

# THE INDONESIAN GENOCIDE OF 1965

CAUSES, DYNAMICS AND LEGACIES

EDITED BY KATHARINE MCGREGOR,  
JESS MELVIN AND ANNIE POHLMAN



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Katharine McGregor · Jess Melvin  
Annie Pohlman  
Editors

# The Indonesian Genocide of 1965

Causes, Dynamics and Legacies

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**Map 1** Map of Indonesia. Source: Robert Cribb, *Digital Atlas of Indonesian History* (Copenhagen, NIAS Press, 2010), reproduced with permission

## PREFACE

It is now over half a century since the Indonesian genocide, one of the largest genocides of the twentieth century, yet research on this violence has only recently begun to intensify. This volume brings together Indonesian and foreign scholars to present new, highly original analyses of the causes, dynamics and legacies of this genocide through the use of a wide range of sources and different scholarly lenses.

This volume is a result of presentations made at the 2015 Indonesia Council Open Conference held at Deakin University in Geelong. First we would like to thank all the participants in our panels at this conference for joining with us to commemorate and reflect on the 50th anniversary of the 1965 genocide in Indonesia. Presenters came from around the world on their own funding to be with us. Secondly we would like to thank the contributors to this volume who offered their papers for publication and who have worked intensely with us to edit and develop their work. Thirdly we would like to thank the convenor of the 2015 Conference, Dr. Jemma Purdey, for supporting the initial conference theme and for writing an epilogue for this volume.

In the production of this ambitious, 17-chapter volume we have received assistance from several research assistants including Hannah Loney and Faye Chan. We have also received assistance in reviewing the volume from three external referees and one of our contributors, Dr. Ken Setiawan. We thank them all for the valuable insights and feedback. We are delighted that Alit Ambara (NobodyCorp) agreed to provide us with the cover image for this book.

Lastly we thank the team at Palgrave Macmillan (Emily Russell, Carmel Kennedy, Deborah Mayersen) for assisting us along the way with the production and finalization of the manuscript.



*The original version of the book was revised: The author name  
“Jemma Purdey” has been included in Table of Contents,  
Notes on Contributors and Epilogue.*

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# New Interpretations of the Causes, Dynamics and Legacies of the Indonesian Genocide

*Katharine McGregor, Jess Melvin and Annie Pohlman*

The mass violence which engulfed Indonesia from October 1965 was genocidal in nature.

The estimated 500,000–1,000,000 men, women and children who were killed during this mass violence died primarily because of their membership within a socio-political group; a group that was defined by the perpetrators of this violence as anyone deemed to be either a member of, or otherwise affiliated with, the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*,

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Indonesian Communist Party). These killings, which occurred at the height of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, were systematic in nature. They were led and coordinated by the Indonesian military leadership, with the intention of physically destroying the PKI as a political force and facilitating the military's rise to power.

Arguably, the Indonesian killings are the clearest case of genocide against a socio-political group in the twentieth century. These killings are not, however, generally understood as a case of genocide. The reason for this exclusion is twofold. First, the Indonesian killings have not, until recently, been understood as a case of state-sponsored violence. Instead, the killings have been explained as a result of spontaneous violence which arose out of Indonesian society as an organic response to the alleged evils of Communism. This interpretation, which was originally posited by the Indonesian military (Farid, 2005; Melvin, 2014; Roosa, 2016), was adopted by the United States, United Kingdom and Australian governments and mainstream media in these countries (Simpson, 2008; Tanter, 2013). This denial of military agency behind the killings was often accompanied by open support for the brutal military regime which came to power on the back of the killings, General Suharto's "New Order" (1965–1998). Suharto, *Time* magazine infamously declared in July 1966, was "the West's Best News for years in Asia". This interpretation was rarely critically questioned by the few Indonesia scholars in these countries who discussed the violence in the decades to follow (Crouch, 1978; Sundhaussen, 1982). Indeed, until very recently it was a matter of serious scholarly contention as to whether or not the military had ordered the killings as part of a national, centralized campaign (see, for example, Cribb, 2002).

Second, the Indonesian killings, when they have been recognized as the result of deliberate state policy, are not generally considered to meet the legal definition of genocide, as laid down in the 1948 United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide Convention"). This is because of the identity of those who were persecuted. Within both the international legal community and the field of comparative genocide studies, the term genocide has generally only applied when considering attempts to wipe out ethnic, racial, national or religious groups. This has led to a situation in which scholarly discussion about whether or not the Indonesian

killings constitute a case of genocide has focused almost exclusively on semantic debates related to the identity of its victims. As a result, some Indonesia and genocide scholars have concluded the Indonesian killings do not “in legal terms” constitute a case of genocide, specifically because the killings were “political” and not based on ethnic, racial or religious bias (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003, pp. 46–47; see also Cribb & Coppel, 2009).<sup>1</sup> This interpretation is at odds with certain legal scholars who argue there is no legal or moral justification for excluding political groups from protection under the Genocide Convention (van Schaack, 1997; Weiss-Wendt, 2005).

Building on the pioneering work of Robert Cribb, who was amongst the first scholars to investigate the killings in greater detail, this volume seeks to reposition current understandings of the Indonesian killings within the field of comparative genocide studies. In doing so, it draws on work particularly from younger scholars of Indonesia that represents a new wave in the study of the killings. This new generation has grown up outside the shadow of the Cold War; a distance that has allowed a new, less ideologically charged, perspective of events. Indeed, key early studies in this new wave of scholarship have been critical not only of official Indonesian propaganda accounts that have sought to justify the violence (McGregor, 2007; Roosa, 2006), but of the role of the US and its allies in encouraging and facilitating this violence (Simpson, 2008; Wardaya, 2008). They have also uncovered new evidence of the specific patterns in the violence across different regions of Indonesia (Ahmad, 2008; Kammen & McGregor, 2012).

This new generation of scholars has also been inspired by and directly benefited from the new democratic space that has opened up in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998. Survivors of the killings are today more free to speak openly about their experiences and this has enabled previously unthinkable interactions between survivors, researchers and human rights activists. Indeed, a key motivation of this new generation of scholars has been to capture the stories of survivors as this older generation ages before their experiences are lost. Through the use of oral history methods in particular, scholars and activists have sought to record and draw meanings from the stories of survivors (examples of which include: Hutabarat, 2012; Kolimon, Wetangterah, & Campbell-Nelson, 2015; Roosa, Ratih, & Farid, 2004; Sukanta, 2013; Wieringa, 2002).

More recently, perpetrators have also begun to offer accounts of how they participated in the killings and at whose direction. These accounts build on the success of Joshua Oppenheimer's first award-winning film on the topic of the genocide, *The Act of Killing* (2012), which features the self-incriminating testimony of former death squad leaders who actively participated in the killings in Medan, North Sumatra. This documentary in turn spurred a leading Indonesian popular publication, *Tempo*, to run a special edition of the magazine dedicated to perpetrator accounts (Tim Laporan Khusus Tempo, 2013). These accounts have made it increasingly difficult for the Indonesian state to continue to deny military agency behind the killings (see also, Kurniawan, 2013). The recent discovery of previously classified internal documents produced by the Indonesian military and government during the time of the genocide, meanwhile, has driven the final nail into the myth of military non-agency behind the killings (Melvin, 2014). These documents prove, using the military's own words, that the genocide was perpetrated as a deliberate nationwide campaign intended to destroy an entire human group, the Communist party and its supporters.

This new evidence and more open accounts from survivors and perpetrators have enabled this emerging generation of scholars to extend on previous studies emphasizing the regional dimensions of the killings. These scholars have built on these earlier studies to examine more systematic patterns in the violence across the archipelago, as well as to examine how Indonesians have lived with the legacies of the genocide. They have also led to a fundamental reassessment of what is now "knowable" about the Indonesian killings (Roosa, 2013). Of the two major "unresolved problems" identified by Robert Cribb in 2002 as gaps in scholarly understandings of the events of 1965–1966—namely the question of agency behind the killings and the number of victims killed—only the second question can today be regarded as "unresolved" (Cribb, 2002). Coupled with renewed attempts within Indonesia to seek justice for victims of the killings (see Evanty & Pohlman, this volume; Wahyuningroem, this volume), there is reason to believe that the next few years will see even further advances in the struggle to achieve truth and justice for victims and survivors of the Indonesian genocide.

Critically, these new perspectives on the Indonesian killings reflect a general turn in comparative genocide studies which has moved away from sharp legalistic interpretations of genocide (as per the definition of the crime in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention) to consider the broader



sociological processes which underpin genocidal events. As discussed in greater depth by Jess Melvin and Annie Pohlman in Chapter 2 of this volume, part of this turn has been a result of dissatisfaction with the enduring debates and disagreements within the field; many of these debates hinging on the omission of a number of key categories of human groups (particularly political groups) and types of violence, as well as the ambiguities and uncertainties embedded in the interpretations of intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a human group (Greenawalt, 1999; Shaw, 2015; Short, 2010).

This does not mean, however, that scholars of the Indonesian genocide have abandoned the 1948 Genocide Convention and the mechanism that it provides to access the international justice system. The main difficulty in applying the Convention to the Indonesian case has been demonstrating that the 1965–1966 killings satisfy its strict definitional requirements. According to this definition, which has also been adopted by the International Criminal Court, the crime of genocide is defined as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious group” (Article II, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948). As noted above, this has led to confusion as to whether the victims of the 1965–1966 killings constitute a protected group under the Convention. While it is clear the PKI was targeted as a political group during the killings, this is not the full story.

Prosecutors at the recent International Peoples Tribunal, a non-legally binding investigation into the 1965–1966 killings held in 2015–2016, have controversially recommended further investigation into whether the PKI constituted a part of the “Indonesian national group”: a potentially protected target group under the Convention (IPT, 2016). It has also been argued that the targeting of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese community during the killings constitutes genocide as specified by the Convention (Melvin, 2013). More recently, Melvin has uncovered evidence the Indonesian army deliberately portrayed its genocidal attack against the PKI as a Holy War (Melvin, 2018). Through this process, which was designed to both justify the violence and disguise the army’s own central role in the violence, the PKI and the broader group of individuals targeted for extermination by the army were identified and targeted as “atheists” (Melvin, 2018), a protected sub-group of religious groups under the Convention (Lippman, 1994; Nersessian, 2010; see also Schabas, 2000). The question of whether or not the Indonesian killings constitute a case of genocide as defined by the Convention remains an active and ongoing debate within scholarship into the 1965–1966 killings, and is addressed in the following chapter (Melvin & Pohlman, this volume).

The chapters found in this volume were originally presented at the Indonesia Council Open Conference held in Geelong, Victoria, Australia, in July 2015 as a form of scholarly recognition of the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the massacres. The contributors approach these events from a wide range of disciplines, including anthropological, historical, socio-political and legal interpretations, in order to explore their causes and impacts, and the long-lasting effects of this violence on Indonesian society. Between them, the authors cover the dynamics of the killings broadly to consider, amongst other topics: the effects of societal and political tensions in different parts of Indonesia during the lead up to 1 October 1965 and the impacts these tensions had on the dynamics of local killings; the roles played and responses made by various institutions, both religious and state, in the killings; and, crucially, the interaction between military and civilian perpetrators in carrying out the killings and mass arrests of suspected Communists. The contributors also weigh the immediate and long-lasting impacts of the killings to examine how families and especially children have coped with the violence and its effects; examine attempts made to memorialize and commemorate the dead through artistic representations of the violence; and reflect on the legacies of anti-Communist discourse in contemporary Indonesia. The possibilities for redress and reconciliation for these events in contemporary Indonesia are also debated.

In presenting the killings from this multi-angled approach, this volume focuses on the unique Indonesian context of the genocide and its impact on Indonesian society. It also has much to contribute to understandings of and contemporary debates within comparative genocide studies. It does so, first, by offering in-depth coverage of the Indonesian case for comparative analysis. The processes of genocidal violence described and examined in this volume are striking in their similarity to other cases of genocide cross-culturally. The dynamics of military-civilian participation in the massacres and arrests, the mass mobilization and deployment of perpetrators, the incitement of civilian participation through propaganda, and the ongoing use of particular forms of violence, including sexual enslavement and forced labour, are all issues of direct comparative relevance for scholars examining genocides in other contexts.

The volume also contributes directly to contemporary understandings of genocide by broadening the field to include the 1965 case. The Indonesian genocide, which effectively wiped out not only the mass-supported Indonesian Communist Party but also the Left more broadly

within the Indonesian polity, stands as one of the few cases, certainly within the modern historical context, whereby a socio-political group was eliminated, as such. With the exception of the work of Cribb (see especially 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2010), and then later Pohlman (2014, 2015) and Melvin (2013, 2014), who have argued for the inclusion of the Indonesian case in this field, these events in Indonesia have, for the most part, been overlooked by scholars in comparative genocide studies. Meanwhile, the few comparative genocide volumes that have included the Indonesian killings have tended to portray the Indonesian case as an example of stand-alone mass killings (see, for example, Dwyer & Santikarma, 2007; Pohlman, 2012; Rafter, 2016). This volume seeks to help to remedy this oversight by presenting a case in Chapter 2 for why the Indonesian killings should be understood as genocide, while offering a deeper understanding of the social and political dynamics within the Indonesia case and examining the broad range of responses from individuals, communities and organizations to these events in Indonesian society. The following section will provide a background and overview of the Indonesian case.

### WARNING SIGNS OF GENOCIDE: THE SUKARNO YEARS

The years prior to the genocide in Indonesia were turbulent. These years, with the benefit of hindsight, saw the development and exacerbation of many of the “risk factors” for genocide, including severe socio-political cleavages in society and increasingly disastrous economic conditions (McLoughlin & Maysersen, 2013). After gaining independence from the Dutch in 1945, the new Republic of Indonesia began with a period of parliamentary democracy. The country’s first general election in 1955 saw wide-ranging debates about what kind of nation Indonesia would become: nationalist, religious, Communist and socialist ideas competed for how best to achieve prosperity and modernity (McVey, 1994). By the end of the 1950s, however, the country’s first President, Sukarno, had replaced the democratic system with an authoritarian form of governance which he termed “Guided Democracy”. This form of governance enabled the rise and entrenchment of the Indonesian Armed Forces into civilian governance (Lev, 1966).

Economically during this period, Indonesia faced impending crisis. Already depressed from years of war, Indonesia’s economy in the 1950s declined rapidly, both due to poor economic planning under Sukarno

and the heavy debt repayment obligations placed on the new nation by the Dutch as the price of independence. By the mid-1960s, many saw Indonesia's economic prospects in apocalyptic terms: the threat of mass starvation, poor rice production and three-digit levels of inflation were predicted to prolong the country's economic stagnation and drive the majority of the population into even deeper levels of poverty (Fox, 2002; Mackie, 1964).

Existing socio-political cleavages in society also worsened under Guided Democracy. By the early 1960s, Indonesian society was undergoing a process described by Robert Cribb as political "pillarization", whereby the polity became divided between three "streams": Islamic, Communist and a group described by Cribb as the "developmentalists". This last group advocated for a continuation of the capitalist policies from during the colonial era, which they argued would now benefit Indonesians rather than the Dutch (Cribb, 2001a). This developmentalist stream found its largest base amongst Dutch-educated professionals and, over time, became more closely associated with nationalist groups and the Indonesian Army. Meanwhile, the Islamic stream was popular among land owners and local elites. It also competed with the PKI for influence within Indonesia's peasant population (Hefner, 2000). By contrast, the Communist stream drew its largest membership from amongst Indonesia's large peasant population. It was also popular with plantation workers and unionized transportation workers, teachers and artists.

Each of these three streams had its own political parties, along with a vast array of social and cultural institutions and organizations. From the early 1960s until the beginning of the genocide in late 1965, this pillarization grew steadily more pronounced, with each stream seeing itself as the rightful heir to the Indonesian state. Deep enmities developed between the three streams. The most significant cleavage was, however, between the military and the PKI, who vied for influence at both national and local levels (Crouch, 1978). This process of pillarization cannot, by itself, explain why the genocide occurred. The killings were not an inevitable outcome of intense political competition; they were the intended outcome of a deliberate campaign launched by the military to physically annihilate its political enemies. These socio-political cleavages in the Indonesian polity in the period prior to the killings, however, help to explain the scope of the killings, which went far beyond the targeting of PKI cadre. It was not just "members of the PKI" who were targeted, but rather "Communists" as an established socio-political group.

The events in Indonesia also need to be understood in the global context of the Cold War. By the mid-1960s, the PKI had emerged as the largest Communist party in the world outside the Soviet Bloc and mainland China. The party claimed 3.5 million members but, more importantly, it also had a mass support base of more than 20 million others (Mortimer, 1974, p. 366).<sup>2</sup> These additional members were part of the PKI's official youth wing (*Pemuda Rakyat*, People's Youth) as well as its many affiliated organizations, including a peasant's association (BTI, *Barisan Tani Indonesia*), a trade union confederation (SOBSI, *Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*) and a large artists' organization (LEKRA, *Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat*). The PKI's claimed membership also included organizations which were not officially affiliated to the party, but which enjoyed strong ties with the organization, particularly the mass-supported Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*, Indonesian Women's Movement) and Baperki (*Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia*, Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship), an ethnic Chinese organization set up in the 1950s (Purdey, 2003). Communist supporters thus made up approximately one quarter of Indonesia's estimated 100 million population at the time (Manning, 1998). The large size of the party and its growing popularity attracted the attention of Western nations who, subscribing to the so-called domino theory, feared that following China's embrace of Communism in 1949, successive countries would "fall" to the Communist Bloc. This fear was especially heightened in Southeast Asia, then a major theatre of the Cold War. The conflict in Viet Nam had escalated from June 1965 when, despite massive troop deployment, the United States seemed unable to make considerable headway. Further to this, Western nations feared that the loss of Indonesia to the Communist world would jeopardize their economic interests. Indonesia was a large, resource-rich country located on important shipping lines that was close to Australia and to British interests in Singapore (Easter, 2004; Simpson, 2008).

The PKI had also developed strong ties with President Sukarno who was himself making overtures to Communist countries in the region. President Sukarno, a self-declared Marxist, had courted both Western and Soviet aid until the early 1960s when he began to lean increasingly towards Communist China as the most suited model for Indonesia to follow. From 1963 he began to speak about setting up a PKI-supported Jakarta-Peking axis, which greatly concerned Western and neighbouring anti-Communist countries (Brackman, 1969).

Meanwhile, although Sukarno managed to secure Western support for the so-called return of West Irian (West Papua) in August 1962, following a year-long military campaign against Dutch attempts to retain the territory, he secured very little support for his next campaign of opposition to the new nation of Malaysia; known within Indonesia as the “Crush Malaysia” (*Ganyang Malaysia*) campaign and outside Indonesia as “Confrontation” (*Konfrontasi*). Throughout this campaign, which had originally been supported by the PKI, Indonesians engaged in mass mobilization and military training, ostensibly in order to prepare for a war with the British. This escalation resulted in border skirmishes and became a significant drain on British military resources. It also caused distrust of both Sukarno and the PKI to mount in the West (Easter, 2004). In response, Western countries, especially the United States, courted anti-Communist members of the Army for training in the United States and tried to foster support for any moves that could be made to weaken the President and the PKI (Simpson, 2008).

Non-Communist groups within Indonesia also feared the PKI’s mass support base, which was particularly strong amongst large sections of Indonesia’s poor. For years, the PKI and armed forces had warily circled each other with mutual mistrust. The *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign, however, brought these simmering tensions to boiling point as the military came to suspect that the PKI intended to use the campaign to challenge the military’s monopoly over armed force (Melvin, 2014). Meanwhile, these tensions were further exacerbated by the declining health of Sukarno, who appeared to be the only one capable of controlling these two opposing forces (van der Kroef, 1968). Tensions between Communist supporters and some parts of the Islamic community also rose, particularly in parts of Central Java, where the PKI-supported land-reform movements (known as *aksi sepihak*) had provoked anger amongst more politically conservative, and land-rich, religious groups (Fealy & McGregor, 2010). The military used the Crush Malaysia campaign to prepare civilians for a move against the PKI (see Melvin, this volume). It was against this backdrop of long-simmering tensions and disastrous economic conditions that the fateful coup attempt occurred.

## TIPPING POINT FOR GENOCIDE: 1 OCTOBER 1965 AND INCITEMENT THROUGH PROPAGANDA

A poorly planned and executed attempted coup during the early hours of 1 October 1965 in the country's capital, Jakarta, was the trigger that led to the annihilation of the PKI and the establishment of a new military government in Indonesia, General Suharto's New Order regime. The coup attempt involved the kidnapping and assassination of six top generals and one general's aide by a group of Leftist-leaning soldiers calling themselves the "30 September Movement" (*Gerakan 30 September*). Five decades on, questions remain regarding who was involved in plotting this coup attempt, and whether indeed it was intended as a coup or as an action aimed at alerting Sukarno of what the group's members understood to be an imminent military coup. Questions also remain about who was involved, and how this relatively small-scale event led so quickly to a full-scale counterattack by the military that would, in turn, escalate into genocide (Roosa, 2006). What is clear is that the military leadership used the Movement's failed coup attempt to move against its main political rival, the PKI. Indeed, it has been argued, the military leadership's actions during the morning of 1 October 1965 constituted the true coup (Melvin, 2014; Wieringa, 2002). The remaining upper echelons of the military, under the command of General Suharto, who was in charge of the Jakarta-based Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), swiftly put down the 30 September Movement and then mobilized to seize control of the state. As examined in Melvin's chapter (this volume), the military leadership used the actions of the 30 September Movement as the pretext to launch its long-term plan to seize state power, which it initiated on 1 October through the activation of Operation "*Berdikari*".

The elaborate propaganda campaign that began in the days after 1 October was created and disseminated by the Indonesian Army and was a critical causal element in the incitement of civilian participation in the genocide (Cribb, 2001a; Kammen & McGregor, 2012; Pohlman, 2014). As many researchers have shown, the role of hate propaganda is often seen as a *sine qua non* in the build-up and prolonging of genocide and other mass human rights abuses (e.g. Kuper, 1981; Staub, 1992). Spread by newsprint and radio across the country, this propaganda blamed the actions of the 30 September Movement on the PKI and used deeply dehumanizing language to depict Communist supporters as dangerous internal enemies of the Indonesian people who had to be eliminated (Drakeley, 2007; Henry, 2014).

Central to this propaganda were entirely false stories that Communist supporters and, in particular, women who were members of the mass organization Gerwani, had carried out sexually perverted acts as part of the attempted coup, all of which were seen as evidence of the PKI's alleged immorality and savagery (Drakeley, 2007; Wieringa, 1998). These stories were reinforced with warnings and other elaborate lies. These included claims that the PKI had secretly been planning to take over the country and kill non-Communist supporters: false reports of weapons hoards and graves allegedly having been dug for the bodies of non-Communists all supported the allegations that Communists posed an imminent threat to society. The consequence of this propaganda was that it created the appearance of the PKI as a dangerous enemy (Cribb, 2001a; Drakeley, 2007). This, in turn, incited widespread civilian participation in the anti-Communist violence that was underway by mid-October and continued at frantic pace for the following six months, resulting in the murder of an estimated 500,000–1,000,000 men, women and children (Cribb, 1990, p. 12). This participation was not, however, fully voluntary. As recently discovered military documents from the time of the genocide demonstrate, civilian participation in the killings was explicitly ordered by the Army (Melvin, 2014).

### THE GENOCIDE CARRIED OUT: MASS ARRESTS AND MASS KILLINGS

The estimates for how many died during the mass violence that began in October 1965 range from as low as 78,000 to higher than 3,000,000 (Cribb, 1990, pp. 11–14). In most contemporary analyses of these events, academics estimate a figure of 500,000 dead (Cribb, 2001b; Kammen & McGregor, 2012, p. 10), and it remains unlikely that a more exact death toll will be possible without considerable further research. The number of people detained in the mass arrests is also unknown, although estimates range from approximately 500,000 to more than 1,500,000 (Amnesty International, 1985; van der Kroef, 1976, p. 643). These waves of extra-legal mass arrests began in early October as the Army, with civilian participation, rounded up and detained hundreds of thousands of people for their alleged “direct or indirect involvement” in the 30 September Movement's coup attempt (Tapol, 1976, p. 1). These mass arrests continued well after the pace of the massacres had abated by mid-1966, with various “clean up” operations of suspected “Communist elements”



continuing through until at least 1970 (Fealy, 1995; van der Kroef, 1970). The majority of those arrested, known as *tapol* (an abbreviation of *tahanan politik* or “political prisoner”), were detained unlawfully without trial and held in prisons, army barracks and guard posts, and in a vast array of ad hoc detention centres that had been established as more and more detainees were rounded up. Many were subjected to interrogation, torture, starvation and forced labour in overcrowded, unsanitary and inhumane conditions (Southwood & Flanagan, 1983).

Those killed and arrested following the Army’s seizure of state power were primarily those connected with the PKI or one of its associated organizations. This connection could be based on an individual’s membership within one of these organizations, such as LEKRA, the BTI or Gerwani, but this connection could also be established through guilt by association. Individuals who were related to or associates of members were also often made targets, such as neighbours, friends or business partners. The children of targeted individuals were also not immune. In some cases, people were arrested or killed through cases of mistaken identity or else were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. There were also some cases of opportunistic violence against individuals due to rivalries or prior disputes, whereby victims were named as PKI suspects and therefore killed or imprisoned (see Cribb, 1990; Pohlman, 2015). Members of Indonesia’s Chinese community were also targeted in this way. Ethnic Chinese members of the PKI were targeted, as were members of Baperki, alongside indigenous Indonesian Communists. As this violence escalated such distinctions became theoretical and ethnic Chinese in general came under attack (Melvin, 2013; see also Tsai & Kammen, 2012).

Patterns for how the killings and mass arrests were carried out vary widely across the Indonesian archipelago. The timing of when the violence began ranges from early October in places such as Aceh in Sumatra’s north (Melvin, 2014) to as late as December 1965 in parts of eastern Indonesia (Lamasitudju, 2014). The majority of the killings were carried out between October 1965 and March 1966. In some areas, however, the killings continued for much longer; one example being the Army’s “*Trisula*” Operation, which was aimed at wiping out Communist remnants in 1968 in parts of South Blitar, East Java (Hearman, 2012).

How victims were killed also varied. There are some reported cases of whole families and communities of villagers being massacred in direct attacks by soldiers and militias, though these seem to have been

uncommon (Roosa, 2006, p. 31; Young, 1990, p. 89). In general, the types of killings implemented fall into two main categories; public killings, which were recorded by the military and often implemented by civilians acting under the leadership of the military; and systematic mass killings carried out at military-controlled killing sites (Melvin, 2014). The majority of deaths occurred at military-controlled killing sites, with the often secretive nature of these executions limiting the number of witnesses. For many victims, death was preceded by capture. Some victims were “called” (*diapel*) to report to the local military command post while others were captured after the arrival of soldiers or militia to the area who then hunted down suspected PKI supporters. Sometimes family members simply disappeared or went into hiding, never to be seen again. Once in detention, the outcome for many detainees was torture and mistreatment followed either by removal and execution in a remote place, or else by months if not years of imprisonment. Sometimes this process happened very swiftly: suspected PKI supporters would be rounded up from a particular area, spend only a few hours or days in an ad hoc detention centre or military post, then be taken to a nearby site that was convenient for the disposal of many bodies, and executed *en masse* (Kammen & McGregor, 2012; McGregor, 2009; Melvin, 2014; Roosa, 2006).

The killings and arrests were perpetrated by the Indonesian Army and civilians drawn from mostly religious and nationalist organizations opposed to the PKI. General Suharto, as head of the Jakarta-based Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad), responded first to the 30 September Movement’s coup and took over command of the Army effectively from 1 October. This was a position that he augmented within his seizure of control over the Kolaga command in Sumatra, where he established *de facto* martial law from 1 October (Melvin, 2014). Within days, Suharto had established a new strategic organization, the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB). This new Command gave him and his clique within the Army’s hierarchy power over the entire armed forces and, as time went on, over much of the civilian government structure as well (Crouch, 1978; Melvin, 2014; Southwood & Flanagan, 1983). Suharto tasked a Special Forces unit, the red beret paratrooper unit RPKAD, with organising the massacres in Java and Bali. RPKAD, led by Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, began this task when they were sent into Central and East Java provinces in October, where they recruited, trained and then worked closely with civilian militias to capture and kill suspected PKI members (Jenkins & Kammen, 2012; McGregor, 2013).

Military and civilian actors cooperated in wiping out suspected Communists across Indonesia under the leadership of Army guidance. Overall and command responsibility for the genocide lies with the Indonesian Army, though this does not lessen the criminal liability of the many civilians who took active roles in hunting down and murdering half a million of their fellow countrymen and women, and unlawfully imprisoning many more. Of the civilian militias involved in the killings and mass arrests, there were several notorious groups. Banser, a paramilitary brigade set up by one of Indonesia's largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), began hunting down PKI members by the second week of October in parts of East Java. Working under the direction of the Army and local Islamic preachers, or *ulama*, killings by Banser members spread across large parts of Java (Fealy & McGregor, 2010, 2012). In each region of Indonesia such groups were established, such as the *Tameng*, mobile killings squads made up of mostly thugs associated with the PNI (*Partai Nasionalis Indonesia*, Indonesian Nationalist Party) in Bali (Robinson, 1995), and the various Protestant and Catholic student groups who took part in the killings in the south-eastern island province of East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) (Farram, 2010). In North Sumatra, the military coordinated its anti-Communist death squads under the umbrella of the *Komando Aksi* (Oppenheimer, 2004). All of these groups had at least some contact with the Indonesian Army in coordinating and carrying out the killings and arrests. Evidence of this coordination has been found in the form of military documents recovered from Aceh, which detail military support for the establishment of anti-Communist death squads, and record the transfer of material support, including rifles and machine guns, to these groups for the explicit purpose of assisting the military in its annihilation of alleged Communists (Melvin, 2014).

The Indonesian genocide took place in the context of a military takeover of the Indonesian state by Major General Suharto. It resulted in a complete reorientation of Indonesian society and the rise of a military dominated regime self-labelled the New Order. The anti-Communist leadership of the Army was assisted during the genocide by Western supporters with arms and equipment, and encouraged by means of direct communication and assistance with propaganda especially from the United States, Britain and Australia to carry out a thorough purge of leftist groups in society (Simpson, 2008). Recent studies have also highlighted the complicity or indifference of the governments of European

countries and of the Soviet Union to the attack on the PKI and its affiliates in Indonesia due in large part to the party's decision to side with Communist China (see Schaefer & Wardaya, 2013). The new military-led regime was welcomed onto the political stage by Western countries and negotiations soon began between leaders of these countries and the new military leaders and technocrats of Indonesia to restore foreign access to Indonesian markets (Simpson, 2008).

## PART I: NEW EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND INTERPRETATIONS

Part I of this volume brings together new empirical research into the genocide and new understandings of how this violence should be interpreted. It reflects on why such widespread violence was able to occur, local contributing factors to the intensity of this violence, and the role of the military in instigating and coordinating this violence. These chapters provide analyses of how the genocide affected Indonesia's social structures and the lasting impacts of this period for survivors. In doing so, the authors in the opening chapters take up questions that remain insufficiently answered in studies of the violence so far, such as: the extent to which the Army was planning for a confrontation with the PKI pre-1965; the role of regional Army divisions outside Java in the 30 September Movement; survivors' reflections on the contribution of local tensions raised due to land reform on the violence; and survivor accounts of the Army's systematic use of sexual violence against women and girls.

The first chapter of Part I, Chapter 3 by Jess Melvin, argues the role of the military in initiating and implementing the Indonesian genocide is greater than it has previously been possible to demonstrate. Melvin uses internal government and military documents to demonstrate the Army leadership's attack against the PKI began as an aggressive attack, conceived of from 1 October 1965 as a means of seizing state power and physically annihilating the Army's political enemies.

Chapter 4 by Akihisa Matsuno draws upon new oral history interviews and the re-interpretation of military trial records to produce a detailed account of the actions of the 30 September Movement in Bali. Matsuno proposes the disorganized and, at times, seemingly improvised nature of the Movement's actions in that province support John Roosa's contention that a major contributing factor to the failure of the Movement nationally was its lack of central coordination (Roosa, 2006). The Army's subsequent response, however, was coordinated. Together the two

chapters by Melvin and Matsuno, based on case studies from the outer islands of Sumatra and Bali, add important insights into the actions of the Indonesian Army before and during the immediate aftermath of 1 October 1965.

Chapters 5 and 6 draw on oral history interviews with survivors and participants in the violence to expand our understanding of how the genocide was comprehended and experienced by those who lived through it. In Chapter 5, Roro Sawita draws on interviews with survivors and eye-witnesses of the genocide in Bali to propose that the issue of land reform contributed significantly to the intensity of mass killings in that province. During 1965–1966, Sawita argues, those opposed to land reform used anti-PKI sentiment to settle scores and ensure their continued control over their land. The scale of violence in Bali, however, would not have been possible without the arrival of RPKAD forces in the province in December 1965.

Annie Pohlman in Chapter 6 draws from her extensive original oral history interviews with women survivors from West Sumatra to provide new empirical evidence of the deliberate way in which sexual violence was systematically perpetrated against women and girls during the genocide. Pohlman focuses specifically on two women's accounts about their experiences of sex-selective and gendered forms of violence to argue that, as in other cases of genocidal violence, Indonesian women experienced unique forms of violence based on their identity as women. Taken together, these two chapters provide new insight into how violence was coordinated at the local level in two provinces of Indonesia.

The second half of Part I focuses on the impact of the genocide on Indonesia's social structures. The chapters here use different lenses from anthropology and history to assess changing social structures across the realms of the performing arts and institutions of higher education and religion. Robbie Peters in Chapter 7 presents an anthropological view of how the genocide might be interpreted as a social phenomenon. Drawing on the work of anthropologist James Peacock, who studied the subversive nature of *ludruk* clown dramas in Surabaya during the 1960s, Peters observes that the PKI, like the character of the *ludruk* clown, was understood as both a symptom of modernization and as a potentially unsettling outsider that threatened to overturn tradition.

One goal of genocidal violence is to engage in a project of remaking society. Using an historical approach in Chapter 8, Abdul Wahid charts how the prominent Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta transitioned

from being a revolutionary campus to a site of violence during the purge of both staff and students on the political left. He explores the conditions on campus and the direction of education just before, during and after the political turmoil. Based on first-hand sources of information and new oral history interviews, the chapter analyses how Suharto's anti-Communist campaigns have disrupted and changed the academic life of Indonesian universities, as well as the legacies of New Order era policies that remain in effect at present day universities in that country.

Vannessa Hearman in Chapter 9 reflects on another response to the genocide, that of religious conversion. In the aftermath of the killings, Hearman explains, conversion to Christianity was observed in Javanese communities that had been affected by the violence, as well as in prisons. The New Order regime required citizens to identify as belonging to several permissible religions. But, what was the reason, beyond this requirement, for survivors and former political prisoners to take up Christian religions in a vastly Muslim area? This chapter analyses the changing relationship between religious organizations and the political Left in Indonesia before, during and after the violence and explores the reasons, both pragmatic and spiritual, that led political prisoners to take up Christian religions in a period of flux and dramatic change.

## PART II: LEGACIES OF THE INDONESIAN GENOCIDE

Part II reflects on the legacies of the 1965 genocide with a particular focus on living with, understanding and memorializing this violent past. These chapters examine intergenerational and family memory, the enduring effects of the violence and efforts to achieve justice for survivors. Beyond imprisonment, former political prisoners and their families and the families of those killed continued to face ongoing formal and social persecution as persons stigmatized as national traitors. The continued stigmatization of alleged Communists and their families was a product of the relentless propagation of anti-Communism for the duration of the New Order regime and beyond.

The first chapter in Part II, Chapter 10 by Andrew Conroe, charts how children and grandchildren of those killed or imprisoned in the genocide were viewed with suspicion by the New Order government and more broadly in society in terms of the possibility they would eventually seek revenge for their parents' suffering. Based on fieldwork in Yogyakarta he analyses how children have approached their parents' pasts differently.

Many are intensely curious about their parents' and grandparents' past, perhaps especially because their experiences have been repressed or erased in mainstream history teaching and history books.

Chapters 11 and 12 by Ken Setiawan and Katharine McGregor take up the theme of second-generation memory and memorialization of the 1965 violence. In Chapter 11 Ken Setiawan reflects on how sites of memory of camaraderie in the camp and/or of places of terror potentially allow the articulation of previously unshared memories of imprisonment amongst fellow prisoners and family members. The observations shared in this chapter are based on her 2015 visit to the island with her father Hersri Setiawan captured in the film *Pulau Buru Tanah Air Beta* directed by Rahung Nasution (2016). She examines how former prisoners remember their experiences and those of fellow prisoners in the camp after a very long absence from the island.

Despite the existence of hundreds of mass graves across Indonesia, only a handful have been marked out, usually with very modest signposts, largely due again to ongoing caution with regard to memorialization of those who suffered in 1965 and ongoing stigmatization of those who died (McGregor, 2012; van Klinken, 2016). It is therefore quite remarkable that the only memorial in the world to all those who died in the 1965 Indonesian genocide is located in the sculpture garden of the National Gallery of Australia. In Chapter 12 Katharine McGregor examines how this transcultural Australian memorial, produced by Indonesian-born artist Dadang Christanto, whose father disappeared in 1965, came about and how it connects the histories of the two countries.

Chapters 13 and 14 by Marianna Lis and Ana Dragojlovic examine how the different artistic mediums of puppetry and film have been used to communicate some of the legacies of the genocide with audiences and some responses to these initiatives. Lis traces the story of why and how young artists in the Yogyakarta based Papermoon Puppet Theatre took up the theme of 1965 in two of their performances. Her chapter helps illustrate the curiosity that many young Indonesians have concerning the history of 1965, which they do not feel they have much information about. Indeed, this curiosity was particularly apparent during the fiftieth anniversary of the violence. Lis argues that through their exploration of these themes using life size puppets, Papermoon Puppet Theatre performers hoped to engage audiences in working through this chapter of history.

In Chapter 14 Dragojlovic takes up the theme of the response of a child of parents who were imprisoned to the now famous films about the 1965 violence directed by Joshua Oppenheimer et al., *The Act of Killing* (2012) and *The Look of Silence* (2014). As mentioned above, these two films focus on accounts from perpetrators, who recount their involvement in the 1965 massacres in and around the North Sumatran city of Medan. Using theories of affect, Dragojlovic traces the responses that the films triggered in a woman of Dutch Indonesian background living in the Netherlands, whose parents were imprisoned before migrating to the Netherlands. The films led her to re-examine her family history and to begin to work through her relationship to this past.

Dragojlovic's chapter, like that by McGregor, reminds us how the history of the Indonesian genocide is connected to multiple communities of memory through processes of migration. It also adds to the insights from Conroe and Setiawan as to how children of former political prisoners have variously dealt with the personal legacies of their family histories.

The final chapters in Part II reflect on the pursuit of justice as another legacy of the 1965 violence. These chapters examine Indonesian activism related to 1965 and the context of continuing anti-Communism with which activists have had to contend. In Chapter 15 Stephen Miller argues that since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998 anti-Communist groups aligned with the military have used increasingly fascist-style tactics to counter democratic reforms. He explains how in the context of more open discussions of 1965, artists and activists have used Communist symbolism to challenge apolitical art and music. Yet alongside this trend and human rights advocacy for victims of the 1965 violence, anti-Communist groups have continued to use the label "Communist" to delegitimize and attack persons and groups seeking to further the process of Indonesian democratization. Miller's chapter highlights the ongoing presence of the Indonesian military in politics despite its formal return to the barracks in 1999. Combined with the findings of new research outlined in Chapter 3 by Melvin as to how central the Indonesian military was in planning and co-ordinating the genocide, it is clear just how difficult an environment in which human rights activists and survivors have operated.

The two final chapters present different dimensions of struggles for historical justice for the case of the 1965 genocide. Focusing on legal mechanisms available to address the legacies of the 1965 violence in



Chapter 16 Nukila Evanty and Annie Pohlman outline some of the most promising legal mechanisms introduced in the early reform era of 1998–2004. They revisit the 2004 legislation for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was rejected by the Constitutional Court in 2006, and the lack of response to the National Commission of Human Rights’ investigation into 1965 to assess why both of these efforts, in the end, failed. Further to this they highlight the contradictory patterns in new laws relating to persons labelled Communist that at once revoke and reinforce discrimination against these persons.

The final chapter of Part II by Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem discusses two local government initiatives to address the legacies of 1965 in the cities of Solo, Central Java, and Palu, Central Sulawesi. She situates these joint initiatives alongside the several state initiatives that have to date achieved very little. She analyses what made these local initiatives focusing on reconciliation and reparation programs a success and asks how applicable these examples of local activism might be to national-based approaches to addressing the case of 1965.

To complete our volume Jemma Purdey offers an epilogue to reflect on how the chapters contribute to new perspectives on the 1965 violence and on violence and genocide more broadly.

## NOTES

1. Robert Cribb and Charles Coppel make the specific argument that, contrary to the popular claim that the majority of victims of the 1965–1966 killings were Chinese killed due to their ethnic identity, the majority of victims were non-Chinese Indonesians, killed due to their political identity as defined by their affiliation with the PKI (Cribb & Coppel, 2009, p. 447). In doing so, they propose that the 1965–1966 killings do not constitute a case of genocide because Indonesia’s Chinese community was not targeted as such. Melvin and Pohlman argue in Chapter 2 that Cribb and Coppel go too far in arguing that ethnic-based killings did not occur in 1965–1966.
2. This figure, calculated to account for joint-membership, includes members of the PKI, Pemuda Rakjat, SOBSI, BTI, Gerwani, Lekra and HSI (Mortimer, 1974). It is not an exhaustive list of all organizations deemed by the military to be “affiliated” to the PKI. It does not, for example, include Baperki membership, estimated to number 280,000 in 1965 (Bertrand, 2004).

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## A Case for Genocide: Indonesia, 1965–1966

*Jess Melvin and Annie Pohlman*

This chapter examines the Indonesian killings of 1965–1966 as genocide. One of the central aims of this volume is to position the eradication of those associated with the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, the Indonesian Communist Party) firmly within the field of comparative genocide studies, both so that scholars within the field may be better able to consider the Indonesian case and so that the analytical templates and methods developed for understanding some of the canonical genocides might be expanded and improved (Cribb, 2003). To this end, we make the argument that the Indonesian killings of 1965 should be understood as genocide. After discussing key debates related to the use of the term in relation to the 1965–1966 killings, we make this argument on three fronts, drawing on work in cross-cultural studies of similar genocidal violence. First, we argue that the exclusion of political groups from protection under the 1948 United Nations Convention

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for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter, the “Genocide Convention”) has been used to conclude prematurely that victims of the killings do not constitute a protected group under the Convention. Second, we posit that the eradication of a socio-political group from the national polity underlines the socially transformative process of genocidal violence. Last, we reflect on how the Genocide Convention, in its current form, may be applied to the Indonesian killings and consider both the inclusion of “ideologically constituted” national groups and how ethnic Chinese Indonesians were persecuted during 1965–1966.

### DEFINING AND CONTESTING GENOCIDE

In the seven decades since Raphael Lemkin coined the word “genocide”, defining what Winston Churchill had called a “crime without a name”, scholars have contested what is meant by the term (Power, 2002, pp. 17–47). In the field of genocide studies, which developed primarily from the 1980s amongst scholars drawn mostly from history and law, but which today incorporates an increasing number of other disciplines, the term has become an “essentially contested concept” (Collier, Hidalgo, & Maciuceanu, 2006; Gallie, 1955–1956; Powell, 2004; Straus, 2001). As a result, there has been a tendency, as Martin Shaw notes, to “simply define genocide anew each time in whichever way appears most convenient for the particular moral, political, legal or academic project” undertaken (2015, p. 22). Specifically, a rift has developed between scholars who adopt the current legal definition of the crime of genocide and those who advocate on behalf of moving away from this legal definition in favour of a “sociological” use of the term (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1993a).

The definition of the crime of genocide, as it was laid down in the 1948 Genocide Convention, was a product of the political compromises which had been necessary to secure the convention (Weiss-Wendt, 2005). This legal definition of the term has also been the subject of debates and disagreements that endure to this day. Many of these debates centre on the human groups and types of violence discussed in the Genocide Convention, as well as the interpretation of intent to commit genocide (Greenawalt, 1999; Shaw, 2015; Short, 2010). For many scholars examining cases of genocidal violence across human



history, whose research has examined colonialism, imperialism, slavery, nation-building or ethnic cleansing, these debates stem from the legal definition of the term adopted by the Convention and often remain marred by dogmatic interpretations and conceptual “blockages” over how we understand and apply the term “genocide” (Moses, 2002; Thaler, 2014).

When considering the mass violence that spread across Indonesia in late 1965, there is a core polemical definitional and conceptual issue at stake.<sup>1</sup> This issue relates to the identity of the target group that was eradicated in Indonesia. It has often been argued that victims of the killings were targeted primarily in terms of real or perceived affiliation with the PKI or one of its many associated organisations (see Chapter 1, this volume). As with many of these conceptual debates within the field of comparative genocide studies, the question of whether a group of victims defined by their socio-political affiliation per se can be the victims of genocide is derived directly from the Genocide Convention’s legal definition of the crime. As Article II of the Convention reads, “genocide means [a range of] acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious group, as such” (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, Article II). This definition implicitly excludes political groups from protection under the Convention. Yet, as will be discussed further below, the automatic rejection of the 1965–1966 killings as a case of genocide on this basis is premature.

The polemic debates over what genocide is, who commits it, who the victims can be and how this violence can be prevented are, in many ways, driven by what are seen as the unique moral imperatives of the term (Boghossian, 2010; Lee, 2009; Thaler, 2014). These contestations are so sharp, and their terms so strong, because the stakes are so high. For many, the rejection of the term can lead, and does lead, to a denial that the violence happened at all (Irvin-Erickson, La Pointe, & Hinton, 2013; Thaler, 2014). Worse still, wilful blindness to genocidal intent and action, the lack of will to name violence as genocide or to intervene to stop it, are often driven by a facile politics of not-naming, and therefore ignoring, the kind of catastrophic violence that makes the promise of “never again” all the more hollow (Mamdani, 2010; Theriault, 2010).

Cases of genocidal violence such as the Indonesian mass killings have been relegated, as some contemporary scholars have argued, to a long

list of hidden, forgotten and often denied genocides in human history (Irvin-Erickson et al., 2013; Lemarchand, 2011). For the Indonesian case, despite the comparative size and scale of the violence and the intensity with which the massacres were carried out, these mass killings have been left out of what Bloxham and Moses call “the canon” of genocide cases within the field: the Holocaust, Armenia, Cambodia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and now, Darfur (2010, p. 4). Indeed, in their discussion of this canon, Irvin-Erickson et al. (2013, p. 6) classify the Indonesian case as belonging to the “periphery” of the field.

Researchers have long questioned why some genocides receive greater attention than others; the “uniqueness” of the Holocaust debate being somewhat symptomatic of this (Stone, 2004). For many, the Genocide Convention sets up scholarly debates in unhelpful juridical terms, framing particularly historical cases as non-genocides because they do not conform to the legal constraints of a convention created in the mid-twentieth century (Barta, 2008; Moses, 2002). For others, the privileging of some cases of genocide over others in this canonical understanding of our shared history of atrocity only ends in setting up a “zero-sum game” whereby some genocides are reified at the expense of erasing others from memory (Moses, 2013).

For others still, the framing of particular events as genocide and the genealogy of denying the term for others, demands close and critical scholarly attention. Daniel Feierstein (2013), for example, warns us that as genocide researchers we must refuse to view this violence through a “binary model”—in which perpetrators and victims are oversimplified into distinct groups—because it obscures our understanding of the broader social phenomena (see also Cribb, 2003). Meanwhile, Chomsky and Herman (1979) distinguish between what they term “constructive”, “benign”, “nefarious” and “mythical bloodbaths”, in order to highlight how some atrocities are condemned by world powers and the media while others are ignored or even celebrated. Genocide scholars must constantly critique how and why mass violence is portrayed, disavowed, endorsed or ignored. As Adam Hughes Henry (2016) rightly points out, for the USA and its allies, the “repositioning” of Indonesia as a result of the killings as a clearly anti-Communist nation open to western investment and support altered the balance of Cold War politics in Southeast Asia and justified, even necessitated, the eradication of the PKI.

## THE INDONESIAN KILLINGS AS GENOCIDE

In this chapter, we make three main arguments for why the 1965–1966 killings in Indonesia must be understood as genocide, drawing on recent insights within the field of comparative genocide studies. We make this argument on the grounds: first, that debate over the dismissal of the 1965–1966 killings due to the exclusion of political groups from protection under the Convention has been based on a misunderstanding of the findings of key genocide scholars including Leo Kuper, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, who have argued since the early 1980s that the military’s target group was far broader than a political group; second, that the Indonesian case highlights the socially transformative processes of genocide; and third, that we should reassess the Indonesian killings in light of recent reconsiderations of what constitutes a “protected” group.

On the first point, the seemingly recurrent impediment to naming the 1965 case in Indonesia genocide is the exclusion of political groups from the list of protected groups specified within the legal definition of the crime in the 1948 Convention. The exclusion of political groups has been a core issue of contention within the field for many decades. A number of scholars have ably demonstrated that this exclusion from the final draft of the Convention was based on fallacious reasoning and political compromise (Saul, 2001; van Schaack, 1997; Weiss-Wendt, 2005). Beth van Schaack, for example, through an examination of the preparatory drafts of the Convention, clearly plots the purposeful creation of the document’s “blind spot” (the exclusion of political groups) by “state leaders intent on protecting their own interests” and aiming to insulate themselves from potential liability (1997, p. 2291). It is important to note that the exclusion of political groups has not always been seen as reason to exclude victims of the 1965–1966 killings from being understood as victims of genocide. Indeed, key genocide scholars, including Kuper (1981), and Chalk and Jonassohn (1990), have argued since the early 1980s that victims of the 1965–1966 killings constituted a much broader target group than a purely political group (Melvin, 2018). According to Kuper, the 1965–1966 killings were “quite comparable to massacre by virtue of race” due to the finality and immutability past affiliation played in the targeting of individuals for destruction (1981, p. 154). He also asserts the military’s target group drew additionally upon class, religious and ethnic identity (Kuper, 1981). Similarly, Chalk and Jonassohn argue the targeting of individuals for destruction “had

curious overtones of an ethnic, religious and economic character” (1990, p. 382). Kuper, Chalk and Jonassohn all believed there were grounds for arguing the 1965–1966 killings constituted a case of genocide under the Convention. They were held back from formalizing their findings, however, by the severe lack of documentary evidence available with which to both prove military intent and the identity of the military’s target group. This has led to an “evidence problem” that has seriously hampered the historiography (Melvin, 2018).

As a consequence, debate over whether or not the 1965–1966 killings constitute a case of genocide has often centred on the problematic nature of the exclusion of political groups from protection under the Convention. Of the several scholars (Melvin, 2014, 2018; Pohlman, 2014; see also Fein, 1993a) who have debated this point in relation to the Indonesian killings of 1965, Robert Cribb makes a compelling argument (2001, 2010). First, as with other scholars on the topic of how the Genocide Convention was drafted, Cribb highlights that the erasure of political groups from the final version of the definition in the Convention was a concessionary measure to shore up support from UN member states. Critically, however, Cribb also draws our attention to the flawed understanding of group identity that underpinned “common political and scientific wisdom at the time” when the Convention was drafted (2001, p. 221). As he explains, this understanding reasoned that a person’s membership within a racial, ethnic or even religious group was stable, natural or immutable. Membership within a political or social group, conversely, was a matter of choice, making such groups somehow “unstable” or “mutable”; therefore the world’s “indignation” against the massacre of civilians is “often tempered by the rationalization that the victims [of political killings] had chosen to engage in politics and that their doom, even if unjust, was a consequence of their own fatal decisions” (Cribb, 2010, p. 447, 2001, 2003; see also LeBlanc, 1988, pp. 274–275).

As Cribb and others have argued, such an understanding of ethnic or racial group identity as somehow having “primordial or historically determined” roots is seriously flawed and thus the legal definition of the crime of genocide in the Convention of protecting only these types of “stable” groups is based on an essentially fallacious logic (Cribb, 2010, p. 447, 2001, 2003; LeBlanc, 1988; Lippmann, 1998; Pohlman, 2014; Saul, 2001). To demonstrate how similar these stable and unstable group identities can be, Cribb traces the evolution and consolidation of

Indonesia's Communist group leading up to the 1965 massacres (2001; see also Rafter, 2016). As discussed in the previous chapter, Cribb outlines the process of political "pillarization" in Indonesia, leading to deep divides between three constituent groups: Communist, Islamist and the group which became most closely aligned with the Army's power bases, the "developmentalists" (2001). The argument here is not really that a Communist group existed—the existence of this group is not contested—but rather that all group identity is socially constructed. In mid-1960s Indonesia, one's membership within any of these groups was just as (un)stable and malleable as any of the many ethnic, religious, linguistic or other groups in Indonesia at the time. By highlighting this aetiology of a Communist group in Indonesia, and how membership within this group became the primary category for persecution after 1965, Cribb demonstrates the false logic underpinning the protection of primarily racial or ethnic groups over others. Furthermore, Cribb explains how, by premising our understanding of genocide on the attempt to wipe out a group most commonly defined on an "ethnic" basis (the Holocaust against European Jewry as archetype), we obscure the commonalities and continuities between episodes of genocidal violence, falsely ascribing the analytical templates developed for the study of the destruction of ethnic groups to much broader cases (Cribb, 2003).

Cribb's concern goes beyond the need to include the 1965 killings within the field of comparative genocide studies; he is asking for a more fundamental appraisal of what motivates the mass destruction of human populations. He deconstructs the eradication of the Left in Indonesia to try to understand these motivations more fully. In a comparative discussion of the positioning of political genocides within this field, Cribb also examines some of the other cases of mass political killings of the last century, such as in the Soviet Union, China and Cambodia (2010). Each case, Cribb argues, highlights the similarities between mass persecutions based on political affiliation with other genocides against ethnic, racial or religious groups. As he points out, the Cambodian genocide has activated perhaps the most broad-ranging engagement with understanding genocide as the attempt to "rid the body politic of a vast group of people whose very existence seemed inimical to the nation as the perpetrators conceived it" (2010, p. 449), provoking a range of academic attempts to try to encompass such killings within genocide, including concepts of "auto-genocide" and "politicide" (see Harff & Gurr, 1988; Shaw, 2015). For Cribb, "the experience of Cambodia continues to sit

uncomfortably on the sharp frontier of genocide studies, bringing other mass political killings such as Indonesia and China in its wake” (2010, p. 463).

Cribb is certainly not the only scholar in the field who implores us to look beyond the “canonical” cases to include other genocidal events in evaluating and creating the tools to understand the mass destruction of human groups. Numerous scholars from a variety of fields engaged in genocide studies have asked us to incorporate a wider sample of cases within our comprehension of the phenomena of genocide (for example, Fein, 1993b; Owens, Su, & Snow, 2013; Shaw, 2015). It is through this greater inclusion of cases, including those in which socio-political groups were targeted, that the similarities between genocidal processes can be elucidated and, potentially, prevented.

This broader view of genocidal processes leads to our second and third arguments in our effort to reposition understandings of the 1965 events in Indonesia within the field of comparative genocide studies. Here we argue that the 1965 case in Indonesia provides a critical comparative study for understanding the social and transformative process of genocidal violence. By understanding the 1965 killings as a fundamentally “creative” process of transformation to remake the nation (through the eradication of part of the national polity), this reveals the essentially genocidal nature of these mass killings.

In his comparative study of the Holocaust (1933–1945) and state-sponsored repression in Argentina (1974–1983), Daniel Feierstein has recently argued for a shift in contemporary understandings of genocide to consider this violence as “the deliberate annihilation of groups as a distinctive form of social engineering” (2014, p. 6). Building on the work of those who have also considered the transformative elements of genocidal processes, including Kiernan (2003; see also 2007) and Dadrian (2004), Feierstein asks us to reposition how we comprehend this violence to think of “genocide as a social practice – a mechanism capable of destroying and reorganizing the fabric of entire societies” (2014, p. 2). Feierstein’s work echoes a general movement, particularly in anthropological analyses of mass violence, towards understanding genocide as a socially creative process; indeed, Straus (2012) notes this trend in a recent article examining the main research trajectories within the field. This growing field of scholarship examines ideas of how “enemies” are identified and vilified so as to justify extreme violence against them. Through the eradication of these now-identified enemies,

society is remade anew (see, for example, Appadurai, 1998; Dunn, 2009; Mamdani, 2001).

In the Indonesian case, in the wake of the Army's dehumanizing propaganda in which Communist supporters were depicted as dangerous and treacherous enemies, the violence functioned to both classify these dangerous internal enemies and necessitate the eradication of the PKI, therefore reforming the Indonesian social polity (see Chapter 1, this volume; Pohlman, 2012). A range of scholars have highlighted this transformative function of the Indonesian genocide by showing how not only Indonesia's polity but also its fundamental social, cultural and religious landscape was changed forever by the violence (for example, Dwyer & Santikarma, 2003; Hearman, this volume; Ida Bagus, 2012).

For Feierstein, this conceptualization of genocide as a socially creative process leads him to reassess how we understand the destruction of a "national" group, which in turn leads to our third argument in this chapter. In essence, he reconsiders what was meant by the term "national" group as per Article 2 of the Genocide Convention in his analysis of repression against the political Left in Argentina under the military junta. Feierstein argues for an understanding of genocide as "essentially a partial destruction of the perpetrators' own national group – a destruction that is intended to transform the survivors through the annihilation of the victims" (2013, p. 68). The Argentine case, as he argues, in which the extermination of a political group was a part of a national group (Leftists in the Argentine national group) highlights how genocide is not so much a result of clashes between groups (e.g. Tutsi and Hutu; Turk and Armenian) but is mainly "a power strategy" in which "the ultimate purpose of genocide is not the destruction of a group as such but the transformation of society as a whole" (2013, p. 73).

In this sense, genocide can be understood as a creative process in which the nation is remade without a part of its former self. Thus, when we consider the eradication of the Left from Indonesia, it is not only the physical processes of mass imprisonment, murder and political repression that reveal the genocidal nature of these events, it is also the complete realignment of Indonesia's polity. Internal military documents produced during the time of the killings indicate the Indonesian military leadership did not simply intend to destroy its political enemies, it intended to remake the Indonesian state through the form of a "perfected" government; a "New Order" through which to consolidate

its new post-genocide regime (Melvin, Chapter 3). As dealt with in this volume, the enduring legacies of the New Order's militarist anti-Communism (Miller, Chapter 15) and the familial inheritance of political repression against former Leftists (Conroe, Chapter 10; Dragojlovic, Chapter 14), all reveal the ways in which Indonesian society was remade after 1965.

Nevertheless, the importance of the Convention as the key means of seeking redress for genocidal violence cannot be overlooked. This is particularly so in the case of the 1965–1966 killings when reference to the Convention has been the key means by which the case has been relegated to its current status as a “peripheral” case of genocide.

### APPLYING THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION TO THE INDONESIAN KILLINGS

As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the recent International People's Tribunal for 1965 (IPT65), the judges considered Feierstein's arguments regarding the destruction of a “national” group in their final judgement regarding the Indonesian case (2016). The Prosecution did not include the charge of genocide in the indictment presented to the Tribunal at the public hearings in November 2015, but the judges decided that they would consider the issue in their Final Report (2016, p. 72). Reflecting on some of the same judgements made before the recent Argentine Federal Tribunals considered by Feierstein, the judges at the IPT65 confirmed that the criminal acts presented to the Tribunal by the Prosecution “demonstrate the extent to which Indonesian society was completely and intentionally reorganized through terror” and that this constituted genocide because of “the destruction of a significant part of the ‘Indonesian national group’” (2016, p. 75). In their findings, the judges concluded that:

The facts brought before the Tribunal by the Prosecution include acts that fall within those enumerated in the Genocide Convention. These acts were committed against a significant and substantial section of the Indonesian nation or “Indonesian national group,” a protected group as enumerated in the Genocide Convention, and were committed with the specific intent to annihilate or destroy that section in whole or in part (2016, p. 82).



There is, however, disagreement among genocide scholars as to whether the partial destruction of a perpetrator group's own national group ("auto-genocide") fulfils the stringent definitional requirements of the Convention. International law expert, William Schabas, for example, in his commentary on the Convention, explains that: "Confusing mass killing of the members of the perpetrators' own group with genocide is inconsistent with the purpose of the Convention, which was to protect national minorities from crimes based on ethnic hatred" (Schabas, 2000, p. 119). International law establishes that the Convention does not apply to members of a national group who are targeted by members of the same national or ethnic group. It is due to this reasoning that the killings of ethnic Khmer during the 1975–1979 killings in Cambodia are not recognised as genocide under international law, while the killing of ethnic minority groups, including ethnic Vietnamese, Cham, Chinese and Thai victims, are (Schabas, 2001).

Accepting this exclusion of "auto-genocide" does not preclude victims of the 1965–1966 killings from being understood as a protected group under the Convention. Returning to Cribb's argument, it is possible to see not only the essentially modern nature of Indonesian national identity, but the manner in which this identity developed as an amalgam of three distinct sub-national group identities: Communist, Islamist and "developmentalist". Cribb argues "the nature of Indonesian national group identity shows with unusual clarity how political cleansing can also be ethnic cleansing" (Cribb, 2001, p. 222). This is because the targeting of any of these sub-national groups for destruction amounted to an attempt to destroy a key and permanent component part of the nation. It was not the Indonesian national group per se that was targeted for destruction during the 1965–1966 killings, but rather Indonesia's "communist group", which can be understood as an "ideologically constituted national or sub-national group" within the Indonesian national group (Melvin, 2018). This distinction is further strengthened by the fact that the military explicitly described its target group as "the communist group" (*kaum komunis*) in its own internal documentation of the killings (Melvin, 2018).<sup>2</sup>

The inclusion of ideologically constituted national or sub-national groups as a type of protected national group under the Convention could well address the current problematic sidelining of genocidal violence against Communist groups in Latin America and Indonesia during the Cold War from mainstream discussions of genocide. As can be seen

so clearly in the case of Indonesia, Communist groups often played a key role in the formation of national identity in post-colonial states (Cribb, 2010; Feierstein, 2010). Their exclusion amounts to a privileging of ethnicity-based national groups.

Indeed, it could be argued that the greatest impediment to the 1965–1966 killings being understood as a case of genocide under the Convention has been the recurring difficulty Indonesia researchers have faced in proving military intent behind the killings. Due to the severe shortage of documentary evidence available with which to counter military claims that the killings were “spontaneous”, debate has remained stuck at the point of trying to prove military agency. It has only been since the discovery of internal military records from the time of the killings that it has been possible to definitively shatter military propaganda accounts and prove the killings were implemented as a deliberate and coordinated “Annihilation Operation” aimed at destroying Indonesia’s Communist group (Melvin, Chapter 3).

New research has also uncovered a clear pattern of race-based killings during the time of the 1965–1966 killings. The following section will provide an overview of the targeting of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese community during the time of the killings. It will also reflect on the potential consequences of these findings for attempts to have the 1965–1966 killings recognised as a case of genocide.

### THE TARGETING OF INDONESIA’S ETHNIC CHINESE COMMUNITY AS GENOCIDE

In their Final Report, the IPT65 judges additionally considered whether the targeting of ethnic Chinese constituted genocide (2016, p. 76). In their deliberations, the judges examined the findings of the Tribunal Report, which asserts:

In Indonesia most Chinese were murdered because they belonged to Baperki, an association of Chinese Indonesian[s] associated with the PKI, but ethnic motives played a role in mass killings of Chinese-Indonesian citizens as well, particularly in Medan, Makassar and Lombok... To the extent that they were killed because of their Chinese identity, their murders would plausibly amount to genocide under the Genocide Convention (2016, p. 76).

The judges also considered new research from Aceh (Melvin, 2013, 2014) which, the Report explains, “has uncovered events of mass killings of Chinese in that province” (2016, p. 76). The judges, however, reserved their findings to state that “further investigation is required” before a ruling can be made regarding whether or not violence against the Chinese community should be classified as genocide (2016, p. 76).

This open finding is, in part, a reflection of the limited research that has to date been conducted into anti-Chinese violence during the time of the killings nationally. It is also a reflection of a current debate among scholars of the genocide regarding how such violence should be interpreted. Robert Cribb and Charles Coppel have, for example, argued “there is simply no evidence for a special targeting of Chinese for murder during this period” (2009, p. 448). In doing so, Cribb and Coppel do not claim that ethnic Chinese were not the subject of violence, nor do they deny that Chinese were killed as a result of this violence. Rather, they argue these victims were not killed for being Chinese *per se*, and that, as such, were not killed as members of a protected group under the Genocide Convention. Initially, this argument was intended to counter erroneous claims commonly found in media reports that emerged during the killings that claimed the majority of victims killed in 1965–1966 were Chinese (Cribb & Coppel, 2009). An article in the Australian edition of *Life* in 1968, for example, describes the genocide as a result of “centuries-old racial antagonisms” resulting in the massacres of “hundreds of thousands of Chinese” (cited in Cribb & Coppel, 2009, p. 452). Cribb and Coppel correctly explain the majority of victims were indigenous Indonesians. They go too far, however, in dismissing the issue of race as a motivating factor behind the violence of the genocide.

As cited above, the International People’s Tribunal has proposed that “ethnic motives” played a role in the killings in Medan, Makassar, Lombok and Aceh. Reports of targeted killings of Chinese have also been uncovered in Central Java (Cribb & Coppel, 2009), Sumbawa, South Kalimantan and West Kalimantan (Davidson, 2008). These killings were not “collateral damage” to the main targeting of indigenous Indonesian Communists. They were the result of a deliberate campaign to conflate “China” and “Chinese people” with the actions of the 30 September Movement. In this first instance, this campaign was intended to strengthen antipathy towards the PKI. From 6 October 1965, the military leadership accused the 30 September Movement of being “in the service of Foreign Subversives [Communist China]” (Melvin, 2014).

It also played on racist stereotypes already present within Indonesian society, which blamed “Chinese” for the country’s economic woes (Coppel, 1989; Suryadinata, 1992). A result of this campaign was the targeting and destruction of shops owned by ethnic Chinese, regardless of their political orientation, alongside the targeting and killing of individuals attacked for their real or perceived affiliation with the PKI (Melvin, 2014). In Aceh, the indiscriminate targeting of ethnic Chinese peaked in April 1966, four months after the end of systematic mass killings of people accused of being members of the PKI and its affiliated organisations in that province. This violence, which resulted in the torture and murder of members of Aceh’s Chinese community, was only brought to a close by the mass expulsion of Aceh’s Chinese community, including local Chinese with Indonesian citizenship, from the province by Aceh’s Military Commander, Ishak Djuarsa (Melvin, 2014).

Perhaps the most extreme anti-Chinese violence occurred in West Kalimantan, the home to Indonesia’s largest Chinese population. According to Jamie Davidson (2008), despite violence during the immediate aftermath of 1 October 1965 remaining subdued due to the small size of the PKI in the province, allegations of Chinese complicity in the actions of the 30 September Movement gained support. From March 1966, when anti-Chinese sentiment was spreading nationally, Chinese people accused of being affiliated with the PKI were ordered to leave the province by Brigadier General Ryacudu, Head of West Kalimantan’s “G30S PKI Annihilation Operation” (Davidson, 2008). Key PKI cadre were able to escape and fled to Bengkayang district, where they launched an armed resistance movement under the name of the “West Kalimantan Communist Army”. In early 1967, the local military launched a series of operations to crush the rebel army, whose members were described as a “band of Chinese communists”. Anti-Chinese massacres broke out in the province in November 1967. The number of Chinese estimated killed in West Kalimantan at this time range from 2000 to 5000 (Davidson, 2008). For these victims, “Chinese” and “Communist” identity was conflated, such that being “Chinese” was alleged to be proof of being “Communist”.

The targeting of members of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese community based on the ethnic identity of this group during the killings plausibly amounts to genocide, as defined by the Convention. This, moreover, can be argued regardless of how the Convention is applied to the military’s larger target group, as the case of the Cambodian genocide is

able to illustrate. Genocide scholar and Cambodia expert Ben Kiernan has argued the Cambodian killings should be understood as a case of genocide because certain sub-groups of victims targeted by the Khmer Rouge were persecuted due to their identity as members of Cambodia's Vietnamese, Cham and Khmer Krom ethnic minority groups (Kiernan, 1990, 2009). This argument was adopted by Benjamin Whitaker, the UN's Special Rapporteur on Genocide, who argued that the Khmer Rouge was guilty of genocide, "even under the most restricted [legal] definition... since the victims *included* target groups such as the Chams [an ethnic and religious minority]" (cited in Kiernan, 1990, p. 40, emphasis added). The same position was adopted by the US State Department in 1989 and by the current UN-sponsored trial of senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea (the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ECCC), who are accused of "the crime of genocide... crimes against humanity... [and] grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention" (Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia, 2003; Melvin, 2013, 2014).

To date, the ECCC has yet to prosecute former members of the Khmer Rouge for the crime of genocide, choosing instead to pursue charges of crimes against humanity. This sidelining of one of the Tribunal's key original missions to pursue charges of genocide against the Khmer Rouge has meant it has yet to be tested in a court of law whether the Cambodian killings can be ruled a case of genocide under the Convention. As such, there is yet to be legal precedence for adopting a similar argument in the case of Indonesia. The ECCC's reluctance to pursue charges of genocide against the Khmer Rouge would appear to be driven by domestic political considerations within Cambodia. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and other top members of the ruling Cambodian People's Party are former Khmer Rouge cadres and this has made them nervous about expanding the scope of the charges. As such, the Cambodian government has sought to tightly limit the Tribunal's room for manoeuvre (see Brinkley, 2013; McCargo, 2011).

This situation in Cambodia has parallels with the current situation in Indonesia. The current Indonesian state also retains strong and, in many cases, direct personal links to Suharto's New Order regime. It is equally against the self-interest of the Indonesian government to prosecute perpetrators of the Indonesian genocide. The International Criminal Court was established precisely to overcome such self-interest on behalf of perpetrator states. Yet, the international community remains just as reluctant

to alienate its post-Cold War allies in Jakarta as in Phnom Penh. It is this political hurdle, rather than theoretical debates relating to how the Genocide Convention might best be adopted in the case of Indonesia, that is the most significant impediment to justice for victims of the Indonesian genocide.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a case for understanding the Indonesian killings as genocide. It has argued that the exclusion of political groups from protection under the 1948 Genocide Convention has been used to conclude prematurely that victims of the 1965–1966 killings do not constitute a protected group under the Convention. It has also posited that the eradication of a socio-political group from the national polity underlines the socially transformative process of genocide. Further, it has proposed that new evidence now available supports the argument advanced since the early 1980s that victims of the 1965–1966 killings constitute a group far broader than a political group. This group, this chapter has argued, can be understood as a protected group under the Convention.

The Indonesian genocide occurred over half a century ago and yet it will continue to haunt Indonesian political life until these crimes are properly investigated and redressed. Furthermore, these killings will cast a shadow over the international justice system for as long as its perpetrators continue to enjoy complete impunity for their actions. The recognition of the 1965–1966 killings as a case of genocide removes the case from its current “peripheral” status and allows scholars and human rights activists to focus on the more important question of why this violence occurred.

## NOTES

1. The politics of naming the 1965–1966 killings as genocide within Indonesia has its own complex history. The first public uses of the term can be traced to the late New Order period and have largely been associated with attempts to seek justice for victims of the killings (see Melvin, 2018).
2. It has additionally been argued that victims of the 1965–1966 killings constitute a religious group. This argument has been advanced based on new evidence victims of the killings were deliberately identified for destruction by the military as “atheists” (Melvin, 2018).

