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TRANSNATIONAL ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE COLD WAR

AGENTS, ACTIVITIES, AND NETWORKS



EDITED BY LUC VAN DONGEN, STÉPHANIE ROULIN
AND GILES SCOTT-SMITH



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The Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series
Series Standing Order ISBN 978-0-230-50746-3 Hardback
978-0-230-50747-0 Paperback
(*outside North America only*)

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Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War

Agents, Activities, and Networks

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Individual chapters © respective authors 2014
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-38879-7

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First published 2014 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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ISBN 978-1-349-48214-6 ISBN 978-1-137-38880-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137388803

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

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Acknowledgements

Much of the material in this volume originated from the conference “Transnational Dimensions of Cold War Anti-Communism” held in Fribourg, Switzerland, in October 2011. The event was initiated by Luc van Dongen within the framework of his research project, supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the University of Fribourg, on Switzerland’s involvement in transnational anti-communist networks during the Cold War.

The conference was co-sponsored by the following institutions: the Swiss State Secretariat for Education and Research (since 1 January 2013 the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation); the Swiss National Science Foundation; the University of Fribourg (specifically, the Rectorate, the Faculty of Humanities, the director of the Interfaculty Institute for Central and Eastern Europe Professor Nicolas Hayoz, and the Institute for Contemporary Swiss History); the Gebert Rûf Foundation; the University of Leiden (specifically, the Ernst van der Beugel Chair in the Diplomatic History of Transatlantic Relations since WWII); the Pierre du Bois Foundation for Current History (with special thanks to Mrs Irina du Bois). The organizers are grateful for their generous support that helped make the event possible.

The editors are indebted to many individuals for their contributions to the conference and to this volume. Claude Hauser and Damir Skenderovic, Professors of Contemporary History at the University of Fribourg, supported the conference and book project throughout and helped with their inspiring suggestions. The conference organizers owe a special note of thanks to the long-suffering and experienced conference assistant, Dr Grzegorz Sienkiewicz, who ably solved any technical and practical problems and whose dedication to the event was appreciated by everyone. The editors also benefited from the diligent work of Duncan Brown (Unlimited Edition) who prepared the translation of several chapters from French and German into English. Finally, the editors would especially like to thank Marc Roulin for producing the cover image (<http://www.m-roulin.ch>).

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List of Abbreviations

AALC	African American Labor Center
ABN	Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations
ACC	Allied Clandestine Committee
ACCC	American Council of Christian Churches
ACEN	Assembly of Captive European Nations
ACNP	Asociación católica nacional de propagandistas (National Catholic Association for Propaganda)
AESP	Académie Européenne de sciences politiques
AFL	American Federation of Labor
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations
AMSAC	American Society of African Culture
APACL	Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League
APLFD	Asia-Pacific League for Freedom and Democracy
ASC	American Security Council
AVC	Aktionskomitee für Verfolgte Christen
<i>BEIPI</i>	<i>Bulletin de l'association d'études et d'informations politiques internationales</i>
BMG	Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst
BVD	Binnelandse Veiligheids Dienst (Dutch Security Service)
CAL	Confederacion anticommunista Latina-Americana (Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation)
CARSC	Current Affairs Research Services Centre
CCEE	Conservative Council on Eastern Europe
CCF	Congress for Cultural Freedom
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CEDI	Centre Européen de documentation et d'information
CESI	Centre d'entraînement syndical international (International Centre for Union Training)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAS	Comité international d'action sociale
CIC	US Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps

CIDCC	Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne (International Committee for the Defense of Christian Culture)
CIERL	Comité international d'étude pour le renouveau du libéralisme
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations
CLSS	Center for Labor and Social Studies (Rome)
CORAC	Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs
CPC	Clandestine Planning Committee
CPUSA	Communist Party of the United States of America
CSAC	Comité suisse d'action civique
DEM	Danish European Mission
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)
DFTU	Danish Federation of Trade Unions
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
EEC	European Economic Community
EIA	Entente internationale anticommuniste
EUROWACL	European branch of the WACL
FARI	Foreign Affairs Research Institute
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei
FEC	Free Europe Committee
FEMACO	Mexican Anti-Communist Federation
FLN	Front de Libération National (Algeria)
FOBB	Fédération des ouvriers du bois et du bâtiment (Federation of Wood and Construction Workers, Switzerland)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FSAN	Foundation for Solidarity and Alliance Netherlands–United States
FTUC	Free Trade Union Committee
FWF	Forum World Features
GDR	German Democratic Republic
ICCC	International Council of Christian Churches
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICH	Instituto de cultura hispánica
IEO	Institute for Eastern Europe (Fribourg)
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IRD	Information Research Department
ISC	Institute for the Study of Conflict
IST	Institute for the Study of Terrorism

IUHEI	Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva)
JASON	Jong Atlantisch Samenwerkings Orgaan Nederland
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MNA	Movement National Algérie
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MPS	Mont Pèlerin Society
NAFF	National Association for Freedom
NIZ	Nationaler Informationszentrum
NSIC	National Strategy Information Center
NTS	Narodnno-Trudovoj Sojuz rossijskix solidaristov (National Alliance of Russian Solidarists)
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
PCF	Parti communiste français
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSB	Psychological Strategy Board
RENAMO	Resistência nacional moçambicana (National Resistance Movement of Mozambique)
RFE	Radio Free Europe
RFST	Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism
RO	Renaissance Occidentale
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SAC	Société africaine de culture
SAMAK	Nordic Cooperation Committee
SB	Stay Behind
SD	Socialdemokratiet (Danish Social Democratic party)
SDECE	Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage
SEPES	Société d'études politiques, économiques et sociales
SFIO	Section française de l'internationale ouvrière (French Section of the Workers' International)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
TNL	<i>The New Leader</i>
ULC	United Labor Congress (Nigeria)
UN	United Nations
UNITA	União nacional para a independência total de angola (United National Movement for the Total Independence of Angola)
UPA	Ukrainian National Army

USCWF	United States Council for World Freedom
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIE	United States International Information and Educational Exchange Program
VFF	Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit (People's League for Peace and Freedom)
VOA	Voice of America
WACL	World Anti-Communist League
WCC	World Council of Churches
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WLFD	World League for Freedom and Democracy

Introduction

Luc van Dongen, Stéphanie Roulin and Giles Scott-Smith

In January 2013 the joint World League for Freedom and Democracy–Asia-Pacific League for Freedom and Democracy (WLFD–APLFD) annual conference was held at the Taipei Grand Hotel. More than four hundred delegates from over one hundred countries took part in plenary sessions, World Freedom Day celebrations, International Development Committee meetings, and welcoming the impending arrival of new chapters in Nigeria and Thailand. The World League’s mission statement describes itself as an

international non-governmental organization dedicated to the aim of uniting the freedom-and-democracy-loving peoples of the entire globe without distinction as to race, nationality, location, occupation, religion, party or sex, in a joint endeavor to pursue freedom and democracy for all mankind and to preserve world peace.¹

With a massive following in the Asia-Pacific region, the WLFD–APLFD is probably the largest-scale transnational anti-communist network that has continued into the post-Cold War era. Originating as the Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League (APACL) in 1954, it expanded beyond the Asian region in 1966 to become the World Anti-Communist League. Faced with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the gradual transformation of the People’s Republic of China towards a capitalist economy, in 1990–91 the WACL adopted a new title and mission for the post-communist era.² The WLFD–APLFD’s durability and adaptability is a prime example of how networks of transnational anti-communism have successfully morphed according to changes in global politics. Other organizations covered in this volume – the Mont Pèlerin Society, Le Cercle, the Bible-smuggling operations – also continue to this day. The Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN) may have been disbanded in the 1970s, but its legacy lives on through the continuing

2 Introduction

observance by the US political system of Captive Nations Week in the third week of July. The assumption that the demise of world communism led these networks to declare “mission accomplished” or simply fade away into irrelevance would therefore be mistaken.

Anti-communism is typically understood in two principal ways. In terms of periodization, it is generally regarded as a Cold War phenomenon that therefore lost its meaning at the end of the 1980s. In terms of organization, the United States is often credited with playing the principal role in dominating Western anti-communist efforts to oppose Moscow's nefarious designs. Yet as the example of the WLFDF shows, anti-communism is a flexible label. Communist doctrine has been opposed from many directions, ranging from its designation as an “evil” and a contagious “disease” to more measured rebuttals of its egalitarianism, justification of political violence, atheism, destruction of private property, negation of individual rights, economic collectivism, Bolshevism and dialectical materialism. Many of these positions, which often overlapped, could be grouped under the broader label of anti-totalitarianism, which some anti-communists preferred in order to emphasize their support for basic rights and values threatened by both the Left and the Right.

As this collection of essays demonstrates, anti-communism has in fact known many different political identities and motivations, ranging from anarchism to the socialist left to conservative nationalism to Christian movements to the far right. This plurality of allegiances has always been present, with “anti-communism” often a convenient label to link up and “unify” wildly divergent interests and groups.³ Stark ideological divisions have continued to define political activism, most notably in Asia, requiring reflection on the Eurocentrism of many Cold War interpretations. Most significantly, the place of the United States as “orchestrator supreme” of the anti-communist cause needs to be nuanced. It is undeniable that the United States – and here we refer principally to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – had an oversized impact on Western anti-communist ideology, mobilization and propaganda during the Cold War, thanks to its dominant political position, strength of purpose, global reach and (seemingly) unlimited budgets. This often gives the impression that the United States was able to coordinate anti-communist activities according to its own worldview, in response to an assumed globally orchestrated campaign run from Moscow.

Yet the essays in this volume clearly show that this did not mean the US could always decide which directions to move in, or all the

possible outcomes. There is thus a need to “de-centre” the United States within the anti-communist narrative.⁴ While recognition is given to its crucial role beyond all other participants, it is above all necessary to adopt multiple viewpoints and escape the all-encompassing discourse of Washington DC-focused Cold War history – or indeed the history of anti-communism as predominantly a government-run enterprise within the boundaries and the contexts of particular nation-states.⁵ The organization of anti-communism involved not just the US’s governmental allies, but a remarkable host of private actors determined to make it *their* cause as well. The essays presented here explore how and why these determined individuals and diverse movements linked up, overlapped and stubbornly pursued their own paths, with or without state support. Rather than national foreign policies looking to deploy private forces and non-governmental organizations as part of their ideological arsenal, the essays presented here portray a complex mosaic of anti-communist motives and movements that at times supported, at other times cut across or transcended, the state-run scenario. It is a mistake to reduce them to being no more than walk-on extras in a state-centric narrative.

Neither does the story begin with the Cold War. Initiatives to oppose socialism and the international workers movement appeared in the nineteenth century. Security measures against the communist threat were intensified after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the aftermath of the First World War. In a Machiavellian twist, the German Foreign Ministry had sought to foment revolution in Russia through the transnational networks of Alexander Helphand (Parvus), who had established a “scientific institute” in Copenhagen for this purpose.⁶ But the interwar period was a seminal moment, as numerous civic organizations, interest groups and militias focusing on national concerns arose across Europe and the United States in the turmoil and instability of 1918–20. A large-scale emigration from the Russian empire between 1917 and 1923 contributed to the anti-communist climate and to hostility towards the Bolshevik regime. Russian anti-communist exile organizations blossomed in the main centres of emigration: Berlin, Paris, Belgrade, Prague. These were some of the first transnational forces to appear in the anti-communist cause, and they found support and sympathy in their host countries. Hopes for a united movement foundered on the unmanageable ideological, political, and cultural divisions between the many different groups.⁷ Perhaps the first transnational, explicitly anti-communist organization, the Entente internationale anticommuniste (EIA), was established in Geneva in

1924. Intended to act as a pressure group, it was led by a Swiss lawyer, Théodore Aubert, and a Russian émigré, Georges Lodygensky, although the EIA soon distanced itself from émigré politics in order to prevent being typecast as a minority movement and to reach out to a wider audience.⁸ In existence until 1950, the EIA linked state and non-state actors in a dedicated campaign that spanned Europe and the United States, coordinating propaganda through brochures and monthly press reviews based on communist and Soviet newspapers. Aiming for the fall of the Soviet communist regime and the destruction of the Third International (the Comintern), the EIA was never able to gain a solid foothold in the United States, where anti-communist organizations were less willing to liaise with foreign-based partners to extend their efforts outside of North America.⁹ While the EIA's religious committee, Pro Deo (1933–39), would also fail to unite Catholics, Protestants and exiled Orthodox groups against the evils of communism, the Protestant Moral Rearmament, established in 1938 in Oxford, would gather more support on faith-based grounds after the Second World War.¹⁰

Was the anti-communist effort, in all its diversity, in any way coordinated across national boundaries? Certainly, to a degree. George Kennan's infamous Policy Planning Staff memo from May 1948, "The Inauguration of Political Warfare", proposed that "liberation committees" should be created amongst the large émigré communities from Central Europe and the Soviet sphere in support of "people suffering under oppression".¹¹ With the Comintern and Willi Münzenberg as the clear (but unstated) models for this move into political warfare, "in just one document George Kennan had set the agenda for all of the United States' front operations in the first years of the Cold War".¹² Kennan's memo led directly to the first such public-private organization in 1949: the National Committee for a Free Europe.¹³ Goaded on by Kennan, the CIA, under the initial guidance of its pioneers, Frank Wisner and Allen Dulles, rapidly developed a "mighty wurlitzer" of patrons and partnerships that enabled it to disseminate news, views and opinion throughout the world.¹⁴ Parts of this extensive CIA "sphere of influence" have been thoroughly covered, but gaps still remain.¹⁵ The extensive reach of the CIA has inevitably led to suspicions of Agency involvement in *all* anti-communist activities. A good example would be the widely circulated claim that CIA money was pivotal for financing the first Bilderberg meeting between North American and West European representatives in 1954, simply because it seems logical that they would have done so.¹⁶ NATO was seen by many as a potential central pole around which to organize psychological warfare on a transatlantic level.

Yet several of its members states were wary of involving NATO in anything that smacked of propaganda to avoid undermining its legitimacy and status.¹⁷ Instead, through Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO functioned more as an inspiration for private organizations to fill that organizational space themselves.¹⁸

It was precisely this inability and unwillingness to officially coordinate anti-communist campaigns among the NATO countries that prompted the private sector to step in. This had its advantages: it could be denied or distanced from state-run foreign policy, while at the same time it served to mobilize private energies in civil society against the communist threat, in doing so legitimizing the anti-communist cause and the anti-totalitarian identity of the “West”. Crucially, by “going transnational” and de-linking anti-communist mobilization from NATO or other official organs, the neutral states could also be included as active participants (this was the case with both Paix et liberté and Interdoc, as well as Bilderberg).¹⁹ A great variety of non-state actors became linked together in these enterprises, from trade unions and commercial conglomerates, to media outlets and faith-based organizations, to the many intriguing anti-communist “entrepreneurs” who took on the cause as a personal mission. In the process the public and private worlds became so entangled, with personnel effectively operating in the name of both, that the distinction between “state” and “non-state” blurred almost into insignificance.

What were the motivations for taking on such a role? The claim that a worldwide communist conspiracy run from Moscow necessarily required a centralized, coordinated response from the non-communist world.²⁰ The call for a “World Institute for the defense against Soviet propaganda”.²¹ The fear that democratic freedoms were vulnerable if the anti-communist struggle failed to organize itself across national boundaries.²² The determination to awaken citizens to the fact that their taken-for-granted freedoms were being subverted and threatened without them knowing.²³ The need to study the theory and practice of Soviet communism in order to understand and exploit its social and political divisions and contradictions.²⁴ The desire for a “spiritual NATO” or a “Marshall Plan for the mind”.²⁵ The political identity to be defended by these efforts also varied, from vague designations of “the West” or “the Occident”, to democratically orientated labels such as the “Free World”, to more cultural or civilizational declarations of “Christian civilization”. The individuals and organizations covered in this volume actively linked up between themselves, via conferences, joint publications and public campaigns – but they also challenged

each other, there being constant competition for public and private funds and official recognition, and incessant clashes of egos. The calls for coordination were therefore often attempts to claim top spot as much as they were intended to improve anti-Soviet propaganda. Several organizations aspired to playing a central role, such as the Catholic comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne (CIDCC), the Franco–German–Dutch Interdoc, and particularly the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which sought to maintain a broad coalition of liberal and conservative anti-totalitarians to oppose restrictions on cultural and intellectual production.²⁶ Certain individuals themselves functioned as important “nodes”, such as the Frenchman Georges Albertini who was associated with a whole range of private national and transnational anti-communist organizations, as well as with official state institutions such as the British Information Research Department (IRD).²⁷

The sheer density and diversity of anti-communist actors and activities makes it difficult to propose uniform lines of analysis, but a simple periodization can be sketched. The first covers the 1940s and 1950s, when the Soviet Union re-activated its network of fronts from the interwar Münzenberg period, and Central and Eastern European émigrés featured strongly in the responses organized by the CIA, MI6, the West German Gehlen Organization, and other allied intelligence and security services. The United States was the dominant orchestrating force in this period, looking to exploit widespread fear of communist subversion and aggression in Western Europe and Asia (in particular) and acting as the principal financier of these operations. Many of the surviving networks and organizers from the interwar period adapted themselves to this US-led environment. There was also an influx of former fascists and Nazis who used the anti-communist umbrella to gain postwar respectability (see the chapter by Ludwig in the volume). This “battle of the fronts” was transformed by the shift in Soviet policy towards “peaceful coexistence” and the pursuit of ideological warfare, combined with the support for armed struggle in the decolonizing Third World, which marked the second period of the late 1950s and 1960s. This shift caused many reappraisals of the existing anti-communist campaigns. First, hard-line approaches that negated everything communism stood for were now seen by some to be counter-productive, resulting in a search for a “positive anti-communism” (see the chapters by Grossmann and Scott-Smith in this volume). Second, there was a recognition in Western Europe that the one-size-fits-all approach of American anti-communism was no longer effective or appropriate, coupled with the fact that the revival of postwar economies meant that Washington felt

its allies could do more themselves. This led into the third period of the late 1960s and 1970s, characterized by *Détente* between the superpowers, the gradual normalization of the People's Republic of China in world politics and the appearance of the New Left, which some interpreted as another reincarnation of Moscow's "invisible hand". It was in this period that the deepest splits emerged across the anti-communist coalitions, as those who denied the value of East–West rapprochement and considered it no more than a confidence trick and a cover for continuing subversion (such as Suzanne Labin, Brian Crozier, *Le Cercle* – see the chapters by Dard, Michaels and Hänni in this volume) lined up against those who sought to utilize *Détente* to promote the human rights cause and so undermine the Soviet bloc from a different angle (see the chapter by Boel in this volume). This contest was fought out verbally both within the anti-communist networks and between the networks and their erstwhile governmental supporters, as in the case of the ACEN continually demanding recognition of Soviet oppression in Central Europe at a time when Washington was open for increasing superpower dialogue. The Euromissiles crisis and the popular appeal of peace movements across the Western world in the early 1980s did involve a last revival of the Soviet-sponsored popular front, generating responses from the anti-communist lobby.²⁸ But from the late 1980s we enter the final, ongoing, post-Cold War period, defined by the exponential rise of non-governmental organizations promoting a diverse range of environmental, medical, ethical and humanitarian causes within the intricate, complex, often highly specialized fora of global governance. It is in this period that those still-existing anti-communist organizations shift emphasis (if they had not already done so) to promote the broader cause of democratic freedoms in a post-Soviet, post-Maoist world.

The Transnational Approach

In many ways, the realm of anti-communist organizations is the perfect laboratory for applying a transnational historical approach. Rejecting a "statist" interpretation that anti-communist activities were orchestrated and controlled according to the interests of governments, it focuses on the role of non-state actors and their interactions, both between themselves and with elements of the state. Previous scholarship has addressed these issues, most notably through the notion of state–private networks and the influence of "patronage networks" nurtured by (US) philanthropy.²⁹

This volume does more than simply contribute to this trend. The goal is to de-link these activities from the presumptions of an all-embracing US-focused analysis. For the first time, it uses the transnational as the principal framework through which to interpret and analyse the many strands of Cold War anti-communism.³⁰ Second, it gathers together a wide array of actors, activities and networks to enable comparisons and contrasts across national contexts, political motivations and individual backgrounds. In this way it lays out new terrain for the analysis of anti-communism in particular and the study of transnational history in general.

Why a transnational approach? Transnational history, in its broadest sense, addresses the study of connections, links, interdependencies, exchanges and circulations between nations and societies. Introduced into International Relations already in the early 1970s,³¹ it is only since the 1990s, in the wake of initial moves into international and global history and in the context of the relative decline of the nation-state as the decisive social and political unit, that it has become grounded in the history profession,³² with a major compendium staking out the field.³³ Transnational history tests constructed national logics of interpretation and development, instead emphasizing the influence and impact of trans-border connections “whether through individuals, non-national identities, and non-state actors, or in terms of objectives shared by people and communities regardless of their nationality”.³⁴ It examines how these connections both feed back to shape nations and interact and interlink to establish an identifiable field of sociopolitical activity in their own right. The distinction between transnational and international is important in this regard:

The difference between international and transnational has nothing [...] to do with the state. Exchanges between countries, even those which do not pass through the mediation of states and cultural diplomacy, remain “international” for as long as their inter-national character does not dilute the “national”. The “transnational” occurs when there is, if not denationalisation, then at least a going beyond the “national”, when the latter, without disappearing, is transcended. Precisely in the domain of culture, the build-up of products, models, and styles across borders can produce the transnational.³⁵

Neither does transnational mean supranational. An international tribunal can have the force of supranational law without actually having a transnational dimension. Pierre-Yves Saunier defines the transnational

nicely as “movements and forces that cut across national boundaries”, in the process disrupting “what we are inclined to see as separated and autonomous spatial, social and cultural planes”.³⁶ Added to this is the crucial addition that “transnational political activities [...] while they cross international borders [...] do not derive their power and authority from the state”. The resulting “problems of legitimacy, authority, and accountability” that this inevitably generates could partly be overcome by the overarching “good and necessary cause” of promoting freedom against tyranny, but this position received increasing criticism from the late 1950s onwards.³⁷

As attention within Cold War history has shifted to the 1970s in line with the declassification of government archives (predominantly, once again, focused on the United States), so has the transnational become a key moniker through which to appreciate the wider array of agents of social change that were active.³⁸ Much of this attention has been directed to the concept of human rights as a carrier and motivator for transnational activism.³⁹ Some have raised concerns about how transnational history has tended to focus on “organisations and causes that claimed to be doing good” (Red Cross, anti-slavery movement, feminist movements), leading to “an implicit assimilation between the national and the bad, and the trans/inter/supranational and the good”.⁴⁰ Likewise, most transnational historical studies have examined the emancipatory causes of the Left, with the linkages of the Right being under-theorized.⁴¹ Some moves have been made to explore the use of particular ideas and concepts to bind political and social thinking. The notion of an Atlantic Community was one such concept, widely used during the twentieth century, with its civilizational claims and value-based identity bonding North America with (Western) Europe.⁴² Much anti-communist activism existed in a mutually supporting relationship with the positive imaginary that the Atlantic Community put forward.

Once again, this volume expands the boundaries of the transnational historical field by examining the intermingling of national, international and transnational levels of activity under the catch-all heading of anti-communism. This intermingling occurred through individuals, organizations and methods, ranging from the circulation of information and documentation to the influencing of public opinion and the infiltration of neutral or “enemy” operations. The struggle was waged through a plurality of forms, from the committee to the forum, the league, the centre, the movement and the circle, but all of them are best described as networks. Some see this as “the new paradigm for the ‘architecture of complexity’ (compared to hierarchy as the old architectural

paradigm of complexity)".⁴³ The usage of "network" here does not explicitly adopt the methodology of social network analysis with its focus on nodes and the types of ties between units, although these historical contributions, while shying away from social scientific discourse, do cover this same ground.⁴⁴ A focus on networks rather than organizations, institutions or associations shifts the spotlight away from the identification of formal decision-making procedures or apparatuses and more towards tracking the informal arrangements that were often sealed by class-based, faith-based or ideological affiliation, and what these arrangements enabled the different actors to achieve in terms of the material output of anti-communism. The examples covered are predominantly *elite* networks, differentiating them from other transnational activists such as large-scale social movements or issue-specific NGOs. The network is a useful loose framework through which to examine the whys and wherefores of social action amongst these groups.

In important ways the usage of networks here overlaps with other more specific approaches such as policy networks ("social communication and informal negotiation and policy-making") and epistemic communities ("the role that networks of knowledge-based experts play in [...] helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation"). However, both of these fields – despite their valuable identification of "feedback loops" between transnational and national levels of activity – are explicitly orientated towards unpacking and broadening out understanding of how policy-making works.⁴⁵ Instead, the transnational networks covered here are exactly *relatively free* of policy-making determinations. There were varying degrees of dependence on public funding and state patronage, with private sources of income (be that from private philanthropy, religious funds or commercial enterprises) playing a vital role in ensuring independence. Individuals such as Sal Tas and Lucien Tronchet (see the chapters by de Vries and van Dongen in this volume) were able to make their way through (and make use of) the US-led, multi-level international apparatus of anti-communism, but in no way were they absorbed by it – instead, one comes out wondering who actually co-opted whom. One of the networks – Interdoc – was actually based on a commercial model that assumed multinationals would pay for various services to entrench anti-communist thinking in their workforces (see the chapter by Scott-Smith). This relative freedom of action also had its downsides, in particular the danger of self-exclusion and deterioration into nothing more than an elite club for the select few. There were also plenty of

obstacles to influence, from different cultural perceptions, determinations on sovereignty and national priorities, and antagonistic visions of what was acceptable (see the differences between US and European fundamentalist Protestantism in the chapter by Ruotsila). Neither can any claim be made that it added up to a coherent anti-communist outlook – far from it, with suspicions being rife and ideologically based accusations very common. But the relative freedom could also mean being able, through the use of mass media or personal influence, to challenge or “bend” the discourse and narratives of state authorities. In this way the state, as the prime actor in international affairs, could be not only cut across and transcended, but also diluted. “National interest”, at best a fluid conception on which to base (the interpretation of) policy, becomes more fluid still when viewed through a transnational lens.

Structure of the Volume

The volume is divided up into four broad sections to illustrate key types of actors and forms of activism present among the networks of anti-communism. The first section covers a set of organizations and individuals who were closely related to the wide-ranging international apparatus of anti-communism that was put together under US leadership. This section is most closely associated with the existing literature on US soft power and “informal empire” during the Cold War,⁴⁶ but it moves the debate forward by highlighting how there were those who largely consented and even solicited this US role for their own benefit and beliefs. These contributions all raise the same difficult question: How should we determine who is an “agent” of the United States, or of the West? The examples of Dutch journalist Sal Tas, Swiss trade unionist Lucien Tronchet, Danish trade unionist Eiler Jensen, and Senegalese intellectual Alioune Diop offer surprising parallels.

The second section covers Transnational Networks, with case studies covering the 1940s to the 1980s on Paix et liberté, the Assembly of Captive European Nations, Interdoc, the World Anti-Communist League, the Institute for the Study of Conflict, and the Cercle. Based on new and previously unpublished materials, these chapters show how each network developed their own identity and cause within a crowded “marketplace”, but that they also often overlapped through inter- and intra-network exchanges, personal contacts and shared campaigns, and in doing so created common visions of the Cold War contest that appeared to relegate differences of opinion to the background. These case studies also illustrate the need to avoid generalizations, with

national idiosyncrasies, prejudices, jealousies and competitiveness playing as important a role as political judgement in terms of the respective network's impact.

The third section covers intellectual networks and anti-totalitarianism, with contributions on Suzanne Labin, Józef Bocheński, Wilhelm Röpke and the Mont Pèlerin Society. Labin and Bocheński were both important figures in terms of anti-communist production, with Labin a prolific writer and organizer, and Bocheński a key governmental advisor and academic activist whose activities linked neutral Switzerland with Poland, the Vatican, West Germany and the United States. While Labin was a talented propagandist, Bocheński belonged to those intellectuals who made full use of their scientific authority to promote a political cause. In the realm of economics, the Mont Pèlerin Society initially represented an intimate, informal "debating academy". However, it soon evolved into a kind of pressure group for free-market ideology with increasing success, first in the West Germany of Ludwig Erhard, and then in other countries (Pinochet's Chile, Thatcher's Britain, Reagan's United States). Anti-communism as a motive has tended to be underplayed or entirely removed from society's narrative, but as the chapter by Solchany on Röpke shows, it was part of the fundamental worldview of this particular neoliberal thinker. Röpke in particular insisted on the need to align the United States and Western Europe in a joint propaganda campaign, but in such a way that would allow the Europeans themselves to run it. This was the "invisible hand", but now in a different form.

The final section, *Christian Networks*, examines both Catholic and Protestant anti-communist activism. Universalists by vocation in their fight against communist atheism, these activists utilized long-established methods (Bible smuggling) as well as more formal transnational organizations: the fundamentalist Protestant International Council of Christian Churches (ICCC) and the Catholic comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne (CIDCC). In the case of the ICCC, the cultural divisions between US and European Protestants reveals an evident limit to transatlantic transnational organization. The American branch went so far as to defend the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and China, a stance considered too radical by the ICCC's European branch.

The contents of this volume obviously do not exhaust this subject. Through its clarification and questioning of the realities, limits and interests involved in transnational activism, the book emphasizes the shortfalls and lacunae that persist if a national framework is maintained

for interpreting anti-communist phenomena. In doing so it expands further the “social” or “societal” approach to Cold War studies that has been pursued in recent years.⁴⁷ In 2006, Leopold Nuti and Vladislav Zubok regretted that one area “so far has been a rather neglected field of studies, namely the role of transnational political forces and movements”.⁴⁸ This remark is still valid today. We hope this book responds to their challenge.

Notes

1. See the World League’s website at <<http://wlfed.alians.com>> (accessed 20 June 2013).
2. On the WACL see Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside the League* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1986), and the chapter by Abramovici in this volume.
3. See for instance Jean-Jacques Becker and Serge Berstein, *Histoire de l’anticommunisme en France, 1917–1940*, vol. 1 (Paris: Orban, 1987).
4. See Jessica Gienow-Hecht (ed.), *Decentering America* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008); Jadwiga Pieper Mooney and Fabio Lanza (eds), *Decentering Cold War History: Local and Global Change* (London: Routledge, 2013); Bevan Sewell and Scott Lucas (eds), *Challenging US Foreign Policy: The US and the World in the Long Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
5. On the United States see for instance Michael J. Heale, *American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830–1970* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Richard Gid Powers, *Not without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006); Marc J. Selverstone, “A Literature So Immense: The Historiography of Anticommunism”, *OAH Magazine of History* 24 (October 2010), pp. 7–11. For bilateral and comparative studies see Markku Ruotsila, *British and American Anticommunism before the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2001); Marc J. Selverstone, *Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945–1950* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Andrew Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945–1958: The Information Research Department* (London: Routledge, 2003); Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001). For Europe, see for example Becker and Berstein, *Histoire de l’anticommunisme en France*; Michel Caillat et al. (eds), *Histoire(s) de l’anticommunisme en Suisse / Geschichte(n) des Antikommunismus in der Schweiz* (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 2009); Dominique Lejeune, *La peur du “rouge” en France. Des partages aux gauchistes* (Paris: Belin, 2003); Pascal Delwit and José Gotovitch, *La peur du rouge* (Brussels: Editions de l’université de Bruxelles, 1996); Stefan Kreuzberger, *Kampf für die Einheit: das gesamtdeutsche Ministerium und die politische Kultur des Kalten Krieges 1949–1969* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2008).
6. Alan Moorhead, *The Russian Revolution* (London: Collins, 1958), pp. 132–4.

7. See Marina Gorboff, *La Russie fantôme. L'émigration russe de 1920 à 1940* (Lausanne: L'Age d'homme, 1995); Paul Robinson, *The White Russian Army in Exile, 1920–1941* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002); Karl Schlögel (ed.), *Der Grosse Exodus. Die russische Emigration und ihre Zentren, 1917 bis 1941* (Munich: Beck, 1994); idem (ed.), *Russische Emigration in Deutschland 1918 bis 1941* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995); Robert C. Williams, *Culture in Exile: Russian Émigrés in Germany, 1881–1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).
8. Lodygensky and his circle were somewhat isolated within the francophone region of Switzerland. He was connected to the synodal church in exile in Serbia, renowned for its right-wing, anti-Semitic views, while most of the émigrés in France and Switzerland were related to the church exile in Paris. See Georges Lodygensky's memoirs: Yuri Lodygensky and Michel Caillat (eds), *Face au communisme – 1905–1950 – Quand Genève était le centre du mouvement anticommuniste mondial* (Geneva: Slatkine, 2009).
9. Michel Caillat, "L'Entente internationale anticommuniste de Théodore Aubert. Organisation interne, réseaux et action d'une internationale anti-marxiste", PhD dissertation, University of Geneva, 2013; Michel Caillat et al., "Une source inédite de l'histoire de l'anticommunisme: les archives de l'Entente internationale anticommuniste (EIA) de Théodore Aubert", *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps présent*, 71 (2004), pp. 25–31; Michel Caillat, "L'Entente internationale anticommuniste (EIA). L'impact sur la formation d'un anticommunisme helvétique de l'action internationale d'un groupe de bourgeois genevois", in Caillat et al. (eds), *Histoire(s) de l'anticommunisme en Suisse*, pp. 147–63; Michel Caillat, "Théodore Aubert and the Entente internationale anticommuniste: An Unofficial Anti-Marxist International", *Twentieth Century Communism*, 6 (forthcoming).
10. For a valuable transnational perspective on the interwar period see Stéphanie Roulin, *Un credo anticommuniste. La commission Pro Deo de l'Entente internationale anticommuniste, ou la dimension religieuse d'un combat politique (1924–1950)* (Lausanne: Antipodes, 2010); Stéphanie Roulin, "A Martyr Factory? Roman Catholic Crusade, Protestant Missions, and Anti-Communist Propaganda against Soviet Anti-Religious Policies (1929–37)", *Twentieth Century Communism*, 7 (forthcoming). Moral Rearmament was renamed Initiatives of Change International in 2001. Studies on Moral Rearmament are few; see Nicolas Walther, "Caux et le Réarmement Moral 1937–1953", in Hans Ulrich Jost and Stéphanie Prezioso (eds), *Relations internationales, échanges culturels et réseaux intellectuels* (Lausanne: Antipodes, 2002), pp. 137–50; Nicolas Walther, "1937–1952: Le regard de Philippe Mottu. Une contribution à l'histoire de Caux et du Réarmement moral", MA thesis, University of Geneva, 2001; Caroline Thouet, "Le centre de rencontres internationales pour un 'Réarmement moral et spirituel' de Caux (Suisse) 1946–1952", MA thesis, Institut d'études politiques, Toulouse, 2004; Patrick Bondallaz, "Au nom de la Pureté, de l'Honnêteté et... de l'anticommunisme. Un regard analytique sur la croisade du Réarmement moral au tournant des années soixante", MA thesis, University of Fribourg, 2009.
11. Thomas Thorne Jr and David Patterson (eds), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 668–72.

12. Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 26.
13. Scholarship on the National Committee (which changed its name to the Free Europe Committee and continued up to 1972) has largely focused on its most high-profile activity, Radio Free Europe (RFE). A full overview of the Committee's many activities is still lacking. On RFE see A. Ross Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond* (Stanford University Press, 2010); Richard H. Cumings, *Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950–1989* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2009); Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000); Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War* (Syracuse University Press, 1997); George Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); James Critchlow, *Radio Hole-in-the-Head/Radio Liberty: An Insider's Story of Cold War Broadcasting* (Washington DC: American University Press, 1995); Sig Mickelson, *America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (New York: Praeger, 1983). On the Committee's other activities see Alfred A. Reisch, *Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-Funded Secret Book Distribution Program behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2013); Giles Scott-Smith, "The Free Europe University in Strasbourg: US State–Private Networks and Academic 'Rollback'", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 15 (2013); Richard H. Cumings, *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom": Rallying Americans behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950–1960* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2010); John Foster Leich, "Great Expectations: The National Councils in Exile, 1950–60", *The Polish Review* 35 (1990); John P.C. Matthews, "The West's Secret Marshall Plan for the Mind", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16 (2003), pp. 409–27.
14. *Ibid.*; see also Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 53–73.
15. For in-depth studies see Helen Laville, *Cold War Women: The International Activities of American Women's Organisations* (Manchester University Press, 2002); Eric Chester, *Covert Network: Progressives, the International Rescue Committee, and the CIA* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).
16. For a typical unsubstantiated claim see Gerard Aalders, *De Bilderberg Conferenties: Organisatie en werkwijze van een geheim trans-Atlantisch netwerk* (Amsterdam: van Praag, 2007), p. 34. Instead, historians of the Bilderberg meetings have turned up no evidence that this was the case. See Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 249–50. For recent research on Bilderberg, see Valerie Aubourg, "Organizing Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute, 1952–1963", in Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Thomas Gijswijt, "Beyond NATO: Transatlantic Elite Networks and the Atlantic Alliance", in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), *Transforming NATO in the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 50–64; Thomas Gijswijt, "The Bilderberg Group and the End of the Cold

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17. See Giles Scott-Smith, “Not a NATO Responsibility? Psychological Warfare, the Berlin Crisis, and the Formation of Interdoc”, in Wenger, Nuenlist and Locher (eds), *Transforming NATO in the Cold War*, pp. 31–49; Linda Risso, *Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War: The NATO Information Service* (London: Routledge, 2014).
 18. On Article II see John Milloy, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1948–1957: Community or Alliance?* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); Valérie Aubourg, “Creating the Texture of the Atlantic Community: The NATO Information Service, Private Atlantic Networks and the Atlantic Community in the 1950s”, in Valérie Aubourg, Gerard Bossuat and Giles Scott-Smith (eds), *European Community, Atlantic Community?* (Paris: Soleb, 2008), pp. 390–415.
 19. See also on this point Valerie Aubourg, “The Bilderberg Group: Promoting European Governance inside an Atlantic Community of Values”, in Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler (eds), *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: Governing Europe 1945–83* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 38–60.
 20. Many expressed this wish throughout the Cold War. See for instance Statutes of the Centre Antikominform, PP 286, 162, Archives Cantonales Vaudoises, Lausanne; Théodore Aubert, 28 September 1948, E 4320(B)1991/69/103, C.19.1183, Archives Fédérales Suisses, Bern; Thomas W. Braden, “I’m glad the CIA is ‘immoral’”, *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967.
 21. Suzanne Labin, “Comment combattre l’impérialisme communiste?”, *Bulletin national d’information* (November–December 1959).
 22. Press communiqué, European Committee of Paix et liberté, San Remo, 30–1 August 1951; August Hausleiter (president of the Deutsche Gemeinschaft), “Note confidentielle du ministère public de la confédération”, 25 May 1951.
 23. Press communiqué, conference of Common Cause, London, 6–11 May 1952, FO 1110, 374, National Archives, London.
 24. Note by Georges Albertini, 27 June 1954, 13.6, Albertini papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford; Corinna Unger, *Ostforschung in Westdeutschland: Die Erforschung des europäischen Ostens und die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1945–1975* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2007); David Engermann, *Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
 25. 2nd congress, Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne (CIDCC), Madrid, 25–30 January 1960, B 136, 4376, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz; Reisch, *Hot Books in the Cold War*.

26. Due to the existing extensive literature on the CCF, it has not been included in this collection. See Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Pierre Grémion, *Intelligence de l'Anticommunisme: Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris 1950–1975* (Paris: Fayard, 1995); Michael Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongreß für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998); Michael Hochgeschwender, "Il fronte culturale della guerra fredda. Il Congresso per la Libertà della Cultura como esperimento di forma di lotta transnazionale", *Ricerche di Storia Politica* 6 (2003), pp. 36–60; Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999); Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Postwar American Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2002). Much of the debate has centred on the extent to which the CCF was orchestrated according to CIA interests, but a new wave of CCF scholarship is beginning to unravel the Congress's impact in different national and cultural settings. See for instance Eric Pullin, "‘Money does not make any difference to the opinions we hold’: India, the CIA, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1951–58", *Intelligence and National Security* 26 (2011), pp. 377–99.
27. On Albertini see Pierre Rigoulot, *Georges Albertini: socialiste, collaborateur, gaulliste* (Paris: Perrin, 2012); Frédéric Charpier, *Les valets de la guerre froide: comment la République a recyclé les collabos* (Paris: Bourin, 2013).
28. See Gerhard Wettig, "The Last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War: Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979–1983", *Cold War History* 9 (2009), pp. 79–110.
29. On state–private networks see Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (eds), *The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State–Private Network* (London: Routledge, 2006); Scott Lucas, "Mobilizing Culture: The State–Private Network and the CIA in the Early Cold War", in Dale Carter and Robin Clifton (eds), *War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy 1942–1962* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 83–107; Scott Lucas, "Total Culture and the State–Private Network: A Commentary", in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds), *Culture and International History* (New York: Berghahn, 2003), pp. 206–14; Scott-Smith and Krabbendam (eds), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960*. On US philanthropy see Volker R. Berghahn, "A Private–Public Partnership? The Cultural Policies of the US Administrations in Western Europe and the Role of the Big American Foundations", in Dominik Geppert (ed.), *The Postwar Challenge. Cultural, Social and Political Challenge in Western Europe, 1945–1958* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton University Press, 2001); Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
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- Die Internationale der Konservativen. Transnationale Elitenzirkel und private Außenpolitik in Westeuropa seit 1945* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013); Johannes Grossmann, "Ein Europa der 'Hintergründigen'. Antikommunistische christliche Organisationen, konservative Elitenzirkel und private Aussenpolitik in Westeuropa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg", in Johannes Wienand and Christiane Wienand (eds), *Die kulturelle Integration Europas* (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), pp. 303–40; Bernard Ludwig, "Anticommunisme et guerre psychologique en RFA et en Europe (1950–1956): démocratie, diplomaties et réseaux transnationaux", PhD dissertation, Université Paris 1, 2011; Bernard Ludwig, "Le Comité européen et international 'Paix et liberté' (1950–1970). 'Internationale' ou réseau de l'anticommunisme?", *Bulletin de l'Institut Pierre Renouvin* 20 (2004); J. Delmas and J. Kessler (eds), *Renseignement et propagande pendant la guerre froide (1947–1953)* (Paris: Editions complexe, 1999).
31. See the pioneering articles by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transnational Relations and World Politics", *International Organization* 25.3 (1971), pp. 329–49, 721–48.
 32. A useful overview is Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad and Oliver Janz (eds), *Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006). See also the valuable discussions in Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), and Andrew Williams, Amelia Hadfield and Simon Rofe (eds), *International History and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 20–30, which notes that "If we include [...] all 'critics of the national paradigm', then most of history since the 1970s [...] is 'transnational'."
 33. Pierre-Yves Saunier and Akira Irye (eds), *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
 34. Iriye, *Global and Transnational History*, p. 15.
 35. Robert Frank, "Conclusion", in Anne Dulphy, Robert Frank and Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci (eds), *Les relations internationales culturelles au XX^e siècle. De la diplomatie culturelle à l'acculturation* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010), p. 672 (translation by the authors).
 36. Pierre-Yves Saunier, "Going Transnational? News from Down Under", *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* 31.2 (2006).
 37. See Ian Richardson, Andrew Kakabadse and Nada Kakabadse, *Bilderberg People: Elite Power and Consensus in World Affairs* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 18.
 38. See Niall Ferguson et al. (eds), *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011); Bernd Greiner and Tim Müller (eds), *Studien zum Kalten Krieg*, 5 vols (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006–2011).
 39. See Sarah Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde and William Hitchcock (eds), *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History* (Oxford University Press, 2012); Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012).
 40. Pierre-Yves Saunier, "Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History", *Journal of Modern European History* 6 (2008), pp. 159–80.

41. See Martin Durham and Margaret Power (eds), *New Perspectives on the Transnational Right* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), especially the Foreword by Akira Iriye and Rana Mitter, p. ix: "In contrast to the Left, the Right has not been examined systematically as a transnational movement."
42. See Aubourg, Bossuat and Scott-Smith (eds), *European Community, Atlantic Community?*, Scott-Smith and Aubourg (eds), *Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America*; Marco Mariano (ed.), *Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 2010). The idea of a "security community" in many ways stems from the NATO-orientated Atlantic Community idea; see Karl Deutsch et. al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton University Press, 1957).
43. Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider, "Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox", in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (eds), *Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 25.
44. See for instance Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Networks Analysis: Methods and Applications* (Cambridge University Press, 1994); Charles Kadushin, *Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings* (Oxford University Press, 2012); Claire Lemerrier, "Analyse de réseaux et histoire", *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 52 (2005), pp. 88–112. For a broad overview of this expanding field, see the sites of the Quantitative History group of the Institut d'histoire moderne et contemporaine (CNRS) (<<http://www.quanti.ihmc.ens.fr>>) and of the Historical Network Research Group (<<http://historicalnetworkresearch.org>>). There is still much work to be done in studying the influence and impact of the kinds of transnational sociopolitical networks covered in this volume.
45. Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler, "Transnational Networks in European Integration Governance: Historical Perspectives on an Elusive Phenomenon", in idem (eds), *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: Governing Europe 1945–83* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 2; Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", *International Organization* 46 (1992), p. 2.
46. See for example Alexander Stephan (ed.), *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945* (New York: Berghahn, 2006); Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire: The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950–70* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008); Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War*.
47. See, for example, the series by Bernd Greiner, Tim B. Müller and Dierk Walter (eds), *Studien zum Kalten Krieg*, 5 vols (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006–11).
48. Leopoldo Nuti and Vladislav Zubok, "Ideology", in Saki Dockrill and Geraint Hughes (eds), *Palgrave Advances in Cold War History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 83.

Part I

The Wurlitzer Revisited

1

The American Society of African Culture: The CIA and Transnational Networks of African Diaspora Intellectuals in the Cold War

Hugh Wilford

In February 1967, the US Cold War effort suffered a major setback. The west coast magazine *Ramparts* revealed that the CIA was secretly funding the ostensibly independent American student organization, the US National Student Association, via an array of “pass-through” foundations. The *New York Times*, which previously had sat on stories about the covert US effort in the Cold War battle for “hearts and minds”, followed up the *Ramparts* revelation with a series of articles exposing concealed Agency subsidies to a variety of other supposedly private citizen groups with overseas programmes. This unwanted publicity profoundly damaged the image of the organizations in question, effectively destroying some, and dealt the reputation of the CIA itself a blow from which it arguably never recovered.

Aspects of this episode are by now well known, especially its calamitous consequences for the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), the CIA’s Paris-based front group in the “Cultural Cold War”. The story of many other organizations exposed as recipients of secret US government grants in 1967, however, remains untold. The purpose of this essay is to relate the history of one such body, the American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), a group of African Americans engaged in cultural exchange with other diasporic African communities and on the African continent itself. By focusing in particular on AMSAC’s origins, programme and relations with the CIA, the essay will, it is hoped, help illuminate what even now remains a little understood dimension of the

Cold War: the US government's attempt to turn transnational citizen networks into weapons of anti-communist political warfare.

The picture that will emerge is a complex one. On the one hand, the CIA's effort to capture diasporic, transnational African networks for national, Cold War purposes might be judged as extremely successful, given that many of the foremost black intellectuals and artists of the day became involved in it. In this respect, AMSAC's case study serves as a corrective to recent scholarship about the transnational dimension of Cold War-era African American culture and politics that omits the role of the US government in enabling and controlling African diasporic networks.¹ On the other hand, the activities of AMSAC's African Americans were dogged with problems, including resistance on the part of other diasporic African communities, appropriation of the organization's resources for oppositional projects presumably never visualized by the CIA, and a number of other unintended consequences. In short, the Cold War nation-state never entirely succeeded in repressing the transnational, non-governmental network; the repressed kept returning.

AMSAC's Origins

The origins of the AMSAC lay in a spontaneous decision by a group of French African intellectuals living in Paris to call an international conference in 1956, the "Congress of Negro Writers and Artists". The group, gathered around the literary journal *Présence africaine*, was dedicated to the principles of "Negritude", a movement started by the Senegalese poet-politician Léopold Senghor during the 1930s, in "celebration of African cultural heritage in the Francophone world".² As such, Negritude might be seen as a French African variant of "Pan-Africanism", a global effort to promote a transnational sense of shared identity and community among the peoples of Africa and the African diaspora, a programme that was profoundly stimulated by the wave of decolonization that swept the African continent, starting in the late 1950s.

The US government was interested in this development for several reasons. To begin with, the communist movement had a history of "front" activities in the African diaspora, including in the US itself, where as recently as 1951 the communist-controlled Civil Rights Congress had presented a petition to the United Nations alleging that the country was engaged in a campaign of genocide against its black citizens.³ The emergence in the mid-1950s of the African American Civil Rights Movement – in a sense, another local expression of a

transnational phenomenon, the global struggle of black people against white domination – only served to increase the US government’s growing awareness that America’s domestic race problems, in particular the continuing existence of southern segregation, invited exploitation by communist propagandists. Finally, with European colonialism receding around the world, and the communist powers showing an interest in capturing the ideological allegiance of postcolonial peoples, the nation’s foreign policy-makers were becoming increasingly conscious of the “Third World” as a theatre of the Cold War. This awareness increased sharply after the Asian-African conference that took place in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. Alioune Diop, the Senegal-born editor of *Présence africaine*, described the conference scheduled to take place in Paris in 1956 as a “second Bandung”.⁴

To ensure that the Congress did not succumb to communist influence, US government officials weighed up the possibility of enlisting the assistance of America’s own black citizenry. There were several African Americans with an interest in Africa and its postcolonial future, most notably the world-famous singer and actor Paul Robeson, and the eminent writer, and “founding father” of Pan-Africanism, W.E.B. DuBois. The trouble was that both Robeson and DuBois were themselves leftists and, in the polarized ideological atmosphere of the early Cold War, therefore beyond the pale politically.⁵

Fortunately, there was another major African American figure, a resident of Paris and friend of the *Présence africaine* group to boot, to whom US officials could turn. Richard Wright, author of one of the great works of twentieth-century American fiction, *Native Son*, was sympathetic with African cultural nationalism yet, at the same time, a convinced anti-communist. Indeed, he was among the contributors to the classic volume of confessional essays by disillusioned former communists, *The God That Failed*. He had also received money from the Congress for Cultural Freedom to attend and report on the Bandung conference. In the run-up to the September 1956 meeting, Wright was in regular contact with officials at the US Embassy in Paris, trying to ensure both that the venture did not fall prey to communist control and that it would be attended by some African Americans who would advocate for the Western cause in the Cold War.⁶ Thanks in part to Wright’s efforts, a delegation did come from the US, consisting mainly of leading African American educators, among them the president of Lincoln University (and father of civil rights campaigner Julian Bond) Horace Mann Bond, and a professor of government at New York’s City College, John A. Davis. These men were interested in African culture but did not share Robeson

and DuBois's politics of leftist anti-colonialism; rather they were liberal anti-communists.

In facilitating the attendance of black Americans at the Paris conference, Wright was not acting entirely on his own. Since 1954, John Davis had helped run the American Information Committee on Race and Caste, a New York-based organization whose mission included investigating foreign attitudes toward America's race problems and laying the foundations of an international body for promoting cultural exchange between the US and the postcolonial world. The Committee underwrote the expenses of the five-man US delegation travelling to Paris with funds that ostensibly came from prominent New York philanthropists. These included a distinguished attorney, Bethuel M. Webster, who earlier in the decade had helped set up the American Fund for Free Jurists, later revealed to be a conduit of CIA funds to the International Commission of Jurists. The American Information Committee on Race and Caste was subsequently renamed the Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs (CORAC) after it was noted that "The word 'information' had very unpleasant connotations and was a sure indicator to certain groups of the nature of sponsorship."⁷ In 1967, CORAC also was identified as a CIA pass-through.

If the backers of the American delegation headed for France hoped that it might garner some support for the US in the Cold War, they must have been sorely disappointed. The five African Americans were regarded with considerable suspicion by the other delegates, in part because a message from W.E.B. DuBois read out during the first session of the Congress (DuBois was unable to attend in person after he had been refused a US passport) included the words, "Any American Negro traveling abroad today must either not care about Negroes, or say what the State Department wishes him to say." According to the African American novelist James Baldwin, in Paris covering the conference for the Congress for Cultural Freedom magazine *Encounter*, DuBois's intervention "very neatly destroyed whatever effectiveness the [...] American delegation then sitting in the hall might have hoped to have".⁸ On their side, the African Americans suspected a hidden communist hand in the proceedings of the Congress, especially when speakers were warmly applauded for making anti-American statements. These mutual political suspicions fuelled national tensions that constantly threatened to undermine the Congress' project of creating a sense of transnational community. Francophone and Haitian delegates commented on the light skin colour of the Americans; some even asked John Davis "just why he considered himself a Negro – he certainly did

not look like one" (as Baldwin recalled).⁹ For their part, "the Americans were struck by the fact that the Africans were exceedingly French or British".¹⁰

Despite these divisions, the Congress succeeded in creating a permanent international body devoted to promoting African culture, the Société africaine de culture (SAC), with headquarters in Paris and local affiliates in Africa and countries with African diaspora populations. The national tensions persisted, however. In January 1957, Alioune Diop wrote John Davis informing him that international members were being sought for SAC's executive council – and that the individuals he had in mind to represent the US were none other than Paul Robeson and W.E.B. DuBois.¹¹ Davis, who had begun to organize the American delegation into an SAC affiliate in the US, was appalled by this suggestion, and insisted instead on two far less controversial nominees: Duke Ellington (Davis's "favorite of jazz musicians") and future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall.¹² Diop backed down, and peaceful relations were restored, but then another row was ignited after the SAC requested money from CORAC to supplement the small subsidies it was receiving from African governments, and Davis responded by proposing the appointment of an American to the editorial board of *Présence africaine* as a condition of US funding.¹³ This time it was Diop's turn to protest, and Davis's to beat a retreat. The relationship between the wealthy CORAC and the cash-strapped SAC remained tense, though. There were echoes here of the constant disputes that took place between the Parisian headquarters of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the New York office of the CCF's US affiliate, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom.¹⁴

AMSAC's Programme and Relationship with the CIA

The American Society of African Culture was formally launched in June 1957, and began active operations in November. Initially, AMSAC was entirely financially dependent on CORAC, which seems to have performed a function similar to that played for the US National Student Association by the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs, acting as a conduit of funding and policy direction from the CIA. Office space was acquired on East 40th Street (the same mid-town territory occupied by other CIA front organizations such as the American Committee for Cultural Freedom) and James T. ("Ted") Harris, Jr, a former president of the National Student Association, was drafted in to assist John Davis as Executive Director. After 1960, when AMSAC was incorporated and

gained federal tax exemption (the legal paperwork having been filed by Bethuel Webster's law firm),¹⁵ CORAC subsidies were limited to the organization's running costs, much larger grants for specific projects coming from various entities later revealed to be CIA pass-throughs, such as the Colt and Cleveland Dodge foundations.¹⁶

The CIA's money was spent partly on domestic, US activities intended, as a handsomely produced publicity pamphlet explained, "to spread understanding of the validity of African and Negro cultural contributions" and thereby "provide a basis for mutual respect between Americans and Africans".¹⁷ Starting with a three-day planning meeting in June 1958, AMSAC sponsored a series of annual conferences featuring a glittering array of black intellectuals, artists and performers. The 1959 conference, staged like many other important engagements in the Cultural Cold War at New York City's Waldorf Astoria hotel, was addressed by Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy. There were also high-profile one-off events in New York, such as a winter 1959 conference on "The Negro Writer and His Relationship to His Roots" graced by the dean of African American poetry, Langston Hughes, regional meetings and regular lectures at AMSAC's Manhattan office. The Society produced a number of publications, including a six-page monthly newsletter, printed in English and French, several volumes of conference proceedings, and a special issue of *Présence africaine*, "Africa Seen by American Negroes". Finally, AMSAC provided various cultural services to Africans visiting the US, including an information bureau, student-exchange grants and English-language education for UN delegates from former French colonies. African guests of honour were entertained at Annual Holiday Parties, where they danced to the music of Count Basie and his jazz orchestra.¹⁸

Meanwhile, AMSAC rolled out a programme of activities on the African continent itself. Most spectacular of these was a two-day festival of the performing arts, "Negro Culture in Africa and the Americas", held in Lagos, Nigeria, in December 1961, at the same time as Nigerian independence celebrations. Among the American artists performing at the event, staged before audiences of between 4000 and 5000 at the city's King George V Stadium, were such major US jazz musicians as Lionel Hampton and Nina Simone.¹⁹ Shortly after the festival closed, AMSAC opened a West African Cultural Center in downtown Lagos, inaugurating a new programme of art exhibits, receptions and performing arts exchanges.²⁰ This initiative took place without consultation with the officers of the *Société africaine de culture* in Paris, who complained that AMSAC was riding roughshod over SAC's Nigerian affiliate,

NIGERIASAC. "We have suffered enough from the cultural oppression of Europe", Alioune Diop wrote John Davis, "to hope that our Black brothers of America will not [...] give rebirth to cultural colonialism."²¹ Interestingly, some members of AMSAC shared Diop's misgivings about the West African Cultural Center. "I am somewhat sensitive about educated Negro Americans overexposing themselves in Africa at this stage", Harvard University's Martin Kilson told Davis in April 1962. African students at Harvard did not like AMSAC's "assertive features", Kilson explained, considering the organization an "Uncle Tom agent" of "American imperialism". AMSAC must get off its "phony high horse", Kilson continued, and concentrate on what "was supposed to be its original aim and purpose", that is, educating the mass of ordinary American blacks about their African roots, something which had become "lost in an attempt to project America (and I'm not really sure it is NEGRO AMERICA) into Africa".²²

Despite these misgivings about an imbalance between AMSAC's domestic and foreign programmes, the organization's leadership stepped up its efforts to send eminent African Americans to Africa, especially after the black nationalist leader Malcolm X visited the continent in 1964, making a series of statements that were highly critical of US race relations and foreign policy. In early 1965, AMSAC funded a five-week African tour by the civil rights leader James Farmer. Although Farmer was no racial moderate – he was a pioneer of the non-violent form of civil disobedience used by the Civil Rights Movement in its campaign against US apartheid – he rejected Malcolm's message of black retaliation and separatism, later summed up by the slogan "Black Power". The purpose of his tour was articulated by the Director of the United States Information Agency, African American Carl T. Rowan, who looked forward to Farmer "voicing the true aspirations of most Negro Americans as compared with what has been said in Africa by such 'spokesmen' as Malcolm X".²³ After the tour concluded, AMSAC's leadership declared itself extremely well satisfied – Farmer had succeeded in meeting the heads of state in practically every one of the nine countries he visited – and began discussing the possibility of funding a similar trip to East Africa by Martin Luther King Jr the following year.²⁴

How much did members of AMSAC know about the CIA's role in funding their activities? Like the majority of organizations exposed as Agency fronts in 1967, the AMSAC denied all knowledge of secret government links, claiming to have been the victim of official deception. At first sight, this claim appears to be borne out by the group's records at Howard University, Washington DC, and, for that matter, the personal

papers of many of the individuals involved, none of which contain the coded references to covert dealings usually to be found in such collections. There is, however, one notable exception to this rule, a memorandum written by Boston University sociologist Adelaide Cromwell Hill to other members of the AMSAC's Executive Council just after the *New York Times* exposé of February 1967. "First of all, the possibility of CIA involvement is not new information to me", Hill stated.

I remember the exact time and place almost eight years ago when such a possibility was first confided in me [...]. Several years later further and more detailed confirmation was given me by another friend. Around the edges were frequent innuendoes and asides. None of this was documented, understandably so.²⁵

Hill's claim that knowledge of the CIA relationship was in fact widespread in the AMSAC circle is supported by oral testimony from one of the organization's administrative officers, Managing Director Yvonne O. Walker. Interviewed years later, Walker recalled attending a meeting with John Davis and two CIA officers, who required her to swear a secrecy oath before disclosing their covert association with the Society (similar meetings took place at the offices of the National Student Association). Thereafter, she and other AMSAC officers would meet with CIA case officers in hotel rooms, usually in New York but, on at least one occasion, in Washington as well. "They were kept fully informed [...] by Dr. Davis on everything that was going on", Walker remembered, "and I'm sure that they helped to steer some of the plans."²⁶

In short, there is clear evidence that the African Americans of the AMSAC were every bit as knowledgeable about the CIA's clandestine patronage as members of other citizen groups who received similar funding. The fact that there is so little trace of this covert relationship in their papers suggests that far from having been the victims of deception they were rather unusually conscientious about observing security protocols – in other words, that they were particularly effective secret agents.

Still, none of these measures were enough to prevent the AMSAC's eventual exposure. The organization was already in decline by the time of the *Ramparts* revelations, beset by new currents of cultural nationalism among younger blacks at home, and the object of suspicion in Paris and Africa. Indeed, James Farmer's tour was the Society's last really successful overseas venture, the proposal for a trip by Martin Luther King

Jr having come to nothing. This, combined with the widespread state of knowledge about the CIA subsidies, helps explain the relative lack of internal recrimination in the AMSAC in February 1967 (other front organizations such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom were engulfed by nasty rows about who was and who was not “witting”). Predictably, the loudest complaints came from Paris, with the Administrative Secretary of the Société africaine de culture, Kala-Lobe, demanding that Alioune Diop’s name be removed from the masthead of *African Forum* (a quarterly journal of African affairs launched by Davis in summer 1965) and speculating darkly about the motives of past AMSAC actions, such as the controversial opening of the Lagos office.²⁷ There was some debate in the US about relaunching the organization as a purely domestic venture geared toward checking the worst excesses of young black nationalists “and those who excite the rage of the Negro poor by referring to the African and slave past”.²⁸ However, John Davis was unable to find funding to replace the CIA subsidies, and AMSAC eventually went into suspended animation in the summer of 1969.²⁹

Conclusion

What are we to make of the African Americans who made up the AMSAC? A “combination of careerists, slick articulate operators with little conviction, and leaders of the integrationist Negro intellectual establishment” was how black radical Harold Cruse described them.³⁰ Certainly, the Society was a basically elitist organization, lacking an organic relationship with the majority of African Americans at home in the US. In the offices of the Société africaine de culture’s headquarters in Paris and SAC affiliates in Africa itself, the AMSAC tended to be viewed as an unwelcome, quasi-official US intervention, while individual Africans resented the basically paternalistic or “redemptionist” attitudes of the group’s leaders, who seem to have thought that modern American blacks had a mission to save the “dark continent” from the forces of both tribal superstition and communist manipulation. There are also occasional hints in the archival record that, although it was not their main function, officers of the AMSAC who spent time in Africa, such as James “Ted” Harris, were involved in espionage activities, reporting on local political developments directly to the CIA.³¹ Small wonder given all this, perhaps, that some black commentators dismissed the “AMSAC Afros”, as Howard Cruse called them contemptuously, as so many “Uncle Toms”.

Such a judgement, though, is too harsh. For one thing, it ignores the fact that many of the AMSAC blacks were sincere anti-communists, their convictions forged in earlier struggles within the African American community against communist front activities. For another, it overlooks the fact that some AMSAC grantees used the organization's patronage for purposes probably unintended by the CIA. These included lobbying the State Department for better black representation in the US foreign service and, occasionally, searching for political or cultural inspiration in postcolonial Africa. The jazz pianist and composer Randy Weston, for example, returned from an AMSAC-sponsored trip to Nigeria reportedly "enthusiastic about tapping the rich variety of African music in his own compositions".³² In other words, CIA subsidies did not always reinforce American "cultural imperialism"; sometimes they "helped to nurture the development of oppositional transnational and Afro-diasporic sensibilities" (to borrow a phrase from historian Penny Von Eschen's insightful discussion of overt US cultural diplomacy in Africa).³³

Finally, as with other front operations, the AMSAC was quite capable of backfiring on the CIA. To take one example, James Farmer's tour of Africa was marred by his tendency to speak out against neo-colonial US policies in South Africa, the Portuguese colonies and, especially, the Congo. Another unintended consequence of the Farmer tour was that while in Ghana the civil rights leader heard rumours of a US government plot to assassinate Malcolm X, and subsequently suspected that the CIA was somehow involved in the young black nationalist's murder in Harlem in February 1965.³⁴

To sum up, then, the AMSAC blacks were – to a certain extent – doing the same thing African American leaders had always tended to do with white patronage, that is apparently accepting it on one set of terms, then actually spending it according to another, turning it to the limited advantage of their own race. They were, in other words, "putting on" – a skill that perhaps helps explain why they were so much better than other front groups at maintaining the appearance of being "unwitting".

Still, it is very much open to question whether the advantages to the AMSAC of its covert contract with the CIA outweighed the disadvantages: the loss of organizational independence, the ill will of many Africans and the allegations of "race betrayal" from other African Americans after the secret had been revealed. No matter how much one might wish to take account of such factors as resistance, appropriation and unintended consequences in a final assessment of the AMSAC, the fact remains that this was a case of a covert official agency "weaponizing" a transnational community – in this instance,

the African diaspora. In accepting secret money and direction from a national government, the AMSAC effectively violated and corrupted the very transnational identity it sought to embody.

Notes

1. For example, Ruth Feldstein's study of jazz musician Nina Simone placing her in a transnational context mentions her visiting Nigeria on an AMSAC-sponsored tour in 1961 yet fails to mention the organization's CIA backing. Ruth Feldstein, " 'I Don't Trust You Anymore': Nina Simone, Culture, and Black Activism in the 1960s", *Journal of American History* 91 (2005), pp. 1370–71.
2. Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 157.
3. See Gerald Horne, *Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946–1956* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988), ch. 6.
4. Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 201.
5. For more on DuBois, Robeson and other African American anti-colonialists, see Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-colonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997).
6. See Hazel Rowley, *Richard Wright: The Life and Times* (New York: Henry Holt, 2001), p. 474.
7. Minutes of Coordinating Committee for the American Information Committee on Race and Caste, Inc., 24 September 1957, box 20, folder 10, AMSAC Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington DC.
8. James Baldwin, "Letter from Paris: Princes and Powers", *Encounter* 3 (1957): 52–3.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
10. "The Origin and Nature of the American Society of African Culture", enclosed with form letter by James Harris, 21 May 1958, A197, Leagues and Organizations: AMSAC, Part III, General Office File, 1956–65, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC.
11. Alioune Diop to John Davis, 25 January 1957, 36.111C, Horace Mann Bond Papers, W.E.B. DuBois Library, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
12. John Davis to Horace Mann Bond et al., 5 May and 20 May 1957, 36.111D, Bond Papers.
13. John Davis to Richard Wright, 18 November 1957, 96.1276, Richard Wright Papers, Beinecke Library, Yale University.
14. It is interesting to note that there were other attempts by the US public-private apparatus to cultivate Alioune Diop: in 1957, he was a recipient of a US Foreign Leader grant. See Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire: The U.S. State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain, 1950–70* (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2008), p. 351.
15. Minutes of First Meeting of Directors, AMSAC, 22 June 1960, 31.82C, Bond Papers.

