TRANSNATIONALISM AND THE GERMAN CITY

Edited by
Jeffry M. Diefendorf
& Janet Ward

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Introduction
Transnationalism and the German City*

Jeffry M. Diefendorf and Janet Ward

It is surely the case that transnationalism is a powerful tool for breaking out of conceptual (and real) confines not only of the nation-state, but also of intensely local, self-limiting perspectives. In certain fields of enquiry, emphasizing the transfers, linkages, interactions, and temporal as well as spatial flows between two or more national processes, events, or sites clearly defies the previous expectations for the discipline.[1] Moreover, moving beyond the confines of the nation-state can provide the practical potential of encouraging interdisciplinary, comparative, and collaborative research and opening windows for new audiences for that work.

In the case of Germany, and most obviously in light of this country's mass atrocities in the mid-twentieth century, too often the national has served as the essential framework for research. We must remember that some sort of national consciousness appeared only in the nineteenth century and that a German nation-state was created as late as 1871. But Germany's borders, and sense of itself, did not provide much in the way of stability, and there was significant in- and out-migration.[2] Germany's national boundaries themselves underwent significant change after both world wars. As a relative latecomer the German nation was also more "imagined" than most other "imagined communities" of the state-as-construct, one that was highly mutable from the outset.[3]

Philipp Ther, a migration specialist, has called for the overdue transnationalization of German history, most obviously because Germany's borders have moved back and forth, and with more surrounding nations than any other European state. This "relational character" of Germany was strategically neglected by scholars during the Cold War years, and hence needs to be articulated more clearly, according to Ther—especially the history of Germany's "relations with its eastern neighbors."[4] It is a call to make Jews, Poles, and other targeted groups into "subjects," not objects, of German history—in ways not dissimilar to the ongoing process of better understanding the roles of Turks in postwar West (and now reunified) Germany. These groups were and certainly are elements in the life of German cities. For German studies scholars, in particular, transnational approaches have generated an increasingly enthusiastic surge beyond the national as a new framework for research, one

that seeks to reflect the contemporary reality about Germany, where one in three children are not born to German parents.[5]

Yet we should not get carried away by the transnational turn. In a chapter in a recent book on German colonialism, Russell Berman, a recent president of the Modern Language Association, accuses German historians of being too timid to abandon "anachronistically national paradigms." Traditional scholarship is, he states, "intellectually impoverished" and has "reached an epistemological dead end."[6] While Berman is right to call for such an entirely overdue paradigm-shift, the urban environment offers certain complexities that warrant closer examination. In our advocacy of the transnational turn, we should avoid obscuring the real importance of the local, the regional, and—yes—the national in shaping urban history, especially with respect to the urban public sphere, modern design and planning, urban sites and activities of cultural production, as well as debates concerning heritage and postwar reconstruction (the very themes of this volume, in fact). Many Germans have long identified more closely with their home towns or regions (like Bavaria) than with the German nation.

Moreover, transnationalism is not a panacea in any context, so even in the belated turn to transnationalism within German studies we should pause to consider that. For all the apparent virtues of shaking free of the confines of the nation-state, we know that transnationalism has not escaped the still-glaring contexts of asymmetrical, postimperialist "power geometries."[7] We should not need to bring up Nazism's specter of genocidally applied transnational activities to understand this point, of course. We also know, for example, that the New Europe is the Europe of new borders that seeks to divide the included EU states from the excluded east, and especially, the global south. While corporate professionals as well as intellectuals experience their worlds transnationally and reap many benefits therefrom, the immigrant working classes performing the material, localized underbelly of metropolitan labor in the First World are not well positioned to interpret their own experiences in the same privileged way.[8] Arjun Appadurai, one of the "fathers" of globalization theory, has recognized that the flipside to transnationalism is not simply contained within past cautionary tales of diasporic modernity. Our globalized world of incomplete, transnationally informed, hybridized yet ultimately uncertain identities has only exacerbated reactionary attempts at racial-cultural purification: "The road from national genius to a totalized cosmology of the sacred nation, and further to ethnic purity and cleansing, is relatively direct...blood and nationalism appear to be in a much fuller and wider embrace in the world as a whole." There is, as Appadurai finds, a "geography of anger" impacting our contemporary environment, not incidental to but very much a key part of globalization's impact.[9]

So the fact that allegiances to the national, regional, and urban local remain obstinately in situ should not be necessarily interpreted as a reactionary response.[10] Globalized scholarship with the desired goal of cosmopolitanism in mind has often tended to assume an imminent deterioration of the local in tandem with the demise of both nation and tradition. Too facile an emphasis on the virtues of the transnational can mean rejection not just of nation-based scholarship but also comparative history, a method that aims at pointing out the hard but useful currency of site-specificity and differences.[11] The good news, some scholars have noticed, is that

transnational and comparative approaches can in fact function complementarily.[12] The former is now often a "dimension," not an eclipsing, of the other.[13] This realization is due in no small part to the fact that local cultural diversity is not on the wane in the face of globalization. "The *worldwide does not abolish the local*," Henri Lefebvre already saw in 1974: people's sense of kinship with their place, ethnic origin, religion, and/or class will continue unabated, and these activities are experienced primarily on the smaller scales of the local, and by extension the regional and the national.[14] We would also note that, when we train graduate students, it is much more practical to have them master at least one language other than English and then master the intricacies of local, regional, and national archives, than to expect them to operate fully on the level of the trans-nation by mastering several languages and archival conditions in many countries.

The aim of our volume is to demonstrate how transnationalism in the city—and particularly in Germany—is, thankfully, not a zero-sum game wherein localities, regionalities, and nationalities appear to be suppressed in favor of a globalized set of identities. If anything, globalization has ended up reinvigorating the local— and Germany is, after all, a place where the local and regional brands of identity have provided far more continuity than the multiply disrupted national. The urban environment has remained host to the "translocal": empirical indications of *re*-territorialization—not oppositional entrenchment, but dialectical adaptation— have become increasingly apparent.[15] Not just migratory people but media, culture, symbols, information, commodities, and capital (in other words, all the mobile actors of cities) are in fact highly susceptible to the emotional pull and "power of place."[16]

Thus, transnationalism in the cities of Germany has been busy reinscribing the very "Germanness" of its urban spaces. The essays in our volume all call into question the seeming smoothness of the "fit" between transnationalism and the German city—where there is often, in fact, considerable "push-back" on the local and regional levels.[17] Our contributors offer an interdisciplinary spectrum of investigations concerning the conundrum of transnational urban life in Germany—discussions that revitalize debates on segregation and integration, and also open up urban transnationalism to include analyses of cultural practices, the creation and the reproduction of identity and *Heimat*, as well as the place-making role of architectural and institutional forms. The significance of transnationalism for cities is generated by, and also moves far beyond, people's vital journeys of in-/out-migration. Our volume hence pays attention to transnational processes' impact on urban space itself: transnationalism has "particular and distinctive spatialities" and "varies over time and space."[18] Not only are these transnational spaces of the city occupied by all kinds of people, recent migrants or otherwise, but they are also imbued with competing urban imaginaries and cultural expectations, which are, in Germany's case, particularly fraught.

With this nuanced vision of urban transnationalism in mind, our volume has brought together scholars from the fields of anthropology, architecture, cultural studies, history, and planning, whose empirically yet also theoretically informed essays help deflate some of the myths about how migratory and communicative practices in the globalized era relate to the presumed undoing of the multiple particularities of the urban condition. Together our contributors reconfigure the German

urban environment to show evidence of a "(trans)nationalism": a transnational set of processes coexisting amidst and alongside local, regional, and national identities rather than supplanting or dissolving them. Each of the fourteen following original essays of *Transnationalism and the German City* demonstrates that transnational urbanism, fundamental as it is for understanding the late capitalist twentieth and now twenty-first-century city, tends in fact to function in a hybrid manner. It helps, then, to think of all cities in terms of a "double move," as Michael Peter Smith has suggested: as both fluid and fixed, as localizing place and agency as well as globalizing process and network.[19]

The four essays of the first section, "Contested German Urban Publics," examine various city-based contexts of the public sphere from the German eighteenth century to post-Wall Berlin. The contributors' accounts address urban spatial articulations of the capitalist economy, colonization, housing, and immigration. In chapter one, "Enlightenment in the European City: Rethinking German Urbanism and the Public Sphere," German cultural studies scholar Daniel Purdy asks us to reconsider our understanding of the mutually informing concepts and merged lineage of the polis, the "European city," and democratic urban exchange. Extending the argument of Jürgen Habermas and using examples like Christian Friedrich Schmidt's *Der bürgerliche Baumeister* (1790–1799), Purdy examines how the German urban public sphere was born not just of Enlightenment ideas and globally oriented trade and commerce, but was, ironically, also forged by a concurrent trend toward private, increasingly differentiated, interior living spaces. Historian Elizabeth A. Drummond, in "Posen or Poznań, Rathaus or Ratusz: Nationalizing the Cityscape in the German-Polish Borderland" (chapter two), finds that the provincial Prussian-Poznanian capital city of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a site of increasing rivalry and hostilities between German and Polish nationalists. Far from realizing its potential to become a site of transnational contact and exchange between cultures and nations that was possible before the German empire-building turning point of 1871, Drummond illustrates by means of place names, the postal system, postcards, and maps how urban spaces in and representations of Posen/Poznań became aggressively radicalized toward each nationalist camp and, ultimately, at the expense of the Jewish minority.

Turning to diversity in Berlin, the next two essays of the first section investigate how attempts have been made to control the spatial distribution of class and ethnicity on the cityscape. In chapter three, "Inclusion and Segregation in Berlin, the 'Social City'," urbanist Stephan Lanz navigates a course through the politicized history of how Berlin's development plans have impacted immigrants and the poor. Lanz demonstrates how urban renewal or even urban social engineering constituted the technocratic goals of the "socially integrative city" Berlin as it emerged in the nineteenth century, through the interwar and Nazi eras, to the Cold War–divided city and the reunified capital today; and that this *Soziale Stadt* contains within itself the potential for both progressive open mixing as well as oppressive social polarization resulting from the displacement of residents into certain areas due to their socioeconomic or ethnic origins. Anthropologist Bettina Stoetzer, in "'Wild Barbecuing': Urban Citizenship and the Politics of Transnationality in Berlin's Tiergarten" (chapter four), investigates contested settings of barbecuing

in urban open spaces by Turkish picnickers as a social and material practice in Berlin as well as in Istanbul. Stoetzer's assessment of the media response to immigrant-driven barbecuing's messy invasion of the public sphere highlights, on the one hand, the rise of German monocultural anxiety vis-à-vis Muslims, as well as the Turkish capital's disdain for exhibitions of outdoor eating by the urban poor, on the other. Nonetheless, in terms of the personal experiences and agency of the barbecuing immigrants of Berlin, a new cosmopolitan civic identity has been emerging, Stoetzer finds, in tandem with barbecuing's destabilizing impact upon more regular encodings of migrant status and class on bodies in the public spaces of cities.

In the second section, "Crossing Boundaries in Modern German Planning," our volume highlights how interwar and postwar modernist design and planning can be understood to have been both more site-specific (that is, local) and yet also more transnational (hence less under national influence) than has been generally understood. Indeed, modern architectural expression forged a coexistence of global and local streams of influence. Architect and historian Deborah Ascher Barnstone draws attention to an instance of this in her essay "Transnational Dimensions of German Anti-Modern Modernism: Ernst May in Breslau" (chapter five). While cross-pollinating architectural modernism easily crossed the borders of countries such as Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands in the interwar years, Ascher Barnstone demonstrates how the vernacular modern styles themselves became transnationally spreading phenomena, too. This pragmatic simultaneity of local context and a transnationally modern building style forms the focus of Ascher Barnstone's analysis of Ernst May's designs for public housing in and around the Silesian city of Breslau.

In "Was There an Ideal Socialist City? Socialist New Towns as Modern Dreamscapes" (chapter six), historian Rosemary Wakeman discusses the degree to which post–World War II architecture and planning fell prey to a transnational form of romantic utopianism regarding the possibilities of urban form. Wakeman asks key questions not just about the modernist planning influences that fueled Socialist New Town planning in East Germany and across Eastern Europe; she also investigates the technology-driven utopia of postwar residential planning, present in the West to be sure but even more acutely visible in new town planning across the entire Eastern Bloc. Increasingly indebted first to a futuristic Sputnik-era form, then a cybernetically charged systems-theory model, these plans for new towns showcased a phantasmagorical fusion of Socialism with urban industrial power.

Revealing the degree to which the Iron Curtain caused only an illusory separation of architecture and planning between East and West during the Cold War is the focus of architectural historian Greg Castillo's contribution to the volume's second section: "Housing as Transnational Provocation in Cold War Berlin" (chapter seven). Castillo examines the at turns competing, parallel, and even intersecting paths of residential planning goals according to the rubric of each superpower's rival bids for hegemonic presence in Germany, particularly in the planning microcosm that made up the divided city and global site of East–West planning confrontation: namely, Berlin. Cold War borders are thus seen to have been, in terms of German urban planning, far more permeable than closed: the media's need to compare West Berlin's social housing with Socialist counterparts reveals that Soviet residential models remained a benchmark against which the West's welfare provision was also being weighed. In

chapter eight, "Transatlantic Crossings of Planning Ideas: The Neighborhood Unit in the USA, UK, and Germany," planner and historian Dirk Schubert charts a major innovative tool of social reform in the twentieth century: specifically, the development of the neighborhood restructuring principle as it evolved for interwar, wartime, and then postwar mass housing projects on both sides of the Atlantic. As an ideologically varied mechanism for moving beyond the slums of the high-density industrial city, for enabling a new quality of life for bombed-out citizens, and for creating a better sense of communal engagement, Schubert delineates how the transnational neighborhood unit whether applied to British, American, or German contexts nonetheless succeeded best when it responded not just to national but also to local needs and perspectives—and yet simultaneously failed when it became too site-specific, or when it succumbed to technically organizational norms.

A central logic of *Transnationalism and the German City*, emphasized in the volume's third section, "City Cultures and the German Transnational Imaginary," is to investigate the creative tensions that emerge between urban cultural productions and the broader possibilities of identification with place. The challenge of how urban communities culturally engage a sense of place (whether local or regional, national or transnational) is illustrated in the three essays of this section that focus on carnival rituals, commemorative acts recalling the Great War, and cinematic representations of German urban and American western space. In chapter nine, "Princes and Fools, Parades and Wild Women: Creating, Performing, and Preserving Urban Identity through Carnival in Cologne and Basel," historian Jeffry M. Diefendorf parses apart the various local characteristics of carnival in Swiss and German urban contexts, in order to investigate what is unique in city life and what is shared across urban, regional, and national borders. Clearly, carnival rituals have participated ever since their Christian inception in vivid intercultural transfer—and yet, as Diefendorf highlights, despite premodern and postmodern globalizing influences, carnival has retained its ability to function as a key source of local urban identity in both Basel and Cologne. Thanks to intricate and systematically local autonomy regarding event organization, participation, and performance, carnival is shown here as a regenerative source of distinctiveness for these two cities, despite the transnational fluidity of the celebratory ritual itself.

Chapter ten in the volume's third section on city cultures is titled "The Local, the National—and the Transnational? Spatial Dimensions in Hamburg's Memory of World War I during the Weimar Republic": here, historian Janina Fuge examines how the Great War was commemorated during the 1920s on the urban local level. Through the lens of the various types of ceremonies dedicated to the "Fallen Soldiers" of World War I and the media coverage of such events in Hamburg, Fuge determines that Germans did not in fact attain a post-traumatic, transnational memory of forgiveness. Rather, the memorializing and ritualizing acts of war memory initiated by most citizens of Hamburg did not linger long on border-crossing reconciliation, but tended to swiftly devolve into an overt harnessing of nationalistic religious sentiment. War trauma of World War II provides a major impulse for the themes of Wim Wenders's movies, the focus of chapter eleven by architects and urbanists Nicole Huber and Ralph Stern: "From the American West to West Berlin: Wim Wenders, Border Crossings, and the Transnational Imaginary." The bombed,

ruined cityscapes in the Germany of Wenders's childhood and his long-term, trans-continental search as a director for a lost (postwar, German) identity are substi-tuted in the oeuvre of the director with the emptied-out landscapes of the American West and populated by a series of wandering protagonists whether in German or other filmic realms. Each of Wenders's films thus offers a renewed displacement of this director's dedication to an Odyssean search for the irretrievable urban-national genius loci. Huber and Stern discern that closure cannot be reached for the German sense of postwar place; Wenders's hauntingly transitional and transnational spaces end up serving as a cinematic mythical topography of German identity.

In the fourth and final section of the volume, "German Urban Heritage for a Transnational Era," our contributors examine how both the end of German postwar modernism in the 1970s, together with the subsequent fall of the Iron Curtain and the reunification of Germany, have created new conditions for historic preserva-tion. We are currently witnessing a reevaluation on the results to date of the recon-struction of Germany's bombed-out cities: an ongoing and admittedly boosterist reformulation is unfolding. Whether we like it or not, German urban "national" design is now being reformulated within the globalized arena. Planners Grischa Bertram and Friedhelm Fischer chart this development in their essay "Post–Postwar Re-Construction of a Destroyed *Heimat*: Perspectives on German Discourse and Practice" (chapter twelve). Bertram and Fischer chart the shift from immediate postwar rebuilding out of the modernist tabula rasa to the postmodern reconstruc-tion of lost symbolic structures. The authors ask whether the current return to heri-tage reconstruction in German cities, as witnessed by over one hundred projects across the country and as driven by citizens' groups in the wake of reunification, amounts to anything beyond a façadist attempt at place-making in a globally sym-bolic urban arena, and if this perhaps constitutes a revitalization and destigmatizing of *Heimat*.

In "Berlin's Museum Island: Marketing the German National Past in the Age of Globalization" (chapter thirteen), German studies scholar Tracy Graves determines that the renovations currently taking place on the *Museumsinsel* reveal a significant amount of control over the marketing of German national culture, all in the name of a repackaging of Berlin's state museums via the masterplan's purported goal of a shared global heritage aimed at an international consuming public. Graves offers us a look forward at the architectural and curatorial strategies involved in the ongoing renovation work, a project that may attempt to shield the public from full disclosure of the Museum Island's (and hence Germany's) less-than-transnational heritage leg-acy. Lastly, in chapter fourteen, "The Historic Preservation Fallacy? Transnational Culture, Urban Identity, and Monumental Architecture in Berlin and Dresden," art and architectural historian John V. Maciuika picks up where planners Bertram and Fischer leave off. In a detailed reading of the reconstruction of Dresden's Church of Our Lady and the ongoing project for rebuilding the City Palace in Berlin, Maciuika demonstrates the degree to which contemporary Germany (along with other countries) has interrupted the transnationally applicable rules of the 1964 Venice Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites. In Dresden and Berlin, we find prominent instances of how cities have attempted to go beyond accepted limits for the scope of architectural preservation, and instead fully

resurrect lost urban heritage sites with the ultimate goal of retrieving lost cultural memory. Despite the architectural and conservationist professions' combined rejection of such aims, Maciuika cautions against dismissing this trend since it could well prove to be a complex component of the German urban postmodern for the early twenty-first century.

In conclusion, then, let us again emphasize that the essays in our volume demonstrate how transnationalism does not necessarily serve as a vehicle for the loss of place-based particularity in the German city. Rather, transnational urban perspectives can serve to contextualize which phenomena are truly local or (supra)national, all the while highlighting and comparing their struggles for ascendancy. It is certainly crucial that scholarship on the history of Germany's cities open itself up to the nation-defying opportunities suggested by the transnational turn. It is also equally important to resist letting this turn blind us to the ways in which local, regional, and national cultural traditions and institutions have shaped both continuities and changes in urban forms and structures.

Notes

1. See Steven Vertovec's synthesizing study, *Transnationalism* (New York and London, UK: Routledge, 2009).
2. Germany's national borders excluded peoples who spoke German and shared features of German culture in the Austrian empire and Switzerland; and at the same time, the borders included peoples of different ethnicities, such as Poles, and French speakers in Alsace and Lorraine. Germany's national borders also did not refer to the massive emigration of north-eastern Germans to the United States, where during the third and largest emigration wave, from 1880 to 1893, Germans became 30% of the foreign-born population. The labor shortage created by the emigration of so many Germans from the north-east fueled the "east-to-west push" into that part of Germany by Eastern European migrants, including Poles, Jews, and white Russians—the *Gastarbeiter* before the *Gastarbeiter*, as Saskia Sassen has indicated—with up to half a million in 1914 entering Germany alone. Moreover, Germans had long been busy migrating in the other direction, as well, to the east: by the end of World War I, up to 8.5 million ethnic Germans lived beyond Germany's borders across eastern Europe. See Saskia Sassen, *Guests and Aliens*, orig. 1996 in German (New York: The New Press, 1999), 56, 57; and Denis Göktürk, David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, "Preface," in *Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955–2005*, ed. Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 7.
3. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London, UK and New York: Verso, 2006).
4. Philipp Ther, "Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe," *Central European History* 36, no.1 (2003): 45–74, 71, 61–62.

5. Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes, "Preface," in *Germany in Transit*, ed. Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes, p. xvii. See also Timothy S. Brown, "'1968' East and West: Divided Germany as a Case Study in Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 114, no.1 (February 2009): 69–96; Ruth Mandel, *Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Ayhan Kaya, "German-Turkish Transnational Space: A Separate Space of Their Own," *German Studies Review* 30, no.3 (2007): 483–502; Ute Frevert, "Europeanizing Germany's Twentieth Century," *History and Memory* 17, no.1/2 (2005): 87–116; Ayse Çaglar, "Constraining Metaphors and the Transnationalisation of Spaces in Berlin," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no.4 (October 2001): 601–613; and Michael Geyer, "Historical Fictions of Autonomy and the Europeanization of National History," *Central European History* 22, no.3/4 (1989): 316–342.

6. Russell Berman, "Colonialism, and No End: The Other Continuity Theses," in *German Colonialism. Race, the Holocaust, and Postwar Germany*, ed. Volker Langbehn and Mohammad Salama (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 164–190, 165.

7. See Doreen Massey, *Space, Place and Gender* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1994); Michael McGerr, "The Price of the 'New Transnational History'," AHR Forum, *American Historical Review* (1991): 1056–67, 1064; and Peter Jackson, Philip Crang, and Claire Dwyer, "Introduction: The Spaces of Transnationality," in *Transnational Spaces*, ed. Jackson, Crang, and Dwyer (New York and London, UK: Routledge, 2004), 1–23, 9–10.

8. See Pierre Hamel, Henri Lustiger-Thaler, and Margit Mayer, "Introduction: Urban Social Movements—Local Thematics, Global Spaces," in *Urban Movements in a Globalising World* ed. Hamel, Lustiger-Thaler, and Mayer (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 7. See, for example, Katy Gardner's account, in "Desh-Bidesh: Sylheti Images of Home and Away," *Man* 28, no.1 (1993): 1–15, of the interplay between the irreconcilable concepts of "desh" (the migrant's former home, with associations of poverty and communal identity) and "bidesh" (the migrant's new locality, with aspirations for economic success) for Sylhetis in Britain and Bangladesh. Discussed by Vertovec, *Transnationalism*, 67–68.

9. Arjun Appadurai, "Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger," in *The Blackwell City Reader*, ed. Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2010), 138–43, 139, 140.

10. Many of the processes of industrial modernity can be understood as an agon between (global) technological uniformity and (local, regional, and national) cultural distinctiveness. Port and capital cities of European empires, for example, became sites for both the globalizing and nationalizing developments underway in modernity. On several levels, that agon is still being played out. See Mikael Hård and Thomas J. Misa, "Modernizing European Cities: Technological Uniformity and Cultural Distinction," in *Urban Machinery: Inside Modern European Cities*, ed. Hård and Misa (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 1–20.

11. McGerr, "The Price of the 'New Transnational History'," p. 1064. McGerr debates these issues with Ian Tyrrell: see Tyrrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History" and "Ian Tyrrell Responds," AHR Forum, *American Historical Review* 96 (October 1991): 1031–1055 and 1068–1072.

12. See Ian Tyrrell's praise for the ethnographic gender history practiced by Patricia Grimshaw, "Comparative and Transnational History," *Australian Feminist Studies* 22, no.52 (2007): 49–54; and Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt's discussion of the ongoing blending between comparative and transnational ("entangled") histories, in "Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History," in *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and*

New Perspectives, ed. Haupt and Kocka (New York and Oxford, UK: Berghahn, 2009), 1–30, 20–21.

13. Matthew Pratt Guterl, "Comment: The Futures of Transnational History," AHR Forum, *American Historical Review* (February 2013): 130–39, 132.

14. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (orig. 1974), trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Cambridge, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991), 86 (emphasis original). See Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, "Introduction: Tracking the Global/Local," in *Global / Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary*, ed. Wilson and Dissanayake (Durham, NC and London, UK: Duke University Press, 1996), 3–4.

15. See Michael Peter Smith, "Translocality: A Critical Reflection," in *Translocal Geographies: Spaces, Places, Connections,* ed. Katherine Brickell and Ayona Datta (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 181–198; Michael J. Watts, "Mapping Identities: Place, Space, and Community in an African City," in *The Geography of Identity*, ed. Patricia Jaeger (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 63–65; and Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 192.

16. On the public history-making of urban vernacular sites and minority communities, see Dolores Hayden, *The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

17. For an illustration of how "local and regional history feeds into the negotiation of sometimes diverging local political and religious identities," see Hauke Dorsch, "Integration into What? The Intercultural Week, Mental Borders and Multiple Identities in the German Town of Bayreuth," in Heidi Armbruster and Ulrike Hanna Meinhof, eds., *Negotiating Multicultural Europe: Borders, Networks, Neighbourhoods* (New York and Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 119–40, 129. See also Maiken Umbach and Bernd Hüppauf, eds., *Vernacular Modernism: Heimat, Globalization, and the Built Environment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

18. Jackson, Crang, and Dwyer, "Introduction: The Spaces of Transnationality," in *Transnational Spaces*, ed. Jackson, Crang, and Dwyer, 1.

19. Michael Peter Smith, *Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 183.

Part I
Contested Urban Publics

CHAPTER ONE

ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE EUROPEAN CITY: RETHINKING GERMAN URBANISM AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Daniel Purdy

Resistance to the leveling economics of globalization expresses itself in Germany today not only at the level of street demonstrations and leftwing politics, but also in the offices of city planners and municipal officials, who at times develop far-reaching policies under the name of preventing worldwide trends from erasing local identities and traditions. City planning and architecture are two of the more visible arenas in which this juxtaposition between "the local" and "the global" has been invoked to justify government policies. Within German urbanism, the contrast between a friendly local identity and an ominous global trend is distributed quite often across a wide spatial scale. At times, the "local" that planners claim to defend turns out to be quite vast. It can, for example, be defined in terms of a single city, a nation, or all of Europe. Indeed, the two levels are often blended into each other, such as when local contests are debated for their European consequences. This nuanced rhetorical move is plausible only because these spatial dimensions are always also set against an even larger "global" context.

One specific local constellation has had increasing prominence in German discussions about architecture and city planning, namely, the "European city." This term seeks to naturalize two distinct spatial scales, a city and a continent, by suggesting that Europe is a precondition for a certain kind of urban order, and that a particular type of city is a manifestation, or expression, of European identity. While discussing the history of this phrase, I will argue that the current invocation of the "European city" reflects conservative Germans' contradictory attitude toward the spread of capitalism into previously Communist countries. At the same time, the urge to restore cities to a European tradition also represents the latest wave of German post–World War II reconstruction—a drive to replace the 1950s and 1960s Modernism with a less functionalist design tradition.

The European city's mixture of cartography and urban sociology shows just how interdependent spatial scales are on each other. For, as it turns out, it is not really so unusual to talk about a city and a continent together in one breath. Indeed, I argue

in this chapter that one of the most basic spatial distinctions in political thought, the difference between the public and the private, shares many contradictory qualities with the European city. The concept of the European city is built on a long political history of the public and the private, whereby the public forum as a site for politics and commercial exchange is set in contrast to the private realm of property and personal intimacy. The presumption is that private space is a container sealed off from the public, just as the city itself is a walled entity bluntly marking off its difference from the surrounding landscape.[1] Rather than consider spaces in terms of polar oppositions, I maintain that as commercial cities developed historically, private spaces became increasingly compartmentalized even as long-distance trading networks expanded. The wider the reach of commercial enterprises became, the less they depended on marketplaces and other openly accessible forums. Over time, the sequestered rooms of the commercial and administrative classes emerged as the most productive sites of public discourse and global commerce. Private business chambers are ultimately as important to the economic and political vitality of a city as its squares and meeting halls. In an era of mass tourism, it is difficult to celebrate the small desk in the back room, but this is precisely where many of the most important public statements were read, written, critiqued, and dispatched. Thus, when considering the history of cities in Europe, we must remember the narrow, quiet corners as well as the crowded piazzas and packed clubs.

The notion of the European city has a two-faced relation to globalization: on the one hand, the many economic, political, and cultural relations that join cities together into the European market system constitute one of the large-scale networks of the global economy that historians can trace back to the height of the Middle Ages; on the other, the term is invoked today in order to draw a boundary and insist on a distinction so as to preserve a quality that is considered fundamentally European. This distinctly urban character is associated with public spaces that foster democratic institutions. Since the Middle Ages, the argument runs, European cities have been designed to preserve openly accessible fora for democratic politics and capitalist exchange.

The preservation of European democracy often tends to be correlated with the maintenance of these urban places. Global economic and medial networks are viewed as a threat to these distinctly local sites of democracy. It is worth reexamining the history of these ambitious claims. My aim is not only to critique some of the ideologies that accompany the concept of the European city, but also to challenge the correlation between democracy and public space that today plays such a significant role in German urban politics. I will argue in the second half of this essay that the emergence of the early modern public sphere and capitalism's first long-range trading networks were matched by an increasing compartmentalization and specialization of domestic space. As public discourse and business became more complex, the bourgeois practitioners of these two exchange systems withdrew into secluded rooms, such as the study, the family library, and the intimate salon. We must recognize that even today our most compelling ideas and arguments are often generated in isolation. My survey of early modern architectural treatises in the second half of this essay will show that the *Bürgertum* recognized the need for privacy in the midst of urbanity.

Revolutionary demonstrations and rallies may require wide-open places, but, as Georg Simmel noted, "the mental attitude of the people of the metropolis to one another may be designated formally as one of reserve."[2] One implication of this tendency toward restraint in urban spaces is that many public political statements are formulated first in places where individuals feel least subject to surveillance. For urban public spaces to accomplish their political and economic ends, they have always required the exclusive private room. Nowhere is this juxtaposition more important than in the Enlightenment institution of *Öffentlichkeit*. The spaces that make up the city are not always public or even inherently urban. In fact, some of the most important places within the city are intended for escaping the physical presence of other people. In the end, personalized rooms are just as important for establishing the media network that enable democratic politics or market exchange. This history of privacy constitutes an important component in globalization.

We can see just how readily local city debates in Germany can assume a European dimension by reviewing the contentious debates in the 1990s about how to rebuild Berlin Mitte.[3] In response to criticisms of the Berlin Senate's strict architectural guidelines for new construction in the historic center of Berlin, proponents of the official policy argued that it set an example far beyond the confines of the new capital to include not just other German cities but most of the European Union as well. The question of how to build in Berlin was transformed into a discussion of the European city.[4] In the 1990s, Berlin's powerful building director, Hans Stimmann, was often quoted as declaring that he wanted to return Berlin to the European traditions of the nineteenth century: "What we want to create here is a European building culture."[5] Upon his retirement in 2006, the *New York Times* summarized Stimmann's zoning policy with the following quote from him: "Berlin is a museum for every failed city planning attempt since 1945 . . . I wanted to go back to a city structure that I call a European city. I wanted to make Berlin readable again."[6] Josef Paul Kleihues, the initiating architect behind the blueprint of Berlin's Critical Reconstruction, reiterated the point as well: "What was accomplished in Berlin is the rediscovery of the European city. Here we have the best example of a city's critical reconstruction. And it is perhaps the first case where urbanity was thematized again. In Berlin we are building the city of tomorrow."[7] This innocuous German phrase has become a source of considerable concern among urban planners, architects, and sociologists, because the European city is consistently described as under siege—by a great variety of forces: globalization; the decline of municipal funding leading to either the neglect or commercialization of public space; star architects whose signature styles ignore local conventions; immigration from outside Europe; and, of course, the Internet. At stake is an idealized perception of the German urban experience that is closely associated with the history of European civilization, the emergence of liberal democracy, personal freedoms, and the market economy as a localized exchange that could be regulated by the state.

Despite these more modern connotations, the originating type of this European city is medieval, wherein well-preserved historic buildings are aligned along irregular streets open only to pedestrians. The type of urbanity considered typical of today's European city predates the Enlightenment and most certainly has little in common with industrialization. The network of commercial cities founded between the

eleventh and thirteenth centuries first in northern Italy, and then later in Flanders, southern Germany, and along the Baltic coast and waterways are held up as the founding sites for the tradition. This question of whether to preserve this long legacy continues to stir controversy within city planning. Nuremberg, Freiburg, and Münster were, for example, ridiculed in the immediate postwar decades for their loyal reconstruction of medieval façades and streets.[8] Today the decisions of these cities to preserve historic lot sizes, roof lines, and building materials—a policy Jeffry M. Diefendorf has described as "determined preservationism"—are held up as models of postwar reconstruction.[9] Indeed, today the old medieval city is praised for having survived both the aerial bombing and functionalist designs of the twentieth century, suggesting a distinct separation between the democratic politics ascribed to the modern public sphere and the urban spaces within which it takes place. In 1958, the Modernist architect Hans Scharoun complained about the layout of Berlin's medieval and eighteenth-century neighborhoods: "We drag this street system with us as an inheritance without really understanding its present-day meaning or its transformation"; whereas Hans Stimmann writing in 2009 referred to the free composition of the Hansaviertel as a second destruction of the city after the bombing raids of World War II.[10] The postwar town fathers in Münster anticipated Stimmann's later perspective, though they made a rhetorical distinction between their local *bürgerliche* tradition and the "big city arrogance" of Frankfurt or Berlin.[11]

The emergence of liberal democracy may have required the overthrow of monarchy, the elimination of medieval guilds, and the secularization of social relationships; however, the buildings of the pre-democratic institutions, the palaces, work houses, shops, churches, and *Rathäuser* of the older orders are now appropriated as representative of this European tradition. Excluded from the European city are many of the utopian aspirations of Modernist architecture, with its attempts to fuse revolution with an industrially defined design.[12] The large-scale housing projects and office buildings that are the legacy of Walter Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, and Le Corbusier are disavowed as disruptive intrusions that ignore the idiosyncrasies of local municipal traditions. Skyscrapers, for example, are described more often than not as either American or, increasingly, Asian forms of urban planning, despite the fact that many of the architects responsible for its elaboration as part of post–World War II capitalism were not only trained in Europe, but also developed their utopian agendas within the context of European political history.

The real problem with the tendency to associate the European city with premodern architectural forms is that it threatens to establish an orthodox position that insists on a correspondence between traditional architectural forms and European political institutions such as liberal democracy, human rights, and open debate in the public sphere. While wanting to avoid the functionalist tyranny of Modernist architecture may be a widely shared belief, the best solution is not to insist that all new architectural design programs be judged on their ability to integrate themselves into the traditions of the medieval town and the early modern market place.

The concept of the European city carries within its terms implicit geographical and historical assumptions. As the discussion around the concept has become more than an architectural question of how to integrate old buildings and neighborhoods into consumer capitalism, the term has become, especially in Germany, a means

of defining European identity. The political implications of the term have become more distinct as cultural historians entered the debate. Once the term is understood as an ideal type, not necessarily restricted to specific buildings and street plans, it acquires a teleological character. Helmut Böhme, for example, traces the European city back to the Greek polis in an almost Hegelian lineage that moves swiftly from Athens to the Roman Empire to tenth-century Europe and then on to the French Revolution.[13]

As a sociological concept, the European city can be traced back to Max Weber's differentiation between the occidental city and two other metropolitan types, the ancient and the Asian city. Weber argued that occidental cities came into existence north of the Alps during the Middle Ages as fortified market places that asserted their own political independence and wherein citizens acquired rights based on property ownership.[14] Over the course of European history, many different, complicated forms of city government and economy developed, yet in general they shared, argued Weber, many of these same qualities, whereas "the cities of Asia, with the possible exception of very isolated cases, would not, so far as we know, fit this classification at all."[15]

Despite Weber's clear-cut distinction, for much of the twentieth century, scholarly writing on the occidental city as a concept makes a deliberate point of turning away from Orientalist projections onto an Asian Other, even as it relies on these distinctions to define itself. While Max Weber practiced comparative sociology, many of the later proponents of the European city concentrate solely on the medieval West, and leave aside any substantive contrasts between types. Within the broad sweep of nineteenth-century Orientalism, historical writing on the occidental city presents itself as a deliberate move away from Asia, back into the European past. In defining the occidental city, Weber was not concerned with establishing knowledge for the sake of administering and mastering distant territories. The occidental city is understood today as a means of legitimating and isolating Europe. Rather than projecting power outward through claims to have understood the Orient, sociological accounts of the occidental city use knowledge of Asia and antiquity to separate Europe from the rest of the world. Hence the European city is deployed today largely to keep globalization at bay and to discourage immigration. To this end, the discourse around the term seeks to avoid Weberian comparisons even as it accepts them as a justification for preserving that which is distinctly "European." The twenty-first-century discourse is not very concerned with defining some ancient essence of Asian or Islamic cities, for the threat that Chinese cities today seem to represent is itself an outgrowth of European modernization: the obliteration of local history through the overwhelming spread of anonymous, industrial architecture. Indeed, the concept of an Asian and Islamic city typology has lost credibility among architectural historians, which makes it all the more striking that Weber's terminology should now be invoked as part of a discourse seeking to recover an idealized European urbanity.[16]

Historical scholarship on the occidental city places considerable emphasis on the internal political organization of medieval market cities and on their trade relations with distant lands. This twofold move insists on a unique (European) character to relationships within the city walls without foregoing thriving economic relations with the wider world. The emphasis on the political organization, that is,

the rights of property-owning citizens, insists on the existence of a unique quality that does not originate outside of Europe. Out of the property rights and political privileges of medieval Burgher, social theorists of the European city have developed a historical lineage that they wish to connect with the present. One problem with positing a continuous European history of urban life is that medieval and early modern notions of communal identity were radically disrupted with the advent of the modern industrial city. In the first half of the twentieth century, there was a vast discourse on modernity that stressed the radical rupture industrial cities made with the social norms of earlier communal life, yet scholarship on the occidental or European city nevertheless insists on the maintenance of an urban social consensus, on the preservation of an unbroken metropolitan political tradition. This is the fantasy inherent in beliefs about the European city—that there exists an unbroken continuity between the political consciousness of urban dwellers today and in the international trading classes of the Middle Ages. Athens and Rome are invoked at times as longer projections backward into history, but as far as the emergence of European capitalism and democratic institutions is concerned, the medieval city is the most important predecessor.

The concept of the European city asserts real historical connections between citizenship, property rights, democratic governance, and architecture—terms that have had strikingly different valences across the twentieth century. One might ask, for example, how the history of cities is deployed as a seemingly neutral discourse within the much more highly charged debates over migration and assimilation. Does the concept of a European urban tradition secretly carry other ideological connotations along with it? Do fields like city planning, architecture, and urban history serve as apparently nonideological referents for more controversial claims about European identity, the composition of urban spaces, the population of cities and the operation of political decision making? If one affirms the importance of "tradition" within European city planning and architecture, has one also agreed to a traditional approach to questions of citizenship and urban politics?

The ideological connotations that developed from the occidental city type became more explicit after Weber's death in 1920. The malleability of the urban typologies for ideological purposes shows itself in the work of Fritz Rörig, a medieval historian.[17] Over three decades, and as many political regimes, Rörig produced a wide body of work on the Hansa League and medieval urban trade, starting first in 1923 as a professor at the University of Kiel, then after 1935 in Berlin under the Nazis and then subsequently in the restructured East German Humboldt University until 1952. The first phase of his research on cities culminated in his vast 1933 study, "Die europäische Stadt."[18] Rörig largely redefined the scholarly understanding of the Hansa in the twenties and the early thirties by demonstrating that these merchant cities were integrated into a medieval network of international trade. His argument shared important features with that of the Belgian historian of medieval cities, Henri Pirenne, and was later a source for Fernand Braudel. Yet, by the mid-1930s, Rörig had adapted his Hansa scholarship to the Nazi plans for eastern European expansion.[19] The "European city" of the Hansa became a nationalist *völkisch* project so that Rörig could describe the Hansa as spreading German spirit through the founding of cities along the Baltic.[20] Even in his most obvious National

Socialist formulations, Rörig never stopped insisting that the medieval colonization of Slavic regions was a European enterprise. Hanseatic cities along the Baltic, he claimed, had asserted a distinctly European character that extended beyond the borders of the Holy Roman Empire.[21] After the war, Rörig's scholarship reiterated his pre-Nazi claim that the Hansa League had spread a market-oriented form of "European city" eastward, which he traces back to the textile industry in late medieval Flanders.[22] In the end, the shifts from one ideology to another never produced clean breaks, and Rörig's postwar scholarship continued to reiterate a link between the racial composition of the cities' *Bürger* and the cohesion of the Hansa League as a successful trade association.[23]

Late twentieth-century scholarship on the occidental or European city passes over the uncomfortable recent past of the German colonization of Eastern Europe, and instead concentrates on the Weberian thesis that medieval trading cities fermented democratic institutions while developing an extensive export market, both goals of the West German postwar *Wirtschaftswunder*. In 1991, the historian Ernst Pitz opened his study of medieval cities by linking the emergence of trading and manufacturing with the universal claims of the Enlightenment: "The freedom that the European bourgeoisie had acquired is the kernel of what European philosophers and statesmen have wanted to secure for all people since the eighteenth century and what we today understand as freedom in the political sense.[24] Christian Graf von Krockow asserted in 1993 that the rights and freedoms enjoyed by medieval *Bürger* were the latent context for the French Revolution's overthrow of feudal law, a tradition that he claimed extended as far East as Kiev but, which he insists, never emerged in Moscow.[25] More recently, Walter Siebel has distinguished the European city from American market cites by arguing that since the Middle Ages, European elites have contained and guided the growth of urban spaces. To this day, Siebel argues, European cities have an influential social elite committed to preserving the historical character of local neighborhoods. Siebel sees a double tradition of urban planning and political engagement in the European city.[26] The communal memory of these cities goes hand in hand for Siebel with a political commitment to avoid the spatial and class polarizations of neoliberal urban policies.

The discourse around the European city is however not just a means of integrating architecture with an idealized history of democracy, it also regularly draws distinctions between continents, so that the European city is characterized as having a genealogy distinct from other places. What is left out of these historical and geographical teleologies is any consideration of the very long and complex histories of much larger cities in China or India. But the questions surrounding the European city are not about whose city is bigger, so much as how to organize the populations within them. The small size of the European city relative to cities elsewhere in the globe is precisely what contemporary writers on the subject value. Small-scale social stability accompanied by affluence is what separates the European city from massive cities being constructed in China today. The European city trope insists that upheavals of modernization now underway in Asia have already been completed in Europe. The construction of inexpensive housing for rural populations moving to cities in search of industrial work, the distribution of the middle classes into neighborhoods outside the cities' administrative and economic centers, the rushed

construction of urban infrastructure and transportation systems, the huge leap from agrarian impoverishment to urban industrialization, all these changes Europe likes to think are behind it. The concept of the European city presumes that there is basically only one course of industrial modernization that Europe has already completed, and that China has just begun. The concern that Europe might have to continue to modernize, or continue to adapt itself to new migrations and technologies, finds its expression in the fear that the European city as we know it might cease to exist and that the arrival of new populations might force cities to spread out beyond their existing borders to become large sprawling urban conglomerates, but without the historic charm of (say) the Netherlands.

That new technologies could make concentrated urban living impractical and unnecessary was already a theme within early twentieth-century Modernism. The current version of this anxiety discussed in Berlin concerns the massive suburbanization that the city has undergone since the Wall was removed. Berlin is of course late in coming to this problem: West German, French, English, and American cities have struggled with it since their respective waves of post–World War II affluence led city dwellers to build larger houses in the surrounding countryside. Coupled with the early stages of Berlin sprawling out into Brandenburg is the general worry that media technologies will make obsolete the need for (desirable) urban populations to congregate in specific downtown locations. The worry is that the city centers will once again be abandoned by the middle classes only to be taken over by newly arrived (undesirable) immigrants who have not yet found the financial means to settle in the suburbs. To avoid just such a dissolution of the city, urban planners and sociologists place great emphasis on the unique value of public spaces within historic urban centers.[27] The old market places and church plazas, the theater and the Philharmonie, the museum and the park are set in opposition to the as-yet-undefined spaces of new media technology. Hence, attempts at preserving the European city have focused on reviving or preserving the vibrancy of public meeting places. These centers are celebrated as the birthplace of democracy, as the stage upon which political freedoms are asserted; yet of course the challenge for planners is how to sustain these public spaces economically when there is no political upheaval to reinvigorate them.

Democracy and capitalism were able to develop within European cities, it is argued, because of the simultaneous development of both municipal politics and private property: a polar opposition that is commonly described as unique to Europe and lacking among the cities of Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas. This familiar juxtaposition is worth reconsidering in order to show just that urban spaces ought not to be understood in dualistic pairs. One crucial role often overlooked is that played by private spaces in the emergence of the media that became vital to long-distance trade as well as political emancipation. Scholars sometimes pay more attention to the open, still legible spaces of cities, while giving less weight to the private chambers that fostered such media networks. A reading of Jürgen Habermas's *Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere* along with sideways glances toward Fernand Braudel's multivolumed histories of early modern trading cities, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century*, will show the emergence of an inverse relationship between the increasing compartmentalization of private space into ever-more exclusive chambers and, precisely, the expansion of global networks. One way of

highlighting this relationship is by analyzing the architectural transformations that occurred in the late eighteenth century and their impact on the formation of the public sphere, a concept that is so often invoked in contemporary accounts of the European city. Enlightenment forms of theoretical space are often difficult to localize and only are mentioned in passing as specific sites (coffee houses, salons, market squares, stock exchanges). They all have a temporary quality to them and lack the stability and permanence of government institutions. Far from being a historical question, the same spatial vagueness dogs discussions of the public sphere's larger offspring: global cosmopolitanism. Where exactly is the cosmopolitan place today that hovers between the Internet and the city?

One way of challenging contemporary conclusions about the European city lies in reexamining the interdependence between architecture and media in the Enlightenment. Both Habermas and Braudel argue that media has long played a crucial role in the rise of trading centers. Habermas's description of long-distance trade certainly appears, at first glance, to overlap with Braudel's history of cities in world commerce. Without seeming to have known about Braudel's writing, Habermas gives a concise version of Braudel's more elaborate history of how cities developed trade routes from northern Italy to Flanders, in order to provide a historical background to the emergence of the public sphere in the eighteenth century. The specialized needs of merchants in Brugge, London, Antwerp, and Hamburg, to pick just a few cities, developed into generalized social relations, so that the pressing need for news of distant wars, storms, and navigation transformed into a broader network of communication in the form of newspapers and periodicals.

Although Braudel, his predecessor Henri Pirenne, and their kin have characterized the history of cities in terms of the network relations between them, these scholarly accounts also reveal a readerly pleasure in descriptions of the specific places within cities where trading took place. Recent historians of Flemish cities have increasingly emphasized the unique character of such urban places. In this new historical approach, the spatial characteristics of market squares are not just secondary information buried with a systematic economic analysis: they constitute, rather, the framework within which economic and political negotiation takes place.[28] This new spatial emphasis augments older economic histories that concentrated on the city's role with the development of capitalist market relations by emphasizing the unique local conditions within which systemic conflicts were negotiated.[29] The older historiography of medieval cities (built on Weber's terms) described them as a local market within a walled, fortified settlement surrounded by farmers who traded with the urban artisan. The city was seen as distinct economic unit supported by its neighboring agricultural areas. Yet as the historian Marc Boone argues, marketplaces were not just sites of economic exchange, but they were also places where the city's factions gathered to voice their claims. Boone cites Henri Lefebvre in arguing that market places were capable of producing political forces autonomous from the strictly economic relations of exchange. Boone insists that we should not consider medieval markets solely in terms of trade, but as sites where diverse identities were represented. Late medieval marketplaces allowed cities to assert their independence just as they granted feudal rulers a place to display their sovereignty. Without mentioning Habermas, Boone's thesis presents marketplaces as early sites of the public

sphere where Flemish cities struggled to preserve their own autonomy in the face of Burgundian and Habsburg claims to overlordship. The local conflicts of the market as a performance ground for competing political factions also had a media echo that moved beyond the immediate scene of confrontation. Pamphlets, correspondences, and *Flugblätter* circulating in the Low Countries' civil society carried the immediate political drama to a European audience. These printed representations of spatial politics were vital to the later post-Enlightenment public sphere, so that later Liberal depictions of the Dutch Revolt, by writers such as Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, or the American historian John Lothrop Motley could look back on the sixteenth-century struggle as a model for later attempts at political emancipation.[30] In discussing the spatial dimension of urban political confrontations, we need, then, to consider how media representations extended the confrontations of the immediate physical spaces to include broader, media-defined public spaces. We ought not confine the public sphere to particular sites of political confrontation but rather conceive it in terms of a broad geography of media distribution, even if the content of the news is about specific events and sites.

The growth of movement in commodities between northern European entrepots depended on an inter-metropolitan communication network. The goods available on the markets in Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, Nuremberg, London, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Amsterdam appeared there not only because these cities had the physical and financial infrastructure required for long-distance trade, but also because they were enmeshed in communication networks that allowed negotiations to occur between partners far removed from one another. Public places in late medieval and early modern cities were not used only to display goods or sovereignty, they were also points where different media networks converged.[31] After all, our historical knowledge about the movement of commodities and the representation of power within the market place depends on printed representations of this process. Information poured into the market places and then out again. The question remains: how did this flow affect the spaces within the city? To what extent were events within urban plazas staged so that they would resonate across Europe?

Boone foregrounds the historical subjugation of independent trading cities by territorial states, a development that Habermas and Braudel do not stress in their histories of urban trade routes. Regardless of how theorists may see connections between late medieval trading centers and the Enlightenment's public sphere, it is important to bear in mind that the great trading municipalities had ceased to operate as independent political actors by the eighteenth century because they had been absorbed or suppressed by larger territorial states that were better able to project first military and then economic forces against them.[32] In terms of German theories of the public sphere, it was Hans Paul Bahrdt who pointed out the great political rupture that distinguished the trading cities in Northern Italy, Flanders, and the Hansa League from the urban culture of the Enlightenment: "We should not overlook the fact that the modern territorial state had already overtaken the city as the dominant political form well before a public forum for politics and securing the privacy of citizens became guiding principles. The old free cities were not the political unit that asserted itself against the absolutist state. The cities had by then already fallen into decay…."[33] The lesson that one can take from Bahrdt is that we should not

automatically connect the bourgeois public sphere with urban spaces, German or otherwise.

German architectural treatises of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century initially shared an enthusiasm for the trading cities Braudel and Habermas describe. The genealogy of trading networks even shows the architectural presentation of the stock market as a building type. Each plan for an exchange referenced its predecessor. If we consult the work of Nicholas Goldmann, the influential Silesian who taught architecture at the University of Leiden in the middle of the seventeenth century, we find that even though he is clearly familiar with Dutch examples he cites buildings in Venice and the Veneto in order to explain the market hall as a building type, specifically Palladio's Vincenza Basilica.[34] We can see how the reputation of the Low Countries as trading centers is well established by the following century when Göttingen professor Johann Penther makes no mention of northern Italian cities in his history of the stock market, preferring instead to concentrate on Flemish examples. These early modern architectural treatises provided their courtly readers with the first plans on how to emulate in German cities the market squares and *Börsen* of Flanders.[35] In the fourth volume of his *Ausführliche Anleitung zur bürgerlichen Bau-Kunst*, Penther provided German readers with a short urban history of the *Börse*, suggesting that as an institution it remained unfamiliar. He defined its function both for the market and governance generally. Along the way he recounted the legend of the Brugges-based family von der Beurse, who supposedly lent their name to the institution.[36] Since the Low Countries were quite clearly the reference point for any German discussion of sophisticated trading centers, Penther made sure to compare his plans for an urban center with the existing trading houses in Brugges and Antwerp. Both these late Baroque architects were addressing an ideal reader who was participating in princely projects to found new cities or redesign traditional ones. Their aim was to replace the architectural traditions of medieval municipalities with the Classical orders derived from Italian treatises. Penther explained that his market places could serve as amphitheaters for staging spectacles in the Roman manner when they were not in being used for commercial purposes (Figure 1.1). Most notably, Penther also incorporates private houses into his plaza, allowing us to recognize that by the end of the eighteenth century, the architectural interest in designing new open places in German urban centers was subsiding.[37] Instead of presenting readers with plans for stock and commodity exchanges, architectural treatises in the late eighteenth century concentrated on showing three-story houses with multiple apartments for unrelated families that could be combined with commercial spaces for craftsmen and retail stores. By 1800, the audience for architectural treatises had shifted away from the princely courtiers who sought to adapt municipal institutions for the Absolute state. Instead, they addressed the professional and commercial classes living within cities but organized through media. The municipal glories of early modern trading cities were long over, and the emergence of the public sphere could not be understood in the same terms Braudel uses to describe Dutch and Italian trading cities. Rather, the spatial conception presented in late eighteenth-century treatises turned away from the open squares that served as markets or parade grounds and toward the private house.

Figure 1.1 Marketplace with private houses attached, from Johann Friedrich Penther, *Ausführliche Anleitung zur bürgerlichen Bau-Kunst*, vol. 4 (Augspurg: Johann Andreas Pfeffel, 1748).

Source: Image courtesy of University of Heidelberg.

The question emerges, then, why around the year 1800 architects were designing more compartmentalized houses with isolated living spaces, just as the German *Bürgertum* was entering into a broad international market for consumer goods. Even at its birth, the German public sphere was bifurcated between experiences of transnational urban exchange and isolated media consumption. As much as we love to wander through a *Fußgängerzone* filled with stores and people, these colorful markets were not the spaces that constituted the public sphere.

Starting in the seventeenth century, urban spaces were increasingly subdivided into smaller units dedicated to increasingly specialized uses. The emergence of the stock exchange is itself one of these important differentiations, whereby the buying and selling of financial obligations was separated out from the larger public markets in the center of town. These public markets for agricultural products and craft goods were also increasingly subdivided beyond the old medieval distinctions between fish markets, meat stalls, and produce fairs. This broad tendency toward increasing spatial differentiation can be found in the increasing partition of domestic households into private rooms set apart from the open family.[38] This transformation had different regional variations, and it often required the construction of new housing even as the street façades kept their medieval appearance. Renovations within the large

open areas of older houses resulted in a succession of subdivisions within the main house, as well as the addition of structures in back courtyards. Household spaces were filled in, divided, and in the case of basements even dug out. As the demand for privacy increased, households sought not only to expand the amount of space available, but also to differentiate more precisely who would occupy it and for what purpose. Architectural historians tend to discuss the specialized functionality of these new rooms, such as separate sleeping quarters for parents, the isolation of the kitchen at the back of the house. However, just as important are the new identities and modes of thought that this privacy provided.

Across the Enlightenment's century, the organization of interior space emerged as a most vexing architectural problem. The conventions governing façades had been established centuries before by Italian theorists, and they were so well known that they were falling under the kind of epistemological critique that occurs only after a cultural convention has been fully established. While critics questioned the cosmological assumptions implicit in the Classical Orders, a much more personalized debate was emerging on the question of how to better organize a building's interior. For centuries, the inner arrangement of rooms was dictated by the requirement that the façade appear ordered and symmetrical. Thus the number and layout of rooms was dictated by the position of windows, entrances, and columns. Buildings were constructed from the outside in, resulting in an unsettling confusion behind the walls of decorated façade. Johann Georg Büsch argued in 1793 that interior design had been a largely neglected aspect of German architecture, and yet general rules for the layout of rooms still could not be developed because the arrangements were always dependent on personal needs and taste.[39] This new concern for the insides of city houses can easily be understood as the architectural materialization of eighteenth-century intellectual developments, in terms of a heightened subjectivity, an individual manner of reading texts, and a decline in late medieval and courtly styles of sociability.

The north German townhouse emerged as a succession of alterations to the large open space of the archaic hall house (*Hallenhaus*). Because nonaristocratic buildings were rarely included in architectural treatises during the medieval and early modern periods, these transformations have been reconstructed through more elaborate ethnographic research. Architectural historian Gunter Binding describes the process whereby the large single room interior of the traditional house was divided into smaller compartments. According to Binding, the north German *Bürgerhaus* developed out of the Middle Ages from the Low German hall house. In its earliest form, the hall house had an entrance along its middle axis that was aligned with the street-side position of the façade's gable. The distinguishing characteristic of this building type was the *Halle*, which was wide and open all the way up to the roof. The fireplace was a source of heat and light, a surface for cooking, as well as a workplace for household manufacturing; however, the *Halle*'s lack of chimney would cause the upper floors of the house to fill with smoke. Starting in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the *Halle* started taking on some of the attributes associated with southern German houses, such as a basement and the creation of enclosed *Stuben* on the street-side of the house that held crawl spaces for sleeping and storage. Inside the cavernous hall, chambers were added that hung from the rafters and that could be

accessed through stairs. By the sixteenth century, the entire height within the front section of the house was filled with individual chambers. The windows in the façade allowed light to flow into these smaller rooms in the front of the building, while the large hall in the back was lit by the fireplace and by windows in the back wall and roof. Above the *Halle*, more small spaces were built for storage. Eventually, these upper chambers were used as sleeping quarters, and then eventually if the household grew larger, the back courtyard would be filled in with small structures that eventually would become wings to the central building. Throughout this process, the central hall remained the primary living space, where business and manufacturing work were combined with cooking and household labor. Only later was the *Halle* subdivided with walls.[40]

In formulating their new models for bourgeois housing, eighteenth-century treatises make mention of the historical transformation Habermas describes. As they lay out plans for newly subdivided urban apartments, they characterize the older household model. Johann Georg Büsch, a Hamburg mathematician and schoolmaster, described the kind of houses that were no longer being built by the end of the eighteenth century. In his 1793 treatise, *The Science of Building: A Practical Presentation* (*Praktische Darstellung der Bauwissenschaft*), Büsch describes the households that he remembers from his childhood: "In times gone by, the bourgeois family liked to gather itself, man, woman and children in a comfortable house with a expansive living room and chambers in which the family could disperse itself at night to sleep."[41] These houses did not have separate chambers for the *Gesinde*, nor did the *Hausherr* keep his papers isolated in a room for himself. Business correspondences were written and stored in the same large hall where dinner was cooked and wool was spun. Personal individual comfort, Büsch claims, was less important to these older generations. Family members were more closely supervised by the *Hausvater* in these single-room households, according to Büsch. This characterization of the traditional patriarchical household was confirmed by Gotha architect Friedrich Schmidt, who in 1788 described the newest bourgeois designs. Before going into his modern plans, Schmidt provided his readers with elaborate description of the traditional household:

> Among the needs for the old patriarch were the following: a large living room in which the entire family could gather and wherein all household affairs could be carried out; a pair of sleeping chambers,…a large kitchen, often set aside from the other rooms; an wide open hall with red or black painted walls, that was not sub-divided by a staircase;…a large and fancy receiving room, a maid's chamber, a pair of vegetable pantries, and chambers of smoking meat, as well as storing malt, hops and flax that was everything one wanted.…[42]

Schmidt's own architectural plans for modern city houses were intended to replace this older arrangement in order to address the new requirements of the *Bürgertum*.

Early modern architectural treatises confirm the claim that the increasing subdivision of interior space was related to the emergence of consumer culture. By examining architectural drawings for both public markets and private houses, we can recognize an increasing differentiation between the two functions, so that market

places are designed more thoroughly with commercial and political interests in mind, thereby differentiating them more sharply from the private spaces required for conducting long-range, written, business transactions as well as personal luxury consumption. The increasing subdivision of private space was directly connected to the design of commercial marketplaces, but drawings from later in the eighteenth century clearly illustrate the increasing isolation of the bourgeois house and its even greater complexity of its internal organization, leading thereby to the further separation of the family's consumption from the commercial sphere. Both discourses legitimated their designs by citing *Bequemlichkeit* as a distinctly private experience that was removed from the intruding glances of neighbors and colleagues.[43] The term was invoked repeatedly to describe the kind of products and lifestyle associated with the new bourgeois discourse on consumption. *Bequemlichkeit* in architecture meant following the wishes of the client as closely as possible without compromising the stability of the building.[44] This new comfort-oriented manner of dressing, eating, decorating, socializing, and housing oneself was sharply distinguished from the older, feudal mode of presenting the individual as the embodiment of a particular *Stand*, *Stadt*, or *Geschlecht*. The correspondence between shifting architectural designs and social transformations was already apparent at the beginning of the eighteenth century to Leonhard Christian Sturm, who worried that an architectural concentration on *Bequemlichkeit* would require a great variety of different building types to reflect the different *Stände*.[45]

Friedrich Schmidt emphasized the link between the new concern for interior comfort and luxury consumption when he introduced his conception of modern housing to readers of the *Mode Journal* (Figure 1.2). As an opening gesture, he felt compelled to explain why as an architect he was writing in a fashion journal, rather than dedicating his volume to a princely ruler: "It cannot be denied that a house, in which one can live comfortably and pleasantly, belongs to the necessities of life, something every rational person wishes to acquire...."[46] The fact that a house would exist as a commodity to be bought and sold on the market, that it would be designed with the current fashions and tastes in mind, and would serve as an investment were all strikingly new notions in a society that still had sharply restrictions on the conditions and classes allowed to own property. An allusion in Schmidt's text to the cynical philosopher who lived naked in a large barrel only serves to reinforce the interchangeability of clothing and housing. Claude Perrault had already argued in the late seventeenth century, to great scandal, that the conventions of Classical architecture were not actually based upon the mathematical harmonies of the natural world, but instead on the particular tastes that reigned at the leading courts.[47] His *Treatise on the Five Orders in Architecture* was intended as a commentary on Vitruvian building norms inherited from antiquity and elaborated by Italians in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, yet it sparked instead a furious debate within the French Academy over the cosmological foundations of the Ionic, Corinthian, Doric, Tuscan, and Composite orders. Writing almost a century after Perrault, Schmidt allowed for a free market understanding of buildings as objects defined not only by the needs, but also by the comforts and desires of their inhabitants. Vitruvius, the author of the sole surviving architectural treatise

Figure 1.2 Interior of late eighteenth-century Bürgerhaus, in *Der bürgerliche Baumeister, oder Versuch eines Unterrichtes für Baulustige*, Friedrich Christian Schmidt, vol. 2 (Gotha: Reyher, 1794).

Source: Image courtesy of University of Heidelberg.

from antiquity, had required that every building have three qualities—*firmitas*, *utilitas*, and *venustas*—and every modern European language and epoch has generated its own set of translations. In late eighteenth-century German, *utilitas*, which in English is often rendered as "commodious," was translated as *Bequemlichkeit*. Hence, Schmidt's easy analogy between the *utilitas*, or *Bequemlichkeit*, of a consumer good and of a well-built house: "As our culture has risen, so have our mores and ways of thinking changed, hence living quarters now require more delicacy and comfort than in the past. Luxury has increased and with it our requirements for the rooms we use to live in. The architect of today must concern himself with these if a building is supposed to suit our age."[48] The new orientation for housing meant that architects needed to concentrate on the internal organization of building in order to address the varying needs of a building's occupants.

One of the underappreciated paradoxes of Habermas's model is his assertion that the bourgeois public sphere takes place in the private spaces of the bourgeois interior. Despite the open spatial connotations of the English translation of *Öffentlichkeit*, architectural critics have noted that the public sphere does not really have a well-defined location, a specific theater within which it takes place. There has been considerable scholarship on salons, coffee houses, and the theater as sites of *Öffentlichkeit*, and these are usually the places associated with Habermas's model. Political theorist Pauline Johnson has summarized the familiar history: "A vibrant urban culture

arose in the course of the eighteenth century to offer a new space to the emerging self-consciousness of this new public. City life with its lecture halls, museums, public parks, theatres, meeting houses, coffee shops, and the like formed a spatial environment for a new mode of association between individuals who were not called upon to sacrifice their anonymity."[49] These sites may have served as transitional sites removed from the representational display of the princely courts; however, they are not the most important nor, by the standards of our own media-driven age, the most intellectually productive sites of the public sphere. If we follow the architectural discourse of the period, the public sphere is better located in the isolation of the private chamber. Just as the Internet cannot be reduced to Starbucks or the campus computer lab, so too we cannot pin the public sphere in the early modern period down to London coffee houses and Parisian salons, along with their German counterparts. City planners today cannot rely on historical precedents to determine where the public debate occurs. It is not possible for German planners to insist that public politics always occurs within the same spaces. Urban planners cannot, with any certainty, invoke the history of European cities to predict specifically where *Öffentlichkeit* takes place. For as Habermas noted, the public sphere is often located outside the immediate reach of government policy, that is, in private spaces: "Included in the private realm was the authentic 'public sphere', for it was a public sphere constituted by private people."[50] Or as Hans Paul Bahrdt wrote: "The book case in the living room represents the world historical events of the present and the past."[51] Understood in architectural terms, these spaces are themselves increasingly compartmentalized and segmented, broken down into limited units that are held apart from each other. Habermas's model has an almost hidden dialectic, for he argues that it is in the isolation of the intimate family setting that the broader unity of the public sphere emerges. Within this private sphere, Habermas distinguishes further between the domestic life in which work and consumption occur and the activities associated with the political *Öffentlichkeit*, yet all are situated within the rooms of the bourgeois house, allowing us to isolate in architectural terms the actual *place* of the public sphere. The new arrangement of specialized rooms for reading within the domestic quarters reflects the new secular and professional texts that replace the religious books that were once read aloud for the entire family's edification. The second volume of Schmidt's architectural treatise of the 1790s directly addresses the urban administrative class Habermas describes, for Schmidt states that his plans are typically "intended to show how an a very small and a middle-sized bourgeois family can fit all necessary comforts into three stories."[52] Schmidt describes his ideal audience as a generally literate and well-read family living in a small or middle-sized town, consisting of a bourgeois man who can no longer work in the living room of a traditional hall house, because he has so many correspondences and negotiations that he needs a study in which can write undisturbed. The old "housefather" role has not vanished, for this study should have direct access to the living room so that the husband may speak with his wife. Sounding very modern, Schmidt goes on to write that the members of the household have sensitive nerves and weak constitutions, and that they therefore need bedrooms directly next to the living room so that they can sleep in moderately warm air. Because many mothers no longer nurse their own children, Schmidt regretfully notes that children need to be housed in a separate

nursery rather than in the family living room. Older children are taught music, drawing, writing, geometry, and needlepoint, which all require special equipment to be set aside in other rooms. Whereas the "housemother" sat in the living room at her spinning wheel, she now has a cook, maids, and servants, all of whom must be given quarters in the house. These requirements bring with them the need for a new architecture that cannot be found in the older Italian treatises. Schmidt states that he has paid considerable attention to the inner organization of the houses, because his audience belongs to the class of people who are more aware of comfort and aesthetics than lower-class city dwellers.

Reflecting on such large-scale changes in eighteenth-century housing, Habermas claims that the line between feudal representation in public and the private sphere ran right through the middle of the traditional house. In the older *Hallenhaus*, the interior consisted of an open hall at the center of which was the hearth. The housefather and mother oversaw everyone's activities from the center of this room. Their physical placement within the house allowed them to supervise children, servants, and relatives alike. According to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conservatives, the decline of social control over the lower classes was a consequence of this retreat by the housefather from the home's central vantage point. One need only think of Jeremias Gotthelf's moralization of domestic architecture in "Die schwarze Spinne" to understand how the retreat of the housefather and mother into their own private spaces represented an abdication of disciplinary responsibility. Habermas relies on Wilhelm Riehl, the nineteenth-century ethnographer, for his history of privatization within the household.[53] Riehl, like Gotthelf, saw the emergence of urban bourgeois household arrangements as a revolutionary threat to the tradition of "das ganze Haus," a phrase coined by Riehl. While Habermas does not draw the same apocalyptic conclusions as Riehl, he does follow his history of domestic space.

So were conservatives such as Riehl the only critics to comment on the slow transformation of interior life over the course of the eighteenth century? By drawing on architectural treatises, we can find an enthusiastic celebratory presentation of these changes, entirely unlike Riehl's sense that the world was coming to an end with the dissolution of "das ganze Haus." By comparing eighteenth-century architectural plans for urban housing with Habermas's delineation of the bourgeois public sphere, it becomes clear that the conceptual terms are not directly reflected in spatial plans. The gregarious city life that is now celebrated as the essence of European urbanity was always intermixed with a media-driven sociability that for a time removed people from circulation with the household or the market. The history of German architectural treatises shows that this "unsocial" sociability helped to define the internal organization of new building designs. Unlike the princely court, the Habermasian public sphere never produced a distinct type of building. Indeed, rather than any correspondence between the exchange of information, business arrangements, political news, and some place where such discourse occurs, there is an increasingly inverse relationship between the sites of the public sphere and its increasingly universal subject matter. The more public sphere debates tend to address the world at large, then, the more private becomes the architecture that enables this discourse in the first place. The eighteenth-century exchange of business news did not happen in a clearly delineated space like the markets or *Börse* of

sixteenth-century Antwerp. Instead, the production and consumption of commodities and information retreated into the exclusive rooms of the bourgeois household, which was thoroughly dependent on the market as an abstraction, but less open to its spatial arrangements. The chaos of the market place, the jumble of trades, and commodities bumping up against each other in an unruly cacophony of foreign exchange: all this was cordoned off by the new households of the eighteenth-century urban classes. The more intertwined these households became with an increasingly global exchange system, the more they sequestered themselves.

The long-term lesson here for recent post-Wall discussions of the European city in Berlin, Germany, and the New Europe is that the unsocial nature of media exchanges are inherently part of the urban experience of sociability. The public sphere is not necessarily limited to *public* places. The very abstraction of the public sphere means that it relies on fewer specific infrastructure locations—compared with transportation networks, which depend on harbors, bridges, rail stations, and airports. By uncoupling the public sphere from specific locations in the European city, we allow for new experiments in architectural design and public discourse.

Notes

1. Walter Siebel, "Einleitung," *Die europäische Stadt* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 14. Siebel is one of the most visible proponents for the concept. In the introduction to this volume, he clearly defines the term and then elaborates all the contemporary forces that challenge its continued viability.

2. Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in Simmel, *On Individuality and Social Forms*, ed. Donald N. Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 331.

3. For a recent, thorough summary of the Berlin debates and their invocation of a European city, see Virag Molnar, "The Cultural Production of Locality: Reclaiming the 'European City' in Post-Wall Berlin," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 34, no.2 (June 2010): 281–309. Many of the most prominent essays were reprinted in Gert Kähler, ed., *Einfach schwierig: Eine deutsche Architekturdebatte, Ausgewählte Beiträge, 1993–1995* (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1995). See also Andreas Huyssen, "The Voids of Berlin," *Critical Inquiry* 24, no.1 (1997): 57–81.

4. "The Berlin discussion about the Senate's administrative strategy for city development, environmental protection and technology exemplifies…a discourse with European dimensions." *Europäische Stadt*: *Auslaufmodell oder Entwicklungspotential?* 65. Sitzung des Stadtforums Berlin am 26. September 1997 (Berlin: Koordinationsburo Stadtforum, 1997), 3.

5. Hans Stimmann in *Die Woche* (July 21, 1994), quoted in Werner Durth and Günter Behnisch, *Berlin Pariser Platz: Neubau der Akademie der Künste* (Berlin: Jovis, 2005), 154.

6. Andreas Tzortzis "Berlin's Post-Wall Master Builder Retires," *The New York Times* (September 27, 2006): http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/arts/design/27stim.html (accessed November 10, 2012).

7. "Der Rationalismus: Dankwart Guratzsch im Gespräch mit Josef Paul Kleihues," in *Deutsche Architektur im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani and Wolfgang Nagel (Berlin: Jovis, 2000), 143.

8. Hans Josef Zechlin refered to Münster's Prinzipalmarkt as "a great big masquerade," *Neue Bauwelt* 49 (1947), 280.

9. Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, *In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II* (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 83–90.

10. Harald Bodenschatz, Jörn Düwel, Niels Gutschow, and Hans Stimmann, eds., *Berlin und seine Bauten, Teil I—Städtebau* (Berlin: DOM, 2009), 227 and 381.

11. Hans Ostermann, the CDU representative on Münster's building commission, wrote in July 1945: "Wenn so die Stadt in einem einheitlichen Geist in Anlehnung an die übernommenen Werte der Vergangenheit in bescheidenen und harmonischen Formen wiedererichtet wird, so dürfte die neue Stadt später den schönsten Eindruck einer bürgerlichen Stadt im besten Sinne machen. Aus dieser Stadt ware jeder prählerische Großstadtgeist verbannt." Cited in Werner Durth and Niels Gutschow, *Träume und Trümmern: Planungen zum Wiederaufbau zerstörter Städte im Westen Deutschlands, 1940–1950* (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1988), 952.

12. For a history of modern German street plans, see Carsten Jonas, *Die Stadt und ihr Grundriss: Zu Form und Geschichte der deutschen Stadt nach Entfestigung und Eisenbahnanschluss* (Tübingen: Wasmuth, 2009).

13. Helmut Böhme, "Thesen zur 'europäischen Stadt' aus historischer Sicht," in *Die europäische Stadt—Mythos und Wirklichkeit*, ed. Dieter Hassenpflug (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2000), 49–101.

14. Describing the occidental city, Weber writes: "To develop into a city-commune, a settlement had to be of the nonagricultural-commercial type…and to be equipped with the following features: 1. a fortification; 2. a market; 3. its own court of law and at least in part, autonomous law; 4. an associational structure and, connected therewith, 5. at least partial autonomy and autocephaly, which includes administration by authorities in whose appointment the burghers could…participate." Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Günther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1226.

15. Weber, *Economy and Society*. vol. 2, 1227.

16. For a review of the many critiques Weber received from historians of China, see Yamin Xu, "Urban Communities, State, Spatial Order, and Modernity: Studies of Imperial and Republican Beijing in Perspective," *China Review International* 15, no. 1 (2008): 1–38. For refutations of the "Islamic" city thesis, see Resat Kesaba's review of Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, eds., *The Ottoman City between East and West* in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 3 (2001): 461–463.

17. On Rörig's accommodation with Nazi ideology, see Peter Lambert, "From antifascist to Volkshistoriker: *Demos* and *ethnos* in the political thought of Fritz Rörig, 1921–45," in *Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800*, ed. Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore (New York and London, UK: Routledge, 1999), 137–49.

18. Fritz Rörig, "Die europäische Stadt," *Propyläen-Weltgeschichte*, vol. 4, *Das Zeitalter der Götik und Renaissance 1250–1500* (Berlin: Propyläen verlag, 1933), 279–392.

19. Fritz Rörig, "'Nationale Frage' und Ostkolonisation," *Historische Zeitschrift* 154 (1936): 96–103.

20. Fritz Rörig, "Volk, Raum und politische Ordnung in der deutschen Hanse, Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften," *Vorträge und Schriften*, Heft 19 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1944), 3–24, here 12: "Was damals die deutschen Städte des Westens im Gebiet der Ostsee geleistet haben, ist aus der nämlichen geistig-völkischen Haltung erwachsen, die aus dem Bewußtsein des eigenen Seins und des eigenen Wertes über Meer hin kolonisiert und Siedlungen schafft, bei denen die alles bestimmende völkische Einheit als etwas Selbstverständliches gewahrt bleibt." For a more recent account of medieval German settlements along the Baltic, see Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950–1350* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). Bartlett's language is distinctly milder than Rörig's: "When Germans came to the eastern Baltic, they found lands which had only a limited urban development. Here along the trade routes, they planted cities whose topography and local structure were modeled on those familiar to them from Lübeck or Soest—colonial

cities, in the medieval sense of the word 'colony', new settlements rather than political dependencies" (194).

21. Fritz Rörig, "Volk, Raum," 24: "Indem sie eine deutsche Aufgabe zu lösen verstand, hat sie [die Hanse] zugleich für Europa eine wahrhaft aufbauende Leistung vollbracht."

22. Fritz Rörig, in *Die europäische Stadt und die Kultur des Bürgertums im Mittelalter*, ed. Luise Rörig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1955).

23. A. von Brand, "Recent Trends in Research on Hanseatic History," *History* 41, no.141–143 (February, 1956): 25–37.

24. Ernst Pitz, *Europäisches Städtewesen und Bürgertum: von der Spätantike bis zum hohen Mittelalter* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), 1.

25. Christian Graf von Krockow, "Urbanität als europäische Lebensform," in *Stadt und Bürger im 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gotthardt Frühsorge, Harm Klueting, Franklin Kopitsch (Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1993), 9–16, here 9.

26. Walter Siebel, "Einleitung," *Die europäische Stadt* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004), 11–47; Martina Koll-Schretzenmayr, Frank Ritterhoff, and Walter Siebel, "Wie global ist die Weltstadthypothese?" *disP* 4 (2005), 50–73, here 69.

27. Thomas Sieverts, "Die Kultivierung von Suburbia," in *Die europäische Stadt*, ed. Walter Siebel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 85–91.

28. Donatella Calabi, *The Market and the City: Square, Street and Architecture in Early Modern Europe*, trans. Marlene Klein (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004); Peter Arnade, *Beggars, Iconoclasts and Civic Patriots: The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Peter Stabel, "The Market-Place and Civic Identity in Late Medieval Flanders," (43–64), and Martha Howell, "The Space of Late Medieval Urbanity," (3–24), both in Marc Boone and Pater Stabel, eds., *Shaping Urban Identity in Late Medieval Europe* (Louvain, the Netherlands: Garant, 2000).

29. Marc Boone, "Urban Space and Political Conflict in Late Medieval Flanders," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 32, no. 4 (2002): 621–640; and Marc Boone and Heleni Porfyriou, "Markets, Squares, Streets: Urban Space, a Tool for Cultural Exchange," in *Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Donatella Calabi and Stephen Turk Christensen (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 227–253.

30. Motley opens his three-volume history of the Dutch Republic with these lines: "The rise of the Dutch Republic must ever be regarded as one of the leading events of modern times. Without the birth of this great commonwealth, the various historical phenomena of the sixteenth and following centuries must have either never existed, or have presented themselves under essential modifications." *The Rise of the Dutch Republic: A History* (Philadelphia: David KcKay, 1856), iii. For a historiographical survey, see Hugh Dunthorne, "Dramatizing the Dutch Revolt: Romantic History and Its Sixteenth-Century Antecedents," in *Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Netherlands*, ed. J. Pollmann and A. Spicer (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2007), 11–31. On the Belgian literary reception, see Marc Quaghebeur, "The Sixteenth Century: A Decisive Myth," *Yale French Studies* 102 (2002): 115–141.

31. Christopher R. Friedrichs, "Das städtische Rathaus als kommunikativer Raum in europäischer Perspektive," in *Kommunikation und Medien in der Frühen Neuzeit,* Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 41, ed. Johannes Burkhardt and Christine Werkstetter (Munich: Oldenburg, 2005), 159–174.

32. Heinz Schilling discusses the different historiographical attempts to link medieval urban *Verfassungen* with later territorial constitutions: "Gab es im späten Mittelalter und zu Beginn der Neuzeit in Deutschland einen städtischen 'Republikanismus'? Zur politischen Kultur des alteuropäischen Stadtbürgertums," in *Republiken und Republikanismus im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Helmut Koenigsberger with Elisabeth Müler-Luckner (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 101–143.

