STUDIES OF THE AMERICAS



THE ORIGINS OF BOURBON REFORM IN SPANISH SOUTH AMERICA, 1700-1763

Adrian J. Pearce

Studies of the Americas

edited by

Maxine Molyneux
Institute of the Americas
University College London

Titles in this series include cross-disciplinary and comparative research on the United States, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada, particularly in the areas of politics, economics, history, anthropology, sociology, development, gender, social policy, and the environment. The series publishes edited collections, which allow exploration of a topic from several different disciplinary angles by eminent scholars, and book-length studies, which provide a deeper focus on a single topic.

Titles in this series published by Palgrave Macmillan:

Cuba's Military 1990–2005: Revolutionary Soldiers during Counter-Revolutionary Times
By Hal Klepak

The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America
Edited by Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden, and Alan Angell

Latin America: A New Interpretation
By Laurence Whitehead

Appropriation as Practice: Art and Identity in Argentina
By Arnd Schneider

America and Enlightenment Constitutionalism
Edited by Gary L. McDowell and Johnathan O'Neill

Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives
Edited by Jens R. Hentschke

When Was Latin America Modern?
Edited by Nicola Miller and Stephen Hart

Debating Cuban Exceptionalism
Edited by Bert Hoffman and Laurence Whitehead

Caribbean Land and Development Revisited
Edited by Jean Besson and Janet Momsen

Cultures of the Lusophone Black Atlantic
Edited by Nancy Priscilla Naro, Roger Sansi-Roca, and David H. Treece

Democratization, Development, and Legality: Chile, 1831–1973
By Julio Faundez

The Hispanic World and American Intellectual Life, 1820–1880
By Iván Jaksić

The Role of Mexico's Plural *in Latin American Literary and Political Culture: From Tlatelolco to the "Philanthropic Ogre"*
By John King

Faith and Impiety in Revolutionary Mexico
Edited by Matthew Butler

Reinventing Modernity in Latin America: Intellectuals Imagine the Future, 1900–1930
By Nicola Miller

The Republican Party and Immigration Politics: From Proposition 187 to George W. Bush
By Andrew Wroe

The Political Economy of Hemispheric Integration: Responding to Globalization in the Americas
Edited by Diego Sánchez-Ancochea and Kenneth C. Shadlen

Ronald Reagan and the 1980s: Perceptions, Policies, Legacies
Edited by Cheryl Hudson and Gareth Davies

Wellbeing and Development in Peru: Local and Universal Views Confronted
Edited by James Copestake

The Federal Nation: Perspectives on American Federalism
Edited by Iwan W. Morgan and Philip J. Davies

Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940–1967
By Steven High

Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and Politics at the Crossroads
Edited by John Burdick, Philip Oxhorn, and Kenneth M. Roberts

Visual Synergies in Fiction and Documentary Film from Latin America
Edited by Miriam Haddu and Joanna Page

Cuban Medical Internationalism: Origins, Evolution, and Goals
By John M. Kirk and H. Michael Erisman

Governance after Neoliberalism in Latin America
Edited by Jean Grugel and Pía Riggirozzi

Modern Poetics and Hemispheric American Cultural Studies
By Justin Read

Youth Violence in Latin America: Gangs and Juvenile Justice in Perspective
Edited by Gareth A. Jones and Dennis Rodgers

The Origins of Mercosur
By Gian Luca Gardini

Belize's Independence & Decolonization in Latin America: Guatemala, Britain, and the UN
By Assad Shoman

Post-Colonial Trinidad: An Ethnographic Journal
By Colin Clarke and Gillian Clarke

The Nitrate King: A Biography of "Colonel" John Thomas North
By William Edmundson

Negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas
By Zuleika Arashiro

History and Language in the Andes
Edited by Paul Heggarty and Adrian J. Pearce

Cross-Border Migration among Latin Americans: European Perspectives and Beyond
Edited by Cathy McIlwaine

Native American Adoption, Captivity, and Slavery in Changing Contexts
Edited by Max Carocci and Stephanie Pratt

Struggle for Power in Post-Independence Colombia and Venezuela
By Matthew Brown

Taxation and Society in Twentieth-Century Argentina
By José Antonio Sánchez Román

Mexico's Struggle for Public Security: Organized Crime and State Responses
Edited by George Philip and Susana Berruecos

Raúl Castro and Cuba: A Military Story
By Hal Klepak

New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource Governance
Edited by Håvard Haarstad

Politics and Power in Haiti
Edited by Kate Quinn and Paul Sutton

Citizenship and Political Violence in Peru: An Andean Town, 1870s-1970s
By Fiona Wilson

Aesthetics and Politics in the Mexican Film Industry
By Misha MacLaird

Reconfiguring the Union: Civil War Transformations
Edited by Iwan W. Morgan and Philip John Davies

Making Brazil Work: Checking the President in a Multiparty System
By Marcus André Melo and Carlos Pereira

Sexual Violence during War and Peace: Gender, Power, and Post-Conflict Justice in Peru
By Jelke Boesten

Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future
Edited by Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, and Christopher Wylde

The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700–1763
By Adrian J. Pearce

This page intentionally left blank

The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700–1763

Adrian J. Pearce

palgrave
macmillan



THE ORIGINS OF BOURBON REFORM IN SPANISH SOUTH AMERICA, 1700–1763

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 ISBN 978-1-137-36223-0

First published in 2014 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978–1–349–47262–8 ISBN 978-1-137-36224-7
DOI 10.1057/9781137362247

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress.

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: August 2014

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Arwen Shirley
with all my love

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

This page intentionally left blank

Preface and Acknowledgments

This book has had a 20-year gestation. Its remote origins lie in a master's dissertation written in 1993–1994, that led on to a doctoral thesis begun in the latter year and completed in 1998. I will first again express here the gratitude acknowledged in that thesis to the individuals and institutions who assisted in different ways in its development. Professor John Fisher supervised my doctorate at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the University of Liverpool, and has been an academic sponsor, and a friend, ever since. Many members of the staff of the institute (now defunct, to my real sadness) helped with the research at different times and in different ways, as did staff at the University's Sydney Jones library, with its excellent Latin American collections. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of staff at the other main research collections where the work was carried out: the Archivo General de Indias in Seville in Spain, the Archivo General de la Nación in Lima in Peru, and the Archivo Nacional de Bolivia in Sucre. I was also privileged to visit the private library of Félix Denegri Luna in Lima in 1996, before his death in 1998 and its subsequent transfer to the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. My grandmother, Violet Whitaker, who died on January 5, 1999, took an interest in my thesis and paid for the desktop computer on which it was written. I undertook my doctoral studies alongside Tim Marr, who provided much-needed camaraderie and has remained among my closest friends. Paul Heggarty was already a close friend, and has remained one, as well as an academic collaborator in recent years.

It would be impossible to acknowledge all debts accrued over the 15 years and more since the thesis was written, and I will not attempt to do so. Since 1998, I worked at different universities and institutions: the Universities of Warwick and Nottingham Trent, the Institute for the Study of the Americas (University of London), and King's College London. I found abundant support and warmth from

heads of Department, colleagues, and administrative staff alike at all of these places. The present book inched toward its conclusion at King's College and, since summer 2013, the Centro de Estudios Históricos at the Colegio de México in Mexico City. I would like to express special appreciation of the support of my bosses at these institutions: Paul Readman, Catherine Boyle, Ariel Kuri Rodríguez, and Erika Pani. Maxine Molyneux was a great boss during difficult times at the Institute for the Study of the Americas in 2008–10, and I further thank her for accepting this book for publication in Palgrave's Studies of the Americas, of which she is the editor. In this regard, thanks also to the anonymous reviewer of the typescript, who supplied many pages of constructive and detailed criticism. Warm thanks are further due to colleagues in England and Mexico who took an interest in my progress beyond the call of duty: Rebecca Earle, Toby Green, and Francisco Bethencourt in Britain, and Bernd Hausberger and Carlos Marichal in Mexico.

Three scholars and friends, in addition to John Fisher, read either my thesis or the typescript of this book, and were generous enough to send me their comments on it. Tony McFarlane served as external examiner for the thesis, and also read the present work at a late stage. He has been far more influential in my academic career, however, not least in his invitation to teach at the wonderful School of Comparative American Studies at the University of Warwick in 2003, when my career was in danger of stalling altogether. Ken Andrien supplied abundant notes on my thesis, in which the generosity of his language for some time prevented me from seeing the depth of the critique, leaving me as grateful for his kindness as for his honesty. I have always found him a model of the generous scholar. Chuck Walker also sent helpful and insightful comments on my thesis, and gave much encouragement during a parallel stay in Seville in the early 2000s and over the years since then.

In 2009, I met Frank Eissa-Barroso and became aware of his work on early Bourbon Spain and Spanish South America. He has been extremely generous with his research ever since, sending me both an electronic copy of his outstanding thesis, and a hard copy of his (with Ainara Vásquez Varela) *Early Bourbon Spanish America*, a landmark edited collection and the first of its type ever devoted to this period. Frank has been the scholar most active in promoting early Bourbon studies over the past few years. I have met Allan Kuethe on a number of occasions, most recently at a conference on the early Bourbons convened by Frank and Ainara at Warwick in 2010, and similarly have found him unstintingly generous with his research. I consider

myself extremely fortunate, then, that Ken Andrien, Allan Kuethe, and Frank Eissa-Barroso, the scholars most active in early Bourbon studies at the broadest level, should have displayed such impeccable scholarly collegiality toward me.

My thanks also to the staff at Palgrave Macmillan, and especially to Sara Doskow, the editor in charge of this project.

My final acknowledgments are more personal. My family has provided faultless and limitless support over the years during which this project came to fruition, through bad times as well as good. I do not think that my debt in particular to Cliff and Jackie Pearce, and to Kath and Robert Tansley, can ever be repaid. My love also to my brother, Martin Pearce, and his partner, Margaret Jennings. My first book, *British Trade with Spanish America, 1763–1808*, was published in 2007, when my son, Chilam, was almost two. I write these lines on his eighth birthday, and when his sister, Maya, is five and a half; both have brought me joy unknown throughout these years.

Lastly, this book is dedicated with much love to Arwen Shirley.

This page intentionally left blank

Abbreviations

AGI	Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain
AGN	Archivo General de la Nación, Lima, Peru
ANB	Archivo Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre, Bolivia
BNM	Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Spain, Sección de Manuscritos

Map 0.1 Spanish South America, ca. 1730.

Introduction

The Early Bourbon Period in Spanish South America: An Interpretation

The early Bourbon period in Spanish America is one whose time has finally come. Long the least-known era in the history of the Spanish monarchy, rivaled in neglect only by the late Habsburg period that went before, the reigns of the first Bourbon kings—covering the first six decades of the eighteenth century—are now producing substantial dedicated research for the first time. This book makes use of this fresh research, while drawing primarily on archival sources in Spain and Peru to present its own interpretation of early Bourbon rule, particularly in Spanish South America, above all in relation to the much better known late-Bourbon era (from the 1760s). Scholarship published in the past 15 years or so, and especially in just the last few years, has given us a far clearer idea of what occurred in Spanish colonial rule during this neglected period. As a result, in many areas of colonial affairs, it will become difficult henceforth to discuss late-Bourbon government and colonial matters without clear and grounded reference to the decades that went before.

The history of the Spanish colonies has been written over the long term from the extremities inward. The focus of modern historical writing rested first primarily upon foundations and collapse: either the European invasions and the early colonial period in the sixteenth century, or the era of independence in the early nineteenth. For at least half a century now, since the 1960s, the majority chronological focus has crept forward and backward, into the mid-Habsburg and late Bourbon epochs respectively. Scholars of the Bourbon Empire in particular have devoted very extensive attention to the sweeping reforms and colonial upheaval that characterized the period from the 1760s through to Independence after 1808. But for historians of

both Spain and America, there has, until very recently, remained a little-explored country, still beyond the advancing frontier: broadly, the century or so between Spain's loss of great-power status in the mid-seventeenth century, and the heyday of Enlightened absolutism under Charles III in the late eighteenth. Christopher Storrs, a leading recent scholar of Spain for this period, dates it more narrowly to the reigns of the last Habsburg and the first Bourbon kings (thus, 1665–1746), referred to as "Spain's Dark Ages."[1] In the title of a landmark edited collection, Francisco Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela still stamp the early Bourbon period in Spanish America "a forgotten era" (here dated 1700–1759, for the reigns of both Philip V and Fernando VI).[2] "Little ever remembered era" might be more accurate; for when, 15 years ago, I devoted my doctoral thesis to early Bourbon Peru, dark indeed was the subject.[3] Eissa-Barroso and Vásquez Varela's *Early Bourbon Spanish America*, however, was published in 2013, as the first work of general scope to be devoted to this period. It will be joined in 2014 by *The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century*, by highly distinguished colonialists Allan Kuethe and Ken Andrien, who devote two-thirds of their book to the period prior to 1759; the present monograph will appear within weeks of that of Kuethe and Andrien. Meanwhile, Frank Eissa-Barroso has his own monograph in progress, based upon his wide-ranging doctoral thesis on early Bourbon Spain and the empire, titled "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making: The Reform of Viceregal Rule in the Spanish World under Philip V (1700–1746)" (2010).[4] And as we shall see, these broad-based works cap a wider surge in high-quality specialist research on the period to appear in recent years.

* * *

The thesis from which the present book ultimately derives was written in the mid-1990s (between 1994 and 1998). In sketching recent developments and the current state of "early Bourbon studies," it is important first to underline just how strikingly little dedicated research existed at that time for the period. (This made for an unusual and also in some ways a challenging experience of doctoral research.) Some valuable material had been published on different aspects of the early Bourbon monarchy at different times since the early twentieth century, much of it regarding politics and policies in Spain itself (this early corpus may be traced through the bibliography to the present volume). The period was well served by recent histories

of eighteenth-century Spain: whether Antonio Domínguez Ortiz's *Sociedad y Estado en el siglo XVIII español*, or John Lynch's *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808*, which appeared in 1989 and devoted extensive original analysis to the first two Spanish Bourbons. There was some specialist research of very high quality, such as Gildas Bernard's *Le Secretariat d'Etat et le Conseil Espagnol des Indes (1700–1808)*, published in 1972. But the amount of what could reasonably be called "modern research" on Spanish America remained remarkably slight. Among works embracing the whole of the Spanish colonies, for example, the Seville school had demonstrated considerable interest in Spanish Atlantic trade: Antonio García-Baquero González published the principal wide-ranging study, *Cádiz y el Atlántico (1717–1778)*, in 1972 (revised in 1988). García-Baquero's work was later complemented by Michel Morineau's celebrated and controversial *Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux*, that used different source materials as well as embracing a broader time frame. It was further complemented by the oeuvre of scholars in Andalusia, including Antonia Heredia Herrera regarding the trade and merchants of Cadiz,[5] Pablo Emilio Pérez-Mallaina Bueno and Bibiano Torres Ramírez on Spanish Atlantic policy and the *Armada del Mar del Sur* in the Pacific,[6] or Carlos Malamud on French trade with Peru during the War of the Spanish Succession.[7] Elsewhere, Lance Grahn published an original monograph on smuggling in New Granada.[8] In other areas, Mark Burkholder, D. S. Chandler, and Lyman Johnson produced outstanding studies of the American *Audiencias* and their ministers covering the early Bourbon era over the decade from 1972, while Burkholder further published a biographical dictionary of councilors of the Indies in 1986.[9]

For the viceroyalty of Peru—which, let it be remembered, in 1700 still embraced most of Spanish South America—"modern" studies of the period were still more limited. They included those of Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo for aspects of Peruvian fiscal affairs, including the tobacco monopoly, dating to the early 1950s;[10] the work of Enrique Tandeter on mining for silver at Potosí, of which the substantive monograph appeared in Spanish in 1992 and in English the following year;[11] and a series of articles and essays by Kendall Brown on mercury mining at Huancavelica, beginning in 1988, with a monograph on the same topic by Miguel Molina Martínez appearing in 1995.[12] There was some excellent material on rebellions and revolts, including the work of James Saeger on the *Comuneros* in Paraguay or of Scarlett O'Phelan on indigenous revolts in Peru and Bolivia,[13] as well as some work on the "rebellion" of Juan Santos Atahualpa in the

central *montaña* in the 1740s.[14] The main *precursor* for early Bourbon Peru, however, in modern historiographical terms, was the Spanish historian Alfredo Moreno Cebrián: for 30 years from the mid-1970s, Moreno Cebrián published a series of often weighty studies, including one devoted to the *corregidor de indios*, and (in 1983) an edition and extensive commentary on the key viceregal report of the Conde de Superunda (viceroy from 1745 to 1761).[15]

The foregoing notes, while not quite exhaustive, should give some sense of the highly limited and fragmentary nature of research on the early Bourbon period in Spanish South America to the mid-1990s. The research available at that time included excellent work on a number of significant topics, but for the most part the period remained almost a blank, and there had been virtually no attempt at fresh critical overview or interpretation. Even the work published on Spain itself during the early eighteenth century was rarely based on modern archival research, tending rather itself to draw upon collections of published primary sources and on secondary analysis dating back many decades (or even to the nineteenth century).

Since that time, much has changed: the historiographical waters of the early Bourbon period have finally begun to rise. As I write in 2014, we are still far from flood proportions, but at least their rumor can no longer be ignored. Research on this lengthy era of Spanish-American history remains at an early stage even now, but it has made remarkable progress over the past 15 years—and, I would argue, in particular in just the past few years. Recent interest in the political history of Spain itself under the early Bourbons—always far stronger than that in the Americas—has yielded important fruits. The tricentenary of the Bourbon accession in 2000 produced a surge of (often rather disappointing) studies and biographies, but also yielded the major modern account of Philip V, by Henry Kamen.[16] Kamen had worked on the period since the 1960s, with seminal studies of the introduction of the Intendant system or of the early Bourbon ideologue, Melchor de Macanaz;[17] his *The War of Succession in Spain*, published in 1969, was superseded as the standard single-volume account of that war only in 2010, by Joaquim Albareda Salvadó's *La guerra de sucesión de España*. Christopher Storrs's current project, concerned with Philip V and his foreign policy, has already borne fruit that includes further work on Macanaz.[18] Spanish historians also at last turned again to the major ministers of the period, who in many cases had languished for decades or even longer practically without dedicated study. The first modern biography of José Patiño, first prime minister of Spain no less, appeared in 1998, written by

Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, and further material on the man and his works has appeared since.[19] Patiño's rival for the title of leading early Bourbon minister, the Marqués de la Ensenada, has also received fresh attention, with dedicated studies including one by José Luis Gómez Urdáñez in 1996.[20] And the figure in some sense standing behind both Patiño and Ensenada, the Italian cleric and master of Spain in the late 1710s, Julio Alberoni, has been the focus of aspects of the recent oeuvre of Allan Kuethe, part of a broader project concerned with the colonial policies of Philip V.[21] Even some key lesser figures have received their historiographical due: notably José de Grimaldo, the influential minister of the period to 1726, of whom Concepción de Castro published a biography in 2004.[22] And these studies have been accompanied by a burgeoning body of articles and essays, published mainly in Spanish journals and edited collections.[23]

So far as the Americas are concerned, it is Spanish colonial trade that has continued to attract the greatest attention over the past 15 years or so. Spanish historians have sustained their long-standing preoccupation with detailed study of different aspects of early Bourbon Atlantic trade and its organization: noteworthy examples include Ana Crespo Solana's work on the *Casa de la Contratación* and the Intendancy-General of Marine (1996), or Margarita García-Mauriño Mundi's book on relations between the *Consulado* of Cadiz and the descendants of foreigners legally entitled to trade with the Indies (1999).[24] In the Anglophone historiography, these works were complemented in 2000 by the appearance of Stanley and Barbara Stein's *Silver, Trade, and War*, a magisterial account that covers the entire period from the sixteenth century to 1759 and includes abundant discussion of early Bourbon affairs, both mercantile and political.[25] For the trade of Peru specifically, Carmen Parrón Salas has worked on the transition from the fleet system to "Free Trade" from 1740 onward, while Jesús Turiso Sebastián wrote a history of the merchants of Lima during early Bourbon times.[26] Perhaps the most striking work on colonial trade has come in just the last few years, in the form of Xabier Lamikiz's *Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World*, and Mariano Bonialian's study of "The Spanish-American Pacific"—seminal works to which I shall return shortly.

Beyond its external trade, Spanish South America has benefited from a range of studies of further areas in recent years. Alfredo Moreno Cebrián followed his edition and commentary on viceroy Superunda's viceregal report of 1983 with a directly comparable work devoted to the report of Superunda's major predecessor, the Marqués

de Castelfuerte, published in 2000. He has since continued to work on the period, sometimes in collaboration with Nuria Sala i Vila, who has herself worked on another noteworthy viceroy of the period: the Marqués de Castelldosríus.[27] Perhaps the leading dedicated scholar of the period, however, is now the Mexican historian Francisco Eissa-Barroso, who, as we have seen, in 2010, completed his excellent doctoral thesis in this area. Eissa-Barroso has since published several articles, in particular on the military in the government of the early Bourbon colonies, and recently edited (with Vásquez Varela) the first collection of essays to be devoted to the period.[28]

To complete this brief survey, among other recent scholars of early Bourbon Peru, Víctor Peralta Ruiz has developed a distinctive body of work embracing institutional reform, major ministerial figures in Spain, and significant writers on colonial themes.[29] Kenneth Andrien, a leading North American scholar of the colonial Andes, has published an important essay on early Bourbon ecclesiastical reform in the viceroyalty, as well as work on the origins of a governing ideology for the colonies, to be joined shortly by his coauthored monograph with Allan Kuethe on the Spanish Atlantic world primarily under the early Bourbons.[30] Pablo Emilio Pérez-Mallaina Bueno and Charles Walker both took the devastating Lima earthquake of 1746 as the basis for books that explore society and politics in Peru at a crucial juncture.[31] I myself published a brace of articles in 1999–2001, focused on administrative reform at Huancavelica and on the census of the indigenous population undertaken by Viceroy Castelfuerte in the 1720s and 1730s;[32] Catalina Vizcarra produced a much-needed fresh account of the tobacco monopoly in Peru, introduced from the early 1750s;[33] Ignacio González Casasnovas has worked on *mita* and mining at Potosí, publishing his principal study in 2000;[34] and Jesús Cosamalón Aguilar has done valuable work on Lima markets throughout the entire eighteenth century.[35] Neither, it should be noted, have the decades prior to 1760 been neglected for other regions of the Americas: New Spain, for example, has witnessed a rise in interest comparable to that in Peru. Purely by way of examples, Christoph Rosenmüller has written a book and a string of related articles on early Bourbon Mexico over the past decade,[36] while Iván Escamilla González has produced a novel and important monograph on New Spanish trade during this period.[37]

* * *

The striking paucity of research on the early eighteenth century up to the 1990s left scholars "struggling for a proper characterization of

imperial policy under the early Bourbons" (as I myself commented at the time).[38] The extreme view, but one in fact so widespread as practically to constitute the orthodoxy, was that of David Brading, the eminent Mexicanist historian. The opening chapter of Brading's classic *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico*, published in 1971, mentioned no imperial policy or reform at all prior to the reign of Charles III; indeed, this work explicitly limited the term "Bourbon Mexico," as a distinctive era, to the period from 1763 onward.[39] Brading expressed essentially the same view in his essay contribution to the *Cambridge History of Latin America*, published in 1984 (while nevertheless recognizing that the records of early Bourbon ministers José Patiño and the Marqués de la Ensenada had "yet clearly to be assessed," and also that the officials of Charles III "built upon the work of these men").[40] The date 1763, of course, is for the Peace of Paris, that ended the Seven Years War and returned Havana to Spain following its wartime occupation by the British. This episode is widely viewed as the key catalyst for late-Bourbon imperial renovation—for which reason, 1763 also stands as the end date of the present study.[41]

Until the past decade or so, those historians who discussed the early Bourbon period at all—often in survey histories or, as with Brading, the introductory chapters to works devoted primarily to the later period—perceived only disjointed and mostly minor reforms that, crucially, did not form part of any conscious or overarching policy. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this stance. On the one hand, there was emphasis upon the conservatism of an early Bourbon government that still seemed tied to the outmoded structures of the Habsburg Empire; thus, the Peruvian scholar Carlos Daniel Valcárcel sought to contrast the "traditional absolutism" of the early Bourbons with the "renewed" or "renovated absolutism" of their later successors.[42] On the other hand, the stress was on the almost random, because it was essentially passive, nature of the early reforms, that merely responded in piecemeal fashion to immediate stimuli. Anthony McFarlane, in perhaps the finest broad-based monograph on Bourbon New Granada, characterized the early measures as "hesitant in tone and uneven in application," such that "the great age of reform did not arrive until the reign of Charles III."[43] James Lockhart and Stuart Schwartz, in a survey history, described early Bourbon imperial policy as only a series of "ad hoc concessions to specific local conditions" (while also emphasizing autonomous eighteenth-century demographic and economic growth in Spanish America as the necessary prelude to the subsequent Caroline reforms).[44] A further influential textbook, by Mark Burkholder and

Lyman Johnson, acknowledged that between 1713 and 1762, "some new policies were dictated by the financial and defensive requirements arising from war," while finally describing these as "halfway measures and ad hoc responses to make the empire stronger economically and militarily,"[45] It is true that Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, one of the few scholars up to the 1990s to have undertaken research on the early Bourbon period in some depth, offered a chronological scheme that posited a stage of "reconstruction" between the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713 and the onset of the full reform program after 1750. Significantly, he also made a strong and carefully dated case for the seminal importance of the Ensenada ministry in the decade after 1743 in the overall program of Bourbon reform. But even Céspedes del Castillo was ultimately scathing in his characterization of the era prior to 1750 as "completely traditional and of the status quo [*continuista*]."[46]

Many of these authors seem to make a perfectly reasonable distinction between the early and late Bourbon eras, acknowledging some of the attempts and achievements of the former, while perceiving a far greater ambition, coherence, and simply scale of reform during the latter. Benjamin Keen recognized, in his *History of Latin America*, that "the first Bourbon . . . concentrated his efforts on an attempt to reduce smuggling and to revive the fleet system," so that "the work of national reconstruction began under Philip V." Nevertheless, Keen concluded that this work "reached its climax under Charles III," who he described a "great reformer-king."[47] Still more strikingly, Peter Bakewell, in his own *History of Latin America*, acknowledged explicitly that "naval and trade reform was pursued energetically in the 1720s," based upon the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* (discussed at length hereafter in chapter 3). Bakewell further identified the creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada as "the one large reform in government made in America before the mid-century." But he then followed the scholarly consensus in perceiving the Seven Years War as the key stimulus to imperial reform, that finally fuelled the resolve in Madrid "to cultivate and draw upon the colonies' wealth *to an extent and with a degree of intentionality and design* without precedent in either the Bourbon or the Habsburg eras" (the emphasis is mine).[48] And such views remain substantially current to the present day: John Fisher, in his *Bourbon Peru, 1750–1824* (2003; the title itself merits notice here), contrasts the "patchy and inconsistent" changes of the first half of the century with the "more structured approach" and "dynamic program" of the second.[49] John Elliott, in his *Empires of the Atlantic World*, published in 2006,

wrote of the absence of "any systematic programme of reform" for the Indies under the early Bourbons, whose few colonial measures "were responses to immediate problems of defence and administration, rather than part of a larger strategy." Indeed, "except where matters of commerce and war were involved . . . inertia, bordering on neglect, appeared to be the order of the day."[50] The most recent major survey history is Matthew Restall and Kris Lane's *Latin America in Colonial Times*, published in 2011; this work regards the early reforms as having "focused mostly on the related problems of coastal defense and contraband trade," with some measures also "focused on more efficient administration." These measures gave way only after 1763 to "a much more ambitious program encompassing curbs on church power, appointment of Spanish-born officials to new colonial offices, the raising of tributes and a host of other taxes, and the improving of mining output." And yet, as will be seen throughout the present work, all of the latter policies and reforms had clear roots running back to the late 1710s, if not before.

* * *

The principal argument of this book is that two of the major preconceptions held of the early Bourbon period in Spanish colonial government can no longer be sustained, and that as a result, our view of the early eighteenth century and in particular of its relationship with the later period now requires fundamental revision. The first preconception is that little reform of real significance was undertaken or implemented in the Spanish colonies prior to the reign of Charles III, or, indeed, prior to the mid-1760s; a view that always carried some caveats, but that can now be seen still more clearly to be erroneous. The second preconception is that what reform was undertaken was ad hoc or piecemeal, formed part of no overall or conscious policy, and for these reasons bore scant (if any) relation to the projects and policies of the great late-Bourbon ministers and reformers. This second view is the most ingrained in the historiography and has received smallest challenge to date, for which reason it requires still more direct challenge in these pages. The core chapters that make up the book are based on extensive archival research on early Bourbon South America, particularly Peru, placed in relation to a body of modern historical literature that, as we have seen, has made rapid strides from all but a standing start in recent years. These chapters aim to demonstrate that important change and innovation came to the Spanish colonies during the first six decades of Bourbon

rule, and particularly between the 1720s and the 1750s. Indeed, it can now be reasonably argued that the switch from fleets to register ships as the dominant vehicle for Atlantic trade, that fell squarely in the middle of this period (in the late 1730s), was among the single most important reforms of the entire Bourbon era. What is more, the concerns, interests, and even the literature that informed the men who designed and implemented reform during this period were so similar to those of the ministers of Charles III that the sort of radical, "before and after," division made to date between the decades either side of 1763 simply no longer makes sense. This is true for one reason more than any other: the late Bourbon period of colonial policies and reforms *cannot* be fully understood without a proper understanding of the early decades.

* * *

It has long been recognized that major reform did, in fact, take place in colonial government under the first Spanish Bourbons. This could hardly be denied, when unquestionably the most fundamental of all reforms affecting the highest level of colonial administration not only took place during the early eighteenth century, but during only its second decade. The separation from most aspects of colonial government, after two hundred years, of the *Consejo de Indias*, the rise in its stead of the Secretariat of State for the Indies, the radical reorganization of the *Casa de la Contratación* or House of Trade, and the transfer of both the *Casa* and the merchant guild from Seville to Cadiz—all took place in the late 1710s. The entire late-Bourbon machinery of colonial government, then, was put in place almost half a century before 1763. In the colonies themselves, it was similarly impossible for historians to ignore the creation of the first new viceroyalty since the sixteenth century, that of New Granada, first assayed in the late 1710s and then permanently from 1739. But these and other measures already known to scholars seemed isolated features in an otherwise largely barren field of view, their significance further diminished by the sense that they formed part of no true Enlightened project.

This book argues that more measures of real substance were undertaken in Spanish South America by the early Bourbons than has been recognized. In part, the lack of recognition accorded these measures has been just that: a product either (in my view) of a mistaken downplaying of the significance of particular reforms, or in some cases of their outright omission, due in straightforward terms

to a lack of research. It also remains the case that a much greater volume of reform, part of it of a much more radical nature, *was* undertaken in the late Bourbon era than the early one. The Caroline reforms *were* more ambitious and wide-ranging than those of their early Bourbon predecessors; no amount of fresh archival research or secondary analysis is likely to challenge this central truth, and this book certainly has no intention of doing so. But of course, this does not diminish the significance of the reforms and other measures that took place prior to the 1760s (much less so when in most cases, these reforms were the direct precursors of those of the later period). The development of this argument lies in the chapters that follow, but the most significant reforms included introduction to Peru of the tobacco monopoly, with a striking impact on Peruvian finances almost from the first; return of most taxation to direct royal administration, and wholesale reform of the colonial Mints and currency; and radical and successful reforms in the mining sector, particularly in mercury mining, but also in silver (the subject of both tax reform and significant administrative reorganization). Other measures discussed in these pages include, but are not limited to, the abolition of sales to colonial bureaucratic posts, as well as a switch in policy regarding the appointment of Spanish-Americans (creoles) to these posts; the legalization of *repartimiento de mercancía*, or forced distribution of goods to native peoples and communities; the substantial reinforcement of viceregal powers, particularly in the fiscal sphere; and an early assault on the regular Orders of the Church, notably via secularization of native parishes administered by their members. Taken together, the late-Bourbon reforms have cast these early measures into a shadow which is only now dissipating in the light of fresh research. But on their own terms, these were measures neither of negligible importance in themselves, nor of scant impact in the colonies.

The best example of major reform in the colonies under early Bourbon rule also provides the foremost case study of the way in which new research and historiographical trends are transforming our understanding of the period. The traditional system for Spanish Atlantic trade, of regular fleets and trade fairs organized under a strict monopoly, operated since the sixteenth century. It collapsed by stages during the eighteenth century: the key moment came in the late 1730s, when the trade fleets were suspended and substituted by single ships sailing at will under register (*navíos de registro*). Soon afterwards, in 1740, the navigational route via Cape Horn was opened to Spanish shipping for the first time since the 1500s, making

possible direct voyages to the Pacific coasts. Although intended as a temporary suspension, and though the fleets to New Spain were indeed restored in the 1750s, finally disappearing only in the late 1780s, the Peruvian fleets were never restored, such that in South America, the switch to register ships was permanent from this time.

The significance of the switch to register ships and the opening of the Cape Horn route has long been understood in some quarters. In his *Bourbon Spain*, John Lynch named it the greatest innovation in colonial trade in two hundred years, while decades ago, an eminent Chilean historian already considered it the most important of all the Bourbon commercial reforms.[51] But it is only as the result of research carried out in the past few years that these views have become both thoroughly documented and all but indisputable. One landmark study was Lamikiz's *Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World*, published in 2010, which suggested for the first time at length just what was the impact of the register system on how trade functioned and who took part in it (including the surprising conclusion that the system worked to favor Spanish nationals, to the detriment of previously ubiquitous foreign merchants and agents). A further key work is Mariano Bonialian's *El Pacífico hispanoamericano*, dated 2012, which told us how the *registros* altered profoundly the prevailing patterns of Spanish-American trade in the Pacific, both between Peru and New Spain and with Asia; he termed this impact "a veritable revolution in commerce and consumption in the imperial system." My own *British Trade with Spanish America, 1763–1808*, published in 2007, had similarly dwelt upon a striking reconfiguration of Anglo-Spanish trade in the Caribbean from ca. 1750, observed by scholars since the early twentieth century. This reconfiguration saw Spaniards displace the British as the primary carriers of mutual trade in the region, with lasting consequences; but neither I nor previous historians of the subject had offered any very convincing explanation for it, until the work of Lamikiz, Bonialian, and other scholars indicated that such changes *must* form part of a single sweeping pattern, brought about by the switch from fleets to register ships. And other scholars there are: Jesús Cosamalón Aguilar's very recent study of Lima markets dates their transformation to ca. 1750, again attributable to the switch to register ships, explicitly controverting the prevailing view that the key shift came with the Free Trade regulations of 1778.

The grounds for considering the switch to register ships as perhaps the greatest of all the Bourbon commercial reforms also lie out with the early period, since they naturally further reflect current shifting

perceptions of the importance of the much better-known reforms based around "Free Trade." If, as we are coming to realize (in particular since further seminal work by Antonio García-Baquero González in 1997), the impact of Free Trade in overall commercial terms may have been very substantially less than we have been accustomed to believe, then the more wide-ranging impact on commercial patterns and practices of the *registro* system from the 1740s onwards can all the better be appreciated.[52] Skeptics will reason that this "reform" was no such thing, and cannot be considered so, given that it was imposed on an unwilling Spanish government by the failure of successive trade fairs for Peru, and above all by the wartime destruction by the British of their venue, Portobelo on the Isthmus of Panama. The imposed, provisional nature of the suspension of the fleets seems beyond dispute; and we have already seen that what is viewed as the *passive* nature of early Bourbon imperial policy, its victimhood of external circumstances, has been used to question or dismiss its significance as a whole. But it is surely now long past time to move beyond what is clearly a false dichotomy: one that on the one hand suggests that only active or conscious reforms, as opposed to passive measures implemented under immediate stimuli, could be of significance in the colonies; and on the other, ignores the role of just such stimuli in the genesis and development of *late* Bourbon reform. To remain with Atlantic trade, was the onset of Free Trade in the 1760s any less the consequence of wartime disaster (the seizure of Havana by the British) than was the suspension of the fleets and the rise of *navíos de registro* in the late 1730s? Where does the line between "reform" and "innovation" or "change" leading to structural improvement truly lie? Surely the key point is that arguably the most important commercial revolution of the eighteenth century took place in the 1740s, under the early Bourbons, rather than subsequent to the 1770s, when the Free Trade reforms acted upon a system already transformed three decades earlier.[53]

* * *

Neither can the second major preconception regarding early Bourbon reform—that it responded to no overall program, and consisted merely of a series of ad hoc measures with little relation between them—be any longer sustained. Indeed, if it is now clear that important innovations were introduced in colonial government and affairs during early Bourbon times, it is still more self-evident that these measures did indeed form part of conscious planning

and project making. This is true both in the general and the specific senses. In general terms, what is striking about the reforms discussed throughout this book is that their *agenda* can be seen to have coincided so closely with that of the late Bourbon reforms (even when the latter were more self-consciously "Enlightened"). That is to say, the same concerns were evident from at least the 1710s as drove the Caroline program from the 1760s: concerns for more efficient and rational administration of resources, to increase revenues and commandeer a greater proportion for the royal exchequer, to ensure a greater responsiveness of colonial administration, to bring wayward or autonomous sectors of society more closely under the royal mandate, and even to make more thorough survey of the colonies in pursuit of all these ends.[54] The "ethos" of the early reforms was recognizably the same as for the later program; which is to say, colonial government was recognizably "Bourbon" almost from its origins, and not only from 1763. This point is further apparent, of course, in the theoretical literature produced during the early period, long recognized as having exerted a fundamental influence over late-Bourbon ministers and reformers precisely because it reflected so closely their concerns and understanding of the colonial problem. The writers on economic themes Jerónimo de Ustáriz, Bernardo de Ulloa, or Bernardo Ward number among the most distinguished of the Bourbon age;[55] while the *Nuevo sistema económico para América* of José del Campillo, completed in 1743, is acknowledged as "the reformers" bible, the definitive text which inspired this [late-] Bourbon revolution in government."[56] This ensures that even those early measures that seem to stand isolated from conscious colonial programs in fact emerged from the same ethos, the same common understanding on either side of the (fast-eroding) divide of the 1760s.

Nevertheless, in finding that conscious policy and planning stood behind the early Bourbon reforms, I am referring to a specific as well as a general phenomenon. This book is organized around two major cycles of early Bourbon reform, perceptible in the archival sources for the period and also through the secondary literature. The first of these cycles had its origins in the late 1710s and ran through until the mid-1730s. It was concerned primarily with Spanish Atlantic trade, though it was rooted in a far more wide-ranging program of measures affecting government and the economy in Spain itself, and in its turn affected a far broader gamut of affairs in the colonies. Following a hiatus of a decade or rather less, a second cycle then

began in the mid-1740s, that spanned a further decade in both Spain and the viceroyalty of Peru; the focus of this second cycle was less on Atlantic trade, and more upon colonial administration and the augmentation of royal revenue in the empire. This second cycle lost impetus from the mid-1750s, so that a further decade passed before the onset of late-Bourbon reform after the conclusion of the Seven Years War.

The fact that such cycles can be detected at all, it needs hardly be remarked, further belies the notion that no "guiding hand" was in evidence—that early Bourbon government generated little in the way of conscious programs of colonial reform.[57] What is more, each cycle had its own clearly identifiable originators and sponsors: all of them servants rather than holders of an early Bourbon Crown that took scant personal interest in colonial policy in most spheres. The key figures associated with the first cycle are Julio Alberoni, at the peak of his power between 1715 and 1719, and José Patiño, who was already a leading figure in the late 1710s, but reached his own peak as chief minister from 1726; my dating of the end of this cycle is for Patiño's death in office in 1736. Alberoni is the more curious figure in historiographical terms, a statesman exceptionally well-known to historians of the nineteenth century, and ignored in almost equal measure by those of the twentieth. Relatively little attention has been devoted to his labors in the Peninsula, while his colonial program was virtually ignored until the past few years (when we have seen that Allan Kuethe has devoted considerable attention to it). In my view, Alberoni's fecund role in early Bourbon government, of lasting significance, has been obscured on the one hand by the brevity of his administration and the debacle of his fall during the War of the Quadruple Alliance, and on the other by the failure to set his colonial reforms within the context of his extensive and radical program for Spain; a program that included naval restoration and state-sponsored industrialization, as well as administrative centralization.[58] It is true that only some portion of his program was implemented before he was driven from power, but much of it was completed by his successors in later years and even decades. Earlier historians were well aware of Alberoni's foundational role in later eighteenth-century reform. As long ago as the 1810s, William Coxe argued that "he extended his views to a gradual and permanent amelioration in the whole system of the Spanish monarchy," while we shall see in due course that 80 years later, Edward Armstrong wrote (in my view with considerable

justification) that "almost all the beneficial projects of the century may be traced back to him."[59]

Following the fall of Alberoni, José Patiño became the early Bourbon minister primarily responsible for the development and implementation of colonial policy. As I argue in chapter 3, Patiño has been the victim of a misguided historiographical tradition that regards him (in the words of John Lynch) as merely "a superior civil servant," and one whose hands were tied to all productive purpose by the irrational foreign policy of his monarchs, in pursuit of territorial conquests in Italy. And yet Patiño's policy priorities, both during his rise and his years in power, are neither difficult to identify, nor were they either set or indeed thwarted in any perceptible sense by Philip V or his domineering wife, Elisabeth Farnese (as opposed to by Alberoni, Patiño himself, and other leading figures in Spanish government).

The focus of the first cycle of reform for the colonies, which it fell primarily to Patiño to implement, was Spanish Atlantic trade; and to the 1730s, most other areas of colonial policy were made subordinate to the commercial question. Trade policy was first based around the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* of 1720, an attempt to make the traditional Habsburg trading system operate effectively and profitably once more. The *Proyecto*, much like its sponsor Patiño, has been derided throughout most of the literature as conservative, unimaginative, and hamstrung by the early Bourbon diplomatic entanglements and foreign wars. But while with hindsight the *Proyecto* surely represented a mistaken strategy in the international commercial context of its day, it nevertheless seems clear that it represented a genuine national approach, rather than (as has been suggested) one simply imposed by wartime defeat and foreign treaties. Moreover, its true significance has been obscured by the failure to recognize that it stood not alone, but as part of the much broader program for the national renewal of Spain devised and in part implemented under Julio Alberoni. And the significance of the commercial program has been further obscured by the failure to acknowledge the extent to which its objectives and assumptions lay behind other colonial policies and reforms in the period from the 1710s to the 1730s. Thus, in my view, essentially commercial priorities conditioned both the establishment of the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717 *and* its abolition in 1723; the halving of taxation on silver mining in 1735, as perhaps the most important reform in Peruvian mining prior to the *Visita General* of the 1770s; and a shift toward the favoring

of military officers in the principal colonial posts, apparent from ca. 1720, among other measures.

Ironically, as we have seen, it was the failure of the trade program, with the renewal of warfare in the Atlantic, that led to what became arguably the most important innovations in colonial commerce of the entire Bourbon era—the switch from fleets to register ships in 1735 and the opening of the sailing route via Cape Horn in 1740. In my view, the switch to *registros*, along with the definitive creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739, have tended to obscure what was in fact a hiatus in active early Bourbon reform in the late 1730s and early 1740s (both these major measures had clear roots in the first cycle of colonial reform, already described).[60] The second cycle of active colonial policies and reforms commenced around 1745, at the hands of the third major ministerial figure to dominate the reigns of Philip V and Fernando VI: Zenón de Somodevilla, Marqués de la Ensenada, in power from 1743 to 1754. Ensenada was abetted in Peru by the capable viceroy for the long decade and a half from 1745, José Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda.

This second cycle, based on what (in chapter 6) I dub the Ensenada—Manso de Velasco program for colonial affairs, differed in its focus from the cycle overseen by Alberoni and Patiño. Although Ensenada himself took an interest in Spanish Atlantic trade, and indeed this period witnessed the further consolidation of the *registro* system, he and Manso were primarily preoccupied with the reform of colonial administration on the one hand, and increasing revenue to the colonial Exchequer on the other. Their activities in these spheres were such that some historians have preferred a model for the development of Bourbon reform overall that commences in earnest ca. 1750 (as opposed to 1700, the 1710s, the 1760s, etc.).[61] Their efforts yielded the introduction to Peru of the tobacco monopoly, from as early as 1752 (15 years earlier than in New Spain), as well as the permanent abolition of sales of posts in the colonial bureaucracy, from the Audiencias down. They also witnessed a very substantial reinforcement of the powers of the viceroys, above all in fiscal matters. Other measures of real substance included a raft of reforms at Potosí that clearly foreshadowed those of the late Bourbon era (a new governorship, and progenitors of the later School of Mines and Royal Bank of San Carlos); the secularization of native parishes run by regular friars; legalization of *repartimiento de mercancía*; and royal operation of the Mints in both Lower and Upper Peru, with establishment of new Mints in Santiago de Chile and Popayán. This was by any standards a significant clutch of reforms, then, that had a substantial impact in

the colony before impetus in Madrid was lost once more with the overthrow of Ensenada in 1754.

* * *

A final significant conclusion of this work concerns the *authorship* of reform and colonial policy under early Bourbon rule. We have seen that a number of key ministers are readily identifiable, among them primarily responsible for devising or overseeing most imperial policy under Philip V and Fernando VI: Alberoni, Patiño, and Ensenada. This authorship and direction of what I have suggested were two distinct cycles of early Bourbon reform provides further evidence for its purposefulness and consistency, contradicting earlier views that see policy during this period as haphazard or piecemeal in character. But these men and others at the imperial center did not act alone: they acted in collaboration with the key officials in the colonies, and above all the viceroys. Two figures stand out above all others: the Marqués de Castelfuerte in the 1720s and 1730s, and José Antonio Manso de Velasco (made Conde de Superunda after his appointment) in the 1740s and 1750s. In this book, I argue that these viceroys in particular played a far more active and influential role in the development of early Bourbon rule in the viceroyalty of Peru than has been recognized, and that this matters for our overall assessment of the period. It matters because it reinforces the principal broader arguments of the work: that more reforms of significance were undertaken during this period than is generally thought; and that these reforms displayed a coherence and common purpose previously denied them. And it also has further implications for the way we think about colonial rule and relations between Peru and Spain, between Lima and Madrid.

The Marqués de Castelfuerte was appointed in 1724 as the first of the military viceroys of the Bourbon age, a man who had fought for the new dynasty during the War of Succession and identified closely with its priorities for the colonies. Not for nothing did Alfredo Moreno Cebrián subtitle his study and edition of Castelfuerte´s *Relación de gobierno* "the first Bourbon attempt to reform Peru."[62] I myself, 15 years ago, made the case that Castelfuerte brought a recognizably Bourbon ethos to his viceregal administration, that marked a real change in the character of government there. He supported diligently the program for colonial affairs overseen by José Patiño, and devoted the greatest part of his energies to support of its commercial dimension, directed toward restoration of the fleet system

for South America. He took a strong and direct hand in implementation of other aspects of the first cycle of reforms for Peru, notably in fiscal and monetary affairs, where he oversaw both the return of most taxation to direct royal control, and the beginnings of reform of the Peruvian currency and Mints. Most strikingly, Castelfuerte undertook a major fiscal reform, implemented alongside a census of the native population of Upper and Lower Peru, that resulted in substantial increases in tribute payments and in draft labor service for the viceregal mines.[63] Had this reform—which made large numbers of migrant native Peruvians liable for tribute and *mita* service for the first time—been undertaken by decree from Madrid, or after the 1760s, it would have long taken its place among the recognized and effective Bourbon reforms. But Castelfuerte undertook it entirely on his own initiative, only informing the Crown after the fact: a feature that helps explain why it was missed in the historiography for so long, while underscoring this active role of viceroys in early Bourbon government in South America.

Castelfuertes's administration also brought a watershed for the post-Habsburg viceroyalty in relations between Church and colonial state. As we will see in chapter 4, his dealings with the viceregal Church were aggressive in ways that gave leading clerics a first sense of what was to be the relationship with the Bourbon state in the colonies; this, even *before* reforms of consequence were apparent in this area. The episode illustrates a further broader point regarding the two leading viceroys of the age: they could have an important impact in the colonies even where easily identifiable reforms were absent, or had not yet made their mark. I am not the only historian to allude to this phenomenon: Charles Walker has shown most persuasively how Manso de Velasco, Castelfuerte´s successor-but-one, exploited the reconstruction of Lima after the catastrophic earthquake of 1746 to impose Enlightened, and recognizably Bourbon, principles of urban organization on a recalcitrant elite population, both ecclesiastical and secular.[64] Manso's urban initiative, then, demonstrates how viceregal actions could bring about "Bourbonizing" change in the culture of the colonies, alongside the more specific impact of reforms. And major reforms were still more apparent during Manso's viceregency than during that of Castelfuerte: he enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the Marqués de la Ensenada, and the two men may have discussed the reforms and innovations required for the viceroyalty prior to his arrival in Peru in 1745. Once there, he played a central role in the development of the major policies of his time, across a number of key areas. Thus, he not only implemented but actively devised

large-scale reforms that included the introduction of the tobacco monopoly, the legalization of *repartimiento de mercancía* in native communities, and the secularization of native parishes held by the regular Orders. In the latter case, a policy suggested and designed by Manso de Velasco in Peru was not only adopted by Madrid, but was extended to New Spain too, so that the viceroy influenced imperial policy throughout the colonies.[65] This active role of the two major early Bourbon viceroys in the formulation as well as the implementation of policy, therefore, is a further important aspect discussed throughout the chapters that follow.

I should emphasize that the claim here is not that the active role of viceroys was unique to the Bourbon era; it may well have characterized the administrations of viceroys of earlier periods as well. But it does seem to have broader implications for our understanding of Spanish colonial government, not least in drastically reducing the distance between the locus of at least some colonial decision making and the territories in which the resulting decisions were to be implemented. It seems possible that the role played by viceroys Castelfuerte and Manso de Velasco made Spanish colonial rule more effective, from an imperial perspective, because it was better informed and closer to daily realities in the colonies.

* * *

This book, then, seeks to present a new interpretation of the early Bourbon period in Spanish South America: above all in the viceroyalty of Peru, which embraced most of Spanish territory in the Continent during most of the period to 1739. New Granada, which was administered independently of Peru briefly in 1718–23 and permanently from 1739, is also discussed, albeit in less depth. Early Bourbon New Granada, both before and after its creation as a viceroyalty, has as yet benefited from no general survey, but does have a growing specialist literature of its own, referenced in these pages.[66] The interpretation of the early Bourbon period set out in these pages rests ultimately on the attempt to demonstrate the essential continuity of Spanish imperial policy over the early and late periods, either side of the traditional divide of the 1760s. This continuity, above all in the aims of reform, but also quite clearly in many of its specific manifestations, in a wide range of areas, are what render the late Bourbon era not fully comprehensible, in my view, without reference to the early one. The better to illustrate the point, the book is organized in straightforward chronological fashion,

structured around the two major cycles through which I regard the early reforms as having developed. Thus, chapters 2–4 are devoted to the first cycle, that ran from the late 1710s to 1736 and had the restoration of Atlantic trade at its heart. Chapter 5 discusses the slackening of colonial initiative apparent between the mid-1730s and the mid-1740s, while chapter 6 is devoted to the second cycle, that began around the latter period and was concerned inter alia with administrative reform and the increase of royal revenues. The conclusions, in chapter 7, further seek to emphasize how the early period provided the necessary foundations for the latter one, in specific policy areas, from mining, to colonial administration, relations with the Church, or Atlantic trade.

First, though, the essential context is provided to all Bourbon colonial endeavor, with a chapter devoted to the War of the Spanish Succession and the first two turbulent decades of Bourbon experience of both Spain and South America following Philip V's accession in 1700.

Chapter 1

Imperial Hiatus: War in Spain and Crisis in Peru, 1700 to 1720s

Introduction: The War of Succession and Its Implications

Spain's eighteenth century opened in war. The Bourbon succession was contested by the British, Austrian Habsburgs, Dutch, and lesser powers, in what became the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13). This war was for the control of Spain and its colonies in Europe and the Americas, and pitted the Allies and their candidate, the Austrian Archduke Charles, against the Bourbon Crowns of France and Spain, in the person of Philip V.[1] The war, with all its attendant circumstances, made the following quarter-century a unique period in Spanish history. Large bodies of foreign troops campaigned on Castilian soil for the first time in centuries, and the last before the Napoleonic invasion. The conflict was not only a general European one with a major theatre in the Peninsula, but a Spanish civil war that pitted Castile against the eastern kingdoms of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia. Much of the Castilian nobility opposed the new dynasty, and the Catholic Church itself splintered along lines of region or hierarchy. A further distinctive characteristic was the great influence of foreign factions at court, where the French dominated from 1700 to 1709, to be displaced thereafter by Italians. The physical disruption and damage caused by the war, consequent fiscal ruination, and bitter factional strife surrounding Philip V combined to create an extreme political instability that paralyzed government. In the longer run, as we shall see, the war acted as both pretext and catalyst for change, and major reforms were introduced that rationalized and streamlined government and gave it the form it retained until the collapse of the "Ancien Regime." But these very reforms, at their inception, accentuated the chaos they were designed to eliminate.

And all these factors affected not only the Peninsula, but also the administration of the American colonies, such that in America as in Spain, this first quarter-century had a peculiar quality, quite unlike the later periods of Bourbon rule.

The progress of the War of Succession cannot be followed here at length, but given its implications for early Bourbon government, some brief sketch is required.[2] For three years, it was fought mainly in Italy and the Netherlands, while Allied attacks on the Peninsula were limited to raids on the coast. In one such raid, the British secured a lasting beachhead at Gibraltar; in another, at Vigo in 1702, the greater part of Spain's diminutive navy was destroyed, obliging a reliance on the French for maintenance of Spanish trade and communications.[3] The war proper came to the Peninsula in 1705–6, with the rapid fall to the Allies of the eastern kingdoms, after which the country was never free of foreign troops until 1713. Within a shifting balance of power and fortunes throughout these years, there were two moments of clear crisis for Philip V and the Bourbon succession. In 1705–6, Spain finally lost control of its historic colonies in the Low Countries and Italy, while in the Peninsula, more than a third of the country lay in the hands of Archduke Charles. Madrid itself was occupied by the Allies, an event that precipitated the defection to the Habsburg cause of part of the high aristocracy.[4] There followed a victory at Almansa (April 1707) and a Bourbon recovery; but a second and still greater crisis then occurred in 1708–10, when a harsh winter and severe famine struck both Spain and France.[5] Exhaustion and heavy military reverses in Flanders obliged Louis XIV to sue for peace, and he withdrew most French forces from Spain, seemingly abandoning his grandson to inevitable defeat. The Allies advanced once more, and occupied Madrid for a second time, while the Pope recognized Charles as the legitimate king of Spain.

The Crown was saved for Philip V partly by military victory at Villaviciosa in December 1710, and partly by changing international circumstances, which made Charles the Emperor of Austria (and so a less palatable champion to his British and Dutch allies). By the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, Philip was confirmed in his possession of both Spain and the Indies, though the Spanish Empire in Europe was lost to Austria, while Britain won both Gibraltar and Minorca, as well as commercial privileges in America (discussed further in both this and the following chapters). While Utrecht ended the War of Succession, however, the conflict dragged on in Spain until the conquest of Barcelona in September 1714 and of Mallorca the following year. And even then, peace was fleeting; Spain was at war

once more in Italy by 1717, and the War of the Quadruple Alliance in 1719 again saw Galicia and Guipúzcoa invaded by British and French troops.[6]

The circumstances of this long war—of rampaging armies and a peripatetic court—naturally presented formidable challenges to Spanish government. The government itself fell victim to the fortunes of war: having retaken Madrid in late 1706, Philip purged or reformed the royal councils for their collaboration with Archduke Charles, and dismissed, exiled, or even imprisoned many high officials. Perhaps more critical still was a desperate fiscal crisis, mitigated only in part by the rapid growth of revenues under a French-directed program of reforms.[7] And at least as importantly, throughout much of this period, Spain's royal court was "a focus of constant rivalry and intrigue, as each faction sought for supremacy and drew upon itself the hatred of all others."[8] Much of this factionalism grew out of resentment of the influence of the French in Philip's early governments. Whether through the offices of the Princesse des Ursins, his personal agent in Madrid, or of a series of French ambassadors, Louis XIV exerted a powerful influence over Spanish affairs, which became all but absolute under Ambassador Michel-Jean Amelot (1705–9), "the unquestioned ruler of Spain."[9] The ascendency of the French excited the hostility of the Spanish, widespread among the people and endemic among the aristocracy. And the latter group found further cause for grievance in the emasculation of the royal councils, which they had dominated under Habsburg rule. As a result, parties were formed, and conspiracies hatched against the regime, in 1705, 1708–9, and (three times) in 1718.[10]

The outright dominion of the French in Spanish affairs was checked by Louis XIV's partial withdrawal from Spain in 1709, although in fact, Des Ursins and the financial wizard Jean Orry continued largely to run government until 1714. Already by 1711, the rise of a new faction, that of the Italians, was apparent, riding on the train of Philip's first wife, María Luisa of Savoy. Italians enjoyed a moment of supremacy after late 1714, when the arrival of Philip's second wife, Elisabeth Farnese of Parma, provoked yet another wholesale revolution in government. The French and their sympathizers were now banished, to be replaced by a flood of Italians, of whom Julio Alberoni was but the first. A French agent now remarked that "the court of Spain is totally different from what it was ten days ago. It is a completely new court and a completely new system."[11] And, as if this chronic factionalism was not

enough, in 1717–18, Philip himself experienced a bout of insanity, the first of similar episodes he would suffer periodically for the rest of his life.[12] It is true that around this same time, the entrenchment of the secretarial system in Spain, and the dynamism of the regime led by Alberoni, brought a renewed sense of purpose to peninsular government and a first burst of Bourbon reform in America (discussed in the following chapter). But at the time of Alberoni's own spectacular fall in December 1719, parts of Spain were once more under foreign occupation. The year 1724 witnessed Philip's extraordinary abdication and the "lightning reign" of the boy-king, Luis I;[13] and this was followed by the administration of the Baron de Ripperdá, a true *validazgo* as absurd as that of Manuel Godoy in a later period, and only less damaging in that it was so brief (late 1724 to mid-1726).[14]

Only with the rise to the chief ministry of José Patiño after 1720, then, was Spanish government finally freed from domestic war, foreign influence, and chronic factionalism, to achieve a semblance of real stability. As we shall see, a major step forward was taken with the demotion of the Councils of State and the creation in their place of ministries or secretariats, which concentrated executive authority and increased the efficacy of government. At their inception, however, the secretariats caused considerable confusion; and this was nowhere more apparent than in colonial administration. The *Consejo de Indias* was an early victim of the War of Succession; disgraced by some of its members' collaboration with the Austrian pretender during the Allied occupation of Madrid, it suffered a purge and a drastic reduction in membership, from 24 members to 8. In November 1714, the first "Secretariat of State for Indies and Marine" was created, its incumbent the francophile Bernardo Tinajero, and this might have provided an important impetus to the direction of colonial affairs. But the secretariat succumbed to the bureaucratic revolution that followed the arrival of Philip's second queen, Elisabeth Farnese, in December the same year, and was abolished in April 1715. From this time until its reestablishment in 1721, there was no specific portfolio for the Indies, whose affairs were rather shuffled between secretaries with responsibility for peninsular policy, themselves subject to frequent changes of titular official or fields of competence.[15] In point of fact, the *Consejo de Indias* continued to discuss policy and to prepare decrees much as it had done before, but decrees of January 20 and September 11, 1717, finally stripped it of most of its functions, after which it was restricted to a largely advisory role, retaining direct authority only as the supreme judicial court of appeal and over secular

and ecclesiastical patronage.[16] When it is further noted that, until the fall of Julio Alberoni in late 1719, the secretaries themselves were largely ciphers, subject to his arbitrary will, it becomes clear that this was a period of extraordinary disorder at the highest level of colonial administration.

In the American colonies themselves, too, the impact of the War of Succession and the accompanying turmoil in government was considerable, though not always in the areas anticipated. The military impact was relatively slight, restricted to Atlantic privateering and to attacks on towns on the Caribbean and Pacific coasts.[17] A rising for the Habsburgs in the colonies—much feared, and not unreasonably—failed to materialize.[18] The greatest direct impact was commercial, since Spanish trade with Peru virtually dried up altogether during the war.

Nevertheless, the first quarter-century in Peru was marked by a chronic disorder in government that paralleled the situation in Spain and was at least in part a product of it. The last of the Habsburg viceroys, the Conde de la Monclova, died in office in Lima in September 1705; and from this date until the arrival of the Marqués de Castelfuerte in May 1724, the viceroyalty experienced no fewer than eight governing administrations, for an average of one every fewer than 30 months. What was more, three of these administrations were by governing *Audiencias* rather than viceroys, during a period when the *Audiencia* of Lima was dominated by creoles. A further three administrations were interim and held by high clergy; only two (those of the Marqués de Castelldosríus in 1707–10 and the Príncipe de Santo Buono in 1716–20) were formal administrations of selected officials dispatched from Spain. In part, this "instability of viceroys" (as the twentieth-century Peruvian historian Rubén Vargas Ugarte called it) was the product simply of misfortune, including the death of incumbents or appointees en route to Peru.[19] But the transnational factionalism that prevailed at court during these years also played its part, evident in both the appointment of Castelldosríus (a former ambassador to the French Court, and the personal nominee of Louis XIV) and Santo Buono (an Italian whose wife formed part of Philip V's closest circle in 1714).[20]

What was more, none of the earliest Bourbon viceregal administrations in Peru can be considered a success. The Conde de la Monclova, a competent albeit conservative governor, was wearied by almost two decades' service as viceroy in both New Spain and Peru, and his last years in Lima wasted away in lethargy.[21] His successor, the Marqués de Castelldosríus, cut among the most striking

viceregal figures of the age, as a cultured man steeped in the ambiance of Versailles who brought a powerful breath of fresh air to Lima's stagnant cultural life. Unfortunately, he was also both inordinately loyal to the French Bourbons, rather than to the Spanish, and extraordinarily corrupt. Accused of playing a major role in the boom in French contraband with Peru that took place during his administration, he was actually dismissed from his post in 1709, though he won a reprieve that permitted him to die in office in April 1710.[22] His own successor, Bishop Diego Ladrón de Guevara (1710–16), seems to have been honest and humane, but little suited to the exercise of the highest colonial office, and he was fined after his departure for further permitting French trade to flourish, among other misdemeanors.[23] The nervous and impulsive Príncipe de Santo Buono, meanwhile, was devastated by the death of his wife on the sea voyage from Spain, and swiftly sought recall, returning in 1720 after less than three and a half years in his post. Lastly, Diego Morcillo Rubio de Auñón, archbishop of Charcas and later Lima, was the period's second prelate-viceroy (after Ladrón de Guevara). He held the post twice, for 50 days in 1716 and for four and a half years from January 1720. By the latter date he was already 74 years old, prompting opponents to label him decrepit; and it was alleged he purchased favor, and possibly even his post, through lavish gifts at court. Often his actions smacked more of naivety or incompetence than corruption, though he later faced charges comparable to those of his predecessors, including complicity in contraband.[24]

The "Decadent Viceroyalty": Peru, 1700–24

In short, it can be stated with little exaggeration that from soon after 1700 and until the early 1720s, the viceroyalty of Peru was deprived of government in most active or coherent senses. But, more crucial still, this breakdown in government coincided with, and exacerbated, the worst period of decline—understood from the perspective of Madrid—experienced by Peru throughout the whole of its colonial history. During the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the viceroyalty experienced a deep crisis that affected every sphere, whether commercial, economic, administrative, or even demographic. This crisis—of what John Fisher described more than 40 years ago as "the decadent viceroyalty"[25]—is discussed in this chapter at some length, since it conditioned both the early Bourbon experience of the empire in South America, and Bourbon attitudes toward imperial

reform throughout the decades that followed. Thus, the viceroyalty of Peru up to the 1720s, with other major parts of the empire, conditioned Bourbon attitudes and expectations toward the colonies. When Bourbon reform commenced, it was of course directed at characteristics of imperial organization and affairs that had roots deep in the Habsburg period. But these characteristics were experienced by Bourbon ministers and viceroys in particularly acute form during the disordered period at the dawn of the eighteenth century. It hardly needs stating that from the perspective of creoles in Peru, major features of this period represented not crisis, but exceptional opportunities. Indeed, this same period can even be described as a "golden age," within the colonial period, for creole elites in Peru. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of Madrid, the answers to what required reform in colonial affairs lay precisely in this earliest period of Bourbon rule—and perhaps nowhere so clearly as in Peru.

Spanish Atlantic Trade

The aspect of colonial affairs that pressed most urgently upon the consciousness of ministers in both Madrid and Lima was that of Spanish Atlantic trade.[26] For by 1700, it was already quite clear that Spanish colonial commerce in its traditional form—based on a strict monopoly, limited to a small number of ports and merchants in the Peninsula and America, and with single fleets leaving Spain once per year for Peru and New Spain—was in serious crisis.[27] The clearest external symptom of the decline of the monopoly was a slowing in the rhythm of departure of the trade fleets: whether the *galeones* fleet, that served Peru via Cartagena de Indias and Portobelo, or the *flota*, that served New Spain via Veracruz. By 1700, the originally annual departures of these fleets were barely a memory. Only 19 fleets sailed for Peru throughout the second half of the seventeenth century, for example, and by the century's end, trade fairs were held at Portobelo only once every five years.[28] The 50 years to 1700 thus accounted for barely one-fifth (22%) of all the traffic of the seventeenth century; and gross tonnage figures fell too, from 7,345 tons per year in the 1640s, to less than 5,000 tons per year in the 1670s and less than 3,500 tons per year in the 1690s.[29] On this most basic of levels, then, it was clear that Spanish Atlantic trade was in sclerotic crisis.

The flaws inherent to Spain's colonial trade, and which are emphasized by historians working in this area, were already

identified by contemporary critics.[30] One factor was the hopelessly complex and burdensome system of commercial taxation, accompanied increasingly by confiscation of private silver by a crown ever more desperate for fresh sources of revenue.[31] The very structure of the monopoly encouraged merchant beneficiaries to delay sailings, so as to increase demand and prices at the trade fairs, in addition to the broader drawbacks of excluding many merchants altogether (and stifling entrepreneurialism even among those who could participate). A further major concern in the eyes of the Crown was contraband, which offered the colonial population alternative supplies of goods, often of higher quality and at lower prices. Smuggling was rife in the fleets themselves, while Cadiz—the major monopoly port, replacing Seville from the 1680s—was the center of a smuggling industry employing perhaps 2,000 people.[32] The merchants of Andalusia increasingly imported their wares from northern Europe, eventually becoming mere commission agents for the traders of other countries.[33] And illicit trade was boosted in the Americas by the readiness of rival nations to sell merchandise, produce, and slaves in markets often chronically undersupplied through monopoly routes. Peru received contraband via at least three major routes: from the Caribbean coasts of New Granada and Panama, whence imports continued by sea or overland to Quito and the north of the viceroyalty; overland from the River Plate and Portuguese Brazil; and along the Pacific coast from New Spain, including reexports of goods imported from Asia.[34]

All we shall see, taxation, problems of organization, and smuggling preoccupied early Bourbon ministers' attempts to reform colonial trade. But in fact, these much-debated themes represented only part of the problem of Spanish Atlantic trade, and were not necessarily decisive to its long-term decline. For a further major factor was the growing self-sufficiency, indeed the economic autonomy, of the colonies themselves, as they reached maturity in the decades after 1600. This theme has been explored by historians engaged in vigorous, sometimes splenetic, debate regarding a putative "seventeenth-century crisis" in America, notably in New Spain, itself understood in the context of the contemporary crisis in Europe.[35] Though this long-running debate was arguably less resolved than neutralized in "a plaintive cry for more work,"[36] the broad point—that New Spain (like Peru) in the seventeenth century retained more wealth for its own purposes, remitting less to Spain and participating less in formal Atlantic trade—holds true. This development represented a "crisis" mainly from an imperial perspective, then, since from the perspective

of the colonies it brought many manifest advantages, making it "a crisis of change rather than stagnation" (in John Lynch's persuasive formula).[37] But this was of scant consolation to Spanish ministers contemplating the state of imperial trade, or calculating the immense losses to royal revenues occasioned by smuggling or by the decline of the trade fleets into the later 1600s.