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PART I

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New Empirical Research and Interpretations

## The Road to Genocide: Indonesian Military Planning to Seize State Power Prior to 1 October 1965

*Jess Melvin*

The Indonesian genocide, the Indonesian military's chief propagandists would have us believe, was the result of a "spontaneous" uprising by "the people" of Indonesia; an "explosion" of "communal clashes resulting in bloodbaths in certain areas of Indonesia" (Notosusanto & Saleh, 1967, p. 77; Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965, p. 111). This is simply not the case. The Indonesian genocide was initiated and implemented by the Indonesian military as a self-described "annihilation operation" (*operasi penumpasan*) ("Laporan", 1966, p. 17). The intention of this operation was to facilitate the military leadership's plan to seize state power. Such an extensive operation, which resulted in the murder of approximately one million unarmed civilians nationally, would have been impossible without extensive coordination and planning.<sup>1</sup> A key difficulty for scholars of the Indonesian genocide is that, despite it being known that the Indonesian military had expressed its intention to seize state

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power during the months leading up to 1 October 1965, the nature of such planning has, beyond its broadest outlines, remained unknown.<sup>2</sup> In this chapter, I show that such planning did take place and demonstrate how this planning occurred in Aceh, Indonesia's western-most province, and Sumatra more generally, using the military's own account of events.

Drawing upon 3,000 pages of previously unknown government and military documents from Aceh, this chapter argues the military's seizure of state power on 1 October 1965 was the result of at least 12 months' planning and preparation. This planning and preparation was facilitated under the guise of the "Crush Malaysia" (*Ganyang Malaysia*) campaign and was premised on concentrating security powers in the hands of the military. This concentration of security powers was achieved through the adoption of *Ganyang Malaysia*-era "*Dwikora*" legislation, which was ironically first conceptualized by Sukarno as a means of providing a counterbalance to the military's monopoly of armed power; and two inter-lapping military operations, the *Operasi Singgalang* and *Operasi Berdikari*. It was these operations that provided the military leadership with the powers and chains of command that it used to launch its seizure of state power and genocidal attack against its political enemy, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, *Partai Komunis Indonesia*) in Aceh from 1 October 1965.

Before moving to outline military planning to seize state power prior to 1 October 1965, it is necessary to make several important qualifications. First, intent is often difficult to prove; this is particularly the case when researching a 50-year-old event using incomplete military records. The conclusions reached in this chapter are by nature speculative: they present a partial rather than total explanation of military planning to seize state power. Second, proving the military leadership's intent to launch a campaign to seize state power is separate to proving the military leadership's intent to launch a campaign of genocidal violence. I believe there is evidence to prove military intent to commit genocide. I have documented this elsewhere. This chapter will concentrate on demonstrating military intent to seize state power prior to 1 October 1965.<sup>3</sup>

Here I propose it is possible to see the culmination of two distinct processes in the military's seizure of state power: the first was the outcome of a long-term plan by the military leadership to create and control an internal parallel government or "state within the state", through the formation of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI); the

second was the outcome of a reactive and opportunistic plan shaped by the circumstances created by the foolhardy actions of the 30 September Movement during the morning of 1 October 1965. This second process, enacted under the leadership of General Suharto, spearheaded the implementation of the military's underlying plan to seize state power. It is the first, long-term plan, that can help to explain the seamlessness of the military's actions in implementing an undeclared coup, which placed almost the entire key executive coercive infrastructure of the Indonesian state under the military's control. Meanwhile, it was the determination of the military leadership under Suharto to use the momentum of circumstance to kick the military's long-term plan into action that explains the speed and ruthlessness of this campaign.

This chapter proposes that the first phase of this campaign can be traced back to at least September 1964, when the military leadership threw its support behind Sukarno's *Ganyang Malasia* campaign and actively began to seek autonomous control over military command structures. The decision to activate these plans to begin to seize state power on 1 October 1965, this chapter will show, was not made until the morning of 1 October 1965.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, the decision to use these preparations to launch a campaign of genocidal violence did not fully evolve until the crucial 1–14 October 1965 period.<sup>5</sup> This understanding does not negate military accountability for the coup and ensuing genocide. Indeed, this chapter argues that the military's seizure of state power and the ensuing genocide would not have been possible without this planning and preparation.

### INDONESIA AT A CROSSROADS

In 1965 Indonesia was at a crossroads. The Cold War was at its height in Southeast Asia, and it appeared to be only a matter of time before the PKI, the largest Communist Party in the world outside of the USSR and Communist China, would come to power. The Indonesian military—a highly politicized armed forces that had constituted an integral part of Indonesia's political life since Indonesia's national revolution—was, however, determined to halt the PKI's rise and place the Indonesian state under its own direction. From the early 1960s the Indonesian military leadership began to make specific plans to “re-orient” the Indonesian state.

In January 1965, the US Ambassador noted the Indonesian military was “developing specific plans for takeover of government [the] moment Sukarno [Indonesia’s highly popular and avowedly Marxist ‘President For Life’] steps off stage” (Roosa, 2006, p. 189). Meanwhile, some officers in the top military command advocated that such a takeover should be launched before Sukarno’s death if the PKI succeeded in forming an armed civilian militia. It was to be “a coup that would not appear to be a coup” (Roosa, 2006, p. 189).

The military leadership’s eventual decision not to wait until Sukarno stepped off stage was intimately tied to the *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign, which was launched by Sukarno in September 1963. The *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign—officially aimed at protesting the formation of the Malaysian nation state<sup>6</sup>—became a disguised power struggle between Sukarno, the military leadership and the PKI, and was ultimately used as a cover by the military leadership to prepare itself to take power. It would be the legislation and structures that were established during this time that were ultimately used by the military leadership to launch its attack against the PKI and which explain the highly centralized and intentional nature of this attack.

### DWIKORA AND THE *MANDALA SATU* COMMAND

Sukarno had originally signalled no interest in opposing the formation of an independent Malaysia. This was in contrast to the PKI, which vocally argued that the new nation would act as a puppet nation for British and US imperialism in the region. From September 1963, however, Sukarno threw his support behind the campaign, seeing it as a means to reclaim the spirit of national unity that had been generated by earlier military campaigns (Crouch, 2007, pp. 58–59). The military leadership, meanwhile, was vehemently opposed to the campaign, worried that it would affect its relationship with the US military and threaten its now eroded powers, which had been in decline since Martial Law was lifted in mid-1963 (Crouch, 2007, pp. 59–62).

On 3 May 1964, Sukarno announced his concept of *Dwikora* (“Peoples Double Command”), which called for the intensification of the Indonesian revolution and *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign, as well as for the mobilization and training of 21 million volunteers to support this campaign. These concepts were subsequently codified in September 1964 through a piece of legislation entitled “Decisions to Increase



the Implementation of Dwikora” (“Keputusan”, 1966, p. 1244). This legislation established a new military chain of command to oversee the *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign, known as the KOTI (“Supreme Operations Command”) command. This new command possessed broad and sweeping powers akin to Indonesia’s existing State of Military Emergency and State of War legislation.<sup>7</sup> Sukarno’s apparent intention was to use this legislation to curtail the military’s powers by placing his own allies in control of this command and to provide a counterbalance to the military’s monopoly on arms by providing basic arms’ training to the campaign’s proposed 21 million volunteers (Sundhaussen, 1982, p. 186).

The military also appears to have sensed the opportunities this legislation presented for it to launch its own attack against the PKI, so long as it was able to wrest control over the campaign. It therefore chose to support rather than oppose the implementation of Dwikora as might have been expected. This led to the odd situation in which the military leadership publicly committed itself to preparing for an armed conflict with Malaysia, while it secretly went about sabotaging military actions related to this campaign (Crouch, 2007, pp. 69–75). This disguised power play produced the structures that would eventually be used by the military to launch its attack against the PKI, as it sought to create a new parallel government, or “state within the state”.

Beneath the newly consolidated KOTI command, a new military command, the Kolaga (“Area Alert Command”), was established parallel to the Kodam Command (“Military Area Command”, the existing province-level military command structure) to coordinate and direct all military activities related to the *Ganyang Malaysia* in Sumatra and Kalimantan (Crouch, 2007, p. 187). These two locations were chosen due to their physical proximity to Malaysia. In Sumatra, this command structure was known as the *Mandala Satu* (First Mandala) Command. In Kalimantan, it was known as the *Mandala Dua* (Second Mandala) Command (Poesponegoro & Notosusanto, 2008, p. 466).

The Mandala Satu Command in Sumatra was headed by a Mandala Satu Commander (*Panglatu: Panglima Mandala Satu*), a position held by Mokoginta, who was also the Inter-Provincial Military Commander (Pangkoanda) for Sumatra under the Kodam command structure. Under the Panglatu in Sumatra, meanwhile, there existed a network of Regional Authorities for the Implementation of Dwikora (*Pepelrada: Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah*) responsible for territories corresponding

with the Kodam. In Aceh the position of Pepelrada was held by Aceh's Kodam Commander Ishak Djuarsa.<sup>8</sup>

This new KOTI command possessed unprecedented powers, including the right to seize property, impose curfews, search people and their belongings, ban people from living in or leaving certain areas, temporarily exile people, require civilians to assist in the implementation of Dwikora and arrest and detain people for up to 30 days without charge ("Keputusan", 1966, pp. 1244–1247). These powers allowed the military to effectively implement martial law without having to declare martial law. Most disturbingly, Dwikora was implemented internally through the KOTI command, allowing the military to effectively impose *de facto* martial law conditions without first having to seek permission from Sukarno, as was the case with Indonesia's martial law legislation ("Keputusan", 1966, p. 1244). This development facilitated Suharto's effort to wrest control of the Indonesian state during the post-Movement period. It also helps to explain why Suharto did not need to confront Sukarno directly in order to seize these new powers. In the case of Aceh and Sumatra, as a result of the military's depth of preparation during the pre-attack period, such a confrontation was simply not necessary.

Sukarno and the PKI were aware of the potential powers that this new command possessed. Indeed, they also wished to use these new powers to their own advantage. Prior to 1 October 1965, both the PKI and the military leadership were actively positioning themselves to benefit from this power struggle, while Sukarno believed he had control over the situation. It is for this reason, for example, that Omar Dhani, Indonesia's Air Force Commander, who was sympathetic to Sukarno and who would eventually become involved in the actions of the 30 September Movement, was assigned as Mandala Vigilance (Kolaga) Commander, much to the irritation of the military leadership (Crouch, 2007, p. 61). In this position, Dhani was responsible to Sukarno, who was assigned as supreme KOTI Commander while the Army's Ahmad Yani was assigned as KOTI Chief of Staff. Beneath Dhani was Suharto, who was assigned as First Deputy Kolaga Commander in addition to his position as KOSTRAD Commander (Crouch, 2007, p. 71). These assignments were a compromise for both the military leadership and the PKI. Each sought to influence the new command and position themselves

for what was assumed to be an inevitable struggle for control of the Indonesian state.

The United States supported such a showdown. Indeed, US officials repeatedly informed key members of the military leadership that the US would support them if they moved against the PKI (Roosa, 2006, p. 193). What was inconceivable to both sides without the benefit of hindsight was that a small conspiracy group in the form of the 30 September Movement could launch an action so devastating that the military leadership would have sufficient political capital to launch a full-frontal attack against the PKI. The actions of the Movement created an opportunity for the military to seize control, openly and without resistance, not only of the KOTI command but also the entire executive infrastructure of the Indonesian state apparatus, and to wield this new power so brutally against its political opponents. Meanwhile, Sukarno was rendered paralyzed and the PKI scrambled to save itself. The actions of the 30 September Movement thus acted not only as a “pretext”<sup>9</sup> for the military’s plans to seize state power but also as an accelerant.

This new command also had access to civilian government. At the provincial level, once *Dwikora* was implemented, the new regional authorities (*Pepelrada*) were “required to deliberate” with the Provincial *Pantja Tunggal* (“One in Five”), the top executive board at the provincial and district level (“Keputusan”, 1966, p. 1245). The *Pantja Tunggal* drew its name from the number of its members, which comprised the province’s Military Commander, Chief Prosecutor, Police Chief, Provincial Governor, and a civilian representative from the Provincial Government. This pattern was also repeated at the district level. The *Pantja Tunggal* was initially intended to allow civilian political representatives (especially Communists, Sundhaussen has explained, who often came to hold the civilian representative position) to act as a “counterweight” to Army officers in the provinces (Sundhaussen, 1982, pp. 185–186). Once *Dwikora* was implemented in response to a military threat, however, the *Pantja Tunggal* acted to subsume the civilian government under military control. This helps to explain the military’s ability to wrest control over Aceh’s key government structures on 1 October 1965 and to then activate and pursue its own campaign for dominance and “annihilation” of its political enemies over the following days, weeks and months.

## MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO SEIZE STATE POWER IN SUMATRA

Throughout 1964, Sukarno became increasingly bellicose in his rhetoric; a situation which was matched on the ground by increased anti-US sentiment. US embassies and cultural centres were attacked, while US-owned plantations were occupied and taken over and the Indonesian military leadership became increasingly publicly identified with pro-US interests (Ryter, 2000, pp. 35–42). The PKI, which supported this anti-US sentiment, was now on the offensive. In Aceh, as around the country, this included the PKI becoming actively involved in training militia groups, ostensibly under the auspices of the *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign.<sup>10</sup>

The military also began to go on the offensive. In March 1965, the Mandala Satu Command engaged in training exercises under the direction of Mokoginta, which it named “*Operasi Singgalang*”.<sup>11</sup> *Operasi Singgalang* was carried out in each provincial-level Military Command (Kodam) in every province in Sumatra and entailed the mobilization of “all members of the Armed Forces and all layers of society” including military-trained civilian paramilitary Hansip (Civilian Defence) (“*Operasi*”, 1966, p. 72). One participant in the Operation, Amir Hasan, who became a leading member of the military-sponsored Komando Aksi (Action Command) death squad that was active during the genocide in North Sumatra, has described how: “At the time of *Operasi Singgalang*, Hansip members were ordered every morning to deliver by motorbike secret reports to the Operation centre in Kotari Subdistrict [in coordination with the military officers responsible for coordinating Hansip at the village level]...” (Hasan, n.d., p. 5). The Operation was a dry run to test the preparedness of the provincial military and paramilitary units to respond to a call to mobilize, described by the military as a theoretical invasion by Malaysia.<sup>12</sup> It appears to have been a means for the military to involve civilians in its own preparations to move against the PKI once the opportunity presented itself.

One month later, in April 1965, this preparation was intensified through the announcement of a new operation named “*Operasi Berdikari*” (“*Laporan*”, 1966, pp. 16–17).<sup>13</sup> Very little is known about the *Operasi Berdikari*. What is known is taken from military reports from the time. In the Aceh Military Command’s “Complete Yearly Report for 1965”, Djuarsa explained how during *Operasi Berdikari* “not only the Armed Forces and the Civilian Government participated, but also the entire society joined in the attempt to prepare the potential

of the territorial defence of Aceh” (“Laporan”, 1966, pp. 16–17). The Operation appears to have progressed through three main phases. During its first phase, from April, the Operation was essentially a preparation campaign (“Laporan”, 1966, pp. 16–17). On 1 August, the Operation entered its second phase, when yet another new military command structure was inaugurated (“Laporan”, 1966, pp. 16–17).

This new command in Aceh was named the Kodahan (Defence Region Command) (“Peta”, 1966, p. 1). The Kodahan command, which existed parallel to the Kodam and Mandala Satu commands, was superimposed over Aceh’s regular territorial command structure. The stated purpose of this new command structure was to facilitate the “territorial defence” (*pertahanan wilajah*) of Aceh (“Laporan”, 1966, pp. 16–17); a term used to refer to the total mobilization of society to prepare for war. Under this new command, Djuarsa was appointed as Defence Region Commander (Panghanda), in addition to his positions as Kodam Commander (Pangdam) and Pepelrada, under the Mandala Satu Command, which he retained. Meanwhile, Mokoginta was appointed as Inter-Regional Defence Region Commander (Pangandahan) for Sumatra, indicating that this new command was established throughout Sumatra at this time. He would hold this position in addition to his positions as Inter-Provincial Military Commander under the Kodam Command (Pangkoanda) and Mandala Satu Commander (Panglatu). Each of Aceh’s districts were assigned as “Defence Sector Commands” (Kosekhan) in addition to their designation as Military District Commands (Kodim). Meanwhile, under the new Kosekhan structure, Aceh’s districts were divided into two major Sub-Region Defence Commands (Kosubdahan), with the Lilawangsa Kosubdahan responsible for Kosekhan to the east of Aceh’s Seulawah mountain range, including Central Aceh Kosekhan, and the Teuku Umar Kosubdahan responsible for Kosekhan to the west (“Laporan”, 1966, pp. 16–17).

The significance of these new district-level command structures lay in the control they gave the military over local district and sub-district-level armed forces and civilian paramilitary organizations. Each Kosekhan was responsible for the coordination of district and sub-district-level military troops and police personnel. They were also responsible for the coordination of village-level Peoples Defence (Hansip) and Civilian Defence (Hanra) paramilitary units (“Daftar”, 1966, pp. 1–8). These paramilitary units had received intensive military training during the months prior to

1 October, as evidenced during the *Operasi Singgalang* campaign, and, by the eve of 1 October 1965, represented a serious paramilitary force in the province.

A list of the numerical strength of Hansip and Hanra units in each of Aceh's newly assigned Kosekhan is attached to the Aceh Military Command's Complete Yearly Report for 1965 ("Struktur", 1966, pp. 1–3). The size of these units is striking. In Greater Aceh, the military had access to 21,661 Hansip/Hanra members "including Student Regiments". In Pidie, it had access to 23,000 Hansip/Hanra members; in North Aceh, 22,412; in East Aceh, 21,000; in Central Aceh, 7118; in West Aceh, 23,322; in South Aceh, 21,000; in Southeast Aceh, 6157; with a total of 148,167 Hansip and Hanra members directly integrated into the military's operations by the eve of 1 October 1965 in the province. This figure is equivalent to approximately 33.4% of Aceh's adult male population (aged 15–54 years).<sup>14</sup> These Hansip/Hanra units would shortly be armed with rifles and machine guns by the military, forming the shock troops of the military's annihilation campaign in the province alongside military-sponsored death squads and the military itself ("Kekuatan", 1966, pp. 1–2).

### ACTIVATION OF *OPERASI BERDIKARI*

These escalations in the military's preparations coincided with Sukarno's declaration on 17 August 1965, during his national Independence Day speech, that he had publicly adopted the PKI's call for the creation of an armed "Fifth Force" or "People's Army" (Mortimer, 2006, p. 384): an auxiliary service to be made up of armed workers and peasants that would exist parallel to the army, air force, navy and police force.<sup>15</sup> Such a force would have effectively stripped the military of its monopoly over armed force and was a significant intensification of Sukarno's first announcement in May 1964, when he had called for the mobilization and training of 21 million volunteers to support the *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign, which had so disturbed the military at that time and had initially prompted it to begin to take action. To the military, Sukarno's announcement crossed an important line and it appears that a decision was now made within the military leadership that it would no longer delay its plans to seize power until after Sukarno had left the scene. It would now seek to seize power as soon as a suitable opportunity

presented itself and consider the possibility of sidelining or removing Sukarno if necessary.

This opportunity arose during the morning of 1 October 1965, when the foolhardy actions of the 30 September Movement acted as the catalyst for the activation of the military's plans to seize state power.<sup>16</sup> In addition to the raft of directives that Suharto, Mokoginta and Djuarsa sent on this morning (outlined below), which indicate the depth of the military leadership's determination to act in an insubordinate manner on this crucial day, it can now be revealed that the Kodahan command was activated on 1 October: an event that was marked by the changing of the Command's name from the Kodahan to the Kohanda (Regional Defence Command) Command. This act was intended to signify that the Operation had moved from its preparation stage to implementation. As Djuarsa has explained:

Since 1 October 1965, the Plan for Operation Berdikari was activated, which included a determination regarding the outlines of policy for the Aceh Defence Region Command as related to the territorial defence of Aceh...

Since the occurrence of GESTOK [a name for the 30 September Movement] on 1 October 1965, the entire strength of Kohanda "Atjeh" has been mobilized to achieve the success of the operation to annihilate GESTOK. This operation has been weighted towards intelligence and territorial actions. This Operation (Operasi Berdikari) has... been a brilliant success. ("Laporan", 1966, pp. 16–17.)

This extraordinary statement, the first of its kind to be found, is the most explicit admission produced by the military leadership that it used the structures that it seemingly established as part of the *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign to launch its attack against the PKI. The military's seizure of power and the subsequent genocide, this statement confirms, was initiated and implemented by the military leadership through the structures of the Kohanda command in Aceh, which it also used to mobilize civilians to participate in this campaign.

Indeed, it would appear that Djuarsa's statement confirms, for the first time on record, that the genocide, at least in its initial stages, was known to the military leadership in Aceh province as "*Operasi Berdikari*": an operation that was established two months prior to 1 October and

activated during the morning of 1 October, when the military was supposedly still deciding how to react.

### *OPERASI BERDIKARI AND THE FACILITATION OF GENOCIDE*

What was known about the mechanics of how the military leadership initiated its seizure of state power during the morning of 1 October 1965 and how this campaign escalated into genocide remained, until recently, sketchy. Nationally, it is known that Suharto assumed the position of Army Chief of Staff, a position held until that morning by Ahmad Yani, between 6.30 am and 7.00 am before refusing to step down from this position when ordered to by Sukarno at 4.00 pm (Crouch, 2007, p. 129). It is also known that during the morning of 1 October, Suharto used his position as Kostrad Commander to enforce his position as self-appointed and insubordinate Commander of the Armed Forces—a position he then used to spearhead his genocidal attack against the PKI. How Suharto extended his control nationally is less well understood. Previously, for example, the only known record of communication between Suharto and regional military commanders occurred at 9.00 pm during the evening of 1 October, when Suharto had announced: “now we are able to control the situation both in the centre and the regions” (“Pidato”, 1965, pp. 59–60). I show, however, that it is now possible to demonstrate that Suharto was in communication with Indonesia’s regional military commanders during the morning of 1 October and that the extent of inter-military communication during this crucial day was greater than previously thought.

The most detailed information we have of how this process occurred can be found in the military documents discovered in Aceh. These documents reveal how, during the morning of 1 October 1965, Suharto appears to have been in contact with regional military commanders throughout the country. Through this communication, Suharto, acting in his newly self-appointed position as Army Chief of Staff, conveyed “news” that a “coup movement” had occurred in the capital (“Chronologis”, 1966, p. 1)—an announcement that pre-empted the 30 September Movement’s own coup announcement by approximately 6–8 hours.<sup>17</sup> In Sumatra, this news was followed by “instructions” sent by Mokoginta acting in his capacity as Mandala Satu Commander (Panglatu) that troops should remain calm and “await further orders/instructions from the Panglatu” (“Chronologis”, 1966, p. 1).



Further instructions were then sent by Djuarsa acting in his capacity as “Pangdahan ‘A’”, which conveyed the directive for all troops under him to “await further orders/ instructions” from “the Panglatu” [Mokoginta] (“Chronologis”, 1966, p. 1).<sup>18</sup> These promised orders from the Panglatu would become clear at midnight that night, when Mokoginta delivered a speech in Medan, where he announced: “it is ordered (*diperintahkan*)... that all members of the Armed Forces... resolutely and completely annihilate (*setjara tegas/tandas menumpas*) this counter-revolution (the 30 September Movement)” (Mokoginta, 1966, pp. 152–153).

In addition to declaring the military leadership’s intention to “annihilate” its political enemies, these directives and instructions are evidence that the military leadership under Suharto used the KOTI command to seize control of the Indonesian state through means of an undeclared coup. The best way to conceptualize this seizure of state power is to understand it as the culmination of two parallel processes. The first of these processes was the reactive and opportunistic actions of Suharto during the morning of 1 October, as he realized that the actions of the 30 September Movement could be used as the long-awaited pretext to launch the army’s campaign to seize state power. His immediate actions involved his self-appointment to the position of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and subsequent refusal to step down from this position. He also mobilized the Army Strategic Command (Kostrad) to neutralize the 30 September Movement and then continued to escalate this response once it was clear that the 30 September Movement had been isolated and then destroyed. He also, in addition to his position as Kostrad Commander and his new self-appointed position of Army Chief of Staff, assumed the position of KOTI Chief of Staff, which, under his control, used Dwikora legislation to mobilize the Kolaga chain of command through the self-activation of martial law conditions—one consequence of which was the activation of *Operasi Berdikari* in Aceh. The second of these processes was the local mobilization of the KOTI and Kolga chains of command in the provinces. In the case of Aceh, this process was driven by Mokoginta and Djuarsa, who, acting independently of Sukarno, acknowledged Suharto’s insubordinate leadership and activated the troops and structures under their own control to support his leadership. This second process was not premised primarily on personal loyalty to Suharto but rather was in accordance with the long-term strategic planning of the national military leadership.

These two processes should be regarded as separate because the military's long-term plan to seize state power existed independently to Suharto's individual actions during the morning of 1 October and could have conceivably been activated through a number of scenarios. *Operasi Berdikari* was the culmination of at least 12 months of planning and manoeuvring by the military leadership in Aceh. Drawing its legal basis in Dwikora legislation, *Operasi Berdikari* was an outcome of the steady concentration of security powers in the hands of the military under the guise of support for the *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign.

There is evidence that similar operations may have been carried out in provinces other than Aceh, in particular in North Sumatra, though the details of these operations, if they occurred, are not yet known.<sup>19</sup> It is also possible that Aceh acted as a kind of "test case" for the military nationally as a result of the higher concentration of pro-military sentiment in the province's political leadership as a consequence of the settlement of the Darul Islam rebellion in the province two years earlier, which saw the military dominate Aceh's Pantja Tunggal body (Melvin, 2014, pp. 49–53). This situation may have helped enable the military to seize control of state structures in Aceh and subsequently launch its annihilation campaign more quickly and more comprehensively than in other provinces where such planning was not yet as advanced. The case of Aceh presents an especially clear example of military intentions to prepare to seize state power prior to 1 October 1965. It also confirms that the military's campaign in the province occurred as part of a centralized, national campaign by demonstrating the communication and coordination that occurred between the provincial military leadership in Aceh, the inter-district military leadership in Sumatra, and the national military leadership in Jakarta.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter proposes that the military's post-movement behaviour was a logical extension of its preparations and planning prior to 1 October 1965. From 1964, the military escalated its preparations to seize control of the Indonesian state in tandem with the escalation in announcements made by Sukarno and the PKI. Specifically, Sukarno's stated plan to establish an armed civilian militia through the framework of the *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign appears to have triggered an escalation in military plans. The military subsequently subverted military frameworks

established during this period for its own stated objectives of seizing state power.

The military's seizure of state power and attack against the PKI was pre-planned, though the exact timing and form of this seizure was not determined until the morning of 1 October 1965. The subsequent genocide was equally coordinated and centralized. Indeed, the killings in Aceh were implemented using these exact chains of command. There was nothing spontaneous about the military's actions. It is the extent of this planning that helps to explain the seamlessness of the military's actions in implementing an undeclared coup that placed almost the entire key executive coercive infrastructure of the Indonesian state under its control without so much as necessitating an open confrontation with Sukarno.

## NOTES

1. As Benedict Anderson has observed, "domestic mass murder on a large scale is always the work of the state" (2013, p. 1). Jacques Semelin has similarly argued, "massacre can only spread on a grand scale if a central authority more or less overtly encourages it" (2007, p. 167).
2. "Suharto's coup d'état", for example, is referenced in the title of John Roosa's study, *Pretext for mass murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's coup d'état in Indonesia* (2006), but the details of how this coup was achieved is not explained in the text.
3. I present an explanation of how the military initiated and implemented the genocide in Jess Melvin, *The army and the Indonesian genocide: Mechanics of mass murder* (2018).
4. Whether or not Suharto had foreknowledge of the actions of the 30 September Movement remains debated in the literature. As John Roosa has observed, Nasution, Yani and the other generals killed could hardly have had known about the intentions of the 30 September Movement unless they consented to their own deaths (Roosa, 2006, p. 79). Moreover, if it is ever proven Suharto had foreknowledge of the actions of the 30 September Movement, a suggestion first posited by W. F. Wertheim, it remains debatable whether he knew what the outcome of the actions of the group would be. He could not have known with any certainty how Sukarno, the PKI, or even the remainder of the military leadership would react to these events, suggesting that the actions taken by Suharto during the morning of 1 October 1965 were at least partly improvised.

5. This self-declared “annihilation operation” included the initiation and implementation of public killings and the formation of military-sponsored death squads. The decision to systematically murder prison populations, meanwhile, appears to have been made on approximately 14 October.
6. For an excellent account of the *Ganyang Malaysia* campaign, see Easter (2005).
7. See, “Keadaan Bahaya”, Perpu 2/1959; LN 1959-139; TLN 1908 (sdu. dg. Perpu 52/ 1960-170), in *Himpunan*, n.d., p. 452.
8. It was common for regional military commanders to jointly hold these two positions (Crouch, 2007, p. 362).
9. This argument has been convincingly and eloquently made by Roosa (2006).
10. A rare photograph in *Life* magazine shows PKI-affiliated Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*, the Indonesian Women’s Movement) members conducting a drill in Jakarta carrying rifles as part of the Ganyang Malaysia campaign. Image available online: <http://pramukanewss.blogspot.com.au/2013/06/ganjang-malaysia-dengan-angkatan-kelima.html>. In Jakarta, PKI-affiliated People’s Youth (*Pemuda Rakjat*) members participated in training at Lubang Buaya (Wieringa, 2003, p. 78). An account of this training in Aceh can be found in Melvin (2014, pp. 58–60).
11. Mount Singgalang is a picturesque twin volcanic mountain adjacent to Mount Tandikat that overlooks Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. In late 1948, Bukittinggi became the bastion of the Republican government following the collapse of the Republic’s capital in Java.
12. See, for example, “Operasi” (1966, p. 72).
13. *Berdikari* is an acronym that means “standing on one’s own feet” and had previously been used by Sukarno. This operation was not part of the “*Berdikari* Operation Campaign”, known as “*Kotari*”, that was launched by Sukarno in September 1965. The *Kotari* campaign was a purely economic campaign, aimed at promoting economic self-reliance, while the *Operasi Berdikari* was a specific military campaign launched five months prior to the *Kotari* campaign in Aceh as a means of mobilizing the military and society through a territorial warfare campaign.
14. See “Atjeh Dalam Angka” (1971, p. 159). This figure uses national census data for the year 1965 to determine the average percentage of the adult male population (aged 15–54 years) (25.1%) compared to the total population. I have applied this percentage to Aceh census data estimates of total population size in the province in 1965 (1,774,160). For national census figures, see: [www.populationpyramid.net/indonesia/1965/](http://www.populationpyramid.net/indonesia/1965/). For Aceh specific census data, see “*Atjeh*” (1971).

15. By way of signalling his depth of support for this proposal, Sukarno claimed the idea for a Fifth Force had been his own (Mortimer, 2006, p. 384). The formation of a "Fifth Force" was first publicly proposed by PKI Chairman D. N. Aidit in January 1965 (Crouch, 2007, p. 87).
16. For an account of the events of 1 October 1965 in Jakarta, see Roosa (2006).
17. The 30 September Movement's declaration of a "Revolution Council" at 2.00 pm marked the formal transformation of the Movement into a coup body. "Decree No. 1 on the Establishment of the Indonesian Revolution Council", 1 October 1965 (1966, p. 136).
18. It is not known why Djuarsa continued to use the pre-1 October term for the Kohanda command, however it is likely this was done for the sake of simplicity.
19. A military map from Aceh designates North Sumatra as the "North Sumatra Regional Defence Command" ("Kohanda Sumut"), suggesting the Kohanda Command was also activated in North Sumatra on 1 October 1965.

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## The 30 September Movement and Its Aftermath in Bali, October–December 1965

*Akihisa Matsuno*

In Bali it is still difficult for the survivors of the 1965–1966 killings to discuss their memories openly due to ongoing sensitivities about this past. The overall picture of what happened at the time, therefore, remains obscure. A particularly puzzling question is why in Bali the massacres began suddenly in late November and escalated in December after nearly two months of calm. In Central and East Java, where regional pro-30 September Movement (G30S) groups took action, military clashes and vigilante violence had begun by late October (Anderson & McVey, 2009, pp. 89–101; Cribb, 1991, pp. 159–169; Sulisty, 2011, pp. 182–194). In comparison, Bali in October 1965 has been described as a calm period. By late October the Army authorities in Bali had not yet taken any action against the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI), and anti-Communist groups had not yet started violent attacks. A Balinese survivor of the purge described this period; “In October I still went to school just normally” (interview with

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a former student activist, Badung, January 5, 2010). Geoffrey Robinson described Bali in October 1965 as “a tense stalemate between competing political forces at the local level” (1995, p. 286).

Behind this calm in October, however, significant events were unfolding inside the armed forces in Bali. In Jakarta, political life in the capital had been thrown into disarray by the actions of the 30 September Movement, a group of Leftist, middle-ranking military officers who had carried out an attempted coup on the night of 30 September/1 October 1965. The Movement declared that they were carrying out the coup in order to protect President Sukarno from a reported “Council of Generals” which was in turn plotting to overthrow the government (see the Introduction to this volume). The Movement in Jakarta, however, was crushed within twenty-four hours by the Army’s Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), under the command of General Suharto. The official history of the Indonesian Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, TNI) on Indonesian communism writes that, in Bali, there was a group of military officers and PKI agents who conspired to create a military movement in support of the 30 September Movement (Pusjarah TNI, 2009, p. 251). According to this book, the group planned to occupy vital installations, kidnap anti-Communist officials and set up a regional revolutionary council (Pusjarah TNI, 2009, p. 251).

Geoffrey Robinson, quoting a book on the history of the 16th Regional Military Command, writes that a Presidential Guard unit, a Mobile Brigade police company, a unit from the Army’s education and training center and a military police unit were alleged to have been involved in the 1965 coup attempt in Bali (Robinson, 1995, p. 233). Quoting interviews and a local newspaper, Robinson also writes that military and police authorities “claimed to have discovered documents proving PKI-Bali plans to stage a local G-30-S coup, and indicating a sizable unofficial PKI organization in the Regional Military Command”, and that a certain Pujo Prasetyo “was named as the principal G-30-S organizer in the command” (Robinson, 1995, p. 293).

Oddly enough, however, details of this movement in Bali (hereafter referred to as “the movement”), including who the members were and what they actually did, have neither been made public nor reported in the media until now. It is odd because logically this could be the most convenient justification for the subsequent purge. The fact is, as explained in this chapter, the Army did not disclose information about the movement until late November, despite having discovered

its existence in early October. The Army's silence of nearly two months needs to be explained, and by explaining it the chapter tries to answer, albeit partially, the question of how the massacres in Bali began.

### ON THE SOURCES USED IN THIS CHAPTER

This chapter uses two new sources. The first is the court proceedings of the Tamuri Hidayat trial at the Extraordinary Military Tribunal in Denpasar (hereafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') in 1967.<sup>1</sup> This Tribunal was established to try those who were involved in the 30 September Movement in Bali. One of the accused, Tamuri Hidayat, was a retired soldier who worked closely with agents of the PKI Special Bureau who had been in charge of recruiting supporters and sympathizers within the armed forces. The Tribunal heard his case in September 1967 and delivered a death sentence to him at the end of that month. It was the only case of capital punishment in the Tribunal in Bali.

The more-than-800-page court proceedings of his trial consists of the judgment and records of court sessions. Many important actors, mostly from Army units in Bali, appear as witnesses and their accounts provide useful information about their own involvement in these events. Needless to say, the information in the Tribunal documents needs to be handled carefully, but the facts contained in them are mostly reliable because the accused and the witnesses did not dispute the facts. What they challenged was the charge that their actions within the Movement in Bali constituted subversion (30 September). In this chapter the trial proceedings will be referred to as "BTH (Berkas Tamuri Hidayat)", followed by the *procès-verbal* (*berita acara*) number and its content, for example, "BTH: VI, Sukarlan's testimony".

The second new source used in this chapter is a series of interviews I conducted with former members of the armed forces and other persons who directly witnessed, or were close to, these events in Bali in 1965. These interviews were conducted in various places in Bali and other provinces in Indonesia between 2007 and 2013. They were recorded with permission, but the identity of the informants is obscured to protect their anonymity. Furthermore, a local newspaper, *Suara Indonesia*, while not a new source, provides basic information about the events of the period. As the newspaper was close to the PKI's rival in Bali, the Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, PNI), it did not report

on atrocities but does report occasionally on movements on the side of the Army.

### THE MEMBERS OF THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT NETWORK IN BALI

Who were the members of the movement? An appendix to the proceedings of the Tamuri Hidayat trial reveals that in January 1966 the Army dismissed seventeen soldiers for involvement in the 30 September Movement in Bali.<sup>2</sup> Some of these dismissed soldiers later appeared as witnesses in the Tamuri Hidayat trial.

Out of the seventeen, four were majors: Alwi and Edy Santoso from the Sub-regional Military Command (Korem) 163, Wiratmoko from the District Military Command (Kodim) 1619, and Sukarlan from the Army's education and training center or Dodik (Depo Pendidikan) VIII. They are the highest-ranking officers among the soldiers accused to have been involved in the movement in Bali.

Alwi seems to have played a major role in the movement. According to a witness who knew Sukarlan well, Alwi fought with Sukarlan in Indonesia's independence war and served in the Diponegoro Division in Semarang before coming to serve in Bali (interview with an eyewitness, Badung, December 29, 2010). Sukarlan said at the Tribunal that Alwi had visited Sukarlan at his residence on the afternoon of 1 October. Alwi then drove Sukarlan around Denpasar to see the situation in the city, and took Sukarlan to a secret meeting being held at the house of his relative, Raden Sardiyono (BTH: VI, Sukarlan's testimony). Another witness testified at the Tribunal that it was Alwi who presented an analysis of the situation in Jakarta at the second meeting on the same day at the house of Sardiyono (BTM: III, Kaijo Sujono's testimony). Alwi killed himself in custody, probably in November, some days after he was arrested (interview with an eyewitness, Badung, December 29, 2010).

Alwi's close friend, Sukarlan, denied at the Tribunal that he was a member of the movement. Indeed his testimony at the Tribunal does not contain any decisive evidence of his involvement, although he was found guilty in his own trial.<sup>3</sup> Sukarlan was born in Semarang in 1926 and entered the PETA (*Pembela Tanah Air*) or Homeland Defenders, which was the Indonesian auxiliary force created by the Japanese army that played an important role in Indonesia's independence struggle.

After serving with the Diponegoro Division in Semarang and then Battalion 741 in Singaraja, north Bali, Sukarlan became the head of the Army's education and training center, Dodik VIII, in Kediri, Tabanan, south Bali in 1961 (interview with an eyewitness, Badung, December 29, 2010). He was personally close to Sukarno's wife, Hartini, and was sometimes invited to the Balinese Presidential palace in Tampaksiring, Gianyar. Sukarno's parents-in-law once stayed in his home in Denpasar (interview with an eyewitness, Badung, December 29, 2010). Hartini is even said to have stayed once in Sukarlan's home in Denpasar (Ardhana & Wirawan, 2011, p. 388). His wife, Kadarwati, was a niece of General Pranoto Reksosamodra. Pranoto was appointed as Caretaker Army Minister and Commander by Sukarno to replace murdered General Yani on 10 October 1965 in the midst of the chaos after the 30 September Movement. The appointment infuriated Suharto, and Pranoto was arrested in February 1966 and detained without trial for fifteen years (Reksosamodra, 2014, p. 280).

Three captains were involved in the movement. Two of them, Wijono and Sukanto, were from the Regional Military Command or Kodam XVI/Udayana, and the third, Trenggono, was from the Cakrabirawa (Presidential Palace Guard) Detachment in Tampaksiring. Two lieutenants, S. Diman and Zaini B., were company commanders of the Battalion 741.

The list of seventeen Army soldiers does not include anyone from the Mobile Brigade Police (Brimob). Four Brimob officers, however, were involved in the movement. Adjunct Police Inspector II (AIP-II) Kaijo Sujono, was the commander of the artillery unit of Brimob's Battalion 414 stationed in Denpasar. He was born in Madiun and joined the *Laskar Rakyat* or people's militia, an irregular armed group affiliated with the PKI in the independence struggle (BTH: III, Kaijo Sujono's testimony). Another Brimob member of the movement was AIP-II Murakeh, who was the head of the Brimob dormitory in Baturiti as well as Sujono's relative. The last two identified Brimob members of the movement were AIP-II Juhari and Brigadier Police Slamet Surono, who were both platoon commanders in Baturiti units.<sup>4</sup>

A salient feature of this group of seventeen soldiers and four Brimob officers is that all of them were Javanese except I Ketut Teduh, an instructor of the Army's education and training center, Dodik VIII. This does not mean, however, that Balinese soldiers were not affected by the subsequent purge. From October 1965 until early 1966, scores of

Balinese soldiers and policemen were arrested and discharged. They were not directly involved in the movement but they were suspected of having links with the movement.

A key conspirator identified at the Military Tribunal was Tamuri Hidayat, a 41-year-old retired soldier. Strangely, although it is evident that he was no more than a liaison between the soldiers and the PKI Special Bureau agents, he is the one that received the harshest sentence. He was born in Yogyakarta in 1924. He joined the student corps (*ten-tara pelajar*) during the independence struggle and was once detained for two months in connection with the Madiun Affair in 1948. He was assigned to Bali in 1957 and the following year his former comrade Yuwonoharjo introduced him to one of the PKI's Special Bureau agents in Bali, Wihaji (alias Narwo). Through Wihaji he met the Bureau's senior agent, Pujo Prasetyo (alias Paijo). In 1962 he took the oath to become a loyal supporter of the PKI. In 1964 Hidayat retired from the Army, but in September 1965 he was called to assist Special Bureau agents in preparation for a military action in October (BTH: II, Tamuri Hidayat's testimony).

Two PKI Special Bureau agents were involved in the movement. Pujo Prasetyo was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Tribunal and, as of 1995, was still in prison in Denpasar (Robinson, 1995, p. 293). Pujo had once stayed in Beijing for some time (interview with an eyewitness, Badung, December 29, 2010). He had skills in acupuncture and in fact had taught these skills to other inmates in prison. Meanwhile, little is known about the other agent, Wihaji, including his whereabouts after 1965. Hidayat told the court that Wihaji introduced himself as a staff member of the PKI's regional committee (*Comite Daerah Besar*) or CDB-Bali (BTH: II, Hidayat's testimony). It is unlikely that Wihaji was a staff member of the CDB-Bali, however, as Special Bureau personnel were part of a separate section headed by Syam and placed directly under the control of the PKI Secretary, D. N. Aidit (Roosa, 2006, p. 128).

In fact, the Tribunal did not examine the role of the PKI's CDB-Bali in connection with the movement. The Secretary of the CDB-Bali was Ketut Kandel; his name never appeared in the trial of Tamuri Hidayat except in a list of the members of Bali's Revolutionary Council, a body of military officers and civilian leaders that the movement allegedly established to take over after their coup. The judges did not even ask about him during the trial. By the time of the trial in 1967, Ketut Kandel had disappeared, most probably murdered at a widely-rumored mass

execution in the village of Kapal, Badung, on 15 or 16 December 1965 (interview with a former student activist, Badung, September 21, 2009).

### THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT'S PLANS IN BALI

Preparations by the movement to carry out some form of military action in Bali began, at the latest, around three weeks before 1 October (BTM: II, Hidayat's testimony). The information provided in testimonies at the Tribunal and from interviews with witnesses is partial, but it provides some insight into the planning and movements of those involved in the 30 September Movement in Bali. In early September, Hidayat was informed by Special Bureau agent Wihaji that President Sukarno's health was in a critical condition and that the Council of Generals, led by General Nasution and supported by the CIA, was preparing for a coup against the President. Hidayat also reported at the Tribunal that he had heard there would be an announcement from Jakarta later that month. It is also known that on 10 September Hidayat went to meet one of the four majors accused of involvement in the movement, Major Wiratmoko from the Kodim 1619 in Singaraja. Separately, First Lieutenant Zaini B. of Company A of Battalion 741 stationed in Kuta testified at the Tribunal that he had been told to occupy the Tuban airport once a movement was launched in Jakarta (BTM: Judgment). On the morning of 1 October, after the leader of the 30 September Movement, Lieutenant Colonel Untung, had released his first statement through the state radio station (RRI) in Jakarta, these officers, soldiers and civilians in different places in Bali were immediately contacted. The judgment of the Hidayat case summarizes the moves of the Special Bureau agents and armed forces members involved in the movement in Bali on 1 October as follows.

At 7 a.m., 1 October 1965, Hidayat was asked by Wihaji to come to a meeting held at the house of Raden Sardiyono at Kamboja Street No. 60-D, Denpasar. Present at the meeting were Special Bureau agents Wihaji and Pujo Prasetyo, as well as Tamuri Hidayat. Also present at this meeting were Bambang Sutopo and Kustaji, both public prosecutors in Bali, First Lieutenant Adhi Wasito, Second Lieutenant Subaja and Raden Sardiyono. At this meeting they agreed to take military action in support of the 30 September Movement in Jakarta. They planned to occupy vital installations in Bali, such as the state radio station (RRI), the post and telecommunications office (Postel), the Tuban airport and a textile

factory, Balitex. The group also planned to detain “reactionary” military officers and politicians (BTH: Judgment). The names of these officers and politicians were not revealed.

The judgment of the Tamuri Hidayat trial concludes that the group had a draft member list of Bali’s Revolutionary Council. Tamuri Hidayat, however, disputes this. At his trial, Hidayat testified that Pujo Prasetyo had a memo with a number of names that he thought might be people who could become members of a Bali-based Revolutionary Council but he said that the memo was not discussed at the meeting that morning (BTH: II, Hidayat’s testimony).

After the meeting, around noon, participants of the meeting left the house to contact other soldiers and Brimob officers in their network. Bambang Sutopo and Raden Sardiyono traveled to Singaraja to meet Lieutenant Colonel (Overste) Kenyung Sardiyono and Major Wiratmoko from the Kodim. Pujo Prasetyo and Tamuri Hidayat went to see AIP-II Kaijo Sujono at the Brimob’s dormitory in Kereneng, Denpasar. From there Pujo Prasetyo and Tamuri Hidayat went to Tabanan and met with Assistant Lieutenant II Agus Sutyono of the Dodik VIII at the *Sederhana* guesthouse. They then traveled to Baturiti where they met AIP-II Murakih at his home and Police Brigadier Slamet Surono (BTH: Judgment).

At 7 p.m. of the same day, a second meeting was held at the same house on Kamboja Street. This time, Captain Sukanto, Major Sukarlan, Major Alwi, AIP-II Kaijo Sujono, Major Wiratmoko, Second Lieutenant Suratman and Sergeant Jawawi attended in addition to Tamuri Hidayat and the two PKI Special Bureau agents. Captain Sukanto volunteered to take up the command of the planned military action. The meeting agreed to occupy the Balitex factory, the Tuban airport and an intersection in west Denpasar. It also agreed to take similar actions in Singaraja and Tabanan and to guard the house of the Regional Military Commander, Brigadier General Syafiuddin (BTH: Judgment).

The alleged list of twenty-five Revolutionary Council members, included in the Judgment, shows an interesting composition. The list names Captain Trenggono of the Cakrabirawa Detachment as the chair and Lieutenant Colonel Kenyung Sardiyono from Kodim 1619 in Singajara as the vice-chair. It further included, in addition to other names of those conspirators, the PKI’s CDB-Bali secretary, Ketut Kandel, Governor Suteja, MPRS member Gede Puger, the 16th Regional Military Commander Syafiuddin, and PNI leader I Gusti Putu Mertha.

A local Nahdlatul Ulama leader and a Hindu religious leader are also named. In effect, the planned Revolutionary Council was to represent a Sukarno-style united coalition, representative of Sukarno's NASAKOM (nationalism, religion, Communism) vision at the regional level with a strengthened Communist component.

This second meeting ended around 9 or 10 p.m. In Jakarta by 7 p.m. on 1 October "all main installations in and around the center of Jakarta had been brought under Suharto's control, and all hostile troops had been withdrawn from the city" (Anderson & McVey, 2009, p. 81). Calculating from the fact that Major Alwi and Hidayat reached the Dodik VIII in Kediri around 11 p.m. with the order to cancel the movement (BTH: Judgment), reports of the coup's failure in Jakarta probably had reached Denpasar by around the end of the meeting.

#### ABORTED ACTIONS AND THE EXPOSURE OF BALI'S 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT

Once the 30 September Movement in Jakarta had failed, the plans of the movement in Bali had to be immediately cancelled. But it was too late. Preparations at the Brimob units in Baturiti and at Dodik VIII in Kediri were already underway.

Around 11 p.m. or midnight on 1 October, two platoons of Company C of the Brimob's Battalion 414 in Baturiti under the commands of Juhari and Slamet Surono left their barracks for Denpasar (BTM: Judgment; interview with a former Brimob member, April 3, 2011). They were commanded by Kaijo Sujono. The platoons reached Balun on the outskirts of Denpasar where they set up guard on a major road. Around 1:30 a.m. on 2 October, Hidayat arrived there in a Jeep and told Sujono of the cancellation. The Brimob platoons then proceeded to the Brimob headquarters in Kerenang, Denpasar (BTM: Judgment).

The following morning on 2 October, four Brimob officers, namely Sujono, Murakih, Juhari and Surono, were detained, taken to Surabaya for investigation and then returned to Bali after a few days. They were kept in custody until they were tried at the police court-martial in 1969. Sujono was sentenced to 20 years, Murakih 15 years, Juhari 12 years and Surono 10 years (interview with a former Brimob member, April 3, 2011).



Meanwhile, soldiers, policemen and activists of the PKI-affiliated youth organization, Pemuda Rakyat, had gathered near the Dodik VIII on the night of 1 October. Sukarlan and Hidayat had left Denpasar for the Dodik VIII before the second meeting at the house of Sardiyono ended and had arrived in Kediri at around 8:30 p.m. (BTH: Judgment). A former policeman who witnessed the crowd near the Dodik VIII had heard that there was a plan to seize weapons and ammunition at the Dodik VIII (interview with a former policeman, Gianyar, August 26, 2013). Sukarlan, however, denies that the Dodik VIII was involved in the movement. He claims that soldiers were gathered in order to do *consignering* or to confine troops to their barracks in order to remain on standby. There, at around 11 p.m., Alwi came to tell Sukarlan that, “the movement has been cancelled (*gerakan tidak jadi*)” (BTH: VI, Sukarlan’s testimony). Sukarlan admitted at the trial that a shooting had taken place near the armory on the Dodik VIII’s premises. He explained that a guard fired a warning shot when the crowd approached the armory. Later in the prison he heard a story that it had been some Pemuda Rakyat youths who had attempted to attack the armory (BTH: VI, Sukarlan’s testimony).

Sukarlan denied the charge that he was a part of the movement, but he did not deny that he had sympathy for the movement’s aims. When a judge asked Sukarlan if he agreed with the movement, pointing to the fact that he did not speak much at the meeting at Sardiyono’s house, he answered, “I think I agreed”. He also said, “Now I know it was wrong. If I had known he [Sukanto] would become the leader (*gembong*), I wouldn’t have agreed” (BTH: VI, Sukarlan’s testimony). If he were telling the truth, he had most probably been drawn into the plot by his long-time friend, Alwi.

As a result of the aborted action at the Dodik VIII, 16 officers and soldiers of Dodik VIII were arrested (interview with a former soldier, Tabanan, September 25, 2009). While most of the arrests took place in the middle of October, Sukarlan was probably arrested on 25 November 1965 (interview with a former soldier, Tabanan, September 25, 2009). In a tragic development, Sergeant Saryono of Dodik VIII killed himself with a hand grenade (Pusjarah TNI, 2009, p. 300).

The crackdown on “progressive” officers, soldiers and policemen did not stop with the arrests of those directly involved in the abortive actions. By mid-October, nine policemen in Tabanan had been put under investigation and they were arrested in mid-November (interview

with a former policeman, Gianyar, September 22, 2009). As quoted above, the TNI claims that seventy-six members of the armed forces were arrested during this period. Out of the various units involved, Battalion 741 became a particular focus of the crackdown. The following section examines what happened to the members of Battalion 741.

### CRACKDOWN IN SINGARAJA

Singaraja is the capital of the northern district of Buleleng. It developed as the center of politics, economy and modern education in Bali as the seat of the Dutch colonial authorities on the island, and then as the provincial capital after independence until 1961 when the provincial capital moved to Denpasar. In 1965 the city was the second most important place for the Army on the island, as the headquarters of the Korem 163, the Kodim 1619 and the Army's Infantry Battalion 741 were all located there. The Army in Bali had its origins in an East Javanese battalion (Battalion VIII, Infantry Regiment 39) from Sukadana/Lumajan, East Java, and it was this battalion that had developed into the Battalion 741 (Sudjatmiko, 1992, p. 121). It is not surprising that many of this Battalion's officers were Javanese.

The Battalion 741 became a focus of the crackdown against the 30 September Movement in Bali particularly because its Company B commander, First Lieutenant S. Diman, had been appointed as the field commander for the 1 October action in Singaraja, while its Company A commander, First Lieutenant Zaini B. in Kuta, was tasked with occupying the Tuban airport (BTH: Judgment). According to a soldier who knew the field commander of the Movement's action, S. Diman, he was a man with a simple lifestyle. He did not drive a car, so he usually walked. He also liked to eat *tempe* (fermented soybean), but he was eloquent when he gave an indoctrination class on Sukarno's Guided Democracy ideology or Manipol-USDEK.<sup>5</sup> People tended to see persons like Diman as pro-PKI (interview with a former soldier, Jembrana, October 1, 2011).

From late November 1965 until 1966, many members of this Battalion were arrested. On 25 November, 12 soldiers including Sergeant Madra'i, I Nyoman Notes, Ida Bagus Santa, Ida Bagus Wasa and Sergeant Pranhayal (also known as Naya) from Kupang were arrested and put in a Battalion cell. As a great shock to their fellow soldiers, on 29 November these 12 soldiers in the cell were machine-gunned from

outside. All 12 soldiers in the cell died. According to one account, Sergeant Madra'i began to kick or bang the wall of the cell from inside because he heard his wife screaming in panic at their nearby home protesting against the burning of their furniture, and then the soldiers guarding the cell thought that the detainees were trying to escape, so they opened fire (interview with a former soldier, Jembrana, October 1, 2011).

Some of the murdered soldiers belonged to a platoon under the command of First Lieutenant Bagus Sugiarto, a nephew of General Pranoto Reksosamodra. Sugiarto himself was arrested in Denpasar in February 1966, and was put in jail in the Pekambangan prison (interview with a former military officer, Badung, March 31, 2015). On 29 November 1965, more soldiers were arrested from Battalion 741, after which time they were detained for years without due process (interview with a former soldier, Jembrana, October 1, 2011).

### ANALYZING THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT IN BALI

From the descriptions of the movement's members and their actions above it is now possible to discuss the scope and nature of the movement. The main conspirators were middle-ranking officers such as majors, captains and lieutenants, and they acted closely with like-minded soldiers under their command. They were Javanese and came from various units stationed in Bali. These facts indicate that the origins of the movement were not likely rooted in local Balinese politics. The conspirators believed that a military coup plotted by "the Council of Generals" against President Sukarno was imminent and they therefore planned to take action to safeguard the President from this conspiracy. Symbolically, Captain Trenggono of the Cakrabirawa (Presidential Palace Guard) Detachment was assigned to the position of chair of Bali's Revolutionary Council, as Lieutenant Colonel Untung of the Cakrabirawa Regiment became the chair of the Revolutionary Council in Jakarta. Safeguarding the President was the task of the 30 September Movement led by Untung and, therefore, what the movement in Bali would do was to occupy vital installations and stop military and civilian leaders of the opposite camp from moving.

The purpose of the movement in Bali was primarily a show of support for Untung's attempted coup in Jakarta. In Bali, where both the civilian and military leaderships were ardent Sukarnoists and cooperative

with the PKI, from the movement's point of view a coup against them was an illogical notion. There is even a testimony that Regional Military Commander Syafiuddin had been informed of the movement's planned action. If this is true, Sayfiuddin had given tacit approval to the movement.

The action was not a well-prepared one. On the morning of 1 October the conspirators were still discussing whether they should take military action or non-military action. They then quickly decided to take military action, but this indicates that they might not have been planning a complex action. Moreover, coordination was not easy because the units involved were scattered across Bali, as were the places they planned to take over. As John Roosa pointed out in the case of Untung's movement in Jakarta (Roosa, 2006, p. 204), the movement in Bali also lacked a "central command" or "a single decision-making center". The movement lacked modern communication equipment, and this fatally delayed the arrival of the decision to cancel the action at the units outside Denpasar.

The movement's relation with the PKI is a central issue. Two Special Bureau agents, Pujo Prasetyo and Wihaji, were without doubt involved in the conspiracy. Their role was to feed the core conspirators information from Jakarta, to facilitate their meetings and discussions and to carry messages among them. However, at least from the documents of Tamuri Hidayat's trial before the Extraordinary Military Tribunal in Denpasar two years later, it is difficult to say whether the two Special Bureau agents took the initiative or even tried to convince them to launch a military movement. Tamuri Hidayat was not a Special Bureau agent, but as a former soldier who had pledged his loyalty to the PKI, he accompanied the two Special Bureau agents. He was essentially a messenger.

Other PKI local cadres or supporters do not appear as actors in the movement in the proceedings of Tamuri Hidayat's trial. The Tribunal neither summoned them as witnesses nor used their interrogation records as evidence. Furthermore, the judges refrained from asking questions about them during the trial. Witnesses also did not mention their relation with the PKI's Regional Committee in Bali or the CDB-Bali. It was as if the judges were satisfied with the mere fact that the accused had contact with Special Bureau agents.

For the Tribunal, however, it had become impossible to prove links between the movement and the CDB-Bali because almost all members of the PKI's local cadres and their close associates had been killed by

that time. The CDB-Bali's secretary, Ketut Kandel, his staff members Anom Dada and Bandem Wirka, and PKI newspaper *Fajar*'s editor Ida Bagus Warjana are all believed to have been killed in a mass execution in Kapal on the outskirts of Denpasar on 15 or 16 December 1965 (interview with a former policeman, Gianyar, September 23, 2009; interview with a former political prisoner, Gianyar, September 23, 2009; interview with a former student activist, Badung, January 5, 2010). Gede Puger, a close associate of Governor Suteja and a successful businessman, is also believed to have been killed in the same execution (interview with a former student activist, Badung, January 5, 2010). Governor Suteja himself had by then disappeared, and was believed to have been killed. He was picked up by four military men at his residence in Jakarta on 29 July 1966, and since then he had not been seen (interview with a Suteja's family member, Jembrana, September 22, 2009). Public prosecutor-turned District Head of Gianyar supported by the PKI, I Made Sayoga, had been murdered in Gianyar probably in early 1966 (interview with a member of Sayoga's family, Gianyar, August 26, 2013). If PKI cadres were detained before the execution, the Army would have interrogated them. But the Army decided not to use their interrogation records or confessions to prove the involvement of the PKI in the 30 September Movement at the Tribunal. Instead, the Army buried everything that connected the movement to the CDB-Bali.

Finally, an important question needs to be answered. That is, why did the Army not expose the existence of the movement until late November, despite knowing about it in early October? The Army officials uncovered this information after the Brimob officers were detained on 3 or 4 October. The detained Brimob officers were immediately transferred to Surabaya and they were interrogated there. The Army commander's decision to dismiss the seventeen soldiers mentioned above refers to a radiogram dated 10 October on the investigation of those involved in the 30 September Movement.<sup>6</sup> So, it can be assumed that the Army had known the movement's plot by then.

However, the Army held off for nearly two months, finally leaking the information to local newspaper *Suara Indonesia* in late November that the CDB-Bali had been involved in the plot. On 28 November the newspaper carried an article on its front page with the title of "House on Kamboja Street D. 60 as Hideout of 'G-30-S'". This article alleged the PKI had plotted to form a Revolutionary Council and to organize

a military action using members of the armed forces. Quoting “an authoritative circle” as the source, the article writes:

Therefore, it may be said that the house on the Kamboja Street was their headquarters (the first hideout), and that later their activities moved to the PKI’s CDB-Bali on Diponegoro Street. It was at this second place (CDB-Bali) where before daybreak on 1 October 1965 [they] stepped up activities to perfect the plan and its implementation of the 30 September Movement in Bali. (*Suara Indonesia*, 28 November 1965, p. 1)

Two “facts” are claimed in this news report. One is that, after the second meeting on the night of 1 October, the conspirators moved their base to the PKI’s CDB-Bali. The other is that a secret meeting was held before daybreak on 1 October there. Neither of these two “facts” can be found in the proceedings of the Hidayat trial. As already explained above, the two meetings of the group on 1 October were both held at the house on Kamboja Street, and it was impossible for the group to have yet another meeting anywhere else in Denpasar before the group began to take action. The second meeting lasted from 7 p.m. until around 9 or 10 p.m. and the news of the failure in Jakarta reached Denpasar by around 10 p.m. at the latest. Those at the Dodik VIII in Kediri, more than an hour away from Denpasar, received the instruction to cancel the action from a messenger at around 11 p.m. Therefore, having a meeting to “perfect the plan” before daybreak is illogical.

During the trial of Tamuri Hidayat, the prosecutors did not try to prove that the CDB-Bali had played any role in the whole event. If the prosecutors had had any evidence that pointed to the CDB-Bali, it is likely they would have used it because proving the PKI’s role in the 30 September movement in Bali definitely served the purpose of the Army.

Why, then, was this fabrication necessary in late November? Perhaps it was deemed necessary, given that late November was a critical juncture in the course of the anti-Communist crackdown. As Geoffrey Robinson writes, “the political and military situation in Bali began to change dramatically in the latter half of November” (Robinson, 1995, p. 292). On 22 November, the Army had killed the PKI’s top leader on the run, D. N. Aidit, in Central Java near Solo (Cribb, 1991, p. 165), indicating that even prominent figures were not given mercy. By late November in Bali, meanwhile, many PKI members and other leftist figures had been

stripped of their positions or ousted from government offices or schools, and they had either been detained in the police dormitory in Sanglah, south Denpasar, or in the prison at Pekambangan on Diponegoro Street. The case of the Governor's close ally, Gede Puger, was illustrative. He was arrested sometime in November, and on 26 November the company he founded, P. T. Mojopahit, ousted him from its commissioners' board (*Suara Indonesia*, 30 November 1965). From mid-November to late November, the PKI's mass organizations and village groups were forced to gather in villages and towns, and to ceremonially dissolve these organizations.

After 28 November, the day the above-mentioned newspaper article came out, the Army began to take more aggressive action. On 29 November, as mentioned above, 12 soldiers were machine-gunned to death at Battalion 741 in Singaraja. On 30 November, the Army sent in spies to a villagers' meeting in Tegalbadeng, Jembrana, and as a result the spies were murdered by the villagers. This incident triggered an intensive crackdown in the area, and led to the first massacre in Bali in 1965 at an empty Chinese shop, Toko Wong, in Negara on 2 December (Ida Bagus, 2012, pp. 214–215; Robinson, 1995, p. 295; Suryawan, 2007, pp. 142–152). On 1 December, Regional Military Commander Syafiuddin publicly stated, “[We] are not satisfied with the dissolution of the PKI alone. [We will] thoroughly destroy it so that there will be no more crackdowns” (*Suara Indonesia*, 3 December 1965). From the following day onwards, violence was unleashed against alleged PKI members and those who had links with them in towns and villages across the island. The execution of some villagers in Bringkit Village, a village seen as a PKI stronghold, in Badung took place on 5 December (interview with an eyewitness, Badung, September 20, 2007). The Army Para-commando Regiment (RPKAD) troops arrived in Denpasar on 7 December, and “their arrival coincided with the rapid intensification in mid-December” (Jenkins & Kammen, 2012, p. 101). After a month of intense killings, on 25 December, Syafiuddin announced to RPKAD soldiers and PNI vigilantes who gathered at the Bali Hotel that “90% (of the Communists) had been eliminated” (*Suara Indonesia*, 27 December 1965). By mid-1967, one official source explains, the total death toll in Bali had reached 50,000 (BTH: judge's statement in the Judgment). Other sources estimate the number as high as 80,000 (Robinson, 1995, p. 273).

Today in Bali very few remember that there was the 30 September Movement in Bali. This is because the movement did not have its origins in local Balinese politics. In this sense, it is possible to say that the movement was an internal affair of the Army. But that is not the whole story. The PKI's Special Bureau was there not as a bystander but as an accomplice in the conspiracy. Their actual role in the movement was minor. But when the movement failed miserably, it was tens of thousands of PKI cadres and supporters in Bali who had to endure the most fatal consequences. The 28 November article of *Suara Indonesia*, which fabricated the fact that the PKI's CDB-Bali was the center of the conspiracy and, by so doing, shifted all the blame on to the PKI, should be placed in this context of anti-Communist crackdowns. The article amounted to a declaration of war against the PKI and the leftists in Bali. An annihilation operation against them then soon spread across the island.

## NOTES

1. Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Denpasar), *Berkas Putusan no. PTS-026/MLB-IX/TH/1967 perkara Tamuri Hidayat, ex peltu UBT nrp. 290292, dalam peristiwa Gerakan 30 September di Bali, 1967*. I thank the Cornell University's Kroch Library for giving me access to this document.
2. *Surat-Keputusan Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Darat Nomor: KEP-601/476-pn/XVII/66* (Decision of the Minister/Commander of the Army No. KEP-601/476-pn/XVII/66), dated 31 January 1966. Out of the seventeen listed in the document, one is Tamuri Hidayat, who was already a retired soldier at the time of the incident. Major Alwi was an important member of the group, but he is not listed in the document because he had committed suicide before this document was made.
3. Sukarlan was tried at a separate military tribunal in the late 1970s and was given a sentence of 20 years of imprisonment for subversion. He died in Lombok on 1 November 2006 (interview with an eyewitness, Badung, December 29, 2010).
4. The Brimob's Battalion 414 had its headquarters in Denpasar, but one company was stationed in Baturiti, a village located strategically on the Denpasar-Singaraja route.
5. "Manipol" is an abbreviation of "Manifesto Politik", the name given to Sukarno's independence day speech of 18 August 1959 (Legge, 1972, p. 330). USDEK is "an acronym made from the initials of the 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang' 45), Socialism à la Indonesia, Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*), Guided Economy (*Ekonomi*



*Terpimpin*) and the Indonesian identity (*Kepribadian Indonesia*)” (Legge, 1972, pp. 332–333). Manipol-USDEK constituted the ideological base of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy regime.

6. The radiogram is referred to as radiogram MEN/PANGAD No. T-2615/1965, dated 10 October 1965 on the investigation of the Army members/civilians who were involved in the 30 September Counter-revolutionary Movement.

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## The Connection Between Land Reform and the 1965–1966 Tragedy in Bali

*Roro Sawita*

“Who says land reform was a creation of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)? It was [the result of] legislation that was approved by the DPR and central government, this means that all parties agreed with it”. (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013)

These are the words of a survivor of the 1965–1966 tragedy in Gianyar, Bali. He made this comment in response to the myth that land reform was purely a PKI initiative. It is of crucial importance, however, that we reassess who supported land reform, how it was implemented and local reactions to this because of their far reaching consequences. In this chapter I argue that the massacre of PKI members and their sympathizers was

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so large in scale on the island of Bali precisely because of the effects of land reform. It is believed that more than 80,000 people, or 5% of the population of Bali, were killed during the mass killings following the 30 September Movement in Jakarta (Cribb, 2003).

It is unsettling to realize that while visitors often view Bali as a beautiful island, home to a friendly people with a complex culture and deep religiosity, in reality, the island hides a dark past. Based on ten years of collecting the oral histories of Balinese people over seventy years of age, I have observed that people of this age continue to admire Sukarno in his role as Indonesia's first President; they recall being amazed not only at his physical appearance and presence, but also with his ideas and policies, including his legislation relating to the implementation of land reform. This expressed admiration for land reform, however, disguises deep tensions and divisions in Balinese society that resulted from the implementation of land reform.

Sukarno believed the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 (UUPA) would be able to solve problems experienced within the agrarian sector, which served as the basis of the national economy, and would help contribute towards creating a more just and equal society (Rachman, 2012). At the local level, its implementation unsurprisingly caused major friction between large land owners (landlords) and sharecroppers (tenant farmers). This is because land owners were not willing to have the land they owned taken over by landless peasants, despite being offered compensation by the government. This situation was heightened in 1963 by the reduction of remuneration received by landlords (Robinson, 2006). Meanwhile, landless peasants, who had, until this time, been surviving by living hand to mouth, were offered hope that they would be able to improve their situation (PRS, personal interview, September 10, 2013).

At the time of these flaring tensions between landlords and peasants, competition was also increasing between political parties, as they vied for support and power. In Java, for example, this competition occurred between the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), while in Bali, this competition occurred between the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the PKI (Aprianto, 2003). Long before this, the PKI and its affiliated organizations had already pondered the socio-economic problems faced by the peasantry. As a result, the PKI was the main party to advocate on behalf of poor peasants for issues important to them (Lyon, 1984). Even though land reform was approved by the Indonesian parliament, the PKI, supported by the Indonesian Peasants' Front (BTI), pushed strongly for its implementation. This resulted in peasants drawing closer to the BTI and PKI in order

to advance their interests. Meanwhile, landlords sheltered behind the parties that opposed the PKI (KL, personal interview, August 27, 2013).

Peasants, often with the assistance of the BTI and like-minded organizations, carried out “unilateral actions” (*aksi sepihak*): seizing land and planting their own crops. Landlords, with the assistance of the PNI which offered them protection, responded by taking back the land and expelling the peasants. Tensions intensified to the point that the two sides would trade insults and physical altercations sometimes also occurred (ND, personal interview, February 2012). This conflict continued to increase and divide local society until news spread about the 30 September Movement in Jakarta. Then individuals who were alleged to be members of the PKI, or who were identified as sympathetic to the land reform campaign, were subsequently massacred without mercy. They were hunted day and night, while those who survived were thrown into jail for years without due legal process.

In this chapter I focus on how the land reform campaigns shaped patterns in the killings. I emphasize how this campaign created deep seated anger. It is not my intention, however, to argue that the campaigns alone were enough to trigger the violence. The Indonesian army also played a role in shaping these resentments and encouraging killing with impunity. In the aftermath of the 30 September Movement’s actions in Jakarta, the army provoked those whose property and control of the land had been threatened. Former PNI members recall rumors spreading in society that if they did not kill the PKI, it would be them who would be killed (IWN, personal interview, December 24, 2012). Meanwhile, the newspapers and radio, which were already under the control of the army, portrayed the PKI as the mastermind behind the killing of the generals and alleged that Gerwani members had danced naked over the corpses of the generals (KKPK, 2014). The army also alleged that the PKI planned to overthrow the government. Spurred on by the army, which supplied both psychological support and weapons (KW, personal interview, December 21, 2012), and, indeed, mobilized its own forces, Bali was transformed into a mass grave site (PRS, personal interview, September 30, 2011).

Most of the killings that occurred in the villages targeted people who had been involved in the land reform campaign. Landlords, using PNI supporters, targeted these people because they felt threatened by them. Those who opposed the landlords became soft targets in the *kampung* (village hamlet). This included not only PKI members, but also those who in their everyday life had appeared sympathetic towards the peasantry and who had participated in or even just watched the land seizures. Villages headed by PKI members that had implemented aspects of land

reform in accordance with the law were attacked indiscriminately by PNI affiliated *tameng* (mobile killing squads) with the assistance of the army and police (NM, personal interview, December 27, 2013). Meanwhile, villages that were still in the process of implementing land reform and not headed by the PKI were carefully screened before any attacks began (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013).

Although several scholars have addressed land reform in Bali (see, for example, Hadiwijana, 1992; Putra, 1986; Santika, 1992), they have not yet explained the connection between the actors involved in the land reform campaign and the mass killings of 1965–1966. Geoffrey Robinson’s seminal study, *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali* (2006 [1995]), for example, discusses land reform but does not explain patterns in the killing of supporters of the land reform campaign at the village level. This chapter begins by explaining how land ownership worked in Bali before it was incorporated into the Republic, before outlining the dynamics of land reform during the Sukarno period and the difficulties and challenges faced during the effort to implement land redistribution and profit sharing in a more equitable way. Second, this chapter will explain the political balance of power in Bali that influenced the actions of the political elite, how they positioned themselves in relation to the implementation of land reform and how this played out at the village level. Third, this chapter will provide several examples of patterns in the 1965 killings in several villages in Bali, arguing that targets of the violence cannot be understood without reference to land reform.

