

Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image

Caterina Albano

palgrave macmillan memory studies

Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies

Series Editors

Andrew Hoskins
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, United Kingdom

John Sutton
Macquarie University
Macquarie, Australia

The nascent field of Memory Studies emerges from contemporary trends that include a shift from concern with historical knowledge of events to that of memory, from 'what we know' to 'how we remember it'; changes in generational memory; the rapid advance of technologies of memory; panics over declining powers of memory, which mirror our fascination with the possibilities of memory enhancement; and the development of trauma narratives in reshaping the past. These factors have contributed to an intensification of public discourses on our past over the last thirty years. Technological, political, interpersonal, social and cultural shifts affect what, how and why people and societies remember and forget. This groundbreaking new series tackles questions such as: What is 'memory' under these conditions? What are its prospects, and also the prospects for its interdisciplinary and systematic study? What are the conceptual, theoretical and methodological tools for its investigation and illumination?

More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/14682

Caterina Albano

Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image

palgrave
macmillan

Caterina Albano
Central Saint Martins
University of the Arts
London, United Kingdom

Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies
ISBN 978-1-137-36587-3 ISBN 978-1-137-36588-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36588-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016954647

Cover illustration: © Kerry Tribe

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London

Acknowledgements

The first idea for this book stems from my collaboration with filmmaker and sound artist Shona Illingworth and an invitation to talk about Kerry Tribe's work *H.M.* at London Camden Arts Centre during the time of her exhibition there. The Amnesia Forums as part of Shona's project *Lesions in the Landscape* have also been a rich opportunity of multidisciplinary discussion on memory and amnesia.

I would like to acknowledge Central Saint Martins, University of the Arts London for the endorsement and support for the research of the book. I am especially grateful to Prof. Janet MacDonnell, Associate Dean of Research, for her kind encouragement and to Prof. Jeremy Till, Head of Central Saint Martins. At Central Saint Martins, the opportunity to share my research with first and second year students of the MRes Moving Image has been both inspiring and enriching. My thank you to my colleague Lucy Reynolds, course leader of the MRes Moving Image. I would also like to thank the colleagues across the University who shared ideas and research around the archive and its traces at the Archive Forum that I organized at Central Saint Martins.

Research libraries and archives and staff at the British Library, the Wellcome Library and Wellcome Film Archive, the BFI Film Archive, Central Saint Martins British Artists' Film & Video Study, and the War Museum Film Archive have been very obliging and cooperative with the research for the book.

At Palgrave Macmillan I would like to thank Felicity Plester and Sophie Auld, the editors of the Memory Study Series and the anonymous reader. I am also grateful to Nicholas Minns for proofreading the text and Samantha Clark for the index.

As ever my heart felt gratitude goes to artists and filmmakers whose work has been the inspiration and intellectual guidance of the book for their generosity, stimulating conversations and invaluable feedback on early drafts as well as help with illustrations. In particular I thank you Lutz Becker, Sivan Eyal, Harun Farocki, Bill Fontana, Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi, Shona Illingworth and Kerry Tribe. I am also grateful to Antje Ehmann at Harun Farocki GbR.

Thank you to my family and friends for their marvellous help that has come in many different ways.

Contents

List of Figures

Preface

In the article 'Between Memory and History: Les *Lieux de Mémoire*', Pierre Nora laments 'an increasingly rapid slippage of the present into historical past that is gone for good, a general perception that anything and everything may disappear' (Nora 1989, p. 7). This slippage of events into an irretrievable past is according to Nora the product of a process that entails the *individualization* and *psychologization* of memory that started in the last decades of the nineteenth century and continues today. This has resulted in a loss of traditional collective forms of remembrance and a complete transformation of the significance and role of memory in contemporaneity. 'The complete psychologization of contemporary memory', as Nora puts it, 'entails a completely new economy of the identity of the self, the mechanics of memory, and the relevance of the past' (Nora 1989, p. 15). Rather than sharing Nora's nostalgia, this book asks what the 'complete psychologization of contemporary memory' means and what is the significance of the new economy of self-identity that it has engendered? In short, what can we garner from an understanding of the mechanics of memory and what relevance has the past today?

Contemporary neuro-psychological research has mapped memory processes in the human brain and has developed original models to explain remembering. A growing field of investigation, memory research expands well-established conceptions of remembering and offers original insight into memory within the broader cultural and philosophical spectrum. Given the current epistemological centrality of science in general, and neuroscience in particular, what follows will bring to bear current research on memory on social and cultural practices of remembering and the politics

of memory that inform them. In this approach, we share Kurt Danziger's (2008) assumption that scientific theories of memory are located within historical frameworks that expose the cultural contexts from which they stem. Scientific theories can also provide a means for reflecting on what happens in culture. Accordingly, ways of remembering are affected by cultural assumptions on how memories are understood, brought together and used. At the same time what is remembered or forgotten at any given time participates to the discourses that historically define memory. Cultural and social practices can in fact help us to frame and reflect on psychological models, locating science within culture as a system of knowledge that is operative and therefore critical to contemporaneity. Such mutuality opens up rich fields of investigation that draw from and contribute to the current debate around memory, trauma and amnesia.

We have identified in the neuro-psychological concept of autobiographical memory the 'site' (to use Nora's phrase) of the contemporary psychologization and individualization of memory. First formulated in the 1980s, autobiographical memory provides multifaceted models for an understanding of memory processes and their functions. As the name infers, autobiographical memory regards one's experiential memories tightly relating the individual with remembering. Hence, within the psychological model, autobiographical remembering supports today's 'economy of the self' and the uses of the past that memory foregrounds. This implies that the narrativization of memories into a life story endorses ideas of the self and that the sharing of memories is an important means of socialization. In turn, what counts as a memory and the ways in which memories are narrativized follows social and cultural parameters suggesting reciprocity between the mind and culture.

Current psychological understanding of memory further suggests that remembering is about the present rather than the past. The capacity to form memories underpins the way in which one uses the past to make sense of the present and imagine the future. Within this context memory can be envisaged as a temporal and spatial environment we inhabit subjectively, but also socially and culturally. In addition, memory research also underlies the relevance of emotion and the affective complexity of subjective and inter-subjective remembering. Memories evoke the atmosphere and emotion of experience and expose the 'contingencies' of the past in the present through their emotional implications and resonances. To history and the disciplinary rigor of historiography memory thus adds the feeling and sensation of what happened.

Central to our analysis of contemporary memory is a consideration of forgetting and its significance in the understanding of memory processes and its implications for cultural and social memorialization. Amnesia and trauma characterize a reflection on the historical development of the concept of autobiographical memory that interweaves with the broader issues surrounding contemporary practices of remembrance. The psychological concept thus frames an extensive consideration of the problematic of forgetting and a questioning of the dynamics of remembering *vis à vis* what is unremembered. This regards the legacy of twentieth-century histories and its mobilization within today's global memory landscapes.

The cultural referent of our analysis is the moving image. Modernity, as we shall examine in the first chapter—an historical overview that sets the parameters of our discussion—established reciprocity between mind and screen and drew on the optic procedures of the moving image to posit a new understanding of memory. On the one hand, film was part of the laboratory apparatus for the study of memory processes and its dysfunctions, offering an additional context for the theoretical elaboration of the ways in which memories arise and the mental processes of remembering. On the other hand, the scientific embracing of the moving image was rooted in the medium's propensity—as argued by cultural commentators, filmmakers and psychologists alike—to capture the affect and emotional charge of reality. Not only a record of experience, the moving image revealed through its 'optic unconscious', to borrow Walter Benjamin's phrase, the hidden forms of the real and the emotional residue of experience no matter how disturbing. Hence, the moving image lent psychology a correspondent for what a memory is and an elaboration of the dynamics of remembering and forgetting. The reciprocity established by modernity is still salient and the moving image, as we shall argue, continues to be a cultural referent for today's conceptualization of memory.

In what follows, we consider the moving image in the dual components of image and sound through the work of contemporary artists and filmmakers whose practice deals with memory through film (or video) and sound installation. Contemporary art offers engaging ways to examine both the psychological and cultural components of remembering and to interrogate its multifaceted manifestations. In particular, artists working with the moving image and sound variously investigate the complexities that underlie their sensory qualities, exploiting the intangible yet visceral power of both to deeply affecting effect. This in turn is conducive to a critical reflection on the issues surrounding individual, social and cultural

practices of remembering, in terms of their emotional and affective implications as well as their context and politics.

The book is organized in five chapters. Each chapter deals with specific aspects pertaining to memory and the moving image as they emerge from the artworks examined. Hence, the chapters stand independently as well as building an overarching discussion on contemporary memory and in particular what a foregrounding of forgetting entails to an understanding of the dynamics of remembering within today's global arenas. The first chapter starts with Nora's assumption about the individualization and psychologization of memory in modernity and outlines the key features of the reconceptualization that memory underwent in modernity when it became the subject of psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Critical to the modern reconceptualization of memory is the rooting of the self in remembering and the theorization of forgetting when for the first time it was normalized in relation to remembering. Such theorization sets the basis for the modern understanding of memory and the elaboration of the concepts of repression, dissociation and trauma. It also establishes the paradigm for the elaboration of the contemporary concept of autobiographical memory. Our analysis of the psychology of memory in the last decades of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth centuries focuses on the role that the moving image played in such reconceptualization. Throughout we shall refer to the historical framework put forward in the chapter to contextualize the analysis of the contemporary panorama of memory in its increasingly global manifestations.

The second chapter examines the psychological concept of autobiographical memory and questions its three components: life story, self and memory. Drawing on literary and film theory, the chapter addresses the issues of self-narrative, identity and memory in autobiographical representation. In particular, we focus on the tension between remembering and narrating that historically underpins individual life stories. Central to the discussion is the role of forgetting both in the theorization of autobiographical memory and in its cultural articulations—what we refer to as (auto)biographical memory. From a psychological point of view, autobiographical memory consists of the transitory, though stable, mental representation of experience that constitutes the narrative configuration of the self and of one's knowledge. The chapter considers the frisson between memories and life stories by examining four artworks by US artist Kerry Tribe. In her work, Tribe explores the tension between the psychological and cultural articulation of memories and the circumstantial and unstable

narratives of the self that unfold at the boundaries of remembering and forgetting. Tribe's film installation *H.M.* (2009) enables us to briefly outline the development of the concept of autobiographical memory from the late 1950s to the present. The work is based on the notorious case study of the amnesiac, Henry Gustav Molaison, known as patient H.M. Following drastic brain surgery, Molaison suffered major memory loss and became incapable of forming new memories. The study of his amnesia coincided with the development of memory research in the second half of the twentieth century. Tribe's work aptly conveys the life story of an individual locked in time. In three other works Tribe further investigates the elusiveness of both individual and collective life stories: *Parnassius mnemosyne* (2010), inspired by Vladimir Nabokov's memoir, questions the nature of a memory; *The Last Soviet* (2010), based on the account of the last Russian cosmonaut who was 'forgotten' in space and on his return encountered the major changes brought about by Gorbachev's government, posits the tension between individual and social remembering; and *Milton Torres Sees a Ghost* (2010), an installation based on the personal account of a pilot who was bound to secrecy following his supposed encounter with an unidentified flying object during a mission, brings into question the trustworthiness of memory by exposing the erasure of forgetting. In this last work, Tribe uses sound recording rather than film, a feature that is further discussed in other chapters.

The third chapter focuses on trauma, amnesia and latency. Drawing on the debate surrounding the representability of trauma, we consider the film paradigm in the laboratory study of intrusive traumatic memories and the role that the moving image played and still plays in their definition and theorization. In particular, we examine the significance of the film that was used in postwar experiments on traumatic memories and question why this particular film now goes unnoticed despite the acknowledgement of the studies that it supported. Since the film deals with an Aboriginal rite of passage, it situates the debate on the representability of trauma within the current context of global memories and the criticality of amnesia within it. Central to our discussion are three video installations that loosely constitute a trilogy by filmmaker and sound artist Shona Illingworth. The three works were developed in collaboration with neuro-psychologist Martin Conway who is a leading figure in the study of autobiographical memory. In these works Illingworth interrogates individual and cultural dynamics of memory, particularly in relation to traumatic memories and contested sites of remembrance, and creates immersive visual and acoustic environ-

ments that are viscerally affecting. In *The Watch Man* (2007) Illingworth tackles individual trauma through the portrait of an elderly man who was one of the British soldiers who liberated the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp at the end of World War II. Rather than the flashback, the work engages with the affective and emotional disturbance of traumatic memories and renders it through the immersive intensity of images and sounds. Trauma and latency are also the subject of the video and sound installation *Balnakiel* (2009). The focus shifts from individual to social constructions of trauma and the politics of memory that denote them. In this work, Illingworth creates an immersive and disturbing space that acts as a memory-scape where the local and the global converge in the latent presence of contested histories. In *Lesions in the Landscape* (2015), a three-screen video and sound installation, Illingworth intersects the experience of Claire, a woman who suffers from amnesia, with the island of St Kilda whose inhabitants were evacuated in 1930. The work brings to bear individual amnesia on the stereotyped representation of a place whose complex historical past and present geopolitical relevance are silenced. The work's fragmentary voice-over introduces direct references to mental processes of remembering and its functions through Conway's commentary. Contingency as a result of memory processes posits the emphasis on the present and on the fixity that amnesia generates for both individual and cultural narratives of memory. The work raises the question of the immanence of what is liminal to remembering as a silenced or amnesiac trace.

In the fourth chapter, neuro-psychological theories about the dynamics of remembering and the persistence of mnemonic traces of what has been supposedly 'forgotten' are considered in relation to cultural and transcultural models of memory. The focus is on sound through the artistic practice of sound artist Bill Fontana. By variously translocating and broadcasting environmental atmospherics to different places including historical buildings and monuments, Fontana's sound-sculptures destabilize traditional sites of memory introducing alterity and the affect of haunting pasts. The memory-scapes that these works engender introduce a critique of Nora's *lieu de mémoire* and a reflection on the dynamics of remembering in terms of cultural and transcultural networks. Through Fontana's work we also discuss the memory trace as a mediatized trace and the connotations that defines it in relation to the globalized arena of digital technologies, thus foregrounding some of the issues about today's 'uses of the past'.

The fifth chapter expands the analysis of the memory trace and considers it through the specificity of the film archival trace. The chapter looks

at the archive as a site of consignation that—as Jacques Derrida argues—sits at the interface of technologies of inscription and the psychology of memory, and questions the potential of rememoration afforded by the moving image. In particular, we reflect on a number of works respectively by artists and filmmakers Lutz Becker, Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi, Harun Farocki, and Eyal Sivan. All the works considered use archival film footage that the artists variously montage and remediate. Rather than a documentary use of the archival footage as illustration, remediation affords a critical engagement with the filmic trace and its affective and emotional resonance. Early twentieth century histories of fascism and colonialism, the two world wars and the Holocaust are represented through the images that documented them. The remediation of the archival film footage reveals the atmosphere, expression and feeling of these events and solicits a reflection on their enduring consequences in the present at the boundaries of memorialization and history. It is by representing us with the feelings, aspirations and sensorium of the first decades of the twentieth century that the moving image reveals ways in which the tragic events of this period still impinge on contemporary constructions of global memories. By variously manipulating and montaging the historical footage, the artists considered reflect on the archival significance of the moving image as a trace that emerges at the interstices of remembering and oblivion. The results are enquiries into the emotional residues of memories and the affect of histories through the specificity of archival film footage.

London, UK Caterina Albano

CHAPTER 1

Memory, Modernity and the Moving Image

'No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my palate'—writes Marcel Proust in *Swann's Way* (1928)—'than a shiver ran through me and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary thing that was happening to me' (Proust 1928/2005, p. 51). The often-quoted reference to the wave of memories triggered by a madeleine dipped in lime-flower tea ideally marks the late-nineteenth century 'discovery' of memory. The passage also signals the beginning of the processes of *individualization* and *psychologization* that, according to Pierre Nora, denote a complete reconceptualization of memory in modernity (Nora 1989, pp. 13–18). In Nora's view, in fact, Proust's madeleine and Freud's Oedipus designate two of modernity's conspicuous *lieux de mémoire* (sites of memory): 'We owe to Freud and Proust those two intimate and yet universal sites of memory, the primal scene and the celebrated *petite madeleine*' (Nora 1989, p. 15). The Oedipus complex and Proust's *petite madeleine* are indeed indicative of modernity's broader reformulation of memory both across psychological sciences and culture at large. This entailed an original theorization of forgetting as inherent to remembering and a questioning of the unsettling impinging of the past onto the present for the individual and society alike. Proust's passage already posits the difficulties that forgetting brings to remembering. Although behind the taste of the madeleine lies 'the image, the visual memory' linked to it, the memory itself struggles to reach consciousness, remaining obfuscated and ungraspable. A question lies behind the involuntary recollection of Proust's protagonist:

C. Albano, *Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36588-0_1

> Will it ultimately reach the clear surface of my consciousness, this memory, this old, dead moment which the magnetism of an identical moment has travelled so far to importune, to disturb, to raise up out of the very depth of my being? (Proust 1928/2005, p. 53)

The moment of remembering is also an encounter with what was forgotten and had remained unremembered. It is an encounter with the past through an unfamiliar trace that emerges unsolicited and unexpectedly. Beyond both Proust's *petite madeleine* and Freud's Oedipus lies what concerns remembering and forgetting alike. In the words of German psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus,

> Mental states of every kind, – sensations, feelings, ideas, – which were at one time present in consciousness and then have disappeared from it, have not with their disappearance absolutely ceased to exist. Although the inwardly-turned look may no longer be able to find them, nevertheless they have not been utterly destroyed and annulled, but in a certain manner they continue to exist, stored up, so to speak, in the memory. (Ebbinghaus 1885/1998, p. 1)

It is the supposition of memories that one believes forgotten and yet are 'not utterly destroyed or annulled' that radically reshaped the concept of memory at the turn of twentieth century, and brought to the fore one of the major difficulties still pertaining to memory today: how do we access memories that seem forgotten and what role do they play in remembering?

Today's pervasive preoccupation with memory is both rooted in and a product of the tenets that redefined it at the turn of the last century, when private and public forms of remembering were inextricably woven together, rendering the modern individualization and psychologization of memory critical to the coming into being of the psychological notion of autobiographical memory and its cultural ramifications in the late-twentieth century. Hence, our discussion of contemporary ideas of memory starts by looking at its historical roots and at the assumptions that fostered the modern reconceptualization of memory both psychologically and culturally. In order to ground the present landscape of remembering, we have to ask what the individualization and psychologization of modern memory meant and further consider the ways in which the moving image infiltrated the discourse of memory in modernity, when it became a referent for its novel theorization.

Film's optic procedures were invoked at the beginning of the twentieth century to talk about memory at the boundaries of biology and culture. The impression of shifting perspectives, speed and movement characteristic of the moving image replicated the pervading impression of 'the rapid telescoping of images', the accelerated tempo and the 'multiplicity of economic, occupational, and social life' that, according to Georg Simmel, denoted modernity and created 'the sensory foundations of mental life' for the modern individual (Simmel 1903, p. 325). Not only a medium for recording reality, the moving image offered a means for viewing the real anew and penetrating into its affective and emotional flow. In Walter Benjamin's words, 'we may truly say that with film a new realm of consciousness came into being' (Benjamin 1927/2005, p. 17). Hence, extending Gilles Deleuze's view, we can argue that with modernity film begins to stand as a way of thinking and as a way of remembering.

In considering the redefinition that memory underwent with modernity, we aim to revisit the relation between the cinematic medium and the 'inner film of the mind' and question the implications for such reciprocity. Of particular relevance is the role that the moving image played in the attempt to 'authenticate' puzzling psychological conditions such as hysteria and trauma. The relevance that we seek to outline resonates with the broader cultural appreciation of the moving image as a medium whose features both psychologists and filmmakers believed could be formally assimilated to those of memory. By suggesting continuity between mind and screen, modernity also maintained continuity between the memory image and the cinematic shot. The inner subjective contingency of remembering fraught with the gaps of forgetting found in the montaged image of film a correspondent on which remembering could be articulated. Such correspondence also extended from the individual to history rendering the moving image conducive for a representation of the past, which was no less fraught with amnesia and latency. The chapter outlines the modern reconceptualization of memory, and the implications of its individualization and psychologization pointing to the cultural, theoretical and experimental centrality of the moving image in such redefinition. This implies a consideration of the centrality of forgetting in psychological and psychoanalytical models of memory and a re-examination of key issues surrounding trauma and amnesia pointing to the relevance of the moving image in the assessment and theorization of such conditions.

1.1 Memory: A Modern Concept

The modern reconceptualization of memory is part of expanded historical and cultural shifts that involved new ways of perceiving, representing and narrating the self and its relations to the world. One of these shifts regards the Kantian concept of 'empirical self consciousness' and the emergence of a 'science of the self' (Berrios and Marková 2003, p. 13). This was founded on the notion of a spatio-temporal context particular to the individual that privileged the mind and one's own representations of the sensory perception and cognitive understanding of experience. Within this context, the self was understood as both an organic and phenomenological construct. And film helped to explain such a construct. Hence, according to French scientist and philosopher Félix Dantec, one's subjective experience is momentary, discontinuous and mutable as it unravels instant by instant 'like the images of the film camera' whose speed gives the impression of continuity despite the gap that separates each frame (Le Dantec 1901, pp. 166–167). The cinematic metaphor supports an idea of the self as an assemblage of disjointed sensations, thoughts, emotions and memories. These incessantly emerge as discrete images on the screen of the mind, combine and then disappear in a continuum of movement and impressions. Such conception of the self results from an increasingly secularized and *scientific* understanding of the mind and its processes including the organization of intimate memories (Danziger 2008, p. 105). This can be synthetized as a shift from a classical notion of memory as a mental faculty to that of a brain function that can be localized and understood, if only comparatively, in terms of other biological processes (Yates 1992; Draaisma 2000; Danziger 2008). Broadly speaking, the late-nineteenth-century physiological and psychological study of memory largely defined the approaches that still characterize today's memory research (Hacking 1996; Danziger 2008). In particular, the neurological study of memory begun by Paul Broca has continued in the localization of brain processes with an emphasis on the physiology and functioning of memory. Ebbinghaus's investigations in recall have paved the way to the experimental study of memory that informs laboratory psychology. By using numerical and phonic sequences in his experiments, Ebbinghaus identified three modes of remembering: voluntary conscious recall, involuntary conscious recall and non-conscious recall (Ebbinghaus 1885/1998, pp. 1–2), setting the premises for an understanding of the associative patterns in the retrieval of memories that are still pertinent today (Bernstern 2007, p. 20). A third approach focused on the study of memory dysfunctions (Hacking 1996), establishing the parameters for autobiographical memory. Common to all these approaches was an understanding of memory as an organic function,

biologically determined, on which consciousness could be grounded. Indeed, modern psychology contended with the organic formation of memories and their recall in terms of sensory perception, stimulation and association at cellular level. Yet, beyond this attempt to frame remembering organically loomed another question: who remembers? Whilst asking what memories are and where they are stored entailed the physiological and psychological mapping of memory processes, to ask who remembers required a consideration of 'the self' as both the subject and the object of remembering.

A contradiction was, in fact, already felt between the affective and emotional individuality of remembering and a purely mechanistic explanation of memory's processes in terms of excitation and retention of sensory stimuli. William James expresses such difficulty in his definition of what is 'a memory'. James understands 'a memory' as the representation of

> the fact to be recalled *plus* its associates, the whole forming one 'object' […], known in one integral pulse of consciousness […] and demanding probably a vastly more intricate brain-process than that on which any simple sensorial image depends. (James 1890/1998, p. 651)

James refers to the writing of French psychologist Charles Richet, who had theorized remembering by explaining it in terms of nerves' sensory stimulation and retention. According to Richet, an external sensation stimulated the nervous systems and memory retained a trace of the sensory stimulation. Associations caused by other stimuli could reactivate the trace kept in memory and produce a repetition of the original sensory stimulus as a mental representation (Richet 1886, p. 570, 1887, pp. 156–159). The relation between external sensation and the trace of the nerves' stimulation and its later associative repetition was believed to constitute the basic principle for the formation of a mental representation (i.e. a sensory imagery), including memories. James suggests that the principle of stimulus association does not explain the concentration of information that makes up a memory as an entity that includes and exceeds the sensory imagery from which it stems. The complex conflation of sensation, emotion and knowledge that constitute a single memory, according to James, enshrines both the act of remembering and the subject that ensues from it.

> Memory requires more than mere dating of a fact in the past. It must be dated in *my* past. In other words, I must think that I directly experienced its occurrence. It must have that 'warmth and intimacy' which were so often

> spoken of in the chapter on the Self, as characterizing all experiences 'appropriated' by the thinker as his own. (James 1890/1998, p. 650)

The placement of the past in a continuum of experience is insufficient to define 'a memory', since what renders the past memorable is the fact that it is unique to the subject who has experienced it. Hence, the self appropriates experience and makes it her own not only cognitively but also emotionally: remembering concerns 'the past' which it is felt and known subjectively. The self and the past are intimately bound together in the unfolding of remembering in the very particularity of an individual's sensory imageries and emotions. The emphasis on the subjective, intimate and emotional qualities of memories is indicative of an original interest in the personal connotations of remembering and the ways in which the individual *appropriates* experience and represents it to herself. In turn, this appropriation of the past maintains that the self is also, at least partly, her own past. According to French philosopher and psychologist Théodule Ribot, the self can be understood both in the immediacy of its present state of consciousness and in the continuity with the past that arises from memory (Hacking 1995, p. 207). At the same time, the knowledge of the past (as that which is invested with the qualities of *pastness*) is always, in James's view, '*mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing*' (James 1890/1998, pp. 605–606). Consciousness as the self-reflective act of grasping one's existence in the immanence of the present, as Henri Bergson argues, already implies the impermanence of the lived moment and the reverting of any conscious self-reflection into remembering. A memory is, in other words, a *re-presentation* of the lived moment which, in the very instant in which the self becomes aware of it, is already past (Bergson 1908/2005, pp. 150–151). The perception of the present continuously shifts consciousness into the immediacy of something past: the present is the transitory link connecting past (what has been experienced) and future (what one is about to experience) (Bergson 1908/2005, p. 150). James refers to the shifting and ungraspable present of consciousness as '*specious* present' (James 1890/1998, p. 609). Hence, experience can only be perceived retrospectively as a memory—that is as a re-presentation of the experience, what Bergson names memory-image (Bergson 1908/2005, p. 140). Consciousness seizes itself in the duration that binds present and past together and reveals itself through remembering (Bergson 1908/2005, pp. 133–177). However, the past as remembered and individualized is also fraught with gaps. In rooting the individual in memory, modernity also grounded the

self in the distortion and absence of memories resulting from forgetting. For the first time, forgetting is presupposed as inherent to remembering and what constitutes a memory.

The nineteen-century's interest in the mechanics of memory also led to an unprecedented preoccupation with the malfunctioning of memory that generated the temporary or complete inability to remember. Since its introduction in 1771—where it first appeared in a French translation of a nosology of diseases by François Boissier de la Croix de Sauvages—the term amnesia has been designated a 'medical disorder, a potential object of knowledge' (Hacking 1995, p. 206). True interest in the condition, however, did not arise until the nineteenth century, when cases of faulty remembering began to attract medical and popular attention, and only in the second half of the century did the study of amnesia became a means for the understanding of the dynamics of memory (Roth 2012, p. 5). Ribot was one of the first psychologists to theorize forgetting in relation to remembering. According to Ribot, memories were themselves 'a temporal and spatial abridgement of experience' since sensory stimuli were condensed and partially lost during encoding (Ribot 1885, pp. 60–61). Ribot, in other words, postulated forgetting as inherent to the process of remembering and conceived memories as a product of the interaction of remembering and forgetting. The supposed 'traces' or 'pale images' of experience that constitute a memory can, as Ebbinghaus remarked, 'suffer changes which more and more affect their nature', and they can be 'progressively weakened and obscured' (Ebbinghuas 1885/1998, pp. 62–65). Forgetting was thus normalized within an economy of remembering that was eminently lacunose and relied on a 'montage' of experience and its abridgement into condensed imageries in which time and place conflated and sensations and emotions merged. This normalization of forgetting further encompassed the decaying of memory that occurs during a lifetime and that underscores different types of amnesia. Ribot classified memory's loss according to stages in an individual's life and described a gradation from normality to pathology. Forgetting was thus objectified into a knowable condition of memory that could be studied and cured, when necessary (Hacking 1995, pp. 208–09). That also helped to explain the healthy processes of memory through the comparative insight gained from cases of amnesia (Roth 2012, p. 13). Maladies of memory, however, signalled a problem that went beyond disturbances of recall to encompass questions about 'the brain, the self, responsibility and normality' (Roth 2012, p. 4). If forgetting was *normal*, what was remembered *vis á vis* what was forgotten? What kind of self stemmed out of the lack or partial lack of memories?

And how did forgetting affect the relation between the individual and her past?

The clinical study of the aetiology of hysteria, psychic trauma and amnesia by promoters of 'dynamic psychiatry' (Micale 2004, p. 7; Hacking 1995, p. 199), including Sigmund Freud, Pierre Janet and Frederic Meyer, brought to the fore the emotional significance that the past played for the individual even when no apparent memories of it were consciously accessible. Personal memories were the raw material of a treatment that 'took the form of a life story' and of the writing of case studies that recounted 'the story of a single, ever-changing mental personality over time – a kind of psychiatric *Bildungsroman*' (Micale 2004, p. 7). In this life story, the self was not only rooted in memories but also in the troubling liminality of forgetting and amnesia. Latent disruptive memories were indeed believed to be symptomatic:

> Freud's concept of *repression* […] and Janet's concept of dissociation shared the distinction of being members of a historically new class of concepts relating to human memory: they were essentially *psychopathological* concepts, derived from the aberrations, not the ordinary or the ideal manifestations, of memory. Unlike previous notions about memory, they were deeply rooted in pathology, and the medical gaze that was required to identify this pathology. (Danziger 2008, p. 116)

At the same time, these concepts offered a means to posit the intricate connection between the individual and her personal past underpinning the reconceptualization of memory in modernity. They intimated the seamless interaction of remembering and forgetting that characterized the modern understanding of memory processes. Repression and dissociation in fact were not limited to pathological conditions but rather were proper of the individual's mental life. Both Freud and Janet drew attention to the historical construction of the individual in relation to the recurrent patterns that could be gathered from the memories of one's life story. Hence, the working through of psychoanalysis entailed an examination and, if necessary, a rearrangement of memories: the past was, in other words, interpreted and integrated into a narrative that rearticulated it anew for the individual. Such a past concerned both what one remembered and what one believed to have forgotten, thus suggesting the centrality of memory to the development of psychoanalysis. As Freud himself stated in 1895 the advancement of a 'psychological theory deserving any consideration' can only be formulated in terms of one capable to 'furnish an explanation of "memory"' (Freud 1895/1966, p. 299).

Freud's emphasis on early experiences and the related attention to childhood amnesia testifies to a rooting of the self in the critical formation and loss of early memories. The traces of these supposedly forgotten early memories could in fact become symptomatic in later life, as they resurfaced impinging on and interfering with the recollection of later experiences. Freud explained the 'unlimited receptive mental capacity for new perceptions' and their layering as 'permanent, though not unalterable memory traces' by famously comparing memory processes to a *Wunderblock* or 'Magic Writing Pad' (Freud 1925/1995, p. 228). The device consisted of a pad layered with wax and covered by a sheet of wax paper and one of transparent celluloid. The writing on the celluloid layer appeared on the wax paper sheet and could be erased by separating the paper from the wax layer. Yet, while the celluloid and paper sheet remained blank the wax layer underneath retained traces of the written text. According to Freud, the Magic Writing Pad showed 'both an ever-ready receptive surface and permanent traces of the notes that have been made upon it' (Freud 1925/1995, p. 228), thus acting as an apt metaphor for the mental formation of memories and the unconscious retention of their traces. Unlike Richet, however, Freud did not refer to the memory trace in terms of the organic imprint of an external sensory stimulus. Rather for Freud the memory trace implied the synaptic connections among memories. Hence, repression and the deferral of *Nachträglichkeit* (afterwardness) did not entail the memory of an event but rather the web of associative traces among memories. The material present in the form of memory-traces' was, as Freud stated, 'subjected from time to time to a *re-arrangement* in accordance with fresh circumstances – to a *re-transcription*' (quoted in Laplanche et al. 1967, p. 112). The psychoanalytic process interacted with such re-transcription and hence with the complex interrelation of memory processes, including forgetfulness and amnesia that, in Freud's economy of the mind, were indicative of the intrusive impinging of the past, particularly the *forgotten* past, on one's individual life.

In *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901), Freud had already drawn attention to the dynamic interaction of remembering, forgetting and misremembering in ordinary experiences. These were indicative of the psychic interference of repression and defence since memories could, at the same time, both reveal and conceal their associative traces. In this text, Freud revisits his discussion of screen memories (1899) —whereby the re-emergence of emotionally disturbing and sensory vivid early childhood memories is screened by their condensation with later and insignificant

memories. 'As the indifferent memories owe their preservation not to their own content but to an associative relation between their content and another which is repressed, they have some claim to be called "screen memories"' (Freud 1901/1995, p. 43). Screen memories are not confined to early recollection and denote the complex interaction of remembering and forgetting proper to memory and to 'the variety of psychical material' involved in memory processes (Freud 1901/1995, p. 47). Screen memories are mostly visual (and more generally highly sensory) and are often accompanied by a displaced point of view of the subject, which suggests the latent emotional resonance of what could otherwise appear as anodyne memories (Conway 2006, pp. 548–549). According to neuro-psychologist Martin Conway, screen memories are in fact 'endemic' in autobiographical remembering and, as Freud supposed, they imply broader and possibly more unsettling significance for the individual and the ways in which memory supports and conditions one's own life story (Conway 2006, pp. 548–549).

Screen memories anticipated the formulation of trauma as another key concept that posits the interaction of remembering and forgetting and the re-emergence of repressed contents. According to Freud, 'untamed memories' emerged unbidden to the psyche and, like screen memories, were vividly plastic. The mental images of these unbidden memories replicated disturbing aspects of the past. Repetition manifested itself as a psychic defining force of trauma. It acted like an inner unconscious structure of the self, which was deeply implicated in the haunting recurrence of trauma's memories and psychosomatic symptoms. Freud understood such recurrence in terms of the conflict that the survival of trauma imposed on the psyche: it was the unavoidable conflict between reality and representation, between the experience of the event and the psychic inability to know it that determined both its latency and recurrence (Freud 1919; Caruth 1996, p. 63 and 101; see also Brunner 2000; Leese 2002; Lerner 2003). As Cathy Caruth observes,

> The repetitions of the traumatic event – which remain unavailable to consciousness but intrudes repeatedly on sight – thus suggest a larger relation to the event that extends beyond what can simply be seen or what can be known, and is inextricably tied up with the belatedness and incomprehensibility that remains at the heart of this repetitive seeing. (Caruth 1996, p. 92)

Repetitive seeing as synonymous with the disturbance of trauma implicitly presupposes a projected image at the heart of trauma itself. Such an image,

as we shall further examine in the third chapter, is deeply implicated with the moving image, both conceptually and in its laboratory study. Trauma memories, in fact, imply imageries that are a 'montage' whereby point of view, condensation and superimposition, freeze and repetition concur in generating intrusive and highly vivid memories that interrupt the normal flow of mental activities. Such imageries, first posited within the modern reconceptualization of memory, acquire significance in the twentieth century theorization of trauma, whereby vivid intrusive memories confer on trauma its contested relation to reality. The unacknowledged cultural referent for such memories is the moving image itself.

Not unlike Freud, Pierre Janet's writing on memory, trauma and amnesia stems from his study of hysteria and the amnesia surrounding traumatic memories. Janet was particularly interested in the narrative structuring of memories (an idea which is central to today's theories). In his view, experiences were selected and categorized according to mental schemata that were given form by the conjuring up of mental imageries and stories on which the past was actively constructed and reconstructed in the present. Hence, Janet conceived memories 'as differed action' (Janet 1928, p. 234): memories were an attempt to overcome the absence and loss inherent in any articulation of the past by a belated imaginative (and therefore *performative*) reframing and projecting of past experiences into the present and a possible future (Janet 1928, p. 243). Remembering was thus an action whereby thought, affect and emotion were reworked and unreeled narratively in recollection. This process could however be hindered by the difficulty or impossibility of remembering disturbing elements of the past. Underpinning Janet's theories of memory was the presupposition of the dissociation that could ensue between the emotional and/or sensory and cognitive contents of a memory, thus preluding to the current notion.

Janet based the concept of dissociation on the observation of patients diagnosed with hysteria. He observed them, often when they were under hypnosis, and was interested in the ways in which they re-enacted events that they could not consciously recall. Janet related such re-enactments or the display of psychosomatic symptoms, including anaesthesia, amnesia and split personality, to the pervasiveness of fixed ideas (or traumatic memories) that were due to an internal dissociation of the painful emotional content of an experience from its conscious awareness. Such dissociation caused the insurgence of amnesia that accompanied trauma as protection against painful memories that were unconsciously impeded to remembering (Howell 2005, pp. 54–57). Through dissociation the

individual avoided the unsettling feelings caused by trauma by literally blocking their recall. The amnesia surrounding a traumatic experience and often the related life period could also be disturbed by the emergence of intrusive, acute, highly distressing and transient images or bodily experiences that were symptomatic of the unconscious (or as Janet referred to it subconscious) re-emergence of traumatic memories. Under hypnosis, whenever presented with a cue, Janet's patients would however re-enact the otherwise forgotten traumatic experience. According to Janet, only by reintegrating the dissociated aspect of these memories within conscious mental structures was it possible for the patient to gradually recollect the traumatic experience and psychically assimilate it.

What emerges as distinctive of the modern reconceptualization of memory, across both psychology and psychoanalysis, is an understanding of memories as not a direct recording and unreeling of experience but rather as reconstructed and condensed representations that remembering and forgetting shape in equal measure. The theoretical presupposition of memories as mental constructs is at the basis of the contemporary understanding of remembering as the result of the complex intersecting and layering of conscious and unconscious processes and contents. Also key is the interrelation recognized between the self and memories that foregrounds the modern psychologization and individualization of remembering. In emphasizing an appropriation of experience as memories that—as James claims—are infused with 'warmth and intimacy' modernity grounded the individual self in the past and its mnemonic imageries. This implicitly sets the premises for the late-twentieth-century's formulation of autobiographical memory whereby a new economy of the self and past is conceptualized through a theory of memory processes that accounts for the cognitive, emotional and affective centrality of remembering to one's mental life. Within this context, we can ask what rendered the moving image culturally relevant to the modern conceptualization of memory and, as a consequence, to its later twentieth and twenty-first century's theorization.

1.2 Mind and Screen

In the silent film *The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador* [*Le mystère des Roches de Kador* 1912], the director Léonce Perret exploits the popular appeal that cases of amnesia had at the beginning of the twentieth century. Reminiscent of Freud's or Janet's case studies, the film tells the story

Fig. 1.1 Léonce Perret, *The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador*, 1912, black and white silent film, film still © Musée Gaumont

of a young woman, Suzanne, who suffers from amnesia and a catatonic state following the witnessing of the supposed killing of her fiancée. In an attempt to treat Suzanne by enabling her to recollect her disturbing memories of such an event, her psychoanalyst, Professor Williams, deploys 'a new cinematographic method of psychotherapy' (Perret 1912: intertitle, Fig. 1.1). He films a re-enactment of the original traumatic scene in which Suzanne's jealous cousin tried to murder her fiancé by shooting him on the rocky seashore of Kador and then screens the filmed *mise-en-scène* for her. Brought into the consulting room turned film laboratory, Suzanne is seated in front of the blank screen. The latter stands for her amnesia and repressed trauma suggesting reciprocity between her inner mental state and the external surface where Professor Williams will project his film (Ludemo 2003; Väliaho 2007). Perret almost literalizes Freud's notion of screen memory rendering the screen both a site of displaced projection



Fig. 1.2 Léonce Perret, *The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador*, 1912, black and white silent film, film still © Musée Gaumont

and concealment, a blank surface that is yet highly evocative and capable of piercing through Suzanne's trauma and amnesia. During the screening of the film, Suzanne shows glimpses of recognition, as if memories were flashing in front of her. When the film is over, she stands in front of the blank screen still illuminated by the projector, her arms stretched out (Fig. 1.2). The film within the film acts both as hypnotic device and prosthesis of memory, thus denoting the modern fascination with a medium that was endowed with psychic potential. Such potential, as Perret's film suggests, relies on the double apparatus of reception (recording and editing) and repetition (projection) that, as filmmakers, psychologists and cultural commentators argued, was thought to be analogous to the interplay of conscious and unconscious processes of the mind.[1] It is such reciprocity of mind and screen that underlies the ways in which the moving image informs the modern reconceptualization of memory.

Early twentieth-century filmmakers and critics acknowledged the propensity of film to expose the fabric of modern life and reveal its hidden and even disturbing configurations. Continuity was established between the medium as a product of modernity and the historical contingencies with which it engaged. The sensitive surface of the film was, as it were, 'impressed' by reality, evincing traces of light, movement, temporal and spatial segments, which were pieced and re-pieced together producing a virtual image of the real and its ghostly shadows. Indeed, the syntactic construction of film was symptomatic of the moving image analogical relation to the inner processes of the self, on the one hand, and to an experience of reality as fragmented, on the other hand (Bratu-Hansen 2012, pp. 9–11). The moving image foreshadowed an image that was intensively affective and emotional and in which temporal and spatial planes condensed in and through movement. In the words of Siegfried Kracauer,

> Film patches together shot after shot and from these successively unfurling images mechanically recomposes the world – a mute world in which no word passes between human beings, in which the incomplete speech of optical impressions is the only language. The more the represented object can be rendered in the succession of mere images, the emblem of simultaneous impressions, the more it corresponds to the filmic technique of association. (Kracauer 1995, p. 287)

Kracauer recognizes in montage the signature of film whereby the 'truncated' image of each frame—as writes Jean Epstein—is recomposed as 'a mobile section' through 'sinuous, variable and contractile' temporal and spatial modulations (Epstein 1921, p. 107). The moving image thus emulates the surging and dissipating of transient and fleeting impressions and the ceaseless 'flow of life' imbued with 'emotional and intellectual contents' hinting at a continuum between the material and mental dimensions, filmic and mental associations: 'cinematic films'—argues Kracauer—'evoke a reality more inclusive than the one they actually picture. They point beyond the physical world to the extent that the shots or combinations of shots from which they are built carry multiple meanings' (Kracauer 1960, p. 71). Indeed, as filmmaker and film historian Lutz Becker observes, montage

> grew from the wish to explore and combine often diverse and fragmented visual information. The compilation and combination of selected images or image components was based on the perception of simultaneity and the parallelism of opposites. (personal communication, 3 November 2015)

The layering of spatial perspective and temporal lapse conveyed the self-reflexivity of the medium and 'the practical capacity to break down the limits between historical time, memory time and event time, which was the true attraction of this new medium' (personal communication, 3 November 2015). This practical capacity also underpinned its psychical endowment.

Dziga Vertov's experimental film *The Man with a Moving Camera* (1926) exemplifies the self-reflective potential of the moving image and the syntagmatic structure of montage. In the initial titles, Vertov claims that the film is based on live footage of twenty-four hours in a Soviet city. In reality, the film was shot over a period of three years in Odessa, Kiev and Karviv (Aiken 2013, p. 602). In the final editing, Vertov intentionally conflates the disparity of locations and temporal gaps, and overtly displays the constructiveness of filmmaking. He shows the processes of shooting 'in motion', the visual and figurative condensation obtained through double exposure and superimposure of shots, the effects of close-ups and rapid speed-shifts and those achieved in the editing room through the cutting and montage of frames. The film mirrors its own process of making and exposes its inner plasticity, mobilizing the traces of reality in ways that resonate with Benjamin's and Kracauer's critique of the medium as a technology of historical reflexivity. The montaged images of Vertov's film apprehend actuality and represent it as condensed, superimposed imageries imbued with subliminal cues—cultural as well as psychological—on which a representation of the real and hence, by extension, of the past can be grounded. At stake, however, it is not the indexicality of the moving image, but rather the affective proclivity of the medium with its inherent features of motion, frame and montage. Indeed, these features can unexpectedly display, like a slip of tongue, otherwise indeterminate, hidden or suppressed aspects of experience (Bratu-Hansen 2012, p. 156). That is, they can display the 'otherness' of things by blurring distinctions between subjective and objective perceptual experiences, uncannily duplicating and projecting the real in its unsettling alterity (Bratu-Hansen 2012, p. 17).

Critical to the modern reflection on the moving image and its reciprocity with the mind is the formal potential of the medium itself. Science is invoked to substantiate the seamless nervous charge that runs through the skin and the celluloid film, the fabric of modern life and the screen. In turn, the moving image is endowed with visceral and hallucinatory potential, emotional content and latent resonances, suggesting affinity between the film shot and the memory image. In commenting on the magnifying effect of close-up, Kracauer remarks,

> Any huge close up reveals new and unsuspected formations of matter; skin textures are reminiscent of aerial photographs, eyes turn into lakes or volcanic craters. Such images blow up our environment in a double sense: they enlarge it literally; and in doing so, they blast the prison of conventional reality, opening up expanses which we have explored at best in dreams before. (Kracauer 1960, p. 48)

According to Kracauer, cinema and science share a focus on the minute details of material phenomena. They act as an apparatus of consciousness since they are both able to 'sensitiz[e] us to the tremendous energies accumulated in the microscopic configuration of matter' (Kracauer 1960, p. 50). In bringing to bear a magnifying lens on modern life in its multiform and ever mutating, if not aggressively saturated, manifestations, film exposes the viewer both physically and emotionally to its nervous jolt and opens up a perceptive landscape that is so to speak 'unconscious'. The Freudian model of the psyche as a space of temporal and spatial condensation, latent contents and repetition translates as a figurative dimension of the real. The virtual imageries of the mind and, by extension of memory, find a correlate in the cinematic image as affectively and subliminally significant. In his theory of montage, Sergei Eisenstein observes that montage bears the *feeling of the shot*, since it results

> from the collision and combination of the individual stimuli inherent in it. These stimuli are heterogeneous as regards their 'external natures,' but their reflex-physiological essence binds them together in an iron unity. Physiological in so far as they are 'psychic' in perception, this is merely the physiological process of *a higher nervous activity*. (Eisenstein 1929/1963, p. 67)

The neurological concept of *innervation* migrates from the physical body to the sensitive transparent film to affect and shock. Benjamin expands on the concept and refers to innervation as the 'neurophysiological process that mediates between internal and external, psychic and motoric, human and mechanic registers' (Bratu-Hansen 2012, p. 133; Benjamin 1929/2005). Hence, as a medium, the moving image figuratively replicates the physical and psychological thresholds of the self, the flow of stimuli that move through the conscious and unconscious layers of reality and the mind alike. By capturing familiar aspects of movement and materiality and representing them anew through slow motion, accelerated speed, close up or superimposition, the moving image thus insinuates into the unconscious potential of the real and its latent signification. On this reciprocity of mind and screen, of an image and its otherness, Benjamin

envisages 'an image of the past' that oscillates between the event and its remembrance, between temporal and spatial determination, between memory and representation. Accordingly, the shock of perception that Benjamin ascribes to the cinematic image becomes synonymous with the shock of history, of a condensed image that blasts out of the continuum of the real and from which the individual and collective pasts emerge as memories (Bratu-Hansen 2012, p. 144).

Film directors exploited such potential of the moving image to tap into the subliminal folds of experience and use the screen as a surface of affective projection and cultural recollection. Hence, in *Secrets of the Soul* [*Geheimnisse einer Seele*] (1926), Georg Wilhelm Pabst figuratively reels the unconscious unfurling of dream and phantasy through cinematic experimentation.[2] The protagonist of the film is a man, Martin, whose anxiety about his childless marriage manifests in his jealousy toward his wife and the unconscious wish to kill her. The film deals with the insurgence of Martin's neuroses and its psychoanalytical treatment by drawing on dream's mimetic figuration and its interpretation (Salina 1979, p. 25). The film visually merges the subject and object of psychoanalytical interpretation. By means of montaged and superimposed images Pabst conjures up Martin's eerie inner world intentionally alluding to the screen as a virtual site of dreamlike projections, whereby the mind's imageries and those on the celluloid film result from similar processes of condensation and displacement. Overflowing with symbols and associative connections, *Secrets of the Soul* intimates Virginia Woolf's remark about film's visceral affective charge. 'It seems plain'—writes Woolf—'that the cinema has within its grasp innumerable symbols for emotions' that do not belong to words but rather to 'speed and slowness; dartlike directness and vaporous circumlocution' (Woolf 1926/1966, pp. 270–271). Such qualities are apparent, according to Woolf, in Robert Wienes's film, *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* [*Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari*] (1919), in which a 'shadow in the shape of a tadpole' threateningly appears at a corner of the screen: 'It swelled to an immense size, quivered, bulged, and sank back into nonentity' (Woolf 1926/1966, p. 270). Characteristically, the sequence contains 'some residue of visual emotion' proper to film only, whereby emotions 'mingling together and affecting each other' are shown as they flash before the eye (Woolf 1926/1966, p. 271), in ways that are viscerally potent and sinisterly evocative (Fig. 1.3).