If the decline of the formal structure of Spanish colonial trade was already manifest prior to 1700, the War of Succession brought it to profound crisis, and one from which, in truth, there would be no full recovery. The trade of Peru was the worst affected throughout the empire. The first trade fleet to reach Portobelo since 1696 arrived only in 1708, and that which followed did not arrive until 1722: a single trade fair to supply the viceroyalty in a staggering 25 years. The resulting lack of supplies was met by a massive expansion of smuggling, so that by the early 1720s, the Peruvian market had been very substantially supplied by smuggling for a full quarter-century. In a major recent study, Mariano Bonialian has argued persuasively and in considerable detail for the impact of Pacific trade in particular in the crisis and ultimate collapse of the *galeones* to Peru.[38] And among the many contributions of Geoffrey Walker's outstanding research on this topic was the demonstration of how the war transformed the character of Spanish American trade, not least because the long severance of commercial ties with the metropolis further fostered a sense of commercial autonomy among American merchants, rendering them still less inclined to engage with the official apparatus of fleets and trade fairs.[39]

Spain's enemies and allies alike saw the war as an opportunity to gain or expand their access to American trade.[40] At the outset, France seemed the country best placed to do both; and this goal was vigorously pursued by the French agents and ambassadors who followed Philip to Madrid.[41] At first they sought legal, formal access to Spain's American trade, but their efforts were mostly frustrated by the stubborn reticence of Spanish ministers.[42] In the event, France's wartime gains derived rather from illegal than legal trade, since in the context of Spanish impotence and dependence on France during the early part of the War, French smuggling direct to Peru and Chile now developed on a massive scale. Between 1700 and 1725, more than 150 French vessels traded on the Pacific coasts, and in the four years to mid-1708, the value of this trade was estimated at 20 million pesos.[43] This is a huge but not incredible figure, since the total silver exported by French traders may have amounted to more than two and a half times this sum.[44] Recently research has emphasized

that the French also developed a direct trade between Peru and Asian ports, from the Philippines to China.[45] The result was the ruination of such regular trade as survived the war, with contraband playing a major part in the delays and commercial disasters attending the trade fairs held at Portobelo in 1708 and 1722. Contraband had implications throughout the Peruvian economy, notably in the mining sector, where it encouraged smuggling of both mercury and silver and so depressed recorded levels of production.[46] And, as Spanish ministers were well aware, smuggling on this scale could only occur with the connivance of the local populace, including at the highest levels of colonial administration. Viceroy Castelldosríus provided perhaps the most notorious case, establishing a company to channel the profits of smuggling, and sponsoring an unofficial "trade fair" in contraband goods at Pisco on the coast south of Lima.[47]

Direct French trade declined from the late 1710s, with the last ship disappearing from Peruvian waters in 1725. But the decline of French interloping brought little respite for Spanish Atlantic trade, since the role played by France was rapidly taken up by other commercial rivals, and above all by the British. The Treaty of Utrecht, that ended the War of Succession, gave an important boost to direct British trade in the Americas, which had displayed strong growth since at least the 1670s. Under the treaty, the *Asiento de negros*, embodying the right to supply the Spanish colonies with African slaves, was transferred to Britain's new South Sea Company; and, whether under cover of the legal rights acquired with the *Asiento*, or through further smuggling within or beyond its framework, a notable expansion of British trade via the Caribbean ensued.[48] The great focus of the trade was out of Jamaica, operating above all along the northern coast of South America and in Panama. A second focus was on the River Plate, far to the south, where some 60 British ships entered Buenos Aires in the quarter-century to 1738.[49] Most striking was the South Sea Company's right, won at Utrecht and expanded in a subsequent Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1716, to send a ship to participate in American trade fairs alongside Spanish vessels. This "Annual Ship" constituted the first ever legally recognized breach of Spain's commercial monopoly in the colonies, surpassing any earlier concessions to foreign nations. It provided a source of highly prized and keenly priced goods that both competed directly with the trade of the Spanish fleets, and served as a vehicle for introduction of large amounts of contraband. British smuggling, with that of the Dutch in the Caribbean and the Portuguese via Brazil, thus survived the

commercial collapse of the wartime years and remained a formidable threat to Spanish interests into the 1720s and beyond.

Fiscal Affairs

The virtual collapse of Spanish Atlantic trade was an important factor in a further major aspect of the crisis in Peru: that which affected the Peruvian treasury. In the first decades of the eighteenth century, royal income in Peru slumped to the lowest levels of the entire colonial period. The nadir was reached in the 1710s, when receipts to the treasury totaled just under 9 million pesos for the whole of the decade: a fraction of income in the peak years around a century earlier, and only about half of revenue even in typical decades of the late seventeenth century. In a number of years, total income scarcely exceeded half a million pesos; in the worst (1714) it fell to a negligible quarter of a million pesos.[50] A treasury thus circumstanced, in a viceroyalty at war, could only with difficulty generate a surplus for remission to Spain; and inevitably, remissions of bullion on the royal account also fell to their lowest ever levels in the period between the late 1690s and 1725. In many years, indeed, no royal silver reached Spain from Peru at all.[51] The supply of silver, especially royal silver, was the most immediate and direct benefit the Crown drew from the Indies, one with what might be termed "psychological" as well as practical significance. Its near disappearance, at a moment of great need, was traumatic, and there is little doubt, shaped Bourbon perceptions of the problem of the colonial treasuries at a very early stage. Even after the end of the war in the 1710s, revenue levels remained depressed for some time, only showing clear signs of growth from the mid-1740s.

Bare statistics of income do not convey the full extent of the crisis afflicting Peruvian fiscal affairs at this time, which has perhaps been described most effectively by Kendall Brown.[52] When the governing *Audiencia* handed over to viceroy Castelldosríus in May 1707, the Lima treasury—the most important in Peru—was indebted to the tune of some 4.65 million pesos.[53] What was more, with large annual deficits of income over expenditure, this debt grew rapidly, until by August 1710 it stood at 6.375 million pesos. If the debts at other treasuries in the viceroyalty, including the second treasury at Potosí, are included, the total Peruvian debt stood at some 12.83 million pesos at the latter date. This when, as we saw immediately above, *total* income to the Lima treasury languished at some 9 million pesos for the whole of the previous decade. Such was the extremity of the need

that in 1706, Philip V actually sent begging letters to Peru, some of them addressed to the six richest merchants of Lima.[54] But even this expedient was insufficient to provoke an adequate response, and the less than 1.4 million pesos eventually remitted to Spain by Viceroy Castelldosríus was gathered only by suspending ordinary payments, raiding ecclesiastical revenues and bureaucratic salaries, and appropriating other reserved funds.[55]

Fiscal crisis had long been a feature of Peruvian government, but never had the *revenue base* itself been so low. The factors underlying the crisis had roots stretching back many decades, but all were aggravated by the War of Succession and by the breakdown of imperial government that accompanied it. With the Portobelo fleets suspended, and little other regular trade with the viceroyalty going on, revenue from the principal taxes on trade plummeted. At the same time, mining production attained historic lows, while the French contraband trade stimulated trafficking in contraband mercury and silver, so that revenue from mining taxes slumped too.[56] And, a final and tragic body blow, in 1718–23 the last great epidemic of the colonial period devastated native populations throughout Peru as far north as Huamanga (the modern Ayacucho), and the indigenous population now fell to its lowest level of the entire colonial period: little more than 600,000 people for the whole of the *Audiencia* districts of Lima and Charcas.[57] The impact of the epidemic was then compounded by fraud and underreporting of survivors; and as a result, revenue from the Indian head-tax or tribute, too, fell sharply.

If the viceroyalty experienced an acute fiscal crisis during the War of Succession, and remittances to Spain virtually ceased altogether, it was also because defense costs naturally soared. Of the royal debt of 4.65 million pesos accumulated by 1707, for example, more than two-fifths represented unpaid wages to the garrison at Callao, Lima's port, alone! And a further, final, factor in the fiscal crisis was corruption in the administration of the treasury. Although the point is controversial, fraud in fiscal affairs seems to have been most serious where American Spaniards (creoles) controlled the administration of revenue in their home regions—an increasing trend since the seventeenth century, as the Crown sold ever more bureaucratic posts of different types. Indeed, corruption appears to have become more widespread during the War, as still more posts were sold and creoles enjoyed a high point of influence in colonial administration.[58] One example of this trend is the immense debt owed the Crown by the guild of the mercury mining town of Huancavelica, that I have argued elsewhere arose directly through a corruption scam involving

the treasury officials, the royal governor of Huancavelica, and at least one of the viceroys (Castelldosríus). This debt reached over 1.6 million pesos by 1718, in unrepaid mining subsidies.[59] And the Lima merchant guild, too, amassed its own debt to the Crown in unpaid taxes on trade, of more than 1.3 million pesos by 1707.[60] More broadly, inevitably, where treasury officials themselves were corrupt, all and any revenue was at risk.[61]

The Mining Sector

The growth of the miners' debt at Huancavelica, described in the preceding paragraph, was no isolated feature, but formed one aspect of a severe crisis that also affected the whole of the Peruvian mining sector at this time. Production of silver at the greatest of the Andean centers, Potosí in Upper Peru (modern Bolivia), for example, had experienced measured but persistent decline following its early seventeenth-century peak;[62] but production hit bottom precisely during the period under discussion, in the 1710s, beginning a prolonged trough that lasted until the late 1740s. Output now averaged less than 150,000 marks per year, with Potosí's share of all American silver reduced to just one-twelfth (these figures had stood at 900,000 marks and two-thirds of American output in Potosí's heyday ca. 1600).[63] Production of mercury at Huancavelica—a metal second in importance only to silver, as the main catalyst in the production of the latter—was subject to much wider fluctuations; but here too, output reached a historic low during the first decades of Bourbon rule.[64] Between 1700 and 1720, some 3,300 *quintales* (hundredweight) of mercury were produced at Huancavelica in an average year, compared with 6,000—8,000 *quintales* in the mine's heyday around 1600. Mining remained the mainspring of the Peruvian economy; its crisis contributed directly and significantly to the decay of Spanish Atlantic trade, to the fall in revenue to the royal treasury, and the drying-up of remissions of bullion to Spain apparent at this time.[65]

Like the factors that operated to depress royal revenues, those that affected the Peruvian mining sector were many decades in the making, but were exacerbated by the peculiar circumstances of the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Primitive mining technology and infrastructure, and a crude and fragmented administration of mining at Potosí, aggravated the impact of the progressive exhaustion of the richest ores.[66] The one great state support to silver mining at Potosí, the vast labor draft termed the mita, was steadily eroded by

the decline of the native population on which it drew, until by 1700 the original weekly quota of 4,500 forced laborers had dwindled to less than one-third that number.[67] It became increasingly difficult for miners to obtain even this number of workers, and absent draftees had to be replaced with wage labor, an addition to costs and a further deterrent to production.[68] A preoccupation with immediate revenue over long-term output meant that the rate of taxation on silver production, the *quinto real* (royal fifth), was maintained in Peru throughout the seventeenth century, despite the decline in the richness of the ores, and this too surely acted to depress production. And the same factors that operated in silver mining also prevailed with regard to mercury mining at Huancavelica, where, moreover, administrative failings and irregularities were probably still more serious than at Potosí.[69]

The War of Succession and its attendant circumstances further degraded the already lamentable condition of Peruvian mining. Smuggling of both silver and mercury boomed in response to the huge French contraband trade on the Pacific coast.[70] Indeed, strong French demand at this time may actually have stimulated silver production in Peru, reversing its downward trend some 20 years earlier than official records suggest; though by definition, the benefits eluded the royal treasury.[71] The industry was dealt a further blow by the epidemic of 1718–23, which devastated the native labor force at Potosí, and provoked anguished pleas for the suspension of the mita for as long as it lasted.[72] The final year of this epidemic witnessed the absolute nadir of silver production at Potosí, of less than 120,000 marks, and there seemed little prospect of any recovery. Viceroy Marqués de Castelfuerte, who arrived in 1724, argued that the most that could be achieved was to hold production at the current low level and avoid further decline; a common contemporary viewpoint.[73]

Nowhere was the turn-of-the-century disorder more severe than at Huancavelica, where standards of administration (rarely high) now slumped still further. As we have seen, mean levels of mercury production were very low, and in several years they were minimal: of fewer than 1,600 *quintales* in 1705, and barely 2,000 *quintales* per year in 1710–12.[74] Shortages of mercury in the silver-mining centers ensued, although the smuggling of mercury undoubtedly also soared to match the contraband trade in silver, since silver could only escape official attention if refined with mercury not registered at the local treasury.[75] The Huancavelica mita remained officially fixed at 620 workers per year from the 1640s, but by the

early eighteenth century only 447 Indians actually served, with many commuting their labor into a cash payment, that enabled mining entrepreneurs to hire free-wage workers, but deprived them of cheaper draft labor.[76] More insidious still was the grant by successive viceroys of an ever-greater proportion of draft laborers to members of the elite who resided not in Huancavelica, but in Lima, whence they were leased back to active miners in return for a cash payment.[77] And we have already seen that an enormous debt, of more than 1.6 million pesos by 1718, accrued in royal credit unrepaid by the mining guild, the result of a corruption scam headed by the governors of the town. The lack of this credit in turn encouraged both the smuggling of mercury by cash-starved miners, and the exploitation of forbidden zones in the mine, at the hazard of the long-term stability of the workings. It was scarcely to be wondered that the number of miners in the *gremio* fell sharply, from 38 in 1683 to 21 in the early 1720s—of whom only 13 were active in exploitation of the mine.[78]

Administration and Society

The general malaise (from a peninsular perspective) of the "decadent viceroyalty" went beyond indices of trade, revenue, or mining production, and extended to the fabric of colonial society itself. The society of early Bourbon Peru was a large, complex, and mature one, in many ways more responsive to the needs of the dominant creole population than ever before (or indeed, arguably, at any period prior to Independence). The growing laxity of imperial control throughout the late seventeenth century permitted creoles a greater measure of control over their lives and over the resources of the colony than they had ever enjoyed. If we speak of the corruption and inefficacy of colonial administration during this period, this is of course to be understood from the viewpoint of the Crown; from the native white perspective, by contrast, colonial government functioned in a highly satisfactory manner. As we shall see, the surrender of effective authority to local interests reached its severest degree during the first quarter of the Bourbon century. The memory of this period then exerted a powerful influence over creole attitudes, both to royal authority and to their own position in society, for the remainder of the colonial age.

Of greatest concern to ministers in Madrid was the growing unresponsiveness and autonomy of both colonial officialdom and elite society. No factor contributed to this process so much as the

sale by the Crown of positions in the colonial bureaucracy, which became widespread throughout the 1600s. Thus, from 1633, posts in the royal treasuries were sold; from 1678, *corregimientos* (provincial magistracies) might be purchased; and from 1687, judgeships in the *Audiencias* or royal courts of justice themselves were offered for sale.[79] By the turn of the century, there is evidence that even the post of viceroy could be purchased by aspiring noble candidates.[80] Only the most important positions in the colonies offered an income and perquisites rich enough to attract purchasers from the Peninsula, so that these sales quickly brought about a dominant creole presence in many sectors of the colonial bureaucracy. Certainly, by 1700, both the Lima treasury and the *Tribunal de Cuentas* were already firmly controlled by native officials, or by long-serving peninsular men with well-established local links.[81] Within 20 years of the advent of sales of Audiencia positions, meanwhile, native sons came to dominate the royal court in Lima, forming an absolute majority after 1710 (which was again bolstered by the presence of peninsular judges with close local ties). And with virtually all lesser bureaucratic posts also held by native whites, the colonial administration in Peru was very strongly creole throughout the early decades of the Bourbon century.

Sale of office was pernicious in a general sense because it often implied the appointment of unqualified or unsuitable candidates. Purchasers occupied directly the highest positions in given institutions, and in so doing disrupted normal patterns of promotion, creating disillusionment among serving officials and probably fuelling corruption. But the sale to creole purchasers of posts in their own regions entailed special risks and problems. With family and economic concerns close about them, the scope for conflict between royal and local bureaucratic interests clearly grew. This same conflict, with declining professional standards, threatened both the technical efficacy of government and the impartial administration of justice. The fiscal bureaucracy provided clear illustration of both these dangers: the capture of the royal treasuries by creoles worked in the long term seriously to undermine the effectiveness of royal fiscal policy in the viceroyalty,[82] while the *Tribunal de Cuentas* in Lima ceased even to remit any accounts to Madrid after 1690 (a pattern also prevalent at the treasuries in other towns).[83] There seems little doubt that a creolized bureaucracy was immeasurably less responsive and less efficient as a vehicle for implementation of royal policies than one balanced by recent immigrant Spaniards.

By far the most striking accretion of creole power to occur during this period was that which affected the *Audiencia* of Lima, the

highest legislative and executive body in the colony after the viceroy. Philip V took swift action to remedy abuses in the American *Audiencias*, with a reform dated March 6, 1701, that halted sales of posts there.[84] But the wartime crisis of 1706 forced a prompt reversal of this policy, and between that year and 1712, *Audiencia* judgeships were sold on a scale without precedent, guaranteeing the creole dominance of the court in Lima that has already been noted.[85] In reality, between the death of the Conde de la Monclova in 1705 and the arrival of the Marqués de Castelfuerte in 1724, the leading Peruvian creoles became the most powerful men in the viceroyalty, maintaining their grip as weak viceregencies passed in rapid succession. This moment of creole power lasted some 20 years, and the absolute high points came in the years 1705–7, 1710, and 1716, when the deaths of Viceroys Monclova and Castelldosríus and the sudden withdrawal of Viceroy Ladrón de Guevara placed full power in the hands of the creole *Audiencia*, for periods amounting to some two and a half years in all. One of these administrations, that of April to September 1710, was actually headed by a native of Lima, Miguel Núñez de Sanabria, and thus represented the first time since the Conquest that supreme power beneath the crown in Peru was held by a Peruvian.[86]

Archival sources offer tantalizing glimpses of the absolute power the leading Peruvian creoles exercised during these years: the Amparadas de la Concepción sisters summarily expelled from their apartments to make way for those of Santa Rosa, who counted two of Nuñez' daughters among their number; the *maestre de campo* of Callao harassed and all but dismissed from his post for his enmity with two creoles judges; Archbishop Antonio de Zuloaga unable to find a lawyer to represent him in a dispute with the Inquisition that brought him into conflict with the court.[87] They appear to have lost no time in exploiting their authority for private gain, and the chronic administrative disorder at Huancavelica was but one consequence of the rapacity and nepotism manifest during this period. Reports reaching the *Consejo de Indias* in 1708 were sufficiently troubling for that body actually to recommend a general inspection (*visita general*) of the viceroyalty.[88] But one can easily imagine the envy and admiration the creole judges must have excited in their fellow Peruvians, and the atmosphere their success engendered. The first two decades of Bourbon rule were indeed a "golden age" for creoles in Peru. The consequences of this era were immediately felt, and may be seen in extraordinary episodes such as one in 1727 when a leading creole merchant flatly refused repeated orders from the viceroy to surrender a fugitive sheltering in his house, confident that his connections

would protect him. On this occasion, viceroy Castelfuerte employed force, and banished the offender to Chile.[89] But creole memories of largely unfettered exercise of power in their homeland in the 1700s and 1710s would prove harder to expunge.

This is no place for any more extended discussion of the broader dimensions to elite Peruvian autonomy from royal control during these years, a subject richly deserving of further study in its own right. But before concluding this section, it should be emphasized that the condition of the Peruvian Church, too, was to a considerable extent representative of this process. The control exercised by the Crown over the Church in America was, in principle, far greater than that which it enjoyed in the Peninsula. This control extended to virtually every aspect of ecclesiastical life, from the collection and distribution of tithes, to appointments to all benefices (from curacies to Archbishoprics).[90] But in practice, at the outset of Bourbon rule, the Church in Peru exhibited major characteristics that were unacceptable to loyal servants of the Crown. For one thing, it was immensely rich; probably richer than ever before.[91] Slow accumulation through donations of land, property, and revenue had made it the greatest landholder and moneylender in the colony, while mortmain protected and concentrated this wealth. As trade and other sources of income diminished, so the Church became an important refuge for those without other employment.[92] It attained enormous size; a survey of 1700 found 18 monasteries in Lima alone, some with more than 300 monks; female convents were larger still, veritable suburbs in their own right of which the largest, La Concepción, boasted more than 1,000 nuns. The total ecclesiastical population of the city encompassed more than 6,000 people, in a city numbering only some 38,000.[93]

The size and wealth of the Church in Peru would remain consistent concerns of rulers throughout the Bourbon age. But quite specific to this earliest period was the appointment of a succession of high clergy to the office of viceroy. Already between 1678 and 1681, Archbishop Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros held the viceregency, while we have already seen that Bishop Diego Ladrón de Guevara and Archbishop Diego Morcillo followed suit in 1710–16 and in 1716 and 1720–24 respectively. These administrations have benefited from little detailed study, so that any assessment of their significance remains necessarily tentative.[94] At the very least, the prelate-viceregencies fuelled the general administrative confusion of this period. Ladrón de Guevara retained the (suffragan) bishopric of Quito during his viceregency, for example, and so was subject

in ecclesiastical matters to the (metropolitan) Archbishop of Lima, Antonio de Zuloaga. Diego Morcillo was archbishop of Charcas until Zuloaga's death in 1722, so that two archbishops resided in the capital together. Most extraordinarily, from 1722 until 1724, Morcillo served as Archbishop of Lima and viceroy of Peru at one and the same time, thus enjoying unhindered control over all lesser benefices, and considerable influence over appointments to higher posts. Morcillo, like Liñán y Cisneros before him, became involved in bitter disputes with his successor as viceroy, suggesting he found it difficult to readjust to subordination following a period of unrivaled liberty of action. And more broadly, it seems clear that the Peruvian Church as a whole became accustomed over the decades to the 1720s to a great deal of functional autonomy, running its affairs substantially without interference from a distant and detached imperial government. This aspect—along with the related question of the moral condition of the clergy—would provide the main focus of Bourbon reform of the Church over the century that followed.[95]

Conclusion

The significance of this brief survey of government and events in both Spain and Peru during the first quarter of the eighteenth century should be clear. From shortly after the arrival of Philip V until at least 1715, a metropolitan government beset by war, fiscal crisis, factionalism, and administrative upheaval could scarcely be expected to devote more than cursory attention to the government of the colonies. Meanwhile, in Peru itself, colonial government experienced among the greatest periods of turmoil in its history, with a rapid succession of viceregal administrations variously weak, corrupt, or of brief duration, that extended into the early 1720s. What was more, this period of turmoil both accompanied and exacerbated by far the deepest crisis, from a formal imperial perspective, in the entire history of the viceroyalty. Thus, the most important economic indicators: the volume and value of Spanish Atlantic trade; income to the royal treasury, and remissions of surplus funds to Spain; production of silver at the Potosí mines, and of mercury at those of Huancavelica; even the very indigenous population of the viceroyalty; all now reached the lowest levels of the entire colonial era.[96] Moreover, colonial society reached new heights of unresponsiveness to the dictates and demands of the Spanish crown, while leading creoles experienced unprecedented levels of access to high positions in the colonial bureaucracy, economic opportunity (much of it through

contraband trade with foreigners), and effective autonomy of action and freedom from royal constraint. At no stage, in short, had the viceroyalty of Peru been so unprofitable to Spain, nor so able to ignore the prescriptions and priorities of the government in Madrid, as during the first quarter-century or so of Bourbon rule.

The Peru of this period, then, with the other major regions of the empire, taught the new dynasty what the colonies had become under late-Habsburg rule, what problems plagued their functioning and their administration, and what were the fields most urgently requiring reform and renovation. As we will see in the chapters to follow, the first concerted program of reform for both Spain and the colonies, designed to address these problems, began to be developed and implemented in the late 1710s; although with some important exceptions, the impact in America was delayed still further, until after 1720.

Chapter 2

Bourbon Rule and the Origins of Reform in Spain and the Colonies, 1700 to 1719

Introduction

This chapter discusses the origins of reform for both Spain and the colonies during the first two decades of Bourbon rule. During the War of Succession and the years immediately following, sweeping reform was implemented within Spain itself, above all in government, and primarily so as to centralize power and administration and to bring the different kingdoms more closely under the rule of Madrid and of Castilian law. These reforms are among the best known of all the varied impacts of the Bourbons in the Peninsula, and yet their manifest importance has done relatively little to shake the view of early Bourbon rule as limited in aspiration or in practical implications for the country. For this reason, the first part of the chapter briefly discusses these reforms. By contrast, little change of any kind was apparent in *colonial* policy or administration following the Bourbon succession prior to ca. 1715. Such change as there was, was concentrated in the area of Spanish Atlantic trade; and this area forms the focus of the second part of the chapter. Finally, the discussion turns to the real changes that then affected Spanish government during the period 1715–19, above all due to the arrival of Elisabeth Farnese as Philip V's second queen, and the rise of the Italian cleric Julio Alberoni to all but absolute power. As will be seen, Alberoni promoted a wide-ranging, coherent program of major reforms, affecting both the colonies and Spain itself. And while his administration proved brief (he was driven from power in late 1719), his policies survived his downfall, to provide the major

elements of the first Bourbon cycle for colonial reform, discussed in chapters 3–4.

Reforms for the Peninsula of the War of Succession and Subsequent Years, 1700 to ca. 1715

In the general dismissiveness to which early Bourbon rule was subject until recently, there was a partial exception: it has long been recognized that the War of Succession and the years immediately following witnessed among the most important reforms of the eighteenth century—indeed, of the entire modern history of Spain. The best known of these reforms was the introduction of the regime of *Nueva Planta* and the abolition of the historic *fueros* or special judicial privileges and autonomy of the eastern kingdoms of Valencia, Aragon, Catalonia, and Mallorca. But there were other major measures too, with the same centralizing tendency, including the introduction of Intendancies on the French model and (of most lasting significance) the demotion of the historic Councils of State and the creation of secretariats or ministries in their place. No account of Bourbon rule or of eighteenth-century Spain can ignore these sweeping reforms, or their lasting impact in the constitution of what (now more than ever) came to resemble "modern" Spain. And yet their broader significance, as well as their relevance to debates regarding the development of Bourbon rule over its early and late subperiods, is often diluted by the perception that these measures were merely imposed by the exigencies of war, rather than as the product of careful planning and strategy by the new dynasty. Recent research, in fact, tends to question this perception, suggesting deeper national roots to the critique of the Habsburg political constitution; but as is so often the case, an emphasis on "reform" as an active undertaking, as opposed to major innovation of whatever stripe or motivation, has tended to diminish the broader significance of these measures. For this reason, it is worth recapping briefly the nature and scope of the profound reforms in government and administration introduced during these years in Spain.[1]

The first major Bourbon reforms were made as early as 1703–4, and foreshadowed in important respects those of later years. A Cabinet Council (*Consejo del despacho*) was now created from the presidents of the territorial councils and other advisors to the king, who presided in person; a Secretariat of War and Exchequer was established, and took from the Council of War the administration

of the armed forces; and a General Treasury of War was established to assist with the financing of the conflict in Spain.[2] But the most important measures were witnessed from 1707, with the abolition of the *fueros* of Valencia and Aragon and the subsequent introduction of a *Nueva Planta* or new system for the administration of both territories. The *fueros* of Catalonia and Mallorca were abolished, and the *Nueva Planta* introduced to those kingdoms, in 1715–16, after they fell under firm Bourbon control. Some significant differences between the different regions notwithstanding, in all four cases the implications of these reforms were clear:

> Traditional representative institutions were abolished; all *Audiencias* underwent a profound reorganisation, as did municipal government with the introduction of Castilian-style *Ayuntamientos* presided by *corregidores*; all privileges excluding Castilians from appointment to offices within the kingdoms were abolished; autonomous fiscal administration was replaced by a system of taxation controlled by the Crown; the appointment of all local authorities was reserved for the king.[3]

As part of the same process, viceregencies were abolished in favor of rule by captains-general, such that by 1716 only three viceregencies remained throughout the monarchy of the ten that had existed under Habsburg rule; indeed, the only viceregencies consistently maintained under Philip V were the American ones, of Peru and New Spain (and later New Granada).[4] These measures fundamentally reshaped the relationship between Castile and the remaining Iberian kingdoms of Spain, their political repercussions not only lamented by nationalist scholars of the former Crown of Aragon, but of course still contested to this day. Francisco Eissa-Barroso has argued persuasively that, though made possible by the particular circumstances of the War of Succession, the reforms were not motivated primarily by "Philip V's desire to punish the rebellious kingdoms." Rather, they responded both to a French-inspired and centralizing sense of what was required for good government, and to an incipient Spanish Enlightened critique of the condition and deficiencies of Habsburg rule.[5]

The second broad process to be emphasized for these years was the shift from government based on historic councils with jurisdiction over the major regions and policy areas, toward government directly by the king and a range of newly created secretaries of state. The councils—of Castile, Aragon, Italy, Indies, State, War, the

Exchequer, and others—had been a central feature of Spanish government for centuries. Their marginalization proceeded by successive steps, introduced particularly during the second decade of Bourbon rule. In 1703–4, as already noted, a Cabinet Council was established, partly made up of the presidents of the territorial councils, and a Secretariat of War and Exchequer was created (until this time, the only secretary had been the "universal secretary" or *Secretario del despacho universal*). In 1713, a *Nueva Planta* was introduced for the Councils of Castile, the Indies, and the Exchequer, which restructured them in such a way as to reduce opposition to the new reforms. This measure was reversed in 1715, but already in 1714 a crucial step had been taken when the Cabinet Council was reorganized and a new system of five secretariats was created: of State, Grace and Justice, War, Exchequer, and Navy and the Indies. A further crucial measure was then introduced in 1717, when the prerogatives and authority of all the councils were drastically reduced. No council was more affected by this measure than that of the Indies, which was not only reduced in size, but saw its jurisdiction limited strictly to affairs of justice; henceforth, it would have no remit over any affairs of government of the American colonies.[6] A final change occurred in 1721, when the Cabinet Council itself became redundant, and government was left entirely in the hands of the king and his secretaries, now with responsibility for six areas: State, Grace and Justice, War, Exchequer, Navy, and the Indies (though a single official held the last two secretariats throughout the reign of Philip V).[7]

The different secretariats established throughout this process suffered checkered fates, especially during these early years. But it should be further emphasized that, beyond all these measures, there took place a parallel process, of the substitution of the *vía reservada* for the *vía de consulta* as the primary executive method of government in Spain. Under the latter system, government had depended upon and been developed through *consultas* or reports drawn up by the different councils. Under the *vía reservada*, by contrast, which grew to dominance from the earliest years of Philip V's reign (antedating the formal demotion of the councils in 1717), decisions were made by the king on the advice of the Cabinet Council, secretaries, or other chosen advisors, and drawn up as decrees for execution by the secretaries. The *vía reservada* thus substantially bypassed the councils and the lengthy delays they implied; "its aim was to transform the priorities of government, emphasizing executive authority, 'liberating' governmental matters from judicial oversight and

reducing 'justice' strictly to the resolution of disputes."[8] Use of the *vía reservada*, marginalization of the councils, and the rise of the secretaries of state, thus all formed part of the same sweeping process of concentration of power and executive authority in the hands of the Crown at this time. It unquestionably reflected French impatience with the perceived weaknesses and sclerosity of Spanish government, and was urged upon Philip V by his grandfather, Louis XIV. But as with the abolition of the *fueros* of the eastern kingdoms and introduction there of the *Nueva Planta*, Eissa-Barroso emphasizes that "dissatisfaction with the Councils was also widespread in Spain," and that moves toward their reform were apparent long prior to the death of Charles II. The Bourbons, in short, were not alone in their critique of the councils; within Spain concerns were already apparent over their cumbersomeness, cost, dominance by a small clique of educated nobles, and challenge to the authority of the king.[9]

One final major reform of these years lay in the introduction of *intendentes*, new officials of the state in the Spanish provinces. Projects for introducing Intendants on the French model were mooted as early as 1702–3, and the first officials were actually appointed in 1711 (among them José Patiño as Intendant of Extremadura). But the key decree was dated 1718, when Intendants were appointed to 20 Spanish provinces; this number was in effect reduced to nine with a further reform of 1721, after which date the powers of these officials were primarily restricted to military affairs and control of royal revenues, with discretional powers besides. Fifty years ago, in a seminal study, Henry Kamen noted that the Intendant was "the symbol of an ideal brought to Spain by the Bourbon monarchy and its advisors, that is to say, government centralised in the hands of officials named and controlled by the ministers of the Crown." But he went on, "the ideal was Bourbon, but nevertheless no more than an extension of the aspirations of the Spanish *arbitristas* of the previous century." That is to say, as Eissa-Barroso has emphasized for the introduction of the *Nueva Planta*, or for the demotion of the Councils of State, "the Intendants were no mere foreign innovation," but also reflected Spanish concerns and antecedents—above all because, as the principal administrative officials in the provinces, they were intended to be based explicitly on the previous post of *corregidor*.[10] In late Bourbon times, as is well known, the introduction of Intendants to replace *corregidores* became a central plank of Bourbon reform for the American colonies.[11]

The Earliest Bourbon Reforms for the Colonies: Spanish Atlantic Trade

During the War of Succession and the later 1710s, then, among the most important reforms of the entire eighteenth century were introduced in Spain, above all in government and in relations between Castile and the other kingdoms. In colonial affairs, by contrast, as has already been noted, little interest or initiative of any kind was apparent prior to ca. 1715. Such as there was, was concentrated in the single area of Spanish Atlantic trade, such that this area does merit brief attention here. It was in the profits and taxation deriving from commerce that Spain reaped the chief rewards of empire, of course, a fact that ensured not only that no sphere of colonial government was as important to Spain as was that of trade, but that also endowed commercial policy with a number of unique qualities. Above all, the Bourbons began to consider commercial reform sooner than any other field, almost from the moment of Philip V's arrival, and no area received such sustained attention thereafter. The importance accorded it, coupled with the nature of the Atlantic trade itself, meant that commercial policy was developed overwhelmingly in Madrid; the role of the American viceroys, while still critical, was more merely executive in the management of trade than in any other field. Commercial policy was also the most "global" in scope, so that here, still more than in other areas, one cannot understand the development of Bourbon trade reform as it concerned Spanish South America without considering the organization of trade throughout the Americas and, yet more crucially, commercial policy in the Peninsula itself.

The growing dysfunction of the trade fleets in the seventeenth century, described in chapter 1, was not the object of passive contemplation by Spanish ministers. On the contrary, it is clear that long before the arrival of Philip V, the government was aware of the failings of the trading system, and prepared at least to consider major reform. Debate on potential reforms began as early as the 1620s, and was almost continuous throughout the later seventeenth century.[12] The first major change to the fleet system was a wholesale fiscal reorganization in 1660 that abolished the *avería*, *almojarifazgo*, and other taxes on exports from America, and replaced them with lump payments by the different groups of American merchants. In 1679, a *Junta de comercio* was established to discuss means to encourage production and commerce in the Peninsula,[13] and further fiscal innovation came in 1695–98, with the first experiment with the volumetric

system of assessment known as *palmeo*. Ultimately, probably the most useful measure implemented during the late Habsburg period was the transfer of the main port for the Indies from Seville to Cadiz in 1680: not simply a passive response to geographical reality, but a major early sign of greater flexibility toward hallowed elements of the traditional trading structure.

When Philip V arrived in Spain the *Carrera de Indias* in its traditional form thus already faced an uncertain future; and it seems clear that Philip himself arrived predisposed toward rapid and radical commercial reform. He had been schooled by his grandfather and advisors in the deficiencies of Spanish Atlantic trade, and was free of the constraint of any special respect for Habsburg institutions or tradition. This at once became apparent during negotiations with the Cortes of Barcelona in 1701–2 and 1706, when Philip offered the Catalans annual trading ships registered in Catalonia: a clear breach of the Cadiz monopoly. From soon after his arrival, he issued requests to concerned parties throughout the kingdom for proposals for means to revive trade with America,[14] part of a vigorous debate on commercial reform that was maintained from these earliest years until the question was resolved in 1715–17. The chief forum for debate was the *Junta de comercio*, which, under different names and through frequent changes of membership, continued to discuss commercial reform for the colonies, and means to promote trade and manufacturing in the Peninsula, into the late 1710s and beyond.[15] In its best-documented guise, as the *Junta de restablecimiento del comercio*, created in 1705, it was composed of senior Spanish officials, including at least one member of the *Consejo de Indias*, and commercial representatives from the main Peninsular ports, while two French Intendants attended the early sessions.[16] It is noteworthy that no limits were set on the scope of the Junta's discussions; in mid-1708, for example, Philip actually accepted a proposal for a species of Atlantic "ferry service," to consist of warships sailing from Cadiz at regular intervals, under whose escort merchantmen would be free to sail at will. Circumstances led to the postponement and ultimately the suspension of this project.[17]

It is worth emphasizing that during these early years, the debate on commercial reform was utterly dominated by France. The French were eager to apply the principles of advanced, Colbertian mercantilism to Spain's decadent Atlantic trade, and naturally also to gain access to that trade for their own merchants. The officials who followed Philip to Madrid, a special commercial *chargé d'affaires* among them, presented an uninterrupted stream of projects of

reform to the government, and packed the relevant committees with their supporters; the Junta of 1705 was convoked at French behest. But French aspirations ultimately broke upon the rock of Spanish ministers' resentment and sheer stubborn resistance to change, and the net results of a decade's exertions were scant indeed. The greatest French access to official trade was achieved during the dark years 1706–10, and was the direct product of Philip's desperate need for income and absolute lack of mercantile and military shipping. Even here it was limited in both scale and duration, restricted largely to a role of escort and supply; the high point came when, in 1708, French ships made up part of the *flota* trading to New Spain, and accounted for 45 percent of its total cargo—the only occasion on which foreign ships formed part of an official fleet and sold goods on their own behalf in America.[18] We have seen that in 1701–2, the French won both limited access to American ports, and the slave-trading *Asiento*—concessions valued as much for their potential for contraband as for their intrinsic worth. With the loss of influence that followed Louis XIV's withdrawal of military support for Philip V in 1709, French goals became more modest, reduced to the defense of their position in the Cadiz re-export trade, and (for a time) of the direct trade with Peru. French influence on the character of commercial reform in the shape it finally took, then, must be considered minimal; an outcome few would have anticipated at the time of the accession.

In the first years of Bourbon rule, then, there was every reason to anticipate that colonial trade would be subject to rapid and radical reform. Why did such reform fail to materialize? The distractions and disruption of the War of Succession clearly played a part, and it was also the case that Spanish resentment of French interference pushed ministers into an exaggeratedly stubborn defense of the traditional system. But it seems likely that, even had these factors been absent, the innate conservatism of the higher Spanish government would have imposed itself against the reforming zeal of the new dynasty.[19] The papers of the *Junta de restablecimiento del comercio* in particular are a revealing guide to ministers' attitude to trade reform and analysis of the deficiencies of the traditional system. Notwithstanding universal agreement that that system was at point of collapse and in urgent need of reform, the members of the Junta evinced a strong conservative instinct and a reverence for traditional commercial structures and institutions. The main problems facing the fleet system were seen as the high costs it implied and the bureaucratic obstacles it placed in the way of trade. A return to an annual rhythm of

fleets was thus identified as a key reform, since it was a prime means to reduce costs. These were precisely the attitudes that would inform the program of commercial reform eventually implemented after 1717, while the *Proyectos de flotas* issued from 1711 and the Alvarez expedition of 1714 (both discussed below) foreshadowed important elements of that program. At this early date, then—several years before the conclusion of the War—ministers were already aware of the broad direction they wished reform to take. As we shall see, this is an important point to bear in mind in judging the developments of the late 1710s and the commercial program eventually implemented from 1720 onwards.

Until these attitudes crystallized into a coherent governmental program after 1715, however, commercial policy—hamstrung by a lack of ships and funds—was limited in scope and erratic in quality. The period coinciding with the last stages of the War of Succession did, in fact, witness significant innovations in the organization of the *Carrera de Indias*, but these scarcely merited the name of reforms. The Crown was obliged to resort to private individuals or corporations for elements of Atlantic trade or transport, for example; the legislation governing the *flota* of 1711 obliged six private merchantmen to make up the fleet, alongside the flagship, and two of these were armed for defense in separate contracts with the Crown. The *flotas* of 1712 and 1715, and the small fleet that sailed for Tierra Firme in 1713, were all organized under contract with private merchant interests, which assumed the organization and most of the costs of the fleet, as well as the obligation to transport necessary military and other supplies, in return for usufruct of the remaining cargo space.[20] This dependence on private shipping was clearly viewed as an undesirable and temporary expedient, since after 1717, the Crown again made a full commitment to provide the escort ships itself. A further consistent theme of this early period was the attempt to restrict foreign contraband trade in the Americas, especially the French interloping trade in the Pacific. But once more, few measures taken at this time can be considered reformist, and French trading continued largely unabated well into the 1710s.[21]

Out of the general disorder, two developments may nevertheless be identified both as representing a genuine search for reform, and the first practical manifestations of what would subsequently emerge as early Bourbon commercial policy in a broader sense. In 1714, two high-ranking officials, Antonio Alvarez de Abreu and Pedro Tomás Pintado, were charged with eradicating contraband and other fraud in the Indies. Their commission had a broader economic purpose,

since they were to report on products suitable for trade to and from the colonies they visited, and make suggestions for improvement of the administration of royal revenues and justice. After a positive start in Venezuela, the investigation lapsed, possibly a victim of the change of government in Madrid.[22] It was thus arguably significant chiefly as an early concrete expression of the royal conviction that massive contraband persisted mainly through the corruption or incompetence of the Crown's own officials; a striking feature of policy after 1720.

The second, and ultimately more important, development was governance of the *Carrera de Indias* throughout the 1710s by *Proyectos de flotas*, or printed sets of rules governing the shipping, bureaucratic, and fiscal administration of individual fleets.[23] These documents expressed the first serious attempt to adapt Habsburg commercial legislation to the circumstances of the early eighteenth century. The first significant example, that of 1711, made important innovations in the fiscal administration of the fleets, reestablishing *palmeo* as a means of assessment and declaring that the current complex and fragmented tax system should give way to single payments levied on export or import at Cadiz.[24] All subsequent New Spain fleets seem to have been governed by similar documents, among which that of 1717 was especially significant (no full fleets sailed for Peru during the 1710s). As we will see, when serious reform of the Indies trade was finally launched in 1720, it was by means of a further *Proyecto*, this time governing *both* trade fleets, along with all other commercial exchange with America.

Elisabeth Farnese, Julio Alberoni, and the Genesis of Colonial Reform, ca. 1715—19

In the period around 1715, circumstances in Spain finally changed in a way that would ultimately favor the development of lasting reform in the colonies as well as in Spain. As a result, the few years that followed, until 1719, came to generate the first true stirrings of Bourbon reform for America, as well as an expansion of the major reforms already affecting the Peninsula. It was during these years, then, and not the earlier period since 1700, that a serious program of imperial reforms was developed, and in part implemented; it was to these years that we must look for the real impact in Spanish America of the change of the ruling dynasty. The policies and projects now developed, as we will see, affected both the colonies and Spain itself, and in many cases were of lasting significance to both. The reforms developed for the colonies all but inevitably centered primarily upon

the question of Spain's Atlantic trade; and following discussion of the origins of these reforms in the current chapter, the commercial reforms provide the primary focus for the chapter that follows. The program also affected a wide range of other areas, however, whether administrative, in fiscal affairs, the mining sector, or the Church, that are discussed in chapter 4.

A number of factors contributed to create a more favorable conjuncture for reform from 1715. On the one hand, the War of Succession finally sputtered to a halt, allowing the Bourbons a respite and liberating resources to devote to projects of government. On the other hand, in the commercial sphere, as we shall see, a renegotiation of the *Asiento* treaty with Britain undertaken in 1716 ("Bubb's Treaty") both provided a stimulus to reform and, scholars have argued, determined its direction. The most important changes, nevertheless, were those that affected the highest direction of policy in the country, at the level of the court and its ministers.

The arrival in Spain of Elisabeth Farnese, Philip V's new queen, in December 1714, was crucial to these changes. Of Philip himself, now as at any other time after the War, little was to be expected. During the early years of battles and campaigns, while his succession was still in doubt, he had shown some real energy and capacity; he was, after all, just 17 years of age in 1700. But with victory and the return of peace in the mid-1710s, he slipped into a lethargy and melancholy that would define the rest of his reign. In John Lynch's words, he was "an impediment to good government and in no sense a patron of reform . . . to whom ministers looked in vain for initiative or innovation."[25] His later life was also marked by incapacitating mental illness, of which the first major bout manifested itself during these very years, in 1717. He was at the same time deeply religious and addicted to sex,[26] and following the death of his first wife, Maria Luisa of Savoy, in February 1714, he was desperate to remarry. After he did so, by proxy and without having met his bride, Elisabeth Farnese soon dominated him completely. Farnese brought an iron will (if not always a strategically intelligent one) to the heart of Spanish government. She was obsessed with securing territories in Italy for her sons by Philip, who were likely to be excluded from the Spanish succession by his children by Maria Luisa. In any case, it was not difficult to convince Philip of the validity of a project that would restore historic parts of the Monarchy in Italy lost during the late war. The queen's Italian obsession, then, set the agenda for Spanish foreign policy for much of the following 30 years, until Philip's death in 1746. The birth in January 1716 of their first son,

Charles of Bourbon Farnese (in the event the future Charles III of Spain), immediately provoked the first bellicose stage in that policy: the conquest of Sardinia and Sicily in 1717–18.

As is well known, Philip and Farnese's first government came to be dominated by a cleric from Parma, Julio Alberoni. Alberoni had come to Spain in the service of the Duc de Vendôme during the War of Succession.[27] Once there, he first promoted the candidature of Farnese, herself from Parma, as Philip's second wife, and then won the friendship and complete confidence of the new queen. With Farnese quickly dominating Philip, by mid-1715 Alberoni had effectively acquired control of the government, which he then retained until his downfall in December 1719. Alberoni was one of very few "Spanish" statesmen to cut a major dash in the affairs of early eighteenth-century Europe, and his life and works generated a large body of literature, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[28] He excited widespread hatred, but also near-universal respect even among his enemies.[29] He had a strong Machiavellian streak, and a dangerous hubris that only grew with his years in power. But he was also an extraordinarily gifted administrator; José Patiño said that he "turned impossibilities into mere difficulties."[30] And he had a real measure of political vision, with a strong conviction of the innate potential of Spain if well governed.[31]

Alberoni was neither a minister nor a secretary, but rather a *valido* in the Habsburg mould; although a Cardinal from 1717, he never held any formal position in Spanish government, and depended for his authority entirely on the king and queen.[32] But their support made him absolute: although his administration presided over the transition from Habsburg conciliar government to the Bourbon secretarial system, he governed independently of either, and the new secretaries spent these years simply rubber-stamping decrees prepared by him.[33] For both Spain and the colonies, Alberoni's significance was thus first and foremost as a catalyst, cutting through the torpor of Spanish government, presiding over a number of major reforms himself, and laying foundations on which his successors (especially José Patiño) might build. In colonial affairs, it thus became possible to discuss and effect the establishment of a new viceroyalty, that of New Granada, in a period that in total occupied less than two years, and may indeed have been virtually a snap decision in 1717.[34] This governmental agility lent the period a degree of real instability, and produced a number of aberrant and abortive projects: these included transfer of the *galeones* trade fair from Portobelo to Buenos Aires, for example, or still more radically the cession of the Spanish Philippines

to France.[35] They also embraced the (largely miscarried) projects for sweeping reform of the Peruvian mining sector in 1719, that are discussed in chapter 4. But there is little doubt that, overall, it proved a positive force. The few years following 1715 were a period of extraordinarily intense legislative activity, when the Alberoni administration implemented a range of reforms of real importance. Many of those reforms that affected the Peninsula represented a clear development of earlier policy, though there were important elements of innovation. The initiative on colonial trade that emerged during this period, by contrast, while it shared points of continuity with policy developed before 1715, in its scale and the scope of its design was quite new.

Alberoni's dependence on the queen brought him to an indissoluble identification with her great concern, to secure territories in Italy for her sons; and his reputation was determined by the first fruits of this concern, the assault on Sardinia and Sicily, whose vigor startled the European powers and was widely accredited to his organizational genius. His domestic program, by contrast, is less well known, or at least less closely associated with his name. In the Peninsula, it witnessed the final flourishing of the major administrative and centralizing reforms undertaken during the previous decade, and included such major reforms as the abolition of the *fueros* of Catalonia and Mallorca and expansion of the Intendant system—to say nothing of Alberoni's naval and military program. In colonial affairs, meanwhile, as already noted, the first great burst of Bourbon initiative and reform originated during his administration and under his auspices, though relatively little of it took effect before his fall; this role in the development of colonial policy is only now coming to be recognized.[36] Edward Armstrong's judgment of more than a century ago, then, that "almost all the beneficial projects of the century may be traced back to him," bears stronger scrutiny than might first be imagined.[37]

Alberoni patronized some policy areas personally—for example, naval reform, of which he was an enthusiastic sponsor. He was less interested in other spheres, apparently including colonial trade. In general, he was content to leave the elaboration of policy to a series of committees of Spanish ministers and experts, which met in the period 1715–17. What little we know of those of these Juntas that were devoted to the development of commercial policy suggests that they were composed of men with extensive personal knowledge of the *Carrera de Indias*; a laudable early instance of Bourbon openness to the voice of personal experience, perhaps. They were chaired by

Andrés de Pez, a former commander of fleets, and after January 1717 by José Patiño.[38] The fact that when Patiño joined these Juntas in 1716 he found the main points of commercial reform already decided suggests that there was some continuity between these committees and the discussions on trade held since 1700, and indeed it is very likely that the old *Junta de comercio* or several of its members participated in the discussions. Recourse to Juntas formed from prominent figures in government and trade also ensured that many elements of the program developed during the Alberoni years were maintained by Spanish ministers into the 1720s and later.

All the reforms implemented at this time were designed ultimately to serve Farnese's foreign policy objectives; in an immediate sense, to make possible the military expeditions to Sicily and Sardinia. This "Italian factor," as is well known, had extremely damaging consequences for Spanish commercial interests. The damage was not only short term, witnessed in the destruction of the Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro in Sicily in 1718 and the associated delay to commercial reform between 1717 and 1720. Alberoni's desire to placate the British motivated the generous concessions made the South Sea Company in a renegotiation of the *Asiento* treaty undertaken in 1716, in what became known as "Bubb's Treaty," after the British envoy George Bubb.[39] The chief of these concessions was the right accorded the company's "Annual Ship" to trade alone in America in default of a fleet in any given year, and represented a threat of the first magnitude to Spanish commercial interests.[40] Walker argues that this clause severely restricted Madrid's options for commercial reform, by tying Spain's international obligations to maintenance of the commercial system in its traditional form of fleets and trade fairs.[41] The restoration of the fleets to an annual rhythm of departures naturally also acquired special urgency. But the influence of a foreign policy based on conquest in Italy was not entirely negative. The need to prepare for war in the Mediterranean lent policy both urgency and a striking degree of coherence. All the reforms of these years were designed as distinct elements within a *single* program, intended to strengthen the Spanish state, to increase and mobilize its resources, and to project its strength externally as military, and specifically naval, power. And if it responded to an immediate stimulus policy nonetheless, planned for the long term and was surprisingly comprehensive in scope. In the outcome, achievement fell far short of aspiration; but in my view, John Lynch's suggestion, that these measures "were not part of a long-term reform programme," requires serious challenge.[42]

Alberoni's Reform Program for Spain and America

Alberoni's reform program—or more neutrally, the reforms developed during the Alberoni years—affected four broad areas.[43] (It should be emphasized that schematic division of this kind should not obscure the essential unity of policy, particularly so far as the reforms that affected the colonies were concerned.) Within the Peninsula, a first set of measures brought to fruition the process of administrative centralization that had begun during the War of Succession. Most importantly, the *Nueva Planta* was now at last extended to Catalonia and to Mallorca in 1715–16, while the *Intendencias* were reformed and extended throughout the country in 1718 (Kamen argued that José Patiño rather than Julio Alberoni should take credit for the latter).[44] These reforms thus rounded off the powerful process of political and administrative centralization undertaken under Philip V since 1707, and which was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Moreover, the demotion of the historic Councils of State in 1717, and the rise in their stead of secretaries of state or ministers (and slightly later, in the 1720s, of Jose Patiño as de facto "first minister"), clearly formed part of the same process of administrative centralization. Fiscal criteria provided a further prime motive behind these processes, since political considerations aside, the *Nueva Planta* was intended to ensure that Catalonia contributed to central resources in proportion to its size and wealth. And the generalization of the Intendancies went hand in hand with a far-reaching reorganization of the royal treasury system, that centralized all revenue in a new *Tesorería general*. A prime purpose of the Intendants themselves was to act as agents of fiscal, administrative, and economic intelligence in the provinces.[45]

In what constituted a second general area, in many ways the most striking initiative developed under Alberoni was that which sought to remedy the chronic decline of the Habsburg navy. Already in 1714, a step of fundamental importance had been taken with the creation of the first *Secretaría de Marina* or Secretariat of the Navy. But José Patiño, Alberoni's most brilliant protégé, has every claim to be considered the father of the modern Spanish navy. Patiño's appointment as Intendant-General of Marine in January 1717 gave him complete authority for naval affairs, and he rapidly implemented a comprehensive plan for naval reconstruction.[46] Modern shipyards and naval bases were established in Cadiz, Ferrol, Cartagena and, in the Indies, Havana, and immediately began production of ships to a modern design, in large numbers. At the same time, a naval supplies industry

was created from almost nothing in the Peninsula: logging centers in the Pyrenees, manufacture of tar in Aragon and Catalonia, and of rigging in Puerto Real on the Bay of Cadiz. The naval bureaucracy was entirely reformed and modernized, and special attention was devoted to naval education, notably with the establishment of a *Colegio de guardias marinas*—future alma mater of the celebrated mariners and scholars, Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa. The effect of these reforms was little short of astonishing: the large fleet of warships and transports that carried the invasion force to Sardinia and Sicily was mostly of Spanish manufacture, put together in scarcely two years.

A third group of reforms sought to narrow the gulf in industrial production and trading strength that separated Spain from competing nations such as Britain and France. The Alberoni administration invested directly in manufacturing, in Spain's first attempt at a concerted program of industrialization. Textiles attracted the greater part of investment: in 1718, the flagship factory at Guadalajara was established to produce high-quality cloths for export as well as for domestic consumption. Managed by experts imported from abroad, Guadalajara received millions of pesos in state subsidies in the first years of production alone.[47] Other royal factories were established in Madrid, Segovia, Talavera, and Valladolid, producing different textiles, silks, and tapestries.[48] These factories were intended to act as training schools for a new class of Spanish manufacturing technicians and as motors for a vigorous private entrepreneurial sector, and such private textiles enterprises as already existed were encouraged with fiscal and other concessions.[49] Other sectors also benefitted from the concern to promote national industries and reduce dependence on imports. The naval supplies industry, as we have seen, benefitted from massive investment in shipbuilding. Foundries in Cantabria and Navarre boomed on the demand for arms for the new navy, and factories in Seville and Barcelona began turning out large bronze cannons and artillery pieces embossed with the names of Philip and Farnese.[50] Experiments were undertaken in the metallurgical sector, notably with a tin-plate factory at Ronda in the mountains inland from Málaga. Means other than direct investment were found to promote the new industries and advance trade: a measure of real importance was the abolition of all internal customs barriers in Spain in August 1717, which was complemented by infrastructure projects designed to facilitate communication and travel between major centers.[51] A vigorous protectionist campaign sought to hinder the access of foreign textiles to the Spanish market: in 1718 the importation of Chinese textiles was prohibited, as will be seen at greater length hereafter, and

the following decade witnessed further decrees restrictive of French, British, and other European imports.[52]

Two of the principal aims of the Alberoni reforms were thus restoration of the navy and the establishment and protection of a national manufacturing sector, especially a textiles industry. A fourth and final major group of reforms was that which affected trade and navigation with the Indies. As will be seen in chapter 3, the commercial reforms of the Alberoni years were based around reform of the fleet system, directed toward reestablishment of a regular and frequent transatlantic traffic, and a campaign against foreign contraband. These initiatives: naval reconstruction; the revival of trade and manufacturing in the Peninsula; and commercial reform for the Americas; were of course intimately linked. Naval restoration was intended to guarantee the security and regularity of the trade fleets. The renewed manufacturing sector was intended to make possible the recovery of markets in America that Spain had relinquished to foreigners in the seventeenth century. Spanish textiles would again constitute the majority of the cargoes of the fleets; foreign reexports through Cadiz and direct contraband trade would be excluded, and the majority of bullion returning from the Indies would again remain in Spain. For its part, reform of the fleets would achieve a regular and frequent traffic to America, itself seen as the best means of stimulating Atlantic trade, and thus the recovery of Peninsular manufacturing. This regular traffic would also feed the development of Spanish shipbuilding, since all the vessels involved were to be of Spanish manufacture. Finally, the campaign against contraband would ensure that Spanish products enjoyed the monopoly in America that should by right be theirs. Colonial and commercial reform during these years thus did not occur in isolation. Rather, it developed in the context of a much wider range of reforms, with which it was closely concerned. Bourbon Spain under Alberoni, and then Patiño, sought to bring about a national economic and military recovery, and did so in a way that relied heavily on exploitation of its enormous American assets. This initiative was to have a profound impact on the development of Bourbon government in the Indies.

What became the major early Bourbon program for colonial trade was launched in earnest only in 1720, after Alberoni's departure. Its origins lay during the Cardinal's years in power, however, and thus require at least brief discussion here. The trade reforms were prepared at the same time as the broader measures developed under Alberoni, which is to say, 1715–17. The two greatest of all early Bourbon reforms affecting colonial administration—indeed,

arguably of *all* Bourbon reforms for the colonies, given that they affected the highest colonial administration—were effected at this time; and while both represented a logical development of earlier policy, both were also designed to clear away the obstacles to the rapid implementation of the remainder of colonial and associated reform. First, as we have already seen, in 1717, the *Consejo de Indias*—historically the supreme governing body for the colonies under the Crown—was emasculated with the transfer to new secretaries of state of most responsibility for colonial affairs. This major and historic reform was intended mainly to increase the efficiency of colonial administration at the highest level;[53] but it also strengthened the hand of Alberoni, who as already noted, was suspicious of and did all he could to marginalize the councils. Alberoni also bypassed the secretaries themselves on all important business, so that Miguel Fernández Durán and José Rodrigo, the two secretaries with ostensible responsibility for colonial affairs at this time, apparently made little contribution to the policies discussed here, other than in signing the relevant decrees.

Second, a wholesale reform was undertaken at this time of the *Casa de la Contratación*, the principal body governing and regulating colonial trade. By a decree of January 28, 1717, the post of Intendant-General of Marine was created, and took from the *Casa de la Contratación* responsibility for shipbuilding and repair, naval supplies and recruitment, and the preservation of forestry stocks. A further decree of May 8, 1717 detailed the competences left to the *Casa*, essentially the legal and bureaucratic administration of the *Carrera de Indias.* The powers of the president were simultaneously reinforced with respect to the other members of the tribunal, which was reduced in size.[54] Both these decrees, of course, tended toward the replacement of government by institutional corporation with government by single officials; and this process was consummated when both the Intendancy-General of Marine *and* the presidency of the *Casa de la Contratación* were given to José Patiño, then to remain united in one official long after his death, until 1754. From 1717, Patiño thus held sole responsibility for the dispatch of the fleets, with powers so extensive as to make him in effect a sort of minister for Marine and Colonial Commerce. His abilities, combined with these sweeping powers, ensured that his appointment proved to be of lasting significance.

When Patiño went to Cadiz in January 1717, he took with him the commission to implement the program of commercial reform designed by the ministerial Juntas, which he headed from this time.

He decided at first to concentrate his energies on the New Spain trade, in view of the chronic disorganization of the *galeones* for Peru; for this reason, the commercial *Proyecto* published in 1717 only affected the *flota*.[55] But the detail of policy had already been fully determined by this time, so that this *Proyecto* already embodied all the main points later expressed in the (much more celebrated) *Proyecto* of 1720 for both *galeones* and *flota*—to which, indeed, long sections of identical text were carried over. Contemporary observers were aware that Patiño was involved with a new and aggressive policy toward trade in Spain and the Americas from this time; as early as September 1717, the British consul in Cadiz already expressed concern as to the implications of "the plan they have laid and are practising to straighten the commerce upon all accounts."[56]

Nevertheless, although much policy developed during the Alberoni years was implemented at once, execution of the majority of the trade reforms was delayed until 1720. This was a direct result of the War of the Quadruple Alliance of 1718–20, in which Britain, France, the Austrian Empire, and the Dutch Republic united against the newfound belligerence of Farnese and Alberoni's Spain. After mid-1717, Patiño himself was mostly absent from Cadiz overseeing the military preparations, and in 1718 the fleet he had so impressively assembled—and on which trade reform in large measure depended—was destroyed by the British at Cape Passaro. The ruin of the Italian campaign, which swept Alberoni from power in December 1719, very nearly did for Patiño, too, who was detained for six months in Barcelona and temporarily relieved of his posts at Cadiz. But above all, and in deeper perspective, the fall of Alberoni prior to 1720 has tended to obscure the central role he played in the development of early Bourbon reform in both Spain and the colonies. For despite his own departure from the scene, the plans and priorities he developed would dominate colonial policy for the next 15 years and more. Indeed, in the broader sense, these plans and priorities remained influential throughout the remainder of the century.

Conclusion

This chapter has emphasized that although major and lasting reform was enacted in the Peninsula from the early years of the War of Succession, scant real change was apparent in Spanish colonial policy during the first years of Bourbon rule in Spain or indeed until after 1715. When such change did begin to come about, it was at the

hands of a vigorous administration headed by Julio Alberoni, and that rested ultimately upon the authority of the queen, Elisabeth Farnese. Following Farnese's objectives of conquests in Italy for her sons, Alberoni set about the reform of government and economy in both Spain and the colonies with great urgency. He launched a coherent single program of reforms, which may be analyzed under four headings: naval renewal, the state-sponsored promotion of manufacturing industry, and the reform of Spanish Atlantic trade, in addition to bringing to completion the administrative centralization in Spain already begun earlier in the reign. Such was the febrile nature of governmental activity during these years that a number of reforms misfired or failed to be implemented, while Alberoni himself dominated government for just a few short years. It was thus left to others, and above all to José Patiño, to implement the policies set for the colonies by Alberoni before his fall in late 1719. But this should not obscure Alberoni's foundational role at the heart of the first Bourbon cycle of colonial reform that would now endure until Patiño's own departure, through death, in 1736. And it is to this first cycle that we now turn: first, with a focus on the program for colonial commerce.

Chapter 3

The First Cycle of Reform, 1710s to 1736: Spanish Atlantic Trade

Introduction

As noted in the introductory chapter, early Bourbon reform may be conceptualized as having developed over the reigns of Philip V and Ferdinand VI in two broad cycles. Each cycle displayed its own chronology and focus, and each was sponsored, propelled, or implemented by particular ministers, officials, and viceroys in Spain and Peru. The current chapter and that which follows are concerned with the first of these cycles, which as we have seen, had its roots in the late 1710s, mainly in the widespread reformist program developed and partially implemented under Julio Alberoni. This cycle may be regarded as having come to a close in the mid-1730s, with the suspension of the trade fleets for America in 1735 and the death of José Patiño, the key minister, the following year.

This first cycle was concerned above all with the reform of Spain's Atlantic trade, and came to center upon the so-called *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* of 1720, which attempted to preserve the traditional monopoly structure of colonial commerce, while making it a useful vehicle for trade once more. The initiative embodied in the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* has been widely dismissed in the literature as conservative, unimaginative, and doomed to failure from the outset. This work, by contrast, while agreeing that the initiative was all but certain to fail, argues that the scale of the program for colonial commerce enacted at this time, and the seriousness with which it was pursued throughout the early 1720s, have not been adequately recognized. The real ambition of the program, and its surprising vigor during a decade or so from the late 1710s, are only appreciated when set in the context of the contemporary reform program for

peninsular Spain, which also embraced administrative centralization, naval reform, and the promotion of industrialization in commercially strategic sectors (discussed in the preceding chapter). And—a key point—its real impact in the colonies can only be acknowledged once it is appreciated that this impact extended far beyond the (limited) achievements in purely commercial terms. This chapter, then, discusses the commercial program as it was pursued from the late 1710s to the mid-1730s. It also introduces the key figures involved in its prosecution: José Patiño in Spain and the Viceroy Marqués de Castelfuerte in Peru. Chapter 4 then follows the story through into the other areas affected by reform during the 1720s and early 1730s, often in relation to the commercial program: whether administrative, fiscal, in the mining sector, or in relations with the Church.

José Patiño: Key Architect of the First Cycle

It is fitting at this point that we should turn for a moment to José Patiño, as the major figure following Alberoni to drive colonial policy, and indeed the official who dominated Spanish government for much of the decade and a half from 1720. Patiño was a native of Milan who, like Alberoni, came to Spain during the War of Succession. He was over 40 years of age before he finally left Italy, and though of Spanish descent, never mastered Spanish perfectly;[1] with Farnese and his first great sponsor, Alberoni, he thus completes a trio of powerful Italians at the head of Spanish government in the decades following the Treaty of Utrecht. He won his first administrative appointment in 1711, as one of the first Spanish Intendants, and then in 1713 as superintendent of Catalonia, where he oversaw abolition of the latter kingdom's *fueros*.[2] His evident ability brought him to the attention of Alberoni, who as we have already seen, made him Intendant-General of Marine and president of the *Casa de la Contratación* in January 1717—the positions that made his reputation. Like Alberoni, Patiño was an exceptionally skilled organizer with a tremendous capacity for hard work, to which was added an ability to master different affairs of state quickly and expertly. Though momentarily disgraced after the fall of the cardinal in late 1719, in 1720 he resumed his post in the navy. Following the bizarre brief administration of the Duque de Ripperdá in 1726, he was made secretary for Indies and Marine and for Finance, to which were later added the Secretariat of State (de facto from 1729, formally in 1733) and of War in 1730.[3] Often considered Spain's first prime minister, he died in office in November 1736.

Arguably more than any other individual, Patiño has suffered the consequences of the neglect of the period of Spanish and Spanish-American history during which he lived. A statesman occupying a position in Spain in some sense clearly analogous with that of Sir Robert Walpole in Britain, or Cardinal de Fleury in France, virtually no fresh primary material for his administration has appeared since a slim collection of state papers and memoirs edited by Antonio Rodríguez Villa in 1882. Secondary material on Patiño, meanwhile, was limited until recently to just a handful of studies of concrete aspects of his career.[4] The work devoted to the eighteenth century in the prestigious multivolume history of Spain edited by Manuel Tuñón de Lara in the 1980s, for example, limited discussion of him largely to a section less than two pages long (which is shared, moreover, with the Austrian ambassador Koningseg). R. W. Kern's *Historical Dictionary of Modern Spain*, published in 1990 and covering the period since 1700, failed so much as to accord him an entry.[5] Only in 1998 did the first modern biography appear, by Ildefonso Pulido Bueno (suggestively subtitled *The Beginnings of Enlightened Political and Economic Government in Spain*), to be followed more recently by further works of substance.[6]

Moreover, a curious historiographical tradition has developed that, emphasizing Patiño's absolute dependence on Elisabeth Farnese for his authority, suggests that the potential of his administration was squandered in furthering her designs in Italy, and that he himself lacked imagination or enthusiasm for reform. Thus, John Lynch, author of arguably the finest single-volume study of Bourbon Spain, suggests that "to place Patiño in a line of so-called Bourbon reformers is to misread his policy and priorities," and adds that he was merely "a superior civil servant."[7] But this seems a curious stance when *all* ministers of the *ancien régime* necessarily worked within the constraints of overarching priorities established by their monarchs; and above all when according priority to an aggressive foreign policy in Europe by no means precluded meaningful reform (and might indeed naturally provide a pretext and a spur to it). In truth, Patiño introduced sweeping and liberal reform in taxation in Catalonia, and hoped to do so in Castile. As we have already seen, he was the founder of the modern Spanish navy, with a major program encompassing wholesale reform of its military organization, a new emphasis on officer training, the creation of a naval supplies industry, and the foundation of modern shipyards in Spain and America—as well as an extensive program of shipbuilding.[8] And, as this chapter and those that precede and follow it suggest, his role in colonial affairs

was more crucial still: as Intendant-General of Marine, and then as minister for the Indies, he was almost single-handedly responsible for implementing the first great burst of Bourbon colonial reform, elaborated during the frenzied Alberoni years. The centerpiece of this program was the reform of Spanish Atlantic trade; but before Patiño's death, its repercussions spread across a much wider range of colonial affairs—as we shall see in chapter 4.