Across the field of comparative genocide studies, scholars have established that competition over resources is a significant pre-condition for mass violence and genocide. Internationally, the threat of loss of economic resources by the dominant or perpetrator group has been identified as an important contributing factor in instances of genocide in recent times (see Mayersen, 2010; Midlarsky, 2005b; Verdeja, 2002; Zimmerer, 2014). As in the case of Bali, competition over land as an economic resource has historically been a significant contributing factor for mass violence. Scholars in particular have identified the desire to acquire land as a factor in the Holocaust and the Khmer Rouge genocide, and in relation to colonial land clearances and associated massacres in countries such as Australia (Midlarsky, 2005a; Verdeja, 2002; Zimmerer, 2014). The concept of protecting a community against economic loss also features in rationalizations of mass violence (Zimmerer, 2014), thus further highlighting the notion that competition over

economic resources, and particularly the threat of economic loss by the elite (Midlarsky, 2005b), is an important pre-condition for mass violence. Building on these observations I examine how competition over land shaped and contributed to the violence in Bali.

### LAND REFORM IN BALI

As an agricultural region, land was of great importance in Bali. Who owned the land and who controlled it determined who would enjoy the results of the harvest. During the pre-colonial period the island was divided into kingdoms, or regencies, with each being controlled by one *raja*. The *raja* exercised absolute power over the land, with the results of the harvest being used to enrich the *raja*'s family and the needs of the state. When the kingdoms fell to the Dutch, land ownership was also affected. The direct rule of the *raja* was replaced with indirect colonial rule, with the Dutch now occupying the apex of the bureaucracy. The *raja* that had previously held administrative control were now forced to defer to the Dutch, while land ownership was automatically transferred to the Netherlands (Wirawan, 1985).

The declaration of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945 did not immediately solve all problems; this was particularly the case for the issue of land ownership. Indeed, land would become one of the most controversial issues to be faced by the new nation at this time. The nationalist movement tasked the Republican government with creating new land ownership rules. These rules were meant to eliminate the disproportionate benefits enjoyed by the feudal elite and foreign capitalists and to be compatible with the values of justice and the new national consciousness (Mortimer, 2011).

The transfer of the bureaucratic system from the Dutch to the Republic of Indonesia had returned land rights and ownership to the *raja* and feudal elite.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, sharecroppers and tenant farmers did not experience any significant change in their situation. The system of land ownership was still based on inheritance, which was often passed on orally, without written records. Generally, three main systems were followed when dividing up the results of the harvest between landlords and tenant farmers. The first was the *petandu* (Balinese: *menandu*) system, whereby the convention was to split the harvest “half and half” between the landlord and tenant farmer. The second was the *patelon* (Balinese: *nelon*) system, which divided the harvest by giving 3/5 to the landlord

and 2/5 to the tenant farmer. Lastly, there was the *ngapit* system, whereby the harvest was divided by giving 2/3 to the landlord and 1/3 to the tenant farmer (Raka, 1955). Three other systems that were less frequently applied were the *nerapat* system in which landlords and tenant farmers received 3/4 and 1/4 shares respectively; another unnamed system in which landlords and tenant farmers received 4/5 and 1/5 shares respectively and the *melaisin* system, according to which farmers paid rent and the share of the crops is unclear (Table 5.1).

In addition to this often unequal system of distribution, sharecroppers were also saddled with the costs of production. This included having to pay for seeds, fertilizer and the cost of treating any plant disease. Sharecroppers were also obligated to supply manpower for religious ceremonies, to clean temples and to feed horses, amongst other tasks. As a result, sharecroppers continued to struggle with poverty, while any surplus they were able to produce was given to the land owning class (ND, personal interview, 2012).

The issue of land control in Bali began to reemerge during the early 1950s. The issue was brought to the fore by the failure of the LOGIS (*Lanjutan Organisasi Gerilya Indonesia Seluruhnya*, Continuation of the All-Indonesia Guerilla Organization) guerilla struggle, which had fought against the central government (Sukarno) in 1952–1954 (Robinson, 2006).<sup>2</sup> There were many youths in Bali who were involved in this fight; however, it was only the leaders who received punishment by the central government, while the youths were returned to their villages (Sarwa, 1985). During the period of struggle, many of the families of these youths had sold or mortgaged land to help pay for the struggle. There were also those who lost their land rights as a result of their illegal activities against the government, which meant that when they returned to their village there was no work for them to perform. Meanwhile, those who had taken over this land were reluctant to return it. The former guerillas, meanwhile, joined with the anti-feudal movement and pressed for land reform to be adopted (Robinson, 2006).

On 24 September 1960, President Sukarno ratified the Basic Agrarian Law Act (UUPA, *Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria*) as part of Government Regulation No. 5 1960. This regulation would become known as the Land Reform Act because it limited the total amount of land which could be owned based on the principle that the land should be made available to the people. This regulation is explained in Table 5.2.

**Table 5.1** Systems of share cropping applied across different districts of Bali in the 1950s. Data sourced and adapted from Raka (1955)

<i>District</i>	<i>Total land (hectares)</i>	<i>Menandu 1/2:1/2</i>	<i>Nelon 3/5:2/5</i>	<i>Ngapit 2/3:1/3</i>	<i>Nerapat 3/4:1/4</i>	<i>Other 4/5:1/5</i>	<i>Melaisin rent system</i>	<i>Total shared land</i>	<i>Percentage of total rice fields (%)</i>
Buleleng	13,933	5693	221	485	261	—	—	6600	48
Jembrana	6077	600	—	—	—	—	600	1200	20
Tabanan	23,171	2917	—	—	—	—	—	2917	16
Badung	19,317	2410	—	—	—	—	—	2410	24
Gianyar	15,792	1003	337	109	1121	67	1548	4185	27
Bangli	3212	—	—	798	—	—	—	798	24
Klungkung	4837	—	—	1316	—	—	—	1316	29
Karangasem	8084	—	475	3605	—	—	—	4080	50
Total amount	96,423	12,623	1033	6313	1382	67	2148	23,566	29

The ratios above indicate the share of crops between land owners and tenant farmers



**Table 5.2** Maximum amounts of land under the land reform laws of 1960 that could be owned by individuals according to the related population density. Source of data Soemardjan (1984)

<i>Population density (km<sup>2</sup>) per region</i>	<i>Classification of region</i>	<i>Rice fields (ha)</i>	<i>Dry land (ha)</i>
Up to 50	Not dense	15	20
51–250	A little dense	10	12
251–400	Dense	7.5	9
401 or more	Very dense	5	6

In line with these circumstances, Bali, which had a population of 1,782,529 in 1961, was categorized as a region with a dense population, and the maximum amount of land permitted to be owned was restricted to 7.5 hectares of rice fields and 9 hectares of unirrigated fields (Hadiwijana, 1992). Land owners whose land exceeded this maximum were to have their excess land seized by the government and paid compensation (Harsono, 2008).

In addition to the Land Reform Act, land reform related regulations could also be found in the Sharecropping Act (UUBH, *Undang-undang Bagi Hasil*) as part of Government Regulation No. 2 1960, which was concerned with ensuring harvests were divided more equally. The Sharecropping Act regulated that wet rice fields should be divided on a 1:1 basis, while market gardens and unirrigated fields were to be divided with the tenant receiving 2/3 of the harvest and the landlord receiving 1/3. Landlords were also made to cover the cost of production (Harsono, 2008).

The implementation of the first phase of the land reform campaign began on 1 January 1960. The first task of this campaign was to register land currently in use and to register families that owned land exceeding the maximum amount allowed. This registration, which was carried out by local sub-district offices, continued until 31 March 1961. From the time it was announced this registration would be carried out in accordance with the Land Reform Act. Landlords in Bali felt angry and agitated (KL, personal interview, August 27, 2013). This anger and agitation increased when it became known that harvest distribution rules were also being changed to 1:1. It is easy to understand why landlords, who until then had lived off the labors of the peasantry, became confused and scared when they heard that the area of land they controlled was to be

reduced, as this would lead to a reduction in their fortune and wellbeing. Frustration also grew among landlords who were assigned as absentee landlords because they lived outside the sub-district where their land was registered (PRS, personal interview, September 12, 2013).

Various techniques were used by landlords to try and retain more of their land so that it would not fall into the hands of sharecroppers. Many landlords did not report their excess land or, before the land could be registered, changed the name on the land ownership certificate to state that the land was now owned by someone else in their family, or by someone else the landlord had chosen. There were also cases of family members being suddenly married so excess land could be assigned to children or children-in-law. Many other evasive strategies were also used by landlords (Macrae, 2003; Robinson, 1988).

These efforts did not go unnoticed by sharecroppers or tenant farmers who, according to the new land reform regulations, had rights to receive this excess land from the landlords. In response, tenant farmers worked together with the BTI to carry out acts of sabotage. These acts of sabotage included continuing to plant and maintain control over this land (DJ, personal interview, January 2, 2010). Meanwhile, landlords, who felt cornered by this sharecropper movement and the BTI, grouped together within the PNI, where they asked for the assistance of the PNI-affiliated Indonesian National Farmers' Association (*Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia*), or, "Petani" for short (GPAA, personal interview, October 1, 2010).

The outbreak of unilateral actions by tenant farmers and the BTI, and their planting of disputed land, was responded to by landlords and Petani members, who would pull up the planted fields. The next day, tenant farmers and the BTI would return to replant the field, whereupon the landlords and Petani members would once again pull up the fields, until tensions spilled over. Police were regularly called upon as the keepers of public order to resolve the disputes that resulted (DJ, personal interview, January 2, 2010).

The most well-known unilateral actions were jungle clearing operations and crop planting by BTI members and the PKI in Prapat Agung village and Nusa Mara sub-district in the Yeh Embang district of Jembrana (See Map 5.1 for major locations). These operations inspired Ketut Putu, an artist and member of Lekra (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat*, People's Art Association), to compose a song titled "*Prapat Agung*", a song that became a campaign or battle song for the BTI and PKI in this action



## THE BALANCE OF POLITICAL FORCES IN BALI

In 1958, Bali was assigned provincial status, and a Provincial Government (DPRGR, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong*) was formed. The new DPRGR held a hearing to choose a governor to lead the province. There were two names proposed: Nyoman Mantik and Anak Agung Bagus Suteja. This hearing selected Nyoman Mantik, who was supported by the PNI with 15 votes, meanwhile Anak Agung Bagus Suteja only received 11 votes (Lane, 2010). Sukarno, however, preferred Suteja to become Governor because he had a similar political outlook to the President. Also, during his time as Regional Head of Bali, the Lesser Sunda Islands and Eastern Indonesia, Suteja had demonstrated his ability to carry out policies that were in accordance with those of the central government. In 1959, Suteja was appointed as Bali's first governor (Aju, 2015).

Suteja's appointment became a source of conflict within Bali's elite. The PNI, as Bali's leading party, felt cheated by Sukarno's decision. From this time, Suteja and PNI forces would never see eye to eye. When the PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*, Indonesian Socialist Party) and Masyumi had been banned in 1959, in practice, Bali was left with only two big political parties, the PKI and PNI (Mardia, 2001). As a result, Suteja slowly began to receive the full political support of the PKI, to the point that it began to be rumored that Suteja was in fact a member of the PKI (Lane, 2010).

The PKI benefited from the banning of the PSI and Masyumi as this ban allowed the Party to grow and become a major party. It also benefited from the emergence of the land reform campaign. After the emergence of Nasakom,<sup>5</sup> Balinese youth began to agitate for officials from the banned organizations to be removed from their positions and be replaced: a move which would have automatically benefited the two remaining rival parties. The PKI grew to become the dominant party in the province. The election of Anak Agung Gde Agung and Sayoga as Regents in Badung and Gianyar evidenced this shift. They had been supported by the PKI and were able to beat the PNI's candidates (Robinson, 2006).

Until 1965, political rivalry continued to increase between these two parties. Generally, PKI cadres were more radical because they launched an offensive campaign and were open about their intentions, launching their anti-landlord campaign in open meetings. The two best known PKI

agitators in the province, Anom Dada, who agitated in Indonesian, and Gus Dupem, who agitated in Balinese, would always draw large crowds of supporters when they spoke. The PNI, meanwhile, whose supporters included landlords and the remaining feudal elite, chose to run a defensive campaign (Vickers, 1996).

This growing political friction between the PKI and the PNI became increasingly pronounced and caused the emergence of serious conflicts that were not easily forgotten by the two parties' supporters. This conflict was heightened even further after Governor Suteja, acting in his capacity as PEPELRADA (*Penguasa Pelaksana Perang Daerah*, Regional War Authority) for Bali, ordered Wedastra Sujasa, a PNI representative in Bali's Provincial Government, to step down from the stage where he was delivering a speech with anti-PKI sentiments on 6 March 1965 (Lane, 2010). Wedastra's speech was deemed to have incited divisions between the different Nasakom groups. Wedastra Sujasa was then detained for questioning on the order of the Bali PEPELRADA. This event led to demonstrations in support of Wedastra (GP, personal interview, August 30, 2015).

Sarwa (1985) has written, based on articles published in the *Suara Indonesia* (Voice of Indonesia) newspaper, that on 25 March 1965, graffiti began to appear on the streets, including calls to "Hang Suteja" and "Retool ('kick out') Suteja". Meanwhile, there was also graffiti written saying "Long Live Suteja". At the time, order was becoming severely threatened and in the end the government chose to find a way to stop the conflict from growing. The government needed to find a way to unite the population to ensure continued development by seeking support for its *Ganyang Malaysia* (a Confrontation slogan) campaign. On 24 March 1965, it issued a joint statement that was signed by seven political parties and the Pantja Tunggal<sup>6</sup> to increase unity and to work together in line with Nasakom. The signatories included Governor Suteja, as a representative of the Pantja Tunggal, Merta as a representative of the PNI, Dupem from the PKI, M. A. Achmad from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Mardia from Partindo (*Partai Indonesia*, Indonesian Party), Sujana from Parkindo (*Partai Kristen Indonesia*, Indonesian Christian Party), Frans Diaz from the Catholic Party and Rai Susandi from IPKI (*Ikatan Pendukung-Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, Alliance of Supporters of Indonesian Independence) (Sarwa, 1985).

## EFFECTS OF LAND REFORM AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL

As the conflict within the political elite continued to intensify, this had a direct influence on politics at the village level. At the *kampung* level, people organized along political lines and the position of village head became increasingly important. At this micro level, the socio-political life of the hamlets was determined by local elites depending on their position within the Balinese caste system. Meanwhile, the implementation of land reform was greatly influenced by the character of this local elite. In general, who became a leader within the PKI and BTI was not determined by caste, but by intelligence and strength of analysis. Individuals who became members of the PKI and BTI were often influential members of their communities who possessed leadership characteristics. Rather than their economic status, it was their intellectual abilities and political communication skills that mattered.

Although there were clear class differences, patron–client relations, loyalty and religiosity were also influential factors in the relationship between landlords and tenant farmers to the point that they were able to prevent the development of a strong class consciousness (Scott, 1993). The impact of the land reform campaign was greater on tenant farmers than on landlords because the number of tenant farmers was much greater compared with the number of land owners who were affected by the new maximum ownership limits. Tenant farmers who felt under threat and unsure about the new distribution system were scared that suddenly the landlords would cut off their permission to use the land which they had been working for years (Hadiwijana, 1992). This situation was not only exploited by the farmers' organizations, but also by moderate parties (such as PNI and NU) (Kasdi, 2001). This shows that the tensions and conflict generated from land reform was not only between landlords and tenant farmers, but between tenant farmers themselves (Kasdi, 2001).

Patron–client ties did not prevent the BTI's followers from constantly campaigning in support of the Land Reform Act. Working together with another PKI-affiliation organization, Lekra, the BTI was skilled at winning the hearts of the people, and especially of tenant farmers who desired entertainment. Almost every night in several villages in Bali, members of Lekra were involved in artistic endeavors connected to the land reform campaign.

One village where this occurred was Tojan village in Blahbatuh sub-district, south of Gianyar, which in the 1960s was a small village, home to approximately 150 families. The majority of Tojan's residents were peasants, both wet and dry field farmers, who produced both rice and dry season crops. Within this peasant population, a majority were tenant farmers whose land was owned by the Blahbatuh Palace (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013). In the early 1960s, a dispute occurred between the Blahbatuh Palace and the village occupants. The story of this dispute began with the coconut trees that grew along the village roads. The occupants cut down several of these trees and used the wood to build a village meeting hall, working together as volunteers to build the building. The palace, however, felt that it had been overlooked because the villagers had not asked permission to use the trees. The palace assumed that because the trees were located in the village, they belonged to the palace, while the villagers felt that they belonged collectively to the village.

The dispute developed and it became known among the villagers that the palace and its watchmen planned to attack Desa Tojan. In response, the villagers united and prepared themselves to confront the palace. Because of this resolve, the palace decided not to attack the village, but from this time, the relationship between the villagers and the palace was no longer harmonious, with each side feeling upset with the other (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013).

Time went by and Tojan Village became known as a center of cultural events in support of the Land Reform Act for the Gianyar area. The village was famous for its choir, which it integrated with a gamelan orchestra and Balinese *angklung* (*angklung* is a traditional musical instrument consisting of suspended bamboo tubes which produce a sound when shaken). Every day was filled with rehearsals and the staging of events. Each event would involve many people—30 people for the choir and 20 or so people to play the gamelan and *angklung* (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013). The songs they played were influenced by the land reform campaign and by Sukarno's speeches. Hundreds of people came to watch each performance (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013). In general, these events were announced by officials and by the PKI or BTI in the village where an event was to be held. Naturally, because this invitation was issued by the PKI or BTI, these events were seen as being leftist, and the PNI would not wish to be involved (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013).

These public events were held in the evening after work in the field was over for the day. The performers would ride in the back of a truck to attend the event. The performers did not wear uniforms or other distinguishing accessories; they just wore whatever they had on but this did not dampen their enthusiasm to perform (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013). “*Janger* and *Cak*” (Balinese *kecak* dance) performances were also staged but the dance was changed. Inserted in the middle of the performance was a scene about the “seven village devils”; the evil landlord, the loan shark, the harvest speculator, the capitalist bureaucrat, the middleman, the bandit and evil people with power (PRS, personal interview, September 12, 2013). The scene featured underfed peasants confronting large landlords and their watchmen (the aforementioned “seven devils”). The peasants in the story would then receive the help of the BTI who would chase out these “bad guys” or “seven village devils”. At the end of the story, a PKI or BTI agitator would make an announcement about the importance of implementing the Land Reform Act.

As part of this agitation, it would also be announced that peasants would receive the land that they, up until now, had been tending, without having to be scared of the landlord because they would be protected by the law. Often, this agitation would upset the landlords who felt they were being portrayed as sinful (IWN, personal interview, December 24, 2012). After these actions by the PKI and BTI, the landlords began to feel scared and would group together with the PNI. This fear was further increased when the BTI and PKI called together their supporters to work together on a building: people would come from far and wide to help and, in a day, the building would be complete. Seeing the crowds and the energy of the PKI and BTI’s supporters made their competitors shrink in fear.

In several villages, including in Tojan, the main demand of the BTI and supporters was not the redistribution of land, but the fair division of the harvest. This issue became particularly important in 1962 as a result of a rat plague that caused harvests to fail, a disaster which was then compounded by the eruption of the Gunung Agung volcano (Robinson, 2006).

Peasants in Bali at this time faced a crisis. The eruption of Gunung Agung on 17 March and 16 May had a devastating impact upon local communities, killing 1500 people and destroying over 60,000 hectares



of land. This led to more than 100,000 people experiencing malnutrition and 75,000 fleeing for other regions (Robinson, 2006).

Governor Suteja outlined that he estimated 25,000 hectares of land was destroyed permanently and 100,000 hectares would be unusable for several years (cited in Robinson, 2006, p. 367). In April 1963, Governor Suteja announced:

We have to provide food for 85,000 refugees, and we just don't have the food to do that. The most serious affects are being felt in the east of the island of Bali: Karangasam, Klungkung, Bangli and Gianyar. The refugees from these districts are now surrounding the big cities, Denpasar and Singaraja. (cited in Robinson, 2006, p. 367)

Under these conditions, it was only natural that leftist organizations such as the PKI became more popular and were favored by the population. In Tojan village, the first thing they did was to enforce the equal division of the harvest between peasants and the palace. Without discussion and without requesting permission once the harvest was in, tenant farmers only gave half of their harvest to the palace. Seeing the strength of the people, the palace was not brave enough to take any retaliatory action and resigned themselves to receiving what they were given.

A similar situation also occurred in Selisihan village in Klungkung sub-district and in Kekeran village in Buleleng. Both of these were classified as small villages and there was no domination by landlords. Residents owned small amounts of land, such that each family did not own more than five hectares, with some only owning one hectare. No land owner owned more than the maximum limit; as a result, the main focus in the village was on the distribution of harvests in line with the Sharecropping Act. The village population could not, according to one interviewee from the village, understand what the PKI was, instead referring to division in terms of colour, as this same interviewee has explained: "We were a red base, our village head was red. Our leaders were known throughout the sub-district, our distribution system was equal at 1:1" (KL, personal interview, August 27, 2013). This "red" domination in the village resulted in a very small PNI membership in the village (traditionally depicted as "black") such that they were not brave enough to show themselves.

### AFTER 30 SEPTEMBER 1965

By 30 September 1965, land reform was yet to be fully implemented in Bali. This delay was caused in part by the political parties which appealed to the feudal elite. It was also caused by the PNI's ambivalence; in Jakarta the PNI supported the Land Reform Act, while in the provinces it opposed it, especially in areas where the PKI was involved in carrying out "unilateral actions" to seize land from landlords (Hidayat, 1999).

The competition between these two parties in Bali became increasingly pronounced by the end of September 1965. Balinese people suddenly heard army announcements over the radio about the six army generals and one officer, who were said to be involved with the Generals Council, being killed by the PKI at Lubang Buaya in Jakarta. Several villages in Bali, such as Ubud, Tojan, Bedulu, Selisihan and Kaba-kaba, fell silent and residents were not brave enough to take any actions, other than wait for instructions. They waited for a long time for an order from Sukarno as the Commander in Chief of the Republic of Indonesia to be issued via Bali's Military Commander, Pangdam XVI/Udayana Brigadier General Sjaffudin, but it never came (ND, personal interview, November 8, 2011).

However, there were also several villages that felt that events in Jakarta were of no relevance to the situation in Bali. They continued to carry out their activities as usual to campaign in support of land reform. Until October 1965, there were still some villages that continued to issue official announcements that were leftist in nature (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013).

Throughout October and until November, the atmosphere in the villages became increasingly tense as violent actions began to occur. These actions included the burning down of houses, arrests and the first cases of killings. They were carried out by the PNI's mass base (R, personal interview, December 2011). Because of the urgency of the situation and the lack of clear information, I Gusti Ketut Merta, as the head of PNI Bali, decided to remain formally under the leadership of the national PNI leader Ali Surachman, while at the same time taking a different position to Surachman by choosing to attack the PKI (Hidayat, 1999). The PNI in Bali strengthened its cooperation with the armed forces and four local parties, including the NU, IPKI, Parkindo and the Catholic Party, to crush the PKI (Hidayat, 1999).

At this point it made a significant difference as to whether villages were headed by PKI members, regardless of whether the villagers had participated in the land reform campaigns. In Tojan village, for example, where land reform had been enacted during the initial period of silence, the non-aligned village head Gusti Aji Sepir was replaced by I Nyoman Genep, who was sympathetic to the PNI. This change in village head was able to occur without any resistance. In about mid-November, an order or directive emerged from the village head for all people who considered themselves to be sympathetic to the left to perform a pledge at the palace temple—fourteen people joined in this procession, during which time they pledged to dissolve all Communist-affiliated organizations. An interviewee explained that this pledge was intended to cleanse individuals and to demonstrate their loyalty to the state ideology of *Pancasila*. This procession and pledge was attended by functionaries from the different religious groups, the village head and his staff, plus members of the police and the military. After this procession, all participants were made to sign a list saying they had attended, plus write their name and their position within their respective organizations in the village (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013).

It turns out this process was not only carried out in Tojan village, but also in other villages, including Ubud, Andong, Bedulu, Angan Telu and others, where it was said the village head was not affiliated to the PKI. Meanwhile, these processions were usually carried out by the village head or village elders (NKK, personal interview, January 2, 2010). This pledge procession was not restricted to the main temple (*pura dalem*), but also occurred at village temples as well as at village meeting halls, depending on the decision of the local village head. Meanwhile, villages that were headed by people considered to be affiliated to the PKI did not hold such processions (KW, personal interview, November 5, 2008). Instead they heard news about the burning down of houses—the houses of PKI front-men from outside the *kampung* would be burnt down by villagers or by those from outside the village. Whether they wanted to or not, village residents began to take turns to keep watch during the day and night.

Like a tidal wave that slammed into Bali in December 1965, the killings began. They started in Tegal Badeng village in Jembrana Sub-district where, as described above, many unilateral actions had taken place. Almost 600 people were killed from this one village without any legal process. In an interview, KW (December 21, 2012), a leader of

one of the *tameng* (death squad) groups from Baluk Village in Jembrana sub-district, has said that at this time, he, as a member of Marhaenist Youth,<sup>7</sup> joined together with the PNI. He remembers hearing an order from the army to gather together people who were “brave enough” to become executioners, after which time they joined together with the Marhaenist Youth and were called the “black front” (*barisan hitam*). One platoon of the black front was divided up into teams comprising 10 people, who were tasked with killing with the help of the army.

The *tameng* groups functioned by bringing together people from different villages that would become executioners to “finish off” those whose names were on lists supplied by the District Military Command (Kodim) (*Tempo*, 2012). The executioners were fitted out with *klemang* (swords with a broad, curved blade). They were also lent guns and bullets by the local army. Each group of executioners was only lent one gun, however, as the number of available guns was limited (KW, personal interview, November 5, 2008). The operation to eliminate individuals who were considered to be leftists in Jembrana sub-district lasted for three months (*Tempo*, 2012).

On 5 December, a siege occurred in the area of Bringkit village, Mengwi. There, the head of the village was a PKI leader. News of a plan to destroy the village had reached villagers several days before, but the villagers had not believed the attack would actually occur. Then, out of nowhere, a group of people dressed all in black appeared, accompanied by members of the police and army, and burst into the village. The entire village gathered together and sought refuge in the temple, where they attempted to resist the invaders. The villagers were able to hold off the *tameng* for quite some time, until an agreement was reached that the village would not be completely destroyed if the five main leaders of the PKI were surrendered to the *tameng*. These leaders were then killed in front of the remaining villagers and their families (KW, personal interview, November 5, 2008).

On 7 December, killings began in the city of Denpasar, in the area of Pekambangan, which is today known as Diponegoro Street. A medical student was shot there by the army, before a farmer and his child, who was still in Elementary School, were shot together. This farmer was known as a member of the BTI (NKK, personal interview, February 3, 2014). At the same time, the RPKAD (*Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat*, Special Forces Command) arrived outside Denpasar (DJ, personal communication, November 8, 2011).<sup>8</sup> The RPKAD troops

roamed the city and let the Badung Market in Gadjah Mada Street burn down. They walked with guns over their shoulders and travelled in convoys of cars that were marked “RPKAD” (ND, personal interview, November 8, 2011). The precise roles of the RPKAD, the local army command and police in directing the violence still remain unclear, yet interviewees from civilian organizations which had taken part in the killings repeatedly stress that they followed army orders. It is generally agreed that the army encouraged the violence and that the violence escalated after the arrival of the RPKAD in Bali (Jenkins & Kammen, 2012, pp. 100–102, see also Chapter 4).

In Tojan Village, in mid-November, after the pledge procession, the village continued to experience calm, with activities running as usual. People continued to go to the rice fields, though choir practice and music in support of land reform ceased. In the middle of December, suddenly the police ordered those who had joined in the procession to report themselves to the police station at Blahbatuh, Gianyar. Without thinking twice, 10 people reported themselves and were never seen again—to this day it is not known what happened to them (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013). Meanwhile four other people, who had not reported, were executed next to the village by *tameng* and other villagers (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013).

In Kekeran village in Bueleleng sub-district and Selisihan village in Klungkung sub-district events took a different turn. In these two villages, which are isolated in the mountains, there was no respite from the cleansing operation against leftists, the PKI and its sympathizers. In Kekeran village, on 12 December 1965, beginning at 12.00 pm, a siege occurred before killings by groups of *tameng*, where 40 people were killed and their bodies buried near the village cemetery. The members of these *tameng* groups were identified as members of neighboring villages (KL, personal interview, August 27, 2013).

In Selisihan village, meanwhile, people who were considered to be leftist leaders were grouped together in a row in front of the house of a PNI member. As they were forced to walk toward the graveyard, one by one they had their necks slashed from behind. At the same time, Selisihan village was suddenly surrounded by hundreds of *tameng* members from neighbouring villages. No one was able to run away as every entrance into the village was blocked by a kind of “post” that was guarded by members of the army—eighty eight men were killed, while their property and livestock were looted by the *tameng*. After this, the

corpses of the victims were buried in the village cemetery and given proper rites in the following days when the situation had calmed down. In this small village, only widows and small children remained (NM, personal interview, December 27, 2013).

In Bali alone, it is thought that more than 5% of the population was killed (Aju, 2015). The Bali Military Command estimates 30,000 PKI activists were killed (Sarwa, 1985). PNI members played a key role in carrying out the killings on this island, because the army was able to exploit the mass base of this party whose members already felt antagonized by the PKI and its sympathizers due to the unilateral actions.

## CONCLUSION

The pattern and targets of the mass killings in Bali in 1965–1966 cannot be understood without reference to land reform. The feudal ties between peasants and landlords that existed for hundreds of years before Indonesia became a republic presented significant challenges to the implementation of land reform in Bali during the early 1960s. Deep tensions and divisions occurred in Balinese society, as landlords illegally redistributed their land to relatives and acquaintances, preventing the equitable distribution of the harvest as required by land reform.

Meanwhile, the disputes occurring within elite politics at the provincial level in turn affected politics in the village. The PKI and the PNI competed for the people's allegiance, both openly positioning the other as the cause of the conflict. The PKI, with its strong links to the peasantry, continued to grow during this time, while the landlords, who joined the PNI, grew increasingly apprehensive as their property and control of the land was threatened.

On their own these tensions may not have resulted in mass killings. They may have instead led to lesser-scale conflict between the two parties, with both parties still managing to exist, had it not been for the "green light" and assistance provided by the army to "finish off" the PKI and its sympathizers. The increasing anger and resentment felt by the landlords towards the peasantry, PKI and BTI meant that they were easily provoked by the army in the aftermath of the 30 September Movement's actions in Jakarta. The army leadership aligned itself with the interests of the landlords and the PNI to get rid of the people who, all this time, had opposed them. Thus, the PNI in Bali played an active role in helping the army to wipe out the PKI and its sympathizers down

to the village level, by providing men to fill the *tameng* death squads. The army encouraged the killings and provided the conditions for impunity; capitalizing on the pre-existing conflicts between the PNI and PKI, and effectively engaging the PNI to do its work in eliminating the PKI.

Thus, the areas where land reform was implemented and challenged fit very closely with areas where mass killings took place. The protagonists, who became the killers, and who was killed also fit the patterns across these earlier contestations. Wherever there had been a strong land reform movement, as seen in the cases of Kekeran and Selisihan, the area was considered to be a PKI stronghold and ultimately the death tolls were higher.

Since the terrible tragedy of the killings, the Land Reform Act and the Sharecropper Act have been largely forgotten. Discussion about land reform during the New Order was always linked to Communism, as if land reform was a product of the PKI whereas it was, in fact, legislation approved by the DPR and the central government. After the killings, some of the land which had been taken over by tenant farmers was returned while other land was retained if the handover had already been certified (WN, personal interview, June 12, 2013).

The misunderstanding that land reform was a PKI program has caused ongoing fear and silence in the community, to the extent that people with the financial capacity are often allowed to purchase land in excess of the allowed amount, or purchase land outside their own sub-district without being called to account. Land reform continues to generate fear and division, and this ongoing tension highlights the strong link between mass violence and control of economic resources.

## NOTES

1. Dutch colonial strategy meant that the *raja* nevertheless maintained a position under Dutch rule, and still held a degree of authority over the people in their regencies during this time (Vickers, 1996).
2. LOGIS were a guerilla group who fought against the Sukarno government in the Tabanan region of Bali from 1952–1954.
3. Confrontation with Malaysia, or “*Konfrontasi*” was an Indonesian campaign aiming to stop Malaysia from becoming a “toy” of the English. The campaign came to a peak in 1964 and early 1965.
4. In 1965 Indonesia was in the midst of a campaign to rid West Irian of Dutch rule and make it part of Indonesia.

5. “Nasakom” (an acronym for “Nationalism, Religion (Islam) and Communism”), was a concept first announced by Sukarno in 1926, to signify his belief that Nationalist, Islamist and Communist thought constituted the three key pillars of Indonesian political thought. Nasakom was adopted as official state ideology in 1959.
6. Pantja Tunggal is the official name given to a forum at regional, provincial or district level whose members consist of the governor or regent/mayor, army chief or leader (Kodam/Kodim), police chief, head of parliament and chief prosecutor. Because it has these five representatives, it is called “panca” meaning “five”, and “tunggal” meaning “one”—as in five becoming one.
7. A youth militia group affiliated with the PNI, who subscribed to the Marhaen ideology (Sukarnoism).
8. The exact date of the RPKAD’s arrival is not certain, what is certain is that they were in Denpasar on 7 December 1965 (DJ, personal interview, November 8, 2011).

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## Two Women's Testimonies of Sexual Violence During the 1965–1966 Indonesian Massacres

*Annie Pohlman*

### TWO WOMEN'S STORIES OF VIOLENCE: IBU TATI AND IBU JUSUFA

The policemen and guards would come looking for “it” every night. Just imagine that, they would come every night just looking for it. I was lucky, I had my little baby, I was arrested not long after giving birth [...] and I held on tightly to the baby. I carried him everywhere. The policeman would get angry at me, for always holding him. He would kill him, he’d say. [...] But I just held onto him. I didn’t care if he were angry, because what had he [the baby] done, after all? The others, well, it was very sad. Every night! By seven in the evening, we would all be frightened, there was nothing that could be done, none of us could even laugh anymore. Whichever one they wanted, they’d take, then they’d take it in turns. They’d be taken upstairs, which is where [they] slept.<sup>1</sup>

(Ibu Tati, former political prisoner, West Sumatra)

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Ibu Tati (a pseudonym) is a survivor of the mass violence which engulfed Indonesia in the mid-1960s.<sup>2</sup> She was one of hundreds of thousands illegally arrested and held in political detention following the 1965 coup, known as *tapol* (an abbreviation of *tahanan politik* or political prisoner). Many were detained for months or years, some for more than a decade. Prisoners were often interrogated and tortured, and most political detainees experienced starvation and forced labour. In this chapter, I draw on the testimonies of two women, Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa (also a pseudonym), to examine some of the gendered forms of violence experienced by many women and girls during this period. In particular, the testimonies of Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa are explored in order to highlight specific forms of sexualized violence, including rape against female detainees, sexual harassment and assault, forms of sexual enslavement over months and years, and pregnancy as a result of rape.

Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa are two women amongst many who survived the concentration camps and who have given testimony about their experiences. Tens of thousands of women and girls were imprisoned illegally within the political detention system and many experienced the sexualized crimes described by these two women. In the nearly 20 years since the end of the New Order, hundreds, if not thousands, of these women have participated in the oral historical documentation projects carried out by researchers, non-government organizations and government-funded institutions into the events that followed the coup (see Komnas Perempuan, 2007; Sukartiningsih, 2004). Taken together, these testimonies reveal the many forms of violence perpetrated against those held for their perceived Communist affiliations. The testimonies of women survivors reveal too the wide range of sexualized forms of violence used mainly against women and girls during this period (see Pohlman, 2015). Expressed in their words, they also go some way towards conveying the horror of their experiences.

The lives and experiences of Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa, as told through their personal testimonies, in many ways ran in parallel. They were born and grew up at nearly the same time within kilometres of each other in a region of West Sumatra. The killings were intense in this area: research into the massacres in this region on the western coast of Sumatra has shown patterns of whole-scale massacres against suspected PKI members as well as large numbers of people being captured and held in detention (see Narny, 2012). Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa both lost family members during the massacres in this area.

Both had married and been active members of organizations connected with the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party) in their communities. By chance, both had been involved in running local childcare centres, which was a national initiative of the Communist-aligned mass women's organization, Gerwani (an abbreviation of *Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*, the Indonesian Women's Movement). During the 1950s and early 1960s, Gerwani was one of the most progressive women's organizations in Indonesia. Gerwani's main platform was to empower women, which attracted women from many social groups and communities across the country. The organization focused on providing opportunities for women: through micro-finance, through basic education initiatives and through establishing cooperative childcare facilities (Wieringa, 2002). Like hundreds of thousands of other women at this time, Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa became involved in Gerwani primarily through these crèches, known as the *Taman Melati* (Melati Gardens) kindergartens (Wieringa, 2002, pp. 240–241). Demonized by the Indonesian Army's anti-Communist propaganda following the 1965 coup, Gerwani women were hunted down during the mass killings and mass arrests (Pohlman, 2016; Wieringa, 2002).

Another commonality between the lives and experiences of Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa was that they both had young children when the 1965 coup occurred, and both had their lives irrevocably changed by the mass violence of this period. In their testimonies, both women give witness to the violence which they, their children, their family members and their friends experienced in the months and years that followed the coup. In particular, they detail many forms of sexual violence which they and other women in detention with them experienced. Through an analysis of these women's testimonies, I examine the gendered and gendering effects of violence against women and girls in a situation of genocidal violence against Communists and their alleged sympathizers. Placing this sexual violence in the context of other genocides and increasing recognition of a range of forms of sexual violence as crimes, I argue that forms of sexual violence perpetrated by members of the Indonesian army and police against women on the political Left constitute crimes against humanity.

### IBU TATI

In the small section of Ibu Tati's testimony recounted at the start of this chapter, she explained how sexual violence against women detainees was perpetrated on a nightly basis in the detention centre where she was

held. Born and raised in a small town in West Sumatra, Ibu Tati trained as a kindergarten teacher in the 1950s and, like many young people in Indonesia at that time, joined a political youth movement, in her case, the Indonesian Communist Party's mass youth organization, Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth). When she married, it was to a young man who was in the Communist-affiliated farmers' and peasants' organization, the BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*, Peasants' Front of Indonesia). In the early 1960s, she took up a position teaching in one of the Gerwani-run *Taman Melati* crèches. The young couple were active members of their respective organizations and Ibu Tati described how they had had "a good life" together.

This changed for Ibu Tati and her family after 1 October 1965, just as the lives of millions of other Indonesians changed. Only days before the coup, Ibu Tati gave birth to their first and only child, a son: her labour was difficult and she had to remain at the local health clinic for nearly a fortnight. The weeks that followed the coup were traumatic: those associated with the Communist Party in the local area began to be hunted down by soldiers, police, and members of militia groups drawn from religious organizations and other political parties. By the time she returned home, her husband and numerous members of her extended family had been illegally detained. Shortly after she was released from the clinic, Ibu Tati was also detained.

The detention centre described by Ibu Tati in the account above was a military police barracks in her small town. There were hundreds of people held at these barracks, kept in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. Ibu Tati described the starvation of the prisoners, the lack of facilities for toileting or bathing and the near-constant physical assaults of detainees casually and indiscriminately meted out by their guards. As was the case for most detention centres, the comparatively smaller numbers of women prisoners were kept in a room separate from the majority male prisoners. As was also often the case, at the barracks described by Ibu Tati, any children or infants who had been brought into detention with their mothers remained with the women prisoners (Pohلمان, 2013). Ibu Tati had been arrested with her baby so he too went into detention at the military police barracks.

The large building described by Ibu Tati in one of our interviews together had two floors: prisoners were kept in a series of overcrowded rooms mainly on the lower level. The women's room was on the ground floor, near to one of the smaller rooms used for interrogation and

torture. As Ibu Tati described, hearing the cries of those being tortured made her and the other women anxious, nervous and so “very frightened of that place”. It was, however, the predatory behaviour of their guards which made living in the barracks terrifying (“*nyerikan*”). In one interview, she described how policemen and soldiers came regularly to assault the women detainees<sup>3</sup>:

We would all scream and wail, “Oh Allah, oh God, no!” And the one [who was being taken] would have her clothes stripped off, not covered up, you know, not [even] a screen or anything to cover her up. The woman would have her clothes stripped off completely. Stripped naked to see exactly what [happened to her]. What we experienced, [you] just can’t imagine it.<sup>4</sup>

Held together in the one room, the women detainees at the military police barracks were routinely and repeatedly sexually assaulted and raped by guards, policemen, soldiers and sometimes men who were from one of the militia groups taking part in rounding up and killings suspected Communists. As Ibu Tati described, these assaults usually began in the evenings: one or more guards or policemen would open the door to the women’s cell, and then forcibly remove a few women to one of the rooms upstairs where they were raped. On some occasions, these men entered and raped women inside the women’s cell.

In the section of her testimony recounted at the beginning of this chapter, Ibu Tati described the fear that she and the other women felt as night approached. In some ways, the regularity of the night-time sexual assaults was a counterpoint to the irregularity, or perhaps the seemingly arbitrary manner, with which detainees were taken from their cells for interrogation and torture. For Ibu Tati and the other prisoners, the cell in which they were all kept was horribly familiar: the cramped and close quarters that they shared were filthy and made them “feel dirty”. Ibu Tati described the conditions in which she and the other prisoners were kept as unsuitable even for “animals”. In a terrible sense, however, the place where they were kept cramped and dirty also became one of illusionary safety: to be taken out of the room, usually in a forced and violent way, meant that you would undergo further violence and degradation.

In another interview, Ibu Tati returned in her narrative to how she kept her infant son with her at all times. She emphasized at numerous points in our discussion how she cared for him: she breast-fed him, kept

him clean and “kept [him] safe in that place”. As Ibu Tati recounted this, she closed her eyes and clutched her arms to her body, as if holding tightly to her baby son.<sup>5</sup> Immediately after this, however, she spoke about how she and the other women in the cell were not safe. Holding tightly to her son did not keep Ibu Tati safe. “We resisted it, but it wasn’t possible, trying to defend yourself meant nothing [...] holding my baby, keeping him close. They came in and did [what they] wanted”.

For some of the women detained at the military police barracks where Ibu Tati was held, repeated sexual assaults and rapes meant that they were effectively subjected to sexual enslavement and enforced prostitution. As Ibu Tati explained, as time went on, the guards at the military barracks began to “lend out” women detainees. In particular, she gave details about how, if a man came to the barracks from the local headquarters, one or more of the women would be taken from their cell for the night.

If a policeman came from the [police headquarters...], then a girl would be taken for him. “I’ve got a friend from [the headquarters],” [the guard] would say, and he’d take her away in a car. If there were a guest from the [headquarters], then [a girl was] taken by car. He’d stay in the mess for a while, so [she’d] be taken there. [...] Every time someone from the [headquarters] came, someone would disappear, one of the girls would definitely be taken. None of the girls were virgins anymore. [...] For the women, if [the police] wanted to, they’d just take them. From the prison, they’d be borrowed, lent out at night. First they’d be taken. Then the next day, they’d be returned. And then maybe about a week later or fifteen days later, they’d be borrowed again. [...] If there were a guest from the police headquarters [...] then girls would be borrowed. He’d need a number of them, whichever ones he liked, he’d take. [The women] were taken, crying, and those sorts of things, that’s what went on.<sup>6</sup>

Ibu Tati made clear that the women who were “lent out” to men from the local police headquarters did not go willingly. Previously sexually assaulted and raped by the men who detained them at the military police barracks, these women were then forcibly removed to secondary locations and raped on multiple occasions by other men. Ibu Tati did not say for how long this “lending out” of women detainees went on for, but from her description of these events, it is likely that the practice continued for longer than one year at that particular barracks. Ibu Tati also did not say, and probably would not have been aware of, any receipt of money or goods by the guards at the barracks who were “lending out” these women.



In our conversations together, Ibu Tati described these experiences as horrifying and terrifying. Her descriptions of the violence which she and the other women held at the military police barracks experienced outlined their deprivation of liberty and the apparent ownership the guards exerted over their persons. Her words also describe the conditions in which they were held and how they were made powerless, how they were attacked in repeated assaults and how they were made to feel as if they were “less than animals”. Ibu Tati’s testimony, as in the testimonies of many other women who experienced similar forms of violence in detention facilities across Indonesia, reveal the egregious nature of the sexually based crimes perpetrated against them.

Ibu Tati spent half a decade in detention before being released in the late 1960s. Many members of her extended family, including her husband, were killed. Ibu Tati and her son, by then a boy, were released, but as with most former political prisoners, she was forced to report to local authorities for many years after. She returned to her home village and rebuilt her life, working so that she could take care of herself and her son.

### IBU JUSUFA

Ibu Jusufa grew up in a small town in West Sumatra, only a short distance from where Ibu Tati was born. While these two women met later in life, they did not know each other before or during the mass violence of 1965 which so fundamentally changed both their lives and the lives of everyone around them. Together with my friend and fellow researcher, Yenny Narny, Ibu Jusufa kindly agreed to meet and be interviewed half a dozen times over a period of approximately two months: sometimes by herself, sometimes bringing other former political prisoners to share their stories as well.<sup>7</sup>

Born during the Second World War, Ibu Jusufa left school early because of recurrent illness. At age 15, her parents arranged for her to marry an older man, not her boyfriend, and they moved to another town not far away where her husband began a new job. She had a baby about a year after, which was around the time that West Sumatra became the seat for a regional rebellion against Jakarta. This rebellion, launched in 1958 by a group called the PRRI (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), protested the direction of Indonesia’s central government (see Kahin & Kahin, 1995). In the upheaval caused by the PRRI conflict, Ibu Jusufa’s

husband lost his job and the family struggled financially. A while later, Ibu Jusufa's husband joined the army and they moved again to another town in West Sumatra.

Once they settled into the new town, Ibu Jusufa became very active in various community organizations and activities. She was a dancer and so joined a dancing group. She also became involved in the Farmer's Union, the BTI. Through her activities in the BTI, she was asked to help set up a local branch of Gerwani. Following Gerwani's national push for more childcare crèches to help working women, she became heavily involved in helping to organize and run the crèches. Ibu Jusufa explained that her husband had been supportive of these activities, but also that he was often "busy and involved" in his career in the army.

Ibu Jusufa was pregnant with their second child at the time of the 1965 coup. Like many of her friends who were involved in BTI and Gerwani activities, she was arrested and taken for interrogation. A group of soldiers came to her house late one night in mid-October and took her to the local military command post. As no one else was at the house that night (she was unclear about where her husband had been), she had to take her seven-year-old child with her. The command post was already overcrowded with detainees when they arrived. The next day, she was questioned about her involvement in Gerwani, before she was moved with a group of other detainees and her child to a prison. In this particular interview with Narny Yenny and myself, Ibu Jusufa laughed, recalling how during an interrogation by a soldier she had "proudly confessed" to being a member of Gerwani and had told her interrogators about organizing the crèches. She paused for a while then laughed again, before recalling somewhat ruefully how enthusiastically she had responded. Her interrogator mocked her then because he felt he had caught her in admitting to so-called "illegal activities", involvement in organizations which were retrospectively banned. Ibu Jusufa recalled telling her interrogator, "Everything I did was legal [...] the crèches, setting up the Gerwani branch, the BTI, I had permission [...] nothing was illegal".<sup>8</sup>

Ibu Jusufa gave birth to her second child in the prison, and members of her family came and took the baby and her older child away to look after them. While Ibu Jusufa was able to see them on the occasions when her family were able to bring the children to visit, it would be nine years before she was able to return home to care for them. When she was finally released in 1974, she returned home to find that her husband had

married another woman and that their children were still with members of her family. Disgusted and “sick of him”, she returned to her family and started working in her family’s garden, often making food or small handicrafts to sell to support her children.

In our interviews with other former *tapol* whom she had brought along, Ibu Jusufa relayed her experiences in detention in small parts over the two months that we sat and spoke together. On some occasions, she focused on the conditions of the prison and other detention centres where she had been held over the nine years of her imprisonment. Like the military police barracks where Ibu Tati had initially been held, the prison where Ibu Jusufa spent years imprisoned was squalid and lacked basic medical care. As in many detention centres, particularly in the early years, Ibu Jusufa and the other detainees held at the prison suffered and starved from the lack of essential provisions and the regular and indiscriminate violence inflicted by their jailors.

On other occasions, Ibu Jusufa talked, quite proudly, about how she had been known as a trouble-maker. As she said in one of our interviews, “I was always getting into trouble, always being moved on, inside the prison and to [other detention centres...]. I got moved around because I would always fight against the officials, the guards”. At one of these detention camps, there was a punishment cell. It was not a room, but rather a large wooden box which was too small to lie down in, and the height was too low so a person could not stand up fully. Though not entirely clear from her descriptions, it seems that the box had some slats in one side which let in the light, but that it was mostly dark inside and cold at night. Ibu Jusufa, because she would “back-chat” and “resist” the guards, was often put into the punishment cell. Ibu Jusufa related how she was also beaten when she spoke back to the guards.

As with many of the women I have interviewed over the last 15 years about their experiences in the detention camps across Indonesia, the topic of sexual violence was negotiated carefully in conversations with Ibu Jusufa and the other women whom she brought for interviews. Conversation about sexual assault and rape was rarely direct and was often discussed using various pragmatic and linguistic techniques used to “soften” these sensitive topics. These included: avoiding naming the sexual violence as such (for example, Ibu Jusufa mostly referred to the sexual assault and rape of women detainees as these women “having that done to them” or “being treated in that way”, “*digitukan*”); and by avoiding naming victims or perpetrators (see Pohlman, 2008).

As one example of this, the issue of sexual harassment and assaults on women detainees came up on a number of occasions. For example, Ibu Jusufa explained how the women in the prison were always being “watched” (“*diawasi*”) by the male guards. It was clear that this “watching” went well beyond the surveillance by prison guards of their detainees. Rather, it involved guards watching the women prisoners while they were going to the toilet, bathing and dressing. The “watching” also frequently preceded sexual assaults or other forms of sexual harassment, including: women being groped while bathing; guards standing over women when they went to the toilet; and sometimes being forced into sexual acts.

As she described during one of our interviews, Ibu Jusufa was a trouble-maker who annoyed the guards by trying to stop them watching and sexually harassing the women detainees. As she explained, one day she became fed up and lashed out against one of the guards:

[At the prison] we were all in the women’s barracks. And we would all go to bathe together. We would all be bathing and they [guards] would just open the door and come in. Of course, I would get so mad. We would all have all our clothes off. So one day I grabbed a rock and I hit him, and blood poured out of his head. After that I went back into the [punishment] cell, because I’d hit him, you see? He, like the other men, the guards, would always open the door to look, and I would always get mad. So I hit him in the head, across the back of the head. That was Pak P\_\_\_\_, a Javanese man. [...] I spent more than a week in the cell for hitting him.<sup>9</sup>

Ibu Jusufa, when recalling this incident, said that she was surprised that she was not beaten. Instead, she spent 10 days locked in the tiny punishment cell with very little food or water, and was not allowed to leave to go to the toilet or to bathe. The cell, being too small to stand up or lie down in, was also difficult to sleep in and caused her body to ache dreadfully from the induced stress position.

As with the experiences recounted by Ibu Tati, the women in the various detention centres and prison where Ibu Jusufa was detained were sexually assaulted by members of the security services and guards. Just like at the military police barracks where Ibu Tati was held, women (and small children) were kept in separate cells from the male prisoners in the places where Ibu Jusufa spent her nine years in prison. Ibu Jusufa also described women detainees being taken away by guards and soldiers or

police on occasion from the women's cell and raped. She was not explicit about these rapes: her descriptions outlined only that "these things were done" to the women prisoners.

In the case of Ibu Lestari who was kept in a cell with her, Ibu Jusufa described how she was "made like a wife" of one of the senior military officers. Ibu Lestari was frequently "visited" by this military officer such that "he made her his wife inside the prison [whereas... he] already had a wife outside". Ibu Lestari was faced with such extreme coercion that, as Ibu Jusufa explained, "She had to go along with it, and she became his wife, that was it. No-one could have resisted it [...] if you resisted, you'd be beaten. I was very often beaten. Or you'd be shot in the head, [they'd say], 'Well, we'll just shoot you, then!' That's what [the guards would say]".

Another of Ibu Jusufa's friends, Ibu Try, a woman whom she knew through her Gerwani and BTI activities, became pregnant from rape. The father of the baby—the man who came frequently to rape her—was an army major. Ibu Jusufa mentioned her friend's experience only briefly: during this interview, it was clear that the topic was greatly upsetting. This was the first time that she had talked about her friend Try and while she mentioned her a few times during our subsequent interviews, it was briefly and each time caused distress. Neither Narny Yenny nor I pressed her to talk more about her friend. Of the brief descriptions which Ibu Jusufa gave, she told us this:

That happened [sexual violence] to so many of my friends. And one of them was my friend, Try, that happened to her, she was raped many times. And then she had a child. (Ibu Jusufa paused for some time at this point in our interview before she was ready to continue.) The name of the one who raped her was Major M\_\_\_\_, he's the one who raped my friend many times. So she gave birth, and then the baby was taken away from her by Major M\_\_\_\_.<sup>10</sup>

Piecing together the story of what happened to Ibu Try and her baby from Ibu Jusufa's short descriptions, it seems that this was a case of forcible child removal. The effect of this forcible child removal on Ibu Try was clear in Ibu Jusufa's recollections of this event: Ibu Jusufa spoke briefly, saying that Ibu Try "suffered badly" for many years after. Having the baby "stolen" from her "destroyed [her]".<sup>11</sup> Ibu Jusufa did not discuss this case further, but it appears that Ibu Try had no contact with her child and that the Major's family took the baby to another province.

## CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF 1965–1966

Since the 1990s, there has been increasing legal recognition of different forms of sexual violence perpetrated during war, genocide and other conflicts as crimes against humanity (Allen, 1996; Askin, 1997; Card, 1996). These new forms of recognition were prompted by revelations, for example, of mass rape in the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides and a re-examination of wartime violence against so-called “comfort women” who were subjected to sexual slavery by the Japanese army during World War Two (Lentin, 1997; Nowrojee, 1996; Soh, 2008; Stiglmeier, 1994; Tanaka, 2002). Based on interviews with more than 120 women survivors of the 1965 mass killings and arrests, the Indonesian National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) in its landmark report concluded “that there are strong indications that the violations committed against women ... fulfil the elements of gender-based crimes against humanity” (2007, p. 11).

The sexual violence described in the testimonies of Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa including rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery and enforced prostitution, as well as forced child removal, are crimes. The violence experienced by the women at the military police barracks where Ibu Tati was held should also be characterized as both sexual slavery and enforced prostitution. Both are crimes against humanity, given that these women were unlawfully detained and experienced severe violence and gross violations of their rights within the broader context of widespread and systematic attacks against civilians identified as Communist Party supporters.

The criminal elements of sexual slavery derive in many ways from the supranational criminal law regarding the crime of enslavement as a crime against humanity, in that these involve the perpetrator exercising “powers attaching to the right of ownership [...] such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering [the victim/s]”. The second crucial element is that the perpetrator must cause the victim/s to “engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature”.<sup>12</sup> The elements of the crime of enforced prostitution as a crime against humanity share much with those of sexual slavery. In particular, the first element of enforced prostitution describes similar criminal acts, that is, that the perpetrator causes the victim to engage in sexual acts through “force, or by threat of force or coercion,

such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power".<sup>13</sup> The second criminal element of enforced prostitution, however, relates primarily to the advantage gained by the perpetrator, that is, that the perpetrator "obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual nature".<sup>14</sup>

Both sexual slavery and enforced prostitution as crimes against humanity involve sexual violence against victims usually over a prolonged period of time and under circumstances of extreme coercion against the victims. For the women held at the military police barracks with Ibu Tati, and indeed for the women at the prison described by Ibu Jusufa, the same criminal acts of sexual violence, committed against them in a repeated fashion over a period of at least months, could be characterized as both. In situations of crimes against humanity, and in similar situations of armed conflict, acts of enforced prostitution in many cases also amount to sexual slavery.<sup>15</sup>

It is not, however, the commercial or pecuniary aspects which should be foregrounded in understanding the differences or similarities of criminal elements between sexual slavery and enforced prostitution. Rather, it is the violence itself and the conditions in which it was perpetrated which should be key to understanding the dimensions of these related but separate crimes against humanity. The "powers of ownership" which a perpetrator exercises over his victim in cases of sexual slavery are, in many ways, similar to those through which a perpetrator forces his victim to engage in sexual acts in order to obtain pecuniary advantage. In the situation described by Ibu Tati, the women were repeatedly raped by guards and others at the military police barracks and then lent out and raped by other men in other locations. The guards and other men in charge of this police barracks unlawfully deprived them of liberty and then carried out systematic forms of violence against these women. They then abused their positions as guards and policemen and sought personal advantage by forcing these women to undertake further sexual acts with other men.

That these guards then found means to exploit further the women detained in the barracks for pecuniary advantage speaks to the aggravated circumstances of the violence against these women. The magnitude of the crimes against these women, individually and collectively, included rape, sexual enslavement and enforced prostitution, and likely other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity. The magnitude of these

crimes also reveals these aggravating circumstances, including the heinous nature of the crimes committed, the duration of these repeated acts over months, the vulnerability of the victims in circumstances of extreme coercion and deprivation of liberty and, indeed, the youth of some of the victims (some of whom were in their teens at the time). The personal gain sought by the men who ran the police barracks and the abuse of personal authority by these men to exert ownership over these women to such an extent that they were able to “lend out” their victims to other men also reveals the aggravated circumstances of these crimes.

Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa, and many of the women whose experiences they describe in their testimonies, were victims of crimes against humanity. The severe harm caused to these women through the perpetration of these sexually based crimes requires separate and special attention. By examining these specific forms of harm, I argue that this allows not only for a deeper understanding of the crimes themselves but also for a better understanding of the gendered and gendering effects of mass violence. The extensive research undertaken by Komnas Perempuan (2007) and, indeed, the attention paid to numerous forms of sexual violence by the International People’s Tribunal for 1965 (held in November 2015, the final judgment delivered in July 2016) highlight the growing understanding of how sexualized forms of violence need specific and separate attention.<sup>16</sup> By studying these sexually based crimes, which must be considered crimes against humanity in and of themselves—including rape, sexual slavery and enforced prostitution—we reveal more about these crimes, perhaps paving the way to achieve better justice for victims and survivors.

## TWO WOMEN’S STORIES AMONGST MANY

The brief sections of testimony by Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa explored in this chapter shed light on the extremes of violence reached during the 1965 genocide. The testimonies of these two women, amongst the many who have given testimony over the past two decades since the end of Suharto’s New Order regime, give human witness to the dehumanizing destruction of those accused of Communist sympathies after the 1965 coup. The life stories of these two women were parallel in many ways: they began on very similar trajectories and both were violently disrupted.



1965 was the year that their lives changed forever. With very young children in their care upon their arrest, they suffered in different ways. Ibu Tati's baby son remained with her in detention, whereas Ibu Jusufa's two children, one seven years old, the other only a baby, were taken in by members of her family for the nine long years of her imprisonment. Both women left prison with almost nothing and had to work for many years to rebuild their lives and to look after their children. Both lost family members in the killings. And both expressed their anger during our conversations about how they and their families had been treated first during the killings themselves and then during the many years since.

Their stories of the treatment which they and other detainees experienced at the hand of soldiers, policemen and guards are also similar. In particular, the testimonies of these two women highlight the sexualized forms of violence experienced by many women and girls during this period. Told four decades after these events, Ibu Tati's and Ibu Jusufa's testimonies are first and foremost individual witness accounts to the violence of 1965. Their points of view, their choices and responses, and their personal stories of living through this violence are shown in these two testimonies of the human experience of loss and survival.

The details in each woman's testimony depict these personal experiences, and stand on their own as witness to the mass violence of 1965. It is the similarities between Ibu Tati's and Ibu Jusufa's testimonies, and their resonance with the testimonies and experiences of others, however, which speak to the overwhelming magnitude of these events in Indonesia's history. This magnitude is felt because Ibu Tati's and Ibu Jusufa's experiences are so horrifyingly similar to those related in the testimonies of thousands of other women and girls who survived this mass violence (see Komnas Perempuan, 2007; Pohlman, 2015; Susanti, 2007). Ibu Tati and Ibu Jusufa, as with the many thousands of survivors who have told their stories in the years since the fall of the New Order regime, give their testimonies with astonishing clarity and generosity: their words humanize the deeply dehumanizing violence that was done to them. The words of these two women amongst so many more women, and men, begin to reveal the depths of this horrific violence as well as bring light to those dark places where crimes against humanity have hidden, unvoiced, for decades since 1965.

## NOTES

1. Interview with Ibu Tati by the author and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, September 2005.
2. “Ibu”, or “Bu”, is a polite honorific for an adult woman in Indonesian, literally meaning “mother” or “Mrs”. The male equivalent is “Bapak” or “Pak”. All names mentioned here are pseudonyms.
3. Interview with Ibu Tati by the author and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, September 2005. Also, interview with Ibu Tati by Robert Cribb and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, February 2004 (transcript obtained with permission).
4. Interview with Ibu Tati by the author and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, September 2005.
5. In almost all my interviews with survivors since 2002, I tape-record our conversations with permission. I also keep hand-written notes during and immediately after interviews in which I note distinctive pragmatic devices which form part of the testimony, in particular, bodily gestures, actions and events which the participants mime. On this process, see Pohlman (2015, pp. 21–22).
6. Interview with Ibu Tati by the author and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, September 2005.
7. Interviews with Ibu Jusufa (and with others) by the author and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, September and October 2005.
8. Interview with Ibu Jusufa and Pak Ardhi, with the author and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, September 2005.
9. Interview with Ibu Jusufa and Pak Ardhi, by the author and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, September 2005.
10. Interview with Ibu Jusufa and Pak Ardhi, by the author and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, September 2005. The name of the perpetrator here has been obscured to protect the anonymity of those effected.
11. Interview with Ibu Jusufa, Ibu Rabitta and Ibu Progo, by the author and Narny Yenny, West Sumatra, September 2005.
12. This wording for the elements of sexual slavery in the UN’s Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in its Elements of Crimes (EoC) document (Article 7(1)(g)-2) mirrors that of the definition of enslavement contained in Article 7(2)(c) of the ICC Statute. It should be noted, however, that the exercise of ownership also includes conditions of deprivation of liberty and a range of non-commercial sexual slavery conditions, see Article 7(1)(g)-2 EoC, footnote 18 (see de Brouwer, 2005, pp. 137–141).
13. Article 7(1)(g)-3 EoC.
14. Ibid. See de Brouwer (2005, pp. 141–143) for a discussion of enforced prostitution as a crime against humanity.

15. On these points, see de Brouwer (2005, p. 142) and UN Commission on Human Rights (1998, paras. 10, 31).
16. Please note that the author was also in charge of preparing the evidence brief on sexual violence for the Prosecuting team of the International People's Tribunal for 1965. This brief, of approximately 250 pages in length, delineated rape, sexual violence as torture, sexual enslavement, enforced prostitution, forced marriage, "other" acts of sexual violence (such as sexual assault), forced pregnancy and forced abortion each as a separate crime against humanity.

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## A Rite of De-modernization: The Anti-Communist Purge in Surabaya

*Robbie Peters*

Across the Indonesian archipelago, what is becoming clearer is that patterns of violence during the 1965–1966 killings were replicated across different islands. There is not yet a consensus, however, on how to explain the outbreak of the violence and how far back in time we should look for explanations. This chapter focuses on changing social forces, including increasingly aggressive behaviour from different political groups and patterns of land occupation from the 1940s to the 1960s. Concentrating on how these patterns played out in Surabaya, the second largest city in Indonesia and capital of East Java, it shows how the PKI's extension of an administrative apparatus into the slum neighbourhoods (*kampung*) established a de facto government there and a mass support base that threatened the authority of the army and even the state over much of the city. This de facto or “wild” sovereignty as it was called was part of a broader ascent into politics of the so-called little person, or *wong cilik*, from the lower orders of society: an ascent supported by the PKI and portrayed in its popular proletarian street theatres of the

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time known as *ludruk*. In those theatres, recalcitrant and uninhibited clowns portrayed powerless slum dwellers cum usurpers who took land and authority with impunity and turned the conservative Javanese social order upside down. The chapter argues that the purge of 1965–1966 restored that conservative order through a form of violence that used the body of the little person as a theatre of communication by breaking it into pieces to disable its disruptive energy and that of the political organisations of which it was a part. By foregrounding the cultural forms and social context through which this political drama played out, this chapter gives new detail to support Robert Cribb's (2001) contention that the Indonesian genocide needs to be understood as the extermination of an entire political group in a country where political identity mattered more than any other form of identity.

### SURABAYA, EAST JAVA AND REVOLUTION

On 10 November 1945, 24,000 British-Indian soldiers of the 5th Indian Division entered Surabaya seeking violent retribution for the deaths of over 400 of their 49th Brigade comrades, killed two weeks earlier by around 100,000 local Indonesian militia (MacMillan, 2005, pp. 32, 44). The 49th Brigade came to stop the butchering over the previous weeks of hundreds of returning Dutch and Eurasian residents and remaining Japanese soldiers by well-armed men hailing from Surabaya's slums and intent on preventing the reinstatement of Dutch authority in the city (Frederick, 1989, pp. 260–263; Palmos, 2011, pp. 239–253). The 5th Indian Division was backed by 24 fighter planes, five battleships and 24 tanks that quashed the uprising in a little over two weeks, killing thousands of people, gutting the city and sending most of its surviving Indonesian population in flight to the countryside (Frederick, 1989, pp. 278–279; Palmos, 2011, pp. 281–282).

Tens of thousands of Indonesians fled the city each day by early November, entering a countryside devastated by years of war and now devastated by revolution: the amount of land under staple food crops had fallen dramatically, the ethnic Chinese traders who bought and sold the staple food crops had fled, and the agricultural estates on which peasants relied for work lay neglected until occupying militia could re-establish the rudiments of a production and distribution system (Peters, 2013, p. 8; Sumarsono, personal communication, January 5, 2016). With food crops in short supply, little estate work and imports unable to redress the

shortfall due to years of allied blockade, peasants were forced to eat their livestock, removing much needed protein from rural diets and beasts of burden from farm work (Peters, 2013, p. 8). In-fighting among republican forces and their demand for the crops, labour and allegiance of rural villagers added unrest to these already dire conditions, forcing more people into Surabaya than had left during the battle (Basondoro, 2013, p. 9).

Situated about 100 kilometres from the Dutch front line and rendered free of fighting by internationally brokered peace talks culminating in the January 1948 Renville Accord requirement that Dutch and Indonesian forces withdraw to their respective territories, Surabaya was safe from the fighting and more economically stable than the countryside (Basondoro, 2013, p. 185). By mid-1947, hundreds of Indonesians entered Surabaya each day and occupied the land and homes of those yet to return (Basondoro, 2013, pp. 184–185; Frederick, 1989, p. 281). The caretaker of the 600-year-old Sunan Bungkul mausoleum returned to find it occupied by squatters and had to fight them off to win it back, while the predominantly ethnic Chinese residents of *kampung* Kapasan Kidul returned to find it occupied by poor Madurese migrants determined to stay (Basondoro, 2013, pp. 185–186). At unattended graveyards around the city, squatters dug out the corpses and used the tombstones and coffins as building material for their shacks, which they numbered, guarded and formed into neighbourhoods, denying any claims to the land by the relatives of those once buried there (Basondoro, 2013, pp. 25, 246–248; *Jawa Post*, December 11, 1952). The American historian William Frederick (1989, p. 213) used the term the “take over phenomenon” to describe such widespread acts of usurpation, while the local Indonesian historian Purnawan Basondoro (2013) used the term *merebut* (usurp), adding that land ownership remained unresolved until the anti-Communist purge of 1965 muted the social tensions it aroused.

### *LUDRUK, THE PKI AND THE KAMPUNG*

Usurpation was a central theme in *ludruk* theatre, a comedic troupe of clown performers and transvestite singers adept at social satire. *Ludruk* was native to East Java, most developed in Surabaya and, according to the anthropologists Robert Jay (1969, p. 412), Clifford Geertz (1960, p. 290) and James Peacock (1968, p. 46), more intelligent and more engaging for its audiences than more refined forms of

classical Javanese theatre. Due to its rapport with the masses in populous East Java and Surabaya and its skilful criticism of social conventions, *ludruk* was one of the folk cultural forms promoted by Nyoto—a senior member of the PKI’s five-man Politbureau and founder of LEKRA (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat*, Institute of People’s Culture [est., 1950]) (Hindley, 1966, p. 184). LEKRA in Surabaya gave *ludruk* priority as an art form by doing such things as designing and building the two-metre-high statue that marked the resting place of Pak Durasim, the anti-colonial *ludruk* hero who died in 1943 from his wounds after being ordered from the stage by Japanese soldiers and tortured for bellowing a satirical rhyme that criticised their wartime occupation (*Pedomani*, December 20, 1956). LEKRA promoted *ludruk* as a symbol of the little man’s fight against oppression. In October 1956, for example, the PKI launched a push for the popular occupation of land by staging several days of *ludruk* performance at Surabaya’s six main *ludruk* venues, and on 23 May 1957 it staged a large *ludruk* performance to celebrate its 37th anniversary (*Perdamaian*, October 25, 1956; *Suara Rakjat*, May 22, 1957). Armed with what Peacock (1975, pp. 182, 179) called *ludruk*’s “counter force of *kasarness*”, or bawdy indignation at social conventions, the PKI communicated at these venues the message that Indonesia’s social and political revolution is ongoing and most expressed in the fierce independence of the *kampung*s as “autonomous” and “sovereign” urban spaces that are managed by their residents and not the government (*Perdamaian*, October 7, 1955; October 25, 1956). At its 37th anniversary celebrations, the PKI reiterated this message, asserting that the large *ludruk* performance it staged raised money from the contributions of *ludruk*-goers rather than from government (*Suara Rakjat*, May 24, 1957).

The PKI most supported those *kampung*s on private land, over which government struggled to exercise authority. Abandoned by its European, Chinese or Arab landlords and accounting for about half of the *kampung*s in Surabaya, it was land the municipal government neither owned nor could afford to purchase. For the approximately 500,000 people who lived in the *kampung*s on private land, the duties normally performed by government were performed by the RKKS (*Rukun Kampung Kota Surabaya*, Surabaya City Kampung Association). Surabaya’s first Mayor, Doel Arnowo, established the RKKS in early 1950 to collect taxes, take censuses, subsidise burials and organise collective work and guard duties in the *kampung*s due to the absence there



of effective municipal government (Hindley, 1966, p. 158; *Mingguan Obor Soerabaja*, January 8, 1952; *Perdamaian*, March 3, 1952; *Pewarta Soerabaja*, October 12, 1950; October 19, 1950).

With its strong support base in the *kampungs*, the PKI gained control of the RKKS, which had its head office across the river from the 50 hectare Ngagel Industrial Estate, one of Indonesia's largest, with thousands of workers employed in over 100 factories (LN, 1970, p. 21; *Surabaya Post*, September 29, 1965; October 14, 1965; October 16, 1965). A punt at the northern end of the estate and a bridge at the southern end took many of these workers to their homes across the river in the large Dinoyo *kampung*, outside of which stood the RKKS head office. In January 1954, cadres at the office sent a letter to municipal government requesting assistance with the digging of drains and latrines in Dinoyo to alleviate the unsanitary flooding of homes during the monsoon (*Trompet Masyarakat*, June 8, 1954). Unable to help due to a lack of money and technical experts, the municipality did nothing, further reinforcing the prominence of the RKKS in the *kampung* on the one hand and the absence of the government on the other.