16. Financial Statement, 1 June 1962–31 May 1963, 6.8, AMSAC Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Center.
17. "AMSAC: Its Purpose, Program, and Activities", n.d., 1.2, AMSAC Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York.
18. Ibid.; "Summary Report, Second Annual Conference", June 1959, 1.4, AMSAC Papers, Schomburg Center; Program for "Fifth Annual Holiday Party", 1961, 1.4, AMSAC Papers, Schomburg Center.
19. John Davis to Martin Kilson, 25 April 1962, 6.2, AMSAC Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Center.
20. "U.S. Culture Society Opens Office in Africa", *Chicago Defender*, 2 September 1961; "AMSAC Opens Cultural Center in Nigeria", *Chicago Defender*, 30 December 1961.
21. Alioune Diop to John Davis, 4 December 1961, 6.2, AMSAC Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Center.
22. Martin Kilson to John Davis, 10 April 1962, 6.2, AMSAC Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Center.
23. Carl Rowan to John Davis, 14 December 1964, 8.31, AMSAC Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Center.
24. For a fuller account of Farmer's tour, see Wilford, *Mighty Wurlitzer*, pp. 215–20.
25. Adelaide Cromwell Hill to Members of Board of AMSAC, 24 February 1967, 33.19, AMSAC Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Center.
26. Yvonne O. Walker, telephone interview with author, 9 May 2006.
27. Kala-Lobe to President of AMSAC, 14 April 1967, 33.19, AMSAC Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Center.
28. John Davis to Charles Frankel, 9 June 1967, 32.90E, Bond Papers.
29. Minutes of Postponed Annual Meeting of Directors, AMSAC, 20 June 1969, 33.91E, Bond Papers.
30. Harold Cruse, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* (London: W.H. Allen, 1969), p. 499.
31. See, for example, James Harris to John Davis, Report on Accra Conference, 18 December 1958, 1.23, AMSAC Papers, Moorland-Spingarn Center.
32. AMSAC Annual Report, 22 June 1963, 49.13, St Clair Drake Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York.
33. Von Eschen, *Satchmo*, p. 256.
34. See Wilford, *Mighty Wurlitzer*, pp. 218–20.

2

The Nordic Trade Union Movement and Transnational Anti-Communist Networks in the Early Cold War

Dino Knudsen

On 7 November 1945, an American arrived in Copenhagen as part of a major tour of the European continent. His name was Irving Brown, and he was visiting Denmark as a representative of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Brown had been invited by the Danish Federation of Trade Unions (DFTU) and both during his visit and afterwards he formed close partnerships with important officials in the Danish trade union movement.¹

Brown used his visit to take stock of the situation in Denmark. In a two-page report, he remarked that the balance of power between the Danish social democrats and the communists had shifted dramatically compared to the interwar period, due to the communists' resistance to the German occupation of Denmark. In the parliamentary elections of October 1945, the Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti (DKP) received 18 seats (out of 149), precisely the same number that the Socialdemokratiet (SD: the social democratic party, now called Socialdemokraterne) had lost.² Eiler Jensen, the president of the DFTU, informed Brown that the reason for the shift of votes was that, for the first time, at least 150,000 industrial workers had voted for the communists. To the visiting American, this was an alarming message. In reports from Sweden and Norway, Brown registered the same tendency.³

In the summer of 1945, unity negotiations between the two Danish labour parties had broken down and ended in a bitter conflict. As both parties were in opposition for the next two years, the conflict would primarily be fought out in the trade union movement. With as many as 650,000 members out of a population of 4.2 million, the trade union movement was an important and well-established institution

in Danish society. Even though the prewar parliamentary balance of power between the two parties was restored over the next few years, the situation was otherwise when it came to the balance of power within the trade union movement itself. Although the social democrats controlled the DFTU and the majority of the trade unions, the DKP was generally more widely represented and enjoyed more support within the movement than in the rest of society. In addition to the historic grudge between the two parties, they also had an almost identical group of members and voters to fight over – and many of these were organized in the trade union movement.⁴

The Danish trade union movement was a unitary movement, there being no real parallel trade union structure outside the DFTU. The Christian trade unions were small and marginalized, and communist attempts in the 1930s to challenge the leadership of the DFTU by establishing oppositional, revolutionary trade unions had failed. Now the communists struggled within the movement instead. This worried Jensen. Brown's visit provided him with the opportunity to appeal to the Americans for support on two fronts: funding aid to reconstruct the war-torn continent, and countering Soviet propaganda in European trade unions.⁵ Thus, with the first postwar contact between the Danish and American trade union movements, the two themes that were to constitute the mainstay of transatlantic trade union cooperation in the coming years (economic reconstruction and combatting communism) were already present.

In this chapter, it is investigated why and how the American trade union movement established networks among its Nordic counterparts, particularly with respect to Denmark, during the early Cold War. Especially, it will focus on the consequences of the American involvement in Nordic trade union matters and use this for wider observations on US support for the European Non-Communist left.⁶ The American trade union movement consisted of two big national organizations, the AFL and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Nevertheless, it was the AFL's activities that, in this period, became decisive with respect to the future affiliation of the Nordic trade union movement. Therefore the focus here will be exclusively on the AFL.⁷

Lovestone, Brown and the Free Trade Union Committee

An essential feature of the AFL was the organization's strong anti-communism, which had its roots in the particular way American society developed historically. At the end of the Second World War the AFL

dissociated itself from the Roosevelt administration's wartime alliance with the USSR. The AFL considered the Soviet Union a threatening totalitarian power that could not be cooperated with under any circumstances.⁸

The same applied to the international trade union movement, where the AFL was opposed to any so-called popular front policy that involved an alliance with communist forces.⁹ As early as 1944, the AFL formed the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC). The purpose of the committee was to gather information on, and assist the formation of, "free trade unions" and to fight against totalitarianism on an international basis. "Free Labor" was defined as being independent of the state and employers, and as far as the AFL was concerned, totalitarian influence was identical to the enemy of tomorrow, communism, rather than the enemy of yesterday, fascism.¹⁰ There exists a good deal of research on the role of the FTUC and its close relationship with the AFL. Anthony Carew suggests that it was a private organization formed by a group of trade union leaders associated with the AFL, but that it functioned as an informal leadership of the AFL's international work.¹¹ Hugh Wilford designates it as a "semiautonomous labor foreign policy unit".¹² Julia Angster argues that the FTUC worked as a kind of "foreign policy think-tank", at best an inadequate and in some ways a misleading description. The FTUC also had an operational side of great importance, including contacts and activities in the Soviet sphere after the division of Europe, and contributions to the establishment of so-called "stay behind" networks in Western Europe.¹³

My research suggests that the FTUC was an integral part of the structure of AFL. It thus appears from an internal FTUC document that its activities were supported by the general assemblies of the AFL, that the committee was "always headed by highest officers of AFL" and was formally a subcommittee under the international committee of the AFL.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Carew and Wilford are right that the committee was run in an informal or semi-autonomous way. The FTUC was the centre of the AFL's activities abroad, but its functions were to a great extent based on personal relationships and word-of-mouth, and few records of its meetings have been left behind in the archives.¹⁵

The FTUC was managed by a legendary team of two, Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone, whose activities have been referred to as one of "the most astounding private initiatives of the Cold War".¹⁶ Brown headed the committee's European office, which was set up in Brussels in November 1946. From there, Brown toured the European continent with a borrowed typewriter and a suitcase packed with US dollars which he could

share with “needy” friends, as it was phrased in an internal FTUC document, and “not only in food”.¹⁷ Brown sent almost daily reports to Jay Lovestone who ran the FTUC from its headquarters in the US.

Lovestone was a person for whom anti-communism was a highly personal matter. Lovestone’s career in the communist movement had culminated in a brief period as chairman of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). In 1929, he fell from grace after the Comintern’s 6th World Congress in Moscow. During the subsequent decade Lovestone gradually moved towards a position of committed anti-communism. Initially, he set up an oppositional fraction that became known as “The Lovestonites”. The organization considered itself Marxist but opposed the CPUSA, and this contributed towards Lovestone’s meteoric career in the AFL later. The AFL found Lovestone’s expertise and inside knowledge very useful. Towards the end of the 1930s Lovestone’s disillusionment with the Soviet Union made him openly denounce Stalin.¹⁸ Along with many others in that decade, the violence and duplicity of the Stalinist regime had caused him to change political direction.

Free Labour, the Non-Communist Left and the World Federation of Trade Unions

In Europe the disillusionment of many with Stalin was delayed because fascism and the threat of war postponed a break with communist ideology. Scepticism and criticism of the course taken by the Soviet Union had to give way to the necessity to defeat Hitler. In the US the situation was different; after all, the Americans were at a comfortable distance from the immediate threat. Yet, whether it occurred before or after, the result was often that ex-communists became key figures in the fight against communism.

The war was the turning point for the American trade union movement, which achieved legitimacy and recognition.¹⁹ The AFL used Lovestone to channel funds to the parts of the European labour movement that were driven underground and contributed to the resistance against the German occupation. The new convert was the perfect man for the job because of his considerable network among the European communist opposition and his knowledge of how to organize clandestine activities and make use of front groups.²⁰ After the war, Lovestone and Brown made use of their European contacts and, as in the Danish case, allied with the leading figures in the trade union movement who had adopted an anti-communist attitude. In brief, their strategy was to

gain influence on the Non-Communist Left. Many European socialists and social democrats may not have been very enthusiastic about the United States, but they were firm anti-communists, and found themselves directly in the field of battle (in the workplaces and the union boards) and they had many years' experience of combatting the threat. In other words, they were obvious and key alliance partners.

The FTUC began a campaign against the communist influence in international labour, its first major objective being to break the unity that had arisen in international trade union circles with the establishment of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in the autumn of 1945. The war had transformed the social and political order and brought former opponents in the labour movement together, in concentration camps, in exile or in the resistance movements. Under the impact of the wartime alliance and the postwar attempts to unite the leftist parties in many European countries, the new federation had proclaimed a hard-won unity. In the WFTU ideological and national boundaries were supposed to be overcome for the greater cause of labour rights. For the first time, both Russians, Americans (the Congress of Industrial Organizations), Europeans and a long list of Third World countries were represented in the same trade union international, and to Lovestone's chagrin, there were communists among them.²¹

The Nordic Countries and the Cold War in the Trade Union Movement

The Scandinavian national organizations, too, joined the WFTU. In a meeting of the Nordic national organizations on 15 July 1945, a common statement was issued:

Strong and well-disciplined labour organisations united in a powerful, international federation would have been able to prevent the rise of Hitlerism to power and influence. They could have prevented the war [...]. This insight should be reason enough for the trade union movement to avoid divisions and internal disagreements in the future [...]. International co-operation of the workers of the world is a prerequisite for securing world peace.²²

It is remarkable that the Nordic trade unionists believed that an international trade union federation would actually have been able to prevent the Second World War. Eiler Jensen had been elected as the representative of the Nordic national organizations in the executive committee of

the WFTU. Personally, Jensen believed that in order to maintain good cooperation within the WFTU, a prerequisite would be that the super-powers come to terms.²³ This may well have been a realistic attitude, but it turned the statement quoted above on the WFTU as a guardian against a new world war upside down. According to Jensen, the absence of tension or war was the prerequisite for the world federation, not the other way round.

A recurrent bone of contention in the WFTU was the organizational statutes. The conflict was about the autonomy and independence of the associated national organizations. On behalf of the Scandinavians, Eiler Jensen proposed the need for extensive autonomy.²⁴ Another question was how to associate the independent international trade secretariats. They had previously been without any Soviet membership. As an agreement could not be reached on how to incorporate them within the WFTU, the matter was postponed. The Scandinavians (except Iceland where the communists were more dominant) were quite pleased that the secretariats had achieved "considerable freedom of action".²⁵

The conflict continued to flare up at regular intervals. Immediately upon returning home in July 1946 from a meeting of the executive committee of the WFTU in Moscow, Eiler Jensen reported to the labour movement's Nordic Co-operation Committee (SAMAK) that the Soviets did not wish to make any concessions to the trade secretariats. In Jensen's opinion, efforts should be made to make them a part of the WFTU, provided they "still retained a certain amount of autonomy".²⁶ At a trade union conference in Oslo in January 1947, Jensen reported that the contention had become more specific as decisions had to be made on the location of the headquarters of the trade secretariats, their financial position and the election of the leadership.²⁷ There was disagreement amongst the Scandinavians, but Jensen went to the heart of the matter in the following statement:

We should not nourish any illusions. The new trade union international will be bigger, but not stronger than the old one [...]. The trade union international is totally dependent on whether the U.N. achieves success or not. Strong differences exist within the trade union international.²⁸

Here, Jensen repeated his view that peace and cooperation among the states were a prerequisite for peace and unity in the Federation. The Swedes especially supported this view. Thus, the Nordic trade unionists gave up the idea that the international solidarity of workers would be

able to prevent conflicts between the superpowers. What was crucial now was to choose the right side if a conflict were to break out. This would soon turn out to be the case.

The Marshall Plan as a Catalyst for the Split within the WFTU

During the first half of 1947, the American government proclaimed both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Parallel to official US diplomacy, the FTUC launched a labour diplomatic offensive that was intended to convince the European trade union movement of the advantages of the Marshall Plan – and at the same time induce a split in the WFTU where, amongst others, the communists spoke against the aid programme. In this instance, the interests of the FTUC and Washington (now promoting Containment) converged.²⁹

In August 1947, the metal workers' international trade secretariat held a congress in Copenhagen. The leaders of the metal workers, including the Danes, were displeased that the WFTU had just decided to combine the international trade secretariats into 15 departments with headquarters in the same town as the WFTU.³⁰ Irving Brown was the American delegate. Ever since the foundation of the WFTU, the AFL had been using the question of the trade secretariats to attack the WFTU. Brown held a long speech in which he urged the European trade union movement to support the Marshall Plan, convene a conference to this end and form a new trade union international. The speech resounded in the trade union world and became the object of communist attacks during the subsequent months.³¹

Brown continued his offensive. During the first two months of 1948, he met with representatives of as many as 14 national organizations. In the Nordic countries, he made use of his personal contacts in the Danish trade union movement, among others, to organize a meeting. The efforts to coordinate this meeting had begun in November 1947, when Brown wrote to Eiler Jensen, "I feel that the time is soon coming for action in defense of international free trade unionism by all of us who have common beliefs and goals", adding that he hoped that they would soon be able to meet. Brown wished to persuade the Scandinavians to co-convene the trade union conference that was going to embrace the Marshall Plan.³²

At the same time, Brown also met the party secretary of the Norwegian Social Democratic Party, Haakon Lie. The latter had encouraged Jensen to gather the leaders of the Nordic national organizations with the aim

of persuading them to support the plans, and he had assured Brown of his support. Lie believed that together with the national organizations of the Benelux countries, it would be possible for the Scandinavians to make the British follow suit. On 28 December Brown informed Lie that Jensen was prepared to meet him. In the meantime, Jensen had responded that it would be possible to have a “completely unofficial conversation” with the participation of the Nordic colleagues.³³

Eiler Jensen hosted the meeting that took place in Copenhagen on 5 January 1948. The leaders of the national organizations in Denmark, Sweden and Norway were present. Afterwards, Brown was able to report “off the record” to Lovestone that those present were open to the proposal for Marshall aid, but that they did not think that a conference on the subject, bypassing the WFTU, could take place without the British. Brown suggested that the Nordic countries should put pressure on the British, and in a private conversation with Brown, Jensen promised to do “everything in his power” to persuade his Nordic colleagues to do so. The Danes wanted to take part in the Marshall Plan and leave the WFTU if necessary, but they did not want to be seen as splitters and preferred others, especially the British, to take the initiative.³⁴

If Jensen had any hopes left at all for the WFTU, he finally gave them up in early February 1948 when it turned out not to be possible to place the question of the Marshall Plan on the agenda of the WFTU's executive committee. It is evident from the minutes of a SAMAK meeting shortly afterwards that Jensen was frustrated. He informed his colleagues that, in his opinion, a split in the organization could not be avoided and should therefore be enforced.³⁵ A contributory factor to this may have been that in the meantime Jensen had been briefed by US embassy personnel and by the American trade union movement that the Russians would impose a “Cominform-line” in the WFTU.³⁶ However, it could also be the consequence of his having ascertained that the opponents of the Marshall Plan held a majority in the leadership of the WFTU.³⁷

In the end, the Nordic national organizations decided to participate in the trade union conference on the Marshall Plan. Thereby, the DFTU and their Nordic colleagues finally gave up their position of the summer of 1945, when they had declared that a strong international trade union federation would be able to prevent a world war. Once again, the world was divided into spheres of interest dominated by big powers that the labour movement would have to accommodate. At the conference, which took place in London, the DFTU announced its support for the Marshall Plan and afterwards made formal contact with the

Danish government in order to contribute towards its implementation in Denmark.

In December 1948 Eiler Jensen met with Vincent Tewson, president of the British Trade Union Center, and Arthur Deakin, who had served as president of the WFTU until its split. Jensen assured them that the Danes were following the British and were going to leave the WFTU and that the only reason why they had not done so yet was a matter of protocol. The British then suggested that Jensen use the question of the international trade secretariats to make the break formal.³⁸ The DFTU then participated in the establishment of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 1949, the Western-orientated trade union international, with the AFL playing a major role and with Eiler Jensen as its vice chairman. Through its affiliation with the ICFTU, the DFTU became involved in intelligence work and transferring funds to anti-communist forces in the trade union movement in both Western and Eastern Europe. Overall, the DFTU membership in the ICFTU meant that the Danish trade union movement contributed towards Denmark's integration in the Western alliance, and the same happened in the other Nordic countries (although Sweden stayed "neutral"). Over the next decade, more than 150 Danish trade unionists were invited to the US to learn about productivity and the "American way of life".³⁹

With these national organizations individually joining the Marshall Plan and breaking the unity of the WFTU, events began to escalate. In France and Italy where the dominant national organizations maintained their association with the WFTU, competing national organizations were established or strengthened with the aid of the FTUC. In practice, the WFTU had been divided, but formally this did not occur until the autumn of 1948.⁴⁰ In the meantime, the first containers of Marshall Plan deliveries began to arrive in Europe. In the major Mediterranean ports like Marseille, Genoa and Napoli, physical fights erupted in what under the auspices of the FTUC went down in history as "the Battle of the Docks". Communist attempts to sabotage the deliveries, for example through strikes among the dock workers, were opposed by Brown who had joined forces with local Corsican gangsters and a workforce of Italian strike-breakers to pacify the docks.⁴¹

The State-Private Network

Brown's efforts in Denmark were supplemented by the US State Department, which saw the Nordic countries as the strongest social democratic "bulwark" against communist influence on the European continent. The

State Department considered the Danish SD to be “more openly hostile [towards the communists] than in most other European countries”.⁴² Eiler Jensen, who built up a close relationship with the US embassy, was characterized as “a conservative and sound thinker”, “a right wing laborite” and as “one of the key men in the whole Scandinavian area”.⁴³ Thus, both the American trade union movement and state representatives thought highly of Jensen.

Even though the AFL maintained an official distance from the US government in order to protect the image of “Free Labor”, in reality the American authorities and trade union movement cooperated on several levels. A prime example of this was the labour attaché programme through which the AFL influenced the appointment of labour attachés in the US embassies. Brown often attended the coordination meetings of these labour attaches.⁴⁴ At one stage, Lovestone was accused of having infiltrated the programme and abused it for his own activities. Furthermore, when Lovestone and Brown’s comprehensive overseas activities started to drain the treasury of the AFL in 1948, the FTUC had to seek funds elsewhere. Enter the CIA, which, with the dawn of the Cold War, benefitted from the comprehensive FTUC network with contacts across Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia.⁴⁵ However, the relationship between the CIA and the FTUC was conflict-ridden as Lovestone and Brown distrusted the authorities and considered the CIA a set of “fizz kids” and amateurs in the anti-communist struggle, which the two partners felt they had been waging while official America was still on good terms with the Soviets. Lovestone regarded the AFL as playing a vanguard role in international union politics, and a vital component of the powerful postwar position of the United States. They therefore attempted to evade auditing by the CIA and often omitted to pass on vital information to the intelligence service. The CIA in return responded by delaying financial support.⁴⁶

Lovestone also encountered problems on the home front. Joseph McCarthy took an interest in his past and his conspiratorial work methods and initiated an investigation. However, McCarthy was stopped by J. Edgar Hoover who, most likely, had greater insight into the nature of Lovestone’s activities.⁴⁷ In any case, these circumstances indicate that there were several competing anti-communist strategies in the US, not merely state and private strategies, but also those who considered any association with the labour movement and socialism to be suspect and others who believed that precisely ex-communists like Lovestone were key actors in the battle against communism. Even on a departmental level, such contradictory views existed. At this time, high-profile leaders

in the Danish labour movement who were known as close friends of the US experienced problems obtaining a visa for the US if they had flirted with communism in their youth. This is where the encouragement of the State Department to invite people from the Non-Communist Left collided with the suspicion of the Justice Department and the immigration authorities towards those whom they considered to be incriminated by their radical past or who had been so-called fellow-travellers.⁴⁸

American Intervention in European Trade Union Affairs in a Wider Perspective

The Italian historian Federico Romero has emphasized that American intervention in trade union affairs in countries like Italy, where the FTUC was instrumental in splitting the trade union movement, left workers defenceless.⁴⁹ Not only because the trade union movement became divided, but also because the communist-dominated Italian national organization – which was truly free in the sense that it was neither associated with the state nor with the ruling political parties – lost legitimacy and strength, and the new, so-called free trade unions – which did become closely associated with the ruling Italian parties and the state – never had the strength to truly defend the employees' interests in relation to the employers. This is where in practice the use of Lovestone and Browns' concept of "Free Labor" became contradictory – in the same way as it was paradoxical when the duo employed anti-democratic methods to defend democracy. Through such actions, Lovestone and Brown helped to compromise the very concepts of democracy they were propagating.

The situation in Denmark was different to that of Italy. In Denmark, the trade union movement was strong, and the hegemony of the social democrats ensured that it remained a single unitary movement that was able to negotiate a class compromise with the employers. This laid part of the groundwork for building the Danish welfare state. The effect of American intervention in Danish affairs was rather that the Americans came to function as a kind of sovereign mediator between labour and capital, an operator coming from outside who enjoyed authority over both parties and therefore was able to sanction the class compromise. Thus, the Americans also contributed to stabilizing and maintaining a social democratic hegemony in the labour movement.⁵⁰

There was no need for Brown to twist the arm of the leadership of the Danish trade union movement in order for them to leave the WFTU. The Danes and their Nordic colleagues soon attached more importance

to Western unity and national financial interests than to international trade union solidarity and the chances of a cohesive international trade union movement being able to speak up against the superpowers. Especially with the launch of the Marshall Plan, the parties had a convergence of interests. On the one hand the social democratic leadership of the Danish trade union movement wanted to defend their (hegemonic) position and contain the local communist threat, especially as the short postwar honeymoon of the workers' parties began to fade. That coincided with the intensification of Cold War tensions internationally. On the other hand, both Americans and Danes favoured a democratic system, and they found common ground with respect to developing a modernization strategy for Danish industry that included centralized planning, high productivity, class cooperation and affluence. The fact that Eiler Jensen appealed to the Americans for help is quite indicative of how American intervention in Danish affairs was a result of local initiatives. In spite of various Danish preferences, reservations and evasions, a great deal of the transfer of American dollars, commodities, ideology and culture during the Marshall Plan occurred in compliance with Danish wishes. Not merely the trade union movement itself, but Danish society in its entirety, too, thus experienced a selective Americanization, "by invitation", in the early days of the Cold War.

Notes

1. M.B. Davis to Secretary of State, 21 November 1945, Box 6496, Decimal File 1945-49, 859.504/11-2145, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, Maryland (hereafter RG 59 NA). Most dates in the references have been standardized by the author.
2. Niels Jul Nielsen, *Mellem storpolitik og værkstedsgulv. Den danske arbejder – før, under og efter Den kolde krig* (København: Museum Tusulanums Forlag, 2004), p. 122.
3. "The Swedish trade unions", Brown wrote, "have been facing a serious threat from the Communists in the metal workers union", describing the latter as the strongest Swedish union. In Norway, Brown registered "that Communist strength and prestige have risen" due to the communists' active role in the resistance and the new authority of the USSR. See the three files "Denmark", "Sweden" and "Norway", Folder: Committee on International Labor Relations, 1945, Box 16, Files of the Director of Research, AFL Records, Series 8a, Wisconsin Historical Society (hereafter AFL WHS).
4. Marianne Rostgård, "Efterkrigsopgøret indenfor fagbevægelsen og socialdemokratiets økonomiske politik 1945-50", *Historievidenskab* 18-19 (1980), pp. 105ff.; Nielsen, *Mellem storpolitik og værkstedsgulv*, pp. 122, 132ff.
5. "Denmark", Folder: Committee on International Labor Relations 1945, Box 16, Files of the Director of Research, Series 8a, AFL WHS.

6. For the purposes of this article I have concentrated on the AFL as the main representative of the American trade union movement.
7. This chapter is based on Dino Knudsen: *Amerikaniseringen af den danske fagbevægelse. Marshallhjælp, kold krig og transatlantiske forbindelser, 1945–1956* [*The Americanisation of the Danish Trade Union Movement. Marshall Aid, Cold War and Transatlantic Relations, 1945–1956*] (København: Museum Tusulanums Forlag, 2012). In Denmark, there had previously been no specific research on the topic, while thus far, only one article has been published on the subject in a Swedish context: Klaus Misgeld, “Facklig alliansfrihet? Landsorganisationen i Sverige och fackföreningsinternationalen i börjen av det kalla kriget”, *Arbetarhistoria* 77–8 (1996).
8. On the particularities of America’s historical development and the labour movement, see Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, *It Didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000); Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1996); Federico Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 12.
9. No title, Folder: AFL, FTUC, Box 402, Jay Lovestone collection, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter JL).
10. Romero, *European Trade Union Movement*, p. 14; “Report on Free Trade Union Committee”, Folder: AFL, FTUC, Box 403, JL; “The Aims of Free Trade Unionism in the Struggle against the Totalitarian Menace”, Folder: 21 Meetings: 2nd Congress Milan 1951, Box 5, George Meany Files, George Meany Memorial Archives (hereafter GM).
11. Anthony Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science* (Manchester University Press, 1987), p. 63; Anthony Carew, “The American Labor Movement in Fizzland: The Free Trade Union Committee and the CIA”, *Labor History* 39 (1998), p. 2.
12. Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 53.
13. Julia Angster, “‘The Finest Labour Network in Europe’: American Labour and the Cold War”, in Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (eds), *The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State–Private Network* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 102; Regin Schmidt, *PET’s overvågning af arbejdsmarkedet 1945–1989. Fra samarbejde til overvågning – AIC, fagbevægelsen og faglige konflikter under den kolde krig*, PET Kommissionens beretning, vol. 8 (København: Justitsministeriet, 2009), pp. 34ff.
14. “Report on Free Trade Union Committee”, Folder: AFL, FTUC, Box 403, JL; Knudsen, *Amerikaniseringen*.
15. One of the few exceptions that I have found is “Free Trade Union Committee Meeting – 08/07/48”, Folder 5 Jay Lovestone 1948 May–Dec., Box 29, Irving Brown Files, George Meany Memorial Archives (hereafter IB).
16. Ted Morgan, *A Covert Life. Jay Lovestone: Communist, Anti-Communist and Spymaster* (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 177.
17. “Report on Free Trade Union Committee”, Folder: AFL, FTUC, Box 403, JL; Romero, pp. 15, 92.
18. See Morgan, *A Covert Life*, pp. 118ff.

19. "Irving Brown", Folder: 10 Irving Brown 1949, Box 12, JL; "Irving Joseph Brown", Folder: 9 Irving Brown, Box 11, JL.
20. Morgan, *A Covert Life*, pp. 118ff., 141.
21. Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan*, pp. 70ff.
22. Misgeld, "Facklig alliansfrihet?", p. 30.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 34.
24. "Koncentrat af Eiler Jensens Forelæggelse paa Formandsmødet den 24/11/45", pp. 6-7, Folder 2, Box 323, Socialdemokratiets arkiv, Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv (hereafter SDA ABA).
25. *Ibid.*
26. "Arbejderbevægelsens nordiske Samarbejdskomitets Møde i København 18-19/07/46", p. 19, Folder 1 Box 1061, Landsorganisationens arkiv, ABA (hereafter LO ABA); "Rapport vedr. Den faglige Verdensorganisation's Eksekutiv-komites møde i Moskva den 22-27/06/46", p. 4, Folder 3 Box 323, SDA ABA.
27. "Delvis beretning fra UN's Møde i Flushing og Lake Success ved New York 23. Oktober til 16/12/46 ang. de Spørgsmål, der særlig interesserer Fagbevægelsen", p. 9, Folder 2/6 Box 1061, LO ABA.
28. "Den nordiske faglige konference i Oslo 03-04/01/47", pp. 6ff., Folder 2/3 Box 1061, LO ABA. For more on the convergence, see Ronald L. Filippelli, *American Labor and Postwar Italy, 1943-1953. A Study of Cold War Politics* (Stanford University Press, 1989), and Jon V. Kofas, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the World Federation of Trade Unions, 1944-48", *Diplomatic History* 26 (Winter 2002), pp. 20-60.
29. Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan*, pp. 75ff.; Filippelli, *American Labor*, pp. 155ff.
30. *Arbejderen*, 42 (1 July 1946), p. 126; Hans Rasmussen to DFTU, 13 January 1948, Folder 13 Box 584, LO ABA. See also Folder 1 Box 585 and "Rapport over den faglige verdensorganisations repræsentantskabsmøde i Prag 09-14/07/47", Folder 21 Box 807, LO ABA.
31. Brown to Lovestone, 14 August 1947, and annex ("Report of I.A.M. delegate, Irving Brown, to International Metalworkers Federation Convention", pp. 1, 10ff.), Folder Irving Brown 1944-66, Box 234, JL; see also Brown to Lovestone, 17 December 1947, *ibid.*
32. Nielsen, *Mellem storpolitik og værkstedsgulv*, p. 104; Brown to Eiler Jensen, 29 November 1947, Folder: 13 Box 584, LO ABA; Brown to Lovestone, 28 December 1947, Folder 3 Box 29, IB.
33. Brown to Lovestone, 17 December 1947 Folder: I. Brown, Box 698, JL; Brown to Lie, 28 December 1947, Folder: 15 Scandinavia 1947-49, Box 1, IB; Jensen to Brown, 20 December 1947, Box 985-87, LO ABA.
34. It is unclear whether there were any representatives from Finland at the meeting. Brown to Lovestone, 8 January 1948, Folder: 4 Jay Lovestone, Box 29, IB; Brown to Lovestone, 28 December 1947, Folder: 3, Box 29, JL.
35. "Protokoll vid den nordiska samarbetskommitténs möte i Stockholm den 07-08/02/48", p. 9, Folder 1 Box 333, SDA ABA.
36. *Report to Executive Council*, p. 2, F. 7 "International Labor Committee, AFL, 1945-58", Box 52, G. Meany Files, GMMA; Matthew Woll to Eiler Jensen, 16.01.48, Box 985-87, LO ABA.

37. "Protokoll vid den nordiska samarbetskommittéens möte i Stockholm den 07-08/02/48", p. 9, Folder 1 Box 333, SDA ABA.
38. "Samtale mellem Generalsekretær i TUC, Vincent Tewson, Generalsekretær i Transport and General Workers Union og Præsident for WFTU, Arthur Deaking og undertegnede, 20.12.48", Box 585, LO ABA.
39. Knudsen, *Amerikaniseringen af den danske fagbevægelse*, pp. 92, 103-53.
40. "World federation of trade unions, 05/49", Folder: 5 International Trade Union Centers 1947-1950, Box 44, JL.
41. Knudsen, *Amerikaniseringen af den danske fagbevægelse*, pp. 68ff.
42. Quoted in Gerd Lundestad, *Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997* (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 126; Walter Galenson to Department of State, 15 December 1945, 859.504/12-2745, DF 1945-49, RG 59 NA.
43. B. Davis to Secretary of State, 13 August 1945, 859.5043/8-1345, DF 1945-49, RG 59 NA; B. Davis to Secretary of State, 11 July 1945, 859.504/3-2115, Box 6496, RG 59 NA; Iben Bjørnsson, "Arbejderbevægelsens Informations-Central. Socialdemokratisk antikommunisme under Den Kolde Krig 1944-73", Master's thesis, Saxo Institute, University of Copenhagen, 2008, p. 159.
44. Romero, p. 94; Carew, p. 61. A classic account of the role of the "labor statesman" can be found in Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1969).
45. See Carew, "Fizz-Kids".
46. *Ibid.*; see also Wilford, *Mighty Wurlitzer*, ch. 3, for a summary of the conflict-ridden relationship, and Quenby Hughes, *In the Interest of Democracy: The Rise and Fall of the Early Cold War Alliance between the American Federation of Labor and the Central Intelligence Service Agency* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011).
47. Knudsen, p. 63.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 116ff.
49. Romero, pp. 218ff.
50. Knudsen, p. 191.

3

“Brother Tronchet”: A Swiss Trade Union Leader within the US Sphere of Influence

Luc van Dongen

During the Cold War, whilst formally neutral in terms of its foreign and security policies, Switzerland actually found itself bound up in numerous ways with transnational anti-communist initiatives, whether in bilateral or multilateral settings. One of the facets of this still poorly understood protean involvement is the participation (deliberate or otherwise) of the Swiss Left – itself a component of soft power toward Western Europe – within the “Non-Communist Left” approach of the United States.¹ Plenty of research has already been conducted on American “state-private networks” and the political, trade union and cultural circles of the European Left, but Switzerland has been largely absent from these investigations.² However, there were “progressives” in Switzerland who joined forces with the United States in their anti-communist (or rather anti-Marxist, anti-Stalinist or anti-totalitarian) battles. The trade unionist from Geneva, Lucien Tronchet (1902–82), was among their number. Leader of the Federation of Wood and Construction Workers (FOBB), he was without doubt one of the principal men of the Swiss Left on whom the Americans decided to pin their hopes at the start of the 1950s.

This fact is little known, since it is Tronchet’s heroic years between the two world wars that are most remembered. The image is enduringly fixed of the trade unionist of direct action, the anti-fascist who took part in the Spanish Civil War and the French Resistance, and above all of the lively militant worker of integrity. As the leader of the Ligue d’action du bâtiment (the anarcho-syndicalist Construction Worker’s Action League) he had no hesitation in occupying building sites and striking a blow at unscrupulous employers. This image of the

“shock syndicalist” has overshadowed the truth of the leader who was won over to the socialist party after the war, and who became increasingly engaged in the international movement of “free trade unions”, ready to mix with the interests of capitalism (read: the American government) and state surveillance (the political police).³ Research into these postwar years reveals the extent to which the links between the European Left and the US were subtle and cannot be reduced to mere control and manipulation. As Hugh Wilford has already shown very well with respect to the case of Britain, it is not always obvious who is taking advantage of whom.⁴ This phenomenon grows more complex still when we take note of the social and cultural dimensions and the autonomy of the actors. It is from this perspective that the case of Tronchet will be tackled.

From his earliest appearances, this indefatigable defender of social justice was opposed to the communist option, preferring routes more in keeping with his commitment to individual freedom and autonomy. In the 1920s he had already opposed the “Muscovites” and “Bolsheviks” in the name of independent trade unions. A committed libertarian, he unwaveringly condemned the October Revolution: “Any organization of political power that proclaims itself provisional and revolutionary can only be a deception, because Lenin’s *coup d’état* can only ever signify the beginning of the counter-revolution.”⁵ But how does this anarcho-syndicalist and champion of insubordination come to be caught up in the Cold War propaganda of the United States? What form did this partnership take? Was it more a case of him winning the Americans over to his cause, or rather the other way around? This last question, which refers to notions of “self-colonization” and “empire by invitation”,⁶ is particularly pertinent here. This chapter will examine in two stages the nature and impact of links with the United States: first briefly describing the four episodes around which the collusion crystallized, and then putting that collusion in the context of the points of view of Tronchet and the Americans.

Lucien Goes to the USA

It is an irony of history that the first mention of Tronchet in the American archives relates to the fact that in September 1950, perhaps in the hope of thereby harming an enemy of the USSR, the CIA representative in Bern, James S. Kronthal – himself a Soviet agent⁷ – categorized Lucien Tronchet as a communist.⁸ And yet, as a member of the Socialist Party from 1949 and leader of the Geneva section of the FOBB,

Tronchet was crossing swords more than ever with the communists. At the end of that same month of September, a union congress was held in which he argued resolutely against their positions. This congress constituted an early step for Tronchet on a route towards the US. Indeed, his speech was closely followed by Pat Frayne from the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) in Paris, who had earlier made a visit to see the man from Geneva.⁹ A labour attaché from the United States legation in Bern took part in the debates. This was Harriet Harling Lothrop (1924–2009), who was later to become Tronchet's mistress and then his second wife. To Pat Frayne, who had enquired about the results of the congress, Tronchet said with satisfaction, “Generally, the congress was a good display of worker maturity.”¹⁰ ‘Despite the use of certain delaying manoeuvres from the communists, the Swiss Trade Union Confederation, the biggest union federation in Switzerland, had shown great skill in proposing a call for membership of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the organization created in 1949 in order to hold in check the communist-influenced World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). From that point on, relations between the administration of the Marshall Plan in Paris and Tronchet would intensify. The latter kept himself regularly fed with documentation on American economic and union life. Once he called for a publication that had been produced by the American embassy in Rome in memory of an Italian martyr worker to be distributed among Italian immigrant “seasonal workers” in Switzerland. At the time the leadership of the Swiss trade unions were doing everything they could to lessen the impact of communism among foreign workers. Tronchet, moreover, had no scruples, a little later on, over handing the names of politically dubious foreigners to the federal police.’¹¹

At the same time as these exchanges with American representatives, a project arose to invite Swiss trade unionists for a study trip to the United States. It is not clear who first proposed this, but in November 1950 Harriet H. Lothrop wrote to Tronchet,

Regarding the voyage of Swiss syndicalists to the USA, I am happy to tell you that I am able to propose some names for such a voyage [...]. As you know, it is important to choose the people who, when recounting their personal impressions, will draw the greatest number of listeners.

The American attaché also wrote to specify that it would be necessary to speak a little English and to have an uncontroversial political past.

Not entirely without shame, I would remind you that because of all the recent American legislation in matters of security, it is preferable to find someone who has never been a member of the communist party. I leave you complete freedom to suggest one or two militants from Geneva, while indicating the reasons for your choice. But, at the same time, do tell me if you would be able or willing to take part in the programme. I would very much like to propose you, and you would be able to learn some elements of English [...].¹²

The personal role of Harriet H. Lothrop and the ultimate aim of the mission are evident here. The “Notes for an act of rapprochement at Worker Level between the USA and Switzerland” that Tronchet delivered to the United States legation in Bern leaves no doubt as to the trade unionist’s enthusiasm and support for the ideological objectives of the operation. While the question of the number and identity of participants was still open, Tronchet underlined the need to better acquaint the Swiss workers with the Marshall Plan and the realities of America, since according to him, there were still too many prejudices and misunderstandings surrounding Swiss views of America.

The men would be chosen from among the best militant workers, as judged by their comrades, on the grounds of their sense of responsibility, their objectivity, their unshakeable attachment to the ideas of liberty and their irreducible opposition to totalitarian concepts. There is no doubt that they will be listened to on their return, these men who know how to speak and write of the world of workers, and a great service will have been granted in the cause of rapprochement between the peoples of America and Europe. We point out in passing that the Russians have been able to make extensive use, in a skilful way, of systems of delegation in the USSR, which have allowed them to develop the influence with which we are already acquainted.¹³

It would be difficult to express more clearly the counter-propaganda value of this approach, adopted as it was from the Soviet model.

In the end Tronchet went on his own, between June and October 1951, with the help of the State Department’s prestigious Foreign Leader Program, in which very few Swiss participated.¹⁴ This four-month-long trip, which took place in the middle of the McCarthy era and at the height of the war in Korea, constitutes the second and most important knot around which Tronchet’s links with the Americans were woven. To a large extent, it was organized by Tronchet himself. All the same, the

State Department lent its support at the administrative level, while occasionally suggesting the names of people to meet. The New York bureau of the ICFTU served as a mailbox for his correspondence.

Tronchet's diary pays testimony to the many meetings that he had in the US, mostly with unionists and workers, but also with entrepreneurs, industrialists, journalists, senior civil servants and diplomats. He became acquainted with the most important American union leaders (William Green, Victor Reuther and Michael Ross), and made contact with two of the most ardent "cold warriors" of international syndicalism, namely Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown of the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The latter pair immediately got on well with the man from Geneva and they were quick to put to good use his documentation on the disappearance of two Swiss in the USSR (Marc Schalks and Yvonne Bovard).¹⁵ While he was at it, "Brother Tronchet" (as he was called according to the customs of American unionists) was able to deliver a speech at the annual congress of the AFL, as well as at the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). In Denver, the union members of the CIO gave him an ovation. "I'm being asked for autographs", he confided, incredulously, to his diary.¹⁶ His tribulations also led him to participate in several demonstrations for Moral Rearmament. This Protestant-inspired movement, founded in Oxford by the American Frank Buchman in 1938, had its headquarters in Switzerland (Caux) after the war. Tronchet had come into contact with them several years before (in 1948, for example, he organized a presentation of *The Forgotten Factor* for young union members in Geneva).¹⁷ In San Francisco, he attended another edifying spectacle typical of Moral Rearmament. The theatre play *Johatam Valley* did not seem to put him off at all: "It is very well played, very fresh and subtle, and at the same time a beautiful presentation of cowboy life on a family ranch, with national costumes."¹⁸ He even went to Mackinac Island, where the American branch of Moral Rearmament was based. In addition, he delivered a lecture at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and was able to express himself via the radio waves of Voice of America (VOA), responding to questions that he had the luxury of preparing for, and this, it seems, at the invitation of Allen W. Dulles. The latter, the deputy director of plans (clandestine operations) at the CIA, even received him in his office on 4 September 1951.¹⁹

During his stay, Tronchet wrote up reports that not only appeared in union publications, but also in mass-circulation Swiss newspapers such as the *Tribune de Genève*. After his return, true to his word, he continued to recount his experience: articles, conferences, film projections,

exhibitions and the distribution of brochures all followed at a frantic pace. For example, he distributed to Swiss workers the book by Irving Brown entitled *Les syndicats européens et américains unis par le plan Marshall (European and American Unions United by the Marshall Plan)*, as well as brochures in French – *Images de l'Amérique, Visages et Perspectives du Syndicalisme Américain (Pictures of America, Faces and Perspectives of US Trade Unionism)* – that were distributed by the United States Information Agency (USIA). He showed films – *Productivity Key to Plenty, With These Hands* and *Key to Plenty* – that were produced by the official services of the ECA and USIA and by private organizations such as the Twentieth Century Fund. In three months, he gave no less than 27 lectures.

Appreciating such devotion, the Americans decided, following Tronchet's pressing appeals, to donate to his International Centre for Union Training (CESI: Centre d'entraînement syndical international). Based in Geneva, this centre had been created by the Swiss, in connection with the FOBB, before his departure for the United States. It had taken on the mission of training Swiss and foreign executives in the practice of free trade unionism. A first course had been set up in the summer of 1950 with several dozen French trade unionists from Force ouvrière, including their leader Léon Jouhaux. The financial assistance of the AFL resulting from the trip made it possible for the centre to develop. Intended for militant Italians, the second course (in May 1952) took on a clearly American flavour because the AFL had in the meantime contributed to redefining the training guidelines.²⁰ This collaboration around the CESI is the third major node in Tronchet's relations with the Americans. It bears the stamp of Irving Brown, the representative in Europe for the AFL and the Free Trade Union Committee, whose proximity to the CIA is well known.²¹ With Joseph D. Keenan, in office at the headquarters of the AFL in Washington, Brown was the man through whom the money from the AFL – and indirectly, therefore, from the Office of Policy Coordination and then the CIA – flowed in to the centre in Geneva (the size of the sums involved are not known). Moreover, on many occasions Brown personally played a part on courses in the role of conference speaker, and made available his networks, such as that of the Congress for Cultural Freedom with which the CESI was later to be associated, notably through Michael Josselson.²² The relationship between Tronchet and Brown was no passing fancy, since it transformed into a friendship that endured into the 1980s.

The fourth salient episode is another trip. In the summer of 1953, Tronchet was sent to Indo-China by the ICFTU. Officially, this was

to study social conditions in a country that was still under French rule; in reality, it was to work towards the reunification of French and Vietnamese unions into a single confederation suitable for membership of the ICFTU. The “fact-finding and information-gathering mission” lasted one month. Tronchet did not ease up in his efforts there and ended up showing great skill in an extremely complex political terrain wracked by colonial conflict.²³ His negotiations certainly did not lead to the hoped-for union, but they earned him the respect of many local unionists as well as the relevant French and international authorities: the ICFTU, Force ouvrière, the CIO, the AFL, the Mutual Security Agency (which succeeded the Economic Cooperation Agency) and Allen Dulles, to whom Tronchet forwarded a copy of his report.²⁴

With Indo-China, Tronchet was to embark on his “Third World” tack. At the start of the 1960s, it is Africa that comes to the foreground of his international activity. Thus, after the French, the Italians and Spanish immigrants from France, the CESI began to take on Tunisian, Algerian, Moroccan and Congolese participants, while the man from Switzerland came to represent the ICFTU at several pan-African conferences (Tunis 1960, Dakar 1962). He became involved again alongside the African American Labor Center (AALC),²⁵ while his illustrious partner from the CESI, the Swiss socialist Hans Oprecht, ran the Center for Labor and Social Studies (CLSS). While the AALC was dependent on the AFL-CIO, the CLSS, based in Rome, enjoyed the support of the CIA and so resembled the CESI that it might have been mistaken for the same thing.²⁶

How to interpret these close transatlantic relationships? For the communists, the reason was understood: when not simply seen as an agent of the CIA, Tronchet was “that McCarthyite American” who had sold his soul and betrayed the working class.²⁷ Here was a moral judgement that scarcely grasped the complexity of the collusion.

A Convergence

The rapprochement first needs to be placed in its general context. Its emergence effectively coincides with the moment when the American battle for hearts and minds became systematized. From 1947–48 onwards, with the aim of countering similar efforts already tried and tested by the Soviets – but also on the strength of internal logic – the American government, following the lead of the CIA, put in place a doctrine and instruments specifically aimed at particular groups around the world: youth and students, intellectuals, lawyers, the Non-Communist Left. The Tronchet case is part of this psychological warfare offensive,

combined with two other strands: the labour policy that accompanied the Marshall Plan in Europe and the cultural diplomacy that was intended to promote the American way of life around the world.²⁸ We have seen how Tronchet had dealings with all the institutional elements of this activity, which were both interlinked and competing: the Department of State, the Department of Labor, the ECA/Mutual Security Agency, USIA, CIA and the principal union confederations (AFL, CIO, ICFTU).

On the American side, everyone had their reasons for turning to Tronchet. The official representatives saw in him an influential unionist of European scope, with routes in to France and Italy, in touch with the terrain, and whose aura – of a free and relentless spirit – only added to his credibility. His presence in Geneva, one of the few Swiss cities where the communists presented a certain danger, also made possible a liaison with the International Labor Organization. He had proven his good will towards the United States and had given enough guarantees of his effectiveness in his fight against the communists. As for his socialism, it was nothing to be afraid of. In 1953, the American counsel in Geneva judged that Tronchet “is no more Socialist, or left wing than any other European labor union movement”. In fact, he added, “Tronchet has the reputation here of being only nominally a Socialist.”²⁹ An opinion no doubt shared by the cultural attaché in Bern who, two years earlier, arrived at the conclusion that Tronchet “would have to be associated with our anti-communist activities in Europe”.³⁰

Modest in scope, the US cultural diplomacy programme towards Switzerland can only have been tempted by Tronchet’s services. The strategy for this country, as defined by the competent bodies – the United States International Information and Exchange Program until 1953, and then later the United States Information Agency – effectively banked on useful personal contacts rather than blind mass propaganda.³¹ At the end of 1950, the cultural attaché in Bern called for up-to-date techniques for a psychological strategy to be applied to Switzerland. If possible, each “front” (unions, press, intellectuals, peasants, women, students) needed to be represented by intermediaries, small in number but reliable and effective, who would themselves take initiative for cooperation.³² Switzerland was given the function of a springboard to the wider world: to France, Italy and Germany, through geographical proximity; to the Third World, through the international organizations based in Geneva, as well as its neutrality and the absence of colonial obstacles; and to the countries of the Eastern bloc, through the many émigrés present in Switzerland. Transnational in essence, the

tactic of using fronts brought certain countries the honour of playing a role incommensurate to their size, acting as the interface allowing access to target groups beyond the national territory. The USIE lent this function to Switzerland, particularly in so far as opinion leaders (since the Swiss press enjoyed an excellent reputation and was believed to be much read abroad), engineers, and indeed unions were concerned.³³ At the time of Tronchet's Foreign Leader grant, certain diplomats even predicted a great future for Switzerland in this domain.

Switzerland is strategically placed in Europe, both geographically and ideologically, for American use in the propaganda war. [...] There is the assumption implicit [...] that Switzerland will play much the same part internationally in the future international relations in Europe as she did during World War II. There is the second assumption that the United States will wish to develop phases of the propaganda war, integrate the USIE program more closely with that of the CIA and move the information side of the program towards political activation.³⁴

The AFL certainly shared most of the motives that encouraged the state to back Tronchet. Ideological affinities were also part of the equation. The AFL's ideas concerning the mission of syndicalism and its productivist credo struck a chord with Tronchet.³⁵ At the same time, the Swiss tradition – somewhat mythologized – of a syndicalism built on the principle of a collective contract and the *paix du travail* agreement on employment was a notion that the AFL found seductive. There was appreciation for Tronchet's pragmatic attitude and organizational capacities, American virtues par excellence. And his rebellious ways: were they not also there for a reason? Indeed, it is known that the US union chiefs had an aversion to the kind of "Fizz Kids" from good families that tended to overpopulate the offices of the US government. The fact is that the man from Switzerland had no trouble being accepted in this environment. Brown considered him one of his own, Lovestone trusted him and others, like Harry Goldberg, knew they could depend on him.³⁶

Everything indicates, however, that the Americans were not the motor behind the relationship. Despite the doubts that remain over how the story began – the decisive meeting with Harriet H. Lothrop and the role she certainly played – it is clear that Tronchet was not caught up in some sort of trap. In 1950, he was investigating all possible means for a way to establish contacts. A tacit agreement, the fruit of converging interests, established itself around the need for propaganda. Lothrop had to quickly curb Tronchet's ambitions, since he already saw himself

at the head of a huge international campaign of support for the Marshall Plan in union circles. “You better start on a smaller scale”, she retorted – “after some initial successes, we were able to develop an autochthonous programme.”³⁷ Tronchet’s black and white anti-communism even irritated Tronchet’s brother, who was responsible for publishing him in Switzerland.

Your articles stink too much like propaganda and not enough like information. [...] Be careful [...] you’re too deeply involved and you might not realise that your readers want to be informed and not ‘doped’. The best propaganda, here in Switzerland, is it not a question of saying purely and simply what you can see [...] with the nuances that you judge to be useful? [...] Your articles give the impression that you are completely caught up in the mood and you’re forgetting the Swiss spirit and mentality!³⁸

Tronchet wasn’t particularly concerned. “If the propaganda is done well, my lectures about the USA are very well attended”, was Tronchet’s self-congratulatory tone shortly after his return from the US.³⁹ Convinced that Switzerland needed to “constitute a solid base of influence and ideological security” for the United States, he pursued the project with a book that he called *Le point de vue d’un syndicaliste suisse aux USA* (*The Point of View of a Swiss Unionist in the USA*).⁴⁰ And yet, despite favourable reactions from the Department of Labor and the Carnegie Endowment, the book was never produced. For all that, his American passion remained undiminished, to the point where the AFL sometimes enjoined him to show more restraint in his lessons with regard to the United States.

As for “empire by invitation”, no one could doubt that the American Empire was invited. But to what end? It was unquestionably for motives that were at the same time political, tactical and cultural. Politically, Tronchet admired the functioning and the political punch of the American unions. He subscribed completely to the idea that productivity would be increased as the result of better cooperation between owners and workers and that this growth would indirectly profit the workers if the unions were successful in getting the owners to let them share the gains as a result. The role in which he saw himself was that of a veritable go-between, conscious of the need to accommodate other cultures and adapt to each audience:

In the USA, I learnt much about your research services, the education of workers, and theories of productivity. Since my return, therefore,

I pay particular attention to these issues around our union organisations and the authorities, which to me seem primordial. [...] Our ideas are very similar. In order to get them accepted by French, Italian, or German militant unionists, it is clear that we need to adapt them to the particular conditions of each country and that we need to have a good understanding of the comrades' mentality, to make sure we do not clash with them.⁴¹

Tactically, therefore, Tronchet understood the full extent to which he could take advantage of an alliance with the USSR's fiercest adversary: a greater capacity for creating nuisance towards communism, certainly, but also increased influence and the means for taking action of his own (he was particularly authoritarian and greedy for power). The expansion of the CESI is one example. One should be careful, however, not to underestimate the idealism of a man who believed in the universal solidarity of (free) peoples, as well as in the European cause. Significant in this respect is the note of self-satisfaction displayed by Tronchet after his speech at the congress of the CIO: "I spoke as neither a beggar, nor a sycophant. [...] I believe that this is good work on behalf of Europe."⁴²

Finally, Tronchet displayed a real fascination for America, for its freedoms, its union culture, its economic vitality, its technological innovations and even its social system. There is certainly an element of sincerity in this article from 1951:

The fact remains that the social conditions, such as they exist in the United States, are the best and the most equitable in the known world. [...] In the United States, we did not only see the oft-repeated demonstration of industrial power, but we saw above all a people grateful and attached to the country which ensures them the development of a social life of well-being and liberty.⁴³

For sure, Tronchet's perception of the United States did not correspond to that of the majority of his compatriots, which was tinged with anti-Americanism. As for him, he enjoyed driving around in an American car and dressing as a cowboy, while going out with a woman from Minnesota on the sly.

Thus, strategies in pursuit of specific aims came together in a struggle against a common enemy and on the basis of certain shared values. There is something astonishing about seeing Tronchet, the determined defender of the oppressed and homeless, destroyer of owner

exploitation, who did time in prison for his anti-militarism, in face-to-face conversation with one of the chiefs of the CIA at the height of the McCarthy era. His fairly radical ideological about-turn in favour of the idea of collaboration between the classes, and his deep-rooted rejection of communism, pushed him, thanks to the Cold War, along a new route marked by the stamp of Atlanticism. Informed and crafty man that he was, he could not have been duped by the game he was playing, even if we might wonder, in certain aspects, about the part that was played by the “American sweetheart”.⁴⁴ Other Swiss men and women of the Left allowed themselves to be pulled into the soft power machinery of America, but few with such intensity. As for the impact of this alliance, it is clearly difficult to evaluate, but Tronchet’s actions did not pass unnoticed internationally. Indeed, when updated on the Swiss man’s efforts in the cause of free unionism in Africa, the United States ambassador at the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) proposed – with the agreement of Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone – that a Swiss should be named as assistant to the secretary general of the OEEC in 1961.⁴⁵

Notes

1. This chapter is part of the author’s wider research project on Switzerland in the Cold War financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation, in association with the University of Fribourg.
2. Among studies on this subject, one might mention: Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton University Press, 2001); Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 1999); Anthony Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987); Federico Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992). See also the contribution by Dino Knudsen in this volume.
3. Eric Golay, Jacqueline Berenstein-Wavre and Alda De Giorgi, *Lucien Tronchet, syndicaliste de choc* (Geneva: Collège du travail, 1998).
4. See the contribution by Hugh Wilford in this volume.
5. Lucien Tronchet’s declaration to the Anarchist Congress in Saint Imier, 16–17 September 1922, cited in Tronchet, *Combat pour la dignité ouvrière* (Genève: Grounauer, 1979), p. 40.
6. See in particular: Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration. *The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997* (Oxford University Press, 1998), and Lundestad, “‘Empire by Invitation’? The United States and Western Europe’”, *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (1986), pp. 263–77.

7. William R. Corson, Susan B. Trento and Joseph J. Trento, *Veuves. Des taupes soviétiques au cœur des services secrets américains* (Paris: Belfond, 1989), pp. 19–27.
8. Swiss Embassy Bern, Box 89, Entry 3208, RG 84, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park (hereafter NA).
9. E.1.1/1, Collection Lucien Tronchet, Archives of the Collège du travail, Geneva (hereafter LT).
10. Lucien Tronchet to Pat Frayne, October 5, 1950, D.1.1.1/1, LT.
11. Malik von Allmen and Jean Steinauer, *L'apport de l'immigration au syndicalisme suisse depuis 1945*, Part 1: Les hommes, les idées, les pratiques, Scientific report within the framework of National Research Programme PNR 39 (Geneva, 2000), pp. 168 and 170.
12. D.1.1.1/1, LT.
13. D.1.1.1/1, LT.
14. Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire: The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950–1970* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008).
15. Regarding the fate of the violinist Yvonne Bovard, see the documentary film by Daniel Künzi, *Yvonne Bovard, déportée en Sibérie* (1998).
16. D.1.1.1/1, LT.
17. 7.4.4/1, PP 746, archive of the Mouvement du réarmement moral de caux, archives Cantonales Vaudoises, Lausanne.
18. D.1.1.1/1, September 13, 1951, LT.
19. On 5 July 1951, Tronchet noted in his journal, "I am supposed to see Mr. Allen Dulles who was in Switzerland with the legation for a long time and knows the European problems well. He is proposing that I prepare a report on my visit here which would then be broadcast on the radio." There is no other mention of Dulles in the journal. However, the meeting is confirmed by a message from an employee of the State Department on 20 August 1951, as well as a personal letter that Tronchet wrote to Dulles on 18 August 1953 (D.2.1/2, LT). No record of their conversation has been found.
20. E.1.1/1 (particularly the letter from Joseph D. Keenan to Lucien Tronchet, 18 February 1952) and B.1.1/25, LT.
21. On Irving Brown, see in particular: Roy Godson, *American Labor and European Politics: The AFL as a Transnational Force* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1976); Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy: The Cold War in the Unions from Gompers to Lovestone* (New York: Random House, 1969); Ted Morgan, *A Covert Life. Jay Lovestone, Communist, Anti-Communist, and Spymaster* (New York: Random House, 1999); Annie Lacroix-Riz, "Autour d'Irving Brown: l'AFL, le Free Trade Union Committee, le Département d'état et la scission syndicale française (1944–1947)", *Le mouvement social* 151 (1990), pp. 79–118.
22. Josselson's first appearance was at a CESI seminar in July 1961. See E.3.2.2/2, LT.
23. Edmund F. Wehrle, *Between a River and a Mountain: The AFL-CIO and the Vietnam War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005); Melanie Beresford and Chris Nyland, "The Labour Movement of Vietnam", *Labour History* 75 (1998), pp. 57–80.
24. D.2.1/1, LT.

25. D.1.5.1/1–2, LT.
26. See the contribution by Tity de Vries in this volume.
27. *Voix ouvrière* (communist periodical), 5 November 1954.
28. Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 2008); Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–1956* (New York University Press, 1999); Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: US Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
29. Letter from R. Kenneth Oakley to Philip Delaney, 23 March 1953, Country Files, Series 1, 006/13, RG18–001, George Meany Memorial Archive (GMMA).
30. Comments reported by Donald C. Dunham on 14 November 1951, Box 2403, 511.54, Central Decimal Files 1950–54, RG 59 NA.
31. Luc van Dongen, “De la place de la Suisse dans la ‘guerre froide secrète’ des Etats-Unis, 1943–1975”, *Traverse 2* (2009), pp. 55–71.
32. Letter from Donald C. Dunham to Department of State, 28 December 1950, Box 2403, 511.54, Central Decimal Files 1950–54, RG 59 NA.
33. “Official Country Plan for the USIE Program, Switzerland”, Box 2, 150/71/35/07, Country Files 1946–53, RG 59 NA.
34. “Survey Report on USIE Activities in Switzerland”, Donald C. Dunham, 28 July 1950, Box 2403, 511.54, Central Decimal Files 1950–54, RG 59 NA.
35. On productivity, see Anthony Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan*, and Bent Boel, *The European Productivity Agency and Transatlantic Relations 1953–1961* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2003).
36. The AFL representative Goldberg notably solicited Tronchet’s support at the time of the Geneva Conference in 1954.
37. Harriet H. Lothrop to Lucien Tronchet, 28 November 1950, D.1.1.1/1, LT.
38. Henri to Lucien Tronchet, 3 August 1951, D.1.1.1/2, LT.
39. Lucien Tronchet to the secretary of the FOBB in Yverdon, 3 December 1951, D.1.1.1/3, LT.
40. E.1.1/1, LT.
41. Lucien Tronchet to Joseph D. Keenan, 3 March 1952, E.1.1/1, LT.
42. Diary, 11 September 1951, D.1.1.1/1, LT.
43. *Tribune de Genève*, 18 October 1951.
44. According to Harriet Lothrop, she was the one who led Tronchet to become engaged in Africa. See Lothrop to Irving Brown, 23 May 1960, and 22 January 1961, Series 2, 35/8, International Affairs Department: Irving Brown Files, RG18-004, GMMA
45. Report by Ambassador Soldati (Swiss delegate to the OEEC), 24 April 1961, E.3.2.1/1, LT.

4

Not an “Ugly American”: Sal Tas, a Dutch Reporter as Agent of the West in Africa

Tity de Vries

“We are no advocates of xenophobia, nor are we fanatics. We are anti-feudal. [...] We are anti-neutralists; we are with the West.”¹ This statement of Habib Bourguiba, who became the first president of Tunisia in 1957, was loud and clear. The readers of the American journal of “news and opinion” *The New Leader (TNL)* could be confident that an independent Tunisia would not ally with Stalin. Bourguiba’s words were cited in an article on the increasing tensions between Tunisian nationalists and French authorities in which the US government was urged to intervene by putting pressure on the French. The core of the article was a unique interview with Bourguiba who was exiled by the French to a bleak hotel in a Tunisian mountain village. The interview and article were the work of Sal Tas (1905–76), *TNL*’s expert on North African affairs during the 1950s, in particular the struggles for the independence of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.

It was no coincidence that Tas focused on the pro-Western views of Bourguiba in this article. *TNL* was considered to be “the real center of political anti-Communist thought and activity” in the US.² It was one of the American periodicals with an outspoken anti-communist liberal perspective on politics and culture. *Commentary*, *Partisan Review* and *Politics* belonged to the same category. In the American political process, in particular foreign policy, *TNL* served as a trustworthy source of information and opinion for members of Congress and the political elite. The magazine had been founded as the official mouthpiece of the American Socialist Party in 1924. Due to its dedicated executive editor Samuel “Sol” Levitas, its profile evolved into a combination of “progressive social advocacy and staunch Cold War combativeness” after the Second

World War. This attracted a global readership as well as the US administration's attention. The State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) considered *TNL* as a useful ally of its early Cold War policies, and supported the journal financially.³ Levitas also succeeded in connecting figures such as Hannah Arendt, Arthur Koestler, Daniel Bell and Sidney Hook to the journal. Its correspondent of French affairs in the early 1950s was the Dutch reporter Sal Tas.

In his *TNL* contributions on North Africa Tas continuously appealed to the US government to put pressure on the French to end its colonial rule in the Maghreb. If the US (or the Western alliance) kept silent, America's prestige in the Third World would be severely harmed. As a consequence North Africa and its Arab population would become more susceptible to communist propaganda and infiltration, resulting in increasing communist influence in the region. In emphasizing the anti-communist stance of nationalist movements Tas tried to reassure his American audience. Later in the 1950s and in the early 1960s Tas expanded his area of operation to sub-Saharan Africa. Starting in 1963 he was affiliated with the Centre for Labour and Social Studies, Inc. in Rome, Italy, which focused on training and assisting underdeveloped countries on their road to development.

These activities made Tas an energetic agent for the West, operating in the extensive transnational state-private network of diplomats, administrators, labour officials, intellectuals and journalists who were engaged in the (cultural) Cold War. In particular he belonged to the international group of journalists and correspondents who informed Irving Brown, director of the European Office of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and one of the key figures of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), on non-Western parts of the world. Both the AFL and ICFTU aimed at "challenging Communism and beating it at its own game", as Brown stated.⁴ The journalist network included Helmy Sabbour in the Near East, Leon Dennen reporting on Eastern Europe, Robert Alexander and Serafino Romualdi on Latin America, and till late 1952, Farhat Hached on developments in North Africa, together with Sal Tas. Hached was murdered on 5 December 1952, and this left Sal Tas as the main informant on the Maghreb. The informants' reports were for AFL eyes only, but most of them also published their findings and opinions in periodicals like *TNL* or European publications like *Encounter* and *Preuves*. None of them were Americans, and they were all dedicated anti-communists. They acquired access to people and organizations in foreign countries which were hard to reach for American agents and diplomats. They were also good at conveying

a message in their writing. Although minor players on the Cold War field they enriched the perceptions of their American principals and readers with their non-American perspectives which were often rooted in their personal history and national background. They were restless individuals, travelling between continents as transnational traders of ideas, simultaneously informing their American readership and spreading ideas of freedom and democracy in the non-Western world. In this double function their non-American nationalities were essential for their role as agents of Western interests. Sal Tas exemplifies this identity.

A Dedicated Anti-Communist and Anti-Colonialist

Tas had been a determined anti-communist all his professional life. Following the Second World War he was one of the hardliners on communism in the Dutch Labour Party. Unlike many others in Cold War intellectual networks, Tas had never been seduced by communism himself. Born in 1905 in an Amsterdam working-class family, he grew up with a strong class consciousness. Disappointed with the dogmatic Dutch social-democratic party he soon developed an outspoken radical socialist political opinion, challenging communists as well as social democrats for lacking the fighting spirit which was needed to battle capitalism, the economic crisis and fascism. Later in the 1930s Tas turned hostile to the unquestioned socialist admiration of the masses. He stopped believing in Marxist dialectics and pointed to the overwhelming support of the German proletariat for Hitler. Marx had been wrong in his prediction that the proletarian masses would be the vanguard of the future socialist society. Instead, Tas proposed a new socialist movement led by a nucleus of educated leaders who would prepare the road to socialism in a rational way. Only in this way could socialism realize the ideal of humanity in a genuinely democratic society. With the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy Tas became even more convinced that energetic democratic forces were the right antipodes to totalitarian regimes and that Stalin had to be feared as much as Hitler.

During the German occupation of the Netherlands Tas, being Jewish, had to go into hiding. In this period he kept reading and writing, focusing on the postwar future of Europe, warning against Stalin who wasn't to be trusted, even as an ally.⁵

In 1945 he reconciled himself with the social democrats, hoping that the new postwar Labour Party would oppose totalitarianism and fight for a just society. Tas was soon hired as a foreign desk reporter by the social democratic newspaper *Het Parool* which had its origins in the wartime

resistance movement. After five years of German occupation, the Dutch were craving for a press in which freedom of information and opinion ruled. In this climate, together with the strong anti-communist profile of *Het Parool*, Tas flourished. Due to his unique opinionated style of writing mixed with a human interest approach, he soon became one of the star reporters of the paper. Almost daily he warned his readers against the further expansion of Soviet communism, and called for greater alertness among the Western states.