Wienes's film, as Anton Kaes argues in his discussion of German expressionist cinema during the Weimar Republic, is a veiled reflection

Fig. 1.3 Robert Wienes, *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari*, 1919, black and white silent film, film still courtesy of a private collector

on the overwhelming legacy of World War I and is steeped in psychic and historical trauma. 'Caligari's historical unconscious is the memory of a traumatic experience. The film itself serves as a flashback to an event that has hardly passed, inviting the audience to recover the memory however discomforting' (Kaes 2009, p. 54). The film both mimics the psychoanalytical process of memory's retrieval under hypnosis and is itself the figurative unravelling of traumatic remembering. Flashbacks, abrupt cuts, the deliberately surreal setting and narrative fragmentation push the film's aesthetic and formal features to reveal, to use Benjamin's phrase, its innermost *optic unconscious.* Robert Reinert's *Nerves* [*Nerven*] (1919) also acknowledges trauma as a condition of modernity as well as of the modern individual: 'In my own nerves' read the inter-titles between two sequences in which one of the characters reflects on his disturbed state, 'I recognize the nerves of the whole world. The nerves of the world are ill' (Reinert 1919, inter-title). Affected by the shock of war and modernity at large, Reinert's character oscillates between lucidity and hallucination, as delirious shots saturated with memories fragment and collide

with the film's narrative (Kaes 2009, pp. 41–43; 49–54). The moving image is thus imbued with the memory trace and compulsive repetition of repressed trauma. Like dream, film 'works through trauma by restaging it' and hence displays a vicarious image of its original shock (Kaes 2009, pp. 51–52) that is both individually and historically disturbing. Like memory, the celluloid film is inscribed with the endless repetition of a latent content that obliquely surfaces in the tadpole-like shadow of *Dr. Caligari*'s and *Nerves*' disquieting afterimages. Thus, Woolf's acknowledgment of film's 'residue of visual emotion' implicates the syntactic affectivity of the moving image not only as a correlate of psychic life but also, as Kracauer argues, of the impending breaking down of Europe between the two world wars. Janus-faced, the moving image holds to both the psychic and cultural analogy and is anchored on both the emotional inner experience of the shot and the physical actuality of the image, on the event and its mental (and cultural) representations.

1.3 Moving Memories

The modern alignment of mind and screen within the cultural arena also extended to the psychology laboratory: here the formal modalities of film offered both a referent for the theoretical modelling of memory and its processes, and an experimental tool for the study of memory dysfunctions on which the dialectic of self and memory, recollection and amnesia, inner and outer realities could be articulated. One of the pioneers in the psychological study of both film and memory was the physiologist and psychologist Hugo Münsterberg who, in *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study* (1916), argued that the formal structure of film was paradigmatic of the working of the mind. Münsterberg maintained within a psychological framework the correlation between mind and screen that was part of the critical currency of the medium at the turn of the twentieth century. Film's features of camera angle, frame, or close-up mirrored mental imageries and rendered evident internal processes of perception, emotion and memory. Münsterberg, not unlike Kracauer, was primarily interested in the audience reception of film and on the insight that could be gained by the impressions that film affected on the spectator. Hence, the moulding of images in film could be envisioned as the mind's shifts of attention, the flowing of emotion and the seamless movements of remembering and imagining. Indeed, for Münsterberg, film or what he referred to as *photoplay*

> has the mobility of our ideas which are not controlled by the physical necessity of outer events but by the psychological laws for the association of ideas. In our mind past and future become intertwined with the present. The photoplay obeys the laws of the mind rather than those of the outer world. (Münsterberg 1916/2002, p. 91)

Like no other medium, the moving image could intimate the inner 'awareness of contrasting situations, this interchange of diverging experiences in the soul' (Münsterberg 1916/2002, p. 92). Though Münsterberg's psychological ideas would soon be superseded, his writing on film resonates with broader cultural assumptions about the formal apparatus of film and a supposed reciprocity with the mind. If film theory embraced psychology and psychoanalysis as part of the critical and interpretative currency of the medium, the cultural alignment of mind and screen that was broadly assumed in the first decades of the century implicitly helped to develop novel theoretical and experimental approaches to the study of memory and its processes.

Münsterberg was particularly concerned with the untrustworthiness of memories, which he believed was evident in forensic testimonies. He thought that psychology could have inestimable applications in testing the reliability of witnesses. According to Münsterberg, like film audiences who could be easily influenced by the formal strategies of the medium without their awareness, whenever someone recalled an event and, even more so in the witness box, internal and external influences could, without the person realizing it, affect remembering. Memories were, in fact, themselves pliable and could be unconsciously altered by the imagination or interfering stimuli at recall (Winter 2012, pp. 9–32). Like a camera, memory recorded experience, yet the trace of this recording was affected by the continuous unravelling of external and internal events, and its 'replay' was consequently blurred or flawed. Münsterberg's concern with false memories overlapped with the recognized instability of memories and their malleability. At stake was the nature of the memory trace and of the processes that regulated memories' formation and retrieval. In the first half of the twentieth century, technologies of visual and sound recording instigated more or less explicit parallels for conceptualizing such processes as well as acting as a means of remembrance on which new mediatized forms of remembering were inflected both individually and collectively.[3] However, relevant to our discussion it is not the straightforward analogy of mental processes with technologies of recording. Rather, what was and is still critical to the role that the moving image played and continues to play in

the modern and contemporary discourses of memory is the conceptual continuity established between mind and screen. The moving image and its optic procedures provided early psychologists with a means that was germane in their effort of developing a model that could explain the features experimentally observed about how and what one remembers.

Significant in this respect is Frederic Bartlett's theorization of the constructive character of memories (now commonly accepted). Bartlett's model in fact challenged an understanding of the memory trace as a record of experience similar to a photograph or filmstrip that could be replayed at recall. First elaborated in the 1920s and further developed in the second edition of *Remembering* (1932), Bartlett's notion of constrictive memories focuses on the ways in which memories change over time and underlines the interfering of forgetting in remembering, thus demonstrating how memories are in themselves mental 'constructs'. Hence, memories are actively reshaped in remembering to fulfil the requirement of a present situation: central to his examination of remembering are 'the active mental processes that he believed made events meaningful' (Winter 2012, p. 199). As he writes, memories are 'imaginative reconstructions' or 'constructions': they are 'built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organized past reactions or experience, to a little outstanding detail which commonly appears in image or in language form' (Bartlett 1932, p. 213). James's appropriation of the past as 'my past' is reformulated in terms of 'the relation of our attitude' to 'a whole active mass of organized past reactions or experience', whereby a cue or detail activates a web of connections and reflections through which a new imagery (verbal, visual and otherwise) is generated, which differs from the past because of the inherent link to the present. Memories, in other words, display our attitude and specific reconstruction of the past in relation to the present and the internal organization of information and knowledge, which is how the past itself has been encoded. 'Blending, condensation, omission and invention' all partake of the compound reconstruction of past experiences in the formation of memories (Bartlett 1932, p. 309). Information is drawn upon and adapted to pre-existing knowledge in order to apprehend and make sense of present circumstances. Underpinning such reconstruction are what Bartlett names *schemata* (i.e. an active organization of past reactions and/or information. Bartlett 1932, p. 201). Schemata are mental frameworks on which information about one's life experience and knowledge are organized according to pre-existing cultural scaffoldings.

Bartlett based his theories on specially devised experiments, in which he used both images and narrative texts to probe mental processes. These included abstract inkblots and photographs of military men in which the particularity of each face was presented according to standard visual conventions, and short narrative stories. Independently of the kind of material the participants to the experiments were exposed to, Bartlett observed that there was a consistency in the ways in which the recollection of the text or image resulted from a personal reconstruction in relation to predetermined patterns. Among Bartlett's experiments is one based on 'The War of Ghosts' an indigenous haunting tale about death that had been transmitted orally and collected by the ethnographer Franz Boas (Winter 2012, pp. 205–214).[4] In writing about 'The War of Ghosts', Bartlett observes that the disjointed structure of the story resembled that of silent films without the support of inter-titles and that the participants to the experiments inadvertently added the missing connections as associative links to establish narrative coherence by relying on culturally established patterns of narrative construction in order to avoid the puzzling features in the tale (Winter 2012, p. 211). At the same time, this ghostly story of disappearance also evoked, in some of the subjects, painful associations with World War I intimating the criticality of 'affective determination in remembering':

> Nearly all the men who reproduced this story had been to War or were faced with the probability that they would soon have to go, or thought that they ought to go. I think it not fanciful to say that this story reminded them of their situation, and in fact some admitted that it did. The reference to relatives had a personal application in most cases, and it is more than likely that it was this that made the reference a dominant detail to remembering. (Bartlett 1932, p. 79)

The emotional association with the war was omitted in the retelling of the tale in later experiments, confirming Bartlett's supposition of the contingency of remembering to the specific circumstances in which one person found herself at any given time of retelling. According to Bartlett, emotion was one the critical factors of such interplay. What rendered memories personal, in fact, was not an abstract idea of the self but rather the intersecting at any given moment between what one experientially apprehended and the mental schemata which, in themselves were 'a function of consciousness', at the same time specific to each individual and culturally determined (Bartlett 1932, p. 213).

Although Bartlett did not use film as an experimental tool, his constructive model of memories can be regarded as *cinematic*. The active rework of traces of memories across the schemata generates narratives or sensory imageries (visual, acoustic, haptic) by means of selection, combination and condensation. Details, as Bartlett maintains, are picked out, modulated and reworked through formal, semantic and thematic association or juxtaposition in ways that are notionally akin to montage: memory's imageries are, in the psychologist's words, 'an assemblage of the past in the present' (Bartlett 1932, p. 219). Not unlike a filmic sequence, the assemblage that characterizes memory's imageries unfurls across extensive topical, temporal and affective associative patterns (active mass of organized past reactions or experience). In Bartlett's model, the memory's imagery shares the irreducible relation of time and space that Deleuze—following Bergson—ascribes to the cinematic image since in remembering temporal and spatial separateness condense. Memory, as Bartlett claims, achieves 'the most complete release from the narrowness of presented time and place' (Bartlett 1932, p. 314) through a virtual imagery of the past that is affectively and emotionally resonant as time and space condense and combine within and across memories. As Deleuze argues of the moving image, remembering can be situated for Bartlett at the non-chronological edge between past and present, 'of indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual' (Deleuze 1989, p. 79). It is the recognition of such indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual in memory that renders Bartlett's model congruent to contemporary ideas of remembering and it is indicative of the ways in which the moving image is pertinent to a critical consideration of models of memory.

The shaping and reshaping of the past that denotes individual remembering can also be extended to the group, advancing a hypothesis of collective remembering. Preluding contemporary ideas (Wertsch and Roediger 2008), Bartlett observes,

> Alike with the individual and with the group, the past is being continually re-made, reconstructed in the interest of the present, and in both cases certain outstanding events or details may play a leading part in setting the course of reaction. Just as individual recall takes on a peculiar personal tinge, owing to the play of temperament and character; so that kind of recall which is directed and dominated by social conditions takes a colouring which is characteristic of the special social organization concerned, owing to the play of preferred persistent tendencies in the group. (Bartlett 1932, p. 309)

Bartlett presumes modalities of remembering for the group similar to those identified for the individual, and further underlines that remembering, whether individually or within a group, always makes use of the past in the present and is conditioned by shared attitudes and frameworks that are culturally and socially determined. Within Bartlett's psychological model, group remembering results from the fluid and dynamic mediation of life experience and paradigms of interpretation that determine the specificity of memories within different groups and across time periods and places. No less for the individual than for the group, remembering is an *active* and *performative* process in which individual and social and cultural features interweave and interact. As for the individual, similarly for the group, details trigger remembering and memories are characteristically 'tinged' and 'coloured' by social and cultural schemata, in an active 'playing' of montage reconstruction.

Bartlett's assumption of group remembering both resonates with and is distinct from Maurice Halbwachs' more widely known notion of collective memory, which was put forward in the late 1920s. In debt to Bergson's ontological idea of memory, whereby memory is a condition one inhabits to make sense of the world, Halbwachs conceives collective memory as an integrated picture of the past on which group identity is articulated through practices, traditions, institutions, narratives, places and the like. Memories are part 'of a totality of thoughts common to a group' (Halbwachs 1992, p. 52). Halbwachs anchors individual and group identity in memory and suggests that in turn personal memory (and the processes of perception and emoting that inform it) are already socially determined by the frameworks (or *cadres médiaux de mémoire*) that shape an individual socially through communication and interaction with one's group (i.e. family, peer group, social group and the like). Since, according to Halbwachs, the ways in which one sees and represents the past are part of common practices that are socially and culturally grounded, memories are not only biologically and psychologically determined, but also and most prominently socially and culturally shaped (Halbwachs 1992, p. 53). Yet, whilst one's remembering draws on different frameworks in ways that are specific to each individual, thus explaining why personal memories of an event tend to differ among people, social memories are, according to Halbwachs, stable and homogeneous among the group in order to maintain social cohesion and group's identity. Hence, Halbwachs envisages social memory as a shared

space, which unifies the past into common stories, images and practices (Halbwachs 1992, pp. 182–189).

Within distinct disciplinary frameworks, both Halbwachs and Bartlett suppose mediation between the individual and the social groups to which one belongs through memory. Whilst memory helps to establish and maintain groups' identities, as it is involved in shared practices of communication and representation, memory itself is shaped by identity as it manifests socially through acquired mental frameworks. In emphasizing the fact that memory endows groups' identities with cohesion and continuity, Halbwachs envisages a concept of memory that is stable. This confers on memories a more or less conservative function for both the individual and society. Forgetting also plays a similar function in smoothing discrepancies among different versions of the past. Whilst Halbwachs acknowledges the reshaping of memories across groups and over time, and maintains that the reconstructing of the past always entails a distortion and the 'erasure' of what might hinder the cohesion of the group, he does not problematize the consequences of the distortion and erasure that are active in the formation and transmission of collective memories (Halbwachs 1992, pp. 182–183). According to Halbwachs,

> This is why society tends to erase from its memory all that might separate individuals, or that might distance groups from each other. It is also why society, in each period, rearranges its recollections in such a way as to adjust them to the variable conditions of its equilibrium. (Halbwachs 1992, pp. 182–183)

The emphasis on equilibrium also implies that historical recollection cannot be assimilated to social memory and that the latter undermines the disturbance of the erasure of elements of the past in favour of a confirmation of groups' identities. Implicitly, and perhaps not casually, Halbwachs' model presupposes a *repression* of historical recollection within the social reconstruction of the past, posing the notional conditions for the absorption and inflection of amnesia that mars most of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century conceptions of social memories.

Bartlett's model differs from Halbwachs' since it focuses on remembering as an active and contingent process that continuously adapts and changes memories so that cultural and social frameworks are dynamically used in shaping memories, both individually and collectively. Underpinning Bartlett's approach is the conviction that the psychological mechanisms of memory (including the malleability of memories and the reconfiguration

of the past that this entails) also affect inter-subjective remembering (Hirst et al. 2012, pp. 144–147). Such a distinction is fundamental since it begs the question of the agency of the individual or group of individuals in the uses of the past and its representations across generations and places. Bartlett's assumption of group remembering however did not influence early thinking on social and cultural memories, and his theory of remembering—particularly the notion of *schemata*—has only entered considerations of collective and cultural articulations of memories at the turn of the twentieth century (Wertsch 2009, p. 129; Erll 2011, p. 4; Hoskins 2009, p. 38). In particular, James Wertsch adopts Bartlett's schemata to argue that groups construct memories according to templates that are shared and pervasive. This may also result in versions of the past that are flawed with omissions and misconstructions, but in which individuals actively partake to shape shared representations of the past (Wertsch 2009, pp. 129–130). Bartlett's model of remembering and the ways in which he endows memories with contingency in the virtual assemblage of past and present also resonate with Benjamin's reflections on the uses and reconfiguration of the past in the present. For Bartlett and Benjamin, *montage* is a constant referent for the designation of this process. As suggested, Bartlett envisages groups' remembering as akin to individual remembering, and the representations of the past that ensue follow similar montage-like processes whereby details are gleaned and reconfigured across patterns of associations through processes of blending, condensation, omission and invention. According to Benjamin, history is also 'a structure whose site is not homogenous, empty time, but time fulfilled by the presence of the now [*Jetztzeit*]' (Benjamin 1940/1999, p. 253). Memory destabilizes the traditional construction of history with an image whose latent content lingers on in the present, 'For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concern'—according to Benjamin—'threatens to disappear irretrievably' (Benjamin 1940/1999, p. 247). The image of history, no less than that of memory, dynamically emerges from the present uses of the past, and it is affectively significant. Benjamin recognizes in montage a dialectical form in which a reflection on the past can be envisaged (Buck-Morss 1991, pp. 77 and 220–221). The moving image thus offers us a means to conceptualize a multifaceted, polymorphous and polyphonic construction of history from which what was previously unnoticed can be made visible, and new perspectives can arise. Oscillating between the particular and the general, the image of history is thus akin to that of memory.

1.4 The Inner Film of the Mind

The modern intersecting of film and memory was not limited to theoretical models of memory; it also invested practical applications of film in laboratory research. Within this context, the optic innervation that, according to Benjamin, denoted the moving image displaying anew the correlation between the individual and reality, the past and its present representations, acquires specific connotations in the use of film in the study of trauma and amnesia. This redefines the boundaries of visibility that underscore the modern alignment of mind and screen. The origins of the laboratory use of the moving image coincide with the broader scientific relevance of photography within laboratory practices of measurement and graphic inscription (Cartwright 1995, pp. 3 and 5–9; Dror 1999). From its advent in the mid-nineteenth century photography had also been deployed for documenting and authenticating mental states in an attempt to capture inner signs of perturbation. One of the pioneers in the use of photography was the neurologist Duchenne de Boulogne who visually mapped and classified the changes in facial expression according to different emotional states by photographing the expression of his sitters as their facial muscles contracted under electro stimulation. Duchenne, a contemporary of Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salpêtrière, aimed to fix the transient and fleeting signs of joy, sorrow or fear establishing continuity between the external surfacing of emotion and the internal physiological occurrence. This correlation between internal disturbance and external manifestation, between the non-visible (physiological changes could only be detectable through measurement) and overtly visible changes and signs, was also at the core of the experimentation with photography and film of Albert Londe (Désiré Magloire and Paul Regnard). Their collaboration with Charcot aimed to capture the 'hysteric body' beyond the ostensible visibility of the presumed symptoms.

Within this early approach, the scientific relevance of the still and moving image exceeded their indexical capacity providing a more complex web of signification than mere evidential proof. As Georges Didi-Huberman remarks about Londe's pictures for Charcot, photography and film were part of methods for construing scientific knowledge (Didi-Huberman 2003, pp. 8–9).[5] 'Photography, for Charcot,'—observes Didi-Huberman—'was simultaneously an experimental procedure (a laboratory tool), a museological procedure (scientific archive), and teaching procedure (a tool of transmission)' (Didi-Huberman 2003, p. 30). As such it

was, at the same time, a means of observation that enabled the generalization of the individual's case into the aetiology of the disorder and 'a modality of signification' (Didi-Huberman 2003, p. 30), a trace—not unlike a diagram or clinical note—that contained observable and interpretable data that could be further abstracted and studied. Hence, film as a laboratory apparatus that was capable of capturing external movement and indirectly displaying inner motion was linked to contemporary technologies of physiological measurements and signification. As Eisenstein remarks about the close-up, its main function is 'not so much to *show* or *present* as to *signify*, to *give meaning*, to *designate*' (Eisenstein 1944/1963, p. 238). It is this capacity to signify and designate that denotes the laboratory use of film and its relevance in the study of memory.

The methodological functions of 'experimental procedure', 'museological procedure' and 'teaching procedure' are evident in the experimentation with film of the Belgian neuro-anatomist and neurologist Arthur van Gehuchten. A contemporary of Charcot, van Gehuchten used a fixed camera to film patients suffering from Parkinson's disease in order to review in slow motion the characteristic tremor, rigidity of the gait, tilt of the trunk, masked faces and fixed gaze. The moving image rendered possible isolating of the bodily symptoms into single distinct frames and then recomposing them in motion, thus evincing features not otherwise observable. The extant films show men and women repeating the single task ascribed to them by the physician behind the camera, almost complicit in the process that was meant to record their involuntary movements and implicitly confirm their medical condition (Gimenez-Roldan and Aubert 2007; Aubert 2002). Van Gehuchten's film experimentation also extended to other disorders, including hysteria, which he regarded as a psycho-nervous disorder (or neurosis) caused by 'the power of suggestion' that he believed was effective on a pre-existing and specific sensibility of the nervous system (van Gehuchten 1920, pp. 766–772). This determined the bodily capacity to use physiological mechanisms to simulate symptoms with no organic reference. The perplexing dissociation between the symptom and its causes destabilized a straightforward reciprocity of interiority and exteriority that film was meant to re-establish. The formal pliability of the moving image, with its inherent possibilities of slow and fast motion, freeze frame and montaged shot, was in fact believed to be apt in reinstating the inner split of hysteria by revealing the opaque correlation between the overt psychosomatic symptom and its supposed neurological origins, thus generating a site on which the aetiology of the disorder could be construed.[6]

This supposed capacity of film to mediate the correspondence between the inner and outer body and record fleeting emotional and physical changes acquired particular significance in the first decades of the twentieth century when film began to be used in the clinical study of trauma ascribed to shell shock and war neuroses, whose symptomatology crossed that of hysteria. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, film was employed to *document* and *authenticate* the altered states of mind of patients suffering from war-related trauma whose treatment included hypnosis and psychoactive drugs (Winter 2004, pp. 371–374). The procedures of these films were not dissimilar to those of early neurological footage. Critical to the use of the moving image was a similar attempt to signify, give meaning to and designate by mediating the psychic split of trauma through the formal pliability of the medium. On the one hand, film acted as a means to chart the compulsive symptomatology of trauma and the recovery of traumatic memories on which a diagnostic plot of treatment and recovery could be constructed. On the other hand, it acted as a means to designate the disorder and its symptomatology.

Early films, such as those by Arthur Hurst and J.L.M. Symns, recorded at Netley Military Hospital in Hampshire in south west England at the end of World War I, show the initial exertion of patients affected by paralysis, amnesia, spasms and other trauma-related symptoms. Hurst and Symns believed in the hysteric origins of war neurosis and the suggestiveness of its symptoms that they treated with the help of hypnosis and physiotherapy. Though implausible, the films' *mise-en-scène* of a before-after cure displays a process of physical and mental transformation that validated not only the improbable 'efficacy' of the treatment but also the disorder itself. Within this context, the body acted like a 'screen' that both displayed and concealed the physical and psychological impact of trauma: it made palpable the repetition of the traumatic event in the compulsive iteration of the symptom and at the same time displaced it at the boundaries of visibility. Hence, the footage itself became a trace of the repressed trauma and of its belated unravelling reiterating the process of the hypnotic treatment itself. In discussing the use of hypnosis in the psychoanalytical treatment of trauma, Ernst Simmel compares the recall of otherwise inaccessible traumatic memories to a film:

> By means of hypnosis an experience can be repeated; 'the film' is made to roll once again; the patient dreams the whole things once more, the sensitized subconscious releases the affect, which in turns discharges an adequate emotional expression and the patient is cured. (Kaes 2009, p. 49)

Simmel aligns 'the inner film of the mind' with the filmstrip as a sensitized surface that bears the trace of the original shock at the boundaries of obliteration and visibility, of dissolvance and superimposition, of amnesia and recollection. The blank screen of Perret's story of trauma and *Dr. Caligari*'s disquieting images stand as the cultural analogue of the inner unravelling of recovered traumatic memories. In an attempt to grapple with the pain of psychic trauma, the moving image is invoked to designate the troubling recovery of its disturbing memories recognizing in the screen the apt referent for envisaging the repression and repetition that surrounds the original shock of trauma itself.

Film documentation of the treatment of war trauma continued well into the late 1940s and early 1950s. In particular, it was used for drug-induced altered states of mind, for example, induced insulin coma or by injecting barbiturates, such as amobarbital (sodium amytal), which was deployed by British psychiatrists Stephen Horsley, William Satton and Eliot Slater (Winter 2004, pp. 381–391). By lessening the nervous response produced by fear, induced altered states facilitated the emergence of traumatic memories that could thus be examined during treatment and possibly integrated with the help of post-hypnotic suggestion (Winter 2004, p. 381). Rather than the recovery from the physical symptoms of trauma, the emphasis was on the integration of the disturbing memories that trauma caused by 'accessing' and 'manipulating' the mind's content in the state of trance. The process was reminiscent of film editing: Simmel's 'inner film of the mind' was made bare in front of the camera and turned into an 'outer film' which supposedly exposed—to use Deleuze's phrase—the 'affective image' of trauma (Deleuze 1989, pp. 54–55), as the total collapse and disturbance of memory. The unrolling of the inner film matched the screening of the body as a site of the mind's most distressed states. Such film was filled with Woolf's 'residue of visual emotion'. It mobilized the past with the gasps, jolts and suspensions of remembering, with the hallucinatory recurrence of what was forgotten. Mostly, this film—literally and figuratively, individually and culturally—displayed 'the disintegrated unity' of remembering imbued with the '*unredeemed*' ghost of reality that pervades what is remembered as well as what is forgotten (Kracauer 1995, pp. 50–51), thus pointing to a criticality that exceeds the medical document.

On the whole, laboratory film footage has contributed to corroborate the centrality of the medium in 'the medical management' and 'in the very configuration of memory and identity' in the early decades of the twentieth century (Winter 2004, p. 368). Indeed, film

> helped to shape conventions of representation for altered states of mind and the psychophysiology of selfhood as well as interpretations of the self as if constituted and recalled by acts of remembering. As a result, the history of the medium is immanent in some of modernity's most elemental concepts of self and memory. (Winter 2004, p. 369)

Both in the laboratory and in the cultural arena, the screen thus acts as a dual site for the projection and obliteration of memories, positioning both film and memory at the intersection of the individual and culture, of mind and history. Within the confinements of standard laboratory procedures as well as without in the experimentation of early silent film, the moving image is, as it were, called upon to 'find a language for extreme psychological states', by formally pushing the limits of the medium itself (Kaes 2009, p. 4). In both instances, from the outset, the moving image is formally and critically implicated with the modern individualization and psychologization of memory and the new uses of the past that such processes entailed psychologically, socially and culturally. Such processes, contrary to Nora's assumptions, are not indicative of some loss or decline. Rather, they foreground a reformulation of remembering that will further lead to the theorization and articulation of contemporary models of memory, as continual processes of reassessment and reconfiguration.

1.5 Modern Memory and Its Contingency for the Present

The implications of the moving image, as a referent for the contemporary concept of memory, are the subject of the following chapters. According to memory's historian Kurt Danziger, '[p]eople have not always remembered in the same way, and their most valued ways of remembering have not always been the same' (Danziger 2008, p. 7). The modern reconceptualization of memory marks a moment of transition towards new ways of remembering and thinking about memory that have coagulated in our time. Whilst the twentieth century, and the first decades of the twenty-first century, has been characterized by a preoccupation with memory, such concern is rooted in the expansive reformulation of what it means to remember, how and what we remember. Modernity—as discussed—normalized forgetting and made memories pivotal to individual lives and by extension to societies as well. Histories themselves faltered around the fissures opened by amnesia and oblivion. At the same time, individual remembering began to acquire predominance within and across public discourses. In

the psychological concept of autobiographical memory we have identified the consolidation and full actualization of the modern individualization and psychologization of memory in new ways of theorizing remembering and the self, and hence of configuring and using the past. A psychological concept, however, does not exist in a vacuum. 'What modern scientists do when they investigate memory'—observes Danziger—'is to reconstitute memory as an object of human knowledge and human practice in accordance with the exigencies and requirements of their time' (Danziger 2008, p. 12). Individuals are active agents of remembering operating within historical and cultural networks of people, processes and artefacts. Such networks influence what and how one remembers individually and collectively, socially and culturally. Autobiographical memory comprises and intersects the broader preoccupation with memory in our time. Throughout, we shall examine such continuity. On the one hand, this will shed light on some of the problems within the psychological model; on the other hand, insight into remembering will enable us to address some of the cultural and social tenets around memory today, in ways that we believe highlight dynamic and fertile fields of analysis. The moving image remains central to our discussion as we maintain it as a critical referent to models of autobiographical memory and to a questioning of cultural practices of remembering.

Within this context, we envisage remembering as multilayered and hybrid at the boundaries of psychology and culture, the individual and society, of mental processes and technologies of recording, of historical remembrance and global resonances. The emphasis is on processes and conditions of remembering, the intersection and recombination of features, traces and meanings, the sedimentation and pressure of the past on the present. Memories emerge at the same time diffused and malleable, transient and repetitive. Formal and thematic tropes are both recurrent and constantly modified and adapted—in remembering, within memories, and across models, definitions and theories of memory. A precursor of today's arguments for the multidirectionality and transcultural forms and modalities of both remembering and memories can be in found in Aby Warburg's *Atlas Mnemosyne* (1923–1929). 'Remembrance'—observes Michael Rothberg—'both cuts across and binds together diverse, spatial, temporal, and cultural sites' (Rothberg 2009, p. 11). Warburg posits the transitional, multidirectional and transcultural character of visual forms by pinning photographic pictures of historical and ethnographic artefacts, artworks and supposedly unrelated objects from science and technology

on large boards covered with black cloth in order to demonstrate the emergence and recurrence of patterns, symbols and 'pathos formulas' (i.e. affective values) associated with the visual forms of artefacts and images (Didi-Huberman 2002, pp. 455–59; Erll 2011b, p. 19). These associations are transient since they trigger new potential connections through a reshuffling of the photographic reproductions within and across panels. Warburg ideally invokes the mythological personification of memory to bear witness to a form of visual knowledge that is unstable and never exhaustive, encyclopaedic and episodic. As such the *Atlas Mnemosyne* is both archival and mnemonic: it epitomizes the archive as both a collection of (photographic) images (atlas meaning album in German) and a re-collection through the unstable and fertile reconfigurations of the associative relations among the images themselves. Warburg's project seeks continuity and variation, convergence and divergence, repetition and rupture. It also presupposes the mediation of memory and history in terms of reconfiguration and recorded trace—each panel is photographed before re-shuffling, highlighting the transitional character of the photographic documentation itself, and the shifting forms of mnemonic traces in culture. The principle that informs the *Atlas Mnemosyne* and the idea of memory that transpires from it is, most of all, *cinematic*. They reflect a use of montage based on formal affinities and movement (Michaud 2004, p. 289). Although no direct reference is made to film techniques, the use of a black back drop to highlight visual features and movement within the pictures and the associative spatio-temporal structuring of the panels denote filmic procedures (Michaud 2004, pp. 244 and 280–282) that point to another instance of the immanence of the moving image in the modern discourse of memory. The *Atlas Mnemosyne* is in fact invoked to endorse contemporary mediatized practices of remembering culturally and transculturally. Aleida Assmann's model of cultural memory as both *ars* and *vis*—as we shall further consider in Chap. 4 —endorses a reflection on both the continuity and discontinuity of memories and their patterns of emergence and disappearance across time, posing the question of the role of the repositories of memories within culture. Such memories, as Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney contend, 'can only become collective as part of a continuous process whereby memories are shared with the help of symbolic artefacts that mediate between individuals and, in the process, create communality across both space and time' (Erll and Rigney 2009, p. 1). These artefacts are tangible and intangible, mediating between the individual and world. At the same time, the contemporary debate

has shifted from locally embedded practices of recollection to global intersecting patterns of memorialization. Gesturing back to Warburg's changing constellations of forms, symbols and emotional resonances, emphasis is given to transcultural remembering, whereby as Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider argue

> national and ethnic memories are transformed in the age of globalization rather than erased. […] they begin to develop according to common rhythms and periodizations. But in each case, the common elements combine with pre-existing elements to form something new. (Levy and Sznaider 2006, p. 3)

Hence, memory as a cultural phenomenon both responds to and partakes of the redefinition of spatio-temporal perception and experience characteristic of contemporaneity as a result of the 'complex intersection of technological media, and new patterns of consumption, work, and global mobility' of our time (Huyssen 2003, p. 21), in a dynamic convergence and divergence of the individual and the collective, the local and global across networks as well as institutions, people and artefacts (Confino and Fritzsche 2002, pp. 4–5).

Within this context, Bartlett's acknowledgment of the active, embodied though socially and culturally embedded processes of remembering inform contemporary theories of autobiographical memory and the ways in which processes, media and artefacts dynamically interact in shaping remembering in its individual and cultural manifestations. Whilst memories are implicated with the construction, normalization or refusal of identities (whether considered as one cohesive notion or as a multifaceted and pluralistic concept for the individual or social groups and cultures alike), our focus is on the significance of forgetting and amnesia in the delineation of contemporary multifaceted and increasingly global memoryscapes. In their respective considerations of the impact of mediatization and of digital technologies on memory practices, Erll (2011a, b) and Andrew Hoskins (2009) return to Bartlett's *schemata* to maintain continuity between experience and its representations, medium and memories. 'Media schemata'—as Hoskins suggests—both contribute to perpetuate and obliterate by framing 'the present and our expectations of that present' (Hoskins 2009, p. 38). Within reflections of mediatized memories, the network (Esposito 2002) has gained currency as a metaphor for contemporary memory practices propelled by digital technologies, but also to infer the processes of remembering across memory systems. By

positioning the moving image as relevant to the procedural formation of memories and processes of remembering, we argue a similar continuity aimed at addressing the erasure and disruption of memories that amnesia, forgetting and repression cause within the cultural sphere(s)—which is understood as transitional, multilayered and multifaceted. Current frameworks of transcultural and global remembering are thus considered at the intersecting of psychology and cultural practices in relation to the artworks discussed, which are indicative of the complexities of the discourses and politics of memory with which they engage. Hence, art practice is contingent on and pertinent to an analysis of the contemporary practices of remembering, not merely as a technology, nor an expression or manifestation of memory, but rather as a conceptual and critical means of investigation. The discussion draws on the modern reconceptualization of memory to further examine the relevance of the moving image and its optic procedures in the contemporary understanding of memory's processes, which we bring to bear on a consideration of the cultural practices of remembering and articulations of histories. The theorization of forgetting that underscores the modern understanding of memory has not only defined the twentieth- and twenty-first-century psychological thinking about remembering, but has also had profound consequences in how we reflect on cultural and social forms of remembering and how we question the inherent fissures in them. Amnesia, latency and interference are key to our discussion and constitute the critical thread of our analysis as consistently understood at the boundaries of psychology and culture. The reciprocity of mind and screen established by modernity also enables us to position the current centrality of the screen—or more precisely of the 'digital screen' of mobile technologies—and the issues that it raises in terms of 'new media memory' (Hoskins 2009, pp. 28–30) within a broader cultural and historical spectrum.

Notes

1. Psychologist Hugo Münsterberg conceived the screen as an external projection of the mind; film director Bela Balazs saw film as an instance of modern physiognomy; and artist and critic Jean Epstein claimed the optic effect and affect of *photogenie* as subliminally conducive and revealing. Cultural critics Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer also considered the moving image a technology that enabled new readings of reality.

2. The film stemmed from Pabst's collaboration with the Berlin Psychoanalytical Institute, in particular with psychoanalysts Karl Abraham and Hans Sachs, and was meant to help to popularize psychoanalytical theories despite Freud's opposition to the project given the inherent resistance to representation of the unconscious (Fuechtner 2011, p. 119; Heath 1999, pp. 27, 52–53; Salina 1979).
3. Alison Winter highlights the broad use of the film's analogy in the post-war research on memory and draws attention to the study of neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, and Harvard psychologists Roger Brown and James Kulik's notion of 'flashbulb memory' that they first observed following the assassination of President Kennedy in people who only experienced it as a mediatized event. 'The shared experience of listening to simultaneous radio programming had already created a new kind of community; in the 1950s and 1960s, television culture was built on radio culture (Winter 2012, pp. 157–158). 'The proliferation of recording technologies that could produce traces of experience replayed in real time redefined what an "experience"—and a memory of that experience—was understood to be. One commenter reflected that television had the "knack of fading the present into the past, scene by scene in direct juxtaposition", which encouraged a "continuity of feeling" about past and present' (Winter 2012, p. 159).
4. 'The War of Ghosts' tells the story of two young men from Egulac who went hunting seals on a river. Fog descended on the river, and the young men heard 'war-cries' and thought that it might be a party. From the shore they saw canoes coming up the river and one of them stopped and the young men were invited to join in. One of them accepted and there other one returned home.

> And the warriors went on up the river to a town on the other side of Kalama. The people came down to the water, and they began to fight, and many were killed. But presently the young man heard one of the warriors say: 'Quick, let us go home: that Indian has been hit'. Now he thought: 'Oh they are ghosts'. He did not feel sick, but they said he had been shot.
>
> So the canoes went back to Egulac, and the young man went ashore to his house, and made a fire. And he told everybody and said: 'Behold I accompanied the ghosts, and we went to fight. Many of our fellows were killed, and many of those who attacked us were killed. They said I was hit, and I did not feel sick'.

> He told it all, and then he became quiet. When the sun rose he fell down. Something black came out of his mouth. His face became contorted. The people jumped up and cried.
>
> He was dead. (Bartlett 1932, p. 65)

5. None of Londe's moving pictures are extant (Didi-Huberman 2003, pp. 8–9).
6. For a discussion of neurological films see Cartwright 1995, pp. 47–80.

Bibliography

Aiken, I. (2013) *The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of the Documentary Film* (London and New York: Routledge).

Aubert, G. (2002) 'Arthur van Gehuchten Takes Neurology to the Movie', in *Neurology*, 59: (11), pp. 1612–1618.

Bartlett, F. (1932) *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Benjamin, W. (1927/2005) 'Reply to Oscar A. H. Schmitz', in W. Jennings, H. Eiland and G. Smith (ed.) *Walter Benjamin Selected Writings: 1927–1930*, vol. 2 (Harvard: Harvard University Press), pp. 16–21.

Benjamin, W. (1929/2005) 'Surrealism', in W. Jennings, H. Eiland and G. Smith (ed.) Walter Benjamin Selected Writings: 1927-1934, vol. 2 (Harvard: Harvard University Press), pp. 207–221.

Benjamin, W. (1940/1999) 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', translated by Harry Zorn, in H. Arendt (ed.) Illuminations (London: Pilmico), pp. 245–255.

Bergson, H. (1908/2005) *Matter and Memory*, translated by N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (New York: Zone Books).

Bernstern, D. (2007) 'Involuntary Autobiographical Memories: Speculations, Findings, and an Attempt to Integrate Them', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *Involuntary Memory* (Malden MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), pp. 20–49.

Berrios, G. E. and Marková, I.S. (2003) 'The Self and Psychiatry: A Conceptual History', in T. Kircher and A. David (ed.) *The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 9–39.

Bratu-Hansen, M. (2012) *Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press).

Brunner, J. (2000) 'Desire and Experience: Etiology and Ideology in the German and Austrian Medical Discourse on War Neuroses, 1914-1922', in *Transcultural Psychiatry* 37: (3), pp. 295–320.

Buck- Morss, S. (1991) *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge Mass. and London: MIT Press).

Cartwright, L. (1995) *Screening the body: Tracing Medicine's Visual Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

Caruth, C. (1996) *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).

Cofino, A. and Frietsche, P. (2002) 'Introduction: Noises of the Past', in A. Cofino and P. Frietsche (ed.) *The Work of Memory: New Directions in the Study of German Society and Culture* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press), pp. 1–19.

Conway, M.A. (2006) 'Memory and Desire: Reading Freud', in The Psychologist, 19: (9), pp. 548–550.

Danziger, K. (2008) *Marking the Mind: A History of Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Deleuze, G. (1989) *Cinema 2 The Time Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: The Anthlone Press).

Didi-Huberman, G. (2002) L*'image survivante: histoire de l'art et des temps des fântomes seleun Aby Warburg* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit)

Didi-Hubermann, G. (2003) *Invention of hysteria: Charcot and the photographic iconography of the Salpêtrière*, translated by Alisa Hartz (Cambridge, Mass. and London, MIT).

Draaisma. D. (2000) *Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas about the Mind*, translated by Paul Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Dror, O. Y. (1999) 'The Scientific Image of Emotion: Experience and Technologies of Inscription' in *Configurations,* 7: (3), pp. 355–401.

Ebbinghaus, H. (1885/1998) *Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology* (Bristol and Tokyo: Thoemmes Press and Maruzen Co., LTD).

Eisenstein, S. (1929/1963) 'The Filmic Forth Dimension', translated by Jay Leyda, in J. Leyda (ed.) *Sergei Eisenstein Film Form: Essays in Film Theory* (London: Dennis Dobson), pp. 64–71.

Eisenstein, S. (1944/1963) 'Dickens, Griffith, and the Film Today', translated by Jay Leyda , in J. Leyda (ed.) *Sergei Eisenstein Film Form: Essays in Film Theory* (London: Dennis Dobson), pp. 195–255.

Epstein, J. (1921) *Cinema* (Paris: Editions de la Sirene).

Erll, A. (2011a) *Memory in Culture*, translated by Sara B. Young (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan).

Erll, A. (2011b) 'Travelling Memory' in *Parallax*, 17: (4), pp. 4–18.

Erll, A. and Rigney, A. (2009) 'Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics', in A. Erll and A. Rigney (ed.) *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter), pp. 1–11.

Esposito, E. (2002) *Soziales Vergessen: Formen und Medien des Gedächtnisses der Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).

Freud, S. (1895/1966) 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' translated by Angela Richards, in J. Strachey (ed.) *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works by Sigmund Freud*, vol. I (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis), pp. 294–410.

Freud, S. (1899/1953) 'Screen memories', translated by James Strachey, in J. Strachey (ed.) *The Standard Edition*, vol. III (London: Hogarth Press), pp. 302–22.

Freud, S. (1901/1995) 'The Psychopathology of Everyday Life', translated by by James Strachey, in J. Strachey (ed.) *The Standard Edition*, vol. V (London: Hogarth Press).

Freud, S. (1919/1955) 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', translated by James Strachey, in J. Strachey (ed.) *The Standard Edition*, vol. XVIII (London: Hogarth Press), pp. 7–64.

Freud, S. (1925/1995) 'A Note upon the 'Mystic Writing Pad"', translated by James Strachey, in J. Strachey (ed.) *The Standard Edition*, vol. XIX (London: Hogarth Press), pp. 227–32.

Fuechtner, V. (2011) *Berlin Psychoanalytic: Psychoanalysis and Culture in Weimar Republic Germany and Beyond* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press).

Gimenez-Roldan, S. and Aubert, G. (2007) 'Hysterical Chorea: Report of an Outbreak and Movie Documentation by Arthur van Gehuchten (1861–1914), in *Movements Disorders*, 22: (8), pp. 1071–1076.

Hacking, I (1995) *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personalities and the Sciences of Memory* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).

Hacking, I (1996) 'Memory Sciences, Memory Politics', in P. Antze and M. Lambek (ed.) *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory* (New York and London: Routledge), pp. 67–87.

Halbwachs, M. (1992) *On Collective Memory*, edited, translated and with an introduction by A. Lewis Coser (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press).

Hirst, W., Cuc, A., and Wohl, D. (2012) 'Of Sins and Virtues: Memory and Collective Identity', D. Bernstern and D. C. Rubin. (ed.) *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 140–159.

Hoskins, A. (2009) 'Digital Network Memory', in A. Erll and A. Rigney (ed.) *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyer), pp. 91–106.

Howell, H. F. (2005) *The Dissociative Mind* (London and New York: Routledge).

Huyssen, A. (2003) 'Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia' *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), pp. 11–29.

James, W. (1890/1998) *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, reprint originally published New York: Henry Holt and Company).

Janet, P. (1928) *L'évolution de la mémoire et de la notion du temps* (Paris: A. Éditions Chahine).

Kaes, A. (2009) *Shell Shock Cinema: Weimar Cinema and the Wounds of War* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press).

Kracauer, S. (1960) *Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality*, with an introduction by Miriam Bratu-Hansen (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).

Kracauer, S. (1995) 'Photography' in *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays*, translated, edited with an introduction by Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge Mass., and London: Harvard University Press), pp. 47–63.

Kracauer, S. (1995) 'The Calico World', in *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays*, translated, edited with an introduction by Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge Mass., and London: Harvard University Press), pp. 281–290.

Laplanche, J., Lagache, D. and Pontalis, J.-B. (1967) *Vocabulaire de psychoanalyse* (Paris: Bibliothèque de psychanalyse).

Le Dantec, F. (1901) *Le Conflit. Entretiens philosophiques* (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin).

Leese, P. (2002) *Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First World War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Lerner, P. F. (2003) *Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 1890–1930* (Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell University Press).

Levy, D. and Sznaider, N. (2006) *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).

Ludemo, T. (2003) 'Technologies of Forgetting: Cinema and Recollection in Les mystère des roches de Kador', in A. Antoni (ed.) *Film and its Multiples: IX Film Studies Conference* (Udine: Forum), pp. 283–290.

Micale, M. (2004) 'The Modernist Mind: A Map' in M. Micale (ed.) *The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in the Modern Age, 1880–1940* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), pp. 1–19.

Michaud, P-A. (2004) *Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion* translated by Sophie Hawkes (New York: Zone Books).

Münsterberg, H. (1916/2002) *Hugo von Münsterberg on film: The Photoplay: A Psychological Study and Other Writing*, A. Langdale (ed.) (New York and London: Routledge).

Nora, P. (1989) 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire', translated by Marc Roudebush, in *Representations*, 26 (Spring), pp. 7–24.

Perret, L. (1912) *The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador* (Neuilly-sur-Seine: Gaumont).

Proust, M. (1928/2005) *In Search of Lost Time: Swann's Way*, vol. I, translated by C.K. Scott Moncrieff & Terence Kilmartin (London: Vintage Books).

Reinert, R. (1919) *Nerves* (Berlin: Monumental-Film).

Ribot, T. (1885) *Diseases of Memory: An Essay in the Positive Psychology* (London: Regan Paul, Trench & Co.).

Richet, C. (1887) *Essai de psychologie générale* (Paris: Félix Alcan, Éditeur).

Richet, C. (1886) 'Les origines et les modalités de la memoire', *Revue Philosophique*, XXI, p. 570.

Roth, M. S. (2012) *Memory, Trauma and History: Essays on Living with the Past* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press).

Rothberg, M. (2009) *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Salina, F. (1979) *Immagine e Fanstasma: La psycoanalisi nel cinema di Weimar* (Roma: Edizione Kappa).
Simmel, G. (1903/1971) 'The Metropolis and the Mental Life', in D. N. Levine (ed.) *On Individuality and Social Forms: Selected Writing* (Chicago: Chicago University Press), pp. 324–339.
Väliaho, P. (2007) 'The White Screen circa 1900', in *Symplokē*, 15: (1/2), pp. 40–65.
Van Gehuchten, A. (1920) *Les maladies nerveuses* (Louvain: Librarie universitaire).
Wertsch, J. W. and Roediger, H. L. (2008) 'Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations and Theoretical Approaches', in *Memory* 16: 3 (April), pp. 318–326.
Wertsch, J. W. (2009) 'Collective Memory', in P. Boyer and J. W. Wertsch (ed.) *Memory in Mind and Culture* (Cambridge University Press), pp. 117–137.
Winter, A. (2004) 'Screening Selves: Sciences of Memory and Identity on Film, 1930-1960', in *History of Psychology*, 7: (4), pp. 367–401.
Winter, A. (2012) *Memory: Fragments of a Modern History* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press).
Woolf, V. (1926/1966) 'The Cinema', in L. Woolf (ed.) *Collected Essays*, vol. II (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd), pp. 268–272.
Yates, F. (1992) *The Art of Memory* (London: Pilmico).

CHAPTER 2

Mémoir(e) and Mémoire(s)

Autobiographical memory concerns knowledge about oneself—from abstract notions and general information to specific events and discrete experiences. The concept, as already pointed out, emerged in the 1980s to describe individual remembering and the ways in which memories support life stories. It presupposes a capacity of meta-representation and self-reflection that endorses feelings of agency about experience on which an enduring sense of self is built over time. Hence, autobiographical memory grounds the individual self in lived experience and knowledge through remembering, and substantiates feelings of identity. Indeed, the recall of facts and events is essential to develop, maintain and express a sense of self; at the same time the self—or what psychology refers to as 'conceptual self'—is a precondition of the autobiographical construction of memories, pointing to a complex and symbiotic relationship between self and memories (Conway and Jobson 2012, pp. 54–58). Remembering is also inherently interpersonal and social. People share their stories as a means of socialization implicitly contributing to the shaping of groups' identities. Hence, memories tend to be articulated narratively (verbally, visually and performatively) and are constitutive of individual and collective narratives. This chapter brings the psychological concept of autobiographical memory to bear on cultural and social forms of remembering, what we shall refer to as *(auto)biographical memory*. By considering remembering at the boundaries of the individual and culture, we unpeel the three components of life narrative, self and memory that underpin the concept. Far from stable, these components are historically and culturally determined

C. Albano, *Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36588-0_2

and part of practices of constructing (and reading) identities, which are mapped onto multifaceted assumptions about what the self is and what a life story entails (Amigoni 2006, p. 2). As a category at the boundaries of psychology and culture, (auto)biographical memory defines the contemporary economy of memory, marking the climax of the modern individualization and psychologization of memory and their reformulation at the end of the twentieth century.

The modern individualization and psychologization of memory, as discussed in the previous chapter, resulted from profound transformations in the ways in which both memory and the self were conceptualized. The privatization of the past through recollection, which began to emerge in the eighteenth century, was in fact one of the factors that led to the late-nineteenth-century alignment of the individual self and memory (Danziger 2008, pp. 103–105). The latter further coincided with the flourishing of life writing and the consolidation of autobiography as a literary genre. In turn, life writing began to be inflected around issues of subjectivity, consciousness and memory (Marcus 1994, pp. 5; 77–82). However, the emphasis on what remains liminal and inaccessible to remembering complicated the modern notion of memory and hence the significance and very possibility of narrating the self and one's life story. In writing about Marcel Proust, Walter Benjamin observes that important 'for the remembering author is not what he experienced, but the weaving of his memory, the Penelope work of recollection. Or should one call it rather, a Penelope work of forgetting?' (Benjamin 1929/2005, p. 238) According to Benjamin, the remembering author weaves her life story from the eroded debris of the past that are memories themselves. Benjamin's preoccupation with memory is indicative of a diffuse faltering in the first decades of the twentieth century of the notion of one's life story as a cohesive narrative that both supports and accounts for a unified and coherent subject (Jay 1982, pp. 1051–1052). At the same time he acknowledges the unreliability of memories and the artificiality of one's life story as a narrative on which the self and identity can be persuasively articulated. Central to Benjamin's reflection is the modern recognition of the partiality and fragmentation of memories suggested by the modern theorization of forgetting as inherent to remembering. This destabilizes the integrity of memories raising the question of what kind of life story ensues from remembering. The 'Penelope work of forgetting' also reproposes a century-long problem concerning the discrepancies between remembering and narrating one's own life story. In the preface to the

1789 Neufchâtel edition of the *Confessions*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau asked himself how he could find a new language suitable for the novelty of his autobiographical project: a language capable of conveying both the flow of impressions and feelings of remembering and the author's state of mind when narrating them. Rousseau admits that the apparently inconsistent style of his writing is itself part of his story, as if remembering and narrating were both irreconcilable and indistinguishable (Rousseau 1789/2000, p. 647). Rousseau highlights a paradox that still mars (auto)biographical memory and the psychological model that underscores it since it implicates representations of the self and the mimetic processes on which identities are implicitly construed.