By 1954, the RKKS had become the quasi-government in many Surabaya *kampungs*, incorporating 37 *kampung* wards, which each contained several distinct neighbourhoods of around 300 residents (Colombijn, 2010, p. 217; *Java Post*, March 21, 1952; Peacock, 1968, p. 94). Despite assertions by the East Java military command that the RKKS was a "wild" or illegitimate form of administration that undermined the nation-state, the municipality considered dealing directly with it and abolishing the sub-district level of government: a measure that would alleviate the government's fiscal burden at a time when it was struggling to repay what was then the equivalent of over US\$1 billion of outstanding public and external debt obligations incurred by the previous colonial regime (Kahin, 1958, p. 501). Indonesia agreed to take over this debt in exchange for independence, but made respective municipal governments responsible for the obligations of their colonial predecessors. Saddled with outstanding colonial debt and struggling with the loss of many of its skilled Dutch and Eurasian administrators, the Surabaya municipal government could not extend into the *kampungs*, leaving an administrative void filled by the RKKS (*Java Post*, February 20, 1953; February 25, 1953; *Perdamaian*, February 26, 1952; May 2, 1955; *Perwarta Surabaya*, October 30, 1954; November 6, 1954). Government officials accused the RKKS of being a quasi-administration that poached their

authority. In nearby Pare, for example, Robert Jay (1969, pp. 422–424) observed how government officials resented what they perceived as the “gratuitous shouldering of government responsibility” by “young [educated] hopefuls”, who had turned their back on farm-work and petty-trade and joined the PKI’s quasi *kampung* administration due to the absence of a formal government job. Whether they wanted to climb the new social ladder through a position of administrative responsibility or wanted to serve the Communist cause, these quasi-officials increased the influence of the PKI in the *kampungs* (Jay, 1969, p. 424).

*Ludruk* was indispensable to the extension of the PKI’s administration in the *kampungs*, enabling it to convey revolutionary messages in local cultural terms. During fieldwork in Surabaya in 1963, the American anthropologist James Peacock (1967, 1968) noted *ludruk*’s affinity with the city’s *kampung*-dwelling majority: its key character, the clown, was someone with whom *kampung* people most closely identified; its performers were *kampung* people; its medium was the rough (*kasar*) Javanese spoken in the *kampungs*; its stage was in or near the *kampung*; and its performers improvised according to their *kampung* audience. As Peacock (1968, p. 59) noted, “*ludruk* can more successfully attune itself to Javanese proletarians, drawing them into empathy with it, and in this way luring them into taking on the attitudes which it expresses.” For Peacock, *ludruk* was a rite of modernization that attuned the thinking of *kampung* dwellers to the modern world, bringing them to terms with that world and helping them engage it and change it by urging them to break with established tradition and conservative authority.

The modern world that *ludruk* promoted was a revolutionary one expressed through themes of the transition of youth, the usurping of authority, the overturning of social hierarchies and the building of new social bonds. Urgings to act on the world and reject authority were common in Indonesian revolutionary art more generally with its imperative to show the common person fighting for justice in their own indignant way and epitomised, for example, in the cartoon of an ugly little man inciting people to revolution with the words “*boeng, ajo boeng*” (brother, come here brother) that one of its artists, Chairil Anwar, said he based on the call of street prostitutes in Jakarta. Supported by LEKRA and the president, and captured by Anwar in his nicknaming himself “wild beast”, this foregrounding of an aggrieved common person seeking freedom was the dominant artistic form until the purge of late 1965 (Knol, Raben, & Zijlams, 2009, p. 97). Using these revolutionary cultural

themes as they were expressed in *ludruk*, archival sources from the period, and the oral histories of Rukun, a Pemuda Rakyat cadre,<sup>1</sup> and Neng, a Gerwani cadre,<sup>2</sup> as well as the eyewitness accounts of several other people, I provide an interpretive understanding of the 1965–1966 killings in Surabaya and the social milieu of popular usurpation out of which they emerged.<sup>3</sup>

## WILD OCCUPATION

The fear of losing one's home, possessions or social position to someone else was common in Surabaya after the social upheavals of war and revolution. In 1962, *kampung* dwellers in Surabaya told anthropologist James Peacock (1967, p. 353) how they feared their peculiarly East Javanese cultural predisposition to passively accept (*nerimo*) the world and those in it: a fear encapsulated in the tension within *nerimo* of being exploited by people you allow into your life. This was a powerful theme in the 1950s when Surabaya faced a shortage of about 100,000 homes, forcing *kampung* residents to accept the poor newcomers flooding into the city and its already cramped and squalid *kampungs* (Peters, 2013, p. 8). By the mid-1950s, Surabaya's *kampungs* accommodated twice as many people as before WWII, many of them recent migrants who occupied the homes of people who had fled during the Revolution and were too frail or penniless to promptly return. As Basundoro (2013, p. 189) put it, "people's fortunes changed 180 degrees as those who had homes became homeless and those who were homeless gained homes." This process of usurpation was played out in *ludruk* through the wandering clown figure who typically enters a *kampung* home and, taking advantage of his host's obligatory hospitality, swindles him of his cash, elopes with his daughter or lodges in his house (Peacock, 1967, pp. 352–353; 1968, pp. 136–138). In *ludruk*, the newcomer always fooled the conservative host, leaving him unable to maintain the integrity of his home and forcing him to come to terms with the extra-*kampung* world beyond it (Peacock, 1968, p. 119).

Using Dutch colonial language, the Army defined the take-over phenomenon as "wild occupation" (*wilde grond occupatie*): a term they used as both a noun and a verb to denote a type of space and a type of appropriation that occurred in the absence of the state. Wild occupation occurred where government authority was lacking, such as over half the *kampungs* in the city (*Jawa Pos*, April 4, 1958; *Pewarta Surabaya*,

September 12, 1958). Most of these *kampung*s were in the south of the city running from the reclaimed hillsides, graveyards and canals of the Sawahan district in the west down to the flatlands around the Mas River and Ngagel Industrial Estate to the east. In exchange for PKI support, residents of these *kampung*s pinned the signs and symbols of Communism to their alley-walls and house-fronts and, by the 1955 national elections, voted overwhelmingly in favour of the PKI, which won about four times as many votes in these *kampung*s as Surabaya's next most prominent party, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (*Perdamaian*, May 2, 1955; October 3, 1955).<sup>4</sup>

The Army used the anglicized term “overdemocracy” to capture what it complained was an increasingly wild sovereignty asserted by society against the state (*Pewarta Surabaya*, October 8, 1954). For the subaltern theorist Achille Mbembe (2003, p. 25), wild sovereignty was normal in the post-colony. As he wrote, “sovereignty meant occupation” and occupation was violent. This link between sovereignty, occupation and violence was clear in the well reported Pakis incident of 4 May 1956 when a crowd of 3000 squatters lynched two policemen who had shot into the crowd as it tried to surround a municipal government demolition crew about to raze squatter shacks. The shots killed two squatters, who were martyred by thousands of mourners in a funeral at the Ngagel cemetery near Dinoyo two days later. The Pakis incident and funeral drew the support of the PKI and the ire of the NU and aroused public debate about whether sovereignty over *kampung* land rested with those who lived on it or with the state (Colombijn, 2010, pp. 220–221; *Perdamaian*, June 18, 1956; *Soerabaja Pos*, June 19, 1956). That debate had been unresolved since the early 1950s, when about 700 hectares of land deemed “wild ground” fell to the squatters who occupied it after its absentee landlords lacked the money and political support to evict them from it and the municipality lacked the money to purchase it or the administrative capacity to administer the legal claims upon it (Colombijn, 2010, p. 212; *Jawa Pos*, December 12, 1952).

To counter the so-called wild sovereignty being exercised by people over *kampung*s, the East Java military ordered soldiers to raze some neighbourhoods, but this aroused the sort of resistance seen at Pakis that made the Army unpopular. By 1962, in need of public support and a foothold in the *kampung*s, the Army in East Java started distributing government-subsidised commodities in the *kampung*s and followed the

direction of the central command in Jakarta by reviving its “civic mission” from the revolution of small units working alongside *kampung* people on local projects (Peters, 2013, p. 37). While the East Java military command tried to muster popular support in this way, it also encouraged NU to be more confrontational by urging them to mobilize a mass support base against the PKI, allowing them to call for the razing of squatter shacks and by supporting them to stage large rallies that Jacob Walkin, an American console in Surabaya, claimed were more frequent, more colourful, more intimidating and more openly violent than those of the PKI (*Djawa Pos*, April 21, 1964; *Soerabaja Pos*, December 10, 1964; Walkin, 1969).

### VIOLENCE, MANHOOD, TERRITORY

These NU demonstrations were part of an increasing public endorsement of violence. They occurred during what the East Java military command termed a “time of war” when all civilian guard units in Surabaya had to be ready to protect the city’s strategic infrastructure, and the Muslim community had to be ready to take up arms against neo-colonialism (*Surabaja Post*, May 7, 1965; June 30, 1965; September 22, 1965; September 29, 1965; October 2, 1965; October 22, 1965). If the revolution was ongoing as President Sukarno continually claimed, then it found its strongest manifestation in these sometimes rhetorical and sometimes real expressions of violence. Writing about anti-colonial struggle in the Third World and its use of violence, Franz Fanon (1967) defines the revolutionary as someone who realises his equality with all others: a realization that he can take from others now as freely as they had taken from him: “I don’t give a dam for him”, wrote Fanon (1967, p. 35) of the revolutionary’s positioning of oneself *vis-à-vis* the other. For Fanon, this approaching of the other with impunity—the ability to take his things and his life—transforms the city from a colonial one that is neatly divided along racial lines to a revolutionary one that is disordered, yet united by what he calls an equality of the right to violence. Indonesian writer Subagio Sastrowardojo (1965, p. 38) captured this peculiar equality in his short story, *Kejantantan di Sumbing* (Manhood on Sumbing), of a man’s need to kill to win back the city and fulfil his manhood. As put to this man by the person whose manhood he questioned, self-realization was only available through the following means:

Suwito, if you're a real man, let's resolve the conflict between us right here! Mudjono then drew his dagger from its pouch and said, "Suwito can choose between a dressing down with this sharp blade or a fight between us. Suwito is going to know who Mudjono really is: a killer!"

Published in 1965, *Manhood on Sumbing* articulated the basic revolutionary tenant that manhood and territory could only be attained through violence, to which all had a right and which propelled to the top of society those men who used it to actualize their destiny.

### THE END OF REVOLUTION

Peacock (1968, pp. 22, 142, 220, 223) noted that *ludruk* was most popular among the 1945 generation, who would often use revolutionary-era expressions like "open your eyes" (*melek*), "act" (*bergerak*) and "fight" (*berjuang*) when goading their children to engage extra-*kampung* society and the new collective organizations of the PKI that offered youth upward social mobility. But such words were losing their force in the wake of new ones constructed by an increasingly authoritarian president: words such as Manipol/Usdek (*Manifesto Politik / Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Sosialisme Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, dan Kepribadian Indonesia*: 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Indonesian Identity). Benedict Anderson (1990, p. 246) called such terms synthetic ones that referred to no concrete reality and rendered *kampung* people silent, burying their language of revolution. Robert Cribb (2002, p. 553) astutely termed Sukarno's Guided Democracy a "kingdom of words" in which everyone had to speak the correct words. By the late 1950s, George Kahin (1958, p. 573), the renowned scholar of Indonesia, wrote that "the momentum and unifying political dynamic of its struggle for Independence are spent and a new positive political ethos must be developed." A stupor had emerged according to Kahin (1958, pp. 528–530), as more power concentrated in the president and in what W. F. Wertheim (1955, p. 52) termed "newly formed collective bodies such as peasant unions ... and trade unions." Wertheim held that these new collectives took precedent over the individual, whose social standing became "increasingly determined by criteria connected to the struggle between collectives."

Through the clown, *ludruk* rallied against this totalizing trend of boxing people into collectives and stultifying language with inflexible social

categories and terms. The clown did what he wanted with words and categories, paying no respect to their correct use (Peacock, 1968, p. 161). Yet, while he was adept with words, he most expressed his lack of convention through his body. The clown always proceeded beyond himself and the categories he bore: his tattooed *kampung*-dweller's chest drawing attention from behind his aristocrat's batik shirt; his Javanese sarong from beneath his European waist coat and vice versa to disrupt the seemingly incommensurate forms he brought together on his body as it burst out beyond them and the categories they imposed on him (Peacock, 1968, p. 154). Through his precocious and uncouth nature, the clown, notes Peacock, was the character that *kampung* dwellers "most deeply regard as 'one of us'. He could 'do things' and what he did best was to bumble forth and run-off-at-the-mouth, disarming authority and usurping property as he went" (Peacock, 1968, p. 73).

#### FROM PASSIVE TO ACTIVE BODIES AND BACK AGAIN

The burgeoning and usurping power of youth embodied by the clown expressed his uncontrollable *nafsu*, or desire. Uncontrolled desire disrupted an ideal disposition that Geertz (1960, p. 13) termed a "negative state of bodily and mental equanimity the Javanese call *slamet* (peace)." For the Javanese, the equanimous body was only achieved as a body among others in a larger social body. Geertz (1963, p. 4) defined this collective state as one of "homeostasis", whereby one's mind and body share an emotionless serenity with those around it in the *kampung*. For Geertz (1957), this state is consolidated by death and its commemoration and is most observable among the mourners at a funeral and post-funeral rites. In the mourners, the funeral and associated rites are meant to produce what Geertz (1957, p. 40) called "a feeling of *iklas*, a kind of willed affectlessness, a detached and static state of not caring; for the neighbourhood group it is said to produce *rukun*, communal harmony." *Iklas* finds its ideal expression in the tensionless face of the corpse because, as James Siegel (1983), Shelly Errington (1987, p. 438) and Ward Keeler (1987, p. 86) variously note, death captures a Javanese ideal of stasis, passivity and detachment as the foundations of a potent spiritual and political power that is unencumbered by worldly conflicts and able to sit above them, direct them and resolve them. The lively *ludruk* clown posed a direct challenge to this ideal state of stasis and the conservative social order it upheld.

In revolution, stasis was not ideal. Revolution sought to disrupt the passive personal body and the static social body that upheld Javanese social conventions. Through his uncontrollable desire, the clown enabled this disruption. However, to forge new social bodies called nations, young men could not rely on such burgeoning desire alone and would have to transform it into the more constructive form of spirit, or *seman-gat*. To do this a young man would first have to do as gallant Javanese warriors before him had done and renounce his desire for women, making them unable to lure him away from the family or polity he oversaw (Cooper, 2000, p. 617). In his short story, *The Soldier*, Nugroho Notosusanto (1976 [1956]) portrays this ideal of masculine strength as it transposed into modern war for a freedom fighter who left his dying wife for the front despite her emotional pleas to be with him. For the soldier, the front must beckon stronger than any woman. The front must even make him hate women, as it did for the manly revolutionary hero in *Manhood on Sumbing*, who not only violently confronted those men who challenged his manhood but also those women who got between him and the front where he realized that manhood.

By the early 1960s, a stiff and disciplined manhood had crept into *ludruk* and Javanese theatre more generally as androgynous and incommensurate characters gave way to more steadfast, masculine, hero-type ones (Peacock, 1968, p. 230). For many Indonesians at the time, these more masculine characters epitomized President Sukarno from the late 1950s: the period in which he dressed as a high-ranking general, enacted the martial law that enabled the Army to tighten its control of society and enacted what he called the Guided Democracy that bolstered his executive power (Peacock, 1968, p. 230; *Suara Rakjat*, May 23–24, 1957). This stiff persona also resembled the army officers who were becoming more conspicuous in the day-to-day affairs of state as managers of state enterprises and executors of authoritarian public instructions. Such instructions intensified under martial law and included stipulations that people no longer wear army-coloured clothes or bear army insignia, that *kampung* guard posts, warning gongs and bamboo spears belonged to the Army, that the heads of *kampung* neighbourhoods must serve the state and not the RKKS, and that if people did not conform to the above, they were guilty of the treasonous act of “seizing the tools of state” (*Jawa Post*, January 31, 1958; *Pewarta Surabaya*, June 21, 1958; *Suara Rakjat*, May 23–24, 1957; *Trompet Masyarakat*, June 24, 1958).



Many people did not accept the new uniformity. One of them was Rukun, a straight-backed, determined man who had gone from peasant to soldier to factory worker to cadre of Pemuda Rakyat (The People's Youth, the youth association of the PKI). Another was Neng, a woman who had married and divorced several men and gone from poor uneducated *kampung* dweller to literate and politically astute factory-worker and cadre of Gerwani (the mass women's organization associated with the PKI). Both attest to seeing themselves in the *ludruk* clown as a figure in a state of transition from a lowly beginning to a higher one got through worldliness rather than tradition. They recall how the clown broke with the past and the stultification of tradition and appeared in scenes in which there were only young people and where old people had died, been swindled or been sent to prison. These metaphors of change and usurpation translated into the real world for Rukun and Neng on 27 September 1965 when they joined the thousands-strong demonstration at the grand Grahadi building that housed the office of the governor of East Java. Carrying placards demanding reduction of rice prices and elimination of officer mismanagement of the factories in which they worked, Rukun and Neng looked on as protestors stormed the building. It was the last time both would feel these powers: three days later, news of the 30 September Movement would break and the gains of the preceding decade-and-a-half in squatters' rights and in workers' and women's rights would be abruptly terminated (*Surabaya Post*, September 28–29, 1965).

### REVOLUTION, COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF DESIRE

In one of the most intriguing political manoeuvres of the twentieth century, a modest and conservative Javanese general put an end to that anarchic spirit of revolution and he did it in the only way possible: the disaggregation of the revolutionary body. The event hinged on the accusation of unrestrained sexual desire; employed by both sides to legitimize their punitive violence against the other. The group that acted first—the so-called 30 September Movement (made up mostly of Sukarno's elite palace guard regiment)—kidnapped and murdered six generals and a lieutenant. They took over Radio Indonesia in Jakarta and broadcast their rationale: not only were the generals about to kill the president, or

so-called “father of the revolution”, they were corrupt businessman generals driven by a lust for money and women, a grave abuse of the revolutionary soldier code (N. A., 1966, p. 135). Suharto’s newly formed rapid response unit, positioned nearby, took over the radio station, enabling him to begin his own counter-narrative that he reiterated three days later during a live broadcast of the news of the retrieval of the corpses of the dead generals from the now infamous well into which they had been dumped. Suharto’s story had the same underlying message of unrestrained sexual desire and corruption, albeit far more excessive. Now a well-established fiction later elaborated in army magazines and newspapers, the story tells that the generals, after being murdered, had their penises cut off by Gerwani cadres, who staged an erotic and victorious dance around the victims (Anderson, 1987).<sup>5</sup>

Kidnaping or killing one’s political adversaries to “safeguard” the nation was common during the revolution, as was the abovementioned idea that desire breached the soldier code, “jeopardizing” the nation (Frederick, 2008, p. 1131; Roosa, 2006, p. 12). Also common, however, were criticisms of the gallant soldier marching into action, blinded by his desire to wield a weapon and summarily kill people based on only the slightest suspicion of enmity. An early example of such criticism was *Surabaya* (1976 [1946]), the popular short story by Idrus that portrayed young cowboy-like revolutionaries who caress their weapons as they await battle. Another was *Our Struggle*, the political manifesto by first Prime Minister, Sutan Sjahrir, that criticizes “our youth’s intoxication with action”, or what he otherwise considered blind, uninterrupted and violent action aimed at other Indonesians (Sjahrir, 1945 [1968]). Shri P. R. S. Mani (1986, p. 42), an Indian journalist who shared Sjahrir’s views on the dangers of action after witnessing the early violence of the Indonesian revolution in Surabaya, recalled the meaning Sukarno gave to the term at a speech in 1951 when he rooted action to desire, stating that “[t]here is no action without desire.” Yet, despite wanting Indonesians to turn desire into action, Sukarno (1952 [1970]) also recognized the dangers of this transposition, likening desire to the flywheels of a factory that kept spinning out of control when the factory was closed: in the factory, as in revolution, the flywheels had to be turned off.

The tensions expressed above in the speeches, short stories and manifestos of the Indonesian political and intellectual elite were expressed in the *ludruk* theatre of *kampung* people through the figure of the clown,

who gave play to the dangers and virtues of acting on one's raw desire. Sometimes a fool driven by lust rather than smarts or reason, the clown was at other times a wily trickster who begins homeless and ends up usurping someone's authority, marrying up, crossing the class line and settling down (Peacock, 1968, p. 137). For Peacock (1968), the clown was a pedagogical figure that showed the wrong way that desire could lead as well as the right way that it could lead. If the clown went the right way towards usurping authority, he showed that the lowliest in society could be its driving force. As Soemarsaid Moertono (2009 [1968], p. 35) noted of the Javanese clown figure more generally, it symbolized "the potential power of those who are apparently lowly and insignificant". With the shift to authoritarianism in Indonesia by the late 1950s, however, power went to those who could suppress this bottom-up social force and turn off the flywheels of revolution.

### THE DISAGGREGATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY BODY

The ascendant Major-General Suharto would take control of the flywheels by appropriating the usurping power of the clown and become, in Mochtar Buchori's (1994, p. 5) words, one of Indonesia's "great clowns". Like the clown, Suharto (1966 [1970]) could do things, declaring that he would "bring the country back into line." This began in early October 1965 by retooling the bureaucracy with compliant officials and dismissing suspected Communists from their posts. But this could not rid society of its revolutionary bodies: only the physical disaggregation of those bodies could do that and it was done violently by killing and chopping up people. Among the dead and imprisoned were *ludruk* clowns: "The head of a certain hair-lipped clown would grimace no more, since it had been severed from its body", wrote Peacock (1975, pp. 182–183) as he reflected on the brutal turn of events that made the year of his fieldwork in 1962–1963 so remote from those after 1965. Elaborating in less rhetorical terms, he explained: "I had entitled my original study 'Rites of Modernisation' to argue that the plays distilled a trend in thought from the traditional to the modern. It now seemed as though, for the *ludruk*, history was running backwards." Lamenting the demise of these anarchic revolutionary forms, he concluded that the "anti-evolutionists can smile in grim pleasure upon observing the reversal of modernisation following the massacre of 1965."

The severing of heads from bodies was potent political expression of this reversal of modernization and it was communicated through the many dismembered corpses left to rot by the riverside. Describing a common sight, an eyewitness recalled: “some of the corpses were without hands, some without penises, but most were without heads” (Juadi, personal communication, August 8, 2015). According to the relative of an NU Mosque leader whose students took part in the killings, the severing of the head from the body was done for three reasons: first, it was efficient for those with only knives, swords or sickles; second, it was methodical; and, third, it stated that the victims were no better than animals (Arimbi & Wardono, personal communication, August 14, 2015). Done clandestinely, often by darkened riverbanks in the dead of night, there was nothing of the spectacle of punishment to these killings, which were done in an ordinary and predictable manner as if slaughtering a goat. Their importance was not the act of killing but the dismembered body it produced.

The dismembered body was a counter to the modern body of the clown that grafted together in its own muddled way the different layers of post-colonial Indonesian society. The grafting of social forms was now a brazen act of underground resistance. Rukun was the penultimate grafter. After escaping capture in the *kampung*, he went into hiding and helped to maintain the underground Communist networks that the Army wanted to smash. Dressed in the disguise of a ragged farm labourer, he became a courier of people, money and arms between Surabaya and South Blitar, a hilly and partially forested area about 200 kilometres to the southwest where the PKI was making a last stand (see Hearman, 2012). The social status he most needed for his role was to be unmarried and without children so that he could focus on building the ties that held the underground together. The body part he most needed was his eyes: they enabled him to assemble the associations between things around him into meaningful scripts that identified a person on the street as the fellow cadre he was to meet. The cadre would stop near a certain corner, pull a certain brand of cigarette from its pack and light it in a certain way; Rukun would reply in a similar manner. Neither man knew the other by appearance but by the way they brought objects together. He had also learned 18 years before as a PKI cadre within a battalion of the East Java military to be able to identify threatening people, such as a fellow battalion member who had come from an anti-Communist militia during the revolution and hated Communists. “As a PKI you had

to know who was who,” noted Rukun. A prolonged stare from an unusually interested bystander or neighbour was enough of a clue, as were verbal clues from the pedicab drivers he knew: clues such as “why are you still around”, “be careful”, “stay away from that street stall”. Being able to correctly identify people kept Rukun safe as he moved from place to place. Only the information gained through the torture of a captured cadre he had couriered to Surabaya led to his identification and arrest after two years on the run.

Rukun now faced his former soldier colleague from 18 years before who hated Communists and who now headed the central intelligence bureau in Surabaya tasked with interrogating suspects. Rukun was interrogated for two months until he signed a statement declaring that he was a Communist. Categorized “A”, the most complicit and dangerous type of Communist, he was sent to prison until 1979, when Amnesty International successfully pressured President Suharto to release the majority of Indonesia’s remaining political prisoners. Upon his return to the *kampung*, a former informant and anti-Communist vigilante remarked, “I thought you were dead!” “Who said Rukun is dead!” he replied defiantly. Indeed he was lucky not to be dead: many thousands had died in Surabaya, most of them in the first two months after 30 September 1965. Hundreds more died in interrogation or later in prison, which were used to break down one’s body, often leaving it dead, crippled or so weakened that it no longer had the confidence to speak out.

But Rukun was not silenced. Energetic and upright, he speaks defiantly about the regime that harmed him. He tells a common story of incarceration that revolves around the isolation of his body parts through objects available to the torturers at the time and, ultimately, the isolation of his body and that of the wider community of Communists around him in prison. Under interrogation he was whipped with stingray tails from the local fish market, electrocuted with wires attached to a car battery, beaten with the fists of the interrogators, or stomped with the legs of the desk behind which they sat. The stingray tale targeted his face, the electricity his fingers, toes and penis, the fists his eyes, the table leg his foot. Rarely though did the victims sign any statement; returning to their prison cells with their integrity intact. But in the cell it was sometimes harder to maintain that integrity: bruises could mean that you gave in and gave up information to your interrogators, as could an unharmed body. Such suspicion served to isolate cellmates from one another. Also isolating was the struggle for food scraps, for a few more seconds in the

washroom or some distance from a nearby cellmate stricken with scabies or pneumonia. Rukun's cell was  $3 \times 5$  metres, with 90 men in it. "Each day all 90 of us were given five minutes to shower!" laughed Rukun. "Impossible." Such absurd tasks demonstrated to the prisoners that they could not pull things together: that organization was impossible.

Interrogations, beatings and killings were seldom revealed to the adult public, who only witnessed the results: the crippled bodies of returned prisoners or the dismembered corpses that washed up on riverbanks. While the beating, killing and cutting-up of people was done away from the public eye, it did not escape the eyes of children, who often stumbled across killings and dismemberments and were allowed to watch (Pohlman, 2013, p. 103). In an eye-witness account told to me that echoes the eyewitness account "By the Banks of the Brantas" [reproduced in Cribb (2004) and Pohlman (2015)], a *kampung* man, troubled by his childhood memories of the killings, described how he watched from the window of a rail-yard warehouse one night as a group of black-clad vigilantes cut up corpses on the banks of the Brantas River in Kertosono, 100 kilometres upstream from Surabaya. He still remembers the haunting sound of the sharpening of the swords used to dismember the corpses (Slamet, personal communication, September 16, 2015). In another account told to me, a man described how in nearby Porong he saw three people forced to kneel and have their heads cut off, their bodies then buried up to their torsos and left there for all to see (Bambang, personal communication, February 24, 2014). Another man recalled to me how the common site of headless corpses floating down the Mas River near the British American Tobacco factory in Surabaya. He noted how children lined the bridge to see down on to the river, urging others to join, while adults kept their distance (Juadi, personal communication, August 12, 2015). In his study of the politics of the injuring and dismembering of bodies in the post-colony more generally, Achille Mbembe (2003, p. 35) holds that such violence functions "to keep before the eyes of the victim—and of the people around him or her—the morbid spectacle of severing." In Surabaya, children and victims were most likely to see the severing, while adults were more likely to see what Mbembe calls its "traces" through which "bodily integrity has been replaced by pieces." Whether one saw the severing or the pieces, they saw an embodied form of political communication that formed what Benedict Anderson (2004, p. 1) termed the New Order's "initial savage phase".

## CONCLUSION

The violence exemplifies what phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1969) in his attack on totalitarianism considered a form of communication done on and through bodies. As a form of communication, this violence had to be observed, yet in the Indonesian case studied here, those doing the killing and dismembering usually did it anonymously and away from the public eye. In this case, it was not the act of killing but the bodies it produced that communicated. As such, the killing formed what Daniel Rothenberg (2003) called a “public presentational” type of violence, albeit through the traces of that violence. I have tried to show, however, that the body was a powerful medium of communication in Surabaya long before the killings took place, resembling what Arjun Appadurai (1998, p. 233) termed “a theatre for social performances and productions”, but one that kept communication open, alive and subversive. Unlike the Rwandan case discussed by Appadurai as a form of vivisectional violence done to discover and reveal the social categories that the body confused, in Surabaya the violence was done to destroy the body’s ability to produce such confusion. The power of the clown’s body was not its ability to conceal anything, but its ability to disrupt everything and to create new things by pulling them apart and putting them together in a different way. By grafting things in new and often confronting ways that broke with convention and proceeded unguided into the future, the clown’s body exemplified the destructive and creative forces of both *nafsu* and revolution. Counter-revolution turned on that body through a disabling form of violence that pulled it apart and left it apart so that it was no longer coordinated. As this chapter stresses, it was through the pedagogy of broken bodies and the potent embodied spectacle of severed corpses that the anarchic energy of the revolution and the society and bodies it produced was finally destroyed.

Those who had to pay most attention were the youth. Up until the killings they were told that they were the driving force behind the building of a “new society”. As Claire Holt (1967, p. 202) put it, that new society “called for the ability to make decisions rather than the acceptance of fate”. The killings reversed that logic with a more conservative one that told the youth they had to watch and learn: they could no longer lead. The *ludruk* clown had taught them to open their eyes to the world around them and change it; but now they had to open their eyes to see the disaggregation of that world and accept it. By December

1965, the Army in East Java ordered the killing to stop and people have struggled ever since to even think about the meaning of it all. In his attempt to give meaning to the revolutionary violence underway in the emerging nations of the time, Jean-Paul Sartre (1967, p. 18) offered a clue when he wrote that “violence is neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage instincts, nor even the effects of resentment: it is man re-creating himself.”

What then of the counter-revolutionary violence of 1965 in Indonesia? It de-created the modern post-colonial body of the common person who can do things and it did so through a potent form of embodied political communication that involved the breaking of bodies. As Fanon (1967, p. 233) noted of counter-revolutionary violence more generally, “subjectivity is not taken as the starting-point for modifying the attitude of the individual. On the contrary, the body is dealt with: it is broken.”

In this chapter, I argue that such violence rendered passive the once active body of the *kampung* person and the anarchic society to which s/he gave rise. I have shown how this active body found expression in the popular occupation of the city, the crossing of social divides, welding together of new social and administrative units and inversion of the old social order, and I have shown how this was mirrored on the *ludruk* stage by a burgeoning and usurping clown propelled by an uncontained desire that threatened a status quo based on an idealised passive body. I have shown how the violence of late 1965 sent a counter message to society by taking apart that usurping body, making it irreconcilable along with the social order it brought about. I have also shown how, as Geertz (1995, p. 7) noted, the violence was “a postscript to a story long in the writing.” Finally, I have tried to show that it was a postscript written on bodies.

## NOTES

1. The *Pemuda Rakyat* originated from the Socialist Party of Indonesia’s armed youth wing, Pesindo (*Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia*, Indonesian Socialist Youth), which was decimated during the revolution by the fiercely anti-Communist Siliwangi division of the Indonesian Army and supporting anti-Communist militia. The *Pemuda Rakyat* re-emerged during the 1950s under the patronage of the PKI and claimed a membership of 450,000 (Hindley, 1966, pp. 187–195; Kahin, 1952, pp. 162–163).



2. Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*, Indonesian Women's Movement) was one of the PKI's main ancillary organizations and claimed a membership of 80,000 in the mid-1950s, incorporated smaller local women's organizations like *Gerakan Wanita Surabaya* (Surabaya Women's Movement) (Hindley, 1966).
3. I gathered the oral accounts used in this paper during several periods of field research (totalling about two years) in the Surabaya *kampung* of Dinoyo since January 1998.
4. Established in 1926 in East Java, from where it drew most of its following to become Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) found institutional expression in the affiliated Islamic boarding schools or *pesantren* and the loosely integrated authority of its venerated Islamic scholars (*Kiai*) and learned teachers (*ulama*). It was a prominent political party during the 1955 national elections, winning a majority of the votes in rural East Java, but not in Surabaya, where it ran second to the PKI.
5. From the time of Daniel Lev's (1966) short account in *Asian Survey* to John Roosa's more recent book (2006), numerous Western scholars have covered the events surrounding 30 September 1965. For a discussion of the gendered dimension, see for example Leclerc (1997) and Wieringa (2002). For the situation in Surabaya, see Peters (2013, pp. 50–52).

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## Counterrevolution in a Revolutionary Campus: How Did the “1965 Event” Affect an Indonesian Public University?

*Abdul Wahid*

History teaches us that political, especially military, coups can be very costly. They can lead to the loss of the lives of those directly involved in the conflict—military as well civilians—but also of the lives of supporters and defenders of coups, and even of innocent civilians. Further to this, coups often lead to military-directed purges within state institutions, such that these institutions begin to reflect a new political order. As recognized

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sources of societal influence, education systems and universities in particular are often targeted because they are viewed as strategic institutions for political indoctrination. There is a view therefore that they need to be purged of both persons and curricula promoting “any unwanted rival ideology or ideas” that could possibly poison the “hearts and minds” of the younger generation. These patterns have been well established across the Cold War in Latin America where many military coups took place. In Argentina’s Dirty War (1976–1983) and Guatemala’s Civil War (1960–1996), academics and university staff were targeted in political violence against so-called state enemies (Schneider, 2010, pp. 324–325).

In Indonesia following the military takeover commencing in late 1965, universities and academics were a similar target. Despite the rapid development of studies of the violence against members or suspected members of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI) during the 1965–1966 period, however, they have not yet fully exposed the effects of the violence on universities and their staff and students. Some studies have provided a preliminary indication of the importance of looking at higher education as an object of study for understanding the far-reaching consequences of the anti-Communist campaign that was launched by the Indonesian National Army from early October 1965. The first is the study by Daniel Dhakidae (2003, p. 220) who revealed how, in the initial stages of the violence, the Indonesian Army’s anti-Communist campaign targeted universities and research bodies/higher education institutions, especially those that were suspected of having ties with the PKI. Dhakidae cited Decree No. 1 of 1965 by the Minister for Higher Education and Science, Brigadier-General Sjarief Thajeb, as the grounds for the “temporary” (but in reality, permanent) closure of 14 universities/academies affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, Dhakidae did not examine further how the same strategy was extended to other institutions of higher learning throughout Indonesia, and the consequences that arose from this Decree, be it at the individual level (for those who worked at the aforementioned institutions) or at the institutional level.

The two chapters by Benjamin White and Hilmar Farid respectively, in a book edited by Daniel Dhakidae and Vedi Hadiz (2005), discuss the interconnectedness between the 1965 repression and social science and power in Indonesia. White (2005, pp. 107–141) presents a historical analysis of the trends in the development of agrarian studies within or outside Indonesia, whether these are conducted by independent intellectuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or by academics from large

Indonesian campuses, from the end of the colonial period until the reform period. He shows how at the height of the Cold War period in the 1950s, Indonesian institutions of higher learning became “battlegrounds” between Western nations and the Eastern Bloc, through various forms of assistance ranging from financial to expertise (capacity building). In the middle of this competition, the issue of agrarian reform became an important focus in research as well as a political issue. The PKI as the main supporter of agrarian reform carried out “participatory research actions” in a number of rural Java villages, and even encouraged unilateral actions by farmers to demand their agrarian rights (White, 2005, pp. 116–117).

After the 30 September Movement, because of the new military regime’s intention to erase leftist influence in society, university administrations expelled a large number of academics and activists in agrarian studies at a number of leading campus, such as the Bogor Institute of Agriculture, the University of Indonesia, Padjadjaran University and the University of Gadjah Mada. University bureaucrats regarded these persons as members of the PKI or at least supporters of the Communists’ ideas of agrarian reform. Most of them never returned to their campuses. Others returned but had to undergo strict supervision of their activities, including the obligation to report themselves to the local military authorities. Meanwhile, the new regime categorized agrarian reform as a political issue that was synonymous with Communism, to the point that it was always suspect (White, 2005).

In a related argument, Hilmar Farid (2005) has pointed to the disappearance of the use of the concept of class or class discourse in social science studies in Indonesia after 1965. In his view, this is the direct result of the new regime’s destruction of the political power of the Communists as the agents of class-based political issues or agendas (although the PKI had already left the orthodox Marxist principles of class struggle and shifted to an anti-imperialist strategy around 1960) and its system of “brainwashing”, “screening” and the systematic exclusion of “critical” intellectuals from public debates. Instead of class, university bureaucrats and government funding initiatives encouraged academics to use categories of analysis more compatible with the regime’s emphasis on developmentalism. The discursive development of social sciences in Indonesia was also influenced particularly by the Cold War role and policy influence of the United States and “Western” donors (Farid, 2005, p. 168).

These studies begin to reveal how the events of 1965 impacted Indonesian universities, both on a personal and on an institutional level. This chapter seeks to extend these studies by presenting a more detailed

case study of how the violence impacted Gadjah Mada University, a public university located in the city of Yogyakarta. There are three reasons this university is interesting as a case study. First, it is one of the oldest and largest universities in Indonesia, a place of learning for thousands of students from various parts of Indonesia. Second, in the memory of the nation, the University occupies a specific historical position, that of a university founded amidst the throes of revolution, as part of a strategy by the national leaders to show the existence of Indonesia to the world community. The other historical factor, of course, is related to the condition and position of the University during the political crises before and after 1965, as will be examined in this chapter. The third and final reason is a practical one. The University has a collection of archives which is quite good and relatively accessible; this has enabled me to track down historical witnesses who have provided additional information to complement related archives and documents.

The main questions to be answered in this chapter are: what was the impact of the events of 1965 on Gadjah Mada University, be it at the personal level or on an organizational or institutional level? And, how and in what form did the New Order's anti-Communist strategies change academic life at this university? To answer these questions, I will first explore the internal dynamics of the University, then the external dynamics, both at the local and regional/national levels that affected the University in the period before and during 1965. This matter is based on the assumption that what happened in the years after 1965 is a consequence of the events and developments that occurred in the preceding years.

### FROM THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION TO THE COLD WAR

Gadjah Mada University was officially established by the government of the young Republic of Indonesia on 19 December 1949, based on Government Regulation No. 23/1949 in Yogyakarta, initially under the name of "Universitit Negeri Gadjah Mada" or Gadjah Mada State University. Yogyakarta at the time was the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, because Jakarta had fallen into Dutch hands. Gadjah Mada State University was basically a combination of several colleges that had previously operated around the city (Rahardjo, Siregar, & Mardanus, 1999, pp. 8–9).

About a week after the inauguration of Gadjah Mada State University, on 27 December 1949, the Dutch-Indonesian conflict ended. Based on the agreement reached at the Round Table Conference in The Hague,



the Netherlands recognized the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia (at that time, the United States of Indonesia), with Jakarta as the capital city. As a national university, it was proposed by some professors that the Gadjah Mada State University also be relocated to Jakarta. The proposal was vehemently opposed by supporters of the Republic of Indonesia and University leaders, because they looked at this university not just as an institution of higher education but as a symbol of the existence of the Republic. On 22 May 1950, it was officially decided that Gadjah Mada State University would remain in Yogyakarta (Suryo, Purwanto, & Padmo, 1999, p. 16).

Teaching and learning activities at Gadjah Mada State University were quickly resumed as soon as the situation and security conditions were restored. At that time the number of registered students had reached 483 (as per 1 November 1949). This number increased at the end of the 1950 academic year to 986 and then swelled to 1785 in August 1951. One year later, the number of students had grown to 3257. The primary issue administrators of the new university faced was the lack of available support facilities; good infrastructure such as lecture rooms, offices, laboratories, libraries, hospitals, workshops and so forth; as well as human resources, especially faculty, who could meet the requirements (Rahardjo et al., 1999, p. 16). Facing such constraints, Sultan Hamengku Buwono the Ninth of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, who had a visionary outlook and right from the start had been most supportive of the independence struggle of the Republic of Indonesia, provided tremendous assistance and support. He permitted the buildings belonging to the Sultanate such as Pagelaran, Sitihinggil and several other buildings to be used for teaching and learning activities as well as accommodation for the students and teachers (Suryo et al., 1999, p. 13).

In 1954, Gadjah Mada State University changed its name to Gadjah Mada University. The following year, the administration undertook institutional reorganization elevating several sections or departments to the status of faculty. Thus, by the end of 1955, the number of faculties at the University had increased to 12, with an overall student population of 8586. To keep pace with these developments the university added new teaching staff and organized various programs to improve the quality of its human resources.

Gadjah Mada University cooperated with a number of foreign universities in order to obtain assistance for the faculties and staff in the delivery of advanced studies. In particular, there were extensive exchanges

with American universities in the fields of economics, science and engineering. In July 1957, for example, the Faculty of Engineering (and Science) signed a contract for collaboration with the University of California, Los Angeles. Under this scheme, UCLA sent 10 of their experts in various fields of engineering and science to teach at Gadjah Mada University, while bringing about 20 faculty from the latter to America for higher education. In addition, Gadjah Mada University received books and laboratory equipment as part of an aid package for improving the quality of engineering education at this university. The contract between the two universities lasted until mid-1963 (Money, 1963, p. 96).<sup>2</sup> There was also close cooperation with the Faculty of Economics at the University of Wisconsin. For example, the Rector's Annual Report of 1959–1960 noted that there were seven University of Wisconsin professors teaching at the Faculty of Economics. In that same period, 13 of Gadjah Mada University's teaching staff in Economics went to the United States for further studies (Sardjito, 1960, p. 44). Overall, throughout the 1950s, the University's foreign cooperation, as well as that of other Indonesian universities, was established mostly with the United States and Western European countries.

In the late 1950s, however, the University also cooperated with Eastern Bloc universities/governments, and the Soviet Union in particular. Gadjah Mada University's Annual Report for 1959–1960 mentioned that a staff member of the Agricultural (Engineering) Faculty had successfully completed his studies in the Soviet Union on the applications of atomic energy in agriculture. Then during 1960–1961, the Rector, Professor Sardjito, visited the Soviet Union. His departure was followed by that of ten teaching staff from the Faculties of Medicine (2), Pedagogy (3), Engineering (2), and Science (3), to pursue further studies over there. Moreover, in the same year, the Soviet Union's Ambassador to Indonesia, followed by 8 visiting Russian professors, 6 engineering professors and 2 in agriculture, visited Gadjah Mada University (Sardjito, 1961, p. 51). The Patrice Lumumba University in the Soviet Union was also a popular destination for Indonesian students in medicine and engineering (Sri Mochayati, medical student during 1961–1965 at Gadjah Mada University, personal interview, October 25, 2015). Further to this the Soviet Union provided diverse forms of aid to Indonesia in this period including aid for the development of expertise in areas such as ship building (Boden, 2008, pp. 115–118).

Thanks to this international assistance, Gadjah Mada University was able to continue developing the quality of their teaching staff and education, as well as complete the infrastructure of their other supporting facilities, including a new campus in Bulaksumur district, in the northern part of the city, that was inaugurated by President Sukarno on 19 December 1959. By December 1964, the University had 16 faculties with a combined total of 16,680 students. In terms of human resources, in July 1965, there were 5658 staff members across the University, including 399 professors, 199 assistant professors and 69 instructors at the University hospital, and 877 administrative personnel. With these resources, on average in one year the University passed approximately 1400–1500 undergraduates (Rahardjo et al., 1999, p. 50).

### BECOMING AN “INDONESIAN SOCIALIST CAMPUS”

During the first half of 1959, there was a significant change in national politics. On 5 July 1959, President Sukarno restored the 1945 Constitution and introduced a new political system known as Guided Democracy. He highlighted what he perceived to be the failures of Indonesia’s experiment with Parliamentary Democracy and emphasized the need to “return to the rails of the revolution” and to move towards the implementation of Indonesian socialism. As a university that was born in the throes of revolution, Gadjah Mada University wholly supported the political decision of President Sukarno. The University’s attitude was based on institutional statutes formulated as a direct translation from the 1945 Constitution, so that Sukarno’s decision meant for the University the resumption of its original ideals as a “university of struggle”. The University’s support was also possible because of the “closeness” between the University and the revolutionary ideas of Sukarno. That closeness intensified when the University conferred the title of *Doctor Honoris Causa* (an honorary doctorate) upon Sukarno on 19 September 1951. This was an honour that was appreciated by Sukarno who then in turn gave the University the title “Eagle of the Revolution University” (Hutagaol, 1985, pp. 105–106; Rahardjo et al., 1999, p. 35; van der Kroef, 1955, p. 371).

Furthermore, as a demonstration of support for Sukarno, in 1961 Gadjah Mada University declared itself to be the “Socialist University of Indonesia” (Sardjito, 1961, p. 5). To prove this claim, the University incorporated many of Sukarno’s “political doctrines” outlining his

conceptualizations of Indonesian socialism into its teaching material (indoctrination) for students through the *studium generale*, lectures and coursework activities. Through this policy, the University desired its students to reflect Sukarno's ideals concerning the revolution. The University also decreased tuition fees and introduced a system of "guided" courses and teaching. In addition, the University declared itself to be a *Pancasila* university that was realized by developing a scientific study of the national philosophy of *Pancasila*, which Sukarno had played a leading role in formulating (Rahardjo et al., 1999, p. 35; Suryo et al., 1999, p. 47).

Gadjah Mada University's academic community also supported President Sukarno's campaigns to reclaim from the Dutch West Irian (West Papua) and to oppose the formation of the new nation of Malaysia, which he termed a neo-imperialist project. Students and lecturers joined various training exercises which prepared volunteers to go to West Irian. One student died while serving as a volunteer in the West Irian campaign. Sukarno's efforts to mobilize progressive forces to support what he called the New Emerging Forces or NEFOS (progressive forces in the world that opposed imperialism) were also supported by the university by its conferring the *Doctor Honoris Causa* upon the King of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, on 30 November 1962. Meanwhile, in the arena of domestic politics a few years earlier, the University—represented by two of its agrarian law professors—was also actively involved in the formulation of the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960. These examples demonstrate Gadjah Mada University's concrete support for Sukarno's idea to make universities and scientific research tools of the revolution (Rahardjo et al., 1999, p. 37).

Gadjah Mada University's policies inevitably strengthened its political position as a socialist university, in which the influence of "leftist" ideology appeared to gain in strength over time. Sukarno's encouragement of political ideological indoctrination of all his major ideas, such as the concept of Nasakom, according to which he encouraged all organizations to align with one of the three stands (Nationalism, Religion and Communism) led to tensions on campus.

The Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, PNI) represented the nationalist group and had considerable support among faculty and staff. Faculty members who were affiliated with the Nationalist Party also joined ISRI (*Ikatan Sarjana Republik Indonesia*, the Association of Scholars of the Republic of Indonesia), while the

majority of employees belonged to the KBM (*Kesatuan Buruh Marhaén*, Marhaén Labour Union), which was affiliated with the PNI. The PKI also exerted its influence over Gadjah Mada University. The majority of teaching staff who were graduates joined the HSI (*Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia*, Association of Indonesian Scholars), while administrative staff were generally incorporated into SS-Pendidikan (*Serikat Sekerja Pendidikan*, Education Workers Union), both organizations associated with the PKI. Meanwhile, of all the religious groups on campus, the Islamic groups exerted the greatest influence. Nevertheless, the group's influence was only limited to certain faculties or departments (Suryo et al., 1999, p. 47). According to a medical student who attended Gadjah Mada University from 1961 to 1965, Sri Moehayati (personal interview, October 25, 2015), one of the faculties controlled by religious groups was the Faculty of Medicine. In this faculty, HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, the Islamic Students Association) and Masjumi were the most influential student and political organizations respectively.

The same ideological polarization also coloured the movement of student organizations on campus. Broadly speaking, they were split into two camps, namely the student organizations based on religion and secular student organizations (nationalist–communist). The former was represented primarily by HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, the Islamic Student Association), PMII (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), PMKRI (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia*, Catholic Student Movement of the Republic of Indonesia), and IMM (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah*, the Muhammadiyah Student Association). The latter was represented mainly by GMNI (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indonesia*, Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement) and CGMI (*Central Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*, the Central Movement of Indonesian Students). Since the early 1960s, these organizations had fought hard for influence among the students. The official student bodies, DEMA (*Dewan Mahasiswa*, the University Student Council) and KODEMA (*Komisariat Dewan Mahasiswa*, the Commissariat Student Council) at the University and faculty levels became the area for competition between these groups. They generally argued about intra-campus activities, particularly the issue of hazing and loyalty issues concerning support for President Sukarno (Rahardjo et al., 1999, p. 56). A student at Gadjah Mada University from 1962 to 1969 commented that the situation on campus before the events of 1965 was stressful. Competition between student organizations

at the faculty level and the University was no longer healthy, even leading to acts of anarchy and open fights. Lecture activities were also disrupted (anonymous personal interview with former student, July 18, 2015).

As President Sukarno's policies became increasingly predisposed towards the Communists, their influence in the region and on higher education institutions also increased. This was made possible by the deteriorating condition of the national economy and the PKI's extensive political campaigns through the land reform issue and their progressive education programmes.<sup>3</sup> In Yogyakarta, the strengthening of Communist influence was already obvious since the mid-1950s, when they obtained a majority vote in the General Election of 1955 at both the provincial and municipal levels of Yogyakarta. The PKI gained 229,145 votes and 10 seats in the provincial parliament, while in the municipal parliament they gained 11 seats. Moreover, the Communists also increased their influence among rural and urban youths through their affiliated organizations, PR (*Pemuda Rakyat*, the People's Youth) and LEKRA (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat*, the People's Institute for Art and Culture) (Soewarno, 1994, p. 305).

On campus, CGMI became the spearhead of the PKI. When recruiting members, the movement initially developed a cell system, by encouraging cadres to provide guidance to three to four people. But by 1965, it started recruiting more openly through arts activities, sports, tutoring, lending books, accommodation assistance and an anti-hazing campaign. Through this strategy, the CGMI managed to recruit many members from amongst the student body (Ibrahim, 2012, p. 111). Together with other "progressive" groups, such as GMNI and PERHIMI (*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia*, the Association of Indonesian Graduate Students Union), CGMI claimed to be the main revolutionary force, loyal supporters of Sukarno. Not surprisingly, these groups supported the indoctrination policy of MANIPOL USDEK (*Manifesto Politik / Undang-undang Dasar 1945, Sosialisme Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, dan Kepribadian Indonesia*, Political Manifesto / The 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian Identity) and were instrumental in helping to get rid of people who were deemed disloyal or opposed to the indoctrination. Moreover, it was not uncommon for these groups to also engage in intimidation or attempt to block the careers of teaching staff or employees who were deemed to be anti-government or counter-revolutionary (Suryo et al., 1999, p. 48).

During the lead-up towards the events of 30 September 1965, politicization and government intervention touched nearly all aspects of the University's management. The administration's removal and replacement of faculty heads, for example, were based on loyalty to and conformity with relevant political attitudes to government policies. Many former staff and students were of the opinion that, even for the election of the rector in 1961, the government's main interest was to seek a more revolutionary leadership for the University. Furthermore, political interests also affected granting permission to the lecturers or assistant lecturers who wanted to continue their studies at universities in Western countries, especially the United States. Similarly, in the selection and appointment of new lecturers, assistant lecturers, employees or directors at university level, political interests became the primary consideration (Suryo et al., 1999, p. 48). These conditions then affected the situation and development of the post-1965 events, which implied shades of "revenge" against the progressive groups.

### THE TURNING POINT AFTER 30 SEPTEMBER 1965

In the wake of the 30 September Movement (*Gerakan 30 September*, G30S) in Jakarta, a similar movement also emerged in Yogyakarta, carried out by a group of military personnel who declared themselves G30S supporters. The movement was started shortly after Lieutenant-Colonel Untung delivered a speech on the establishment of the Revolutionary Council through the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia on 1 October 1965 at 7.00 am. Mayor Mulyono declared the formation of the Revolutionary Council in Yogyakarta and took over the local military authorities led by Colonel Katamso. Mayor Mulyono announced those measures through the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia on the same day and on behalf of himself as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. Meanwhile, that evening, his men, led by Major Wisnuaji, kidnapped and murdered Colonel Katamso and Lieutenant-Colonel Sugiyono in the northern part of Yogyakarta. Leftist students and members of youth organizations and students showed their support for the formation of the Revolutionary Council through a street demonstration on 2 October. They were even more excited when rumour spread that the PKI Chairman Aidit had come to Yogyakarta to consolidate the local PKI figures. They hoped that the failure of the 30 September Movement



in Jakarta could be compensated by the success of the movement in Yogyakarta and Central Java (Ibrahim, 2012, pp. 114–120).

But that hope was soon destroyed, because RPKAD (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat*, the Army Commando Regiment) arrived in Yogyakarta on 4 October and took immediate action to crush the General Council and its supporters. Military action was quickly followed by the wave of anti-Communist actions carried out by civil society, which mostly comprised Islamic youth organizations such as Gerakan Pemuda Islam (the Islamic Youth Movement), the Muhammadiyah Student Association, Hezbollah and others (Harnoko, Fakkih, & Darban, 1994, pp. 74–76). They mobilized demonstrations against the 30 September Movement and started to destroy buildings which were the headquarters of the PKI and its affiliated organizations in various corners of Yogyakarta. Initially, the mass resistance of the PKI resulted in a mass brawl in the square north of Yogyakarta, which resulted in a number of victims, but in the end they were overwhelmed and became helpless as the Army Commando Regiment and members of the KOREM (*Komando Resort Militer*, the Military Resort Command) Yogyakarta started a campaign to “cleanse” the city and its environs of the Communists. For the Yogyakarta region, the cleansing turned into a massacre of alleged PKI members in a village in Semanu, Gunung Kidul district. Here people were forced into a sea cave off the south coast and consequently drowned when the tide came in. A study estimated that thousands of alleged Communists were murdered in this manner (Ibrahim, 2012, p. 124).

At the same time the purges had already begun on campus. Prior to 1965, Gadjah Mada University had been known as a “red” campus, thus it was a primary target for the army and anti-Communists. Done in stages, the purges initially began with an instruction by the Indonesian Armed Forces, followed up and implemented by the Ministry for Higher Education and Science. The chronology of those purges was as follows. KOTI (*Komando Operasi Tertinggi*, the Supreme Operations Command) issued instructions for purging the campus and state agencies on 10 October 1965 in the form of Letter of Instruction No. 22/KOTI/1965. The letter of instruction was immediately implemented by the Minister for Higher Education and Science, Brigadier-General Sjaferd Thajeb. He in turn issued Emergency Decree No. 1 of 1965 to freeze the 14 higher education institutions belonging to the PKI (see Note 1). He then issued Emergency Decree No. 2 of 1965



concerning the freezing of CGMI, PERHIMI and IPPI (*Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia*, the Association of Indonesian Student Youth). Furthermore, he issued Emergency Letters of Instruction No. 5, dated 15 October 1965, and No. 11, dated 26 October 1965, on “the implementation of measures to purge the Department of Higher Education and Science and the sphere of higher education institutions of counter-revolutionary adventurous elements that were called the ‘30 September Movement’.”<sup>4</sup> Thajeb still used the term counter-revolutionary at this time to describe so-called “subversives” because of the thorough penetration of Sukarnoist language according to which everyone sought to represent themselves as true revolutionaries (supporters of Sukarno’s revolutionary ideas).

As a follow-up to Emergency Instruction No. 2 of 1965 from the Minister for Higher Education and Science, the Rector of Gadjah Mada University, Professor Herman Johannes, issued Decree No. 13 of 1965 containing a decision to deactivate three Student Council members, who had been singled out as members of the Central Movement of Indonesian Students. The rector also issued Decrees No. 14 and 15 of 1965, which essentially froze the status of 13 students from 11 different faculties who were on the board of the Commissariat Student Council, because they were alleged members of PERHIMI and CGMI. The decrees were the result of the University leadership’s direct response to the instructions of the Minister for Higher Education and Science. The university leaders oversaw a thorough process of systematic investigation and purging elements “of the 30 September Movement” from 1 November 1965. Some sources indicated different information about the results of the process. Antara News Agency on 1 January 1966 reported that the university purged as many as 115 lecturers/employees and 3006 students of Gadjah Mada University, meaning they were temporarily or definitively dismissed.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the 19 January 1966 edition of *Kedaulatan Rakyat* (People’s Sovereignty), a local newspaper, cited the University’s public relations bureau in saying that 2986 students who had been “involved with the 30th September Movement”, meaning they had alleged Communist sympathies, were either temporarily suspended or expelled altogether (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, January 19, 1966; see also Harnoko et al., 1994, p. 9). Data from this particular source provides detailed background information about the faculties of the students who had been sanctioned, as can be seen in Fig. 8.1. Apparently on the basis of these expulsions, the Army Commando Regiment awarded a




Fig. 8.1 Suspended students per faculty (19/1/1966)



Fig. 8.2 The RPKAD plaque awarded to UGM for its role in the anti-communist purge in 1965 on display at the UGM Museum. Photograph by author

plaque dated 25 December 1965 to the University for its “contribution in the suppression of the 30 September Movement” in Central Java, and particularly the Yogyakarta Special Region (see Fig. 8.2).

In the midst of this precarious socio-political environment, Gadjah Mada University had to choose a new Rector, because Professor Johannes had reached retirement age and his term of office had ended. After a brief selection process, Muhammad Nazir Alwi, who had previously served as Rector at the University of North Sumatra, was appointed by the Central Government as Acting Rector of Gadjah Mada University in July 1966. The appointment of a new Rector who came from outside the University was a clear indication of the Central Government’s intervention and particular interests. As Rector, M. Nazir Alwi immediately resumed the task of purging “elements of the 30th September Movement” from the University. The first step he took was to form a Student Special Investigation Team and an Employee Special Investigation Team to carry out the task. Each team consisted of 10 people headed by the Rector himself, and comprised representatives from the police, military and university leadership.<sup>6</sup> These teams re-examined the findings of previous investigations and then determined the results in December 1966. In particular, of the number of students who were allegedly “involved”, the student investigation team’s findings differed slightly from the previous figure of 3059 students expelled or temporarily suspended. From this total, 2034 individuals were allowed to resume their studies, while the rest could not return to campus and were unaccounted for later (Rahardjo et al., 1999, p. 60).

The interesting thing about the investigation process or screening was the active and intensive involvement of students (especially the caretaker members of the Student Council who originated from the rival student organizations, especially HMI) in compiling the inventory and investigating the names of students who were allegedly “involved”. The involvement of students was due to the University leadership not having accurate data on the activities and political affiliations of its students before 1965, to the point where the identification process was conducted in an inaccurate and even haphazard manner. Student representatives were involved because it was expected that they could provide more accurate information about who among their colleagues were considered appropriate for the list. In addition, there were also a number of students and faculty involved in the process of examination and interrogation. For example, there were several army officers who became students in the Faculty of Medicine and greatly assisted in the identification of students “suspects” in that faculty (Sri

Mochayati, personal interview, October 25, 2015). Meanwhile, Loekman Soetrisno, who worked on sociology and agrarian studies, became one of the most well known of the teaching staff (at the time he was an assistant lecturer) who was actively involved in the process of vetting the suspects (Tedjabayu Sudjojono, student at the Faculty of Biology, Gadjah Mada University from 1962 to 1965, personal interview, July 20, 2015; anonymous personal interviews with former academics, July 10, 2015).

Based on information from survivors, the screening and inspection process itself was often arbitrary, subjective and varied depending on the whims of individual officers. Tedjabayu, for example, was suspected of being a member of the Central Movement of Indonesian Students. He was arrested together with about 90 of his friends in the building of the CHTH (*Chung Hua Tsung Hui*, Chinese Central Association) office that was also the premises of the Res Publica University in early October 1965. During the examination process, when he had to move from one prison to another, he witnessed many of his colleagues undergo all manner of torture as they were interrogated. The interrogators were often not military officers but fellow students who had received training from the army (Tedjabayu Sudjojono, personal interview, July 20, 2015).

Sri Mochayati, who was arrested for being a member of CGMI, told a somewhat different story. As the daughter of a prominent Indonesian Communist, Muhadi, Sri initially thought that she would not be arrested at her parents' home, but rather at the police or Indonesian Army station when she visited her father. One thing that surprised her was that for several months she was detained in a library building named Jefferson that was the property of the United States government before being transferred to Fort Vredenburg and Wirogunan Prison. She also witnessed the repeated use of torture, although she herself never experienced it (Sri Mochayati, personal interview, October 25, 2015).<sup>7</sup>

The purge extended to faculty heads and members of the University leadership. Grounds for expulsion included not just suspicion of being a Communist, but also support of some other leftist ideology, or even on made-up reasons. To avoid this process, some professors tried to save their juniors by sending them to study abroad or radically changing their political orientations to something that was acceptable to the authorities (anonymous personal interview with former academic, September 15, 2015).

The screening process, either directly or indirectly, created the conditions and the climate of mutual suspicion, mistrust and fear amongst

colleagues on the University campus. It also resulted in an attitude of self-censorship amongst academics to avoid “problems” with the authorities. As a control mechanism, the screening agency was maintained and institutionalized by the New Order, not only to eradicate any last remaining vestiges of Communist influence, but also to prevent the resurgence of dissident elements that were at odds with the authorities. The screening policy endured until the end of the New Order in 1998, with different names but the same format.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, the overall policy of screening that proceeded very systematically and structurally had completely eliminated anyone suspected of being involved in the organizations that were “associated with” the 30 September Movement, and even managed to purge from Gadjah Mada University campus “elements” of ideology, thought and discourse of the Left (read Communist/Socialist). This “clean environment” policy clearly benefited those groups that since the very beginning had been at odds with leftist groups (students, staff and faculty) and nationalist-Sukarnoism until mid-1965. Purging the campus through screening paved the way for such groups to fill a variety of administrative positions in the University environment, and then to support and collaborate with the higher education policy of the Suharto government.

### HAUNTING MEMORY

Throughout the years of the New Order, this dark episode in the history of Gadjah Mada University was almost never discussed openly by either students or faculty, including by those who had witnessed and experienced that period first-hand. In terms of research and learning, especially in the faculties of social sciences and humanities, there were very few Gadjah Mada students and academics who made in-depth studies of the events of 1965, especially those that occurred within the campus itself.<sup>9</sup> This shows the magnitude of the historical trauma that overwhelmed this campus, in addition to the strength of control of those who do not want to reopen that episode, as well as the reluctance amongst academics of this campus to “touch” on the issues surrounding the events of 1965.

That rigidity only changed slightly after the collapse of the New Order in May 1998. It can be seen from the publication of at least two official history books by Gadjah Mada University in 1999, the results of work

conducted under the auspices of the 50th anniversary of the University under the leadership of Professor Ichlasul Amal. The first was written by a team of University historians, while the second was written by an external team from the LP3ES (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial*), a prominent NGO in Indonesia (Rahardjo et al., 1999; Suryo et al., 1999). In contrast to other state universities in Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University—through these two books—was relatively honest about what happened in the years before and after 1965. These publications prove, on some level, the “willingness” of Gadjah Mada University to acknowledge a dark episode in its history and open a discourse on its “position” in the 1965 events.

Nevertheless, a strong public demand for Gadjah Mada University to recognize its “role” in the 1965 events surfaced at the end of 2015, especially after the success of the International People’s Tribunal 1965 which was held in The Hague from 10 to 13 November. In one of the sessions, an anonymous witness who was a former student of Gadjah Mada University testified about the sexual torture inflicted upon her by a university staff member at the end of 1965, who later became a professor at Gadjah Mada University and was known as a critic of New Order policies. The public testimony of this survivor triggered a public debate on social media that pushed the University into the international spotlight. A movement calling itself “Gadjah Mada University Alliance for the 1965 Tragedy” appeared in the media with an online petition ([www.change.org](http://www.change.org)) to demand an apology from the university to victims. As of February 2016, this initiative had succeeded in obtaining about 1000 supporters.<sup>10</sup> According to an informant, the petition movement was organized by a number of alumni of this University and supported by a group of young professors in various faculties. However, the Rectorate did not respond. According to some sources, the Rectorate was reluctant to respond to these demands, and considered the torture incident to be an isolated event and not associated with the University institutionally (anonymous personal interview with former academic, December 12, 2015).

## CONCLUSION

Based on the above historical survey, I conclude that the events of 1965, and primarily the anti-Communist strategy launched by Suharto’s New Order regime, profoundly impacted Gadjah Mada University and most

likely many other universities in Indonesia. The most concrete impact was the loss of a generation of Indonesian intellectuals, who were products of the 1950s—a decade known for openness, cosmopolitanism, democratic humanism and an appreciation for intellectualism. The forced disappearance of sections of this generation also marked the strengthening of state intervention and political interests in the academic world of Indonesia. It was followed by the removal of books that canvassed Marxist/Socialist thought from the library shelves, and the elimination of conflict theories and class analysis from curricula and lectures. The violence of 1965 also became taboo as an object of study and academic research. In these conditions, academic freedom became increasingly hollow. The screening process systematically eradicated elements of the leftist intellectual heritage in this populist campus, and encouraged the academic community to avoid the 1965 killings and related issues from their intellectual work. In addition, that “dark episode” left a prolonged historical trauma for the University, so much so that it still has not been able to formulate concrete steps to come to terms with this difficult past. More in-depth investigation needs to be conducted to determine the extent of the post-1965 shift of influence on curriculum development and international cooperation; as well as the extent to which it shaped the University’s management practice in the present day to be bureaucratic and increasingly market-oriented.

## NOTES

1. The 14 universities/academies are: (1) Res Publica University; (2) People’s University of Indonesia; (3) Aliarcham ([Ali Archam] Academy of Social Sciences); (4) Bacharudin Academy of Political Science; (5) Ir. Anwari Technical Academy; (6) Dr. Rivai Academy of Journalism; (7) Multatuli Academy of Letters; (8) Dr. Ratulangi Academy of Economics; (9) Ronggowarsito Academy of History; (10) People’s University; (11) Municipality of Surakarta Government University; (12) W. R. Supratman Academy of Journalism (Surabaya); (13) *Teruna Patria* Academy of Journalism and Communication Science; and (14) *Egom* Agricultural Institute of Bogor. In addition, the Minister for Higher Education and Science also issued another decree as a follow-up to his previous decree, namely Emergency Decree No. 92 of 1965, dated 11 October 1965, which contains the decision to suspend CGMI (*Central Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*, the Central Movement of Indonesian University Students) and PERHIMI (*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia*, the Indonesian University



- Student's Association), both of which being suspected of Communist affiliations (Dhakidae, 2003, p. 220).
2. For further details on US assistance and the mentoring expertise provided to universities in Indonesia see Beers (1971, pp. viii–xi), Money (1963, pp. 94–95) and Rice (1968, pp. 8–9).
  3. According to Robert Murray Thomas (1981, pp. 369–392), the PKI's political programme in the education sector include the following strategies: (1) attempts at controlling existing institutions; (2) weakening the institutions' existing competitors if there were any that could not be controlled; and (3) establishing new organizations/institutions to strengthen the position of the Party. The first strategy was aimed at controlling the education ministry, *Taman Siswa* (a private college established by Ki Hajar Dewantara), Association of Teachers of the Republic of Indonesia, and existing schools. The second strategy was directed at the Indonesian Student Association and religious groups; while the third strategy was about the formation of the People's University, and research institutions such as the Ali Archam Academy and so forth.
  4. These instructions are available in the Collection of National Education Ministerial Regulations of 1965 at the National Archives (Jakarta).
  5. Announcement of the results of the investigation by the Student Special Investigation Team was published in *Warta Berita* (News), a publication of Antara News Agency. The document is stored at the National Archives (Jakarta) under the heading *Warta Berita Antara* (Antara News).
  6. Decree of the Rector No. 12 of 1966, the collection of the Gadjah Mada University Archives.
  7. Her story is also told briefly in the memoir of Heryani Busono Wiwoho (2012, p. 131).
  8. The final document concerning the formation of screening teams or special investigation teams can be found in the Archives of Gadjah Mada University, dated 31 March 2000.
  9. An article about the violence in Klaten and Banyuwangi that was written by a team from the Centre for Village Studies of Gadjah Mada University, in Robert Cribb's seminal book (1990, pp. 121–158), is an interesting exception. It was the only piece of writing to come out of the university on the topic until 1990. However, until now, the members of that research team are not known and some informants who were contacted claimed ignorance. Robert Cribb himself admitted to having received the manuscript anonymously.
  10. Retrieved from <https://www.change.org/p/rektor-ugmyogyakarta-dwikorita-karnawati-akui-ugm-terlibat-tragedi-1965>.



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## The 1965–1966 Violence, Religious Conversions and the Changing Relationship Between the Left and Indonesia's Churches

*Vannessa Hearman*

Relations between Indonesia's churches and the political Left were not always cordial in the lead up to the 1965–1966 anti-Communist violence. With increasing political competition in the 1960s between the Army and the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party) in particular, churches and Christian political parties feared a PKI victory would create difficulties for them. The 1965–1966 violence resulted in half a million dead and between 600,000 and 750,000 Indonesians detained for various lengths of time up to the late 1970s (Amnesty International, 1977). The destruction of the Left thawed the relationship between it and the churches for two main reasons. Firstly, in the churches' view, as a result of the violence, the Left could no longer pose a threat to religious communities. Secondly, the humanitarian catastrophe as a result of the violence needed the intervention of the churches to alleviate the suffering. In this context, the churches provided spiritual

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and material assistance to victims and their families. A number of political detainees also converted to Christianity. Until the fall of Suharto's New Order regime (1966–1998), there had been only limited possibilities to explore how the persecution of the Left in Indonesia led to large-scale conversions to Christianity and the kinds of assistance the churches provided to detainees. Based on several interviews conducted in Java following the fall of the New Order regime with former detainees, religious cleric and laypersons, this chapter explores the tensions in the relationship between the Left and religious communities, the attitude of the churches to the violence, and the motivations of converts.

By analyzing testimonies drawn primarily from former detainees from East Java, this chapter discusses the meanings detainees ascribed to Christian religious practices and the difference the churches made in their lives. My choice of East Java as the primary field site enables a range of observations. In that part of Java, perpetrators of the anti-Communist violence were those drawn from the military, police and civilian groups from the youth group Ansor. Ansor is the youth wing of Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The involvement of Islamic, and therefore, civilian groups in the commission of violence led to a recalibration of community relations and community responses to questions of religion following the violence. In addition, the higher proportion of killings rather than political imprisonment in East Java, as compared to Central Java, led to different challenges for the churches in East Java (Thomson, 1968, p. 15). In the following sections of the chapter, I will trace the common explanations given in church histories about the 1965-linked conversions, before discussing the position of the churches towards the 30 September Movement (a group that abducted and killed seven army officers and was subsequently linked to the PKI by the army), and the churches' responses to the humanitarian situation after October 1965. Finally, the chapter will turn to the recollections of interviewees about their experience of prison and finding a new faith.

### EXPLANATIONS FOR THE PHENOMENON OF CONVERSION

Conversion to Christianity in the prisons and violence-affected communities of Java attracted considerable commentary in church circles internationally (Bentley-Taylor, 1967; Cooley, 1968; Thomson, 1968; Willis, 1977). The extent of the growth of Christian congregations in Indonesia led church historians to dub the phenomenon an "Indonesian revival,"

with two million Indonesians joining Christianity in 1966 onwards (Willis, 1977). Before we examine some of the possible causes for this growth, let us firstly look at the statistics reported in scholarly and church literature. Between 1964 and 1973, the Catholic Church in the Semarang Archdiocese of Central Java reported a growth of 126% (from 103,195 to 234,135 Catholics) (Aritonang & Steenbrink, 2008, p. 709). In East Java, this growth was seen across all Christian denominations, including the smaller Chinese Protestant GKI (*Gereja Kristen Indonesia*, Indonesian Christian Church) and Evangelical and Pentecostal churches (Aritonang & Steenbrink, 2008, p. 717). The Protestant Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan (GKJW) in East Java is one of the oldest churches in Java (Cooley, 1968, p. 86). In 1967, the GKJW synod reported that in East Java, the church had 80 congregations with 90,000 baptized members, in contrast to only 72 organized congregations and 62,500 baptized members in 1964—a rise of eight new congregations (Thomson, 1968, p. 16). There was also a high rate of conversion among the Indonesian Chinese to Catholicism. In 1966, around 16.7% of the total Indonesian Chinese Catholic population was found in East Java. By 1969, this had grown to 26.7% (Coppel, 1983, p. 108). These figures therefore seemed remarkable.