The 1948 communist coup in Prague reconfirmed his suspicions and worst fears, even more after he visited Prague right after the putsch. Deeply shocked on seeing the realities of communism (he compared the communist police force with the German SS during the Second World War), Prague 1948 became a radicalizing turning point in Tas's postwar approach towards communism. Even more than before he focused on the evils and failures of the USSR and its affiliated communist parties in Western Europe. Communism's lack of compassion for humanity became a core element in his arguments.

Tas's dedication to the cause of fighting communism was equalled by his anti-colonialism, which originated in the late 1920s. For a while he had been a student in colonial law and administration, aiming at a future as a colonial administrator in the Dutch East Indies. A small group of his co-students consisted of young Indonesians who were involved in the struggle for Indonesian independence. Hearing their experiences of the practice of colonial rule opened Tas's eyes to the injustice of the colonial system. One of them, Sjahrir, became a close friend. Sjahrir later became one of the prominent leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement after he returned to the Dutch East Indies in December 1931. Tas's involvement with Sjahrir and other nationalists made him a lifelong supporter and propagandist of independence for all colonial territories, in particular the Dutch East Indies. He wrote blazing articles of protest against the inhuman treatment of the Indonesian population by the Dutch colonial administration, accusing the Dutch government of crimes against humanity.⁶

On 17 August 1945 Sukarno proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch government, a coalition of the social democratic and Catholic parties, reacted with suppressing the rebellion through force. Tas, together with most of his *Parool* colleagues, was deeply disappointed when the Labour Party supported two military actions in Indonesia to restore Dutch rule. Only after severe American pressure were the Dutch willing to restart negotiations. On 27 December 1949 Queen Juliana signed the transfer of sovereignty in the presence of Mohammad

Hatta, vice president of Indonesia. By then Tas had left for Paris to take the paper's position of correspondent in France. The predominance of Dutch national self-interest in the Indonesian conflict and in particular the Labour Party's position made him decide that the Dutch political climate of opinion had become too parochial. Paris, nerve centre of international politics in those days, offered him a much larger challenge.

Kindred Spirits in Paris

As Paris correspondent of *Het Parool* Tas had ample opportunities to report on European affairs, NATO politics, French politics and the Maghreb. In the tense Cold War climate of the 1950s his opinions usually fitted very well into *Parool's* radical anti-communist pro-Western profile. New chances arose when Sol Levitas was looking for a *TNL* correspondent in Paris. Already in 1948 Tas had offered Levitas a contribution on Czechoslovakia, but Levitas had declined, instead suggesting that Tas write "from time to time on important events in Holland that would be of interest to American readers".⁷ Tas had also been recommended to Levitas by Sidney Hook, who had been interviewed by Tas in the summer of 1948. Politically the three of them were kindred spirits with their anti-communist social democratic opinions. It didn't take long for Levitas to ask Tas to become *TNL's* correspondent in France. In July 1950 his first article in the journal was published.⁸

Tas's arrival in Paris coincided with the increasing activities of nationalist parties in Morocco and Tunisia. For Tas it was rather easy to get access to North African independence movements which had many supporters among African students in Paris.⁹ With his personal Second World War history of being in hiding (*onderduiker*) for three years Tas could easily relate to these fighters for freedom and win their trust. His anti-colonialism and references to his friendship with Sjahrir were also helpful. One of these students was the Tunisian Masmoudi, later Tunisia's first Secretary of State. Masmoudi was Tas's introduction to Habib Bourguiba, the leader of the Tunisian nationalist party Neo-Destour and later first president of independent Tunisia.¹⁰ These connections gave him the opportunity to extend his network to other nationalist leaders in Morocco and Algeria. Contacts like these made him highly interesting for the US Embassy in Paris and the European Office of the AFL. Embassy employees were hardly able to contact North African nationalists because the US administration supported the French government in its dealings with the North African struggles for independence. The AFL's policy was to limit communist influence

in North African trade unions. However, the organization had become somewhat suspect itself because of Irving Brown's connection with the CIA, giving him a reputation as a "notorious moneybag man of the CIA world".¹¹ Being Dutch, with the cover of his Dutch newspaper, and with Masmoudi's recommendations, Tas was able to move around relatively easily in the Maghreb and gather information.

Tas's life in Paris was exciting and provided him with an enervating sense of power. Being part of the Parisian international scene and writing for *TNL* offered him the opportunity to be close to the centres of power and to fulfil his ambition to make a difference. He tried to expand his network by sending influential Americans his *TNL* articles, hoping that they would act on his recommendations. His records contain correspondence with people like Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State, the famous theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, Adlai E. Stevenson, Democratic politician and 1952 presidential candidate, Michael Harris of the Ford Foundation, Paul R. Hays of the School of Law at Columbia University, and several high-positioned officers in the US Foreign Service. Harris and Hays belonged to his personal friends, as well as writer James T. Farrell.¹²

Expert on the Maghreb

Most of Tas's Africa contributions to *TNL* dealt with the long and troublesome process of decolonization of the French North African colonies. Often he introduced the need for independence by focusing on the inequality between the native population and the French, as here in Morocco:

A glance at the countryside tells the whole story. On one side of the road you see huge estates, with up-to-date machinery and, in the middle, a beautiful villa and a garage. On the other side you see little patches of land, poorly tilled by primitive ox-drawn plows, with a small, squalid hut to shelter the Arab owner and his entire – usually large – family.¹³

Appealing to his liberal American audience's regard for equality, he pointed out how an American airfield construction company was forced to employ two wage-scales for its labourers: a high one for the French and a low one for the Moroccans. In an analysis of the Moroccan political situation Tas paid much attention to the nationalist movement of Istiqlal and its popularity. He emphasized that the Istiqlal was not a

communist movement (it even defended Coca-Cola when the French wine growers started their campaign against the introduction of the soft drink in Morocco), and he made it crystal clear why it was time for the US to change its policy towards France: "A free world cannot be committed to a reactionary policy in Africa despite French threats."¹⁴ Tas framed his message in a Cold War context, using anti-communism as a strategy for promoting the idea that the US support independence movements. Cleverly he also emphasized America's moral responsibilities in focusing explicitly on the injustices and inequality of French colonial rule.

The course of actions in Tunisia was very similar to Morocco. The moderate nationalist movement Neo-Destour was firmly supported by trade unions, the middle classes and farmers, drawing increasingly repressive measures from the French. Tas's 1952 interview with its leader-in-exile Bourguiba drew a lot of attention. In this article he made the message even more explicit: "Continued repression can only foster rancor and extremism, that is to say, Communism. [...] In Tunis, we can still win an Arab ally able and willing to become an enthusiastic partner of the West in the common struggle against threatened Soviet aggression."¹⁵

Eight months later the Tunisian situation had grown worse. Again Tas made it clear that the US should think twice before continuing its support for French colonial politics. Again he played the communist card in powerful language: "we are faced with a mortal enemy who feeds on unrest, especially where such unrest is based on poverty and cultural backwardness".¹⁶ The French were finally forced to seek a solution. In March 1954 Bourguiba was released. AFL funding enabled him to travel to New York where he addressed the UN General Assembly. Tas promised his readers that "If we in the West provide the necessary aid and support, Tunisia seems destined to become a stronghold of liberal democracy in North Africa."¹⁷

In Algeria the path to independence took much longer and was even more complicated and violent. There the radical Front de libération nationale (FLN) had started a war of independence in 1954 which lasted until 1962. Tas wrote some 20 articles on Algeria and France for *TNL*. At first he didn't have a solution for ending the violence: "On both sides, there is a stubborn, poisonous will to exterminate the enemy. [...] An atmosphere of murder pervades the whole scene and rolls like a fog over the battlefield, cloaking all maneuvers, preventing true insight."¹⁸ In 1957 he urged in his article "A Way Out of Algeria" that NATO should interfere directly. These suggestions were adopted by the growing group of critics among American congressmen, like John

F. Kennedy, William Fulbright and Hubert H. Humphrey. On 22 July 1957 Humphrey addressed the Senate: "Mr. President, the Senate's attention has recently been directed to the disintegrating situation in Algeria. [...] Among the proposals for a constructive resolution of this explosive problem is the suggestion that there is a role for NATO to play".¹⁹ Humphrey urgently advised his fellow senators to read Tas's article, which was copied in the Appendix of the *Congressional Record*.

Although congressional criticism didn't have much effect on the Eisenhower administration's policy, for Tas Humphrey's speech was further recognition of his importance as an expert on North African affairs. Later in 1957 he composed a long report on Algeria's situation, probably at the request of the AFL. In it he unravelled the complicated relationship between the two Algerian independence movements, the "proletarian nationalist" Movement National algérien (MNA) and its competitor, the extremist, militarized FLN. Tas warned that the FLN people "only think in black and white [...] they do not think as politicians".²⁰ The current deadlock could only be broken by negotiations and intervention from outside.

The election of Charles de Gaulle as first president of the Fifth French Republic in 1959 reassured Tas that a solution for Algeria was close. De Gaulle, a realist in foreign policy, offered the stability the French needed. De Gaulle knew that France would turn into an isolated country if it continued to refuse Algeria its autonomy. As Tas recognized, de Gaulle "wants to have his hands free for a 'diplomacy of grandeur', and this grandeur [...] can only be attained with the assent of his most important allies", although he could not foresee the French-American conflicts on NATO leadership that were to come.²¹ But as Tas predicted, de Gaulle did act to end the Algerian tragedy, granting Algeria independence on 3 July 1962.

Tas aimed his Maghreb articles at those among his American readers who were involved in the policy-making process. He was rather successful in this, as Humphrey's 1957 speech shows, as well as the regular compliments Sol Levitas passed on to him: "By the way, I want you to know this interview created quite a stir and I received many requests for permission to reprint", Levitas informed Tas after his interview with Algerian nationalist leader Messali Hadj had been published in early 1959.²² Tas seems to have been the right guide for liberal America through the confusing labyrinth of French and North African politics, even though he didn't hesitate to criticize the USA for its policy of non-involvement in French North African affairs. This criticism was inspired by the same moral element which he considered as the essential reason

for fighting communism: denying North African nations their independence was as reprehensible as denying them the opportunity to live a humane life.

Educating Young Africans

During the 1950s and 1960s Tas made several trips to sub-Saharan Africa. In 1953, on an assignment for his employer *Het Parool*, he visited South Africa for the first time, followed by several trips to French West Africa and later the Central African states in the first half of the 1960s. Tas was fascinated by Africa, its jungles and wilderness, its animist religions and primitive life styles. However, this primitiveness also required a special responsibility of the West: to educate and guide the African nations on their road to modern life and civilization. With the rapid independence of these former European colonies, Africa had turned into a new battleground of the Cold War. In Tas's perception, only economic development and the creation of a democratic political elite could prevent an increase of communist influence in these young states.

In 1963 Tas became affiliated with a rather obscure American organization located in Rome, the Center for Labor and Social Studies (CLSS). The CLSS paid him for reports on political developments in newly independent African states and hired him to participate in seminars on democratic leadership for potential future African leaders. Very little is known about the CLSS: there are no accessible records left and references to its existence and its activities are scarce. It originated in a committee established in 1956 by *TNL* editor Sol Levitas, which had mainly engaged in supporting labour unionists who were being prosecuted by totalitarian regimes.²³ After Levitas's death in 1961 the committee withered without his dynamic leadership. Around the same time, the CIA expanded into new fields of front operations. Evidence suggests that the Agency appropriated the committee and transformed it into the CLSS in 1962. A CIA case officer, Edward P. Whittemore, became its director.²⁴ At first the CLSS focused mainly on Africa, but in 1965 it opened new offices in Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo. The centre was supported by international socialist and (free) trade unions, and presented itself as being privately financed.²⁵ Social justice was its core concern. Its creed was "Service, Research, Solidarity" and its activities were described as follows: "The Center encourages and assists in the publication of pertinent texts in its field of interest. It carries out technical assistance programmes and educational programmes in administration, publications and information techniques, and related fields."²⁶

The initial focus on African labour unions and leaders was a deliberate choice. In colonial times non-white unions were the vanguards of national independence movements. In particular in Africa (but also in Asia) the unions were often the training grounds and starting-points for a political career.²⁷ In offering union officials training and educational programmes the CLSS might counter the substantial covert Soviet penetration of African labour movements, at the same time preparing their members for future political positions.

In 1965 Whittemore became the director of the Tokyo office. He was replaced in Rome by Charles McCarry, also a front man of the CIA. McCarry had been working for the Agency since 1957, performing undercover assignments all over the world. He resigned from the CLSS (and from the CIA) in July 1967 because he wished to return to the US after ten years abroad and to his profession as a writer (of spy novels).²⁸ It seems likely that his resignation was also related to the exposure of the CIA as a secret funder of countless civic organizations inside and outside the US earlier that year. Considering the positions of Whittemore and McCarry the CLSS was probably also one of the beneficiaries of these CIA funds.

The CLSS's activities seem to have been rather low key. According to its annual report of 1964–65 the Center compiled a directory of some 300 European non-governmental organizations which offered training and technical assistance to developing countries.²⁹ The Center also published the review *ANALYST* which aimed at an audience of trade unionists and intellectual leaders. For a different, less-educated audience, it distributed a weekly newsletter, *Afrogrammes*, in English and French. Incidentally the Center offered assistance to study tours of research scholars, and published brochures on current issues. In late 1963 it started a project in direct assistance with the main free trade union federation in Congo, the Confederation des syndicats libres du congo. The project consisted of an information programme and training programme on public relations. A similar project was started in Nigeria, where the United Labor Congress (ULC) was the principal pro-Western labour federation. The CLSS financed the national journal of the ULC while the League for International and Social Co-operative Development of Denver, Colorado, a major recipient of CIA funds, paid over \$8000 annually to the ULC school.³⁰ CLSS seminar and training programmes for specific labour groups and individuals usually involved a four-week basic course in "Organization Procedures and the Democratic Process": "The course includes practical training in the techniques of leadership together with an examination of the democratic processes."³¹

Tas had stopped writing for *TNL* in 1962 because he didn't agree with its post-Levitas editorial policy. At the same time his relationship with the editor of *Het Parool* had deteriorated because of limitations to his budget and travel opportunities. Instead his attention was drawn to the CLSS. In June 1963 he contacted Edward Whittmore, asking if he could make a trip to Cuba later that year "under the auspices of the Centre d'études sociales et syndicales".³² This request resulted in fruitful cooperation over several years, allowing Tas to break his contract with *Het Parool* (although he kept writing for them). Performing assignments for the CLSS offered him ample ways to propagate Western interests in underdeveloped countries. If he knew of the CLSS's CIA connection it didn't bother him – for him as for many others in the state–private networks of the cultural Cold War, the battle against communism had to be fought with all available means. Tas participated in the training programmes and seminars of the Center and wrote reports on the political and labor situation in the countries he visited.

His visit to Ethiopia in 1964 offers a representative impression of his activities at the time. He lectured to the alumni of the University of Addis Ababa on "Africa and Socialism", explaining to them the popularity of Marxism in underdeveloped countries. Since the intelligentsia of the underdeveloped peoples themselves are impatient, he told them, they are tempted by the violent "short-cut" methods of communism. However, Tas warned,

Violent, dictatorial unscrupulous methods lead to destruction of the personality, especially when these methods are applied on a mass-scale. But: the human element is your most important if not your only capital! Destruction of the personality therefore means destruction of your human capital, of your national capital.³³

This was a typical Tas approach: emphasize the human element as a strategy to win the hearts and minds of his audience. He reported to the CLSS that "The intelligentsia [...] are powerless, embittered and restless. The overwhelming majority of the intellectuals is anti-communist, labour socialist. They are willing to assist the emperor in the modernization of the nation, but they want to be handled as adults."³⁴ Tas had advised his audience to establish a kind of Fabian Society in order to become an influential force in Ethiopian politics. He also suggested that they set up an Ethiopian branch of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) as an instrument of protection: "The emperor would think twice before attacking a group that has the sympathy, respect and

organisational support of the democratic labor world which eventually can mobilize world labor opinion."³⁵ Tas even mediated between some of the Ethiopians and the CCF headquarters in Paris, but in the end he lost interest due to complications and delays. However, he did succeed in acquiring a scholarship for the leader of the Ethiopian group to study at an American university.

Tas also contributed to *ANALYST* using the pseudonym Ephraim Roget. In "Zanzibar after the Long Knives" he sketched how the Russians, Chinese and East Germans had tried to turn Zanzibar into a centre of Communist propaganda for East Africa after its independence in December 1963: "Zanzibar was thus becoming a testing ground for Communism in Africa."³⁶ The union with Tanganyika was a victory for Africans over communists, of moderate Tanganyikans over revolutionary Zanzibaris. Tas's relationship with the CLSS ended in September 1967 when the organization was dissolved. The formal reasons for this were the lack of a qualified replacement after the resignation of McCarry as director, and the continuing problem of adequate finances.³⁷ For Tas the closing of the Center also meant the end of his travelling. Up to his retirement in 1970 he mainly contributed to *Het Parool* and a Dutch weekly, worked on a book on Indonesia and wrote his memoirs. He died six years later, in the American Hospital in Paris.

Conclusion

Over a period of some 15 years Tas functioned as an agent of Western interests in his work as a reporter and in related activities for transnational anti-communist networks in which *TNL*, the AFL, CLSS and CIA were major participants. In these networks he may not have been a major player but he was well respected and appreciated for his analytical and rhetorical skills. A social democrat at heart, he employed his earlier connections with Indonesian nationalists and his personal experiences in the Second World War as strategies to relate to his American and African audiences. As a Dutch reporter with an excellent reputation on anti-colonialism Tas was trusted by (North) African nationalists, intellectuals and politicians, offering him ample opportunities to propagate the principles of freedom and democracy as conditions for a humane life. He knew how to translate the metanarrative of the battle against the worldwide communist threat into comprehensible proposals. For liberal America Tas was a valuable guide for the relatively unknown (North) African region, reassuring his *TNL* audience of the nationalists' pro-Western opinions, unravelling the complexities

of French and North African politics and supplying congressmen with arguments to criticize US policy. In his reports for the AFL he assessed the local political and labour situation in African states, giving them material to develop or adjust their policies. His CLSS affiliation offered him the opportunity to directly approach African political elites, training them in democratic skills and assisting them in adapting Western models to their needs. Using his Dutch identity and Second World War experiences as a strategy added to his effectiveness as a transmitter of ideas, making the anti-communist crusade on the African continent a somewhat less American affair.

Notes

1. Sal Tas, "French Repression in Tunisia", *The New Leader* 28 (10 March 1952), pp. 2–4 (3).
2. Hugh Wilford, "Playing the CIA's Tune? The *New Leader* and the Cultural Cold War", *Diplomatic History* 27 (January 2003), pp. 15–34 (15).
3. *Ibid.*, 30.
4. Irving Brown, "How Labor Fights the Cold War", *TNL* (2 July 1951), pp. 2–5 (3).
5. Sal Tas, *Rusland en het Westen* (Amsterdam: De Nieuwe Vrijheid, n.d.)
6. See Sal Tas, "Rondom het process Soekarno. De geest der koloniale rechtspraak", *De Socialist* 137 (15 May 1931), pp. 9–10; Sal Tas, "Honger in Indonesia!", *De Fakkell* (27 May 1932); Sal Tas, "Onrecht in Soerabaja. De berechting der muiters", *De Fakkell* (10 November 1933).
7. Sol Levitas to Sal Tas, 12 May 1948, Folder: Sal Tas, Correspondence 1939–2008, Subseries II.3, New Leader Records 1895–2008, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York.
8. Sal Tas, "The Civil War in Indo China", *TNL* 33 (1 July 1950).
9. Sal Tas, *Wat mij betreft* (Baarn: Ten Have, 1970), p. 198.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
11. "Central Intelligence Agency: Jay Lovestone", report by Paul Sakwa, 1976, Box 63:5, Subseries B, Series VII, Victor G. Reuther Collection, Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit. Sakwa was a CIA operative from 1952 to 1962.
12. Papers of Sal Tas, collection T143, Letterkundig Museum (Literature Museum), The Hague (hereafter ST).
13. Sal Tas, "After Egypt, Morocco?", *TNL* 27 (17 December 1951), pp. 2–5 (3).
14. Sal Tas, "France Fights the March of Time", *TNL* 28 (17 November 1952), pp. 16–19 (19).
15. Sal Tas, "French Repression in Tunisia", *TNL* 28 (10 March 1952), pp. 2–4 (4).
16. Sal Tas, "France Fights", pp. 18–19.
17. Sal Tas, "The New Tunisia", *TNL* 32 (20 August 1956), pp. 7–8 (8).
18. Sal Tas, "Algerian Report", *TNL* 32 (2 July 1956), pp. 3–5 (3).
19. *Congressional Record* – Appendix, "Extension of Remarks of Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota in the Senate of the United States", 22 July 1957, p. A5879.

20. Typescript "Algeria", n.d., p. 26, A.1, ST.
21. Sal Tas, "The Army, the Ultras, the Allies", *TNL* (5 October 1959), pp. 5–6 (6).
22. Sol Levitas to Sal Tas, 19 March 1959, B.1b, ST.
23. Centre for Labour and Social Studies, Inc., Edward Whittemore to David Dubinsky, 17 April 1963, Folder 7 Box 417, 5780/002, David Dubinsky Papers, Kheel Center, Cornell University (hereafter DDP).
24. Whittemore's CIA connection is acknowledged in Anne Sydenham, "Dreaming of Jerusalem", *The New York Review of Science Fiction* 15 (January 2003). Available online at <<http://www.fantasticmetropolis.com/i/whittemore/full>> (accessed 29 October 2012).
25. Its executive board consisted of David Dubinsky (president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union), Serafino Romualdi (executive director of the American Institute for Free Labor Development), L.L. Borha (general secretary of the United Labour Congress of Nigeria), Hans Oprecht (former president of the Swiss socialist party), Italo Viglianesi (founder and first secretary of the Unione Italiana del Lavoro/Italian Labor Union (UIL), Bruno Storti (Christian democratic politician, secretary general of the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL)), Niels Matthiasen (secretary general of the Danish Social Democratic Party), and Ben Josephson (director of the Tamiment Foundation).
26. Centre for Labour and Social Studies, Inc., "Report of the Director 1964–1965", Folder 7 Box 417, 5780/002, DDP.
27. Gary Busch, *The Political Role of International Trades Unions* (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 76.
28. McCarry refers to his CIA years in: Robert Birnbaum, "Charles McCarry", *The Morning News* (9 August 2004). Available online at <<http://www.themorningnews.org/article/birnbaum-v.-charles-mccarry>> (accessed 27 October 2009); Charles McCarry to Serafino Romualdi, January 20, 1967, Folder 7 Box 417, 5780/002, DDP.
29. "Report of the Director 1964–1965", DDP, p.5.
30. Busch, "Transnational Relations", p. 29.
31. "Report of the Director 1964–1965", DDP, p. 7
32. Sal Tas to Edward P. Whittemore, Centre d'études sociales et syndicales, Rome, 6 June 1963, B.1b, ST.
33. Typescript "Africa and Socialism", 1964, A.1, ST.
34. Africa correspondence, typescript "Ethiopia", n.d., B.2, ST.
35. Sal Tas to E.P. Whittemore, Rome, 18 May 1964, B.1b, ST.
36. Efraim Roget, "Zanzibar after the Long Knives", *Analyst* 3 (1965), pp. 1–16 (6).
37. S. Romualdi to David Dubinsky, 28 May 1967, DDP.

Part II

Transnational Networks

5

Paix et liberté: A Transnational Anti-Communist Network

Bernard Ludwig

In the France of the 1950s, Jean-Paul David and the famous poster, “La colombe qui fait boum” (“The dove that goes boom”) ensured the notoriety of the French anti-communist organization Paix et liberté. Linked with similar organizations across Western Europe via the Comité européen Paix et liberté, the network was rechristened the Comité international d’action sociale (CIAS) in 1956. Throughout the decade it participated in American psychological warfare campaigns and the mobilization of Europeans for the anti-communist cause, mixing covert actions with open propaganda.¹

Paix et liberté was, first and foremost, a two-dimensional state-private network:² at the national level, agents from civil society joined forces with the state to fight against the dangers of communism; at the international level, the United States and other powers used these organizations and their wider networks to wage the ideological Cold War. There were two factors that gave the Paix et liberté organization a transnational dynamic: its anti-communist purpose and its determination to act in ways that went beyond national frameworks. Paix et liberté therefore provides insight into the continuities and changes in anti-communist activity after 1945, as well as the transfers and circulations, in time and space, in terms of people, practices, means and influence. These were not smooth processes. Paix et liberté’s effectiveness as a transnational organization was hampered by clashes of interest between the national and international levels, between private and governmental organizations, and by political differences regarding anti-communism.

The Networking of Anti-Communist Professionals

Due to a lack of sources, the exact circumstances and dynamics behind the creation of Paix et liberté remain uncertain. According to one

plausible scenario, the network constituted a sort of “operation *Gladio* of propaganda” orchestrated by the secret services, with the CIA at the head.³ However, this theory overlooks the decidedly European impulse that accompanies, not to say precedes, the American initiative.

At the end of the summer of 1950, two associations emerged in France and in the Federal Republic of Germany that seemed to have little in common other than the similarity of their names: Paix et liberté (Peace and Freedom) and the Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit (VFF: the People’s League for Peace and Freedom).⁴ The creation of the former owed much to the action of the then prime minister and former Minister of Defence (1949–50) René Pleven, whose interest in psychological warfare went back to the war years and especially to the context of the defeat of June 1940. An additional indication of state involvement in the project is the fact that leadership of the organization was entrusted to a member of parliament from the Parti radical, Jean-Paul David. Nevertheless Paix et liberté was placed on the register of private associations. The same tactic was used for the VFF in West Germany. The Volksbund, ostensibly a civil society organization, was put to use as the strong arm of the government, particularly by the Ministry for All-German Affairs.⁵ Unlike Paix et liberté, which was led by a politician, the protagonists from the VFF were – or had been – close to government circles, and took advantage of connections with intelligence circles. This was particularly so in the case of the founder of the organization, Eberhard Taubert, a former executive in the National Socialist Ministry of Propaganda.⁶ In 1933 he had created an association similar to the VFF, the Antikomintern. The anchoring of the VFF at the heart of the state apparatus was made possible by the extensive anti-communist consensus that reigned in Bonn, built particularly around the Christian Democrat party (CDU) and its extended networks. A key figure for the VFF was its vice president, Arthur Ruppert, a journalist and CDU militant from the Ruhr who had participated in the party’s reconstitution in Hamburg and across the British zone, making him a key contact of the future chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

While both organizations were direct products of the Cold War, their roots went back to the anti-communism of the interwar period and the Second World War. Paix et liberté certainly counted former members of the resistance among its ranks (such as David himself, his deputy Pierre Rostini, and various militants from the RPF [Rassemblement du peuple français]) who switched to the anti-communist struggle, but it was also able to rely on the networks of Boris Souvarine,⁷ a former founder of the Parti communiste français (PCF) and head of the Komintern who had broken with Stalinism in the 1920s. In the 1950s, Souvarine reactivated

l'Institut d'histoire sociale, an anti-communist documentation centre that he had founded in 1935. Jean-Paul David also relied on Georges Albertini,⁸ a socialist from the 1930s who went from pacifism and syndicalism to collaboration, notably as the right-hand man of Marcel Déat. As for the VFF, it combined displaced persons from the former German territories to the East with former national socialists who had already been active in the anti-Bolshevik struggle. Taubert was determined to form a federation of anti-communists and revive the Antikomintern. In July 1947 Taubert, just over two years previously the right-hand man of Josef Goebbels, had approached the US Army's counter-intelligence corps (CIC) via an intermediary with a "project for action and organisation".⁹ In February 1948 he repeated the initiative, this time sounding out Robert Murphy, the political advisor to the American occupation forces. Like others, Taubert was hoping to profit from his experience and establish new networks with the Americans. By the time the VFF was formed in 1950 he was surrounded by veterans from the Ministry of Propaganda and a core group from the press service of the Nazi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was also helped by two individuals who had been active in anti-Bolshevism since the 1920s, the writer Jürgen Hahn-Butry and the intelligence officer Fritz Cramer, both of whom would later lead the VFF. The political background of the militants from the regional and local sections were more varied, including anti-communists of a more recent vintage.

Both Jean-Paul David and Eberhard Taubert wanted to take the fight to the international stage. Taubert's Antikomintern was already nourishing this ambition within the framework of a collaboration with the Entente internationale anticommuniste (EIA) from Geneva, an extension of the catholic Pro Deo network.¹⁰ The foundations for a global anti-communist organization with national sections, modelled on the Internationale, had even been laid down at the time of a congress in November 1936. After the Second World War all the plans that Taubert proposed to the Americans comprised an international dimension based on these former projects. In late 1947 or early 1948 he sent Alfred Gielen to Geneva, his former colleague from the Ministry for Propaganda who had become an agent for the Gehlen organization. Gielen would later become head of international relations for the VFF. Gielen's trip was supposed to reactivate the link with Pro Deo, but it did not meet with success.¹¹

The activities of Jean-Paul David, something of a new arrival among anti-communist professionals, obviously attracted the interest of others, particularly the United States.¹² Paix et liberté was approached by

the small anti-communist group Renaissance occidentale (RO 1951), formed in 1951 in Germany around the figure of Bernt Engelmann, which aimed to create an information bulletin for the press under the aegis of an International Committee for the European Movement for Resistance to Bolshevism.¹³ In December 1950 it also came to the attention of a similar organization in Switzerland, the Comité suisse d'action civique (CSAC), led by Marc-Edmond Chantre.¹⁴ Following these initial contacts – and perhaps at the behest of the CIA – David promoted the creation of several Paix et liberté organizations across Western Europe. Pace e libertà was founded in Italy in the Spring of 1951 by Giulio De Marzio, an employee from the propaganda office of the Marshall Plan who was attached to the Italian ministry for Foreign Affairs, and whom David had been directed to by the Italian authorities.¹⁵ At the end of spring 1951, a Paix et liberté committee was also set up in Brussels under the leadership of Marcel Paternostre, president of the World Committee of Political Refugees from Central Europe and member of the Belgian section of the Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne (CIDCC).¹⁶ But the true architects of the Belgian wing, officially created on 4 October 1951, were Marcel De Roover and Maurice Keyaerts. De Roover had run the Société d'études politiques, économiques et sociales (SEPES), a private anti-communist organization that represented the Belgian section of the EIA, from behind the scenes prior to the Second World War. At the start of 1951 he served as David's intermediary in the creation of a Dutch Paix et liberté committee (Vrede en Vrijheid) under the leadership of E.P. van Dam van Isselt, secretary of the Benelux committee, the body for trilateral cooperation.¹⁷

The Paix et liberté “Internationale”

This fragmentary international network became more concrete from the moment contacts were established between Paix et liberté and the VFF. Several indications seem to imply that the “alliance” between these two organizations started to take shape in November 1950 following the approach by Engelmann. It became more defined during talks in Bonn in May 1951, held on the fringe of a preliminary meeting organized by CDU executive Rudolf Junges for the creation of a German section of the Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne.¹⁸ David must have sanctioned these talks, because a follow-up meeting took place in Paris less than two weeks later. David invited the Italian de Marzio and his collaborators, a Swiss representative, Van Dam Van Isselt,

Paternostre, and the leadership of the VFF (Hahn-Butry, Ruppert, and Taubert), as well as Engelmann. They agreed to cooperate more closely, though still informally, since a contractual association was judged as premature. This cautious approach was abandoned shortly afterwards, however, and a European committee of Paix et liberté was created in San Remo on 30–1 August 1951 during a congress of Pace e libertà. This grouped together the French, German, Italian, Dutch and Belgian associations. It is a sign of the preponderance of the French association within the European committee that Jean-Paul David became the secretary general and the Bosquet villa its headquarters. David also prepared an agreement protocol and an internal ruling determining relations between the associations.¹⁹ It was also relayed to the Swiss CSAC, which, despite the absence of Chantre in San Remo, was also associated with the project. The protocol succinctly laid out the aims of the Comité: to create “links of solidarity and a permanent flow of exchange”; “to coordinate the activity of these organisations”; and to “give rise to communal actions in the defence of peace and freedom”. It also underlined the means for action: coordinated poster campaigns on the same themes, information campaigns using brochures, tracts and common slogans, and the publication of an information bulletin. Membership was open for new organizations to join, subject to certain conditions: that they commit to the defence of freedom and democracy as their priority; that they were constituted with the support of all political parties while remaining outside or above them; and lastly, that they had to bear the title Paix et liberté. In addition, the committee would only recognize one organization per country. It would also accept corresponding members who might be associated with some of its activities. The general secretariat had to carry out the decisions that were taken, centralize the documentation, maintain the finances and convene quarterly meetings.

The Comité européen witnessed a strong expansion under David’s leadership. He worked towards the foundation of a Paix et liberté committee for the region of the Saar in 1952. That same year, the contacts that he made with Niels Matthiasen and the information gathered by the VFF made it possible to establish a Danish section through the transformation of the Danish Society for the Atlantic Pact and Democracy, an organization created several years earlier by former non-communist members of the Danish resistance.²⁰ Two successive trips to Oslo to found a Norwegian section in April 1952 and June 1953 ended in failure.²¹ Folk og Forsvar (People and Defence), the Atlanticist organization with which it held discussions, was considered first a corresponding

member, and then a quasi-member from 1955, but remained largely inactive.²² A Turkish committee was also created at the time of David's visit to Ankara in December 1952.²³ In a very similar fashion, David secured from the Greek prime minister Marshall Papagos the formation of Eirene & Eleutheria, which joined the European committee in December 1952.²⁴ The organization was led until the end of the 1950s by Stamatis Mercouris, the former Minister of the Interior and a deputy from Papagos's Greek Rally party. On the other hand, despite months of negotiation (from September 1952 to May 1953), David did not succeed in arranging cooperation with the Swiss anti-communists of the CSAC or the Nationaler Informationszentrum (NIZ), who were divided, little inclined to break the façade of Swiss neutrality, and also resistant (through their federalist orientation) to Paix et liberté's tendency towards supranationalism ("We reproach the commies for being a section of an international whole, so why do the same?").²⁵ The international committee did, however, accept CSAC as an associate member and authorized it to take part in meetings.²⁶

David was also involved in the resurgence of Pace e libertà, whose financial resources were running out at the same rate as relations between him and de Marzio were deteriorating. The organization was reactivated in Milan in August 1953 by Count Edgardo Sogno, a diplomat and former officer whom David had met at the NATO Defence College in 1952.²⁷ David held discussions with Alcide De Gasperi and several dignitaries from the ministries of the interior and foreign affairs in Rome in May 1953 to secure this revival. Finally, on numerous occasions between September 1951 and April 1953, David and his deputy, Pierre Rostini, solicited the British authorities via the embassy in Paris and the Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office with an eye to establishing a British section of Paix et liberté.²⁸ This did result in collaboration with the existing organization Common Cause from 1954.

From March 1952, the date of admission of the Vietnamese committee, the European Committee changed its name to Comité international Paix et liberté. David's brochure, *A Psychological Defence of the Free World* and the attempt to draft a protocol of agreement for the constitution of a "universal Paix et Liberté movement" attest to the ambitions to develop the organization as the propaganda front of the "free world" on a global level. Taubert, for his part, persisted in thinking of internationalization in the terms of the 1930s by calling for a "world movement" or a "global front" against communism. Nevertheless, in the first half of the 1950s, the movement's scale remained more European than global, echoing

the threat of communism in Europe. Aspirations of globalization were limited to contacts as well as to a certain circulation of ideas and methods, as is revealed by the presence of Paix et liberté posters behind the speakers at the congress of the Association for Asian Expansion in 1953.²⁹

The financing of the various Paix et liberté committees was ensured by subsidies originating from industrialists and employers' associations, political parties and, above all, the regular and secret funds from national and regional governments. Notably, these special funds served to mask the provision of aid from the United States via the CIA and the Marshall Plan's counterpart funds.³⁰ Support given to the Paix et liberté network fell under the clandestine operations sanctioned by the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to combat communist influence in Western Europe: Cloven/Midiron (PSB D-14) for France; Demagnetize/Clydesdale (PSB D-15) for Italy; Plutonic (PSB D-21) for Germany. Through this framework CIA subsidies were transferred to the national committees. Paix et liberté also benefited from additional funds intended for the budget of the international committee which was used to assist the formation of new organizations such as Vrede en Vrijheid³¹ and the Saarland committee, which it financed almost entirely (at least 3.3 million francs) up to August 1954.³²

The Propaganda of the Paix et liberté Network: Circulations and Transfers

Like its national divisions, the propaganda of this transnational network was nourished by the circulation and transfer of people and ideas, facilitating the maintenance of a common outlook to overcome national and political differences in anti-communism. Even before its official constitution, the network decided in May 1951 to launch a joint poster campaign that was based on the denunciation of the Soviet camps. The Paix et liberté posters "Pour vos vacances visitez l'URSS, pays de la liberté" ("For your holidays, visit the USSR, country of freedom") and "Profitez des camps de vacances... soviétiques" ("Make the most of the holiday camps... of the Soviets") showed silhouettes of emaciated men, evoking the Nazi concentration camps in all aspects, other than the red colour of their striped prison garb and the communist symbols decorating the padlock of their cell.³³ Typical of French and German social democratic symbolism, this form of anti-totalitarianism was also in vogue in the United States (the *New York Times* was to use part of the poster to illustrate an article on communist domination in Hungary).³⁴

The VFF, aware of the obvious associative imagery, preferred to keep only the blank silhouettes in order to distance itself a little from the legacy of the Third Reich, adding the bell towers of the Kremlin to render the enemy more clearly identifiable, and modifying the slogan to *Ferien im Sowjetparadies: unvergesslich!* (Holidays in the Soviet paradise: Unforgettable!).³⁵ Taubert thus resorted to the myth of the “Soviet paradise”, a recurrent motif in the anti-Bolshevik literature of the 1930s, which he had already exploited in a large exhibition in 1942–43. This method, which consisted of denouncing the gap between the ideal and the reality of communism, spread through the network’s propaganda from 1952 onwards. A section entitled “Paradis” appeared in the Paix et liberté bulletin *Défendre la Vérité*, while a tract from the Belgian committee called out to Belgian communists: “Why does the USSR, the workers’ paradise, not welcome any of the 200,000 Belgian unemployed? Why do men leave this ‘Paradise’ every day?”³⁶ Recourse to this method was also encouraged by British and American anti-communist specialists.³⁷ Their influence can certainly be seen in the proliferation of posters and tracts that circulated in Europe that compared the standards of living in the East and in the West: “French workers! Purchasing powers compared... A funny sort of paradise. And we don’t fear any denials”, “Communist workers... emigrate to the USSR” (comparing the price of goods), and “French worker... do you want to be Sovietised?” (showing an example of USSR legislation).³⁸

Similar phenomena of propaganda homogenization and transfer can be observed in the treatment given to the theme of peace. This indicates a growing cooperation between the national organizations and a common analysis of the international situation. In November 1950, Paix et liberté released a poster entitled “La colombe qui fait boum” (“The dove that goes boom!”). The motif, a tank disguised as a dove of peace, was very close to the illustration for a book that Taubert had published entitled *Die trojanische Taube. Kommunistische Friedenspropaganda ohne Maske* (*The Trojan Dove: Pacifist Communist Propaganda Unmasked*).³⁹ The poster, which was also distributed in the form of stickers and stamps,⁴⁰ ensured a worldwide reputation for the French organization and was re-used in identical form by the Belgian committee.⁴¹ Following, in particular, the American recommendations from the Interim Plan for Intensified Psychological Warfare in Germany that sought to popularize David’s poster, the VFF returned to the poster in 1951, adapting it in a way that was not especially innovative. The slogan “*Iwan, kehr um! Deine Taube macht Bumm!*” (“Ivan, turn around! Your dove goes boom!”) and the figure of the Bolshevik with Asian features in

the background constituted a reactivation of anti-communist themes beloved of Goebbels, thereby doubling the initial message with an echo familiar to Germans.⁴²

The Paix et liberté organizations sought to promote a Western peace founded on a European heritage, illustrated by a poster where the word “peace” appeared on top of a Greek column around which a banner composed of flags of European nations unfurled.⁴³ The slogan “Europe unie. Gage de Paix” (“United Europe. Guarantee of Peace”) that decorated the French version was even more explicit. The map of Europe went beyond any association with the newly formed European Coal and Steel Community by including the British, Swiss and Swedish flags. The repeated use of the slogan in two further posters shows the importance that Paix et liberté accorded to the construction of Europe in the defence against communism, a conviction, moreover, also shared by American decision-makers.

In addition to the poster campaigns, other international actions attest to the network's performance. For Stalin's birthday in December 1952, he and the leaders of the principal communist countries each received a personalized postcard featuring their own image, in a package destined to be sent on to Moscow with the note “Sample of no value.”⁴⁴ The leaflet and the poster “Anniversaire de la révolution d'octobre. Bilan d'une dictature” (“Anniversary of the October Revolution. Assessment of a Dictatorship”), published by the French, Belgian, Italian and Saarland organizations, listed the names of dignitaries who were victims of the purges and was even exported to the United States at the time of the eviction of the Rumanian communist dignitary Anna Pauker in 1952.⁴⁵ Another poster, based on material provided by the IRD, presented the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe, lending itself to different uses according to the national context. Paix et liberté demanded, “Where are the imperialists?” by juxtaposing maps from 1938 and 1952, while Pace e libertà compared 1938 and 1953 by asking not “where” but “Who are the imperialists?”⁴⁶ Similar methods were applied to discredit communist news sources. The Belgian section thus responded to the leftist journal *Le drapeau rouge* (*The Red Flag*) with the political parody *Le drapeau bouge* (*The Flag Moves*), and the Dutch Vrede en Vrijheid went further by regularly producing *De Echte Waarheid* (*The Real Truth*) in response to the communist party newspaper *De Waarheid*.⁴⁷ Delegates at the European Paix et liberté congress of January 1954 enthused over the VFF's method of anti-communist struggle within businesses and factories and looked to export it to Greece, to the industrial basin of northern France and to the Netherlands.⁴⁸

Tensions and Limits of International Action

If the cited examples give evidence of a genuine desire for cooperation, the actions of the network as a whole were often slow and difficult. The agreement protocol and the internal rules and regulations do not seem to have been formally adopted. David reported on a number of occasions the difficulty of obtaining the information from the national committees which was necessary for the production of the monthly bulletin *Activités communistes. Notes de synthèse du comité international paix et liberté*.⁴⁹ The French security police considered that beyond the French committee, only the Belgian and German committees were regularly active.⁵⁰ Though referred to in national publications and promoted amongst decision-makers, international action remained insufficiently valued, and *Paix et liberté*'s publications were somewhat confidential and not aimed at the public. The absence of a shared budget and the fact that the secretariat's expenses were solely met by the French committee serve as just one of many illustrations of the limits of international solidarity. Operating under the guise of unity of action, the criticisms exchanged between the national groups instead reveal the strong antagonisms that lay at the heart of the European association, in particular between the VFF and *Paix et liberté* itself. Their competitiveness, reflecting multiple tensions, culminated at the European association meeting in December 1952.⁵¹

Towards the middle of 1954, the French security police – perhaps after hearing from Gielen of the VFF – again signalled this malaise at the heart of the international movement: Gielen reproached David for “giving his activity an excessively governmental and even excessively NATO character [and] of not having fulfilled his mission, that is to say, the procurement and provision of funds to the National Committees”.⁵² The fact that “the French leader freely admits these reproaches” clearly shows the antagonism that existed at the heart of the international organization. These tensions encouraged the other members of the international committee to restrict David's influence and even consider replacing him. Financial controls were introduced by establishing the position of treasurer for Van Dam van Isselt, followed by the appointment of an honorary president.⁵³ The nomination of the VFF candidate, Paul Van Zeeland, in favour of David's choice, Alcide De Gasperi, marked a decisive shift. The international committee was then rechristened the *Comité international d'action sociale*.

Ultimately, one might say that the various national committees of *Paix et liberté* and the central organization itself played the role of an

ideological “look-out post”, and their propaganda projected a collective European imaginary within Cold War culture. The network shows how anti-communism and its protagonists adapted to the new conditions of the Cold War while preserving certain continuities with the interwar years and the Second World War. On the other hand, it remained handicapped by the great diversity of different national situations. The threat of communism, the legacies of the past, the political and democratic traditions, the involvement of governments, as well as the nature of the agents’ anti-communist engagement – all very different from one country to the next – constituted as many limits to international action as they did impulses for the process of transfer. Because of his national-socialist past and a Federal Republic that remained to a large extent a minor player on the international scene, Taubert was not able to come to the fore like David, whereas David’s status as a member of parliament made him a credible spokesman, at both national and international levels. Similarly, the French, Italians and Germans agreed and disagreed in equal measure on how best to combat communist influence and how far to cooperate with the United States. The countries from the north of Europe, less exposed to powerful communist parties, and strong in more consensual democratic traditions, were less inclined to engage in anti-communist struggle than the countries of the south. Neither should one forget the brake that was applied to common action by the strong personalities of the leaders of these organizations, whose political engagement outside of political parties betrayed their relative marginalization by official political structures. Paix et liberté was intended to build a transnational network geared towards common anti-communist action. However, the practice of transnational anti-communism often had to restrict itself to smaller common denominators and sectoral initiatives – as indeed did the broader European construction process itself.

Notes

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6

The Assembly of Captive European Nations: A Transnational Organization and Tool of Anti-Communist Propaganda

Martin Nekola

The activities of East European exiles in the United States during the Cold War, for many years a neglected topic, has recently and rightfully become the object of historical and political research. Estimates of the numbers of refugees and exiles continue to vary widely. The exiles included workers as well as the cultural, scientific, intellectual and political elites of Eastern Europe. Many were determined to contribute towards the difficult task of liberating their homelands from communist rule. To do so, they needed to gain the support of governments willing to back their cause, and most importantly to establish a unifying umbrella organization that would give them greater legitimacy and become a worthy partner for Western nations.

The Exile Community

The representatives of democratic parties in Bulgaria and Romania had to leave their homelands by 1945–46, with Hungarians, Poles and Czechoslovaks following soon after. Dozens of former ministers, deputies, ambassadors and senior government officials, expelled by the communist regimes, looked to the US government and expected full support in their struggle for the return of democracy to Eastern Europe.¹ Washington preferred to keep an official distance and did not openly coordinate the exile groups because of the need for maintaining diplomatic and economic relations with countries in the Soviet sphere of influence. The US granted asylum to incoming Eastern European politicians, but strongly warned against the establishment of exile

governments as had been done during the Second World War.² France and Britain also refused to grant governmental status to the nascent exile organizations. As can be seen in State Department memos from the years 1947–48,³ US diplomacy deliberately avoided delicate issues, such as the granting of entry visas to prominent exiles. At the same time, there was still a likelihood of armed conflict between East and West, and the defectors from the “enemy camp” were a handy propaganda triumph and a potential source of strategic information. The central goal of all exiles, namely the return of freedom to their homeland, was considered of secondary importance by US diplomatic, military and intelligence planners.⁴

As early as 1945 Georgi “Gemeto” Dimitrov, chairman of the Peasant party, founded the first organization of exiled democratic Bulgarians in New York. He was followed in October 1947 by Stanisław Mikołajczyk, chairman of the Polish government in exile during the Second World War, who became the head of the Polish National Democratic Committee (Polski Komitet Narodowo Demokratyczny). In November 1947, under the chairmanship of Monsignor Bela Varga, the Hungarian National Committee (Magyar Nemzeti Bizottmány) was established, followed by the Romanian (Comitetului National Român) in January 1948. The Council of Free Czechoslovakia (Rada svobodného Československa) was organized in February 1949, followed in December of the same year by the Albanians (Komitetin Kombetar Shqipnia e Lire) and in 1951 by the exile umbrella organizations of Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians.⁵

These “national committees” were similar in many respects. The management of a typical exile organization involved a board of 15 to 20 members (with few exceptions, it was exclusively a male matter), recruited from among former statesmen, party officials and senior civil servants. A high percentage had also been diplomats representing their homelands in missions abroad before the communist take-over. Once they had received instructions from the new “red” governments, they often disobeyed and refused to leave their posts.⁶ Their experience and knowledge at the international level proved crucial during negotiations with Western governments, and this was enough to solicit financial support. Each committee had its own offices with paid staff in New York or Washington DC producing newsletters, brochures and magazines in English or in their national languages. The numbers of staff varied widely depending mainly on the extent of US financial support. The activities of the committees consisted of lobbying US government officials and compatriot associations in the interests of East European

exiles, participating in cultural, educational and memorial events, and maintaining an intensive information campaign in the press.⁷

The exile communities formed a conglomerate of diverse political currents, and none of them was able to avoid internal strife or financial problems. The national committees maintained contacts with their homelands, informing US politicians and especially the CIA of the latest developments. However, all attempts to create illegal, sophisticated organized networks of informers and spies failed.⁸ The Americans felt the need to coordinate their activities, at first via the State Department and then through a “proxy”, the National Committee for a Free Europe (from 1953 known as Free Europe Committee or the FEC), established in June 1949. The FEC ran a variety of information and propaganda operations, but its most important was Radio Free Europe (RFE). RFE first went on air on 1 May 1951 and would rely on exile expertise in the coming decades. Originally dedicated to giving the exiles their own political voice, it was a controlled operation. On the occasion of anniversary events, representatives of the committees were given an opportunity to present their various points of view, but were otherwise rarely able to influence the content of broadcasts.⁹

The Free Europe Committee

In December 1947 the newly formed National Security Council (NSC) warned that the Soviet Union was conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the US, employing coordinated psychological, political and economic measures designed to undermine non-communist elements in Europe and elsewhere. The only response available to weaken and to roll back this communist influence was to initiate a psychological offensive in return. The director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, George F. Kennan, presented the document “Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare” at an NSC meeting on 4 May 1948 in the presence of President Harry Truman. Kennan highlighted the importance of providing assistance for “liberation committees, underground activities behind the Iron Curtain, and the support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the Free World”.¹⁰ The “liberation committees” proposed by Kennan would encourage the formation of a public organization to sponsor selected political exile organizations to pursue their anti-Soviet and anti-communist activities, support popular resistance directly within communist-led nations and prepare liberation movements for the eventuality of an armed conflict between East and West.

Kennan's proposal was summarized in NSC directive 10/2. Covert activities behind the Iron Curtain, information campaigns, the launching of new propaganda channels, the uniting of political exiles through a common organizational platform – all forms of political warfare were now sanctioned and were to be carried out by the anodyne-sounding Office of Policy Coordination (OPC).¹¹

Kennan, together with the nascent CIA and OPC and drawing on advice and support from various former diplomats, businessmen and public figures, outlined a form of anti-communist struggle that should proceed without official support, distancing the US government, allowing for deniability and maintaining diplomatic relations with the East. Political and financial aid to exile leaders could then be presented as a public cause and not simply as an extension of UD foreign policy. In February 1949 Kennan first discussed these issues with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who gave his assent and asked for the formation of a working committee representing leading political, social, economic and religious figures which could then arrange contacts with the various exile organizations. This liaison would enable the provision of assistance and the insurance that such activities could be directed for the benefit of US foreign policy. Alongside Kennan, other figures who contributed to the formation of the FEC were former ambassador to Germany and Japan Joseph C. Grew, former diplomat to the Soviet Union DeWitt Clinton Poole, Lazard Frères New York chief and later General American Investors Company chairman Frank Altschul, lawyer, Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veteran and director-to-be of the CIA Allen W. Dulles, and former diplomat Frederic R. Dolbeare.¹²

The founders of the nascent organization were initially not totally certain of its exact purpose and functions. They knew the FEC would not provide humanitarian aid to refugees from Eastern Europe or apply for US visas for those still interned in refugee camps. Instead it would focus on a chosen group of non-fascist and non-communist leaders who had successfully made it to the United States to find appropriate employment and make use of their knowledge and abilities during their enforced stay in "the Land of Freedom".¹³ The Committee's articles of association were signed in New York on 17 May 1949. At its first press conference Joseph Grew introduced a four-point programme:

1. Create an institution in which the exiles from the Soviet satellite nations could find employment to utilize their skills and, at the same time, document for the world at large the repressive actions of the satellite governments and Soviet Russia;

2. Utilize the political exiles as rallying points and as symbols of unified opposition to communism in the United States and abroad;
3. Relieve the Department of State of the need to deal with exiled political leaders whom they could not endorse as "Governments in Exile" at a time when the United States officially recognized the satellite governments;
4. Generally "aid the non-fascist, non-communist leaders in their peaceful efforts to prepare the way for the restoration in Eastern Europe of the social, political and religious liberties, in which they and we believe".¹⁴

At his own press conference three weeks later, Secretary of State Acheson also expressed full support for the FEC. Altogether 35 names were included in its member list, including generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lucius D. Clay, founder and head of OSS William J. Donovan, labour leader James B. Carey, ex-governor of New York Herbert H. Lehman and press magnate and publisher of *Life* magazine Henry R. Luce. By founding the FEC the political, organizational and operational groundwork for all forms of anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda was in place.

At the time of its foundation, the FEC consisted of four basic divisions: the National Councils Division responsible for supporting the exile political organizations (and which played a crucial role in the creation of the ACEN in 1954), Radio Free Europe, the Middle European Studies Center for scholarly research, and the American Contacts Division that provided the link between the exile networks and American audiences, especially the labour unions.¹⁵ Financial aid for the FEC's activities was assured. While donations came from private persons, the main contributions came from large corporations, foundations and above all the behind-the-scenes support from the CIA. Soon after its foundation the FEC began to bargain about the size and regularity of its contributions to the exile national committees. Exile leaders dealt especially with Poole and Dolbeare. This negotiating often revealed that the expectations of the exiles were exaggerated. The FEC undertook to provide monthly subventions to each committee for administration, travel expenses, information and social services, being a generous but also strict patron, and the money also became an effective instrument of pressure. If, in subsequent years, any of the committees did not respect the FEC's recommendations and demands, the Americans first appealed for and then strongly urged changes before ultimately cutting back on the subventions if it became clear that the desired results would not

be forthcoming.¹⁶ This subservient position caused long-running debate inside the committees: to what extent did the FEC's support obligate specific political activities and subordinate the committees to the role of carrying out US interests?

The FEC's millions did not prevent the ineffectiveness of the quarrelling committees, which caused extreme dissatisfaction.¹⁷ In some cases other ways of keeping the qualified, experienced and well-known exile leaders "busy" were employed. The Middle European Studies Center was used as a platform for former diplomats and political leaders, where they could write memoirs, essays, analyses and situation reports on their home countries. The topics of the resulting publications varied widely, from land reform, mining and the oil industry to freedom of speech, international relations and the Sovietization of agricultural policies. The Free Europe Press was created to distribute the reports and issue a monthly magazine *News from Behind the Iron Curtain*. Most important was involving prominent exiles in radio broadcasting to their home countries. Besides joining in the programs of Voice of America, this led directly to the first broadcasts of Radio Free Europe in May 1951.¹⁸

At one point FEC officials were even inclined to drop the national committees completely, since they had not proven themselves fully competent, and to shift their funding to common "working groups" or "boards of experts" consisting of selected obedient and trouble-free exiles. This reorganization did not materialize, but efforts were still made to unite the East European exiles to give the appearance that they spoke with one voice in line with US foreign policy. On 11 February 1951, 202 exile representatives signed the "Declaration of the Aims and Principles of Liberation of the Central and Eastern European Peoples" in Independence Hall in Philadelphia. It was a symbolic act, whereby the participants expressed their will to fight against world communism and to cooperate closely. There were fears that the Second World War and the years preceding had exposed many reasons for distrust and bitterness. Nevertheless, the complicated relationships between Poles and Czechoslovaks, Hungarians and Romanians did not prevent the formation of a common front against the communist enemy. Soon after the Philadelphia declaration their cooperation was institutionalized. The Central and Eastern European Committee and the Central and Eastern European Conference, later the United National Committees and Councils in Exile, were established to function as think tanks and discussion boards, outlining possible European developments after the fall of Soviet rule. The trend was to set out the grounds for a peaceful transition to a post-communist future, ideally involving a gradual process towards the

federalization of the whole continent. The creation of the supranational European Coal and Steel Community with the Treaty of Paris in 1951 was a marker that inspired further moves in this direction.¹⁹

Public support for the East European exiles in the US came from carefully supervised propaganda campaigns such as the Crusade for Freedom.²⁰ Its goal was to collect donations for Radio Free Europe from American citizens as well as from industrial and financial giants (Chevrolet, Ford Motor Company, General Electric, Chase National Bank), and generally to raise domestic support for Cold War policies. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations both expressed their support for Chiang Kai Chek's Kuomintang government and the East European exiled anti-communists. The nationalist Chinese regime in Taiwan was behind the establishment of various anti-communist organizations such as the Asian People's Anti-Communist League, Aid for Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, and American-Asian Educational Exchange.²¹ Yet it was precisely the number of organizations and their inability to effectively work together that began to cause problems. US officials became more exasperated at the antics of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, the European Freedom Council, the League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR and other similar organizations.²² Many of these groups were in fact passive and beset by internal quarrels. To try and ensure greater effectiveness, from late 1953 moves were made to create a new representative body, fully controlled and funded by the US government through the FEC.²³ The result was the Assembly of Captive European Nations, which officially saw the light of day on 20 September 1954 as a non-incorporated, non-profit company.²⁴

The Structure and Purpose of the ACEN

The ACEN brought together the members of nine "national committees" of exiled Albanians, Bulgarians, Czechoslovaks, Estonians, Hungarians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles and Romanians.²⁵ Moreover, the representatives of various "internationals" which gathered political and cultural exiles together were also present.²⁶ The ACEN, which was intended to act as a "shadow" counterbalance to the United Nations,²⁷ was meant to coordinate the management of anti-communist campaigns, publicize news from behind the Iron Curtain, generate international support for the liberation of Soviet-ruled parts of Europe, and cooperate with other organizations such as the Council of Europe and the European Movement to facilitate the basis for future all-European integration.²⁸

The structure of the ACEN generally followed the structure of the United Nations. It consisted of a general assembly, a general committee and six working committees (political, legal, social, economic, information and cultural), which at the end of 1960s were merged into three (political-legal, socio-economic and culture-information). The general sessions were held once a year, usually in September, in New York or Strasbourg, and these functioned as the sanctioning assemblies through which resolutions were announced and the members of the general committee were elected.²⁹ The first two-day session took place on 20–1 September 1954 in New York (the final, 18th session took place in 1971). Each of the participating nine “captive nations”, through their respective national committees, sent a 16-member delegation to these sessions, where lectures and situational reports on developments in individual countries behind the Iron Curtain were presented and voting on resolutions and protests notes took place. The Polish delegation was the only exception to this arrangement. Due to disputes over which of two leading exile organizations (the Polish Political Council and the Polish National Democratic Committee) had the right to make nominations, the delegation consisted of two competitive eight-member sections.³⁰ Each of the “internationals” could send a four-member delegation, but without the right to vote. From the beginning of the ACEN a principle was adopted that delegates had to either possess the citizenship of their country of origin or, having been deprived of their citizenship by communist authorities, had not accepted citizenship of another country. The majority of exiles in 1954 still believed in the early fall of communism and their return from exile, so for many the adoption of another citizenship was not an option. However, later this “citizenship affair” resulted in serious disputes, particularly within the Czechoslovak delegation.³¹

The ACEN assemblies, which took place in New York to coincide with the United Nations General Assembly sessions, were frequently also coordinated with public demonstrations to raise their profile and increase the volume of their message. During 1956–63 the ACEN rented a two-storey building owned by the Carnegie Endowment on First Avenue, directly opposite UN headquarters. Hence, the UN delegates from communist countries could not avoid the unpleasant view of posters and billboards hanging across the street that alerted passers-by to the ongoing “red terror” and “Soviet imperialism.” In 1956 the ACEN opened another three permanent offices in London, Paris and Bonn, all of which remained active until 1973. The ACEN also maintained a presence in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Venezuela,

Salvador, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay), Mexico, Canada, Lebanon, Japan, Turkey, the Philippines, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Greece, Switzerland and Spain. Africa is notable for its absence from the ACEN register of political contacts.³²

The chairman, who represented the ACEN externally, was elected for a one-year term. Latvian diplomat Vilis Māsēns acted as the first chair, exceptionally, for a four-year term between 1954–58.³³ While the chair moderated sessions and supervised communication with international, governmental and private organizations and individuals, the secretary general, who oversaw all administrative matters and daily operations and was supported by a permanent secretariat, was a much more important position. Romanian diplomat Brutus Coste served in this post during 1954–65, and his successor, Polish diplomat Feliks Gadomski, from 1966 to 1985.

Brutus Coste (1901–85) was a diplomat with extensive experience in Paris, London and Washington. From 1942 until the end of the Second World War he worked at the Romanian embassy in Lisbon. He came into conflict with the postwar communist government of Petru Groza, refusing to follow its regulations or release documents and office equipment. In November 1947 he joined the nascent Romanian exile structures in New York headed by general Nicolae Rădescu. Coste was very active in the media to warn the American public about the communist threat. He regularly prepared foreign policy comments for NBC broadcasting, wrote hundreds of articles and studies, including a widely regarded study on propaganda in Eastern Europe.³⁴ Coste's expertise also led to his employment by the University of New York, University of Pennsylvania, Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey, and the Institute of World Affairs. He also created the so-called "Tuesday Board", whereby a group of East European exile leaders would gather on the first Tuesday of every month to discuss policy issues and prepare a common press release. It was out of these meetings that the initiative for the Philadelphia Declaration arose in February 1951. The arrival of the ACEN in 1954 was an ideal opportunity for Coste to expand his activities further, and he was successfully elected to the post of secretary general eight times in succession.³⁵

Feliks Gadomski (1898–1998) had originally been a journalist and publisher before becoming a judge of the district court of Warsaw and a legal advisor at the Polish consulate in London. During the Second World War he joined the Polish government in exile and did not return to Sovietized Poland in 1945, instead moving to the United States. With the arrival of RFE in 1951 he became an editor in the Polish section,

and he held senior positions in the Liberal Democratic Union of Central Eastern Europe, the Kosciuszko Foundation and the Polish Council of Unity. Gadomski described his experience with the ACEN in a memoir that provides a unique description of the organization's activities, its development in the crucial period 1954–72, as well as the level of support from US authorities.³⁶ Gadomski also lived long enough to be one of the few original participants to see the fall of the Iron Curtain, and for his significant contribution to democracy he was awarded many honours in Poland.

It is important to mention also a third person who significantly influenced the outlook and operation of the ACEN. Polish lawyer Stefan Korboński (1901–89) belonged to the well-known group of heroes of the wartime anti-Nazi resistance. He was the underground leader of the suppressed Warsaw uprising in the autumn of 1944. Arrested by the Soviet NKVD, he survived and after his release entered politics, becoming active in the Polish People's Party, traditionally connected with the peasantry and an ideological rival to the communists. Korboński was also elected a deputy to the parliament in January 1947, but the increasing power of the communists and threats to his safety made him leave for the United States in late 1947. In exile Korboński became an active member of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America, the International PEN Club, and the Polish Council of Unity. The ACEN provided him with a perfect platform from which to address the wider exile community, and he was elected chairman three times in 1958, 1966 and 1971 as well as serving as deputy chair in 1960 and 1965. When the ACEN turned into an incorporated company in 1972, he became its director. Stefan Korboński was among the most prominent public figures of the organization, regularly meeting with North American and West European leaders and leading an ACEN delegation on a world tour in 1959 to raise the organization's profile.³⁷

The ACEN took advantage of every opportunity to point out the crimes of the Soviet Union and its East European satellite regimes. ACEN representatives were constantly active at international scientific and political conferences lobbying for support and sharing scarce information from the Eastern bloc. One of the ACEN's most high-profile activities was the establishment of "Captive Nations Week" in the US political calendar. Begun in 1959, this public campaign was used to directly oppose policies of *détente*, regarded as no more than another form of appeasement of Soviet aggression and the enslavement of peoples in Central and Eastern Europe. Officially recognized by the US Congress and the White House, it became the official annual remembrance of

the tragic fate of captive nations. US presidents from Eisenhower to Obama have acknowledged every year the third week of July as “Captive Nations Week”.³⁸ US politicians at the federal and state levels – most of the Republicans – quickly understood its significance and tried to take advantage by using it to criticize “softer” opponents during their campaigns, thereby winning votes from the wider exile communities present in the US. Understandably, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev called “Captive Nations Week” an inadmissible provocation.

The ACEN also arranged a number of exhibitions. The widest publicity was given to the “Soviet Empire Exhibit”, whose initiator was the chairman of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia Petr Zenkl. Displaying the grim reality of life in the Soviet Union, it propagated an inextricable link between communist tyranny at home and Soviet imperialism abroad.³⁹ After its opening in January 1958 in the entrance hall of Grand Central Station in New York the exhibition toured across the US before continuing on to Italy, Sweden, Japan, Taiwan and New Zealand.⁴⁰ Looking to extend its reach as a source of information, from April 1955 the press bureau of the ACEN published the monthly bulletin *ACEN News* in multiple languages, including Arabic. Issue number 153, the last, was published in December 1971.

The ACEN's Relevance

It goes without saying that State Department dispatches during the years 1955–57 display an intense interest as well as concerns about the dramatic events in Eastern Europe.⁴¹ Along with the Suez Crisis in the Middle East, this was the area where developments could unexpectedly erupt into conditions which would be very disadvantageous to US strategic interests. The political analyses of the State Department noted that the workers’ riots in Eastern Germany, Poland and Hungary had broken out unexpectedly, causing real concern in Moscow. The US government decided to send a clear signal to the Kremlin that existing borders and spheres of influence established at the end of the Second World War would be respected. The Geneva Conference in 1955, which brought together the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States for the first time since the Second World War, resulted in a cool rapprochement between the two rivals. Even the Hungarian uprising in 1956, with its thousands of casualties, failed to shake this position among Western governments.⁴² The exiles responded to this desire to secure the status quo with dismay, fearing that further

East–West normalization through trade deals and cultural agreements would undermine their position (and political importance). When vice president Richard Nixon went on a state visit to Moscow in July 1959, ACEN leaders sent him a message to sharply disagree with any policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

ACEN leaders did undermine their credibility with Western politicians by making too strong demands. Some ACEN radicals demanded that the Soviet Union be excluded from the United Nations because of its obvious conflict with the UN Charter. Representatives of French, British and West German governments and parliaments considered ACEN assemblies to be prestige social events and useful gatherings of specialists on Central and Eastern Europe, but during their speeches and papers they took great care not to express any official political support or commitments. The Eastern bloc, “the big evil” for exile leaders, represented an attractive trading partner in the eyes of many Western countries. In Paris, London and Bonn, therefore, there was an increasing interest in normalizing political relations, against the wishes of the exile organizations. From the end of the 1950s the British Foreign Office purposely avoided official public negotiations with organizations like the ACEN, instead seeking to establish normal relations with East European governments and so encourage more independence from Soviet influence. Policies aligned with the ACEN’s demands for free elections, national self-determination, freedom of speech or the release of political prisoners were out of the question for British foreign policy.⁴³

At the beginning of the 1960s, the importance of the ACEN gradually declined in the US as well. Albert D. Kappel, director of the National Councils Division of the FEC which funded the ACEN, did not confine himself to advice and recommendations like his predecessors, but sharply criticized the ACEN for its inefficiency in the political field, departure from official US policy standpoints, old-fashioned and impractical forms of presentation, and a lack of communication with the American public and media.⁴⁴ Kappel’s unflattering comments displayed the fact that the ACEN’s usefulness for the US foreign policy apparatus was fading.