Fragmentation and discontinuity are in fact the defining tropes of the literary and artistic experimentation in autobiographical practices—first as life writing and also later as filmic (and video) self-portraiture. From the early decades of the twentieth century, thanks to their rapid technical developments, photography and film flourished as amateur practices and became the paradigmatic mediums for the recording of one's life and hence a means of autobiographical self-reflection (Easton 2011). Photography, according to Roland Barthes, provides the autobiographical author with a 'repertoire of images' in which the self is present to itself in the archival immobility of a moment in the past that simultaneously intimates presence and absence, sameness and otherness, continuity and change (Barthes 1995, caption, n.p.). The moving image instead 'keeps'—as Edward Casey observes—'the past present', by looping the recorded time of the frame to that of its projection, thus conveying the dialectic proper to memory of being at the same time passive and active, 'receptive and spontaneous' (Casey 1987, pp. 90–91). Such dialectic between the inner recorded time of the frame and the external time of the film projection is akin to the intersecting of temporal and spatial dimensions (now/then; here/there) that characterize memories and the swing in memories of temporal, spatial and subjective states. Among the pioneers of the autobiographical experimentation with photography and film is Edvard Munch who, in 1927, acquired an amateur film camera (Albera 2012, pp. 189–190). Although only four short films are extant, the artist formally transgressed 'the prescribed standards' of amateur filming in an attempt to capture the interplay of the visible and non-visible 'in movement' and render the assumed potential of the medium to mediate between exterior reality and mental processes of association, recall and dream (Albera 2012, pp. 193–194). The films show Munch himself—flittingly as he moves in

front of the camera—or his relatives, pedestrians and passing vehicles. In one of the films, a woman is first shown waiting at a street corner and then walking along a train track. If the subject of these short films is trivial, the editing—whether in filming or during montage—reveals an attempt to defy representational references in order to generate unexpected associations and visual resonances 'when overexposure "burns" the image, or when shadow drowns it, when the orderly "quick" movement smudges it from one shot to the next' (Albera 2012, pp. 193–194). The diffusion and superimposition of shots and blurring of images resonate with the swift flow of memories, the fuzziness of remembering and blanks of forgetting. Munch's experimentation with film testifies to an attempt to stretch the form of the medium to chronicle the ephemeral and the insubstantiality of movement and temporality.

Such experimentation characterizes the appropriation of the moving image as an autobiographical medium that is not so much a record of experience but rather of self-reflection and the grappling with the discontinuity and fragmentation of the self in remembering. The moving image as both 'movement image' and 'time image' (Deleuze 1986, 1989) acts at the same time as record and memory trace and loops time and movement in its inner duration that is at once repetition and projection. In focusing on artists' autobiographical experimentation with the moving image (particularly in video), Raymond Bellour refers to the notion of the essayistic 'self-portrait' put forward by the literary critic Michel Beaujour and maintains that the configurations of the moving image's recording are fluid and betray 'encyclopaedic' practices of self-representations that freely draw on and merge genres as diverse as the memoir, travelogue and self-portraiture (Bellour 1989, p. 9; Beaujour 1991, p. 110; Burgin 2004). Hence, the moving image enables the subject to forge 'its identity through the optic of the world, and the particular of culture – of everything in other words that constitutes the individual' (Bellour 1989, p. 9).[1] Such heterogeneity has now further infiltrated the multilayered and fragmentary modes of constructing individuality that define today's hybrid autobiographical practices across the Internet and social media (Renov 1989/2004, Lejeune 1980, 1999, Robin 1999; Rascaroli 2014). These practices attest to the contemporary redefinition of 'the status of image technology in relation to memory' (Winter 2012, p. 161) that photography and film initiated when the snapshot and home movie tied individual and collective narratives to technologies of documentation and repetition.

In our discussion we shall examine the psychological concept of autobiographical memory and question its cultural implications, indirectly pointing to the historical development of the concept itself. A contradiction is evident between the immanence of the moving image in the shaping of a theoretical understanding of memory processes and the linguistic frameworks that explain the articulations of memories and their narrative construction. Despite the emphasis on the sensory plasticity of autobiographical memories, memory research tends to describe them in relation to language with little consideration of the broader mimetic cultural contexts on which memories and the self are construed. If the individual is recognizable to herself, in Barthes's words, only as a 'repertoire of images' (Barthes 1995, Preface, n.p.), how does the acknowledgement of the moving image as a cultural referent for the modern and contemporary conceptualization of remembering help us to address the difficulties surrounding the self and life narrative in autobiographical memory? How does such acknowledgement already foreground the problem of forgetting within the contemporary discourses of memory—whether psychological, philosophical or cultural? How can we address the irreconcilable and indistinguishable relations between remembering and narrating that, as Rousseau already recognized, are at the core of any life story?

The chapter addresses these questions through the work of Los Angeles-based artist and filmmaker Kerry Tribe who has consistently addressed issues of personal memory. Tribe's film installation *H.M.* (2009) focuses on the life story of Henry Gustav Molaison—known until his death in 2008 as H.M. Molaison was an amnesiac whose case study has been instrumental in the brain localization and understanding of memory processes that support the concept of autobiographical memory as proved by the vast scientific literature spanning from 1957 to the time of his death. H.M. is also the subject of two biographies, respectively by Philip J. Hilts and by Suzanne Corkin, the psychologist who studied his amnesia for nearly fifty years. Through a consideration of Tribe's film installation on the life of Henry Molaison I will outline some key features of the scientific concept and draw attention to the complexities that underpin the relation between autobiographical remembering and life story. While the biographies deal with the life story of an individual as a case study and the history of psychological memory research, Tribe positions the viewer at the affective intersection of memory and narrative, of individual and social memories. This is also the subject of other works considered, namely *Parnassius mnemosyne* (2010), *The Last Soviet* (2010) and *Milton Torres Sees a Ghost* (2010), in which the

artist addresses both the potential for and impossibility of narration as a modality of memory at the boundaries of official documentation and personal remembering, of revision and confabulation.

2.1 Autobiographical Memory: A Psychological Model

Some general considerations are essential to introduce the concept of autobiographical memory and its cultural ramifications. As already indicated, autobiographical memory pertains to memories about one's life experience and the world. Autobiographical memories in fact sustain an individual's knowledge and identity by 'linking personal history to public history, supporting a network of personal goals and projects across the life span, and ultimately in grounding the self in experience' (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, pp. 261–265). The self is further understood in terms of the experiencing ego (the conscious awareness of oneself that is the focus of one's phenomenological experience), the self-schema (which infers the cognitive structures about the self) and the associated personal memories and autobiographical facts on which a sense of identity is constructed across different lifetime periods (Bluck et al. 2010, pp. 285–287). Within this paradigm, the self is distinct from the individual, which is understood as the larger entity that includes the self, the depersonalized aspects of the mind (non-self) and the body (Bluck et al. 2010, pp. 290). Memory researchers describe the purposes of remembering as 'directive (helping to guide future behaviour), social (enhancing social cohesion among individuals) and self functions (helping to facilitate and maintain conceptualizations of the self)' (Mace 2010a, p. 45). Remembering is, in other words, about the relevance of the past in the present since it enables a person to interpret reality and imagine future situations. Memories are also drawn upon to communicate with others using our personal stories, which are rich in emotional and affective details, to build cohesive and intimate relationships. Memories moreover support ideas of the self that further inform the construction of individual identity. This partly relates to the autonoetic property (i.e. the awareness and feeling of remembering) of autobiographical memories versus other kinds of memories, such as procedural memories (i.e. memories related to the execution of tasks or actions) and also to the fact that self-images and what we remember about ourselves and how we remember it are deeply interconnected so that memories are selected and may be altered to support self-images

(Mace 2010a, pp. 50–53). The functions of autobiographical memory highlight both the subjective and inter-subjective qualities of remembering that underscore the broader socio-cultural significance of memories (Wang and Brockmeier 2002, p. 47). Within memories, moreover, the default position of the self is *narratively* construed in ways that are comparable to that of the position of a narrator in film or fiction from a first-person point of view. However, one can also distance oneself into a third-person point of view as if one could see oneself in the memory. This distancing can be an indication that the self does not recognize itself anymore in the 'I' of the memory causing estrangement marked by the narrative shift from the first- to the third-person viewpoint. Alternatively, the affective content of a memory is such as to cause dissociation. In this case, the remembering 'I' attempts to protect itself from the overwhelming and painful emotional potency of a memory, as in the case of traumatic memories (Rice 2010). Freud, as discussed, recognized the third-person shift in screen memories as an indication of both the historical distancing and repressed traumatic content of these highly plastic and anodyne memories.

Autobiographical memories comprise information about one's life experience (episodic memories) and acquired knowledge about oneself and the world (semantic memories). Episodic memories can be understood as the records of 'sensory-perceptual-conceptual-affective details that characterize or predominate a particular experience' (Conway 2005, p. 612). Such details refer to the network of patterns' activation in sensory-motor and affective systems during the experience. Hence, the accuracy of a memory is determined by how closely the sensory-affective pattern mirrors what was experienced. Predominantly visual, episodic memories refer to short-time slices. They are formed within the working-memory system and are retained only if they enter long-term memory, that is, if they are related to existing conceptual frames (not dissimilar to Bartlett's schemata) where these memories become accessible to both conscious and non-conscious processes of activation and retrieval (Conway and Loveday 2010, pp. 58–62).[2] The episodic raw material of remembering is what Benjamin refers to as 'that image, that taste, that touch' (Benjamin 1932/2005, p. 597), that is, the minute details of experience that memories evoke. More precisely, the sensory, cognitive and affective stimuli of the recalled experience are selected and edited in remembering in relation to the sensory, cognitive and emotional environment at the moment of recall into a memory's imagery (whether visual, verbal, or performative). One's internal (mental) and external (experiential) environments condition, in fact,

the recall of memories, both affecting and interfering with what and how one remembers. This further determines the accuracy, consistency and coherence of memories. Rather than exact records of experience, memories, as suggested, are mental representations that are reshaped every times one recalls them. This is because the reconfiguration of memories is meant to support existing knowledge and self-images to the detriment of exactness and reliability thus maintaining internal coherence and consistency (Conway 2006, pp. 548–549). Accuracy and coherence in one's mental life in fact govern the ways in which experience and information is remembered rendering the ecology of memory congruent with other brain functions (Boyer 2009, pp. 18–20).

Although the memorization of experience begins in the life of an infant and episodic memories start to form around six months of age, autobiographical remembering does not fully develop until adolescence, thus explaining childhood's amnesia (Habermas and Bluck 2000; Fivush and Bauer 2010). The articulation of memories involves the development of language (and other semiotic systems that mediate modes of representation) and the function of telling, that is of 'how children are encouraged by adults to spin more or less elaborate narrative tales of events' (Leichman and Wang 2005, p. 38), and hence to organize experience linguistically and narratively. This elaboration influences the modalities of reminiscence including the richness of details, emotional colouring and the ways in which the individual presents herself. The telling of memories helps to develop a child's sense of subjectivity as an autonomous, self-determined agent in the narration of an experience. Degrees of narrative elaboration are indicative of cultural differences in the ways in which people remember and construct memories. This includes the prominence conferred to the self in the retelling of memories whereby in western cultures there is a greater emphasis on individuality and the role of the self than in non-western ones where prominence is given to one's social group and the interaction of the individual with the group (Conway and Jobson 2012, pp. 54–65). Autobiographical remembering is in other words influenced by cultural practices of telling and representing that are socially learned. These practices characterize the richness and formulation of details in memories and hence the ways in which the past is used to construe and maintain an individual self's identity within a given culture (Wang and Brockmeier 2002, p. 50). Current research thus supports Bartlett's supposition of the social and cultural basis of remembering. This is further evinced in the organization of one's memories, since they are structured hierarchically

according to culturally recognized life scripts (i.e. the expected template of activities across a life span, including going to school, university, having a first job). Accordingly, one's life story is a general account that combines and intersects information and event-specific details related to various life scripts. Memory research conceives life scripts to be organized according to the linear temporal structuring that matches those of conventional biography. The internal elaboration of memories is also described in terms of the standard narrative tropes of beginning, middle and end, and dissociation from such parameters is seen as symptomatic (Berntsen and Bohn 2009, pp. 62–67; Habermas 2012). Life story and life scripts can thus be understood as organizational and thematic scaffoldings 'that both structure remembering and define identity by selecting from the rich treasure of autobiographical memories some biographically salient events, and by arranging them in a specific way' (Berntsen and Rubin 2012, p. 38). This implies that the relation between memories and the organizing systems underpinning them is mutually determining. Because they are essential to generating meaning for the individual, memories are shaped by systems of signification (including narrative). In turn, memories performatively generate and shape such systems in ways that are congruent to one's culture and inner reality. The internalization of a cultural concept of autobiography thus acts as a prerequisite for the articulation of autobiographical memories into a life story since it provides the narrative template of life scripts that, as suggested, match culturally recognized stages in a person's life. These templates also adhere to narrative conventions and shared social and cultural values about autobiographical telling (Bernstern and Bohn 2009, p. 73).

From a cultural historical perspective, the economy of memory that the psychological understanding of autobiographical remembering articulates is, however, problematic. The psychological model has, so to speak, inherited the difficulties that have historically characterized autobiography as a literary genre, particularly those concerning narrative and the self. By linking the development of autobiographical memory with that of language, memory research regards the structural formation of memories mainly linguistically, rather than within broader mimetic systems of representation that inform the cultural frameworks of telling and showing. This begs the question of the relevance of other modes of narrative beyond linguistic ones in the formation and structuring of memories. Moreover, when considered in relation to the autobiographical discourse more generally, the psychological concept reiterates the paradox of the irreconcilable and indistinguishable overlap of remembering and narrating. A consideration of

(auto)biographical memory has thus, to bring to bear on the twentieth century debate on narrative theory and the related critique of autobiography, to highlight some the unsolved difficulties that the conflating of remembering and narrating poses within the psychological model and beyond in the uses of the past that remembering supports.

In discussing autobiographical writing, Paul Ricoeur remarks that '[i]ndividuals and communities are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history' (Ricoeur 1985, p. 247). Ricoeur confirms the key role that narrative plays in shaping identities. He names 'narrative identity' the constant rectification of experience into narrative, of memories into stories. Yet, narrative identity does not imply a stable and unified identity, since diverse plots can be construed out of the same incident. The subject can also take different roles and positions in the telling and retelling of the same incident, and diverse levels of actuality and fiction can intervene that destabilize and reconfigure identity (Ricoeur 1985, p. 248; see also Ricoeur 1990). 'Narrative identity thus becomes the name of a problem at least as much as it is that of a solution' (Ricoeur 1985, p. 249). Such problem concerns any kinds of autobiographical representation (or telling) and hence the ways in which memories are narrativized.[3] By suggesting a distinction between remembering and narrating, we underscore a fundamental difference between memory and life story, and memories and records. Such a difference or gap shares the notional position of forgetting in the theorization of remembering and is thus germane to both the historical emergence of the concept of autobiographical memory and the articulation of one's life story. The 'Penelope work of forgetting' necessarily complicates autobiographical representations and the narrative identity that the telling of memories supports: what kind of self emerges from the lack of memories? Autobiographical memory itself is historically contested on such a question and on the pervasiveness of forgetting in the elaboration of one's life story.

2.2 H. M.: A Case of Amnesia

In 1955, in order to stop severe epileptic seizures that could not be controlled with medication, the 27-year-old H(enry) M(olaison) underwent 'experimental' surgery: 'H.M.'s bilateral medial temporal lobes resection included the hippocampal formation and adjacent structures including most of the amygdaloid complex and entorhinal cortex' (Scoville and Milner 1957, p. 11). As he recovered from the operation, H.M. began to show evident signs of memory loss:

> After the operation this young man could no longer recognize the hospital staff nor find his way to the bathroom, and he seemed to recall nothing of the day-to-day events of his hospital life. There was also a partial retrograde amnesia, inasmuch as he did not remember the death of a favorite uncle three years previously, nor anything of the period in hospital, yet could recall some trivial events that had occurred just before his admission to the hospital. His early memories were apparently vivid and intact. (Scoville and Milner 1957, p. 14)

H.M.'s epileptic seizures returned about one year after the operation and though their effect was less debilitating, his memory loss did not improve. H.M. suffered from *anterograde amnesia*—inability to establish new memories. He also experienced *retrograde amnesia*—he was unable to retrieve memories prior to his operation. William Beecher Scoville, the neurosurgeon who operated on H.M, made the case known to the medical community. Psychologist Brenda Milner noticed the report and was the first to test H.M. to assess the nature of his amnesia proving that it was not related to perceptual or other cognitive impairments.[4] Scoville and Milner's joint 1957 paper suggested the neural basis of new memory formation and consolidation and speculatively linked these processes to the medial temporal lobe hippocampi (the brain areas that had been removed in H.M.'s surgery). They produced the first biographical account of Henry Gustav Molaison as case study H.M. Unable to remember the location of objects in the house or what he ate for lunch, H.M. would nonetheless seem 'to a casual observer'—as Scoville and Milner remarked—'like a relatively normal individual, since his understanding and reasoning are undiminished' (Scoville and Milner 1957, p. 14). This contradiction rendered Henry Molaison an ideal case study. Not related to any progressive disease, such as Alzheimer's, 'his memory impairment was amazingly specific. The purity of his disorder made him a perfect focus for the investigation of memory mechanisms in the human brain' (Corkin 2013, p. 47). Indeed, Henry Molaison became the subject of scientific research for the rest of his life.[5] The research into his amnesia coincided with and supported the twentieth-century mapping of memory processes in the brain and the neuropsychological underpinning of remembering. Suzanne Corkin's biography testifies to this history as she uses the narrative of the study of H.M.'s amnesia to portray the man and to explain the development of contemporary theories of memory. Any biography of Henry Molaison, however, raises the question of the gap between the life story of Henry Molaison and that of H.M., of the slippage between the individual and the case study—in other words, of the *differance*, in Derrida's terms, of

mémoir(*e*) (i.e. memory and memorandum) and *mémoire*(*s*) (i.e. memories and records) (Derrida 1986, pp. 10–11).

Throughout the years of testing and getting to know him, Corkin and her team realized that H.M.'s early memories were not as 'vivid and intact' as originally supposed. H.M.'s semantic memory of public events, facts and dates for the period previous to the operation was not impaired. He also showed semantic memory of events and public figures relating to the years following his operation. However, his recollection of episodic memories for the years preceding the operation was merely factual: H.M. could remember information about his past life but he was unable to evoke scenes from his past and to convey them to himself and others. With the exception of the memories of his first cigarette and of his first and only flight whose details and emotions were still vivid, H.M.'s recollections were vague and verged on confabulation. When asked 'What is your favourite memory that you have of your mother?' he would reply 'Well, I – that she's my mother' (Corkin 2013, p. 218). Although Corkin's face was familiar to him, when asked where they had met he would invariably reply in high school. H.M. knew he had problems remembering and expressed his internal struggle by stating 'I have an argument with myself' (Corkin 2013, p. 218). However, he lacked a time frame to support this knowledge and he could not tell how long he had been amnesiac (Corkin 2013, pp. 215–222).

Across the years, comparative tests enabled researchers to assess H.M.'s ability to learn and perform tasks, the kind of information he could remember, which brain areas were activated and could link the results to models of memory encoding, storage and retrieval. The study of H.M.'s amnesia also fed into a growing body of research that theorized memory processes, including distinctions between procedural and declarative memory, short-term and long-term memory, semantic and episodic memory that developed from the 1950s to the first decade of twenty-first century. Within this context, H.M.'s case study emerges from the differentiation, localization and understanding of structures, functions, processes and systems that define the act of remembering in our time; the study of Henry Molaison's amnesia helped to identify, confirm and assess contemporary ideas of remembering. It also closely linked them conceptually and figuratively with its aberration. Henry Molaison's life story is thus entangled with the large body of *mémoirs* (scientific articles, papers, biographies, and magazine articles) that refers to his case and that coincides with and supports the formulation of the contemporary concept of autobiographical memory. The narrative of his life is however *sans mémoir*(*e*).

Fig. 2.1 Kerry Tribe, *H.M.*, 2009, single 16 mm film with sound, two projectors with a 20 second delay, film still, courtesy of the artist © Kerry Tribe

Kerry Tribe's film installation *H.M.* (2009) consists of two side-by-side projections from a single 16-mm film (Fig. 2.1). The projections run through two synchronized projectors with a twenty second delay to simulate the mechanics of short-term memory and to create an affective environment in which Henry Molaison's life story is loosely conveyed. Extracts from Hilts' biography in the voice-over narration intercept a range of visual components, including the fictional re-enactment of an interview between Henry Molaison and Suzanne Corkin at MIT and scenes showing sleep studies and laboratory tests. The footage of these reconstructions are intersected with images of places connected to Molaison and his life that Tribe filmed 'with a Bolex camera with a hand-cranked motor that records for only 20 seconds' (Carson 2010, pp. 47–48). Tribe's film further includes animations and examples of psychological tests taken by Molaison. All these features are edited as a single, looped filmstrip, so that each frame appears first on the left screen and then on the right one with an interval of twenty seconds. The twenty-second delay between the two projections is indicative of the time in which the continuous flow of live information is retained in short-term memory and, if encoded and consolidated, then enters long-term memory.

Short-term memory—further elaborated by Alan Baddeley as working memory—refers to the processes of encoding and consolidation of information into memories that support remembering (Baddeley 1986, 2007; Moscovich 2012).[6] The localization of this system was critical to the understanding of Henry Molaison's amnesia, which in turn probed the theoretical model. Hence, in *H.M.*, the time delay between the two projections acts as the functional duration of the formation of a memory that generates the

confines of working memory on which the present-past of remembering is inscribed, and in which memory loss originated for Molaison. The interval also denotes the figurative dimension of the work as the installation directly involves the viewer in the act of remembering, as she may or may not recognize the images as they shift from one screen to the other. The installation 'literally (or procedurally) *demonstrates* H.M.'s condition at the same time as the narrator's voiceover describes his story' (Carson 2010, p. 48). Tribe merges the visual and oral narratives of the work with the act of remembering itself, implicitly raising questions about what it means *to remember*.

In *H.M.* Tribe exploits the currency of the image as both an analogue and instrument of remembering individually and culturally, episodically and semantically. Yet, she also destabilizes any simple correlation of images and memories by displacing the former within the duration that determines the encoding of memories thus engendering discontinuity and ambiguity between what the viewer sees and what she remembers, what an image shows and evokes on one screen and then on the other, what remains and what is lost as the visual narrative of the work interrupts and shifts in the twenty-second gap between the two screens. Proposed by Endel Tulving in 1972, the distinction between the semantic and episodic memory systems is indicative of the different kinds of knowledge that, according to current models of autobiographical memory, concur in shaping memories and notions of the self (Corkin 2013, pp. 220–221). As indicated above, whereas semantic memory concerns general information that supports a person's knowledge about the world, episodic memory regards specific events or experiences in a person's life. Hence, episodic memories relate to a particular time and place in one's life, and are subjective, rich in sensory and emotional details. They are the past that—to use James's phrase—we appropriate. Remembering, however, conflates the distinction of semantic and episodic memories since 'autobiographical memories consist of both general semantic knowledge and details that are unique to a given time and place' (Rubin 2012, p. 23). Hence, memories can take various forms from 'the most specific – the raw record of experience, as it were – to the most abstract – the association of a mere fragment of experience to a lot of knowledge' (Boyer 2009, p. 6). Tribe variously addresses this conflation by exposing the ambiguity and distortion that the notion of (auto)biographical remembering takes on for Henry Molaison and his life story.

The pictures of two different houses shifts from screen to screen whilst Suzanne Corkin describes her own house and relates personal memories of growing up in Connecticut, not far from where H.M. lived. One of her

childhood friends was a girl who lived in a house opposite hers and whose father was a neurosurgeon, William Beecher Scoville. Whose houses are we seeing? H.M.'s? Corkin's? Scoville's?[7] The pictures ambiguously confound Molaison's and Corkin's memories posing the question of who is the remembering 'I' in the work. The anecdotic coincidence of Scoville being Henry Molaison's surgeon and the father of Corkin's friend is in fact indicative of the inextricable relation that binds any recollection of Henry Molaison's life to Corkin's testimony and the documentation of his amnesia. H.M. is the product of the 'psychologist's gaze' and of her narration that unquestionably assumes that Henry Molaison's inability to 'construct an autobiography as his life unfolded' (Corkin 2013, p. 235) can be turned into the narrative of H.M.'s life story—a narrative that concerns another set of memories, the history that links the study of H.M.'s amnesia to the development of twentieth-century theories of memory. In H.M.'s *mémoir*, Molainson's *mémoires* fades into the blanks and silences of amnesia or in the recurring mnemonic adjustments of confabulation, which ultimately are the faint traces of Henry Molaison's life story.

Not dissimilarly, the intersection in Tribe's film of a series of photographs of known figures and events from the post-war period to the last decades of the twentieth century hints to media culture and the shared memory that it engenders. The viewer's uncertainty or familiarity in recognizing the people and situations in the pictures is indicative of her contextual knowledge and, in fact, this was one of the tests used to assess H.M.'s semantic memory. In both instances, the pictures act as a double cultural record since they are both the indexical referents of people, places,



Fig. 2.2 Kerry Tribe, *H.M.*, 2009, single 16 mm film with sound, two projectors with a 20 second delay, film still, courtesy of the artist © Kerry Tribe

and events and clues for accessing individual and shared memories. They are visual memoranda and evidence of memory itself (Fig. 2.2). Tribe figuratively draws the viewer into the mechanism of remembering, and presents the viewer with the unstable heterogeneity of autobiographical memories, wrapping the screened images with uncertainty. In the equivocation of *mémoir*(*e*) and *mémoir*(*e*)*s*, *H.M.* posits the issue of the performativity of autobiographical memory as an embodied process that cannot be disentangled from the contexts, enactors and audiences that turn the act of remembering into one of narrating. The internal disjunction between the two screens *performs* a difference whereby the visual palimpsest of the work is disjointed from the narrative account of the voiceover, affectively inscribing a temporal fissure in the structure of the film that—as suggested—corresponds to the time-lapse that characterizes the formation of new memories.

The male voiceover in the film asks what it would be like 'to live without recourse to the past' and '[t]o lose the fourth dimension of time and live in the three dimensions of space alone?', suggesting that, 'Perspectives would flatten, and one could only guess at what these signals from another dimension would mean. In this way, time would not be linear and fixed but liquid. Malleable' (Tribe 2009, voiceover). However, if memory is a condition of the self, since it underpins the integration of experience into a cohesive story, narrative cohesion and linearity are already a result of the shaping of memories into narratives. Narrative linearity corresponds to a *spatialization*, in Bergson's terms, of duration. The continuous flow of present-past is in other words reshaped in the linear structure entailing beginning, middle and end. However, duration can be conceived as the delay linking the two projections in Tribe's installation. In *H.M.*, Tribe renders the malleability of time perceptible suggesting the ambiguity of a self caught in remembering. The 'objective' measurable duration of memory fading (twenty seconds) is experienced as the liquid duration of subjectivity and the elusiveness of remembering itself. As critic Martin Herbert observes,

> Tribe's art is structurally paradoxical, being a sequence of controlled mechanisms that stage their own collapsing into a sphere of doubt, of shattered holism. The reality we experience is filtered through the brain, but the brain is massively fragile, quixotic, and not available to be stepped outside of to reveal the angle of its tilt. (Herbert 2010, p. 31)

Indeed, *H.M.* engulfs the viewer in the fragility of a disorienting performance that falls onto itself, of a narrative that both attempts linear-

ity and subverts continuity. This paradox also denotes Henry Molaison's life story whose scattered traces can only be loosely linked together in the improbability of confabulation. While the linearity of the narrative of H.M.'s case study accounts for a *Bildungsroman* of amnesia, the split narrative of *time-images* locked in the twenty-second duration of Tribe's work conveys an affecting anti-memoir of loss whereby 'memory is', as Chris Marker remarks in *Sans Soleil* (1982), 'not the opposite of forgetting but its lining' (Marker 1983, voiceover). The *Möbius* strip of the film spins for the viewer this lining of disjointed imageries, traces of absent narratives and of unremembered memories. Indeed, Tribe's work invites the viewer to ask if the traces of remembering are ever anything more or anything less than the traces of what has been forgotten, not-remembered or mis-remembered; if memories are other than a loose assemblage that never quite account for a life story.

2.3 The *Möbius* Strip of Remembering

In his own memoir *A Berlin Chronicle* (1932), Benjamin remarks that 'Remembrance must not proceed in the manner of a narrative' but rather it must follow 'the discontinuities of space and time', as it meanders through the endless interpolation of the past that is remembering (Benjamin 1932/2005, pp. 611–612). Benjamin wanders the streets of his native city revisiting the places and impressions of his childhood in his mind's eyes. He uncovers the traces of memory and weaves them in a loose topography of the past. The fragmentary style of *A Berlin Chronicle* is reminiscent of early experimental film's techniques of montage and the formal discontinuity of the style evokes the visual connotations of the cinematic frame and changing points of view within it. Childhood recollections vividly emerge from panoramic views of the streets of Berlin and close-ups of buildings and interiors in a *mise en abîme* of places and anecdotes from different periods of the author's life. The tempo of the narrative similarly follows the discontinuous rhythms of sequences and takes swiftly shifting from the present to the past and vice versa as images and imageries overlay and fade one into the other, changing location, situation and characters.

A Berlin Chronicle resonates with the sensory cityscape of films such as Walter Ruttman's *Berlin: The Symphony of the Great City* (*Berlin: Die Sinfonie einer Großstadt* 1927) and Piel Jutzi's *Berlin Alexander Platz* (1931) whose layering of multiple perspectives and surfaces loosely pieces together ephemeral, at times dissonant, impressions of urban life, capturing commonplace

gestures, billboards, traffic and teeming streets whose idiosyncratic figures are at home in the heterotopia of the city itself (Barber 2002, pp. 31–38). Both the literary and filmic texts are in fact denoted by an episodic and digressing structure, which revels on the fragment, on the tangential connections among shots and memories, sequences and events, which continuously shift from the individual to the social, from the personal to the cultural. The topography of memories intersects that of the city generating a temporal and spatial network of associations that trigger the memories of personal anecdotes and reflections on the social and cultural histories of a place and a generation. The formal experimentation of film thus informs new ways of articulating the multifaceted self of modernity subverting traditional forms of autobiographical writing. In turn, the twentieth-century dissipation of the narrative integrity typical of traditional forms of life writing brings to the fore the criticality of the fragment on which a new dialectic between memory and narrative is further predicated. Memories can indeed be conceived, as psychologist Daniel Schacter puts it, as 'the fragmentary remains' that become the tale of who we are (Schacter 1996, pp. 71–73).

In drawing attention to the discontinuity and fragmentation of memories Benjamin highlights, as suggested, one of the most contentious issues surrounding the modern and contemporary autobiographical discourse, namely the discontinuity and plurality of self that stems from memories and the irreconcilable and indistinguishable relation recognized between remembering and narrating. If self-identity and the related feeling of self-constancy, as Ricoeur claims, are the product of narrative, what kind of self(s) is the reflection of the meandering of memories? What life story unfolds from the gaps and discontinuities of forgetting? Is it, in other words, possible to disentangle remembering from narrating in relation to memories and notionally question their respective implications for the self and one's life story? How does the moving image inflect such questions as a cultural referent for memories and memory processes? In the installation, *Parnassius mnemosyne* (2010), Tribe further deploys the *Möbius* strip as both the medium and metaphor of a work, which consists of a single 16-mm film. Inspired by Vladimir Nabokov's memoir *Speak, Memory* (1951), the work references Nabokov's own metaphor for his life, the butterfly named after the Ancient Greek personification of memory. Tribe's film shows the projected image of the microscopic enlargement of the butterfly wing pattern revealing its minute configuration: yet, the image is fleeting. At every forty-second interval, the filmstrip flips onto itself on a mirror image of the same enlarged pattern, evoking the intensity

and partiality of remembering. The detail of the butterfly's wing is like that of a picture that cannot be recaptured in its totality, but whose partiality conveys a feeling of completeness. It alludes to a memory or a detail in a memory, if one could catch it in isolation, and the flickering film to its retrieval and disappearance. Not unlike *H.M.*, *Parnassius mnemosyne* ask us to consider what a memory is and how does remembering spin memories in and out of our awareness, like a *Möbius* strip that moves in and out of consciousness without ever translating into a story (Fig. 2.3).

In *Speak*, *Memory*,[8] Nabokov compares his childhood's memories of pre-Revolutionary Russia to the 'projections of a magic lantern' at times sharp, at times out-of-focus and quickly fading (Nabokov 1951/2000, p. 127), as memories 'de-focalize' or cannot be recaptured since they are obscured by other memories (Nabokov 1951/2000, p. 182). The metaphor is cinematic and reminds us of a predecessor of cinema itself. It is also congruent with Tribe's metonymic focus on the wing pattern of the butterfly in *Parnassius mnemosyne* to evoke Nabokov's life story. Almost a spectator of his own memories, Nabokov describes approaching the scene of the past 'from the outside, from the depth of the park – not the house – as if the mind, in order to go back thither, had to do so with the silent steps of a prodigal, faint with excitement' (Nabokov 1951/2000, p. 129). In Nabokov's memories of a summer day of his childhood, details coalesce vividly: a sunny afternoon, a long table laid outdoors for chocolate and tea, the close-up image of a girl's arm stretched across the table, the lips of relatives that move 'in forgotten speech […]. And then suddenly, just when the colours and outlines settle at last […] a torrent of sounds comes to life: voices speaking all together, a walnut cracked, the click of a nutcracker carelessly passed,' (Nabokov 1951/2000, p. 129). Conceived over thirty years, *Memory*, *Speak* combines pieces written in different periods mainly for periodicals, variously edited, corrected and translated. It epitomizes life writing as malleable and discontinuous. Rather than the coherent chronological structure of a life story, Nabokov deploys the loose gathering and disappearing of memories to write about his childhood and adolescence, seamlessly shifting from the particular to the general, from personal to historical references. Details trigger streams of memories, amplifying the singularity of an event in narrative detours and reverberations.

Nabokov's narrative descriptions in *Memory*, *Speak* unfold cinematically, as if they were made of distinct and superimposed shots, of long spans and close-ups. Images both linger and quickly dissolve. Figuratively, Tribe evokes the 'film of remembering' that unreels in Nabokov's memoir



Fig. 2.3 Kerry Tribe, *Parnassius mnemosyne*, 2010, 16mm möbius film loop, 40 seconds, installation shot Arnolfini Gallery, Bristol, courtesy of the artist © Kerry Tribe, photo credit Jamie Woodley

by focusing on a single enlarged detail that reminds us of the unstable 'projections of a magic lantern'. This single image stands for both *mémoire*(*s*) and *mémoir*(*s*), without ever giving way to narrative. The quivering pattern of the butterfly's wing intimates a memory image—its visual pattern alludes to the neural pattern of the sensory-cognitive-emotional trace of a memory that is reshaped at every recall. It also suggests the figurative surfacing and disappearing of a memory, when the past is virtually iterated—always partial, condensed, almost archetypal and at times alien. Through memory, Nabokov returns to the places of childhood weaving his family's stories into the events that led to the Revolution and its aftermath. The shifting from the personal to the historical and vice versa engenders a merging and intersecting of episodic and semantic contents within and across memories as they unfold through a movement comparable to the flipping of the *Möbius* strip of Tribe's work. Remembering thus becomes like a film continuously turning on itself, capturing and losing the unstable revolving of its imageries. In *Parnassius mnemosyne*, in watching the enlarged projection of the butterfly's wing pattern, we similarly encounter an image that repeats itself, both other and the same, as the film flips over. This movement figuratively evokes the emergence and dissipation of memories, but also the internal dynamics of a memory in which then and there, past and present coincide. The pattern of the butterfly's wing does not yet translate for Tribe's viewer into a *story*. It is, as it were, a mere memory image, the recall of a trace that reshapes itself into a pattern. The image conveys the intensity of a memory, capable of evoking feeling, sensation and thought, and together with other memories of becoming a story. But the work resists this transition reminding us that remembering and narrating are not the same. Procedurally, *Parnassius mnemosyne* intimates a distinction that lurks at the core of autobiographical memory, both culturally and psychologically, as integral and yet distinct processes in memory. Hence, *Parnassius mnemosyne* brings us back to the paradoxical relation between remembering and narrating in memories, as both irreconcilable and indistinguishable.

In Ricoeur's view, narrative entails a three-fold mimesis of prefiguration (i.e. competence to articulate a story), configuration (emplotment) and refiguration (the intersection of the world of the narrator with that of the listener/reader or viewer) (Ricoeur 1985, pp. 242–243). Such features of mimesis are recognizable in the narrativization of memories argued by models of autobiographical memory whereby the account of memories is related to culturally acquired narrative systems that can be thought of as systems of representation (whether verbal, visual, acoustic, or performative) that enable the internal and external articulation (prefiguration)

of memories. Within this process of narrativization, the individual construes for herself and others images about the past, by selecting, editing, omitting and reconfiguring episodic and semantic features of memories in the present (emplotment). However, from a narrative point of view, memories present us with 'the problem of duration' since they constantly issue from 'the present or quasi-present', which differs from the time of recollection (Ricoeur 1985, p. 252). Although distinct from the living present, according to Ricoeur, the time of recollection is endowed with the qualities of an imagined 'quasi-present' (Ricoeur 1985, p. 252). Not unlike cinematic time-images that, according to Deleuze, condense the temporal, spatial and affective features at the intersection of 'the actual image of the present which passes' and 'the virtual image of the past that is preserved' (Deleuze 1989, p. 79; Pisters 2003, p. 4), memories *actualize* the past in the present in virtual images in the internal duration of remembering. In this duration, as in that which characterizes the moving image, past and present coincide in the repetition and projection of the memory image itself. Such image shares with the moving image the non-chronological synthesis of past and present through its being a virtual representation of experience. Without reducing the complexity of mental processes of remembering to the qualities ascribed to the moving image, the latter nonetheless can help us to address some of the issues raised by psychological models of remembering through an image that is itself condensed and composite. The moving image not unlike the memory image is the result of selected and edited frames that encompass semantic and episodic elements both formally and thematically. Hence, the moving image articulates ways of representing (and telling). The internal configuration of a memory can thus be thought of as cinematic in terms of its organization of planes, points of view and the collating within a frame of diverse features that encompass semantic and episodic contents, sensory, emotional and affective elements. In this sense the moving image acts as a cultural referent for envisaging what is a memory and a means to further explain the narrative organization across memories.

According to psychology, memories are recalled both consciously and unconsciously through montage-like associative patterns of connections known as spreading, whereby a memory or details within a memory and/or memory systems 'spread' to another similar or related memory within the same system (i.e. episodic or semantic) or across different systems activating the recall of diverse memories pertaining to the same experience or related ones (Mace 2010b, pp. 184–185). Hence, the recall of memories

is—to use Benjamin's phrase—a 'meandering' within and across memory systems and their retrieval is akin to the optical procedures characteristic of the moving image. Within this context, montage provides us with intelligible narrative structures (refiguration) by looping memories one onto the other within and across life periods. Processes of selection, combination and recombination that are active in the formation of a memory also order the organization of memories as they are brought together narratively. Montage, in fact, encompasses duration. Hence, following Deleuze's formal cinematic structuring as 'rhizomatic' (Pisters 2003, pp. 4–7), the conscious and unconscious associations that organize and reorganize memories into meaningful narrative patterns can be thought of as being dynamically looped 'and' this image (memory) 'and' that image (memory) (Deleuze 1989, pp. 180–181). Such looping maintains the associative potential of remembering within which free temporal and spatial, emotional and thematic connections can be achieved and, at the same time, supports the structuring into culturally intelligible and thus shareable forms proper to narrating. Coherence still substantiates the mimetic construction of memories as a feature denoting the structuring of memories into narrative patterns that are yet malleable and multilayered. This implies that neither the internal structuring of a memory nor its voluntary and involuntary patterning into a narrative is bound to linear chronological modalities, sequential and causal relations, but rather it unfurls according to associative forms and structures that are characteristic of the moving image and further relates to modalities of narrativization (verbal, visual or performative) that are culturally active. Memories thus mobilize narrative structures at the intertwining of remembering and narrating in ways that can be profitably theorized in terms of montage.

Within this perspective, life periods and life scripts that, according to psychological models, structure memories appear as narrative patterns superimposed on memories and the associative temporal and spatial bridging of remembering. Such paradigmatic patterns, with their beginnings, middles and ends, which endorse traditional forms of narrating are better understood as on-going sequences whose frames can be cut and edited, combined and juxtaposed not only linearly but according to repetitive, circular and other kinds of patterns. Indeed, drawing from Paul de Man's critique of autobiography, it is not memory that engenders a life story, but rather a life story is a figurative construction of memories (de Man 1979, pp. 920–921). This implies that the life scripts informing a life story are far less definite and stable structures than psychology would argue. Such malleability does not

undermine the coherence and cohesion that narrative confers upon memories, but rather it facilitates a dynamic mobilization of the past in the present through remembering. Hence, narrative structures emplot the meandering of memories according to more or less culturally accepted clichés. A life story emerges from the patterning generated by the intersecting of remembering and narrating that is better understood 'as a figure of reading or of understanding' (de Man 1979, p. 921). Autobiographical narratives are thus partial, and susceptible to revision and reinterpretation,[9] since the time and the subject of memories oscillate between present and past, continuity and change, consistency and mutability.

The problem exposed by a life story as a figure that frames memories further extends to the characteristic self-reflection that informs autobiographical texts as both distinct and contingent on the autonoetic property of autobiographical memories. The 'specular moment' that historically (and psychologically) aligns the 'I' of remembering and the 'I' of narrating within the cohesive structure of a life story is in itself precarious (de Man 1979, pp. 921–922): indeed for de Man '[t]he specular moment that is part of all understanding reveals the tropo-logical structure that underlies all cognitions, including knowledge of the self' (de Man 1979, p. 922). The defining figure of speech of such an opaque structure is according to de Man *prosopopeia* (veiling or masking). De Man undermines the grounding of subjectivity accorded to a life story by problematizing the very possibility for the self as 'I' to construe itself otherwise than as a narrative trope. But if narrative generates its own subject, how can we understand the 'I' of and in remembering? Jean Starobinski describes the style of autobiographical narrative as it emerges from remembering as 'deviation' (Starobinski 1980, p. 75). Deviation refers to the pronominal constancy that the first person narrator ensures in the narrative as it navigates the different temporal and spatial planes of recollection (Starobinski 1980, pp. 77–79). This constancy is however ambiguous 'since the "first person" embodies both the present reflection and the multiplicity of past states, as a quasi "third-person"' (Starobinski 1980, p. 79), thus exposing an inherent discontinuity embedded into the narrative structures that support the articulation of memories whereby the remembering 'I' and the recalled subject of, and in, memories are at the same time one and another. This oscillation can be assimilated to that of points of view within the cinematic frame (Deleuze 1986, pp. 73–74) and it enables us to explain the distinctive position of the 'I' in memories. To ask who this 'I' is implies a consideration of identity that, as Ricoeur argues, can be better described as narrative identity, an identity that is configured

within the structures of narrative and the dynamic temporal constructions arising from the composition of a text—literary, visual, performative and the like. Rather than understanding identity in terms of an abstract sense of 'being the same (*idem*)' (Ricoeur 1985, p. 246), which corresponds to the psychological notion of conceptual-self, Ricoeur anchors self-constancy into narrative identity in terms of 'oneself as the same [*soi-meme*] (*ipse*)' (Ricoeur 1985, p. 246), suggesting that 'this narrative identity, constitutive of self-constancy, can include change, mutability, within the cohesion of a lifetime' (Ricoeur 1985, p. 246). Hence, not unlike the butterfly-wing pattern in Tribe's work the 'I' of, and in, remembering and the 'I' of, and in, narrating constantly flick to and fro maintaining continuity and change, self and otherness, first and third person. Indeed 'the story of a life continues to be refigured by the truthful or fictive stories a subject tells about himself or herself. This reconfiguration makes this life itself a cloth woven of stories told' (Ricoeur 1985, p. 246). Remembering and narrating are themselves the figure of montage through which the story is woven. Montage however also presupposes what does not form into a story—that is, the trace of the memories that are suppressed, erased or unremembered.

2.4 (Auto)Biographical Memory: The *Möbius* Strip of Remembering

Contemporary memory is according to Nora both archival since 'it relies entirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image' (Nora 1989, p. 7), and autobiographical since it is centred on the self and the psychology of remembering (Nora 1989, p. 9). Such critique of contemporary memory informed a project launched by the French historian in the 1980s known as *ego-histoire*. The project addressed the role of personal memories and life story in the academic enquiry into history and focused on the intersecting of a scholar's personal history—whether cultural, intellectual, social or ethical—and the writing of history (Nora 1987; see also Popkin 2005). By asking a number of historians to reflect on the influence of their individual life story on their academic and intellectual pursuit, Nora's *ego-histoire* is indicative of a broader preoccupation with memory and interpretation of the past that denotes contemporary historical and cultural practices, including the arts. Memory, as both mediatized and autobiographical, has in fact acquired cultural predominance alongside historiography often productively pointing to the dynamic and multidimensional intersecting of remembering in the writing

of recent histories. The emphasis on testimony and the cultural position of the witness in contemporary culture testify to, and are a symptom of, the imbrication of memory and history. This is further reflected by the preoccupation with memory that has characterized the diverse and extensive confessional culture of the 1990s and which has further metamorphosed into the (auto)biographical telling of contemporary social networks and other digital media where individual and collective stories even more densely interlink and overlap. Here, the materiality of the trace (textual, visual, oral and the like) has become ubiquitous and pervasive through the online presence of one's life, and within the expansiveness of digital archiving and of the Internet (Artières 1999; Merzeau 1999; Rascaroli 2014; Longley Arthur 2009; Robin 1999; Van Dijk 2007). The memories that emerge from the contemporary conflation of the private and the public, the personal and the collective, the cultural and the historical arenas are the product of the processes, paradigms and practices that dominate the contemporary mediatized representations of the past.

In this context (auto)biographical memory looms as an *assemblage*, heterogeneous, malleable and mobile, a *Möbius* strip—inferring both record and memory, projection and screening, repetition and erasure. Hence, the psychological conceptualization of autobiographical memory is implicitly inscribed within broader concerns about the articulation of remembering in history, social sciences, and the arts and humanities. Autobiographical memory, as suggested, stands at the apex of the processes of psychologization and individualization of memory that started with the modern reconceptualization of memory. At the same time, its relevance as a model for the elucidation of processes of remembering within societies and cultures testifies to the epistemological currency gained by neuropsychological thinking in our time. The complexities underpinning the articulation of identities and narrative in life writing re-emerge at the boundaries of social and/or cultural forms of remembering and the reconstruction of historical events bringing to the fore the discontinuity, erasure and interpolation that affect these representations. Historian Luisa Passerini conceives memory in terms of the relationship of 'present and past, silence and speech, the individual and the collective, and thus as a narrative made up of individual and collective forms of forgetting' (Passerini 2007, p. 8). Passerini is concerned with the inter-subjective character of (auto)biographical memory and its significance in the construction of cultural and social forms of remembering that interact in the delineation of histories. As in memories the episodic and semantic contents tend to merge, weaving a network of associations that

extends beyond the personal to intersect cultural and historical references, so in culture the private and public constructions of memories and identities mutually inform each others. Annette Kuhn interprets this intersecting through the unpacking of family photographs and argues that

> Memory work makes it possible to explore connections between 'public' historical events, structures of feeling, family dramas, relations of class, national identity and gender, and 'personal' memory. In this case histories outer and inner, social and personal, historical and psychical, coalesce; and the web of interconnections that binds them together is made visible. (Kuhn 1995/2002, p. 5)

Kuhn considers the visual record as a 'pre-text' for recollection, which continually oscillates between individual and collective processes of interpretation (Kuhn 1995/2002, pp. 13–19; Kuhn 2000), thus rendering the record susceptible to interpolation and alteration. The visual record, however, also informs processes of remembering by formally and thematically shaping the memory work and the very web of interconnections that binds the episodic and semantic layers of remembering. Tribe further interrogates the intersecting of individual life stories and historical events in the video *The Last Soviet* (2010) and the installation *Milton Torres sees a Ghost* (2010). Both works are based on actual people and events and interrogate the disparity of individual memories and official records, memory and memorandum. And in both works such disparity is inflected in terms of *forgetting* as the screening, repression, silence or interference that affects individual and collective remembering and histories.