In relying on Church statistics, as these writers have done, a note of caution is in order. Churches might have underreported the size of their congregations and membership numbers prior to October 1965 to avoid drawing attention to themselves and to downplay their influence, as party rivalry intensified between the PKI on the one hand and Christian and Catholic political parties on the other, discussed further below. With underreporting, growth rates under the New Order might have become exaggerated. In turn, in the early New Order period, churches might have exaggerated some of their recruitment figures, sometimes to appeal to congregations in Western countries to support their work. As Steenbrink (2010, p. 105) has shown, enormous goodwill in the West towards Indonesian churches in the early New Order period led to high levels of development aid received from countries like West Germany after 1965. With that note of caution regarding the politicized uses of statistics, we turn to possible reasons for the growth of congregations.

The most common reasons to explain the phenomenon of conversion in the available scholarship thus far are that, firstly, people seized upon Christianity in order to simply possess a religion. The New Order regime required each citizen to identify as belonging to one of five permissible religions and this helped drive the growth of Christian

congregations in Java. Alan Thomson noted that people converted in this period, because, “it is not good to be an unbeliever in Indonesia today” (Thomson, 1968, p. 17). Avery Willis Jr. (1977, p. 223) found in his study that respondents identified the 1966 government policy stating that all citizens must profess a religion as the key factor for them in joining the Church. These explanations suggest that conversions to Christianity occurred simply to avoid being labeled as atheist and therefore Communist under the New Order. As a result of this, there was thus some skepticism in the clergy towards the motivations of converts in the 1960s and 1970s. As these conversions were often motivated by circumstances, “one veteran pastor” asked of those who expressed a desire to enter Christianity “whether they have come to save their souls or their necks” (Thomson, 1968, p. 19). Research in the 1960s and 1970s conducted by Church historians tended to investigate the growth of congregations through interviews with clergy and lay preachers and the marshalling of anecdotal evidence those interviewees were able to gather from prison and families of detainees.

While churches and clergy have been free to write of their achievements in expanding their flocks and embracing former leftists, those who took the conversion road had not been able to be as free and frank in discussing their motivations, as a result of past New Order discrimination against former political prisoners. The lasting impact of this restriction has been the continuing dominance of Church sources in the literature and therefore the promotion of the view by scholars that such conversions were largely politically motivated. Indeed scholars of religion and Christianity in Indonesia such as Schröter (2010, p. 13), Seo (2013, p. 77), Hoon (2013, p. 459), Mujiburrahman (2001, p. 34) and Arifianto (2009, p. 81) interpret Christianity’s growth in the mid-1960s as predominantly the result of the New Order’s policy of forcing Indonesians to belong to a religion. This underscores the importance of bringing out the voices of the converts themselves into play.

Despite the aforementioned skepticism of some clergy, the second explanation for conversion was that converts sought solace in Church teachings as a result of the traumatic regime transition. Church historians tend to highlight the spiritual side of the decision to convert. For example, Willis (1977, p. 223) found the most important reasons to convert, after the need to hold a religion in New Order Indonesia, were, in order of importance: the Church’s action or services it provided, followed by spiritual need, interest in the Gospel, social relationships, protection,

and family relationships. In this chapter, I will explore those reasons that Willis identified which have thus far been more difficult to research openly, namely the Church's action or services provided, and the social and family relationships that influenced conversion. Solace in the Church took the form of more than just theological teachings but also in the churches' ability to make a real difference to the survival and quality of life of detainees in prison and afterwards.

### THE CHURCHES AFTER THE 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT

In Indonesia, Roman Catholicism and Christian Protestantism were the main Christian denominations after independence in 1949, with the former being the oldest form of Christianity in Indonesia (Cooley, 1969, p. 112). Roman Catholicism had arrived under the aegis of Portuguese traders and colonizers in the sixteenth century, beginning in the Maluku islands (Cooley, 1969, p. 112). By 1964, there were 1.5 million Catholics recorded, mostly located in the eastern Indonesian island of Flores (Cooley, 1969, p. 113). Protestantism was introduced to Indonesia by the Dutch East India Trading Company in the seventeenth century and boosted by the circulation of a Malay-language translation of the Bible in 1733 (Cooley, 1969, p. 114). As a result of missionary activities, other churches also grew in Indonesia. Most Protestant churches in the mid-1960s were united in the DGI (*Dewan Gereja-gereja Indonesia*, Indonesian Council of Churches). The DGI, founded in 1950, represented three-quarters of the total number of Indonesian Protestants, some four million spread across 25 provinces of Indonesia and 7000 congregations (Cooley, 1969, p. 110). Most Protestant churches in the 1960s were Calvinist, owing to Protestantism's Dutch origins in Indonesia.

Despite its colonial and Western origins, Christianity managed to flourish in Muslim dominated Indonesia. Arifianto (2009, p. 80) shows that the size of the Catholic congregation in Indonesia almost doubled between 1953 and 1965. Under Sukarno, religious freedom as well as government aid to the "educational, charitable and sometimes even religious work of the church" ensured the growth of churches (Cooley, 1969, p. 113). Catholicism was well represented in national life with the existence of the Catholic Party, several mass organizations and Catholic representation on legislative bodies, as well as 10 regular publications, including a daily newspaper.

Nevertheless, the Church's Western origins and links proved problematic later on. With the political tensions occurring during the Cold War and Sukarno's Guided Democracy period (1959–1965), Indonesia became increasingly opposed to the capitalist world. Anti-Western sentiment hardened. Christian churches with roots in the Anglo-American world became an easy target for anti-imperialist protests (Willis, 1977, p. 76). The Baptist Church and the hospital they ran in Kediri, East Java, for example, were targeted by anti-American protests in 1964–1965 (Ichsan, personal interview with Katharine McGregor, February 29, 2008). Pressure from Communists against Baptists in various parts of Indonesia is documented in Southern Baptists' official histories (International Mission Board, 1998). The Baptists complained that the Church's association with "American imperialism", which led to such protests, stopped them from being able to convert from 1964 onwards (Willis, 1977, p. 18). Catholic and Protestant churches, while protected by their size, still felt under pressure as a result of the anti-Western sentiment and the PKI becoming the third largest Communist party in the world.

The pressure felt by religious organizations led them to react positively at first to the Army's suppression of the 30 September Movement in October 1965. The DGI issued a statement a week after the 30 September Movement, giving thanks to God for the failure of the Movement, dubbed a "coup attempt" by the Army (Willis, 1977, p. 19). According to Webb, the DGI and the MAWI (*Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia*, Indonesian Bishops' Conference) then failed to protest the "unauthorized killings and the illegal imprisonments without charges and trial" and that many Christians he interviewed privately expressed their discontentment with this failure of church institutions to take a stand (Webb, 1986, p. 110). But as more information about the brutality of the suppression later came to light, the standpoint of church organizations changed. The PKI victory they had dreaded now seemed so fanciful.

Church leaderships were arguably walking a tightrope. A statement issued by the GKJW synod in East Java on 1 December 1965 pledged to "assist the efforts of the armed forces to overthrow the Thirtieth September Movement" and expressed the Church's opposition to the Movement and its activities, and opposition to Christians' search for alternative ideologies (denoted as "other sources of action") (Thomson, 1968, p. 18). However, the letter also emphasized the importance of upholding the principle of justice in combatting the Movement (Thomson, 1968, p. 18). The Churches' position, while condemning the "coup attempt", was also a call for restraint and for due process of law to take place.



While on one hand Christian churches had regarded the Communists as a threat and greeted the suppression of the PKI with relief, there was a great deal of uncertainty about the new political situation. From expressions of support for the suppression of the Movement, Catholic Church leaders swung into action to urge their congregations not to participate in the violence that accompanied the suppression. The army saw religious communities all over Indonesia as potential allies in the anti-PKI operations, because of the fears such communities might have held of a PKI victory in Indonesia. When the Movement struck, many Indonesian Catholic bishops and archbishops were in Rome at the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), including Archbishops Gabriel Manek of Ende, Flores (Prior, 2011, pp. 133–135) and Darmoyuwono of Semarang, Central Java. Darmoyuwono's secretary and Vicar General C. Carri SJ issued two letters (dated 22 October and 6 November 1965) to priests and the laity supporting the government's screening of those involved in the 30 September Movement, but advising against taking part in violent action or of being involved in screening teams (Carri, 1965). A third letter from the Semarang Archdiocese was issued by Archbishop Darmoyuwono himself on 6 January 1966, explicitly stating that Catholics should not be involved in the torture, abuse or killing in the course of the suppression of the Movement (Darmoyuwono, 1966). These were, therefore, clear instructions against participation in violence.

Political party rivalry had led some Catholics into becoming involved in the violence. The Catholic Party was founded in 1945 out of the Indonesian Catholic Political Union (PPKI) (Webb, 1978, p. 49). Although small, it had developed links with Islamic party and PKI opponent Masyumi and the anti-Communist elements of the Armed Forces such as Generals Abdul Haris Nasution and Gatot Subroto (Van Klinken, 2003, p. 215). In February 1957, Catholic party founder Ignasius Josef Kasimo opposed Sukarno's concept of Guided Democracy, together with Mohammad Natsir from Masyumi, the only two party representatives to do so (Van Klinken, 2003, p. 215). Having created this friction with Sukarno, in 1960 the party replaced Kasimo with Flores-born Frans Seda as party chairperson.

Protestant and Catholic political parties were part of the anti-PKI coalition in Jakarta, the KAP-Gestapu (*Komite Aksi Pengganyangan Gerakan Tigapuluh September*, Action Committee for the Destruction of the Thirtieth September Movement), and formed part of the suppression forces in the regional areas. Protestant groups in Pare, near Kediri,

reported one observer, were also enthusiastic participants in the anti-Communist operations (Rochijat, 1985, p. 44). Kasimo expressed pride that the PMKRI (*Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia*, Catholic Students' Union of the Republic of Indonesia) formed the core of Catholic participation in "exterminating" the 30 September Movement, while the Catholic Party played the role of "policy- and decision maker" (Van Klinken, 2003, p. 215). Indeed my interviews in East Java with a former Catholic priest in Kediri and with a former Catholic high-school student in Blitar showed that young Catholics were involved in anti-Communist operations, such as by assisting the army in carrying equipment during operations (Haryanto, personal interview, November 13, 2010; Marcus, personal interview, February 3, 2009). Kasimo noted that, "Throughout all of Indonesia, the Catholic Party was not left behind in its integration- and active participation with the population to put down the [Thirtieth September Movement]" (Van Klinken, 2003, p. 215). Though being implicated in the extreme violence was problematic, sections of the Catholic Church and Catholic mass and political organizations were highly integrated with the new, incoming political establishment (Prior, 2011, p. 319).

### CONVERSIONS AND DETAINEES' MOTIVATIONS

The Churches' initially welcoming attitude to the anti-Communist repression made some think twice about converting and might have discouraged others. Nevertheless the scale and complexity of the ensuing humanitarian crisis forced churches to act. The prison population grew and those family members left behind needed assistance. In this context, I explore two reasons referred to by Willis for joining the Church, namely the Church's action and service provision and, secondly, the formation of networks and relationships as a result of participation in Christian worship. The first category relates to the direct material impact the Churches had on the lives of political prisoners and their families. The second category pertains to the sense of belonging, community and identity that worshipping as a Christian provided to them.

The Jawi Wetan church, GKJW in East Java, the largest church in the province, was soon confronted with the dimensions of this humanitarian disaster. Thomson (1968, p. 15) notes that quite unlike in Central Java where many people were incarcerated "as a formal military activity, under the terms of state of war", in East Java, the Church confronted a situation where a higher proportion of people had been killed by civilian militias with

“benevolent non-interference by the military”. They had to assist those members of the congregation who lost family members and relatives in the killings. The emergency session of the GKJW synod in Surabaya from 30 November to 1 December 1965 noted that to its knowledge, 116 Church members had been killed in the previous two months (Thomson, 1968, p. 15). In one village congregation, there were 40 widows and 100 orphans (Thomson, 1968, p. 15). In response the Church decided to establish two new orphanages, a widows’ assistance fund and, “in two especially difficult areas” (not named by Thomson, 1968, p. 15), to set up work projects to provide some income.

Christian churches became government partners in delivering spiritual guidance, thus guaranteeing the churches a level of exposure to the detainees. As Thomson (1968, p. 11) acknowledged, Churches were invited to enter prisons to provide religious services, “on the theory that the making of believers was the unmaking of Communists”. In other words, according to this view, religion and Communism were completely antithetical. Because of this contact with church personnel in prison, sometimes prisoners’ choice of religion came about by accident. Religious guidance officers who themselves were detainees (*uragam*) also had to fill certain quotas of adherents in places of detention (Setiawan, 2000, p. 31). There was therefore little free choice in that context, but conversion was actively encouraged by the state.

Despite this constraint, however, the choice of religion, in a situation where detainees had lost control over many aspects of their lives, became important to those who *were* able to choose, and was a way to voice their opposition to their jailers. One of my interviewees, an engineer prior to his arrest, Winata (personal interview, February 22, 2008), initially explained that he fell into Christianity quite by accident. He told me that he randomly chose to nominate himself as a Christian in 1968 when he was first arrested in East Java. However, upon closer probing, he explained that his conversion was because he harbored hatred towards Islam “because of their vehemence in killing us” (Winata, personal interview, February 22, 2008), referring to the involvement of Muslim civilians in the killings in East Java. Some detainees therefore expressed their sentiments about the political situation through their choice of religion.

Detainees were sometimes vague about the reason they chose to convert to Christianity. They were unable to pinpoint spiritually the reason they chose to be a Christian. A former schoolteacher, Tuti, seemed not to have been particularly religious prior to 1965, citing difficulties in reciting the Quran and Islamic prayers throughout her life as

being the reason. In our interview, when asked why she chose to enter Catholicism, she replied:

I didn't choose it as such. Since I was small, when I lived with my uncle in Pasuruan from grade 5, when I was told to pray, I just could never memorize [passages from the Quran]. My uncle couldn't believe it, "You are a smart kid, I can't believe that you can't even do this." I cried. In grade 6, I moved to [another town] Mojokerto. Our grade 6 teacher, Mr Dibyo took us to the mosque and I still couldn't recite the Quran. [It was like that] right up to when I went to Teachers' College. (Tuti, personal interview, February 16, 2008)

Religion had not occupied an important role in her life up to that point, but in prison, Tuti was told she needed to choose a religion. She recalled, "A Catholic nun started coming regularly. She was very diligent in coming to the prison. Maybe it was God's call [that I became a Catholic]. Every Sunday there was Catholic religious instruction. So OK, I entered that religion" (Tuti, personal interview, February 16, 2008). The dedication with which religious clergy visited the prison and ministered to the prisoners might have impressed Tuti. However, Tuti was unable to pinpoint clearly her reasons for becoming a Catholic.

### HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO DETAINEES

In the provision of material assistance and visits, interviewees were also strikingly vague about the denominations of their helpers and visitors. The divide in their minds was more commonly between the Muslim religious clerics and those "from the Church". They used the term "from the Church" (*dari gereja*) to refer to all Christians who came to the prison.

Nonetheless those "from the Church" provided tangible material assistance to detainees in the face of extreme hardship. The presence of religious clergy and lay Christians in prisons had a considerable direct practical impact on the lives of prisoners. They remembered those from the Church as providing them with soap or other simple everyday items that made life easier. Winata (personal interview, February 22, 2008) noted, "Each month, we had a prayer meeting (*kebaktian*) with the local Catholic Church, they gave us gifts and money. That money could keep me and my friends alive, for example by enabling us to buy rice from the

kitchen”. A Catholic priest who had worked in Kediri Prison in East Java in the late 1960s until 1972 explained how he had organized activities for prisoners:

They were only allowed to read the Bible, no newspapers or any political books. I knew well my congregation in jail at the time. I brought in comedy films because in jail they were not allowed to watch films, except for funny films. Those who were detained, their activities were just sport, volleyball, running, just those things. (Marcus, personal interview, February 3, 2009)

Activities in prison, organized by the Church, provided an important diversion and helped bind prisoners to the faith. Winata had told Tuti, who was a close friend, that political prisoners were severely deprived of food in Kediri prison and the Catholic Church decided to supply food directly to prisoners, which resulted in increasing interest among prisoners to enter Catholicism (Tuti, personal interview, February 16, 2008). This might have been another reason for Winata’s conversion, which he did not mention at the outset.

Various prison fellowship organizations were founded to organize prayer sessions, Bible classes and church services in prison, such as YHB (*Yayasan Hidup Baru*, New Life Foundation) in the early 1980s. YHB was founded by journalist Jopie Lasut, who himself had been a political prisoner under both Presidents Sukarno and Suharto (Lasut, 2011). YHB was part of the Prison Fellowship International. Prison visitors undertook pastoral care duties as well as tasks that seemed outside the ambit of religious duties, such as couriering letters in and out of prison. Priests from various denominations smuggled letters in and out of prison, connecting prisoners with pen pals in and outside of Indonesia (Capon, 2006; Hearman, 2016). Wiwiek, a Catholic schoolteacher in Malang, visited a number of nearby prisons such as Koblen in Surabaya, Lowokwaru and the Malang Women’s Prison. She explained, “I visited [prisons] on behalf of the Church. I visited both women’s and men’s prisons” (Wiwiek, personal interview, July 30, 2007). Wiwiek visited these prisons because some of her family members and relatives were detained there, but it was easier for her to go as a religious visitor than to disclose her leftist family connections. Prison visitors such as Wiwiek were important sources of information for the churches and for advocacy organizations about the conditions inside various prisons.

The Churches played a direct role in helping care for loved ones left alone as a result of political imprisonment. Accused of being Communists, Tina and Dading were two teachers who were arrested in 1969 in Blora, Central Java, far away from their East Javanese families. The family went into Blora prison with their two children, a boy and a girl, who were then four and two years old respectively, because there was no one else to care for them (Tina, personal interview, February 16, 2008). When they were first arrested and detained in the District Military Command headquarters, Tina and Dading were encouraged to become Catholics by the guards. Tina continued to practice her religion when she was finally sent to Plantungan women's prison in Central Java. With her imprisonment there and Dading being exiled to Buru Island in far-flung Maluku, Tina wondered what to do with the children. As she had professed her faith as Catholic, a priest took them to a Catholic orphanage in Semarang. They remained there for a week, before being fostered out to a childless couple. The boy, Dodi, remembered as his earliest memories life in prison with his parents and then in the orphanage. Dodi had wanted to be a priest, as priests were those who had been kind to him and his sister when they became separated from their parents (Dodi, personal interview, April 27, 2007). Their father Dading converted to Catholicism, taking on the baptism name Paulus while he was on Buru Island. The church played an integral part in this family's life and continued to do so, after the parents' release from prison and their reunion with the children.

Churches assisted former detainees with transition arrangements following their release. They at times accommodated former detainees who could not return to their villages or families and found them jobs and temporary places to live. Formerly an education administrator, Haroto returned to Java from Buru Island in 1978. He had been in prison for nine years. Rather than alighting in Surabaya, his city of origin and where he was supposed to disembark the ship, he continued on to Jakarta. He and Wito, another friend also from East Java, were formally released at the District Military Command headquarters in Jakarta. Not wanting to contact any relatives they had in Jakarta, they needed a place to stay and to start a new life. Haroto recounted their arrival in Jakarta:

OK, who are we going to seek support from now? Go to an Islamic, Catholic or Christian (Protestant) foundation? Me and Wito thought to ourselves, "OK like this, we just go to a Catholic foundation, they are

usually less tough.” We were put up in the Cathedral and stayed there about 3 days. On the third day, a car arrived. It was an Australian priest who wanted to take us to the dormitories at 687 Tebet Barat Raya Street. There we were told to bathe, change our clothes. It turned out that there were already ex-political detainees from Salemba, Lidikus, Kalong (detention centres), they were all staying there. We lived there. They told us to eat, sleep, while looking for work. We also did duties like sweeping, mopping, cooking. (Haroto, personal interview, July 28, 2007)

The provision of accommodation and a small stipend helped former detainees who faced community stigma and ostracism with a way to get back on their feet. Farmer organizer Warno converted to Catholicism while in military detention in Kediri in 1969. He returned to the Kediri district in 1979 after he was released from Buru Island, whereupon the Pare Catholic Church sought him out as a former political prisoner in order to assist him. They provided him with sums of money from time to time (Warno, personal interview, February 28, 2008).

Another form of direct practical help was in allowing former political detainees to work in the Church for a small amount of money as a fresh start, and also to work in Church-run schools. Tina as a former political prisoner was unable to resume her career as a teacher in the public education system, so she found work in the private sector. She became the principal of a Baptist kindergarten, after rescuing the languishing school of six students and increasing the enrolment to 90 (Tina, personal interview, February 16, 2008). As private schools, Church-run schools were free from the controls of state education. Teachers in such schools were not classified as civil servants. Through providing them with a network, with contacts and sometimes jobs, Christian Churches consolidated their prison converts once they were released. Prison fellowship organizations also provided important social networks (Capon, 2006, p. 68). Former detainees found a safe place to gather and for their self-confidence to be restored through speaking out in fellowship gatherings about their experiences in prison and of finding God.

### LONGER TERM RESPONSES AND IMPLICATIONS

The growth of Christianity in Indonesia in the post-1965 period was not particularly welcomed in some quarters. From around 1967 onwards, Islamic organizations charged that Christian religions were aggressively

engaging in “Christianization” as evident through the high rate of conversions (Nugroho, 2008, p. 195). Tension increased with the circulation of pamphlets alleging that Christians were engaged in a deliberate campaign to Christianize Indonesia (Nugroho, 2008, pp. 200–202). Islamic youth disrupted church construction in Meulaboh, Aceh and in Makassar, South Sulawesi in 1967, prompting the government to hold an interreligious dialogue on 30 November 1967 in Jakarta.

Rather than as a result of an aggressive campaign of “Christianization”, however, the conversions occurred because of the succor and material assistance provided by Churches to detainees and following their release. This contrasted with, for example, NU’s attitude towards former detainees. NU instructed its members to note down the details of detainees who were being released and to continue to monitor them (Feillard, 1999, p. 93). But NU also reported an increasing devotion to Islam, with people going to the mosque in greater numbers than before (Anam, 2010, p. 295). Therefore, the late 1960s proved a boon for Churches but also for the expansion of Islamic congregations, though the latter is outside the scope of this chapter.

Most of those I interviewed who converted in prison adhered to Christianity for the remainder of their lives. Their level of engagement with and practice of the religion might have varied; however, they identified themselves as Christians. One exception was Winata. He was released in 1990 and remained a Catholic until 2000 when he married his second wife. As she refused to convert to Catholicism, Winata converted back to Islam instead. He found leaving Catholicism difficult, as he had sung in the Church and led choirs and Eucharists, and he missed playing these roles. But after converting back to Islam, he quickly became a respected Islamic *modin* (religious officiant) in his village, being called to recite prayers and preside over ritual meals (*slametan*) and weddings. He proved his adaptability, a quality possessed by many political detainees, through his conversion and reversion (Winata, personal interview, February 22, 2008). In many ways the conversion of political detainees to Christianity was influenced by the need to be adaptable to circumstances. However, the lack of reversion across the board indicates that conversion tended to be a long-term change.

In some regions, criticism continues to be voiced against the Churches’ failure to distance itself sufficiently from their past support for the suppression of Communists, such as in Flores and West Timor (Kolimon, Wetangterah, & Campbell-Nelson, 2012; Prior, 2011;



Webb, 1986). Some efforts however have been made to acknowledge this dark past, to challenge the perceived silence of the churches, and to provide a more welcoming environment to former detainees, particularly those who had felt deserted by their church at their hour of need (Kolimon et al., 2012). Efforts to promote reconciliation based on greater understanding of different perspectives and a reliance on theological approaches have also arisen within Catholic circles (Sumarwan, 2007). Despite the long-term conversion of political detainees, it has not meant that this dark part of church history has necessarily been resolved.

## CONCLUSION

The Protestant and Catholic Churches' strong opposition to the PKI and their support for the Army-led suppression of the party in late 1965 affected the relationship between the Christian Churches and political detainees early on. Despite the initial ambivalence or tacit support of the Churches towards the anti-Communist operations, the demand for humanitarian assistance and the request of the state soon led Christians into prisons and detention centers, many of which had sprung up to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of detainees. Church historians and scholars have tended to portray increasing rates of conversion as due to the New Order regime forcing citizens to adhere to a religion. This chapter has discussed those factors that have been less analyzed and yet which have now been possible to research through interviews with former political detainees in the post-Suharto era. These interviews enable us to gain an understanding into how detainees' lives were changed materially and spiritually as a result of their contact with the Churches and their institutions. It did not seem that detainees differentiated greatly between the various denominations. Through an insight into detainees' lives, it is evident that the sense of belonging and protection that ensued from being part of a larger collective was another factor in conversion and ongoing Christian worship.

It is difficult to conclude from the research undertaken the extent to which converts assimilated fully the theological teachings of the churches they belong to. There is a tendency on the part of interviewees to affirm that indeed they had fully accepted these teachings, but it is difficult to research the subjectivity of the interviewees with regards to their religious convictions. However, there is evidence that those who converted as a result of political persecution tend to remain within Christian

religions. Government policies that continued to discriminate against former political detainees helped bind the adherents to their new faith by providing them with a more accepting church community within which to rebuild their lives.

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PART II

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Legacies of the Indonesian Genocide

## The Efficacy of “Dangerous” Knowledge: “Children of Victims” in Indonesia After 1965

*Andrew Conroe*

Throughout the military dominated New Order regime (1966–1998), persons accused of past membership in Left organizations and their families were branded “Communist”. With this label came multiple forms of discrimination. Along with this process and due to fears of more intense persecution, there was a sense within families that any knowledge about the 1965 events was potentially “dangerous knowledge”. We know very little, however, about how families and especially the children of those imprisoned or killed in 1965 negotiated their situated knowledge of the repression.

This chapter suggests that societal and individual knowledge of the Indonesian violence of 1965 is not marked by either of two extremes of knowledge: a totalizing, repressive silence and ignorance, or a comprehensive, thoroughgoing “straightening of history”. We can see beyond this dichotomy by paying attention to the experiences and assertions

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of a group who have lived their lives in between these two possibilities: the children and grandchildren of individuals imprisoned or killed in the 1965 violence, who came to be known either pejoratively as “*anak PKT*” (Communist children) or more sympathetically as “*anak korban*” (children of victims). (In this chapter, I will refer to these individuals as *anak korban*, as many of them use this term to refer to themselves.) After a discussion of how *anak korban* became a source of societal anxiety during and after the New Order, I will use individual accounts collected during my 2005–2007 fieldwork in Yogyakarta<sup>1</sup> to argue that one way in which *anak korban* have positioned themselves after 1965 (and particularly after the fall of Suharto) has been through a downplaying of the issue of the *content* of their knowledge in favor of what can be *done* with that knowledge and what types of authority/expertise they can claim from it. As will be shown in my examples, these claims to authority can take various forms: the instilling/acquiring of a particular work ethic; the blending of one’s own experiential authority with the authority of certain texts; or the playful inversion of educational hierarchies.

Many *anak korban* were small children or not yet born in the mid-1960s, when their parents or grandparents were imprisoned or killed for their alleged affiliation with the Indonesian Communist Party. Yet the state-directed violence visited upon their parents continued to deeply impact their lives throughout the 32-year duration of Suharto’s New Order regime, long after their parents and grandparents (the ones who had survived) had returned home from imprisonment and exile. The “Communist subversion” and “treachery” of which their parents were accused was presented by the New Order state as a hereditary taint, and therefore these individuals—equally suspect in the eyes of the state and in much of New Order society—were subject to many of the same restrictions and forms of political and social marginalization as their parents and grandparents (Heryanto, 2006; Pemerintah Indonesia, 1988). In most cases, they were ineligible for jobs such as teachers, clergy, journalists, civil servants, parliamentarians and performers, occupations that would give them an audible voice in the public sphere, to say nothing of steady employment and a decent wage. Some of the individuals with whom I spoke told of being able to get around these restrictions by using an assumed name, moving to a different area or having friends in high places. Yet, however incomplete the process of marginalization, these individuals described to me having grown up feeling (however vaguely and however unaware they were of the specifics of their

parents’ ordeal) a sense of being different, of not being part of the “*kita*” (inclusive “we”) of Indonesian society.

The *anak korban* with whom I spoke in 2005–2007 felt themselves very much caught up in the atmosphere of potential opening amidst lingering oppression and discrimination that followed the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998. Even though the ban on Marxism–Leninism and the Indonesian Communist Party remains in place, and the former political prisoners and *anak korban* continue to be demonized and harassed at the societal level (often with the passive acquiescence of law enforcement), much of the legal apparatus that upheld formal discrimination against former political prisoners and their descendants has been dismantled or overturned since 1998 (Bedner, 2015).

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, victims of the 1965 violence have begun to speak out, primarily about their unjust imprisonment and/or persecution, but others also describing lives and activism prior to 1965, rescuing their pre-1965 activities from the demonization of leftist politics. Although more recent years have seen an increase in attacks on 1965-related gatherings by vigilante anti-Communist groups, during the 2005–2007 period of my fieldwork there were numerous events relating to the 1965 violence (exhibitions, film screenings, academic talks) held with relative ease in Yogyakarta. Former political prisoners, their families and sympathizers were further energized during this period by an ultimately unsuccessful class action lawsuit brought by former political prisoners in Jakarta against then-current and former Indonesian heads of state (Conroe, 2017).

The aftershocks of the 1965 violence have also been rendered in a number of accounts and memoirs by children of historical actors associated with the violence of 1965: several from the perspective of children of the slain Army generals (Keluarga Pahlawan Revolusi, 2002; Nani, 2013), but many more from those who parents were killed or imprisoned (Abdullah, 2003; Ibarruri, 2006; Khoriyah, 2007; Proletariyati, 2002; Sukanta, 2016). Taken as a whole, these works relate the experience of children growing up with the weight of a violent past upon them.

The content of their stories is important, crucial both to a history of post-1965 Indonesia and a study of the workings of memory in contemporary Indonesia. However, as noted above, the focus of this chapter is elsewhere: through a recounting of several of my fieldwork conversations, I suggest that we should not neglect an angle that takes

us away from the content, and that is focused more upon the claims and consequences of knowledge and the conferred authority contained within.

Such a shift in focus can serve not only to provide a fuller account of the experience of *anak korban* after 1965, but also to counter a pernicious societal anxiety centered upon exactly what and how much the *anak korban* know about their parents' (and the Indonesian Left's) past. The types and degrees of knowledge possessed by these children have been presented by Indonesians of various ideological persuasions as being enormously consequential for the whole of Indonesian society: at times representing the possibility of clarity, healing and reconciliation, but more often as a potential source of dangerous "vengeance".

### FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE

Such fears were already present in the immediate aftermath of the mass killings, as can be seen in a short story by Gerson Poyk published in 1966: in *A Mother and Her Children* (Perempuan dan Anak2nya), the main character A. is being entreated by the widow of an executed PKI official to adopt and care for her children. A is further encouraged to do so by a friend, who warns him to:

educate the children so that they can be human beings, not members of a party. Because for their entire lives, they will be susceptible to a disease: the disease of revenge and hatred [*dendam*]. If they are not taught about God, religion, and morality, then our history will be marked by a tragic dialectical process. (Poyk, 1966, p. 142)

Even decades later, as the New Order came to an end and public interest grew in reevaluating or revisiting the history of the mid-1960s (in spite of still-significant opposition to such endeavors from anti-Communist groups), the figure of the "Communist child" remained for some a source of uncertainty and anxiety. In a 2002 book, *Collecting the Scattered Debris* (Memungut Puing yang Berkeping-Keping), a former government-affiliated social worker, M. Sri Martani Rustiadi, recounts her work in the 1970s caring for children whose parents were imprisoned after 1965.<sup>2</sup> She describes her work as a needed correction to widespread indifference towards the plight of "communist children": "There



was no one from the government or the community speaking out about the fate of these children of political prisoners, who don’t know anything about the matter of their parents and don’t know anything about political issues” (Rustiadi, 2002, p. 1).

Rustiadi, hearkening back to the sentiments expressed in Gerson Poyk’s story from the 1960s, warns of the social consequences of insufficient care and management of the population of “communist children”. She acknowledges the fear that “communist children” may want revenge. Yet she portrays this potential for dangerous vengeance as a step removed, based not upon the direct experience of the children or their families, but on how and from whom the children obtain knowledge of these events:

They experienced an event that stung their hearts, and that made them sick. Heartbreak that piles up over time will later turn into “vengeance”. Could this really be the case? The answer is, it’s very possible. And against whom would these children want revenge? It depends who answers their questions, and what these answers contain. Why has all of this happened, and what exactly is [the situation] that they’ve received? (p. vii)

These accounts reflect an anxiety about the *content* of the children’s knowledge of the parental past, and a desire for the children of 1965 victims to be taught in a “correct” and “accurate” way, so as to prevent disastrous consequences and a cycle of violence. Such fearful attitudes towards the *anak korban*, however, ignore the ways in which these individuals could be concerned less with what could or could not be known of the past, and more with what could be *done* with whatever knowledge they could possess. By taking a perspective that looks beyond the content of the knowledge, we can nevertheless see a particular slippage in what is considered to be encompassed by this knowledge: between knowledge of a parent or grandparents’ victimization (which may or may not have been preceded with their involvement with leftist organizations), and a depersonalized historical knowledge of a stigmatized history of the Left in Indonesia. This sort of slippage belies the contrasting assumptions exhibited above: Poyk’s assertion of total knowledge, versus Rustiadi’s defense of the innocence of *anak korban* as not knowing anything about politics or the circumstances of their parents’ imprisonment.

Having noted the persistent fear of *anak korban* in the New Order period and the extent and content of their knowledge, I now turn to individual accounts from my fieldwork that shift the focus to the efficacy of this knowledge. An important caveat is in order before continuing: in conveying the reflections of my interlocutors in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, I make no claim to encompass the full spectrum of *anak korban* experiences in Indonesia. Rather, my aim is to present some of the possible claims to expertise and authority deriving from an intergenerational connection to “1965 knowledge”, as reflected in my conversations. Although there may be common patterns of experience of *anak korban*, linked to patterns in the experiences of their parents, this chapter shows the various claims of expertise, knowledge and authority to be strikingly idiosyncratic.

### THE SILENT TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE AND (WORK) ETHICS

Before moving on to the accounts of *anak korban* themselves, I wish to briefly highlight the way in which *anak korban* focus upon the efficacy of their knowledge could be something inculcated by their parents. My conversations with many former political prisoners demonstrated that they were concerned not only with the degree and types of knowledge transmitted to their children, but also the effects and uses of said knowledge. Notably, some made a sharp distinction between the types of knowledge, the means of transmission and the intended effects of knowledge between their own offspring on the one hand and a wider group of young activists on the other hand. This was certainly the case with Pak Sumanto,<sup>3</sup> a former political prisoner (and my neighbor in Yogyakarta) who had been imprisoned for six years for his involvement in the leftist Pemuda Rakyat organization. Following his release from prison, he had struggled to earn a living, illegally selling lottery numbers for a time before savings from this venture and financial assistance from other former political prisoners enabled him to open his own *bengkel* (motorcycle repair shop). At the time of my fieldwork, Pak Sumanto lived down the street from me and ran his *bengkel* in front of his house assisted by his son and several employees. He was quite active and outspoken in the local community of former political prisoners, participating regularly in events and meetings sponsored by local human rights and former political prisoner support groups.

Noting Pak Sumanto’s passionate way of speaking about his prison and post-prison experiences—and the plight of former political prisoners in general—to me and in the context of activist gatherings, I asked about how he had discussed such things with his children. He admitted to me that he had never directly told them of his experiences or their family political status. At the same time, somewhat surprisingly, he suggested that they discovered the truth without him, through a “natural process.” This meant that somehow they had access to the proper information that would allow them to recognize the constraints placed upon their lives, and develop an appropriately “self-sufficient” attitude:

I’ve never discussed that matter [with my children]. So my children know that I’m an ex-political prisoner; they figured it out themselves. I didn’t tell them. The kids came to know about their father through a natural process [*mengerti secara alami*]. By way of a slow process. So, my children grew to understand this, through this process... Who knows when, exactly? Maybe I don’t even know. I’ve never discussed the matter. What I’ve told [them] is how I’ve educated my children so that at the very least they feel a sense of responsibility towards themselves. I place more of an emphasis on making sure that my children have a good work ethic...so that they can take responsibility for themselves, and not become dregs of society. If they can take responsibility for themselves, then they can help other people. Including employing other people. That’s been my hope all this time: that my children focus on their work in order that they can recruit a workforce.

This sense of Pak Sumanto’s that his children will acquire the necessary information about the past through a kind of osmosis, without narration, is in sharp contrast to the way in which he described his interactions with the younger members of the local human rights organization with which he affiliates (who consist of both “outside” activists and *anak korban*). While in the latter case, he considers the efficacy of his knowledge transmission to be distinctly political, aiding in the creation of a human rights paradigm, in the former case the expected comportment of his children is independent from any specific knowledge of their family history. “Knowledge” is an acknowledged factor in both cases. Yet this anecdote suggests that in the process of intergenerational transmission, the issue of the content of knowledge is downplayed, while the expected efficacy and consequences of knowledge are rendered in quite personal ways.

## INTERTEXTUAL AUTHORITY

While some *anak korban*, such as Pak Sumanto's children, were never told directly of their parents' past, many others described to me a history that was passed between parent and child cautiously, haltingly and fragmentarily (Conroe, 2012). Following the end of the Suharto regime, when a number of Indonesian-language scholarly and popular books were published on the once-taboo topic of the 1965 coup attempt and subsequent violence, this transmission gained an intertextual component. A number of *anak korban*—particularly those who were born in the early 1980s and still in high school when Suharto fell in 1998—told me of books and periodicals relating to the violence of 1965 and/or to leftist politics that were left around the house (or presented to them directly) by their former political prisoner parents.<sup>4</sup> These works could supply historical knowledge not provided by reticent parents, or could reframe the personal stories of parents within broader contexts and discourses. This tendency was illustrated in the comments of Mas Sigit, an *anak korban* born in 1983, whose father had been imprisoned on Buru Island for his involvement with the Pemuda Rakyat organization. Throughout Sigit's childhood and early adolescence, his father had attempted to hide his past from his son. Sigit's father began speaking to his children about his past imprisonment after the fall of Suharto, which coincided with Sigit's entering high school. However, although in our conversation Sigit explicitly linked his acquisition of knowledge about the violence of the 1960s to his ability to help and support his father, he saw the most significant sources of this knowledge as being the newly-published books about 1965 rather than stories from his father about his personal experiencing of these events:

I read books, all kinds of books about G30S, and then I compared them with the history I was being taught in high school. Because when I was in high school, it was during the Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid] era.<sup>5</sup>... And so I wanted to find out more about G30S... I had a great desire to know, because the New Order version of history had been shown to be untrue. I had to find out more. I wanted to help my father, you know? Give support, because my father is the silent type, he doesn't talk much... He'll tell a lot of stories about his experience as a prisoner on Buru Island, but he's never spoken much about the straightening of history [*pelurusan sejarah*]. Maybe because he doesn't know about it. Or maybe he knows, but he's

still hesitant, thinking “I’m just a political prisoner. What if [as a result of talking about the straightening of history] I’m insulted and stigmatized by the community?”

As I have discussed elsewhere (Conroe, 2012), the plight and experiences of former political prisoner families have been used by those of various ideological leanings as triggers for asking broader questions about Indonesia as a nation: the proper or just way in which to come to terms with Indonesia’s past, and the way in which this coming to terms will shape Indonesia’s present and future. What we see in Sigit’s comment is a reversal of this dynamic: the ways in which an *anak korban* presents the accessing of broader national discourses (the straightening of history) as being important for conditioning himself to be a source of support and advocacy within his former political prisoner household. There is an ambiguity in Sigit’s remarks as to what it was that signaled to him the “falseness” of New Order versions of history: was it the personal stories of his father’s imprisonment that he heard at home or the texts he encountered that presented alternative histories abstracted from his personal family situation? In either case, we see that “silence” and “knowledge” here are complex phenomena, with Sigit considering certain forms of articulation and knowledge (his father’s personal stories) to be less efficacious in both “helping” his father and contributing to farther-reaching reconsiderations of Indonesian history. (This devaluing of the utility of personal stories may also explain why Sigit describes his father as considering them to be “safe” articulations, contrasted with the potential risks of associating himself with the “straightening of history” project.)<sup>6</sup>

Another of my *anak korban* interlocutors, Mas Eko, also conveyed to me a sense of authority and agency derived more from “objective” outside sources than his own family history. Yet Eko directed this authority towards different ends, and was far more dismissive than Sigit of the efficacy of personal “family” stories of the 1965 violence and its aftermath. Mas Eko’s father had been a teacher at a technical school in Yogyakarta in the early 1960s, and a member of a teacher’s organization that was seen as being affiliated with the PKI. Between 1965 and 1970, Eko’s father spent two stints in prison, and his having been “*dicap merah*” (marked as a Communist) was enough to put an end to his teaching career.

Mas Eko claimed that his father spoke to him quite openly about his past and about the history of “1965” in Indonesia, and encouraged him to study national and global history. Eko was a founder and active member of a local Yogyakarta-based human rights organization focused upon the plight of former political prisoners. Despite lacking the university education that many of his friends and fellow activists had (in part because of his family’s economic difficulties due to his father’s status as a former political prisoner), Eko prided himself on being self-educated and well-versed in the “big picture” history that he saw as providing an explanation (at the national and global levels) for the violence of 1965. Contrary to those who valorized the perspectives and insights of the older generation of former political prisoners themselves, the “witnesses of history” to 1965, Eko presented himself as a far more qualified source of information; he was almost dismissive of the “long-windedness” of the former political prisoners in telling their stories. Despite the ways in which his identity as an *anak korban* has shaped his life, opportunities, interests and activism, Eko negated that identity even as he asserted it:

So when other people ask my brother about something [regarding the history of 1965], he’s become a little braver about talking about it. And then he says, “If you want it explained more clearly, go talk to my older brother. He knows more than I do.” And then, if they come discuss things with me, there are a lot of things they will discover about the history of 1965.

I asked Eko why these individuals should prefer to talk to him, rather than to one of the former political prisoners. He continued:

Yeah, if they try to ask the *bapak* about it... The 1965 people [*orang* ’65] don’t have a good grasp of it, academically, you know. And if they tell stories about it, sometimes they’re too long-winded. They’re insubstantial. They don’t get to the heart of the matter. For example, they’ll start talking, “Back on Buru Island...”. They’ll talk for a whole week, and still not be done!... Maybe you’ve experienced this yourself...

But then, if they come to me for information, I can explain to them about the post-World War Two era, the Cold War, the political situation at the time...My focus is more on the global context, because our society has a very constricted understanding of communism. They don’t see the wider picture. I make them aware of the global political constellation. I tell them,

for example, about the history of the French Revolution. We open up with the idea that there's a basis to [what happened in 1965]. Why did 1965 happen?

Much like Sigit, Eko privileged the "objective" authority of texts over what he considers to be the "longwinded" familial stories that he heard at home.<sup>7</sup> However, while Sigit sought this outside information in order to better help his father at home, Eko sought to establish himself as a public expert on "1965," Communism and leftist movements. He attempted to sever his public expertise from the family history that may have pushed him towards seeking such expertise in the first place.

### KNOWLEDGE, PRIDE, HISTORY, HUMOR

A final example shows that *anak korban* could use the authority generated by parental (or grandparental) suffering in an assertive, even humorous, display of a specialized knowledge for a wider audience. To make this claim is not to deny or make light of the immense pain, suffering and deprivation faced by former political prisoners and their families in the years since 1965. Rather, it is an observation that wry amusement and even glee at perceived superior knowledge can emerge in spite of those painful histories. This dynamic was on display in my interview with a pair of sisters whose father had been a prominent journalist and minister in the Indonesian Communist Party prior to his abduction and murder in 1965. After the father disappeared, the family was forced to split up and hide their identities; they were unable to fully reunite until 1983. Even after reuniting, their attempts to learn more about their father (who was killed when they were still young) were a long struggle: at the time of our interview in 2006, they had few photographs of their father, and had been able to obtain and read only a handful of his writings. Although they could recount many intimate family stories in which their father was included (as remembered from when they were young children, or conveyed to them by their mother), their knowledge of his public role and persona still seemed fragmentary.

However, these gaps in knowledge did not necessarily stymie the ability to assert a certain form of privileged knowledge in a more public educational forum. Bu Siti, the elder daughter, described to me in our interview how she conveyed her personal family history to her children, and how they in turn lay claim to it:

I've purposely taught my children, informed them about who their grandfather was, even before they started school lessons... I tell them who their grandfather was, how he was skilled at languages, about his activities. About why he made it into the [history] books. I also tried to explain in a more objective way, rather than saying "Oh, it's like this." Actually, both of my children enjoy studying history. I'm not sure if it's because of my stories, or if they're just naturally interested.

Towards the end of our interview, Bu Siti—with obvious amusement—describes her child's playful personalization of an Indonesian history class, drawing upon the knowledge he possesses of his grandfather:

My younger child [who was in 5<sup>th</sup> grade of elementary school at the time of our interview] was eager to be taught his history lessons, even before they were taught. He waited impatiently to take his classes so that he could ask the teacher: "Ms. Teacher, Mr. Teacher, do you know my grandfather?" [laughs]

For an *anak korban* whose own schooling had included an inculcation of the hegemonic, communist-demonizing government version of the history of 1965, Bu Siti obviously took delight in the ability of her son to cheekily speak back to his history teacher, briefly and humorously turning the teacher-student hierarchy on its head with an assertion of authority based upon his family background. Equally notable, however, is the fact that this claim to authority could be made in the relative absence (and, in fact, longtime state repression) of specific, detailed knowledge of his grandfather's political/public contributions prior to the violence of 1965.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I hope to have unsettled more positivist renderings of what "knowing 1965" means for former political prisoners, their families and Indonesian society as a whole. Access to and unhindered discussion of knowledge of "what happened" in 1965 and its aftermath is of immense value, no doubt, and is central to both a fuller understanding of the Indonesian past, and present and future projects relating to justice and rights of 1965 victims. Yet, the pursuit of this knowledge should come with the awareness that in different settings, for different



individuals affected by the violence of 1965, it contains not only different content, but different emphases, resonances and intended efficacies. These range, as we have seen, from the depoliticized transmission of “work ethic” by Pak Sumanto; to Mas Sigit and Mas Eko’s integration of more “objective” knowledge in an attempt to offset perceived familial deficiencies; to Bu Siti’s amusement at her son’s wielding of family history.

In her critical assessment of a “1965 Park” designed by young activists in contemporary Bali, Leslie Dwyer notes the problematic aspects of how the young generation assert their authority in relation to the history and narration of “1965”, claiming that the activists may be unable to sufficient hear “figures that haunt the edge of narration” and “those who told their tales in culturally unrecognizable or politically perilous languages” (Dwyer, 2010, p. 241). These are important points, and some skepticism is warranted. Yet I end by suggesting that we should linger upon these claims to knowledge and authority by *anak korban* and other young Indonesians, even as we critically interrogate them. Doing so will serve to both complicate our sense of what “1965 knowledge” may entail and illuminate how contemporary Indonesians are making—and contesting—their history.

## NOTES

1. Yogyakarta, with its numerous universities and thriving arts and literary scene, has long been considered a hotbed of youth and student activism. Although this activism was repressed under the New Order (Aspinall, 1993; Heryanto, 2006), Yogyakarta became a key site of anti-Suharto protests leading up to and in the months following May 1998 (Strassler, 2005). By the time I arrived to begin my fieldwork in 2005, street protests had become somewhat routine, with drivers rolling their eyes as their commute was slowed by yet *another* student protest. Yet a significant amount of intellectual and activist energy remained, including (but not limited to) a reckoning with past abuses and cases of mass violence committed under the New Order. This activist vitality no doubt contributed to the relative ease with which activists from various backgrounds and generations interacted and collaborated; for instance, in a small local NGO whose membership included former political prisoners, *anak korban* and young activists who were not from “Communist” families.
2. See Lis (this volume) for more on the treatment and care of children abandoned or orphaned in the 1965 violence.

3. As is the case with all references made to my interviews in this chapter, I am using a pseudonym to protect the privacy of my interlocutors.
4. In most of these conversations, the *anak korban* would only mention reading “history books” or “books about 1965,” declining to give more specifics. The several specific works mentioned to me, however, included: a collection of speeches by Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno (which had been difficult to obtain during the New Order period); an Indonesian-language translation of Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey’s *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (which presents an alternative view of the 1965 coup attempt as an internal military affair, rather than as masterminded by the PKI); issues of *RUAS*, the magazine of the organization Syarikat; and an Indonesian-language translation of Marx’s *Das Kapital*.
5. Many *eks-tapol* and *anak korban* described the period of Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency (1999–2001) as a turning point for them, due primarily to his apology for the role his Nahdlatul Ulama organization had played in the 1965–1966 killings, his suggestion that the ban on Marxism–Leninism be lifted and his more general calls for national reconciliation. However, the same people felt that Wahid’s good intentions (stymied by his impeachment by his political foes in 2001) had not translated into a more systematic easing of the discrimination against them or acknowledgement of the victims of the 1965–1966 violence.
6. The distinction between those former political prisoners and *anak korban* who related to the violence of 1965–1966 and its aftermath primarily in terms of personal/family experience, versus those who did so as part of wider (national) discourses such as the “straightening of history”, does not seem to have a clear-cut generational component. I encountered a number of former political prisoners who were comfortable speaking of their plight and experiences in terms of wider discourses of human rights, rehabilitation and the “straightening of history”; at the same time, I encountered *anak korban* who had some awareness of their parent’s past, but did not seem invested in more abstract language and affiliations. It is possible, however, that active involvement in former political prisoner advocacy organizations made *anak korban* and former political prisoners more comfortable with connecting their personal experiences with broader contexts. Sigit, for instance, is an active member of a local Yogyakarta human rights organization, whereas his father (though apparently sympathetic to the cause of advocacy organizations) did not actively participate due to physical infirmities.
7. Eko’s dismissive attitude towards the “long-winded” stories of his father and other former political prisoners can be seen as troublingly unsympathetic to those whose situated knowledge does not allow them to speak

in an “expert” register; Dwyer (2010) and Yang (2008) offer trenchant critiques of this sort of bias against those survivors of violence whose accounts of their experiences do not conform to positivist standards of knowledge transmission. It is possible that Eko’s irritation with the older former political prisoners was linked to unrelated (procedural) disagreements between younger and older members of the local human rights organization to which Eko and a number of former political prisoners belonged. It is also notable that, on other occasions, I witnessed Eko and other *anak korban* being quite respectful and deferential as the former political prisoners narrated their experiences.

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## Remembering Suffering and Survival: Sites of Memory on Buru

*Ken Setiawan*

### INTRODUCTION

Survivors and their families have remembered the events of 1965 and the related suffering of persons targeted in the violence in complex ways. In the absence of state recognition of the suffering of victims of 1965, survivors and families have had to pass on their memories in personal ways making their own meanings of these sites of terror within families and communities of former political prisoners. This chapter considers this process in terms of memories of imprisonment on the remote eastern Indonesian island of Buru.

In the aftermath of the 1965 events, more than 10,000 *tapol* (an abbreviation of *tahanan politik* or political prisoners) were imprisoned without trial on Buru. The island was a crucial part of remaking

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Indonesian society in the aftermath of the 1965–1966 killings. Buru was envisaged as a place of permanent resettlement for political prisoners and their families in order to secure their removal from Java, Indonesia's political centre. As will be discussed below, Buru's prison camp was planned at the highest levels of government and its day-to-day operations were in the hands of the local military command, another example of the Army's command responsibility in the Indonesian genocide.

Conditions of detention on Buru were extremely harsh. Prisoners were subjected to forced labour and worked long days under constant military supervision. Torture and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment were a systematic part of military conduct towards prisoners (Adam, 2014; Krisnadi, 2001; Nadia et al., 2014). While sites of terror often become public spaces of commemoration (Jacobs, 2011), the state-enforced silencing of the 1965 events in Indonesia means that on Buru there are no memorials to commemorate its past as a place of banishment and locus of mass violence (Setiawan, 2015). This not only leaves victims and survivors without formal acknowledgement, but also raises the question of what sites former prisoners use to remember the past and communicate their memories to others.

In May 2015, I travelled to Buru for the first time and was faced with the paradoxical situation of coming to a new, yet very familiar, place. My father survived eight years of incarceration on the island and I grew up with his stories of life in prison. Together with my father and other former *tapol*, I visited many places associated with the island's prison camp and realized that the few structures that remain evoke strong memories from, and are of great significance to, former prisoners and their family members.

The importance of place can be illustrated by a discussion I had one evening with Sri, the daughter of a former prisoner who stayed on the island after the prison camp was gradually closed in the late 1970s.<sup>1</sup> While talking about the arts building that was built by prisoners in the village Savanajaya, Sri said that the structure was part of “our history” (*sejarah kita*). In using the inclusive first plural *kita* (“we”), Sri signified that the building was also part of my history. That we had only just met was irrelevant: we shared a similar background and as such she included me in the larger community of former *tapol* on Buru, illustrating the power sites can have in binding individuals together. Moreover, in choosing the wording “our history” she demonstrated her strong identification with her father's past on Buru. The prison camp was not just his experience but it had become her narrative too, even though she was born after her father's detention and had thus never experienced his imprisonment.

The strong connection of the second generation to the often deeply painful experiences of their parents has been defined as postmemory (Hirsch, 1997, 2008). Postmemory plays a crucial role in the transmission of memories by reactivating past events. As Sri explained, sites can play an important part in bringing the past to the present, even when formal memorials are absent. This chapter will look at two sites of memory in the village Savanajaya that enable the verbalization of individual memories, which allow former political prisoners to give meaning to their experiences and position themselves in the social and political context in which they live. This chapter will thus argue that in a context where the narratives of victims and survivors of the events of 1965 continue to be repressed, sites offer an avenue for the transmission of memories.

### SITES AND OBJECTS OF MEMORY

While on Buru there are no formal places dedicated to the experiences of former political prisoners, many sites are an important medium for former *tapol* to tell their stories. As such, these sites can be considered as *lieux de mémoire* (realms of memory or memory spaces), defined by Pierre Nora as “any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element in the memorial heritage of any community” (Nora, 1996, p. xvii).

While Nora’s work focuses on *national* memory—to which the experiences of 1965 victims and survivors do not belong—this definition can also be used to the memorial heritage of “societal subgroups” (Smith, 2013). Departing from Maurice Halbwachs’ theories on social memory, Andrea Smith argues that while individuals have unique memories, these are fundamentally social in nature: shared memories can hold social groups of various scales together. In these “social frameworks” in which individual memories are present, places and objects play a crucial role in recollection. Sites and objects of memory bear the imprint of individuals and others, providing a sense of continuity and stability and as such shape the direction of social life. Space can thus become a powerful unifying force in that it defines not only the group’s image of itself, but also its external environment (Smith, 2013).

Sites and objects of memory thus fulfil a social role. This means that they are not just a depository of memories, but a referent that allows

recollections to be articulated (Argenti & Schramm, 2010). This is highly relevant for survivor-witnesses, as sites play an active role in giving meaning to their experiences (Abrams, 2014; Argenti & Schramm, 2010), as well as communicating their memories to others.

In the context of former political prisoners engaging with sites of memory on Buru, the conceptualizations on the transmission of memories by Jan and Aleida Assmann are particularly useful. Jan Assmann developed the concept of collective remembrance, consisting of communicative (biographical, factual) memory on the one hand and cultural (institutionalized, archival) memory on the other (Assmann, 1997). Aleida Assmann extended these concepts further, distinguishing four memory formats. Individual and family or group memory correspond to Jan Assmann's notion of communicative remembrance; while national or political memory, as well as cultural or archival memory, fall under the umbrella of cultural memory. While communicative memory is intergenerational, cultural memory is transgenerational (Assmann, 2006).

These memory formats do not, however, account for the ruptures that emerge in instances where histories have been suppressed and eradicated. This situation is relevant to the Indonesian context where accounts of the 1965 violence and its aftermath are systematically silenced. In her seminal article "The Generation of Postmemory", Marianne Hirsch argues that postmemorial work can counteract these losses caused by historical suppression. In her analysis, photographs can mobilize postmemory by offering access to the event itself, and thus become a powerful medium for transmitting "unimaginable" events (Hirsch, 2008).

Building on Hirsch's insights, I will argue that sites and objects of memory play a similar role in reactivating distant memories. Before turning to specific sites on Buru, I will discuss the wider context in which these places and objects are situated: the island's background as a prison camp and the establishment of the village Savanajaya, where many former *tapol* and their families continue to live today.

## A PLACE OF NO RETURN

By the late 1960s, the Indonesian government was faced with the question what to do with the 34,000 B-category political prisoners languishing in prisons on Java.<sup>2</sup> B-category prisoners, mainly members of the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party) and affiliated mass organizations, could not be tried as there was insufficient



evidence against them but were considered to have been involved in the 1965 events. The government was therefore unwilling to release them even though their continued detention was costly and, as will be discussed below, politically difficult.

In 1967, a government delegation researched the possibilities to detain these prisoners on Buru, part of the Maluku islands in East Indonesia. According to the delegation, Buru was particularly suitable as a site of detention because of its dense forests that formed a natural barrier to possible escape attempts, as well as its rich natural resources. This meant that sending prisoners to Buru would be a cost-effective way for the government to develop the island as a “special transmigration area”, which was also in line with the government’s transmigration program to Indonesia’s outer islands in an attempt to ease overpopulation in Java (Adam, 2014; Amnesty International, 1977; Krisnadi, 2001).

The “Buru project” was orchestrated at the highest levels of government. On 26 February 1969, President Suharto, in his capacity as Commander for the Restoration of Peace, Security and Order, officially designated Buru as a resettlement area for B-category prisoners. The Attorney General, Soegih Arto, was given responsibility for the so-called Buru Rehabilitation Installation Project. Subsequently, Soegih Arto ordered the military to implement the project under the umbrella of the Buru Resettlement Implementation Body, which fell under the local military command known as the Pattimura Division (Nadia et al., 2014).<sup>3</sup>

On 17 August 1969, the first group of 850 prisoners was sent from Java to Buru. They were not informed of where they were taken. Within three years, more than 10,000 male prisoners were sent to the island (Adam, 2014; Krisnadi, 2001; Nadia et al., 2014).<sup>4</sup> Those imprisoned on Buru included former government officials and intellectuals, as well as artists and writers (Krisnadi, 2001), such as novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer and film director Basuki Effendi. Both the large number of prisoners and the presence of prominent figures meant that Buru became “better known internationally than any other camp or prison” (*TAPOL Bulletin*, 7, October 1974).

The Indonesian government rejected international criticism of Buru’s prison camp, most prominently led by TAPOL (The British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners) and Amnesty International, and insisted that sending prisoners to Buru was necessary as they considered political prisoners to be a threat to national security. The presence of *tapol* in prisons on Java was particularly deemed

undesirable ahead of the 1971 general elections, which the government portrayed as a “celebration of democracy” (Adam, 2014, p. 351). According to the authorities the relocation of prisoners to an outer island, “far away from the very sensitive political environment in the capital [Jakarta]” (Marsudi, 1971, p. 17) was thus essential from a political and security perspective.

The authorities also presented Buru as an opportunity for prisoners, in which they could live outside “the four walls of a prison cell” (Marsudi, 1971, p. 51), and gave them “a new field of work in a completely new society” (Marsudi, 1971, pp. 16–17). The authorities thus conceived of Buru, in the words of then Attorney General Soegih Arto, as a “humanitarian project” (Krisnadi, 2001, p. 95). This was believed to be in the best interests of *tapol*: ongoing anti-Communist sentiments and the stigmatization of those believed to be involved in the 1965 events as “unclean” (*tidak bersih lingkungan*) meant that returning prisoners to their own communities put their safety at risk (Marsudi, 1971, p. 47).

The relocation of prisoners was intended to be permanent and the authorities ruled out an eventual return to Java. In 1975, Admiral Sudomo, the Commander for the Restoration of Peace, Security and Order, said that the *tapol* were “settled and successful; there is no need for them to return” (Krisnadi, 2001, p. 10). That Buru was a site of indefinite detention was made clear to the prisoners from the outset: former *tapol* Hersri Setiawan recalled that upon arrival in 1971, a guard told the prisoners: “here you will eat, drink, sleep and work. And don’t forget to pray! You will be here forever. Until you die!” (Setiawan in Nadia et al., 2014, p. 310).

The arrival of political prisoners changed Buru dramatically. Before, the island was sparsely populated by indigenous peoples: only 300–500 lived in the direct vicinity of the prison camp, which would eventually cover almost 3000 km<sup>2</sup> or approximately one-third of the island. A number of local rulers voluntarily donated land to the authorities, which was then used as agricultural land and worked on by the prisoners. The establishment of the prison camp had a profound impact on indigenous communities and their traditions, many of which disappeared in a short period of time (Krisnadi, 2001).

Many of Buru’s dense forests made way for prison units. By 1972, there were 22 units that held around 500–1000 prisoners each and which were surrounded by barbed wire. Units were sub-divided into barracks, holding 50 prisoners each. There were a number of special units:

including the isolation (punishment) unit Jiku Kecil,<sup>5</sup> while units R, S and T held elderly and sick *tapol* (Krisnadi, 2001; Nadia et al., 2014).

While the Indonesian government claimed that the prisoners were “free, in good health and being treated humanely” (Marsudi, 1971, p. 10), in reality life and death were in the hands of the military (Nadia et al., 2014). Prisoners were subjected to forced displacement, deprivation of liberty, forced labour and slavery. On average they worked ten hours of hard labour every day under continuous military supervision. There are many accounts of torture and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, as well as indiscriminate killings (Adam, 2014; Nadia et al., 2014).<sup>6</sup> Prisoners were not provided with adequate nutrition and suffered from many diseases. They received minimal health care: the government only budgeted 400 Rupiah per prisoner for an eight-month period (*Tapol Bulletin*, 8, January 1975).<sup>7</sup> It was not uncommon for stomach aches to be “treated” with beatings, while prisoners with malaria were ordered to run laps until they fainted (Hersri, 1995).

The responsibility of the Indonesian state in establishing Buru’s prison camp and the role of the Indonesian Army in the systematic violation of rights have been the subject of inquiries by the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, Komnas HAM. In 2003, the Commission finalised a report on the island, part of a larger research project on human rights violations under the Suharto regime. Nevertheless the report was not made public because of internal disputes (Setiawan, 2013).<sup>8</sup> In 2012, the Commission issued a report on the 1965 events, based on a four-year investigation, for which it collected testimonies of hundreds of people. For the specific case of Buru, Komnas HAM found indications of crimes against humanity, including slavery, indiscriminate killings and torture.<sup>9</sup> The Commission has recommended the case to be addressed through judicial and non-judicial means, but the Indonesian authorities, however, have yet to act on the report’s findings.

### SAVANAJAYA: VILLAGE OF *TAPOL* FAMILIES

While the government portrayed Buru as a humane place of detention, by sending prisoners to Buru they also forcibly separated them from their families. In response, the authorities started encouraging family members to join imprisoned relatives on the island.<sup>10</sup> The reunion of families on Buru also addressed a number of security concerns. Many government

officials were worried about sending a large group of political prisoners to Buru, which in their opinion would expose the local population, as well as guards, to Communist and leftist ideologies. This carried the risk that Buru would become the “Red Island” (Krisnadi, 2001). It was thought that by bringing family members to Buru, chances of prisoners socializing with the local population were reduced. At the same time relatives of *tapol*—who were also considered “unclean”—were removed from their communities, meaning that these were cleansed of carriers of leftist ideologies—another government objective.

Most detainees rejected the government’s plans (Krisnadi, 2001; Setiawan, 2006). When Pramoedya Ananta Toer was asked whether he wanted his family to join him, he replied that he could under no circumstances accept the offer and described the idea as “immoral” (Toer, 1989, p. 32). Many *tapol* believed that if their family members would join them, this diminished their chances of an eventual return to Java. They were also concerned with how their wives and children would adjust to agricultural work, with which they had little experience. Moreover, they were worried about the lack of educational facilities for their children on the island (Krisnadi, 2001). Many *tapol* wives had their reservations about the government’s plans too: according to a survey, 70% did not want to come to Buru (*The Guardian*, January 5, 1972). Women were subjected to significant pressure, including physical threats, to convince them otherwise (Setiawan, 2006).

In 1972, the first family members arrived on Buru—a group of 164 wives, 485 children and three mothers (Krisnadi, 2001). According to the authorities, these families had “won the lottery” and they were congratulated on commencing a “new life” (Setiawan, 2006, p. 123). This discourse illustrates the importance the authorities accorded to the arrival of families as part of the larger objective to create a new society on Buru. However, life on Buru for the newly arrived women was far from easy. While the authorities had promised the women that they and their accompanying children would remain free, in practice they were not allowed to move around the island, let alone leave (Amnesty International, 1977). They were subjected to interrogations, as well as verbal and physical abuse from guards (Setiawan, 2006). One woman recalled that sometimes she tried to negotiate with the guards: “after all, I came as a free woman! But I always drew the short straw – they had the iron, the gun!” (Rooijen, 1998, p. 10). These women thus effectively

“became B-category *tapol*, but without a photo or shirt number” (Setiawan, 2006, p. 127).

The *tapol* families were settled in Unit IV, where prisoners had built small houses. In 1972, the unit was renamed Savanajaya village and by 1976 there were 240 houses. Assuming that there were at least 10,000 prisoners on Buru, less than 3% of families decided to join their relatives on the island—the scheme could thus hardly be called successful. The authorities continued to pursue the permanent resettlement of political prisoners on Buru, amongst others by putting on mass weddings for marriages between prisoners and the children of other *tapol* (Krisnadi, 2001; Setiawan, 2006).<sup>11</sup>

The permanent resettlement of political prisoners on Buru was eventually not feasible due to international pressure on the Indonesian government.<sup>12</sup> As a consequence, between 1977 and 1979 all *tapol* were “returned to society”.<sup>13</sup> While most prisoners returned to Java, 298 stayed. This number included 209 families already residing in Savanajaya and 89 single men (Krisnadi, 2001). They had various reasons for staying, including that they had lost all their property in Java, or because they had married local women (Setiawan, 2006, 2016). Over time, some of these families relocated to other parts of the island, or even left Buru altogether. In May 2015, approximately 30 *tapol* families were living in Savanajaya.

While no longer prisoners, former *tapol* continued to face difficulties. Despite being allocated land similar to Buru transmigrants, in the case of former *tapol* it was often taken from them. Both then and now, former prisoners have little access to legal redress: the nearest court, in Ambon, is a long and expensive journey away; and understandably many former *tapol* have little trust in state bodies. To this day, former prisoners are subject to intimidation: when they meet, military officers often warn them “not to form a new Communist Party”. From time to time, their (grand)children remain the subject of discriminatory practices, including attempts to prevent them from enrolling at certain schools. These realities mean that remembering and addressing the past on Buru remains fraught with tensions and is actively resisted by local authorities.

## SITES OF MEMORY IN SAVANAJAYA

Little remains of Buru's prison camp: the barracks have long been demolished, and there are no memorials for political prisoners. Yet, many places are connected to the island's history as a prison camp. For former political prisoners, these sites are very significant as they offer a starting point to speak about their experiences, which have been erased from mainstream narratives. In this section, I will discuss how former political prisoners engage with two sites in Savanajaya: the Tugu ("Pillar") monument and the arts hall.

The Tugu monument (Fig. 11.1), in the heart of Savanajaya, marks the formal establishment of the village. The monument has two plaques, with the one on the back stating the parties involved in the "village project"—the camp and unit commanders. While the word "unit" alludes



Fig. 11.1 The Tugu monument, Buru Island, photograph by author

to the prison camp, there is no mention of the prisoners who built the village.

Two former Buru prisoners who returned to Java, Hersri Setiawan<sup>14</sup> and Tedjabayu Sudjojono,<sup>15</sup> were asked to reflect on the monument.<sup>16</sup> Hersri said “I have no feelings at all. It is as I’m looking at a monument that has no meaning to me.” For Tedja, the monument represented repression. Hersri agreed with this interpretation and nodded quietly, while Tedja continued: “Inside, I’m angry, but what can you do? I don’t think it should be demolished. Rather, it is proof that the military were part of Suharto’s machinery of repression.”

Hersri and Tedja’s conversation illustrates that a particular site can hold different meanings to individuals. Once these interpretations are verbalized, individual interpretations or memories become part of a broader social group in which memories are shared but can also be queried (Hirsch, 2008). This interaction then gives way to creating a site’s meaning. Tedja’s comments regarding how the monument should be retained as proof of the military involvement and responsibility for the violence perpetrated against political prisoners on Buru show his desire for this information to be shared more widely. This can be seen as a reflection of Jan and Aleida Assmann’s theories on communicative and cultural memory. In wanting to share the meanings associated with Tugu beyond a particular social group (former political prisoners and their families), Tedja expresses a desire for these memories to become institutionalized, becoming part of national and political memory.

Opposite Tugu stands Savanajaya’s arts hall (*balai kesenian*, Fig. 11.2). During Buru’s time as a prison camp, all units, except the isolation unit Jiku Kecil, had an arts barrack (*barak kesenian*) used for cultural performances for the entertainment of the camp commanders, guards, as well as other prisoners (Setiawan, 2015).<sup>17</sup> These arts barracks were complete theatres, equipped with a stage, backdrops for performances, two sets of Javanese gamelan and benches to seat more than 500 people (Hersri, 1995).<sup>18</sup>

Of Buru’s arts barracks, only the one in Savanajaya remains. In 2014, it was renovated with funding from the Governor of Maluku, who agreed that the building was a site of historical significance. The wishes of the former political prisoners in Savanajaya to restore the building to its original state were, however, ignored. The supporting poles of the building, made from cajuput trees indigenous to Buru, were removed. Now, the art building is an impressive modern structure, which former



**Fig. 11.2** The renovated arts hall within the former Buru Island prison camp, photograph by author

political prisoners feel has lost its original character. While walking through the hall Udin, a former prisoner, explained:

They replaced all the wooden poles with concrete ones. You can still see a few of them there [on the field]. I remember cutting the tree and then bringing the poles here! Now, they are all gone, replaced with these ones [taps with his hands on the concrete]. The only thing that remains – what was made by us – is the framework of the roof. The rest... all gone! (personal communication, May 17, 2015)

The strong sense of ownership expressed by Udin was thus related to the physical experience of building the hall. Similarly, because there are very few remnants of Buru's prison camp, the significance of those that remain increases.

In an article on art and entertainment in Buru as well as Jakarta's Salemba jail, Hersri Setiawan has argued that for many *tapol* creative expression (whether by performing, writing, or making instruments) was very important as it represented a sense of normalcy within the extremities of prison life. While some prisoners viewed performances as “useless and treacherous activities” (Hersri, 1995, p. 12) as they provided entertainment for the commander and guards, for many other *tapol*—among them accomplished dancers, musicians and *dalang* (master



puppeteers)—performing, even when it took place in a context of oppression, was

[...] not without benefit for the artists and performers involved. They represented an opportunity to maintain, even develop, their technical skills. And however cruelly a system of power oppresses creative freedom; it can never destroy the artist and the work of art. (Hersri, 1995, p. 12)

This analysis helps explain the importance many former *tapol* attach to the arts building. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the descendants of former political prisoners share this attachment too. Sri, the daughter of a former political prisoner, said, “We want to salvage the poles and keep them somewhere. Maybe we can establish some kind of museum” (Sri, personal communication, May 19, 2015). Sri’s perceptions are insightful in various ways. As noted in the introduction, on considering the arts hall a part of “our history”, she demonstrated profound identification with her father’s past. This illustrates the privileged role of the family in memorial transmission (Hirsch, 2008), as well as the fact that sites can help bring a distant time to the present. As such, these places or objects have a role as a “memory technique” (Pichler, 2010, p. 139), which allows survivor-witnesses to express their memories and pass them on to subsequent generations (Argenti & Schramm, 2010). In so doing, sites can mobilize postmemory, as illustrated by the daughter who expressed her desire for memories attached to the arts building to become institutionalized. This would enable the stories of Buru *tapol* to be shared beyond the circle of former prisoners and their families, moving from intergenerational to transgenerational memory.