Conclusion

The ACEN’s record as a strong and respected political lobby in US government and Congress is mixed. The Assembly directed a large part of

its efforts at the press, and met only limited success in attracting public attention. Only the *New York Times* regularly published some news items on ACEN activities. Inevitably, the ACEN was also gradually forced to adapt to the fact that the US government was increasingly interested in some form of accommodation with the Soviet Union as the 1960s progressed. In June 1965 the organization suffered a drastic 56 per cent reduction in its budget, causing the necessary suspension of many of its activities. Many ACEN offices around the world had to be closed, the publishing of periodicals was stopped, and most of the staff of the secretariat were fired. In December 1971 the American press revealed that the CIA had been the prime financial resource for the FEC since the beginning, a fact which had not been known by the rank-and-file members of the ACEN. For the ACEN's leadership the funding of the FEC had been an open secret, although official spokespersons consistently argued that the organization relied on donations from foundations, corporations and the public. Negative media attention spilled over to the ACEN and led to the cancellation of all remaining governmental financial support. This exposure and subsequent shutting down of the CIA's involvement in the "cultural Cold War", together with a decline of interest among the public in ACEN activities in a period of increasing East–West détente and the death of many of the exile communities' postwar leaders, in practice meant the effective end of the organization.

On 22 May 1972, the Supreme Court in New York registered the ACEN as an incorporated company, which allowed it to continue its activities to a very limited extent.⁴⁵ The "exile parliament" was now reduced to an almost meaningless lobby association, although Captive Nations Week did continue as a reminder of what the ACEN was supposed to stand for all along. The ACEN continued to maintain its contacts with the US State Department and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, contributing its viewpoints on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and its culmination with the Helsinki Final Act, signed on 1 August 1975. The arrival of President Reagan in 1980 did bring a certain revival of ACEN activities as part of the Reagan administration's determination to put pressure on the Soviet Union, and Reagan himself welcomed several ACEN delegations to the White House.

The role of the ACEN is an important addition to the development of "exile studies" as a crucial part of Cold War history. The Assembly was at the forefront of an exile politics that stretched beyond Europe to link with similar developments in the Far East. Although it may be thought to have been no more than an extension of covert US foreign policy and that its shallow foundations collapsed when details of the CIA's role

were exposed, the ACEN did at least contribute to sustaining the voice of the “stateless” through three decades.

Notes

1. J. Robert Wegs and Robert Ladrech, *Europe since 1945: A Concise History* (Boston: St Martins, 1996), pp. 38–53.
2. See Martin Conway and José Gotovitch (eds), *Europe in Exile: European Exile Communities in Britain 1940–45* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001). See also Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton University Press, 2001).
3. “Attitude of the United States toward Eastern European Exile Leaders and Organizations”, Department of State, in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter FRUS), vol. IV, 1948 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office,), pp. 396–435.
4. See Bernd Stöver, *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus. Amerikanische Liberation Policy im Kalten Krieg 1947–1991* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2002).
5. John F. Leich, “Great Expectations: The National Councils in Exile 1950–1960”, *Polish Review* 35 (1990), pp. 183–96.
6. One of the most daring diplomats was Jan Papanek, the Czechoslovak ambassador to the United Nations, who instigated the proceedings of the Security Council on the situation in Czechoslovakia after the communist coup of February 1948. He endured numerous attempts to effect his return by the communist authorities, and continued working for the United Nations headquarters in New York until the end of his regular term of office in December 1950.
7. John Radzilowski, “Ethnic Anti-Communism in the United States”, in Ieva Zake (ed.), *Anti-Communist Minorities in the U.S.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 1–17.
8. Peter Grose, *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), pp. 11–32.
9. On RFE see Robert Holt, *Radio Free Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); A. Ross Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010); Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), pp. 210–13. On the issue of the control of broadcast content, particularly in relation to Hungary in 1956, see also Anne-Chantal Lepeuple, “Radio Europe libre et le soulèvement hongrois de 1956”, *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 47 (2000), pp. 177–95.
10. Richard H. Cummings, *Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950–1989* (Jefferson: McFarland, 2009), pp. 6–7.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
12. See Waldo H. Heinrichs Jr, *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition* (Oxford University Press, 1986); Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950* (Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 203–7.

13. Leich, "Great Expectations", p. 183.
14. Cummings, *Cold War Radio*, p. 9.
15. Leich "Great Expectations", p. 183. See also Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, pp. 7–13.
16. For example the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, divided between two rival camps from 1951 onwards, saw its funding drop from \$195,925 in 1953–54 to \$139,229 in 1955–56.
17. National Committee for a Free Europe (1951–55), Folder 1, Box 1, MS 125, Archives and Special Collections, University of Nebraska.
18. See Holt, *Radio Free Europe*, pp. 9–16.
19. See John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
20. Wendy L. Wall, *Inventing the "American Way": The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement* (Chapel Hill: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 241–77. See also Martin J. Medhurst, "Eisenhower and the Crusade for Freedom: The Rhetorical Origins of a Cold War Campaign", *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 27 (Fall 1997), pp. 646–61.
21. Sara Diamond, *The Road to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), pp. 41–4.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 45–6.
23. See Anna Mazurkiewicz, "'Join, or Die' – The Road to Cooperation among East European Exiled Political Leaders in the United States, 1949–1954", in Katalin Kádár Lynn (ed.), *The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe* (Budapest: Helena History Press, forthcoming).
24. In German: Versammlung der versklavten Völker Europas, in French: Assemblée des nations captives d'Europe.
25. The Americans, wanting to avoid interfering in the internal politics of the Soviet Union, did not include the separatist movements of the White Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians in ACEN. The case of the three Baltic nations was slightly different due to the US refusal to recognize their annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940. In addition there was socialist Yugoslavia, which after Tito's break with Stalin in 1947 represented an important Balkan partner for American and particularly British diplomacy. For this reason representatives of separatist Croats, Serbs or Slovenians had little chance of international recognition, although they were occasionally invited to join ACEN conferences and public gatherings as observers.
26. These included the International Peasant Union (IPU), Socialist Union of Central Eastern Europe (SUCEE), Christian Democrat Union of Central Eastern Europe (CDUCE), Liberal-Democratic Union of Central Eastern Europe (LDUCEE), Centre international des syndicalistes en exil (CSU), International Federation of Free Journalists (IFFJ) and the Central European Federal Movement (CEFM).
27. The ACEN was informally labelled the "United Nations of Exiles". The *New York Times* used the term "Smart Little United Nations" in its headline announcing the ACEN's arrival.
28. The Assembly's records are kept at the Immigration History Research Center of the University of Minnesota. It contains the entire documentation

- of ACEN activities, including the biographical profiles of its officials (<<http://ihrc.umn.edu/research/vitrage/all/am/GENassembly.htm>>). Alongside this is the East European Collection held at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University (<<http://www.hoover.org/library-and-archives/collections/east-europe>>), the Ferenc Nagy papers at the Rare Books and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/archival/collections/ldpd_4079757), and the Feliks Gadomski papers held at Zakład Narodowy in Ossolińskich (<<http://www2.oss.wroc.pl/kat>>).
29. Anna Mazurkiewicz, "The Voice of Silenced People", in Zake (ed.), *Anti-Communist Minorities in the U.S.*, p. 172.
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7

The World Anti-Communist League: Origins, Structures and Activities

Pierre Abramovici

There is a type of no-compromise anti-communism that can be referred to as militant or “fighting” anti-communism. Many of the groups that adopted this approach during the Cold War were gathered together in the only transnational organization that achieved global representation: the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). Although the WACL came into existence in response to the activities of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement during the 1950s and 1960s, its origins go back to the Bolshevik revolution.

A Difficult Target: The Historiography of the WACL

A comprehensive study of the WACL and its wide array of activities is still lacking. Up until the late 1970s it was generally characterized as an extension of European neo-Nazi networks. The sources for this characterization were contradictory. On the one hand it came from Soviet propaganda that aimed to discredit the many East European émigrés and the West German *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) under Reinhard Gehlen that supported them as right-wing extremists. In France this information was recycled by Alain Guérin, a communist journalist, who became the main public source on WACL.¹ On the other hand the Ukrainian émigré networks in the US propagated their own histories of WACL and other organizations (with the exception of the White Russian émigrés of the NTS: National Alliance of Russian Solidarists, which ran its own operations from its headquarters in Paris). The League became an object of serious interest during the years of the “strategy of tension” in Italy (1969–80), when investigative journalists began

examining whether a transnational organization existed behind the acts of neo-fascist terrorism.² At that time only two primary documents on the WACL had surfaced. One was a report by the head of the League's British chapter, Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, who resigned in protest against the large influx of fascist elements into the WACL's European division (EUROWACL). The other was a "blue paper" written by former members of the anti-Nazi resistance in Norway which likewise denounced the fascist presence. In London the anti-fascist periodical *Searchlight* was also collecting materials, most of which covered various conferences, with Stewart-Smith as the original source. The activities of WACL outside of Europe were at the time not known.

In the 1980s WACL's involvement in Nicaragua triggered the interest of investigators in the United States, and it was this that led to the (up till now) only attempt at a complete study of the network: *Inside the League* by the freelance journalists John Lee Anderson and Scott Anderson (no relation). Their book concentrated on Central America and the role of the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation (CAL), but they also covered the background links with the Ukrainian émigrés.³ CAL's sponsorship of political violence was further exposed by journalist Penny Lernoux, who had been investigating the struggle between the Catholic Church and the liberation theologians in Latin America. It was Lernoux who revealed the so-called "Banzer Plan" regarding the elimination of left-wing Catholics, a strategy adopted at the third conference of the CAL.⁴

My own research, based at first in the archives of the Dominican order in Paris, led to a report by a missionary that revealed the extent to which the WACL was implicated in the violent repression of progressive Catholics across Latin America. In 1984 I began an investigation on the events in Central America for TF1, the French television company, which took me to the WACL conferences in Dallas, Luxemburg, and Geneva. By the end of the decade I had gathered hundreds of documents and interview transcripts on which to base a proper assessment of the League.⁵ Then in the late 1980s a Paraguayan political refugee, Martin Almada, offered to join my investigation, partly to assist his return to his country and support his case against the Paraguayan leader Alfredo Stroessner. It was Almada who in December 1992 in Asuncion discovered the so-called "archives of horror" (five tons of documents from the political police archives) covering the inside story of state-sponsored violence in Latin America. The Paraguayan Ministry of Justice made the materials available to us so that we could bring the details into the public domain. It was this source that seriously brought to light "Operation

Condor” and the many links between state and private organizations in the transnational state terrorism network, including the CAL.⁶ So far only Patrice McSherry has been able to transform these accounts from investigative journalism into academic analysis,⁷ and much more needs to be done to examine the involvement of the WACL and the CAL in Cold War anti-communism more generally.⁸

Anti-Bolshevism

On 11 November 1918, after the signing of the armistice that ended the First World War, a new kind of ideological war began. Seventeen nations and a multitude of armies and armed bands coalesced under the white flag (or their own colours) against the Bolshevik regime. In many ways more of an extension of the First World War than a civil war, it involved an intervention by the Western allies to overthrow the Bolshevik regime in order to protect their commercial, industrial and financial interests, and to defeat the communist threat.

There were several anti-communist groups that arose in the Soviet sphere and which played a role in the Civil War. First we note the Ukrainians, who set out to regain their lost independence which they had held for only a few months in 1920. The foremost body representing their interests was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a movement that for the next 70 years would be plagued by the conspiratorial activities of several security services. Second, there were the Caucasian nationalists, particularly the Muslims, the most rebellious of the peoples of the Russian Empire. Several eminent members of this group lined up under the pan-Turkish banner. Those on the Left who joined the communists soon became disillusioned by the dominance of Russian chauvinism, and they returned to the (clandestine) opposition. Third, there were other irredentist nationalists from the Baltics and Byelorussia. All these groups operated separately from the White Russians, who only wanted a return to the *ancien régime* and refused to recognize radical border changes to the Russian imperium. The White Russians were therefore as much competitors as they were allies in the anti-Bolshevik cause. Following the defeat of the Whites and the consolidation of Soviet control from Moscow, the nationalists looked for other allies. By the late 1930s there were links with German military intelligence (the Abwehr). Outside help was needed both to end communist rule and re-assert independence.⁹

In the second half of 1941, during the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Abwehr organized Ukrainian nationalists into units under German

command and used them in front of the regular troops and the SS extermination battalions. The aim of this tactic was to open the path for the Wehrmacht with units that would be welcomed as liberators, particularly in Lvov, previously known as Lemberg in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in the western part of the Ukraine. These Ukrainian forces seized the opportunity to declare a "Free State of Ukraine", but this lasted less than a week before being suppressed by the Germans. It nevertheless would be used later as a model for all Ukrainian demands for nationhood.

At the end of 1943, in the forest of Jytomir (Galizia, in the western part of the Ukraine), these same Ukrainian nationalists held the first clandestine congress of the Anti-Bolshevik Blok of Nations (ABN), creating at the same time the Ukrainian National Army (UPA). The UPA then took part in attacks on the retreating Wehrmacht, while at the same time harassing the Red Army, the communist partisans and Jewish citizens (due to their suspected communist sympathies). The UPA, consisting of around 70,000 guerrillas, were joined by fragments of the SS Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Russian and Cossack battalions, as well as Hungarian, Rumanian, Soviet, Baltic and Georgian deserters. Many of these dispersed former elements of the German army ended up in Western displaced persons camps.

The Americans, British and French began to take an interest in the UPA, especially when it became apparent that some of its units continued their struggle against the Red Army after 1945. This anti-communist guerrilla warfare went on for several years. In the context of the many anti-Soviet forces that were active in the mid-1940s, the Ukrainians were undoubtedly the best organized and the most dangerous threat to Soviet dominance. Stalin mobilized considerable forces against the UPA (with Nikita Khrushchev playing a leading role) and forced the repatriation of millions on the borders of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in an effort to defeat them. The UPA was finally subdued in 1954, but its influence would continue via the various actors who later congregated in the WACL.

Throughout the 1950s the OUN, in combination with the ABN, undertook a consistent and high-profile lobbying campaign in West Germany, Canada and the United States to secure exclusive representation of the international anti-Soviet emigration. In 1959 this also resulted in the US Congress passing public law 86-90 which designated the third week of July as an annual Captive Nations Week, a highly visible recognition by the United States of the continuing Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe. The event also commemorated

the mostly short-lived attempts to assert national independence from Russia and the Soviet Union in 1920 (and 1941 for Ukraine). This involved, in some cases, the promotion of pseudo-nationalist causes that were based on a minimum of credibility, such as the alleged nation of the Idel-Ural for a race of people who probably never existed. Nevertheless, Captive Nations Week continues to this day as a symbol of US support for democratic freedoms around the world.

The Asian Anti-Communists

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, while Europe (and Germany) was treated as the prime site for the East–West power struggle, the “hot wars” were all being fought on the Pacific Rim: China’s civil war resulted in a communist victory, the Indo-China war dragged on and the outbreak of the Korean War seemed to herald a new wave of communist expansion. For the anti-communist movements across Asia, much depended on the *Guomindang* led by Chiang Kai Chek, the anti-communist nationalist and former head of the Chinese state. Following the loss of mainland China to Mao Tse-Tung’s forces, CIA covert operations began to be run out of Taiwan. Chiang was supported by the “China lobby” in the United States, a powerful network of congressmen and business interests that promoted the anti-communist struggle in Asia and possessed considerable influence in Washington up to the end of the Reagan era.¹⁰ Making use of this support, Chiang himself financed various anti-communist movements in Asia and was also assisted by Ukrainian members of the ABN, specialists in clandestine warfare, who were sent over by their American mentors. They trained the secret police and covert action personnel, and contributed to the creation of Radio Free Asia, the Taiwanese equivalent of the Munich-based Radio Free Europe.

In 1954, at the end of the Korean War, Chiang visited his Korean counterpart Syngman Rhee to discuss further collaboration. Communist victories in China and Indo-China and insurgencies in Malaya and the Philippines lent a sense of urgency to these deliberations, and with the support of the China lobby and the CIA, Chiang and the Koreans created a new transnational organization, the Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League (APACL). South Vietnam would soon join to form the third pillar. The APACL, run from its headquarters in Tai’pei, would make good use of the propaganda value of Captive Nations Week in the ensuing decades to link its cause with the Europe-focused anti-Soviet campaign. This was particularly the case in the 1970s following the normalization of relations between mainland China and the United States. The APACL would

provide the fulcrum around which the future WACL would turn, both in terms of the size of its membership and in terms of the support it enjoyed from the China Lobby in the United States. Having said that, the question of who the principal enemy actually was – the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China – remained an unresolved issue within the WACL. Using the APACL, Taiwan pushed the case of the illegitimacy of the communist regime in mainland China at every opportunity. Much of this was motivated by nothing more than a desire to avenge the defeat of 1949.

The Latin Americans

The development of transnational anti-communist movements in the Latin American continent was connected, paradoxically, to the lack of any substantial organized local communism. The archives of the Comintern have revealed that Moscow only began to build a communist network there from the late 1940s onwards. As a result, anti-communism in Latin America had a broader purpose, it being used as a label to legitimize state power against all “subversive” threats to social order, such as the trade unions, student movements and radical elements in the Church.

Through the training received in the US military academies, the ideology of national security was passed on to political and military elites throughout the continent, with a special emphasis on the Brazilians. The East–West conflict was used to condemn all the (potential) “enemies of the state” as members of the *Movimiento Comunista Internacional*, setting them up as direct threats to national security. Not only that, but this approach was set in the context of continental security, a view only strengthened by the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959 and the fear that Havana would export the revolution across the region. For many years this was used to legitimate the repressive tactics of dictatorial military regimes acting in the name of law and order.

One of the hard-line anti-communist organizations that emerged at this time was the Anticommunist Popular Front, created by Jorge Prieto Laurens. Laurens came to prominence in 1954 as the organizer of the first American Congress against Soviet Intervention in Latin America. Held during 27–30 May 1954 in Mexico City, its main objective was to denounce the regime of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. With the CIA-backed coup against Arbenz less than a month away, the Congress was used as a show of support for the rebellion of Colonel Castillo Armas. Declassified documents confirm the leading role of the CIA in

the Congress, and follow-up events were held in Brazil in 1955 and Peru in 1956.¹¹ The linkage between the Latin America Congress and the formation of the APACL, both in 1954, point to a new level of coordination in transnational anti-communism.

In 1955, following the Rio de Janeiro conference, Dr Ku Chen Kang, the leader of the APACL who attended the event, used the APACL bulletin to call for a “World Anticommunist League” to cement the bond between the Asian and Latin American networks.¹² Laurens, increasingly active across Latin America, attempted to solidify the link with the World Anti-Communist Congress in Mexico City in 1958, inviting delegates from five continents. This initial ambitious attempt to unite all anti-communist factions failed, but the effort would soon be taken up again, this time in Europe.

Suzanne Labin and the European Network

In 1960–61 the French publicist and political activist Suzanne Labin organized two important international conferences: the first, *The Political Warfare of the Soviets*, was held in Paris during 1–3 December 1960, and the second, *The Communist Threat to the World*, held in Rome during 18–22 November 1961. The list of participants is enlightening because in terms of the personnel involved these events prefigured the WACL. Labin also used them as platforms to launch the idea of a world organization to consolidate the still separate regional networks. These two conferences also signified the political convergence of the “fighting anti-communists”, in particular the Soviet bloc émigrés grouped around the ABN, with the social democratic and Christian Democratic circles and the more moderate conservative right-wing. Continental Anticommunist Confederation Labin herself had a background in French social democratic networks. The Brazilian Admiral Penna Botto, known for his public stance as an anti-communist (which brought him to participate actively in the military coup of 1964), attended the conferences as the leader and principal representative of the Latin Americans.

Another group represented at the conferences was the American Security Council (ASC), an ultra-conservative movement created in 1955 “to promote the American cause of peace, freedom, democracy, and human rights at home and abroad through public policy advocacy”. Its political creed was summed up in the phrase “Peace through Strength”. On 6 August 1962 Suzanne Labin published a long article in the *Washington Report*, the ASC’s bulletin, entitled “Cold War

Education – Prerequisite to Victory”.¹³ Having defined the “weapons of Political Warfare waged by the enemy” as “Propaganda, crypto-communist organizations, infiltration, activist cells, popular fronts, organized journey, attack on anti-communists, special schools, violent means”, she asked the question, “What can be done to counteract Soviet political warfare?” The answer was as follows: beyond the necessary counter-propaganda activities, it was necessary to create new agencies to build up a political warfare capacity in the West. There was a need for a “headquarters of political warfare which recommend countermeasures to their governments and to devise a political warfare counterstrategy”. To counter the communist threat, it was essential to assign tasks to “civil servants and military officers who have to deal with the communist threat”. In order to achieve this, it would be necessary to create an international institute to coordinate the work of the various national agencies. This institution should be a World League of Freedom, consisting of private organizations and working closely with the media. Under this transnational umbrella a network of academies for training political warfare experts could be established.

For Labin the best allies in this endeavour would be the representatives of “peoples behind the Iron Curtain. Their desire for freedom is our own best weapon of political warfare.” The institution would organize demonstrations and provide “‘liberating Legions’ on a voluntary basis” which could provide “political commandos” for “later trouble spots”. Above all, “the Centers would be the most striking embodiment of the cardinal principle that we must abandon the purely defensive and take the offensive on the enemy’s weakest front: the internal front”. As an example of a successful organization in this field, Labin pointed to the APACL. The base for the intended WACL had been laid.

The Creation and Structure of the WACL

At the annual conference of the APACL in Seoul in 1966, the decision to formally establish the WACL was taken. The first conference of the WACL took place in Tai’peh during 25 September–1 October 1967 and included 170 representatives from 60 nations. Among the delegates were individuals who had been active in anti-communist activities for several decades, such as the Belgian Marcel de Roover, already a member of the anti-Bolshevik coalition in 1919–21. On the whole, the European countries were under-represented and some nations, such as Spain, only sent an embassy attaché as observer. The Asian representatives were the dominant faction, with social democrats and the

US China lobby (in particular the American Marvin Liebman) also in attendance.¹⁴ International organizations involved were the Asian Christian Anti-Communist Association, the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, European Freedom Council (a European off-shoot of the ABN supported by the BND), and the Inter-American Confederation of Continental Defense (an out-growth of the 1954 Latin American Congress). Suzanne Labin was also present. Soviet émigrés were represented by two organizations, the ABN (favoured by the Taiwanese due to their long association) and the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN), a more moderate organization with close ties to the Council of Europe. The ACEN was also a creation of the CIA and BND. While the ABN joined the managing group of WACL, ACEN was pushed aside as an associate member. The large numbers of Anti-Soviet Russians (particularly members of the NTS) in the ACEN caused them to reject the leadership of the Ukrainian OUN in the anti-communist émigré movement, and the ACEN was in turn regarded as highly untrustworthy.

The WACL was organized around national and regional (continental) chapters, with various international organizations and associated representatives also attending the conferences. It was managed by a board of directors in which were always Taiwanese. An annual assembly put together by a national or regional chapter provided a regular meeting place for its members, and the local chapter's leader became the president of WACL up to the following assembly. When the WACL held assemblies in Asia, in particular in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, it was a major anti-communist manifestation with all the trappings of a mass movement. Three publications were used to publicize its activities: *Asian Outlook* for the APAAL, *Replica* (from 1972) for Latin America and *ABN Correspondence*, largely devoted to the Ukrainian cause.

The history of the WACL can be divided up into several periods, each one marked by internal splits. The main division at the heart of the organization was that between the US–Asian networks focused on China and the threat of communist expansion throughout the region (the domino theory), and the more Atlantic-orientated groups focused on the Soviet Union. The large-scale presence of Latin American groups at the annual assembly in Mexico City in 1972 also brought in new members stemming from the European far right and those directly linked to right-wing “death squads” in South and Central America. Catholic fundamentalists from Argentina, Mexico and Spain were also present. The Latin American chapter, created at the Mexico City assembly as a joint initiative of several groups connected with various national intelligence services, internal security services and armed forces, was termed the

Confederacion Anticomunista Latina-Americana, the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation (CAL). The Europeans were the least well organized, being deeply divided and including moderates who were rejected by many active WACL members.

For the far right the WACL provided a major opportunity to link up with other organizations and make use of existing international networks to provide a greater visibility, credibility and freedom of movement. The links between Europe and Latin America were particularly strengthened in this regard. Out of this came a short-lived attempt to build the European dimension: EUROWACL. The WACL continued into the 1970s as a broad “umbrella organization” for these different groups, but it was the US-supported anti-communist movements (with the American Security Council at their head) that ensured the League as a whole was orientated around the interests of US global anti-communism. At the same time, the Taiwanese used the WACL and the APACL to try and undermine the PRC–US rapprochement begun under President Nixon. On 23 January 1975 Ku Chen Kang, the honorary chairman of the WACL, issued a statement from Tai’peh entitled “The Evil Result of Detente”: “This is a crucial moment, and our ardent hope is that the United States will stop taking any further steps towards the so-called ‘normalization of relations’ with the Chinese Communists.”¹⁵ The Taiwanese attempted to solidify their leadership of the transnational movement by teaming up with the Latin Americans and issuing a call to unite the anti-Soviet and anti-PRC branches:

The heroic anti-tyranny struggle on the Chinese mainland, the recurrent exodus of refugees from behind the Bamboo Curtain, the liberalization campaigns forcefully carried on in Russia and behind the East European Iron Curtain, the persistent anti-oppression movement started by Russian intellectuals and led by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, and the struggle for freedom waged by the Jews in the Soviet Union.¹⁶

While the symbol of the “captive nation” did serve to unite the movement in a basic sense, the leadership did admit that internal differences existed:

In the course of our promotion of the WACL, we cannot avoid running into different viewpoints on the part of certain members that have to take notice of the specific conditions of their areas [...]. First

and foremost for us in leading the WACL movement, therefore, is to promote coordination and cooperation among the anti-communists of various countries, doing everything possible to prevent and rectify divergence and other conduct harmful to unity.¹⁷

The objective of the many movements that made up the WACL was the collapse of communism, both as a system of political rule and as an ideology itself, particularly within those countries outside of the communist orbit. The communist threat, seen as predominantly a threat of subversion from within the “free world”, justified an “armed struggle” in response and enabled the forces grouped under the WACL banner to oppose any form of political manifestation that did not accept this as the starting point for their worldview. In this way all non-communist reform movements were rejected and attacked as “stooges” for the plans of Moscow and Beijing, including the Non-Aligned Movement, the Church of the Theology of Liberation, the environmental movement, Students for a Democratic Society and the student movement, and all shades of the labour movement. In this way anti-communism was transformed into anti-subversion, redirecting the focus onto the “internal enemy”. This anti-subversive struggle was particularly important in Latin America.

The Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation

The CAL was officially born in 1972 during the annual assembly of the WACL in Mexico City. Raimundo Guerrero, president of the Mexican Anti-Communist Federation (FEMACO), became the Confederation’s first chair. FEMACO, which had appeared in 1967, was a front organization for a clandestine group on the Catholic far right, TECOS, based at the autonomous University of Guadalajara. One of the central targets of FEMACO was the Vatican’s Second Council and the liberation theology that emerged from it. This was interpreted as a form of direct communist infiltration into the Church’s teachings. CAL would gradually involve representatives of all the Latin American domestic security forces, intelligence services, military establishments, paramilitary movements and death squads across the continent, including the Cuban émigrés of Alpha 66, the Mano Blanca of Guatemala, and the Orden of Salvador. It had two major objectives: fight against internal subversion to allow the armed forces to consolidate their power through “national security states”, and oppose the “Marxist” Church, which meant attacking the

leftist-tinged progressives in its ranks. Pope Paul VI was one of its particular political targets, he being accused of playing into the hands of Marxism with his tolerance for liberation theology (especially after the Medellín conference of the Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano – CELAM – in Colombia in 1968).¹⁸

Structurally, CAL was much less visible than the WACL. Generally its assemblies were held in two parts: a public event usually associated with the annual assembly of the WACL, and a “secret congress” where decisions were taken in connection with coordinated actions by the security services and the military. The extensive, secret transcontinental network known as Condor, which began as a channel for the exchange of information on threats to national security between Chile and Argentina and expanded into the exchanges of prisoners, interrogations and murders, was closely associated with CAL’s “war against communism”.

The murder of Salvador Allende’s former foreign secretary, Orlando Letelier, in Washington DC on 21 September 1976 for the first time brought the public spotlight onto the Condor network. This operation had been subcontracted via CAL, with the Argentine security services in charge of the logistics. Right-wing “death squads” were their main tools of repression, and they were often members of CAL. With no authorities holding them back and everything justified under the heading of national security, these actions resulted in large-scale massacres, particularly in Central America. Out of the CAL meetings came another plan – code-named “Banzer” – to attack the progressive Church and its liberation theology supporters. After sending a message to Pope John Paul II expressing its opposition against “communist infiltration inside the hierarchy of the Catholic clerics”, CAL then sent a list of bishops “who cooperate actively with international communism and anti-Christian subversion [and] priests incorporated into communist guerrilla movements, and others who provide arms and money”. These individuals were considered “heretics and Marxists” and CAL demanded their excommunication.¹⁹ Various lists of individuals were sent to Popes Paul VI and John Paul II and many subsequently murdered.²⁰ In an internal document the Bolivian delegation to the third assembly of the CAL in Asunción, 28–30 March 1977, stated the following: members of CAL must “collaborate with the armed forces and other friendly institutions to identify suspicious activity, subversive plots, and the activities of foreign priests and religious as well as secular Marxists [...] attacks against the extremist agents should preferably be in quiet, rural areas”.²¹ The culmination of this violence was the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador on 24 March 1980.²²

The New Governance of WACL and the “Freedom Fighters”

During the early 1980s, spurred on by President Reagan’s hard-line anti-communist rhetoric, diverse right-wing factions of the Republican party in the United States began to take a greater interest in the WACL. Having been linked either directly or indirectly with the organization for many years, there was now a determination to instrumentalize it for specific goals. The worldview of these anti-communist “freedom fighters” was dominated by the need to respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and the ongoing wars in Africa (Sudan, Angola, Namibia, the Ogaden) that were seen as the new front-line hot wars in the East–West contest. With executive authority to commit the United States to war being restricted by Congress following Vietnam (the War Powers Resolution of 1973), the principle channels for supporting the anti-communist forces around the globe were necessarily covert. In this campaign the CIA under William Casey was supported by the right wing of the Republican party and its network of think tanks, financiers and public intellectuals (for instance the American Security Council, the Heritage foundation, the Western Goals foundation, Accuracy in Media, National Strategy Information Center, the John Birch Society, Young Americans for Freedom, the *National Review*, Larry McDonald, Richard Viguerie, Lewis Lehrman, Andy Messing, and billionaires such as the Hunt brothers and the Coors family).

The WACL, especially under the leadership of General John Singlaub,²³ saw an influx of a large number of anti-communist “hawks” from the US military and other former military personnel such as the Belgian General Robert Close, the former deputy director of the NATO War School in Rome. Under Singlaub’s leadership the activities of the ABN, the APACL and in particular the WACL were refocused to work more closely with the Reaganite strategy to support anti-communist “freedom fighters” around the globe. The 18th annual assembly of the WACL in San Diego in 1984, with its slogan “The Counter-Offensive for World Freedom”, was the most significant gathering of this period. Taking place only one month before the US Senate would vote to ban all aid to the anti-communist Contra forces in Nicaragua, the leader of the Contras, Adolfo Calero, was present along with representatives from six other anti-communist guerrilla movements from Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique and Afghanistan.

The WACL became a direct channel for supporting these groups, not just with finance but also with hardware. On the initiative of the North American chapter of the WACL, the Resistência Nacional

Moçambicana (RENAMO) placed an order for 50,000 uniforms, 500 surface-to-air missiles, 15,000 light weapons, enough ammunition for 30,000 men, 500 bazookas and assorted rifles, portable 81 mm mortars, and heavy machine guns. This was done under the very shallow cover that RENAMO were only asking the WACL for “information” on these weapons, thereby staying within the letter of US law, because the League was only allowed to provide humanitarian aid. Of course, no one was deceived. Singlaub later used the WACL banner to offer a combat helicopter to the Contras, filling it full of medicinal supplies to cloak it as “humanitarian support”.²⁴

In May 1985, as a follow-up to San Diego, an international meeting was held in Jamba, Angola, involving representatives from guerrilla movements in Laos and Afghanistan. The purpose was for these groups to sign an international agreement with Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The meeting, initiated by Lewis Lehrman to consolidate an international anti-Soviet alliance, failed to produce anything substantial. According to the Republican lobbyist Jack Abramoff,

Lehrman read a letter [Dana] Rohrabacher [Republican representative and supporter of the Afghan mujahideen] had drafted on Reagan’s behalf, expressing solidarity with those struggling against the Soviet empire. The *Time* reporter on the scene concluded that the meeting marked the beginning of “a new lobby to urge Congress to support the Nicaraguan Contras and other anti-Communist guerrillas”.²⁵

In the same year, at the 19th WACL assembly in Dallas, an Afghan delegate made a request for ground-to-air missiles to attack Soviet helicopters: “give us missiles to destroy the soviet helicopters”.²⁶ The private networks of the WACL, the US “New Right” and the CIA would successfully provide “Stinger” missiles to the Afghan forces, tipping the balance against the Soviet military. In this way the WACL became an instrument of the global “private war” against communism that by-passed the restrictive measures of Congress. The exposure of some of these networks in the Iran–Contra scandal finally brought the WACL’s activities to a halt.²⁷

Conclusion

The WACL’s activities ultimately had no real impact on the strength of communist organizations or state authorities. The collapse of the

Soviet Union came about largely due to the inability to sustain its socio-economic and political model, and the WACL was not linked in any way to the influential dissident and social protest movements that arose in the Soviet bloc during the 1970s and 1980s. The League's anti-communist crusade thus saw the fall of communism occur in spite of its efforts and without any armed or violent intervention (with the large exception of Afghanistan). It is fair to say that the transnational "fighting anti-communism" as represented by the WACL lost the war – or, perhaps better, that it chose the wrong battle.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the WACL was transformed so that its main emphasis lay on the promotion of democracy rather than the defeat of communism. Still based in Taiwan, its specific enemies have been reduced to mainland China and North Korea. These changed circumstances also caused it to alter its name to the World League for Freedom and Democracy (WLFD), while the APACL became the Asia-Pacific League for Freedom and Democracy (APLFD). The original structure of the WACL is still maintained, with annual assemblies and a prominent role for the Taiwanese, and national groups that were previously absent (such as from Australia) have shown interest. Even in Taiwan, however, the changing relationship between Tai'peh and the PRC has seen the local network fluctuating between nationalism and pragmatism in its political outlook. The Ukrainians and other émigré groups took on active political roles in their homelands after the Soviet collapse. Franjo Tudjman, a member of the Croatian chapter of WACL, became the president of post-Yugoslavia Croatia in 1990. Slava Stetzko, the widow of the former president of the short-lived pro-German Free Ukraine in 1942 and president of ABN, went on to become vice president of the Ukrainian national assembly. Her death on 12 March 2003 was an occasion of national mourning. In Western Europe, where the WACL was never very important, its networks disappeared. In Latin America the end of the dictatorships saw many of the CAL/Condor network arrested and put on trial. Others escaped and vanished.

Notes

1. See Alain Guérin, *Les commandos de la guerre froide* (Paris: Julliard, 1969).
2. The best example is Frédéric Laurent, *L'Orchestre noir* (Paris: Stock, 1978). I wrote my first article on the WACL in 1979 making use of much of this material.
3. John Lee Anderson and Scott Anderson, *Inside the League* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1986).
4. Penny Lernoux, *Cry of the People* (New York: Doubleday, 1980).

5. This material has appeared not only in my own journalistic accounts in *Le monde diplomatique* but also in *Inside the League*. A good source was the Catholic periodical *DIAL* that covered Latin American affairs in the 1980s. Father Charles Antoine who ran *DIAL* later gathered much of this material in *Guerre froide et eglise catholique* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1999). These connections also led to an investigation of Opus Dei's connections with the forces opposed to liberation theology; see the documentary by Pierre Abramovici, *Opus Dei, la longue marche*, part of the series "Les dossiers de l'histoire", France 3, 1997.
6. John Dinges investigated the Condor network but drew links with the WACL, not the CAL. See Dinges, *The Condor Years* (New York: New Press, 2004).
7. See J. Patrice McSherry, *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
8. Many of the documents on the WACL that I have collected since the 1980s are not obtainable from any public archive or depository, and this obviously makes referencing awkward. Information on the Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League is generally drawn from English-language publications and internal WACL documents.
9. Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988); John Loftus, *America's Nazi Secret* (Waterville, OR: Trine Day, 2010; repr. of *The Belarus Secret* (Alfred Knopf, 1982)); Wolodimir Kosyk, *L'Allemagne national-socialiste et l'ukraine* (Paris: L'Est Européen, 1990), the most interesting pro-Ukrainian book with regard to its propaganda contents.
10. For an early study see Ross Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
11. Documents available online at <www.foia.cia.gov> (1954 Guatemala coup: Kugown Operations).
12. APACL Bulletin No. 7 Vol. II (September 1955).
13. Suzanne Labin, *Washington Report*, No. 15, 6 August 1962.
14. Several social democrats moved to the right during the 1960s and 1970s as they became embroiled in the more hard-line anti-communist networks. A good example is Ivan Matteo Lombardo, a socialist who by the 1970s was head of the Italian branch of the WACL and was implicated in the strategy of tension.
15. *Freedom for All Mankind: Presentations by Ku Chen-Kang* (Tai'peh: WACL/APACL, July 1984).
16. Ku Chen Kang, *The Evil Result of Detente*, World Freedom Day meeting of the Republic of China chapter, Tai'peh, 23 January 1975, reprinted in *Freedom for All Mankind*.
17. *Correct Direction of Human Endeavor*, Statement by Ku Chen Kang, WACL executive board meeting, Sao Paulo, 8 December 1974, reprinted in *Freedom for All Mankind*.
18. The Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano (CELAM: Latin American Episcopal Conference) was formed in 1955 in Rio de Janeiro by the Catholic bishops on the continent. It was CELAM that pushed the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) towards a more progressive stance, preparing the way for the Medellin conference of 1968 in support of liberation theology. Considered

- “Marxist” by the conservative church establishment (and Opus Dei and some Jesuits), CELAM represented a major split within the post-Council Church. Pope John Paul II condemned the “Marxist aspects” of liberation theology in 1987. See Daniel Levine and Gilbert Vincent, “The Impact of Liberation Theology in Latin America”, *Archives des sciences sociales des religions* 71 (1990), pp. 43–62.
19. Letter and petition from Rafael Rodriguez (CAL secretary general), *Su Santidad Juan Pablo II*, Ciudad de Vaticano, enero 20 de 1979. Prominent members of the progressive church opposed by CAL were Mgr Raul Silva Enriquez (Santiago de Chile), Mgr Don Helder Camara (Recife, Brazil), Mgr Sergio Mendez Arceo (Cuernavaca, Mexico), Mgr Pedro Casaldaliga (Sao Felix, Brazil), Mgr Miguel Obando Bravo (Managua, El Salvador), and Mgr Leonidas Pronao (Riobamaba, Ecuador).
 20. It is difficult to produce a statistic but during the intense period of repression against the Catholic Church, around 1000 priests, lay, bishops and various religious were arrested, tortured, disappeared or expelled. Three bishops were killed.
 21. “Principios tacticos de enfrentamiento a la infiltracion Marxista en la Iglesia Catholica”, delegation of Bolivia to the third assembly of CAL.
 22. Pierre Abramovici, “Opération Condor, cauchemar de l’Amérique latine”, *Le monde diplomatique* (May 2001), available online at <<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/05/ABRAMOVICI/15179>>.
 23. A former OSS Jedburgh during the Second World War, in the late 1960s Singlaub was a field officer during the secret CIA operations in Tibet and was involved in the Phoenix Program as head of the MAGVSOG (Special Operation Group) in Vietnam. In 1977, while Chief of Staff of US Forces in South Korea, he publicly criticized President Carter’s decision to withdraw US troops from the Korean Peninsula. He was relieved from duty and subsequently resigned from the military. He went on to co-found the Western Goals Foundation, a conservative lobby group, in 1979, followed by the US Council for World Freedom, the US chapter of the WACL, in 1981. He was fully involved in the Iran–Contra affair. See Singlaub’s memoirs, *Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Summit Books, 1991).
 24. Proceedings, WACL annual assembly, San Diego, September 1984; Pierre Abramovici, “Des millions de dollars pour les combattants de la liberté”, *Le monde diplomatique* (April 1986), available online at <<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1986/04/ABRAMOVICI/39176>> (accessed 9 October 2012).
 25. Mark Hemingway, “My dinner with Jack: The jamboree in Jamba, the making of ‘red scorpion’ and other tales of the Abramoff era”, *The Weekly Standard* (3 April 2006).
 26. The quote made it into the *New York Times* and was part of the documentary by Pierre Abramovici, “Nicaragua, Guerre en Sous-traitance – Le réseau North un an avant le scandale”, TF1 Infovision, November 1985.
 27. Abramovici, “Des millions de dollars pour les combattants de la liberté”.

8

Interdoc, Western Anti-Communism and the Transnational Imperative

Giles Scott-Smith

On 7 February 1963, in a solicitor's office in The Hague, the Netherlands, the statutes for the International Documentation and Information Center (known as Interdoc) were signed. This mundane act was the official starting point for a remarkable experiment in transnational cooperation in anti-communism. Interdoc was the product of in-depth deliberations, running from 1956–57 onwards, between members of the West European security and intelligence services, industrialists and intellectuals concerning the ongoing ideological threat of communism to Western society. While the core of this informal community was made up of French, Germans and Dutch, representatives from Britain and Italy were also present from the late 1950s onwards, and the Americans were inevitably involved. The communist threat was changing, and Western anti-communism needed to change with it. Interdoc was the response. In the ensuing twenty years it would go through several mutations trying to fulfil this mission. Interdoc epitomizes transnational cooperation because it always functioned as a separate entity from the official bodies of the states concerned. Security and intelligence services are often accused of acting as “a state within a state”, yet they do so behind the scenes. In contrast, Interdoc was a public organization, using its own name as an imprint on its publications, although this in no way means that all of its activities were transparent. It therefore functioned as a meeting point and transit centre for information and personnel between the overt and covert worlds, representing a mixture of different interest groups united around the belief that anti-communist agitation needed to be improved if the West was not to lose out in the ideological contest. Its activities over two decades confirm the conclusion that

the transnational right wing represents a flexible “diverse phenomenon” that is neither tied down by nationalist identities nor fixed in its political alliances.¹

The 1950s: The Need for Transnational Action

Efforts to coordinate anti-communist strategy between Western nations began already in the late 1940s. Three stages are evident in these developments. The first concerned the self-mobilization of professionals and intellectuals determined to meet the challenge posed by Moscow’s affiliates to manipulate international public opinion in the Soviet Union’s favour, starting with the youth movement and the trade unions and expanding across all areas of social activity. The second stage involved the “institutionalization” of these private activities through the creation of public bodies devoted to uniting and representing an anti-communist professional community. These were often supported by covert means to perpetuate their image as private spontaneous initiatives driven purely by the concerns of active and concerned citizens, and they ranged from the (initially) MI6-supported World Assembly of Youth in 1946 to the high-profile establishment of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in 1950, backed by the US government’s covert action wing at that time, the Office of Policy Coordination.²

The third stage – and the stage that occupies several of the contributors to this volume – concerns the efforts to create new forms of anti-communist alliance in line with the changing realities of international politics in the 1950s. On the one hand this refers to changes in the West, namely the economic recovery of Western Europe, the beginnings of European integration and institution-building and the subsequent gradual turn towards European solutions for European problems. On the other hand the de-Stalinization initiated by Malenkov and then Khrushchev after 1953, and the adoption of “peaceful coexistence” as a strategy of normalization in East–West relations (albeit with an ongoing and determined ideological campaign as part of the package) changed the nature of Cold War diplomacy. Admittedly the Geneva summits of 1955 produced only a “spirit” rather than anything substantial, and the threat of violence would continue from Budapest to Berlin to Cuba in the ensuing years, but nevertheless the first steps towards superpower accommodation were being made, and they would be pursued further in the 1960s.

In many ways this was a trend to be supported, since increased diplomacy should usually mean a reduction in the chances of conflict. Yet

what motivated the circle of professionals who went on to form Interdoc was the concern – if not the fear – that such a normalization would lead to a decline in the sense of danger that communism continued to pose to Western democratic societies. This bred a determination to ensure that the “peaceful coexistence” approach of Moscow did *not* entail the superiority of the communist worldview, since it could easily be interpreted that the West was being forced into accommodating “actually existing communism”. On the contrary, it had to be turned around and used exactly to *expose* the rotten contradictions at the heart of that communist worldview. Interdoc’s mission was therefore to ensure that peaceful coexistence proved to be Moscow’s fatal political boomerang.

An essential part of the Interdoc project was also to “upgrade” Western anti-communism from the methods and motifs of simplistic anti-Stalinism. In particular the activities of Jean-Paul David’s *Paix et liberté* came in for criticism, with its often emotional slogans, pamphlets and posters being regarded as no longer effective or appropriate.³ However, the Interdoc upgrade covered two principal issues. The first involved method. The aim was to switch away from emotional scare-mongering or “negative anti-communism” in favour of a more measured, verifiable, and factually based analysis of communist societies. This “positive anti-communism” would instead accept the communist challenge and regard it as an opportunity to proselytize a counter-narrative based on Western values, driven more by confidence than by fear. In this way the move would be made from negative propaganda to the promotion of a positive value system as an alternative. Communism had arisen and gained such popularity precisely because it addressed issues of inequality and injustice that were either accepted or ignored by other political streams. This needed to be acknowledged – with the follow-up, of course, that communism itself was no solution.

This was of course not an isolated standpoint, and there is a close correspondence between the steps taken to develop Interdoc and the moves that led to the creation of the Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne (CIDCC) in 1957.⁴ Yet there are two crucial differences that separate the two networks. One concerns the value system that they promoted. While the CIDCC was unashamedly Christian (Catholic) in orientation, Interdoc was seeking a broader approach that could unite *all* those, whether religious, agnostic or atheist, who believed in Western values as epitomized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The other concerns the fact that Interdoc, as stated above, was brought into existence by a legal contract following lengthy deliberations involving representatives of the Dutch, French and West

German security and intelligence services. The CIDCC and other similar ventures were often the outcome of private deliberations sufficiently distanced from state authorities to avoid such formal arrangements.

The second issue concerned international – or better said, transnational – coordination. In this sense the initial moves of *Paix et liberté*, with its decentralized network of national committees sharing ideas, information and campaign materials, laid the path for what was to come. In 1956 *Paix et liberté* morphed into the *Comité international d'action sociale* (CIAS), and while Interdoc sought to distance itself from David's legacy, it would make full use of the CIAS connections that had been built up across Western Europe and beyond. Of particular importance was the fact that *Paix et liberté* had been able to establish relations with neutral nations such as Switzerland, broadening the basis for anti-communist liaison beyond the members of NATO. A similar attitude would later be adopted towards other transnational networks such as the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) and the activities of Jean Violet (the instigator of the CIDCC), although in these cases it is harder to tell who was really using whom, and whether there was not more of an actual merger of networks taking place.

At the core of the planning phase of Interdoc was the rapprochement between the French and the (West) Germans. Several factors fed into this: the failure of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956 which propelled the orientation of French security thinking towards European solutions; the (almost complete) granting of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany through the realization of the General Treaty in 1955, and its subsequent membership of NATO; the moves towards greater European integration being made between the Messina conference of 1955 and the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957. The Germans were looking for full recognition, while the French wanted to consolidate a Franco-German axis at the heart of postwar European politics and economics. This mutual interest would reach a high point with the Elysée Treaty signed by Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle in late January 1963 (significantly just over two weeks before the Interdoc agreement was sealed in The Hague). Interestingly enough, this closeness on the level of high politics obscured the direct clash of interests between the two nations over Algeria, almost certainly involving French covert action against German business interests during the late 1950s.⁵

The French military had been interested in using NATO as a central point from which to coordinate "ideological warfare" and "psychological defence" since the early 1950s. Resistance from, among others, the United States and Britain prevented such moves due to real concerns

about turning NATO into a supranational propaganda agency, but the Berlin crisis of 1958–61 saw these plans temporarily revived by the West Germans with a call for “NATO-Wide Co-operation and Co-ordination in the Field of Psychological Warfare”. The inability to move NATO in this direction lay behind the German commitment to the Interdoc project for the next decade.⁶ In 1956 the Ministry for All-German Affairs set up the Studienbüro Berlin as a forum for discussing common anti-communist information strategies among the NATO and neutral states, also partly as a way to ensure the German Question remained central. Interdoc would be an extension of this kind of thinking.

A further, contentious and difficult to explore angle on Interdoc as a transnational actor concerns its relationship with the “stay behind” units (SB, otherwise known under the more popular Italian term of Gladio) established across Western Europe after the Second World War. SB came into existence initially through the influence of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), as allied nations sought to copy its techniques of sabotage, intelligence-gathering, and courier services behind enemy lines in order to be prepared for a future invasion (Soviet or otherwise). The signing of first the Brussels Treaty in 1948 followed by the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, and the security infrastructure that they brought into existence, resulted in a level of official liaison between the national SB units that had not existed before, firstly through the Western Union’s Clandestine Committee, from 1951 through the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC), with the creation of its off-shoot for exchanging know-how and technical data, the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) in 1957 (they were both attached to SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).⁷ While details of the SB units in various nations have emerged since the early 1990s, the issue of to what extent they were actually coordinated remains highly contentious.⁸

Within the Netherlands the SB units were known as “O/I”, Operations and Intelligence. Originally these were two separate formations. What became “I” (or SAZ: Sectie Algemene Zaken) was initiated already in March 1945 by the then head of the Dutch government’s intelligence bureau, Lt Colonel J.M. Somer. “O”, on the other hand, was a “private” initiative of Louis Einthoven, the influential former Rotterdam police chief who was appointed head of the Central Security Service in 1946 and its successor, the Domestic Security Service (BVD: Binnelandse Veiligheids Dienst) in 1949. It was only in 1949 that SAZ chief Baron van Lynden discovered – via the British – that Einthoven’s “O” had been in existence already for three years. Attempts by the military establishment to enforce a merger of the two groups were resisted by Einthoven, who

even after his retirement as head of the BVD in March 1961 was able to ensure that "O" continued as (to a large extent) his own private domain. While its tasks were obviously overseen by the government in a broad sense, "O" never disclosed what its budget was actually spent on.⁹ Since it was also tasked with psychological warfare, and since Einthoven himself was a driving force behind the creation of Interdoc and the situating of its headquarters in The Hague (Geneva was a serious alternative), the links between SB and Interdoc can be traced to the very beginning. It could also be that Einthoven's existing contacts across Europe through the CPC/ACC network and with SB organizations in the neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland made him an ideal candidate for getting the Interdoc project off the ground.

The 1960s: From Institutes to Networks

Between 1963 and 1968 Interdoc was predominantly a German-Dutch concern. De Gaulle's suspicion's towards the loyalty of the Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionage (SDECE) concerning Algerian independence caused a clamp-down on its activities. The French president's desire to improve relations with Moscow also did not sit well with a new transnational anti-communist campaign. Instead the Interdoc headquarters was led by a Dutch director, former BVD officer Kees van den Heuvel, with Einthoven the *eminence grise* in the background and a German deputy director as support. In the beginning the share of funding was set at 4:1 with the larger amount coming from the federal intelligence service (BND: Bundesnachrichtendienst) in Munich, but by 1969 the German-Dutch imbalance had ballooned to about 10:1. This financial dominance inevitably brought with it greater demands for German control, but the decisive factor was that the Germans needed the Netherlands as the public face of Interdoc. As the BND officer Herman Foertsch remarked in 1960, "as neutral a site as possible is desired, to counter national misgivings", and the Dutch were both the ideal frontmen for Interdoc operations and middle-men for bringing various European parties together.¹⁰

Up to 1965 Einthoven, Van den Heuvel and their German associate, the BND officer Rolf Geyer, concentrated on encouraging the formation of national institutes in those nations regarded as essential partners: Belgium, Britain, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. The original design of Interdoc had assumed a rather rigid structure, with national institutes functioning as the producers of information and analysis on developments in the communist world (both locally

and internationally), and the Interdoc headquarters serving as the fulcrum (a “clearing house”) through which the network communicated. Originally the training of anti-communist “cadres” was going to be a central purpose of Interdoc, but concerns over what this might entail led to this task being controlled at the respective national levels. The formation of the Dutch Foundation for the Study of Human Ecology in 1960, followed by the German Verein zur Erforschung sozialpolitischer Verhältnisse im Ausland, led the way for others. The process of finding and gathering like-minded individuals together, formalizing the new group’s purpose and goals, and arranging for the necessary funding in each of these nations proved laborious and ultimately achieved little. The only apparent success, the formation of Interdoc UK in July 1964, itself proved to be of limited value due to the ongoing reluctance of both MI6 and the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department (IRD) to really commit.¹¹ The Interdoc model also relied on a major contribution from big business, which would provide funds in return for the training of its management “cadres” on the communist threat and the ways to counter it. Even Shell, the mainstay of the Interdoc operation in the Netherlands and a vital channel for building contacts in Belgium, France and Italy, proved unwilling to back Interdoc UK to any real extent (instead offering its support to Brian Crozier’s Institute for the Study of Conflict at the end of the 1960s).¹²

The abandonment of the “national institute model” at the end of 1965 entailed a more fluid structure whereby the Interdoc headquarters in The Hague would serve as a distribution point and network facilitator for a diverse and constantly shifting array of partners and projects. This allowed for a more free-wheeling approach that emphasized more the entrepreneurial character of the operation, with Interdoc serving as a kind of “contractor” there to be utilized by whichever parties required specific anti-communist expertise. In this way it could work closely together with individuals while avoiding the pitfalls of internecine disputes that had plagued the earlier phase. A good example is the relationship that was built up directly with the Swiss organizations of Peter Sager and his Ost-Institut in Bern and the Aktionskomitee Wahret die Freiheit, cooperation that had previously been hampered by the problem of achieving consensus between them and the many other Swiss partners involved.

This new arrangement also fitted Interdoc’s role as a distributor of periodicals covering communist phenomena. Mostly produced by the BND’s in-house analysts and its associated research institutes, and by the IRD, at its peak Interdoc was sending out 25 titles in English,

German, French and Spanish. Subjects ranged from the weekly *Notes on Communist and Communist-Sponsored Activities as Reported by Communist Sources* to the monthly *Religion and Church in the Communist Orbit*, the bi-monthly *East–West Contacts*, and the tri-monthly *Activities of the Communist World Organizations*. Selected publications, such as *The Position of Top Ranking General Officers in the Leadership of the Soviet Union* (1969), were published in Japanese. Some of these would go out under the Interdoc imprint, while other material would be deliberately kept “unattributable”. In this way one nation’s output would be translated and circulated via The Hague through another nation’s network of recipients in government, the media and academia. Regular conferences were also a key method of bringing the network together and introducing new experts to the community. Between 1963 and 1976, 20 were held in locations in Britain, Italy, Switzerland, the United States and West Germany, with topics ranging from “Africa: East–West Confrontation” (Cambridge, September 1966) to “The New Left” (Zandvoort, The Netherlands, September 1968) and “Soviet Activities in the Mediterranean” (Rimini, Italy, October 1970).

Interdoc also involved a covert action side, although this was intermittent. Van den Heuvel (code-name Victor) had survived two years on the run as part of the Albrecht resistance network in occupied Netherlands during 1942–44, and one of his tasks in the BVD had been to undermine support for the Dutch Communist Party by spreading disinformation (and so suspicion) among its leadership and rank and file, an operation of some success. With this as his background it is unsurprising that Van den Heuvel lived several lives, on the one hand acting as the public face to Interdoc’s Hague office, on the other facilitating and running behind-the-scenes operations with a host of hidden partners. The first such operation involved a counter-action against the Moscow-backed World Youth Festival in Helsinki in August 1962, with a (trained) Dutch student delivering a speech opposing Soviet imperialism. The goal of connecting with and training a select group of committed youth to pursue political goals was a running theme throughout Interdoc’s existence, from the covert trans-European “Luxembourg Group” of student activists that came out of the Helsinki operation, to the more overt creation and expansion of Interdoc Youth in 1968–70, and the formation of the Jong Atlantisch Samenwerkings Orgaan Nederland (JASON) in the Netherlands in September 1975.¹³ In each case a crucial element was the wish to pass on to a younger generation a set of values that explained what the West stood for and why it was worth defending.

The 1970s: Moves to the Right?

One of the intriguing aspects of the Interdoc story is the relationship with the United States. The Dutch were from the beginning adamant that the Americans should be a part of the set-up, to the extent that Einthoven acted as a go-between for the European partners with the CIA and, he appealed directly to Allen Dulles in 1961–62 for funding. Dulles had been encouraging from the beginning about the Dutch taking on a coordinating role within Western anti-communism, but this did not stretch to providing CIA funds on a structural basis. In a period when the US balance of payments were a matter of some concern, and European recovery from the Second World War was shifting into European integration and economic expansion, it makes sense that Interdoc could have been regarded as a European responsibility which the Europeans should pay for themselves. Dulles was then fully undermined as CIA director by the Bay of Pigs disaster of April 1961, and while Einthoven and Van den Heuvel did maintain informal contact with the CIA heads of station in The Hague, little seems to have happened under Dulles's successors John McCone or William Raborn to further the relationship. Neither were the French or Germans particularly interested in a US presence that would disrupt their dominant roles.

Things changed somewhat in the mid-1960s. In December 1965 a CIA officer based in Munich, Gaither Stewart, visited The Hague to assess its current operations. Gaither's report indicates that there had been minimal operational contact in the previous years. CIA interest was focused on Interdoc's involvement with Dutch and European youth organizations, East–West student exchanges and the use of its Dutch base for book-mailings to the Soviet Union. In turn Van den Heuvel provided Interdoc's contacts in Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland, and opened the way for CIA material to be sent out via the Inter Press news agency in Latin America.¹⁴ The brief report sums up Interdoc's relations with the Americans: business-like cooperation on no more than a case-by-case basis. Whether the renewed CIA interest was connected to the arrival of Richard Helms as CIA Director is unclear. By this stage a link had already been established with the Washington DC-based National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) and its director, Frank Barnett. The NSIC had been founded in 1962 as an offshoot of the right-wing Institute for American Strategy, and its financial backers included Joseph Coors and Richard Mellon Scaife. In May–June 1966 Van den Heuvel made a three-week trip to North America to pursue a formal cooperation arrangement, a move which also received support from the National Association of

Manufacturers' Stewart Baeder, who was keen to use Interdoc as a stepping stone for a major European conference on East–West trade. But Barnett evaded this pressure to tie NSIC to Interdoc. Instead a new constellation of forces arose that seemed to place Interdoc at a disadvantage. In 1967–68 Barnett linked up with Brian Crozier and laid the path for Crozier's Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC) to receive funding from the Scaife foundations. Interdoc's report for 1969 stated explicitly that "to set up a permanent central office in the United States still remains the object of Interdoc aspirations",¹⁵ but instead its own position was shifting in uncertain ways.

It is noticeable that in the late 1960s Interdoc's anti-communist orientation moved to the Right. Partners who were previously beyond the pale were now being welcomed. Interdoc's American "promoter" from 1967 onwards was not Barnett but Crosby Kelly, the public relations expert with Litton Industries who was also a member of the Pinay Circle (Le Cercle).¹⁶ In the same year the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) was formed, and Van den Heuvel took on the role of Dutch representative until 1973. WACL members featured prominently in Interdoc conferences in this period, and the effort to expand Interdoc contacts beyond Europe from 1967 onwards (something the Germans were especially keen on) also saw an important role for WACL activists in Lebanon, India, South Korea and South Vietnam. This move seems to have been a deliberate effort to connect with the right-wing trend in US anti-communism, the Vietnam War having undermined the credibility of liberal Cold Warriors, and the exposure of the CIA's many covert operations (the "mighty wurllitzer") in *Ramparts*, the *New York Times* and other publications in 1967 caused a major rethink on anti-communist strategy.¹⁷ In November 1968 Van den Heuvel travelled to the United States with Rolf Geyer to formalize a new working relationship with American partners, and this – as far as is known the only time that the Dutchman and the German went together across the Atlantic – seems to have sealed the ideological re-orientation of Interdoc in return for increased US financial and organizational input.¹⁸

Yet this relationship proved highly fractious. In 1970–71 BND involvement was dramatically curtailed due to the election of Willi Brandt and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD). The SPD, generally suspicious of BND activities, was not going to allow any "dirty tricks" from Munich to undermine the normalization of relations with the East through Ostpolitik, and the links with Interdoc were cut. The East German Stasi anticipated in a report from 1971 that "Interdoc

would increasingly become financed by the American secret services" as a result, and to a degree they were correct.¹⁹

But only to a degree. The German withdrawal placed Interdoc in a precarious financial position through 1971–72, so much so that by 1973 Interdoc's paid workforce (at least on paper) was no more than Van den Heuvel, two clerical staff and Interdoc UK representative Walter Bell. Money clearly did continue to flow in from somewhere, since the accounts for the Oost–West Instituut, the Dutch national base for Interdoc, indicate that sums from abroad were still coming in up until 1978.²⁰ Yet Interdoc's transatlantic relations deteriorated through the 1970s. Van den Heuvel's aim during this decade shifted towards a furthering of the process of détente, and this meant actively engaging with Soviet and East European counterparts in dialogue and debate. The fact that the former psychological warfare expert of the BVD was now claiming that the West should better understand and appreciate the Soviet position certainly took many by surprise, not least Frank Barnett and the NSIC. Brian Crozier, always dubious of détente as a cover for nefarious Soviet designs, publicly broke off relations at the ISC-organized Multi-national Conference on New Dimensions for the Defense of the Atlantic Alliance held in Winchester in November 1976. Crozier used the event to call for more effective coordination amongst anti-communist organizations, and this demanded a re-alignment that placed Interdoc beyond the pale (Van den Heuvel was not present to defend Interdoc policy). This seems to have triggered the end of NSIC involvement, and Barnett withdrew from the Interdoc board. Whether it triggered the end of all American involvement is hard to say. Certainly Crosby Kelly was still operating as an Interdoc link-man through 1975, and correspondence shows that he continued to search for US partners for the Interdoc operation. One attempt was made via Kenneth Adelman, at the time with the Pentagon's Army Review Board Agency and an advisor to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In the same period Van den Heuvel looked to strengthen ties in the US through the Veterans of OSS in New York and, via Ray Cline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC.²¹

The fact that Interdoc was able to continue at all after 1972 is testament to Van den Heuvel's fundraising abilities and wide-ranging contacts. He was also adept at creating new ventures to attract alternative funding sources. One example was the Stichting Solidariteit en Verbondenheid Nederland–Verenigde Staten (FSAN: Foundation for Solidarity and Alliance Netherlands–United States). This evolved out of a plan of Brian Crozier's to establish "a sort of pressure group to keep

the Americans in Europe", since the early 1970s saw serious debate in the US congress concerning the continuing costs of stationing larger-scale military forces on the European continent.²² FSAN duly received sponsorship from Heineken breweries, KLM and the American Chamber of Commerce in Rotterdam, and became an important public outlet for linking up with government, the royal family and veterans organizations (influential in the Netherlands) for Second World War commemorations.

Crosby Kelly's continuing involvement points to how Interdoc's position became quite complex in the 1970s. Van den Heuvel's pro-détente stance did not sit well with the Cold Warriors of the US right wing, but it did fit with the activities of the Catholic right in Europe. With the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1973–75) opening up the possibility of a general East–West settlement on borders, sovereignty and further cooperation, several groups on the Right pushed for a human rights platform and the free movement of people and ideas. Central in this campaign was the Académie européenne de sciences politiques (AESP) based in Brussels, a creation of the Belgian Florimond Damman with support from Jean Violet and closely connected to *Le Cercle*.²³ Van den Heuvel avoided any public association with AESP (or with the WACL), but cooperation was clearly arranged behind the scenes. In 1984 a Dutch newspaper published sections of a letter from Damman to Violet that spoke of a meeting of French and Belgians in September 1973 to discuss transatlantic relations that was arranged through the US embassy in Brussels. In the letter Damman spoke of Interdoc as "a good cell in the Netherlands" for their ongoing activities, something Van den Heuvel obviously denied.²⁴ The letter was almost certainly referring to the activities of Van den Heuvel's FSAN. What is noteworthy is the role of certain personnel at the US embassy to organize such a meeting.

Van den Heuvel's contacts with the Right in the 1970s also involve a renewed relation with O/I. Various sources point to his reluctance to become too closely involved in O/I affairs, because this would have required him to operate entirely out of the public eye. There is some truth to this, but it does not exclude the probability of liaison should it be mutually beneficial. Einthoven's dominance of the O/I set-up also played out to Van den Heuvel's advantage. During 1967–75 O/I was overseen by Marius Ruppert, an influential Protestant politician and advisor to the royal house, but his successor as head of O was none other than Van den Heuvel's former wartime resistance colleague from the Albrecht group, Theo J.A.M. van Lier. Following van Lier's appointment

O's budget expanded from almost 1.5m guilders in 1975 to around 2.5m guilders by 1981, and as an internal history of I ruefully remarked later, "we have never had a clear insight into the O budget". There are also claims that O was partly financed by multinationals and the CIA – something very similar to Interdoc, and therefore strengthening the supposition that for a period in the second half of the 1970s part of the O budget marked for psychological warfare was redirected to Interdoc operations. It is noteworthy that William Colby became CIA director in 1973. Considering Colby's involvement in forming SB units in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in the early 1950s, there is a potentially close correspondence of interests here.²⁵ Added to this is the presence of renegade Cold Warrior and Van den Heuvel associate Carl Armfelt in Belgium and the Netherlands during the 1970s and early 1980s, running anti-communist disinformation campaigns and – according to some reports – parallel SB networks funded by the CIA.²⁶

The "official" history of SB in the Netherlands, written by the former head of the BVD archive, refers to the set of tasks for O agreed by the head of the Dutch Chiefs of Staff, General B.R.P.F. Hasselman, in the 1950s, which included "verbal and written propaganda to maintain the morale of the population and to undermine that of the enemy". Care should be taken, however, with making any such claims. Ruppert had insisted to the incoming labour minister president Joop den Uyl in 1973 that O did not get involved in domestic politics.²⁷ Nevertheless Interdoc could be described as internationally active as a way to bypass this regulation, and it is noticeable that Van den Heuvel, in a period in which Interdoc's budget was meant to be severely curtailed, had the funds to travel to both the United States and to Eastern Europe (including Moscow) several times during 1974–78. What can be confirmed is that from the early 1970s Van den Heuvel did have contact with counter-subversion circles that belonged to the wider networks of the European SB world, for instance the American Society for Industrial Security and the Belgian security expert Robert Thomas, and members of the British Reserve Forces Association.²⁸ It is possible that this does also point to a direct link between Van den Heuvel, Armfelt, right-wing counter-subversion and the CIA's anti-communist "black operations" in the 1970s.