33. Hans Paul Bahrdt, *Die moderne Großstadt. Soziologische Überlegungen zum Städtebau* (Hamburg: Christian Wegner, 1969), 112.

34. Jeroen Grundeau, "A Typology for the Well-Ordered Society—Nicolaus Goldmann's Public Buildings," in *Public Buildings in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Konrad Ottenheym, Krista De Jonge, and Monique Chatenet (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2010), 13–26.

35. On the dispersion of this building type across Europe, see Karl Heinz Schreyl, *Zur Geschichte der Baugattung Börse* (Berlin: Inaugural Dissertation, 1963), 9–32.

36. Johann Friedrich Penther, *Ausführliche Anleitung zur bürgerlichen Bau-Kunst* (Band 4): "Worin von publiquen weltlichen Gebäuden, als von Fürstlichen Residenz-Schlössern samt darzu gehörigen Neben-Gebäuden…gehandelt" (Augsburg: Johann Andreas Pfeffel, 1748), 56; and http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/penther1748 (accessed November 11, 2012).

37. The best studies on eighteenth-century German architectural discourse include Ulrich Schütte, *Ordnung und Verzierung: Untersuchungen zur deutschsprachigen Architekturtheorie des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1986), and Klaus Jan Philipp, *Um 1800: Architekturtheorie und Architekturkritik in Deutschland zwischen 1790 und 1810* (Stuttgart: Axel Menges, 1997).

38. Jens Friedhoff, "'Magnifence' und 'Utilité'. Bauen und Wohnen 1600–1800," in *Geschichte des Wohnens*, vol. 2, ed. Ulf Dirlmeier (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), 620–625.

39. Johann Georg Büsch, *Praktische Darstellung der Bauwissenschaft, erster band welcher die bürgerliche Baukunst enthält* (Hamburg: Benjamin Gottlob Hoffmann, 1793). The series title is: *Versuch einer Mathematik zum Nutzen und Vergnügen des bürgerlichen Lebens, dritten Teils, erster Band*, 203.

40. Günther Binding, "Architektur der Hansestädte," *Hanse in Europa: Brücke zwischen den Märkten 12 bis. 17. Jahrhundert* (Cologne: Kunsthalle Köln, 1973), 283–294, here 286. Jens Friedhoff confirms and expands upon Binding's basic model, in *Geschichte des Wohnens*, vol. 2, 620–48.

41. Johann Georg Büsch, *Praktische Darstellung der Bauwissenschaft, erster band welcher die bürgerliche Baukunst enthält* (Hamburg: Benjamin Gottlob Hoffmann, 1793), 229.

42. Friedrich Schmidt, "Der bürgerliche Baumeister, oder, über Regelmäßigkeit, Bequemlichkeit und Eleganz in bürgerlichen Wohngebäuden," *Journal des Luxus und der Moden* 3 (October 1788): 381–401, here 385.

43. Jens Friedhoff also isolates a concern for "Bequemlichkeit" in Ludwig Sturm's architectural writing. He lists running water, heating, room size and their distribution, as well as a tendency to distinguish between private and more public sections of the house as central concerns. Friedhoff, *Geschichte des Wohnens*, vol. 2, 641–646.

44. "Bequemlichkeit in einem Gebäude erhällt man, wenn mandie Absicht desselben nach dem Willen des Bauherrn, so vollkommen als möglich zu erreichen sucht, ohne dass man der nöthigen Festigkeit schadet." Friedrich Meinert, *Zeichenbuch für Baukünstler und Bauhandwerker*, erster Heft (Leipzig: Friedrich August Leo, 1799), 152.

45. "Wegen des grossen Unterschieds der so gar vielerley Stände vor welche solche Häuser zur Bequemlichkeit müssen eingerichtet werden fast unzehliche Umstände müssen bedacht werden." in *Architekt und Ingenieur: Baumeister in Krieg und Frieden*, ed. Ulrich Schütte (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 1984), 213.

46. Schmidt, "Der bürgerliche Baumeister," *Journal des Luxus und der Moden*, 381.

47. See Daniel Purdy, *On the Ruins of Babel: Architectural Metaphor in German Thought* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 14–28.

48. Schmidt, "Der bürgerliche Baumeister," *Journal des Luxus und der Moden*, 384.

49. Pauline Johnson, *Habermas: Rescuing the Public Sphere* (New York and Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2004), 21.

50. Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 30.

51. Hans Paul Bahrdt, *Die moderne Großstadt*, orig. 1961, 2nd ed. (Opladen: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 85.

52. Friedrich Christian Schmidt, *Der bürgerliche Baumeister, oder Versuch eines Unterrichtes für Baulustige*, 4 vols., 1790–1799, here vol. 2 (Gotha: Reyher, 1794), 47; http://digi.ub.uni -heidelberg.de/diglit/schmidt1794 (accessed November 11, 2012).

53. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,* 260, note 41.

CHAPTER TWO

POSEN OR POZNAŃ, RATHAUS OR RATUSZ:
NATIONALIZING THE CITYSCAPE IN
THE GERMAN-POLISH BORDERLAND

Elizabeth A. Drummond

In the years after 1910, two postcards, both produced by the Verlag J. Themal, began to circulate in the city of Poznań/Posen.[1] The graphic images of the two postcards were identical. Both showed a blackboard with a picture of the city of Poznań/Posen and a text; a young boy stood in front, gesturing toward the board. A closer examination, however, reveals that the two postcards visually and textually represented the competing claims that Germans and Poles made to the cityscape of Poznań/Posen (Figure 2.1). One postcard, likely the first of the two to be produced, represented Posen as a modern German city. The view was from the west and showed a panorama of Posen's new buildings—the imperial castle, the city theater, the royal academy, the zoological and botanical gardens, all built during the time of Prussian rule (most in the first decade of the twentieth century). The text emphasized that Posen's beauty was situated in this "modern" cityscape, one forged by German governmental and civic institutions:

> This is Posen seen from the new palace square. Many people believe that it is not beautiful here, but they have no idea at all. We now have here a newly built imperial palace and many beautiful parks all around and many stately buildings, for example, the Academy and the new City Theater. Then we have a large museum and a library and a Zoological and Botanical Garden and a very old town hall and many monuments. Here there are also many officers and many pretty girls. And a lot of beer and schnaps. Adieu![2]

The second postcard, by contrast, represented Poznań as an old Polish city. It emphasized the old town, in particular the town hall and the cathedral, which had been built during Poznań's "golden age," when the city was one of the largest in the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. The text also highlighted the triumphs of Polish culture through references to the city's Polish theater, Polish museum, and monuments for the poets Adam Mickiewicz and Jan Kochanowski. In this postcard,

Figure 2.1   Rival postcards of German Posen (from 1910 to 1915) and Polish Poznań (from before 1918).

Source: Images courtesy of Nordost-Institut an der Universität Hamburg/IKGN e.V.

Poznań's beauty lay in the achievements not of Prussian-German modernity but of Polish culture:

> This is our old Poznań on the Warta. The opinion of some people, that there are no old attractions here, is a mistake. We have here, namely, an ancient town hall and a magnificent cathedral, in addition to a beautiful Polish theater and a Polish museum, monuments for Kochanowski and Mickiewicz as well as many churches that date to the Polish times. There are also pretty girls here as well as a lot of beer and vodka. Cheers! Goodbye![3]

The texts of both postcards ended by praising Poznań/Posen's pretty girls, beer, and liqueurs (schnaps for the Germans, vodka for the Poles). But aside from that one commonality, the two postcards, despite their graphic similarities, juxtaposed the German image of a modern Posen under Prussian-German administration with the Polish image of the old and historic Poznań. Even the two young boys clearly announced their national loyalties, with the German boy dressed in a sailor suit, popular children's clothing during the time of Germany's naval build-up, while the Polish boy was dressed in the Polish national costume.

These mirror-image postcards highlight the ways in which Germans and Poles shared an urban space in Poznań/Posen. The provincial capital of the Prussian

province of Poznania, Poznań/Posen was in many ways a transnational city–a site of trade fairs and a home to Germans, Poles, and Jews. It contained within it the potential to become a site of transnational contact and exchange. But rather than become a bridge between cultures and nations, the city became a battleground for growing hostilities between German and Polish nationalists. Germans and Poles both laid claim to the urban landscape, claiming spaces and places in Poznań/Posen as "national property."[4] As the ruling power in the city, moreover, Germans sought to physically transform Poznań/Posen into a German city. While Germans and Poles lived aside each other and walked the same city streets, they imagined the cityscape in explicitly national terms. A city that had its origin as a diverse and multiethnic Poznań, Posen, and Poyzn (the Yiddish name for the city) gradually became nationalized as the Polish and German nationalities inscribed themselves on the city. While there were opportunities for Poznań/Posen to transcend the national divide and to become, given its location in the borderlands, a transnational city, the emergence of German and Polish nationalisms in the nineteenth century and the sharpening of nationalist positions at the turn of the century precluded such a possibility and ensured that the city became a place where coexistence increasingly gave way to conflict.

Dating to the turn of the millennium and Poland's Christianization, Poznań/Posen had long been a site of encounter between Germans and Poles.[5] Home to Polish princes and, since 968, the seat of the first Polish bishop, the original city of Poznań/Posen was concentrated on the island between the Warta/Warthe and Cybina rivers, today known as Ostrów Tumski and home to Poznań/Posen's cathedral. In 1249, Prince Przemysł I began the building of a royal palace on the left bank of the Warta/Warthe river and subsequently founded a city under Magdeburg Law there in 1253. Germans and Jews, the latter mainly from German-speaking territories, soon arrived in the city, giving it its early multinational character. Poznań/Posen quickly emerged as the economic and political center of Great Poland. While German settlers constituted the economic foundation of the city in the thirteenth century, Poznań/Posen began to attract Poles from the surrounding areas in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and then became a major Polish city during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a center for regional governance and a major stop on East–West trading routes. By the end of the sixteenth century, the city's population numbered approximately 20,000, one-third living inside the city walls, making it Poland's third-largest city after Danzig/Gdańsk and Cracow. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, because of foreign invasions and internal political crises, Poznań/Posen, like the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania as a whole, suffered a period of decline. The city's population numbered only 15,000 by the end of the seventeenth century and a mere 6,000 by the middle of the eighteenth century. The trauma of the first partition of Poland in 1772–1775 prompted a series of reforms in the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, which focused in part on the strengthening of the cities. The Commission of Good Order [*Komisja Dobrego Porządku*] in Poznań/Posen introduced municipal self-government, overhauled both the financial and the police systems, renovated public buildings, and helped to revive trade and the crafts. As a result, beginning in the 1770s, the population began to grow again, to approximately 15,000 in 1793.[6] This period of reform, however,

was short-lived, brought to a quick end by the second and third (and final) partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795.

Prussia acquired the province of Poznania—and the city of Poznań/Posen—in the second partition of Poland and, except for a brief period during the Napoleonic wars, Prussia ruled Poznania until the end of World War I.[7] Prussian policy toward its new eastern provinces vacillated over the course of the nineteenth century between moments of conciliation, with promises of tolerance and even equality for the Poles, and more aggressive attempts to subordinate the Poles to the Prussian state. Initial Prussian policy had two prongs. The state sought, on the one hand, to undermine the traditional Polish elites, the *szlachta* [Polish nobility] and the Catholic clergy. At the same time, the Prussian government sought to tie Poles to the Prussian state by extending the benefits of Prussian rule to the provinces—namely, by improving the economic lot of Poles through peasant emancipation and town reforms and by cultivating the loyalty of the Poles through the institutions of the schools and the army. As German nationalism developed in the second half of the nineteenth century, however, Prussian officials and German nationalists alike increasingly came to see Poles not as fellow Prussian subjects but as members of an inferior culture, whose supposed primitiveness justified Prussian-German conquest of the territories. Where officials in the dynastic state of Prussia sought to create "Polish-speaking Prussians," officials in the German-national *Kaiserreich* sought to undermine the Polish nation as a cultural entity and then to Germanize the Polish masses by means of the *Kulturkampf*, language and educational policies, and a policy of state-supported settlement of Germans in the binational eastern provinces.[8]

Poles responded to the Prussian *Polenpolitik* with a new political orientation in the form of "organic work." Ironically, Prussian-German policies facilitated the emergence of this new strain of national activism among the Poles. Intended to tie the Polish masses to the state, peasant emancipation, the integration of the Prussian eastern provinces into the Prussian economy, and the Prussian educational system all entailed the modernization of the regional economy and social structure, thus inadvertently creating the foundations for the political and national mobilization of a broader spectrum of Polish society. Emerging first in the 1830s and 1840s and gaining strength after the failed uprising of 1863 in Congress Poland, the "organic work" movement, taking its inspiration mainly from English liberalism, was a program of educational and economic "self-help."[9] Polish nobles, clergy, and educated elites worked to establish a variety of voluntary associations—agricultural and artisanal societies, credit unions, and trade and professional associations—designed to serve the social, economic, and cultural interests of Poles. The economic modernization of Polish society and the development of a thriving middle class—both urban and rural—was but one goal of the "organic work" movement. The movement also sought to defend Polish society against the forces of Germanization, raise the overall educational niveau of Poles, and preserve Polish language and history, despite the elimination of the former from the school curriculum. The resulting network of associations focused on all aspects of Polish life, from agricultural modernization to support for the development of crafts and industry in the cities, to education, to cultural activities.[10]

Poznań/Posen itself was home to two of the oldest and most important organizations in the "organic work" movement—the Poznań Hôtel Bazar, an economic hub for Polish merchants and artisans, and the Society for Educational Aid (*Towarzystwo Naukowej Pomocy*, often called the Marcinkowski Society), which distributed scholarships to Polish students so that they could continue their educations.[11] The city would later become home to the headquarters of most "organic work" organizations, a testament to its significance in the national movement. Taken together, the institutions of the "organic work" movement enabled the Poles to stand fast in the face of Prussian anti-Polish and Germanization policies. Moreover, the network of economic, educational, and cultural organizations of "organic work" strengthened Polish society by fostering the development of a Polish propertied and educated middle class, a prosperous peasantry, and an industrial working class. As Witold Jakóbczyk argues, the Polish nation developed "from a nation [*narod*] under the hegemony of the nobility [*szlachta*] to a bourgeois nation [*narod burżuazyjny*] under the hegemony of the intelligentsia and the middle class," "from a loose conglomerate of people around a faint, passive, ethnic-national consciousness to a highly organized society around a sufficiently general, active civic-political [*polityczno-obywatelski*] and cultural consciousness."[12]

Prussian policies and the efforts of the Polish "organic work" movement resulted in significant demographic, economic, and social changes in Poznań/Posen. Prussian reforms in the first half of the century abolished the remnants of feudalism in the city and in the province. The province's economy, however, continued to lag behind other parts of Prussia, not surprising given its focus on agriculture rather than on industry. Only in the second half of the century did Poznań/Posen begin to develop an industrial sector, after which the economy grew slowly but steadily. The population of Poznań/Posen also grew over the course of the nineteenth century. In 1816, the city had 22,000 civilian residents. The city's population, including the soldiers stationed there, expanded to 56,000 in 1871 and 70,000 in 1890. It then doubled in the next 15 years, to almost 137,000 in 1905. Population growth also affected the demographic balance of ethnic groups in Poznań/Posen. In 1816, approximately two-thirds of the Poznanian population were Poles, with Jews constituting 20 percent of the population and Germans 10 percent. Prussian rule, however, brought with it German settlers. The influx of German bureaucrats, military personnel, professionals, and workers shifted the demographic balance of the city, both absolutely and relatively, to the benefit of Germans in the first half of the nineteenth century. By the 1840s, Germans were the largest population group in Poznań/Posen, their growth coming at the expense of Poles, with the Jewish population remaining constant. This trend continued into the 1860s. In 1867, 47 percent of the Poznań/Posen's population was German, 38 percent Polish, and 15 percent Jewish. Beginning in the 1870s, however, another demographic shift occurred, as rapid migration to the city occurred, mainly from the Poznanian countryside and the neighboring provinces. While both Germans and Poles recorded increases in absolute terms, the relative power of the German population dwindled, as Germans and particularly Jews began to leave the eastern provinces, largely for economic opportunities in western Germany or abroad, a process known as *Ostflucht*. By 1890, 51 percent of Poznań/Posen's population was Polish, by 1910 more than 57 percent.[13]

In the first half of the nineteenth century, despite moments of heightened national tensions, national ambivalence and indifference characterized German-Polish relations more than nationalist agitation and mobilization. Germans, Poles, and Jews lived aside each other, walked the same city streets, and interacted with each other regularly. Even after 1848, when national differences divided the revolutionary movement, ambivalence and a generalized wariness, rather than outright hostility, dominated the attitudes of Germans and Poles toward each other. Cooperation between Germans and Poles was still possible on both political and economic levels. German and Jewish representatives from the liberal and progressive parties often sought out Polish allies in their attempts to stake out positions in opposition to the Prussian bureaucracy and military. Germans, Poles, and Jews also regularly interacted with each other in the marketplace—as merchants and consumers and as employers and employees. Indeed, before 1871, assimilation in either direction was still a real possibility, as national identity remained mainly a matter of self-identity and professed loyalties. There were Polish families that assimilated into the German bourgeoisie, embracing the German language and "German" cultural values. The Jewish population in Poznań/Posen tied itself ever more firmly to the Prussian state, developing a strong sense of belonging to German culture.[14] A Yiddish-Jewish Poyzn thus transformed itself into a German-Jewish Posen.[15] At the same time, many Germans, especially those families long resident in Poznania, took Polish names and adopted aspects of Polish culture. The founding of the German Empire in 1871, however, proved a turning point in German-Polish relations in Poznań/Posen. Self-consciously styled as a nation-state, unified Germany required not merely Polish loyalty to the monarch but also political and cultural identification with the German nationality. As Prussian-German policies toward the Polish minority became ever more aggressive and as both German and Polish nationalisms radicalized, opportunities for cooperation shrank. Germans and Poles in Poznań/Posen turned from national ambivalence to national mobilization, as the city became the primary battlefront in the national conflict.[16]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in response to the growing strength of the Polish nationalist movement, prominent German nationalists in the Prussian eastern provinces highlighted the threat of the Polonization of the German East. They were concerned, in particular, by the tendency of Poles to use Polish place-names for cities and towns in the province of Poznania as well as for the streets and locations within the city.[17] The use of Polish or German place-names was not simply a function of linguistic habit or convenience. It entailed a claim to a particular territory as part of the "national property," an important indicator of the legitimacy of a particular nation's right to rule. For their part, Polish nationalists went to great efforts to use Polish place designations, even translating street names into Polish. Correspondence to the main office of the "Guard" Society, an umbrella organization for Polish nationalists, was generally addressed to "Ulica Rycerska 12" in "Poznań," the address given in publications of the society, rather than to "Ritterstraße 12" in "Posen."[18] The society distributed a list of street names in Poznań, providing both the official German street names and their Polish equivalents. The organization then instructed Poles to use Polish street names and Polish place names in all correspondence within the province.[19] This effort

was part of a larger campaign to assist Poles in their interactions with a German, and Germanizing, bureaucracy.

The use of Polish in addressing correspondence did not go unnoticed by German nationalists. The Polish "abuse" of the postal system for political goals proved to be a popular topic in the pages of the German nationalist press. The Eastern Marches Society, for example, repeatedly demanded that "good German" postal officials refuse to deliver correspondence addressed in Polish. As the Society noted: "The Imperial Postal Administration is imperial bureaucracy and the German Empire was founded, as is known, for the nursing [*Pflege*] of the health [*Wohlfahrt*] of the German people."[20] In a letter to the State Secretary of the Imperial Post complaining about the use of Polish in addresses and the number of Polish postal workers, the Society's executive board reminded the head of the German post that "every German post official must be loyal to the Kaiser and a good German."[21] German nationalists accused the German post, the imperial bureaucracy, and the Prussian-German state of pursuing de facto policies of "Polonization," their policies thus endangering the health and welfare of the German nation in the East and, at the same time, strengthening the Polish-national movement and the Polish middle class.

German nationalists advocated a renewed commitment to more aggressive Germanization efforts, including policies to nationalize places and spaces in the Prussian East. For one, they encouraged a more "energetic" approach to the Germanization of place-names in the eastern provinces. Moreover, the new German place names, German nationalists instructed, should not merely be Germanic transliterations of Polish place names, but rather names that represented the essential Germanness of the land itself. One of the most successful of these name changes was the transformation of the Polish Inowrocław into the Germanic Inowrazlaw and hence into the German Hohensalza, the final change being approved by the municipal government in September 1904.[22] Such name changes—and the changes were numerous, the proposals even more so—also ameliorated German concerns about the aesthetics of the Polish language. As German nationalists stressed repeatedly, Germans had difficulty "getting their tongues around" Polish words. Even more important, however, German place-names represented German ownership of territory, adding to the German "national property" in what was in the eyes of both German and Polish nationalists a zero-sum game.[23]

At the same time, German nationalists lobbied the government to transform the cityscape itself, physically creating a German Posen from the ground up. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Prussian government had undertaken an ambitious program of improving Poznania's infrastructure, investing heavily in building streets, schools, railroads, and libraries. Already in the first years after the acquisition of Poznania, the Prussian government had dismantled the old town's walls, part of a larger project to expand and to modernize Poznań/Posen. An 1803 city map showed a compact city, confined mainly to the old city—the cathedral island, the oldest part of Poznań/Posen, and the Old Market and the network of streets radiating out from the market square, which dated to the thirteenth century—and hemmed in by the city's system of fortifications, which impeded the city's natural growth.[24] Following an 1803 fire, the Prussian government embarked on plans for

new building in the city, including the construction of a new city to the east of the old town, thus filling in the city between the old town and the cathedral island. Subsequent development in the nineteenth century took place mainly to the west of the old town, as the city witnessed the proliferation of German businesses, schools, and cultural institutions, especially around the area that became Wilhelmsplatz. Because of its proximity to the Russian border, the Prussian government also began the construction of a series of defensive fortifications in the 1820s. Construction on Festung Posen (Twierdza Poznań) began in 1828. The fortifications were centered on the citadel, Fort Winiary, and included a system of walls, forts, and gates that tightly encircled the city. The state added a second ring of defensive structures in the 1870s and 1880s. These fortifications were both a defense against the Russian Empire (via Congress Poland) and a demonstration to Poles that Prussia intended never to relinquish the territories. The modernization of the city's infrastructure accompanied the transformation of the city's geography. The city government established a gasworks in 1856 and began work on a waterworks in 1865. At the end of the nineteenth century, the city repaved many of the city streets and began to lay the foundations for a sewer system. Poznań/Posen's transit system also developed. The arrival of the railroad in 1848 and the construction of a new rail station in 1879 facilitated contact with the wider world, while the introduction of coaches, horse-drawn buses, and electric streetcars (the last in March 1898) facilitated the movement of Poznanians throughout the city. Urban planners worked to improve the amount and quality of housing in the city, in part to attract German settlers.[25]

Even as Poznań/Posen acquired national significance for both Germans and Poles, until the end of the nineteenth century Poznanians could still find German and Polish quarters and institutions dispersed throughout the city. The physical manifestations of Polish national life, many of them the institutions of Polish "organic work," tended to crowd around the old town square (Stary Rynek) and Wilhelmplatz (Plac Wilhelmowski, today Plac Wolności). The oldest among them included the Catholic cathedral and the old town square and its town hall (designed by Giovanni Battista di Quadro and built in 1550–1560, Figure 2.2). These areas served as the two-headed center of historic Poznań, a physical reminder of Poland's "golden age." In the nineteenth century, as a result of the activism of the "organic work" movement, the Polish-national public sphere expanded to encompass the area around Wilhelmplatz, a short distance to the west of the old town square. Walking west on Neue Straße (Ulica Nova, today Ulica Ignacego Paderewskiego) from the old town square, a Poznanian would soon come across the Bazar Polski (or Hôtel Bazar) at the corner of Wilhelmstraße (Ulica Wilhelmowska, today Aleje Karola Marcinkowski). Designed to promote Polish urban interests, the Bazar served as a meeting center for progressive members of the *szlachta*, artisans, and the emerging middle class.[26] Crossing the street to Wilhelmplatz, a Poznanian could visit the Raczyński Library, a center of Polish culture and learning. Continuing to just west of the square, she could take in a play at the Polish Theater. But Germans also strolled the market square (Alter Markt) and walked the streets around Wilhelmplatz. Opposite the Bazar was the Kaiser Friedrich Museum. Just in front of the Raczyński Library stood the Kaiser Friedrich monument, and at the opposite side of the square stood the police station. The Kaiser Wilhelm Library,

Figure 2.2 The Town Hall (Ratusz / Rathaus) in Poznań / Posen's old market square (Stary Rynek / Alter Markt).

Source: Photo courtesy of Elizabeth Drummond, 1997.

the Reichsbank, and many other German administrative offices were all clustered around the square, each only a few steps away.[27]

Poznań/Posen, however, gradually developed into a German Posen and a Polish Poznań around the turn of the century, as two separate, nationally defined public spaces became superimposed on a common cityscape. At this time, the Prussian-German government embarked on another phase of construction and urban planning. Ostensibly an effort in urban modernization, the undertaking was also designed to imprint Prussian rule on the Poznanian landscape and to transform Posen into the unofficial capital of the *Ostmarken*. Following the dismantlement of most of the city's fortifications and the annexation of Poznań/Posen's suburbs, the Royal Commission for the Urban Development of Poznań/Posen began construction on a series of new public buildings and spaces on the western edge of the old town. German administrative offices, formerly housed in older buildings, moved to newly constructed buildings along Am Berliner Tor (Brama Berlińska), Paulikirchstrasse (Ulica Św. Pawła), St. Martinstraße (Ulica Św. Marcin), and across

the railroad tracks in the newly annexed western suburbs. New buildings included the Kaiser Wilhelm Library (1902: nowadays known as the University Library), the Kaiser Friedrich Museum (1904: now the National Museum in Poznań), the Royal Academy (1904: now part of Adam-Mickiewicz University in Poznań), and the new City Theater (1910: now known as the Grand Theater).

Two building projects embodied, more than any other, the Prussian-German attempt to mark Poznań/Posen as German territory, subject to German rule. The first was the construction in 1908 of the new building to house the Settlement Commission (on Paulikirchstraße; today part of the Adam-Mickiewicz University in Poznań). Founded in 1886, the Settlement Commission for West Prussia and Poznania (*Ansiedlungskommission für Westpreußen und Posen*) was endowed with one hundred million marks, subsequently increased, to buy out Polish land and redistribute it to German migrants relocating to the eastern provinces. The Commission strove both to increase the absolute and relative amount of German "national property" and to strengthen the German demographic presence in the eastern provinces—to effect an "inner colonization."[28] The settlement campaign focused primarily on the establishment of German villages in the countryside, which German nationalists saw as essential for preserving and sustaining urban Germandom.[29] The Prussian-German state also undertook specific efforts to bolster the German population in Poznanian cities, which often proved more successful than settlement efforts. Bonuses (*Ostmarkenzulage*) attracted German officials to the East, and both the province of Poznania and the city of Poznań/Posen became saturated with German government officials. In addition, in 1898, the Prussian Landtag created a "disposition fund" of 400,000 marks given annually to local administrations to strengthen the economic and cultural foundations of the German urban population. By 1907, more than two million marks had been distributed.[30]

The crowning achievement of the effort to transform Poznań/Posen's cityscape was the completion of the imperial castle (constructed in the years between 1905 and 1910: now a cultural center). From 1910 the city was officially termed the Haupt- und Residenzstadt Posen (Capital and Residence City of Poznań/Posen). In August 1913, Wilhelm II finally occupied the castle, completing the symbolic colonization of the province.[31] Considered as a whole, the urban planning campaign of the first decade of the twentieth century shifted the city's center of gravity further and further away from the cathedral and the old town square, west toward the railroad and Berlin, a symbolic shift from the Polish Catholicism of the past to the German industry and modernity of the future.

The nationalization of the urban cityscape was represented in the postcards that depicted Poznań/Posen.[32] Early postcards tended to feature snapshots of Poznań/Posen, identifying city buildings with both German and Polish names.[33] The bilingualism of the postcards acknowledged the binational character of the city and the province. By the early twentieth century, however, Poznanian postcards had lost their binational character. Different postcard collections had developed for Germans and Poles, with German postcards featuring the greeting *Gruß aus Posen* and Polish postcards featuring the greeting *Pozdrowienie z Poznania* and the buildings identified only in the appropriate national language. Increasingly, these postcards featured not the general sights of Poznań/Posen, but nationally meaningful

buildings in Posen or Poznań. The competing urban nationalisms were thus sent through the mail every day.

As the city increasingly divided itself into German and Polish sectors, so too did symbolic representations of the city present nationally homogeneous images, thereby erasing the binational character of Poznań/Posen. Where there had once been images of the town hall identified both in German (Rathaus) and Polish (ratusz), there now appeared either images of the German quarter of the city in the west or of the historically Polish old town. These images of Poznań/Posen—often mirror images of each other, as with the postcards described at the beginning of this chapter—reinforced the historical and contemporary claims each national group was making to the city and to the eastern provinces more generally.

German nationalists in both image and text laid claim to Posen as a historically German city, made all the more German by its physical transformation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They highlighted the significance of Magdeburg Law and German settlers for the early history of Poznań/Posen, arguing that the city spiraled into a condition of decline under Polish rule, when the Polish nobles asserted their interests in opposition to the status of the city. Only the partitions and the subsequent Prussian rule enabled the revival of Poznanian urban life. Even the cityscape of Poznań/Posen showed for German nationalists the essential Germanness of the place. As the *Ostmärker* Adolf Warschauer argued, Posen's central market place with its town hall and mercantile buildings paid tribute to German law and German commerce, just as the orderly grid of streets emerging from the central square to the defensive fortifications on the city's edge was early evidence of German order and rational planning.[34]

The German imprint on the city was strengthened by the urban planning of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. German postcards thus depicted the ways in which Prussian-German urban policy had quite literally built a German city in Posen. The Rathaus simply disappeared from most German postcards, to be replaced by St. Paul's Church, the Royal Academy, the Friedrich Wilhelm Gymnasium, the Kaiser Wilhelm Library, the Kaiser Friedrich Museum, the City Theater, the Settlement Commission, and the imperial castle. German postcards highlighted the modernization and Germanization of Poznań/Posen, focusing on the new city that grew up around the imperial castle.[35] Some postcards even showed the building project in progress; one postcard featured photos of the area around Berliner Tor before and after the dismantling of the city's fortifications, while others depicted a scaffolded imperial palace rising from the ground.[36] German postcards also put the most obvious symbols of German modernity and German culture on display. The City Theater was frequently featured, as were scenes of vibrant economic activity.[37] In their representations of technology, Germans took credit for introducing modern science and engineering into the "backwards" eastern provinces. For example, a series of postcards celebrated the German technological and industrial achievements on display at the East German Exhibition for Industry, Crafts, and Agriculture (*Ostdeutsche Ausstellung für Industrie, Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft*) in 1911.[38] Other postcards featured electric streetcars, the railroad, cars, and even zeppelins and airplanes in scenes of daily life in Poznań/Posen.[39]

This new Posen was represented—exclusively—as a German city. As such, representations of German rule were of particular importance. The notion of the *Ostmark* developed in the late decade of the nineteenth century as a way to emphasize the border provinces' significance for the German Empire as a whole. Posen became the capital of the eastern provinces. Visual representations of Posen thus stressed the institutions of German rule. Many postcards featured Posen's monuments to great German rulers from history, including Kaiser Friedrich, Kaiser Wilhelm, and Otto von Bismarck.[40] Still others featured the current Kaiser, Wilhelm II, and celebrated, in particular, the Kaiser's September 1902 visit to the city.[41] Given Poznań/ Posen's proximity to the Russian border and its status as a *Festung*, the military played a significant role in establishing the strength of Prussian-German rule in the city and in the province. Many postcards featured images of military parades; one postcard featured a military celebration at Poznań/Posen's memorial for the war dead from the 1866 and 1870/71 wars of unification, thus symbolically tying Germany's East to Germany's West.[42] The ultimate symbol of Posen's status as the capital of the *Ostmark* was the headquarters of Settlement Commission, which was featured on many German Poznanian postcards, some of which even carried a *Gruß aus der Ostmark* to other parts of Germany.[43] Even as Poznań/Posen had a growing Polish majority, German nationalists re-presented and represented it as exclusively German, a city of wholly German commerce, German technology, German soldiers, and German civil servants.

For Poles, by contrast, Poznań's identity was inseparable from its historic core, the cathedral island, and the old town, which put Poland's "golden age" on display. Polish nationalists thus emphasized Poznań's significance in the broader history of Poland, and Poles celebrated Poznań's and Poland's past greatness, as represented by the ratusz, the cathedral, and the surviving parts of the old Polish royal palace (then the State Archives, now the Museum of Applied Art).[44] Even as they emphasized Poznań's historical Polishness, they also celebrated contemporary Poznań's significance as the center of the Polish national movement in the Prussian eastern provinces. Postcards highlighted Polish cultural institutions such as the Raczyński Library and the Mielżyński Museum as well as the institutions and individuals of the "organic work" movement, including the Hôtel Bazar and Karol Marcinkowski.[45]

In the early twentieth century, Poznań/Posen was at once the capital of the Polish national movement in the German Empire and the German capital of the *Ostmarken*. In naming spaces and representing places, Germans and Poles claimed territory for the national community. This nationalization of a shared, multinational urban space thus not only precluded the development of a transnational urban culture based on cross-cultural or regional identities, or even on national indifference, but worked to destroy those elements of transnationalism that had emerged previously. As a site increasingly marked—physically, politically, and culturally—by conflict, Poznań/Posen ultimately became a Polish city as a result of World War I. After the war, the city of Poznań and most of the province of Poznania became part of the new Republic of Poland. Germans fled the city, with the German population rapidly decreasing from 65,321 in 1910, to 5,980 in 1926 and 4,387 in 1934.[46]

German nationalists, however, continued to harbor revisionist dreams for the city, dreams realized during World War II, when Poznań/Posen was annexed into

the Third Reich as the capital of the *Reichsgau Wartheland*. Germans and ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) settled in the city, displacing the Poles, many of whom were expelled to the General Government. The German government's plan of demographic transformation, to make a multinational city with a Polish majority but notable German and Jewish minorities into a thoroughly German city, also included the elimination of Poznań/Posen's Jewish population. After the defeat of Nazi Germany (Poznań was liberated by the Red Army on February 23, 1945), the Communist-led Polish government followed a policy of demographic engineering of its own, expelling Germans from Polish territory. Poznań was, as a result, Polish to a greater extent than ever before in its history. As part of postwar reconstruction, the Communist authorities added yet another layer onto Poznań's cityscape, a Stalinist architecture that imprinted a Soviet mark on a city that already bore the marks of Poles, Jews, and Germans.

Visitors to Poznań today, the capital of the Polish province of Great Poland, can still see remnants of the city's multicultural history. The medieval and early modern Polish core—the cathedral island and the market square—coexists with a nineteenth-century German layer, which itself has been enveloped by a postwar Communist shell, mainly of prefabricated apartment buildings. Even as Poznań today is a thoroughly Polish (and Catholic) city in terms of its demographics, it retains a certain international character, mainly because of its respected university and its role as host to international trade fairs. Its multinational history—and the transnationalism and multiculturalism of today's Europe—took center stage again in 2012, when Poznań was one of eight Polish and Ukrainian cities to play host to the European Football Championships, at which a German national team led by two Polish-born players (Miroslav Klose and Lukas Podolski) finished third.[47]

Notes

1. Because the issue of place names was so politicized at the time, I use the term Poznania to refer to the province of Poznań/Posen and both the Polish (Poznań) and the German (Posen) forms of the name to refer to the city itself.

2. "Das ist Posen vom neuen Schloßplatz aus gesehen. Viele Leute meinen, daß es hier nicht schön ist, aber die haben gar keine Ahnung. Wir haben jetzt hier ein neuer-bautes Kaiserschloß und ringsherum viele schöne Parkanlagen und viele Prachtbauten, z.B. die Akademie und das neue Stadttheater. Dann haben wir ein großes Museum und die Bibliothek und einen Zoologischen und Botanischen Garten und ein ganz altes Rathaus und viele Denkmäler. Dann giebts hier viel Militär und viele schöne Mädchen. Und viel Bier und Schnaps. Adieuh!" Postcard produced between 1910 and 1915 by Tx [Themal], as reproduced in Sophia Kemlein, ed., *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte: Die Stadt Posen 1896–1918 / Pocztówki opowiadają historię: Miasto Poznań 1896–1918* (Lüneberg: Institut Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 1997), 176. All translations are my own.

3. "Oto nasz stary Poznań leżący przy warcie. Zdanie niektórych twierdzących osób, iż niema tu zgoła dawnych pamiątek jest mylnem; bowiem mamy tutaj starożytny ratusz I wspaniałą katedrę, prócz tego piękny teatr polski i muzeum polskie, pomniki Kochanowskiego i Mickiewicza oraz wiele kościołów, pochodzących z polskich czasów. Także ładne dziewczęta znachodzą się tutaj a nadto wiele piwa i wódek. Na zdrowie! Do widzenia!" Postcard produced before 1918 by J. Themal in Poznań/Posen, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*, 176–177.

4. For a valuable discussion on the increasing importance of the concept of "national property" in the many national conflicts in Central Europe, see Pieter Judson's "'Not Another Square Foot!' German Liberalism and the Rhetoric of National Ownership in Nineteenth-Century Austria," *Austrian History Yearbook* XXVI (1995): 83–97.

5. The most thorough history of Poznań/Posen is the multiauthored series *Dzieja Poznania*, edited by Jerzy Topolski, 3 volumes (Warsaw/Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1994).

6. For the demographic figures, see Sophia Kemlein, "Die Stadt Posen bis zum Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts/Miasto Poznań do końca XIX wieku," in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*, 11–19.

7. On Poznań/Posen under Prussian rule, see volume 2 of *Dzieje Poznania*, edited by Jerzy Topolski and Lech Trzeciakowski (Warsaw/Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1994). For the broader history of the Prussian eastern provinces, see William W. Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772–1914* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Lech Trzeciakowski, *Pod pruskim zaborem 1850–1918* (Warsaw: PW "Wiedza Powszechna," 1973); and Thomas Serrier, *Entre Allemagne et Pologne: Nations et identités frontalières, 1848–1914* (Paris: Belin, 2002). See also Piotr Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1974).

8. For Prussian policy in the eastern provinces, see Martin Broszat, *Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972); Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews;* Trzeciakowski, *Pod pruskim zaborem*; and Richard Blanke, *Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871–1900)* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs/New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

9. See Brian A. Porter, "The Social Nation and Its Futures: English Liberalism and Polish Nationalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Warsaw," *American Historical Review* 101, no. 5 (December 1996): 1470–1492. The philosophy that developed to underlay the "organic work" movement was called Polish Positivism: a confusing term, since the philosophy, as Porter argues, owed more to English liberals such as John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Darwin than to Auguste Comte. For a discussion of Polish positivism often at odds with Porter's interpretation, see Stanislaus A. Blejwas, *Realism in Polish Politics: Warsaw Positivism and National Survival in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (New Haven, CT: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984).

10. For the "organic work" movement in Poznania, see Witold Jakóbczyk, *Studia nad dziejami Wielkopolski w XIX wieku (Dzieje pracy organicznej)*, 3 vols. (Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 1951–1967). See also William W. Hagen, "National Solidarity and Organic Work in Prussian Poland, 1815–1914," *Journal of Modern History* 44, no. 1 (1972): 38–64; and Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews.*

11. Both organizations were founded by Dr. Karol Marcinkowski, the founder of the "organic work" movement in Poznań/Posen, in the 1840s. For Marcinkowski and his initiatives, see Witold Jakóbczyk, *Karol Marcinkowski 1800–1846* (Warsaw/Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1981); Witold Jakóbczyk, *W Poznańskim Bazarze 1838–1839* (Poznań, 1986); and Witold Jakóbczyk, *Towarzystwo Naukowej Pomocy w Wielkopolsce 1841–1939* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1985).

12. Jakóbczyk, *Studia nad dziejami Wielkopolski*, vol III, 1.

13. See Kemlein, "Die Stadt Posen;" Krzysztof A. Makowski, "Die Bewohner der Stadt/ Mieszkańcy miasta," in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*, 111–115; and Mieczysław Kędelski, "Stosunki ludnościowe w latach 1815–1918," in *Dzieje Poznania*, vol. 2, 221–270. For population statistics in the province, see the appendix "Demographic Movements in the Province of Poznań, 1815–1914," in Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 324ff.

14. See Elizabeth Drummond, "On the Borders of the Nation: Jews and the German-Polish National Conflict in Poznania, 1886–1914," *Nationalities Papers* 29, no. 3 (2001): 459–475.

15. See Sophia Kemlein, *Die Posener Juden 1815—1848: Entwicklungsprozesse einer polnischen Judenheit unter preußischer Herrschaft* (Hamburg: Dölling & Galitz Verlag, 1997) and Drummond, "On the Borders of the Nation."

16. For recent discussions of notions of national ambivalence in Central Europe, see Pieter M. Judson's work on Austrian nationalists, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); James E. Bjork's study of religion and national identity in Silesia, *Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008); Caitlyn Murdock's study of the German-Bohemian borderland, *Changing Places: Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870–1946* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2010); and Tara Zahra's study of children, education, and bilingualism in the Bohemian lands, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands 1900—1948* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

17. German nationalists were equally alarmed by the Polonization of "good" German names. As the Pan-German League noted: "When one enters the province of Posen and looks at the signs of the firms in the cities, then each German-feeling person must be overcome with a deeply shamed feeling, when it is so frequently warned, how people of the same origin could lower themselves so far as to clothe the names inherited from their fathers with Polish declensions. One sees there among others, how Schulz and Scholz today shine in large letters as Szulc and Szolz, how Schuhmann and Großmann have transformed themselves into Szuman and Grosman, how Herr Adam, Herr Hofmann, Herr Friedrich have transformed themselves with Polish endings into Adamski, Hofmanski, and Frydrychowicz, how Wollschläger became Wolszlegier, how Schneider became Snyter, how Schubert became Szubert." *Alldeutsche Blätter* 1985: 239.

18. Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu (henceforth APP), Towarzystwo Straż, no. 6, 48, broadsheet titled "Przestroga przed niesumiennemi agientami." See also the correspondence sent to the organization, APP, Towarzystwo Straż, no. 13–27.

19. APP, Towarzystwo Straż, no. 6, 113–114.

20. *Die Ostmark* (1901), 10 and 58.

21. "Jeder Postbeamte muß kaiserlich treu und gut deutsch sein." Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (henceforth GStA PK), I. HA, Rep. 195, Deutscher Ostmarkenverein, no. 174, 37–42, letter from the Executive Board to the State Secretary of the Imperial Post (M).

22. *Die Ostmark* (1904): 67 and 89–90; see also *Die Ostmark* (1901): 10–11; and *Die Ostmark* (1904): 108.

23. GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 195, Deutscher Ostmarkenverein, no. 9b, 55ff: Bovenschen's speech to a meeting of the Gesamtausschuß in Poznań/Posen, December 7, 1902 (M). See also Adolf Warschauer, "Städtewesen: 1. Provinz Posen," in *Die deutsche Ostmark*, ed. Deutscher Ostmarkenverein (Lissa i.P.: Oskar Eulitz Verlag, 1913), 204–220, 206.

24. See the 1803 map of Poznań/Posen that is a supplement to volume 2 of *Dzieje Poznania*.

25. See Magdalena Warkoczewska, "Städtebauliche Veränderungen um die Jahrhundertwende/Zmiany w zabudowie miasta na przełomie wieków," 61–66 and Jan Skuratowicz, "Architektur/Architektura," 67–69, in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*; and Zofia Ostrowska-Kęblowska and Jan Skuratowicz, "Architektura I budownictwo," in *Dzieje Poznania*, vol. 2, 479–583.

26. For the Bazar, see Jakóbczyk, *Poznańskim Bazarze 1838–1839*. It is worth noting that the streets intersecting at the corner where the old Hôtel Bazar stands are named

for the Bazar's founder, Karol Marcinkowski, and the second prime minister of the Second Polish Republic, the pianist and composer Ignacy Paderewski; the current street names thus honor Polish nationalist heroes in this now thoroughly Polish city.

27. See the 1911 map of Poznań/Posen that is a supplement to volume 2 of *Dzieje Poznania*.

28. *Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Kulturarbeit: Tätigkeit und Aufgaben neupreußischer Kolonisation in Westpreußen und Posen* (Berlin: W. Moeser Buckdruckerei, 1907). For the history of the Settlement Commission, see Witold Jakóbczyk, *Pruska Komisja Osadnicza 1886–1919* (Poznań, 1976); Jakóbczyk, *Kolonizatorzy i hakatyści* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1989); and Jakóbczyk, "The First Decade of the Prussian Settlement Commission's Activities, 1886–1897," *The Polish Review* 71, no. 1 (1972).

29. See GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 195, Deutscher Ostmarkenverein, no. 336b, Denkschrift zur ostmärkischen Städtepolitik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Provinz Posen, 1914 (M).

30. See Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews*, 176–180; and Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, 285.

31. Wolfgang Hofmann, "Reichshauptstadt und Hauptstadt der 'Ostmarken'. Staatlicher Städtebau in Berlin und Posen im deutschen Kaiserreich (1871–1914)," in *Ideologie, Poglądy, Mity w Dziejach Polski i Europy XIX I XX wieju*, ed. Jerzy Topolski, Witold Molik, and Krzysztof Makowski (Poznań: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, 1991), 25–27; Warkoczewska, "Städtebauliche Veränderungen"; Zofia Ostrowska-Kęblowska and Jan Skuratowicz, "Architektura I budownictwo."

32. See Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 179–183.

33. See the 1896 postcard produced by Ottmar Zieher in Munich, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*, 30.

34. Warschauer, "Städtewesen: 1. Provinz Posen," in *Die deutsche Ostmark*, 206.

35. See postcards #14, 16, 17, 18, 32, 33, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84, 108, 110, 118, and 131, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

36. See postcards #40, 52, and 80, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

37. See postcards #16, 17, 18, 33, 118, and 131 (for the City Theater) and #5, 60, 62, and 87 (for scenes of commerce), as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

38. See postcards #125–128, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

39. See postcards #15, 49, 61, and 66, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

40. See postcards #32, 108, and 110, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

41. See postcards #88, 119, 121, 122, 123, and 124, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

42. See postcards #9, 10, 11, 101, 102, 103, and 104, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

43. See postcards #77, 120, and 136, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

44. See postcards #37, 69, 98, and 132, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

45. See postcards #111, 112, 113, 114, and 129, as reproduced in Kemlein, *Postkarten erzählen Geschichte*.

46. Albert S. Kotowski, *Polens Politik gegenüber seiner deutschen Minderheit 1919–1939* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassovwitz, 1998), 56. See also Richard Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles. The Germans in Western Poland 1918–1939* (Lexington, KY: University Press

of Kentucky, 1993); and Dariusz Matelski, *Mniejszość niemiecka w Wielkopolsce w latach 1919–1939* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1997).

47. Poznań, with Gdańsk, hosted Group C, which consisted of Spain (the eventual champion), Italy (the runner-up), Croatia, and Ireland. Three matches were played in Poznań's new stadium: Ireland versus Croatia, Italy versus Croatia, and Italy versus Ireland. Germany was in Group B, the so-called "group of death," with the Netherlands, Portugal, and Denmark.

CHAPTER THREE

INCLUSION AND SEGREGATION IN BERLIN, THE "SOCIAL CITY"

Stephan Lanz

The idea of the German city as an inclusive "Social City" (*soziale Stadt*)—that is, a city that actively seeks to solve social problems through a wide range of policies—has had a considerable influence on the "spatial image" and "urban meaning" of cities in Germany, both during the twentieth and now the twenty-first century.[1] The concept of the "Social City" was shaped to a great degree by its delineation as a contrast to the American city, the regulatory model of which was based mostly on market mechanisms and community self-help models, and gained the reputation of an "unsocial" counter-concept to the German version. With regard to Berlin, certain socio-technical strategies designed to ensure a balanced mix of the social classes in urban space can already be discerned in the urban development plans that were drafted as early as the mid-nineteenth century to manage the growth explosion of the belated industrial metropolis. When the Social Democrats became the city's governing party at the beginning of the Weimar Republic, the goal of making the metropolis into a balanced social space gained a political significance that it has retained to this day. Since the early 1990s, and in response to intensifying socio-spatial polarization and segregation processes, the normative model of the "Social City" has once again become one of the key elements of government programs and urban intervention strategies in reunified Berlin.

Using the example of Berlin, this chapter discusses the history of the German city as a "Social City," focusing in particular on the relationships that form as a result between class, ethnic group, and urban social policy, and the degree to which transnational practices in the city are assisted or stymied by practices of residential placement and displacement. Specifically, we can trace historical continuities and changes with regard to discourses, characteristics, and modes of implementation of the "Social City" both in politics and in urban planning, and thus better understand and define the agenda of the "Social City" Berlin.

Class Antagonisms in the Expanding Industrial Metropolis

With the establishment of industrial production and the emergence of the proletarian masses in the mid-nineteenth century, the face of Berlin became definitively

changed. Within just a few decades, the city's population grew tenfold. But Berlin's flourishing industry was accompanied by a great deal of social misery. Living conditions in the tenement blocks, the so-called rental barracks [*Mietskasernen*] of Berlin's working-class quarters, were often inhumane. Even basement and attic flats were overcrowded; one-tenth of working-class households took in lodgers and night lodgers. The National Liberals, who governed the city for decades and ensured the continuity of homeowners' privileges codified in the three-class franchise system, favored social policies of private welfare and of a traditional state as "provider." These policies were based on "ideas of individualism and individual responsibility, a belief in society's ability to heal itself, and the notion of poverty as a personal fault."[2]

Poverty in modern Berlin was not regarded as a social problem; instead, it was seen as an expression of moral degeneracy. In the imaginary battle between order and chaos, those excluded by society became the "dangerous classes" that were beyond state control.[3] The example of Berlin's Scheunenviertel quarter, now part of Berlin-Mitte but formerly outside the city walls where poor East European immigrants, many of them Jewish, had settled, illustrates how (sub-)proletarian quarters were systematically depicted as suspicious by newspapers and academic publications and branded as a world beyond the bourgeois order. Notwithstanding their integration into the labor market as laborers or domestic servants, their inhabitants were stigmatized as "revolutionaries, vagabonds, criminals" who willfully refused civilization.[4]

Against this background, one of the central debates in city politics of the era dealt with the question of whether different classes should be kept separate or whether the social strata should be mingled in mixed residential areas. The Berlin Land Use Plan of 1863 (the Hobrecht Plan) codified the street lay-out and regulated the city's ensuing rapid growth. The Plan's main editor, James Hobrecht, head of the "Planning Commission of the Royal Police Headquarters," naively defended the tenement structure's social mix within individual neighborhoods, and even within front and rear buildings and attic, basement, and belle-étage apartments. He relied on the supposedly civilizing effect of neighborly coexistence:

> Out of moral, and hence governmental, considerations, it seems to me that not "seclusion" but "diffusion" is called for…In the tenement blocks, the children from the basement flats use the same hallway on their way to the free school as the councilman's or the merchant's children on their way to grammar school. A nourishing bowl of soup in case of illness here, a piece of clothing there, effective assistance in obtaining free schooling or the like—and everything that develops as a result of the comfortable relationship between the residents, equal in nature, however different in situation, is a help that exerts its ennobling influence on the giver.[5]

Hobrecht's idea of a quasi-natural solidarity between the upper and the lower classes was rooted in social romanticism; he also took it as a given that the latter needed to be civilized and educated by the example given by the former. He was blind both to the sharply conflicting interests between the social classes and to the power disparity between them. Although his idea of social mixing informed the urban expansion plan, Berlin's socio-spatial segregation became more pronounced as the city's large-scale industries grew. Nonetheless, the spatial image of a residential mixing of social classes strongly influences the social policies of German cities to this day. It is fed,

still in keeping with Hobrecht's projection, by a middle-class sense of superiority vis-à-vis both the working class and (to use Marx's term) the *lumpenproletariat*. This has given rise to social techniques designed to "civilize" the poor and distribute these populations across urban space.

The Beginnings of the "Social City" in Weimar-Era Berlin

Both in Prussia and in Berlin itself, the first free and equal elections, held in 1919, were won by the Social Democrats, who had aspirations for a socialist modernization of "Red Berlin," as they dubbed the proletarian capital. In a sweeping reform of local administration, they created, from 7 towns and 59 rural communities, the new entity of Greater Berlin. In the 1920s, the city's Magistrate (council) undertook to modernize Berlin from the ground up by way of systematic urban planning and an effective infrastructure and to turn this "giant cluster of a city" into a social space.[6] And Berlin did indeed become internationally renowned for its public transportation, waste disposal, electricity and gas supply systems. But the city council's biggest project was its state-sponsored mass housing scheme. More than 130,000 apartments were built in the new *Neue Sachlichkeit* (New Objectivity) style. Along with statutory rent control, public housing was intended to further the social integration of urban society by severing the link between poverty and poor housing and living conditions.[7]

In 1925, a new building code put an end to the building of the *Mietskasernen*, which had been sharply criticized for decades for the horrible living conditions they had created. But even the building of mass housing could not keep up with the demand for living space in the still-growing city. The continued existence, at the end of the 1920s, of more than 40,000 shacks bore witness to the ongoing housing shortage. Eventually, after the Great Crash of 1929, "Berlin's economic, political and cultural structure" collapsed, and the city's socio-spatial polarization became once again more pronounced.[8] A quarter of its population was now dependent on welfare; many people who had sunk into poverty were dwelling in dilapidated new buildings, and national emergency relief schemes increasingly constricted the scope of local self-government. It was no longer just the conservative side that considered the modern social city a failed model.

Even this Social Democrat–run modern city, which today is considered an exemplary model of social integration, had structural exclusion mechanisms built into it. Its welfare policy operated on a concept of society as a social "body" in the physical sense, with the proletariat as a health risk that endangered the nation through epidemics or "degeneracy." Influential sociopolitically motivated discourses on urban development—such as those propagated by the Berlin economist Werner Hegemann—became blended with the theory of eugenics, producing the argument that bad housing conditions and high urban density were harmful to German genetic material. This view facilitated the propagation of lines of argument about racial hygiene that were later taken up by the Nazis. In turn, the "New Building" style (*Neues Bauen*) functioned as a "socio-aesthetic educational dictatorship." Its aim was to create, through education of "the broad masses of the population," a domestic culture based on hygiene, cleanliness, and order that would produce the "New Man." Everything that did not fit these parameters was rigorously excluded.[9]

Berlin's Urban Renewal Agenda from the Wilhelmine
Era to the National Socialists

Urban renewal projects implemented at this time were based on similar ideology. From the days of the monarchy through the Weimar Republic to the National Socialists, the goal was to "cure"—to use the nomenclature of the day—the working-class quarters that were the focal point of the public discourse on slums. A de facto part of the rationale behind the wholesale razing of existing housing structures was the physical dispersal of undesirable poor and immigrant communities.

This motivation is particularly well illustrated by the example of the previously mentioned Scheunenviertel district, a site of projection for fears of a perceived dangerous "agglomeration of the poor," especially of Eastern European Jews who were the primary targets of racist discourse. Many of them had fled pogroms in Eastern Europe. Located adjacent to the Jewish-bourgeois neighborhood of Spandauer Vorstadt with its new synagogue, the Scheunenviertel offered cheap housing and was characterized by poverty and petty crime. One contemporaneous commentator on urban renewal, Otto Schilling, compared its social conditions with those of the slums of London.[10]

In 1906, Berlin's magistrate began with the implementation of an urban renewal project for the Scheunenviertel that entailed large-scale demolition and redevelopment. Its aim was the destruction of the social structure of what was commonly regarded as a ghetto without walls. The city council had a large number of buildings demolished without providing alternative accommodation for the occupants, who were thus forced to move on to other poor neighborhoods. The Social Democratic Magistrate of the 1920s continued with the program: twenty years after the first wave of large-scale demolition and redevelopment, another comprehensive, yet only partially realized construction project was put into action to effect the "eviction of the undesirable long-time residents."[11] Beginning in 1933, the Nazis stepped up the program: shortly after they came to power, a police raid on the Scheunenviertel, presented to the public as a conquest of enemy territory, marked the beginning of the quarter's takeover, destruction, and reinterpretation by the Nazis, whose propaganda made use of the neighborhood's bad reputation and of the public's racist prejudices against Eastern European Jews.[12]

In spite of its racist agenda, the renewed partial demolition and redevelopment of Berlin's Scheunenviertel neighborhood—wrongly depicted by the Nazis as exclusively Jewish for years—was hailed as a model of center-city redevelopment at an international conference in 1935. Around this time, redevelopment experts and Berlin's mayor began to investigate whether it might not be possible to unceremoniously expel Jewish tenants without German citizenship who had been displaced by the large-scale demolition of housing as "troublesome foreigners," or at least to resettle them into temporary barrack camps.

In addition to the renewal of the city center, Berlin's social policy was likewise initially marked by continuity after the Nazis had come to power: tenants' rights, building maintenance policies, and the building of subsidized housing continued to exist and were even extended in some areas. But their benefits were increasingly reserved for members of the Aryan *Volksgemeinschaft* (literally "people's community"). From

the end of the 1930s onward, planning included the eviction of Jews from rental apartments and the eventual "de-Judaization" [*Entjudung*] of the city.

The Postwar "Social City": West and East Berlin

After the collapse of the Third Reich and the division of Berlin into eastern and western sectors, urban development policy was once again decisively influenced by the 1920s concept of urban space. Wartime destruction had been both vast and uneven across the city (some suburbs suffered relatively little, and even some inner-city housing blocks could be rapidly repaired). During the Cold War, West Berlin's special case brought an atypical population mix, based on both subsidized industry and special privileges for university students. Until the end of the 1970s, West Berlin's social policy consisted primarily of the building of state-subsidized mass housing estates "for the broad masses of the population." The overall rationale behind the postwar project of providing subsidized housing was not welfare for the poorest but the social integration of urban society.[13] Until the Social Democrats were voted out of office in 1981, they pursued an urban development policy that sought to create standardized living conditions and a homogeneous urban space divided into different functional zones, a goal they sought to achieve by way of centralized urban planning. The public housing sector produced a coalition of interests that consisted of nonprofit housing companies, the building industry, banks, construction workers' unions, architects, and private companies established for tax write-off purposes.[14] Until the late 1970s, this conglomeration developed large-scale housing estates along the city's periphery, the most important of which—Gropiusstadt in Neukölln, the Märkisches Viertel in Reinickendorf, and the Falkenhagener Feld in Spandau—today have around 35,000 residents each. In addition, from the early 1960s onward, large-scale urban redevelopment projects were implemented in the city's Wilhelmine-era quarters, especially in Wedding and Kreuzberg, where historical buildings were demolished wholesale through large-scale blasting.

By and large, similar developments took place in the capital of the German Democratic Republic, but with a specific, nation-building emphasis. East Berlin made the rebuilding and expansion of that part of the city the top priority for the GDR. The socialist city of the postwar decades was characterized by centralization, land nationalization, and the construction of nationally owned housing. Urban space was supposed to represent the achievements of socialism, to serve as a "stage for the display of the new People's Democracy."[15] Since the organizing rationale behind the spatial order was the creation of a class-transcending social commonality, the urban center was considered a "place of communicative centrality," and one of its functions was that of a residential quarter.[16] Large-scale demolition and redevelopment took place on the East side of the Wall, as well: for example, on the Fischerinsel (part of Berlin's medieval city core) and at the Alexanderplatz. These projects combined the large-scale demolition of historical buildings with the kind of industrialized building of mass housing that also came to dominate the city's peripheries. In East Berlin's outlying areas, the building of large suburban housing estates took place on a much larger scale than in the West: in the three East Berlin districts of Marzahn,

Lichtenberg, and Hellersdorf alone, about 150,000 apartments went up between the 1970s and the end of the GDR.

In addition to subsidized housing, West Berlin also expanded the right to financial support for people in need by way of bureaucratically managed social transfers. But the established discursive and political patterns on social hygiene continued to exert their influence on the city's social policy: the foreign *Gastarbeiter* ("guest workers"), for example, who had been recruited mainly as industrial workers since the late 1960s, were systematically barred from access to subsidized housing. Generally speaking, the "authoritarian, socially educative element of state housing policy" lived on.[17] Restrictions on and redesigns of transnationally developing processes were thus effectively put in place in Cold-War West Berlin.

Worse yet, housing applicants were classified according to their ethnic origin. While so-called *Aussiedler*, "resettlers" from Eastern Europe who could prove their German ethnicity, were considered German and qualified for access to rent-controlled housing, the mostly Turkish "guest workers" were subject to a quota system based on an arbitrarily set "tolerance" cut-off point that was set far below actual demand levels. An example of this occurred in the newly built Gropiusstadt, where the state-owned housing association rented only two percent of its subsidized apartments to non-Germans. Not until the 1980s were the municipal public housing companies instructed to elevate the so-called foreigners' quota to 15 percent, but the directive was not enforced due to a lack of political will. Statistics from the 1987 census show that even at that time, hardly any subsidized apartments were occupied by non-Germans.[18]

Still, the urban planning goal of distributing "foreigners" evenly across the city was still in effect. The political argument used to justify this strategy was that a "concentration" of foreigners would pose a danger to domestic security and national identity. Racist and biologist ghetto discourses pointed to the existence of immigrant neighborhoods as proof that immigrants deliberately kept their distance from German society. But this argument reverses cause and effect. For example, Kreuzberg, a working-class neighborhood adjacent to the Wall and thus dislocated both spatially and infrastructurally, was branded a West Berlin "ghetto." It provides an object lesson in a neighborhood's quick transformation into an immigrant area through the combined workings of its proximity to the Wall, state policy, a profit-driven real estate industry, and institutionalized racism. For one, the unwelcome foreigners were only rented run-down apartments that Germans had no interest in because they were slated for destruction as part of demolition and renewal projects. Landlords were even known to charge a discriminatory surcharge of up to 30 percent of the rent.[19] Secondly, West Berlin's social policy makers made a point of refusing to adapt schools and social services to the needs of the city's new residents in order to discourage them from "crowding" into Berlin and its "conurbations," as the mayor put it.[20] In other words, the city's policy makers tacitly accepted the development of so-called trouble hotspots with poor infrastructure in order to deter further immigration.

To dispose of these politically undesirable immigrant neighborhoods, which were a frequent target of media sensationalism, West Berlin's Senate imposed a so-called *Zuzugssperre* ("settlement ban") in 1975 that prohibited foreigners from moving into

the major immigrant boroughs of Kreuzberg, Wedding, and Tiergarten. Until 1989, foreign nationals moving to Berlin had a note to this effect entered into their passport and could be expelled from Germany if they were found in contravention of this regulation. In many cases, this drastic curtailing of the right to choose one's place of residence led to the separation of children from their parents and of husbands and wives from their spouses. Constitutionally, it was extremely problematic, and it was declared unlawful by the Higher Administrative Court in a number of cases. The following quote is taken from a statement by the Senate of the Interior explaining the withdrawal of the residence permit of a Turkish woman who had left Turkey to join her husband in Berlin-Wedding and in so doing had contravened the settlement ban. It demonstrates how the regulation was justified politically in spite of its disputed constitutional validity: the regulation, it said, was necessary to "counter the excessive concentration of foreigners in certain residential areas, and to prevent the development of foreign ghettos and areas of social tension."[21] But it was the settlement ban that produced a particular ghetto characteristic—and one that was ignored in public discourse—in the first place: namely, the state's limiting of the freedom of certain social groups to choose their place of residence. The regulation did not apply to citizens of EC countries or to US citizens. It was not directed at foreigners per se, but at a specific Muslim "other" socially constructed on the basis of racist discourses. The same cannot be said about the social structure of West Berlin's outer boroughs, where the unemployed and deprived were mostly white Germans. In socialist East Berlin, in turn, a demographic control system had been established that lasted until the end of the GDR: the foreign "contract workers" recruited from socialist brother countries like Vietnam or Mozambique were completely segregated from Germans and housed in guarded hostels.

From Standardization to Enterprise City: West Berlin in the 1980s

In the late 1970s, the Social Democrats' Fordist-style urban development policies of extensive planning and regulation entered a crisis. Their "system of social democratic socialization" became undermined by fundamental social restructuring processes.[22] The model of the modern "Social City" ran aground due to weakening state control mechanisms, declining finances, and broad opposition from the local population. In 1981, with the coming to power of the Christian Democrats, the era of Social Democratic dominance in Berlin came to an end. The CDU would, with a brief interlude, dominate Berlin's politics until just after the millennium, forging a neoliberal version of the spatial control of social and ethnic classes across West Berlin.

In Kreuzberg, in particular, the "cartel of housing companies and state planning" was derailed by local citizens' resistance.[23] In 1981, squatters took over numerous buildings in the borough—many of them slated for demolition—and kept resisting eviction, in some cases violently. In an effort to meet the crisis of the Fordist city with appropriate urban renewal strategies, Berlin's parliament set up the so-called *Internationale Bauausstellung* (International Building Exhibition), a planning instrument that developed strategies for a "sensitive" or "careful" renewal, and included social education and spatial and architectural concepts as well as support

for self-help initiatives. The objective of this approach was to preserve old buildings wherever possible and to cater to residents' needs and include them in the implementation stages.

These new urban renewal programs were designed to simultaneously act as preventive social policies. "Sensitive" renewal practices were designed to encompass the entire living environment of a given local area, and just like the new market mechanisms at play in urban development, they advanced the city's division into subspaces. In their turn away from the "management of social benefits and ready-made socialization opportunities," they now acted as preventive social policies whose decentralized and informal intervention practices targeted "attitudes, leanings and needs."[24] State apparatuses were supplemented by soft modes of regulation tied to the para-governmental *Internationale Bauausstellung*. This approach not only made it possible to legalize those squatters who were willing to cooperate with the municipal authorities and to redevelop the buildings they occupied through resident-run redevelopment agencies, it also succeeded in neutralizing the broad resistance against the city's urban development policy. The Christian Democratic Senate complemented this sensitive renewal policy with a repressive strategy that entailed the eviction of militant squatters by the police.

In this way, a trend emerged toward "semi-autonomous/semi-governmental 'para-apparatuses'" that were independent of the local parliamentary institutions and were often operated privately.[25] Its buzzwords were increased flexibility, decentralization, self-help, participation, and "endogenous development." This approach was appealing not only to neoconservative forces within the CDU that wanted to see the welfare state curbed in favor of local communities, individual responsibility, and regulation close to the market. It also appealed to a countercultural scene whose young members were mostly from a white middle-class background and hence much better equipped than other segments of the population to assert their interests in these new participatory processes, which required a high degree of cultural capital. With the new state intervention techniques responding to the counterculture developed by the new social movements and deriving their content from clients' sociocultural needs, West Berlin's urban cultural policy thus became a key instrument of social governance.

Due to the competition between the two political systems, the term "cultural metropolis" had become, with an eye to the respective other across the Wall, "strikingly common" in both parts of the divided city in the 1970s.[26] In 1980s West Berlin, however, it came to denote a model of internal social order. The recycling of urban space and structures and the increasing number of mass spectacles (anniversary celebrations, the *Internationale Bauausstellung*, the European Capital of Culture award), in combination with funding for a wide range of sociocultural initiatives, coalesced into an identity politics that integrated, at least symbolically, the city's social classes and sociocultural strata, which were increasingly drifting apart as a result of socioeconomic transformation processes that brought with them decreasing industrial production, the dismantling of social security mechanisms, and the declining prestige of traditional occupations.

The CDU Senate was also intent on rolling back the Social Democrats' "quantitative social policy" (dubbed a "management and service company with unlimited

liability" by Berlin's mayor) in favor of a "responsible partnership between the active and capable and those in need."[27] Berlin's Senate Administration for Social Affairs initiated a funding program for self-help initiatives that was aimed at refashioning as many social services as possible. In 1987, for example, almost 50 groups that worked in the area of foreigners' issues received support based on the rationale of "helping people to help themselves." Up till then, state assistance for immigrants had been exclusively paternalistic and had been delivered in the form of social assistance through large charity organizations. Now the focus was shifting to social problems such as the lack of apprenticeships for young people or the rapidly rising unemployment rate among immigrants, most of whom had been employed in the industrial sector and were now, in the 1980s, hit hard by the rapidly accelerating deindustrialization of West Berlin's economy. This social policy paradigm produced a slew of new initiatives, with "ethnic organizations" often being considered "eligible for funding on the basis of their mere existence."[28] Self-help initiatives and independent sponsoring organizations increasingly employed formerly unemployed people in jobs that were financed by the state through "work creation schemes."

Another measure introduced by the West Berlin Senate was the tying of welfare benefits to certain compulsory measures, an instrument whose effectiveness was first tested on foreign refugees. The authorities began to sign up asylum seekers for compulsory community work, later extending the measure to welfare recipients in general.[29] This marked the beginning of a social policy shift from welfare to workfare, a first in West Germany. At the time, critical voices argued that the state was exploiting volunteer community help in an attempt to shirk its sociopolitical responsibilities. They claimed that the funding schemes had excluded critical groups and were essentially producing self-exploiting organizations that had "degenerated into outposts of the established professional system."[30]

Reunified City: The End of Subsidized Housing

The post-1989 reunification of the city meant status as a "Land" ("state") and the loss of all kinds of subsidies from the federal government, even as the latter prepared to move the capital from Bonn back to Berlin. The housing supply became increasingly dictated by market mechanisms, and during Germany's initial post-Wall decade of the 1990s, the construction of subsidized housing effectively ground to a halt. The federal government had already pulled out of funding for new subsidized housing in 1986 and eventually revoked the nonprofit status of West Berlin's housing associations (which up to then had been legally nonprofit) on the grounds that it distorted competition, in effect pulling the rug out from under them.[31]

The neoliberal 1990s and 2000s thus saw a turn away from the "guiding principle of socio-spatial cohesion" in housing policy.[32] Based on a staggeringly optimistic projection that predicted a possible population increase from 3.5 to 6 million for Berlin within a few years, another 75,000 rental units were built using public funding during the first decade after reunification—but here the rationale behind the funding model was no longer explicitly social. The *Eigentumsstrategie 2000* ["Property Strategy 2000"] marked the beginning of a radical turn in post-Wall Berlin's housing policy. In an effort to counter the ongoing exodus of the city's

middle classes to the surrounding areas and the resulting loss in revenue, it was planned to double the number of apartment owners in Berlin within 15 years. This project did not just entail the funding of private housing with public means; it also included the conversion of a large number of publicly owned rental units into condominiums. Entire federal state–owned housing companies were sold lock, stock, and barrel. In 2002, the new Social Democrat-Socialist Senate finally ended publicly subsidized housing. The number of subsidized apartments in post-Wall Berlin declined from 375,000 in 1991 to 200,000 in 2006.[33]

The free-marketization of Berlin's housing supply had its effect on urban renewal as well. Since large parts of post-Communist East Berlin were in an advanced state of dilapidation, West Berlin's "sensitive" urban renewal strategy was extended to large areas of the city's eastern center, primarily Mitte, Prenzlauer Berg, and Friedrichshain. But the circumstances were entirely different now. The local state—increasingly less willing to regard urban renewal as a responsibility of the welfare state and to fund it with public money—simply employed agencies as intermediaries to coordinate what were now market-driven processes, engaged in by private investors.[34]

The post-Wall cessation of public housing construction, the expiration of fixed-term rent-controlled leases, and the adoption of market mechanisms in urban renewal practices led, first of all, to a significant increase in housing costs, particularly in the core of East Berlin. The result was the displacement of a large number of former (East German, poor) residents. In the 2000s, this gentrification process began to spread to West Berlin's immigrant area of Kreuzberg as well.[35] Even parts of multicultural Neukölln, generally regarded as one of Germany's worst "problematic districts," are in a stage of "gentrification waiting to happen"—a process indicated by rapidly rising rents and an increasingly tight housing market. The situation has been exacerbated since 2005 by a reform of the social benefit system. This reform measure, known as Hartz IV, was implemented by the outgoing coalition federal government of the Social Democrats and the Greens, and drastically tightened the requirements for access to social benefits. To give just one example: the Hartz IV laws, which in Berlin affect almost half a million people, closely tie the right to housing benefits—a social transfer mechanism—to "adequate" rent amount and apartment size, both set at very low levels. Urban sociologist Andrej Holm, who has conducted studies in Berlin's rental housing stock in relation to these issues, sums up his findings: "Especially in East Berlin, the apartments available to Hartz IV recipients are limited mainly to inner-city substandard housing and large suburban housing estates. From this perspective, Hartz IV is also an instrument that furthers the city's spatial restructuring and the marginalization of those considered dispensable."[36]

The Post-Wall Transformation of the "Social City" Concept

In fact, the socio-spatial polarization of Berlin had already become more pronounced over the course of the 1990s. This was the result of two combined factors: the forced gentrification of inner-city, Wilhelmine-era neighborhoods and the increasing impoverishment of working-class people hit by—often permanent—unemployment as a result of post-Wall Berlin's deindustrialization. In 1998, the

Berlin Senate published a study titled "Urban Development with a Social Focus," which noted a "cumulative exacerbation of socio-spatial problems" in certain districts and called for a "strategy of urban integration" to stop the "process of marginalization and exclusion."[37]

The increasing socio-spatial polarization also brought with it a return of traditional constructions of the socially and ethnically "other" in political and media discourse. In poor inner-city areas, to quote the urban studies researcher Hartmut Häußermann, the close proximity of "losers in the modernization process, the socially maladjusted and the socially discriminated against" has left its imprint on the inhabitants' "ways of acting and thinking" to the point of creating a "culture of deviation."[38] The equation of marginalized spaces deviating from the norms of majority society with "breeding grounds of lawlessness, deviation and anomie" that is implied here in the connection between poverty, moral decline, and crime is unpleasantly reminiscent of those bourgeois depictions of peripheral neighborhoods like the Scheunenviertel in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.[39] Over the course of the twentieth century, as we have seen, such class-ridden and racist constructions of the urban "other" were gradually superseded by the model of the European "Social City." But as these notions of socially regulating, welfare-based equality lost ground to neoliberalism, the earlier prejudices appear to have returned with renewed force. The growing contradiction between increasing social conflicts and problems on the one hand and the retreat of the social policy models of the welfare state on the other has led to increasingly forceful attempts to solve crises with law-and-order policies. Further, the welfare-to-workfare trend continued in the 1990s, with the moniker of an "activating" (as opposed to "providing") welfare state now focusing on mobilizing the entrepreneurial subject who was deemed ultimately responsible for his or her own needs and thus to blame for any deficiencies.[40]

With regard to urban policy, the "imperative of mobilization" applies to the socio-spatial dimension as well. In 1999, the Berlin Senate implemented a political intervention program against increasing socio-spatial polarization and impoverishment especially among immigrant groups whose members had permanently lost their jobs due to the deindustrialization of the city's economy. The program is co-financed by a joint federal and state initiative entitled "The Social City."[41] Initiated by the coalition government of the Social Democrats and the Greens, the "Social City" program consists of a so-called neighborhood management scheme initially established by the Senate in 15 "areas particularly in need of development." The main problems identified by the Senate were—in keeping with the Jamesonian *ideologeme* of the desirability of social mixing—a spatial over-"concentration of problem groups" caused by selective migration processes, social descent, and cultural communication barriers.[42] The program's objective was to stimulate "sustainable social, economic, urban, and ecological development through integrated action and interconnected measures." It made vague promises of "creating living environments without exclusion" and "maintaining the social mix."[43]

Local state agencies hired privately operating "neighborhood managers" to connect, in cooperation with the authorities, local actors and to develop projects designed to help "local residents…change their circumstances and use their skills and potential to become more independent."[44] The rationale, according to

the Senate, was not so much for the state to provide a "framework of action" but to "strengthen people's engagement and their capacity to help themselves through local networks and information."[45] Essentially, the goal of the program—which has been extended to 34 urban areas since the coming to power of a Social Democrat-Socialist coalition in 2002—is the creation of self-regulating local communities by means of producing active local citizenries, which are said to no longer exist in these disadvantaged neighborhoods. Thus, marginalized inhabitants are to get access to "help to help themselves." "Empowerment" is the big buzzword.

One important component of Berlin's neighborhood management program is the creation of local employment opportunities to make up for jobs lost in the regular economy due to deindustrialization—a development that has driven a large number of inhabitants of disadvantaged neighborhoods into dependence on employment agencies and social welfare programs. No activity that can be fashioned into a job, no matter how precarious and badly paid, escapes consideration: groundskeeping, neighborhood patrol, social and cultural services of any kind, temporary stores offering or teaching various handicrafts (sewing shops, galleries, puppet theaters), courses (homework assistance, yoga, etc.), and many others. Such projects aside, the bulk of individual measures implemented under the umbrella of the neighborhood management program look like updated versions of the social and sociocultural projects run by the alternative movement that the Senate had already funded in the 1980s. They include, for example, public space upgrading projects, continuing education programs, drug and violence prevention programs, "integration courses," social work in schools, funding for artists, and block parties.[46] What is new here is that the local state now initiates these kinds of projects itself, indirectly pressuring citizens to become proactive. Once again, the poor are being divided by discourse: While the state sees it as its mandate to increase its support for "worthy" groups, it tends to give up on or increase control over what it perceives to be the less worthy sections of society.[47]

All this rhetoric about the "social investment" necessary to maintain the "Social City" obscures the fact that the primacy of budget consolidation actually results in a "decrease of welfare state expenditures on continuing education, job training, and social integration programs for the unemployed." In Berlin, the coalition is contributing to this trend with its strategy of rolling back the budget deficit "through massive cuts to local infrastructure and the abolition of benefits."[48] Especially in Berlin's immigrant groups, hit particularly hard by unemployment, there are now growing numbers of people who are excluded from society, permanently cut off from the labor market, suffering stigmatization, and see no chance of improving their situation.

The outcomes of the neighborhood management scheme, the central element of the current discourses and political agendas connected with the "Social City," are, in other words, highly ambivalent. Thus the impact of the "Social City" on Berlin's urban transnational processes is equally ambivalent. On the one hand, the scheme allows for the participation of its target groups, and it does a better job than Fordist bureaucratic procedures of fitting urban social policy to local needs and environments. On the other hand, it does nothing to eliminate either the causes of poverty or poverty itself, which is actually increasing as a result of a consistently

enterprise- and marketing-oriented urban policy. Socioeconomic and ethnicity-based forms of polarization in Berlin have not been reduced by the program, now in its second decade—they have actually become more pronounced.[49] The think-tank *Monitoring Soziale Stadt* notes this ongoing tendency toward socio-spatial polarization, yet chalks up as a modest success the fact that aspects of the social data of particularly difficult areas have leveled out, albeit at an extremely low level. Yet there are also social studies on individual neighborhood management projects that indicate that rents are rising dramatically even while income levels are at best being maintained.[50]

Adding to all this is the fact that the neighborhood management model tends to put the most marginalized residents at a disadvantage because they lack the means and agency to participate in these state-supported self-help structures. Finally, we should ask whether the strong emphasis on social inclusion and local community in Berlin is not just a veiled attempt to compensate for the dismantling of social rights and the state's gradual abdication of its responsibility for citizens' material welfare.

Conclusion: The Covert Americanization of the German "Social City" Model

This chapter's overview of the German "Social City" model as exemplified by Berlin illustrates, first, that the model has undergone a number of significant transformations over the course of the past century. Second, it shows that it has, in all its historical incarnations, maintained various social exclusion patterns that work against transnational mobility and keep certain urban groups from socially integrating beyond the lines of class and ethnic origin. In other words, the idea and agenda of social justice have only ever manifested themselves selectively.