The Last Soviet alludes to the story of Russian cosmonaut Sergei Krikalev who remained in the space station Mir for 311 days during the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, only to return in March 1992. Tribe intercuts degraded video footage of the interior of a model of *Mir* and of its gravity free environment with archival images of the period that coincided with Krikalev's mission, including pictures of the Earth from space and tanks in the street of Moscow, a group photograph of Soviet cosmonauts, one of whom was erased from the image because he was dismissed from his position, and an excerpt from *Swan Lake* used to censor news of political unrest during television broadcasts. The video shifts from personal to historical events, individual and public memory, from first to third person narrator—that is from Krikalev's point of view to the external point of view of a news reporter. A male voiceover accompanies the *Mir* images talking in English (with Russian subtitles) about daily activities and the equipment in the space station as if the man were recollecting the experience of being in space; a woman news



Fig. 2.4 Kerry Tribe, *The Last Soviet*, 2010, color double screen video with sound, video still, courtesy of the artist © Kerry Tribe, photo credit Kelly Barrie

reporter describes the archival pictures in Russian (with English subtitles)—her commentary asynchronously refers to the images to follow (Fig. 2.4 and 2.5). A direct reference to Hollis Frampton's *Nostalgia* (1971) and the film's experimentation with time delay and dissonance (Ellegood 2010, pp. 19–20), the slippage exposes the discrepancy between the two texts—visual and oral—in ways that intimate the inconsistencies underscoring both documentation and interpretation. Throughout Tribe layers and interpolates the documentary material of the work through the intersection of multiple versions of the same account, the overt editing and deterioration of the images generating fissures and interferences within the components of the work. The poetic vision of autumn leaves floating in the gravity free interior of the space station—an image based on the anecdote of a bag of leaves sent to Mir—lyrically relates the traces of memory to the imagination, as the lingering frame is itself suspended between reality and fantasy: 'The distinction between private and public memory – between the Fall leaves and the fall of the Soviet Union – is made explicit in *The Last Soviet*. We become acutely aware of their key distinctions and their inextricable connections' (Ellegood 2010, p. 21). Hence, by juxtaposing and intersecting the different 'sets of memories' that shape an incident that coincidentally linked the destiny of an individual to major political changes, Tribe addresses the tension between personal memories and official remembrance. Yet, for both the individual and society

Fig. 2.5 Kerry Tribe, *The Last Soviet*, 2010, color double screen video with sound, video still, courtesy of the artist © Kerry Tribe

at large remembering is inextricable from the representations that make it. These images are filled with emotions, fantasies and desires, whether overt, repressed or deferred, betraying the processes of selection, editing, distortion and silencing that actively reshape the past into memories.

The Last Soviet renders explicit the interpretation (and translation) that governs any appropriation of the past into memories, and hence the significance of memories in relation to historical accounts. While a distinction between history and memory remains fundamental (Wertsch and Roediger 2008; Assmann 2012; Traverso 2015), recent histories have been increasingly predicated, juxtaposed and interjected with memory—whether in terms of personal, public or collective forms of remembering. Both history and memory (and the processes of remembering that the latter entails) ensue from the common preoccupation with and shared representations of the past conditioned by and contingent to the present (Traverso 2015, p. 18). Yet, whilst history shares the same contents of memory, it is also a reflection on memory itself, which, in turn, becomes the subject of historiographical analysis (Traverso 2015, p. 18; see also Crane 2013). At the

same time, as Jan Assmann puts it, in the case of memory 'the past is not simply "received" by the present. The present is "haunted" by the past and the past is modelled, invented, reinvented, and reconstructed by the present' (Assmann 1997, p. 9). This ties the relevance and significance of memories to the changing contingencies of the here and now rendering the 'truth' of memory subjected to time and to its unfolding (Assmann 1997, p. 14). Assmann also draws a parallel between the narrative construction of individual identities as life narrative/s, and the formation of collective memories as equally relying upon the narrative structures active in the organization of experience and its representations (Assmann 1997, pp. 14–15). Such narratives tend to adhere to established formula, often acting conservatively in relation to the elaborations of history (Wertsch 2009, pp. 130–132). Conversely, as we shall further argue in the following chapters, memories can also generate subversive images of the past that are able to undermine and challenge conventional representations of histories, displaying the emotional and affective contents of the past.

The difficulties concerning the intersecting of remembering and narrating in psychological models of autobiographical memory also extend to social and cultural representations of the past where memory and history interweave and overlap. As instrumental in construing identity, both subjectively and inter-subjectively, memories rework the past in ways that satisfy or contend with social and cultural aspirations and expectations, whether through a questioning of inequalities or the inscription of frustrations in what it is remembered. Accordingly, they offer individuals or groups of individuals a means to negotiate the lines separating the private, the public and the political. Memory—as Assmann suggests—engages with the past as a means of interpreting and understating the present from a perspective that starts and involves the individual (and/or the group). Since individuals are 'socially situated', they are 'agents of remembering' (Wertsch and Roediger 2008, pp. 320–321), so that social constructions of remembering include, and can be altered by, individual recollections of the past. This generates malleable representations that variously position and re-position both individuals (or groups) and the past in the present. The psychological mechanisms that make memories malleable and unreliable seemingly 'guide mnemonic reshaping' so that 'socially connected individuals will begin to converge on shared representations of the past' on which not only collective identities but also sociability itself are grounded (Hirst et al. 2012, p. 142). Hence, the circularity binding remembering and narrating traces the contours of what Passerini describes

as 'memory's insistence on creating a history of itself, which is much less and perhaps somewhat more than a social history' (Passerini 1996, p. xi). Not unlike a life story, the 'history' that memory creates for itself is a *representation* of the past that contains selections, adaptations, erasures and even falsifications of events: it is a product of filtering, organizing, repressing, denying or displacing. That is, memories are affected by the selection and the filtration imposed by a posteriori knowledge, and by the reflection that other experiences insinuate on certain events, superimposing and interfering with their reconfigurations of the past (Traverso 2015, p. 19). Individual memories, as Passerini reminds us, contribute to shape the fabric of social and cultural remembering, and ultimately the articulation of histories; at the same time they are themselves shaped by existing social, cultural and historical patterns (Passerini 1996, p. xi). This implies that the relation between the individual and her experience of events is muddled by the contingencies that determined how the events were lived but also how they are remembered and reconstructed in the present. The intersection of individual and collective remembering, on the one hand, and official and public documentation, on the other, invariably displays adherence to and rupture from existing cultural themes, inner contradictions, ambiguities, and silences (Passerini 1996, p. 23). Indeed, memory can act as a stultifying means of control that uses the past for the continuation of *status quo* using its own processes of selection, organization and editing to suppress the emergence of disturbing or disruptive features that may hinder present conditions—whether concerning social identities and regimes, cultural assumptions and representations (Connerton 2008, pp. 61–66).[10] At the same time, as we further discuss in the following chapters, memory can also bring to the fore what remains marginal or forgotten in official narratives and representations acting in Assmann's word as 'counter-memory', a memory that contradicts another memory (Assmann 1997, p. 12) and shows counter-currents within cultures and existing historical accounts of the past and the artefacts that support them.

By using documentary-like images, in *The Last Soviet*, Tribe exploits the contemporary emphasis on the archival character of memory and the materiality of the trace as image. The fuzziness of some of the sequences, however, brings into question the reliability of the archival trace and intentionally disrupts the narrative flow of the work. The formal juxtaposition and dissonance among the images and between images and texts further invites an interrogation of the nature of such a trace and of its interpretations. What is the borderline between individual and public memories? What is the official

and non-official dimension of history? To what extent is the active suppression from and by public remembering comparable to the removing and altering of 'official' documentation that shapes adequate or alternative versions of the past? The censorship exacted on the picture in which the face of one of the cosmonauts was erased and footage documenting news of unrest intimates the authorities' active repression of the official memories of the events—what Paul Connerton refers to as repressive erasure (Connerton 2008, pp. 60–61). In Tribe's video, however, this repression is contradicted by the intersection of the censored footage accompanied by the dissonant voiceovers, which activates another level of remembrance that brings to the fore what has been silenced. This, as we shall further examine in relation to the archive and the filmic archival trace, is conducive to *rememoration*. Indeed, as Passerini puts it, 'one could argue that we speak from a century which has given rise to a contradictory mixture of memory and oblivion' (Passerini 2007, p. 18) in the concurring and antithetical processes at work in contemporary representations of the past.

Tribe further interrogates the tension between personal memories and official documentation and the processes of silencing, distortion and interpolation in the installation *Milton Torres Sees a Ghost* (2010). Milton Torres is a US fighter pilot who, in 1957, during a mission over British air space was asked to locate and shoot down an unidentified aircraft that his radar had detected but which then disappeared. The mission might have involved the CIA's alleged use of phantom aircrafts as weapons during the Cold War and was kept secret until 2008 when the British government released the redacted records of the incident. Torres was sworn to secrecy and did not talk about what happened for over fifty years. Tribe's work is based on a recording that the artist made of Torres's account of the incident. In the installation, the audiotape of the recording is looped between two listening stations in the gallery. Each station is equipped with a reel-to-reel audio player connected to an oscilloscope. The tape is made to run along the gallery space as it passes through two decks, one of which lays the track down while the other one erases it. At one listening station the visitor listens to Torres's testimony; at the other, the tape is 'strafed by the sonic equivalent of thick black marker' (Herbert 2010, p. 35). This is complemented by the redacted transcription of Torres's testimony that is displayed on the gallery walls along which the tape runs. Fuzziness of memory traces occurs when a trace is susceptible to interference and decay during encoding or recall and it is considered one of the processes underscoring the formation of false memories (Brainerd and Reyna 2002). Hence, in Tribe's installation, the erosion of the tape and

the diminution of the oscilloscope signals intimate both the experience of the event and its internal re-elaboration and representation as flawed and interfered with by official reconstruction and by Torres's own indistinct memories (Fig. 2.6).

Torres's account is full of ambiguities, inconsistencies and gaps. There is no definite consensus, evidence or resolution to it. The tape itself has been edited to engender equivocation so that Torres's description of the technical equipment indistinctly refers to both that in the cockpit and in the installation. The allusion to the radar screen and its signal on the aircraft that recur prominently in Torres's recollection of the event visually corresponds to the sound waves recorded by the two oscilloscopes in the installation. The intensity of their signal, like that of the aircraft's radar, varies from high to nil, depending if the oscilloscope is recording Torres's voice track or its erased version. As in the case of *The Last Soviet* and *H.M.*, Tribe exposes the tension between *mémoire* and *mémoir*, memory and memorandum. Rather than the inadequacy of memories as records of experience—though unreliable a memory remains authentic to the individual, *Milton Torres Sees a Ghost* further engages with the susceptibility

Fig. 2.6 Kerry Tribe, *Milton Torres Sees a Ghost*, 2010, installation with audiotape, reel-to-reel players, oscilloscope and framed documents, installation shot LAXART, Santa Monica, courtesy of the artist © Kerry Tribe

of the trace (whether mnemonic or archival) to deterioration, distortion, repression and suppression. The recording tape denotes both the materiality of the archival record and the physicality of the memory trace, to which the signal of the oscilloscope alludes. Like the filmstrip in Tribe's other works, the tape is indicative of the intersecting of autobiographical remembering and mediated records of memories in the shaping of both individual and social or official remembrance. And like the *Möbius* strip, the tape embodies the constant 'deviation' of remembering into narrating.

Whilst individual memories are tied to personal narratives and representations that morph them into autobiographical confabulation in order to maintain a coherent though flawed picture of oneself, the historical trace is no less vulnerable to the pressure of hegemonic control and suppression in order to support official versions of events. *Milton Torres Sees a Ghost* reveals an episode for which there is scant evidence. Though inconsistent and confabulatory, his account is nonetheless indicative of the intersection, argued by Passerini, of personal memories and historical recollection. Accordingly, memories—whether individual or historical—are dynamically reconfigured within silence, oblivion and suppression as well as remembering itself. In Tribe's installation, the tape of Torres's testimony both physically and figuratively delimits a space of recollection and a trajectory of memory as it runs along the perimeter of the gallery. The visitor traverses the room of the installation, moves from listening post to listening post. Her movement in the gallery is synchronous to that of the tape. It is also synchronous to the layering and cancellation of the soundtrack embedding both the work and its experience in the present as the time of remembering, the time when the trace of the past is recalled—*re-traced* and *traced upon*, ever unstable, malleable and susceptible to disappearance. The visitor, like in Tribe's other works, is figuratively *looped* in the performance of memory and its ambiguities. By questioning the relation between memories and their records, between the mental processes of memory and their cultural and historical counterparts, Tribe thus exposes the continuity and disruption with the past on which memory is predicated. This instability is directly inscribed in the spatial and temporal dimensions of her film/video and sound installations, whether as the temporal delay in *H.M.*, the turning film in *Parnassius mnemosyne* or the interference and erosion of signal in *The Last's Soviet* and *Milton Torres Sees a Ghost*. The space that Tribe's works figuratively create operates both epistemologically and perfomatively and is indicative of environments of remembering that, as we shall further discuss, characterize the contemporary economy of memory and its uses of the past.

Notes

1. Representatives of such practices include for instance Stan Brakage's and Derek Jarman's filmic palimpsest of domestic and cultural footage, Hollies Framptom's and Chris Marker's cinematic exploration and deconstruction of memory, and Joseph Morder and Jonas Mekas cinematic diaries, all of which testify to new forms of engaging with memory and the self.
2. 'Working memory comprises multiple specialized components of cognition that allow humans to comprehend and mentally represent their immediate environment, to retain information about their immediate past experience, to support the acquisition of new knowledge, to solve problems, and to formulate, relate, and act on current goals' (Conway 2005, p. 620).
3. According to Ricouer, the working-through of psychoanalysis also involves the creation of a narrative identity by piecing together 'bits and pieces of stories that are unintelligible as well as unbearable, in a coherent and acceptable story, in which the analysand can recognize his or her self-constancy' (Ricoeur 1985, p. 247).
4. Brenda Milner studied in Cambridge with Frederic Bartlett before moving to St Gilles University in Toronto.
5. Henry Molaison donated his brain for scientific research and it is still studied today.
6. Memory researchers refer to the distinction between short-term memory and long-term memory back to William James's postulation of primary memory and secondary memory (Moscovich 2012).
7. The two houses are respectively Corkin's and her childhood friend's homes (personal communication, 5 December 2015).
8. In the foreword, written in 1966, Nabokov refers to the fragmentary composition of the work and the choice of the title (Nabokov 1951/2000, pp. ix–xiv).
9. According to de Man autobiographical narratives are textual systems denoted by the impossibility of closure and totalization (de Man 1979, p. 922).
10. According to Paul Connerton, models of social and cultural memory have not been exempt from the problematic of forgetting and the ricochet of what is 'forgotten'. Through a consideration of socially and culturally shared memories as a means of preserving or ensuring group identity, Connerton categorizes social and cultural forgetting in relation to its functions from political censorship to oblivion and

the obsolescence of past events. He classifies forgetting in terms of: political acts of censorship (repressive erasure); official acts of oblivion meant to preserve group and national cohesion (prescriptive forgetting); shared silences which support the formation of new memories (forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of new identity); selective uses of the past that are socially and culturally important (structural amnesia); cancellation caused by overload of information (forgetting as annulment); outmodedness of information, artefact and so on where usefulness becomes outdated (forgetting as planned obsolescence); erasure of shameful pasts (forgetting as humiliated silence) (Connerton 2008, pp. 59–71, and 2011, 33–50).

Bibliography

Albera, F. (2012) 'Munch the Filmmaker, a Recalcitrant Amateur', translated by Laura Bennett in A. Lampe and C. Chéroux, (ed.) *Edvard Munch: The Modern Eye* (London: Tate Publishing), pp. 189–195.

Amigoni, D. (2006) 'Introduction', in D. Amigoni (ed.) *Life Writing and Victorian Culture* (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 1–13.

Artières, P. (1999) 'Une vie en ligne: Des archieves personelles sur le Web', in *Récits de vies et medias* (Nanterre: Université Paris X), pp. 73–78.

Assmann, A. (2012) 'To Remember or to Forget: Which Way Out of a Shared History of Violence', in A. Assmann and L. Shortt (ed.) *Memory and Political Change* (Basington: Palgrave MacMillan), pp. 53–71.

Assmann, J. (1997) *Moses The Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism* (Cambridge Mass., and London: Harvard University Press).

Baddeley, A. D. (1986) *Working Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Baddeley, A.D. (2007) *Working Memory, Thought and Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Barber, S. (2002) *Projected Cities: Cinema and Urban Space* (London: Reaktion).

Barthes, R. (1995) *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes*, translated by Richard Howard (London: Papermac).

Beaujour, M. (1991) *Poetics of the Literary Self-portrait*, translated by Yara Milos (New York and London: New York University Press).

Bellour, R. (1989) *Eye for I: Video Self Portraits*, translated by Lynne Kirby, exhibition catalogue (New York: Independent Curators Incorporated).

Benjamin, W. (1929/2005) 'On the Image of Proust', in W. Jennings, H. Eiland and G. Smith (ed.) *Walter Benjamin Selected Writings: 1927–1934*, vol. 2 (Harvard: Harvard University Press), pp. 237–247.

Benjamin, W. (1932/2005) 'A Berlin Chronicle', in W. Jennings, H. Eiland and G. Smith (ed.) *Walter Benjamin Selected Writings: 1927–1934*, vol. 2 (Harvard: Harvard University Press), pp. 595–637.

Bernstern, D. and Bohn, A. (2009) 'Cultural Script and Individual Life Stories', in P. Boyer and J. W. Wertsch (ed.) *Memory in Mind and Culture* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 62–82.

Boyer, P. (2009) 'What are memories for? Functions of Recall in Cognition and Culture', in P. Boyer and J. W. Wertsch (ed.) *Memory in Mind and Culture* (Cambridge University Press), pp. 3–28.

Bluck S., Alea, N. and Demiray, B. (2010) 'You Get What You Need: The Psychological Functions of Remembering', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 284–307.

Brainerd, C.J. and Reyna, V.F. (2002) 'Fuzzy Trace Theory and False Memory', in *Current Directions in Psychological Studies* 11 (5), pp. 164–69.

Burgin, V. (2004) *The Remembered Film* (London: Reaktion).

Carson, J. (2010) 'On Consciousness: Kerry Tribe's Performative Aesthetics', in *Kerry Tribe: Dead Star Light*, exhibition catalogue (Bristol: Arnolfini Gallery, London: Camden Arts Centre, Oxford: Modern Art Oxford), pp. 45–49.

Casey, E. (1987) *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* (Minneapolis: Indiana University Press).

Connerton, P. (2008) 'Seven Types of Forgetting', in *Memory Studies*, 1: (1), pp. 59–71.

Connerton, P. (2011) *The Spirit of Mourning: History, Memory and the Body* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press).

Conway, M.A. (2005) 'Memory and the Self', *Journal of Memory and Language*, 53: (4), pp. 594–628.

Conway, M.A. (2006) 'Memory and Desire: Reading Freud', in *The Psychologist*, 19: (9), pp. 548–550.

Conway, M.A, and Loveday, C. (2010) 'Accessing Autobiographical Memories', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 56–70.

Conway, M. A. and Jobson, L. (2012) 'On the Nature of autobiographical memory', in D. Berntsen and D. C. Rubin (ed.) *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 54–69.

Corkin, S. (2013) *Permanent Present Tense: The Man with No Memory and What He Taught to the World* (London: Allen Lane).

Crane, S. (2013) 'The Pictures in the Background: History, Memory and Photography in the Museum', in J. Tumbley (ed.) *Memory and History: Understanding Memory as Source and Subject* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 123–142.

Danziger, K. (2008) *Marking the Mind: A History of Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Deleuze, G. (1986) *Cinema 1 The Moving Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The Anthlone Press).

Deleuze, G. (1989) *Cinema 2 The Time Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: The Anthlone Press).

Derrida, J. (1986) 'Mnemosyne', in *Memoires for Paul de Man*. The Wellek Library Lectures at the University of California, Irvine, translated by Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, and Eduardo Cadava (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 1–44.

Easton, E. ed. (2011) *Snapshot: Painter and Photography, Bonnard to Villard* (New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale University Press).

Ellegood, A. (2010) 'Kerry Tribe: The Invention of Memory', in *Kerry Tribe: Dead Star Light*, exhibition catalogue (Bristol: Arnolfini Gallery, London: Camden Arts Centre, Oxford: Modern Art Oxford), pp. 19–24.

Fivush, R. and Bauer, P.J. (2010) 'The Emergence of Recollection: How We Learn to Recall Ourselves in the Past', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 259–83.

Habermas, T. and Bluck, S. (2000) 'Getting a Life: The Emergence of the Life Story in Adolescence', in *Psychological Bulletin*, 126, pp. 748–769.

Habermas, T. (2012) 'Identity, Emotion, and the Social Matrix of Autobiographical Memory: A Psychoanalytic Narrative View', in D. Berntsen and D. C. Rubin (ed.) *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 33–53.

Herbert, M. (2010) 'The Uncertainty Principle', in *Kerry Tribe: Dead Star Light*, exhibition catalogue (Bristol: Arnolfini Gallery, London: Camden Arts Centre, Oxford: Modern Art Oxford), pp. 31–35.

Hirst, W., Cuc, A., and Wohl, D. (2012) 'Of Sins and Virtues: Memory and Collective Identity', D. Bernstern and D. C. Rubin. (ed.) *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 140–159.

Jay, P. L. (1982) 'Being in the Text: Autobiography and the Problem of the Subject', in *MLN*, Comparative Literature (Dec.), 97: (5), pp. 1045–1063.

Kuhn, A. (1995/2002) *Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Imagination*, new edition (London and New York: Verso).

Kuhn, A. (2000) 'A Journey through Memory', in S. Radstone (ed.) *Memory and Methodology* (Oxford and New York: Berg), pp. 179–196.

Leichtman, M.D. and Wang Q. (2005) 'A Socio-Historical Perspective on Autobiographical Memory Development', in D. B. Pillemer and S. H. White (ed.) *Developmental Psychology and Social Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 34–58.

Lejeune, P. (1980) *Je est un autre* (Paris: Édition de Seuil).

Lejeune, P. (1999) 'Cher écran', in P. Lejeune (ed.) *Récits de vies et medias* (Nanterre: Université Paris X), pp. 51–71.

Longley Arthur, P. (2009) 'Saving Lives: Digital Biography and Life Writing', in J. Garde-Hansen, A. Hoskins and A. Reading (ed.) *Save As… Digital Memories* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan), pp. 44–59.

Mace, J. H. (2010a) 'Involuntary Remembering and Voluntary Remembering: How Different Are They?', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 43–55.

Mace, J.H. (2010b) 'Understanding Autobiographical Remembering from a Spreading Activation Perspective', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 182–201.

Man de, P. (1979) 'Autobiography as De-facement', in *MLN*, Comparative Literature (Dec.), 94: (5), pp. 919–930.

Marcus, L. (1994) *Auto/biographical Discourses: Theory, Criticism, Practice* (Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press).

Marker, C. (1982) *Sans Soleil* (Paris: Argos Film).

Merzeau, L. (1999) 'Médiologie et Moi', in P. Lejeune (ed.) *Récits de vies et medias* (Nanterre: Université Paris X), pp. 225–235.

Moscovitch, M. (2012) 'The Contribution of Research on Autobiographical Memory to Past and Present Theories of Memory Consolidation, in D. Berntsen and R. C. Rubin (ed.) *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 91–113.

Nabokov, V. (1951/2000) *Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited* (London: Penguin Books).

Nora, P. (1989) 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire', translated by Marc Roudebush, in *Representations*, 26 (Spring), pp. 7–24.

Nora, P. (ed.) (1987) *Essais d'egohistorie* (Paris: Gallimard).

Passerini, L. (1996) *Autobiography of a Generation: Italy, 1968*, translated by Lisa Erdberg (Hanover, N.H. and London: University Press of New England).

Passerini, L. (2007) *Memory and Utopia: The Primacy of Intersubjectivity* (London: Equinox).

Pisters, P. (2003) *The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

Popkin, J. D. (2005) *History, Historians, & Autobiography* (Chicago and London, The University of Chicago).

Rascaroli, L (2014) 'Working at Home: *Tarnation*, Amateur Authorship, and Self-inscription in the Digital Age', in Rascaroli, L. and Young, G. with Monahan, B (ed.) *Amateur Filmmaking: The Home Movie, the Archive, the Web* (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 229–242.

Renov, M. (1989/2004) 'The Subject in History: The New Autobiography in Film and Video', *The Subject of Documentary* (London and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 104–119.

Rice, H.J. (2010) 'Seeing Where We're at: A Review of Visual Perspective and Memory Retrieval', in J. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 228–258.

Ricoeur, P. (1985) *Time and Narrative*, translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, vol. 3 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press).

Ricoeur, P. (1990) *Oneself as another*, translated by Kathleen Blamey (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press).

Robin, R. (1999) 'Ma page web: Home page papiers perdus'. Lejeune, P. ed. *Récits de vies et medias* (Nanterre: Université Paris X), 79–98.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1789/2000), 'Preface to the Neufchâtel edition', *Confessions* translated by Angela Scholar, edited with an introduction and notes by Patrick Coleman (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 643–649.

Rubin, D. C. (2012) 'The Basic System Model of Autobiographical Memory', in D. Berntsen, and D. C. Rubin ed. *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 11–32.

Schacter, D. L. (1996) *Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind and the Past* (New York: Basic Books).

Scoville, W. B. and Milner, B. (1957) 'Loss of Recent Memory after Bilateral Hippocampal Lesion', in *The Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry*, 20, pp. 11–21.

Starobinski, J. (1980) 'The Style of Autobiography' in J. Olney (ed.) *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press), pp. 73–83.

Traverso, E. (2015) *Le passé: modes d'emploi. Histoire, mémoire, politique* (Paris: La fabrique editions).

Tribe, K. (2009) *H.M.*, single 16 mm film with sound, two projectors with a 20 second delay.

Van Dijk, J. (2007) *Mediated Memories in the Digital Age* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press).

Wang, Q. and Brockmeier, J. (2002) 'Autobiographical Remembering as Cultural Practice: Understanding the Interplay between Memory, Self and Culture', in *Culture and Psychology*, 8: (1), pp. 45–64.

Wertsch, J. W. and Roediger, H. L. (2008) 'Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations and Theoretical Approaches', in *Memory* 16: 3 (April), pp. 318–326.

Wertsch, J. W. (2009) 'Collective Memory', in P. Boyer and J. W. Wertsch (ed.) *Memory in Mind and Culture* (Cambridge University Press), pp. 117–137.

Winter, A. (2012) *Memory: Fragments of a Modern History* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press).

CHAPTER 3

Trauma, Latency and Amnesia

Trauma is eminently a modern concept. Its origins can be located in the 1870s at the convergence of technological advancement and the development of psychology and psychoanalysis. Initially deployed to designate the psychological impact of railway accidents (i.e. 'railway shock'), the term was later used to describe the impact of modern warfare on soldiers, as in shellshock and war neurosis. Hence, the original meaning of the term 'wound' shifted from denoting a physical injury to indicating an internal psychic wound that haunted and tarnished the individual. This etymological shift, as Roger Luckhurst points out, already posited the unresolved duality between the reality of the traumatic experience and its memories, which took the form of disquieting and alienating mental representations (Luckhurst 2008, pp. 20–34). Rather than a visible lesion, trauma meant a hidden wound whose symptoms were akin to those of neurosis and hysteria, and manifested as intrusive nightmares and disturbing flashes that brought back to the sufferer the original experience in harrowing ways. The vividness of the unbidden mental imageries that characterize trauma and the latency that mar and distort the recollection of the original traumatic event are critical to an understanding of trauma in relation to individual, social and cultural memory. From its origin, the psychological notion of trauma is imbricated with the modern theorization of forgetting and what remains latent to remembering, pointing to complex relations between trauma, amnesia and latency.

In her historical analysis of the emergence and development of the concept of trauma from the late-nineteenth century to the present, Ruth Leys

C. Albano, *Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36588-0_3

draws attention to its instability and outlines the competing models on which the current understanding has evolved in terms of two competing models, mimetic and anti-mimetic (Leys 2000). The mimetic model is based on the bodily identification with the traumatic symptom to which the individual is passively subjected; the anti-mimetic model presupposes the autonomy of the individual who sees rather than enacts the traumatic symptom, since the latter is displaced from memory and inaccessible to representation (Leys 2000, pp. 8–11). The historical conflation of these two models and the confusion that this has caused is at the core of Leys's critique of today's notion of trauma and of the underlying question of *representability*, on which the concept is predicated both individually and culturally. The chapter addresses the issues of representability *vis à vis* the significance of the moving image in the formulation of the concept itself, and further examines the implications for trauma of latency and amnesia. The discussion draws on the initial considerations about the modern assimilation of the moving image and mind and the ways in which the latter infiltrated the conceptualization of trauma as a means of designation. In particular, we return to the laboratory use of film in the study of war-related trauma and consider its role in the psychological history of trauma. The chapter examines the ways in which the moving image has intersected the discourse of psychology and has provided a means of enquiry as well as a malleable cultural referent to theorize the unbidden images that characterize traumatic remembering. The correlation of such intrusive memories and the moving image further enables us to consider the implications of trauma with latency and amnesia.

Trauma today refers to both a painful experience for the individual and a cultural construct that encompasses the horror of violence, war, atrocities and man-made as well as natural disasters. Throughout the twentieth century the concept has gained cultural prominence across the humanities, history, art criticism and practice as well as in psychological sciences, legal, social and political studies. The word 'trauma' is meant to convey the complexity of the spectrum of experiences that it supposedly defines and of its implications for the individual and society alike. This broadness has facilitated the assimilation of the concept, but also rendered it unstable and susceptible to interpretation, bringing its validity into question. Central to the debate, from the emergence of the concept to the present, is the representability of traumatic memories (Luckhurst 2008, p. 80)—both mentally and culturally. Considered within the diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and the theoretical model of autobiographical memory,

traumatic memories are characterized by vivid, persistent, fragmentary and intrusive mental images that disrupt the unfolding of one's self-narrative inducing deep feelings of anxiety, guilt and loss of control or emotional numbing (Holmes and Bourne 2008, pp. 553–554). To ask what is the relation between the shattering recollection of trauma and the moving image implies an examination of the ways in which the contemporary understanding of traumatic memories has been predicated on the experimental use of film in laboratory testing.

Psychically and culturally situated at the threshold between reality and its representation (mental and otherwise) the concept of trauma and its diagnosis[1] rests on the mental images that denote traumatic memories. Memories of emotional events, in fact, 'typically take the form of mental images irrespective of whether such memories are intrusive or deliberately recalled and conversely imagery seems to have a special impact on emotion' (Holmes and Bourne 2008, p. 553). The theorization of such images, as suggested in the first chapter, has been predicated on the optic procedures of the moving image to the point that, as Luckhurst observes, 'It is now hard to think of contemporary psychology of trauma outside an imbrication with photography and cinema, with cultural metaphors of flashbulbs and flashbacks now literalized in scientific and cultural theory' (Luckhurst 2008, p. 150; see also Turin 1989). The disturbing imageries of trauma, in other words, can be thought of in Deleuze's terms as 'sensory aggregates', the product of an intrinsically affective montage of visual, acoustic and haptic perceptions that engender sensible impressions in the viewer who is emotionally looped into the unravelling of the image (Shaviro 1993, pp. 25–26; Deleuze 1995, pp. 46–56). Indeed, the 'imbrication' of trauma and film raises the question of the correlation between mental imagery and moving image, both historically and within contemporary science and art practice. As Lisa Saltzman and Eric Rosenberg ask, 'how, […] are trauma and visual representation entwined in modernity?' (Saltzman and Rosenberg 2006, p. ix). And how is such entwining marred by amnesia?

The assimilation of film to the processes of the mind is suggestive of a profound and perhaps not fully accountable cultural contamination. At the same time neuropsychological insight on the features of traumatic memories are instructive in rethinking trauma and its cultural legacy within the framework of memory environment, latency and amnesia. In this context, a trilogy—*The Watch Man* (2007), *Balnakiel* (2009), *Lesions in the Landscape* (2015)—by filmmaker and sound artist Shona Illingworth is

relevant to our discussion. The works have been developed in conversation with memory researcher and neuropsychologist, Martin Conway, and also, in the case of *Lesions in the Landscape*, in dialogue with neuropsychologist Catherine Loveday. Illingworth interrogates the individual and cultural dynamics of memory in relation to traumatic memories and contested histories, and creates immersive visual and acoustic environments that are viscerally affecting. The chapter begins with a consideration of the laboratory use of the moving image in the study of the intrusive mental pictures that characterize traumatic memories from the 1950s to the present and examines the pervasiveness of such reciprocity by focusing on the critical role that one film played in validating the 'image' of trauma. Illingworth's work then helps us to further examine the implications of the cultural alignment of traumatic memories and the affective potency of film, and address social and cultural articulations of trauma and amnesia bridging individual with cultural and transcultural remembering.

3.1 'Subincision': The Cultural Making of Intrusive Memories

Although Freud rooted the notion of repression in a discursive model that was based on language, the plastic presence of imageries—whether of dreams, phantasies or memories—could not be completely dismissed. Inevitably, the mental image remains a thorny presence and is perhaps unavoidably implicated with the moving image for both psychoanalytical and psychological theories. Referring to current memory research and to the debate surrounding the reliability of traumatic memories in cases of sexual abuse, Michael Billig revisits the Freudian concept of repression and considers it a 'social skill acquired in the course of development, especially moral development, [so that] the cultural and ideological dimension can be emphasized' (Billig 1999, pp. 142–143). Billig draws on the postulation that autobiographical memories are shaped by linguistic and narrative structures that are developmentally acquired and culturally determined. This also implies that forgetting as an inherent process of memories' formation is subject to a similar structuring and is equally acquired and culturally determined. Quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, Billig comments that psychological words, including repression, call for 'outward criteria':

> 'Remembering' cannot consist of replaying an internal private video. If it did, then there could be no concept of 'remembering' in the public vocabulary:

> 'What we deny is that the picture of the inner processes gives us the correct picture of the idea of the use of the word to "remember"'. Psychological subjects, when asked whether they remember seeing a particular stimulus, are not being asked to replay an internal video. (Billig 1999, p. 156)

Although Billlig is critical of the filmic referent to convey remembering and focuses on the importance of language in the shaping of memories, he nonetheless situates memory's processes within semantic structures that, as we have argued, also pertain to mimetic representations that are not exclusively linguistic but also encompass visual and more broadly sensory imageries. Hence if, as Billig suggests, 'the picture of the inner process' is the referent for the concept itself—whether of memory, forgetting or repression—images and ways of seeing are part of the individual and cultural narrative structures on which the mind supposedly anchors the concept. This is relevant to our discussion since, as Saltzman and Rosenberg observe, the formulation of trauma is eminently visual both as a mental construct and a cultural discourse,

> From primal scene to flashback, to screen memory to the dream, much of the language deployed to speak trauma's character is emphatically, if not exclusively, visual. It may even be argued that the very form taken by trauma as a phenomenon is only, however asymptomatically or not, understood as or when pictured. (Saltzman and Rosenberg 2006, p. xii)

This picture calls for a framework of articulation, both mentally and culturally. Film, with its inherent 'innervation', has provided trauma with a correspondent for the 'picture of the inner process'. When it comes to the flashback of trauma, the word 'remember' meant and still means a picture that implies the moving image in more than one way—formally and theoretically (Luckhurst 2008, p. 80). From the late 1950s, in fact, the film paradigm, which involves showing short films containing stressful or traumatic scenes to non-clinical participants, has determined the laboratory study of the intrusive image of trauma (Holmes and Bourne 2008, p. 554). The stimulus and the 'internal video' betray a figurative, if not literal, affinity. The flashback is, so to speak, a moving image, and a short black-and-white documentary is the 'forgotten film' on which the visualization of the unbidden image of trauma has been scientifically formulated.

The film paradigm—still amply used in psychological testing—exploits the cultural reciprocity between the moving image and mind established at the turn of the last century, and underlies the ways in which film could

be experimentally exploited in the study of trauma. This is not unproblematic. The film, which established the paradigm, is itself 'symptomatic' of the trauma that it attempted to describe. Leys highlights the difficulty in the definition of the concept of trauma encountered across psychological and social sciences *vis-à-vis* the psychoanalytical discourse that had been instrumental to its first formulation (Leys 2007, pp. 93–95). She traces the coming into being of the aetiology and diagnosis of PTSD and questions the shift from a consideration of the mimetic context in which the intrusive imageries that supposedly characterize traumatic memories were first described and what Leys regards as the indexical reading of traumatic memories, in general, and of their imageries in particular. In her discussion, Leys draws attention to the experiments respectively of psychologists Richard Lazarus and Mardi Horowitz (Leys 2007, pp. 95–111). Their research focused on the study of intrusive mental representations caused by trauma and the related defence mechanisms that would inhibit them. The latter were based on Freud's theory of repression and defence that, at the time, theoretically underpinned the notion of trauma. For these experiments, both Lazarus and Horowitz used the same silent black-and-white anthropological documentary as a stressor. The film, entitled *Subincision* (1930s) by the Hungarian psychoanalyst and anthropologist Géza Róheim (1891–1953), was about an Aboriginal ritual of male initiation. *Subincision* was 'used as the traumatic film'—as Horowitz remarks—'because its wide use in film research attests to its traumatic impact, at least as measured by psychophysiologic indicators of stress' (Horowitz 1969, p. 554). Róheim's film was thus standard currency in psychological research in the late 1950s and 1960s, but what caused its 'traumatic impact'? What kind of image and imagining did this short film offer? What made it, in other words, relevant to a definition of intrusive traumatic memories?

Subincision follows early-twentieth century standards of anthropological films documenting indigenous people (Griffith 2002). It shows young boys, around 13 or 14 years of age, undergoing ritual genital incision during which the underside of the penis is cut to the depth of the urethra with a piece of sharpened flint. The wound is meant to create a 'hole' that, according to Róheim's interpretation, symbolically alludes to the vagina, or what he refers to as a 'penis-womb' (Róheim 1945, p. 174, 1949, p. 321). Róheim documents with the film camera the various phases of the ritual, the repeated scene of the painful incision undergone by the boys, their reactions, and the comforting support of some of the elder men and

a concluding dance. Because of its content the film was also employed in studies based on Freud's theory of castration anxiety whereby the film acted as an anxiety inducer in a control group of adult homosexual men (Schwartz 1956, pp. 318–327). Both Lazarus and Horowitz exploited the suggestiveness of the film and its 'traumatic impact' to investigate the nature of the unbidden images of trauma by showing it to control groups including university students and airlines staff. The experiments aimed to test both the physiological and psychological stress reaction during screening and the post-screening experience of intrusive images related to the film in the days following the experimental tests. The protocol conforms to the film paradigm still used today for the laboratory study of traumatic intrusive images with healthy control groups.

Lazarus's (and his team's) experiments focused on the different psychological reactions that the stressor film would produce on the control groups when it was shown with modified presuggested interpretations (Speisman et al. 1964, p. 367). For this purpose, he and his colleagues showed the film in the original (i.e. silent) form and with specifically created soundtracks. The first soundtrack emphasized the horror of the experience for the young boys; the second one the positive outcome of the ritualistic incision; and the third soundtrack gave a 'neutral' commentary, of the kind of the one used in traditional anthropological documentary. The first type of soundtrack was purposed to induce distress in the audience, the second to deny the traumatic content and form a defence reaction, and the third one offered 'intellectualization' of the images (Speisman et al. 1964, pp. 367–368). Hence, the different commentaries to a scene that shows a boy being held down as he is undergoing the operation of subincision is described respectively: 'Several men do nothing more than hold the boy so that he cannot escape. The penis is grabbed, stretched taut, and cut on the underside from the tip to the scrotum' (trauma inductive soundtrack); 'As you can see, the operation is formal and the surgical technique, while crude is very carefully followed' (intellectualizing soundtrack); 'You will soon see that the words of encouragement offered by the older men have their effect and the boy begins to look forward to the happy conclusion of the ceremony' (denial and reaction formation soundtrack) (Speisman et al. 1964, pp. 368–369). In other experiments, Lazarus and his team screened *Subincision* as a silent film, and introduced it with guiding statements that also variously emphasized the nature of the footage in terms of intellectualization, anxiety induction, and denial. The experiments proved that, by altering the soundtrack or by using guiding statements, the view-

ers had different responses to the 'stressful sequences', confirming that neutral (intellectualization) and denial formation interpretations lessened the emotional impact of the film and the later occurrence of intrusive images (Lazarus and Alfred 1964, pp. 196–203).

Horowitz also based his experiments on Freud's notion of psychic trauma. Accordingly, the affective and perceptual stimuli caused by trauma overwhelm the subject and tend to return as visual imageries of unbidden memories and the insurgence of psychic defence mechanisms. Moving from these premises, Horowitz probed the occurrence of intrusive involuntary imageries caused by watching a stress film versus a neutral or non-stressful one. His experiments suggested that traumatic unbidden memories were the product of displaced anxiety, as the psychic re-elaboration and re-emergence of repressed fears. It is perhaps worth noting that involuntary memories also occurred for the neutral film intimating that intrusive traumatic memories relate to broader processes of involuntary remembering (Bernstern 2007, p. 39, Bernstern 2012, p. 304). The two films used by Horowitz were *Subincision* and *The Runner*, which dealt with a long distance race. The two films had a similar structure, including the repetition of certain scenes, and both of them built a 'feeling of suspense about what would happen next' (Horowitz 1969, p. 554). For the experiments, Horowitz and his team rated the sequences in the two films according to three 'somewhat overlapping qualities: the intensity of their emotional reactions while viewing the film, the intensity of recalling the scene now, and the vividness of their visual imagery on this recall' (Horowitz 1969, p. 554). Viewers were asked to rate their responses according to these features. Most of them reported the occurrence of intrusive images for the stressful film and some of the participants indicated the recurring interference of 'an unbidden image of the penis cutting scene' accompanied by feeling of anxiety in otherwise pleasant situations. On the strength of the findings, Horowitz emphasized the significance of these images as characteristic of trauma and 'that psychic trauma tends to be re-enacted' through these mental pictures, thus confirming the psychoanalytical ideas underpinning his research.

According to Leys, however, whilst Lazarus drew attention to the cognitive appraisal inherent in the mental assessment of an external stimulus in the formation of emotion and its re-elaboration through memory, Horowitz increasingly collapsed the distinction between the image and the related stimulus and eventually considered 'the threat of trauma as if it was indeed simply "out there" as an objective property of the trau-

matic film and of the traumatic event, and to disregard the role-playing, contextual-mimetic dimension of the imagery itself' (Leys 2007, p. 116). In referring to the 'contextual-mimetic dimension of the imagery', Leys alludes to the mental environment in which it forms. The latter, as we shall further consider in this and the following chapters, is critical to a discussion of remembering and the issues that latency and amnesia bring into it. The direct correlation of the moving image and intrusive traumatic memories also begs the question of what is the relation between the mental imagery and the projected image that the experiments that Lazarus and Horowitz respectively carried out implicitly align.

Though a 'scientific' documentary—hence supposedly 'objective'—*Subincision* attests to a film that is deemed to affect, to disturb and even to arouse. For this reason, it was considered to be apt for laboratory experiments. Yet, *Subincision* is also symptomatic of broader cultural issues concerning remembering, repression and amnesia that invest the twentieth-century elaboration of the concept of trauma. These issues concern the history of psychology and anthropology and what we can refer to as transcultural inflections of trauma around the cultural legacy of colonialism, thus attesting to diverse and ingrained forms of amnesia. *Subincision* relates, in fact, to Geeza Róheim's neglected theoretical synthesis of anthropology and psychoanalysis, according to which he postulated that 'collective trauma', as the psychic trauma typified by the Oedipus complex, is at the origins of culture (Róheim 1945, pp. 174–177; Damousi 2011, pp. 81–85). In the first decades of the twentieth century, Aboriginal tribes attracted the interest of western anthropologists since they were believed to belong to one of the most primitive stages of human evolution, both biologically and culturally. The assumption that Aboriginal tribes were a disappearing primitive race is in itself indicative, as Chris Healy argues, of the problematic and paradoxical presentation of Aborigines in Australia and more broadly in the west, as both present and absent, at the same time susceptible to cultural remembering and forgetting (Healy 2008, pp. 10–13). Hence, in evincing a figurative relation between a supposed collective psychic unconscious and trauma as epitomized by the ritualistic re-enactment of the primal scene, Róheim's psychoanalytical reading of Aboriginal rituals and mythology testifies to both the twentieth-century cultural institutionalization of the western encounters with indigenous people and the amnesia that surrounds their recollections.

Róheim shared the common view of his contemporaries that Aborigines were 'the most primitive race'. This meant, in his view, that the study of

their culture would unveil unconscious meanings that could support the core dilemma of the Oedipus complex (Robinson 1969, pp. 94–119). Róheim observed that Aborigines were a highly masculine and aggressive culture that tended to exclude women from ceremonies and that male representations prevailed in myths and dreams (Damousi 2011, p. 86). He attributed this masculinization of the culture to collective trauma, and argued that continuity could be suggested between the history of the individual and her psychic development, on the one hand, and the early history of cultural development, on the other hand (Damousi 2011, pp. 86–88). The widespread ritual of subincision among Aboriginal tribes enabled Róheim the to explain the inhibited homoerotic ties that gave cohesion to Aboriginal culture and by extension to early human development. This could be explained in terms of the 'ambisexuality' that he believed underpinned the Oedipus complex and that, in his interpretation, was also at the core of the ritual of subincision (Robinson 1969, p. 97). The latter was, in fact, intended to separate the boys in the tribe from their mothers and symbolically instate them in the clan of the fathers by creating a wound that acted as a symbolic vagina: 'the meaning of the subincision was thus "Leave your mother and love us, because we too have a vagina"'(Róheim 1945, p. 166). The ritual thus sanctioned the passage from boyhood to adulthood, from being part of the mother's group to entering the father's one. This was figuratively achieved by an incision that symbolized the child's own desire—a condition that the father already ideally epitomized. Róheim explains the ritual as an effort to 'negotiate the final separation of the child from the mother and to offer incorporation into the society of males as a substitute gratification' (Róheim 1945, p. 174) that metaphorically alleviated the separation anxiety of the child (Róheim 1945, pp. 174–177; Robinson 1969, pp. 104–119). According to this interpretation, the child's individual trauma was construed and, at the same time, assimilated within a collective ritual that both literally and figuratively embodied the trauma (as a socially shared experience and wound). The ritual, however, also acted as a resolution of the trauma, since the wound/vagina symbolized the child's newly achieved incorporation into the men's clan. The trauma that underpinned both the individual's development and Aboriginal social life was thus established as a collectively shared and culturally embedded trauma, whose ritualistic assimilation also meant its cultural integration. Róheim, however, distinguished 'the psychological significance of past collective trauma from the social conditions of his recent informants,

the victims of contemporary colonial violence' (Anderson et al. 2011, p. 6). Colonial violence insinuated another trauma that the ritual did not integrate and was latent to Róheim's own observation. Hence, in grounding the Oedipus complex culturally, he was careful in differentiating the universal and the particular, the collective basis of culture and the individual experience as historically conditioned (Anderson et al. 2011, p. 6). Indirectly, *Subincision* testified to both the psychic and historical reality of trauma, to the individual and cultural formation of the concept. The film also testified to the inherent repression that the history of trauma denoted and the amnesia surrounding the history of Aboriginal tribes—a history that the historical construction of their culture refuted, fixing it in an 'image' of the 'origin of culture'.

The researchers who used *Subincision* as a trauma film, those concerned with castration anxiety, and Lazarus and Horowitz implicitly exploited the traumatic content of the film, although they did not make any overt reference to Róheim's interpretation. When participants to the experiments were asked to assess the affective impact of the various sequences and later the disturbing memories that the film might have unleashed, they were implicitly asked to recognize an archetypal scene of trauma that was 'screened' from the scientific discourse and experiments that the film supported and was meant to substantiate. Róheim's film acted as both mimetic content and context for a culturally recognizable yet displaced scene of trauma. In this sense, *Subincision* was latent to the unbidden image of trauma that it was called to support, and was soon to be forgotten within the scientific discourse itself, despite the appreciation of both Lazarus's and Horowitz's experiments. Hence, what may appear as an odd choice testifies instead to a supposed cultural if not psychic concept of trauma, to something 'which could never have been "forgotten" because it was never of any notice – was never conscious' (Freud 1914/1953, pp. 148–149). What was 'forgotten' was the unresolved and complex relation of psychological sciences with psychoanalytic theories in the process of redefining the concept of trauma in the 1960s and more broadly the cultural latency of trauma as an equally unsolved postulation. Róheim's film both legitimated and displaced these ambivalences: the picture of trauma that it offered was foreign and archetypal at the same time, individual and allegedly universal. The film was also eminently alien to the unresolved haunting horrors of the post-war period. It was 'archetypal'. *Subincision* was yet, as suggested, also rooted within complex cultural strategies to construe and disown a people within the paradigm of western colonialism. This hints at the latency and amnesia that sur-

rounds the mnemonic constructions of trauma culturally and transculturally. *Subincision* thus bestowed the concept of trauma with 'an image' that was both potent and hallucinatory as if it were the metaphorical analogue of unconscious fears. Its unacknowledged historical and cultural content indirectly reflects the uncertainty surrounding the significance of trauma for cultural memory, the selective remembering constitutive of the politics of memory, and the amnesia that implicates both.

Whilst the theoretical premises of Lazarus's and Horowitz's experiments have been superseded in the definition of PTSD, the film paradigm that they pioneered and particularly Horowitz's recognition of intrusive images have been key to both the aetiology and diagnosis of PTSD and have paved the way to current research on the subject. Memory researchers still amply use film as a stressor implicitly embracing the early recognition of its affective impact, thus presupposing the moving image as an analogue of a traumatic event in the study of intrusive imageries in the laboratory: 'Regardless of the clear differences between a trauma film and real trauma, there are clues indicating that the underlying mechanisms of intrusion development are similar in both situations' (Krans et al. 2010, pp. 318–319). This intrusion is articulated in terms of a picture that bears the same features of sensory intensity, and varying points of view and emotional density that have been historically ascribed to the moving image. *Subincision* is however forgotten. The film is 'never of any notice' and mainly ignored in references to Horowitz and Lazarus. This may be partly due to the fact that its content is now regarded as sensitive. This short film is, in other words, like an uncomfortable memory that has to be repressed across memory research. Partly, the idea of trauma that *Subincision* endorses may bear little connection to the range of references and hence images that are associated to trauma today. Mostly, the theoretical premises and historical contingency of this short film and its experimental relevance are uncomfortable within contemporary models. Hence, *Subincision* has itself become a repressed memory across the psychological history of the concept of trauma, particularly of trauma memories, and the broader debate surrounding their cultural and transcultural articulation. Róheim's film is hidden from the discourse that it so conspicuously helped to forge. Unacknowledged is the reciprocity between the moving image and the mental picture of trauma: a reciprocity that the experimental use of *Subincision* endorsed as the pragmatic and figurative referent for the unbidden image of traumatic memories.