The *Proyecto para Galeones, y Flotas* and its Implementation, 1720 to ca. 1726

As eventually implemented, the first major process of Bourbon commercial reform traced a clearly defined cycle, beginning in 1720 and effectively ending in 1735—although the consequences of its ultimate failure conditioned developments into the 1740s and beyond. During this period, it was defined above all by the attempt to make the traditional system for Spanish colonial trade, based upon a closely regulated monopoly, regular fleets crossing the Atlantic, and trade fairs held in Peru and New Spain, function regularly and profitably. It was in part designed, and almost exclusively executed, by José Patiño, first as Intendant-General of Marine and president of the *Casa de la Contratación* in 1717–19 and 1721–26, and then as minister for the Indies from 1726 to 1736. Within this cycle, this central early Bourbon initiative for the colonies reached its peak between 1720 and ca. 1726; afterwards, as we shall see, the original intent became increasingly obscured, and the policy undermined. The key piece of legislation was the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* of April 5, 1720, the first such document to govern both American fleets, as well as all other shipping involved in the *Carrera de Indias*.[9] The *Proyecto* was by far the most important piece of early Bourbon commercial legislation, but it was supplemented by a series of regulations and ordinances (many of them printed), together with a great many *cédulas*. Between 1717 and 1725 this enormous legislative corpus reiterated most Habsburg laws on the Indies trade, while incorporating significant innovations.

The preamble to the *Proyecto* of 1720, as had that of 1717 before it (discussed in the previous chapter), gave the impression that the chief aim was to achieve a return to a regular rhythm of fleets, as itself the best means to stimulate trade between the Crown's dominions. In both cases the Crown emphasized the immediate means by which this regular rhythm was to be brought about: the imposition of a fixed timetable, guaranteed by the presence of sufficient Crown ships.

But in fact, this emphasis is somewhat misleading, to the extent that the policy embodied in the *Proyecto* and associated legislation was far more ambitious, and sought to remedy the whole range of defects that were seen as having brought about the decadence of the fleets. Legislation centered on two great elements: making the fleets a reliable, efficient, and attractive vehicle for Atlantic trade, and eliminating the competition of foreigners and foreign goods from American markets. The former initiative was elaborated in the *Proyecto* of 1720 and its associated ordinances and regulations; the latter was the product of a separate series of measures and decrees. Despite a substantial literature, much of this legislation remains remarkably little known. As a result, in this section, the *Proyecto* and the full range of its accompanying measures are discussed at some length.

First, however, we should reflect explicitly on the treatment of early Bourbon trade policy in the historical literature to date. The most pugnacious view of the *Proyecto* of 1720 set forth in recent times has been that of the highly distinguished scholar of the Bourbon Empire, Allan Kuethe. Prevailing views of this trade program portray it as an inherently flawed policy, but nevertheless a sincere one within the grave limitations imposed by its sponsors, Philip V and his ministers and officials. Kuethe, however, disputes these views, arguing that the *Proyecto* was decidedly *not* "a policy derived from an authentic response to commercial imperatives and objectives."[10] Rather, the approach it expressed was imposed upon an unwilling Spain by treaty obligations to commercial rivals, reaffirmed at Utrecht in 1713 as part of the price of peace at the end of the War of Succession. Kuethe argues that these treaty rights, along with the slave-trading *Asiento* granted the British at this time, required maintaining the traditional system of fleets and fairs, actively precluding more serious or radical commercial reform. In this stance, he builds upon the work in particular of Geoffrey Walker, already discussed in the preceding chapter; but distinctively, Kuethe sees Julio Alberoni as the first to seek to free Spain from this treaty-woven straitjacket. Thus, having first pursued cordial relations with the British, Alberoni switched to a policy of confrontation in 1716–17, evident in an aggressive attempt to reassert control of Spanish ports and especially of Cadiz (through customs inspections, curtailment of extraterritorial privileges for foreign merchants, and a reduction in the powers of foreign consuls). Kuethe sees the creation of the *Intendencia General de Marina* and the transfer of the *Casa de la Contratación* and the *Consulado* from Seville to Cadiz in 1717, in fact, as part of the same shift of policy and move toward genuine reform in Atlantic trade; while action in

the ports in contravention of treaty rights continued into 1718.[11] It was these actions, with the Spanish assaults on Sardinia and Sicily in the same years, that led to the War of the Quadruple Alliance and to further military defeat, as well as to the fall of Alberoni himself in late 1719.

Kuethe thus argues unambiguously that the *Proyecto* of 1720 "should be understood . . . within the context of Spain's military humiliation at the hands of the Quadruple Alliance," and that it was moreover "obviously a hurried, unfinished effort." He goes on: "The preservation of the traditional fleet system should, then, be understood as an act of capitulation . . . Saddled with the archaic commercial policy re-imposed at Utrecht and reaffirmed through the War of the Quadruple Alliance, the Spanish monarchy found its options severely limited."[12] The same points are emphasized in other work: "It is fundamental . . . to understand the infamous *Proyecto* of 1720 as the product of a humiliating military defeat, not as the result of a reactionary and clumsy policy by Madrid."[13] And this was true with regard to specific provisions of the *Proyecto* as well as its general thrust. Above all, the *palmeo* method now imposed for assessment of taxation on trade, based on volume rather than value or even weight, was itself "a kind of capitulation, in this case of special relevance to the victorious French"—whose American trade was especially tied to Seville and Cadiz, and specialized in high-value textiles henceforth liable for the same duty as sackcloth.[14] In these circumstances, the *Proyecto* and its associated legislation became little more than a charade, an essentially cynical exercise in legislative and commercial prevarication, undertaken by ministers and officials obliged to put off serious commercial reform pending some shift toward more favorable times.

It is worth dwelling still further for a moment specifically on *palmeo*, since of all the reforms that centered on the *Proyecto* of 1720, by far the most important were those that affected the fiscal administration of trade, and because these reforms too have been the subject of pointed criticism. The *Proyecto*'s main innovation was the definitive re-introduction of *palmeo* as a system of tax assessment for the goods shipped. Goods dispatched in regular packages or bundles, including the textiles that constituted the majority of all cargoes, were now subject to a flat rate of taxation of 5.5 *reales* per cubic *palmo* (span), regardless of their value. Goods dispatched in irregular containers—barrels, flasks, boxes, and so forth—were taxed by weight or unit at rates listed individually for each product. All taxes previously exacted on exports at Cadiz, even port charges,

were considered as included in this single levy; though on arrival in the Indies, goods were still liable for import duty (*almorifazgo*) and for various small taxes levied in different ports, as well as for the *alcabala* sales tax. Goods exported from the Indies to Spain, on the other hand, were declared free from taxation in their ports of origin, and paid the rates established in the *Proyecto* only in Cadiz. Again, these rates replaced *all* import taxes and other charges previously paid in Andalusia.

The *Proyecto* of 1720 thus greatly simplified the administration of taxes at Cadiz on both imports and exports (I return to this point in the detailed discussion of the trade reforms that follows). Under the regime of *palmeo*, merchants now paid a single tariff on each package or item, instead of the mass of levies of different weight and origin that had characterized the Habsburg system. *Palmeo* had the merit, in fact, of greatly simplifying the process of assessment of taxes, and so of speeding up the preparation of cargoes for dispatch. It was seemingly to this that the Crown referred in asserting that under these reforms, the tax system had been adjusted so that "by the most liberal method, shipments are made easy and quick, such that not even the practice of their execution should have, by being tiresome, the least onerous circumstance."[15] Patiño's successor, Francisco de Varas y Valdés, in response to a multipoint critique of *palmeo*, noted that no other system gave "such a prompt and convenient definition, both to the regulation of freights and the production of revenues, so swiftly, such as is needed in shipments to the Indies."[16]

Scholars are often dismissive of *palmeo*, which seems a rather absurd method of assessment that required little inspection and levied the same tax on a bundle of silk or brocade as on one of far coarser cloth. Stanley and Barbara Stein have noted that it "induced shippers to maximise profit by continuing to load low-volume but high-value textiles," precisely those goods still manufactured largely outside Spain.[17] Allan Kuethe, in a spoken paper, recently called the system "stupid," considering it symptomatic of the broader "capitulation" which, as we have already seen, he views as embodied in the *Proyecto* of 1720 itself.[18] We will return to the latter important argument in a moment; but with regard to *palmeo*, an alternative interpretation seems possible. For all its drawbacks, as the contemporary quotations cited in the preceding paragraph emphasized, *palmeo* greatly speeded the process of dispatch of goods for the Indies. This prompt dispatch formed a key element in the broader program of which the *Proyecto* formed a part, in which colonial commerce was to be harnessed to the goal of restoration of domestic industry and manufactures; and the

Crown seemed willing to pursue this goal even at the cost of immediate revenues. If we suppose that early Bourbon ministers were other than irrational, then, *palmeo* can be seen as evidence of the *seriousness* with which commercial reform was pursued during these years, within the constraints imposed by foreign treaty rights, recent military defeat, and (I would argue above all) an inherently conservative stance toward colonial commerce on the part of Spanish officials.

What, then, is to be made of prevailing historiographical interpretations of this first Bourbon program for the renewal of colonial trade? It seems unquestionably true that the commercial monopoly in its traditional form had innate disadvantages that no amount of reform was likely to remedy. In this sense, the program described in these pages was indeed fundamentally flawed, and doomed to the relative commercial failure in which, sure enough, it resulted. But recognition of these facts does not, it seems to me, preclude a view of the *Proyecto* of 1720 and its associated reforms as a serious attempt at commercial renewal, seriously pursued. On the one hand, it is difficult to see the *Proyecto* as conditioned by military defeat in 1718–20, or indeed as "a hurried, unfinished effort," when as Kuethe himself recognizes, it was "based closely" on the earlier royal projects issued between 1711 and 1717—from which we have already seen that large blocks of text were carried over to that of 1720 all but unaltered.[19] But neither was it the case that adherence to the structure of the traditional monopoly was imposed entirely by the circumstances of the 1710s, of the renewal of treaty obligations and military defeat.

We saw in chapter 2 that the papers of the *Junta de restablecimiento del comercio*, established as early as 1705, already displayed a deep-seated attachment to the monopoly and the fleet system, that was only strengthened in opposition to French pressure for change. It might well be argued that this attitude reflected little more than the stranglehold exercised over this and similar bodies by the *Consulado* of Cadiz and its spokesmen, prime beneficiaries and defenders of the traditional trading system. I would argue, by contrast, that we see here rather a further manifestation of what Stanley and Barbara Stein have described as "Spain's multifaceted traditionalism," in which "change toward something new, an innovation, was in principle unacceptable."[20] That is to say, the attempt to renew the fleet system could be seen as a Spanish solution to Spanish problems, and one likely to have been pursued even in the absence of treaty obligations to the British and French. In this light, the policies pursued by Alberoni from 1716 to 1719 represented a *departure* from "true" Spanish policy—as well they might, given the cardinal's origins and

character—rather than a first vigorous attempt to reform it. It has also been pointed out, again by the Steins, that "in the second decade of the eighteenth century the full power of commercial capitalism in England and its naval outreach could not yet be fully envisioned, and it was still reasonable that Spaniards hoped to revive pre-1700 trade patterns."[21] And again, even the much-maligned *palmeo* seems absurd only if it is assumed that the main priority of policy was to raise revenue from taxation. If, as is argued here, and as was emphasized by the contemporary observers cited above, the overriding aim was to facilitate shipments, ultimately so as to contribute to a Spanish industrial and agricultural renaissance, then *palmeo* is more comprehensible.

The commercial project embodied in the *Proyecto* unquestionably failed, then, and in historical hindsight was almost certainly destined to fail from the outset. But it was not the insipid, half-hearted effort as which it has been portrayed, much less a "capitulation" or conscious (if unacknowledged) renunciation of attempts at serious commercial reform. As we will see at greater length in the pages that follow, it was a carefully designed, comprehensive, and vigorously executed program, which though it left the fleets intact, sought to convert them into an efficient, reliable vehicle for trade. Its core measures were those that aimed to reduce the costs in trade, and much of the reduction was directed specifically toward encouraging the export of native Spanish products. Above all, as was argued at length in chapter 2, it was simply the colonial *projection* of a broad range of reforms that sought nothing less than a national economic and military renaissance. In my view, the failure to set the *Proyecto* of 1720 more firmly in the context of this broader and mainly domestic program for Spanish national renewal has been a prime cause of its neglect and underestimation in published work to date.

The program's overall aim was to achieve yearly sailings of fleets, with cargoes of the order of 7,000–8,000 tons of merchandise each.[22] Frequent sailings and tonnage quotas were not the same as profits, of course; but by the supreme effort described in this section, for a few years this aim seemed close to realization. The fleets were restored to a rhythm they had not enjoyed for a century: the *galeones* for Peru sailed in 1721 and 1723, and the *flota* in 1720, 1723, and 1725, virtually a fleet every year. The cargoes transported in these fleets seemed smaller than intended, at just over 4,000 tons on average for fleets to New Spain between 1720 and 1735. But when escort vessels are included, Morineau argues that the average rose to 6,000–8,000 tons, very considerably superior to the few fleets

of the period 1700–20. To remain focused on the New Spanish case, the value of returning fleets plus mercury transports (*azogues*) ranged from 5.5 million pesos to 6.6 million pesos per year, excluding Mexican silver lost to contraband. And the value of *all* silver received from the American colonies during 1720 to 1735 suggests "a grand (indeed, extraordinary) total" of more than 187 million *pesos fuertes* reaching Spain and Portugal (of which 42% came from South America, and 58% from Mexico and Cuba).[23] Thus, even while the majority of the trade fairs held at both Portobelo and Veracruz seemed failures, the total volume of trade grew. The period 1709–22 has been characterized as one of "modest recovery," followed in 1722–47 by "more stable growth."[24] Here, perhaps, lay foundations for the stronger growth of the 1740s and 1750s.

Let us turn, then, to more detailed consideration of the commercial program itself: first the measures elaborated in the *Proyecto* of 1720 and associated legislation and that focused on the fleet system, and then more briefly the policies aimed at the elimination of foreign competition from American markets. In the *Proyecto*, the reorganization and reform of the Habsburg fiscal structure of which *palmeo* formed a central part went hand in hand with a reduction in the fiscal burden itself on trade. The *Proyecto* announced explicitly that its various measures were complemented by that of "moderating the contributions . . . which may not again be raised, nor increased in any way";[25] and modern research tends to substantiate this claim. Geoffrey Walker, who compared the rates established in 1720 with those fixed by the previous *Proyectos* of 1711 and 1717, so as to attempt what remains the only modern assessment of the fiscal impact of these reforms, concludes that "the burden of taxation . . . was considerably lessened" by their overall effect. Furthermore, the reduction in taxation was designed specifically to favor the export of native Spanish products, with tax and freight charges on traditional Spanish exports reduced by as much as 85 percent with regard to the levels of 1711.[26] The Crown claimed that duty on silk products (manufactured in eastern Andalusia, and increasingly in Valencia) now reached barely 1 percent of value, while rates on agricultural products (*frutos*) had been "very considerably reduced"—a claim confirmed by the leading contemporary Spanish economic theorist, Gerónimo de Ustáriz.[27] By contrast, tax on traditional re-exports, such as Flanders thread or pepper, was considerably increased.

Throughout the empire, no region's trade benefited more from this policy of rationalization and reduction of taxation than did that of Peru. Ordinances published simultaneously with the *Proyecto* in

1720 rationalized the tax on goods imported to Tierra-Firme (the northern coast of South America, especially of modern Colombia and Venezuela, and also including Panama), and reduced still further the fiscal burden on the *galeones*, in a quite conscious attempt to favor the most decadent branch of the Atlantic trade. It was decreed that, unlike goods entering other American ports, those imported to Cartagena de Indias and Portobelo—and that supplied the viceroyalty of Peru via these routes—were to be free of *all* import duties, including even the *almojarifazgo*.[28] Such goods were liable only for *alcabala*, and even this was to be assessed according to the value of the goods in Spain, not America, a stipulation that further reduced the burden of the tax.[29] It is worth noting, nevertheless, that if the Crown was willing to reduce taxation in order to promote Spanish exports, it still claimed that it benefited from the overall effect of these reforms. It was estimated that the New Spain fleet of 1717, governed by the *Proyecto* of that year, yielded the Treasury an income four times greater than would have been the case under the former tax regime.[30]

These measures were explicitly intended to stimulate exports to America, and in 1720, the Crown instructed its Intendants in Spain to further encourage such exports, by impressing on producers the scale of the tax reductions being made.[31] The export of agricultural products, as the only sector of American trade that Spain still dominated, received special protection. The *Proyecto* of 1720 formalized a tradition that one-third of the cargo of the fleets must be reserved for agricultural produce,[32] and in 1725 more than half the articles of further regulations ostensibly reviewing the whole of the fleets trade were dedicated to guaranteeing that shipowners actually made this space available, without charging excessive freight. Distribution of the quota among Andalusian producers was also strictly regulated, to avoid disputes and fraud.[33] In my view, trade policy during these years seemed capable of displaying an admirable pragmatism: already in 1717, the Crown abandoned a serious legal case it had pursued since 1705 against leading Cadiz merchants, rehabilitating them for participation in trade.[34] This pragmatism reached its zenith with a decree dated February 12, 1722, which, with the aim of boosting trade while the *Proyecto* regime was at its peak, actually sanctioned the export of foreign goods by Spanish nationals; a counterproductive measure, however, which was soon repealed.[35]

The reduction in the weight and complexity of taxation was complemented by a parallel attempt to ensure moderation and consistency in other costs associated with Atlantic trade. The *Proyecto* of

1720 fixed the rates to be charged for freight (*fletes*) for the various products and quantities of goods to be shipped. A tariff published in 1719 fixed the rates to be charged for transport fees (mainly loading and unloading) in the bay and city of Cadiz,[36] and a similar document of June 1720 set the fees to be charged to shipowners, merchants, and passengers for requisite official services: inspections of ships, processing of permits, pilotage in ports, and the like.[37] In 1723, further regulations prescribed the wages to be paid to sailors working the various American routes, along with rates for careening work, and even the rations that crews might expect, with detailed weekly menus; the aim being to put an end to interminable disputes between officers and crews at sea.[38] All of this eminently Bourbon legislation was printed in great numbers and distributed widely among those engaged in the *Carrera de Indias*.

A further broad aim of these reforms, similarly complementary to the reduction and rationalization of taxes and costs, was the elimination of bureaucratic impediments to trade. This was a prime motive behind the transfer to Cadiz of the *Casa de la Contratación* and the *Consulado*, by decree of May 12, 1717. To some extent, this measure simply ratified officially a process long apparent in practice, since Cadiz had functioned as the chief port for the Indies since ca. 1680, and by the early 1720s its trade was already perhaps as much as nine times greater than that of Seville. But the transfer also meant that all the bureaucratic prerequisites to trade could again be satisfied at point of import or export, so relieving merchants of tiresome and expensive toing and froing between Cadiz and Seville. Reform of the *Casa* itself in 1717, as we have seen, had placed entire responsibility for the dispatch and receipt of shipping in the hands of José Patiño and his successors as Intendants-General of Marine and presidents of the *Casa*,[39] and these officials were instructed to afford merchants all possible assistance and protection.[40] Patiño oversaw the removal of the *Casa* and *Consulado*, and was instrumental in ensuring that the reform was not reversed in the face of a strong rearguard campaign organized from Seville.[41] He was also instructed to supervise preparation of new statutes for both bodies, to replace original documents that had remained largely unaltered since the sixteenth century.[42]

The *Proyecto* of 1720 emphasized the need to achieve a regular rhythm of departures of fleets quite clearly, by imposing a rigid timetable. It set fixed dates of departure for the *flota* and the *galeones*, and prescribed maximum periods of stay in the ports en route. The aim of these fixed dates was to ensure that in no case did the round trip of

either fleet take longer than one year, with the ultimate intention of avoiding the huge costs that long delays caused to both Crown and merchants, and so of helping to keep down the price of Spanish merchandise sold at Portobelo or Veracruz.[43] To seek to ensure that the timetable was respected, the Crown committed itself to maintaining sufficient warships in Cadiz to guarantee the departure of both fleets and single "register ships," among other measures, while great emphasis was laid on the responsibility of the fleet commander and ships' captains to guarantee punctual departures. To guard against any accident that might delay the progress of voyages, a special ship was to accompany each fleet, with "spare" crew to replace those lost to sickness, and all vessels were obliged to carry stocks of naval supplies (especially those difficult to obtain in the Indies).[44]

Like so much of the legislation associated with the *Proyecto*, the latter measures were significant less for their probable practical consequences than for the aspirations they expressed. But related reforms had greater substance. The creation in 1718 of a service of regular dispatch boats or *avisos* was intended not least to facilitate coordination of the trade fairs, by providing the authorities with regular commercial intelligence. A decree of the latter year, consummated in a contract signed with the *Consulado* of Cadiz in 1720, formalized a system that had developed over the course of the previous hundred years or so, with four pairs of *avisos* operated by the *Consulado* sailing for Tierra-Firme and New Spain each year; the chief innovation of 1718–20 was the imposition of fixed trimestral sailing dates.[45] One of the more successful of the early reforms, the *aviso* service functioned almost without interruption until the War of 1739–48.[46]

A final measure to be considered here, and one that further underscores the vigor of the commercial program at this time, was the prohibition in 1718 (reiterated in 1719, 1720, 1722, and 1724) on the importation to America of Asian silk textiles in the Manila galleon. It will be recalled from chapter 1 that these textiles, sold at firsthand at the Acapulco fair, were widely distributed throughout both New Spain and (via contraband exports down the Pacific coast) Peru. Mariano Bonialian has recently argued most persuasively that they played a crucial role in the crisis of the *galeones* and the Portobelo fairs, by offering a massive alternative source of supplies of cloth, and by diverting a huge volume of coin toward the Pacific rather than the Atlantic. He argues that a boom in Pacific trade was apparent from the late seventeenth century, to reach a peak after 1700, and that the flow of American silver toward the

Philippines may have reached no less than 4 million pesos in typical years up to the 1730s.[47] The prohibition in 1718 of silks, the most important single Asian import, was thus "a drastic measure that struck the trade of Manila and Mexico hard." Gerónimo de Ustáriz, no less, regarded it as a "highly appropriate royal policy, that would henceforth protect Peninsular industry and give a new stimulus to the development of the *flotas* and *galeones* trades."[48] The measure caused loud protests in New Spain, and disturbances in the Philippines; evidence perhaps of its impact during the short period it remained in force.

While most commercial reform was directed at the rich Peruvian heartland, especially at the Atlantic trade channeled via Lima and its port of Callao, this period also witnessed modest early efforts to bolster the infrastructure of commerce in Peru beyond its "Lower" core. In Chile between 1724 and 1735, for example, merchants were given the right first to a *diputación de bodegas*, and then a *diputación de comercio* in Santiago—in effect a local branch of the *Consulado* of Lima.[49] Potosí in Upper Peru also gained its own *diputación de comercio* in 1735, in the same decree and on the same terms as the one established in Santiago.[50] Elsewhere, in 1723, Montevideo was founded on the remote eastern shore of the Uruguay river, for reasons that were commercial (in preventing contraband from the Portuguese settlement at Colônia do Sacramento) as well as strategic (in containing the Luso-Brazilian presence in this region more generally). And in Spanish South America beyond the viceroyalty of Peru, in 1720, a further set of regulations cut import taxes on Venezuelan cacao at Cadiz by more than half, as the centerpiece of a series of measures designed to enhance Spanish control over the cacao trade. Two years later, the Crown granted exclusive right of trade to Maracaibo and Caracas provinces to two merchant concerns, in *asientos* designed to stimulate trade and exclude foreigners; the latter of these expired in 1728 and was a clear forerunner, in function if not in form, of the celebrated Caracas Company established the same year.

The Caracas Company itself was of course but the first of the chartered trading companies established in later decades to promote commerce with neglected regions in the Spanish Caribbean; other major examples included the Havana Company of 1740 and the Barcelona Company of 1756. But above all it should be remarked, albeit in passing, that the necessary focus in these pages primarily on South America notwithstanding, no branch of trade attracted more attention during these years than did that of New Spain; an emphasis only to be expected when Mexico was now the richest of all the

colonies of Spain. As already noted, among José Patiño's first concerns on assuming his positions at Cadiz in 1717 was reform of commerce with Mexico, so that the *Proyecto* governing the *flota* of that year already contained in embryo all the reforms to Spanish Atlantic trade implemented from 1720 onward. A *cédula* of March 20, 1718, instituted a major reorganization of Mexican trade, whose elements included biannual *flotas* and the first formal trade fairs to be held in the northern viceroyalty, at the town of Jalapa, inland of Veracruz at an altitude of around 1,500 meters.[51] Mexican trade remained subject to constant review and readjustment throughout the 1720s and early 1730s; a topic lately the subject of a fine, groundbreaking study by the Mexican historian Iván Escamilla González, covering the period from 1700 to 1739. [52]

Both in Peru and throughout the American Empire, the policy expressed in the *Proyecto* and its associated legislation was complemented by a broad and sustained campaign against foreign contraband trade. Few aspects of this campaign can be interpreted in the terms of "reform," a factor that may have contributed to its relative neglect in discussions of this topic. But despite this neglect, it merits at least brief discussion, both as an important part of early Bourbon commercial policy in its own right, and because in my view, its imperatives contributed to shape Bourbon rule in Peru in significant ways. The significance of the anti-contraband campaign to the commercial project has already been suggested: if the legislation centered on the *Proyecto* and related decrees was designed to make the fleet system an efficient and attractive vehicle linking Spanish products to American markets and bullion, the antismuggling drive was intended to ensure that those products—or at least, any products shipped within the structure of the commercial monopoly and that paid the appropriate taxes—should enjoy uncontested markets upon arrival in the Indies. We saw in chapter 1 that in the period to ca. 1715, direct French contraband along the Pacific coast of Peru was the source of greatest concern. A stream of *cédulas* reiterated the prohibition of this trade, but real action against smuggling was largely limited to the exertion of diplomatic pressure on Paris, which yielded scant results.

The late 1710s marked the beginning of a new and much more active phase. The French Crown was now prevailed upon to issue a further interdiction on voyages to the South Sea, and in December 1716 a remarkable Franco-Spanish expedition was dispatched to enforce this ban, captained by the French officer de Martinet.[53] These initiatives dealt the interloping trade a heavy blow; French trading on

Peru's Pacific coast ceased almost completely in 1717–19, and never regained its former levels. Some years later, the extensive contraband that sabotaged the trade fair held at Portobelo in 1722 prompted José Patiño to create the first ever *guardacosta* ("coastguard" or anti-contraband) naval squadron, in 1724. Successor to the old *Armada de Barlovento* as a permanent Spanish naval presence in the Caribbean, despite its great expense the *guardacosta* was notoriously underfunded and woefully inadequately supplied, and its own regular participation in smuggling is a matter of record. Nevertheless, its impact cannot be entirely dismissed when, by the mid-1730s, it became a *casus belli* for what were then the two principal nations engaged in smuggling with the Spanish colonies.[54] The Dutch at Curação were threatening armed reprisals by 1737, while the British used supposed coastguard atrocities as justification to declare war in 1739.[55] The coastguard proper was complemented elsewhere by analogous flotillas operated by merchant groups with a monopoly on the trade of specific regions: on the coast of Venezuela by two *asentistas* after 1722, and by the Caracas Company from 1728; on the River Plate by the register shipowners Alzaybar and Urquijo somewhat later.[56] In 1728, too, the licensing of corsairs was authorized for the Americas for the first time, and corsairs at times proved of value against smuggling in both the Pacific and the Caribbean.[57] Meanwhile, we will see in chapter 4 that the need to eradicate a further great focus of illicit trade was arguably a factor in the greatest of all of Alberoni's reforms in America, the creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1718. Ironically, the failure of the viceroyalty to fulfill its role within the commercial program may also have contributed to its abolition after just a few years, in 1723.

The campaign against contraband reached its peak in the context of the wider commercial reforms implemented from 1720. For the early 1720s, the sheer volume of the extant correspondence and decrees concerned with smuggling is astonishing.[58] The decrees of this period seem to me to be distinguished from those issued since 1700 not least in the strikingly explicit blame apportioned to ministers of the Crown, up to and including viceroys, for the persistence of contraband:

> What has mainly caused and causes the continuance of these harmful abuses is the omission of the viceroys, governors, and ministers of those kingdoms, without whose tolerance the fraudsters (*defraudadores*) would not be able to sell their goods so frequently and with the freedom and openness they have done during the past few years.[59]

This declaration was complemented by extremely harsh declared penalties for infractors (including death without trial for officials firmly suspected of involvement in contraband!); and while these penalties were unlikely to be imposed in practice, the same harshness was manifest elsewhere in the legislation of this period. An outbreak of plague in Marseilles, for example, was used as pretext for an absolute ban on the admittance of French ships to American ports, even in cases of storm or imminent danger of shipwreck. Prohibitions on smuggling had been issued before, and to scant effect, but there is little doubt that the atmosphere surrounding contraband changed during the few years after 1720; especially in Peru, where these laws were enforced with some energy.

I have suggested that the imperatives of the anticontraband campaign may actually have contributed to shape Bourbon rule in Peru in significant ways. This was so above all because the vital importance to the effective restriction of illicit trade of the loyalty and trustworthiness of Crown officials in the major ports and towns, acknowledged in the decrees cited immediately above, together with the broader Bourbon drive to reform the colonial administration, at this time prompted a change in policy toward appointments in the colonies. A group of highly respected military officers, many of whom had made their careers fighting for Philip V in the War of Succession, acceded to the posts of greatest strategic importance, in Peru and elsewhere. These military officers included Jorge de Villalonga, the first viceroy of New Granada in 1718; Bruno de Zavala, governor of Buenos Aires from 1721; the Marqués de Casafuerte, viceroy of New Spain from 1722; Luis de Aponte, governor of Cartagena de Indias from 1723; and Antonio Manso Maldonado and the Marqués de Castelfuerte, president of the *Audiencia* of Santa Fé de Bogotá and viceroy of Peru respectively, from 1724.[60] These were the men chosen to restore order and impose royal authority in the colonies. Their appointment was a direct product of the attempt to restore the fleets and to eliminate contraband, but of course, their impact was much wider. Castelfuerte in Peru, Casafuerte in Mexico, and Zavala in Buenos Aires, made solid reputations as the finest governors of the first half of the century in their respective jurisdictions.[61] For a decade the high administration of the Indies lay in the hands of vigorous and capable officials of a recognizably new stamp. America experienced a change in the character of government, and a firsthand taste of what Bourbon rule might mean.

José de Armendáriz y Perurena, first Marqués de Castelfuerte, merits special mention here, as among the most influential and effective

of the early Bourbon viceroys. As noted in the "Introduction," Castelfuerte is distinguished as the first recognizably "Bourbon" viceroy to serve in Peru; the main published study of his administration, by Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, is subtitled *The First Bourbon Attempt to Reform Peru*.[62] This judgment rests upon the viceroy's route to office and on the coincidence between his own character and outlook and Bourbon objectives for the viceroyalty. Castelfuerte fought for Philip V with great distinction in many of the principal battles of the War of Succession, being both ennobled and receiving the habit of the Order of Santiago for his role in the decisive action at Villaviciosa in 1710; at the time of his nomination as viceroy he was serving as captain-general in Guipúzcoa.[63] His military career brought him to identify closely with the new dynasty, and in fact, his trajectory ensures that he stands as an archetype of Bourbon officialdom, ennobled by the new king, a military governor and the first of the military viceroys who dominated the eighteenth century.[64] He made a striking character: imperious, decisive, obstinate, personally courageous, and with a profound sense of duty toward the Crown (which does not, however, appear to have prevented his enriching himself greatly during his term, according to a further innovative study by Moreno Cebrián).[65] He pursued his policies with a vigor occasionally verging on brutality, that at times disgusted creole opinion in Peru, but he nevertheless won widespread respect for the efficacy and general impartiality of his government.[66] On his return to Spain he was decorated with the Order of the Golden Fleece (*Toisón de Oro*), an honor quite exceptional outside of royalty.

Castelfuerte also demonstrates effectively one of the key themes of the present work: the ability of viceroys to make a major contribution of their own to the realization of Bourbon priorities in Peru, and indeed themselves to shape early Bourbon policy in particular ways (albeit less so in commercial policy than in other areas). Castelfuerte knew José Patiño personally from their joint service on the Sardinia and Sicily campaigns of 1717–18, and a few articles of private correspondence survive that suggest a degree of confidence between the two men.[67] Whether Patiño had any direct hand in his appointment to Peru cannot be ascertained, though this does not seem improbable. In any case, Castelfuerte's close identification with Bourbon aims, and indeed with an incipient "Bourbon ethos" of rule, led him to make a contribution that went far beyond his implementation of, and support for, commercial policy and reform in the colony. Thus, in my view, his viceregency marked a watershed in relations between Crown and Church in Peru, centered on a series of major conflicts

with the higher clergy that developed in the mid-to-late 1720s. He also introduced a striking reform, in a clear break with deep-seated Habsburg precedent, that made far more Indians liable for the mita forced labor draft and for payment of tribute at higher rates; and he did so without even so much as informing Patiño or the king, at least via formal channels.

These and other aspects of Castelfuerte's administration are discussed at length in the chapter that follows. For our present purposes, his instructions as viceroy left him in no doubt as to the primary motive for his appointment: he was to make the elimination of contraband and the sanitization of the royal administration his chief concerns.[68] For 18 months after his arrival in Lima, these tasks occupied a large part of his considerable energies. European gazettes came to comment on the vigor of his methods, which contributed finally to extinguish the direct interloping trade in the Pacific, where the last French and Dutch merchantmen were expelled or captured in 1724–25.[69] In the latter year alone, more than 1,400 bundles of "Chinese cloth" were seized on the South American coasts, equivalent to around one-third of the entire cargo of a Manila galleon during these years, and worth at least 1 million pesos.[70] Beyond the eradication of contraband, it fell to Castelfuerte to organize from Lima what in the event would be the last two trade fairs to be held at Portobelo, in 1726 and 1731. Caught between sympathy for some part of the Lima merchants' grievances, and an acute awareness of his responsibility for the organization of successful fairs, his trade policy degenerated into a sustained and bitter battle of wills with the recalcitrant merchants. The campaign against contraband was a critical part of his strategy, since it was intended not least to deprive the Peruvians of alternative sources of supplies to the legal trade. In a parallel initiative, he sought to close all the lesser trade routes into the viceroyalty, including all exports of bullion to Panama between the trade fairs. He then employed a wide range of pressure tactics against the merchants in which he himself recognized that his "fervour went so far as perhaps to seem violent";[71] these included threatening immediate collection of the *Consulado's* tax debt to the Crown and making the Guild financially responsible for the costs arising from the delay of the galleons in Cartagena de Indias.

The Decline of Commercial Policy, ca. 1726–35

The broadly positive assessment set out thus far notwithstanding, it should be emphasized that commercial policy to the mid-1720s was

neither entirely coherent nor perfectly implemented. Rather, problems and contradictions were apparent from the very beginning, affecting both the fiscal dimension and other areas. Particularly ominous was the fact that the core of the reform program—the reduction of taxation on exports—was compromised from an early stage. The *Proyecto* of 1720 itself imposed punitive taxation on the use of foreign-built ships, pursuing the "nationalization" of the Atlantic merchant marine, which in practice affected the majority of merchants trading to America for some time. The *aviso* service established the same year was funded by a 1 percent tax on all proceeds of the Indies trade, and Andalusian merchants contributed a heavy further 6 percent of the value of their imports to maintain the *guardacosta* squadron founded in 1722.[72] Despite the abolition of internal customs barriers, for several years stiff tariffs continued to be levied in the province of Jerez on goods going to Cadiz, so further penalizing exports. Elsewhere, key parts of the reforms were poorly implemented. Failure to reform voting procedures within the *Consulado*, for example, meant that its governing body continued to be dominated by the more conservative Seville interest, against repeated protests from Cadiz, until 1744.[73] Similarly, despite several attempts, the outdated statutes governing both the *Consulado* and the *Casa de la Contratación* were never replaced.

Beyond the strictly fiscal aspect, moreover, several of the reforms of the Alberoni years were ill-prepared and were implemented too rapidly. The fall of Alberoni himself in 1719 tended to discredit the program he had sponsored, and—perhaps crucially—until Patiño's appointment as minister of the Indies in 1726, colonial government again lacked a firm guiding hand. Some important reforms were reversed altogether: the viceroyalty of New Granada was abolished in 1723, while in New Spain, the trade fairs at Jalapa had been suspended the year before. As has been noted, the Alberoni years left a legacy in the form of the British South Sea Company's "Annual Ship" that plagued the official trade for years; and contracts for register ships for Buenos Aires conceded at this time had a similar harmful effect. Important contracts signed with Salvador García Poré in 1718 and with Francisco de Alzaybar in 1724 and 1726 permitted the sale of goods as far inland as Chile and the *Audiencia* district of Charcas, and the export from the region of millions of pesos. These contracts stood directly contrary to the broader trend of policy during these years, and constitute a notable example of short-term financial expediency overriding considerations important to colonial policy as a whole.[74]

Nevertheless, the broad intent of trade reform was largely maintained until around 1726. After this date, I would argue that the picture becomes rather more complex. Ostensibly, Patiño remained committed to a regular dispatch of the fleets, and in the course of the decade prior to his death in 1736, he continued to implement measures designed to achieve this. His attempts to promote the *galeones* included removal of the president of Panama in 1728, accused of fraud and extortion on the Isthmus, while in 1730 he ordered works for a new port at San Cristóbal, to replace Portobelo itself: clear evidence even at this late date of a persistent concern to improve the trans-Isthmian route. In 1729, he oversaw preparation of new statues for the Cadiz *Consulado* that were mostly concerned with avoiding internal disputes within the guild and fostering an enhanced sense of corporate identity and responsibility—notably, in negotiations with American merchants at the trade fairs.[75] Most significantly, in 1735, Patiño secured an important measure of real reform: the halving of tax on Peruvian silver mining, from *quinto* to *diezmo*, with the explicit intention of stimulating mining production and so the silver trade. Ironically, this measure—which is discussed at greater length in the following chapter—was announced in the very decree that suspended the *galeones* altogether, in principle temporarily.[76]

These aspects notwithstanding, however, from ca. 1726, the integrity of the initiative launched in 1720 was increasingly compromised, and the intent of policy undermined. Indeed, on balance, Crown policy in this later period did as much to undermine the fleet system as to shore it up. In part, this was surely the result of the failure of most of the trade fairs held since 1720, which seems to have fuelled an increasingly cynical attitude toward the fleets in Patiño. There is evidence, in fact, that he was waiting only for the expiry of the British *Asiento* in 1744 before implementing much wider reform, possibly encompassing abolition of the fleets in their present form.[77] From ca. 1726, then, it becomes easier to perceive the "capitulation" detected by Allan Kuethe in the commercial policy developed since the Alberoni years as a whole. A further chief factor in this shift probably derived from the evolution of Patiño's own glittering ministerial career. In 1726, he exchanged his positions at Cadiz for the Ministries of Indies and of Finance and the superintendency-general of Revenues; he thus became responsible no longer solely for the management of colonial trade, but for the whole of the national finances. The late 1720s was a period of immense extraordinary expenditure, much of it associated with the establishment of prince Charles of Bourbon-Farnese in an Italian fiefdom.[78] Patiño, of course, was no

less dependent on the support of Elisabeth Farnese than had been Alberoni; fund her Italian projects he must, and during these years, he sought revenue from whatever source was possible, and notably by scouring the Indies. In this context, the Indies trade was far too ready a source of income to escape attention, and one that Patiño understood better than most.

The result was recourse, from the late 1720s, to an irresponsible fiscal policy that ran directly contrary to the guarantees of a more responsible attitude contained in the *Proyecto* of 1720. In 1727, Patiño urged Philip V to decree a one-time expropriation of 25 percent to 30 percent of the profits of the fleets of that year. A heavy *indulto*, or forced payment, in principle against mercantile wrongdoing, was levied in 1728, following in 1729 by another of 16 percent against funds returning in the *galeones* (though this was later moderated to 10%); further such irregular levies followed.[79] Regular taxation, too, once more increased; in 1729, port administration taxes at Cadiz were subject to a general increase of 4 percent. The new statutes of the *Consulado* of the same year imposed a 1 percent tax on all bullion and agricultural products carried in the fleets, to fund a corporate insurance scheme against accident or fraud. A decree of 1732, in effect a contract between the Crown and the *Consulado* for continued financing of the "coastguard" squadrons, imposed a tax of 4 percent on all bullion and cochineal imported from the Indies. In 1737, a tax was imposed to support the newly created Admiralty.[80] The impact of these measures, especially the *indultos*, was clear: the cost of trading through the legal system again rose sharply, and the incentives to fraud became ever more enticing.

Both arbitrary and regular levies were offensive to Peninsular and American merchants alike; and to ensure their ongoing collaboration with a trade that now presented much reduced prospect of profit, Patiño was obliged to make a series of concessions to the elite of the Cadiz *Consulado*. The decree of 1732, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, shows this relationship quite clearly: in return for continued funding of the *guardacosta*, the *Consulado* won benefits including the right to exploit a limited trade in *aviso* ships, enhanced scrutiny of the actions of the South Sea Company in the Caribbean, and measures to improve anticontraband efforts and ensure that confiscated goods did not compete with merchandise sold at the trade fairs.[81]

But the most striking product of the need to compensate for an increased tax burden was a series of concessions that reinforced the position of the great merchant houses of the *Consulado* with respect

to less privileged mercantile groups. Thus, the legal minimum value of cargoes was increased to 300,000 pesos, a move that favored the Cadiz elite. The definitive restoration of the Jalapa fairs in 1728 was a victory for the Andalusians and a set-back for their Mexican counterparts, whose position was undermined by the geographical neutrality and restricted duration of the fairs.[82] The new statutes of the Cadiz *Consulado* of 1729 attacked the important *jenízaro* community—the descendents of foreigners resident in Cadiz and legally entitled to trade with the Indies—by enabling the *Consulado* to deny them membership.[83] A confidential decree of 1730 actually disqualified *jenízaros* formally, and certainly no member of this group obtained license to trade from this time until after the statutes were revoked in 1742.[84] The statutes of 1729 also increased the autonomy of the Consulado with regard to the *Casa de la Contratación* and the *Consejo de Indias*. Most significantly, they made the first ever legal distinction between Peninsular and American merchants, by declaring that no goods might be consigned to the latter on the outward or return voyages of the fleets, but must go under consignees appointed by the *Consulado* of Cadiz. This distinction was consummated in the fourth article of the decree of January 1735 suspending the *galeones*, which altogether prohibited Americans from sending funds in the fleets to purchase goods on their own behalf. This clause provoked such a storm of protest in America that it was partly repealed in 1738 (and was reversed in 1749).[85] But these measures can only have made a profound impression on American merchants, who witnessed the emergence for the first time of a policy clearly and explicitly discriminatory toward them.

My argument in these pages, that from ca. 1726 a shift was apparent in Patiño's trade policy, which ran contrary to the core tenets of the *Proyecto* of 1720 and ultimately undermined it, is based on close scrutiny of the documents of this period, and already formed a part of the doctoral thesis from which this book ultimately derives. But in a striking passage in his recent work on trade and politics in the "Spanish-American Pacific," Mariano Bonialian similarly perceives a shift in the attitude of Patiño, and even dates it to the same year. Thus, by this point, "in Spanish circles of power the failure of the policy drawn up in 1720 was already accepted…It was Patiño himself who first addressed the problem. Around 1726 the minister of Indies undertook a new shift in policy for trans-Pacific trade."[86] Moreover, intriguingly, and informed by his Pacific perspective, Bonialian places a far more positive construction upon this shift. It will be recalled that among the measures intended to support the

Proyecto, by restricting access to both New Spain and Peru of goods that competed with the *galeones* trade, was the prohibition in 1718 (reiterated repeatedly in following years) on imports of Asian silks via the Manila Galleon. This prohibition was reversed from the mid-1720s, however, and definitively from 1734, when the volume of imports of silks to Acapulco was also increased. Bonialian sees this policy as a conscious attempt to rebalance trade flows in the empire, in the light of the failure of the *Proyecto* of 1720 to restore the fleets trade. Thus, in his view, "the royal decision to permit, after 1724, the circulation throughout the viceroyalty of Asian silk textiles was a pragmatic policy, a counter-weight, that sought an imperial balance among trade circuits; an inevitable measure in the light of the lack of a response from the regime of *flotas* and *galeones*."[87] Patiño, then, in this light, proved less cynical than pragmatic, less engaged in a capitulation of trade policy than seeking to further it by other means; while recognizing, as he must, the failure of the overarching policy he had championed for the best part of a decade.

Following repeated commercial failures at the trade fairs—some disastrous, in particular that at Portobelo in 1731—on January 21, 1735, a decree was issued that, in effect, closed the cycle of policy that had begun in the late 1710s and was embodied in the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* of 1720. This decree restricted the volume of goods to be dispatched in future *flotas*; more to the point, it suspended the *galeones* to Peru altogether, until such time as the Crown might deem the dispatch of another fleet to Portobelo feasible.[88] As we shall see in chapter 5, this suspension, seemingly genuinely intended as merely temporary at the time of its introduction, was rendered permanent by the circumstances of the following years, and especially by the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1739 and its later merger into the War of the Austrian Succession, lasting until 1748. During this long period of suspension, affecting both *galeones* and *flota* and enforced by British naval action in the Atlantic, single register ships amply proved their capacity to serve as a vehicle for trade between Spain and the American colonies. Indeed, as Xabier Lamikiz has recently demonstrated, from 1740 the register ship system began to bring about profound changes in the character of Spanish Atlantic trade, its participants, and even perhaps to some extent its (historically weak) ability to resist penetration by foreign interlopers.[89] Such was the power of the interests vested in the traditional structure of Spanish colonial commerce that the *flotas* servicing Mexico were restored in the mid-1750s, to endure for a further three decades. The *galeones* for Peru experienced no such revival, however. The calamitous trade fair of

1731 thus proved to be the last full fair ever to be held at Portobelo; and the forest that rapidly reclaimed that port testified not only to the destructive power of the British Admiral Vernon's guns in 1739, but to the failure of the master strategy for commercial reform and renewal devised by Julio Alberoni in the 1710s, and implemented by Spanish ministers since 1720.

Conclusion

Scholarly consensus suggests that early Bourbon commercial reform from the late 1710s until 1735, centered in the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* of 1720, was inherently conservative and—in large part for this reason—doomed to failure. The *Proyecto* did not attempt any significant reform of the (Habsburg) structure of Spanish Atlantic trade, and was thus incapable of bringing about any revival of that trade, in an early eighteenth-century international context marked by fierce manufacturing and commercial rivalry. In Allan Kuethe's view, and that of Geoffrey Walker before him, this conservatism was not necessarily or even probably a native Spanish response, but was rather imposed upon the country by treaty obligations to commercial rivals reaffirmed at Utrecht and in subsequent years. As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, both the characterization of Spanish trade policy at this time as strongly conservative, and the suggestion that the program was all but doomed to failure from the outset, are strictly accurate. Certainly, its commercial impact was modest: some increase in the rhythm of the trade fleets for a few years, some increase in the size and value of cargoes; little profit and much loss during the American trade fairs of the 1720s and early 1730s, including the last formal fairs ever held at Portobelo.

But as I have also sought to show across this and the preceding chapter, to rest only with these points is to fail to acknowledge both the seriousness and coherence of the program, and its real impact in the colonies, notwithstanding the limited commercial outcome. The coherence of the commercial initiative is understood only when it is set in the context of the wide-ranging program of reforms developed and partly implemented under Julio Alberoni from the late 1710s. This program embraced wholesale administrative centralization in Spain, major naval reform, and more modest state-sponsored industrialization, in addition to the restoration of trade with America. The reforms undertaken in these areas were inherently complementary, and they shared the central goals of strengthening the Spanish state, mobilizing its resources more efficiently, and projecting its strength

externally, above all in pursuit of the military conquests sought in Italy by Elisabeth Farnese. The commercial program, then, was not the rather lame, isolated policy it is usually portrayed as, but simply one element within a markedly more ambitious overall strategy of Spanish national renewal. And although unquestionably conservative, it is worth emphasizing once more that this conservatism was scarcely forced upon Spanish ministers by "external" circumstances, of wars and foreign treaty rights. Rather, it reflected an autonomous Spanish commitment to the *Carrera de Indias* in its traditional form.

This deeper contextualization of commercial reform, and emphasis on its Spanish origins in addition to the external influences operating upon it, is important, because it helps both underline and explain the real vigor with which the program was pursued, at least for a number of years. Lastly, since commercial affairs were part of a much wider program of reform developed during this period, and since the commercial imperative informed directly other measures now drawn up for the colonies, its success or impact should be judged on more than commercial criteria alone. I have pointed to one signally important area in which this point is evident: the talented and devoted group of military officers appointed to the highest colonial bureaucracy in the late 1710s and early 1720s, who changed the character of colonial government at firsthand. This is why studies of the viceregency of the Marqués de Castelfuerte tend to identify it as marking the real advent of Bourbon rule in Peru, after the chronic disorder of the quarter-century to 1724. And it is also why we now turn to other areas of reform introduced during this first cycle, whether in colonial administration, fiscal affairs, the mining sector, or relations with the Church. For in many of these areas, too, I will argue, can be seen both the drive and the specific priorities that lay behind the *Proyecto* of 1720 and its associated legislation.

Chapter 4

The First Cycle of Reform, 1710s to 1736: Government, Treasury, Mining, and the Church

Introduction

The cycle of early Bourbon reform for the colonies that began in the late 1710s and ended in the mid-1730s embraced far more than commercial affairs alone. Beyond Atlantic trade, it also encompassed a further range of measures, affecting colonial administration (including the territorial organization of the colonies), fiscal affairs (from the administration of the treasury to the coinage), the mining sector (both for mercury and silver), and relations with the Peruvian Church. This chapter, then, considers these other areas, that complemented the commercial program discussed in the preceding chapter. Indeed, they more than complemented it; for as we shall see, commercial concerns arguably lay behind several of the other reforms now undertaken, in fields as diverse as territorial organization or the taxation of silver mining in Peru.

Colonial Administration

Among the most dramatic reforms in colonial affairs of the Alberoni years and the period that followed were those that affected the organization and administration of the Indies. Foremost among these was the establishment of a new viceroyalty, that of New Granada, carved out of the northernmost sector of the viceroyalty of Peru. The creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada was first decreed in 1717, with its capital in Santa Fé de Bogotá, and incorporating the two *Audiencia* districts of Santa Fé and Quito, as well as the

province of Caracas (administered since early colonial times from Santo Domingo).[1] The first American viceroyalty to be created since the mid-sixteenth century, this was among the greatest of all early Bourbon innovations in the colonies. Its organization was entrusted to an official commissioned for the purpose, Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero, who arrived in Cartagena de Indias in September 1717 and remained active in the region until late 1719. De la Pedrosa proved both energetic and capable, raising funds and reorganizing finances, reviewing the defenses of the coast, creating a new viceregal guard, and generally laying the foundations for the new administrative entity.[2] Among the orders he implemented was the abolition of both the *Audiencia* of Quito and that of Panama—which, nevertheless, remained a dependency of Peru rather than of the new viceroyalty. De la Pedrosa's task accomplished, the first viceroy, Jorge de Villalonga, Conde de las Cuevas, took up his post in Bogotá in July 1718.

The motives for the creation of the viceroyalty were complex and have been subject to a range of sometimes conflicting interpretations.[3] One basic factor was almost certainly the sheer paucity of the royal presence in the region by the late seventeenth century.[4] The characteristics of the territory: distance from Lima, an extremely difficult geography, a sparse and scattered population, and a broken coastline within easy reach of British and Dutch colonies in the Caribbean, reduced royal authority there to the merely nominal. The Peruvian viceroys of the early eighteenth century barely took an interest in New Granada, mention of which is almost entirely absent from their papers and governmental reports, while even the president and *Audiencia* at Bogotá exercised little effective control over the provinces under their jurisdiction.

The result of this laxity of royal control was serious disorder throughout the colony's affairs. The extent of the chaos prevalent in the treasury, for example, may be gauged by the fact that this, the greatest center for gold production in the Spanish Empire, produced virtually no income from mining taxes. In trade, it was well known that New Granadan gold sustained a vigorous contraband commerce that imported everything from luxury manufactures to flour for the coastal garrisons.[5] Perhaps of greatest concern was the neglect of the coastal defenses, dramatically underscored when in 1697 Cartagena de Indias, the mightiest Spanish bastion in the region, was captured and sacked by the French.[6] And this chronic disarray then actually worsened during the War of Succession and its aftermath. The breakdown of the *Carrera de Indias*—it will be recalled that just a

single fair was held at Portobelo between 1695 and 1722—left New Granadan markets almost entirely supplied by foreign contraband, so that "the growing separation between the metropolitan and colonial economies became a clear divorce."[7] In 1715, the political disorder that plagued the Audiencia devolved into farce when three oídores united to depose and imprison the president, Francisco de Meneses, in a colonial coup d'état.[8]

New Granada was thus ripe for radical administrative reform; and indeed, some such reform would probably have been undertaken even in the absence of a change of dynasty in the metropolis. In 1695, for example, the *Consejo de Indias* had already commissioned a general inspection (*visita general*) of the region. The logic that drove the creation of the viceroyalty was then only reinforced by the development of Bourbon policy in the first years of the new century. The thrust of commercial policy since at least 1705 reinforced the need for a strong royal presence in the region, above all so as to eliminate contraband from what was a key link in the commercial chain that led to the rich markets of Peru. In 1717 there began a process of review of standards in the American *Audiencias* (discussed hereafter) that led to a purge of unsatisfactory or superfluous judges, coinciding closely with a vigorous reaction to the New Granadan political crisis of 1715.

If the new viceroyalty thus responded to a wide range of motives, nevertheless, in my view the decisive factor in 1717—what prompted the reform in an immediate sense—was very probably the commercial question. The period 1715–17, it will be recalled from the preceding chapters, was one during which the entire system of Spanish Atlantic trade was under active review, while the latter year witnessed implementation of several major measures of commercial reform. These measures ranged from creation of the Intendancy-General of Marine, to reform of the *Casa de la Contratación*, the transfer to Cadiz of both *Casa* and the *Consulado*, and a *Proyecto de flota* that already incorporated the main points of the general *Proyecto* that would follow three years later. The creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada was decreed within days and weeks of these projects of commercial reform: and this was surely no coincidence. The enabling force behind this, as behind the other major reforms of this period, was Cardinal Alberoni, for here as elsewhere, Alberoni's absolute power circumvented governmental torpor, permitting reform to proceed at an unprecedented pace. Although the founding decree asserted that the creation of the viceroyalty had been discussed "on different occasions," there is not a scrap of

evidence of prior consideration of so major a project, which appears to have been entirely the product of the few months before its promulgation. And the actions in office of both Antonio de la Pedrosa and Jorge de Villalonga, the first viceroy, underline the central significance they accorded to commercial affairs. De la Pedrosa spent six months in Cartagena after his arrival in New Granada, given over to the suppression of contraband and the regulation of trade. He continued these policies once in Bogotá, and before returning to Spain spent a further period in Cartagena, again combating official fraud and contraband. Villalonga, for his part, made a trip to Cartagena by express order of the Crown soon after his arrival, also spending six months there (though he achieved little beyond some repair of the fortifications).

Recognition that the primary motive for the foundation of the new viceroyalty was commercial, and that Alberoni was the key catalyst, helps to situate the reform in its broader context. It deepens appreciation of the seriousness and scope of the early Bourbon program, particularly in commercial affairs, which, as already emphasized in chapter 3, can be seen to have embraced a range of major measures both in the colonies and in Spain. And it may also help to explain why the reform failed, leading to abolition of the viceroyalty after only a few years. This issue has excited debate on a similar scale to that which surrounds its establishment. The *cédula* abolishing the viceroyalty, dated November 5, 1723, noted that a president could govern the provinces as well as a viceroy; that the viceroyalty had neither increased royal revenues nor eliminated fraud; and that it brought about a great increase in the costs of government. María Teresa Garrido Conde, while noting that these reasons were either superficial or simply mistaken, nevertheless suggests that the question of costs was ultimately the decisive factor.[9] Another major motive is often considered to have been the actions of the first viceroy, since Villalonga was a foolish, conceited official, and one with little experience or aptitude for civil government. His insistence on lavish ceremonial and on maintaining a large retinue of assistants certainly boosted the costs of his office.[10]

But it was the precise nature of Villalonga's failure, in my view, that determined the abolition of the viceroyalty. He had been appointed fundamentally to cooperate with the commercial program expressed in the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* of 1720, especially by eliminating contraband, and it was in precisely these areas that he failed most egregiously. Smuggling once more sabotaged the only trade fair held at Portobelo during the brief existence of the viceroyalty, that of

1722, and Villalonga actually suspended some parts of the *Proyecto*, earning an angry rebuke and a clear warning against further such action from the Crown.[11] His interference with the *Proyecto* was among the chief points commended to the judge who undertook the statutory investigation that followed his departure from office, in fact; and 13 of the charges Villalonga eventually faced linked him directly or indirectly with smuggling. It is likely that an administration urgently concerned with the swift and smooth implementation of its commercial program in the early 1720s lost patience both with Villalonga and the administrative institution he represented. A further factor may have been the general repugnance toward initiatives associated with Alberoni that prevailed in Madrid during the years following his downfall in December 1719.[12]

After 1723, then, New Granada reverted to its old form of government, under an *Audiencia* and a president based in Bogotá. In line with general policy at this time, the new president, Antonio Manso Maldonado, was a military officer, a field marshal and former commander of the defenses at Barcelona. His administration (1724–29) and the years that followed are a relatively little-known period, albeit characterized by one authority as one of "stasis," when New Granada slipped back into its old ways and was again neglected by Madrid.[13] It would not be long, however, before major reform returned to the region, with the re-establishment of the viceroyalty, this time definitively, occurring in 1739—as discussed in chapter 5.

Elsewhere, perhaps the most significant reform in territorial administration of the period to the 1730s was the settlement and fortification of Montevideo in the early 1720s. We saw in chapter 3 that the River Plate provided a main locus of tension with the Portuguese in the Americas, partly because the Colônia do Sacramento (founded on the eastern shore of the Uruguay in 1680) served as a conduit for massive Portuguese and British smuggling with Buenos Aires. Sacramento presented a permanent challenge to Spanish control of the River Plate, and it was to preclude the establishment of further such enclaves that Montevideo was fortified from 1723. The new settlement was made a separate military governorship, subordinate to Buenos Aires. Over the century that followed, it would become an important settlement, ultimately the anchor of an enduring Hispanic presence in this region. In general terms, however, and with the major exception of the (frustrated) viceroyalty of New Granada, early Bourbon policy toward territorial administration proved remarkably cautious, a caution arguably best exemplified precisely in the case of Buenos Aires. Rapid commercial growth from the late seventeenth

century, redoubled or tripled after 1740 with the opening of the Cape Horn trade route, meant that already by the mid-1750s, Buenos Aires could be called one of the largest cities in Peru by its viceroy.[14] And yet commercial and demographic growth went unaccompanied by any formal acknowledgment or change in administrative status. Throughout the early Bourbon period, and indeed up until the arrival of the first viceroy of the Río de la Plata in 1776, Buenos Aires remained a humble *gobernación*—the status it had maintained since the early seventeenth century.

Nevertheless, administrative reform in the colonies affected more than territorial reorganization alone. A further key field embraced the colonial bureaucracy, and within this area, focused upon two questions of concern to Bourbon rulers from an early date: the access of creoles to high administrative office, and the sale of bureaucratic posts by the Crown. We saw in chapter 1 that by the late seventeenth century, the sale of bureaucratic posts affected the gamut of positions in the colonies, from the humblest scribe to the highest magistracies on the *Audiencias*. The result was, on the one hand, a clear corruption of standards of administration, and on the other, the conquest by local creole interests of the crucial bureaucratic bodies: the treasuries, the *Tribunal de Cuentas*, and even the *Audiencias* themselves. The demands of the War of Succession obliged Philip V to reverse early attempts to halt sales, and indeed sales of posts in the *Audiencias* reached their historic peak during the final years of the war.

That early Bourbon government was sensitive to the ills arising from sales in the colonial bureaucracy is clear enough. It is striking, for example, that wartime sales of the (particularly lucrative) *Audiencia* posts were halted in 1712, as soon as the immediate threat to Philip's throne receded, and *before* the signing of the Peace of Utrecht. Over the following decades, royal policy more than once decreed the end of sales to different posts or attempted to restrict their harmful effects. These attempts, however, were frustrated by urgent fiscal imperatives, so that in fact, sales of office went on largely uninterrupted. Posts on the *Audiencias* formed a partial exception, with a suspension of sales between 1712 and ca. 1730; but most other positions seem to have been available for purchase without interruption.

The sale of *Audiencia* posts has attracted most attention from scholars, understandably, since these were by far the most important positions affected by the process.[15] The halt to sales in 1712, though not officialized by any decree, held firm for almost 20 years, and largely so for a further decade thereafter. In 1718–20, moreover, the *Consejo de Indias* took steps to reverse the harm caused by the heavy

sales made since 1687, by commissioning inspections of the courts and having unworthy officials removed from office. It seems likely that this sudden zeal—also evident at this time in mining policy and possibly in the abolition of the viceroyalty of New Granada—was a further reaction to the demotion of the *Consejo* upon the creation of the secretariats in 1717. In the viceroyalty of New Spain, it led to a wholesale reform of the *Audiencia* of Mexico. In Peru, its impact was more slight, and just two *oídores* were removed from their posts in Lima.[16] These inspections, nevertheless, complemented and reinforced the tacit policy of an end to sales of *Audiencia* posts, evident throughout the 1710s and well into the 1720s. From about 1725, some weakening of this new policy was apparent in a renewal of sales of dispensations to judges to marry locally, while in 1730 and 1733–36 a number of posts were actually sold once more. But these sales remained limited, affecting perhaps four or five positions throughout the decade, and in 1737–39 the *Consejo* again displayed a determination to preserve and reinforce standards.[17] Only the outbreak of war in 1739 brought a return to indiscriminate sales, which after 1745 again reached the levels of the War of Succession.

Sales to posts in other sectors of the colonial bureaucracy were similarly suspended at intervals, at least officially. But where *Audiencia* judgeships were sold, it is hardly surprising that the lesser positions were also sold both more consistently and in greater numbers. Thus, at the royal treasuries, from 1700 to the 1740s, purchase remained the most common route to appointment. For example, nine posts were sold to the main treasury in Lima alone during this period (when only seven men took possession of the three chief positions!). A decree dated October 10, 1725, which lamented the effects of, and declared an end to, sales, thus remained a dead letter, and Kenneth Andrien implies that sales of treasury posts were finally halted only in 1750, alongside those to *Audiencias*.[18] Similarly, at the *Tribunal de Cuentas*, not only were posts as accountants routinely sold (with 18 positions purchased in 1700–45), but the new post of Regent of the Tribunal was created in 1712 specifically for the revenue that might arise from its sale. And the provision of provincial magistracies (*corregimientos*) displayed the greatest disorder of all during this earliest period, despite a decree (issued on the same day as that which abolished sales to the colonial treasuries) that emphatically declared a halt to sales of *corregimientos*.[19] It is quite possible that purchase became the *only* route to appointment to *corregimientos* under the early Bourbons, in fact, since the official titles listed by Alfredo Moreno Cebrián for the period 1687–1751

all record the price paid by the appointee for his post.[20] Finally, sales of the humblest offices—the ubiquitous *oficios vendibles y renunciables*, including notarial and other minor fee-earning posts, places on town councils, and so forth—were never so much as questioned.[21] As we will see, ultimately, the definitive halt to sales of posts in the colonial bureaucracy was among the major products of early Bourbon rule; but this reform would await a later period, subsequent to 1750.

Despite this, the question of sales of office, specifically to *Audiencia* posts, is closely related to a further major issue arising during these years, in which a real change *was* apparent during the early decades of Bourbon rule. This issue was that of the restriction of access for creoles to the high colonial bureaucracy. It should be emphasized here that little conscious, much less legal, discrimination against creoles in appointments to the high bureaucracy was evident in the Spanish colonies prior to the eighteenth century. If fewer creoles were in fact appointed to the higher bureaucratic posts prior to 1700, or indeed to the 1710s, it has been argued convincingly that this was a product of innate characteristics of the system for appointments, rather than of any intended prejudice.[22] Structural disadvantages for creoles, including limited direct access to the fountainhead of patronage in Madrid, or to education in one of the *colegios mayores*, were what tended to reduce their access to the high administration.[23]

However, in their major study of this topic, Mark Burkholder and D. S. Chandler identify a change of attitude in government to the prejudice of creoles, dating from the late 1710s. These scholars attribute this change precisely to high creole and "native son" penetration of the *Audiencias* during the first era of heavy sales between 1687 and 1712.[24] The new attitude was clearly consistent with a more "Bourbon" view of empire, inclined to see the American territories more simply as colonies, as opposed to the Habsburg conception of parallel kingdoms whose subjects enjoyed equal status within the Monarchy. In 1717, the secretary of the Indies recommended that only peninsular Spaniards be appointed to American *Audiencias*, marking a novel emphasis on the birthplace of candidates as a factor in the selection process. The consequences were felt immediately: the purges of the courts effected in 1718–20, already mentioned, demonstrated clear prejudice not only against purchasers of office, but also against native sons (categories into which both the judges removed from the *Audiencia* of Lima at this time fell). A decree of May 31, 1720, further reinforced the legal restraints on access of

creoles to office, as well as laws prohibiting the marriage of judges to local women.[25] New appointments in the early 1720s in practice continued to strongly favor peninsular or nonnative creole candidates, so that the Crown went some way toward reversing the effects of heavy sales made during the War of Succession. The impact was felt much less powerfully in the Peruvian *Audiencias* than in those of New Spain; nevertheless, what was manifestly a new trend could not but be noticed by creole aspirants to posts, among whom it provoked bitter disappointment.[26]

What was more, the perception among Peruvian creoles of a closing of avenues to advancement could be felt in other ways during this period. Thus, the structural disadvantages faced in winning access to salaried bureaucratic positions also prevailed with regard to *corregimientos*; and whether due to this factor, or to conscious discrimination on the part of the Crown, an overwhelming majority of the posts granted in Madrid (that is to say, most full five-year *corregimientos*) during this period went to peninsular candidates. Of 92 appointments reviewed by Moreno Cebrián for the period 1680–1778, no fewer than 82 were of peninsular Spaniards, and none was unquestionably of a creole.[27] The *corregimiento*, with its lucrative commercial potential, had long been viewed as a prime source of income for the older Peruvian families, and of rewards for long-serving local offialdom; exclusion from most available posts naturally riled, and creole protests echoed long and loud.[28] And in 1720, another traditional fount of creole wealth and social status was dealt its final death blow, by a declaration that all *encomiendas* falling vacant thereafter were to be incorporated into the Crown. There would be no more concessions, no more grants of additional "lives." With this decree, the *encomienda* thus neared the end of its long economic and social decline since the sixteenth century. The value of *encomiendas* was for the most part already small, and the motive of the Crown here seems to have been as much political as fiscal; a final tying of loose ends left over from an earlier age of empire.[29] But the pedigree of the institution naturally only enhanced its symbolic value to Peruvian creoles. And as we shall see shortly, major reforms of 1728–30 took a further important range of posts, those at the royal Mints, out of creole ownership and returned them to the disposal of the Crown (even if many creoles were subsequently reappointed to their posts, now as salaried officials).

Nevertheless, and despite all these comments, it should be emphasized that in broad terms, the "golden age" of creole dominance of the Peruvian bureaucracy, initiated around the turn of the century

and described in chapter 1, endured with only minor inflection throughout the early Bourbon age. Most strikingly, the numerical superiority of native sons in the *Audiencia* of Lima, achieved by the early 1720s, was maintained well into the 1760s (and indeed beyond). The suspension of sales of *Audiencia* posts between 1712 and ca. 1730 brought only a slight reverse in this trend; and if one also takes into account the presence of peninsular ministers with strong local ties (so-called *radicados*), then control of the Lima court by local interests remained overwhelming.[30] And, while the detailed prosopographical studies available for the *Audiencias* are lacking for the royal treasuries or *corregimientos*, the impression is of a dominant creole presence among the former, and a significant one among the latter. As just one example, at the important provincial treasury in the mercury-mining town of Huancavelica, instances of treasury officials who were not only natives of the town, but even members of the miners' guild, were not uncommon—giving quite extraordinary scope for conflict of interest.[31] And creoles retained significant access to those *corregimientos* whose provision lay in the hands of the viceroy as opposed to the Crown, above all interim appointments caused by the death or absence of incumbents.[32] Again as just one example, at least half of all the *corregidores* of the silver-mining town of Oruro in Upper Peru were local men, even in the half-century from 1750.[33]

Finally, the Peruvian Church, too, remained a stronghold of creole officeholding, where prior to the 1760s, creoles supplied at least half of the episcopacy, and dominated both the Cathedral chapters and the lower echelons of the priesthood, outside of the Regular Orders. And it is worth emphasizing that creole aspirants to positions in the Church benefited from the sponsorship of the early Bourbon viceroys, who demonstrated a striking, in some respects surprising, lack of prejudice in this regard. The Marqués de Castelfuerte, the Marqués de Villagarcía, and José Antonio Manso de Velasco (among them covering the period 1724–61) all sponsored creoles even for posts from which they were formally excluded, such as archbishoprics; and this sponsorship extended equally to high positions in the colonial bureaucracy.[34] And these bare facts merely hint at the sheer range of opportunities open to creoles in early Bourbon Peru, among whom leading figures won access to virtually every branch of the colonial bureaucracy and elite, secular, ecclesiastical, or intellectual, enjoying rich and varied careers and becoming very wealthy as a result.[35] Serious moves toward the exclusion of creoles from high colonial office, then, would await the 1750s, and their effects were little felt until well into the late Bourbon era.