A quote from the study "Urban Development with a Social Focus" by the Berlin Senate succinctly sums up the position of many current critics of the neoliberal city: "Whether the difference of the European vis-à-vis the American city can and should be maintained is one of the most important urban policy questions of the 21st century."[51] The "Social City" / neighborhood management model is considered a key instrument in ensuring that this difference can in fact be maintained. But the notion implied here of a simple dichotomy between the "good," socially inclusive European city and the "bad," anti-integration American one is misleading, especially in terms of how one regards the degree to which urban transnational processes are encouraged or damaged. Useful reassessments are offered in such recent transatlantic, comparative studies of urban social equity such as Susan C. Fainstein's *The Just City*.[52] Current urban social policy agendas no longer have much in common with the state-directed social policies of European cities. Rather, the "Social City" program, touted as a panacea for all kinds of ills in today's metropolises, now appears to be informed more by the American idea of a local community. In contrast to urban policy in twentieth-century Germany, the objective of which has been the equalizing of living conditions and the elimination of socio-spatial disparities, these ideals are considered gratuitous in the United States, if not "fundamentally un-American, since they run counter to the American idea of democracy, i.e., the notion of self-rule and administrative autonomy."[53]

Essentially, the new local social programs signify a turn away from the concept of spatial homogenization in social policy. In another area, this process had already taken place in the 1980s, when endogenous potential and local diversity were discovered as useful resources in the area of locational competition, then an emerging phenomenon. These days, the main rationale is not the equal distribution of infrastructure across urban space but an emphasis on neighborhood development programs, the identification of different needs, and local civic activities. The normative ideal of subcommunal territorial units that the "Social City" program aspires to is that of an "autonomous community" with a citizen-run administration that requires as little state intervention and expenditure as possible.[54] It is conspicuous how much the program emphasizes the importance of local communities and its intention of activating local self-help resources: It seems that non-governmental modes of solidarity are replacing what Alain Lipietz terms the Fordist "solidarities of the administrative type" that characterized the municipal policy of German cities and were fiercely attacked, especially by the Left, for their repressive, educational components.[55] It is not least the broad range of strategies the "Social City" program employs—from the privatization of subsidized housing to encouraging disadvantaged citizens to use their own self-help resources—that illustrates how much this model is at odds with the system of state-guaranteed welfare for the "broad masses of the population" that characterized the "Social City" model for most of the twentieth century.

The ambivalent nature of such programs, which, after all, were devised to save a model of the "German city" that is considered socially inclusive, appears to arise from the very fact that they are tacitly informed by American models. On the one hand, these programs are based on the neoliberal pillars of deregulation and privatization and constitute an attempt to establish a socially "sustainable neo-liberalism" of sorts, one that replaces provision by the state with empowering citizens to help themselves—an approach that often has a repressive rather than a supportive character.[56] On the other hand, their emphasis on local needs, self-regulating communities, and neighborhood solidarity—all of which are closer to the American notion of what constitutes a local community—also opens the way for emancipatory modes of local social policy that the paternalistic model of social integration employed by the modern German social democratic city, which originated in the 1920s and is regarded as exemplary to this day, had repressed.

Notes

1. See Detlev Ipsen, *Raumbilder. Kultur und Ökonomie räumlicher Entwicklung* (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1997); and Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Berkeley / Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1983).
2. Ralf Stremmel, *Modell und Moloch. Berlin in der Wahrnehmung deutscher Politiker vom Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum 2. Weltkrieg* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1992), 49. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
3. Joachim Schlör, *Nachts in der großen Stadt. Paris, Berlin, London 1840–1930* (Munich: Artemis & Winkler, 1991), 53.
4. Michael Zinganel, *Real Crime. Architektur, Stadt und Verbrechen* (Vienna: Edition Selene, 2003), 87.

5. James Hobrecht, cited by Andrej Holm, "Soziale Mischung. Zur Entstehung und Funktion eines Mythos," *Forum Wissenschaft* 1, no. 9 (2009): 23–26. See also Hartmut Häußermann and Andreas Kapphan, *Berlin. Von der geteilten zur gespaltenen Stadt* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000), 34.

6. Stremmel, *Modell und Moloch,* 142.

7. See Häußermann and Kapphan, *Berlin*, 11.

8. Stremmel, *Modell und Moloch*, 146. See also Wolfgang Ribbe and Jürgen Schmädeke, *Kleine Berlin-Geschichte* (Berlin: Wolfgang Stapp Verlag, 1994).

9. Harald Bodenschatz, *Platz frei für das Neue Berlin! Geschichte der Stadterneuerung in der »größten Mietskasernenstadt der Welt« seit 1871* (Berlin: Transit, 1987). See also Klaus Ronneberger, "Biomacht und Hygiene. Normalisierung im fordistischen Wohnungsbau," in *Ernst Neufert. Normierte Baukultur*, ed. Walter Prigge (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus Verlag, 1999), 432–64.

10. Otto Schilling, *Innere Stadterweiterung* (Berlin: Der Zirkel, 1921).

11. Bodenschatz, *Platz frei für das Neue Berlin!* 49. See also Mischket Liebermann, "Im Berliner Ghetto," in *Juden in Berlin 1671–1945. Ein Lesebuch*, ed. Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung Beuermann (Berlin: Nicolai, 1988), 192–194.

12. See Horst Helas, "Altstadtsanierung 1934/35" and "Die Razzia am 4. April 1933," in *Das Scheunenviertel. Spuren eines verlorenen Berlins*, ed. Verein Stiftung Scheunenviertel (Berlin: Haude & Spener, 1999), 128–134 and 135–136.

13. See Häußermann and Kapphan, *Berlin*, 11.

14. See Bodenschatz, *Platz frei für das Neue Berlin!* 9.

15. Häußermann and Kapphan, *Berlin*, 62.

16. Bruno Flierl, "Stadtgestaltung in der ehemaligen DDR als Staatspolitik," in *Wohnen und Stadtpolitik im Umbruch. Perspektiven der Stadterneuerung nach 40 Jahren DDR*, ed. Peter Marcuse and Fred Staufenbiel (Berlin: Wiley-VCH Verlag, 1991), 49–65.

17. Bodenschatz, *Platz frei für das Neue Berlin!* 100.

18. See Jürgen Hoffmeyer-Zlotnick, *Gastarbeiter im Sanierungsgebiet. Das Beispiel Berlin-Kreuzberg* (Hamburg: Christians, 1977; and Stephan Lanz, *Berlin aufgemischt: abendländisch—multikulturell–kosmopolitisch? Die politische Konstruktion einer Einwanderungsstadt* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2007).

19. Yvo Dirickx and Ayse Kudat, *Ghettos: Individual or Systemic Choice* (Berlin: Internationales Institut für vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung, 1975; 29, no.75).

20. Planungsteam Eingliederung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien, ed., *Eingliederung der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien. Abschlußbericht* (Berlin: Der Regierende Bürgermeister von Berlin, 1972), 28.

21. Ausländerkomitee Berlin (West) e.V., *Gleiches Wohnrecht für alle! Dokumentation zur Zuzugssperre für ausländische Arbeiter* (Berlin: Ausländerkomitee Berlin (West), 1978), 22.

22. Karl Homuth, "Identität und soziale Ordnung. Zum Verhältnis städtischer Kultur und gesellschaftlicher Hegemonie," *Prokla 68* 17, no. 3 (1987): 90–112, 101.

23. Stefan Krätke and Fritz Schmoll, "Der lokale Staat—'Ausführungsorgan' oder 'Gegenmacht'," *Prokla 68* 17, no.3 (1987): 30–72, 53.

24. Karl Homuth, "Identität und soziale Ordnung," 93; and Homuth, "Pädagogisierung des Stadtteils. Über die Bedeutung von 'behutsamer Stadterneuerung' als präventive Sozialpolitik," *Ästhetik und Kommunikation* 16, no. 59 (1985): 78–86, 80.

25. Krätke and Schmoll, "Der lokale Staat," 61.

26. Boris Grésillon, *Kulturmetropole Berlin* (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaft Verlag, 2004), 105.

27. Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, ed., *Berliner Forum 6/85. Stadt der Chancen. Die Regierungserklärung vom 25. April 1985 des Regierenden Bürgermeisters von Berlin Eberhard Diepgen* (Berlin: Presse-und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, 1985), 35.

28. Thomas Schwarz, *Zuwanderer im Netz des Wohlfahrtsstaates. Türkische Jugendliche und die Berliner Kommunalpolitik* (Berlin: Edition Parabolis, 1992), 146.

29. See Peter Grottian, Friedrich Krotz, Günter Lütke, and Michael Wolf, "Die Entzauberung der Berliner Sozialpolitik," *Ästhetik und Kommunikation* 16, no. 59 (1985): 45–53, 49.

30. Friedrich Krotz, "Die Instrumentalisierung der Selbsthilfe. Erfahrungen mit dem 'Berliner Modell'," in *Die Wohlfahrtswende. Der Zauber konservativer Sozialpolitik*, ed. Peter Grottian et al. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1988), 82–111, 107.

31. "From that point on, the federal government has been focusing on specific aspects of urban development funding." Florian Wukovitsch, "Verteilungs- und demokratiepolitische Aspekte der Stadtentwicklung—Umbrüche der Wohnungspolitik in Berlin und Wien, unpublished paper at Verteilung und Demokratie conference, November 14–15, 2008, Vienna, 2.

32. Andrej Holm, "Hartz IV und die Konturen einer neoliberalen Wohnungspolitik," in *Sozialer Wohnungsbau, Arbeitsmarkt(re)integration und der neoliberale Wohlfahrtsstaat in der Bundesrepublik und Nordamerika*, ed. Jens Sambale and Volker Eick (Berlin: John F. Kennedy Institute, Free University Berlin, 2005), 135–146, 145.

33. See Wukovitsch, "Verteilungs-und demokratiepolitische Aspekte," 4.

34. "These days, urban redevelopment is primarily geared to the needs of investors writing off their taxes, and the residents have to accommodate them." Matthias Bernt, *Rübergeklappt. Die »Behutsame Stadterneuerung« im Berlin der 90er Jahre* (Berlin: Schelzky & Jeep, 2003), 258.

35. See Matthias Bernt and Andrej Holm, "Is it, or is it not? The Conceptualization of Gentrification and Displacement and its Political Implications in the Case of Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg," *City* 13, no.2–3 (2009): 312–324.

36. Holm, "Hartz IV," 135.

37. IfS / S.T.E.R.N., *Sozialorientierte Stadtentwicklung. Gutachten im Auftrag der Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie* (Berlin: Kultur-Buch Verlag, 1998), 79.

38. Hartmut Häußermann, "Sozialräumliche Struktur und der Prozeß der Ausgrenzung: Quartierseffekte," *Nachrichtenblatt zur Stadt- und Regionalsoziologie* 14, no.1 (1999): 7–18, 11.

39. Loic Wacquant, "Drei irreführende Prämissen bei der Untersuchung der amerikanischen Ghettos," in *Die Krise der Städte*, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Rainer Dollase, and Otto Backes (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), 194–210, 201.

40. See Stephan Lanz, "In unternehmerische Subjekte investieren. Integrationspolitik im Workfare-State. Das Beispiel Berlin," in *No integration?! Kulturwissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Integrationsdebatte in Europa*, ed. Sabine Hess, Jana Binder, and Johannes Moser (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009), 105–22.

41. For more on the "Social City" program at the federal and Berlin levels, see Hilary Silver, "Social Integration in the 'New' Berlin," *German Politics and Society* 24, no. 4 (2004): 1–48.

42. Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, "Dr. 13/4001: Bericht zur Entwicklung einer gesamtstädtischen Strategie zur Entschärfung sozialer Konflikte besonders belasteter Stadtquartiere, Aktionsprogramm ›Urbane Integration—1. Stufe‹ und zur Sozialorientierten Stadtentwicklung: Einrichtung von integrierten Stadtteilverfahren—Quartiersmanagement—in Gebieten mit besonderem Entwicklungsbedarf. Vorlage zur Kenntnisnahme vom 02.08.1999," 6.

43. Ibid., 2.

44. Ibid., 10.

45. Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, "Dr. 13/3273: Innenstadtkonferenz—Ergebnisse und Folgerungen. Vorlage zur Kenntnisnahme vom 17.11.1998," 1.

46. Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, *Das Berliner Quartiersmanagement: Informationen zum Programm "Soziale Stadt"* (Berlin: Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, 2010).

47. See Stephan Lanz, "Powered by Quartiersmanagement: Füreinander Leben im ‚Problemkiez'," *Dérive—Zeitschrift für Stadtforschung* 31 (2008): 28–31.

48. Volker Eick, Britta Grell, Margit Mayer, and Jens Sambale, *Non Profit-Organisationen und die Transformation lokaler Beschäftigungspolitik* (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2004), 14.

49. In 2008, a Senate speaker presented the latest edition of Berlin's *Sozialstrukturatlas* ("social structure atlas") with the words: "Unfortunately, it must be noted that the more affluent areas are becoming better and the poorer ones worse." *Berliner Morgenpost* (May 4, 2009); Meinlschmidt, *Sozialstrukturatlas Berlin 2008—Ein Instrument der quantitativen, interregionalen und intertemporalen Sozialraumanalyse und –planung* (Berlin: Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit, Umwelt und Verbraucherschutz, 2010).

50. See Hartmut Häußermann, Axel Werwatz, Daniel Förster, and Patrick Hausmann, *Monitoring Soziale Stadtentwicklung im Auftrag der Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung* (Berlin, Topos, 2010), 26; and Sigmar Gude, *Sozialstudie Richardplatz Süd. Topos Stadtforschung Berlin* (Berlin: Topos, 2010).

51. IfS / S.T.E.R.N., *Sozialorientierte Stadtentwicklung*, 27.

52. Susan C. Fainstein, *The Just City* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).

53. Rita Schneider-Sliwa, *Kernstadt und Modelle der Erneuerung in den USA: Privatism, Public-Private Partnerships, Revitalisierungspolitik und sozialräumliche Prozesse in Atlanta, Boston und Washington D.C.* (Berlin: D. Reimer, 1996), 30.

54. ARGEBAU, *Leitfaden zur Ausgestaltung der Gemeinschaftsinitiative "Soziale Stadt"* (Berlin: Difu, 2000).

55. Alain Lipietz, *Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology, and Democracy* (Oxford, UK, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

56. See Joachim Hirsch, "Tote leben manchmal länger. Auf dem Weg zu einem nachhaltigen Neoliberalismus," in *Das Ende des Neoliberalismus?*, ed. Joachim Bischoff et al. (Hamburg: VSA, 1998), 216–24.

CHAPTER FOUR

"Wild Barbecuing": Urban Citizenship and the Politics of Transnationality in Berlin's Tiergarten

Bettina Stoetzer

Walking along the banks of the river Spree, you reach the edges of Berlin's largest green space, the Tiergarten.[1] As you approach the park's meadows in summertime, you smell the fragrance of barbecued chicken, lamb, or beef; boiling tea; and sweet tobacco. Many Berliners, and especially Turkish immigrant families, extend their lives and homes into the Tiergarten. As people of all generations gather here, picnic blankets, chairs, kitchen tables, hammocks, prayer rugs, teapots—and most importantly a small grill—are spread out on the grass. Only a few steps further, you encounter a spectacle of thin layers of smoke dancing in between tree branches (Figure 4.1).

This mixture of fire, smoke, and smells has captured many Berliners' attention for the past two decades—and, after a heated debate in 2011, it is, in fact, slowly vanishing from the park's landscape. For some, barbecuing is a site of pleasure—the trace of a pleasant afternoon spent with family and friends in the park. For others, it is an insult to the fresh air produced by Berlin's cherished "green lungs." Barbecuing has thus offended German sensibilities since the 1990s. Concerned with environmental pollution, the City Office for Green Spaces (*Grünflächenamt*) has closely monitored "wild barbecuing" (*wildes Grillen*) and its traces since then: large amounts of litter, smoke, and bad smells. City measures have especially targeted Turkish immigrants: today, barbecuing is outlawed in most of Berlin's parks—especially in immigrant neighborhoods—while the city has designated specific areas for barbecuing in a few select parks. Recently, in the fall of 2011, the district administration of Berlin Mitte once again placed the outlawing of barbecuing in the Tiergarten back on the political agenda, and the direct ban took effect in 2012. Although a few new barbecue areas in parks, such as the Tempelhofer Feld, have been added, many still argue for outlawing the grilling of meat in other parks.[2] These efforts to control barbecuing have been met with resistance by Berlin's barbecuers—and they have set off national and even transnational controversy over the appropriate use of public space, the protection of "nature" in the city, and the limits of "multiculturalism."

Figure 4.1   "Wild barbecuing" (*wildes Grillen*) in Berlin's Tiergarten.
Source: Photo courtesy of Bettina Stoetzer, 2011.

Why is it that barbecuing became such a charismatic object of controversy? To answer this question, I will engage with ethnographic material based on extensive fieldwork in the Tiergarten and other local green spaces between 2007 and 2012 as part of my larger book project on nature, citizenship, and urban life in Berlin.[3] Drawing on this research, I track barbecuing—and its material traces—as a border practice in this essay. More specifically, I argue that barbecuing is attached with racial meanings—it is, to invoke Hobsbawm, an "invented tradition" that marks territories and bodies and renegotiates urban citizenship across borders.[4] Tracing local media and public policy responses to barbecuing in the Tiergarten, I first analyze how ideas about bodies and practices "out of place"—and thus current discourses about the nation and immigration in Germany—come to bear on arguments about the appropriate use of urban parks. However, if we look beyond the boundaries of the Tiergarten, we can begin to see barbecuing not only as a marker of difference but also as an embodied practice that remakes urban citizenship across Europe. This requires attending to immigrant strategies of inhabiting green space and its transnational significance. Engaging with Turkish picnickers' perspectives on "wild barbecuing," I thus secondly show how barbecuing generates a breathing space and

transcends spatial divisions in the everyday lives of immigrants. Yet barbecuing also incites debate across national borders. Thirdly, I thus attend to recent controversies about barbecuing and picnicking in Istanbul. These debates at Europe's fringes echo cosmopolitan anxieties about the presence of immigrants and shed light on larger questions around urban citizenship and the role of Muslim immigrants in contemporary cities across Europe.

Barbecue City Berlin

In the 1990s, barbecuing entered the political stage in Berlin. Just a few years after the reunification of East and West Germany, the Tiergarten—no longer situated in the shadow of the Wall, but right in the new center of the city—gained renewed attention as the city's showcase park and as Berlin's "green lungs." Arguing that Turkish barbecuers increasingly took over the park and displaced German citizens, many politicians and public officials lobbied to curb excessive barbecuing.[5] After ongoing controversy in the Berlin Senate in 1997, the City Office for Green Spaces outlawed barbecuing in Berlin's public parks—except in designated "barbecue areas" (*Grillgebiete*). As a consequence, many public parks—especially those located in migrant neighborhoods, such as Neukölln and Wedding—were now completely off-limits for barbecuing.[6] Accordingly, the city published its first "barbecue map," charting the urban territory in which barbecuing was still allowed.[7]

Among barbecuers, these regulations triggered various migrations—especially between immigrant districts in former West Berlin and the city's Eastern districts, where barbecuing is permitted in several parks.[8] In the Tiergarten, a few meadows in front of the Bellevue Castle turned into one of sixteen remaining "barbecue areas" in Berlin. Barbecuers traveled from all over town to gather in these areas and enjoy the weekend. Yet the controversy over barbecuing was far from settled and continued to incite local and national debate. At the end of the 1990s, Eberhard Diepgen, Berlin's conservative mayor, presented a birthday gift to Volker Liepelt, one of his party friends and opponent of barbecuing in public parks: an electric grill. On the birthday card he wrote: "Volker Liepelt's resistance agitates open air mass barbecuing—hence, vote for the home barbecue by and with the Christian Democrats!"[9] In the early 2000s, suggestions increased for a new "barbecue police" to prevent any "wild barbecuing" beyond designated areas.[10] A "barbecue guide" published in 2004 by the Senate Department for Urban Development in five languages—German, English, Turkish, Arabic, and Russian—set out rules on how to have a barbecue "to your heart's content" in Berlin: barbecue only in special designated areas; bring your own grill and coal; do not collect branches; never place a barbecue under a tree; do not grill anything that does not fit on your grate (i.e., don't grill a whole dead animal!); don't ignite a fire on the ground; extinguish the fire when you are done; pack away the trash and recycle it because it will attract crows and rats.[11]

Other suggestions included introducing a 5 euro barbecue fee, or a "dirty corner hotline" for concerned citizens to report littered areas in the park.[12] As municipal services and financial resources dwindled, some called for private cleaning services. Others vouched for simply leaving things as they were, wondering what would happen if the state just left the garbage in the parks. In an attempt to capture public

sentiments, several local and national newspapers circulated opinion polls about whether to outlaw and regulate barbecuing in Berlin's parks.[13]After a long controversy, the district government of Berlin Mitte then decided to ban the grilling of meat in the Tiergarten from 2012 onward. When picnickers did not adhere to the new rule in the first few months of the ban, the district introduced a special task force to patrol "wild barbecuing" in the park and if necessary charge high fines.[14] As a result, the aromatic traces of barbecuing increasingly disappeared from the Tiergarten's landscape by 2013. As many picnickers have now moved on to other parks, they trigger once again concerns about smoke, smells, and overcrowding. Thus, new voices emerge to ban barbecuing in other parks as well.[15]

These continued efforts to regulate barbecuing have not remained unchallenged: as many members of local political parties such as the SPD and CDU have argued repeatedly for more restrictive policies, immigrant groups such as the Turkish Union (*Türkische Bund*) and other members of the SPD, as well as the Green and the Left Party and several tourist organizations have voiced strong opposition.[16] In fact, some have celebrated barbecuing as a sign of multicultural Berlin. In 2003, Germany's president Johannes Rau defended barbecuing in Berlin's parks as a "cultural right" of Turks living in Germany. In a similar vein, Social Democratic party member Ephraim Gothe called barbecuing a symbol of "lived integration."[17] In addition, the Green Party has repeatedly argued against outlawing barbecuing, as well as for putting up advisory signs on environmentally conscious barbecuing, while emphasizing its multicultural and socially integrative dimensions.[18]

Others have utilized barbecuing as an expression of cultural pride. Turkish newspapers with special editions in Germany, like *Hürriyet*, have declared barbecuing to be part of the Turkish cultural tradition.[19] These reports often made their way into German newspapers: emphasizing that most dedicated barbecuers are Turkish immigrants, they articulated how "Turkish people love meat. Among all the people in the world, the Turkish are the barbecuing world champions."[20] Curiously, on all sides of the debate, barbecuing has become a matter of "culture," associated with a particular ethnic group—Turkish immigrants. A peek into local and national media representations verifies this: here "barbecue area" emerges as a distinct cultural territory, in which Turks have taken over German lands.

The Tiergarten as "Savage Space"

In both public and media discourse, the material traces of barbecuing—fire, smoke, meat, and garbage—trigger anxieties around pollution and transgression. "Barbecue areas" become sites of excess, unrefined consumption, and bad environmentalism—spaces in which the state has lost control. Covered with blue garbage bags and endless smoke clouds, the Tiergarten and other parks thus serve as proof of a "failed integration" of Turkish immigrants. Smoke hovers over the park and threatens to pollute the "green lungs" of Berlin in many news articles: "Hundreds of people have squatted the area; black or white smoke is rising everywhere."[21] Reports proliferate of an invasion of smells—the smell of burnt chicken wings, thighs of lamb, meatballs, and garlic. Charred patches of grass and burning trash cans evoke a sense of the park being burnt down. Images of Turkish immigrants squatting on the lawn, their faces covered in smoke, abound in the media.

Not only the parks but also other districts close to the Tiergarten have been considered at risk of smog pollution from excessive barbecuing: "The Tiergarten belongs to everyone," a journalist wrote in a local news report clip, "but if the Tiergarten continues to be so carelessly ravaged, then people in nearby districts will soon suffocate from smog."[22] In these urban doom scenarios, smoke infuses the city and its neatly landscaped nature spaces. A harbinger of fire, it threatens to break down the boundary between order and chaos, civilization and wilderness, and nature and society. As this symbol of disorder becomes a target of state control, foreigners and outsiders are held responsible for it.[23]

In addition to smoke and fire, images of garbage have populated the media reports. "The barbecue problem in the Tiergarten is a garbage problem . . . . On a nice weekend, more than twenty tons of rubbish are collected in the Tiergarten alone."[24] According to local politicians, the Tiergarten, the city's showcase park, has been in need of saving for a long time. Others gave up on this area of Berlin a long time ago, claiming that barbecuers are dangerous.[25] Thus the "barbecuing problem" is framed as a battle of the city against wild migrant hordes who produce trash: "Every Monday, the Barbecue Meadow in the Tiergarten looks like a battlefield. The city clears away the garbage of the migrants. Yet the conflict keeps smoldering."[26]

As many analysts have shown, garbage often carries racial meanings and is a potent "polysemous symbol of disorder and threat to community" in debates about urban development.[27] In Berlin, the garbage left behind by barbecuing immigrants and cleared away by municipal services signifies a violation of turf and a threat to the coherence of the "natural" national community, as posed by Muslim immigrants. Furthermore, it symbolizes what national media have increasingly claimed: that immigrants have failed to "integrate," that they are wasteful, and take advantage of the "charities" of the state in times of financial distress and austerity.

Tales of bloody and inappropriate meat practices have added a final touch to a state of emergency in Berlin's parks. The opening scene of a feature article in the national weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* depicts a panorama of savagery. On a humid Monday morning, as the park slowly awakes and dew sparkles on the leaves of trees, two big men with tattoos drag a bloody leg of lamb out of the bushes—together with a great deal of trash, the last remnants of a "normal" barbecue weekend.[28] As they enjoy the afternoon sun each weekend, Turkish immigrants revel in roasting chicken wings, meatballs, and thighs of lamb—or even worse: entire animals. Another article in the local newspaper, *Der Tagesspiegel*, reports Turkish "wild barbecuers" hanging out at the Spree river shore, grilling a lamb and camping right next to signs prohibiting barbecuing. Their transgression signals provinciality, disconnection, and illiteracy vis-à-vis the written rules of urban public order, food consumption, and German environmental standards.[29]

Like smoke and garbage, excessive barbecuing of meat in public—and not in the safely bounded domestic realm of the home—functions as a sign of immigrant difference in these reports. This attention on meat echoes a longer history of casting certain meat consumption practices as a sign of racial difference in Germany and beyond.[30] Thus, immigrants' relations to nonhumans—as meat—as well as their alleged tendency to pollute pristine urban nature with smoke and garbage, turn out to be a symbol of their otherness and the need to manage their behavior. But even more, the meat-eaters themselves appear almost animal-like, as beasts of

prey spun out of control—which puts an ironic twist on the original meaning of the Tiergarten as a zoo inhabited by "wild animals" such as foxes, deer, and wild boar, and as a showcase hunting territory for the Electors of Brandenburg. It is in this sense of disconnection and being out of control that the Tiergarten is constructed as a place of lawlessness and wilderness—a space beyond civitas. Imagined as "wilderness" amid the city, "barbecue areas" thus become an extension of the "ghetto" and the problematic district—an image that has dominated much public debate about immigrants in German cities, especially in Berlin, over the past two decades.[31] Whereas the ghetto or problematic district is coded in a racial language of otherness and the threat of crime, the "barbecue area" figures as a "savage space" amid a tranquil urban nature and thus as a sign of immigrants' urban *and* environmental illiteracy.

Tropes of urban wilderness often vilify certain urban inhabitants and have been used "to justify the treatment of minority inhabitants of the inner city as 'savages' to be contained by the forces of civilization."[32] Similarly, in Berlin, the image of wilderness and violated urban nature serves as symbol of the immigrant body as culturally other—and thus in its racialization. As Uli Linke has reminded us in her work on race and representation in postwar Germany, there is a longer genealogy of racial ideologies in Germany that inscribe difference into not only bodies but also landscapes. In fact, the placement of different bodies in particular natural and urban landscapes has played a key role in the construction of whiteness and national identity throughout German history—and it took on a high currency in Nazi corporeal imaginaries that linked nature and the nation with human bodies, discourses of blood, and public space. Thus, with Linke, we can argue that "body space and public space" continue to intersect in contemporary debates about barbecuing in Berlin's parks.[33]

The Tiergarten as Breathing Space

As I have shown, barbecuing arouses a sense of both revulsion and desire within much public debate. Yet what does barbecuing look like from the perspective of those who barbecue? During my fieldwork in public parks and green spaces in Berlin, I was able to get a sense of the many different, and often quite opposite, meanings that Turkish immigrants who regularly went to the Tiergarten attach to barbecuing. While some stressed barbecuing as an expression of cultural pride, others attached nostalgic feelings of home to it. Again others framed barbecuing in parks as a practice of freedom and as a transgression of otherwise segregated everyday lives in Berlin.

One Sunday afternoon, I sat together picnicking with Özgür and his family and friends in the Tiergarten. As he was taking pleasure in fiddling with utensils, building a fire, and handling greasy meat, Özgür reminisced in memories of days spent outside on the beach in Turkey, barbecuing. Özgür, whose family had migrated to Istanbul from a small village in Anatolia in the 1960s, had moved to Berlin with his sister in the mid-1970s, where he ended up working as a forklift truck driver for a local German company. In the 1990s, after reunification, he had lost his job and, after some time of unemployment, he was now working odd jobs, struggling

to make ends meet. In contrast to his currently rather precarious job situation in Germany, he spoke with excitement about his memories of living in Turkey with his family, or going there to visit them. And barbecuing took on an almost nostalgic space in these memories.

"Instead of cooking at home, you go barbecue outside, on the beach and in the countryside," he told me. When he spent time in Istanbul during the summer, his and many other families he knew would have a grill in the trunk of their car and would not miss any chance to take a trip outside the city to go picnic. This, he explained to me, is the reason why barbecuing is a "Turkish tradition" and also an expression of Turkish hospitality. If people join your picnic, even if they are strangers, you offer them food. From this perspective, cooking meat in the open, and sitting on the ground all day, are what recreation is all about—and it is healthier too. While Özgür emphasized the "health benefits" of barbecuing, he also expressed a sense of nostalgia for a simpler life, away from the city, a desire to venture outdoors, and escape. Barbecuing for him involved rekindling a flame of the past and it brought up memories of being in Turkey and picnicking with friends and family in the countryside.

And yet for many picnickers, barbecuing conjures up feelings beyond nostalgia. For several Turkish immigrants I spoke to, barbecuing neither refers to the past nor pollutes the city. Instead, it creates a breathing space in the present—a space where you take a break from everyday life in the city. As Cemal, Özgür's friend, put it, the air in Berlin tends to be stifling. Berlin sometimes feels like a modern prison, an invisible border, because your everyday life is divided: during work, you have to pretend to be a German, whereas at your home, you are a Turk. And when you are on the streets, you get ignored or simply treated as a foreigner. In contrast, "in the park you can breathe," he pointed out to me: "The air is good—not like at home when you sit around all day and watch TV or go to work. Thus in the park, things taste differently. The aroma is so much better. Even if you barbecue on your balcony, it's not the same as it is in the park. The air in the park makes for a better aroma." It is in this sense of the park's public realm and its "fresh air" contributing to a better flavor and aroma that barbecuing creates a taste of freedom, a breathing space. As they barbecue in public parks, picnickers refuse to domesticate the grilling of meat; instead they place it into the public realm—not only transgressing normative notions of urbanity and mass consumption, but also a division of everyday life into two worlds—the Turkish home and the German world of work,[34] as well as the "native" German environment and the space of immigrants.

Furthermore, in contrast to the emphasis of media images on immigrants' ignorance vis-à-vis the urban environment, for many of my interviewees the Tiergarten served as a key reference point of their knowledge of the city. From the perspective of the picnickers, "barbecue areas" in the Tiergarten do not constitute constricted spaces of pollution and chaos, but spaces where one is able to breathe and where a national discourse in which Turks are nothing but foreigners can be transcended. Barbecue's appeal is thus not only that it draws lines of difference between the European civilized self and the Muslim other. For many German Turks and Turkish immigrants who migrated to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s and who have struggled to make a future in Germany because they have been disproportionately affected

by unemployment since reunification, barbecuing creates an opening, a space in which questions about the future and seemingly immobile divisions of everyday life are opened up. It is in this respect that barbecuing and people's stories about it can be read as a response to growing social divisions and the constraining metaphors of the immigrant "ghetto" and the "problematic district" [*Problemkiez*]—metaphors that have infused media and public discourse on urban space in Germany for more than a decade now.

Barbecue City Istanbul

The smoke that emanates from the grills in Berlin's parks also transgresses the confines of an imagined national community in yet another respect: it captures imaginaries beyond Berlin and Germany. In fact, Istanbul, a city that has most recently become the site of intense struggles over the use of public space triggered by the protests in Taksim Gezi Park in 2013, has its own barbecuing debate. Here, it is the Bosporus, the geographic frontier between Asia and Europe, and the public parks and beaches alongside of it, that become the target of controversy over class divisions and the question of what it means to be European and modern. Like Berlin, Istanbul has been both a destination and an intermediate stop for many Turkish families such as Cemal's and Özgür's. Attending to the Istanbul debate thus provides insight into the larger political context at stake: the maintenance and renegotiation of urban citizenship in the context of a new Europe—especially in the face of Muslim migration to Europe and Turkey's potential integration into the EU, as well as an increasing privatization of public space in global metropolitan centers.

As you enter the Bosporus Strait, traveling from Bakırköy along the Marmara Sea towards the Golden Horn, you pass long stretches of green space. Constructed in the 1990s, as part of rehabilitation projects to clean up and "green" the Golden Horn, these spaces offer patches of lawn—squeezed in between the water and busy roads. While trees and bushes provide precious cool shade in the summer, these parks are also the only access and openings to the water beyond private property.[35] Many of the families who come here to picnic or barbecue on the grass are former migrants from Anatolia, and many of them have relatives in Berlin. When they arrived in Istanbul, these families often lived in the so-called *gecekondular*—housing structures that entered the Turkish national imagination as the migrant villages, ghettos, or slums of Istanbul.[36] Not unlike in Berlin, these families now bring hammocks, blankets, carpets, lawn chairs, strollers, or bikes—and, most importantly, a grill to Istanbul's parks. Sitting on the grass or lying in the shade, local residents of all generations eat, chat, play backgammon, and drink tea. The menu ranges from tomato and cucumber salads, bread, *köfte*, *kebab*, fried eggplant, and peppers to watermelon or simply a snack of sunflower seeds. When it gets crowded, people huddle around the grill on small strips of grass close to the road or right next to a parking lot. During the summer, as temperatures rise, the heat mixes with the hot smoke of the barbecues. And yet the water offers a slight breeze.

Owing to concerns about environmental pollution, smoke, fire hazards, and cleanliness, barbecuing is illegal in most parts of the city, including green spaces.[37] Nevertheless, you can see picnickers and barbecuers all over the city—which has

triggered heated controversy in Istanbul for years. The most recent debate was set off by an article published in the newspaper *Radikal* in July 2005. In it, the author, Mine Kırıkkanat, reported growing cultural divisions in Istanbul's public spaces. Beginning a tour of the city with the Istanbul International Airport, she described the airport as the "frontier of Europe," a beacon of modern Istanbul, lighting up Turkey's non-Arab, modern side. In contrast, the ride from the airport to the city reveals a different Istanbul. Driving along the road toward the historic city center, you pass scenes of urban backwardness and an invasion of shantytown people—the barbarian, "dark" Istanbul, a giant scene of barbecue:

> As men stretch out on the grass in their underwear, ruminating, women who wear black chadors or headscarves and are covered without exception, fan the barbecue, brew tea, and rock their babies.... This view is repeated every square meter: our dark people cook meat by the sea toward which they turn their backs. It is impossible here to encounter one single family grilling fish. Perhaps, if they enjoyed eating fish and if they knew how to cook it properly, they would not just be lying there in their dirty white flannel; they would not be chewing and burping on the grass, scratching themselves; and perhaps they would not even be this chubby, long-armed and hairy![38]

Dubbing this scene "Carnivore Islamistan," Kırıkkanat placed Istanbul's divisions of class, ethnicity, and region in a language of meat, consumption, dress, and appropriate use of public space. Complaining about the urban poor taking over Istanbul's parks and beaches with grills, white underwear (*don*), and headscarves, the author drew on several controversial cultural images. The consumption of meat—and especially *kebab*, which is associated with Anatolian food—stands in contrast to the Istanbul native's preference of fish. Not unlike in Berlin's barbecuing debate, Kırıkkanat described the consumption of meat in public as an anti-urban, uncivilized practice by first- or second-generation migrants from rural Anatolia—Istanbul's "black people"—and cast them as beasts of prey and as incompetent citizens. In addition, Kırıkkanat zoomed into the cultural politics of beachwear and the headscarf by accusing working-class men wearing the *don* and women wearing long cloaks for offending urban cosmopolitan sensibilities. The class and ethnic connotations of both meat and beachwear could hardly be overlooked. Kırıkkanat concluded: "On Sundays in the summer, it is not even Arabia that one encounters along the Bosporus. It is Ethiopia overfed with meat."[39]

Kırıkkanat's article triggered a heated public debate. Like *Radikal*, newspapers published stories about the "misuse" of parks and beaches by the urban poor in the following months, while others critiqued Kırıkkanat's public dismay as elitist, as unacceptable denial of "authentic" Turkish (rural) traditions and as discrimination of lower-class migrants from rural Anatolia living in Istanbul today.[40] In contrast to Kırıkkanat, these accounts defended the "tradition" and authenticity of certain kind of beachwear and barbecuing. Writers such as Timur Danis spoke in favor of wearing longjohns, the *don*, pointing out that it was a symbol of one's class status and poverty and thus should be worn with pride. Following this lead, his satirical magazine *Leman* lobbied for a beach rally titled "Hold on to Your Underwear." Eventually, the municipal government responded to the debate by regulating the use of barbecues, as well as the wearing of the *don* and the headscarves in public

beaches. Affirming middle-class "European standards" of civic enjoyment and mass consumption, guards soon patrolled the beaches to make sure beach-goers would adhere to the modern code of dress of bathing suits.[41]

Not unlike in Berlin, different parties in the controversy attached a variety of meanings to barbecuing (and beachwear) and thus engaged competing definitions of urban citizenship. In these portrayals of public parks along the Bosporus, barbecuing was seen as an authentic expression of the culture of the urban poor—a culture that conflicts with a Western, European, and capitalist style of urban living and refined consumption. Imaginaries surrounding picnicking and grilling meat thus illustrated the cultural disjunctures of class and regionality created in the course of migration from the countryside to the city in Turkey and beyond.

At the heart of these disjunctures lies, as Stephan Lanz has pointed out, an increasing fissure between two symbolic communities and political movements in Turkey. Since the 1990s, the duality between civilized "cosmopolitan citizen" and uncivilized "rural migrant," between the "white Turks" and the "black Turks"—between what Lanz calls the "urbanites" and "anti-urbanites"—has had a strong hold in both public and academic realms.[42] These figures can be discerned in discourses about public green space in Istanbul and Berlin: whereas the anti-urbanite stands for the provincial uncivilized urban community that is led by affect and does not know how to act adequately in public space, the civilized urban cosmopolitan citizen engages in capitalist consumption, is economically independent, barbecues on his private property, and is both commercially oriented and environmentally "conscious."[43] In Turkey, these figures have emerged in a larger context in which commercial interests and neoliberal development have increasingly transformed urbanization processes since the 1980s. It is in this respect that the barbecuing debate also echoes conflicts over the increasing privatization of public space that originally triggered the protests in Istanbul's Gezi Park at Taksim Square in 2013.

Conclusion

Following barbecue's key ingredients—fire and meat—as well as its traces—garbage and smoke—I have tracked various ways in which "wild barbecuing" animates anxieties and pleasure in Berlin and beyond: on the one hand, as I have shown, there is a fascination with the sweet smells of spices and slowly cooked meat as an expression of "cultural traditions." On the other hand, barbecue arouses a sense of revulsion against a savage practice threatening the "civilized" order of the European city. Via these ambivalent feelings, the barbecue battles in Berlin and in Istanbul draw lines between the foreign and the native, and between appropriate and inappropriate forms of public consumption and they thus engage questions of what it means to be a "modern" and "European" citizen. This illustrates an emergent discourse of failed integration and urbanization that stretches across Europe and targets rural migrants, whose families now live in both Berlin and Istanbul, as incompetent citizens and consumers—as "anti-urbanites" and thus as internal enemies of the European city.[44] Depicted as chaotic others, they are excluded from urban citizenship. The habitats of these immigrants, whether they are "barbecue areas," the makeshift arrangements of the *gecekondu*, or neighborhoods in Neukölln and Kreuzberg are imagined as

non-places and no-go areas—places where civitas has ended and crime prevails.[45] As these racialized images of a bleak nature of the non-European, immigrant city reverberate in both barbecue debates—in Berlin and along the shores of the Bosporus—the "savage" practice of barbecue straddles the borders between what constitutes the "European city" and its proper urban citizens and inhabitants.

And yet, as I have shown, for many Turkish immigrants, barbecuing does not pollute. Rather it creates a breathing space—a space where you take a break from everyday life. In this sense, barbecuing can not only be understood as a reinvented tradition, but also as a strategy to overcome a form of "pollution" in the city based on everyday exclusion. As they barbecue in public parks, Cemal, Özgür, and other picnickers do not adhere to existing national and racial geographies in Berlin and beyond. Instead, they raise the question of who belongs to the city and who gets to be what kind of citizen. By claiming the right to barbecue in public, they challenge a frozen image of the rural, backward, and uncivilized Muslim immigrant invading the center of Europe. As one of my informants once put it: "If Turkey joins the European Union, we will go to Paris and barbecue in front of the Eiffel Tower!"

Notes

1. The Tiergarten (German for "animal garden") is not just central Berlin's largest green space but also a major site of cultural and political identity for the reunified capital city. Originally a royal hunting preserve for the Hohenzollerns, in the early nineteenth century it was opened as a public park and landscaped by Peter Joseph Lenné. Lenné also designed the zoo that opened in the park's southeastern corner in 1844. Restored in the 1950s after World-War-II aerial bombing and postwar tree decimation for firewood, the park's name was also the name of a borough of West Berlin. The Tiergarten has long been an important site of cultural monuments. The Siegessäule (moved from just west of the Reichstag to the park's center by Hitler's architect Albert Speer in 1939) is a victory column celebrating the wars of unification under Bismarck. On the eastern edge, the Reichstag building was constructed in 1894 to house the Imperial parliament, but now it is the home of the Federal parliament. The new Federal Chancellery is in the northeastern corner; and the German president's official residence, Schloss Bellevue, is also located in the park.
2. See Nele Pasch, "Viel Gedränge um wenig Platz," *Der Tagesspiegel* (May 5, 2013).
3. I conducted fieldwork in Berlin between July 2007 and September 2008, and did ongoing follow-up research since then. This essay is also based on two field trips to Istanbul in 2007 and 2008. Research has been funded by grants from the Wenner-Gren Foundation, the ACLS/Mellon Foundation, a University of California Chancellor's Dissertation Writing Fellowship, the University of California at Santa Cruz, and the University of Chicago. For comments on different versions of this article, I especially thank Lisa Rofel, Anna Tsing, Mark Anderson, James Clifford, Donna Haraway, Aviva Sinervo, Anna Higgins, and John Marlovits. For help with research in the field, I thank Katrin, Özgür, and Fatma Minaz. Daniel Kraft and Serra Nur Saridereli assisted with library research and translations.
4. I am utilizing Eric Hobsbawm's concept of the "invention of tradition" here in conversation with Andrew Warnes to point to the ways in which different groups claim barbecuing as a long-standing tradition. See Warnes, *Savage Barbecue. Race, Culture, and the Invention of America's First Food* (Athens, GA and London, UK: University of Georgia Press, 2008); and Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

5. Stefanie Flamm, "Die Affäre Hammelbein," *Die Zeit* 35 (August 20, 2009).
6. The Görlitzer Park in Kreuzberg is one of the few parks in immigrant neighborhoods in former West Berlin where barbecuing is allowed, yet not without controversy.
7. Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung (SenStadt), "Grillen in Berlin," Brochure (Berlin, 2004). For an updated list of parks where barbecuing is permitted in Berlin, see: http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/umwelt/stadtgruen/gruenanlagen/de/nutzungsmoeglichkeiten/grillen/de/hier.shtml (accessed July 24, 2013.) All translations are my own.
8. For example, during summer weekends, many barbecuers carry backpacks and push wheelbarrows with barbecue utensils, traveling from Wedding, a former West Berlin district with a big Muslim immigrant community (where outdoor barbecuing is completely off limits) to barbecue areas in the East, such as the post-unification era Mauerpark.
9. Christine Richter, "Liepelt freut sich über den Grill," *Berliner Zeitung* (August 7, 1999).
10. Marc Neller, "Zu viel Kohle für die paar Kiezstreifen. Die Grillsaison in den Parks hat mit Rekordhitze und Rekordmüllbergen begonnen. Die Ordnungsdienste sind dem nicht gewachsen," *Der Tagesspiegel* (May 31, 2005).
11. Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, "Grillen in Berlin."
12. Flamm, "Die Affäre Hammelbein."
13. Christoph Stollowsky, "Soll Grillen im Tiergarten verboten werden?" *Berliner Zeitung* (April 24, 2011); and Derya Özkan, "The Misuse Value of Space. Spatial Practices and the Production of Space in Istanbul" (PhD diss., University of Rochester, 2008).
14. Nele Pasch, "Viel Gedränge um wenig Grillplatz."
15. Ibid.
16. Uwe Aulich and Paul Eitzel, "Grillverbot im *Tiergarten,*" *Berliner Zeitung* (October 14, 2011); and Alexander Budweg and Ralf Schönball, "Grillverbot im Tiergarten entzweit die Stadt," *Der Tagesspiegel* (November 18, 2011).
17. Flamm, "Die Affäre Hammelbein."
18. See, for example, Katrin Lange, "Mitte beschliesst Grillverbot im Tiergarten" *Berliner Zeitung* (November 18, 2011), and http://gruene-berlin.de/mitte/archiv/papiere/mai/grill2.html (accessed March 12, 2012).
19. Süleyman Selçuk, "Yeşil aday, Türklere davullu zurnalı mangal partisi verdi," *Hürriyet* (August 28, 2002).
20. Suzan Gulfirat, "'Wir sind die Grillweltmeister'. Wie türkische Blätter über die Rauchschwaden im *Tiergarten* berichten," *Der Tagesspiegel* (May 30, 2005).
21. Thomas Fülling, "Müll im Tiergarten. Ignoriert und angepöbelt: Mit der Grill-Streife unterwegs," *Berliner Morgenpost* (October 10, 2011).
22. Marianne Rittner, "Grillverbot bleibt bestehen," *Berliner Morgenpost* (June 10, 2008).
23. Gaston Bachelard, *The Psychoanalysis of Fire* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1964), 10; see also Andrew Mathews, "Suppressing Fire and Memory: Environmental Degradation and Political Restoration in the Sierra Juàrez of Oaxaca, 1887–2001," *Environmental History* 8, no.1 (2003): 77–108.
24. "Durchwachsenes Wetter mindert die Grill-Lust," *Berliner Morgenpost* (May 17, 2009).
25. Brigitte Schmiemann and Katrin Schoelkopf, "Müll in Parks—Buschkowsky gibt Tiergarten verloren," *Berliner Morgenpost* (April 15, 2009). The mayor of Neukölln pointed out that municipal authorities were now powerless against the barbecuing masses: "Even in Neukölln, where the problem is not quite as stark, it's impossible to handle it in a different fashion. You don't even need to think about sending four people from the district office of urban order to a meadow with thousands of barbecuers. They'll get punched in the head."
26. Flamm, "Die Affäre Hammelbein."
27. Steven Gregory, *Black Corona. Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban Community* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 125.

28. Flamm, "Die Affäre Hammelbein."

29. Jörn Hasselmann, "Es ist angegrillt. Jetzt ziehen wieder dichte Rauchschwaden durch den *Tiergarten*. Doch die Kiezstreifen machen sich rar," *Der Tagesspiegel* (May 30, 2005). This notion of immigrants as ignorant and disconnected from the urban environment emerges in many media stories about barbecuing. In Flamm's article in *Die Zeit*, a Turkish woman being interviewed by the author, Ayşe, allegedly does not know how to read the Berlin map and knows, in fact, only two specific spots in Berlin—her own home and the *Tiergarten* (Flamm, "Die Affäre Hammelbein," 2009).

30. For example, in Nazi racial discourse, the mistreatment of animals as well as specific practices of meat consumption served as signifiers for an assumed antisocial mentality of Jews and the idea that non-Aryans disrespected the natural world. See Boria Sax, *Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the Holocaust* (New York and London, UK: Continuum, 2000). Historically, fantasies about "savage" meat practices, including the grilling of meat and cannibalism, had a high currency in colonial discourse and, in the case of an—often imagined—cannibalism, these played an important role in illustrating the primitiveness of non-Western people and thus in justifying colonial practices. See Warnes, *Savage Barbecue*.

31. As observers have argued, German media have consistently described neighborhoods with a high percentage of migrant population as "ethnic enclaves," "problematic districts," or "hot beds," and as predominantly "Turkish spaces" that threaten to turn into "ghettos" and parallel societies. References to Black ghettos in America and the French *banlieues* after the 2005 riots at the edges of Paris abound. Together, these allusions illustrate that immigrant neighborhoods are imagined as dangerous spaces of otherness. As physical environments and spatial metaphors, these neighborhoods thus become markers of immutable difference and racialization. See Ayşe Çağlar, "Constraining Metaphors and the Transnationalization of Spaces in Berlin," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 4 (2001): 601–613; Stephan Lanz, *Berlin aufgemischt. Abendländisch—multikulturell—kosmopolitisch? Die politische Konstruktion einer Einwanderungsstadt* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2007); and Ruth Mandel, *Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).

32. Michael Bennett and David Teague, eds., *The Nature of Cities. Ecocriticism and Urban Environments* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1999), 6; and see also Andrew Ross, "The Social Claim on Urban Ecology," in ibid., 15–30.

33. Uli Linke, "Formations of White Public Space: Racial Aesthetics, Body Politics, and the Nation," *Transforming Anthropology* 8, no. 1 (1999): 129–161, 129; see also Linke, *German Bodies: Race and Representation after Hitler* (New York and London, UK: Routledge, 1999).

34. As Ruth Mandel has pointed out, *helal* dietary rules—especially around the consumption of meat—have become an important concern for many people in exile in order to avoid "moral contamination" in Germany. Eating habits and the consumption of meat in public spaces can become not only a symbol for resistance and ethnic pride in Berlin, but also a strategy to overcome a form of "pollution" in the city based on everyday exclusion. See Mandel, "A Place of Their Own: Contesting and Defining Places in Berlin's Migrant Community," in *Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe*, ed. Barbara Metcalf (Berkeley / Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 147–166; see also Jennifer Wolch, Alec Brownlow, and Unna Lassiter, "Constructing the Animal Worlds of Inner-City Los Angeles," in *Animal Spaces, Beastly Places: New Geographies of Human-Animal Relations*, ed. Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert (New York and London, UK: Routledge, 2000), 71–97.

35. Deniz Göktürk, Levent Soysal, and İpek Türeli, eds., *Orienting Istanbul: Cultural Capital of Europe?* (New York and London, UK: Routledge, 2010), 16. As real estate values are very high for spaces along the water, residents of the upper class or public authorities

tend to have privileged access to seaside properties: see Özkan, "The Misuse Value of Space," 128.

36. For a discussion of the history of the *gecekondular*, see Orhan Esen, "Learning from Istanbul. Die Stadt Istanbul: Materielle Produktion und Produktion des Diskurses," in *Self Service City Istanbul*, ed. Esen and Stephan Lanz (Berlin: b_books, 2005), 33–52, 37. *Gecekondular* are "places built over night." They are illegal low-cost apartment buildings that rural migrants set up at the outskirts of many Turkish cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, from the 1950s and 1960s onward. By building the houses in one night, the *gecekondu* families were able to take advantage of a legal loophole that maintains that if one builds a house overnight and moves into it before dawn, the city is not allowed to tear down a dwelling. As many families migrated from rural regions into Turkish cities at the time, *gecekondu* areas proliferated at the edges of many Turkish cities. They were simple in structure, usually with only one level and with courtyards, trees, and a small field for subsistence cultivation. Resembling the structures of Anatolian villages, they soon were situated in the middle of the sprawling city.

37. Özkan, "The Misuse Value of Space," 128.

38. Mine G. Kırıkkanat, "Halkımız Eğleniyor," *Radikal* (July 27, 2005).

39. Kırıkkanat, "Halkımız Eğleniyor"; see also Carl Vick, "On Istanbul's Beaches, an Altered Social Fabric: Class Divisions Seen in Swimsuit Uproar," *Washington Post* (September 21, 2005), 21; and Ozan Zeybek, "Republican Swimming: Modernity and Culture in Turkey," *Uninvited Guest* 42, no. 10 (2006).

40. Compare Ece Koçal, "Caddebostan'da şenlik var," *Sabah* (July 28, 2005) with, for example, Ahmet Hakan, "Faşist cesareti," *Radikal* (July 29, 2005), and Ertugrul Özkök, "Who Is Right? Mine or Ahmet?" *Hürriyet* (August 3, 2005).

41. Vick, "On Istanbul's Beaches." It is important here to remember that modern Turkey, though largely Muslim, was founded as a secular republic in 1923 and was led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who envisioned his modern nation-state emerging from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire based on a French definition of secularism.

42. As Stephan Lanz argues, the dual categories of urbanite and antiurbanite gained renewed currency as images of urban doom began to prevail in much public debate about city development in the 1990s—both in Turkey and in Germany. Yet as he demonstrates for Istanbul, this duality fails to grasp the complexities of urban everyday life. Instead, it engages fears of blocked modernization and secularization that have both played a role during the making of the Turkish nation under Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s, as well as in contemporary modernization efforts to pave the way for Turkey's entry into the European Union. Lanz, "Wenn du es in Istanbul schaffst, schaffst du es überall. Über Städter und Anti-Städter, Dorf und Metropole," in *Self Service City Istanbul*, ed. Esen and Lanz, 55–68.

43. In her study of public space in Istanbul, Özkan points out that, in fact, many barbecuers challenged the notion of urban citizenship, ownership, and (il)legitimacy. She quotes one park user: "None of us are legitimate in this country. . . . The owner of that expensive house is no more legitimate than I am. They launder money; we barbecue." Özkan, "The Misuse Value of Space," 134.

44. Lanz, "Wenn du es in Istanbul schaffst," 31.

45. Esen, "Learning from Istanbul," 37.

Part II
Crossing Boundaries in Modern German Planning

CHAPTER FIVE

TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF GERMAN ANTI-MODERN MODERNISM: ERNST MAY IN BRESLAU

Deborah Ascher Barnstone

The internationally acclaimed architect and urban designer Ernst May (1886–1970) is generally considered an exemplary modernist, yet from 1919 to 1925 he practiced an anti-modern modernism in Silesia that calls into question conventional classifications of early modern architecture and has local, national, and transnational implications.[1] Documented in numerous articles May wrote for *Schlesisches Heim*, May developed a pragmatic mix of modern and traditional architecture and urban planning idioms that was neither fully modern nor fully traditional. His approach was common among a certain group of European design professionals who matured between 1870 and 1910, during the rapid industrialization of the latter part of the nineteenth century when the benefits of new technology and modernization were called into question by a growing awareness of industrialization's ill effects. On the one hand, industrial progress and new technologies improved the general standard of living by creating new, better-paying jobs and by making inexpensive mass-produced products readily available. On the other hand, industrialization and concomitant urbanization caused air pollution, overcrowding and urban blight, threatened traditional local, regional, and national ways of life, arts and crafts, and centuries-old social structures. Pressures often seemed mutually exclusive in nature, making it difficult to negotiate a middle way: machine-made against handicraft, standardization against unique design, steel and glass against wood and stucco, flat roofs against pitched ones (which erupted in the [in]famous War of the Roofs during the 1920s), Taylorism against Spenglerism. May's solution was to combine forms inspired by distinctly local Silesian vernacular with contemporary spatial planning, new materials, and construction methods. The transnational nature of anti-modern modernism is apparent in the commonalities in social concerns, architectural concepts, and aesthetics between May's Silesian projects such as Goldschmied (1919), Oltaschin (1921), and Haynau (1920–1924), and other 1920s European architecture such as work by Bruno Taut (1880–1938), Heinrich Tessenow (1876–1950), and Paul Bonatz (1877–1956) in Germany; projects by J. F. Staal (1879–1940) and

Willem Marinus Dudok (1884–1974) in the Netherlands; Eliel Saarinen (1873–1950) and Alvar Aalto (1898–1976) in Finland; and Gunnar Asplund (1885–1940) and Sigurd Lewerentz (1885–1975) in Sweden.

Transnationalism is the study of human activities and institutions that extend beyond and across national borders. Ernst May's Breslau work was transnational at many levels. To begin with, the social concerns that inspired European mass housing developments in the interwar period were the result of a steady rise in social awareness that began with the Enlightenment, and accelerated during the nineteenth century as a reaction against the excesses of the Industrial Revolution. The heightened social consciousness fostered a transnational reform movement represented by figures such as Henri de Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier in France; Raymond Unwin, Ebenezer Howard, and William Morris in England; Ferdinand Domela Niewenhuis in the Netherlands; and Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lasalle in Germany. The nineteenth-century reformers held a diverse set of doctrines, ranging from the utopian to the pragmatic, but they shared a critique of the ill effects of industrialization and rapid urbanization and the consequent wealth inequities, along with a concern for the well-being of the poor and working classes. The reformist impulse spawned the establishment of organizations like the Fabian Society in England and new political parties throughout Europe like the Social Democrats in Germany in 1875, in the Netherlands in 1881, and in Sweden in 1889, to name just a few. The ideas of these social reformers often not only included utopian architectural or urban planning components as in Howard's and Fourier's schemes, but also generally affected the course of architecture and urban planning by introducing several concepts to the design professions: concern for health and hygiene in building and urban design, belief that access to fresh air and green space was important in any context; and the notion that everyone had a right to good, affordable housing regardless of class or economic status.

Three key aspects of interwar affordable housing had transnational dimensions: the immediate conditions that caused housing shortages, policies adopted to deal with them, and architectural solutions offered. Housing shortages developed in Europe during the period of rapid industrialization in the nineteenth century when enormous population shifts overcrowded the cities while simultaneously depleting rural areas. Reasons for reform responded not only to real conditions and concern for the well-being of less fortunate fellow citizens, but also to fears held by the propertied classes of social unrest caused by poverty and epidemics spread because of unhygienic living conditions.[2] Equally compelling was the argument that an unhealthy working class was unproductive and would therefore adversely affect the general wealth. Although the specific circumstances varied from country to country, as historians taking a comparative approach to housing history have pointed out, there are still many similarities. Many European countries passed legislation at this time guaranteeing affordable housing as a social right, rather than a privilege. The understanding regarding who the target population actually was for affordable housing differed, however; in some countries mass housing was deemed necessary for the very poor and disenfranchised, while in other countries it was seen as necessary for the working classes and lower middle class as well.[3] Scandinavian and Northern European countries like Germany and the Netherlands adopted a mass

housing approach, that is, they attempted to provide as much housing as was economically feasible for their poorest citizens. As part of the new housing programs, many European nations also established a series of institutions to facilitate design and construction, including housing associations, housing cooperatives, special banks and funding instruments, public/private partnerships, and more.

Sweden's approach to mass housing is unique among European nations; it is characterized by the concept *Folkhem*, or the "People's Home." *Folkhem* is an understanding of nation as benefactor that uses tax dollars for all basic social services for all citizens regardless of class or wealth. Sweden's public housing program is the most aggressive and comprehensive, perhaps, in Europe. The Swedish movement for affordable housing began in 1872 with the founding of Sweden's first housing cooperative that year in Gothenburg.[4] Not unlike the resettlement campaign in twentieth-century Silesia, Germany, Sweden's early housing policy was designed as much to stem emigration from the countryside to the city as to help the working poor. Over time, the program metamorphosed and expanded to become a national concern and include urban as well as rural housing, although the main focus remained "increasing rural landholders, especially for constructive social reasons."[5] The Swedes implemented a series of fiscal devices to make home ownership possible for the poor, including low interest loans, grants, and self-help programs. By the twentieth century, Swedish architects began to work on standardization and mass production ideas as well as the self-help projects.[6] Designed for the working poor, these schemes offered inexpensive housing to the future owner who was willing to build the house himself. It was only in the 1930s that Sweden arrived at an unusual consensus, that affordable housing was a community responsibility and that the state should help provide such housing to all Swedes, not just the poorest or most needy.

In the Netherlands, the first attempt to codify the right to housing was the Dutch Housing Act of 1902. The Housing Act immediately improved the quality of housing as well as the quantity, especially of low-cost worker's housing.[7] The Act not only mandated building regulations in the municipalities but also separated low-rent developments from speculative markets, thereby ensuring that affordable housing would be built. The Act also gave cities the power to regulate all aspects of urban planning ensuring better conditions for sewage, transit, and other public services while establishing the basis for mandatory indoor plumbing, proper ventilation, fire safety, and exhaust.[8] Over the years, the Dutch modified the act to respond to changing economic and political circumstances. Immediately after the First World War, for instance, they altered the act to respond to postwar conditions, such as emergency housing needs and material shortages, but retained its essential qualities. A slightly different understanding than the Swedish or German housing laws, it nevertheless had a similar effect and intent: to provide low-cost housing to poor Dutch citizens. Like the Swedes and Germans, the Dutch founded building associations that would finance and develop large-scale housing projects. In February 1918, at the national Housing Congress in Amsterdam, architects decided that public housing should be as unassuming as possible and strive for "Minimal Construction," a clause that aided construction industry standardization and the development of factory-produced prefabricated elements.[9] In particular, Dutch architects were

fascinated with the problem of the "minimum existence" dwelling. One product of this Dutch interest was the 1920 publication *Album*, which was a compendium of minimal plans for workers' housing available to all Dutch architects.[10]

Concern over public housing began to crystallize in Germany after 1880, although real, comprehensive reform dates to the Weimar era. Immediately after the First World War, Germany suffered extreme housing and construction material shortages, overcrowding that was compounded by returning soldiers and displaced populations from ceded territory, and severe economic stress suffered by many Germans, particularly the working class. In March 1918, Prussia attempted to address these problems by passing its comprehensive Housing Law. Soon after, the new democratic parliament responded by writing Articles 153 and 155 into the new constitution in order to protect property ownership and also to ensure hygienic conditions in housing for all Germans. Article 155 guarantees "every German a healthy domicile and all German families, especially those with children, a dwelling and work homestead appropriate to their needs."[11] Because Article 155 recognized the state's responsibility to provide housing for its citizens, it helped set in motion a series of initiatives at the federal and local level.[12] The Article included provisions that would allow government expropriations of land for housing. Legislation at the state, federal, and municipal levels soon followed to centralize housing programs and create innovative financial instruments to support new construction. In 1919, the federal government launched a campaign to recolonize parts of the German interior including in Silesia; in 1921, the Farm Worker Housing Act created a series of housing standards and put in place an appropriation of 200 million Reichsmark to construct the homesteads. In 1924, parliament passed an act to facilitate reasonable financing for mass housing projects more generally. In Breslau, the new wave of legislation resulted in the establishment of the Landesgesellschaft Schlesien (Regional Company of Silesia) and Schlesische Heimstätte (Silesian Rural Settlement Authority), where May worked from 1919 to 1925.

In Germany overall during the 1920s there was a need for at least a million units of housing, while Breslau and Silesia were short tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of units.[13] Approximately three million Germans were displaced from the Eastern territory after World War I. Although it is difficult to know precisely how many of these immigrated to Breslau, the welfare rolls increased 422% from prewar levels: from 7,441 people in 1913 to 44,275 in 1927![14] Breslau was the densest city per hectare in Germany in 1926, at 114 people per hectare and 381 per constructed hectare. (Berlin was second at 46 and 308, respectively.[15]) Compounding these problems was an unusually high unemployment rate in Breslau and the province. The same displacements caused by the war also radically changed social structures. Not only were the old moneyed classes somewhat less powerful after 1918, but also upwardly mobile members of the new white-collar class as well as wealthy industrialists jockeyed for social status, political power, and control. To make matters worse, political unrest shook other foundations of the German world. Silesia made the initial transition to democratic government quite peacefully, but in 1919 it too suffered Spartacist rioting and succumbed to the Kapp Putsch, then to three Silesian Risings in 1919, 1920, and 1921.[16] Seen against this backdrop, many of the interwar efforts were aimed at hedging against popular revolution, at maintaining civil order, and

consolidating support for the state. As Michael Harloe points out, private market collapse in the aftermath of the war, coupled with social unrest and heightened demand, joined to encourage state and municipal action.[17] Adequate, affordable, and hygienic housing was deemed a necessary human right without which the people would become restless and perhaps dangerous. Indeed, Breslau adopted a series of policies to try to alleviate the problems, including targeted housing developments for displaced persons, homeless returning soldiers, low-income residents, and homeless rural residents.

At the same time that instruments were being developed to facilitate the financing and construction of mass housing, reformers and architects were struggling with the question of design. What were the goals of mass housing and what model best served the new needs? At the end of the nineteenth century, a series of schemes were published and disseminated throughout Europe. For example, Ebenezer Howard's Garden City concept had a wide readership in the Netherlands and Germany and, although his specific ideas were not taken up, his emphasis on healthy communities, access to green, limitation of growth and sprawl, walking city planning, and belief in the importance of the small cottage, or low-rise, development were very popular. Garden City ideas appeared in the Netherlands in 1905; Howard's book *Garden Cities of Tomorrow* was published in Dutch in 1906 and in German in 1907.[18] The transnational aspects of garden city planning ideals are evident in the international membership in the Garden City Association; Germany and the Netherlands had chapters by the early twentieth century. In fact, the 1918 and 1924 International Garden City and Town Planning Association conferences were held in Amsterdam, and the 1923 meeting was held in Gothenburg, Sweden. Beyond the Garden City ideals, architects working on mass housing had to consider economy of means. Governments faced fiscal crises ranging from mild to severe after the war and, many countries suffered material scarcities and productive deficiencies that lasted at least until 1920–1921, if not beyond. Further, mass housing seemed, because of its typical clientele, to demand new, cheaper building techniques. Prefabrication and mass production methods, standardization of parts and even whole sections of buildings, along with the development of type models, were common concerns across Europe. Lastly, as in the Netherlands, architects in Germany responded to economic pressures by exploring the *Existenzminimum* ("minimum for existence"). The purpose of the *Existenzminimum* was to discover the absolute minimal spatial requirements for different potential occupants: single adult, couple, couple with one child, and so on, in order to minimize construction costs and also maximize efficiency in the dwelling.

There was a transnational side to the aesthetics of mass housing as well. Projects executed between 1919 and 1925 grappled with issues related to outward expression as well as inward organization, what architects call "form." Throughout the nineteenth century, European architects had experimented with historic styles as they searched for the appropriate way to accommodate contemporary habits in house design, but the process ultimately led to unsatisfactory results. The nineteenth-century styles seemed superficial dress rather than the true reflection of new modes of living. The struggle over style continued into the twentieth century, when it affected interwar housing developments lining traditionalists and progressives up against each other.

The aesthetic battles pitted advocates for one aesthetic approach or the other against one another: pitched roofs against flat ones; small, punched windows over large surfaces of transparent glass; brick, stone, and colored stucco versus white stucco; wood against steel; small, differentiated rooms versus the open plan, to name just a few of the polarizing values. The famous War of the Roofs or Flat Roof Controversy that erupted in the 1920s was one such battle. It occurred at the Onkel Toms Hütte and Am Fischtal Colony housing developments in Berlin; the architects of Onkel Toms Hütte constructed flat-roofed units while directly across the way were the pitched-roof designs by the Am Fischtal group. The polemical exchange about roofs was only one of many contentious aesthetic issues that split architects. A related debate focused on what the outward expression of the new architecture should be. Positions ranged from supporters of vernacular architecture, a combination of vernacular and modern, to totally modern and free of references. In Germany, the camps aligned *Neues Bauen* (New Building) and *Neue Sachlichkeit* (New Objectivity) proponents against traditionalists; in the Netherlands, it was the Nieuwe Bouwen and De 8 ("the 8") groups against the Amsterdam Expressionists. Ernst May, like J. F. Staal and Willem Dudok in the Netherlands, Gunnar Asplund in Sweden, and others, initially advocated an aesthetic mix for public housing projects.

Aesthetic debates were not only concerned with the outward appearance of buildings but also the spatial organization, programmatic requirements, and the character of space designed. There were practical as well as ideological sides to the question of space. The Industrial Revolution had not only altered where people lived but also how they conducted their daily lives and, therefore, what kind of spatial organization was required in their homes. For instance, it was now increasingly common for people to purchase goods like food as and when such items were required, rather than store up for the year. Thus, the need for large storage areas and attics in the home diminished. As May later wrote, "One didn't need the steep roofs to dry onions or plums anymore."[19] More and more women went to work, which meant that there was less time in the day to prepare food, so the demand for more efficiently organized kitchens grew. Life before the twentieth century had been formal, social groups separate, and space tended to be compartmentalized, but the twentieth century introduced the open plan and free-flowing space as a compliment to new social mobility.[20]

By the interwar period, a consensus had developed among most German reformers that the ideal for mass housing was a detached single-family house, even if that model was often not economically viable.[21] This was true because it seemed to hold many more benefits than the hated nineteenth-century German *Mietskaserne* ("tenement house"), including the opportunity for ownership, improved hygiene, contact with fresh air, light, and green space, and reinforcement of family life by providing more private quarters. Of course, it is very difficult to construct inexpensive free-standing homes, so architects developed models that combined economies of scale that exist in higher density, multistory housing with elements from the detached home. Row houses of varying lengths and between two and five stories were the most typical solution, although architects like May experimented with double, triple, and quadruple family buildings and other variations. German architects designed numerous small, multifamily models in parks and tree-lined neighborhoods like those May

developed in and around Breslau. Although not precisely Garden City designs, the new neighborhoods certainly borrowed ideas from the Garden City. May's familiarity with the Garden City came from first-hand experience; he studied at University College London, then apprenticed in Raymond Unwin's office in 1910.

May's primary responsibility in Breslau was to oversee construction of housing in unincorporated suburbs and towns, homesteads, and rural settlements. Breslau and Silesia were particularly hard hit because they suffered from the combined effect of prewar under-construction and a postwar population influx that accelerated when Germans fled Eastern regions awarded to Poland in 1921.[22] Breslau was not only one of the most densely populated German cities but also one of the poorest. Its average of 116 residents per hectare in 1926 was very high compared with the national average of 41.5. Although it was Germany's fifth largest city, its economy was weak, making absorption of the new population extremely difficult because the city did not have the economic infrastructure to support more residents. In 1927, Berlin had 112 major industrial concerns, while Breslau had just one; shipping had declined dramatically in Breslau after 1913 from 432,000 to 130,000 tons; average income was lower in Breslau than in any other major German city; every major economic indicator showed that the city and province were suffering. Studies of the Breslau housing stock show a dearth of multi-bedroom units, extreme overcrowding in most apartments, and a lack of hygienic amenities like indoor toilets and running water.[23] These conditions were acute in the city but existed throughout the province.

In such a strained economic climate, new housing had to be as inexpensive as possible, so May focused his attention on design and construction strategies that reduced costs like building smaller, more spatially and functionally efficient units. At the same time, May vociferously decried the hated *Mietskaserne*; May's designs were meant as an antidote to the cramped, unhygienic conditions of this building-type most often constructed to house the urban poor.[24] May's planning at times included structures that could be easily built by the lay person, a strategy that conformed to the growing self-help construction movement in Europe at the time. Furthermore, May combined his rational and economic reasoning with an appeal to nostalgia and *Heimatgefühl* (a "sense of home"), powerful emotions held by many Silesians. *Heimatgefühl* is difficult to translate into English because no direct translation captures the deep emotional ties to place implicit in the German concept of *Heimat*. *Heimat* architecture tended to work with aesthetic elements common to the local and regional vernacular as a way of capitalizing on attachment to local traditions. Yet May also argued against the skyscraper as a low-cost solution to the housing crunch. He felt the skyscraper was an excellent type of building for commerce but that people needed their "own home and garden...where the family circle could find peace and relaxation"; therefore May favored cottages and low-rise solutions for public housing.[25] May attacked his responsibilities with enthusiasm and the conviction that he was charged with accomplishing an important social good. "The first condition underlying housing reform of every kind is the acknowledgment of social and economic efficiency, that is, of an economic policy that recognizes its limits at the point where the well-being of human beings is threatened."[26] May's approach and the arguments he used to justify it amounted to a tidy fit for the settlement push to populate the countryside.

May laid the groundwork for his design approach in a series of articles published in *Schlesisches Heim*, the journal he founded, edited, and wrote for, beginning in 1919.[27] The articles were primarily directed at lay clients and not architects, an important fact to consider when reading the language and the ways May framed his arguments.[28] May recognized that without the support of average Germans, nothing would be built, since he needed political and financial underpinning.[29] Equally important, the housing projects in and around Breslau were for the poor and working class, not the usual architect's educated bourgeois clientele. His aesthetic therefore had to appeal to the average German or it ran the risk of not being built. May chose to work primarily with the *Kleinwohnung* ("small dwelling") as a foundation for his projects because it was a "primary form" developed from the "living requirements and habits of the segment of our folk that live in such dwellings."[30] The *Kleinwohnung* was a type of architecture that, true to its name, was small and economical but had a broad range of aesthetic expressions in buildings as varied as the traditional farmhouse, village dwelling, and urban apartment. In a series of design experiments, May pushed the limits of the *Kleinwohnung* by trying to discover "how far the living area of the small house can be shrunk."[31] Many of May's contemporaries developed totally modern versions of this type as did May himself later in Frankfurt. But in Silesia, May chose to work with the traditional Silesian vernacular farmhouse as the basis for his aesthetic. The farmhouse was an iconic building type, centuries old, familiar to most Silesians, yet with enough variety to make it a good source of design tropes. Its history and familiarity made it a romantic type beloved to many locals. Furthermore, it fit with May's belief in using "primary forms." The use of vernacular forms also supported the nationalist rhetoric of the resettlement campaign, although the fervor with which May pursued the aesthetic as evidenced in the many *Schlesisches Heim* articles on the subject suggests that he had a passionate interest in the aesthetic that went beyond political exigencies.

May summarized his design position and goals in nine points in *Schlesisches Heim* in an essay from 1924: (1) the path to the New Man; (2) the path to an essential floor plan; (3) the path to straightforward household effects; (4) the path to honest form and with it a new style; (5) the path to joyful cladding for the small house; (6) the path to modern building technology; (7) the path to scientific business operation; (8) the path to unity of small house and garden; and (9) the path to a federal law for comprehensive regional planning.[32] Although not all of May's design objectives were transnational in nature, many of them were. By "path to the New Man," May meant that architecture should reflect the new ways people were living in the twentieth century, offer better living conditions for people, and have an educational element. Here, May's ideas fit squarely into the reform-minded tradition of the 1920s. The means with which May wished to make reforms, articulated in points 2 through 8, likewise reads like a list of progressive tactics from the period. May's interest in the legal side to good planning was also not uncommon; he recognized that legal instruments were necessary to providing good, affordable housing for the poor. "Essential floor plan" meant good, efficient spatial planning as well as the adoption of "type forms" (*Typisierung*). Related to this, and key to developing scientific modern building techniques, was *Normierung* (use of norms, or standards, in building design and construction). In Germany, the Deutsche Institut für Normung (Institute

for Standardization) was founded in 1917 to create standards for manufacturing in order to rationalize production, improve overall industrial quality, and enhance interchangeability between parts and systems fabricated by different companies. The DIN is still in place today as the European production standard. Other similar organizations include the Engineering Standards Committee in London (renamed the British Engineering Standards Association in 1918) and the window and door normalization in the Netherlands in 1918. For May, "modern building technology" referred to new materials and construction systems as well as *Typisierung* and *Normierung*. As discussed above, interest in finding new ways to relate architecture to landscape was common throughout Europe in the 1920s as was the push for better planning legislation.

The adoption of *Typisierung* and *Normierung* in the Schlesische Heimstätte projects was a linchpin of May's design strategy because together these approaches could ensure speedier, more economical construction. *Typisierung* refers to the development of reusable design patterns based on historic building types while *Normierung* refers to the creation of standard sizes, profiles, and connections for all construction elements. *Normierung* allows the construction industries to prefabricate many components, which, in turn, reduces costs dramatically for several reasons. Site work is more expensive than factory work and repetitive standard components are easier to assemble than unique ones. Debates over *Typisierung* and *Normierung* raged in the architecture press during the interwar period. Proponents argued the economic benefits of standardizing design and construction as well as the historic importance of types.[33] Opponents railed against the loss of individuality, destruction of German building heritage, and heartlessness of a technology-dominated society. May's strategy of combining elements of traditional German architecture tropes into types while normalizing construction undermined some of the critique, if not all. People seemed to be able to better accept standardization if it applied to the "invisible" aspects of architecture.

In articles for *Schlesisches Heim*, May developed arguments for his positions. To begin with, he scrutinized the traditional Silesian vernacular farmhouse from the inside and outside, dissecting it into discreet design elements worthy of reuse and readaptation. A large part of the exercise involved abstracting and simplifying vernacular architecture to distill the design essentials. From vernacular architecture he appropriated type-defining elements like the steeply sloped roof, thatched roofing material, stucco façades, vertically clad wooden gable ends, painted gable ornament, the longhouse plan, and eyebrow windows. May believed that type should "crystallize the origin's most essential [qualities]."[34] In the essay "Typ und Stil," May articulates what he thinks are the basic principles of good design: "integrative," "refusing ornamentation," "the archetypal, essential form," those design elements that together will create a style.

May described the new building technologies, materials, and spatial arrangements that Schlesische Heimstätte was planning to employ. In "Ersatzbauwesen," May delineates several new building systems: the 30-cm brick cavity wall, loam rendering, and sand/lime brick, to name just a few. These were all variations on masonry block construction that was far cheaper in the 1920s than wood, concrete, or steel because of postwar shortages and attendant escalation in prices for certain

building materials and systems. Not only did May embrace new building materials and systems, but he also worked assiduously to rationalize the construction process so he could reduce costs, speed up building time, and make construction easy enough for inexperienced builders to erect their own homes. In "Die bewegliche Bodentreppe im Kleinhaus," May explains the surprising "wasted space" typical of prewar "Kleinwohnungen," which, of course, defies the logic of the small dwelling. In this and other articles, he sets forth new design strategies: reducing room numbers and actual spatial needs to a minimum, eliminating corridors, using all spaces in the house especially those thought of as wasted like under the stairs, moveable stairs, double functions in kitchens and living rooms, and so on.[35] In another group of articles, May proposed a series of new building types based on a combination of vernacular design tropes with new spatial strategies and building technologies. May introduced the new "types" using a seemingly scientific system of classification of the variants into *Gruppen* and *Typen* with subdivisions in each of these. He hopes that by using this design system, he can avoid "superficial" styles.[36] As May himself writes, the building design is "simple," "using primary forms," and "like the old farmhouses there is supposed to be a harmonious effect, not through motives of some kind or through non-*sachlich* additions but through the relationship of the building volume, size and position, with windows and door openings, as well as material colors."[37] Ultimately, the new model should be a modern, scientifically determined adaptation of the best traditional and contemporary architectural elements.