Nonetheless, the moving image remains pertinent to the study of traumatic memories as an apt experimental tool though the spectrum of sources has changed in favour of 'traumatic' subjects that broadly refer to life-threatening experiences, including life-footage of car or industrial accidents, fire safety films showing the burning down of buildings, hospital sequences of people dying from severe injuries, montages including Holocaust scenes, natural disasters, and even sequences of sexual and physical violence from a feature film such as *Irreversible* (2002). Yet, whilst memory research has sought a direct correlation between the stressful image and the intrusive image of memory, paying little attention to the formal features of the film used and to the nature of the filmic shot, art formally opens up such reciprocity in ways that intriguingly re-propose the complexity of the modern relation between the moving image and mind. We shall examine the ways in which film encompasses contemporary ideas of trauma through a discussion of the work of filmmaker and sound artist Shona Illingworth. The three video installations considered concern trauma, amnesia and latency. They also deal with 'forgotten' stories, individuals and places that are both at the margin of and central to global and transcultural memories and histories. Illingworth engages with the politics of memory and the dynamics of remembering and erasure, emergence and repression that *Subincision* has uncannily inscribed within the historical concept of trauma and beyond.

3.2 'Just an Image': *The Watch Man*

Illingworth's *The Watch Man* is the portrait of an elderly man who, as a nineteen-year-old British soldier and the youngest of his unit, witnessed the liberation of Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in 1945 and was traumatized by the experience.[2] His memories were muted for years: 'The people did not want to know – they did not want to hear'. Yet the intrusive memories of what he witnessed return to him as haunting images of a wood, of graves and corpses,

> They'd already dug one quite huge grave – just, just a huge, a huge cavity […] They were all skeletons, they didn't really look like people, human beings at all, they were just bone […] All around were these people, they were figures – they, have to call them not people – they were figures […] They were not walking, they were not walking, they were simply very, very slowly moving around. (Illingworth 2007, voiceover)

In describing the disturbing qualities of traumatic memories, specifically about *The Watch Man*, Martin Conway observes,

> Although not often consciously repressed, these memories nonetheless haunt the perimeter of consciousness constantly pressurising it for entry into consciousness or conscious representation. These memories carry information that is destabilizing for the self and consequently when they gain conscious representation they are edited, changed and reconstructed into forms that are fragmentary, in an attempt to make them more bearable. (Conway quoted in Illingworth 2011, p. 52)

Conway underlines the tension between conscious and non-conscious forms of remembering that underpin traumatic memories and suggests a spatial configuration whereby repressed painful memories 'haunt the perimeter of consciousness'. Hence, remembering as a dynamic process of 'gain[ing] conscious representation' is conceptualized as a montage (or re-montage) across spatial and temporal lines of what is overt and what is latent, what is emotionally endurable and what is intolerable to remember. The related mental image is thus an assemblage of these contrasting components including sensory inputs, emotions, and contextual contents. These are imbued with the actuality of the event (time, place, circumstantial details and the like) but they also take on features that we recognize as cinematic. Indeed, 'they can take the form of "film clips" of part of the trauma, single images, sounds, smells, somatosensory sensations or thoughts' (Holmes et al. 2005, p. 4). Such description resonates with Eisenstein's claim of montage as the 'feeling of the shot' and Deleuze's saturation of sensation that is proper to film as an assemblage of sensory components.

The *Watch Man* is projected on a round suspended screen in the immersive environment produced by a carmine reverberating floor. Black-and-white sequences showing the daily routine of the elderly man, a watchmaker, are abruptly interrupted by colour sequences of trees, a storm of birds or a sunlight cobweb. The camera intimately follows the mundane events and gestures that make up the sensations and impressions that feed into autobiographical memory. Stirring sugar in a cup of tea, spreading butter on a piece of bread, feeling the water under the shower, sleeping, scrutinizing the mechanisms of watches and clocks under a magnifying glass and attentively mending their mechanisms: memory pervades every single action in which past and present seamlessly overlap (Figs. 3.1 and 3.2). As the images unfold on the screen under the pressing sound of clocks and machines, the man's voice-over disconnectedly evokes dis-

Fig. 3.1 Shona Illingworth, *The Watch Man*, 2007, single round screen video and multichannel sound installation, video still, courtesy of the artist © Shona Illingworth

turbing memories of the few survivors of the concentration camp and the burial of corpses and the distressing feelings that such memories cause: 'Over and over and over'—reveals the elderly man—'I would get this horrible – absolutely horrible – suffocating – frightening in so far as its unstoppable and its – you think you're going to die sort of feeling' (Illingworth 2007, voiceover). Throughout Illingworth's work the colour sequences of exteriors intercept the domestic interior in which the elderly man lives and works. This produces a visual dissociation that subverts

Fig. 3.2 Shona Illingworth, *The Watch Man*, 2007, single round screen video and multi-channel sound installation video still, courtesy of the artist © Shona Illingworth

the traditional diachronic flashback in favour of the abrupt interpolation of vibrant and disconnected sequences that break the narrative flow of the video, reminding us that traumatic memories are highly sensory and emotionally dense fleeting images. Hence, the disjunction between the black-and-white and colour sequences is further accentuated by a juxtaposition of interiority and exteriority whereby the vivid exterior frames of trees and branches convey the potency of disquieting memories that are unconnected to the ordinary flow of life in which they intrude.

Time recurs as a visual motif of clocks and watches; a pendulum moves side to side. Its shape almost duplicates the round screen on which the video is projected, suggesting ephemeral layers of mirror forms and shadows that allude to the temporal discrepancies in the work. As Jill Bennett observes,

> Clocks strike and tick, their metronomic function anchoring the acoustic rhythm of the piece but modified in places so that the marking of time becomes unstable, slightly out of synch, a struggle between forces. Where rhythm builds and connects, narrative remains inchoate. (Bennett 2011, pp. 166–167)

The viewer is immersed in the conundrum of time and deferred images, as sound pulsates in overwhelming waves, creating an oppressive and suffocating feeling, thus binding the disturbance of trauma to the dynamics of time and montage, of displacement and affective presence. The tension between interiority and exteriority conveyed through the 'intrusion' of colour images in the black-and-white texture of the video is replicated in the orchestration of different soundtracks played through speakers distributed across the floor and overhead, alternating high and low frequencies that are variously perceived and felt by the audience. Illingworth mixes the sound of clocks and sounds of the watchmaker's lathe with the vibrating blast of a low-flying helicopter and other acoustically disturbing noises that impinge on the installation's environment and turns it into a resonant chamber. 'Sound, in other words, shifts the register of the images repeatedly giving rise to sensations that transform rather than reinforce the meaning of the imagery on screen' (Bennett 2011, p. 164). Illingworth exploits the visual and acoustic components of film to reinforce its affective impact. This is realized in the immersive intimacy of a work that draws the viewer into a figurative mnemonic-scape. The elderly man's fragmentary memories unravel loosely, as they are triggered, for instance, by voices heard from a radio-transistor. It is indeed through the internal disruption of the visual and acoustic components of the work that Illingworth evokes the distressing and overwhelming qualities of intrusive traumatic memories as they impinge on consciousness (Albano 2012, pp. 143–148).

Memory research suggests that during a traumatic situation a shift in processing occurs 'from standard, conscious, verbal processing of information ("verbally accessible information") to a relative increase in sensory processing and storage ("situationally accessible memory")' (Holmes and Bourne 2008, p. 555). While memory representations that stem from the former can be consciously retrieved and are integrated 'in a conceptual context bound by temporal and causal structures', the representations

stemming from automatic perceptual processing cannot be accessed consciously but are rich in sensory information and 'are automatically activated by cues that bear similar sensory qualities (visual, olfactory, bodily sensations, emotions, etc…), hence their disconnected and unbidden qualities' (Krans et al. 2010, p. 316). Illingworth layers image, sound and voiceover in ways that are congruent with these different kinds of mental representations, not to reproduce the processing of memories, nor to illustrate the traumatic experience of the elderly man, but rather to create an affectively and emotionally vibrant environment in which the image and imagery converge as a 'sensory aggregate', making the shot feel like the distressing memories of the elderly man.

Latent to the immersive space of the installation is the historical question of the representation of horror—and of the Holocaust, in particular—and the critical role that images and testimonies have had and still have in its cultural memorialization. Contemporary art has entered the debate, drawing attention not to the indexical function of images but rather to their multiple resonances—emotional, psychological, sensory and intellectual. Hence, as Bennett suggests, 'in presenting the process of memory as "sign" it [art] registers the affective experience of memory, enacting a process of 'seeing feeling' where feeling is both imagined and regenerated through an encounter with the artwork' (Bennett 2003, p. 36; see also Saltzman 2006; Baer 2002; Young 2000). Accordingly, the image of trauma that art in general and the visual arts in particular engage with is, as Jacques Rancière argues, not a reproduction but a 'complex set of relations between the visible and the invisible' (Rancière 2009, p. 93). Such an image is 'always an alteration that occurs in a chain of images which alter it in turn' through figurative processes of condensation and displacement that convey 'the sensible texture of an event' (Rancière 2009, p. 94). The event itself emerges as collective and cultural expressions of trauma from the fragmented and often silenced and unspoken memories of thousands of individuals. In the *Watch Man* Illingworth invites us to watch, to listen, and mostly to feel such silenced and unspoken memories as image, sound and word generate the 'sensible texture' in which past and present interweave. The artist exposes the disjunction between the individual experience of trauma and the cultural narratives that frame it. The fragmentary memories of the elderly man are thus neither the story of a witness nor a testimony predicated on belatedness and loss, but rather become the immersive room of the artwork, the viewer's own experience of seeing, hearing, and viscerally sensing. The memories are turned into a feeling of remembering whereby the event in the past is

actively present and affectively woven in the fabric of the work. The image that *The Watch Man* evokes is in fact close to Jean-Luc Godard's idea of the cinematic image, as an image that cannot be considered in isolation but that is always linked to other images, to the 'metaphorical and affective resonances' that exceed representation (Godard and Ishagpour 2005, p. 107). Illingworth thus addresses the correlation between the stimulus of the stressor film and the unbidden image of trauma and rearticulates it through the resonances, and sensory interferences within the work: in *The Watch Man* these metaphorical and affective resonances are an intimation of the 'untamed memories' of trauma.

3.3 Interference and Memory-Scape: *Balnakiel*

Illingworth continues her investigation of memory in another video and sound installation, *Balnakiel* (2009). The work shifts the focus from individual traumatic memories to their latency and interference in social and cultural remembering. Central to *Balnakiel* is landscape of the place and the latent presence of fear that pervades it. The work addresses the geopolitics of memory in ways that resonate with the contextual relevance of *Subincision* as a film that dealt with the layering of individual and historical trauma: a relevance that, as suggested, went amiss historically, and which is part of the general amnesia that surrounds this short film as emblematic of 'trauma'. Once again, at stake is not the correspondence between the stressful stimulus and the inner intrusive image of trauma, but rather the interference of the latent traces of trauma—individually, but also culturally and historically. *Balnakiel* presupposes spatial planes of memories as tangible and figurative sites of disturbance, which are both local and global.

The video was filmed in the eponymous location of Balnakiel, a former military camp near the village of Durness in the north of Scotland. The strategic position of Balnakiel on the North Atlantic determined the geopolitical relevance of this secluded place during World War II, the Cold War and the more recent War on Terror. Both peripheral and central to these major conflicts, Balnakiel first hosted a radar station and 'listening post' for the Home Chain Command that was then replaced in the 1950s by an Early Warning Station intended for the detection of a potential nuclear attack. The concrete barracks built for the Early Warning Station, which were never completed, were converted into residences and workshops for a craft centre in the 1960s. Craft-workers (referred to as 'incomers') moved into this former military camp with the ideal of creating an alternative lifestyle. However, initially they did not integrate with the small

local community that had lived in this impervious area over many generations and who had endured the impact of Highland Clearances during the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The army's presence also continued, despite the end of Cold War hostilities. The possibility of simultaneously carrying out land, air and sea military exercises means that Balnakiel is part of a training ground for NATO and Allied combat forces including in recent years for those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Like *The Watch Man*, *Balnakiel* is an immersive and viscerally affecting work that uses a large screen and five overhead speakers distributed around the installation room, and a subwoofer, which generate physically perceptible disturbance. Environment is key to the conceptual and thematic development of the work, and to a volumetric conception of memory that integrates space and time (Albano 2011, pp. 111–114). Formally, *Balnakiel* is structured around a series of circular sequences whereby the layering of visual and acoustic motifs interrupt the forward motion of the film by creating vertical compositional volumes that produce the impression of compressing and expanding the installation space, thus intensifying the sensorial immersion of the work. Thematically, the video revolves around the physical landscape of Balnakiel and its atmospherics (Albano 2011, 2013; Bennett 2011, pp. 158–161). In a voice transcript quoted by Illingworth, one of the inhabitants observes, 'there is something oppressive about the place, maybe it's not, maybe it's just overwhelming, maybe it is just sensorially overwhelming to be here. Nothing inside has a chance to get out' (Illingworth 2011, p. 84). It is this claustrophobic feeling that in Illingworth's work bridges individual and social remembering with the politics of memory that saturates Balnakiel. Sequences scanning the high-ground and aerial views of the inner-land areas and coastline alternate with long shots of the military barracks, the interior of the Range Radar Control Room and two of the barracks (a semi-derelict one and an occupied building). Illingworth juxtaposes these sequences with close-ups of ordinary objects including a small plant swirling in the breeze, a piece of cloth moved and twisted by the wind, a piece of paper that delicately hangs on a string. Within the economy of the work, bird-like panoramic views and close ups are indicative of the variable prevalence in memories of semantic and episodic contents, and hence of readings and interpretations of experience. The aerial views are associated with the regimented perception and reconfiguration of the region for the military. They denote the visual perspective from the Range Radar Control Tower and the armed G4 tornadoes jets: from such a perspective the layout of Balnakiel and the surrounding area is clearly demarcated by the low and fenced buildings of

the barracks and by the stone edges that delineate patches of ground. Such panoramic views enable an abstraction of the landscape into knowable connotations, definable features and calculable spatial and temporal distances, and correspond to a horizontal memory plane. The low frequency sound that accompanies these sequences augments the dissociative distance that they engender in the viewer. Such a horizontal plane of memory is both temporally and spatially denoted: temporally since it refers to the surveillance role of Balnakiel during the Cold War and to its being used today for military training; and spatially since it ties the locality to the geopolitical mapping of conflicts across the globe in the recent past and in the present.

In contrast, the close-ups are vivid in colour, texture, luminosity, movement and sound. They do not convey or contribute to abstracted information or semantic knowledge, but rather they communicate the affective intensity of the environment and share the same qualities of sensory details proper to episodic memories. The point of view that pervades such sequences in *Balnakiel* is that of 'a dwelling perspective'. It is the ground-like point of view, imbued with the sensations and feelings of the environment. It attests to the landscape as 'an enduring memory and testimony to the place as it is affectively lived in and experienced' (Ingold 2000, p. 189), rather than cognitively mapped. Both perspectives further regard modes of remembering that are social as well as individual. An adolescent girl is the connective figure in Illingworth's work as a silent observer and presence in the place. At the beginning of the video, Illingworth shows her wandering with a lamp among the barracks and looking through one of the windows, and then looking out of the window of a school mini-bus. In another sequence, we see the girl in a room observing the play of light and shadows to the crackling sound of a small radio. Adolescence coincides with a general consolidation and development of autobiographical memory. In particular it refers to the acquisition of distinctive social and cultural connotations (Fitzgerald and Broadbridge 2012, pp. 249–251). Deliberately acknowledging these connotations, Illingworth introduces the first volumetric shift in the structure of the work by showing the girl spinning with a rope on the roof of one of the barracks. The camera turns with her to the deafening sound of a military helicopter's downward thrust, which mixes with rising, acutely thin notes and the intermittent horizontal whipping sound of the rope slicing through the air. Close-ups and close-angle views intercut showing the spinning girl as if in a vortex. As in the case of another of such moments in which the film camera scans the empty room of one of the barracks, where a trapped goshawk screeching at high pitch flaps its wings against the closed window-pane, the viewer

Fig. 3.3 Shona Illingworth, *Balnakiel*, 2009, video and multi-channel sound installation, HDV video still, courtesy of the artist © Shona Illingworth

experiences contrasting forces within the installation space that render it vertiginously oppressive. The screeching sounds of the bird mix with the engine noise of a helicopter taking off and the blades cutting through the air to which are added the low frequency thuds of the subwoofer. The downward push of the low frequency (whose pressure viewers can feel in their abdomen) contrasts with the vertical thrust of the helicopter. This generates the impression of being claustrophobically restrained by the surrounding space. The sensation matches the vision of the trapped goshawk against the window (Fig. 3.3). The experience is visceral, immersive and oppressive at the same time.

The interweaving of horizontal and vertical axes generates the memory-scape of *Balnakiel*, in which the different perspectives resonate with the multidimensional viewpoints in memories and their related forms of knowledge. Within this context, the barracks, as the most prominent architectural feature of Balnakiel, act as material relics of the past and traces of memories. However, in Illingworth's video, such traces of the built environment are not 'a product and physical support of memory' as 'the persistence of the existing continuity of history' (Galiano 2000, pp. 67 and 70). Rather than an intimation of social memory, the barracks allude to the amnesia that pervades Balnakiel. The historical circumstances to which they testify are latent to the contemporary politics

Fig. 3.4 Shona Illingworth, *Balnakiel* 2009, video and multi-channel sound installation, HDV video still, courtesy of the artist © Shona Illingworth

of memory that dominate the perception of the place. 'Such politics', as Illingworth observes, 'constructs Balnakiel as a place that is "remote" and "on the edge" and, at the same time, central to geopolitical developments and international surveillance strategies' (personal communication, 16 December 2016) (Fig. 3.4). Within the visual structure of the film, Illingworth inserts the diverse voices that make up the disjointed voiceover of the work and testify to the different and even contradictory perceptions of this area by the people who live in Balnakiel and in the nearby older village of Durness.

Male voice 1 (incomer accent)	01:25:57:05	Reminders everywhere of
Male Voice 2 (local accent)	01:25:59:05	A sense of belonging
Male voice 1 (incomer accent)	01:26:00:07	Displacement
Woman's voice (incomer accent)	01:26:04:07	The people that pioneered to Balnakiel were people that wanted freedom
Male Voice 2 (local accent)	01:26:11:11	I never thought of it as being isolated at all
Military radio	01:26:15:23	Nastar 11, Nastar 11, this is Range Control, nothing heard, out. (Illingworth 2009, voiceover transcript)

The intersection of the fragmentary memories of Balnakiel that the different voices infer is indicative of a search for the traces of the contrasting ways in which the inhabitants perceive and relate to the place and hence to the memory-scape that Balnakiel instigates for and in them. The voices denote the basic and fundamental relevance of memory as a means that enables individuals and groups to navigate and make sense of everyday experience, to recognize and interact with the surrounding environment and the people and objects in it since memories provide us with the cognitive, emotional, affective and functional knowledge to inhabit time and place. In turn, memory is also used to invest the place with a range of meanings that are embedded in personal and collective histories, which convey diverging feelings from belonging to displacement. Apart from the military personnel, who remain outsiders but relate to the area functionally and cognitively, the other inhabitants, as already indicated, are the local people and the so-called 'incomers', those who moved to Balnakiel in the 1960s. Whilst the military presence is rendered through the intermittent crackling sound of radio transmission, the immersive 'dwelling' perspective of the people belonging to the other two groups is rendered in fragmented phrases. According to an older woman's voice '[t]he incomers were all escaping something. They'd come to the edge of the country to escape something. They wanted to absent themselves from the pressure of urban living' (Illingworth 2009, voiceover). Yet, as other voices remark, ambiguously referring to both the harshness of the weather and the military presence 'I remember people saying I haven't been out for forty days' and 'It felt like being under attack' (Illingworth 2009, voiceover). Conway, in commenting on the relation between the perception of place and remembering, observes that for each group the interaction with the surrounding environment differs.

> For the local people it is going to be an almost complete integration between memory and physical environment and physical space. Here the landscape is charged with affective cues facilitating their memory and subsequently allowing them to imagine a future in that landscape. (quoted in Illingworth 2011, p. 71)

Memory roots the local people in the history of the place and enables them to project themselves into a future there. For the incomers, the affective cues in the landscape are less evident, as the environment is blurred and mixed with memories of other landscapes. For the military the landscape

> is serving the purpose of creating a mental schema where there are no individual memories. A schema, which can then be transposed to a site of con-

> flict or war in another part of the world. The military are disconnected from the landscape but not that 'type of landscape' and when they transfer to a site of conflict elsewhere, the disconnection which allows routine action continues. (quoted in Illingworth 2011, p. 71)

The aerial and 'dwelling' perspectives that seamlessly shift, generating the volumetric environment of *Balnakiel*, are thus indicative of the temporal as well as spatial co-ordinates of remembering, and infer the ways in which memories are instrumental to the construction of past, present and future. The aerial view relates to both Balnakiel's past history and the ways in which the locality is implicated in contemporary geopolitics. Such links belong to the specialist knowledge of an otherwise inconspicuous place and a 'semantic' construction of interactions that renders the specificity of Balnakiel's environment functionally relevant. The 'dwelling' perspective is no less knotted to a local temporality (past and present), which is further projected onto faraway war zones with which this secluded place in the North of Scotland is associated. Such association refers to the affective saturation of the environment charged with memory cues and threatening, oppressive feelings. It is such saturation of Cold War fears and continuing global tensions that resonate within the environment of Balnakiel and relate it to the war zones for which its landscape acts as a mnemonic paradigm, letting us presume that the atmospherics of these other places are equally filled with divergent constructions, histories and investments of all sorts. *Balnakiel*'s volumetric and immersive space of shifting perspectives, modalities of remembering and memories thus enables us to envisage an environment for the 'global memoryscape' argued by Astrid Erll, whereby national and local perspectives 'are unsettled by the dynamic movements of globalization and new memories and practices of remembrance' (Erll 2011b, pp. 13–14). Such an environment emerges not from an opposition of the local and global but rather from the interplay of practices and dimensions of remembering. These at times generate conflicting perspectives and at other times they converge resonantly.

Elsewhere I have discussed the colliding of interests and the politics of memory in Balnakiel (Albano 2011). Critical to the analysis is the tension between centre and periphery and the latency of a pervading threat that hangs over Balnakiel and never materializes. Individual trauma is expressed in terms of screen memories, whilst historical trauma lingers in the silent and ominous buildings of the barracks, in the signs of the Clearance scarred in the landscape, and in the potential projection of Balnakiel's latent threat into violence experienced elsewhere, in zones of war across

the globe, often in equally remote areas. Hence, Balnakiel's historical and present circumstances are conducive to a manifestation of trauma as 'violence congealed in an intensified representation' (Berlant 2001, p. 43) of a landscape marked by the ghostly signs of the Cold War threat and the roaring sound of Tornado fighter jets that stand for a deferred shock that impinges at the margins of perception and recollection. Such latency is constituted by a layering of temporal deferrals onto mnemonic structures of repetition (those that enable the military to carry out complicated tasks). This latency further resonates with the affective image on which trauma memories are historically and culturally predicated. In other words, it alludes to an image that has from its beginnings been predicated on the repressed legacy of geopolitics and a mediated 're-presentation' that was both extraneous and deeply affective. In *Balnakiel*, the environment acts as the repressed site of trauma and a latent presence of unremembered memories and histories that wraps and interferes with it. At the intermittent sound of communication between the Range Radar Control Tower and one the G4 Tornado fighter jets, the voice of a man tells of the distressing bodily feelings that walking through the village causes him.

> Man's voice: In my stomach and in my chest – breathless – it's like being breathless with your heart pounding at the same time – and feeling sick – almost like hunger, and having this almost silent hiss in your head […]
>
> Range Control: Few at six hundred climb out to south of the attack area scattered at fifteen hundred few to two thousand. (Illingworth 2009, voiceover)

The man's panic attack manifests as breathlessness, a pounding feeling in the chest and head, a sensation of being 'wired'. 'And' as the man's voice adds, 'and the crazy thing is – not once – was there an incident for me to fear walking through the village' (Illingworth 2009, voiceover). Conway explains the inability of the man to remember what has happened as 'retrieval failure', that is,

> the control processes cannot generate the appropriate cue and therefore knowledge which is in some sense apprehended cannot be brought into consciousness. The blocked retrieval seems to give rise to and then exacerbates these profound feelings of anxiety, which are also manifest in an intense physical/sensorial response, as the memory which is sought for is somehow locked and cannot be opened. (quote in Albano 2011, p. 115)

The failure to retrieve the past despite its oppressive impinging on the present that mars individual memory is also critical to social and cultural forms of remembering. Indeed, the current argument for transcultural multidirectionality in which localized remembrance interacts globally across associative networks call—as we shall further examine in following chapter—for an understanding of the complexity of remembering. This does not imply a conflation of psychological and cultural processes. Rather, from an understanding of mental processes we can glean features that help us to recognize dynamics active in the historical, social and cultural actualization of remembering or its failure. *Balnakiel* concludes with a sequence showing a silent bombing at sea. The image conveys presence and absence, proximity and distance, abstraction and affective immersion. Enzo Traverso remarks that all recent wars have also been 'wars of memory' since they have been justified by the 'ritualistic evocation' of a 'duty to remember' (Traverso 2015, p. 16). The silent bombing figuratively alludes to and disavows such invoked duty. The image displaces the trajectories of remembering across the complex intersection of local and global lines in the geopolitical mapping as they are delineated by recent histories and today's contingencies and evokes the collision of memory and amnesia that invests such trajectories.

3.4 Amnesiac Environments: *Lesions in the Landscape*

An immersive three-screen video and sound installation *Lesions in the Landscape* (2015) deals with amnesia, bridging across individual and socio-cultural environments of remembering. The work focuses on the depopulated island of St Kilda, a volcanic archipelago situated west of the Outer Hebrides in the North Atlantic, and on Claire who lives with amnesia (retrograde and ante-retrograde amnesia and prosopagnosia) due to a severe brain lesion caused by viral encephalitis (Bennett and Illingworth 2015; Conway and Loveday 2010). Claire's amnesia means that she cannot remember the past and is unable to form new memoires. Martin Conway and Catherine Loveday, the two neuropsychologists who study Claire's amnesia and have collaborated on *Lesions in the Landscape*, explain that she 'shows some impairment on any recall that extends to 30 minutes or more and a very unreliable and inconsistent memory for anything that is more than three days old' (Conway and Loveday 2010, p. 63). This seems to indicate that encoding memory processes have remained active, whilst processes of consolidation,

which enable the integration of memories within neural networks and pre-existing knowledge structures, fail (Conway and Loveday 2010, pp. 64–65). Occasional memories are fleetingly triggered for Claire by pictures taken from a SenseCam that she wears around her neck. One of the key features of the SenseCam is that 'it "sees" what the wearer sees and because it responds to movement and light changes it specifically records moments, however incidental, that are likely to be salient to that person' (Conway and Loveday 2010, p. 65). By creating effective cues for memory, the SenseCam pictures relate Claire to a world that, as she observes in Illingworth's video, is 'full of information I cannot share' and from which she feels 'left out' (Illingworth 2015, voiceover).

Claire's feelings of isolation from the events and people in her life and the world in which she lives are indicative of the role that, as already suggested, memory plays in helping individuals to navigate experience and to relate to one's environment by situating oneself in time and space. Remembering, in other words, upholds the consciousness of the changing contingencies of the present—of the shifting remits of the here and now—that permits us to move and adapt from one situation to another. To exemplify the ways in which memory supports a feeling of the present, Conway refers in the voiceover of *Lesions in the Landscape* to a situation in which people are in a big room with some objects that they have to memorize. If these people move to one end of the room, they are likely to remember quite well the objects in it. However, if they are asked to exit the room and go into another one, their recall of the objects in the first room is much poorer. 'What your brain is doing is, okay when we went through the door that event is over so we no longer need to keep it into consciousness, we can turn it into a memory. If one lacks the ability to form memories then it probably means'—as Conway mantains—'[that] you cannot have a now. You are always in the same room' (Illingworth 2015, voiceover). Contingency is indeed an outcome of remembering. Memory, moreover, as suggested in the previous chapter, grounds the individual in knowledge (semantic information about the world and oneself) and in one's affective and emotional experience, thus fostering interpersonal communication. Remembering also has 'a directional function purposed toward future behaviour' (Bluck et al. 2010, pp. 295–301). Memories, in fact, provide us with the forms and contents that enable us to envisage a future (D'Argembeau 2012, pp. 312–314). Hence, amnesia posits not only the problem of the access to and uses of the past but also of what counts as contingent and informs the imaging of the future.

In *Lesions in the Landscape*, Claire is shown in her house, the camera focuses on her hands touching the border of a curtain or the edge of a half-open drawer, and sitting in a bow window and taking from the window ledge a family photograph and looking at it. The short sequences seem however suspended at the confines of temporal and spatial recognition and of the boundaries of awareness that, as Conway suggests, delimit the here and now. Duration as the continuum of perceptual experience that, according to Bergson, memory holds together shrinks in the narrow window of recollection that is Claire's present and the isolation that accompanies her inability to form and retrieve memories. 'I knew I had no memories I could remember' – she poignantly remarks '… I cannot remember the last minute. Ten minutes ago… And yesterday' (Illingworth 2015, voiceover). Claire evokes this condition by describing the first impression of waking up from a coma in an amnesiac state as the feeling of falling into a tunnel and, despite knowing it was dream, being unable to disengage from it. She then voices her experience of returning to a house that she was told was her home but that felt alien to her and in which she did not know her way around. 'I allowed myself to believe…' (Illingworth 2015, voiceover)—she recounts—that she belonged to a life and a world that she can only inhabit at the margins, at the frayed edges of a past that others construe for her and a future that she is unable to imagine. The foreclosure that amnesia causes translates for Claire into the paradox of a boundless enclosure. Such a paradox resonates with the metaphor of 'an endless abyss' that according to Paul Ricoeur figuratively expresses forgetting within the discourse of memory. 'Forgetting proposes, on the existential plane, something like an endless abyss, which the metaphor of vertical depth attempts to express' (Ricoeur 2004, p. 414). Rather than the distance and remoteness of memory, forgetting implies a different kind of spatial and temporal representation, one on which the 'problematic of presence, of absence, and of distance' that denotes memory is inverted from a horizontal to a vertical axis (Ricoeur 2004, p. 414; see also Weinrich 2005). Such a problematic concerns the functions of remembering and the trace of memory that forgetting generates.

Presence, absence and distance are indeed the spatial and temporal figures that *Lesions in the Landscape* mobilizes to convey the amnesiac environment that denotes the work. Through a dialect of visual associations, iterations and juxtapositions across the three screens, Illingworth intersects Claire's inner experience of amnesia with the scenarios of St Kilda, bridging across the individual and the geographical and cultural scales

Fig. 3.5 Shona Illingworth, *Lesions in the Landscape* (2015), three-screen video and multi-channel sound installation, installation shot FACT, Liverpool, courtesy of the artist © Shona Illingworth, photo credit Jon Barraclough

(Fig. 3.5). *Lesions in the Landscape* opens with a sequence showing gannets circling around the black volcanic formation of a stack that emerges from the sea. The voiceover explains the geological formation and early history of the archipelago. The sequence then shifts to dream-like shots: on the dark screen we see a hardly distinguishable image of Claire that fades into darkness till reaching the edges of visibility (personal communication, 16 December 2015). On Claire's fading image Illingworth superimposes the circling gannets. The superimposition intimates the figurative associations between Claire's amnesia and the historical and cultural amnesia that pervades St Kilda. The sequence further shifts to one of crumbling rocks cascading into the sea. Mesmerizing, the gravelly cascade hints to the geological origins of the archipelago and the frail remnants of the culture of the islanders who lived on the island continuously for nearly 4,000 years until their evacuation by the Scottish authorities on 30 August 1930 (Bennett and Illingworth 2015).[3] With their removal from St Kilda, the social and cultural memories of the place have also been eradicated. Without its inhabitants, any recollection of St Kilda is devoid of the 'dwelling' perspective that they would have brought to remembrance. This renders the environment of St Kilda amnesic. Because of her amnesia, Claire cannot access the

episodic affective content of remembering and hence the dwelling, close-up perspective that characterizes the individual appropriation of the past. She relies on others' perspectives and memories. The limited agency that Claire has over her past and its representation is comparable to the ways in which St Kilda has been historically presented by outsiders and the ways in which these representations still impinge on the island's preservation as a UNESCO heritage site. As Illingworth observers,

> The dominant narratives are that St Kilda is an abandoned island on the 'edge of the world' with the loss of a perfectly preserved community. In many ways, St Kilda is locked into the fixed moment of its final evacuation in August 1930. The islanders, who were the subject of fascination for increasing numbers of summer tourists from the late-19th century, who viewed them as exotic and annexed from the modern world, have been separated from their place within a broader cultural context. This type of essentialism is resonant of the narrative constructions that support defence and the maintenance of borders. (Homer 2015)

These narratives implicate imageries of dislocation, of spatial and of temporal remoteness and isolation, suggesting a tension between what is present in the cultural constructions of the place and what is consistently removed or remains liminal to such constructions.

Historical nineteenth century accounts tended to present St Kilda as a 'primitive outpost in a world of developing sophistication' (MacDonald 2001, p. 153). At the same time, the island was also a remainder of a lost past, a site of sublime longing and an enduring vestige against innovation and modernity. Hence, St Kilda endorsed the expectations of many travellers of a sublime landscape endowed with fear and awe in equal measure. Fraser MacDonald suggests that the cultural representation of St Kilda as a site of the sublime at a time when it became a tourist destination and part of larger strategies of economic development fulfilled a politicized 'aesthetic logic' meant to continue the marginalization of the place (MacDonald 2001, p. 156). A similar politicized aesthetics still dominates the contemporary perception of the island that is fossilized around the single event of the evacuation to the mainland of the last inhabitants and the preservation of a supposed unaltered image as a heritage site. Such constructions both obliterate the long and complex history of the island and further foreclose it to any alternative representations. At the same time, the image is also a screen for St Kilda's geopolitical strategic relevance and scientific significance.[4]

Not unlike Balnakiel, St Kilda's isolation and remoteness is key to its strategic importance in global military surveillance and geopolitics, as a satellite controlled area and a military testing range. The latter dates back to 1959 when Britain combined the nuclear testing programme and St Kilda and the surrounding sea area became 'a theatre of military operations and the arena of clandestine military intelligence' (MacDonald 2010, pp. 268–276). This relevance is, however, generally omitted from the 'dominant' narratives of St Kilda, despite a large control radar dome that stands out on the top of the island's hillside and the drone of military training actions. This silencing perpetuates an 'occultation of referents', which had already started with the Cold War nuclear programme (MacDonald 2010, p. 277) and, as MacDonald observes about the latter, is instrumental in St Kilda's military and geopolitical prominence. The archipelago and its surroundings are, in fact, a 'sanitized' silent air space (i.e. a no fly zone) that extends for 30,000 square kilometres, granting a safe precinct for the testing of new-generation weapons to be used in war zones elsewhere. The coordinates of such an area expand beyond air-land-sea to include the fourth dimension of spatial satellite connections and digitally transmitted information that circulate across the high atmosphere, intersecting global geopolitical areas of control and interaction (personal communication, 16 October 2015). MacDonald reads the shift from the horizontal axis of traditional perspective to vertical axis of space control and weapon testing as a re-articulation of the sublime imagination with which St Kilda has been historically associated (MacDonald 2010, pp. 267–268). Such a shift also resonates with the figurative realignment from the horizontal plane of distance to the vertical axis of depth that forgetting insinuates into the phenomenology of memory. The sublime infinity of the sanitized silent air space that governs the atmosphere of St Kilda is thus also an amnesiac site saturated with traces that are yet displaced and silenced.

In *Lesions in the Landscape*, Illingworth conveys such 'depth' through different kinds of scale by alluding to the spectrum (from macro to micro) of signal data tracking. This includes the military telemetry tracking weapon testing, the exchanges between US and Russian operatives who co-operatively guide a supply ship docking onto the International Space Station and the ground mapping of St Kilda's archaeological traces through GPS.[5] An amalgam of inputs, whose varying degree of accuracy is relative to the level of approximation that can be technically achieved, the signal data defines the virtual and shifting parameters of specialized knowl-

edge and the different kinds of 'vision' that different scales afford. If the scale of military testing and the airspace programme infer interchangeable, if not conflicting, geopolitical alliances and an evolving picture of power relations across the globe, the micro scale introduces indeterminism and uncertainty. As Illingworth notes,

> In military weapons testing there is also the extensive micro data collection – which for me connects with the increasing narratives around precision targeting in contemporary warfare – one that completely disavows the imprecision of weapons targeting (due to many reasons – including technological, human error, intelligence etc..) and the expansive and boundless consequences of bombing (collateral, cultural, social, economic etc..) (personal communication, 16 December 2015)

The information gathered from the tracked data thus pertains to concurrent constructions of information and knowledge that are contingent to St Kilda and its global relevance but that are also consistently ignored (or silenced) since they interfere with the memorialization of the island as a remote and unspoiled heritage site. The undercurrent of such latent information infers the tension between presence and absence that forgetting insinuates in remembrance. It intimates the amnesia that permeates the place and fixes it in a stereotyped image, which is both removed from St Kilda historical past and its present contingency.

The acoustic environment of Illingworth's installation further intensifies the discrepancy between the protected environment of St Kilda and the saturation of traces that pervade it. The soundtrack combines different environmental data that are also indicative of different ranges of signals. These include the calls of gannets on St Kilda,[6] the buzzing sound of an energy generator on the island and the sonification of an electroencephalogram (EEG) recording the neurological firing of Claire's brain as she examines the pictures taken from her SenseCam during her visit to St Kilda.[7] The sonification acoustically reproduces the electric trace produced by the neural activity in amnesia. The EEG intermittent signal captures the landscape of Claire's amnesia as she searches for her own memories of her trip to St Kilda, suggesting the presence of memory traces that Claire cannot access but that are nonetheless affective. The compiled soundtrack intersects one of the few colour sequences in *Lesions in the Landscape*. The sequence—shot at dusk and shown on the three screens simultaneously—features a maze-like semi-panoramic view of the age-old and now abandoned village on St Kilda, which low, dry stone edges demarcate. Here, the shadowy figure of the artist duplicated across the screens moves with

a searchlight amongst the emptied out 'husks' of the once complex and inhabited cultural landscape to suggest at the same time the constant patterns of activation across networks in the brain and the quest for St Kilda's lost memories (personal communication, 16 October 2015). As Conway obverses in his voiceover commentary,

> As individuals all you ever experience are the outputs of non-conscious processes. There are lots of things we do in life that are driven by memories that don't come to mind. Things get into long-term memory. They are there forever more. The real problem is how to access them. (Illingworth 2015, voiceover)

The problem of accessing memories is indeed the problem that underlies the supposed 'depth' that forgetting inscribes into the phenomenology of memory, not as erasure of memories, but rather as a trace that is liminal to remembering. 'Real forgetting'—continues Conway—'occurs only when there's damage in the brain' (Illingworth 2015, voiceover). The searchlight, which on the screens we see moving across the maze-like landscape of St Kilda, infers the continuous surfacing and dissipation of patterns of activation across brain networks. The traces of memories, however, although they have been activated, do not reach consciousness. They remain latent to remembering for Claire and St Kilda alike. These traces cannot or are not accessed: they are the unremembered memories that do not enter individual and cultural narratives. Throughout *Lesions in the Landscape*, Illingworth interpolates frames from historical archival footage documenting the inhabitants final day on the island, shot by John P. Richie, an amateur filmmaker and ornithologist, who at the time was on the island collecting birds' eggs. The footage shows women and girls running away from the camera; a woman who turns her back to it and enters her house; others who deliberately move out of shot or cover their faces. The attempt to document the last hours of life on St Kilda encounters the overt resistance to memorialization of the islanders. The film camera records the people's anger, fear and defiance and in so doing presents the viewer with affective and emotional traces that interfere with remembering and the memory-scape of the work. The grainy black-and-white images act, in fact, as counter-memories of a past that cannot be accessed: a past that no less than the present is screened in the representations of the island. Hence, the footage's affective traces disturb traditional representations of St Kilda with images of defiant people that yet fail to enter historical reconstructions of the complex and ambivalent relations that the

island had with the outside world. The archival frames seem to evoke in Illingworth's video the 'frozen words' filling the air with cacophonies to which the voiceover refers in a quoted extract from François Rabelais's *Gargantua and Pantagruel* (1564), inferring the ominous memories that pervade the atmospherics of the Artic Pole in Rabelais's story and that figuratively also mar the island of St Kilda.[8]

Overall, through the intersecting of affective, historical, and cultural registers and scales, Illingworth resists any linear narrative or single perspective. The shifting of images across the three screens visually exposes the processes of association typical of montage and at the same time defies the composite imagery of memory that has its cultural correlate in the moving image. The work disperses across the thematic, perceptual (visual and acoustic) and figurative trajectories and exposes the interference that forgetting inscribes in remembering. Hence, the viewer, who is positioned at the active nexus of 'recall', has to piece together fragments of information and sensations, perspectives and scales to form a picture whose parameters and contents will vary and change. She has to navigate the visual and acoustic montage of disjointed images, references and sounds and find connective clues that will enable her to engage with the multiple associations that proliferate within the work. Inevitably details will be lost, one feature will be chosen over another, others will conflate together and even unexpected links will be made. Thus, as in the other works discussed, the immersive space of *Lesions in the Landscape* is also a memory-scape where remembering and forgetting dynamically interweave, counteracting the immobility and the frozen representations that amnesia engenders by mobilizing new images and new memories. However, the work also raises the question of what it is like to look for memories, to search for clues to navigate the experience that the work generates and thus to ponder the consequences of forgetting. Indeed, what are the lesions that amnesia generates in the cultural and transcultural landscapes of our time? *Lesions in the Landscape* provides us with clues to search for answers.

Notes

1. This imagery is also at stake in the debate surrounding the reliability of traumatic memories and hence of their relevance in legal testimonies, such as those concerning domestic abuse and other forms of violence (Luckhurst 2008; Brewin 2003; Leys 2000).
2. The elderly man in the film is the artist's father.

3. The inhabitants themselves had requested to be removed from the island, though that was less unanimously decided than it was presented. Many of inhabitants resented the evacuation. The Scottish authorities suppressed any documentation of the event until 1979 (Harman 1997, pp. 118–123).
4. Illingworth includes shots of a black Soay sheep, an ancient breed descended from a feral herd on the islands of Soay and St Kilda. The animals are now kept wild on St Kilda and studied for their genetic profile in population genetics research and the effects of climate change on bio-systems. The animal stands for a 'vector of information' trailing from the sheep's biological past onto projected models of behaviours and future living conditions.
5. Illingworth draws a parallel between the approximate accuracy of a GPS with that of fMRI scanning, which is able to detect the extent of the brain lesion that had caused Claire's amnesia. Both are limited assessments of the 'actual' minimal scale (personal communication, 18 November 2015).
6. Martin Martin, one of the first travellers to the island in 1697, was directed to St Kilda by the birds' call (Martin 1698/1999).
7. As part of the project, Claire travelled to St Kilda with the artist during the filming of the work in June 2014.
8. The extract recounts Pantagruel's approaching the Arctic Circle on a ship and hearing muffled noises that filled the air and sounded like suffocated voices and screams. These were, as the captain of the ship explains to Pantagruel, the memories of a battle whose screams and sounds fell like snow and melted in a cacophony.

Bibliography

Albano, C. (2011) 'Balnakiel: In the Spaces of memory', in S. Illingworth (ed.) *The Watchman – Balnakiel* (London: Film and Video Umbrella), pp. 108–19.

Albano, C. (2012) *Fear and Art in the Contemporary World*. London: Reaktion.

Albano, C. (2013) 'At the Edge: Balnakiel a Video and Sound Installation by Shona Illingworth', in *Memory Studies*, 6: (4), pp. 404–417.

Anderson W., Jenson D., and Keller R.C. (2011) 'Introduction: Globalizing the Unconscious', in W. Anderson, D. Jenson, and R.C. Keller (ed.) *Unconscious Dominions: Psychoanalysis, Colonial Trauma, and Global Sovereignities* (Durham and London: Duke University Press), pp. 1–18.

Baer, U. (2002) *Spectral Evidence: Photography and Trauma* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press).

Bennett J (2003) 'The Aesthetics of Sense-Memory: Theorizing Trauma through the Visual Arts', in S. Radstone and K. Hodgkin (ed.) *Regimes of Memory* (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 27–39.

Bennett J (2011) Atmospheric affects: past events and present feeling, in S. Illingworth (ed.) *The Watch Man – Balnakiel* (London: Film and Video Umbrella), pp. 158–71.

Bennet, J. and Illingworth, S. (2015) *Lesions in the Landscape*: A Project by Shona Illingworth, exhibition publication (Liverpool: FACT).

Berlant, L. (2001) 'Trauma and Ineloquence', in *Cultural Values,* 5: (1), pp. 41–58.

Bernstern, D. (2007) 'Involuntary Autobiographical Memories: Speculations, Findings, and an Attempt to Integrate Them', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *Involuntary Memory* (Malden MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), pp. 20–49.

Bernstern, D. (2012) 'Spontaneous Recollections: Involuntary Autobiographical Memories are a Besic Mode of Remembering', in D. Bernstern and D. C. Rubin (eds.) *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 290–310.

Billig, M. (1999) *Freudian Repression: Conversation Creating the Unconscious* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bluck S., Alea, N. and Demiray, B. (2010) 'You Get What You Need: The Psychological Functions of Remembering', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 284–307.

Brewin, C. R. (2003) *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Malady or Myth?* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press).

Conway, M.A, and Loveday, C. (2010) 'Accessing Autobiographical Memories', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 56–70.

Damousi J (2011) 'Geza Roheim and the Australian Aborigine: Psychoanalytic Anthropology during the Interwar Years', in W. Anderson, D. Jenson and R. C. Keller (ed.) *Unconscious Dominions: Psychoanalysis, Colonial Trauma, and Global Sovereignities* (Durham and London: Duke University Press), pp. 75–95.

D'Argembeau, A. (2012) 'Autobiographical Memory and Future Thinking', in D. Bernstern and D. C. Rubin (ed.) *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 311–330.

Deleuze, G. (1995) 'On The Movement-Image', translated by Martin Joughin, in *Negotiations* (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 46–56.

Erll, A. (2011b) 'Travelling Memory' in *Parallax*, 17: (4), pp. 4–18.

Fitzgerald J.M. and Broadbridge, C.L. (2012) 'Theory and Research in Autobiographical Memory: A Life-span Perspective', in D. Berntsen and D. C. Rubin (ed.) *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 246–266.

Freud, S. (1914/1953) 'Remembering, Repeating and Working Through', translated by James Strachey, in J. Strachey (ed.) *The Standard Edition*, vol. XII (London: Hogarth Press), pp. 147–56.
Galiano, L.-F. (2000) *Fire and Memory* (Chicago Ill. and London: MIT).
Godard, J.-L. and Ishagpour, Y. (2005) *Cinema* (Oxford and New York: Berg).
Griffith, A. (2002) *Wondrous Difference: Cinema, Anthropology, & the Turn of the Century Visual Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press).
Harman, M. (1997) *An Isle Called Hirte: History and Culture of the St Kildans to 1930* (Watermish: Maclean Press).
Harman, M. (1997) *An Isle Called Hirte: History and Culture of the St Kildans to 1930* (Watermish: Maclean Press).
Healy, C. (2008) Forgetting Aborigines (Sidney, N.S.W.: University of New South Wales Press).
Holmes, E.A., Grey, N., and Young, K.A.D. (2005) 'Intrusive Images and 'Hotspots' of Trauma Memories in Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: An Explorative Investigation of Emotions and Cognitive Themes', in *Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry* 36, pp. 3–17.
Homer, L. (2015) 'Shona Illingworth: "Art Practice is Deeply Important in a Changing World', in *Studio International: Visual Arts, Design and Architecture* http://www.studiointernational.com/index.php/shona-illingworth-interview-lesions-in-the-landscape-fact-liverpool
Horowitz, M. J. (1969) 'Psychic Trauma: Return of Images after a Stress Film', in *Archive General Psychiatry* 20 (May), pp. 552–559.
Illingworth, S. (2007) *The Watch Man*, single round screen video and multichannel sound installation.
Illingworth, S. (2009) *Balnakiel*, video and multi-channel sound installation.
Illingworth, S. (2011) *The Watchman – Balnakiel* (London: Film and Video Umbrella).
Illingworth, S. (2015) Lesions in the Landscape, three-screen video and multichannel sound installation.
Ingold, T. (2000) 'The Temporality of the Landscape', in *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (London and New York: Routledge).
Krans, J., Woud, M.L., Näring, G., et al. (2010) 'Exploring Involuntary Recall in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder from an Information Processing Perspective: Intrusive Images of Trauma', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Toward an Understanding of How we Recall the Past* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 311–336.
Lazarus, R.S. and Alfred, E. (1964) 'The Short-Circuiting of Threat by Experimentally Altering Cognitive Appraisal', in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 69, pp. 195–205
Leys, R. (2007) *From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press).