The manner in which former political prisoners engage with sites also illustrates that physical places play an important role in the construction of the self, and the social group that individuals belong to (Filippucci, 2010). Here, it is important to contrast the different emphases chosen by former prisoners at the sites of memory discussed. While both at Tugu and in the arts hall the prisoners alluded to their ultimate survival; at Tugu, Hersri and Tedja emphasized military repression, while at the arts hall former prisoners underlined their role as builders and developers of the island.

The emphasis on development is closely related to the profound changes *tapol* made to the island’s landscape. Many former political prisoners also use this discourse when discussing the plans of the

government for Buru to become the main supplier of rice for eastern Indonesia (Setiawan, 2015). In the eyes of former *tapol*, Buru's present agricultural success cannot be separated from their forced labour. In locating their memories as prisoners on Buru beyond a context of suffering and loss, and in one of survival and development, the narratives of former political prisoners show that sites and memory play a role in the construction of identity and positioning in the social world (Abrams, 2014).

Meanwhile the emphasis on oppression at Tugu, as expressed by Hersri and Tedja, cannot be separated from the monument's direct link to the role of the military on Buru as well as the different experiences of former *tapol* after the prison camp was closed. Tedja and Hersri were among those who returned to Java, where both were exposed to, and became actively involved in, human rights activism. The community of former political prisoners in Savanajaya, however, has barely been the subject of activism.<sup>19</sup> Their discourse of development has perhaps also emerged because there are little other frameworks available to them to express their experiences (Abrams, 2014), reinforced further by ongoing pressure from the local security forces to remain silent about the past.

The emphasis of development rather than survival of violence can also be explained by taking into account the particular context of Buru. The former political prisoners who stayed were not only faced with the challenge of rebuilding their lives, but had to do so in a place where they were detained and where remembering the past remains actively resisted. This combination of profound suffering and "institutional silencing" (Shaw, 2010, p. 258) makes it even more difficult for survivors to articulate painful memories. It is in these situations of "unspeakable" memories (Hirsch, 1997, p. 13) that material objects—including sites—can become a bridge between what can and cannot be expressed, creating an avenue for the transmission of memories.

## CONCLUSION

Buru's history as a site of serious human rights violations has virtually been erased. There are very little remnants of the prison camp, let alone memorials. Ongoing resistance from local authorities has meant that remembering the past, even when it takes place in private settings, is

fraught with difficulties. Despite this situation, former political prisoners have found ways to communicate their experiences. Sites play an important role in this process.

The recollections of former prisoners at both Tugu and Savanajaya's arts hall underline the various memory formats that emerge simultaneously: from collective memory in the form of individual and group memory to wishes (shared by those who have not directly experienced the prison camp) for the institutionalization of their experiences as part of national and cultural memory.

From the engagement of *tapol* with these places, sites fulfil various roles in the recollection and transmission of memories. Tugu and the Savanajaya arts hall show that sites are a locus of memory, allowing for the retrieval of individual recollections. Sites are more than just a vessel, however, as individual memories are also fundamentally social: they do not only bear the imprint of one former *tapol*, but also those of others. Especially when recollections are shared between people, memories are no longer the exclusive domain of the individual, but they become a social agent, in which sites create an active relationship between individuals, spaces and objects.

This relationship gives way to a number of other processes. First, sites themselves gain a particular meaning: Tugu symbolizes military repression, while the arts hall stands for the contribution of prisoners to the island. Both sites are proof of the past of *tapol* on Buru, a history that is deliberately forgotten by most government bodies. Second, in bestowing meaning to sites, they help to shape social identities, binding together individuals with a common past. In that sense, sites influence the positioning of former *tapol* both as survivors of military violence and the developers of an island. Third, by transmitting narratives of suffering and survival to others, sites have the power to mobilize postmemorial work.

Sites are thus a medium for the transmission of memories. This is particularly important in a context where there are no public commemorations or monuments, and where sites thus represent a unique framework allowing former prisoners to tell their stories, and pass them on to subsequent generations. In imbuing their narratives with a discourse of survival, former Buru *tapol* show that remembering at a site of terror does not only serve to acknowledge past suffering but recognizes the power of the living, who continue to tell their stories.

## NOTES

1. For safety reasons, pseudonyms have been used for the former prisoners and their family members who live on Buru.
2. The government never admitted there were political prisoners in Indonesia. Instead, it argued that because of security considerations, individuals involved in “political issues” were being detained. Unsurprisingly, the authorities never gave full disclosure of the number of individuals held. In 1973 Amnesty International estimated that there were 55,000 B-category prisoners (*TAPOL Bulletin*, 2, November 1973).
3. For detailed discussions of the role of government agencies and the military in the design and operation of Buru prison camp, see Adam (2014) and Nadia et al. (2014).
4. According to the authorities, those sent to Buru were healthy men under forty-five years old (*TAPOL Bulletin*, 8, January 1975), but in fact most were between twenty and seventy years old, and also minors were sent to the island (Krisnadi, 2001). It is unclear exactly how many prisoners were sent to Buru. In 1976, the authorities stated that there were more than 10,000 prisoners, Amnesty International estimated the number to be 14,000 (Amnesty International, 1977).
5. Ironically in 1974 Jiku Kecil was renamed Ancol, the same as a recreational area in Jakarta (Hersri, 1995).
6. According to Krisnadi (2001), 320 prisoners died on Buru, a number based on notes by Pramodya Ananta Toer. However, this number is likely to be higher: the data obtained by Toer only refer to one prison unit and do not include any deaths after 1978. The Indonesian government has never issued information on the exact number of detainees, let alone deaths.
7. The Catholic Church played a crucial role in providing medical assistance (Sumarwan, 2007).
8. The executive summary of the report on Buru was eventually published in 2014 (see Nadia et al., 2014).
9. It is difficult to assess the quality of the Komnas HAM investigation on 1965 as the Commission has not made the full report available. The summary has a number of flaws; in the case of Buru, it fails to explicitly state that it was a labor camp (Meijer, 2015). Nevertheless, to date, the report remains the only condemnation on the violence of 1965–1966 and its aftermath by an Indonesian state body.
10. Language was used to present Buru as a humane place of detention. Military policy dictated that prisoners were not referred to as “detainees” (*tahanan*) but as “citizens” (*warga*) (Krisnadi, 2001). Interestingly, former political prisoners on Buru continue to use *warga*, particularly when differentiating themselves from transmigrants and indigenous peoples.

11. A number of *tapol* married local women, for which they required permission from the military.
12. For an extensive discussion, see Krisnadi (2001, pp. 156–171).
13. It would be inaccurate to speak of “release”, as the prisoners were never given release letters, only one that changed the status of a detainee from “a full prisoner to one returned to society” (Setiawan, 2006, p. 225).
14. A former member of the left-wing cultural organization Lekra (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat*, Institute of People’s Culture) and general secretary of its central Java branch (1958–1960), Hersri was also Indonesia’s representative at the Asia-Africa Writer’s Bureau in Colombo, Sri Lanka (1961–1965). He was arrested in December 1969 and sent to Buru in 1971.
15. A former member of the student organization CGMI (*Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*, Indonesian Student Movement Concentration), Tedjabayu was arrested in October 1965 and sent to Buru in 1971. He is the eldest son of pioneering painter and former PKI-member S. Sudjojono and Mia Bustam, former general secretary of Lekra Yogyakarta.
16. These reflections were part of the 2016 documentary *Pulau Buru: Tanah Air Beta* (Buru Island: My Home Land), directed by Rahung Nasution.
17. Between 1971 and 1975, performances on Buru truly represented forced labour as they were held entirely for the camp commander, his staff and guards. Prisoners developed a number of terms to describe work associated with performances based on “forced labour” (*korve*), e.g. “eye *korve*” meant having to watch the performances (Hersri, 1995).
18. For an extensive discussion on art and entertainment on Buru and Salemba prison in Jakarta, see Hersri (1995).
19. An exception to this has been the involvement of a number of wives and daughters of former *tapol* in a number of programs of Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR), including the photo exhibition “The Act of Living”.

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## Heads from the North: Transcultural Memorialization of the 1965 Indonesian Killings at the National Gallery of Australia

*Katharine McGregor*

Memories of the 1965 violence continue to reverberate across the generations in Indonesia. Children impacted by the violence have chosen to express or not express their experiences in different ways depending on the audiences they address. This chapter considers the functions and messages of a memorial to the victims of the violence created by Dadang Christanto, an Indonesian whose father was murdered in 1965. The memorial takes the form of a bronze sculpture series in the sculpture garden of the National Gallery of Australia (NGA).

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*Heads from the North* can be considered a transcultural memorial in the sense it largely memorializes violence that took place in “another” country at the hands of members of “another” nation. This memorial is part of a larger trend of transcultural memorialization. Yet as the only permanent memorial to all victims of the 1965 violence in the world, including Indonesia, it is unique. Reflecting on Australia’s implication in the 1965 violence and Christanto’s relationship to Australia, this chapter asks what kinds of memory work this permanent memorial fulfills?

Throughout the chapter, I use the term transcultural memory following Astrid Erll to refer to the shift in memory studies away from the idea of nation states as containers of memory, to instead capture mnemonic processes unfolding *across* and *beyond* cultures (Erll, 2011, p. 9). I consider whether transnational memorials work to bring relatively forgotten violent pasts into memory or to further erase them, and how they bring the histories of different countries and peoples into dialogue. This chapter also highlights the fact that through the movement of people and ideas, memories of 1965 have travelled across space such that they are increasingly becoming part of global memory of mass violence.

## TRANSCULTURAL MEMORIALS

Transcultural memorials to violence that occurred in other places are perhaps most prevalent in the United States. Sometimes such memorials have been created with direct government support and at other times they are more a product of community-based efforts. The US Congress, for example, endorsed the now famous United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, which opened in 1993 as a “living memorial” to the Holocaust. It was directed towards “remembering the victims, honoring the survivors, and ensuring their history remains both a cautionary tale and a vital lesson to future generations” (Bloomfield, 2006, p. xv). This lesson was to be extended to people, nations and institutions that stood by as the Holocaust unfolded.

Located in Washington on the National Mall, this is a national memorial. The creation of this museum is in part related to the presence of a large Jewish diaspora consisting of Holocaust survivors and their families in the United States, but it is also related to the increasing universalization of messages of the Holocaust as the most horrific crime of the twentieth century. At the time of its opening, the genocide in

Bosnia was unfolding. Over time this museum has expanded to include other comparative cases such as the Cambodian, Bosnian and Rwandan genocides.

American diaspora and activist communities have also initiated memorials to cases of violence that occurred outside of America. The comfort women memorials—in Palisades Park, New Jersey; Long Island, New York; Glendale, California; and Fairfax, Virginia—are, for example, projects initiated by Korean–American communities who either feel aggrieved by what they perceive as continuing Japanese denials about the war-time comfort women system or seek to link this issue to modern-day sex-trafficking (McCarthy, 2014). They seek to use their location in America, a superpower with close ties to Japan, to pressure the Japanese government to do more on the case.<sup>1</sup> Further to this, Cambodian Americans have created various memorials and small museums to remember the victims of the Cambodian genocide of 1975–1979. In this process, America’s anti-Communist history has created a supportive context for the elevation of this history of what are often perceived to be “Communist crimes”. Yet Cambodian Americans have also sought through their remembrance to remind American audiences of US complicity in the rise of the Khmer Rouge and continued support for the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese takeover in 1979 (Schlund-Vias, 2012).

Perhaps due to its relatively minor status in world politics, with the exception of a few Holocaust memorials, there are far fewer trans-cultural memorials in Australia to non-Australian victims of violence abroad. Christanto’s sculpture was one of the first such memorials. Before considering the memorial and its creator in more detail, I would like to reflect on Australia’s relationship with the 1965 violence as context for understanding this memorial.

### AUSTRALIA AND THE 1965 VIOLENCE

At the time the attack on the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party) and leftist sympathizers began in late 1965, relations between Indonesia and Australia were tense. There were fears about the spread of Communism from Vietnam and potentially Indonesia southwards to Australia. The first Australian troops entered the Vietnam War in 1962 to fight against what the Australian

government represented as a Communist regime. There were also fears about President Sukarno and his increasing embrace of the PKI, and his firm stand against the British and Americans. From February 1965, Australia contributed a small number of troops to fight with British Commonwealth troops in an undeclared war against the Indonesian army in the so-called Malaysia Confrontation (Mackie, 1974).

The Australian government accepted the Army's interpretation of the 30 September Movement as a Communist plot and encouraged Australian media outlets to replicate the Indonesian Army's position on the Movement and on the repression of the PKI (Najjarine & Cottle, 2003). Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt was generally guarded in what he said about the violence, but during a less formal meeting with the Australian-American Association at the River Club in New York, he said: "With 500,000 to 1 million Communist sympathizers knocked off, I think it is safe to assume a reorientation has taken place" (cited in Tanter, 2002). As Robert Cribb noted, there was a noticeable lack of moral outrage internationally at the killings (1990, p. 6). The Australian government was largely supportive of the new military regime emerging under General Suharto, and it certainly did not condemn the large scale massacre in Indonesia.

As detailed above, Cambodians who suffered under the Khmer Rouge regime and who were refugees from this period have been the driving force for the creation of US memorials to the Cambodian genocide. There is an Indonesian diaspora in Australia, but unlike the Cambodian diaspora in the United States, this is not a community primarily made up of persons who fled persecution in their home country. I do not know of a systematic study of how many people were able to flee Indonesia in 1965. Some Indonesians on the political left were trapped abroad, unable to return for fear of persecution. Very few who remained in Indonesia, however, were able to escape because of the rapid pace of the repression, the fact they did not anticipate the scale of the repression, a lack of resources, curfews, airport controls and the unwillingness of many countries to grant asylum to persons considered to be Communists. Indonesian embassies engaged in a screening process of Indonesians abroad, requiring those with suspect backgrounds to choose to return home or lose their passports (Barton, 2002, pp. 90–97). Not only was there hostility to Communists in Australia, the White Australia policy was

still in place until 1966 and the government only made exceptions for Colombo Plan students and professionals whose skills were in demand.

The few exiles from the Indonesian Left that made it to Australia generally kept their histories relatively hidden with some exceptions. Meanwhile, Australian prime ministers continued throughout the Suharto regime to praise Suharto, ignoring the regime's record of violence (Hyland, 2008). Although some journalists, activists and a few scholars continued to highlight the 1965 violence and its legacies, it would be fair to say there was a reluctance to talk about the violence critically in broader circles in Australia. David Hill has suggested this is connected to Australian scholarly concern about continuing access to Indonesia, but it may also be connected to the lack of a motivated and vocal leftist Indonesian diaspora to back this process (Hill, 2009). The Australian government became further entangled in support for the military-dominated Suharto regime through its official recognition of the 1975 Indonesian takeover of East Timor.

After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, and following trends in Indonesia of greater press openness, there was more media discussion of Indonesia in the Australian press. One could say that Australian media attention to the role of the Indonesian military also escalated during the May 1998 riots and in the post-independence ballot violence in East Timor in 1999 (Tapsell & Eidenfalk, 2013, pp. 587–590). There was a new spotlight on the military's human rights record.

In the context of expectations of ongoing reform and democratization, and a new opening around discussions of the 1965 violence in Indonesia, the NGA sponsored a sculpture by Australian Indonesian artist Dadang Christanto entitled *Heads from the North*. This was a significant sculpture, firstly because it took up the theme of the 1965 Indonesian violence; secondly because it was intended as a memorial to those who died; and thirdly because it was unveiled on 1 October 2004. 1 October is a highly charged day in the Indonesian commemorative calendar—Sacred Pancasila (*Hari Kesaktiaan Pancasila*), which in effect celebrates the crushing of the Communists (“Drowning”, 2004). After the fall of the Suharto regime, there were expectations that anti-Communism would soften in Indonesia but, as detailed in Chapter 15 by Miller, this has not proven to be the case.

THE NATIONAL GALLERY AND THE COMMISSIONING  
OF *HEADS FROM THE NORTH*

Christanto's sculpture series consists of 66 bronze heads cast from six different clay moulds located in a marsh pond. The heads and a small section of the neck attached to each head protrude out of the water to look at a viewer from a number of angles through the reeds (Fig. 12.1). The pond is surrounded by indigenous plants and is shaded by trees producing a secluded feel. There is an extra aura around the pond when the nearby fog generated by Fujiko Nakaja's *Fog* sculpture emits steam at intervals throughout the day. At those times the faces eerily peep through the mist.

The number 66 symbolizes the last year of the most intense violence. Christanto notes he chose the number 66 over 65 because sometimes people associate 1965 with the 30 September Movement only and not the violence that came after it, and for the practical reason that he wanted to reproduce six moulds evenly across the 66 sculptured heads (personal communication, June 29, 2015).

So how did this work come to be part of the permanent exhibition of the NGA, and what does this mean in terms of its significance? In commissioning the work, the NGA curator, Melanie Eastburn, explained the Gallery was following a long tradition of a commitment to collecting



**Fig. 12.1** Heads from the North, National Gallery of Australia Sculpture Garden, photograph by author

art from Southeast Asia (personal communication, May 7, 2015). The NGA is a relatively new institution. In fact, in March 1966 as the violence in Indonesia was still underway, a Committee of Inquiry was working to formulate the basis of the Gallery. The Inquiry reported to Prime Minister Harold Holt that aesthetic merit should be the foundation of the acquisition policy, but that there should also be a commitment to “art representing the high cultural achievement of Australia’s neighbors... before its disappearance”, as well as “art of the twentieth century on a worldwide basis” (National Art Gallery, 1966, p. 1). The 1960s assumption about the disappearance of particular art forms in the region reflects a widespread colonial view about a golden age of Indonesian art, dating in particular to the Hindu Buddhist past of Indonesia (McGregor, 2004, pp. 15–30). By the early 2000s, the Gallery had increasingly begun to collect contemporary Asian art, but there were very few pieces by modern Indonesian artists.

It is notable then that *Heads from the North* was the second of Christanto’s works acquired by the Gallery. The first was a piece also relating to the 1965 violence called *Red Rain*. *Red Rain* consists of a collection of drawings on small pieces of gold paper, faces of people encased in plastic, symbolizing identity cards (Turner, 2007b, p. 93). From each face hung in a canopy, a long thin red thread falls to the ground. The thread references tears of blood shed for victims of human rights abuses. A private art foundation, The Sherman Contemporary Art Foundation, funded *Red Rain*. The Chairman and Executive Director Gene Sherman describes the aim of the Foundation as to “bring audiences into conversation with history via a focus on artists who mesh complex world and national stories with contemporary realities” (Sherman, 2009, p. 63). Sherman’s commitment to political art stems from her life experiences. Born to an Austro-German family in South Africa, she left the country in 1964 with her parents in protest at the continuation of apartheid (Ng, 2014, p. 53). She has consistently supported critical art practice, such as the work of Dinh Q Le, whose 2011 installation entitled *Eraseure* featured “thousands of black and white photos of families and individuals, some who might have died or gone missing during the American-Vietnam War” (Ng, 2014, p. 53).<sup>2</sup> The Foundation supports socially engaged artists who take up issues related to violence and loss and who thus create “connected aesthetics” (Sherman, 2009, p. 64).

It was through Dadang Christanto's reputation for aesthetically superior art and the Gallery's ownership of the *Red Rain* installation that he was chosen to create the first new piece for the sculpture garden in many years. Curator Melanie Eastburn stresses that this choice was very much about the artist, rather than the politics of his work or any kind of social justice initiative (personal communication, May 7, 2015). Yet all of Christanto's work includes references to social and political issues. Art scholar Caroline Turner notes Christanto is amongst a small group of activist-artists born from the 1950s onwards, such as F. X. Harsono, Arahmaini, Heri Dono and Moelyono to take up issues of human rights in Indonesia including economic marginalization (Turner, 2007b, pp. 86–87).

Christanto was free to choose the theme of his NGA sculpture. His first idea was to install 200 terracotta heads in Lake Burley Griffin, but one concern was they would have washed away. Moreover, the lake did not form part of the national estate space allocated to the gallery and the adjacent High Court (personal communication, June 29, 2015). Following from themes in his earlier works, he was interested in an installation around water so he chose to base the work around the marsh pond within the existing sculpture garden. In 1996 Dadang famously placed 1001 full body sized fiberglass figures of naked men and women into the sea at Ancol beach in north Jakarta where they disappeared into the surf (Maxwell, 2004). This art project called *1001 Earth People* was inspired by the 1992 Kedung Ombo Dam project in which poor villagers were displaced for unfair compensation to make way for a dam.

In an interview, Christanto commented that water is a vital element in the *Mahabharata* story and other folk legends in Java, and that it thus has a “sacred and holy” meaning (Eastburn, 2008). He wanted to use water in both the *1001 Earth People* installation and in *Heads from the North* “as a metaphor for suffering and torture” (Eastburn, 2008). In *1001 Earth People*, only part of the fiberglass bodies was submerged in the water when he released them into the sea. In *Heads from the North* by contrast he positioned the head and neck of the bronze sculptures at the waterline to signal the more intense danger the people killed in 1965 faced (personal communication, June 29, 2015). Water is also an important theme in the mass violence of 1965, due to the disposal of corpses and decapitated heads in rivers and seas. As Hearman (2013) has noted in her work on oral histories about this period in East Java, a frequent recurring image is that of the Brantas River and bodies floating in it.



She describes this oral imagery as a convenient way of “trying to convey the horrors to audiences”. For these reasons, water summons memories of the 1965 killings.

Heads are also a recurrent image in Christanto’s work. Turner explains this choice by noting “the head is the site of memory and of intelligent thought” and “it is only through memory and intelligent thought, through recollection and reflection that trauma caused by violence can be cured and reconciliation achieved” (Turner, 2007a, p. 18). Christanto thus used heads in both *Red Rain* and *Heads from the North* to signal memories as well as violent deaths (Fig. 12.2).

### PERSONAL MEMORY AND *HEADS FROM THE NORTH*

One reason the sculpture is so haunting, for informed visitors at least, is that this piece touches on a very personal history for the artist. Christanto grew up in a family of ethnic Chinese background in a village called Kamantran in Tegal, Central Java. His father, Tak Ek Tjiu, owned a small business. He sympathized with the PKI, but according to Christanto’s mother, he was not a PKI member. The military took his father away early one morning when the family was sleeping (Kronenberg & Herbert, 2006). This was in October 1965, so very early in the repression. This timing seems to coincide with the arrival of army crack troops RPKAD (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat*, Army Para Commandos Regiment) into Central Java, who carried out the killings and armed and trained local anti-Communist groups to kill (Jenkins



Fig. 12.2 Individual head in *Heads from the North*, National Gallery of Australia Sculpture Garden, photograph by author



& Kammen, 2012, pp. 83–90). Christanto was a child only eight years old at the time. He never saw his father again.

His father's disappearance, however, was not his first experience of the persecution of his family. Three years earlier, his family's house was burned down in anti-Chinese attacks led by outsiders. Reflecting on his sense of isolation, he stated in an interview that "Even though I was five I felt we were different" (personal communication, June 29, 2015). The ethnic Chinese were not the primary targets of the 1965 violence in Indonesia, but some were certainly targeted.<sup>3</sup> Due to the events of 1965, Dadang, however, became a person who was subjected to double discrimination. His village was located in a Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) stronghold where most residents were *santri*, devout Muslims, and he was often teased on the basis, for example, of being Chinese and not circumcised as well as being the child of a PKI (personal communication, June 29, 2015). The taunting was so bad in his local area that he was sent to live with an aunt in Bandung. As discussed in Chapters 11, 13, and 14 by Setiawan, Lis and Dragojlovic, many children of persons accused of being Communists, whether imprisoned or killed, suffered discrimination because of the pervasive anti-Communist propaganda continually propagated by the regime and replicated in society. Christanto had similar experiences (personal communication, June 29, 2015). He remembers he did not want to go to school because people teased him for being the son of a PKI person (Kronenberg & Herbert, 2006).

Christanto attended art school during 1975–1977 at the Indonesian Academy of Fine Arts in Yogyakarta. He did not reveal his personal background, however, until migrating to Australia in 1999. His story fits with the patterns of intergenerational memory of many children of people targeted in the violence who often choose to conceal their parents' pasts.

The installation *Red Rain*, which Christanto created after migrating to Australia, was the first time he directly referenced the 1965 violence in his work. He notes "when I made Red Rain [2003] was the first I was clearly talking about my father, straightly and clearly" (Kronenberg & Herbert, 2006). In this installation, as noted above, he used red string to symbolize "bloodshed everywhere". He also used joss paper "because it is a symbol of praying for the Chinese tradition" (Kronenberg & Herbert, 2006). He combined references to both his Chinese identity and his personal loss in relation to 1965 in this piece.

Christanto felt freer living in Australia to represent this history. He was able to make a break from the common practice of using

metaphorical references to controversial events that was necessary in the authoritarian context of the Suharto regime. He felt released from the paranoia he experienced living under the Suharto regime (personal communication, June 29, 2015). Turner comments that living away from his homeland has had the effect of “liberating his expression of his full identity as an Indonesian of Chinese ethnicity and identity” (Turner, 2007b, pp. 92–93).

His new capacity to talk about 1965 was also, however, related to changes in Indonesia and more open discussion by former political prisoners of their experiences and increased advocacy for them. At the time he made *Red Rain*, for example, President Wahid had three years earlier made the very hopeful personal apology to victims of 1965 for the role of NU in the violence and had suggested the revocation of TAP MPRS XXV 1966 (Purwardi, 2003, pp. 49–67). Yet there were also signs of firm resistance to opening this past, including the forced disruption of the attempted reburial of remains from a forest grave from 1965 in the town of Kaloran, north of Yogyakarta in 2001. I have argued elsewhere that this reburial was symbolically important for many families who had lost loved ones in 1965 and who had no knowledge of the whereabouts of their family members’ remains (McGregor, 2012, p. 250). This was true also for Christanto, who was moved by an SBS documentary directed by Mike Carey covering the story of one man to find his brother’s remains, which led to the Wonosobo excavation.<sup>4</sup> The documentary led him to ask why discrimination against those considered PKI had endured so long in Indonesia (Ingham, 2003, p. 22).

Many of the killings took place in secret in secluded forests after executioners picked up groups of prisoners from their homes or from jail at night (Hearman, 2013, pp. 105, 108). In the same year he completed *Heads from the North*, Christanto finished another installation called *Witness* (2004) in which he affixed metal to sections of branches in a tree in a work commissioned by the Australian National University. Speaking about that work he said:

the trees became witness when there is [sic] slaughter in the forest. I am curious to ask where is my father? The body? But nobody answer about that, nobody and I ask to the trees. And when I ask to the trees the trees just crying, crying, crying... If they can talk if they can explain, they will explain about the brutality of regime (Kronenberg & Herbert, 2006).

In this statement, Christanto reveals the extent to which he continues to be troubled by the lack of information about the final resting place of his father. His position mirrors that of thousands of other Indonesian families who lost loved ones who have been unable to search for or locate their relatives (“1965 survivor”, 2015). Christanto is committed to repeatedly representing his responses to the violence, despite the sorrow it has caused him. He feels that he has to “be a witness” to that past, to prevent it from recurring (Kronenberg & Herbert, 2006).

### *HEADS FROM THE NORTH AS A TRANSCULTURAL MEMORIAL*

I now want to turn to the question of in what sense *Heads from the North* functions as a memorial, and the transcultural dimensions of this work. *Heads from the North* is both a personal memorial for Christanto and also a transcultural memorial to those who died. It is extremely personal for the artist because each of the six faces used as moulds for the 66 heads were modeled on different expressions of his parents’ faces. When the installation was opened on 1 October 2004 Christanto symbolically smeared ceremonial ash on his face and body and moved between the sculptured heads in the pond touching them gently (“Drowning”, 2004). This sculpture is therefore a form of memorial to his parents for the loss of his father and the suffering of both his mother and the broader family. But it is also a memorial to all the victims of 1965 (personal communication, June 29, 2015).

This work is remarkable because despite several plans, there is not yet to my knowledge a purposefully built monument to all the victims of 1965 in Indonesia. There are markers to sites where people died such as wells, caves and bridges throughout Java and Bali, but there are almost no permanent memorials to those who died. One exception is the small tombstone in a forest in Wonosari district near Semarang, naming the victims buried in a mass grave, which was installed in June 2015. A Semarang-based human rights group gained permission for the tombstone after eight months of prior socialization of this idea (Narudin, 2015). One reason for the extreme hostility to the reburial of remains of 65 victims in Kaloran in 2001 was the fear that the new gravesites might become a memorial for all those who died in 1965 (McGregor, 2012, pp. 249–250). Similar fears were expressed regarding the Semarang tombstone, with a condition for the memorial being that all activities at the site had to be coordinated with the owners of the land, the Ministry of Forestry. There is a sense then that it is not yet possible to memorialize all the victims of 1965 collectively in Indonesia.

So how does this transcultural memorialization of the 1965 violence work? Originally there was no plaque attached to this piece in the sculpture garden. Perhaps this led to some confusion from those who looked upon the installation. Only later was a plaque with the following text added (Fig. 12.3).

Curiously the text does not acknowledge who perpetrated the violence, nor does it acknowledge the international support, including Australian support, for the violence. It does, however, acknowledge the brutality of the repression and the mass nature of the killings, although no figure for the number of people killed is provided.

What is interesting about this transcultural memorial is that *Heads from the North* is not defined exclusively by Christanto's country of origin. Instead the installation reflects his complex positionality and what literary critics Syed Manzurul Islam has described as a "migrant's memory event" (1999, p. 119). This term refers to the performance of memories by a migrant that reflects making sense of multiple belongings across time and space. Although this concept was developed in the field of literary studies by Islam to apply in particular to the works of Salman Rushdie, Anne Ring Peterson has extended this term to apply to the work of Palestinian exile and artist Mona Hatoum's work (Peterson, 2013). This term is equally useful for thinking about Christanto's work.



Fig. 12.3 Plaque for *Heads from the North*, National Gallery of Australia Sculpture Garden, photograph by author

Firstly, the title of the work, *Heads from the North*, signals that Christanto is looking at this past from the location of Australia. He explained in an interview that he used water as a total concept for this piece to signal not only suffering and torture, and perhaps the specifics of the 1965 violence, but also the water between Australia and Indonesia as Australians look “North” (personal communication, June 29, 2015). Here he wanted to reference the domination of the Australian imagination of Indonesia as a place where there are many stories of violence, tragedy and people smuggling. He sought thus to tap into a long history of the white Australian cartographical imagination of the North, including fears of invasion by both so-called Asians and Communists (Broinowski, 1992). Christanto thus invites visitors to the gallery to look north, but also to examine a particular history of the “North”. In doing so, I read this as a call to both remember and to think about the relationship between Australia and Indonesia, including the relationship at the time the violence took place.

Although 1965 was the specific inspiration for the work, Christanto notes he was also inspired by the desire to memorialize the many victims of both conflict and natural disaster in the twentieth century, which he describes as “a horrible century” (Kronenberg & Herbert, 2006). Like the case of the Holocaust Museum in the United States, Christanto seeks to connect the history of the 1965 violence in Indonesia with other histories of violence and more universal suffering. Christanto also acknowledges it is difficult for younger audiences to understand the Cold War and the geopolitics of the 1960s, especially for Indonesians given New Order versions of history, so he chooses to represent the 1965 violence in a more abstract, universal way as a human tragedy (personal communication, June 29, 2015). But I wonder if there is a risk of the specifics of this history being lost in this process, given this case is far less well known than either the Holocaust or the Cambodian genocide.

The existence of memorials and the functions they can perform is a product not only of political support, but also of the resources such memorials require. In less well-known cases of violence, the requirement to universalize messages may be more prevalent. Well-funded memorials can go way beyond the project of universal remembrance of human tragedy. The Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington has, for example, launched a fund-raising campaign for a “world memory project” through which it hopes to make the 170 million records of the Holocaust and

Nazi persecution searchable.<sup>5</sup> The memory project has already made available almost three million documents and it builds on tools from [ancestry.com](http://ancestry.com). Through this search tool, a child Holocaust survivor, Sol Finkelstein (2015), comments in a video posted online after being able to view his father's death record: "Now I know where my father is, it's not easier that I know but at least I know". At this stage, it is impossible to imagine comparable resources being provided for a memorial museum that could perform such a function in Indonesia because of the political situation, a lack of resources and poor documentation of the killings in Indonesia, due to again the lack of political will and taboos around Communism.

## CONCLUSIONS

The location of Dadang Christanto's evocative bronze sculpture series *Heads from the North* in the sculpture garden of the NGA is a remarkable example of transcultural memorial to victims of violence that took place in another country. It is particularly remarkable because of the background of the artist, who is the child of a person who disappeared in the 1965 violence. The work conveys both a personal sense of loss and grief, while at the same time asking its audiences to reflect on the larger scale of this violence and Australia's relationship to it.

The memorial is perhaps necessarily framed in terms of more universal messages of the loss and suffering inflicted on those left behind in cases of violent pasts. Yet it does achieve the aim of bringing a relatively forgotten history into memory, and bringing the histories of Australia and Indonesia into dialogue.

## NOTES

1. For some critiques of Korean American framing of this issue see Kang (2003) and Yoneyama (2003).
2. For more on the exhibition, see <http://sherman-scaf.org.au/exhibition/dinh-q-le/>.
3. See Cribb and Coppel (2009). For some qualifications to this argument concerning anti-Chinese violence in Aceh, see Melvin (2013).
4. The documentary was most likely Carey (1998).
5. Retrieved from <http://www.ushmm.org/online/world-memory-project/>.

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## The History of Loss and the Loss of History: Papermoon Puppet Theatre Examines the Legacies of the 1965 Violence in Indonesia

*Marianna Lis*

This is a story about the history of loss (and the loss of history) in our lives. Shouldn't it be so, that if we know what has happened in the past, then we can understand why we stand here now, and where we want to go in the years to come? (*Mwathirika* DVD booklet, n.d.)

The extract above comes from young performance artists from the Papermoon Puppet Theatre in Yogyakarta. Here they seek to explain why they took up the theme of the 1965 violence in their work. For survivors of and witnesses to the 1965 violence, remembering and talking about it has been difficult because of fear. Some who lost their loved ones simply suffered in silence. Children who lost parents in the violence often struggled to survive and did not understand why their parents disappeared or were killed. Indonesians trapped in exile lost everything

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because they could not come back to their homeland. The generation of Indonesians who grew up after 1965 heard little about the violence because their parents often did not want to talk about it and because Suharto's New Order (1966–1998) government concealed the truth about the events of 1965.

The New Order regime continued to produce anti-Communist propaganda about those events. One of the most powerful expressions of this was the state endorsed propaganda film *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (The Treason of the September 30 Movement/PKI), which was shown at schools and screened on television during the annual commemoration of the elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party and the victory of the military regime on 1 October each year (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI). As Ariel Heryanto describes, the film reinforced “a ‘master-narrative’ in Indonesia’s official history and political discourse” (Heryanto, 2006, p. 8). According to New Order propaganda, the Indonesian Communist Party was responsible for the conflict and chaos and the military regime of President Suharto saved the country from them by restoring order and bringing prosperity. In the film *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*, the events of 1965 were reduced to black and white opposition and presented in a way that was to justify the ruling regime (Heryanto, 2006, pp. 11, 15).

After the fall of the New Order in 1998, the official version of history began to be the subject of discussion. Leftist artists who had been imprisoned or exiled began to reveal more about their experiences. They started not only to publish their memoirs or talk in public about their experience, but also to create autobiographical works of art. The traditional Javanese puppeteer (*dalang*) Ki Tristuti Rachmadi, a former member of the leftist Lekra (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat*, Institute for the People’s Culture), for example, was imprisoned between 1965 and 1979. From 1998 he began to vocalize his experiences of imprisonment (Rachmadi, 2005). The works of artists with similar experiences to Rachmadi led to new artistic discussions with young, independent artists who were born after 1965. Through this process, they learnt about the violence, which for many, as Barbara Hatley notes, was “a remote, myth-shrouded subject” (Hatley, 2010, p. 267). In response, young artists in the 2000s conveyed their views of history in films or performances with an emphasis on “reconstructing the history of past political violence and promoting reconciliation” (Hatley, 2010, p. 267).

In contrast to films covering the 1965 violence which screened in film festivals, on the Internet or on television, most theatre performances had very limited audiences and did not reach a wide range of spectators. Hatley provides examples of performances in which the artists tried “presenting alternative perspectives to standard, stereotypical interpretations of both Communist and anti-Communist activity” (2010, p. 275). She describes three performances created in the Yogyakarta region: the *ketoprak* show *Bang-bang Sumirat* (The Red Light of Dawn, 2005) and two student performances created by theatre groups from Gadjah Mada University (*Jaran Sungsang*, 2005; *Lenggok*, 2008). In her assessment:

All three plays confirm the association of the Left with traditional arts and popular performance. [...] The representations of the events of 1965 and recollections by members of the Left in recent Indonesian films and performances reveal a limited recovery of these events and their meanings. The message of the injustice suffered by the victims and their families, and the need to guard against a repetition of such inhumanity, are clearly conveyed [...]. (Hatley, 2010, pp. 283–284)

Hatley acknowledges the limitations of these works as representations of history. Yet alongside strong anti-Communist sentiment and limited government support for reconciliation, the artists hoped that their niche works would challenge stereotypes and encourage survivors to be able to talk about their experiences. In their view, remembering the past is necessary for the future of Indonesia. Nations who forget about their history cannot build strong futures. This was also the thinking that motivated the Papermoon Puppet Theatre to address the topic of the 1965 violence. In contrast, however, to the more localized performances described by Hatley, the Papermoon Puppet Theatre has enjoyed great acclaim, which has meant that it has performed not only in Indonesia, but in other countries across four continents. Their performances recall the past in order to educate a new generation, the generation to which the founders and artists of that theatre belong.

The Papermoon’s performances are based on transmitting personal stories of the violence that encourage audience empathy with different historical actors. Below, I discuss the background of the artists within the Papermoon Puppet Theatre and how they came to the topic of 1965. I analyze their unique artistic expression through a very particular

style of puppetry. This chapter examines two of the Papermoon's performances that focus on the themes of bystanders, orphans and suffering; and exile, loss and separation. I argue that this particular form of art offers an alternative means of addressing the societal trauma related to this history.

### THE FORMATION OF THE PAPERMOON PUPPET THEATRE

The Papermoon Puppet Theatre was established in 2006 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, by Maria "Ria" Tri Sulistyani and Iwan Effendi. Ria and Iwan intended to create a project which would attract more young people to global art. Ria, who was born in 1981 in Jakarta, was encouraged by her parents from an early age to be involved in various artistic activities, such as dancing, drawing, acting, singing, "playing with hand puppets, and creating performances using shadows when the electricity was off. Ria's family were the ones who gave her the greatest support in her love for the arts" (Triasuti, 2010). After she moved in 1999 to Yogyakarta to study, she joined the Teater Gardanalla (Gardanalla Theatre). Thanks to the work in the theatre group, she had the opportunity to participate actively in the creative process and artistic development. Self-development connected the work in the group with the local community. It raised her awareness of the problems of young people and taught her to respond creatively to the surrounding reality. The Gardanalla Theatre, in which artists from various background met, was for each of them an occasion for free artistic expression. The theatre was directed by Joned Suryatmoko, an inspirational director and scriptwriter whom she greatly admired. After a few years working with the Gardanalla Theatre, Ria decided to explore her own artistic pathway. Among other things, she wrote and illustrated children's books, which was a kind of introduction to her future work with children.

Iwan Effendi was born in 1979 in Sleman, Yogyakarta Special Administrative Region (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta). He studied in Bandung and then at the Indonesian Institute of the Arts (Institut Seni Indonesia) in Yogyakarta. He started his artistic career as a painter, initially using traditional techniques such as acrylic painting on canvas or paper, but later he began to experiment with other, unconventional media. He became particularly interested in exploring history in his work. He most commonly uses charcoal in his art. His "obsession with charcoal stemmed from his observations about how history is linked to certain traumas,

which are imprinted in the minds of young people in Indonesia today. [...] By burning [his wooden works], Iwan obtained a situation that is symbolic of historical phenomena that – (having been) deliberately omitted or forgotten – turn to ash/carbon” (Kurniawan, 2012). He therefore burns paintings and sculptures to charcoal as a reaction to history.

Ria and Iwan both view puppets as “another form of human being, which may be an extension of the human hand, or substitutes for people themselves” (Kurniawan, 2012). In Indonesia, puppets are primarily associated with the *wayang kulit* (shadow puppet) tradition, which has existed for over 1000 years. *Wayang kulit* puppets are cut from specially prepared water buffalo leather (*kulit*). Its roots go back to animistic times, as reflected in its name: the word *wayang* in Old Javanese means “ancestor” or “shadow”. The derivative, *hyang*, is used to describe deities and *eyang* denotes ancestors (Irvine, 2005, p. 129). The repertoire based on the Mahabharata and Ramayana comes from the time of Hindu domination and the influence of the Indian subcontinent in Java. When Islam was introduced on the island, *wayang* was used to popularize the new religion among Javanese. In the Dutch colonial era, *wayang* was depoliticized (Schechner, 1990, p. 27). At the time of revolution (1945–1949), *wayang* was used for propaganda purposes to fight for independence. Both in Guided Democracy (1959–1965) and during the New Order, the government and political parties used *wayang* as a propaganda tool and for legitimating authority. The more globally universal style of puppet theatre (*teater boneka*) using string, rod or hand puppets, aimed at younger audiences, became popular in Indonesia in the twentieth century. In the later part of the twentieth century, its repertoire was inspired by different sources such as popular children’s television series known for their educational content, like the Indonesian *Si Unyil* (which started in 1981 on TVRI, the Indonesian national television company) created by Suyadi (better known as Pak Raden, 1932–2015) or the American television program, *Sesame Street*, among others. With the increasing popularity of *teater boneka*, audiences started to differentiate puppet theatre from *wayang* theatre on the basis that it was suitable for young children only.

When they formed the Papermoon Puppet Theatre Ria and Iwan decided that since they wanted to aim for a young audience, they could attract the most spectators by using puppets because young people were most familiar with this sort of theatre. From the beginning, they tried to combine different puppetry techniques (e.g. creating puppets

from garbage or found objects (*objets trouvés*) or life-sized Muppet-style puppets) with the philosophy of *wayang*. Ria had previously studied *wayang* under the direction of *dalang* Ki Ledjar Subroto (1938–2017), the creator of *wayang kancil*—*wayang* with the mouse-deer as a leading hero. The first Papermoon Puppet Theatre productions addressed children from the local neighborhood, especially those who had suffered from the earthquake that struck Yogyakarta in 2006. For the first time, Ria and Iwan experienced how theatre and puppets could help people affected by trauma. The view that art can assist in recovery from traumatic experiences is widely supported in the field of art therapy, which focuses on healing through the creation of art or through increasing self-awareness through exposure to art of trauma.

After some time, the creators of the Papermoon Puppet Theatre decided to use puppets in performances for adult audiences. In making this decision, they were influenced by the performance, *Sommernachtstraum reorganisiert* (Midsummer Night's Dream Reorganized), an adaptation of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* performed by the German Figuren Theatre Wilde and Vogel, which they saw in November 2006 at the Jakarta International Puppetry Festival. For the first time, Ria and Iwan saw puppets, different than *wayang*, used in a performance for adults.

In 2008, the Papermoon Puppet Theatre performed *Noda Lelaki di Dada Mona* (A Stain on Mona's Chest). This production shocked the public and marked the beginning of a new phase for Papermoon. The creation introduced a new style of theatre the likes of which Indonesian audiences had never seen before. The story was performed with 18 puppets (life-sized puppets, as well as marionettes and *wayang* puppets), eight puppeteers and two actors. The artists tried to join the traditions of *wayang*, drama theatre and puppet theatre, creating a new innovative type of theatre. Ria commented that:

People were shocked with what they saw. Not just only about the theme, but also by the kind of puppets we performed with, how realistic they were, and how we combined puppets with the actors who spoke as individuals, which had never been seen by people in Yogyakarta. Together with our audience, we started to realize that puppet theater could reach many people, including adults. Instead of having one puppeteer verbalize all the voices, we decided each puppeteer will speak for his own puppet. (Sulistiyani, 2012)

From an artistic point of view “in Ria’s opinion, this performance was still a theatre performance using puppets, not a performance of puppet theatre” (Kelola Database, 2010). The puppets were not yet used to their maximum potential. In this performance, the subject of the 1965 events appeared for the first time—one of the characters in *Noda Lelaki di Dada Mona* was “an orphaned girl brought up by a retired soldier who made a mistake while opening fire at the time of the 30 September 1965 events” (Papermoon Puppet Theatre [from the official website of the theatre]), but the events of 1965 were only the background of the story told, not the main subject of the performance. Two years later, in 2010, the Papermoon Puppet Theatre took up the 1965 events more fully in their performance, *Mwathirika*. That performance focused on exploring themes of loss and suffering as a result of the 1965 repression.

#### EXPLORING THE THEMES OF BYSTANDERS, ORPHANS AND SUFFERING: THE *MWATHIRIKA* PERFORMANCE

The Papermoon Puppet Theatre interpreted the events of 1965 as crucial for comprehending the past, the present and the future of Indonesia. Their experience with *Noda Lelaki di Dada Mona* proved to them that *teater boneka* was an ideal medium for embarking upon difficult topics. Members of the audience arriving at a Papermoon Puppet Theatre spectacle, although expecting entertainment and fun that they associated with *teater boneka*, were shown performances that explored difficult, controversial or painful themes. This medium also allowed them, just as in the case of *wayang*, to convey through spectacles values, moral choices and the sort of conflicts people might encounter in their lives. In taking up the most difficult period of history in contemporary Indonesia, the 1965 violence, the Papermoon Puppet Theatre artists do not mention dates, numbers or statistics. Instead, they focus on the stories of individuals which might resonate with the experiences of audiences as people who were either bystanders to the violence in their communities or affected by it in their family or community circles. As members of the theatre say: “For us, those histories are important to be remembered, to talk about and to be learned. Especially in times when no one talks and nobody remembers, either because they feel the issues are no longer important and have expired, or because they don’t want to relive a fear that caused trauma” (*Mwathirika* DVD booklet, n.d.).



The title of this performance was *Mwathirika*, the Swahili word for *victim*. The performance focuses on the perspective of victims of the 1965 violence and other tragedies all over the world caused by political turmoil. That is why a Swahili word was used: to stress that the experience is not only Javanese or Indonesian. Members of the theatre wanted to adopt this perspective because they felt the voices of victims are often not heard or not accepted such that trauma becomes like a sting that is felt deep into the body and cannot be removed without further pain. In their performance, the puppeteers examine who the victims of 1965 were by asking rhetorical questions:

When a representative of the people tries to defend the interests of the nation, who are the victims? When the army attempts to fight off evil, who are the victims? And when we will only seek the safe path, who are the victims? Children, brothers, sisters, loved ones, parents, neighbours, friend, they, who are not guilty. (*Mwathirika* DVD booklet, n.d.)

This quotation refers to the issues of perpetrators and victims. The performance questions the black-and-white divisions and shows how the interpretation of the same deeds and the participants changes according to different views of the political reality. While collecting material for *Mwathirika* and writing the scenario, the authors talked with neighbors, acquaintances, the immediate family of victims and more distant relatives, inquiring about their recollections and stories connected with the 1965 events, which became their inspiration. In narrating these stories they gathered, the performers do not pass judgment, nor do they point to the guilty or indicate the winners. Instead, they describe the impact of historical events upon the life of individuals, families and an entire generation brought up in those years.

The hour-long silent spectacle describes one of the blackest pages in the history of modern Indonesia. The story is recounted in the style of a fairy tale. The protagonists are two families living next to each other and maintaining friendly relations. The first is composed of Baba (Swahili: Father), a one-handed father who loves his sons more than anything in the world; his ten-year-old Moyo (Swahili: Heart); and the four-year-old, constantly merry Tupu (Swahili: Empty) (Fig. 13.1). The second family includes Haki (Swahili: Right), who regards the security and peace of the whole household and predominantly his only daughter, Lacuna,



**Fig. 13.1** Mwathirika, Papermoon Puppet Theatre, photograph by author

confined to a wheelchair, as of prime importance. The adults work hard, the children frolic, and leisure time is dedicated to casual conversations and meetings. The fairy-tale ambience is interrupted by the appearance of masked and heavily armed soldiers in the background, separated by a thin, transparent net. They remain at odds with the bucolic atmosphere prevailing on stage to such an extent that they appear to be merely a bad dream, a phantom.

There comes a day, however, when Moyo and Tupu take their father's red whistle, carelessly blow it and play with a red balloon. At night, someone paints a red triangle on their window—a verdict. Soldiers appear in the village and seize Baba. Carrying out an order, they detain the boys' father, taking him—no one knows where to or for how long. The children remain alone and their neighbor, Haki, not only refuses to come to their assistance but, fearing the loss of his daughter, forbids her to play with them. In order to survive, the brothers catch frogs and on cold days huddle close together in an attempt to keep warm. Time

is measured by visits paid by an itinerant clown with a portable stall of colorful puppets and notches made by the imprisoned Baba, marking the days of his detention. At a certain moment, the whole stage seems to be filled with marks symbolizing the flow of days, months and years, as well as millions of others, waiting for their relatives to come back, as indefinite imprisonment without trial was the norm. Soldiers once again stand in the background, this time carrying out death sentences and creating people-puppets resembling them.

The last act once again poses a question concerning the identity of the victims. Lacuna discovers Tupu's characteristic cap and the red whistle. She lifts it and tries to summon her companion by delicately blowing it. The lights go out and when they come on again, we see only her empty wheelchair and the distraught father bending over it.

The puppets were designed by Iwan Effendi and were constructed in accordance with two traditional Japanese techniques—*bunraku* and *kuruma ningyo*—used in performances for adult audiences. In the *kuruma ningyo* technique, puppeteers move on small wooden boxes on wheels (*rokuro-kuruma*) while animating the puppets (*ningyo*). With their right hand, they set into motion the puppet's right hand, and with their left hand, the head and left hand of the puppet. The legs of the puppets are outfitted with special grips, which the puppeteer places between his/her toes. The close contact between puppeteer and the puppet not only increases the realistic aspect of motion, but also makes it possible to enhance the tempo. By depriving the puppet of verbal communication, motion becomes the most prominent and only way of transmitting contents and emotions. The Papermoon artists frequently stress that the selected techniques were intended predominantly to establish a close relationship between the actors, the puppets and the spectators.

The *Mwathirika* performance, which has run from 2010 until now, was one of the most discussed artistic events taking up the 1965 violence in Indonesia. It was shown in Yogyakarta and in Jakarta and afterwards also outside Indonesia in Singapore, the United States, Great Britain and Australia, among other places. It evoked the same emotions everywhere. As Ria said, there were people who survived the Holocaust, the terror of the Khmer Rouge regime and the Balkan conflict among the audience. They stayed after the performance to talk with her and the other members of the group about their experiences. "Mwathirika is presented [...] because we don't want this history of loss to repeat itself again. Not in

our country, Indonesia; not in another country; not in the whole wide world and the universe” (*Mwathirika* DVD booklet, n.d.). The artists hope that their performance will help people understand this history and will influence audiences wherever it is shown.

### EXPLORING THE THEMES OF EXILE, LOSS AND SEPARATION: *SETJANGKIR KOPI DARI PLAYA*

In a 2011 performance entitled *Setjangkir Kopi dari Playa* (A Cup of Coffee from Playa), the Papermoon Puppet Theatre took up some other themes related to the impact of the 1965 violence, this time focusing on exile, loss and separation. In this performance, the titular cup of coffee is the leitmotif of a story about a couple separated by the events of 1965. Ria discovered this story in her research for the previous production. Pak Widodo Soewardjo, the hero of the story, was born in 1940 in Mojoagung, Jombang, in East Java. At the end of the 1950s, he moved to Yogyakarta, where he began his studies in the Civil Engineering Faculty at Gadjah Mada University. At the same time, he met Widari Soewahjo, born in 1944, the daughter of the head of the Soda and Salt Company. Widari and Widodo fell in love and hoped to marry. In 1960, however, he was sent by the Indonesian government to study at the Metallurgic Institute in Moscow [on these students, see Hill (2010, pp. 26–30)]. On the eve of his departure, the young couple became engaged and Widodo promised his beloved that they would marry immediately upon his return. Sharing the fate of thousands of other young Indonesians trained in assorted countries of the Communist Bloc, he had been selected to create the future elite of his country. After 1965, however, all were deprived of Indonesian citizenship. Without a passport, an opportunity to come back home or contact their families, they had lost their homeland and stayed on in the USSR, Cuba or in other countries of study. Deprived of citizenship after studying in Russia, Widodo moved to Havana, Cuba.

Keeping the promise given to his fiancée, for more than 40 years Widodo tried to contact her. He never married and, in 2001 when he returned for the first time to Indonesia, he devoted his entire three-month stay to the search for his lost love. The lovers had last seen each other in August 1965, a month before the 30 September Movement, when they met in France, where Widari studied. They did not expect

then that it would be their last meeting, and upcoming events would separate them for so long. In 1966, Widodo, aware that he probably would never return to Indonesia, sent a letter to Widari, in which he wrote that he freed her from their “promise”, so that she could marry the man chosen by her parents. He did not want to ruin the lives of her and her three younger sisters, who according to tradition could not marry before their older sister. He never received an answer to that letter.

In September 2006, the story of the lovers separated by the 1965 events was published in Indonesian media (see [Detik.com](http://Detik.com)) and became the basis of the action “Solidaritas W&W” helping the couple to meet again. Widodo could not find his sweetheart during his short visit in 2001. He only had her old address and nobody was able to tell him the new one. He tried without luck to look for their mutual friends from the past. Widodo wanted to use the media to find Widari in order to tell her that he had not run away nor broken his promise, even after he freed his sweetheart from the promise. He also wanted to learn how her life had turned out and to make sure she was happy and healthy. And he wanted to ask a question that had plagued him for 40 years. Had she received his letter sent in 1966 and, if she had, why did she never send a reply?

Shortly after the publication of the article about the search of Widari, Widodo learned that his sweetheart had married and had children and grandchildren. She was healthy and happy. The story not only engaged Indonesian readers in the search—the history of the lovers was described by Andi Mallarangeng (the spokesperson of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) on the presidential website. The Widari family, though initially surprised by the search and surprised by the huge interest in her life, decided to contact Widodo and also asked readers and Internet users to respect her privacy.

Knowing the history of Widodo and Widari, their lives, separation and subsequent search, Ria wavered for a long time about whether to base a performance on this scenario, fearing the reaction of the protagonists and their families, whose story she wished to describe in the performance. While working on the presentation, she repeatedly contacted Widodo, whom she calls Pak Wi. He encouraged her to go ahead, stating: “The history of our country should be shown so that current and future generations can learn and draw wisdom from their own

history, that the tragedy of humanity in any form will never be repeated” (*Setjangkir Kopi dari Playa* DVD booklet, n.d.).

*Setjangkir Kopi dari Playa* is a spectacle played out in an antique shop. Each of the objects emerging in the performance has a story waiting to be discovered and told. The artists collected mementoes related to the lovers and stories connected to them. Collecting the old stories was like moving through time and space. On this basis, they decided audience members should also move not only metaphorically but also physically. So before the audience enters the antique shop, they are taken by shuttle bus to the venue and accompanied by a guide who slowly, through his narration, transfers them into the past. The objects in the antique shop then become the focus of narration. The titular cup of coffee, for example, leads to the story of the coffee brewed before Widodo’s departure and the cup which, years later, he uses to drink coffee in solitude. An old bicycle, which they rode together in the 1960s, a typewriter with which Widodo wrote letters and suitcases symbolizing a journey all lead to the narration of different scenes from their shared story.

The performance is narrated with two pairs of puppets, portraying the same protagonists—in 1960 and today. In addition, the puppets appear in two sizes. The larger puppets are accompanied by the smaller puppets in their memories, dreams or daydreams. The love story of Widodo and Widari presented in the play is illustrated by archive radio recordings, which underline the documentary character of the spectacle. As in the case of *Mwathirika*, the creators of the performance do not judge anyone, nor do they attribute blame, but through the prism of the history and the stories of just a few of the thousands of people who became victims in 1965, they show the lasting legacies of this history (Fig. 13.2).

In May 2015, Widodo visited Indonesia for the first time after regaining Indonesian citizenship and a passport and met his family and friends, whom he had not seen for so many years. He also met artists from the Papermoon Puppet Theatre. This was the performers’ first encounter with the hero of their performance. For performers and audience members, the history of Widodo and Widari became a symbol of the fate of families, lovers, friends or neighbors disconnected by the events of 1965, whose history is still unknown.



**Fig. 13.2** Setjangkir Kopi dari Playa, Papermoon Puppet Theatre, photograph by author

## CONCLUSION

Ria and Iwan began their work by creating theatre for children, in order to help young spectators to cope with trauma after the earthquake that struck Yogyakarta in 2006. It quickly became clear that puppets, other than *wayang* and those known from TV programs, were perfectly suited for examining difficult subjects, and to treat the trauma of young and old audience members. Their decision about making a series of performances that take up the subject of the greatest trauma in the history of independent Indonesia was connected with Iwan's interest in history and Ria's interest in vintage objects and the stories they bring. They also wanted people in Indonesia to remember and understand the past.

The Indonesian government does not run programs or discussions aimed at helping the victims of 1965. The voices of those affected including their families are often sidelined or muted in the public

discourse. The next generation of Indonesians, to which Iwan and Ria also belong, are born with trauma inherited from their parents or grandparents who were eyewitnesses to the 1965 events. Because they have no support from schools and the state in the process of understanding the past, the artists of the Papermoon Puppet Theatre decided to create their own way of communicating to their generation this intergenerational trauma, so viewers could understand the past, attempt to reconcile with it and approach the future more openly. Polish philosopher professor Robert Piłat describes the anthropological, not only psychological, characteristics of trauma. His understanding of trauma is similar to that adopted by the artists from the Papermoon Puppet Theatre. Piłat notes:

From the example of enormous harms, such as those related to the Holocaust, you can see how the trauma returns with a sense of injustice. Such is the nature of trauma. It lives its own life and you never know when it lets you know about itself. Articles are published now which indicate that the second generation of Holocaust victims inherit trauma. Trauma is not only the form of memory. It is self-determination, a feature more anthropological than mental. [...] We do not know how trauma gets stored and transferred. [...] it might be that we find one word, read one thing, have one memory and trauma comes back. In this sense, great harms tend not to retreat, or disappear. They become part of the human condition instead [...]. (Piłat, 2012 [trans. author])

The process of forgiveness, required to take the “sting” of trauma from the body, according to many researchers is often impossible. It is too difficult for many victims who do not receive adequate support. “In such drastic cases, when forgiveness is impossible, the choice of the path of reconciliation is needed, which is something other than forgiveness. This is not to deal with the past, but rather to look at what kind of future is possible. This is an act [...] [that allows us to] start all over again” (Piłat, 2012).

The performances of the Papermoon Puppet Theatre focus on the victims, not the oppressors. They ask questions about who they were and restore the memory of society as a whole and of those whom the official history wanted to wipe out from memory. They depict the lives of families and individuals who suffered. They try without words, using pictures, gestures, movement and music, to show the history of the loss of their loved ones, friends and relatives, and the loss of history.



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## Violent Histories and Embodied Memories: Affectivity of “The Act of Killing” and “The Look of Silence”

*Ana Dragojlovic*

### INTRODUCTION

In the context of a society where public memory of the violence is still difficult, it is critical to reflect on what enables communities and individuals to confront these histories. In some cases, it is only very recently through new openings in discussions of this past that families have dared to share their memories of persecution in 1965–1968. For diaspora communities, the sense of dislocation from this past may be even greater given the lack of ready reminders of what happened. This chapter analyses the detailed personal narrative of an *Indisch* (Indo-Dutch) descendant of survivors of the 1965–1966 killings living in the Netherlands. It examines how she began to confront her personal family history and their connections to 1965 only after watching *The Act of Killing* (2012) and *The Look of Silence* (2014), documentaries by Joshua Oppenheimer et al. *The Act of Killing* centres on the perpetrators of the 1965–1966 killings,

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while *The Look of Silence*, its sequel, follows how the main protagonist, Adi (born after the 1965–1966 events), confronts the killers of his brother, who was brutally murdered during these events.

The Indonesian killings of 1965–1966 brought about the largest massacre in Indonesia's history, constituting "the clearest case of genocide against a political group in the twentieth century" (McGregor, Melvin, & Pohlman, this volume). After the killings of an estimated 500,000 people, survivors associated with the political left continued to suffer through decades of stigmatization, marginalization and repression (Cribb, 2001; Kammen & McGregor, 2012). In light of this long repression following the fall of President Suharto and his New Order regime in 1998, scholars have stressed the importance of personal narratives in understanding the 1965 violence (e.g. Dwyer & Santikarma, 2007; Heryanto, 2006; McGregor & Hearman, 2007; Wieringa, 2002). Another group of people affected by the violence was Indonesians who became diasporic due to the genocide—either because they were overseas during the killings and, due to their association with the left, were unable to return to Indonesia, or because they managed to escape from Indonesia following the killings (Dragojlovic & Hill, 2010; Hearman, 2010). It is important to stress that while, during the New Order regime, memory of the killings was repressed in Indonesia, many Indonesians in the diaspora were deeply involved in documenting and preserving the history of the killings and of the Indonesian left (Dragojlovic, 2012; Hill, 1993). Yet, their work and activism during the Cold War remained, for the most part, known only to discrete groups of individuals and institutions (see Dragojlovic, 2012), remaining both omnipresent and elusive for the children of the survivors of violence.

This chapter seeks to examine how children of diasporic survivors of the violence have come to engage with memories of the violence through the increasing prominence of this case in global memory. This prominence has largely resulted from the success of Joshua Oppenheimer's film, *The Act of Killing* (2012), which features the self-incriminating testimony of former death squad leaders who participated in the killings in Medan, North Sumatra. This film has had a major impact in memory work around the Indonesian genocide, in both Indonesia and its diasporic communities. Oppenheimer's documentary has made it increasingly difficult for the Indonesian state to continue to deny that the killings were the result of state-sponsored violence (Kurniawan, 2013; McGregor et al., this volume). Using responses to the Oppenheimer

films as a starting point, this chapter examines the long-lasting effects of genocide on the children who grew up in the diaspora, examining, like McGregor (Chapter 12), how the history of the Indonesian genocide is connected to multiple communities of memory.

My focus in this chapter is on the capacity of visual media to produce an affective atmosphere capable of evoking embodied memories of intergenerational experiences of historical violence. The narratives I analyse were told to me over several years by a long-term interlocutor of mine, to whom I refer here as “Dina” in order to protect her anonymity. Dina’s narratives form part of a larger, ongoing project on Indisch (Indonesian–Dutch) memory and genealogy work that I began in 2009. My long-term ethnographic research has allowed me insights into how Indisch intergenerational “incorporated body memory” (Leys, 2013) grapples with memories of places left by ancestors in the colonial Dutch East Indies as a result of wars, imprisonment and torture (Dragojlovic, 2011, 2014, 2015a, 2015b). I approach memories not only as constructed, but as sediment in the bodies, wherein bodies are carriers of memory, which is often unconsciously incorporated (Connerton, 1989). In this chapter, my focus is on how “incorporated, body memory” (Leys, 2013) becomes animated during the watching of *The Act of Killing* and *The Look of Silence*, demonstrating how the affective atmosphere of visual media can evoke embodied memories of historical violence and thus become a point which necessitates a re-configuration of the self.

In order to productively analyze embodied memories of intergenerational experiences of violence, I resort to affect theory. Affect theory emerged in the wake of poststructuralism, arguing that language and discourse should not be given primacy over visceral, lived experiences of the body. Affect studies scholars distinguish affect from emotions and feelings and delineate it as an intensity that is pre-personal, pre-linguistic, non-intentional and non-conscious (Blackman & Venn, 2010; Massumi, 2002; Seigworth & Gregg, 2010; Thrift, 2008). This follows the lead of Lisa Blackman (2012) and Yael Navaro-Yashin (2012), who argue that, while it is important to engage with the lived experiences of the body and affective intensities in our analysis, it is equally important to pay attention to how such experiences are articulated by the subject. In analyzing the ethnographic material at hand, it is important to engage not only with gaps, silences and the subject’s struggle to articulate affective intensities, but also with the circumstances under which affectivity is articulated. To begin, I offer a brief overview of the history of Indisch

people in order to provide a background against which to analyze Dina's narrative. Understanding Indisch history sheds light on the ways in which the affective atmosphere produced by the two documentaries evokes embodied memories of violence within her. In this case study, I argue that Dina, the spectator—a descendant of the 1965–1966 events—is overwhelmed by the affective atmosphere of the violent past, which necessitates a re-establishment of her affective connection to the past events and its incorporation within the present.

Joshua Oppenheimer's *The Act of Killing* was filmed over several years in Medan, the capital of North Sumatra. The film presents a series of re-enactments of interrogations, torture and killings that took place in 1965–1966, as performed by the very people who took part in these events forty years before. Encouraged by the director, the protagonists boast about their past brutalities by re-staging the butchering of alleged "Communists", and narrate their dreams, fantasies and nightmares. In his critique of the film, historian Robert Cribb has argued, "The killings are presented as the work of civilian criminal psychopaths, not as a campaign of extermination, authorized and encouraged by the rising Suharto group within the Indonesian army and supported by broader social forces frightened by the possibility that the Indonesian communist party might come to power" (2014, p. 147).

*The Act of Killing* is the first documentary made in Indonesia that was nominated for an Academy Award. It was a co-winner of the Royal Anthropological Society's prize for ethnographic film and gained recognition at numerous documentary festivals. In addition, the documentary has received more than 500 reviews (Yngvesson, 2014) and has been widely debated across numerous academic fields. For example, in 2014, the journal *Critical Asian Studies* dedicated a special issue to the film, where 13 prominent scholars and activists engaged in a discussion focusing on "ethics" (van Klinken, 2014), "aesthetic sensibility" (Tiwon, 2014), "impunity of screen" (Herman, 2014) and "sexual politics" (Wieringa, 2014), to name a few. Scholars have acknowledged tangentially that *The Act of Killing* has affected viewers across the world (Heryanto, 2014; van Klinken, 2014; Hoskins & Lasmana, 2015) as well as in Indonesia (Wandita, 2014). *The Look of Silence* is a documentary made as a companion to *The Act of Killing* and focuses on the point of view of a victim's family and how 1965–1966 killings affect the present. The second documentary has not received much scholarly attention and has been characterized as "less of a milestone for documentary cinema, [but] ... just as compelling and necessary" (Rafter, 2015, p. 135). My focus here

is to ethnographically explore how historical violence is embodied and felt intergenerationally, and to examine how Oppenheimer's documentaries affect those who do not live in Indonesia but are genealogically linked to it. The ethnographic material I discuss in this chapter urges us to consider the multifaceted and multidirectional effects that these two films might have on people who are connected to the violent events of 1965 and their long-lasting effects.

### INDISCH PEOPLE: A BRIEF HISTORICAL INTERLUDE

The formation of Indisch cultures began in the colonial Dutch East Indies—present day Indonesia (Bosma & Raben, 2008). From the early seventeenth century onwards, European (mainly Dutch) men took Indonesian women as their companions, either as legitimate wives or as so-called *nyai* (housekeepers/bed partners), which resulted in a large Indo-European population. Over the centuries, this practice was normalized (Locher-Scholten, 1995; Taylor, 1983) and interracial intimacies were accepted as long as they followed prescribed gender, race and class patterns. Indisch people and communities in the Dutch East Indies occupied an ambivalent space; on the one hand, they were granted privileges reserved for Europeans but on the other, they were able to move between European and Indonesian worlds (Stoler, 2002).

During the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies (1942–1945), Indo-Europeans/“Eurasians” came to be classified as “Asians” rather than “Europeans” and while the majority of the European population was interned in prison camps, those of Eurasian origin were given the opportunity to stay outside of the prison camps if they succeeded in proving a desirable degree of Indonesian background. Approximately 100,000 Dutch and Eurasian individuals were interned, while approximately 220,000 Eurasians were able to stay outside of the Japanese prison camps (de Jong, 2002). Living conditions were especially harsh for women and children both in and outside of the prison camps. Many Eurasians suffered terrifying brutalities during the initial period of the Indonesian independence movement between 1945 and 1946, known as the “*bersiap*” period (Anderson, 1972; Dragojlovic, 2011, 2014, 2015a, 2015b). Following the formal recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949, those recognized as Dutch citizens were forced to leave the country. Many moved to the Netherlands, the United States or Australia (Bosma, Raben, & Willems, 2006).

### “THE VIOLENCE FROM THE PRISON CAME INTO OUR HOUSE”

I met Dina for the first time in 2009 when I commenced a research project on Indisch memory and genealogy work. Like a small minority of Indisch people, her parents remained in Indonesia after Indonesia was officially given independence in 1949, and Dina was born in 1967. Dina’s family moved to the Netherlands in 1968, which, in her initial life narrative, she attributed to her parents realising that “Indonesia [was] not a country in which they wanted to live after all.” When I first met Dina, she was heavily involved in Indisch cultural politics and Indisch trauma work in the Netherlands, and was particularly focused on children of Indisch people who had relocated from the independent Indonesia to the Netherlands. Over the years, Dina and I engaged in numerous open-ended conversations about her personal history, as well as the Indisch trauma work and cultural politics she was involved in. She invited me to various events in which she participated and when I was not in the Netherlands, we kept in regular email contact. During this time, Dina frequently talked about her parents’ imprisonment in Japanese internment camps during the Second World War and about the survival strategies they had developed during the *bersiap* period. As a social worker and a trained psychologist, Dina often reached for the language of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) to talk about her parents’ well-being, and used the term “secondary trauma” to talk about herself and other children born to survivors of the Japanese internment camps and the *bersiap* period. Over the first two years of our ongoing conversations, Dina never mentioned the killings of 1965–1966.

During my stay in the Netherlands in 2013, Dina’s established narrative about her personal and family history and how the events they lived through influenced Dina’s sense of self and her emotional well-being was interrupted. I met with her in late June of that year after being absent from the Netherlands for some ten months. Such absence generated many topics in which we were eagerly engaging over a lunch in a small café in a town where Dina lives. At the beginning of our conversation, Dina inquired about my publications, and I shared the news that one of my articles about Indonesian political exiles from 1965 (Dragojlovic, 2012) had recently been published. Somewhat surprised that I was writing on this topic and very curious, Dina began to ask many questions about the publication and I gladly shared the particularities of my work with her. After a prolonged conversation on the topic, Dina began to cry

and soon afterwards she was sobbing uncontrollably. Although I tried to comfort her, it was in vain and as Dina stated she “just needed to cry.” We left the café and moved to a nearby park and remained there until Dina felt better. Concerned, I queried whether Dina should talk to one of several counsellors we both knew well, but Dina reassured me that she did not, and I walked with her to her house.

The intensity of Dina’s reaction left me somewhat puzzled. Over the years, we had talked many times about the violent historical events in Indonesia’s history, and while such conversations had on occasion become tearful, they never brought about such a distressed response. Moreover, the content of my article was not something I thought would inspire tears—while it was about former Indonesian political exiles, it was about the various forms of archivization in which they were engaging in overseas, rather than any specificities of the killings and torture that occurred in the 1965–1966 events and their aftermath. While my article was certainly a form of memory work through which former exiles were engaging with the memories of the 1965–1966, these memories were of events that I had not known that Dina had any personal connection with.

After the intensity of Dina’s reaction, I did not ask her directly what it was that had brought it about. However, I inquired with her via email about how she was feeling, and Dina confessed that she had been feeling exceptionally tired and exhausted of late and had been planning to take some time off work. She excused herself for her reaction at our previous conversation and relegated it to her recent state of “emotional fragility”, concluding that “there are still things from the past I need to work on.” Over the next several months, Dina and I met over coffee every couple of weeks. During that time, she took a year off from her job, completely withdrew from Indisch trauma work and was only attending some Indisch cultural events. In the meantime she was diagnosed with a burnout and was undergoing an intensive psychological therapy. For weeks, our conversations avoided “difficult topics” until one day, while on the way to Dina’s house, we passed a poster about the screening of *The Act of Killing* at the local cinema, and Dini decided to engage in the topic. She asked my opinion about the documentary and uttered in a low, somewhat frightened voice, “my parents were victims... I haven’t told you before; I saw the film some weeks before I cried that day in the café but I could not talk about it... this film forced me to look at that past again, I had no choice but to face my ‘absent’ grief.”