Conclusion

Van den Heuvel regularly criticized the "1950s mentality" of many who considered themselves anti-communist activists, as if the image of Stalin

remained the main motivation for many in this field. This was the basis for Interdoc to try and set out a new path that would actively engage with communism as a doctrine and a worldview. It would be easy to dismiss this as the self-justification of a security service professional deluded by his own role in the Cold War. Yet from another perspective it must be admitted that the founders of Interdoc were on to something. Peaceful coexistence did not stupefy Western societies into abandoning essential values, but it did contribute towards the popular view that the Soviet Union was less of a threat to Western Europe, and it did pave the way for the possibility of compromise between communist and socialist parties (notably in Italy) and the rise of Eurocommunism as a force in the 1970s. The fear that lay behind Interdoc was that this trend towards normalization would obscure the fact that communist doctrine was still geared towards ideological superiority, if not all-out "victory". The answer was not to declare everything emanating from Moscow (and Beijing) as irrational rant, but to understand the mind-set that fed into it, and contrast its ideological fervour with the facts on the ground. Van den Heuvel summed this up well in claiming that "Interdoc occupied a central position, distancing itself from the Cold War on one side, and from gullibility, naivety, and wishful thinking on the other."²⁹

Interdoc's importance as a transnational actor comes from its ability to act as a flexible platform for a variety of partners, both on a short-term, project-based basis or a long-term, structural basis. Simply put, whereas the planning phase indicates American and above all Dutch, French and West German interests, the 1960s saw the Germans as the dominant force, effectively using The Hague as an outlet and distribution centre for their studies on the Soviet bloc and world communism. In the 1970s it is difficult to categorize Interdoc's political profile, and neither is it possible to connect it to any particular national interest. Contacts with right-wing Catholic transnational organizations such as the AESP and Le Cercle need to be balanced by Van den Heuvel's efforts to generate East-West dialogue as a fundamental part of the détente process. One might say that the 1970s, the last decade that Interdoc was active, signifies its transnational high point. It had always represented not so much governmental interests as the interests of subgroups within both government and society – the intelligence services, the military, the anti-communist intelligentsia in academia and the media – and the international connections of these subgroups. The diversification of Interdoc activities, from counter-subversion and pro-NATO public relations to strengthening US-Dutch relations and the promotion of East-West trade, points to a strong entrepreneurial impulse behind its

purpose. It confirms the outlook that Interdoc's anti-communist vision – indeed, its notion of how the Cold War could be overcome – could best be fulfilled as a transnational network at the service of all who shared its vision of the Cold War.

Notes

1. See Martin Durham and Margaret Power, "Introduction", in M. Durham and M. Power (eds), *New Perspectives on the Transnational Right* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 3.
2. See for instance Hugh Wilford, *The New York Intellectuals: From Vanguard to Institution* (Manchester University Press, 1995).
3. See the contribution by Bernard Ludwig in this volume, and the contributions by Éric Duhamel and Christian Delporte in J. Delmas and J. Kessler (eds), *Renseignement et propagande pendant la guerre froide 1947–1953* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1999).
4. See the contribution by Johannes Grossmann in this volume.
5. Mathilde von Bülow, "Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1956–1961", *Intelligence and National Security* 22 (2007), pp. 787–820.
6. For details of the efforts to utilize NATO as a central point for Western psychological warfare see Giles Scott-Smith, "Not a NATO Responsibility? Psychological Warfare, the Berlin Crisis, and the Formation of Interdoc", in Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist (eds), *Challenges Beyond Deterrence: NATO in the 1960s* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 31–49.
7. Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 28–30.
8. On the Technische Dienst in West Germany, for instance, see Deborah Kisatsky, *The United States and the European Right 1945–1955* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005).
9. See Frans Kluiters, *De Nederlandse inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten* (The Hague: Sdu, 1993), pp. 304–11; Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*, pp. 148–64.
10. "Gedanken zur Errichtung einer Zentrale für Dokumentation und Information im Anschluss an den französisch-holländisch-deutschen Arbeitskreis", File: Voorgeschiedenis Interdoc, in possession of the author.
11. On Interdoc's institute-building phase see Giles Scott-Smith, *Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 108–33.
12. See the contribution by Jeffrey H. Michaels in this volume.
13. See Scott-Smith, *Western Anti-Communism*, pp. 134–67.
14. "DTDORIC/QKACTIVE/Operations – PBCHORD Relations with Interdoc", 27 December 1965, CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room. On the CIA's book programmes to the Soviet bloc see Alfred Reisch, *Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2012).
15. *Progress Report 1969* (The Hague: Interdoc), p. 6.
16. See the contribution by Adrian Hänni in this volume.

17. See Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
18. See Scott-Smith, *Western Anti-Communism*, pp. 199–204.
19. “Information über die finanzielle Situation und analytische Materialien des Internationalen Dokumentations- und Informationszentrum (Interdok), Den Haag”, 1971, Ministerium für Staatsicherheit, HVA 180, Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin.
20. The origin of these funds is unspecified in the Instituut’s accounts. Apart from the United States, the only other outside possibility would be that they were coming from West Germany (either the Ministry of Defence or Haus Rissen in Hamburg). See File: 246 Financiën OWI 1969–1979, Financieel beheer, archive of C.C. Van den Heuvel, Nationaal Archief, The Hague (hereafter CC NAH).
21. Crosby Kelly to Florimond Damman, 16 May 1975, Box 4.68, Rubriek 4: Florimond Damman, archive of Walter de Bock, Special Collections, University of Leuven; Van den Heuvel to Cline, 24 November 1976, Folder 2 Box 25, Ray S. Cline Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC.
22. “Minutes of the Interdoc Board Meeting in The Hague, 12 May 1972”, File: 220 Einde Interdoc 1970–73, Overige Dossiers betreffende Interdoc, CC NAH.
23. On Dammand see Catherine Lanneau, “Du gaullisme à la driote radicale: Les étranges ‘compagnons de route’ belges de l’Europe gaullienne”, in Olivier Dard (ed.), *Doctrinaires, vulgarisateurs et passeurs des droites radicales au xx siecle (Europe-Amériques)* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012), pp. 99–126.
24. Rijk Timmer, “Ultrarechts lonkt naar Nederland”, *Het Vrije Volk* (12 January 1984).
25. See John Prados, *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
26. See Guy Bouten, *De Bende van Nijvel en de CIA* (Leuven: Van Halewyck, 2011). While Bouten is a long-time investigative journalist, as with all publications on this topic it is difficult to fully verify fact from fiction.
27. “Geschiedenis van de Sectie Algemene Zaken”, n.d., archive of the Cabinet of the Minister President, 2.03.01, Nationaal Archief, The Hague; D. Engelen, *De Nederlandse stay behind-organisatie in de koude oorlog 1945–1992* (The Hague: Rijksarchiefdienst, 2005), pp. 62–3, 70; Paul Koedijk, “Geheimste Dienst: Gladio in Nederland”, *Vrij Nederland* (25 January 1992).
28. File: 145 ASIS 1972–1974, België (1961–77), and File: 38 Jeugd en Verzet 1970–74, Internationale Jeugdzaken, CC NAH.
29. Van den Heuvel to Brigade General Dr J. Gerber, 14 August 1972, File: 220 Einde Interdoc 1970–73, Overige Dossiers betreffende Interdoc, CC NAH.

9

The Heyday of Britain's Cold War Think Tank: Brian Crozier and the Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1970–79

Jeffrey H. Michaels

Introduction

In the United Kingdom, the think-tank community devoted to foreign and security policy issues has for decades been dominated by Chatham House, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). However, beginning in the 1970s, this trio nearly became a foursome due to the emergence of the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC), headed by the highly controversial Cold War activist Brian Crozier. Officially, the ISC was created to conduct unbiased research into the “social, economic, political and military causes and manifestations of unrest and conflict throughout the world”.¹ Unofficially, the Institute’s research and activities were very much shaped by its politically active director. Crozier admitted in his autobiography that “Throughout my period as Director, the ISC was involved in exposing the fallacies of détente and warning the West of the dangers inherent in a policy of illusion.”² Given Crozier’s anti-Soviet and anti-détente views, as well as his reputation as a frontman for the CIA, the ISC as a whole became a target of the Left. For instance, in their book *The “Terrorism” Industry*, Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan note that the ISC “provides an especially well-documented case study of the use of a purportedly ‘independent’ institute as a front for propaganda operations of a hidden intelligence agency and corporate sponsors”.³

One of the consequences of these types of portrayals was the exaggeration of the ISC’s influence and impact, with all sorts of nefarious

associations being attributed to it. Indeed, it is this gap between reputation and reality that this chapter will explore. Admittedly, the ISC was deservedly a controversial institution, and there was often a great deal of substance in the criticism. That being said, by the standards that are typically employed to assess the impact of think tanks in relation to public policy, particularly in Britain, the ISC would probably be viewed as having a marginal impact at best.⁴ On the other hand, both Crozier and the ISC were portrayed as important British representatives of a much wider transnational anti-communist network. In this respect, a transnational appreciation of their role is crucial.

To examine these issues, this chapter is divided into five sections. It will begin by providing background information about the Institute and its activities. Next it will highlight the ISC's "mixed" relationships in Whitehall and Westminster. The following section will describe the ISC's relationships with other transnational anti-communist groups. This will be followed by a section detailing the criticisms of the ISC in the press and parliament. The final section describes the events leading up to Crozier's defenestration and the subsequent decline of the ISC in the 1980s.

Background

The ISC was the brainchild of Brian Crozier, and grew out of his earlier work as a journalist and as head of Forum World Features (FWF), a CIA front company responsible for disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda. A key point that should be noted before proceeding further is that Crozier was not only a Cold War activist, and an individual who thrived as an intriguer, but he was usually busy with many projects running simultaneously. By the late 1960s, in addition to his work with FWF, Crozier came up with the idea of starting up a research centre that would focus on such topics as subversion, terrorism, insurgency and revolutionary movements, primarily in the context of the Cold War and perceived Soviet strategy. Underlying this was a broader assumption that the Soviets were merely paying lip service to *détente*, and that Moscow's support for "subversive" movements indicated their actual intent to undermine the West rather than peacefully coexist with it.

According to Crozier, the mainstream British think tanks did not cover these issues, particularly in their analyses of Soviet strategy, preferring instead to focus on conventional military and nuclear issues. To fill this gap, he initially complemented his work with FWF by starting up the Current Affairs Research Services Centre (CARSC) in 1969.

Initially this centre was something of a hollow shell, and Crozier had little success finding funds. Nor did it have a full-time staff that could conduct research. Instead, it was more of a front for commissioning outsiders to produce monographs of about 8000–10,000 words for a publication called *Conflict Studies*. In the course of the CARSC's short life, only five of these studies were produced.

In the course of a discussion with Professor Leonard Schapiro, an expert on Soviet affairs at the London School of Economics, it was suggested that a "research centre" was the wrong model, but that an autonomous institute was more appropriate. It was as a result of this discussion that in June 1970 the ISC emerged out of the CARSC. Crozier created a founding council with an impressive membership of academics and former civil servants and military officers. The council, headed by Schapiro, initially included: Max Beloff, Major General Richard L. Clutterbuck, Geoffrey Fairbairn, S.E. Finer, Hugh Seton-Watson, Sir Robert Thompson, Brigadier W.F.K. Thompson and J.H. Adam Watson. Over the years, other prominent individuals joined the Council such as General Sir Harry Tuzo, Vice Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly and Laurence W. Martin. Retired Major General Fergus Ling helped the ISC negotiate the Institute's tax-exempt charitable status and also served as its first administrative director. Michael Goodwin, who had previously been involved with various Cold War propaganda activities, later replaced him.

As with any private start-up venture, finding money was a major concern. In fact, throughout the ISC's history, funding was an ongoing pre-occupation of the management. Unlike other anti-communist research and information centres, such as the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) and the International Documentation and Information Center (Interdoc), the ISC did not rely on a steady stream of government stipends or philanthropic funding. Neither the British nor American governments were prepared to subsidize the ISC in the way that they had with other organizations that promoted anti-Soviet views. Government contracts for research were also few and far between. Although it did receive some initial funding from Shell, British Petroleum and also the Scaife Foundation, there is considerable evidence that the ISC was barely able to cover its running costs.⁵ In 1972, Crozier complained to Defence Secretary Lord Peter Carrington that the ISC had basic annual running expenses of about £43,000, yet his original grant money was exhausted and that attempts to gain contributions from international organizations such as NATO and CENTO had netted a mere £100.⁶ Numerous examples of Crozier lobbying officials from other government departments and international organizations even for small

sums of money can be found in the British archives.⁷ Interestingly, other accounts of the ISC's finances suggest that both the amount of money required to run the Institute, and its main source, were slightly at odds with Crozier's recollection. A highly critical 1976 *Guardian* article, based largely on ISC documents, stated that "the bulk of ISC's £30,000-plus annual budget comes from around 2,000 subscriptions to a series of reports – called *Conflict Studies* – which the Institute publishes".⁸ An additional discrepancy arises, again from Crozier's own account, when he noted that in the years 1977–79 he and a colleague "had raised a total of £447,000 of which £330,000 or 73.7 per cent had gone to the ISC".⁹ Without access to the ISC's financial records, it is impossible to reconcile these seemingly conflicting accounts. At best, they should be treated with some scepticism.

The ISC produced three types of publications. First, it produced the *Conflict Studies* series that began as part of the CARSC. This developed into a monthly publication. Second, the ISC prepared *Special Reports* based on the deliberations of study groups that would be convened to consider a particular topic. Study groups consisted mostly of British academics that held conservative views. The third publication was the *Annual of Power and Conflict*, which provided "a survey of political instability and violence worldwide".¹⁰ This publication was of book length and mainly for use as a reference guide similar to IISS's *Strategic Survey* and *Military Balance*.

The range of topics covered in the ISC's publications was quite broad. The very first ISC issue of *Conflict Studies* dealt with Northern Ireland, whilst the first *Special Report* focused on the Arab–Israeli conflict. Apart from looking at the issues of terrorism and insurgency in the broader Cold War context, mainly in the Third World, a great deal of attention was placed on a fairly broad definition of subversion. Topics in this category ranged from "The Survival of the 'Capitalist System'" to "The Attack on Higher Education – Marxist and Radical Penetration", as well as other studies examining "Marxism and the Church of Rome". Some studies covered strategic topics that were typically handled by other UK think tanks, such as the *Conflict Studies* issue entitled "SALT II: The Eurostrategic Imbalance". Of the more than 100 issues of *Conflict Studies* and nearly 20 *Special Reports* that were issued through 1979, only a handful received attention in the press.¹¹ Arguably the *Special Report* which received most coverage was the February 1974 issue on "Sources of Conflict in British Industry" which was released prior to polling day.¹²

Initially, the ISC rented office space within the RUSI building in Whitehall, although Crozier maintained a separate office in Piccadilly.¹³

The hiring of a small administrative and research staff would only occur over the next couple of years. At the start, Crozier noted that "In my Piccadilly office I was clerk, accountant and manager, as well as director, editor, and Director of Studies, writing to potential authors, commissioning print orders, licking stamps and entering names and addresses of subscribers."¹⁴ However, the ISC staff would gradually expand, so that at its height in the mid-1970s, it numbered about 15, of whom only two were full-time researchers.¹⁵ Although the bulk of ISC research was outsourced rather than produced in-house, members of the Institute were "frequently invited to lecture on security matters at police and military training centers, universities, colleges, and industrial seminars in the United Kingdom, and also at international conferences".¹⁶

The ISC and the British Government

The ISC's contacts in Whitehall and Westminster varied considerably. Crozier's efforts to get the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to provide start-up funds were vetoed by the Permanent Undersecretary Sir Denis Greenhill.¹⁷ Individual civil servants may have been sympathetic to Crozier's beliefs, but institutional support was another matter. The ISC's most sympathetic point of contact seems to have been the Information Research Department (IRD) of the FCO. As one IRD official put it,

we have a reasonably close connection with the ISC, particularly with its director Mr. Brian Crozier [...]. We have provided background material for a number of its periodic Conflict Studies and have distributed certain Studies widely to posts overseas [...]. In general, we consider that the ISC has a useful and valuable function to perform and our policy has been to give it whatever assistance we consider appropriate, not least to ensure it retains the right balance.¹⁸

This official also stated that

There was considerable scope for drawing on well-researched work by a non-official body whose products could in some cases carry more weight than material known to be official and bearing a Government imprint, and possibly a security classification. We help the Institute with open source research material available to us and our financial contribution was confined to pump priming purchases of Institute studies for the use of our posts overseas.¹⁹

Among the other practical assistance IRD provided to the ISC was to open doors that might otherwise be shut. To take one example, in 1974, the IRD lobbied behind the scenes to get Crozier to speak at a meeting of the NATO Information Secretariat.²⁰ The IRD also provided assistance to the ISC library.²¹

Arguably the most important IRD assistance came in the form of commissioning the ISC to produce a counter-insurgency manual.²² Beginning in the early 1970s, the FCO had been receiving requests from its overseas posts to provide counter-insurgency advice but had been responding to them in an ad hoc manner.²³ It was decided that what was needed was a "compact booklet on the ways in which potential insurgency could be identified and steps taken to meet it".²⁴ Moreover, it was essential that this booklet "could be available to friendly governments on request and would not bear the official imprint of HMG".²⁵ IRD officials hoped that the manual's publication would enhance the ISC's reputation as a "useful independent body from which interested governments could commission future studies directly".²⁶ In March 1973, the ISC published the manual, although the rights to it were eventually purchased by the FCO and Ministry of Defence (MoD).²⁷

The ISC had mixed relations with other government institutions. The MoD was reluctant to become too closely associated with it. In the course of discussing the prospect of purchasing a corporate membership, one MoD civil servant warned, "Although the ISC has done some useful work, it has some projects in mind which could provide a source of some embarrassment to Ministers if the fact became known that we are providing regular financial support."²⁸ Another official noted that although the MoD wished to be helpful, they had limited funds available for supporting academic studies from think tanks in their field. Furthermore, they "had doubts about supporting the ISC, whose status they thought was less firmly established and whose written output which they had seen fell rather below academic standards".²⁹

Despite being politely rebuffed in certain sections of the MoD, the ISC was also welcomed by others. In his autobiography, Crozier recalled that he was "invited several times, by different Army establishments, to lecture on current problems [...] Specifically, the invitations came from: the Staff College at Camberley; the Joint Warfare Establishment at Old Sarum near Salisbury; Army Headquarters, Wales, at Cardiff; and the Territorials at Harrogate, Yorkshire."³⁰ Other ISC staff members similarly lectured at a number of army institutions, usually on matters related to terrorism and subversion.³¹

Similar to its relationship with the military, the ISC had an ambiguous relationship with the police. On the one hand, beginning in July 1972, ISC staff were invited to lecture at the police college at Bramshill. However, when the ISC tried to get the college to formalize its relationship by purchasing a corporate membership, they were rebuffed on the grounds that the ISC was perceived to be “very right wing” and the police were sensitive about a formal link. Instead, the police would maintain an informal link and limit itself to the occasional lecture by ISC members.³²

Further evidence of the civil service’s ambivalent relationship with the ISC can be found in the FCO’s attitude. In 1974 Frank Brenchley, who had recently served as Britain’s ambassador in Warsaw, was seconded to the ISC for an academic year, and contributed to the ISC study group that produced the 1975 *Special Report* “New Dimensions of Security in Europe”. Following his ISC stint, Brenchley became Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Cabinet Office, and would eventually return to the ISC as its chairman in 1983.³³ And yet, during the same period, the lack of institutional backing for the ISC can be seen in the response of the FCO and MoD to requests for their assistance in the preparation of ISC studies. In one case, officials cast doubt on both the advisability of assisting the ISC due to its perceived bias, and also called into question the competence of the ISC researcher.³⁴ The twofold problems of bias and competence would arise time and again.³⁵

Relations at the political level would deteriorate quickly after the Tory government of Edward Heath was defeated by Labour in the 1974 election, though it is notable that even under Heath, the Tory Party never embraced the ISC. After Margaret Thatcher replaced Heath as party leader in 1975, she maintained informal advisory relationships with Crozier, as well many of the academics who were directly or indirectly associated with the ISC, such as Leonard Schapiro and Hugh Seton-Watson.³⁶ However, in stark contrast to her close association with the Centre for Policy Studies, Thatcher avoided any similar type of overt connection with the ISC. While it is quite possible that a number of the ideas that would find their way into Conservative Party speeches and policies may be traced in some way to the ISC, there is little actual evidence to support this claim.

The ISC and Transnational Anti-Communist Networks

The ISC maintained a number of important affiliations with other anti-communist groups and institutions, though in the majority of cases it was their connection with Crozier as an individual that was key to

these relationships. In terms of purely foreign institutional links, the most important was with the NSIC, headed by Frank R. Barnett. It was through Barnett that Crozier was able to gain access to funding from the Scaife family that was essential to the creation of the ISC. Moreover, the initial publication of the *Annual of Power and Conflict* was actually co-produced with the NSIC.³⁷ The ISC and NSIC were also sponsors, along with the German Thyssen Foundation and the French centre international d'étude du monde moderne, of the "Multinational Conference on New Dimensions for the Defense of the Atlantic Alliance" held in Winchester in November 1976. One of the important themes that emerged from this conference was that like-minded anti-communist groups should coordinate their activities more effectively. Crozier volunteered the ISC to assume this role, though what became of these efforts is unclear.³⁸ By the late 1970s–early 1980s, the NSIC worked more closely with Geoffrey Stewart-Smith's Foreign Affairs Research Institute (FARI) in terms of hosting major international conferences. Nevertheless, links between the two organizations continued, and even after Crozier's resignation from the ISC in 1979, Barnett maintained a close relationship with his successor, Michael Goodwin.³⁹

In the mid-1970s the ISC attempted to launch an American branch to extend its reach and to fundraise. A committee was proposed in March 1975 that included Barnett, George Ball, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Edward Shils, Richard Pipes, Rear Admiral J.S. Mott, Admiral John McCain, Kermit Roosevelt and R.F. Byrnes.⁴⁰ However, this committee seems to have existed more in theory than in practice, and there is no evidence that it met, or that if it did meet, that it made any noticeable impact. Nevertheless, in May 1975 Crozier did gain some attention in Washington DC as the first witness to testify at a US Senate hearing on the topic of international terrorism. Senator Strom Thurmond introduced Crozier, describing him as "one of the free world's foremost experts on international terrorism".⁴¹

Another important ISC association was with Le Cercle (Pinay Cercle), of which Crozier was a member. Although Crozier mainly kept his Cercle activities separate from his ISC work, there were at least several cases of overlap. Through Crozier's close relationship with former French intelligence official and fellow Cercle member Jean Violet he was able to obtain funding and distribution for ISC *Special Reports*. For example, the January 1972 report on "European Security and the Soviet Problem" was funded by Italian industrialist Carlo Pesenti and reproduced in French in Violet's quarterly review *Le monde moderne*. Likewise, the 1973 report on "The Peacetime Strategy of the Soviet Union" was not

only inspired by Violet, but also funded through Violet's connections, as was the 1975 report on "New Dimensions of Security in Europe". Furthermore, Crozier's Cercle associates ensured that the ISC reports were translated and reproduced in French, Spanish, Italian and German publications. The Cercle group also raised £7500 for the 1974 ISC *Special Report* on "The Security of the Cape Oil Route".⁴²

The ISC maintained relations with a number of other international entities. Among these was the Hague-based Interdoc, with which Crozier had maintained relations for many years prior to the ISC's creation. Interestingly, ISC board member Brigadier W.F.K. Thompson was invited to serve as Interdoc president in 1971. While the two outfits were ostensibly on the same side, ideological differences, and perhaps competition for American funds, gradually dampened relations, most notably at the Winchester conference where Crozier accused Interdoc of "going 'soft' on communism".⁴³

It is also worth mentioning the ISC's connections with the security services of South Africa and Rhodesia. Although these connections were often cited in criticism of the Institute, the actual content of these links was fairly minor. It was reported in the press in the mid-1970s that ISC researcher Peter Janke had corresponded with members of these security services and that they supplied him with material for his *Conflict Studies* publications on southern Africa.⁴⁴ However, only three of these publications were produced during the Institute's first ten years. This is not to say that more significant links did not exist, only that no evidence was ever provided. Incidentally, Janke eventually sued a paper for alleging he had connections with the South African Bureau of State Security, and won the case.⁴⁵

The ISC as Target

The example of an ISC connection with South Africa and Rhodesia was actually one of many that emerged in what Crozier described as the "Great Smear Campaign" of 1975–76. Prior to this period, the ISC had elicited little public attention. This changed with the July 1975 theft from the ISC premises of some 300 documents running to 1500 pages. The material included "files belonging to Dr. Peter Janke, Lynn Price, financial data and even some of Crozier's own materials".⁴⁶ Crozier suspected the theft was organized by the KGB in order to damage the ISC's reputation.

Shortly after the theft, a number of highly critical newspaper and magazine articles were published, mainly by *Time Out* and *The Guardian*.⁴⁷

Furthermore, Labour MPs raised questions in the House of Commons about the government's links with the ISC. For example, one MP asked the prime minister if he would "conduct an inquiry into links between present and former members of the Cabinet Office and the Institute for the Study of Conflict, in view of the links between that organisation and the South African, Rhodesian and United States of America intelligence agencies".⁴⁸ Another MP sought assurances from the Defence Secretary that the ISC "will not in future be commissioned or employed by his Department for lecturing and other purposes".⁴⁹ Additional questions were raised about the ISC's role in producing the counter-insurgency manual.⁵⁰ A couple of years later, further revelations about the IRD's connections to the ISC helped lead to that department's closure by the Labour government.⁵¹ It also probably did not help the ISC's image when Iain Hamilton, who had replaced Crozier as head of FWF, was later employed as the ISC's director of studies.

The main consequence of the "Great Smear Campaign" was that the ISC was publicly tarnished in a way it had not been before. Yet it was this very publicity that led commentators to attribute to the Institute more influence than it actually possessed. For example, the ISC's counter-insurgency manual was cited on numerous occasions as an example of the Institute's "sinister" relationship with the British authorities and a right-wing agenda. However, no evidence was ever produced showing that the manual had ever been distributed, much less used by anyone. Its mere existence was deemed damaging in its own right. As with many of the other facts that were presented, no context was provided, hence the ISC gained an outsized reputation that was probably undeserved.

Defenestration and Decline

Even though Crozier was officially the ISC's director, most of the Institute's day-to-day management was left to Goodwin. Among his other jobs, Crozier was a writer and journalist, and during the 1970s he published a number of books, in addition to magazine and newspaper articles. Most importantly, Crozier was a political activist who also engaged in political intrigue. For instance, he often used his ISC office, which had separate access and entrance arrangements, to conduct secretive meetings, including with individuals from one intelligence agency or other.⁵² His political contacts read like a "who's who" of the British right wing, and he was also directly and indirectly associated with a number of groups that formed during this period, including Stewart-Smith's FARI, General Walter Walker's Civil Assistance, Colonel Stirling's

GB75, the National Association for Freedom (NAFF), later renamed the Freedom Association (FA), and Aims of Industry.⁵³

In 1976 Crozier was introduced to Margaret Thatcher and helped form what became known as the Shield Committee. The purpose of this secret committee was to advise on security and intelligence matters. Its members included former MI6 officer Nicholas Elliott, Conservative MP Harry Sporborg, Peter Shipley, Douglas Eden and Ross and Norris McWhirter. Crozier ensured that ISC resources were made available to the committee for the preparation of "some 20 papers on various aspects of subversion". Recipients of these papers included Thatcher, Lord Carrington, William Whitelaw and Sir Keith Joseph.⁵⁴ In addition to his work for the Shield Committee, Crozier decided in February 1977 to start yet another venture by creating a private intelligence network. This network was known as "the 61".⁵⁵ The key members of this network were Elliott, Violet and General Vernon Walters, who had recently retired as the CIA deputy director. Although the work of "the 61" was kept separate from the ISC, there was some degree of overlap. For example, the November 1978 *Conflict Studies* issue authored by Robert Moss entitled "The Campaign to Destabilize Iran" was based largely on material supplied to the 61 by the Iranian intelligence service (SAVAK).⁵⁶

When Thatcher became prime minister in 1979, Crozier's secret activities began to worry a number of influential people, particularly the new foreign secretary Lord Carrington. The precise details of the "palace coup" that forced Crozier to stand down from his position as ISC director remain unclear, with the only account of this event being Crozier's own. According to him, in August 1979 ISC Council members Sir Louis Le Bailly and Leonard Schapiro, most likely at the instigation of Lord Carrington, presented an ultimatum. Either Crozier would have to give up his secret work with the 61 or resign from the ISC. On 12 September 1979, Crozier offered his resignation, and shortly thereafter was literally "locked out" of the ISC premises.⁵⁷ Missing from Crozier's account is a correspondence he had with Thatcher only a week and a half earlier. In a letter from 2 September to Thatcher he complained, "I am being pressed from various quarters to undertake additional commitments, largely involving my Institute."⁵⁸ He then goes on to ask her for advice on whether to devote more time to the ISC or to his other secret activities. Thatcher's reply three days later is most revealing. She plainly states, "Please accept the extra commitments. By so doing you will be putting across the right views to an even wider audience. I am sure that is the most important factor to consider."⁵⁹ From her remarks, Thatcher appears to be telling Crozier to continue working for the ISC

rather than to focus on his secret activities. What precisely her reasoning and motivations were for making this recommendation is difficult to ascertain, though perhaps it was a subtle hint that his overt activities were of greater value, and potentially less embarrassing, than his clandestine activities. Regardless, Crozier ignored her recommendation, concentrating instead on running the 61.

In the aftermath of Crozier's tenure as director, the ISC's heyday had reached its end. Nevertheless, it continued operating, first under Goodwin and then under Brenchley. Several of the older research staff were fired, and the library was closed, though a couple of former civil servants were recruited. Over the following years, it became more of a publishing house that commissioned outsiders rather than produced research internally. The ISC continued into the late 1980s when it merged with the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism, which was headed by Paul Wilkinson, and was renamed the Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the ISC in the 1970s was "Brian Crozier's Institute". It was not only Crozier's idea, but had it not been for his motivation, reputation and contacts, the Institute would never have been founded and sustained. However, it was Crozier's "baggage" in terms of his strong political views, associations and penchant for political intrigue that ultimately strangled the ISC and ensured it would never be accepted in the mainstream. In summing up the ISC's legacy during this period, Richard Sim, its former librarian and head of research, concluded,

A dazzling army of intellectuals and Whitehall luminaries had written and spoken for the Institute; intelligence services subscribed to its publications; the Army esteemed its studies, especially those on Northern Ireland; police and military academies welcomed its speakers; its library and archives formed a unique focal point of learning. To little avail. Much of the Institute's work remained unrecognised or unfulfilled.⁶⁰

This analysis of the ISC starkly contrasts with the views held by the Institute's critics, who tended to assign it a more prominent place both in British politics and in the transnational anti-communist "internationale". When looked at from the perspective of its critics, the ISC's importance was primarily assessed by who it knew rather

than what it did. The ISC's mere association with the army, police and intelligence services, as well as with other anti-communist groups, was deemed to have importance in its own right, with little consideration given to the nature, quality or output of those associations. That being said, the very fact that the ISC became an important target of the Left in the press and in parliament is an important factor to consider. From this perspective, even bad publicity was good publicity since the ISC was placed on a pedestal and regarded as a key player by its "adversaries".

The reception of the ISC's output varied considerably depending on one's political viewpoint. It appealed to certain audiences that were ideologically sympathetic but probably did not persuade audiences that took an alternative view. However, failure to persuade in the marketplace of ideas, which might be viewed as the primary purpose of a think tank, should not detract from the more subtle impact the ISC had. Its publications served as an important outlet by presenting the right-wing view on a range of foreign and security policy topics in a more coherent and respectable form than was otherwise available in the UK at that time. In this sense, the ISC put Britain on the map as far as other anti-communist groups were concerned. When looking back on this period, and similar to the output of many other ideologically like-minded think tanks, their main contribution seems to have been to keep the anti-communist and anti-détente discourse alive during a period in which it was relegated to the political extreme. Had this discourse not remained as "background noise" it might never have made the comeback in the way that it did in the 1980s with the advent of Thatcher and Reagan.

Notes

1. Memorandum of Association cited in Brian Crozier, 'The Study of Conflict', *Conflict Studies* 7 (October 1970), p. 2.
2. Brian Crozier, *Free Agent: The Unseen War 1941–1991* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 96.
3. Edward Herman and Gerry O'Sullivan, *The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions That Shape Our View of Terror* (New York: Pantheon, 1990), p. 108.
4. See for instance: Diana Stone, *Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process* (London: Frank Cass, 1996); Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, "The Nature and Impact of Think Tanks in Contemporary Britain", in Michael David Kandiah and Anthony Seldon (eds), *Ideas and Think Tanks in Contemporary Britain, Volume 1* (London, Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 43–61.
5. According to Crozier, "Shell put up 5,000 a year for three years, BP 4,000 pounds for two years" whilst the Scaife family trust provided "a grant of 100,000 dollars a year to my Institute". Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 90. It is

- notable that given the exchange rate of dollars to pounds in 1970, the Scaife money alone should have more than covered the ISC's expenses, particularly for its early years when it had yet to build up its staff.
6. From PS/Secretary of State to DS 15, Minute MO 35/1, 23 November 1972, FCO 46/958, National Archives, London (NAL).
 7. See for instance: Crozier to SEATO Secretary General Mr Sunthorn Hongladarom, 22 March 1974, FCO 95/1741, NAL.
 8. Chris Mullin, "How to win friends", *The Guardian* (16 July 1976).
 9. Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 173.
 10. Richard Sim, "The Institute for the Study of Conflict", p. 6. Unpublished paper provided to the author, 5 November 2012.
 11. Two examples include: Education Correspondent, "Marxists see students and schoolchildren as key people in the ideological struggle", *Times* (21 September 1977); John Cooney, "Polemic that Church aids Communism", *Irish Times* (14 June 1974).
 12. Crozier, *Free Agent*, pp. 106–8.
 13. After RUSI, the ISC moved to 17 Northumberland Ave. and several years later to 12–12a Golden Square.
 14. Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 89.
 15. Sim, "The Institute", pp. 1–2.
 16. Richard Sim, "Research Note: Institute for the Study of Conflict", *Terrorism: An International Journal* 1 (1978), p. 214.
 17. Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 89.
 18. H.H. Tucker, FCO 46/958, NAL.
 19. Tucker to Barker, December 1972, FCO 46/958, NAL.
 20. Lancashire to Isolani, 3 May 1974, FCO 95/1744, NAL.
 21. Allott to Janke, 2 August 1973, FCO 95/1590, NAL; Janke to Allott, November 30, 1973, FCO 95/1590, NAL.
 22. Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 104.
 23. The Sri Lankan government in particular was quite interested. Memo from Street to Andrew, 7 December 1972, FCO 95/1428, NAL.
 24. Draft Letter from Information Research Department to Heads of Chancery at Posts Listed, FCO 95/1428, NAL.
 25. Memo, Street to Andrew, 7 December 1972, FCO 95/1428, NAL.
 26. Manual on Counter-insurgency, FCO 95/1428, NAL.
 27. Crozier, *Free Agent*, 104.
 28. Mayne to Jackson, 9 August 1973, FCO 95/1428, NAL.
 29. Memo, Street to Andrew, 7 December 1972, FCO 95/1428, NAL.
 30. Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 120.
 31. Sim, "The Institute", p. 8.
 32. Mullin, "How to win friends".
 33. "Obituary: Frank Brenchley", *Daily Telegraph* (22 August 2011); Crozier to John Vernon, Information Secretariat NATO, 28 June 1974, FCO 95/1744, NAL.
 34. See, for instance: Jackson to Mayne, 21 August 1973, FCO 46/958; Wright to Mr Skilbeck, 15 August 1973, FCO 46/958, NAL.
 35. Crozier to Rex Hunt, FCO, 3 September 1973, FCO 46/958, NAL.
 36. G.R. Urban, *Diplomacy and Disillusion at the Court of Margaret Thatcher: An Insider's View* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 2

37. Brian Crozier (ed.), *Annual of Power and Conflict 1971: A Survey of Political Violence and International Influence* (London: Eastern Press, 1972).
38. Crozier to Barnett, 1 December 1976, Menaul Collection, 10/74/1, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives.
39. Michael Ivens, "Arms and the Quiet Man", *The Guardian* (10 September 1988).
40. Richard Sim, "Research Note", p. 215; Mullin, "How to win friends"; Richard Sim, correspondence with the author, 4 October 2012.
41. Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 94th Congress, First Session, Part 4, May 14, 1975, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, p. 179.
42. Crozier, *Free Agent*, pp. 97, 99–101, 124–5; Tucker to Barker, FCO 46/958, NAL.
43. Cited in Giles Scott-Smith, "Interdoc and West European Psychological Warfare: The American Connection", *Intelligence and National Security* 26 (2001), p. 376. For additional information on Crozier's links with Interdoc, see Giles Scott-Smith, *Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
44. Mullin, "How to win friends".
45. Richard Sim, correspondence with the author, 6 October 2012.
46. Sim, "The Institute", p. 11.
47. Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 115.
48. Written answers (Commons) of Friday 23 July 1976, House of Commons, Hansard, Elizabeth II Year 25, Fifth Series, Volume 915, 1975–76, c.674.
49. Written answers (Commons) of Tuesday 30 March 1976, 1975–76, House of Commons Hansard, Elizabeth II year 25, Fifth Series, Volume 908, c.437.
50. Written answers (Commons) of Monday 17 January 1977, 1976–77, House of Commons Hansard, Elizabeth II year 25, Fifth Series, Volume 924, c.76.
51. David Leigh, "Death of the Department That Never Was", *The Guardian* (27 January 1978).
52. Sim, "The Institute", p. 17.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 20; Crozier, *Free Agent*, pp. 106–7.
54. Crozier, *Free Agent*, pp. 129–30.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 166–77.
58. Crozier to Thatcher, 2 September 1979, Brian Crozier Collection (BCM), Margaret Thatcher File (MTF) 1976–91, The Hoover Institution Archive (HIA).
59. Thatcher to Crozier, 5 September 1979, BCM, MTF, 1976–91, HIA.
60. Sim, "The Institute", p. 9.

10

A Global Crusade against Communism: The Cercle in the “Second Cold War”

Adrian Hänni

Foundation and Evolution of the Cercle up to 1979

The *Cercle* was founded in 1952–53 by the French statesman Antoine Pinay and his close associate, the international lawyer Jean Violet.¹ At the time, Pinay was prime minister and Minister of Finance, while later that decade he served as the first Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance under President de Gaulle. Violet is a lesser-known and quite shadowy figure who would nonetheless play an important role behind the scenes during much of the Cold War era. He worked for the French foreign intelligence service SDECE (Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage) from the early 1950s until 1970² and in the 1960s he also became a paid agent of the German foreign intelligence service BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst).³ The long-serving Chancellor of West Germany, Konrad Adenauer, and the prominent Bavarian politician and federal minister, Franz Josef Strauss, acted as co-founders of the Cercle. Pinay and Adenauer, the first chairmen, appointed Violet secretary general and entrusted him with the organization of the Cercle.

The promotion of postwar reconciliation between the historic rivals France and Germany after the Second World War was one of the first major objectives. The personal friendships established in the Cercle led to secret meetings between Pinay, Adenauer and Strauss, with Violet acting as the go-between, paving the way for de Gaulle’s own encounters with Adenauer and the signing of the Franco–German Elysée Treaty in 1963.⁴ The Cercle’s founding vision encompassed the integration of a Christian-Catholic Europe, an aspiration reflected in the Cercle’s personal membership and the countries represented in its

early years. The Cercle's guests ranged from founding fathers of the European Union such as French statesmen Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet to the Catholic pretender to the Austrian throne, Archduke Otto von Habsburg.⁵ The Germans and Frenchmen were soon joined by government members from Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – the other founding countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.⁶ Since the late 1940s, these states had mostly been governed by Christian democratic governments. The Christian democratic and often Catholic background of its early members left a long-standing mark on the Cercle's identity, an affinity reflected in the high number of members from Opus Dei and the Knights of Malta among its ranks.⁷

In 1969, the Cercle's founding Franco–German axis was shaken when the political pendulum reversed direction: Willy Brandt of the SPD (Social Democratic Party) became German chancellor, and General de Gaulle was ousted from power in France. These new pressures forced the Cercle to reinvent itself and to expand beyond the original six Christian democratic nations to include a wider gathering of conservative leaders from Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Britain and the United States.⁸ With the addition of the new countries, the number of participants at Cercle meetings, until then strictly limited to 20, expanded to some 25 to 30 members, although the frequency of meetings was reduced from three to two every year. The broadening of the Cercle was also accompanied by a change of personnel in the directorate. Franz Josef Bach took over the secretariat from Jean Violet, who nonetheless continued to play an important role in running the Cercle throughout the 1970s. Bach was a German diplomat who had run Adenauer's secretariat before serving as German ambassador in Iran from 1964 to 1968 and representing the CDU in the German parliament from 1969 to 1972.

In the 1970s, the Cercle evolved into an Atlanticist organization, following the objective of a strong alliance between Europe and the United States. High-ranking American personalities thus began attending Cercle meetings, such as Nelson Rockefeller or Henry Kissinger. The expanded outreach only strengthened the Cercle's other key focus (if not obsession): anti-communism. The leaders of the group increasingly considered strategies to target public opinion and, to this end, formed a "Cercle network" of associated organizations, institutes and think tanks, which attacked both the Soviet Union and the perceived "leftist" governments or opposition movements in Europe and the Third World.⁹ At the end of the 1970s, the Cercle had evolved to become a confidential forum for influential personalities and the policy advisors of the

heads of state, rather than the heads of state themselves, to hold off-the-record discussions on current affairs and the desired action to be taken. This high-level discussion of policy would then be implemented by individual Cercle members working within their governments, legislatures, parties and public opinion.¹⁰ As French Cercle member Monique Garnier-Lançon summed up the Cercle's function in her invitation to the banker Jean-Maxime Leveque in 1983, "The leaders of the free world can now examine the very grave problems which we face in order to determine together possible solutions and then to try to implement them, each in their respective sphere."¹¹

The Directorate: The Cercle's Leaders in the 1980s

Whilst the *modus operandi* and concerns of the Cercle remained fairly constant throughout the 1980s, changes in personnel led to alterations in its organizational structure. In 1980, as he approached his 90th birthday, Pinay would finally retire¹² and hand over the chairmanship to Julian Amery, who would run the Cercle for the next 14 years. Like many of the British members of the Cercle, Amery had an intelligence background as a member of the Second World War Special Operations Executive and MI6. Amery also acted as a co-founder of the CIA-run Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), attending the founding CCF conference in June 1950 in Berlin and serving on its International Steering Committee. Following his service in MI6, in 1950 Amery would – like several British Cercle members – be elected a Conservative MP, later holding several senior governmental and parliamentary posts.¹³

Whilst Amery took over the chairmanship from Pinay in 1980, Franz Josef Bach remained as secretary. However, the most important organizer of Cercle activities from 1980 to 1985 held no official post: in 1980, Jean Violet, who had serious health problems, handed over the actual organization of the Cercle to Brian Crozier.¹⁴ A militant anti-communist, Crozier was one of the most influential Cold War propagandists, working with and for various Western intelligence services, especially the Americans and British. He ran the CIA press agency Forum World Features as well as the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC), which he had set up in London in 1970.¹⁵ Crozier, who had been recruited to the Cercle by Jean Violet in 1971, would stop organizing and participating in regular Cercle meetings in 1985,¹⁶ but continued to play an important role behind the scenes and eventually returned as a participant at Cercle meetings in the first half of the 1990s. Another unofficial but crucial Cercle figure in the 1980s was the German diplomat Hans

Graf Huyn. After ending his diplomatic career in 1971, Huyn worked as Franz Josef Strauss's foreign policy adviser in the Bundestag until 1976 when he was himself elected as a member of parliament, serving until 1990 and acting as the key foreign and defence policy spokesman for the CSU. Huyn's multiple contacts with the "Cercle network" dated back to the early 1970s, and he joined the Cercle itself around 1975.¹⁷ A staunch member of the World Anti-Communist League, he was the author of several anti-Soviet books. Hans Graf Huyn, Brian Crozier, Franz Josef Bach and Julian Amery formed the ruling "quadrumvirate" of the Cercle in the 1980s.

The Inner Circle: The Operational Arm of the Cercle

An "executive staff" inside the Cercle was established by the powerful Italian businessman Carlo Pesenti in spring 1976. Pesenti and a group of Cercle leaders "thought that we have to enlarge the sphere of action of the Cercle and study methods of influence".¹⁸ This "Inner Circle", also called the Pinay Group, was a small "command staff" to discuss and develop suitable lines of action for current political questions.¹⁹ The Inner Circle met occasionally throughout the 1980s, for example in Zurich in January 1980. Violet led this meeting, which included Hans Graf Huyn, Brian Crozier, former MI6 Division Head Nicholas Elliott and former senior CIA officers General Richard Stilwell and Donald "Jamie" Jameson. Among other things, plans were discussed for the international promotion of Franz Josef Strauss, standing as a candidate in the German chancellorship elections of 1980, and to influence the situation in Rhodesia and South Africa "from a European Conservative viewpoint".²⁰ Even in spring 1989, the Inner Circle was still planning influence operations to combat the policy of reconciliation towards the Soviet Union and the pro-Gorbachev sentiment in West Germany. The plans included the organization of demonstrations and diplomatic pressure, especially through the US Ambassador in Bonn, General Vernon Walters, a former deputy director of the CIA and Cercle member.²¹ The Inner Circle thus occasionally set Cercle priorities and policies, bypassing the larger Cercle forum.

The Crusaders: The Cercle in the 1980s

As befits a confidential discussion forum, the Cercle did not have a constitution or formal membership. However, it did document the participants of its meetings. The only way to gain admission to the

meetings was to be invited. Those invited to attend meetings were considered “members” and are designated as such in this article. They included high-ranking politicians, diplomats, businessmen (bankers, industrialists, publishers and editors), military officers as well as mostly “retired” intelligence agents. This broad grouping of members shared a set of common characteristics – elite, conservative, often elderly and almost always male. Notably, the Cercle members were predominantly fervent anti-communists who were engaged in anti-communist operations and organizations of all kinds, such as the World Anti-Communist League.²²

The most significant national delegations hosted by the Cercle came from Britain, the United States, Germany, France and South Africa. A common past in intelligence services (MI6, the Special Operations Executive of the Second World War) was characteristic of the British delegation, which was heavily peppered with Conservative members of parliament (both Commons and Lords). The British, together with the Americans, were the dominant grouping within the Cercle. The American delegation counted among its ranks an impressive number of senior officials from the key bodies which planned and implemented US foreign and security policy – the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Department of State and the CIA – as well as several eminent intelligence veterans. The Cercle also established an alternative information channel to President Reagan. William A. Wilson, a Knight of Malta,²³ who had long been an intimate friend of Reagan, was appointed not only to the sensitive post of Reagan’s first Ambassador to the Holy See, but also, more confidentially, to be Reagan’s personal link with the Cercle.²⁴

After Jean Violet’s withdrawal from the Cercle due to ill health in 1980, Georges Albertini, another key French member, died in 1983, leaving the Cercle struggling to form a top-level French delegation. Despite continuous attempts to improve the quality of the French delegation, French representation in the Cercle remained relatively weak throughout the 1980s compared to the British and the American delegations, and certainly in relation to the historical role the French had played. The German group in the Cercle was largely composed of CDU/CSU politicians and industrialists. Besides its leading organizers Franz Josef Bach and Hans Graf Huyn, the Cercle in the 1980s still included one early member, the CSU politician Otto von Habsburg.²⁵

South Africa was an anomaly, insofar as it was the only country with an official state delegation selected by the government. Liaison between the South African government and the Cercle was ensured by

Peter Rae Killen, one of the key figures in South African foreign policy-making in the 1980s, and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Pretoria arranged South African representation.²⁶ The official South African delegations at Cercle meetings were largely composed of ambassadors to the major Cercle countries (Britain, the United States, France and West Germany), accompanied by senior officials from the DFA, and Foreign Minister Pik Botha at times attended as a guest.²⁷ The connection between the Cercle and the South African government had been initiated in the first half of the 1970s, when Cercle leaders had cooperated with the South African Department of Information on a secret propaganda programme to improve the image of South Africa and the apartheid regime.²⁸ There were, however, other South African Cercle members who did not belong to the official delegation selected by the government, usually businessmen, such as the billionaire Anton Rupert, who had established the Rembrandt Group, a tobacco and industrial conglomerate.

Big Business and Apartheid Agents: The Financial Backers

The funding of the Cercle in the 1980s rested on four pillars: the members themselves, German party political foundations, European companies and the South African government. Contributions were sometimes channelled through funding fronts, such as the Conservative Council on Eastern Europe (CCEE).²⁹ Whenever the meetings were held in West Germany (roughly one in every three), the Cercle was the guest of either the CDU party foundation, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, or its Bavarian CSU counterpart, the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. The two foundations sponsored Cercle meetings – including meals and accommodation – no less than seven times between 1977 and 1986.³⁰ Contributions to Cercle expenses were also made by major industrial and financial companies from Germany, France, the Netherlands and Britain, such as Philips, Valmonde and SEL (Standard Elektrik Lorenz, today Alcatel-Lucent).³¹ Valmonde was a French press group founded and directed by Cercle member Raymond Bourguine, which included the publications *Valeurs actuelles* and *Le spectacle du monde*. Other business patrons of the Cercle included Alphons Horten and André Bettencourt.³² The final major source of funds for the Cercle in the 1980s was the apartheid South African government. The DFA regularly financed the Cercle until South Africa's "Third Force" (international covert intelligence) operations were shut down in 1992 following secret negotiations between Premier de Klerk and African National Congress

leader Nelson Mandela.³³ Besides contributing to the Cercle's coffers, the South African government also provided other services, inviting Cercle members for a five-day visit to the country in 1988.³⁴ The members unsurprisingly returned the favour with their pro-South African initiatives.

Provoking Collapse: The Counter-Offensive

At Cercle meetings its leaders, particularly Crozier, Amery and Huyn, repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet Union was unilaterally waging "World War III" against the "free world" and that this had to be confronted. As Brian Crozier made clear at a Cercle meeting in January 1984, the members should do nothing less than provoke the disintegration of the Soviet system and the Soviet Empire.³⁵ The "counter-offensive" that the Cercle advocated had two main components: first, a "roll-back" of Soviet and communist influence through the overthrow of "socialist regimes" in the Third World, and second, propaganda operations directly against the Soviet Union.

At Cercle meetings participants constantly deliberated how they could support such a "roll-back" of Soviet power, advocating support for anti-communist rebel groups fighting "socialist" governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America.³⁶ As Chairman Julian Amery put it at a Cercle meeting in Washington DC in February 1986, "The principle of supporting anti-Soviet Freedom Fighters has thus been accepted. We need now to ensure that help is given to them on a sufficient scale. It is urgent that this should be done if we are to deter the Soviet Union".³⁷ To achieve this aim, the Cercle tried to influence the policies of the Reagan administration through the network of close personal contacts that it enjoyed within its top levels. To a lesser degree they also intended to sway British government policies. In September 1982, for instance, Crozier handed a memorandum entitled "The Case for a Roll-Back in the 1980s" to National Security Advisor William Clark, who would himself attend a Cercle meeting in 1985. Clark and President Reagan studied the memo, and it was discussed with Crozier in the White House and at the CIA in December 1982.³⁸ This planning document, which was also handed to prime minister Thatcher, suggested that certain peripheral countries in the Soviet sphere of influence – namely Grenada, Angola, the Seychelles, Nicaragua and Cuba – were ripe for counter-intervention, and it stimulated a great deal of discussion in the Reagan administration.³⁹ Crozier's roll-back memorandum was obviously virtually congruent with the Reagan Doctrine.

Given the role played in the Cercle by the South African government, it is hardly surprising that a major focus of the roll-back strategy lay in Southern Africa, particularly Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. The Cercle agitated against Namibian independence and the take-over of the country by the "Marxist terrorist organization" SWAPO (South West African Peoples' Organization) from the very beginning of the 1980s. The Cercle was also preoccupied with the Angolan war. It liaised directly with UNITA's foreign secretary Jeremias Chitunda, who at the same time was the UNITA (União nacional para a independência total) representative to the United States – including the CIA.⁴⁰ As for Mozambique, the Cercle supported RENAMO, which fought against the "Marxist FRELIMO regime" and was heavily sponsored by the South African government in the 1980s.⁴¹ The Cercle liaised with the rebels through hardline anti-communist Evo Fernandes, the general secretary of RENAMO (Resistência nacional moçambicana), who attended Cercle meetings. Hardly surprisingly, the Cercle also liaised with the Afghan resistance which was represented in the Cercle by Fatima Gailani, the daughter of mujahideen leader Said Ahmed Gailani, who headed the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA).

Anti-Soviet Propaganda

The Cercle also conducted anti-Soviet propaganda operations targeting the populations of both the Soviet Union and Western Europe. An example of a propaganda scheme directed at the Soviet population was a plan, discussed at the meeting of the Inner Circle in Zurich in January 1980, to establish a powerful directional radio station in Saudi Arabia for propaganda broadcasts to the Islamic border regions of the Soviet Union.⁴² The planning of this operation was led by Hans Graf Huyn, who had already proposed such a scheme in his 1978 book *Der Angriff*.⁴³ Huyn met with Prince Turki bin Faisal, the director of the Saudi intelligence service, who had already attended the May 1979 Cercle meeting in Bavaria.⁴⁴ Huyn reported to the Cercle meeting in Zurich in June 1980 that the Saudis were interested and had guaranteed to finance the operation.⁴⁵ However, there is no indication in the sources available that the radio station ever became operational.

Besides waging psychological warfare within the communist bloc, the Cercle concentrated more heavily on propaganda operations targeting a Western audience. At the Cercle meeting in Bonn in July 1984, for example, plans were made to launch anti-Soviet propaganda operations to "explain the Soviet strategy to the public". Adequate "information"

should be selected and the individual Cercle members should then coordinate their media efforts, which should demonize the Soviet Union and communist ideology.⁴⁶ Notably, the Cercle played a major role in an international propaganda campaign that blamed the KGB for controlling international terrorism and directing it against the West.⁴⁷ In the 1980s, “international terrorism” became a regular topic at Cercle meetings. At the February–March 1986 meeting in Washington, for example, Michael Ledeen, one of the main propagandists of the idea that the KGB was behind international terrorism, reported on Soviet involvement.⁴⁸ Initiatives to promote this propaganda theme were certainly discussed within the Cercle before being disseminated by the individual members through the terrorism research institutes which they had founded or controlled. Cercle member Lord Chalfont chaired the London-based Institute for the Study of Terrorism (IST), which was run by Jillian Becker, author of one of the main books of the “KGB mastermind of terrorism” campaign entitled *The Soviet Connection: State Sponsorship of Terrorism* (1985). Another British terrorism institute was the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism (RFST), the board of which included Cercle members Nicholas Elliot and Sir John Biggs-Davison. A German outlet for Cercle propaganda was provided by Hans Josef Horchem, who from 1969 to 1981 directed the Hamburg Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz (State Office for the Protection of the Constitution). Horchem founded the Institut für Terrorismusforschung (Institute for Terrorism Research) in Bonn in 1986.⁴⁹

Conclusion: “It Looks Like We’ve Scored”

In the late Cold War the Cercle was a thoroughly transnational institution, contributing to the transfer of anti-communist theory and practice between Western nations. As such it was, in the words of Pierre-Yves Saunier, “a structured space of interconnections and relationships which cut across what we are inclined to see as separated and autonomous spatial, social and cultural planes”.⁵⁰ On the basis of the documents available, it is hard to assess the impact of the Cercle and its leaders on the history of the Second Cold War, especially their influence on the policies of the Reagan administration, whether directly or indirectly through the manipulation of public opinion. Certainly, the Cercle’s crusaders worked relentlessly for the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, and they claimed a share of the credit. As Franz Josef Bach put it in 1989, “There is no question in my mind [...] that – by coordinating our efforts and using our friendly relations – we were

able to influence international relations in accordance with our political beliefs."⁵¹ In September 1991, in the midst of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Brian Crozier wrote to former President Reagan, "The recent events in the Soviet ex-Union are exhilarating for the few of us who have spent decades fighting the evil of communism. Looking back on your distinguished double term as President, I am grateful to you for the access you allowed me."⁵² Reagan replied, "Yes, we were allies in the fight against the evil Communism and it looks like we scored."⁵³ In contrast to the Soviet Union the Cercle survived the end of the Cold War, and in the 1990s would reinvent itself once again in light of a changing political environment.

Notes

1. This essay is based on the analysis of primary documents from the papers of Julian Amery at Churchill Archives Centre, the Brian Crozier papers and the Monique Garnier-Lançon papers at Hoover Institution Archives, and the William A. Wilson papers at Georgetown University. The earliest account of the Cercle is Pierre Péan, *Enquête sur l'affaire des avions renifleurs et ses ramifications proches ou lointaines* (Paris: Fayard, 1984). Extensive, though not always correct, information was collected by the Institute for the Study of Globalization and Covert Politics: Joel van der Reijden, *Le Cercle and the Struggle for the European Continent: Private Bridge between Vatican-Pan-European and Anglo-American Intelligence* (2006, available online at <https://wikispooks.com/ISGP/organisations/Le_Cercle.htm>). There are as yet very few studies of the Cercle which are based on primary sources. Johannes Grossmann provides a brief introduction to the Cercle up to the late 1970s in an early publication based on his PhD research: Johannes Grossmann, "Ein Europa der 'Hintergründigen': Antikommunistische christliche Organisationen, konservative Elitezirkel und private Aussenpolitik in Westeuropa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg", in Johannes Wienand and Christiane Wienand (eds), *Die kulturelle Integration Europas* (Wiesbaden 2010), pp. 303–40. David Teacher compiled a very detailed book on the main characters in the Cercle and the organizations they were associated with: *Rogue Agents: Habsburg, Pinay and the Private Cold War 1951–1991* (3rd edition, 2011), available online at <[https://wikispooks.com/wiki/File:Rogue_Agents_\(3rd_edition,_2011,_full\).pdf](https://wikispooks.com/wiki/File:Rogue_Agents_(3rd_edition,_2011,_full).pdf)>. Teacher, who worked as a translator with the European Union, has provided a very valuable account of some of the main characters involved and of their wider networks, although his conclusions are speculative and not backed up by primary sources. I would like to thank David Teacher for his assistance in writing this chapter.
2. See Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, *La Piscine: The French Secret Service since 1944* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 151–6, 248; Brian Crozier, *Free Agent: The Unseen War, 1941–1991* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 191ff.
3. "Contributions to State Protection: Cercle", confidential note for Dr Waltner from Hans Langemann, March 7, 1980, *Der Spiegel*, 13 September 1982,

pp. 28–31. This document is from the so-called Langemann Papers. Hans Langemann, who was the director of the Bavarian Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz (State Office for the Protection of the Constitution), had been receiving reports on the Cercle from Hans Christoph Schenk Freiherr von Stauffenberg in exchange for intelligence. Stauffenberg, a former agent of the BND, ran a private intelligence service closely connected to the CSU and the CDU and participated in Cercle meetings. Langemann repeated the information obtained from Stauffenberg in a series of intelligence reports, which were delivered to either Gerold Tandler, Bavarian Interior Minister, or to Dr Georg Waltner, Tandler's Private Secretary. In 1982, Langemann leaked a number of documents to the German far-left magazine *konkret*, some of which were reproduced in *Der Spiegel*. There is no doubt that the Langemann Papers are authentic.

4. "Le Cercle", 28 November 1995, Box 31, 1/10, papers of Julian Amery, Churchill Archives Centre (hereafter JA); Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 192.
5. David Rockefeller, *Memoirs* (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 413.
6. Participation in the Cercle was not strictly limited to these six countries. One of the principal Cercle members in that era was Manuel Prado, president of Peru from 1939 to 1945 and from 1956 to 1962. In the first decade after the Second World War, and from 1962 until his death in 1967, he lived in exile in Paris. See "Le Cercle", 28 November 1995, JA.
7. The Knights of Malta are a Roman Catholic lay religious order based in Rome and widely considered a sovereign subject within international law, with a permanent observer status at the United Nations. The modern continuation of the original medieval order of Saint John of Jerusalem, known as the Knights Hospitaller and founded in Jerusalem in the eleventh century, the order today has around 13,000 members, 20,000 medical personnel and 80,000 permanent volunteers providing medical aid around the world. Opus Dei and the Knights of Malta were both engaged in political and anti-communist activities in the Cold War.
8. "Note about the Cercle", Box 33, 1/10, JA; "The Cercle: Confidential Note", 18 September 1991, Box 31, 1/10, JA.
9. For a profound analysis of the Cercle network in the 1970s see Teacher, *Rogue Agents*.
10. See "Note about the Cercle", Box 33, 1/10, JA; Julian Amery to Lord Younger of Prestwick, 9 February 1995, Box 31, 1/10, JA.
11. Monique Garnier-Lançon to Jean-Maxime Leveque, November 3, 1983 (translation from French by the author), Folder 3 Box 32, Monique Garnier-Lançon papers, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter MGL).
12. Brian Crozier to Antoine Pinay, March 16, 1980, and Antoine Pinay to Brian Crozier, 2 April 1980, Folder 1 Box 4, Brian Crozier papers, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter BC).
13. On Amery's role in the SOE and MI6 see Teacher, *Rogue Agents*, pp. 28ff.; on Amery's role in the Congress for Cultural Freedom see Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999), pp. 76, 88.
14. Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 193.
15. On Crozier see, besides his autobiography *Free Agent*, Teacher, *Rogue Agents*; Edward S. Herman and Gerry O'Sullivan, *The Terrorism Industry: The Experts*

- and Institutions That Shape Our View of Terror* (New York: Random House, 1989).
16. Crozier, *Free Agent*, pp. 97, 193.
 17. See the documents on the Centre europeen de documentation et d'information (CEDI) and the Académie européenne de sciences politiques (particularly the membership list from c.1977) in Teacher, *Rogue Agents*. On Huyn see also Tim Geiger, *Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten: Aussenpolitischer Konflikt und innerparteilicher Machtkampf in der CDU/CSU 1958–1969* (München: Oldenbourg, 2008), pp. 388–95.
 18. Carlo Pesenti to Brian Crozier, 22 April 1976, Folder 9 Box 2, BC.
 19. Contributions to State Protection: Cercle. 7 March 1980; Crozier, *Free Agent*, 193.
 20. "Contributions to State Protection: Cercle", 7 March 1980, in *Der Spiegel* (13 September 1982).
 21. Excerpt from the minutes of the "Inner Circle" meeting, Washington DC, 10 April 1989, in Jürgen Roth, *Die Mitternachtsregierung: Reportage über die Macht der Geheimdienste* (Hamburg: Rasch und Röhrling, 1990), p. 33. Roth's brief remarks on the Cercle are not reliable and he gives a fairly mysterious account of how he received the document at a meeting with a British intelligence officer in a wine bar in Bonn (pp. 28–37). However, there are good reasons to conclude that the two documents relating to the Cercle that are cited by Roth are authentic. For example, a number of other sources confirm that psychological operations against the policy of *rapprochement* towards the Soviet Union and the pro-Gorbachev sentiment in the West were indeed preoccupations of Crozier and other Cercle leaders in 1989, and the minutes of the meeting refer to numerous details that were not known to outsiders at that time.
 22. WACL was founded in Taiwan in 1966 as an expansion of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League (APACL), which was formed to fight communism at the request of Chiang Kai-shek at the end of the Korean War. In the 1970s WACL spread to all continents with chapters in Western Europe and the United States, but it also attracted the far right. In the 1980s its US chapter, the United States Council for World Freedom (USCWF), led by former General John Singlaub, became the most active branch of WACL, which now operated globally against communist groups and governments. In 1984, committees were established to support anti-communist resistance groups in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Nicaragua, where WACL, collaborating with the Reagan administration, was a major source of support for the Nicaraguan Contras. See, besides the chapter by Abramovici in this volume, Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986); Russ Bellant, *Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party* (Boston: South End Press, 1991).
 23. John J. Donovan Jr (Chancellor Knights of Malta, Western Association) to Pope John Paul II, Folder 55 Box 2, William A. Wilson papers, Georgetown University (hereafter WW).
 24. Brian Crozier to Margaret Thatcher, 18 March 1981, Folder 5 Box 3, BC; Crozier, *Free Agent*, p. 186.

25. See Otto von Habsburg to Julian Amery, 11 November 1985, Box 33 1/10, JA.
26. Peter Rae Killen to Julian Amery, 30 July 1987, Peter Rae Killen to Julian Amery, 12 January 1988, and Peter Rae Killen to Julian Amery, 22 August 1988, Box 33 1/10, JA. On Killen's career in the DFA see Roger Pfister, *Apartheid South Africa and African States: From Pariah to Middle Power, 1961–1994* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2005), pp. 9–15.
27. "The Group" (note by Julian Amery), 13 November 1991, Box 31 1/10, JA.
28. On the Department of Information's secret propaganda programme, which led to the Muldergate scandal of 1978–79, see James Sanders, *South Africa and the International Media, 1972–1979: A Struggle for Representation* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).
29. Julian Amery to Robert Cranborne, 18 December 1990, Box 31 1/10, JA.
30. Anthony Cavdendish, "The Cercle. Confidential Note", Box 33 1/10, JA.
31. Julian Amery to Robert Cranborne, 21 March 1990, and Julian Amery to Robert Cranborne, 31 January 1991, Box 31 1/10, JA; Julian Amery to Frans Otten (board member of Philips), 8 May 1989, Box 33 1/10, JA; Julian Amery, "Budget of the Group", 13 November 1991, Box 31 1/10, JA; Franz Josef Bach to Julian Amery, 21 August 1985, Box 33 1/10, JA.
32. Georges Albertini to Brian Crozier, 15 November 1979, Folder 2 Box 3, BC; Alphons Horten to Franz Josef Bach, 24 April 1990, Box 31 1/10, JA; "Cheques for Cercle", 3 December 1990, Box 31 1/10, JA.
33. Albrecht Erich van Niekerk (Embassy of South Africa, Bonn) to Julian Amery, 12 October 1992, Box 32 1/10, JA; Robert Cranborne to Franz Josef Bach, 29 May 1990, Box 31 1/10, JA; "Statement for the Special Reserve Account 'Le Cercle'", National Westminster Bank, Salisbury, 5 October 1990, Box 31 1/10, JA.
34. Julian Amery to Alastair Goodlad, 1 February 1988, Box 33 1/10, JA. The South African government had long run a "guest programme" for senior European military and political figures, several of whom were connected with the Cercle – see Teacher, *Rogue Agents*.
35. Handwritten notes of Monique Garnier-Lançon from the Cercle meeting in Stellenbosch, South Africa, 12–15 January 1984, Folder 3 Box 32, MGL.
36. See for example: "Meeting of the Cercle", Wildbad Kreuth, 11–13 June 1982, and "Crisis of the Empire (Notes for Memory)", Brian Crozier, June 1982, Folder 1 Box 32, MGL; handwritten notes of Monique Garnier-Lançon from the Cercle meeting in Bonn, 30 June to 3 July 1983, Folder 2 Box 32, MGL.
37. Address of Julian Amery to the Cercle meeting in Washington DC, 27 February 1986, Box 33 1/10, JA. On the Cercle's commitment to ensuring support for various anti-communist rebel groups, see handwritten notes of Monique Garnier-Lançon from the Cercle meeting in Stellenbosch, South Africa, 12–15 January 1984.
38. Brian Crozier to Margaret Thatcher, 2 December 1982, Folder 5 Box 3, BC.
39. Crozier, *Free Agent*, pp. 262ff.
40. *Transnational Security* 2 (1981), pp. 3ff., Folder 5 Box 3, BC.
41. David Alexander Robinson, "Curse on the Land: A History of the Mozambican Civil War", PhD dissertation, University of Western Australia, 2006, pp. 125–60.
42. "Contributions to State Protection: Cercle", 7 March 1980.