Fiscal Affairs: The Peruvian Treasury and Mints

Bourbon policy toward the Peruvian treasury during the early decades, and indeed prior to the 1760s, was characterized above all by a determination to regain control over, and to achieve a more effective administration of, fiscal resources. The Crown assumed direct responsibility for the administration of the majority of its revenues, long since relinquished to private interests, and undertook ownership and direct operation of the viceroyalty's Mints. It attempted to achieve a more honest and efficient administration of the royal treasuries by halting sales of office and by imposing closer controls on the activities of the royal treasury officials. Changes were made in administrative structures that brought about a concentration of responsibility for fiscal policy in the hands of ministers in Madrid and of viceroys in Lima. In a parallel process, a serious attempt was made to modernize practice in the Mints and so to improve the quality of colonial coinage. These measures were not the product of a unitary program of legislation, but were introduced piecemeal by different ministers and viceroys, mostly in the 30 years or so after 1724. Nevertheless, policy displayed a striking degree of coherence throughout this period. Taken together, the relevant measures in these areas constituted a significant body of reform, and one that marked a clear break with many aspects of Habsburg policy.

José Patiño directed American fiscal policy from 1726, when he obtained the Ministries of Indies and Finance, as well as the Superintendency General of Revenues. In 1728 he was closely concerned with perhaps the most significant fiscal reform of the 1720s, the New Ordinances governing colonial Mints and coinage. His policy afterwards became less imaginative and more purely predatory in fiscal terms. He maintained retrograde measures such as forced levies on bureaucratic salaries (*valimientos* and *tercios*), and in the late 1720s ordered the Marqués de Castelfuerte to make annual remissions of no less than a million pesos from Peru, understood as above and beyond "ordinary" remissions.[36] He toyed with minor sources of revenue and made slight changes to Peruvian fiscal organization, in part to ensure direct remission to Spain of certain reserved funds. Before his death in 1736, however, Patiño again moved toward greater radicalism, with the separation of income from the mercury industry from the jurisdiction of the viceroy, and the bold, overtly reformist reduction in mining taxation of 1735.[37]

A key feature of fiscal policy during the early Bourbon period was the reversal of the dependence upon private tax farming that had

prevailed under the Habsburgs. Until 1724, many of the Crown's principal revenues were collected not by royal officials or the colonial bureaucracy, but by private individuals or corporations; the only major exceptions to this rule, in fact, were mining taxes, indigenous tribute, and the income from mercury sales. But by sharp contrast, by 1763 virtually all revenue was administered by Crown officials, including above all the previously farmed commercial taxes, but also seigniorage at the Mint and the *Cruzada* ecclesiastical levy. A major new source of income, the powerful tobacco monopoly, was from the first entrusted to a dedicated team of Crown functionaries. By the time of the accession of Charles III, as a result, the only moderately significant source of revenue still administered privately was that part of the *alcabala* sales tax corresponding to the interior provinces, where as we shall see, it was mostly still farmed out to private contractors.

By far the most valuable revenue group to be returned to direct Crown administration under the early Bourbons was that of the great commercial taxes, of *avería*, *alcabala*, and *almojarifazgo*. Since 1660, these taxes—often known collectively as simply the *reales derechos*—had been effectively suspended, to be replaced by fixed sums paid the Crown by the *Consulado* of Lima, which taxed its members in proportion to the size of their affairs. The amount to be paid was established by contracts (*asientos*) negotiated every five years or so between the *Consulado* and the viceroy. The Crown's dissatisfaction with the *asiento* system grew from the late seventeenth century, as the merchants sought to gain ever more favorable conditions and offered lower sums in return. The contract negotiated by Viceroy Castelldosríus in 1709 was actually annulled, and when Viceroy Morcillo presented a fresh contract in 1722, this too was rejected. In part this was because the terms imposed by the *Consulado* were deemed intolerable, and it was also argued that Morcillo had failed to follow proper procedures in reaching the agreement.

Crucially, however, the Crown had now decided that it would receive a greater income if it again levied the commercial taxes directly through its own officials, at the rates recently established in the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* of 1720. The *asiento* system itself was thus abandoned, and by *cédula* of June 13, 1724 administration of the *reales derechos* was returned to the royal treasury officials. The new system came into effect in late June 1725. It was bitterly protested by the Lima merchants, who resented the closer scrutiny of their activities which it implied, and probably feared that they would have more to pay besides. Possibly as a result of the merchants' protests, in 1728, Viceroy Castelfuerte was ordered to form a Junta to review the

whole issue of the *asientos*; but this was merely a sop to local opinion. Castelfuerte himself had strongly criticized Morcillo's *asientos*, and the Junta approved the cancellation. From this time until the end of the colonial period, the commercial taxes were administered directly by Crown officials.[38]

In the late 1720s, furthermore, the Crown began to move toward direct administration of the Peruvian Mints, a sector of the fiscal machinery whose symbolic significance perhaps outweighed the (relatively marginal) revenue it generated. Bourbon reform of the Spanish imperial Mints affected every aspect of coin production and circulation, and was entirely the product of the early period (prior to the reign of Charles III). The key legislation was set out in two sets of ordinances covering practice at both Spanish and American Mints, of June 9, 1728 and July 16, 1730. The latter ordinances governed the transition to operation by the Crown; they stipulated that all bullion should be purchased, and all minting undertaken, exclusively on royal account, and that all Mint functionaries should be royal officials on fixed salaries.[39] Both private ownership of positions at the Mint, and the mediation of the great silver merchants (*mercaderes de plata*), were eliminated. In November 1730 a special *Junta de Moneda* headed by Patiño was created in Madrid with overall supervision and judicial competence over the Mints.[40]

The regime of Crown operation was fully established in the viceroyalty of New Spain as early as 1732,[41] but it was many years before it was realized in Peru. In 1731, Castelfuerte suspended its implementation entirely, arguing that recent brief experience of minting on royal account had shown the process to be prohibitively expensive. He was also concerned at the cost of purchasing the building of the Mint itself, then in private hands.[42] For several years, Madrid took no further action, in part because crucial documents were lost in the great fire that destroyed the royal palace in 1734. Later, Viceroy Villagarcía was asked to assess the likely cost of establishing Crown operation, but he too urged that nothing was to be gained by altering the existing system.[43] The outbreak of war in 1739 then again provoked the suspension of the project. For these reasons, we will see in the following chapters that another decade passed before early Bourbon reform of the Peruvian Mints was finally accomplished.

Nevertheless, further major reform did affect the Peruvian currency at this time. Assumption of direct Crown operation of the Mints, already described, was but one element within the reforms to the Mint of 1728 and 1730, and at the time was not even perceived

as the most important of these reforms. Both Ordinances of the latter dates, besides standardizing practice at peninsular and American Mints, aimed fundamentally at improving the quality of colonial coinage. The American *peso sencillo*, or *macuquina*, was a sorry affair, "struck by hammer on irregular blanks, without protective milling, with clipped edges, of variable thickness and crude manufacture."[44] The circulation of coinage of such poor quality had long been a matter of scandal, and the drawbacks had recently been underlined at the great Spanish Atlantic trade fairs, where peninsular merchants found themselves obliged to accept Peruvian currency at equal value to Spanish *pesos fuertes*. The ordinances of 1728 aimed to address this problem by establishing new levels of weight and fineness for coins and by providing for the introduction of a new manufacturing process, employing the flywheel press (*molino de volantes*), which permitted manufacture of round coins with milled edges (*moneda de cordoncillo*). These changes were intended to give American coins a uniform quality, while it was believed that operation of the Mints by Crown officials would ensure that the new standards were maintained. Not all the changes responded solely to a desire to improve the quality of coins; the adjustment to fineness implied the first debasement of the American silver mark, while at the same time the seigniorage tax was increased, so that 68 pesos were minted from every mark instead of 67.[45]

As with Crown operation of the Mints, the ordinances of 1728 were implemented in full in New Spain by 1732, while in Peru the various provisions fared differently. Only the changes to weight and fineness were realized immediately. Batches of samples dispatched to Madrid for periodic checks were at first disappointing, but by the mid-1730s, coins minted in Lima were of a consistent and acceptable quality.[46] Production of *moneda de cordoncillo* presented greater difficulties. The flywheel press was a technological innovation only recently introduced to Spain by Philip V from France. There were no such machines in Peru, and while it was intended that a number should be imported, none were in fact sent. The *Junta de Moneda* repeatedly urged the Crown to make presses available, but it was not until royal operation was established that the new system was finally introduced. In 1751, Manso de Velasco had the first press constructed, to plans brought from Mexico, and manufacture of the new gold and silver coins was phased in between 1751 and 1753.[47]

When the Crown reassumed the direct administration of taxes or sought control of the Mint, it evinced concern for a further general principle of Bourbon rule: the professionalization of the fiscal

bureaucracy. The administration of revenues was again to be placed in the hands of trained officials rather than those of private purchasers of office who, theoretical safeguards notwithstanding, were not always personally or professionally qualified for the positions they held. Policy was not entirely consistent, and as we have seen, the Crown undermined the process by continuing to sell influential posts, even important ones such as that of Regent of the *Tribunal de Cuentas*. A step in the right direction appeared to be taken in October 1725, when an end was declared to sales of office in the royal treasuries themselves.[48] This measure was prompted by a petition from Viceroy Castelfuerte, who besides an end to sales of office, sought for himself the right of appointment to treasury posts.[49] This request was denied, and a dispute ensued as to whether the *Audiencia* or the *Tribunal de Cuentas* should enjoy the right of presentation of candidates; eventually the support of the viceroy decided the issue in favor of the Tribunal.[50] I have argued elsewhere that the latter ruling contributed to a growing control of the Tribunal over treasury officials from ca. 1720, a process also deriving from the creation of the post of regent of the Tribunal in 1712, and from the competence and prestige of the first holder of this office, Francisco Carrillo de Córdoba.[51] Nevertheless, as we have seen, sales of posts in the treasury went on largely as before—even if the prohibition of 1725 was never formally repudiated.[52]

During the decades that followed the Bourbon accession, the Crown also extended the network of treasury offices and other elements of the state fiscal infrastructure, both as a means of further enhancing control, and in response to broad shifts in the Peruvian economy. As early as 1702, a new treasury was established in the port of Saña on the northern coast. In 1721, another was created at San Juan de Matucana to cater to the central mining districts, and this was transferred to Jauja in 1730.[53] Elsewhere, in 1722 a new treasury was established at Cuenca in the *Audiencia* of Quito.[54] Over the course of the early Bourbon era as a whole, a network of eight treasuries and subtreasuries was created to cover the strategic region of northern Tucumán, between the mining districts of Upper Peru and the River Plate.[55] In Peru, the viceroys also took direct action to bring the royal treasury officials to heel. Under the Marqués de Castelfuerte, the regent of the *Tribunal de Cuentas* was given significant powers to monitor the professional activities of treasury officials, much to their displeasure, and this system of controls was significantly enhanced by later viceroys.[56] Elsewhere, the sanction of formal investigation was applied to treasuries of special

significance: most notably, *visitas* at fixed periods were revived at Potosí from 1720, and in 1746 Manso de Velasco commissioned inspections of the treasuries at Huancavelica, Cuzco, and Potosí.[57] These measures tended to curb the treasury officials' historic independence, and left them more closely subordinate to the viceroy, setting in train a process whose culmination was establishment of the viceregal *Superintendencia general de Real Hacienda* after 1747.

Thus far, this section has been devoted to reform of the *infrastructure* of the Peruvian treasury, whether the administration of taxation and the Mints, or the professionalization and growth of control over fiscal officialdom. It remains to consider early Bourbon policy toward the *generation* of revenue. In this regard, at least until the 1720s, Bourbon measures for the generation of revenue in the colonies were born of desperation, and scarcely merit the name of "policy" (much less "reform"). They arose from the demands of war in Spain and then a crippling and unsustainable foreign policy, and consisted of irregular levies on colonial salaries and rents (*valimientos* and *tercios de encomienda*), the ongoing sale of bureaucratic posts or noble titles, demands for *ex gratia* donations of funds for different ends (*donativos*), and other irregular levies.[58]

From the 1720s, however, and particularly from the 1730s, something more closely resembling a real policy toward the generation of revenues became apparent. And when it did emerge, in one sense, this policy displayed an inherent conservatism—more so than did policy toward fiscal administration and infrastructure. Most strikingly, few strictly new taxes were imposed in Peru before the 1760s; the major exception was the "New Tax" imposed by Viceroy Villagarcía during the War of Jenkins' Ear, of but brief duration. The Crown evinced reluctance even to increase the rates of existing taxes, and focused instead on extracting greater value from those that already existed, not least by increasing the efficiency of their administration. Thus, direct royal operation of the Peruvian Mints tripled the income from seigniorage, while the *sisa* tax on consumption of meat was revived in Lima and the provinces.[59] As discussed hereafter, the Crown also claimed a greater proportion of ecclesiastical revenues, for example, from vacant benefices from the mid-1730s. In another sense, however, this apparent conservatism of early Bourbon policy toward revenue generation is clearly deceptive—as legalization of *repartimiento de mercancía* in the late 1740s, or introduction of the *estanco del tabaco* in the early 1750s (discussed in chapter 6) make clear.

Foremost among the Crown's revenues were those that derived from Atlantic trade and from silver mining, and in my view, taxation in these areas presented one instance in which early Bourbon policy shed its conservatism in favor of a bolder approach. The rationalization and reduction in the overall burden of commercial taxation in 1720 (discussed in chapter 3), and perhaps still more the reduction of mining taxes by half in 1735 (discussed in the following section of the current chapter), suggested some real attempt to place wider economic interests ahead of immediate fiscal gain. Within Peru itself, meanwhile, no fiscal issue commanded such attention from the 1720s onward as did commercial taxation, particularly the *alcabala*, *almorifazgo*, and *avería* taxes. It was in the hope of raising the revenue from these taxes, it will be recalled, that their administration was returned to royal treasury officials from 1724. By the mid-1730s, it was clear that this hope had proved false, setting in train a further process of inquiry and review. In 1730, the *Consejo de Indias* rejected a proposal from Castelfuerte for adoption of the system for collection of *alcabalas* in force in Mexico, deemed to be both simpler and more effective in combating fraud.[60] The following year, Castelfuerte ordered treasury officials in the provinces to rent out the *alcabala* if their own administration produced little revenue, among other minor reforms.[61] Further changes followed in the 1730s and 1740s; nevertheless, serious reform of administration of the *alcabala* would occur only in the late 1760s.

Finally, during the 1720s and 1730s, Castelfuerte introduced a major fiscal reform of his own, playing a role in the development of fiscal policy in Peru in this sense comparable to the later one of Viceroy Manso de Velasco in the 1740s and 1750s. Castelfuerte's reform affected indigenous tribute and forced labor, and was prompted by the great Andean epidemic of 1718–23, which devastated the native population and rendered tribute rolls obsolete. To address this problem, Castelfuerte undertook a general census of the indigenous population—the only census to be undertaken in Peru throughout the century from the 1680s to the 1780s. Virtually all the highland provinces of Lower and Upper Peru were included, as were several coastal provinces with significant Indian populations.[62] And as eventually undertaken, the census embodied two striking innovations or reforms: the registration of *mestizos* as Indians if they lacked proof of their mixed-blood status, and the registration of *forastero* Indians (permanent native migrants) as *originarios* (natives still living in ancestral communities) if they were found to possess land and property in the villages where they lived.

Mestizos neither paid tribute nor served the mita labor draft; *forasteros*, too, were freed from mita service, and paid tribute at a lower rate than *originarios*, if at all. The large-scale re-registration of these groups as *originarios*, then, marked a sharp break with Habsburg precedent and had significant fiscal repercussions. In 42 provinces inspected by 1735, for instance, it brought about an increase in native tribute—among the most important branches of viceregal income—of more than 60 percent. Indeed, the re-registration of thousands of *forasteros* and *mestizos* as *originarios* cancelled out, in fiscal terms, the impact of the epidemic of 1718–23, so that the colonial state could count on as many tributaries after the epidemic as it had before. Thus, Castelfuerte's census had the effect of a major fiscal reform: it allowed the viceregal finances to survive, virtually unscathed, the worst demographic disaster of the century.[63] As we shall see in the following section, it also boosted the major labor drafts of the viceroyalty, notably at Potosí. And it was of lasting import, in that its measures remained in force in later years, while the tribute rolls it generated remained current well into the late eighteenth century. Finally, it provides further evidence of the general point made throughout this book, regarding the significant role played by viceroys of the early Bourbon period in the development of colonial policy as a whole. Since it did not emanate from Madrid, and might not even find expression in royal decrees, this role has tended to be neglected in surveys of Enlightened reform in the Spanish colonies; but this does not detract from its real impact in Peru, particularly from the mid-1720s onwards.

Mining

Beyond Atlantic trade, no economic sector so dominated Bourbon thinking with regard to the colonies as did mining for precious metals: above all, silver and mercury. Reform of the mining sector in Peru, like policy toward other sectors, was driven by the severe crisis of the first quarter-century of Bourbon rule, coupled with a more general concern to increase production and to improve standards of administration. It will be recalled, from the extended discussion in chapter 1, that the clearest symptom of the crisis of Peruvian mining during the 1700s and 1710s was a fall in production, to the lowest levels of the entire colonial era. This fall affected both silver mining, above all at Potosí (still the greatest center for the industry in Peru), and mercury mining at Huancavelica. Contraband trade in silver and mercury probably reached new heights during the war, driven

by administrative laxity and a great boom in maritime smuggling by French merchants. Administrative disorder and lapses, fuelled by a fragmented administrative structure and corruption, itself seriously affected both output and the profits accruing to the Crown from mining—nowhere more so than at Huancavelica.

The case of Huancavelica will be discussed first here, since in my view, reform of the mercury-mining industry became among the central concerns of early Bourbon government in the viceroyalty.[64] Not only was the industry an important one in its own right, both as a source of revenue and for its role in providing the main catalyst in silver mining, but at crucial points, reform of mining complemented or coincided with early reforms in other major sectors. The Spanish mercury industry embraced both metropolis and colonies, with the world's greatest mine located at Almadén in New Castile, and reform of this pan-imperial industry began early. Thus, as early as 1708, the Almadén mine was placed under a newly constituted *Junta de azogues*, which enjoyed responsibility for the mercury industry throughout the empire. This body moved swiftly to improve the administration of mercury in America, appointing a *Superintendente general de azogues*, Juan de Beitia, in the viceroyalty of New Spain, whose powers then provided inspiration for the comparable reforms attempted in Peru some years later.[65] The *Junta de azogues* took no immediate action with regard to Peru, however, and was abolished in 1717 in favor of a *Superintendente general de azogues* for the Peninsula, an official appointed directly by the Crown.[66]

Major reform at Huancavelica may be said to date from the Alberoni years, when in March 1719, the *Consejo de Indias* drew up a series of decrees that together outlined sweeping, radical changes throughout the Peruvian mining sector.[67] The centerpiece of these reforms was abolition of the historic mita labor draft, such that the mines would henceforth be worked mainly by voluntary wage labor, supplemented by that of convicts and vagrants. Among the measures intended to compensate mining entrepreneurs for this loss of subsidized labor was a reduction of the royal tax on silver production, the *quinto real*, to a *diezmo*, or tenth of total output. The reform was to be implemented by a powerful new official to be dispatched from the Peninsula, titled the *Intendente de azogues* (Intendant for mercury) since that part that affected the mercury industry was perhaps the most radical of all. Huancavelica was effectively to be mothballed, and Peru supplied with quicksilver from Spain, via Buenos Aires. These supplies were to be paid for with the product of mercury sales and *diezmos* in the viceroyalty, and an important part of the Intendant's responsibilities

was the collection and remission of these funds. Among other powers, he was also responsible for the administration and distribution of mercury throughout Peru.

The decrees of March 1719 constituted the type of radical project that could only prosper, albeit briefly, due to the peculiar atmosphere of despotism and governmental skittishness characteristic of the Alberoni administration. José Patiño actually claimed that it was part of a campaign pursued at Court in his absence to undermine him, and it has been suggested that the *Consejo de Indias*' sponsorship of the project, too, was politically motivated.[68] In the event, the plan fell victim to the very institutional instability that engendered it, and the various decrees were recalled before they were dispatched to Peru. But while the radical reform of 1719 was suppressed, in several key respects, the thinking it expressed continued to influence royal policy toward the mining sector for the following 30 years.

Within just over a year of its withdrawal, two of the principal elements of the project actually became part of royal policy. On December 6, 1719, the Crown moved to create a revised *Superintendencia general de azogues* for Peru. As part of this reform, a titular official was appointed, the Marqués de Casa Concha, a judge of the *Audiencia* in Lima, who was invested with many of the powers outlined in the earlier plan.[69] Among these, and in line with powers already accorded De Beitia in New Spain, was exclusive control of revenue produced by the mercury industry (the *ramo de azogues*), entirely independently of the other viceregal authorities. Casa Concha also retained responsibility for the collection of *quintos* and other taxes on precious metals. On April 5, 1720, a subsequent decree then abolished the Huancavelica mita outright, in favor of a regime of convict and (predominantly) voluntary labor. The viceroy at this time, the Príncipe de Santo Buono, was ordered to Huancavelica personally to oversee implementation of this decree.[70]

These measures had no more effect in Peru than had the project that inspired them, primarily because Santo Buono's successor, Viceroy Diego Morcillo, flatly refused to implement them.[71] Abolition of the mita, meanwhile, was simply ignored in Huancavelica, the superintendent writing five years later to explain his motives for not bringing it into effect.[72] The Crown made no attempt to pursue the matter, and a royal decree of 1733 then officially "restored" the Huancavelica labor draft.[73] Nevertheless, a reformed *Superintendencia general de Azogues* was finally established by a group of decrees issued on February 13, 1722.[74] As it

was finally instituted, the superintendency, again conferred on the Marqués de Casa Concha, had powers that paled in comparison with those planned for its frustrated predecessors, despite which it remained a position of some authority. The main power carried over from the former projects was the superintendant's right to requisition funds required at the mine from any treasury in the viceroyalty, independently of the viceroy, including the capacity to remove any treasury official who failed to cooperate. The considerable significance of this apparently innocuous measure is discussed hereafter. The second major element of the reform altered the system of appointment to the governorship of the mine that had been in effect since the sixteenth century. It provided that after a three-year term, Casa Concha be replaced in the posts of superintendent of the mine and governor of the town by his fellow judges of the *Audiencia* of Lima, who were to serve similar terms in rotation by order of seniority.[75] Previously the governor of Huancavelica had been appointed by the viceroy, and the change may have reflected a conviction in Madrid of the viceroys' complicity in the chronic disorder of the preceding decades.[76]

During the period of judge-governorships at Huancavelica instituted in 1722, there occurred a recovery of mercury production from the historically low levels of the earlier 1700s. In this sense, the system was not an unsuccessful one; but the Crown nevertheless remained dissatisfied with the arrangement, which seems moreover only ever to have been intended as a temporary expedient.[77] In August 1734 a major new cycle of reform began, when José Patiño (now de facto chief minister) asked José Cornejo y Ibarra, a recent and successful governor of the Almadén mines, to report on possible reforms to the Peruvian mercury industry. Cornejo's report, which began with a severe critique of the existing state of affairs at Huancavelica, proposed a solution based on his experience at the Spanish mine.[78] The core proposal was that the *gremio* system (of operation of the deposits by a mining guild) be abolished at Huancavelica, and a regime of direct Crown exploitation be introduced, on the Almadén model. To establish this regime in Peru, a peninsular superintendent should be sent out to govern the mine, familiar with operations at Almadén and accompanied by trained officials from there. To ensure the success of the reform, this official would require some degree of independence from the viceroy, particularly with regard to his ability to finance operations at the mine.

Cornejo y Ibarra's ambitious proposals were adopted in full. The official chosen to implement the reform was Jerónimo de

Sola y Fuente, then a member of the *Consejo de Hacienda*, whose commission and jurisdiction were set out in papers dated January 22, 1735.[79] These revoked the earlier reforms of December 1719 and February 1722, and named Sola superintendent of the mine and governor of the town, with an initial term of office of five years. From this time up to the 1760s, the governors of Huancavelica were all similarly high-ranking peninsular officials appointed directly by the Crown. Sola's chief commission was to establish a regime of direct Crown exploitation of the Huancavelica mines. This would end the system whereby the mine was exploited by members of the *gremio de mineros*; henceforth, private individuals would take no part in the extraction and processing of the ores, which instead would be undertaken by a draft labor force under the direction of royal administrators. Most significantly, to ensure that his office carried sufficient weight, in addition to the powers enjoyed by the judge-governors since 1722, he was given exclusive control over the income from mercury sales, a faculty last conceded in the abortive *Superintendencia general de Azogues* of December 1719. He was to use these funds to guarantee an annual output of 5,000 *quintales* of mercury, and any surplus income was to be remitted directly to Spain, via Buenos Aires. As the supreme local authority in all things relating to mercury sales, Sola would correspond with the treasury officials in the silver-mining centers quite independently of the viceroy, and indeed might remove those officials he considered unsatisfactory. The viceroy and other local officials were forbidden to touch the income from mercury sales, which during Sola's administration ceased to be calculated as part of viceregal income.[80] Recognizing that conditions in Huancavelica might differ greatly from those at Almaden, a final clause in Sola's commission empowered him to suspend any of the new measures found to be unsuited to Peru.

The sweeping reform that Jerónimo de Sola was to implement was not an isolated measure but, like most early Bourbon reform, responded to criteria that were ultimately *commercial*. By the early 1730s, as we saw in the preceding chapter, the early Bourbon program for commercial renovation, of which the cornerstone was the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* of April 1720, was in a clear state of bankruptcy. The Portobelo trade fairs of 1722 and 1726 had been failures, and that of 1731 was so catastrophic that it ruined a large number of Andalusian merchants. Beginning in 1734, Jose Patiño headed a series of Juntas that were convened to discuss the trade issue, and were attended by a delegate of the Lima merchant guild, Juan de Berria, among many other participants.[81] The end result of these

meetings was a royal decree of January 21, 1735 that temporarily suspended the departure of the Peruvian trade fleets. But, recognizing that the ultimate reason for the deterioration of the Peruvian trade was the great decline in silver production in the viceroyalty since the end of the sixteenth century, the same decree also introduced a striking measure of reform intended to stimulate silver production: the reduction of the royal tax on silver, from the *quinto* to the *diezmo*.[82] The burden of taxation at Potosí and elsewhere was one of the factors that Berria claimed had hindered economic growth in Peru; another was the scarcity of mercury at the silver-mining centers. One of Sola's commissions explicitly stated that the reforms he was to introduce at Huancavelica were to bring about higher levels of mercury production to meet the demand of a silver industry that, it was anticipated, would boom in the wake of the reduction of taxes on silver mining.[83] The year 1735 was thus one of concerted reform across the Peruvian mining sector, aimed at achieving a renaissance in silver production and, as a consequence, the restoration of trade by the southern fleets.

The real significance of the reforms of 1722 and 1735 to the Peruvian mercury industry is best understood in the light of the importance to the mining cycle of an external supply of capital. Credit was vital to the normal development of that cycle. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, increasingly irregular remissions of capital from Lima led to a whole series of harmful consequences, of which a drop in registered production was only the most obvious. Attempts to guarantee sufficient funds for Huancavelica failed because as long as the viceroy or royal treasury officials in Lima controlled these funds, they were always liable to be diverted to ends that these authorities considered more pressing.[84] The single great innovation of the mining regimes introduced in 1722 and 1735, then, was a shift in control over these funds away from the viceroy and treasury officials in Lima, and their placement under the direct control of the governors in Huancavelica itself. In principle, the Marqués de Casa Concha and his successor judge-governors in the 1720s and 1730s enjoyed the power to requisition whatever funds were required from any treasury in Peru, independently of the viceroy. Jerónimo de Sola's powers through into the 1740s were greater still, since they encompassed the complete separation of the mercury funds from the viceregal treasury as a whole.

Contemporary commentators repeatedly stressed that the key to successful administration of the mine lay fundamentally in the prompt and plentiful supply of credit.[85] No factor so well explains the relative stability and prosperity of mid-century Huancavelica as does the

governors' ability to guarantee such credit. Anchored in his control over funds for the mercury industry (but also as a result of his broader policies at the mines—not least his tact in dealing with the members of the *gremio*), Jerónimo de Sola presided over the most successful (as well as the longest) governorship of the eighteenth century. The middle decades of the century thus constituted a final florescence of the Huancavelica mines, with stable and increasing production and solid profits for Crown and miners alike—in marked contrast to the declining production, persistent financial crisis, and ultimately structural collapse that marked the period subsequent to 1763.[86] Nevertheless, the most radical aspect of the reform that brought Sola y Fuente to power in 1735 was never in fact implemented. Within months of his arrival in Peru, Sola abandoned the principal objective of his commission: abolition of the *gremio* system and establishment of direct Crown operation of the mercury mines. He claimed to have done so essentially because he viewed the reform as based on mistaken information and likely to prove extremely costly; though in fact, it is more probable that he was influenced by the members of the *gremio* and other members of the local elite, who bitterly opposed the scheme. A decree of 1742 then sanctioned the governor's preservation of the existing system for exploitation of the deposits.[87]

Mercury, for all its importance, remained the junior branch of the Peruvian mining industry in the minds of royal ministers and colonial officials. It was silver mining that took pride of place, both in the accounting of royal revenues, and in more general "imaginings of empire." Early Bourbon reform of the silver industry in Peru began at almost the same time as that of the mercury sector; in fact, the first reforms at Huancavelica were born out of a process of review that chiefly affected Potosí. The focus of this first legislative cycle was the mita, the forced labor draft that served the mines. The moral implications of obliging thousands of Indians to serve periodic terms toiling in the "Rich Hill" at Potosí had troubled Spanish theorists and legislators since the establishment of the system by viceroy Francisco de Toledo in the 1570s. Vigorous debate about the draft went on in Peru and Madrid throughout the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and more than once threatened its continued existence; in the 1690s, the *Consejo de Indias* seriously considered the issue of abolition.[88] As will be seen in the pages that follow, after a brief a truce imposed by the War of Succession, from 1717 this same issue again came under scrutiny, in a process of review that lasted until 1732. This was a moment of some significance in the long history of the mita, since while it continued to provoke debate subsequent to

the 1730s, notably in the 1790s, never again was its very existence seriously threatened.[89] And the debates and viceregal policies of this period not only guaranteed the subsistence of the labor draft until the end of the colonial period, but also (in the context of native population recovery) appear to have boosted the number of Indians serving it, so halting its long decline.

The cycle of debate regarding the Potosí mita began in October 1717, when the *Consejo de Indias* reviewed a report drawn up at the request of the Crown, based on arguments for and against the draft prepared by miners and representatives of the contributing provinces respectively.[90] After a second viewing of this document, in a report dated May 4, 1718, the *Consejo* formally urged the king to abolish both the Potosí mita and the other Peruvian labor drafts.[91] This stance—opposition to mass state-sponsored forced labor in the viceroyalty by traditionally the highest colonial governing body, beneath the king—was without precedent, and possibly represented a further attempt by the *Consejo* to recover the legislative protagonism it had lost in recent months; it will be recalled that the last of the decrees transferring most of its historic powers to the new Secretariats of State was dated September 11, 1717, just weeks before the issue of the mita resurfaced in Madrid. After further debate, in mid-1718 the relevant documentation was sent to the *Audiencias* in Lima and Charcas. The judges of each were instructed to vote on the dual issues of whether to abolish the mita and, if it were to be maintained, what form it should take; the verdict of the majority was to be implemented in the viceroyalty pending final confirmation from Madrid.

By early 1719 the *Consejo's* proposal for abolition had developed into the sweeping project for the Peruvian mining sector whose broad outlines have already been described. The mita was, indeed, to be abolished, and the mines worked by free wage labor, supplemented by that of convicts and vagrants. Voluntary labor would be attracted by better pay and by the halving of tribute during the period of service. The miners would be compensated for the loss of the draft by the reduction of the royal tax on production, from *quinto* to *diezmo*, but also by the supply of mercury at 85 pesos per *quintal* instead of the current ca. 100 pesos, and by valuation of the silver mark at 59 reales instead of 52.[92] The *Intendencia de azogues*, and supply of Peru with mercury from Spain, was the second major part of the project. We have seen that this reform was aborted before it could be implemented. In April 1720, the mita for Huancavelica was in fact decreed abolished, but this measure, too, was frustrated in Peru.

The documentation on the mita dispatched to Peru in mid-1718, with a request for a vote among *Audiencia* members on whether to abolish the draft, lay dormant for some years, probably because the judges were reluctant to pronounce on an issue so central to the viceregal economy. The *Consejo de Indias* continued to press for action, however, and orders for reports were reissued in 1727 and again in 1728. These reports were finally submitted some two years later: almost all supported maintaining the mita, with just a single judge arguing in favor of abolition.[93] In the light of these and supplementary reports, on October 22, 1732, Philip V issued a decree that finally sanctioned the Potosí and other Peruvian mitas.[94] The body of this decree simply reaffirmed the rules governing the conditions of the draft—of liability for service, duties at the mine, wage rates, and travel allowances—that had been set out in 1697 in consequence of the reforms to the mita effected some years previously by Viceroy Conde de la Monclova.[95] Nevertheless, the eminent historian of Potosí during this period, Enrique Tandeter, suggested that its ultimate significance was finally to put an end to the long decades of debate, and to give the miners "the security of a regular and permanent provision of mita labour for the foreseeable future."[96]

What was more, the decree of 1732 incorporated important innovations intended to further reinforce the mita. Foremost among these was the provision that *forasteros* (permanent native migrants) should serve the draft alongside *originarios* (natives still living in ancestral communities). This obligation of *forasteros* to serve the mita was a particularly striking measure, one that, as I have argued elsewhere, overturned at a stroke a century and a half of Habsburg precedent.[97] Whether it was implemented in Peru in practice is in fact uncertain. Viceroy Castelfuerte, whose census of the indigenous population, discussed briefly earlier in this chapter, provided the ultimate motive for the reform, ordered that the *forasteros* of particular provinces serve the mita alongside *originario* natives.[98] In 1733, a further royal decree formally also ordered extension of the other great mining draft, that of Huancavelica, to include *forasteros*.[99] In the 1750s, however, the miners of Potosí protested that neither decree had been acted upon, and pressed the viceregal government for new measures to enforce them.[100] Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that at Potosí, the draft received an immediate boost in numbers, of more than 50 percent, as a result of both the new census counts and the incorporation of *forasteros*. What was more, this was a lasting change, since the number of *mitayos* (draft laborers) serving in Potosí remained thereafter at a level close to that established by Castelfuerte in the early 1730s (of

some 3,200 Indians per year). This longevity is significant, because it implies that these reforms, in the context of the recuperation of Peru's native population following its nadir ca. 1730, not only gave an immediate boost to the Potosí mita, but also marked the end of a century and a half of continuous decline in the labor draft.[101]

The mita aside, early Bourbon policy toward the silver mining sector prior to the 1740s displayed real vigor in one further area, albeit a signally important one. As we saw during our discussion of the mercury industry, a decree dated January 21, 1735, mainly devoted to suspension of the trade fleets for Peru (the *galeones*) after more than a century and a half, also reduced direct royal taxation on silver mining by 50 percent: from one-fifth to one-tenth of output (*quinto* to *diezmo*). This decree was ultimately commercial in origin, since it aimed at assisting the recovery of Atlantic trade through the fleet system, by bringing about a renaissance in silver production in the viceroyalty. As is well known, silver production at Potosí did indeed recover from its 1720s nadir, virtually doubling by the final years of the century, while growth at the other Peruvian silver mines was also strong throughout these decades.[102] Enrique Tandeter emphasized the "circumstantial" factors favoring this growth, including the stimulus of strong external trade, growth of the indigenous population, and the increased workload demanded of draft laborers at the mines;[103] and these were unquestionably important factors in the renaissance of Peruvian silver mining. But so too, surely, was the guarantee and expansion of subsidized labor through the mita from 1732, and still more the radical tax reform of 1735, by which the Crown renounced half of its fiscal rights from mining. This bold measure once more broke with royal policy extending back into the early colonial era, designedly to stimulate production. It is tempting to conclude that, had this measure been delayed until the late Bourbon era, it would have taken a more prominent place alongside the measures introduced after 1763—including establishment of the *Real Banco de San Carlos*, the creation of mining colleges and technical missions, and reductions in the price of mercury—cited by historians as responsible for the Bourbon mining renaissance.

Finally, in the 1720s there began a further cycle of reforms, this time affecting the *administration* of silver mining at Potosí and the revenues that it generated. This cycle remained in low key during the period up to the 1730s, though in the 1740s it would yield reforms of some substance. It began with a decree dated January 31, 1720, that revived an earlier law (long in abeyance) stating that members of the *Tribunal de Cuentas* in Lima should spend three years in Potosí

by turn, supervising accounting procedures and inspecting the royal treasury there.[104] This measure was not a success, but a further step then came as part of a decree of October 22, 1732, already discussed, that sanctioned and regulated the Potosí mita. Responding partly to a suggestion by Viceroy Castelfuerte, the final clause of this decree gave the viceroy authority to appoint ministers from the *Audiencia* of Lima or Charcas, or another local tribunal, as superintendent of the mita, in successive terms of two years, essentially so as to ensure that the conditions governing the labor draft set out in 1732 were respected. Castelfuerte also incorporated into the post that of inspector of the royal treasury.[105] The measure thus in effect created a situation not dissimilar to that which had prevailed prior to 1720, and with similarly unsatisfactory results. The Charcas judges lacked professional accounting qualifications, hindering their ability to control the treasury, and were moreover closely linked to the mining and bureaucratic elite in Potosí; it was not to be expected that they should achieve the sought-after improvement in standards of government there. Nevertheless, from the mid-1740s, early Bourbon reform of the administration of Peru's most important silver-mining center would begin to bear real fruit—as discussed in chapter 6.

The Church

Few significant reforms of the colonial Church were undertaken during the early Bourbon era. With powers over the American Church already far exceeding those it enjoyed in the Peninsula, with perhaps one major exception, few measures of substance were adopted much prior to the 1760s. Thus, the Bourbons began issuing new laws governing the colonial Church virtually from the moment of accession in 1700, and during the period to the 1740s, a considerable number of measures were decreed. But most seemed trivial in scope or import. By way of some examples, a first significant flurry of laws was issued in the late 1710s, doubtless reflecting the vigor of the Alberoni administration and the tensions it engendered with Rome. In 1716, the clerical *fuero* (corporate legal jurisdiction) was limited strictly to clergy and not to family or dependents, while sanctuary was restricted to churches, so that other types of church-owned property were excluded. The following year, clerics were barred from holding legal positions with intromission in purely secular suits, while as a whole, the years 1714–19 witnessed numerous decrees against overcharging for confirmations or burials in convents, and against personal clerical employment of Indians. The high clergy was urged

to punish priests setting a bad example, exiling them if necessary. Other measures followed in later years, for example in 1725 regarding clerical qualifications, particularly with regard to competence in native languages, or in 1730, decreeing that no transfers between curacies might be made without prior presentation of full reports by the bishop to the viceroy.[106]

The reason for discussing these decrees and others of their type, manifestly minor albeit abundant, is twofold. First, in my view, these measures demonstrate the essential constancy of purpose in Crown policy across the early and later Bourbon periods. New royal legislation concerning the Church in Peru under the early Bourbons developed around a number of central themes: first, prima facie regalist reforms (those that extended the *Patronato Real* or curtailed clerical legal privilege); second, reform of ecclesiastical standards or behavior, more broadly understood; third, the appropriation by the state of a greater share of ecclesiastical revenues; and last, royal control and restrictions on the religious Orders. These themes, of course, are the same as those that informed Bourbon policy toward the Church during the more active and aggressive later period. In this sense, the earlier measures, though limited in scope, evinced the same basic motives as did those of the period subsequent to 1760. The earlier measures represented the first slender shoots, then, of policies that became more robust before the accession of Charles III, and came to full flower only following the latter event.

A more important reason to discuss these measures, nevertheless, is to seek to emphasize how apparently trivial decrees, buried in the archives or in scholarly collections of colonial laws, could have a real impact in Peru, *given the wider context* in the viceroyalty. Put another way, in this as in other spheres, the impact of Bourbon rule could be expressed through other means than major reform, while having a comparable impact on the Peruvian Church. Thus, the period 1726–33 witnessed a series of much more serious decrees regarding the Church in Peru, most of them provoked by the hostile policies of Viceroy Castelfuerte (discussed immediately below). These decrees made serious allegations against the Church, of moral laxity and even criminal behavior among the clergy, in uncompromising language. A *cédula* dated February 13, 1727, for example, addressed apparently widespread concubinage among the priesthood, citing reports of many priests "maintaining illicit exchanges and publicly supporting whole families of wives and children."[107] This decree, and another dated May 7, 1730, also concerned illicit trade by members of the clergy, with some convents pictured as storehouses and markets for contraband

goods; further *cédulas* followed in the same vein. Although ostensibly concerned with ecclesiastical reform, these decrees had ends that clearly exceeded those of reform alone. They seemed to represent something new in the address of the Spanish Crown to the Church in the colony, and the local clergy sensed this: the archbishop of Lima, Diego Morcillo, described the *cédula* of February 13, 1727 as "less favourable to the Church than is usual from the Catholic kings."[108] In general terms, it is clear that this and other legislation and actions during these years surprised and offended a broad spectrum of clerical opinion in Peru.

Indeed, it should be emphasized that during this early period as afterwards, it was viceroys' own policies toward the Church, in addition to their influence in Madrid, that left their mark on Church-state relations in Peru. Whether associated with concrete reforms, or divorced from practical policies, it was viceregal actions that set the tone and timbre of relations and so shaped the clergy's perceptions of the impact of the new dynasty. Arguably the leading example of this was the episode of great tension in relations with the Church that occurred during the administration of the Marqués de Castelfuerte in the 1720s and 1730s. Castelfuerte brought a highly aggressive attitude to his dealings with the Peruvian Church, which came to define important characteristics of early Bourbon relations with the institution as a whole. The resulting crisis embraced the whole of the Church, from the high clergy or leaders of the religious Orders, to the Tribunals of the Inquisition or the *Santa Cruzada*. No fewer than 30 or so discrete disputes may be identified, mainly over points of ceremonial, exercise of the *Patronato*, or conflicts of legal jurisdiction. Among the worst of these arose with the secular Church over Castelfuerte's attempts to monitor moral abuses among the clergy, and with the Franciscan Order over the riot that attended the execution of the Paraguayan rebel, José de Antequera, in Lima in 1731. Two Franciscan friars were actually shot dead by viceregal troops during the latter riot, and in the aftermath, their Commissary-General tried to have the viceroy excommunicated by the Cathedral Chapter (in the event winning only his own recall to Spain).[109] Though caused by the viceroy's own attitude and on his initiative, rather than ordered or organized from Madrid, in all but a handful of these cases the Crown approved Castelfuerte's actions and policies and supported him wholeheartedly in his conflicts with the clergy. The viceroy's administration thus came to embody an episode of especially aggressive regalism in Peru, following a period of particular clerical influence and freedom of action. To a Church

accustomed to late-Habsburg laissez-faire, it came as a shock, and the first acute indication of what Bourbon rule might yet mean—even before the era of major ecclesiastical reforms.

Elsewhere, to the 1730s, the principal trend to emphasize is the incipient traces of what in later decades would become a major plank of Bourbon reform of the American Church: the attempt to restrict the autonomy or limit the activities of the religious Orders. The reforming legislation of the early period was directed at both secular and regular clergy, but official criticism of regulars was often much the harsher. Friars were criticized more often and more severely for the inefficacy of their mission, inadequate preparation, and scandalous behavior. Rather than respond to objective criteria, this persistent criticism is evidence of the general distrust manifest toward the Orders by representatives of both the Crown and the secular Church. It gave rise to a series of decrees restricting the number of friars and the wealth of the Orders, diminishing their independence of the bishops, and (after 1750) even eroding their visible presence in colonial society. Thus, a *cédula* of 1717, reiterating earlier decrees of 1704–5, reaffirmed a ban on new foundations of monasteries, convents, and hospitals without authorization from Madrid. A further decree of 1727, reiterating measures of the early 1700s and itself repeated twice in the 1730s, decreed that monasteries with fewer than eight members (so-called *conventillos* that dotted the Peruvian countryside and were subject to the authority of a superior of their Order rather than a secular prelate) were to be closed or merged with their head monastery. The heads of the Orders excited particular suspicion, particularly the Franciscan Commissaries-General and the Mercedarian Vicars-General, as positions of special power, with few equivalents among the other Orders. A handful of decrees from 1707, including in 1729 and 1734, ordered special vigilance of the Vicars-General, including with regard to communications with (and remission of funds to) Rome.[110] These minor measures, then, prefigured the more sweeping reforms of the 1750s, above all the single important exception to the general rule of early Bourbon inaction over the colonial Church: the secularization of Indian parishes administered by friars.

Conclusion

This chapter has completed this book's examination of what it identifies as the first cycle of early Bourbon reform for the colonies, covering the period from the late 1710s until the death of José Patiño in

1736. It has discussed those areas of colonial policy and reform—administrative, fiscal, in the mining sector, and the Church—that complemented the early Bourbon commercial program, discussed in the previous chapter. In isolation, the reforms undertaken in these other areas may seem unimpressive to, and in some cases have simply been overlooked by, historians familiar with the more wide-ranging program pursued by Charles III and IV and their ministers after 1763. But taken together—and of course, as only *part* of the early Bourbon reform program as a whole, that continued into the 1740s and 1750s—they unquestionably included measures of real importance, and that contributed to reshape Peru in significant ways. To recap only the main measures, they embraced establishment of the viceroyalty of New Granada from 1717 (definitively from 1739); the systematic ending of tax farming in the viceroyalty, and return to direct administration of fiscal resources by salaried Crown officials; wholesale reform of the Peruvian currency; substantial and successful administrative reform of the mercury industry; and the halving of taxation on production in the silver-mining sector. Lesser but still significant measures included the favoring of peninsular or nonnative candidates over creoles in posts in the higher bureaucracy, and the reform and effective expansion of indigenous tribute and forced labor (the mita). All this, in addition to the suspension of the Atlantic trade fleets in 1735: in no sense an active reform, but nevertheless among the most enduringly significant of all the measures undertaken in the colonies at this time.

A further conclusion is that specifically *commercial* concerns informed policy across a wider range of measures than those directly affecting trade alone. Thus, I have argued that both the establishment of the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717, and its abolition in 1723, responded to motives that were ultimately commercial, in the need to enhance royal authority in this region and to prevent contraband there. The halving of taxation on silver mining in 1735 similarly responded to commercial imperatives, in the need to restore Peruvian Atlantic trade, and was announced in the very decree that suspended the trade fleets. And these and other measures of this period, notably throughout the mining sector, had their origins in the feverish activity of the Alberoni years in the late 1710s.

Finally, and beyond specific policies and reforms, and building on material presented in chapter 3, I have argued that this period marked a change in the character or style of government in the colonies, in ways recognized by scholars as identifiably "Bourbon." In part, this change came at the hands of a new corps of military men appointed

to the leading colonial posts; the Marqués de Castelfuerte, viceroy of Peru from 1724 to 1736, is perhaps the most significant example. Partly through their implementation of new policies emanating from Madrid—particularly in the areas of colonial administration, fiscal affairs, and relations with the Church—but partly simply through their own style of government, these men gave Peruvians a first indication of what the change of dynasty in 1700 might actually mean. Peruvian creoles, and the Peruvian Church, were among the most affected, and the first to notice this change; even if the real impact on their wealth and freedom of action yet remained modest. But it is worth noting here that the tribute and labor reforms undertaken by viceroy Castelfuerte, in association with his census of the indigenous population, provoked widespread unrest among the native and *mestizo* population affected by them. Scarlett O'Phelan identified this reaction as a "first eighteenth-century moment" of rebellion; and elsewhere, I have noted that the reform-inspired unrest of these years provided a precedent for the future that was both suggestive and ominous.[111]

Chapter 5

Reform Abated, 1736 to 1745

Introduction: War, Ministries, and the Viceregency, 1736–45

The years 1735–36, with the suspension of the trade fleets for America and the death of José Patiño, marked the end of the first cycle of Bourbon reform for the colonies. This is not to say that major innovations in the organization and administration of the colonies were absent in the decade following 1736; quite the contrary, in fact. Two of the most self-evidently important measures of the entire Bourbon era—the development of colonial trade via *registros* or single register ships rather than annual fleets, and the definitive creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada—came to fruition during precisely this period. But neither measure was the product of these years; rather, both were now implemented after a process of contemplation and legislation that, as we saw in chapters 2–4, had far deeper roots. Thus, the viceroyalty of New Granada was first established under Julio Alberoni in 1717–18, only to be abolished in 1723; as we shall see shortly, its reestablishment in 1739 was a response not only to the War of Jenkins' Ear that broke out in the latter year, but to discussions initiated by Patiño before his death and ongoing since the mid-1730s. The suspension of the trade fleets, meanwhile, occurred in 1735, but in a broader sense represented the final failure of early Bourbon commercial policy as developed under Alberoni and implemented since 1720. Outwith these two important areas, during the decade 1736–45, few measures of any substance were taken in the colonies, and fewer still that merit the name of reform. Thus, for example, a rare new tax imposed in Peru in the early Bourbon era was introduced in 1741. But this was introduced entirely as a measure of emergency wartime fund-raising, and did not long survive the end of hostilities.[1]

Warfare provides one clear explanation for the loss of momentum in government and reform that, in my view, was apparent between the mid-1730s and the mid-1740s. If the War of Succession had disrupted or delayed concerted reform at the dawn of the century, so then armed conflict performed a similar role during the War of Jenkins' Ear that began in 1739. Blending all but seamlessly into the War of the Austrian Succession, this became the second extended period of warfare of the Bourbon age, persisting until 1748 and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The War of Jenkins' Ear was the first genuinely colonial war to confront Spain and Britain, and was fought mainly in the Americas, over access to colonial trade. It was sparked by British frustration at the success and aggression of the *guardacosta* in defending Spanish commercial rights on the coasts of the Main and in surrounding waters.[2] It resulted in the celebrated (by Britain) capture of the key Panamanian port of Portobelo by Admiral Edward "Old Grog" Vernon in December 1739, and his equally celebrated (in Spain) repulse at Cartagena de Indias in 1741 (of which the novelist Tobias Smollet was a critical eyewitness).[3] A further major consequence was grievous losses of Spanish register ships sailing to and from America, throughout the period to 1748. And more broadly, the factors that had operated during the War of Succession now surely operated once more, with chronic fiscal crisis arising from wartime expenditure, joined with governmental preoccupation with the hostilities, once more delaying or disrupting the planning or implementation of reform.

Along with warfare, however, a further factor contributed to the loss of governmental momentum following the death of José Patiño in 1736: the absence of any very capable successor in the key ministries. The Secretariat of the Indies was occupied by the Marqués de Torrenueva from 1736 to 1739, and by José de la Quintana from 1739 to 1741. Neither achieved much of note, whatever their personal qualities (Allan Kuethe has recently argued that Quintana, in particular, was a figure of some experience and stature).[4] Far more promising was the appointment of José del Campillo y Cossío to succeed Quintana in 1741, holding a cluster of ministries (including Indies) until his death in office only two years later, in April 1743. Campillo, like his own successor the Marqués de la Ensenada, was formed under Patiño during the latter's long administration in various posts since before 1720.[5] He is renowned among historians for a theoretical tract, *Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para América*, or "New System for the Economic Government of America," completed in the year of his death, which advocated wholesale reform of the colonial

system, and exercised considerable influence over the program afterwards pursued by the ministers of Charles III.[6] This work, however, remained unpublished until 1789, while Campillo's administration was both too short, and too wholly absorbed with the war, to have much impact of consequence in the colonies. Only with the appointment of Ensenada to the secretariats of Hacienda, War, and Indies and Marine in 1743 did government (both colonial and peninsular) recover both energy and a firm direction and purpose.

The view sustained in these pages, that a lull in reform and governmental initiative was apparent for a decade from 1736, is further shaped by the course of events in Peru itself. For here, the long and active viceregal administration of the Marqués de Castelfuerte was followed by that of José Antonio de Mendoza y Sotomayor, Marqués de Villagarcía, who served from January 1736 to July 1745. Villagarcía belonged to the very highest Spanish nobility, and had served in diplomatic positions in Italy and as viceroy of Catalonia.[7] This aristocratic pedigree was typical of the viceroys of the Habsburg period, and in some respects Villagarcía can be seen as a throwback to the pattern prevailing prior to the viceregency of Castelfuerte. He left only the briefest of governmental reports,[8] and his official correspondence, held in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville, is both relatively slim and largely preoccupied with war; so that he remains perhaps the least known of the period's Peruvian viceroys. Entering his post at the age of almost 70, he displayed what seemed like lethargy, or perhaps a desire for the quiet life, that at times saw him fail to follow through with important aspects of policy. He was also excessively concerned with the pomp of his office and—perhaps unsurprisingly for someone formed in the Spain of Charles II—had something of a reputation as a religious bigot. He is remembered, if at all, chiefly for the coincidence of his viceregency with the scientific expedition of Charles Marie de la Condamine and the subsequent writings on Peru of two of its Spanish members, Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa. After 1739, virtually all his energies were absorbed with war, above all that of Jenkins' Ear with Britain, but also with the rebel Juan Santos Atahualpa in the lowland forests east of Tarma. He displayed some vigor in organizing the viceregal defenses, and his sole significant innovation was a new tax to finance the war effort.[9]

On the whole, Villagarcia's was clearly the least effective of the viceregal administrations of the middle decades; and in this sense it may be seen as paralleling the loss of ministerial momentum that prevailed in Spain between the death of Patiño and the rise of the Marqués de la Ensenada. Although momentum was recovered in

Madrid in April 1743, with the latter's rise to power, only in July 1745 did a further active and long-lasting viceroy take the helm in Peru, in the form of José Antonio Manso de Velasco, later Conde de Superunda. And while this might have been a purely Peruvian phenomenon—the result of the vagaries of the viceregal office—it may be noted briefly here that a similar pattern appears to have prevailed in New Spain also. There, the long and vigorous administration of Viceroy Casafuerte from 1722 to 1734—often taken as closely paralleling that of his near-namesake Castelfuerte in Peru—was followed by the interim appointment of the archbishop of Mexico, Juan Antonio de Vizarrón, from the latter date until 1740.[10] This in turn was followed by the brief terms of the Duque de la Conquista and the *Audiencia* in 1740–42, and then the somewhat anonymous administration of the Conde de Fuenclara between 1742 and 1746.[11] Only with the arrival of Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, first Conde de Revillagigedo, in 1746, and his rule until 1755, did stable and dynamic governance return to Mexico. And as we shall see in the chapter that follows, Güemes y Horcasitas' own appointment was made in very similar circumstances to that of Manso de Velasco, and at the hand of the same minister: the Marqués de la Ensenada. In short, the lack during this period of firm ministerial direction in Madrid seems paralleled, whether fortuitously or otherwise, by the lack of strong or effective viceregal rule in the two major colonies.

In this context, then, this chapter focuses first and foremost on the major reforms, or alterations in the colonial system, that (while their origins lay mainly in the earlier period) came to fruition in the decade after 1736: the reorganization of Spanish Atlantic trade, and the recreation of the viceroyalty of New Granada. It then goes on to discuss lesser measures introduced during this period, and which above all affected fiscal affairs and the viceregal treasury.

Spanish Atlantic Trade

One of the two major measures implemented (if not originating) during the otherwise relatively undistinguished decade after 1736 was radical reorganization of Spanish colonial trade. The suspension of the historic fleets and fairs for Atlantic trade, decreed in 1735, as we saw in chapter 3, was ostensibly intended merely as a temporary measure, to endure until commercial conditions in Peru should turn favorable to their reestablishment. The decree announcing the suspension made this quite clear, and went so far as to legislate on some points of the organization of anticipated future fleets. A fleet

was, in fact, dispatched to Panama in 1737, and a silver fleet was sent from Peru to meet it; though these *galeones* were classed officially as a group of register ships sailing under *guardacosta* escort, so as to deny the British the right to send an "Annual Ship" to the fair. In 1739, José del Campillo still counted proper organization of the fleets to Portobelo and Veracruz among the chief duties of the minister for the Indies, possibly suggesting that policy on commercial reform remained unfixed (even at so late a date).[12]

Governmental attitudes to colonial trade, nevertheless, were superseded by events, and the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1739 enforced the prolongation of the suspension of the *galeones.* In December of the latter year, Admiral Vernon destroyed Portobelo, rendering the trans-Isthmian route unviable. The impending trade fair had to be abruptly suspended; the Peruvian treasure was ordered withdrawn to New Granada, and most was scattered or lost to contraband along the way. The threat to the fleets imposed by the British navy, and Spain's need of all its warships for its own defense, led to the substitution of both *galeones* and *flota* by single register ships (*navíos de registro*), sailing alone between Cadiz and ports in the Americas. In 1740, it was ordered that such ships might trade directly with the coasts of Chile and Peru via the Straits of Magellan and Cape Horn, so ending a prohibition on this route that had endured since the sixteenth century. And while no blanket permission was given for register ships, in practice, the fiscal as well as the commercial benefits to be gained from their concession meant that permits were granted practically on demand. For some 15 years after 1740, register ships constituted the primary vehicle for Spanish Atlantic trade.

The transfer from fleets to *registros* has been called, correctly, "the greatest innovation in two centuries of colonial trade."[13] Such a change could only seem traumatic to the groups that had been the chief beneficiaries of the traditional system. The great Lima merchants, who had long resisted participating in the official trade, now found their position under serious threat. Viceroy Manso de Velasco described their plight in terms of a pincer movement: in Lima they faced the competition of peninsular merchants off register ships, selling their goods direct to the population, without the need for intermediaries. At the same time, their traditional reexport markets in Upper Peru were fully supplied from Buenos Aires, so that goods might cost less in Cuzco than in Lima itself.[14] Moreover, until the repeal of the ban on American remissions to Spain to purchase goods on their own behalf, they were even denied the opportunity to compete with the register merchants on equal terms. For years, they lobbied in Lima

and Madrid for the closure of the port of Buenos Aires and a return to the fleets. In an irony that crowned half a century of bitter mutual hostility, they were joined in this plea both by their Mexican counterparts, and by the merchants of the Cadiz *Consulado*, who were no more enamored of the new and more competitive climate.[15]

It was long argued that the register trade proved no more capable of remedying the underlying weakness of Spanish trade than had been the fleet system. Most notably, the merchandise the single ships carried remained of predominantly foreign manufacture, and many of the *registros* themselves were foreign vessels with foreign crews. Carmen Parrón Salas, in dedicated work on the transition to the register system in Peru, emphasizes the dominance of French and other "neutral" shipping throughout the 1740s.[16] Again, of 164 register ships that sailed to Veracruz during the period of suspension of the *flotas*, 45 were neutral (between 24% and 40% of them French).[17] Some vessels even sailed direct to or arrived from the Americas at neutral ports in Europe or at ports in France—including ships contracted by the Caracas Company.[18] This was a more overt surrender of colonial trade than had been apparent even during the War of Succession at the turn of the century, then—an aspect discussed in major work on this topic by Stanley and Barbara Stein.[19] And neither was the register trade especially safe during the wartime years; of 118 such ships leaving Cadiz in 1740–45 alone, no fewer than 69 (58%) failed to return. It is also worth emphasizing that abandonment of the fleets in favor of register ships did not imply, at least from a legislative point of view, any rupture of the traditional monopoly structure of the *Carrera de Indias*. Cadiz remained the only port qualified for trade with the Indies, and the merchants of the Cadiz *Consulado* remained the only merchants qualified to engage in the Indies trade (although in practice, the concession of *registros* gave access to a much wider range of participants).[20] The extension to other ports and merchant groups of a generalized right to trade only commenced after 1765, until which date, the ongoing restriction continued to exert a negative influence on the natural development of trade in the Peninsula.

But the advent of the register ship trade nevertheless proved an event of profound importance for both the commercial and, in the longer term, even the political development of Spanish South America. It had an enormous impact on the character and structure of trade with the viceroyalty of Peru, one which in my view has only recently come to be appreciated in its full extent. This topic has been explored recently and most persuasively in an outstanding study by

the Basque scholar Xabier Lamikiz, published in 2010.[21] Register ships were cheaper and more flexible than were fleets, and responded much more readily to market conditions. With respect to the *galeones*, not only did they save the infrastructure costs of escort ships and crews, but—with the opening of the Magellan Straits route—also those of transport across the Isthmus of Panama. The reduction in costs, and much greater frequency of sailings, affected both the quantity and the quality of the trade. Lower prices and a more diverse and measured supply facilitated imports of goods previously prohibitively expensive, and Peru experienced a boom in luxury imports, from carriages to fine silks. Lamikiz cites Manso de Velasco in 1761 to the effect that due to the register system, "those who could not afford it in the past wear exquisite silks at present." José de Baquijano similarly later noted that from the mid-century, "prices decreased, allowing families to wear the most exquisite fabrics at prices that previously would not have allowed them to buy the rough manufactures of this country."[22] Mestizos, *castas*, free blacks, and Indians were now able to dress after the fashion of creoles and Spaniards, "scandalising travellers."[23] Moreover, this boom in luxury imports was but one symptom of a general expansion in trade, which built on the modest growth of the earlier period. The number of ships crossing the Atlantic each year increased by 55 percent in the period 1739–54 with regard to 1717–39; yearly tonnages increased by 38.5 percent in the same period.[24] If one compares the periods 1710–47 and 1748–78, the increase is more marked still, with a rise of 86 percent in shipping movements between the two.[25] The upward trend was thus maintained into the era of *Comercio libre*, that began in 1765 and reached its zenith after 1778.

The register trade also provoked a revolution in the mercantile community in Spanish South America. Faced with the new, fluid, rapidly changing, and aggressive trading climate—where "fierce competition" now prevailed[26]—many of the great Lima merchants simply withdrew from commerce, and invested their resources in other fields. Meanwhile, the length and difficulty of trade via the Straits of Magellan led to a shift among Spanish merchants away from the use of agents and toward consignment. "Though not an overnight transformation, by 1760" this shift toward the consignment trade "was well established," according to Lamikiz.[27] The shift itself formed but part of the "completely new pattern of trade" apparent after 1739, in which notably, "the very nature of risk was transformed," so that "the risks associated with agency and competition became more important" than they had been under the *galeones* regime. Cadiz

merchants necessarily came to rely far more on their correspondents in America, so that, for example, "it is no wonder that in 1755 there were sixty Cadiz agents in Mexico City" alone.[28] Spanish merchants also began to trade more on their own account, instead of acting simply as intermediaries for foreign merchants residing in Spanish Atlantic ports. And perhaps most strikingly, Lamikiz suggests that the new system proved disadvantageous to foreign merchants, whether in Spain or in the colonies themselves. This was not only because "the new pattern of trade might have encouraged Spaniards to depend less on foreigners and more on their transatlantic correspondents," but because the greater reliance on long-distance trade, itself dependent both on consignment and much more extensive use of credit, presented greater risks for foreigners than for their Spanish competitors. As a result, "the advent of the register ships changed the pattern of trade with America in favor of Spain's indigenous merchants," so that "trade with Peru was for the most part dominated by Spanish merchants."[29] This is a contrasting conclusion, then, to that of the Steins and others, who have rather emphasized foreign penetration of the *registro* trade, not least in ownership of the shipping involved. And here may also have arisen a further factor contributing to the growing disenchantment among British merchants with the reexport trade to America via the Peninsula, detected especially from the 1750s onwards.[30]

The place partly vacated by Lima wholesale merchants was occupied increasingly by Peninsular merchants, whether trading on their own behalf, or acting as factors for Spanish firms. Within a few years, these Peninsular merchants (the majority of whom were Basques) became the dominant commercial class in Lima, generally smaller scale than the merchants they had displaced, but more dynamic, and accustomed to the risks and opportunities of a much freer market. And this process was fuelled by the recision of the ban on remissions of funds in 1749, which permitted both these newly established merchants, and Peruvians themselves, to deal directly and cheaply with counterparts in Andalusia.[31] For Peruvians, this right to remit funds to Spain was probably the key issue, in fact, since once gained, they could participate fully in the new system, sending funds to Spain to purchase stock for which they knew there was a market. The fact that the essence of the Cadiz monopoly was maintained was of far less importance to Americans than to those Peninsular merchants who continued to be excluded from trade. It mattered much less to a merchant in Peru, Chile, or Buenos Aires whether his or her merchandise was imported from or exported to Cadiz or another peninsular port;

what mattered was that he or she was allowed to participate in direct trade at all. Manso de Velasco, who had written in 1749 arguing for a restoration of the fleets, by 1756 expressed a change of attitude that he claimed was common to the Peruvian mercantile community at large: "Experience has taught me . . . that the *Registros* via the Cape, when well organised, offer greater profits and benefits."[32]

What was more, the opening of the Cape Horn or Magellan Straits route profoundly affected the economic complexion of the continent, preparing the way for the political changes of the later colonial era. The River Plate and Chile, previously backwaters, suddenly found themselves on a major trade route. Buenos Aires swiftly became among the foremost trading entrepôts of the continent, importing goods to its own hinterland and resupplying ships en route for the Pacific. Legally or otherwise, much merchandise made its way inland to the mining zones of Upper Peru and beyond, strengthening economic ties with those regions and fuelling the precipitate growth of the capital of the Plate. Chile, for its part, could now import and export goods direct to the rest of the empire. Its agro-export economy and population soared, prompting the eminent Chilean historian, Sergio Villalobos, to describe the advent of the register trade with his country as "the most important of the commercial reforms of the eighteenth century."[33]

Further studies in recent years have contributed to a wider appreciation of the impact and implications of the switch to register ships in trade with Peru. Mariano Bonialian, in his *El Pacífico hispanoamericano*, published in 2012, describes the impact of the new system on Hispanic trading networks in the Pacific. These networks had flourished greatly from the late seventeenth century, to such an extent as to contribute (in Bonialian's view) to the crisis of the last Portobelo fairs and the collapse of the *galeones* by the 1730s. But with the switch to register ships, trade in the Pacific experienced a marked decline, in *both* its principal manifestations: the Manila Galleon that linked New Spain with the Philippines, and the illicit coastal trade between Mexico and Peru. Thus, by the mid-1750s, the Manila trade at Acapulco was described as suffering from "decadence and a notorious lack of funds," and was in a "deplorable state." The formerly vigorous trade from Mexico to Peru, partly in China goods, now no longer made sense when it was "more risky, with low profitability and reduced chances of success" compared to the register trade. Asian goods continued to enter both Peru and Mexico, of course, but strikingly, they now did so from the Atlantic rather than the Pacific, whether in register ships, the New Spain *flotas*, or via foreign

contraband. Bonialian concludes: "We are in the presence of a veritable revolution in commerce and consumption in the imperial system, brought about by the early signs of the British industrial revolution and a reorientation of the trade in Oriental products via Europe towards the Americas."[34] And—to further underscore the profound impact of the register trade on broader patterns of Hispano-American commerce—in my own book on British trade with the Spanish colonies, published in 2007, I drew attention to a major shift observed from ca. 1750 in the nature of Anglo-Spanish commercial relations in the Caribbean, which saw Spanish-Americans displace the British themselves as the primary carriers of this trade. I suggested a range of possible explanations for this striking shift, only for Xabier Lamikiz to provide the most convincing explanation to date, by discussing so thoroughly the broader shifts in Spanish Atlantic trade caused by the move toward the register system.[35]

Finally, on the basis of a study of prices in Lima markets, published in 2013, Jesús Cosamalón Aguilar is explicit in dating the key secular economic transformation in the viceroyalty's markets to ca. 1750. This transformation was attributable to the opening of the Cape Horn route and the switch to register ships, *as opposed to* the era of "Free Trade" that commenced in the 1760s and reached its legislative peak with the Regulation of Free Trade of 1778. Cosamalón Aguilar identifies a "period of low prices between 1751 and 1800," with "a general tendency towards stagnation and even a drop in prices of some goods"; this trend affected "especially imported goods," that is to say, "European goods in Lima."[36] Although necessarily tentative, based on a selected subset of goods and products, his study thus

> suggests that from 1750, regional markets began a process of restructuring brought about by the loosening (*flexibilización*) of the Spanish commercial monopoly . . . It is possible that the true commercial reform began around three decades before free trade was approved in 1778; it can be stated that the reduction in transport costs, the register ships, and the dynamic among the economic actors transformed the American reality prior to this much-cited measure. When the regulations were issued, prices were already falling, the structure of trade was undergoing full transformation, and new products (and merchants) were making an entrance . . . Contrary to what has been stated, the reform of 1778 did not cause the disintegration of the markets; these had been experiencing a transformation since some time earlier, and the measure perhaps only accelerated the economic dynamic in play . . . That is to say . . . the decade of the 1750s was the critical point, not 1778.[37]

It may not be too early, then, to identify a consolidated trend in the historiography that now views the switch from *galeones* to register ships as the most significant commercial transformation of the Bourbon era; a trend complemented, moreover, by more moderate calculations of the true commercial impact of *Comercio libre* itself in the period from 1778 onward.[38]

During the long years throughout which they constituted the primary means of transatlantic traffic, the advantages of the register ships became apparent even to many former avid supporters of the fleets. After all, and after the initial shock of readjustment, Peruvian merchants could appreciate that the new system corrected those elements of the former one they had found so objectionable. They no longer faced being ordered to trade against their will, nor were they obliged to make the long, costly, and dangerous round trip to Panama. The cost of stock imported from Spain was now much lower; business expanded, as a greater range of items came within the reach of a broader spectrum of the population. These changes clearly benefited the viceroyalty's creole consumers. The Andalusian merchants, too, might have appreciated the attractions of the new system. They no longer had to support the costs of the fleets, nor suffer arbitrary appropriations of their capital in *indultos*. The new environment was more competitive, and profit margins smaller, but at least the *Consulado* as a whole no longer faced the threat of general commercial disasters such as had occurred at the Portobelo fairs. They were no longer obliged to travel to Peru in person, with all the costs and discomforts the voyage implied.[39]

Finally, the Crown, too, might have appreciated the advantages it drew from the new system. It could no longer levy *indultos*, it is true, since to do so required concentration of trade in the fleets. But the tax system and rates levied prior to 1740 remained in force, while the volume of trade expanded considerably, so that the Crown's income rose accordingly. The great late-Bourbon minister José de Gálvez later observed that with *registros*, "more funds came to Spain than under the former *flota* system"; and indeed, it has been noted that although receipts dropped for a few years in 1741–45, they rose "spectacularly" in 1746–55, to around twice the prewar figures.[40] And this was true as much in Peru as in Spain: Manso de Velasco stated that just four register ships yielded tax revenue greater than an entire *Armada del Mar del Sur*. All these factors might have contributed to the failure to reestablish the *galeones* for Peru following the end of hostilities in the late 1740s; so that the "suspension" decreed

in 1735 in fact marked the permanent abolition of these fleets and their associated trade fairs (as discussed in the following chapter).