May tested his ideas in numerous drawings and also in realized projects. Between 1919 and 1928, he and *Schlesisches Heim* constructed over 11,000 units of rural settlement housing, even more expansions of existing settlements, plus emergency housing in the cities. Although Goldschmied (1920) and Oltaschin (1921) were two of May's first attempts at large-scale urban planning and design, they are representative of both his planning and architectural strategies. Goldschmied was May's very first project, designed just after World War I on a site just south of Breslau, for a group of self-help farmers. As in many of May's subsequent projects, the houses were two-family cottages with steeply pitched saddle-backed roofs and stucco siding, arranged in large swathes of green space. The settlement began with a group of houses situated around an oval public square from which the main street extended. The lots were long and thin to accommodate individual farm plots for each family. May developed three different variations on the double house at Goldschmied; all constructed on slab-on-grade, which is cheaper than building a basement, with a single main floor and habitable attic space. Located just outside Breslau, Oltaschin was a typical small medieval village constructed around a public commons. Most of its residents were herb farmers at the beginning of the twentieth century. The village was close enough to Breslau with ample open space to make it an excellent site for a satellite community; thus, in 1920, it became the location for a new affordable housing project. The clients were not urban commuters, however, but local farmers. Baron Richtohofen-Boguslavitz donated a 12-hectare plot for the development. Here, May opted for the traditional farmhouse image of the steeply pitched, saddle gable with a large eyebrow window in the roof and small, square windows on the stucco facades. The gable end sports a modern adaptation of the traditional farmhouse hex decoration designed by

Lotte Hartmann, something she also did for the homes in Goldschmied. The roof covers a two-family house, with rental units under the eaves, one departure from the historic farmhouse and from his designs at Goldschmied. May experimented with the layout of the individual units where he discarded the traditional four-room model separated by a corridor to join spaces together in a corridor-free more modern and spatially efficient plan. May rationalized the spatial organization here to minimize the building footprint while maximizing usable space and increasing spatial efficiency. One example is the placement of the kitchen in the space underneath the stair, an area often ignored or under-utilized. His professed goal was to create a more "*sachlich* and functional" dwelling.[38] The construction system at Oltaschin was the new mud-block wall system May wrote about in *Schlesisches Heim* that could be easily assembled by non-professional builders. Outer walls were covered with stucco, which was cheap, readily available after the war, and relatively easy to apply. As at Goldschmied, Oltaschin was planned to be as much in nature as possible. The houses at Oltaschin were laid out around a north–south–oriented courtyard in u-shaped configurations, with green space between the units and also all around. The site planning helped provide good lighting for the units.

Oltaschin was one of scores of owner-constructed and publicly sponsored housing projects that cropped up around Germany and in other European countries after World War I. Sigurd Lewerentz designed a similar self-help, workers' housing development in Helsingborg, begun in 1911 but suspended, then completed in 1918, as part of the Swedish Movement for Home Ownership, akin to settlement and home ownership schemes in Germany at the time.[39] Like May's Oltaschin, Helsingborg consisted of rationalized two-family houses that combined traditional elements and modern prefabricated construction methods and spatial planning.[40] The homes were built of the local, traditional Helsingborg load-bearing red brick topped by a pitched roof with small punched openings. Details were reduced to a minimum both to make it easier for locals to construct and to make construction as cheap as possible. The units were distributed in the landscape to maximize public and private outdoor areas. Outside and in, the homes are simple and straightforward and unassuming. The project was typical of Lewerentz's work at the time that combined an abstracted vernacular with modern planning and construction principles, such as the Workers Housing at Eneborg, Palsjö (1911–1918), Marma-Langrörs Sagverk, Marmaverken, Söderhamn (1915–onward), Öjervik (1917), and Rostorp (1922).

In the Netherlands, many of Willem Dudok's projects for public housing in Hilversum share strategies with May and Lewerentz's work. Dudok was municipal architect in Hilversum for most of his career. In this capacity, he was responsible for planning new neighborhoods in the town as well as schools, municipal buildings, and utility buildings. From 1915 onward, Dudok designed 337 units for the upper middle class; 830 for the middle class; 1,123 for the lower middle class; and 2,515 for the working class.[41] Dudok was, perhaps, less socially motivated than May because he believed that Hilversum should expand but maintain its upper middle class character. However, he was acutely aware of the potential danger to the community overall if housing for the poor was substandard spatially, aesthetically, and urbanistically. Dudok felt very strongly that workers' housing had to "be of high value" and "be of first-rate materials and economical spatial planning but simply

on a smaller, more modest scale than housing for the rich."[42] Dudok's Hilversum work in general combines elements of Dutch vernacular, at times abstracted, at other times borrowed, with functional spatial planning, new materials, and rationalized construction techniques. His very first project on the Anemonestraat and Papverstraat (1915–1919) features a barn-like gambrel roof on the long sides, wooden siding under the eaves, and brick below. Dudok minimized interior space in order to economize on construction. The site plan is a mix of row houses and double houses with small plots on the street side and generous gardens at the back. The fifth residential development Dudok designed for Hilversum on Hilverstweg, Diependaalselaan, and Lavendelstraat between 1920 and 1922 was to accommodate 100 workers' families, although the final design included 113 units with 2 commercial spaces. From surviving documents, it is apparent that like May, Dudok developed a series of housing types that he could mix and match: he writes that he used "65 houses Type E, 25 houses Type C, and 10 houses Type A."[43] Again, Dudok uses traditional materials under steeply pitched roofs to create the sense of an old Dutch village rather than a new one. The clever way in which he mixed housing types and their orientation to each other and the street makes the development appear more like a settlement that grew gradually rather than one constructed all at the same time. As Herman van Bergeijk writes, Dudok's success and appeal lay in the way he utilized familiar aspects of Dutch vernacular like steeply raked thatched roofs, red brick, and massive wooden doors, so that the average person could identify with his architecture. Technological innovations were masked by the aesthetic rather than expressed in the form, even later in his career when his work took on a more modern outward appearance.

Anti-modern modernism has gone by several different names over the years as historians and critics struggle to articulate qualities of this work more precisely: vernacular modernism, rational vernacular, and, critical regionalism, are just a few examples. Its transnational dimensions are evident in the geographic spread of projects by architects who shared May's interest in combining traditional design aesthetics with contemporary building methods, rationalized and functional planning. Proponents lived all over Germany, in France, England, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and elsewhere. Briefly, this group of architects was intensely concerned with being sensitive to the cultural context; they did not reject modernism outright but did reject the blanket application of a modern aesthetic to all functions and building types. They often used traditional forms for projects on the land, for the poor, and for state institutions where an appeal to familiarity seemed particularly important. Dudok put it beautifully when he wrote that the critical aspects of architecture were "beautiful and harmonious proportions," "expression of cultural significance," and "values extending beyond time": "values which cannot be replaced by slogans and catchwords such as cubism, futurism, functionalism."[44] Dudok used the modern idiom, construction methods, and materials but like so many of his contemporaries he was wary of fashion and the use of an aesthetic style on all buildings regardless of function or location. To him, and to architects like Hans Poelzig in Germany, modernism was just as likely to become a "style" in the nineteenth-century sense of the term, an outward fashion for architecture, as any historic style had been. As he put it, buildings needed to express something culturally significant

and relate "to their soil, their surroundings, their climate and their purpose."[45] In other words, buildings need to respond to their context, which means the historic aesthetics of and around the site, or local vernacular as much as the natural setting. Architects such as Dudok and Staal in the Netherlands; Poelzig, Tessenow, and Taut in Germany; and Lewerentz and Asplund in Sweden all spoke about mediating between functional planning, rationalized construction methods and modern materials to bring to architecture what Dudok termed "something more." This "something more" was sometimes referred to as "human values" or the "spiritual in art" but was usually interpreted as a simplified vernacular architecture.[46] Again and again, these architects called for *Sachlichkeit*, "simplicity," and "clean forms," or as Tessenow so aptly put it: "The simplest is not always the best but the best is always simple."[47]

What was the transnational appeal of May's design method? Germany was not the only part of Europe to industrialize, urbanize, and modernize at a very rapid rate after 1870; and even countries like England, France, and Belgium that had begun the process earlier suffered from similar challenges. Shared concerns about loss of cultural identity in an industrial age made traditional architecture attractive; worries over economic stress made inexpensive modern construction systems and functional planning appealing. Where did anti-modern modernism originate? How did the ideas move? Or, alternatively, did these ideas emerge simultaneously because of other linkages between nations and cultures? It is certainly possible that the shared experience of late nineteenth-century industrial revolution, rapid urbanization, increased pollution and crime in the cities, housing crises, displaced populations, World War I, new diseases and pandemics, and more, were common concerns that may have sparked common architectural responses. Magazine and monograph circulation between the nations disseminated many ideas; we know that by the 1910s these publications were showing work from around the developed world. In Germany, *Wasmuth* and *Bauwelt* were two periodicals that surveyed the international architectural landscape for buildings and urban designs of note; in the Netherlands, architects read *Nieuwe Bouwkunst* and *Wendingen*, among others, and *Arkitektur* in Sweden. Furthermore, many of the architects who engaged in similar practices knew each other from university (many studied in Germany), from apprenticeships, or from professional associations. A short list of the intersections and connections is revealing. Lewerentz worked for Theodor Fischer and Richard Riemerschmid, where he was on the design team for the famous Hellerau housing project based on Ebenezer Howard's planning ideas. Tessenow also worked on Hellerau as did May; Taut also worked for Fischer, and knew Riemerschmid, Tessenow, Lewerentz, and May.

It is important to conclude by briefly discussing the politics entwined with anti-modern modernism. It is certainly true that many of the resettlement and affordable housing campaigns projects using this approach were government funded, so that to some degree a nationalist agenda was present, whether overt as in the Silesian resettlement campaign, or more subtle as in the Hilversum housing and school projects. Governments hoped to use such projects to help calm working class unrest in the interwar period and to obviate the appeal that Communism had to the lower classes at the time. It is equally important to note that although vernacular-inspired design

received a bad name because of Nazi use of traditional architecture to promote their nationalist agenda, anti-modern modernism was not a rightwing or a conservative position.[48]

What we call modernism today was still forming during the interwar period. There were architects who were already totally committed to a new aesthetic, but there were also many who were unsure. To them, the new architecture seemed unresponsive to site, context, or client, without a relationship to history, and lacking character. At the same time, these architects recognized the logic of modern planning and construction methods as well as the economic benefits mass production techniques could bring to their profession. It is revealing to juxtapose the anti-modern modernist approach to the International Style functionalism that was supposed to be transnational, but ultimately failed because it could not adapt to local and regional contexts. The comparison suggests that the historiography of modernism needs to be reconsidered and broadened. Though important to the history of architecture, International Style functionalism was clearly not what first-generation modernists and historians have claimed. It was narrowly prescribed and therefore limited, but also not the only design method adopted by first-generation modern architects. May's approach, by contrast, succeeded not only in the 1920s but afterward and has kept reappearing in new iterations: Critical Regionalism in the 1980s and vernacular modernism of the 1990s, thereby underscoring not just the strength and appeal of the approach, but also showing that the issues Ernst May grappled with in the 1920s still challenge architects today.

Notes

1. Roland May coins this very apt term for a new research group in Germany concerned with architects such as May and Bonatz, whose work confounds the usual means of classifying early twentieth-century architecture. May, "The Architect Paul Bonatz between Turkey and Germany," *New German Critique* 36, no. 3.108 (2009): 1–38.

2. Michael Harloe, *The People's Home? Social Rented Housing in Europe and America* (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), 18.

3. Kathleen Scanlon and Christine Whitehead, eds., *Social Housing in Europe II: A Review of Policies and Outcomes* (London, UK: LSE London, 2008).

4. Kooperativa Förbundet, *Swedish Cooperative Union and Wholesale Society's Architects' Office 1925–1949*, vol. 2 (Stockholm: Kooperativa Förbundets Bokförlag, 1949), 12.

5. Waldemar Svensson, "Home Ownership in Sweden," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 197 (1938): 154–59, 157.

6. Eva Ericksson, "International Impulses and National Tradition 1900–1915," in *20th-Century Architecture: Sweden*, ed. Claes Caldenby, Jöran Lindvall, and Wilfried Wang (New York and Munich: Prestel, 1998), 42–44; see also Svensson, "Home Ownership in Sweden."

7. Donald I. Grinberg, foreword by J. B. Bakema, *Housing in the Netherlands 1900–1940* (Delft: Delft University Press, 1977), 33.

8. Aedes, *Dutch Social Housing in a Nutshell* (Hilversum: Aedes, 2003), 8.

9. Herman van Bergeijk, *Willem Marinus Dudok: Architekt und Stadtplaner 1884–1974* (Naarden: V+K Pub./Inmerc, 1995), 101.

10. Grinberg, *Housing in the Netherlands*, 96.

11. Ursula Kanacher, *Wohnstrukturen als Anzeiger gesellschaftlicher Strukturen. Eine Untersuchung zum Wandel der Wohnungsgrundrisse als Ausdruck gesellschaftlichen Wandels*

von 1850 bis 1975 aus der Sicht der Elias'schen Zivilisationstheorie (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1987), 137. All translations are my own.

12. Jörg Sanders, *Die Wohnungsreform der 20er Jahre* (Göttingen: Georg-August-Universität Göttingen / Grin Verlag, 2002).

13. Magistrat der Hauptstadt Breslau nach amtlichen statistischen Unterlagen, ed., *Breslau nach dem Kriege* (Breslau, n.d.), 3.

14. Magistrat der Hauptstadt Breslau, *Breslau nach dem Kriege*, 13.

15. Schlesisches Bund für Heimatschutz, ed., *Siedlung und Stadtplanung in Schlesien*, vol. 1 of 2 (Breslau: Schlesisches Bund für Heimatschutz, 1926).

16. Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse, *Microcosm: Portrait of a Central European City* (London, UK: Jonathan Cape, 2002), 326–332.

17. Harloe, *The People's Home?* 76.

18. Grinberg, *Housing in the Netherlands*, 54 – 55.

19. Ernst May, "Auswirkungen von Architektur und Städteplanung in der Weimarer Zeit auf die Gegenwart" (December 2, 1965). Lectures, Ernst May Archive, Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Nuremberg.

20. Numerous books from the 1920s describe the altered living situation of many Europeans. See, for example, Walter Müller-Wulckow, *Wohnbauten und Siedlungen* (Leipzig: Karl Robert Langewiesche, 1929).

21. Nicholas Bullock and James Read, *The Movement for Housing Reform in Germany and France 1840–1914* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1995), 85

22. Schlesisches Bund für Heimatschutz, ed., *Siedlung und Stadtplanung in Schlesien*, 9.

23. Schlesisches Bund für Heimatschutz, ed., *Siedlung und Stadtplanung in Schlesien*, 9.

24. Ernst May, "Kleinwohnungstypen," *Schlesisches Heim* 1 (1919): 14–17: "Ich möchte hier im ersten Hefte klar und deutlich den Kampfruf ertönen lassen, 'Nieder mit der Mietskaserne!'" (15).

25. May "Kleinwohnungstypen," 15.

26. Ernst May, "Fünf Jahre Wohnungsbautätigkeit in Frankfurt am Main," in *Das Neue Frankfurt* 2/3, ed. E. May and F. Wichert (Frankfurt am Main: Englert und Schlosser, 1930).

27. Klaus Jürgen Winkler, "Das soziale Moment in den Architekturanschauungen Ernst Mays in den 20er Jahren," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift / Hochschule für Architektur und Bauwesen* 33, no. 4/6 (1987): 288–291, 289.

28. Ernst May, "Wohnungsfürsorgegesellschaften und Baukultur," *Schlesisches Heim* (August 1920): 3–7, 6.

29. See, for example, Ernst May, "Typ und Stil," *Schlesisches Heim* 5, no. 2 (1924): 42–43.

30. May, "Kleinwohnungstypen," 14.

31. Ernst May, "Wie weit kann die Wohnfläche des Kleinhauses eingeschränkt werden?" *Schlesisches Heim* (1920): 38–43, 38.

32. Ernst May, "Wohnungsfürsorge," *Schlesisches Heim* 5, no.12 (1924): 406–412.

33. May himself wrote that "it is significant for today's compromised architectural culture that we have to struggle for such evident things, whereas in the times of elevated building art there was never a building without a type." "Kleinwohnungstypen," 15.

34. May, "Typ und Stil," 44.

35. See Ernst May, "Die bewegliche Bodentreppe in Kleinwohnungen," *Schlesisches Heim* (1920): 273–75; and May, "Wie weit kann die Wohnfläche des Kleinhauses eingeschränkt werden?" 38–43.

36. May, "Typ und Stil," 42.

37. May, "Kleinwohnungstypen," 14.

38. May, "Wohnungsfursorge," 406–412.

39. Janne Ahlen, *Sigurd Lewerentz, Architect* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 26.

40. Nicola Flora, Paolo Giardiello, Gennaro Postiglione, and Colin St. John Wilson, eds., *Sigurd Lewerentz: 1885–1975* (Milan: Electa, 2001), 52.

41. Herman van Bergeijk, *Willem Marinus Dudok: Architekt-Stadtplaner 1884–1974* (Naarden: V+K Pub./Inmerc, 1995), 76.
42. Willem Dudok, explanation dated July 19, 1916; reprinted in Van Bergeijk, *Willem Marinus Dudok*, 143.
43. Cited in Van Bergeijk, *Willem Marinus Dudok*, 167.
44. Willem M. Dudok, "To Live and to Build," reprinted in *Willem M. Dudok*, ed. R. M. H. Magnee (Hilversum: Lectura architectonica, 1957), 138.
45. Dudok, "To Live and to Build," 138.
46. Dudok, "To Live and to Build," 136.
47. Lewerentz's motto for the design was "a simple dwelling for a simple soul." Ahlen, *Sigurd Lewerentz*, 26.
48. Tessenow, Taut, Rading, and May were all barred from practice in Germany during the Nazi era; Taut, Rading, and May spent the 1930s and war years in exile.

WAS THERE AN IDEAL SOCIALIST CITY? SOCIALIST NEW TOWNS AS MODERN DREAMSCAPES

Rosemary Wakeman

The post–Second World War period was a golden age of New Towns. Throughout Europe and the United States and beyond, in the Middle East, Australia, and Asia, New Towns were a campaign to construct—literally—a completely new world.[1] All these projects shared a utopian rhetoric and conception, the imagery of the marvelous. In Eastern Europe, this utopian archetype was imagined as the Socialist City. The ideal Socialist City, built from scratch, was the experimental arena for a new society, one in which harmony and happiness would reign.[2] Some 60 "New Towns" appeared in the Eastern Bloc countries along with hundreds in the Soviet Union. For the most part, they have been written off by scholars as worker dormitories at steel plants and oil refinery sites. And indeed the New Towns were the flagships of the Five-Year Plans. They were linked to the development of heavy industry. However their ideological and symbolic content was enormous. As political ciphers, they became almost as important as the Red Flag. They were conceived as complete, coherent urban places and imagined as "splendid living environments, economically and culturally, that would promote the collective life of mankind."[3] This "concern for mankind" was transmitted in the housing, schools, parks and recreation facilities, and houses of culture. Here were all the prerequisites of the *new socialist man*. In response to this rhetoric, discussions about these ideal Socialist cities during the Cold War years also focused on their distinct characteristics. What made them "socialist" was an analytical device for delineating the ideological differences between the two Blocs, especially the assertion that city planning was "based on the philosophical tenets of Marxism-Leninism."[4] Dogma overrode all other logic. These were "purely political decisions" and the planning of Socialist New Towns was "conducted independently of external influence."[5]

The ideal Socialist City that emanated from the Soviet Union was clearly a primary source of inspiration. The design and construction of New Towns were intimately associated with politics, as all utopias are. The socialist New Towns were "new" because they were planned and therefore avoided the incoherency and

bourgeois cosmopolitanism of the capitalist city. They were "new" because they were a prototype for the "socialist way of life" that would give the workers the right to the city, the right to work, housing, culture, and recreation. New Towns were imagined as free of conflict, as beautiful. They were the spatial site for a new socialist generation that would grow in peace and happiness. The East would craft the urban future of mankind. Without questioning this narrative, the following discussion argues that ideal Socialist cities were not fundamentally different from the urban utopias imagined in the capitalist world. Both sides of the Cold War divide shared deeply in the regenerative, utopian qualities of the reconstruction years. Rebuilding opened enormous hopes for the perfectibility of the urban realm. For all the rhetoric about their distinctiveness, socialist New Towns shared in the heritage of modernism and in fact interpreted it within the context of the Soviet Bloc.[6] The architects and urban planners who designed and built the New Towns in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were members of a key mid-century generation who were students and came of professional age during the 1920s and 1930s in the milieu of the Bauhaus and *Neues Bauen* ("New Building"). For many of them, their years of exile during National Socialism and the war enhanced their international networks and the transfer of planning concepts. Coopted into GDR state technocratic institutions after the war as a progressive new generation, they were put in charge of reconstruction and housing programs and continued to work well into the 1960s. Their knowledge and professional experience allowed them to weather the shifting ideological tides of socialist planning and architectural doctrine.[7]

These transnational influences were as important to the socialist urban dreamscape as the received wisdom of Soviet planning policy—and perhaps they were longer lasting. The flow of professional knowledge about how cities should be built continued across the Iron Curtain. Socialist utopia was built from a wide assortment of aesthetic influences, professional relationships, and shared urban theories. I am assuming that urban phenomena and urban form are autonomous from explicitly capitalist or socialist relations, and that they as much produce these conceptual paradigms as they are produced by them. Socialist New Towns were shaped just as much by the necessities of modernization as they were by political ideology. New Towns consolidated borders. They served the tasks of population redistribution and social change as well as regional and economic development. There was much in common between the urban ideologies of the two Blocs: each focused on social ordering, on providing their citizens with a constructed happiness of material and social betterment both collectively and individually. Behind the façade of differences in capitalist and socialist urban ideals, there was a common pattern of modern urbanization.

Four official New Towns were built in the German Democratic Republic: Stalinstadt / Eisenhüttenstadt (the name changed in 1961), Schwedt, Hoyerswerda, and Halle-Neustadt (now a part of Halle).[8] Stalinstadt was founded in 1950 on the Polish border near Frankfurt/Oder and was heralded as the "first Socialist City" in Germany. It is without doubt the most studied of these ideal places. It was a "steel town" of the same mythic status as Magnitogorsk. With well over half of East Germany's industrial infrastructure destroyed during the war, the founding of Stalinstadt was interpreted as a momentous sign of national reemergence. It was

promoted as the counterpart to Nowa Huta (New Steel Town) in Poland along a new "border of peace." The former enemies would be reconciled in the humming industrial production of the two New Towns in a new economic geography overseen by the Eastern Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Although initially *Landesplanung* was denounced by the GDR as capitalist and fascist, there was a strategy for moving into underdeveloped rural regions and industrializing the northeast around large-scale heavy industrial complexes. Stalinstadt was thus founded as a worker foothold in the rural Uckermark. Poor regions such as these "inherited from capitalism, would be eliminated forever." The socialist city would loosen the grip of the reactionary rural and petit bourgeois classes.[9] The region was also far from the US Air Force bases in the Federal Republic of Germany. Even more significantly, Stalinstadt was meant to absorb the refugees forcibly expelled from the east by the new German-Polish border and provide them with the stabilizing influences of jobs and homes in the new socialist system.

Both Stalinstadt and Nowa Huta attained allegorical status in the socialist imagination.[10] Newspapers spilled over with articles on the utopian worlds rising from the mud. Their construction and design were documented and disseminated in films, photographs, and official publications, in novels, paintings, and popular music. The socialist urban ideal would construct a sophisticated, revolutionary modern citizen. Historian Ruth May has described Stalinstadt as an ideal city in the tradition of Tony Garnier's *cité industrielle* and Magnitogorsk.[11] For East German architects, Stalinstadt was "a piece of utopia," a "social model." Early propaganda pamphlets describe a place where "the future bids you good morning." The town was famously based on the GDR's new policy of socialist urban development called the "Sixteen Principles of Urbanism." Derived from the General Plan for Moscow and the result of an East German delegation to the Soviet Union in 1950, this document has been interpreted by architectural historians as a political reaction against the Athens Charter of CIAM (Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne). Along with the *Neues Bauen*, the Athens Charter was condemned as functionalist and cosmopolitan.[12] Kurt Liebknecht was the driving force behind the GDR's socialist aesthetic, although Walter Ulbricht himself was directly involved in its conceptualization. Liebknecht, who had worked with Mies van der Rohe before the war and was exiled in the Soviet Union during hostilities, became president of the Deutsche Bauakademie (DBA, founded in 1951). The architects appointed by Liebknecht ran the gamut from former members of the National Socialist Party (such as Kurt W. Leucht) to former Bauhaus students, who were everywhere in central and Eastern Europe despite the official political posturing against modernism.[13]

The official aim of socialist urban planning was the harmonious satisfaction of the human demand for work, dwelling, culture, and recreation. The extraordinary attention to urban planning at Stalinstadt was meant to make visible the GDR's social revolution in the landscape. After a bevy of early experimental plans, Leucht's urban typology for a New Town of 30,000 inhabitants was officially accepted. The city's size was restricted to the need for a productive labor force. Strict zoning separated the residential neighborhoods from the steel plant. The town was compact, bounded, and featured a formal unity in the tradition of Renaissance classicism. A ceremonial *magistrale* baptized Lenin Avenue led to the main square

that defined social and political power.[14] The urban center was an absolute priority in socialist urban planning. The Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) outlined the primary role of the center at the Third Party Congress in 1950. Rather than a buzzing downtown with Western-style traffic and commerce, the center of the city was a measure of political man. It would be a site of "grandeur and beauty" at which everyone would feel welcome.[15] At Stalinstadt, Leucht planned the all-important House of Culture and the City Hall flanked by the grand entranceway into the steel plant in a formal geometric ensemble. These three institutions would act as the mechanisms for social transformation. Their monumental architecture would serve as backdrop for "political demonstrations, parades, and popular celebrations..." The workers would claim their right to the city, which should be "national, beautiful, generous." A library, theater, and cinema would join them in a classical design tribute to socialist urban utopia.

Nearly 50 percent of the steel plant workers were refugees from the East, newly settled in the city of the future.[16] Others were farm workers and young people looking for jobs in industry. They found homes in four concentrated residential communities in a tight radial around the center. The complexes featured four-story brick buildings divided into spacious modern flats and surrounded by gardens and green courtyards, playgrounds, and pedestrian pathways. Each neighborhood was a self-contained unit with a communal daycare center and school, playground and clubhouse, health center and services calculated by the number of inhabitants. Beyond them lay allotment gardens, sport fields, and parks. The layout of discrete, carefully zoned units would assemble into an independent and complete New Town. The architecture exuded an interpretive classicist style with rich decoration. Local topography was integrated into the urban design to provide a particularity of place. Ruth May argues that the uniqueness of Leucht's approach was the "attempt to construct an ideal congruence between traditional urban features and the new characteristics of a socialist industrial town." Work and life are reconciled in a new urban ideal.[17] The city would provide workers with the opportunity for unlimited potential. It was a collectivist dream (Figure 6.1).

Stalinstadt shared the heroic characteristics of socialist New Town archetypes across Eastern Europe in this early reconstruction period. As each country put in place urban reform measures and desperately needed housing programs, New Towns became the experimental gateways into the socialist future. They were the solution to the sprawling chaos of old cities and the prospect of a dreary unfulfilled life in dismal slums. As ideological and propagandist strategies, New Towns gave hope to a postwar generation embarking on the great experiment in socialism. Like the New Towns of Nowa Huta in Poland, Dunaújváros in Hungary, and Kunčice in the Czech Republic,[18] Stalinstadt was portrayed as a "city of youth." Propagandistic photographs of the city typically staged young workers on an elevation, surveying the rise of utopia on the plain along the Oder–Neisse frontier. They are a self-actualizing people building a new world. This totalizing gaze, pure and unencumbered, was found in socialist realist production novels such as Karl Mundstock's *Helle Nächte* (1952), in which the female protagonist dreams of standing atop a crane looking down on what will become Stalinstadt. The revered construction site transmutes into an idyllic urban setting. Young families with children and young

Figure 6.1 Vacationers view new town of Stalinstadt (later: Eisenhüttenstadt), German Democratic Republic. Photograph by Helmut Schar for Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst: Zentralbild (1954).

Source: Photo courtesy of Deutsches Bundesarchiv.

men and women are photographed in the streets of Stalinstadt, in the schools, play-grounds, and health centers. They gather in the clubhouse for community dances and festivities. Their everyday lives have been transformed. In the extraordinary collection of photographs in *Stalinstadt, Neues Leben—Neue Menschen* (1958), the great iron and steel combine dominates the city, with workers tending to their tasks among the fiery furnaces and machinery. The individual portraits, the valiant faces, the joyful children, and families produce a heroic working people, their lives "freed forever from anxiety about daily existence…Stalinstadt is the beginning."[19] They are building a new world.

Stalinstadt appropriated and expressed various strains of European urban theory. Leucht had traveled to the Soviet Union and studied Magnitogorsk as well as the Georgian industrial town of Roustavi founded in 1948. Nowa Huta just across the border was also a model. Both Nowa Huta and Stalinstadt were grounded in clas-sicist urban design. In an irony famously lost on SED officials, classicism was also the hallmark of National Socialist utopian visions as well as Le Corbusier's designs for the reconstruction of towns such as Saint-Dié or even his Radiant City. More to the point, however, is that classicism was a shared design vocabulary throughout Europe. It provided the new socialist ideal with legitimacy and meaning. The lay-outs have a formal geometry with a central axis marked by monumental buildings and radial boulevards. They are the antithesis of the disorder and urban misery

associated with the past. Reconstruction provided the opportunity to rectify these evils. The return to classical ordering was an alternative to Western-style functionalism as well as to the dreamy meanderings of the garden city. At the same time, Stalinstadt's functional zoning, the attention to neighborhood, schools, recreation, and park areas followed in step with CIAM's Athen's Charter.[20] Like the Garden City and CIAM movements, socialist planners envisioned sunlit dwellings amid greenery and parks. By the 1950s, this was a shared rhetoric and aesthetic, much of it steeped in a postwar picturesque about the healing effects and social benefits of nature.

Residential housing organized into "neighborhood units" containing community centers and social services and bounded by greenbelts was also an ideal shared by a wide variety of theorists, from Garden City enthusiasts to Ernst May and Le Corbusier. The "neighborhood unit" was the sine qua non of twentieth-century urban planning theory. The work of Clarence Perry and Clarence Stein for the *Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs* (beginning in 1923) and at Forest Hills Gardens in New York was instrumental in providing a conceptual framework for the ideal of "neighborhood" as a social concept and planning device. It was imagined as a village, with the school and recreational and social facilities at its center. This inward-looking quality would provide a coherent neighborhood identity. The ensemble of neighborhoods would then arrange around an urban core and organically link up to form the town as a whole. By the 1940s and 1950s, this vision had been thoroughly absorbed into planning discourse. It was the essence of Stalinstadt. At the United Nations Symposium on New Towns held in Moscow in 1964, which featured a procession of international New Town experts from both the Eastern and Western blocs, it was agreed that the "neighborhood unit and the residential district should be the basic scales of new town planning." The ideal was developed in the Soviet Union as the *mikrorayon* or micro-district. To underscore the point in relation to Soviet New Towns, N. V. Baranov, deputy chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Engineering and Architecture, added that the "neighborhood, as the basic structural component, retains its significance and is organized on the same lines whatever the size of the town..."[21]

What initially differentiated the Socialist variant on these ideals was the rhetorical and design emphasis on the collective nature of urban life, which was evidenced in the schools and daycare, medical facilities, and community clubhouses located in each neighborhood. However, even this difference was exaggerated by Cold War ideological conflicts. Social equity, peace and harmony, and the desire for individual happiness were a shared dream across Europe in the reconstruction years. The New Town vision of the future represented the renewed authority of the State and its capacity to fulfill these longings through building and modernization schemes. The utopian aspect of this vision was that the physical design of the New Town could affect human action and the standards of social conduct. With the correct urban design and configuration, neighborhoods, towns and regions, and ultimately the nation, would grow and prosper as a structured, rationalized whole. New Towns acted as the laboratory for this dreamscape of social engineering. From this point of view, they were not built from a corpus of fixed socialist (or capitalist) ideals so much as they functioned to define these ideals around postwar modernization. Towns and

regions were made modern and manageable and were absorbed into the national territory and economy through infrastructure projects and distribution systems. As part of this master planning, New Towns were the mechanisms for rationalizing economic, social, and spatial relations. These concepts and their application were dynamic, changing with political and economic conditions.

The GDR's State Planning Commission formed three research groups in 1958–1959 to study future territorial development. Of particular concern was balancing regional inequalities by focusing on greater industrial development in the agricultural north while avoiding overpopulation in the already industrialized south of Germany. As part of this regional industrial policy, the New Town of Schwedt was ratified at the SED's fifth party congress and was established in the Uckermark near the Oder River on the border with Poland, at the terminus of the 4,000-km "Friendship Oil Pipeline" that snaked from the Urals through Poland into East Germany. The location of the oil refinery at Schwedt was thus situated within the transnational economic territory of COMECON. The old town of Schwedt had been almost completely destroyed during the war. Perhaps even more significantly, the neighboring Neumark district and the nearby commercial town of Stettin (Szczecin) were now in Polish territory with the postwar redrawing of Germany's eastern border. Construction of Schwedt as a New Town thus solidified this new frontier along the Oder River. Its exact site was a decision made by Deputy Minister for the Chemical Industry Hans Adler. In the often-quoted reminiscence of his Sunday morning walk through the marshes and woods, Adler picked an "excellent location" on the Oder-Neisse "frontier of peace."

The fact that planners were invited to take part in the design of a New Town for 17,000 to 20,000 inhabitants did not make things easier. Historian Philipp Springer describes the local leadership in what had been an entirely agrarian area as completely overwhelmed.[22] Nonetheless, the cutting down of the first trees on the building site in 1959 was organized with great symbolic ceremony. Thousands of workers streamed into Schwedt each year in the hopes of finding jobs in its oil refineries and paper mill. The atmosphere is captured in filmmaker Karl Gass's 1966 documentary *Aces* (*Asse*) that focuses on the 50 men of the "Habener brigade" who arrived in Schwedt as socialist heroes ready to construct the new oil refinery. Although their work is hounded by disorganization, technical problems, and herculean assignments that threaten strikes, the crew of pipe layers and welders join together to complete their mission and are solemnly rewarded.

Housing for the workers was slapped up before a plan for the town was even decided on. Minister of Construction Ernst Scholz finally intervened and appointed architect Selman Selmanagic to lead the project. Selmanagic had studied at the Dessau and Berlin Bauhaus, practiced in Constantinople and Jerusalem, and taken part in antifascist resistance in Berlin. As a professor at the Art Academy at Berlin-Weissensee after the war, he offered a design for Schwedt that mirrored the early fantasies of a socialist utopia. It featured a compact semi-circle of four-story residential complexes around the old city center, each replete with schools and services, pedestrian pathways and green spaces. A new *magistrale*, Lenin Avenue, would end in the restored historic castle at the heart of the city. Nevertheless, Selmanagic had little sympathy for historicism and was content to demolish anything left of the old

city fabric in the name of "new standards" for socialist society. Students working with him on the design for Schwedt remember his raw anger with fascist barbarism, the enormous hope for the future, and the passion for designing a progressive urban world.[23] The vision was compact, built around an honorific and ideological city center that was standard in early socialist urban planning with Stalinstadt as inspiration. The center of Schwedt would contain an array of urban activities from shopping centers to cultural facilities. No residence would be more than a five-minute walk from the town center. Sports facilities and allotment gardens dotted the green belt spreading out into the suburbs. It was symptomatic of a socialist ideal city, a "Sanssouci of socialism" as Selmanagic called it, a "happy, safe, sustainable city in the countryside" that found little sympathy in the GDR of the late 1950s. The ideologically driven New Town fantasies of the early postwar years had already fallen victim to economic realities and shifting political perspectives. Selmanagic was accused of "individualism" and his urban concepts swept aside for a more rigorous adherence to "socialist urban design" and more scientific principles of urban planning.[24] The criticism against his plans came from Walter Ulbricht himself, a sign of the significance of New Town imagery. Selmanagic was replaced by a team of architects from the Institut für Städtebau und Architektur that included Peter Doehler, Hans Peter Kirsch, and Richard Paulick.

Richard Paulick became the premier New Town builder in East Germany. As one of the leading architects in the GDR, his ideas were implemented in the New Towns of Hoyerswerda, Schwedt, and Halle-Neustadt. Paulick was a member of the mid-century generation that began their careers when modernism was arriving as cutting-edge architectural design. He began as Walter Gropius's assistant at the Dessau Bauhaus, where he was involved with the "Metal Prototype House" and the Dammerstock Housing Estate in Karlsruhe as experiments in industrial housing and *Neues Bauen*. Paulick emigrated to Shanghai with the victory of National Socialism in 1933. As the first to hold a university Chair in urban planning in China, he prepared for the postwar world by studying Clarence Perry's "neighborhood unit" concept, which by that time had become part of the professional corpus shared by urban experts worldwide. As head of the Shanghai Town Planning Office, Paulick initiated Shanghai's comprehensive metropolitan plan that resembled Patrick Abercrombie's Greater London scheme and was structured, like Abercrombie's plan, around the "neighborhood unit" ideal. Returning to Europe in 1949, Paulick traveled briefly in France and Italy, and then reached the East German capital in 1950. Under Liebknecht's sponsorship, this transnational planner adapted himself to the realities of the GDR's "nationalist" architecture and quickly established himself at the Institut für Bauwesen at the Akademie der Wissenschaften and became vice-president of the Deutsche Bauakademie.

At Schwedt, Paulick faced an expanding population that was predicted to reach 60,000 by 1980. Crisis-level population forecasts such as this were part of a broad discourse throughout Europe in the 1950s and 1960s that had multiple origins. The return of refugees and then the "baby boom" were more than enough evidence of a population explosion. Faced with wartime destruction and an acute housing shortage exacerbated by young families trying to start their lives, building homes was a hot-point political issue everywhere. Planning documents consistently began with

demographic statistics and startling population forecasts as legitimization for comprehensive urban development schemes. They were a political strategy for gaining state subsidies and scarce resources.[25] The green belts and social amenities that had been Selmanagic's vision for Schwedt were all abandoned for the rapid production of apartment buildings on a mass scale. Expensive "swimming pools...and cultural centers" that had been prominent in Selmanagic's design were deemed inappropriate to the city's needs. Apartment units in each *Wohnkomplex* were made smaller, the buildings themselves increased in size and density.[26] Rather than forming a compact town around a ceremonial urban center, the housing complexes were spread out and placed nearer to the oil refinery. Each residential complex was to form its own neighborhood unit, with its own community center. The baroque axis with Lenin Avenue leading to Schwedt's famed castle was ignored. As a symbol of this abandonment of Schwedt's historic center and its symbolic role, the socialist government destroyed the castle in 1962.

These later attempts at socialist New Towns such as Hoyerswerda, Schwedt, and Halle-Neustadt thus veered sharply from the utopian model of Eisenhüttenstat and Selmanagic's ideal vision for Schwedt, both of which emphasized the city center with its monumental buildings, ceremonial axial streets, and plazas as the gathering place for collective life. The Soviet Union led the break away from these expensive ideological prototypes with Nikita Khrushchev's November 1954 announcement of an all-out drive for standardized mass-produced housing. East Germany followed suit in April 1955 with a program announced by Kurt Liebknecht to some 1,800 delegates assembled at a construction conference to build "better, cheaper, and faster." Liebknecht pushed aside the aesthetic discussions over national tradition in architecture and instead focused on the "absolute necessity that we make the technical and scientific side of the building industry as the priority and focus all our efforts on acquiring an advanced knowledge of modern construction."[27] Even Kurt Leucht, who had designed Stalinstadt, argued that the attention to "national traditions and cultural heritage was a one-sided romance that left out modern construction technology, mechanization, and costs..."[28]

The shift to mass housing was also based on the crucial influence of East German architects with extensive contacts in the West and knowledge about technical innovations taking place there. When the Soviets announced the new policy, they were ready. As vice-president of the Deutsche Bauakademie, Richard Paulick gave the keynote address on the industrialization and standardization of construction at its 1956 Plenary Conference. He was one of the GDR's earliest and most vehement advocates of industrialized housing. Western housing construction models were crucial in this turn toward mass prefabrication. Study tour reports and articles on West European towns began to appear regularly in *Deutsche Architektur*. The Housing Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe sponsored study trips to Belgium and Holland in 1956 in which GDR architects took part.[29] Reports on early French *barres* and *tours* using prefabricated large-panel building systems such as Coignet or Camus appeared,[30] and the latter was produced on a vast scale in the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe. Events such as the Union of Architects 1958 Congress held in Moscow were key international events for introducing Western-influenced housing concepts.[31] The *Plattenbau* shared the

landscape of standardized prefabricated housing that spread throughout Europe and beyond by the mid-1950s. The load-bearing concrete slab walls and floors were constructed in series directly in the factories, transported to the site, and then assembled into buildings using huge cranes. The New Towns were the testing ground for these system-built construction techniques that were intended to solve the housing shortage quickly and cheaply, just as Krushchev had advocated. They showcased the largest stock of entirely new prefab *Plattenbauten* in East Germany, and the demand for them was enormous.

The New Town of Hoyerswerda became the pilot project for the industrialized mass production of housing and was one of the largest construction projects of the GDR's Second Five-Year Plan (1956–1960). Close to the border with Poland in the Lausitz region that had once been part of Silesia, the old town of Hoyerswerda had been heavily damaged during the war by the invading Red Army, and its population had dwindled to only 7,000. The value of the site, however, was linked to the rich lignite coal deposits in the vicinity. In 1955, the "Schwarze Pumpe" coal-fired power station was established that would supply gas for much of East Germany, and a New Town was envisioned for some 480,000 people northeast of the old town. Hoyerswerda was meant to showcase the planning and technological skills of the new socialist society. "Under capitalism," wrote Paulick, "the town site would have been based on the needs of executives and white-collar workers…In socialist society, such considerations play no role. We are not only able to regulate the development of productive forces, but distribute them among the regions of our republic in a properly planned way based on scientific principles, as well as layout the homes of our working population based on their needs."[32] The construction workers building the town and the skilled employees at the Schwarze Pumpe station would alter the social composition of the region. It would be made modern.

The groundbreaking ceremony took place in August 1955. The new power station included the gas works and electrical distribution facilities, water treatment plants, brick factories, workshops, administration buildings, and restaurants and clubrooms for the employees, much of which was designed by architect Hermann Eppler in the tradition of the *Neues Bauen* formalism. Hoyerswerda and the Schwarze Pumpe facility were the heartbeat for an entire generation of energy workers. The new industrialized technical standards for the *Plattenbau* housing complexes at Hoyerswerda were outlined in the pages of *Deutsche Architektur*.[33] The first fully mechanized large-scale plate and panel manufacturer in East Germany, Groß-Zeißig, began production in Hoyersweda with a contract for 7,000 apartment units per year. A competition was held for the design of the New Town that was meant to create the new benchmark for GDR urban planning. Paulick eventually took over leadership of the project with the goal of a completely industrialized city: "Our objective in building Hoyerswerda is to unify technological production and assembly. The construction of Hoyerswerda is an experiment in economic, structural, technological and architectural planning…The entire city will be prefabricated."[34]

As the basic unit of socialist planning, each of the seven self-contained residential complexes was to have its own shops and services, its own commons and gardens at its center, with schools located along the edge. Paulick began developing a series of theoretical postulates on socialist design during his work on Hoyerswerda. He

saw the "housing block" as the smallest unit of social organization. Its significance lay beyond design and planning to include art, culture, and, above all, social life. The ideal of a housing block as a self-sufficient unit was meant to carry through the socialist emancipation of women by providing all the needs of daily life within its precincts. It should raise the standard of public health by strict zoning and protection from noise, traffic, and pollution. It should integrate the best of town and country by providing green areas, fresh air, and room for outdoor activities. And, most importantly, the complexes should solve the chronic housing shortage wreaked by capitalism. Paulick was sharing in the ideas of urban reformers from Ebenezer Howard, Raymond Unwin, and Clarence Stein to Swedish sociologist Alva Myrdal and architect Sven Markelius. These last had made the emancipation of women the priority in their cooperative Collective House in Stockholm in 1937 (which was itself a takeoff on the Russian collective housing experiments of the 1920s). The result was that Hoyerswerda's seven residential complexes, each made up of "housing-blocks" of varied height and length, were strung along the main highway as discrete entities separated by flat green geometric spaces. The segregation created by the horizontal planes assured the identity of each residential "neighborhood unit." Together, the residential complexes assembled into the town of Hoyerswerda. Western New Town programs were drawn on for ideas for the city center. Eisenhüttenstadt's ceremonial plaza as a vision of socialism was cast aside for the model of the Swedish New Town of Vällingby designed by Sven Markelius, which had become an international sensation when it was completed in 1954. For the town center, Markelius had opted for lower-scale buildings surrounding a pedestrian platform-plaza over the railway station. As a result, Hoyerswerda's city center was planned as an open plaza at the intersection of the railroad station and the main avenue to the Schwarze Pumpe facility. This "flat center" was to be surrounded by great department stores, specialty shops, and services that "offered a complete product range in a fully developed socialism." Along with them would be cinemas, cafes and restaurants, and the House of Culture.[35] Although a Marx-Engels monument was planned as its focal point, the Socialist New Town looked increasingly liked its Western counterparts.

The production of full-scale models, diagrams, and sketches for Hoyerswerda and for Halle-Neustadt were extraordinary. Architects set out the housing blocks like dominoes across blank sheets of paper. Their spatial composition appeared decisive to the New Town's success: mass-produced blocks in parallel lines, at right angles, in diagonals, in squares covered the make-believe model landscapes. The non-hierarchical configurations represented a cooperative society in which all shared and participated equally. The diagrams were icons for a new social order and living environment—pure dreams that confused the real with the abstracted design. They were an instrument of suspended reality and a utopian apparatus.[36] East German architects thus shared in the general obsession in the second half of the twentieth century with drawing the spatial designs that would create and stabilize social communities. It produced an overwhelming corpus of illusory illustrations, drawings, and diagrams that defined planning as a professional expertise capable of rationally organizing and controlling the physical environment. The projects were exhibited in heavily publicized media events, celebrated in documentary films, in magazine and newspaper articles, and flaunted as futuristic apparitions about to be made

real. Ultramodern illustrations of the British New Town of Milton Keynes, drawn in the space-age aesthetic of the 1960s and 1970s replete with glass-enclosed public plazas, heliports, and multilevel roadways, accompanied the epic descriptions of Hoyerswerda in the pages of *Architektur der DDR*.[37] It was a mutual space-age fantasy of urban life. The most spectacular symbolism was the appearance in October 1965 of Walter Ulbricht with Soviet cosmonaut Alexei Leonov in Halle-Neustadt. In a photograph disseminated throughout the GDR, Leonov peers down, smiling on a scale model of the futuristic city. Hoyerswerda and Halle-Neustadt were New Towns for the sputnik age. This image production was a form of pop-culture public education, an indication of how the *new socialist man* was to live and work by modern standards.

It is particularly ironic that despite this intense effort to build utopia, the *Plattenbau* complexes at Hoyerswerda are perhaps more symbolic than any other East German site of the failure of modernism. Despite Paulick's devotion to the housing-block social environment, the repetitious prefab concrete buildings were a monotonous, isolating landscape. Variety was sacrificed to "the socialist principle of order."[38] Each complex was home to between 4,500 and 5,500 people. The first playgrounds were not built until ten years after the town's founding. Writer Brigitte Reimann moved to Hoyerswerda in 1960 to become a laboratory assistant at the Schwarze Pumpe station as part of the GDR's cultural program *Bitterfelder Weg*. Her best-selling novel *Franziska Linkerhand* (1974) is a searing account of the social isolation, indifference, and violence that became symptomatic of the housing estates. In the novel, a young draughtswoman working in a local design office challenges housing policy and finds her views pitched against those of the chief architect of the town, Schafheutlin. He is a stand-in for Richard Paulick and his dream of a rigidly organized prefabricated ideal town.[39] Instead, Franziska lives in a sterile complex littered with garbage and trampled soccer pitches. It is a deadening environment. The divergence between the vision of socialist utopia and the everyday dystopia in Hoyerswerda may have been the New Town's most salient feature, and certainly its most famous one. One cause for these conditions was the number of people streaming into the city for jobs at the Schwarz Pumpe facility. The original population forecasts for the New Town were immediately too low. By the mid-1960s there were already 35,000 people living in Hoyerswerda, when the residential complexes were still being built. That number jumped to over 53,000 by 1968 and 73,000 by 1980. Little was done to create the dreamed-of urban amenities or the cafes and terraces around the city's central plaza. Instead, housing construction took precedence over everything. In the process, the issue of everyday living standards doomed the prefab *Plattenbauten* even as they were being built. Finally, in 1968, the Centrum Department Store opened its doors to great celebration. Urban planners had exchanged political symbolism for that of consumer society. The building itself was an experiment in designing large-scale, flexible commercial spaces. Inside, consumers could find the household goods, especially the new refrigerators, washing machines, radios, and television sets that were finally becoming available by the mid-1960s in East Germany.

The failure of the Five-Year Plan of 1958 and its abandonment in 1961 had led to a radical rethinking. East German planning and economic experts shifted to

new planning concepts and new organizational structures put in place as the New Economic System (NÖS). Cost efficiency, rationalization, computing, and cybernetics became the new buzzwords. The GDR-journal *Einheit* organized a conference to popularize cybernetics in 1961. Philosopher Georg Klaus at the Academy of Sciences (the most well-known enthusiast) published his collection of papers on "Cybernetics in Science, Technology, and Economics in the GDR" the same year, stating that cybernetics was "the most impressive confirmation of dialectic materialism." By the Seventh Congress of the SED in April 1967, Ulbricht began talking openly about "systems" thinking and the work of Norbert Weiner. The GDR became a pacesetter for the Eastern Bloc on scientific leadership and management, opening the way for a new generation of technocratic elites set in place with the NÖS of the early 1960s. They adopted cybernetics and systems theory as only fully realizable in advanced socialist countries, and as a way to stay competitive with the West. Increasingly, experts were brought into the SED at both the central and regional levels as advisors to industry and construction. Rather than top-down ideologically driven directives, planning could be based on scientific models. An advanced socialist society was to be thought of as a total system (*Gesamtsystem*) composed of self-regulating subsystems. Information and data processing would provide the keys to the scientific understanding and management of these complex societal systems "by the people for the people," in Ulbricht's words.

Responding to the SED's call for an "advanced socialist system," the Deutsche Bauakademie opened debates about a "new stage in urban planning" at conferences, on study trips, and through numerous articles in the architectural press. The science of urbanism was based on four factors, of which the first was "atomic power, automation and cybernetics as the new productive forces." These, along with increased productivity, urbanization, and respect for history and the environment would produce cities that were "larger, more differentiated, more complex, denser, higher, more mobile, lively, urbane, and humane. Of course, these progressive ideas can only flourish in the socialist city, where careful planning has replaced the profit motive." Among questions socialist planners should be asking, it was declared, was how urban planning factors could be put into mathematical form and how new international concepts could be put to use.[40] The consequences were enormous: cities and regions were viewed as complex systems that could be rationally measured and calculated, especially through the use of the new data-processing powers of the computer. Inventories were taken of the existing state of this system: population, employment, traffic flows, etc. Specific goals and objectives were set for its performance through precise mathematical formulas. The entire metropolitan region was envisioned as a unified functional system of production and reproduction, structured by urban epicenters linked by transportation networks. Each New Town was planned as a unified system of carefully arranged buildings, spaces, and traffic arteries. Rather than the earlier model of Stalinstadt as a discrete, bounded place with its own inner logic, cities were imagined as abstract, fluid nodes in the regional circulation of people, goods, and information.

The GDR's acceptance of cybernetics and systems theory was part of a broader international crusade to introduce scientific methods into urban planning. In the Eastern Bloc, it overrode political and ideological taboos and allowed an open transfer

of technical knowledge from the West. In the publication *The Ideal Communist City*, written originally in the late 1950s and then revised and updated in 1968, a group of young architects at the University of Moscow attempted to establish a scientific projection of the model communist life by integrating a Marxist conception of social relations with cybernetics, information theory, human engineering, and a new aesthetics of technology. The chaotic growth of cities under capitalism would be replaced by a dynamic system of urban settlement. The emergence of rationally planned areas many miles in dimension indicates, they said, "that we have moved into a new stage of conscious urban development ultimately aimed at uniting the planet into a single system corresponding to a new kind of social organization and to the growing potential of modern technology."[41] The towns within it resembled the system of Garden Cities originally imagined by Ebenezer Howard, but now with a cybernetic and computerized data framework. A second example is Boleslaw Malisz, a professor at the Institute for Town Planning and Architecture in the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw. Malisz wrote extensively on regional development and New Towns and created the quantitative forecasting technique of "Threshold Analysis" that was influential in Western Europe and the United States from the 1960s.[42] Systems analysis and cybernetics presented the illusory objectivity of science, numbers, and forecasts, but they were nonetheless governed by societal values about modernity and power.

How did these social scientific approaches influence GDR New Town policies? By the mid-1960s, urban and regional planning offices were established at the provincial level and began to consider infrastructure, transportation, and urban settlement from an integrated spatial perspective. The New Town of Halle-Neustadt (or Halle-West as it was initially called) was consciously designed and built using these new systems formulas. The "chemical city" was planned around the Leuna and Buna chemical plants on the outskirts west of the manufacturing city of Halle along the Saale River in Saxony-Anhalt. It was located as a major transportation hub with rail, road, and inland waterway connections extending into the GDR. The planning of Halle-Neustadt was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm. Exhibitions, official publications, articles in the press heralded the city of the future. A brochure on the initial plans for the New Town invited the GDR to "step into the socialist millennium." Fidel Castro visited in 1972 (photographed standing over the scale model of the future city), as did delegations from North Vietnam, from the Palestinian Liberation Organization, West Nigeria, and France. Halle-Neustadt was an all-encompassing city model for the future—it was a happy city, a child of socialism.[43]

Walter Ulbricht and SED officials were involved in the discussions about the new city's form. Teams of urban planners and architects, economists, sociologists, engineers, and technologists were brought in to consult on a master plan that fully integrated all aspects of urban life and infrastructure in the context of the surrounding region. The transportation network was imagined as the city's fluid circulatory system. Most importantly, mathematicians and computer engineers poured over technical data on infrastructure, construction engineering, mass housing materials, and transportation flows, all of which was input into early computer programs to create construction and forecast models. Electronic data processing and forecasting were the boldest part of the New Town's emergence. Halle-Neustadt was one of the

largest town planning schemes in the GDR. Over a hundred companies and some 4,000 workers were involved in its construction. Construction experts from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia took part as well as the ever-present Youth Brigades that were emblematic of the job training and community spirit the New Towns represented. It was in building Halle-Neustadt that the young members of the "Artur Becker" Brigade, for example, learned the newest construction technologies and civil engineering techniques.

"Halle-Neustadt was a symbol of the new," the official publication resounded, "It is a magnet for youth..." Other than the official photos of the famous gazing down in awe at the scale model of utopia, the visual imagery produced of the New Town was of two distinct types. The most prevalent was of children and young people relishing their lived environment and the benefits it offered. The dreamscape of social utopia comes alive in the smiling faces of children in playgrounds, the young couples contentedly promenading through the parks with their baby prams, children planting trees, cavorting in fountains, or on their way to school. This imagery of a new socialist generation was codified in the symbolic laying of the foundation stone of the New Town, which was simultaneously the groundbreaking for the city's polytechnical high school. The city had developed, *Halle-Neustadt: Plan und Bau der Chemiearbeiterstadt* goes on, "into a complex aggregate of work, housing, culture, trade, administration, technical and organizational needs...This requires a harmonious blend that forms the structure of the city." Creating a stable functional system such as this had been impossible under capitalism. Under socialism, it could be achieved for the first time in history.[44] Photographic composition of this new cityscape was the second form of visual production (Figure 6.2). The images revel in the housing blocks along the skyline. By day, they jut up like vertical specters across the horizontal open spaces and parks. At night, their lights glisten in a spectacle of the modern city. They constitute a visual chronicle of the socialist quest for modernity.

Figure 6.2 New apartment blocks at Halle-Neustadt, German Democratic Republic. Photograph by Helmut Schar for Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst: Zentralbild (1966).

Source: Photo courtesy of Deutsches Bundesarchiv.

The scale of the *Wohnkomplex* at Halle-Neustadt was enormous in comparison to the earlier New Towns, reaching some 15,000 residents each. Mammoth building sites and the WBS 70 series of standardized apartments became the norm. Paulick and his team of architects tested everything from gravel to ceramic and advanced materials such as plastic, polyester, and aluminum. They experimented with movable modular wall panels and precast concrete "Delta" shells in hyper-parabolic shapes for the roofs of public buildings. Paulick wrote avidly about American construction technologies.[45] The massive towers and linear bars were situated in groups along a four-lane highway and rail lines that connected them to the chemical plants and to the old town of Halle an der Saale. As the New Town expanded, more residential complexes were added in different configurations. The design fantasies took on a life of their own—produced and reproduced as visual texts of the future. The layout of the neighborhood ensemble, codified in the configuration of interior space and surrounding buildings, was essential to the feeling of harmony and unity. The designs would "shape themselves into consciousness and contribute to the emotional identification with the environment." Quoting Kevin Lynch's 1960 *The Image of the City*, the official description of Halle-Neustadt raised the possibility that with the correct design, the harmonious, cozy feeling of neighborhood Lynch described could potentially be extended to the city as a whole.[46]

The neighborhood center for *Wohnkomplex I* was a sleek modernist *Kompaktbau* shopping mall constructed in reinforced concrete masonry and surrounded by sculpture-graced gardens, recreational areas, and playgrounds. Praised for its economy and functionality as well as its sophisticated style, the *Kompatkbau* contained all the services necessary for daily life in the new community: supermarket and restaurant, post office, pharmacy and infirmary, hairdresser and cleaners, club rooms, and auditorium. It was within walking distance of every apartment in the complex. More than just a shopping center, it was meant to be the collective heart of the neighborhood and was applied in Schwedt as well. Architect Erich Hauschild's nearby Buratino kindergarten, designed as a flying saucer-shaped building with sheet-glass walls, exuded the populuxe space-age aesthetic of the 1960s. The ensemble was a mid-century futuristic take on the neighborhood ideal customary to New Town design.

It was, however, the dreamscape for the town center of Halle-Neustadt that most clearly evidenced the transfer and adaption of transnational planning influences. The utopian imagery exuded the atmosphere of a vibrant downtown with high-rise towers, multilevel shopping malls, and sophisticated urban life.[47] It was dedicated to the culture of consumption as much as to political ideology. From the mid-1960s, car production and public road systems became yardsticks of the GDR's economic achievement, with a keen eye on progress in capitalist countries. The ideal socialist city of Halle-Neustadt thus featured expressways, intricate road systems, overpasses, and roundabouts. In the city center, architects opted for a strict functionalist division between pedestrian and vehicular traffic, a strategy that was taken up by planning elites throughout Europe, as with the 1963 publication of the British Ministry of Transport's *Traffic in Towns*. The highways at Halle-Neustadt cut past sleek pedestrian plazas and multilevel malls reached by escalators. The architectural

illustrations were a sensational glam-modern pictorial gallery—the unveiling of a utopian world that combined urbanism and science fiction. The city's life floats across sweeping horizontal spaces between breathtaking towers in an entirely new public domain. It was a modernist optic identical to that featured in British and French New Towns throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

The ideal socialist city was a glimpse of tomorrow. It was imagined as a blank canvas on which a utopian settlement could be designed and produced as a glamorous model of the future. The future itself was imagined as empty space that could be filled with abstract images, and ultimately with abstract citizens. For many, this postwar socialist urban utopianism appears without much significance. It is banal, ideological, and ended in dismal failure. However, it represents a significant corpus of ideas and influences that follow in the legacy of modernist utopias. Socialist New Towns were the celebrated stars of the GDR: the projects offered a singular path toward modernity. Urban paradise was linked to postwar modernization, social stabilization, and to defining national territory. It offered a path of spatial legibility and social control. Planners and architects arrived with a set of aesthetic preconceptions about utopia that were derived from a complex transnational framework, an approach that was guided by a dynamic transfer of expert knowledge and new technologies. Professional exchanges between architects and urban planners continued despite the Cold War. The GDR shared fully in the professionalization of planning as it developed an intellectual base in the social sciences. Planners gained scientific legitimacy. Their knowledge was accepted and promoted by the regime as the framework for imagining an ideal socialist world.

Notes

1. See Arnold Bartetzky and Marc Schalenberg, eds., *Urban Planning and the Pursuit of Happiness: European Variations on a Universal Theme (18th–21st Centuries)* (Berlin: Jovis, 2009); and Robert H. Kargon and Arthur P. Molella, *Invented Edens: Techno-Cities of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press, 2008).

2. Cor Wagenaar, ed., *Happy Cities and Public Happiness in Post-War Europe* (Rotterdam: NAi Publishers/Architecturalia, 2004).

3. *Grundsätze des Städtebaus* (Berlin, 1950), quoted in Michel Grésillon, "Les villes nouvelles en République Démocratique Allemande. Problèmes d'intégration," *L'Espace géographique* 7, no.1 (1978): 27–34, 32.

4. Jack C. Fisher, "Planning the City of Socialist Man," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 28, no.4 (1962): 251–65, 251.

5. Jack Wawrzynski, "New Towns Concept in Poland," in *Learning from Other Countries: The Cross-National Dimension in Urban Policy-Making*, ed. Ian Masser and R.H. Williams (Norwich, UK: Geo Books, 1986), 115–24. See also David M. Smith, "The Socialist City," in *Cities After Socialism: Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies*, ed. Gregory Andrusz, Michael Harloe, and Ivan Szelenyi (Cambridge, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996), 70–99.

6. This point is also made by Christoph Bernhardt, "Planning Urbanization and Urban Growth in the Socialist Period: The Case of East German New Towns," *Journal of Urban History* 32, no.1 (2005): 104–119.

7. See the excellent discussion by Jay Rowell, "Du grand ensemble au 'complexe d'habitation socialiste'. Les enjeux de l'importation d'une forme urbaine en RDA," in *Le monde*

des grands ensembles: France, Allemagne, Pologne, Russie, République Tchèque, Bulgarie, Algérie, Corée du Sud, Iran, Italie, Afrique du Sud, ed. Frédéric Dufaux and Annie Fourcaut (Paris: Editions CREAPHIS, 2004), 97–107. See also Andreas Schätzke, "Nach dem Exil. Architekten im Westen und im Osten Deutschlands," in *Grammatik sozialistischer Architekturen. Lesarten historischer Städtebauforschung zur DDR*, ed. Holger Barth, Ingrid Apolinarski, and Harald Bodenschatz (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 2001), 267–278.

8. Residential "New Towns" or satellite towns were also constructed in the suburbs of a variety of cities. A good example is Rostock, where New Towns took shape in the city's outskirts from the mid-1950s on. The rebuilding of Dresden after the war was referred to as the "New Dresden."

9. The New Town of Schwedt would also fulfil this function. Ökonomisches Forschungsinstitut der Staatlichen Plankommission, *Planung der Volkswirtschaft in der DDR* (Berlin: Verlag Die Wirtschaft, 1970), 191; cited in William H. Berentsen, "Regional Change in the German Democratic Republic," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 71, no.1 (1981): 50–66, 54.

10. For a comparison of Stalinstadt and Nowa Huta, see Ingrid Apolinarski and Christoph Bernhadt, "Entwicklungslogiken sozialistischer Planstädte am Beispiel von Eisenhüttenstadt und Nova Huta," in *Grammatik Sozialistischer Architekturen*, ed. Barth, pp. 51–65. On Nowa Huta, see Bolesław Janus, "Labor's Paradise: Family, Work, and Home in Nowa Huta, Poland, 1950–1960," *East European Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (2000): 253–274.

11. Ruth May, "Planned City Stalinstadt: A Manifesto of the Early German Democratic Republic," *Planning Perspectives* 18 (2003): 47–78. See also May, *Planstadt Stalinstadt: ein Grundriss der frühen DDR, aufgesucht in Eisenhüttenstadt* (Dortmund: IRPUD, 1999).

12. The 1950 GDR delegation to the Soviet Union included architects Kurt Liebknecht, Kurt W. Leucht, Edmund Collein, Lothar Bolz, Walter Pisternik, and Kurt Adler.

13. On the influence of the Bauhaus, see Wolfgang Thöner, "From an 'Alien, Hostile Phenomenon' to the 'Poetry of the Future': On the Bauhaus Reception in East Germany, 1945–1970," *GHI Bulletin* Supplement 2 (2005): 115–37. See also Eric Mumford, "CIAM and the Communist Bloc, 1928–1959," *The Journal of Architecture* 14, no.2 (2009): 237–254.

14. See Kurt W. Leucht, *Die erste neue Stadt in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Planungsgrundlagen und -ergebnisse von Stalinstadt* (Berlin: VEB Verlag Technik, 1957).

15. On the role of the city center in socialist utopian planning, see Elisabeth Knauer-Romani, *Eisenhüttenstadt und die Idealstadt des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Weimar: Verlag und Datenbank für Geisteswissenschaften, 2000), 89–108.

16. Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast, "Ein lokaler 'Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe': Eisenhüttenstadt, Kraków Nowa Huta und Ostrava Kunčice," in *Sozialistische Städte zwischen Herrschaft und Selbstbehauptung. Kommunalpolitik, Stadtplanung und Alltag in der DDR*, ed. Christoph Bernhardt and Heinz Reif (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2009), 95–114, 99.

17. May, "Planned City Stalinstadt," 63.

18. For a comparison of East European steel towns, see Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast, "In the Shadow of the Factory: Steel Towns in Postwar Eastern Europe," in *Urban Machinery: Inside Modern European Cities*, ed. Mikael Hård and Thomas J. Misa (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press, 2008), 187–210.

19. Heinz Colditz and Martin Lücke, *Stalinstadt. Neues Leben—Neue Menschen*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Kongress Verlag, 1958). All translations are my own.

20. See Mumford, "CIAM and the Communist Bloc, 1928–1959."

21. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "Planning of Metropolitan Areas and New Towns." Paper presented at the United Nations Symposium on the Planning and Development of New Towns, Moscow, August 24–September 7, 1964 (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1967), 6, 213, Ibid.

22. Philipp Springer, "Leben im Unfertigen. Die 'dritte sozialistische Stadt' Schwedt," in *Grammatik Sozialistischer Architekturen*, ed. Barth, 70–71.

23. Iris Grund, ed., *Selman Selmanagić. Festgabe zum 80. Geburtstag am 25. April 1985* (Berlin: Kunsthochschule Berlin, 1984), 44.

24. Philipp Springer, *Verbaute Träume. Herrschaft, Stadtentwicklung und Lebensrealität in der sozialistischen Industriestadt Schwedt*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2006), 199–200.

25. See Bernhardt and Reif, eds., *Sozialistische Städte*, 305–306.

26. Springer, "Leben im Unfertigen," 75–76.

27. Kurt Liebknecht in *Deutsche Architektur* 4, no. 2 (1955): 56; and Liebknecht, "Die Wissenschaft im Dienste der Industrialisierung des Bauwesens," *Deutsche Architektur* 5, no. 3 (1956): 103–105.

28. Kurt Leucht, "Die Industrialisierung gibt uns die Generalperspektive," *Deutsche Architektur* 5, no.4 (1956): 153–54.

29. Ulrich Wilken, "Probleme des Städtebund Wohnungsbaus in Belgien und Holland," *Deutsche Architektur* 6, no. 1 (1957): 27–30.

30. Hans Mucke, "Industrieller Wohnungsbau in Frankreich," *Deutsche Architektur* 6, no. 6 (1957): 342–345.

31. On this point, see Miles Glendinning, "Cold-War Conciliation: International Architectural Congresses in the late 1950s and early 1960s," *Journal of Architecture* 14, no. 2 (2009): 197–217. On the increase in the exchange of ideas with Western European planners see also Thomas Topfstedt, "Die nachgeholte Moderne. Architektur und Städtebau in der DDR während der 50er und 60er Jahre," in *Städtebau und Staatsbau im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gabi Dolff-Bonekämper and Hiltrud Kier (Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1996), 39–54.

32. Richard Paulick, "Hoyerswerda—eine sozialistische Stadt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," *Deutsche Architektur* 9, no. 7 (1960): 365.

33. See, for example, Hans-Georg Heinecke, "Die neuen Typengrundrisse für die Wohnbauten in Neu-Hoyerswerda," *Deutsche Architektur* 5, no. 1 (1956); as well as Helmut Mende, "Das Grossplattenwerk von Hoyerswerda," *Deutsche Architektur* 5, no. 2 (1956), and Rudolf Dehmel, "Die neuen Typengrundrisse für Grossplattenbauweise in Hoyerswerda," *Deutsche Architektur* 5, no. 9 (1956).

34. Wolfgang Thöner and Peter Müller, eds., *Bauhaus-Tradition und DDR-Moderne. Der Architekt Richard Paulick* (Berlin: Deutsche Kunstverlag 2006), 126.

35. Paulick, "Hoyerswerda," 357. Excellent material on the design of Hoyerswerda can be found in Thomas Topfstedt, *Städtebau in der DDR 1955–1971* (Leipzig: E. A. Seemann, 1988), 31–36.

36. On these points, see Anthony Vidler, "Diagrams of Diagrams: Architectural Abstraction and Modern Representation, *Representations* 72 (2000): 1–20.

37. *Architektur der DDR* 24 (December 1975): 742–745.

38. Paulick, "Hoyerswerda," 366.

39. Brigitte Reimann, *Franziska Linkerhand* (Berlin: Aufbau, 2000).

40. Reinhard Sylten, "Zur Prognose und Analyse im Städtebau," *Deutsche Architektur* 17, no. 4 (1969): 217.

41. Alexei Gutnov et al., *The Ideal Communist City*, trans. Renée Neu Watkins (New York: George Braziller, 1971), 101.

42. Boleslaw Malisz, "Threshold Analysis as a Tool in Urban and Regional Planning," *Papers in Regional Science* 29, no. 1 (1972): 167–177.

43. See the visits and quotations in *Architektur der DDR* 23 (June 1974): 326.

44. Büro für Städtebau und Architektur des Rates des Bezirkes Halle, *Halle-Neustadt. Plan und Bau der Chemiearbeiterstadt* (Berlin: VEB Verlag für Bauwesen, 1972), 41, Ibid, Ibid.

45. Richard Paulick, "Rationelle Technologie für die Modernisierung von Wohnbauten in den USA," *Deutsche Architektur* 16, no. 2 (1967): 117–118.

46. Halle, *Halle-Neustadt*, 143.

47. See the illustrations of Halle-Neustadt in *Deutsche Architektur* 16, no. 4 (1967) and *Architektur der DDR* 23 (June 1974).

CHAPTER SEVEN
HOUSING AS TRANSNATIONAL PROVOCATION IN COLD WAR BERLIN

Greg Castillo

The structures that perhaps best illustrate Cold War Berlin's opportunities for using the urban fabric as a propaganda medium were not buildings, but twin billboards. On the western edge of Potsdamer Platz—a central plaza demarcated with a painted line indicating Berlin's internal border—construction workers in the fall of 1950 assembled three spidery steel pylons. Topping out at the height of an eight-story building, they were capped by a horizontal truss 30 m (100 ft) in length and 1.5 m (5 ft) high. A grid composed of 2,000 light bulbs studded the east face of the truss. Above it, neon letters announced: "DIE FREIE BERLINER PRESSE MELDET" (Berlin's free press reports). On October 10, a consortium of news agencies began feeding the illuminated sign their latest headlines. A scintillating banner of Western news briefs crawled above East Berlin's evening rooftops for the next 24 years.[1]

The provocation spurred a quick reaction from East German authorities. Within a week, Hamburg's *Abendblatt* reported that the Ministry for State Security had devised a "special catapult"—a fire hose stuffed with pea gravel and charged with compressed air—and, like a latter-day David, would soon unleash a volley of stones at the western Goliath's lightbulbs.[2] The actual response was far more devious. Contravening ideological orthodoxy, the socialist state countered the West's information offensive with an appeal to capitalist consumers. Within weeks, another set of eight-story pylons began their ascent on the eastern edge of the Potsdamer Platz. Diagonal arms and a web of guy wires stabilized a competing 30-m long illuminated sign that flickered to life on November 24.[3] It proclaimed: "Der kluge Berliner kauft in der HO" ("The smart Berliner shops at the HO")—a pitch for East Germany's state-operated retailer, the Handelsorganisation (Trading Organization)

During the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949, the HO flagship store flanking Potsdamer Platz had offered West Berliners items in short supply in return for their sector's new currency. By 1950, with the Blockade broken, politicians in the West vowed to end this monetary expatriation route. A West Berlin journalist intoned: "Those who earn Western currency but go to the Eastern sector hairdresser, tailor, shoemaker, public swimming pool and the HO…are parasites in the Berliner's fight for freedom."[4] The state retailer's bright new billboard rubbed salt into the

wound. Like the HO slogan, which used language that addressed shoppers in both East and West Berlin, the illuminated sign was two-sided, projecting the same message in both directions. But while the goal of the westward side was to draw Western shoppers (and their hard currency) over the open border, its Janus face, as Günther Bellmann observes, served a different purpose. The glaring neon foreground interfered with East Berliners' ability to read the news headlines spelled out in lights above the western skyline.[5] Photos of the HO sign bedecked with subsidiary banners intended to further obscure West Berlin's news bulletins substantiate Bellman's argument.

The battle of the billboards waged on Potsdamer Platz provides a case study in the birth of a competitive dialogue transacted in urban space. Divided Berlin served as its proving grounds by virtue of the city's unique status as the Cold War site at which a socialist capital and capitalist metropolis converged along an open border. For historians and the public alike, the term "Cold War Berlin" conjures images of a city divided by a concrete wall, concertina wire, and the gash of the lethal no-man's-land. But from 1945 until the infamous wall went up in 1961, the city's partition was jurisdictional rather than physical. In its initial configuration, postwar Berlin allowed inhabitants to construct daily lives that transgressed geopolitical boundaries. Western citizens shopped in their East Bloc sister city for cheap goods at favorable exchange rates. East Berliners crossed into their capitalist frontier town for luxuries and popular entertainments abhorred by Party ideologues. Inspired by the ways consumers exploited Berlin's porous boundary, propagandists devised new strategies to reach target audiences across the city's Cold War divide. The face-off on Potsdamer Platz demonstrates both the improvisational nature of these confrontations and the tendency of each tactical move to trigger a cascade of adversarial counter-measures.

"Berlin Rebuilds with Marshall Plan Help": The Innsbrucker Platz Highrise

Soviet prime minister Vyacheslav Molotov also expressed the opinion of US authorities when he declared: "What happens to Berlin, happens to Germany; what happens to Germany, happens to Europe." Wartime devastation brought housing construction to the foreground in the occupying powers' battle for the hearts and minds of postwar Germans. As a dénouement to Hitler's total war, Anglo-American bombing and Soviet shelling had converted 884 square kilometers of the Nazi capital into a labyrinth of ragged masonry, twisted metal, and smoldering timber. Within Berlin's limits, one-third of all dwellings were damaged beyond repair or reduced to rubble; in inner-city districts the proportion rose to more than half. Berliners emerged from cellars onto a wasteland in which even time shrank to a cipher: the legendary *Stunde Null* or "zero hour." A postwar letter from former Bauhaus faculty member Joost Schmidt to Walter Gropius, his former dean who had opted for self-exile in the 1930s, conveys the psychological impact:

> If you had even an inkling of how unspeakably primitive life here has become. Robinson (Crusoe) had an island to himself, and we…a jumble of rubble around us and within those who surround us.

> We belong to the survivors! But survival isn't over yet; the bitter end comes only now. Ruins from which the renowned 'new life' has yet to bloom, paralyzing lethargy everywhere—hard to steer clear of it. Rubble, tears have overwhelming effects.[6]

Upon return to his former hometown for a first postwar visit in the summer of 1947, Gropius recorded his impressions in a note to his wife, Ilse. "Berlin is a has-been! A disintegrated corpse! Impossible to describe. The people bent down, bitter, hopeless."[7] Two years after the Third Reich's capitulation, its former capital remained a patchwork of wreckage, improvised shelters, and public spaces devoted to black market transactions. Systematic reconstruction remained subverted by an urban economy crippled by industrial dismantling, administrative quarrels between occupying powers, absence of coherent municipal land use regulations, a debased currency, and the scarcity of building materials.

The onset of the Cold War in 1947 brought new obstacles to construction in Berlin's western zones, while elevating the stakes of failure. A report by the US Office of Military Government (OMGUS) noted that in its battle with "communistic forces for the popular opinion of the population in Berlin," attitudes were often determined by "the physical well-being and welfare of the people. A reasonable amount of up-to-date modern living space is one of the most important requirement of a people accustomed to a reasonably high standard of living."[8] As Soviet-American relations turned hostile, the United States quickly shifted its German policy from one of punitive suppression to mentored revival.[9] Its instruments were the Marshall Plan's European Recovery Program (ERP), initiated in April 1948, and a radical currency reform that introduced the Deutschmark (DM) two months later. The Kremlin retaliated with a total embargo of West Berlin: an urban island embedded 90 miles behind the Soviet sector border.

