 75, 86n33, 87n34
Hudde, J., 76–77, 84, 98
Huybert, J. de, 44, 61n41

I
Israel, J.I., 10n4, 14n33, 59n5, 59n9, 66, 71, 85n4, 86n21, 90, 108, 116n10, 116n12
Italy, 10n4, 38, 59n5, 59n9, 66, 71, 85n4, 86n21, 90, 108, 116n10, 116n12

J
James Francis Edward, 68, 93
James II, 67, 68, 75, 80, 81, 93, 109
Jones, J.R., 5, 12n17, 38, 59n2
Jurieu, P., 24, 31

K
Kant, I., 22
Karl von Simmern, 67

L
League of Augsburg, 66, 67
Legrelle, A., 90, 116n13
Leicester, Earl of, 51, 52, 54
Lipsius, J., 20
Lisola, F., de, 22, 23, 30, 33n22, 52, 53, 62n93, 63n94, 106, 129
Loevestein party, 25
Lossky, A., 66
Louis XIV, 2, 4, 10n3, 23, 30, 33n22, 38–40, 47, 51–55, 58, 59, 59n4, 63n94, 67, 73, 75, 78, 79, 80, 85, 90–93, 97, 103, 105, 106, 110, 112, 113, 115, 125

M
Maria Anna, 91
Maritime Powers, 91, 93
Mary II, 82

Mary of Modena, 68
Maurice, 26, 50
Maximilian Heinrich von Wittelsbach, 67
Montaigne, M., 20
Münster, 3, 11n10, 26, 39, 40, 43, 93

N
Nantes, 24, 67, 73, 75, 78, 85n8, 129
Nimwegen, O. van, 7, 12n18, 13n27, 13n29, 89, 115n1, 115n9
Nine Years' War, 3, 4, 11n10, 65–88, 89, 91, 104

O
Oldenbarnevelt, J. van, 26, 29, 31, 50, 57
Old Testament, 24, 49
Orangism, 14n34, 26
Orangists, 4–6, 19, 26, 27, 30–31, 32, 34n30, 38, 40, 43, 44–49, 51–58, 62n69, 71, 75, 79–82, 84, 94–97, 99, 100, 104, 105, 107–110, 112, 113, 124–128
Orleans, Duchess of, 67
Ottomans, 67
Overijssel, 25, 39

P
Palatinate, 67–69, 78, 93, 108
Parliament, 12n15, 14n30, 25, 38, 53, 68–70, 75, 92, 93, 98, 100, 106
Peace and Commerce Discourse, 19, 29, 41, 42, 46, 48, 58, 82, 84, 94, 113, 114, 126
Peace of Karlowitz, 92
Peace of Ryswick, 4, 91
Peace of Utrecht, 3, 4, 124, 125
Peace of Westminster, 3
Peace of Westphalia, 3
Penn, William, 22
Perpetual Edict, 39, 57
Peter, Father, 74, 78, 81
Philip of Anjou, 92, 127
Philip IV, 91
Philip Wilhelm von Pfaltz-Neuburg, 67
St Pierre, Abbe, 22
Pincus, S., 7, 14n32, 33n25, 38, 59n8
Pinkham, L., 66, 85n5
Pocock, J., 7
Pope, 67, 78, 108
Portland, Earl of, 11, 10n78, 83, 87n37, 97, 117n51, 119n107(cf. Bentinck)
Price, L.J., 7, 14n33
Prussia, 93
Pufendorf, S. von, 22

R
Realist, 2, 7–10, 19–23, 27, 29, 31, 32, 37–38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 57, 58, 66, 82, 95, 114, 126–131
Reformation, 2
Reinders, M., 7, 48, 62n67, 62n69
Religion and Liberty Discourse, 72, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84, 99, 102, 126, 127, 130, 131
Republicans, 4–6, 19, 25–32, 38–40, 44–52, 54–58, 76–84, 90, 93–95, 97, 98, 100, 109–113, 124–129
Réunions, 67
Rietbergen, P., 11n10, 66, 85n10
Rohan, Duc de, 21, 28
Roman Empire, 2, 3, 67
Rome, 18, 24
Rommelse, G., 8, 13n29, 14n34, 59n3, 59n8, 60n8
Rowen, H., 12n8, 12n19, 13n28, 38, 43, 59n2
Rule, J.C., 66
Ruyter, M. De, 40, 111