Joshua Oppenheimer's *The Act of Killing* was not only screened at public cinemas throughout the Netherlands, but also at many events organized by Indisch communities across the country. In the Netherlands (as in many other parts of the world), the documentary and its content brought about many public debates, making it almost impossible for an Indisch person heavily involved in the Indisch community to avoid them. While debates among various Indisch communities and individuals about the documentary's style and the 1965–1966 killings were various, for Dina they brought about embodied memories of her own family's relationship to the events. Dina:

When the film [*The Act of Killing*] came out I did not want to watch it but it was everywhere, you could not escape it. You cannot escape such past [as reference to herself]. At the end, I went and saw it... [long pause]... the atmosphere, the atmosphere grabbed me, I felt like I was about to suffocate, I couldn't breathe [she begins to tremble, takes a large cushion from the couch next to her and hugs it as if to protect herself from the atmosphere she was talking about and continues]. I grabbed Martin's [her husband's] hand. He tried to calm me by stroking my hand, offering me water, reminding me to take deep breaths, suggesting we leave... but I could not move. It was like I was paralysed. I was struggling to breathe. As the film progressed and, you know, the perpetrators were speaking, I started to shake with fear... such a fear... and one of them, one of the men... I am so ashamed to say this, but... but... he was... he was like my father. I remember my father as a very cruel man... [long pause]... Was my father like that before he lived in the Japanese internment camp, before he was imprisoned and tortured in 1965? I learned that both he and my mother were imprisoned in 1965 only in 2005 when my father passed away. I began to look for information but there was not much out there. I did not know many things about my parents' lives in Indonesia, but now I know that the violence from the prison came into our house... I grew up with the violence from the prison!

When the film ended I could not move. Martin tried to help me but I was paralysed, energy gone from my body. We waited for everybody to leave and then he carried me home. I started therapy afterwards, felt better, tried to live and work as normal, but couldn't. And then you know I took time off work and ever since I've been trying to recover... It is so hard to get out of that frightful atmosphere from the film... I'm so low in energy, it is hard to sleep.

Throughout my stay in the Netherlands, Dina continued to occasionally talk about her feelings and about the progression of her therapy to me, and often referred to our conversations as “reflective sessions outside of therapy.” When I returned to the Netherlands in December 2014, Dina was back at work and reported that her therapy sessions had decreased to one session per month and were likely to completely cease in a couple of months’ time. There was, however, something else that she was more interested in talking about; another significant event that featured in her narrative as having affected her in the meantime.

### “THE CHILDREN OF 1965”

“Have you seen it, the film?” asked Dina, with exuberant anticipation. When faced with my puzzlement about what “the film” might stand for she clarified, “*The Look of Silence*, a new documentary by Joshua Oppenheimer – it is about us, the children of 1965!” When I said that I had not seen the film as yet, Dina seemed particularly pleased to be in a position to offer close insights. I quote her here in some length in order to illustrate how the affectivity of visual media is experienced, articulated and qualified:

Oppenheimer did the right thing by making *The Look of Silence*. You can’t talk about the killings without talking about how it affected us, the children. There was so much shame, growing up in family like mine – violent, dysfunctional but trying to “keep face”, as if everything was normal.

I am like Adi [the film’s protagonist]. I watched *The Act of Killing* in pain and disbelief... but Adi is a lucky one... his mother told him how she felt when her son was killed in the 1965. If only my parents had talked to me like that; if only they were able to reflect on their own experience, their grief.

The scene that really got me is when Adi’s mother is telling him that he is her blessing. I wish my mother felt like I was her blessing. Like Adi, I was born right after the tragedy took place, but my parents did not have a loving relationship.... It was more like they hated each other... I could just imagine how they were after just getting out of prison... Like Adi’s parents, my parents lost a child to the killings. My mother was pregnant when they took her to the prison. To this day I do not know where my older siblings were, who was looking after them during that time. My mother lost

the baby in prison and then after that, after the tortures, when they were released from the prison, I was born. I am a child of pain. Adi's mother said his birth had saved her, kept her sane... who knows. If I wasn't born, life could have been even more difficult for my parents.

I cried so many tears for Adi's children. When his son's teacher speaks today about how communists were bad and needed to be killed, it makes me shiver in pain and fear. Like me when I was a child, you do not understand but you are scared and there is no place to go, no place to hide. This horrible pain and fear is just dropped on your shoulders. If I had a child, I'd tell them about cruelties and violence that took place 50 years ago. You have to. No one needs such an inheritance. *When does it end, this pain?* [emphasis in speech].

When Adi asks his mother how she feels living surrounded by her son's killers who were never prosecuted, I felt the terror of fear and restlessness rising in my body, I started to shiver. Watching it, it all becomes so clear to me – I grew up with that fear; *I was surrounded by my parent's torturers all my life even though they were far away* [emphasis in speech].

Adi is us, the children of 1965. He spoke to the perpetrators for all of us who could not speak. Like Adi, I feel the perpetrators talked about killings the way they did because they feel sorry for what they did... maybe they feel guilty. When one of the killers said, "All is safe now, the past is past", somehow I felt like he knew this was not true. You can see it in the way children of the perpetrators deny the past in the film. *The past lives in us*, the children of the victims and of the perpetrators [emphasis in speech].

I was re-traumatized by watching *The Act of Killing*; it was like a shock-therapy that I was not searching for – not consciously, anyway – but it found me. Being re-traumatized helped me face my repressed grief. What Oppenheimer showed us in this documentary is brutal, but it helped me look into my own silence. *The Look of Silence* is a kind of closure I needed. In one of the interviews, Oppenheimer said that he wanted to show with this film what it does to the survivors to have to be forced to continue to live in fear and silence, unable to grieve for the loss. He wanted to show what this does to families, but also to humanity. These films are about Indonesia, but such atrocities happened elsewhere as well. Oppenheimer is Jewish; he understands how deep the pain of your ancestors can go.

For Dina, *The Look of Silence* connects her affectively to "the children of 1965"—an imagined community to which she had no access prior to seeing the film. Her parents' involvement in 1965–1966 in Indonesia

was covered in a veil of secrecy until some eight years prior to her seeing the films. Even though she was deeply involved in Indisch trauma work, Dina had never met anyone who admitted being personally involved in or having family members who experienced the events of 1965–1966 in Indonesia. This did not, however, stop her from pondering who, out of the many people who came to the Netherlands from Indonesia in the late 1960s, had similar experiences but, like her and her family members, was never able to talk about them until seeing the Oppenheimer’s documentaries. In this case, the films serve as therapeutic sequence, as discussed in the next section.

### VISUAL MEDIA, AFFECTIVE ATMOSPHERE AND EMBODIED MEMORIES

In scholarly literature, atmosphere has been conceptualized as transpersonal intensity (Stewart, 2007), mimetic waves of sentiment (Thrift, 2008), tone in literature (Ngai, 2005) and, rather broadly, a sense of place (Rodaway, 2011). Theresa Brennan (2004) makes an “inquiry into how one feels... the ‘atmosphere’,” arguing that such inquiry needs:

to take accounts of physiology as well as the social, psychological factors that generate the atmosphere in the first place. The transmission of affect, whether it is grief, anxiety, or anger, is social or psychological in origin. But the transmission is also responsible for bodily changes; some are brief changes, as in whiff of the room’s atmosphere, some longer lasting. In other words, the transmission of affect, if only for an instant, alters the biochemical and neurology of the subject. The “atmosphere” or the environment literally gets into the individual. (Brennan, 2004, p. 1)

Several other scholars approach affective atmospheres in a similar way, as experiences that occur across human and non-human bodies, beyond the subject–object distinction and before and alongside subjective formations (Anderson, 2009; Anderson & Wylie, 2009; Seigworth, 2003).

Insights made by Brenna (2004) and others are crucially important for the discussion of the ethnographic material presented in this chapter. The atmosphere Dina experiences while watching *The Act of Killing* and *The Look of Silence* is an experience that occurs beyond a subject–object distinction. Here, the argument made by affect scholars (e.g. Ahmed, 2004) for the cessation of Descartes’ split between the mind and the

body is crucially important. In Dina's case, the documentaries and especially *The Act of Killing* generated an affective experience in the body—difficulty breathing and an inability to make physical movement—before the spectator is able to articulate her feelings or take complete, conscious control over her body. Here, affect is clearly autonomous and immaterial (Blackman & Venn, 2010). Paying attention to extralinguistic and embodied aspects of experience as argued by “affect turn” scholars is crucial for our understanding of how the documentaries about historical violence might affect certain spectators. Equally important here is turning to the subject's own articulation of such experience. Doing so, we can see that affectivity of visual media can be produced in relation to the spectator's specific family history of multiple violence and forced geographic mobility. Moreover, from the subjective articulation, we can see that the affective atmosphere generated while watching *The Act of Killing* resonated long after the act of watching it. For the spectator in this case, watching the film becomes a significant event that not only effects immediate changes in the body, but also necessitates ongoing therapeutic intervention, taking the subject from a state of “being fine” to being diagnosed with “burnout”.

The significance of watching the documentary is apparent in Dina's qualification of it as a state of being “re-traumatized”. Paying attention to her subjective articulation, we can also see that she employs therapeutic discourse to qualify the affective experience. Ascribing importance to the event of being “re-traumatized”, Dina is echoing a particular therapeutic approach to dealing with long-term effects of multiple forms of historical violence. *The Look of Silence*, which is concerned with seeking justice for historical atrocities, in many ways rests on therapeutic discourse which necessitates that particularities of the past need both articulation and public revelation for the healing process to occur. Nicolas Rose (1990) refers to this as a rise of “psy discourse”, arguing that the therapeutic culture has spread far beyond the medical therapeutic realms to become present in the sphere of everyday life. In a similar vein, Eva Illouz (2008) argues that “therapeutic persuasion” has been institutionalized in many aspects of social life; from mass media and educational systems to corporations. An important component of therapeutic persuasion has been an emphasis on the confessional, public revelation of dark secrets most prominently present in talk shows. Dina employs this therapeutic understanding of the self and a need for the revelation of the dark secrets to qualify her affective experience of watching the two

documentaries. For her, watching these two documentaries is a form of therapy itself; an affective remedy serving a re-establishment with the past and a re-configuration of the present. Her engagement here is conscious and intentional—part of her long-standing trauma work with the children of *Indisch* survivors of Japanese internment camps—but also unconscious and non-intentional—the way she was affectively drawn while watching *The Act of Killing*.

For Dina, Oppenheimer's Jewish ancestry is not a coincidence but rather a clear ratification that those whose biological ancestors (or ethnic group) have suffered terrifying brutalities are specifically attuned to how such events might affect subsequent generations. While such a claim might seem over simplistic or even naive, it rests on what has been referred to as multidirectional memory of the Holocaust (Rothberg, 2009). The multidirectional memory approach argues that the Holocaust has enabled the articulation of other historical atrocities. Thus, based on her interpretative understanding of the documentaries, Oppenheimer's interviews, her knowledge of the Holocaust and the director's ethnicity, Dina presumes Oppenheimer's motivation for making these two documentaries, and situates them both as a desire to understand how historical violence might be felt intergenerationally, as well as a concern for universal humanity. In this line of thinking, affectivity of historical violence operates multi-directionally with a capacity to produce both intentional and non-intentional affects for visual media producers and consumers.

The affectivity of *The Act of Killing* and *The Look of Silence* for Dina, an *Indisch* descendant of survivors of the 1965–1966 events, operates in a continuum of affective and cognitive, intentional and non-intentional. Neglecting to incorporate into our analysis how such affectivity is articulated and given meaning and how it features in the reconfiguration of the subject might be misleading, counter-productive and limiting if we try to see it through the binary oppositions of cognitive and affective, intentional and non-intentional. This is because affectivity of visual media is multifaceted, and the affective atmosphere that it might produce is not only dependent on the media itself, but also produced in relation to the spectator, where the spectator's specific positionality is of crucial importance. This is the reason I argue that, in the context of watching these two documentaries, the affective atmosphere generated needs to be understood within particular historical contingencies.

Dina's narrative poignantly demonstrates how both the affective forces of, and the lingering presence of, the trauma of the Indonesian genocide present intergenerationally in both Indonesia (McGregor, 2013) and its diasporas. We can see that both survivors and their descendants, whether in or outside of the documentary, are haunted by the ghostly presence of killings, torture, marginalization and exclusion. As we have seen in Dina's narrative, through the intensity of affective encounters with Oppenheimer's documentaries, the ghostly presence becomes animated, making it impossible for the viewer to remain silent about the everlasting presence of violence. It is instructive here to be reminded of the theory of transgenerational haunting, developed by psychoanalysts Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok on the basis of their research in the 1960s with the adult children of Holocaust survivors and others with collective traumatic histories. Abraham and Torok cogently argue that haunting effects are often not produced by the original trauma, but by the fact that it has been kept secret and/or as a fabrication and disregard for the past. Ignorance of family secrets and falsification and disregard for the past, they contend, are fertile grounds for the production of hauntings across generations (1994: 169). Abraham and Torok conceptualize the unconscious as a "crypt", a space from where ancestral secrets are passed down to descendants. Jacques Derrida has argued that "the inhabitant of the crypt is always a living-dead, a dead entity we are perfectly willing to keep alive, but as dead, one we are willing to keep, as long as we keep it, within us, intact in any way save as living" (1986: 78). As is convincingly argued by Grace Cho (2008) in the context of Korea, the intergenerational transmission of traumatic memory, both in its personal and collective forms, invites us to ponder not only about the effects of Oppenheimer's documentaries on individuals in Indonesia and its diasporas, but also about how they have affected national history and memory and led to the rethinking of the killings, which can no longer be seen as isolated events disassociated from the role of the military, but as state-sponsored violence that brought about the largest genocide in Indonesian history.

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## Zombie Anti-Communism? Democratization and the Demons of Suharto-Era Politics in Contemporary Indonesia

*Stephen Miller*

More than five decades after the destruction of the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party) in the genocide of 1965–1966, and more than a quarter of a century since the end of the Cold War, anti-Communism continues to be a feature of Indonesian politics. Is this a case of “zombie” politics—a phenomenon that is no longer a living part of public life, but nevertheless persists as a hangover from earlier times?

Anti-Communism has been part of Indonesian politics since the PKI was founded in 1920. The violent destruction of the party in the mid-1960s, however, transformed anti-Communism into an integral feature of the ideology of the new military-dominated regime. Suharto’s resignation in 1998 ushered in an era of liberalization, known as *Reformasi*, which has, on the whole, created a more open atmosphere of public discussion. Nevertheless, neither has the process of liberalization

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been smooth, nor has it seen the disappearance of the type of political ideologies and practices that characterized the New Order period, including those of anti-Communism. The period since the emergence of former general Prabowo Subianto as a candidate in the 2014 presidential election has seen an upsurge in political actions that seek to close down a variety of different forms of public discussion and attack organizations that have been associated with the *Reformasi* process. Those engaging in these actions have used anti-Communism as both a justification for such actions and as core ideology.

This essay focuses on anti-Communism in the *Reformasi* era. It begins by looking at the place of anti-Communism in the broad sweep of twentieth-century history, focusing especially on the New Order period (1965–1998). Although anti-Communism had existed for decades before this time, this period was especially formative for contemporary anti-Communism, as it was in this period that key elements of anti-Communism were instilled in popular consciousness. *Reformasi* activists and artists in particular have sought to challenge the anti-Communist narrative of the Suharto era using a variety of imagery and platforms, including modern social media (which have high rates of uptake and usage in Indonesia, especially from smartphones) (Kirkpatrick, 2011, p. 275; Lukman, 2015). These are important yet under-recognized forms of resistance to long established anti-Communist politics.

At the same time, military-backed groups such as the FAKI (*Front Anti-Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Anti-Communist Front) and the FPI (*Front Pembela Islam*, Islamic Defenders' Front) have continued to promote anti-Communism as a rebuke to efforts to further liberalize society including advocacy for human rights cases. I chart these patterns and analyse how FAKI, FPI and other anti-Communist groups used anti-Communist discourse in the 2014 presidential election campaign and how anti-Communist discourse persisted in public debate throughout the period surrounding the 50th anniversary of the 30 September Movement in 2015 up until the point of writing (early 2016). I argue that anti-Communism has remained robust for so long because it is an entrenched tool of repression of liberal/progressive ideologies and political practice. In recent years, it has taken on an increasingly fascist character, marked notably by the use of mass-based, street-level politics to confront and intimidate the Left.

There are complex debates about what fascism is and how the term should be applied. Historically, the regimes of Mussolini and Hitler are

held up as two of the earliest examples of potent forms of fascism. Roger Griffin, a leading scholar in this field, defines fascism as “a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism” (1993, p. 26). His emphasis on the trend towards remaking society through populist and ultranationalist mechanisms characterizes not only the two classic cases of fascism in Italy and Germany but also many of the diverse post-war manifestations of fascism, which are generally referred to as neo-fascism. Fascism and neo-fascism can also be categorized under the broader spectrum of extreme right ideology. The Indonesian political scientist Daniel Dhakidae described the New Order regime as neo-fascist on the basis of “the combined rule of Indonesian military and the government’s political vehicle of Golkar, both of which fully supported and at the same time controlled the bureaucracy and capital, thereby increasing their capacity to produce and reproduce neo-fascist military political discourse” (Dhakidae, 2003, p. 288). This discourse emphasized the values of “calmness, harmony, the middle way and avoiding conflict”, alongside the continuing use of violence to repress any groups that opposed the regime and its political base (p. 288). The New Order’s “neo-fascist” discourse focused on the idea of political enemies, amongst whom so-called “communists” were designated the most threatening. This discourse was used by the military to justify the genocide and the violent and continuing persecution of such persons. In recent years, as I will argue, we have witnessed signs of the continuation of these tactics and beliefs expressed again in the form of anti-Communism pursued by neo-fascist groups with links to the police and army. These groups, which are increasingly gaining a mass following, have targeted both expressions of liberal democracy and claims for redress from those previously persecuted by the military.

### ANTI-COMMUNISM IN INDONESIAN HISTORY

Ariel Heryanto prophetically wrote in his 1999 essay “Where Communism Never Dies” that:

This discursive regime [of anti-communism] predates the 1965 violence, or the birth of the republic itself. By no means is it essentially local or unique to Indonesia or the New Order regime. It may continue to constitute a dominant discourse in Indonesia long after the New Order relinquish power.... (Heryanto, 1999, p. 167)

Anti-Communism has been a significant part of Indonesian politics for around a century. Ruth McVey's account of the early years of the PKI, for example, demonstrates colonial anxiety over the rise of left-wing radicalism in Indies communities, as well as counter-measures aimed at marginalizing such threats to colonial *rust en orde* (peace and order) (McVey, 1965). However, this aspect of the archipelago's colonial history remains one that has not yet become the subject of extensive investigation. A handful of scholars have focused specifically on the anti-Communism of the period of the early Cold War. Madinier (2009), McGregor (2009b), Samsuri (2004) all explore anti-Communism in the period between the declaration of independence and the fall of the Sukarno regime in 1965–1966. As we will see below, some writers have also taken up the subject of anti-Communism in New Order and post New Order contexts. This chapter seeks to add to this body of work by focussing on two key organizations that have not been the focus of substantial research, the FAKI and the FPI, both of which have played key roles in the anti-Communist upsurge that started in 2014. It also seeks to provide new perspectives by focussing on social media and popular culture, especially internet memes.

The anti-Communism of this century is most heavily influenced by that of the Suharto period, to the point of sometimes appearing to be simply a hangover from that era of Cold War authoritarianism. Goodfellow (1995), Heryanto (1999, 2006), and McGregor (2007) all investigate New Order anti-Communism and identify a variety of core features of this central aspect of the regime's state ideology and its impact on Indonesian society. In the first place, the anti-Communist account of the events of late 1965 and early 1966 constituted the genesis story of the regime, and therefore provided justification for its existence and a number of its key political actions, most notoriously the incredible slaughter of the mid-1960s, which is the point of departure for the studies in this volume. As the regime aged, anti-Communism came to be increasingly used to justify the repression that allowed the regime to survive and stave off democratization.

In state ideology throughout the period, Communists were characterized as: national traitors who stabbed the republic in the back at key times; violent and inhumane; immoral; persons who sought to create chaos and disturb the harmony of established institutions; atheists intent on destroying religion; and people who opposed the state ideology of *Pancasila* (hence the day of the coup was celebrated as “Sacred *Pancasila* Day”). From the establishment of the regime until its demise,

Communist revival was presented as a real possibility and danger. As the regime aged, it came to increasingly talk of the “latent danger of Communism” and to focus on “Communist methods” (for example, grass-roots organizing of workers or poor farmers, or the politicization of art) as a means of identifying emergent forms of this danger, and as a way of justifying the suppression of such opposition. All this occurred as pressures built up within the ruling elite for different forms of political reform (see Aspinall, 2005, pp. 5–6, 47–85, 112–113, 130–131, 191–196; McGregor, 2007, pp. 176–178, 193–210); The longer the New Order ruled, the deeper its roots reached into popular culture, even as the regime was increasingly discredited and disliked. Symbols and tropes of anti-Communism’s presentation of the PKI (especially the hammer and sickle as symbols, and Indonesian Communism’s supposed anti-religious/atheist bent) became more embedded in popular consciousness. This element of anti-Communism under the New Order was explored by Heryanto (1999, 2006) and has proved resilient.

#### LIBERALIZATION AND CHALLENGES TO ANTI-COMMUNISM POST 1998

*Reformasi* from 1998 led to more open public discussion of a whole range of topics of social and political importance. For example, the early reform period was marked in literature by an explosion of work by women that often openly portrayed and explored sexuality (Aveling, 2007; Hatley, 2008).

This opening up also extended to challenges to the dominant New Order narrative of the history and nature of Indonesian Communism. The first ten years or so following Suharto’s resignation were marked by a flurry of publications that had been either banned or could not have been published under the New Order regime. This included translations of pre-1998 academic work in English concerning the 30th September Movement (*Gerakan 30 September*, G30S) and the killings (e.g. Cribb, 2003; van Langenberg, Anderson, & Dale-Scott, 1999, amongst many others), alongside contemporary work (for instance, Roosa, 2008). This was complemented by a plethora of publications in Indonesian dealing with the events of the mid to late 1960s, including victims’ testimonies and biographies.<sup>1</sup> Some works attacked New Order historiography head on (e.g. Soedjono, 2006; Yuliantri & Dahlan, 2008). Other works, while not directly challenging norms of New Order ideology, nonetheless

moved away from both a teleological focus on the events of 1965, as well as the homogenized and nationalized representation of pre-1965 Indonesia that was predominant during the New Order period.<sup>2</sup> In addition, a number of classic Marxist and other radical works were published in Indonesian for the first time or the first time since 1965, as were several works by PKI leaders.<sup>3</sup>

This opening up was not limited to the publishing world of fiction and non-fiction; it also occurred in cyberspace. New websites in Indonesian appeared, for example, which propagated a range of views about the history of the PKI, both defending and criticizing New Order anti-Communist ideology. Social media discussions about this history, too, have been vibrant.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, many Indonesians have sought to de-stigmatize the PKI and Communism more broadly by injecting humor into their commentaries.

This process has included the creation of numerous internet memes, as well as the creation of pop culture artefacts. For example, in 2013 a group of Yogyakarta-based artists created a logo using the letters “PKI” with smaller letters expanding these initials to “*Pekerja Keras Indonesia*” (“Hard-working Indonesians”), with the slogan “Make Art, not War” under the logo (see Fig. 15.1). This meme has been reproduced in many places online, as well as being spread through social media like Facebook and Twitter, and being used for artefacts like t-shirts, notebooks, bags, mugs, etc.<sup>5</sup> In the New Order period, such logos could have led to police investigation, as was famously the case with a key ring that appeared with a hammer on one side and an axe on the other in 1993. Even hammer-shaped balloons were the subject of some official hysteria in the early 1990s.<sup>6</sup>

Another recent meme parodied the popular Dangdut group, the “Manis Manja Group” (the “Cute and Spoilt” Group) with the meme the “Marxist Manja Group” (“The Spoilt Marxist Group”, see Fig. 15.2), which appeared on the Facebook site “Dewan Kesenian Jakarta” (“The Loneliness Council of Jakarta”, a play on “Dewan Kesenian Jakarta”, “The Jakarta Arts Council”), which was created by the left-wing intellectual and cultural editor of the popular *Indoproggress* website ([indoproggress.com](http://indoproggress.com)), Windu Jusuf.<sup>7</sup> On this site he replaced lyrics from popular songs (both Dangdut and Western-style pop) into humorous Marxist or otherwise left-wing verses. For instance, he morphed the lyrics of Caca Handika’s Dangdut classic “Angka Satu” (“The Number One”) in the following way:





Fig. 15.1 Pekerja Keras Indonesia (“Hard Working Indonesians”) ([www.facebook.com/Pekerja-Keras-Indonesia-202262046604402/](http://www.facebook.com/Pekerja-Keras-Indonesia-202262046604402/))



Fig. 15.2 The “Marxist Manja Group” (the “Spoilt Marxist Group”) (<https://www.facebook.com/dewankesepianjakarta/>)

*Masak... Masak sendiri,  
Makan... Makan sendiri,  
Cuci baju sendiri,  
Tidurku sendiri  
Cook... I cook alone,  
Eat... I eat alone,  
I wash my clothes alone,  
I sleep alone*

*Tulis... Tulis sendiri,  
Baca... Baca sendiri,  
Kritik-kritik sendiri,  
Marxis pun sendiri  
Write... I write alone,  
Read... I read alone,  
I critique alone,  
I am a Marxist alone*

While playing mischievously on the jilted lover/lonely single theme, this site also consistently publicizes key progressive themes and *causes célèbres*. It has promoted campaigns for labour rights and human rights, for example, by advocating the resolution of the case of the murdered human rights activist Munir and the “refuse to forget” campaign led by the KKPK (Coalition for Truth and Justice), which focuses on many cases of unresolved past human rights abuses, including the 1965 case (Fig. 15.3).

In the first years following Suharto’s resignation, it seemed possible that real reform might be realized. In early 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) proposed that the law banning “Marxism-Leninism” be rescinded. Later in the same year, he gave a public apology to the victims of the violence of 1965–1967. He did not do this, however, as an official apology as the President of the Republic, but rather in his personal capacity as a former chairman of the world’s largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which was heavily implicated in the massacres (Fealy & McGregor, 2010; McGregor, 2009a).

These initiatives inspired some grass roots NU members, especially in the organization’s youth wing, Ansor, to investigate the organization’s role in the killings, and to seek reconciliation with victims of the violence. Although this activity only rarely directly confronted the New Order regime’s basic anti-Communist narrative (focusing as it did on targets of the violence as victims, rather than on a critical reassessment




Fig. 15.3 “Caca Handika - Penyanyi Dangdut Militan” (Caca Handika—The Militant Dangdut Singer) (<https://www.facebook.com/dewankesepianjakarta/>)

of the latter's political activity prior to the killings), it created a significant backlash within the organization, spearheaded amongst others by Wahid's uncle, the late Yusuf Hasyim.

### ANTI-COMMUNIST REACTION

Suharto's resignation in 1998 and the subsequent liberalization still left many of the institutions, individuals and practices of the New Order period intact. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the opening up of discussion of Communism's place in Indonesian history would not be left unchallenged by forces close to the old regime.

Almost as soon as Suharto resigned, anti-Communist groups formed and began publishing works. On the whole, these books and pamphlets simply repeated tropes of Suharto era anti-Communism, and this has generally continued to be the case throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century and beyond. In the last 10 years, however, some writers and anti-Communist figures have begun to move towards more of an emphasis on the "failure" of the PKI in the 1960s and learning lessons that might be felt to be relevant to defeating the post-1998 Left.<sup>8</sup>

Reliable data on levels of anti-Communist activity is difficult to find, but it seems that such activity increased during the second term of the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ("SBY").<sup>9</sup> Yudhoyono was not only the first *Reformasi*-era president to serve a full presidential term (five years); he was also re-elected and served a second term, holding the role of president for a full decade (2004–2014). As a former army general, he was well connected to key New Order-era power brokers, but was also seen as a "clean skin", as having no human rights abuses on his record,<sup>10</sup> and had already served in ministerial posts under presidents Abdurrahman Wahid ("Gus Dur") and Megawati Sukarnoputri through the early *Reformasi* period (Liddle & Mujani, 2005; Tomsa, 2010).

The pace of political reform under his presidency slowed, as the Indonesian economy stabilized and entered a new period of sustained growth. While Yudhoyono was seen as a reforming leader, his presidency also seemed a return to many of the norms of the New Order era—a military leader presiding over political stability and economic development. Human rights reform stalled in several areas, and the president repeatedly backed away from defending victims of human rights abuses, most famously in the case of the series violent attacks on Indonesia's Muslim minority Ahmadi community starting from 2008 (Berger, 2015; Tomsa, 2010).

There is a real sense that SBY represented both poles of the *Reformasi* era: he was both a reformer, a creature of the new liberal democratic politics prevalent since 1998, and a representative of the remaining power of New Order institutions and networks. In the end, however, this second part of his political character seemed to have far more influence on his presidency than the former. This is unsurprising given that, whether cleanskin or not, he was a product of a successful New Order military career covering a quarter of a century, and he was intricately embedded in the networks of power and privilege that were built under Suharto's rule, and which survived it. A quick look at his service record and his family connections is enough to confirm this. An officer in Suharto's former command, Kostrad (the Army Strategic Command), he was also at one time closely associated with General Wiranto, Suharto's last Minister of Defence and Security and Armed Forces commander. He is married to the eldest daughter of the late General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, who was heavily involved in organizing the massacres of 1965–1966, and was also involved in human rights abuses in West Papua. One of his sons, also an army officer, is married to the daughter of a Suharto-era deputy governor of the Bank of Indonesia, while the other (named "Edhie" in honour of Sarwo Edhie), is married to a daughter of Suharto-era mining magnate Hatta Rajasa, who became Prabowo Subianto's vice-presidential running mate in the 2014 presidential election (see below). It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that SBY's tenure emphasised New Order values of "stability" and "development" over continued liberalization, and was especially disinclined to take strong stands on issues such as human rights.

This more conservative, even reactionary, side of SBY's presidency created space for the emergence of an unmistakably reactionary candidate for his replacement in the form of Prabowo Subianto. Nevertheless, his presidency still also created an environment for another potential successor who was more the product of the post-New Order era, Joko Widodo, whose successful candidacy will be explored below. But first we will look at the rise of a candidate with strong New Order credentials, Prabowo Subianto, and the part anti-Communism played in his political campaign.

### ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE RISE OF PRABOWO

Towards the end of SBY's tenure another senior army officer from the New Order era, Prabowo Subianto, emerged as a contender for the presidency. Unlike Yudhoyono, Prabowo had a significant record of human

rights abuses, including accusations of involvement in a massacre in East Timor and in the “disappearances” of pro-democracy activists immediately prior to Suharto’s resignation (Aspinall, 2015; van Klinken, 2014).

In 2009, Prabowo ran as the vice-presidential candidate in Megawati Sukarnoputri’s unsuccessful campaign. He was able to build on this campaign to emerge as one of the two key candidates for the presidency in the 2014 elections. In the latter presidential campaign, key anti-Communist groups announced their support for Prabowo, including the FAKI (Indonesian Anti-Communist Front) and the far-right Islamist group, the FPI (Islamic Defenders’ Front). The former established the MP3 (*Masyarakat Pendukung Prabowo Presiden*, Society of Supporters of Prabowo for President) to campaign for Prabowo (Pratomo, 2014; Zakaria & Listy, 2014).

FAKI is one of a number of secular anti-Communist organizations in a loose coalition of similar groups, and can be seen as generally representative of the politics of this alliance (which includes the Union of Indonesian Anti-Communists in West Java, the Anti-Communist Front in East Java, and the National Patriot’s Front in Jakarta) (Zakaria, 2014). These organizations all have close links with the military and police and use ultranationalist discourse. A FAKI website, for example, openly and clearly announced in 2010 that the front was “established by the Indonesian Defence Forces and National Police Force”. The authors of the site went on to argue that FAKI “has a right and a duty to protect the Unitary Republic of Indonesia from the threats, disturbances, undermining, and whatever nuisances [that might be produced by] the PKI in its various forms in the communist and neo-communist movement”. This is precisely the language of New Order era anti-Communism, replicating the ideas of “latent” and “hidden” forms of Communist revival (<https://fakidpdsleman.wordpress.com/faki/>). FAKI and its associated groups have used such ideas to forcibly block, attack and disperse liberal and progressive political and cultural events that seek to push forward reform or social justice agendas, especially those with any connection to survivors of the 1965–1966 killings and imprisonments. They have repeatedly been able to act without obstruction from police, and sometimes with open support from the latter and/or elements of the army (Idhom, 2014; *Jakarta Globe*, 2013; Susanto & Aritonang, 2016).

Besides being anti-Communist, the FPI is part of a constellation of right-wing Islamist groups, including those in and around the JI (Jema’ah Islamiyah) network. Like FAKI, the FPI from its foundation

in 1998 enjoyed backing from elements of the Indonesian military and police, including former General Wiranto and former Jakarta police chief, Nugroho Jayusman (Saragih, 2011; Setiyarso, 2010; Woodward et al., 2014). It is a vigilante organization, with a prominent paramilitary component, notorious for its violent attacks. These have included many directed against targets that its members feel are in any way “Communist” (for example, an attack on a meeting in central Java by the survivors’ organization Sekber 65, which was held to discuss the provision of free health care for survivors of the 1965 violence). Liberal Muslim intellectual, Julia Suryakusuma, has labelled the organization “Islamofascist”, and many prominent figures in Indonesia have called for the FPI to be banned (Pausacker, 2012; Suryakusuma, 2008; Wilson, 2005, 2010).

Both organizations see Communism as an imminent and often amorphous threat, and associate it with a broad range of liberal and progressive political phenomena. In this sense, they continue to perpetuate Suharto-era anti-Communist ideas such as the “latent danger” of Communism, of the formation of “stealth organizations” (*organisasi siluman*) and “amorphous organizations” (*organisasi tanpa bentuk*).

### THE ANTI-COMMUNIST ATTACK ON “JOKOWI”

Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”) is the first president in the *Reformasi* era who did not originate from the political elite of the New Order period. He is also the first president who cut his teeth in regional, rather than Jakartan or national-level, politics. As such, his candidacy and successful election stands as a watermark in post-New Order politics.

Jokowi entered the 2014 presidential campaign as a popular figure with clear front-running in polling. His political career had begun and developed completely within the *Reformasi* era, starting with his successful seven-year tenure as mayor of the Central Javanese city of Surakarta (2005–2012), then a two-year period as governor of Jakarta. In both roles, he gained a name as a “cleanskin” with new ideas for reform. He was a clear contrast to Prabowo, and gained significant support from liberal and progressive political groups and leaders (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014).

With this background, and with anti-Communists lining up publicly behind Prabowo, it is not surprising that internet memes began appearing associating Jokowi with the PKI and the “Neo-PKI”. The latter is

one of several terms that anti-Communist groups have begun to use to describe the “new forms” of “Communism” that emerged especially from the 1980s on (i.e. the re-emergence of various forms of liberal and progressive politics that grew up in opposition to the authoritarianism of the Suharto regime). Another iteration of this labelling is “Komunis Gaya Baru” (KGB, “New Style Communism”).

The FPI frequently identifies forms of progressive politics with Communism explicitly through banners with slogans like “Liberals reject Islamic law; the PKI rejects Islamic law; Liberal = PKI”. When a journalist from the respected national daily *Kompas* found this slogan on a banner, he tweeted it with the hash tag “mindblown” (see Fig. 15.4). Similarly, left-wing writer Jusuf Windu reported another example from one of the widely publicized FPI showings of the Suharto-era anti-Communist propaganda film “The Betrayal of the Thirtieth of September Movement/PKI”, held for the 50th anniversary of the events of 1965. Windu reported that at a large public showing in Jakarta a keynote speaker argued from the stage that “Communism and Liberalism differ very little, they are like brothers” (*Liberalisme dan Komunisme itu beda tipis, seperti adik-kakak*) (Windu, 2015).

This kind of logic shows how the claims of anti-Communists can seem to make sense to believers. Jokowi was the candidate favoured by liberals and progressives; liberals and progressives are close to or identical to Communists; therefore Jokowi is a Communist, or “neo-PKI”. Throughout the first half of 2014, rumours circulated that he was supported by Communists, that he was a secret Communist himself or that members of his family were Communist. Initially, the Jokowi campaign team ignored these often bizarre claims but, as they continued to attract attention online and in the mass media, Jokowi felt he had to respond.

With less than a week remaining in the election campaign, and with polls showing that Prabowo was closing the gap in voter intentions, Jokowi and his running mate, Jusuf Kalla (previously a leader of Suharto’s former party of state, Golkar) held a press conference denying any PKI involvement in the campaign or in Jokowi’s background (Fajerial, 2014; Farid, 2014; Kuwado, 2014).

In the last period of the campaign, these polls alarmed left of centre groups and prominent figures came out to support and campaign for Jokowi. Amongst other things, this led artists, such as the writer and singer Dee Lestari, to come out in support of Jokowi, and for the campaign to take on more creative forms, perhaps most famously in the *Tintin*-inspired





Fig. 15.4 Didit Putra Erlangga's Twitter post (<https://www.facebook.com/dewankesepianjakarta/>)

posters that began to appear (Adhitrisna, Wibowo, & Prast, 2014; Nurcahyani, 2014; Prast & Adhitrisna, 2014). While this no doubt played an important role in shoring up his campaign, it would also have strengthened anti-Communist convictions that Jokowi was tied to “Communism”.



Since his appointment to the presidency in October 2014, Jokowi has continued to face anti-Communist pressure. As the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 30 September Movement approached, there was public discussion of the possibility of an official public apology to victims of the killings, torture, imprisonment and other suffering that victims and their families faced following the defeat of the Movement. This drew energetic protests from anti-Communist groups and many on the right and even in the centre of Indonesian politics (*Jakarta Globe*, September 30, 2015a).

On the anniversary of the repression of the Movement on 1 October, Jokowi “inspected” the Army-led commemoration ceremony at the “Sacred Pancasila Monument” in Jakarta. As in previous years, the ceremony continued to promote the New Order narrative that G30S was evidence of the barbarism of Communists and thus justification for the ensuing killings, torture and repression. At the same time, the President also made it clear that he had no plans for a formal apology, arguing that those who were spreading such rumours were “irresponsible” (JPNN, 2015; *Jakarta Globe*, October 1, 2015b). Given that his Human Rights and Justice Minister, Yasonna Laoly, had earlier seemed to canvass the idea of an apology, and that he himself had seemed favourable to stronger human rights positions, this was a disappointment to many of his progressive supporters. His response reflects the persistent power of anti-Communist politics.

### THE ENDURING POWER OF ANTI-COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS

The 50th anniversary of the 1965 violence brought to a head tensions over Communism’s place in Indonesian history and its relevance to contemporary politics. It culminated in a number of significant cases of censorship, the most notorious being the forced cancellation of a number of events (including panels, book launches and a film showing) at the Ubud Readers’ and Writers’ Festival in October 2015. These cancellations apparently came at the behest of the local police, but were not overruled by government officials. They led the festival director to comment that “censorship has become fashionable again overnight” (Topsfield, 2015). Other cases included the deportation of a 77-year-old visiting the grave of his father who had been a PKI member in Sumatra, and the banning of an edition of a student newspaper in Central Java discussing issues

around the events of 1965. The left-leaning intellectual Eka Kurniawan, who was due to speak on one of the banned panels at Ubud, commented: “Recently a new wave of anti-communism seems to have been revived, even when communism barely exists in Indonesia” (Topsfield, 2015).

It now seems this wave of anti-Communism throughout the election campaign in 2014 and the 50th anniversary of the violence in 2015 represented the beginning of a new phase of more intense anti-Communist politics. In 2016, for example, anti-Communism intensified further (Manan et al., 2016; *Tempo*, 2016; Trianita & Farmita, 2016).<sup>11</sup> This intensification is in part related to increasing demands for justice for survivors of the violence (see chapters 16 and 17 of this volume). Yet it is not limited to issues relating directly to Communist history or even progressive politics in general. For example, in early 2015 it came to light that the winner of the 2014 *Puteri Indonesia* (Miss Indonesia) contest had earlier, on a shoot in Vietnam, innocently worn a t-shirt given to her by a Vietnamese friend that had a hammer and sickle symbol on it. This all became public knowledge because she had subsequently made the mistake of posting a photograph of herself wearing the shirt on Instagram. This caused outrage in anti-Communist circles, and the FPI demanded that criminal charges be brought against her. Eventually, she had to make a public apology for her poor judgement (Parwito, 2015).

In another case in 2015, a Golkar member claimed that the burning of a mosque in Papua was clearly the work of the PKI (JPNN, 2015). Meanwhile, student protest leaders in South Sulawesi tied issues around Chinese immigrant labour and investment to the danger of a re-emergent Communism (Hidayat, 2015).

These are only a few examples of regularly emerging anti-Communist reports. So, why does anti-Communism continue to survive and even flourish in Indonesia over two and a half decades after the end of the Cold War and more than half a century after the annihilation of the PKI? Is it a hangover element from the Suharto era? Contemporary anti-Communism certainly contains many elements recognizable from the state ideology and practice of the New Order regime, especially that of the latter years of its rule. But the fact that anti-Communism can have such an impact on public debate seems to suggest it is still a potent part of Indonesian life, rather than simply being an element of an older society that is fading away.

Is it then an important part of a broader reaction against the democratic and social gains accrued since 1998? While these gains have been inconsistent or have often not been institutionalized (e.g. through legislation), and

while many of these gains, for this reason amongst others, have not fulfilled the promise of the years immediately following (and preceding) the fall of the Suharto regime, it nevertheless remains the case that the political culture of the New Order era has been challenged on a myriad of fronts—from sexuality to feminism, to labour rights, to human rights more generally, to attitudes to the events of 1965 themselves. Is it the case, then, that just as New Order anti-Communism served to justify the state's suppression of democratic politics, contemporary anti-Communism serves to justify ongoing suppression of progressive politics, both by the state and through the vigilante activity of anti-Communist organizations like FAKI and the FPI?

The ease with which this linkage can be drawn makes it clear that it is still important to recognize the significance of contemporary anti-Communism's roots in New Order era ideology and political practice. At the same time, it should be stressed that anti-Communism since 1965 has continued to be an ideology in the service of *oppression*. In the New Order era, anti-Communism was central to a state ideology justifying mass killings, imprisonments and torture in the 1960s, as well as being used to justify the often violent suppression of opposition to the regime and to hold back democratization as the regime aged. In the *Reformasi* era, anti-Communism has been used to justify pushback against democratic and social reform, and to limit the open discussion of the brutality and oppression of the Suharto years.

In this sense, I argue that anti-Communism in Indonesia has increasingly fascist tendencies, the dangers of which have not yet been fully recognized. Because of this, scholars cannot simply pretend "neutrality" when considering Indonesian anti-Communism. Fascism expert Dave Renton asked in relation to the advent of "Fascism Studies":

how can a historian, in all conscience, approach the study of fascism with neutrality? What is the meaning of objectivity when writing about a political system that plunged the world into a war in which at least forty million people died? How can the historian provide a neutral account of a system of politics which turned continental Europe into one gigantic prison camp? (Renton, 1999, p. 18)

Indonesian anti-Communism has been and continues to constitute a politics of violence and reaction. The fascist roots of these practices should sound alarm bells particularly because while during the New Order regime fascist ideology was produced and reproduced from above and

disseminated to the masses, it is now mass organizations such as FAKI and FPI organizing grassroots vigilante actions. Furthermore, the FPI has endeavoured over almost two decades to build up a mass, grassroots base. One sign of its growing influence is its role in mobilizing massive demonstrations against the Christian PDI-P politician and Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (“Ahok”) in late 2016 on the basis again of the FPI’s exclusionary political vision, including the view that only Muslims should be leaders in Indonesia (at least in Muslim majority areas, and certainly on the national stage).

Joko Widodo’s election, as a New Order network outsider and politician who cut his teeth on regional politics, is a milestone in the development of *Reformasi*. But Prabowo’s success and Jokowi’s cautious and conservative response to calls for justice over the events of 1965 are an indication of the continuing power of New Order ideology and practice, including anti-Communism. This also indicates a possibility of a return to more violent and authoritarian politics.

In that context, there is a pressing need now to continue the post-*Reformasi* work on Indonesian history that seeks to “re-humanize” and “normalize” the histories of the PKI and other mass organizations of the pre-1965 Left. The effects of prior histories in which the PKI was repeatedly blamed for “betraying” the nation, include the all-too-easy demonization of people now branded “Communist”. Instead, we need detailed, evidence-based work on the nuanced history of the struggle between Communists and anti-Communists in Indonesia in order to better understand historical contests in this country. Neither of these tasks is neutral; both have to be undertaken under the shadow of the enormous human rights abuses and the deep-rooted inculcation of the anti-Communist state ideology of the Suharto era, as well as ongoing efforts to revive and reformulate anti-Communist politics and methods.

## NOTES

1. Amongst many others: Roosa, Ratih, and Farid (2004), Kusni Sulang (“J. J. Kusni”) (2005), Sulami (1999), Riza (2010), Setiawan (2003, 2006), Bustamam (2006).
2. See, for example, Subhan (1996), Samsuri (2004), Suryawan (2005), amongst others. Although the former two works seem to be mainly concerned with elaborating anti-Communist narratives, the move away from

- the 1960s and the endeavour to write in a form more easily recognised as history (as opposed to regime propaganda) is still significant.
3. Amongst others: Marx (2004), Aidit (2002), Njoto (2003), Semaoen (2000), Kartodikromo (2000), Malaka (2000).
  4. Probably the most prominent progressive website that does this is Indoprogress. Retrieved from <http://indoprogress.com/>. There are a large number of activists and groups that intervene on social media to comment on New Order ideology and Communism's place in Indonesian history. Another starting point is Windu Jusuf's Facebook page, "Dewan Kesepian Jakarta" (<https://www.facebook.com/dewankesepianjakarta/>), which will be discussed below. On the other side of the political fence, starting points could be the Facebook and other social media sites of the key anti-communist groups, for example the Front Anti Komunis Indonesia. Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/Front-Anti-Komunis-Indonesia-115541701142>.
  5. Pictures of these products and a variety of logos and memes playing with anti-communist paranoia can be found on the "Pekerja Keras Indonesia" Facebook page. Retrieved from [www.facebook.com/Pekerja-Keras-Indonesia-202262046604402/timeline](http://www.facebook.com/Pekerja-Keras-Indonesia-202262046604402/timeline).
  6. For a discussion of the hammer and sickle and similar symbols in New Order popular culture, see Heryanto (1999, pp. 157–162) and Heryanto (2006, Chapter 5). The "PKI" meme appears in many places on the Indonesian web, but seems to have originated from a group using that title as a tongue-in-cheek group name, see the "Pekerja Keras Indonesia", Facebook group site: <https://www.facebook.com/Pekerja-Keras-Indonesia-202262046604402/>.
  7. "Dewan Kesepian Jakarta", Facebook group site: <https://www.facebook.com/dewankesepianjakarta/>.
  8. For examples of this literature, see Masyarakat Anti Komunis Indonesia (2001), Fauzan (2009, 2011), Tanjung (2006a, 2006b, 2007), Zon (2009).
  9. For example, the news channel Metro TV reported an increase of incidents of FPI violence from eight cases in 2008, to more than 40 in each of 2009 and 2010. See "Jejak Panjang Kekerasan FPI" at <http://news.metrotvnews.com/read/2014/11/13/318310/jejak-panjang-kekerasan-fpi>.
  10. Although this has been debated, given that he completed a number of tours of duty in East Timor during its occupation by Indonesia, and given the position of authority he held during the Indonesian military-backed militia violence following that territory's independence referendum in 1999. See Tanter, van Klinken, and Ball (2006, pp. 109, 150,

153–154, 173n18, 180). For a range of discussion on the Yudhoyono presidency see Aspinall et al. (2015).

11. All of these articles are from an edition of *Tempo* magazine (16–22 May 2016) focused on the upsurge in anti-Communism. The edition contains a number of other articles and interviews that provide useful coverage.

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## After 1965: Legal Matters for Justice?

*Nukila Evanty and Annie Pohlman*

Since the end of the New Order regime in 1998, survivors of the 1965 violence, their families and advocates have demanded that the Indonesian state take responsibility for dealing with the grievous human rights abuses committed from 1965 onwards. Their demands are based on the sheer number of victims, the fact that many of the perpetrators remain unknown and the long-lasting impunity for these crimes (see Wahyuningroem, 2013). Many methods of dealing with past human rights abuses have been proposed by survivors and their advocates including a range of legal and non-legal measures. Despite many promising new laws incorporating methods of dealing with abuses, there has yet to be a legal process or judicial decision that addresses the crimes committed against the majority of victims and their families. The crimes against civilians in 1965–1966 include execution, unlawful arrest and

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detention, torture, exile and forced removal, sexual violence, rape and murder, as well as the stealing of lands and possessions, unfair dismissals and many social, political and economic forms of stigmatization and marginalization (see Southwood & Flanagan, 1983). The issue of how the state will deal with the crimes of the past remains at a standstill at the time of writing (early 2017).

This chapter examines the legal mechanisms for dealing with human rights abuses provided for in new human rights laws implemented from 1998 onwards. It examines the formal obligations of the Indonesian government to deal with past human rights abuses as dictated by the provisions of Indonesian law and Indonesia's ratification of international human rights instruments. We assess some of the gaps between these new laws and their implementation as evidenced by the failed 2004 Truth and Reconciliation Legislation and the decision not to follow up the 2012 Report by the National Commission of Human Rights with an Ad Hoc Human Rights Tribunal. The contradictory nature of reform in Indonesia is further explicated in new laws that both revoke and reinforce discriminatory measures against persons labelled "Communists". Further evidence of a waning commitment to legal justice is evidenced by the latest drafts of the revised Truth and Reconciliation Commission Legislation and recommendations emanating from the 2016 government-sponsored symposium on the 1965 violence. We argue that across the five presidencies since Suharto, there seems to have been diminishing support for legal measures for justice alongside persistent resistance to legal justice. Under the present government of President Djoko (Jokowi) Widodo, there have been new efforts to address the 1965 violence through non-judicial measures which emphasize reconciliation over justice.

### THE LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL PROVISIONS

After the end of an authoritarian regime, the law must deal with both the past and the future, with both justice for past crimes and ensuring political transformation, and with weighing the rights of individuals with the collective good. According to Teitel (2003), law during a time of transitional justice is imperfect and partial, but it also is the only way to provide justice during that time for a history of state crimes. The moral demands of transitional justice are the establishment of a government and society which respects human rights and dignity through democratic

means, legal stability without resort to violence, and the guarantee that the crimes of the past will never be repeated. Thus the goals of transitional justice are much greater than the redress of specific cases of grave human rights violations under the former regime (Teitel, 2008). As we shall see below, new human rights laws passed in Indonesia in 1999 and 2000 very much reflect these tensions and the prioritization of law as the primary means of achieving justice in the early transition period.

When Suharto stepped down as President in 1998 and B. J. Habibie became President, the long and complicated process of *Reformasi* (the Reform movement) began. Under the subsequent administrations of Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and now Joko Widodo, there has been sustained pressure but little progress in dealing with cases of past human rights abuses.

In the early *Reformasi* era, the Indonesian government demonstrated a new commitment to human rights. Indonesia's 1999 Law on Human Rights, for example, outlined the Indonesian government's specific obligations with regard to human rights. Article 71 of the 1999 Law on Human Rights (Law No. 39) states that it is the responsibility of the state to respect, protect, uphold and advance human rights and that the government is responsible for upholding those rights as secured under any international instruments to which Indonesia is a state party. In 2000, Indonesia's upper house, the MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, the People's Consultative Assembly), passed Resolution No. 5 on the Stabilization of National Unity and Integrity (*Ketetapan MPR-RI No. V/MPR/2000 tentang Pemantapan Persatuan dan Kesatuan Nasional*). Within that Resolution were special provisions for dealing with unresolved past cases of human rights violations, as well as ongoing violations (chapter two, Problem Identification, and chapter three, Required Conditions). With this Resolution, the MPR instructed the President to work with the lower house, the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, the House of Representatives), to create a Law for a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which would be an extra-judicial body charged with finding the truth about past grave human rights abuses and to bring about national reconciliation (see ELSAM, 2015).

In 2002, the government followed up these decisions by publishing two Regulations, which were Government Decree No. 2 on Witness and Victim Protection for Cases of Gross Human Rights Violations (*Peraturan Pemerintah No. 2 Tahun 2002 tentang Tata Cara Perlindungan terhadap Korban dan Saksi dalam Pelanggaran*

*Hak Asasi Manusia yang Berat*) and Government Decree No. 3 of 2002 on Compensation, Restitution and Rehabilitation for Victims of Serious Human Rights Violations (*Peraturan Pemerintah No. 3 Tahun 2002 tentang Kompensasi, Restitusi, dan Rehabilitasi terhadap Korban Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia Berat*). Both Regulations came out of the earlier Human Rights Court Law (Articles 34(3) and 35(3), Law No. 26 of 2000, *UU Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia*). The first of these two Regulations (No. 2/2002) can be used by survivors and victims' family members of the 1965 killings to obtain protection from legal officials and security services throughout any investigative process (Article 2). Meanwhile, the second Regulation (No. 3/2002) gives a guarantee to survivors and victims' families that they will receive restitution, compensation or rehabilitation by the state, perpetrators and any third parties involved (Articles 7 and 8) (see Samendawai, 2016).

After a long drafting process, a law to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was passed by the DPR in 2004 (Law No. 27 of 2004). Under this Law, the Commission was to act as a non-judicial transitional justice mechanism to resolve past cases of grievous human rights violations. The Commission could achieve this resolution by uncovering the truth of past crimes, by helping to establish a culture in which there was respect for human rights, and by bringing about national reconciliation to create a harmonious and united country. Under the 2004 Law, any Truth and Reconciliation Commission established would have had no judicial powers and was not intended to function as, or replace, a court or judicial process. Rather, the Commission envisioned was to work alongside existing judicial processes to resolve cases of human rights abuses (see Prasetyo, 2006).

Aside from the 2004 Law to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there were other mechanisms established in Indonesian domestic law at the start of the *Reformasi* period meant to address cases of serious human rights violations. These included Law No. 26 of 2000 regarding the Human Rights Court (*UU No. 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia*). Under this law (specifically, Articles 43 and 47), provisions to establish judicial mechanisms to deal with human rights violations were set out as: first, for cases of human rights violations which occur after the Law was passed to be resolved through a Human Rights Court; and, second, for cases of human rights violations which

occurred before the passing of the Law to be resolved through an ad hoc Human Rights Court (Articles 43 and 44) or potentially through a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Article 47). The 2000 Law regarding the Human Rights Court had been created in accordance with a previous law, Law No. 39 of 1999 regarding Human Rights (*UU No. 39 Tahun 1999 tentang Hak Asasi Manusia*). Both laws were intended to provide avenues for past cases of grievous human rights abuses to be investigated and prosecuted within a court system.<sup>1</sup> Under these laws, particularly the 2000 law, cases such as the 1965–1966 killings were to be dealt with through mechanisms such as an ad hoc human rights court and/or a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

At the same time that Indonesians were attempting to formulate ways to deal with past human rights violations, new international guidelines with regards to human rights were being developed. In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (UNGA Res. 60/147, see Buyse, 2008, pp. 140–143). The Basic Principles and Guidelines set out the rights of victims to remedy for past gross violation, including access to justice and various forms of monetary and non-monetary reparations, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition of violations (Birks, 2006; van Boven, 2005).

In addition to the Basic Principles and Guidelines, the right to justice for victims is also laid down in the “Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity”, first produced in 1997 and updated in 2005 by the UN Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/2005/102/Add. 1; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2005). The Set of Principles requires the state to undertake a number of measures to uphold the rights of victims. First, victims have the right to truth and it is therefore the obligation of the state to investigate and identify perpetrators and victims of human rights violations. Victims have the right to reparation, and thus it is the obligation of the state to make compensation and restitution available to victims. Victims also have the right to the guarantee that measures will be taken to ensure non re-occurrence, and so it is the obligation of the state to prevent such crimes from happening again. These international guidelines attempt to set global standards with regard to how human rights cases are handled.

There are other potential avenues for legal redress of serious human rights abuses in Indonesia, though, to date, none has been acted upon. These include mechanisms provided for in a range of international instruments to which Indonesia is a state party. These instruments obligate state parties to offer judicial remedy for offences committed. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) was ratified by Indonesia in 1998 and is one such instrument with provisions for redress (see Pohlman, 2013). Being a state party to the CAT obligates Indonesia to ensure that all victims of torture receive compensation and have the right to secure justice, as well as the right to other forms of compensation and rehabilitation (see Nowark, 2012; Shelton, 2007). Another instrument is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was adopted by Indonesia in Law No. 12 of 2005 (see Crouch, 2012; Lubis, 2014). Article 2 of the ICCPR requires Indonesia to ensure that each victim of human rights abuse receives effective restoration through a competent judicial process.<sup>2</sup> To date, however, no claims under these international instruments have been adjudicated by an Indonesian court.

#### LEGAL MECHANISMS IN PRACTICE: THE 2004 TRC BILL AND THE 2012 KOMNAS HAM REPORT

On paper, the legal mechanisms created in the first few years of *Reformasi* seemed to hold the possibility of ways to deal with the 1965 violence. Yet none of the transitional justice mechanisms meant to be established by these pieces of legislation has come to pass. The Constitutional Court annulled the 2004 Law and no Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established (Prasetyo, 2006; Suh, 2016). During the two terms of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), the Attorney General refused to initiate criminal investigations into any of the cases brought before it by Komnas HAM (*Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*, Indonesia's National Commission for Human Rights), and thus blocked any possibility of dealing with such cases through an ad hoc human rights court.<sup>3</sup> We will now look in more detail at how this came to pass.

The original Truth and Reconciliation Commission Law (Law No. 27 of 2004), was drafted during the early period of *Reformasi* after the then President Abdurrahman Wahid had called for its creation in 2000.



The purpose of the proposed KKR (*Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi*, Truth and Reconciliation Commission) was to investigate grievous human rights violations committed during the “New Order” regime in Indonesia, a period which began with the mass killings of hundreds of thousands of suspected Communists in 1965 and ended amid widespread calls for democratization in 1998. When the Law was finally passed in 2004, the mandate of this commission was: to investigate and uncover the truth of past abuses; to provide compensation, restitution and/or rehabilitation to the victims; and to consider the granting of amnesties to perpetrators (UU KKR, 2004; Prasetyo, 2006; Suh, 2016).

There was dissatisfaction with the original law mainly for its amnesty provisions that, on the approval of the President and the DPR, would have allowed perpetrators of grievous violations, including perpetrators of international crimes such as crimes against humanity, to avoid prosecution if they were willing to admit to their wrongdoing and ask forgiveness (see Articles 25, 28 and 29, *Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 27 Tahun 2004 tentang Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi*; Kasim & Terre, 2003; Sulistiyanto, 2007). Because of these provisions, a coalition of individuals, human rights groups and non-government organizations in Indonesia requested a judicial review by the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) to examine, in particular, the provisions for granting amnesties for perpetrators of human rights violations, which they claimed were unconstitutional and did not uphold international human rights’ norms (see ICTJ, 2006). The Court agreed with the claims made by the human rights organizations that the amnesty provisions were unconstitutional. Rather than correct these specific provisions so that they were in line with Indonesia’s international obligations and constitution, however, the Court threw out the Law altogether, ruling that “the declaration that [the Article on amnesties] is inconsistent with the 1945 Constitution and does not have binding force [thus] renders all provisions of the [Truth and Reconciliation] Law unenforceable” (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2006, cited in Burgess, 2012, p. 282).

Domestic and international organizations and observers alike lambasted this decision (Burgess, 2012; Sulistiyanto & Setyasiswanto, 2016). One of the organizations which had been part of the coalition which requested the review, ELSAM (*Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat*, the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy), in particular, strongly criticized the Court’s decision, arguing that the court had

stepped beyond its mandate and created further impediments for redressing past abuses in Indonesia (ELSAM, 2006; Constitutional Court ruling no. 006/PUU-IV/2006, pp. 130–131). As discussed below, it would be years before drafting began for a revised law to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Indonesia.

Indonesia's independent state body for the investigation of human rights abuses, Komnas HAM, began an investigation two years later in 2008 into the anti-Communist killings of 1965–1966. The Komnas HAM investigation lasted from June 2008 to April 2012 and included the collection and analysis of 349 witness statements by those who had survived the massacres (348 survivors and one military source) across a number of regions of Indonesia—Mauere, Flores, Maluku, South Sulawesi, South Sumatra and North Sumatra (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia [Komnas HAM], 2012; Suh, 2016).<sup>4</sup> The finalized report, completed in July 2012, concluded that the investigating team had found strong indications that crimes against humanity had been committed in 1965–1966 and recommended that the Indonesian Attorney General pursue the matter with further investigation, the only mechanism by which an Ad Hoc Human Rights Court might later be established to try the perpetrators of these crimes. The Komnas HAM report also included recommendations for dealing with these past abuses through a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Komnas HAM, 2012).

Komnas HAM's 2012 report on 1965 was rejected by the Indonesian Attorney General's Office (AGO), the only body which has the power under current legislation to take the findings further.<sup>5</sup> The AGO argued that the report was incomplete and that the findings were insufficient (Prakoso, Sihite, Marhaenjati, & Novialita, 2012). Djoko Suyanto, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs went further, arguing that the 1965 mass killings were justified because they had been to "save the country" (Aritonang, 2012). Under current law, only the AGO can act on the findings of a Komnas HAM report and carry out the kind of criminal investigation that could lead to the establishment of an Ad Hoc Human Rights Court (Herbert, 2008). As with a string of other reports compiled by Komnas HAM into serious human rights abuses over the past decade, the AGO has refused to undertake further investigations, effectively cutting off any possibility for redress of these crimes via a domestic court mechanism.

## REVOKING AND REINFORCING DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION

At the same time that laws allowing the potential prosecution of past human rights abuses and forms of truth telling and reconciliation were being passed in the early *Reformasi* period, moves were made to address ongoing legal discrimination against those labelled “Communist”. Simultaneously, however, new laws were passed that could potentially be used to continue discrimination against these same people. These two trends further highlight the ongoing contradictions in processes of human rights-related legal reform in Indonesia. The contradictions and ongoing efforts to undermine legal justice reflect the persistence of anti-Communism in Indonesia (see Miller, this volume).

From early in the New Order period, the regime introduced legislation that is discriminatory against those with real or perceived former ties to the PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party). This legislation is the 1966 ban put in place by the then People’s Provisional Consultative Assembly (MPRS) on the PKI and on propagating Marxist-Leninist teachings (*Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara No. XXV/MPRS/1966*). Article 1 of this Resolution bans the PKI and all its associated organizations from Indonesia. Article 2 prohibits any and all activities used to “spread or promote the beliefs or teachings of Communism/Marxism-Leninism”. While the wording of the Resolution relates only to these prohibitions (the Resolution itself is only four articles in length), this legislation has been used until today as a blanket form of discrimination against those with former ties to the PKI, or any of its associated organizations. This Resolution, along with other measures, supported a broad range of civil sanctions imposed without due process on any person who had been a *tapol* (political prisoner), as well as the family members of those killed or imprisoned during the mass killings and purges after the 1965 coup. These included not only the banning and sanctions on any publications or materials thought to be of leftist content, but also a raft of restrictions on former leftists in general, including restraints on: residence and employment; freedom of speech; freedom of assembly and movement; and numerous forms of surveillance practices (see Birks, 2006; Orentlicher, 1988, pp. 57–73).

Once again, during the early *Reformasi* period, moves were made to redress this discrimination against survivors and victims’ families. In March 2000, then President Abdurrahman Wahid called for the 1966

Resolution to be rescinded (“Terhadap Korban G30S/PKI Gus Dur”, 2000). Known for his progressive pluralist stance, Wahid spent the first months of his time in office from 1999 trying to fulfil the *Reformasi* agendas of pushing the military back into its barracks and removing restrictions on Chinese Indonesians (Budiman, 2001; Bush, 2009, p. 136). The reaction against Wahid’s proposal to revoke the ban on Communism from religious and more hard-line groups across Indonesia was swift and unforgiving, particularly from conservative forces within Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia whose members had played an active role in the 1965 massacres and which had been led by Wahid for many years (Fealy & McGregor, 2010, p. 37). The majority of the members of the MPR refused to support Wahid’s call to revoke the ban, as only the MPR can repeal its own resolutions (Birks, 2006, p. 20). Outmanoeuvred by more conservative forces within the political elite and dogged by a series of poor political decisions, Wahid was impeached from the presidency a year later (Tan, 2002).

Under Wahid’s replacement, President Megawati Sukarnoputri, there was little support to redress past human rights abuses, such as by revoking the discriminatory 1966 ban. In 2003, the MPR held a special session of parliament to review all its Resolutions made between 1960 and 2002, the purpose of which was to bring these pieces of legislation into line with recent constitutional amendments (Puspitadewi, 2007). Of the scores of Resolutions passed by that house of parliament over the 42 year period under review, the 1966 Resolution banning the PKI and Communist teachings was one of only three retained (Birks, 2006, p. 21). As Teresa Birks (2006, p. 21) has argued, the intended effect of retaining the 1966 ban was “to continue to forbid ex-political detainees from standing as local, national, or presidential candidates”, a move which was then formalized in Law No. 12 of 2003 on General Elections (*UU Nomor 12 Tahun 2003 tentang Pemilihan Umum*).

This reinforced the continuing hard-line anti-Communist stance which outlived the New Order (see Miller, this volume). A clear example of this can be seen in Law No. 27 of 1999 regarding Changes to the Criminal Code in Connection with Crimes Against State Security (*UU No. 27 Tahun 1999 tentang Perubahan Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, KUHP, yang berkaitan dengan Kejahatan terhadap Keamanan Negara*). Under this law, a number of new clauses were added to the Criminal Code which specifically outlawed the dissemination of

Communist/Marxist–Leninist teachings in any form and by any media. On the premise that such teachings posed a threat to national security, harsh sentencing provisions were also included, with those found guilty of disseminating Communist teachings to spend between 12 and 20 years in prison for the offence (see Birks, 2006, pp. 18–19).

In addition, the long-awaited law to revise the Criminal Code (*Rancangan Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, RUU KUHP*), in its currently draft (as of the time of writing, early 2017), still retains the ban on spreading Communist or Marxist teachings in Indonesia. According to Article 219 of the current draft, once again, the dissemination of any Communist teaching through any media will be punished with imprisonment for a period of seven years (Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, 2015). Furthermore, Article 220 essentially upholds the 1966 ban on the PKI by punishing any person with 10 years of imprisonment for establishing a Communist or Marxist/Leninist organization, or for providing assistance to any such organization, either in Indonesia or abroad. Once again, as in the 1999 changes to the Criminal Code, these harsh penalties are justified on the basis of protecting national security (see also Elsam, 2005; Komnas HAM, 2014).<sup>6</sup> Under every administration since this time, the ban against Communism and Communist teachings has remained in force. Thus far, the Jokowi government has made no moves to remove these discriminatory pieces of legislation and has, to date, only re-enforced the 1966 ban (“Ban on Communism”, 2016; see also Miller, this volume).

### THE REVISED TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION BILL

In the decade since the Constitutional Court nullified the original KKR Law (Law No. 27 of 2004), quiet and persistent efforts to revise and reintroduce another bill to establish such a commission have continued. This occurred during the 10 years of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration, described by human rights organizations as a time “characterized by the return to the stage of disgraced former members of the security forces and foot-dragging on accountability for mass crimes” (ICTJ & KontraS, 2011, p. 2). Driven mainly by Indonesian human rights NGOs with some support from international donors, discussions to begin redrafting the bill began approximately two years after the annulment. In 2009, the United Nations Development Programme began work with the Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights, as

well as the Director-General's Office on a new national law to establish a KKR (Horne, 2014; UNDP, 2009). It took another five years, however, before a new Draft Law was prepared and could begin the long process of review in advance of discussion in the DPR. Before a new Bill can be introduced to the DPR, it goes through an "academic drafting" process, which may take years to complete, as in the drafting of the revised Bill to set up a TRC, after which the Bill will progress to a separate legislative process in the DPR (see Sherlock, 2003; Ziegenhain, 2008).<sup>7</sup>

To date, the academic drafting reviews of the Revised TRC Law have seen a gradual shift from truth-seeking to reconciliation as an emphasis for a future Commission. In the 2015 draft, the legal terminology focuses less on the truth-seeking functions that the Commission might perform and much more on it becoming a body to facilitate national reconciliation. There remains, particularly in the preamble section of the draft, the acknowledgement that grave human rights abuses committed in the past must be investigated in order to uncover the truth, and that this is important for survivors and victims' families (*Rancangan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia tentang Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi*, 2015 draft). There is no mention in the draft of the rights of survivors and victims to justice as, for example, laid out in the UNGA's "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" (UNGA Res. 60/147). Indeed, the Draft Bill in its current form is markedly brief on the position of survivors and victims' families throughout.

Under the current draft, also, two main subcommittees are envisioned: one to "uncover the truth and clarify grievous human rights violations", the other to take care of "compensation and rehabilitation" (Draft Articles 13–15, our translation). There is no mention of other avenues for dealing with violations addressed by the Commission other than through compensation and rehabilitation. In particular, there is no mention of how such a Commission might handle and/or recommend violations for any form of court proceedings. The only mention of a court comes in Article 28 of the Draft Bill, which states that "Cases of Grievous Human Rights Violations which have been resolved by the Commission cannot then be taken to an Ad Hoc Human Rights Court" (*Rancangan Undang-Undang*, our translation).

When compared with the original 2004 TRC Law, this current draft is strikingly shorter and contains fewer provisions to achieve either truth or

reconciliation, let alone justice, for historical cases of human rights violations in Indonesia. The current draft contains no mention of amnesty provisions yet, critically, it makes little mention whatsoever of alleged perpetrators: the sub-committee charged with establishing the “truth and clarifying Grievous Human Rights Violations” has the task of determining “who is a perpetrator and who is a victim”, but that is all (see Article 14(f) of *Rancangan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia tentang Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi*, our translation). Perpetrators, their acts and intents, any acts of contrition that they might perform or, indeed, any mechanisms to prosecute them have all disappeared from the current draft.

This is made clearer in another area where the current revised TRC draft could have been strengthened when compared with the 2004 TRC Law, which is in the provisions for reconciliation measures. In the 2004 Law, potential reconciliation measures for survivors and victims’ families covered: compensation, provided by the state and which included monetary and healthcare provisions; rehabilitation by way of restoring of the name, dignity and rights of victims; and restitution, which was defined as “compensation given by perpetrators or another third party to the victims or victims’ families” (see Article 1, *Undang-Undang Nomor 27 Tahun 2004*, our translation). In the current version, there is no mention of potential acts of restitution by perpetrators or third parties. In itself, the lack of specific provisions for restitution is not that significant, nor is it likely to have any overall impact on the compensation outcomes for survivors. It does, however, indicate once more that, in any TRC mandated by this current draft, perpetrators and any role that they might play in such a Commission have been almost entirely removed. As outlined earlier, this directly contravenes the rights of victims to effective remedy and justice, as guaranteed under Indonesia’s accession to a range of international human rights instruments.

When in 2000 the late Abdurrahman Wahid called for a national body to be established to uncover the truth of Indonesia’s many past injustices in order to achieve reconciliation, there was no way to foresee that, nearly 20 years on, the promise of a TRC commission would remain unfulfilled. Furthermore, no one could have predicted how fraught the journey to create such a commission would be. This journey is still far from over because the 2015 draft will not be the final version. This draft was returned at the end of 2015 to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights for further consideration and remains in the drafting process.

## THE JOKOWI PRESIDENCY AND JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL MEASURES TO ADDRESS 1965

For the full two terms of former President SBY (2004–2014), little progress was made towards reconciliation or redress for the crimes of 1965. Under current President Joko Widodo, however, there has been some movement on this issue. Widodo first signalled an intention to prioritize human rights during his presidential campaign in the lead-up to his election in 2014. His election platform, the “Nine Agenda Priorities” (known as the *Nawacita*), outlined a commitment to upholding legal norms, including the judicial resolution of past cases of human rights cases, amongst them the violence of 1965–1966. Widodo specifically made the commitment to “reform the system and law enforcement [so that they are] corruption-free, dignified and reliable” (see Lopulalan, 2014, our translation). This priority also stated that there would be a “just finalization of past human rights violations” because they were a “social and political burden” on Indonesia (see Setiawan, 2016).