Colonial Administration

The late 1730s also witnessed final consummation of among the most significant of all early Bourbon reforms in the colonies: the creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada. We saw in the preceding chapter that this viceroyalty, the first to be founded since New Spain and Peru in the sixteenth century, experienced a first, brief, existence from 1717 until 1723, when it was summarily abolished. The need for reform in the region encompassed by the viceroyalty was too self-evident, however, for this project to remain long dormant, and it was recreated just 16 years later, in 1739. On this second occasion, its territory was much the same as in 1717, except that it now also included Panama, while the *Audiencias* there and in Quito were permitted to subsist.[41] The factors that motivated the second creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada closely resembled those that had provoked the first, although the weight of the various elements differed somewhat. In 1734, José Patiño began a review of the experiment of 1717–23, linked with broader consultations on the progress of the commercial program, that led to suspension of the *galeones* in 1735. He consulted the opinion of different experts, among them none other than Jorge de Villalonga, the former viceroy of New Granada.[42] The reasons set forth by these experts and others for reestablishment of the viceroyalty emphasized the need to achieve a more effective and responsive royal administration in the region, better realization of the economic potential of New Granada, the need to combat illicit trade, and the question of defense.[43] In the end, it was the latter question that proved decisive; as Francisco Eissa-Barroso, the latest scholar to devote extensive and detailed attention to this topic, notes, "given the timing of and the international context in which the decision was made, it is difficult not to think that defensive concerns must have weighed heavily in the mind of those involved."[44] With war with Britain imminent in mid-1739, the chosen viceroy, Field Marshal Sebastián de Eslava, was hurriedly dispatched at the head of a large body of reinforcements to the garrison at Cartagena de Indias. (In 1736, a military reform had already transformed and expanded the garrison at Cartagena, into a fixed battalion of 700 men.[45]) But it should be emphasized that the onset of the War of Jenkins' Ear merely precipitated reestablishment of the viceroyalty, which was already a foregone conclusion at this time.

It may be worthwhile reflecting briefly at this point on the outcome of this significant administrative reform and on the wider implications of the creation of the new viceroyalty.[46] Of the three chief motives behind its establishment—defense, trade, and government—the viceroyalty seemed at first most completely to satisfy the needs of the former. Sebastián de Eslava's most brilliant achievement, for example, was the repulse of the British at Cartagena de Indias in 1741. Whether this success can be considered a product of the creation of the viceroyalty, however, is doubtful, since Eslava's forces were not maintained in Cartagena when the war ended. Both the later Quito revolt (of 1765) and the *Comunero* rebellion (of 1781) found the capital and interior almost entirely without defense—emphasizing that a viceroyalty without major standing or militia forces was scarcely better defended than an *Audiencia* in similar conditions.[47] Second, so far as trade was concerned, the commercial results of establishment of the viceroyalty, if encouraging, were modest prior to the 1760s. The volume of traffic between Cadiz and Cartagena increased, there was some reduction in smuggling in the immediate postwar years, and Spain recovered a greater proportion of New Granada's external trade. Nevertheless, the overall volume of trade remained very small, while contraband subsisted on a major scale, and there were few attempts to develop the colony's natural resources or to diversify its exports. Positive developments in trade, moreover, are as easily attributed to the impact of the new trading system that grew out of suspension of the *galeones* and the growth of the register ship system from 1740 as to the creation of the new viceroyalty. In this context, and thirdly, it was in its political dimension that the reform was perhaps a most unqualified success. Immense persisting problems notwithstanding, the viceroyalty does seem to have imposed a greater degree of royal control over the New Granadan provinces, while the treasury in the region gained in authority and revenues. New treasury offices were later established, in the 1750s, in Ocaña, Cartago, and Barbacoas. Most significantly, Eslava's administration witnessed final successful development of a new and lucrative branch of income, the cane-liquor monopoly (*estanco de aguardiente*), which rapidly came to occupy a position in New Granadan finances comparable to that of the tobacco monopoly in Peru some years later.[48] Much remained to be done, but there is little doubt that colonial government in New Granada was more effective in the 1750s than in the frankly chaotic early years of the century.

Meanwhile, the impact on Peru of the loss of New Granada still awaits its historian; we have no "Lima and Santa Fé" to match

Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo's classic *Lima y Buenos Aires*. This historiographical lacuna, though in a sense surprising, may reflect the fact that the likely impact was negligible. New Granada had been too isolated from Lima's effective political control, and was too marginal to its economy, for its separation to be greatly felt. It is noteworthy, for example, that neither Villagarcía nor afterwards Manso de Velasco—the Peruvian viceroys immediately affected—raised any serious objection to this amputation of a large part of their jurisdiction (as their successors would, most vociferously, following the creation of the viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in 1776). Villagarcía and Manso's criticisms were directed at specific aspects of the reform, not the principle: above all the separation of Panama and Guayaquil, both which ports were seen as vital to Peru's commercial interests, especially before the implications of the suspension of the *galeones* and the opening of the Cape Horn trade route sank in.[49] The economic implications for Lima of the separation of New Granada, indeed, such as they were, probably derived more from the new commercial system than from establishment of the viceroyalty as such. The New Granadan markets themselves, distant and long since supplied with imports via Cartagena and the Caribbean, were of minimal interest to Lima merchants. The one significant market at stake was that of Quito, which, sure enough, provoked the only serious dispute between the mercantile communities of Lima and Cartagena. This dispute concerned legal access to Quito for imports from Callao and Cartagena, with each party petitioning Madrid for the exclusion of the other.[50] In the medium term, Lima could not compete with an increased flow of goods through Cartagena, and Quito slipped away from Peru's economic sphere; as a result, imports into northern Peru probably grew as well. But these remained relatively minor concerns for Lima merchants, and the creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada proved in no sense as traumatic as that of the establishment of the Río de la Plata some 30 years later.

Beyond the lasting creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada, one or two further measures worthy of note were taken in colonial administration at this time. Indeed, the first of these measures was decreed in the very same year as the establishment of the viceroyalty; although in this case, once more, this measure's origins lay much deeper in the early Bourbon period. By a *cédula* dated July 22, 1739, a prohibition was declared on further appointments of high-ranking clergy to American viceregencies. We saw in chapter 1 that since the late seventeenth century, three prelates had served as viceroys of Peru: archbishop of Lima Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros in 1678–81, bishop

of Quito Diego Ladrón de Guevara in 1710–16, and archibishop of Charcas and then Lima Diego Morcillo in 1716 and 1720–24. There were examples in other regions, too, notably the archbishop of Mexico, Juan Antonio de Vizarrón, who was interim viceroy of New Spain from 1734 to 1740 and was thus in post at the time of the decree banning further ecclesiastical viceregencies.

In discussing the motives for formally prohibiting cleric-viceroys, the decree of 1739 focused on the conflicts of jurisdiction and problems in the exercise of the *Real Patronato* (the rights of the Crown over the American Church) that arose from the union of the secular and ecclesiastical powers in the person of the leading colonial official. Enrique Sánchez Pedrote, in a rare publication specifically devoted to the prelate-viceroys, suggested it was based on a report by the Marqués de Torrenueva to the secretary of state, Sebastián de la Quadra; but it seems probable that reports from the Indies were a further important factor.[51] Viceroy Castelfuerte sent reports virulently critical of his predecessors as prelates-viceroy, and seeking a ban on further such appointments, in 1725 and 1733, and the experienced captain of fleets Manuel López Pintado wrote in a similar vein to Torrenueva in 1736. The Marqués de Villagarcía also later commented on the problems that arose from the union of the two powers.[52] Whatever its origins, and although in both the viceroyalties of New Spain and New Granada there would be further examples, in Peru this decree brought the age of the prelate-viceroys to an end. It thus closed an important chapter in the power of the Peruvian Church and its intromission in secular administration and government.

Finally, Francisco Eissa-Barroso has identified a further royal decree of 1740–41 that ordered that "all the military offices" in the colonies should be "granted to soldiers whom I [the King] will personally choose." Eissa-Barroso argues that with this decree, the Crown "officially recognised its intention to militarise all governorships along the coasts and borders of Spanish America"; a further significant moment, then, in the wider Bourbon militarization of administrative positions in both the colonies and Spain.[53]

Fiscal Affairs

Beyond the shift to the register ship system and reestablishment of the viceroyalty of New Granada, the main developments of interest during the period covered by the current chapter were concentrated in fiscal affairs. The late 1730s and early 1740s were marked by

further tinkering with taxation and revenues, among which perhaps two initiatives may be highlighted as having broader significance. First and foremost, this period witnessed the only strictly new tax to be introduced in the viceroyalty of Peru throughout the early Bourbon decades. Ironically, it came at the hands of the Marqués de Villagarcía, substantially the most conservative of the viceroys of the period, who found himself obliged to seek some new source of revenue to address the huge costs of the War of Jenkins' Ear. In February 1741, he summoned a *Junta general de tribunales* (a general council of administrative bodies) to discuss what was best to be done, and this Junta resolved to raise funds for the war through the imposition of an entirely new tax in the viceroyalty. This tax was only ever known as the *Nuevo Impuesto* (New Tax), though in fact it was a sort of domestic *almojarifazgo*, with duty charged on a wide range of agricultural and industrial goods entering Lima and other towns and cities. Only a small range of products were explicitly exempted, most of them foodstuffs: meat, bread, candles, animal fat, and also soap. The goods affected and the rates to be charged were decided by a specially constituted Junta and the *cabildo* (municipal council) of Lima. In the viceregal capital, administration of the tax was charged to the *Consulado*, and it became a means of recovering sums loaned by merchants toward defense costs at the start of the war. In the provinces, by contrast, the tax was administered directly by the *corregidores*, although from 1744 onward, a growing number of provinces paid their quota by lump sum, until eventually this became the dominant form of payment outside the capital. The new tax was deeply unpopular, and provoked general and sustained protest on the part of *cabildos* and prominent individuals throughout the viceroyalty. There was widespread incidence of fraud among *corregidores*, and in Lima the tax was especially resented in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake of 1746. Introduced in August 1742, it was finally abolished by the end of 1752; in this period, it produced the not inconsiderable sum of 1,920,980 pesos, of which more than half was collected in Lima. All funds remaining after administrative costs were spent on defense, especially on naval costs.[54]

A second initiative in fiscal affairs concerned the rights of the Crown to revenues pertaining to the Church in Peru. In general, the decade following 1736 was a quiet period in Church-state relations, as in other spheres, compared with those that went before or followed after. Viceroy Marqués de Villagarcía achieved a return to harmonious relations with the Peruvian Church, after the turbulence of the Castelfuerte years, that endured into the early 1750s. It is possible

that he was simply too old and tired to confront the continual challenges that seemed indispensable to maintenance of the privileges of the Crown; although in practice, his seemingly reasonable and diplomatic approach to the Church does not appear to have implied any serious abdication of authority.[55] Nevertheless, Villagarcía's viceregency was marked by a small but significant instance of what would afterwards become a growing trend in relations between Bourbon Crown and Church: the quest for an increase in the share demanded by the Crown of the revenues of the American Church. Thus, in 1737, the Crown won an increased proportion of the ecclesiastical tithe by appropriating the income from vacant benefices (*vacantes*). Ecclesiastical livings often fell vacant, usually through the death of the incumbent, and—given the vagaries of the state and Church bureaucracy—might remain unfilled for years, their income left unclaimed. It was these funds that the new measure targeted: in July 1737, a Junta formed for this purpose in Madrid declared that, since under the *Patronato* all tithes belonged to the Crown, and since *vacantes* were a product of the tithe, so they too belonged to the Crown. This Junta suggested that income from *vacantes* should be put to pious ends, and treasury officials were instructed in a *cédula* of October 5, 1737 to reserve the product of lesser benefices to support good works. Nevertheless, the same *cédula* ordered that income from greater benefices (Bishoprics, the more lucrative posts on Cathedral Chapters, and so forth) should be kept for use at the discretion of the Crown.[56] The income from vacantes averaged some 44,000 pesos per year in the 1740s, a figure which more than doubled in the following decade.[57] The fiscal significance of the measure was thus limited; but it marked the commencement of a notable trend, whose next major step, taken in the early 1750s, was the appropriation of an entire ecclesiastical levy, that which derived from sales of Bulls of Crusade (as discussed in the following chapter).

Finally, we saw in chapter 4 that no fiscal issue commanded such attention in Peru from the 1720s onwards as did commercial taxation, particularly the *alcabala*, *almorifazgo*, and *avería* taxes. It was in the hope of raising the revenue from these taxes that their administration was taken out of contract with the *Consulado de Lima* and returned to the hands of royal treasury officials from 1724. By the mid-1730s, it was clear that this hope had proved false, setting in train a further process of inquiry and review. An initial proposal from Viceroy Castelfuerte to adopt the system for collection of *alcabalas* then in force in Mexico was rejected by the *Consejo de Indias*, and Castelfuerte ordered treasury officials in the provinces to rent

out the *alcabala* if their own administration produced little revenue. This train of review and reform of the domestic *alcabala* in Peru was continued when in 1736, José Patiño relented, and ordered the Marqués de Villagarcía to adopt the Mexican system so far as conditions in Peru would permit.[58] In 1738 the Crown's commitment to direct administration itself wavered, and the *Consejo* was instructed to prepare Villagarcía for a return to the system of contracts (*asientos*) for levying of the *alcabala*, contracts in all likelihood to be signed once more with the *Consulado*. A respected Crown official was to manage transition to the regime of tax farming; but in view of difficulties in appointing this official, the project was permitted to lapse.[59] Nevertheless, in 1736, Villagarcía, who was generally in favor of tax farming, had all the provincial *alcabalas* put out to farming.[60] Only in 1746, and under a later viceroy (Jose Antonio Manso de Velasco) would further significant review of the *alcabala* take place; and even then, the principle of tax farming remained unchanged into the late Bourbon era after 1763. The provincial *alcabala* thus remained the sole significant exception to the general rule of a return of revenues to direct royal administration evident under early Bourbon rule during the period from the 1720s onwards.

Conclusion

The decade following the death of José Patiño in 1736 witnessed two of the most important innovations in colonial government of the entire Bourbon era, either early or late. The definitive creation of the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739, as the first new viceroyalty to be created in the Spanish colonies since the sixteenth century, naturally features in any survey of Spanish Bourbon reform. The shift to register ships tends to feature less prominently in such surveys, understandably when it was not the product of active policy, but was forced upon Spanish ministers by the failure of the earlier program for Atlantic trade and by the onset of a long war from 1739. This does not detract from its importance, nevertheless, as a major shift in the structure of colonial trade, and an important bridge between the Habsburg *Carrera de Indias* and the Bourbon era of "Free Trade" introduced from 1765. But the development of these two major measures during the late 1730s and early 1740s should not blind us to the underlying loss of reforming momentum in imperial government that took place during this decade. The first cycle for early Bourbon reform, that began under Julio Alberoni in the late 1710s, and was developed above all by Patiño in the 1720s and 1730s, died with the

latter minister; both the viceroyalty of New Granada and the shift to register ships in colonial trade, indeed, had origins that lay before his death. The lack of any very clear colonial policy in the years following 1736 was itself the product of the lack of any very strong successor to Patiño at the head of Spanish government, particularly in colonial affairs, tied to the sapping costs and effects of the war. Only from 1743 would a firm direction return to Spanish colonial affairs, with the rise of the Marqués de la Ensenada as Patiño's most distinguished successor. And only from 1745 would a new cycle truly commence in Peru, with the arrival of a fit successor to the Marqués de Castelfuerte as viceroy, in the person of José Antonio Manso de Velasco, later Conde de Superunda.

Chapter 6

Reform Renewed: The Second Cycle, 1745 to 1763

Introduction

The pace of governmental initiative and reform, both for Spain and the colonies, that slowed following the death of José Patiño in 1736, quickened again around a decade later. Two main factors may be identified as providing the basis for the renewed stability and efficacy apparent in government from the mid-1740s. The first was the final winding-down of the Wars of Jenkins' Ear and the Austrian Succession; the final Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was not signed until 1748, but major hostilities in the Americas had ceased by the end of 1742. Just as the ending of the long War of Succession had contributed to the first florescence of early Bourbon government after 1713, so a return to peace unquestionably freed up resources and energy for a second flourishing of reforming initiative in the mid-1740s. But the other major factor was the rise to power of Zenón de Somodevilla y Bengoechea, Marqués de la Ensenada, who with Julio Alberoni and José Patiño made up the trio of most influential servants of the early Bourbon Crown. It is to Ensenada, then, and his key servant and collaborator in Peru, Viceroy Manso de Velasco, that we first turn in this chapter.

The Marqués de la Ensenada was the product of a petty noble family of Logroño, and like his predecessor José del Campillo y Cossío, was a protégé of Patiño. Appointed by the latter to a minor post in the Ministry of Marine in 1720, Ensenada spent the following two decades at work in virtually every branch of the navy, rising by 1737 to secretary of the Admiralty.[1] On the death of Campillo in 1743, he acceded to the secretariats of Hacienda, War, and Indies and Marine,

to which were later added the Superintendency-General of Revenues and sundry other posts, making him "Secretary of Everything."[2] Although the point has not been explored at any length, I would argue that this concentration of ministries in their persons was key in allowing both Ensenada and Patiño before him to make a space for colonial affairs among the other pressing problems of government. Ensenada was prodigiously hardworking, flamboyant, and self-confident to the point of arrogance; in politics, he was astute, inventive, a realist, and a fierce patriot. His vision for Spain depended on reform at home and peace abroad, with a role of balance and arbitration between Britain and France. When he fell in July 1754, it was in a sort of coup largely engineered by the British ambassador, Sir Benjamin Keene.[3] With peace finally secure from 1748, he was able to implement a program that has at times caused him to be considered the first true Bourbon reformer. Because of this, or because he was Spanish by birth, or for the elements of social reform perceptible in his domestic program, he seems destined for a place in the Spanish historiography of the period denied until now to Patiño. He has fared better than the latter only in relative terms, however, with writings on his work few and far between even to date.[4]

To foreign observers it appeared that Ensenada shared power in the 1740s with the secretary of state, José de Carvajal, and the royal confessor, the Jesuit father Francisco de Rávago, in a governmental triumvirate. The importance of this sharing of power should not be underestimated—Allan Kuethe has suggested that it was Ensenada's failure to secure the Secretariat of State that ultimately brought him down—but in practice, his authority was virtually absolute in domestic affairs, and entirely so in the affairs of the Indies.[5] His program of domestic reform is often portrayed as novel in its scale, and perhaps especially in the social dimension detected in its fiscal aspect, although in fact, most of it built upon firm foundations established either by Alberoni or Patiño. In fiscal affairs, Ensenada attempted to "replace existing taxes on consumer goods . . . by a single tax on income"; this single tax would "not only resolve immediate problems of revenue but also effect more permanent structural change and become part of a general reform of the administration and the treasury." It was ultimately frustrated by its (primarily aristocratic) opponents, but Ensenada also returned the *rentas provinciales* (the *alcabala*, *cientos*, and *millones* taxes) to direct royal administration, and established the *Real Giro* scheme to serve the Crown in transactions of international finance.[6] He extended the Intendant system throughout the Peninsula and, true to his naval background,

launched a major shipbuilding and supplies initiative, refloating a program that had foundered since the death of Patiño.[7]

So far as Ensenada's program for the Indies is concerned, some scholars have interpreted his colonial policies as marking the true onset of Bourbon reform in America, and as clearly precursory to the program of Charles III.[8] His own preoccupation was with colonial trade; and if his apparent radicalism in Atlantic affairs failed to find full expression—he was reported as remarking in 1750 that "the most beneficial thing that could happen to this country would be to burn all the laws of the Indies"[9]—it was nevertheless during his administration that single register ships came further to dominate the Atlantic trade, sealing the fate of an already moribund traditional system of fleets and trade fairs. Elsewhere, as we shall see, he was concerned above all with administrative reform, finally halting sales of office to the *Audiencias* and *corregimientos*, and with colonial defense, of which he instituted a large-scale review after 1748.

Ensenada's greatest impact in America, however, was exercised indirectly, through his choice of candidates for the top administrative positions in the colonies. He staffed the Indies with trusted dependents, many of them like himself from the Rioja region, and provided steadfast support to the initiatives these men chose to implement locally. What might have proven to be disastrous nepotism was averted by the high caliber of the officials so appointed, who came to constitute a new wave of Bourbon officialdom, in my view directly comparable to the group of military officers appointed to key posts in the years around 1720 (and who were discussed briefly in chapter 3). These officials included the first Conde de Revillagigedo as viceroy of New Spain (1746–52) and Domingo Ortiz de Rosas as governor of Chile (1746–55), as well as the key figure for the present purposes: José Antonio Manso de Velasco, later Conde de Superunda, as viceroy of Peru. In 1751, Ensenada further decided to place "in the main provinces of this viceroyalty military governors to re-establish the proper administration of justice"; nine such officers arrived two years later, their disposal placed at the discretion of Manso de Velasco.[10]

Manso de Velasco reached Peru in July 1745, and remained there for more than 16 years, the longest term of any of the Peruvian viceroys throughout the colonial period. Following the aristocratic viceregency of the Marqués de Villagarcía after 1736, Manso represented a return to the classic Bourbon administrative type: a man of modest *hidalgo* origins who rose by his own merit through a military career to the rewards of high office and ennoblement. A *riojano*, he

entered the Royal Guards at the age of 16, and began a career at arms that involved him in the battles of the War of Succession, the recapture of Oran in north Africa in 1732, and successive "Farnesian" campaigns in Italy. In 1736, he received his first appointment in government, and his first posting to America, as captain-general of Chile. He spent eight years in Santiago, an active period now chiefly remembered for the foundation of a string of new towns in the environs of the capital.[11] In Peru, he proved a highly capable viceroy, industrious and thoughtful; his long governmental report presents a clear index to a well-ordered mind.[12] Manso was an innovator who undertook several major reforms of real novelty, while his less aggressive style probably ultimately made him a more effective governor than the most directly comparable of his immediate predecessors, the Marqués de Castelfuerte. He was seen at his best in the aftermath of the huge Lima earthquake of 1746, working diligently to succor the populace and speed reconstruction—efforts that contributed to his ennoblement two years later, and that even today are commemorated by a string of monuments in the Peruvian capital.[13] Probably still the best known of the early Bourbon viceroys, his end was tragic: he was caught up in the British attack on Havana in 1762 on his return voyage to Spain (at the age of 74), was made a scapegoat for the loss of the city, and was ruined. He died five years later still attempting to clear his name.[14]

As already noted, Manso de Velasco numbered among Ensenada's colonial protégés; and it was this relationship with the chief Spanish minister that conferred upon his viceregal administration much of its significance. A remarkable fragment of the private correspondence between the two men survives to illustrate its nature.[15] They addressed each other as *paisano del alma* ("countryman of my soul") or *amigo de mi vida* ("friend of my life"); Ensenada handled important family affairs for Manso in his absence; both alluded repeatedly to their common origins in La Rioja.[16] From the very first, Ensenada announced his intention not only to support Manso in his decisions, but also formally to supply him with any additional powers he might find imperative to the prosecution of his program: "You should act as your honour and conscience dictate, since here you will be supported; and tell me what you cannot do by yourself, so you can be sent the necessary orders."[17] This support was not to be acknowledged openly, but would be none the less real for that:

> "It is necessary that you should take a hand in affairs, throwing the stone where you see fit, and hiding the hand; since that is what I am here for, and my sword is very long";[18]

> "Care will be taken to ensure that the orders conceding you the powers that you ask for do not refer to your reports; but you should take no notice of this, since everyone knows that you are greatly supported by the king, and my ministry".[19]

The chief goal of this absolute support was reform of the Peruvian treasury and the increase of remissions to Spain, and the greatest new powers conceded to Manso de Velasco were those encompassed within the General Superintendency of the royal treasury (discussed later in the present chapter). But the viceroy used his special influence in a wide range of affairs; and this, combined with his own resourcefulness, produced a program of reforms perhaps unprecedented in Peru since the viceregency of Francisco de Toledo in the 1570s. The most important of these reforms operated in the field of fiscal affairs, not surprisingly given the overall priorities set by Ensenada; but we shall see that other major measures also affected the silver-mining sector and the viceregal Church during these years. And we shall first address a still further key area: reforms to the colonial administration itself.

Colonial Administration

In colonial administration, after 1750, a decisive shift occurred in a question that had been of concern to the early Bourbon Crown almost from its origins: that of sales of posts in the colonial bureaucracy. As we saw in chapter 4, sales of posts at the highest level in the colonies, in the *Audiencias*, were effectively halted between 1712 and 1730, and remained largely suspended for a further decade thereafter. Sales of other posts in the colonial bureaucracy went on without interruption, however, or even increased, despite several decrees announcing their abolition, particularly in the 1720s. After 1745, indeed, sales of posts in the American *Audiencias* again reached levels unprecedented since the War of Succession at the beginning of the century. Throughout the 1740s, doubtless spurred by the long period of warfare after 1739, 12 appointments or promotions to the *Audiencia* of Lima alone were without question purchased, while the number of posts sold for all the Peruvian courts reached twice this number.[20] The most that can be said for the reforming attitude of the Crown during what constituted a second major episode of sales of *Audiencia* posts is that some attempt was made to mitigate their impact, by the momentary suspension of supernumerary judges and by the grant of enhanced powers to American authorities to investigate the qualities of new appointees.[21]

However, a major change came about from 1750, which signified the definitive end to sales of the higher posts in Spanish colonial administration. Most importantly, and although no formal decree announced the reform, strong circumstantial evidence suggests that the sale of *Audiencia* positions was halted permanently from this time.[22] Furthermore, the sale of posts in colonial treasuries was also halted in 1750, alongside *Audiencia* judgeships. And it is claimed that sales of *corregimientos* (provincial magistracies), too, were halted, in 1751,[23] possibly in the context of the broader reform that legalized the forced distribution of goods by corregidores at this very date. In short, the early 1750s witnessed a definitive shift in policy, marking the end to sales of posts in the higher colonial bureaucracy, and closing a cycle that had plagued colonial administration since the seventeenth century. In its concern for a closer royal control over bureaucratic appointments, and thus a tighter and more active control over the colonies themselves, this must be considered a major early Bourbon reform in colonial affairs.

What was more, the halt to sales of colonial offices found its counterpart in a much less well-known process: a notable reinforcement of the authority of the viceroys, evident from the late 1740s onwards. During the early years subsequent to 1700, a recognizably Habsburg confusion of jurisdictions had prevailed in the colonies, with a fragmentation and overlapping of authority between different officials and bodies, that operated at least in part to the prejudice of the viceroys. As examples of the development of this process, in 1717, *Audiencias* were permitted to grant appointees access to their bureaucratic posts over the heads of the viceroys,[24] while in 1725, Viceroy Castelfuerte was rebuffed in an attempt to win the right to make appointments to the Peruvian treasuries. The patronage at the disposal of the viceroys, too, was sharply curtailed when *cédulas* of 1716 and 1727 further restricted their rights of appointment to *corregimientos* and proprietary military posts,[25] and with the legal death of *encomienda* in 1720 (discussed in chapter 4). And in the decade following 1727, minor but significant branches of the royal treasury were removed from the viceroys' control and placed under that of dedicated officials, including income from the *media anata* and *lanzas* taxes and from the regularization of land titles (*composiciones de tierras*). Most significantly, in 1736, the revenue from sales of mercury from Huancavelica in the silver-mining centers was removed from viceregal control and placed in the hands of a newly powerful governor (in the first instance, Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente—see chapter 4).

This pattern of dilution of viceregal authority was reversed firmly from the late 1740s. Between 1748 and 1751, the right of *Audiencias* to grant access to office without the assent of the viceroys, granted in 1717, was revoked. Viceroys' authority over *Audiencias* was further enhanced in 1749 by the concession of greater powers to punish negligence or malfeasance among judges, and in 1753 by the right to determine appeals arising from suits involving judges or their close relatives.[26] But the greatest accretion to the powers of the viceroys was that which derived from the *Superintendencia general de Real Hacienda* (General Superintendency of the Royal Exchequer) and associated measures taken during the years 1746–52. This innovation (discussed at length in the following section) gave viceroys unprecedented, indeed absolute, authority over any affairs related to the treasury; for example, it even deprived *Audiencias* of cognizance of legal cases involving royal revenues. The strengthening of the office of viceroy after 1746 arose from Ensenada's determination to grant trusted officials in the colonies the powers necessary to implement whatever reforms they saw fit. But its effect was much more wide-ranging, and ensured that the viceregency in Peru entered the late Bourbon period with its authority significantly enhanced. Policy toward colonial administration from the years around 1750, then, was based on both an end to sales of American office, and the strengthening of the authority of the viceroy, in both cases in quest of a more effective and efficient government of the colonies.

Fiscal Affairs

From the mid-1740s, responsibility for fiscal policy in the American viceroyalties lay ultimately with the Marqués de la Ensenada. Ensenada sought self-sufficiency for the treasury within the Peninsula, and tended to regard American income as a windfall, to be applied strategically as and when it arrived.[27] But this did not mean that he underestimated the importance of American revenues. He obtained several decrees strengthening his authority over colonial treasury affairs, as secretary for the Indies.[28] He believed that American viceroys faced fewer obstacles in laying hands on funds than he himself did, and in letter after letter he pressed Manso de Velasco for remissions of revenue from Peru. The urgency of these requests was reinforced in 1748, with the enhanced opportunities and greater costs that came upon the Peace of Aix-la-Chappelle.[29] Ensenada's policy toward American fiscal affairs broadly reflected

the concerns apparent in his domestic program of reform. In 1746, as part of a general review of colonial fiscal policy that encompassed the *alcabala* tax, he considered introducing a variant of the Intendant system to Peru.[30] In the same year, he reactivated the process that brought an end to private operation of the Peruvian Mints (as discussed hereafter). After the Treaty of Aix, he ordered that military garrisons be cut back to a minimum so as to save on salaries, and more broadly, he invited Manso de Velasco to advise as to possible cuts in civil and ecclesiastical salaries.[31]

In general terms, indeed, Ensenada left Manso a free hand in the development of viceregal fiscal policy, merely issuing vague injunctions to set the Peruvian treasury in good order, foster the more rigorous administration of revenues, and eliminate corruption. It was to enable the viceroy to realize the parallel goals of an improved administration of the treasury, higher revenues, and so a greater surplus for remission to Spain, that Ensenada offered Manso a legislative *carte blanche* and any additional powers he might require. This offer was reiterated in 1748, Ensenada writing that the viceroy was well placed to establish order in the Peruvian treasury, "since you have the powers, and you will be given all that you wish." He returned to the point some months later: "You have been given powers to do so, and should you wish for more, you will be given more."[32] The offer was complemented by a special receptivity to Manso's proposals in fiscal matters; indeed, the viceroy's initiatives were accepted so readily in Madrid that it seems possible the two men discussed the options for fiscal innovation in Peru before Manso's departure from Spain.

This unusually close relationship between minister and viceroy provided the context within which the significant innovations in Peruvian fiscal affairs of the 1740s and 1750s developed. Ensenada's readiness to give Manso the additional powers he needed to effect reform and increase income to the Peruvian treasury became apparent from the late 1740s, in an important process of concentration of fiscal responsibility in Peru. This policy first bore fruit in 1746, when Manso was granted broad powers to correct abuses and ensure the treasury was run properly according to established laws.[33] In 1747, he gained ultimate legal jurisdiction over most branches of the treasury, including the *media anata* and *Lanzas* taxes and income from *composiciones de tierras*, though still excluding revenue arising from the Mint and the mercury monopoly.[34] But in the following year, a new governor was appointed for Huancavelica with greatly curtailed control over the income from mercury sales, while the viceroy later exploited an internal crisis in the *Tribunal de Cuentas* to assume

several of the functions of the regent of the latter body.[35] And this extended process reached its culmination in 1751, with the decree of the viceregal *Superintendencia General de Real Hacienda*. This measure had its origins in Ensenada's proposal of 1746 for establishment of Intendants with special fiscal responsibility in Peru, an idea Manso had opposed, seeking instead a general superintendency of the treasury for himself.[36] The crucial *cédula*, dated June 30, 1751, gave American viceroys powers identical to those of the Superintendent General of the treasury in Spain; that is to say, complete authority to collect, administer, and farm out the royal revenues. The mercury monopoly and the Mints were now expressly included in his jurisdiction, and it was declared that no minister or tribunal of the Crown might challenge the viceroy's authority in fiscal matters.[37] Two further *cédulas* of the following year rounded out these powers, notably by declaring that no official might undertake any initiative in questions affecting the treasury without the viceroy's knowledge and prior approval.[38]

The General Superintendency of the royal exchequer was a major innovation in colonial fiscal organization. It gave viceroys a degree of authority in fiscal, and more broadly economic, matters they had not enjoyed since the formal organization of the treasury system in the early 1570s almost two centuries before. Manso made explicit use of his powers in a variety of ways: to quash the claim of owners of register ships to large tax concessions in the wake of the breakdown of the fleet system; to reinforce his authority with regard to the treasuries and the *Tribunal de Cuentas*; or to bring the governor of Potosí to heel in disputes arising from implementation of the new regime at the Potosí Mint.[39] The basic effect of the decrees of 1751 and 1752 was to give the viceroy entire freedom of action to manage the treasury as he saw fit, to abolish or alter established features or to introduce new ones, without fear of legal challenge from the *Audiencia*, royal treasury officials, other ministers, or governors. The great potential of these powers to effect real change in the viceroyalty was recognized, and to some extent realized, when in 1780 they were transferred to inspectors-general José Antonio de Areche and then Jorge de Escobedo during the *visita general* of 1776–84 (they were transferred back to the viceroy in 1787).[40]

Armed with these formal powers, and equally importantly with the unstinting support of Ensenada, Manso de Velasco became the author of two measures of real importance to the Peruvian treasury. The first was the legalization of *repartimiento de mercancías* (forced distribution of goods to Indians) by *corregidores*. The provincial

magistrates had long distributed batches of supposedly needful goods among native communities in their districts, and had drawn much of the economic benefit of their posts from this practice. But it was the object of persistent criticism from observers who emphasized the excessive prices that were charged, often for goods of little practical use to the native peasantry.[41] The official documentation surrounding legalization of *repartimiento* consistently emphasized the economic and social aspects to this "reform": the benefits it would bring both to *corregidores* themselves and to the Indians, who would be able to obtain necessary supplies under shelter of a properly regulated legal framework. But there is little doubt that the principal motive was fiscal. When Manso arrived in Lima he held several discussions with the Regent of the *Tribunal de Cuentas*, the Marqués de Casa Calderón, concerning means of raising revenue to the treasury. Among other matters, Casa Calderón brought to Manso's attention the revenue which the Crown forfeited by failing to recognize and so to tax the *repartimiento de mercancía*, which went on anyway and was worth up to 2 million pesos per year. Casa Calderón also recalled two *cédulas* of 1735, which could be interpreted as permitting *repartimiento*, so long as the goods distributed were both necessary and sold at fair prices.[42] Manso immediately acted on these discussions, and, in July 1746, sent a full report on his proposals for legalization of the *repartimiento* to Madrid—including provisional estimates prepared by the Royal Officials of the value and price of goods to be distributed.[43]

These proposals contradicted royal policy of the previous two hundred years, and envisaged legalization of a practice whose evil effects were abundantly documented. The Council of the Indies opposed it outright, while Ensenada hesitated; he seems to have requested the opinions of the viceroy of New Spain and the president of the *Audiencia* of Guatemala, since both men presented reports on this matter, in November 1748 and November 1749 respectively. Ensenada then referred all of this documentation to Sebastián de Eslava, the former viceroy of New Granada; and it was Eslava's favorable verdict that finally decided the issue.[44] His recommendations were incorporated in a *cédula* of June 15, 1751, which ordered the formation of a Junta composed of members of the *Audiencia*, which would prepare the detailed tariff lists on which the new system was to be based.[45] Under Manso's presidency, the Junta in Lima drew up lists (*aranceles*) establishing the precise quantity and species of goods each *corregidor* would be permitted to distribute to Indians under his jurisdiction, as well as the prices at which these goods were to be

sold.[46] Fifteen-point regulations were also established, intended to ensure that the new distributions were made honestly and in accordance with the tariffs.[47] Legalized *repartimiento* came into effect from early 1754, and the tariff lists and regulations were approved by decree of June 5, 1756.

The fiscal impact of this measure was considerable. Assuming that full quotas of goods established in the tariffs were actually sold at the prices indicated, and that little income was lost to fraud, taxing *repartimiento* implied an immediate increase of some 47 percent in the value of the *alcabala* on trade within Peru. That is to say, income from the *alcabala* in Peru should have risen from 503,546 pesos for the five-year period 1747–1752, to 739,308 pesos in the five-year period after the system was introduced.[48] Even if all this increase was not achieved, a large part of it clearly was, and so fuelled the overall increase of 60 percent in the value of the *alcabala* which Manso de Velasco identified as occurring during this same period. The income from tax on *repartimientos* was soon considered so significant, in fact, that it long contributed to the deafness of the viceregal authorities in the face of growing evidence of the critical social need to abolish the institution of *repartimiento de mercancía* itself.[49] As is well known, it would take the traumatic experience of the rebellion of Túpaq Amaru in 1780–81, with the resulting huge loss of life and property, before the Crown finally recognized this need, and again suppressed legal *repartimiento*.[50]

Manso de Velasco's second and far greater contribution to Peruvian fiscal resources was establishment of the *estanco del tabaco*, the royal tobacco monopoly.[51] The Marqués de la Ensenada showed an early interest in exploiting the market for colonial tobacco to the Crown's advantage, and may have discussed the establishment of a monopoly with Manso before his departure for Peru.[52] But the *estanco* itself was entirely Manso's work. Soon after his arrival he entrusted the affair to a royal accountant, Tomás de Chavaque, who prepared a detailed project describing how it might be arranged. In its eventual form, the monopoly was governed by a *Junta Real de Tabacos* comprising members of the *Audiencia* and headed by the viceroy himself. It was administered by a team of dedicated Crown functionaries under the Director General José Nieto, a former consul of the Lima merchant guild. Tobacco was imported, principally from Havana via Panama, or purchased from producers in the north of Peru itself; it was kept in a central store and distributed in Lima through a network of kiosks (*estanquillos*) set up at points around the city. The *estanco* was introduced over a

number of years; proclaimed by viceregal decree of April 24, 1752, it first operated only in Lima and affected only snuff (*tabaco en polvo* or *rapé*). Early in 1753, it was extended to include the more widely used leaf tobacco (*de hoja* or *rama*). In May of the same year, a separate monopoly was established in Chile; and after 1754, the system was gradually extended throughout the viceroyalty: to Trujillo, Huamanga, Cuzco, Arequipa, La Paz, Santa Cruz, La Plata, and lastly Buenos Aires, in late 1755. Ordinances governing the monopoly's operations were finally printed in Lima in 1759.

Start-up costs for the *estanco* were high: purchase of existing stocks of tobacco alone cost some 380,000 pesos, and there was further investment to be made in buildings and the salaries of governing officials. All of this had to be advanced from the treasury, to be repaid against future profits. On the other hand, income was considerable even from the first years. In the period 1752–62, the *estanco* gave average annual profits of some 140,000 pesos in the viceroyalty as a whole; from as early as 1754, the whole of the military subsidy (*situado*) for Chile was paid from *estanco* income, to the relief of the treasury in Lima.[53] In later years, the tobacco monopoly became one of the Crown's most important sources of both revenue and credit. Income increased gradually until the late 1770s, but then grew rapidly as a result of a reorganization undertaken during the *Visita General* that followed the Túpaq Amaru rebellion, to reach a peak of more than half a million pesos in 1785. As Catalina Vizcarra has emphasized in recent work on this topic, in fact, "gross revenues from the tobacco monopoly surpassed silver" for much of the period from 1752 to the eve of Independence, while "net revenues represented around 15 per cent of fiscal income for most of the period."[54] The *estanco del tabaco's* rich resources—already by 1760, tobacco stocks represented almost 30 percent of all Crown wealth in Peru—were used to guarantee emergency borrowing by hard-pressed viceregal authorities.[55] Indeed, the reliable character of tobacco profits made it easy for the government to obtain huge loans from creditors happy to receive payment in the form of *censos* against the monopoly income.

Legalization of *repartimiento de mercancía* and establishment of the *estanco del tabaco* represent the two major policies developed by viceroy Manso de Velasco in fiscal affairs. But there were other measures. The 1740s also witnessed a renewal of the reform of the Peruvian Mints, which it will be recalled (from chapter 4) had been suspended on the outbreak of war in the late 1730s. By chance, one of the earlier obstacles to Crown ownership of the Lima Mint was

removed when the great earthquake of 1746 demolished the old building and permitted the purchase of its site and some adjoining land at a greatly reduced price. In the same year, the Crown demonstrated its commitment to reform by dispatching an official, Andrés de Morales, to Mexico City with orders to familiarize himself with the workings of the Mint there, and then to proceed to Lima to implement Crown operation as superintendent. Morales arrived in Lima on May 25, 1748, with a team of experienced Mexican officials, and took possession of the Mint two days later. Coinage on the royal account began immediately. A viceregal decree was published ordering all owners of raw gold and silver (*pastas*) to take them to the Mint for valuation and purchase. To promote the smooth establishment of the new system, and to forestall any hesitation on the part of the owners, Manso took steps to ensure funds sufficient to purchase incoming metal were always readily available. All existing staff, most of whom had purchased their positions, were suspended; though most were promptly restored to their posts, now as salaried Crown officials.[56]

Several dispossessed officials who had previously enjoyed proprietary occupation of their posts (through purchase) resisted introduction of the new regime. The chief of these, the former treasurer the Conde de San Juan de Lurigancho, spent years lobbying the Crown for continuance of the income he had received while owner of his position. But this and similar obstacles were overcome. In 1751, the Crown sent Manso de Velasco a copy of the Ordinances governing the Mexican Mint, and invited him to suggest adaptations suitable to conditions in Peru. With the viceroy's suggestions incorporated, the final Ordinances governing Crown operation of the Lima Mint were issued on November 11, 1755.[57] The wholesale reform of the Mint in Lower Peru that had commenced in the late 1720s was thus brought to conclusion some quarter of a century later. Meanwhile, reforms in this sector extended further afield than Lima alone: in the 1740s, the Crown responded to appeals by the local population in Chile, and created an entirely new Mint at Santiago. The first to be established in Spanish South America since the 1680s, and operational from 1749, it saved Chilean precious metals the expensive and risky voyage to Lima for coinage.[58] In 1758, a further new Mint was established, at Popayán in southern New Granada, and produced *moneda de cordoncillo* (the new round, milled coinage) from this date. The process of reform at the second Peruvian Mint, at Potosí, was rather slower; incorporation to the Crown was decreed in 1750, but there were many delays. Construction of the

splendid new building went on throughout the 1760s, and it was not until 1767 that the first *moneda de cordoncillo* was manufactured in Potosí.

Lastly, in 1746, Manso de Velasco made further changes to the administration of the *alcabala* tax in Peru, an issue that, as we have seen in the previous two chapters, had preoccupied all the viceroys of the period since the 1720s. To be highlighted here is the preparation by a Junta on Manso's orders of tariff lists (*aranceles*) assigning all American goods a fixed value for the purposes of taxation. These lists were then used to calculate the *alcabala* due on each cargo of merchandise, allowing the unreliable and time-consuming system of piecemeal valuation between Royal Officials and individual merchants to be discarded.[59] The evidence is that these reforms had some effect on revenues from commercial taxation, further contributing to the 60 percent rise in income from *alcabalas* that Manso de Velasco claimed to have witnessed between the five-year periods 1740–44 and 1750–54.[60] Nevertheless, Madrid continued to be dissatisfied, and administration of the *alcabala* was subject to further review by Ensenada in 1746 and again in 1752; though no further action was taken during the period covered by this book.[61] In late Bourbon times, as is well known, the *alcabala* rates and administration in Peru formed a major focus of fiscal policy in the viceroyalty, and one that became the target of much violent resistance to reform there.[62]

Beyond fiscal administration as such, Bourbon policy toward the *generation* of revenue during the 1740s and 1750s demonstrated much the same apparent conservatism as in the 1720s and 1730s: the primary emphasis was on extraction of greater value from existing taxes rather than the imposition of new levies. Perhaps the key instance of this greater appropriation of existing resources was the requisition by the Crown after 1750 of the ecclesiastical levy known as the *Cruzada*. We saw in the preceding chapter that the first significant instance of a Bourbon claim to a greater share of the income of the Peruvian Church dated to the late 1730s, with the appropriation of income from benefices left vacant after the death or departure of their incumbent (so-called *vacantes*). Appropriation of income from the *Cruzada* represented a more significant step than this earlier measure, since it embraced a distinct branch of ecclesiastical revenue. In their origins, *Bulas de la Santa Cruzada* (Bulls of Crusade) were designed to raise funds for military campaigns in the Holy Land, but they had long since become a regular ecclesiastical levy, sold to willing purchasers every other year. In

1750, Fernando VI won from the Pope the right to administer the *Cruzada* through the clergy of his choice and to apply its product to whatever end he saw fit. A *Nueva Planta* (new regulations) governing administration of the tax was decreed by *cédula* of May 12, 1751, but had to be substantially modified by Manso de Velasco, and was eventually established in Ordinances published in Lima in 1752. These placed the *Cruzada* under the overall responsibility of the viceroy, with actual sale of bulls handled by Crown rather than clergy officials wherever possible. The *Nueva Planta* provided that the resulting income be used to maintain forts and garrisons along the coasts and to "pacify" the Indian tribes of the interior, in both cases ostensibly in defense of the church. But after 1752, this earmarking was all that distinguished the *Cruzada* from any other branch of the Peruvian treasury.[63]

Mining

In the mining sector, the late 1740s witnessed the reversal of the policies for reform of the mercury industry witnessed during the 1720s and 1730s, and that were described at some length in chapter 4. These reforms—based on changes to the system of government at the mines of Huancavelica, and above all on the guarantee of ample credit to the mercury industry—must be considered broadly successful. Culminating in the long governorship of Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente (1736–48), they produced a stable and prosperous regime of exploitation at the mines, with rising levels of production, and good profits for both Crown and miners. But despite this success, the experiment with alternative forms of management of the mines and mercury industry in Peru did not survive Sola y Fuente's administration. Initially, the commission to his successor as governor, Gaspar de la Cerda y Leiva, conveyed to him all the powers enjoyed by his predecessor.[64] But at the same time, his authority was seriously compromised by the provision that in all his actions, De la Cerda y Leiva was to proceed in accordance with the viceroy, a clause that prompted viceroy Manso de Velasco to observe that De la Cerda came to his post "quite subordinate."[65] Although couched in rather diffuse language, the effect of this clause was clear: the independence of the Huancavelica governors, with regard to their financing of mercury production, as well as in other matters pertaining to their jurisdictional authority, was at an end.

Why was the series of quite effective reforms of the Peruvian mercury industry launched since the 1720s abandoned in the late

1740s? One of the reasons may be found in the views that Sola y Fuente himself expressed on the future administration of the mines.[66] Sola had been the most fervent defender of the value of the governors' maintaining autonomous control over the financing of the mercury industry; and yet he had also experienced firsthand the difficulties that such a control entailed. The viceroys regarded both the removal of the mercury funds from their control, and the autonomy the governor enjoyed as a result, as an intolerable restriction of their authority. As a result they refused to cooperate with, and indeed at times were openly hostile to, Sola, who wrote of his "continual battle" with the higher authorities of the viceroyalty.[67] While these authorities always advanced sufficient funds to the Huancavelica treasury, they also found a variety of pretexts to requisition sums from the income from mercury sales. This was in open violation of Sola's authority, but the governor found it prudent to acquiesce to these affronts.[68] From the beginning of the War of Jenkins' Ear, the viceroys insisted that all funds in Huancavelica surplus to the mine's operating requirements be remitted to Lima; in this way they frustrated the clause of Sola's commission that ordered that all such surplus be sent directly to Spain.

In any case, as we have already seen, royal policy was now taking a different course, quite incompatible with the thrust of the administrative reforms at Huancavelica of the past quarter-century. In 1743 Ensenada stepped into the ministerial vacuum left by the death of José del Campillo, eager for a rapid reform and capitalization of the American territories to help fund his program of domestic renewal. He quickly placed trusted men of ability in high positions throughout the colonies, including Manso de Velasco. Ensenada was willing to give men such as Manso any powers they required to purge the colonial administration, especially in the treasuries, not least so as to secure a more copious remission of surplus revenue to Spain. Over the following years, the result was a considerable reinforcement of viceregal powers, especially in the fiscal sphere. In Peru this process was consummated in 1751, with the important reform that conferred on the viceroys the *Superintendencia General de Real Hacienda*. And this decree explicitly returned control of the mercury funds to the viceroy. As his commissioning papers indicated, governor Gaspar de la Cerda's subordination to Manso de Velasco was thus part of the Crown's conscious effort to "conserve and maintain [viceregal authority] in all its breadth and magnitude." Major reforms at Huancavelica in 1722 and 1735, then, had sought to improve administration by strengthening the powers of

the governors there; in 1748, in my view, this concern was sacrificed to the wider aim of enhancing that of the viceroys.

The broad conditions surrounding his administration apart, De la Cerda's governorship coincided with the culmination of a process of debate that, for the first time since 1719, brought into question the very survival of mercury production at Huancavelica. As early as January 1746, Ensenada brought the whole enterprise of mercury production in Peru under review.[69] The motive most frequently offered for the project he came to consider, which contemplated closure of the mine and the use of mercury from Almadén to supply the Peruvian silver industry, was the toll the Huancavelica mita labor draft exacted among the subject Indian population.[70] But Ensenada's chief interest seems to have been the possibility of supplying Peruvian miners with cheaper mercury, and so further stimulating silver production. In 1748 he asked Manso de Velasco to consider the cost of transporting mercury from the Isthmus of Panama to the silver mines, and the price at which it might then be sold. Privately he acknowledged that the Huancavelica mine would probably be closed, though at this point the official position was that it had to be kept in readiness to supply Peru in case of any interruption in remissions from Almadén.[71] Manso replied the following year with the considered opinion of a group of local experts: the Huancavelica mine could not sustain being left idle for any lengthy period of time, so that if the project were to go ahead, the mine had to be closed altogether. In this case it would be necessary to maintain at least four years' supply of mercury in reserve.[72] Ensenada then solicited further opinions among experts resident in Madrid.[73] In October 1750, Manso was advised that a trial remission of mercury from Almadén was to be made, via the Buenos Aires route. Miguel de Escurrechea, a former silver merchant at Potosí, was charged with the transport of the mercury and its sale in Peru, at a price not to exceed 70 pesos per *quintal* (hundredweight).[74] A total of 1,300 *quintales* were eventually distributed in Potosí and Oruro; but the whole project was abandoned when a serious collapse at Almadén left the Spanish mine for a time unable to supply the requirements even of New Spain, much less those of Peru as well.

The policy shift toward Huancavelica of the late 1740s, and the concurrent debate regarding possible closure of the mines, thus brought to an end the active cycle of early Bourbon intervention in the mercury industry that had begun in earnest after 1719. In terms of their administration and reform, the mines and mercury industry in Peru languished all but untroubled throughout the later 1750s

and indeed the 1760s—notwithstanding the celebrated governorship of that most self-consciously Enlightened official, Antonio de Ulloa, from 1758 to 1764. Major, sweeping late-Bourbon reform reached the mines only with the *Visita General* of José Antonio de Areche, in 1776; an episode followed swiftly by a major structural collapse, the ending of state-sponsored exploitation of the deposits, and a permanent decline in levels of production.[75]

In the silver-mining sector, we saw in chapter 4 that during the 1720s and 1730s, significant reforms were introduced affecting the Potosí mita and royal taxation of silver production. We also saw that from the former decade onwards, there developed a further cycle of relatively minor measures that aimed to achieve a better administration of both mining at Potosí and the revenues it produced. These measures were based first on regular inspection of the Potosí treasury by members of the Lima *Tribunal de Cuentas*, and (from 1732) on the union of the posts of superintendent of the mita and inspector of the treasury in the person of a judge from the *Audiencias* of Lima or Charcas. They yielded little improvement either in the administration of Potosí or its financial affairs, which continued to be marked by chaos and irregularities.

In 1745, Manso de Velasco, scandalized by the state of affairs in Potosí, again sent an accountant from Lima to inspect the treasury there. This official was José de Herboso, who arrived the following year having inspected the treasuries at Huancavelica and Cuzco while en route.[76] Herboso's inspection was an important one, above and beyond his modest success in imposing order at the treasury, since his and Manso de Velasco's reports decisively influenced the immediate course of ongoing reform at Potosí. Most significantly, in 1749, they prompted a further and far more ambitious reform of the administration of the town and its mining industry. A single official was appointed for the first time uniting all the diverse and often conflicting jurisdictions that had developed piecemeal over time and had long plagued the administration of the town and its mines: the *corregimiento*, inspectorate of the treasury, superintendency of both the mita and the royal Mint, the post of *alcalde mayor de minas*, and a commission against contraband.[77] This thus became the most important Bourbon reform of the administration of Potosí prior to the Intendancy in the early 1780s, which it clearly foreshadowed. In that part of the new official's instructions that pertained to the treasury, he was instructed to maintain the system introduced by Herboso, along the broad lines set out in the latter's instructions of December 1, 1745.[78]

The first of the new class of governor was Ventura de Santelices (in post 1750–61), whose long and eventful administration has, surprisingly, benefited from little detailed study.[79] The parallels with the governorship of Jerónimo de Sola at Huancavelica, whose origins were discussed in chapter 4, are evident: both men headed substantial reforms in the administration of their respective mining industries, both enjoyed an authority without precedent among their predecessors, and both were appointees of the Crown, dispatched directly from the Peninsula. Assessing the success of Santelices's administration requires some caution, however, more so than in the case of Sola y Fuente. As governor, he seems to have been honest, industrious, and often acute, but he nevertheless lacked the degree of tact or ability to compromise that was vital in any important Peruvian office. In this sense, his case was not dissimilar to that of his contemporary at Huancavelica, Antonio de Ulloa—to maintain the parallels between the two mining centers.

An early crisis arose for Santelices over the "revolt" in February 1751 of the *kaj'chas*: Indians who scavenged for ore on the Rich Hill. Santelices handled this disturbance badly, and so gave his opponents a pretext to criticize him.[80] These opponents included a faction of the Potosí miners, as well as those local authorities whose jurisdiction had suffered with the creation of his post—notably the *Audiencia* of Charcas itself. Among his chief adversaries in Potosi was none other than the former inspector José de Herboso, now himself active in both mining and refining. Herboso's position seems to have swayed Manso de Velasco, who was persistently critical of Santelices, and sought his dismissal from as early as March 1752.[81] In this context, the governor's story was one of well-meaning and intelligent policies, some of them defeated by circumstances or opposition, which nevertheless produced reforms of real importance. He took vigorous steps to defend *mitayos* against the abuses of the miners, while attempting to promote workings on a wider scale on the mountain. He undertook a large-scale program of restoration of the reservoirs and canals at Kari Kari, that supplied water to the refining mills of the town. He was closely concerned with the incorporation to the Crown of the Potosí Mint, discussed in the preceding section of this chapter, and with the construction of the sumptuous building designed to hold the new minting machinery. In 1757, Santelices also created a rudimentary "commission or school," an early forerunner of the later School of Mines. Composed of a director and six experts, it was intended to promote a more scientific understanding of extraction and refining techniques.[82]

The most important initiative hatched during Herboso's inspection and perfected by Santelices, however, was the credit and silver-dealing scheme that later developed into the *Real Banco de San Carlos*. This scheme sought to free the Potosí miners from the extortionate rates demanded by private merchants for advances of capital or supplies, and so, by lowering costs, to further promote silver production. The project of a group of miners first given form by Herboso, it appeared in early 1747 as the *Compañía de azogueros* (an *azoguero* in this context meaning a mining entrepreneur), with the limited aim of supplying the industry with necessary materials and notably with mercury. This early scheme was not a success, since its funds (raised by the cession of a fraction of the value of each silver mark produced by participating merchants) were lost in dubious financial operations. In 1752, against the backdrop of the resulting financial crisis, Santelices assumed the direction of the Company and expanded its operations to include the purchase from the miners of all raw silver. This scheme was of far wider value to the mining community, since the poor rates paid by private silver merchants (*mercaderes de plata*) had long been among the miners' chief grievances.[83] For a decade the *Banco de la Compañía*, or *banco de rescates*, flourished under Santelices's direction, with a consequent positive impact on production.[84] Not the least benefit of the scheme was to increase the amount paid the producers for each mark, from seven pesos two-and-three-quarter *reales* to seven pesos four reales for Spanish miners, and from six pesos six reales to seven pesos for *kaj'cha* Indians.[85] It was to Santelices's undoubted credit that on his departure from Potosí the Company held net assets of more than 700,000 pesos. The mismanagement of his successors, and the squandering of this sum, was the chief motive behind eventual assumption of the Company's role by the Crown, as the *Real Banco de San Carlos*, from 1779.

The Church

In the affairs of the Church, we saw in chapter 4 that pressure from royal reformers on the religious Orders was evident from soon after the Bourbon accession, and was sustained in mild fashion throughout the decades that followed. This pressure increased markedly, however, after 1746. One of the first decrees dispatched by the Marqués de la Ensenada in the name of Ferdinand VI ordered the suspension of licenses to build new monasteries and convents pending reports from local authorities on the advisability of each foundation. A *Junta de Ministros* was then formed in Madrid in

November 1748 with the remit to discuss a wide range of issues affecting the Orders.[86] Following the discussions of this Junta, a clutch of *cédulas* was dispatched to Peru in October 1749, giving Manso de Velasco and the archbishop of Lima the option of different measures limiting the reconstruction of convents destroyed in the 1746 earthquake. A further decree barred the Orders from the newly established town of Bellavista, mid-way between Lima and Callao.[87] But by far the most important measure to come out of the Junta, indeed the most important Bourbon reform of the colonial Church prior to the reign of Charles III, was the secularization of Indian parishes administered by friars.

The secularization of Indian parishes, or *doctrinas*, was first decreed in partial form on October 4, 1749, and then generally on February 1, 1753. By the latter decree, it was declared that henceforth, all *doctrinas* falling vacant should be granted to a secular priest and not a member of the regular Orders.[88] This was a major blow to the regulars. Against strict tradition, and often against their own instincts, they had taken charge of a large number of Indian parishes during the half-century following the Conquest, when the secular Church was insufficiently manned and organized to cope with the task of evangelization and maintenance of the faith among a vast new flock. They had retained these parishes throughout the maturity of the colonies, in time coming to depend on the income from the corresponding tithes, a substantial proportion of which passed to the Order rather than the individual friar. Thus, until 1754, the Orders controlled 190 parishes in Peru, and received nearly 450,000 pesos per year in income as a result.[89] *Doctrinas* constituted a significant proportion of all parishes: in 1756, *after* the process of secularization began, regulars still occupied around 62 percent of parishes in the frontier bishopric of Mizque, and 37 percent even in the archbishopric of Lima. The total figure for Lower and Upper Peru was more than 25 percent.[90]

The parishes administered by friars had long been viewed with resentment and jealousy by many secular priests, and provided a major source of tension between the two branches of the Church. Some secularizations were effected earlier in the century, but from 1749, they proceeded on a systematic basis. Surprisingly, this major reform was the subject of little study until recently: Kenneth Andrien has described it as "one of the least examined, yet most influential, of the early Bourbon reforms," in an essay that now constitutes the leading work on the subject for Peru.[91] In New Spain, for comparison, secularization took place quite rapidly: in the most recent study,

Christoph Rosenmüller shows that no fewer than 109 *doctrinas* were sequestered between 1749 and 1755, almost half of them in the latter year alone. The program could advance rapidly in Mexico "because the government in Madrid, the viceroys, several bishops and most secular priests threw their weight behind it"; thus, the early Bourbon phase of secularization "was more radical than scholars have assumed."[92] In Peru, the process appears to have been rather slower and more piecemeal: Andrien describes secularization as "a long, steady process, particularly with the recalcitrant Franciscans," that became a "war of attrition" that ran on into the 1770s. This process was nevertheless "inexorable";[93] and by the end of the century, few parishes remained in regular hands.

The Crown viewed the process of secularization with satisfaction, since the return of the friars to cloisters was a goal of regalists everywhere. Indeed, the measure constituted "a forceful, direct attack on the considerable wealth and power of the regular clergy," in which the Crown was "the real winner."[94] The secular clergy, too, viewed with complacency what represented in many ways a signal victory over regulars. But the blow to the Orders was severe, and went beyond the purely financial dimension. Secularization was inevitably seen by many as a punishment or rebuke, and had a demoralizing effect. Individual friars were denied the option of following a vocation outside the convent, and many abandoned their Order or returned to Spain, resulting in a loss of brothers that for some Orders reached 40 percent of the total.[95] The return to cloisters diminished their visible presence and thus doubtless their status in colonial society, a process complemented in 1754 by a decree that, noting the excessive presence of the religious at the University of San Marcos, ordered that each Order be restricted to a maximum of two graduates and a single Chair, even where the Orders had themselves endowed the Chairs in question.[96] In the event, secularization faced practical obstacles, including the economic threat to the Orders themselves and the difficulty of procuring sufficient qualified secular clergy to take charge of *doctrinas*. The Crown acknowledged these problems with a modifying decree of 1757, which reserved to each Order "one or two parishes, of the richest" in each province, while in 1758, the restrictions on regulars at San Marcos were rescinded after energetic protest by Manso and the Audiencia. But these measures did little to reverse what was by any standards a major shift in the character and constitution of the Church in Peru.

It should be noted that the secularization of *doctrinas* presents a further leading instance of the influence of American viceroys in

the formulation of imperial policy, since Viceroy Manso de Velasco played a key role in both its origins and its subsequent implementation. Charles Walker has researched this role, along with the origins of the reform more broadly: in 1746, Manso had sent a brace of letters accompanying a report on that year's devastating earthquake, both of which proposed reforms affecting the Orders.[97] The first of these letters proposed a reduction in the number of nuns and friars in monasteries and convents, so as to avoid chaotic overcrowding. But the second letter requested the secularization of *doctrinas*, as a means of achieving the necessary reduction in numbers of regulars.[98] In a later report, Manso further argued for exclusion of the Orders from the new settlement of Bellavista, as mentioned at the beginning of this section.[99] It was these reports, with one from the viceroy of Mexico, that motivated the formation of the Junta that, as we have seen, met in Madrid from 1748 to discuss these and related issues; and when Manso was informed of the deliberations of this Junta, he sent further letters setting out his proposals in greater detail.[100] *Cédulas* of 1749 regarding the secularization of *doctrinas*, disbarment of the Orders from Bellavista, and reconstruction of the monasteries ruined in the earthquake, were all products of the discussions of the Junta. The former measure affected not only Peru, but also New Spain; as in other spheres, then, and notably in fiscal affairs, Manso de Velasco here influenced imperial policy at the highest level. In my view, the most important reform in ecclesiastical affairs of the period was thus proposed or prompted by the viceroy—supporting one of the broader conclusion of this work, that policy formulated at first hand in Peru consistently influenced or informed the actions of ministers in Madrid.

Secularization of Indian parishes was overwhelmingly the most important ecclesiastical reform of the late 1740s and 1750s; but in other areas, too, the pace of legislation affecting the Church quickened from around 1750. As was the case in earlier decades, a great many laws were decreed, few of them of any great significance taken separately; but as in the earlier period, this legislation responded to a number of key themes, themselves suggesting what I have sought to emphasize was the essential constancy of Bourbon purpose over both earlier and later periods of the eighteenth century. These themes were: *prima facie* regalist reform (strengthening or extending the royal *Patronato*); the reform of ecclesiastical morals; and the quest for a greater share of Church revenues; in addition to the assault on the religious Orders, most evident in the secularization of *doctrinas*. And, as had been the case in the 1720s and 1730s, the impact of apparently

trivial decrees often lay beyond their specific content. Several measures merely reaffirmed much earlier legislation, for example, but might conflict with long-standing practice in Peru, and so have the force and effect of new laws.

Among the lesser regalist measures of the 1750s, it was declared that priests might be removed from their benefices with only the agreement of the vicepatron and prelate, with no right of appeal (1758), and that no collation to any benefice might be made prior to presentation of the royal letters of patent (an issue over which the Crown proved particularly scrupulous: 1750).[101] Royal control over examinations for Cathedral canonries was increased (1756), while ecclesiastical judges were barred from imposing imprisonment in pursuit of debts to the Church. Even when entitled to decree confinement or fines for clerical or other crimes, judges of the Church might do so only with the intervention of the secular authorities (1758). A law of 1756, following one of 1741, sought enhanced royal control over lay religious brotherhoods (*cofradías*), which invited regalist reform both as fora for social gatherings and for the popular religiosity they promoted.[102] And in 1744, the Crown sponsored a major inspection of the Inquisition in Lima, in response to interminable disputes and abuses prevalent there, though to little ultimate effect.[103] The ecclesiastical *fuero* (or corporate legal privileges) enjoyed by the Inquisition was nevertheless limited to Inquisitors, and not to subordinate officials of the tribunal nor their family members (1751, 1760),[104] while the Holy Office was obliged to share cognizance of bigamy cases with justices of the Crown (1754). Regarding ecclesiastical morals and misdeeds, decrees of 1752 and the years that followed, citing an earlier law of 1739, sought to address the apparently widespread problem of priests' absenteeism from their parishes.[105] So far as royal appropriation of Church revenues was concerned, we saw in the preceding section that the 1750s witnessed full appropriation of revenues from sales of bulls of Crusade. And finally, from 1752, the largest reorganization of the secular Church of the early Bourbon period took place, with the restructuring and reduction from 14 to 7 of the Indian parishes of Potosí. The motive for this measure, too, was essentially fiscal, and it brought about a halving of clerical salaries in the *Villa Rica*.[106]

Military Matters

Early Bourbon policy toward defense and military affairs in Peru differed very little from Habsburg attitudes and practice in these

areas. Notwithstanding constant review of military preparedness and finance, and tinkering with aspects of armed and naval forces by almost every viceroy, very few real reforms were introduced during the early decades of Bourbon rule.[107] The major exception lay in reforms to naval forces in the Americas, and especially the establishment of formal anticontraband or "coastguard" forces, undertaken under José Patiño in the 1720s (discussed in chapter 3). Manso de Velasco was the first early Bourbon viceroy to oversee or initiate real military reform in Peru, responding both to the circumstances of his times and to Ensenada's military and fiscal reformism; and even here, the impact was distinctly modest. The principal measures concerned, first, the reform of naval forces in the Pacific, and second, regulations governing military garrisons in the viceroyalty.