Leys, R. (2000) *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).
Luckhurst, R. (2008) *The Trauma Question* (London and New York: Routledge).
MacDonald, F. (2010) 'Perpendicular Sublime: Regarding Rocketry and the Cold War', in F. MacDonald, K. Dodds and R. Hughes (ed.), *Observant States: Geopolitics and Visual Culture* (London and New York: I B Tauris), pp. 267–289.
MacDonald, F (2001) 'St Kilda and the Sublime', in *Cultural Geographies*, 8: (2), pp. 151–174.
Martin, Martin (1698/1999) *A Description of the Western Islands of Scotland circa 1695; Including a Voyage to St Kilda by the Same Author*, D. J. MacDonald (ed.) (Edinburgh: Birlinn).
Rancière, J. (2009) *The Emancipated Spectator*, translated by Gregory Elliott (London and New York: Verso).
Ricoeur, P. (2004) *Memory, History, Forgetting*, translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press).
Robinson, P. A. (1969), 'Géza Róheim', in *The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse* (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper Colophon Books), pp. 75–146.
Róheim, G. (1949) 'The Symbolism of Subincision', in *The American Imago,* 6: (4), pp. 321–8.
Róheim, G. (1945) *The Eternal Ones of the Dream*: *A Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Australian Myth and Ritual* (New York: International University Press).
Saltzman, L. (2006) *Making Memory Matter: Strategies of Remembrance in Contemporary Art* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press).
Saltzman, L. and Rosenberg, E. (2006) 'Introduction', in L. Saltzman and E. Rosenberg, (ed.) *Trauma and Visibility in Modernity* (Hanover and London: Darmonth College Press and University Press of England), pp. ix-xix.
Schwartz, B. J. (1956) 'An Empirical Test of Two Freudian Hypotheses Concerning Castration Anxiety', in *Journal of Personality*, 24: (3), pp. 318–327.
Shaviro, S. (1993) *The Cinematic Body* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press).
Speisman, J.C., Lazarus, R.S., Mordkoff, A. and Davison, L. (1964) 'Experimental Reduction of Stress Based Ego-Defense Theory', in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 68: (4), pp. 367–380.
Traverso, E. (2015) *Le passé: modes d'emploi. Histoire, mémoire, politique* (Paris: La fabrique editions).
Turin, M. (1989) *Flashbacks in Film: Memory and History* (New York and London: Routledge).
Weinrich, H. (2005) *Lethe: Kunst und Kritik des Vergenssens* (München: Beck)
Young, J. (2000) *At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

CHAPTER 4

Sound, Trace and Interference

During the period of the installation at the Wellcome Collection in London of US artist Bill Fontana's *White Noise* (2011), anyone approaching the building along the dense transport artery of the Euston Road would have heard the rattling sound of shingle and the breaking of waves on a shore over the din of traffic. The title of the work alludes to the random signal with a constant spectral density typical of ambient noise. In the case of Fontana's work, the 'white noise' of the title is that of waves and shingles that he translocates to blend and interfere with the atmospherics of the Euston Road. The projected sound is that of the Atlantic Ocean at Chisel Beach in Dorset.[1] The geological, archaeological and historical significance of Chisel Beach infers a memory-scape whose sound Fontana has recorded in different locations along the length of the seashore and transferred to play back through loudspeakers with the noise of traffic jams and passers-by in London. The practice is typical of the artist who, since the 1970s, has developed what he calls sound-sculptures by way of displacing and superimposing sounds at historical sites, in buildings and at other locations. These include works such as *Sonic Mappings* (2016), realized for the MAXI Museum in Rome, for which Fontana has collected the resonances of the Roman aqueduct of the *Aqua Vergine*, which runs underground through the historic quarters of the city and feeds its many fountains; and *Harmonic Bridge* (2006), in which the vibrations of footsteps, load and wind on the Millennium Foot Bridge in London were broadcast live and projected into the Turbine Hall at Tate Modern and the main concourse of the nearby Southwark Underground Station.

C. Albano, *Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36588-0_4

In his work Fontana variously collates and transmits ambient sounds and investigates the often unperceived acoustic vibrations of buildings and structures, tracing the perceptive and emotional cues that can be regarded as mnemonic.

Fontana's work continues our discussion of individual, social and cultural environments of remembering introduced with Kerry Tribe and Shona Illingworth. Through an examination of Fontana's practice, we further reflects on cultural modalities of remembering and interrogates the implications of forgetting, interference and amnesia within them. The persistence of inaccessible traces of memories highlighted in the analysis of Illingworth's *Lesions in the Landscape* is germane to an interrogation of the politics of memory and practices of memorialization. Drawing on current neuro-psychological models of remembering, the chapter considers such theories for reflecting on the current debate around cultural and transcultural networks of remembrance and global memories (as site of memory, inhabited memory and knot of memory). This introduces a consideration of the mediatized trace of the moving image as salient for cultural remembrance that will be developed in relation to the archive. Here we focus on the trace of memory in terms of sound, of acoustic rather than visual resonances. But why sound?

Together with film and photography, sound recording is a technology that has redefined the twentieth-century documentation of events and testimonies and, hence, the ways in which the past can be recalled and 'made to speak' to us. Sound recording, replication and broadcasting have in fact contributed to the redefinition of the perceptual experience of time and space in modernity. They have helped to shape new forms of repetition and displaced simultaneity by enabling the 'documentation', reproduction and radio transmission to distant locations in real time of sounds and disembodied voices (Sterne 2003, p. 6). In so doing, these technologies have conferred new prominence to acoustics by making air and background environments carriers of information. This has generated for acoustics an equivalent to Benjamin's optic unconscious, what Steven Connor names the 'auditory unconscious' (Connor 2010, p. 198). Indeed, the transmission of sound alters the atmospheric sensorium into an arena of previously 'undreamt-of instantaneity' (Connor 2010, p. 214).

> What was heard in atmospherics was the fracture and fluctuation of time; atmospherics suggested a time out of joint. As broadcasts became more established, atmospherics often took the form of an infuriating fringe of Morse signals, which seemed more and more to intervene, not just from

> a different frequency, but from a different epoch of communicative time. (Connor 2010, p. 215)

No less than the moving image, the recording and transmission of sound has expanded and transformed the spatial and temporal coordinates of modernity, shifting the parameters through which the past, as well as the present and future, can be construed and imagined. Sound has thus intervened in the reshaping of the modern landscape of memory in ways that are still pertinent today. One of the most apparent consequences of such reshaping regards the technological enabling of testimony as documentary evidence and mnemonic record. In turn, the gathering of visual and oral archives has both propelled and given new forms to the social and cultural mediatization of memories in the twentieth century (see Hamilton and Shopes 2008). However, as discussed in relation to Illingworth, sound is also an affective and emotional component of both memories and the moving image and it can be productively considered as a trace that is both physical and insubstantial, defined by intensity and frequency, impermanence and continuity within physical, mental and cultural environments.

Memory researchers draw on sound physics to convey the physicality of the neural encoding of sensory-emotional-cognitive inputs into memory processes in terms of the weakness and strength of the signal of encoded information. This implicitly presupposes a recallable *trace* as a synaptic neuronal activation that shows in EEG recordings or fMRI scans (Ricoeur 2004, p. 422). In his analysis of the phenomenology of memory and forgetting, Paul Ricoeur reads the cortical trace as a 'material trace', for which the brain acts as a projecting system, and which forgetting supposedly effaces (Ricoeur 2004, p. 414) or, as we shall suggest, silences. Psychological models of remembering postulate that what is 'forgotten' can interfere with and even re-emerge into consciousness, thus presupposing the persistence of 'unremembered' memories as residual or inactivated traces (Mace 2010a, pp. 46–48). These traces, as Illingworth's sonification of Claire's neural activation during remembering suggests, fill her amnesiac landscape. Such traces also interact in normal processes of remembering and are at the core, following Martin Conway's remark in his commentary in *Lesions in the Landscape*, of the main problem in memory: how to access memories, how to access what is unremembered. In his analysis of memory, Ricoeur also postulates another kind of trace, what he refers to as the psychic trace: 'one speaks of it retrospectively on the basis of precise experiences which have as their model the recognition

of images of the past' and on which the signification of the memory image itself is based (Ricoeur 2004, pp. 415–416). The psychic trace also infers what French analysts César and Sara Botella call 'memory without recollection', which intimates the awareness that something has occurred but which cannot be psychically represented (Parsons 2014, pp. 123–124). Hence, forgetting and the residual presence of a trace (whether thought of as cortical or psychical) that cannot be recalled, accessed or represented problematize an understanding of remembering and of what one remembers. Put it another way, 'The absence of a representable content'—as psychoanalyst Michael Parsons observes—'does not mean the absence of an event' (Parsons 2014, p. 124), instead of a mnemonic trace, there is what can be called an 'amnesiac trace' (Parsons 2014, p. 124).

Through a consideration of sound, we shall address the mediatized trace of filmic, video and radio recording that denotes contemporary social and cultural memory-scapes. The latter exist at the boundaries of the local and the global and increasingly include the arena of digital communication technologies and the emergence of 'digital memories' (Erll 2011b, pp. 11–16). In this context the trace has been absorbed within both the coded systems of information technology and the material configuration of digital networks, giving way to what have been argued as new kinds of memories (Garde-Hansen et al. 2009, pp. 1–21). However, although digital technology has altered the mediatized production and accumulation of traces impinging on the social and cultural articulations of memories, questions of obsolescence, deferral and erasure remain pertinent to the trace and these questions can be profitably addressed in terms of acoustics and the ways in which it affects environments.

4.1 Sound Traces

Fontana's characteristic translocation of sound across two or more sites to generate polyphonic immersive spaces of resonance entails either field recording, almost 'ethnographically' capturing the ambient sound in different locations, or the live broadcasting of environmental sound using wireless technologies (Fontana and Rudi 2005, pp. 97–99). Both techniques relate to the mediatization of cultural memories facilitated by recording and broadcasting technology. However, it is not only the use of this technology that renders Fontana's work relevant to our discussion, but rather the actualization of environments through sound. Through his work we shall address cultural and transcultural dimensions

of remembering in terms of the sonic spatio-temporal resonances his sound-sculptures create.

In works such as *Distant Trains* [*Entfernte Züge*] (1984), *Sound Island* (1994) and *River Sounding* (2010), Fontana's site-specific sound sculptures use historical buildings and monuments mobilizing what the artist refers to as the 'acoustic memory' of architectural sites that he conceives as an accumulative condensations of acoustic traces (Fontana 1990). In *Distant Trains*, the historic site of Fontana's installation is the ruinous building of the Anhalter Bahnhof in the proximity of Potsdamer Platz in former West Berlin. One of the city's most important railway stations of the prewar period, Anhalter Bahnhof was one of the transit points deployed during the Nazi regime for the deportation of inmates to the camp of Theresienstadt. Rather than special convoys, the trains from Anhalter Bahnhof had ordinary coaches attached to regular trains directed to the Czech Republic. Bombed in 1943, the station was closed down in 1952 when transits from East to West Berlin were suspended. 'The first time I visited the Anhalter Bahnhof,'—remarks Fontana—'the empty field behind the shattered facade seemed strangely quiet, as if haunted by the sounds of trains and people' (Fontana 1990). In an attempt to make such haunting presence palpable to the visitors, Fontana transposed onto the abandoned station the sounds of the Hauptbahnhof in Cologne, one of the busiest railway transit points in Europe. He recorded the noise of trains entering and exiting Cologne's station, the sound of signals, train announcements, voices, footsteps and the general multiplicity of simultaneous acoustics that fill a busy transit network.[2] He then compiled and projected the recordings in the empty shell of the Anhalter Bahnhof by burying eight loudspeakers in two parallel rows, which mimicked the train tracks, so that they would not be visible and, at the same time, would generate an optimal acoustic field within the large empty station. In *Distant Trains*, Fontana activates the acoustic haunting within the abandoned building of the Berlin train station by harnessing and destabilizing notions of location and presence as spatial and temporal fixed conditions. Ambiguously, the recorded traces of the many sounds that animate the Hauptbahnhof in Cologne were displaced to resound—literally recalling—the residual echoes of other trains, announcements, footsteps and voices, infiltrating absence with the displaced presence of past resonances. *Distant Trains* is indicative of Fontana's practice. By appropriating 'two levels of spatiality' and the specificity of their respective sound events, the artist mixes 'multiple sites and their sounds, expanding out through a broadcast and con-

tracting back in technological manoeuvres, creating an aural network of environmental information' (LaBelle 2015, p. 229). It is the convergence of different levels of spatiality—and temporality—and networks of environmental information (aural, but also more generally affective, emotional and cognitive) that mobilize remembering in Fontana's immersive installations, instigating further considerations on cultural practices of memory.

Sound Island (1994) consists of a site-specific installation at the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. With this sound-sculpture, Fontana reconfigured the perception of the urban environment of this iconic memorial site and tourist attraction at the junction of traffic-congested boulevards by live broadcasting the ocean sound from a number of locations along the coast of Normandy. These included a hydrophone five kilometres out of sea and a microphone on shore at Phare de Gateville 'to hear waves, seagulls and an occasional fog horn', and at Pointe de Hoc (site of an US Battle Monument) 'a stereo microphone overlooking the sea from a German bunker on the side of a cliff that hears waves breaking on the rocky coast' (Fontana 1994, Sound Island microphone sites, personal communication, 23 February 2016).[3] The white noise of the sea was meant to alter the acoustic ecology of the Parisian site and wrap it in a silent envelope by exploiting the effect of the super-imposed sound of the ocean waves, which characteristically mute other noises (Fontana 1995). The live transmission, translocation and superimposition of the patterns of sound captured in Normandy onto the Parisian urban environment also resulted into a conflation and displacement of spatial and temporal co-ordinates. Brandon Labelle explains such slippage of references as 'a double-take of presence: the broadcast swaps here and there in a move that unsettles without resolution or recuperation both the transmitting and receiving body' so that the work enfolds 'the listener within a sonic network that integrates the geographical with the sonorous, place with tonality' (LaBelle 2015, p. 231). By bridging across the coast of Normandy and Paris, the broadcast entangles the there and here, and with them the distinct temporalities of then and now, reconfiguring them in the displaced simultaneity of the work. Such dislocation and convergence of affective traces generates, according to LaBelle, a site which is 'radically other' (LaBelle 2015, p. 231). It is a site of sonorities, of disjointed affective clues (e.g. visual and acoustic), but also of new relations, of novel perceptive and associative connections. 'Listeners live in two places at once, while geographic site is defined through audible information, a sonority that introduces a mix of messages in which one finds meaning' (LaBelle 2015, p. 231). The

juxtaposition between the urban architecture of the piece and the compiled natural sounds also create a tension between the visual and acoustic components of the work. Such tension translates into original perceptual impressions for the viewer/listener, whereby 'the actual visual aspects of the sound sculpture'—observes Fontana—'lies in this person's imagination, in their personal mental space to create virtual images' (Fontana 1995). In the case of *Sound Island*, the meanings that unfold destabilize the viewer's associations with the site of Fontana's sound sculpture and complicate its perception as a 'site of memory' (*lieu de mémoire*), as argued by Pierre Nora, that is, as a physical and figurative residual 'realm' of recollection (Nora 1989) (Fig. 4.1).

The *lieu de mémoire* stems from a 'disappearance of memory', from the loss of those 'places' that express memory as 'part of everyday experience' (*milieu de mémoire*) and whose phantom presence only persists as 'a residual sense of continuity' of the past into the present (Nora 1996, p. 1). Nora imputes the disappearance of the traditional *milieu de mémoire* to today's 'tumbl[ing] of things with increasing rapidity into irretrievable past'—a past that does not seem to belong either to memory or to history, but of



Fig. 4.1 Bill Fontana, *Sound Island*, 1994, montage, courtesy of the artist © Bill Fontana

which only a mediatized archival record remains (Nora 1996, p. 1 and pp. 8–9; Carrier 1993). The *lieu de mémoire* is itself hybrid and unstable and infers alterity in terms of the loss of the environment of memory that the *milieu de mémoire* guaranteed. Hence, the binary opposition between *lieu* and *milieu de mémoire* antithetically renders the *lieu de mémoire* both a by-product of forgetting and an attempt to 'inhibit forgetting' and to 'fix a state of things' (Nora 1996, p. 15). As Fontana's work suggests, the mediatized trace filled with information and sonorities but also capable of altering environments problematizes the inhibition and fixity of the *lieu de mémoire* bringing into question its constituent binary opposition. The mediatized trace is in fact also an affective trace, which infers a different kind of alterity—one that is imbued with the displaced presence of what is forgotten and alien to memorialization itself. Such a trace is not predicated on a supposed loss of memory, but rather on dynamic reconfigurations of remembering as contingent on the here and now. Indeed, as Andreas Huyssen remarks about Nora's concept, it is necessary to 'move out of a discourse of loss and accept the shifting structures of feeling experience and perceptions as they characterize the simultaneous and shrinking present' (Huyssen 2003, p. 24).

Sound Island was commissioned to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day, and hence had overt commemorative purposes that the site chosen for the installation well evinced. Started in 1806 and completed in 1836, the Arc de Triomphe was erected by Napoleon to celebrate his military victories in the vein of the imperial arc of classical Rome. The area chosen for the Arc was l'Étoile (now Place Charles de Gaulle), which was at the time an empty esplanade at the end of an ill-defined path known as the Champs Élysées that was appropriate for the display of military parades to which Napoleon aspired (Agulhon 1998, p. 532). The area was further encompassed within the larger plan to redesign Paris's city centre into a 'ceremonial composition' of large boulevards and expanded views that was suitable to be used for public displays of power and national potency (Boyer 1994, pp. 33–40). Since 1920 the Arc de Triomphe also encloses the tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Originally added to commemorate the dead of World War I, the tomb is now a memorial to the French soldiers who died during the two world wars and beyond. Hence, as a symbol of nationalism, imperialism, grievance and remembrance, the Arc de Triomphe encapsulates a range of historical and ideological references (Agulhon 1998, p. 532) that renders the monument a complex site of shifting and, even conflicting, commemorative meanings. Imbricated

in the triumphalism and commemoration for which the Arc de Triomphe stands are the still impending issues posed by France's colonial and post-colonial history and the intricacies of World War II and post-war period. Fontana acknowledges such conflation of divergent meanings—typical of monuments of the kind (Winter 2014, p. 79)—and deploys sound to 'deconstruct the known identity of the site' rendering public what 'the architectural icon […] could only be imagined as sounding to itself' (Fontana 1994). Such deconstruction brings to the fore the ambiguity of France's most conspicuous war memorial, its ideological, historical and contemporary significance at the boundaries of commemoration and commodification, grievance and contestation. Hence, the translocated live broadcast of the white noise of Normandy's sea onto the Arc and its congested surroundings introduces an element of alterity that contradicts and unsettles the immediate aural perception of the site and its visual associations. It introduces 'inherent difference *to* the here and now, as a live intersection and sonorous overlap' (LaBelle 2015, p. 235). The sound adds an unexpected dimension to the historical site and repositions it within a different environment where references to triumphalism, patriotism and nationalism are temporarily displaced and disavowed. The displaced trace 'screens'— by both figuratively covering and exposing—the Arc de Triomphe in ways that destabilize memorialization and mobilize the 'acoustic unconscious' of the monument, the unremembered resonances within it.

Fontana's search for the phantom resonances of historical sites can, as in the case of the Anhalter Bahnhof in Berlin, also act as a kind of activation of silences and amnesiac traces within the architectural structure of a building. For *River Sounding*, an installation that the artist realized at Somerset House in London in 2010, Fontana infiltrated the ground structure of the edifice with the rustling noise of the running water of the River Thames. An eighteenth-century governmental building designed by William Chambers for King George III, Somerset House was constructed on the bank of the Thames as part of an extensive plan of urbanization and sanitation of the area which, at the time, was considered a geographically and socially liminal site (Gissen 2009, p. 120). Together with Joseph Balzalgette's Embankment, the building contributed to the transformation of this marginal zone in a move that imposed socio-geographical control on the river's edge (Gissen 2009, pp. 121–122). Hence, Fontana reinstates within the building's vaulted arcades, in which the river originally entered, the sounds that inhabited it and, in so doing, he

inscribes the site with past resonances. The overlaying of the once present sound of water on the architectural structure of Somerset House, as in the case of Fontana's other works, redefines the visual features of the historical building and instigates novel imageries that infuse the place with new 'meanings'. The artist intercepts the existing architecture with a sonic trace that is both extraneous and evocative not of what is remembered and memorialized but rather of what is generally omitted and silenced. Fontana brings back to Somerset House the muted sound of the Thames and with it the marginality that the building was originally meant to foreclose. Such marginality, not unlike the muted echoes haunting the silence of the Anhalter Bahnhof in Berlin, intimate memories for which there is no recollection: they infer the amnesiac trace of cultural memorialization by posing the question of its residual presence despite the absence of representation. Such a trace is congruent with current theories of remembering and with the residual presence of what is silenced, repressed or forgotten in memory. But how can we understand such trace and how it impinges in remembering?

4.2 Memories, Silences and Cultural Remembering

According to Jacques Derrida, a trace alludes to a displaced presence, that is to a presence that does not exist in opposition to absence but rather that is constantly reminiscent of its erasure and liminal endurance (Derrida 1978, p. 230). If thought of in terms of memory and memory processes, such displaced presence reminds us of the memory trace as an amnesiac or inactivated trace that has not been completely erased but that cannot be consciously accessed. It insinuates the trace of an event that remains unrepresented or even repressed, whose signal has been weakened or silenced. A notion of the trace as a displaced presence let us presuppose that what is forgotten is a by-product of remembering—not an absence of memories—but rather memories that cannot be accessed because they have been muted. Psychology helps us to explain social remembering in ways similar to individual remembering and hence further extends hypotheses about processes of remembering from the mental to the social and cultural spheres. Selectivity is in fact an important factor in remembering, both for individual and social memories, since it 'reinforces what is remembered but also induces forgetting for what goes unnoticed' (Hirst et al. 2012, p. 149). Hence, forgetting occurs

'not only when an individual overtly but selectively remembers the past but also when people listen to others overtly and selectively remember (*sociallys shared retrieval-induced forgetting*)' (Hirst et al. 2012, p. 151). This is because the sharing of memories in social exchanges tends to alter what and how one remembers by exploiting the malleability of memories themselves to generate 'mnemonic convergence'—the merging of disparate memories or details of a memory into a new common one (Hirst et al. 2012, p. 152). The residues of the malleable reconfigurations of memories are the *silences* of memories that one fails or refuses to remember (Hirst et al. 2012, p. 149). Like an audio signal, memories or their details are lessened or muted during remembering and become inaudible while they are still present in the 'atmospherics' of memory. Critical to our discussion is the significance of silences in remembering and the ways in which the residual traces of memories still persist, variously affecting, interfering, and disturbing remembering, but also enhancing the retrieval of new memories.

In arguing for a functional model of cultural memory, Aleida Assmann distinguishes between memory as *vis* (memories that speak to the present and are drawn upon, as they are, in Assmann's words, 'inhabited') and memory as *ars* (a 'storehouse' of memories that are not lived in) (Assmann 2011, pp. 34–35). *Vis* memory is characterized by its 'relevance to a group, selectivity, its relation to shared values and an orientation towards the future' (Assmann 2011, p. 34). It 'is an acquired memory, which emerges from processes of choosing, connecting, and constituting meaning' and helps the construction of identity and legitimization of social forms (Assmann 2011, pp. 34–35). Stored memory instead serves as a reservoir of what is obsolete, unused, forgotten, repressed in social and cultural constructions of memories. *Vis* memory can be envisaged in the background rather than foreground of cultural memory-scapes. From the reservoir of *vis* memory unused or repressed memories can be drawn and potentially re-emerge into *ars* memory as a source of renewal and thus a 'condition of possible cultural change' (Assmann 2011, p. 35). Assmann's model entails both a spatial and temporal conception of cultural memory suggesting continuity and mutuality between inhabited and uninhabited memories. The cultural records or traces that Assmann considers vary from literary texts to spatial environments. The latter are particularly interesting since they reflect on cultural memory from both structured practices and environments of remembrance and hybrid ones. Indeed, it is in places and sites, which are not traditionally memorialized and where remember-

ing is unstructured that memory asserts itself 'against a strong desire to forget and to suppress' (Assmann 2011, 138) and what is unremembered re-emerges.

> Here, the metaphors emphasize what is hidden and out of reach rather than what is revealed and available. I argue that this new notion of hidden depths brings the spatial metaphors very close to the temporal notion of latency and thereby creates a bridge from spatial to temporal metaphors of memory. (Assmann 2011, p. 138)

Assmann reintroduces the spatial metaphor of depth that Ricoeur attributed to forgetting and relates such depth to a trace that is 'hidden and out of reach', a trace that is displaced and that impinges on and affects remembering. According to Assmann, the metaphor of depth, not unlike Fontana's sound-sculptures, also links spatial and temporal dimensions of memory, suggesting the re-articulation of new configurations of memories through the mobilization of the muted and displaced presence of what is 'hidden and out of reach'. The persistence of muted and amnesiac traces of memories problematizes Assmann's binary model of cultural memory and brings to the fore the connections between the two planes of memory that the model posits. Rather than a distinction between inhabited and uninhabited spheres of memory, environments of remembering emerge from a continuum of interaction, transfer, overlaying of memories and forms of knowledge. As James Young observes a-propos of Marc Augé's analysis of oblivion, the problem lies in the ways in which one conceives the relation between remembering and forgetting: 'can we, do we ever, really forget something on our way to remembering something else? Or is it all remembered in light of everything we ever knew, whether now forgotten or remembered?' (Young 2004, p. xi). At stake is all that is 'remembered in light of everything we ever knew', that is the significance of such residual traces in remembering.

Theoretical speculations on processes of remembering in psychology provide us with a useful framework to consider the dynamics of remembering and the persistence of what is unremembered, not only individually but also socially, culturally and transculturally. Complementary rather than antithetical to remembering, forgetting explains the extensive elaborations of encoded information across memory systems and time periods. This can be described as the spatial and temporal environments in which memories form, arise and dissipate. Silences in remembering, as suggested, can be a consequence of the induced forgetting of unretrieved memories—known as retrieval-induced forgetting (Hirst et al. 2012,

pp. 149–150). Retrieval-induced forgetting is believed to 'affect the representation' of the memories that remain unnoticed, inhibiting their recovery by rendering their representation or content unavailable rather than inaccessible as in amnesia (Pastötter and Bäuml 2010, p. 205). Unlike direct forms of forgetting where information to be forgotten is inadequately encoded, retrieval-induced forgetting happens in order to minimize interference by unwanted information (Pastötter and Bäuml 2010, pp. 205–207). In this sense, forgetting interacts with modalities of remembering, namely voluntary (deliberate recollection of the past) and involuntary remembering (spontaneous recollection of the past) (Mace 2010a, pp. 44–45). Although the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' have been criticized as imposing a binary opposition that undermines the fact that 'most of our daily recollections are achieved through unconscious processes' (Mandler 2007, pp. 210–212), relevant to our discussion are the implications of the continuum of memory activation and retrieval in which what one 'remembers' (or believes to remember) and what one does not remember (or is not aware of remembering) converge and overlap. In other words, relevant to our discussion are the unsolicited traces of what is silenced or never remembered.

So-called involuntary memories are in three distinct categories. They refer respectively to memories occurring as part of our everyday mental life, particularly during states of low attention focus; unsolicited memories occurring during processes of recall of specific memories; and memories related to psychiatric syndromes, as in the case of traumatic intrusive memories (Mace 2007a, pp. 2–3; see also Mace 2010a). Traumatic memories are thus part of a broader phenomenon pertaining to remembering and the emergence of unpredictable and fleeting memories. These memories can be novel and unexpected to consciousness; and often they only partly reach consciousness or they cannot be fully represented in consciousness because their signal is blurred or weak. Although they remain 'unremembered', these memories still affect the retrieval of other ones. The activation of involuntary memories is presumed to follow dynamics not dissimilar to the spreading of activation patterns across synaptic networks that are believed to regulate the recall of autobiographical memories. Spreading uses associative cues whereby a memory or a detail in a memory triggers the activation of another memory or detail in it as a sort of associative resonance within related clusters of memories about a particular event. In turn, the activation can spread to similar related memories within and across time periods or frames of knowledge (Mace

2010b, pp. 46–48). In the case of involuntary memories, the process of activation is described as chains of associative memories (or chaining) (Mace 2007b, pp. 53–64) that include what is not normally brought into remembering. Chaining mobilizes memories or fragments of memories that cannot be accessed consciously. These may refer to 'general events associations (memories in the chain are from the same general (or extended event period) and conceptual associations (memories in the chain come from different periods, but they otherwise contain overlapping information)' (Mace 2007b, p. 52). Everyday involuntary remembering is mostly due to cues within memories that trigger the retrieval of other associatively related memories; in chaining involuntary memories emerge either through cue activation or spreading activation (Mace 2007a, pp. 14–15, pp. 60–63), thus generating a continuous activation of networks across knowledge structures. The chaining of unexpected or unremembered memories, in other words, intersects and overlaps with target recall through the seamless interweaving of voluntary and involuntary remembering. Chaining and spreading are thus not distinct processes, but rather intermingling ones. The activation of memory networks produced by chaining can, however, differ in strength,

> when activation is strong enough, they [involuntary memories] may come immediately into consciousness in which they are experienced as chained involuntary memories. On the other hand, when activations are not strong enough to capture consciousness, they may result in a form of associative priming within the system, whose influence may be exerted later. (Mace 2007b, p. 63)

Involuntary remembering functionally expands the recall of target memories by adding related new memories to the one intentionally recalled or by preparing future retrieval, thus bringing into remembering what would not otherwise emerge (Mace 2007b, p. 64). Other forms of remembering that mobilize normally inhibited material are memories triggered by cognitive processes, such as thoughts, and traumatic involuntary remembering which, as discussed, responds to emotional and affective cues whether internal or external. In all cases, involuntary remembering engenders 'uncontrollable acts of recognition' (Mace 2010b, p. 51) of the residual traces retained within memory systems. These traces presumably belong to discarded memories (possibly episodic memories); they are the residues of memories that have been forgotten. They can also be the traces of memories that have been silenced in remembering (Mace 2007a, p. 14), the muted signals of interfering memories. Involuntary remembering thus

brings to the fore the dynamics in remembering as a continuum of activations through associative links whereby what is apparently forgotten interferes, intersects and underlies memories' retrieval.

Cultural and social memory-scapes can also be envisaged in terms of an interweaving of voluntary and involuntary forms of remembering. Within these processes, certain memories are more extensively accessed, whilst others are silenced or are never accessed. The traces of these memories, however, pervade environments of cultural and social remembering variously interfering and crisscrossing remembrance and memorialization. In this sense, Fontana's architectonics of transmission and reverberation mobilize what Connor refers to as the 'acoustic unconscious' of sonorities and atmospherics. This also involves silence and the noise that pervades it. In *Silent Echoes* (2008 and 2015) Fontana has respectively recorded the 'silent' throbs inside the bells of five Buddhist Temples in Kyoto,[4] and the vibrations of the disused Finnieston Crane in Glasgow's city centre. The recordings trace the otherwise imperceptible presences that mix with the surrounding voices and sounds of the temples and the urban environment of Glasgow. The condensation of overt, and hidden and out-of-reach resonances that Fontana exposes can also be claimed for cultural environments of memory where muted memories can be actively traced and retraced.

4.3 Chaining Hidden Memories

Fontana's cross-continental installation *Cologne San Francisco Sound Bridge* (1987) was realized by connecting sound sculptures created respectively in Cologne and in San Francisco through a radio satellite bridge between the two cities. The simultaneous sound installations in the two cities connected diverse local points and further broadcasted live environmental sound onto their respective urban landscapes. In Cologne, sixteen locations were linked through live transmission and the incoming sound was then amplified through speakers mounted on the façade of the city cathedral and projected onto the surrounding square. In San Francisco, the Golden Gate Bridge was linked to the Farallon Islands National Wildlife Refuge and the recordings of the two locations were amplified and transmitted at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. This generated complex sonic representations of the two cities and of their urban and seaport environments. Fontana also mixed the live recordings of the two local installations in a composition of compiled resonances that was transmitted for one hour through satellite broadcasting to wide-reaching audiences in North America and Europe

(Fontana and Rudi 2005, pp. 98–99). 'The medium of radio, which'—as LaBelle observes—'exists as a decontextualizing and transformative mechanism, made complete Fontana's mission by mixing beyond recuperation the details of particular global points onto an unknowable number of additional locations' (Labelle 2015, p. 32). The work effectively, though only temporarily, generated a network of acoustic ecologies of the cities where the sound sculptures were situated beyond any specific confines. This was further explored in another *Sound Bridge* realized between the cities of Cologne and Kyoto in 1993. The work entailed the translocation of sounds from two 'different cultures and acoustic environments played in public spaces in each city that were both cultural zones' (Fontana and Rudi 2005, p. 99), namely the Heinrich Böll Platz of the Museum Ludwig in Cologne and the public area in front of the Kyoto Museum of Modern Art. 'This transmission'—as Fontana observes—'was much more advanced technologically than the 1987 project […] the medium was a 2Mbit digital line over which sixteen live audio channels went in each direction simultaneously' (Fontana and Rudi 2005, p. 99). As in the other works discussed, Fontana's sound bridges intimate both the compression and expansion typical of temporal and spatial horizons of our time as synchronicity (or quasi-synchronicity), the affective convergence of movement (dislocated transmission) and duration. According to Huyssen,

> Modernity has brought with it a very real compression of time and space. But in the register of imaginaries, it has also expanded our horizons of time and space beyond the local, the national, and even the international. In certain ways, our contemporary obsession with memory in the present may well be an indication that our ways of thinking and living temporality itself are undergoing a significant shift. (Huyssen 2003, p. 4)

The 'significant shift' that Huyssen argues for temporality can also be extended to spatiality—whether conceived in terms of the depth forgetting inscribes in the discourse of remembering—as suggested in Illingworth's *Lesions in the Landscape* – or of the dislocation and transmission of signals that characterize Fontana's artistic practice. The consequences of this shift also invest the constructions of the past and its interpretations in the present (Huyssen 1995; Huyssen 2003, p. 4). Spatiality and presentness (Traverso 2015, p. 20) are the conditions that inform today's panorama of remembering whereby local and global, cultural and transcultural processes and practices coexist, intersect and are constantly mediated and remediated, inferring hybrid, 'prismatic and het-

erogeneous, rather than holistic and universal' memory-scapes (Huyssen 2003, p. 24). Such hybrid, prismatic and heterogeneous memory-scapes, as Fontana's installations remind us, rely on the mediation and transmission of traces that are deeply embedded in environments and capable of reconfiguring them by introducing alterity as displaced and muted traces that through superimposition expand the perceptive and affective environment for the viewer/listener.

The issues that Assmann's model poses in relation to the emergence, endurance and latency of memories within cultural practices of memories—that is memories embedded both locally and historically—are no less relevant when considering transcultural networks of remembering and the emergence of global memories. Michael Rothberg conceives transcultural remembering in terms of a multidirectional interplay of parallel trajectories of remembering across cultures, places and times, through ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing and borrowing (Rothberg 2009, pp. 1–5; see also Bond and Rapson 2014). Rothberg calls such multidirectional networks of knotted patterns of remembering, *noeuds de mémoire* (knots of memory) to intimate the criss-crossing of different pasts and trajectories of remembrance (Rothberg 2010, p. 7; Silverman 2013; Sanyal 2015). This suggests dynamics akin to those argued for Fontana's sound sculptures and the disruption of sites of memories that they engender. Rothberg focuses on traumatic histories and the politics of commemoration that surrounds them: paradigmatic is the Holocaust and the ways in which it has shifted from a private individual experience of trauma to collective articulations, and has been further culturally and politically appropriated and memorialized. According to Rothberg, the process resonated and was concomitant with the emergence and cultural elaboration of other traumatic histories during the post-war period, such as those surrounding the legacy of European colonialism and slavery in the USA. Indeed 'the period between 1945 and 1962 contains both the rise of consciousness of the Holocaust as an unprecedented form of modern genocide and the coming to national consciousness and political independence of many of the subjects of European colonialism' (Rothberg 2009, p. 7). Rather than seeing these two sets of memories as competing for cultural priority, Rothberg argues that they mutually informed each other and reciprocally supported the memorialization of such traumatic histories by disentangling their recollection from exclusive versions of the past and related constructions of group and cultural identities (Rothberg 2009, p. 11). Hence, remembering both cuts across and binds together

diverse spatial, temporal and cultural sites, and moves across systems and modalities of remembering. This entails a 'remapping of memory in which links between memories are formed and then redistributed between the conscious and the unconscious' (Rothberg 2010, p. 21). Rothberg brings alterity to bear on transcultural trajectories of remembering by suggesting connections between actively selected memories and those which are 'hidden and out of reach'—to use Assmann's phrase—through 'rhizomatic networks of temporalities and cultural references' produced by the dynamic and multidirectional 'encounters from diverse pasts and conflictual presents' (Rothberg 2010, p. 7). Such 'rhizomatic networks of temporalities and cultural references' presuppose the persistence of the undercurrent of traces of memories that have been silenced and repressed, and of their potential activation in remembering across systems of mediation and diffusion.

The activation of traces in the rhizomatic transcultural networks of remembering proposed by Rothberg can be thought of in terms of processes of remembering (voluntary and involuntary) similar to those highlighted within theoretical models of autobiographical memory and the assemblage structures of the moving image (which, according to Deleuze, are akin to mental processes) (Deleuze 2000, pp. 366–367). Spreading and chaining, as the associative dynamics of activation of memories across knowledge systems, can be conceived as the modalities for the configuration and reconfiguration of memories within and across cultures. Given the parallels between individual and inter-subjective and social processes of memory, spreading and chaining offer us a means to encompass agency and the constitution of different levels and modalities of associative networks and the potential activation of the latent, amnesiac traces in them. Spreading and chaining posit, in other words, ways of conceiving the convergence, overlap and tension between different sequences or networks of remembrance across places and times and spheres of memory whether in relation to private, public or (semi) public remembering (see Rascaroli 2014). In this sense, Fontana's sound sculptures are suggestive of the chaining of traces across physical and mediatized environments that define the global and transcultural configuration and reconfigurations of memories since they are anchored in the affective, physical and emotional transformation of the audience's perception of the respective sites. Such reconfigurations, moreover, exploit the potential of translocation and (quasi) simultaneity of recording and broadcasting technologies that foreshadow the full emergence of connectivity of contemporary digital tech-

nologies and 'the media-affected formation and reformation' of memories within the landscape of digital technologies that, as suggested, expand beyond traditional notions of spatiality and temporality (Garde-Hansen et al. 2009, pp. 5–6).

In this landscape duration, obsolescence and deferral have acquired new significance as the connotations of a mediatized trace of the live event, which is ever increasingly situated at the shifting boundaries of the real and the virtual. Such a trace supposedly 'resistant to total erasure' determines the new forms of 'digital memories' and a reconfiguration of memory whereby the past indeterminably emerges across the connectivity, convergence and interdependence among communication systems in the present (Garde-Hansen et al. 2009, pp. 6–7). 'The instantaneous and flexible production of digital memories that puts history on hold, at least for the moment in which the digital memory is created' also exposes 'new forms of deferral' as a result of overload, speed and connectivity (Garde-Hansen et al. 2009, p. 5).

We can, however, consider digital memories and their deferral in terms of the emergence and dissipation of memories that characterize the continuous activation across systems and networks of both active and muted traces as the one argued about voluntary and involuntary remembering. As Fontana's sonic streaming suggests, duration and obsolescence can be envisaged in relation to a residual trace that is neither erased nor retrieved but rather activated through 'chaining' across networks. Indeed, as Andrew Hoskins contends, 'contemporary memory is principally constituted neither through retrieval nor through representation of some content of the past into the present. Rather, it is embedded and distributed through sociotechnological practices' of the Internet, social networks and other digital networks whereby memories are forged by the communication and posting that 'dynamically add to, alter and erase, a kind of archival living memory' (Hoskins 2009, p. 93). Impermanent and hybrid, the 'new memories' propelled by digital technology are defined and conditioned by the temporal and spatial mobility of constant reconfigurations. Whilst today's 'mediatised regime of memory' is characterized by a 'new texture of the past that is driven, maintained and replenished through its connections and aggregations' (Hoskins 2009, p. 31), such a texture is rooted in the forms that have redefined the temporal and spatial boundaries in modernity and late modernity and it is conditioned by the contemporary politics of memory that impinges on the private and public discourses and environments of remembrance.

Notes

1. Chisel beach is known for the particularity of the sediment stone formation and connects the mainland to the Isle of Portland.
2. Fontana could not broadcast the sound live because of the limited broadcast facilities in East Germany at the time.
3. The work comprised of other locations in Paris, including: at the Musée du Louvre near da Vinci's painting of the Mona Lisa; at Notre Dame; at the Grande Arche de La Défense in the mechanical room for the elevators to collect the sound of the relays; at Sacré Coeur; l'Hôtel de Ville; Tour Eiffel; Jardin du Luxembourg; Pont de Arts; Jardin de Bagatelle; and Bourse—Palais (Fontana 1994, Sound Island microphone sites, personal communication, 23 March 2016).
4. The artist further transplanted the bells' silent sounds at the Rubin Museum in New York.

Bibliography

Agulhon, M. (1998) 'Paris: A Transversal From East to West', in *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past*, *Symbols*, vol. III P. Nora (ed.) translated by Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 523–552.

Assmann, A. (2011), *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Bond, L. and Rapson, J. (ed.) (2014) *The Transcultural Turn: Interrogating Memory between the Borders* (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter).

Boyer, C. M. (1994) *The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural Entertainments* (Cambridge Mass. and London: MIT Press).

Carrier, P. (1993) 'Places, Politics and the Archiving of Contemporary Memory in Pierre Nora's Les lieux de mémoire', in R. Terdiman (ed.), *Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), pp. 37–57.

Deleuze, G. (2000) 'The Brain is the Screen: An Interview with Gilles Deleuze', translated by Marie Therese Guirgis, in G. Flaxman (ed.) *The Brain is the Screen* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 365–373.

Connor, S. (2010) *The Matter of Air: Science and the Art of the Ethereal* (London: Reaktion).

Derrida, J. (1978) 'Freud and the Scene of Writing', in *Writing and Difference*, translated with an introduction and additional notes by Alan Basss (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul), pp. 196–231.

Erll, A. (2011b) 'Travelling Memory' in *Parallax*, 17: (4), pp. 4–18.

Fontana, B. and Rudi, J. (2005) 'From a Musical Point of View, the World is Musical at Any Given Moment': An Interview with Bill Fontana', in *Organised Sound*, 10: (2), pp. 97–101.

Fontana, B. (1995) 'Sound as Virtual Image', http://resoundings.org/Pages/sound%20As%20Virtual%20Image.html

Fontana, B. (1994) 'Resoundings' http://resoundings.org/Pages/Resoundings.html

Fontana, B. (1990) 'The Relocation of Ambient Sound: Urban Sound Sculpture' http://resoundings.org/Pages/Urban%20Sound%20Sculpture.html

Garde-Hansen, J., Hoskins, A. and Reading, A. (2009) 'Introduction', in J. Garde-Hansen, A. Hoskins and A. Reading (ed.) *Save as… Digital Memories* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1–21.

Gissen, D. (2009) *Subnature: Architecture's Other Environments: Atmosphere, Matter, Life* (New York: Princeton University Press).

Hamilton, P. and Shopes, L. (ed.) (2008) *Oral history and Public Memories* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press)

Hirst, W., Cuc, A., and Wohl, D. (2012) 'Of Sins and Virtues: Memory and Collective Identity', D. Bernstern and D. C. Rubin (ed.) *Understanding Autobiographical Memory: Theories and Approaches* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 141–159.

Hoskins, A. (2009) 'Digital Network Memory', in A. Erll and A. Rigney (ed.) *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyer), pp. 91–106.

Huyssen, A. (1995) *Twilight Memories: Making Time in a Culture of Amnesia* (New York and London: Routledge).

Huyssen, A. (2003) 'Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia', in *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), pp. 11–29.

La Belle, B. (2015) *Background Noise: Perspectives on Sound Art* (New York and London: Bloomsbury).

Mace, J. H. (2007a) 'Involuntary Memory: Concept and Theory', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *Involuntary Memory* (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 1–19.

Mace, J. H. (2007b) 'Does Involuntary Remembering Occur during Voluntary Remembering?' in J. H. Mace (ed.) *Involuntary Memory* (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 50–67.

Mace, J. H. (2010a) 'Involuntary Remembering and Voluntary Remembering: How Different Are They?', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 43–55.

Mace, J.H. (2010b) 'Understanding Autobiographical Remembering from a Spreading Activation Perspective', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Towards an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 183–201.

Mandler, G. (2007) 'Involuntary Memories: Variations on the Unexpected', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *Involuntary Memory* (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 208–223.

Nora, P. (1989) 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire', translated by Marc Roudebush, in *Representations*, 26 (Spring), pp. 7–24.

Nora, P. (1996) 'Introduction: Between Memory and History', translated by Arthur Goldhammer, in P. Nora (ed.) *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past, Conflicts and Divisions*, vol. I (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 1–20.

Pastötter, B. and Bäuml, K.-H. T. (2010) 'Retrieval Inhibition in Autobiographical Memory', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *The Act of Remembering: Toward an Understanding of How We Recall the Past* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 202–227.

Parsons, M. (2014) *Living Psychoanalysis: From Memory to Experience* (London and New York: Routledge).

Rascaroli, L (2014) 'Working at Home: Tarnation, Amateur Authorship, and Self-inscription in the Digital Age', in L. Rascaroli and G. Young with B. Monahan, (ed.) *Amateur Filmmaking: The Home Movie, the Archive, the Web* (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 229–242.

Ricoeur, P. (2004) *Memory, History, Forgetting*, translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press).

Rothberg, M. (2009) *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

Rothberg, M. (2010) 'Introduction: between Memory and Memory. From Lieux de Mémoire to Noeuds de Mémoire', in M. Rothberg, D. Sanyal and M. Silverman (ed.) *Noeuds de mémoire: Multidirectional Memory in Postwar French and Francophone Culture* (New Haven, Conn. and London), pp. 3–12.

Sanyal, D. (2015) *Memory and Complicity: Migration of Holocaust Remembrance* (New York: Fordham University Press).

Silverman, M. (2013) *Palimpsestic Memory: The Holocaust and Colonialism in French and Francophone Fiction and Film* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books).

Sterne, J. (2003) *The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction* (Duke and London: Duke University Press).

Traverso, E. (2015) *Le passé: modes d'emploi. Histoire, mémoire, politique* (Paris: La fabrique editions).

Winter, J. (2014) *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Young, J. E. (2004) 'Foreword' in M. Augé *Oblivion*, translated by Marjorlijn de Jager (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press).

CHAPTER 5

Amnesia and the Archive

On 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist, assassinated Archduke of Austria heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Franz Ferdinand. The incident let to Austria's declaration of war on Serbia and propelled the mobilization of allied troops on both fronts, thus marking the beginning of World War I. The montage of original footage of the time, including war combat, of the Spartacist Revolt in Berlin in January 1919 and the Russian Revolution (1917–1918) is reworked in Chris Marker's multiscreen installation *When the Century Took Shape* (*War and Revolution*) [*Quand le siècle a pris forme* (*guerre et révolution*)], created for the exhibition *Paris-Berlin* at the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris in 1978. Though Marker maintains the cinematic language of the archival footage (i.e. silent film, newsreel, and *kino-eye*), he partially alters it by tinting the sequences with a video synthesizer (Darke and Rashid 2014, p. 97). This creates shifting colour fields according to the subject matter of the footage (i.e. red for Russia, brown for Germany and blue for France). The figures in these colour fields become dark outlines that move in them as if they were disembodied phantoms. Figuratively, the manipulation of the original footage brings to bear the impact of technology on World War I combat on the archival trace that supposedly documented it (Lupton 2005, pp. 148–50). An overt homage to modernist avant-garde filmmaking, Marker's work recognizes in the moving image the defining archival trace of the modern era: whilst warfare technologies and the failed ideals

C. Albano, *Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36588-0_5

of revolution irrevocably mar the twentieth century, film is the technology of remembrance that marks the century by shaping its 'image of the past.'

Film cannot, in fact, be considered outside history: from its beginnings, it has been part 'of history in becoming its visible trace, archive, and spectacle' (Comolli 1997, p. 13),[1] since from its beginning film 'has been mingling itself in and about everything. There isn't anything that has not been filmed, is not filmable or in the process of being filmed' (Comolli 1997, pp. 13–14). As one of the defining technologies of recording and documenting ordinary as well as official occurrences of the century, film has served as the defining 'prosthetic memory' (i.e. the vehicle for the mass mediated experience of events) of modernity and late modernity (Landsberg 2004, p. 19). Consequently, it has also qualified the archive with its defining features of visibility, movement, repetition and duration. The formal optic procedures that have historically denoted the cultural assimilation of the moving image to memory processes have also contributed to define a trace that, as the modernist avant-garde was well aware, was eminently *archival* and *archivable*. By inscribing the archive with a new kind of mediality, the moving image has also opened it up to novel modes of documenting, epitomizing the modernist 'contradictory desire of archiving presence' (Doane 2002, p. 82). The moving image, in other words, has provided the archive with a trace that oscillates between the fragment and its contextual construction, between contingency and its narrative possibilities. Because of the impermanence of nitrate film,[2] endless possibilities of duplication of *the original* and its figurative malleability, the moving image has also marked the virtual, unstable nature of the archive and its trace: 'what film archives […] is first and foremost a "lost" experience of time as presence, as immersion' (Doane 2002, pp. 221–222). In this sense, the moving image has ideally underscored the modernist resistance towards the totalizing principle of the archive as a prelude to the late-twentieth-century critique that has increasingly construed the latter in terms of internal gaps, absence and amnesia (Spieker 2008, p. 144; see also Merewether 2006; Steedman 2001).

Situated at the interface of technologies of inscription and the psychology of memory, the archive is, according to Jacques Derrida, a site of consignment ruled by practices of sedimentation, storage and re-surfacing (Derrida 1998, p. 85). Derrida's influential theorization of the archive aligns it to Freud's structures of the unconscious by pointing to the mobilization of a trace—whether material or psychic—which continuously refers to another one. Repression, according to Derrida, 'is a form of

archivization', as one archives while repressing (Derrida 1998, p. 64). For memory and the archive, then, repression and the related compulsion of repetition are inseparable from 'a priori forgetfulness…', which Derrida assimilates to Freud's death drive (Derrida 1998, pp. 11–12). Hence, the archive—not unlike the unconscious—is governed by loss, by something that has been forgotten but whose amnesia is however haunting. The principle of the archive—like that of memory in Freud's economy of the unconscious—is then one of 'reinvestment under disguise' whereby what emerges conceals another hidden trace (Derrida 1998, pp. 11–12). As a result, the archival trace is never exhaustive since it is constantly inflected on amnesia, interference and latency through the phantom of what repressed. 'What [is] most interesting in repression'—mantains Derrida—'is what one does not manage to repress' (Derrida 1998, p. 61), what resurfaces despite having been forgotten. At the same time, the archive also refutes memory, '[b]ecause the archive, [...] will never be either memory or anamnesis as spontaneous, alive and internal experience. On the contrary: the archive takes place at the place of originary and structural breakdown of the said memory' (Derrida 1998, p. 11). This rupture figuratively sanctions the discrepancy between memory and its prosthetic manifestations, between individual and cultural, social and institutional consignments of the record. The archive acts as the '*external place*' of consignation 'which assures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of reimpression' (Derrida 1998, p. 11). The structural fracture between memory and the archive is, in fact, instrumental for *rememoration,* since the emergence of what is liminal to both the archive and memory can unpredictably bridge the past to the future, opening up a potential *re-presentation* of what is repressed (Derrida 1998, p. 67): indeed, without the spectral element intrinsic to the archive—and the possibilities that it implies—'there would be neither history, nor tradition nor culture' (Derrida 1998, p. 61).