43. Hans Graf Huyn, *Der Angriff: Der Vorstoss Moskaus zur Weltherrschaft* (Wien: Molden, 1978), p. 258.
44. Hans Huyn to Franz Josef Strauss, 13 February 1979, *Der Spiegel* 10 (1980), p. 23.
45. Minutes of Cercle meeting, Zurich, 28–9 June 1980 in Jürgen Roth and Berndt Ender, *Geschäfte und Verbrechen der Politmafia* (Berlin: IBDK, 1987), pp. 89ff.
46. Handwritten notes of Monique Garnier-Lançon from the Cercle meeting in Bonn, 5–8 July 1984, Folder 4 Box 32, MGL.
47. For a detailed history of the idea that the Soviet Union was behind international terrorism see Adrian Hänni, "Mastermind of Terror: The Soviet Union as the Leader of the International Terror Network", in Eva-Maria Stolberg (ed.), *Rivals of the Twentieth Century: USSR and USA: Two Geopolitical Powers in Competition* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012), pp. 221–49.
48. "Proposed Itinerary for Meeting 27th February to March 2nd Washington", Box 33 1/10, JA.
49. On the IST and the RFST see Herman and O'Sullivan, *Terrorism Industry*, pp. 113–15, 131ff. On Horchem's relationship with the Cercle see Crozier, *Free Agent*.
50. Pierre-Yves Saunier, "Going Transnational? News from Down Under", Transnational History Symposium, Australian National University, Canberra, September 2004, published in *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* 31 (2006), p. 127.
51. Franz Josef Bach to Richard McCormack, n.d., Box 33 1/10, JA.
52. Brian Crozier to Ronald Reagan, 11 September 1991, Folder 4 Box 3, BC.
53. Ronald Reagan to Brian Crozier, 24 September 1991, Folder 4 Box 3, BC.

Part III

Intellectual Networks and Anti-Totalitarianism

11

The Sovietology of Józef M. Bocheński: Transnational Activism in Catholic Switzerland, 1955–65

Matthieu Gillibert

When the Institute for Eastern Europe (IEO) was created at the University of Fribourg in 1958, the announcer from Radio Geneva declared that “the story does not lack a certain piquancy”. Marxism was to be studied, dissected and taught on Catholic soil, in Fribourg, at the Swiss university perhaps the least inclined towards communist philosophy. Father Bocheński (1902–95), the leader of the IEO, immediately responded to the editorial team of Radio Geneva by saying that Catholic philosophers are precisely the most capable in dissecting Marxist-Leninist thought. It was precisely the radical divergences that divided communism from the Catholic Church that bestowed his colleagues with a greater sensibility for dealing with these questions.¹

Behind the discrete irony of the Radio Geneva announcer lay an interesting question. What led to the creation of such a centre for Soviet studies, specifically orientated toward philosophy? The organization emerged in a Catholic and bilingual Swiss canton, was led for twelve years by a Polish Dominican, was supported for six years by an American philanthropic foundation and was frequented by students from very varied disciplines and countries. Its objectives oscillated between a scientific and an ideological pole, and this bipolarity between science and politics was to be the “red thread” running through it: it delimits the field in which this brand of Sovietology evolved, a tension between, on the one hand, the desire to know and understand the motivations behind Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology, largely ignored in the West,

and on the other hand, a determination to dismantle piece by piece a philosophical system considered dangerous to humanity.

The institute owed its existence to the efforts of Father Józef Bocheński, a figure at the intersection of various transnational networks through which it is possible to analyse the IEO's position and role in the Cold War. This chapter examines the aims it pursued, the intellectual and financial resources Bocheński was able to mobilize, and how the factors that fed into the IEO's formation were no longer relevant a decade later in the changing ideological conditions of the Cold War, causing Sovietology to become marginalized as a discipline.

Bocheński's Background

Bocheński was born a subject of the Tsar into a relatively wealthy family from Czuszków, near Krakow. After a youth spent in the torment of the First World War and then the Polish–Russian war – he enrolled as a soldier at the age of 17 – he then embarked on studies in law and economics, first at Lviv and then Poznań. He was an active student politically, flirting with both anarchism and the youth movement of the extreme right, both demonstrating his assessment at the time that democracy was not going to save a Europe in decline.²

In 1926, while still claiming to be an agnostic, he entered the seminary at Krakow where he pursued studies in philosophy and theology.³ He was interested in two philosophical currents that were particularly dynamic in Poland between the wars: Thomism, which was enjoying a revitalization among Catholic intellectuals; and the Polish Lviv–Warsaw school of logic, with which he had always identified. With other intellectuals from the “Krakow Circle” such as Jan Salamucha, someone who had been engaged on a parallel path to Bocheński since the Polish–Russian war,⁴ Bocheński concentrates on the task of modernizing Thomism through logic. In the 1930s he took this task with him to the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and to the Angelicum of Rome, ending up as chaplain to the Polish army in Britain during the Second World War. There he writes his first anti-communist work under the pseudonym of Józef Miche⁵ and pursues his path as a logician by reading Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead.⁶ His affinity for these philosophers places him definitively – and he too perceives himself this way – among the advocates of an Anglo-Saxon tradition of analytical philosophy, uncompromising and centred on logic.⁷ Besides their intellectual import, the milieux with which he comes into contact in the time leading up to the end of the war form the basis for the different networks that Bocheński will mobilize for his anti-communist activity

when he is named professor of contemporary philosophy at Fribourg in 1945.

From Polish Emigration to International Expertise

Polish exiles living in Switzerland formed an important initial social circle for Bocheński. From his arrival in Fribourg, the Dominican became active in the organization of the Catholic mission in Marly, a neighbouring town. He also took care of soldiers interned in Switzerland who had the opportunity to pursue their studies at university, since Bocheński was able to attract funds for them from the United States. As well as providing material assistance, he tried to unite them behind a rejection of the new communist regimes in the Soviet sphere by launching the bulletin *Veritas* and by establishing a link with the markedly anti-communist Federation of Polish Organisations in Switzerland, led by Alfons Bronarski.⁸ Acting alongside his expatriate fellow countrymen allowed him to maintain contact with bishop Józef Gawlina, director of the Documentation Centre for the Catholic Church in Rome, whom he had accompanied during the Italy campaign. They shared mutual interests since Bocheński was assisting with tracking the Polish émigré community linked to the Catholic Church, a project financed by a Vatican initiative towards the Polish church.

Gawlina also acted as an intermediary for the new Polish section of Radio Free Europe led by Jan Nowak-Jeziorański. Understanding the need to back this radio station, rather than gambling their hopes on Radio Vatican whose technical and financial means were markedly inferior to those of the powerful Munich broadcaster, Gawlina encouraged Bocheński to become a part of it.⁹ From 1952, the latter became the presenter of weekly transmissions on religious and ethical matters. Once there he rediscovered the military environment that he was particularly fond of, since the majority of the members in the Polish section were recruited from among veterans of the war.¹⁰ Bocheński took the opportunity to play the role of an expert on the question of Bolshevism by distilling teachings on communist philosophy into the form of fictional dialogues between a professor and his student. In this way he covered subjects such as “Christian happiness”, “the Catholic Church in France”, “Science, faith and Marxism”, and “Communism and egoism”.¹¹ This engagement as an expert in communist philosophy led him to become engaged in the internal affairs of the Polish church. In 1954 he submitted an extremely critical report on a publication by Bolesław Piasecki entitled *The Important Issues*.¹² Together with a group called *Znak*, the author was seeking to explore possible

collaborations between the communist government of Bolesław Bierut and the Catholic Church. With the collaboration of Poles based in Switzerland, Bocheński went to great lengths to have the index to this work corrected, underlining the incompatibility of Catholicism and communism as well as the danger faced by the church in Poland given that Cardinal Wyszyński was still being detained.¹³

Alongside the issue of Polish emigration, Bocheński developed his contacts within the religious orders, particularly among Dominicans and Jesuits. The former founded a foster home at the University of Fribourg, where they had already been active before the war. In Rome in the 1930s and also later at the end of the Second World War Bocheński had already established links with prominent Jesuits. One in particular was the Austrian Jesuit, Gustav Wetter, a specialist in Russian philosophy at the Vatican's Collegium Russicum. Bocheński, aware of Wetter's influence,¹⁴ decided to collaborate with the Austrian, even though he adopted a more dogmatic approach to separate himself from Wetter.¹⁵ As expected, his relationship with Wetter brought him to the attention of the government of Konrad Adenauer in West Germany. Within the framework of the discussion on the unconstitutionality of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschland that was launched by the government in 1951, he was requested to prepare for the Federal Constitutional Court an opinion to be published by the Ministry of the Interior. In a very scholarly fashion, he systematically contrasted the articles of the German *Grundgesetz* with philosophical syntheses arising from his readings of Engels, Lenin and Stalin.¹⁶ By the mid-1950s Bocheński had acquired the status of an international expert, a status that was then amplified by his trips to the United States (particularly the Catholic University of Notre Dame in Indiana) and South Africa.¹⁷ The climate of suspicion and tension between East and West served Bocheński well, and in 1958 he published his famous handbook on global communism (*Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*), a reference book produced in collaboration with Gerhart Niemeyer from the University of Notre Dame.¹⁸ But in order to understand the reasons for establishing the study of Sovietology in Fribourg, it is important to look into the role that Bocheński plays in the Swiss intellectual landscape.

An Original Perspective among the Swiss Intelligentsia

Switzerland offered favourable terrain for such an expert on anti-communism. In the thoroughly Swiss climate of political compromise, the greater part of the ideological struggle against communism was

effectively carried out through a network of universities and other private or semi-public organizations. Bocheński, backed by his growing professional status, was also able to benefit from his expertise being characterized as Anglo-Saxon in orientation, both in terms of his outlook and his contacts. His profile as an analytical philosopher set him apart from the French and Swiss-francophone intellectuals, with the exception of Jeanne Hersch, herself a philosopher of Polish origin, but one who shared with him, above all, a committed anti-communism. A French Sovietologist such as Bernard Jeu, who published *La philosophie soviétique et l'Occident (Soviet Philosophy and the West)* in 1969, was in contrast very critical towards the Dominican. Against Bocheński's adopted position of a positivist logician who considered his system of thought to be superior, Jeu claimed that the Pole did no more than reflect a Manichaeist vision of the world curiously similar to that expressed in Soviet philosophy.¹⁹

Bocheński bypassed these criticisms and remained completely convinced of the validity of an unqualified fight against communism. Despite possessing an impulsive and lively personality, he was known for adopting a domineering attitude towards others. From his arrival in Fribourg until the middle of the 1960s he taught Soviet philosophy within the framework of the University Union for Human Liberty, a section of which he founded in the canton of St Gall.²⁰ This was linked to various patriotic associations such as the *Schweizerischer Aufklärungsdienst* and *Amitié et liberté*, several of whose members attended the World Youth Festival in Helsinki in 1962.²¹ In a more official capacity, responding to an invitation from the historian Jacques Freymond (who was himself on good terms with the Rockefeller Foundation) he regularly gave classes at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. A key location in Bocheński's Swiss network is Peter Sager's Ost-Institut in Bern. Fully behind Sager's effort to accumulate and analyse communist theory and practice, he wrote a report for the attention of the federal council that spoke in glowing terms of Sager and backed the idea of providing governmental support for his operation. Bocheński and Sager shared the view that the communist system constituted a terrible danger to humanity, but that it was important to know it in great depth to appreciate that danger better.²²

However dogmatic Bocheński's thinking might have been towards communism, it was not lacking in tensions. First, there was the relationship between the scholar and the political cause. Bocheński's scientific approach masked the eminently political character of his enterprise.²³ The context of the Cold War transformed his discipline

into an ideological weapon, and the Dominican clearly positioned himself within the camp of radical scholarly anti-communists despite proclaiming the purely scientific nature of his research. A second tension lay in the obstinate method with which Bocheński dissected Marxist thought, a method that bordered on fascination. Contrary to a common anti-communist attitude which aimed to delegitimize Soviet thought, Bocheński took it seriously by adopting the principle that there are philosophers in the USSR and therefore they need to be analysed. Besides the undeniably militant aspect of Sovietology, an essential part of it was therefore dedicated to understanding this enemy, even if the analyses very often brushed aside the social conditions linked to the production of this knowledge in the USSR. The IEO amplified these tensions between science and politics, fascination and repulsion.

The Creation of the IEO at the University of Fribourg

The government of the Canton of Fribourg endorsed the creation of the IEO at its session on 5 May 1958. Its primary objective was the “scientific study and elaboration of problems concerning Eastern Europe”.²⁴ Here again we find the tension between a situation in Eastern Europe that was considered a priori a problem, and the desire to understand it in detail. To justify its existence, the IEO played heavily on the possibilities offered by the ideological context of the 1950s, at the expense of any scientific considerations. This research centre, connected to the department of philosophy, did not seem to pose a major problem for the university professors, nor to the Dominican rector, Norbert Luyten. The only reticence concerned the statutes: the IEO was in effect authorized to bestow diplomas in Sovietology without them having to go via the dean.²⁵

The idea for the institute seems to have come initially from Bocheński. He had already made contact with private backers and with the German Ministry of the Interior.²⁶ Yet the contribution from the Rockefeller Foundation was decisive. In October 1957, Charles Fahs, director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Human Sciences division, made a detour on his trip around Europe to visit Fribourg. He considered Bocheński to be the “leading European scholar on current trends in dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries”.²⁷ The American foundation signed up to an initial provision, over three years, of \$20,000, on the condition that Bocheński was in charge of directing the work.²⁸

The objective of the Rockefeller Foundation was threefold: to build an international network for the study of Eastern Europe by linking the IEO with the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam and

the Osteuropa-Institut of the Freie Universität in Berlin;²⁹ to maintain contacts with researchers in the satellite countries of the USSR; and to nurture young scholars.³⁰ Less than two years after the launch of the IEO, some ninety students were following courses there.³¹ Bocheński surrounded himself with a limited number of young PhD students who were to form the basis of the new Sovietology network. The work was generally divided up by region, with each research student studying the particular strands of Marxism-Leninism in their country of origin and drawing up a bibliography of philosophical activity in that country.³² These students, who were carefully selected, allowed Bocheński to extend his influence as an international expert: the Polish researcher Zbigniew Jordan went on to work at Radio Free Europe; the Czech Nikolaus Lobkowicz, from a rich Catholic family, became professor at Notre Dame University and then in Munich; the East German Werner Maibaum contributed to the establishment of the *Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst* in Germany.³³ After their studies in Fribourg these Bocheński-trained graduates continued to collaborate on the IEO's *Sovietica* collection and the review *Studies in Soviet Thought*, projects launched in 1959 and 1961 respectively.

Strategically, the diffusion of knowledge via these two projects corresponded to the second phase of the IEO's development, which required an increase in funding. Yet in 1959, just when the Rockefeller grant was renewed, the Foundation's outside expert, the philosopher Roderick Chisholm from Brown University, expressed certain reservations about Bocheński in particular. The Dominican's powers of persuasion, his ability to popularize philosophical questions and his enthusiasm were counterbalanced by his overbearing character and his dominance of the intellectual environment of the Institute. What is more, his work could scarcely be called innovative. East-West dialogue at the turn of the 1960s had also changed in nature, with cultural and academic exchanges between the two blocs on the increase, and the foundation no longer wished to appear in the front lines of an excessively dogmatic anti-communist struggle. It is in this sense that the request from the Rockefeller Foundation's Chadbourn Gilpatric to Bocheński should be understood: "For various reasons, I would prefer not to use the term 'Sovietology' or 'Communism' [...]. Would you possibly concur in such a phrase to describe your research as 'Critical Studies of Recent Philosophical Developments in Communist Thought'?"³⁴ The IEO finally received another \$20,000 to last three years. However, Sovietology in Fribourg, dependent as it was on Bocheński's networks, was drifting away from the positive changes to be seen in East-West relations.

Up until the point of Bocheński's departure in 1972, the IEO evolved in a paradoxical manner. On the one hand, it increased its activities in terms of research, expertise and education, despite the diminishing means at its disposal. From 1966 onwards the financial resources from overseas that had been arriving from the United States and the West German Ministry of the Interior had practically run dry. Despite his appointment as rector of the University of Fribourg from 1964 to 1966, Bocheński was unable to reverse this tendency regardless of his initiatives to promote the IEO, including with the media.³⁵ During the first half of the 1960s the IEO had developed its study plan according to a number of courses or cycles, for instance the one-year cycle F on "Fundamental sovietology" (open to "all cultivated people") and cycle H on "advanced sovietology".³⁶ There is expansion, therefore, in terms of Sovietology research addressed to an audience beyond those studying for exams (civil servants from the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, sent by the Ministry of the Interior), in terms of an interest being taken in other countries besides the USSR, and even an increase in the number of academic disciplines. Contacts with the Ostkolleg of Cologne are strengthened when Bocheński becomes its president in 1961–62.³⁷ One course of study, praised in an IEO publicity brochure, is open to students of the natural sciences, as well as those from the Institute of Automation, for educating "Eastern Experts".³⁸ Fribourg's Institute of Automation is directed by Ernst Peter Billeter, who was named as Professor of Statistics in 1958 and was the former bursar of the Rockefeller Foundation.³⁹ The positivist perspective of this collaboration, which pretended to make an association between Sovietology and nascent information technology, is interesting if not problematic. But the alignment of Bocheński and Billeter from 1959 onwards was no coincidence. Billeter intended to turn his own institute into a research centre to combat "communist infiltration in Western Europe".⁴⁰

The IEO therefore maintained a broad curriculum, which included Slavic languages (obligatory). Some contacts with non-dissident philosophers from the communist bloc were also sought, such as the correspondence between Helmut Fleischer and the Russian philosopher Vasilii Tugarinov.⁴¹ By the time of Bocheński's departure in 1972, the Institute had less financial resources but was still able to provide PhD programmes in subjects outside of Marxist-Leninist thought, and a remarkably interdisciplinary form of education was practised. Bocheński's focus on logic receded, and the IEO evolved towards a study of Soviet thought more anchored in historic and cultural reality. Some of Bocheński's

collaborators remained in place, causing ongoing tensions between advocates of a more dogmatic Sovietology and a new generation of researchers interested in exploring other areas of philosophy.⁴² The scientific-political tension only dissipated after 1989.

Conclusion

After his retirement in 1972, Bocheński devoted more of his time to his passions: logic and aviation. Shortly before his death, however, he reappeared with an article on Sovietology just when communist power was crumbling in the USSR. Ironically, he gave the text the title “Did we not waste our time?”⁴³ Self-assured, he answered in the negative. Contrary to numerous philosophers from the 1950s, he was one of the few to take the philosophy of the USSR seriously, his analytical approach allowing him to put his finger on the confusion that Marxism-Leninism introduced between science and *Weltanschauung*, between analytical investigation and moral instruction. The main bias in his method was to deny the importance of the point of view of the philosopher who claims to study Sovietology, while denying the impact of his own involvement in a cause which was every bit as ideologically conditioned as its object of study. Far from resolving the tension – induced by communist thinkers – between science and ideology, Bocheński’s philosophical position contributed as much to making it worse as it did to easing it. Soviet thought, considered to be a coherent and logical system in the service of a political project, acts like a mirror: Bocheński’s Sovietology understood equally well how to function as a system of rational thought in order to fortify anti-communist ideology.

Notes

1. Correspondence between Bocheński and Jo Escoffier, March 1958, C3.1, OEI 2, archives of Père Józef Bocheński, Fondation Archivum Helveto-Polonicum, Bibliothèque cantonale, Fribourg (hereafter AHP-Bo), C3.1. OEI 2. The original papers of Bocheński are located at the Dominican Convent in Krakow, but the greater part of this collection has been photocopied and transferred to Fribourg.
2. Jan Parys, *Entre la logique et la foi. Entretiens avec Joseph.-M. Bochenski recueillis par Jan Parys* (Montricher: Editions noir sur blanc, 1990), pp. 291–307. See also his interview with Guy Ackermann, a journalist with French-speaking Swiss television, in 1970, available online at <<http://www.rts.ch/archives>>.
3. Józef Bocheński, *Wspomnienia* (Krakow: Philed, 1994), pp. 54–57. For him, the church would have represented, above all, a rampart against the modernity inherited from the French revolution. See Ludwig J. Pongratz, *Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen*, Part 1 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1975), p. 14.

4. Zbigniew Wolak, "Naukowa Filozofia Koła Krakowskiego", *Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce* 36 (2005), pp. 97–122.
5. Józef Miche, *Filozofia bolszewicka* (Rome: Druk, 1946).
6. Pongratz, *Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen*, p. 19. For his inaugural academic conference at the University of Fribourg in 1945 Bocheński chose the subject of "Le triomphe de l'idée chrétienne selon A.N. Whitehead". 1945–1995 Rectorat: personal dossier Józef Bocheński, E.911, archives of the University of Fribourg (hereafter A-Unifr).
7. Pongratz, *Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen*, p. 25.
8. Jan Sikorowski, "De la fondation du Musée Kościuszko à la fermeture du Musée de Rapperswil (1936–1952): deux exemples d'un anticommunisme suisse?", MA thesis, Université de Neuchâtel, 2010, p. 119.
9. Gawlina to Bocheński, Rome, 17 September 1954, C1z Gawlina 5, AHP-Bo.
10. A. Ross Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2010), p. 86. See also Michał Kasprzak, "Radio Free Europe and the Catholic Church in Poland During the 1950s and 1960s", *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes* 46 (2004), p. 323.
11. Bocheński, "Audycje radiowe", 5 May 1952–11 June 1952, RFE 1952–53, AHP-Bo.
12. Bolesław Piasecki, *Zagadnienia istotne* (Warsaw: PAX, 1954).
13. Mikołaj Stanisław Kunicki, "The Polish Crusader: The Life and Politics of Bolesław Piasecki, 1915–1979", PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 2004, pp. 275–82.
14. Innocent [Józef] M. Bocheński, *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus* (Bern: Francke, 1950), p. 10.
15. Evert Van der Zweerde shows that Bocheński considered Soviet philosophy to be similar to a well-structured system of logic, while Wetter had a more "continental" approach that was more interested in Marxism as applied in the USSR. Evert van der Zweerde, "Soviet Philosophy Revisited: Why Joseph Bocheński Was Right While Being Wrong?", *Studies in East European Thought* 55.4 (2003), pp. 317–20.
16. Josef M. Bocheński, *Die kommunistische Ideologie und die Würde, Freiheit und Gleichheit der Menschen im Sinne des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23.5.1949*, Schriftreihe der Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst, Part 21, 1956, pp. 71–2.
17. Parys, *Entre la logique et la foi*, pp. 277–8.
18. Joseph M. Bocheński and Gerhart Niemeyer, *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus* (Freiburg/Munich: Karl Alber, 1958). According to the report of the Institute of East-European Studies, this work had already sold 120,000 copies by 1959. Report of the Institute of East-European Studies, 30 March 1959, C3.1, OEI3, AHP-Bo. The communist periodical *Kommunist* considered the work to be the bible of anti-communism. See Tim B. Müller, *Krieger und Gelehrte. Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2010), p. 410.
19. "Son [Bocheński] antidogmatisme dogmatique constitue une brillante preuve *a contrario* du manichéisme idéologique contre lequel il s'élève" ("His dogmatic antidogmatism constitutes a brilliant demonstration *a contrario* of the ideological Manichaeism he is protesting about"), Bernard Jeu, *La*

- philosophie soviétique et l'Occident* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1969), p. 402. In Catholic circles the Jesuit father Henri Chambre, another recognized specialist in Marxism, was also not especially close to Bocheński.
20. This student organization had contacts with the Comité suisse d'action civique (Swiss Committee for Civic Action) in 1958. According to a circular from the organization, most of its members were anti-communist militants after its creation in 1957. Circulaire No. 1, 18 November 1957, Adok 1, AHP-Bo.
 21. "Le Festival communiste de la jeunesse", *Le Journal de Genève* (28 July 1962), p. 7.
 22. Bocheński, "Gutachten über die Osteuropa-Bibliothek des Herrn Dr. Peter Sager", Fribourg, 20 April 1959, C3.1, OEI 3, AHP-Bo.
 23. Les "savants ont le devoir de mettre leur savoir au service des hommes politiques", Parys, *Entre la logique et la foi*, p. 276.
 24. Document signed by the State Council for the Canton of Fribourg, "Approbation des statuts de l'Institut d'Europe orientale", 5 May 1958, 4.10.57-3.6.63, C 42.3, A-Unifr.
 25. Professor de Diesbach expressed the view that the new institute constituted a state within a state. Minutes of the University Council, 16 December 1957, 4.10.57-3.6.63, C 42.3, A-Unifr.
 26. See Bocheński's interview in *Kultur und Kritik. Leipziger philosophische Zeitschrift* 5 (August 1993), pp. 88-9.
 27. Rockefeller Foundation Report, 1957, Folder 54 Box 5, 803R, Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC).
 28. Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1957, available online at <<http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/annual-reports>>.
 29. The Berlin institution and its director, the historian Werner Philipp, were given the responsibility for coordinating this network. See Müller, *Krieger und Gelehrte*, p. 409.
 30. Rockefeller Foundation Report, 1957, Folder 54 Box 5, 803R, RAC.
 31. Annual Report of the Institute of East-European Studies, 1959, C3.1, OEI 2, AHP-Bo.
 32. The Pole Zbigniew Jordan studied communist philosophy developed in Poland, the Czech Nikolaus Lobkowicz in Czechoslovakia, and the Slovenian, Ludvik Vrtačič, in Yugoslavia.
 33. The editor of the *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus* and one of Bocheński's PhD students, Maibaum acted as director of the Ostkolleg in Cologne in 1964. Rüdiger Thomas and Bergisch Gladbach, "Ein Brückenbauer mit Phantasie und Leidenschaft. Zum Tod von Werner Maibaum (1928-2007)", *Deutschland Archiv* 3 (2007), pp. 404-5.
 34. Gilpatric to Bocheński, 12 September 1960, C3.1, OEI 4, AHP-Bo.
 35. "Un centre de recherche sur la philosophie communiste: l'Institut de l'Europe orientale à l'Université de Fribourg", *Le Journal de Genève* (24 February 1965), p. 3.
 36. Typescript of the press conference given by Bocheński, 22 February 1965, 20.5.64-16.6.65, C111.5, A-Unifr.
 37. Bocheński was the director of the Ostkolleg der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung during 1961-1962, and thereafter remained an active member of the board of directors. *Histoire de l'Université de Fribourg Suisse, 1889-1989*:

- institutions, enseignement, recherches*, Part 2 (Fribourg: Editions universitaires, 1991–1992), pp. 669–71. See also “Ost-Kolleg”, C10.1–4, AHP-Bo.
38. Brochure for “Physikalisch-philosophisches Sonderstudium” (“Special Course in Physical-Philosophical Studies”), 1962, C3.2, OEI 1, AHP-Bo.
 39. In 1950 Billeter received a bursary to take him to the universities of Chicago, Harvard and Columbia. Fellowship Recorder Cards: Social Sciences/Humanities, Switzerland, RAC.
 40. Letter from Billeter to Bocheński, 29 April 1959, C3.1, OEI 2, AHP-Bo.
 41. Letter from Thomas Blakeley to Bocheński, 11 October 1960, C3.1, OEI 4, AHP-Bo.
 42. These tensions emerged in the local press in 1985. See “Uni de Fribourg: un ancien professeur accuse. Un Institut à la dérive?”, *La Gruyère* (6 July 1985). The comments of Guido Küng and Bocheński, still defending the OEI as a unique institute in the West for the study of Soviet philosophy, were published on 9 July in the same journal.
 43. Józef M. Bocheński, “Did We Not Waste Our Time?”, *Studies in Soviet Thought* 42 (1991), pp. 295–302.

12

Suzanne Labin: Fifty Years of Anti-Communist Agitation

Olivier Dard

Suzanne Labin (1913–2001) may be largely forgotten today, but she deserves to take her place in the front rank of anti-communist “professionals”.¹ If referred to at all she is often summarily considered as a member of the extreme right, a label that is simplistic, largely false, and one that does not permit an understanding of the career and intentions of a woman who was originally from the socialist left, and was fiercely anti-Stalinist in the 1930s.² Details are limited, with the main source on her career being a work of hagiography published by Suzanne Labin herself.³ That aside, apart from some notes from specialists in literary history who recall her links with André Breton or Louis Guilloux,⁴ her role in the networks of transnational anti-communism has largely been ignored.

Suzanne Labin deserves more attention to track the remarkable trajectory of her activities and to bring into sharper focus her writings on communism, which cover numerous books, brochures, pamphlets and the many articles in the *Bulletin national d'information* (connected to the Swiss Committee for Civic Action). Many of these works have been translated and distributed throughout Europe, Asia and the Americas.

The Sources of Suzanne Labin's Anti-Communism

Given the lack of a personal archive, the historian is forced to return to the account of Suzanne Labin recorded by Elie Hatem. This covers her Parisian childhood in the *XX^e arrondissement*, the youngest child of a working-class father who was both absent and alcoholic, and an herbalist mother who raised her alone. A bursary allowed the young Suzanne Devoyon to begin her studies in the Sciences at the Sorbonne, where she obtained a degree. She must have been involved politically during her

studies, but Hatem's narrative remains vague. We know more about her background from going through printed sources. It seems that the first texts published by Suzanne Labin were in *Les feuilles libres de la quinzaine*. By 1939 this small, eight-page monthly journal defending "total pacifism" is in its fifth year of existence. It is principally the concern of two men, the philosopher and disciple of Alain, Michel Alexandre, and the professor at the École normale de Lyon, Léon Emery.⁵ Besides pacifism, *Les feuilles* violently denounced the Moscow trials, provoking a deep rupture at the heart of the League of Human Rights at its congress of 1937, with Michel Alexandre and Léon Emery resigning from the League in a fracas since they considered it to have sold out to Stalinist apologetics. It is in this context, along with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, that they welcome the young Suzanne Labin, who publishes a study in three instalments about the "*Culte du Chef*".⁶ The editorial note that introduces it is instructive:

Some reproach us for our anti-Stalinism. We have indeed fought against the Stalinists, just as we have hoped to put people on guard against their duplicity and effectively denounce them as warmongers. Now that the proof is there, we will not lose any more time trampling on the corpses. But the articles that we are about to read, which form the résumé of a doctoral thesis in preparation, that we were sent, incidentally, last July, remain an instructive analysis of that which may yet, in our time, be the blindness of the masses and the idolatry of leaders.⁷

The title and supervisor of the thesis are not known, but Labin's project augurs well for her future publications, above all *Stalin the Terrible*. Labin deliberately included numerous quotations with the aim of revealing the extent to which the Stalin personality cult was servilely perpetuated within the Parisian intellectual scene. To this end, she draws on the official sources available (the press, the civil service) and turns the arguments back on the authors. She also summons up the prose of Boris Souvarine, a qualified "expert", to support her writing. The name is no surprise, since Souvarine, who published his own work critical of Stalin in 1935, is well known within the small world of left-wing anti-communism. There is another reason, however, why the reference to Souvarine is important. At the beginning of the 1930s Souvarine depended on the support of Edouard Labin (whom Suzanne married at the age of 19) in order – from 1933 onwards – to develop a network among students and develop an audience for his review, *La critique*

sociale.⁸ It is obviously difficult to transpose Souvarine's influence onto the wife of his young disciple, but it is clear that Labin immersed herself in political meetings during the course of her studies. The question of Stalin and the USSR was one she made progressively her own, which explains why, after taking her first steps in *Les feuilles libres de la quinzaine*, she published a study on the death penalty in the USSR in the *Mercure de France* in June 1940. Having strenuously denounced Stalin, she attacked the regime for its legal and repressive texts, placing particular emphasis on the criminalization of children. She saw the USSR as "a huge concentration camp" and concluded her analysis by condemning "en bloc" a state that she refused to consider as one that "takes care of education" or that was referred to as the "Land of the Workers". On the contrary, "any notion of humanity is irretrievably dead within it".⁹

Suzanne Labin's university and editorial projects are disrupted by the war. Her husband was called up to fight, but his Jewish identity (of Romanian origin) and his association with acts of resistance perpetrated by the group surrounding André Weill-Curiel, pushes the couple to emigrate to Argentina, where Suzanne Labin spends the whole of the war. She establishes contacts there that later prove fundamental, notably with Octavio González Roura, co-founder of *La revue argentine* in 1934, the monthly *Argentina libre* in 1940, and the *Acción Argentina* movement. In 1963 Suzanne Labin co-prefaced his work *Me duele la Argentina (My Argentina Hurts)* by describing him in the following terms: "Anti-Nazi and anti-Stalinist, he displays democratic convictions, which are coupled with a socialist inspiration, and are of a kind that might be expressed by the Socialist Party of Argentina under the direction of his friend, Alfredo Palacios." Labin also gave homage in support of Argentina: "During the Nazi war, I have had the pleasure of living in a prosperous Argentina. I remain grateful to the women and men of this magnificent country for having welcomed me and treated me with a generosity that rivals that of France, homeland to refugees from the disgrace."¹⁰

From *Stalin the Terrible* to *The Traps of Gorbachev*

While it is impossible within this contribution to analyse Labin's prose in its entirety, her output can be placed in a clearer context in order to track how her thinking on communism evolved over the course of several decades. It is possible to distinguish four phases in her production, each interlocking with the others. *Staline le Terrible*, subtitled *Panorama de la Russie soviétique*, was published in the second half of 1948 but

should be understood as the direct extension of a venture started before the Second World War. Significantly, this work contains the same theme as the two articles already cited, as well as a dual emphasis on both the figure of the Soviet dictator and the regime, not forgetting the presence in the book of extracts from her own articles.¹¹ Calling on Soviet printed materials and an abundant bibliography, Labin draws on the materials that would probably have gone into her thesis had she completed it. On the epistemological level, thanks to her education as a chemist, she understands how to distinguish between “objectivity” and “neutrality”: the first is “a quality in the method of research that is necessary in order to establish the truth, regardless of the consequences and any preconceived ideas”. Thus, “there is no conceivable reason for the truth to always and precisely reside in a ‘happy medium’ [...]. Confusing objectivity and neutrality would amount to never allowing a black or white result and forcing a chemist to always find a grey precipitate.” Labin is therefore objective, but not neutral.¹² The essay is published by Self, the publishing house that was made famous by Victor Kravchenko’s *J’ai choisi la liberté* (*I Choose Freedom*) and Jan Karski’s *Mon témoignage devant le monde. Histoire d’un Etat secret* (*Story of a Secret State: My Report to the World*). Labin’s aim is not just to denounce Stalinism, but also to contrast it with a “rational and human socialism”, the terms of which she discusses in her conclusion in the form of a long “discussion with an enlightened supporter of Stalinism”. The author’s objective is to restructure democracy by endowing it with “new forms adapted to modern life, to the increase in the number of citizens, the complexity of professions, the flowering of resources”.¹³ This large volume finishes with a veritable hymn to globalization, far removed from any discourse of the nationalist right:

First and foremost, above all, we need to remove these oppressive frontiers and these multicoloured stains that spread around the globe like a pernicious skin disease; we need to overcome national prejudices, preach the fusion of nations, races and languages, in short, devote ourselves without delay to the work of all works: the unification of the Earth.¹⁴

At the turn of the 1950s Suzanne Labin was fully aligned with the logic of the anti-communist anti-Stalinist left (she was a member of the Section française de internationale ouvrière at the time)¹⁵ and a belief in the Atlantic alliance with North America. It is at that time that she attempted to found, with André Breton, an anti-Stalinist cultural review

whose committee of patronage would have comprised Henri Frenay, André Gide, Arthur Koestler, Alfred Rosmer, Denis de Rougemont, David Rousset and Boris Souvarine.¹⁶ It is understandable, therefore, that Labin took such an interest in the first steps of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), having played an important role in the French delegation to the inaugural conference in West Berlin in June 1950. She also had ambitions, supported by Arthur Koestler, to take over the editorship of the CCF's journal in Paris, *Preuves*.¹⁷ However, her ambitions were blocked, and even if the lines were not fully broken she did move away from the CCF network. Labin did remain a visible part of the SFIO, bridging the gap between the moderates and the more virulent right-wing anti-communists such as Georges Albertini. Labin would make considerable use of the works of Albertini's *Bulletin de l'Association d'études et d'informations politiques internationales (BEIPI)* to feed her work *Les entretiens de Saint-Germain. Liberté aux liberticides? (The Saint Germain Conversations: Freedom for the Destroyers of Liberty?)*, published in January–March 1957 by Éditions Spartacus. This presented a dialogue between “Suzanne” and “Pierre”, a professor from the Sorbonne. The book marks a change in the anti-communism of Suzanne Labin, with its focus on the threat to Western societies coming from communist subversion as exposed by McCarthyism. Freedom could only be safeguarded by tracking down and denouncing the three circles of the “communist conspiracy”, organized like the Society of Jesus, “the archetype for all conspiratorial movements with an ideological exterior, from which the Bolsheviks merely copied down the recipes as they transposed them into Marxist jargon”.¹⁸ In rabble-rousing language she talks of “sordid communities of monks” and “a meagre smidgeon of clerical beguilers” mixed with communist “killers”.¹⁹ Thus “the whole edifice of the communist hold over the country is constructed on a pyramid-model of secret sections”.²⁰

From that point on, Labin maintained this type of anti-communist populism in her work, often using evocative titles. In April 1957 Éditions Spartacus published a 48-page work entitled *La conspiration communiste: L'hydre totalitaire. Comment le museler (The Communist Conspiracy: The Totalitarian Hydra and How to Muzzle It)*, followed three years later by one of her most famous works, *Il est moins cinq (English version: The Unrelenting War: A Study of the Strategy and Techniques of Communist Propaganda and Infiltration)*. This volume is the summation of her counter-subversion doctrine, one that was not so original but was more a synthesis of existing debates on psychological warfare, with plenty of “military vocabulary” included.²¹ The book is more original than

it appeared, however, because Labin evokes neither Indo-China nor Algeria (unlike the debates on the Right at the time), and because her stated and repeated objective was to defend liberal democracy (which cannot be said to be the model for the radical right). It is also worth adding that during the whole of the Algerian period, Suzanne Labin does not condemn the Gaullism that she tears to pieces several years later in denouncing his politics vis-à-vis the Americans and the Soviets and his role as “an old habitu   of the Paris–Moscow line”.²² Labin therefore clearly thinks along the lines of the Atlanticists, and even those of the United States, which explains her defence of McCarthy (with whom some of her adversaries compare her),²³ as well as her concern for promoting a League of Liberty, closely aligned to the United States, that could form an association of “missionaries for freedom” in France and throughout the world (including within “underdeveloped countries”).²⁴

If for years Suzanne Labin understood communism in terms of “la chose sovi  tique” (the Soviet thing), and thought of her subject in terms of “Comp  tition USSR–USA”,²⁵ she progressively oriented her attention, international circumstances allowing, towards Asia. Increasingly interested since the 1950s in the fate of Formosa (now Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China, in 1959 she published an anthology of 52 anonymous testimonies collected in Hong Kong.²⁶ In the years that follow Labin went on to avidly defend and justify the American intervention in Vietnam,²⁷ once again making use of witness testimonies as used in her work on China from 1959.²⁸ While continuing to defend Formosa,²⁹ she published a series of brochures against communist China, denouncing any prospect of diplomatic recognition, and castigating its activity in Africa and Asia.³⁰ Her essential book from this period is *Le petit livre rouge arme de guerre* (*The Little Red Book, Weapon of War*), which, centred on the figure of Mao, is the counterpart to her book on Stalin. A classic example of Suzanne Labin’s writings, it describes in detail “the instrument of conquest” which is “the apparatus of propaganda and subversion”, and expresses a certain Orientalism in its judgement that this “classic instrument of communism” is “basted with a particular Chinese stock that gives it a certain piquancy”.³¹ Opium is a useful tool for the communists for making money and recruiting agents.³² Labin’s use of testimonies gathered from witnesses would return in later publications covering the kinds of psychological manipulations present among drug addicts and hippies.³³

The end of the 1970s opened the final phase of Labin’s production. A continuing concern with communist subversion (which led her to defend the regime of General Pinochet in Chile) was combined

with denunciations of international terrorism and a vibrant defence of Israel.³⁴ Yet despite an impressive rate of production, a decline in quality is evident, demonstrated by repetitious writing and the fact that she is increasingly unable to find a publisher. This is epitomized by the fact that she ends up self-publishing her brochures on communist expansion and its alleged new advances (New Caledonia was “sacrificed to the red sharks”), or “the traps of Gorbachev”.³⁵ This series culminated in the authorized biography that Elie Hatem devoted to her in 1995.

The Reception and Legitimacy of Suzanne Labin

In terms of Labin’s reputation and influence, the first thing to bear in mind is that her works were often translated into different languages, both in Europe and beyond. This was the case with *Staline le Terrible*,³⁶ *Drame de la démocratie: La condition humaine en Chine communiste*,³⁷ *Il est moins cinq*,³⁸ *Compétition URSS–USA*,³⁹ and *Vietnam. Rvélation d’un témoin*.⁴⁰ Labin did not fail to remind her readers of this fact from one book to the next, and also took the opportunity to highlight how she participated in conferences all over the world, under the banner of the League of Liberty and the International Conference on Political Warfare, an organization of which she was the president and which formed part of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). She was also linked to the Comité international d’action sociale (CIAS), the successor network to the Paix et liberté organization of Jean-Paul David. Labin’s speeches (many of which are captured in photographs gathered in Hatem’s biography) were apparently delivered in French, English or Spanish.

Labin was certainly an engaged political writer, utilizing a popular style that suggests someone more interested in reaching a wider audience than influencing the decision-makers. Yet some observers did ascribe considerable influence to her. A Swiss memorandum on her activities in the early 1960s views her as being the inspiration for Article IV of the constitution of the French Fifth Republic, which compelled political parties to adopt a democratic structure and so allow for the outlawing of the Parti communiste français (PCF).⁴¹ Others such as François Bondy remained circumspect about the importance of Labin and her husband. In discussion with Denis de Rougemont, Bondy declared himself “dumbfounded” as he recounted how Edouard Labin talked to him about the “jury of the Prix de la Liberté as if he himself had personally appointed it”.⁴² Others remarked on “how to manage the oversized ego of Suzanne Labin?”⁴³ The aforementioned Swiss memorandum

attributed a strong influence to her in diplomatic and anti-communist circles and insisted on the fact that she had “become one of the international leaders in the struggle against communism” as recognized in the communist world as much as everywhere else. Yet a reader familiar with Labin’s prose cannot help but notice that this document presents her as she saw herself.

What about her role in France itself? Without completely ignoring Suzanne Labin, the scholarly world has paid her scant regard. Certainly, her articles and books figure in the *Bibliographie des travaux parus en France concernant la Russie et l’URSS* published by André Lhéritier in the *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, but little else is mentioned. Similarly, the reviews to be found in *Politique étrangère* or *la Revue française de science politique* are succinct and neutral. The brief review of one of her essays is typical: “Mme Labin draws a balance sheet of what democracy is, of its strength and its weakness; she studies the critics who are opposed to democracy and concludes by affirming her faith in a slow but continuous progress of the human condition.”⁴⁴ It is much the same story with her *Révélation d’un témoin à propos du Vietnam*, which is only mentioned briefly in the Recent Books section of *Politique étrangère*,⁴⁵ while *Le tiers-Monde entre l’Est et l’Ouest* gives rise to the brief remark, “Mme S. Labin, who has visited 22 Third World nations, conveys the result of her pessimistic observations.” A third source, *La revue française de science politique*, is no better. In reference to *Vie ou mort du monde libre* and the 50 testimonials collected by Labin, the journal states dryly that the work

Collects together the speeches and contributions of fifty individuals at the “Conférence internationale sur la guerre politique des Soviets” [International Conference on Soviet Political Warfare], held in Paris in December of 1960. Aims to “wake-up the free world” and alert public opinion to the lethal decline of democracies in the face of communism since 1945. Summons the free world to defensive and offensive political warfare against communism’.⁴⁶

This mistrust from academics was not shared by the military circles in whose journals Suzanne Labin also published.⁴⁷ So far as journals of ideas and the more politically engaged press were concerned, two elements characterize the period 1960–70. In the first place, Labin did publish in *Revue des deux mondes* over a prolonged period of time.⁴⁸ Second, some Catholic reviews do give her a favourable reception at the start of the 1960s.⁴⁹ While *France catholique* accepted her articles,⁵⁰ the

journal *Etudes* gave favourable write-ups on some of her books, albeit with guarded language. Thus if *La condition en Chine communiste* is “a testimony of very great value”, reviewer André Bonnichon stressed that the “committed socialist” Suzanne Labin “does not hide her aversion for the communist system”. Praising this “all too rare frankness”, the writer expressed hope that a “conspiracy of silence” would not descend on the book.⁵¹ *Vie ou mort du monde libre* received support from the same André Bonnichon two years later: “It needs to be read, this cry of alarm, which is going up with one voice in all countries and on all continents. We know the fate of those edifices that are gnawed away from the inside and then suddenly collapse. No catastrophe is inevitable, and that is why we ask the consuls to keep watch.”⁵² The third review, dedicated to *Compétition URSS–USA*, is equally laudatory. Here, Bonnichon made much of the “salubrious work of demystification” undertaken by Labin, whom he praised for her method (the recourse to official sources) and her conclusions. The reviewer of *Etudes* also highlighted “a wilful blindness towards the objective nature of Russian successes. [...] A book to be read.”⁵³

Finally, the relations between Suzanne Labin and nationalist right-wing groups deserves some attention. Labin did not emerge from those ranks, and scarcely had any points of entry despite their shared anti-communism and the fact that she, like they, were published by La Table Ronde. Also, the anti-communist struggle in the name of democracy was not a mobilizing force for those circles affected by the defence of French Algeria, not a cause for which Labin was fighting. She is, ultimately, a little unusual within the French context. Right-wing periodicals such as *C'est-à-dire* and *Ecrits de Paris* did not refer to her except in passing in relation to her publications.⁵⁴ The assessment holds true for the years that follow. Her contribution in the journal *Item* in 1976 gives some answers: her critique and conclusions are stamped with the values of what she calls “the old Left”. Like the old Right (which, according to her, died at Yalta), the old Left found itself “consigned to the wayside”.⁵⁵ The fact that Suzanne Labin ended up publishing *Les colombes rouges* through Dominique Martin Morin in 1985, and contributed to *Cahiers de chîré*,⁵⁶ indicates her complete marginalization rather than any sign of her importance within ideological battles.

The most difficult aspect of Labin's career concerns her position on the left–right spectrum. Originally on the anti-Stalinist left, she has long been associated with the radical right. When considering the different phases of her anti-communism from the Liberation to the Vietnam war, it is noticeable that she reflects more of an American chronology rather

than a French one. France is in fact largely absent from her writings, and she rarely directed her anti-communism towards the French communist party. Her anti-communism was primarily anti-Soviet. One has to wait until 1983 to see her denounce, in a brochure, the *socialisme* of the 1980s.⁵⁷ At that point, any resonance that Labin may have had is clearly on the wane, and French socialism was far removed from the kind she had previously championed. Yet whether Labin was *of* the right remains an open question.

Notes

1. Pierre Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anti-communisme. Le congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris 1950–1975* (Paris: Fayard, 1995). She is cited on eight occasions.
2. In his *Histoire générale de l'ultra-gauche* (Paris: Denoël, 2003) and his 'Réflexions tardives sur l'histoire générale de l'ultra gauche' published on his blog in June 2005, Christophe Bourseiller qualifies Suzanne Labin as an "author of the right, pro-American and conservative".
3. Elie Hatem, *L'étonnante Suzanne Labin. Son œuvre, Sa lutte, Son message*, preface by Philippe Malaud [who takes the opportunity to highlight the fact that he participated in annual congresses of the World Anti-Communist League] (Paris: Editions Suzanne Labin, 1995).
4. Sylvie Golvet, *Louis Guilloux, devenir romancier* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2010). She cites a letter from André Breton to Suzanne Labin (whom she describes as a collaborator of André Breton), dated 7 March 1950, in which the latter wrote to him saying that they had "sung songs in the gondola".
5. On the journal and its editors, see Christian Jelen, *Hitler ou Staline. Le prix de la paix* (Paris: Flammarion, 1988), pp. 28–33.
6. Suzanne Labin, "Le culte du chef d'après les documents tirés de la presse soviétique", *Feuilles libres de la Quinzaine* 85 (10 September 1939), pp. 209–12; 86 (10 October 1939), pp. 218–20; 87 (15 October 1939), pp. 226–8. For an overview of this "cult" in the French communist press at the end of the 1930s, see Jean-Marie Goulemot, "Du culte de Staline et de quelques autres chez les communistes français", in Natacha Dioujeva and François George (eds), *Staline à Paris* (Paris: Ramsay, 1982), pp. 21–32.
7. *Feuilles libres de la quinzaine* 85 (10 September 1939), p. 209.
8. Jean-Louis Panné, *Boris Souvarine. Le premier désenchanté du communisme* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1993), pp. 208–9.
9. Suzanne Labin, "La peine de mort en URSS et les lois excessives", *Mercure de France* 598 (1 June 1940), pp. 546–54 (552, 554).
10. Diana Quattrochi-Woisson, "La Revue Argentine, Paris-Buenos Aires, 1934–1945. 'Hommage à nos prédécesseurs'", *La Nouvelle Revue Argentine* 1 (September 2008), pp. 8–27.
11. Page 417 of *Staline le Terrible* (Paris: Self, 1948) repeats these phrases from the article in *Mercure de France*.
12. *Staline le terrible*, pp. 12–13 (italics in original).
13. *Ibid.*, p. 555.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 556.
15. Grémion, *Intelligence d'anticommunisme*, p. 79.
16. This circular letter is reproduced in Carole Reynaud-Paligot, *Parcours politiques des surréalistes, 1918–1969* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2010), pp. 208–9. Above all, see Gérard Roche, “Entre collaboration et intervention: les surréalistes à *Combat* et *Arts* (1950–1952)”, *Cahiers du Centre de Recherche sur le surréalisme, Mélusine* 25 (2005). Suzanne Labin is cited on p. 91.
17. Grémion, p. 76.
18. Suzanne Labin, *Les entretiens de Saint-Germain. Liberté aux liberticides?* (Paris: Éditions Spartacus, 1957), p. 77.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 79–101.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
21. Suzanne Labin, *Il est moins cinq* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1960), p. 9.
22. Suzanne Labin, *De Gaulle ou la France enchaînée* (Paris: Editions de la Ligue de la Liberté, 1965), p. 38. Significantly, Labin sings the praises of the socialist Paul Ramadier and denounces the nature (p. 39) of General de Gaulle's anti-communism as expressed by the Rassemblement du Peuple Français.
23. Suzanne Labin, *Il est moins cinq*, pp. 87ff.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 106ff.
25. See *Il est moins cinq* and the title of one of her essays published by Éditions de la Table Ronde in 1962.
26. Suzanne Labin, *La condition humaine en Chine communiste* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1959).
27. Suzanne Labin, *La liberté se joue à Saïgon* (Paris: Editions de la Ligue de la Liberté, 1965).
28. Suzanne Labin, *Vietnam, révélations d'un témoin* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions latines, 1964).
29. Suzanne Labin, *Goliath et David. Justice pour la Chine libre* (Paris: Editions de la Ligue de la Liberté, 1967).
30. See Suzanne Labin, *Ambassades pour subversions* (Paris: Editions de la Ligue de la Liberté, 1965); *Les colonialistes chinois en Afrique* (Paris: Editions de la Ligue de la Liberté, 1965); *Menaces chinoises sur l'Asie* (Paris: La Table ronde, 1966).
31. Suzanne Labin, *Le petit livre rouge arme de guerre* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1969).
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 19–34.
33. Suzanne Labin, *Hippies, drogue et sexe* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1970) and *Le monde des drogués* (Paris: France Empire, 1975).
34. Suzanne Labin, *Israël, le crime de résister* (Paris: Nouvelles éditions Debresse, 1980); *La violence politique* (Paris: France Empire, 1979); *Israël, le crime de vivre* (Paris: Nouvelles éditions Debresse, 1981).
35. Suzanne Labin, *Les requins rouges et leurs Poissons-Pilotes. La politique Nord-Sud au service de l'expansionnisme soviétique* (Paris: self-published, 1986), see pp. 113ff.; *Le monde libre va-t-il tomber dans les pièges de Gorbatchev? Son cheval de Troie: la maison commune* (Paris: self-published, 1990).
36. Translated into English, Chinese, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese.
37. Translated into English (United States, Great Britain and India), Burmese, Chinese, Korean, Spanish, Portuguese, Hindi and Urdu.
38. Translated into English, Chinese, Spanish, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese and Vietnamese.
39. Translated into Spanish, Japanese and Portuguese.

40. Translated into English.
41. Document obtained from Cantonal Archives of Vaud, PP 296, 9/8. This represents a major overestimation of Labin's role. Her name does not appear in the works that cover the formation of the constitution of the Fifth Republic, and the constitution's authors had no intention of banning the PCF. It is illustrative that this claim can also be found in Hatem's biography, *L'étonnante Suzanne Labin*, which claims (p. 136) that "among her initiatives, she inspired Article IV of the constitution".
42. Bondy to de Rougemont, Series VII, Box 5, Folder 2, papers of the CCF/International Association of Cultural Freedom, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago.
43. Anonymous memorandum, Bundesarchiv, B 137, 2617, Koblenz.
44. *Politique étrangère* 19 (1954), p. 628.
45. *Politique étrangère* 30 (1965), p. 545.
46. *Revue française de science politique* (bibliographic information) 4 (1962), pp. 1055–6.
47. "Les Nations Unies, un piège manipulé par l'URSS," *Revue militaire générale* 5 (1963), pp. 676–81.
48. Worthy of mention are "La toxicomanie", July 1977; "La violence et les mass media", October 1977; "La stratégie du terrorisme au Chili", October 1986.
49. The links between France and Quebec are an important aspect of this, in particular in relation to the role of Marcel Clément and the magazine *Aujourd'hui Québec*, which ran in the mid-1960s as an anti-communist, pro-Catholic publication. Labin received flattering reviews (*Ambassades pour subversion* is chronicled in May 1965 in the "Best Books" section) and she herself published articles that were anti-Gaullist ("Où de Gaulle mène-t-il la France?", March 1966, pp. 43–8) and pro-American ("La liberté se joue à Saïgon", May 1966, pp. 43–8).
50. Notably "La guerre politique des Sovièts au Sud-Vietnam", *La France catholique* 777 (20 October 1961); "Comment l'URSS s'infiltré dans le Tiers-Monde", *La France catholique* 801 (6 April 1962), pp. 1, 8; "URSS–USA, deux blocs ou deux morales?", *La France catholique* 860 (1963), p. 6; "La coexistence pacifique est-elle un piège?", *La France catholique* 883 (1963), pp. 1, 8.
51. *Etudes* 7 (1960), p. 148.
52. *Etudes* 12 (1962), p. 435.
53. *Etudes* 5 (1963), p. 277.
54. See the editions of *Ecrits de Paris* for January 1965, July–August 1966, September 1966 and April 1969.
55. Suzanne Labin, "Un destin pour la droite", *Item. Revue d'opinion libre*, February 1976, pp. 13–15.
56. In particular, for volume 5 she supplied an article entitled "Hanoi prend sa commission sur l'aide des réfugiés vietnamiens à leurs familles".
57. Suzanne Labin, *Socialisme. La Démagogie du Changement* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Debresse, 1983).

13

The Mont Pèlerin Society and the Rise of a Postwar Classical Liberal Counter-Establishment

Niels Bjerre-Poulsen

In March of 1947, the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek gathered a group of 39 participants from 10 different countries together at Mont Pèlerin, near Vevey in Switzerland. The idea was to create an informal network of scholars and politicians, who all shared a belief in liberalism and who all believed that freedom was under serious threat, either from socialism or from Keynesian ideas. The participants, who had been exclusively selected by Hayek, believed that not only had faith in the forces of a free-market economy been dealt a severe blow during the economic crises of the 1930s, but equally troubling, the wartime experiences of many Western countries had also convinced the political elites that central planning was a viable option. Democracies not only faced an external threat from communism, these liberals would argue, but also an existential one from the collectivist ideas of their own governing elites.¹

Eight months after the gathering in Switzerland, the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) was incorporated in Springfield, Illinois, with the stated aim of facilitating “the exchange of views among minds inspired by certain ideals and broad conceptions held in common, to contribute to the preservation and improvement of the free society”.² This article explores the Mont Pèlerin Society’s efforts to meet this goal and to restore faith in the superiority of market-based solutions over “planning” and state intervention.

The idea behind MPS was to create an elite network that could serve as a nexus of ideas and an incubator of new liberal policies among thinkers, politicians and journalists on both sides of the Atlantic. During the early Cold War years, MPS managed to successfully bring a number of neoliberal scholars out of intellectual isolation and make them a vital

part of a new conservative “counter-establishment”. Three decades later, many liberals would trace the dominance of their views back to the seeds sown in the late 1940s by Hayek and his fellow members of the MPS.

Agreeing on the proper terminology for the views shared by these members remains a difficult task. Although all of them would describe themselves as liberals of some sort, they maintained different conceptions about exactly what that implied. Furthermore, there are differences of terminology on the American and the European side. Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that Hayek in his address to the first meeting at Mont Pèlerin, chose to speak in rather vague terms about the shortcomings of “traditional liberal theory” and about the need to “reconstruct a liberal philosophy which can fully meet the objections which in the eyes of most of our contemporaries have defeated the promise the earlier liberalism offered”.³ Several scholars have chosen to use the term “neoliberalism” to describe the MPS. However, this term has predominantly been used in Europe, whereas Americans have tended to prefer “libertarian”, “laissez-faire liberal”, or even “conservative”. Furthermore, neither Hayek nor any of the other leading members described themselves as “neoliberals”.⁴ For the rest of this chapter the term “classical liberal” will be used.

Terminology notwithstanding, Hayek managed, in the words of Jamie Peck, to establish “a transatlantic space of communication across an embryonic network of localized liberalisms”.⁵ Many of the people who made the journey to Mont Pèlerin were already well known within their fields and in their respective home countries, while others would become so later. Nevertheless, most of them shared a sense of having been intellectually marginalized by the new dominance of Keynesian thinking.⁶ They saw it as their mission to “save the books” while Rome was burning, and the topics discussed at the early meetings clearly reflected this defensive outlook.⁷ However, it was Hayek’s ambition to move beyond that. He hoped that he and his fellow participants at Mont Pèlerin could create a long-term strategy for intellectual dominance, along the lines of what socialist organizations such as the British Fabian Society had done since the 1880s.⁸ A couple of years later, Hayek would elaborate on why he and his associates had to emulate what the Left had done a generation before. In an essay entitled “The Intellectuals and Socialism”, he noted that “in every country that has moved towards socialism, the phase in development in which socialism becomes a determining influence on politics has been preceded for many years by a period during which socialist ideals governed the thinking of the more active intellectuals”.⁹

As Hayek saw it, Germany, England and France had long since reached that stage, while the United States had only reached it during the Second World War. “Experience suggests”, he noted, “that once this phase has been reached, it is merely a question of time until the views now held by the intellectuals become the governing force of politics.”¹⁰ The critical step was to secure the transmission from the scientists and utopian thinkers to the “professional second-hand dealers in ideas”. The Mont Pèlerin Society would play an important role in doing this. At its meetings the thinkers could meet influential journalists, educators and politicians – the people who helped shape common values and perceptions. These were the people who could undo a generation of socialist influence in Western democracies. The urgency of this task required a willingness to go beyond laissez-faire and create “a liberal Utopia” that could inspire the imagination and compete with the attraction of socialism. As Hayek noted, “The intellectual, by his whole disposition, is uninterested in technical details or practical difficulties. What appeal to him are broad visions, the spacious comprehension of the social order as a whole which a planned system promises.”¹¹ The next step – to create an institutional framework that could promote such broad visions of a liberal Utopia – required funding.

The Austrian School Meets Midwestern Capital(ism)

As it turned out, Hayek received most of the initial funding for MPS from a group of Midwestern businessmen keen to gather intellectual firepower for a new conservative movement. Among them were the wealthy Du Pont brothers, the owners of Du Pont Chemical, and Jasper Crane, who had retired after long service as executive vice president in that company. These men were convinced that the creation of a new intellectual counter-establishment could help recreate faith in the market. This conviction had brought Hayek and his Austrian mentor, Ludwig von Mises, to their attention.

Hayek had become a household name among American conservatives in 1945 when his book *The Road to Serfdom* was published in the United States. Although it was never intended for popular consumption, the book actually became a bestseller. It was even reprinted in an abridged version by *Reader's Digest* and achieved sales of more than a million copies. Hayek's book was dedicated to “socialists of all parties”. His claim was that countries such as Great Britain and the United States were most likely to be taken down an unforeseen road to “totalitarianism” by well-meaning democrats adopting “planning” in their attempt

to promote the general welfare of the nation, rather than by dedicated communists or fascists. Thus, “totalitarianism” would be an unintended consequence of the way in which economic planning would ultimately change the social and moral values of the nation. The radical message in *The Road to Serfdom* was that no stable middle ground existed between unconditional faith in planning and unconditional faith in the virtues of the free market, and that the latter was the only choice which *in the long run* was compatible with democracy. Hayek did not argue that planning equalled “totalitarianism”, but rather that it created an “alteration in the character of the people” that would create the social and moral climate for a totalitarian state.¹²

The American response to Hayek’s book is often mentioned as one of the first signs of the birth of the modern conservative movement in that country. Several conservative intellectuals would later refer to their reading of it as a crucial event in their political awakening, and Hayek soon found himself on a national book tour, speaking to large audiences. In New York City, some 3000 people showed up to listen to him.¹³ When Hayek began promoting his plans for an “international academy of political philosophy” to potential donors, he would argue that Americans had a lot to learn from European liberals who had supposedly seen the true face of centralized power. As he would put it in his first address to the participants at Mont Pèlerin in 1947, “For the inhabitants of a free country it seems almost impossible to understand the process first by which freedom is lost!”¹⁴ In other words, the purpose of a transatlantic gathering was not just to promote American liberal values in the restoration of Europe, but also to use European examples to alert Americans to the alleged dangers of “collectivism”.

On his book tour around America Hayek had met Harold Luhnnow, a businessman from Kansas City who was very responsive to this message. Luhnnow was in charge of his uncle’s furniture distribution company, William Volker & Company, and when Volker died in 1947, he was also put in charge of the company’s philanthropic trust, the Volker Fund. He decided to begin sponsoring conservative and libertarian causes, and among the first things he chose to support was Hayek’s proposed meeting at Mont Pèlerin.¹⁵ The Volker Fund and Jasper Crane would later combine forces and funds to secure Hayek a chair at the University of Chicago, just as various conservative funds had secured Ludwig von Mises a position as visiting professor at New York University. Other Austrian economists who already held chairs in the United States included Professor Gottfried von Haberler at Harvard University and Fritz Machlup at University of Buffalo (from 1947 at Johns Hopkins

University). Like Ludwig von Mises, they too would join the Mont Pèlerin Society. The Volker Fund may have been a philanthropic trust, but the objectives of business financiers such as Luhnnow and Crane were always pretty clear – they wanted the organizations and initiatives they sponsored to have a real political impact.

Dreams of a Classical Liberal “Thought Collective”

Although wartime planning and the emergence of the Cold War had further alarmed the participants at Mont Pèlerin, the very idea of creating a liberal thought collective actually predated the war. In 1938, the French philosopher Louis Rougier had gathered some 26 liberal intellectuals in Paris to mark the publication of a French translation of Walter Lippmann’s *The Good Society*.¹⁶ Lippmann, whose column “Today and Tomorrow” was syndicated in 100 newspapers and read regularly by some ten million Americans, was also well known in Europe, and the *The Good Society*, which went against the grain of New Deal America by reasserting the superiority of a free-market economy, was widely praised in many European countries. Accordingly, the event in Paris had been named the *Colloque Walter Lippmann* in his honour.¹⁷

The meeting resulted in a common desire to create a transatlantic network in order to promote a “renovated liberal order, distinct from Manchester *laissez-faire*”.¹⁸ The participants had high hopes of maintaining direct contact and perhaps joining forces to publish a journal and a series of pamphlets. They even made the outline for an organization: the Comité international d’étude pour le renouveau du libéralisme (CIERL). The war disrupted their ties and delayed such ideas, but in a sense, the meeting at Mont Pèlerin continued where the meeting in Paris had left off nine years earlier.¹⁹ Many of the participants were also the same.

The group that met at Mont Pèlerin in 1947 included prominent intellectuals such as Raymond Aron, Maurice Allais and Karl Popper. Friedrich Hayek had also invited a number of influential journalists to the meeting, including Willy Bretscher of *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, John A. Davenport of *Barron’s*, Henry Hazlitt of *Newsweek*, and Felix Morley, editor of the conservative American journal *Human Events*. Walter Lippmann was also present. While only two other Americans had joined him nine years earlier in Paris, almost half of the participants were American this time.²⁰ A majority of them were economists. Eight members of MPS would later win the Nobel Prize for economics, and four of them were present at this first gathering.²¹ A number of

European and American “schools” of liberalism were present, such as the “Austrian School” (originally centred on Vienna but largely transplanted to the United States) and Hayek’s colleagues from the London School of Economics, led by his close friend and British mentor Sir Lionel Robbins and his colleague Sir Arnold Plant. A third group consisted of German free-market economists, often described as “ordoliberalists”. While some leading proponents, such as Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow, had been in exile, another group of economists and legal scholars had quietly survived the years of the Nazi regime at the University of Freiburg under the leadership of Walter Eucken. The fourth school that was strongly represented was the “Chicago School”. The University of Chicago had emerged during the 1930s as a centre for principled opposition to Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, and would later become known for its emphasis on monetary economics and the way in which it applied a quantitative theory of money to attack the major theses of Keynesianism. At Mont Pèlerin it was strongly represented by Frank Knight and disciples such as Aaron Director, Milton Friedman and George J. Stigler.

Among the people who joined the Mont Pèlerin Society after its incorporation in November 1947 were the Austrian sociologist Alfred Schütz and Luigi Einaudi, then governor of the Bank of Italy and deputy prime minister. Einaudi would the following year become the second president of the Italian Republic (1948–55). West Germany’s Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhardt, joined the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1950. He had previously served as director of the Economic Council for the joint Anglo–US occupation zone and in that capacity worked with several other members of MPS. In 1963 he became German chancellor. Other prominent politicians who would later join MPS included US Secretary of State George Shultz, Republican House Majority Leader Dick Armey, Chile’s Finance Minister Carlos Cáceres, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, British MP Enoch Powell and Czech President Václav Klaus.