In 1745, Manso proposed that the *Armada del Mar del Sur*, Spain's sole formal naval presence on the coasts of Peru and Chile, with origins dating back to the late sixteenth century, be abolished outright, as expensive and of little value in practical terms. He suggested that the *Armada* be replaced by small squadrons sent out from Spain, serving two-year tours in the Pacific in rotation.[108] The abolition of the *Armada del Mar del Sur* was, in fact, decreed in 1747, and a squadron of the type envisaged by Manso, comprising the *Castilla* and *Europa* men-of-war, spent some 18 months in Peruvian waters in 1748–49.[109] But the fact that this naval tour from Spain was not repeated thereafter, and that Manso oversaw the construction of a new naval vessel, the 60-gun *San José el Peruano*, at the Guayaquil shipyards in 1756, suggests that this decision was later reversed. Nevertheless, the loss of the *Armada*'s historic role, of protecting Peruvian trade en route to the fairs at Portobelo, with the end of the fleet system itself, ensured its definitive decline from around this time.[110] Elsewhere, in 1748, Manso was instructed to draw on his experience in Chile and Peru to prepare new military regulations governing the garrisons in both kingdoms. Approved in 1752, these regulations were designed to eliminate the irrational command and company structures that had prevailed before the late war. They also had the effect of decreasing both the cost and the outright size of the military establishments in Lima and Callao.[111]

Lastly, both the fortifications and the town of Callao, the port of Lima, were completely destroyed by the earthquake and tidal wave of October 1746; and it fell to Manso de Velasco to oversee construction of a new fortress.[112] Plans were drawn up by the French engineer Gaudin, originally a member (like Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa) of La Condamine's scientific expedition to the

Equator; construction took some 20 years, and was only finally completed under Viceroy Amat y Juniet in the 1760s and 1770s.[113] The *Real Felipe* fort proved extremely effective; during the Wars of Independence some half-century later, it served as an inexpugnable retreat to patriots and royalists by turn, and was eventually surrendered in January 1826 only after a two-year siege, the last Spanish toehold on the American mainland.

Spanish Atlantic Trade under the Marqués de la Ensenada: A Note

We saw in the previous chapter that of two unquestionably major developments to affect the colonies during the period between the death of José Patiño in 1736 and the rise of the Marqués de la Ensenada from 1743, the most lastingly significant was that which transformed Spanish Atlantic trade. The onset of the Wars of Jenkins' Ear in 1739, and later of the Austrian Succession, brought about the suspension of the historic system of fleets and fairs for Spanish colonial commerce that had operated since the sixteenth century, and its substitution for trade by single ships sailing under register (*registros*). Over the years that followed, and the difficult wartime conditions notwithstanding, the *registro* regime appeared fully to prove its worth, with an increase in the volume and value of shipments, higher tax revenues to the Crown, and perhaps even some diminution in the role and dominance of foreign merchants.

It should be noted here, albeit briefly, that notwithstanding all of this, the advantages of the new and more flexible system for colonial trade embodied by *registros* were outweighed in the minds of many of the old mercantile elite by the loss of the strict monopoly that the fleet system had symbolized. Such was the case with the Cadiz *Consulado*, which, after the end of the war, continued doggedly to advocate restoration of the fleets. And extraordinarily, this advocacy was sufficient within years of the end of the war to sway the counsels of the government in Madrid, at least in substantial part. In 1750, Ensenada summoned a Junta composed of Cadiz merchants to discuss what should be done with regard to the colonial trade. Ensenada himself believed that register ships rather than fleets provided the superior vehicle for trade, and he temporized over the question of renewal or, alternatively, permanent abandonment of the fleets.[114] The group he summoned to Madrid, however, voted unanimously to restore the fleet system in its entirety (both the *galeones* for Peru and the *flota* for New Spain); though it acknowledged that there were

real practical impediments to revival of the Peruvian fleets, chiefly the fact that the Isthmian terminus at Portobelo still lay in its wartime ruins. The Junta's proposals were then passed for their opinions to a group of government gurus, including Sebastián de Eslava and Ricardo Wall.

The outcome of the deliberations of these individuals was that the *flota* to New Spain was restored in 1754, and first sailed again in 1756.[115] The *galeones*, by contrast, were not revived, nor even referred to in the decree that restored the *flota*. It seems that the question of restoration of the *galeones* was put on hold in view of the practical difficulties, and simply lapsed with time, until the move toward "Free Trade" after 1765 made it irrelevant. The logical conclusion to draw from this is that, despite the manifest advantages of the *registro* system, if restoration of the *galeones* had been possible after the end of the war, they would have been restored. Bourbon government in the 1750s thus displayed a greater degree of retrograde conservatism, and willful lack of imagination, than it had done in the late 1710s and early 1720s. Ensenada himself may be excused the ignominy; not only was he opposed in principle to restoration of the fleets, but the decree restoring the *flota* was dated October 11, 1754, some three months after his fall from office. Indeed, it seems likely that Ensenada's removal by his enemies was a prerequisite to restoration of the monopoly with regard to its richest, New Spanish, branch. The *flotas* to Veracruz thus now entered their final stage—one which would last until their final abolition in 1789.[116]

Conclusion

The second major cycle of early Bourbon reform, that began in the mid-1740s and was undertaken principally at the hands of the Marqués de la Ensenada in Madrid and Viceroy Manso de Velasco in Lima, differed in key respects to its predecessor. Above all, in contrast to the earlier cycle, it was less concerned with Atlantic trade, even if it witnessed restoration of the *flota* to New Spain after Ensenada's fall. Elsewhere, commercial policy was now largely limited to managing the new trade via register ships, prevalent since 1740. Rather, what might reasonably be termed the Ensenada-Manso de Velasco program for Peru concerned primarily the administration of the colonies and the boosting of revenues to the colonial treasury. In these areas, and in a fashion directly comparable to the measures taken between the late 1710s and 1736, it produced a raft of reforms of real substance. The most significant measures included the definitive end

to sales of posts in the upper colonial bureaucracy; the introduction of a tobacco monopoly; substantial administrative reform at Potosí (including institutional forerunners of the later Intendancy, School of Mines, and the *Real Banco de San Carlos*); and the sweeping secularization of native parishes administered by the regular Orders. Lesser but still noteworthy reforms included the legalization of the forced sale of goods to Indians (*repartimiento de mercancía*), direct royal operation of the Mints in Lima and Potosí, and a process of strengthening of the powers of the viceroys, which, I would argue, meant that these officials entered the late Bourbon age with their authority substantially enhanced. And, still more than had been the case in the 1720s and 1730s, in the late 1740s and the early 1750s, the viceroy (Manso de Velasco) played a role in reforms for Peru that went far beyond simple implementation of decrees from the imperial center. In measures as substantial as legalization of *repartimiento de mercancía*, creation of the tobacco monopoly, or the secularization of regular parishes, he played a leading role in the development of policies that were then applied far beyond the boundaries of Peru.

Finally, whatever their specific character or scope, the measures now introduced in colonial administration, fiscal affairs, mining policy, or relations with the Church, shared certain basic objectives and priorities both with the measures that had preceded them, and with those that came afterwards, in the late Bourbon era. This commonality of purpose or ethos, in government and reform, across the early and late periods of Bourbon rule lies at the heart of any attempt to measure the significance of the early Bourbon period in broader historical context. And it is to that question that we now turn.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

In this concluding chapter, rather than summarize or reiterate the major arguments of this book—made at length in the Introduction and throughout chapters 1–6—I wish to return to the suggestion made in the opening paragraph. This suggestion is that the fresh research of recent years means that it should henceforth be difficult to discuss the Bourbon period in Spanish-American history, including the celebrated late-Bourbon reform program, without informed reference to the first half-century and more of Bourbon rule. This is not, as was noted in the "Introduction," because long-standing perceptions of the greater significance of the period from the 1760s onwards are erroneous. Anthony McFarlane has noted recently that the strong tilt apparent in the historiography toward the second half of the century "is not unreasonable," on a number of substantive grounds, and no number of new monographs or articles is likely to challenge this verdict.[1] What has been unreasonable, however, and has now become frankly unsustainable, is the degree of neglect to which the early period has been subject, along with the radical distinction made between the periods prior to and following the 1760s. On the one hand, this book has sought to demonstrate that more reforms, and of greater substance, were undertaken in colonial affairs by the early Bourbons than has been recognized. But still more importantly, these reforms displayed concerns and priorities—an essential "ethos"—so similar to those of late-Bourbon policy-making as to belie the notion that true Bourbon government for the colonies began only with the reign of Charles III. In consequence, in my view, it is difficult to discuss many areas of colonial affairs during the period of late-Bourbon reform—from mining, to administration, relations with the Church, or Atlantic trade—without substantial engagement with the earlier

period. In this conclusion, I seek to show just why this is so, in a number of such areas.

Let us take first the mining sector. The most striking intervention of early Bourbon government in Peruvian mining affected not the silver sector at Potosí and elsewhere, but rather the mercury industry at its (all but unique) center, Huancavelica. From the perspective of the Crown, it will be recalled that Huancavelica had entered the Bourbon age as a prime example of late-Habsburg decadence and disorder, manifest in a corrupt and chaotic administration, the lowest levels of production since discovery of the mines in the 1560s, and a debt of the miners' guild to the Crown that by 1718 reached the sum of 1.6 million pesos. Perhaps in part for this reason, Bourbon reform of the mercury sector throughout the monarchy began very early, in 1708, and the first reforms of significance for Huancavelica were drawn up and implemented between 1719 and 1722, affecting primarily the governorship and the supply of funds to the local treasury. When this ongoing reform program reached its peak, in 1734–35, it took exemplary Bourbon shape: a report was prepared by an expert in Spain (a recent governor of the mines at Almadén in Castilla-La Mancha), and a high-ranking official, Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente, was dispatched to Peru equipped with substantial new powers necessary for its implementation. Against the backdrop of these measures, the period from the 1720s to the 1750s witnessed a return to administrative stability and rising levels of production at Huancavelica; indeed, this became the last period during which the mines satisfied the demands of Peruvian silver mining for mercury for the amalgamation process, while yielding substantial profits for both the Crown and the mining entrepreneurs. Progress was even made in recovering a portion of the huge miners' debt to the colonial exchequer.[2] This experience stands in sharp contrast to that of the late-Bourbon mines, where the still more radical reforms implemented as a result of the *Visita General* of José Antonio de Areche from 1776 brought about a return to maladministration of the mines and rapidly led to a structural collapse from which there was no lasting recovery. The relative success and failure of early- and late-Bourbon policies for Huancavelica was doubtless affected by factors not necessarily inherent to them, including the quality of particular governors and the progressive exhaustion of the ores. But in the mercury sector, the experience of the early period clearly casts that of the later one in a different light.

In silver mining, above all at Potosí—still in 1700 by some margin the most important of the South American centers—a rather

different but equally revealing picture may be drawn. As discussed in this book, reform of administration at Potosí under early Bourbon rule seems low key: a new governorship for the town and mines in 1749, a rudimentary mining school in 1757, and development of the *Banco de la Compañía de Azogueros*, or *banco de rescates*, from the early 1750s, above all to purchase unrefined silver from members of the mining guild. On their own terms, these were modest reforms; but when set in deeper context, their significance appears greater. For these were the direct forerunners of key late-Bourbon innovations in the government and practice of mining at Potosí: the governorship of the Intendancy in the 1780s, the *Banco de la Compañía* of the *Real Banco de San Carlos* from 1779, and the mining academy of the later School of Mines—a leading symbol of Enlightened renovation of Spanish-American mining. The first of the new governors at Potosí from 1749, Ventura de Santelices, paralleled the case of Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente at Huancavelica, as a direct appointee of the Crown dispatched to Peru to undertake reform in his sector, armed with unprecedented powers to do so. Here, then, the early-Bourbon precedents to the late-Bourbon program seem indisputable. And reforms of indubitable substance in silver mining there were too: in 1732, the Potosí mita was not only sanctioned once and for all, but was extended to include *forastero* Indians for the first time, receiving thereby a substantial boost.[3] Most importantly, in 1735, the Crown renounced half its income from the taxation of Peruvian silver mining, which was slashed from *quinto* to *diezmo* in a conscious and coordinated attempt to boost output at the mines. In chapter 4, I observed that had this measure been the product of the late Bourbon era, it would surely have taken its place among the reforms introduced after 1763 and that are held responsible for the recovery of Peruvian silver-mining; reforms that included precisely the establishment of the *Real Banco de San Carlos* and the School of Mines, among others.

In colonial administration, in one major respect, little change seemed apparent after 1700 or indeed prior to 1750. This was in the closely related areas of sales to the colonial bureaucracy, and the penetration by creole officials of the highest colonial administration. Under the Habsburgs, sales of provincial magistracies (*corregimientos*), posts in the royal treasuries, and even on the *Audiencias* (the highest courts of justice and government) had become commonplace. The result of this trend was that by the period of the War of Succession, creoles formed a majority of judges on the *Audiencia* of Lima (where their presence was moreover bolstered by that of peninsular officials with close local ties). Creoles also dominated the royal treasuries,

the Tribunal of Accounts, the *corregimientos*, and many lesser bodies and positions, such that taken as a whole, the administration of the Spanish colonies during the early eighteenth century was very heavily creole. In the perception of Bourbon commentators and critics after 1700, this predominance was problematic because it brought a drop in standards of administration and a greater risk of corruption, and above all because it contributed to the effective autonomy of the colonies and their unresponsiveness to royal control. Sales of *Audiencia* posts were formally abolished from as early as 1712, before the end of the War, and those of posts in the treasuries and provincial magistracies in 1725; but none of these decrees were fully effectual, and sales continued in practice over several decades.

Nevertheless, the failure to halt the practice of sales to the colonial bureaucracy following the Bourbon succession is to some extent misleading. This is so because a change in governmental attitude was in fact apparent during this period, to the prejudice of creole officeholders. From as early as 1717, it was declared that peninsular Spaniards would henceforth be preferred for *Audiencia* judgeships, in the first explicit discrimination by place of birth in appointments to these posts. Purges were made of the major *Audiencias* over the following three years, which seemed to target purchasers of office and creoles disproportionately, while appointments made in the early 1720s strongly favored peninsular (or at least, non-native) candidates. The great majority of full five-year *corregimientos* granted throughout the early Bourbon era, too, were made to peninsular Spaniards, in the face of vociferous protest by creoles, who further suffered marginally from the final abolition of the institution of *encomienda* in 1720 (all these issues were discussed in chapter 4). In truth, these measures did little to reverse creole domination of the colonial bureaucracy, a feature that prevailed throughout the reigns of Philip V and Fernando VI and indeed beyond. But more major change finally came in 1750–51, when sales of posts on the colonial *Audiencias*, in the royal treasuries, and to *corregimientos*, were finally halted once and for all. The relinquishment of royal control implied by sales to the bureaucracy, along with creole predominance as among its most striking products, stood as leading symbols (from the imperial perspective) of the laxness of the Habsburg Empire and of the "decadent" colonies of the turn of the eighteenth century. The permanent ending of sales in 1750–51, with the incipient assault on creole officeholders, thus represented a major reform, and should inevitably form part of any discussion of what is sometimes called the "Bourbon reconquest of America" from Habsburg waywardness and creole autonomy.

Nor can this topic be limited to the presence of creoles in viceregal administration: in relations with the colonial Church, too, we have seen that the early period actively marked the transition toward the late-Bourbon era, and a break with the Habsburg one, in three major ways. First, the very great number of decrees directed at ecclesiastical affairs and the Church from the first years of Bourbon rule seemed for the most part trivial, of little real impact or consequence in the colonies. But the aims of these decrees fell into a number of readily identifiable categories: conscious regalist reforms, that extended royal privileges over the Church or curtailed clerical autonomy; the reform of clerical morals and behavior; measures directed at (or against) the regular Orders, perceived as the most autonomous branch of the colonial Church; and measures that sought a greater proportion of Church revenues for the Crown. While trivial in nature (if great in number), early Bourbon legislation for the Church thus displayed its regalist, Enlightened credentials virtually from the first, soon after 1700. The thrust of Bourbon policy toward the colonial Church was identical prior to the 1760s and subsequent to that decade, even if its major fruits were not yet apparent. In this case, at least as clearly as elsewhere, the 1760s can be seen as a watershed only in terms of the scale of reform, not its essential character or direction.

Second, one reform of real substance *was* undertaken during this period, in the secularization of native parishes held by the regular Orders (the Franciscans and others), beginning in the years around 1750. And third, I have argued that relations with the Church provide a clear example of the way Bourbon rule might have an impact in the colonies even in the *absence* of major reform, through the changing ethos and attitudes of the Crown and its ministers. The tense and often aggressive relations of the Marqués de Castelfuerte with all branches of the Church in Peru, in the 1720s and 1730s, marked a shift from the traditional Habsburg model to the Bourbon one, long before most major regalist reform became apparent; a shift of which the leading Peruvian churchmen of the day seemed quite aware. And it should be added that, as I have noted elsewhere, Church-state relations in the colonies naturally took place in the context of their development in Spain itself, where unusually, their products were greater than in the period following 1763. The greatest single achievement of Bourbon regalism in the Peninsula was the Concordat with Rome signed in 1753, the product of negotiations going back deep into the reign of Philip V. This Concordat conceded all chief points of the regalist agenda, and won for the Crown powers over the Peninsular Church it had previously enjoyed only in the Americas, including the

extension of royal patronage to virtually all ecclesiastical benefices, and the right to a rich income from vacant livings (previously remitted to Rome).[4] The tense relations with the Papacy of Philip V, his unusual personal interest in the affairs of the Church, and the long negotiations that led to the Concordat seven years after his death, provided the foundations for policy and attitudes toward the Church in South America.

The case of Spanish Atlantic trade is a particular one: that of a major area for which perhaps the greatest reform of the entire Bourbon era took place during the early period, consummated by the 1740s. The origins and seriousness of early Bourbon trade reform have long been the subject of skeptical analysis, focused primarily upon its first major initiative, the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas* of 1720. The *Proyecto* has generally been derided as flawed in design and of negligible impact, the product of a deep conservatism in commercial matters that doomed it to certain failure. More recently, criticism has taken a different turn, becoming focused on the purportedly cynical nature of a program that was never really intended to succeed, but was rather imposed upon Spain by the treaty rights of foreign powers and by wartime defeat. My own argument, developed in chapters 2 and 3 of this book, is that the *Proyecto* merits more serious consideration than it has received to date, even when it was indeed poorly matched to the international commercial reality of its times. On the one hand, with all its failings, it seems clear that it represented an authentically Spanish response to the question of colonial commerce, and not merely one imposed by rival powers. On the other, its seriousness and scope have been obscured by a failure to recognize its grounding in a much broader project of national renewal, establishing the *Proyecto* in consciously complementary relation to a range of major economic, naval, and administrative measures directed primarily toward Spain itself. And beyond this, the *Proyecto* and the large volume of supplementary legislation and decrees that accompanied it merits our attention because its impact in the colonies was much more far reaching than in the volume or quality of trade alone. The imperatives of this first Bourbon commercial program informed and affected most other aspects of colonial policy developed during the 1720s and 1730s: from the halving of taxation on silver mining, to the first trial of a viceroyalty in New Granada, to the type of colonial official selected to represent the Crown and implement its policies in the major jurisdictions. Thus, much early Bourbon colonial government for South America as a whole, and not just trade policy, can be understood only in relation to the *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas.*

Nevertheless, it was the failure of the *Proyecto*, and particularly of successive trade fairs at Portobelo, along with the return to lengthy wartime conditions from 1739, that brought about the greatest early innovations in colonial commerce. These were the suspension of the trade fleets in 1735, to be substituted by registered vessels sailing at will, along with the opening of the navigational route via Cape Horn in 1740, permitting direct access to the Pacific coasts. That these innovations represented a major change in trading patterns has long been known, but the full implications may only now be becoming clear. As we saw in chapter 5, it seems ever more apparent that the switch to *registros* brought about a wholesale revolution in trading patterns in the Americas, and even a shift in the nature of trade between the metropolis and the colonies. The impact on commercial circuits in the Americas at the broadest level can be witnessed in the crisis of Hispanic commerce in the Pacific after 1740, both with Asia (mainly via the Philippines) and along the littoral between Peru and New Spain—of which much of the volume and value was now diverted to Atlantic routes. The same period witnessed a striking shift in Anglo-Spanish trade in the Caribbean, in which Spanish-Americans displaced the British as the primary carriers of an intercourse centered primarily in the British islands (above all Jamaica). In Lima, still the major commercial center for Spanish South America, the great creole merchants began to be displaced by smaller-scale Peninsular traders (especially Basques), while in a lasting pattern, prices fell, and a wider range of luxury goods became available to a greater proportion of the populace. And in the Atlantic trade of Spain itself, Spanish merchants now began to trade more on their own account, as the new system proved favorable to them and prejudicial to the traditionally dominant foreigners. As a result, as we have seen, "the advent of the register ships changed the pattern of trade with America in favour of Spain's indigenous merchants," such that from this time, "trade with Peru was for the most part dominated by Spanish merchants."[5]

Though inadequately studied, the increase in overall trade brought about by the shift from fleets to register ships seems to have been relatively modest; the rise in shipping movements was perhaps 55 percent, and in tonnages less than 40 percent, in the first 15 years, albeit with a rising tendency. The much more celebrated and better studied reforms of the "Free Trade" era, that began in 1765 and reached its peak after 1778, had a greater impact; though not, it seems on the basis above all of the research of Antonio García-Baquero, so extraordinary an impact as we have been accustomed to think.[6] Comparing these two major reforms—the permanent shift from fleets to register

ships in Spanish South American trade in the late 1730s, and the advent of *Comercio Libre* some decades later—is difficult, when their nature and implications were so different. The one, after all, in principle affected primarily the means of Spanish Atlantic trade, although in practice also Spanish-American trade circuits and the mercantile communities active in both Spain and America. The other was aimed principally at the ports on both sides of the Atlantic that were permitted to participate in trade, though it necessarily also affected the merchandise and the merchants involved, as well as leading to a larger increase in overall volumes and values. While comparisons may be problematic, however, the key point is surely that both form necessary parts of the same story: the story of the transformation of Spanish colonial commerce during the eighteenth century under Bourbon rule. The first great stage in this transformation began by 1740, and had a far-reaching impact and lasting implications (above all in South America) long before the onset of the second stage, the Caroline Free Trade program. Any historical account that discusses the latter without full appreciation of the former must fail to recognize the ways in which Spanish American trade had already undergone transformation, prior to the accession of Charles III; any such account thus unreasonably privileges one moment of Bourbon commercial transformation, over an earlier stage that provided the necessary context to it.

The roll call of areas in which the early Bourbon period witnessed significant reforms that in their type and concerns were clear forerunners of the late-Bourbon program is not limited to mining, administration, relations with the Church, or Spanish Atlantic trade. Fiscal affairs presents a further striking case, with a raft of major measures, of recognizably Bourbon stamp, that affected the revenues raised in South America as well as the administration of the treasury. On the administrative side, beginning as early as 1724, *all* the major taxes previously farmed out to private interests were returned to royal control, including the great commercial levies of *avería*, *alcabala*, and *almojarifazgo* (the *"reales derechos"*); as a result, the sole significant tax still farmed privately by 1763 was the provincial *alcabala*. Between the late 1720s and the 1750s, wholesale reform was effected of the South American Mints and coinage, embracing a return to operation by the Crown and reform of the currency, as well as the construction of new Mints in Santiago de Chile, Popayán, and Potosí. It was in fiscal administration, too, that the powers of the American viceroys were most notably enhanced under early Bourbon rule, in a process that commenced in the late 1740s and reached its peak in 1751, with the award to the viceroy of the *Superintendencia General de Real*

Hacienda. Early Bourbon fiscal policy seems superficially to have displayed greater concern with efficient administration than with raising the rate of taxes or introducing new ones, but to an important degree this is deceptive. One major measure aimed at raising revenues consisted of the mass transfer of migrant Indians to the *originario* sector in the 1720s and 1730s, yielding a gross increase of more than 60 percent in tribute payments, as well as a lasting boost to the Potosí mita.[7] Another was legalization of *repartimiento de mercancía*, or forced distribution of goods to the native population, in the early 1750s, contributing to a comparable increase in revenue from the *alcabala* tax at this time. The greatest of the early measures was introduction of a tobacco monopoly throughout the viceroyalty of Peru, again in the early 1750s; a reform with immediate fiscal impact, and that in the middle term had a transformative effect on the viceregal finances. Establishment of the *estanco del tabaco* in Peru in the 1750s provides a far more convincing precedent for its introduction to New Spain some 15 years later, in the 1760s, than its (much earlier) establishment in Cuba, which is often cited in this regard.

Nor does the roll call end here: the viceroyalty of New Granada, established permanently from 1739 but initially from as early as 1717–18, stands as the major jurisdictional innovation of the period, and the only Spanish-American viceroyalty to be established between those of New Spain and Peru in the 1500s and that of the Río de la Plata in 1776. It is time to conclude, however. I will do so emphasizing that there was indeed such a thing as a "Bourbon era" in Spanish colonial history, distinctive from the Habsburg centuries that went before. It was distinctive in its concern for and its approach to colonial government, and in the extensive program of imperial reforms that were implemented as a result, and that transformed the colonies by the close of the Bourbon age and the beginnings of the Wars of Independence after 1808. There is consensus among historians that this program reached its peak in the late eighteenth century, perhaps especially in the 1770s and 1780s, during the reign of Charles III. This book, by contrast, has explored its early stages, in two cycles of measures and decrees that developed between the late 1710s and the mid-1730s, and the mid-1740s and mid-1750s, respectively. It may be appropriate to observe, albeit in passing, that cycles of this kind have been detected for the late Bourbon era too: in one well-known article published almost 40 years ago, Jacques Barbier placed "The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms" in 1787–92, largely under Charles IV and after the death of Charles III (so sparking a lively debate with John Fisher and Allan Kuethe in the pages of the

Hispanic American Historical Review).[8] Bourbon reform as a whole could perhaps be conceived as developing in four such cycles, broadly associated with the reigns of each monarch, though far from occupying the whole of each. In truth, dating the onset and development of the Bourbon program for the Americas has always proven challenging. This book has sought clearly to place its origins in the long six decades after the House of Bourbon acceded to the throne of Spain. In doing so, it has further argued that the Bourbon era in Spanish-American history, as a distinctive subperiod, began soon after 1700, rather than in the 1760s, as has been argued for so long. These do not seem surprising conclusions, but—15 years after the thesis from which the book is derived was completed—they perhaps remain necessary ones.

Notes

Introduction The Early Bourbon Period in Spanish South America: An Interpretation

1. On Storrs's University of Dundee homepage as of January 2014. Technically, there was another Bourbon reign prior to 1746, the "lightning reign" of Luis I for less than eight months in 1724.
2. Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era* (1700–1759) (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
3. Adrian J. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1700–1759," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1998.
4. Eissa-Barroso's monograph in progress is titled *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717–1739): The Politics of Reform in the Early Bourbon Spanish World*. I thank Dr. Eissa-Barroso for permission to refer to this work here.
5. See esp. Antonia Heredia Herrera, *Sevilla y los hombres del comercio (1700–1800)* (Seville: Editoriales Andaluzas Unidas, 1989).
6. Pablo E. Pérez-Mallaina Bueno, *Política naval española en el Atlántico, 1700–1715* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1982); same author and Bibiano Torres Ramírez, *La Armada del Mar del Sur* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1987).
7. Carlos Daniel Malamud Rikles, *Cádiz y Saint Malo en el comercio colonial peruano (1698–1725)* (Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1986).
8. Lance R. Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling: Regional Informal Economies in Early Bourbon New Granada* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
9. See esp. Mark A. Burkholder and D. S Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977); Mark A. Burkholder and Lyman L. Johnson, *Biographical Dictionary*

of Audiencia Ministers in the Americas: 1687–1821 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982)*;* Mark A. Burkholder, *Biographical Dictionary of Councillors of the Indies, 1717–1808* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986).

10. Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, *Reorganización de la hacienda virreinal peruana en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid, 1953), first published in *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 23 (1953), pp. 329–69; and Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco en el virreinato del Perú," *Revista Histórica* (Lima) 21 (1954), pp. 138–63.
11. See esp. Enrique Tandeter, *Coercion and Market: Silver Mining in Colonial Potosí, 1692–1826.* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1993) (covering the period 1692–1826).
12. Kendall W. Brown, "La crisis financiera peruana al comienzo del siglo XVIII, la minería de plata y la mina de azogues de Huancavelica," *Revista de Indias* 48:182–83 (Jan.–Aug. 1988), pp. 349–81; Kendall W. Brown, "The Spanish Imperial Mercury Trade and the American Mining Expansion under the Bourbon Monarchy," in Kenneth J. Andrien and Lyman L. Johnson (eds.), *The Political Economy of Spanish America in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1850* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1994), pp. 137–67; and Kendall W. Brown, "La recepción de la tecnología minera española en las minas de Huancavelica, siglo XVIII," in Marcos Cueto (ed.), *Saberes andinos: ciencia y tecnología en Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1995), pp. 59–90; Miguel Molina Martínez, *Antonio de Ulloa en Huancavelica* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1995).
13. James S. Saeger, "Origins of the Rebellion of Paraguay," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 52 (1972), pp. 215–29; James S. Saeger, "Clerical Politics in Eighteenth-Century Peru: The Trial of José de Antequera," *Journal of Church and State* 19:1 (1975), pp. 81–96; and James S. Saeger, "Institutional Rivalries, Jurisdictional Disputes, and Vested Interests in the Viceroyalty of Peru: José de Antequera and the Rebellion of Paraguay," *The Americas* 32 (1975), pp. 99–116; Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, *Un siglo de rebeliones anti-coloniales: Perú y Bolivia, 1700–1783* (Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos "Bartolomé de las Casas", 1988).
14. See esp. Steve J. Stern, "The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742–1782: A Reappraisal," in Steve J. Stern (ed.), *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1987), pp. 34–93.
15. Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, *El corregidor de Indios y la economía peruana en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1977); and Alfredo Moreno Cebrián,

Relación y documentos de gobierno del Virrey del Perú, José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (1745–1761) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983).

16. Henry Kamen, *Philip V of Spain: The King who Reigned Twice* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). Other works published at this time included, but were by no means limited to, Ricardo García Cárcel and Rosa María Alabrús Iglesias, *España en 1700: ¿Austrias o Borbones?* (Madrid: Arlanza, 2001); Enrique San Miguel Pérez, *La instauración de la monarquía borbónica en España* (Madrid: Comunidad de Madrid, 2001); and Carlos Martínez Shaw and Marina Alfonso Mola, *Felipe V* (Madrid: Arlanza, 2001).
17. Henry Kamen, "El establecimiento de los Intendentes en la Administración española," *Hispania* 24:95 (1964), pp. 368–95; and Henry Kamen, "Melchor de Macanaz and the Foundations of Bourbon Power in Spain," *English Historical Review* 80:317 (1965), pp. 699–716.
18. Christopher Storrs, "Felipe V: Caesura or Continuity?" in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 9–21; and Christopher Storrs, "The Fallen Politician's Way Back In: Melchor de Macanaz as Spy and Secret Negotiator," in D. Szechi (ed.), *The Dangerous Trade. Spies, Spymasters and the Making of Europe* (Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2010), pp. 115–38.
19. Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, *José Patiño: El inicio del gobierno político-económico ilustrado en España* (Huelva: Artes Gráficas Andaluzas, 1998); see also esp. Carlos Pérez Fernández-Turégano, *Patiño y las reformas de la administración en el reinado de Felipe V* (Madrid: Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, 2006).
20. José Luis Gómez Urdáñez, *El proyecto reformista de Ensenada* (Lleida: Milenio, 1996); see also the important work on Ensenada of Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), chap. 8.
21. Allan J. Kuethe, "The Colonial Commercial Policy of Philip V and the Atlantic World," in Renate Pieper and Peer Schmidt (eds.), *Latin America and the Atlantic World (1500–1850)* (Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau-Verlag, 2005), pp. 319–33; and Allan J. Kuethe, "Cardinal Alberoni and Reform in the American Empire", in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 23–38.
22. Concepción de Castro, *A la sombra de Felipe V: José de Grimaldo, ministro responsable (1703–1726)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2004).

23. The best recent guide to this literature may be found in Francisco Antonio Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making: The Reform of Viceregal Rule in the Spanish World under Philip V (1700–1746)," Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2010.
24. Ana Crespo Solana, *La Casa de Contratación y la Intendencia General de la Marina en Cádiz (1717–1730)* (Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1996); Margarita García Mauriño-Mundi, *La pugna entre el Consulado de Cádiz y los jenízaros por las exportaciones a Indias (1720–1765)* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1999); for trade with Britain during the period, see Nélida García Fernández, *Comerciando con el enemigo: El tráfico mercantil anglo-español en el siglo xviii (1700–1765)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2006).
25. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*; this of course was the first in a projected four-volume series of works primarily devoted to the late Bourbon era (to 1810).
26. Carmen Parrón Salas, "Perú y la transición del *comercio político* al *comercio libre*, 1740–1778," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 54:2 (1997), pp. 447–73; Jesús Turiso Sebastián, *Comerciantes españoles en la Lima borbónica: Anatomía de una élite de poder (1701–1761)* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 2002).
27. Moreno Cebrián, "El regalismo borbónico frente al poder vaticano: Acerca del estado de la Iglesia en el Perú durante el primer tercio del siglo XVIII," *Revista de Indias* 63:227 (2003), pp. 223–74; and (with Núria Sala i Vila), *El "premio" de ser virrey: Los intereses públicos y privados del gobierno virreinal en el Perú de Felipe V* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005); also Núria Sala i Vila, "La escenificación del poder: El marqués de Castelldosríus, primer virrey Borbón del Perú (1707–1710)," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 61:1 (Jan.–June 2004), pp. 31–68.
28. Francisco Antonio Eissa-Barroso, "'Of Experience, Zeal and Selflessness': Military Officers as Viceroys in Early Eighteenth-Century Spanish America," *The Americas* 68:3 (Jan. 2012), pp. 317–45; "'The Honor of the Spanish Nation': Military Officers, Mediterranean Campaigns and American Government under Philip V," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 39–60; and "'Having Served in the Troops': The Appointment of Military Officers as Provincial Governors in Early Eighteenth-Century Spanish America (1700–1746)," *Colonial Latin American Historical Review*. Forthcoming.
29. See esp. Víctor Peralta Ruiz, *Patrones, clientes y amigos. El poder burocrático indiano en la España del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2006).

30. Kenneth J. Andrien, "The Coming of Enlightened Reform in Bourbon Peru: Secularization of the *Doctrinas de indios*, 1746–1773," in Gabriel Paquette (ed.), *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 183–202; and "The *Noticias secretas de América* and the Construction of a Governing Ideology for the Spanish American Empire," *Colonial Latin American Review* 7:2 (1998), pp. 175–92.
31. Pablo E. Pérez-Mallaina Bueno, *Retrato de una ciudad en crisis: La sociedad limeña ante el movimiento sísmico de 1746* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 2001); Charles F. Walker, *Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru, and Its Long Aftermath* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).
32. Adrian J. Pearce, "Huancavelica 1700–1759: Administrative Reform of the Mercury Industry in Early Bourbon Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79:4 (Nov. 1999), pp. 669–702, and "The Peruvian Population Census of 1725–1740," *Latin American Research Review* 36:3 (Oct. 2001), pp. 69–104.
33. Catalina Vizcarra "Bourbon Intervention in the Peruvian Tobacco Industry, 1752–1813," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 39:3 (Aug. 2007), pp. 567–93.
34. Ignacio González Casasnovas, *Las dudas de la corona: La política de repartimientos para la minería de Potosí (1680–1732)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2000).
35. Jesús A. Cosamalón Aguilar, "Precios y sociedad colonial (1700–1810): Transformaciones en los mercados y ciclos económicos en Lima," *Historia Mexicana* 249 (LXIII:1: July–Sept. 2013), pp. 51–109.
36. Christoph Rosenmüller, *Patrons, Partisans, and Palace Intrigues: The Court Society of Colonial Mexico, 1702–1710* (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2008); see also the same author's "The Power of Transatlantic Ties: A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Mexico's Social Networks, 1700–1755," *Latin American Research Review* 44:2 (2009), pp. 8–36, and further works cited in the bibliography.
37. Iván Escamilla González, *Los intereses malentendidos: El Consulado de Comerciantes de México y la monarquía española, 1700–1739* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011).
38. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," p. 3.
39. David A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763–1810* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), Chap. 1, see esp. pp. 25, 30.
40. David A. Brading, "Bourbon Spain and its American Empire" in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Colonial Spanish America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), esp. pp. 115–28.

41. For a recent restatement of the impact of the Seven Years War on imperial reform, see John H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), Chap. 10.
42. Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, "Perú borbónico y emancipación", *Revista de Historia de América*, 50 (Dec. 1960), pp. 315–438, see p. 318.
43. Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence: Economy, Society and Politics under Bourbon Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 99.
44. James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz, *Early Latin America: A History of Colonial Spanish America and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
45. Mark A. Burkholder and Lyman L. Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 234–43.
46. Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, *América Hispánica (1492–1898)*, vol. 6 of Manuel Tuñón de Lara (ed.), *Historia de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1983), pp. 111–18, 315–19; see also this author's comments in his *Reorganización de la hacienda virreinal peruana*, p. 7.
47. Benjamin Keen, *A History of Latin America,* 4th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), pp. 120–21.
48. Peter Bakewell, *A History of Latin America*, *c. 1450 to the Present*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 282–86.
49. John R. Fisher, *Bourbon Peru 1750–1824* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), p. 4.
50. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, pp. 231, 233.
51. Sergio Villalobos; see chap. 5 for my full analysis of this topic, including detailed discussion of the authors and works cited in this paragraph.
52. Antonio García-Baquero González, "Los resultados del libre comercio y el 'punto de vista': Una revisión desde la estadística," in Antonio García-Baquero González, *El comercio colonial en la época del absolutismo ilustrado: Problemas y debates* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2003), pp. 187–216. This citation represents the republishing of the 1997 article in the author's collected essays.
53. Again, these themes are developed in full in chaps. 3 and 5 in this book.
54. Among the best-known surveys and reports on the Spanish colonies, after all, is that of Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa, *Noticias secretas de América*. (1748; Madrid: Historia 16, 1991), completed in 1748 on the basis of a voyage begun in the mid-1730s.
55. See Marcelo Bitar Letayf, *Los economistas españoles del siglo XVIII y sus ideas sobre el comercio con las Indias* (Mexico City: Instituto Mexicano de Comercio Exterior, 1975), which devotes extensive attention to the early Bourbon figures.

56. Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, p. 25.
57. Allan J. Kuethe and Kenneth J. Andrien, in their forthcoming *The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century*, appear to identify the same two cycles or "waves" of reform, again with 1736 the pivotal date between them, though they do not seem to perceive any hiatus between the cycles as I do. I thank these authors most warmly for sending me the Contents page and Introduction of their book.
58. These questions are developed in full in chap. 2.
59. William Coxe, *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon, from the Accession of Philip V to the Death of Charles III*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1815), vol. 2, p. 377; Edward Armstrong, *Elisabeth Farnese, "The Termagant of Spain"* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892), p. 125.
60. This hiatus is described in chap. 5.
61. One example is Fisher, *Bourbon Peru*, pp. 3–4; see the introduction to chap. 6 below.
62. Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, *El virreinato del marqués de Castelfuerte, 1724–1736: El primer intento borbónico por reformar el Perú* (Madrid: Catriel, 2000).
63. Castelfuerte's policies in these areas are discussed in chap. 4.
64. Walker, *Shaky Colonialism*, esp. chap. 5, see also the same author's "The Upper Classes and their Upper Stories: Architecture and the Aftermath of the Lima Earthquake of 1746," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 83:1 (Feb. 2003), pp. 53–82; and ´Civilize or Control? The Lingering Impact of the Bourbon Urban Reforms," in Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada (eds.), *Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750–1950* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 74–95.
65. These points are made at length in chap. 6.
66. The need for a dedicated, wide-ranging account seems likely to be met by Eissa-Barroso's forthcoming *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717–1739)*. I thank the anonymous reviewer of this book for Palgrave Macmillan for detailed suggestions on published research for New Granada, some of which I have attempted to incorporate here.

1 Imperial Hiatus: War in Spain and Crisis in Peru, 1700 to 1720s

1. On the origins of the War, see M. A. Thompson, "Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* 5th series, 4 (1954), pp. 111–34, and Duque de Frías, "El cumplimiento del testamento de Carlos II: La embajada del condestable de Castilla a Felipe V de España y Luis XIV de Francia", *Hispania* 98 (1965), pp. 263–84.

2. Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700–1715* (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969) was long the standard broad-based account of the war, but see now above all Joaquim Albareda Salvadó, *La guerra de sucesión de España (1700–1714)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2010). Arthur Parnell, *The War of the Succession in Spain during the Reign of Queen Anne, 1702–1711* (London: George Bell, 1888), and David Francis, *The First Peninsular War, 1702–1713* (London: Ernest Benn, 1975) are expert military histories. A relatively recent bibliography, including French and northern European sources, is Calvin W. Dickinson and E. R. Hitchcock, *The War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–1713: A Selected Bibliography* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).
3. Henry Kamen, "The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 39 (1966), pp. 165–73.
4. Pedro Voltes, "Documentos sobre episodios del año 1706 en la Guerra de Sucesión," *Hispania* 49:173 (Sept.–Dec. 1989), pp. 1,053–86; John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 28–29.
5. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, pp. 32–34; Kamen, *The War of Succession*, pp. 20–21; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *Sociedad y Estado en el siglo XVIII español* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1976), pp. 29–32.
6. W. Michael, *England under George I: The Quadruple Alliance* (London: Macmillan, 1939).
7. In the first years of the war, the cost of maintaining the army alone, at 100 million reales, exceeded the normal income of the Crown, at 97 million reales; Kamen, *The War of Succession*, p. 75.
8. Kamen, *The War of Succession*, p. 43.
9. Kamen, *The War of Succession*, p. 51; see also E. W. Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les côtes de l'océan Pacifique* (Paris: H. Champion, 1909), pp. 329–33, 342–43, 483, suggesting that Amelot "n'était pas loin d'être . . . le véritable régent de l'Espagne."
10. Kamen, *The War of Succession*, pp. 95–96; Alfred Baudrillart, "Les intrigues du Duc d'Orléans en Espagne, 1708–1709," *Revue Historique* 43 (1890), pp. 1–33, 241–73; Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, p. 79.
11. Pachau to Torcy, Dec. 31, 1714, cited by Kamen, *The War of Succession*, pp. 55–56.
12. Marqués de San Felipe, *Comentarios de la guerra de España e historia de su Rey Felipe V, el Animoso* (Madrid: Atlas, 1957), p. 269; Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, p. 69.
13. Jacinto Hidalgo, "La abdicación de Felipe V," *Hispania* 22 (1962), pp. 559–89; A. Danvila, *El reinado relámpago. Luis I y Luisa Isabel de Orléans (1707–1742)* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1952).

14. G. Syveton, *Une cour et un aventurier: Le Baron de Ripperdá* (Paris: n. pub., 1896).
15. "During these years of continual changes, Indies affairs passed through diverse hands" (Margarita Gómez Gómez, *Forma y expedición del documento en la Secretaría del Estado y del Despacho de Indias* [Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1993], p. 37); "thus shuffled around, the affairs of the former Secretariat of the Indies lacked the firm direction they would be given in January 1721"; Gildas Bernard, *Le sécretariat d'Etat et le Conseil espagnole des Indes (1700–1808)* (Geneva: Droz, 1972), p. 33.
16. Gómez Gómez, *Forma y expedición*, pp. 37–38.
17. Manuel Tejado Fernández, "Cartagena, amenazada (datos para el estudio de las repercusiones en América de la Guerra de Sucesión (1701–1713)," *Revista de Indias* 11:43–4 (1951), pp. 179–92; María del Carmen Mena García, "Santa Marta durante la guerra de sucesión española," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 36 (1979), pp. 569–702.
18. Among older work, see Analola Borges, "Los aliados del archiduque Carlos en la América colonial," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 27 (1970), pp. 321–70; Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, "Precedente separatista," *Revista de Indias* 26:103–4 (1966), pp. 127–31; for a recent take, Aaron Alejandro Olivas, "The Global Politics of the Transatlantic Slave Trade during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1700–1715," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 85–109). Olivas has a thesis in progress on loyalty and disloyalty to the Bourbons in the colonies.
19. This is the title to Rubén Vargas Ugarte, *Historia general del Perú* (Lima: Milla Batres, 1966), vol. 4, chap. 5, covering 1710–20; see also pp. 32, 44–45.
20. Geoffrey J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 36. Charles Frostin, "Les Pontchartrain et la pénétration commerciale française en Amérique espagnole (1690–1715)," *Revue Historique* 245 (1971), pp. 307–36, esp. pp. 333–34, discusses French influence over colonial appointments, concluding that "in this way, francophile elements, or at least elements so reputed, were placed at the head of the main Spanish settlements"; he lists five examples, among them Castelldosríus.
21. Vargas Ugarte, *Historia general*, vol. 4, chap. 1, pp. 11–34; Manuel Moreyra y Paz-Soldán (ed.), *Virreinato peruano: Documentos para su historia: Colección de cartas de virreyes, Conde de Monclova*, 3 vols (Lima: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1954–55).
22. Nuria Sala i Vila, "La escenificación del poder: El marqués de Castelldosríus, primer virrey Borbón del Perú (1707–1710)," *Anuario*

de Estudios Americanos 61:1 (Jan.–June 2004), pp. 31–68, and "Una corona bien vale un virreinato: El marqués de Castelldosríus, primer virrey borbónico del Perú," in Alfredo Moreno Cebrián and Núria Sala i Vila, *El "premio" de ser virrey: Los intereses públicos y privados del gobierno virreinal en el Perú de Felipe V* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005), pp. 17–150; significant earlier discussions include Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *Tres Catalanes, virreyes en el Perú* (Madrid: Hidalguía, 1962); Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 34–48; Vargas Ugarte, *Historia general*, vol. 4, pp. 73–90; Manuel de Mendiburú, *Diccionario histórico-biográfico del Perú* (Lima: Enrique Palacios, 1931–48), vol. 8, pp. 230–36.

23. Vargas Ugarte, *Historia general*, vol. 4, pp. 41, 95–109; Mendiburú, *Diccionario*, vol. 6, pp. 381–93. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 61–62 and 80, presents an excessively critical view.
24. Vargas Ugarte, *Historia general*, vol. 4, pp. 121–34; Mendiburú, *Diccionario*, vol. 8, pp. 16–28; Luis Merino, *Estudio crítico sobre las* Noticias Secretas de América *y el clero colonial (1720–1765)* (Madrid: Graf. Jura, 1959), pp. 93–94, note 8; Antonio de Egaña, *Historia de la Iglesia en la América española: Hemisferio sur* (Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1966), pp. 816–17; Enrique Sánchez Pedrote, "Los prelados virreyes," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 7 (1950), pp. 211–53. For accusations against Morcillo, see, for example, Marqués de Casa Concha to Crown, March 26, 1721, A.G.I., Quito 143; Francisco Xavier de Salazar to Crown, August 1, 1722, A.G.I., Lima 521; Castelfuerte to Crown, November 8, 1725, A.G.I., Lima 412.
25. John R. Fisher, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System, 1784–1814* (London: Athlone Press, 1970), this is the title to Chapter 1. See also the same author, *Bourbon Peru, 1750–1824* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), Chap. 1, discussing "Antecedents: The Viceroyalty of Peru prior to 1750."
26. The organization of Spanish Atlantic trade throughout the Habsburg and early Bourbon periods has been the subject of numerous studies since Clarence Haring's early *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1918). Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, *Seville et l'Atlantique, 1504–1650,* 8 vols (Paris: A. Colin, 1955–59), is monumental, exhaustive, and more cited than read; John R. Fisher, *The Economic Aspects of Spanish Imperialism in America, 1492–1810* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997), is more accessible.
27. For a wide-ranging and expert discussion, see Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), esp. Chaps. 1–3. Sergio M. Rodríguez

Lorenzo, *La Carrera de Indias (la ruta, los hombres, las mercancías)* (Esles de Cayón: El Municipio, 2012) is an excellent recent synthesis.

28. Lawrence A. Clayton, "Trade and Navigation in the Seventeenth-Century Viceroyalty of Peru," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 7 (1975), pp. 1–21 see pp. 3–4.
29. John Lynch, *The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598–1700* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 278–79.
30. José Muñoz Pérez, "El comercio de Indias bajo los Austrias y la crítica del proyectismo del XVIII," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 13 (1956), pp. 85–103. Muñoz Pérez notes, however, that polemical criticism of the system only became widespread after ca. 1760, when government itself became committed to change, and the fleets themselves had already been largely abandoned; see p. 86.
31. On taxation, see Antonio García-Baquero González, *Cádiz y el Atlántico (1717–1778): El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano,* 2nd ed. 2 vols. (Cadiz: Diputación de Cádiz, 1988), vol. 1, pp. 183–93; on confiscations and arbitrary fines, see John H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 76, 157, 254, 368, 452–53, 519; Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, pp. 237–38.
32. García-Baquero González, *Cádiz y el Atlántico*, vol. 1, pp. 216–24; Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales*, p. 260.
33. Interest in foreign communities in Cadiz, long centered on the French, has more recently embraced other nationalities. For the British, see María del Carmen Lario de Oñate, *La colonia mercantil británica e irlandesa en Cádiz a finales del siglo XVIII* (Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 2000), and Nélida García Fernández, *Comunidad extranjera y puerto privilegiado: Los británicos en Cádiz en el siglo XVIII* (Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 2005); for the Dutch, see above all Ana Crespo Solana, *Mercaderes atlánticos: Redes del comercio flamenco y holandés entre Europa y el Caribe* (Cordoba: Universidad de Córdoba / Cajasur, 2009), esp. section 2.
34. Woodrow Borah, *Early Colonial Trade and Navigation between Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954); Sergio R. Villalobos, *Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata y Chile, 1700–1811* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria, 1965), Enrique M. Barba, "Sobre el contrabando de la Colonia del Sacramento: siglo XVIII," *Investigaciones y Ensayos* 28 (1980), pp. 57–76, and José Torre Revello, "Un contrabandista del siglo XVII en el Río de la Plata," *Revista de Historia de América* (Mexico City) 45 (1958), pp. 121–30; Lance R. Grahn, "An Irresoluble Dilemma: Smuggling in New Granada, 1713–1763," in John R. Fisher, Allan

J. Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane (eds.), *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), pp. 123–46; Mariano Ardash Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano: Política y comercio asiático en el imperio español (1680–1784): La centralidad de lo marginal* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2012). Jean-Paul Duviols, "Les côtes du Vénézuela au XVIIIieme siècle: Témoignage d'un contrebandier," *Cahiers des Amériques Latines* 32 (1979), pp. 5–17, reproduces an interesting eyewitness account, while Germán de Granda, "Una ruta marítima de contrabando de esclavos negros entre Panamá y Barbacoas durante el Asiento inglés," *Revista de Indias* 36:143–4 (1976), pp. 123–46, contains an extensive bibliography of earlier studies of smuggling in South America.

35. Much of this debate was played out in the pages of the journal *Past & Present*. Jonathan I. Israel, "Mexico and the 'General Crisis' of the Seventeenth Century," *Past and Present* 63 (May 1974), pp. 33–57, and John J. Tepaske and Herbert S. Klein, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality?" *Past and Present* 90 (Feb. 1981), pp. 116–35, with contributions to the following volume of the same journal, provide a good summary.
36. John H. Elliott, "The General Crisis in Retrospect: A Debate without End," in John H. Elliott, *Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500–1800* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 52–73, see p. 63.
37. Lynch, *The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change*, pp. 10–11, 210–19.
38. Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano*, esp. pp. 351–65, also pp. 68–71, 176–89.
39. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade*, esp. pp. 76–81.
40. "There can be no disputing the role of colonial factors in the crisis of Spain's Hapsburg regime and the War of the Spanish Succession"; Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, p. 121.
41. In a much-quoted phrase, Louis XIV declared that "the principal object of the present war is the commerce of the Indies and the riches they produce"; letter to Amelot, Feb. 18, 1709, in Baron de Girardot (ed.), *Correspondence de Louis XIV avec M. Amelot, son ambassadeur en Espagne, 1705–1709*, 2 vols (Nantes: Aubry, 1864), vol. 2, p. 121.
42. For details, see Adrian J. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1700–1759," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1998, pp. 33–34.
43. This boom in French smuggling has generated a substantial literature. The outstanding work is still Dahlgren's early (1909) *Les relations commerciales*; Carlos Daniel Malamud Rikles, *Cádiz y Saint Malo en el comercio colonial peruano (1698–1725)*

(Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1986) is undermined by the lack of detailed reference to sources; see also Frostin, "Les Pontchartrain," and Pablo E. Pérez-Mallaína Bueno, *Política naval española en el Atlántico, 1700–1715* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1982), pp. 141–69, which gives a detailed survey of French arrivals at major Pacific ports.

44. For the figure of 20 million pesos in four years, see Marqués de Castelldosríus to Crown, August 31, 1708, A.G.I., Lima 408. In the 1690s, it was calculated that Peru might accumulate 30 million pesos in five years without a trade fair, and 1708 witnessed the first fair since 1696; Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, p. 281.
45. Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano*, esp. 228–58.
46. Enrique Tandeter, *Coercion and Market: Silver Mining in Colonial Potosí, 1692–1826* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), pp. 5–10.
47. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 38–40.
48. Adrian J. Pearce, *British Trade with Spanish America, 1763–1808* (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 2007), pp. 18–25. On the South Sea Company, see also Victoria G. Sorsby, "British Trade with Spanish America under the Asiento, 1713–1740," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of London, 1975; the early studies by Donovan and Nelson, cited in the bibliography; and Colin Palmer, *Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700–1739* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1981). For the "Utrecht Treaty Complex," including extensive discussion of the British *Asiento*, see Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, pp. 136–44.
49. Vera Lee Brown, "The South Sea Company and Contraband Trade," *American Historical Review* 31:4 (July 1926), pp. 662–78; María Dolores Gómez Molleda, "El contrabando inglés en América: Correspondencia inédita de la factoría de Buenos Aires," *Hispania* 10 (1950), pp. 336–69; also Allan Christelow, "Contraband Trade between Jamaica and the Spanish Main, and the Free Port Act of 1766," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 22 (1942), pp. 309–43.
50. See Tepaske and Klein, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis," p. 122, graph 2.
51. María Encarnación Rodríguez Vicente, *Economía, sociedad, y Real Hacienda en las Indias españolas* (Madrid: Alhambra, 1987), pp. 334–36, annex 1.
52. Kendall W. Brown, "La crisis financiera peruana al comienzo del siglo XVIII, la minería de plata y la mina de azogues de Huancavelica," *Revista de Indias* 48:182–83 (Jan.–Aug. 1988), pp. 349–81, which includes statistical data.
53. The development of this debt is described in Ladrón de Guevara to Crown, October 19, 1711, and "Relacion del estado que tiene

la Rl Hazda," September 25, 1711, both in A.G.I., Lima 409; see also Castelldosríus to Crown, December 15, 1707, and August 15, 1708, both in A.G.I., Lima 408. The figures in this paragraph are rounded.

54. Cédula, October 19, 1706, A.G.I., Lima 408.
55. Castelldosríus to Crown, August 31, 1707, December 15, 1707, and August 15, 1708, all in A.G.I., Lima 408; Ladrón de Guevara to Crown, October 19, 1711, A.G.I., Lima 409.
56. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," tables 2 and 3, showing revenue from commercial taxes to the Lima treasury, and from mining taxes and sales of mercury to that of Potosí, 1651–1760.
57. Adrian J. Pearce, "The Peruvian Population Census of 1725–1740," *Latin American Research Review* 36:3 (Oct. 2001), pp. 69–104, esp. pp. 97–99.
58. For allegations by the Marqués de Castelfuerte regarding corruption among treasury officials, see Castelfuerte to Crown, July 26, 1724 and November 6, 1724, both in A.G.I., Lima 411.
59. Adrian J. Pearce, "Huancavelica 1700–1759: Administrative Reform of the Mercury Industry in Early Bourbon Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79:4 (Nov. 1999), pp. 669–702, see pp. 674–77.
60. Castelldosríus to Crown, December 15, 1707, A.G.I., Lima 408.
61. As one example, it was claimed that after the royal officials at Vico y Pasco were dismissed for corruption following an inspection in 1725, registered income at that treasury rose more than threefold: Castelfuerte to Crown, May 14, 1726, A.G.I., Lima 412.
62. Peter Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production in the Potosí District, 1550–1735," *Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat, Wirtshaft, und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 12 (1975), pp. 67–103, see esp. graph 1.
63. Consulta del Consejo de Indias, May 4, 1718, A.G.I., Charcas 274.
64. Peter Bakewell, "Mining," in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Colonial Spanish America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 203–49, fig. 2, p. 219; Pearce, "Huancavelica 1700–1759," fig. 2, p. 694, and fig. 4, p. 702.
65. Remittances from Potosí contributed 41 percent of total revenue to the Lima treasury in 1707, and the neighboring mining center of Oruro a further 11 percent; Lima itself produced 26 percent, most of it in commercial taxation. Brown, "La crisis financiera peruana," table 3, p. 358.
66. David A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 52 (1972), pp. 545–79, see pp. 573–77; Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production", p. 89; Pierre Chaunu, "Notes péruviennes (XVIieme, XVIIieme, XVIIIieme siecles). Aristote et le Potosí," *Revue*

Historique 224 (1960), pp. 59–74, see pp. 70–72, considers the crisis already apparent by the late seventeenth century.

67. Jeffrey Cole, *The Potosí Mita, 1573–1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), fig. 3, p. 120.
68. On the progressive decline of the mita see Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, pp. 72, 110, 116–17; for the significance of free-wage labor, see Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labour in Potosí, 1545–1650* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1984).
69. Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *Las minas de Huancavelica en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1949).
70. Thus, both the fall in revenue from the quinto real, and the poverty of trade, were blamed on large-scale diversion of silver toward the French; Castelldosríus to Crown, August 15, 1708, A.G.I., Lima 408.
71. This is the suggestion of Tandeter, *Coercion and Market*, pp. 9–10; see also the similar point made by Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production," p. 81.
72. For the impact in Potosí, see Manuel de Villavicencio to Crown, September 6, 1719, A.G.I., Charcas 219; for a plea for suspension of the mita, see Juan Bautista Uru Siri, "Petición," A.N.B., Minas, T.126, no. XIII.
73. Marqués de Castelfuerte, "Relación del estado de los reynos del Perú . . ." (1736), in Manuel Atanascio Fuentes (ed.), *Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español*, 6 vols. (Lima: F Bailly, 1859), vol. 3, p. 347.
74. Pearce, "Huancavelica 1700–1759," fig. 4, p. 702.
75. Brown, "La crisis financiera peruana," pp. 370–75. It was calculated that every quintal of contraband mercury cost the treasury 292.5 pesos in the loss of its sale price and of revenue from taxation on silver mining and trade: Marqués de Casa Concha, "Relación del Estado que ha tenido, y tiene la Real Mina de Guancavelica . . ." (1726), copies in Archivo General de Indias. Lima, copies in A.G.I., Lima 469, 479, Chaps. 6, 10.
76. In 1685, it was even reported that only 11 percent of the draft actually served in person; Lohmann Villena, *Las minas de Huancavelica*, p. 404.
77. Pearce, "Huancavelica 1700–1759," p. 673.
78. Casa Concha, "Relación del Estado," Chap. 9.
79. See respectively Kenneth J. Andrien, "The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Authority in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1633–1700," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 62 (1982), pp. 49–71, and John H. Parry, *The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies under the Hapsburgs* (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1953), p. 51; Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, "Venta y beneficio de los corregimientos peruanos," *Revista de Indias* 36:143–44 (1976), pp. 213–46, see p. 215; and Mark A. Burkholder and D. S. Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977), p. 18.

80. Domínguez Ortiz, "Un virreinato en venta" *Mercurio peruano* 49 (Jan.–Feb. 1965), pp. 46–71.
81. Antonio Kenneth J. Andrien, *Crisis and Decline: The Viceroyalty of Peru in the Seventeenth Century* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985), pp. 117–21.
82. This is among the central arguments of Andrien, *Crisis and Decline*.
83. Madrid Office of Accounts (*contaduría*), report, July 7, 1735, A.G.I., Lima 415, lists accounts extant for recent decades.
84. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, p. 24.
85. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, p. 27.
86. Jorge Tovar Velarde, "La Audiencia de Lima (1706–07). Dos años de gobierno criollo en el Perú," *Revista Histórica* 23 (1957–58), pp. 338–453, see pp. 403–5; on Núñez de Sanabria, see also Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, "El regalismo borbónico frente al poder vaticano: Acerca del estado de la Iglesia en el Perú durante el primer tercio del siglo XVIII," *Revista de Indias* 63:227 (2003), pp. 223–74, esp. pp. 265–66 (where he is mistakenly described as from Cáceres in Spain).
87. Respectively: much material on the Amparadas dispute in A.G.I., Lima 414; Tovar Velarde, "La Audiencia de Lima," pp. 433–34, see also 405–9 for further allegations of corruption; Zuloaga to Crown, Lima, October 28, 1721, A.G.I., Lima 521.
88. Tovar Velarde, "La Audiencia de Lima," p. 409.
89. Castelfuerte to Crown, August 30, 1727, A.G.I., Lima 412; Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa (Luis J. Ramos Gómez, ed.), *Noticias secretas de América* (1748; Madrid: Historia 16, 1991) pp. 411–13.
90. For a general survey, see Josep M. Barnadas, "The Catholic Church in Colonial Spanish America," in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 511–40.
91. The absolute peak of Church wealth may have been reached by 1687, when a huge earthquake destroyed many churches, and much land and income was alienated to pay for reconstruction; Rubén Vargas Ugarte, *Historia de la Iglesia en el Perú*, 5 vols. (Lima: Imprenta Santa María, 1953–62), vol. 3, pp. 211–16.
92. Castelfuerte suggested that most creoles in Lima entered the Church, as "la más ancha para el concurso y la más regular para la conveniencia"; *Relación*, pp. 63–64.

93. Vargas Ugarte, *Historia general del Perú*, vol. 5, pp. 405–6.
94. Sánchez Pedrote, "Los prelados virreyes," is really only an introduction to the topic.
95. The moral condition of the Church, and especially of the religious Orders, was criticized at length in what remains the best-known contemporary portrait of the "decadent viceroyalty," that of Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa: *Noticias secretas*, Chaps. 5, 8, and 11. Merino's *Estudio crítico* is a measured refutation of Juan and Ulloa's accusations; see esp. Chap. 3. See now also especially Charles F. Walker, *Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru, and Its Long Aftermath* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 111–16; Moreno Cebrián, "El regalismo borbónico," esp. pp. 238–54.
96. Mercury production at Huancavelica fell below the levels of this early period only with the final crisis of the mines from the 1780s, with a catastrophic structural collapse and wholesale but fruitless administrative reform into the 1790s; see Arthur Preston Whitaker, *The Huancavelica Mercury Mine: A Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance in the Spanish Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1941), Chaps. 5–7.

2 Bourbon Rule and the Origins of Reform in Spain and the Colonies, 1700 to 1719

1. I draw in this section in particular on the recent outstanding doctoral thesis of Francisco Antonio Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making: The Reform of Viceregal Rule in the Spanish World under Philip V (1700–1746)," Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2010; see esp. Chap. 2.
2. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making," pp. 83–90, citing Concepción de Castro, "Las primeras reformas institucionales de Felipe V: El marqués de Canales, 1703–1704," *Cuadernos dieciochistas* 1 (2000), pp. 155–83. These earliest reforms suffered a checkered fate.
3. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making," p. 67.
4. The ten Habsburg viceroyalties were Catalonia, Valencia, Aragon, Mallorca, and Navarre in the Peninsula; Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily in Italy; and Peru and New Spain. After 1716, in the European territories only Navarre remained a viceroyalty, though it was left vacant for much of Philip's reign: Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making," pp. 67–75.
5. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making," pp. 95–115, quotation on p. 107.
6. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making", pp. 129–35.

7. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making," pp. 83–95 and Appendix 6.
8. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making," pp. 91 and (for use of the *vía reservada* under Julio Alberoni) 123–39.
9. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making," pp. 84–87.
10. Henry Kamen, "El establecimiento de los Intendentes en la administración española," *Hispania* 24: 95 (1964), pp. 368–95, see pp. pp. 369–80.
11. John Lynch, *Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810: The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata* (London: Athlone Press, 1958); John R. Fisher, *Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System, 1784–1814* (London: Athlone Press, 1970).
12. Roland Dennis Hussey, "Antecedents of the Spanish Monopolistic Overseas Trading Companies (1624–1728)," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 9 (1929), pp. 1–30.
13. W. J. Callahan, "A Note on the Real y General Junta de Comercio, 1679–1814," *Economic History Review* 21 (1968), pp. 519–28, see pp. 519–20.
14. Valentín Vásquez de Prada, "Las rutas comerciales entre España y América en el siglo XVIII," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 25 (1968), pp. 197–241, p. 201; Geoffrey J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 24.
15. Callahan, "A Note on the Real y General Junta de Comercio," pp. 521–22; Roland Dennis Hussey, *The Caracas Company, 1728–1784* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1934), pp. 38–39; José Joaquín Real Díaz, "Las ferias de Jalapa," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 16 (1959), pp. 167–314, see pp. 169–71; E. W. Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les côtes de l'océan Pacifique* (Paris: H. Champion, 1909), pp. 485, 519–21; for the Juntas of 1715–17, see below; Gerónymo de Ustáriz, *Theorica, y práctica de comercio y de marina* (1724; facsimile ed., Madrid: Aguilar, 1968), pp. 166–67.
16. The papers of this Junta constitute *legajo* A.G.I., Indiferente general 2,046a. Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales*, pp. 322–46, and Real Díaz, "Las ferias de Jalapa," pp. 169–71, add important information.
17. Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales*, pp. 509–21. Dahlgren's great work is especially valuable as a rare source drawing extensively on French archival sources.
18. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, p. 52; Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales*, pp. 352–57. On two further occasions, French ships were granted

licences to trade directly from France to New Spain: Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 55, 58.

19. Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 158–59, discuss "Spain's multifaceted traditionalism." I return to this key point in chapter 3.
20. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 53–60, 75, 99.
21. For a somewhat more extensive discussion of the issues raised in this paragraph, see Adrian J. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1700–1759," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1998, pp. 58–59.
22. Analola Borges, *Alvarez Abreu y su extraordinaria misión en Indias* (Tenerife: Instituto de Estudios Canarios Santa Cruz, 1963); Walker, *Spanish Politics*, p. 100.
23. Pablo E. Pérez-Mallaína Bueno, *Política naval española en el Atlántico, 1700–1715* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1982), pp. 327–58.
24. Copy in A.G.I., Indiferente general 2,649; Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 55–56.
25. John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 73. On Philip, see the same work, Chaps. 2–4, and Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *Sociedad y estado en el siglo XVIII español* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1976), pp. 25–103, both excellent accounts. The tercentenary of the Bourbon accession in 2000 brought a slew of generally rather undistinguished biographies; see, for example, Carlos Martínez Shaw and Marina Alfonso Mola, *Felipe V* (Madrid: Arlanza, 2001). The major modern biography is Henry Kamen, *Philip V of Spain: The King who Reigned Twice* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); among other recent studies, see also Christopher Storrs, "Felipe V: Caesura or Continuity?," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 9–21.
26. An earlier historian remarked, somewhat more elegantly, that he "combined with a character incredibly sensuous a conscience abnormally scrupulous"; Edward Armstrong, *Elisabeth Farnese, "The Termagant of Spain"* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1892), p. 9.
27. For Alberoni's origins, see Juan Alvarez de Colmenar, *Annales d'Espagne et de Portugal*, 8 vols (Amsterdam: François L'Honoré et fils, 1741), vol. 2, pp. 316–18; A. Professione, *Giulio Alberoni dal 1708 al 1714* (Verona: Padova, 1890).
28. In English, see the classic studies by Simon Harcourt-Smith, *Alberoni, or, the Spanish Conspiracy* (London: Faber and Faber,

1943), and G. Moore, *Lives of Cardinal Alberoni, the Duke of Ripperda, and Marquis of Pombal, Three Distinguished Political Adventurers of the Last Century* 2nd ed. (London: J. Rodwell, 1814). The major biography is P. Castagnoli, *Il Cardenale Giulio Alberoni*, 3 vols. (Piacenza: Collegio Alberoni, 1929–32); see the bibliography prefaced to vol. 1 for some sense of the interest Alberoni aroused in the 1700s and 1800s.