Although the celebrated airlift successfully supplied Berliners with food, coal, and subsistence basics, transport of building materials was an understandably low priority. West Berlin's construction industry collapsed, further aggravating the city's high unemployment levels. To provide work, OMGUS and the Berlin Magistrate (city council) tripled the budget earmarked for demolition of ruined buildings and rubble clearance.[10] East Berlin added insult to injury by announcing a housing initiative that soon would become a flagship construction program of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a nation founded in October 1949 from the eastern rump of occupied Germany. Job offers appeared in East Berlin dailies soliciting tradesmen from the city's western half to build the GDR's new capital city. According to an OMGUS assessment, West Berlin provided employment for less than half of its 70,000 skilled and unskilled tradesmen.[11] As a result, thousands of construction workers from "Free Berlin" accepted jobs building the housing estates, academies, and sports stadia of Stalin-era Germany.[12]

West Berlin's unfolding economic (and thus political) catastrophe prompted an unprecedented US intervention. Administrators of the ERP and GARIOA (Government Relief in Occupied Areas) targeted the city for massive investment. An emergency subvention of 20 million DM per month covered construction industry wages. Marshall Plan counterpart loans financed needed building materials and industrial imports. By mid-1950s, 50,000 formerly unemployed West Berliners were

working on projects ranging from demolition to the creation of housing, parks, and urban infrastructure.[13] Geopolitical prominence and a tenuous postwar recovery ultimately made West Berlin the beneficiary of one-third of all Marshall Plan funds allocated to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), forged from the American, British, and French occupation zones in May 1949.[14] Between 1949 and 1954, the ERP and GARIOA would finance new construction or rehabilitation of approximately 100,000 units in Berlin alone, constituting nearly half of the total US housing contribution to the FRG.[15]

American propagandists wasted no time in showcasing West Berlin's Marshall Plan successes. Press release photos depicted construction sites flanked by billboards announcing: "Berlin rebuilds with Marshall Plan help." An eight-story residential tower on Innsbrucker Platz merited more detailed coverage. Located two blocks from the Rathaus Schöneberg, West Berlin's city hall, the apartment building garnered public relations praise for amenities like "elevators, central heating, automatic garbage disposal units, laundry facilities, and roof garden." Marshall Plan publicists dispatched interior and exterior photos for publication by Western Europe's popular presses.[16]

A key press release claim concerning the "new apartment building in the Innsbrucker Platz (US sector)" was, in fact, only about one-quarter accurate. The building presented as having been built in 1950 with Marshall Plan funds was actually the bombed and rebuilt fragment of a 1927–1928 complex designed by Paul Mebes and Paul Emmerich for DeGeWo, the Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Förderung des Wohnungsbaues ("German Society for the Promotion of Housing Construction"), founded in 1924.[17] The Innsbrucker Platz tower, a Weimar-era social housing showpiece rendered in a restrained style of interwar modernism favored by Mebes and Emmerich, was the first DeGeWo property rebuilt after the war.[18] Emmerich, the firm's surviving partner, prepared the reconstruction documents, adding two additional floors: the truly "new" portion (with respect to Marshall Plan claims). Even in its earlier six-story incarnation, the building had conveyed a tower-like impression, as seen from Innsbrucker Platz, thanks to a masterly use of perspective effects and massing by Mebes and Emmerich. They greatly enhanced the scale of a minor appendage to their sprawling perimeter-block complex by dramatically thrusting that portion toward the square and adding another story. With additional height, which made the rebuilt structure half again as tall as its neighbors, the Innsbrucker Platz apartment house became what the postwar DeGeWo proudly (if misleadingly) called "Berlin's first highrise."[19]

As an inaugural reconstruction project, the Innsbrucker Platz block made sense for both the German Marshall Plan and DeGeWo. Until being bombed in 1943, the complex had also housed DeGeWo offices. Rebuilding it signaled the organization's postwar revival. For American officials, the structure known since the late-1920s as "the gate to Schöneberg" offered associations with West Berlin's seat of democratic municipal governance.[20] Land tenure and ownership, legalities that could ensnare the reconstruction process, were straightforward in the case of the Innsbrucker Platz site. DeGeWo owned the building (or rather, its remains) outright. And with the Weimar-era housing association freshly purged of the Third Reich overseers installed in 1933 as part of the Nazi eradication of political opposition, the DeGeWo boasted sterling antifascist credentials.[21]

What must have struck DeGeWo administrators as a match made in heaven was for their American partners, however, a mere marriage of convenience. Marshall Plan advisors approved of certain West German continuities with interwar precedents, particularly the Weimar era's artistic heritage, but demonstrated far less enthusiasm for municipal socialism and corporatist democracy—the interwar legacies responsible for the DeGeWo's efflorescence as one of Germany's largest *gemeinnüzige Baugesellschaften* or "public utility building corporations." Tracing their origins to the nineteenth-century working-class housing reform movement, these legal entities came to dominate national homebuilding in the wake of World War I, hyperinflation, and the collapse of Germany's construction industry. A 1924 rent tax (*Gebäudeentschuldungssteuer*, or *Hauszinssteuer*) enacted by the Weimar Republic to subsidize housing construction, in concert with rent control laws, helped send privately funded homebuilding into a tailspin. By 1929, four-fifths of all new housing involved some sort of public financing. By 1931, the private construction firms that had accounted for almost all homebuilding activity before the war had lost half their market share, and were mostly limited to single-family or small multifamily dwellings.[22] Financing methods for huge complexes composed of small apartment units—a housing type created to address the interwar shortage of living space—had taken those commissions away from private enterprise.

The Weimar era's radical reconstruction of the construction industry favored public utility building corporations like DeGeWo: a situation perfectly suited to the ideology and practice of municipal socialism. City administrators piled local subsidies upon subventions derived from a national rent tax; provided construction sites at non-speculative prices, sometimes by wielding their powers of urban land expropriation for public welfare; supplied the required street, sewer, water, and power infrastructure at no cost to the developer; and granted privileged tax exemptions. In return, municipalities stipulated low profit margins among suppliers of social housing and sometimes purchased a controlling interest in the local public utility building corporation. This symbiotic relationship collapsed at the onset of the global depression of the 1930s. For good reason, historians regard the modernist housing estates built under municipal socialism as the monumental architecture of the Weimar Republic.

Postwar American architects and urban planners celebrated Germany's Weimar-era social housing, but it raised a red flag—in a number of senses—for economists attached to the OMGUS and Marshall Plan officers. A US position paper reported: "Problems of financing have been a major obstacle to construction of adequate low-cost housing within European countries during the postwar period. These stem, to a large degree, from rent control legislation going back to World War I days that make investment in most European countries unprofitable."[23] A classified 1950 report on West Germany's stalled rate of investment found the worst capital shortages associated with housing. Traditional building methods, combined with customary rent controls, yielded return of about two percent—less than a third of long-term investment rates. As a result, privately financed housing construction remained limited to individual homes and company towns. The absence of insured, long-term home mortgages reduced a key initiative for private savings, further starving the economy of investment capital.[24]

After reviewing the report, ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) director Paul G. Hoffman—the chief administrator of Marshall Plan operations—outlined a course of action. He prescribed a Technical Assistance (TA) program to transfer American housing know-how to West Germany, and clarified its goals:

> In this I am not referring to the technique of housing construction, but rather to the need…for technical assistance in creating a proper financial environment…for the encouragement of private investment and the creation of employment opportunities through a revitalized home building program. The TA project…should also analyze the effect of rent ceilings and possibly suggest basic changes that would avoid the need for public subsidies.[25]

In other words, just at the time that US publicists trumpeted the Marshall Plan's construction of the Innsbrucker Platz tower—a publicly subsidized, rent-controlled, low-profit-margin apartment built by a public utility building corporation of Weimar-era provenance—Marshall Plan administrators were devising strategies to make such projects a thing of the past.

Perhaps the most surprising agent of change in the American campaign to wean West Germany from its social housing habit was Bernard Wagner. He was the son of Martin Wagner: the German expatriate, Harvard professor, former city planner for Weimar-era Berlin, ardent interwar socialist, and founder of GEHAG (Gemeinnützige Heimstätten-, Spar- und Bau-Aktiengesellschaft)—a public utility building corporation that produced over half of Berlin's new housing units between 1924 and 1933, including the Weiße Stadt and Britz Hufeisensiedlung (Horseshoe Estate), today registered as UNESCO world heritage sites.[26] The apparent generation gap separating an advocacy of Weimar-era collective housing and the promotion of suburban home ownership was inherent to the elder Wagner's career. Within just a few years of his transatlantic exodus from Germany, Wagner père experienced a Pauline conversion to American housing ideals. At Harvard, he produced visionary designs for factory-manufactured, single-family homes and supervised student proposals to resettle unemployed inner-city residents in self-sufficient communities on greenfield sites.[27] Wagner fils began work as an ECA housing consultant in 1950 with the Marshall Plan Amerika zu Hause (America at Home) installation for the first annual German Industrial Exhibition: an assignment that advanced "a struggle as vital to the peace and prosperity of the world as any military campaign in history," according to an OMGUS officer. It was a sobering burden of portent for a modest suburban home from Minneapolis erected in West Berlin's exposition park. Wagner selected all interior furnishings and coordinated overseas transport of the home's prefabricated elements. Crews of West German tradesmen labored round-the-clock for five days to assemble the components, a publicity stunt used by Marshall Plan publicists to promote increased productivity through innovative building methods. West Berlin's midwestern house attracted 43,000 visitors, 15,000 of them from across the city's eastern border. US officials called the display "a gratifying demonstration of what can be accomplished in selling the American democratic way of life from the Berlin 'showcase' behind the Iron Curtain."[28]

Bernard Wagner's subsequent assignments contributed to America's most ambitious efforts to influence housing production and financing in West Germany. He sat on the design jury for a 1951 housing competition sponsored by the ECA and MSA (Mutual Security Administration) that earmarked ten million dollars from Marshall Plan counterpart funds for the creation of 3,300 low-cost residential units in 15 West German cities. To stimulate innovation, designs by competing teams of local architects and contractors were exempted from compliance with local building codes and zoning regulations. Non-profit public utility building corporations would, ideally, own each project only until tenants could purchase their unit.[29] The experiment produced housing costing ten percent less than that built using conventional construction methods. However, the quest for prototypes built for private ownership and without state subsidies remained illusive for familiar reasons, as Wagner explained in his summary of *Neuer Wohnbau,* the competition catalog: "lack of private capital, high interest rates, high land costs and strict rent control." As a result of subsidies, Germans were accustomed to paying too little for housing: typically only 14% of their income, according to Wagner, while Americans spent up to twice that.[30] US officials prescribed a complement of linked solutions: "relaxing or eliminating rent controls," "development of housing built for home ownership," and the introduction of "programs of housing finance of the mortgage insurance type."[31] West Germany, in other words, needed to learn the lessons of Levittown.

American housing reformers in West Germany produced only one model project, a 1952–1954 MSA-funded development in Dortmund-Derne, that met all their reformist criteria. Ruhr miners, upon whose coal production Western Europe's economic revival depended, were the target demographic. The MSA sponsored a six-week study tour in the United States for a German consulting team that included miners, miners' wives, architects, a home economist, a reporter, and municipal and union officials. The delegates visited American mining towns and housing developments, noting innovations in home design, technology, and financing. As a result, all of Dortmund's 800 new units, consisting solely of single-family row houses and semi-detached dwellings made available for either rent or purchase, boasted modern, fully equipped kitchens. To explain homeownership benefits and financial mechanisms, the MSA built a construction site showroom containing scale models, two full-size kitchens, and home finance consultants. Wagner found the outcome heartening. With miners ensconced in new houses and anchored by neighborhood associations, the vast majority were "satisfied, knowing they are getting their money's worth and better." As expected, turning miners into homeowners reduced labor turnover by increasing their standard of living and rooting them within an industrial community.

The use of MSA housing as an intervention in labor relations grabbed the attention of what Wagner called communist "rabble-rousers." Their nocturnal visits to the Dortmund-Derne construction site left "several large signs informing the public that this was a housing project built with Marshall Plan aid…neatly sawed off." Local police captured and jailed one of the "night-raiders"; another was said to have escaped across the border to East Germany.[32] The would-be saboteurs need not have bothered. Scorned by a new Republican majority in Congress and rendered irrelevant by

a nascent economic miracle's surge of home-grown investment capital, US efforts to reform the West German housing industry all but ceased after 1954.

"The 'Formalist Eggcrates' are put to Shame": East Berlin's Weberwiese Highrise

Like Marshall Plan administrators, the leaders of East Germany's SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei, or "Socialist Unity Party") were, by the end of the 1940s, disenchanted with the legacy of Weimar-era housing. A postwar community prototype designed by members of a planning collective led by Hans Scharoun, a luminary of German expressionism, ignited bitter controversy. Their Friedrichshain *Wohnzelle* ("residential cell"), created under the aegis of East Berlin's city council, further advanced the visionary agenda of interwar modernism. Completing the cultural transformation begun by Weimar-era public utility building corporations, the *Planungskollektiv* approached housing as a communal urban infrastructure. Maximum efficiency determined dwelling design. A one-person unit (with kitchen and bathroom) started at 25 sq m (269 sq ft), a bravura feat of *Existenzminimum* planning. As the normative trajectory of marriage, child-drearing, and retirement advanced, individuals would exchange public housing units in conformance with their spatial requirements.[33] Stripped of the comforts of long-term housing tenure, residents would instead identify with their neighborhood "cell." Based on the Berlin tradition of the *Kiez,* a close-knit precinct fostering local identity, every *Wohnzelle* would be "nest-like…a mediator between the chaos of the metropolis and the forlorn individual," according to Scharoun.[34] Postwar socialism, as envisioned by the *Planungskollektiv*, would shatter antiquated notions of home as a private commodity by substituting life-long allegiance to an urban community.

The *Wohnzelle* proposed a truly indigenous conception of postwar German socialism: a concept increasingly regarded as treasonous as the GDR's trajectory as a Soviet satellite advanced. The coordinated attack on the prototype Friedrichshain *Wohnzelle* revealed the tactical characteristics of a Stalinist party-state. On December 21, 1949, Stalin's 70th birthday, occurred the inauguration of the project's first housing block and the renaming of its adjacent boulevard as the Stalinallee; and GDR Minister of Construction Lothar Bolz issued a memorandum complaining that East Berlin merited buildings that would "better express the progress and strengths of our new state than the proposed low-rise housing reminiscent of the…estates of Weimar times."[35] Was the modernist *Planungskollektiv* housing "New Construction in an Old Style?" asked a headline in the SED newspaper *Neues Deutschland* two weeks later.[36] Another daily condemned *Wohnzelle* efficiency apartments for their "predictable infiltration of cooking smells into the bedroom." A state-affiliated architect simultaneously decried the "full-blown Formalism" of the design.[37] These critiques could scarcely be taken at face value in a city of inhabited coal cellars and urban rooftop shanties. The real sin committed by the *Planungskollektiv* was its rehabilitation of Weimar modernity on the eve of a Stalinist cultural revolution. Or as posed in the rhetorical question asked by a GDR trade journal, "From whom could we learn more about city planning than our Soviet colleagues?"[38]

Six officers representing various GDR ministries tasked with reconstruction departed from East Berlin's Schlesischer Bahnhof on April 12, 1950, bound for Moscow. Their mission, approved by the SED Party General Secretary, Walter Ulbricht, was to examine Moscow as the paradigmatic socialist capital.[39] They returned with a document that changed the course of East German reconstruction. The *Sechzehn Grundsätze der Städtebau* ("Sixteen Principles of Urbanism"), a manifesto clumsily translated from a Russian typescript presented to the delegation by its Soviet hosts, prescribed rules for reconstruction conforming to the aesthetic ideology of late Stalinism. Members of the mission became a bureaucratic avant-garde prepared to foment a cultural revolution in architecture.

The *Sechzehn Grundsätze*, passed into national law in September 1950, inducted the GDR into the confederation of East Bloc nations that shared an aesthetic lingua franca: the Socialist Realist style, based on the (literally) authoritative norms of Soviet design practice. East German architects discovered to their great surprise that German (or more precisely, Prussian) neoclassicism constituted the root stock from which a contemporary socialist architecture would blossom. Modernism—in Soviet parlance, "formalism"—was its opposite, according to the *Tägliche Rundschau*, a national daily affiliated to the SMAD (Soviet Military Administration). "It can hardly be disputed that a drastic change is required in German architecture," proclaimed SMAD political advisor Vladimir Semenov, writing under the pseudonym N. Orlow. "The long-standing reign of the fatuous formalist movement has led to gray, cheerless, monotonous, dishonest architecture that has disfigured German cities with expressionless and oppressive housing-containers."[40] Within the context of this narrative, the Marshall Plan reconstruction of Weimar-era modernist housing in West made perfect sense. "Ugly, artistically worthless slabs," according to no less an authority than Ulbricht, served to "cripple and destroy the national consciousness of the West German people." Communist ideologues deemed this a necessary step in capitalist world domination.[41]

With the West's modernism and the East's neoclassicism established as aesthetic and ideological antipodes, Cold War architecture entered an uneasy symbiosis. However, a difficult task of conversion faced the SED. Given Hitler's penchant for bombastic neoclassical monuments, East German architects had to be disabused of their belief that modernism was the logical idiom of post-Fascist reconstruction. The career of Hermann Henselmann, a rising star in the GDR architectural establishment, provides a compelling case study in Stalinist cultural rehabilitation. With the exception of a somewhat embarrassing collection of agrarian buildings designed for colonies in Reichsgau Wartheland, a Polish territory annexed by the Third Reich, Henselmann's portfolio showcased modernism in applications ranging from prewar private villas to postwar projects for workers' housing, schools, and community centers.[42] Slated to visit Moscow with the 1950 GDR study tour, Henselmann was dropped from the slate as an unreliable affiliate of Scharoun's *Planungskollektiv*.[43] He confirmed his reputation as a loose cannon upon the mission's delivery of the *Sechzehn Grundsätze*, which he found "altogether too dictatorial."[44]

"The Battle for a New German Architecture," launched by the SED and its Socialist Realist partisans in 1951, redefined Henselmann's intransigence as "class-alien" behavior. "His designs aestheticize form and do not express the idea of our

social order," railed a critic in *Neues Deutschland*.[45] Undeterred, Henselmann addressed a lecture series on the theme "Studies in National Tradition" with a talk on the Bauhaus, a deeply heretical topic. Because a career as a modernist designer remained available to Henselmann within strolling distance across the border to West Berlin, his SED minders struggled to devise alternatives to Stalinism's time-honored methods of instilling appropriate professional behavior.

A carrot-and-stick approach finally brought the wayward architect into line. SED officials used a high-profile housing commission as an opportunity to extinguish any lingering resistance to Soviet-imported aesthetic ideology. Henselmann headed one of the three architectural collectives competing to design the Weberwiese estate, a project intended to transcend the "formalism" of the Friedrichshain *Wohnzelle* and provide a template for subsequent reconstruction efforts. At a meeting of Party officials and designers competing for the Weberwiese commission, Henselmann observed that East Berlin's new neoclassical Soviet embassy had garnered "mixed reviews in architectural circles, as everyone knows." A week later, the editor of *Neues Deutschland* published a scathing denunciation titled "On Building Style, Political Style, and Comrade Henselmann." There was no middle ground in the battle pitting "formalism" against "humanism," the editor maintained. "One can be for one or the other: for man as minion or master of creation, for war or for peace, for Washington—or for Berlin!"[46] It was time for Henselmann to choose sides.

The chastised architect offered penitence in textual and architectural form. Before the year was out, *Neues Deutschland* published "The Reactionary Character of Constructivism," Henselmann's repudiation of Bauhaus design. Even his tract's title, which assessed Weimar modernism using the terminology of the Russian avant-garde, conformed to Stalinist discursive tropes.[47] Meanwhile, his Socialist Realist design for the Weberwiese received star billing on posters for a new National Building Campaign for the German Capital City, implying East Berlin's status as the only true German capital. Henselmann's work, according to Rudolf Herrnstadt, fused "the building elements of the Berlin tradition (Schinkel) into a grand conception that expresses the standards of people today."[48] The official claim that Schinkel's Feilner House of 1829 served as the prototype for Henselmann's design collapses under even the most cursory comparison. The Weberwiese was deemed a "masterpiece" nonetheless—at precisely the time one was sorely needed as the poster child of a national reconstruction campaign.

In the areas of construction financing and labor organization, however, the "Weberwiese highrise" truly was a breakthrough project. Newspapers, newsreels, posters, and radio programs called upon citizens to volunteer their labor and household funds to help build the apartment block (figure 7.1). Workplace agitators encouraged citizens to compete for banners and medals as members of rubble-clearing brigades. Families could buy slips of paper printed with windows, pilasters, and doors from which a miniature apartment tower could be assembled: every completed model contributed 43 marks to the cause. Labor organization on the construction site also incorporated money-saving innovations. As a finishing school for "workers of a new type," the Weberwiese introduced German masons to high-speed bricklaying, "technical work norms" (*technische Arbeitsnormen*), and "socialist competition." The first of these Soviet imports rationalized bricklaying into separate

Figure 7.1 East Berlin's "Highrise on the Weberwiese" (1951–52, architect Hermann Henselmann) costars with a heroic construction worker on a poster for the National Construction Program for Germany's Capital City. The headline exclaims "Berlin—more beautiful than ever!"

Source: Poster courtesy of Deutsches Bundesarchiv.

and discrete tasks, assigning each to a different member of a "brigade." One team member hauled bricks where they were needed and another prepared the mortar while a female colleague placed a continuous supply of bricks and mortar along the mason's work path. Exemplary workers engaged in socialist competition with other brigades, voluntarily accelerating work tempos and inventing new techniques to raise productivity. These achievements pushed labor norms and production quotas upward for all workers, reducing the so-called performance wage (*Leistungslohn*), a piece-rate pay system at the core of Soviet wage policy.[49] American workers a generation earlier had responded to a similar system, known as Taylorism, with walkouts and strikes. Any comparison with socialist labor was spurious, according to Stalinist ideologues: when the proletariat owned the means of production, by what logic could the beneficiaries be accused of exploiting their own labor?

The first built artifact of East Germany's cultural revolution was a dream come true for US propagandists. They had labored long and hard to popularize the notion

that East Germans were the unwilling subjects of relentless Sovietization. Suddenly, the evidence was handed across the border on a platter. The *Neue Zeitung,* a nationally distributed West German newspaper founded by the Information Control Division of OMGUS, was quick to strike.[50] Reporter Eduard Schönbeck infiltrated the Weberwiese site armed with a miniature camera. His two-part exposé, "The 'Formalist Eggcrates' are Put to Shame," and "With a Leica in the Weberwiese Tower," lampooned this "pioneering achievement in progressive domestic culture," calling it "a failed copy of a Soviet 'skyscraper' in Moscow." Entering the apartment block as a foreign sightseer, the reporter described "barracks-like corridors" and families sick of putting their home life on display at the state's behest. He compared the Party's pride in "new discoveries" like garbage chutes and telephone intercoms to the reaction of proverbial Red Army peasants upon their first encounter with Western plumbing.[51] According to Schönbeck, the motto of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship—"To learn from the Soviet Union means learning to triumph" (*Von der Sowjetunion lernen, heißt siegen lernen*)—was a recipe for dumbing-down East Berlin, both culturally and technologically.

Faultfinding by American and West German critics of the Weberwiese Highrise was the least of the problems confronting East Berlin's National Building Campaign. The happiness of residents moving into their new apartments on May 1, 1952, as choreographed for media consumption, belied the nation's mood. Despite appeals for donations of cash and voluntary labor, housing production was falling well behind that of West Germany. The SED Central Committee trumpeted socialist workplace heroism in factories and construction sites while progressively raising labor quotas. As workers struggled to increase productivity, state economists prioritized investment in heavy industry over the consumer sector. Daily necessities disappeared from shop shelves. Against a backdrop of faltering food supplies and plummeting morale, nearly 8,000 East Germans were arrested in the first three months of 1953 for black market transactions or speaking ill of the regime. Both were infractions punishable with prison sentences. As morale plummeted, the number of citizens fleeing westward each month fluctuated between 15,000 and 20,000, adding to the West German housing shortage.[52] The most remarkable socialist tempo, as it turned out, was not that at which bricks were laid, but that at which workers were abandoning the state established in their name.

On June 16, 1953, construction laborers on the site of a new generation of "workers' palaces" adjacent to the Weberwiese laid down their tools and marched on SED headquarters in East Berlin to air their grievances. Their transfiguration from Stalin-era "new men" to antigovernment rebels annulled the campaign to fuse workers' bodies, workers' housing, and Soviet labor methods into a unified spectacle symbolizing the construction of socialism. The protesters called for a general strike. RIAS (*Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor,* or "Broadcasting in the American Sector"), the radio network established by US occupation forces, carried news of the event, inciting further citizen participation. The next day, 30,000 people—about 15% of East Berlin's workforce—joined the strike, taking to the streets to chant slogans and mock Party leadership. The uprising spread to towns and villages nationwide on June 18. SED Politburo members fled to safety at SMAD headquarters in Karlshorst and remained in power only through a second invasion of Berlin by Red

Army tanks and troops. As a source of political provocation, East Berlin's first generation of socialist housing, it seems, had succeeded all too well.

Notes

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3. "Leuchtschriftkrieg," *Hamburger Abendblatt* 276 (November 25–26, 1950): 2.
4. "D-Mark gegen 'Tapetenmark'," *Die Zeit* 49 (December 1, 1989).
5. Günther Bellmann, *Potsdamer Platz. Drehscheibe der Weltstadt* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1997), cited in http://www.potsdamer-platz.org/die-freie-berliner-presse-meldet.htm (accessed December 3, 2012).
6. Joost Schmidt to Walter Gropius (March 14, 1946). Ger 208 (1495) 81M-84 bMS, Walter Gropius papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
7. Walter Gropius to Ilse Gropius (August 5, 1947); quoted in Reginald Isaacs, *Gropius: An Illustrated Biography of the Creator of the Bauhaus* (Boston, MA: Bullfinch, 1991), 259.
8. "Eighteen Month Report," Building, Housing, and Requisitions Section, Office of Military Government Berlin Sector (May 26, 1948). RG 260/390/48/20/5, box 570, OMGUS Records of Berlin Sector, Records of the Economics Branch, Reports of the Building and Housing Section, 1946–49. US National Archives, College Park, MD.
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10. "Eighteen Month Report," Building, Housing and Requisitions Section, Office of Military Government Berlin Sector (May 26, 1948). RG 260/390/48/20/5, box 570, OMGUS Records of Berlin Sector, Records of the Economics Branch, Reports of the Building and Housing Section, 1946–49. US National Archives, College Park, MD.
11. "Quarterly Estimate of the Situation," Building, Housing and Requisitions Section, Office of Military Government Berlin Sector, August 11, 1949. RG 260/390/48/20/5, box 571, OMGUS Records of Berlin Sector, Records of the Economics Branch, Reports of the Building and Housing Section, 1946–49. US National Archives, College Park, MD.
12. Wolfgang Bohleber, *Mit Marshallplan und Bundeshilfe: Wohnungsbau Politik in Berlin, 1945–1968* (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 1990), 119.
13. Ibid, 121.
14. Jeffry M. Diefendorf, "American Influences on Urban Development in West Germany," in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1968*, vol. 1, ed. Detlef Junker (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 590.
15. Bernard Wagner, "FSA/FOA German Coal Miners' Housing Program 1952/54." RG 469/250/75/1/7, box 103, Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Deputy Director for Operations, Office of European Operations, Office of the Director, Geographic Files 1953–54, US National Archives in College Park, MD.
16. "Berlin, Germany: Apartment House in the Innsbrucker Platz." RG 306 PS-C 51–3118 and 51–3119, Still Pictures Division, US National Archives in College Park, MD.
17. Dieter Rentschler and Wilfred Pape, "Liste der Mehrfamilienhäuser," in *Berlin und seine Bauten,* vol. 4, Architekten- und Ingenieur-Verein zu Berlin (Berlin: Verlag Wilhelm Ernst und Sohn, 1964), 460.
18. On the modern social housing designed by Mebes and Emmerich, see Annemarie Jaeggi, "Traditionell und modern zugleich: Das Werk des Berliner Architekten Paul Mebes als

Fallbeispiel für eine 'andere Moderne'," *Marburger Jahrbuch für Kunstwissenschaft* 28 (1999): 227–241.

19. "Ältestes Hochhaus steht in Schöneberg," *DeGeWo stadtleben* (January 2010): 30. For a historically grounded discussion of Berlin's high-rise legacy, see Cordula Grewe, ed., *From Manhattan to Mainhattan: Architecture and Style as Transatlantic Dialogue* (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 2005).

20. Because other Western Europeans could not be expected to know the building's local history, Marshall Plan photos of the Innsbrucker Platz apartment that were circulated internationally always specified its location in Berlin's US Sector.

21. For a general history of the DeGeWo, see Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Förderung des Wohnungsbaues, ed., *Wir bauen auf—75 Jahre DeGeWo* (Berlin: DeGeWo, 1999). It is interesting to note that the legacy of postwar reconstruction has conquered institutional memory to the extent that the building's initial configuration has been largely forgotten, with DeGeWo sources ascribing the rebuilt eight-story height to the original Mebes and Emmerich 1927 design.

22. Dan P. Silverman, "A Pledge Unredeemed: The Housing Crisis in Weimar Germany," *Central European History* 3, no. 1/2 (1970): 112–139, 123.

23. "US Position Paper re: International Financing of Low Cost Housing" (October 1953). RG 469/250/73/18/4, box 14, Records of Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948–61, Office of the Deputy Director, Subject Files, 1953, US National Archives, College Park, MD.

24. "A Financial Program for Western Germany" (February 7, 1950). RG 469/250/72/27/6, box 19, Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948–50, Assistant Administrator for Programs, Subject files 1948–1950, US National Archives, College Park, MD.

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33. Ludmilla Herzenstein, "Bevölkerungsentwicklung als Faktor der Stadtplanung," *Bauplanung und Bautechnik* 2, no. 7 (1948): 214–215.

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38. Heinrich Stark, "Berlin plant und baut," *Bauplanung und Bautechnik* 11 (1949): 345.

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42. On Henselmann's oeuvre, see Hermann Henselman, Wolfgang Schäche, and Gilles Barbey, eds., *Hermann Henselmann: "Ich habe Vorschläge gemacht"* (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1995).

43. Lothar Bolz to Walter Ulbricht (January 7, 1950). Bundesarchiv SAMPO, DH1/44476.

44. Hermann Henselmann, "Vorschläge aus dem Ministerium für Bauwesen" (July 5, 1950). Bundesarchiv SAMPO, DH2/DBA/B38/I.

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46. Rudolf Herrnstadt, "Über den Baustil, den politischen Stil und den Genossen Henselmann," *Neues Deutschland* (July 31, 1951).

47. Hermann Henselmann, "Der reactionäre Charakter der Konstruktivismus," *Neues Deutschland* (December 31, 1951).

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CHAPTER EIGHT

TRANSATLANTIC CROSSINGS OF PLANNING
IDEAS: THE NEIGHBORHOOD UNIT IN
THE USA, UK, AND GERMANY

Dirk Schubert

Planning ideas after World War II were based on similar visions worldwide. Many of them were developed half a century before, and the war offered a unique chance to put them into practice. Although there were different political systems and a diversity of urban situations, the planning models seem to have been similar in this period. There was an almost universal agreement that reconstruction combined with slum clearances would be necessary and would need to be planned rather than be left to the free play of the market. Planning was seen as the key to postwar rebuilding—for slum clearance, optimized land use, new housing production, and restructuring dense urban area based on the neighborhood principle.

It would not be too great an exaggeration to state that already in the decades before the war, a dominant urban design model had emerged advocating low densities, decentralization, and the structuring of the urban conglomeration with neighborhood units. For many reasons, it seemed to be absolutely necessary to restructure the dense, amorphous urban mass. Differences in the various examples of neighborhood types manifested themselves only in the local contexts of their (ideological) conception and in their built and architectural form. Simply clearing away inner-city slums and developing new housing estates was no longer enough for planners, who at conferences of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning (in New York in 1925 and in London in 1935) established principles of how to structure large cities and paradigms of modern planning. Urban planners dreamed transnationally of "organizing communities" and neighborhoods to create a better new world.

Rarely has there been such international consensus among planners as that reached in the 1930s and 1940s on the concepts of urban restructuring and neighborhoods. The goal of restructuring the city by lowering densities and decentralization was internationally widespread. The method of achieving this aim, using smaller urban units and school units, was indeed a transnational phenomenon. It was the question of which form the city should actually take that caused national,

local contextual, and political opinions to drift apart. Some of the most important meccas that were based on the neighborhood unit theory are Tapiola next to Helsinki, Vällingby near Stockholm, Sondergaardsparken and Gyngemorung in Copenhagen, and Linda Vista in San Diego.[1] Robert Freestone analyzed examples of model settlements in Australia; Abdallah Abd El Aziz Attia studied settlements built on the principles of neighborhood units in Holland, Switzerland, Poland, and Germany and tried to transpose these principles to Baghdad and Cairo; Spencer E. Sanders and Arthur J. Rabuck documented the advantage of planned reconstruction; Steen Eiler Rasmussen and Paul Ritter discussed Scandinavian examples; and Eugen C. Kaufmann and A. I. Tarantul, for example, demonstrated the importance of the concept in the Soviet Union.[2]

This chapter will trace the origins of the neighborhood idea in Germany, Britain, and the USA, where the idea was first implemented. It became the most important planning paradigm after 1945 in Germany and in Britain. In the United States, the private market took over after World War II and only a few examples of neighborhood unit planning were privately developed, while in the United Kingdom and Germany, many examples were realized. Some of the most important examples of postwar reconstruction in London and Hamburg related to this planning idea will be analyzed here.

Origins of the Vision: Decentralization and Neighborhoods

Because similar ideas of decentralization were developed at the end of the nineteenth century in many industrialized countries, this shared background needs first to be contextualized. Social scientists identified processes leading to huge, crowded cities and the related phenomenon of "losing one's roots" in those cities. The German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936) made an important distinction between "community" (*Gemeinschaft*) and "society" (*Gesellschaft*), of which the latter was dominant in the postindustrialization period. Tönnies defined community interaction as reliant on blood ties, neighborhood, and friendship, while societal interaction is based on evaluation of advantages, disadvantages, and expectations of reward. Family, clan, village, and friendship are forms of communities, whereas city and state are categories of society. "In large cities, that is in capitals and in the metropolis, the family is in decay. . . . Large cities typify society as such. . . . Therefore the city and the condition of society is the decline and death of the people," Tönnies wrote, and lay the foundations for a hostile perception of large cities, a view that was fraught with consequences.[3]

Tönnies's ideas soon spread internationally, become very influential among sociologists. Robert Ezra Park studied in Germany and later became the founder of the Chicago School of urban sociology. The American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley developed and based his differentiation of "communal" ("primary") and "social" ("secondary") groupings on the ones by Tönnies. The social reformer Robert A. Woods had lived in a settlement in London's East End for a while and had started similar settlements in Boston, applying Tönnies's ideas in the United States. The Chicago School's human ecologists were concerned with organic relationships between human communities and their physical environment.[4] Sociologists such

as Park and E. W. Burgess did extensive research on the city, social organization, "social surveys," "natural areas," and "community units," and how to establish and support neighborhoods as an important part of urban life. In 1891, Stanton Coit published work based on his experience in London and New York that encouraged the theory of neighborhood guilds.[5] The ideas of neighborhood guilds, the settlement movement, and similar concepts were developed to organize the "social life of all people in one small district": "It thus brings neighbors together, families together, different interests together."[6]

English Garden Cities have become case studies of how the vision of modern urban planning implemented decentralization concepts. Ebenezer Howard wanted to develop Garden Cities, not Garden Suburbs, and the structure of the Garden City would be based on school-centered wards as centers of community.[7] He does not mention the term neighborhood, although the principles of the neighborhood unit idea formulated later are similar. In the United States, few projects were produced promoting the idea of creating a whole settlement until the 1920s.[8] In 1906, the year Letchworth opened in Britain, the Garden Cities Association of America was founded. From 1909 onward, urban designers and planners in the United States held National Conferences on City Planning (NCCP), and in 1917 the American City Planning Institute (ACPI) was founded to address the necessity of planned urban expansion. Unlike in Britain, however, urban planning in the United States was not a direct result of the American Garden City, public health, or housing movements.[9] It was primarily based on the City Beautiful and City Scientific movement as well as private initiatives.

Much of the experience of American planners had been obtained during World War I, when planning developed in the context of war-stimulated public housing programs.[10] In 1923, the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) was formed in New York due to the driving force of Henry Wright as a rather informal, interdisciplinary think-tank of housing and town planning experts (including Catherine Bauer Wurster, Lewis Mumford, Benton MacKaye, Frederick L. Ackerman, Stuart Chase, Robert Kohn, Edith Elmer Wood, and Clarence S. Stein).[11] They discussed the idea of state-wide regional planning, low-income housing, and in particular the concepts that could lead to the construction of such a settlement realizing their goals. The RPAA in New York anticipated the increasing social disintegration of the metropolis, as well as problems of unplanned suburbanization and urban sprawl, and countered these with planned decentralization, regional planning, and the establishment of neighborhoods.[12]

RPAA member Clarence A. Perry formulated in the "Regional Survey of New York and its Environs" (1929) the basic physical design principles of a neighborhood unit. In "The Neighborhood Unit. A Scheme of Arrangement for the Family-life Community," Perry tried to transpose the positive experience of the settlement movement with its strong social links and networks that had partly strengthened the sense of community in existing residential areas onto a planning concept with neighborhood units in built-up areas, as well as new developments and urban expansion areas.[13]

Although he drew from many sources, it was Perry who became known worldwide as the father of the neighborhood unit, constituted by six principles: "Size,

Boundaries, Open Spaces, Institution Sites, Local Shops, Internal Street System."[14] Perry's general principles included setting the ceiling population at 5,000 for an area surrounding an elementary school, placing services required on a daily basis along streets on the edge of the housing estate, especially at the nodes between neighborhoods, mandating the ability to reach central facilities on foot, rerouting through-traffic, segregating modes of transportation, using cul-de-sacs, and a creating a green belt around the estate unit that separated it from other settlements. Perry predicted the need for new urban planning solutions because of the increase in private car ownership. "The cellular city is the inevitable product of the automobile age.... We are going to live in cells.... They require the organized neighbourhood."[15] Perry developed a blue print for urban development planning intending to avoid the negative aspects of the large city. Since he lived in the Garden Suburb Forest Hills on Long Island (Queens), he drew from personal experience in developing the model. Perry argued that the social mix of the population in the neighborhood units should be a "wide range of income classes," but a neighborhood nonetheless required a socially homogeneous population.[16] Perry as well as others believed that a strong sense of community in a neighborhood was only achievable within groups similar in their ethnic, social—and above all racial—make-up.[17]

In 1928, the City Housing Corporation bought a site in Fair Lawn, New Jersey, to translate Perry's theoretical framework into the built reality of Radburn that was expected to rise to model status on an international scale. Clarence S. Stein and Henry Wright were responsible for the architecture and planning; Thomas Adams, Raymond Unwin, Frederick Ackermann, and Robert D. Kohn were to serve as advisors. Three neighborhood units with about 25,000 inhabitants were planned, each built around an elementary school and all clustered around a single high school. The neighborhoods were designed in a way that children could walk to school. Because in 1929 automobiles killed more than one child per day on the streets of New York City, separating pedestrians from roads became a desirable design element in the neighborhood.[18]

Not one element of the Radburn plan was truly new. It was a (sub)urban model that promoted communal lifestyles and it was meant to meet modern demands such as private transportation. Although the planners had high hopes for the new sense of community, its inhabitants predominantly held conventional and conservative values. The urban planning typology was quite modern, but the architecture was traditional. Radburn became a mecca for planners, while the daily lives of the Radburnites conformed on the whole to those of other American suburban housing estates.[19] Lewis Mumford, for example, praised the plan as the "first major departure in city planning since Venice."[20] In May 1929, the first owners moved to Radburn, but by October of that year Wall Street crashed. Many Radburn inhabitants lost their jobs and incomes and had to move. Radburn was never completed and became a victim of the global recession. The transnationally applicable urban planning ideal turned into a financial disaster.

F. D. Roosevelt's New Deal gave rise to new opportunities for regional plans as intended by the RPAA, and the implementation of planned independent settlements that were modeled on Howard's vision and the example of Radburn. In 1934, the National Housing Act was passed and the Federal Housing Administration was

established, mainly concerned with creating employment.[21] The degree to which the FHA influenced model housing policies during the following decades cannot be overestimated. It advanced suburbanization by building large suburban settlements with neighborhood units. Neighborhoods according to the FHA were to be socially and racially homogeneous in order to promote a sense of community among their residents.[22]

In 1935, a Greenbelt Towns concept was adopted by the US government, based in part on the Radburn and Garden City models. It was aimed at creating jobs and cheap housing as well as demonstrating new urban planning concepts. Rexford Tugwell, a supporter of state intervention and planned decentralization and a follower of Howard's vision, became coordinator of the Resettlement Administration.[23] Initially, fifty Greenbelt Towns were planned; this was later reduced to eight, but only three were built, with Greenbelt (Maryland) becoming the most well known.[24] Greenbelt Towns could not be compared to the English Garden Cities, as they were smaller settlements of less than 1,000 households without places of work. Many planners linked redevelopment and new housing estates with slum clearance and demolition of old tenements. "The attack (on slum districts), however, can be indirectly assisted by the development of model home neighborhoods in the suburbs just as much as by replanning and rebuilding the slum areas themselves. No direct attack on the slum districts will yield completely satisfactory results."[25] Those in control of housing policies, the building industry and developers, placed the emphasis on the urban periphery, thereby causing the inner city to be neglected with negative impacts for several decades.

In Britain, private developers dominated housing production after World War I. Although some municipalities like the London County Council built a lot of new housing on the city periphery between the wars, decentralization and spreading the population across the whole countryside were considered the best solutions. For example, in Becontree—the largest council (public housing) estate in the world—25,000 dwellings were built to house over 110,000 people. But many found it difficult to adjust to the costs of suburban living. Many working-class people could not afford the new public housing, while higher income groups preferred to buy on the private market that enjoyed a much better image than council housing. Therefore, many of the large housing estates became "one-class estates," a social disaster, badly planned with dreary buildings, cultureless life, and people living in an annoying monotony. It became clear that Becontree was not a "community," and it had no adequate local government and social infrastructure. Critics complained about suburban commuting ghettos and vast dormitory deserts, and they argued that housing had to be combined with community planning and structured by neighborhoods, where people know each other and can have multiple types of contacts.

In the initial plans for Becontree there had been some provision for social life and recreation by creating neighborhood units.[26] But owing to shortages of material and labor, many of these ideas had to be abandoned. The "civic spirit" was missing and what was left had little in common with the famous Garden City idea of decentralization. Critics in England complained about the absence of a social mix in the new public housing estates: "The loss of neighborhood values has its further

bearing on socially disorganized areas."[27] In this context, planners sought out different models of decentralization as ways to overcoming London's overcrowded condition. In 1940, the Barlow Report (Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population) suggested a new spatial distribution of the industrial population in Britain and new towns with "mixed neighborhoods."[28] Lower densities in inner city areas were suggested, making rehousing operations necessary. World War II and the damage caused by bombing gave more and important support to the arguments for decentralization, lower densities, and neighborhoods, like the 1942 MARS Plan for London by the Modern Architectural Research Group: "Only by forming clearly defined units, which in turn are part of larger units can social life be organised."[29] The East End of London with its huge slum areas was to be remodeled with modern housing estates and neighborhoods.

Also, in the 1943 County of London Plan, London's official plan, the neighborhood unit formed a central planning element. The plan prescribed extensive action, even in areas that had escaped destruction during the war. It foresaw new dimensions of rebuilding destroyed areas in accordance with the ideal of the neighborhood unit. "Partial solutions are not sufficient," John Henry Forshaw and Sir Lesley Patrick Abercrombie wrote in the Foreword to the Plan; redevelopment and slum clearance on a big scale were mandatory. The planning goals were demonstrated, using a neighborhood unit in Shoreditch and Bethnal Green in the East End and the community of Eltham as examples. The redevelopment areas were to be similar in size to New Towns, which were developed in the framework of massive resettlement projects. They were to have 60,000–100,000 inhabitants, in neighborhood units of 6,000–10,000 people each. "The composite plans which we have prepared provide a proportion of lofty blocks of flats, spaced well enough apart for groups of trees, with terraced houses dispersed in regular but not monotonous form, the whole interspersed with open space and organically related to the smaller neighbourhood centre and finally the centre of the whole community."[30] The neighborhood units were envisioned as having open spaces and all necessary communal facilities.

Shortly after World War II began, discussion intensified regarding how postwar England should look. There was practically unanimous acceptance among planners for the necessity of large-scale redesigning of cities. Because of his preliminary work for the County of London 1943 Plan, Abercrombie, who worked for the Ministry of Country and Town Planning, was entrusted with the design of a plan for the Greater London area. Whereas the 1943 plan had concentrated on the administration area of the LCC, the new plan covered an area of a 30-mile radius from the City. One element of the 1943 plan to be developed further was the concept of organic communities. Abercrombie wrote:

> Both the neighborhood and the town should be given physical definition and unmistakable separateness, and the population should be socially stable. This stability can largely be archived by the provision within the community of a variety of houses and dwellings to meet the needs of all population groups. . . . We have used the community as the basic planning unit. . . . Each community would have a life and character of its own, yet its individuality would be in harmony with the complex form, life and character of its region as a whole.[31]

But it was not the neighborhood concept, in fact, but the community concept that was to serve as the basis for this new plan. The East End of London again served as a model for rebuilding according to modern principles of neighborhood planning. Abercrombie even thought that the buildings and dwellings in the slum areas of the East End that had not been destroyed by German bombs should be demolished anyway. Redevelopment areas were established and the plans were made to relocate the population as needed for implementing modern neighborhood units.

Deconcentration Strategies for Planning in Hamburg and Germany

In 1920s Germany, many large modern housing estates were built, such as those in Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, and Hamburg. The focus was on housing reform; community development was secondary. Although new schools were built and served as community centers, it was generally deemed more urgent to first solve the housing question by constructing many modern, healthy, well-ventilated apartments. As many of the units were too expensive for working-class people, most were rented by the rising class of white-collar employees. In Hamburg, many of the reform ideas were implemented by restructuring plans from the pre–World War I period to include parks, recreation areas, and more light and sun for the apartments. These housing estates were often built on land owned by the municipality, with a greater number of apartments in one estate to save costs. In Hamburg, they were termed a "belt" around the densely built-up inner city with its tenements from the nineteenth century.

During the Nazi dictatorship after 1933, housing and planning policy alike became a political and ideological issue. The National Socialists were primarily interested in good housing conditions for workers needed especially in the armaments industries; they condemned nineteenth-century housing as "speculative," and found the new housing from the 1920s to still be "ugly tenements." Many plans emphasized the poor urban environment and the need for improvement. The Nazi Party (NSDAP) saw a direct connection between urban planning, physical planning, and what it called *Volk ohne Raum* ([Aryan] "people without space"). Urban design concepts drew upon the antiurban critique of large cities in the nineteenth century and postulated "de-densification." "The city as the seat of Judaism" and "site of Marxism," in the words of the leading National Socialist ideologue Gottfried Feder, was to be thinned out and reordered: "This urban organism will be composed of a series of cells, which will be grouped in cell associations within different sub-cores around the center of the city."[32] Feder suggested using the *Volksschule* (combined elementary and lower secondary school) as a basis for creating order. By means of urban development, the "health of the body of citizens" could be achieved. Programmatic statements by the National Socialists called for a decrease of urbanization, or even its reversal in a migration back to the land. They were connected to ideas of autarky in an agrarian society, *blood and soil*, (de- and re-)population policies, and antiaircraft defense. Nonetheless, by the late 1930s, the Nazis had come to see large cities as a necessary evil.

American and English plans for neighborhood units had been presented at international conferences and sparked off discussion among German planners. Articles

about Radburn were published in German periodicals.[33] In 1932, Clarence S. Stein's partner, Henry Wright, described his vision of the neighborhood idea to the German planning community in the journal *Die neue Stadt*. In 1934, Bruno Schwan also published a map and photographs of Radburn. For the Nazis, the challenge was how to apply the Anglo-American vision of neighborhoods so as to bring order to big German cities, to help in redesigning specially designated Führer-cities, and after 1939 to develop the newly conquered European "East" without merely imitating the "decadent" Western democracies. There were conflicts between the ideological claims of hostility toward the city, the ideal of an idyllic homeland, the reality of highly industrialized armaments production, and ideals of economic modernization. It was thought that the disintegration of large cities should be accelerated by new settlements for car owners.[34] The conversion of cities to accommodate cars and the new settlement concepts were an integral part of the link between Nazi political power and spatial planning. Yet Hitler had to postpone mass-motorization as a secondary political goal for the time after the war that first had to be won. (In the USA, by contrast, car-based suburbs had already become reality during the interwar years.)

Likewise, Nazi planning principles for new settlements were to assume mass-motorization and transfer the framework of the political structure to town planning. The idea of the *Ortsgruppe als Siedlungszelle* ("local group as a settlement cell") was a model that emerged from National Socialist theory and planning practice and adopted the neighborhood theory, but then used it to connote something completely different with a Nazi bias. Within this basic context, the emphasis could be placed upon the Germanic-national origins linking community with kinship, neighborhood, and camaraderie. In 1941, in Hamburg, the private architect Konstanty Gutschow, not the building or planning department of the city, was made responsible for town planning. In 1937, Hamburg's boundaries had been extended into an amalgamation with the Prussian cities Altona, Wandsbek, and Harburg. Most important however was the expansion of Hamburg's port. This was to be intended to be far larger than the one of London because of increasing trade, the growing importance of Germany, and the new colonies Germany intended to acquire. When Gutschow made this plan, there was only minimal war damage, and he had grandiose ideas for the modernization of the city that included a new bridge over the river Elbe and the only new skyscraper Hitler would permit in Germany.

Gutschow's 1941 urban development plan for Hamburg was based on the organizational principle of neighborhoods and followed the political structure of the party. Administrative units of the National Socialist German Workers Party were replicated in the planning of new housing estates in order to represent a cross section of German society, and excluded Jews and "unwanted" groups not belonging to the *Volksgemeinschaft*. A mixture of owner-occupied row houses, small blocks, and tenement buildings with flats for rent was planned. The *Ortsgruppe als Siedlungszelle*-estate was planned for about 6,000 to 8,000 people with schools, stores, and infrastructure.[35] Gutschow declared: "The anonymity of the city is the result of an amorphic formation. It is necessary to make it more transparent again, to structure and design it to create order. For neighborhoods to evolve, the settlement units must be clearly set apart."[36]

The increasing war damage from 1940 onward gave the planners a unique chance to put their new ideas into practice; it offered opportunities for radical change. The plans mainly aimed at air defense, less monotony, decentralization, and the structuring and organization of cities by means of neighborhoods and residential areas. The home front was important and many promises were made, including plans for better housing and living conditions. The Nazis drew up plans for a massive public housing program after the war based on the exploitation of foreign workers. In the wake of destruction inflicted during the war, Gutschow created a second general plan for Hamburg in 1944. He was familiar with the central role of the neighborhood concept for British wartime reconstruction. The plan followed the principle of reducing housing densities, with local groups serving as neighborhood cells:

> Every previous master plan for Hamburg that wanted to avoid the danger of becoming utopian and attempted to remain realistic had to take the existing physical situation in the central areas more or less for granted. A totally effective renewal, even if implemented gradually, was reserved for a very distant future, especially a reduction of the irresponsible population densities in the areas that had traditionally housed the Communist "electorate." The new master plan is based on the reality of destruction and the entirely new possibilities it has offered…and the new master plan sees it as its task to build a city in which, despite its size, no national comrade [*Volksgenosse*] feels like a mere number, but is the member of a neighborhood.[37]

In plans for the destroyed areas, this concept was to form the basis for spacious rebuilding of residential areas in Hamburg.[38] There are many more green areas and green belts in the plan dividing up the residential areas and neighborhoods. The plan is tabula-rasa style, creating new residential units. The urban fabric and bombed and destroyed areas were again divided into neighborhood units corresponding to the organization of the Nazi Party.

Local groups were to be used as a structuring element, not only in Hamburg and other cities, but also in the conquered eastern zones. Significantly, Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer of the SS, planned to use this same principle to "secure German national tradition in the new east."[39] Although neighborhood unit planning is a transnational product of various national roots and processes, Nazi German planners insisted that the idea offered a uniquely German solution. A great variety of different design models of neighborhood cells were developed, even if mostly unrealized. There were organic ones, like those of architect Hans Bernhard Reichow, or geometric ones by Walter Hinsch in 1944, with a mix of housing, densities, and of course a party building on a central axis.

If we compare the Plans for London to a 1944 plan for Hamburg by Gutschow's colleague Reichow, the scheme looks very similar. Reichow's organic "cells" appear different from the MARS Plan schemes. Reichow always used examples from the natural environment for his organic type of planning. He changed the names of his units: until 1945 he used the National Socialist term *Ortsgruppe als Siedlungszelle*, but later called them "organic neighborhoods." If we take a more detailed look at two blitzed areas, we find that the plans for Shoreditch in London and Barmbek in Hamburg look very similar. Abercrombie's thought was to demolish the slums of the East End, whether bombed or not; similarly in Hamburg, the postwar plan

for the area of Barmbek presumes a tabula rasa, creating new residential units and neighborhoods.

Changing Terminologies and Planning Continuities in Postwar Germany

After 1945, the term neighborhood gained a bad reputation in Germany because of the analogy to Nazi mechanisms of discipline and control. Thus the discredited concept of the "local group as neighborhood cell" was renamed as "cell" or "estate node" or "unit." National Socialist town planning and architecture remained forbidden subjects of study for a long time after the war. In fact, the goals formulated after 1945 appeared similar to the pre-1945 vision, despite the denazification of terminology. The myth of the *Stunde Null* ("zero hour") of 1945 as a completely new start was misleading. A degree of continuity occurred in both the people involved and in the planning paradigms. While some of the senior planners were removed from office or allowed to resign, most of the (pre-)war planners ("Gutschists") did find new jobs and brought into the postwar period the models, concepts, and practices they had developed both during the Nazi era and before.[40] Thus the "ideological ballast" of urban planning in Germany was shed after 1945, and the National Socialist idea of "local groups as neighborhood cell" was transformed into a western, democratically envisioned neighborhood unit called "estate node" in Hamburg. Although most of the grandiose party buildings and axes were not realized, German postwar reconstruction thus pursued some of the goals of the National Socialist period, as well as the goals of previous periods, even if the racial-political rationale was replaced by other appellations.

In 1946, Gutschow himself wrote in a letter to Rudolf Wolters, the former head of Albert Speer's Ministry: "I have found, to my delight, my hobby, the idea of the residential cell in Abercrombie's rebuilding plans. There they are called neighborhoods. They are the central idea of the plan.... From now on these formations will be called, by my own defaming mouth, neighborhood cells. I hope they do not identify these urban design ideas, which are so dear to me, as an infiltration of the totalitarian pretensions of the party."[41] H. B. Reichow, having propagated the "local group as neighborhood cell" in Germany before 1945, later used biological metaphors and attempted to plan "organic neighborhoods." Once employed by Gutschow during the Third Reich, he had no trouble morphing and depoliticizing National Socialist terminology into concepts derived from examples in nature. He used the term "branching" for creating a street pattern in postwar housing estates, and borrowed the idea of segregation of modes of transport from Radburn. His projects are regarded among the most influential in postwar West Germany and his books were bestsellers: *Organic City Planning* (1948) and *The Car-Suitable City* (1959) in which he primarily propagates the "Radburn principle."[42] He criticized the Abercrombie Plan and the London neighborhood unit plan for being insufficiently organic. Similarly, although more technocratic and lacking biologic analogies, the influential work *The Structured, Low-Density City* (1957) followed a comparable line of thought.[43] Its authors did not disguise the fact that it was conceived during the National Socialist era and thus made no attempt to change the terminology.

One of them, Roland Rainer, pointed to the neighborhood theory as early as 1948 and published a translated version of the plans of Clarence Perry's Radburn. So there was a continuity of planning models based on the neighborhood unit, with many similarities between the expansive plans during the war and postwar ones.

In 1947, parts of Abercrombies's Greater London Plan were published in German. To offer the Germans more (democratic) examples of modern planning, a translation of Thomas Sharp's book on town planning was published in 1948 that also contained principles of the neighborhood idea.[44] British military planners wanted to establish principles for rebuilding Hamburg similar to those of British cities. When the British occupation forces arrived in Hamburg in 1945 they were surprised at the parallels of planning ideas. The German visions for rebuilding in Hamburg were, in fact, modest in comparison with the ideas for London. The bombing damage had left a lasting impression on the losers and the political and economic insecurity did not allow for grand ideas. Nevertheless, Hamburg's general building plan of 1947 and rebuilding plan of 1950 contained the principles of neighborhood units and of relieving city monotony. Included in the plans were lower population densities and green belts to divide the residential neighborhoods.

New Housing Estates in Hamburg and London

In Britain, the war resulted in a modernization function, not only in terms of urban planning but also for British society and politics more generally. What was possible during the war was deemed possible for peacetime as well. The war taught Britons the value of good neighbors, and at the same time "opened up an unparalleled demand for experimentation and innovation."[45] In turn, Hamburg's master architect of brick-based interwar *Neue Sachlichkeit*, Fritz Schumacher, called for extensive powers for planners to control the post–World War II land market.[46] But financial difficulties and ownership problems hindered the realization of "great visions" in the inner city even when there was hardly any controversy between the planners about basic aims and models for rebuilding. The planners were forced to concentrate on lower population densities and on the planning and building of new estates. This was done according to the principles of neighborhood units on suburban edges as well as rebuilding bombed-out inner cities.

The housing shortage in Germany and especially in Hamburg, where half of the housing stock was blitzed, was dramatic. Housing projects began as soon as the political and financial situations were stabilized. The first major project in Hamburg was for the British Army's headquarters in its occupation zone. In the area selected for the project, there had been a prewar total of 185 buildings with about 730 apartments. In this period of dire housing shortages, buildings in the area were even demolished to make space for the new project. Most of the sites could be acquired by negotiations with the former owners.

The British Military Forces wanted an architectural competition for the Grindelberg project. The competition was won by a group of architects from Hamburg (B. Hermkes, R. Jäger, R. Lodders, A. Sander, F. Streb, F. Trautwein, and H. Zeß). The project included 12 skyscrapers and was planned with offices and apartments for British officers; there were to be 6 buildings each with 15 floors, and

another 6 each with 10 floors. The estate constituted the first and unique example of high-rise buildings with this scale. Although there had been some proposals like Mies van der Rohe's skyscraper for Berlin, the modernist steel-frame construction methods were new in Germany. But a controversy arose about high-rise buildings, about "Hamburg's Manhattan." While some architects argued this would be a unique chance for a new start, others preferred lower buildings. For the people of Hamburg, the debate over the Grindelberg high-rises soon became a symbol for rebuilding according to modern ideas and standards. In England the *Architects' Journal* explained it as newly discovered project of Le Corbusier, and did not mention the local architects involved.

In Hamburg, there was a shortage not just of steel but of all building materials shortly after the war. When the British Government decided to move their military headquarters to Bad Oeynhausen, Hamburg's city government refused to take over the project that was still under construction. Finally in 1948 the Hamburg parliament agreed to complete the project as public housing. Over 2,000 apartments were built between 1949 and 1956, and because of the housing shortage there was a big demand for them.

The high-rise project of Grindelberg departed from the basic neighborhood mix of densities and housing types. The flats were standardized and the buildings had only two different heights. But all amenities were included: stores, laundry, the borough Town Hall, and a gas station. Sculptures were positioned in green zones and playgrounds for children were included away from traffic. As the rents were quite high, not many working-class people could afford to live there. Since the buildings of the estate were easy to distinguish from the surrounding areas, the tenants developed a unique, positive identity for their vertical neighborhood.

A decade later, a handbook was published by the Hamburg Ministry for Building, Housing and Settlements that explained the guidelines for planning new housing estates. The family was to serve as a basis, followed by a neighborhood of 6–10 families forming an initial settlement unit. Three to five of these small units would form settlement groups, which in turn would lead to a school unit for 5,000–7,000.[47] Although different terminology was used, the key unit for structuring the city remained the same.

One of the biggest housing projects in West Germany was implemented in the Hamburg district of Altona after 1958. About 90,000 people lived in Altona's *Altstadt* before the war. Most of the buildings were demolished by bombing, especially in Altona's eastern area, where about 60 percent of the housing stock was destroyed. In 1955, planning started with a team from the planning department of the City of Hamburg, including Werner Hebebrand, Otto Sill, and Arthur Dähn, as well as the Neue Heimat, the biggest housing company in Germany. Architect Ernst May was the head of the planning group in the Neue Heimat, and he had extensive planning experiences from Frankfurt am Main, Breslau, the Soviet Union, and Africa. In the ten years since the war, some buildings had been erected without planning permission, some had been modernized, and others had become squats. The plans for Neu-Altona included the demolition of many older buildings. New roads were planned, with an increase of green space from 2 to 15 percent in the area.

New housing was to avoid the old mix of housing and business on one plot. These planning visions followed the Charter of Athens with a clear separation of housing and working spaces. The density was to be lowered to about 500 people per hectare and the area structured by neighborhoods. Although it was not possible to separate neighborhoods completely from each other because of existing streets and industries, individual solutions were to be created to give the metropolitan dweller a sense of his or her local neighborhood and establish a human scale in the anonymous big city.[48]

If we compare these Hamburg projects with a counterpart in London, Churchill Gardens in Pimlico, they seem to be very similar. Designed by two young architects P. Powell and H. Moya, who won the competition, for the Westminster City Council in 1946, it was planned as a neighborhood unit from the start. Churchill Gardens was a mixed development of 1,600 homes: ten-story blocks of apartments, four-story maisonnettes, and a few three-story terraced houses for large families ("anglicized Gropian *Zeilenbau*"). Social infrastructure, schools, stores, and a community center were integrated into the project. A view to the Thames was offered for most of the tenants. The monotony of the LCC's prewar housing estates was avoided by a mix of building heights. Churchill Gardens was an important demonstration of the successful use of modern architecture for housing.

The 1951 Festival of Britain, in the tradition of the 1851 Great Exhibition, was a demonstration with great international potential for British reconstruction, but its resonance was primarily destined for the home front. The South Bank side of the Thames chosen for the festival was far from optimal. But a demonstration project for modern housing was developed in the East End as a "Live Architecture Exhibition." The first Compulsory Purchase Order was made for the Lansbury Estate area in Stepney in 1949. Part of the Stepney-Poplar Comprehensive Development Area with a population of approximately 100,000 inhabitants, Lansbury was the first project to be developed both comprehensively and on a neighborhood basis. The layout of the area was prepared by the LCC's Architects Department, and also many private architects were involved. Its neighborhoods were each planned with a number of social facilities, such as day care and schools, two churches, a pedestrian shopping center, and public open space. A maximum of housing types was offered: six- and three-story apartments, four-story maisonnettes, three- and two-story terraced houses, and houses with apartments overhead. The exhibition area of Lansbury was intended as a demonstration of new types of neighborhood planning and new types of houses, apartments, and maisonnettes for Londoners. Lewis Mumford counted the estate as "one of the outstanding examples of postwar urban planning."[49]

However, before very long the results of Lansbury were criticized as a "major disaster" not just by observers but also by tenants, who found it hard to overcome their aversion to tenements ("model dwellings for the poor") as well as to the relatively high density.[50] The Lansbury people were displaced by East Enders with their specific socio-(sub)cultural traditions. Most were dependent on nearby industries and port activities. Moreover, the romantic vision of social mixing did not function well in practice. A group of middle-class Lansbury dwellers had problems with the social homogeneity and solidarity of the impoverished East Enders.

The Neighborhood Planning Vision: Divergences and Convergences

Urban renewal combined with (slum) clearance may appear as excellent examples of a transnational postwar consensus. All parties strongly supported the ideas of clearing unhealthy housing and the visions of modern housing—as public housing—with light, air, electricity, and sun in the neighborhood units. Nonetheless, the key problems could not be resolved. A gap remained between the accommodation that poorer households could afford and architects' notions of minimum levels of acceptable housing conditions. State intervention only widened this gap, in fact, when on the one hand slums were demolished with compensation paid to the landlords, and on the other hand new subsidized council housing, neighborhoods with schools, and social infrastructure were built using public subsidies. It became prohibitively expensive to fully compensate private owners, and so parts of the old underground infrastructure often had to be used. The neighborhood unit principle was easier to achieve for new estates on the urban periphery. Thus it can be concluded that the neighborhood idea was not that important for rebuilding inner cities and built-up areas. Not surprisingly, then, in the early 1950s, the focus of reconstruction shifted to the periphery. Social housing was assigned the task of solving the problem of housing shortages: large, often prefabricated housing estates were the result.

World War II promoted modernization, necessitating government interventions in economics, society, and planning. A core element of this "modernization" became the expansion of housing programs of urban renewal. Planning ideas from the war's victor, the United States, became more important in Europe. Even representatives of the Modern Movement, such as Walter Gropius, supported the neighborhood theory and the goals it denoted. He stated that lower densities and not the complete diffusion of the city were the goal of organic neighborhood planning.[51] Yet it soon seemed quite clear that architects' and planners' "grand visions" of population dispersal from the dense inner city areas to the suburbs could only partially be put into practice. Problems of landownership, building costs, and all the problems of creating a social new community from scratch made the implementation of such visions ultimately impossible.[52]

The worldwide planning euphoria of the 1960s produced technocratic models that ultimately reduced the neighborhood theory to a technical, organizational norm. Planners became unpopular and their work unspectacular; the inspiration of the 1940s had gone. Spawned by new variants, the international planning movement acquired greater diversity.[53] The legendary charismatic figures of the first postwar generation with their visionary, even missionary ideas departed the scene. International organizations dealing with planning matters remained quite small (International Federation for Housing and Planning, IFHTP; International Union of Local Authorities, IULA; and International Congresses of Modern Architecture, CIAM), but offered regular opportunities for exhibitions, tours, and conferences. The future trends of urban change, slum clearance, and planning the welfare state became dominated by the United States, but the Netherlands and Scandinavia also became transnational models.

In the 1960s, a big demand for office space made the extension of central business districts necessary, including a reorganization of areas next to city centers and the demolition or conversion of housing from the nineteenth century for office use.

Inner cities lost their population base, and the discussion about urban slum clearance came to the fore again. Slum clearance has often meant the displacement of an existing low-income population, creating space for more profitable office, commercial, and luxury residential development, or the provision of transport facilities.[54] Urban redevelopment and gentrification became the new paradigms, along with urban rehabilitation and revitalization, and, in the 1970s, the "inner cities debate."

Without a doubt, the neighborhood concept has functioned as "one of the major landmarks in shaping urban form during the twentieth century" and beyond.[55] Important contemporary planning movements like "New Urbanism" and "Smart Growth" in North America also explicitly refer to the neighborhood theory, trying to implement higher densities, mixed-use developments, public transportation, and defining an optimal size of the neighborhood based on walking distances.[56] But in the end, the chief reason for the success of the neighborhood idea has been the social homogeneity of the areas, not the intended heterogeneous mix or even the physical layout.[57] The planning theory of neighborhood units always had a technical instrumentalist side to it, manifesting its design paradigm in traffic segregation, cul-de-sacs, housing layouts, and infrastructure. But it also contained rather less transparent elements of social engineering, antiurban ideology, political visions, and sociological implications. Hopes were continually raised and dreams nurtured, making the idea so successful, similar to that of the Garden City concept. This proved to be the downfall of the theory as well. The neighborhood has not shown itself to be resistant to instrumentalization in all kinds of different political contexts, or to misuse for purposes of social control and behavioral manipulation directed at greater order and lucidity in planned parts of the metropolis.

Notes

1. The multitude of examples completed according to the neighborhood concept in the immediate postwar years cannot be examined here. See James Dahir, *The Neighborhood Unit Plan, Its Spread and Acceptance. A Selective Bibliography with Interpretative Comments* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947).

2. Robert Freestone, *Model Communities. The Garden City Movement in Australia* (Melbourne, Australia: Nelson, 1989); Abdallah Abd El Aziz Attia, *The Neighbourhood as a Basic Unit in Planning New Towns and Town Extensions* (Dielsdorf: Akarets Erben, 1963); Spencer E. Sanders and Arthur J. Rabuck, *Städtebau der Zukunft. Städtewiederaufbau, seine Durchforschung und Technik* (Vienna: Phönix-Verlag, 1948); Steen Eiler Rasmussen, "Neighborhood Planning," *Town Planning Review* (January 1956/57): 197–218; Paul Ritter, "Radburn Planning: Foreign Examples," *The Architects' Journal* 10 and 2 (1960/61): 680–684 and 176–182; Eugen C. Kaufmann, "Neighbourhood Units as New Elements of Town Planning," *Journal of the Royal Institute of British Architects* (December 1936): 165–175; A. I. Tarantul, "A Neighbourhood in the USSR," *Town and Country Planning* 30 (1962): 264–267.

3. Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie*, orig. 1887 (Berlin: K. Curtius, 1922), 242, 244, 246. All translations are my own.

4. Andrew Blowers, "The Neighbourhood: Exploration of a Concept," in *Urban Development: The City as a Social System*, ed. Philip Sarre, Hedy Brown, Andrew Blowers, Chris Hamnett, and David M. Boswell (Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire, UK: Open University Press, 1973), 58.

5. Stanton Coit, *Neighborhood Guilds: An Instrument of Social Reform* (London, UK: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891).

6. William D. P. Bliss, ed., *The New Encyclopedia of Social Reform* (New York and London, UK: Funk & Wagnalls, 1909), 821.

7. "A feature of Howard's town plan was its division into neighbourhoods, each based on the population required for one school, and having its community sub-centre." Frederic James Osborn, *Green Belt Cities: The British Contribution* (London: Faber & Faber, 1946), 30.

8. Henry Wright wrote: "There was still the desire to see what might be done in the United States, comparable to Letchworth and Welwyn, given a free hand." Wright, *Rehousing Urban America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), 45.

9. See Stanley Buder, *Visionaries and Planners: The Garden City Movement and the Modern Community* (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), 157.

10. Mel Scott, *American City Planning Since 1890: A History Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the American Institute of Planners* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, and London, UK: University of California Press, 1969), 170.

11. See Roy Lubove, *Community Planning in the 1920s: The Contribution of the Regional Planning Association of America* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963); Carl Sussman, *Planning the Fourth Migration: The Neglected Vision of the Regional Planning Association of America* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976); and Daniel Schaffer, "The American Garden City: Lost Ideals," in *The Garden City: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. Stephen Victor Ward (New York and London, UK: Spon, 1992), 127–45, 128.

12. Some members of the RPAA found proof in the German apocalyptic bestseller by Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (1918), for the process of cultural disintegration in the Western world. See Sussman, *Planning the Fourth Migration*, 228.

13. "That path led him from the neighborhood to the neighborhood unit: from a mere cohabitation to the creation of a new form and new institutions for a modern urban community." Lewis Mumford, "The Neighborhood and the Neighborhood Unit," *Town Planning Review* 24 (1953/1954): 256–270, 260. See also Christopher Silver, "Neighborhood Planning in Historical Perspective," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 51, no. 2 (1985): 161–174, 162.

14. Clarence A. Perry, "The Neighborhood Unit: A Scheme of Arrangement for the Family-Life Community," in *Regional Survey of New York and its Environs, vol. 7: Neighborhood and Community Planning* (New York, 1929), 22–140, 34.

15. Perry, "The Neighborhood Unit," 31.

16. "On the whole, however, Forest Hills Gardens, as it is, constitutes an excellent illustration of a new type of urban community. The fine quality of neighborly social life it has produced obviously has its roots in a real-estate plan…" Perry, "The Neighborhood Unit," 100. See also Silver, "Neighborhood Planning in Historical Perspective," 166.

17. The presumption that planning concepts for neighbourhood units induce a homogeneous population structure was later explicitly formulated by the Chicago planner Reginald R. Isaacs in the article "'The Neighborhood Unit' is an Instrument for Segregation," *The Journal of Housing* 5, no. 8 (1948): 215–218, 215.

18. See Larry Lloyd Lawhorn, "The Neighborhood Unit: Physical Design or Physical Determinism?" *Journal of Planning History* 8, no. 2 (2009): 111–132, 122.

19. "'The Radburn Idea' remains one of the strongest and most enduring intellectual streams in urban planning." Carol A. Christensen, *The American Garden City and the New Towns Movement* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1986), 55. See also Eugenie Ladner Birch, "Radburn and the American Planning Movement," in *Introduction to Planning History in the United States*, ed. Donald A. Krueckeberg (New Brunswick, NJ: Center Urban Policy Research, 1983), 122–151, 122.

20. Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, its Transformations, and its Prospects* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1975), 51.

21. There were two building programs under the Emergency Relief Appropriation (ERAA) of 1935: "(1) the Rural Resettlement Programme, which attempted to stem rural migration by building economically viable rural communities; and (2) the Suburban Resettlement Programme, which was designed to create alternatives to the urban slum." Carol Corden, *Planned Cities: New Towns in Britain and America* (Beverly Hills, CA and London, UK: Sage Publications, 1977), 52.

22. See Evan McKenzie, *Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 64.

23. Mel Scott, *American City Planning Since 1890: A History Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the American Institute of Planners* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 336.

24. These initial aims regarding proliferation were why right-wing critics saw the program as "socialist regimentation disguised as co-operative planning." McKenzie, *Privatopia*, 101. See also, Dirk Schubert, "'City of the Future': Modellstadt Greenbelt—Maryland," *Die alte Stadt* 36, no. 2 (2009): 215–234, 215.

25. Thomas Adams, *The Design of Residential Areas: Basic Considerations, Principles, and Methods* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 265.

26. Andrzej Olechnowicz. *Working-Class Housing in England between the Wars: The Becontree Estate* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1997), 219.

27. W. R. Tyler, "The Neighbourhood Unit Principle in Town Planning," *Town Planning Review* 18 (July, 1939): 174–186.

28. J. H. Jones, "The Report of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 103, no. 3 (1940): 323–343.

29. Arthur Korn and Felix J. Samuely, "A Master Plan for London Based on Research Carried Out by the Town Planning Committee of the MARS Group," *Architectural Review* 91 (June 1942): 143–150, 143.

30. John Henry Forshaw and Sir Patrick Abercrombie, *County of London Plan. Prepared for the London County Council* (London, UK: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1944), 9.

31. Patrick Abercrombie, *Greater London Plan 1944* (London, UK: H. M. Stationery Off., 1945), 112–113.

32. Gottfried Feder, *Die neue Stadt. Versuch der Begründung einer neuen Stadtplanungskunst aus der sozialen Struktur der Bevölkerung* (Berlin: J. Springer, 1939), 19.

33. See Cornelius Gurlitt, "New Yorker neue Siedlungen," *Stadtbaukunst* 2 (1929): 27–31; and Robert Lederer, "Die Stadt Radburn," *Der Städtebau* 25 (1930): 529–530.

34. See Carmen Hass-Klau, *The Pedestrian and City Traffic* (London, UK: Belhaven Press, 1990), 118.

35. See Elke Pahl-Weber and Dirk Schubert, "Myth and Reality in National Socialist Town Planning and Architecture: Housing and Urban Development in Hamburg, 1933–45," *Planning Perspectives* 6 (1991): 161–88, 184.

36. Konstanty Gutschow, State Archive Hamburg, AKG, A 125, 1941.

37. Konstanty Gutschow, State Archive Hamburg, AKG, A 44 D34, 1944.

38. See Pahl-Weber and Schubert, "Myth and Reality," 183.

39. Regarding the newly conquered areas of Eastern Europe, Himmler announced: "In the design of housing areas, schemes on a massive scale should not be allowed to take over. Instead, homely settlements for the promotion of the common good should be created in the interest of urban design.... The criteria for the structure of housing areas, with a view towards developing the community, can be drawn from the same source that guides the political structure of the *Volksgemeinschaft* (the community of all Germans in the National Socialist sense). The structure of housing areas must thus, as far as possible, confirm with the political organizational structure of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, organised in cells, local groups, and districts. The urban form appropriate to the local group would, in this sense, consist of small cells and ultimately in small scale streets,

as well as the clear arrangement of squares, residential courtyards and neighborhood groups." Ernst Lehmann, *Volksgemeinschaft aus Nachbarschaften. Eine Volkskunde des deutschen Nachbarschaftswesens* (Prague, Berlin, and Leipzig: Noebe, 1944), 13–14.

40. See Jeffry M. Diefendorf, *In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II* (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 181.

41. Gutschow, quoted in Werner Durth, *Deutsche Architekten. Biographische Verflechtungen 1900–1970* (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1986), 257.

42. Hans Bernhard Reichow, *Organische Stadtbaukunst. Von der Großstadt zur Stadtlandschaft* (Braunschweig: G. Westermann, 1948); and Reichow, *Die autogerechte Stadt—Ein Weg aus dem Verkehrs-Chaos* (Ravensburg: Otto Maier Verlag, 1959).

43. Johannes Göderitz, Roland Rainer, and Hubert Hoffmann, *Die gegliederte und aufgelockerte Stadt* (Tübingen: Verlag Ernst Wasmuth, 1957).

44. Thomas Sharp's *Town Planning* (New York and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1945) was translated by Gerhard Jobst as *Städtebau in England* (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1948).

45. Nicholas Bullock, *Building the Post-War World: Modern Architecture and Reconstruction in Britain* (New York and London, UK: Routledge, 2002), xi.

46. See Jeffry M. Diefendorf, "Reconstruction Law and Building Law in Post-War Germany," *Planning Perspectives* 1 (1986): 107–129, 110.

47. Baubehörde der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, *Handbuch für Siedlungsplanung. Städtebauliche Planungsgrundlagen für den Hamburger Raum*, Schriftenreihe der Baubehörde zum Bau-, Wohnungs- und Siedlungswesen (Hamburg: Hammonia-Verlag, 1966), 10.

48. See the Baubehörde der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg, *Handbuch für Siedlungsplanung*, 48.

49. Quoted in Percy Johnson-Marshall, *Rebuilding Cities* (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 4.

50. J. N. Tarn, *Working-Class Housing in 19th-Century Britain* (London, UK: Lund Humphries, 1971). See also John Westergaard and Ruth Glass, "A Profile of Lansbury," *The Town Planning Review* 25, no. 1 (1954): 33–58, 33.

51. See Walter Gropius, *Architektur. Wege zu einer optischen Kultur* (Frankfurt am Main and Hamburg: Fischer Bücherei, 1956), 107.

52. When the (German-born, American) planner Hans Blumenfeld was invited to Germany in 1949 he reported a lack of coherent, centrally directed long-range planning. See Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Hermann-Josef Rupieper, eds., *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955* (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 338.

53. See Stephen V. Ward, *Planning the Twentieth-Century City: The Advanced Capitalist World* (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2002), 155.

54. See Michael S. Gibson and Michael J. Langstaff, *An Introduction to Urban Renewal* (London, UK: Hutchison, 1982), 12.

55. Nicholas N. Patricios, "The Neighborhood Concept: A Retrospective of Physical Design and Social Interaction," *Journal of Architecture and Planning Research* 19, no. 1 (2002): 70–90, 71.

56. Andres Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Jeff Speck, *Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream* (New York: North Point Press, 2000), 18.

57. See Herbert J. Gans, *People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 33.

PART III
City Cultures and the German Transnational Imaginary

Princes and Fools, Parades and Wild
Women: Creating, Performing, and
Preserving Urban Identity through
Carnival in Cologne and Basel

Jeffry M. Diefendorf

At mid-morning on the Friday before Ash Wednesday, the mayor of Cologne welcomes three men in costume on a podium in Alter Markt. One is dressed as a prince, another a peasant farmer, and the third a glowing, virginal maiden (*Jungfrau*), and they wave to a huge crowd consisting mostly of women. At 4 in the morning on the Monday after Ash Wednesday, parades of drummers, pipers, and 200 huge illuminated lanterns fill the streets of Basel. What we have here are distinctly different variants of an extraordinary phenomenon that shares common roots: the official beginning of Cologne's Carnival and Basel's Fasnacht.

The celebration of carnival raises interesting questions about what is unique in the culture of individual cities and what is shared across urban, regional, and national borders. The Pre-Lenten bacchanalia in Christian Europe have common medieval origins in the practices of Catholicism. As such, carnival predated the appearance of nation-states. The Reformation challenged virtually all Catholic rituals, but carnival nonetheless survived in some Protestant cities. And, of course, imperial conquests and the spread of Catholicism introduced carnival beyond the borders of Europe. One can hardly imagine New Orleans or Rio de Janeiro without carnival. Moreover, carnival celebrants today are well aware of carnival practices across the globe, with Germans going to Brazil to buy costumes and Brazilians dancing on parade floats in Cologne. Surely this is a transnational and cross-cultural phenomenon.

Precisely because of its prominence in urban cultures, carnival has served as prime material for research in diverse social sciences. Here the goal of scholars has been to identify and analyze common forms of behavior in support of various kinds of theory, reaching beyond any particularistic observations in the search for universal models. For example, carnival as a type of ritualized behavior has attracted the attention of many ethnologists, folklorists, and anthropologists.