Virtually all the members of MPS would describe themselves as liberals of some sort, but they had different conceptions about just what that implied. They agreed on the need to counter illiberal ideologies, on the essential importance of private property, the rule of law and an effective market. However, they had discussions – and sometimes passionate disagreements – over issues such as the proper role of the state, the uses of monetary policy, the need for a gold standard, the role of agricultural subsidies and the connection, if any, between Christianity and freedom. There were scholars such as Wilhelm Röpke who opposed

the idea of “godless capitalism”, and Frank Knight, who saw no role for religion in liberalism. The ordoliberalists acknowledged a strong influence from Catholicism, just as Hayek himself and a number of other participants shared the idea that the cultural traditions of Christianity could make up for the “creative destruction” of capitalism. Concerning the proper role of the state, most agreed with Hayek that some form of government intervention was indeed necessary, but that the true purpose of such intervention had to be to create “a competitive order” that would make competition work. An article about the Mont Pèlerin Society in the *Swiss Review of World Affairs* referred to it as “the nucleus of a neo-liberal school of thought, of a new movement in favour of a liberalism true to classic tenets, but wiser by the rich experience of recent decades”.²² What the last part of the sentence supposedly alluded to was that most of the participants in the early years of the society were willing to accept that liberalism was not a natural order, and that the market did not work by itself. Unlike laissez-faire or Manchester liberalism, a new liberalism had to be able to actively create social change.

Although the Cold War and the threat from the Soviet Union would occasionally be addressed directly at Mont Pèlerin Society meetings in the following years, it was to some extent seen as such an obvious problem that it was hardly worth mentioning. In a sense MPS was more concerned with “domestic containment” – preventing socialism from entering Western democracies through the back door and threatening them from the inside. The second MPS meeting in Seelisberg, Switzerland, in 1949 had papers on “Soviet science” and the “Soviet genetics controversy”, but it was not until the seventh meeting in Berlin in 1956 that the challenge from communism explicitly was made the major theme.²³

A few of the society’s members were willing to make big ideological compromises in an effort to strengthen liberal forces in Europe. Prior to the first meeting at Mont Pèlerin, Karl Popper, Hayek’s colleague at the London School of Economics, wrote him that the most important mission for a new international academy of political philosophy would be to strengthen democracy throughout postwar Europe. In the current political situation that would, in his view, require a reconciliation of liberals and socialists. “It is a fact (although it may be deplorable)”, Popper wrote, “that, at the present moment, the only democrats of any influence in Central Europe are the social democrats and the christian democrats. To find some platform for co-operation with these two forces is more important than ever.”²⁴ There were also participants who strongly disagreed with such talk of political compromise, and indeed

with the very idea that markets were inherently flawed and that government intervention was required. Most outspoken was the truculent Ludwig von Mises, who at one point wanted Wilhelm Röpke excluded from the Society as “an outright interventionist”.²⁵ Ludwig von Mises was a minority voice at the first meeting at Mont Pèlerin, but his views were largely shared by many of the American sponsors, including representatives from the Volker Fund.

Hayek envisioned “a sort of International Academy of Political Philosophy”, but the business sponsors were not interested in an academy.²⁶ What they wanted was an organization that could help spread the gospel of laissez-faire on both sides of the Atlantic. Leonard Read, president of the Foundation for Economic Education, who co-sponsored the first meeting at Mont Pèlerin, found that many of the attendees were “socialists who like to label themselves liberals”.²⁷ As he wrote to the editor of *Human Events*, Felix Morley, he was not sure that the MPS would become the proper vehicle for his efforts to “perform a liberal service to those in Europe who desire it”:

Ideologically, even with the initial group hand-picked by Hayek, with the exception of a dozen, it ranged all the way from state-interventionists to one who was an out-and-out socialist. It doesn't appear to me to have quite the element of liberalism in it that would make its expansion something to be ardently desired.

After the initial meeting at Mont Pèlerin a worried Jasper Crane also wrote Hayek that he had been told that not all the participants were “completely forthright in their belief and support of Liberty”.²⁸ Crane found this very disturbing and wanted Hayek's assurance, since “the fight for Liberty will only be won under leadership which is single-eyed and whole-souled in devotion to truth and righteousness”.²⁹ In his response, Hayek elegantly turned Crane's argument on its head by admitting that there was a certain lack of homogeneity in the American group:

As you have probably heard, they not only differed a good deal among themselves, but almost every member of the American group did regard some of the others as not truly liberals. There is [...] a tendency to create an unreasoning orthodoxy which treats traditional liberal principles as a faith rather than a problem on which reasonable people may differ.³⁰

Hayek's plea for tolerance did not deter Crane, who still found that "future recruits should be scrutinized with great care". Compromising with principle could have us all "troop the 'Road to Serfdom' in greater or less degree".³¹

It would not be the last time that Crane attempted to put pressure on Hayek regarding the need for orthodoxy and a stronger business influence. He found it to be of vital importance that the European members would mix with American businessmen in the hope that they would "lose some of their distrust of capitalists".³² Before the society's first meeting in the United States in 1958, which Crane co-sponsored, he was concerned that Wilhelm Röpke and other German ordoliberalists might "attack laissez faire" and "undo much of the good that can be accomplished in an American meeting".³³ In his response, Hayek admitted that Röpke had "a bee in his bonnet on the preservation of traditions and a curious horror of 'commercialism' (which affects his attitude to the U.S.)". It would be his task, Hayek promised, "to steer Röpke away from such topics".³⁴

Strategic Considerations

The Mont Pèlerin Society was meant to lead a new classical liberal/conservative counter-establishment, but how was it meant to play this role? Would it actively seek political influence? Would it promote actual policy proposals? Friedrich Hayek himself wanted the meetings of the society to be private and "off the record".³⁵ Although he invited a number of influential journalists, he did not want them to do any reporting unless the members decided otherwise. His main concern focused on long-term shifts in the intellectual climate, and he talked about waging a twenty-year battle of ideas. The official "Memorandum of Association" for the Mont Pèlerin Society mentions the organizing of conferences and the circulation and possible translation and publication of papers "which will assist the study of a free society".³⁶ It also mentioned the appointment of correspondents in various countries as a task for the Society. More direct channels of influence were not mentioned.

However, some members disagreed with Hayek's strategic objectives and talked about the urgent need for the direct contestation of reigning political ideas. Among them were Ludwig von Mises, Felix Morley, Karl Brandt and the prominent French economist (and later Minister of State in Monaco) Jacques Rueff, who all argued that a prominent gathering of minds such as the Mont Pèlerin Society could have an

immediate propaganda value. The discussion about how to have a political impact continued in the following years. In June 1949 Karl Brandt wrote to Hayek to urge more “momentum and speed”: “Rome is burning right now. The appalling landslide toward the ‘welfare state’ in this country [the United States] since we met on the Mont Pèlerin should be irrefutable evidence of it.”³⁷ There was, however, one place where the classical liberal “thought collective” was already about to have a more direct political impact. In West Germany, Ludwig Erhard was acting on the ideas of Mont Pèlerin Society members Walter Eucken, Alfred Müller-Armack and Wilhelm Röpke in creating the social-market economy.

Transatlantic Tensions

Hayek was convinced that the most urgent concern of the people meeting at Mont Pèlerin was the future of Germany. In his view a revived Germany was the key to European stability, not just in economic terms but also as a way of “regaining those values on which European civilization was built”.³⁸ Writing from Geneva, Röpke likewise stressed that restoration of a free-market economy in West Germany was the key to the economic rehabilitation of all of Western Europe. As he saw it, an organization like the Mont Pèlerin Society could play a special role in this process:

Every possible effort ought to be concentrated on this task. That means that the ideological climate of socialist Europe must be changed by a subtly organized and well concerted propaganda which the US could safely leave to the European advocates of free enterprise without showing their hand too openly.³⁹

Röpke was talking about the empowerment of European liberals both in a general sense and in a very specific way. He was calling on American authorities in Europe to trust him and his colleagues with the restoration process, since a higher degree of American control of the money spent would “create a new and gigantic machinery of planned economy which would reveal its worst features and deprive the Americans of the possibility of teaching the Europeans a sound economic policy based on the working of free markets”.⁴⁰ Instead, Röpke called for

an energetic and intelligent counter-offensive of the advocates of the free market economy – a task that several millions out of the billions

of the ERP [Economic Recovery Program] ought to be earmarked for [...] in order to ensure the success of the remaining billions.⁴¹

Although Röpke was not writing on behalf of the Mont Pèlerin Society, his views probably reflected a more general difference in how the society's European and "American" members perceived the nature of the transatlantic partnership. His primary focus was on the future of Europe, and unlike most of the members from the American side, he seemed less concerned about alleged threats from "collectivism" and central planning within the United States. One may argue that for their part, the US financiers of the MPS were preoccupied with the American situation, and mostly interested in European developments to the extent that they provided valuable lessons for the United States or to the extent that European scholars provided intellectual credibility to an emerging conservative counter-establishment. Regardless of Röpke's desire for closer cooperation between the American government and European classical liberals, some ideological tension also remained between European free-market moderates and many of the American delegates, whose views were more libertarian in nature.⁴²

In some cases, tensions of a more personal nature were cloaked in transatlantic terms. The Mont Pèlerin Society's Swiss secretary, Albert Hunold – eager to gain influence beyond the practical matters of the new organization – wrote another founding member, Professor Karl Brandt, that

we have to be careful with these Americans because they want to do it all themselves and are not inclined to follow for instance the proposal of Roepke that the ideological campaign for the Marshall plan could safely be left to the European advocates of free enterprise.⁴³

The job of brokering some of these tensions was to a large extent left to Hayek.

The American sponsors, for their part, remained suspicious about a number of the European members, not least the German "ordoliberals", who attempted to reconcile liberal capitalism with long-standing German traditions of social order. Ordoliberalism acknowledged the destructive potential of the market and emphasized the need for government to promote social cohesion, just as it stressed the importance of an active anti-monopoly policy in order to constantly counter economic concentration.⁴⁴ The regulatory role that ordoliberals ascribed to the state went well beyond Hayek's emphasis on the rule of law, and was

even further from the Chicago School of Milton Friedman and George Stigler. However, Hayek, von Mises and Friedman all recognized that their German colleagues had to overcome certain local hostilities, and that they had in fact contributed to the process of introducing liberal capitalism in postwar West Germany.⁴⁵

Assessing the Impact of the Mont Pèlerin Society

At the Mont Pèlerin Society's meeting in Kassel in 1960 the editor-in-chief of the broadcasting company Deutsche Welle, Dr Hans Otto Wesemann, looked back on the dramatic first years of the postwar German economy and concluded that the complete economic disintegration between 1945 and 1948 had been a blessing in disguise:

Had there not been the economic breakdown and all the miseries of the "Reichsmark" time but rather a halfway smooth transition into a post-war economy, there would probably not have been the clear majority with which the people pronounced themselves in favour of the order of a free market economy, either.⁴⁶

Regardless of how favourable the conditions for a radical change might look in hindsight, it had nevertheless required a bold move, and the man who had made this move was Ludwig Erhard. In June 1948 he had, without the consent of the allied authorities, simultaneously lifted wage and price controls, and in so doing changed the economic climate overnight. Within two years, the industrial output of Germany had tripled. The year before Erhard's move, something along the same lines had been discussed among members of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Erhard could draw on papers on the future of Germany presented by Walter Eucken, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Sir Lionel Robbins and other participants. Members of Mont Pèlerin most likely influenced Erhard in other ways as well. Eucken knew him personally, and Röpke had long since had a significant influence on his economic thinking. Erhard would later write about how he had illegally obtained Röpke's books during the war and "soaked them up like the desert absorbs life-giving water".⁴⁷ Close ties between the Mont Pèlerin Society and Erhard's team of reformers were established in the following years. Erhard joined the society in 1950 and by 1951 almost all of his associates had become members.⁴⁸ When members of the MPS were later asked whether they could point to an area or an event where it had had a direct political impact, many would point to Erhard's reorganizing of the West German economy.

By 1951 the Mont Pèlerin Society had grown from its initial 39 participants to 167 members, and the growth continued in the following years. As it grew, the nature of the meetings changed, and so did the channels of influence within the classical liberal counter-establishment. With hundreds of members, the meetings became more like regular conventions, involving relatively fewer academics and more business people, politicians and think-tank professionals. If the society in its early years had served as a crucial transatlantic forum for classical liberals, many members were now founding, working at or affiliated with think tanks that met the original goals of the Mont Pèlerin Society. The wealthy chicken farmer Antony Fisher – a member of MPS since its incorporation in 1947 – had by 1955 founded the Institute of Economic Affairs in London.⁴⁹ Another MPS member, Professor F.A. Harper, founded the Institute for Humane Studies in 1961. Other think tanks where Mont Pèlerin Society members were to be involved would include the Hoover Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the Center for the Study of Market Processes (now the Mercatus Center) at George Mason University, the Institut économique de Paris in France, the Fraser Institute in Canada, and the Centre for Independent Studies in Australia.

Not only had the functions of the Society changed by the late 1950s, but also its scholarly focus. The change became even more evident in the following decade, as Milton Friedman and some of his colleagues from the “Chicago School” became more dominant figures. From the outset there had been some strategic and methodological disagreements between what Hayek later described as a “Friedmanite and a Hayekian wing” of MPS.⁵⁰ With the “Friedmanites” in control, discussions of a more scientific and technical economic nature were given higher priority than political philosophy. To some extent this reflected the sense that the urgent crisis of the late 1940s was over. At a meeting in Montreux in September 1971 Milton Friedman declared that the war of ideas had largely been won and suggested the possibility of disbanding the Mont Pèlerin Society.⁵¹ To him, this war of ideas had been the real Cold War, and the fact that the Soviet Union was still in existence was accordingly of minor importance. Somewhat simplified, Friedman’s view of the Cold War had always reflected that he was more concerned about the absence of private property than about the lack of democracy. His suggestions about disbanding the MPS were not followed, and four decades later it continues to thrive.

The attempt to assess the political influence of the Mont Pèlerin Society in the early Cold War years inevitably raises a number of problems. Was the society as such influential or was it merely a social club to which many influential people happened to belong? Was there continuity from

the activities of the MPS in the 1950s and 1960s to the new golden era of classical liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s? After all, when Hayek was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1974, it came as a genuine surprise to many, not least himself. A couple of years later, things suddenly looked different. He was now hailed as someone who had long since warned about “stagflation” and other problems that Keynesian economics had run into. Both the demise of communism and the crisis of Keynesianism provided new opportunities for classical liberals during the 1970s. In the preceding decades, however, the Mont Pèlerin Society had successfully prepared to seize the opportunities they were now granted. Although scores of think tanks and more specialized political advocacy groups now contributed to a much bigger counter-establishment, the MPS still had an important part to play. It was not the secret cabal that some critics would like to portray, but neither was it merely a social club for people who just happened to be influential. What had begun as a small transatlantic gathering of marginalized intellectuals had evolved into a global network of networks.⁵²

Notes

1. The Papers of the Mont Pèlerin Society are located at the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (hereafter MPS Papers). On the Mont Pèlerin Society’s history, see R.M. Hartwell, *A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995); Angus Burgin, *The Great Persuasion; Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands; The Making of the Conservative Movement From the New Deal to Reagan* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009); Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds), *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Jamie Peck, *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Bernhard Walpen, *Die offenen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft: Eine hegemonietheoretische Studie zur Mont Pèlerin Society* (Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 2004).
2. The Mont Pèlerin Society, “Statement of Aims”, available online at <<https://www.montpelerin.org/montpelerin/mpsGoals.html>>.
3. F.A. Hayek, “Address to the Mont Pèlerin Conference”, 1 April 1947, MPS Papers.
4. Just to add to the confusion, Hayek actually preferred to describe himself as a “Whig”, perhaps to stress his view that the state had an important role to play in his model society, creating and enforcing “the rule of law” in order to keep competition free.
5. Jamie Peck, “Remaking laissez-faire”, *Progress in Human Geography* 32 (2008), p. 25.
6. Many of the participants had been the leading critics of John M. Keynes’s *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936).

7. Milton Friedman's expression, quoted from R.M. Hartwell, *A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), p. 203.
8. On Hayek's view of the Fabian Society, see Richard Cockett, *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931–1983* (London: Fontana Press, 1995), pp. 111–12.
9. F.A. Hayek, "The Intellectuals and Socialism", in George B. de Huszar (ed.), *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 371–84.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Hayek, "The Intellectuals and Socialism", p. 380.
12. F.A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (University of Chicago Press, 1972 [1944]), pp. xiff. In this respect Hayek's analysis was building upon his mentor, Ludwig von Mises.
13. Richard Cockett, *Thinking the Unthinkable*, p. 101.
14. Hayek, "Address to the Mont Pèlerin Society".
15. See Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands*, p. 55. From the European side, generous funding was gathered by the society's future treasurer, Albert Hunold, from Schweizerische Kreditanstalt (Credit Swiss).
16. Walter Lippmann, *The Good Society* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2004 [1937]).
17. It was at this meeting that the term "neoliberalism" was coined by the German economist Alexander Rüstow. For an account of the Colloque Walter Lippmann, see Francois Denord, "French Neoliberalism and Its Divisions: From the Colloque Walter Lippmann to the Fifth Republic", in Mirowski and Plehwe (eds), *The Road from Mont Pèlerin*, pp. 45–67.
18. Angus Burgin, *The Great Persuasion*, p. 71. The organizer, Louis Rougier, would also eventually join MPS, but he was not admitted until 1951 due to his involvement with the Vichy government during the Second World War.
19. For an extensive account of the continuity from "Colloque Walter Lippmann" to the founding of MPS, see Angus Burgin, *The Great Persuasion*, pp. 55–86.
20. Mirowski and Plehwe, *The Road from Mont Pèlerin*, p. 16.
21. The eight members to win the Nobel prize in economics were Hayek (1974), Milton Friedman (1976), George Stigler (1982), James M. Buchanan (1986), Maurice Allais (1988), Ronald Coase (1991), Gary S. Becker (1992) and Vernon Smith (2002).
22. Carlo Mötteli, "The Regeneration of Liberalism", *Swiss Review of World Affairs* 1 (November 1951), p. 29.
23. "The Challenge of Communism and the Response of Liberty", Berlin, 29 August–3 September 1956.
24. Karl Popper to F.A. Hayek, 11 January 1947, MPS Papers.
25. Quoted from Angus Burgin, "The Return of Laissez-faire", p. 155.
26. Hayek's Circular, 28 December 1946, MPS Papers.
27. Leonard E. Read to Felix Morley, 28 January 1948, MPS Papers.
28. Jasper E. Crane to Friedrich Hayek, 3 June 1947, Hayek Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (hereafter HP Papers).
29. *Ibid.*
30. F.A. Hayek to Jasper Crane, 19 June 1947, HP Papers.
31. Jasper E. Crane to F.A. Hayek, 5 September 1947, HP Papers.
32. Jasper E. Crane to F.A. Hayek, 13 December 1956, HP Papers.

33. Jasper E. Crane to F.A. Hayek, 19 November 1957, HP Papers.
34. F.A. Hayek to Jasper E. Crane, 7 December 1957, HP Papers.
35. For a discussion of the role of neoliberal ideas in the larger conservative intellectual movement in the United States, see Angus Burgin, *The Great Persuasion*, pp. 137ff., and Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, *Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement 1945–65* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2002), pp. 39–54.
36. “Memorandum of Association”, signed by F.A. Hayek, Albert Hunold and Aaron Director, 9 April 1947, MPS Papers.
37. Karl Brandt to F.A. Hayek, 28 June 1949, MPS Papers.
38. Quoted from R.M. Hartwell, *A History of The Mont Pèlerin Society* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), p. 28.
39. Wilhelm Röpke, memo on the European Recovery Program [n.d.], Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, HP Papers.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*
42. “American” is perhaps a somewhat misleading term here, considering that the most uncompromising character probably was a European émigré, Ludwig von Mises.
43. Albert Hunold to Karl Brandt, 27 January 1948, MPS Papers.
44. See James C. van Hook, *Rebuilding Germany; The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945–1957* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
45. The ideas of the Social Market Economy are described by Alfred Müller-Armack himself in “The Social Market Economy as an Economic and Social Order”, *Review of Social Economy* 36.3 (1978), pp. 325–31. See also Ralf Ptak, *Vom Ordoliberalismus zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Stationen des Neoliberalismus in Deutschland* (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2004), Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), *Germany’s Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989), and Mark E. Spicka, *Selling the Economic Miracle: Economic Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949–1957* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).
46. “Comments by Dr. Hans Otto Wesemann on the Subject ‘Public Opinion in a Free Society’ at the Meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society at Kassel”, September 1960 (transcript from interpreter’s notes), MPS Papers.
47. Quoted from Alfred C. Mierzejewski, “Water in the desert? The Influence of Wilhelm Röpke on Ludwig Erhard and the Social Market Economy”, *Review of Austrian Economy* 19 (2006), pp. 275–87.
48. These included Erich Welter, Leonhard Miksch, Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken, Alfred Müller-Armack, Franz Böhm, Bernhard Pfister, Constantin von Dietze, Karl Friedrich Maier, Friedrich Lutz, Fritz Meyer, Hans Ilau and Karl Paul Hensel. For more on how these economists became part of Erhard’s team, see Ralf Ptak, “Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations of the Social Market Economy”, in Mirowski and Plehwe (eds), *The Road from Mont Pèlerin*, pp. 98–138.
49. By the 1980s he would go on to found a whole string of neoliberal think tanks around the world, including the Atlas Economic Research Foundation (1987).
50. F.A. Hayek to Arthur Seldon, 13 May 1985, HP Papers.

51. Friedman's arguments for disbanding the Mont Pèlerin Society were mostly practical in nature. He felt that it had gotten too big and he missed the intimacy of the early meetings. Milton Friedman, "Presidential circular to all members", October 1971, MPS Papers.
52. By 2005, The Mont Pèlerin Society had close personal ties to more than a hundred neoliberal think tanks across the globe. For a list of these, see Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen and Gisela Neunhöffer (eds), *Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 48ff.

14

Better Dead Than Red: Wilhelm Röpke, a Neoliberal Anti-Communist on All Fronts

Jean Solchany

Research on the history of neoliberal thought rarely addresses the issue of anti-communism. Most studies concentrate on the contours of neoliberal economic thinking and its evolution since the 1930s, identifying several stages of development: the role of the Mont Pèlerin Society, the denunciation of Keynesianism and the welfare state, the proliferation of think tanks, and the impact of Reagan and Thatcher. Yet neoliberalism emerges out of this history as a global vision, providing a normative reading of the social and political world beyond the mere intricacies of economic theory. Its analysis cannot be dissociated from a more general history of ideas. Consequently, the investigation of its anti-communist dimension is not secondary, but central. This chapter examines this wider interpretation through a case study on the career of Wilhelm Röpke (1899–1966), one of the pioneers of neoliberal thought. Although less well known than Friedrich von Hayek, Röpke, exiled after 1933, was equally prominent in the early years, and his work provides an ideal vantage point through which to consider the linkage between neoliberalism and anti-communism.¹

The anti-communism of Wilhelm Röpke was initially fed by the premises of neoliberal doctrine. But it was also the reflection of an era when liberal and conservative elites everywhere were racked by the same fear of the “Reds”. Röpke’s anti-communism can be understood on three levels: first, as an outcome of his economic thinking; second, as a product of the zeitgeist of liberal and conservative intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s; third, as a wish to contribute combative propaganda. Through his published writings, many of which were translated

into numerous languages, Röpke personified the transnational character of neoliberal anti-communism.

The Sources of Röpkeian Anti-Communism

There are two ways of approaching neoliberalism and its relationship to communism. The first deals with its content in strictly economic terms. From 1925, the young Röpke, already a university professor, draws a conclusion about the “impossibility” of a “rational socialist economic policy”.² Among the names invoked in support of this claim was Ludwig von Mises, the Austrian liberal economist who launched the debate on this question in 1922 with his work *Gemeinwirtschaft*.³ In the 1930s Röpke referred in equal measure to Friedrich von Hayek and the Norwegian businessman and journalist, Trygve B. Hoff. To denounce the “frightful experiences” of the “Russian economic system”, he evoked the Hungarian economist Michael Polanyi and his *USSR Economics*.⁴ All of these intellectuals joined the Mont Pèlerin Society after the war. A professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies (IUHEI) in Geneva since 1937, with Ludwig von Mises and William Rappard as colleagues, Röpke felt supported and justified in his point of view.

Yet Röpke also wanted to comprehend communism as a wider socio-economic phenomenon. On 22 September 1939, he described it as the principal geopolitical and ideological fact which has pushed humanity into a new and worrying era: “With the Russian revolution of 1917, a new system of society and government came into the world and spread out under different colours, different costumes and in diverse national forms.”⁵ With the onset of the Cold War, Röpke invited his colleagues to comprehend the intrinsic political essence of the totalitarian communist regime, since he judged it to be animated by the principle of “absolute politicization”.⁶ He compared Soviet communism to Islam with its “Arabia” and “Mecca” and which functioned as a “religious and fervent atheism, a faith that mocks sacredness and transcendence”, and a “diabolic mix of limitless power and sorcery over the masses”; in a word, it represented a veritable “satanism”.⁷ A communist victory would be the equivalent of the “world domination of absolute evil, besides which the empire of Genghis Khan would look like a timid little sketch”.⁸

This apocalyptic vision illustrates a cultural and political dimension very much present in neoliberal ideology. In general the neoliberals projected a pessimistic diagnosis of the state of the world. Röpke denounced modernity in *Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart* (*The Social Crisis of Our Time*), the work that made him famous in 1942.⁹ In his proposal

of August 1945 calling for the founding of an international academy, Friedrich von Hayek also pronounced that all countries were affected to varying degrees by the “sickness of our age”.¹⁰ Founded in 1947, the Mont Pèlerin Society adopted a “Statement of Aims” which postulated that the “the central values of civilization are in danger”, evoking a “crisis of our times” caused as much by moral as economic deficiencies.¹¹ In denouncing this crisis, neoliberalism also identified its enemies, among which communism occupied a central position. It represented the dark vanishing point towards which all manifestations of collectivism were inclined, including those which, following the example of Keynesianism or the welfare state, ostensibly appeared to be a long way removed from the gulag.

Röpkian anti-communism followed in part from the presuppositions of nascent neoliberalism, but it also reflected other factors, namely, among others, the worldview of German university “mandarins”.¹² Certainly, the young professor Röpke was one of many liberal and conservative intellectuals concerned about “the masses” in the 1920s. But unlike many of his colleagues, he was a true republican, his anti-Marxism and anti-communism still being moderate. A more important determinant for his growing anti-communism is to be found in what was brewing, conceptually and ideologically, in the 1930s.

In Switzerland the economist was ideally placed to follow what was written about fascism and communism, notably from the pens of émigrés such as Waldemar Gurian who published *Das Bolschewismus als Weltgefahr* (*Bolshevism as Global Threat*) there in 1935.¹³ Röpke read Hermann Rauschning’s *Nihilist Revolution* with enthusiasm and kept up to date with the latest literature on “modern dictatorships”, concentrating on the conservative and liberal critiques that offered more sophisticated analyses of the communist phenomenon beyond the traditional fear of Bolshevism based on class.¹⁴ The economist himself intervened in these debates. In 1937, in “Sozialismus und politische Diktatur” (“Socialism and Political Dictatorship”) he presented an analysis of the totalitarian paradigm.¹⁵ In 1940 he saluted the French liberal Elie Halévy, author of *Ere des tyrannies* (*Era of Tyrannies*).¹⁶ During the Second World War Röpke linked up with the German Catholic conservative Albert Kramer after reading the latter’s *Das rote Imperium* (*The Red Empire*), which Kramer, the future founder of the *Rheinischer Merkur*, had sent him by way of introducing himself and his ideas.¹⁷ The contacts established in his new adopted country were therefore a strong influence on him.

By the end of the 1930s Röpke's anti-communism was in the final analysis a reflection of an age preoccupied with a fear of communism, as much in Switzerland as elsewhere. Whereas up to that point he had occasional close contact with the Swiss intellectual and economic elites, the publication of *Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart* in early 1942 made him the darling of the liberal and conservative milieux. Publishers fought over his contracts, and he began to write regularly for the *Neue Schweizer Rundschau*, *Schweizer Monatshefte*, and *La Gazette de Lausanne*. The Swiss literati saw him as an intellectual prophet (re)constructing a liberalism able to form a barrier to socialism. His most fervent supporters were strongly anti-communist in outlook, such as Jann von Sprecher, the editor-in-chief of *Schweizer Monatshefte*, who had previously evoked the alarming perspective of Russians charging along the shores of Lake Constance.¹⁸ During the war Sprecher's journal relentlessly denounced the dreadful communist menace preparing to bear down on Switzerland.¹⁹ Another admirer of Wilhelm Röpke, Georges Rigassi, editor-in-chief of the *Gazette de Lausanne* and a member of the Entente internationale anticommuniste (EIA), envisaged with satisfaction a German victory as being synonymous with the "annihilation of bolshevism".²⁰ The economist maintained a correspondence with all of these liberal conservatives, a testimony to a reciprocal exchange of ideas.

Röpke, the German émigré, cannot be suspected of indulgence towards Nazism – which he always condemned quite unambiguously – yet he did declare himself ever more preoccupied with Russia. By the end of 1943 Nazism amounted to nothing more than a "military problem" that was soon to be resolved, but he was fearful that the world would succumb to communism in much the same way as the extreme right had gained popularity.²¹ In December 1944 he worried about not having been able to convince an American diplomat that appeasement towards Stalin would be just as much in vain as it had been towards Hitler.²² In September 1945 he felt that postwar realignments would effectively relegate the "old quarrels" to a secondary level, making the "clash between bolshevism and everything that is found on this side of the divide" the new fundamental reality.²³ He prophesied at the start of 1946 that, given the "funny peace" that he regarded as "highly provisional", sooner or later there would have to be a showdown.²⁴

In sum, this Cold War worldview was fed by a number of sources, not least the influence of Swiss liberal-conservative values. Preoccupations of the past (traditional old-school anti-Bolshevism) and those of the future (the fear of the communist threat increased by a Soviet victory)

combined at the end of the war to forge a vision of the world based on a particularly virulent form of anti-communism, a vision also seen as particularly radical by other neoliberals not concerned to the same degree by the communist issue. A position judged to be too soft in relation to communism effectively constituted – in the eyes of Wilhelm Röpke – a reason to rule it out completely.

Waiting for the Third World War

Röpke never ceased to castigate the so-called “progressives” who, he felt, were everywhere. In 1947 he complained about female students of Smith College (Massachusetts) staying at IUHEI on the grounds that they would be “contaminated by cryptocommunist or even phanéro-communist [conspicuously communist] ideas”.²⁵ The progressives also included “prominent Christians, who are unaware to the point of converting to communism in the name of the Gospel, or at least of encouraging it through their sympathies”, and numerous intellectuals.²⁶ In May 1959 Röpke railed at a Toronto professor for extolling “the revolutionary élan” and “dynamism” of “Red China” during an IUHEI conference. This “idiot” represented “the typical, soft-in-the-head and pusillanimous intellectual, with his relativist values, his scientism, his *sinistrismo* [dismissive term for “leftism”], and his sociologism”.²⁷

Röpke equally denounced those “fearful of the atom” (*Atomschlotter*) who failed to understand that the West could only dissuade the Soviet Union through the use of its nuclear arsenal. He condemned those whose ignominious slogan was “better red than dead”.²⁸ Having failed to make the ideological clarification that would have distanced it from collectivism, democratic socialism was another weak link in the face of communism. On the face of its aspiration to social justice, it would effectively mean capitulating in the face of the Soviet threat. These “social-pacifists” would put the well-being of the masses before the armaments that the West needed in the face of a “communist empire that is armed to the teeth”.²⁹ But the progressives were also liberals. Wilhelm Röpke criticized the West German Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) for its positions on “world politics”, the “liberation of Eastern Germany”, and the “mortal danger of the communist empire”.³⁰ Röpke’s anti-communism at times sounds like the work of a propagandist. He attacked trade with the East (*Osthandel*) and warned that small nations like Austria and Finland risked succumbing to the “embrace of the boa constrictor”³¹ even though they played an essential role in the “defensive combat” (*Abwehrkampf*) of the West.³²

In a more general way, Wilhelm Röpke contributed to Spiritual National Defence, a heterogeneous political-cultural movement that originated in Switzerland in the 1930s and which was revived during the early Cold War.³³ Launched in 1959, the magazine *Diskussion*, “a monthly in the spirit of the spiritual national defence”, sought to reinforce national cohesion with contributions entitled: “Is time working on the side of Communism?”, “What must the free world do?”, “The significance of morality in the war of the future”, “What really happened in Russia”, and “The red holiday paradise seen from below”. In this *Reader’s Digest* of anti-communism, Wilhelm Röpke recycled his publications in condensed form.³⁴ In 1960 he also contributed to *Freiheit und Friede sind unteilbar* (*Freedom and Peace Are Indivisible*),³⁵ a brochure hostile to the idea of coexistence with the East, introduced by Peter Dürrenmatt and published by *Pro Libertate*, an association of the bourgeois right that was founded in the wake of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. “Ah, if only communism were fought as energetically everywhere as it is in Switzerland”, he exclaimed, but his input was equally sought on the German side. In 1961, the Studiengesellschaft für Staatspolitische Arbeit (Research Association for National-Political Work), an anti-communist organization founded in 1958 by two deputies from the CDU, Karl-Heinz Vogt and Karl-Friedrich Grau, proposed that he join their board of directors. In this way Röpke joined fellow German neoliberals Franz Böhm and Hans Ilau, as well as Otto von Habsburg. The Studiengesellschaft distributed reprints of his texts, and Röpke praised their fight against the “red defamers” and the “anti-anti-communists”.³⁶ He also supported the committee of *Rettet die Freiheit!* (Save Freedom!), founded in 1959 by the Christian democrat Rainer Barzel and the Christian socialist Franz-Josef Strauss. *Rettet* published an accusatory and sulphurous “red book” on “communist infiltration” in 1960.³⁷

Wilhelm Röpke’s anti-communist reputation is therefore justified. From May 1947 onwards the economist saw the world embroiled in a Third World War, with the Russians using totalitarian methods of propaganda, slander and infiltration to secure and expand their zone of influence.³⁸ In the period after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, he drew parallels with Munich and September 1938.³⁹ In November 1956 he fully supported the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt.⁴⁰ Astonished by the international outcry that the Suez operation caused, Röpke despaired. By fearing war more than communism, the free world would end up lost. Better to risk a wider conflict, he wrote to Albert Hunold, secretary general of the Mont Pèlerin Society.⁴¹

Even at the heart of an organization little suspected of sympathy toward communism, Röpke personified a hard line. In shock at the events of Suez and Budapest, Albert Hunold and the German sociologist Helmut Schoeck acknowledged his prescience: "It is hard to imagine how that might now evolve without it all ending up in world war", wrote Hunold. "It is now or never, Röpke says, and he is right. We have to take on the risk of a Third World War, because the situation has never been so favourable", replied Schoeck.⁴² But these bellicose dispositions were not shared by everyone. Röpke reproached the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* for its coverage of the events of November 1956.⁴³ Willy Bretscher, the editor-in-chief with whom he nevertheless had a very good relationship, refused to support a "Suez adventure" launched at the "wrong time, without adequate diplomatic-political preparation, and without the assurance of a quick and decisive military success".⁴⁴

Röpke wanted to actively involve the Mont Pèlerin Society in the struggle against communism, hoping that it would agree on a draft declaration he wrote on Hungary and Suez. Röpke also duly reprimanded members suspected of being too progressive, such as Michael Polyani, whose analyses on Yugoslavia did not meet his approval: "I no longer want to be in the Society alongside a Titoist. Submit the case to Hayek, if you want to!", he wrote to Albert Hunold.⁴⁵ Even though he declared himself ready to sign Röpke's text as an individual, the society's president, Friedrich Hayek, did not consider there to be enough of a consensus to sanction a public declaration. Hayek dodged the issue and saw no reason to reproach Polyani.⁴⁶

Röpke had no hesitation in supporting the most controversial of anti-communist essayists. In 1960, the publicist Winfried Martini published *Freiheit auf Abruf (Freedom on Standby)*, a denunciation of the "red menace" that was loaded with authoritarian overtones.⁴⁷ Röpke rejoiced in a book full of "rigorous thought, courageous clarity, and pertinent formulations", and he published a broadly positive review in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.⁴⁸ He also approved of the Austro-American publisher William S. Schlamm (1904–78). In 1958 this former communist turned right-wing conservative approached Röpke with a project for a "genuinely important book about Germany".⁴⁹ *Die Grenzen des Wunders*, which appeared in the summer of 1959, was a significant but controversial success. Schlamm railed against the "mentality of apolitical contentment" and "the West collapsing from its hunger for peace".⁵⁰ Röpke, by introducing Schlamm to his contacts, effectively sanctioned this typical example of US right-wing anti-communism. Undoubtedly, Röpke's anticommunism was fed by exchanges with his American counterparts.

Defending the “Free World” from Princeton to Pretoria

However much Röpke professed a profound anti-Americanism, his links to the United States were genuine. He was in contact with two important think tanks – the Foundation for Economic Education and the American Enterprise Association – was himself sought-after by corporate executives and lobbyists, and corresponded with the celebrated American neoliberal publicist Henry Hazlitt. His integration into US conservatism was confirmed by his appointment to the boards of the *National Review* and *Modern Age*, the journals founded in the 1950s by William F. Buckley and Russel Kirk, the two main leaders of postwar new conservatism. Röpke’s transatlantic presence, largely ignored up till now, was fully the result of the Mont Pèlerin Society, but his US encounters cannot be properly understood outside the context of shared anti-communist convictions.

Already in 1950 Röpke corresponded with the Texan conservative James Evetts Haley, enjoining the United States to stand firm in the face of the “Russian drive for real world domination”.⁵¹ In 1958, at the time of the Princeton congress of the Mont Pèlerin Society, he took the initiative for a declaration praising the “historic role of the United States in the current battle for the survival of freedom and human dignity against the forces of tyranny”.⁵² In 1959 he sent a message of support to the hard-line anti-communist Alice Widener, editor-in-chief of *USA Magazine*.⁵³ And in 1960 he was in dialogue with Magnus L. Gregersen, professor of physiology at the University of Columbia, president of the Board of Directors of the Ingalls-Taiwan Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, and a lobbyist “passionately engaged in anti-communism in general and in the defense against Mao in particular”.⁵⁴

Röpke had closer ties with William F. Buckley and Russell Kirk. They shared a deep agreement on international issues. The *National Review* was the epitome of uncompromising anti-communism. James Burnham, well-known author of *The Managerial Revolution*, had his own column entitled “The Third World War”. Röpke, moved to denounce Western laxity, published the startling “A Dream” in 1959.⁵⁵ In this short essay of “fiction-history” we are in August 1939 and the Soviet Union is about to trigger a war having annexed first the Baltic countries and then Persia. Convinced that Westerners will not want to “die for Constantinople”, Stalin invades Turkey. In 1941, however, he commits the “fatal mistake” of attacking Hitler, breaking the non-aggression pact. Having become an ally against Stalinism, the Third Reich pushes back, defeating and occupying Russia and discovering concentration camp atrocities along

the way. As their Nazi equivalents are ignored, the Reich becomes a major actor in the new postwar order. But Hitler begins to increase his territorial demands, thinking that his fifth column of supportive intellectuals has sown enough confusion to prevent any Western resistance. At the moment when war again looks likely, this time on the initiative of the Nazis, Röpke wakes up. This striking piece of uchronia was published shortly after the ultimatum on the status of West Berlin issued by Nikita Khrushchev on 28 November 1958. The American conservative press also picked up on Röpke's refusal to become a member of the International Association of Political Sciences. The "association which should, above all else, grasp the nature of totalitarianism" actually "incorporates communist countries and their delegates", an example of the "betrayal of the intellectuals" and complacency towards "red totalitarianism" that was "infinitely more dangerous" than the brown version.⁵⁶ Röpke distributed his protest widely, with the *National Review* and the *Indianapolis Star* publishing a translation.⁵⁷ The path that leads from Wilhelm Röpke to Eugene Collins Pulliam, owner of the Republican press's *Indianapolis Star*, reveals neoliberalism's characteristics as a doctrine of combat, a multitude of networks, and a movement that gives great importance to anti-communism.

Röpke was also in tune with US hard-line anti-communism when he criticized development aid. In 1950, Henry Hazlitt published *Illusions of Point Four*, a pamphlet that denounced the State of the Union address of 20 January 1949, in which President Truman assigned Third World development a central role in US foreign policy. For the neoliberals, on the other hand, Western aid was the bearer of all evils.⁵⁸ Röpke intervened on this point at the Beauvallon congress of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1951,⁵⁹ denouncing the "new magic formula" that prescribed the "development of underdeveloped countries". For him, aid given by one state to another, or on behalf of international organizations, was no more than another manifestation of collectivism. The only thing that could guarantee development was respect for market economics.⁶⁰ Above all, the West would be playing against itself by encouraging "precisely the intentions of those groups of politicians and intellectuals who, as committed socialists, favour the collectivist methods of Moscow or Peking".⁶¹

Fear of communism also brought concerns over decolonization. At the Saint-Moritz congress of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1957, British economist Arthur A. Shenfield judged that "In a world in which the West is at bay, no liberal can support the replacement of Western dominion

by a power vacuum.”⁶² The Germano-American economist Karl Brandt added that it is not the “colonial question” but the communist threat that weighed down on colonized peoples.⁶³ Röpke shared the unease that the “inevitable” process of emancipation was taking place at the very moment when the “free world” could not afford it.⁶⁴ The West would struggle to counter communist advances in the Third World. Determined to view the situation for himself, Röpke toured Mexico and Venezuela in late 1957 and Argentina, Peru and again in Venezuela in early 1960. This tour was no accident. Political tendencies in Latin America had been of some concern for neoliberals and anti-communists, and following the Second World War and especially in the 1950s various European and US intellectuals and think tanks had promoted neoliberal thinking on that continent. For example, the Argentinian Centro de difusión de la economía libre was founded in 1957 following the model of the North American Foundation for Economic Education, and its advisory board included neoliberal luminaries such as Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and Wilhelm Röpke. On the basis of his experience Röpke wrote a critical review in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that castigated “interventionist” countries, praised free-market initiatives, and warned against communists who “agitate against the free world and against this [moral and spiritual] heritage that we [South Americans and Europeans] share in common”.⁶⁵ Privately he cursed the well-meaning vagueness of US policies.⁶⁶ In Caracas he took the opportunity, before an audience of students “totally contaminated by communism”, to give them “plenty to think about”, he being able to speak out more than an American in such a situation.⁶⁷

Röpke strongly objected to evidence of double standards. Unlike the left-wing Mexican dictatorship, the military dictatorships of Marcos Pérez Jimenéz in Venezuela and Manuel O. Odria in Peru were heavily criticized in the media. Yet Röpke felt that at least these regimes had made it possible to contain the “communist populace”.⁶⁸ He saw the army as the backbone of Latin American nations, provided it could remain politically consistent.⁶⁹ Röpke even spoke to the officer trainees at the Escuela superior de guerra in Argentina.⁷⁰ In 1964 he rejoiced at the Brazilian military taking power.⁷¹

From Latin America Röpke moved on to Africa. In September 1963 he travelled to South Africa, where he publicly approved of the discriminatory regime.⁷² The reasons behind this controversial support are complex, but anti-communism played a major role. The South African blacks were not a “mass of harshly oppressed and unhappy human

beings”, and it would be “appalling” to compare their situation with that of the Tibetans or the “fate of the Baltic countries, or of other peoples within the communist super-empire”. Though questionable in some respects, apartheid suffered above all from being put into practice “in a climate of African supernaturalism and inverted racism, and under the threat of global communist revolution”. But there was no better solution. Only “misled ideologues”, the “self-styled ‘liberals’ of South Africa” and their “equivalents abroad” could propose equality of rights, which was an “invitation to national suicide”. The transformation of South Africa into some “sort of Congo or Indonesia” would be a collapse comparable with “the transformation of Latin America to communism”.

Conclusion

As Wilhelm Röpke’s career path demonstrates, anti-communism is not a secondary category within his neoliberal vision. On the contrary, it is the product of powerful anti-Bolshevik stereotypes that have impregnated the liberal and conservative imaginations since 1917 and been given a further boost by the dramatic political context of the 1930s and 1940s. If the concept of totalitarianism made it possible to denounce national socialism, it also served, and increasingly so, to stigmatize the Soviet Union. The Nazi–Soviet Pact and the Red Army’s advance to the heart of Europe in 1944–45 consolidated anti-communism among liberals and conservatives alike. The concern that Röpke showed in 1940 towards Soviet power is telling in this respect. One might talk here of a “Cold War culture” ahead of its time. The vision of a decisive confrontation between “Western civilization” and the forces of evil embodied in communism was well in advance of the onset of what might properly be called the Cold War. In some respects, the Cold War culture traditionally associated with the postwar period, and with the 1950s in particular, merely constituted the realization of long-held anxieties shared by numerous intellectuals and policy-makers. From the early 1930s Röpke and his associates favoured in response the development, on a transnational and transatlantic level, of a new paradigm, neoliberalism, capable of imagining an alternative to collectivism, a catch-all term that stretched from William Beveridge to Joseph Stalin, by way of John Maynard Keynes, the New Deal and social democracy. The history of neoliberalism cannot avoid its inherent anti-communist imagination which, between conscious analyses and deeply rooted prejudices, contributed to its realization and later success in the second half of the twentieth century.

Notes

1. On Wilhelm Röpke, see Hans-Jörg Hennecke, *Wilhelm Röpke. Ein Leben in der Brandung* (Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, 2005); Jean Solchany, "Retour sur une économie très politique. Wilhelm Röpke, l'autre Hayek", Habilitation, Université de Paris 1, 2011.
2. Wilhelm Röpke, "Sozialisierung", in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, vol. 7 (Iéna: Fischer, 1925), pp. 567–78 (574).
3. Ludwig von Mises, *Gemeinwirtschaft. Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus* (Iéna: Fischer, 1922).
4. Wilhelm Röpke, *L'explication économique du monde moderne* (Paris: Librairie de Médecis, 1940), p. 256; Friedrich von Hayek (ed.), *Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism* (London: Routledge, 1935); Trygve B. Hoff, *Economic Calculation in the Socialist Society* (London: Hodge, 1949; the first edition appeared in Norwegian in 1938); Michael Polanyi, *USSR Economics* (Manchester University Press, 1936).
5. Wilhelm Röpke to William Rappard, 28 September 1939, reproduced in *Institut universitaire des hautes études internationales. 40e anniversaire 1927–1967* (Genève: IUHEL, 1967), pp. 84–9 (the reproduction is dated incorrectly as 3 October 1939).
6. Wilhelm Röpke, "Außenhandel im Dienst der Politik. Bemerkungen eines Nationalökonomen zum Handel mit dem kommunistischen Imperium", *ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* 8 (1956), pp. 45–65 (46).
7. Wilhelm Röpke, "Umgang mit dem Bolschewismus", in *Was muß die freie Welt tun?* (Ludwigsburg: Hoch, 1959), p. 9.
8. Wilhelm Röpke to Ernst Ginsberg, 14 July 1958, dossier: AK 58–9, papers of Wilhelm Röpke, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik, Cologne (hereafter WR).
9. Wilhelm Röpke, *Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart* (Erlenbach-Zürich: Rentsch, 1942).
10. Friedrich von Hayek, "Memorandum on the Proposed Foundation of an International Academy for Political Philosophy Tentatively Called 'The Acton-Tocqueville Society'", August 1945, papers of Albert Hunold, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik, Cologne (hereafter AH).
11. See the definitive "Statement of Aims" text in Plickert, *Wandlungen des Neoliberalismus*, p. 480.
12. See Fritz K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1969).
13. Waldemar Gurian, *Bolschewismus als Weltgefahr* (Lucerne: Vita Nova, 1935).
14. Hermann Rauschnig, *Die Revolution des Nihilismus. Kulisse und Wirklichkeit im Dritten Reich* (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1937); Wilhelm Röpke to Alexander Rüstow, 3 December 1938, dossier: Rüstow, WR.
15. Wilhelm Röpke, "Sozialismus und politische Diktatur", *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (18 January 1937).
16. Wilhelm Röpke, *L'Explication économique*, pp. 297–320; Elie Halévy, *L'Ere des tyrannies. Essai sur le socialisme et la guerre* (Paris: Gallimard, 1938).
17. Franz Albert Kramer, *Das rote Imperium* (Munich: Rösel et Pustet, 1933).
18. Jann von Sprecher, "Die Schweiz vor der Neuordnung Europas", *Schweizer Monatshefte* 22.7 (April 1942–March 1943), pp. 359–70 (365).

19. On Wilhelm Röpke in Switzerland, see Jean Solchany, *Retour sur une économie très politique*, and Jean Solchany, "Wilhelm Röpke et la Suisse. La dimension helvétique d'un parcours transnational", *Traverse* 2 (2010), pp. 23–37.
20. Georges Rigassi in *Gazette de Lausanne* (11 July 1941). On the *Gazette de Lausanne* see Alain Clavien, *Grandeurs et misères de la presse politique* (Lausanne: Antipodes, 2010).
21. Wilhelm Röpke to Joseph Zürcher, 23 October 1943, dossier: Briefe M-Z (42–3), WR.
22. Wilhelm Röpke, Tagebuch No. 3, entry from 20 December 1944 (with thanks to Hans Willgerodt for making his uncle's diary available).
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Part IV

Christian Networks

15

Transnational Fundamentalist Anti-Communism: The International Council of Christian Churches

Markku Ruotsila

For most of the Cold War, the International Council of Christian Churches (ICCC) was the single largest international organization of self-designated fundamentalist or “Bible-believing” Christian churches and parachurch organizations.¹ From its creation in 1948 until the emergence in 1975 of the rival World Congress of Fundamentalists, it was the only one of its kind, the sole worldwide information-sharing, coordinating and collaborative agency of fundamentalist Protestants. With nearly four hundred member denominations (by the mid-1980s) in Western Europe and in the Americas, in Southeast Asia and in sub-Saharan Africa and a claimed membership of 55 million, it maintained offices in Amsterdam in the Netherlands and in Collingswood, New Jersey in the United States. On a semi-annual basis, it held international, national and hemispheric conferences, and it published some 34 periodicals in 16 languages in 89 countries, maintained contact with key political decision-makers on all four continents and fostered an extensive network of informants and collaborators, some behind the Iron Curtain.²

While principally concerned with a theological defence of traditional notions of biblical authority and with opposition to the ecumenical movement, from its very beginnings the ICCC was also the pre-eminent international voice for fundamentalist Christian anti-communism. Its lifelong president, the controversial American pastor, publisher and broadcaster Carl McIntire (1906–2002) was the recognized *primus inter pares* of fundamentalist anti-communists in the United States from the

mid-1930s, and he created the organization as a worldwide extension of his earlier American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC).³ Despite its extensive and well-publicized activities on four continents for all of the Cold War that make the ICCC into an apparently prime example of transnational faith-based anti-communism, Cold War scholars have largely ignored the organization.⁴

A broader historiographical problem is involved in this neglect. While religion has indeed been increasingly recognized as a key variable in the burgeoning field of newer Cold War studies that investigates the role of non-state actors, all too often it continues to be studied instrumentally, that is, the focus remains on the processes by which Cold War political decision-makers used religion for their own, essentially secular ends. There have been very few studies that track faith-based anti-communists as actors in their own right and fewer still that examine them from a transnational vantage point. Yet as Martin Durham and Margaret Power have recently pointed out, the political and religious Right no less than the Left has long practised “transnational transfer of ideas, information and resources” – for it, too, has been cohered by self-perceptions that cross national borders and purposes that are global.⁵ This is particularly the case with Christian groups, since these, by definition, place their allegiance on a God who is sovereign and transcendent, unlimited by national boundaries or by any given culture. For a study of such faith-based transnationality, the ICCC offers a uniquely fruitful entry point, for it was a truly worldwide organization of conservative religious civil society groups, led from the United States but including representatives and input from a range of non-US cultural, political and confessional backgrounds.

Transnational Theology

All of the ICCC’s varied constituents shared a core faith-based conviction about the immense and present danger that communist ideology and the Soviet Union posed to the Christian faith. They were particularly concerned about what Carl McIntire called “Russia’s most effective fifth column”⁶ – the ecumenical and theologically liberal Christian groups in the West who had embraced a socially oriented understanding of the Christian faith, who sought peaceful coexistence between the superpowers and who in their World Council of Churches (WCC) cooperated with clergy from behind the Iron Curtain. Throughout the Cold War, the WCC issued reports critical of the free-enterprise system and calls for disarmament and for strengthening the United Nations; in the

late 1960s they initiated financial assistance programmes for leftist revolutionary movements in the Third World.⁷ Consequently, its clergy were regularly denounced by ICCC leaders as “near-communists” and as the principal carriers of communistic notions into Western churches and public discourse.⁸ By contrast, most ICCC constituent bodies critiqued the modern social democratic welfare state and tended to endorse as unrestrained a free-enterprise system as possible, and they engaged in pointedly faith-based linking of the Catholic Church and the United Nations with the felt menace of international communism.

“Communism is anti-God”, McIntire himself stressed some ten years prior to his having even created the ICCC. “Communism as it is expressed consistently is a religion. It takes the place in the loves of men which belong to God.” This being so, “every true Christian and every lover of the Bible must logically and of necessity oppose Communism”.⁹ Once the Cold War had begun, McIntire amended these said bases of fundamentalist Christian anti-communism by adding that “Communism has a global plan” for the subjugation of all nations, that “Communism cannot rest until it conquers the world”. According to him, this “diabolical conspiracy for the destruction of human freedom and Christianity” was “diametrically opposed, in all its parts, to the Christian concept of God and man” and coexistence with it was an impossibility.¹⁰

On these doctrinal bases of the ICCC’s transnational anti-communism, there was full agreement among all the different national and regional member bodies and communities. This was evident in 1950 when at its second plenary conference, held in Geneva, Switzerland, the ICCC resolved that communism was “false economically, morally and spiritually” because based on an atheistic view of life, because it stood for violent revolution and “dictatorship based on force and unrestricted by law” and because it promised to erect an economic democracy that was, according to the ICCC, by definition “delusional”.¹¹ The “Christian Manifesto on World Communism and the Christian Church”, issued a year later by the ICCC’s Far Eastern Council of Christian Churches, similarly denounced what it claimed as the ten fundamental characteristics of communism – including a “militantly atheistic” theory of historical materialism, an economic determinism that was “anti-Christian and debasing to human dignity”, with “its denial of moral and spiritual values” and its “efforts to overthrow by violence all existing governments”.¹² In 1957, the ICCC’s Middle East Bible Council held that the Christian faith was “diametrically and irrevocably opposed to anti-God, materialistic, tyrannical Communism”,¹³ while the Scandinavian

Evangelical Council resolved that communism embodied an “anti-Christian ideology” rooted in a materialistic view of life that was paving the way toward the biblically prophesied worldwide anti-Christian “totalitarian regime” of the end-times.¹⁴

Especially for its American leaders and those Dutch members of the Reformed and Christian Reformed Churches who directed its European offices in Amsterdam, this critique of communist ideology was part and parcel of a much broader faith-based defence of the free-enterprise system. In his books *The Rise of the Tyrant: Controlled Economy v. Private Enterprise* (1945) and *The Author of Liberty* (1946), McIntire in particular profiled himself as an economic libertarian who stood for the neo-Calvinist doctrines of sphere-sovereignty (*souvereiniteit in eigenen kring*), originally developed by the Dutch Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper.¹⁵ In his view and that of other neo-Calvinists, the “divine law” limited the state to assuring law and order and prohibited it from hindering the operations of non-governmental civic institutions, each of which had its own divinely instituted sphere of operations. Especially was the state prohibited from interfering in “private enterprise and the capitalistic system” for they constituted the “very foundation structure of society itself”.¹⁶

Many of the ICCC’s non-Reformed European leaders found such a defence of free enterprise troubling, given their traditions of not mixing religion and politics. They maintained, too, that it was “dangerous” for European churches to be claiming that “Christ favored capitalism”, since in Europe the word “capitalism” carried with it connotations of plutocratic control of government that were understood as deeply un-Christian.¹⁷ On such a basis, most of the ICCC’s West European leaders accepted some type of a social welfare state.¹⁸ The difference should not be overdone, however, for it remains that even the ICCC’s Swedish leaders engaged in a pointed and very early critique of the Nordic welfare state as it was being created in the early 1950s – a model which they, too, saw as deeply materialistic and therefore a potential conduit to and approximation of a fully communist system.¹⁹ The Europeans, too, fell in line behind a 1950 resolution that called upon the churches to uphold “the teaching of the Bible of responsibility of the individual to God rather than the State”. In this, the ICCC affirmed the “God-given right to own property and use the same in faithful stewardship and to engage in free enterprise to the glory of God”.²⁰

At their more conspiracist moments, the organization’s leaders maintained that theologically liberal churches, social democratic politicians and the Vatican were in an alliance with communists, attempting to

make the United Nations into a communistic “one-world” empire. According to the premillennarian prophecy that many in the ICCC shared, such an empire foretold the biblically prophesied end-times reign of the Antichrist that included the creation of a “one-world church” imbued by a false, socialistic and syncretistic religion.²¹ For this and other reasons, the ACCC repeatedly called for the United States to withdraw from the UN, and it campaigned for the so-called Bricker amendment, a proposed constitutional measure that would have given the US Congress veto rights over international treaties.²² While the ICCC’s non-American member bodies did not launch similar campaigns in their countries, their leaders did agree with the Americans and are classed, especially in Europe, as among the most radical of all the UN’s critics.

In the view of the ICCC’s key Dutch leader J.C. Maris, for example, there was nothing “basically different” between the enthusiasm shown for the UN by the WCC and “the vain ideals of Marxism”, for both were paving the way to “the tyranny of Antichrist”.²³ Even the group’s Swedish vice president David Hedegård wrote about the United Nations’ General Secretary Dag Hammarskiöld (also a Swede) as one of those who were implicated in the communist push towards “a world government, a world dictatorship and a false religion [...] in the service of the antichristian world dictatorship”.²⁴

Finally, in the ICCC’s public theology, communism and Roman Catholicism were invariably seen as equal and mutually cooperating threats to free enterprise and Western freedom. Already in 1950 the ICCC resolved that “the Roman Catholic Church is itself totalitarian” and thus not fit to fight totalitarian communism, and it warned all churches “against any kind of co-operation with Roman Catholicism”.²⁵ In 1957, Carl McIntire stressed that “to the fundamentalist, there are three main enemies – Communism, Roman Catholicism and modernism”.²⁶ No disagreements existed on this point between the ICCC’s American and other constituents – except that some of the European affiliates (such as the British Consultative Committee and the French Union de defense protestant) seemed to regard Catholics as even bigger threats than the communists.²⁷ McIntire, by contrast, would cooperate with selected conservative Catholics in anti-communist projects.²⁸

Transnational Networks

For information on what the churches had to endure under communist rule and on how clergy were being used by communist authorities,

the ICCC relied on a network of informants and collaborators that its European representatives had started to build immediately after the Second World War. The European network always remained the broadest and the most significant, but in the late 1940s similar, smaller ones were built also in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East and in Latin America, and after 1950 in sub-Saharan Africa.

Even before the ICCC had been created, McIntire had sent to Europe as his special representative his student and protégé Francis Schaeffer, and in the first half of the 1950s this Switzerland-based operative managed to recruit an impressive roster of contacts.²⁹ Also highly important were those army chaplains placed in occupied Germany and Austria who belonged to ACCC member denominations; many of them recruited collaborators at displaced persons camps.³⁰ The network included Russian and East European émigrés, as well, who were already in the West (including, most notably, the Nazi-supported wartime Prime Minister of the Ukraine who led the Anti-Communist Bloc of Nations, Jaroslaw Stetcko), the *Intelligence Digest* circle around the British anti-communist Kenneth DeCourcy and at least one member of the major interfaith anti-communist organization under Prince Otto von Habsburg, Committee for the Defence of Christian Civilization.³¹ Despite deep theological disagreements, the ICCC would work even with anti-communist clergymen from Eastern Orthodox churches.³² These links were via individuals only, with each group going about their business separately, exchanging information and (sometimes) distributing published materials from each other.

Of the networks outside of Europe, the most important one was the Southeast Asian one. Originally, this owed to missionaries sent to the area by the Independent Board of Presbyterian Foreign Missions, a body that McIntire controlled and a part of the ICCC. Also key were the pre-existing contacts of the first ICCC general secretary, the former Dutch diplomat Arie Kok. Due to his service of over 30 years in pre-revolutionary China, he knew many of the local anti-communist actors.³³ The Asian network was further strengthened and expanded during a tour that McIntire took in the region in 1949.³⁴ From his conversations with Southeast Asian churchpeople and politicians, McIntire concluded that “the future and balance of world power is to be determined, not in Europe, but out here”, so he invested much energy and many resources to building a presence in the region.³⁵

Unlike in Western Europe and the Americas, the ICCC's Southeast Asian network included high-ranking figures in government positions, particularly in the staunchly anti-communist countries of Taiwan and

South Korea. The South Korean president in the 1950s, Syngman Rhee, was a long-standing personal friend of one key ICCC official.³⁶ Other ICCC representatives forged close cooperative contact with the son of the president of Taiwan, General Chiang Ching-kuo, who directed the country's secret police. In the early 1960s, they were asked to provide religious anti-communist instruction to the Taiwanese military and talks were begun about allowing the ICCC to start radio broadcasts on the island.³⁷ Occasionally the ICCC received intelligence products from some of their Asian contacts, including from intelligence officers in the US occupation force in Japan, and their Taiwanese leaders worked closely with the well-connected members of the key, regionally strong anti-communist organization, the World Anti-Communism League.³⁸

The Asian networking benefited also from McIntire's closeness to several key members of the so called "China Lobby", the collection of anti-communist politicians, newspaper editors and businessmen who advocated forceful measures for supporting Taiwan and liberating mainland China from the Communists.³⁹ Both McIntire and his successor as the ACCC president, W.O.H. Garman, were members of the Republican party,⁴⁰ and they could rely on "China Lobby" politicians and others in that party's right wing. At times, they would receive classified information from these sources, and especially from the varied congressional committees that investigated communist subversion in America.⁴¹

The ICCC's Middle Eastern and Latin American networks, on the other hand, were much less important, not least because of the paucity of established Protestant churches in these regions.⁴² In Africa, networking was complicated by McIntire's well-known alliance with Southern segregationists in the US and by his vociferous criticism of Dr Martin Luther King and the rest of the black civil rights movement.⁴³ The implication of racism was compounded by McIntire's vocal support for the white Rhodesian and South African governments, ostensibly because of their opposition to communism. Some in his inner circle maintained close contact with the South African secret police and worked with Afrikaner anti-communist groups.⁴⁴ There were those in Africa who used all this against the ICCC, claiming that it was a neo-colonialist venture in the councils of which genuinely African voices were regularly silenced.⁴⁵ Yet by the 1960s the ICCC did possess two black African affiliates (the West Africa Christian Council and the East Africa Christian Council); by the 1970s it had a non-white majority.⁴⁶ The several millions of black African members provided a source of significant grassroots information on communist, WCC and Catholic manoeuvrings on the continent.

Transnational Dissensions

The exchange of information in the ICCC was truly transnational. Yet when it came to deciding on what to do about all the threats perceived, the transnational consensus promptly disappeared. The ICCC's various regional bodies would issue generally couched statements about every Christian's duty to pray (as the Bible Society of India and Ceylon put it in 1958) for victims of communism and for "the liberation of China, North Korea, Russia and all other lands from Communist domination".⁴⁷ They would demand that all Christians refuse all contact with communists and those sympathetic to communists and that they do their utmost to educate their countries on the ideology and purposes of communists and communist sympathizers. The ICCC could readily agree, as well, to oft-reiterated warnings about "the steadily growing theoretical and practical godlessness of the Western world" that seemed to them "the best ally of communism", and they could all join in calls for renewed missionary and revivalist work to arrest this development.⁴⁸

But once it came to more pro-active measures, there emerged significant and persistent disagreements between the organization's disparate national and regional member communities. These were partly theological, partly cultural and partly they owed to the domineering and autocratic leadership style of Carl McIntire himself. In Europe in particular, ICCC executive committee members otherwise in agreement with McIntire resented the felt American arrogance and dictation that his autocratic style involved.⁴⁹ Similar charges were frequently made in the United States, as well, and in 1968–70 they led to McIntire being ousted from the ACCC and to the ACCC's departure from the ICCC (although some of its individual member bodies stayed in).⁵⁰

Theologically, on the other hand, the ICCC's non-Reformed leaders insisted that the organization never take official positions on what they called "purely political matters". The taking of such positions was quite normal – indeed, required – for the Reformed, but a significant part of the ICCC membership (especially in Europe) was not Reformed, and they felt that church bodies had no business becoming involved in political lobbying.⁵¹ The non-Reformed were satisfied with the issuance only of very general proclamations about the evils of communist atheism and materialism and they expressly did not want the organization to offer any policy suggestions to Western governments. This persistent divergence in approach was exposed quite early on, and it complicated the ICCC's anti-communist operations throughout the Cold War.