29. Marqués de San Felipe, *Comentarios de la guerra de España e historia de su Rey Felipe V, el Animoso* (Madrid: Atlas, 1957), pp. 269–70, 277, 319; Armstrong, *Elisabeth Farnese*, pp. 124–25.
30. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, p. 78.
31. Armstrong, *Elisabeth Farnese*, p. 101; Harcourt-Smith, *Alberoni*, p. 171; also Domínguez Ortiz, *Sociedad y Estado*, p. 51.
32. On the *valido* in Spanish government, see Francisco Tomás y Valiente, *Los validos en la monarquía española del siglo XVII* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1963). Perhaps too much is made of the distinction between *validos* and ministers, for this period at least. Under the early Bourbons, the key ministers held virtually all the main ministries at once, and of course lacked any independent "power base"; so that the distinction seems more an administrative nicety than one of substance.
33. Alfred Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la cour de France* (Paris: Firmin-Didot et Cie., 1890–1900), vol. 2, pp. 244–45; San Felipe, *Comentarios*, pp. 268, 313; on his disdain for the secretaries, see Armstrong, *Elisabeth Farnese*, p. 101; also Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *Patiño y Campillo: Reseña histórico-biográfico de estos dos ministros de Felipe V* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1882), pp. 29–30; Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making," pp. 136–37.
34. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture, and Policy-Making," pp. 126–27.
35. Mariano Ardash Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano: Política y comercio asiático en el imperio español (1680–1784): La centralidad de lo marginal* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2012), pp. 99, 130–31.
36. Allan J. Kuethe, "Cardinal Alberoni and Reform in the American Empire," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 23–38. Historians are indebted to Alberoni for an early reorganization of the royal archives.
37. Armstrong, *Elisabeth Farnese*, p. 125.
38. On these Juntas, see Rodríguez Villa, *Patiño y Campillo*, pp. 22–23; Jean O. McLachlan, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 147; enclosure

marked "Es copia de la papeleta . . . ," with López Pintado to Varas y Valdés, June 12, 1736, A.G.I., Contratación 5,102; discussions in Real Díaz, "Las ferias de Jalapa," pp. 172–74, 178, 210; Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 96–97, 106.

39. McLachlan, *Trade and Peace*, pp. 67–73; Armstrong, *Elisabeth Farnese*, pp. 73–78; Baudrillart, *Philippe V*, vol. 2, p. 224.
40. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, pp. 139–40.
41. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 85–88, 93–94, 132–33; see also Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, p. 181.
42. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, p. 78.
43. For a general account, see Harcourt-Smith, *Alberoni*, Chap. 8.
44. Kamen, "El establecimiento de los Intendentes," pp. 374–75.
45. Fabrice Abbad and Didier Ozanam, *Les Intendants espagnols du XVIIIième siècle* (Madrid: Casa de Velásquez, 1992), pp. 10–13.
46. Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Armada española: Desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragón* 9 vols (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1895–1903), vol. 6, pp. 209–17; Ustáriz, *Theorica y práctica*, pp. 162–64.
47. A. González Enciso, *Estado e industria en el siglo XVIII: La fábrica de Guadalajara* (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1980); Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, pp. 182–85.
48. See also Jaime Vicens Vives (ed.), *Historia de España y América*, 5 vols. 2nd ed. (Barcelona: n. pub., 1971), vol. 4, pp. 175–85; Domínguez Ortiz, *Sociedad y Estado*, pp. 99–100.
49. Ustáriz, *Theorica y práctica*, pp. 159–61, 164–69.
50. Two fine examples of these guns may be seen in the Museo Militar, Seville.
51. Ustáriz, *Theorica y práctica*, pp. 117–22, 137–38; Vicens Vives, *Historia de España y América*, vol. 4, pp. 190–94, 199–203.
52. Many of these protectionist decrees are reproduced in a printed collection dated Seville, April 28, 1734, A.G.I., Indiferente general 652.
53. On the Secretariat of Marine and Indies, see the recent work by Víctor Peralta Ruiz, *Patrones, clientes y amigos. El poder burocrático indiano en la España del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2006), Chap. 1.
54. Both decrees are reproduced in Rodríguez Villa, *Patiño y Campillo*, Appendices 3, 7. On these reforms, see Gildas Bernard, "La Casa de la Contratación de Sevilla, luego en Cádiz, en el siglo XVIII," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 12 (1955), pp. 253–86, esp. pp. 254–57; Fernández Duro, *Armada española*, vol. 6, pp. 210–11.
55. "Proyecto de flota," July 4, 1717, A.G.I., Arribadas 191.
56. Russell to Addison, Cadiz, September 27, 1717, quoted in McLachlan, *Trade and Peace*, p. 74.

3 The First Cycle of Reform, 1710s to 1736: Spanish Atlantic Trade

1. Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *Patiño y Campillo: Reseña histórico-biográfico de estos dos ministros de Felipe V* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1882), pp. 19–20, 35.
2. J. Mercader Riba, "Un organismo-piloto en la monarquía de Felipe V: La Superintendencia de Cataluña," *Hispania* 27 (1967), pp. 116–57, 354–76; see also the same author's "La ordenación de Cataluña por Felipe V: La Nueva Planta," *Hispania* 11 (1951), pp. 257–366.
3. Rodríguez Villa, *Patiño y Campillo*; Marqués de San Felipe, *Comentarios de la guerra de España e historia de su Rey Felipe V, el Animoso* (Madrid: Atlas, 1957), pp. 390, 396, 448, 462; John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 90–91.
4. Antonio Béthencourt Massieu, *Patiño en la política internacional de Felipe V* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1954); Jean O. McLachlan, "Patiño and the Economic Development of the Spanish Empire," appended to her *Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), pp. 146–54; Julián B. Ruiz Rivera, "Patiño y la reforma del Consulado de Cádiz, 1729," *Temas Americanistas* (Seville) 5 (1985), pp. 16–21.
5. Emiliano Fernández de Pinedo et al., *Centralismo, Ilustración, y agonía del antiguo régimen (1715–1833)*, vol. 7 of Manuel Tuñón de Lara (ed.), *Historia de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1980), pp. 191–93; Robert W. Kern (ed.), *Historical Dictionary of Modern Spain, 1700–1988* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990).
6. Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, *José Patiño: El inicio del gobierno político-económico ilustrado en España* (Huelva: Artes Gráficas Andaluzas, 1998); elsewhere, see especially Carlos Pérez Fernández-Turégano, *Patiño y las reformas de la administración en el reinado de Felipe V* (Madrid: Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, 2006); Francisco Antonio Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making: The Reform of Viceregal Rule in the Spanish World under Philip V (1700–1746)," Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2010, esp. pp. 251–60, 265–66. Víctor Peralta Ruiz, *Patrones, clientes y amigos. El poder burocrático indiano en la España del siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2006), Chap. 2, titled "Dionisio de Alsedo y Herrera o el Oráculo de América de Felipe V y José Patiño," explores the impact of Alsedo's writings on his relations with Patiño and American career.
7. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, pp. 90–100, 146. This appears to be a specific rather than a general tradition; it was first expressed in Rodríguez

Villa, *Patiño y Campillo*, p. 6, and was elaborated on in McLachlan, *Trade and Peace*, appendix, esp. p. 152 ("Patiño was kept so busy supplying the immediate needs of Their Catholic Majesties that he had little time for anything but the effective execution of a hand-to-mouth policy," and so on). Rodríguez Villa gives a generally positive assessment, however, as does Béthencourt Massieu, *Patiño en la política internacional de Felipe V* (of which note 8 on p. 18 is a refutation of McLachlan), and Alfred Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la court de France*, 5 vols. (Paris: Firmin-Didot et Cie., 1890–1900), vol. 4, pp. 365–66.

8. Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Armada española: Desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragón* 9 vols. (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1895–1903), vol. 6, pp. 209–25.
9. Many copies of this *Proyecto* are extant in the Archivo General de Indias, including in sections Indiferente general 652 and 2,528 and Contratación 5,070b; it is reproduced in Anon (ed.), *Documentos para la historia argentina*, 45 vols. (Buenos Aires: Compañía Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1913–), vol. 5, as document 8. Page references to the *Proyecto* in this work refer to the original document.
10. Allan J. Kuethe, "The Colonial Commercial Policy of Philip V and the Atlantic World," in Renate Pieper and Peer Schmidt (eds.), *Latin America and the Atlantic World (1500–1850)* (Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau-Verlag, 2005), p. 332.
11. Kuethe, "The Colonial Commercial Policy of Philip V," pp. 326–29.
12. Kuethe, "The Colonial Commercial Policy of Philip V," pp. 331–33.
13. Allan J. Kuethe, "La política colonial de Felipe V y el Proyecto de 1720," in Fernando Navarro Antolín (ed.), *Orbis Incognitus: Avisos y legajos del Nuevo Mundo*, vol. 1. (Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2007), p. 238.
14. Kuethe, "The Colonial Commercial Policy of Philip V," p. 332; "La política colonial de Felipe V," p. 238.
15. "*. . . con método el más liberal se hagan fáciles, y breves los despachos, sin que aún la práctica de su execución tenga en ser molesta la menor circunstancia de onerosa*"; *Proyecto* of 1720, p. 16. See also Antonio García-Baquero González, *Cádiz y el Atlántico (1717–1778): El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano*, 2nd ed. 2 vols. (Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1988), vol. 1, pp. 199–20.
16. "*. . . tan puntual y conveniente definición, así a la regulación de los fletes como a la producción de los derechos con tan pronto expediente, conforme a él que para los despachos de Indias se necesita*"; cited in Rafael Antúnez y Acevedo, *Memorias históricas sobre la legislación,*

y gobierno del comercio de los Españoles con sus colonias en las Indias occidentales (1797; (Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1981), Appendix XIII, xlvii.

17. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, p. 182.
18. Allan Kuethe, "Alberoni's Reform Agenda in America," Paper presented at the conference on "Spanish America in the Early Eighteenth Century: New Perspectives on a Forgotten Era," University of Warwick, Apr. 15–16, 2011; see also the same author's "The Colonial Commercial Policy of Philip V," p. 332 (where *palmeo* is "seemingly irrational"), and "La política colonial de Felipe V," p. 238.
19. Kuethe, "The Colonial Commercial Policy of Philip V," p. 331.
20. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, pp. 158–59. Kuethe finds inexplicable the Steins' failure to discuss the point first made by Geoffrey Walker, that Utrecht rendered radical reform of Spanish Atlantic trade largely unfeasible, by reaffirming the foreign treaty rights that depended on it. It is true that this theory should have been cited by the Steins, but of course, they may not have seen it as finally determining the direction of early Bourbon trade policy: Kuethe, "The Colonial Commercial Policy of Philip V," p. 323.
21. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, p. 198.
22. Printed *cédula*, December 31, 1720, A.G.I., Indiferente general 652.
23. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, War*, pp. 189–90; citing Michel Morineau, *Incroyables gazettes et fabuleuz métaux: Les retours des trésors américains d'aprés les gazettes hollandaises (XVIe-XVIIIe siecles)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 362–66, fig. 24.
24. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, pp. 153–56.
25. *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas*, p. 13.
26. Geoffrey J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789* (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 109–11; see also Appendix III of this work.
27. Gerónymo de Ustáriz, *Theorica, y práctica de comercio, y de marina* (1724; facsimile ed., Madrid: Aguilar, 1968), pp. 104–6, 111. On Ustáriz, the principal modern biography is Reyes Fernández Durán, *Gerónimo de Uztáriz (1670–1732): Una política económica para Felipe V* (Madrid: Minerva, 1999).
28. Printed *Declaración de los derechos, que por razón de Alcavala, antigua, y moderna*…, April 5, 1720, A.G.I., Contratación 5070b.
29. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 110–11; Antúnez y Acevedo, *Memorias Históricas*, pp. 223–24.
30. "Estado, y ajuste de el producto que tubo la R.l haz.da en la flota de Nueva España…," April 13, 1720, A.G.I., Indiferente general 2595. The respective figures were 828,911 pesos and 208,270 pesos.

31. Ustáriz, *Theorica y práctica*, pp. 110–13.
32. *Proyecto para galeones, y flotas*, p. 6.
33. "Reglamento para las Flotas, y Galeones, que en adelante se despacharen . . . ," August 28, 1725, A.G.I., Indiferente general 2528. It is not entirely clear whether this ostensibly important decree was actually promulgated.
34. "El Consulado . . . informa," ca. 1763, A.G.I., Arribadas 193; for the background to this affair, see Pérez-Mallaína Bueno, *Política naval española*, pp. 202–28.
35. "*. . . se previno . . . que a los españoles originarios de estos Reynos se les tolerase y disimulase la admisión y embarque de qualesquiera consignaciones extrangeras*"; Antúnez y Acevedo, *Memorias históricas*, p. 273.
36. Printed tariff (*Aranzel*), April 4, 1719, A.G.I., Contratación 5070b.
37. *Aranzel, de los derechos que se han de cobrar . . . de los provistos en empleos, comerciantes, y dueños de navíos*, June 23, 1720, A.G.I., Contratación 5070b.
38. *Reglamento y ordenanza de las soldadas, que ha de ganar la gente de la Tripulación de los Navíos Marchantes . . .*, December 9, 1723, A.G.I., Arribadas 191; prepared by José de Patiño.
39. The vast competences of these officials are detailed in the *Proyecto* of 1720, pp. 8–9, and in that of 1717, also pp. 8–9.
40. *Cédula* of May 31, 1720, in Ustáriz, *Theorica y práctica*, pp. 110–13.
41. Bernard, "La Casa de la Contratación," pp. 258–64. Both bodies *were* returned to Seville in 1725, but only momentarily.
42. Antonia Heredia Herrera, "Reglamentos y ordenanzas del Consulado de Cádiz en el siglo XVIII," *IV Jornadas de Andalucía y América*, vol. 1. (Seville, 1985), pp. 59–77, esp. pp. 60, 68.
43. *Proyecto* of 1720, preamble, pp. 3–5.
44. *Proyecto* of 1720, pp. 4–12; *Proyecto* of 1717, pp. 1–3.
45. "Reglamento para las Flotas, y Galeones, que en adelante se despacharen . . . ," August 28, 1725, A.G.I., Indiferente general 2528, article 21, provided that *avisos* should sail four months before the departure of any fleet, so that preparations for the fair might begin.
46. Antonia Heredia Herrera, "Asiento con el Consulado de Cádiz en 1720, para el despacho de avisos," *Instituto de Estudios Gaditanos.* (Cadiz, 1975), separata, pp. 163–70.
47. Mariano Ardash Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano: Política y comercio asiático en el imperio español (1680–1784): La centralidad de lo marginal* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2012), pp. 207–27, esp. pp. 217, 223.
48. Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano*, pp. 73–76.
49. Elsa Urbina Reyes, "El Tribunal del Consulado de Chile," *Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia* 67 (1962), pp. 104–43, esp.

pp. 108–11; the founding cédula forms part of the Marqués de Villagarcía's "Instrucción de gobierno," dated January 30, 1735, A.G.I., Lima 642.

50. "Instrucción de gobierno" to Marqués de Villagarcía, dated January 30, 1735, A.G.I., Lima 642. By 1750, Buenos Aires also boasted a *diputación de comercio*; here too, however, its operation was frustrated by internal bickering, and elections remained suspended throughout the 1750s: José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, ed.), *Relación y documentos de gobierno del Virrey del Perú, José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (1745–1761)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983), pp. 423–24, see also 314–15.
51. José Joaquín Real Díaz, "Las ferias de Jalapa," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 16 (1959), pp. 167–314, esp. pp. 172–81; the cédula of 1718 is reproduced as document 1, pp. 295–97.
52. Iván Escamilla González, *Los intereses malentendidos: El Consulado de Comerciantes de México y la monarquía española, 1700–1739* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011).
53. On De Martinet and the expedition, see Manuel Moreyra Paz-Soldán, *El Tribunal del Consulado de Lima: Cuadernos de juntas,* 2 vols. (Lima: Lumen, 1956–59), vol. 1, lxiv–lxx and pp. 290–93; Carlos Daniel Malamud Rikles, *Cádiz y Saint Malo en el comercio colonial peruano (1698–1725)* (Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1986), Chap. 5; Pablo E. Pérez-Mallaína Bueno and Bibiano Torres Ramírez, *La Armada del Mar del Sur* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1987), pp. 318–26; on the repercussions in Chile, see Moreyra Paz-Soldán, *El Tribunal del Consulado*, vol. 1, lxv.
54. Details of operation of the squadron in "Copia de la ynstrucción que se dió…a Dn. Domingo Justiniani," December 1, 1729, A.G.I., Indiferente general 2,595.
55. For the British, see Adrian J. Pearce, *British Trade with Spanish America, 1763–1808* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), pp. 24–25.
56. For correspondence on the Alzaybar *asientos*, see Patiño to Varas y Valdés, February 1, 1733, and related material, A.G.I., Contratación 5,071.
57. Decree dated June 6, 1728, in Juan Joseph Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico de pragmáticas, cédulas, decretos, órdenes, y resoluciones reales.* (1819; Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 1978), pp. 302–3.
58. Many of the relevant decrees may be found in printed form in A.G.I., Indiferente general 652; see also viceroy Castelfuerte's correspondence in A.G.I., Lima 411–12.

59. Printed *cédula*, December 31, 1720, A.G.I., Indiferente general 652; reproduced, dated March 9, 1721, in Antonio Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano del siglo XVIII*, 3 vols. (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1956–1977), vol. 2, doc. 379, pp. 590–94 (quotation on p. 590). The Spanish text reads: " *. . . de lo que principalmente ha pendido y pende la continuación de estos perjudiciales abusos es de la omisión de los virreyes, gobernadores y ministros de aquellos reinos, sin cuya tolerancia no pudieran los defraudadores frecuentar el comercio de sus géneros con la libertad y franqueza que lo han hecho en estos últimos años.*"
60. Adrian J. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1700–1759," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1998, p. 77, table 4. On early Bourbon military viceroys, the major published study is now Francisco Antonio Eissa-Barroso, "'Of Experience, Zeal and Selflessness': Military Officers as Viceroys in Early Eighteenth-Century Spanish America," *The Americas* 68:3 (Jan. 2012), pp. 317–45.
61. Casafuerte in Mexico has been the focus of two doctoral theses, no less: those of Kenneth Warren Jones in 1971 and Ascensión Baeza Martín in 2002.
62. Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, *El virreinato del marqués de Castelfuerte, 1724–1736: El primer intento borbónico por reformar el Perú* (Madrid: Catriel, 2000). My own interest in early Bourbon Peru dates to a master's dissertation on Castelfuerte: "Economy and Society in Early Eighteenth-Century Peru: The Viceregal Administration of José de Armendáriz, Marqués de Castelfuerte, 1724–1736," unpublished master's dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1994.
63. On Castelfuerte, in addition to the study by Moreno Cebrián, see Eissa-Barroso, "'Of Experience, Zeal, and Selflessness'" (whose title is taken from Castelfuerte's letter of appointment); Manuel de Mendiburu, *Diccionario histórico-biográfico del Perú*, 2nd ed., 11 vols. (Lima: Enrique Palacios, 1931–48), entry for "Armendáris," which probably draws on the brief biography attached to Castelfuerte's manuscript governmental report, Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Manuscritos 3,109; also San Felipe, *Comentarios*, references cited in index; Dolores Andrada-Vanderwilde, La Fundación de Mayorazgo de don José de Armendáriz y Perurena, Marqués de Castelfuerte, virrey del Perú, *Príncipe de Viana* 138–39, pp. 229–51; and the pamphlet by Eulogio Zudaire Huarte, *José de Armendáriz, Marqués de Castelfuerte y virrey del Perú* (Pamplona: Diputación Foral de Navarra, 1982).
64. On the characteristics of Bourbon officialdom, see John H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 137; David A. Brading, "Bourbon Spain and Its American Empire," in Leslie

Bethell (ed.), *Colonial Spanish America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 114; and Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, pp. 106, 123, where captains-general are described as "the front edge of the new absolutism."

65. Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, "Acumulación y blanqueo de capitales del Marqués de Castelfuerte (1723–1763)," in Alfredo Moreno Cebrián and Núria Sala i Vila, *El 'premio' de ser virrey: Los intereses públicos y privados del gobierno virreinal en el Perú de Felipe V* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005), pp. 151–290.
66. Antonio de Ulloa (A. Saumell, ed.), *Relación histórica del viaje a la América meridional*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Historia 16, 1990), vol. 2, p. 597; Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa, *Noticias secretas de América* (1748; Madrid: Historia 16, 1991), pp. 413–14 ("no viceroy has been, in the view of all those people, more just, charitable, affable, and apt to govern"); echoed in Sebastián Lorente, *Historia del Perú bajo los Borbones, 1700–1821* (Lima: Gil y Aubert, 1871), p. 64.
67. See the letters in the viceroy's own (spidery and almost illegible) hand, in A.G.I., Lima 642.
68. "Ynstrucción reserbada de lo que el Marqués de Castelfuerte ha de ejecutar en el Perú . . . ," November 18, 1725, A.G.I., Lima 642. The parallels with Casafuerte's administration in Mexico are here especially powerful; see Real Díaz, "Las ferias de Jalapa," pp. 244–45.
69. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, p. 153; Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," p. 78.
70. Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano*, pp. 321–22.
71. Castelfuerte, *Relación*, pp. 249–50.
72. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, p. 150.
73. Printed *cédula*, February 1, 1744, A.G.I., Arribadas 191. On this topic, see especially Allan J. Kuethe, "Traslado del Consulado de Sevilla a Cádiz: Nuevas perspectivas," in Enriqueta Vila Vilar and Allan J. Kuethe (eds.), *Relaciones de poder y comercio colonial: Nuevas perspectivas* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos / Texas Tech University, 1999), pp. 67–82.
74. These contracts may be found in A.G.I., Contratación 5,070b and 5,071 respectively; see also Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, *Lima y Buenos Aires: Repercusiones económicas y políticas de la creación del virreinato del Perú* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1947); first published in *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, 3 (1946), pp. 29–30, 35.
75. Ruiz Rivera, "Patiño y la reforma del Consulado."
76. Article 3, *cédula* dated January 21, 1735, A.G.I., Arribadas 191. De Berría's undated *Memorial impreso*, advancing his arguments, is in A.G.I., Mexico 2,978.
77. Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 167–68, 194–95.

78. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, pp. 133–38; Domínguez Ortiz, *Sociedad y estado*, p. 72.
79. Correspondence of Varas y Valdés for 1729, in A.G.I., Contratación 5,071; also Walker, *Spanish Politics*, p. 160; Domínguez Ortiz, *Sociedad y estado*, p. 98; Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, pp. 149–50; Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making," p. 259, n. 32.
80. Antúnez y Acevedo, *Memorias históricas*, pp. 263–66.
81. Printed *cédula*, June 18, 1732, A.G.I., Arribadas 191.
82. Real Díaz, "Las ferias de Jalapa," p. 223. Walker takes an opposing view of the significance of this measure: *Spanish Politics*, pp. 163–64; but see Escamilla González, *Los intereses malentendidos*, pp. 229–310.
83. Ruiz Rivera, "Patiño y la reforma del Consulado"; useful comment in García-Baquero González, *Cádiz y el Atlántico*, vol. 1, pp. 122–29. The *jenízaros*' own view of these events is set out in a printed appeal dated 1741, in A.G.I., Arribadas 193. The major study is that of Margarita García-Mauriño Mundi, *La pugna entre el Consulado de Cádiz y los jenízaros por las exportaciones a Indias (1720–1765)* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1999), see esp. Chap. 3.
84. Antonia Heredia Herrera, "La presencia de extranjeros en el comercio gaditano en el siglo XVIII," in *Homenaje al Dr Muro Orejón,* vol. 1. (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1979), pp. 233–43. Curiously, naturalizations for the purpose of trade continued during this period at an uninterrupted rhythm.
85. Antúnez y Acevedo, *Memorias históricas*, pp. 297–300.
86. Bonialian, *El pacífico hispanoamericano*, pp. 76–77.
87. Bonialian, *El pacífico hispanoamericano*, p. 73–77; quotation on p. 77.
88. Printed *cédula*, January 21, 1735; many copies in the Archivo General de Indias, including in Arribadas 191; reproduced in Antúnez y Acevedo, *Memorias históricas*, appendix XX. An earlier draft of this decree, adding useful detail, may be found in A.G.I., Mexico 2,978.
89. Xabier Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and their Overseas Networks* (Woodbridge and Rochester: Boydell Press, 2010); this major work and its implications are discussed at length in chapter 5.

4 The First Cycle of Reform, 1710s to 1736: Government, Treasury, Mining, and the Church

1. Cédula, May 25, 1717, reproduced in Jerónimo Becker and José María Rivas Groot, *El Nuevo Reino de Granada en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Asilo de Huérfanos de la S. C. de Jesús, 1921), pp. 200–3; also Antonio Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano del siglo XVIII*,

3 vols. (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1956–77), vol. 2, xxxii–xxxiii.

2. María Teresa Garrido Conde, "La primera creación del virreinato de Nueva Granada," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 21 (1964), pp. 25–144, esp. pp. 47–89; De la Pedrosa's instructions are reproduced in extract in Ernesto Restrepo Tirado, *Gobernantes del Nuevo Reyno de Granada durante el siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1934), pp. 46–48.
3. See the varying accounts in Garrido Conde, "La primera creación," esp. pp. 40–42, 62, 72–73, and 119–20; Becker and Rivas Groot, *El Nuevo Reino de Granada*, pp. 69–71; José María Ots Capdequi, *Instituciones de gobierno del Nuevo Reino de Granada durante el siglo XVIII* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1950), Chap. 4, esp. pp. 175, 194; Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society and Politics under Bourbon Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 187–91; and now, at considerable length, Francisco Antonio Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making: The Reform of Viceregal Rule in the Spanish World under Philip V (1700–1746)," Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2010, Chap. 3.
4. McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, pp. 23–27.
5. Lance R. Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling: Regional Informal Economies in Early Bourbon New Granada* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, "La economía del Virreinato, (1740–1810)," in J. A. Ocampo (ed.), *Historia económica de Colombia,* 2nd ed. (Bogotá: Planeta, 1988), pp. 53–54, 69; Germán de Granda, "Una ruta marítima de contrabando de esclavos negros entre Panamá y Barbacoas durante el Asiento inglés," *Revista de Indias* 36:143–4 (1976), pp. 123–46.
6. Enrique de la Matta Rodríguez, *El asalto de Pointis a Cartagena* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1979); the same author's "La 'rebelión' de Diego de los Ríos: Una página inédita de la historia de Cartagena de Indias', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 31 (1974), pp. 955–71, studies circumstances surrounding the official investigation into the disaster.
7. McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, p. 101.
8. Synnøve Ones, "The Politics of Government in the Audiencia of New Granada, 1681–1719," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Warwick, 2000, offers the most detailed account.
9. Garrido Conde, "La primera creación del virreinato de Nueva Granada," pp. 124–25.
10. Villalonga's extraordinarily large retinue has been discussed by Ainara Vásquez Varela, "Jorge de Villalonga's Entourage: Political Networking and Administrative Reform in Santa Fe (1717–1723)," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.),

Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759) (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 111–26.

11. Geoffrey J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789* (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 143–46; Garrido Conde, "La primera creación," pp. 116–17.
12. Eissa-Barroso has argued that the suppression resulted from a power play at court, particularly from attempts by the *Consejo de Indias* to regain the influence in colonial government lately lost to it. As a further factor in the suppression, this viewpoint is reasonable, since as is discussed elsewhere in this chapter, other instances have been identified of the *Consejo* seeking renewed protagonism through major policy shifts at this time (including in mining policy and reform of the American *Audiencias*); Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making", esp. pp. 170–84.
13. McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, p. 193.
14. José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, ed.), *Relación y documentos de gobierno del Virrey del Perú, José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (1745–1761)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983), pp. 333–34.
15. See Mark A. Burkholder and D. S Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977); the same authors' "Creole Appointments and the Sale of Audiencia Positions in the Spanish Empire under the Early Bourbons, 1701–1750," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4 (1972), pp. 187–206; and Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *Los ministros de la Audiencia de Lima en el reinado de los borbones (1700–1821)* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1974), xcvii–cvi.
16. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, pp. 37–42.
17. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, pp. 44–47.
18. Cédula, October 10, 1725, in Juan Joseph Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico de pragmáticas, cédulas, decretos, órdenes, y resoluciones reales.* (1819; Buenos Aires Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 1978), p. 301; Kenneth J. Andrien, "The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Authority in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1633–1700," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 62 (1982), pp. 49–71, see p. 71. The latter article also discusses sales to the Tribunal de Cuentas in the period 1700–45.
19. "I have resolved . . . to close (as I do close) entirely the door to every class of sales of governorships, *corregimientos*, and *alcaldías mayores*"; cédula, October 10, 1725, in Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano*, vol. 3, doc. 20, pp. 28–29.

20. Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, *El corregidor de Indios y la economía peruana en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1977), tables, pp. 86–96; also the same author's "Venta y beneficios de los corregimientos peruanos," *Revista de Indias* 36:143–44 (1976), pp. 213–46.
21. John H. Parry, *The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies under the Hapsburgs* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), Chaps. 2–4. While now superseded for other posts, this work remains authoritative on these lesser positions.
22. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, pp. 10–11, 74.
23. On the importance of these factors in access to higher posts, see John Lynch, *The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598–1700* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 180–81, 402–3; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *Sociedad y estado en el siglo XVIII español* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1976), p. 92; and Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700–1715* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), pp. 37–38.
24. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, pp. 37–43.
25. Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano*, vol. 2; the relevant decree is summarized on xxxviii.
26. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, p. 43.
27. Moreno Cebrián, *El corregidor de Indios*, tables on pp. 161–65.
28. It should be noted that the lengthy protests regarding this point reproduced in Castelfuerte, *Relación*, were penned by Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo, the eminent savant and polymath, who often acted as a spokesman for Peruvian opinion. Peralta has long attracted the interest of historians, from Irving Leonard's early study, "Don Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo," in 1936, to the work of Luis Alberto Sánchez, a similarly polymathic Peruvian of letters, whose *El Doctor Océano* appeared in 1967. Most recently, see especially Mark Thurner, "The As-If of the Book of Kings."
29. Cédula, June 12, 1720, described by Marqués de Castelfuerte, "Relación del estado de los reynos del Perú . . . " (1736), in Manuel Atanascio Fuentes (ed.), *Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español*, 6 vols. (Lima: F. Bailly, 1859), vol. 3, pp. 56–369, see p. 210; also José de la Puente Brunke, "Política de la Corona en torno a las encomiendas peruanas (1670–1750)," *Histórica* 11 (1987), pp. 181–206; Luis Navarro García, "Felipe V y el Consejo de Indias: El debate de las encomiendas," *Temas Americanistas* (Seville) 3, pp. 5–11. The process of incorporation was a slow one, dependent upon the deaths of incumbents; but by the mid-1750s, Viceroy Manso de Velasco could anticipate the only survivors being historic grants made to religious communities and colleges; Manso, *Relación*, p. 240.

30. Adrian J. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1700–1759," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1998, pp. 224–25, including table 9.
31. See, for example, Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente to Crown, October 20, 1743, A.G.I., Lima 1326.
32. On these appointments, see Moreno Cebrián, *El corregidor de Indios*, pp. 37–42.
33. Concepción Gavira Márquez, personal communication, Seville, May 1997.
34. See Manso de Velasco to Crown, February 11, 1747, A.G.I., Lima 521, in which he proposes Juan Bravo de Rivera as sole candidate for the archbishopric of Lima, despite not only being a *limeño*, but having a brother on the *Audiencia*; also Lohmann Villena, *Los ministros de la Audiencia de Lima*, p. xxxiii, where all the candidates for posts on the *Consejo de Indias* are creoles.
35. For discussion of several striking examples, see Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," pp. 227–29.
36. Draft cédula to Villagarcía, n.d. (ca. 1736), A.G.I., Lima 642; see also Ramón Ezquerra Abadía, "Problemas de la mita de Potosí en el siglo XVIII," in *La minería hispana e iberoamericana: Contribución a su investigación histórica*, vol. 1. (León: Cátedra de San Isidoro, 1970), pp. 483–511, esp. p. 496.
37. These reforms are discussed below.
38. Castelfuerte, *Relación*, pp. 230–33; Castelfuerte to Crown, November 7, 1725, A.G.I., Lima 506; Lima Royal Officials to Crown, November 15, 1725, A.G.I., Lima 429. For the terms and discussion of the *asientos* celebrated between 1660 and 1722, see Respuesta del señor fiscal, June 2, 1738, A.G.I., Lima 506; also Clarence H. Haring, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1918), pp. 69–85.
39. Castelfuerte to Crown, April 27, 1731; Junta de Moneda to Crown, June 28, 1736; and Francisco Fernández Gamieles (secretary of the Junta) to Miguel de Villanueva, November 13, 1744, all in A.G.I., Lima 507.
40. Muro Orejon, *Cedulario americano*, vol. 3, pp. 103–10 (cédula, February 7, 1731). The Junta was effectively abolished, and its powers passed to the Consejo de Indias, 14 years later; see Muro Orejon, *Cedulario americano*, vol. 3, pp. 344–5 (cédula, May 25, 1745).
41. For reform of the coinage in New Spain, see Christoph Rosenmüller, "Assayers and Silver Merchants: The *visita* of 1729/1730 and the Reform of Mexican Coinage," *American Journal of Numismatics,* 2nd series, 16–17 (2005), pp. 179–93.
42. Castelfuerte to Crown, April 27, 1731; Audiencia of Lima to Crown, December 17, 1730, both in A.G.I., Lima 507.

43. Junta de Moneda to Crown, n. d., in A.G.I., Lima 507, summarizes Villagarcía's letter of July 28, 1736.
44. Humberto Burzio, *La ceca de Lima, 1565–1824* (Madrid**:** Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre, 1958), pp. 39–41.
45. Castelfuerte, *Relación*, pp. 186–87; Gamieles to Villanueva, November 13, 1744, A.G.I., Lima 507; a copy of the Ordinances may be found in A.G.I., Indiferente General 652.
46. Cédula, October 14, 1735; Junta de Moneda to Crown, June 28, 1736; and cédula to Villagarcía, ca. 1737, all in A.G.I., Lima 507.
47. Manso, *Relación*, pp. 374–75. Shortage of the new coins, nevertheless, meant that macuquina currency was never entirely eliminated.
48. Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, p. 301 (cédula, October 10, 1725).
49. Castelfuerte to Crown, November 13, 1724, A.G.I., Lima 411.
50. Castelfuerte to Crown, May 12, 1726, A.G.I., Lima 412; Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, pp. 302–4 (cédulas, May 16, 1728, November 23, 1729); Castelfuerte to Crown, November 1, 1730, A.G.I., Lima 413.
51. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," pp. 102–3.
52. Andrien, "The Sale of Fiscal Offices," p. 71.
53. John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America*, 4 vols. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982–1990), vol. 1 *Peru*, x.
54. TePaske and Klein, *The Royal Treasuries*, vol. 4 *Eighteenth Century Ecuador*, xii.
55. TePaske and Klein, *The Royal Treasuries*, vol. 3 *Chile and the Río de la Plata*, xi–xii.
56. Castelfuerte to Crown, July 26, 1724, A.G.I., Lima 411; Castelfuerte, *Relación*, p. 374; Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, p. 300; see also Villagarcía, *Relación*, pp. 374–75. For the near-contemporary attempt of the first viceroy of New Granada to impose similar controls, see Garrido Conde, "La primera creación del virreinato de Nueva Granada," p. 110.
57. For the latter, see "Copia de títulos de vizitador general de las R.s cajas de Guancavelica, Cusco y Potosí," A.G.I., Lima 429.
58. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," pp. 108–10.
59. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," pp. 111–12.
60. Castelfuerte to Crown, January 5, 1728, A.G.I., Lima 506, with annotations by the fiscal and Consejo.
61. Castelfuerte to Crown, July 23, 1732, A.G.I., Lima 506.
62. This paragraph draws on Adrian J. Pearce, "The Peruvian Population Census of 1725–1740," *Latin American Research Review* 36:3 (Oct. 2001), pp. 69–104.
63. Pearce, "The Peruvian Population Census," p. 95.

64. A significantly fuller discussion of this topic is presented in Adrian J. Pearce, "Huancavelica 1700–1759: Administrative Reform of the Mercury Industry in Early Bourbon Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79:4 (Nov. 1999), pp. 669–702.
65. Early Bourbon reform of the mercury industry in New Spain is discussed by Antonia Heredia Herrera, *La renta del azogue en Nueva España: 1709–1751* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1978), esp. pp. 103, 13–32.
66. Heredia Herrera, *La renta del azogue*, pp. 13–17; Antonio Matilla Tascón, *Historia de las minas de Almadén* 2 vols. (Madrid: Gráficas Osca, 1958–87), vol. 2, pp. 36, 121–26.
67. These decrees may be found in A.G.I., Charcas 274.
68. Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *Patiño y Campillo: Reseña histórico-biográfico de estos dos ministros de Felipe V* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1882), pp. 44–46.
69. The relevant decrees are in A.G.I., Lima 479.
70. Cédula to president and Oidores of the Audiencia of Lima, April 5, 1720, A.G.I., Lima 376; Castelfuerte, *Relación*, p. 152. Santo Buono had himself proposed abolition of the mita and closure of the mine, one of a number of projects for major reform that met with a withering response from the Council of the Indies; see Crown to President of Council of the Indies, December 2, 1719, A.G.I., Lima 410, and related material.
71. Diego Morcillo to Crown, October 26, 1720, A.G.I., Lima 469, with related correspondence.
72. Casa Concha to Crown, October 25, 1725, A.G.I. Charcas 275; reproduced in Marqués de Casa Concha, "Relación del estado que ha tenido, y tiene la Real Mina de Guancavelica . . . " (1726), copies in A.G.I., Lima, 469, 479, Chap. 4.
73. Anon. (ed.), *Documentos existentes en el Archivo General de Indias: Sección de Lima*, vol. 8 in two books of Anonymous (ed.), *La minería hispana e iberoamericana: Contribución a su investigación histórica* (León: Cátedra de San Isidoro, 1974), item 1535, decree dated April 17, 1733.
74. Anonymous (ed.), *Documentos existentes en el Archivo General de Indias*, vol. 8 in two books of Anonymous (ed.), *La minería hispana e iberoamericana*, items 1509–12, decrees of February 13, 1722; and Casa Concha, "Relación del estado," Chap. 10.
75. José Eusebio de Llano Zapata, *Memorias histórico-fisicas-apologeticas de la América meridional* (1757; Lima: San Pedro, 1904), pp. 145–46.
76. A decree of 1696 had already foreshadowed the end of viceregal provision of the governorship; see Anon. (ed.), *Documentos existentes en el Archivo General de Indias*, vol. 8 in two books of Anon. (ed.), *La minería hispana e iberoamericana*, item 52, decree of December 12, 1696.

77. For criticism of the system instituted in 1722, see Superintendente General de Azogues to Crown, May 20, 1741, A.G.I, Lima 1326; and Sola y Fuente to Crown, October 20, 1743, A.G.I., Lima 1326.
78. Cornejo y Ibarra to José Patiño, August 17, 1734, A.G.I., Lima 442.
79. In A.G.I., Lima 775.
80. See Manso de Velasco, *Relación*, pp. 231–32, 350; comments in Manso de Velasco to Crown, July 31, 1746, A.G.I., Lima 416; and Manso de Velasco to Crown, August 14, 1748, A.G.I., Lima 643.
81. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade*, pp. 137–56, 177–88; for the meetings of 1734–35, see p. 195; a more recent important discussion is Mariano Ardash Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano: Política y comercio asiático en el imperio español (1680–1784): La centralidad de lo marginal* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2012), pp. 114–17.
82. Printed cédula, January 21, 1735, A.G.I., Juzgado de Arribadas, 191; discussed in Walker, *Spanish Politics*, pp. 195–200. De Berría's arguments are advanced in an undated printed memorial, in A.G.I., Mexico 2978.
83. See the "Facultad a Dn Gerónimo de Sola," January 22, 1735, A.G.I., Lima 775.
84. See Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente, *Relación e informe, que haze el Doc. D. Gerónymo de Sola y Fuente . . . , Governador, que acaba de ser de la Villa, y Mina de Guancavelica* (Lima: Imprenta de la Plazuela de San Christoval, 1748), p. 51: "Si los caudales para el fomento [de la mina] han de venir del Superior Govierno, siempre havrá trabajos para la subsistencia de esta tan substancial parte del Reyno."
85. For example, Sola y Fuente, *Nuevo Assiento, que . . . ha celebrado el Señor Don Gerónimo de Sola y Fuente . . . , Gobernador de la Villa de Guancavelica . . . con el Gremio de Mineros. . . .* (Lima: Imprenta de la Calle de S. Ildephonso, 1745), fol. Qv: "y assí se repite, por circunstancia la más principal, el que haya siempre en la Real Caxa, plata prompta, assí para los referidos socorros, como para la paga puntual, de los alcanzes"; and Castelfuerte, *Relación*, p. 362, where he calls prompt provision of credit to the miners "the whole essence" (*todo el ser*) of the administration of Huancavelica.
86. On Sola's administration, see Brown, "La recepción de la tecnología minera española en las minas de Huancavelica, siglo XVIII," in Marcos Cueto (ed.), *Saberes andinos: ciencia y tecnología en Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1995), pp. 59–90; Pearce, "Huancavelica 1700–1759," pp. 689–93.

87. Cédula, March 14, 1742, A.G.I., Lima 1,326. On the context for abandonment of the reform, see Pearce, "Huancavelica 1700–1759," p. 690.
88. Jeffrey Cole, *The Potosí Mita, 1573–1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), pp. 119–21.
89. The major account of the debates regarding the *mita* that took place over four decades to 1732 is Ignacio González Casasnovas, *Las dudas de la corona: La política de repartimientos para la minería de Potosí (1680–1732)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2000), esp. part 3.
90. See Bartolomé Arzans de Orsúa y Vela, *Historia de la Villa Imperial de Potosí*, 3 vols. (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1965), vol. 3, pp. 68–69.
91. Report by the Consejo de Indias, May 4, 1718, in A.G.I., Charcas 274.
92. The relevant decrees are in A.G.I., Charcas 274.
93. Nine of the (ten) judges' reports may be found in A.G.I., Charcas 275; two are summarized at length in Ezquerra Abadía, "Problemas de la mita de Potosí," pp. 498–511. Viceroy Castelfuerte also submitted his own report, opposed to abolition.
94. Cédula addressed to Viceroy Castelfuerte, October 22, 1732, A.G.I., Charcas 275; also in Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, pp. 305–6.
95. Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, pp. 115–22; Ignacio González Casasnovas, "Un intento de rectificar el sistema colonial: Debates y proyectos en torno a la mita de Potosí a fines del siglo XVII (1683–1697)," *Revista de Indias* 50:189 (1990), pp. 431–53.
96. Enrique Tandeter, *Coercion and Market: Silver Mining in Colonial Potosí, 1692–1826* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), p. 11.
97. Pearce, "The Peruvian Population Census," p. 83.
98. Silvio Zavala, *El servicio personal de los Indios en el Perú*, 3 vols. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978–80), vol. 1, pp. 17, 29; González Casasnovas, *Dudas de la Corona*, p. 429.
99. Decree dated April 17, 1733, in Zavala, *Servicio personal de los Indios*, vol. 1, pp. 32–33.
100. Manso, *Relación*, pp. 238–39.
101. See Pearce, "The Peruvian Population Census," esp. pp. 82–84, 92–95. Although the topic has not been the subject of any definitive research, there are grounds to suppose that Peru's native population displayed relatively strong growth from its historic low point following the epidemic of the early 1720s, until at least the late nineteenth century. On the later period, see the outstanding article by Paul Gootenberg, "Population and Ethnicity in Early Republican

Peru: Some Revisions," *Latin American Research Review* 26:3 (1991), pp. 109–57.

102. Peter Bakewell, "Mining," in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Colonial Spanish America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 203–49, p. 240, fig. 4.
103. Tandeter, *Coercion and Market*, pp. 5–6, 10–11; also same author, "Forced and Free Labour in Late Colonial Potosí," *Past & Present* 93 (1981), pp. 98–136, pp. 107–9. Tandeter's arguments are neatly summarized by Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, pp. 133–34.
104. For this decree, see Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, p. 296, and Pedro Vicente Cañete y Domínguez, *Guía histórica, física, política, civil y legal del gobierno e intendencia de la provincia de Potosí* (1787; Potosí: Editorial Potosí, 1952), pp. 362–63, 605–7. On its impact, see Castelfuerte to Crown, September 29, 1727, A.G.I., Charcas 198; Castelfuerte to Crown, September 4, 1728, A.G.I., Lima 412; Arzans de Orsúa y Vela, *Historia de la Villa Imperial*, vol. 3, pp. 224–44, 273, 299–300.
105. See also Cañete y Domínguez, *Guía histórica*, pp. 605–7; and report by Consejo de Indias, April 22, 1748, A.G.I., Charcas 435, which includes a summary of a further report by the Lima Tribunal de Cuentas. The first of these superintendents was Pablo Vásquez de Velasco, a leading Charcas judge and prominent Potosí miner; he was followed by Simón de Ribera, and later by Ignacio del Castillo and Joaquín Pérez de Uriondo. See also Arzans de Orsúa y Vela, *Historia de la Villa Imperial*, vol. 3, pp. 311, 334, 360, 376.
106. These decrees and others are discussed in Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," pp. 186 et seq. Unless otherwise stated, decrees referred to in this section are listed in Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, and Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano*, vols. 2–3.
107. Printed cédula, A.G.I., Indiferente General 652, reproduced in Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano*, vol. 3, pp. 39–40; Luis Merino, *Estudio crítico sobre las* Noticias Secretas de América *y el clero colonial (1720–1765)* (Madrid: Graf. Jura, 1959), p. 97.
108. Morcillo to Crown, Aug. 11, 1729, A.G.I., Lima 413; see also Merino, *Estudio crítico*, p. 100.
109. For a more detailed treatment of Castelfuerte's disputes with the Church, see Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," pp. 196–200. On José de Antequera and the *Comunero* rebellion in Paraguay in the 1720s and early 1730s, see especially the works of James Schofield Saeger, cited in the Bibliography.
110. Castelfuerte to Crown, February 26, 1735 and March 1, 1735, both in A.G.I., Lima 414; Villagarcía to Crown, August 10, 1744, A.G.I., Lima 415; see also Manso, *Relación*, p. 206.
111. Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, *Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia, 1700–1783* (Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos "Bartolomé de las Casas", 1988), Chap. 2 (titled "El virrey

Castelfuerte y la primera coyuntura rebelde") and fig. 4, p. 296; Pearce, "The Peruvian Population Census," pp. 84–87 and 102.

5 Reform Abated, 1736 to 1745

1. The Marqués de Villagarcía's "New Tax" is discussed later in this chapter.
2. See the classic articles by Ernest G. Hildner, "The Role of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy Leading to the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1729–1739," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 18 (1938), pp. 322–41; Harold W. V. Temperley, "The Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear (1730)," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 3rd series, 3 (1909), pp. 197–236; and Sylvia Lyn Hilton, "El conflicto anglo-español sobre derechos de navegación en mares americanos (1729–1750)," *Revista de Indias* 38:153–4 (1978), pp. 671–713.
3. See Tobias George Smollet's *Roderick Random* (London: J. Osborn, 1748), Chaps. 31–34, for a fictional account based closely on his experiences. On the siege, Allan J. Kuethe, "La batalla de Cartagena de 1741: Nuevas perspectivas," *Historiografía y bibliografía americanistas* (Seville), 18 (1974), pp. 19–38, may be contrasted with the older Charles E. Nowell, "The Defense of Cartagena," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 42 (1962), pp. 477–501, and Manuel Lucena Salmoral, "Los diarios anónimos sobre el ataque de Vernon a Cartagena existentes en Colombia: Su correlación y posibles autores," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 30 (1973), pp. 337–469.
4. Allan J. Kuethe, "Alberoni's Reform Agenda in America," Paper presented at the conference on "Spanish America in the Early Eighteenth Century: New Perspectives on a Forgotten Era," University of Warwick, Apr. 15–16, 2011.
5. On Campillo, see Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *Patiño y Campillo: Reseña histórico-biográfico de estos dos ministros de Felipe V* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1882); José Martínez Cardós, "Don José del Campillo y Cossío," *Revista de Indias* 30:122 (1970), pp. 503–42; Miguel Artola, "Campillo y las reformas de Carlos III," *Revista de Indias* 12:50 (1952), pp. 685–714.
6. José del Campillo y Cossío (Manuel Ballesteros Gaibrois, ed.), *Nuevo sistema económico para América* (Oviedo: Grupo Editorial Asturiano, 1993). Campillo's authorship of this work is questioned by some; see esp. Luis Navarro García, "El falso Campillo y el reformismo borbónico," *Temas Americanistas* (Seville) 12 (1995), pp. 10–31, which returns to his earlier work on this subject.
7. Manuel de Mendiburu, *Diccionario histórico-biográfico del Perú*, 2nd ed., 11 vols (Lima: Enrique Palacios, 1931–48) entry for Mendoza Caamaño.

8. "Relación del estado de los reynos del Perú…", 1745; this is available in published form only in the edition by Manuel Atanascio Fuentes, *Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español*, 6 vols (Lima: F. Bailly, 1859), vol. 3, pp. 371–88.
9. Adrian J. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1700–1759," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1998, pp. 173–74.
10. On Casafuerte see Kenneth Warren Jones, "New Spain and the Viceregency of the Marqués de Casafuerte, 1722–1734," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1971, and Ascensión Baeza Martín, "El Marqués de Casafuerte, Virrey de Nueva Espana, 1722–1734," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Seville, 2002.
11. On the brief administrations of 1740–46, see Francisco Antonio Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making: The Reform of Viceregal Rule in the Spanish World under Philip V (1700–1746)," Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2010, pp. 301–15; on Fuenclara, Eugenio Sarrablo Aguareles, *El conde de Fuenclara, embajador y virrey de Nueva España (1687–1752),* 2 vols. (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1955–66).
12. Rodríguez Villa, *Patiño y Campillo*, p. 167.
13. John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 153.
14. José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, ed.), *Relación y documentos de gobierno del Virrey del Perú, José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (1745–1761)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983), pp. 280–83. On *internación*, in this case the sale of goods to the interior provinces (and especially Upper Peru) from Buenos Aires after 1740, see Carmen Parrón Salas, "Perú y la transición del *comercio político* al *comercio libre*, 1740–1778," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 54:2 (1997), pp. 447–73, esp. pp. 457–61.
15. Jesús A. Cosamalón Aguilar has noted helpfully of the Lima *Consulado* that "profits were not the only thing that interested them…Rather, the thing was to recover the privileges that the Crown had taken from them"; "Precios y sociedad colonial (1700–1810): Transformaciones en los mercados y ciclos económicos en Lima," *Historia Mexicana* 249 (LXIII:1: July–Sept. 2013), pp. 51–109, see p. 103.
16. Parrón Salas, "Perú y la transición," pp. 450–51.
17. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, p. 153; Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 192.

18. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, pp. 193–94; Roland Dennis Hussey, *The Caracas Company, 1728–1784* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 79.
19. The Steins' discussion of the *Registro* trade may be found in *Silver, Trade, and War*, pp. 191–99.
20. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, pp. 192–93, emphasize the continuance of the Cadiz monopoly under the regime of *registros*.
21. Xabier Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and their Overseas Networks* (Woodbridge and Rochester: Boydell Press, 2010), especially part 2. Unless otherwise indicated, the following paragraphs draw on this work.
22. Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, p. 108.
23. Cosamalón Aguilar, "Precios y sociedad colonial," p. 67.
24. Antonio García-Baquero González, *Cádiz y el Atlántico (1717–1778): El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano,* 2nd ed. 2 vols. (Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1988), vol. 1, p. 172; for figures specific to the New Spain trade, see Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, p. 195.
25. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, pp. 153–56.
26. Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, p. 111.
27. Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, pp. 85, 89.
28. Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, pp. 88, 92.
29. Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, pp. 134–38.
30. Allan Christelow, "Great Britain and the Trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil, 1759–1784," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 27:1 (Feb. 1947), pp. 2–29; Adrian J. Pearce, *British Trade with Spanish America, 1763–1808* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), p. 108.
31. For this measure, see chap. 3, subsection on the decline of commercial policy after 1726.
32. Manso de Velasco, *Relación*, pp. 283–84; for Manso's attitude, see also Parrón Salas, "Perú y la transición," p. 460.
33. Sergio Villalobos, quoted in García-Baquero González, *Cádiz y el Atlántico*, vol. 1, p. 172.
34. Mariano Ardash Bonialian, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano: Política y comercio asiático en el imperio español (1680–1784): La centralidad de lo marginal*. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2012), pp. 370–93, quotations on pp. 376, 384, 392.
35. Pearce, *British Trade with Spanish America*, pp. 29–30; Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, part II.
36. Cosamalón Aguilar, "Precios y sociedad colonial," pp. 54, 66, 79, 80 (for quotations).
37. Cosamalón Aguilar, "Precios y sociedad colonial," pp. 55, 81, 98–99.

38. On this point see especially the major essay by the late Antonio García-Baquero González, "Los resultados del libre comercio y el 'punto de vista': Una revisión desde la estadística," in Antonio García-Baquero González, *El comercio colonial en la época del absolutismo ilustrado: Problemas y debates* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2003) (first published in 1997). García-Baquero discusses here earlier work on this topic by José María Delgado Ribas, published in the 1980s.
39. See Geoffrey J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789* (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 218–19.
40. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, pp. 194–95.
41. The Audiencia of Panama was abolished in 1751, however, as a direct consequence of the loss of the fleets trade; John H. Parry, *The Spanish Seaborne Empire* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 290.
42. Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society and Politics under Bourbon Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 194–97. For detailed discussion of the origins of the reform under José Patiño, see Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making," esp. pp. 251–53, 260–71.
43. For discussions and proposals regarding the motives for reestablishment, see Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making," pp. 271–98.
44. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making," p. 287. Chapter 5 of Eissa-Barroso's thesis is devoted substantially to reestablishment of the viceroyalty.
45. Printed regulations, dated November 30, 1736, A.G.I., Indiferente general 652; Juan Marchena Fernández, *La institución militar en Cartagena de Indias en el siglo XVIII* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1982).
46. This paragraph largely follows McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, pp. 116–20, 197–202.
47. Anthony McFarlane, "The 'Rebellion of the Barrios': Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 69 (1989), pp. 283–330; Kenneth J. Andrien, "Economic Crisis, Taxes and the Quito Insurrection of 1765," *Past & Present* 129 (Nov. 1990), pp. 104–31; Allan J. Kuethe, *Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773–1808* (Gainesville, FL: The University Presses of Florida, 1978), pp. 48–50, 79, 83–92; John Leddy Phelan, *The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), esp. pp. 112–17, 126–27, 144–46. On the military organization of Cartagena across this period, see Marchena Fernández, *La institución militar en Cartagena de Indias*, esp. Chaps. 3–4.

48. Gilma Mora de Tovar, *Aguardiente y conflictos sociales en la Nueva Granada, siglo XVIII* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1988), pp. 17–58, 170–72.
49. See Villagarcía to Crown, January 14, 1741, A.G.I., Lima 642, for his (curiously halfhearted) protest at the separation of Panama and Guayaquil; also Manso, *Relacion*, p. 268. On Guayaquil and its economic dependence on Peru during this period, see María Luisa Laviana Cuetos, *Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1987), and Dora León Borja and Adám Szásdi-Nagy, "El comercio del cacao de Guayaquil," *Revista de Historia de América* (Mexico City), 57–58 (1964), pp. 1–50, esp. pp. 18–29. Guayaquil was later temporarily reincorporated into the viceroyalty of Peru; Kuethe, *Military Reform and Society*, p. 2. Peru continued to fund a large part of the defense costs of Panama, as of Cartagena de Indias and Santa Marta, through annual *situado* military subsidies, well into the late Bourbon era.
50. McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, pp. 114–16.
51. Enrique Sánchez Pedrote, "Los Prelados-Virreyes," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 7 (1950), pp. 211–53, esp. pp. 239–46; for this decree, see also Antonio Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano del siglo XVIII*, 3 vols (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1956–77), vol. 3, doc. 112, pp. 239–41.
52. Castelfuerte to Crown, November 30, 1725, A.G.I., Lima 412; Castelfuerte to Patiño, November 18, 1733, A.G.I., Lima 642; López Pintado to Torrenueva, June 14, 1736, A.G.I., Mexico 2977; Villagarcía to Crown, January 27, 1745, A.G.I., Lima 415. Already in 1728, the *fiscal* agreed in principle to Castelfuerte's request for a ban on ecclesiastical viceregencies: Respuesta del fiscal, April 5, 1728, A.G.I., Lima 412.
53. Eissa-Barroso, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making," pp. 304–7.
54. Little work has been done on the New Tax, so that we remain primarily reliant on primary sources: see especially Manso, *Relación*, pp. 285–91; some further detail in Marqués de Villagarcía (José de Caamaño y Sotomayor), "Relación del estado de los reynos del Perú…" (1745), in Manuel Atanascio Fuentes (ed.), *Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español*, 6 vols. (Lima: F. Bailly, 1859), vol. 3, pp. 371–88, see p. 377; Manso to Crown, August 2, 1748, A.G.I., Lima 416; and Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa, *Noticias secretas de América* (1748; Madrid: Historia 16, 1991), pp. 218–20, 453–55.
55. "At times, impartial suggestion achieves more than the exercise of the regalian rights": Villagarcía, "Relación del estado," p. 386; for a typical example of this policy, see Villagarcía to Crown, November 10, 1742, A.G.I., Lima 415.

56. Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano*, vol. 3, pp. 196–204, reproduces the decree, including the verdict of the Junta; for its implementation in Peru, see Villagarcía to Crown, June 14, 1739, A.G.I., Lima 639.
57. See the accounts in John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America*, 4 vols. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982–90), vol. 1.
58. Patiño to Villagarcía, April 27, 1736, A.G.I., Lima 506.
59. "Respuesta del señor fiscal," June 5, 1747, and Manuel Vásquez y Morales to Joaquín Ruiz de Porras, June 28, 1752, both in A.G.I., Lima 506; Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente to Crown, November 1, 1743, A.G.I., Lima 1326.
60. Villagarcía to Crown, July 28, 1736, A.G.I., Lima 506.

6 Reform Renewed: The Second Cycle, 1745 to 1763

1. Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *Don Cenón de Somodevilla, Marqués de la Ensenada: Ensayo biográfico.*... (Madrid: M. Murillo, 1878), pp. 1–11, 28–29.
2. John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 160, quoting a contemporary opinion.
3. Sir Richard Lodge (ed.), *The Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene, K.B.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), xix–xx, and the same author's "Sir Benjamin Keene, K.B.: A Study in Anglo-Spanish Relations," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* 4th series, 15 (1932), pp. 1–43; also José Luis Gómez Urdáñez, "El duque de Duras y el fin del ministerio Ensenada (1752–1754)," *Hispania* 59:1 (1999), pp. 217–49.
4. On Ensenada, see Martín Fernández de Navarrete, "Noticia biográfica del Marqués de la Ensenada," appendix to the same author's *Estado general de la Armada* (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1829); Rodríguez Villa, *Don Cenón de Somodevilla, Marqués de la Ensenada*; Joaquín María Aranda, *El Marqués de la Ensenada: Estudios sobre su administración* (Madrid: M. G. Hernández, 1898); Agustín González de Amezúa y Mayo, *Un modelo de estadista: El marqués de la Ensenada* (Madrid: J. Ratés, 1917); and Constancio Eguía Ruiz, *El marqués de la Ensenada según un confidente* (Madrid: Razón y Fé, 1922). The few recent works include Felipe Abad León, *El marqués de la Ensenada: su vida y su obra*, 2 vols (Madrid: Editorial Naval, 1985); José Luis Gómez Urdáñez, *El proyecto reformista de Ensenada* (Lleida: Milenio, 1996); and Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), Chap. 8.

5. Allan J. Kuethe, "Alberoni's Reform Agenda in America," Paper presented at the conference on "Spanish America in the Early Eighteenth Century: New Perspectives on a Forgotten Era," University of Warwick, Apr. 15–16, 2011. On the "triumvirate", see Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, pp. 158–63, and for Ensenada's control of Indies policy, p. 173.
6. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, pp. 167–73; quotations on p. 168.
7. On the naval program, see Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Armada española: Desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragón*, 9 vols. (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1895–1903), vol. 6, Chaps. 21–22, which also reproduces the relevant documents from Rodríguez Villa.
8. On this point, see the otherwise disappointing Lucío Mijares Pérez, "Programa político para América del Marques de la Ensenada," *Revista de Historia de América* (Mexico City) 81 (1976), pp. 82–130; also Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, *América hispánica (1492–1898)*, vol. 6 of Manuel Tuñón de Lara (ed.), *Historia de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1983), pp. 315–19. Note also that John Fisher's *Bourbon Peru* takes a start date for this era of 1750; for the rationale behind this chronological approach, see his Introduction.
9. Quoted in Jean O. McLachlan, "The Seven Years' Peace and the West Indian Policy of Carvajal and Wall," *English Historical Review* 53 (1938), pp. 457–77, esp. p. 464. In 1747, he proposed that ships be permitted to sail for the Indies from any Spanish port: Rodríguez Villa, *Don Cenón de Somodevilla*, p. 63.
10. José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, ed.), *Relación y documentos de gobierno del Virrey del Perú, José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (1745–1761)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983), pp. 446–49. Manso de Velasco is often referred to by his title rather than his name. But he was created Conde de Superunda only in 1748, and began to use the title only from 1749; so that to avoid anachronism on the one hand, and confusion on the other, he is referred to as Manso de Velasco throughout this book.
11. M. Salvat Monguillot, "En torno a la fundación de San Felipe el Real (1740)," *VI Congreso internacional de historia de América,* vol. 3 (Buenos Aires, 1982), pp. 187–98. On Manso's early life and career prior to Peru, see Pilar Latasa Vassallo, "Negociar en red: familia, amistad y paisanaje: El virrey Superunda y sus agentes en Lima y Cádiz (1745–1761)," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 60:2 (2003), pp. 463–92, esp. pp. 465–72.
12. The report (*Relación de gobierno*) was first published in the collection edited by Manuel Atanascio Fuentes in the 1850s (*Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje*

español, 6 vols [Lima: F. Bailly, 1859], vol. 4, pp. 1–340). A far better edition was prepared by Moreno Cebrián and is appended to his *Relación y documentos de gobierno del Virrey del Perú, José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (1745–1761)* (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983).

13. These include a plaque on the Plaza de Armas, a street running behind it, and a fine portrait in the Cathedral. On Manso and the Lima earthquake, see Charles F. Walker, *Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru, and Its Long Aftermath* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), esp. Chap. 4; also Pablo E. Pérez-Mallaína-Bueno, *Retrato de una ciudad en crisis: La sociedad limeña ante el movimiento sísmico de 1746* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 2001).
14. In addition to Moreno Cebrián, *Relación y documentos*, see Joseph Dager Alva, *Conde de Superunda* (Lima: Editorial Brasa, 1995); Diego Ochagavía Fernández, "El I Conde de Superunda," *Berceo: Boletín del Instituto de Estudios Riojanos* 16:58 (1961), pp. 5–48; 16:59 (1961), pp. 161–76; 16:60 (1961), pp. 321–32; 16:61 (1961), pp. 7–24; 17:63 (1962), pp. 171–72; Walker, *Shaky Colonialism*, esp. Chaps. 4–5; Latasa Vassallo, "Negociar en red"; María Luisa Martínez de Salinas Alonso, "Noticias del virrey conde de Superunda en el Archivo de la Diputación Foral de Álava," in Ronald Escobedo Mansilla et al (eds.), *Álava y América* (Vitoria-Gasteiz: Diputación Foral de Álava, 1996), pp. 351–64.
15. The sequence is to be found in A.G.I., Lima 642 and 643; it includes seven letters and some fragments, mostly dated March 1748–May 1749, in quarto and in the same hand.
16. For example: "Your Honour would not wish two *Riojanos* to fail to assist in such saintly ends [of the service of God, and the relief of this Monarchy], since Divine Providence has placed one of them as Viceroy of Peru and the other as minister for a reason"; Ensenada to Manso, May 9, 1749, A.G.I., Lima 643.
17. Ensenada to Manso, November 30, 1745, A.G.I., Lima 642.
18. Ensenada to Manso, May 26, 1748, A.G.I., Lima 643, referring to potential conflicts with *Audiencias* and other tribunals.
19. Ensenada to Manso, May 9, 1749, A.G.I., Lima 643.
20. Mark A. Burkholder and D. S. Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977), Appendix 3.
21. Cédula, April 29, 1742, in Antonio Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano del siglo XVIII*, 3 vols. (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1956–77), vol. 3, doc. 131, pp. 308–9; for the impact of this decree in Peru, see Villagarcía to Crown, August 12, 1744, A.G.I., Lima 415; cédula, July 18, 1745, and related

measures, discussed in Manso to Crown, January 29, 1747, A.G.I., Lima 416.

22. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, p. 89. The lack of any formal decree in my view underlines the semi-clandestine nature that had, in fact, always attached to sale of these posts.
23. Alberto Yalí Román, "Sobre alcaldías mayores y corregimientos en Indias: Un ensayo de interpretación," *Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 9 (1972), pp. 1–39, esp. pp. 36–37.
24. Cédula, March 27, 1717, in Juan Joseph Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico de pragmáticas, cédulas, decretos, órdenes, y resoluciones reales.* (1819; Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 1978), p. 294.
25. Cédulas of May 5, 1716, and October 8, 1727, in Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, pp. 293, 302.
26. Cédula, April 10, 1748, A.G.I., Lima 643; see also Manso, *Relacion*, p. 234; cédula, November 19, 1749, in Manso, *Relación*, p. 228; cédula, December 22, 1753, in Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, p. 318.
27. Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, p. 173; Emiliano Fernández de Pinedo et al., *Centralismo, Ilustración y agonía del antiguo régimen (1715–1833)*, vol. 7 of Manuel Tuñón de Lara (ed.), *Historia de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1980), p. 203.
28. See esp. cédula, August 10, 1747, in Manso, *Relación*, p. 353.
29. See esp. Ensenada's private letter to Manso, May 26, 1748, A.G.I., Lima 643.
30. Cédula, June 20, 1746, A.G.I., Lima 642; summarized in Manso, *Relación*, pp. 342–43.
31. Ensenada's interest in Peruvian fiscal affairs may be followed in almost yearly decrees: cédula, 7 Feb. 1747, A.G.I., Lima 642; cédula, July 25, 1748, in Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, p. 314; cédula, March 29, 1749, in Manso, *Relación*, pp. 353–54; cédula, June 18, 1749, cited in Manso to Crown, October 20, 1752, A.G.I., Lima 643; cédula, June 21, 1750, cited in a report by the Lima treasury officials, September 30, 1752, A.G.I., Lima 643; cédula, July 2, 1753, in Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, p. 318.
32. "Pués tiene facultades, y se le darán todas las que quiera"; "facultades para ello se han concedido a Vuestra Merced, y si más quisiere, más se le darán"; Ensenada's private letters to Manso, May 26, 1748, and August 17, 1748, respectively, A.G.I, Lima 643.
33. Carta órden, June 20, 1746, A.G.I., Lima 642; Manso, *Relación*, p. 359.