Carnival also became a subject of central importance to postmodern literary theory after the publication in English in 1968 of Mikhail Bakhtin's *Rabelais and His*

World. Writing about carnival and folk humor in the medieval and early modern period, Bakhtin argued: "As opposed to the official feast, one might say that carnival celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions."[1] By creating a temporary realm of social equality and intellectual and political freedom, Bakhtin and his followers claimed that carnival presented a fundamental challenge, "a ludic form of subversion" to the ruling powers and their ideals that was nonviolent and based on laughter.[2] When ritualized and commercialized in the modern world, however, carnival may cease to be strongly transgressive and instead become another device that supports rather than undermines the existing order.[3]

Catherine Bell, in her survey of ritual theory, suggests that "we think of 'ritual' as a complex sociocultural medium variously constructed of tradition, exigency, and self-expression; it is understood to play a wide variety of roles and to communicate a rich density of over determined messages and attitudes."[4] Whether imitating historic events or by acting out and temporarily turning social roles and norms on their heads, rituals can both help to maintain and alter existing social, political, and cultural structures. Rituals such as carnival are characterized by sets of rules and "standard ritual inversions."[5] Bell also notes that rituals and ritual-like activities commonly include forms of performance, and powerful performances often draw upon all of our senses, something that turns those present into participants and not just passive viewers. Local culture and local identity can be shaped and manifested in public performances that include street festivals.[6] Where rituals are closely tied to specific urban spaces, they can reinforce connections between public values, behavior, and the physicality of the city. We need not look far to find ritual features in carnival: the use of particular forms of costumes and masks, the annual reenactment of ceremonies, reversals or inversions of gender or social roles, satirical critiques of those at the top of the social and political order, and so on.

Other social scientific analyses might focus on the festivalization of public life, with carnival being but one of many significant public festivals. Urbanists have examined the ways in which festivals like carnival use the public space of the city.[7] Economists might analyze the place of carnival in encouraging tourism by serving as a mechanism for city boosterism or city branding. Like other major festivals, carnival also serves as a powerful economic engine for a variety of trades and industries. Social scientists using theories of practice—how rituals adapt and change over time in relation to new circumstances rather than rigidly replicating past models—open the door to historical analysis.[8]

The study of urban culture as a transnational phenomenon can serve as an antidote to an excessive focus on the nation. However, emphasizing the transnational poses the risk of neglecting the distinctive character of the culture of individual cities.[9] In her introduction to a volume on festivals celebrating major anniversaries in German cities between 1935 and 1975, the historian Adelheid von Saldern argues that the staging of urban festivals has provided a vehicle for the creation of local identities and a collective sense of belonging to a local citizenry. Local identity and local citizenship could thus persist at a time when political authority had otherwise shifted from the city to the state.[10] Historians of politics have also noted that public

festivals, especially those sponsored by the state, have played a role in creating a politicized public sphere, but when taken over by local citizens, these festivals had the potential to challenge the ruling authorities when the festivals went beyond the role of just letting off steam. Moreover, fueled by drink and neighborhood rivalries, the merrymaking in the streets has at times turned violent, something that has troubled both the authorities and the propertied middle class. For this reason, at times public festivals, including carnival, have been at least temporarily banned.[11]

The ways in which different cities developed distinctive forms of carnival over the centuries suggests that we may learn as much or more about the individuality of certain cities than about what they have in common. Cologne and Basel are two cases in point. The former, a bastion of Catholicism, stages the largest and most famous of the German carnival celebrations. Basel, a Protestant city in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, stages a more somber festival known as Fasnacht. In both cities, these festivals help both maintain the unique identity of the city for long-time residents and, to some extent, provide a vehicle through which newcomers might become Basler or Kölner. This essay will examine some of the distinctive features of carnival/Fasnacht in these cities.[12]

Carnival in Cologne opens officially at 9:40 a.m. on the Thursday before Ash Wednesday and ends the evening of the following Tuesday. Fasnacht in Basel begins officially at 4 a.m. on the Monday after Ash Wednesday and ends exactly 72 hours later. In both cities, the main public events are enormous in scale; significantly, they are for the most part carefully planned and executed by numerous organizations over the course of many months. Cologne's carnival took its modern form in 1823, when the city patrician elite created a Festkomitee kölner Karneval and two carnival *Gesellschaften* (societies or clubs) to revive the festival after its repression during the Napoleonic era and give the events formal shape. It was also a means for setting the city and its culture apart from its new, Protestant Prussian rulers. Carnival became a prime vehicle for voicing criticizing Prussian values and politics.[13] For example, the Rote Funken, one of those societies formed in 1823, wore the uniforms of the city militia while providing both a disciplined and unruly honor guard for the leaders of the main parade, thereby mocking the Prussian military and asserting the city's traditional independence. According to the Festkomitee's web site, there are now 57 Ordentliche societies, the main societies that play the greatest roles in the festivities and elect the Dreigestirn or triumvirate of the prince, peasant, and virgin, and 95 other kinds of clubs.[14] During most of the nineteenth century, Basel's Fasnacht was an unruly and sometimes drunken lower-class affair, but in the early twentieth century, the city's bourgeois elite grew concerned about the growing strength of the labor movement and social democracy and determined to assert its control.[15] A Fasnachts Comité, established in 1911, became the controlling body, helping coordinate the activities of what has grown to several hundred clubs, including around 40 *Stammcliques* and 120 drum and pipe corps.[16] In both cities, it is now essential for the coordinating committees to work with the city police to plan parade routes because the huge crowds of participants and spectators can immobilize all traffic flow.

In both Cologne and Basel, these organizations, drawing their members from the leading families of the two cities, meet throughout the year to raise funds and choose themes for carnival balls, banquets, and parade lanterns and floats.[17] They

maintain collections of costumes, rehearse music, practice marching, compose special poetry, songs, and skits, and so on. They encourage opportunities for children to master the traditional skills of drumming or piping, thereby preparing new generations of carnival celebrants. These organizations are the primary keepers of the local rules and practices that make these carnival events specific to their cities while keeping them vital. In his 1961 history of Cologne's carnival, Joseph Klersch, himself part of the city's carnival leadership, expressed concern that ever since World War I, one found ever more professional entertainers who played the same roles at the club "sessions," and their presence posed a threat to spontaneous and amateur speech and songwriting and performing by true natives of the city. As a result, the central carnival organizations in 1950 formed a Literarische Comité to encourage growth of a new generation of people dedicated to keeping the traditions of local humor alive.[18]

The internal social dynamics of most of the carnival and Fasnacht clubs are largely underresearched.[19] Clearly, however, for those not born and raised in Cologne or Basel, it is necessary to build connections with or gain admission to these organizations to become full participants rather than just observers or "wild" or spontaneous participants. The organizations have bylaws, collect dues, elect officers, and plan activities. Some have club buildings and warehouses to store costumes and build floats. In both cities the organizations are dominated by men. A typical Basel clique, the Spale-Clique, was founded in 1927. In 1941 it had 14 members. By 1957, there were 167 members, with about 50 regularly attending meetings. Members who rehearsed and performed with drums and flutes were considered active members; those who did not perform but took part in other activities were considered passive members.[20] In Basel, a few clubs have had women members since the mid-1920s, and five all-women's clubs have been formed since 1939.[21] The first all-women's carnival club in Cologne was founded in 1999, with a few of the men's clubs allowing some women to join.[22] Women have, however, appeared at club balls and other festive functions as guests.

A major obstacle that outsiders face is that some of the activities of the societies and many of the skits, poems, float, and lantern placards they produce are in the local dialects—Kölsch or Baseldytsch or Baseldüütsch. Basel's dialect is the only Swiss-German dialect that is Low Alemannic; others are High Alemannic. To be sure, many Germans or German-speaking Swiss, especially those who already know some other Low-German dialect, can understand if not speak the Cologne or Basel dialects. (Celebrants in Cologne shout "Kölle allaf!" This is variously translated as "cheers to Cologne," "hail Cologne," and "Cologne above all.") But for those not truly fluent in German or for some who know only High German, the dialects obscure meanings and thereby shut them out. In Basel, there are dozens of Schnitzelbänkler, clubs that meet to compose satirical verses and songs, sometimes spontaneously, and perform them. This is an activity that cannot be learned, since it requires not just mastery of the local dialect but also special talent.[23] Indeed, the year-long run-up to carnival serves the broader function of keeping the dialects and local culture vital, and some have complained when too much High German is used.[24]

In other words, these clubs and societies help make sure that the preparation of the primary carnival rituals has included insiders and, to some extent, excluded outsiders.[25] Less exclusive are some of the neighborhood-based carnival clubs, where newer residents might fit in more quickly. Neighborhood parades and festivities, along with events for children organized in the schools, are not under the control of the central committees. These activities do serve to help recruit new generations of residents to devote their energies to carnival, and, at the same time, facilitate the assimilation of outsiders and help them feel at home in these cities.[26] (Carnival parties staged in many private businesses include newcomers, though these are smaller affairs.) Nonetheless, the run-up to carnival is by and for the long-term inhabitants, not the hundred thousand visitors who watch Fasnacht in Basel and the 1.5 million people who flood Cologne's streets for its big parade on Rosenmontag.

Let us now address the main features of carnival in both cities. Basel's Fasnacht formally begins on Monday at 4 a.m. with the Morgenstraich, though there are a number of musical and dramatic performances in the days before. In the Morgenstraich, the costumed members of the cliques and other clubs parade through the city behind tall, illuminated lanterns displaying symbols of the cliques and humorous or satirical images or verses based upon the themes chosen for the year. The costumes and masks (*Larven* in local parlance) range from traditional clown figures to oversized grotesques. Clubs from Kleinbasel, the part of the city across the Rhine, are led over a bridge by their famous three figures of men costumed as the lion, griffin, and wild man.[27] Some cliques are accompanied by some of the 140 drum and flute corps, although others of these musical groups parade on their own. The drum and flute corps trace their form and music back to Switzerland's military heritage. Some of the lantern themes are quite local; others have nothing to do with Basel. For example, local themes included the opening of the new art museum (1936), urban renewal and the black market (1946), and the demolition of an old theater (1976). Non-Basler themes included Louis Armstrong and space travel (1956) and the Beatles (1966).[28] Among the 100 themes featured in 2011, popular subjects were the great oil spill of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, politics in the Swiss federal parliament, and the 550th anniversary of the city's university.[29] Bars and restaurants are open during the Morgenstraich and serve a flour-thickened soup and onion or cheese pancakes to the hungry.

On Monday and Wednesday afternoons, there are parades of floats, the drum and flute corps, and added to this cacophony are over 140 brass bands playing "rough" music (*Guggenmusik*). These activities so dominate the city that both afternoons have become public holidays. In 1961, the first two all-women's parades took place.[30] The parades are not a single, long parade. Multiple parades happen at the same time, with each clique deciding just when to start and stop. Should they cross paths, one waits for another. On Tuesday there are concerts and small parades for families and children. The lanterns paraded during the Morgenstraich are displayed on the cathedral square and also illuminated in the evening.

The paraders are costumed, as are some of the spectators. (There have been around 12,000 participants who are members of some recognized association and perhaps 6,000 "wild" participants, costumed but not association members.) Both

participants and uncostumed spectators are expected to purchase medallions issued each year by the Fasnacht Comité or the cliques. This is a main source of funding for the Fasnacht activities. Riders on the floats throw handfuls of confetti and sometimes candy at the onlookers. Costumed participants stuff confetti down the shirts of spectators not in costume and not wearing a medallion, though it is considered improper to pick up confetti from the street—which can pile up a foot deep—for this purpose. Alcohol is consumed, but not to the extent that Fasnacht becomes a week of drunken excess.

Fasnacht formally ends at 4 a.m. on Thursday morning with an organized and spontaneously shaped parade. Basel's Fasnacht thus has a formal duration of exactly 72 hours. However, each clique has its own ceremony on Thursday to put away the lanterns and floats, and on Friday and Saturday there are parties and masked balls to bring the week's events to a conclusion. The city sanitation department manages in just a few hours to clean up the confetti and other debris. The tourists depart, and the cliques and other Fasnacht societies as well as the city government can begin to think about next year. Well aware of the revenue Fasnacht produces from tourists, the city government uses the celebrations to market Basel and attract future visitors.

Now let us turn to Cologne, where carnival is a vastly larger set of events. Cologne, of course, is a much bigger city, with over a million inhabitants now compared to some 160,000 in Basel. Moreover, Cologne is part of the large Rhine-Ruhr urban agglomeration. As in Basel, the carnival societies spend months preparing floats, designing and sewing costumes, composing skits and verses, and making all sorts of preparations, and there are many parties along the way. The Festkomitee, with members from the leading carnival societies, does its best to structure and control the main events. The societies commission special carnival medallions, some resembling serious military medals, others humorous, or even off-color. Unlike in Basel, where the medallions are sold to everyone, Cologne's medallions are mostly limited to society members or even just to society officers, thereby turning the medallions into prized collector's items.[31] At 9:40 a.m. on the Thursday before Ash Wednesday, carnival formally begins with the mayor and the Prince, peasant farmer, and virgin launching Weiberfastnacht, the carnival of women, on Alter Markt.

The fame of Weiberfastnacht is something that certainly distinguishes Cologne's carnival from Fasnacht in Basel. According to Petra Plutwatsch, at least as early as 1810, women on Alter Markt celebrated the Thursday before Lent with "Mötzenbestot," snatching the hats or caps off of men, as a form of equalizing status. Women from the market and nearby shops led the way, and this involved heavy drinking. Sometimes at night the celebrations turned into regular street brawls, to the consternation of authorities. Sometimes people also threw foul trash from the street at others.[32] It was not until 1953 that Weiberfastnacht received formal recognition from the Festkomitee. Since then, at 9:40 on Thursday morning, the mayor, the carnival prince, virgin, and peasant-farmer officially launch both carnival and Weiberfastnacht on Alter Markt, with some 10,000 women and men on the market square and some 50,000 on nearby streets. At 11:11, many businesses—except of course for bars and restaurants—close because so many female workers have departed for the street festival. Weiberfastnacht goes on into the night, and for

the bars and restaurants, it is the biggest business day of the year. Though far more people fill the streets on Rosenmontag, most are outsiders who remain fixated on the parade, and evidently many Cologners celebrate at home.[33] In contrast to the carefully organized parades in the neighborhoods, the Sitzungen of the carnival societies, and the Rosenmontag parade, the activities of Weiberfastnacht are relatively unstructured and more spontaneous.

There are no fixed costumes; women (and men) buy what is available or make their own. The "unruly" women, free to approach and kiss men, have substituted the snatching of hats for another practice: cutting off the ties of men they encounter. Knowing this can happen, men wear their oldest or cheapest ties. The symbolic meaning of this act by the costumed women probably needs no great elaboration. It is a remnant of the more ancient role reversal, where women have a brief opportunity to assert their domination. Pluwatsch states that Cologne's women "celebrate as they please—loud, merrily, and a bit anarchistically, as did once upon a time their ancestors on Alter Markt."[34] Even more, however, Weiberfastnacht has become a long, inebriated street party, with some of its special meaning watered down by the consumption of Kölsch—the beer, not the dialect. Even so, it is the largest and most exuberant women's festival of its kind in Germany, one that Cologne's citizens call on to mark the distinctive identity of the city.

Friday, Saturday, and Sunday see parades in many of the city neighborhoods, costume balls, club meetings ("Sitzungen") with satirical skits, speeches, and songs in Kölsch, the local dialect, special events for children, and endless numbers of small parties in businesses and homes. The neighborhood and children's parades can be elaborate enough to include floats and pipe and drum corps. One parade that has attracted much attention in the past two decades has been the so-called Geisterzug, or the parade of ghosts or spirits on Saturday evening. Perhaps so named because some participants wear ghost costumes, this event dates back to the nineteenth century. Until 1992 the Geisterzug was a spontaneous, unscripted parade, but in that year a club was formed to raise donations to cover the costs of cordoning off streets on the parade route, which changes from year to year, and cleaning up afterward. In 2000 and 2006, the Geisterzug was cancelled for lack of funds, but then several spontaneous parades took place anyway. This may be why now the Geisterzug is partly sponsored by the city government and by the "Festkomitee des Kölner Karnevals von 1823," giving it official status, although it is not organized by the main carnival associations and still retains an atmosphere of spontaneity. The Geisterzug presents itself as an "alternative" parade to which everyone is invited. Electrically amplified music is frowned upon, and instead music comes from drum corps and individual musicians, some drumming with the lids of pots and pans to mock the organized musical groups. Sometimes there has been a political theme chosen for placards, such as opposition to the 1991 Gulf War or opposition to reduction of the social safety net. The Geisterzug's web site lists the number of participants as ranging from 4,000 in 2000 to 60,000 in 2004, with observers sometimes exceeding 100,000.[35] Presumably these are very rough guesses, but clearly this is a popular part of the carnival festivities.

By far the biggest event in Cologne is the parade on Monday, Rosenmontag. In contrast to the multiple parades in Basel, the Rosenmontag parade is a single long

parade, perhaps 4.5 miles in length, and carefully organized and managed by the carnival societies. It features around 100 large floats, marching bands, corps of dancers, and units on horseback, and it takes many hours for the slow-moving parade to pass. Except for bars and restaurants, most businesses along the parade route simply close for the day, as do many others where employees want to participate or watch. The floats make fun of persons or events as determined by the carnival committee. The participants and many of the citizen-spectators are in costumes, and around 1.5 million spectators from other places flock to Cologne to watch. Economists at the Dresdner Bank estimated that for 2005–2006, 3 million costumes, 900,000 wigs, and 500,000 masks were made by private individuals and by companies specializing in such things. (This may be too high, since many carnival societies store and reuse costumes. Some costumes, such as those worn by the mounted units, do not change much from year to year, and presumably private individuals are apt to reuse old costumes.) Whereas Fasnachtlers in Basel mostly throw confetti, in Cologne it is mostly candy that is hurled in all directions from the floats, and not just to spectators on the sidewalks but also to people hanging out of windows and balconies of apartments and businesses. One source estimated that 150 tons of candy, including 700,000 chocolate bars, are tossed. While sometimes the candies are single pralines, I have witnessed large boxes of candy being thrown like discuses and causing minor injuries to those trying to catch them.[36]

As one might imagine, with such huge crowds of people eating, drinking, and wrestling over candy, some of which ends up on the ground, the amount of trash left after the parade finally passes is enormous. This is true for the lesser parades as well. In 2011, trash collectors estimate that Weiberfastnacht festivities in one-quarter of the city produced 140 cubic meters of trash, some of which reeked of alcohol and urine.[37] One of the most amazing spectacles of Cologne's carnival is the appearance of a brigade of street sweepers, using brooms, shovels, and heavy equipment to clean up the mess. In just 15–30 minutes, the sidewalks and street of a city block will be clear enough for the next day's business, though one still finds candy bars in bushes and on outcroppings of buildings.

The objects of Carnival humor are often political figures, ranging from the mayor to the chancellor of the Federal Republic to international leaders (such as George W. Bush, whom many Germans blamed for the war in Iraq). In 2011, the politicians singled out for mockery was Karl-Theodor von Guttenberg, who had just been forced to resign as Defense Minister once it was revealed that he had plagiarized much of his doctoral dissertation. The tradition of political humor has a long history. Mounted units in the parades mocked the Prussian cavalry by sticking flowers in the barrels of guns. Because of satirical criticism of the government, the Prussians felt compelled to censor Cologne's carnival newspaper from 1829 until after the unsuccessful 1848 revolution.[38] The Nazis distrusted large crowds not organized by themselves, put the national before the local, and sought to prohibit any kind of public political criticism. Thus they were deeply suspicious of Cologne's carnival traditions, which normally included political satire and where the use of the local dialect suggested something other than a homogeneous *Volk*.[39] In fact, from 1935 to 1939, at which point carnival was suspended because of the war, the parade included floats with explicit anti-Semitic themes and floats attacking British and

French leaders. There were songs celebrating rearmament and remilitarization of the Rhineland and songs praising the fact that many Jews were fleeing the country. For example, one float had as its theme "Rund um de dude Jüd," a reference in Kölsch to a Jewish cemetery.[40] While carnival did not pose an ideologically political threat to the regime, the carnival leadership did strive to maintain the independence of its organizations. They successfully resisted efforts in 1935 by the city government to gain control and then in 1937 an attempt by Robert Ley to make carnival part of his Kraft durch Freude ("Strength through Joy") organization.[41] However, the Nazis did insist that true Nazi men did not dress up as women, and thus in 1938 and 1939, the role of the virgin was given to a woman, temporarily overturning a long local tradition.[42] In any event, the war and suspension of carnival activities left unresolved the question of whether the Nazis would manage to take over the carnival completely.

Carnival societies began to meet again in September, 1945, with the first large celebratory "session" in February, 1946. While there were smaller neighborhood festivities from 1946 to 1948, including one featuring war veterans whose limbs, lost in the war, had been replaced by prostheses, the first Rosenmontag parade after war was in 1949, when a modest group of a dozen floats snaked through mountains of ruins, with spectators using the ruins as viewing platforms. The revival of Cologne's carnival thus took place at a time when there was no clear sense of a German nation, no unified German nation-state, and no transnational connections. Carnival was intensely local, and its leaders and participants were entirely focused on recovering the city's unique identity.

In 1950, while the city was still working to recover from its destruction in the war, the theme of the first official Rosenmontag parade was the city's anniversary of its founding 1,900 years earlier—evidence again that carnival was an integral part of the identity of the city.[43] This ritual was so important to the city that in 1952, the mayor apologized that the city government could not afford to put on a Monday parade "worthy" of the name, so he asked the city's business leaders to make large contributions and promised to make it possible for them to write off these contributions from their taxes.[44] As West Germany's economy boomed during the 1950s, Cologne's big parade and other carnival festivities rapidly grew to the huge size they have retained ever since.

Cologne's carnival officially ends on Tuesday, the day after the huge parade, with more costume balls and with the carnival prince going to the town hall to "rule" the city until midnight, after which Lent begins. The costumes and other materials are put away for future use, and the members of the carnival societies begin to think about next year. This brings me back to the questions posed at the beginning of this essay. What is most important here—carnival as a transnational and cross-cultural phenomenon with common origins and many similar features and functions, or carnival as something specific and distinct in each city, place-bound and central in defining local identity? To those on the outside, it is perhaps the former. To the citizens of Basel and Cologne, it is the latter. Both cities stress that their carnival is unique and not to be lumped together with carnival elsewhere. The use of local dialect, oversight by a central committee, and the dominant role played by the exclusive carnival societies and Fasnacht cliques are all mechanisms employed to maintain

the distinctive character of each city's festival. Nonetheless, the ever-expanding role of mass communications media and the economic importance of huge numbers of tourist spectators further the commodification of carnival and pose challenges to that distinctiveness, enough so that some long-time residents of Basel and Cologne have concluded that Fasnacht and carnival are no longer theirs. The tension in these two cities between the local and transnational is bound to continue.

Notes

1. Michail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), 10.

2. Hwa Yol Jung, "Bakhtin's Dialogical Body Politics," Michael Mayerfeld Bell and Michael Gardiner, eds., *Bakhtin and the Human Sciences* (Thousand Oaks, CA, London, UK, and New Delhi, India: Sage, 1998), 105.

3. Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, excerpted from *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*, in *Critical Essays on Mikhail Bakhtin*, ed. Caryl Emerson (New York: G. K. Hall & Co., 1999), 248.

4. Catherine Bell, *Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions* (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), xi.

5. Ibid, 126.

6. Ibid., 160. See also John J. MacAloon, ed., *Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle: Rehearsals Toward a Theory of Cultural Performance* (Philadelphia, PA: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1984).

7. See the essays in David Picard and Mike Robinson, eds. *Festivals, Tourism, and Social Change: Remaking Worlds* (Clevedon, UK, Buffalo, NY, and Toronto: Channel View Publications, 2006).

8. Catherine Bell, *Ritual*, 76. See also William H. Sewell Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

9. A theorist of cultural transnationalism, Peter Hitchcock asks: "Does not any claim to transnationalism risk the elision of key specificities in individual cultures that do not require and do not need the mantle of globalism to understand their textures and logics?" Peter Hitchcock, *Imaginary States: Studies in Cultural Transnationalism* (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 4.

10. Adelheid von Saldern, "Einleitung," in *Inszenierter Stolz. Stadtrepräsentation in drei deutschen Gesellschaften (1935–1975)*, ed. Saldern (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005), 11–13.

11. Eugen A. Meier, *Festfreudiges Basel: Basels Volksbräuche und Traditionen im Spiegel von Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Basel: Buchverlag Basler Zeitung, 1992), 54ff. Also Ute Schneider, *Politische Festkultur im 19. Jahrhundert. Die Rheinprovinz von der französischen Zeit bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkireges (1806–1918)* (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 1995); Dieter Düding, "Einleitung: Politische Öffentlichkeit—politisches Fest—politische Kultur," in *Öffentliche Festkultur. Politische Feste in Deutschland von der Aufklärung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. Düding, Peter Friedemann, and Paul Münsch (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1988), 10–24. See also George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975).

12. For extensive studies of the history and practice of Cologne's Karneval, see Joseph Klersch, *Die Kölnische Fastnacht von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Cologne: J. P. Bachem, 1961); Peter Fuchs and Max-Leo Schwering, *Kölner Karneval. Zur Kulturgeschichte der Fastnacht* (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1972); Peter Fuchs, Max-Leo Schwering, and Klaus

Zöller, *Kölner Karneval. Seine Bräuche, seine Akteure, seine Geschichte* (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1997). For Basel's Fastnacht, see Eugen A. Meier, Lukas Burckhardt, et al., eds., *Die Basler Fasnacht: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer lebendigen Tradition* (Basel: Fasnachts-Comité, 1985); Dorothea Christ Blasius, Hanns U. Christen, et al., *Unsere Fasnacht* (Basel: Verlag Peter Heman, 1971); Robert B. Christ and Eugen A. Meier, eds., *Fasnacht in Basel*, Basler Schriften 16 (Basel: Pharos Verlag, 1969)

13. See here James M. Brophy, "Carnival and Citizenship: The Politics of Carnival Culture in the Prussian Rhineland, 1823–1848," *Journal of Social History* 30 (1997): 873–904, 882; and also Brophy, "Mirth and Subversion: Carnival in Cologne," *History Today* 47, no.7 (July 1997): 42–48.

14. http://www.koelnerkarneval.de/gesellschaften/ (accessed December 4, 2012).

15. Hans Trümpy, "Zur Geschichte der Basler Fasnacht," in *Unsere Fasnacht*, ed. Blasius and Christen, 20–21; and Rudolf Suter, "Die Basler Fasnacht im Wandel," in *Die Basler Fasnacht*, ed. Meier, 389–401.

16. http://www.fasnachts-comite.ch/en/ (accessed December 4, 2012). Different sources provide different numbers for the Fasnacht groups in Basel. Thus, Pierre Farine, "Die Strassenfasnacht," in *Die Basler Fasnacht*, ed. Meier, states that in 1985, 457 groups of different kinds participated.

17. For example, see Alex Fischer, "Die Aktivitäten der Cliquen während des Jahres," in *Die Basler Fasnacht*, ed. Meier, 123–158.

18. Klersch also praised the neighborhood festivities for functioning as a "fountain of youth for Cologne's popular humor." Klersch, *Die Kölnische Fastnacht*, 192–193, 196.

19. Recent studies include Elisabeth Mick, *Die Roten Funken—Vom Stadtsoldaten zum Karnevalsverein* (Frechen-Cologne: Ritterbach Verlag, 2007), and Michael Euler-Schmidt and Marcus Leifeld, *Die Prinzen-Garde Köln. Eine Geschichte mit Rang und Namen* (Cologne: Bachem Verlag, 2006).

20. Staatsarchiv Basel/Privatarchiv 823 (Spale-Clique)/C1 Protokolle Generalversammlungen 1941–1983.

21. Hans Dürst, "Das Cliquenwesen und die Basler Fasnacht," in *Unsere Fasnacht*, ed. Blasius and Christen, 48. Alex Fischer notes that the participation of women has grown after 1945. (One might note that women received the right to vote in some Swiss cantons starting in 1958 and at the federal level only in 1971.)

22. Petra Pluwatsch, *Weiberfastnacht. Die Geschichte eines ganz besonderes Tages* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2007), 48–52.

23. Heinrich Kuhn, "Vom Moritatensänger zum Schnitzelbänkler," in *Die Basler Fasnacht*, ed. Meier, 307–319. Kuhn estimates that there are 30 Schnitzelbänkler. Hans Dürst, in "Das Cliquenwesen und die Basler Fasnacht," in *Schweizerisches Archiv für Volkskunde* 65 (1969): 6, estimates the number of these groups to be 200.

24. This is the opinion of Wolfgang Niedecken, the leader of Cologne's rock band BAP, which was noted for its songs in dialect. Pluwatsch, *Weiberfastnacht*, 108.

25. Dennis L. Rhein, of the Basel tourist office, and Felix Rudolf von Rohr, of the Fasnacht-Comité, state: "The Fasnacht in Basel is a family celebration—strangers are not welcome. It is a point of honour for every, even only moderately fanatic, active participants in the Fasnacht to make this statement their credo," though "the three greatest days also require civilians, spectators—yes, guests." Prologue, in Beat Trachsler and Jane Roberts, *Basler Fasnacht: for Insiders and Outsiders* (Basel: GS-Verlag, 1992), 7.

26. Suter, "Die Basler Fasnacht im Wandel," 391.

27. Fischer, 128, notes that the Kleinbaslers open the unofficial opening of Fasnacht shortly after New Year's Eve, when drummers accompany a small parade led by the lion, griffin, and wild man.

28. Hans Peter Löw, "Unsere Fasnacht im Spiegel der Jahre," in *Die Basler Fasnacht*, ed. Meier, 405ff.

29. In 2011, 482 different organizations formally registered for participation in the various Fasnacht activities and proposed themes. "Grosse Sujet-Vielfalt, aber keine Topthemen," *Basler Zeitung* (February 25, 2011).

30. Hans Dürst, "Das Cliquenwesen und die Basler Fanacht," in Blasius and Christen, p. 48.

31. Max-Leo Schwering, *Kölner Karnevalsorden 1923–1914: "Noblesse op Plüsch"* (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1989); Festkomitee des Kölner Karnevals von 1823 e.V., *Der Kölner Karneval im Spiegel des Jahres 1987* (Cologne: Greven & Bechtold, 1988), 77–81.

32. Pluwatsch, *Weiberfastnacht*, 38–40.

33. Ibid., 146.

34. Ibid., 149.

35. www.geisterzug.de (accessed December 4, 2012). The 2012 Geisterzug was canceled due to route security problems.

36. Pluwatsch, *Weiberfastnacht*, 145.

37. Matthias Pesch, "So viel Jecken-Müll wie noch nie," *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger* (March 4, 2011).

38. Hildegard Brog, "Karnevals-Zeitung von Köln," *Die Zeit* (March 3, 1995): 24. See also Brophy, "Carnival and Citizenship," and Elaine Glovka Spencer, "Adapting Festive Practices: Carnival in Cologne and Mainz, 1871–1914," *Journal of Urban History* 29, no.6 (2003): 637–657.

39. Carl Dietmar and Marcus Leifeld, *Alaaf und Heil Hitler. Karneval in Dritten Reich* (Herbig Verlag: Munich, 2010).

40. Michael Zepter, "*Paradiesvogel und Lumpenball*. Zwei Kölner Künstlerfeste zwischen 1925 and 1939 im Spiegel der Presse," in *Moderne und Nationalsozialismus im Rheinland*, Vorträge des Interdisziplinären Arbeitskreises zur Erforschung der Moderne im Rheinland, ed. Dieter Breuer and Gertrude Cepl-Kaufmann (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1997), 395–432, 414–415; and Jürgen Meyer, "Organisierter Karneval und 'Narrenrevolte' im Nationalsozialismus. Anmerkungen zu Schein und Sein im Kölner Karneval 1933–1935," *Geschichte in Köln* 42 (1997): 74–76.

41. Meyer, "Organisierter Karneval," 79–81.

42. Klersch, *Die Kölnische Fastnacht*, 181–184.

43. Ibid., pp. 186–187, 195–196.

44. Speech by Ernst Schwering (January 21, 1952), in Cologne's Excelsior Hotel. Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln / Acc.2: Oberbürgermeister/828/7.

CHAPTER TEN

The Local, the National—and the Transnational? Spatial Dimensions in Hamburg's Memory of World War I during the Weimar Republic

Janina Fuge

A stirring scene was described by the newspaper *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* in the summer of 1924: "Anticipation covers the city's restlessness. The giant flag at the central place in front of the Town Hall [Rathausmarkt] is at half-staff. A large crowd is gathering beneath it, a lot of people in mourning. While the clocks proclaim noon, the church bells fall gradually silent. The trams stop on the tracks, no car rattles. Cyclists dismount, pedestrians stand still, bare-headed and serious. Solemn calm in the heart of the metropolis. A nation remembers its dead. The crowd stays quiet as if praying."[1]

This occurred on August 3, 1924—as in many other German cities, Hamburg remembered the tenth anniversary of World War I's outbreak as a day of collective grief. The German government requested the state governments to recall this date as a "commemoration for the victims of war," as Karl Jarres, Minister of the Interior, put it.[2] Even an excerpt as brief as this mentions various spatial references that are implied within the topic of remembrance of the dead. Referring to places in Hamburg—like Rathausmarkt—underlines a local impact; a national sense is given by focusing on how a "nation remembers its dead"; characterizing Hamburg as a "metropolis" seeks out worldwide dimensions. This small episode can be linked to the wider field of the spatial dimensions of collective memory. Using the city of Hamburg as an example, this chapter examines the prospects and limits of a "transnational memory" in the aftermath of World War I.

Memory studies' insights into the fundamental connection between community, space, and memory are based on the findings by Maurice Halbwachs.[3] In Germany's case, theories of a transnationally informed spatial memory have been almost exclusively focused on the "second history" of National Socialism. Political scientist Jens Kroh sees how a "transnational field of policy" has emerged within Holocaust memory studies. The Holocaust has become a "global space of memory" in which agents from nationally based systems of culture, industry, law, or science

generate products (films, trials, professional publications) for various recipients, and these products become, in turn, unconfined by national boundaries. As such, they occupy transnational public spheres.[4] An explanation of the process may also be found in the structure of both communicative and cultural memory. According to Jan Assmann, communicative memory is built within a daily public dialogue between people—it amounts to contemporary witnessing.[5] On the passing of the present generation, communicative memory merges into cultural memory that alludes to a commonly shared certainty about the past, as manifested in rituals and institutions. Interestingly, this is the chronological point at which an analysis of memorial structures shifts from a primarily "national" focus to the "border" areas: the subnational (local, regional) and the transnational fields.[6]

How, then, does "transnational cultural memory" emerge, and what are its characteristics? First, an event must occur of transnational potential—an event that will be remembered by subsequent generations beyond one's own community or nation (in the sense of a community of remembrance, or *Erinnerungskollektiv*), and is therefore perceived by one's community as being memorable. Nation-specific interpretations and judgments may be negotiated over time beyond one's national borders, giving rise to the potential, at least, of a cross-border interpretation or even consensus. Second, there should be at least the possibility of intercultural or international communication, as in the form of transnational public spheres or collective rituals. For memory to function transnationally, it needs appropriate institutions that enable different parts of the content of remembrance to cross borders and come together in an appropriate exchange, such as at conferences of related associations or the participation of different actors in commemorative events. Third, the various collectives have to accept the possibility of a transnational identity-formation. Transnational memory inherently presumes the will to compromise—as such, then, transnational memory may be a medium for international understanding. If the commemoration of an event beyond national boundaries only serves to deepen national entrenchment instead of opening them up for reinterpretation, new perceptions, and a memory update of the event, it is not a transnational memory. Fourth, we have to accept the accompanying complexities and ambivalences, ambiguities and antagonisms of collective self-interest and historical interpretation. The formation of a transnational memory is characterized by conflicts and disputes. Differences in the interpretation of the past need to be recognized as such and are difficult to overcome in practice without discrediting one's communal counterpart. Without the ability to admit possible wrongdoing and the confrontation with questions of guilt, a transnational memory is hardly conceivable, since its main goal remains the development of a broad consensus about the interpretation and recall of the past, and common visions for the future within a shared discourse.

Certain events can give rise to these processes leading to the formation of transnational memory better than others, and certain social mechanisms can prevent its full and successful articulation. This chapter will discuss the transnational potential of the public memory and cultural policies that emerged in the period following World War I in Germany. Rituals of war remembrance in Hamburg provide a case study of complex interactions between local, national, and also transnational memory. These rituals were about the "Fallen Soldiers." The thousands or even

millions of fallen soldiers in every war-suffering country obviously qualify World War I as fulfilling the first criterion for a transnational memory: a unifying initial event. "Commemoration was a universal preoccupation after the 1914–1918 war," writes Jay Winter: "[S]ymbolic gestures of the return of the fallen were made in many countries. In 1920, unknown soldiers were interred in Westminster Abbey in London, and under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. In the following year, the same ceremony took place in the United States, Italy, Belgium, and Portugal. Most other countries followed suit, or, as in the cases of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, accepted the tomb in the Motherland to represent their own unknown soldiers."[7] This signature of the commemoration of fallen soldiers was clearly an international phenomenon—yet whether it contained transnational aspects in addition to local and national ones merits further analysis.

The Fallen Soldier: Local, National, and Transnational Implications

About nine million fell victim to World War I, more than two million of whom were on the German side, accounting for more than three per cent of the total population and impacting an even larger number of orphans, widows, and so on. This was also true for Hamburg, which lost 34,519 soldiers, a death toll of almost 7 percent of its male population. In Cologne, by comparison, the losses were lower at "only" 5 percent, and 5.5 per cent across Prussia.[8] The mass death of this war was everywhere, in every European city. The fallen soldier became a key space of memory for the European powers. For Germany, this happened with double intensity. In contrast to the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, which gave rise to Germany's long-sought unification and a sense of national uplift, Germany now had to cope with a sweeping defeat. Germany's death toll of the 1914–1918 war—combined with the stigma worded in paragraph 231 of the Versailles Treaty of having caused the war in the first place and, subsequently, all its death, pain, and sorrow—made it hard for survivors to recover. Further, although not as dramatic a national collapse as after World War II, the post–Versailles reparations and surrendering of territory added to the sense of deep collective humiliation for Germans. The war's sacrifice now appeared increasingly futile and meaningless, particularly to former frontline soldiers and their dependents.

Yet, in a remarkable and seemingly contradictory relation to all the above is the fact that a flood of commemoration for the soldiers manifested itself in various forms. In the immediate postwar period, there was a rush of "memory-" and "welcoming-ceremonies," in which fallen soldiers were honored and returnees were welcomed; also there were *Gedenkblätter* ("commemorative sheets") that noted the names of the fallen and their obituaries. These commemorative sheets were mostly edited by companies and associations, but were also found in school chronicles and regimental histories. Memorial books were published by (church) communities, schools, clubs, and associations and often represented a practical way to mention all the fallen by name, since to do so in the form of a monument often failed due to financial or organizational reasons.

There were also commemorative coins and medals, and even sporting events could hold functions to honor fallen soldiers; these were in addition to the more

obvious memory-events of war novels and war films. "House signs" were also briefly used; these were attached to houses and showed that a soldier had left that house to go to war and had died.[9] As scholars have noted, the mass dying of solders in World War I brought about the rise of a politically utilized death cult in Europe.[10] The memory of the fallen soldiers was flanked by a strong expression of the suffering and dying in genres such as literature, painting, and the visual arts—and especially the field of memorials, which were set up in both urban and rural areas with intensive frequency.[11] Memorials in particular had a strong centralizing action, propagating a "national union or social unity." As Reinhart Koselleck puts it, the vast majority of German war memorials was "relatively homogeneous," and was stamped "by a dull heroism—in a Christian dress-up—in which the defeat was displaced or even reinterpreted into a victory. Monuments depicting sorrow were very rare; however, those proclaiming blatant revenge ('undefeated in the field') were erected in great numbers. Neither expressions of sorrow with purely pacifist statements nor political beliefs in democratic society ended up being depicted in monuments in Germany."[12] Historian Kerstin Klingel has compiled a compendium of war memorials in Hamburg confirming this trend in the city by collecting a variety of iconographic evidence.[13] That this was a particularly German style of commemorating the dead soldiers becomes evident if we turn to France, where a much wider range of memorial culture made allowances for antimilitary as well as pacifist, Catholic, and even republican-national memorials. In many cases, the monuments mourned the death of the private citizen who died in the name of the nation.

Reaching a different conclusion, World War I historian Jay Winter has spoken out against a German *Sonderweg* within interwar memorial culture. Winter examines different types of artistic media—film, canvas, poetry, memorials, and commemorative rituals—and describes the cultural history of the Great War as more of a shared, "common history": "This is a story with fewer boundaries than is to be found in most histories of the period. To bring these diverse cultures together in the aftermath of this murderous war is to place less emphasis than others do on the facts of victory and defeat. They mattered; but all too often victory had a taste of ashes."[14]

A look at the Hamburg context reveals trends that can possibly be classified between both of these theses.[15] Moreover, these local trends demonstrate the need for an actor-specific approach when assessing the potential transnational contents of memory. On July 5, 1924, the newspaper *Hamburger Nachrichten* reported on a proposal of the Reich Aesthetic Adviser (Reichskunstwart) Edwin Redslob to "place a sarcophagus in Berlin's main boulevard *Unter den Linden* in order to memorize German war victims—which might be similar to the symbol of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier." The author of the *Nachrichten* article compares the dropped plan with the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier of French and British monuments, a spatialized phenomenon of mourning by which both nations pay "symbolic homage to their dead of World War I."[16] Visualizing and giving shape to the loss of the dead in this way is thus described as an internationally unifying experience—a necessary and very basic requirement of transnational memory. But this community in and of itself is not enough to share grief or even reach a common approximation of a transnational public sphere. As a note in the newspaper *Hamburger Correspondent* makes

rather clear, Tombs of the Unknown Soldiers even seem to highlight the boundaries between nations:

> The "Unknown Soldier" is commemorated by the countries that have been against us in war, in order to keep awake the memory of the victims who called the fight against Germany, and in order to simply keep this battle awake. This ever recurring reminder, this sentimental custom that successfully touches a nation's spirit in order to make patriotic blood pump at Tombs of the Unknown Soldiers really corresponds with French attitudes. Paris invented the "Unknown Soldier," London, Brussels, Bonn, and who knows who else followed this invention, and so, no matter where, the Tomb or the memorial of the Unknown Soldier is the planting and breeding ground for ever new hatred against Germany.[17]

Soldier memory in other countries was thus understood as an insult; in contrast to that, continues the article, "Germany…rightly…refrained from introducing this kind of relentless hero worship for her remaining unidentified dead." Interestingly enough, the task of reconciliation is very clearly delegated to the Allied forces; a critical analysis of Germany's own war dead cult and its ability for reconciliation is not called for.

Significantly, then, the tenth anniversary of the war's outbreak was not widely used for spreading reconciliatory ideas to the German public. In the foreground stood the call for national unity, or as was vividly expressed in the same article of the *Hamburgische Correspondent*: "Might the ill-omened German discord stay away on this commemoration of the 3rd of August as the Heroes' Memorial of ten years ago when the first shots were fired, the first victims fell; might all those who call themselves German finally come together on this day in a common, special ceremony not disturbed by any party opposition and worthy of heroic size, to mark how the fighters lost their lives before the enemy and for our people and our country, for hearth and home."[18] This commemoration also became an occasion for amalgamating national and religious sentiment. In organizing these somber festivities the Hamburg Senate placed high value in avoiding a collision with Constitution Day taking place just eight days later. As a solution to the dilemma of "too much accumulation of similar ceremonies" and a possible impairment of the "effect of the Constitution Day celebration," it was decided that the memorial service to the war was to take on a "predominantly ecclesiastical shape."[19]

The official ceremony took place in St. Catherine's Church, with guests invited by the Hamburg Senate as well as the municipal parliament. In addition, members of the state authorities, economic corporations, war-wounded, and military organizations' camaraderie clubs joined the ceremony. "Thousands" found their way into St. Catherine's, the *Hamburgische Correspondent* melodramatically announced the following day: "high and low, rich and poor" came together for a "common memory."[20] Following this line of argument, Senior Pastor Dr. Carl Gustav Stage provided a prime example of politically active commemoration.[21] He prefaced his sermon with Romans 14:8: "For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord; whether we live therefore, or die, we are the Lord's."[22] Stage assigned World War I to the category of ineluctable fate; the mass extinction was thus not a result of a political decision, but rather a God-given passion of the

German people—hence inevitable, unavoidable. Stage did not shy away from connecting war's outbreak with war's end, and he even drew political conclusions—such as the rejection of the Versailles Treaty, particularly its war guilt clause: "Peace is imposed upon us, a peace that does not know any such colossal parallel in world history. And we have to sign off that we were the sole perpetrators of the conflagration....Our signature to the Treaty of Versailles can never prove our guilt; it is blackmailed by torture." This interpretation merges religious significance with national identity: "Is there something that can strengthen us in today's woes? I know only one thing: the thought of those who have made the hardest sacrifice, of those who have become role models in their loss and who have given their lives for their country, for all of us."

Such faith arrives at an almost vexing national pathos—eschatological hope is now on a par with a nationalist resurrection. Christian faith becomes here a kind of vicarious agent of national politics. "Faith is action!" ("Glaube ist Tat!") becomes Stage's militant slogan: "We need to translate into deed what we believe and hope, with a brave heart and strong hand. Faith in His people, that is: loving your people, putting them higher than your own happiness and wellbeing. Germany, Germany above all! Only then will we be worthy of celebrating the memory of our fallen soldiers. Why have people remembered the victims joyfully? Because they believed in the lives of their people, because they knew that the individual life must be sacrificed for the life of the whole."[23] In short: German national Protestantism did not have space for transnational interpretations—something that is also shown in the following examples of remembering.

Politics and Religion: The Hamburg Examples of Volkstrauertag and Totensonntag

The "combination of national identity commitments ('for the Fatherland', 'for Germany') and religious identity declarations of war and sacrifice" has proven to be an extremely close alliance.[24] The phenomenon of "political religion" was already recognized in the 1870s. Historian Thomas Nipperdey provided its legendary formulation: "The religious is secularized by nationalism, the secular becomes sacralized."[25] The Church did not have any objections to the export of its religious imagery; on the contrary, in an era of general secularization, church representatives welcomed this increase in social relevance.

The intermingling of politics and religion in remembering the fallen was formally expressed on the occasion of two church-linked commemoration days: Volkstrauertag (Remembrance Sunday) and Totensonntag (the last Sunday before Advent, commemorating the dead). Totensonntag is a Protestant commemoration of the previous year's deceased. In 1816, King Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia introduced Totensonntag as an "occasion for the general Protestant church to remember the dead." Volkstrauertag was a day introduced during the Weimar Republic specifically to remember those who had died during World War I. Proposed in 1919 by the newly founded Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge (German War Graves Commission), its first main ceremony took place in 1922. Ever since 1926, Volkstrauertag has been commemorated on the fifth Sunday before Easter—also

named Reminiscere Sunday in the Christian calendar. Despite different connotations of commemoration, both days became huge collective events for Germans (in marked contrast to other occasions like Constitution Day).

So were Hamburg's contexts of these two significant memorial activities for World War I local, national, or even transnational? We can detect a particular area of conflict between two attributes that are constitutive for the fallen soldiers' space of memory. On the one hand, the fallen soldier had significant potential for attaining the status of a transnational memory—simply due to the fact that the warring parties (and especially European) nations had suffered such a high loss of life. Yet, on the other hand, in the immediate postwar years the fallen soldier motif held a special significance at the local level. The people who on different occasions came together to remember were often directly involved in one another's lives and shared each other's suffering. Below the abstract national level, these kinds of commemorative events thus had an immediate and powerful effect in creating a postwar identity within communities. At this point, the German city is neither just a background for action nor a "container for possible history...that surrounds the social affairs and extracts them from contexts of action."[26] Rather, the city becomes a "contact zone," to use Helmut Walser Smith's term.[27] The exchange within a limited urban collective about the past happens face to face; important things are negotiated with a manageable number of players. The limited geographical framework acts as a "European reference point," where witnesses, bystanders, and the postwar generation alike all met to generate collectively used narratives by (re-) constructing the past and by using visually authentic impressions (from eyewitness reports to local events).[28]

An example of this was the interwar Volkstrauertag in Hamburg, which generated a large number of events, primarily organized by conservative groups such as military societies or veterans groups, as well as pastors and communities. The main event took place at Hamburg's main cemetery in Ohlsdorf, organized by the local branch of the German War Graves Commission. Thousands of people joined this firmly local commemoration of the dead; it was again the newspaper *Hamburgischer Correspondent* that portrayed the actual setting of the commemoration and its unifying effect for the people of Hamburg: "To decorate Ohlsdorf's war tombs, more than 1,200 flower donations arrived so that it was possible to decorate the 3,300 war tombs. Ohlsdorf's cemetery administration generously supported this aim. Almost all of Hamburg's florists contributed to the decoration."[29] It becomes clear that mourning the dead was specifically local; the many donations and the involvement of city florists indicate the population's commitment to the fallen. This involvement of many people working to remember the dead would have provided countless "remembrance talks" within families and circles of friends. This localization of memory can be recognized in the interaction between memory interacting with daily life (florists working on flower arrangements, organizations preparing elaborate flower donations). The more one narrows down the nation's suffering, the stronger it becomes. This was reaffirmed at an evening service in the main church of St. Michaelis—with a seating capacity of 2,500, it is Hamburg's most famous church and a major city landmark. On that evening, the Frauenausschuss der Kriegerehrung—the female committee of a conservative union that commemorated

war heroes—handed over a necrology (*Ehrenbuch*) to the church and its "protection," where it was to be stored for safekeeping in a shrine.[30]

In this honor roll that has been added to since 1924, the names of thousands of "Hamburg's sons" are listed, as well as inscriptions of surviving dependents.[31] A wide range of local groups took part in this act of commemoration, such as fraternities, veterans' associations, national patriotic groups (with flags), as well as schoolgirls from flower-arranging classes at public vocational schools who decorated the church.[32] In short, there were old and young people from Hamburg, veterans and wives, children and friends, brothers and sisters—mourning for the dead became a locally bound, politicized, collective event, with significant roles for women. At the municipal level, commemorating the fallen soldiers took place in multiple ceremonies, a fact primarily caused by the overwhelmingly direct grief that touched the people of Hamburg. Therefore, mourning in shared grief in a unified, shoulder-to-shoulder mass event provided a good opportunity to draw retrospective conclusions about the situation on a national level.

There are numerous documents repeating this observation—for example, it was Mayor Carl Petersen, who, on the war's tenth anniversary, cut right to the heart of the matter by pointing out: "And what are we more in need of than real comradeship, when friends remain loyal in distress and death! From such a spirit out there bridges can be built to overcome all party differences and finally provide the kind of true national community that is imperative for our advancement."[33] Additionally, the press emphasized this link, the conservative newspapers as well as the left-wing ones—like the Social Democratic *Hamburger Echo* that generally took a critical stance on the practice of Volkstrauertag. However, despite its regular skepticism, the *Echo* in an article on the Volkstrauertag of 1925 pointed out: "The danger of war is not over, if you, men and women, if you, youth, are not strong and do not heed the wake-up call that connects us solely with this day: 'Reminiscere!'—Remember!"[34] Essentially, however, the ability of Volkstrauertag to enforce a unified remembrance and an overall consensus for interpreting the past had its drawbacks. Catch phrases like "national unity" or *Volksgemeinschaft* ("people's community") covered up a national, conservative claim to create identity and legitimacy by using the past. Interestingly, being in the public office of Reichskunstwart, it was not Redslob's task to arrange memorial ceremonies—while Redslob was nonetheless nominally responsible for shaping a new republican identity through cultural polity and policies, it was in the urban commemorative ceremonies to the war dead that Weimar German memory and cultural identity were most deeply forged.

Volkstrauertag thus became the counterpoint of a torn and crisis-ridden nation and commemorated the war dead by propagating an alternative myth. Even the *Echo*, which certainly criticized the Graves Commission's aims and rhetoric, committed its readers to unity by focusing on the same national aims for the occasion of remembering the war dead. "The danger of war has not been averted if you, men and women and youth, are not strong enough to heed the call, which unites us today: Reminiscere—Remember!"[35] And, of course, the German War Graves Commission was a more than equal partner in this nationalizing rhetoric: "In the true sense of the word we wish to be a *Volksbund* [people's federation], a federation born through the power and the deepest soul of the German nation; a people's federation that does

everything in its power to help everybody, a people's federation in which the whole nation is unified without distinction by commemorating the dead."[36]

The Volksbund set its sights on taking care of German graves in foreign countries, such as France, Belgium, Italy, Poland, and even South Africa. This was to be worked out in close cooperation with comparable foreign organizations; in the Volksbund's articles of association it was codified that the "intergovernmental care for the war's graves should be operated based on mutuality."[37] The Volksbund negotiated internationally—with France in the 1920s, for example, when Germans' ability to maintain their own war graves was established as part of a mutual Franco-German agreement.[38] Despite the reborn nationalism inherent to the Volksbund, at least it facilitated important communication across borders.

A small episode from the Volkstrauertag of 1931 highlights the steps that were taken toward international understanding—as well as their limitations. The Volksbund's journal *Kriegsgräberfürsorge* published an article about the "German Volkstrauertag in Foreign Countries."[39] This text makes clear that the German involvement with war graves abroad was primarily intended to generate national unification rather than any nation-linking (transnational) attitude of mourning remembrance. "We must be thankful," says the article, "that there is no country left in the world where a common day of mourning has not been embraced by Germans living there. This is of great importance—first and foremost: for the sake of Germanity itself.... Therefore whatever has to happen should happen in order to link Germans living abroad to their home in the closest spiritual way possible." Hence it was not the foundation of a transnational European postwar memory that was becoming a top priority, but rather the search for national reference points, despite phenomena of transnational dispersal, to be utilized in the service of collective memory.

Turning now to the example of the Totensonntag commemorations, we find a strong contrast with those of Volkstrauertag. The year 1931 in particular demonstrated their direct competition in terms of memorial power. On Totensonntag, on November 22, 1931, thousands of Hamburg citizens attended the inauguration of a war memorial initiated by the Hamburg Senate and designed by the sculptor Ernst Barlach. Compared with multiple social strata of involvement in Volkstrauertag, the main protagonists of the Totensonntag event were formally appointed administrators and elected politicians: members of government, members of the Parliament, representatives of administration and public institutions, as well as delegates of companies, the sciences, and the arts. Among the attendants were delegations from the Social Democrats and the Social Democratic Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold—the Red-Black-Gold Banner of the Reich that was peopled by members of labor organizations, protested political extremism, and identified far more with international inclinations than with national ones. But while the Volkstrauertag version of Memorial Day was characterized by national as well as religious-conservative intentions, the Sunday in Commemoration of the Dead implemented a religious occasion in the services of republicanism and even a transnational understanding of postwar peace. Mayor Rudolf Ross pointed out in his speech: "Admonishing and demanding, this sober memorial stands in the middle of the pulsating life of the city.... Time and again it will illustrate to us how disastrous war is and that every nation is obliged to work

responsibly toward world peace."[40] Seen from this angle, the pacifist "never again" dictum was an early transnational helping hand—and afforded the possibility of creating a minimum consensus between the war's different parties. Such a leftwing demand would have been unimaginable for the Volkstrauertag's version of remembrance. This transnational characteristic performed on Totensonntag was demonstrated by another ceremony at the Ohlsdorf Cemetery that was mainly attended by members of the Hamburg Senate, and was concluded with a wreath-laying ceremony at the British military cemetery, a 3,000-square-meter memorial area built at Ohlsdorf in 1923 (and one of four Commonwealth World-War-I gravesites in Germany).

Totensonntag also shows that the degree to which the ability to construct a transnational memory is dependent on the agency of those involved. On the tenth anniversary of war's outbreak, the Social Democratic Reichsbanner held a memorial service at Ohlsdorf. This event was celebrated in a traditional, therefore, religious way: choirs, hymns, and sermons.[41] Pastor John Nicolassen of St. Johannis-Harvestehude, who had served as military chaplain during World War I, broached the issue of suffering caused by war: "Nobody knew what times of terrible emotional and physical distress should follow."[42] The experience did not lead Nicolassen to invoke yet new evidence of German heroism, rather he argued—albeit from the position of believing in the rationale of a German defensive war—for a pacifist "Never Again!": "When the fighters protected home with their bodies until the bitter end of the war, it was in the firm resolve to give rise to a new Germany and to ensure that such a disaster does not befall the human race again."[43] Nicolassen's hope was not, at least, limited by the borders of his own nation or faith, as the *Echo* reported: "The speaker remembered in poignant words the fallen soldiers' bereaved on both sides of the borders, and he thought of the infinite number of cripples whose existences drag on a life that is often worse than death. With special warmth he remembered the fallen Jewish soldiers in the trenches and their bereaved. Besides the loss of their dead comrades these people still endure insults and suspicion of their own countrymen. This racial hatred could be marked as un-German and un-Christian." With solemnity, two groups of a hundred men apiece marched to the graves of German and British casualties, and wreaths were laid down with black-red-yellow ribbons, including at the graves of German-Jewish fallen soldiers.[44]

Out of Time: "Transnational Particles" in Interwar Germany

At best, then, what was going in terms of remembering the war dead during the 1920s can be regarded as "transnational particles" in a more widespread general climate of nationalist fervor. The small episodes recounted here within Hamburg's context of Totensonntag and Volkstrauertag indicate an ambivalent mixture, but one with obvious weighting, of local, national, and transnational elements of collective memory regarding the fallen soldiers of World War I. The Hamburg example shows that after World War I, a broad transnational memory of the war dead fitting all the criteria did not quite emerge. We can compare the short-lived Weimar years to the far longer aftermath of World War II, an era that has generated a more universal Holocaust memory dedicated to Jewish and other victims targeted by the Nazi regime and that is increasingly experienced transnationally; yet even here we find that Germans are still addressing multiple voids and traps in the memory

mechanisms regarding, for example, their own military dead and German civilian air war victims.

One reason for the failure of transnational memory in Germany in the wake of World War I was the fact that cross-border, international orders with merged actors could only exist in very small batches, and were often transnational by effect rather than by intent. The Weimar Republic lacked the prerequisites necessary for the construction of war memories on a transnational level; and it ran out of time to achieve more. "Much of our remembering is, indeed, obviously socially motivated—prompted by social occasions, geared to social exchanges. We remember in the context of conversation, in response to interrogation, under the impulse of some need to contribute to joint activities, or to forge mutual understandings, or to justify ourselves in the eyes of others: the nature of these social occasions shapes the ways in which we remember," as Geoffrey Cubitt puts it.[45] Since there were so many post–Versailles hindrances to interacting with other nations, there was little to no opportunity for Germans to deepen a mutually informed set of memories, activities, and rituals. But it should be noted however that, even in light of the relative failure of transnational memory during the Weimar Republic, we can identify "particles" or "seeds" that certainly did indicate transnational potential and possible lines of development. In short, remembering the Holocaust did not start out as a transnational ability, but it became so over years and decades—the transition from a communicative memory of the witnesses into a cultural memory of the future generations should be taken into consideration on this point. Interwar Hamburg might be viewed as significant for its extraordinarily enthusiastic and varied actors who represented a wide range of positions that aimed to swiftly and actively reshape the past. Comparing the example of Hamburg to Berlin's situation with its "Stellungskrieg der Denkmäler" (trench warfare of memorials), in which not just every assembly room but even every local bar was contested by the various interest groups that commemorated World War I, Hamburg might appear as a somewhat more normal case of exploring pluralism after a change of political systems—and where transnational elements of war memory can indeed be found among others.[46] However, clear differences must be observed when making claims for these transnational "particles": differences between involuntary entrées into transnationalist processes, as witnessed with the Völkerbund, and those efforts that were openly and bravely dedicated to opening up Germany from extremist nationalist restrictions, as it was shown in our example of the Totensonntag ceremony of 1931. The latter also shows that steering toward a transnationally oriented (war) memory means first and foremost the emancipatory and reconciliatory attempt at establishing dialogue across both internal and external borders. Hamburg therefore yields an especially useful study of the dilemmas facing Weimar Germany because of the strongly competing alternative memories set forth in this city's interwar rituals to the dead.

Notes

1. See "Hamburgs Gedenkfeiern," *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* (August 4, 1924). All translations are my own.
2. Report of the Reichsminister des Inneren (July 9, 1924). Staatsarchiv Hamburg (StaHH), Staatliche Pressestelle I–IV, Akte 4370.

3. Maurice Halbwachs, *La mémoire collective*, 1939 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950). Used for citation: Maurice Halbwachs, *Das kollektive Gedächtnis* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1985), 142, 161.

4. Jan Eckel and Claudia Moisel, eds., *Universalisierung des Holocaust? Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik in internationaler Perspektive* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2008), 51.

5. See Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1997), 9–19.

6. For the "subnational" focus, see Janina Fuge, Rainer Hering, and Harald Schmid, eds., *Das Gedächtnis von Stadt und Region. Geschichtsbilder in Norddeutschland* (Munich and Hamburg: Dölling & Galitz, 2010).

7. Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 27.

8. See Ursula Büttner, *Politische Gerechtigkeit und sozialer Geist. Hamburg zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (Hamburg: Christians, 1985), 22.

9. All these cases of commemoration are concisely explained with examples from the Hannover region in Gerhard Schneider's "*...nicht umsonst gefallen*"? *Kriegerdenkmäler und Kriegstotenkult in Hannover* (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1991), 153–80.

10. Michael Jeismann and Rolf Westheider, "Wofür stirbt der Bürger? Nationaler Totenkult und Staatsbürgertum in Deutschland und Frankreich seit der Französischen Revolution," in Reinhart Koselleck and Michael Jeismann, eds., *Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1999), 23–50, 26ff.

11. On the commemoration of the fallen soldiers and especially their war memorials, see, for example, Meinhold Lurz, *Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland*, 6 vols. (Heidelberg: Esprint-Verlag, 1985–1987); Gerhard Armanski, "*...und wenn wir sterben müssen*". *Die politische Ästhetik von Kriegerdenkmälern* (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1988); Klaus Latzel, *Vom Sterben im Krieg. Wandlungen in der Einstellung zum Soldatentod vom Siebenjährigen Krieg bis zum II. Weltkrieg* (Warendorf: Schnell, 1988); Georg L. Mosse's inspiring *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990); Volker Ackermann, *Nationale Totenfeiern in Deutschland. Von Wilhelm I. bis Franz Josef Strauß. Eine Studie zur politischen Semiotik* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990); Rainer Rother, ed., *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit. Bilder des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Berlin: Ars Nicolai 1994), 435–444; Sabine Behrenbeck, *Der Kult um die toten Helden: Nationalsozialistische Mythen, Riten und Symbole 1923 bis 1945* (Köln: SH-Verlag 1996); Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Stefan Goebel, "Intersecting Memories: War and Remembrance in Twentieth-Century Europe," *The Historical Journal* 44, no. 3 (2001): 853–858.

12. Reinhart Koselleck, "Einleitung," in *Politische Totenkult*, ed. Koselleck and Jeismann, 16, 29.

13. Kerstin Klingel, *Eichenkranz und Dornenkrone. Kriegerdenkmäler in Hamburg* (Hamburg: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006).

14. Winter, *Sites of Memory*, 227.

15. See Janina Fuge, "'Ohne Tod und Sterben kein Sieg': Die gefallenen Soldaten des ersten Weltkrieges in der Hamburger Erinnerungskultur der Weimarer Republik," *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* 34, no. 4 (2009): 356–373.

16. "Den Plan eines Heldendenkmals fallen gelassen? Drahtmeldung unserer Berliner Schriftleitung," *Hamburger Nachrichten* (July 5, 1924).

17. "Der Helden-Gedenktag," *Hamburgischer Korrespondent* (July 4, 1924). Bonn is mentioned because as part of the Rhineland it was occupied by Allied (French) forces in 1920.

18. Ibid.

19. Report of the Reichsminister des Innern (July 11, 1924). StaHH, Staatsministerium und alle übrigen Ministerien, Pressestelle der Senatskanzlei.

20. "Hamburg und seine Toten," *Hamburgischer Correspondent* (August 4, 1924).

21. Since 1923, Dr. Carl Gustav Stage had been the longest serving senior pastor (and there-fore head of the Protestant clergy) of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Hamburg state; since 1903 he was senior pastor at St. Catherine's. Stage made his mark nationwide with a contemporary translation of the New Testament in 1897, and he gave lectures in theology at the University of Hamburg. See Rainer Hering, "Carl Gustav Stage," in *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, vol. 14 (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 1998), 1514–1519.

22. King James Bible. Sermon by Senior Pastor Dr. Carl Gustav Stage, *Vorwärts* (August 3, 1924). The following quotes: ibid.

23. "Hamburg und seine Toten."

24. Jeismann and Westheider, "Wofür stirbt der Bürger?" 31.

25. Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat*, 4th ed. (Munich: C.H. Beck 1987), 300. See also Koselleck, "Einleitung," in *Politische Totenkult*, eds. Koselleck and Jeismann, 14.

26. See Ulrike Jureit's review of Bernd Belina and Boris Michel, eds., *Raumproduktionen. Beiträge der Radical Geography. Eine Zwischenbilanz* (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2007), *H-Soz-u-Kult* (accessed December 28, 2012).

27. Helmut Walser Smith, "Lokalgeschichte. Überlegungen zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines Genre," in James Retallack, ed., *Sachsen in Deutschland* (Gütersloh: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte 2000), 239–253.

28. See Malte Thießen, "Gedächtnisgeschichte. Neue Forschungen zur Entstehung und Tradierung von Erinnerungen," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008): 607–634.

29. Anon., "Reminiscere. Hamburg gedenkt seiner gefallenen Krieger," *Hamburgischer Correspondent* (March 2, 1931).

30. Anon., "Hamburgs Ehrenbuch bekommt seinen Schrein. Ein Kriegergrab in St. Michaelis," *Hamburgischer Correspondent* (March 1, 1931).

31. Anon., "Reminiscere."

32. Anon., "Hamburgs Ehrenbuch bekommt seinen Schrein."

33. Mayor Carl Petersen's speech at the Kameradentreffen des Hamburger Kriegerverbandes (May 30, 1924). StaHH, Staatliche Pressestelle I-IV, 4179 (Band 1).

34. Anon., "Volkstrauertag," *Hamburger Echo* (March 16, 1930).

35. Ibid.

36. Joseph Koeth (a former military officer, and first präsident of the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge), "Auf den Weg," *Kriegsgräberfürsorge. Mitteilungen und Berichte vom Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge* 1, no. 1/2 (1921): 2.

37. See Anonymous, "Jahresbericht 1920," *Kriegsgräberfürsorge* 1, no. 1/2 (1921): 2.

38. Ibid.

39. Ernst Grosse (as managing member of the executive committee of the League of Foreign Germans [Bund der Auslandsdeutschen]), "Deutscher Volkstrauertag im Auslande," *Kriegsgräberfürsorge. Mitteilungen und Berichte vom Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge* 10, no. 6 (1931): 82.

40. Address of Mayor Rudolf Roß on the occasion of Totensonntag 1931. Quotes from the *Hamburger Anzeiger* (November 23, 1931) and *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* (November 23, 1931). The following quotes as ibid.

41. "Die Feiern in Hamburg," *Hamburger Anzeiger* (August 4, 1924).

42. See Herwarth von Schade, *Hamburger Pastorinnen und Pastoren seit der Reformation. Ein Verzeichnis*, gen. ed. Gerhard Paasch, Kirchenkreisvorstand Kirchenkreis Alt-Hamburg, Nordelbische Ev.-Luth. Kirche (Hamburg: Edition Temmen, 2009), 187.

43. "Die Feiern in Hamburg."

44. "Das Reichsbanner ehrt die Toten des Weltkrieges," *Hamburger Echo* (July 20, 1928).

45. Geoffrey Cubitt, *History and Memory* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2007), 119.

46. Christian Saehrendt, *Der Stellungskrieg der Denkmäler. Kriegerdenkmäler in Berlin der Zwischenkriegszeit 1919–1939* (Bonn: Dietz, 2004), 162.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

FROM THE AMERICAN WEST TO WEST BERLIN:
WIM WENDERS, BORDER CROSSINGS, AND THE
TRANSNATIONAL IMAGINARY

Nicole Huber and Ralph Stern

Written in the West is the title of the German film director Wim Wenders's catalog of photographs exhibited at the Parisian Centre Pompidou in 1986. The catalog contains striking images of cities and landscapes taken throughout California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. It closes with an image of "The Devil's Graveyard," taken in Big Bend, Texas, which is the location of the opening sequences in Wenders's remarkable film *Paris, Texas* (1984). In the accompanying catalog interview with the French critic Alain Bergala, Wenders speaks eloquently about the meaningful relationship between photography, exploration, and travel: "Photography makes it possible to comprehend a place right away. . . . Both the familiar and the unfamiliar are, for me, excluded by photography: it's an instrument of exploration, it belongs essentially to travel, practically like a car or a plane. The photo camera makes arrival in a place possible."[1] The histories of photography and the "discovery" of the American West through the lenses of explorers, photographers, and cinematographers are closely connected. As in Wenders's *Written in the West*, another catalog titled *Framing the West: The Survey Photographs of Timothy H. O'Sullivan* discusses O'Sullivan's nineteenth-century images of the American West as a "foundation of our understanding of the landscapes of the West"; photographs that create the "immediate impression of a landscape in turmoil."[2] These images depict a landscape that had suffered cataclysmic events. Importantly, rather than striving toward representations of the sublime, a not uncommon trope in early representations of the West, O'Sullivan was "interested in emptiness, in apparently negative landscapes, in the barest, least hospitable ground. . . . The preponderance of his best pictures are of vacancies." Moreover, in this emptiness and vacancy, O'Sullivan understood that the "most powerful element in this landscape was his camera."[3]

Emptiness, vacancy, and a camera—whether still or movie—are the starting points for our own exploration of transnationalism and the German city. In the hands of Wim Wenders, these attributes and actions lend structure and unity to Wenders's early German and German-American "road movies" *Alice in the Cities*

(1974) and *Kings of the Road* (1976), connecting these with his somewhat later explorations *Paris, Texas* (1984) and his "vertical road movie" *Wings of Desire* (1987) and, much later, *Don't Come Knocking* (2005). The "cataclysmic events" underscoring these films are not only events associated with emptiness and landscapes in turmoil but, particularly in *Wings of Desire*, National Socialism, the tumultuous destruction of World War II, and the resultant emptiness of postwar inner-city "ruin landscapes" (*Trümmerlandschaften*). Equally important thematic continuities found in these films involve the generational ruptures between fathers and sons following such seismic historical events. In this framework, the American West (and the American Western) served a specific purpose: envisioning both traumatic upheaval and a utopian projection for the postwar German West. This cinematic projection was as much of a sociocultural project as it was a cinematic fantasy. Wenders has commented that his "first memory of America is of a mythical land where everything was much better."[4]

This land where everything was much better was lent a powerful focus by Hollywood cinema, presenting American life in often stark contrast with that of not only Germany, but postwar Europe generally. It was left to European directors to negotiate an often complex and contrasting terrain framed by the polarities of city and country, truth and fantasy. We are, for example, reminded of the dialogue between Maddalena (Anna Magnani) and her husband Spartaco (Gastone Renzelli) in Luchino Visconti's seductive exploration of postwar cinema *Bellissima* (1951). While sitting in a crowded tenement courtyard watching an outdoor screening of a cattle drive (truly a landscape in turmoil) along the Chisolm Trail in Howard Hawks's *Red River* (1948), husband and wife converse:

> "You don't understand, Spartaco. Look at those places. Look where we live." (Maddalena)
>
> "It's all fantasy." (Spartaco)
>
> "That's not true. Look, Look! They're taking the whole wagon across. Wow!" (Maddalena)

The dialogue and location juxtapose the European postwar city with the open expanses of the Texas prairie. "Wow" is exclaimed when wagons and cattle are driven across the Red River, located in Texas, as generational conflict is played out between a youthful Montgomery Clift and his adoptive father, John Wayne. The heroes of films by Hawks (together with those by Nicolas Ray and John Ford) "provided German adolescents with a much desired new mythology and served as models for European apprentices like Jean-Luc Godard, François Truffaut, and Wenders."[5] Peppering his films with frequent cinematic references, in *Paris, Texas* Wenders marks *Red River* in a dialogue between the character of Travis (Harry Dean Stanton), the father, and the young son he had earlier abandoned. Here the town of Paris, Texas, the title and central *motif* of the film, is located "close to the Red River."

For Hawks, "Texas" is located south of the Red and north of the Rio Grande; as wagon trains move west toward California, it is in this Texas that the Western unfolds. And it is in this same Texas that we first encounter Travis, adrift in an "empty" and limitless landscape, wearing a red baseball cap. Desperately in search of

water, Travis stumbles into the tiny settlement of Terlingua, where his first encounter is neither with a cowboy nor an Indian, but a German doctor, an immigrant, played by the noted director Bernard Wicki. On occasion Wenders uses American directors as characters in his films, such as Nicolas Ray and Dennis Hopper in *The American Friend* (1977); but through his appearance in *Paris, Texas* Wenders honors Bernard Wicki as one of the few early German postwar directors not rejected by the New German Cinema.[6]

It has been argued that the "west" of *Paris, Texas* refers not just to place but also to a "European/American system of discursive power."[7] Other postwar West German directors have touched upon America; Werner Herzog moves from a bizarrely distinctive Berlin milieu to an equally specific rural Wisconsin in *Stroszek* (1977), and Percy Adlon drops a lost Bavarian soul into the heart of the Mojave Desert in *Out of Rosenheim / Bagdad Café* (1987). However, Wenders is the only German director consistently negotiating the borders of past and present, city and country, Germany and the American West in his search for a postwar identity and a correlative mythology and imagery (Figure 11.1). Not unlike Travis, who mutely staggers into frame after crossing the border from Mexico, Wenders and his generation were literally born into a "landscape in turmoil," a cataclysmic land of ruins resulting from World War II; a topography of absence and vacancy, of lost traditions, generations, and faith. Wenders has written about postwar Germany in difficult terms: "I don't think

Figure 11.1   Film set photos from Wim Wenders' *Wings of Desire* (*Der Himmel über Berlin*, 1987).

Source: Photos courtesy of Wim Wenders Stiftung.

that any other country has had such a loss of faith in its own images, stories, and myths as we have."[8]

In response, Wenders seeks to "establish a transnational space, unstable and full of longing for someplace else, for someone else."[9] Injected into this space is the figure of the "modern male hero as lone migrant and wanderer" in which the American Western and specifically John Ford's *The Searchers* (1956) play a prominent, if far from exclusive, role. Filmed in the iconic Monument Valley but ostensibly set in Texas, *The Searchers* has been described as a "psychological epic" of a deeply flawed character marked by war (the American Civil War) and forever closed out of the safe and stable environment of domesticity. Centrally, *The Searchers* provides an account of a man losing his sanity through the effects of violence and loss, with the film framed by the words of the opening song: "What makes a man to wander / What makes a man to roam?" Wandering, specifically the wanderings of men, is a staple of Wenders's early films and he had already constructed a visual quote of *The Searchers* in his earlier *Kings of the Road* (1976). Wandering connects Wenders's interest in Westerns and road movies located in the American West with the vertical road movie depicted in *Wings of Desire* (1987), in which two angels encounter the complex topographies of West Berlin under largely American occupation. But it is with *Paris, Texas* that Wenders first engages cinematic representations of the American West. Casting Harry Dean Stanton in the lead role of Travis, it is also the first time that Wenders has an American rather than a German figure in the central role of the wanderer, thereby lending the narrative a specifically "American" perspective.

This perspective distinguishes *Paris, Texas* from Adlon's *Out of Rosenheim* (1987). Released in the United States as *Bagdad Café*, Adlon's film is arguably another example of the German transnational imaginary set deep in the American West. However, the protagonist, a German woman, is a tourist searching for a place or home that can be found, as the film depicts, in even the unlikely location of a roadside café in the Mojave desert. By way of contrast in this land of vacancy and the "least hospitable ground," Wenders, unlike Adlon, is not concerned with establishing place as a stable location. Rather he seeks the "road" itself as "home" and the locus of stability. *Paris, Texas*, as in John Ford's *The Searchers*, presents a protagonist barred from or fleeing domestic environments, and the narrative trajectory moves Travis from the opening scene in which he appears "off road" in the desert borderlands to the closing scene of his being "on the road," traveling comfortably in a car he has purchased in Los Angeles. The stage for this trajectory is set at the beginning when it is clear that Travis is in the US-Mexican borderlands, a nonplace where "immigrants . . . just die in the desert because there is not a drop of water anywhere."[10]

In *The Logic of Images*, Wenders relates that he had originally intended to shoot his opening sequence for *Paris, Texas* in Big Bend National Park (Texas), but chose instead a "godforsaken patch of ground (that) wasn't even entered on our maps . . . that turned out to be a gigantic abstract dream landscape known as the 'Devil's Graveyard'."[11] Whether in the Devil's Graveyard along the US-Mexican border, or tracing the border of West and East Germany in *Kings of the Road*, or following angelic views of the no-man's-land along the Berlin Wall in *Wings of Desire*, Wenders has exhibited extraordinary sensitivity and insight into the crossing of

borders and visual imaginary that owes as much to American as it does to German sources.

Importantly, Wenders goes "deliberately and repeatedly beyond German borders," choosing to tell stories not from the "center" but from the margins.[12] National borders and their transgressions characterize Wenders' land- and cityscapes. From the question of whether Travis knows "which side of the border" he is on that opens *Paris, Texas* to the angel Cassiel wondering whether "there [are] any borders left?" in *Wings of Desire*, there are, as the latter film relates, "more [borders] then ever. Each street has its borderline." It is in this sense that Wenders saw "'Germanness'" as something that could only be experienced in Berlin.[13] More a "*site*" than a city characterized by the historic postwar division between East and West, "*Berlin*" also represents "*the World*" since "Berlin is divided like our world." The German title of *Wings of Desire*, *Der Himmel über Berlin,* signals not a "*story of unity*" but "*one* story about *division*." However, in contrast to Christa Wolf's *Divided Sky* (*Der geteilte Himmel*), published shortly after the construction of the Berlin Wall, Wenders consciously affirms the unity of the sky showing "images and traces of past history, and intimations of what is to come."[14] Thus, Wenders sees the German city, as cities globally, not only as divided but also as fundamentally and transnationally interlinked.

Borderlands as spaces of "nothing," as "wastelands" and "voids" play key roles "as places, as spaces of possibility."[15] The abundance of such spaces created by the traumatic destruction of World War II as well as its aftermath marked postwar Berlin. These spaces continued to exist through the early reunification years and contributed greatly to the sense of cultural vibrancy and opportunity in the city. Critics have emphasized the importance of voids in an urban fabric and many of the tensions surrounding post-reunification urbanism in Berlin circled around efforts to either develop or protect the city's voids, illegibilities, and erasures.[16] It is in these often remarkable urban "gaps" that Wenders generates much of the activity in *Wings of Desire*. However, in order to better understand Wenders's notions of emptiness and vacancy, we will need to turn to his wanderings in the American West.