S
Sceperus, J., 54, 56, 63n106, 63n110
Second Anglo-Dutch War, 13n29, 39, 48, 55, 59n8
Slechte, H., 71, 86n20, 87n46
Sonnino, Paul, 38, 59n4
Spain, 1, 3, 23–26, 29, 39, 41–43, 52, 54, 58, 71, 74, 91–96, 98–99, 101, 103, 104, 106–108, 111–113, 119n108, 127
Spanish Netherlands, 30, 40–42, 75, 90–93, 95, 99, 102, 107, 111, 113, 124
Stanhope, A., 92, 119n94
States General, 39, 43–47, 58, 60n34, 61n60, 69–71, 74, 82, 84, 87n41, 92, 97, 100–105, 109–110, 119n108
Stern, J., 8, 14n34, 64n130
Stork-Penning, J.G., 11n12, 12n18, 13n22, 90, 115n2, 115n4, 115n6, 115n9
Suárez, F., 22
Surendonck, J. Van, 125, 132n4, 132n5
Symcox, G., 12n18, 66, 85n9

T
Tacitus, 20
Teellinck, M., 54
Third Anglo-Dutch War, 3, 38, 51, 57
Thucydides, 20
Tories, 92, 125
Triple Alliance, 39, 41–43, 48, 50, 54, 55, 82
Troost, W., 7, 11n7, 13n22, 13n29, 59n7, 60n30, 85n3, 115n8
Twelve Years' Truce, 25, 56, 57
Two Crowns, 93
Two Kings Discourse, 46–49, 51, 52, 54, 58, 59, 71–72, 77–80, 84, 126

U
Universal monarchy, 2, 4, 18, 19, 22–24, 30–32, 33n23, 33n24, 33n25, 43, 44, 46–49, 51, 52–58, 59n8, 60n30, 62n69, 63n97, 71, 72, 76, 78–79, 81–84, 97–101, 103–108, 110–115, 124–131
Universal Monarchy Discourse, 19, 23, 24, 31, 32, 33n23, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 53–56, 58, 62n69, 71, 72, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 84, 97–101, 103–108, 110–114, 124, 126–127, 129–131

V
Valckenier, P., 27, 30, 31, 35n54, 52, 53, 58, 62n94, 73, 81, 82, 86n30
Van Reede van Amerongen, Lord, 43, 60n31, 61n42
Vienna, 43, 73, 76
Vitoria, F. De, 22
Voetius, G., 25, 44
Voorhoeve, J., 2, 6, 10n2, 11n7, 13n24
Vroesen, J., 96, 117n35
Vroomen, I., 48, 62n68

W
Walzer, M., 91, 116n16
War of the Spanish Succession, 4, 11n10, 13n22, 34n30, 89–115, 115n2
Wars of religion, 24
Wassenaar, W., 69–70, 75, 76, 86n12
Wassenberg, G. Von, 53, 63n95, 63n97
Waterlinie, 3, 40
Weber, C., 9, 15n43
Wendt, A., 8, 14n36

Weststeijn, A., 28, 34n38
William II, 26
William III, 4, 11n7, 13n22, 13n29, 14n30, 14n32, 26, 30, 39, 44, 50–53, 55, 58, 59n7, 60n30, 60n33, 61n47, 68n70, 73, 75, 78, 80–83, 85n5, 85n6, 85n7, 87n37, 87n39, 89–93, 96, 97, 102, 105, 106, 109–111, 115n8, 117, 118
William IV, 26
Wilson, C., 6, 12n20, 38, 59n2
Witsen, N., 76, 77, 86n26
Witt, Cornelis de, 40, 41, 50
Witt, John de, 12n18, 26, 28, 37, 39, 41, 45, 48, 49, 59n2, 60n22, 60n23, 60n26, 60n37, 60n39, 60n40, 61n49, 61n50, 61n51, 61n52, 61n53, 61n55, 80, 95
Wood, C., 4, 11n8