Critical to our discussion is a consideration of the archival trace afforded by the moving image and of its potential rememoration. Our concern is with the ephemeral and evanescent qualities of atmosphere, transience, affect and emotion as evinced by the moving image's optic procedures. These are the conditions that can be called upon for the mobilization of the spectral quality within the archive itself. As Derrida states,

> the technical structure of the *archiving* archive also determines the structure of the *archivable* content even in its very coming into existence and its

> relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much as it records the event. This is also our political experience of the so-called new media. (Derrida 1998, p. 17)

At stake is what accounts for the event as a 'mediatized event' and the ways in which archival film footage impinges on the dialectics of memory and history. If 'the archivization produces the event as much as it records it', what are the *documentary* features that the filmic archival trace elicits to us? What are the connotations of 'mediatized events', whose memories remain unremembered? What kind of rememoration does the moving image archival trace afford? These questions are ever more topical given the contemporary expansiveness of prosthetic technologies of recording and archiving across digital media. The 'new media memory' brought about by the digital 'connective' turn, argued by Andrew Hoskins (2011), for an interrogation of the 'memori(es)' and narratives (or hyper-narratives) that it mobilizes, and such questioning has a critical precedent in the moving image and its implications with memory.

Throughout we shall address the moving image as an archival trace and interrogate its implications for the contemporary politics of memory *vis à vis* the production of history. The chapter focuses on works based on archival film footage by a number of artists and filmmakers, namely Lutz Becker, Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi, Harun Farocki, and Eyal Sivan. All the works contend with and contest ingrained histories and established narratives of our recent past. The focus is on twentieth-century early histories of fascism and colonialism, the world wars and the Holocaust, and their enduring consequences in the present. Film-mediated traces of these events still impinge on contemporary constructions of cultural and transcultural memories by mobilizing the spectral forms of the archive and the latent contents that such forms carry. The archival footage used in the works examined comprises films by both professional filmmakers and amateurs, including official documentation and private recording or home movies, known footage as well as unused or discarded material. By variously perusing, manipulating, and montaging these records, the artists considered reflect on the archival significance of the moving image as a trace that emerges at the interstices of remembering and oblivion, of memory and history. The results are 'new' films made out of the scattered images of the past: these are neither historical reportage nor docufiction; rather an enquiry into the emotional residues of memories and the affect of histories through the specificity of archival film footage.

5.1 Archival Memories and the Affect of History

By standing as both a repository and source of documented evidence, the archive acts as 'a supplement or prosthetic device for experience and memory', and its reverse 'the most direct form of contact with reality or at least its traces and material residue' (La Capra 2004, pp. 23–24; see also La Capra 2001). The moving image betrays the archive's duality through a trace that embodies the dialectic between the specificity of a recorded moment and the reviving of such a moment through screening. The material trace of experience is also the virtual film of remembrance, the repetition and reproduction of the event: as Walter Benjamin puts it, '[h]istory breaks down into images, not stories' (Benjamin 1999, p. 67). Not unlike memories, the fractured constellation of events that is experience condenses images of the past that, according to Benjamin, retain the affective and emotional qualities of lived experience thus ensuring their mnemonic, if not historiographical, circulation and uses in the present. In this sense, cultural memory affords a *remediation* (Hoskins 2009, p. 95) of the images of the past, whereby its fragmented traces can dynamically converge and recombine in new configurations in the present which, as in the case of mental processes, are contingent on it. Whether in the form of a letter, an official document or a filmed sequence, these traces are always mediated products that rely on 'medial frameworks' denoted by existing forms and patterns of representation and aesthetic expectations (Erll and Rigney 2009, pp. 2–3). Remediation can be used 'to describe the diachronic and inter-medial dynamics that underlie the very production of cultural memory' (Erll 2011a, p. 141). Digital technologies, social networks and the Internet have propelled remediation through the diffusion and pervasiveness of a continuum of recycling and multiplication of mediatized traces (Erll 2011a, p. 140), thus infiltrating the contemporary production of cultural memories. However, remediation predates the 'digital turn' since it also implies the 'mediateness' (Erll and Rigney 2009, pp. 4–5) that characterizes the production and circulation of cultural memories. In this sense, remediation denotes the self-reflexivity of a medium on its own procedures and processes. Since, following Derrida, archiving shapes the event through a mediatized archival trace, we shall ask what are the consequences of a remediation of the filmic archival trace? Can such remediation solicit rememoration? In other words, can the remediation of archival film footage activate the amnesiac trace of events and memories that have been repressed through archiving and silenced in remembrance

and history? And what are the implications of such rememoration within cultural and transcultural networks of remembering?

On the Internet one can watch a small selection of home movies that Eva Braun, Adolf Hitler's long-term mistress, originally shot in 16 mm at Hitler's Obersalzberg chalet in the Bavarian Alps between 1936 and 1942. The films, now digitized, are in colour and show mundane moments in the private life of Hitler and his entourage. Mostly filmed outdoors, on the chalet's terrace and its vicinities, the footage includes Hitler drinking coffee, patting his dogs and jokingly playing with the children of his collaborators. Eva Braun performs to the camera her skills as a skater, gymnast and swimmer, and exchanges pleasantries with Hitler's private secretaries about Clark Gable's sex appeal. The footage testifies to the emergence and consolidation of mediatized personal memories that impinge on official documentation of Hitler's regime. The footage and its archivization also testify to the transition from repression to the re-emergence from the archive of forgotten features of the past into cultural memory and historical reconstruction. Braun's home movies were not known until they were found by artist and filmmaker Lutz Becker in the 1970s. His painstaking search of the material is well attested (McCrum and Downing 2013; see also Downing 2012; Grunfeld 1974). Inspired to look for the films by a photograph showing Eva Braun with her Siemens cine camera and hearsay of the existence of such films, Becker could not locate them until, almost by chance, he came across the film cans among uncatalogued 16-mm footage kept in a deposit of the US National Archive outside Washington DC. The footage was included in a long-feature documentary that Becker co-directed with Philippe Mora, *Swastika* (1973), which documents Hitler's regime from 1933 to 1941 through archival film, including uncut rushes of Nazi's ceremonies, military training and the party's rallies. The film was edited at the same time (in adjacent editing rooms; personal communication, 30, March 2015) as Becker's companion documentary *The Double Headed Eagle*: *Hitler's Rise to Power 1918–1933* (1973). At the time of their release, the films provoked heated controversy. Shown at the 1973 Cannes Film Festival, *Swastika* shocked audiences for the inclusion of Braun's home movies and was banned in former West Germany.[3] Extracts of Braun's films were further included in the British series *The World at War* (1973) alongside commentaries and interviews, and the footage has since gained currency and is ordinarily featured in historical documentaries of the period. Yet, Eva Braun's home movies, as Becker hinting at Hannah Arendt's famous utterance (Arendt

1963, p. 231) observes, 'are banal in action and banal in color' (Becker quoted in McCrum and Downing 2013). Such *banality* contends with the historical understanding of Nazi Germany and fascism. It also suggests the significance of the films' archival trace to such understanding. Indeed, although Braun's home movies—now decontextualized, or rather contextualized within and by the diffusion and proliferation of the Internet—no longer shock, their banality remains thorny.

The Double Headed Eagle and *Swastika* were and still are provocative since they expose what historian Geoff Eley refers to as 'the character of Nazi ideology, the forms of its presence in everyday life and the processes that enabled Germans to turn themselves into Nazis' (Eley 2013, p. vi). Becker and Mora's documentaries do so not through historical analysis but rather through the *formal* remediation of filmic archival traces. Both films use archival footage with original soundtrack and no external commentary or voice-over in ways more akin to artistic practice than to the background use of archival film footage as an illustration of events characteristic of conventional documentary and news. The disturbance that Eva Braun's home movies brought to the 1970s reading of Hitler's regime has in fact to be considered in terms of the remediation of the archival footage that, in Benjamin's terms, operates as a *montage* of images of the past whose condensation is laden with affective and emotional cues.

The Double Headed Eagle offers the viewer a cross-section of the contradictions that characterized the Weimar Republic during the inter-war period that helped fuel the upsurge of the Socialist Nationalist Party. The film is organized in thematic chapters, which do not follow a strict chronological order and shift from images of destruction at the end of World War I to the effervescence and liberalism of 1920s Berlin; from the financial crisis in 1929 and the subsequent unemployment of the 1930s to Germany's economic and institutional collapse, which was accompanied by escalating and destabilizing violence. Stylistically, the film is a montage of newsreel, propaganda and other factual archival documentary footage alongside film clips of the same period. To convey the atmosphere of the epoch, Becker has drawn from his own experience of growing up in post-war Berlin and wandering the ruined city still filled with debris and the oppressive feeling of the recent past, of watching avant-garde and popular films of the inter-war period and listening to the recollections of an earlier generation who had lived through the 1920s and 1930s (personal communication, 30 March 2015). Such memories inspired the artist's search

for the affective undercurrent of historical archival footage in order to open it to new forms of remembering.

The Double Headed Eagle begins with Hitler's first speech to the nation after his nomination as Chancellor in 1933. The camera spans from Hitler to the assembled thousands crowding the Berlin Sportpalast and the heavy presence of military squadrons, an indication respectively of the popular appeal and violence that characterized Hitler's rise to power. The footage captures the effect of Hitler's words on the crowd, displaying the deleterious influence of the Nazi propaganda machine. The sequence then cuts to colour images of the Storm troopers' victory parade lighted by thousands of torches. The next sequence shows footage of the bombardments during World War I. In its collage-like structure *The Double Headed Eagle* evinces its debt to Russian avant-garde cinema whereby visual, thematic and emotional motifs are built through a palimpsest of associative links. One of the first images of the future dictator shows Hitler's face in the crowd cheering the end of World War I (Fig. 5.1) and thematically ties his 1933 speech

Fig. 5.1 Lutz Becker, *The Double Headed Eagle*, 1973, black and white and color 16 mm film, courtesy of C. Sandy Lieberson © C. Sandy Lieberson

to the social, economic and political contexts that foreground his rise to power. By drawing attention to individuals, Becker consistently embodies the Nazification of Germany in the perpetrators, victims and bystanders of the events that the film discloses and thus confers on it a physiognomy of expressions, voices and gestures.

From a national parade in Nuremberg in 1923 to Hitler's rallies at the National Socialist assemblies in 1927 and 1929 and his arrival in Berlin in 1932, *The Double Headed Eagle* charts Hitler's rise in popularity. In this period the social-nationalist propaganda rages against a climate of the ever-growing unemployment and financial difficulties, and garners anti-communist feelings. The film evokes Germany's patriotism in response to the legacy of World War I and the discrepancies between rural and urban modes of life. The modernism and liberalism of Berlin in the 1920s is juxtaposed with the escalation of violence in its streets where the police increasingly backed the assaults of Hitler's squadrons on anti-fascist and labour demonstrations (Fig. 5.2). Details of the lynching of a passer-by

Fig. 5.2 Lutz Becker, *The Double Headed Eagle*, 1973, black and white and color 16 mm film, film still, courtesy of C. Sandy Lieberson © C. Sandy Lieberson

and a policeman checking the papers of a woman at a street corner document the growing hostility to any form of opposition and the construction of the state of surveillance that led to Hitler's election. The film concludes with the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on 30 January 1933 and colour images of red flames at night: the sequence shows the burning of the books in May 1933 and Joseph Göbbels' declaration of 'the end of intellectualism', ominously alluding to the tragic events that followed. The footage evinces what Eley refers to as the 'militarized activism', 'striving for a coercive state' and the 'unrestrained political violence' that characterized the Nazification of Germany (Eley 2013, p. 208). Indeed, by exploiting the editing malleability of the moving image, through repetition of sequences, rapid cuts and juxtaposition of frames, Becker's film renders the affective and emotional atmosphere in which those processes took place and conveys the ways in which Nazi ideology gradually penetrated and swallowed up every aspect of life.

Throughout, Becker intersects Nazi propaganda footage with other contemporary sources, generating a dialectic as well as a poetics of images that can be summarized in a couple of sequences in the chapter dedicated to Berlin in the 1920s. In one of the extracts, Josephine Baker rides in an open car whilst Hitler stares at the façade of one of the city's modern buildings. Images of Baker are then shown in the famous banana dance, cutting rapidly from billboards to the bright light insignia of theatres, revolving doors and fairgrounds, and fashionable pedestrians promenading outside crowed cafes. By harnessing the affective undercurrent of the filmic archival trace, the montage unravels the atmosphere that Hitler encountered in Berlin and figuratively contextualizes the social and cultural milieu in which fascism consolidated as an undetected expression of the modernism that the city epitomizes (Eley 2013, pp. 212–213; Traverso 2003). However, through montage, Becker also implicitly suggests the potential for an uncanny fortuitous encounter between Baker and Hitler—an encounter that never happened but that film montage can imaginatively recreate. In so doing, Becker reminds us of the emotional as well as historical contingency of the footage. Film itself participates in the fabrication of the reality it records. Hence, seamlessly, *The Double Headed Eagle* intersects the factual archival footage with excerpts from films of the 1920s and 1930s, including Walter Ruttmann's *Berlin*: *Symphony of a Great City* [*Berlin*: *Die Sinfonie der Großstadt*] (1927), Joseph von Stenberg's *The Blue Angel* [*Der blaue Enge*] (1930), and Ludwig Berger's *I by Day*, *You by Night* [*Ich bei Tag*, *und du bei Nacht*] (1932). The film clips catalyse an

evocation of the economic and social aspirations and romantic fantasies of the period and remind us of Siegfried Kracauer's assumption that '[w]hat film reflects are not so much explicit credos as psychological dispositions – those deep layers of collective mentality which extend more or less below the dimension of consciousness' (Kracauer 1947/2004, p. 5). Indeed Becker inscribes the 'documentary' footage of Hitler's rise to power within the filmic sensorium of the 1920s and 1930s in order to solicit the emergence of 'the unobstructive, the normally neglected' forms of 'current reality or imaginary universe', which, in Kracauer's view, are imbued with 'clues to hidden mental processes' (Kracauer 1947/2004, p. 5). Hence, in *I by Day, You by Night*, an office girl, played by the renowned actress of the period, Käthe von Nagy, sings as she wakes up and gets ready for work about the monotony of her life and the dream of meeting a rich man and living happily ever after like in the movies she watches on a Sunday at the cinema. In the Hollywood-style musical, *Hello, Dear Luck* [*Guten Tag liebes Glück*] (1939), Lilian Harvey also sings her romantic fantasy, which is visually suffused in the roseate hue of the filmstrip itself. Not unlike film that appropriated audiences' imagination and projected their dreams of happiness onto the cinema screen, fascism also colonized people's imagination 'shaping ordinary needs and inscribing everyday transactions with its rules' (Eley 2013, p. 213). By exploiting the dialectic potential of montage, Becker gives form in his remediation of heterogeneous film extracts to the subliminal 'dream-work' of the Nazi 'colonization of the everyday' and indirectly exposes its insidious pervasiveness. Indeed, as Becker himself observes, Nazism seized commonplace desires under the disguised form of 'the generation of a dream, an illusion' (personal communication, 30 March 2015; see also Elsaesser 2000, pp. 383–415). However, Becker is careful in positioning such fantasy within the crescendo of violence that led up to Hitler's election, and *The Double Headed Eagle* further points to the deceptive reach of Nazi ideology in popular culture. Another clip from the 1933 propaganda film, *Hitler Youth Quex* [*Hitlerjunge Quex*] directed by Hans Steinhoff shows the moment when Werner, a boy impressed with the Hitler Youth in his street, sings their song, '*Unsre Fahne flattert uns voran*' [*Our flag flies ahead of us*]. Overheard by his father—a fervent communist—he is forced by him to hum *The International* while the boy's mother cries in a corner. The scene takes the fighting in the street inside the home and turns it into an overt anti-communist message, which presents the boy as the victim of a strong-minded father. Within the context of Becker's montage, the propaganda message of the clip is indicative of

the physical and psychological coercion by which German audiences were manipulated. It is within the context of such colonization of the everyday, of its needs and aspirations, of its sensorium and fantasies, that we have to consider the banality of Eva Braun's home movies, since the latter are imbued with and display the same 'psychological disposition and collective mentality' that fascism appropriated. And it is within the remediated context of images and references constituted by the montage of diverse archival footage proposed by Becker, that Braun's films reveal the disturbance of their kitsch ordinariness.

Following a structure akin to *The Double Headed Eagle*, *Swastika* is also organized according to thematic chapters, including topics such as militarization, motherhood, racism, sport and the arts, and intersects extracts from Hitler's private films with official footage and newsreel. The mediatized public image of Germany that Nazi propaganda carefully crafted and projected both nationally and internationally, is reflected upon and juxtaposed in *Swastika* with the unofficial images of its leader, generating—as in Becker's companion documentary—a web of thematic and affective associations (Fig. 5.3). At the beginning of the film, the projected fantasy of a united Germany and the future it heralds is visually conveyed in conventional idyllic sequences of the German countryside and of Nazi youth. These sequences are intercepted by Eva Braun's panoramic shots of Obersalzberg. Throughout, the inclusion of Braun's colour home movies resonates with a fantasy whose increasing disturbance ensues through a mixture of *naiveté*, dullness and kitsch, which is in stark contrast to Germany's growing imperialism and anti-Semitism. From such contrast, *Swastika* evinces the commonplace quality of Braun's home movies and, within its folds, the complacency of the regime, its ambivalent perception abroad and the devious normalization of its aggressive policies. Rather than the indexical references of Braun's footage, at stake is the unreeling in technicolour of a 'mentality' of ordinary people and ordinary life. Hence, repeatedly, *Swastika* cuts to Eva Braun practicing sports, thematically linking her performances to well-known footage of the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games and other newsreel footage. In one of Braun's clips, a man off-camera shouts 'bravo' at Braun time and time again as she performs some gymnastic feat. The images show Braun in her swimming tracksuit swinging herself over a tree-branch at the edge of a mountain lake. The exaggeration of the praise resonates with the crowd's cheering Hitler in typical official propaganda, but also with the troubling praise of his government by the US reporter Dirk Brinkley. In a short newsreel

Fig. 5.3 Lutz Becker and Philip Mora, *Swastika*, 1973, black and white and color 16 mm film, film still, courtesy of C. Sandy Lieberson

clip Brinkley claims his appreciation for Nazi Germany and his desire to report 'the true facts […] to the American people of what is going on in Germany' (Becker and Mora 1973, original film dialogue). Brinkley aims to disclaim the information circulating in the USA that has led, he claims, to demonstrations. Images of these demonstrations in New York and a short sequence of a rally of the US Nazi party are juxtaposed with footage of anti-Semitic violence in Germany. In a clip from the propaganda film *Der Ewige Jude* [*The Eternal Jew*], the camera pans across the faces of several men seen against a neutral background. The commentary explains this is 'a whole group of Polish Jews, wearers of the caftan' (Becker and Mora 1973, original film commentary). The camera then continues panning over the men's faces, but the commentator warns the viewer that these same men appear in 'European clothes ready to infiltrate Western civilization' (Becker and Mora 1973, original film commentary). The visual strategies evinced by this short extract are derived from those used in anthropometric photography and ethnographic film and are meant to



Fig. 5.4 Lutz Becker and Philip Mora, *Swastika*, 1973, black and white and color 16 mm film, film still, courtesy of C. Sandy Lieberson © C. Sandy Lieberson

designate anti-Semitic propaganda with 'scientific' accuracy. Similar strategies are also evident in another film clip, which shows the recruitment of German soldiers parading their muscular bodies in front of the recruitment officials and the camera (Fig. 5.4). In these sequences, the body acts as the visual trope through which racism, militarization and spectacle can be equally inflected, so that the apparently innocuous images of Eva Braun's athletic prowess acquires insidious tones. Such tones become further apparent in the final sequences of the documentary, in which emaciated corpses filmed at the camp in Bergen-Belsen are moved with a power shovel into a mass grave. The sequence is juxtaposed with aerial views of the destruction of Berlin by the allied bombardments and two children sitting among the debris of a collapsed building as the end of the war is announced from a loudspeaker.

To question the relevance of the remediation of the archival footage in Becker and Mora's documentaries is to confront the potential of rememoration that such remediation instigates within the dynamics of cul-

tural and transcultural remembering and the production of histories. *The Double Headed Eagle* and *Swastika* are indicative of the interference and emergence of silenced, if not actively repressed aspects of the fascist era. In the 1970s, historiographical analysis tended to focus on the political and socio-cultural development of the phenomenon strongly inscribing it within the economic and political crisis of the inter-war period. The emphasis was on the exceptionality of Nazism. Only in the 1990s did historians turn their attention to the everyday aspects of fascism, focusing on social and cultural features, including the role of fashion, the arts and sport. Hence, when Becker and Mora made their films, little consideration had been given to the relation between the private and public, the individual and the collective, the official rhetoric of the regime—including images and their aesthetic appropriation—and the popular manifestations of Nazi propaganda. The Holocaust, though known in its historical occurrence, had also not yet acquired cultural prominence as a paradigm for collective trauma worldwide. By garnering different kinds of archival film footage, Becker and Mora's documentaries dipped into ignored and forgotten aspects of the inter-war period and the atmosphere in which Hitler rose to power. As Becker observes,

> the kind of choice of archival material plus its treatment in the editing process, [including] the emphasis on close-ups, brings about a system of observation, both close as well as distant at times, which turns the viewer into an eye-witness. Both *Swastika* and *The Double Headed Eagle* are without commentary which amplified our editing method in the direction of an 'anthropological study'. (Personal communication, 3 November 2015)

Through their montage, *The Double Headed Eagle* and *Swastika* mobilized the dialectic of public and private filmic traces of the Nazification of Germany. This resulted in what, following Jacques Rancière, we may call a 'shock of the heterogeneous' (Rancière 2007, p. 60). To connect, according to Rancière, always implies 'to organize a clash and to construct a continuum' at once:

> The space of these clashes and that of the continuum can even bear the same name: History. History can indeed do contradictory things: the discontinuous line of revealing clashes or the continuum of co-presence. The linkage of the heterogeneous elements constructs and, at the same time, reflects a meaning of history that is displaced between these two poles. (Rancière 2007, p. 60)

The continuum and clash brought about by Becker and Mora's associative montage is one that concerns film history and the implications of the moving image in the history of the Nazification of Germany, as the medium for the dissemination of the regime's public propaganda and the recording of private memories. By means of remediation and montage, Becker and Mora reinstate the 'action and colour' of a 'colonized' everyday, the sensorium and 'psychological dispositions' of an epoch. The resonances of the reinsertion of such 'action and colour' upset 1970s audiences since they diverged from and disturbed the paradigms of remembering that surrounded the establishment of cultural narratives of the recent past, bringing back silenced interfering memories. However, the shock effect of Becker and Mora's film is also *banal*.

Recent historiographical assessment of Hitler's rise to power and his regime renders *The Double Headed Eagle*'s and *Swastika*'s demystification less problematic compared to the 1970s, and we can appreciate the use of archival film footage to convey the atmosphere of Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. At the same time, the dialectical tension of the montage engenders a different reflection on history, one that helps to abstract the defining features of Nazism and fascism. This entails a consideration of the fascist movements of the first decades of the twentieth century in relation to the ways in which they epitomized both a form of modernism and imperialism; they provided an ideological justification of violence in terms of governability; they displayed an ideological use of aesthetics and they enacted a colonization of the everyday (Eley 2013, pp. vi). The abstraction of the defining motifs of fascism and Nazism, as Eley argues, provides us with a template that enables us to read the symptoms of our own time and detect the tendencies of the political movements and people in today's political scenarios (Eley 2013, pp. vi and 214–218).[4] Such abstraction does not regard a conceptual framework—as argued by Eley—but rather an affective one. The films mobilize a visibility of history in the present, a rememoration of unremembered aspirations, fantasies, and fears, moods and gestures. Becker and Mora's associative montage garners the memory traces of the historical footage and produces a new way of remembering and hence of perceiving, knowing and feeling by producing an 'image in the now of its recognizability' (Benjamin 1999, p. 463). Rememoration and the kind of knowledge it solicits requires a different reading of the archival footage one that following Benjamin, relies on forgotten details, repressed scenes and latent connections between memory and history. Becker and Mora achieve such

recognizability by mobilizing buried resonances of the archival footage. From this mobilization, they draw an affective template of patterns that is relevant to our time. Perhaps it is not accidental that Eva Braun's home movies share the same digital space as our own home movies. Of greater concern is that 'the banal action and colour' of Braun's films resonate with that of the many videos we post. However, it is only when we consider the banality of Braun's home movies in relation to the visual rhetoric that denotes much of the propaganda footage of the 1920s and 1930s that a different range of political and ethical questions emerge about the mediatized production and diffusion of images in our time (Mitchell 2011, pp. 16–24). The banality of our own home movies seen in relation to the public production of images also carries the affect, emotions and aspirations of contemporary societies, not excluding the features of today's xenophobia, economic and other anxieties, surveillance policies and violence. Hence, the memory trace afforded by the moving image indicates that we can use remembering critically (Traverso 2015, p. 80) through a reflection of connections between past and future and a comprehension of present attitudes.

5.2 'Chemical Amnesia' and Spectral Memories

Spanning a career of over forty years, artists and filmmakers Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi[5] have consistently used archival film footage (from the beginnings of cinema to 1978) to address historical subjects—including World War I, the Armenian Genocide, fascism, colonialism and imperialism. Following a well-established practice of using archival footage from a variety of sources, including material by renown professional filmmakers, anonymous or amateur cameramen, and found or discarded footage, the artists address the twentieth-century emergence of film as a defining technology for recording and documenting experience, from political propaganda to entertainment, from medical and ethnographical films to the flourishing of home movies. Such diverse sources testify to the immanence of the medium in documenting public events as well as ordinary life, as a private or semi-private testimony akin to the epistolary, memoir or personal journal, implicitly suggesting the inherent archivable character of the moving image and its intersecting of both memory and history. The artists' remediation of the historical film footage is a reflection on the optic procedures of the moving image itself and the potential activation of spectral forms of the past in the present.

Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's approach to archival film footage and the significance of its trace is evident in a series of video based on short amateur films developed between 2002 and 2005 under the title *Electric Fragments*. Collectively, *Electric Fragments* is a heterogeneous palimpsest of 'representations of the other' (Nash 2004, pp. 27–28; Lumley 2011, pp. 119–121) across diverse places and times: from post-war Italy to colonial Vietnam and New Caledonia.[6] Characteristically, the artists extend the duration of the original footage by re-photographing and re-assembling each frame thus slowing down its movement. They also enlarge, tint, invert or replicate some of the frame drawing attention to its internal composition, texture and luminosity and to the most minute details within it, whether a gesture, an expression or the natural features of a landscape. This focus on composition and detail highlights the modes of engagement of the camera lens, and hence the visual and structural patterns through which, in the case of *Electric Fragments*, the anonymous eye behind the camera frames and records its encounter with the other. Also evident is the physical deterioration of the filmstrip itself, which implicitly infers the inherent *amnesia* proper to both the archival and memory trace and its criticality to the artists' interrogation of the archive.

Fragment 2 – Vietnam (2001), focuses on the 'personal memories of colonial Vietnam filmed by a French official at the end of the 1940s' (Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi 2001, inter-title). The visual memories of the French official include a young boy running on a country road, people walking in the street, a soldier diving and swimming with friends, a line of young girls dancing in a nightclub. For the contemporary viewer these images have lost their immediate contextual referents. What we are left with are the formal patters on which the frames are constructed: tonalities of light and shadow, points of views and visual motifs within the frames, inscription of movement and stillness across contingent shots, and temporal and spatial shifts in-between sequences. The footage also evinces the mundane forms that colonialism took on the antithetical fascination with and uneasiness toward the exotic. Hence, whilst the semantic and episodic qualities of these filmic memories are difficult to reconstruct, one can nonetheless perceive their affective potency and untangle some of the ambiguities that informed the ways in which the eye behind the camera related to the subject matter. For instance, one can notice the luminosity of the water and the glow of the man's body as he plunges and wonder about the sensuality of the scene, what it meant for the gaze behind the camera, why it was filmed. In another sequence, one is aware of the translucent

quality of the tulle of the dresses that girls dancing in a bar wear as well as the contrived emphasis of their hand gestures during the performance of the routine dance. It is difficult not to notice the exploitative undercurrent of the images and the reality that film unwittingly documents. At the same time, the artificiality of the movement of the young dancers is juxtaposed and associatively linked to the flowing motion of the long dark hair of young women walking in a square and the ways in which the darkness of the hair stands out against the whiteness of their robes. The women seem identical and identical are the gleaming metallic hairbands pinned at the back of their heads. These details share the affect characteristic of the memory patterns activated in remembering and one can infer the desire of the eye behind the camera, the hybridity of a gaze that construes and is in turn shaped by the subject it films. The memories that the footage return to us are thus not biographical episodes, but rather patterns of configuration and it is by exposing such patterns that Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi engage with the mnemonic relevance this archival footage still has today. Indeed, the artists minutely scrutinize each frame in the process of reassembling and montaging the archival films to expose their syntagmatic construction in order to mobilize the rememoration of forgotten forms of the past. The artists do so by deconstructing and recomposing the filmic archival trace. As a result, the slowed down frames fragment into details: as Kracauer comments about photography '[i]f one can no longer encounter the grandmother in the photograph, the image taken from the family album disintegrates into its particulars' (Kracauer 1995, p. 55). These particulars make visible the forgotten forms of the past and the footage reveals its own internal memories of formal patterns within each single shot and across frames through the web of transversal associations that the artists' remediation unreels. These are the *memories* that Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's films ask us to re-remember. We may argue that what the artists assiduously search for is the field of disappearance and amnesia that presses at the margins of the frame. In the chemical degradation of the filmstrip the artists reveal the spectral forms that insinuate in the fissures and gaps of the archive, in what has been dismissed and forgotten. Indeed, in looking at the artists' films—whether as multiscreen installation or as art-film/documentary (Lissoni 2012; Lumley 2011; MacDonald 1998)—one is faced with questions not dissimilar to those that Avery Gordon asks about the ghostliness of the ordinary: 'how do we reckon with what modern history has rendered ghostly? [How do we] describe and analyse the affective, his-

torical and mnemonic structures of such hauntings?' (Gordon 1997/2008, p. 18).

By haunting Gordon understands 'a structure of feeling' (Gordon 1997/2008, p. 18) that mediates institutional histories and practices with the multifaceted experience of individuals. Haunting confronts us with the unrememberable, the emotional and affective residue of what is silenced, erased or repressed from history and memory alike. Indeed, according to Gordon, the ghost is 'the principal form by which something lost or invisible or seemingly not there makes itself known or apparent to us' (Gordon 1997/2008, p. 63). Notionally related to Freud's uncanny and Benjamin's 'historical materialism' and its montage-based constructivism (Gordon 1997/2008, pp. 50 and 64–65), haunting responds to Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's assertion that their work is concerned with the present rather than the past (Lumley 2011, p. 141). In other words, we may argue that the artists are concerned with the spectral forms of the past in the present as they are afforded by the moving image. It is such concern that enables Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi to instigate forms of rememoration intrinsic in the moving image's optic procedures, the historical reciprocity between montage's syntagmatic construction and the modalities of remembering, and film's early history. This is evident, for instance, in the numerous cinematic quotes and overt allusion to early film tropes.[7] However, more significantly for our discussion, Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's manipulation of the archival film footage engages with film's optic procedures that, as discussed in the first chapter, foreground the modern reciprocity of mind and screen. Within a modernist perspective these procedures also imply the capacity of the moving image to evoke reality beyond its indexical record by mobilizing a multiplicity of subliminal meanings. Hence, by slowing down the duration of the original footage, lingering on close-ups, in particular of faces and gestures, repeating sequences and frames (occasionally also inverting them), Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi engage with the structures that are conducive to the spectral forms proper to the moving image and the time when the material they use was filmed.

In a trilogy dedicated to World War I, namely in *On the Heights All is Peace* [*Su tutte le vette è pace*] (1998), which deals with combat on both sides of Mount Adamello in the Retic Alps between 1915 and 1918, and in *Oh Man*! [*Oh Uomo*!] (2004), which focuses on the trauma caused by World War I across Europe, Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi seek 'the individual, the soldier, the man moved' through 'the distinctive features of

expression, the significant measures of the physiognomy of the individual's behavior as they were captured by the perishable nitrate film' (Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi 1998, film inter-title). In order to draw attention to the individual and make him recognizable, the artists isolate, enlarge and iterate single frames of faces, almost freezing the singularity of their countenance. In so doing, they also isolate an expression from a common canvas of experiences, which are the same for all soldiers, on both fronts, and entail combat, long marches, fatigue and camaraderie. Indeed, by slowing down and re-photographing the original footage frame by frame, Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi actualize Benjamin's assumption that the camera makes 'visible entirely new structures of the subject' since 'a different nature opens itself to the camera than to the naked eye – if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted by one penetrated by man. The camera introduces us to unconscious optics' (Benjamin 1936/1999, pp. 229–230). To claim the mobilization of Benjamin's notion of optical unconscious seems pertinent because Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's remediation of the archival filmic footage 'reveals'—as Benjamin claims of photography in its use of slow motion and close-up—'physiognomic aspects, image worlds, which dwell in the smallest things – meaningful yet covert enough to find a hiding place in waking dreams, but which, enlarged and capable of formulation, make the difference between technology and magic visible as a thoroughly historical variable' (Benjamin 1931/2005, p. 512). The waking dreams are the screen images of the past—those of film and memory. Hence, by focusing their camera on the frayed shadows of the filmstrip and the micro-physiognomy of expression, the artists lift those individual faces from anonymity (even though they remain nameless) conveying their ghostly presence in slow motion. By fixing countenance in the repetition and duration characteristic of the moving image, Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi fleetingly recapture unremembered and yet meaningful aspects of the past. What emerges is the physiognomy of a generation as it manifests in the singularity of a gaze, grimace or smile. What is distilled from the perishable trace of the archival film footage is the normality of war, the everyday appearance of soldiers at the front: not history but the becoming of history, the inscription of contingency on the filmstrip not as fact or event but as affect and presence.

Oh Man! focuses on the potential significance of the close-up. The film deals with footage documenting the conditions of orphanages, refugee camps and war hospitals at the end of the war. It includes rare film footage accessed in archives in Russia showing harrowing images of children

rummaging for food among the debris of devastated towns, in orphanages and camps queuing for soup and bread (personal communication, 16 December 2015). These images are intercepted by sequences showing the making of prosthetic limbs or nurses caring for veterans and medical footage of eye and face surgery and limb amputation. The film sequences document physical and mental trauma. The filmic material, as discussed in the first chapter about the early twentieth use of film in the study of hysteria and trauma fulfilled museological, didactic and experimental procedures. Whilst museological and didactic procedures can be ascribed to most of the archival material included in Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's film, the experimental procedure is characteristic of the medical use of film. The camera focuses on the anatomical details of the lesion, recording the surgical proceeding and showing the before and after treatment. Not unlike the footage documenting the treatment of war trauma, the films are meant to be slowed-down, stopped and repeated, frame-frozen, enlarged and minutely scrutinized. The experimental procedure in the medical use of film meant that the moving image had the function to designate and signify. Through their alteration of original archival footage Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi emphasize such function and shift the subject of designation from the medical practice to the individual soldiers and their pain. Intentionally, they removed visual references to the doctors who practiced the medical procedure and any recognizable signs of the military ranks of the soldiers (personal communication, 16 December 2015). It is indeed by exposing and subverting such referents of signification that Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi engage, as Christa Blümliger argues about their work, with new forms of legibility (Blümliger 2012, p. 32). Such legibility brings to the fore not only the iconographic, ethnographic or even demagogic references of the frames but also the archaeology of the apparatus of inscription that, extending Blümliger's reading of the artists' use of Marey's chronophotographic study of movement in *The March of Man* [La *Marcia dell'uomo*] (2001),[8] was directed towards 'the analysis of a *cliché*' (Blümliger 2012, p. 32). Hence, what unfolds from Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's appropriation and representation of the archival film trace is a 'cartography of gestures and filmic movements' that opens it up 'to an analysis of the unconscious contents and modalities of production of messages and desires' (Blümliger 2012, p. 32).

Indeed, the cartography that the artists' extensive oeuvre charts concerns the *clichés* and spectral forms latent in the cinematic archival trace. Gestures and filmic movements concur one with the other to shape

Fig. 5.5 Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi, *From the Pole to the Equator*, 1986, color 16 mm film with soundtrack by Keith Ulrich and Charles Anderson, film still film still, courtesy of the artists © Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi

frames and sequences instigating the boundaries of what is visible and what remains out of the frame, what is memorable and what is liminal to remembering. As suggested for *Electric Fragments* and the War Trilogy, it is through the ordinariness of expression and movement that the artists give body to the encounter with the other and confer a physiognomy to war and trauma. Walking, carrying objects, weaving, combing hair, launching spears or hunting are all embodied cultural practices, in themselves manifestations of bodily memories. The footage inflects the affect and emotion of such memories within and beyond the thematic content of the film images themselves. Bodily posture, movement and expression also belong to 'the systems of enunciation' (Foucault 1972, p. 128) that inform memory across time and place, historically and transculturally. In these systems, the archaeology of the apparatus and the cultural archive of visibility (pictorial, fictional, scientific and the like) are internal components of the frames whose patterns the artists analyse and *reconfigure* to the possibili-

ties of rememoration. *From the Pole to the Equator* [*Dal Polo all' Equatore*] (1986) is indicative of such a process. Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi have reassembled archival material that belonged to the Italian pioneer filmmaker Luca Comerio that testifies to the early-twentieth-century fascination with the exotic, travel and distant places. The archival material involves Italy's and more generally Europe's colonial history and its implications through the specificity of the moving image.

Documentary and its related genre such as ethnographic film and travelogue were part of the early currency of the medium. Predicated on the intermeshing of colonialist expansion, imperialist propaganda and their ramifications as scientific exploration, economic exploitation and the civilizing enterprise of missionaries, civil servants and educators, these genres testify, on the one hand, to modern audiences' fascination with and anxiety towards distant people and cultures (Griffiths 2002, pp. 216–219). Their entertainment value and spectacle was akin to, and even became, a substitute for the reconstructions of native villages typical of World's Fairs at the turn of the twentieth century where indigenous people were displayed performing traditional crafts techniques or dances (Griffiths 2002, p. 69). On the other hand, the documentary was part of polysemic systems of visualization and representation of 'the other', 'the exotic' and 'the wildness' (which included fiction, journalism, ethnographic account, painting, anthropological diorama, photography and scientific film) and of the social, cultural and political constructs of people and places that such genres endorsed (Griffiths 2002, pp. 233–234).

Such ramification of references is evident in *From the Pole to the Equator*, for instance, in the case of the often discussed sequences, respectively at the beginning and toward the end of the film, of the killing of a polar bear and a safari, in which the artists have inverted a frame showing a man with a rifle ready to shoot, thus aiming toward the viewer. The sequences share visual and narrative tropes with the adventure novel, painting, travel memoir and the like, and testify to the exploitation and aggression of colonialism through their overt violence (Skoller 2005, pp. 16–24) (Fig. 5.5). It is, however, a particular scene—that the artists split and insert as two separate sequences—referring to the role of religion and missionaries in the colonial enterprise that denotes the mobilization of the spectral in Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's remediation of the archival film footage. The scene shows a group of young children wearing white camisoles arranged in neat ascending rows along wooden benches, and it is shot in one long take with a fixed-lens camera, with the children positioned

at the centre of the frame. In watching, one is aware of the staged composition of the scene and the imposed composure and stillness of the children. Moreover, the whiteness of the clothes stands out against the darkness of the skin accentuating the light contrasts for the camera. At a nun's instruction, the children perform the sign of the cross. The second sequence (presumably part of the same take) shows the children singing with raised hands at the rhythmic clapping of the nun. They then repeat the sign of the cross and on the instruction of the nun leave in pairs holding hands (Figs. 5.6 and 5.7). We see the first row of children moving out of the frame while the nun holds a chair to impede the exit of the second one, and then the third one. Within the palimpsest structure of *From the Pole to the Equator*, the scene refers back to two previous ones—possibly also originally part of one sequence—which show first the same nun and a priest taking a baby from a hut, and the baby's subsequent baptism, in which the nun holds the baby in her arms whilst the priest perform the ritual. The parents stand by as witnesses of the scene; the aesthetics is reminiscent of the iconography of the baptism of Jesus here reconfigured within a colonial setting.

Religion and religious rituals are a recurring motif in Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's work as a collective and culturally ingrained expression and governance of feelings. In *From Pole to the Equator*, the two scenes, respectively of the baptism and the children's performance, allude to Christianity as one of the *dispositives* (Agamben 2009, p. 14) that underscored European colonialism. Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's remediation of the original sequences inserts the gestures of the religious rituals (be it the sign of the cross or other) with other gestures equally learned and clichéd within cultural practices, and ask the viewer to consider their epistemological as well as performative significance. As viewers, we are presented with a canvas of ordinary or ritualistic gestures, which had been learnt and memorized. Most importantly, the gestures were part of the daily enactment of colonial encounters and were inscribed within the social, cultural and political fabric of such encounters and their representations for early-twentieth-century audiences. These gestures display the forgotten micro-sign of violence and cultural dominance of colonialism. Once more, the emphasis is on the inscription of the quotidian into history, on the politics of memory and on the enactments of colonization and the patterns that its presence and affect took. To be brought to our attention is the forgotten site of transcultural memories—memories that are *global* and presuppose a *globalized* image of the past but whose

Fig. 5.6 Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi, *From the Pole to the Equator*, 1986, color 16 mm film with soundtrack by Keith Ulrich and Charles Anderson, film still, courtesy of the artists © Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi

details have been silenced. Of these mediatized memories, not unlike the gaze behind camera, the viewer is at the same time spectator, bystander and accomplice.

Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's remediation of the archival film footage, however, further complicates the relation to forgotten forms of the past and the role of the viewer in relation to them. The artists invite her to replicate their own attentive scrutiny of each frame. Indeed, as Benjamin argues of photography, they ask the viewer to search the picture

> for the tiny spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of the long-forgotten moment the future nests so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it. (Benjamin 1931/2005, p. 510)

By conjuring up the spectral forms of the past Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi ask us to consider their reverberations in the present. They pose the question of what are the forms, contradictions and ambiguities of our transcultural

Fig. 5.7 Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi, *From the Pole to the Equator*, 1986, color 16 mm film with soundtrack by Keith Ulrich and Charles Anderson film still, courtesy of the artists © Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi

encounters. In this sense, Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's remediation of the filmic archival trace is an active memory work with the 'chemical amnesia' of the filmstrip and the unremembered memories that mar both remembrance and histories. By charting gestures and filmic movement alike, the artists mobilize both the material and spectral traces of the archival film footage and the procedural and affective significations of the archival images. Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi activate the resonances of the archive with an image of the past that is assertive for and is of the present. The memories the artists evoke through the perishable trace that the artists revisit come from the store-house of twentieth-century encounters, conflicts, hopes, fears, dreams and desires as they emerge from the unclaimed stories of people and the history of a medium. Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi present us with brittle images that are both moving and in movement across places and times. Through them they unravel the structures of perception and representation of the past that can make claims to the present by evoking the complex affective and emotional patterns that shaped early-twentieth-century constructions of the

other and ourselves from both afar and within. This is the amnesiac trace that denotes the emergence of new modes of *transcultural* remembering and representations of a still unimagined global past.[9]

5.3 Montage of Unremembered Memories: Harun Farocki and Eyal Sivan

In Harun Farocki's *Images of the World and the Inscription of War* [*Bilder der Welt und Handschrift des Krieges*] (1988), the artist and filmmaker includes the first two aerial photographs of the concentration camps of Auschwitz-Birkenau that allied forces took accidentally in April 1944 while photographing a nearby industrial target. The analysts who studied the recognition pictures did not see the camps: they 'had no orders to look for the camps, and therefore did not find them' (Farocki 1998, voiceover), thirty-three years later the CIA identified them. Farocki inserts these now famous photographs in discursive relation with images from a broad range of other sources, including industrial footage, and dialogically decodes the traces 'of the event inscribed in the picture, simultaneously taking the measure of what is not immediately represented' (Lindeperg 2009, p. 32). It is not the photographs but rather the testimony of survivors, the footage of the liberation of the camps and the overall coming to be of the cultural memory of the Holocaust that drew attention to what had been photographed over thirty years earlier (Ernst and Farocki 2004, pp. 269–270, Rascaroli 2009, pp. 53–54). More generally, Farocki points to the tension between what an image reveals and what is seen in it, the ways in which an archival trace can generate visibility as a result of the historical and ideological contingencies with which it is read. Whilst Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi excavate the spectral within the archive in order to represent its forms in the present, Farocki's investigation is concerned with the reconfiguration of the images of the past in the present and with the dynamics of rememoration that ensues from oblivion and repetition, repression and re-emergence. How does the unremembered enter remembering and become re-remembering? How do the unremembered traces of the past activate associative chains of recollection that move across the conscious and unconscious pathways of collective and cultural practices of memory? What in the process still remains liminal to rememoration? Farocki's interrogation of the ideological and political contextual framework of images expands the archive to include the heterogeneous spectrum of images of contemporaneity, by drawing on the flow of still and moving pictures that

fill television and computer screens and operational and surveillance images whose aesthetics and significance Farocki locates within the broader cultural and historical practices of visual production and diffusion, archiving and discarding.[10] The operational images use computerized patterns of detection and recognition and their obsolescence depends on use. This renders these images contingent on their functionality and on their state as 'screen-images'. By introducing operational and surveillance footage within the archive, Farocki shifts the referents of the event to re-address the implications of archiving within today's mediatized networks.

Operational images, whether industrial or military, are construed around an algorithmic interface and such interfaces already position stored information and image information relationally, predicating the reading of the incoming image on the mediated result of the algorithmic comparison of patterns. Farocki's own interest in the archive in particular in an encompassing visual archive reminiscent of Aby Warburg's *Atlas Mnemosyne*, exploits the potential of algorithmic reading to generate new transversal patterns of associations based on the structural components of images, thus suggesting a transmedia as well as a transcultural archive that continuously undergoes remediation and associative reconfiguration. Drawing on Warburg's associative structure of the emergence and recurrence of formal affinities and affective correspondences across cultures and historical periods, Farocki conceives the twenty-first-century archive in terms of variability based on digital coding whereby images can be searched and related according to their 'data-structure' so that 'the memory of (time-based) images itself becomes dynamic and images get a temporal index' (Ernst and Farocki 2004, p. 265). Such an index endows the image archive with 'a visual memory in its own medium' (Ernst and Farocki 2004, p. 263), which is still steeped in the procedures of montage and in a convergence of the archive image with the memory image. Farocki's enquiry into visual practices is in fact not only a questioning of the archival trace and its inscriptions, but also of the transcultural dynamics of remembering. In works such as *Workers out of a Factory in Eleven Decades* [*Arbeiter verlassen die Fabrik in elf Jahrzenten*] (2006), Farocki unravels the continuity and variations of the basic thematic motif of workers exiting factory gates across the history of cinema, starting from one of the Lumière brothers' first sequences. Shown across eleven screens, the excerpts tease formal analogies and cross-references through the succession and simultaneity of multiscreen projection whereby an image is not only related to the preceding one but also to the concurrent one. 'Imagine', as Farocki puts

it, 'three double bonds jumping back and forth between the six carbon atoms of a benzene ring; I envisage the same ambiguity in the relationship of an element in an image track to the one succeeding or accompanying it' (Farocki 2010, p. 70; See also Montero 2012, pp. 56–57; Blümlinger 2008; Rascaroli 2009, p. 59; Silverman 1996). Such layering of ambiguities underscores Farocki's consideration of practices, technologies and memories across places, times and cultures. Among other subjects, Farocki has also turned his attention to the contemporary global construction of the memory of the Holocaust and its visual archival traces.

Respite [*Aufschub*] (2007) is based on archival footage filmed at the Dutch transit and labour camp of Westerbork in the Netherlands in 1944. The commandant of the camp, Albert Konrad Gemmeker, had ordered three inmates with its realization: Heinz Todtman was responsible for the scenario, and the photographer Rudolf Breslauer and his assistant Karl Joordan for the filming (Lindeperg 2009, p. 31). Never edited, the footage is among the rare documentation of the camps. Unlike the fully edited film of the Czech camp of Theresienstadt, *Terezin*: *A Documentary Film of the Jewish Resettlement* (1945), which had also been realized by camp inmates in order to deceive the allied forces prior to a visit of a delegation of the International Red Cross, Breslauer's film exists only as rushes. These consist of unedited fragments of slow-motion sequences, which add up to a non-linear narrative whose purposes are far from clear (Lindeperg 2009, pp. 29–30; Elsaesser 2014, p. 249). Although, as Thomas Elsaesser observes, the archival material contains unique footage of the Jews' deportation committed by the Nazis, only one sequence—'the relentless detail of one particular transport of Jews to Auschwitz, wittingly or unwittingly testifying, in heartbreaking fashion, to the deception perpetrated by the Nazi and the self-deception of their victims' (Elsaesser 2014, p. 246)—is 'routinely inserted in television docudrama or even news bulletins every time a producer needs to evoke the deportation and the train, and has only a few seconds to encapsulate them' (Elsaesser 2014, p. 248). The rest of the footage is hardly known. Indeed, one can argue that the footage that Farocki has shown in its entirety without editing in an attempt to *historicize* its images (Elsaesser 2014, p. 254) participates not only to the cultural memory of the Holocaust but also, and more conspicuously, to the metahistory of its articulation as a global paradigm for trauma.