In the first year of his administration, there was little movement by Widodo’s government to delve into, let alone redress, past serious crimes. One explanation for this is the President’s fragile position given he only narrowly won the election and thus had to build a coalition around him consisting not only of people from his party, the PDI-P, but also of senior retired military men (Hamayotsu & Nataatmadja, 2016). There was increasing domestic and international pressure, however, on Widodo’s administration to address the 1965 case. Domestically, survivors and their advocates have been working consistently over the past two decades to raise awareness, with a number of Indonesia-based campaigns drawing attention to the events of 1965 and their effects on society. Some of these campaigns include the silent and peaceful “Thursday” demonstrations (*Aksi Kamis*) and the recent “Year of Truth” campaign organized by the KKP (Koalisi Keadilan dan Pengungkapan Kebenaran, Coalition for Justice and the Disclosure of Truth) (see Pohlman, 2016; Wahyuningroem, 2013). Internationally, the release of two documentaries by Joshua Oppenheimer, *The Act of Killing* (2012) and *The Look of Silence* (2014), garnered renewed interest in the events of 1965 amongst international and Indonesian audiences (see Dragojlovic, this volume). Indonesian activists used this new awareness to mount the International People’s Tribunal for 1965, a people’s court made up of researchers, survivors and their advocates and held in



the Netherlands in late 2015 to try crimes against humanity committed during this period in Indonesia (Katjasungkana & Wieringa, 2015).

Against this backdrop of increasing domestic and international pressure, the government seemed to support the formulation of a revised TRC law which, as above, emphasizes reconciliation. It is unknown exactly when the TRC draft will return from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. When it does, it will proceed to the next step in the legislative process, which is for the draft law to be tabled as part of the National Legislation Program, the program which sets out draft laws for discussion and debate in the House of Representatives (DPR). Although the draft TRC law was listed on the 2016 program, as at the time of writing, it had yet to be debated by parliament.

Further to this, the government has signalled in the current phase (known as the “medium term” plan, or RPJMN, for 2015–2019) of Indonesia’s Long Term Development Plan (spanning 2005–2025, set up under Law No. 17 of 2007) a commitment to dealing with *past* human rights violations noting:

The handling of human rights cases require special treatment where the handling of cases of human rights violations should not just focus on cases that will occur in the future, but also on cases of gross human rights violation that occurred in the past. This is motivated by universal principles that apply in cases of gross human rights violations; [these are] retroactive principles and [are therefore] timeless. Thus, to respect human rights and protection of the state’s responsibility to process cases of past human rights violations requires a national consensus of all stakeholders (Book 2, Chapter 7, RPJMN 2015–2019).

This document underlined the fact that human rights principles were retroactive and that past cases thus still required a resolution.<sup>8</sup> Interestingly, however, the document noted that resolution would require a consensus.

In one step to try to achieve such as consensus, Widodo set up a Reconciliation Committee in May 2015 headed by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, retired General Luhut Panjaitan. The Committee was to formulate a non-judicial means for dealing with past cases of human rights resolutions. From 18 to 19 April 2016, Panjaitan authorized a national discussion of the 1965 violence (Soloway, 2016). The stated purpose of the “national symposium on the 1965 tragedy” was to hold, for the first time, an official discussion

about the killings. The chair of the advisory council which had organised the symposium, Lieutenant General (Ret) Agus Widjojo, opened the meeting by inviting all attendees to speak openly and truthfully, and to listen to what all of the speakers had to say (Heryanto, 2016). Around 200 attended, including cabinet ministers, military and police officials and other VIPs, as well as survivors of the killings and representatives of human rights organizations (Kwok, 2016). There were mounting tensions, however, as the symposium commenced and Panjaitan, perhaps in an effort to appease conservatives, stated at the opening of the symposium that there would be no apologies from the government for the massacres (Heryanto, 2016). On last day of the symposium, participants raised a number of suggestions for how the case could be resolved. A key point of debate was whether or not legal measures for justice should be followed. Retired Lieutenant General Wijdojo, for example, stated a strong preference for truth-telling and reconciliation whereas activists continue to advocate for the necessity of judicial measures (McGregor & Purdey, 2016).

To express their dissatisfaction with the first symposium, a group of right-wing military personnel and hard-line religious leaders held their own symposium in Jakarta on 1–2 June 2016. This symposium-in-response was entitled “Securing the Pancasila from the Threat of the Indonesian Communist Party and other Ideologies” (the *Pancasila* being Indonesia’s national ideology). Keynote speakers included a range of retired military leaders such as Try Soetrisno, Sayidiman Soerjohadiprodjo, Sintong Panjaitan and Achmad Rustandi and the symposium was supported by the current Minister of Defence, Rymizard Ryacudu. Islamic public figures, such as Muhammad Rizieq Shihab from the FPI (*Front Pembela Islam*, Islamic Defenders’ Front) and Yunahar Ilyas from Muhammadiyah, who is the current head of the MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, Indonesian Council of Ulama/Religious Leaders), were also speakers (“Simposium Nasional”, 2016). At the symposium, aside from calls to continue to ban the PKI, speakers also recommended that the past be forgotten and the nation look toward the future (Gumilang, 2016). Though it remains unclear at this stage what the outcomes of this symposium or other moves by hard-line groups may be, it is indicative that there remains strong and vocal opposition to any attempt to open up Indonesia’s past of mass atrocity crimes, including the 1965 case (Priyandita, 2016).

## CONCLUSION

In the nearly two decades since Suharto fell from power, ending his long-lasting authoritarian New Order, little progress has been made towards achieving reconciliation or justice for the many state-sponsored crimes committed by his regime. The momentum for change and for dealing with the past that was a feature of the early *Reformasi* period died quickly and many of the survivors the New Order's atrocities have now passed on without ever seeing justice, reconciliation or compensation for their losses. The pattern for transitional justice over the past two decades does not leave much hope for achieving any kind of meaningful justice or reconciliation for the survivors of historical cases of human rights abuse. As John Braithwaite has argued, "the post-Suharto pattern is of non-truth and reconciliation. [...] we found the low level of political commitment to high integrity truth-seeking at all levels of politics and in most civil society networks disturbing, especially when non-truth meant not just forgetting, but lies" (2011, p. 132). We concur with Budi Hernawan and Pat Walsh's findings that the hopes that Indonesia would open up and deal with past atrocities have come up against an "impenetrable" wall of impunity, creating a "silent history of [...] state-sponsored Indonesian atrocities that have been misrepresented or suppressed and rendered invisible" (2015, p. 3).

In spite of the overwhelming odds, the seemingly blanket impunity for perpetrators, and the lack of political will by oligarchic elites more interested in power-sharing than creating meaningful reform, there is still reason for hope. Throughout the last two decades, the relatively small but vocal and active community of human rights organizations, survivors and their advocates have kept up a campaign of truth-telling and continued to demand justice for past atrocities (Pohlman, 2016; Suh, 2016; Wahyuningroem, 2013). Recent moves by the Jokowi administration to begin the process of truth-telling and reconciliation are slow, but they have been spurred by the domestic and international pressure created in recent years by the campaigns of these organizations. The release of Oppenheimer's two documentaries on the killings, the "Year of Truth" campaign by the KKP coalition and the International People's Tribunal for 1965 have all drawn unwanted critical attention to the issue of how the Indonesian government has yet to deal with the 1965 killings and other past state-sponsored violations. The resolve of these human rights campaigners and survivors has not waned in two decades, and there is

no reason to believe that they will lessen their efforts to achieve justice in the future. Justice delayed may be justice denied for now; however, cracks have started to form in the impenetrable wall of impunity for gross human rights violations in Indonesia, and so it may yet just be a matter of time.

## NOTES

1. The second amendment to the 1945 Constitution in 2000 was also an important example of the commitment to human rights shown in the early *Reformasi* period.
2. It is worth noting, however, that Indonesia has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR that allows individual complaints to be heard by the UN.
3. There was an Ad Hoc human rights court set up for the Tanjung Priok incident, held shortly after the East Timor Ad Hoc Court in 2004. The Tanjung Priok incident occurred in 1984 in a northern suburb of Jakarta: a crowd of mostly Muslim protestors were fired upon by police (see *Tapol*, 2005).
4. The full Komnas HAM report into the 1965 events has yet to be made public. At this time, only the executive summary is available (Komnas HAM, 2012).
5. In November 2012, the Attorney General returned the report that Komnas HAM had submitted on the grounds that it was incomplete (Attorney General Letter, No. 56/A/JA/08/2012). Komnas HAM resubmitted the report to the AGO, which was then again rejected. According to the AGO, the findings of the Komnas HAM report were not yet sufficient for further investigations to be undertaken (see Prakoso et al., 2012).
6. In addition to the 1966 ban on the PKI and the spreading of Communist teachings, further enforced in the current and draft Criminal Codes, there is a range of other discriminatory regulations still in force in Indonesia. Law No. 2 of 2011 on Political Parties (*Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2011 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2008 tentang Partai Politik*), for example, also forbids political parties to spread Communist or Marxist-Leninist beliefs. The Attorney General can also still ban books (UU No. 4/PNPS/1963), which has been done in recent times, such as against John Roosa's book on the 30 September Movement (Roosa, 2006). On this, see Farid (2010).
7. The legislative drafting process is widely considered an institutional weakness of the DPR. Once the drafting is complete and the text finalized,

there is a plenary meeting, where a steering committee decides which Commission or Special Committee or Legislation Council will have steerage of the bill through the legislative process (see Sherlock, 2003, pp. 16–17). There are several DPR commissions, and most decisions about the final drafting is all done within the selected commission, which makes for little outside scrutiny or debate (see Ziegenhain, 2008).

8. Note, however, that in the 2nd round of amendments to the 1945 Constitution in 2000 (see note 1 above), it was specifically outlined that non-retroactive principles applied.

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## Working from the Margins: Initiatives for Truth and Reconciliation for Victims of the 1965 Mass Violence in Solo and Palu

*Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem*

Since the *Reformasi* (Reform movement) began in 1998, a variety of actors have demanded that the Indonesian state deal with the legacies of the mass violence of 1965–1966. These demands include that the Indonesian government right the wrongs of the past by acknowledging the truth of what happened to many of its citizens and bringing about justice for them. Some transitional justice policies were initiated at the state level but they have been unsustainable and have stagnated over the past 10 years (ICTJ & KontraS, 2011). One of the most significant factors which explains this stagnation is the nature of the political transition that combined both aspects of rupture with the old regime and gradualist reform, which involved accommodation between old and new elites (Mietzner & Aspinall, 2010).

During the first three years of the Reform period under President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999 until 2001), the state accommodated

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and implemented some policies to address the 1965 mass violence. However, under Presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, state policies in regard to settling the case of 1965, and all other cases of past abuses, resulted in total impunity and denial of justice (Evanty & Pohlman, this volume; Wahyuningroem, 2013).

In the same time period, however, there were important initiatives on this issue from state-backed bodies such as the independent National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the National Commission on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) and the LPSK (*Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban*, Witness and Victims Protection Body). Komnas HAM, for example, completed its four-year inquiry into the 1965–1966 crimes against humanity in 2012 and submitted it to the Indonesian Attorney General's Office (AGO). The AGO, however, rejected the Komnas HAM 1965 report, just as it had rejected numerous other investigations by the human rights body into grievous abuses (see Suh, 2015). Even though the AGO, and others amongst the political elite in the parliament, did nothing to follow up with judicial investigations, Komnas HAM issued recommendation letters for victims, including access to medical service from the LPSK as a form of reparation. In 2007, Komnas Perempuan also published a report documenting testimonies and the life stories of women victims of the 1965–1966 mass violence providing an important form of acknowledgement of their experiences by one government body (Komnas Perempuan, 2007).

Despite the very limited achievements in achieving truth and justice for past abuses so far at the state level, civil society groups have continued to work towards these aims with victims and affected communities. In the years leading up to Suharto's resignation in 1998, it was these human rights NGOs who insisted that the truth of the 1965 mass violence should be addressed and that the state should be accountable to its citizens. In the two decades since the beginning of *Reformasi*, these NGOs have been organizing their work around truth-seeking (particularly through the collection and documentation of victims' testimonies), public campaigns, claims for reparations (including legal advocacy on victims' rights), and calls for policy reforms (Pohlman, 2016; Wahyuningroem, 2013). These initiatives have taken place both at the national and the local or community level both by human rights organizations and victims' groups.<sup>1</sup> Even though these initiatives by civil society groups have had the positive impact of producing and circulating

narratives of gross violations of human rights and victims' suffering, such approaches also suffer limitations. With the exception of the Komnas Perempuan report (2007) into gender-based violence during 1965, they have not resulted in state acknowledgement of the harms inflicted on victims. Thus, for many of the survivors and their families, the truth of 1965 remains obscured and justice and healing for victims remain absent.

In this chapter, I examine alternative initiatives for dealing with the 1965 mass violence, driven by local governments, that focus on reconciliation and reparations. These initiatives, which began in 2011, resulted from local human rights NGOs and victims' groups adopting new strategies to achieve truth and justice for the 1965 case. Instead of focusing only on victims' empowerment and reconciliation within their own communities, these groups decided to reach out and lobby local governments to institutionalize programs for reconciliation and reparations for victims which included acknowledgement of their suffering. Such approaches through local governments have gained little attention within the literature on transitional justice, a field of study that looks at ways of addressing past abuses under repressive regimes in newly democratic societies. In this chapter, I assess initiatives for reconciliation and reparation in two cities: Palu in Central Sulawesi and Solo in Central Java. I will discuss, first, the initiatives and strategies used by local NGOs in each of these areas and compare their outcomes. Second, I will assess the potential impacts of these local programs on national-level efforts in addressing the 1965 mass violence.

## LOCAL INITIATIVES FOR TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOLO AND PALU

In Solo and Palu, local NGOs adopted strategies to lobby and collaborate with their local governments to address the 1965 mass violence through reconciliation and reparation projects. These NGOs took the lead in the initiatives in collaboration with survivors in each area. In Solo, a local legal aid NGO called YAPHI (*Yayasan Pengabdian Hukum Indonesia*, the Foundation for the Upholding of Indonesian Law) had been working with victims and survivors of the 1965 mass violence for many years including before the 1998 reform. Through their programs, they helped to organize a forum with survivors called the Sekber 65 (*Sekretariat Bersama 65*, the Joint Secretariat for Victims of 1965). Sekber 65 was established in 2005 in response to the lack of

coherence and cooperation between victim groups due to technical issues (“Documentation”, 2013, p. 151; Wardaya, 2015). The forum also served to gather and empower survivors so that they could be actively involved in the struggle for justice. As Didik Rahayu, one of the founders of Sekber 65, stated,

Victims are now more openly speaking of their experiences because we gather them, raising their awareness as victims, organizing them through Sekber 65. It started with ten people around Solo. We work together with other NGOs, meet with various groups in society, we introduce them with these other groups, including students, and so on. (Didik Dyah Rahayu, personal interview, May 8, 2013)

There are now Sekber 65 representatives in Solo and in the surrounding districts of Sukaharjo, Karanganyar, Klaten, Wonogiri, Purbalingga, Cilacap, and Banjarnegara (“Documentation”, 2013). The organization decided to be independent from YAPHI after 2011, and to fund the organization themselves through fund-raising events and collecting donations (Didik Rahayu, personal interview, May 8, 2013).

Initially, Sekber 65 focused on gathering the survivors together and engaging them with other groups in civil society; for example, by inviting them to join protests against government policies, commemorations of major international days such as International Human Rights Day, organizing seminars and other community programs. Most of these events attracted hundreds of attendees.<sup>2</sup> Most of the attendees were survivors but the events also included students, local organization leaders (including from Islamic mass organizations or *Ormas Islam*) and media. Since 2010, however, Sekber 65 changed their strategy to approach local authorities to support their work. For example, from 29 September to 1 October 2010, they organized a large event, held symbolically on the date widely known as the anniversary of the 30 September Movement. The press covered the event and some of the local media wrote stories about individual survivors. The event, entitled *Membangun Rekonsiliasi untuk Mewujudkan Perdamaian* (Building Reconciliation to Create Peace), gathered together representatives of the local government, parliament, local figures and leaders of Muslim organizations. All invitees agreed to a peace declaration for reconciliation related to the 1965 mass violence. After the event, YAPHI drafted the declaration for all parties to sign, including the Mayor at the time, Joko Widodo, who is now the

Indonesian President (“LPH YAPHI Rintis Deklarasi Damai Korban 65”, 2010). It was unclear, however, as to whether all parties eventually signed the draft.

On 19 July 2012, Sekber 65 members met with local members of parliament, including the Chairperson of the local parliament, YF Sukasno, to seek support for formal reconciliation. At this meeting, the Sekber 65 members also lobbied MPs to put pressure on the national parliament to start legislation on the new draft law for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission bill. Sukasno made a promise to follow up on their promises by writing an official letter for the National Parliament (Ryanthie, 2012). This meeting did not result in any concrete action, nor was it followed up by the local parliament.

On 20 November 2012, Sekber 65 held another large event: a launch of an edited book by Baskara T. Wardaya from the Center for History and Political Ethics (Pusdep) at Yogyakarta’s Sanata Dharma University. The book was entitled *Menyimak Suara di Balik Prahara* (Listening to the Voices behind the Tempest). The event was organized in collaboration with the Indonesian Ministry of Information and Communication. The Mayor, FX Hadi Rudyatmo, opened the event. In his speech, Rudyatmo stated that only having discussions about past wrongs would not resolve these problems; instead, concrete action was needed to improve the nation (Rudianto, 2012; Wardaya, 2015). Following up from the Mayor’s statement, Sekber 65 organized another seminar on 25 August 2014 entitled *Masa Depan Penyelesaian HAM di Indonesia Pasca Pemilu* (The Future of Settling Human Rights Violations after the Elections). Around 150 survivors attended the event, including from neighboring regencies in Central Java, Purbalingga, Cilacap and Semarang. On that occasion, Rudyatmo promised to institutionalize a reconciliation and reparation program, and asked Sekber 65 to start to draft such a program (Gosta, 2014). At the time of writing (2016), Sekber 65 was working with scholars from Universitas Sebelas Maret (Eleventh of March University, UNS) in Solo to create a draft program on reconciliation and reparations for the 1965 mass violence in Solo.

It is unlikely that the reconciliation and reparations program will be supported by the military. Even though Sekber 65 has tried to invite military representatives to their events, their invitations have never been accepted. Instead, in December 2012, the Military Regional Commander of the IV/Diponegoro region (which covers Central Java) provocatively stated that the activities of Sekber 65 were indicative

of a “communist revival” (“Kodam IV Diponegoro Sinyalir”, 2012). Members of Islamic mass organizations (*ormas*) have also interrupted Sekber 65 activities several times.<sup>3</sup> One recent interruption took place when Sekber 65 planned to host a seminar on reparations with Komnas HAM commissioners and LPSK on 24 February 2015. The event had to be cancelled after a group of men claiming to be from various Islamic organizations threatened to use violence to break up the meeting (Noviansyah, 2015).

Meanwhile in Palu, Central Sulawesi, the local initiatives to address the legacies of the 1965 mass violence have been led by an organization called SKP HAM (*Solidaritas Korban Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia*, Solidarity for Victims of Human Rights Violations) and have resulted in somewhat more positive outcomes. SKP HAM was established on 13 October 2004 by some of Indonesia’s foremost human rights organizations, including KontraS (*Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan*, the Commission for Disappeared Victims of Violence), IKOHI (*Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang*, the Association for Families of Disappeared Persons) and a local institute called LPS-HAM (*Lembaga Pusat Studi Hak Asasi Manusia*, Institute for Human Rights Study) after a three-day workshop on the establishment of victims’ organizations in Palu. The meeting was held in response to the four-year (1998–2001) conflict in Poso, an interreligious conflict that resulted from economic disparity and political interests of different groups and actors at the local level (see Aragon, 2001; McRae, 2013; van Klinken, 2007). Activists aimed to gather together and empower victims, not only from the Poso riots, but also from other cases such as survivors<sup>4</sup> of the 1965 mass violence. When it was established, SKP HAM aimed to organize, strengthen and empower victims of human rights abuses in Central Sulawesi, prioritizing the case of the 1965 mass violence.

Some local survivors in the Central Sulawesi region were already participating in meetings organized by students and NGO activists. They sometimes held meetings among themselves, but not openly for fear of backlash from local communities. Their activism started to become public after SKP HAM involved them in truth-seeking and reparation initiatives (Nurlaela Lamasitudju and SKP HAM staff, personal interview and communication, September 2014).

SKP HAM applies inclusive strategies to gain the support of communities and local authorities in order to facilitate processes of empowerment and reconciliation among victims and other members of society at



the community level (Nurlaela Lamasitudju and staff, personal interview and communication, September 2014). Being inclusive means that SKP HAM activists always involve local authorities and other groups from civil society organizations in their activities, including students. The organization involves younger activists and younger members of families of the victims in its work. By using inclusive strategies, SKP HAM was able to reach more 1965 survivors and to involve them in activities with the wider society at the grassroots level.

Their outreach to survivors resulted in a documentation project. Nurlaela Lamasitudju, the Secretary General of SKP HAM, with other members of the organization, collected the names and identities of victims of 1965 in a simple format. Later, she modified the format of the data and developed a human rights database. Over time, SKP HAM collected and documented relevant archives, photos, audio visual materials and 1028 testimonies of victims.<sup>5</sup> They identified 1210 victims in Central Sulawesi during the 1965–1966 violence, spread across four districts: Palu, Sigi, Donggala and Parigi Moutong (Lamasitudju, 2014b, p. 378).

Based on their research, the SKP HAM staff identified a need to engage other members of society, especially local authorities, in discussing truth and reconciliation concerning the 1965 abuses. They started at the village level by going door to door to meet with local people and discuss their ideas. Later, they involved village leaders (*lurah* and *camat*) as well as religious leaders. The topics they discussed included national laws related to human rights, a potential truth and reconciliation commission, and the 1965 mass violence (Nurlaela Lamasitudju, personal interview, 2012). This program was called the *Diskusi Kampung* or “Village Discussions”.

The *Diskusi Kampung* developed further into a city-level advocacy campaign. Nurlaela approached prominent figures with political influence in Central Sulawesi to engage them in discussions on human rights and the 1965 victims, attempting to gain support from them. The first big event to which members of these networks were invited was the launching of an edited book by Putu Oka Sukanta, writer and former political prisoner, entitled *Memecah Pembisuan* (Breaking the Silence) in 2011. SKP HAM asked the Governor of Central Sulawesi to deliver a speech, which was read by his Deputy, Sudarto. In the speech, the Governor admitted that mass violence had taken place in Central Sulawesi in 1965–1966, and the Deputy acknowledged the practice of forced labor

in the years after 1965 (Lamasitudju, 2014b, p. 380). The book launch convinced the Mayor of Palu, Rusdi Mastura, to accept SKP HAM's invitation to an event on 24 March 2012 to commemorate International Day for the Right to Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims, where he then delivered an apology. In his speech, he said,

The State at the time conditioned the situation where many of its people were arrested, murdered, jailed. It was mass provocation ... resentment because of different ideologies. But we cannot continue to be like that anymore now, therefore nothing is more appropriate for me to say than to apologize, personally...and on behalf of the local government of the city of Palu, to all the victims of 1965 tragedy in Palu and Central Sulawesi.<sup>6</sup>

The Mayor's apology was a significant achievement in terms of SKP HAM's sustained efforts to achieve acknowledgement of the violence for victims of the 1965 mass violence.

SKP HAM followed up this event with lobbying local authorities in Palu to plan reparation programs for survivors. After months of lobbying and working closely with the local government, the Mayor issued Mayoral Decree No. 25 of 2013 regarding the Palu Human Rights Action Plan. The Decree serves as a legal basis for human rights fulfillment in Palu (Setiawan, 2016). The 1965 mass violence, however, is not mentioned in the document even though the proposal initially was to settle the 1965 mass violence. In order to gain local political support from both the executive and legislature in Palu, the Decree was expanded to accommodate other cases of violence and human rights abuses (Nurlaela Lamasitudju and Mulyati, Head of Palu's Department of Law, personal interview, September 2014). Six main programs included in the Decree are: (1) strengthening of the institutions implementing the human rights plan (Ranham Committees/working groups); (2) human rights education; (3) communication and outreach to increase public awareness of human rights; (4) the implementation of human rights norms and standards; (5) harmonizing drafts and evaluations of local and national mechanisms with human rights perspectives; and (6) evaluation, monitoring and reporting on the programs mentioned (see Lamasitudju, 2014a).

As part of the implementation of the Decree, that is to fulfill the government's obligations with regard to human rights violations, the Palu government conducted research to verify the data collected by

**Table 17.1** Government Social Program for Victims of Human Rights Violation Source: Mastura (2014)

<i>No</i>	<i>Identified program</i>	<i>Numbers of beneficiaries</i>	<i>Responsible local government department</i>
1	Health insurance	41 families	Dept. of Health
2	House renovation	64 families	Dept. of Social and Workforce
3	Toilet and bathroom	22 families	Dept. of Housing
4	Scholarship	41 persons	Dept. of Education
5	Livelihood	55 persons	Dept. of Industrial Relation
6	Farming seeds	6 families	Dept. of Farming and Fishery
7	Rice aid	27 families	Dept. of Economy
8	Work and social care	53 persons	Dept. of Social and Workforce

SKP HAM and identified forms of reparation needed for the survivors and their families. The total numbers of survivors and their families in Palu verified in this research by the Palu government was 580 families. The verified names were formalized in the Mayor's Decree and submitted to Komnas HAM for further verification. The research also identified several forms of reparation programs needed for survivors listed in Table 17.1, which involve various Palu local government departments (Mastura, 2014).

Other than the reparation program, the Palu local government also works with SKP HAM and a national NGO, ELSAM, in developing programs and activities related to dealing with the 1965–1966 human rights violations, including by developing human rights education. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in Jakarta on 20 October 2014 between the Government of Palu and ELSAM (see ELSAM, 2016). The Palu government was also invited to a national coordination meeting between LPSK, Komnas HAM and Komnas Perempuan. Palu government officials organized a focused group discussion on local initiatives to settle cases of gross human rights violations with a member of the President's Advisory Council, Albert Hasibuan, Komnas HAM commissioner, Roichatul Aswidah, Vice Chair of LPSK, Hasto Atmojo Suroyo, and chair of Komnas Perempuan, Yuniarti Chufaizahin, in the same year (Indonesian President's Advisory Council, 2014; Muhidin, 2016). The Palu government also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with ELSAM for two years of human rights education programs, including holding a few sessions at


the local Republic of Indonesia's Television station (TVRI) to socialize human rights issues and initiatives (Mastura, 2014).

### FACTORS DETERMINING THE OUTCOMES OF RECONCILIATION AND REPARATION EFFORTS IN SOLO AND PALU

The initiatives for reconciliation and reparation regarding the 1965 mass violence led by NGOs in Palu and Solo have resulted in different outcomes. Sekber 65 in Solo and SKP HAM in Palu have both worked at the grassroots level in their local communities, collaborating with local government structures to varying degrees. Their strategies have had mixed results, with the more inclusive and collaborative approach of SKP HAM leading to more successful outcomes. Even though Sekber 65 Solo engaged with local authorities, they were less successful in institutionalizing reconciliation and reparation measures for victims of the 1965 mass violence than SKP HAM. In order to evaluate the success of these two organizations and their approaches, I identify three factors that contributed to the effectiveness of outcomes. The first relates to the internal factors within each NGO. This includes the strategies used, the individual actors in the organizations and the roles played by the survivors of the 1965 mass violence. The second factor discussed relates to local politics, including the characteristics of the local government, buy-in from local leaders and local opposition groups. The third factor relates to the historical context of the 1965 mass violence and the nature of this violence in each place. Figure 17.1 illustrates the relationship between these three factors.

#### *The Internal Factors of the Organizations*

Internal factors within Sekber 65 in Solo and SKP HAM in Central Sulawesi in part explain the comparative success of each organization's programs. Although both organizations ensure their activities are inclusive, in the sense that they invite other groups within society to participate and support their initiatives, they reach out to and interact with these supporters differently. SKP HAM's *Diskusi Kampung* started at the village level in remote areas, including an area well-known for being a former Communist base (*basis PKI*). They began in that area because many of its survivor members came from communities in that region and because many victims were detained and experienced enforced labor



**Fig. 17.1** Elements of Local Transitional Justice

there after 1965. The *Diskusi Kampung* program expanded to other villages, involving the heads of villages and sub-districts, and most meetings took place in mosques or village meeting halls. Each meeting was attended by relatively small numbers of people. In comparison, Sekber 65 in Solo adopted different strategies when including other groups from local society. Their events and meetings, including regular meetings, are always well attended. These regular meetings are mostly attended by an average of 30–40 of its members (Pohlman, 2013, p. 152). Their public events such as seminars are also attended by hundreds of victims from around the region, and are always covered by local media. Contrasting with the public events held by SKP HAM in Palu, even though Sekber 65 often invite select key stakeholders from the local government and parliament, very few, if any, came to these events.

The individual actors in each organization also play significant roles in determining the success or failure of local initiatives in Palu and Solo. The secretary general of SKP HAM Palu, Nurlaela Lamasitudju, comes from a family with strong Islamic ties. Her father was a prominent local *ulama* (Islamic religious scholar) who ran his own traditional Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) in the area. Even though she has never associated her activism with her family's fame and influence, her background

gives her an advantage in meeting and gaining the trust of Islamic leaders. I would argue that the *Diskusi Kampung* meetings were successful in part because of her background, which, in turn, enabled her to play an activist role. Nurlaela and her family, she explains, also lived through the intercommunal violence of the late 1990s and early 2000s in Poso, an experience which drives her activism to achieve truth and reconciliation for survivors of the 1965 tragedy (Nurlaela Lamasitudju, personal interview, September 2014). Similarly, many of the young activists in SKP HAM are family members of victims of the 1965 mass violence. In SKP HAM, young activists, victims and non-victims alike are the most active especially in documenting and verifying data on victims of the 1965 mass violence (SKP HAM staff, personal interview, September 2014).

In Solo, the activists who lead Sekber 65 are Winarso and Didik Rahayu. Winarso was active in the SRS (*Serikat Rakyat Surakarta*, Surakarta People's Union), an organization affiliated with the PRD (*Partai Rakyat Demokratik*, Democratic People's Party) during the last years of Suharto's regime. He later joined the legal aid organization, YAPHI Solo, and together with his wife, Didik Rahayu, formed Sekber 65 under one of the programs in YAPHI. Sekber 65's activities rely on Winarso's networks both locally and nationally. In Didik's words, "Winarso is a prominent figure in social movements, and he stitches together Sekber 65 with other elements in these social movements" (Didik Rahayu, personal interview, May 8, 2012). For the leadership and activists within Sekber 65, these connections with wider social activist networks are seen as valuable and useful for the work of the organization.

The third aspect regarding the influence of internal factors on the success of each organization relates to the level of involvement of survivors. In both SKP HAM and Sekber 65, survivors are often former members of national-level victims' groups such as the LPKP (*Lembaga Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan*, Institute for Research into the Victims of the 1965–1966 Massacres), LPRKROB (*Lembaga Perjuangan Rehabilitasi Korban Rezim Orde Baru*, Institute for the Struggle to Rehabilitate Victims of the New Order Regime) and YPKP (*Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965/1966*, the Foundation for the Research into the 1965/1966 Massacre). In this respect, SKP HAM and Sekber 65 are very similar in that these two locally-based organizations have mobilized survivors in different ways to those of the longer-established,

national-level survivor organizations. Even though the decision-making in these two local organizations involves survivors, many times the ideas and networks as well as resources come from the younger activists who lead these organizations. Survivors are mostly active when they are invited to an event or are involved in other activities such as documentation.

### *The Influence of Local Politics*

The second area which contributes to the outcomes of local transitional justice is the dynamics of local politics. This includes the individual factors of local leaders, relationships between local elites and opposition groups. In terms of leaders, both FX Rudyatmo, the mayor of Solo/Surakarta, and Rusdi Mastura, the Mayor of Palu, are known to have strong leadership skills. They have also both disclosed that in their youth they were members of local gangster networks, networks that continue to give them access to voters at the community level.<sup>7</sup> Both have maintained wide networks with various groups in society from their younger days. They both represent parties that won local elections: the PDI-P in Solo and Golkar in Palu. This means that they can work relatively smoothly with the parliaments where the majority of MPs are from the same political party. The only aspect that makes Rudyatmo's leadership more challenging than Mastura's is the presence of opposition groups from Islamic *ormas*, such as from the FPI (*Front Pembela Islam*, Islamic Defenders' Front). The local FPI group has attacked him several times in regards to the conflict between its members and a group of gangsters in Solo. In 2012, for example, a local FPI leader accused him of master-minding the conflict between FPI members and a group of thugs and local community members, accusing him of directing the thugs (Bramantyo, 2012). These opposition groups are the same groups which opposed Sekber 65's public activities. Further to this, as detailed by Miller (this volume), the FPI has frequently been mobilized by the military to stage anti-Communist protests.

One particular figure who has opposed both Rudyatmo and the activities organized by Sekber 65 is Moedrick Sangidoe. He is a senior politician from the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, Development Unity Party) and leader of a hardline Islamic *ormas*, as well as leader of the FAKI (*Forum Anti Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Anti-Communist Front). He is also well-known for his close relationship with local and

regional military commanders in Central Java, and is a strong supporter of Prabowo Subianto, a presidential candidate in the 2009 and 2014 elections with a notorious track record in human rights abuses. Interestingly, Moedrick Sangidoe accepted Sekber 65's invitations to some of their activities, including the 2010 activities that resulted in the idea of a signed peace and reconciliation agreement (Didik Rahayu, personal interview, May 8, 2012).

### *Historical Context and the Local Dynamics of the 1965 Mass Violence*

The third area which has determined the outcomes of local transitional justice initiatives in Solo and Palu is the historical context of the violence that took place in these two places. In the 1955 elections, the PKI gained the majority of seats in eleven districts in Central Java, including Solo (then Surakarta). Solo was one of the bases for the PKI. The RPKAD (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat*, Army's Paracommando Regiment) entered Solo on 22 October 1965 through Yogyakarta and Boyolali (Kammen & Jenkins, 2012, p. 85) and took the city, crushing all members of the PKI and its supporters. Solo's historical background as a "red" city stands in stark contrast to that of Palu. The PKI won only 0.5% of the vote in that part of Sulawesi, and received an average of less than 1% of all votes in Sulawesi.<sup>8</sup>

The scale and intensity of the violence in Solo was much greater than in Palu. There is no specific data for the death toll in Solo or Surakarta, but for Central Java approximately 100,000 people were reported exterminated during the killings (Hammer, 2013; Kammen & Zakaria, 2012). These figures also stand in sharp contrast to the number of victims in Central Sulawesi. SKP HAM's documentation identified that tens of people were killed, hundreds were tortured and enslaved, and four PKI members were forcefully disappeared, including the local PKI leader, Daeng Maselo (Lamasitudju, 2014b, p. 374).

The types of violence in these two regions are also an important factor that has shaped attempts to settle the legacies of the 1965 mass violence. In Solo, as mentioned above, most deaths involved extra-judicial killings and torture. In Palu, SKP HAM identified forced labor as the dominant form of violence for both men and women detainees. The total numbers of cases of forced labor in their documentation was 793 out of the 1210 total victims. Seven men died as a result of overwork and ill treatment in forced labor. The detainees had to build public infrastructure not only



in Palu, the capital city of Central Sulawesi, but also in the surrounding Donggala and Poso districts. Because Central Sulawesi was only established as a new province on 13 April 1964, the focus of the new government was to build infrastructure and development. As military institutions were responsible for implementing these projects, the detainees were forced to perform this labor without any payment. The projects included the building of an airport, bridges, military housing and compounds, and government offices. The forced labor took place between 1966 and 1981 (Lamasitudju, 2014b, p. 374; Nurlaela Lamasitudju, personal interview, September 2014).

### THE PROSPECTS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ADAPTING REGIONAL INITIATIVES TO SETTLE THE 1965 MASS VIOLENCE

In my interview with him, the Mayor of Palu Mastura suggested that local initiatives to deal with the 1965 case might have far greater chance of success. He commented:

It is better to settle this [the 1965 mass violence] in partial ways in the regions, [because] there is still a deep wound at the national level. The PKI's *agitprop* [agitation and propaganda] made lots of people hurt... If the PKI was crushed, well that's how it was. People were punished, but the punishment was beyond reasonable... You know, it's all about the political game. One time we won, another time we lost. That's the way it is. (Rusdi Mastura, personal interview, September 2014)

Two further things we can infer from his comment are: first, that it is possible to settle the 1965 mass violence “partially” by stages rather than attempting to settle it comprehensively at the national level. The second inference is that it is difficult to settle the case nationally because resolving the 1965 mass violence is indeed a political act. These two propositions invite the question: can regional initiatives for reconciliation and reparation potentially effect national measures in settling the 1965 mass violence?

The initiatives of Sekber 65 in Solo and SKP HAM in Palu demonstrate that, even though there has been stagnation at the national level, there are spaces for local civil society groups and local governments to address the legacies of the 1965 mass violence. Survivors and NGOs can potentially collaborate with regional governments to achieve positive

outcomes for truth and justice. Among the many transitional justice mechanisms available to post-authoritarian states, there are two mechanisms for reconciliation and reparation that can be implemented at the regional level in Indonesia. Under Law No. 23 of 2014 on Regional Governance, governments at the provincial and district levels have the authority to concurrently conduct government affairs, which includes obligatory affairs.<sup>9</sup> According to Article 12 of the Law, this includes the delivery of basic services such as education, health, security and protection, housing and essential works. Regional governments, therefore, have the capacity to introduce initiatives for reconciliation and reparation that addresses these areas, given that each member of society in that region, including survivors of violence, has the right to access these basic services equally.

The positive outcomes from these regional initiatives, such as the policy and program implemented by Palu's government, could potentially have a "snowball effect" and inspire other regions in Indonesia to adopt similar measures. Both Mastura and Nurlaela of SKP HAM have been promoting their policies and programs in other regions as well as in Jakarta. The Minister of Law and Human Rights awarded Palu the award of "*Kota Sadar HAM*" or "City of Human Rights Awareness" in 2013 (Firman, 2013). Mastura has established good relationships with some national offices and figures, such as with Komnas HAM, LPSK, Komnas Perempuan, the Office of the Presidential Advisory Board, and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. He has also presented his policies in various national seminars, mostly in Jakarta. Meanwhile, Nurlaela and SKP HAM have become active members of the national-based KKPK (*Koalisi Keadilan dan Pengungkapan Kebenaran*, Coalition for Justice and the Disclosure of Truth), which works towards truth-seeking and restorative justice for cases of human rights violence throughout Indonesia (see Pohlman, 2016). She also maintains strong networks across Indonesia and has been involved in various national and international events in human rights campaigning and advocacy.

Similarly, Sekber 65 is an active member of the KKPK and has been involved in various national and international campaigns on human rights and the 1965 mass violence (see "Documentation", 2013). The outcomes in Palu have inspired them to work towards more positive outcomes with local political authorities in Solo (Didik Rahayu, personal interview, May 8, 2012). National-based organizations and coalitions such as the KKPK are also seeking to work with regional

governments to encourage such measures for reconciliation and reparation. ELSAM, for example, is currently working with the Sanggau City Government in West Kalimantan on legislating human rights-based local bylaws (ELSAM, 2014). Similarly, institutions such as LPSK, Komnas Perempuan and KOMNAS HAM have encouraged local groups and regional governments to formulate their own measures to settle cases of human rights abuses, including the 1965 mass violence.

However, as Mastura notes, there are challenges for transitional justice in Indonesia's current political climate. Even though the events of 30 September 1965 remain the subject of endless debate, the facts regarding the mass violence that took place after 1 October 1965 are undeniable (Rusdi Mastura, personal interview, September 2014). It is fair to say that the systemic roots of this violence and the involvement of state institutions and apparatus which carried out such massive violence have yet to be fully acknowledged in Indonesian society, let alone the role that the military played in seizing power and setting up the long-lasting New Order regime. This is a major challenge considering that from the beginning of the reform movement in 1998 until today, there has been a continuation of power-sharing between the political elites of the New Order in politics in Indonesia (see ICTJ & KontraS, 2011).

One strategy used by Sekber 65 and SKP HAM to address the 1965 mass violence has been to depoliticize the mass violence and its implications for contemporary Indonesia. Their programs and activities are built around the language of human rights, detaching the violence from its political context of the mass violence and neutralizing the violence by describing it as a "human tragedy". As a consequence, the systemic root causes of the violence have been obscured from discussions. For Sekber 65 in Solo, for example:

The issue we promote is how to settle human right abuses. They (the victims) understand that "1965" is political, and therefore the solution is not prosecution, but acknowledgement, reconciliation. Judicial (prosecution) is important, but not the priority... We don't talk about political ideology here, therefore we mingle them with police/military personnel, scholars, and figures from Islamic fundamental groups, political parties, so that they can be well-accepted by these groups... Eventually society will not be allergic anymore to talking about 1965 because victims will no longer call themselves "*eks tapol*" (former political prisoners). (Didik Rahayu, personal interview, May 8, 2012)

Meanwhile, SKP HAM in Palu share a similar approach in framing the 1965 mass violence in their works:

In Palu, when I met *tapol* for the first time, there were LPKP'65, LPR KROB, but their activities were mostly "underground"... They only met secretly... They came to NGO events, joined in advocacy activities on land rights and some other [issues]. By that time they did not speak using a human rights framework... We convinced them that if we tell people that "1965" violence happened to many people, then we can see a clear picture of what happened to them. (Nurlaela Lamasitudju, personal interview, May 8, 2012)

On the one hand, such an approach could benefit these organizations in terms of gaining sympathy and support from the wider society and decision-makers within regional governments. This approach might create greater possibilities for healing as well as reconciliation for survivors and local societies. On the other hand, one aim of transitional justice is to uphold the rule of law and to solidify democratic reform within a new regime. In this respect, these approaches could potentially lead to a localized collective memory and sustain impunity nationwide.

## CONCLUSION

In the last seven years, there have been attempts by human rights groups and survivors of the 1965 mass violence in Indonesia to collaborate with regional governments in addressing and settling these serious human rights violations. Sekber 65 and SKP HAM work with survivors and regional governments to try to institutionalize projects on reconciliation and reparations for the victims of the 1965 mass violence. However, the outcomes of these collaborations with their separate regional governments have had varied results. Compared with Solo, the regional government of Palu has been more responsive to the proposals by SKP HAM, and has launched policies and programs related to reconciliation and reparation for survivors. I have identified some of the factors that determined these different outcomes. These include factors internal to each organization, local politics and the historical context and nature of violence in each region. The factors in the internal organization include strategies applied, the individual leadership within each of the organizations and the roles played by survivors. Local politics include

the characters of local leaders, political supporters and local opposition groups, in addition to the historical context and nature of violence in the Solo and Palu settings. Furthermore, it is important to relate these local dynamics to the national context.

Lastly, I assessed the potential impact of these regional initiatives on national efforts to settle the 1965 mass violence. I argue that such initiatives have the potential to create a “snowball effect” in other regions, and with the support of the state’s institutions such as Komnas HAM, LPSK and Komnas Perempuan, these initiatives combined with other forms of domestic and international activism might create pressure on the central government to adopt and implement national measures for truth and justice. However, I also identify a challenge arises from the framing of the violence by these NGOs in purely human rights language, which detaches the violence from national politics. In the long term, regional initiatives can localize the collective memory and sustain impunity nationally.

## NOTES

1. Two examples of such efforts at the national level were the drafting of the Law on Truth and Reconciliation, led by ELSAM (*Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat*, the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy), and the class action led by LBH Jakarta (the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute) against the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, the President and former Presidents of the Republic of Indonesia, which demanded the rehabilitation of victims’ names and the annulment of all policies which stigmatized those persecuted after 1965 and called for compensation. See Lawsuit No 341/SK/LBH/V/2005, LBH Jakarta, 2005.
2. In one of the seminars I attended in 2010 as a speaker on truth and reconciliation, at least 150 victims attended along with students, media and local NGO representatives. According to Didik, this is the average numbers of attendees at their events (Didik Rahayu, personal interview, May 8, 2013).
3. Reported by members of Sekber 65, interviews. This including the seminar on truth and reconciliation where I was one of the speakers together with KOMNAS HAM’s Commissioner Nurkholis and Coordinator of KontraS, Haris Azhar, in 2010.
4. Netty and Nurlaela from SKP HAM, personal interviews, September 2014; and Aminuddin Kasim (LPHAM Tadulako University), personal interview, September 2014. SKP HAM’s website, lists its members as victims of the 1965 mass violence, Poso conflict and BOM Maesa. Retrieved from <http://www.skp-ham.org/tentang-kami/>.

5. Retrieved from [www.skp-ham.org](http://www.skp-ham.org).
6. Statement from Palu Mayor in a Public Dialogue on the commemoration of the International Day for the Rights to Truth and the Dignity of Victims of Gross Human Rights Violation, March 24, 2012, quoted in Nurlaela Lamasitudju, *Ketika Walikota Minta Maaf kepada Korban* (When the Mayor Apologize to the Victims), date unknown, unpublished paper.
7. Rudy admitted his past in a talk show held by Satya Wacana University on 26 November 2013 (Dhave, 2013). Meanwhile, Rusdi Mastura (known as “Cudy”) shared his past during my interview with him in September 2014 in his office in Palu.
8. Haliadi, historian at Tadulako University Palu, personal communication, September 2004. See also Majowa (2015, p. 14).
9. The Law is the legal base for regional governance and decentralization in Indonesia. The Law replaced Law No. 32 of 2004, which replaced Law No. 22 of 1999 on regional governance.

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## EPILOGUE

*Jemma Purdey*

This past December, I led a group of Australian students on a study tour to Indonesia, including a week of language and cultural immersion at a university in Bandung. The coordinators of the unit took the initiative to include a guest lecture in the program for our students and other foreign visitors, as well as their own graduate students in Citizenship studies. The topic of the lecture was Indonesian history and the *Pancasila*. As mine is a breadth subject open to enrolments from across faculties, in general my students had only a tacit knowledge of Indonesian history. The lecturer delivered his rather dry account as a chronology of Indonesian “pre-colonial”, “colonial” and “post-colonial” history with a concluding discussion on *Pancasila* as national ideology. My students found this latter aspect of his lecture to be the more stimulating (the idea of a “national ideology”, particularly with religion as its starting point, as it seems a provocative one for young Australians). Personally, despite his comprehensive chronological listing of historical events complete with detail of lives lost in the colonial wars against the Dutch, what struck me was that there was no mention at all of “1965” beyond the 30 September Movement and Suharto’s triumphant suppression of it. Not of the mass killings and purges of Communists. Not even as a footnote.

“1965” represents a period in Indonesian history roughly from 1965 to 1966 when an estimated half a million people were murdered (though some authors in this volume put this figure higher, see in this volume

Melvin & Pohlman), but also extending until the late 1970s, during which the state led a sustained campaign of terror and perpetrated other crimes against humanity including unlawful detention, torture, sexual enslavement and forced labour of hundreds of thousands more. Concealed as it was for decades, perhaps I was wrong to expect more disclosure in this particular forum. Nevertheless, as someone who has observed with close interest the opening up of this history in Indonesia these past two decades (however slowly, tentatively and fraught), this stark omission from the historical narrative presented to these students was a stinging disappointment.

In our own class discussion following the lecture, I mentioned this omission to my students, who are themselves only vaguely knowledgeable of it, and we talked about historiography and the selective nature of history telling. Following the lecture, there was an open, vibrant and rather rigorous discussion with the lecturer, which included challenging questions from the local post-graduate students of his position on *Pancasila*. However, not one raised the question of this missing entry.

In the 2005 edited volume, *Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present*, Mary Zurbuchen expressed her impatience at what she saw as a slowness amongst analysts, historians and other researchers and public officials to question and find new understandings of this period in Indonesia's past: "Why is it, ... that we have seen in Indonesia since 1998 so few thorough investigations, commissions, trials, textbook overhauls, rehabilitation, or other examples of 'getting to the bottom of' any one of the host of dimly understood incidents (*peristiwa*) that so many believe have taken place?" But she then goes on to concede, "It would be unfair, of course, to expect Indonesian society to deal with a diverse legacy of wrongs quickly and neatly" (2005, pp. 13–14).

More than ten years since the release of this seminal volume in what was then the emerging field of historical memory in Indonesia on 1965, Zurbuchen's call has in large part been heeded by a growing community of researchers, including Indonesians. In the past decade a significant body of new research of the "fact-finding" and truth-seeking kind has been produced through investigations by individual researchers, journalists, activists and organizations. Douglas Kammen and Katharine McGregor's edited book *Contours of Mass Violence* (2012) based on a conference held in Singapore in 2009, was an example of such scholarship, offering, as one reviewer described it

considered responses to questions such as when did the violence erupt, which parties were involved in which regions, why the death toll in a particular area was higher than the numbers of fatalities recorded in other locations, and whether there was any connection between the central government and the cases of violence emerging in various regions. (Adam, 2012)

In the past decade, the most important of the large fact-finding investigations was that conducted by the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and presented to the government for consideration in 2012. This breakthrough report “The Findings of the National Human Rights Commission on Human Rights Violations of 1965–1966” was then the basis for further evidence gathering and legal arguments assembled for the International People’s Tribunal (IPT) 1965 held in The Hague in November 2015, although the report itself remains suppressed by the government that commissioned it.

This current volume offers significant new empirical contributions to the field of this form of history writing and research on 1965 (see in this volume Melvin, Matsuno, Pohlman, Peters, Wahid, Hearman). But importantly, it also picks up where *Beginning to Remember* left off, with deep and revelatory work focused on the meanings of representations of this history, on the testimony of survivors and their families, thereby adding to what is now a deeply-rooted and maturing field of scholarly research on the historical memory on 1965. I will mention these in more detail shortly.

As Zurbuchen also noted over a decade ago, this research endeavour is tightly and irrevocably bound to the pursuit of transitional justice. This is an element for which the editors of this volume, all historians of 1965, would make no apologies and to which their work, including this book, commendably remains committed.

### A CRITICAL MASS

In this field, the years 2012–2016 constitute something of a watershed for changing how and to whom this most contested and traumatic moment in Indonesia’s modern history was told and represented. In the lead up to the 50th anniversary of the commencement of the mass purges of Communists and their suspected sympathisers on 30

September 2015, a wave of public cultural, legal and scholarly activity emerged. This began with the extraordinary documentary feature film, *The Act of Killing*, by American filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer (2012), followed by a special edition on the killings by *Tempo* magazine (2012) drawing on its own journalists' research, culminating in the groundbreaking report from Komnas HAM mentioned earlier. This documentation on 1965 added to a growing collection of publications including scholarly work, autobiographies and testimonial from victims and perpetrators and assumed something like a critical mass, which could no longer be ignored at home or overseas. Those involved urged that this momentum be continued into the 50th anniversary year and beyond with calls for still more documentation, storytelling, investigations and testimony (Hatley, 2013).

The goal for the survivors and their supporters is ultimately for such truth-seeking to lead to transitional justice, including acknowledgement of the crimes committed followed by reconciliation. A direct example of this effort was the "Say Sorry for 1965" campaign launched by Tapol in 2013 on the occasion of its 40th anniversary. "Say Sorry" was held in conjunction with screenings of *The Act of Killing*, and included using the film's imagery on its own campaign materials to gather support for a petition asking Indonesia's president (initially SBY, but ultimately Jokowi) to "acknowledge the truth about the atrocities and apologies to victims and their families" (Tapol, 2013).

This period of hyper-activity for research and activism on 1965 coincided with a period of renewed hope and anticipation of change in Indonesia under the new, non-establishment president Joko Widodo, elected in mid-2014. Many of those involved in human rights activism, including survivors of 1965 and their supporters, had significant expectations that the new president would stand by his election pledge to examine and pursue transitional justice for past cases of human rights violations, including 1965 (Wahyuningroem, 2016).

In 2015, the anniversary year, we saw a range of public events about 1965 take place in Indonesia—film screenings, academic seminars and conferences, artistic performances and literary discussions. However, as chapters in this volume detail, this period also saw a disturbing and deflating backlash against such opening up. From early 2015, threats against groups organising these events escalated and forced their closure (Leksana, 2015). These actions appeared random and localized and were mostly carried out by radical groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front

(FPI). In some cases, such as the Ubud Writers and Readers Festival cancellations in October 2015, to justify their threats against the festival organizers, local police called on a 1966 law prohibiting the spread of Communist ideology (McGregor & Purdey, 2015a). As Kate McGregor and I have written elsewhere, in looking for explanations for this unprecedented action by the Bali police, it is instructive to consider the complicity of the police in killings, torture, detention and surveillance of suspected Communists during the purges in Bali themselves (McGregor & Purdey, 2015b)<sup>1</sup>: to look to the past for a better understanding of the present. Despite their seemingly local character, the consequence of such threats was indeed a nationwide heightening of awareness among this community of activists and survivors, and in many cases a period of reduced public activity.

### THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In this volume, Andrew Conroe observes how in contrast to the heightened tension around 1965 events in 2015–2016, in the mid-2000s in Yogyakarta at a time when this long taboo history was just starting to emerge from the shadows for public discussion and reimagining, there were no such threats. As the editors and contributors to this book highlight, today the prospect of an “official” state-sponsored re-imagining, re-telling and reconciliation of this past, acceptable to both survivors and their families, their supporters, the activist community and the government and military, remains some way off.

Indicative of the stance taken in recent years is the rejection of any possibility of a government apology. On 1 October 2015, for example, former coordinating minister of Politics, Law and Security and close confidant of the President, Luhut Panjaitan stated: “The President just said that there are no thoughts on apologizing. I have said many times: We are looking forward. Don’t ever look backward” (Lala, cited in [voa.com](http://voa.com), 1 October 2015). He repeated this position more forcefully in May 2016 in his opening statement to the government-backed conference on 1965. It was a “reality-check”, perhaps, to those optimists who had expected more and faster improvements from Jokowi’s government on human rights, including 1965. The government-backed symposium invited testimony from both “sides” of this historical debate—from the military, as well as survivors and their family members, as well as “experts”. It

was significant as the first such occasion at which the survivors could be heard so widely. The event was broadcast live on the internet.

The decision on whether or not to issue an apology for past crimes against humanity as other national governments have done, including Australia and South Africa, became a focus for the media; however, of greater concern to those involved on the survivors' side was the government's lack of control or condemnation (read as tacit approval) of increasing hostility from groups opposing the symposium, military factions and the anti-Communist *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defenders' Front). This included factions led by powerful figures, former Vice-President Try Sutrisno and current Minister for Defence, Ryamizard Ryacudu. As described here in Stephen Miller's and Evanty and Pohlman's chapters, the political role of the FPI and the anti-Communist "symposium in response" held in June 2016, reveal how alive and critical this history remains for those close to the institutions of state for whom anti-Communist and anti-Left rhetoric remains an ideological keystone. As several authors in this book detail, despite the fall of the New Order and almost 20 years of national reforms, impunity appears to be an insurmountable obstacle to the ultimate goal of truth-telling, justice and reconciliation for the survivors and their families (this volume, Evanty & Pohlman; Setiawan; Wahyuningroem). But the message one takes from this volume is far from one of defeat. In itself, this work represents some of the growing body of documentation gathered, voices represented and portrayed in films and artistic and cultural works as well as scholarship, that inevitably, as Pohlman eloquently puts it in her chapter, "brings light to those dark places" where these crimes have remained hidden since 1965.

## SECOND GENERATION SCHOLARSHIP

Zurbuchen, Vickers and Heryanto are amongst those who have debated the "impossibility" of a history of 1965 where history means achieving a "full understanding" of "what really happened" (Heryanto, 2014, p. 107). The contributors to this book, many of them young, emerging scholars, would accept this as a challenge. The studies contained here are concerned with the scholarly interrogation of the processes, to paraphrase Conroe here, of "making and contesting history about 1965" in Indonesia today. The first half of the volume opens with chapters deep in new research made possible by access to heretofore unseen archival

documents (Melvin, Wahid, Matsuno, Sawita) and new approaches to use of testimony (Pohlman, Hearman). To frame their work, these scholars, who include several young Indonesian scholars, draw on what could be called the first generation of research in this field (for example, Robinson, Dhakidae, Farid, White, Coppel, Cribb)—which was at the time and remains ground-breaking and myth-smashing history-writing on this period. This new research extends and deepens these findings, made possible through the discovery of new sources and methodologies. Melvin's serendipitous discovery of "smoking gun" documents in government archives in Aceh and Wahid's bold requests to research his own university's records are two examples demonstrating the potential that still lies hidden in archives of government and other institutions, awaiting investigation. What is more, given the enduring political and social atmosphere about 1965 in Indonesia, in many cases these researchers undertake their work with a significant level of courage; plunging into institutional archives and personnel records, recounting in lucid detail victim testimony as precious oral histories (Pohlman), potentially stirring up what remain "haunting memories" of this period for organizations, individual victims and perpetrators alike.

This *second generation* of scholarship is also evident in the section of this volume dedicated to discussion of the ways in which 1965 is remembered, embodied, socialized and, in some cases, resolved (Wahyuningroem). Within this fine and diverse collection the researchers focus on the "personal" as the site for this "history" to be acted out in various forms. There are several chapters concerned with the multi-generational nature of this history, in its telling (Conroe), remembering (Setiawan), and the continuation of its trauma (Dragojlovic, McGregor). As Setiawan describes it, this constitutes a form of post-memory, the transmission of personal memory to the children and grandchildren of survivors of 1965, but also to generations of Indonesian children born since the 1980s. Much like the powerful sequel to Oppenheimer's *Act of Killing*, the searing *Look of Silence* (2015), these chapters remind us that this past is very much "living" in the present for those children and grandchildren of ex-political prisoners or "Anak' 65".

Chapters from McGregor and Lis remind us that as the 1965 narrative transcends the "Indonesian" story. The creative expressions of the Papermoon Puppet Theatre and artist Dadang Christanto bestows on this history an appropriate and necessary universal rendering, with global themes of suffering, oppression, bearing witness and memorialization

intended for both domestic and international audiences. Indeed, chapters by Evanty and Pohlman and Wahyuningroem make very clear that the internationalisation of “1965” is increasingly critical, it would seem, for those hoping to achieve some form of transitional justice. The government’s pursuit of a plan to facilitate a process of reconciliation without first acknowledging and acceptance of the facts—“what happened”—as presented by its own Human Rights Commission in its 2012 report (let alone the IPT 1965 evidence and findings, IPT 2015; 2016) meant that by mid-2016 activists and survivors who spearheaded the IPT 1965 and continue to drive this project were resolved to the fact that its goals could not be reached through internal processes alone (McGregor & Purdey, 2016). They planned to use the results of the tribunal to petition to the United Nations Human Rights Council to consider the 1965 case.

## CONCLUSION

My history lesson in Bandung this past December was a timely reminder of the critical importance of the work being done by the contributors to this volume and those about whom they write—survivors, their supporters and children, artists, journalists, filmmakers. Over 50 years since these events occurred and almost 20 years since the fall of the regime founded on this legacy of violence and terror, recording and acknowledging the “1965 tragedy” in Indonesia’s historical narrative (in whichever version) cannot yet be counted as a given. For those survivors and their supporters, this is indeed slow progress to a national awareness and acknowledgment of this history. Several generations of Indonesians born since these events were steeped in the fears and terrorising that accompanied these horrors. The taboos and resulting silences remain and have been passed on to their children. Without open discussion and contestation the myth of anti-Communism prevails and both official and unofficial censorship continues.

This current generation of scholars and scholar-activists is continuing the work of those who embarked on such research under great duress in the New Order period, and in the early post-*Reformasi* facilitated the breaking down and opening up of this narrative. Today this work continues to face challenges, not least the denial of the importance of coming to terms with the past for forging a better future for Indonesians. Some Indonesians, including many in the government, ask, “Why open up this



painful past?” The work ahead remains but as the scholarship in this volume shows, there is also much hope, not least due to the work already done over many decades to assemble this critical mass of documentation, testimonies and narratives. As a consequence, this part of Indonesia’s history can no longer be overlooked.

Melbourne, 19 January 2017

## NOTE

1. This volume includes several chapters concerned with Bali as a major site of mass violence in 1965 and beyond. In newly accessed sources, they reveal new insights into the roles of land reform, factionalism within the military and involvement of the police force in the program of terror.

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## GLOSSARY

- Abangan*, nominal Muslim, especially in Java
- ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), former name for the Armed Forces, now called the TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*)
- AGO (Attorney General's Office)
- Aksi sepihak* (unilateral action), land reform program undertaken by the PKI and associated organizations
- anak PKI* (child of a communist), a derogatory epithet
- Ansor, youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
- Banser (*Barisan Serba Guna Ansor*, Multipurpose Ansor Brigade), a paramilitary militia formed within Ansor in the early 1960s
- BAPERKI (*Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia*, Deliberative Association for Indonesian Citizenship), an Indonesian Chinese political organization with ties to the PKI
- bersih diri, bersih lingkungan* (clean self, clean environment), refers to an anti-communist campaign commencing in the 1980s
- BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*, Indonesian Peasants' Front), peasant organization affiliated with the PKI
- bupati*, regent, head of a *kabupaten*, the major administrative division between province- and village-level governance
- Cakrabirawa*, Sukarno's Presidential Guard

- CAT (Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment)
- CGMI (*Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*, Indonesian Student Movement Centre), a leftist student movement disbanded after the 1965 coup attempt
- CHTH (*Chung Hua Tsung Hui*, Chinese Committee for the Preservation of Peace and Order)
- dalang*, mastermind, puppet master
- DEMA (*Dewan Mahasiswa*, Council of University Students), Student council
- desa*, village
- Dewan Jenderal*, Council of Generals, a group of Army generals who allegedly plotted a military coup against Sukarno
- Dewan Revolusi*, Revolution Council, a steering body set up by the coup organizers in Jakarta as a kind of governing council
- DGI (*Dewan Gereja-gereja Indonesia*, Indonesian Council of Churches)
- DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, People's Representative Council)
- Dodik (*Depo Pendidikan*, Education Depot), an Army education and training centre
- dwifungsi* (dual function), the name given to the dual military and political function of the Indonesian Armed Forces
- Dwikora* (People's Double Command), the name given by Sukarno for the involvement of civilians in *Konfrontasi* in May 1964
- ECCC (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia)
- ELSAM (*Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat*, Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy)
- FAKI (*Front Anti-Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Anti-Communist Front)
- Fifth Force, a PKI-supported "people's army" to be made up of armed labourers and peasants
- FPI (*Front Pembela Islam*, Islamic Defenders' Front)
- G30S (*Gerakan Tiga Puluh September*, Thirtieth September Movement), formal name of the movement which launched the 30 September 1965 coup, led by Colonels Untung and Latief, which kidnapped and killed six generals and one general's aide
- Ganyang Malaysia* (Destroy Malaysia), a *Konfrontasi* campaign launched by Sukarno in September 1963

- Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*, Indonesian Women's Movement), a mass-based women's organization with close links to, but not formally affiliated with, the PKI
- Gestapu*, acronym for the 30 September Movement, coined by Brigadier General Sugandhi, Director of the Armed Forces' daily newspaper, *Angkatan Bersendjata*
- GKI (*Gereja Kristen Indonesia*, Indonesian Christian Church)
- GKJW (*Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan*, East Javanese Protestant Church)
- GMNI (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indonesia*, Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement)
- Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, Functional Groups), the name of the New Order government's electoral party
- Guided Democracy, the political system proclaimed by President Sukarno in 1959
- Hanra (*Pertahanan Rakyat*, People's Defence), civilian militia under Army control
- Hansip (*Pertahanan Sipil*, Civil Defence), civilians under Army control, similar to Hanra
- HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, Islamic University Students' Association)
- HSI (*Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia*, also spelled *Himpoenan Sardjana Indonesia*, Indonesian Graduates' Association), an organization associated with the PKI
- ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)
- IMM (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah*, Muhammadiyah University Students' Association)
- Indisch*, Indonesian-Dutch; a person of Indonesian-Dutch heritage
- IPB (*Institut Pertanian Bogor*, Bogor Agricultural Institute)
- IPKI (*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, Alliance of Supporters of Indonesian Independence)
- IPPI (*Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia*, League of Indonesian Student Youth), a students' association affiliated with the PKI
- IPT65 (International People's Tribunal for 1965), a people's tribunal held in 2015
- ISRI (*Ikatan Sarjana Republik Indonesia*, Indonesian Association of University Graduates)
- kabupaten*, regency, the major territorial administrative division between province (*propinsi*) and village (*desa*) level governance

- KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*, Indonesian Students' Action Front), an anti-Communist group formed in October 1965
- kampung*, hamlet, cluster of dwellings
- KAP-Gestapu (*Komite Aksi Pengganyangan Gerakan Tigapuluh September*, Action Committee for the Destruction of the Thirtieth September Movement)
- KAPPI (*Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia*, Indonesian Student and Youth Action Front), an anti-Communist group made up of mainly university students, similar to KAMI
- KBG (*Komunis Gaya Baru*, New Style Communism)
- KBM (*Kesatuan Buruh Marhaen*, United Marhaenist Labor)
- kebaktian*, prayer meeting
- kecamatan*, territorial administrative division between *kabupaten* (regency) and *desa* (village)
- kelurahan*, formal administrative term for village (*desa*)
- ketoprak*, a theatre genre in Java involving singing accompanied by *gamelan* orchestra
- kiai/ kyai*, a Muslim religious scholar
- KKPK (*Koalisi Keadilan dan Pengungkapan Kebenaran*, Coalition for Justice and the Disclosure of Truth)
- KKR (*Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi*, Truth and Reconciliation Commission)
- KODAHAN (*Komando Daerah Pertahanan*, Joint Regional Defence Command), later called KOHANDA (Regional Defence Command) in Aceh
- KODAM (*Komando Daerah Militer*, Regional Military Command)
- KODEMA (*Komisariat Dewan Mahasiswa*, Student Council Commissariat)
- KODIM (*Komando District Militer*, District Military Command)
- KOLAGA (*Komando Mandala Siaga*, Area Alert Command)
- Komnas HAM (*Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*, National Commission on Human Rights)
- Konfrontasi* (Confrontation), the Indonesian military campaign to oppose the formation of Malaysia, 1963–1966
- KOPKAMTIB (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*, Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), the military organization with special powers created by Suharto shortly after the 1 October 1965 coup which oversaw

- much of the killings and which remained in various forms throughout the New Order
- KORAMIL (*Komando Rayon Militer*, Military Sub-district Command)
- KOREM (*Komando Resort Militer*, Sub-regional Military Command)
- KOSEKHAN (*Komando Sektor Pertahanan*, Defence Sector Command)
- KOSTRAD (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat*, Army Strategic Reserve Command), commanded by Suharto at the time of the 1965 coup
- KOTI (*Komando Operasi Tertinggi*, Supreme Operations Command)
- LEKRA (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat*, Institute of People's Culture), a cultural organization made up of writers, artists and performers associated with the PKI
- LOGIS (*Lanjutan Organisasi Gerilya Indonesia Seluruhnya*, Continuation of the All-Indonesia Guerrilla Organization), a land reform movement in the 1950s
- LP3ES (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial*, Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education and Information)
- Lubang Buaya* (Crocodile Hole), the name given to the well in which the seven victims of the 30 September Movement were thrown, and a central feature in the New Order regime's propaganda about the 30 September coup
- ludruk*, a theatre genre from East Java, often involving comedic life stories of everyday people and their struggles
- lurah*, village head
- Mahmillub (*Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa*, Extraordinary Military Tribunal), a court created to try leaders of the 30 September Movement during the New Order
- Mandala Satu* (First Mandala) Command (also *Mandala Dua*, Second Mandala Command), set up in Sumatra during *Konfrontasi*
- Manipol (*Manifesto Politik*, Political Manifesto), part of Sukarno's political rhetoric during the Guided Democracy era, also written as Manipol-USDEK
- Masyumi, a modernist Islamic political party, banned by Sukarno in 1960
- MAWI (*Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia*, Indonesian Bishops' Conference)

- MK (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*, Constitutional Court)
- MP3 (*Masyarakat Pendukung Prabowo Presiden*, Society for Supporters of Prabowo for President)
- MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, People's Consultative Assembly)
- Modin*, Islamic religious officiant
- Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad), a mass-based modernist Islamic social organization, founded in 1912
- MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, Indonesian Council of Ulama/Religious Leaders)
- NASAKOM (*Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme*, Nationalism, Religion, Communism), a political slogan created by Sukarno to try to unite various factions during the Guided Democracy era
- NEFOS (New Emerging Forces), a political slogan created by Sukarno
- NU (*Nadlatul Ulama*, Revival of the Muslim Scholars), a mass-based Islamic organization, founded in 1926
- Operasi Trisula* (Operation Trident), a military campaign to wipe out Communist bases in South Blitar, East Java, in 1968
- Opsus (*Operasi Khusus*, Special Operations), a domestic intelligence agency dominated by Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo during the early New Order period involved in creating propaganda
- Orde Baru (New Order), the name coined in 1966 for the new Army-led regime under Suharto
- Orde Lama (Old Order), the name coined in 1966 to refer to former President Sukarno's reign
- Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth), an anti-Communist youth militia group
- Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth), the youth wing of the PKI
- PETA (*Pembela Tanah Air*, Homeland Defenders)
- PETANI (*Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian National Farmers' Association), a PNI-affiliated association
- PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party)
- PMII (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Muslim Student Movement)
- PMKRI (*Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia*, The Republic of Indonesia's Catholic University Students' Union)
- PNI (*Partai Nasionalis Indonesia*, Indonesian Nationalist Party)



- PPKI (*Persatuan Politik Katolik Indonesia*, Indonesian Catholic Political Union)
- Qur'an (al-Qur'an), Islamic holy book
- RKKS (*Rukun Kampung Kota Surabaya*, Surabaya City Kampung Association)
- RPKAD (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat*, Army Para-Commando Regiment)
- santri*, student at an Islamic school, also refers to a devout Muslim, especially in Java
- SARBUPRI (*Sarekat Buruh Kehutanan Republik Indonesia*, Plantation Workers' Union of the Republic of Indonesia), affiliated with the PKI
- SEKBER 65 (*Sekretariat Bersama 65*, Joint Secretariat for Victims of 1965)
- slametan*, a ritual meal
- SKP HAM (*Solidaritas Korban Pelanggaran HAM*, Solidarity for Victims of Human Rights Violations)
- SOBSI (*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*, All-Indonesia Organization of Labor Unions), a unions' federation associated with the PKI
- Supersemar (*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*, Letter of 11 March 1966), the letter signed by Sukarno on that date granting Suharto the authority to take whatever measures he deemed necessary to restore order in the aftermath of the genocide; letter used by Suharto to usurp executive powers from Sukarno
- Taman Melati* (Melati Gardens), kindergartens set up by Gerwani in the 1950s
- Tameng*, civilian militia group involved in the killings primarily in Bali
- Tameng Marhaenis*, PNI-affiliated youth group, involved in the killings
- TAP MPRS XXV 1966 (*Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, No. XXV, tahun 1966*, People's Assembly Decree No. 25 of 1966), the ban on "all activities that spread or develop Communist/Marxist-Leninist ideas of teachings"
- tapol* (*tahanan politik*, political prisoner); also 'E/T' which stood for 'ex-tapol' was stamped on former political prisoners' identity cards after release
- TAPOL, the British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners

*teeter bone*, puppet theatre, a genre of stage theatre which involves the manipulation of large puppets (*boneka*)

UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles)

UGM (*Universitas Gadjah Mada*, Gadjah Mada University)

UI (*Universitas Indonesia*, University of Indonesia)

*ulama*, Islamic scholar

*uragam* (*urusan agama*, detainees who acted as religious guidance officers)

UUPA (*Undang-Undang Poko Agraria*, Basic Agrarian Law Act) of 1960

*wayang kulit*, shadow puppet, also a genre of theatre performance

YHB (*Yayasan Hidup Baru*, New Life Foundation)

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