Starting in early 1948, Carl McIntire and his American cohort called for the pre-emptive use of American armed force to actually destroy the Soviet (and Chinese Communist) regimes. From then on, they pressurized successive US administrations to this end. McIntire himself testified before the US Senate Armed Services Committee in April 1948, stressing that “there are interests which God wants men to value above peace”, and later in the year, the ACCC as a body called for a “complete and frank showdown with Russia” that should include, if expedient, the pre-emptive first use of nuclear weapons.⁵² The demand was reiterated in even clearer terms in another ACCC statement in 1951.⁵³ From that year through the 1960s, the ACCC kept proposing that the contested islands of Quemoy and Matsu be used as launching pad for an invasion of Communist mainland China by US-backed Taiwanese forces.⁵⁴

With these and similar proposals, the ACCC lent its endorsement to the roll-back of Soviet power from Eastern Europe and to the forceful liberation of the Soviet Union and Communist China. According to Carl McIntire, “fighting [communism] on every front, rolling back the Communist advances, and winning the Cold War” had to be the goal. Meeting the goal required the employment of a comprehensive, holistic approach that resorted to military force whenever feasible and worthwhile and, at all other times, tapped into the “heavy artillery of propaganda, espionage, subversion”. The use of economic boycotts and other forms of non-intercourse was demanded, as well, and throughout McIntire insisted that Western Cold War policy had to include a systematic, unceasing effort – carried on “in every possible way and direction”, as he put it in 1969 – to disrupt each communist regime and to turn their people to revolt.⁵⁵

None of these calls for action were endorsed by the bulk of the ICCC nor were they official ICCC policy. The Far Eastern Bible Council, particularly its Taiwanese leaders, were highly supportive, but the farthest the ICCC would go corporately was to suggest, in a unanimously accepted resolution at its 7th World Congress in 1968, that whereas “peaceful coexistence with Communism is morally impossible [...] it must be exposed and opposed until it is defeated and its imperialistic policies ended”. On this basis, the ICCC insisted that “the struggle in Vietnam must not be relaxed until victory is won”.⁵⁶ Even this guardedly worded apparent endorsement of liberation was, in fact, a major and rather belated departure for the ICCC which many of its key non-American leaders had long resisted making. For ten years following the ICCC’s creation, even such a usually staunch ally of McIntire’s as its Swedish vice president David Hedegård had felt that no man of the cloth should

make such calls for the use of armed force to actually defeat and destroy the Soviet Union. He insisted that “the Christian should ‘seek the peace of the city’ where he is living and that resistance to the godless regime could only be a passive one”.⁵⁷

The very limited willingness for pro-active measures among most of the ICCC European cadres was shown even in the organization’s most famous project of all, the so-called Bible Balloon Project of 1953. This project flew some one million copies of selected Bible passages into Eastern European countries on helium balloons sent from the US occupation zone in Germany “to help those countless oppressed souls under the tyranny of communism”.⁵⁸ Thus limited though it was in its aims, even this kind of psychological warfare generated strong objections among the European ICCC once it was revealed that Soviet authorities had forbidden, on pain of death and collective punishment, anyone from touching the packages.⁵⁹ In the end, McIntire had to bypass the ICCC and hire his own functionaries for the project in the US.⁶⁰

Another point of disagreement related to McIntire’s preferred use of the public spectacle – of marches, demonstrations, rallies and mass petitions – as the means of pressurizing political decision-makers. The first one of these was organized in 1951 against a mooted appointment of a US ambassador to the Vatican and bigger ones followed in the mid-1950s against US visits by Russian clergy delegations. ACCC members would join in rallies with Eastern European émigrés whom they had flown in, carrying signs such as “Marx is not Christ”, “Go Home, Servants of the Devil” and “They Are Not Priests, They Are Red Agents”.⁶¹ At later rallies in the 1970s that were called to demand a military victory in Vietnam, ACCC members burned Soviet and Vietcong flags and McIntire offered prayers for repentance over America’s “sin and guilt” in allowing, by withdrawing from the war, the genocide in Cambodia, and over President Richard Nixon’s policies of détente.⁶²

In 1970 and 1971, the ICCC’s Latin American Alliance of Christian Churches did give these pro-war marches their endorsement, and Taiwanese, Australian and Pakistani ICCC leaders praised them.⁶³ Among McIntire’s fellow fundamentalists in America they were always controversial,⁶⁴ and the bulk of the ICCC’s European cadre never showed any sympathy whatsoever. Only one key ICCC leader, the Revd Ian Paisley of the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster, employed similar methods in Europe. But when he did so in connection with ICCC-sponsored events, others in the organization felt disgusted (and the founding member and ICCC vice president of more than 20 years, David Hedegård, even resigned). On the whole, the ICCC’s European leaders

thought that demonstrations were a “shame and a scandal” and that “as a rule, picketing does not work here”.⁶⁵

Finally, the ICCC’s European leaders believed that it was out of place for church people to criticize their own governments in the vociferous ways that McIntire was doing. On the European side of the Atlantic, he was often accused of “McCarthyite” witch-hunting methods unbecoming of men of the cloth and distinctly counterproductive in Europe.⁶⁶ The cultural differences between the militant separatist fundamentalists of the United States and the rather more subdued European conservative clergymen who worked, for the most part, inside rather traditional state churches, proved in the end all too substantive to overcome even in the interests of a shared worry over international communism.

Conclusion

In conclusion, then, the ICCC did form a single transnational community of discourse from among the widely disparate Cold War-era fundamentalist Protestants of Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa. There was significant interchange of information and some interchange of resources between the organization’s different ethnic, cultural and confessional member communities. Each of these was equally anti-communist in theology and equally determined to bring the resources of “Bible-believing” churches into the struggle to expose, contain and to defeat the Soviet Union and all its believed allies and accomplices. There was even significant agreement over the juxtaposition of communism, socialism and modern Western liberalism on the one hand and nearly unrestricted free enterprise on the other that was conjured up by the minority of the ICCC’s leaders who had embraced economic libertarianism. Because of these points of agreement we can speak of Cold War fundamentalist anti-communists as having formed a truly transnational community of discourse and consultation.

However, there were deep cultural and theological disagreements behind the façade of apparent unity. These disagreements militated against the ICCC ever having a real-world impact on the Cold War policy of the Western governments that it tried to influence. Preaching and publishing against communism as a movement, ideology and a false religion was certainly acceptable to all of the ICCC’s national and regional sub-communities, but it was only the Americans (and to a lesser extent the Southeast Asians) who were ever willing to move beyond such merely rhetorical witnessing and to push for specific policy outcomes through detailed policy proposals. The American members

were the only ones to call for roll-back, liberation and the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons and the only ones to appear before congressional committees in support of specific pieces of Cold War legislation. With a few individual exceptions, they were also the only ones who saw the value of mass petitions, demonstrations and rallies. To West Europeans, these seemed out of place for churchpeople and vaguely distasteful; to the Africans, Asians and South Americans, living as they did in societies with weak or non-existent civil societies, mostly irrelevant.

All this internal dissension meant that the ICCC could never fulfil its true potential as a transnational Cold War actor. In terms of its membership and the reach of its publications, it had the makings of a major participant in policy discussions and in shaping public opinion. But it never could resolve the deep theological and cultural rifts that existed within its diverse member communities, and there emerged no truly transnational interchange in it except in information sharing and Christian fellowship. Only after the Cold War had ended did the ICCC's total membership begin to decline precipitously, but already in the 1970s its autocratic life-long leader Carl McIntire had lost his North American and European bases. The deep disagreements over means and methods simply could not be overcome.

Notes

1. I would like to thank the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation and the Oscar Öflund Foundation for the funding that made the research for this essay possible.
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3. For a summary of McIntire's career, see Markku Ruotsila, "Carl McIntire and the Fundamentalist Origins of the Christian Right", *Church History* 81 (June 2012), pp. 378–407.
4. The organization is not even mentioned in Dianne Kirby (ed.), *Religion and the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and mentioned only once or twice, only in passing, in each of the following: David Foglesong, *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire": The Crusade for a "Free Russia" since 1881* (Cambridge University Press, 2007); William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960* (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jonathan P. Herzog, *The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America's Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press,

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5. Martin Durham and Margaret Power, "Introduction", p. 3, in idem (eds), *New Perspectives on the Transnational Right* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
 6. Carl McIntire, *Russia's Most Effective Fifth Column: A Series of Radio Addresses by Carl McIntire* (Collingswood, NJ: Christian Beacon Press, 1948).
 7. See Harold C. Fey and Stephen Neill (eds), *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, vols 2 and 3 (Geneva: WCC, 2004 [1970]).
 8. See, for example, *Resolution on the World Council of Churches* (Amsterdam: ICCC, 1948); *Metropolitan Nikolai: Agent in Soviet Secret Police* (Collingswood, NJ: Christian Beacon Press, n.d.).
 9. *Christian Beacon*, 9 September 1937, p. 4.
 10. McIntire, "The Communist Party Line in the Churches", *Christian Beacon* (21 May 1953), p. 1.
 11. "Resolutions Passed by the International Council of Churches of Christ 2nd Plenary Congress, August 22, 1950, in Geneve, Switzerland", File 8 Box 466B, ACCC/ICCC Collection, Presbyterian Church in America Historical Center, St Louis, Missouri (hereafter ACCC/ICCC).
 12. *Christian Beacon* (13 December 1951), p. 1.
 13. *Reformation Review* 5 (October 1957), pp. 51–2.
 14. *För Biblisk Tro* 21.4 (1957), pp. 170–1.
 15. See John Bolt, *A Free Church, a Holy Nation: Abraham Kuyper's American Public Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); James D. Bratt (ed.), *Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998).
 16. McIntire, *Author of Liberty* (Collingswood, NJ: Christian Beacon Press, 1945), pp. 26–7, 38–9; McIntire, *The Rise of the Tyrant: Controlled Economy vs. Private Enterprise* (Collingswood, NJ: Christian Beacon Press, 1945), pp. xiii, 12–28, 47–8, 181–7.
 17. David Hedegård to Francis Schaeffer, 16 May 1950, Folder: ICCC Korrespondens 1950, Box 39, A I, David Hedegård papers, Swedish National Archives, the Regional Archives at Lund (hereafter DH); Schaeffer to Arie Kok, April 27, 1950, Folder: ICCC Korrespondens 1950, Box 1, A II a, DH; Rolf Lein to Kok, September 21, 1949, Folder: ICCC Korrespondens 1949, Box 1, A II a, DH.
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 19. *För Biblisk Tro* 15.1 (1951), p. 54; *För Biblisk Tro* 21.4 (1957), pp. 170–1.
 20. "Resolutions Passed by the International Council of Churches of Christ 2nd Plenary Congress, Aug. 22, 1950", Box 466B, ACCC/ICCC.
 21. See Markku Ruotsila, *The Origins of Christian Anti-Internationalism: Conservative Evangelicals and the League of Nations* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), pp. 27–32, 171–80.
 22. *Christian Beacon* (7 December 1950), p. 2; *Christian Beacon* (6 November 1952), p. 4; *News from the American Council of Christian Churches* (25 October 1956), n.p.
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24. Hedegård, "Redaktionellt", *För Biblisk Tro* 19.4 (1955), pp. 145–7.
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26. *Christian Beacon* (21 February 1957), p. 6.
27. Ivan Milsted to McIntire, 20 February 1955, Folder: Rev. I.S. Milsted Box 19, McIntire Manuscript Collection (hereafter MMC); *Valiant for the Truth* 12 (1968), pp. 1–3; *Le cri d'alarme* 13 (October 1950), p. 3.
28. Ruotsila, "Carl McIntire", pp. 388–91.
29. Barry Hankins, *Francis Schaeffer and the Shaping of Evangelical America* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), pp. 12–15, 27–37.
30. McIntire to Hedegård, 7 June 1954, Folder: Hedegård, David 1954–, Box 20, MMC; ICCC press release, 3 August 1954, Folder: Dietrich, Revd Z., Box 13, MMC; "Memorandum for ICCC Executive Committee, Memorandum III", 3 January 1955, Folder: ICCC Korrespondens 1955, Box 3, A II a, DH.
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32. McIntire to Hedegård, 7 June 1954, Folder: Hedegård, David 1954–, Box 20, MMC.
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36. McIntire to Kok, 28 June 1950, Folder: Hon. Arie Kok – 1950, Box 19, MMC.
37. See the correspondence between McIntire and Dr. Samuel W.S. Cheng in Folder: Dr. Samuel W.S. Cheng to 1968, Box 13, MMC.
38. Timothy Pietsch to McIntire, 11 November 1951, Folder: Rev. Timothy Pietsch, Box 18, MMC; Cheng to McIntire, 24 July, Folder: Dr. Samuel WS Cheng to 1968, Box 13, MMC.
39. See McIntire's correspondence with Alfred Kohlberg and Marvin Liebman, Boxes 19, 103 and 254, MMC.
40. McIntire to Mrs Philip Cobes, 15 November 1960, Folder: Miscellaneous Correspondence 1948–62, C, Box 28, MMC; Garman to Barry Goldwater, 16 June 1975, Folder: Garman – Personal Correspondence, WG.
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47. *Reformation Review* 5 (April 1958), pp. 169–70; *Christian Beacon* (6 September 1962), p. 1.
48. "Resolutions Passed by the International Council of Churches of Christ 2nd Plenary Congress, Aug. 22, 1950", Box 466B, ACCC/ICCC; *Christian Beacon* (29 September 1955), p. 4; *Christian Beacon* (30 August 1962), p. 8.
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52. *Christian Beacon* (8 April 1948), p. 1, 8; ACCC press release, 31 October 1948, Folder: ACCC – Resolutions, WG.
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16

The Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne and the Transnationalization of Anti-Communist Propaganda in Western Europe after the Second World War

Johannes Grossmann

In 1966 the Portuguese postal service issued a special set of three stamps. The stamps were dedicated to the sixth international congress of the Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne (CIDCC: International Committee for the Defence of Christian Culture) which was held in Lisbon at the end of March. What lay hidden behind the event could not be seen by looking at the stamps with their symbolic Christian images. It was in fact the conference of an international anti-communist propaganda agency with sections in numerous countries of Western Europe, as well as in the United States and Latin America. In terms of its political influence and financial resources, the CIDCC was one of the most significant attempts to amalgamate anti-communist forces in Western Europe in the period after the war. The Comité, which characterized itself as a kind of “Christian Kominform”,¹ was different from other similar organizations, not because of the nature of its operations but on account of the religious and moral motivation behind its activities. Its members represented a Christian-conservative worldview and maintained close links with the Catholic Church. Their disapproval of communism was primarily based on their atheist doctrine, and the way in which the Comité behaved toward the institutions and dignitaries of the church.²

Although the CIDCC can certainly be described as “one of the most significant reactions to the communists’ anti-religious offensive on

public opinion in Europe”,³ unlike other internationally active anti-communist organizations like *Paix et liberté*⁴ or the Congress for Cultural Freedom,⁵ it has to date remained largely unexamined. When any notice has been taken, it has only been in the margins and from thematically limited points of view.⁶ Thus far, there has yet to be a thorough history of the organization and its development.⁷

This essay draws on sources from German and Spanish archives as well as contemporary printed materials, sketches the emergence and development, as well as the personnel, ideological direction, mode of operation, scope and potential leverage of the CIDCC, from transnational and comparative perspectives. At the same time, it will be argued that for all its historic singularity, its organizational history can be seen as a prime example of the development of anti-communist propaganda agencies. This allows for the inference of a general temporal frame of reference for the transnationalization of anti-communist ways of thinking, patterns of behaviour and forms of organization in Western Europe after the Second World War.

Origins of the CIDCC in France: Integralism, Pétainism and Anti-Communism

The slogan “Christian civilization”, which suggests a causative relationship between Christian belief and the advancement of civilization, arose in the course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as Catholic traditionalism’s response to enlightenment and revolution. In the second half of the nineteenth century Christian civilization developed into the determining principle of an integralism that the Catholic Church explained as both the source and ideal of social existence.⁸ With the culmination of political crises and the popularity of the Catholic lay movement in France in the 1920s and 1930s, the term became an interpretive model that was similar in meaning to the German concept of *Abendland*. Certainly, in the *Reichsgedanke* the notion of *Abendland* elevated the synthesis of Christian and Germanic roots to the fundamental principal of European civilization, while the concept of Christian civilization stressed France’s role as that of the “oldest daughter of the church” and was directed against atheistic communism as much as against Germanic “barbarism”.⁹

Some Catholic intellectuals called for France to return to its role as the guardian of Christian civilization. Among these was the Church historian Paul Lesourd from the Institut catholique de Paris. Lesourd came to attention in the interwar period for a proto-fascist portrayal of the Lateran Accords and for publications about the history of the

Catholic mission.¹⁰ He regularly wrote articles about church events and commentaries for *Le Figaro*, in which he passed judgement on the division between the state and the church and called for France to be reconciled with its Catholic roots.¹¹ After the German occupation of 1940, Lesourd appeared as the publisher and lead article writer of the collaborationist weekly, *Voix Françaises*, which closely connected to Action catholique, called for support of the Vichy Regime, and preached the fight against secularism, freemasonry and communism.¹² After 1947 – with the support of church circles and prominent protagonists of the early Vichy Regime such as General Maxime Weygrand and Admiral Lucien Lacaze – Lesourd published a new Catholic weekly, *Clergé-Informations*. This paper, which saw itself as the mouthpiece of the pope, was predominantly based on translations from the *Osservatore Romano*. Nominally published by the specially created Centre catholique international de documentation et statistiques, it was particularly aimed at French priests and bishops. In the form of *Observateur catholique*, *Clergé-Informations* soon had a companion publication that was intended to be read by Catholic laypersons.¹³ The founding of the CIDCC, which according to its own account had come about as a protest against the abduction of Greek children by communist rebels,¹⁴ was ultimately a direct result of Lesourd's publishing activities.

The Development of the Comité international into a Transnational Network

The CIDCC, which in contrast to the Centre catholique also appealed explicitly to Protestants as well as to members of the Orthodox Church and humanists, was a transnational operation from the outset. In the view of its founders, it was essential to share “a general plan of action [...] between the different national committees” if they were to “construct a dam and establish a counterweight to communist and crypto-communist propaganda”, “organise and coordinate counter propaganda in each country”, and “effectively intervene in official international and national organisations”. In keeping with their assumption that “the world had to be re-established on a Christian basis” or “sink into communist materialism”, the CIDCC was intended – “in the face of a well-organised communist and anti-Christian Internationale” – to become the nucleus for a “Christian Internationale”.¹⁵ Lesourd's most important partner in the early years was the Belgian prime minister Paul Van Zeeland. The Christian-conservative Van Zeeland was in contact with notable representatives from the monarchist, nationalist and proto-fascist elements of the Right, such as the writer Pierre

Nothomb and the entrepreneur Paul de Launoit, by far the most significant financier of the right-wing conservative and anti-communist right in Belgium during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. As a renowned European politician, Van Zeeland also had excellent international contacts at his disposal, which he was then able to deploy in his role as international president of the Comité.¹⁶

For his fight against “atheist” communism Lesourd won several supporters among representatives of the Franco regime in Spain. The Spanish ambassador in Paris, Manuel Aguirre de Carcér, declared himself ready to collaborate, as did the president of the influential lay organization, the Asociación católica nacional de propagandistas (ACNP), Fernando Martín-Sánchez Juliá. Contacts also existed with the Instituto de cultura hispánica (ICH), which was affiliated to the Spanish Foreign Ministry and had excellent financial and publishing resources at its command.¹⁷ The Comité international’s support for the roll-back/liberation rhetoric of the US political right found expression in the formation of several Eastern European sections by prominent exiles. Along with an Albanian, a Hungarian and a Polish section, there was also a Slovakian section which counted high-ranking functionaries from the former Tiso regime amongst its members. In addition, CIDCC maintained contacts in the early years in Britain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the US, Canada, Brazil and Togo. Even though, initially, these links were primarily based on declarations of intent and only rarely extended to a sporadic exchange of letters, they do undeniably reflect a claim for international standing and influence.¹⁸

The German Section of the Comité international: Professional Anti-Communism

Initially, there was no German section. This was due, on the one hand, to continuing resentment in Western Europe towards Germany, the former wartime enemy. At the same time, confessional obstacles made it difficult for the Catholic-inspired Comité international to establish contact with German representatives. It was not until 1951 that Lesourd travelled to Germany to campaign for the foundation of a German section.¹⁹ Alongside representatives of the Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit (which thanks to his intervention shortly thereafter became the German division of the European committee of Paix et liberté), Lesourd’s most important contact was the then office manager of the CDU Press Service, Rudolf Junges. Prior to 1933, Junges had been a member of the Catholic Deutsche Zentrumspartei and had taken part

in a German–French student exchange programme. During the war, Junges was responsible for the Wehrmacht's censoring of the press in Bordeaux and Paris. It was also in this context that he had met Lesourd, whose *Voix françaises* was being published in Bordeaux at the time. His overly francophile attitude led Junges, a good friend of the newspaper magnate Jean Luchaire (who was sentenced to death in 1946 for collaboration and high treason), to be transferred to Greece in 1943.²⁰

Junges became general secretary of the German section of the CIDCC, which was officially founded in 1952. For the office of president, Junges was able to attract the deputy chairman of the CDU, Friedrich Holzapfel, who was later succeeded by Herman Pünder, the former Chief Director of the Economic Council for the British-American occupied territories of Bizonia. In a very short time, the German section developed into an efficient anti-communist propaganda agency. Through the publication of several periodicals – such as the monthly *Informationsdienst*, the fortnightly *Das Stichwort*, and the weekly newsletter *Rundbrief* – as well as through poster campaigns, writing circulars to priests, and training courses inside companies and at exhibitions, it pointed to the threat of communism and raised the issue of the German question among its foreign partners.²¹ The German section soon took over the uncontested leadership role within the Comité international. In terms of external appearances, the Christian – now emphatically inter-confessional – orientation of the Comité still persisted, yet in the background, it increasingly advanced a desire for the greatest possible efficiency in terms of anti-communist propaganda. The activities of the German section were financially supported by the Federal Republic's Ministry for the Interior, the Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government), and the Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery).²² They had an influential supporter in the Foreign Office, moreover, in Rudolf Junges, who had meanwhile switched across to the diplomatic service. Outsourcing the work of anti-communist propaganda had several advantages from the point of view of the state authorities. First, it spared them from public criticism and from the threat of comparison with the national-socialist propaganda machine. Second, at very low financial cost, it was possible in this way to unlock extensive amounts of private and voluntary resources, which had greater powers of persuasion and deployed a more widespread effect on society than state initiatives. Third, the financial dependency provided an excellent means to bind and control potentially radical currents within the democratic system.

Personnel and Content Realignment in Psychological Warfare

The planned expansion and intensification of international activities certainly stalled after the founding of the German section. After being named as the Belgian Foreign Minister in 1949, Van Zeeland bestowed only limited attention on the *Comité international*. At the same time, faced with limited numbers of customers and a bottleneck in his finances, Lesourd's publishing activities came to a standstill. International meetings hardly ever took place any more. The German section therefore made contact in February 1957, via the Parisian embassy, with some politicians from the periphery of the former French prime minister, Antoine Pinay who, clearly seeing a useful political instrument of power in the CIDCC, prompted a re-establishment of the French section that completely bypassed Lesourd.²³

The man pulling the strings behind this development was Pinay's long-standing companion, the Parisian lawyer Jean Violet. As an international legal advisor, volunteer in the French Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage (SDECE), and unofficial member of the French UN delegation, Violet had, since 1945, built up a considerable network of contacts. Later, it was from this network of contacts that the so-called Cercle was to emerge.²⁴ Thanks to these connections, Violet was able to bring his own concept of professional, internationally coordinated Action psychologique into the political debate. This concept turned against the "direct" anti-communist propaganda work of the postwar years. This was not particularly suited for combatting the post-Stalinist Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence, and saturating the Western population with newspapers, flyers and posters had been condemned, from Violet's perspective, for its "complete lack of effectiveness". As an alternative, he advocated the "indirect" influencing of the "individual and collective subconscious". This strategy was supposed to be based on scientific arguments and psychoanalytic knowledge, and be carried out by "micro-groups" organized by the intelligence services.²⁵ In as much as it understood the free exchange with the East as a lever to use against the communist regimes, it conformed in many aspects to the concept of "positive" anti-communism that was later represented by the Interdoc network.²⁶ After 1957, the *Comité international* actively brought these ideas into the international debate over psychological warfare and thereby put itself forward as a potential partner for NATO.²⁷

The Comité international in the 1960s: Rivalries, Radicalization and Globalization

As a consequence of this development, however, the organization increasingly came into competition with other propaganda agencies that laid claim to a similar role. One of these was the European committee of what was formerly Paix et liberté, under its new name, the Comité international d'information et d'action sociale (CIAS), by this stage also dominated by its German section. It was only logical, therefore, that Van Zeeland was forced to resign from his presidency of the CIDCC when he was named honorary president of the CIAS at the end of 1957. At the same time, this left the way open for an extensive restructuring of the organization. Notable exiles created a Baltic section as early as November 1957. In the course of 1958, new national sections emerged in Austria, Sweden and Belgium. José Solis Ruiz, the general secretary of the Falange party who was seen as a possible successor to Franco, became president of a new Spanish section. In Italy, with the help of the Pro Deo movement that was supported by notable clergymen and businessmen, it was possible to create a representative national section around Eduardo Martino, later a member of the Commission of the European Economic Community. In addition, promising contacts also emerged in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Greece.²⁸

On the other hand, the CIDCC did not join in with the worldwide coordination of anti-communist propaganda agencies advanced by the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL), a call which reached its first highpoint in March 1958 with the anti-communist world congress and moved on to the formation of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) in 1966.²⁹ This was because, with the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations and the CIAS, there were already two European organizations in the project with which the CIDCC had been competing for sociopolitical recognition and state support. CIDCC tried therefore, through the formation of its own sections on other continents, to raise itself to the level of a global organization and position itself as a Christian alternative to the emerging WACL. By the end of the 1950s, initial contacts had already been made with Uganda.³⁰ Latin America stood at the centre of interest, where several national branches emerged on the initiative of the German section.³¹ Under the leadership of the former secret service officer of German origin, Charles A. Willoughby, to whom General Douglas MacArthur gave the title "my pet fascist",³² a US section was also formed in 1962. From the end of

1963, there was also a Portuguese section that was closely linked to the Salazar regime. With the international activities of the CIDCC enjoying the dynamic support of the German Foreign Office, its monthly information service now appeared under the name of *IC Information*, and was at times being printed in as many as five different languages.

Collapse of the Comité international with Détente

The great strength of the Comité international, namely the support it received from the federal German government, was also at the same time its greatest weakness. After the end of the Adenauer era anti-communist propaganda began to lose support. The one-sided dependence on state support became the undoing of the CIDCC. A Foreign Office survey of 21 German embassies conducted in 1964 showed that the organization's foreign operations did not enjoy the "stated level of coverage". The supposed leader of a Paraguayan section had lived "for years in Paris", and a conservative representative of the House of Commons, named as the Comité's British contact, was unable to recall the organization's name. In addition, the participation of representatives from the Spanish and Portuguese governments was also criticized, as was the closeness between the section from the United States and radical right-wing circles and the cooperation with the former Bundesminister für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte (Federal Minister for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims), Theodor Oberländer, notoriously controversial because of his national-socialist past.³³

The Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (BMG: Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs), on the other hand, saw the loss of trust in the CIDCC as a welcome opportunity to help its preferred choice, the CIAS, to assert itself in the struggle for state recognition and financial support.³⁴ Even if the German section of the CIDCC could avoid financial cuts, it had to accept an increasing ministerial control of its activities.³⁵ Its dependency was therefore strengthened further. Despite the fact that at its major international congresses, such as in Lisbon in 1966, the CIDCC still evoked the impression of being a high-performance propaganda agency, it had been with its back against the wall since the mid-1960s. After the Grand Coalition came into office in December 1966, the new social democratic foreign minister, Willy Brandt, abandoned the payment of contributions to the CIDCC "for reasons of budget and objectivity".³⁶ Shortly thereafter, the Presse- und Informationsamt also cancelled its support. The Ministry for the Interior, on the other hand,

worked again after 1968 on an attempt to fuse the CIDCC with the equally criticized CIAS.³⁷ Once Willy Brandt was elected chancellor of a social-liberal coalition at the end of 1969, all support from the side of the federal government was discontinued. The German section was therefore dissolved in March 1970,³⁸ which also meant, in effect, the end of the CIDCC as a transnational propaganda organization.

Conclusion

It is very hard to assess the actual influence of the Comité international on national and international decision-making processes. In terms of its lifespan, financial opportunities and membership, it belongs, alongside the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIAS and the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations, among the most significant, transnationally active anti-communist propaganda agencies in Western Europe after the Second World War. It is striking that despite its prominent circle of members, the CIDCC could never even come close to exploiting its full diplomatic potential. Although it certainly might have become an informal forum for foreign policy discussions and negotiations on European politics, it was always restricted to the work of anti-communist propaganda.

At the same time, the development of the CIDCC – aside from its own anchoring in the Christian-conservative milieu – can be considered as paradigmatic for a comparative investigation of transnational anti-communist propaganda agencies. Thus the various phases in its history summarized here certainly appear comparable to those of other organizations, and may potentially offer an analytical framework for the changes that were seen in models of anti-communist thought, activity and communications in Western Europe after the Second World War. It is possible to distinguish: an initial phase at the national level in the late 1940s and early 1950s, characterized by a high degree of ideological, procedural and participant continuity with the anti-communist propaganda work of the interwar years; a period of early international contacts and institutional consolidation between 1948 and 1952; a phase increasingly combining state and private propaganda work, plus the emergence of an anti-communist “state-private network” over the course of the 1950s, in which organizations and ministries from West Germany can often be identified as the driving force behind transnational propaganda work; the climax of the debate over an international coordination of psychological warfare towards the end of the 1950s, accompanied by realignment in terms of the content and methods of anti-communist

propaganda; as a consequence, a spatial expansion and globalization of anti-communist organizations in the late 1950s and through the 1960s, marked by struggles over resources between rival transnational propaganda agencies; finally, a phase that sees the fundamental restructuring of anti-communist propaganda and its institutional agencies in Western Europe under the impression of altered national and international frameworks towards the end of the 1960s, that ended up – and not just in the case of the CIDCC – with the withdrawal of financial support, and eventual dissolution.

Notes

1. Information folder on the Comité international de défense de la civilisation (Autumn 1949), Document IX: “Kominform” chrétien, R 3035/138, Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs General Archives), Madrid (hereafter AGMAE).
2. For an overview of the accusations levelled against communist rulers and their ideology, see the catalogue to the travelling exhibition “Four Decades of Communism” conceived by the German section of the Comité international: *Vier Jahrzehnte Kommunismus. Europäische Dokumentar-Ausstellung* (Munich: ZOPE, 1959).
3. Philippe Chenaux, *Une Europe vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome* (Brussels: Ciaco, 1990), pp. 39–43 (40).
4. On Paix et liberté, and particularly on its German section, the Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit, see Bernard Ludwig, “Anticommunisme et guerre psychologique en République Fédérale d’Allemagne et en Europe (1950–1956)”, PhD dissertation, Paris-Sorbonne, 2012.
5. See, amongst others: Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy. The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Post-War Europe* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Pierre Grémion, *Intelligence de l’anticommunisme. Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris* (Paris: Fayard, 1995); Michael Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen* (Munich: Oldenbourg 1998); Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and Post-War American Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2002).
6. See, for example: Antonio Moreno Juste, “Actitud y reacción de España ante Europa (1951–1962). Franquismo y construcción europea”, PhD dissertation, University of Madrid, 2001, pp. 388–90; Carlos Sanz Díaz, “España y la República Federal de Alemania (1949–1966). Política, económica y emigración, entre la Guerra Fría y la Distensión”, PhD dissertation, University of Madrid, 2005, pp. 450–7.
7. For a short historical abstract with a focus on the 1950s, however, see Johannes Grossmann, “Vom ‘christlichen Kominform’ zur ‘geistigen Nato’. Das Internationale Comité zur Verteidigung der Christlichen Kultur als transnationale antikommunistische Propagandaagentur”, *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung* (2011), pp. 139–54.
8. Jacques Gadille, *Le concept de civilisation chrétienne dans la pensée romantique*, in Jean-René Derré, Xavier de Montclos and Bernard Plongeron (eds),

Civilisation chrétienne. Approche historique d'une idéologie, XVIIIe–XXe siècle (Paris: Beauchesne, 1975), pp. 183–209.

9. On the concept of *Abendland* and the idea of Christian civilization between the wars, see Dagmar Pöpping, *Abendland. Christliche Akademiker und die Utopie der Antimoderne, 1900–1945* (Berlin: Metropol, 2002); Philippe Chenaux, *De la chrétienté à l'Europe. Les catholiques et l'idée européenne au XXe siècle* (Tours: CLD, 2007), pp. 37–57.
10. See the works by Paul Lesourd: *La Cité de César et la Cité de Dieu* (Paris: Portiques, 1929); *L'Œuvre civilisatrice et scientifique des missionnaires catholiques dans les colonies Françaises* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1931); *Histoire des Missions Catholiques* (Paris: Arc, 1937).
11. See, for example, Paul Lesourd, "Les lois 'dites de laïcité'", *Le Figaro* (12 March 1925), and "L'État doit-il ignorer l'Église?" *Le Figaro* (9 May 1933).
12. For *Voix Françaises*, see Jacques Duquesne, *Les catholiques français sous l'Occupation* (Paris: Seuil, 1996), pp. 85–6.
13. Information folder on the Centre catholique international de documentation et statistiques, 1948, Réalisations 1: Clergé-Informations, and Réalisations 2: Observateur catholique, R 3035/138, AGMAE.
14. Hans Edgar Jahn, *Lebendige Demokratie. Die Praxis der politischen Meinungspflege in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main: Ammelburg, 1956), p. 728.
15. Information folder on the Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne, 1949, R 3035/138, AGMAE.
16. For Van Zeeland's biography and his relationship with the Comité International, see Vincent Dujardin and Michel Dumoulin, *Paul van Zeeland (1893–1973)* (Brussels: Racine, 1997), pp. 156–9.
17. In the summer of 1952, leading protagonists of the Comité international gave a series of lectures at the Summer University that the ICH organized in Santander, with notable representatives of the so-called "Abendland" movement as guests. The contributions were subsequently published in two anthologies: *Aspectos económicos de la Europa actual* (Madrid: Ediciones cultura hispánica, 1953) and *Panorama político de la Europa actual* (Madrid: Ediciones cultura hispánica, 1953). Afterwards this meeting came to be seen as the founding congress of the Centre européen de documentation et d'information (CEDI). On the "Abendland" movement and the CEDI, see Vanessa Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen. Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920–1970)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), pp. 127–206.
18. On the composition of the national sections in the initial phase, see Information folder on the Comité international de défense de la civilisation chrétienne, 1949, Comités nationaux, 3035/138, AGMAE.
19. See the federal archive report by Ewert Freiherr von Dellingshausen, Head of Department in the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs, 4 May 1951, B 137/2607, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (hereafter BArch).
20. See the interview with the former leader of the Press Group at the Department of Propaganda in Paris, Hermann Eich, reproduced in David Pryce-Jones, *Paris in the Third Reich: A History of the German Occupation, 1940–1944* (London: Collins, 1981), pp. 245–8.
21. For an overview of the activities of the German section in the early years, see the financial report for the period from January 1954 to October 1957, B 136/4376, BArch.

22. There is an insight into the financing of the German section in the letter written by Friedrich Wilhelm Willeke to Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, 26 November 1956, in B5/4, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (hereafter PAAA).
23. See two letters from the German section to the Foreign Office, 21 March 1957 and 25 October 1957, in *ibid*.
24. On Jean Violet and the Cercle, see Johannes Grossmann, "Ein Europa der 'Hintergründigen'. Antikommunistische christliche Organisationen, konservative Elitenzirkel und private Außenpolitik in Westeuropa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg", in Johannes Wienand and Christiane Winkler (eds), *Die kulturelle Integration Europas* (Wiesbaden: VS, 2009), pp. 303–40, and Adrian Hänni's contribution in this volume.
25. "Note sur un projet d'action psychologique dans le cadre du Nato", Spring 1956, in BMVg 852, Papers of Franz Josef Strauss, Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Politik, Munich (hereafter ACSP).
26. On Interdoc, see Giles Scott-Smith, *Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), and Giles Scott-Smith's contribution in this volume.
27. See, for example, the note from Junges, 19 February 1958, in B 12/382, PAAA.
28. A good insight into the international development of the Comité international is given by the anthology of contributions from the second congress produced by the Spanish section in 1960: *Actas del II congreso del Comité internacional de defensa de la civilización cristiana* (Madrid: Comercial española de ediciones, 1960).
29. On the WACL, see the (admittedly quite polemical) account by Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League* (New York: Dodd-Mead, 1986), and Pierre Abramovici's contribution in this volume.
30. See documentation in B 4/10, PAAA.
31. See documentation in B 5/37, PAAA.
32. Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 161.
33. Hans Waiblinger (Office of Structural Questions on the Eastern Bloc) to the Domestic Office of the Department for Foreign Affairs, 14 October 1964, B 5/37, PAAA; note from Waiblinger, 8 January 1965, in *ibid*.
34. BMG draft for a memo to the Comité international, 16 December 1964, B 137/5986, BArch.
35. Kurt Hoffmann (Domestic Office of the Department for Foreign Affairs) to the CIDCC German section, 15 February 1965, B 5/37, PAAA.
36. Georg Negwer (Domestic Office of the Department for Foreign Affairs) to the CIDCC German section, 9 January 1967, *ibid*.
37. Internal memo from the Federal Chancellor's Office, 7 November 1968, B 136/4376, BArch.
38. Protocol from the extraordinary members meeting, Bonn, 26 March 1970 (protocol dated 2 April 1970), No. 698, Best. 1304, papers of Hermann Pünder, Historisches Archiv, Cologne.

17

Bible Smuggling and Human Rights in the Cold War

Bent Boel

Bible smuggling was a little known dimension of Western anti-communist endeavours during the Cold War.¹ It took place throughout the conflict and involved numerous (overwhelmingly Protestant) groups from especially the Nordic countries, West Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States. Unambiguously anti-communist in their orientation, these groups were fully transnational in terms of outlook and operation. The original source of inspiration for many was a pioneering Dutch smuggler, Anne van der Bijl, better known as Brother Andrew, whose first visit to the Soviet bloc took place in 1955.² By their very nature, these operations required secrecy and segmentation. Nonetheless, forms of cooperation developed as the various groups shared the view that missionary efforts ought to ignore state borders. Transnational cooperation was helped by personal links between key actors, public as well as secret international gatherings aimed at denouncing violations of religious rights in the communist countries, the exchange of information, and the coordination of activities. Such cooperation took very practical forms: co-financing publications, dividing tasks among Bible translators, producers and smugglers, and even operational collaboration.

Much of this activity remains uncovered, with most accounts provided by the smugglers themselves or their sympathizers.³ The lack of scholarly interest in Bible smuggling seems to come down to an implicit dismissal of its significance and impact, and the paucity of available and reliable archival sources. This chapter identifies several key issues raised by this activity and takes a closer look at one group, the Danish European Mission (DEM), established by Reverend Hans Kristian Neerskov in 1964.

The Issue of Bible Smuggling

That smuggling of religious literature took place may seem self-evident, but the specifics need to be documented. Some claims concerning the number of Bibles smuggled to the communist countries during the Cold War are so extravagant that one could be tempted to dismiss the whole enterprise as a fraud. Scepticism may also be nurtured by smuggler accounts in which “God’s hand” was decisive in ensuring success. Nevertheless the large number of organizations involved and the size of their membership do testify to their significance as a Cold War phenomenon. As does the fact that couriers were sometimes caught in the act by communist authorities.⁴ The Soviet authorities devoted considerable energy to denouncing them.⁵ The Stasi archives reveal that the communist authorities were worried about their impact.⁶

It would not make much sense to smuggle Bibles to the East if they were readily available or nobody cared to read them. Access to Bibles was often heavily restricted. Among the many human rights which the communist authorities violated in the Soviet Union and after 1945 to various degrees in Eastern Europe was that of religious freedom. For decades, the Soviet regime pursued a policy of “forced secularization” of the population.⁷ Religious persecution took many forms, directed towards institutions, buildings, symbols and the actual practice of individuals. It included anti-religious propaganda, social/political pressure on and in some countries legal sanctions against the practitioners of religion, the closing of places of worship as well as the control, supervision or harassment of religious institutions and those in charge of these institutions. As far as Christianity was concerned, an important way in which church activities and individual worshipping could be hampered was to restrict, hinder or explicitly prohibit access to Bibles. In fact, the degree of religious freedom varied greatly from one communist country to another, and so, logically, did the availability of Bibles, although how much is a matter of dispute. A report by *Time* magazine in 1979 stated that Bibles were easily available in Poland but their access was “erratic in East Germany, difficult in Czechoslovakia and Hungary [...], extremely difficult in Romania, virtually impossible in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Buying a Bible is an out-and-out crime in Albania.”⁸ On the opposite side, Poul Hansen, Europe secretary for the Department of Church Cooperation of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) in Geneva, argued that in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, Bibles were available for those who really wanted one and that Bible smuggling

in those countries was “a demonstration, not a necessity”.⁹ Hansen left the Soviet Union out of his “positive list”, and with good reason, since there does seem to have been a serious and organized shortage of Bibles in that country. The actual demand for such texts is of course difficult to assess. Smuggler accounts unsurprisingly testified that there was such a demand. Somewhat more conclusive evidence – albeit in a rather changed situation – came in the late 1980s when the liberalization of access to Bibles was followed by an explosive increase in their distribution, presumably reflecting a corresponding demand.¹⁰

The Western Context: Bible Smuggling as a Controversial Activity

Bible smuggling was an extremely controversial activity during the Cold War. A first criticism directed at Bible smuggling was that it was unnecessary. While it was difficult to dispute the fact that there was a shortage of Bibles in many Soviet bloc countries, some official church circles emphasized the positive stories, for instance when the regimes occasionally accepted the importation of Bibles. The smugglers argued that such official deliveries were just drops in the ocean, and that positive assessments of the Bible situation were based on an overly optimistic reliance on reports from official churches in the East. A second criticism was that it was a Cold War relic – undermining détente and the liberalization which détente was expected to foster. Such a claim came from established church circles interested in an official dialogue across the Iron Curtain. Some of the Christians involved in the non-aligned peace movement, and who as such played a key role in Western contacts with dissidents, likewise saw the Bible smugglers as disruptive right-wing “cold warriors”. Other reasons to see Bible smuggling as counterproductive were the following: it could make the Bible look “subversive” in the eyes of communist authorities; it might have a perverting impact in the East, attracting individuals whose primary interest in such Western contacts was not necessarily religious; it was dangerous, certainly for the Eastern recipients and sometimes also for those providing the Bibles; and that Bible smuggling was wrong because it was illegal, unethical and presupposed the need to lie.¹¹

These accusations were countered by smugglers arguing that they ought not to obey unjust laws, and that if asked they would tell the truth anyway.¹² Some criticisms may have reflected a tendency among secular observers to regard Bible smugglers as fanatics and members of bizarre and irrelevant religious sects. In-fighting, accusations of inappropriate

conduct and lawsuits certainly contributed to taint their reputation and weaken their credibility. The fact that a number of the smugglers' claims, whether political (for example concerning the communist impact on the media in the West) or concerning the number of Bibles smuggled to the East, seemed far-fetched no doubt contributed to this dismissal. It further fed the suspicion that for some the whole issue was no more than a process of personal "empire building" and fundraising. This seems particularly to have been an issue in the US, where missionary groups eagerly competed against each other – especially when it came to fundraising – and among their key selling points was the number of smuggled Bibles. The incentive to boast with inflated figures of success was obviously powerful.¹³

There were many different organizations involved in Bible smuggling, but they were overwhelmingly Protestant, albeit of different denominations. It never became a mainstream Protestant activity. A pioneer in this endeavour was the Dutch Brother Andrew, who initiated smuggling to Poland as early as 1955 and gradually extended his activities to other communist countries as he built up his own organization, Open Doors. Further examples of important European organizations were Misjon bak Jernteppet (Norway, established 1967), Suomen Evankelisluterilainen Kansanlähetyt (Finnish Lutheran Mission, 1967) and Glaube in der 2. Welt (Switzerland, 1972). Older organizations also joined the cause, including Slaviska Missionen (Sweden, 1903), European Christian Mission (1904) and Licht im Osten (Germany, 1920). Among the American groups were Underground Evangelism (established by Joe Bass) and Jesus to the Communist World (Richard Wurmbrand). Many of these were in touch with Michael Bourdeaux's Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism (1969, later renamed Keston College). Twelve Western organizations institutionalized their cooperation within the framework of the Biblical Education by Extension based in Vienna.¹⁴ While Catholics may to a limited extent have brought Bibles into the Soviet bloc, there does not seem to have been any large-scale or systematic effort to do so, with the major exception of the Italian group Russia Cristiana.¹⁵ There seems to have been a difference between the American and the European Bible smugglers. The Americans were much more aggressive in their public relations efforts, were better fundraisers, and were able to build bigger organizations. They were generally characterized by a significant political and theological conservatism as well as intense mutual rivalry. To what extent this enabled them to operate on a larger scale in terms of actual smuggling remains uncertain.

The Danish European Mission, Bible Smuggling and Human Rights Activism

The Danish European Mission was the only Danish self-confessed Bible-smuggling organization during the Cold War. To date no serious historical research has ever been directed at this group or its founder, the Pentecostal reverend Hans Kristian Neerskov. This is in contrast to those Danish print media which in recent years have produced articles on Neerskov as one of the (unsung) heroes of the Cold War. A story based (mainly) on such reports might sound as follows. Neerskov was the “Smuggler-King by the grace of God”, “agent 007” and a “living legend” who set out in 1964 to bring Bibles to “the Kingdom of Lies”, travelling to the “most remote corners” of the Soviet Union, bringing Bibles and giving sermons, while heading a team of up to 40 couriers.¹⁶ Neerskov and his group were thus behind “a huge solidarity endeavour in Eastern Europe during the Cold War”, displaying “legendary” civil courage at “great personal risk”.¹⁷ Over the years Neerskov managed to smuggle “millions of Bibles into the communist countries” for which he was “arrested 11 times” but somehow managed to escape trials and jail.¹⁸ His courage also served him well back home, in Denmark, where he endured the opposition of the media and of the political and church establishments who saw his activities as a needless “provocation”.¹⁹ In the East Neerskov became known as the “smuggler-priest”²⁰ and *Izvestia* denounced him as “the Soviet Union’s ideological enemy no. 1”.²¹ Neerskov’s reputation prompted Sakharov to contact him in 1975, which ultimately, on Neerskov’s initiative, led to the holding of the so-called Sakharov hearings and a personal friendship between the two.²² He also “held meetings with [...] president Ronald Reagan”²³ who invited him to his 75th birthday celebration in 1986. One of Neerskov’s most spectacular successes came in 1983, when he managed to secure an American donation of 60,000 tons of wheat (valued at \$20m) to Poland, the transfer of which he negotiated personally during a face-to-face meeting in 1983 with General Wojciech Jaruzelski.²⁴ A prolific writer, occasionally appearing on TV (an interview he gave to the Christian Broadcasting Network in 1974 sealed his friendship “for life” with TV evangelist Pat Robertson and made him “a celebrity in Christian circles in the US”), his book *Mission Possible* was published in 16 languages, 26 countries and more than 10 million copies were distributed.²⁵ Claims have been made that few others have exerted such an influence “not just in Denmark, but in the US, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and many other countries of the world” and that

Neerskov ought to be seen as one of those who contributed to the collapse of communism.²⁶ This tale of heroism should obviously be seen in the context of the ongoing “memory war” over Denmark’s role in the Cold War: Neerskov’s fans can be found among those who believe that the Left at the very least was too “soft” on communism.²⁷

To what extent are these exploits truthful, semi-truthful or just plain fantasy? Many stories seem ultimately to draw on just one source, Neerskov himself, who once conceded that modesty was not among his salient qualities.²⁸ Among the sceptics we find René Hartzner, a former close friend and associate of Neerskov, who joined him on what was for both of them their first trip to the Soviet bloc in 1968.²⁹ In Hartzner’s view Neerskov’s accounts of his Bible-smuggling activities and other feats are largely fictitious.³⁰ He finds it unlikely that Neerskov visited the Soviet Union between 1970 (when he was arrested and expelled) and 1988 (when he went back and met Sakharov, probably for the first time). While Neerskov did go to Poland in the early 1980s, his travel activity in other Soviet bloc countries during that period is, according to Hartzner, likely to have been modest. The latter assessment is consistent with the fact that Neerskov himself has stated that he stopped smuggling after his ill-fated trip to the Soviet Union in June 1970.³¹ Hartzner further states that the famed donation of 60,000 tons of wheat to Poland never took place.³² One can add that it has not been possible to find any evidence of Neerskov’s invitation to Reagan’s birthday party or that he indeed ever met Reagan.³³ Nor has a search in *Izvestia* succeeded in unearthing any reference to Neerskov being the Soviet Union’s ideological enemy No. 1.³⁴ What is more, the initiative for the Sakharov Hearings was taken not by Neerskov but by the Common Council of Eastern Exiles and its de facto leader, Øjvind Feldsted Andresen.³⁵

While Neerskov’s achievements have been exaggerated in the media, and while these embellishments may owe something to Neerskov’s lack of modesty, it remains clear that DEM was involved in Bible smuggling during the Cold War.³⁶ The single most important source available is Neerskov’s own account, which can be supplemented with newspaper articles, interviews and to a very limited extent private archives.³⁷ Based on some of the more plausible claims emanating from these sources, a picture of DEM emerges that covers its multidimensional activities, its “soft” anti-communism, its increasing incorporation of human rights concerns, and a strong transnational (both trans-European and trans-Atlantic) dimension to its outlook and activities.

In 1964 Neerskov established the Danish European Mission with the goal of doing missionary work in Europe.³⁸ An encounter with the

wife of Pastor Hodoroaba in Paris (and probably also with Richard Wurmbrand) made Neerskov aware of the plight of Christians in Rumania deprived of the right to a Bible.³⁹ DEM thereafter started its Soviet bloc activities, mailing Bibles to Rumania from Denmark and later from Sweden and the Netherlands. Such mailings often proved futile, since the communist regimes discovered the traffic and intercepted the packages. After a first trip by Neerskov and Hartzner to the Soviet bloc in 1968, it was decided to resort to actual smuggling.⁴⁰ A storage centre was established, which made Bibles in numerous different languages available for individual tourists (Westerners going East or Easterners visiting Denmark) who were going (back) to a Soviet bloc country. To what extent this centre was actually used (and Bibles actually smuggled) we do not know.

In 1975 DEM decided that its courier activities should be relocated to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and Folke Filskov was sent to Hessen to work together with another smuggler group, the Aktionskomitee für Verfolgte Christen (AVC). Filskov spent the next ten years in the FRG as the *de facto* head of DEM's courier activities. After three years of cooperation with the AVC, Filskov moved on to working with a Norwegian Bible smuggler, known as "Pete", and his group (allegedly called "Group P" or "Group XP") which during the period 1974–88 used a villa in Tegernsee, not far from Munich, as its base. During the period 1981–85 Filskov seems to have been responsible for the daily running of this Bible-smuggling centre. The Tegernsee house indeed provided the secret base from which Pete's smugglers (as well as, probably, some smugglers from DEM) prepared their trips into the Soviet bloc. Hartzner is probably right in his belief that Folke Filskov is the only full-time, professional Bible smuggler that Denmark has ever had. During the period 1975–85 DEM thus had two faces: the public, Danish (and American, as shown below) one, represented by Neerskov, and the hidden, West German one, represented by Filskov, in charge of the actual Bible smuggling.⁴¹ After Filskov and DEM parted ways in 1985, DEM had to reconstruct a contact network in Eastern Europe, since for security reasons Filskov did not pass it on. DEM remained active in promoting Bible distribution, illegally and sometimes legally, to the Soviet bloc throughout the period.⁴²

DEM also became involved in Bible translation and printing. The latter activity included the production of small, smuggler-friendly books. When the Institute for Bible Translation (IBT) was created in Stockholm in 1973, close links developed, with DEM covering up to 25 per cent of IBT's expenses.⁴³ Other activities included radio broadcasting (in

cooperation with the Russian-American radio evangelist Earl Poysti), a publishing house (Doxa, established in 1974), numerous publications (in particular by Neerskov himself), a press agency (Daneu Press, 1981), as well as participation in a number of international Christian gatherings.⁴⁴

DEM's Bible-smuggling activities raised political issues, particularly within the Danish Lutheran Church where many condemned Bible smuggling, but also outside church circles. Indeed, Neerskov directed much of his polemical fervour against what he saw as the Danish left's complacency towards the regimes in the East. Neerskov always claimed that he was not an anti-communist. In practice, he spent much energy denouncing not only communism in the East but also domestic communist activities and attitudes, which in his mind included various non-communist left-wing groups and individuals.⁴⁵ Neerskov's anti-communism, however, was different from that encountered in American Bible-smuggling groups. He actively supported a liberal minded non-believer like Sakharov and he quite consistently welcomed a dialogue with whoever wanted to talk with him, including communists. In March 1977 he was received by the Rumanian ambassador in Copenhagen, and in 1979 Neerskov held a meeting with the Russian Archbishop Pitirim then visiting Denmark.⁴⁶ A few times DEM was instrumental in organizing the legal import of Bibles into the Soviet bloc, first of all to Poland in 1982. This propensity for dialogue also applied to his religious contacts: while most Bible smugglers focused on Protestant denominations, Neerskov happily met with Orthodox representatives as well. Finally, it should be mentioned that Neerskov himself has stated that he was systematically debriefed by the CIA whenever he visited the US, which he did quite often.⁴⁷ Whether any further cooperation with Western intelligence services was involved cannot be ascertained at this stage.

Almost from the outset, DEM's activities were transnational in orientation, involving cooperation with like-minded groups and individuals in other Western countries. The initial mailings of Bibles were organized not just from Denmark but also from Sweden and the Netherlands. Early on, contacts were established with other organizations: in Sweden (Slaviska Missionen and Institute for Bible Translation); in Finland (Avainsanoma Mission); in Norway (Misjon bak Jernteppet), in West Germany (Aktionskomitee für Verfolgte Christen, which partly – according to the AVC itself – owed its existence to Neerskov),⁴⁸ as well as with Richard Wurmbrand and Brother Andrew.⁴⁹ Neerskov developed significant contacts in the United States from the mid-1970s onwards. In 1974 he went to the US and early the following year he

established the Mission Possible organization there. In 1985 Mission Possible went independent, but for the previous ten years Neerskov had been its president and was regularly in the United States, touring the country, and hosting radio broadcasts and TV shows.⁵⁰ Yet at the operational level, the most important cooperation developed first with AVC and then with Underground Evangelism in West Germany. Moreover, Hartzner as well as other DEM representatives participated in annual international gatherings held in discrete places (usually in Austria, but at least once in Switzerland) where Bible-smuggler groups met and exchanged experiences.⁵¹

Initially DEM's focus was on Bibles and religious freedom. In the early 1970s a change occurred, as greater emphasis was put on the generally repressive nature of the communist regimes. From 1974 onwards Neerskov became involved in human rights activism focusing on the communist countries.⁵² This involved campaigns for imprisoned Christians, petitions, demonstrations, letters to Danish politicians, and press conferences to raise popular awareness in the West. The single most important involvement in human rights activism was the International Sakharov hearings held in Copenhagen in 1975. Subsequently, the International Sakharov Committee was established to monitor human rights violations in the Soviet bloc. Neerskov and his group became very active in this committee, and when its driving force, Øjvind Feldsted Andresen, died in 1997, Neerskov took over as its chairman.⁵³ Neerskov's involvement with human rights may have deepened as a result of several trips he made to Poland in the early 1980s.⁵⁴

Conclusion

Bible smuggling was probably a significant anti-communist activity during the Cold War. It involved numerous groups and individuals within an active, fluid transnational network of activity, and these linkages sometimes coincided around an event of major significance such as the Sakharov hearings of 1975–85. Yet much of this narrative is based on vague or shaky evidence. Serious scholarly (particularly archival) research in this field is (where even possible) required to verify the basics: numbers of smuggled Bibles; amount and origin of funding; types of actors on both the sending and receiving end; clear chronology of the networks; motives of the Bible smugglers; attitudes of Western states; reaction of Eastern regimes. Bible smuggling did not have a politically subversive impact similar to that of more direct assistance to Soviet bloc dissidents. However, such impact which it may have had (for instance,

in terms of encouraging dissidence or keeping alive religious practices in the Soviet bloc) deserves more attention. Yet as the example of DEM illustrates, the challenges faced by the historian when compiling an assessment are still numerous.⁵⁵

Notes

1. The Bible smuggling referred to in this article was performed by non-state groups (leaving aside the special case of the Vatican. The CIA's secret book-distribution programme included religious literature, but its primary focus lay elsewhere. See Alfred Reisch, *Hot Books in the Cold War: The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2013).
2. Brother Andrew (with John and Elizabeth Sherrill), *God's Smuggler* (Grand Rapids: Chosen Books, 2001 [1967]).
3. Those who have conducted research in this field include: Pii Latvala, *Valoa itään? Kansanlähetys ja Neuvostoliitto 1967–1973* (Helsinki: Suomen Kirkkohistoriallinen Seura, 2008), abstract in German on pp. 366–73; Walter Grassmann, "Geschichte der evangelisch-lutherischen Russlanddeutschen in the Sowjetunion, der GUS und in Deutschland in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts", PhD dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians Universität, Munich, 2006 (see pp. 208–38); Walter Sawatsky, *Soviet Evangelicals since World War II* (Scottsdale PA: Herald Press, 1981); Beatrice de Graaf, *Over de Muur* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2004), pp. 85–90. Further relevant literature: Peter F. Penner, "Western Missionaries in Central and Eastern Europe", *Acta Missiologiae* 1 (2008), pp. 33–53; Walter Sawatsky, "Bible Work in Eastern Europe since 1945", Part 1: *Religion in Communist Lands* 3 (1975), pp. 4–10 and Part 2: *Religion in Communist Lands* 3 (1975), pp. 4–14; Joe Gouverneur, "Underground Evangelism: Missions during the Cold War", *Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies* 24 (2007), pp. 80–86. Examples of accounts originating from the smuggling milieu: Lois M. Bass, *Forbidden Faith* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Thousand Oaks, 2000); Waldemar Sardaczuk, *Der Grenzgänger* (Erzhausen: Leuchter Verlag, 1997); Ann-Charlotte Fritzon, *Framåt ändå. 100 år med Ljus i Öster* (Solna: Ljus i Öster, 2003); Lasse Trædal, *Når ett lem lider* (Oslo: Misjon i øst, 1992); Ralph Mann, *Red November* (Orange: Promise, 1988); Richard Wurmbrand, *Tortured for Christ* (Bartlesville: Living Sacrifice, 1967); Clariss Brubaker Smith, *The Song of Unsung Heroes* (Bloomington: WestBow Press, 2011); Gernot Friedrich, *Mit Kamera und Bibel durch die Sowjetunion* (Berlin: Verlag am Park, 1997); George Verwer, *Drops from a Leaking Tap* (Milton Keynes: Authentic Media, 2008).
4. Andres Küng, *Fallet Engström/Sareld* (Stockholm: Filadelfia, 1978); David Hathaway, *Czech-mate* (Lakeland FL: Lakeland, 1974).
5. Kathleen Matchett, "Review of Diversion without Dynamite", *Religion in Communist Lands* 5 (1977), pp. 251–2.
6. De Graaf, *Über die Mauer*, p. 86.

7. Paul Froese, "Forced Secularization in the Soviet Russia: Why an Atheistic Monopoly Failed", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43 (2004), pp. 35–50.
8. *Time* (19 March 1979).
9. *Baptist Press Features* (12 November 1980), available online at <<http://media.sbhla.org.s3.amazonaws.com/5158,12-Nov-1980.pdf>> (accessed 23 September 2012).
10. "Bibles in the Soviet Union", *Religion in Communist Lands* 17 (1989), pp. 257–63.
11. Interview with René Hartzner, 29 August 2012; Mikael Wandt Laursen, "Hank imod strømmen", *Udfordringen* 12 (2012); Mary Raber, "Remembering the Russian Bible Commentary", in Mary Raber and Peter F. Penner (eds), *History and Mission in Europe* (Schwarzenfeld: Neufeld Verlag, 2011), pp. 303–25 (see p. 321).
12. Dansk Europamission, *Dansk Europamissions 25-års jubilæumsskrift*, Bagsværd, April 1989, p. 5.
13. Walter Sawatsky, "The Centrality of Mission and Evangelization in the Slavic Evangelical Story", in Walter Sawatsky and Peter F. Penner (eds), *Mission in the Former Soviet Union* (Schwarzenfeld: Neufeld Verlag, 2005), pp. 38–62 (see p. 56); Gouverneur, "Underground Evangelism".
14. See <<http://www.beeworld.org/history.htm>>.
15. Pigi Colognesi, *Russia Cristiana* (Milano: San Paolo Edizioni, 2007), p. 104. Possible explanations for the key role played by Protestant groups include the Protestant emphasis on a personal reading of the Bible, denominational pluralism and diversity within Protestantism, or, as far as the US is concerned, the rise of (right-wing) missionary evangelism. On the last of these see Sara Diamond, *Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right* (Boston: South End Press, 1989). Part of the difference, however, may simply be due to the fact that Protestant endeavours were more publicized than the Catholic ones. Allegedly Archbishop Karol Wojtyła, later John Paul II, was heavily involved in the illegal import of Bibles into Poland in the 1960s and the Vatican was kept abreast of Russia Cristiana's Bible smuggling. See Giacomo Galeazzi and Ferruccio Pinotti, *Wojtyla segreto* (Milano: Chiarelettere 2011), p. 42; Romano Scalfi, interview with the author, 2 May 2012.
16. See Sonja Sabinsky, "Smugler-konge af Guds nåde", *Horsens Folkeblad* (17 July 2004); Klaus Wivel, "Miraklernes tid", *Weekendavisen* (23 December 2011); Thorsten Asbjørn Lauritsen, "Kristen med livet som indsats", *Kristeligt Dagblad* (12 May 2012); Ulrik Høy, "Pramdragerens sang", *Weekendavisen* (19 September 2002).
17. Bent Jensen, "For meget om for lidt", *Jyllandsposten* (15 December 2009); Lars Ole Knippel, "80 år i dag: bibelsmugleren", *Jyllandsposten* (12 May 2012); Sabinsky, "Smugler-konge".
18. Jørgen Steens, "Bibelsmugleren", *Kristeligt Dagblad* (27 August 2008); Knippel, "80 år i dag".
19. Knippel, "80 år i dag".
20. Jørgen Davidsen, "Smuglerpræsten", *Berlingske Tidende* (11 May 2002).
21. Henrik Garman, "75 år i dag: Sovjets ideologiske fjende", *Politiken* (12 May 2007).

22. Wivel, "Miraklernes tid"; Laursen, "Han gik imod strømmen"; Jørgen Davidsen, "Smuglerpræsten"; Knippel, "80 år i dag".
23. Knippel, "80 år i dag".
24. Knippel, "80 år i dag"; Wivel, "Miraklernes tid".
25. Wivel, "Miraklernes tid"; Knippel, "80 år i dag"; Davidsen, "Smuglerpræsten".
26. Henri Nissen, "En fighter fylder 75", *Udfordringen* 19 (2007).
27. Høy, "Pramdragerens sang"; Laursen, "Han gik imod strømmen"; Neerskov, "Penge til Bent Jensen", *Jyllandsposten* (24 January 2003); Bent Jensen, Foreword to Neerskov, *Sejrende martyrer* (Bagsværd: Doxa, 2004), pp. 7–8.
28. Neerskov, *Sejrende martyrer*, p. 100.
29. René Hartzner, interview with the author, 29 August 2012; Neerskov, *Sejrende martyrer*, p. 164; Neerskov and Dave Hunt, *Mission Possible* (Basingstoke: Cross Roads, 1974), pp. 62–3.
30. Hartzner, interview; Hartzner, correspondence with the author, 30 August 2012 and 5 September 2012.
31. Sabinsky, "Smugler-konge"; Bent Blüdnikov, "En bibelsmugler beretter", *Berlingske Tidende* (23 June 2004).
32. It is noteworthy that the deal which Neerskov allegedly struck with Jaruzelski in 1983 – a rather impressive feat – goes unmentioned in DEM's own listing of its major accomplishments in 1989 (see *DEM's ... jubilæumsskrift*).
33. Neerskov's name does not appear on the attendees list for President Reagan's birthday party. However, according to Hartzner, it may well be that Neerskov attended the Annual Breakfast Prayer on 6 February 1986, probably on the suggestion of another guest, Ebbe Jensen, rather than as a result of any personal invitation from the White House. Hartzner, interview; Kary Charlebois, correspondence with the author, 23 August 2012.
34. A search was performed by East View Information Services (www.eastview.com) in the digitalized versions of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* for the period 1970–80, with no results.
35. Bent Boel, "Menneskerettighedspolitik fra neden? Sakharovhøringen i København, oktober 1975", *Fund og Forskning* 50 (2011), pp. 549–88.
36. Øjvind Kyør, "Strid om bibelsmugling gavner de kristne i Østeuropa", *Weekendavisen* (11 September 1981); Claus J. Deden, "Det kristne budskab smugles ind i Østblokken", *Aalborg Stiftstidende* (9 March 1980). For non-Danish tributes to Neerskov and DEM: Mann, *Red November*, pp. 10–13; contributions of Waldemar Sardaczuk and Seppo Pehkonen in *DEM's ... jubilæumsskrift*, pp. 41–2; from a Soviet perspective, V. Kassis, "Фабрикант? Нет, провокатор!", *Izvestia* (19 August 1977), and Boris Antonov, "Prisoners of Conscience" in the USSR and Their Patrons (Moscow: Novosti, 1988), p. 55.
37. Two Bible smugglers interviewed for this article have asked to remain anonymous.
38. Neerskov, *Mission over alle grænser* (Bagsværd: Doxa, 1989), p. 49.
39. *DEM's ... jubilæumsskrift*, p. 4; Hartzner, interview.
40. Among those who in the following years most probably made more than just one trip were: Hans Kristian Neerskov, Moses Hansen, Kirsten Steffensen, Ellen Bramsen, Folke Filskov, Bent Kofoed Jacobsen, René Hartzner and Kim Hartzner.

41. *DEMs... jubilaemsskrift*, pp. 8, 24; Neerskov, *Sejrende martyrer*, pp. 95–96; Dale Smith, correspondence with the author, 8 November 2012; “Pete”, telephone interview, 31 May 2013.
42. René Hartzner to the board of DEM, 23 August 1988; Hartzner to the board of DEM, September 1990; DEM, Minutes of Governing Board Meeting, 4 April 1987, private archives of René Hartzner; Hartzner, interview. DEM remains active and is still involved in Bible smuggling (see <<http://www.forfulgtekristne.dk/om-de.aspx>>).
43. Neerskov, *Sejrende martyrer*, p. 167. See also Borislav Arapović, *Bibelns Sidenväg* (Stockholm: Institutet För Bibelöversättning, 1998), pp. 26, 33, 105; Borislav Arapović, correspondence with the author, 9 October 2012.
44. Neerskov, *Sejrende martyrer*; *DEMs... jubilaemsskrift*.
45. Neerskov, *Sejrende martyrer*, pp. 32, 37, 146.
46. Jens Ravn Olesen, “Hører bibelsmugling under Gud eller under politi og toldvæsen”, *Kristeligt Dagblad* (4 April 1979).
47. Neerskov, interview with the author, 2 May 2007.
48. Waldemar Sardaczuk in *DEMs... jubilaemsskrift*, pp. 41–2.
49. *DEMs... jubilaemsskrift*, pp. 11, 41.
50. Ralph Mann (co-founder of Mission Possible – and a former US intelligence officer), correspondence with the author, 14 September 2012 and 18 September 2012; Neerskov, *Sejrende martyrer*, p. 168.
51. Trædal, *Når ett lem lider*, pp. 99–100; Hartzner, interview; Michael Bourdeaux, interview with the author, 27 August 2013.
52. Neerskov, *Sejrende martyrer*, p. 53.
53. See for example: International Sakharov Committee, minutes of meetings on 20 June 1975, 23 April 1976, 24 January 1980, 27 August 1981, and 9 June 1982, private archive of Preben Kühl (in author’s possession).
54. When Solidarnosc in 2005 published a book as “a way of saying ‘thank you’ to all those with whom, together, we were trying to give a new meaning to the word ‘solidarity’” (Lech Walesa, in the preface to the book), Hans Kristian Neerskov was among the selected 59 Solidarnosc sympathizers. See: Marcin Frybes and Andrzej Jagodzinski, *Solidarnosc and Solidarity* (Warsaw: Instytut Adama Mickiewicza, 2005), p. 116.
55. For a Danish – and somewhat more detailed – version of this article, see Bent Boel, “Dansk Europamission, bibelsmugling og menneskerettigheder under den kolde krig”, *Fund og Forskning* 52 (2013), pp. 381–401.

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