Wim Wenders has been characterized by his dual "obsession with America" and his role in the New German Cinema, the "national cinema of aesthetic experimentation and political opposition" that includes cinematic luminaries such as Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Werner Herzog, Volker Schlöndorff, and Margarethe von Trotta.[17] By 1984, the year that *Paris, Texas* opened and won the prestigious *Palme d'Or* award at the Cannes Film Festival, Wenders had extensive experience with crossing the borders between West Germany, West Berlin, and the American West. Born in 1945, less than four months after the end of World War II, Wenders sees his contributions to the New German Cinema as marked by his "distanced relationship to Germany as a 'fatherland'."[18] Belonging to a "generation without fathers," without a "tradition of our own," Wenders draws heavily upon non-German traditions, particularly the American genres of the Western and the road movie.[19] His very early *Summer in the City* (1970) already organizes the movement of the primary protagonist through Munich and Berlin. In the narrative, a man, newly released from prison, is on the run from former associates trailing him in an old Chevrolet. Images of the street scenes unrolling outside of car windows are coupled with specific images of flight by plane that would surface again in *Alice in the Cities* (1974). American culture is present

throughout the film as a constituent element of late 1960s' urban German culture: radio broadcasts from American stations discussing the value of the dollar and joint American-West German military maneuvers ("Project Partnership from Hamburg to Bamberg"), a discussion of John Wayne's role in adopting a child orphaned by conflict in the rather obscure John Ford Western *3 Godfathers* (1948), as well as an LP playing Bob Dylan's *John Wesley Harding* (a song about a Texas outlaw and gunfighter). Although the movie is "Dedicated to the Kinks," the film's title *Summer in the City* is taken from the 1960s' hit song of the same name played by American band The Lovin' Spoonful. This song resonates loudly during a fast walk (in the depths of winter) by the protagonist along Berlin's Landwehrkanal and the iconic modernist Shell House, a structure associated with the Weimar era's New Objectivity. *Summer in the City*, then, introduces us to central themes in the work of Wenders in which American economic and industrial prowess are coupled with Hollywood genre films and contemporary American pop culture in the German metropolis.

Wenders's next major films, comprising the trilogy *Alice in the Cities*, *The Wrong Move*, and *Kings of the Road*, are structured as road movies. *Alice in the Cities* moves explicitly from America to West Germany, from New York City to Wuppertal. *The Wrong Move* (1975) follows the tradition of the nineteenth-century German *Bildungsroman* in which one travels in order to learn. *Kings of the Road* follows two men moving along the borderlands of West Germany adjacent to the German Democratic Republic, repairing projectors in local movie houses while tracing the history of cinema itself. The subsequent films *The American Friend* (1977), *Hammett* (1982), and *The State of Things* (1982) display a great deal of transatlantic movement, but are more directly concerned with translations of aesthetic sensibilities into the economic structures of the Hollywood culture industry. Following *The American Friend*, from 1978 until 1984, Wenders lived in San Francisco, then Los Angeles, and finally New York. It was a period about which Wenders would later explain:

> That was a seductive life. And then, for a while, I really thought I could make an American film and become an American director. This was, in fact, my ambition. It took some time for me to recognize that I didn't have it in me, from *Hammett* and then coming to terms with *Hammett* in *State of Things* and finally *Paris, Texas*. Then, finally, I realized I could only be a European director.[20]

As the quote indicates, it was Wenders's experience with *Hammett* and the control of the American studios that led to his reconsideration of earlier ideals. As such, *Paris, Texas* became a pivotal film for Wenders's own transition from Germany to America and back again; a film in which, like *Wings of Desire* (1987) that followed, the city is framed as a site in which diverging national experiences are merged. He uses different genres to construct a transnational space of human experience, a space characterized by the continuous search for belonging only to find in the end one's own otherness.

Sites and Sights: From West Berlin to West Texas and Back Again

Wenders scripted (or co-scripted) and directed the films under discussion during the Cold War, a period during which Berlin served as a global image for the politics of

division and confrontation. From the end of World War II up to German reunification in 1989, both East and West Berlin served as paradigmatic sites (and sights) for constructing respective national identities, identities articulating the geopolitical dichotomy of East and West and realized in competing and contested architectural representations. The early postwar construction of the Stalinallee in the Russian sector of Berlin was countered by the 1957 Interbau building exhibition in the West, a panoply of modernist architecture owing much to Germany's prewar Bauhaus tradition rejected by the National Socialists and presenting Berlin as a "shopping window of the West." Cross-border competition in the realm of architectural representation continued in the following decades and was formalized again under the parallel "new" and "old" categories of West Berlin's International Building Exhibition (IBA, 1984–1987). This tradition of the "politics of architecture" evolving through stages from a city in ruin, to a blockaded, then divided, and ultimately reunified city arguably entered another phase in the *Baustelle / Schaustelle* (building site / spectacle site) projects of the reunified New Berlin, and the staging of a new capital claiming a leading position within an expanding European Union and a globalizing world economy.[21]

In the early post-reunification period, the complex dichotomies of East and West were increasingly replaced by a new distinction between the "European" and the "American" city. On the one hand, this distinction served as a means of identity construction in a globalizing economy, as an often contested means of reconnecting Berlin to one or the other of its many competing histories. Furthermore, historians have understood the city's architecture as a "master discourse," allowing one to "read urban topographies as special manifestations of German history and identity" informed by the "overlapping binaries of East and West, German and European, and European and American."[22] On the other hand, at the height of the period of Berlin's post-reunification building style of Critical Reconstruction, it also enabled urban planners to utilize the city and its multiple architectures as a language, a "vocabulary of the European city."[23]

Cinematic representation has played a central role in the "shaping of urban images," all the way from the seminar silent film *Berlin, Sinfonie der Großstadt* (1927) directed by Walther Ruttmann to the recently acclaimed *The Lives of Others* (2006) by Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck. As such, Wenders's filmic renditions of Berlin are framed within a complex intertextuality comprised of the city as well as the cinematic. Importantly, *Wings of Desire* marks Wenders's effort to return to "das Deutsche" (the German).[24] However, with regard to a (trans)national context, *Wings of Desire* has also been described as an "angelic remake" of *Paris, Texas*, with one critic linking the two films together as an "improbable diptych" thematizing the "Europe/America interface" while addressing issues of belonging, identity, and authorship.[25]

This presents, then, a cinematic diptych, of a divided metropolis and a film based on Wenders's own situation as described in his short story "Motels," his search for anyplace ("irgendeinen Ort") on a US map and, importantly, Sam Shepard's *Motel Chronicles* (1983). In an interview on *Paris, Texas*, Wenders related that he was inspired by the image of "looking at a map of the USA, prepared at any moment to drive to just any place found on the map."[26] But the relationship between Wenders and the Pulitzer Prize–winning Shepard is a complex one, the long-term cooperation

with Shepard serving as an American counterpoint to Wenders's relationship with Peter Handke in Germany. In his *The Logic of Images*, Wenders relates: "Actually, I was going to make a far more complex film, because I had originally intended to drive all over America....But my scriptwriter Sam Shepard persuaded me not to. He said: 'Don't bother with all that zigzagging. You can find the whole of America in the one state of Texas'."[27]

Continuously tracking divisions and connections, Wenders approaches the American West by mapping "ungewöhnliche Ortsnamen" ("unusual place names"),[28] exposing thereby the ways in which the "special manifestations of German history" can be seen as spatial hybridizations of national identity. In *Paris, Texas*, Wenders searches for the common in the uncommon, the familiar in the foreign, for "things that are out of place" creating places that are "strangely quiet, or quietly strange."[29] Wenders recounts his interest in portraying a man "who is on a journey without goal and only stops to study the map and make arbitrary decisions."[30] His search for signs of displacement involves continuous approximation and distanciation. But if Wenders used *Paris, Texas* to familiarize himself with the American West, the film also marked the end of his "American phase" and his return to Germany.[31] He did, however, return to America again for *The End of Violence* (1997) and *The Million Dollar Hotel* (2000). After the events of 9/11 and the increasing militarization and global isolation of America, Wenders completed *Land of Plenty* (2004) and *Don't Come Knocking* (2005) as a "goodbye to the West."[32] As with divided Berlin, it is through navigating between proximity and distance that Wenders saw the American West not as a destination but as a site of transition, as "*the* place where things fall apart," where "civilization simply passed through."[33]

Linking the senses of site and sight, Wenders's navigations problematize the role of the image for urban history. In the 1970s, he saw Germany as characterized by an "unceasing distrust of images" due to their National Socialist abuse.[34] In contrast, he saw America as the "country where vision was set free."[35] Vision is not only political but is also facilitated by media technologies, centrally those of photography and cinematography, whereby the former is considered as a means not just of exploration but also of preservation "in your eye and in your memory."[36] The latter, cinema, implies narration, the bringing along of one's history and the search for a place to tell it: "one reads something into the landscape."[37]

For Wenders, the linking of sites and sights involves a continuous change between the roles of photographer and filmmaker. As a photographer, he states how he aims at sharpening his "sense of empathy" with the landscape, to "take in" (*auf[zu]nehmen*) the previously unknown, making visible through the act of perceiving (*wahrnehmen*), literally considering something as true thereby granting it adequate attention; as a filmmaker, his declared intention is to "decipher, disclose, and pass on the histories places can tell."[38] Both roles require specific attitudes: as photographer it is to remain a "traveler," as filmmaker it requires being both a "traveler" and a "dreamer."[39] These attitudes translate into cinematic takes; every traveling is a "question of morals," "every take requires...a moral decision since every image expresses at the same time a way of seeing, a way of showing and representing (yes: 're-present-ing') the world."[40] According to Wenders, "you film an

'Einstellung', i.e., a shot; and you have a certain 'Einstellung', i.e., an attitude or approach to the shot—the one does not exist without the other."[41] This *Einstellung* of a traveler and dreamer allows Wenders to see both photograph and film as hybrids of fact and fiction. A photo tells a story (*Geschichte*) in the sense of both history and fiction.[42] Shooting a documentary involves an inventing ("ein Erfinden"), every fiction a finding ("ein Finden"). Many of Wenders's own films are based less on a "script" than on an "itinerary."[43]

Border Crossings

We will now investigate how Wenders's travelogues between West Berlin and the American West deliver important contributions to understanding the urban condition in relation to national borders and transnational networks, and as sites of migrating geopolitical imageries and imaginaries. German and Austrian directors have long ventured into the landscapes of the American West, frequently doing so with sharp juxtapositions of urban and landscape environments. An early and notable foray was made by F. W. Murnau in his severely edited *City Girl* (1930); a visually striking engagement ostensibly set in the contrasting environments of a bustling, metropolitan Chicago and an isolated, rural North Dakota. Filmed in the prairies of eastern Oregon, the striking images of undulating wheat fields resonated across decades of cinematic history to resurface again in the majestically poetic work of Terrence Malick's *Days of Heaven* (1978). A few years after Murnau, the Austrian-born Luis Trenker ventured deep into the deserts of the American West in his *Der Kaiser von Kalifornien* (1936). Trained as an architect, Trenker was equally adept at capturing images of landscapes or cityscapes and *Der Kaiser von Kalifornien* directly followed his *Der verlorene Sohn* (1934) with its moving images of New York City in the throes of the Great Depression. As such, the coupling of these two films provides remarkable contrasts of urban hardship and natural splendor. Fritz Lang, also Austrian-born and renowned for his dystopian urban visions in films such as *Metropolis* (1927) and *M* (1931), engaged the American West after fleeing the National Socialists through genre films such as *The Return of Frank James* (1940), *Western Union* (1941), and *Rancho Notorious* (1952). A quarter century later, Werner Herzog provided audiences with a very direct contrast between the Cold War Berlin neighborhood (*Kiez*) of Kreuzberg and the unfulfilled promise of a new life in rural Wisconsin in his *Stroszek*.

Complementing this fascination with the American West and its settlements ranging from farmhouse to doublewide trailer are the numerous *Winnetou* films based on Karl May's western novels. A product of both West and East Germany, and filmed largely in Yugoslavia (now in Croatia), these films helped generate a transnational "western imaginary" that fueled the rage for the Italo-Westerns of the 1960s and 1970s. In turn, the Italo-Westerns drew a great deal of imagery (and occasional film locations) from the magisterial western genre films of American directors such as John Ford. In this regard, German cinematic history has a close connection with both a mythic and a real American West, a connection in which city and landscape are often juxtaposed or intertwined.

Taken together, this is a complex terrain and one in which Wim Wenders takes a decisive stand. In his essay *From Dream to Nightmare*, Wenders recounts:

> Kracauer spoke of film as the "redemption of physical reality," meaning the tenderness that cinema can show towards reality. Westerns have often brought out this tenderness in a dreamily beautiful and quiet way. They respected themselves: their characters, their plots, their landscapes, their rules, their freedoms, their desires. In their images they spread out a surface that was nothing else but what you could see.[44]

The "nightmare" of the essay title is Sergio Leone's *Once Upon a Time in the West* (1968). Unlike most Italo-Westerns, Leone had enough budget to film in Monument Valley, the location of many of the Ford Westerns. For Wenders, however, the use of Monument Valley in the Leone film made him feel "like a tourist, a 'Western tourist'." Although influences of Leone and the remarkable scores of his Westerns by Ennio Morricone made echo through *Paris, Texas* in the remarkably stylized music of Ry Cooder, Wenders announces in his text that "I don't want to see another Western"—nonetheless ending with a reengagement with the West and remarking that "I'm pleased that I saw Monument Valley again in another film, that I had a chance to *see* it again: in *Easy Rider*."[45]

Wenders had begun his film career by reframing a fundamental trope of the western genre, that of enlightenment through individual encounter with the tests and trials of an overpowering nature, in terms of the road movie. The road movie can be understood as a renewal of the Western for contemporary movie-going audiences of the 1960s, and this direction is exemplified by *Easy Rider* (1968), which offers juxtapositions of the urban and the natural that include Los Angeles and Ford's Monument Valley. *Paris, Texas* can be seen as a hybrid of western homage and contemporary road movie, and as noted above, *Wings of Desire* is best understood as a vertical road movie. As such, it is in this decidedly "Berlin" film that we can locate both the hybrid construction of a site-specific postwar European urban imaginary and an American western imaginary; a construction in which the wanderings of the angelic pair across the vacant no-man's-land of vanished Potsdamer Platz and the death zone of the Wall echo the landscape of emptiness and cataclysmic events that had so fascinated Timothy O'Sullivan a century earlier and half a world away. In moving from west Texas to West Berlin, Wenders implicates not only the borders of north and south, east and west, but also successfully negotiates the borderlands of landscape and urbanism in postwar Berlin through his engagement with the American Western.

Beyond *Heimat*: The Transnational Imaginary

National borders have played a crucial role in recent discussions on German immigration politics in which the notion of a "deutsche Leitkultur" (a "guiding German culture") was put forth and the mastery of the "language spoken here" declared a prerequisite for successful integration.[46] In response, claims for a guiding German culture and its expression in German language have been criticized as "increasing xenophobia" and endangering the faith that there is some "scope left for collectively

shaping a challenging future."[47] Such claims have also been disputed by linguists who study *Deukisch* and *Kiezdeutsch*, hybrid languages that are developing in multiethnic neighborhoods.[48]

In assessing the role of language for narrating national historiographies, spoken and visual languages should be considered as coequal in narrative constructions. As such, Wenders has diligently worked to develop a filmic language engaging transnational imaginaries and anticipating concepts of trans- and multinational urbanism.[49] As a representative of the German *Autorenfilm*, his work contributes less conspicuously than that of his contemporary Fassbinder or more recent efforts by the younger directors Thomas Arslan and Fatih Akin, who specifically address the transnationalism of German-Turkish communities in Berlin and Hamburg. However, Wenders's specific attention is to land- and cityscapes and the ability of the individual to find a "home" for the self in negotiating these shifting locations. His focus on the individual in a multiplicity of physical borderlands has facilitated his cinematic movement between the "wests" of Berlin / Germany and America in a manner redolent of Odysseus. This "continuation of ancient mythology" characterizes films such as *Paris, Texas* and Ford's *The Searchers*.[50] Importantly, the mythologizing of the American West is frequently marked by the trope of the encounter of the individual with his innermost self; an encounter facilitated by engagement with the immensity of the landscape and the "otherness" of a visual and cultural order with new and not readily recognizable features. As in *The Searchers*, there is a continual negotiation between race and culture, law and lawlessness, territory and language.

The complex relations between histories of nation-states, national languages, and film has been saliently explored by Michael Shapiro, who argues that "cinematic nationhood" allows for analyzing both the "cultural articulation of the nation-building and sustaining projects of states" and their opposite, contestation, the challenging of "territorial and bio-political commitments in identifying national peoples."[51] Writing from the perspective of political science, he analyzes the "thought worlds" of art genres to "render American political thought as a multi-genre as well as a multiethnic field of thinking."[52] Film plays an important role by rendering the facticity of events unstable, as he points out by quoting the philosopher Jacques Rancière, through the "contradiction that the visible brings to narrative signification."[53] Film features a "fragmented or proximate mode of focalization which imposes raw presence to the detriment of the rational sequence of the story" presenting viewers with numerous perspectives rather than a single focus.[54] Following Rancière, Shapiro uses the film genre to challenge Euro-American notions of "facticity" and objectivity commonly deployed in political science, embracing instead the "permeable boundary between epistemological and aesthetic modes of analyses and judgment."[55] This perspective allows us to question and inform disciplinary methods and their products, rendering historiography as a blending of historicity and story.[56] More importantly, it necessitates focusing on the relationship between sites and sights to uncover histories of the German city as informed by its non-German, transnational, transcontinental, and particularly trans-urban interfaces.

Critics have recognized that Wenders's genre-bending or genre-blending plays an important role in contesting hegemonies of national culture. Robert Kolker and

Peter Beicken understand Wenders's road movies as a counter to the *Heimatfilm*.[57] Wenders's road movies are linked to the New German Cinema, which, as Anton Kaes has argued, instigated a shift from national guilt to personal memory and yearning for a national identity.[58] Eric Rentschler credits the New German Cinema with developing the "critical *Heimat*" genre as a "legitimate national cinema,"[59] and Alon Confino sees it as establishing the "anti-*Heimatfilm*" to critique social, political, and ecological issues.[60]

According to Kolker and Beicken, Wenders remains a "stranger in *Heimat*"; he acts as an "itinerant filmmaker, lives out the peculiarly Germanic state of postwar rootlessness. He makes homelessness a virtue, an aesthetic"; his form of domesticity is not homesteading but "heimatization of the self."[61] It is a condition in which "not being at home means being more at home then anywhere else [...] Identity means not having to have a home."[62] For Roger Bromley, Wenders conceives of home and family as "mental / cultural constructs of ever renewable *belongings* and deep communal but shifting mutualities."[63] Completing this trajectory of being at home without a home, Shapiro argues that postwar German political culture was reconstructed through the "importation of cinematic versions of the American thought world."[64] As Wenders himself emphasizes, the "setting out into the unknown assumes...a return home at the end of it ....the thing you've been looking for in other places you end up finding in yourself."[65] In this sense, Wenders experienced homecoming when he arrived in New York, where he "was HOME. It's the only way I can describe how it felt that day, when, from dawn to dusk, I walked the streets."[66]

In extending the trajectory of Wenders to contemporary cinema, Jaimey Fisher and Brad Prager see the New German Cinema as a "reaction to *Heimat* films," with its filmmakers going "deliberately and repeatedly beyond German borders." They understand Wenders as exploring the "expansion and migration of cinema images around the globe." Drawing a line from the *Autorenfilm* directors to filmmakers such as Akin, Tom Tykwer, and Oskar Roehler, the authors state the "end of the homogenously and reductively national" and emphasize the "hybrid and even dialectically national as well as transnational political character" of currently cinema.[67] As a "hyphenated-identity director"[68] Akin insists that the "places of socialization, Germany and Turkey" represent globalization. Those who understand "both systems...can fathom the worldwide connections. In this way what I am doing becomes world cinema."[69] Such films tell "our stories no longer from the margins but from the middle of society."[70]

While the *Autorenfilm* directors' border crossings helped to spur the international reputation of New German Cinema, their turning to American genres contributed to challenging conventions of national cinema.[71] Addressing the relationship between word and image, they developed a "new film language" capable of articulating meanings that elude the "grasp of verbal expression." The combination of verbal, auditory, and visual forms enable a greater degree of complexity than any of these forms in isolation. Their integration through montage generates "ambiguity, polyphony, and variation" thereby creating a "Verfremdungseffekt" (a "distancing effect") that serves to counter the "alienation" ("Entfremdung") of everyday urban life. This cinema stood "at the crossroads" between the potential to become an intellectual institution and the institutionalization of commercial filmmaking; the

American Western proved to be particularly fit for taking the former direction, to serve as a "vehicle for political, social, and psychoanalytic messages."[72]

There is a profound irony in the manner in which the American Western served to destabilize German national identity, for it had certainly contributed to building the American one. Historian Richard Slotkin has detailed the fundamental role that the Western played in constructing the "Myth of the [American] Frontier," a myth clearly spatialized in "the West." Building on Frederic Jackson Turner's thesis, Slotkin argues that the closure of the western frontier as a geographical place was complemented and replaced with "symbols that *constituted* an explanation of history," its significance as a "*mythic space*" far outweighing its importance as a "real place." The "*mythic space*" of the Western is fundamental as it is most deeply rooted in the "American cultural past," namely, in the precinematic imageries of Wild West shows, dime novels, and fiction.[73]

During the postwar and Cold War periods, "darker" forms of the genre helped both propagate and critique varying frontier myths. These forms were derived from blending combat and Western genres anticipating *film noir*. Particularly Ford's films were crucial for both establishing and challenging the frontier myth. In *The Searchers*, Ford utilized frontier myth and fact associated with Indian wars and the captivity narratives of white women and children abducted by Indians and merged these with Cold War ideology; with the choice of "being Red and being dead."[74] The Western in general and Ford's films in particular portrayed the west as the "domain of heroic European-American conquest, as the location of the establishment of familial domesticity, and as the pictorial icon of the territorial and cultural and economic consolidation of European-America in general."[75] However, in *The Searchers*, the nation-building narrative is inhibited by the image sequence. Here the storyline offers a resolution transforming a narrative of destruction into one of rescue at the same time that the imagery contrasts the domestic realm with the "seemingly untamable landscape," a space "too large to afford easy incorporation into the cultural habitus of any one group."[76]

Actively referencing *The Searchers*, Wenders's *Paris, Texas* uses the imaging of written words and place names to inform the narrative.[77] The film's opening shows the main protagonist Travis arriving in the frontier town of "Terlingua," a corrupted formation of Spanish "tres linguas" referring to the three languages of Spanish, English, and the Comanche, or the languages of the Apache, Shawnee, and Comanche.[78] The cinematic entrance into Terlingua is also the point of the film where language itself enters or, as Alexander Graf observes, the point of leaving the desert in which "vision is limited only by the sky itself: there are few landmarks and no language."[79] When Travis collapses at this threshold between vision and narrative, word is sent to his brother Walt, owner of a billboard company in Los Angeles (thereby associated with spreading the "white man's language"). Traveling to Texas for Travis, Walt argues that there is "nothing out there" and brings Travis back to Los Angeles, westwards to civilization.

As in *The Searchers*, the amnesic Travis soon discovers that his wandering is motivated by his wondering; his yearning for the destination turns out to be a search for his origination. The only key to his past is a photo showing a "For Sale" sign on an empty lot in Paris, Texas, and his remembrance of having purchased the property

without even having been there. Forgetting his reason for this acquisition illustrates the erasure of the history of nation-building; his remembering the reason is aligned with an admission of his European-American projections. By recalling his father's story of his own conception in Paris, Texas and his mother's maiden name ("Mary Sequin" or "Zechin"), he reveals his European-American / American-Hispanic roots with its underlying dichotomy of virtue for sale. His remembrance of his parents' relationship as well as his relationship to his wife reveals his own violence, his own roles as victim and as perpetrator.

The revealing and blurring of the boundaries of psycho-geographic dichotomies and geographies is not only addressed by fusing the genres of domesticity and western, but also the imageries and imaginaries of European and Indian myths. As Fleig has argued, *Paris, Texas* fuses Shepard's interest in Indian culture (here the Hopi myth of hawk moon) with Wenders's fascination with the *Odyssey* ("Homer" appears in *Wings of Desire*, played by Curt Bois) to thematize the complex of personal guilt, suffering, and forgiveness.[80] Whereas Wenders had intended to resolve the conflict through an encounter between Travis and his father, to be played by the director John Huston, Wenders transformed this encounter into a discussion with his wife, Jane. In this manner, "John" became "Jane," and "Huston" becomes Houston, the city in which they finally meet again.[81]

Ultimately, like Travis, Wenders found his way to social identity by abandoning notions of father figure and fatherland and by reengaging his mother tongue: back into *das Deutsche*. Wenders's hostility to "national myth, both Germany's and America's" resists Slotkin's "closure" of the West as geographical place, restoring the West as a "place whose history must be reopened, as a set of symbols requiring critical explanation."[82]

Conclusion

The early work of Wim Wenders consistently demonstrated a dual fascination with borders and transnationalism frequently articulated in the form of road movies and drawing heavily on the genre of the American Western. Wenders's films track along the borders of East and West Germany, the borderlands of a divided Berlin, the "border" between Europe and the New World, and, in *Paris, Texas* the Mexican-American border. Figuratively, his *Wings of Desire* delineates the border between heaven and earth, the transgression of this border in turn linked to the notion of a "vertical" road movie.

From his early road movies *Alice in the Cities* and *Kings of the Road* to *Wings of Desire*, Wenders depicts the German city, largely Berlin, as a "wasteland" where voids play key roles as spaces of possibility.[83] Deriving his depictions of emptiness and vacancy from the American West, he reframed his earlier mythical view of the United States into a site of transition, a space characterized by the continuous search for belonging only to find one's own otherness. Wenders uses the road movie and the Western to construct a transnational space of human experience where national myths—both Germany's and America's—resist closure as geographical places and restore the west, from the American west to West Berlin, as a place whose history is to be continuously reopened and reexamined.

Notes

1. Wim Wenders, *Written in the West. Photographien aus dem amerikanischen Westen* (Munich: Schirmer / Mosel, 1987, repr. 1996), 8. All translations are our own.

2. Toby Jurovics and Timothy H. O'Sullivan, *Framing the West: The Survey Photographs of Timothy H. O'Sullivan* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress / Yale University Press, 2010), 19.

3. Quoted from Robert Adams, a noted twentieth-century photographer of the American West, in ibid., 26 and 9.

4. From Michel Ciment, "Entretien avec Wim Wenders," *Positif* 236 (1980); cited in Michael Töteberg, "Back to the US of A. Das Bild Amerikas in den neuen Filmen von Wim Wenders," in *Man of Plenty—Wim Wenders*, ed. Volker Behrens (Marburg: Schüren, 2005), 23–38.

5. Roger F. Cook and Gerd Gemünden, *The Cinema of Wim Wenders: Image, Narrative, and the Postmodern Condition* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1997), 206.

6. The Terlingua character played by Bernard Wicki is named Dr. Ulmer, presumably a play on the Moravian émigré director, Edgar Ulmer, justly renowned for the noir road movie *Detour* (1945), a gritty story of things going from bad to worse as the main character travels across the desert southwest to Hollywood.

7. Roger Bromley, *From Alice to Buena Vista. The Films of Wim Wenders* (London, UK: Praeger, 2001), 49.

8. Wim Wenders, *Emotion Pictures. Reflection on the Cinema* (London, UK: Faber and Faber, 1989), 94.

9. Wim Wenders, quoted in Robert P. Kolker and Peter U. Beicken, *The Films of Wim Wenders: Cinema as Vision and Desire* (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 36.

10. Wim Wenders, "Like Flying Blind without Instruments. On the Turning Point in *Paris, Texas*," in Wenders, *The Logic of Images: Essays and Conversations*, trans. Michael Hofmann (London, UK: Faber, 1991), 66.

11. Ibid.

12. Jaimey Fisher and Brad Prager, "Introduction," in *The Collapse of the Conventional: German Film and Its Politics at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Fisher and Prager (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2010), 13.

13. Wim Wenders, "An Attempted Description of an Indescribable Film. From the First Treatment for *Wings of Desire*," in Wenders, *The Logic of Images*, 73–83, 74.

14. Ibid., 74 and 76 (emphasis in the original). On the interrelationship between these films, see Volker Wehdeking, *Mentalitätswandel in der deutschen Literatur zur Einheit, 1990–2000* (Berlin: E. Schmidt, 2000), 229.

15. Wim Wenders and Daniel Bickermann, *A Sense of Place: Texte und Interviews* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Autoren, 2005), 39.

16. Andreas Huyssen, "The Voids of Berlin," *Critical Inquiry* 24, no.1 (1997): 57–81.

17. Stephan Schindler and Lutz Koepnick, "Introduction. Against the Wall? The Global Imaginary of German Cinema," in *The Cosmopolitan Screen: German Cinema and the Global Imaginary, 1945 to the Present*, ed. Stephan Schindler and Lutz Koepnick (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 2.

18. Volker Behrens, "Der Geschichte einen gewaltigen Raum schaffen: Ein Interview mit Wim Wenders," in *Man of Plenty: Wim Wenders*, ed. Behrens (Marburg: Schüren, 2005), 133–138, 135. On Wenders' role in the New German Cinema, see Thomas Elsaesser, *New German Cinema* (London, UK: British Film Institute, 1989).

19. Wim Wenders, quoted in Kolker and Beicken, *The Films of Wim Wenders*, 37.

20. Wim Wenders, "Stinksauer. Betroffen. Bereit zum Kampf," interview with Hanns-Georg Rodek, *Die Welt Online* (September 25, 2004), http://www.welt.de/print-welt

/article342654/Stinksauer-Betroffen-Bereit-zum-Kampf.html (accessed December 15, 2012).

21. See Hartmut Häußermann and Claire Colomb, "The New Berlin: Marketing the City of Dreams," in Lily M. Hoffman, Susan S. Fainstein, and Dennis R. Judd, eds., *Cities and Visitors: Regulating People, Markets, and City Space* (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2003), 200–218; Janet Ward, *Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space and Identity* (New York and Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and Claire Colomb, *Staging the New Berlin: Place Marketing and the Politics of Urban Reinvention Post-1989* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

22. Philip Broadbent and Sabine Hake, "Introduction," in *Berlin: Divided City, 1945–1989*, ed. Broadbent and Hake (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 3.

23. Hans Stimmann, Michael Goj, and Erik-Jan Ouwerkerk, et al., eds., *Babylon, Berlin etc: Das Vokabular der europäischen Stadt* (Basel, Berlin, and Boston, MA: Birkhäuser, 1995). As Claire Colomb has recently written: "Urban policy-makers (and other actors) seek to 'shape' urban images not only through transformations of the built environment, but also through the production of particular textual and visual representations disseminated via various media." Colomb, *Staging the New Berlin*, 18.

24. Wenders and Bickermann, *A Sense of Place*, 230.

25. Tony Rayns, "*Der Himmel über Berlin* (*Wings of Desire*)," *Monthly Film Bulletin* 55, no. 654 (1988): 203–205, 204.

26. Wim Wenders, "Interview mit Wim Wenders" (n.d.), 7. Schriftgutarchiv Deutsche Kinemathek Museum für Film und Fernsehen, Berlin.

27. Wenders, *The Logic of Images*, 67. The versatile Shepard would ultimately play the leading role in *Don't Come Knocking* (2005) as a man fleeing the Hollywood film industry and a Western in the making. In *Paris, Texas* the leading role is played by Stanton, a denizen of the cinematic west just as Bruno Ganz is of the skies of Berlin. Stanton is associated with other late or revisionist westerns such as *Ride in the Whirlwind* (1966) and *Pat Garrett & Billy the Kid* (1973), road movies such as *Two-Lane Blacktop* (1971), the offbeat *Christine* (1983), and Alex Cox's cult classic *Repo Man* (1984). This was followed a year later by a role in *Fool for Love* (1985), Robert Altman's direction of a Sam Shepard novel unfolding in a western motel in which Shepard stars and Stanton appears in a supporting role.

28. Wim Wenders, "Ich möchte das Unsichtbare zeigen," interview with Cosima Schmitt, *Die Zeit Online* (June 21, 2011), http://www.zeit.de/2011/24/Interview-Wenders (accessed December 15, 2012).

29. From Wim Wenders's comments for the exhibition "Places, Strange and Quiet" at the Haunch of Venison, London, UK (April 15—May 14, 2011), http://haunchofvenison.com/exhibitions/past/2011/wim_wenders/ (accessed December 15, 2012). See also *Wim Wenders: Places, Strange and Quiet* (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2011).

30. Wenders, "Interview mit Wim Wenders," 7.

31. Wim Wenders quoted in David Tacon, "Wim Wenders," *Senses of Cinema* 26 (2003), www.sensesofcinema.com/2003/great-directors/wenders/ (accessed December 15, 2012).

32. Steven Pill, "State of Grace: An Interview with Wim Wenders," in *British Journal of Photography* (May 17, 2011), http://www.bjp-online.com/british-journal-of-photography/interview/2036692/grace-interview-wim-wenders (accessed December 15, 2012).

33. Wenders, *Written in the West*, 11.

34. Wim Wenders quoted in Anton Kaes, *From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 8.

35. Wim Wenders, "The American Dream" [1984], in Wenders, *Wim Wenders: On Film: Essays and Conversations*, trans. Sean Whiteside and Michael Hofmann (London, UK: Faber and Faber, 2001), 126–127.

36. Ibid., 10.

37. Wenders, "Ich möchte das Unsichtbare zeigen."

38. Wenders, *Written in the West*, 8; Wenders, "Ich möchte das Unsichtbare zeigen"; and Wenders, "Im Konsumzeitalter ist ausgerechnet das SEHEN aus der Mode gekommen. Eine Rede über Orte, die uns jede Menge Geschichten erzählen könnten, wenn wir nur zuzuhören verstünden—und allerlei andere Bilder von der Oberfläche der Erde," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (October 24, 2002): 39.

39. Wenders, "Ich möchte das Unsichtbare zeigen"; and Wenders quoted in Gunnar Luetzow, "Ich habe einen Traum," *Die Zeit Online* (November 19, 2008), http://www.zeit.de/2003/41/Traum_2fWenders (accessed December 15, 2012).

40. Wim Wenders, "Traveling," in *Reisefilme. Ästhetik und Geschichte*, ed. Annette Deeken (Remscheid: Gardez! Verlag, 2004), 11.

41. Wenders quoted in Cook and Gemünden, *The Cinema of Wim Wenders*, 54.

42. Wenders, "Im Konsumzeitalter...," 39.

43. Wim Wenders quoted in Marlie Feldvoß, "'Damit der Zufall eingreifen kann'. Ein Gespräch mit Wim Wenders," *Frankfurter Rundschau* (July 23, 1994): ZB2.

44. Wim Wenders, "From Dream to Nightmare. The Terrifying Western *Once Upon a Time in the West*," in *Emotion Pictures*, ed. Wenders (London, UK: Faber and Faber, 1989), 24–25, 24.

45. Ibid., 24 and 25. Emphasis in the original.

46. "Seehofer und Merkel befeuern Leitkultur-Debatte," *Spiegel Online* (October 15, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,723466,00.html (accessed December 15, 2012). This critique of multicultural politics was reinforced in *Germany Abolishes Itself* published by SPD politician and former Bundesbank board member Thilo Sarrazin in the same year. Thilo Sarrazin, *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2010).

47. Jürgen Habermas, "Leadership and Leitkultur," *The New York Times* (October 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/opinion/29Habermas.html?pagewanted=all (accessed December 15, 2012).

48. See Friederike Kern and Margret Selting, *Ethnic Styles of Speaking in European Metropolitan Areas* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2011); and Heike Wiese, *Kiezdeutsch: Ein Neuer Dialekt Entsteht* (Munich: Beck, 2012).

49. Reinhold Martin and Kadambari Baxi, *Multi-National City: Architectural Itineraries* (Barcelona: Actar-D, 2007).

50. Horst Fleig, *Wim Wenders. Hermetische Filmsprache und Fortschreiben antiker Mythologie* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2005), 43–47.

51. Michael J. Shapiro, *Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 142.

52. Michael J. Shapiro, *Deforming American Political Thought: Ethnicity, Facticity, and Genre* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), xi.

53. Ibid., xii. Shapiro quotes from Jacques Rancière, *La fable cinématographique* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2001), 22.

54. Ibid., Shapiro quotes from Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (New York: Continuum, 2004), 24.

55. Ibid., x.

56. Barbara J. Eckstein and James A. Throgmorton, *Story and Sustainability: Planning, Practice, and Possibility for American Cities* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

57. Kolker and Beicken, *The Films of Wim Wenders*, 164.

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Part IV

German Urban Heritage for a Transnational Era

CHAPTER TWELVE

POST–POSTWAR RE-CONSTRUCTION OF A
DESTROYED *HEIMAT*: PERSPECTIVES ON
GERMAN DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE

Grischa F. Bertram and Friedhelm Fischer

At some point in the 1990s, it emerged that a new phenomenon had entered the realm of the broader German debate in the fields of building, conservation, and urban development. Buildings and spaces that had been destroyed in war and shortly thereafter and that had long been considered to have been lost forever were being reconstructed in striking quantity. These reconstructions amounted to a wave, one that was distinctively different from the postwar construction that had gone before, and certainly different from the destructive waves of modernization of the 1960s and 1970s.

With rapidly increasing frequency after 1989, historic landmark and signature buildings destroyed in World War II have been recreated in some way or another—often as replicas, or at the very least in the form of reconstructed façades or parts thereof. The most famous examples, such as the completion of the Frauenkirche (Church of Our Lady) in Dresden and the plans for the reconstruction of the Berlin City Palace, have become internationally known and discussed. In response to the sheer number of such projects, the German Federal Ministry for Transport, Building and Urban Development decided in 2008 to commission a research project on the topic. Conducted by the Department of Urban Renewal at the University of Kassel, the study asked: What is going on with this trend toward the recreation of city-scapes through reconstruction?[1] Is Germany witnessing a newly legitimate reforging of *Heimat*—"where home is"?[2]

About 100 projects of this kind have been completed, or are in various stages of the planning process (Figure 12.1). It is a phenomenon visible across Western Europe but particularly in Germany. This wave is highly complex in terms of context, actors and products, motivations, processes and strategies.[3] Before we explore these findings and long-term perspectives regarding German politics, architecture, and planning, let us first specify our terminology, When we use the term *re-construction* (spelled with a hyphen to distinguish it from the general phenomenon of urban reconstruction after the air war of World War II), we mean projects that undertake

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Burg Hamm failed
Thurn-und-Taxis-Palais
Herrenhäuser Schloss
Strehlower Dorfkirche
Johanniskirchturm
Neustädter Rathaus
Coselpalais
St-Pauli-Kloster
Thomas-Mann-Haus
Altes Rathaus Halle a.d. Saale
Checkpoint Charlie
Schloss Osterstein
Haus Sommer, Haus Liebermann Gerbermühle
Synagoge Potsdam
Paulinerkirche
Meisterhäuser/Gropiushaus
Schloss und Kloster Dargun

Postmodern Wave of Re-Construction
Stemtor Magdeburg Festhalle
Schloss Hundisburg Hundisburg Stadtbibliothek Ulrichskirche
Alte Waage Braunschweig Einnehmerei Pellerhof Nürnberg
Löwenapotheke Mittelalterliches Badehaus
Stadtschloss Potsdam
Kaiserhaus Herrenhaus der Kommende Siersdorf
Kurländer Palais
Rathaus Demmin
Neue Synagoge Berlin Bischöfliches Palais Kommandatur Residenzschloss
Reuterhaus Wismar
Belvedere auf dem Pfingstberg Altes Rathaus Altona
Collegium Maius
Marktnordseite Ratslaube Halberstadt Wallwitzburg
Garnisonskirche
Adlerturm Bauakademie
Leibnizhaus Ephraim-Palais Stadtschloss Berlin
Nikolaikirche Hotel Adlon Neues Museum
Schrannenhalle Bürgerhaus Rampische
Römerberg Ostzeile Historisches Rathaus Wesel
Knochenhaueramtshaus Umgestülpter Zuckerhut Hildesheim
Reitstadel
Taschenbergpalais
Ostflügel Schloss Biebrich Frauenkirche
belated postwar reconstruction Semperoper Residenzschloss Dresden Seebrücke Sellin
Alte Oper Kirche Loschwitz Herzogin Anna-Amalia-Bibliothek
Rathaus Mannheim Wulkower Dorfkirche

Neues Schloss Bad Muskau
Kongresshalle Berlin Nikolaikirche Anklam Schloss (Ostflügel) Zerbst
St. Marien Beeskow
reconstruction-like renovations Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig
Unteres Tor Alte Neuendorfer Kirche
Langer Franz
Dom Berlin

Figure 12.1 Reconstruction Projects in Germany, 1960–2010.
Source: Image courtesy of Grischa Bertram.

to build something new on the site of a destroyed structure with conscious reference to what was there before. This endeavor can be approached in various ways, ranging from individual buildings to entire neighborhoods, from painstaking replication via façadism to contemporary interpretation.

In terms of public perception and media discussion, it all seems to have begun with two projects from the mid-1980s (that is, before German reunification in 1989): the re-construction of the Butchers' Guild Hall (Knochenhaueramtshaus) of Hildesheim and that of a row of buildings on the eastern side of the historic market square in Frankfurt am Main, the Römerberg (Roman Mountain). Each received very different degrees of appreciation.

The perfectionist replica and rich décor of the half-timbered sixteenth-century Hildesheim Guild Hall that employed historic construction technologies throughout the entire building met with great acclaim—all the more so since the postwar town square design with its mediocre modernist hotel dominating the square had been truly desolate. Even many of the arch-critical architectural critics and

conservative conservationists were happy. Further, the stores and office buildings in the area were in poor condition and badly in need of redevelopment. This can be seen as an expression of the crisis of the simultaneous aging of the physical structure of buildings all developed at the same time and therefore requiring simultaneous redevelopment or replacement.

In contrast to the Hildesheim Guild Hall, the re-construction of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century merchant façades in Frankfurt's Römerberg market square received a great deal of criticism.[4] While each new façade is indeed a careful replica of a historic building, each dates back to a different time. Moreover, the new houses are elevated about one meter above their predecessors' actual location, because they sit on the protruding concrete ceiling of the underground garages. Criticized as Disneyland façadism, the buildings are nevertheless a great attraction for tourists enjoying "authentic German atmosphere" on their Oktoberfest tours—but then again, it has to be said, also for the locals, who are finding the new historical décor perfectly appropriate for the design of their city's central site for gatherings and urban spectacle, and who are saying "forget about the architects, planners, and conservationists and their farfetched discourse on authenticity" and who insist there is a significant difference between their "urban living room" and the worlds of Disney and Rodeo Drive.[5]

If we call this façadism, and if we wonder whether façadism is an expression of a crisis of authenticity, then the 2007 re-construction of the Brunswick Palace (Braunschweiger Residenzschloß) as basically a shopping center with additional rooms for a museum and the city archives can be seen as a particularly blatant case in point.[6] The huge shopping mall (Schloß-Arkaden, or Palace Arcades) came to replace a central park and sits clumsily in the urban fabric. Here, a coalition of Germany's largest retail development corporation, ECE, and Braunschweig's conservative mayor took advantage of the popularity of re-construction projects and used the trend as a vehicle for pushing a transformation process against the opposition by defenders of the park that was destroyed in the process.

Reconstruction after World War II: Debates and Strategies

Looking back at the debates and strategies of reconstructing historical buildings in the West German postwar period, we can discern how the immediate postwar years were characterized by feelings of shock—shock at the magnitude of the physical damage, but moreover at the extent of the atrocities committed in the Nazi years. The architect Otto Bartning summed up the feeling of many in 1946 when he exclaimed: "Reconstruction? Technically, financially impossible! What am I saying—mentally [*seelisch*] impossible!" Even of the word component of *wieder* as part of *Wiederaufbau* ("reconstruction") was suspicious to Bartning, because it suggested a *Wiederholung*, a "repetition": "Think of the *Zwinger* in Dresden," Bartning argued. "Can it, may it be resurrected as a *museal* lie, as a gigantic death mask?….Imagine complete town squares and streets full of such stage scenery, such lies!"[7] The approach of comprehensively reconstructing large parts of a destroyed city, building by building, as applied to Warsaw's historic center that had been annihilated with the intention of extinguishing Polish identity, appeared unacceptable in many instances. Attempts at returning

the German cities into their prewar state, just as if nothing had happened, were distrusted by many planners as a potential negation of history, proof of an inability to learn, a rejection of acknowledging Germany's responsibility for causing the war, or an act of psychological repression. The notion of re-constructing Germany's broken buildings back to their original form was thus a highly contentious one. Where replica-kind reconstructions of significant buildings were indeed proposed in the wake of war, they were heavily debated. The Goethehaus in Frankfurt is the outstanding example of this. The home of young Goethe and his mother became a focus of a discussion on fault and consequences, truth and responsibility. It ended with the house being rebuilt while many others faced further destruction.[8]

This kind of soul-searching self-investigation had its particular arena of discussion and its time. Contributions of outstanding quality were published following the first national conference of engineers and architects in 1947 and in journals like the *Frankfurter Hefte* during the second half of the 1940s.[9] But then, toward the end of the decade, this discourse subsided. The ensuing years of relative silence can be explained in terms of the Germans' "inability to mourn," the needs of the Cold War, and long-concealed feelings of German shame.[10] The late scholar and writer W. G. Sebald admitted that there had been a repressed agreement "that the true state of material and moral ruin in which the country found itself was not to be described . . . a kind of taboo like a shameful family secret."[11] While there had in fact been air-war literature in Germany, it had found no readership.[12]

Silence at very different levels seems to have been a recurring feature in postwar West Germany. For a long time the impression prevailed that the principles of German reconstruction had been the products of a fundamentally new beginning—after a mythical "zero hour" following Germany's liberation from the National Socialists. It was only in the 1980s that a wave of research on the continuities and ruptures in planning revealed that there had been far less change in planning personnel than assumed. Films such as *Rosen für den Staatsanwalt* ("Roses for the Prosecutor," directed by Wolfgang Staudte in 1959) had highlighted the calamitous fact of personal continuities between the Nazi and postwar periods as early as the 1950s. Now it turned out that in planning, too, many of the specialists of the National Socialist era had again been in charge of postwar reconstruction. Their technical skills were very useful in the new situation, in particular because well before the end of war the experience of the bombardments had shifted the Nazis' vision for redesigning cities away from a focus on the well-known megalomaniac architecture to a type of modern urban planning well in tune with international practice.[13]

Breaking the silence surrounding the continuities behind the mythical "zero hour" has kept planning historians busy since the 1990s.[14] Today, looking back over the results of reconstruction in German cities, we can see an enormously wide range of approaches between the radically modernist way of reconstructing cities such as Hannover, Kassel, and Kiel and the very different solutions to retaining figure ground plans, building, and block typologies, as well as the overall appearance and restoration of individual buildings therein, albeit mostly in a modernized, "simplified" version.

We could say that by the end of the 1960s postwar reconstruction came to an end, even though construction had not taken place on every empty site at that time.

This was valid in particular for the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which was subject to highly controversial planning policies. A very small selection of historic buildings, most notably in the city centers of Berlin and Dresden, was restored in the 1950s very close to their original state. Other historical buildings were, in contrast, demolished for political reasons because they were interpreted as symbols of an undemocratic, imperialist past and were held responsible for leading straight into war. Most inner city areas, in particular, the city extension districts of the industrial age and its tenements that were criticized as heritage of the capitalist past, fell into neglect in favor of building completely new peripheral housing estates. While they were thus spared the fate of destruction for modernization, which was suffered by many of their West German counterparts, they were rapidly decaying as a consequence of maintenance failure.

By 1975, the European year of architectural heritage, more buildings in West Germany had been destroyed for modernization since 1945 than as a consequence of war. This calculation presented by the then federal president Gustav Heinemann was one of the reasons why the year became a turning point in urban planning and architecture—ending the era of modernist thinking and comprehensive urban renewal.[15] But it was not only the perception of the degree of destruction of built heritage that brought about this perceptual change. A critical reaction against modern architecture and planning had been on the rise all over the western world since the groundbreaking publication on the *Life and Death of Great American Cities* by activist Jane Jacobs in 1961. In Germany, the most influential books in this vein were published a few years later by political and social scientists such as Alexander Mitscherlich and Hans Paul Bahrdt and publisher Wolf Jobst Siedler.[16]

The German Postmodern Wave of Re-Construction since 1975

It was also around 1975 that a new wave of re-construction began, one that has not yet come to an end. It started quite slowly with only very few projects during the 1970s and 1980s, some of which are even not clearly divisible from the former era of postwar reconstruction. Among the earliest definitively postmodern re-constructions are two of the examples mentioned above: the Hildesheim Guild Hall and the eastern part of Frankfurt's Römerberg, as well as the Leibnizhaus in Hannover, which was not only rebuilt but also relocated. There was a considerable increase of such re-constructions following German reunification and in tandem with the reconstruction period of Dresden's Frauenkirche (1993–2005). During the first phase of rebuilding following the war, the ruins of the church had been left alone explicitly as a memorial sign of the destruction and loss of the bombing of February 1945, and despite GDR attempts to interpret them as a warning against Western (capitalist) militarism, they retained more meaning as a kind of provisional gravestone for the 35,000 killed in the Dresden bombing. The restoration of that church is today seen as an act of reconciliation, with a group of British citizens taking part in the ceremony that marked the completion of the restored dome.

This experience of a restoration of the missing key piece in a historical setting gave significant support to many other projects, including that of the re-construction of the royal residence in the city center of Berlin.[17] The original building dating back

to the fifteenth century with significant additions in the early eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries had been demolished in GDR times as a symbol of imperialism, and was consequently replaced by the Palace of the Republic, nominally the seat of the GDR parliament but used as a kind of urban entertainment center.

Over the millennium, civic groups composed of a solid core of elitist activists with good financial backing collected a substantial amount of money used for lobbying for the re-construction project of Berlin's Palace. A spectacular feature in this process occurred in 1993 with the erection of canvas façades hung up on a scaffold that created a pretty good illusion of what the re-constituted castle might look like. Others contested these plans as a revanchist approach following the logic of "you destroy my symbol, I destroy your symbol." In the end, reunified Germany's federal parliament decided in favor of the reconstruction and the Palace of the Republic was then slowly demolished (2006–2008) to make way for a re-construction of the old Schloß. It has remained the only case based on a parliamentary decision and with the government acting as the builder-cum-building agency.

The trouble is that it does not make sense at all to reconstruct the Palace's original floor plans. Worse, many historical details of the building are lost and cannot be retrieved, as is the case for the majority of the building substance; and it has proved difficult to come to an agreement as to the kinds of functions that should fill the building. The final decision to house a multi-institutional, science and humanities-focused "Humboldt Forum" inside a stone mock-up of the castle was by no means convincing to everyone. By 2008, what was to be constructed was to be a mere three-face façade reconstruction.

The 2009 architectural competition that was won by the Italian architect Franco Stella of Vicenza yielded a controversial result. While supporters of the reconstruction were particularly impressed about the historic reconstruction of the dome, opponents mainly criticized the design of the fourth façade as reminiscent of Italian rationalism and called it a "palace of coldness" ("eine Residenz der Kälte").[18] Even in the face of widespread disapproval of the project, the government decided to fast-track the process. Following interruptions caused by the global financial crisis and its associated budget cuts, offers were underway in 2011. Growing in intensity, the current re-constructive wave made emblematic by the Berlin Palace has become more complex and now includes a variety of different buildings and strategies.

Typologies and Societal Causes of Re-Construction

We can ascertain typologies for this phenomenon as well as various societal causes. Since 1975, there have been about 100 re-construction projects proposed altogether across Germany. Over 60 projects have been realized, others are still being debated or waiting for funding, and only very few have been rejected.[19] We have mapped these one hundred projects and sorted them into two different typologies (Figure 12.2). There is an easy typology of building types and a more complicated one for the strategies used for re-construction. Of the re-constructions proposed, about 30 are former palaces and the like, including the most well-known project in this category, Berlin's Palace. Re-constructed palaces are located equally in the western and eastern part of Germany, while the approximately 20 civic buildings are mainly found in the old

Figure 12.2   German Re-Construction Projects since 1975.

Source: Image courtesy of Grischa Bertram.

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). They are often symbols for citizens' pride in the (lost) beauty of their city. For example, the people of Aschaffenburg chose to rebuild a former pharmacy, even though the building was neither of any historical importance nor of a special cultural interest. Also about 15 places of worship have been proposed for re-construction and many of them have been built. This was mainly the case in eastern Germany, where the socialist government had tended to be much less in

favor of restoring war-damaged churches after the war than western local authorities were. Even some churches practically untouched by war were torn down in the former GDR. For example, Leipzig's University Church of St. Paul (Paulinerkirche), once consecrated by Martin Luther, was dismantled as late as 1968, and this led to quite exceptional protests. After long debates, it is now being reconstructed in a fairly contemporary fashion.

This brings us to the second typology. To capture the diversity of the wave, it is most helpful to look at the re-construction strategies used in the different projects. Despite the difficulties of sorting the very distinct strategies into groups, our proposed typology may be of some use for portraying the phenomenon. Not all of the 100 projects are facsimiles. Replicas make up only for about half of the buildings already constructed or in progress. Their aim is to reproduce the original as close as possible. As one can imagine, the definition of a building being true to a destroyed original is subject to debate. Does it only have to "look like" before? Do the same materials have to be used? Or even the same building techniques? Which moment in the predecessor's "life" shall be reproduced? Should there be any traces of use? And, of course, there still is the position predominant in scholarly, conservationist, and architectural debate that any facsimile, however sophisticated, is only a copy and will never become a "true" representation of the original building. Therefore they are often accused of counterfeiting history. Still, facsimiles are not only the most common, but also the most prominent type of German re-construction.

As replica types of re-constructions are very expensive, and remaining true to the building's historical predecessor often means restrictions on the ultimate use of the new building, it has become quite common to reproduce only the façade and combine it with a more or less contemporary core. The most prominent but also somewhat burlesque of all façade re-constructions is the former palace of Braunschweig that is, as we have seen, but the "skin" of an ordinary shopping mall. If a facsimile is not aspired to whether for reasons of architectural attitude or due to lack of data, re-constructions tend to become contemporary interpretations of the former building. While during the postwar years, simplification was the most common method of re-constructive interpretation, today there are quite different postmodernist approaches as can be seen by the example of Leipzig's University Church of St. Paul. While the cubature of the old church has been kept, new forms and materials have been used in such a way that those who campaigned for re-construction in the first place cannot identify with the results, whereas the university itself that had originally opposed re-construction now seems quite happy with its new iconic building.

In addition to these contemporary interpretations, some re-constructions aimed at reproducing the original but then introduced, mostly for pragmatic reasons, some quite remarkable changes while nonetheless still trying to imitate the historical style. For example, Frankfurt am Main's Palais Thurn und Taxis used to be part of a building block but was rebuilt in a detached form, inventing two new façades in the process. We may call these instances "re-orchestrations" of a historical image. Last but not least, extensive renovations of ruins make up for another distinct type: major parts of a destroyed building such as walls are in place and can then be used for the re-construction. While not in accordance with conservation principles like

those of the Charta of Venice, this re-construction type tends to be much less criticized and closest to preservationists' interventions.

Various societal trends can also be identified within the re-construction boom. Up until 2006, reunified Germany witnessed a continued increase in re-construction projects. Many commentators argued that this trend would be ongoing. The re-construction boom most certainly is a product of the aftermath of reunification and thus persists as a German specialty. In our research project, we examined underlying societal trends that led to this postmodern wave of re-construction. Several tendencies as well as basic characteristics of German society seem in combination to explain the phenomenon or at least show how deeply rooted it is.

First, a specifically German tendency toward kitsch and nostalgia is a basic condition for re-construction. Kitsch emerges from both practices of the bourgeois middle classes and even more of consumerism, providing a feeling of security and a possible escape from fast-moving reality.[20] In contrast to other art forms it does not demand critical reflection of either the self or of the society as a whole. In the architectural context, nostalgia is a special form of historical kitsch and gives the audience a "break," or breather. While nostalgic architecture of the New Urbanism kind, which is popular in many other countries, only plays a minor role in Germany, at least some instances of German re-construction can be understood as nostalgic kitsch objects. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romantic movement was especially pronounced in Germany, and its echo in later periods has often been linked to the nostalgic components of the re-construction wave. While, on the one hand, the Romantic emphasis on the individual seems to be more closely aligned with those groups criticizing architectural re-construction today, there are, on the other hand, some parallels between the desire for re-construction and the more perversely nationalist development of Romantic thought.[21]

A second feature of re-construction is the contested role of the sacred and of holy relics and the like in modern secular societies. The religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were never fought to an end and were only stopped by the onset of secularization in the wake of the Reformation.[22] Even so, we find that "holy" or special places do still matter, authenticity is being debated, and new popular cults fill gaps caused by cultural reforms of the elites—all the more so in the wake of German reunification. A surprising observation is that only very few such re-construction projects were launched in those parts of Germany with a Catholic majority.

German remembrance culture after World War II provides a third strong tenet for the re-constructionist wave. By now it has become possible to discuss German victims and suffering without simultaneously negating Germany's responsibility for the Holocaust. Historic buildings and places are transmitters or media of memory that can link history with the present—unless they have been destroyed. Significantly, this architectural loss is felt much more acutely nowadays than in the direct aftermath of war when memory was so closely linked with the burdens of guilt.

In and of themselves, the above three—and probably many more—tendencies would not explain the emergence of the re-constructive boom. To produce a wave, there have to be actions or forces, as with objects dropped into the water or tidal

movement. Societal changes of this kind, while having a particular impact in post-Wall Germany, are not so much specifically "German" but can be seen in one of the most commonly quoted trends of the postmodern age, namely, globalization. As Michael Peter Smith has emphasized, there is no preordained, communitarian "ontology of locality": "transnational networks are constituted by their…groundedness *inside* the local."

Moreover, "the contested politics of representation applies not only to any locality's historical past but to the shaping of its present and the formation of its alternative future(s)." This "crisscrossing of discursive domains" in urban preservation debates is, Smith reminds us, "a key dimension of…transnational urbanism."[23] Pro-local activism is not separate from transnational networks of influence and communication; in seeking to preserve or re-construct local sites and structures, activists may function within transnational networks while simultaneously rejecting global monoculturalism in urban design.

Not surprisingly, these cross-border changes seem to stir up rather different reactions in individual societies.[24] In our transnationally fluid era, we find that not just architecture, design, and style, but also local traditions and their built equivalents have become important tools for distinction and self-stylization. They are also helpful in communicating social and place-based affiliation in a more differentiated society. As cities compete with each other, they use similar techniques to create images of themselves. In an increasingly mobile society where globalization can lead to a sense of loss regarding local particularity, people are—quite simply—seeking a place to be "at home." Yet this is a contested sense of home. The politics and power struggles of historical preservation and re-construction are not static or boilerplate; they are, rather, entirely dependent on context: and they are not necessarily narrowly local, either. While *Heimat* in Germany has long been closely linked with (extreme) nationalism, newer more proactive associations of the term have also been developing, including adopting, caring for, and changing one's environment. This can also mean mourning the loss of a particular part of the built environment, especially as modern architecture is often criticized for its lack of intelligible symbols that are needed for communal and historical identification.[25] Moreover, Gerhard Schulze has described Germany as a typical *Erlebnisgesellschaft*, a society of events and experiences in which people's basic motivation is a life that is individually perceived as "nice" and "exciting."[26] The experiential therefore becomes the chief qualifier: All objects and places are designed and assigned values according to their ability to stimulate their users. Inhabitants increasingly experience not just their entertainment, artworks, and museums but also their cities in ways that tourists once did. Here, then, architectural re-construction can deliver an exciting, if incomplete, environment that people judge as pleasurable and worth experiencing.[27]

These re-constructions are often debated in the German public and political realm, and so we need to consider their impact in relation to changes in the overall democratic system and culture. Public civic engagement has become more flexible and project-oriented. Campaigning for a concrete and achievable goal like a re-construction is now more popular than long-term involvement with parties, unions, or the like. Professionalism—the opinions of historians, conservation experts, and architects—has

come under pressure, while laypersons have gained in importance in local democracy, and populist arguments are emerging within debates on re-construction.[28] Finally, the increased importance of mass media has led to a situation where images and symbols such as those of old, destroyed, and rebuilt buildings are key elements in winning over public opinion and in postmodern urban boosting.[29]

Looking only at these societal trends might lead to the erroneous conclusion that re-construction was a ubiquitous mainstream phenomenon across Germany. But the map of designated projects reveals that while re-construction can indeed be described as a nation-wide phenomenon, there are strong regional differences. While re-construction is rather widespread in eastern Germany, in the western part there are three states (*Länder*)—Schleswig-Holstein, Saarland, and the city of Bremen—in which, not a single re-construction has been discussed so far. By contrast, several hotspots can be identified: Berlin, Dresden, Frankfurt am Main, as well as the cities of Hannover, Braunschweig, and Hildesheim in Lower Saxony. Most cities, however, and among them some of the most severely destroyed, have been left untouched by the re-construction wave.

Conclusion: Windows of Opportunity for Re-Constructing *Heimat*

These underlying societal trends require, in fact, special conditions in order to manifest themselves as an actual initiative or project. A window of opportunity is needed to transform an unspecific wish or hidden desire into a demand. Although some of the citizens' groups have been campaigning for decades, these groups would not have been successful without a key moment when their "dream of the lost city" morphed into a vision of the future and became joined by other people equally convinced of the possibility of success.[30] This discourse coalition can bring together different arguments and stakeholders and create a movement capable of persuading the public and political decision makers alike. At least two different kinds of changes within a city may function as a window of opportunity: spatial and political. If the spatial configuration of a city changes or is considered likely to change because of a major urban development project or a specific need for urban regeneration, an opportunity arises for the re-construction of a destroyed building at that site. Radical changes in governance, especially like that of the downfall of the socialist regime in the GDR, clearly also function as catalysts for re-construction. There have been cities where the opportunity was always there—an empty plot, or willing decision makers—but the project only actually started when the society as a whole changed or examples of other re-constructions were observed and emulated, not just in reunified Germany but across the entirety of post-socialist Europe.

After the window of opportunity opens, re-construction projects usually face public debate. Here the historical, symbolic, or architectural importance is central to the question of whether people and decision makers will agree on the significance of the lost building. Those in favor of re-construction will have to provide arguments against an opposition that in most cases will consist of practically all the experts in the field of the built environment: professional conservationists, architects, planners, as well as many politicians tend to respond in a critical or defensive manner.

But their propositions are either too abstract (such as architectural drawings that cannot compete with the public's still vivid memories) or remain on the procedural level (design competition, planning process, and so on). Finally, the ability of the re-construction proponents to control the debate and master both the funding and the strength of the opposition, consisting in most cases mainly of architects and preservationists, will be the deciding factors.

Within local debates, proponents of re-construction tend to argue that the "reborn" building or space will recreate *Heimat*, "healing the wounds suffered" of aerial warfare and postwar urban planning alike, giving back beauty or "history" to the city, showing its (former) greatness and—as an overarching theme—strengthening the identity of the place as well as the communal identification of its citizens. Not surprisingly, these are promises that cannot be kept by the new buildings that are erected without history (or "soul"), and that only resemble the old ones lost forever. This illusory course notwithstanding, until now most debates have indeed resulted in decisions favoring re-construction.

What the new pieces should look like in this transnational phenomenon of re-constructed *Heimat* remains entirely part of an ongoing cultural discourse in today's Germany.[31] The rigidity of connections between architectural form and ascribed political content—a specifically German phenomenon that emerged in the wake of the Industrial Revolution—persisted for several decades after World War II. By the 1980s, it seemed to have lost most of its significance, only to return in the wake of reunification and reverberate in new discussions about *Heimat*, tradition, and modernity, and in the conflicts about the recent wave of re-construction projects. What was once perceived as a reluctance of Germans to talk about the war seems to have turned into a fervent eagerness in German cities to apply localized preservation and re-construction efforts toward an exploration of the themes of war, history, and national identity, thereby creating new perspectives and new opportunities.

Notes

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7. Otto Bartning, "Ketzerische Gespräche am Rande der Trümmerhaufen," *Frankfurter Hefte* 1 (1946): 63–72, 46, 71.

8. Jan Friedrich Hanselmann, *Rekonstruktion in der Denkmalpflege. Texte aus Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Fraunhofer-IRB-Verlag, 2005).

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10. See Alexander and Margarte Mitscherlich, *Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern. Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1967). See also W. G. Sebald, *Luftkrieg und Literatur. Mit einem Essay zu Alfred Andersch* (Munich: C. Hanser, 1999); translated by Anthea Bell as *On the Natural History of Destruction: With Essays on Alfred Andersch, Jean Amery, and Peter Weiss* (New York: Random House, 2003).

11. Sebald, *On the Natural History of Destruction*, 10.

12. "No one wanted to hear of the pain, the destruction, the death. The trauma, though touched on by some authors, was too much, if not for words, then for readers." Scott Denham, review of Susanne Vees-Gulani's *Trauma and Guilt: Literature of Wartime Bombing in Germany* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), H-German, H-Net Reviews (January 2005): http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=10111 (accessed December 1, 2012). See also Volker Hage, *Zeugen der Zerstörung. Die Literaten und der Luftkrieg. Essays und Gespräche* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003).

13. See Jeffry M. Diefendorf, *In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II* (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993); Friedhelm Fischer, "German Reconstruction as an International Activity," in *Rebuilding Europe's Bombed Cities*, ed. Jeffry M. Diefendorf (Basingstoke and London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); and Leo Grebler, *Europe's Reborn Cities* (Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute, 1956).

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19. See Uwe Altrock and Grischa Bertram, eds., *Identität durch Rekonstruktion? Positionen zum Wiederaufbau verlorener Bauten und Räume. Öffentliche Baukulturwerkstatt im*

Bärensaal des Alten Stadthauses, Berlin. 16. Oktober, 2008 (Berlin: Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung, 2009); and Altrock, Bertram, and Horni, eds., *Positionen zum Wiederaufbau.*

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26. Gerhard Schulz, *Die Erlebnisgesellschaft. Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1992).

27. See Jürgen Trimborn, "Der Schlußstrich unter eine unbequeme Vergangenheit," *Die Alte Stadt* 2 (2001): 92–110.

28. See Religionswissenschaftlicher Medien- und Informationsdienst (REMID), "Religionen & Weltanschauungsgemeinschaften in Deutschland: Mitgliederzahlen": http://www.remid.de/remid_info_zahlen.htm (accessed December 15, 2012); Bernd Faulenbach, "Mehr Demokratie 'wagen' aus sozialdemokratischer Sicht," in *Auf dem Weg zur Zivilgesellschaft. Mythos und Realität der 60er und 70er Jahre in Ost und West*, ed. Faulenbach and Rainer Eckert (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2003), 53–61; Riklef Rambow, "Das Auge des Architekten. Festvortrag anlässlich der Verleihung des 8. Kölner Architekturpreises am 23.09.2000," *Der Architekt* 12 (2000): 1–4; Karin Priester, *Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007); and Altrock and Bertram, eds., *Identität durch Rekonstruktion?* 39, 43.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

BERLIN'S MUSEUM ISLAND: MARKETING
THE GERMAN NATIONAL PAST IN THE
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Tracy Graves

According to Hou Hanru, the award-winning curator and Director of Exhibitions for the San Francisco Art Institute, the central issue in current artistic and cultural debates within museum studies is the question of how the local and the global interact and are implicated in one another. Rather than seeing the local and the global as "two sides of the same coin," as Hanru contends they should be seen, many museums are currently caught up in debates that posit the local and global as antagonistic and unable to exist simultaneously.[1] As Mark Rectanus points out, many museum scholars, directors, and curators disagree about the status of global contexts and local meanings of artworks and their presentation within museums. Some believe that the "translatability" of artworks from the local or national to a transnational or even global context is of the utmost importance; others defend the need to preserve an artwork's locality, its local and national context, in order to prevent it from becoming a "signifier of cultural politics" on the global level.[2] Museums throughout the world are currently undergoing architectural, administrative, and curatorial transformations that will make them more accessible to the global public. These transformations allow for new networks of exchange and collaboration, but they also "challenge and re-map the relations between culture, identity, and nation."[3]

Berlin's Museum Island (Museumsinsel) may be one of the prime examples of this trend. It is and has been a site of negotiations between the actual and imagined past, the political and economic restrictions of the present, and imagined and hoped for futures. In what follows, I will analyze current construction projects on the Museum Island in order to assess how past history, present cultural and historical politics, and future possibility are articulated in public space and architecture in Berlin. Since the future possibility of museums is as much about utopian visions for art as it is about economic status, the first portion of this chapter is dedicated to a discussion of marketing methods employed historically by Berlin's State Museums. Next I will explore the various ways Berlin's State Museums have parlayed their current construction projects into a promotional strategy that emphasizes cutting-edge

technology and accessibility in order to ensure future economic gains and longevity. To do so, I will examine the three key construction projects of the *Masterplan Museumsinsel 2015*: the proposed "Archaeological Promenade," the planned entrance building to the Museum Island, and the new fourth wing of the Pergamon Museum. In taking a closer look at the vocabulary used to describe these projects and analyzing the reformulation of the island's architecture and spatial layout, I aim to pinpoint the various ways that an architectural grammar of the past and future is being produced in the present moment. I will consider the plan's use of glass as it lays claim to the architectural language of transparency in the New Berlin. The reliance of the *Masterplan Museumsinsel* on glass and concrete construction, I will argue, exposes meaningful and important tensions between the globalizing agenda of Berlin's State Museums and their political legacy.

A Museum for All Eras: Marketing Strategies on Berlin's Museumsinsel

Currently undergoing a major facelift, Berlin's Museum Island has been the site of both large- and smaller-scale construction projects since the early nineteenth century. These projects have served to "market" Berlin and its museums to the national and international public and to represent Germany's political power in its various incarnations.[4] In the Wilhelmine era the Museum Island was conceived of as a symbol for the city's imperial power. The Nazi government transformed it into a center for the performance of fascism's aesthetics and the dictation of German political consciousness. During the period of German division, it was reconstructed in such a way as to promote East Germany's *Realpolitik* and socialist realist aesthetics; it became a place to experience and touch the realities of history. Now, a full decade into the twenty-first century, a concentration of cranes and other construction equipment is once again visible over the seat of Berlin's museum industry. According to the website of Berlin's Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning, the *Master Plan Museum Island* will enable the State Museums to "bring Berlin's world-renowned collections . . . together again . . . and to present them in accordance with twenty-first-century standards."[5] Thus, in order to promote themselves within Berlin's ever-growing tourist industry, Berlin's State Museums emphasize the transformation of the Museum Island into a state-of-the-art museum system prepared to meet the demands of a global viewing public.

Construction on the Museum Island began in 1824 with the building of the Altes Museum under orders from architect and city planner Karl Friedrich Schinkel. Schinkel, it is often said, was largely responsible for conceiving of the cultural narrative to transform Prussia from a victorious, "military Sparta" to a "cultural and educational state" (*Kultur- und Bildungsstaat*) with its seat on the Museum Island, then known as the "Athens on the Spree."[6] The Neues Museum and the Alte Nationalgalerie were erected in 1859 and 1876, respectively. Construction continued well into the age of German nationhood with the building of the Kaiser-Friedrich-Museum, now the Bode Museum, which was completed in 1904. The final project, the Pergamon Museum, was in the works from 1901 to 1930, with construction beginning in 1907.

The Island saw major renovations during the Nazi Period and after the Second World War and smaller renovation and restructuring projects during the period of German division. The period of National Socialism, for instance, saw the construction of a bridge over the Spree. This bridge was placed exactly at the center between the east and west wings of the Pergamon Museum and cut a path into the middle of the museum's grand and stately *Ehrenhof*, or forecourt. Decades later, when the government of East Berlin was attempting to raise revenues and make the Museum Island relevant to the culture of East–West German *Realpolitik*, this bridge was torn down and a new bridge was constructed. The new bridge was set slightly off to the side, closer to the east wing than the west. A new entrance to the museum was built at this time as well, a large glass foyer that was placed at the center of the north wing. Realized in part in the early 1980s, the proposed plan also included the addition of a tree to the forecourt.[7] The restructuring of the entrance to the Pergamon Museum represents a conscious attempt on the part of the East German Museum administration to visibly change the National Socialist architectural paradigm of sublimity and monumentality, and promote growth and increase revenue by making the museum a friendly and hospitable place for visitors to wait in line, sit, and read or—given its park-like atmosphere—even eat a picnic lunch.

Between 1964 and 1989, East German newspapers spent a lot of ink proclaiming the fame of the Museum Island and the international public's adoration for it. Articles giving information about the number of visitors to the museums appeared with regularity, sometimes as often as three times per year.[8] Especially noteworthy were visits of foreign dignitaries, heads of state and government officials, celebrities of the Eastern Bloc, and visitors from the other side of the Iron Curtain. Other than regularly published accounts such as these, further indications of the East German museum administration's attempt to market the museum to East Germans include exposés on fashion shows staged in the Pergamonsaal in February 1968, reports on curriculum reform that included mandatory visits to the museums, and the announcement of the museums' first audio guide system.[9]

Articles and accounts similar to those from the period of German division were published frequently in the post-*Wende* period as well and are still published at least biannually.[10] These articles clearly demonstrate the importance of the Museum Island as a source of revenue for the Berlin governments of the Cold-War and post-unification eras and for the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation (Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz), the organ that oversees the finances of Berlin's museums, libraries, and archives. A major source of expense to the city of Berlin, the state of Berlin-Brandenburg, and to the German taxpayer, the marketing of Berlin's museums and their seemingly constant reconfiguration has been a topic of great concern over the past century.

The Archaeological Promenade: "Making Connections"

A major architectural renovation of the *Masterplan Museumsinsel 2015* is the "Archaeological Promenade" (Figure 13.1). This pathway will extend underground from the Altes Museum through the Neues Museum and the Pergamon Museum and ends at the Bode Museum. The central access point to the pathway is to be

Figure 13.1   Three-dimensional model of the future Museum Island Berlin showing the path of the Archaeological Promenade; view from the south (2012).
Source: Image courtesy of bpk / Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz / ART+COM / Art Resource, NY.

located in the James Simon Gallery, the new entrance building to the museum complex. To protect the autonomy of each of the museums and their collections, entry points will also be established within each museum. The pathway will wind its way from the ground level of the museums into preexisting underground passageways (historically used as storage spaces for archival material and as magazines for the collections' artworks) and newly constructed passageways connecting each museum to its neighboring institutions.

New exhibits will be set up along the path. Such exhibits will make use of interactive technologies in order to emphasize the overarching themes of the collection in an interdisciplinary fashion. Some of the promenade's themes that will thus "make connections" ("Verbindungen herstellen") are "Porträt und Menschenbild" ("Portrait and the Image of Man"), "Gott und Götter" ("God and Gods"), and "Kunst des Erinnerns" ("The Art of Memory").[11] While such exhibits will allow the museums to illustrate the historical and cultural specificity of artworks with regard to their (often colonially exploited) country or civilization of origin, they are far from achieving a complete "globaliz(ation) of tropes of national culture" that would best serve the museum-going public that is global in origin.[12] Addressing the customs and cultures from which the artworks originate is valuable information for museum visitors, and by no means do I want to suggest that such information be glossed over. However, the authoritative website for the plan to restructure the island (www. museumsinsel-berlin.de) does not make any mention of referencing the histories of

the actual museum space or the artworks themselves (most notably their provenance) as they relate to the German national (and of course former Nazi German) narrative. Moreover, given the universality of the themes chosen (for instance, the theme "The Art of Memory"), it would not be difficult to build information about the provenance of artworks in their German context into the exhibits. The failure on the part of project planners to do so, or at this point to mention or discuss doing so, points both to the dominance of the global context in the presentation of the museums' permanent collections and to the unwillingness on the part of the museums' curatorial direction to acknowledge the histories of the artworks and the museum spaces they inhabit.

The promenade, leading visitors from above-ground spaces into the former vaults and underground spaces of the museum, is a problematic construct to say the least. Such an experience might be interpreted as simulating an archaeological dig on the island and thus revealing the various geological strata of the Island's (and Berlin's!) history. When visitors enter the underground connecting spaces between the museums and their former vaults, they may gain the sense that they are witnessing a sort of unveiling of the history of the island itself. However, as mentioned above, the pathway and its exhibits are not scheduled to make use of or discuss this history in any way.

Almost as problematically, initial marketing plans advocated how the Archaeological Promenade would connect over "600,000 years of the history of humanity."[13] As the Goethe Institute has announced, the promenade will give museum visitors the option to decide between a quick 40-minute walk through the museums on their way from Checkpoint Charlie to the Brandenburg Gate or a longer day at the museums with new state-of-the-art interactive exhibits and audio guides.[14] This path certainly enables visitors to decide just how much the museums will play a role in their day, an appealing possibility for Berlin's busy citizens and tourist population to be sure. However, in doing so, it plays into the very historicist models of learning and thought that have been at work on the Museum Island since its inception. The notion that visitors might "pocket" or even really "experience" 600,000 years of canalized history by strolling down the promenade results, at the very least, in a disturbing simplification of history's complexity. Hermann Parzinger, president of the Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, recently indicated a clear application of transnational curatorial goals for Berlin's major art museums.[15] But are these postimperial, purportedly postnational artifacts on display in structures of German national heritage in the reunified capital going to be applied as a convenient overlay, a method that will shield rather than reveal the representation of the Museum Island's own history?

What's in a Name? Chipperfield's James Simon Gallery

The new entrance to the Museum Island, the James Simon Gallery designed by David Chipperfield, is scheduled to open in 2017. A ceremonial laying of the foundation stone took place in October 2013. The expected cost of the project is 98.8 million euros (up from 79 million euros); indeed, due to underwater foundation work the budget may end up exceeding even the revised projections.[16] The

new entrance gallery will house a foyer, a reception area with ticket counters and information booths, shops, a café, visitor facilities, a media center, an auditorium, and temporary exhibition spaces. Although larger in scale than the original plans, like its predecessors Chipperfield's third plan has been deemed too small. Heinrich Wefing has even likened it to a "Toilettenhäuschen" (a "small outhouse") that, much like many of the other newly renovated structures on the island, will not live up to the task allotted to it and will never be large enough to accommodate the kind of retail space that turns a significant profit.[17] Moreover, with its tall base, the front façade of the structure has been called "die Mauer des Architekten Chipperfield," a moniker likening the structure to a new Berlin Wall.[18]

To complicate matters further, the entrance gallery has been named for German-Jewish cotton magnate James Simon, one of the greatest benefactors the Berlin museums have ever known. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Simon brought his collection of Renaissance paintings and medieval Christian sculpture to Berlin. At his death in 1932 he had given over 20,000 objects to Berlin's Museums, including the famous Nefertiti bust now housed in the Neues Museum. The naming of the new entrance building to the Museum Island in honor of James Simon is a direct result of the Berlin Museum's post-unification scrutiny of the provenance of their collections in an attempt to discern how many of their artworks had been looted from Jewish collectors who fled or fell victim to Nazi genocide. Following the donation of the widely known Berggruen collection, the 1999 opening of the Jewish Museum, and the inauguration of the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe in 2005, the naming of the new entrance and subsequent publicity about James Simon's (heretofore little-known) patronage have allowed the Berlin Museums to emphasize and augment awareness of the pre–World War II history of the Berlin art world.[19]

Whether we deem it a well-meaning attempt to acknowledge a lost portion of the history of the Berlin art world or an attempt on the part of the museums to revise this history, it stands to reason that this move capitalizes on the importance and visibility of Berlin's German-Jewish history in the current museum market. While the structure of the new entrance gallery may not be ample enough to meet the needs of the Museum Island in the twenty-first century, the naming of the James Simon Gallery represents an attempt on the part of the Museums, however complicated, to acknowledge their history and, in so doing, to employ an important theme in Germany's history to attract the interest of twenty-first-century visitors from all corners of the world.