34. Cédula, June 30, 1751, A.G.I., Lima 643, which describes powers granted by a cédula of August 26, 1747; Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, p. 313, gives the date as August 27, 1747.
35. Adrian J. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1700–1759," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1998, p. 103.
36. Manso, *Relacion*, p. 342; Ensenada to Manso, private correspondence, May 9, 1749, A.G.I., Lima 643.
37. Cédula, June 30, 1751, A.G.I., Lima 643.
38. Cédula, February 23, 1752, in Manso, *Relación*, p. 232, includes the provision cited; see also cédula, July 1, 1752, in Manso, *Relación,* pp. 232–33.
39. Respectively, Manso, *Relación*, pp. 354–59; Manso to Crown, March 2, 1757, A.G.I., Lima 420, also Manso, *Relación*, pp. 361–62; Manso, *Relación*, p. 378.
40. Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, *Reorganización de la hacienda virreinal peruana en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid, 1953); first published in *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 23 (1953), pp. 329–69, see pp. 333–34.
41. One celebrated account is that of Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa, *Noticias secretas de América* (1748; Madrid: Historia 16, 1991), pp. 240–52.
42. The main cédula is included as a chapter of Villagarcía's *Ynstruccción de gobierno*, dated January 30, 1735, in A.G.I., Lima 642.
43. Manso to Crown, July 31, 1746, A.G.I., Lima 416.
44. Lucío Mijares Pérez, "La permisión reglada de los repartimientos por los corregidores y alcaldes mayores," in *Estudios sobre política indigenista española en América,* 3 vols (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1975–77), vol. 3, pp. 99–105.
45. The legislation receives detailed and well-documented treatment in Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, *El corregidor de Indios y la economía peruana en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1977), pp. 285–384.
46. Manso to Crown, September 19, 1752, A.G.I., Lima 417; Manso to Crown, September 12, 1754, and "Compulza de los Aranzeles formados de Orn del Exmo Sor Conde de Superunda," both in A.G.I., Lima 419.
47. Manso, *Relación*, pp. 294–96.
48. Moreno Cebrián, *El Corregidor de Indios*, p. 295.
49. See, for example, Moreno Cebrián, *El Corregidor de Indios*, p. 370–71.
50. For a revisionist study of *repartimiento*, however, see Jeremy Baskes, *Indians, Merchants and Markets: A Reinterpretation of the* Repartimiento *and Spanish-Indian Economic Relations in Late Colonial Oaxaca, Mexico, 1750–1821* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).

51. On the *estanco del tabaco*, see esp. Catalina Vizcarra, "Bourbon Intervention in the Peruvian Tobacco Industry, 1752–1813," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 39:3 (Aug. 2007), pp. 567–93; Manso, *Relación*, pp. 362–72, 441; an early study is Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco en el virreinato del Perú," *Revista Histórica* (Lima) 21 (1954), pp. 138–63.
52. Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco," cédula to Marqués de Villagarcía, March 18, 1745.
53. Céspedes del Castillo, "La renta del tabaco."
54. Vizcarra, "Bourbon Intervention in the Peruvian Tobacco Industry," p. 569.
55. Manso, *Relación*, pp. 438–39.
56. Manso, *Relación*, pp. 372–75.
57. These Ordinances are analyzed at length in Manuel Moreyra y Paz-Soldán, *La Moneda colonial en el Perú* (Lima: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 1980), pp. 204–18.
58. José Toribio Medina, *Las Monedas chilenas* (Santiago de Chile: El autor, 1902); A. Fontecilla Larraín, "Las Monedas de Chile desde la Conquista hasta hoy día," *Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia* 8.
59. Manso, *Relación*, pp. 345–49; Manso to Crown, November 27, 1746, and accompanying report, A.G.I., Lima 415; Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, "Análisis de la reforma en el ramo de alcabalas del Perú (1746)," *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 15–16 (1975), pp. 121–37.
60. Manso, *Relación*, pp. 348–49.
61. Ensenada to Montijo, October 18, 1746, and response of the fiscal dated June 5, 1747; and correspondence dated April–June 1752 between Ruiz de Porras and Vásquez y Morales, all in A.G.I., Lima 506.
62. For example, see David Cahill, "Taxonomy of a Colonial 'Riot': The Arequipa Disturbances of 1780," in John R. Fisher, Allan Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane (eds.), *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru* (Gainsville: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), pp. 255–91, discussing events in Arequipa in 1780.
63. Manso, *Relación*, pp. 379–81; Manso to Crown, October 1, 1752, A.G.I., Lima 417; further relevant documentation in this legajo and in Lima 419. A copy of the Ordinances of 1752 may be found in the library of the Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, Seville; see also Ismael Sánchez Bella, *Iglesia y Estado en la América española* (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1990), p. 160.
64. Draft cédula, August 20, 1746, A.G.I., Lima 775.
65. Manso de Velasco, *Relación*, pp. 231, also 299; see also Manso de Velasco to Crown, Lima, July 20, 1748, A.G.I., Lima 775.
66. Sola y Fuente to Crown, October 20, 1743, A.G.I., Lima 1,326.

67. Sola y Fuente to José del Campillo, April 30, 1742, A.G.I., Lima 1,326.
68. Jerónimo de Sola y Fuente, *Relación e informe, que haze el Doc. D. Gerónymo de Sola y Fuente…, Governador, que acaba de ser de la Villa, y Mina de Guancavelica* (Lima: Imprenta de la Plazuela de San Christoval, 1748), pp. 55–56.
69. Ensenada to Conde del Montijo, January 6, 1746, A.G.I., Lima 1326. Montijo was *superintendente general de azogues* in Madrid.
70. For a bleak account of the health implications of mercury mining at Huancavelica, see Nicholas A. Robins, *Mercury, Mining, and Empire: The Human and Ecological Cost of Colonial Silver Mining in the Andes* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).
71. Ensenada to Manso de Velasco, 30 Nov. 1748, A.G.I., Lima 643: "I have almost agreed to sending mercury from here, and closing the Huancavelica mine…".
72. Manso de Velasco, *Relación y documentos*, pp. 299–303, which reproduces key correspondence; originals and related material in A.G.I., Lima 1326, bundle marked "1748–1749."
73. See, for example, Ensenada to Sola y Fuente, June 12, 1750, and Sola y Fuente to Ensenada, June 14, 1750, both in A.G.I., Lima 1326.
74. On Escurrechea, see Enrique Tandeter, *Coercion and Market: Silver Mining in Colonial Potosí, 1692–1826* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), pp. 158–59, 163–64, and Antonio Matilla Tascón, *Historia de las minas de Almadén*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Gráficas Osca, 1958–87), vol. 2, pp. 135, 349–50. The idea of supplying Potosí with mercury from Almadén via Buenos Aires may bave been that of Escurrechea, since he made several proposals along these lines to the Madrid government.
75. On Ulloa, see Miguel Molina Martínez, *Antonio de Ulloa en Huancavelica* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1995). On late Bourbon Huancavelica, see Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Huancavelica Mercury Mine: A Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance in the Spanish Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1941); John R. Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners in Colonial Peru, 1776–1824* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1977), esp. Chap. 5.
76. See "Copia de títulos de visitador general de las Reales cajas de Guancavelica, Cusco y Potosí," n.d., A.G.I., Lima 429.
77. Consejo de Indias, April 22, 1748, and "Copia de la Instrucción original…para los cargos de Superintendente de minas, y visitador de Caxas," May 2, 1749, both in A.G.I., Charcas 435; Manso, *Relación*, pp. 312–13; Pedro Vicente Cañete y Domínguez, *Guía histórica, física, política, civil y legal del gobierno e intendencia de la provincia de Potosí* (1787; Potosí: Editorial Potosí, 1952), pp. 338, 606–7; Tandeter, *Coercion and Market*, p. 124.

78. Copy in A.G.I., Charcas 435.
79. The account here is based largely on Tandeter, *Coercion and Market*, and Cañete y Domínguez, *Guía histórica*, pp. 338, 607–8, 612. Santelices's huge correspondence may be approached through A.G.I., Charcas 435 and 676–77 and Lima 643–44.
80. Tandeter, *Coercion and Market*, pp. 98–107.
81. Manso to Consejo de Indias, March 13, 1752, A.G.I., Charcas 435.
82. Guillermo Ovando Sanz, *La academia de minas de Potosí, 1757–1970* (La Paz: Banco Central de Bolivia / Academia Boliviana de Historia, 1975), pp. 6–11; see also document III, 2, 3.
83. Vicente Palacio Atard, "La incorporación a la Corona del Banco de Rescates de Potosí," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 2 (1945), pp. 723–37; for a more nuanced modern account, see Tandeter, *Coercion and Market*, pp. 121–26.
84. Cañete y Domínguez, for example, offered high praise: *Guía histórica*, p. 129.
85. Cañete y Domínguez, *Guía histórica*, p. 130; Tandeter, *Coercion and Market*, p. 98.
86. Sánchez Bella, *Iglesia y Estado*, pp. 121–41.
87. Sánchez Bella, *Iglesia y Estado*, pp. 127–28; Manso, *Relacion*, pp. 271, 460.
88. Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, pp. 315, 318; Sánchez Bella, *Iglesia y Estado*, pp. 134–36.
89. Kenneth J. Andrien, "The Coming of Enlightened Reform in Bourbon Peru: Secularization of the *Doctrinas de indios*, 1746–1773," in Gabriel Paquette (ed.), *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 183–202, see p. 200.
90. Figures elaborated from Manso, *Relación*, "Mapa" on pp. 241–46.
91. Andrien, "The Coming of Enlightened Reform," published only in 2009; see p. 183.
92. Rosenmüller, "The Indians…Long For Change," pp. 143, 148–49.
93. Andrien, "The Coming of Enlightened Reform," pp. 196–99.
94. Andrien, "The Coming of Enlightened Reform," p. 200.
95. Antolín Abad Pérez, *Los Franciscanos en América* (Madrid: Mapfre, 1992), p. 143.
96. Manso to Crown, February 6, 1756, A.G.I., Lima 419; Manso, *Relación*, p. 415.
97. Walker, *Shaky Colonialism*, pp. 117–22.
98. Manso to Crown, December 10, 1746, A.G.I., Lima 415; for the second letter, also dated December 10, 1746, see Manso to Crown, December 18, 1748, A.G.I., Lima 643. Sánchez Bella, *Iglesia y Estado*, p. 122, suggests Manso was responding to a decree dated July 22, 1746, suspending new foundations of convents, but there

is little evidence that this decree prompted his proposals, or indeed that he had received it by late 1746.

99. Manso to Crown, March 16, 1747, A.G.I., Lima 415, with note by fiscal, and Manso, *Relación*, pp. 269–70.
100. Manso to Crown, December 18, 1748, A.G.I., Lima 643; Manso to Crown, December 18, 1748, A.G.I., Lima 983.
101. Manso to Crown, September 21, 1750 and October 15, 1751, both in A.G.I., Lima 417. Unless otherwise stated, decrees referred to in this section are listed in Matraya y Ricci, *Catálogo cronológico*, and Muro Orejón, *Cedulario americano*, vols. 2–3.
102. Manso de Velasco investigated cofradías: Manso to Crown, November 20, 1756, A.G.I., Lima 419.
103. J. Pérez Villanueva and B. Escandell Bonet (eds.), *Historia de la Inquisición en España y América,* 3 vols. (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Inquisitoriales, 1984), vol. 1, p. 1341; see also José Toribio Medina, *Historia del Tribunal de la Inquisición de Lima (1569–1820),* 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Santiago de Chile: Fondo Histórico y Bibliográfico J. T. Medina, 1956), vol. 2, pp. 280–88.
104. Manso, *Relación*, pp. 222–25, 416–18; Manso to Crown, December 15, 1753, A.G.I., Lima 419.
105. Manso, *Relación*, p. 410; Villagarcía to Crown, March 18, 1744, A.G.I., Lima 416.
106. Report marked No. 5716, in A.G.N., Acuerdos de justicia, 3.
107. For an overview, see Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government," Chap. 6.
108. Manso de Velasco, *Relación*, p. 389.
109. Sergio F. Bonnet, "La expedición al Mar del Sur de la flota de Don Francisco de Orozco," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 3 (1946), pp. 1,033–39.
110. On the last years of the *Armada*, see Pablo E. Pérez-Mallaína Bueno and Bibiano Torres Ramírez, *La Armada del Mar del Sur* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1987), pp. 326–38.
111. "Reglamento para la guarnición del Callao," July 1, 1753, A.G.I., Lima 1,040; Leon George Campbell, "The Military Reform in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1762–1800," Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Florida, 1970, p. 20; Manso de Velasco, *Relación*, pp. 390–95, also summarizes the regulations for forts in Chile.
112. Ensenada to Manso, April 1, 1750, A.G.I., Lima 643, and related material; Manso de Velasco, *Relación*, pp. 394–95.
113. Material relating to the construction may be found in A.G.I., Lima 416 and 1,490 to 1,492; see also Juan Manuel Zapatero, "El castillo Real Felipe del Callao," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 34 (1977), pp. 703–33, and the bibliography to Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *Las defensas militares de Lima y Callao* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1964).

114. Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, pp. 197–99.
115. José Joaquín Real Díaz, "Las ferias de Jalapa," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 16 (1959), pp. 167–314, see pp. 260–61; Antonio García-Baquero González, *Cadiz y el Atlántico (1717–1778): El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano*, 2nd ed. 2 vols. (Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1988), vol. 1, pp. 161–62; Walker, *Spanish Politics*, p. 216.
116. Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Apogee of Empire: Spain and New Spain in the Age of Charles III, 1759–1789* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), part 2.

7 Conclusions

1. Anthony McFarlane, "The Bourbon Century," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759*) (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 182.
2. Adrian J. Pearce, "Huancavelica 1700–1759: Administrative Reform of the Mercury Industry in Early Bourbon Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79:4 (Nov. 1999), pp. 669–702, see pp. 688–89.
3. Adrian J. Pearce, "The Peruvian Population Census of 1725–1740," *Latin American Research Review* 36:3 (Oct. 2001), pp. 69–104, pp. 83–84, 93–94.
4. Adrian J. Pearce, "Early Bourbon Government in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1700–1759," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1998, pp. 183–85. A printed copy of the Concordat may be found in A.G.I., Arribadas 191; it is reproduced in Fernando Díaz-Plaja, *Historia de España en sus documentos: Siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1986), pp. 156–61.
5. Xabier Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and Their Overseas Networks* (Woodbridge and Rochester: Boydell Press, 2010), pp. 134–38; see chap. 5 in this book.
6. Antonio García-Baquero González, "Los resultados del libre comercio y el 'punto de vista': Una revisión desde la estadística," in Antonio García-Baquero González, *El comercio colonial en la época del absolutismo ilustrado: Problemas y debates* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2003), pp. 187–216.
7. Pearce, "Peruvian Population Census," pp. 87–95.
8. Jacques A. Barbier, "The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms, 1787–1792," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 57:1 (Feb. 1977), pp. 51–68; see also John R. Fisher, "Critique of Jacques A. Barbier's 'The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms, 1787–1792,'" *Hispanic American Historical Review* 57:1 (Feb. 1977),

pp. 51–68; Jacques A. Barbier, "Jacques Barbier's Reply," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 58:1 (Feb. 1978), pp. 87–90; and Allan J. Kuethe, "More on' The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms': A Perspective from New Granada," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 58:3 (Aug. 1978), pp. 477–80.

Bibliography

Note: Most research for this book in printed sources was carried out in the libraries of the Archivo General de Indias and the Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, both in Seville; the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid; the Sydney Jones Library of the University of Liverpool, the Central Library of the University of Cambridge, the Maughan Library of King's College London, and Senate House Library of the University of London; the British Library; the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, the Colección Riva-Agüero, and the private library of Félix Denegri Luna (now part of the Library of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú), all in Lima; and the Biblioteca Daniel Cossío Villegas, of the Colegio de México, Mexico City.

Primary Sources and Early Histories (to 1900)

Alcedo y Herrera, Dionisio de, "Aviso Histórico" (1740), in J. Zaragoza (ed.), *Piraterías y agresiones de los ingleses y otros pueblos de Europa en la América española desde el siglo XVI al XVIII*. Madrid: M. G. Hernández, 1883.

———, "Incursiones y hostilidades de las naciones extranjeras en la América meridional…" (1770–1771), in J. Zaragoza (ed.), *Piraterías y agresiones de los ingleses y otros pueblos de Europa en la América española desde el siglo XVI al XVIII*. Madrid: M. G. Hernández, 1883.

Alvarez de Colmenar, Juan, *Annales d'Espagne et de Portugal*, 8 vols. Amsterdam: François L'Honoré et fils, 1741.

Anonymous (ed.), *Documentos existentes en el Archivo General de Indias: Sección de Lima*, vol. 8 in two books of Anon. (ed.), *La minería hispana e iberoamericana: Contribución a su investigación histórica*. León: Cátedra de San Isidoro, 1974.

Anonymous (ed.), *Documentos para la historia argentina*, 45 vols. Buenos Aires: Compañía Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1913–.

Antúnez y Acevedo, Rafael (Antonio García-Baquero Gonzalez, facsimile ed.), *Memorias históricas sobre la legislación, y gobierno del comercio de los Españoles con sus colonias en las Indias occidentales,* 1797; Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1981.

Aranda, Joaquín María, *El marqués de la Ensenada: Estudios sobre su administración*. Madrid: M. G. Hernández, 1898.

Armstrong, Edward, *Elisabeth Farnese, "The Termagant of Spain."* London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1892.

Arzans de Orsúa y Vela, Bartolomé (Lewis Hanke and Gunnar Mendoza, eds.), *Historia de la Villa Imperial de Potosí*, 3 vols. Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1965.

Baudrillart, Alfred, "Les intrigues du Duc d'Orléans en Espagne, 1708–1709," *Revue Historique* 43 (1890), pp. 1–33, 241–73.

———, *Philippe V et la cour de France*, 5 vols. Paris: Firmin-Didot et Cie., 1890–1900.

Campillo y Cossío, José del (Manuel Ballesteros Gaibrois, ed.), *Nuevo sistema económico para América*. Oviedo: Grupo Editorial Asturiano, 1993.

Cañete y Domínguez, Pedro Vicente, *Guía histórica, física, política, civil y legal del gobierno e intendencia de la provincia de Potosí*. 1787; Potosí: Editorial Potosí, 1952.

Casa Concha, Marqués de (José de Santiago Concha), "Relación del estado que ha tenido, y tiene la Real Mina de Guancavelica . . ." (1726), copies in Archivo General de Indias. Lima, 469, 479.

Castelfuerte, Marqués de (José de Armendáriz y Perurena), "Relación del estado de los reynos del Perú . . ." (1736), in Manuel Atanascio Fuentes (ed.), *Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español*, 6 vols. Lima: F. Bailly, 1859, vol. 3, pp. 56–369.

Castro y Rossi, Adolfo, *Vida del Almirante D. Andrés de Pez*. Cadiz: Federico Joly, 1879.

Coxe, William, *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon, from the Accession of Philip V to the Death of Charles III*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1815.

Díaz-Plaja, Fernando, *Historia de España en sus documentos: Siglo XVIII*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1986.

Fernández de Navarrete, Martín, "Noticia biográfica del Marqués de la Ensenada," appendix to the same author's *Estado general de la Armada*. Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1829.

Fuentes, Manuel Atanascio (ed.), *Memoria de los vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español*, 6 vols. Lima: F. Bailly, 1859.

Girardot, Baron de, *Correspondance de Louis XIV avec M. Amelot, son ambassadeur en Espagne, 1705–1709*, 2 vols. Nantes: Aubry, 1864.

Hanke, Lewis, & C. Rodríguez (eds.), *Los virreyes españoles en América durante el gobierno de la Casa de Austria*, 7 vols. Madrid: Atlas, 1978–80.

Juan y Santacilia, Jorge, and Antonio de Ulloa (Luis J. Ramos Gómez, ed.), *Noticias secretas de América*. 1748; Madrid: Historia 16, 1991.

Llano Zapata, José Eusebio de, *Memorias histórico-físicas-apologéticas de la América meridional*. 1757; Lima: San Pedro, 1904.

Lodge, Richard, Sir (ed.), *The Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene, K.B.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933.

Lorente, Sebastián, *Historia del Perú bajo los Borbones, 1700–1821.* Lima: Gil y Aubert, 1871.

Manso de Velasco, José Antonio, Conde de Superunda (Alfredo Moreno Cebrián, ed.), *Relación y documentos de gobierno del Virrey del Perú, José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (1745–1761).* Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983.

Matraya y Ricci, Juan Joseph, *Catálogo cronológico de pragmáticas, cédulas, decretos, órdenes, y resoluciones reales.* 1819; Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 1978.

Moore, G., *Lives of Cardinal Alberoni, the Duke of Ripperda, and Marquis of Pombal, Three Distinguished Political Adventurers of the Last Century.* 2nd ed. London: J. Rodwell, 1814.

Moreyra y Paz-Soldán, Manuel (ed.), *Virreinato peruano: Documentos para su historia: Colección de cartas de virreyes, Conde de Monclova*, 3 vols. Lima: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1954–55.

Muro Orejón, Antonio, *Cedulario americano del siglo XVIII*, 3 vols. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1956–77.

Parnell, Arthur, *The War of the Succession in Spain during the Reign of Queen Anne, 1702–1711.* London: George Bell, 1888.

Professione, A., *Giulio Alberoni dal 1708 al 1714.* Verona: Padova, 1890.

Rávago, Francisco de (C. Pérez Bustamante, ed.), *Correspondencia reservada e inédita del P. Francisco de Rávago, confesor de Fernando VI.* Madrid: M. Aguilar, 1943.

Rodríguez Villa, Antonio, *Don Cenón de Somodevilla, Marqués de la Ensenada: Ensayo biográfico.…* Madrid: M. Murillo, 1878.

———, *Patiño y Campillo: Reseña histórico-biográfico de estos dos ministros de Felipe V.* Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1882.

San Felipe, Marqués de (Vicente Bacaller y Sanna; Carlos Seco Serrano, ed.), *Comentarios de la guerra de España e historia de su Rey Felipe V, el Animoso.* Madrid: Atlas, 1957.

Smollet, Tobias George, *Roderick Random*. London: J. Osborn, 1748.

Sola y Fuente, Jerónimo de, *Nuevo Assiento, que…ha celebrado el Señor Don Gerónimo de Sola y Fuente…, Gobernador de la Villa de Guancavelica…con el Gremio de Mineros.…* Lima: Imprenta de la Calle de S. Ildephonso, 1745.

———, *Relación e informe, que haze el Doc. D. Gerónymo de Sola y Fuente…, Governador, que acaba de ser de la Villa, y Mina de Guancavelica*. Lima: Imprenta de la Plazuela de San Christoval, 1748.

Syveton, G., *Une cour et un aventurier: Le Baron de Ripperdá*. Paris: n. pub., 1896.

TePaske, John J., and Herbert S. Klein, *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America*, 4 vols. Durham: Duke University Press, 1982–1990.

Ustáriz, Gerónymo de, *Theorica, y práctica de comercio, y de marina* (1724; facsimile ed.), Madrid: Aguilar, 1968.

Ulloa, Antonio de (A. Saumell, ed.), *Relación histórica del viaje a la América meridional*, 2 vols. Madrid: Historia 16, 1990.

Villagarcía, Marqués de (José de Caamaño y Sotomayor), "Relación del estado de los reynos del Perú . . . " (1745), in Manuel Atanascio Fuentes (ed.), *Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español*, 6 vols. Lima: F. Bailly, 1859, vol. 3, pp. 371–88.

Vivero, Domingo de, *Galeria de retratos de los gobernadores y virreyes del Perú (1542–1824)*. Lima: Librería Clásica y Científicia, 1891.

Secondary Sources

Abad León, Felipe, *El marqués de la Ensenada: su vida y su obra*, 2 vols. Madrid: Editorial Naval, 1985.

Abad Pérez, Antolín, *Los Franciscanos en América*. Madrid: Mapfre, 1992.

Abbad, Fabrice and Didier Ozanam, *Les intendants espagnoles du XVIIIieme siecle*. Madrid: Casa de Velásquez, 1992.

Albareda Salvadó, Joaquim, *La guerra de sucesión de España (1700–1714)*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2010.

Andrada-Vanderwilde, Dolores, "La fundación del Mayorazgo de Don José de Armendáriz y Perurena, Marqués de Castelfuerte, virrey del Perú," *Príncipe de Viana* 138–39, pp. 229–51.

Andrien, Kenneth J., "The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Authority in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1633–1700," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 62 (1982), pp. 49–71.

———, *Crisis and Decline: The Viceroyalty of Peru in the Seventeenth Century*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985.

———, "Economic Crisis, Taxes and the Quito Insurrection of 1765," *Past & Present* 129 (November 1990), pp. 104–31.

———, "The *Noticias secretas de América* and the Construction of a Governing Ideology for the Spanish American Empire," *Colonial Latin American Review* 7:2 (1998), pp. 175–92.

———, "The Coming of Enlightened Reform in Bourbon Peru: Secularization of the *Doctrinas de indios*, 1746–1773," in Gabriel Paquette (ed.), *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, pp. 183–202.

Anonymous (ed.), *Historia General del Perú*, 8 vols. Lima: Editorial Brasa, 1994.

Anonymous (ed.), *La minería hispana e iberoamericana: Contribución a su investigación histórica: Estudios, fuentes, bibliografía*, 8 vols. León: Cátedra de San Isidoro, 1970–74.

Artola, Miguel, "Campillo y las reformas de Carlos III," *Revista de Indias* 12:50 (1952), pp. 685–714.

Baeza Martín, Ascensión, "El Marqués de Casafuerte, Virrey de Nueva Espana, 1722–1734," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Seville, 2002.

Bakewell, Peter, "Registered Silver Production in the Potosí District, 1550–1735," *Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat, Wirtshaft, und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 12 (1975), pp. 67–103.

———, *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labour in Potosí, 1545–1650.* Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1984.

———, "Mining," in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Colonial Spanish America.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 203–49.

———, *A History of Latin America, c. 1450 to the Present*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Barba, Enrique M., "Sobre el contrabando de la Colonia del Sacramento: siglo XVIII," *Investigaciones y Ensayos* 28 (1980), pp. 57–76.

Barbier, Jacques A., "The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms, 1787–1792," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 57:1 (February 1977), pp. 51–68.

———, "Jacques Barbier´s Reply," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 58:1 (February 1978), pp. 87–90.

Barnadas, Josep M., "The Catholic Church in Colonial Spanish America," in *Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 511–40.

Baskes, Jeremy, *Indians, Merchants and Markets: A Reinterpretation of the* Repartimiento *and Spanish-Indian Economic Relations in Late Colonial Oaxaca, Mexico, 1750–1821.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Becker, Jerónimo, and José María Rivas Groot, *El Nuevo Reino de Granada en el siglo XVIII.* Madrid: Asilo de Huérfanos de la S. C. de Jesús, 1921.

Bernard, Gildas, "La Casa de la Contratación de Sevilla, luego en Cádiz, en el siglo XVIII," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 12 (1955), pp. 253–86.

———, *Le Secrétariat d'Etat et le Conseil espagnole des Indes (1700–1808).* Geneva: Droz, 1972.

Béthencourt Massieu, Antonio, "Felipe V y la Florida," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 7 (1950), pp. 95–123.

———, *Patiño en la política internacional de Felipe V.* Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1954.

———, *Relaciones de España bajo Felipe V: Del Tratado de Sevilla a la Guerra con Inglaterra (1729–1739).* Valladolid: Asociación Española de Historia Moderna, 1998.

Bitar Letayf, Marcelo, *Los economistas españoles del siglo XVIII y sus ideas sobre el comercio con las Indias.* Mexico City: Instituto Mexicano de Comercio Exterior, 1975.

Bonialian, Mariano Ardash, *El Pacífico hispanoamericano: Política y comercio asiático en el imperio español (1680–1784): La centralidad de lo marginal.* Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2012.

Bonnet, Sergio F., "La expedición al Mar del Sur de la flota de Don Francisco de Orozco," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 3 (1946), pp. 1033–39.

Borah, Woodrow, *Early Colonial Trade and Navigation between Mexico and Peru*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1954.

Borges, Analola, *Álvarez Abreu y su extraordinaria misión en Indias*. Tenerife: Instituto de Estudios Canarios Santa Cruz, 1963.

———, "Los aliados del Archiduque Carlos en la América virreinal," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 27 (1970), pp. 321–70.

Borrego Plá, María del Carmen, "Tráfico comercial de España con Indias (1700–1714)," *Revista del Instituto de Estudios Gaditanos*. Cadiz 1975, pp. 145–50.

Brading, David A., "Mexican Silver Mining in the Eighteenth Century: The Revival of Zacatecas," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 50 (1970), pp. 665–81.

———, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763–1810*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

———, "Bourbon Spain and its American Empire," in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Colonial Spanish America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 112–62.

Brading, David A. and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 52 (1972), pp. 545–79.

Brown, Kendall W., "La crisis financiera peruana al comienzo del siglo XVIII, la minería de plata y la mina de azogues de Huancavelica," *Revista de Indias* 48:182–83 (January–August 1988), pp. 349–81.

———, "The Spanish Imperial Mercury Trade and the American Mining Expansion under the Bourbon Monarchy," in Kenneth J. Andrien and Lyman L. Johnson (eds.), *The Political Economy of Spanish America in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1850*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1994, pp. 137–67.

———, "La recepción de la tecnología minera española en las minas de Huancavelica, siglo XVIII," in Marcos Cueto (ed.), *Saberes andinos: ciencia y tecnología en Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1995, pp. 59–90.

Brown, Vera Lee, "The South Sea Company and Contraband Trade," *American Historical Review* 31:4 (July 1926), pp. 662–78.

Buechler, Rose Marie, "La Compañía de azogueros y el Banco de rescates de Potosí, 1747–1779," *Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana* 26 (1980), pp. 67–116.

Burkholder, Mark A., *Biographical Dictionary of Councillors of the Indies, 1717–1808*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Burkholder, Mark A. and D. S. Chandler, "Creole Appointments and the Sale of Audiencia Positions in the Spanish Empire under the Early Bourbons, 1701–1750," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4 (1972), pp. 187–206.

———, *From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977.

Burkholder, Mark A. and Lyman L. Johnson, *Biographical Dictionary of Audiencia Ministers in the Americas: 1687–1821*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982.

———, *Colonial Latin America*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Burzio, Humberto, *La ceca de Lima, 1565–1824*. Madrid**:** Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre, 1958.

Cahill, David, "Taxonomy of a Colonial 'Riot': The Arequipa Disturbances of 1780," in John R. Fisher, Allan Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane (eds.), *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*. Gainsville: Louisiana State University Press, 1990, pp. 255–91.

Callahan, W. J., "A Note on the Real y General Junta de Comercio, 1679–1814," *Economic History Review* 21 (1968), pp. 519–28.

Campbell, Leon George, "The Military Reform in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1762–1800," Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Florida, 1970.

Cañizares-Esguerra, Jorge, "'Enlightened Reform' in the Spanish Empire: An Overview," in Gabriel Paquette (ed.), *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, pp. 33–35.

Carrillo Ureta, Gonzalo, "'La única voz por donde los yndios pueden hablar': Estrategias de la élite indígena de Lima en torno al nombramiento de procuradores y defensores indios (1720–1770)," *Histórica* (Lima) 30:1 (2006), pp. 9–63.

Castagnoli, P., *Il cardenale Giulio Alberoni*, 3 vols. Piacenza: Collegio Alberoni, 1929–32.

Castro, Concepción de, "Las primeras reformas institucionales de Felipe V: El marqués de Canales, 1703–1704," *Cuadernos dieciochistas* 1 (2000), pp. 155–83.

———, *A la sombra de Felipe V: José de Grimaldo, ministro responsable (1703–1726)*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2004.

Céspedes del Castillo, Guillermo, *Lima y Buenos Aires: Repercusiones económicas y políticas de la creación del virreinato del Perú*. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1947; first published in *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, 3 (1946), pp. 667–874.

———, *Reorganización de la hacienda virreinal peruana en el siglo XVIII*. Madrid, 1953; first published in *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español* 23 (1953), pp. 329–69.

———, "La renta del tabaco en el virreinato del Perú," *Revista Histórica* (Lima) 21 (1954), pp. 138–63.

———, *América Hispánica (1492–1898)*, vol. 6 of Manuel Tuñón de Lara (ed.), *Historia de España*. Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1983.

Chaunu, Pierre, *Seville et l'Atlantique, 1504–1650,* 8 vols. Paris: A. Colin, 1955–59.

———, "Notes péruviennes (XVIieme, XVIIieme, XVIIIieme siecles). Aristote et le Potosí," *Revue Historique* 224 (1960), pp. 59–74.

———, "Les routes espagnoles de l'Atlantique," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 25 (1968), pp. 95–128.

Christelow, Allan, "Contraband Trade between Jamaica and the Spanish Main, and the Free Port Act of 1766," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 22 (1942), pp. 309–43.

———, "Great Britain and the Trades from Cadiz and Lisbon to Spanish America and Brazil, 1759–1783," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 27:1 (February 1947), pp. 2–29.

Clayton, Lawrence A., "Trade and Navigation in the Seventeenth-Century Viceroyalty of Peru," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 7 (1975), pp. 1–21.

Cole, Jeffrey, *The Potosí Mita, 1573–1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985.

Cosamalón Aguilar, Jesús A., "Precios y sociedad colonial (1700–1810): Transformaciones en los mercados y ciclos económicos en Lima," *Historia Mexicana* 249 (LXIII:1: July–Sept. 2013), pp. 51–109.

Crespo Solana, Ana, *La Casa de Contratación y la Intendencia General de la Marina en Cádiz (1717–1730)*. Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1996.

———, *Mercaderes atlánticos: Redes del comercio flamenco y holandés entre Europa y el Caribe*. Cordoba: Universidad de Córdoba / Cajasur, 2009.

Dager Alva, Joseph, *Conde de Superunda*. Lima: Editorial Brasa, 1995.

Dahlgren, E. W., "Le comte Jérome de Pontchartrain et les armateurs de Saint-Malo (1712–1715)," *Revue Historique* 88 (1905), pp. 225–63.

———, *Les relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les côtes de l'océan Pacifique (commencement du XVIIIieme siecle*, vol. 1, but no further volumes published). Paris: H. Champion, 1909.

Danvila, A., *El reinado relámpago. Luis I y Luisa Isabel de Orléans (1707–1742)*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1952.

Delgado Barrado, José Miguel, "Reformismo borbónico y compañías privilegiadas para el comercio americano (1700–1756)," in Agustín Guimerá (ed.), *El reformismo borbónico*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas / Alianza, 1996, pp. 123–43.

Dickinson, W. Calvin and E. R. Hitchcock, *The War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–1713: A Selected Bibliography*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996.

Domínguez Ortiz, Antonio, "Un virreinato en venta," *Mercurio peruano* 49 (Jan.–Feb. 1965), pp. 46–71; also in same author (Miguel Molina Martínez, ed.), *América y la monarquía española*. Granada: Comares, 2010, pp. 177–85.

———, *Sociedad y Estado en el siglo XVIII español*. Barcelona: Ariel, 1976.

Donovan, E., "The Early Days of the South Sea Company, 1711–1718," *Journal of Business and Economic History* 2 (1929–30), pp. 419–50.

Doyle, William, *The Old European Order, 1660–1800*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Duviols, Jean-Paul, "Les côtes du Vénézuela au XVIIIieme siecle: Témoignage d'un contrebandier," *Cahiers des Amériques Latines* 32 (1979), pp. 5–17.

Egaña, Antonio de, S. I., *Historia de la Iglesia en la América española: Hemisferio sur*. Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1966.

Eguía Ruiz, Constancio, *El marqués de la Ensenada según un confidente*. Madrid: Razón y Fé, 1922.

Eissa-Barroso, Francisco Antonio, "Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making: The Reform of Viceregal Rule in the Spanish World under Philip V (1700–1746)," Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2010.

———, "'Of Experience, Zeal and Selflessness': Military Officers as Viceroys in Early Eighteenth-Century Spanish America," *The Americas* 68:3 (January 2012), pp. 317–45.

———, "'The Honor of the Spanish Nation': Military Officers, Mediterranean Campaigns and American Government under Philip V," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)*. Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 39–60.

———, "'Having Served in the Troops': The Appointment of Military Officers as Provincial Governors in Early Eighteenth-Century Spanish America (1700–1746)," *Colonial Latin American Historical Review*. Forthcoming.

———, *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717–1739)*: *The Politics of Reform in the Early Bourbon Spanish World*. Forthcoming.

Eissa-Barroso, Francisco Antonio, and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)*. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Elliott, John H., *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.

———, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.

———, "The General Crisis in Retrospect: A Debate Without End," in John H. Elliott, *Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500–1800*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009, pp. 52–73.

Escamilla González, Iván, *Los intereses malentendidos: El Consulado de Comerciantes de México y la monarquía española, 1700–1739*. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011.

Escobedo Mansilla, Ronald, *Control fiscal en el virreinato peruano: El Tribunal de Cuentas*. Madrid: Alhambra, 1986.

Escudero, José Antonio, *Los secretarios de estado y del despacho, 1474–1724*. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, 1969.

Ezquerra Abadia, Ramón, "Problemas de la mita de Potosí en el siglo XVIII," in *La minería hispana e iberoamericana: Contribución a su investigación histórica*, vol. 1. León: Cátedra de San Isidoro, 1970, pp. 483–511.

Fernández de Pinedo, Emiliano, et al., *Centralismo, Ilustración, y agonia del antiguo régimen (1715–1833)*, vol. 7 of Manuel Tuñón de Lara (ed.), *Historia de España*. Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1980.

Fernández Durán, Reyes, *Gerónimo de Ustáriz (1670–1732): Una política económica para Felipe V.* Madrid: Minerva, 1999.

Fernández Duro, Cesáreo, *Armada española: Desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragón* 9 vols. Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1895–1903.

Fisher, John R., *Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System, 1784–1814.* London: Athlone Press, 1970.

———, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners in Colonial Peru, 1776–1824.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1977.

———, "Critique of Jacques A. Barbier's 'The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms, 1787–1792,'" *Hispanic American Historical Review* 58:1 (February 1978), pp. 83–86.

———, *Commercial Relations between Spain and Spanish America in the Era of Free Trade, 1778–1796.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1985.

———, *The Economic Aspects of Spanish Imperialism in America, 1492–1810.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997.

———, *Bourbon Peru, 1750–1824.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003.

Fontecilla Larraín, A., "Las Monedas de Chile desde la Conquista hasta hoy día," *Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia* 8.

Francis, David, *The First Peninsular War, 1702–1713.* London: Ernest Benn, 1975.

Frías, Duque de, "El cumplimiento del testamento de Carlos II: La embajada del condestable de Castilla a Felipe V de España y Luis XIV de Francia", *Hispania* 98 (1965), pp. 263–84.

Frostin, Charles, "Les Pontchartrain et la pénétration commerciale française en Amérique espagnole (1690–1715)," *Revue Historique* 245 (1971), pp. 307–36.

Gárate Ojagurén, M. M., *La Real Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas.* San Sebastián: Sociedad Guipuzcoana, 1990.

García-Baquero González, Antonio, *Cádiz y el Atlántico (1717–1778): El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano,* 2nd ed. 2 vols. Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1988.

———, *La Carrera de Indias: Suma de la contratación y océano de negocios.* Seville: Algaida, 1992.

———, "Los resultados del libre comercio y el 'punto de vista': Una revisión desde la estadística," in Antonio García-Baquero González, *El comercio colonial en la época del absolutismo ilustrado: Problemas y debates.* Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2003, pp. 187–216.

García Cárcel, Ricardo and Rosa María Alabrús Iglesias, *España en 1700: ¿Austrias o Borbones?* Madrid: Arlanza, 2001.

García Fernández, Nélida, *Comunidad extranjera y puerto privilegiado: Los británicos en Cádiz en el siglo XVIII.* Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 2005.

———, *Comerciando con el enemigo: El tráfico mercantil anglo-español en el siglo xviii (1700–1765)*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2006.

García Fuentes, Lutgardo, *El comercio español con América, 1650–1700*. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1980.

García-Mauriño Mundi, Margarita, *La pugna entre el Consulado de Cádiz y los jenízaros por las exportaciones a Indias (1720–1765)*. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1999.

Garrido Conde, María Teresa, "La primera creación del virreinato de Nueva Granada," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 21 (1964), pp. 25–144.

Gibson, Charles, *Spain in America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Gil-Bermejo García, Juana, "La Casa de Contratación en Sevilla (algunos aspectos de su historia)," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 30 (1973), pp. 679–761.

Glave, Luis Miguel, "El virreinato peruano y la llamada 'crisis general' del siglo XVII," in Heraclio Bonilla (ed.), *Las crisis económicas en la historia del Perú*. Lima: Centro Latinoamericano de Historia Económica y Social / Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1986, pp. 95–137.

Gómez Gómez, Margarita, *Forma y expedición del documento en la Secretaría del Estado y del Despacho de Indias*. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1993.

Gómez Molleda, María Dolores, "El contrabando inglés en América: Correspondencia inédita de la factoría de Buenos Aires," *Hispania* 10 (1950), pp. 336–69.

Gómez Urdáñez, José Luis,*El proyecto reformista de Ensenada*. Lleida: Milenio, 1996.

———, "El duque de Duras y el fin del ministerio Ensenada (1752–1754)," *Hispania* 59:1 (1999), pp. 217–49.

González Casasnovas, Ignacio, "Un intento de rectificar el sistema colonial: Debates y proyectos en torno a la mita de Potosí a fines del siglo XVII (1683–1697)," *Revista de Indias* 50:189 (1990), pp. 431–53.

———, *Las dudas de la corona: La política de repartimientos para la minería de Potosí (1680–1732)*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2000.

González de Amezúa y Mayo, Agustín, *Un modelo de estadista: El marqués de la Ensenada*. Madrid: J. Ratés, 1917.

González Enciso, A., *Estado e industria en el siglo XVIII: La fábrica de Guadalajara*. Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1980.

———, "A Moderate and Rational Absolutism: Spanish Fiscal Policy in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century," in Rafael Torres Sánchez (ed.), *War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*. Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2007, pp. 109–32.

Gootenberg, Paul, "Population and Ethnicity in Early Republican Peru: Some Revisions," *Latin American Research Review* 26:3 (1991), pp. 109–57.

Grahn, Lance R., "An Irresoluble Dilemma: Smuggling in New Granada, 1713–1763," in John R. Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane (eds.), *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990, pp. 123–46.

———, *The Political Economy of Smuggling: Regional Informal Economies in Early Bourbon New Granada*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.

Granda, Germán de, "Una ruta marítima de contrabando de esclavos negros entre Panamá y Barbacoas durante el Asiento inglés," *Revista de Indias* 36:143–4 (1976), pp. 123–46.

Guimerá, Agustín (ed.), *El reformismo borbónico*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas / Alianza, 1996.

Harcourt-Smith, Simon, *Alberoni, or, the Spanish Conspiracy*. London: Faber and Faber, 1943.

Haring, Clarence H., *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1918.

———, *The Spanish Empire in America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

Hera, Alberto de la, *Iglesia y Corona en la América española*. Madrid: Mapfre, 1992.

Heredia Herrera, Antonia, "Asiento con el Consulado de Cádiz, en 1720, para el despacho de avisos," *Instituto de Estudios Gaditanos*. Cadiz, 1975, separata, pp. 163–70.

———, *La renta del azogue en Nueva España: 1709–1751*. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1978.

———, "La presencia de extranjeros en el comercio gaditano en el siglo XVIII," in *Homenaje al Dr Muro Orejón,* vol. 1. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1979, pp. 233–43.

———, "Reglamentos y Ordenanzas del Consulado de Cádiz en el siglo XVIII," *IV Jornadas de Andalucía y América,* vol. 1. Seville, 1985, pp. 59–77.

———, *Sevilla y los hombres del comercio (1700–1800)*. Seville: Editoriales Andaluzas Unidas, 1989.

Herr, Richard, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958.

Hidalgo, Jacinto, "La abdicacion de Felipe V," *Hispania* 22 (1962), pp. 559–89.

Hildner, Ernest G., "The Role of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy Leading to the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1729–1739," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 18 (1938), pp. 322–41.

Hilton, Sylvia Lyn, "El conflicto anglo-español sobre derechos de navegación en mares americanos (1729–1750)," *Revista de Indias* 38:153–4 (1978), pp. 671–713.

Hussey, Roland Dennis, "Antecedents of the Spanish Monopolistic Overseas Trading Companies (1624–1728)," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 9 (1929), pp. 1–30.

———, *The Caracas Company, 1728–1784.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1934.

Israel, Jonathan I., "Mexico and the 'General Crisis' of the Seventeenth Century," *Past and Present* 63 (May 1974), pp. 33–57.

Jaramillo Uribe, Jaime, "La economía del virreinato (1740–1810)," in J. A. Ocampo (ed.), *Historia económica de Colombia,* 2nd ed. Bogotá: Planeta, 1988.

Jones, Kenneth Warren, "New Spain and the Viceregency of the Marqués de Casafuerte, 1722–1734," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1971.

Kamen, Henry, "El establecimiento de los Intendentes en la administración española," *Hispania* 24:95 (1964), pp. 368–95.

———, "Melchor de Macanaz and the Foundations of Bourbon Power in Spain," *English Historical Review* 80:317 (1965), pp. 699–716.

———, "The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 39 (1966), pp. 165–73.

———, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700–1715.* London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.

———, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665–1700.* New York: Longman, 1980.

———, *Philip V of Spain: The King Who Reigned Twice.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.

Keen, Benjamin, *A History of Latin America,* 4th ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992.

Kern, Robert W. (ed.), *Historical Dictionary of Modern Spain, 1700–1988.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Kuethe, Allan J., "La batalla de Cartagena de 1741: Nuevas perspectivas," *Historiografía y bibliografía americanistas,* Seville, 18 (1974), pp. 19–38.

———, "More on 'The Culmination of the Bourbon Reforms': A Perspective from New Granada," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 58:3 (August 1978), pp. 477–80.

———, *Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773–1808.* Gainesville, FL: The University Presses of Florida, 1978.

———, "Traslado del Consulado de Sevilla a Cádiz: Nuevas perspectivas," in Enriqueta Vila Vilar and Allan J. Kuethe (eds.), *Relaciones de poder y comercio colonial: Nuevas perspectivas.* Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos / Texas Tech University, 1999, pp. 67–82.

———, "The Colonial Commercial Policy of Philip V and the Atlantic World," in Renate Pieper and Peer Schmidt (eds.), *Latin America and the Atlantic World (1500–1850).* Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau-Verlag, 2005, pp. 319–33.

———, "La política colonial de Felipe V y el Proyecto de 1720," in Fernando Navarro Antolín (ed.), *Orbis Incognitus: Avisos y legajos del Nuevo Mundo* vol. 1. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2007, pp. 233–41.

———, "Alberoni's Reform Agenda in America," Paper presented at the conference on "Spanish America in the Early Eighteenth Century: New

Perspectives on a Forgotten Era," University of Warwick, April 15–16, 2011.

———, "Cardinal Alberoni and Reform in the American Empire," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)*. Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 23–38.

Kuethe, Allan J. and Kenneth J. Andrien, *The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century: War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713–1796*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

La Force, James C., *The Development of the Spanish Textile Industry*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.

Lario de Oñate, María del Carmen, *La colonia mercantil británica e irlandesa en Cádiz a finales del siglo XVIII*. Cadiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 2000.

Lamikiz, Xabier, *Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and their Overseas Networks*. Woodbridge and Rochester: Boydell Press, 2010.

Latasa Vassallo, Pilar, "Negociar en red: familia, amistad y paisanaje: El virrey Superunda y sus agentes en Lima y Cádiz (1745–1761)," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 60:2 (2003), pp. 463–92.

Laviana Cuetos, María Luisa, *Guayaquil en el siglo XVIII*. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1987.

Leonard, Irving A., "Don Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo," *Revista Histórica* (Lima), 10 (1936), pp. 45–75.

León Borja, Dora, and Adám Szásdi-Nagy, "El comercio del cacao de Guayaquil," *Revista de Historia de América* (Mexico City), 57–58 (1964), pp. 1–50.

Lockhart, James, and Stuart B. Schwartz, *Early Latin America: A History of Colonial Spanish America and Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Lodge, Richard, "Sir Benjamin Keene, K.B.: A Study in Anglo-Spanish Relations," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* 4th series, 15 (1932), pp. 1–43.

Lohmann Villena, Guillermo, *Las minas de Huancavelica en los siglos XVI y XVII*. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1949.

———, *Tres catalanes, virreyes en el Perú*. Madrid: Hidalguía, 1962.

———, *Las defensas militares de Lima y Callao*. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1964.

———, *Los Ministros de la Audiencia de Lima en el reinado de los borbones (1700–1821)*. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1974.

———, "Victorino Montero del Aguila y su 'Estado político del Reyno del Perú' (1742)," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 31 (1974), pp. 751–807.

Lucena Salmoral, Manuel, "Los diarios anónimos sobre el ataque de Vernon a Cartagena existentes en Colombia: Su correlación y posibles autores," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 30 (1973), pp. 337–469.

Lynch, John, *Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810: The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata*. London: Athlone Press, 1958.

———, *Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

———, *The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598–1700*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Malamud Rikles, Carlos Daniel, *Cádiz y Saint Malo en el comercio colonial peruano (1698–1725)*. Cadiz: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1986.

Marchena Fernández, Juan, *La institución militar en Cartagena de Indias en el siglo XVIII*. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1982.

Martínez Cardós, José, "Don José del Campillo y Cossío," *Revista de Indias* 30:122 (1970), pp. 503–42.

Martínez de Salinas Alonso, María Luisa, "Noticias del virrey conde de Superunda en el Archivo de la Diputación Foral de Álava," in Ronald Escobedo Mansilla et al (eds.), *Álava y América*. Vitoria-Gasteiz: Diputación Foral de Álava, 1996, pp. 351–64.

Martínez Shaw, Carlos, and Marina Alfonso Mola, *Felipe V*. Madrid: Arlanza, 2001.

Matilla Tascón, Antonio, *Historia de las minas de Almadén*, 2 vols. Madrid: Gráficas Osca, 1958–87.

Matta Rodríguez, Enrique de la, "La 'rebelión' de Diego de los Ríos: Una página inédita de la historia de Cartagena de Indias', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 31 (1974), pp. 955–71.

———, *El asalto de Pointis a Cartagena*. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1979.

McFarlane, Anthony, "The 'Rebellion of the Barrios': Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 69 (1989), pp. 283–330.

———, *Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society and Politics under Bourbon Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

———, "The Bourbon Century," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)*. Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 181–98.

McLachlan, Jean O., "The Seven Years' Peace and the West Indian Policy of Carvajal and Wall," *English Historical Review* 53 (1938), pp. 457–77.

———, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940.

Medina, José Toribio, *Las Monedas chilenas*. Santiago de Chile: El autor, 1902.

———, *Historia del Tribunal de la Inquisición de Lima (1569–1820)*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. Santiago de Chile: Fondo Histórico y Bibliográfico J. T. Medina, 1956.

Mena García, María del Carmen, "Santa Marta durante la guerra de sucesión española," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 36 (1979), pp. 569–702.

Mendiburu, Manuel de, *Diccionario histórico-biográfico del Perú,* 2nd ed., 11 vols. Lima: Enrique Palacios, 1931–48.

Mercader Riba, J., "La ordenación de Cataluña por Felipe V: La Nueva Planta," *Hispania* 11 (1951), pp. 257–366.

———, "Un organismo-piloto en la monarquía de Felipe V: La Superintendencia de Cataluña," *Hispania* 26 (1966), pp. 382–409, 526–78.

———, "Un organismo-piloto en la monarquía de Felipe V: La Superintendencia de Cataluña," *Hispania* 27 (1967), pp. 116–57, 354–76.

Merino, Luis, *Estudio crítico sobre las* Noticias Secretas de América *y el clero colonial (1720–1765).* Madrid: Graf. Jura, 1959.

Meza Villalobos, Néstor, "Felipe V y el problema ético-político de la provisión de mano de obra a la minería del Perú y Nuevo Reino de Granada," in *Estudios sobre política indigenista española en América,* 3 vols. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1975–77, vol. 2, pp. 313–43.

Michael, W., *England under George I: The Quadruple Alliance.* London: Macmillan, 1939.

Mijares Pérez, Lucío, "La permisión reglada de los repartimientos por los corregidores y alcaldes mayores," in *Estudios sobre política indigenista española en América,* 3 vols. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1975–77, vol. 3, pp. 99–105.

———, "Programa político para América del Marqués de la Ensenada," *Revista de Historia de América* (Mexico City) 81 (1976), pp. 82–130.

Molina Martínez, Miguel, *Antonio de Ulloa en Huancavelica.* Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1995.

Mora de Tovar, Gilma, *Aguardiente y conflictos sociales en la Nueva Granada, siglo XVIII.* Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1988.

Moreno Cebrián, Alfredo, "Análisis de la reforma en el ramo de alcabalas del Perú (1746)," *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 15–16 (1975), pp. 121–37.

———, "Venta y beneficios de los corregimientos peruanos," *Revista de Indias* 36:143–44 (1976), pp. 213–46.

———, *El corregidor de Indios y la economía peruana en el siglo XVIII.* Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1977.

———, *Relación y documentos de gobierno del Virrey del Perú, José Antonio Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (1745–1761).* Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1983.

———, *El virreinato del marqués de Castelfuerte, 1724–1736: El primer intento borbónico por reformar el Perú.* Madrid: Catriel, 2000.

———, "El regalismo borbónico frente al poder vaticano: Acerca del estado de la Iglesia en el Perú durante el primer tercio del siglo XVIII," *Revista de Indias* 63:227 (2003), pp. 223–74.

———, "Acumulación y blanqueo de capitales del marqués de Castelfuerte (1723–1763)," in Alfredo Moreno Cebrián and Núria Sala i Vila, *El 'premio' de ser virrey: Los intereses públicos y privados del gobierno virreinal en el Perú de Felipe V.* Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005, pp. 151–290.

Moreno Cebrián, Alfredo, and Nuria Sala i Vila, "Una aproximación a la corrupción política virreinal: La confusión entre lo público y lo privado en el Perú de Felipe V," *Histórica* (Lima) 29:1 (2005), pp. 69–105.

———, *El 'premio' de ser virrey: Los intereses públicos y privados del gobierno virreinal en el Perú de Felipe V.* Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005.

Moreyra y Paz-Soldán, Manuel, "La tesorería de la Casa de Moneda de Lima bajo juro de heredad y comprada por los Condes de San Juan de Lurigancho," *Revista Histórica* 15 (1942), pp. 106–42.

———, *El Tribunal del Consulado de Lima: Cuadernos de juntas,* 2 vols. Lima: Lumen, 1956–59.

———, *La Moneda colonial en el Perú*. Lima: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 1980.

Morineau, Michel, *Incroyables gazettes et fabuleuz métaux: Les retours des trésors américains d'aprés les gazettes hollandaises (XVIe-XVIIIe siecles).* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Muñoz Pérez, José, "Los proyectos sobre España e Indias en el siglo XVIII: El proyectismo como género," *Revista de Estudios Políticos* (Madrid) 81 (1955), pp. 169–95.

———, "El comercio de Indias bajo los Austrias y la crítica del proyectismo del XVIII," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 13 (1956), pp. 85–103.

———, "Ideas sobre comercio en el siglo XVIII," *Revista de Estudios Americanos* (Madrid) 19 (1960), pp. 47–66.

Navarro García, Luis, "Felipe V y el Consejo de Indias: El debate de las encomiendas," *Temas Americanistas* 3 (1983), pp. 5–11.

———, "El falso Campillo y el reformismo borbónico," *Temas Americanistas* (Seville) 12 (1995), pp. 10–31.

Nelson, George H., "Contraband Trade under the Asiento, 1700–1739," *American Historical Review* 51 (1945), pp. 55–67.

Nowell, Charles E., "The Defense of Cartagena," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 42 (1962), pp. 477–501.

Ochagavía Fernández, Diego, "El I Conde de Superunda," *Berceo: Boletín del Instituto de Estudios Riojanos* 16:58 (1961), pp. 5–48; 16:59 (1961), pp. 161–76; 16:60 (1961), pp. 321–32; 16:61 (1961), pp. 7–24; 17:63 (1962), pp. 171–72.

Olivas, Aaron Alejandro, "The Global Politics of the Transatlantic Slave Trade during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1700–1715," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759*). Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 85–109.

O'Phelan Godoy, Scarlett, *Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia, 1700–1783.* Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos "Bartolomé de las Casas," 1988.

Ones, Synnøve, "The Politics of Government in the Audiencia of New Granada, 1681–1719," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Warwick, 2000.

Ots Capdequi, José María, *Instituciones de gobierno del Nuevo Reino de Granada durante el siglo XVIII*. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1950.

Ovando Sanz, Guillermo, *La academia de minas de Potosí, 1757–1970*. La Paz: Banco Central de Bolivia / Academia Boliviana de Historia, 1975.

Palacio Atard, Vicente, "La incorporación a la Corona del Banco de Rescates de Potosí," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 2 (1945), pp. 723–37.

———, "La neutralidad vigilante y constructiva de Fernando VI," *Hispania* 36 (1975), pp. 301–20.

Palmer, Colin, *Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700–1739*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1981.

Paquette, Gabriel B., *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and Its Empire, 1759–1808*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

———, (ed.), *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.

Parrón Salas, Carmen, "Perú y la transición del *comercio político* al *comercio libre*, 1740–1778," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 54:2 (1997), pp. 447–73.

Parry, John H., *The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies under the Hapsburgs*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953.

———, *The Spanish Seaborne Empire*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973.

Pearce, Adrian J., "Early Bourbon Government in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1700–1759," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1998.

———, "Huancavelica 1700–1759: Administrative Reform of the Mercury Industry in Early Bourbon Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79:4 (November 1999), pp. 669–702.

———, "The Peruvian Population Census of 1725–1740," *Latin American Research Review* 36:3 (October 2001), pp. 69–104.

———, *British Trade with Spanish America, 1763–1808*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007.

Peralta Ruiz, Víctor, "Un indiano en la Corte de Madrid: Dionisio de Alsedo y Herrera y el *Memorial informativo* del Consulado de Lima de 1725," *Histórica* (Lima) 27:2 (2003), pp. 319–55.

———, "La política hacia América de Felipe V según la *Descripción de los Tiempos de España* (1763) de Dionisio de Alsedo y Herrera," in Agustín Guimerá and Víctor Peralta Ruiz (eds.), *El equilibrio de los imperios: De Utrecht a Trafalgar. Actas de la VIII Reunión Científica de la Fundación Española de Historia Moderna*. Madrid: Fundación Española de Historia Moderna, 2005, pp. 615–30.

———, *Patrones, clientes y amigos. El poder burocrático indiano en la España del siglo XVIII*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2006.

———, "Prensa y opinión palaciega: La *Gaceta de Lima* de Villagarcía a Superunda (1744–1751)," *Histórica* (Lima) 31:1 (2007), pp. 59–83.

Pérez Bustamante, C., "El reinado de Fernando VI en el reformismo español del siglo XVIII," *Revista de la Universidad de Madrid* 3 (1954), pp. 491–514.

Pérez Fernández-Turégano, Carlos, *Patiño y las reformas de la administración en el reinado de Felipe V.* Madrid: Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, 2006.

Pérez-Mallaina Bueno, Pablo E., *Política naval española en el Atlántico, 1700–1715.* Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1982.

———, *Retrato de una ciudad en crisis: La sociedad limeña ante el movimiento sísmico de 1746.* Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 2001.

Pérez-Mallaina Bueno, Pablo E., and Bibiano Torres Ramírez, *La Armada del Mar del Sur.* Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1987.

Pérez Villanueva, J. and B. Escandell Bonet (eds.), *Historia de la Inquisición en España y América,* 3 vols. Madrid: Centros de Estudios Inquisitoriales, 1984.

Phelan, John Leddy, *The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781.* Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.

Puente Brunke, José de la, "Política de la Corona en torno a las encomiendas peruanas (1670–1750)," *Histórica* 11 (1987), pp. 181–206.

Pulido Bueno, Ildefonso, *José Patiño: El inicio del gobierno político-económico ilustrado en España.* Huelva: Artes Gráficas Andaluzas, 1998.

Real Díaz, José Joaquín, "Las ferias de Jalapa," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 16 (1959), pp. 167–314.

Restall, Matthew and Kris Lane, *Latin America in Colonial Times.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Restrepo Tirado, Ernesto, *Gobernantes del Nuevo Reyno de Granada durante el siglo XVIII.* Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1934.

Robins, Nicholas A., *Mercury, Mining, and Empire: The Human and Ecological Cost of Colonial Silver Mining in the Andes.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.

Rodríguez Casado, Vicente, "La política del reformismo de los primeros borbones en la Marina de guerra española," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 25 (1968), pp. 601–18.

Rodríguez Lorenzo, Sergio M., *La Carrera de Indias (la ruta, los hombres, las mercancías).* Esles de Cayón: El Municipio, 2012.

Rodríguez Vicente, María Encarnación, *Economía, sociedad, y Real hacienda en las Indias españolas.* Madrid: Alhambra, 1987.

Rosenmüller, Christoph, "Assayers and Silver Merchants: The *visita* of 1729/1730 and the Reform of Mexican Coinage," *American Journal of Numismatics,* 2nd series, 16–17 (2005), pp. 179–93.

———, "Friends, Followers, Countrymen: Viceregal Patronage in Mid-Eighteenth Century New Spain," *Estudios de Historia Novohispana* 34 (2006), pp. 47–72.

———, *Patrons, Partisans, and Palace Intrigues: The Court Society of Colonial Mexico, 1702–1710*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2008.

———, "The Power of Transatlantic Ties: A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Mexico's Social Networks, 1700–1755," *Latin American Research Review* 44:2 (2009), pp. 8–36.

———, "'The Indians . . . Long for Change': The Secularization of Regular Parishes in Mid Eighteenth-Century New Spain," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)*. Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 143–63.

Ruiz Rivera, Julián B., "Patiño y la reforma del Consulado de Cádiz, 1729," *Temas Americanistas* (Seville) 5 (1985), pp. 16–21.

Saeger, James S., "Origins of the Rebellion of Paraguay," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 52 (1972), pp. 215–29.

———, "Clerical Politics in Eighteenth-Century Peru: The Trial of José de Antequera," *Journal of Church and State* 19:1 (1975), pp. 81–96.

———, "Institutional Rivalries, Jurisdictional Disputes, and Vested Interests in the Viceroyalty of Peru: José de Antequera and the Rebellion of Paraguay," *The Americas* 32 (1975), pp. 99–116.

Saenz de Santamaría, Carmelo, "La Compañía de comercio de Honduras, 1714–1717," *Revista de Indias* 40:159–62 (1980), pp. 129–57.

Sala i Vila, Núria, "La escenificación del poder: El marqués de Castelldosríus, primer virrey Borbón del Perú (1707–1710)," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 61:1 (January–June 2004), pp. 31–68.

———, "Una corona bien vale un virreinato: El marqués de Castelldosríus, primer virrey borbónico del Perú," in Alfredo Moreno Cebrián and Núria Sala i Vila, *El "premio" de ser virrey: Los intereses públicos y privados del gobierno virreinal en el Perú de Felipe V*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005, pp. 17–150.

Salvat Monguillot, M., "En torno a la fundacion de San Felipe el Real (1740)," *VI Congreso internacional de historia de América*, vol. 3, Buenos Aires, 1982, pp. 187–98.

Sánchez, Luis Alberto, *El Doctor Océano. Estudios sobre Don Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo*. Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1967.

Sánchez Bella, Ismael, *Iglesia y estado en la América española*. Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1990.

Sánchez Pedrote, Enrique, "Los prelados virreyes," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 7 (1950), pp. 211–53.

San Miguel Pérez, Enrique, *La instauración de la monarquía borbónica en España*. Madrid: Comunidad de Madrid, 2001.

Sarrablo Aguareles, Eugenio, *El conde de Fuenclara, embajador y virrey de Nueva España (1687–1752)*, 2 vols. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1955–66.

Sempat Assadourian, Carlos, *El sistema de la economía colonial. El mercado interior. Regiones y espacio económico*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982.

Sempat Assadourian, Carlos, et al., *Minería y espacio económico en los Andes: Siglos XVI–XX*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980.

Sorsby, Victoria G., "British Trade with Spanish America under the Asiento, 1713–1740," Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of London, 1975.

Stein, Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.

———, *Apogee of Empire: Spain and New Spain in the Age of Charles III, 1759–1789*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.

Stern, Steve J., "The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742–1782: A Reappraisal," in Steve J. Stern (ed.), *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1987, pp. 34–93.

Storrs, Christopher, "The Fallen Politician's Way Back In: Melchor de Macanaz as Spy and Secret Negotiator," in D. Szechi (ed.), *The Dangerous Trade. Spies, Spymasters and the Making of Europe*. Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2010, pp. 115–38.

———, "Felipe V: Caesura or Continuity?," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759)*. Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 9–21.

Tandeter, Enrique, "Forced and Free Labour in Late Colonial Potosí," *Past & Present* 93 (1981), pp. 98–136.

———, *Coercion and Market: Silver Mining in Colonial Potosí, 1692–1826*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1993.

Tejado Fernández, Manuel, "Cartagena, amenazada (datos para el estudio de las repercusiones en América de la Guerra de Sucesión (1701–1713)," *Revista de Indias* 11:43–4 (1951), pp. 179–92.

Temperley, Harold W. V., "The Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear (1730)," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 3rd series, 3 (1909), pp. 197–236.

Tepaske, John J. and Herbert S. Klein, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality?" *Past and Present* 90 (Februry 1981), pp.116–35.

Thompson, M. A., "Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* 5th series, 4 (1954), pp. 111–34.

Thurner, Mark, "The As-If of the Book of Kings: Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo's Colonial Poetics of History," *Latin American Research Review* 44:1 (2009), pp. 32–57.

Tomás y Valiente, Francisco, *Los validos en la monarquía española del siglo XVII*. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1963.

Torre Revello, José, "Un contrabandista del siglo XVII en el Río de la Plata," *Revista de Historia de América* (Mexico City) 45 (1958), pp. 121–30.

Tovar Velarde, Jorge, "La Audiencia de Lima (1706–1707). Dos años de gobierno criollo en el Perú," *Revista Histórica* 23 (1957–58), pp. 338–453.

Turiso Sebastián, Jesús, *Comerciantes españoles en la Lima borbónica: Anatomía de una élite de poder (1701–1761)*. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 2002.

Urbina Reyes, Elsa, "El Tribunal del Consulado de Chile," *Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia* 67 (1962), pp. 104–43.

Valcárcel, Carlos Daniel, "Perú borbónico y emancipación," *Revista de Historia de América* 50 (December 1960), pp. 315–438.

———, "Precedente separatista," Revista de Indias 26:103–4 (1966), pp. 127–31.

Vargas Ugarte, Rubén, *Historia de la Iglesia en el Perú,* 5 vols. Lima: Imprenta Santa María, 1953–62.

———, *Historia general del Perú,* 6 vols. Lima: Milla Batres, 1966.

Vásquez de Prada, Valentín, "Las rutas comerciales entre España y América en el siglo XVIII," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 25 (1968), pp. 197–241.

Vásquez Varela, Ainara, "Jorge de Villalonga's Entourage: Political Networking and Administrative Reform in Santa Fe (1717–1723)," in Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vásquez Varela (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700–1759*). Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 111–26.

Vicens Vives, Jaime (ed.), *Historia de España y América,* 2nd ed., 5 vols. Barcelona: n. pub., 1971.

Villalobos, Sergio R., "Contrabando francés en el Pacífico, 1700–1724," *Revista de Historia de América* (Mexico City) 51 (1961), pp. 49–80.

———, *Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata y Chile, 1700–1811.* Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria, 1965.

Vizcarra, Catalina, "Bourbon Intervention in the Peruvian Tobacco Industry, 1752–1813," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 39:3 (August 2007), pp. 567–93.

Voltes, Pedro, "Documentos sobre episodios del año 1706 en la Guerra de Sucesión," *Hispania* 49:173 (September–December 1989), pp. 1053–86.

Walker, Charles F., "The Upper Classes and Their Upper Stories: Architecture and the Aftermath of the Lima Earthquake of 1746," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 83:1 (February 2003), pp. 53–82.

———, "Civilize or Control? The Lingering Impact of the Bourbon Urban Reforms," in Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada (eds.), *Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750–1950.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005, pp. 74–95.

———, *Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru, and Its Long Aftermath.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008.

Walker, Geoffrey J., *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789.* London: Macmillan, 1979.

Whitaker, Arthur Preston, *The Huancavelica Mercury Mine: A Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance in the Spanish Empire.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1941.

Yalí Román, Alberto, "Sobre alcaldías mayores y corregimientos en Indias: Un ensayo de interpretación," *Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 9 (1972), pp. 1–39.

Zapatero, Juan Manuel, "El castillo Real Felipe del Callao," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 34 (1977), pp. 703–33.

Zavala, Silvio, *El servicio personal de los Indios en el Perú*, 3 vols. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978–80.

Zighelboim, Ari, "Un inca cuzqueño en la corte de Fernando VI: Estrategias personales y colectivas de las élites indias y mestizas hacia 1750," *Histórica* (Lima) 34:2 (2010), pp. 7–62.

Zudaire Huarte, Eulogio, *José de Armendáriz, Marqués de Castelfuerte y virrey del Perú*. Pamplona: Diputación Foral de Navarra, 1982.

Index