Rather than a single historical event and memory, the Holocaust designates a constellation of events, experiences and memories that the legacy of World War II partly submerged in the immediate post-war period. In the

initial aftermath of events, these memories were fragmented and dispersed, if not repressed (Assmann 2010, p. 97). In Europe, where the events took place, such memories were moreover historically and geographically located and entangled with the no less problematic and contradictory memories of fascism and the war. Out of contradiction, silence and repression, the Holocaust has slowly emerged as a cultural, as well as individual and historical memory, through distinctive political acts of archivization and memorialization. Indeed, 'It took two decades before the event was identified by name and a discourse evolved on the unprecedented magnitude of the trauma and the crime' (Assmann 2010, p. 97). The process was, however, far from linear and, as Michael Rothberg has demonstrated, it overlapped and coincided with the historical process of decolonization and the emergence and articulation of other problematic memories (Rothberg 2009). From the 1980s onward, as the result of a consorted political effort in Europe, the USA and Israel in particular, the Holocaust has consolidated as a global memory layered and condensed across complex historical, political and critical landscapes, and as such has become a paradigm for the articulation of collective trauma. Indeed, the Holocaust acts as a 'rhetorical trope in political debates' for the legitimization of action or its opposite, a currency used 'to draw attention to other marginalized collective memories', and is 'invoked as a model to articulate, analyze and legitimize other traumatic memories around the globe' (Assmann 2010, p. 107). However, the globalization of the Holocaust as a cultural memory has also meant that its recollection has been increasingly decontextualized and reframed into an overarching narrative that discards or neutralizes the contradictions and difficulties within it, which are particularly evident in Europe. According to Aleida Assmann.

> To engage actively in the memory of a community of the Holocaust raises the moral profile of a nation in an international context, but it also allows the nation to evade awkward themes concerning its own past: genocide of the native population, slavery and nuclear warfare in the US, collaboration with the Nazis or the colonial history in various European countries. (Assmann 2010, p. 105)

Whilst the transcultural articulation of the Holocaust is seen to provide a framework for memory beyond national, cultural and other boundaries and to allow the recollection of other disturbing histories (Levy and Sznaider 2006; Alexander et al. 2009; Rothberg 2009), its uses can also be problematic and insular (Moses 2011). Rather than entering the debate surrounding the globalization of the memory of the Holocaust and its

implications, we shall focus on the unremembered, suppressed filmic traces that impinge on the ostensive visibility of the Holocaust as a memory and its globalized archival presence. At stake, once more, are the spectral forms of the archive and their affective disturbance.

Breslauer's footage is indicative of the selection, editing and diffusion of images and memories alike. From the entire film, as suggested, only a few frames and sequences have entered the cultural and transcultural *re-presentation* of the Holocaust. The iconic and metonymic status of the transport sequence in the film results from it being selected out of Breslauer's context and inserted within footage from other sources of the period. This is also the case of the close-up of the face of a girl wearing a headscarf framed in the cracks of one of the carriage doors. The composition of the frame and the elusive, poised expression of the girl rendered this image an epitome of the deportation of the Jews perpetrated by the Nazi regime and it was endlessly reproduced (Fig. 5.8). On the wave of the 1990s memorialization

Fig. 5.8 Harun Farocki, *Respite*, 2007, black and white silent film 16 mm transferred to video, video still, courtesy of Harun Farocki GbR © Harun Farocki GbR

of the Holocaust, Dutch journalist Aad Wagenaar identified the girl as Anna Maria Settela Steinbach, of Sinti rather than Jewish origins (Lindeperg 2009, p. 33). Uncannily, at the time, the image elicited the *unremembered* memories of the Nazi persecution among others of Roma people, homosexuals, and mentally ill people. One can argue that Breslauer's frame 'screened' other memories by means of displacement and substitution, epitomizing broader processes of appropriation, selection and silence that were contributing to the global memorialization of the Holocaust. Breslauer's frame both concealed and revealed another aspect of the extermination camps that had remained unnoticed and mostly removed from public recollection, and was excluded from the cultural narratives of the Holocaust as they were being reframed as a global paradigm for trauma.

In *Respite*, Farocki's investigation of montage and of the retrospective, simultaneous and anticipatory relations that can be established among filmic frames is articulated in terms of a *rememorization* of Breslauer's footage at the intersecting of archival and memory images. In his discussion of the work, Elsaesser asks,

> What if *Respite* were proposing an epistemology of forgetting, that is, what if it posed the question of the kind of knowledge we can derive from no longer knowing what we think we know, and by extension, what it would mean to appropriate Breslauer's ignorance rather than his knowledge? (Elsaesser 2014, p. 248).

At stake, in Farocki's remediation of Breslauer's archival footage within the contextual globalization of the cultural memory of the Holocaust, is not the paradigmatic injunction of 'never to forget' but rather the question of what has been forgotten? What have cultural and transcultural processes of memorialization of the Holocaust selectively silenced in order to generate the 'memory convergence' for its globalization? If repression is itself a form of archiving how can the archival image elicit the emergence of what is liminal to it? How can the dynamic processes of conscious and unconscious retrieval intersect the inscription of the archival trace in order for it to be re-remembered when weaving past and future through the present? Indeed, as Georges Didi-Huberman argues,

> The historic legibility of the images produced at the liberation of the camps seems to have been definitely obfuscated by the construction, manipulation and use values, which the photographs and films of the time have undergone. Very soon, one finds oneself facing the images of the camps with the difficult paradox of voluntary memory and voluntary oblivion, of culpability

> and denial, of the duty of showing history and the mere pleasure of showing history. (Didi-Huberman 2010, p. 21)[11]

This poses the necessity of re-instating the visibility of the archival images of the Holocaust through montage or rather 're-montage' (Didi-Huberman 2010, p. 210). Only 're-montage'—as a modality of both remediation and rememoration—is able to release the images of the Holocaust from the oblivion of overexposure and render them legible. Legibility has to be understood in Benjamin's sense of 'applying to history the principle of montage' (Didi-Huberman 2010, p. 20; see also Didi-Huberman 2008), that is, to instigate the working of memory to make the archival footage significant by engaging with the layers of visibility of the frame and its contingent and projected meanings.

The German title of Farocki's film, *Aufschub*, means both postponement and respite (Elsaesser 2014, p. 248). It captures the ambiguity of the footage and the process of its realization, but also of its belated reception. The reasons why the commandant Gemmeker had the film made are unclear. Supposedly Gemmeker aimed to prove the efficiency of the Westerbock camp. From its original purpose as a transit site, Westerbock had been turned into a labour camp for the recycling of used material at a time when it was at risk of being closed down since most Dutch Jews had been transferred (Lindeperg 2009, pp. 29–30). The footage includes shots of the plan of the camp drawn by Gemmeker, with arrows indicating the West-East transit, and the logo of the camp, a factory chimney framed by barracks (Fig. 5.9.). Hence, as Farocki suggests, the film can be read as an industrial film, a film about the productivity and efficiency of the camp, but also as a film that deals with process, not least the process of filming itself (Elsaesser 2014, p. 253). Delay seems to be the condition implied by both productivity and process—if productive and hence useful the camp would continue to be active; by being engaged in the shooting of the film Breslauer and his assistant are useful to Gemmeker and thus delaying the time when they themselves would be deported. The inmates who are filmed also enter the suspension and hiatus afforded by the moving image and its inherent archival inscription of continuity and postponement: by being filmed their presence is inscribed in the endless repeatability of the shot. The meandering slow motion of Breslauer's film-camera lingers on the various activities in the camp. He films dentists treating some inmates, a girl running smiling to the camera as she is practicing sports, inmates stripping copper wires for recycling, a group of inmates resting in the



Fig. 5.9 Harun Farocki, *Respite*, 2007, black and white silent film 16 mm transferred to video, video still, courtesy of Harun Farocki GbR © Harun Farocki GbR

grass, the weekly arrival and departure of the transport train. What is he documenting? What is he trying to signify? The unedited footage is fragmented. The rushes of Breslauer's film are in Benjamin's sense shattered images of the past that 'blast out' and arrest the flow of history 'in a constellation pregnant with tensions, it gives that constellation a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad' (Benjamin 1940/1999, p. 254). Farocki maintains the gaps that break the flow of the original footage and in the interstices between the images inserts his own voice to interrogate what Breslauer was seeing and filming from the point of view of the Dutch filmmaker himself and his knowledge of the camps. '*Respite* imagines what it must have been like to look at the camps at that moment in time without the knowledge of insight', of our contemporary historical understanding and commemorative reconstruction (Elsaesser 2014, p. 251). Indeed, Farocki endows the archival footage with belated recollection, with the *Nachträglichkeit* of trauma 'screened' by its own visibility.

Characteristically, Farocki's montage uses freeze shots and repetition, drawing the viewer's attention to details, such as the birth date and initial embossed on the suitcase of an elderly woman taken on a barrow to the camp's transport convoy. Farocki repeats the sequence several times in an unsettling rehearsal poignant with the tacit implications of some of the inmates helping others onto the transport trains. He draws the viewer's attention to the armband that those inmates wear and the meaning of the initials FK (*Fliegende Kolonne*, transit column) that appear on it. The repetition of Breslauer's sequences in Farocki's montage also introduces a shift from Breslauer's knowledge to our own knowledge of the Holocaust. By commenting on the repeated sequences, Farocki instigates mental associations with other images of the Holocaust in ways that are akin to the transversal montage of a double-screen installation and the principle of retrieval within Derrida's notion of the archive. Farocki does not insert these pictures; rather he evokes them as memory images and asks the viewer to conjure them up from her own mental repertoire of 'cultural memories' of the Holocaust. These memory images are simultaneous and transversally relate to Breslauer's frames and shots generating a new level of meaning. Hence, as Farocki's voiceover suggests, the camp's logo can infer the chimney in the concetrantion camps of Bergen-Belsen or Auschwitz, the inmates resting on the grass, the corpses moved by bulldozers into mass graves or the inmates being treated in the camp infirmary infer the experiments undertaken by Mengele (Farocki 2007, voiceover). By inviting the viewer to call upon her own memories of images of the Holocaust, as Didi-Huberman suggests, Farocki elicits another form of visibility that opens up Breslauer's seemingly serene sequences to rememoration. 'Farocki's montage', does so 'by offering us the possibility of "remontage"', of 're-editing' the archival footage ourselves, 'imaginatively, according to multiple trajectories', which exceed his own solutions (Didi-Huberman 2010, p. 210). Put another way, Farocki offers us the possibility to re-remember the camps by drawing on the array of images and narratives that constitute the transcultural memorialization of the Holocaust asking us to reflect on the significance of such remembrance. As Elsaesser observers,

> *Respite* is not another film about the Holocaust, it is about our knowledge of the images of the Holocaust, and how the memory of this knowledge (and of these images) has forever altered our sense of temporality and causality, and thus how we see an image from the archive. (Elsaesser 2014, p. 252)

It is by making 'room for the accidental and unexpected' (Elsaesser 2014, p. 255), by upsetting and disavowing stereotyped images of the past and thus by allowing the past to look differently to those who lived and filmed it that Farocki presents us at the same time with an archival and mnemonic image of the past. The artist draws our attention to an image that has the potential of being a memory image, that is an image in the process of transitioning from the unremembered to the remembered and hence of bridging, as Derrida claims, the past with the future. Farocki achieves such rememoration in the present, in the duration of his own remediation of Breslauer's film. This duration coincides with the unreeling of the filmic archival trace and its repetition. It coincides, in other words, with the unreeling of the moving image and memory image alike. In so doing, *Respite* intimates the points of insertion of the unremembered into the processes of remembering, and of the inherent ethical and political implications that surround the archiving and reading of images of the past. For this the Holocaust is once more paradigmatic.

The global importance given to the Holocaust by the contemporary politics of memory raises questions about the selection and diffusion that inform the production of transcultural memories more broadly. Whilst the archive acts as the external site of consignation for any cultural articulation of memories, the notional understanding of remembering proposed by memory research offers us a means to consider the implications of cultural selection, silencing and even falsification in the processes that underscore the formation of cultural memories. Issues surrounding the imprecision of memories have informed memory research since Hugo Münsterberg's early experiments and have been part of the debate concerning the forensic reliability of testimonies in tribunal, particularly in relation to the recollection of traumatic memories as in cases of child sexual abuse. 'False memory' has become part of the currency to describe the ability of the mind to generate memories about events that did not happen or did not happen as they are remembered by drawing from real circumstances and existing knowledge and confounding what is assumed, misinterpreted or imagined in remembering, so that the false memory acquires its own 'authenticity' for the individual (Loftus and Pickrell 1995). Groups are no less prone to self-deception and the creation of misleading memories (Wetsch and Roediger 2008), often opposing historiographical evidence. Given the overt selectivity and manipulation in cultural remembering, falsification calls into question institutionalized remembrance, not in terms of 'false memories' *per se*, but rather of the cultural 'optic procedures'

that inform such kind of remembering and the archival images that support it. The mediation and re-mediation that underpin the archive as a site of consignation and representation can, in fact, reveal institutional strategies for the appropriation, silencing and manipulation of memories. Such strategies also denote the consolidation of the Holocaust as a globally shared set of memories in ways that shed light on the current digital mediatized diffusion of archival traces regarding transcultural constructions of remembering.

Paris-based Israeli filmmaker Eyal Sivan critiques the political appropriation of the Holocaust and its cultural re-articulation as a collective memory in Israel in the film *The Specialist: The Portrait of a Modern Criminal* (1998). The film is based on the original archival footage of the trial held in Jerusalem in 1961 of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi official responsible for the organization of the deportation across Europe of millions of people. Sivan's work seizes the inscription of this pivotal event into public memory through its filmic mediation that used the, at the time, pioneering technique of video recording of the trial proceedings for televised broadcasting. As the first trial following the end of World War II to be uniquely concerned with crimes related to the Nazi persecution, deportation and extermination of European Jews, the Eichmann trial drew attention to the victims of the concentration camps and made them central to the legal prosecution with the testimony of over 100 survivors. 'Prior to the Eichmann trial'—as Shonana Felman maintains—'what we call the Holocaust did not exist as a collective story. Neither did it exist as a semantically authoritative story' (Felman 2002, p. 127). It also did not exist as a public and shared body of memories. Although memoirs and documentaries, including Alain Resnais's film *Night and Fog* [*Nuit et Broulliard*] (1955) and Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin's *Chronicle of a Summer* [*Chronique d'un été*] (1961) dealt with the recollection of the Holocaust, the Eichmann trial was pivotal in establishing the paradigmatic memorialization of the Holocaust thus allowing it to gain the current 'global' status (and its diverse inflections despite and in relation to the universalizing paradigm that denotes it) (Assmann 2007; Levy and Sznaider 2006). Given the international resonance of the trial and its subsequent political relevance for the newly established state of Israel, the Israeli government commissioned a US company to video-document the whole proceedings.[12]

Despite the extensive documentation, only a few images of the trial made the world-view and entered the visual currency of the Holocaust.

The rest of many hours of footage were first archived in the USA, and then returned to the Steven Spielberg Jewish Archive in Jerusalem in 1977 on occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the trial. The institution 'decided to prepare a selection of 72 hours of trial footage. 72 hours of images recording on poor-quality tape were presented not as copies but as originals; the rest of the footage was declared inaccessible or nonexistent' (Sivan 2011, pp. 69–70). It is this uncatalogued 'inaccessible or nonexistent' material (a third of the original footage has been lost; Sivan 2011, p. 70) that Sivan remediates by re-mastering, editing and re-montaging the poor quality video footage on 16-mm film. Rather than the well-known footage of the survivors of the camps who testified at the trial, the focus of Sivan's remediation—and hence of his selection and editing of the archival footage—is Eichmann himself. Sivan focuses his attention on the dynamics of the trial as they emerged from the interaction between the prosecution, the defendant and the jury (Guerin 2006). Acknowledging Hannah Arendt's critique of the ways in which the Israeli jury conducted the trial, turning it into a spectacle (Arendt 1963), Sivan revisits the archival footage and centres his remediation of it on Eichmann's account of the ways in which the Nazi regime developed and implemented routine deportation. Important in the late 1990s was the need to see a different representation of the trial, one that asked what it would have been like to see Eichmann explaining how the deportation of millions of people had been organized and carried out: to hear this otherwise average looking man detailing, in his precise bureaucratic German, the devising of one of the key cogs of the Nazi extermination machine. The focus of Sivan's film is thus on Eichmann's testimony and his replies to the public prosecutor, on his recollection of events and the memory images that ensue from the film's recording of his gestures and expressions, which Sivan juxtaposes with those of the prosecutor and other members of the jury. The film partly responds to a growing concern in the 1990s, in the visual arts and literature as well as in memory studies, with the figure of the perpetrator (Crownshaw 2011, pp. 74–78). However, at least stylistically, Sivan's film also eschews a fascination with Eichmann and a generalized and generalizing fantasy of identification (Torgovnick 2005, pp. 68–69; see also Agamben 1997). Sivan achieves this double register by means of reflection and deflection of faces onto the glass box in which Eichmann stood during the trial, and other visual strategies of displacement through montage.

In Sivan's highly edited film, at stake are not the enactors of the trial, but rather the institutionalized appropriation and 'falsification' of the

public memory of the trial itself *vis à vis* its paradigmatic role in the historical reconstruction of the Holocaust and the emblematic function that the trial had for the articulation of the Holocaust as a collective trauma. Hence, Sivan focuses on the constructiveness of the archival footage as a documentary trace and, through its remediation, shows the inextricable overlapping of the staging and video recording of the trial. 'The act of filming', argues Sivan, 'allows an emphasis on the spectacular function of the event: some images, mainly of the victims, help to create icons of memory – what we used to call – "monuments"' (Sivan 2011, p. 71). Sivan himself takes a stand on the historical material he is dealing with and edits a fictitious reconstruction of it that mixes footage from different periods of the trial, repeating frames and fast-forwarding sequences. If the memory image that 'icons of memory' engender is based on established documentary *clichés* of frame, light, point of view, and length of shot and their subsequent editing, Sivan's remediation of the recorded footage both appropriates and subverts such *clichés* to create another memory image that overtly reveals and reflects on its artificiality. Rather than an apparently unadulterated representation of the original archival footage, *The Specialist* displays its own artifice. Superimposition of frames, distortion of images and sounds, changes of speed, repetition and blurring are indicative of Sivan's critique of what he refers to as the Zionist 'instrumentalization' of the cultural memory of the trial aimed to bolster the Israeli government's policy of forging a memorialization of the Holocaust that was eminently Jewish and that could be used to support the identity of the newly established state of Israel (Sivan 2011, p. 65). These strategies also demystify Eichmann not so much by emphasizing the ordinariness of the man, but rather by confronting the viewer with the culturally silenced and forgotten images and words of his testimony.

Sivan's critique is directed towards the politics of memory surrounding the Holocaust in Israel and the ways in which they are denoted by meticulous media strategies of cultural construction, including the repeated exposure of images of the camps and testimonies of survivals woven within a strong nationalist ethos (see Meyers et al. 2014). In turn, *The Specialist* engages with the broader tension around the historical memory of the Holocaust and the mediation of trauma. The globalized cultural memory of the Holocaust has in fact also inferred a mediatized construction of trauma. Drawing on current psychological theories of second-generation trauma, Kirk Moses argues that while trauma is transmitted through familial forms of representations and communication (Moses 2011, pp. 93–94)

that mobilize and ingrain emotional patterns of response, the formation of cultural trauma selectively appropriates such representations and emotional patterns of response and reconstructs them according to 'a compelling framework of cultural classification' that is at the same time contingent and polarizing (Alexander 2012, p. 17). Hence, cultural trauma coagulates the fragmented and heterogeneous patterns of memories transmitted across generations into mediated representations (verbal, visual or otherwise), and further gathers them into legitimate ideological uses of the past. This may entail feelings of humiliation, persecution and victimhood that, according to Moses, are recognizable across the intricate nexus of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Moses 2011). *The Specialist* critically re-enacts the polarization of the cultural appropriation of the Holocaust. Sivan's film also seizes and reconfigures the 'unremembered' memories of Eichmann's explanation of the implementation of the Nazi regime of persecution and indirectly brings them to bear on the complexities that surround the Israeli government's appropriation of the Holocaust *vis à vis* its hegemonic policy toward Palestinians. Sivan's selectivity, manipulation and distinctiveness of montage of the archival footage mirror the processes that inform the political articulation of collective trauma and its memorialization. No less than the memory image that it aims to criticize, *The Specialist* both exposes its ideological investment towards the archival footage and reflects on its own dispositive of appropriation, manipulation and 'falsification', overtly displaying the ambiguity of its own strategies of montage, and the complexities that underscore memorialization.

In *Forbidden Editing* [*Montage interdit*] (2012-on-going), Sivan further interrogates the current status of the archive and its implications for memorialization through a digital platform based on fictional and non-fictional archival footage. Developed in association with Issue Zero and the Berlin Documentary Forum, the platform engages with the contemporary diffusion of documentary texts and images across the Internet. Sivan addresses the expansiveness of digital media and its structures by referring back to film montage and its implications for remembering. The fluidity and self-reflexivity of the medium is a means for the emergence and disappearance of different thematic fields through which pervading politics of memory are contested. These include subjects as diverse as 'Native American', 'Vietnam', 'the Archive' 'Third World' and 'Algeria'. These themes relate the issues surrounding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to a broader range of archival material, interviewers, film excerpts and other contextual references positioning it within a global landscape that

bridges times and places through interviews conducted by the filmmaker himself and archival excerpts from Jean-Luc Godard's films and interviews concerning the French director's public stance on the Palestinian question in the 1970s. The excerpts from Godard also refer to the director's reflections on montage, including those about the difference between film and documentary montage. Whilst the visual structure of *Forbidden Editing* is reminiscent of Godard's *Historie(s) du cinema*, the title is yet indebted to André Bazin's famous essay on the superfluity of montage. Bazin claimed that montage was an ideological superimposition on the moving image's capacity to capture and display reality through long- and medium-sequence shots (Bazin 1953/2002, pp. 46–61). Hence, the platform posits the 'historical montage' to engage with today's diffusion of images afforded by digital technologies and the related politics of memorialization. Sivan's digital platform reflects on two antithetical positions of montage that have historically characterized the history of cinema and pushes it towards new directions. The tension between fictional and documentary images on which the historical debate on montage focused is undermined by the potential for new reconfigurations that the digital platform enables through both archivization and 're-presentation'. As such, the platform is at the same time a site of archival inscription and of mnemonic flow. Sivan both appropriates and deconstructs the possibilities of montage as a one-sided way of making meaning. Indeed, 'forbidden montage' takes on a different connotation from Bazin's original utterance. Rather than the ideological closure claimed by Bazin, in Sivan's platform remediation is the principle that rules the site's internal drift and continual potential renovation. As such montage becomes synonymous with the potential that Derrida ascribes to forgetting within the archive, namely to instigate the generation of new associations among traces and connect what the ideological structures of the politics of memory want to keep apart.

Forbidden Editing suggests the uncharted associations within the archive and across events through a kind of digital chaining of what is silenced and unremembered across variable connective patterns. In this sense, the platform reformulates the historical links of the moving image and montage with the memory image and its reconfigurations. The platform performs a sort of the simultaneous gleaning of contingency and pastness that shares some of the forms of transcultural remembering through what we can regard in terms of the associative chaining across the compiled extracts, themes and references. Elsaesser proposes '*forgetting*, including traumatic forgetting' as the modality of remembering that

denotes 'the repetition regime of contemporary media culture' (Elsaesser 2014, pp. 317–321), whereby the relation between the historical event and its representation—and I would add its archival diffusion—is 'one of mutual implication and over-determination' (Elsaesser 2014, p. 317). Such mutual implication and over-determination call into question today's regimes of representation of reality and with them the mediatized archival trace they inflect. It is through an interrogation of the selectivity, convergence and silences of global remembering that we can mobilize the amnesic traces that pervade the contemporary politics of memory and address the contingencies that remembering generates thus allowing the unreeling of images for the future.

Notes

1. Quotations from Comolli are my translation.
2. The original celluloid negative and positive film stock was based on *nitro-cellulose*. It is highly inflammable, even given to self-ignition. It had been phased out in the early 1950s but still creates storage and conservation problems for film archives. Though available since the late 1920s for 16-mm (amateur) film stock, safety-film based on *cellulose acetate* only replaced nitrate in film production from the 1950s onwards (Becker, personal communication, 25 October 2015).
3. The film was screened in Berlin and Munich in 2009. Eva Braun's sister tried to stop the release of the *Swastika* since it featured footage showing her and Eva as they swam naked (*Berliner Zeitung*, 17 January 1974). Reviews include Frederic V. Grunfeld's for *The Saturday's Review* (1973) and David Wilson's and Derek Malcom's interview with Lutz Becker, *The Guardian* (19 December 1973). I am grateful to Lutz Becker for sharing insight into the making of the films and access to his archive.
4. Imperialism, one of the features of fascism, is dealt with in Becker's documentary, *The Lion of Judah* (1981), based on archival film footage of Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia. *The Lion of Judah* maps the Italian military campaign and the Ethiopian defensive response as an 'anthropology of war' (personal communication, 25 October 2015). The film draws attention to the prevalence of airstrikes and the pernicious use, allowed by Mussolini despite an international ban after World War I, of mustard gas. The film includes numerous sequences

showing the preparation of military aircrafts and aerial views from the planes themselves in which the camera either follows the trajectory of the falling bombs or overlays the position of firing weapons, civilians perusing the sky for incoming planes, and the devastating effects of the gas on people and the environment. The images resonate with the sinister threat of air bombing that dominates current warfare. The footage preludes other images of destruction during World War II and beyond, as part of the visual currency of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, from the Vietnam War to the war in Afghanistan and in Syria. The historical footage presents us with the latent threat that has redefined the modern perception of the atmosphere whereby 'New weapons of terror are those through which the basic means of survival are made more explicit; new categories of attack are those which expose – in the mode of a bad surprise – new surfaces of vulnerability' (Sloterdijk 2010, p. 29). Significantly, as Enzo Traverso observes, the war in Ethiopia and its implications never quite penetrated collective memory in Italy and elsewhere in Europe (Traverso 2015, p. 38).

5. Yervant Gianikian is of Armenian origins.
6. *Electric Fragments N. 1 Rom* (*Men*) [*Frammenti elettrici N. 1 Rom* (*Uomini*)] (2002) consists of 8-mm film shot in Italy on the shore of Lake Garda in the immediate post-war period. A small group of bourgeois visits a Rom camp and film the visit. *Electric Fragments N. 3 New Caledonia* [*Frammenti elettrici N. 3 Nuova Caledonia*] (2004) include footage that the filmmakers found in France in 1994 shot by an anonymous cameramen before and during the celebration in 1946 when the Kanak inhabitants of the island became French citizens (Lumley 2011, p. 120). *Electric Fragment N. 4 Bodies* [*Frammenti elettrici N. 4 Corpi*] (2003), as Mark Nash puts it 'comprises the clandestinely filmed footage of women's bodies; neither prudish nor prurient, this film underlies voyeurism, an issue that is at the heart of the series, as well as the issue of control: Who possesses the camera? Indeed, in one of these fragments we catch a fleeting glimpse of the photographers themselves' (Nash 2004, p. 27).
7. *People*, *Years*, *Live* [*Uomini*, *Anni*, *Vita*] (1990), which deals with the Armenian Genocide, includes extracts from Esfir Schub's *The Fall of the Romanov Dynasty* (1927) and Dziga Vertov's newsreels; the train running through tunnels in the Alps, in the opening

sequence of *From the Pole to the Equator* [*Dal Polo all'Equatore*] (1987) alludes to the modernist fascination with trains (Blümliger 2004). The artists reflect on their own practice in the film *Transparencies* [*Trasparenze*] (1998).

8. *The March of Man* is a multiscreen installation based on Étienne-Jules Marey's chronophotographic physiological studies of movement (Blümliger 2012, my translation).
9. An analogous reading could be made of other works by Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi. In particular *Pays Barbare* (2013) uses found ethnographic footage on Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia and is an 'anthropological' reflection on the 'colonial man' (personal communication, 16 December 2015). Like Becker's, the film includes footage showing the use of gas on the local population. The artists' ongoing investigation of the Armenian genocide includes the award installation at the Venice Biennale in 2015.
10. Farocki reflects on his own practice in the double channel video installation *Interface* [*Schnittstelle*] (1996). Video installations including *Eye/Machine* [*Auge/Machine* I-III] (2000–2003) and *Immersion* use respectively operational and surveillance footage.
11. All quotations from Didi-Huberman are my translation.
12. During the trial Eichmann testified, describing in detail the complex machine he had helped to devise. Though claiming he was not guilty because he had acted according to his duty as a soldier and obeyed orders, he was found guilty of all charges and hanged on 30 May 1962 (Sivan 2011, pp. 68–69).

Bibliography

Agamben, G. (1997) *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York and London: Zone Books MIT Press).

Agamben, G. (2009) *What is an Apparatus?: And Other Essays*, trans. by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).

Alexander, J. et al. (2009), *Remembering the Holocaust: A Debate* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Alexander, J. (2012) *Trauma: A Social Theory*, (Cambridge: Polity).

Arendt, H. (1963) *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Faber and Faber).

Assmann, A. (2007) 'Europe a Community of Memory?' in *Bulletin of the Historical Institute*, 40 (Spring), pp. 11–25.

Assmann, A. (2010) 'The Holocaust – A Global Memory? Extensions and Limits of a New Memory Community', in A. Assmann and S. Conrad (ed.) *Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan), pp. 97–117.

Bazin, A. (1953/2002) 'Montage Interdit', in *Qu'est-ce que le cinema*. (Paris: Éditions du Cerf), pp. 49–61.

Becker, L. and Mora, P. (1973) *Swastika* (London: C. Sandy Lieberson Production).

Benjamin, W. (1931/2005) 'Little History of Photography, *Selected Writings,*' M. W. Jennings, H. Eiland, and G. Smith (ed.) *Walter Benjamin Selected Writings: 1927–1934*, vol. 2 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press), pp. 507–530.

Benjamin, W. (1936/1999) 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', translated by Harry Zohn, in H. Arendt (ed.) *Illuminations* (London: Pilmico), pp. 211–244.

Benjamin, W. (1940/1999) 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', translated by Harry Zohn, in H. Arendt (ed.) *Illuminations* (London: Pilmico), pp. 245–255.

Benjamin, W. (1999) *The Arcade Project*, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge Mass. and London: Belkap Press).

Blümliger, C. (2004) 'Lumière, der Zug und die Avangarde', *in Räume und Rahmungen*, in M. Hagener, J.N. Schmidt and M. Wedel (ed.) *Spur durch den Spiegel. Der Film in der Kultur der Moderne* (Berlin: Bertz & Fisher Verlag), pp. 27–41.

Blümliger, C. (2008/2009) 'Memory and Montage: On the Installation Counter-Music', translated by Michael Turnbull, in A. Ehmann and K. Eshun (ed.) *Harun Farocki/Against What? Against Whom?* (Köhl, New York and Oxford: Koenig Books and Raven Row), pp. 101–109.

Blümliger, C. (2012) 'Cartografia dei gesti', translated by Studio Bozzola in A. Lissoni and C. Bertola (ed.) *Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi Non Non Non* Quaderno Hangar Bicocca N. 1 exhibition catalogue (Milano: Hangar Bicocca), pp. 31–33.

Comolli, J. L. (1997) 'Le Miroir A Deux Faces', in J. L. Comolli and J. Rancière, *Arrêt sur Histoire* (Paris: Editions de Centre Pompidou), pp. 11–45.

Crownshaw, R. (2011) 'Perpetrator Fictions and Transcultural Memory', in *Parallax*, 17: (4), pp. 75–89.

Darke, C. and Rashid, H. (2014) *Chris Marker: A Grin Without a Cat*, exhibition catalogue (London: Whitechapel Gallery).

Derrida, J. (1998) *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, translated by Eric Prenowitz (Chicago Ill. and London: The University of Chicago Press).

Didi-Huberman, G. (2008) *Images In Spite of All: Four Photographs from Auschwitz*, translated by Shane B Lillis (Chicago, IL and London: Chicago University Press).

Didi-Huberman, G. (2010) *Remontage du temps subi* (Paris: Minuit).

Doane, M. A. (2002) *The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive* (Cambridge Mass. and London: Harvard University Press).
Downing, T. (2012) *The World At War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan).
Eley, G. (2013) *Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology and the Ground of Consent in Germany 1930–1945* (London and New York: Routledge)
Elsaesser, T. (2014) *German Cinema: Terror and Trauma: Cultural Memory since 1945* (London and New York).
Elsaesser, T. (2000) *Weimar Cinema and After: Germany's Historical Imaginary* (London and New York: Routledge).
Erll, A. (2011a) *Memory in Culture*, translated by Sara B. Young (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan).
Erll, A. (2011b) 'Travelling Memory' in *Parallax*, 17: (4), pp. 4–18.
Erll, A. and Rigney, A. (2009) 'Introduction: Cultural Memory and its Dynamics', in A. Erll and A. Rigney (ed.) *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter), pp. 1–11.
Ernst, W. and Farocki, H. (2004) 'Towards an Archive for Visual Concepts', in T. Elsaesser (ed.) *Harun Farocki: Working on the Sight-Lines* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), pp. 261–186.
Farocki, H. (1988) *Images of the World and the Inscription of War* (Berlin: Harun Farocki Filmproduktion).
Farocki, H. (2007) *Respite,* 16 mm *(Digital Beta) transferred to video black/white, silent* (Berlin: Harun Farocki Filmproduktion).
Farocki, H. (2010) 'Cross Influence/Soft Montage', translated by Cynthia Beatt, in A. Ehmann and K. Eshun (ed.) *Harun Farocki/Against What? Against Whom?* (Köhl, New York and Oxford: Koenig Books and Raven Row), pp. 69–74.
Felman, S. (2002) *The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press).
Foucault, M. (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books).
Gianikian, Y. and Ricci Lucchi, A. (1998) *On the Heights All is Peace*, 16 mm and 35 mm colour, soundtrack with Giovanna Marini.
Gianikian, Y. and Ricci Lucchi, A. (2001) *Electric Fragments N. 2 – Vietnam*, Betracam SP colour.
Gordon, A. (1997/2008) *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*. With a new Introduction (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press).
Griffith, A. (2002) *Wondrous Difference: Cinema, Anthropology, & the Turn of the Century Visual Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press).
Grunfeld, F. V. (1974) *The Hitler File: A Social History of Germany and the Nazis, 1918–45* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson).
Guerin, F. (2006) 'The Perpetrator in Focus: Turn of the Century Holocaust Remembrance in The Specialist', in *Law Text Culture*, 10: (1), pp. 167–193.

Hoskins, A. (2009) 'Digital Network Memory', in A. Erll and A. Rigney (ed.) *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyer), pp. 91–106.

Hoskins, A. (2011) 'Media, Memory, Metaphor: Remembering and the Connective Turn', in Parallax, 17: (4), pp. 19–31.

Kracauer, S. (1995) 'Photography' in *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays*, translated, edited with an introduction by Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge Mass., and London: Harvard University Press), pp. 47–63.

Kracauer, S. (1947/2004) *From Caligari to Hilter: A Psychological History of German Film*, L. Quaresima (Ed.) (Princeton, N.J. and Oxford: Princeton University Press).

Landsberg, A. (2004) Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture (New York: Columbia University Press).

La Capra, D. (2004) *History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory* (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press).

La Capra, D. (2001) *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press).

Levy, D. and Sznaider, N. (2006) *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).

Lissoni, A. and Bertola, C. (ed.) (2012) *Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi Non Non Non*, Quaderno Hangar Bicocca N. 1 exhibition catalogue (Milano: Hangar Bicocca).

Lindeperg, S. (2010) 'Suspended Lives, Revenant Images: On Harun Farocki's Film Respite', translated by Benjamin Carter, in A. Ehmann and K. Eshun (ed.) *Harun Farocki / Against What? Against Whom?* (Köhl, New York and Oxford: Koenig Books and Raven Row), pp. 28–34.

Loftus and Pickrell (1995) 'The Formation of False Memories', in *Psychiatric Annals*, 25, pp. 720–725.

Lumley, R. (2011) *Entering the Frame: Cinema and History in the Films of Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi* (Oxford and Bern, Peter Lang).

Lupton, C. (2005) *Chris Marker: Memories of the Future* (London: Reaktion).

MacDonald, S. (1998) A Critical Cinema 3: Interviews with Independent Filmmakers (Berkeley: University of California Press).

McCrum, R. and Downing, T. (2013) 'The Hitler Home Movies: How Eva Brown Documented the Dictator's Private Life', in *The Observer*, 27 Jan. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/27/hitler-home-movies-eva-braun

Merewether, C. (ed.) (2006) *The Archive*, Documents of Contemporary Art (Cambridge Mass. and London: MIT Press and the Whitechapel Gallery).

Meyers, O., Zandberg, E. and Neiger, M. (2014) *Communicating Awe: Media Memory and Holocaust Commemoration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan).

Mitchell, W.J.T. (2011) *Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to the Present* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press).
Montero, D. (2012) *Thinking Images: The Essay Film as a Dialogic Form in European Cinema* (Oxford: Peter Lang).
Moses, D. (2011) 'Genocide and the Terror of History', in *Parallax*, 17: (4), pp. 90–108.
Nash, M. (2004) 'Experiments with Truth: The Documentary Turn', in M. Nash in collaboration with D. Scofidio (ed.) Experiments with Truth, exhibition catalogue (Philadelphia: The Fabric Workshop and Museum, Philadelphia), pp. 15–21.
Rancière, J. (2007) *The Future of the Image*, translated by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso).
Rascaroli, L. (2009) *The Personal Camera: Subjective Cinema and the Essay Film* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
Rothberg, M. (2009) *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Silverman, K. (1996) *The Threshold of the Visible World* (New York and London: Routledge, 1996).
Sivan, E. (2011) 'Archive Images: Truth or Memory The Case of Adolf Eichmann's Trial', in M. Paasche and J. Radul (ed.) *A Thousand Eyes: Media, Technology, Law and Aesthetics* (Berlin: Sternberg Press), pp. 65–77.
Sloterdijk, P. (2010) *Terror from the Air*, translated by A. Patton and S. Corcoran (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT).
Skoller, J. (2005), *Shadows, Specters, Shards: Making History in the Avant-garde Film* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
Steedman, C. (2001) *Dust: The Archive and Cultural History* (New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press.).
Spieker, S. (2008) *The Big Archive: Art from Bureaucracy* (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press).
Traverso, E. (2015) *Le passé: modes d'emploi. Histoire, mémoire, politique* (Paris: La fabrique editions).
Traverso, E. (2003) *The Origins of Nazi Violence,* translated by Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press).
Torgovnick, M. (2005) *The War Complex: World War II in Our Time* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press).
Wertsch, J. W. and Roediger, H. L. (2008) 'Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations and Theoretical Approaches', in *Memory*, 16: 3 (April), pp. 318–326.

CHAPTER 6

Afterword: Contingency and the Performativity of Remembering and Forgetting

Much has been written on the contemporary preoccupation with memory and the politics of remembrance that dominate it. Today's global dimension of memory and its digital forms expand the remits not so much of memory per se but rather of its contingency. Memory research, as discussed, explains the ways in which memory regulates an awareness of the here and now and defines contingency by establishing the boundaries of the present. And it is contingency that memory brings to the images of the past. Hence, in weaving our discussion about memory and the implications of the moving image in its theorization we have questioned the relevance of the archival filmic trace and the kind of re-memoration that ensues from it. As the remediation and (re)-montage of archival film footage in the works considered demonstrate, the memory traces that the moving image projects back to us pertain to the atmospherics, feeling and affect of the past; gestures, fantasies and 'micro-physiognomy of individual behaviour'; ways of looking, framing and documenting. The celluloid film catches presence, frames temporality and documents an intention of recollection. It intimates perspectives on reality conditioned by its own boundaries of awareness and knowledge and projects them back to us as a there-and-then imbued with affect and emotion. Such forms can betray the implications of the politics of memory, as argued for Farocki's and Sivan's films, probing memorialization with a questioning of what it means to remember. These same forms can display the disquieting conditions of our time as they emerge from an abstraction of the features that define contested histories, as suggested in the case of Becker's and

C. Albano, *Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36588-0_6

Gianikian and Ricci Lucchi's works and their respective analysis of the 'colonization of the everyday' that characterized fascism and colonialism, and the 'physiognomy' of war and trauma. In all these instances, the filmic archival trace emerges as an antecedent of today's globalized arena exposing the tensions within it and the necessity for re-memoration that the artists considered achieve through the remediation of what is marginal to history and the archive.

The memory trace that filmic archival footage affords in fact implicates silenced, repressed or unremembered memories and the emergence of the amnesiac traces that pervade remembering. Forgetting insinuates instability to what counts as past and its relation to the present: 'forgetting is, in this respect, the emblematic threat that lurks in the background of the phenomenology of memory and of the epistemology of history' (Ricoeur 2004, p. 174). The problematic of forgetting, as discussed in relation to Tribe's and Illingworth's film and video and sound installations, underscores and haunts the development of the contemporary concept of autobiographical memory and trauma, implicating both memory and history. Forgetting, as memory research reminds us, relates to the ways in which memories form both individually and interpersonally, since remembering shapes how we configure the past in the present by selecting, morphing and silencing features, events and feelings. Rather than being erased, traces of what is silenced and repressed still linger in memory, thus affecting, interfering and disturbing remembering. Memorialization uses the malleability of memories to articulate narratives and representations that conform to ideology, parochial interests or other kinds of beliefs. In turn, the dynamics of remembering and forgetting can solicit the emergence and articulation in the present of unremembered and silenced memories, bringing back what the individual or cultures fail or refuse to remember. Hence, the associative patterns of retrieval known as 'chaining' and 'spreading' can be thought of as figurative procedures to conceive what—borrowing Nora's phrase— we can call 'the new mechanics of memory' (Nora 1989, p. 15) that characterize today's modalities of remembering. As Fonanta's sound sculptures suggest, chaining and spreading allow us to envisage the intersecting of individual and social, cultural and transcultural remembering injecting the here and now with the alterity of what is liminal and latent in memory and history alike.

Not only are memories malleable configurations that weave past features with the contingency of the present, but their activation is also the result of the mobilization of memory traces across memory systems in

the mind and in cultures. Translocation of memorized patterns is implicit in the training of the military into war-zones worldwide and in the data collection of weapon testing. These, as Illingworth's immersive video and sound installations intimate, are imbricated with the narratives that inform the globalized arena of contemporary politics of memory and what is disavowed by and within them. Translocation, however, also denotes the affect and emotion of environments on which such politics impinge and operate generating associative spatial and temporal webs of overt and hidden links that weave the local with the global. This, as discussed, implies the performativity of remembering and forgetting that I have addressed through the artworks considered and the ways in which they implicate the agency of the viewer. Performativity in memory entails the interaction of both psychological and cultural components and the reconfiguration of cognitive, affective and emotional features. Hence, performativity underscores the irreconcilable and irreducible weaving of remembering and narrating that predicates the representation of memories, and exposes the tension of presence, latency and distance that forgetting inscribes on the relationship of memory and history. In this sense, performativity pertains to the modalities of montage and the moving image's integration through its optic procedures of diverse spatial and temporal planes. It also denotes the dynamics within contemporary transcultural memory-scapes rendering it pertinent to the diffusion of contemporary environments of memory on the Internet.

Contingency and performativity are germane to a consideration of the digital platforms and networks that characterize many of today's practices of memorialization. Within these practices issues of duration, deferral and obsolescence affect the shifting boundaries of the real and virtual and the related configurations of memories and histories. Although these boundaries have become porous and today's 'digital memories' are ever more hybrid and conditioned by the mobility and pliability of the medium, the global mediatized arena of remembering is no less susceptible to the instability and latency of amnesia. Indeed, today's uses and configurations of the past call into question the ways in which contingency is predicated on the amnesiac traces that digital deferral and obsolescence engender, intimating that the here and now of global environments of memory—whether physical or virtual—produce their own residual traces, and the forms and affect of such traces impinge upon the private and public discourses of memory. Hence an interrogation of the present and the shaping of today's environments of remembering are bound to the significance of

both contingency and performativity and their engagement with what is latent and liminal in memory and history.

Bibliography

Nora, P. (1989) 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire', translated by Marc Roudebush, in Representations, 26 (Spring), pp. 7–24.

Ricoeur, P. (2004) *Memory, History, Forgetting*, translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press).

Selective Bibliography

Agamben, G. (1997) *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York and London: Zone Books MIT Press).

Assmann, A. (2010) 'Re-framing Memory. Between Individual and Collective Forms of Constructing the Past', in K. Tilmans, F. van Vree and J. Winter (ed.) *Performing the Past: Memory, History, and Indentity in Modern Europe* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), pp. 35–50.

Assmann, J. (2011) *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Barthes, R. (1977/1984) *Image, Music, Text*. Essays selected and translated by Stephen Heath (London: Flamingo).

Bellour, R. (1989) *Eye for I: Video Self Portraits*, translated by Lynne Kirby, exhibition catalogue (New York: Independent Curators Incorporated).

Bellour, R (1988/2012) 'Self-portraits' translated by Ron Ross, in *Between-the-Images* (Zurich and Dijon: JPR/Ringier & Les Presses du Réel), pp. 318–393.

Benjamin, W. (1936/1999) 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', translated by Harry Zohn, in H. Arendt (ed.) *Illuminations* (London: Pilmico), pp. 211–244.

Benjamin, W. (1932/2005) 'A Berlin Chronicle', in W. Jennings, H. Eiland and G. Smith (ed.) in *Walter Benjamin Selected Writings: 1927–1934*, vol. 2 (Harvard: Harvard University Press), pp. 595–637.

Bennett J (2005) *Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).

C. Albano, *Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36588-0

Bernstern, D. (2007) 'Involuntary Autobiographical Memories: Speculations, Findings, and an Attempt to Integrate Them', in J. H. Mace (ed.) *Involuntary Memory* (Malden MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), pp. 20–49.

Boyer and J. W. Wertsch (ed.) *Memory in Mind and Culture* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 62–82.

Berrios, G. E. and Markova, I. S. (2003) 'The Self and Psychiatry: A Conceptual History', in T. Kircher and A. David (ed.) *The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 9–39.

Brett, E.A. and Ostroff, R. (1985) 'Imagery and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: An Overview', in *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 142: (4), pp. 417–24.

Bruss, E. W. (1980) 'Eye for I: Making and Unmaking Autobiography in Film' in J. Olney (ed.) *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press), pp. 296–320.

Cadida-Smith, R. (2002) *Art and the Performance of Memory: Sounds and Gestures of Recollection* (London and New York: Routledge).

Caine, B. (2010) *Biography and History* (Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan).

Carrier, P. 'Places, Politics and the Archiving of Contemporary Memory in Pierre Nora's *Les lieux de mémoire*', in R. Terdiman (ed.) *Present Past: Modernity and the Memory* Crisis (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), pp. 37–57.

Chéroux, C. (1994) *L'expérience photographique d'August Strindberg: du naturalisme au sur-naturalisme* (Arles: Actes Sud).

Chéroux, C. (2012) 'Write Your Life: Photography and Autobiography', translated by Laura Bennett, in A. Lampe and C. Chéroux (ed.) *Edvard Munch: The Modern Eye* exhibition catalogue (London: Tate Publishing), pp. 57–63.

Conway, M.A. (2009) 'Autobiographical memory and consciousness', in W. P. Banks (ed.) *Encyclopaedia of Consciousness*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Elsevier), pp. 77–82.

Conway, M.A. and Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000) 'The Construction of Autobiographical Memories in the Self Memory System', in *Psychological Review*, 107: (2), pp. 261–288.

Davidson, P. (2005) *The Idea of North* (London: Reaktion).

Dhondt, R. (2009) 'Saying Everything and Affected Self-Disclosure in the works of Reinaldo Arenas and Hervé Guibert', in E. van Alphen, M. Bal and C. Smith (ed.) *The Rhetoric of Sincerity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 263–279.

Downing, T. (2012) *The World At War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan).

Gordon, A. (1997/2008) *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*. With a new Introduction (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press).

Hellawell, S. J. and Brewin, C. R. (2004) 'A Comparison of Flashbacks and Ordinary Autobiographical Memories of Trauma: Content and Language', in *Behaviour Research and Therapy,* 42, pp. 1–12.

Holmes, E.A., Brewin C.R. and Hennessy, R.G. (2004) Trauma Films, Information Processing, and Intrusive Memory Development, in *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 23: (1), pp. 3–22.

James, W. (1890/1984) *Psychology: A Brief Course* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Kilbourn, R. J. A. (2010) *Cinema, Memory, Modernity: The Representation of Memory from the Art Film to Transnational Cinema* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge)

Kindt, M. and Engelhard, I. M. (2005) 'Trauma Processing and the Development of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder', in *Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry,* 36, pp. 69–76.

Kirmayer, L. J., Lemelson, R. and Barad, M. (ed.) (2007) *Understanding Trauma: Integrating Biological, Clinical, and Cultural Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Kracauer, S. (1926/1960) 'The Establishment of Physical Existence', in *Theory of Film. The Redemption of Physical Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 41–59.

Lissoni, A. and Bertola, C. (ed.) *Yervant Gianikian and Angela Ricci Lucchi Non Non Non* Quaderno Hangar Bicocca N. 1 exhibition catalogue (Milano: Hangar Bicocca).

Passerini, L. (1996) *Autobiography of a Generation: Italy, 1968*, translated by Lisa Erdberg (Hanover, N.H. and London: University Press of New England).

Pearson, D.G., Ross F.D.C., Webster V.L. (2012) 'The Importance of Context: Evidence that Contextual Representations Increase Intrusive Memories', in *Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry,* 43, pp. 573–580.

Prost, A. (1997) 'Monuments to the Dead' translated by Arthur Goldhammer, in P. Nora (ed.) *Realms of Memory: the Construction of the French Past*, vol. II Traditions (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 307–330.

Roth, M. S. (2012) *Memory, Trauma and History: Essays on Living with the Past* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press).

Spieker, S. (2008) *The Big Archive: Art from Bureaucracy* (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press).

Voegelin, S. (2010) *Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards A Philosophy of Sound Art* (New York and London: Continuum).

Wang Q., Leichtman, M.D., and Davies, K.I. (1998) 'Sharing Memories and Telling Stories: American and Chinese Mothers and their 3-year-olds', in *Developmental Psychology*, 34: (4), pp. 701–713.

Winter, J. (2014) *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Index

Note: Page number followed by 'n' refers to notes

C. Albano, *Memory, Forgetting and the Moving Image*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36588-0