The Fourth Wing of the Pergamon Museum

Similar in structure to the James Simon Gallery, the new fourth wing of the Pergamon Museum has also been highly contested in the press. This new wing will house the collection of Egyptian Art, including the famous bust of Nefertiti. Designed by Oswald Matthias Ungers, the architect who also finalized plans for the large-scale renovation of the other three wings of the museum before his death in 2007, the wing is scheduled for completion in 2025. The renovation project and the new wing will cost the city about 385 million euros, although a revised estimate from the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning is expected in 2014.[20]

Notably, the future Pergamon Museum bears a striking resemblance to Alfred Messel's original concept for the museum from 1903, which contained a colonnade entryway to the museum on the Kupfergraben.[21] According to documentation from the period of construction, the originally planned hall of columns was never built due to financial difficulties and the economic crisis of the 1920s.[22] An examination of minutes from the meetings of the Prussian State Assembly (Preußischer Landtag) demonstrates that the "Säulenhalle" (Hall of Columns) or "Kolonnadeneingang" (Entryway Colonnades) was a point of political contention as far back as 1922. During the period parliamentarians, house representatives, and special investigatory committees held meetings and staged hearings in order uncover the reasons for the halt in construction on the Pergamon Museum. In part, these hearings attempted to answer questions about the earnings of contractors and museum officials and the chain of oversight—no small task, given the fact that construction spanned a time period in which two very different governments were in power: a constitutional monarchy and a social democratic government. These investigations also provided a forum for the airing of political rhetoric about the task of art in "healing" the German people after World War I, the monumentality of the museum structure, whether or not architecture was in fact considered an art, and whether or not architects were allowed to have artistic temperaments.[23] According to these sources, the colonnade entryway to the Pergamon Museum—the pet project of acting architect Ludwig Hoffmann—was seen as a superfluous luxury, a project that could either wait until more money was available or one that should be permanently abandoned.[24]

Information about these hearings and the progress of construction on the museum or lack thereof was often reported in the Weimar-era press. Journalists focused most of their attention on the cost of the museum and the fact that the Pergamon Altar fragments had been in storage and therefore unavailable to the German public for nearly 45 years. Several newspaper articles published between 1927 and 1930 focus on debates about the colonnade entryway. One of the most prominent examples of this trend, a 1927 newspaper article attributed to T. W. (likely Theodor Wiegand, director of the Antiquities Collection of Berlin's State Museums), praises the museum's appearance without the colonnades. The author states further: "One would like to see this impression preserved in undiminished fashion and therefore would like to abandon the construction of the columned entryway, which, according to Messel's plan, would serve to connect the two wings and to block off the magnificent forecourt."[25] Describing the "grand structure" as displaying "earnest majesty" and the open forecourt as "magnificent," this author (like many politicians) held the opinion that the planned entryway colonnades were a superfluous construct. However, the author's thoughts on the matter—on the surface at least—had nothing to do with economic issues. Rather, he described the plan to add columns to the stately forecourt as an aesthetic mistake that would detract from the grandiosity of the structure.

Such a sentiment becomes problematic when we note that the museum's existing structure, without the hall of columns, bears a striking resemblance to National Socialist architectural projects, most notably the forecourt of the new Reich Chancellery designed by Albert Speer for Adolf Hitler in 1938. What we see in a

comparison of Messel's original sketch with the Pergamon Museum of today and Speer's Reich Chancellery building is an architectural paradigm shift that illuminates the difference between early twentieth-century nationalist architecture and the subsequent architecture of National Socialism, between modernist architecture and the monumental architecture of fascism.[26] Visitors today who are aware of the history of the museum and the history of the governmental architecture of Berlin might see the plan to dam up the "magnificent" forecourt as an attempt to mute the monumentality of the structure and thereby deny the museum's architectural participation in Germany's nationalist and National Socialist history.

In tandem with this comparison, the *Masterplan Museuminsel 2015* website predicts how the Pergamon's three-sided *cour d'honneur* ("Ehrenhof") will become, once it is closed in, "a forum with a distributor function ("ein Forum mit Verteilerfunktion")."[27] This draws attention to the shift in thought not only about the function of the courtyard, but also about the way people relate to and move through it. The term "forum" is more user-friendly and calls to mind the forum of the ancient Western world, a place or venue where people could come together to exchange ideas and views. Moreover, by alluding to a "Verteilerfunktion" the website makes clear that the new forum will also direct visitors to various wings of the museum and to the Archaeological Promenade.

In the words of Parzinger, the construction of the fourth wing will "complete" ("vollenden") the Pergamon Museum.[28] The Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning refers to the addition of the fourth wing as an "Ergänzung," a noun that can be translated not only as "addition" or "supplement," but also as "completion."[29] Although the *Masterplan* website does not make use of such language, it does provide an application that is supposed to allow users to view the changing history of the museum's façade.[30] Visitors to the website see a composite of the 3D mock-up of the projected Pergamon Museum overlaid with a black-and-white photograph of the museum façade under construction in 1925. Visitors to the website most likely expect to be able to use the "time-line" to scroll forward from 1925 to the present and into the future, with photographs of the façade from different time periods blending in and out. Instead, they experience the fade-out of the black-and-white photograph from 1925 and the appearance of the digitally created image of the future museum. This representation of the façade's history completely leaves out, for example, the construction, reconstruction, and maintenance work done to the bridge leading across the Spree river during the period of National Socialism, not to mention the renovations of the forecourt completed in the 1980s and, although provisional, more recently in the 2000s. It plays down the actual history of the museum between 1930 and the present in favor of the spectral fade-in, not of a past architecture, but of future design-as-completion.

The rhetoric and representations discussed above feed into a narrative advocated by Berlin's museums that says, "This is how it was supposed to be after all," which conceives the history of Berlin's museums and art world anew. By adding a fourth wing to the front of the museum, the project's architects could be accused of veiling the monumental nature of the forecourt. Such a move might be seen as an attempt to diminish the appearance of the national and National Socialist past, thus making the museum more palatable to a forward-looking, international public.

Transparency and Globalizing Reconstructions of National Museums

The fact that the new fourth wing of the Pergamon Museum and the James Simon Gallery will be constructed of glass and concrete complicates this view somewhat. Glass has played an important role in the German architectural imagination since the early twentieth century. Moreover, the use of glass in their construction locates these structures within the current trend of transparency in New Berlin. Cultural critics have contributed a variety of viewpoints on the status of transparency and glass architecture in post-Wall Germany. Eric Jarosinski reads the Reichstag and the trend of glass construction in Berlin with the interwar works of Siegfried Kracauer, alluding to the use of glass architecture as evidence of the modernist participation in the very paradigm of monumentality with which it claimed to dispense.[31] Glass architecture thus becomes a carrier of spectrality, a trope that has numerous implications for our reading of Berlin's history, the uniquely German sense of responsibility toward that history, and notions of progress.[32] When we think of history in terms of the specter, it is far easier to banish or contain it. "Examined on a more critical, philosophical level," Jarosinski states, "attempts to make a clean break from the past are futile yet revealing of the workings of power and desire in the present."[33]

Unlike the simple symbolism of Norman Foster's Reichstag Dome, where transparent architecture equals transparency in government, architectural transparency is actually a complicated trend. Jarsosinski's reading traces this trend back to its roots in the pre–World War I and Weimar architectural theories of Paul Scheerbart and Bruno Taut, who hoped to mobilize architectural transparency in order to break down the barriers between the classes and enact social change through the production of a transparent landscape. Glass, according to Jarosinski's reading of Scheerbart and Taut, was the substance of the future, breaking down the boundaries erected by brick-and-mortar architecture, leading to progress, and promising "resurrection, a new life in a new see-through society."[34] Kracauer voiced the counterargument to this utopian mobilization of glass, exposing glass architecture as a failed attempt to abandon the past and underline the possibility for residue, fissure, breakage, the blurring of forms, and the refraction of light that "releas[es] the spectrality [glass architecture] seeks to contain."[35] In the poignant feuilleton piece, "Zertrümmerte Fensterscheiben," written shortly after the Nazi destruction and looting of Jewish shops (*Kristallnacht*, or "Night of Broken Glass" on November 9–10, 1938), Kracauer wanders along Berlin's Leipziger Straße in order to piece together information about the events of the night before. The shattered glass on the ground, which is quickly cleaned up, represents transparency's deception. For an instant there is a disruption in the immediacy and simultaneity glass represents, and the seamless ahistoricity that glass symbolizes is broken. In this moment, as Jarosinski reads Kracauer, lies the potential for redemption and critical reflection.

Departing from a strict genealogy of glass, Lutz Koepnick's analysis of Sir Norman Foster's Reichstag Dome outlines the problematic nature of this monumental "window" onto the New Berlin.[36] The dome, Koepnick summarizes, has been read as a symbol of the plurality and transparency of German politics after the National Socialist era and the period of German division. As a marketing tool, he asserts, it offers visitors captivating glimpses onto Berlin's changing cityscape and a

position from which to act as visual consumers of the city's panorama and its rich urban history. Such readings of the dome rely on the vocabulary of the nineteenth-century panorama, designed to place viewers in the context of past realities and give them an "imaginary sense of visual omnipotence."[37]

Far from focusing on the potentially limiting ramifications of the dome as symbol and viewfinder, Koepnick discusses the ways the architecture of the New Berlin recalls the nation's past while striving toward the global future. He champions the "multiplicity" and "polyfocality" of the dome's "instructive tensions," "deliberate contradictions" and "ironic inversions," suggesting that it displays notions of national identity that are no longer defined in terms of national heritage and tradition.[38] The ways the dome situates spectatorship and the consumption of Berlin's architectural history, according to Koepnick, "at once revokes and reworks…historical legacies…so as to define a new political aesthetic in which global aspirations and national identifications supplement each other." This analysis of the dome sees both sides of the coin simultaneously, rendering the structure as both monumental and antimonumental in nature, attesting to the importance of multiple perspectives, meanings, and memories in the transnational age, which "requires us to situate our minds and bodies in parallel orders of time and space."[39]

In light of both Jarosinksi's and Koepnick's analyses, can one interpret the construction on the Pergamon Museum and James Simon Gallery similarly? Is it possible to understand the fourth wing of the Pergamon Museum with its large glass windows as an attempt at temporal pastiche, a play not only on the modernism of Messel, Scheerbart, and Taut but also on the cultural critique of Kracauer? Is it possible to see it as a symbol of a museum industry that looks forward to a globalized future while still testifying to its own nationalist history? Activating Koepnick's reading of the Reichstag dome, can we interpret the Pergamon Museum's new wing as offering spectators a chance to experience the history of the museum from a myriad of viewpoints?

On the one hand, the future glass windows and concrete columns of the Pergamon Museum's new wing and the James Simon Gallery would certainly appear to recall the modernism of Messel and promote a pastiche-like architecture.[40] Adding a glass front to the Museum Island may still allow visitors to take in the original façades of the Pergamon Museum and the recently restored Neues Museum. Reading glass in this way, the new structures can be seen as acknowledging the museum's past while looking forward to the future. Given the elevation of the Pergamon Museum's new wing in comparison to the forecourt, it may be understood as providing visitors with a different perspective not just on the forecourt but on the museum's history. From the elevated wing, visitors will not experience the sublimity of the monolithic forecourt of the Pergamon Museum; rather, they will view the forecourt from above, a position that may permit them to understand its monumentality without experiencing certain physical ramifications, that is, the sense of their own physical smallness in the face of the mammoth, aging structure and the overwhelming shadows cast by the grandiose wings in varying degrees of sunlight. Such a position can allow for a view of the history of the museum's architecture that is situated in the safety of the present moment, but that does not attempt to deny the museum's participation in the architecture of monumentality during both the Wilhelmine era and the Third Reich.

On the other hand, if we activate Jarosinksi's analysis of Kracauer, it is possible to suggest that the smooth glass façade of the future Museum Island invokes a framework of "seamless ahistoricity" and the abandonment of the past in favor of future progress. Such an analysis locates these structures as attempts on the part of museum planning commissions to veil the architecture of the buildings behind them and to effectively gloss over the history of the museums during the periods of nationalism and National Socialism in order to make them palatable to the twenty-first-century visitor. In this analysis, the glass windows and concrete columns of these structures serve as markers of a spatial-temporal divide; they privilege surface appearances and external vantage points in an attempt to keep the past contained. They give the impression of the bars of a cage or a prison behind which the Museum Island of yesterday has been trapped. When read as bars, we might see these structures as symbols of the imprisonment of the history of the Museum Island in an imagined battle between the national past and the global future, between history and new beginnings.

It is not yet possible to say whether the new Museum Island façade provided by the Pergamon Museum and the James Simon Gallery will serve to underscore the national history of Berlin's museum architecture or whether it will eventually obscure that history. While Koepnick has provided an insightful argument regarding the role of glass in the multiple possibilities for reading Foster's dome and the history of Berlin's cityscape, construction on the Museum Island will not necessarily provide as open-ended an architectural experience as have Foster's windows. It is less certain that the *Masterplan*'s new structures will allow for such a rhetorically open museum experience. What these analyses demonstrate, however, is that, despite all attempts (whether conscious or otherwise) to rewrite, overwrite, or conceal it, the history of Berlin's Museum Island will have an almost uncanny tendency to return.

"Somewhere Between Now and Then?" Acknowledging the Past for the Future

Walking from the Kupfergraben front of the Museum Island toward Alexanderplatz, visitors to Berlin stroll through a maze of covered pedestrian pathways and protective barriers that cordon off the construction sites on the Museum Island. As I happened to go along this route on my way to the Central Archive on a summer morning in 2010, a piece of graffiti on one of the traffic barriers caught my eye: "Somewhere between now and then." This is a timely statement not only about the status of the Museum Island, but also about the ability of the city of Berlin to acknowledge its past in the current, transnationally oriented era. Berlin is certainly a battlefield for representations of the German nation. In many ways the city runs away from the past, but in many ways it also attempts to seek that past out and make it visible in new ways.

Separating me from construction on the James Simon Gallery, and under the covered pathway on the graffiti-sprayed wall among the various advertisements for new exhibitions, was a bright pink panel. Presenting a short written history of the construction site behind the wall, this panel also contained three peepholes, each of which showed an image of the construction site from a different time period.

The left-most peephole held an image of the site during the hey-day of the museum island in 1920; the right-most peephole contained a projection of the finished building of the future; the middle peephole held a transparent plane of glass with no image behind it. The idea for this advertisement was, clearly, that passersby would stop to gaze through the peepholes at the past and future of the site, and when looking through the middle peephole they would see a connecting image: the construction as it was taking place behind the barrier. However, for much of that summer, a portable shed unintentionally blocked the middle peephole. This marketing blunder is symbolic of Berlin's Museums and their efforts to market and transform themselves at the current moment in history. Like those who looked through each of these peepholes and saw a glorious future, a virtually unrecognizable past, and no present, Berlin's museums still seem to offer no connection between their national past and their global future.

Through the imminent restructuring of the Museum Island, Berlin's museums show themselves, then, to be at a difficult crossroads on the path to globalization. They are equipped with the state-of-the-art technology to meet the needs of their global, twenty-first-century visitors. They have proven themselves capable of showcasing the histories of artworks with relation to the multiple cultures from which they stem and they provide visitors with opportunities to connect the various cultures and epochs represented in their collection. They also appear to be able and willing to highlight aspects of German history in certain instances, especially where Germany's history allows them to participate in and capitalize on current trends in the marketing of culture and history in the city. However, the museum designers and officials seem to participate largely in rhetorical and architectural strategies that mask the nationalist past of artworks and museum architecture. While perhaps more conducive to the outfitting of the museums for a global public, these strategies do not work to uncover the social, political, and material conditions of the acquisition and reception of artworks as well as the museum space within Germany's national and broader transnational narratives.[41] In other words, Berlin's museums should strive to achieve a level of self-reflexivity, not only in their use of museum architecture and the exhibition of artworks, but also in the way they present and market themselves to the public. Just as they embrace the global scope and appeal of their collections and exhibition spaces, they should simultaneously unmask the national political connections of those spaces and artworks. Only by fully acknowledging the past can Berlin's State Museums anticipate a future in which works of art might be viewed more honestly within a global context.

Notes

1. Hou Hanru, "Initiatives, Alternatives: Notes in a Temporary and Raw State," in *How Latitudes Become Forms: Art in a Global Age*, ed. Vasif Kortun and Hanru Hou (Minneapolis, MN: Walker Art Center, 2003), 36–39, 36. Cited in Mark Rectanus, "Globalization: Incorporating the Museum," in *A Companion to Museum Studies*, ed. Sharon MacDonald (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2006), 381–397, 381.
2. Rectanus, "Globalization," 388–389.
3. Rectanus, "Globalization," 382.

4. As Rectanus explains, there is a trend toward advertising construction projects and the introduction of new technologies into museum space. These marketing strategies are employed alongside other methods (investment in blockbuster exhibitions and traditional retail practices, among others) in the hopes of augmenting revenues collected from general ticket sales. For whatever reason, mainstream retail strategies like the sale of miniature reproductions of artworks from the State Museums' collections play an extremely minute role in the marketing of the museums. Discussions of the museum's current retail strategies have appeared in columns by Birgit Walter ("Die Schöne unter der Decke," *Berliner Zeitung* (May 20, 2010) and Jenni Roth ("Gemischtwarenladen auf der Museumsinsel: Schon 100,000 Besucher in Berlins Babylon-Schau," *Die Welt* (July 18, 2008).

5. See http://www.museumsinsel-berlin.de/home/ (accessed January 10, 2013).

6. See "Masterplan Museumsinsel. Von der 'Freistätte der Kunst und Wissenschaft' zum Masterplan Museumsinsel"; http://www.staedtebaufoerderung.info/nn_21468 /DE/BautenStiftungPreussischerKulturbesitz/MuseumsinselBerlin/Masterplan-Projektuebersicht/Masterplan.html (accessed January 10, 2013).

7. See Zentralarchiv (ZA) 1.1.6 – 7083. Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Preußischer Kulturbesitz.

8. See ZA 3.1.6: Pergamonmuseum: Zeitungsausschnitte, 1927–1988, Section 1964–1988.

9. See ZA 3.1.6: Pergamonmuseum: Zeitungsausschnitte, 1927–1988, Section 1964–1988.

10. See ZA 3.1.6: Pergamonmuseum: Zeitungsausschnitte, 1927–1988, Section 1988–2000.

11. See http://www.museumsinsel-berlin.de/promenade/uebersicht-promenade/ (accessed January 15, 2013).

12. Rectanus, "Globalization," 381.

13. See the Museum Island's introductory video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v =NkbxK3xhOYk (uploaded August 2012); and the critique of this concept by Ronald Berg in "Am Ende bleiben Ruinen," *taz* (July 24, 2012).

14. Falk Jäger, "A Remarkable Success Story—The Museum Island in Berlin," trans. Marsalie Turner see: http://www.goethe.de/kue/arc/pan/en5611226.htm (accessed January 15, 2013): "This 'main circuit' aims to enable the hurrying bus tourists to tick off the highlights of the museum island, the Pergamon altar, the Ishtar gate and the Nefertiti [bust], in just 40 minutes on their way from Checkpoint Charlie to the Brandenburg Gate."

15. Interview with Hermann Parzinger by Christiane Peitz and Rüdiger Schaper, "'Nur Veränderung bringt Erfolg'," *Der Tagesspiegel* (May 12, 2013).

16. See Nicola Kuhn, "Grundstein für die James-Simon-Galerie gelegt," *Der Tagesspiegel* (October 18, 2013); "Museumsinsel-Sanierung wird teurer," *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger* (January 23, 2013); and Isabell Jürgens, "Auf der Museumsinsel ist alles in Bewegung," *Berliner Morgenpost* (June 5, 2010).

17. Heinrich Wefing, "Museumsinsel Berlin: So nicht Mr. Chipperfield!" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (October 24, 2010).

18. Rainer Haubrich, "Die Neue Mauer des Architekten Chipperfield," *Die Welt* (June 27, 2007).

19. In December 2012, the German television station ZDF broadcast a documentary on James Simon (directed by Carola Wedel), in tandem with the opening of a major exhibition on Nefertiti in Berlin's Neues Museum. For an updated list of the relatively few publications about Simon, see http://www.james-simon-stiftung.de/publikationen.htm (accessed January 11, 2013). In addition to the sparse scholarship, very little mention is made of Simon or his patronage in the archival literature. A note on the dust cover of Bernd Schulz's recent book on Simon, *James Simon. Philanthrop und Kunstmäzen*, trans. Dayna Sadow (Munich: Prestel, 2006) calls him the "man doomed to oblivion."

20. See "Museumsinsel-Sanierung wird teurer"; and Jürgens, "Auf der Museumsinsel ist alles in Bewegung."

21. See ZA 1.1.6–6760 for Ludwig Hoffmann's sketch of Messel's original plan. Critiques of the renovation have discussed the similarity between the new wing and Messel's plan. See Ralf Schönball, "Pergamonmuseum. Wie der Umbau der Museumsinsel schaden könnte," *Der Tagesspiegel* (January 25, 2011).

22. See ZA I/AS 015.

23. See the minutes of the Prussian Parliament and House of Representatives (Abgeordnetenhaus) at the Geheimesstaatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz: GStA PK, I. HA 169D Landtag XL B Nr. 4, Bd. 1: Preußischer Landtag Sitzung 105 am 23. Februar 1922, Columns 7480–7484. See also: Ergebnis der Verhandlungen des Unterausschusses des Hauptausschusses zur Vorberatung der Museumsangelegenheiten, Nr. 0370, Preußischer Landtag, 1. Wahlperiode, 1. Tagung 1921/1923, 8, 39, 43, 49.

24. See ZA I/AS 015: Neubau des Pergamonmuseums Laufzeit: 1927–1931, Abschrift zu U IV 2192.1. Zu I 256/27 Niederschrift über die Sitzung der Museums-Baukommission am 1. Juli 1927 im Neubau der Staatlichen Museen. Cost estimates for the columned entryway vary due to inflation during the period. An article outlining Wilhelm Wätzoldt's 1930 speech about the museum places construction costs at 4 million Reichsmark. See "Tagebuch der Kunst. Museumsinsel" (author unknown) from *Das Tagebuch*, SW 48, 29, März 1930, in ZA 3.1.6: Pergamonmuseum: Zeitungsausschnitte, 1927–1987.

25. T. W., "Wo ist Helena?" *Berliner Tageblatt* (March 13, 1927: morning edition), in ZA 3.1.6: Pergamonmuseum: Zeitungsausschnitte, 1927–1987. Translation mine.

26. For a discussion of the problematic assumption that there is a vast difference between modernist and fascist architecture, see Kathleen James-Chakraborty, "Inventing Industrial Culture in Essen" (116–139, especially endnote 17) and Jan Otakar Fischer, "Memento Machinae: Engineering the Past in Wolfsburg" (89–115) in *Beyond Berlin: Twelve German Cities Confront the Nazi Past*, ed. Gavriel D. Rosenfeld and Paul B. Jaskot (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2008).

27. See http://www.museumsinsel-berlin.de/gebaeude/pergamonmuseum/ (accessed January 11, 2013).

28. See Schönball, "Pergamonmuseum"; and Hermann Parzinger and Nikolaus Bernau, "Endlich Vollenden?" in *art. Das Kunstmagazin* (March 2011): 130.

29. The phrase "Grundinstandsetzung und Ergänzung" appears on the website of the Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung: http://www.bbr.bund.de/nn_25610 /DE/BautenStiftungPreussischerKulturbesitz/MuseumsinselBerlin/Pergamonmuseum /Pergamonmuseum.html (accessed January 11, 2013).

30. See http://www.museumsinsel-berlin.de/gebaeude/pergamonmuseum/ (accessed January 11, 2013).

31. See Eric Jarosinski, "Architectural Symbolism and the Rhetoric of Transparency: A Berlin Ghost Story," *Journal of Urban History* 29, no.1 (November 2002): 62–77; and Deborah Ascher Barnstone, *The Transparent State: Architecture and Politics in Postwar Germany* (New York and London, UK: Routledge, 2005).

32. On the connections between spectrality, memory, and Berlin see Brian Ladd's *The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Janet Ward, *Post-Wall Berlin: Borders, Space and Identity* (New York and Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

33. Jarosinski, "Architectural Symbolism," 63.

34. Jarosinski, "Architectural Symbolism," 69.

35. See Kracauer's essays "Das neue Bauen," "Abschied von der Lindenpassage," and "Zertrümmerte Fensterscheiben." Jarosinski, "Architectural Symbolism," 70.

36. Lutz Koepnick, *Framing Attention: Windows on Modern German Culture* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 240–262.

37. Koepnick, *Framing Attention*, 253.

38. Koepnick, *Framing Attention*, 260–261.

39. Koepnick, *Framing Attention*, 262.
40. This is in contrast, say, to the total blocking from public view of the front façade of the former Nazi Reichsbank, which is now hidden behind the substitute façade of the more democratically acceptable entrance building for the Federal Foreign Office. See Janet Ward, "Re-Capitalizing Berlin," in *The German Wall: Fallout in Europe*, ed. Marc Silberman (New York and Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 79–98.
41. See Douglas Crimp's assessment of postmodernist artists such as Louise Lawler, Daniel Buren, Cindy Sherman, and Hans Haacke, who have turned to modes of production typically thought incompatible with traditional museum space in an attempt to expose its politics and dispense with its rigid social practices. Crimp, *On the Museum's Ruins*, with photographs by Louise Lawler (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 287.

The Historic Preservation Fallacy? Transnational Culture, Urban Identity, and Monumental Architecture in Berlin and Dresden

John V. Maciuika

Historic preservation is concerned with cultural heritage. Yet in an age of heightened historical awareness and contestation of meanings, cultural heritage has itself come to be understood as a narrative subject to modification, alteration, and reinterpretation. In the case of architectural monuments, which often concentrate cultural memories and evoke them through material form, preservation implies a material politics of place: that is, people negotiate what will be saved and what will be demolished, what will be preserved, altered, or, indeed reconstructed if a building was destroyed at some earlier time. Reconstructions also raise complicated questions about the past, present, and future meanings of a place; what is reconstructed or preserved is always central to narratives of nationhood and to constituent local and individual identities that coexist, often in considerable tension, within that place.[1]

In Germany, East Germany's legally termed *Beitritt* ("joining," or oddly in its traditional sense, "accompaniment," as in a dance) added former communist territory onto that of capitalist, democratic West Germany. This causes the "reunified" nation to be viewed differently depending on citizens' political orientation, geographical location, and demographic or generational status. Historical reconstruction of destroyed buildings has also taken on particularly complex and diverse meanings in the German context, as this chapter will show through analysis of the reconstruction of the Dresden Church of Our Lady (Frauenkirche) and the Berlin Hohenzollern palace (Stadtschloss).

Using the built environment as a lens through which to interpret historical forces in cultural context, this chapter also assesses how local constituencies have used architectural reconstructions to "edit" their urban landscapes and construct new infrastructures of cultural memory. Moving beyond an existing body of fractious research that more often than not declares itself "for" or "against" reconstruction in all times, places, and cultures, this chapter instead examines reconstructions as expressions of political and cultural power on the part of constituencies seeking

to advance particular group values or notions of identity—be they local, regional, national, religious, or dynastic.[2] It also explores another issue that has come to affect Berlin, Dresden, and other German cities: the increasing role that local reconstructions are coming to play in a growing world heritage tourism economy, an economy that converts historic monuments that were once territorially and culturally specific into the commodified scenography of UN-sanctioned "world heritage."[3] In many locations, this commodification of the "historical" and a growing number of building facsimiles are contributing to the gradual conversion of historic city cores into musealized spectacles. Localized heritage "industries" (tourism-related businesses, often supported by chambers of commerce, local and state governments, and even national tourism boards) increasingly market urban centers in ways that draw upon a historical "atmosphere" in which the architecture is partly preserved, partly reconstructed, and partly fabricated.

Historical Reconstruction as an Expanding Field

The most definitive modern document associated with preservation and reconstruction is the UN-sanctioned Venice Charter of 1964, which UNESCO and ICOMOS (the International Council on Monuments and Sites) continue to champion. Yet these organizations have also begun approving reconstruction "where it recovers the cultural significance of a place," as is stated, for example, in the Riga Charter on Authenticity and Historical Reconstruction in Relation to Cultural Heritage, adopted by the UN in 2000.[4] The issue of reconstruction arose with some force in Riga, Latvia, and the neighboring Baltic states of Lithuania and Estonia when, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all three nations recovered the national independence they had had before World War II. Now constituencies in all three nations are interested in "editing" their built environments, particularly in relation to the reconstruction of monuments and buildings seen as central to national narratives. Russians, too, have reconstructed the monumental Cathedral of Christ the Savior as the headquarters of the long-suppressed Orthodox Christian church, mobilizing very different victim narratives about Soviet communist suppression.[5]

Despite the diminished sway that the historic mid-century Venice Charter holds with ongoing reconstruction projects in post-socialist European countries, it is important to remember that historical reconstructions are hardly a new or exclusively European phenomenon. In the West, the field of historic preservation emerged in the nineteenth century through various combinations of antiquarian groups (dominant in England) and official state institutions (dominant in France and Austria). Nineteenth-century building restorations commonly engaged in reconstruction to "restore" monuments to their perceived (if often historically inaccurate) former glory. In fact, there was little distinction in the 1800s between the terms "restoration" and "reconstruction," as the historians Françoise Choay and Achim Hubel have each pointed out.[6] The English art critic John Ruskin, battling against what he saw as the degradation of authentic historic building remains through misguided "improvement" schemes, denounced reconstruction practices in his classic work of 1849, *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*. By 1877, the artist-craftsman William Morris, very much influenced by Ruskin, founded the Society for the Protection

of Ancient Buildings. Its motto, "Save Monuments from the Restorers," reflected Morris's view that so-called restorers were violating authentic building remains with their imagined versions of historic buildings.[7]

Glancing for a moment at Asia, there are instances where the act of complete building reconstruction is interpreted very differently, and with a far more positive valence. In Japan, for example, a long-standing Shinto religious tradition involves the complete reconstruction of the sacred Shinto Jingu Shrine in Ise, Japan, every 20 years; this has been taking place (with some interruptions, most often due to warfare) since the year 785 CE. The last reconstruction took place in 1995. The next reconstruction, scheduled for completion in the summer of 2015, will be the 63rd time in recorded history that the building has been reconstructed. For two weeks, the old and new shrines will stand side by side as ritual consecrations and a transfer of relics take place. Thereafter, the cypress wood from the dismantled sacred structure will be redistributed around the shrine's grounds for use in refurbishing gate posts and renovating smaller, subordinate shrines around the complex. Such practices are not particularly common, and while not unheard of elsewhere in Asia (the Stupa of Bodhnath in Nepal, for example, is also reconstructed regularly), they do indicate the culturally specific nature of building and reconstruction practices in different locations.[8]

Returning to the European context, historical reconstruction has recently reappeared in opposition to the modern discipline of historic preservation. It occupies the extreme end of a spectrum of broadly preservation-related interventions that has tended, at least since around 1900 (thanks to Ruskin and Morris in England, Georg Dehio in Germany, and Alois Riegl in Austria) to emphasize conservation, stabilization, and preservation of authentic building remains, and to exclude reconstruction on the grounds of its material inauthenticity. Terms like "restoration," "rebuilding," and "adaptive reuse" give some sense of the range of interventions undertaken by preservationists in various times and places, while preservation codes generally require new building materials to be clearly demarcated and distinguished from older, historic materials.[9]

Since 1980, a new and unprecedented wave of enthusiasm for "scientific" building reconstruction (which emphasizes incorporating or at least respecting what remains of historical building material) has spread across Central and Eastern Europe. Constituencies in reunited Germany and in newly independent, reinvigorated nations are resurrecting vanished monumental symbols from the past. However, national and local experiences of historic reconstruction vary extremely widely, depending on historical and ideological outlooks in a particular time and place. Poland, for example, pioneered a now legendary historical reconstruction of Warsaw's historic old town and market square in tandem with a Soviet program of urban modernization immediately following World War II.[10] West Germans in the 1940s and 1950s emphasized modern rebuilding, or *Wiederaufbau*, often erasing historic building fabric in the rebuilding process.[11] Only in recent decades have innumerable cities and towns in reunited Germany explicitly abandoned this *Wiederaufbau*-approach in favor of "reconstruction," or *Rekonstruktion*, of vanished historic buildings.

The appropriateness and legitimacy of historic building reconstruction remains hotly debated among international experts. To date, the leading protagonists to

be feuding in the German academic arena are the pro-reconstruction champion Winfried Nerdinger of Munich and the preservation-minded architectural historian Adrian von Buttlar of Berlin.[12] To von Buttlar and his coauthors in the recent book, *Monuments Preservation Instead of a Cult of Imitations: Against the Reconstruction of Monuments–An Anthology* (*Denkmalpflege statt Attrappenkult. Gegen die Rekonstruktion von Denkmälern–eine Anthologie*), reconstruction is a perversion of decades of established and accumulated preservation practice. This is particularly the case when façades are reconstructed without any regard for the historic interiors that existed behind the façades. Such façadism in pedestrian-oriented shopping districts is often criticized as a shallow attempt by real estate developers and city officials to leverage historical nostalgia for economic development purposes.

In 2010, such projects received a major boost from a prominent exhibition organized in Munich by Bavaria's leading architectural historian, Winfried Nerdinger of the Munich Technical University. Nerdinger's exhibition, entitled "History of Reconstruction—Construction of History" (*Geschichte der Rekonstruktion—Konstruktion der Geschichte*), forcefully argued in favor of historical reconstruction as a practice. Nerdinger's exhibition, in fact, was the motivating force behind Adrian von Buttlar's anthology against reconstruction of 2011, which devotes a blistering chapter of criticism to Nerdinger's Munich exhibition. The exhibition and the accompanying 511-page catalog engaged for their part in a frontal assault against the long-held professional opinion that, in the simplest terms, "preservation is good, reconstruction is bad."

Held in the Munich Pinakothek der Moderne, Nerdinger's 2010 exhibition displayed some 200 detailed examples of reconstructed buildings in Munich, Dresden, Hildesheim, Warsaw, and Vilnius, as well as in such relatively far-flung locations as Kyoto, Ise, Mumbai, Jerusalem, and Djenna. The exhibition appeared to overwhelm visitors with its thematic variety and geographical diversity of examples of historical reconstructions in many different cultures and time periods. The catalog presented research articles, extensive documentation, and polemical essays by Nerdinger and others in connection with exhibited reconstruction projects, past and present. For those sensitive to the post-1945 fate of Munich, this exhibition can perhaps be seen as harking back to that city's defiant postwar attitude toward rebuilding, when local authorities ignored General Lucius Clay, American commander of occupying forces in Germany, and his advisor, Walter Gropius of Harvard University's Department of Architecture, and reconstructed much of Munich's old town along loosely historical lines. Gropius had called for the replacement of ruined historic fabric with resolutely modernist structures of concrete, steel, and glass, as had been done in many other West German cities.[13]

What is perhaps of greatest significance in Nerdinger's exhibition is its absolute insistence on shifting the paradigm for understanding historical reconstruction in the context of the fields of historic preservation, architecture, architectural history, and cultural memory. Nerdinger's introductory essay leaves no doubt about the exhibition's polemical aim, opening with the statement: "A copy is not a betrayal; a facsimile is not a falsification; a refilled mold is no crime; and a reconstruction is not a lie."[14] To Nerdinger, after the caesura of World War II, historical forms and modernist architectural values were pitted against one another in a false dichotomy.

This dichotomy equated ornamented, historicist buildings with "lies," since, in the opinion of such leading mid-twentieth-century architectural historians as Nikolaus Pevsner, Sigfried Giedion, and Henry Russell Hitchcock, historicist buildings of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries recombined ornaments from a variety of bygone eras and styles in an effort to achieve an architectural synthesis that was inherently "false" and dishonest. By contrast, Pevsner, Giedion, Hitchcock, and the architects they supported (people like Gropius, Le Corbusier, and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe) equated modernist, technology-driven buildings with "honesty," since they aspired to use newly available modern industrial materials (concrete, steel, and glass) and the constructional means of the present (high-rise structural steel frames, clean surfaces and volumes, elevators, and fireproofing) to create a "true" and "honest" architecture expressive of the modern age.[15]

This demonizing polarization, Nerdinger notes, remained in force even after the return of historical forms through the architecture of postmodernism in the 1980s. Significantly for an academic exhibition about historical reconstruction, Nerdinger's show and catalog leave completely unexamined postmodern theory's destabilization of linear historical narratives and the possible opening that postmodernism created for a considered coexistence of modern and reconstructed historic architecture. The same is true, parenthetically, of an ambitious 2011 "blockbuster" retrospective and catalog entitled *Postmodernism: Style and Subversion, 1970–1990*, an exhibition at London's Victoria and Albert Museum from September 2011 through January 2012. For all the intellectual energy expended on the topic of postmodernism and its implications in recent decades, leading art and architectural historians have, in these two important cases at least, apparently relegated postmodernism to the status of a hermetic period style or design "moment," with no serious thematization of how architects "after" postmodernism might address history, tradition, modernity, and reconstruction in the built environment in new ways.[16]

Nerdinger's exhibition and catalog remind viewers that a veritable historic reconstruction mania has swept modern cities and towns since the end of the Cold War. To Nerdinger such modernist styles as functionalism and its 1950s offspring— primitivism, brutalism, and neorationalism—have been rejected in city after city as unsatisfactory architecture that has not served communities and downtowns well, and has contributed little to the pride and long-term sense of heritage of many communities. The message being communicated by Nerdinger and other reconstructionists is that twentieth-century modernists' messianic promises of redemptive new styles for a progressive age of urban living simply have not withstood the test of time, and therefore fail to justify further adherence to mid-twentieth-century doctrines.

The past, argue Nerdinger and his colleagues, is not an irretrievable history that must remain inaccessible as designers in successive postwar decades claimed a monopoly on progress and a linear, supposedly progressive future of often esoteric avant-garde architecture. Rather (and here may be the postmodern moment, after all, however problematic), the exhibition organizers contend that history can serve as a catalog for study, a wellspring for the potential re-creation of key monuments that reproduce the architectural forms that matter for the preservation of longer-term cultural memory for future generations. Nerdinger makes maximum use of examples of reconstruction that reflect localities' efforts to rebuild monuments that

play a key role in fostering citizenship, patriotism, and affirmative cultural participation at the local level. Reconstructionists, he argues, seek not to rebuild monuments of fascism or buildings that faithfully "survey" all periods of a city's history. Rather, Nerdinger would have readers believe, they endeavor to reconstruct key structures that help children, adults, and visitors understand what is special or distinctive about their towns and cities, and what localities most wish to restore and carry forward over successive generations.[17]

Nerdinger criticizes his home discipline of architectural history; for too long, he argues, architectural historians have emphasized narratives privileging "the next big thing," so to speak—histories that underscore the progressive achievements of contemporary architects across time, at the expense of tales of restoration and reconstruction that have always taken place alongside vaunted "advances" in building culture. Nerdinger argues that, properly understood, the history of architecture is just as much a history of reconstruction, of copying, of following and modifying precedent, in all times and all places, and his exhibition sets out to document this sweeping contention. Historical reconstructions cannot be dismissed, as they so often are among architects and preservationists in the West, as examples of "Disneyfication" or the mere production of architectural kitsch. To Nerdinger, there is a finer line than has been previously acknowledged between reconstruction and examples of buildings that follow "precedent" in building—between copying, adapting, and re-creating what has existed before.

One building that helps Nerdinger's exhibition to make its point is the Black Helmet Merchants' Guild (*Schwartzhäupterhaus*) in Riga, Latvia (Figure 14.1). The building is the elaborately decorated headquarters of a Hanseatic guild constructed of stone and brick that dates from the fourteenth century. The *Schwartzhäupterhaus* was destroyed during World War II and then reconstructed in the year 2000 in time for the nationally symbolic celebration of Riga's 800-year anniversary in 2001. An inscription on the portal of the building provides Nerdinger with evidence that edifice reconstruction was not always the taboo that later architects and the authors of the Venice Charter of 1964 would have us think it was. The guild's original portal inscription read, in German: "Sollt ich einmal fallen nieder, So erbauet mich doch wieder!" One could perhaps loosely and poetically translate this as, "If I happen to fall down one day, please rebuild me in the same way."[18] To the reconstructionists in Riga, the rebuilding of a key symbol of their city is a repetition of architectural forms from the past that may admittedly shock or sound a note of artificiality in the present. Over time, however, the reconstruction of a building that had stood for centuries is meant to echo with increasingly strong historical continuity, to bridge a span of time intended for generations that will far outlive the current one. The contemporary field of historic preservation, for its part, seems to oscillate in a case like this between positions that see a reconstruction either as a gesture of complete architectural dishonesty and financial folly (à la von Buttlar), or as one of communitarian good faith (Nerdinger); as a tragic misallocation of resources, or as a legitimately resurrected architectural monument continuous with a past that had been violently interrupted by an extended period of Czarist, and later Soviet, national subjugation.

Figure 14.1 Postcard view of the Black Helmets Guild Hall (Schwartzhäupterhaus), Riga, Latvia, in 1910, originally constructed in the late fourteenth century, destroyed 1941, reconstructed 1993–2000.

Source: Collection of John V. Maciuika.

Interestingly in this case, the Latvian state decided to fund reconstruction of a building identified with a foreign presence and culture, namely that of Germany. But this Baltic German monument buttresses ethnic Latvian heritage by bringing to light a historic identification among many Latvians with Germany and Western Europe. This identification has long underpinned Latvian efforts to assert a distinctive Baltic cultural identity and to remain independent from involuntary associations with Russia—that is, when Latvian territory was absorbed and administered as a Czarist province or as a Soviet Socialist Republic. As such, state reconstruction is linked in this case with national and ethnic self-assertion of a sort that for an extended historical period had been suppressed, rendering both Latvian political independence and a decision to reconstruct a Hanseatic guild house both a political and cultural impossibility until after the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Hence the reconstruction of a building is playing a role in the reinforcement of a particular Latvian identity; further, a transnationally informed architectural process is playing itself out within a Latvian national framework, even if not all Latvians endorse the particulars of this vision.

Chronological "Inflation" and Historic Preservation's Social Turn

Might the resurgence in popularity of historical reconstruction be related to changes in attitudes toward time, history, and what qualifies as "the past" in historic

preservation? This is the argument advanced, for example, in Françoise Choay's 2001 book, *The Invention of the Historic Monument*, originally published in France in 1992 under the title *Allégorie du Patrimoine*. Choay identifies a fateful threefold inflation of historic preservation in the roughly two centuries since preservation emerged as a modern field. In terms of temporality, Choay asserts, a "chronological expansion" vastly increased the number of monuments considered legitimately historic by gradually shrinking the interval of historical time separating the present from the age of monuments deemed worthy of preservation. When the field of historic preservation first arose in tandem with Western modernity and modernization in England and France some 200 years ago (although its roots go deeper than that), the interval between the present and the age of buildings preserved was typically 1,000 years or more.[19] By 1900, new laws reduced the time span to 200 years, multiplying the stock of potential monuments. In 1903 it would be possible for the Austrian art historian and jurist Alois Riegl to speak of a "Modern Cult of Monuments" ("*Der moderne Denkmalkultus*") in a now classic essay that differentiates among "intentional monuments" created to commemorate people and events, and monuments resulting from their perceived "age value" and even their "ruin value," where the patina and aura of the past forges a visible, palpable connection to heritage and prior generations.[20] Accelerating industrialization and urbanization helped create an interest in preserving artifacts of the industrial age, further shrinking the interval of time between the present and past structures deemed worthy of preservation. By the time of the adoption of the Venice Charter in 1964, Culture Minister André Malraux of France added the first ever modernist building—Le Corbusier's Villa Savoye of 1929—to France's list of protected "antiquities." [21] By 1996 the Swiss government voted to protect the architect Peter Zumthor's Thermal Baths in Vals as a historic monument; the building had been completed just one week earlier.

Concomitant "typographical" and "geographical" expansions completed the threefold enlargement of the historic preservation field. From a typographical or typological standpoint, historic monument designation gradually broadened its original focus on antique monuments to include religious buildings, castles, and great houses. Following World War II, lists of protected monuments grew to include department stores, concentration camps, factories, and entire cultural landscapes. At the same time, the number of nations signing landmark conservation agreements increased, producing Choay's "geographical extension": whereas only European countries had gathered to accept the first international conservation agreement in Athens in 1931, by 1979 twenty-seven additional countries from five continents had signed onto a World Heritage Convention. Consequently, the number of citizens who thought of local monuments in terms of international or world heritage increased exponentially. The ground was prepared for people to travel along veritable heritage pilgrimage routes and engage in a transnational cultural consumption of historic monuments. Commercially and on a local level, the culture industry could more easily market history in historically themed schemes for the redevelopment of pedestrian shopping districts. To borrow from an article titled "Preservation Is Overtaking Us" by the radical contemporary Dutch architect and thinker Rem Koolhaas: "We are living in an incredibly exciting and slightly absurd moment,

namely that preservation is overtaking us. Maybe we can be the first to actually experience the moment that preservation is no longer a retroactive activity but becomes a prospective activity."[22]

But the issue extends well beyond historically themed pedestrian shopping malls. The historian Michael Falser, for example, notes an important concomitant development in the historic preservation field's relationship to contemporary urban society. He argues that the high-water-mark of monuments preservation in the 1970s, with its great temporal shrinkage in the time it took for buildings and districts to receive protected status, actually paved the way for monuments to be regarded not only as objects of history, but also as spaces for social interaction and communal life.[23] In other words, it became possible for the lines between protected monument space and social space to become blurred when it was no longer necessary for a historic monument to be the Pantheon in Rome or George Washington's Mount Vernon home; it could just as well be the earliest diner in town to feature streamlined deco detailing, or even a dense, leafy urban residential district such as Sunnyside Gardens, Queens, built by architects Stein and Wright in the 1920s, and designated a protected historic residential district in 2008.

Could it be, then, that the interpenetration of the historical with the landscapes of everyday life has to some extent democratized historic preservation? Has this interpenetration also made the leap to actual wholesale reconstruction of historic buildings a less difficult one to make, despite the fact that many official preservation practices still shun reconstructions as inauthentic imitations? This brings us to the way that historic preservation and the cultural heritage it seeks to preserve comprise part of what historian Alon Confino has usefully written about as the highly fraught politics of cultural memory.[24] Confino's work on *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance* reminds historians of the pitfalls of reifying categories like "nation" or "state" when analyzing cultural memory as an historical phenomenon. Simply put, the nation, the state, and commemorative national representations are not the same as the memories of people, who are themselves distinguished through different experiences of race, gender, religion, class, and generational cohort. To Confino, "[m]emory operates in society through a multiplicity of social times, social experiences, and representations, in part contradictory and ambiguous, in terms of which people construct the world and their actions." This is especially apparent in the context of Germany, with its radical twentieth-century shifts in regime, geopolitical division, and reunification. Sensitivity to such conditions and their complexities means, to Confino, that historians should approach "writing the history of German memories as a narrative of incongruities between the sensibilities of the self and the representation of the collectivity in the context of a multiplicity of social times."[25]

Baroque Staging versus Baroque Reconstruction: The Dresden Frauenkirche

Confino's remarks suggest a way of understanding the currently volatile state of debates over German historical monument preservation, demolition, and reconstruction. They offer a promising entry into investigation of the Frauenkirche reconstruction, just as the trajectory of this reconstruction story offers a kind of test

Figure 14.2   George Bähr, Church of Our Lady (Frauenkirche), Dresden, in 1910; originally constructed 1726–1743.

Source: Otto Richter, ed., *Dresden sonst und jetzt* (1905).

case for the application of Confino's thoughts on collective memory. For a time after 1990, when a profoundly altered political landscape first enabled the rebuilding of the Frauenkirche, an "archaeological reconstruction" was the express intention: the reuse of as many of the original stones from the church as possible, in combination with newly quarried stone. The new stone was to be obtained from historic upstream quarries of the Elbe that traditionally provided Dresden with its well-known *sächsischer Sandstein*, or Saxon sandstone. For some, this archaeological reconstruction represented the fulfillment of intentions voiced at the conclusion of World War II, when many Dresdeners held out hope for rebuilding the 200-year-old symbol of their city (Figure 14.2).

While no reconstruction of the Frauenkirche ever came to pass during the era of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a complex series of meaningful preservation-related events did. As the art historian Christiane Hertel has noted, Saxon archaeologists and preservation officials promoted the stabilization and preservation of the church ruins by consecrating them, in May 1967, as a memorial to the civilian victims of the Allied bombing and, as such, a memorial to the dead and to the church's own destruction in 1945. In some respects, this caused the Frauenkirche ruins to take on a new status as a historic monument, not as a structure per se, but in the form of a dramatic, yet stabilized ruin. At least anecdotally if not officially, some circles in the GDR understood that this consecration of a ruin was an ideal interim site-stabilization; one day, perhaps, authorities would be in a position to actually rebuild the church. Opinion on the matter, not surprisingly,

was divided—and not least on either side of the two former Cold War Germanys. Hertel writes: "Especially in West Germany, the memorial ruin was a welcome and seemingly unalterable given, whereas [in the East] interest in the hope for the reconstruction of the Frauenkirche never entirely perished. Therefore it is not surprising that the idea of undertaking [an archaeological reconstruction] . . . was voiced immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall."[26]

Hertel's research offers a personal and highly perceptive account of the ideological slippages and renegotiations of meaning that took place over the course of the Frauenkirche reconstruction. Hers is a story of the city setting out to reconstruct what Rudy Koshar usefully terms its "memory landscape." In the old city this included a constellation of reconstructed and restored baroque monuments by Gottfried Semper and George Bähr, along with vernacular mercantile buildings comprising the Dresden Neumarkt during the era of Augustus the Strong, Elector of Saxony and a great patron of architecture and the arts until his death in 1733.[27] Yet the market-driven reconstruction of the Neumarkt area around the reconstructed Frauenkirche now features new building re-creations with little fidelity to actual baroque buildings that once stood on these sites. Criticizing this direction of redevelopment in Dresden as a travesty that has yielded a "Las Vegas on the Elbe River," the architecture critic Andreas Ruby denounced the new buildings executed in the "business baroque" style as inauthentic. He noted that some surviving buildings during the GDR era had actually retained original eighteenth-century baroque vaults in their basements, but these were destroyed when post-reunification developers elected to excavate new underground parking garages for the historic city center.[28] Ruby has criticized Dresdeners' seeming obsession with generating as many vanished as well as fictive elements of the eighteenth-century baroque era as possible, as though architectural contributions from the Renaissance, the nineteenth century, or even the GDR era had never existed. Such a static representation of baroque-era Dresden as somehow capturing the city's "actual essence" (*eigentliches Wesen*), asserts Ruby, has caused theater-set urbanism to win out over thoughtful change—change that would have been appreciated by no less a creative architectural thinker than Augustus the Strong.

The popularity of the baroque in Dresden endures in spite of the criticism, not least because of the powerful symbolism of the baroque Frauenkirche. After 1990, the high-tech crafting of new stones and repositioned stones from the original Frauenkirche demonstrated local authorities' interest in a reconstruction that was as scientific and true to the original architecture as possible. Authorities rejected all suggestions to encase any part of the reconstructed building in avant-garde framing elements, or to place any portion behind glass, as such additions would only starkly remind visitors of the difference between the original and the reconstruction. Any such musealizing contemporary glass vitrines or other visible avant-garde architectural displays on the church's façade would, in other words, produce a version of Bertolt Brecht's "alienation effect," emphasizing the reconstruction as a spectacle rather than as a restored, historic sacred space.

The integration of a reconstructed church into the life and landscape of the city was an unambiguous priority, with only the old and new stones providing a record of the church's original and newly introduced building materials. Builders concealed

such structural reinforcements as additional steel anchor rings and elongated steel rods in the main cornice and cupola within the sandstone structure to preserve the historical appearance of the church and to mimic Bähr's original iron reinforcing rings. Over time, the weathering processes that blacken and protect Elbe sandstone behind a hardened, iron-infused oxidation layer will render the newly carved sandstone blocks all but indistinguishable from the old, original blocks.[29] Inside, only at one spot has a modern altar-like sculpture been inserted in the church's catacombs by artist Anish Kapoor, famous for the Cloud Gate sculpture in Chicago's Millennium Park.

The scientific reconstruction of the Frauenkirche was interrupted in 1994, when financial difficulties at the Frauenkirche Foundation prompted more national and international forces to assume decisive roles in financing and directing the project. New players included the Dresdner Bank, the American Friends of Dresden, and the CDU government of Helmut Kohl. Reflecting the increasingly international and mass tourist dimension of world cultural heritage, a variety of new mass appeals began to close gaps in the construction budget. The foundation sold splinters of original church stone in Frauenkirche wrist watches, for example, while Dresdner Bank branches across Germany displayed information panels and coin collection boxes in the form of models of the Frauenkirche. Nonetheless, it became clear that more drastic cost-saving measures would have to be taken—measures that would violate the initial resolution to use only the Frauenkirche's original stones and newly quarried stones of the same type to reconstruct the church. As Hertel documents, engineers and archaeologists collaborated to salvage stone blocks from the Torgau bridge following its demolition in 1996; this historic bridge was the site where Soviet and American troops first made contact in 1945. Instead of employing newly quarried stone into the church, the 60 masons and bricklayers working at the Frauenkirche incorporated blocks of Torgau bridge sandstone into the vaulted ceiling of the crypt. Certainly, pragmatic reuse of the stones saved on the costs of mining new blocks, but this solution moved the project away from the stated ideal: an archaeological reconstruction consisting entirely of the old, original building materials and new, specially quarried Saxon sandstone.[30]

Meanwhile, new billboards around the construction site reflected the roles and attitudes of the project's new participants. One proclaimed that the completed church would return the Frauenkirche to "the world of culture." The ambiguous phrasing, according to Hertel's study, implied the end of the building's fate as a ruin in a communist era lacking the vision, capabilities, or will to reconstruct the church, on the one hand, *and* the rebirth of the church within the more "enlightened" Western cultural and political framework on the other.[31] The language of the billboard certainly elided the highly personal memories of multiple social and local institutional actors in favor of an overarching official narrative. This in turn rendered the project uncanny to many residents and visitors who had witnessed various phases of the church's incarnation as a "monumental ruin" (1967–1990), a vaunted "archaeological reconstruction" (1990–1994), and, eventually, as a pragmatic, Western-inflected reconstruction (1994–2004). The Kohl government and its successors appear to have claimed the Frauenkirche as a combined symbol of a new German postcommunist unity. Locally, however, and over the span of centuries

if not decades, the gradual weathering of the new and old stones will combine with demographic realities to naturalize the expertly reconstructed church.[32] At that point, it will be the challenge of new generations to preserve narratives about the church and its reconstruction, or to fashion new ones about the nature of the "new-old" baroque style of commercial buildings that surround the Frauenkirche in the Dresden Neumarkt.

Palace Coup: Demolition and Reconstruction at Berlin's Stadtschloss

Confino's insightful remarks on how historians of Germany should pursue the "overlap" or "incongruity" that exists "between individual and collective, public and private, celebratory and every day, and official and underground memory" can certainly also be applied to central Berlin.[33] Among the capital's most contested sites of monument destruction and reconstruction has been the area historically occupied by the Berlin City Palace (1451–1951), the GDR Palace of the Republic (1977–2009), and the precinct of historic buildings that surrounds it.[34] Originally begun in 1443 as a medieval palace-fortress and seat of Brandenburg-Prussia's Hohenzollern dynasty (1415–1918), the Berlin palace complex grew ever larger in tandem with the capital city over which Hohenzollern margraves, Hohenzollern electors, Hohenzollern kings, and later Hohenzollern emperors presided.

In 1945, aerial bombardment destroyed 75 percent of this former seat of Prussian rule; although most of the roofs collapsed, all of the exterior walls of the hulking, four-story palace remained intact, and the 20 percent of rooms and halls that survived were put to immediate postwar use as museum and exhibition spaces. In 1950, however, East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht returned from a trip to Moscow and ordered the leveling of the entire 500-year-old building complex, reportedly to create the necessary open space for a plaza and parade ground that would acquire the name "Marx-Engels Plaza." The Berlin palace was only the largest among thousands of war-damaged buildings cleared in East Berlin to remake this *Ostzone* into a modern "Hauptstadt der DDR" (Capital of the German Democratic Republic). By the late 1950s, the East German capital was replete with kilometer-long socialist realist boulevards and modern housing tower blocks intended to symbolize socialist victory over the "rental barracks" and courtyard apartment developments that characterized prewar capitalist Berlin. Indeed, it is no accident that the official seal of the GDR was not a Soviet-style hammer and sickle, but rather the architect's compass and hammer. This symbol combined with an official slogan that trumpeted the "building of socialism" (*Aufbau des Sozialismus*) on banners at such construction sites as the monumental, neoclassical Stalinallee. Just as Soviet authorities triumphantly proclaimed the emergence of a new *Homo Sovieticus*, East German cities and socioeconomic organization claimed to be creating the "new socialist man and woman."[35]

By the 1970s, Walter Ulbricht's successor, Erich Honecker, would oversee the construction of a modern, marble and glass showcase building on the oldest portion of the former Hohenzollern palace site. Named the Palace of the Republic, and completed in 1977 to the designs of the Architectural Collective of Heinz Graffunder, this "people's palace" contained not only the seat of the East German parliament,

Figure 14.3 Heinz Graffunder Architectural Collective, exterior view of the Palast der Republik, East Berlin, 1973–1976; here, c. 1980.

Source: Photo courtesy of the Wende Museum and Archive of the Cold War, Los Angeles.

but also a public movie theater, ballrooms, bowling alleys, a concert hall, and a dozen restaurants and cafés (Figure 14.3). Yet multiple projections of transnational meaning and memory would come to be associated with this socialist architectural landmark, depending on whether one saw it from the West or from the East bloc of Europe. For example, in her book, *The Future of Nostalgia*, the Russian-born Harvard comparative literature professor Svetlana Boym remembers the journey she took with her mother from their native Leningrad/St. Petersburg to East Germany in 1976—"our first trip 'to the West' and the first crossing of the Soviet border." She vividly recalls:

> We visited the clothing stores as one would visit a museum and gawked together with a group of Soviet military wives at jackets and boots available to the German people. We were treated with cool impatience like cheap barbarians with bad man-ners...Most impressive of all was our trip to Alexanderplatz and Marx Engels Platz with the newly built Palace of the Republic. We had never seen such a triumph of modern architecture that for me represented the West. It had windows of shaded glass that spoke of exotic places and bristled with opportunities. It was open to the public and appeared more democratic than Russian government buildings. It was in this palace that we tried our first Western drink: chilled orange juice, one for two, which was as much as we could afford.[36]

Boym's individual cultural memory assumed new poignancy when, following German reunification in 1990, one grassroots organization emerged to support a reconstruction of the Hohenzollern palace, and another supported conservation of the Palace of the Republic. Other citizens advocated turning this overdetermined Berlin site into a landscaped public park free of any government buildings. Still

others motioned to create an inclusive, "hybrid" structure that would connect the Palace of the Republic to a reconstructed portion of the Hohenzollern palace to explicitly acknowledge the multiple phases of Prussian and German history at the site.

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall, it was unclear what would come to pass. By 1992, several enthusiasts, led by the Hamburg businessman Wilhelm von Boddien, founded the controversial yet decisively influential Association for the Support of the Berlin Palace (Förderverein Berliner Stadtschloss e.V.). The association mounted an exhibition about the history and fate of the Berlin palace entitled "The Palace? An Exhibition about the Center of Berlin"; the exhibition catalog came with bank transfer slips for potential donors and visitors to wire money to the association's account.[37] To solicit media attention and financial support, and to fire the imagination of visitors and city residents generally, from 1993 to 1994 the organizers erected a giant scaffolding that supported a full-size reproduction of the original palace façade shown emerging from the mirrored side of the Palace of the Republic, and covering the original footprint of the Hohenzollern palace's original site. Preservationists who recognized the historical worth of the GDR's Palace of the Republic were horrified that East Germany's flagship of modernist building from the 1970s might be endangered by a movement to reconstruct the entire Hohenzollern palace.[38] Commenting on the situation, political philosopher Susan Buck-Morss was quoted by Boym in *The Future of Nostalgia* as saying that the gigantic vinyl print façade reproduction was "a brilliant example of postmodern principles: what couldn't be resolved politically was resolved aesthetically: a pseudo-Schloss to provide a pseudo-nation with a pseudo-past. It reduces national identity to a tourist attraction and stages the German nation as a theme park."[39] Buck-Morss's damning observation brings all the skepticism about reconstruction to the fore, especially in the absence of all but the slightest of authentic building remains. But might Berlin's "staging" of its past in a recreated Hohenzollern palace façade assume different meaning under current conditions of actual building reconstruction?

To be sure, the Italian architect Franco Stella's prize-winning project from 2008 to reconstruct three historic façades of the Berlin palace as a new "Humboldt Forum," a home for the capital's historically displaced museums, libraries, and institutes, is an ongoing dramatic tale. Disputed right up until an official cornerstone-laying ceremony at the palace site on June 12, 2013 (an event attended by the federal president, Joachim Gauck, but, notably, not by Chancellor Angela Merkel), the €600 million project has nonetheless received significant financial support from backers taking the long view. These include the private Association for the Berlin Palace along with local, state, and especially federal sources. One international funding source is also playing a role: an expanded version of the American Friends of Dresden, which once raised funds for the Dresden Frauenkirche, now holds fundraisers on behalf of the Berlin Palace Foundation-Humboldt Forum.

Construction of Stella's designs for the palace currently proceed in accordance with available funding—an issue that remains to be fully solved, with attendant political controversy and lively discussions in the press. Eventually the reconstructed palace façades of the new Humboldt Forum are slated to house modern interiors for an array of educational, cultural, and scientific facilities. These include a future

museum for non-European art, comprising the ethnographic collections that had been moved to the Berlin suburb of Dahlem; a museum of sciences from the historic and likewise displaced Leibniz Society and Academy of Sciences; and a so-called library of arts and sciences, made up of selected holdings from the city and state libraries. Finally, there is to be a cultural events agora slated for inclusion in a reconstructed (but covered) version of the Grosser Schlosshof (or Eosanderhof), the largest, westernmost courtyard of the palace. It is still unclear whether funds will be raised to reconstruct the large nineteenth-century dome originally designed by Friedrich August Stüler.

Meanwhile, in June 2011 a five-story Humboldt Box and observation deck opened to help generate enthusiasm and support for the project from its prominent location at the north end of the palace site. Berlin has a tradition of employing such Info Boxes, notably at the site of massive construction projects at Potsdamer Platz and the Sony Center in the mid-1990s. Unlike the free admission granted to the bright red Info Box that informed visitors about the high-rises and shopping arcade emerging at Potsdamer Platz, visitors to the Humboldt Forum Info Box are being charged a €4 admission fee. This unusual fee is understood by many as a sign of the difficult funding circumstances facing palace reconstruction authorities. As of July 2013, the palace is in the early stages of a reconstruction consisting largely of an entirely new, modern building and infrastructure. This modern building will be housed inside a reconstructed baroque building envelope created of new carved and cut stones, with perhaps some minor archaeological accents—the odd original column or stone recovered from a nearly forgotten warehouse, and glass floor coverings to allow visitors to view the exposed partial remnants of historic palace basements.

As is well documented, the decision to reconstruct the Stadtschloss came at the expense of at least two notable GDR structures. One, the GDR Foreign Office, was completed in 1969 by a GDR architectural collective led by Josef Kaiser. The demolition of the Foreign Office prompted little outcry as cranes moved in to begin a demolition process that lasted from October through December 1995. The other was the iconic Palace of the Republic. A protracted process of fainthearted preservation during the 1990s and then more aggressive dismantling (*Rückbau*) of this Palace came to a conclusion in February 2009, when the last recycled steel beams were sold off for scrap, reportedly incorporated into the steel frame of the world's tallest building, the half-mile-high Burj Khalifa in Dubai.

The dynamics behind the decision to reconstruct Berlin's City Palace were, in fact, driven by appeals made from four viewpoints, specifically its historical, geographical, symbolic, and urban significance. Proponents of palace reconstruction gained maximum momentum for the historical point of view by pointing to the simple fact that it was the Hohenzollern family's elevation to Elector status in the fifteenth-century Holy Roman Empire, and their subsequent move to this relatively small town on the Spree River from Franconia, that gave rise to the palace and the rapid growth of the town in the centuries that followed. The sound bite used most frequently in the post–Cold War palace reconstruction debates was: "The Palace was not in Berlin—the Palace WAS Berlin" (Das Schloss lag nicht in Berlin—Berlin war das Schloss). This phrase was coined in 1992 by the Berlin historian Wolf Jobst Siedler as the title of what has become an oft-reprinted article.[40] By invoking the

palace as the beating historical heart of the city almost from its inception, reconstructionists emphasized the building's centrality and the role that its royal occupants played in the evolution of the city for over 500 years. The 14-year period during which the offending Palace of the Republic served as a showcase for the "Socialist Party Dictatorship," which is how the Federal Republic refers to this day to an East German state that dynamited the palace ruins in 1950, was judged to represent insufficient cause for the preservation of a socialist palace over a resurrected Berlin palace (Figure 14.4).

This argument fed into several others. Geographical and historical essentialism justified the reconstruction of a replica. This replica is then offered paradoxically as an authentic expression of Berlin's history and a sense of loyalty on the part of leading constituencies to institutions like the monarchy that indelibly shaped Berlin, Brandenburg, Prussia, and Germany over centuries. Simultaneously, palace reconstruction is seen as necessary from the perspective of local urbanism, for, to be sure, much of the urban fabric surrounding the palace was laid out partially in response to it. This helped strengthen justifications for reconstructing the palace "as it was," even if only for the urban scenography of the historic façades. Streets like Unter den Linden, along with buildings like the Prussian armory, the army headquarters (Kommandatur), the cathedral, the stables (Marstall), and the Altes Museum were all undeniably sited and designed to a significant degree as responses

Figure 14.4 The "Ghost Palace," Berlin. Aerial view from the northwest of the Hohenzollern palace at approximately its original site, here shown overlaid onto the GDR's Palace of the Republic and Marx-Engels Plaza.

Source: Photo courtesy of John V. Maciuika.

to the imposing Berlin palace. Indeed, all five of these buildings contain functions that were originally housed within the palace itself, eventually being spun off as freestanding monumental structures in their own right as rulers like Frederick William II, King Frederick I, and Frederick the Great expanded the palace over centuries.

The destruction of the GDR Foreign Office exposed the site of the army headquarters on Unter den Linden, which the Bertelsmann Foundation reconstructed to serve as its headquarters in 2005. The Foreign Office demolition also exposed the site of the former Building Academy (Bauakademie) by Karl Friedrich Schinkel (heavily damaged in 1945 and demolished in 1961) and, behind it, the Schinkelplatz, dedicated to Prussia's most celebrated architect. Both the Building Academy and the plaza are undergoing reconstruction with support from corporations like Daimler AG and a separate nonprofit, the Association for the Support of the Building Academy.[41] Finally, removal of the last piece of the Palace of the Republic opened the way for the scheduled reconstruction of the palace façades in anticipation of the new Humboldt Forum.

Only one historic portal of the Hohenzollern palace survived the demolition of 1950–1951: the politically useful Portal IV, identified with the communist hero Karl Liebknecht and the days of the abortive November Revolution. GDR authorities removed this portal from the palace ruin prior to demolition. They preserved and mounted it in 1961—almost like the architectural equivalent of a moose's head or similar hunting trophy—on the brand new façade of the Roland Korn architectural collective's GDR Ministry of State building, a baroque accent on an otherwise severely functionalist-modernist mid-twentieth-century building. Here the quasi-surgical removal and preservation of a fragment of the historic Berlin palace and the destruction of the great majority of the rest of the building directly served the GDR state's heroic narrative of communist city-building. Yet by 2019 or 2020, if the Berlin palace reconstruction is completed as planned, Berliners and visitors alike will be confronted by a unique architectural spectacle: the repositioned historic four-story Portal IV from the original Hohenzollern palace will stand face to face with its own replica across the street and plaza historically known as the Schlossplatz. Admittedly, the reproduced Portal IV will stand on a façade that does not face the original, repositioned Portal IV, but the reconstructed palace façade's proportions and baroque ornament originally designed by architects Andreas Schlüter and his successor, Eosander von Göthe, will be the same. Much as the duplicated façades will confront one another, there will also be a multiplication of narratives. Perhaps fans of the reconstruction will construct a favorable narrative about "a palace so nice, they built it twice." Skeptics and opponents of the reconstruction may lampoon the old façade fragment facing the new Schloss façade, perhaps regarding it as Germany's answer to the hall of mirrors in Versailles, 150 years after Prussia's victory over France in 1871.

In each of the cases surveyed here, dramatic new political and cultural conditions opened the way to new options for the shaping of cities and identities through choices about demolition and reconstruction. It is somewhat striking to note just how far away the popular movement for reconstructions remains from prevailing standards in both contemporary architectural and historic preservation practice. It

just may be that after the determinedly forward-looking modernity of the twentieth century, the doubling back to revive elements, identities, and edifices from the historical past may prove to be an important component of a more complex postmodernity in the twenty-first. Such revivals and reimportations of historic buildings certainly challenge prevailing notions of authenticity. Yet the concept of authenticity often presupposes an unaltered or "pure" state for surviving monuments that were, in fact, rebuilt by prior generations, but were adapted in ways that current generations were not alive to witness. To be sure, historians may not yet have adequately theorized historical reconstructions in the early twenty-first century, but, theorized or not, they are certainly making their appearance in stone.

Notes

1. The author is grateful for the suggestions of the participants in the 2012–2013 Mellon Seminar on "Globalization and Temporality" at the CUNY Graduate Center, and especially Karen Miller, in the completion of this chapter.
2. At opposite poles of current reconstruction debates are Winfried Nerdinger, ed., *Geschichte der Rekonstruktion / Konstruktion der Geschichte*, Publikation zur Ausstellung des Architekturmuseums der TU München in der Pinakothek der Moderne vom 22. Juli bis 31. Oktober 2010 (Munich: Prestel, 2010); and Adrian von Buttlar, Johannes Habich, Gabi Dolff-Bonekämper, Michael S. Falser, Achim Hubel and Georg Mörsch, eds., *Denkmalpflege statt Attrappenkult. Gegen die Rekonstruktion von Baudenkmälern—eine Anthologie* (Basel and Berlin: Birkhäuser, 2011).
3. Françoise Choay, *The Invention of the Historic Monument*, trans. Lauren M. O'Connell (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also Daniel J. Walkowitz and Lisa Maya Knauer, eds., *Memory and the Impact of Political Transformation in Public Space* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
4. Quotation from the Riga Charter on Authenticity and Historical Reconstruction in Relation to Cultural Heritage, viewable at http://www.altes-rathaus-halle.de/dokumente_17.asp (accessed November 10, 2012).
5. For two views on the Moscow reconstruction see Isabelle de Keghel, "Der Wiederaufbau der Moskauer Erlöserkathedrale. Überlegungen zur Konstruktion und Repräsentation nationaler Identität in Russland," in Beate Binder, Wolfgang Kaschuba, and Peter Niedermüller et al., eds., *Inszenierung des Nationalen. Geschichte, Kultur und die Politik der Identitäten am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2001), 211–232; and Marina Dmitrieva, "Christus-Erlöser-Kathedrale versus Palast der Sowjets: Zur Semantik zeitgenossischer Architektur in Moskau," in *Kultur und Krise. Russland 1987–1997*, ed. Elisabeth Cheauré (Berlin: Arno Spitz Verlag, 1997), 121–135.
6. Choay, *The Invention of the Historic Monument*, 91–94; Achim Hubel, "Denkmalpflege zwischen Restaurieren und Rekonstruieren. Ein Blick zurück in ihre Geschichte," in *Denkmalpflege*, ed. von Buttlar, 42–62, 42.
7. Hubel, "Denkmalpflege zwischen Restaurieren und Rekonstruieren," 43–45.
8. Niels Gutschow, "Wiederaufbau, Neubau und Rekonstruktion in Asien. Zur Kontinuität von Objekt und Ritual in Nepal, Indien und Japan," in Nerdinger, *Geschichte der Rekonstruktion*, 36–47; also entries on 192–195.
9. Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, *Anachronic Renaissance* (New York: Zone Books, 2010); and John H. Stubbs and Emily G. Makaš, *Architectural Conservation in Europe and the Americas: National Experiences and Practice* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011).
10. Bolesław Bierut, *The Six-Year Plan for the Reconstruction of Warsaw: Report at the Warsaw Conference of the Polish United Workers Party on the 3rd of July 1949* (Warsaw: Ksiazka I

Wiedza, 1949); Anna Jozefacka, *Rebuilding Warsaw: Conflicting Visions of a Capital City, 1916–1956* (PhD diss., New York University, 2011).

11. Dieter Bingen and Hans-Martin Hinz, eds., *Die Schleifung: Zerstörung und Wiederaufbau historischer Bauten in Deutschland und Polen* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2005).

12. The highly public nature of this feud is made plain at: http://www.bauwelt.de/cms /buch.html?id=2369541#.UQFFjPInh8F (accessed January 18, 2013). For sources discussed here, see note 2.

13. I am grateful to Greg Castillo for several illuminating conversations on this point. See also Greg Castillo, *Constructing the Cold War: Architecture and the Cultural Division of Germany, 1946–1956*, (PhD diss., University of California Berkeley, 2000); and Castillo, *Cold War On the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

14. Translation by author; the exact language is "Eine Kopie ist kein Betrug, ein Faksimile keine Fälschung, ein Abguss kein Verbrechen und eine Rekonstruktion keine Lüge." Winfried Nerdinger, "Zur Einführung – Konstruktion und Rekonstruktion historischer Kontinuität," in *Geschichte der Rekonstruktion*, ed. Nerdinger, 10.

15. Nikolaus Pevsner, *Pioneers of the Modern Movement from William Morris to Walter Gropius* (London, UK: Faber & Faber, 1936); Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time, and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1941); and Henry Russell Hitchcock, *Architecture: Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1958).

16. Glenn Adamson and Jane Pavitt, eds., *Postmodernism: Style and Subversion, 1970–1990* (London, UK: V&A Publishing, 2011). For a perceptive reading of Berlin in terms of simulation and citation of the past see Rolf J. Goebel, "Berlin's Architectural Citations: Reconstruction, Simulation, and the Problem of Historical Authenticity," *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 118, no.5 (October 2003): 1268–1289.

17. Aleida Assmann, "Rekonstruktion—Die zweite Chance, oder: Architektur aus dem Archiv," in *Geschichte der Rekonstruktion*, ed. Nerdinger, 16–23.

18. Translation by author; quoted in ibid., 16; see also the entry on 324–326.

19. Choay, *The Invention of the Historic Monument*, 138–143; see also Marvin Trachtenberg, *Building-in-Time: From Giotto to Alberti and Modern Oblivion* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).

20. Alois Riegl, "The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and its Origin," trans. Kurt Forster and Diane Ghirardo, *Oppositions* 25 (1982): 21–51.

21. This process is detailed in Kevin D. Murphy, "The Villa Savoye and the Modernist Historic Monument," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 61, no. 1 (March 2002): 68–89.

22. Rem Koolhaas, "Preservation Is Overtaking Us," *Future Anterior* 1, no.2 (Fall 2004): 1–3, 2. Koolhaas expands on the predicament faced by the field of historic preservation in the closing chapters of the idiosyncratic book: Rem Koolhaas / Office of Metropolitan Architecture, *Content: Triumph of Realization* (Cologne / London, UK: Taschen, 2004).

23. Michael S. Falser, "'Ausweitung der Kampfzone': Neue Ansprüche an die Denkmalpflege, 1960–1980," in *Denkmalpflege*, ed. von Buttlar, 89–134, 93–94.

24. Alon Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Confino is not writing about architecture or the materialization of memory in this way; I am merely bringing the built environment into alignment with his provocative discussion of the role of cultural memory in society.

25. Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance*, 206. Confino builds on the work of Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago, IL: University

of Chicago Press, 1992); see also Rudy Koshar, *From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870–1990* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). On an individual level, an adage commonly heard among Germans in Berlin during the 1990s and early 2000s may illustrate the phenomenon Confino describes. "We tore down the Wall in 1989," Germans from both the Former East and West would say during these years: "The problem is that the Wall still exists in our heads."

26. Christiane Hertel, "Beyond In/Authenticity: Dresden's Frauenkirche," in *Architourism: Authentic, Escapist, Exotic, Spectacular*, ed. Joan Ockman and Salomon Frausto (Munich: Prestel, 2005), 42–49, 44.

27. Koshar, *From Monuments to Traces*.

28. Andreas Ruby, "Las Vegas an der Elbe—Eine Stadt im Kulissenwahn: Wie sich Dresden die eigene Vergangenheit zurechtlügen möchte," *Die Zeit* 46 (September 11, 2000).

29. W. Jäger and T. Burkert, "The Reconstruction of the Frauenkirche in Dresden," in *Historical Constructions: Possibilities of Numerical and Experimental Techniques*, Proceedings of the 3rd International Seminar, ed. Paulo B. Lourenço and Pere Roca (Guimarães, Portugal: University of Minho, 2001), 167–185. A film by Ralf Jesse and the Goethe Institute, *The Reconstruction of Dresden's Frauenkirche* (2004) can be viewed at http://www.goethe.de/kue/flm/prj/kub/std/en3982506.htm, while the text of the film is published at http://www.goethe.de/wis/pro/kub/pdf/63_dresden_en.pdf (both accessed November 12, 2012). Details on modern steel reinforcement rings that replaced the iron supports of the original church may be found in Siegfried Dornacher and Ernst Schäffer, "Spanntechnik beim Wiederaufbau der Frauenkirche Dresden" (Dürmentingen: Paul Maschinenfabrik GmbH, n.d. [1997?]), available at http://www.paul.eu/fileadmin/paul_template/dateien/b147.11_1.pdf (accessed November 12, 2012).

30. Hertel, "Beyond In/Authenticity," 46–48.

31. Ibid., 46.

32. Janet Ward, "Sacralized Spaces and the Urban Remembrance of War," in *Memory Culture and the Contemporary City: Building Sites,* ed. Uta Staiger, Henriette Steiner, and Andrew Webber (New York and Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 145–160.

33. Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance*, 206.

34. The span indicating each building's existence includes the year in which the building began to be used and the year in which the building, or a portion of it, was still standing; for example, the Berlin palace was demolished between September 1950 and January 1951, so its dates are listed as 1451–1951. This section is indebted to two earlier investigations of the Berlin royal palace reconstruction controversy, John V. Maciuika, "Whose Schlossplatz? Architecture and the 'Materialization' of German Identities in Berlin's Historic Center, 1945–2009," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute*, Supplement 7, "East German Material Culture and the Power of Memory" (2011): 15–28; and an expanded, Polish- and English-language variant, "Zamek dla Berlina czy Berlin dla zamku?" ("The Castle for Berlin, or Berlin for the Castle?"), trans. Marta Duda-Gryc, *Herito: Heritage, Culture, and the Present* 3 (2011): 4–21.

35. Castillo, *Constructing the Cold War*.

36. Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 186–187.

37. Förderverein Berliner Stadtschloss e.V., ed., *Das Schloss? Eine Ausstellung über die Mitte Berlins* (Berlin: Ernst und Sohn Verlag, 1993). I am grateful to Janice Reiff for a copy of this catalog, complete with the original *Überweisungsformular*.

38. A very fine study that places the Palace of the Republic within the historiography of modern architecture and, in particular, within the tradition of post–World War II Soviet bloc "cultural palaces" is Anke Kuhrmann, *Der Palast der Republik. Geschichte und Bedeutung des Ost-Berliner Parlaments- und Kulturhauses* (Petersberg: Michael Imhoff Verlag, 2006).

39. Quoted in Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*, 192.
40. Wolf Jobst Siedler, "Das Schloss lag nicht in Berlin—Berlin war das Schloss," in *Das Schloss*, ed. Förderverein Berliner Stadtschloss e.V., 12–22.
41. Förderverein Bauakademie, http://www.schinkelsche-bauakademie.de/ziele.html (accessed July 26, 2013).

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